"... SAMPAI MERAUKE"
The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-62

by

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A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in

The Faculty of Graduate Studies
(Department of History)

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

The University of British Columbia
December 1999

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Date Dec 22, 1999
Abstract

This paper concerns the struggle among the Netherlands, Indonesia and indigenous Papuan nationalists for the territory variously named West New Guinea, West Irian and West Papua. It considers the clash of emergent Indonesian and West Papuan nationalist movements in the period leading up to 1962, when a United States-brokered agreement saw the territory pass from Dutch to United Nations administration as a transition stage to Indonesian rule.

Indonesian nationalism found in the struggle for West Irian a new integrative focus based on the map of the old East Indies and bolstered by appeals to a modernized tradition. A similar process saw West Papuan nationalism coalesce around the map of the territory and was beginning to project itself into the past as well. Indonesian nationalism asserted a claim “from Sabang to Merauke” while West Papuan nationalists counter-claimed “from Sorong to Merauke.”

Both the Indonesian and West Papuan “nations of intent” were constructed in the international arena and shaped by the course of international relations. The eventual outcome of their diplomatic struggle was determined by the mental maps of policy makers in the United States, whose decisions were shaped by their need to “contain” communism.
Contents

Abstract ................................................................. ii

1. Introduction .................................................................................. 1

2. Diplomacy & struggle, 1945-59

   a) Revolution, diplomasi/perjuangan & West New Guinea .................. 4
   b) Mapping Indonesia ......................................................................... 6
   c) Papuans in the Indonesian Revolution ............................................. 7
   d) Sukarno and West Irian, 1950-3 ....................................................... 8
   e) Anti-colonial resurgence: West Irian in the UN, 1954-7 .................... 10
   f) Back the rails of revolution: Economic confrontation, Irian & national unity, 1957-9 .......................................................... 11
   g) The last emerald: West New Guinea under the Dutch ..................... 13
   h) “Neutrality” favours the Dutch: the United States, Australia & West New Guinea to 1959 ......................................................... 14

3. Rising tensions, 1960-1

   a) The Dutch ten-year plan ............................................................... 16
   b) Confrontation escalates: the Indonesian response ......................... 17
      Guided democracy & Revolutionary diplomacy .................................. 18
      Modernizing tradition & Remapping Irian into Indonesia .................. 22
   c) Becoming Papuan: the emergence of a nationalist movement ............. 24
   d) Mediation attempted: West New Guinea & the business lobby ........... 26
   e) A new direction: the Kennedy administration and Indonesia, 1961 ....... 28


   a) Back to the UN: The Luns plan & internationalization ..................... 33
   b) War beckons: Trikora, memories of the revolution & a taste of battle ...... 35
   c) Washington steps in: the US and UN force talks ............................. 36
   d) West Irian talks, West Irian struggle ............................................ 40
   e) A nation gels: the West Papuans on their own ................................. 44

5. Aftermath ....................................................................................... 47

Notes .............................................................................................. 49
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 68

Appendix A: What is in Three Names? .................................................................................. 76

Appendix B: Maps & Figures ................................................................................................. 79

  Fig. 1: Extent of Majapahit according to the Negarakertagama ................................. 80
  Fig. 2: Likely extent of Majapahit ..................................................................................... 80
  Fig. 3: Map-logo of West New Guinea as Dutch settler territory ............................. 81
  Fig. 4: Map-logo Merdeka dengan Irian ................................................................. 82
  Fig. 5: Map-logo, from Sabang to Merauke ............................................................... 83
  Fig. 6: Map-logo billboard commemorating Trikora ................................................ 83
  Fig. 7: Cartoon on debate over ownership of the map of West New Guinea .......... 84
  Fig. 8: Cartoon on debate over ownership of Papuan in “quasi-logo form” .......... 84
  Fig. 9: West Papuan map-logo ................................................................................. 85
  Fig. 10: West Papuan flag, 1961 .................................................................................. 85
  Fig. 11: Australian mental map: New Guinea in Australian defence ....................... 86
  Fig. 12: American mental map: containment in Asia .................................................. 86

Appendix C: Article from Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December 1999 ...................... 87
"... sampai Merauke" : The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-62

"Indonesia merdeka, dari Sabang sampai Merauke" (a free Indonesia, from Sabang to Merauke)
— pro-independence slogan from Indonesian revolution, 1945-9

"Papoea Barat, dari Sorong sampai Hollandia sampai Merauke“ (West Papua, from Sorong to Merauke)
— Mansren movement declaration, 1942

1. Introduction

One of the anomalies of Asian decolonization until 1963 was the variously-named western half of the island of New Guinea. 1 The Netherlands held on to this colony in 1949 when it agreed to the independence of the Dutch East Indies as a new state, Indonesia. For more than twelve years, West New Guinea was a bone of contention which assumed an importance wildly out of proportion to the territory's own — not least as the central focus of Indonesian nationalism. For the last two years of this period, the issue became one perceived as a threat to world peace. Intervention by the United States proved crucial to forcing a settlement that met the needs of both Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesia gained control of the territory, while the Netherlands was enabled to save face through an interim United Nations administration. By ignoring the emergent nationalism of the territory’s people, however, the settlement proved to be a failure in the long run.

The clash of two emergent nationalisms and their play in the international arena is the central concern of this paper. Indonesian nationalism, having lost its raison d’etre of anti-colonial revolution, found in the struggle for a lost corner of the Indies a new integrative focus. A stepped-up campaign for what Indonesians called West Irian was a crucial component of President Sukarno’s new system of “guided democracy,” introduced in 1959. At the same time, however, the Papuans (indigenous people of West New Guinea) were becoming conscious of themselves as a nation distinct from Indonesia, a process that gelled in the same period.

Benedict Anderson has stressed the importance to nationalism of three factors: territory that comes to be regarded as bordered and sacred, a shared language, and a constructed history that confers a shared past on nations that are seeking a shared future.2 With these bases, people are able to imagine themselves as nations and leaders are able to “nation-build.”3 Indonesia provides a good example for Anderson’s schema. The struggle for West Irian, under the slogan “dari Sabang sampai Merauke,” from Sabang to Merauke, illustrates the centrality of territorial borders to Indonesian nationalism. It was
the territory, the completion of the “map as logo” of the old East Indies, that fired Sukarno’s nationalist revival. Sabang was the furthest point to the northwest of the Indies; Merauke in New Guinea its most southeasterly reach. The Papuans themselves were irrelevant to this integrative struggle for territory. But the Indonesian struggle for West Irian also stimulated a reactive indigenous nationalism that, as Anderson points out, took its own base from a bordered territory, the Dutch New Guinea colony, which nationalists renamed West Papua. They also mimicked Indonesian territorial slogans with their own call for a new nation that would stretch “from Sorong to Merauke.” These bordered “imagined political communities” were bolstered by recalling historical memories that were seen as the forerunner of the modern Indonesian and Papuan nations.

These bordered territories did not contain the struggle, however. Many Papuans looked across the ruler-straight line separating them from the Australian colony of Papua & New Guinea and saw people who looked like them: ethnic Melanesians, therefore compatriots. A new slogan, “from Sorong to Samarai,” expressed the hope for an island-wide Melanesian Federation with ethnicity as its base. This idea sprang from international factors: ethnicity lay at the base of the Dutch argument that West New Guinea had nothing in common with Indonesia. International developments in turn foreclosed this option by the end of 1961, and the power of the colonial border re-asserted itself.

Both Indonesian and Papuan nationalism defined themselves in the international arena. The identity “Papuan” did not simply fill up the territory assigned to it by colonial borders, but existed as a response to the incursions of an insistent Indonesian nationalism. The effort to build West Papua was of necessity waged more in the international arena than in the homeland itself. The course of the international struggle in turn did much to shape an emerging Papuan identity. Between 1960 and 1962, a West Papuan “nation-of-intent,” to use Shamsul A.B.’s phrase, had emerged despite the lack of a state structure, and was trying to escape the cage imposed by Dutch and Indonesian actions.

Indonesian nationalism, too, had been constructed in an international context in the first half of the twentieth century. The name itself was an anthropological term conferred by European anthropologists, adopted by nationalists in the 1920s as the name of the nation they were trying to build. Indonesia was “born in fire,” as Sukarno liked to say, in the course of a two-front war of independence in which diplomasi proved as important as perjuangan (struggle). The campaign for West Irian succeeded through its ability to replicate this two-pronged strategy. It was conceived as part of
Sukarno’s effort to return Indonesia to “the rails of the revolution.” It also asserted a leadership role in regional and Afro-Asian affairs as an inherent component of Indonesian nationalism. In so doing, it intruded Indonesian nationalism once again into a world setting where the actual battles would be fought.

The logic of the nationalist struggle for West Irian, thus, drew outside powers in. Most important among them were Australia and the United States. Both these countries plotted their response to an escalating diplomatic crisis on their own mental maps. Australians remembered that New Guinea had been used as a springboard for invasion in the Second World War and took it as an item of faith that they had an inherent right to determine the island’s future for their own security. This imperative eventually clashed, however, with the mental maps of a more powerful actor, the United States. American policy makers saw it as their responsibility to contain an expansionist communism within its existing borders, in order to maintain their own security. This was particularly important in Southeast Asia, where a “Malay barrier” including Indonesia served as a rear line of defence and an integral part of a “great crescent” of “free” states from Japan to India. When Indonesia turned to the Soviet Union and China for help in its Irian liberation effort, the American effort in Southeast Asia was threatened with the loss of the region’s most important country. Indonesia effectively combined radical nationalism with able diplomatic brinkmanship to gain American support, the key to winning control of New Guinea. The Kennedy administration was forced to abandon earlier efforts to stay out of the conflict. Within eighteen months of office, it had actively intervened to force a resolution.

