NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
AN ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONS AND STRATEGIES

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the existing literature on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international politics. It synthesizes the current knowledge of the activities of these organizations, highlighting the functions they perform in the international system.

Drawing on several case studies, and a survey of the Yearbook of International Organizations, this thesis identifies the four main functions of international NGOs: the research and monitoring of state, international organization and corporate behaviour; the mobilization of public support to change popular social attitudes and values; capacity-building for local, grass-roots groups; and advocacy to pressure states, international organizations and corporations to uphold international norms. This thesis also analyses the strategies that NGOs employ to perform these four functions, and the conditions which either limit or facilitate their effectiveness.
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TO MY PARENTS

I am blessed to be your daughter
PART I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW

By all estimates, the number of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has mushroomed in recent years. According to statistics on internationally oriented organizations compiled by the Union of International Associations, the leading statistical authority on these groups, the international NGO community has grown by sixty percent between 1981 and 1996.\(^1\)

Another survey, conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 1995, found over 29,000 internationally oriented NGOs, and recent estimates suggest that this number has increased considerably since.\(^2\) Not only has the number of NGOs multiplied, but the membership of these organizations doubled in the 1990s.\(^3\)

Although the fantastic growth rate of the international non-governmental community is significant in and of itself, it is the increasing influence of NGOs in the international political arena that has attracted the attention of international relations scholars. In a discipline that has long debated the centrality of the state as a unit of analysis, the emergence of these newly influential actors has created a fruitful line of research. International NGO involvement in issue areas such as environmental protection, human rights, the status of women,

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disarmament, economic liberalization and development has become an interesting focus of scholarship, and there is a growing body of literature composed of case studies of the activities of individual NGOs.

However, the involvement of NGOs in international relations has yet to be examined systematically. The literature is mainly comprised of detailed organizational case studies, sometimes capped with token efforts to compare the behaviour of NGOs from different issue areas. This approach obscures the extent to which the interests, goals, organizational structures, strategies and functions of NGOs differ, and exaggerates the homogeneity of the NGO community. Indeed, few scholars of NGOs distinguish between the monitoring of human rights abuses, the promotion of industry interests, the delivery of health care services, the lobbying of state representatives in international fora, the demonstrations outside convention halls, and the boycotting of corporate products, lumping all these disparate activities together. Other authors produce vague "think pieces" that are long on predictions regarding the potential of NGOs to change the rhythms of international politics, but short on empirical analysis.

As Tessa Morris-Suzuki remarks snidely, "much of this literature on NGOs is written in a breathless prose uncomfortably close to advertising copy, by academics falling over each other to discover radically new forms of social existence in everything from health food cooperatives to Live Aid..."
concerts.” Hence, there is an obvious need for a thorough overview of the case study literature that will account for the diversity within the NGO community by distinguishing between different types of NGO activity and by comparing NGO activities in different sectors. We need to re-conceptualize our approach to the study of NGOs before we prematurely draw conclusions regarding their influence in international relations. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to integrate the broad range of case studies with the conceptual literature, and thus consolidate our current knowledge of the international political behaviour of NGOs. I intend to construct a comprehensive synthesis of the existing literature to serve as a foundation for future analysis of NGO activity in the international system.

With this goal in mind, I have analysed a variety of different NGO case studies with an eye to understanding the functions of NGOs within international relations, and the strategies they use to accomplish these functions. I have identified four functions which NGOs perform within the international system: the research and monitoring function, whereby NGOs generate technical knowledge, and oversee state, international organization, and corporate behaviour; the mobilization function, whereby NGOs change popular social attitudes; the capacity-building function, whereby larger NGOs foster smaller organizations at the grass-roots level; and the advocacy function, whereby NGOs pressure states, international organizations, and corporations to modify their policies. To successfully perform these four major functions, NGOs employ various strategies which I discuss in detail in the chapters that I have devoted to each function. In order to evaluate the impact of the different NGO strategies, I have drawn upon a wide array of

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secondary sources to determine under which circumstances these strategies are effective.

I have focussed on three issue areas of NGO involvement—human rights, environmental protection, and disarmament—in order to gain comparative leverage on the question of NGO influence. Not only is it important to distinguish NGOs according to the functions they perform in the international system, but it is also critical to recognize that the different strategies may not be uniformly effective across the various sectors of NGO involvement. Therefore, I have used examples of NGO activity from these three issue areas to illustrate the similarities and differences in NGO strategies. Within these three sectors, I have chosen three of the most well-known organizations to serve as recurring examples: Amnesty International in the field of human rights, Greenpeace in the field of environmental protection, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in the field of disarmament. Although these organizations are “hardly typical NGOs,” as they are larger, more recognized and influential than most NGOs, they will often be in the spotlight of this thesis for two reasons. First, as large and highly institutionalized organizations, composed of both professional, expert leaderships, and extensive mass memberships, they are capable of performing all four functions. Thus, they serve as excellent cases for comparative analysis. Second, these organizations are considered by international relations scholars to be the “cornerstones” of the international NGO community. Amnesty and Greenpeace were two of the first NGOs to attract international media coverage and to recruit

\[\text{References:}\]


members internationally in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, Amnesty’s 1 million members celebrate the organization’s 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary this year,\textsuperscript{9} and Greenpeace’s 3 million members also celebrate its 30\textsuperscript{th} this year.\textsuperscript{10} While the Nobel prize-winning ICBL is much newer, this loose network of individual NGOs has revitalized the disarmament and peace movement, which had remained largely dormant since the end of the Cold War, by demonstrating the threats posed to peace by conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{11} Due to their high profiles and international reputations, these three NGOs are the most extensively studied by international relations scholars. Therefore, I have also concentrated on these three organizations to reflect this bias in the existing literature. However, I have supplemented my discussions of the activities of Amnesty, Greenpeace and the ICBL with case studies of less well-known, but equally influential NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of Jurists in the human rights sector; the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Forest Stewardship Council, and the EarthAction Network in the environmental protection sector; and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and Parliamentarians for Global Action in the disarmament sector.

I have also attempted to provide a clearer quantitative picture of NGO involvement in international relations by surveying the 2000-2001 edition of the \textit{Yearbook of International Organizations}, the widely recognized and comprehensive record of membership of NGOs, assembled annually by the Union of International Associations. Although it was difficult to


establish clear distinctions, since most NGOs are multi-functional, I examined the detailed entries for NGOs active in three issue areas to determine their chosen strategies. With this data, I was able to classify several environmental, human rights and disarmament NGOs according to the functions that they perform in the international system. I have used this information to support the conclusions I have drawn from the qualitative case study literature regarding the effectiveness of NGO strategies.

Thus, in the first two parts of this thesis, I have attempted to create a solid foundation for further research on the influence of NGOs by synthesizing current knowledge of NGO behaviour, highlighting the strategies utilized by different organizations and their effectiveness. In my conclusion, I briefly examine what forces or conditions have led to the explosive growth of the NGO community, and extended its political influence within the international system. I also address the implications of NGO involvement for the practice of international politics. As Peter Newell points out, when compared with state authority, the influence of NGOs “is a less coercive power aimed at changing consciousness and creating mechanisms of accountability. They employ norms, moral codes and knowledge rather than law and forced compliance.”\(^\text{12}\) Therefore, the study of NGO involvement in international politics may require a re-conceptualization of the state-centric discipline of international relations. Although a complete exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, I hope that I will have laid the groundwork for further research with my overview of the existing literature. We need to understand the various

\(^\text{11}\)Ibid., 11-12.

functions and strategies of NGOs from different sectors before we can situate NGOs within the international political system.
CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF THE BEAST:
DEFINING THE TERM “NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION”

Before I proceed to classifying NGOs by function, the term ‘non-governmental organization,’ often treated as self-explanatory, must be precisely defined. However, as P. J. Simmons notes, “defining NGOs isn’t an exercise for the intellectually squeamish,”\(^\text{13}\) as the concept embraces with its vagueness a wide variety of organizations. In search of conceptual clarity, numerous authors have attempted to reformulate the terminology for these actors, leading to a glut of labels and acronyms, including “private voluntary organization” (PVO), “non-profit organization” (NPO), “civil society organization” (CVO), “non-state actor” (NSA), “transnational social movement organization” (TSMO), and “value-driven organization” (VDO). This abundance of labels has only created more confusion.\(^\text{14}\) Therefore, a clear definition of the more widely accepted term, non-governmental organization, must be established.

One of the most widely quoted definitions of the term comes from the United Nations, which is not surprising considering that the term ‘non-governmental organization’ first appears in the UN Charter, in the articles permitting these organizations to attend the sessions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to the definition used for accreditation of NGOs as observers to ECOSOC, an NGO is not only not affiliated with a government, but it is also a non-profit, non-violent organization. In addition, to be admitted to ECOSOC, an

\(^{13}\)P. J. Simmons, “Learning to Live with NGOs,” *Foreign Policy* 112 (Fall 1998): 83.

organization must also have an international orientation; that is, it cannot be a national political party or any other type of organization that focuses solely on the interests of a local population.\textsuperscript{15} The spirit of the UN specifications requires that an NGO be “private in form but public in purpose.”\textsuperscript{16} This UN definition still leaves a significant grey area, as it does not address sufficiently the two components of the term, explicating neither ‘non-governmental’ nor ‘organization.’ To elaborate on the UN’s conception of non-governmental organization, it is necessary to first discuss the second half of the term, ‘organization.’ L. M. Salamon and H. K. Anheier provide a framework of five NGO organizational traits that is useful for further clarifying the murky concept of non-governmental organization. First, NGOs have a formal institutional presence, with some semblance of “organizational permanence,” as indicated by regular meetings and active officials. Second, NGOs are privately administered groups, although they may receive state support. Third, they do not distribute profits to their membership or administrators. Fourth, NGOs are self-governing and autonomous organizations. Lastly, NGOs are premised on voluntary association, even though they need not rely on volunteer labour or donations.\textsuperscript{17} These five criteria help to further elucidate the ECOSOC definition of non-governmental organization. In regards to the first component of the term, ‘non-governmental,’ it should be noted that some organizations that qualify under the ECOSOC definition have such


\textsuperscript{17}Cited in Smilie, 34.
close ties to states that the applicability of the label ‘non-governmental’ is questionable. "The line between what constitutes governmental and non-governmental is highly permeable and very often blurred."18 Many NGOs receive substantial funding from state sources, particularly in the development sector, as Northern governmental overseas development agencies increasingly distribute resources to private organizations in the South for service delivery. Such funding need not imply a loss of NGO autonomy, but it is important to recognize that the distinction between governmental and non-governmental is not absolute.19 In addition, although international corporations and businesses are barred from participation in ECOSOC, and are not generally considered NGOs, the non-profit restriction does not exclude industrial and commercial lobby groups and representatives.20 For instance, the European Chemical Industry Council is but one of the vested interest groups listed alongside environmental protections NGOs like Greenpeace under the "Environment" heading in the Yearbook of International Organizations. In fact, the largest proportion of NGOs listed in the Yearbook are either professional associations or groups concerned with commercial or economic issues.21 Therefore, while the non-profit maxim does prevent corporations from being recognized as NGOs, it does not exclude organizations that promote vested, particularistic interests, rather than the realization of a perceived common good.


21 Boli and Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” 41.
In contrast, the groups that most authors consider to be NGOs are organizations that do not act on behalf of their membership, but for the benefit of the wider public.\textsuperscript{22} Such public interest NGOs are based on solidarity or empathy with the universal human community, and are thus "bound together more by shared values than self-interest."\textsuperscript{23} Although private interest groups outnumber public interest groups within the international NGO community, and are generally better established, with greater resources donated by their stakeholders upon which to draw, it is the public interest groups that are the focus of the international relations literature.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, vested interest NGOs, such as professional organizations, industry representatives and unions, are virtually ignored by the majority of international relations scholars.\textsuperscript{25} Although it appears as though international relations scholars have implicitly distinguished between public and vested interest groups, choosing to concentrate on the activities of the former, it is nevertheless necessary to acknowledge that vested interest NGOs also seek to influence international politics. However, in accordance with my goal of synthesis and analysis, this thesis will abide by the conventions of the international relations literature; therefore, I too will concentrate on the behaviour of public interest groups.

All public interest groups are not necessarily committed to issues that are explicitly political, and thus some are not considered by international relations scholars. The \textit{Yearbook of}

\textsuperscript{22}Winston, 30.


\textsuperscript{24}Boli and Thomas, "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture," 41-42.

\textsuperscript{25}Newell, \textit{Climate for Change}, 6.
International Organizations includes entries for athletic leagues, cultural societies, technical regulatory bodies, medical associations and religious orders, as well as listings for labour unions, political party federations, advocacy groups, and scientific organizations. For instance, the International Maize Testing Association and the International Mountaineering and Climbing Federation are listed as environmental NGOs in the Yearbook, and the Ibero-American Down Syndrome Association is considered a human rights NGO. Such groups are not politically active in the international system, as defined by interaction with states, international organizations or corporations. These apolitical groups may be contributing to the development of a sense of world culture and citizenship, as John Boli and George Thomas posit. Alternatively, they may be fostering "global social capital" of trust and reciprocity norms, as Wolfgang Reinicke and Francis Deng suggest. Drawing on Robert Putnam’s research into civil society dynamics in Italy, Reinicke and Deng propose that NGOs create a social environment that encourages actors within the international system to trust each other, and that reinforces the reciprocal nature of international arrangements. While these NGOs may indeed strengthen social connections within the international system as these authors suggest, they are not actors in international politics. Political interaction with states, international organizations and corporations is a key trait of the NGOs of interest to international relations scholars.

Thus, international relations scholars do not study the behaviour of all NGOs, but

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27 Boli and Thomas, "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture," 35-39.

28 Reinicke and Deng, 62.
concentrate on the activities of public interest groups with definite political aims. In addition, international relations scholars are most interested in the behaviour of both transnational NGOs, meaning NGOs with transnational memberships, organizational structures, linkages or alliances, and national NGOs with international foci. A large proportion of NGOs are local, grass-roots organizations, and do not concern themselves with international political issues. In particular, the activities of many NGOs based in the South, whether they be agricultural cooperatives, or environmental or human rights groups, are focussed on local development. Unless they seek to form networks with larger international NGOs, these organizations that do not seek to participate in the international system fly below the international relations radar, and are thus also excluded from the analysis of this thesis.

To summarize, I define NGOs as organizations that are not controlled by any state government, that do not espouse violence or collect commercial profits, and that are not local political parties, in accordance with the UN's definition of the term. Drawing on Salamon and Anheier's criteria, I will also consider NGOs to be organizations that are formally institutionalized, privately administered, self-governing, and voluntary. In addition, for the purposes of this thesis, the term NGO will refer to public interest groups with expressed transnational political goals. While the NGO community actually does include a variety of vested interest groups, and apolitical or national organizations, these NGOs are not of particular interest to international relations, and thus will not be the focus of my study.
Having established a working definition of the term ‘non-governmental organization,’ I can now categorize NGOs according to the functions they perform in the international system, in order to capture a clearer picture of the quantitative presence of NGOs in the international system. Recognizing that “there is a need for classification systems that can accommodate the extreme heterogeneity of the field,” several authors have proposed various different ways to categorize NGOs. However, documenting the “swiftly growing universe” of the diverse NGO community has proven to be a difficult exercise for the discipline of international relations. Public interest NGOs are active in multiple issue areas, such as the status of women, human rights, development, environmental conservation, trade equity and anti-globalization, emergency relief, and disarmament and peace. Not only are there many areas of NGO involvement, but these groups also take on many organizational forms, including clubs, foundations, think tanks, committees, conferences, extended federations, and umbrella networks of smaller NGOs. Therefore, NGOs conceivably could be classified according to either sectoral interest, or organizational type. However, most authors distinguish NGOs by the functions or roles they perform in international politics. For instance, Clair Gough and Simon Shackley identify the three functions of climate change NGOs as the formulation of “creative policy solutions,”

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29 Tvedt, 30.


31 Boli and Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” 20.
"knowledge construction" and "lobbying and campaigning." P. J. Simmons names agenda-setting, the negotiation of treaties and agreements, the conferral of legitimacy on international organizations, and regime implementation as the roles of international NGOs. Jessica Mathews considers the functions of NGOs to be idea generation, advocacy and protest, scientific and policy analysis, service provision, monitoring and implementation of regimes, and the encouragement of norm change. Drawing upon these various proposed classification systems, I have chosen to categorize the different activities of NGOs in the international system into four functions--research and monitoring, mobilization, capacity-building, and advocacy--to classify NGOs and to evaluate their impact on international politics. Before elaborating on each function in detailed individual chapters, I will briefly review the significance of these categorical titles.

