

Transcendence and the Moral Self:
Identity Integration, Religion Orientation, and Moral Life

by

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Abstract

Kohlberg's stage model of moral reasoning is able to account for some of the variability in moral behavior, yet much remains unexplained. Recently, a number of components of personality have been proposed as bridging the gap between moral cognition and moral behavior, including that of identity. Kohlberg also theorized moral behavior as being based on transcendent or religious meaning, especially at the highest stages of moral reasoning. The present study is an investigation of the role that identity integration and religious orientation may have in leading to moral behavior. A sample of 60 undergraduates was assessed on identity integration, religious orientation, and level of moral reasoning, as well as moral behavior, using a self-report measure of altruism. A measure of socially desirable responding was used to account for the degree to which altruism scores may have been tainted by impression management. Identity integration, an intrinsic religious orientation, moral reasoning and self-report altruism were all positively related to one another. A regression analysis yielded a model with moral reasoning as the only predictor of altruistic behavior, implying that it is the integration of moral knowledge into identity that accounts for the relations between identity and moral reasoning. The discussion focuses on this relationship, and the relations between identity integration and an intrinsic religious orientation, suggesting that the intrinsic religious scale is a measure of identity integration in the religious domain.

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Kohlberg (1969; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) proposed a six-stage theory of moral reasoning moving from a Piagetian (1932/1948) concept of heteronomous morality at Stage 1 to universal ethical principles at Stage 6. Although there have been a number of variants (Krebs, Denton, & Wark, 1997; Rest, 1979) and alternatives (Damon, 1977; Gilligan, 1982; Turiel, 1983), and even, as late, a Neo-Kohlbergian theory (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999), Kohlberg's theory continues to substantially dominate the field of moral psychology. Moral reasoning appears to be able to account for some of the variability in moral behavior, such as altruistic or helping behavior. However, the degree of consistency between moral reasoning and moral behavior should not mask the fact that one can reason at a post-conventional level of moral reasoning and still remain immoral in behavior. Although individuals at higher levels of moral reasoning are less likely to conform their judgments, they appear to be just as likely under social pressure to conform their behavior (Blasi, 1980). Likewise, exemplars of prosocial behavior need not reason at the post-conventional level to be highly moral in behavior (Colby & Damon, 1992).

Walker and Hennig (1997) have referred to the division between moral cognition and moral behavior as the gappiness of moral life and have called for moral functioning to be viewed within the broader context of personality. In particular, Lee and Snarey (1988) conducted a review of previous research on Loevinger's (1976) stages of ego development and moral reasoning, finding a significant relationship between the two. The relationship appears to change, however, as a function of age, with a greater number of individuals evincing higher moral than ego stage with development across time. That is, early in development ego-stage

appears to precede moral stage, but at some point this relationship changes and moral stage then precedes ego-stage. Based on this evidence, there does not seem to be a clear necessary but not sufficient relationship between the two. Further investigation is needed to understand the exact nature of this relationship. It may be that various aspects of ego do not develop simultaneously, with particular functions being related to moral development and others not related.

A number of studies have also found a positive relationship between Marcia's (1966; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993) ego-identity statuses and moral reasoning, with higher stage moral reasoning being exhibited by individuals considered to be identity-achieved—that is, having explored a number of possible identities and committed to one (Hult, 1979; Podd, 1972; Rowe & Marcia, 1980). The present research is an investigation of the predictability of helping behavior based on identity and moral reasoning. Although Marcia's ego-statuses have proven useful in this regard, identity in the present study was assessed from the “phenomenological perspective”—that is, the way in which individuals experience identity. It was believed that the phenomenological viewpoint would reflect the degree to which an individual's moral concerns has become fully integrated into the self-concept— “the degree of coordination of one aspect with other subsystems ... and the level of superordination of the aspect ... in the hierarchy” (Blasi, 1995, p. 232). A third variable used to predict altruistic behavior, discussed in further detail shortly, is that of one's orientation toward religion. Religious beliefs can be understood as a subcomponent of identity (cf. Marcia et al., 1993). As well, the particular measure of religious orientation used here appears to reflect a similar notion to that of integration.

I will begin by discussing identity as a possible motivator of moral behavior, as well as the form such a theory must take if behavior is to be considered truly moral. Second, Kohlberg

(Kohlberg & Power, 1981) introduced a metaphorical Stage 7—one's religious beliefs or a sense of transcendence—in order to deal with the gappiness of moral life. After familiarizing the reader with his Stage 7, I will introduce a measure of religious beliefs that may reflect a similar notion to that of identity integration in the religious domain. Finally, a number of studies have been conducted that show prejudice and prosocial behavior to be related to one's orientation toward religion. A brief review of these studies will be given, followed by the specific hypotheses of the current research.

1.2 Identity as Moral Motivator

Nisan (1993) discussed the relevance of a self-actualizing process as a source of moral motivation, proposing that people act in accordance with what each sees as central to their identities. He added that if one aspect of identity has recently been actualized, the tendency would be toward actualizing a different component of identity. For example, Jewish students who had recently been given a chance to actualize their Jewish identity were more likely to choose a different activity than participate in an interview examining issues related to Jewish identity, as they had already actualized this component of identity. Similar conclusions were drawn from studies conducted on moral issues (Nisan, 1991; Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). Nisan (1993) concluded that moral motivation comes from the regulation of self-esteem achieved through actualizing one's identity. Nisan's theory of moral balance provides insight into how identity shapes behavior. There appear to be competing components of identity, the moral component being only one of them.

However, an understanding of identity actualization in the moral domain needs to extend beyond mere psychological payoff (i.e., self-esteem or positive emotion) as the basis for moral motivation if the behavior is to be considered "moral" (Blasi, 1993, 1999). It appears that Nisan

(1993) is contending that moral behavior is simply driven by that part of identity in need of actualization, without the person asking whether a behavior is objectively moral or obligatory. It is this agentic quality that is needed to consider behavior as moral, not merely a spontaneous outpouring of the self based upon emotions. An agentic process is needed that regulates, shapes, and accepts an emotion according to the individual's moral concerns, rejecting or accepting emotions and integrating them into already existent moral concerns. Such a process would lead to behavior that could be considered explicitly moral (Blasi, 1999; Montada, 1993).

Moral understanding, in this respect, is left as an autonomous system, maintaining the cognitive-developmental assumption that one's moral understanding helps to shape personality, rather than the other way around (Blasi, 1995). More generally understood, the cognitive-developmental perspective relies on the assumption that cognitions have a direct effect on the self. "A cognitive solution will be possible to the extent that the essential self is sensitive to, and indeed biased toward, cognitive considerations, not only in moral decisions but also in setting up goals and ideals for itself, namely, in constructing its very self" (Blasi, 1984, p. 133).

Blasi (1980, 1983) introduced his self-model to deal with the gap between moral judgment and moral behavior. He used the terms "personal consistency" and "integrity" to describe the ability to conform behavior to moral knowledge. Blasi (1984) laid out four basic components to this model: (a) the person, having made a moral judgment, considers whether he or she is personally responsible to carry-out the behavior; (b) the person feels morally responsible when the moral behavior is related to the self; (c) the motivation for consistency between the self and one's behavior motivates the person to perform the behavior; and (d) the extent to which the person can inhibit defensive strategies will determine the likelihood of following through on the motivation to perform the behavior. A general understanding from

these four components is that after a moral judgment has been made, the probability of an individual acting on that judgment is a function of identity. Blasi (1984) has referred to this as moral identity or “self-as-moral.” Moral identity is then the extent to which moral concerns have become part of one's identity.

Colby and Damon (1992) made the following statement about Gandhi's identity: “Personal concerns became inseparable from moral ones. In many instances, they were by choice perceived as the same concern” (italics added; p. 17). Colby and Damon marked a turn in moral development research with their case-study analysis of 23 moral exemplars — individuals illustrative of a common understanding of what it means to be highly moral over a long period of time. Many of their moral exemplars did not consider themselves as being morally courageous because they did not feel they really had any choice in the matter. In other words, it was not a moral struggle because they did not think of any alternative courses of action as viable. Their moral behavior simply flowed from identity. That is, the central concern around which an individual constructs identity produces a sense that some acts are not only seen as immoral, but simply “unthinkable” (cf. Blasi, 1993; Frankfurt, 1987, 1993; Nisan, 1993). Colby and Damon (1992) postulated the union of moral concerns with personal ones as a developmental process.

Again, the moral actor must continue to be seen as a moral decision-maker if we are to talk about moral behavior as being explicitly moral. Yet, if behavior is seen as morally unthinkable, then the agentic quality needed to consider an action moral may be lost, as there is no decision, no freedom to do otherwise, and thus no reason to consider the behavior anything other than a spontaneous outpouring of the self. The process proposed by Colby and Damon (1992) appears to be an agentic one, where identity is seen as constructed within the broader

context of one's moral understanding, and though moral behavior follows from identity, moral agency is maintained as the individual shapes identity in light of moral knowledge.

Blasi (1993) distances himself somewhat from Erikson's theory of identity (and others who have followed after him, i.e., Marcia, 1966; Marcia et al., 1993) in that he focuses exclusively on the phenomenological experience of identity—that is, one's own subjective experience of the self. He makes the assumption that people not only differ in the extent to which they have committed to an identity, but also in how those who have made such a commitment experience and relate to their identities. Blasi (1988; Blasi & Milton, 1991; Glodis & Blasi, 1993) derived four identity modes from a reanalysis of Loevinger, Wessler, and Redmore's (1970) ego development categories. These four identity integration modes appear to follow a developmental sequence (Blasi & Milton, 1991; Glodis & Blasi, 1993). Social Role Identity is experienced externally, focusing on one's behavior and the frequency of this behavior, social and family relationships, and external appearance. It is not until the second mode, Identity Observed, that identity is experienced as an "inner quasi substance" in contrast to external characteristics. Feelings are understood to be at the core of identity with one's values derived from these feelings. Acting in opposition to these feelings is self-betrayal, or at the very least acting phony. At the Management of Identity mode feelings are understood to be transitory and somewhat under agentic control, as opposed to the immutability of emotional reactions at Identity Observed. One constructs an identity around chosen ideals and a philosophy of life. There is a genuine felt responsibility for the self and acting consistent with that identity by setting out goals and moving toward them. The fourth mode, Identity as Authenticity, includes much of the same features as Management of Identity, but also moves beyond it. The person becomes concerned with the construction of identity in relation to the world as a whole. There is

an awareness of inner conflicts and dichotomies. Universal objective concerns and openness to truth become an integral part of identity, along with an awareness of the tendency toward distorting truth.

Blasi (1993) theorized that it is at the highest levels of identity integration that the individual becomes aware of, and takes agentic control over, the construction of identity. Individuals not seeing morality as central to identity would therefore evince less consistency between moral judgment and moral behavior (Blasi, 1984; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995). The extent to which one's moral knowledge has been integrated into personality will manifest itself in emotions (e.g., resentment, guilt, indignation, etc.) and a lack of such emotions will indicate moral knowledge as being isolated from the rest of personality (Blasi, 1995; Montada, 1993; Nunner-Winkler, 1993). Blasi (1993) thus claimed that self-betrayal is best understood in relation to identity—that is, an individual will feel self-betrayal and its accompanying emotions when compromising the moral self.