The thin literature on the struggle for West New Guinea can be grouped into two areas: international diplomatic histories, and examinations of the domestic history of Indonesia (or, much more rarely, West Papua). Diplomatic histories, like Terence Markin’s superbly-detailed *The West Irian Dispute*, tend to zero in on the negotiations of 1962 and miss the crucial events of 1961, 1960 and before. This paper attempts to examine the intersection of domestic and diplomatic histories in the two-year period between August 1960, when Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and signalled a new policy of confrontation, and August 1962, when the Netherlands handed its colony to the UN as the first step in a transfer to Indonesia. Because the themes of this period were forged fifteen years earlier, it is necessary to start with the Indonesian Revolution.
2. Diplomacy & struggle, 1945-59

a) Revolution, diplomasi/perjuangan & West New Guinea

The Republic of Indonesia was born furtively, in a discreet ceremony in which two nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, issued a terse proclamation while their country was still occupied by the defeated Japanese army. It swiftly became a mass cause, however, and its hold on the hearts of a people who had been christened “Indonesians” within living memory was solidified under the hammer blows of Dutch attempts to reconquer their colony. The Republic was unable to win a military victory, but was strong enough to shift to guerrilla warfare when Dutch troops over-ran most of the country. This was perjuangan — struggle. Partisans of the Republic fought back and relied on mass mobilization of opinion, winning a clear victory by gaining the allegiance of virtually the entire country, even those leaders who were appointed to head Dutch-run puppet states.

Perjuangan alone, however, was not enough to gain independence. The other ingredient was diplomasi, in its Indonesian spelling. “The Indonesians have entered the international arena” through their revolution against colonialism, Sukarno said, and now needed to bring the world into their struggle. “This is what has become the basis of the foreign policy of the Republic.”11 This meant winning the support of the United States, Britain and other countries that could force the Netherlands to make concessions. But diplomacy by itself, Sukarno insisted, could win no victories. “The policy now adopted by the Indonesian Republic must be oriented to the international world,” he declared. “For this, the prime condition is diplomacy. Yet no nation can enter the international arena by diplomacy alone. Behind that diplomacy, indeed the very basis of the diplomacy, must be a power force.”12

While some leaders stressed diplomacy and others struggle, Sukarno united the two streams into one. The strategy worked well: when the Dutch conquered the entire Republican territory but were unable to end the Indonesian revolution, the United Nations delivered the coup de grace to the Dutch colonial empire. Within months, the Dutch were forced to recognize Indonesian independence.

The one exception was West New Guinea, retained over vociferous Indonesian objections. New Guinea was the forgotten stepchild of the Dutch empire, its coast only brought under Dutch control in the early twentieth century and its interior still unknown in 1949. Its importance to Dutch and Indies residents alike was purely in the imagination. For Indonesian nationalists, it was the home of the
notorious Boven Digul prison camp, so remote that it needed no guards or perimeters — those who escaped were sure to be killed by disease, animals or native tribes. Hatta, half of the ruling duumvirate from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, was the most prominent nationalist exiled here by the Dutch, and wrote of it as a place where men like himself went to be martyred. “With proudly erected heads the condemned rebels mounted the Oppressor’s scaffold,” he wrote in 1929. “With admirable courage too the hundreds of exiles, fighters and defenders of oppressed Indonesia go to face a slow but certain death in the living grave of Upper Digoel.”

The myth of Boven Digul grew with time. In 1957, Sukarno (never sent there himself) recalled all of West Irian as “the martyr place of the struggle for independence.”

For the “Indies Dutchmen,” the Dutch-speaking Eurasians who felt most threatened by indigenous nationalism, New Guinea offered itself as a promised land to be colonized as Australian Queensland had been, a modern-day Canada snatched from the fires of revolution for Dutch Empire loyalists. Colonization started in 1930, and the first call for separation of New Guinea from the Indies came in 1946, a year after the revolution began. New Guinea was formerly severed from the Indies, but was largely irrelevant to Dutch policy making at first. It was only as the prospects of keeping control of the Indies receded that more and more Dutch policy makers looked to New Guinea as one area that could be held by the empire. This would maintain the cherished position of the Netherlands as a world power, conferred only by virtue of its colonial empire. It would also reduce the “trauma of decolonization” felt by many Dutchmen. The Catholic Party, the country’s largest, was also demanding New Guinea be preserved as a mission field. Merauke, the centre of the Catholic mission, was the only part of the Indies where the Dutch flag flew throughout the Second World War. Finally, there was the hope that New Guinea, like the Belgian Congo, might have untapped wealth that could help spur the postwar recovery of the metropolitan economy. Political necessities in the Dutch parliament made separation a reality. Dutch and Indonesian negotiators spent the latter part of 1949 thrashing out a treaty granting Indonesia independence, always conscious that a two-thirds vote in both chambers of the Dutch parliament would be needed. The only way to gain that majority was to hold on to New Guinea.
b) Mapping Indonesia

Indonesia's borders were fluid in 1945. Two visions of the new state's territory contended in the Japanese-sponsored Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, each linked to a stream in Indonesian political thought. (The third stream was more concerned with the goal of an Islamic state than borders.) The status of what was then called Papua was hotly debated, although delegates were clearly confused as to what exactly they meant by "Papua" — the whole island or just the Dutch half.

The "secular" nationalist stream led by Sukarno called for the unification of Malay peoples that would include British colonies in Malaya and Borneo, Portuguese Timor, and even the Philippines, had they not already been granted independence. Sukarno declared that Renan's definition of a nation, a people with the desire to live together, was out of date in the age of geopolitics. In addition, a nation was based on its territory. "Men cannot be separated from place .... Even a child if he looks at the map of the world can see that the Indonesian archipelago forms one unity." One orator from this camp, Mohammed Yamin, summed up this principle as "the areas which should be included in Indonesian territory are those which have given birth to the Indonesian people," again illustrating how the nationalist movement was creating the nation.

The competing vision was offered by Hatta, who insisted that the new state should have the borders of the Dutch East Indies — thus, a nation defined by territory and not by blood. He was even willing to pass on Dutch Papua. "I am inclined to say that I do not need Papua and that it should be left to the Papuan people themselves. I recognize that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation...." The preparatory committee voted for the "Greater Indonesia" idea, but international realities interfered by the time Sukarno and Hatta declared independence: they were unwilling to face the Dutch and British at the same time, so avoided claiming Malaya and North Borneo. What remained of the larger vision was the belief Indonesia had a special place of regional leadership as a "real" nation, superior to "artificial" states like Malaya/Malaysia.

At the independence negotiations of 1949, the question of West New Guinea was left until last because it was the most contentious. It was the Dutch-appointed Federalist leaders, under Eastern Indonesia premier Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, who were most determined to see the territory as part of their state and therefore of Indonesia. Hatta, leader of the Republican delegation, saw the question as unimportant. The Dutch, meanwhile, were adamant on the point, with their resolve apparently
strengthened by Australian urgings. Talks on the item opened with a blunt Dutch statement that "the following decision will not meet the aspirations of the Indonesian delegations: i.e. the Netherlands will not transfer sovereignty over West Irian to Indonesia."24

When the issue caused deadlock, American and Australian mediators stepped in to suggest that the issue be postponed: sovereignty over Indonesia would be transferred immediately, with control of West New Guinea to be settled by talks over the next year.25 The compromise was agreed to, and a two-part agreement signed. The first clause transferred sovereignty over Indonesia, while the second reserved the status quo of West New Guinea for one year, to be settled by negotiations.26

c) Papuans in the Indonesian revolution

Nationalism seems to have been growing in this period in West Papua itself, but what type of nationalism is harder to say. With Dutch rule largely nominal, there was little anti-colonial activity before the Second World War. During the Pacific war, the much more intrusive Japanese presence stimulated some resistance. The Koreri millennial movement created a flag to symbolize indigenous struggle against foreigners, while the Mansren movement declared an independent West Papua bounded by Sorong, Merauke and Hollandia in 1942.27 A further spur came with the arrival of American troops in 1945. Papuans saw enormous wealth, and they saw soldiers who were black like themselves on a level of apparent equality with white soldiers.

As the Indonesian revolution became the dominant theme in the Dutch Indies, Papuan nationalism began to be expressed through two different channels: one pro-Indonesian, the other pro-Dutch. The small Papuan elite struggled over how to respond to the independence proclamation, with allegiances shifting for some time. Eventually, the pro-Indonesian side formed the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian (Irian Party for Indonesian Independence) and the pro-Dutch side responded with the Gerakan Persuatan Nieuw-Guinee (New Guinea Unity Movement).28 There was also a movement for annexation by the United States.29 Each in its own way, however, seems to have been an attempt to advance the Papuan cause as part of a larger unit, whether ruled from Jakarta or from The Hague. As Paul van der Veur writes, "both segments ... were indicative of a new Papuan consciousness, entangled in the Netherlands-Indonesia conflict."30 The only formal Papuan presence in
any of the 1945-9 talks was at the Dutch-convened Malino conference of 1946, in which Papuan delegate Frans Kaisiepo proposed a new name for his homeland to replace the eastern Indonesian term Papua, meaning frizzy-haired. Iryan (or Irian), in his local Biak language, meant cloudy or hot land.

A Papuan delegation led by anti-Japanese guerrilla Johan Ariks travelled to The Hague for Indonesian independence negotiations, where it petitioned the two sides plus the United Nations, United States and Canada for separation of Papua from Indonesia, but attracted little attention. The small group of early Papuan nationalists, faced with a dilemma over which side to back, had been forced into the international arena.

d) Sukarno and West Irian, 1950-3

Sukarno never travelled to West Irian until it became an Indonesian province, but made it uniquely his issue. This is not to say that other political leaders did not hope for the transfer of West Irian, but that Sukarno identified himself more and more with the issue, which he saw as a means to rediscover the unity of purpose of revolutionary days. Each escalating step in his campaign was declared on days of revolutionary significance, usually in his annual address to the nation on August 17, the anniversary of the Republic's 1945 declaration of independence.