The first function that NGOs perform in the international system is the gathering of information through scientific and expert research, and the monitoring of state, international organization and corporate behaviour. Research and monitoring NGOs provide the technical expertise that states and international organizations need to resolve international problems. In addition, research and monitoring NGOs oversee the compliance of states, international organizations and corporations with international regulations and regimes. Second, NGOs seek to increase public awareness of international problems and to change popular social attitudes and behaviour through the mobilization function. To generate popular support for their causes,
NGOs construct narratives that will appeal to public values, and disseminate these interpretations via the mass media. The third function that NGOs perform in the international system is capacity-building, whereby NGOs seek to extend the political and material capabilities of Southern states and other smaller, local NGOs through the provision of services, assistance and resources. Fourth, advocacy NGOs pressure states, international organizations and corporations to adopt their agendas, influence these international political actors to modify their policies, and stigmatize violators of international norms within the international community. I use these four functional categories to examine the various strategies of NGOs, and evaluate their effectiveness. I also applied these categories to a study of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* in order to estimate the proportion of NGOs performing the four functions in the international system.

Very few international relations scholars have attempted to assess or measure quantitatively the size or characteristics of the international NGO community. Two of the few surveys of the broader NGO community, one conducted by John Boli and George Thomas, and the other by Jackie Smith, categorized NGOs by issue area, not according to the functions they perform in the international system. To help fill this gap in the political science literature on international NGOs, I have followed the methodology of both of these studies. Both Boli and Thomas and Smith scrutinized the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, the comprehensive source of data on international NGOs, and I have done the same, compiling information on the

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36 Boli and Thomas analysed the entries for nearly 6 000 organizations with international membership or structure from 1875 to 1988 to measure the evolution of a world polity, via patterns and density of social organization. Smith reviewed the 1974, 1984 and 1994 editions to determine changes in the participation of
functions of NGOs from three issue sectors, human rights, environmental conservation, and disarmament. The *Yearbook* is a vital resource for the study of international NGOs because it supplies the results of the Organization of International Associations (OIA) census of NGOs. By contacting different groups, sending questionnaires, asking for colleague referrals, and monitoring UN records and media coverage for NGO activity, the OIA gathers information on the history, goals, membership, alliances, linkages, activities and structure of over 20,000 NGOs. Moreover, the *Yearbook* captures the dynamism of the NGO community, as it keeps records of both defunct organizations and actively seeks out new groups. First the League of Nations, and then the UN, have unofficially entrusted the OIA with the task of compiling information on the international NGO community.\(^{37}\)

For this study, I surveyed the 2000-2001 edition of the *Yearbook*, noting all NGOs in the three issue areas that were not designated as either commercial entities, national subsidiaries of larger international organizations, intergovernmental bodies\(^ {38}\) or inactive. While in their study, Boli and Thomas examined only NGOs designated in the *Yearbook* as having international membership or structure,\(^ {39}\) I was unable to make a similar distinction because the OIA has changed its coding system since their study, and it no longer distinguishes between NGOs with international participation and an international “orientation.”\(^ {40}\) I encountered other problems

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\(^{37}\) Boli and Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” 21.

\(^{38}\) The OIA includes entries for intergovernmental organizations, including the UN and its organs.

\(^{39}\) Boli and Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” 20.

\(^{40}\) John Boli, Thomas A. Loya and Teresa Loftin, “National Participation in World-Polity Organization,” in *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875*, edited by John Boli and
determining the sectors to which NGOs belonged, as the Yearbook's vague category headings were of little help. It was difficult to wade through the myriad organizations without clear categories, as the Yearbook lists innumerable NGOs without any express political orientation, including religious orders, athletic associations and esoteric hobby groups, which are lumped together under ambiguous headings. For instance, the category “Life” included both the International Association for Near-Death Studies and Ornamental Fish International, as well as several human rights monitoring groups. In addition, some categories overlapped, with organizations appearing under several category headings. To account for the ambiguity of the category headings, and for these overlaps, I examined numerous categories for each sector. I considered NGOs that were listed in the index volume of the Yearbook under the headings “Human Rights Organizations,” and “Innovative Change / Rights” as falling in the human rights sector. Environmental NGOs were those listed under “Agriculture, Fisheries / Fisheries,” “Agriculture, Fisheries / Forestry,” “Agriculture, Fisheries / Whaling,” “Climatology / Arctic Zones,” “Climatology / Arid Zones,” “Climatology / Tropical Zones,” “Conservation,” “Earth,” “Environment,” and “Geography / Ecology.” I considered disarmament NGOs to be those classified as “Defence / Arms,” “Innovative Change / Peace,” and “International Relations / Disarmament.” I also scanned those NGOs listed under the broader headings of “Activism,” “International Relations / Planetary Initiatives,” “Policy-making / Future,” and “Policy-making /
Policy” for groups with a pertinent focus.

From these listings in the index, I turned to the entries in the substantive volumes, for particulars on the functions performed by the listed NGOs. As the functions and strategies of an organization are not always obvious from its name, I ignored those entries without a detailed summary of NGO activities or goals—roughly half of all relevant entries. Hence, I collected information on the functions of 131 environmental NGOs, 69 human rights NGOs and 43 disarmament NGOs. Two NGOs, Greenpeace and the EarthAction Network, were counted twice, as these two organizations are interested in both disarmament and the environment. From this data, I was able to assign NGOs to the four functional categories, and thus gain more information on the preferred strategies of NGOs from different issue areas. Since many NGOs perform multiple functions, I noted all the different functions each NGO performs, rather than creating exclusive categories. In the following chapters, I integrate the findings of my study with examples from the case study literature to elaborate on the functions and strategies of NGOs.\(^{41}\)

\(^{41}\)For the raw results of my study of the *Yearbook*, refer to the appendices.
PART II
THE FOUR FUNCTIONS OF NGOs
CHAPTER 1
THE RESEARCH AND MONITORING FUNCTION

The first function that NGOs perform in the international system is the collection of information and the generation of new knowledge, through professional research, and the monitoring of state and corporate behaviour. Research and monitoring NGOs seek to gain influence by becoming the leading authorities in their specific areas of interest and activity. These organizations are staffed by experts who are part of what Peter Haas has called an "epistemic community" of politically engaged scholars and professionals.42 Such NGOs rely on the expertise and reputation of their staff and membership to establish themselves as reliable sources of the detailed, technical information and data needed by states and international organizations for the construction of policies and regimes. Some research and monitoring NGOs are "think tanks" or research institutes, whose reputation is based on their distance from political activism, and their close relationship with academic institutions and practices. Their legitimacy, and thus their influence within the international system, comes from their research competence, rather than their popular membership, as these groups are organizations of elite scholars and professionals, rather than mobilized citizens. Therefore, these NGOs seek to avoid overt lobbying for political solutions, preferring instead to function as the knowledge backbone of the

international community. Many of these NGOs attempt to maximize their independence from state and corporate interference in order to maintain their status as either purveyors of objective analysis, or impartial observers who can hold states, international organizations and corporations accountable.

Since states and international organizations will only turn to NGOs that are recognized as legitimate and knowledgeable, the first main strategy of research and monitoring NGOs is to cultivate a reputation for impartiality and professionalism. While think tanks and research institutes constitute the majority of research and monitoring NGOs, politically activist groups have also sought to promote themselves as reliable sources of scientific and technical information, often explicitly separating their research activities from their advocacy or mobilization work. For instance, Greenpeace and the Climate Action Network, two overtly political NGOs, were able to join the epistemic community regarding climate change by providing impeccable scientific research, offering up technical solutions and abiding by the apolitical discourse of the scientific community. Thus, scientific expertise grants these NGOs respect and status in arenas where their political message would otherwise be ignored. Similarly, the reports of Amnesty International are renowned for their thoroughness and accuracy, although Amnesty is also the preeminent popular mobilization organization in the field of human rights. Moreover, Amnesty's stated mission to investigate human rights abuses in every country, even in

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44 Gough and Shackley, 339.
large Western democracies, has cemented its credibility as an unbiased human rights monitor.\textsuperscript{45} In order to influence the policies and regimes of states and international organizations by becoming valued sources of information, NGOs must provide objective, reliable, and accurate research and monitoring.

Once an NGO has established its reputation, it can pursue the three other main strategies that constitute the research and monitoring function: NGOs provide technical research and data for international regimes, supply assistance to unprepared government delegations, and monitor both state compliance with international treaties and corporate behaviour. The first of these strategies is the provision of information that would otherwise be unavailable to states and international organizations. Indeed, the information and knowledge generated by research and monitoring NGOs has become indispensable for many international organizations, particularly for the low level working groups where the technical aspects of international agreements are decided upon.\textsuperscript{46} These NGOs offer the expert advice and the legal or scientific data that facilitates the formulation of definitions and standards, and the drafting of international agreements.\textsuperscript{47}

For instance, in the field of human rights, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), composed of 44 elected jurists from various legal backgrounds, is respected for its knowledge of


the intricacies of human rights law. Both the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and individual states turn to the ICJ for information on legal issues, and adopt human rights standards proposed by the ICJ. For instance, the ICJ has been the leading information source for the international community on the codification and implementation of economic and social rights, and the institution of the International Criminal Court.48 In the field of disarmament, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a group of scientists dedicated to the abolition of nuclear weapons, performs a similar role. This organization of academics helps the international disarmament regime to operate by providing an objective source of information regarding the scientific clarifications needed to implement the verification procedures for biological and nuclear weapons agreements. Without the specialized knowledge of these physicists to supplement the legal expertise of international treaty negotiators, each “unanticipated technical development...[could] open up a legal slalom course through treaty restrictions.”49 Thus, the ICJ and Pugwash have parlayed the specific knowledge of their legal experts and scientists into an important position in the international system as sources of the research and technical information that is critical for the implementation of the international human rights and disarmament regimes.

Not only do NGOs supply international organizations with the expertise they need to formulate and implement regimes, but they also render technical information accessible to states


by publishing reports and newsletters, and hosting conferences and colloquia. Often, state representatives are not well-versed in the scientific or legal jargon that pervades international agreements, and are thus unable to make informed decisions about policy. If this is the case, research and monitoring NGOs that can provide states with coherent analyses are able to increase their influence; therefore, the informing of state delegations is the second main strategy of research and monitoring NGOs. For instance, in the environmental sector, Greenpeace was able to draw the attention of Southern governments to loopholes in the draft of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Export of Hazardous Waste by publishing and widely distributing its *Toxic Trade Update*, which specifically listed what companies from which countries were exporting hazardous where and when.\(^5\) This type of technical data would have otherwise been unavailable to government officials who would never have devoted state resources to conducting such an intensive investigation. As Kal Raustiala notes, with the assistance of NGOs such as Greenpeace, "states can maximize policy information and research while minimizing expenditures."\(^51\) Armed with Greenpeace's compilation of data, many Southern states allied to push for more stringent restrictions on the exporting of hazardous wastes.\(^52\) Hence, Greenpeace was able to influence the negotiations to achieve its objectives by plying states with extensively researched information. In fact, smaller, Southern states have come to rely on NGOs for technical research, and even policy analysis. For example, a group of small, island states that

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could be severely affected by rising sea levels devises its positions for any international negotiations on climate change with the assistance of Greenpeace.\textsuperscript{53} Some “microstates,” such as St. Lucia and Nauru, have gone so far as to include NGO experts in their national delegations, “effectively ceding their representation to NGOs.”\textsuperscript{54} Evidently, the technical expertise of research and monitoring NGOs is in high demand in the international system, both from international organizations and states.

NGOs also act as autonomous monitors in the international system, drawing attention to problems, and reporting on the behaviour of states, corporations and regimes. In a sense, the third strategy of research and monitoring NGOs is to act as the international community’s “fire alarms,” noting violations of regimes, conventions and international law.\textsuperscript{55} In some cases, international organizations without effective enforcement mechanisms have become reliant on NGOs to provide the information necessary to enforce regimes, especially regarding compliance with environmental regulations and protocols for the respect of human rights. Since most international agreements are based on national self-reporting, evidence of compliance tends to be incomplete, either because states are reluctant to divulge information, or because they do not have the resources to devote to adequate reporting.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, international organizations do not have the resources to monitor all state commitments either.

For example, the UNCHR is highly dependent on the research and monitoring of NGOs.

\textsuperscript{53} Newell, \textit{Climate for Change}, 143.

\textsuperscript{54} Spiro, 50.

\textsuperscript{55} Raustiala, 729.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 728.
As William Korey explains in his history of the involvement of human rights NGOs in the UN system, “without NGOs, the entire human rights implementation system at the UN would come to a halt.”\textsuperscript{57} Significantly underfunded, the UNCHR lacks the resources to effectively investigate as many human rights violations as NGOs do. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch dispatch experts to attend trials, advise detainees, and gather evidence and witness statements—activities that the UNCHR is ill-equipped to perform independently.\textsuperscript{58} In fact, the professional and volunteer staff of 320 people at Amnesty’s London headquarters alone outnumbers the entire staff of the UN’s Human Rights Centre in Geneva.\textsuperscript{59} As a result, the UNCHR’s rapporteurs rely on these organizations for the reports and documentation that they need to confront violator states. Several NGOs in the environmental sector also pursue the monitoring strategy. One such organization is Greenpeace: although it actively monitors state commitments in a wide-range of environmental issue areas, publishing in-depth reports comparing governmental pledges and policies, it is most well-known for its regular inspections of the whaling operations of states party to the International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on commercial whaling. Since the Commission does not have the resources to appoint monitors, whaling states are left responsible for reporting their catches, “and this practice leaves a lot to faith, and makes the vigilance of groups like Greenpeace significant.”\textsuperscript{60} Thus, the monitoring efforts of NGOs such as Amnesty

\textsuperscript{57}Korey, 9.

\textsuperscript{58}David P. Forsythe, \textit{Human Rights in International Relations} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 172.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., 166.

\textsuperscript{60}Peter J. Stoett, \textit{The International Politics of Whaling} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 123-124.
and Greenpeace help to ensure state compliance with international regimes that would otherwise go largely unenforced.

While NGOs are integral to the functioning of international organizations and regimes, they also attempt to independently monitor the activities of multinational corporations, which are for the most part unregulated by any formal international regime. Individual states have traditionally been responsible for monitoring the corporate enterprises of their nationals, but governments have become both unwilling and unable to maintain their restrictions on corporate activity. NGOs have stepped into this regulatory vacuum, assuming the state’s role of holding multinational corporations accountable for their business practices. Indeed, it appears as though NGOs, as private organizations, are more capable of regulating the behaviour of private actors such as multinational corporations than states that are reluctant to enforce even nominal environmental and labour legislation.\(^6^1\) For instance, a coalition of environmental NGOs including Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network, and the World Wide Fund for Nature have cooperated to form a “private regime,” the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which serves as a regulatory board for forestry industry certification bodies.\(^6^2\) In order to encourage forestry corporations to comply with a code for sustainable harvesting, the organizations involved with the FSC organized boycotts of lumber retailers, rather than the logging companies, because consumers identify the stores where they buy their do-it-yourself supplies, not the faceless corporations whose practices lead to deforestation. As one Dutch activist observed, “Nobody knows Wijma [the timber importer and original target for direct

\(^{61}\) Newell, “Environmental NGOs and Globalization,” 117-123.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 126.
action]. If you buy timber you don't know it comes from Wijma so it's of no use to them to have an environmentally friendly image." Instead, by convincing retailers to only stock lumber with the FSC seal of approval, the NGO coalition has forced many logging corporations to abide by its code of conduct in order to maintain their share of the wholesale market. Thus, the FSC has essentially replaced state regulation of forestry practices with its certification guidelines, which it enforces by mobilizing consumer protest.

Human rights NGOs have also become involved in the regulation of corporate behaviour. In particular, NGOs have investigated and exposed the labour practices of multinationals whose headquarters and consumer base are located in the North, but whose questionable operations are concentrated in the South. For instance, Save the Children rallied a coalition of human rights NGOs, athletic associations and local labour groups to pressure large sporting goods corporations such as Nike, Reebok, Umbro, Lotto and Mitre to refuse to buy soccer balls from South Asian subcontractors suspected of using child labour. These multinationals joined with the NGOs to form the World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry, a body to oversee a workshop inspection program, and social development and education initiatives. In another case, human rights organizations have formed a network with garment manufacturers, the Apparel Industry Partnership, to set standards for labour practices in a sector infamous for its disregard for state labour regulations. It appears as though certain multinationals are beginning to recognize their

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63 David F. Murphy and Jem Bendell, In the Company of Partners: Business, environmental groups and sustainable development post-Rio (Bristol: Policy Press, 1997), 130.