Blasi and Glodis (1990, cited in Blasi, 1993) postulated that those who are at the Management of Identity mode, as opposed to lower identity modes, would experience the most feelings of self-betrayal. An individual at this identity mode takes ownership over identity and feels the responsibility that goes along with maintaining and actualizing it. If identity is merely viewed as a given, not constructed, then acting in opposition to one's identity would not carry with it the same sense of personal loss. Glodis and Blasi interviewed 30 women to determine their level identity integration and asked them to select an ideal considered central to their sense of self. A number of weeks later, each participant was presented with a vignette in which the main character acts against the same ideal chosen by the participant for financial gain. More so than at the lower identity modes, those in Management of Identity or in transition to it reported

more intense negative emotions, talked more about the chosen ideal, and justified their response in terms of self-consistency and integrity. Conducive to the argument that there is a developmental process through which the divisibility of moral and personal concerns is lessened as identity becomes more integrated into the self (cf. Colby & Damon, 1992), these women too reported the psychological reaction that certain behaviors are simply “unthinkable.”

Blasi (1980, 1983, 1984) has provided a model of identity that helps to explain the role of personality in moral functioning. The degree to which moral identity has become integrated into the self determines whether what has been reasoned to be moral behavior will be acted upon. Identity then helps to develop a unity within the self, providing a superordinate structure, with all other components of the self rested upon one’s moral concerns.

1.3 A Seventh Stage: Transcendence

Kohlberg (1981), being aware of the separation between moral cognition and moral behavior, proposed a higher level structure upon which even one’s moral concerns find their basis. He proposed the need for meaning behind morals.

The “Why be moral?” question appears at the limit of moral inquiry and raises a new problem for consideration—the fundamental meaningfulness of human activity.... Religion helps us to accept our duty to be moral even in the face of evidence that acting morally will not lead to any tangible nonmoral rewards, such as pleasure. (p. 322)

Kohlberg was convinced that it was not principles of justice alone, but rather deep religious convictions behind these principles that allowed both Martin Luther King and Socrates to sacrifice their lives for what they believed. In formalizing his thinking, Kohlberg postulated a metaphorical Stage 7, giving life to the cold justice principles of Stage 6. It is possible to appeal to non-religious reasoning to justify moral behavior at any of the stages below Stage 6 (e.g., Stage 5: protecting the right to freely pursue personal happiness, while taking into account the rights of others). When trying to justify universal ethical principles, however, appealing to social

order does not as readily answer the “Why be moral?” question. Kohlberg claimed that the question can only be answered by appealing to transcendental meaning. In other words the “Why be moral?” question raises the ontological question of the meaning of life, “Why live?” Kohlberg does not, of course, rule out the raising of the moral and ontological questions before Stage 6, nor does he claim that a transcendent basis for moral behavior is impossible at the lower stages.

Fowler (1981) suggests that all people have faith, or a system of beliefs by which they function in the world. Faith in this sense is more than just religious faith: “Faith is a person’s or group’s way of moving into the force field of life. It is our way of finding coherence in and giving meaning to the multiple forces and relations that make up our lives” (p. 4). The atheist too has faith—a centering of life around what is believed to be of ultimate concern, whether that be hedonism or human rights. Upon this faith we place our life-bets. It is what gives meaning and motivation to behavior. Our moral decisions then are a function of what we believe to be of worth, that for which we are willing to die and live. Fowler too claimed moral reasoning to be rooted in faith.

Every moral perspective, at what ever level of development is anchored in a broader system of belief and loyalties. Every principle of moral action serves some center of value. Even the appeal to autonomy, rationality, and universality as justifications for Stage 6 morality are not made prior to faith. Rather they are expressions of faith—expressions of trust in, and loyalty to, the valued attributes of autonomy and rationality and the valued ideal of a universal commonwealth of being. (Fowler, 1976, p. 209)

In their case-study analysis of exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992) went to great lengths to define “moral exemplar” in a way that would avoid getting too narrow a sample. The 22-member nominating committee was made up of people from a variety of racial, religious, geographic and political backgrounds. These individuals refined Colby and Damon’s nominating criteria before nominated exemplars. Moreover, there was no mention of religion in

Colby and Damon's original or refined set of nominating criteria. They were, for this reason, surprised to find that the majority of their moral exemplars had some sort of spiritual focus or faith. Moreover, individuals who did not hold deep religious convictions looked beyond themselves finding faith and transcendent meaning "in the forces of good, a sustaining hope in a power greater than oneself, a larger meaning for one's life than personal achievement or gain" (p. 311). Colby and Damon found that their moral exemplars drew on a sense that they were involved in a larger purpose. It is what "drives the exemplars out of themselves and into courses of action that absorb their attention and energy" (p. 291). Such a belief in a higher purpose allows one to ascribe great worth to every individual, even those who would otherwise be considered worthless, such as one's enemies. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus stated it as an imperative: "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, 'Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you'" (Matthew 5:43-44). However, this attitude need not stem from a Christian or even a religious commitment (Colby & Damon, 1992). Rather moral motivation stems from a more general understanding of how one answers ontological questions, be those answers religious or not.

Colby and Damon (1992) suggested it was through their great moral sacrifices that exemplars actualized the religious component of identity.

How is it possible to continue loving and serving those who show nothing but ingratitude for the greatest sacrifices that one can make? With such acts, exemplars confirm their deepest moral and religious values and discover their own spiritual potential. (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 279)

It may be through a process of identity integration that the answers one finds to the ontological question "Why live?" become part of the self. The extent to which the religious component of identity has been integrated will determine its strength to regulate what the individual considers to be of moral concern.

1.4 An Integrated Religion

Gordon Allport (1950/1960) introduced the concepts of mature and immature religion, later dubbing them intrinsic and extrinsic orientations toward religion (Allport & Ross, 1967). An intrinsic religious orientation (I) is an orientation toward religion that gives meaning to all aspects of a person's life, acting as the primary motive, other motives becoming secondary; religion is fully integrated into the life of the individual, with religion serving as an end. The extrinsic religious orientation (E), in contrast, is an orientation toward a religion of utility, serving an instrumental purpose; religion provides comfort and social reward; religion is compartmentalized in the life of the individual, used primarily as a means toward other ends.

Allport (1950/1960) described mature religion this way:

Mature religion is less of a servant, and more of a master, in the economy of the life. No longer goaded and steered exclusively by impulse, fear, wish, it tends rather to control and to direct these motives toward a goal that is no longer determined by mere self-interest. (p. 63)

Allport's intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations appear to represent identity integration in the area of religion, reflecting an integrated and non-integrated religion, respectively.

Batson (1976; Batson & Ventis, 1982; Batson, Shoenrade & Ventis, 1993) challenged the idea that the intrinsic religious orientation is a measure of mature religion. He claimed Allport had reduced what was originally a complex conceptualization of mature religious sentiment to merely a "single-minded commitment to religion" (Batson et al., 1993, p. 158). Batson laid out three criteria he believed to be more representative of Allport's original concept: (a) facing problems without reducing their complexity, (b) a readiness to doubt, and (c) openness to change. From these he derived a third orthogonal religious orientation, Quest (Q).

Allport and Ross (1967; Feagin 1964) developed scales to measure the intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientations. They found two orthogonal factors related to each of the two subscales, I

and E. These findings were in opposition to Allport's (1950/1960) original notion of intrinsic and extrinsic orientations being at polar ends of a continuum. Accordingly, some individuals strongly endorsed both intrinsic and extrinsic items, while others endorsed neither. Allport, therefore, postulated a fourfold typology: The Intrinsic type and Extrinsic type represented those scoring high on one scale and low on the other, respectively. The Indiscriminately Proreligious type represented those scoring high on both and the Indiscriminately Antireligious type those scoring low on both scales.

Further development came when Gorsuch and Venable (1983) noted some of the items on the Allport-Ross Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) used language too difficult for children to understand. In response, they developed an "Age-Universal" I-E scale. Also, Kirkpatrick (1989; see also Hoge, 1972, note 4) conducted an analysis of the ROS and Feagin scales, revealing three orthogonal factors, the traditional I and two E factors. The first new factor, extrinsic-personal, characterizes those who seek religion for personal reasons (e.g., comfort, solace). The second, extrinsic-social, characterizes those who seek religion for social reasons (e.g., friends, social status). Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) revised the Age Universal scale after validating Kirkpatrick's factors in it as well. However, the reliability of these two extrinsic factors is somewhat questionable, as they are measured by only three items each (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990, note 2; Trimble, 1997). Additionally, these revisions to the ROS led to a scale that measures religious motivation, somewhat unmixed by theology, thus making it possible to score high on the intrinsic scale no matter the religious beliefs (Gorsuch, 1994).

A positive relationship between intrinsic religious orientation and socially desirable responding raises some question as to what the intrinsic scale is measuring (Batson, 1976; Batson & Ventis, 1982). However, many scales used to measure social desirability (e.g.,

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability) are not sensitive to whether individuals' responses represent unconscious self-deception or conscious impression management. Paulhus (1984) made a distinction between self-deception and impression management. Self-deception is the tendency to give honest but positively biased self-reports (Paulhus, 1991, p. 37). Impression management, on the other hand, reflects deliberate over-reporting of desirable and under-reporting of undesirable behaviors—that is, lying. In a review, Trimble (1997) found the intrinsic scale to be positively associated with measures of both self-deception and impression management. A second problem is that most measures of social desirability appear to contain items that are religiously loaded (Watson, Morris, Foster, & Hood, 1986). An example of this from the MCSD is: "I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoing," or "I always try to practice what I preach" (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960, quoted in Paulhus, 1991, p. 30). An association between impression management and the intrinsic scale may "reflect a commitment to normative social values that are considered relevant to religious beliefs" (Watson et al., 1986, p. 227). Paulhus' (1984, 1991) measure, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, on the surface, does not appear to be confounded with religion, and therefore may be the best measure to be used with the intrinsic scale (Leak & Fish, 1989). This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that there are certain values represented on measures of social desirability that are confounded with religious values (Watson, Morris, & Hood, 1990a).

Hood and Morris (1985) disagreed with Batson's re-definition of Allport's conception of religion, claiming the Quest religious orientation to be merely questioning without wanting answers, and that it is biased against orthodox beliefs. Although Allport (1950/1960) presumed a mature religious sentiment to be fashioned within a "workshop of doubt" (p. 72) he also claimed

that this “theoretical skepticism is not incompatible with practical absolutism” and “successive acts of commitment ... slowly strengthen the faith and cause the moments of doubt gradually to disappear” (italics added, p. 72). It may very well be that individuals with an intrinsic orientation towards their religion have passed through a process of doubt before reaching the single-minded commitment now held (Shindler, 1998). Batson’s measure of the Quest orientation does not, unfortunately, measure the process through which the individual came to a mature religious sentiment, only where the individual is at the time of testing (Donahue, 1985a; Hood & Morris, 1985).

In line with Hood and Morris’ (1985) second criticism, Kirkpatrick (1993) found a negative relationship between Christian Orthodoxy and the Quest orientation. Watson, Morris, Hood, Milliron, and Stutz, (1998) asked participants to respond to the question “How interested are you in religion?” They found a negative relationship between religious interest and all five of the scales they used to measure the Quest orientation. Watson et al. (1998) also had participants rate whether they believed items on these Quest scales to be antireligious. Twenty-two of the 33 items were considered antireligious, and 11 neutral. It appears that Quest items are considered by religious individuals to be hostile toward religion, rather than measuring mature religion. All this said, Batson (1976; Batson & Shoenrade, 1991; Batson, Shoenrade & Ventis, 1993) may have uncovered a separate and valuable dimension of religious sentiment. Yet, it has been proposed that the Quest orientation may reflect a search for meaning that is non-religious (Watson et al., 1998; Donahue, 1985a). It may also reflect the searching component in the process toward mature religion, perhaps somewhat similar to Marcia’s (Marcia et al. 1993) Moratorium identity status—high on exploration, low on commitment.