This started in the midst of deteriorating Dutch-Indonesian relations in 1950, during negotiations that were supposed to settle West Irian's final status. "The Irian question," Sukarno declared on 17 August 1950,

... is a question of colonialism or non-colonialism, a question of colonialism or independence.... In our present Constitution it is expressly laid down that the territory of our state comprises the entire former Netherlands Indies, that is from Sabang to Merauke.... This is not a trifling question; this is a major issue.... Because we have pledged that we will fight [berjuang, usually translated as struggle] until the end of time as long as one part of our Country — no matter how small that part may be — is not yet free!"

At this time, however, the government apparatus was not in Sukarno's hands. Most power in the 1949 and 1950 draft constitutions was vested in the office of the prime minister and cabinet, held by men who preferred economic stabilization to continuing revolution, diplomacy to struggle as a method for getting Irian. Early cabinets were dominated by the Muslim-based Masyumi party, which leaned to the pro-Western side of non-alignment. The campaign for West Irian, then, was restricted to bilateral diplomatic efforts to persuade the Netherlands to hand over the territory. Indonesia's political
leaders were mostly Dutch-educated and saw no reason that they could not now work in close cooperation with the Netherlands, as India did with Great Britain. They wanted West Irian, but did not see it as worth a rupture with the West. Arguments made by Indonesia in this period rested on the country’s status as successor state to the Netherlands East Indies. This was bolstered by the one-time Dutch recognition of part of West Irian as subject to the Sultan of Tidore, by legal arguments stemming from the 1945-9 period, and by the arguments that Papuans had been part of the Indonesian revolution.33

In a 1950 constitutional crisis, this view won out, but Sukarno would henceforth use Irian as a club to beat his opponents, a means to place himself as a figure enunciating the national will for the “return of West Irian to the fold of the motherland,” and a way to play politics despite the constitutional limitations placed on the office of the president. West Irian also provided the occasion for a rapprochement between Sukarno and the PKI, the Communist party that had rebelled in 1948.34 The PKI would henceforth use West Irian militancy as an anti-imperialist issue to both increase its support and cement its relationship with the President as an ally against the religious and conservative parties who held power.

The Netherlands, on the other hand, was less and less willing to consider a hand-over. Hatta believed he had been implicitly promised a two-stage transfer as part of the 1949 compromise: once tensions in the Dutch parliament had a year to cool, his Dutch friends assured him, the hand-over of West Irian would present no real difficulties.35 Events in the intervening year, however, had the reverse effect. Republican partisans had swept away the patchwork federalist structure set up by the Dutch, substituting a unitary state. Jakarta had crushed an attempted secession, the “Republic of the South Moluccas.” Many Dutchmen felt powerless to help the peoples who had remained loyal. Handing over New Guinea in this setting looked like appeasement.36

The very day the one-year negotiations period ended, the Dutch government brought in “an old-style colonial constitution for West New Guinea with every appearance of permanence.”37 Even some limited concessions offered in 1951 contributed to the collapse of the Dutch cabinet. Future cabinets survived only by agreeing to put differences among the governing parties on New Guinea into “cold storage.”38 From this point on, Dutch governments proved unwilling to discuss the issue with Indonesia, arguing there was no point in talks since Indonesia insisted on discussing only the means of transfer.39
This strategy ensured political cohesion in the Netherlands, but also helped to radicalize Indonesian policy. In 1953, Indonesia's fourth cabinet in as many years fell and was replaced by one that for the first time excluded the Masyumi party.

e) Anti-colonial resurgence: West Irian in the UN, 1953-7

The new government was headed by Ali Sastroamijoyo, ambassador to the United States and a member of the left wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI). Ali's government moved Indonesian foreign policy to the centre of its agenda, stressing a far more assertive policy. Instead of following, Indonesia would now seek to lead.  

Ali’s foreign policy was two-pronged: it sought to build a stronger third world bloc which by necessity would be united by anti-colonialism, and it turned up the heat in the fight for West Irian. These two goals were linked in the government’s major foreign policy initiatives: moving the campaign for West Irian into the United Nations, and hosting the Bandung conference of Asian and African states in 1955. Ali’s policies accorded well with Sukarno’s. In a 1956 speech to the Canadian parliament, for example, Sukarno warned his audience not to underestimate the Asian-African “nationalist torrent ... whose object is the greater freedom, the greater liberation, of mankind. I say this in all seriousness: any attempt to stand in the way of that torrent will be in vain.” Part of Indonesia, he added, “still suffers under colonialism, that plague on mankind’s fulfillment.... Until West Irian is rejoined to the rest of my country Indonesia will feel herself incomplete and insecure.”

The terms of the West Irian debate shifted in 1954 when Indonesia took the question to the UN General Assembly. In response, the Netherlands raised the question of self-determination for the Papuans, apparently for the first time. An eight-power resolution drafted by India that called for further bilateral talks received two-thirds of the vote in committee, enough to pass a resolution. When the resolution came to the General Assembly, however, twelve abstainers shifted to the Dutch side: nine Latin American states plus Canada, Israel and Taiwan, most of them states that Ambassador Sujarwo Condronegoro called states “independent in name only.” The most careful study of the vote indicates that this shift likely came with the tacit backing of the United States. The United States did not even support negotiations when a strongly pro-Western cabinet took over briefly in 1955-6 and tried to negotiate with the Netherlands. This cabinet then unilaterally abrogated the Dutch-
Indonesian Union. While the number of co-sponsors of Indonesian resolutions grew in 1956 and 1957, the Indonesian majority actually eroded, never reaching the two-thirds mark again.

f) Back to the rails of revolution: Economic confrontation, Irian & national unity, 1957-9

In the late 1950s, under the hammer blows of regional rebellion and martial law, parliamentary democracy collapsed in Indonesia. In this period, which ended with Sukarno’s declaration of “guided democracy” in 1959, the country looked on the verge of splitting apart into its constituent regions and opposed political currents. The struggle for West Irian was used as a unifying factor in an attempt to hold all these forces together, as well as the pretext for mobilizations by all forces contending for power. The most successful mobilizers formed the new triangle of power: the army, the PKI, and at the pivot, Sukarno and his courtiers.

West Irian was used by both sides in the lead-up to a regional rebellion that broke out in 1958, in an effort to restore crumbling national unity. “The claim to West Irian is a national claim backed by every Indonesian party without exception,” Hatta wrote in a 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, raising an issue he had not thought worth mentioning in the same journal in 1953. Hatta and Sukarno both sent messages to a November 1957 rally in Jakarta in the lead-up to another UN vote, with Hatta noting differences on many national issues but unity on the Irian claim. The difference came in methods. Hatta wanted a 5-minute national strike “to show to the world that the entire Indonesian people, all the 84 million Indonesians, are one with respect to the West Irian issue.” Sukarno called for confrontation. “Although our claim is just,” he said, “West Irian will never come under our control if our claim is not substantiated with power.”

The symbols of the revolution, when Indonesians were united, began to be recalled as national unity crumbled. In October 1957, a West Irian Liberation Campaign was founded, with provincial branches chaired by the governor and assisted by the provincial military commander, a sign of the joint civil-military authority that was emerging throughout the country. Campaign waves were held on October 28, the anniversary of the Youth Pledge that had defined the basis of modern Indonesia in the 1920s, and again on November 10, newly minted as Heroes’ Day to mark the anniversary of the 1946 Battle of Surabaya against British troops. Heroes’ Day would soon become the occasion for continued
evocations of revolutionary unity in the struggle for West Irian. The holiday was also used to declare recently deceased fighters as “heroes of the revolution.” As Klaus Schreiner has noted, “the election of recently deceased persons to the status of a National Hero strengthened the ties between the legitimizing past and the ongoing revolutionary process suggesting a continuity between the two periods.” Even the Sumatra-based rebels campaigned for the acquisition of West Irian and placed this in this and their entire struggle in the revolutionary mold.

Although employed by both sides, West Irian was used most successfully as a mobilizing tool by Sukarno, the central army command and the PKI, following the defeat of the moderate 1957 draft UN resolution on West Irian, sponsored by 21 Asian and African states. In presenting it, foreign minister Subandrio placed his central emphasis, for the first time, on the threat to international peace. Most significantly, he announced that Indonesia was bringing the issue to the multilateral forum for the last time. “The patience of a people is not inexhaustible.”

On Nov. 27, 1957, the vote failed, once again on Latin American votes that looked to Washington on most matters. The next day, there was an assassination attempt against Sukarno, against the background of escalating American encouragement to the dissidents in Sumatra. Sukarno now authorized a new phase of economic confrontation against the Netherlands, with seizures of Dutch enterprises by student activists and then by the PKI-affiliated trade unions. Actual management of the Dutch enterprises was quickly handed to the army, which instantly gained commanding economic power in addition to the political power already conferred by martial law. The confiscations should have come as no surprise. Sukarno had been warning for months of actions that would “startle the world,” while the threat of nationalizations was mentioned to the U.S. government as early as 1951 and repeated by both Subandrio and Juanda weeks before the event.

Dutch businesses were valued at $1.3 billion (14% of Dutch national income, according to the Indonesian government; according to the Dutch 3.1% of their income but half of Indonesia’s). The confiscations were accompanied by the expulsion of 47,000 Dutch nationals. It seemed like a completion of decolonization, as economic control by the former colonial power finally ended, symbolically enough as part of the struggle to complete the territorial extent of the revolution. It was in 1957, too, that Indonesia began to complain of Dutch subversive activities aimed at re-colonizing Indonesia, with New Guinea used as a base. The new phase of economic confrontation aided the PKI
immensely as an anti-imperialist issue on which to mobilize. The army countered in 1958 by founding the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian as its mass political vehicle to compete with the PKI. Both strong national actors, then, continued to use the Irian issue to advance their own cause.