64 Ibid., 187.

65 Reinicke and Deng, 40-44.
responsibilities for both the violation of human rights and the destruction of the environment due to active monitoring by NGOs. Indeed, the monitoring efforts of NGOs may have a greater impact on the behaviour of multinational corporations than the enforcement of feeble state legislation.\textsuperscript{66}

These four main research and monitoring strategies—the cultivation of a reputation for impartiality and expertise, the provision of necessary data to regimes, the clarification of technical research for unprepared state representatives, and the monitoring of state and corporate behaviour—are effective, provided that the supply of NGO expertise meets the demand of states and international organizations for information. If NGOs are denied access to information, they will be unable to conduct research or monitoring successfully. Although states and international organizations are rarely eager to supply prying NGOs with the information they covet, in certain sectors, it is especially difficult for NGOs to gather data. For instance, information on state compliance with disarmament agreements is highly sensitive for security reasons, unlike data on environmental and human rights agreement compliance; therefore, disarmament information is jealously guarded by states and disclosed only when required. The compliance measures of international disarmament treaties, such as the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, are predicated on national self-reporting. If violations are suspected, the states party to the treaties can dispatch an official inspection team.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66}Forsythe, 210.

Hence, disarmament NGOs are often excluded from the monitoring process. Instead, NGOs such as Pugwash and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines compile the information supplied by states and disseminate it to a wider audience, rather than performing independent research.

International organizations can also be highly secretive, preventing NGOs from effectively monitoring their programs. The World Bank is particularly notorious for its reluctance to allow NGOs access to its records, even though two different internal review processes recommended that technical project details be made publicly available.\(^\text{69}\) The Bank has since increased its openness, but environmental NGOs seeking to peruse internal environmental impact assessments, for instance, have only been granted sanitized documents. Moreover, the Bank’s new freedom of information policy is not retroactive, so NGOs are still barred from investigating projects initiated before 1993.\(^\text{70}\) The World Trade Organization also refuses NGOs access to many of its documents, insisting on maintaining strict security measures.\(^\text{71}\) Even the UN, with its extensive liaisons with the NGO community,\(^\text{72}\) makes its CD-ROM based "Official..."

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\(^\text{72}\) Eighty-six individual UN offices have NGO liaisons, and the UN has a well-established NGO office to...
Documentation Service available only to those organizations that can afford to pay a substantial subscription fee.\textsuperscript{73} Without access to the official documents of states and international organizations that are vital sources of technical information, NGOs cannot successfully employ research and monitoring strategies.

However, even if NGOs can readily supply research, and compliance can be easily monitored, these strategies will only be effective if there is demand for their information. NGOs are most influential when states and international organizations have few other sources of information, or are ill-equipped to perform their own research or monitoring,\textsuperscript{74} as demonstrated by the UNCHR’s dependence on NGO reports, and the reliance of island states on NGOs for environmental policy. When states or international organizations have the capacity to complete their own research or monitoring, NGOs are less influential. For instance, over the last decade, the United States State Department has established a human rights reporting network to rival Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, and thus is usually already aware of any abuses these organizations report. As a result, Human Rights Watch has changed its research and monitoring strategies, and now provides American officials with detailed policy options instead of raw data. Hence, Human Rights Watch has been able to maintain its influence by catering to the “market” for monitoring and research.\textsuperscript{75} Evidently, the impact of research and monitoring coordinate these relations. See Alger, “Citizens and the UN,” 51.


\textsuperscript{74} Newell, Climate for Change, 133.

\textsuperscript{75} Winston, 37.
NGOs in international relations "seems to depend on two factors: the needs of government and the capabilities of NGOs."\(^\text{76}\)

While the case study literature provides numerous examples of NGOs performing research and monitoring, and describes the impact of NGO information on the policies of states and international organizations, it does not make comparisons across issue areas. Before compiling the data from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, I hypothesized that the environmental and human rights sectors would be two areas where the research and monitoring function would be especially important because of the technical, scientific or legal aspects of these issues. Therefore, it came as no surprise that 64 percent of environmental NGOs and 71 percent of human rights NGOs list research and monitoring as part of their functions in the *Yearbook*. Research and monitoring are thus popular strategies in the environmental and human rights NGO communities. In fact, each region of the world has at least one network of human rights monitors observing and recording violations, and an association of legal professionals drafting judicial standards, ranging from the Arab Human Rights Documentation and Information Network, to the Commission for the Defence of Human Rights in Central America. Likewise, each region and each specific environmental conservation problem has an organization dedicated to research and monitoring, whether it be the European Ice Sheet Modelling Initiative or the Association for Environmentally Friendly Carpets. Interestingly, only 37 percent of disarmament NGOs counted research and monitoring among their activities. This supports the assertion that research and monitoring strategies are only effective when data is relatively easy to gather. As aforementioned, NGOs such as Pugwash and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines do

\(^{76}\)Simmons, 92.
not conduct independent monitoring, because disarmament compliance information is so highly
guarded by states fearful for their national security. Thus, the findings of my survey of the
*Yearbook* are consistent with the analysis found in the case study literature regarding the research
and monitoring function, and the effectiveness of research and monitoring strategies.
CHAPTER 2

THE MOBILIZATION FUNCTION

States, international organizations, and multinational corporations are not the only loci of NGO interest: through the mobilization function, NGOs attempt to reach a broader audience, extending their message beyond governmental and business elites to a more general public.\(^{77}\) Mobilization NGOs appeal to individuals and communities, in order to change popular social attitudes and behaviour, and thus influence political decision-making. These organizations seek to change popular perceptions of international problems, mould public opinion, and attract supporters. This popular mobilization is an integral part of the political activity of NGOs, as these organizations are able to draw upon public support to pressure corporations, states, and international organizations to change their policies. The focus of this chapter is the strategies employed by NGOs to generate sympathy for their causes from individual citizens, as the influence of NGOs cannot be measured solely in terms of how they affect state behaviour.\(^{78}\) By informing and mobilizing individual citizens, NGOs are able to change conventional perceptions and activate popular protest, influencing the behaviour of political actors at the international level. The main strategy of mobilization NGOs is “framing,” whereby these organizations shape the popular interpretation of international problems, by either simplifying highly technical information to make it more accessible to a wider audience, or by constructing a narrative that is emotionally appealing. In order to disseminate their message, and attract the attention of the

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wider public, mobilization NGOs utilize the international mass media—primarily television, but increasingly the Internet as well. As Peter Newell notes, the mass media contribute to “the social learning that often precedes political action.”79 Hence, the success of the mobilization strategies is highly dependent on the ability of NGOs to manipulate these media as tools for the dissemination, and interpretation, of information.

The key to the mobilization process is “framing,” whereby NGOs reshape popular perception of an issue by highlighting selected elements of the problem. As Kenneth Rutherford explains, “people will think about an issue in a particular way depending on how that issue is presented.”80 In essence, NGOs disseminate information in such a way that a concern is emphasized, spurring changes in public perception of that issue. Often, this process involves redefining behaviour that has been conventionally considered appropriate or normal as illegitimate or problematic. Thus, NGOs seek to “set the boundaries of what is considered acceptable behaviour.”81 Once previously accepted behaviour has become stigmatized, NGOs can generate public opposition to the status quo, and advocate suitable solutions. A clear dichotomy is created between the right and wrong responses to the problem, and equivocation is not included amongst the possible options.82 Hence, NGOs act as “transnational moral

79Newell, Climate for Change, 72.


entrepreneurs," introducing new conceptions of global problems and advocating appropriate solutions to a wider public audience. In the process of framing, the dissemination of information is no longer the objective provision of collected data and research, but the exploitation of information to draw attention to a problem, advance an agenda, and advocate a political position. The NGO provides information with an unmistakable interpretation that is meant to convert the audience to the organization's point of view. Thus, NGOs actively inform and mobilize the public, "bearing witness" to unacceptable behaviour in order to change opinions and perceptions.

While the primary goal of these NGOs is popular attitudinal and value change, the term 'mobilization' also implies the organization of political protest. Once individuals have been convinced of the organization's interpretation, they can be mobilized to sign petitions, write letters to politicians and newspaper editors, boycott products, speak out at shareholder meetings, donate money, volunteer their time and labour, attend rallies, and change their personal behaviour. Without these types of active popular support, NGOs would not be able to pressure states, international organizations and corporations. Once mobilization NGOs have demonstrated to the public that the actions of an international political actor violates norms of acceptable international behaviour, the offender will face the scrutiny of an informed public. Mobilization organizations thus employ "norms of cosmopolitan publicity," threatening states, international

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85 James Bohman, "International regimes and democratic governance: Political equality and influence in
organizations, and corporations that violate international norms with prolonged public outcry. Not only can mobilization NGOs potentially expose international organizations, states and corporations to unfavourable publicity, and thus hold them accountable for their decision-making, but they can also muster a dedicated constituency of supporters who will react negatively to inaction. Although this support may not be concentrated or significant enough to influence the outcome of a national election, or to perpetrate an extensive boycott of a corporate product, international organizations, states and corporations often dread the possibility of demonstrations, and showdowns with protesters. Therefore, violators will accommodate NGOs because they hope to avoid the additional negative publicity entailed by any confrontation. These actors fear the negative publicity generated by exposure, but they fear more the cycle of criticism that would be instigated by a public conflict with demonstrators. Although mobilization NGOs may attempt to encourage international organizations, states and corporations to undergo “a genuine change of heart,” their pressure is effective because they cause these actors to “change [their] calculation regarding what will look good to the public.”

Thus, mobilization NGOs utilize popular perception of acceptable and appropriate political behaviour to shame international organizations, states and corporations into modifying their policies.

Environmental protection is an excellent example of an issue that was largely neglected by the international community until NGOs drew attention to it, since it required an understanding of complex scientific arguments. NGOs have succeeded in publicizing the

global institutions,” *International Affairs* 75 (Fall 1999): 506.

86 Florini and Simmons, 11.

87 Newell, *Climate for Change*, 130.
destruction of our natural environment by simplifying the technical information, forcing popular recognition of environmental problems. Indeed, informing and mobilizing by NGOs has been key to increasing popular appreciation of the gravity of human impact on the environment. Although environmental issues received attention as early as the late nineteenth century with the emergence of wildlife conservation NGOs in Europe and North America, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that concern for the environment was popularized by NGOs such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. This second generation of environmental NGOs emphasized the destruction wreaked by humanity on natural systems, and insisted on the necessity of political responses. Pollution, climate change, species extinction, deforestation and resource depletion were no longer only considered the inevitable results of economic growth and development, but also significant problems that require political action. As Karen Litfin notes, “environmental problems are not just physical occurrences; they are informational phenomena which are socially constructed through multiple struggles among contested knowledge claims.”

In order to build credibility and motivate public support, NGOs have taken complicated scientific information and made it accessible to wider audiences, mobilizing public concern for pressing environmental concerns.

The need for environmental protection is pressing on many different fronts; hence, there is a wide variety of NGOs with different areas of specialization. Part of the appeal of these

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89 Murphy and Bendell, 45-56.

various groups is that they reduce a broad issue into smaller, manageable problems through their framing devices, creating a less complicated discourse for the public. By concentrating on simpler issues and clearer processes rather than the more ambiguous and complex problem of "the environment," these organizations are able to mobilize public support for their causes. For instance, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) relates broader issues such as climate change and deforestation to the effects these processes will have on animals. Climate change in particular is a difficult issue for which to mobilize public support, as the scientific explanations of the warming process are abstract and disputed, the predicted impacts are as yet far in the future, and there are no clear or easy solutions.\footnote{Gough and Shackley, 330.} The WWF is able to mobilize public support by relating these indeterminate processes to the tangible impacts they will have on the natural habitats of specific living things, including the diverse life of the tropical rainforests.\footnote{Ibid., 335.} Hence, the WWF renders the complex problems of climate change and deforestation, and their global effects, more understandable to the public by relating the larger issues to the loss of individual, well-known species such as the orangutang or the giant panda.

In the field of disarmament, Greenpeace has also utilized this framing strategy, distilling the complicated political rationales for the use of nuclear weapons to a simpler and more accessible discourse. By framing the issue of nuclear disarmament as a question of environmental danger, instead of criticizing the military logic of nuclear weapons, Greenpeace was able to draw support for its concerns even though disarmament remains a highly sensitive political issue. Greenpeace's very first demonstrative action was the 1971 dispatch of a leaky
fishing boat to interrupt the testing of nuclear submarines by the United States navy in Canadian waters, an operation that brought the issue of nuclear disarmament home to the public in both Canada and the United States. Greenpeace was able to force the public to consider the potential environmental and human damage if the testing went awry. From this initial success, Greenpeace's activists also learned the value of presenting their message in a format that would appeal to the wider public.\textsuperscript{93} Greenpeace has repeatedly employed this technique of using a visually-striking protest to attract media attention to a simple message, often portraying itself as the activist David facing off with the Goliath nuclear powers. Confrontations between Greenpeace's fleet of small, private boats with the huge navies of the world's nuclear powers have become its trademark tactic for creating awareness of nuclear disarmament issues. For example, Greenpeace's numerous showdowns with the French navy captured the world's attention. When the French announced their decision to break the tacit ban on nuclear testing in 1995, just before the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the presence of Greenpeace ships at the South Pacific testing sites grabbed media headlines. Having been exposed to Greenpeace's anti-testing information, people around the world were inspired to boycott French products, most notably French wine, without any explicit prompting from Greenpeace. This incident suggests that Greenpeace has succeeded in mobilizing popular opinion against nuclear testing to such a degree that the public was conditioned to respond spontaneously to the French actions.\textsuperscript{94} Greenpeace has proven itself capable of generating

\textsuperscript{93} Dale, 19.

support for the cause of nuclear disarmament by framing the use of nuclear weapons as an unacceptable environmental peril as opposed to a question of politics or security. Moreover, it has cast itself as a small organization courageous enough to confront the world’s military powers and hold them accountable. Both the WWF’s campaign for environmental protection, and Greenpeace’s demonstrations against nuclear weapons, are just two examples of the variety of frames constructed by mobilization NGOs to build public awareness of environmental and disarmament issues and generate political support.

In another mobilization strategy, NGOs also construct an emotive discourse in order to appeal to the public for support. Some organizations, in the environmental sector in particular, create constituencies for their causes by relating global issues to more proximate local problems, as they have found that individuals are more likely to respond to recognizable and manifest environmental problems. For instance, the EarthAction Network coordinates information flows and communication between smaller, communal NGOs in order to locate localized environmental concerns within the bigger picture of global environmental protection. Thus, the EarthAction Network is able to demonstrate the relationship between the logging of Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia, and the deforestation of the Amazonian rainforest by bringing NGOs from both regions into contact. This relationship suggests to the citizens of wealthier, Northern countries that environmental destruction is not solely committed in distant, poorer states, and highlights that all environmental problems are global. By relating distant problems to the local


96 Jackie Smith, “Building Political Will after UNCED: EarthAction International,” in Transnational Social
context, mobilization NGOs formulate an emotional appeal that will resonate with potential supporters.

In the human rights sector, Amnesty International has been particularly successful at generating public support for its causes with its effective framing and mobilizing techniques. Amnesty's strategy of encouraging individuals to take up the cause of specific prisoners of conscience has proven to be an effective technique for generating public interest in human rights, as it creates a personal connection between members and prisoners, mobilizing public interest in otherwise distant problems. Indeed, each prisoner comes to represent the problems of her entire country, as the campaigns to free individual prisoners draw attention to all human rights abuses occurring within a violator state. For instance, Aung San Suu Kyi has become symbolic of the Burmese people's suffering under their brutal authoritarian regime.97 Moreover, the "Work on Own Country Rule," which obliges members to write letters on behalf of prisoners only to officials who are not part of their own national governments, not only protects members themselves from persecution, it also makes the protests more effective, as it channels external pressure on offending states. Significantly, this strategy has also allowed Amnesty to create "a new class of global citizens," as it fosters a sense of international solidarity that is highly attractive to new members.98 Amnesty International has become the international human rights NGO with the largest membership because it has succeeded in framing human rights violations as


97Winston, 39.

98Ibid., 31-32.
the personal concern of individuals, not the exclusive domain of states. Amnesty can effectively mobilize public support because it has encouraged ordinary people to become involved and informed about human rights by creating personal solidarity across long distances.