If religious orientations are recognized as a measure of a person's attitude toward religion, as opposed to religiousness per se (Donahue, 1985a), these orientations can be used as a general measure of faith integration—the extent to which a person's answers to the ontological question have been integrated into identity. Shindler (1998) conducted an exploratory study with a measure of religious integration, using concepts similar to identity integration, with a specific religious population, Orthodox Jews. Two findings of interest concerning her variable “Sense of Self and Religious Commitment” were that it was positively related to participants' understanding of their religion and positively related to the degree to which they applied their religion to other areas of life. Interestingly, she found no relationship between Sense of Self and Religious Commitment and Quest. However, her sample size was extremely small ($N = 10$), and she did not investigate the relations of religious integration and the other two religious orientations.

Foster and LaForce (1999) examined the moral reasoning, religious orientations and identity of students at a Christian liberal arts college. Although they found a decrease in an extrinsic religious orientation and an increase in moral reasoning from participants' freshman to senior year, they unfortunately never directly analyzed the relationship between the religious orientation and moral reasoning. Counter to what has been proposed here about the relations between identity and religious orientations, Foster and LaForce found that those considered diffuse in identity (low exploration, low commitment) were significantly higher on both intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations than those who were identity achieved (high exploration, high commitment).

Following Taylor's (1989) conception of identity as situated within religious and moral space, Watson et al. (1998) undertook an empirical investigation of the relationship between

religious orientation, ethical ideology and identity commitment. Ethical ideology was measured using Forsythe's (1980) Ethical Position Questionnaire, consisting of two subscales, Relativism (belief in the rejection of universal moral rules) and Idealism (belief that with the right action desirable consequences can always be obtained). Contrary to Foster and Laforce's (1999) findings, Watson et al. (1998) found identity commitment to be positively related to an intrinsic and negatively related to an extrinsic orientation. Quest was negatively correlated with identity commitment, perhaps reflecting identity confusion or exploration. Identity commitment was also positively related to idealism and negatively related to relativism. Both Quest and extrinsic scales were associated with a relativistic ideology. The intrinsic scale, on the other hand, was associated with idealism or absolutism, that is, believing in universal moral rules. According to Kohlberg, the development of moral reasoning is marked by progressively greater use of principled thinking—that is, employing universal ethical principles in one's moral decision-making. The greater use of idealism by individuals high on identity commitment is not surprising then considering the research on the relationship between ego-identity statuses and moral reasoning (Hult, 1979; Podd, 1972; Rowe & Marcia, 1980). If, as proposed here, an intrinsic religious orientation reflects the integration of identity in the religious domain, then it is expected that there will be a relationship between an intrinsic religious orientation and moral reasoning. There is also expected to be a relationship between religious orientation and moral behavior.

1.5 Religious Orientation as Moral Motivator

A number of studies have been conducted linking religious orientations and moral behavior, with the majority of these concluding moral behavior to be positively related to an intrinsic religious orientation and negatively related to an extrinsic religious orientation. The two

areas of behavior that have received the most attention concerning religious orientations are prejudice and altruism. Allport (1950), in fact, formed his ideas about mature and immature, or intrinsic and extrinsic, religion as a reaction to finding a positive relationship between prejudice and being religious (Allport & Kramer, 1946). The distinction between an intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation helped greatly in explaining this relationship. Allport and Ross (1967), Feagin (1964), and Wilson (1960) all found a positive relationship between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice. In general, the intrinsic religious orientation has been found to be either negatively related or to have no relation to prejudice. In a review, Donahue (1985a) calculated the mean correlation between prejudice and the intrinsic orientation to be $-.05$, and the extrinsic orientation, $.34$.

Kirkpatrick (1993), however, found the intrinsic orientation to have a low positive relationship with discrimination against homosexuality, but a negative relationship with discrimination against blacks. The intrinsic religious orientation was also related to discriminatory attitudes against communists. Prejudice was also differentially related to each of the two extrinsic subscales. Extrinsic-personal was related to discriminatory attitudes against communists, and extrinsic-social to a discriminatory attitudes against blacks, women, and homosexuals. The Quest orientation was negatively correlated with discriminatory attitudes toward homosexuals and communists, but only in females. Overall, the relationship between discriminatory attitudes and religious orientations appear in the expected direction. However, the intrinsic religious orientation appears to be somewhat less consistent than that of discriminatory attitudes and the extrinsic religious orientation. As well, the two subscales of the extrinsic scale appear to be differentially predictive of other moral behavior.

Haerich (1992) conducted a study of attitudes toward sexual permissiveness of self and others in a college sample consisting of both religious and non-religious participants. The intrinsic scale was negatively related, and extrinsic-personal positively related, to attitudes of sexual permissiveness of both self and other. Extrinsic-social, on the other hand, was positively related to permissiveness of self only. The relationship between sexual permissiveness of self and extrinsic-personal was slightly stronger than that of extrinsic-social. Haerich postulated that those appearing to be more extrinsic-personal also take the same attitude toward sexual permissiveness—a means to comfort and security. Considering that, in general, most conservative Christian churches teach against premarital sexual behavior, these findings could be taken as evidence for a relationship between moral consistency and an intrinsic religious orientation. Unfortunately, Haerich did not break the sample down by religious interest or affiliation to investigate this relationship.

Religious orientations also appear to be associated with helping behavior (Batson, 1976; Batson & Gray, 1981; Darley & Batson, 1973). However, individuals scoring high on Quest appeared to be more situationally responsive than individuals scoring high on the intrinsic orientation. That is, the higher on Quest the more responsive the individual was to the victim's stated needs, whereas, those low on Quest and high on intrinsic appeared to be fulfilling their own needs (Batson, 1976; Batson & Gray, 1981). People who score high on Christian orthodoxy appear to persist in their helping behavior, even when the victim gives assurance that he to she is going to be okay (Darley & Batson, 1973; Batson & Gray, 1981). However, much of the research has been done using a paradigm which requires the individual to spontaneously respond to a request for help, which may elicit helping behavior for quite different reasons than that of a non-emergency situation (Bernt, 1988).

Bernt (1988) investigated the relationship between religious orientations and volunteer work. Although those reporting the highest number of hours of volunteer activity were highest on the intrinsic and Quest scales, the relationship was not significant. However, there was a significant difference on the three religious orientation scales between those belonging to the Jesuit Volunteer Corp, an organization dedicated to social justice, and those who did not. The volunteers scored significantly higher on the Quest scale and lower on the extrinsic scale than the non-Jesuit Volunteer Corp group.

The persistence of intrinsics when help has been declined could also be related to Nisan's (1993) notion of identity actualization. Intrinsics may be fulfilling that part of identity that tells them to "Love thy neighbor" without giving the neighbor's request or refusal of love proper attention. As well, the possible relationship between identity and religious orientation may explain the link between frequency of prayer and being friendly and cooperative (Morgan, 1983).

In sum, an extrinsic religious orientation does not appear to be associated with consistency between one's moral cognitions and moral behavior, and in the case of prejudice, is predictive of what is commonly understood to be immoral behavior. As Donahue (1985b) put it, an extrinsic religious orientation is "the sort of religion that gives religion a bad name" (p. 422). Both a Quest and an intrinsic religious orientation, on the other hand, appear to be predictive of helping behavior, and therefore likely to be related to moral reasoning. Yet, the motivation behind an intrinsic individual's helping behavior is less clear, as there is some question of how uniformly predictive an intrinsic religious orientation is of non-discriminatory attitudes.

1.6 Summary and Predictions

The lack of consistency between moral cognition and moral behavior has cast somewhat of a shadow on Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. A number of personality variables have

been explored as possibly bridging this gap (see Noam & Wren, 1993; Walker & Hennig, 1997). In particular, identity has received a great deal of attention. Blasi (1993) has made some fairly bold claims concerning his identity integration modes and moral behavior. However, as interesting as Blasi's research on identity integration is, there is little reason at this time to believe that it will help to close the gappiness of moral life. Rather, Blasi (1993), though maintaining an agentic quality, has merely reframed the problem in terms of the distance between moral behavior and feelings of self-betrayal as opposed to moral reasoning. What is yet to be investigated is the extent to which identity integration is related to moral reasoning and is able to predict moral behavior. If Blasi's claims are correct, the identity modes should show a robust positive relationship with moral reasoning and be predictive of moral behavior.

There remains a great deal of controversy concerning the direction of the relationship between moral reasoning and identity (Lee & Snarey, 1988). If, as Blasi (1999) has theorized, moral reasoning informs identity integration, it is expected that moral reasoning will enjoy a stronger relationship with helping behavior than identity integration. The predictive power of identity integration and whether it is able to account for any of the variability in moral behavior beyond that of moral reasoning remains unknown.

Colby and Damon's (1992) serendipitous finding that the majority of their moral exemplars claimed to hold to a faith in something beyond themselves is interesting in light of Kohlberg's hypothesized Stage 7. For their moral exemplars, it was an integrated belief in something transcendent that acted as a moral motivator, keeping them going when times were tough. More important than the presence of belief is the orientation the individual takes towards his or her faith. Yet, Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981) seemed to see moral knowledge as prior to religious belief. Not directly relevant, but conducive to Kohlberg's argument is research

on people's folk concepts of highly moral and highly religious people (Walker & Pitts, 1998). This research indicates that people generally believe that a highly religious individual should also be a moral individual, but the opposite is not true. A highly moral individual does not need to be a highly religious individual. Yet, if an intrinsic religious orientation is able to account for some of the variability in helping behavior that is not already accounted for by moral reasoning, then religion is well worth mentioning when speaking of moral functioning.

Finally, an intrinsic religious orientation and identity integration appear to reflect a similar notion, that of being a master motivator for moral behavior. If moral reasoning is assumed to shape identity, then it should also be assumed to shape religious belief, since the relationship between identity integration and an intrinsic religious orientation appears to be one of part/whole, with an intrinsic religious orientation reflecting the religious component of identity integration. An intrinsic religious orientation is expected to carry less predictive weight, therefore, than that of identity integration, as it is assumed to be merely a single component of identity.

In summary, the present study is an investigation of the relations between identity integration, religious orientations, and moral reasoning, and the predictive power of these variables in relation to moral behavior, more specifically self-reported altruism. The use of altruism as a measure of moral behavior is somewhat controversial. Kohlbergian moral psychology, steeped in the Kantian perspective of morality, has mainly focused its attention on the duty to avoid harm, as opposed to going beyond one's duty to perform supererogatory behavior. Using identity integration, as opposed to identity commitment, may address what appear to be contradictory findings of Watson et al. (1998) and Foster and LaForce (1999). The focus of the present investigation will be on young adults, as this is the period of life when

individuals appear to experience the greatest amount of change in identity (Erikson, 1959). The following is a summation of the main hypotheses that will be investigated.

1.6.1 Hypotheses

1. Identity integration and moral reasoning are expected to show a strong positive relationship as the two are assumed to be developmentally ordered.
2. The intrinsic religious orientation scale and moral reasoning are expected to be positively related. Because Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) claimed higher stage moral reasoning to be based on the ability to think relativistically, higher Quest scale scores may be positively related to moral reasoning. The extrinsic religious orientation scale is expected to have a negative relationship with moral reasoning.
3. Intrinsic religious orientation is expected to be positively correlated and extrinsic negatively correlated with identity integration. Quest is expected to have a low positive correlation with identity integration.
4. Intrinsic religious types are expected to be higher on moral reasoning, identity integration, and self-report altruism, in comparison to Indiscriminately Proreligious, Extrinsic, and Indiscriminately Antireligious.
5. Identity integration, the intrinsic and Quest scales, and moral reasoning are expected to be individually positively related to the number of altruistic behaviors reported by individuals.
6. A regression analysis predicting altruistic behavior from identity integration, religious orientation and moral reasoning is expected to produce a model, such that moral reasoning is the most salient predictor of altruism. It is unclear whether the latter two will be able to significantly add to the model.