So did Sukarno. In 1959, he announced a new “guided democracy,” presenting the new system as a return to the days of the revolution, when Indonesians were united: “All failures, all jammings and deadlocks are at bottom caused because we, deliberately or not, consciously or not, have deviated from the Spirit, from the Principles, and from the objectives of the Revolution!” Guided democracy, then, would return Indonesia “back to the rails of the revolution.” With undivided control, Sukarno would raise the temperature of confrontation another notch.

g) The last emerald: West New Guinea under the Dutch

Dutch writers had long portrayed the Indies as an equatorial “girdle of emeralds” that made their nation great in the world. With just one emerald left, Dutch colonialists wanted to prove they could succeed next to an Indonesia that was failing. One parliamentarian called for a Dutch-led “model state in Southeast Asia which would stand out like a lighthouse above the decayed area around it.” The Dutch colonial ideology in the Indies had rested on the belief that the Netherlands was providing efficient economic development while at the same time preserving traditional cultures; the same style was replicated by many of the same colonial civil servants in Netherlands New Guinea.

Cultural preservation of this “earthly paradise for anthropological research” was stressed, leading to a virtual government by anthropologists. At home, this was backed up by academic organizations and journals and by Dutch nationalist groups. Gradually, the rhetoric of cultural protection of the Papuan replaced that of a Eurasian homeland. In parallel with all this, the Dutch also pledged to provide economic development. The common thread in these two Dutch themes was paternalism and the duplication of Indies government policies. Self-government was to be through tightly-controlled regional councils, political uprisings were blamed on the lack of jobs, and the government generally followed what Papuan nationalist leader Nicolaas Jouwe called a “friendly Santa Claus attitude.” Not surprisingly, Indonesians were not impressed with Dutch efforts to follow policies in New Guinea that they remembered all too well themselves.
h) "Neutrality" favours the Dutch: the United States, Australia & West New Guinea to 1959

American and Australian policy aimed at a stable and pro-Western Indonesia. Throughout the 1950s, however, American policy was more influenced by the demands of European strategy which demanded a friendly Netherlands. Thus the U.S. position was one of "neutrality," which meant no pressure on the Dutch to negotiate, then abstaining on all votes in the UN while seeking to remove the issue from the agenda. The most the Far East division of the state department could do was prevent an outright shift to the Dutch side or a move to make West New Guinea a UN trust territory. Assistant secretary of state (Far East) Walter Robertson noted that both sides were "psychopathic on the issue [so] our best position was to remain neutral."

In practice, however, this position favoured the status quo, that of Dutch control. There was little effort to hide this. Dean Rusk, undersecretary of state in the Truman administration, argued in 1949 for support for the Dutch position. Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, always suggested to the Dutch that he was on their side, and as indicated above the U.S. may have used its influence to prevent passage of a UN resolution. Especially influential in policy was Hugh S. Cumming, ambassador 1953-7 and then director of the state department's intelligence unit. Cumming was a key figure in a back channel that linked the CIA field offices in Indonesia to the state department, bypassed the U.S. embassy entirely, and even ignored reports from his own intelligence bureau.

Ambassador John Allison, the senior American diplomat in Asia, was out of the loop, so it was no surprise that Allison's proposal for the United States to involve itself in the New Guinea question was ignored in Washington, with Allison himself soon fired. In essence, Allison proposed to swap West New Guinea for the restoration of Dutch economic interests in Indonesia, a shift to a pro-U.S. foreign policy and strict control of the PKI. Allison's plan was the first to accept the offer made by Sukarno to every American to enter his office throughout the decade: if the United States would support the Indonesian claim, then Indonesia would instantly become a close friend to the U.S.

Allison's successor, Howard P. Jones, embarked on a rapprochement with the Indonesian army command, which he soon realized was the strongest anti-communist element in the country. Both the United States and Britain, concerned with ensuring a non-Communist Indonesia, resumed arms sales over strong Australian objections. New Guinea itself was not seen as a strategic priority by the United
States. On the other hand, Indonesia's natural resources and position on the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that "a hostile Indonesia would present a most serious problem." Indonesia was part of an offshore island chain "of crucial strategic importance to the United States."

Australia, on the other hand, saw the whole of New Guinea as crucial to its security, since, in one foreign minister's words, "we cannot alter our geography which for all time makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia." The same adamant stance was supported by the opposition Labour Party, which even on occasion pressed for Australian control of the whole island. One senator declared that "New Guinea has been sanctified by the blood and bones of our gallant boys who died there.... That area is sacred to Australia." The greatest fear seems to have been an Indonesian claim to Australia's half of New Guinea. But more generally its geography led its leaders, partisans of a "white Australia" policy which foreign minister Richard Casey called "the heart of our being," to a desperate fear of Indonesia. Bruce Grant has noted that Indonesia "acted as a 'locum' for the abstract threats which Australians sensed in their bones. Indonesia gave substance to what has long been called in Australia 'the threat from the north.'"

Dutch-Australian administrative cooperation grew steadily through the 1950s. In November 1957, Australia and the Netherlands signed a pact that was generally seen as the first step towards an eventual federation of their colonies. The only limits Australia placed on its support for the Dutch position were military. While ensuring that its own colony was part of the SEATO defence area, Australia blocked a similar commitment to the Dutch and barred their participation in ANZUS. However, in all other matters Australia stood as the number one Dutch ally. While the United States ignored Australian misgivings in pursuit of its goals in Indonesia, Australian representations over West New Guinea may have prevented an American move to intervene in the issue. However, Australia stepped back from the front lines in 1959 when Casey signed a joint communiqué with Subandrio promising that "if any agreement were reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties principal, arrived at by peaceful processes and in accordance with internationally accepted principles, Australia would not oppose such an agreement."
3 Rising tensions, 1960-1

a) The Dutch ten-year plan

In 1960, the Dutch government made a fundamental shift that changed the basis of the debate over West New Guinea. It announced a ten-year plan for local control. Although no actual target date for self-determination was set (beyond promises that it would be within "less than a generation"), the terms of the debate now shifted from Dutch colonialism versus Indonesian anti-colonialism, to what sort of decolonization should take place. Throughout the debate, the Dutch government (backed by public opinion) retained a stubborn refusal to let the territory fall into Indonesian hands.

In New Guinea, this meant that the administration was to be rapidly handed over to Papuans. By 1960, half of government posts were in indigenous hands, a figure that rose to three quarters over the next two years and was slated to reach 95% by 1970. At the same time as self-determination became a mantra for Dutch officials in the international and domestic political arenas, however, officials remained reluctant to give in to the Papuan nationalism that was encouraged by all this talk. The Dutch do not seem to have really believed in their hearts that Papuans were ready for independence or likely to be ready by 1970. Foreign minister J.M.A.H. Luns never budged from his belief that the natives were content with Dutch rule. As Indonesian pressure grew in 1960-62, the Dutch government proved less and less willing to consult Papuan leaders.

To make the ten-year plan work in the face of Indonesian military threats, the Dutch had to make parallel preparations for defence, in the hopes of deterring an attack. A small Papuan volunteer corps was established in 1960, but defence was to rest for the most part on Dutch resources. Thus in 1959 the conscription law was amended to allow conscripts to be sent overseas, while the defence minister announced reinforcements and dispatched the country's only aircraft carrier to West New Guinea the next year, followed by visits by Dutch warships. Yet no comprehensive defence plan was ever drawn up. The Netherlands relied more on warnings to Indonesia by its allies, and the hope that Australia could be drawn in. The ten-year self-determination plan can be seen as an effort to implicate Australia by forcing it to move towards closer co-operation, or else see West New Guinea lurch into independence decades before its own cautious plans for Papua New Guinea reached fruition. The Dutch hoped that they could gain Australian agreement for a Melanesian Federation uniting both halves of the island and possibly the British Solomon Islands as well, an idea with great popular appeal in Australia that
could help shift the Dutch defence burden.\textsuperscript{93} Australia, however, refused to be drawn into closer political ties and resisted any military commitments.

b) Confrontation escalates: the Indonesian response

The self-determination plan threatened Indonesia’s occupation of the moral high ground, encouraging an already-evident Indonesian shift to a trial of strength with the Netherlands. It was important for Indonesia to gain control of West Irian before the Dutch succeeded in establishing what all Indonesians saw as a puppet state similar to the Dutch-established federal states they had swept away in 1950. Self-determination was seen as yet another excuse to divide and rule Indonesia.\textsuperscript{94}

A shadow “autonomous province of West Irian” had been established by the Ali government, but this lost Papuan support because it was headed by the house of the Sultan of Tidore, whose “rule” over the coasts of West New Guinea had been mostly in the form of slave-trading. Indonesia had ignored a 1956 declaration of an autonomous province by pro-Indonesia Papuan leader Silas Papare.\textsuperscript{95} Anti-Indonesian sentiment among Papuans was put down to Dutch manipulations, with an apparently genuine belief that uprisings were common in the territory. After 1960, Indonesian pamphlets placed increasing stress on Papare’s \textit{Gerakan Rakyat Irian Barat}, West Irian People’s Movement. The royal house of Tidore was eased out in favour of a new governor, Navy Colonel Pamuji, who officially was deputy to an incognito Papuan living in the territory.\textsuperscript{96} Indonesian pronouncements continued to stress that West Irian would have autonomy within Indonesia. Efforts to win the hearts and minds of Papuans who “did not know, either, that they were Indonesians” increased, for instance in the form of the army-backed newspaper \textit{Karya} published from Tidore for the “autonomous province.”\textsuperscript{97}

In August 1960, Sukarno inaugurated a new phase of confrontation by announcing in his independence day speech that Indonesia was breaking all diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and embarking on an arms buildup.\textsuperscript{98} This has been portrayed as an impulsive move by Sukarno, but was not as sudden as it seemed. Indonesia had banned Dutch ships from its waters in April 1960, and this time took steps to minimize the economic impact: Indonesian gold reserves were shifted from the Netherlands to Britain in advance, so the loss of assets was minimal.\textsuperscript{99}
The intensification of confrontation with the Dutch, once again, served the need to establish unity among the various political forces in Indonesia. Sukarno broke ties only after a meeting of the National Council attended by army chief Nasution and PKI leader Aidit. The army, already using the Irian issue to build a mass base, saw its interests enhanced by the military buildup: its share of the national budget climbed from 32% in 1960, to almost half in 1961, to as high as 80% in 1962. The PKI, while still reacting rather than leading on the Irian issue, was able to tie itself closer still to the president in an anti-imperialist cause. Sukarno himself was able to unite the main contenders for power behind his leadership and keep them from each other’s throats with this campaign. The army was unlikely to move against him while he was leading a campaign very much in army interests; the PKI was more and more domesticated. Any threat that the PKI might have presented was further reduced by competing mobilizers who tied themselves still more closely to Sukarno, such as the 1945 Generation led by Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik. Even the last rebel bands, which were now “returning to the fold of the republic,” were often integrated by sending them to the Irian front.