Another framing technique used by mobilization NGOs is to emphasize the human cost of an international problem, as unnecessary human suffering resonates across cultures, allowing NGOs to generate widespread empathy. In the field of disarmament, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) succeeded in mobilizing the public support that was vital for persuading state officials of the need for the land-mine ban by highlighting the toll that landmines exact on innocent civilians. The mobilization function was key to the anti-land mine campaign. The coalition’s strategy was to create a barrage of emotive images which would arouse such strong domestic public opposition to mines that states could no longer deny that the military usefulness of land mines outweighed the costs in terms of human dignity. For instance, the coalition stacked the unused shoes of amputees who had lost legs to land mines outside conference halls as a poignant reminder to the public of the human toll of the weapons. Thus, the ICBL was able to frame the issue in humanitarian terms, rather than as a question of arms control.99 By repeating the horrifying, if sometimes inflated, statistics and flashing pictures of mangled amputees, the ICBL sought to persuade citizens that any state that refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty would be morally unconscionable.100 When the states gathered in Ottawa in 1998 to sign the treaty, it was in large part due to the success of the ICBL in generating public support


100 Rutherford, 89.
and citizen pressure through its coordinated mobilization campaign.

However, the simplicity required for successful framing sometimes prevents NGOs from mobilizing support for more complex issues. Not all issues have uncomplicated narratives with identifiable victims or villains or the local connections needed for an emotional appeal; or the demonstrable and evident impacts, easily understood scientific reasoning or practical solutions that allow NGOs to simplify the technical details. For instance, in the environmental sector, it has been tempting for NGOs to go along with the popular perception that freak weather occurrences are evidence of global warming, although there is no proven scientific link between climate change and current weather patterns. Even with issues which are less scientifically complex than climate change, and thus more accessible, such as the protection of wildlife, it can be difficult to balance the value of mobilizing support with the importance of accuracy. For instance, the WWF has encountered problems with its animal-centred mobilizing strategy. If anything, it appears as though it is easier to mobilize public support for the conservation of animal life, than it is to generate sympathy for humans affected by environmental problems, as the WWF learned with its campaign against the illegal ivory trade. The WWF’s campaign emphasized that ivory harvested by park wardens during annual and necessary herd culls not only did not violate the goal of maintaining a healthy elephant population, but it also provided local communities with a valuable resource. However, the WWF lost support to groups which advocated an outright ban on all ivory because they were able to make a more effective appeal to the public, presenting a clear dichotomy of helpless elephants falling victim to evil poachers. As a result, the WWF had to make a concerted effort to provide the public with a more nuanced

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101 Gough and Shackley, 339.
frame that accounted for the complex dynamics of the legal ivory trade to regain public support. Nonetheless, as it turned out, the ivory quotas which the WWF advocated "may have been biologically sustainable, but not politically sustainable"—an outright ban, backed by international stigma, proved to be more enforceable than a complicated system of quotas and exceptions.

In its environmental activism, Greenpeace also discovered the difficulty of mobilizing public support without a clear and uncomplicated frame. Greenpeace found success with its campaigns against whaling and the seal hunt, because in these cases, it was easy to provide simple narratives with clear solutions. In both cases, the bloody slaughter of appealing animals by well-equipped commercial hunters was caught on film by Greenpeace activists. Greenpeace had a clear message in both campaigns: stop the seal hunt, save the whales. However, this strategy proved inadequate for its campaign for dolphin-friendly tuna fishing. In this case, Greenpeace discovered that it was not as easy to cast the villains of the piece. Greenpeace, and other environmental NGOs, first blamed tuna fishers from Peru and Mexico who, having invested heavily in the latest technologies, were trying to break into the North American market for canned tuna. Facing this competition, fishing companies from the United States scapegoated these fishers, proclaiming American tuna as more dolphin-friendly. Since the American corporations could afford to replace their equipment with dolphin-friendly technologies, and their poorer counterparts could not, the Americans were able to corner the market. Once Greenpeace

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102 Smilie, 56-57.

was alerted to the dynamics of the issue, it tried to counteract the framing process it had initiated, arguing against an outright ban on non-dolphin-friendly tuna in favour of calling for technology transfer to improve the fishing techniques of the Latin American fishers. This more complex message met with limited success, as dolphin-friendly tuna had caught the attention of the public.\textsuperscript{104} Evidently, it has proven difficult for NGOs to mobilize support around issues which are not clear-cut, and thus easily framed.

It can be particularly difficult to create simple frames in an international context, as successful framing is often dependent on a shared sense of morality which is culturally defined. This problem is especially apparent in the long struggle for international recognition of the importance of human rights.\textsuperscript{105} For instance, Amnesty International has found it easier to muster popular opposition to torture, than to the violation of civil, economic or social rights, since these abuses do not strike as strong an emotional chord as torture, which elicits nearly universal revulsion.\textsuperscript{106} As a result, Amnesty was able to help convince 66 states to sign the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and 119 states to become contracting parties, a level of support that has not been so forthcoming for other human rights issues that do not provoke similar emotional responses.\textsuperscript{107} Often, states

\textsuperscript{104}Dale, 162-65.


\textsuperscript{106}Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 27.

\textsuperscript{107}“Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” Available: www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-9.htm
that have been implicated in human rights violations by organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch have accused these organizations of cultural insensitivity. These large international NGOs have sought to overcome these criticisms by increasing their membership and participation outside their traditional European and North American bastions of public support. By forging links with Southern human rights groups or extending their membership in Southern nations, international NGOs have managed to reassert their legitimacy because these links reinforce the universality of the human rights agenda.\textsuperscript{108} Local involvement has become fundamental in not only the crossing of cultural boundaries and changing perspectives, but also for effective monitoring. The involvement of groups that are familiar with the local political and cultural environment enhances the accuracy of the reports of international NGOs, and thus ensures their reputation as authoritative and responsible monitors.\textsuperscript{109}

Nonetheless, human rights NGOs often have to choose between ensuring the accuracy of their reports, through thorough, time-consuming research, and maximizing the impact of their message. In order to mobilize public support in time to save a prisoner, information must often be released immediately, making absolute verification difficult.\textsuperscript{110} For instance, Human Rights Watch has come under fire for exaggerating the number of casualties in Kosovo in order to spur


\textsuperscript{110} Winston, 37.
the public outcry that was needed to pressure NATO to intervene.\textsuperscript{111} Ironically, this tension between accuracy and impact has grown as human rights NGOs have become more effective. In the face of greater NGO scrutiny, oppressive states have turned to "disappearing" dissidents, rather than imprisoning them, as it is more difficult to focus attention or target pressure when the fate of a person is unknown. In particular, Amnesty International was challenged to provide accurate information and mobilize public support quickly to protect disappeared dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America. Amnesty was forced to change its mobilization strategy from letter-writing to "Urgent Action" petitions, allowing for a quicker response by members, while maintaining as much as possible the personal involvement that is key to Amnesty's popularity.\textsuperscript{112}

Thus, framing is a difficult process for NGOs in the human rights sector: NGOs can neither assume that the discourse of human rights is relevant across cultures, nor can they jeopardize their reputations as fair reporters with exaggerated claims or over-simplified framing narratives.

Despite the problems associated with the simplification of complex issues into uncomplicated narratives, simple frames are important to the mobilization function of NGOs because they suit the format of the mass media. In order to circulate their message to wider audiences, NGOs must depend on both the media and electronic communication technologies, as surveys have demonstrated that NGO publications have only a marginal impact on public


opinion.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, attention from international mass media is fundamental to the framing process.\textsuperscript{114} Although the significance of the media to the political influence of NGOs is often overlooked by international relations scholars,\textsuperscript{115} mass media such as television, newspapers and the Internet are vitally important, because not only do the media broadcast news of international problems to wide audiences, but they also shape popular opinion with their coverage. As Markus Schultz points out, NGOs use the media to develop the “sensitized audiences, sympathetic multipliers and potential supporters” they need to mobilize the popular protest necessary to influence political decision-making.\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, NGOs must persuade media outlets to broadcast their information, along with the interpretation they espouse. As a result, NGOs have become increasingly media savvy, tailoring their information to suit the rhythms and discourse of broadcast television and the international press. This often entails demystifying complex issues and condensing long contextual narratives into short, entertaining segments that fit into conventional television news programming, or concise, hard-hitting stories for the print media. The mass media, and television in particular, do not allow for complex explanations.\textsuperscript{117} Hence, NGO reliance on the mass media for mobilization has necessitated the further distillation of complex interpretations into simpler frames.

\textsuperscript{113}Smilie, 135.


\textsuperscript{115}Newell, Climate for Change, 6.


\textsuperscript{117}Dale, 117.
Indeed, the more well-known NGOs are those organizations which have mastered the art of exploiting the media to popularize their message and inform the public. In the field of disarmament, the ICBL targeted not only the international news media with information packages, chilling footage of survivors, and mass demonstrations, but it also went so far as to enlist popular comic book authors to pen stories illustrating the human impact of land mines.\textsuperscript{118}

Thus, the ICBL sought to use every means of popular communication available to spread its message, and was able to effectively delegitimize the use of land mines in the public perception. Human Rights Watch is another NGO that actively pursues media attention, sending out reports that are styled to fit well into either magazine articles or newspaper editorials, measuring its organizational success by the number of times its work is mentioned or cited by journalists.\textsuperscript{119}

Consequently, its reports are quoted more frequently than the research of any other human rights organization.\textsuperscript{120} The EarthAction Network, and Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), a disarmament NGO, have also had success blitzing newspaper publishers with packages of relevant statistics, maps, pre-prepared interview questions, and angles for opinion pieces and editorials. EarthAction succeeded in maintaining the spotlight on environmental problems after the conclusion of the 1992 Rio Conference,\textsuperscript{121} while PGA was able to generate public support for the 1991 negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when the large nuclear powers were


\textsuperscript{119}Korey, 366.

\textsuperscript{120}Winston, 37.

\textsuperscript{121}Smith, “Building Political Will after UNCED,” 189.
intent on ending the conference.\textsuperscript{122}

Similarly, Greenpeace bombards media outlets with reports and information, but with the intention of catching the attention of television broadcasters, as opposed to print journalists. As Stephen Dale notes, Greenpeace seeks “to squeeze their [sic] message through the eye of a needle...the highly restrictive lens of the electronic news industry.”\textsuperscript{123} To do so, Greenpeace sends a film crew along with its activists to record the demonstrations when no reporters will be present. That video is then adapted to conform to the conventions of broadcast news by media professionals. Since television producers do not have the wherewithal to pursue environmental stories, Greenpeace has assumed the “muck-raking” role of the media, supplying broadcasters with pre-packaged coverage.\textsuperscript{124} With this strategy, Greenpeace can provide media outlets with material which they find suitable, and are thus more likely to use. Also, Greenpeace can ensure that it is their interpretation that is portrayed to the public, creating the frame which will mobilize popular support. Indeed, other human rights and disarmament NGOs are trying to mimic Greenpeace’s successful television tactics.\textsuperscript{125} For example, Amnesty International is shifting its documentation strategies, and now equips local monitors with video cameras in hopes of capturing powerful images that will help to stigmatize human rights abusers.\textsuperscript{126} Clearly, the media’s role is very important to the mobilization function of NGOs, whether it be through the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{122}Schrag, 143.
\bibitem{123}Dale, 7.
\bibitem{124}Ibid., 110.
\bibitem{125}Ibid., 120.
\bibitem{126}Winston, 38.
\end{thebibliography}
publication of newspaper articles and opinion pieces, or the broadcasting of arresting television images.

Mobilization NGOs are also increasingly turning to the Internet to communicate their messages to wider audiences. Unlike conventional broadcast media, the Internet allows for the freer transfer of information, and allows NGOs to easily establish frames. For although “the Internet may be neutral...the information providers are not.”127 Hence, NGOs are free to portray issues and manipulate facts as they so choose to attract attention and advocate action. Not only does the Internet facilitate the framing that is necessary to initiate norm change, but it also opens up a whole new repertoire of contentious action, enabling the mobilization of “occasional publics around specific campaigns.”128 With the development of user friendly HTML, graphics software and hyperlink technology, NGOs are now able to post well-constructed, informative and flashy web sites with links to other related sites, drawing new audiences for their messages.129 In order to ensure that their voices are heard above the Internet’s cacophony, mobilization NGOs have had to become creative with their usage of the new communications technology. They have learned to advertise, apply to “gatekeeper” sites and search engines, and construct easily navigable web sites.130 Not only have NGOs set up their own web sites, but they have also developed “mirror sites” to provoke criticism of states, corporations and international organizations which they


129 Wiseberg, 239.

130 Ibid., 244.
consider to be violating international norms of behaviour. For example, the web site address www.gatt.org is not the official web site of the World Trade Organization, but an imitation site designed by a coalition of environmental, human rights and anti-globalization NGOs to mock and denounce the international organization. Mobilization organizations also exploit the Internet to enlist so-called “armchair activists” to pressure states, corporations and international organizations by sponsoring email petitions and electronic sit-ins. For instance, Amnesty International was able to circulate an online petition on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was “signed” by 12 million supporters. Essentially, the Internet has helped to reduce the transaction costs of organizing and mobilizing large groups of supporters. In addition, survey responses by print and television journalists indicate that they now increasingly turn to the Internet for research, photos and press releases, particularly after business hours. Therefore, the Internet is an increasingly important tool for mobilization NGOs seeking to disseminate their information and implement their interpretations and frames.

However, the reliance of mobilization NGOs on the mass media introduces new

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132 For interest’s sake, compare www.wto.org, the official WTO web site, called “Welcome to the WTO website,” with www.gatt.org, the mirror site, which is entitled “WTO/World Trade Organization.”

133 Bray, 18.

134 Wiseberg, 241.

135 Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accelerated Pluralism,” Polity 31 (Fall 1998): 156.

136 John V. Pavlik and Steven S. Ross, “Journalism Online: Exploring the Impact of New Media on News and Society,” in Understanding the Web: Social, Political and Economic Dimensions of the Internet, edited by Alan
limitations on the ability of these organizations to successfully implement their strategies. As aforementioned, the logic of the mass media, particularly for television news, demands that any coverage be simple and attention-grabbing. An international problem is most likely to receive media acknowledgement if it is “event-centred,” as opposed to an ongoing process without any media-friendly climax.\(^{137}\) It must not be forgotten that while newspapers and television networks have a significant political function, they are also commercial enterprises, and are thus more likely to broadcast messages that they believe will entertain their audience. Hence, NGOs have difficulty interesting media outlets in issues such as climate change, which are too complex to be encapsulated in a forty-five second long segment on the evening news. Mobilization NGOs also often sensationalise their messages in order to attract as much attention as possible, leading to the exaggeration of crises, and a negative focus which does not properly acknowledge progress or solutions. As different critics of NGOs point out, success would essentially put mobilization NGOs out of business: therefore, it is in their best institutional interests to emphasize tragedy and disaster if they are to continue to generate public support.\(^{138}\)

It is also important to ask who constitutes the “public” these NGOs are seeking to mobilize. Mobilization NGOs have difficulty disseminating their messages across national borders, because there is as yet no truly global media outlet to serve as a forum for transnational mobilization, assertions regarding the influence of CNN to the contrary.\(^{139}\) Only a limited

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\(^{137}\) Giffard, 200.

\(^{138}\) Tvedt, 84-86.