CHAPTER 2 – METHOD

2.1 Participants

A sample of 60 participants, balanced for gender, was recruited from the undergraduate psychology subject pool of a major Canadian university. The average age for the 30 males was 20.99 years ($SD = 5.92$; range = 18 to 51 years) and for the 30 females 20.40 years ($SD = 2.60$; range = 18 to 32 years), with 95% of the participants between 18 and 23 years. Their years of post-secondary education ranged from 0.5 to 5 years. The ethnic background of the participants was reasonably representative of the university population (42% white, 48% Asian, 5% Arab, 3% East Indian, 2% African). It should also be noted, however, that although more than half of the sample consisted of participants of non-western ethnicity, 80% of the sample was born in either Canada or Europe. Approximately half of the participants indicated having no religious affiliation (48%), with the rest representing diverse religious affiliations (40% Christian, 4% Buddhist, 3% Baha'i, 3% Sikh, and 2% Moslem). Two methods of recruitment were used. Approximately half of the sample was given course credit for their participation. However, when the university subject pool appeared to have been depleted, a token amount of \$7 was offered for participation. A MANOVA examining the possibility of differences due to type of recruitment was not significant, $F(1, 53) = .195$, n.s.

2.2 Procedure

Participants were individually interviewed for approximately 40-60 minutes. The semistructured interview, assessing identity integration and moral reasoning, consisted of several questions concerning participants' phenomenological experience of identity and having them report a real-life moral conflict. Moral reasoning on a real-life dilemma was chosen for two reasons. First, it was believed that a moral dilemma they had actually experienced would better

reflect their moral functioning in everyday life. Second, it was hoped that the dilemma would reflect an issue of significance for them, and thus better tap ideals well integrated in identity. The two sections of the interview were counterbalanced to avoid possible carry-over effects. The interview was audiotaped, and the moral reasoning interview was later transcribed to assist scoring.

Following the interview, participants were given a set of paper and pencil self-report measures, taking approximately 15 minutes. Included were measures of intrinsic, extrinsic, and Quest religious orientations, as well as a demographic information sheet. They were also asked to rate the degree to which they engage in certain helping behaviors. In order to account for the possible effects of impression management on the report of helping behavior, participants were given a measure of socially desirable responding. The order of these questionnaires was partially counterbalanced to avoid carry-over effects.

2.3 Measures

The moral reasoning and identity integration interview and the three questionnaires used in the present study can be found in the Appendices.

2.2.1 Interview Measures

Identity Integration. Blasi's (Blasi & Milton, 1991; Glodis & Blasi, 1993) Sense of Self Interview was used to assess identity integration. The semistructured interview asks participants questions concerning their phenomenological experience of identity (e.g., "Would you say that certain aspects of your self are more true and real than others?").

The identity integration interviews were scored directly from tape using a global categorization system. The scoring system yields a six-point scale, the four previously discussed modes, plus two transitional modes between social role identity and identity observed and

between identity observed and management of identity: (1) Social Role Identity, (2) Transitional mode, (3) Identity Observed, (4) Transitional mode, (5) Management of Identity, and (6) Identity as Authenticity. A template listing the features of each global identity integration category was used to aid scoring. The rater listened to the tape and a category was assigned. If there was any doubt concerning the identity category to which the protocol belonged, the interview was listened to a second time to make a finer discrimination among categories. A transitional category was assigned when a protocol was an indistinguishable combination of two adjacent categories. A justification was then written listing the reasons for and against the categorization, as well as the reason for choosing the particular code despite evidence to the contrary. Inter-rater reliability was established by having a second rater independently score 25% of the interviews. There was 80% agreement between the two raters for exact match (Cohen's Kappa = .68) and 93% agreement within one mode, similar to reliability found by Blasi and Milton (1991) and Glodis and Blasi (1993).

Moral Reasoning. Participants were asked to relate a moral dilemma that they had personally experienced. A semistructured interview was used to assess stage of moral reasoning. Participants were asked to relate how they went about solving the dilemma (e.g., "What factors were involved and why are those considerations important?") and what they believed was the best solution.

Following Walker et al.'s (1987) procedure, participants' reasons for their course of action were matched to criterion judgments in Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual. This scoring relied on general stage structure definitions as opposed to content, due to dissimilarity between Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas and real-life dilemmas. The interview judgment scores were combined to provide a distribution of percent usage at each stage. These

scores were then used to calculate an overall weighted average score (WAS: a score between 100 and 500) to enable analyses as a continuous variable. Inter-rater reliability was established by having a second rater independently score 25% of the interviews. Reliability calculated with interclass correlation using WAS scores was $r(14) = .83$, similar to reliability reported by Colby and Kohlberg (1987).

2.2.2 Questionnaire Measures

Religious Orientations. Religious orientations were measured using the I/E-Revised scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). The measure consists of eight intrinsic (I) and six extrinsic (E) items. Overall, the I-revised scale has been shown to have sufficient reliability (Cronbach $\alpha = .83$; Trimble, 1997). The reliability of the E-revised scale, however, is not as good, ($\alpha = .56$), nor the sub-scales, Ep ($\alpha = .64$) and Es ($\alpha = .63$). As pointed out earlier, the low reliability is most likely due to too few items (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990, note 2; Trimble, 1997). Using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula, Trimble (1997) showed that the reliability of Ep and Es would improve to .78 and .77 respectively, if three items were added to each scale. The Ep and Es scales do not appear to lose reliability in breaking up the extrinsic scale, even though each has only half the items. Although the reliability is somewhat low on the two E scales, it appears sufficient for the purposes here, as the main thrust of the present study surrounds the intrinsic scale. Inter-item correlations in the present sample for the intrinsic (Cronbach $\alpha = .83$), extrinsic-personal (Cronbach $\alpha = .90$), and extrinsic-social (Cronbach $\alpha = .72$) scales were sufficient. Batson's revised (Batson & Schoenrade, 1993) 12-item scale was used to measure Quest. The Quest scale appears to have good internal consistency based upon past research (Cronbach $\alpha = .78$) and in the present study (Cronbach $\alpha = .84$). Agreement with items was indicated on a 7-point Likert scale: 0 (Extremely untrue of me) to 6 (Extremely true of me).

Scoring I, E and Q scales consisted of reverse-scoring negatively keyed items, summing across all scale items and then dividing by the number of items in the scale to obtain an average for each of the scales. The sample medians were used to determine high and low on the intrinsic and extrinsic scales to yield the four typologies: Intrinsic (I), Extrinsic (E), Indiscriminately Proreligious (IP), and Indiscriminately Antireligious (IA).

Altruistic Behavior. The Self-Report Altruism scale (SRA; Rushton, ChrisJohn, & Fekken, 1981), consisting of 20 items, was chosen because it contained items representing both emergency and non-emergency opportunities for helping behavior. The SRA scale appears to have good convergent validity and correlates with peer ratings of altruism. The measure also has been shown to have good internal consistency ($\alpha = .78$ to $.87$) and continued to do so in the present sample (Cronbach $\alpha = .83$). Participants are asked to report the frequency of their altruistic behavior by checking the appropriate category on a 5-point scale: 1 (Never), 2 (Once), 3 (More Than Once), 4 (Often), and 5 (Very Often).

Participants' scores on the SRA are calculated by converting the five categories to their respective numerical values, summing across the items and then dividing by the number of items to obtain an average. Items left blank were considered to be situations where the participant has lacked opportunity to engage in helping behavior, and therefore when this occurred this item was left out and an average was taken based upon the remaining items.

Socially Desirable Responding. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991) was used to assess participants' response bias. The BIDR was chosen because of its unique psychometric properties in relation to other measures of socially desirable responding, in that, the BIDR teases apart Self-Deception (SDE) and Impression Management (IM). The SDE ($\alpha = .68$ to $.80$) and IM ($\alpha = .75$ to $.86$) subscales have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability, as well as good convergent and discriminant validity (Paulhus, 1984, 1991). It seemed prudent to partial out Impression Management, as impression management reflects the propensity to give a false impression of oneself (Paulhus, personal conversation, 2000). The SDE scale was included to assess the degree to which cognitive distortions may also

play a role in self-reported altruism, but these analyses were secondary to the main purpose.

Agreement with items was indicated on a 7-point Likert scale: 1 (Not True) to 7 (Very True).

The standard method for scoring the BIDR was used. Negatively keyed items on the BIDR are reverse-scored. The scale is then dichotomized by assigning a 0 to item-scores of 1 to 5, and a 1 for each extreme response (6 or 7). The converted items scores are then added together to produce SDE and IM scores ranging from 0 to 20. In the case of missing values, participants are considered to be acting defensively toward the item and one point is added.

CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS

The following results are organized into seven sections. The first section reports preliminary analyses that were of little interest to the main hypotheses, including gender effects and the possibility of differences due to presentation order of the two interviews or three questionnaires, and religious interest. Much noise has been made about the possibility of gender differences in Kohlberg's theory, with few studies actually finding such differences (see Walker, 1995). However, it seemed prudent to examine the possibility of gender differences here. Descriptive statistics concerning participants reported religious interest and its relations with religious affiliation are also reported in this section. The second and third sections respectively report descriptive statistics concerning identity integration and moral reasoning and their relations with age and education. The fourth section explores the relations among the three religious orientation scales and their relation with religious interest. The first three hypotheses will be examined in the fifth section, namely, whether or not there are relations among the three predictor variables: identity integration, religious orientations and moral reasoning. The sixth section further explore these relationships by examining differences between the four religious orientations types (Intrinsics, Extrinsic, Indiscriminately Proreligious, and Indiscriminately Antireligious) on moral reasoning and identity integration, as well as self-report altruism. The seventh and final section will examine the possible relations moral reasoning, identity integration, and the religious orientations have with self-reported altruism. Included in this final section is an examination of the predictive power of these three variables, as well as further analysis of the relationship between identity integration and an intrinsic religious orientation.

3.1 Gender Effects, Order Effects, and Religious Interest

A MANOVA was used to examine the possibility of gender differences on the seven variables in this study (namely, identity integration; intrinsic, extrinsic, and Quest religious orientations; moral reasoning; self-report altruism; Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding). No overall effect was revealed, $F(1, 58) = 1.50$, n.s. Therefore, gender was dropped from subsequent analyses. MANOVAs were also performed to examine the effect of questionnaire and interview presentation order. There were no overall order effects, $F(2, 57) = 1.30$, n.s. and $F(1, 58) = 1.03$, n.s., respectively.

Participants ranged in the degree to which they claimed to be interested in religion on the 7-point scale. Relatively few indicated having little or no interest (7%) endorsing 1 or 2, with the majority claiming to be moderately interested (60%), endorsing 3 to 5, and a number being highly interested (20%) in religion ($M = 4.5$, $SD = 1.78$). A MANOVA exploring the possibility of differences between participants who indicated some religious affiliation and those who did not was significant, $F(1, 58) = 3.59$, $p < .01$. Those indicating some religious affiliation were significantly higher on religious interest and the Intrinsic Scale.

3.2 Identity Integration

The majority of participants were identified as being in the Identity Observed mode (Table 1). As might be expected in a university population going through changes in identity (Marcia et al., 1993), a number of participants fit into the two transitional modes. Although there were a number of participants at or in transition to Management of Identity, no participants were found to be in the highest identity integration mode, Identity as Authenticity. Identity integration was significantly correlated with age, $r(58) = .26$, $p < .05$, but unrelated to years of education, $r(58) = .15$, n.s.