**Guided democracy & Revolutionary diplomacy**

From this point on, diplomacy was downplayed in favour of confrontation in official rhetoric. Indonesia would win its West Irian struggle through the mobilization of its entire population for a trial of strength with the Netherlands. “The Indonesian people,” Sukarno shouted in his independence day address of 1961, “consider freeing West Irian a hallowed duty, a sacred moral obligation.... At present our policy vis-à-vis the Dutch is a policy of confrontation in every field, — in the political, the economic, yes, even in the military field! ... We are, therefore, building up power.” It was a repeat of the 1954-9 revolution’s tactics, combining diplomacy with struggle.

Struggle was pursued through an arms buildup that Sukarno believed would force the Netherlands and the world to take Indonesia seriously. The main source of arms was the Soviet Union, only too happy to support third world nationalists against NATO powers. The Soviet arms connection dated back to Sukarno’s visit of 1956, the same year the USSR granted Indonesia a $100-million line of credit. The next year, however, the army had offered to cancel Soviet arms purchases if the United States would supply the needed weapons, an offer that was ignored. The new Indonesian air force
(jet fighters bought from Czechoslovakia) was inaugurated on armed forces day in 1958, with Sukarno declaring: “Not a single country is respected without a strong armed force.”

In 1959, youth militants Malik and Saleh were named as ambassadors to the Soviet Union and China respectively. Malik recalled that his orders from Sukarno were simple. Exhaust the Soviet arsenal. That’s what you must do, Adam.... I need a fighting diplomat without being burdened by protocol, but who commands all the tricks of the trade in order to serve the Republic well.... Adam, do everything you can. If necessary, go and fraternize with them. You know what I mean.”

The 1960 visit of the sole Dutch aircraft carrier, the Karel Doorman, stirred enormous Indonesian anger and served as the pretext for a massive acceleration in the arms buildup. The army again tried unsuccessfully to obtain arms from the Eisenhower administration in 1960. General Nasution then departed for Moscow for more major purchases in January 1961, where he signed a deal worth $400 million and accepted a Soviet offer to train Indonesian army officers. Nasution stopped on his way back in India and Pakistan to ask that they close their airspace to the Dutch in the event of war, and made a similar request to Egypt about the Suez canal. By 1962, Indonesia was largest non-Communist recipient of Soviet bloc military aid, with credits in excess of $1.5-billion. Nasution continued to insist, however, that Indonesia would take its own military decisions.

The arms were not as effective as was portrayed. Deliveries were often slow and Indonesian expertise on Soviet systems often limited. Indonesian officers later admitted that their jets, for instance, lacked the range for actual operations in West Irian. This was secondary, however, to the impression that was being built of Indonesia as a force to reckon with. In this sense, the arms buildup served as an element of the “revolutionary diplomacy” of confrontation.

The foreign policy of guided democracy was grounded strongly in ideology and moral underpinnings which gave it its strength as a cohesive basis for action. Its central ideologue was Sukarno himself, the master orator and wielder of symbols; its central message was the unity and strength of the Indonesian people, forged in the flames of continuing revolution; its central struggle was to “regain” West Irian as part of the global struggle against imperialism and thereby conjure a united and strong nation. The name Irian itself became a slogan, an acronym for Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti-Nederland (Follow the Republic of Indonesia anti-Netherlands). The revolution even acquired a revolutionary canon in 1961, required reading for all those engaged in the West Irian campaign: five
Sukarno speeches and a volume by PNI ideologue and onetime foreign minister Ruslan Abdulgani. But it did not seek to challenge any social forces within Indonesia, but rather to synthesize all streams, a synthesis summed up in the slogan NASAKOM: nationalisme, agama (religion), kommunisme.

Sukarno’s picture of himself as one who synthesizes is best summed up in his own description of guided democracy:

In Guided Democracy, the key ingredient is leadership. After hearing the general views and contras views, the Guider summarizes the points into a compromise palatable to each faction. No one side wins totally to the exclusion of others. Only strong leadership is capable of synthesizing the final decision; otherwise the system will not work.

The Guider, whether he be village chief, Bung Karno, or any minister capable of commanding respect and confidence, incorporates a spoonful of so-and-so’s opinions with a dash of such-and-such, always taking care to incorporate a soupgon of the opposition. Then he cooks it and serves it with his final summation, ‘OK, now my dear brothers, it’s like this and I hope you agree...’ It’s still democratic because everyone has given his comment. To call this Communistic is ridiculous.

The new Indonesian ideology extended beyond the country’s own borders, and indeed could only be framed within a global context. In fact, since Sukarno had absolutely no interest in revolutionary social change within Indonesia’s borders, the continuing revolution could only be expressed through foreign policy. Regionally, Indonesia had a duty to lead other countries like Malaya, the Philippines “and other recipients of counterfeit independence” into the revolution of mankind. Globally, it was blazing a new path in international relations, expressed first at Bandung and then through Sukarno’s concept of the “new emerging forces,” or in their revolutionary acronym NEFO, which would sweep away the “old established forces” (OLDEFO) of imperialism and colonialism. The struggle for Irian was the local expression of the NEFO struggle, and demonstrated Indonesia’s leading role in the worldwide struggle. The NEFO concept, for its part, united nationalist, Islamic and socialist countries, “a sort of NASAKOM National Front writ large.” Sukarno believed that “the Indonesian revolution is bigger, greater than any revolution in the world.” His doctrine of the Pancasila had managed to unite the diverse streams of Indonesian nationalism in 1945. He saw no reason he could not play a similar role as synthesizer on the world stage. Few in Indonesia found it odd when he suggested that the UN adopt Pancasila as its central tenet.

In concrete terms, Indonesian revolutionary diplomacy used the new appearance of national strength skillfully in pursuit of the claim to West Irian, playing superpowers against each other, always with the “maintenance of a mood of crisis ... boldness of posture, readiness to take risks,
swiftness of adaptation to setbacks or challenges and, once again, unpredictability.” Even as he submitted a 1960 resolution calling for the Soviet and American leaders to meet, Sukarno warned the UN General Assembly that the greatest threat to world peace was not superpower confrontation, but lingering colonialism, with West Irian the prime example. Even Indonesian weakness was used as a weapon: the threat that the country would fall to communism without American help on Irian was just as effective for neutralist Indonesia as it sometimes was for American allies in the region.

The leading exponent of revolutionary diplomacy was foreign minister Subandrio, who demanded that diplomats become one with the revolution of the Indonesian nation, not civil servants standing aloof from it. Here he echoed Sukarno, who had condemned any separation between the leadership of the revolution and government. Subandrio ordered Indonesian diplomats to carry out “two aspects of diplomacy: conventional diplomacy and diplomacy as an instrument of revolution, the one complementing the other, each giving content to the other.” Even the “United Nations [was] merely a forum for a form of struggle.” Nevertheless, Subandrio was still seen by American policy makers as a moderating influence on Indonesian foreign policy.

Indonesia under guided democracy departed from its traditional interpretation of non-alignment to one of actively courting all major powers in an effort to play one against the other in order to escape client status. Non-alignment on the Indian model had stressed conciliation, but the NEFO concept preached an “era of confrontation” for the entire world. The Nehru and Sukarno visions first clashed at the Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade in September 1961, when Sukarno began to use the NEFO term.

To avoid over-dependence on the USSR, Indonesia departed from its traditional suspicion of China to sign a treaty of friendship in April 1961. A strained Indonesian-Chinese relationship began to mend in 1958 when China linked the cases of West Irian and Taiwan and extended a small economic aid package as the US-backed regional rebellion began. After the Soviet-Indonesian arms deal, China chose to support Sukarno despite his harsh repression of the Chinese-Indonesian community. China eventually became Indonesia’s major ally, but was always kept at arms’ length. “I know what China is.” Subandrio insisted. “I know she’d eat me up alive if she could.” Similarly, Indonesia counter-balanced economic ties with Europe and the United States by embracing Japan,
Sukarno’s favourite overseas destination and home of his third wife. Japanese funds were crucial to
Sukarno’s survival during the 1958 rebellion, and Sukarno was happy to return the favour by inviting
extensive Japanese investment. Japanese reluctance to offend Sukarno was demonstrated on several
occasions, most notably when Japan reversed a decision to allow the Dutch aircraft carrier Karel
Doorman to visit in 1960 after its stop in West New Guinea.

Most importantly, Indonesia tried to use its slow drift towards the Soviet Union as a lever to
force American involvement. This was done by continual stress on the threat to international peace
created by the Dutch presence in West New Guinea, portrayed as a hot spot like Berlin or the Congo.
Implicitly, a threat was also posed to the American position in Southeast Asia.

Modernizing tradition & Remapping Irian into Indonesia

While Sukarno’s Indonesia was building a nationalism oriented to a glorious future global role, the glue
for this new nationalism was being supplied increasingly by recalling a glorious past, which was then
equated on maps with the extent of Indonesia’s territory. Edward Said calls this “reinscription,” the
emotional need to find pre-colonial traditions, “the rediscovery and repatriation of what has been
suppressed in the natives’ past by the process of imperialism.”