\(^{139}\) See Ingrid Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere: A Study of CNN and its Impact on Global*
proportion of the world's population has access to the satellite television networks or the internationally-circulated English-language newspapers that transnational NGOs utilize to disseminate their messages. As Colin Sparks points out, there may be a very tiny "CNN-watching, Time-reading, international professional class" emerging, but the wide majority continues to rely on national media for their information, especially in the South, as they are neither wealthy nor educated enough to access these supposedly global media. Moreover, the Internet is even less accessible than conventional mass media in the South. In fact, a recent study found that the digital divide is actually a "digital abyss," as North Americans and Scandinavians are the only people who use the Internet on a regular basis. When half of the world's population has never made a telephone call, never mind used the Internet, it is unrealistic to assume that mobilization NGOs can have a significant impact with Web-based framing strategies outside the North. Evidently, there is no truly global "public" which mobilization NGOs can reach with their framing strategies. As a result, mobilization NGOs seek to change popular social attitudes and behaviour within national contexts. Since most transnational mobilization NGOs are based in the North, they tend to concentrate their efforts on generating public support from within Northern societies. Thus, when considering the strategies of mobilization NGOs, it is

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important to recognize that they are mainly aimed at Northern citizens. Not only do NGOs focus on changing public perceptions in the North because they have their strongest base in Northern societies, but also because democratic Northern governments are most likely to respond to popular pressure, and because these Northern states are the most influential in the international system. Therefore, mobilization NGOs hoping to have the greatest impact on international politics seek to sway public opinion in Northern societies.\textsuperscript{143}

To summarize, the strategies of mobilization NGOs are most effective when these organizations are able to construct frames which are uncomplicated and emotionally appealing, and when they are able to promote their interpretations of international issues through the mass media. In order to change popular social attitudes and behaviour, mobilization NGOs demystify complex issues, distilling a narrative that will have an impact on public opinion. Whether it be Greenpeace playing David to France's nuclear Goliath, or the ICBL piling the useless shoes of amputees, mobilization NGOs seek to involve individuals and communities in solving international problems by interpreting technical discourses and by appealing to human emotions. In order to implement these strategies, NGOs enlist the mass media, distributing information and research to newspapers, offering videotapes to television broadcasters, and building web sites. Consequently, their interpretations and narratives must be uncomplicated and emotionally appealing for their intended audiences, as well as suited to the constraints of the media market. In addition, mobilization NGOs have been most effective in changing public opinion in the North, in part because Northern citizens generally have greater access to the mass media, and because NGOs are most active in organizing protest within their national domains, located

\textsuperscript{143} Newell, “Environmental NGOs and Globalization,” 131.
mainly in the North.

Since the mobilization function is an important component of the political behaviour of NGOs, as it fosters the public support that these organizations need to effect change, I expected that a large proportion of NGOs would list this function amongst their goals in their entries in the Yearbook of International Organizations. My study of the Yearbook confirmed this hypothesis, as the majority of NGOs from all three issue areas included informing the wider public through the media, annual reports and publications, conferences, and membership recruitment as part of their activities. Of the relevant listings, 53 percent of disarmament NGOs and 52 percent of human rights NGOs listed informing and mobilizing in their entries. Fifty-three percent of environmental NGOs also cited informing and mobilizing as an area of involvement. Since of the three issues, environmental protection is the only one that requires changes to individual behaviour, as opposed to human rights and disarmament with their focus on the state and international organizations, this function is especially important to environmental NGOs. Environmental NGOs must not only convince states, international organizations and corporations to heed their warnings, but they must also motivate individuals to modify their behaviour. Hence, there are numerous NGOs devoted to persuading people and private businesses not to waste, not to hunt, not to drive cars, not to pollute the air or water, not to cut down forests and not to exhaust the soil. Although many human rights and disarmament NGOs also perform the mobilization function, it is especially important for environmental organizations for these reasons.
CHAPTER 3

THE CAPACITY-BUILDING FUNCTION

The third function that NGOs perform in the international system is the provision of resources and information in order to increase the social and economic capabilities of states, and to encourage and fortify smaller, local organizations. The most widely noted capacity-building is performed by NGOs in the sphere of economic development and emergency relief. Development NGOs have become increasingly active in the provision of services such as education, health care and public housing, becoming the distributors of development aid and emergency relief from both private and public sources. Essentially, development NGOs have interceded when national governments have been ineffectual in managing domestic social and economic problems. In fact, NGOs now deliver more development funds in underdeveloped economies than the entire UN system. These resources come in part from private donations, but the percentage of money coming from state overseas development budgets has grown substantially since the 1990s. States have found that NGOs are better equipped for handling humanitarian emergencies and long-term development than government agencies, and can do so in a more cost-efficient manner, a major concern at a time when development money is scarce. For instance, nearly half of Canada’s overseas development assistance is distributed by NGOs. The UN itself has also initiated joint projects with NGOs, creating a developmental “division of labour,” whereby NGOs become

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146 Florini, “Lessons Learned,” 228.
partners in UN coordinated relief operations and assistance projects. Consequently, NGOs have become “subcontractors” for the UN and Northern states, assuming the task of delivering development assistance. In part as a response to these new responsibilities, the size of the development NGO community has ballooned, growing by sixty percent between 1981 and 1996. The growth has been most phenomenal in the South, where small, local development organizations have sprouted in the 1990s. Although it is difficult to calculate the total number of grass-roots NGOs active in the South, the statistic of 35,000 is often bandied about. It is estimated that the number of NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa has grown by nearly four hundred percent in the 1990s. The same story is played out in nations across the South, ranging from Nepal, where the number of NGOs rose from 220 in 1990, to 1,210 just three years later, to Tunisia, where the numbers grew from 1,886 in 1988, to 5,186 in 1991. Evidently, development organizations are significant members of the international NGO community, and we should consider their role in the international political system.

However, development NGOs will not be the focus of this chapter on the capacity-building function. First, a comprehensive analysis of this huge sector of NGO activity is beyond the scope of this thesis. With one chapter, I could not do justice to the diversity of the

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147 Edwin M. Smith and Thomas G. Weiss, “UN task-sharing: Towards or away from global governance?” Third World Quarterly 18 (Fall 1997): 595.

148 Reinicke and Deng, 11.

149 Mathews, 52.

150 Reinicke and Deng, 11.

Development NGO community, which includes both gigantic development institutions, such as Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision, and village agricultural cooperatives and shantytown mutual aid societies. Second, development NGOs are significantly different from the other organizations in the fields of environmental protection, human rights, and disarmament that have been my focus in this thesis. Although the provision of services and the channelling of aid funding are inherently political activities, it is difficult to reconcile this sort of NGO behaviour with the three other functions that I have identified. Development NGOs perform a more material and operational function in the international system than do research and monitoring, mobilization or advocacy organizations, whose functions are more ideational. As a rule, unlike the majority of NGOs that I have discussed, development NGOs prefer to concentrate on delivering services, rather than advocating explicitly political agendas. These organizations tend to be more dependent on funds from state or international organizations than other NGOs, and are therefore more reluctant to take controversial political positions for fear of jeopardizing their funding.152

Despite the obvious differences between development NGOs and monitoring, mobilization, and advocacy organizations, critics of NGO involvement in development tend to confuse the shortcomings of these NGOs with those of the entire non-governmental community. Some development professionals are increasingly critical of NGO involvement in the development process, as the “comparative advantage” of NGOs over state participation in the development system appears to be illusory.153 NGOs have been plagued with the same problems

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152 Florini and Simmons, 8.

153 Tvedt, 129. Both Tvedt and Smilie, as former development NGO officials, offer pointed and cogent
faced by state agencies in the frustratingly slow process of economic development and poverty reduction. NGO project administrations can be just as byzantine and inflexible as state bureaucracies, and funding for projects can be either insufficient or poorly directed. Moreover, since NGOs are private organizations, they are not accountable in the same ways that elected governments and their state agencies are. In the field of emergency relief and conflict intervention, NGOs are accused of harbouring combatants and undermining local coping mechanisms. However, the failures of NGOs in development and emergency relief echo the difficulties encountered by states and international organizations. As P.J. Simmons acknowledges, “the record for such NGOs is surely no worse than that of governments”\textsuperscript{154} that have foundered in the complicated process of economic and social development. Nonetheless, critics of NGO activity have trumpeted the failings of developmental groups and emergency relief organizations as evidence of the detrimental effect of public or citizen participation in the international system.\textsuperscript{155} Such criticism confuses the various functions of NGOs, as it condemns all non-governmental political activity for the missteps of individual organizations in one sector of NGO involvement. This confusion only serves to highlight the importance of distinguishing non-governmental development organizations from other NGOs. Therefore, I will differentiate between development NGOs, and NGOs from the sectors of environmental protection, human rights and disarmament that also perform the capacity-building function.

While I emphasize that the operational projects of development NGOs are a vital part of criticism of the developmental NGO community from an inside perspective.

\textsuperscript{154}Simmons, 88.

\textsuperscript{155}“NGOs: Sins of the secular missionaries.”
the capacity-building function, I will instead concentrate on the capacity-building strategies of NGOs in the three issue areas of environmental protection, human rights and disarmament. The capacity-building function is performed by NGOs across these other issue sectors, not just in the field of development, and entails more strategies than merely the provision of development aid. The two main capacity-building strategies of international NGOs are the endowment of smaller organizations with the resources and expertise they need to help them increase their political influence and local impact, and the establishment of local branches of the parent organization in underdeveloped areas. These international NGOs not only contribute materially to smaller groups, but they also promote partnerships and networks with their local counterparts in order to create a two-way flow of information and expertise between the grass-roots and international levels.156 In addition, these networks help to recognize local efforts and demonstrate international support, thus boosting morale.157 Together, these dual processes of sharing resources and creating connections help to shorten the “learning curve” for smaller NGOs by increasing their ability to hone their political skills.158 Hence, the capacity-building function entails NGOs either strengthening local organizations by providing them with needed resources and crucial connections to international networks, or the founding of local branches to improve the parent organization’s ability to reach local communities.


NGOs employ these capacity-building strategies in order to establish a non-governmental presence at the local level. This local presence is important for two major reasons. First, it facilitates international NGOs in achieving their local initiatives, easing the implementation of programs, and increasing their long-term effectiveness.\textsuperscript{159} For instance, in the environmental sector, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) prefers to work with grass-roots groups in individual villages for its wildlife conservation initiatives, as it has found that this strategy is more effective than trying to pressure national governments to enforce their own legislation. Hence, the WWF has found that enhancing the capabilities of local village organizations in at-risk areas is an effective strategy, as local support is key to project implementation.\textsuperscript{160} Not only does a local NGO presence increase the likelihood of success for local programs, but it also improves the ability of NGOs to perform research, and monitor local conditions. In the field of human rights, Amnesty International relies on the reporting of its local networks, as opposed to parachuting foreign experts into crisis situations, because domestic sources are more sensitive to the local political context, and are thus able to provide more accurate monitoring.\textsuperscript{161} In fact, Amnesty has linked its numerous local sections through an expansive communications network in order to further build their reporting capabilities.\textsuperscript{162} Amnesty and the WWF are but two of the international NGOs that have established partnerships with local groups in hopes of ensuring their goals are achieved, whether they be the protection of endangered species or the monitoring

\textsuperscript{159} Reinicke and Deng, 80.

\textsuperscript{160} Wapner, \textit{Environmental Activism}, 157.

\textsuperscript{161} Welch, "Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch," 105.

\textsuperscript{162} Winston, 44.
of human rights abuses.

The second rationale for the establishment of connections with local organizations is to gain international legitimacy. Specifically, since the vast majority of the large international NGOs are headquartered in Europe or the United States, and since they draw the bulk of their membership from Northern states, many NGOs are often subject to criticism for being unrepresentative of Southern interests. In particular, large international NGOs without Southern members or connections come under fire when they suggest solutions to Southern problems. In order to bolster their credibility, and ensure the inclusion of Southern input, many international NGOs have encouraged Southern NGOs, and especially smaller, grass-roots groups. Thanks in part to this outreach and capacity-building by international NGOs, the Southern non-governmental community has grown significantly. In fact, both the number of NGOs based in the South, and Southern membership in NGOs, is increasing at a faster pace than in Europe or North America. In fact, whereas only five percent of NGO secretariats were located in the South in 1953, by 1993, that proportion had increased to twenty-three percent.

International NGOs thus perform the capacity-building function to assure the success of local programs, and to enhance their international legitimacy. Therefore, environmental protection, human rights and disarmament organizations have actively pursued the two major

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163 Boli, Loya and Loftin, 53-62.
165 Boli, Loya and Loftin, 56.
166 Smith, “Global Civil Society?” 98.
capacity-building strategies. First, the larger, international NGOs have been instrumental in strengthening fledgling local organizations, providing them with needed resources and expertise. Some international NGOs have merely become "transmission belts" for donations from the North to local organizations in the South, directly contributing funding to their smaller counterparts. However, many international capacity-building NGOs provide training, education, services, equipment and infrastructure instead, preferring to endow local organizations with these types of material resources. In order to provide local leaders with the skills and experience they need to effectively manage an organization, international NGOs have established various educational programs, including internships, training seminars, and international exchanges. For instance, many local human rights organizers in the South are "graduates" of Amnesty International, having learned the techniques of human rights monitoring and mobilization within the larger international organization. Besides assisting local NGOs, Amnesty also conducts educational programs for politicians and military officers in violator states in order to promote human rights at the local level and initiate a process of political learning. Hence, Amnesty seeks to improve the capacities of both local non-governmental groups and state officials to uphold human rights. The ICBL pursued a similar capacity-building strategy. Unlike Amnesty, the ICBL is not an integrated organization, but a coalition of loosely affiliated independent NGOs, who were each responsible for their own fundraising. Instead of channelling Northern donations to national campaigns in Southern states such as Cambodia, the

167 Tvedt, 75.
168 Winston, 35.
169 Forsythe, 169.
larger members of the coalition, such as Human Rights Watch and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, assisted their smaller allies with publicity and logistical support.\textsuperscript{170}

International NGOs have also assisted local groups by distributing equipment and needed supplies. Grants of communication equipment and computer capabilities have been particularly valuable to local groups. With this assistance, smaller, grass-roots organizations are able to tap into international networks for news and information, disseminate their message to wider audiences, and contact either larger NGOs, international organizations, states, or corporations with their concerns. For Southern groups especially, grants of communication equipment have been fundamental in helping them overcome the aforementioned "digital abyss." Since an Internet connection requires not only a basic computer and a modem, but also a phone line, a dial-up account, and a reliable source of electricity, all of which are scarce commodities in the South, access to the Web is often prohibitively expensive for Southern NGOs, particularly for those in rural areas.\textsuperscript{171} Moreover, the Internet remains a nearly exclusively English domain, and thus inaccessible to many Southern activists.\textsuperscript{172} Hence, international NGOs that have supplied local groups with computer access, and the skills to navigate the immense networks of the Internet, have become invaluable allies. In the human rights sector, Amnesty International has provided its Southern sections and partnership agencies with computer facilities in order to speed


its monitoring efforts and improve its communication with local organizers. EarthAction International, an NGO active in both the fields of environmental protection and disarmament, has also contributed communication and computer technology to a variety of Southern groups, as its goal has been to establish a global network of like-minded smaller NGOs. EarthAction has found that these connections not only facilitate successful political advocacy at large international conferences such as the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio, but they also encourage local groups to participate at the international level because they feel as though they belong to a larger cause. As one of EarthAction’s Brazilian affiliates wrote after a communique from the larger organization, “we don’t feel alone anymore...please tell those who sent letters of support... how very very much we appreciated them doing that.”

Another NGO that has been prominent in capacity-building is the Association for Progressive Communication (APC), which describes itself as “a network of networks,” encompassing NGOs working in the fields of environmental protection, human rights, development and peace. This organization provides low-cost Internet connections to over 50,000 NGOs in 133 countries. The APC counts amongst its various networks both the alliance of local and international NGOs protesting the World Bank’s environmental assessment

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173 Winston, 32.
175 Smith, “Global Civil Society?” 101.
177 Mathews, 54.
procedures, and the coalition of human rights monitors, environmental activists, and indigenous groups that mobilized to support the Zapatistas in their uprising against Mexico’s involvement in North American free trade. Not only does the APC provide Southern NGOs with inexpensive Internet access, but it also trains activists to effectively use these new communication technologies. For instance, the APC introduced human rights activists to the Internet by setting up an extensive computer lab at the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna.

The APC and other capacity-building NGOs have furnished local and grass-roots organizations with the ability to communicate with NGO networks across international borders, promoting the freer flow of information and knowledge and allowing these Southern groups improved access to the international political system. Enabled by capacity-building NGOs, Southern organizations can take advantage of the Internet’s potential for communication and organization. Email has proven to be a boon for NGOs, as it facilitates communication between organizers through chat rooms, electronic bulletin boards, and list-serv newsletters, and it allows activists to maintain relationships across long distances with minimal effort and expense.

International NGOs have undertaken capacity-building in order to ease communication with their

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179 Schultz, 595.

180 Wiseberg, 240.

smaller, local counterparts, and thus forge the international connections they require to effectively implement local programs and to ensure their legitimacy within the international system. As Thomas Risse notes, the participation of Southern organizations is vital to the international political process, as “free-floating pressure” by Northern NGOs without Southern partnerships or membership is often disregarded.\textsuperscript{182} For advocacy and mobilization NGOs, who must maintain their image as representative and legitimate, the inclusion of Southern voices through the development of local NGO capacities is a key strategy.