Table 1

Frequency of Identity Integration Modes

Identity Integration Mode	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Social Role Identity	1	1.7
<u>Transitional mode</u>	9	15.0
Identity Observed	34	56.7
<u>Transitional mode</u>	12	20.0
Management of Identity	4	6.7
Identity as Authenticity	0	0.0

3.3 Moral Reasoning

Participants' weighted average scores for moral reasoning ranged from 162 to 377, approximately representing transition Stages 1/2 to 3/4 ($M = 257$, $SD = 42.6$). The expected correlations between moral reasoning and age did not emerge, $r(58) = .14$, n.s. The relationship between moral reasoning and years of education also was not significant, $r(58) = .22$, $p < .10$.

3.4 Religious Orientation

There was a positive correlation between the Quest and the extrinsic scale, the source of which was found to be in extrinsic-personal, $r(58) = .37$, $p < .01$ (see Table 2), suggesting that there may be some similarities between seeking after religion for solace and peace and the Quest orientation. The two extrinsic subscales were unrelated to any other variables, and will not be mentioned further.

A high interest in religion may be needed in order to cultivate an intrinsic orientation toward religion, as religious interest was positively correlated with the intrinsic religious orientation scale $r(58) = .68$, $p < .001$. The extrinsic scale was unrelated to religious interest $r(58) = .08$, n.s., perhaps reflecting the purpose of religion being a means to other ends.

Unexpectedly, the correlation between the Quest scale and religious interest was not significant, $r(58) = .22$, $p < .10$. It may be, as indicated above, that the Quest orientation is often an extrinsic orientation as well, or, as suggested by Donahue (1985a), Quest may reflect a searching for non-religious meaning.

Table 2: Correlations Among Variables

Variable	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Religious Interest	.23 [†]	.18	.68***	.08	.13	-.01	.22 [†]	.21
2. Moral Reasoning		.48***	.28*	-.15	-.08	-.16	.23 [†]	.36**
3. Identity Integration			.27*	-.02	-.09	.05	.21	.28*
4. Intrinsic			(.83)	.10	.10	.06	.13	.28*
5. Extrinsic				(.78)	—	—	.31*	-.06
6. Extrinsic Social					(.90)	.31*	.12	-.07
7. Extrinsic Personal						(.72)	.37**	-.03
8. Quest							(.84)	.20
9. Self-Report Altruism								(.83)

Note: Coefficient alphas are listed in parentheses, where applicable.

All of the above are two-tailed correlational analyses.

[†] < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

3.5 Relations among Moral Reasoning, Identity Integration, I, E, and Q

An examination of the interrelations among moral reasoning, identity integration and religious orientations was conducted. The majority of the statistical results presented in this section are in the order in which they were presented in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Secondary analyses are also presented. Intercorrelations among variables can be found in Table 2.

The expected correlation between moral reasoning and identity integration was found, $r(58) = .48, p < .001$. Moral reasoning was also related to the intrinsic religious scale, $r(58) = .28, p < .05$. A test of two nonindependent r 's revealed no significant difference between the correlations of identity integration and the intrinsic scale with moral reasoning, $t(57) = 1.43, n.s.$ There was only a marginal and nonsignificant correlation between the Quest scale and the moral reasoning, $r(58) = .23, p < .10$, and the extrinsic religious scale showed no relation to moral reasoning, $r(58) = -.15, n.s.$

As predicted, identity integration was positively correlated with the intrinsic scale, $r(58) = .27, p < .05$, but was unrelated to either the extrinsic or Quest scales, $r(58) = .10, n.s.$ and $r(58) = .21, n.s.$, respectively. A chi-square contingency analysis was used to examine the possibility that an integrated identity is necessary for an individual to have an intrinsic orientation. An intrinsic religious orientation and identity integration were dichotomized for the present analysis. A later analysis will examine these two measures as continuous variables. The sample median was used to split the intrinsic scale into those scoring high and low. Social role identity and the first transitional category were collapsed and Identity observed, the second transitional category, and Management of Identity were collapsed to roughly form categories that represent presence and absence of an awareness of an internal sense of identity (see Table 3). Virtually no participants scored high on the intrinsic scale without also appearing at an identity integration

mode that included an internal sense of self, $\chi^2(1) = 7.06$, $p < .01$. This suggests that being intrinsic in religious orientation necessarily entails having a religion that has been integrated into identity.

Table 3

Cross-tabulation of High/Low Intrinsic Religious Orientation and Internal/External Sense of Self

Intrinsic Religious Orientation	Identity Integration	
	External Self	Internal Self
High	1	28
Low	9	22

3.6 Religious Types

Casting individuals into typologies based on being high and low on religious orientation scales diminishes the richness of what it means to be religious (Batson, Shoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990). It seemed prudent, however, in order to compare the current study with past research to examine the classic four-fold typology. The following is an examination of the differences between religious orientation types. The intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation scales were used to produce the four typologies (see Table 4). There was no significant difference in age between religious orientations, $F(3, 58) = 1.23$, n.s. A one-way ANOVA was performed across the four religious types for each of moral reasoning, identity integration, and self-report altruism to test hypothesis 4. A significant main effect was found for self-reported altruism, $F(3, 58) = 3.12$, $p < .05$. A Tukey multiple comparison test revealed that Intrinsic types reported significantly more altruistic behaviors than the Indiscriminately Antireligious types. There were no other differences among groups. The ANOVAs for identity integration and moral reasoning across of the four types were nonsignificant, $F(3, 58) = 2.20$, $p < .10$ and $F(3, 58) = 1.56$, n.s., respectively.

Table 4

Religious Types: Frequency, Age, Self-report Altruism (SRA), Moral Reasoning (WAS), and

Identity Integration (II)

Religious Orientation Type	N	%	Age	SRA	WAS	II
Intrinsic	19	31.7	22.24	3.17	272	3.47
Extrinsic	6	10.0	19.85	2.94	234	3.00
Indiscriminately Proreligious	10	16.7	19.19	2.79	253	3.30
Indiscriminately Antireligious	25	41.7	20.33	2.74	251	2.88

3.7 Self-Report Altruism

The results from hypotheses 5 and 6 are presented in this section. Refer to Table 2 for correlations among variables. Self-report altruism was positively related to the intrinsic religious orientation scale, $r(58) = .28$, $p < .05$, but unrelated to the Quest scale or the extrinsic scales, $r(58) = .20$, n.s. and $r(58) = -.07$, n.s., respectively. Upon removing the effects of impression management, the relationship between the intrinsic scale and self-report altruism only just remained significant, $r(57) = .25$, $p = .05$. Removing self-deception, however, appeared have more of an effect, as it caused the relationship to be nonsignificant, $r(57) = .23$, $p < .10$. Identity integration and moral reasoning were also significantly related to self-report altruism, $r(58) = .28$, $p < .05$ and $r(58) = .36$, $p < .01$, respectively. Impression management appeared to have no effect on the latter two relationships, $r(57) = .28$, $p < .05$ and $r(57) = .36$, $p < .01$, respectively. Again, removing self-deception appeared to have some effect on the relationship of self-report altruism with moral reasoning, $r(57) = .33$, $p < .01$, but not with identity integration $r(57) = .28$, $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 6 was tested using a step-wise regression analysis, determining the predictability of self-report altruism based on moral reasoning, identity integration, and the intrinsic religious scale. As predicted, moral reasoning was the strongest predictor of self-report altruism, entering the model first, $F(1, 58) = 8.77$, $p < .01$. However, neither identity integration nor the intrinsic religious scale significantly added to the model (see Table 5a).

Because the above analysis does not allow any inference concerning the relationship between identity integration and an intrinsic religious orientation, a second regression analysis was conducted without the presence of moral reasoning. It was determined that if the intrinsic scale fails to contribute to the predictability of self-report altruism beyond that of identity

integration, it may be because the relationship between an intrinsic religious orientation and self-report altruism has already been accounted for by identity integration, giving further reason to think that an intrinsic religious orientation is merely a subcomponent of an integrated identity. The analysis produce a regression model that only included identity integration, with the intrinsic scale unable to account for any of the left over variability in self-report altruism, $F(1, 58) = 4.99$, $p < .05$ (see Table 5b).

Table 5

Multiple Regression Analyses of Self-report Altruism

	Variable	<u>R</u>	<u>R</u> ²
a.	Moral Reasoning	.36	.13**
	Intrinsic Scale	.41	.16
	Identity Integration	.42	.17
b.	Identity Integration	.28	.08*
	Intrinsic Scale	.35	.12

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

CHAPTER 4 – DISCUSSION

4.1 Overview

The present study is in response to the recent call to see moral functioning in the broader context of personality (Walker & Hennig, 1997). In particular, the role of identity in bridging the gap between moral cognition and moral action has received a great deal of attention (see Noam & Wren, 1993). Colby and Damon's (1992) research points toward a developmental process involving the fusing together of moral and personal concerns, or the integration of moral knowledge into identity. In addition, their work raises questions concerning the role of faith in moral life. Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981) proposed that transcendent beliefs breathe life into moral justice principles causing individuals to act on their moral knowledge. The research reported here is based on the proposition that it may be more than simply one's beliefs, but rather one's orientation toward these beliefs that is most important. An intrinsic religious orientation appears to reflect the integration of one's religious beliefs into identity. An investigation of the role that identity integration (Blasi, 1983, 1993) and religious orientation (Allport, 1950) have in predicting moral behavior was carried out. The relation of identity integration to both moral reasoning and religious orientation was also examined. The individual predictor variables, identity integration, moral reasoning, and religious orientation will be discussed first. Second, an explanation of the relationship between identity integration and moral reasoning will be proposed, followed by a discussion of the relations of identity integration and religious orientation. Next, the role of religious orientations in moral functioning will be discussed, and lastly the possible limitations to the present study.

4.2 Identity Integration, Moral Reasoning, and Religious Orientations

4.2.1 Identity Integration

The range of identity modes represented by the present sample is reflective of those found in prior studies with this age group (Glodis & Blasi, 1993). It appears from previous research (Glodis & Blasi, 1993; Blasi & Milton, 1991) that these identity modes are developmentally ordered. This is not surprising in light of Marcia's work on the developmental process of Erikson's identity crisis and resolution (see Marcia et al., 1993). Although identity status is conceptually different from identity integration, there probably exists a relationship between identity as phenomenologically experienced and the identity statuses (Glodis & Blasi, 1993, Note 1). However, the present research found no relationship between the identity modes and age, probably due to the restricted age range in the sample.

4.2.2 Moral Reasoning

Moral reasoning was related to the number of years of education participants had received, a far from new finding (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Walker, 1988). Colby and Kohlberg (1987) reported a correlation of .78 between age and moral stage for their U.S. longitudinal sample. Yet, this relationship was not found in the current sample, likely due to a restricted age range, with all but two of the participants being between 18 and 23 years of age.

4.2.3 Religious Orientations

Batson's revised scale is not the only measure of Quest to correlate with the extrinsic scale. Similar to the present findings, Watson et al. (1998) found low correlations ranging from .18 to .25 for five measures of Quest. The original Quest scale (Batson & Ventis, 1982), however, was found to correlate with both the extrinsic-personal and extrinsic-social scales (Watson, Morris, & Hood, 1990b). The findings here suggest that the revised Quest scale

(Batson et al., 1993) is related to only the extrinsic-personal scale, a finding similar to that of Kirkpatrick (1993) who used Kojetin's scale (also a revised version of Batson's original scale; see Kojetin, McIntosh, Bridges, & Spilka, 1987). If extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations are developmentally ordered, as has been suggested by Gorsuch (1994), then it is not unreasonable for an orientation that may reflect the searching component of religion to be associated with an extrinsic religion based upon prayer and solace. Perhaps not true of the mystic, one who's religion consists of a perpetual quest, but true of those in the process of searching for a religion to which they may commit, an exploration of various religions without yet commitment may appear as a developmentally immature form of religion (i.e., extrinsic).