As Sukarno piled revolutionary concept upon revolutionary concept, the Indonesian nation was
also projected backwards in time. The Indonesian flag, once made haphazardly by ripping the blue
stripe off the Dutch flag, was now ascribed sacredness as sang merah putih, the honoured red-and-
white, and defined as the symbol of resistance which “never ceased to be used” during the Dutch period
by a string of heroes retroactively claimed for the national pantheon. References to the old empire
of Majapahit seem to have increased in parallel with rising Javanese dominance, culminating in the
Javanese-inspired vision of guided democracy. The Negarakertagama, the epic poem of Majapahit,
was carefully interpreted by historians like Mohammed Yamin to build a picture of “the last sovereign
Indonesia-wide state” sharing much the same boundaries as present-day Indonesia, including West
Irian. Research on the actual extent of Majapahit shows that it was far less than the
Negarakertagama’s rhyming off of islands, and that the areas equated with West Irian were just a tiny
corner of the island, but the perceived sprawl of Majapahit proved far more important than the
reality in the nationalist imagination. The mental map of Majapahit was layered on top of the
physical map of Indonesia and made to conform (see appendix B). Sukarno even claimed that he had "unearthed" Pancasila from the *Negarakertagama*. Although the Dutch had only colonized West Irian at the end of the 19th century, it was now said that West Irian had suffered 400 years of colonialism, a date derived from the beginning of the Dutch presence in Java.

With Majapahit now defined as coterminous with Indonesia, the continued presence of the Dutch on the sacred territory of Indonesia was all the more intolerable. National unity already rested on the borders of the Dutch East Indies, and the exclusion of one part therefore represented a standing threat to the unity of the whole — as Arend Lijphart noted, "if West Irian were to be regarded as not essential to the national whole, the definition of national unity would cease to operate." With the weight of Majapahit added to the inheritance of the Indies, the separation of any part of Indonesia could be viewed as the mutilation of what Thongchai Winichakul has called the "geo-body" of the nation. Thus Subandrio at the UN rejected "the Netherlands' concept of self-determination" as an "amputation which the Dutch are performing on our national body." The map of Indonesia had already been made into a logo by the Dutch and their Indonesian successors (one which always included West Irian, but never the eastern half of the island). In some cases the logo-map included only two place names: Sabang and Merauke. The map of West Irian itself was also made into a logo for the liberation campaign which would physically complete Indonesian independence (see appendix B). If traditional Javanese power was indivisible, with no allowance for alternative power centres within the realm, as Anderson argues, this became true of modern Indonesia too. Any other administration inside the map of Indonesia, whether Dutch or Papuan, was an added threat to national unity.

Anderson has pointed out that the Papuans themselves were soon imagined as "Irianese," a new word named after the map, therefore "imagined in quasi-logo form: ‘negroid’ features, penis-sheaths, an so on." The initial impetus for this image was Dutch, but independent Indonesia embraced the same image. Subandrio spoke of grandiose development schemes and the need to get Papuans "down out of the trees even if we have to pull them down." A people who were peripheral geographically came to be seen as embodiments of an earlier, primitive state — Indonesians now, and therefore Indonesians throughout all history, albeit backwards ones: *Papua bodoh*, stupid Papuans, as the popular expression has it.
c) Becoming Papuan: the emergence of a nationalist movement

Between 1960 and 1962, the tiny Papuan elite coalesced into an embryonic nationalist movement which
both responded to the Dutch ten-year plan and demanded that Dutch rhetoric on self-determination be
transformed into reality. This nationalist movement was once again caught between Dutch and
Indonesian power, unsure of which side would provide a better patron.

Throughout the 1950s, Papuan leaders had expressed pro-Dutch views, largely out of
necessity. There were also demands for more local control which mounted in parallel with
increasing Dutch use of the self-determination argument in international forums. Indigenous
nationalism was also in part a reaction to the Eurasian influx after the Indonesian revolution. Eurasians
(who had status as Dutch citizens) and a handful of pro-Dutch Indonesians formed a middle layer
resented by many Papuans for blocking their prospects in business and administration.

The new Dutch policy was to accelerate elite political development of a “dynamic few” who were supposed to lead West New Guinea under Dutch guidance and meld one of the most diverse
regions of the world into a single nation. “The authorities are deliberately striving towards integration
of the many small groups of the native population and endeavouring to get them to realize that in
actual fact they are one people,” in the words of one government pamphlet. At the same time, however, many highland peoples were still being contacted by Europeans for the first time.

Parna, the National Party, was the most important of a dozen-odd parties formed in 1960 in the
lead-up to the New Guinea Council elections. Its name worked in both Dutch and Indonesian as well as
avoiding the issue of which nation it sought to represent, and its leadership straddled the pro-Dutch
and pro-Indonesian camps, prompting some opponents to call it a fifth column for Indonesia. It seemed
driven by typical anti-colonial sentiments, noting that “even today there are Netherlanders, and
among those religious leaders in Papua country, who still regard the people of New Guinea as a herd of
animals, who cannot think, who can only eat.” The Parna platform called for an independent West
New Guinea by 1970 and, as tensions rose, for tripartite talks between Indonesia, the Netherlands and
Papuan leaders. Its leaders stopped short of calling for immediate independence based largely on
outside considerations: the botched decolonization of the Congo.

Outside Parna, the main Papuan political force lay in non-party figures like Nicolaas Jouwe
and Markus Kaisiepo, who worked in support of the Dutch ten-year plan while consciously trying to
build a Papuan national identity. This identity placed strong emphasis on race (not coincidentally a mainstay of the Dutch case for why West New Guinea should not come under Indonesian rule). The Papuan people were black-skinned Melanesians having no kinship with Indonesians, and thus should seek close ties with the Pacific and Africa while staying aloof from Asia. That meant the Melanesian Federation idea looked attractive. “I don’t believe that in the future we will be friendly with Asiatic people,” Jouwe said. “They will become more and more Communistic. We are Pacific people.” 161 At an Australian-Dutch administrative cooperation conference in 1961, Jouwe appealed to natives of Australian Papua New Guinea over the heads of his Dutch masters. “We look not only to the Dutch but also to Australia. We also look forward to the distant day when all Papuans from Sorong in West New Guinea to Samarai in East New Guinea will share common political feelings.” 162

February 1961 elections for the inaugural New Guinea Council were the “final attempt to defeat Sukarno” by creating an alternative focus for decolonization. 163 They were hailed as a great success, with Papuans accounting for 22 of the 28 Council members along with five Dutchmen and an Indonesian. 164 “This is the first step on the road that leads to self-determination for your people,” said Queen Juliana in a taped message. 165 Despite very limited powers, council member was the most respected occupation among Papuan students in 1962, a demonstration of the new body’s strong potential. 166 The New Guinea Council (with Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo now named vice-presidents) attempted to assert its authority through a resolution that the Netherlands was “no longer free” to dispose of West New Guinea without its agreement. 167 The new elite attitude was summed up by one student, who pointed out that “we are not the same people we were 15 years ago. We know what future we want now. We want independence.” 168

After the election of the New Guinea Council, Parna members like Eliezer Bonay had begun to complain that the Dutch still wanted to use the Council as a rubber stamp. Dutch authorities soon were trying to isolate Bonay, considering him pro-Indonesian. 169 When the Dutch began in 1961 to consider placing the whole issue before the UN, a Papuan National Council was held on the initiative of Parna and the Jouwe-Kaisiepo group, which took the next step in the process of building a Papuan nation. In a move much like the 1920s Indonesian Youth Oath, seventy elite Papuans agreed on a set of national symbols. These included a new name, Papua Barat (West Papua) that was to replace the Dutch name (West New Guinea) and the Indonesian name (West Irian). The conference also decided to adopt the
Morning Star (Koreri) flag used during the Second World War and a new anthem, “My Land of Papua.” Within a year, 95% of Papuan students were able to identify the flag and anthem.\textsuperscript{170}

All these national symbols recalled the past in support of the future nation-building project. The name West Papua and the flag recalled the Mansren movement’s declaration of independence in 1942, which pre-dated Indonesia’s. The anthem was penned in 1925, ironically by a Dutch missionary. And the identification of nation with the territory bounded by the colonial borders was complete as West Papua replaced the Melanesian Federation idea, nixed by Australia in August 1961.\textsuperscript{171} The Dutch accepted the new flag, but insisted it fly only alongside their own, and slightly lower.\textsuperscript{172} The raising of the new flag on December 1, 1961, has become an event to be commemorated with flag-raisings by today’s West Papuan nationalists. It did not mark independence, but it did mark the arrival of a new “nation-of-intent.”

d) Mediation attempted: West New Guinea & the business lobby

Despite the severance of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, contacts continued through a back channel apparently known to both governments. This was the Rijkens group, an informal gathering of Dutch businessmen headed by Paul Rijkens, former managing director of Unilever, and including top executives from a number of other large Dutch corporations. Most Dutch multinational corporations had supported the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia since 1950,\textsuperscript{173} so Sukarno was happy to discuss the question with them. Secret talks began a month after diplomatic relations were broken. Sukarno met members of the group on at least three occasions between April and June 1961. General Nasution also opened his own channels to Dutch figures. The Rijkens group talks ended abruptly when they were publicized in the Dutch press and foreign minister Luns denied any knowledge of the back channel.\textsuperscript{174}

Business interest in West New Guinea was not confined to the Rijkens group. There were also companies interested in the territory for its own sake. Dutch business first interested itself in 1938, when fifteen corporations formed a New Guinea Consortium following discussion of a bill in the Japanese imperial diet to lease West New Guinea as colonization territory.\textsuperscript{175} Oil and mining had proved disappointing in terms of output, and postwar West New Guinea was a burden on the Dutch treasury. By the mid-1950s, the government subsidy was $10-15-million a year.\textsuperscript{176} Exports, which in
neighbouring Papua New Guinea were roughly equal to the territorial budget, covered just 20% of the Dutch colony’s budget. Most contemporary works portray West New Guinea as essentially a worthless swampland.