Sometimes, rather than building the capacities of local organizations, larger international NGOs establish branches in areas that are not being effectively reached by local organizations. In the environmental sector, Greenpeace has utilized this second capacity-building strategy, founding local sections in Eastern Europe, Central America and South America. While Greenpeace continues to receive the bulk of its financial and popular support in Western Europe and North America, it is attempting “to build the kind of knowledge and activism around issues in Southern countries that [is] really need[ed] to transform those societies and the way they relate to and use the environment,” in the words of the head of the organization’s Central American office.\textsuperscript{183} In the field of human rights, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are expanding, founding sections in Southern states. Amnesty has mobilization sections in 54 countries, and members in 150,\textsuperscript{184} while Human Rights Watch has organized monitoring facilities

\textsuperscript{182}Risse, 205.

\textsuperscript{183}Dale, 35.

\textsuperscript{184}Winston, 32.
in 70 countries. In all three cases, although these international NGOs continue to receive more support from their Northern constituents, and thus have greater influence over political decision-making in Northern states, they have committed to developing a network of members and supporters in the South. While not all international NGOs have the resources or the wherewithal to pursue this capacity-building strategy of introducing new branches in the South, for the largest of the international NGOs, it can be an effective way of establishing the global presence needed for effective program implementation and international legitimacy.

The strategies of capacity-building – the provision of resources, information, and expertise, and the establishment of local branches – work best under three circumstances. First, the effectiveness of efforts to develop a local NGO presence depends on the accessibility of resources and funding, as by definition, successful capacity-building requires a ready supply of resources and funding. Indeed, the mushrooming of Southern NGOs can be understood as a result of the availability of easily-obtained funding from larger, wealthier NGOs, Northern states, and international organizations. On the other side of the coin, less well-endowed international NGOs are unable to effectively perform the capacity-building function because they do not have adequate resources to bestow upon local groups. Second, it is often forgotten that international NGOs require the approval of national governments to cooperate with domestic organizations. State permission may not always be forthcoming, particularly when international NGOs appear to be assisting political opposition groups. For instance, authoritarian governments often perceive


186. Smilie, 170.
the establishment of local Amnesty monitoring sections as threatening. As a result, Amnesty will not commence a fact-finding mission without the consent of the national government, to ensure its monitoring will be unimpeded by the state, and thus more effective.\footnote{Korey, 164.} Third, as specialists from the development sector have learned from experience, capacity-building is most effective when donor NGOs treat their smaller counterparts as partners, rather than dependents.\footnote{Smilie, “Painting Canadian Roses Red,” in \textit{Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World}, edited by Michael Edwards and David Hulme (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996): 187.} Nascent grass-roots organizations can buckle under the supervision and responsibilities that accompany an influx of new external funding; however, it is still vital that donor organizations oversee the appropriate dispersal of resources. As Claude Welch notes, “since continued financial support is contingent on success, potentially in terms established more by the funder than by the NGO, the definition and evolution of success take on critical importance.”\footnote{Welch, “Introduction,” in \textit{NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance}, edited by Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001): 12.} Therefore, it is important that capacity-building NGOs maintain open, yet structured, relationships with their partners to ensure success.\footnote{Kendall W. Stiles, “Grassroots empowerment: States, non-state actors and global policy formulation,” in \textit{Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System}, edited by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (London: Routledge, 2000): 42.}

Hence, when international NGOs can draw upon enough resources to adequately support the growth of local groups, when domestic governments do not feel threatened by NGO initiatives, and when international NGOs can form balanced and equitable partnerships with grass-roots organizations, their capacity-building strategies are most effective. The capacity-
building function, as performed by organizations that are not expressly dedicated to economic development, helps to incorporate Southern NGO voices into the international political system. By pursuing the two main capacity-building strategies of providing resources and expertise and establishing local branches, international NGOs ensure that they can both implement their local programs effectively, and maintain their international reputation. Therefore, the capacity-building function is a two-way street, benefiting smaller Southern NGOs, and larger international organizations.

Considering that the bulk of the international relations literature on NGOs does not mention the capacity-building strategies of environmental, human rights and disarmament NGOs, as most authors concentrate on the activity of development NGOs, I did not expect there to be many organizations performing this function. However, my study of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* provided some interesting results. Only 41 percent of environmental groups, and 37 percent of disarmament organizations listed endowments of funds, grants of equipment, or educational programs amongst their activities, indicating that capacity-building is not a primary function for these types of organizations. Since capacity-building strategies do require substantial funding, I hypothesize that many environmental and disarmament groups do not have the resources to devote to establishing a local NGO presence. For disarmament organizations in particular, a local presence may not be vital, as international NGOs from this sector do not as a rule have local agendas to implement. While few environmental and disarmament NGOs listed capacity-building amongst their activities, over half of all human rights organizations, roughly 55 percent, included capacity-building initiatives in their *Yearbook* entries. This finding suggests that capacity-building is an especially important function for human rights
organizations. This is not surprising, considering that human rights groups rely on local networks to report and monitor abuses. Moreover, it is particularly important for international human rights NGOs to establish local connections in order to reinforce their legitimacy, as these groups are especially vulnerable to accusations of cultural insensitivity by violator states. Therefore, large international human rights organizations employ capacity-building strategies more often than environmental and disarmament NGOs, as they need a local presence more than do other NGOs, in order to monitor abuses effectively, and to establish their credibility with critical national governments.
CHAPTER 4
THE ADVOCACY FUNCTION

NGOs perform a variety of roles in the international system that do not involve directly pressuring states. As I have detailed in the previous three chapters, NGOs provide technical expertise, monitor the activities of political actors, mobilize public support, and assist national governments and local organizations. Clearly, NGOs must not be mistaken as the international equivalents of the national lobby and special interest groups that actively pressure national governments.\footnote{Warner, Environmental Activism, 10.} Although the analogy with domestic lobby groups is not entirely accurate, there are some NGOs whose tactics resemble those of domestic pressure groups. These groups, which I have classified as advocacy NGOs, apply political pressure and targeted lobbying to influence the policies of international organizations, states, and corporations. While mobilization NGOs attempt to change individual perceptions and behaviour, international political actors are the focus of advocacy NGOs. To encourage conformity with international norms, advocacy NGOs convince external states to pressure norm violators, involve themselves in the workings of international organizations, and lobby multinational corporations. In this chapter, I will examine these three main strategies used by advocacy NGOs, and evaluate their effectiveness.

To enact these strategies, advocacy NGOs use different approaches to lobbying than political pressure groups at the national level. Like national lobbyists, they organize letter-writing campaigns, arrange meetings with officials, host briefings for government staff, submit editorials to newspapers, and offer commentary as televised “talking heads.”\footnote{Forsythe, 167.} However, international
advocacy NGOs do not derive their influence from their ability to promise election victory, bargain with business capital, or contribute election campaign funds. Instead, advocacy NGOs use the “mobilization of legitimacy.” Alternatively, advocacy NGOs rely on ideational inducements, rather than material incentives, to convince political actors such as states, international organizations, and corporations to change their policies. Rather than threatening violators with material punishments, these NGOs pressure violators to comply with accepted norms of international behaviour by stigmatizing them within the international community. Since most states, international organizations, and corporations value their reputation and the esteem of their peers, they are likely to modify their behaviour for fear of becoming the subject of international opprobrium. Hence, advocacy NGOs employ the strategies of lobbying sympathetic states to put pressure on violators, participating in international organizations, and confronting corporations, in order to generate opposition to objectionable behaviour. By stimulating the criticism of the international community, advocacy NGOs can influence offenders to change their policies.

Advocacy organizations have found that one of the most effective strategies for convincing violators to modify their behaviour is to lobby states, international organizations or corporations with whom they have connections, rather than only pressuring the violators directly. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have constructed a model of this strategy which they have called the “boomerang pattern.” According to their analysis, NGOs in authoritarian states with little domestic political recourse can appeal to sympathetic international NGOs, who in turn

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pressure other governments to take a strong stance vis-a-vis the offending authoritarian state. While the offending state undermines the ability of local groups to mobilize public opposition, the "transnational advocacy network" of local groups and their international allies shifts the focus of criticism to the level of the international community. Sikkink has elaborated on this analysis with Thomas Risse, using a five stage "spiral model" to explain how states come to comply with the international norms espoused by advocacy NGOs. First, the repressive state quells local dissent, and local NGOs seek to activate an international network to compensate. Second, confronted with international disapproval, the repressive state will first deny any wrongdoing and refuse to acknowledge any criticism. Third, facing continued condemnation, the state will make concessions to improve its foreign relations. Fourth, the norm acquires "prescriptive status," as the repressive state begins to abide by the normative discourse of the international organizations and NGOs. In the fifth and final stage, the norm has been widely adopted and the state's behaviour conforms with NGO expectations. Advocacy NGOs are thus able to capitalize on their access to international organizations to influence the behaviour of states, as they expose offenders to censure in international fora, tarnishing their reputations as good international citizens.

While criticism by other states and international organizations may be sufficient to convince offending states to change their behaviour, financial penalties help to reinforce this normative pressure. Although NGOs do not have the resources to offer material inducements

194 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 13.
195 Risse and Sikkink, 22-32.
196 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 13.
themselves, they are able to convince other states and international organizations, which do have the authority to withhold assistance, to make their aid conditional on improved behaviour, or to impose sanctions. As Kal Raustiala notes, "the state remains the leading form of political organization, and NGOs need the coercive power of states to realize the behavioural and policy changes they seek." Offending states that both are under diplomatic pressure in international fora, and denied aid funds or trading status by partners who have been lobbied by international NGOs, are more likely to comply with behavioural standards and international norms.

Therefore, the strategy of advocacy NGOs of pressuring external states allows these groups to harness their power and authority as sovereign actors in the political system. However, material inducements alone have often proven insufficient. The states that have been most susceptible to international pressure have not been those most deprived by economic sanctions, but those most conscious of their international reputation. Thus, material inducements must be supplemented with normative pressure to shame states that value their connections with the international community.

As a result, advocacy NGOs pressure not only the offending state, but also its diplomatic allies, its trading partners and its counterparts in international organizations to encourage it to modify its policies. I will now turn to examples from the case study literature to evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy for advocacy NGOs in the three fields of human rights, disarmament, and environmental protection.

Two of the most prominent human rights NGOs, Amnesty International and Human

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197 Raustiala, 726.
198 Risse and Sikkink, 15.
199 Ibid., 38.
Rights Watch, rely heavily on the strategy of lobbying external states to influence violators. It is nearly impossible to quantify the effectiveness of human rights NGOs, as it is difficult to measure either the number of prisoners who their captors decided not to torture in order to avoid criticism, or the impact of lobbying on state policies. However, the following examples help to illustrate under what circumstances Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have had the most success with the advocacy strategy of pressuring external states to act against human rights violators.

While Amnesty's ethos since its founding in 1961 has been to draw international attention to the mistreatment of prisoners of conscience, the organization came into its own in the 1970s and 1980s by using the boomerang strategy to pressure the brutal dictators who had come to power throughout Latin America. Having collected information on numerous cases of torture and disappearance perpetrated by security, intelligence and police forces across Latin America, Amnesty supplemented its member-led letter-writing campaigns with a concerted effort to lobby other states to pressure the violators and to shame them in UN fora. This tactic proved particularly effective in the case of Chile, which Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink describe as a "watershed" for human rights NGOs. It was one of the first confrontations between a repressive regime, and an Amnesty-led network of vocal activists, exiles, church officials and Chilean NGOs, which sought support from the UN and the international community. Chile's military junta succumbed to international pressure, which at the behest of Amnesty and other lobby


201. Risse, 181-182.

groups, included condemnations in the UN and sanctions by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the records and internal documents of General Augusto Pinochet’s regime reveal that the decision to end the most egregious abuses was made in order to deflect persistent international criticism. Thus, the Chilean case provides an excellent example of the effectiveness of Amnesty’s lobbying of external states.

Amnesty also became involved in monitoring human rights in Guatemala, but with less clear results. The abuses perpetrated by the Guatemalan military regime were far more widespread than in Chile, and yet the Guatemalan violence remained largely overlooked by the international community until the late 1970s, because unlike Chile’s vocal activist network, local dissent had been intimidated into silence. As a result, there were no Guatemalan organizations daring enough to seek out support from an international NGO. Without a local network to connect with, Amnesty could not coordinate the pressure from within Guatemala that would have helped to legitimize its campaign. As a result, the Guatemalan military was able to label Amnesty as a foreign, meddling organization, “‘without any moral authority’ and ‘ignorant of our situation’.” Moreover, in contrast to Pinochet’s regime in Chile, Guatemala’s generals were impervious to international criticism, as they were more concerned with winning the country’s ongoing civil war than with courting public opinion. Even though Amnesty and other human rights NGOs were able to convince the United States Congress to withdraw American military assistance, the generals were not fazed. Amnesty continued to press individual states and the UN to condemn Guatemala’s abuses, and eventually Guatemala was caught up in the “norm cascade”

203 Ibid., 186.

204 Clark, 62-63.
of democratization and respect for human rights that swept through Latin America in the 1990s. Once the military had ceded power to an elected civilian government and an end to the civil war had been negotiated with the help of the UN, the state-directed violence ceased for the most part.\textsuperscript{205} Amnesty’s tactics were not immediately successful in Guatemala both because its leadership was less troubled by international opinion, and because domestic human rights organizations had been silenced. However, its continuing pressure on Guatemala contributed to the general climate of disapproval within Latin America that encouraged the Guatemalan government to end the abuses. The comparison between the Guatemalan and Chilean cases reveals that the advocacy strategy of lobbying external states is most effective when the offending state desires to maintain an upstanding reputation in the international community, and when local groups can be included in the advocacy network. Thus, Amnesty lobbies international organizations and states as part of its wider mandate to protect prisoners of conscience. However, its primary strategies remain popular mobilization through member-led letter-writing campaigns, and the research and monitoring of abuses.

In contrast, the main focus of Human Rights Watch is the lobbying of states and international organizations, and the United States government in particular. Its strategy is to influence the most important decision-makers in international politics to promote human rights abroad, rather than attempting to appeal to a mass public. Therefore, Human Rights Watch tailors its thorough monitoring reports for the American political elite by including the in-depth analysis and policy options that high-level politicians and bureaucrats demand.\textsuperscript{206} By catering to

\textsuperscript{205}Ropp and Sikkink, 191.

\textsuperscript{206}Winston, 37.
the needs of top decision-makers, Human Rights Watch has been able to foster a close relationship with the American government, giving the organization a sympathetic ear for its lobbying efforts.\textsuperscript{207} Accordingly, one of Human Rights Watch recent successes was the involvement of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's war to prevent further human rights abuses in Kosovo. It was Human Rights Watch’s daily reports based on interviews by local organizations of survivors of Serbian massacres that American government officials and NATO representatives cited as proof of the need to intervene in Kosovo. Rather than lobbying the recalcitrant Serbian government, Human Rights Watch focussed its campaign on the United States and NATO, who eventually decided to bomb Serbian targets to ostensibly protect the Kosovars.\textsuperscript{208}

While Human Rights Watch’s choice to concentrate its attention on the American political elite paid off in the case of Kosovo, this strategy also has its drawbacks. In order to appeal to the political decision-makers, Human Rights Watch is structured as a policy group staffed with professionals and experts, and not a membership organization like Amnesty.\textsuperscript{209} However, this focus on professionalism and lobbying instead of popular mobilization may actually undermine its influence with American politicians, who are unlikely to respond to the pressure of an organization that does not represent any voting constituency.\textsuperscript{210} For instance, Human Rights Watch was unable to generate the political will amongst the American foreign policy community

\textsuperscript{207}Korey, 343.

\textsuperscript{208}Brown, 80.

\textsuperscript{209}Claude E. Welch, “Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,” 108.

\textsuperscript{210}Korey, 362.
to intervene in Rwanda. The organization could not muster the public outcry that would have convinced the United States to become involved even though it did not have any national interest in the region.\textsuperscript{211} Thus, Human Rights Watch's inability to mobilize mass public support renders its elite lobbying approach less effective. Without the leverage of popular legitimacy, advocacy NGOs such as Human Rights Watch cannot effectively pressure governments.