Quest was not significantly related to any other variables. However, based upon previous research, it was expected that Quest would have been related to altruism and religious interest. Watson et al. (1998) found religious interest and Quest to be negatively related. Theirs and the present study, however, reflect quite different samples. Watson's sample was with a religious population, as it was restricted to those indicating at least a moderate interest in religion ("at least 4" on a 9-point scale). The current sample may better reflect the general population as no such restrictions were applied. The current findings add to the controversy about whether Quest is truly a measure of religion, especially a mature one (Donahue, 1985a).

By definition, the intrinsic religious orientation reflects an interest in religion. Thus it is not surprising that this relationship emerged in the present study, with those indicating a greater interest in religious being more intrinsic in their orientation toward religion. Although with a less restricted range the correlation here is somewhat higher than Watson et al.'s (1998), there is no significant difference between the two correlations. A relationship that did not emerge here, but has done so in much of the previous research, is that of a negative correlation between the

intrinsic and extrinsic scales. However, Donahue's (1985a) meta-analysis found essentially no correlation between the two, becoming more positive as the sample becomes more conservatively religious. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) found this negative relationship on the Age-Universal scale to be a function of extrinsic items that better served as reverse-scored intrinsic items. After revising the scale to reflect this, they found only a very low negative correlation between the intrinsic and extrinsic-social scale (.12). An extrinsic orientation appears to be a truly distinct orientation from that of intrinsic.

4.3 Identity Integration and Moral Life

Colby and Damon's (1992) research with moral exemplars led them to propose a developmental process, whereby there is a coming together of moral and personal concerns. Blasi (1980, 1983) has offered further insight into how such a process may occur. He claimed that moral behavior stems from the degree to which moral knowledge has been integrated into identity or one's self-concept. A sense of moral responsibility is thus derived from a psychological need to be self-consistent, to act in accord with who one believes oneself to be. "According to this model, moral identity plays a central role, and self-consistency is the basic motivational spring of moral action" (Blasi, 1993, p. 99). Blasi (1995) claims moral identity to be an agentially constructed identity. At each successive identity integration mode, individuals take more agentic control of the construction of identity around moral ideals; it is a purposeful "cultivation" of values considered to objectively good.

As predicted in the first hypothesis, there does appear to be a relationship between moral cognition and the integration of identity. Considering the restricted age range of the present sample it appears that these two variables are indeed related to one another, as opposed to being merely co-developing structures. As well, identity integration was found to have a low positive

correlation with altruistic behavior, but was not able to add to the prediction model beyond that accounted for by moral reasoning.

The relationship between moral cognition and moral action appears to be mediated by a sense of moral responsibility (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Blasi, 1995), which, at least in part, may be a function of the degree to which moral cognition has been integrated into identity. Blasi (1995) suggested that almost everyone considers morality important, but not everyone considers morality as central to his or her self-concept, though one's moral understanding, from the cognitive-developmental perspective, influences behavior. For what reason, then, should moral reasoning and identity integration be developmentally related to one another? Low stage moral reasoning should be just as likely as high stage moral reasoning to be integrated into identity. Yet, this was not the case in the present sample. Higher levels of moral reasoning were found in conjunction with higher identity integration modes.

First, lower stage moral reasoning is an external morality of reward and punishment. Beginning at Stage 3, however, personal interest is subordinated to interpersonal relationships. The pursuing of personal interest is a feature of social role identity. Only when personal interest is set aside, replaced by one's feelings, thought and ideas, namely cognition, does there develop an inner sense of self. Perhaps, the same underlying cognitive structures allow for both an interpersonal morality and for a more stable sense of inner identity. A necessary but not sufficient relationship between cognitive development and moral reasoning is well established (Walker, 1980). Although not with identity integration, there appears to be some evidence for this relationship in ego-identity statuses. Rowe and Marcia (1980) found the development of formal operations to be necessary but not sufficient for identity achievement and post-

conventional morality. Thus the relations found between identity integration and moral reasoning may be caused by a third variable, logical operations.

A second possible explanation for this relationship may be found in the obligatory nature of moral judgment. Each of Kohlberg's succeeding moral stages is more attractive than the one prior. That is, as long as a stage can be cognitively comprehended, individuals seem to prefer higher stage judgments, finding them more adequate in making moral decisions (Walker, 1988). Thus, setting aside identity involvement for the moment, moral reasoning alone appears to influence whether a particular course of action should be followed. Likewise, stage development appears to determine the degree to which individuals put forward excuses to avoid moral obligation (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). As one moves through each stage of moral reasoning, moral judgments take into account and balance a greater number of perspectives, and therefore, from the first person vantage, make it more difficult to provide reasons against conforming one's behavior to these judgments (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). So, the relationship between moral reasoning and identity integration originates in moral conviction—that is, moral concerns must first be judged as “moral” before they can shape personal concerns. Only then will the determined morally right course of action begin to be integrated into identity. Yet, the extent to which one goes about cultivating moral understanding in identity would depend on exactly how convinced the individual is that a particular course of action is in fact the right one. More so than lower level reasoning, developmentally advanced moral reasoning is seen as morally obligatory not just for oneself, but for others as well. The degree to which moral judgments are seen as obligatory may determine whether that course of action is integrated into identity. For instance, two individuals, one at Stage 2 and one at Stage 4, may both judge a course of action to be morally right, but the individual at Stage 4 is more likely see her judgment as more universally

applicable, thus making fewer exceptions to the rule and consequently fewer excuses. It is much easier for Stage 4 individuals to confidently assert their judgment as being morally right because they are less likely to run into situations where their judgment will not apply. They can, with greater confidence than Stage 2 individuals, cultivate their moral judgment into identity. It is not surprising therefore that moral reasoning enjoys a rather robust relationship with identity integration.

Identity integration may not have moral motivational power of its own, since the relationship between identity integration and self-report altruism disappeared once moral reasoning had been taken into account. In this case, it is the integration of moral knowledge into identity, derived from moral stage reasoning, which is determinative of behavior. Moral reasoning alone appears to be able to predict moral behavior (cf. Blasi, 1980), but when moral knowledge is integrated into identity it takes on greater motivational power—that is, when acting in accord with one's moral understanding is seen as acting in accord with oneself, the motivation to act stems from the motivation to remain self-consistent (Blasi, 1993).

Still, there appears to be a great deal of variability in moral behavior that is not explained. The correlation between identity integration and altruistic behavior was quite low and moral reasoning was only able to account for 13% of the variance. The integration of nonmoral aspects of identity could have some moral sway. First, there seem to be other areas of identity that compete with moral identity in determining behavior, leading individuals to choose a course of action that may appear, at first glance, to be at odds with what was understood to be the most central moral concern (see Nisan, 1991, 1993). Second, one's already existent identity (including, for that matter, those moral concerns that were previously integrated into identity)

could influence what courses of action will be chosen and which of a number of moral concerns will be cultivated and given precedence in one's self-concept (Blasi, 1995).

Individuals may behave in ways that are considered morally right, but following the whims of personality cannot be considered moral per se; personality must be infused with moral understanding (Blasi, 1995). First, an individual reasons what the morally right course of action should be. The obligatory nature of the judgment will depend on stage of moral reasoning. A sense of personal responsibility will stem from the presence of allied personal concerns and the lack of competing personal and moral concerns. Furthermore, the obligatory nature of higher level moral reasoning will carry greater weight in overcoming other aspects of identity, and as such one's moral knowledge will become the backdrop against which one shapes his or her moral identity.

What makes Nisan's (1991, 1993) research so interesting is that he looks beyond individuals' reasons for following a particular course of action, to their reasons for not performing the action. The Kohlbergian tradition has narrowly focused on cognitive and personality characteristics that provide greater ego-strength, while only recently beginning to shed light on what may draw upon or compete with carrying-out a particular moral judgment (e.g., Matsuba & Walker, 1998). More research needs to be conducted to find out which of a number of personality variables provides the greatest competition to moral judgment.

4.4 Transcendence and the Self

The current research helps to disentangle the relationship between an intrinsic religious orientation and identity. Previous research has produced somewhat equivocal results (see Watson et al., 1998; Foster & LaForce, 1999). These contradictory findings may be a product of the way in which identity was measured. Watson et al. (1998) used two measures of identity that

assessed the degree to which Erikson's identity stage has been reached and resolved, as opposed to the quality of resolution. Foster and LaForce (1999), on the other hand, using a measure developed to reflect such qualitative distinctions (i.e., OMEIS; Grotevant & Adams, 1984), found what appeared to be a negative relationship between identity commitment and both intrinsic and extrinsic orientation scales. Yet, neither of the previous studies captures the essence of an intrinsic religious orientation in identity. Certainly, we could imagine an individual committed to his or her religion without necessarily being intrinsic in religious orientation. An intrinsic religious orientation entails not just exploration and commitment, but a self-perceived giving over of oneself to the religion. The individual has become servant to the religion, not the other way around (Allport, 1950/1960), and measures of identity commitment or the quality of that commitment do not capture such a distinction. Whether the religion has become a primary motivator for the individual is better reflected by the degree to which the religion has been integrated into the life of the individual—that is, a self-perceived embodiment of the religion. As such the measure of identity integration used in the present study was able to capture the essence of an intrinsic religious orientation, finding, as predicted, a positive relationship between the two. The intrinsic scale appears to be a measure of identity integration in the religious domain. Evidence of this is found, not only in the direction of the relationship between the intrinsic scale and identity integration, but also in that an intrinsic orientation and an external view of identity appear incompatible. Almost none of the present sample scoring high on the intrinsic scale scored below Identity-Observed—the first identity mode in which individuals see identity as internal. In addition, the similar direction of the relationships of moral reasoning with both the intrinsic scale and identity integration can be seen as evidence of convergent validity. Likewise, an intrinsic religious orientation, being only a part of the identity integration story, had

only a low correlation with identity integration, and a lower correlation with moral reasoning than identity integration (though not significantly so). As well, an intrinsic religious orientation was not able to account for self-reported acts of altruism above that accounted for by identity integration.

Previous research raises an expectation of there being a negative relationship between measures of identity and an extrinsic religious orientation, but the current research failed to find this relationship. Two differences exist between the present and previous research, however. The current study was conducted using the I/E-revised scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989), whereas previous research on identity has used the ROS (Allport & Ross, 1967). And, as previously concluded, the I/E-revised scale not only produces intrinsic and extrinsic orientations as two orthogonal factors, as does the ROS, but, unlike the ROS, the two scales appear to show virtually no relationship with one another. These previous findings may have been caused by the presence of extrinsic items that are better suited as reverse-scored intrinsic items. The intrinsic and extrinsic scales on the I/E-revised scale are in no way merely measuring opposites. As such, being low on the intrinsic scale appears to be a better measure of a lack of identity integration, while the extrinsic scale does not measure identity integration whatsoever.

The second difference with the current research is that it relies upon a measure of identity from the phenomenological perspective, whereas previous research (Watson et al., 1998; Foster & LaForce, 1999) used measures of identity commitment. What is yet to be determined is whether the extrinsic scale merely correlates with identity commitment and not identity integration, or if it is the low reliability of the I/E-revised extrinsic scale failing to produce the information needed to reach similar conclusions.

In sum, there appears to be some commensurability between identity integration and an intrinsic orientation. The intrinsic religious orientation appears to reflect an integrated religion, although the particular measure of identity integration used here is divorced from the content of identity. That is, Blasi (1993) claims that a person can construct a highly integrated identity regardless of whether commitments have been made to certain political or religious ideologies. Identity can be constructed around any number of issues that provide a more integrated sense of self. One need not be intrinsic in religious orientation to have an integrated identity, which may explain why there is only a moderate correlation between the two constructs. If Blasi is correct then one should find a positive correlation between identity integration and any aspect of life to which someone is intrinsically motivated. More will be said about intrinsic motivation as a general construct in the conclusion.