For political leaders, that may have been so. Neither the Dutch nor Indonesian governments seemed interested in West New Guinea as a money-making venture, although Indonesians sometimes cited the territory’s resources as a reason for Dutch stubbornness. Literature on the struggle for West New Guinea inevitably contains a bleak description of the “remote, inhospitable territory.” However, the lack of investment in the territory stemmed less from its intrinsic lack of value than from the political uncertainty that enveloped it. At least two Papuan nationalist leaders established close ties with Japanese corporations in 1960-1 which stalled as the threat of war grew. Additionally, a number of foreign corporations were aware of mineral deposits which were potentially enormous moneyspinners. Nickel and cobalt were known to exist in large quantities in the Cyclops Mountains near Hollandia and on Gag and Waigeo islands off the west coast. One of the last acts of the Dutch New Guinea regime in March 1962 was a contract for mining rights to islands of Gag & Waigeo with Pacific Nickel Co., a subsidiary of US Steel; this was renewed by the Indonesian government in 1972. The vast copper deposit of Mount Ertsberg in the southern highlands was discovered in 1936 and reported to the American company Freeport. In 1960, a Freeport manager climbed the mountain and concluded that “the Ertsberg was indeed a unique deposit and probably the largest above-ground outcrop of base metal in the world.” Freeport was the first company to sign a contract of work for mining with the Suharto government in 1967 and remains Indonesia’s largest taxpayer today. The inauguration of the Freeport mine, in fact, served as the occasion for West Irian to be renamed Irian Jaya, Victorious Irian. The province is one of three that today provides the bulk of Indonesia’s export earnings, generating revenues of about $125 million annually.

It might be expected that potential investors in West New Guinea would have preferred Dutch rule to that of the erratic Sukarno. On the other hand, Indonesia had offered far more generous guarantees to investors than those likely from Dutch administrators who stressed the preservation of Papuan cultures. On balance, it seems likely that such business interest as existed was exerted in favour of a settlement that would allow investment to take place, without preference as to who emerged as the eventual administering power. As long as the territory remained in dispute, favourable
investment conditions would not exist. The dispute also made the investment climate in Indonesia itself unstable, although Indonesia was careful never to follow through on threat to act against non-Dutch capital, even Dutch-British companies like Shell.

e) A new direction: the Kennedy administration and Indonesia, 1961

Tensions around New Guinea alarmed the Kennedy administration, which came to power at the beginning of 1961 determined to set a new course, more friendly to neutral states like Indonesia. While the Soviet Union under Nikita Kruschev was proclaiming co-existence in the developed world, it saw Africa, Asia and Latin America as the battleground for superpower competition. The new administration, wrote one of its key policy makers, was “activist in foreign policy, oriented to the emerging peoples and the new nationalisms, and determined to attempt to shape events.” American policy was to become one of stressing economic growth in regions like Southeast Asia, in order to build stable, non-Communist regimes that would then be able to aid their neighbours — what one writer called “islands of development.” Neutral governments like Sukarno’s were no longer to be regarded as the enemy, but as potentially powerful partners, if not allies, in containment. In Kennedy’s own words, “more energy is released by the awakening of these new nations than by the fission of the atom itself.” But the bases of American policy in the region remained containment of Communism, with great symbolic store still set on keeping Southeast Asian states out of the “Communist orbit.”

Indonesia, in this strategy, was a key player. Economically, it was especially important to Japan and Britain. Indonesia was the major oil supplier to Japan, with most of that oil pumped by American firms. On the mental maps of American policy makers, Indonesia’s position was not quite that of mainland Southeast Asia. Rather it formed part of the offshore island chain beloved of strategists after the “loss of China,” a Pacific Rim string of bases and friendly states that would contain Communist Chinese pressures from the Asian mainland. States like Indonesia and the Philippines were not on the front lines as Laos and Vietnam were, but formed a second line of defence. Indonesia was part of a “Malay barrier” of Southeast Asian islands familiar to American policy makers from the Second World War, “rich in resources but weak in self-defence capabilities” and thus uniquely vulnerable to internal communist subversion. The “loss” of a state in this tier would spell disaster for the “free world” position on the mainland. Robert Kennedy noted that the “capture of Indonesia by the
Communists would enable them to flank the whole of Southeast Asia, an area barely holding on to freedom by its fingertips." Secretary of State Dean Rusk worried that U.S. "commitments on the Indo-China peninsula could be lost if the bottom of Southeast Asia fell out to Communism." Ideally, the administration wanted Indonesia as part of a "New Pacific Community," in which neutralist Indonesia would be safely anchored in an association with Australia, the Philippines, Japan and American Pacific island territories.

The new administration gave the final nod to the policy advocated since 1958 by Howard Jones, the American ambassador in Jakarta. Jones advocated a friendly stance towards Sukarno coupled with ever-closer ties to the Indonesian armed forces, the strongest anti-Communist force in the country. On the one hand, personal friendship with Sukarno was pursued: Kennedy invited him to send his son to an American university, Jones commissioned his autobiography, American funds paid for a hospital named for his wife, and so on. Economic growth was also fostered by the sending of an American survey team. On the other hand, the United States started to rebuild its "assets" in the army in the hopes that they would replace Sukarno in time. Army chief/defence minister Nasution's hopes for effective grassroots competition with the PKI dovetailed perfectly with the Kennedy administration's civic action strategy. As many as one in five Indonesian officers in this period were American-trained. Direct military aid of about $20-million a year fell far short of the Soviet contribution, but held enormous symbolic importance. Technically this aid was in the form of a sales program, but Indonesia was allowed to pay a token amount (one-thirtieth of the book value in 1959) and may not even have deposited the requisite rupiahs.

Frederick Bunnell has described this as a two-track "post-West Irian strategy." The strategy could not work, however, while the West Irian issue continued to dominate the Indonesian political scene. It was necessary, then, to resolve the issue in some way that would allow the economic-military strategy to go ahead. Jones had been calling for U.S. action to resolve the West Irian dispute since 1959. Even the non-partisan economic survey mission dispatched in 1961 recommended a "favorable position" on Irian. Irian was responsible for all the obstacles, according to Jones:

It was Sukarno's determination to obtain West Irian that was responsible for his dissatisfaction with us, for his turning to the Soviet Union for military assistance, for his welcoming the political support of Peking, even, to some extent, for his growing fondness for the PKI, which had proved the most able and enthusiastic adherent of the cause.
In essence, key American decision makers had come to accept the argument that Indonesia could disintegrate and leave the PKI in control unless given American aid over Irian.  

United States policy on West Irian began to be reviewed early in the administration. When it was revealed that Sukarno would be the first foreign head of state to visit President Kennedy, a full-scale review was launched. Kennedy told his cabinet that Indonesia was “the most significant nation in Southeast Asia” and a solution to the West Irian dispute “the key” to winning Indonesia. However, the administration as a whole continued to seek a middle position between Indonesian and Dutch positions. The shift at this time was simply one from passive neutrality to active neutrality.

The Department of State’s new preferred solution, developed by the policy planning staff, was a trusteeship to remove the issue from the international arena. Pro-Western Malaya was the recommended trustee, and Malayan prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was encouraged to play a stronger mediating role. The White House national security staff also turned to outside sources for new policy inputs, however, and these appear to have been more important than the State department in determining the eventual administration policy. Enormous time was spent eliciting the views of RAND Corp. analyst Guy Pauker, who saw Sukarno as the problem and bewailed Nasution’s unwillingness to challenge the president, but believed a deal on West Irian might be the only way to save the situation. A more pro-Indonesian line was stressed by George Kahin of Cornell University and Dutch journalist Willem Oltmans. Oltmans wanted an immediate shift. His recommendations seem to have been given little credit in the White House, but his input seems to have influenced the White House staff’s views on Dutch opinion as soft on the issue.

A formula for a face-saving withdrawal is eagerly searched for in the Netherlands by all.... Dutch public opinion — and the writer believes he is in a position to categorically state — needs another hard knock on the head in regards to West Irian. It is in their own and very interest (sic) [t]hat it may not be a bombardment from Indonesian Ilyushin jet bombers, but rather to come from Washington in the form of quiet, friendly but firm diplomatic pressure.

By the end of the review, the White House staff (which constituted “really a small state department,” according to Robert Kennedy) seemed determined to act along the lines of the Jones approach to Indonesia. Robert Johnson, point man on the West New Guinea issue, listed American objectives as:

(a) the elimination of an issue from Indonesian politics and foreign policy which is tending to drive Indonesia into the arms of the Communist Party (PKI) internally and into the arms of the Bloc
externally; and (b) achievement of a major gain in U.S. relations with Indonesia. This is not to say that we are totally unconcerned with Dutch and Australian reactions, but we are prepared to accept at least some difficulty with the two of them... We have committed ourselves to a search for a solution, thus reversing our past policy of total non-involvement.\textsuperscript{210}

The Pentagon, looking at a mental map of its own, also broadly supported the Jones line.\textsuperscript{211}

"Indonesia's large population (sixth ranking in the world), wealth of natural resources, and strategic location constitute a major prize in the East-West struggle," argued the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "All the major trade routes between the Far East and points west pass through or near this massive island complex. The loss of Indonesia to the communists would gravely undermine the Free World military position in the Western Pacific."\textsuperscript{212}

There were barriers in the administration that slowed American initiatives, centred in the state department and the CIA. Australia, which Washington was committed to consulting on its West New Guinea policy, also restrained an outright move to the Indonesian side, particularly in 1961 when Prime Minister Robert Menzies was acting as his own foreign minister.\textsuperscript{213} State reluctance to depart from support for a NATO ally that had just agreed to house American nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{214} was not resolved until November 1961 when Kennedy axed many of the department's top men. Most importantly for Indonesia policy, Averell Harriman was brought in as assistant secretary for the Far East and Walt Rostow as assistant secretary for policy planning.\textsuperscript{215} Rusk stayed on as secretary, however, and continued to be seen by the White House as an obstacle. Rusk spoke of self-determination as a principle in the same moral terms as used by Dutch politicians. "If Sukarno starts aggressing against his neighbors, he'll find us on the other side," Rusk said. "We learned our lesson with Hitler. The time to stop him was at the beginning."\textsuperscript{216}

The Central Intelligence Agency view was even more strongly anti-Sukarno, a predictable stance from an agency that had tried to overthrow Sukarno in 1957-8. Like Rusk, the CIA apparently saw Sukarno as Hitler, and opposed any concessions to him.\textsuperscript{217} "We believe that accession to Indonesia's claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve the best interests of United States security in that part of the world," said one CIA paper.\textsuperscript{218} After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the destruction of the CIA's assets in the Indonesian rebel movement and the ascendancy of Ambassador Jones, however, CIA views on Indonesia seem to have been downplayed.
With the national security staff committed to American activism and the State Department still clinging to its idea of a Malayan trusteeship, the end result was caution. Kennedy indicated to Sukarno that the United States wished to be helpful but made no commitments, saying publicly that it would be "rather difficult" to offer American mediation. Essentially, he wanted West New Guinea removed from the arena of great power competition. The Indonesians for their part had great hopes for the visit, as seen by the delegation's composition: in addition to Sukarno it included his first deputy prime minister, Leimena; foreign minister Subandrio and seven other cabinet ministers; and representatives of the army, navy and air force. In their April 24 meeting, Sukarno pleaded with Kennedy for help on West Irian. "Give me something to enable me to say that America is our friend," he said, recalling American support in 1948-9 for Indonesian independence and asking for support to complete the territorial extent of that independence. Subandrio, for the first time, offered to consider a trusteeship of one or two years as a transition step to Indonesian rule, and Sukarno added that Indonesia "would be willing to borrow the hand of the United Nations to transfer the territory to Indonesia." This foreshadowed the eventual compromise settlement.