Interestingly, in the three previous examples, the advocacy organizations approached Northern states, and the United States in particular, when seeking support within the international community for their efforts. Advocacy NGOs have targeted Northern states for three reasons. First, they are more influential in the international community, as they have greater access to resources which can be used as leverage than do most Southern states. Second, since the headquarters and memberships of most advocacy NGOs are based in the North, and most Northern states are democratic, these states will be more likely to adhere to NGO initiatives because of the appeal to their citizens.\textsuperscript{212} Third, Northern states have added credibility within the international community, as they generally practice the values and abide by the norms which they espouse to violator states. For human rights advocacy especially, censure must come from a state where human rights are respected for any pressure to be effective.\textsuperscript{213} Therefore, when advocacy NGOs search for external states to apply pressure to offenders, they are most likely to turn to Northern states, and the United States specifically, as the examples of Amnesty International’s

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\item \textsuperscript{212}Welch, “Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,” 93.
\item \textsuperscript{213}Forsythe, 164.
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advocacy work on Latin America, and Human Rights Watch’s campaign for Kosovo illustrate.

However, in the case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, this condition for successful advocacy did not obtain. Whereas in the previous examples the United States had been the target for human rights advocacy NGOs seeking an influential ally to pressure violators to change their policies, in the case of the anti-landmine campaign it was the United States that was being pressured by other states to change its position. Some of the first states to come on board with the ICBL’s campaign were countries such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Croatia, that had been wracked by civil war and had large populations of land mine survivors as a result. Vocal survivor networks within these small, poor, relatively insignificant countries that had joined the ICBL convinced their governments to join with the so-called “core group” of middle power states such as Canada, Austria, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries. These supportive states took up the cause of the ICBL, providing the NGO campaign with vital diplomatic allies. Canada in particular became a key player in the negotiations, as in 1996 the Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, challenged the international community to sign a treaty banning land mines at a conference to be held a year later in Ottawa. At the urging of the ICBL and its component NGOs, Canada and the core group states joined the ICBL in pushing for an outright ban, lobbying more powerful but less sympathetic states such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, to sign the treaty. The ICBL was able present a compelling negotiating position in favour of the treaty by calling on the states that had been most ravaged by the effects of land mines. Although the hold-out states, including the United States,

Russia, China, Pakistan, and India, did not sign the Ottawa treaty, they did come to adopt some of the principles of the ban, as all five have instituted unilateral moratoria on the transfer of land mines.\textsuperscript{215}

Advocacy NGOs in the field of environmental conservation have also lobbied external actors to pressure states and international organizations on behalf of local activists. The most successful "transnational advocacy networks" in the environmental sector have been those organized to protect the interests of local populations whose lifestyles were threatened by state projects funded by international financial institutions that would destroy local ecosystems. As Keck and Sikkink note, environmental advocacy groups have been most effective in pressuring states and international organizations when they have been able point to a demonstrable human cost of environmental damage.\textsuperscript{216} To evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy of lobbying external actors under these circumstances, I will examine the case of the coalition to stop World Bank funding of an important development project in India on account of its negative environmental impacts. Evidently, states are not the only targets of advocacy NGOs: international organizations are also subject to criticism within the international community when so urged by advocacy organizations.

Advocacy NGOs succeeded in convincing state representatives to the World Bank to vote

\textsuperscript{215}\textsuperscript{Rutherford, 109.}

\textsuperscript{216}\textsuperscript{Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, 27.}
against funding the Sardar Sarovar hydro-electric project to dam the Narmada River. The 150,000 local inhabitants that would have been displaced organized non-violent protests at the construction site, beginning in 1985. Indian environmental activists took up their cause, as they found that the project would not only uproot the population, it would also have deleterious effects on the regional environment, ruining the river’s complex ecosystem and flooding the surrounding forests and farmlands. The World Bank had agreed to fund the project without conducting sufficient environmental assessments, in contravention of its own regulations. A coalition of Indian environmental activists and local groups formed the Save the Narmada Campaign, which in turn reached out to international environmental NGOs. With the help of organizations such as Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment and the World Conservation Union, the Campaign was able to publicize the regional crisis internationally and lobby the state representatives to the World Bank. The support of two of the Bank’s largest donors, the United States and Japan, was particularly important in forcing the Bank to undergo a review by an outside commission. The Morse Commission found that the Bank had been negligent in authorizing the dam, and its construction was cancelled. In addition, the Commission advised important reforms to the Bank’s project evaluation process, and suggested that the Bank reconsider funding any large hydro-electric projects at all, due to their potential for environmental destruction and popular dislocation, just as the NGOs had advocated. While hydro-electric projects had been associated with modernization and development, after the Save the Narmada Campaign, dams came to be perceived as threats to the environment and to local populations. The NGO coalition had succeeded both in stopping the dam’s construction and in changing

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217 Udall, 393-401.
procedures within the World Bank. Moreover, after the fallout from the Narmada confrontation, Bank officials agreed to join the World Conservation Union in forming the World Commission on Dams, a forum for dialogue between engineers, financial institutions, local activists, and international environmental NGOs. By linking environmental concerns with human suffering, and holding an international organization accountable to its own standards, the transnational advocacy network against the Narmada dam project accomplished its advocacy goals through the use of the external lobbying strategy.

As the case of the NGO coalition to halt the World Bank’s financing of the Narmada dam project indicates, advocacy NGOs perform an important oversight role in the international system, as they hold international organizations, states and corporations accountable. In particular, lobbying NGOs serve as a vital link between the public and international organizations, as these political actors are not directly answerable to any specific constituency. Although international organizations are ostensibly representative institutions, as they are composed of delegates from different national governments, they are often perceived as being unaccountable, since they operate largely without popular input. Therefore, advocacy NGOs seek to improve their access to the proceedings of international organizations in order to increase the transparency of the decision-making and policy formulation processes within international

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organizations. In a sense, the inclusion of NGOs at international organization meetings “enhance[s] public participation” because NGOs try to penetrate the secrecy of many international organizations, revealing their operating procedures to the public. For instance, advocacy organizations stage parallel NGO meetings at major international conferences and publish conference newsletters in order to expand public awareness of the UN’s conference work. While advocacy NGOs intend to hold international organizations more accountable, these groups also seek to improve their access to international organizations in order to influence the decisions made within these bodies, and to exert further pressure on violators in these fora.

These advocacy organizations specialize in the intricacies of international diplomacy and negotiation, as they attend the meetings of international organizations and participate in international conferences. Advocacy NGOs haunt the corridors of formal state power and play the “report-writing lobbying resolution-passing game.” In order to effectively oversee and monitor the behaviour of international organizations, and to influence negotiations and decision-making, NGOs have sought increased access to their deliberations. The UN is an important locus for NGO activity because it sets the global standard for conventions of diplomacy. Increased participation by NGOs in UN organs sets the precedent for NGO involvement in negotiation

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220 Ibid., 23-25.
221 Alger, “Transnational Social Movements,” 266.
elsewhere. Although NGOs have interacted with the UN since its creation, and have reserved "consultative status" in ECOSOC through Article 71 of the UN Charter, the involvement of NGOs in UN organs has increased dramatically in the 1990s, especially since 1996 when the rules for NGO accreditation for ECOSOC were loosened. The mushrooming of NGO participation at the UN is most evident in their ubiquitous presence at the UN-sponsored world conferences. For instance, less than three hundred NGOs participated at the first UN conference on the environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. In contrast, twenty years later, 1 400 NGOs were officially registered at the Rio Conference on the Environment, while 18 000 organizations participated at the parallel NGO conference. Not only have NGOs been able to participate in greater numbers at UN sponsored fora, but the character of their participation has also changed. Whereas NGO representatives were once limited to lobbying delegates in the corridors of UN headquarters, they can now make presentations and speeches when called upon, as well as approach delegates in council chambers and delegate lounges. Moreover, it has been the express desire of current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, that even more NGO participation be incorporated into the daily business of the organization. Although formal NGO participation within key UN fora, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, remains minimal, NGO activity has become integral within the ECOSOC committees and at the major international

224 Willetts, "‘Consultative Arrangements’ to ‘Partnership’", 201.

225 Ibid., 193.


conferences. In fact, for the three issue areas under study in this thesis, NGO participation was essential to the workings of the conferences dedicated to the discussion of each issue area. At the 1984 Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development, and the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference, NGOs drafted statements, facilitated negotiations, lobbied state representatives, hosted parallel fora to publicize their positions, networked amongst themselves, and published daily newsletters regarding the progress of the negotiations that were widely read.\textsuperscript{228} As Michael Edwards has stated, NGOs have “a voice, but not a vote” at the UN and in other international organizations, and thus seek to influence the state representatives who can vote.\textsuperscript{229}

Advocacy organizations have had an important impact at the UN, as they have been able to oversee its operations, and lobby state representatives to advance their agendas. Indeed, the influence of NGOs in the UN is demonstrated by the reluctance of many violator states to increase NGO participation in the business of the UN, and thus open themselves up to criticism. In particular, human rights abusers have sought to exclude NGOs from the UN or to disallow their findings.\textsuperscript{230} However, the effectiveness of NGO advocacy at the UN may be less consequential than it may seem upon first analysis. As Riva Krut notes in her UN-funded report on NGO participation, “having spent five decades lobbying at the gates of the UN, non-governmental groups have finally been granted access only to see that real power now lies behind

\textsuperscript{228} For more details on NGO participation at these conferences, see Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler; Atwood; and Smith, “Building Political Will after UNCED.”


\textsuperscript{230} Forsythe, 177.
other doors.” First, lobbying NGOs have found their ability to influence political negotiations hampered by the inherent limitations of the UN itself. Specifically, the UN has been forced to cut back on the number of major international conferences, the fora where NGOs are most effective, as many UN members, including the United States, object to hosting conferences due to their expense. In addition, NGOs have found it difficult to work within the UN’s structure, as its large and extremely diverse membership, representing literally a universal spectrum of different positions, encumbers negotiations. For instance, the ICBL specifically chose to lobby states to conceive of an anti-land mine treaty outside of the conventional disarmament negotiation framework of the UN Disarmament Committee, because the committee’s unique consensus format inhibited the drafting of an effective ban. Indeed, the ICBL was able to accomplish in three years what the deadlocked UN Disarmament Committee could not, even after decades of negotiation.

Moreover, NGOs have found that the UN is not central to the international political process. The UN, as a global multi-purpose organization, has been supplanted by more functional, economic regimes, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, as the locus for international political decision-making. Therefore, advocacy NGOs have shifted their lobbying efforts to these essentially economic institutions because they are increasingly the sites of political power. However, neither the World Bank nor the World Trade Organization, two

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233 Reinicke and Deng, 103.
main foci of advocacy NGOs, have the long tradition of NGO involvement that is characteristic of the UN, and thus have had to adjust to their structure and policies to accommodate NGO demands for increased access. Both organizations were confronted by critical NGO campaigns, the World Bank with the “Fifty Years is Enough” coalition, and the World Trade Organization with both intense demonstrations and formal lobbying at its Seattle round, and as a result, came to acknowledge the importance of including non-governmental participation. NGOs have chosen to target these international organizations because environmental and human rights groups in particular have found that the political decisions that are relevant to their issue areas are being made in these economic institutions and regimes. Therefore, it has become increasingly important to improve the transparency of their dealings, and expand the level of non-governmental participation in their negotiations and policy-making.

In addition, advocacy NGOs have found that political and economic power has also shifted to multinational corporations, that appear to be even further beyond the reach of public surveillance, as they are private organizations responsible only to their shareholders. Advocacy organizations now consider corporations as potential levers for further pressure on violator states, and thus target them with lobbying campaigns. For their part, corporations have started to respond to the pressure exerted by NGOs, as the business community has come to accept the

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importance of ethical business practices and corporate responsibility. Human rights and environmental NGOs have been particularly active in lobbying corporations to change their policies, as they have recognized that corporations can be instrumental allies in the struggle to resolve international problems. For example, Greenpeace has acquainted various insurance companies with the impact that global climate change would have on their business. Afraid of the rising costs of claims, these corporations have joined Greenpeace in pressuring their clients to use green energy sources. In the human rights sector, multinational corporations have become primary subjects of NGO lobbying, as advocacy organizations have urged multinationals to pull out of states with poor human rights records in order to emphasize global human rights norms. Indeed, advocacy NGOs believe that violator states may respond more readily to the economic losses caused by a major corporate exodus than to pressure from within the international community. For instance, multinational apparel manufacturers such as Reebok, Levi Strauss and Timberland have withdrawn from China at the behest of NGOs. By targeting corporations, NGOs have been able to find new ways to advance their agendas outside the purview of international organizations and state-based politics.

After evaluating these various cases of NGO advocacy, it can be seen that their efforts are most effective when a political actor values its international reputation. Image-consciousness is


236 Peter Newell, Climate for Change, 35.

237 Spiro, 48.

238 Reinicke and Deng, 75.
an especially important factor for the effective lobbying of individual states. In particular, for the strategy of pressure by external states to be effective, the offender must care about its international reputation. Unfortunately for advocacy NGOs, the worst violators are most likely to be international pariah states without the ties to the international community that foster image-consciousness. For human rights abusers with little regard for their reputation as good international citizens, and few connections to the outside world, such as North Korea, Myanmar, Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easy to ignore the norms of the international community. As David Rieff notes, in these instances, “stigma is not getting the job done.” However, as the case of Chile demonstrates, most states value their position within the international community, and are thus vulnerable to pressure from external states. As David Forsythe writes, “it is obvious that most states care about their reputations in international relations, and go to great [lengths] to try to block critical commentary.” For instance, human rights violators such as China and Argentina have sought to exclude NGOs from involvement in international fora such as the UN. International organizations that must burnish their international image at a time when their authority and legitimacy are in question are also susceptible to NGO advocacy efforts, as the example of the Narmada dam campaign illustrates. Hence, the UN, the World Bank and the WTO increasingly attempt to include “civil society actors” in their activities. Likewise, corporations have become aware of the importance of cooperating with NGOs in order to

239 Risse and Sikkink, 34-38.


241 Rieff, 39.

242 Forsythe, 177.
maintain their international reputation, and have responded to NGO efforts to suspend corporate business operations in violator states.

A second condition that determines the effectiveness of NGO advocacy is the presence of allies at the local level. As the Guatemalan example highlights, without a local source of information, human rights advocacy groups like Amnesty International will not be effective, and international support cannot be generated. Although Amnesty attempted to generate support for its criticism within Guatemala by publishing reports and taking out advertisements in local newspapers, Amnesty could not effectively lobby external states to put pressure on the Guatemalan generals in part because there was no effective internal opposition. In contrast, the active involvement of Chilean human rights groups and Indian activists helped Amnesty and the Narmada campaign successfully enact advocacy strategies. Hence, a local connection is vital, whether it be initiated from the “top down,” as in Guatemala, or the “bottom up,” as in Chile and India. A presence at the local level gives advocacy NGOs both access to more accurate information, and a sensitivity to local context. Moreover, without connections to local activists, advocacy NGOs can easily be labelled as foreign meddlers by violator governments. Unfortunately for advocacy NGOs, John Boli, Thomas Loya and Teresa Loftin found in their study of national NGO membership that countries with the fewest connections to the international

\[243\] Clark, 62.


community and the least participation in international fora were also those states with the lowest number of national NGOs, and the lowest rate of popular NGO participation.\textsuperscript{246} Therefore, it becomes more difficult for international NGOs to forge partnerships with local organizations in offending states, further limiting the effectiveness of advocacy strategies with pariah states.

The effectiveness of advocacy strategies is also determined by the strength of NGO leverage. As the case of Human Rights Watch’s Rwandan campaign demonstrates, without the support of a local constituency, NGO lobbying of individual governments may not be effective. Human Rights Watch was unable to persuade the United States to intervene in Rwanda despite its thorough reporting, as Human Rights Watch was not supported by American public opinion.\textsuperscript{247} Without some modicum of popular support, NGOs are hard pressed to convince states to change their policies, or to pressure offending states. Thus, advocacy NGOs rely on mobilization NGOs to generate public support for their initiatives. States are even more unlikely to become involved in pressuring norm violators when moral imperatives do not coincide with their national interest. As David Forsythe points out, although advocacy NGOs such as Human Rights Watch had convinced NATO to intervene to protect the human rights of Kosovars, it used only high altitude air strikes, which may not have been the most effective way of ensuring the safety of the Kosovars. However, air strikes were the most politically expedient option, as NATO members were reluctant to risk a costly ground war.\textsuperscript{248} Hence, when material concerns trump ideational convictions, the ability of NGOs to mobilize legitimacy is blunted. Nonetheless, advocacy NGOs

\textsuperscript{246}Boli, Loya and Loftin, 57.

\textsuperscript{247}Rieff, 41.