4.5 Transcendence and Moral Life

In light of Watson et al.'s (1998) findings that Intrinsic types were higher on ethical idealism and lower on relativism than the other three religious orientation types, it was expected that there would be a difference in moral reasoning for religious type. Yet, the current study did not reveal a difference on moral reasoning. Nor was there found the predicted difference on identity integration for religious types. The one prediction for religious orientation types that did emerge was that of Intrinsic reporting significantly more altruistic acts than the Indiscriminately Antireligious, an interesting finding considering that the former represents mature religion and the latter not being religious at all.

There appears to be something positive about not only being religious, but approaching religion with a certain orientation. As predicted, the Intrinsic Scale showed a low positive relation with self-report altruism, whereas neither the extrinsic nor the Quest scale was

significantly related to self-report altruism. One possible explanation for the relationship between the intrinsic scale and altruism is that provided by Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981) and Fowler (1976, 1981), where moral behavior ultimately relies upon one's sense of transcendence or faith. Hood (1973) investigated the relations between an intrinsic religious orientation and a sense of transcendence. He found that individuals high on the intrinsic scale used more transcendent language in describing their "single, most personal experience" (p. 443). A relationship appears to exist between an intrinsic religious orientation and religious or transcendent experiences (Hood, 1970, 1973, 1975). However, Kohlberg conceived of his metaphorical Stage 7 as occurring subsequent to Stage 6, whereas the participants here appear to have used moral reasoning no higher than approximately Stage 4. Alternatively, it may be that there is a developmental progression across stages in the use of transcendence in justifying moral behavior. One could investigate this relationship simply by looking at the amount of transcendent or religious language used to justify moral judgments across stages of moral reasoning.

A second possible explanation for the relationship between an intrinsic religious orientation and self-report altruism is perhaps found in identity. As discussed previously, an intrinsic religious orientation may reflect the integration of religion into identity. Identity integration and an intrinsic orientation appear to be equally related to altruistic behavior. The relationship with identity integration, however, seems somewhat more robust, in that, after partialling-out impression management and self-deception, a truer account of the predictable value of an intrinsic orientation was obtained. An intrinsic religious orientation as only a part of the identity integration story does not encompass the whole of identity integration, as there are many other areas of life that can be integrated into identity. Blasi's (1993) self-model, for

example, is based on one's moral knowledge as a component of identity integration. As such, identity integration, as a broad measure of identity from the phenomenological perspective, may be predictive of altruistic acts without the necessity of being religious per se. The moral component of religion being integrated into the self may work to motivate the individual to behave morally. It is then the presence, and to what degree, of Blasi's "self-as-moral" that is predictive of moral behavior and not necessarily the orientation one takes toward religion.

The lack of relationship between the extrinsic scale and self-report altruism is not surprising considering that altruistic behavior is often supererogatory behavior—that is, going beyond simply performing one's duty. However, perhaps the more intrinsic the orientation individuals take toward religion, the more likely they are to perform actions that are supererogatory, such as altruistic acts. Being more or less extrinsic, however, would not necessarily lead the individual to perform over and above simple moral duty. It would, therefore, be the presence of an intrinsic orientation and not absence of an extrinsic orientation that would lead to an individual helping. This is similar to the relationship found between religious orientation and prejudice. In the case of prejudice, however, it is the presence of an extrinsic orientation and not the absence of an intrinsic orientation that is predictive (Donahue, 1985a).

It is interesting to note that removing impression management and self-deception had little effect on the relation of self-report altruism with identity integration and moral reasoning, but did appear to affect its relationship with the intrinsic scale. If participants were over-reporting altruistic behavior, exaggerating the relationship between self-report altruism and the intrinsic scale, it should have a similar effect on the other variables as well. An argument could be made that participants were over-reporting the degree to which they are intrinsic in their orientation toward religion. However, it begs the question to say that those who are intrinsic

over-report the degree to which they are intrinsic. More likely is the explanation given by both Trimble (1991) and Watson et al. (1990a), claiming that the content of social desirability scales, even that of the BIDR, is confounded with being religious.

The fact that an intrinsic religious orientation did not add to the predictability of altruistic behavior above that of moral reasoning is rather interesting. Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981) made two claims that may help explain this relationship. Although being intrinsic may be a sign of participants having sought answers to the “Why live?” question, it may not be until one reaches “the limit of moral inquiry” (p. 322) that these answers are used to answer the “Why be moral?” question. Only then would one’s orientation toward religion significantly contribute to moral behavior. On the other hand, Kohlberg claimed that religion was not necessary to explain moral functioning, as he believed moral knowledge to be prior to religious knowledge. The research of Walker and Pitts (1998) on folk conceptions of highly religious and highly moral individuals is also suggestive of this order of development. Moral reasoning appears to remain the most salient predictor of moral behavior, but whether religion is involved in the path moral knowledge takes in leading to moral behavior requires further investigation.

4.6 Limitations

There are a number of limitations in current study worth mentioning. For one, the sample size was adequate, but not large. A number of relations may have achieved significance with a slightly larger sample. The power to find a significant result between Quest and moral reasoning, for example, was only .40, quite low by Cohen’s (1988) standards. Approximately 20 more participants would have been needed to achieve significance with the current level of correlation. Of course these relationships could remain nonsignificant or even change direction.

Secondly, although the current study is not a developmental study and there is expected to be variation among individuals of the same age on developmental variables, a sample with too narrow an age range does limit the variability in developmental variables. Two of the main variables in the analyses, moral reasoning and identity integration, have been demonstrated to be developmentally ordered, perhaps curtailing the likelihood of finding significant results. For example, Kohlberg claimed that an appeal to transcendence does not occur until the latter stages of moral reasoning, which were not used by participants in the present sample. The variability in identity integration may also have been limited by this age restriction, hampering its ability to contribute to the regression model.

Third, intelligence is often related to developmental variables. For example, Colby and Kohlberg (1987) found moderate correlations between IQ and moral reasoning (.37-.59). They concluded that moral reasoning was related to but not reducible to intelligence, finding that other variables such as education are also related to moral reasoning after IQ has been taken into account. Still, it is likely that identity integration and religious orientations are subject to the influence of intelligence as well. The correlations in the present study may be partly attributable to IQ.

Although the sample was representative of the particular Canadian university from which it was taken, the sample is not representative of North America in general. However, both moral reasoning (see Walker, 1988) and religious orientation (Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988) appear to be applicable cross-culturally. Incidentally, the high percentage of Asian participants consisted mostly of people of Chinese origin. Walker and Moran's (1991) work in China demonstrates the applicability of Kohlberg's model to this population. Blasi's measure has not been used to assess identity integration in non-western cultures, leaving some

question as to whether identity integration would be as salient, developmentally, in collectivistic societies. However, even a highly collectivistic culture, such as is found in China, has an understanding of an individuated inner self, found both in Confucianism and more so in Taoism.

A caveat needs to be added to the relationship between an intrinsic religious orientation and altruism. Although the measures for both of these variables have been found to correlate adequately with observation and peer nominations (Donahue, 1985a; Rushton, Chrisjohn, Fekken, 1981), both are based on self-report paper and pencil procedures. The accuracy of such a methodology is a limitation for the current research. Thus, it is not known to what extent self-reports of altruism may or may not have been exaggerated or false. A stronger case could be made if there had been some objective measure of altruistic behavior.

4.7 Conclusion and Future Directions

The cold cognition of Kohlberg's moral stages seems to have lost a great deal of its popularity. While many may be more than happy to throw out the bath water, baby and all, the cognitive-developmental perspective appears to still have import to understanding moral life. Recent projects (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Matsuba & Walker, 1998; Matsuba, 2000; Rest et al., 1999) extending and integrating cognitive-developmental variables into other domains would appear to contribute more to our understanding of moral functioning than simply beginning anew. The current research was an attempt to help better understand the role of identity in everyday moral decision-making. The findings here suggest that further research be conducted on identity as a mediating variable between moral cognition and moral action. The integration of one's moral knowledge into identity appears to play a part in whether individuals act on their moral judgments. However, stage of moral reasoning appears to contribute to whether these judgments are integrated into identity. In addition, other mediating variables besides identity

need to be sought, since identity occurs rather late in life (Blasi, 1993) and seems to account for only a fraction of the variability in moral behavior. Trait approaches have shown some promise in this regard (Matsuba, 2000; Walker, 1999). As well, some yet to be published work by Matsuba and his colleagues suggests a link between attachment style and moral behavior.

The examination of another possible mediating variable arose from Kohlberg's suggestion that transcendent beliefs give life to justice principles, acting as a moral motivator. Religious orientation, which has been associated with transcendent experience, seems to be predictive of moral behavior. However, the intrinsic scale may be measuring something similar in form to identity integration, but vested with religious content. In fact, studies that have slightly altered the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation scales to reflect non-religious content (e.g., non-Christian) or an ideology (e.g., communism) have found results similar to North American Christian samples (Gorsuch, 1994; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997). The intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations may simply be measuring a motivational style in religious form (Gorsuch 1994).

Deci and Ryan's (1985) research points toward there being intrinsic and extrinsic motivational styles that have nothing to do with particular content (although religion has not directly been investigated). The intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations may simply be measuring a religious form of Deci and Ryan's (1985) intrinsic and extrinsic motivational styles. The intrinsic motivational style is reflected by Deci and Ryan's autonomy causality orientation—the initiation and regulation of one's own behavior is perceived as self-governed. The autonomy orientation is positively associated with ego-development and thought to reflect a unified and integrated sense of self. The underlying construct of both identity integration and an intrinsic religious orientation may be found in an autonomy orientation. Only one study has examined the

relations of motivational style and moral reasoning (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Using the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979), a positive relationship was found between the use of principled reasoning and identified reasons—acting from one's own values or goals (Ryan & Connell, 1989). However, similar to the current findings there was no relationship between moral reasoning and external reasons (reference to authority or fear of punishment) or interjected reasons (self-esteem, guilt, shame, self or other disapproval). Obviously, the relation of an intrinsic motivational style to moral functioning is in need of further investigation.

The current research has focused exclusively on helping behavior. Although a great deal of research has been conducted with religious orientations and various other areas of moral life, no other research has directly investigated identity integration and moral behavior. Research on other moral behaviors (e.g., delinquency, honesty, etc.) as well as the ability to follow through on one's moral judgments in the face of competing needs must be conducted on identity from the phenomenological point of view to establish its role in moral functioning. Moreover, objective measures of moral behavior rather than self-report are needed. As found here, this is especially true when using measures that may be confounded with the content of socially desirable responding questionnaires, since there is no way to adequately tell apart true and exaggerated or false responses.

One effective approach to objectively assess moral behavior, employed by Colby and Damon (1992), is the nomination of moral exemplars. A number of reasons make this the method of choice. First, it is presumed that moral exemplars would embody certain personality traits that set them apart, allowing one to speculate about those traits that should be cultivated in moral life. Second, moral exemplars are expected to be at the upper end of many developmental variables, levels that may be more difficult to find in the average individual. Of course, this is

not always the case (e.g., moral reasoning of moral exemplars). Nevertheless, a more rigorous investigation of the religious and motivational style of moral exemplars may be the logical next step considering the present findings and those of Colby and Damon. Whether these play a significant role in moral self-consistency is yet to be determined.

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Appendix A
Sense of Self Interview
 (Blasi and Craypo, January 1991, unpublished)

I. Sincerity and Self-Blame

Purpose: To approach S's meaning of the inner self, by addressing the issue of the match between the real me and its outer expressions. Questions of sincerity and phoniness are excellent to distinguish the Identity Observed mode from lower modes; questions concerning self-betrayal seem to be more appropriate for later modes.

1.

- a. Sometimes we say of a person that he or she is phony or fake
- b. What does it mean to be phony?
- c. Can you give me an example of someone who is being phony?
- d. Why would you consider this person phony?

[After question 1, the following question can be raised, if there is a need to clarify or sharpen S's understanding]

Would you think that a person is being fake every time he or she shows a feeling different from the real one?

Or do you think that to be a phony person one has to fake only certain feelings? Which? Explain.

2. This is a hard question: Imagine that one day you look at yourself and think: I have become a phony person. [Encourage real reflection.]

- a. What kind of things would you tell yourself in your mind?
- b. How would you feel about yourself?
- c. Would your being phony be really important to you? Why?

3

- a. Sometimes we hear another expression; We say: So and so betrayed himself or herself. What do you think we mean?
- b. Could you give me an example of someone who betrayed himself (you can make it up)? Why would this be self-betrayal?

4.

- a. Do you think that to betray oneself is rather similar to being phony?
 - b. Can you explain why they are the same or different?
- [Probe]

5.

- a. Imagine that a person is not hurting anybody else; it is a matter that only concerns himself or herself. In this case, would it be so bad to betray oneself?

6. Imagine that one day, in conversation with a friend, you realize that you have been betraying yourself.

- a. In this case, what would go through your mind?
 - b. How would you feel?
- [Encourage S to be aware of his or her real feelings.]

II. The Real Me

Purpose: This topic is most central, since it relates to the very meaning of identity. The purpose includes (a) to see whether S differentiates certain aspects of himself or herself and recognizes them as truer, more central, basic, or more real than others; (b) to bring out some of these aspects in general; and (c) to understand in what sense they are thought to be particularly true or real.

Note: Some people do not respond well to the terms, real or true self; in these cases, try to substitute them with “central or core self,” “essential self,” or similar expressions.

1. Sometimes people say: “This is my truest self,” or “This is my real me.”
 - a. What do you think they could mean by “true or real me”?
 - b. Why do they speak of “true” or “real”? Is there a part of oneself that is less true or real? Explain. [Probe]
2.
 - a. Would you say that certain aspects of your self are more true and real than others? [If the answer is yes, continue with b and c; if the answer is no, continue with d, and then go back to b and c.]
 - b. Can you give some examples?
 - c. In these cases, what is especially real and true? Explain. [Probe carefully]
 - d. Of course, everything that is part of you is real (hair, body, intelligence, feelings, nationality, your goals, etc.) However, some people think that certain aspects are more real (or more central, essential, basic) than others. What do you think?
3. This question may seem strange to you, but do the best you can with it.
 - a. You told me that certain aspects of you are more real than other aspects. Could it be that you are wrong, that you actually don’t see what is the real you?
 - b. [If doubt is expressed] What information would you need to decide if something is part of the real you?
 - c. Does it matter to you whether your idea of what makes up the real you is right or wrong?
4. I will show you some different ways people go about deciding what is their true self. I would like for you to look at the list and then tell me which one makes the most sense to you. [Present The Real Me Questionnaire]
 - a. Why does this one makes sense to you?

The Real Me Questionnaire

When different people go about deciding what is their truest self, they give different answers. Some of these answers are listed below. Read them carefully and then decide which answers make the most sense to you.

1. I would look at which feelings I experience. All of these feelings are my true self and only belong to me.
2. For me the true self is the values and ideals that I really care about.

3. I would look at the things I do most frequently; this is what makes me different from anybody else.
4. To decide I would have to know what is really important not only for me, but also for human beings in general and also what the world is really like.
5. The true me is whatever I choose it to be, therefore it is not that difficult to decide what the true me is.

III. Responsibility for the Real Me

Purpose: To differentiate an agentic and constructive approach to identity (which should characterize the Management of Identity and later modes) from more passive, objectivistic, and naturalistic approaches (typical of earlier modes).

1. If you heard someone say: "I am responsible for the kind of person I am."
 - a. What do you think this person may mean?
 - b. If you said it, what would you mean?
2. Let's focus on the real me or true self [briefly remind S of the earlier conversation and summarize S's already stated opinions about the true self].
 - a. Do you think that one can be responsible for one's real me? How so?
 - b. As for you, what would it mean to be responsible for your true self? [Probe.]
3. Different people understand this question quite differently. I will show you some of these various opinions and will ask you to tell me which one makes the most sense to you and which one makes the least sense. [Present Responsibility for the Real Me Questionnaire]
 - a. Can you explain why ____ makes most sense to you?
 - b. Can you explain why you disagree with ____?

[The following questions are asked selectively, depending on S's choices.]
- 4a. [Explore first the details of S's opinion - i.e., what does S refer to by life or career, and by happiness]
 - 1) Tell me: what is the connection, as you see it, between a career (or life, etc.) and your real me? [Probe carefully.]
- 4b.
 - 1) What could it mean to lose one's true self?
How could it happen?
 - 2) Is the true self so fragile?
 - 3) How could one protect it?
- 4c.
 - 1) What does it mean to choose one's values?
 - 2) As you see it, what is the connection between your values or your ideals and your true self? [Probe.]
- 4d.
 - 1) Why is honesty so important for your true self?
- 4e.
 - 1) As you see it, what is the connection between your values or your ideals and your true self? [Probe.]
 - 2) Imagine that you talk with other people having different values or read about people with ideals very different from yours. Are you saying that you would not want to compare these different values with yours? You would not try to decide whether perhaps your values are not completely correct? [Probe.]

Responsibility for the Real Me Questionnaire

People can give very different answers, when they are asked about being responsible for their true self. Several among them may seem right to you. But choose the opinion that makes the most sense to you. Then tell me which one you agree with the least.

1. To be responsible for myself means that I have to choose carefully the type of career and life that would make me most happy, and then work at it.
2. I am responsible for my true self if I care about it and protect it; it's not so difficult to lose my own self.
3. Being responsible for my true self means to choose very carefully those values that are worth my commitment and effort.
4. To be responsible for my own self means to honestly express the feelings that I find within me, without being afraid of what others think
5. This is what it means to me: Whatever values and beliefs I have, I should stick with them, without raising doubts or questions. Or else I will never be able to put them into practice.

Appendix B
Real-Life Conflicts Interview
(adapted from Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995)

1. It's quite normal for people to have conflicts in their lives. A moral conflict is a situation where you have to make a decision about what is right or wrong, and you're not sure what to do. I'm wondering if you could describe for me the most difficult moral conflict you've had to face or, perhaps, are presently experiencing?
2. What was the conflict for you in that situation?
3. What was it about this conflict that made it a problem of right and wrong? (What would you say is the moral issue in this conflict?)
4. What was it about this conflict that made it so important to you? (What was at stake for you in this conflict?)
5. What were you feeling or experiencing at the time?
What was your feeling?
What were you thinking at the time?
6. In deciding what to do, what did you consider, what factors were involved?
Why are those considerations important?
How did you weigh those considerations?
7. What do you think is the most important thing to be concerned about in this moral dilemma?
Why is that important?
8. What do you think would have been the best or most moral thing to do?
9. On a scale of 1 to 9, how sure are you that what you have said is the moral or most right course of action truly is moral, 1 (I am not very sure) and 9 (I am very sure)?
10. Did you have a duty, obligation, or responsibility to do that? Why?
[or] Did you have a right to do that? Why?
11. On a scale of 1 to 9, how closely do you think your actions approximated what you believe is the most moral thing to do, 1 (I do not believe I took the most moral course of action) and 9 (I believe I took the most moral course of action)?
12. If you could do it over again, what would you do now?
13. How do you feel about what you did?
14. Do you think your actions were actually right or wrong? How do you know?

Appendix C
Intrinsic, Extrinsic and Quest Scale
(Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Batson, Shoenrade, & Ventis, 1993).

Please indicate your answer on the scale from 1 to 7:

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Extremely untrue of me	Mostly untrue of me	Somewhat untrue of me	Neutral	Somewhat true of me	Mostly true of me	Extremely true of me

Scale	
Q	1. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
I	2. I enjoy reading about my religion.
Q	3. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
Es	4. I would go to church because it helps me to make friends.
Q	5. As I grow and change, I expect my religion to grow and change.
I(-)	6. It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good.
Q	7. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and purpose of my life.
I	8. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.
Q	9. God wasn't very important for me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my own life.
Q	10. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.
I	11. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence.
Q	12. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my world and in my relation to my world.
Ep	13. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.
I	14. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.
Q	15. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
Ep	16. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.
Q	17. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
Q	18. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
Ep	19. Prayer is for peace and happiness.
I(-)	20. Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life.
Es	21. I would go to church mostly to spend time with my friends.
I	22. My whole approach to life is based on my religion.
Q(-)	23. I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.
Es	24. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.
I(-)	25. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life.
Q(-)	26. I find religious doubts upsetting.

(-) Reversed item.

Appendix D
Self-Report Altruism (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981)

Instructions: Tick the category on the right that conforms to the frequency with which you have carried out the following acts:

	Never	Once	More than Once	Often	Very Often
1. I have helped push a stranger's car (out of the snow, ditch etc.)					
2. I have given directions to a stranger.					
3. I have made change for a stranger.					
4. I have given money to charity.					
5. I have given money (or food etc.) to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).					
6. I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.					
7. I have done volunteer work for a charity.					
8. I have donated blood.					
9. I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, parcels, etc.).					
10. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.					
11. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (at Xerox machine, in the supermarket, etc.)					
12. I have given a stranger a lift in my car.					
13. I have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the supermarket, etc.) in undercharging me for an item.					
14. I have let someone whom I didn't know too well borrow an item I owned of some value to me.					
15. I have bought something (Christmas card, etc.) from a charity deliberately because I know it was a good cause.					
16. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with a homework assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.					
17. I have before being asked, voluntarily looked after someone's pets or children without being paid for it.					
18. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger (e.g., across a street).					
19. I have offered my seat on a bus, train, or in a waiting room to a stranger who was standing.					
20. I have helped an acquaintance to move households.					

Appendix E
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Not True			Somewhat True			Very True
	1.			My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.			
R	2.			It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.			
	3.			I don't care to know what other people really think of me.			
R	4.			I have not always been honest with myself.			
	5.			I always know why I like things.			
R	6.			When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.			
	7.			Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.			
R	8.			I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.			
	9.			I am fully in control of my own fate.			
R	10.			It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.			
	11.			I never regret my decisions.			
R	12.			I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.			
	13.			The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.			
R	14.			My parents were not always fair when they punished me.			
	15.			I am a completely rational person.			
R	16.			I rarely appreciate criticism.			
	17.			I am very confident of my judgments.			
R	18.			I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.			
	19.			It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.			
R	20.			I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.			
R	21.			I sometimes tell lies if I have to.			
	22.			I never cover up my mistakes.			
R	23.			There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.			
	24.			I never swear.			
R	25.			I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.			
	26.			I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.			
R	27.			I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.			
	28.			When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.			
R	29.			I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.			
	30.			I always declare everything at customs.			
R	31.			When I was young I sometimes stole things.			
	32.			I have never dropped litter on the street.			
R	33.			I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.			
	34.			I never read sexy books or magazines.			
R	35.			I have done things that I don't tell other people about.			
	36.			I never take things that don't belong to me.			
R	37.			I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.			
	38.			I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.			
R	39.			I have some pretty awful habits.			
	40.			I don't gossip about other people's business.			

1-20 SDE, 20-40 IM; R-Reversed item.