\textsuperscript{248}Forsythe, 171.
have succeeded in redefining international problems so that they are more congruent with international norms in order to stimulate action from the international community. For instance, both the Narmada coalition and the ICBL were able to recast the problems of environmental conservation and disarmament as issues of human suffering, just as Amnesty chose to focus attention on Chile and Guatemala, where the most extreme violations of human rights, including torture and murder, were being perpetrated. By depicting the human cost of these important problems, these advocacy NGOs were able to appeal to the international community for support in pressuring violator states and international organizations to comply with international norms of respect for human rights, environmental protection, and disarmament. Therefore, under certain conditions, namely the image-consciousness of lobbying targets, the presence of local linkages, and the universal human appeal of the normative issue, advocacy NGOs can effectively use their three strategies to influence international political actors to abide by international standards of behaviour.

According to the data I compiled from the Yearbook of International Organizations, the advocacy function is performed by NGOs from across all three issue areas, but is particularly important for human rights and disarmament organizations. Over two thirds—65 percent—of human rights NGOs include involvement with international organizations and pressuring of states and corporate actors amongst their activities. Similarly, 58 percent of disarmament groups employ advocacy strategies. In contrast, only 38 percent of environmental NGOs listed advocacy in their organizational descriptions. From this finding, I inferred that advocacy is more important to human rights and disarmament NGOs because in these two issue areas, states and international organizations are more responsible for upholding international norms. Whereas in the field of
environmental protection, NGOs are more concerned with changing popular attitudes and behaviour, and thus these organizations concentrate on mobilizing individuals, rather than influencing states or international organizations. While states and international organizations are key players in environmental politics, they are the primary actors in human rights and disarmament. Thus, for NGOs in these two issue areas, advocacy strategies are especially popular.
PART III

DRAWING CONCLUSIONS:
CONTEMPLATING THE IMPACT OF NGO STRATEGIES AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING NGO INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

According to most calculations, the international NGO community has grown significantly in the last two decades, both in the number of organizations and in absolute membership.\textsuperscript{249} The sheer number of NGOs that have become internationally active may be evidence enough that these organizations have become a significant presence in the international system. However, as I have emphasized throughout this thesis, it is important to fully understand the strategies pursued by NGOs in the international political system, before considering the impact that these organizations may have on the practice of international relations. Rather than adding another case study of an individual organization to the already extensive literature, I have chosen to synthesize our current knowledge of NGOs, so that we might begin this analysis of the implications of their participation in the international system. As Ann Florini and P. J. Simmons note, "anecdotes and isolated cases cannot answer fundamental questions about the significance, sustainability, and desireability of transnational civil society."\textsuperscript{250} Therefore, in response to this perceived need for a systematic overview, I have undertaken a wide-ranging study of the existing literature on the activities of NGOs with the goal of analysing their functions and evaluating the effectiveness of their strategies. This synoptic exercise has produced some interesting insights into the political behaviour of NGOs, and the conditions under which they have the most

\textsuperscript{249} Boli, Loya and Loftin, 53.

\textsuperscript{250} Florini and Simmons, 4.
influence in international relations. As I have explained, NGOs perform four distinct functions in the international system—research and monitoring, mobilization, capacity-building and advocacy.

In this conclusion, I will draw attention to the forces that have enhanced the influence of NGOs in the international system, emphasizing the arguments that have been embedded, but not highlighted, within the body of the thesis. Let us now recall the strategies employed by NGOs, and the conditions that promote their effectiveness in the three different issue areas of environmental protection, human rights and disarmament:

1. Research and monitoring NGOs promote their technical expertise to gain influence in the international system, providing states and international organizations with the detailed technical information they need to generate policy solutions, and the monitoring capability they require to enforce international regimes. The four main research and monitoring strategies of NGOs are thus the cultivation of a reputation for impartiality and expertise, the provision of the data that is necessary to uphold international regimes, the clarification of technical information for state representatives, and the monitoring of state and corporate behaviour. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on two factors: NGOs must be allowed to gather relevant data, and states and international organizations must have need for NGO research and monitoring. First, NGOs are most successful when they can readily access information. Therefore, for issues that are highly sensitive, particularly regarding national security, NGOs have had difficulty performing the research and monitoring function, as state secrecy often foils their attempts to gather data. However, this may be changing, as the NGO involvement in the negotiation of the Ottawa Treaty banning land mines indicates that states may be becoming less hesitant to involve
NGOs in discussions of security.\textsuperscript{251}

Hence, as my survey of the Yearbook revealed, human rights and environmental NGOs have had more success with these strategies than disarmament NGOs because human rights and environmental organizations help to ensure the compliance of states, international organizations and corporations with lightly policed international regimes. In contrast, states jealous of their military security deny disarmament NGOs a role in monitoring regime compliance. However, the global trend towards greater political democratization may be facilitating the research and monitoring efforts of NGOs, as democratic states tend to be more open to public inquiries for information.\textsuperscript{252} Research and monitoring NGOs have also benefitted from innovations in information technology, as the new forms of electronic communication have allowed larger international organizations to forge stronger links with local reporting groups. Not only does the ability of NGOs to employ research and monitoring strategies depend on the availability of information, but it is also contingent on the demand for their assistance. Clearly, if states and international organizations can supply their own information, they will not require the analysis and reports of NGOs. However, many states and international organizations do not have the wherewithal to perform this function independently. For Southern states in particular, the research and monitoring of NGOs is very valuable.

2. While research and monitoring NGOs concentrate their efforts on international political actors, including states, international organizations and corporations, \textbf{mobilization NGOs} operate at the individual level, as these organizations seek to change popular social attitudes and

\textsuperscript{251}Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights."

\textsuperscript{252}Kriesberg, 5.
behaviour. Mobilization NGOs seek to transform the public discourse by creating simple and emotionally appealing narratives that will elicit a widespread response to international problems. To effectively mobilize popular support, these NGOs must construct narratives that are easily communicated by the mass media, and that emphasize the human toll exacted by the violation of international norms. Moreover, the mobilization process is most effective when these norms are broadly accepted. For instance, Amnesty International has had the most success mobilizing public support by focussing on the norm against torture, which resonates across cultures and elicits strong public revulsion. The effectiveness of mobilization strategies has also been increased by the forces of technological change and democratization, just as the impact of research and monitoring has been. Mobilization NGOs have utilized the new modes of electronic communication to disseminate their message to wider audiences. In addition, since their influence is greater in democratic societies where they are freer to organize popular support, the global trend of democratization will only improve their ability to implement mobilization strategies. Hence, mobilization NGOs will likely become more influential as “moral entrepreneurs,” changing popular attitudes and values. While many NGOs from all three issue areas perform the mobilization function, it is especially important for environmental organizations, as individual behavioural modification is more significant in this sector of NGO involvement.

3. **Capacity-building NGOs** distribute funding, supply equipment, and conduct training to enhance the capabilities of resource poor states and grass-roots organizations, particularly in the South. Assistance for building communications infrastructure by capacity-building NGOs are especially important, as this technology is integral for the formation and expansion of networks
between the larger, international NGOs and smaller, local groups. Large, international NGOs may found local branches to service areas in need if there are few local NGOs with which to connect. By establishing a presence at the local level, capacity-building NGOs can better implement their local initiatives and reinforce their international legitimacy, while assisting their smaller counterparts. Hence, capacity-building strategies are mutually beneficial for both the larger, international NGOs and local, grass-roots organizations. Capacity-building strategies are most effective under three conditions. First, since not all international NGOs have the resources to devote to capacity-building, only the most institutionalized and well-funded organizations engage in capacity-building at the local level. My study of the *Yearbook* revealed that human rights organizations are more likely to make the substantial investment in capacity-building strategies than environmental and disarmament NGOs, because international human rights groups are more likely to have their local legitimacy challenged, and because they require a local presence to effectively monitor abuses. Second, capacity-building NGOs must have the permission of the state in order to operate at the local level, since as Kal Raustiala notes, “NGO participation remains a privilege granted and mediated by states.” 253 Hence, capacity-building NGOs tend to have a greater role to play in democratic states, as democratic governments tend to be more amenable to NGO participation. Finally, capacity-building strategies are most effective when the larger, international NGOs treat their local counterparts as partners, and accept local input.

4. **Advocacy NGOs** exert pressure on states, international organizations and corporations to stigmatize norm violators within the international community. To do so, advocacy NGOs

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253 Raustiala, 724.
utilize three different strategies: they convince external states to pressure violators; they attend the meetings of international organizations; and they lobby multinational corporations. Offenders are most susceptible to the international pressure of NGOs when they value their international reputation. Therefore, pariah states are less vulnerable to the strategies of advocacy NGOs, as they do not care to maintain their image as good international citizens. Similarly, large, well-known multinational corporations such as Nike are more susceptible to NGO advocacy than more anonymous enterprises, as the campaign against the Dutch forestry giant, Wijma, demonstrates. The effectiveness of advocacy strategies is also contingent on the ability of international advocacy NGOs to form alliances with local activists. Without internal support, advocacy NGOs are hard pressed to assert the legitimacy of their claims. In addition, just as mobilization organizations are most successful when the norms they espouse are widely accepted, advocacy NGOs are most effective when they can demonstrate the universal appeal of an international normative issue. Indeed, the NGO functions of mobilization and advocacy are closely related: mobilizing NGOs target individuals, seeking to change popular social attitudes, while advocacy NGOs are committed to pressuring international political actors to re-evaluate their values and policies. Hence, human rights and disarmament NGOs employ advocacy strategies more often than do environmental organizations, because states and international organizations are the primary actors in these two issue areas, whereas environmental groups tend to focus on modifying the behaviour of individuals, whose actions have an important impact on the environment.

I have endeavoured to highlight the major strategies of NGOs, and pinpoint under what conditions they are most effective. However, I still cannot assess the impact of NGOs on international politics with any certainty, even after systematically evaluating NGO strategies and
comparing the findings of my survey of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* with the abundant case study literature. As several authors assert, it is difficult to measure the influence of NGOs because it is largely impossible to isolate which factors affect the decision-making processes of international political actors.\(^{254}\) Therefore, rather than attempting to quantify the influence of NGOs, I will take a different tack: I will instead seek to understand what implications the different NGO functions will have for the practice of international relations, and what international political forces are affecting the influence of NGOs.

One of the key forces that has opened up space for NGO participation in international politics is the complex and multi-faceted process of globalization. One aspect of globalization is the emergence of global crises without clear national solutions, such as threats to global common property resources including the climate and the oceans, and transborder problems including acid rain, the trade in hazardous wastes, and the exploitation of Southern labour by large corporations. While issues of global import such as the abolition of slavery and women's suffrage have historically mobilized individuals,\(^{255}\) environmental protection, respect for universal human rights and nuclear disarmament are just three of the international causes that have inspired new political responses. Individual states are incapable of dealing with these transnational problems alone, and NGOs have been integral in helping states and international organizations cope with these global


\(^{255}\)Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*. 
Moreover, the process of globalization has been associated with economic and political liberalization, two forces that have also contributed to the growth of NGO influence. In the spirit of liberalization, states have begun “to shed functions,” becoming less willing to regulate the activity of multinational corporations, and more reluctant to administer economic development projects. This withdrawal has created “operational gaps” which have been increasingly filled by NGOs, as the examples of NGO activity in monitoring and capacity-building indicate. Indeed, the research and monitoring and capacity-building functions of NGOs can be understood as reactions to the inability and unwillingness of national governments and international organizations to deal with global problems. As the example of the Forest Stewardship Council illustrates, privately administered regimes are taking the place of state regulation. Thus, these two NGO functions do not necessarily represent new forms of political activity: rather, research and monitoring and capacity-building NGOs are strengthening state and international organization responses to global problems. Alternatively, NGOs have assumed the research and monitoring and capacity-building roles once performed by states.

In contrast, the mobilization and advocacy functions of NGOs represent an increasingly different form of political participation in the international system. While the activities of research and monitoring and capacity-building NGOs are not significantly different from the research, monitoring and capacity-building efforts of states and international organizations, the

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258 Reinicke and Deng, xii.
strategies utilized by mobilization and advocacy NGOs seem to be unique to non-governmental actors. As Peter Newell writes, "the power assets that states and non-state actors have at their disposal are in any case largely incomparable in a meaningful way."\textsuperscript{259} Thus, the participation of these types of NGOs in the international system requires more study, as it appears to fall outside the conventional international relations conception of authority. Mobilization and advocacy NGOs "manipulate ideational factors" to influence international politics, while states draw upon their material power and sovereign authority.\textsuperscript{260} These NGOs use the weight of international norms to pressure individuals, and states, international organizations and corporations to change their behaviour.

The forces of globalization have also been at work in the evolution of these new forms of political activity, just as they have helped to create the need for NGO research and monitoring and capacity-building. First, the global spread of democratic values has encouraged states and international organizations to become more responsive to citizen demands.\textsuperscript{261} As a result, states and international organizations now pay more heed to advocacy and mobilization NGOs, who have come represent citizen voices in the international system.\textsuperscript{262} Second, the innovations in electronic communications technology that have been fundamental to the process of globalization, have also facilitated the efforts of mobilization and advocacy NGOs, as

\textsuperscript{259}Newell, Climate for Change, 164.

\textsuperscript{260}Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 150.

\textsuperscript{261}Kriesberg, 4.

technological improvements such as the Internet and satellite television increasingly allow NGOs to organize more expansive networks and disseminate their messages to larger audiences. Hence, the growth in the influence of advocacy and mobilization NGOs can also be attributed to two processes associated with globalization, democratization and technological change.

Since the advocacy and mobilization activities of NGOs represent different forms of political participation in the international system, as these actors utilize ideational leverage, unlike states and international organizations, these two functions should be of particular interest to international relations. Not surprisingly, advocacy and mobilization strategies have attracted more attention in the literature than research and monitoring and capacity-building strategies. However, further research into these two significant NGO functions is still necessary. First, the role of the mass media in the activity of NGOs has been overlooked within the discipline of international relations. Most of the work on the media's political impact has been conducted by scholars in media studies, but their approach focuses on media actors to the exclusion of all others, as neither states nor NGOs figure prominently in their research. Therefore, we need to better understand from an international relations or political science perspective how the international mass media affect the framing strategies of mobilization NGOs and the ability of advocacy groups to stigmatize violators of international norms. Second, we need to place greater emphasis on the link between popular mobilization and advocacy. It is often suggested that NGO participation in the international political system “democratizes” international relations, even though NGOs are accountable only to their members, and represent only a narrow constituency.

263 Newell, Climate for Change. 69.

While many authors have drawn attention to this paradox, they have not tried to understand the relationship between popular mobilization and advocacy. As the case of Human Rights Watch seems to illustrate, advocacy NGOs cannot successfully employ their strategies unless widespread public support has already been mobilized in favour of an international norm. Although advocacy NGOs are not representative organizations, it appears as though they cannot be effective without some popular support for their agendas, as states cannot easily ignore advocacy that is backed by public opinion. Therefore, we need to further explore the interaction between mobilization and advocacy NGOs in order to fully understand the implications of NGO participation for international relations. Moreover, we need to reconsider what we mean by democracy at the international level. As Max Cameron has pointed out, NGOs may indeed be democratizing international relations, not because they are increasing popular representation, but because they render the international decision-making process more transparent, and expose international political actors to public criticism. Thus, rather than discussing representative democracy at the international level, perhaps it is more appropriate to consider NGO participation as enhancing deliberative democracy, as these actors seem to be opening up a new locus of public debate within the international political system.

Clearly, our understanding of the impact that advocacy and mobilization NGOs will have on international relations is still incomplete. I have suggested these avenues for further research in hopes that other students of international relations will be able to extend our knowledge of

\[\text{See Simmons, 90; and Mathews, 64.}\]

these significant political actors. Rather than adding to the already abundant case study literature on NGOs, I have hoped to contribute to this wider research project by consolidating our knowledge base and gleaning from the existing literature the most important insights regarding the functions and strategies of international NGOs. With a greater understanding of the research and monitoring, mobilization, capacity-building and advocacy strategies of NGOs, international relations scholars can proceed to question the impact NGOs have on international politics.


Kobrin, Stephen J. “The MAI and the clash of globalizations.” *Foreign Policy* 112 (Fall 1998): 97-110.


Simmons, P. J. “Learning to Live with NGOs.” *Foreign Policy* 112 (Fall 1998): 82-96.


## APPENDIX I

### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NGOs, CLASSIFIED BY FUNCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Research/ Monitoring</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>Capacity-Building</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
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### APPENDIX III

**DISARMAMENT NGOs**

**CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION**

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### APPENDIX III

**DISARMAMENT NGOs**

**CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION**

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