Kennedy's charm apparently made a good impression on Sukarno, and the joint communiqué condemned imperialism "in all its manifestations," wording seen as a criticism of Soviet expansionism. Although Kennedy made no commitments on West Irian, Sukarno could not have been unaware that American policy was beginning to change. Two moves prior to Sukarno's visit served up ample evidence of this. Privately, Rusk in April 1961 told the Dutch that the United States would no longer abide by Dulles' promise to come to their aid if Indonesia attacked. He also decided to stop repeating counter-productive warnings to Indonesia over the use of force. Britain and Australia publicly denied any commitments to help the Dutch around the same time. The first public shift came when the United States declined to send an observer to the installation of the New Guinea Council, the only South Pacific Commission member state to boycott the ceremonies. Since the Council was the centrepiece of the Dutch self-determination plan, the symbolism was very clear. Although the decision elicited little discussion in Washington, Robert Johnson noted that American absence "had a very favorable impact upon the Indonesians."
4. The threat of war and the US-brokered solution, 1961-62

a) Back to the UN: The Luns plan & internationalization

The advent of the New Guinea Council had not proved enough to swing international opinion to the Dutch side. Meanwhile, public opinion at home was swinging towards shedding the country's top international problem. The government's response was to seek to internationalize the problem, a reversal of years of Dutch policy and an indication that the Dutch now saw themselves as the weaker party, in need of international endorsement. In the fall of 1961 they advanced a plan to turn West New Guinea over to the United Nations.

In the context of Dutch domestic politics, this was a brilliantly-crafted compromise that could draw the support of all major political parties. Internationally, it responded to the evolving American suggestion of a trusteeship and embodied the American hope for Dutch withdrawal. In fact, many of the ideas included in the resolution were American in origin, as was the idea of taking the issue back to the UN. It also played to the UN's willingness to become more directly involved in post-colonial problems, as in the Congo. However, as foreign minister Luns conceded, it completely ignored the Indonesian contention that West Irian was part of Indonesia and could no more be separated from its territory than Katanga from the Congo. Luns may have seen it as a cover for continued Dutch administration under a UN blanket.

Luns presented a draft resolution to the United Nations at the end of September 1961, which promised to hand over sovereignty to the Papuan people and administration to the UN, following the visit of an investigating commission to West New Guinea. He sweetened the deal by pledging to continue Dutch financing of the entire territorial budget to the tune of $30 million a year. Indonesia's claim was not mentioned until the resolution came up for debate in November, at which time Luns said he would raise no objections if the Papuans themselves chose to join Indonesia. The plan was endorsed strongly by Australia, and seems to have been urged privately on the Indonesians by American diplomats as well. But its chances faded when Liberia and Ghana, which had been heavily lobbied by Papuan nationalists, opposed the plan. African governments sympathized with the Papuan cause, but international politics determined their votes, with divisions over the Congo decisive in determining the alignments.
The Dutch plan was presented in the context of a debate on ending colonialism in which Indonesia served as one of the leading backers of an Asian-African joint resolution. Although Dutch diplomats seemed confident they could pass their plan since it granted self-determination to what they insisted was their last colony, their Indonesian counterparts were equally confident that they could muster 40 votes, more than the one-third needed to block a resolution (this exactly anticipated the eventual results). Amidst the early debates, the visiting chief of the Soviet navy presented a gift of ten gunboats to be used to safeguard Indonesian sovereignty and help unite Indonesia.

Thus Subandrio, who addressed the General Assembly four times, felt no pressure to compromise, and merely insisted that the Luns plan be rejected. He continually insisted that self-determination for West Irian had been exercised in 1945 along with the rest of Indonesia, but the Dutch had "embarked upon a regime of terror to de-Indonesianize that part of Indonesia" and re-opened the notorious Boven Digul prison camp. This meant West Irian was "the shrine, the symbol of our freedom." Like other examples of continuing colonial rule, West Irian represented a growing threat to international peace. If the Dutch resolution passed, he said, Indonesia would consider this as legalization of its "right to eject the Netherlands by force." Perhaps most importantly, he spoke directly to other Asian and African states when he said that Indonesia had fought for their freedom, and they should return the favour and show solidarity with Indonesia, regardless of the merits of the Dutch plan. The only concession Subandrio was willing to consider was agreement to a resolution drafted by India that called for talks between the two sides.

The United States was in a quandary, having failed to achieve a compromise. It welcomed the Luns plan as "imaginative and constructive" but said it failed to "sufficiently recognize the intense Indonesian interest in the Territory." The result was a new resolution, presented by 13 mainly francophone African states known as the Brazzaville group, which mentioned self-determination and tried to wed the two resolutions by calling for bilateral talks but also for a UN commission to visit if no result was achieved by the end of March 1962, preparatory to implementing the Luns plan. This was very much along the lines that the United States had been urging, and therefore received American support. When it came time to vote on November 27, the 53-41 division was solidly along bloc lines formed over cold war issues and the Congo: the Western states, Latin Americans and Brazzaville group voted in favour (with four abstentions), but were joined by only three misfit Asian states: Israel, the
Philippines and Taiwan. Indonesia had its 40 supporters in Asia, the Soviet bloc and the seven African radicals (with, again, four abstainers). On the Indian draft, virtually the same 41 countries voted in favour, while enough Brazzaville states abstained to give the resolution a one-vote majority. In the aftermath, both sides claimed a moral victory and vowed to continue with their existing plans. Sukarno dismissed the Brazzaville states as artificial countries, born not in revolutionary fire but "under the rays of the full moon ... protected by the perfume of roses and jasmine," lacking the legitimacy conferred by a struggle for independence.

The Dutch were left with no real choice but to negotiate or face a test of strength with an Indonesian state they had failed utterly to isolate. Papuan leaders, faced with an apparently unreliable Dutch policy and unable to convert African sympathy into votes, were thrown increasingly onto their own devices. The United States saw its plans for a UN solution ruined, and its post-West Irian strategy for closer ties to Indonesia in jeopardy. Indonesia, vindicated in its belief that confrontation was the best policy, saw the chances for American support melting away, with only the threat of war remaining as a lever to use on Washington. The imperatives of struggle and diplomacy now both pointed to the need to rattle sabres.

b) War beckons: Trikora, memories of the revolution & a taste of battle

Indonesians spent the first part of December waiting for Sukarno to order the army into action. Fevers rose even more when India invaded Portuguese Goa on December 18, 1961. Sukarno delayed his new policy announcement until December 19, the anniversary of the 1948 Dutch "police action" against the Republic. His speech was made in Yogyakarta, revolutionary capital of Indonesia and the target of that Dutch police action. Similar proclamations were issued all across Indonesia.

Sukarno's Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat, threefold command of the people) was actually a very nuanced escalation. In November and early December speeches, Sukarno had promised to order an invasion. Instead, Trikora called for preparatory mobilization of the whole country, the defeat of the formation of the Papuan state, and the raising of the red-and-white flag of Indonesia in West Irian. Sukarno rejected West Papuan self-determination as the greatest provocation yet, a reminder of Dutch attempts to split Indonesia. Thousands of people volunteered to go fight in Irian. They
included the entire PKI membership, which thereby gained the first success in its campaign for an armed popular force outside the army.\textsuperscript{247}

There was still room left for diplomacy, but military action was also stepped up. Soon after Trikora, a special Mandala military command was set up with authority over all of the eastern Indonesia war zone, headed by General Suharto.\textsuperscript{248} (The name Mandala recalled traditional concepts of sovereignty radiating out from centre to periphery.) Dutch defences were tested in January 1962, when Indonesian patrol boats entered Dutch waters and were fired upon.\textsuperscript{249} One ship was sunk and the deputy commander of the Indonesian Navy was killed, a bloody nose for Indonesia but also a chance to create a new martyred National Hero.\textsuperscript{250} This came just days after a Sukarno survived his fourth assassination attempt, allegedly carried out by Dutch agents.\textsuperscript{251} In the war fever that followed, with every organization in the country vying to mobilize volunteers for Trikora, Sukarno ordered the arrest of his remaining political opponents.\textsuperscript{252} Even the Indonesian language was “re-tooled” to remove Dutch spellings in accord with the “national identity.”\textsuperscript{253}

The military seemed prepared to attack on command, although they were unsure of success.\textsuperscript{254} Naval and air capacity were below what was needed, and the army preferred to spend another year infiltrating soldiers into West Irian before launching a frontal attack.\textsuperscript{255} By the middle of 1962, according to General Nasution, 2,000 troops were in West Irian and three quarters of the country’s military was poised for an attack.\textsuperscript{256}

c) Washington steps in: The US and UN force talks

After the UN debacle, the United States followed the logic of its post-West Irian strategy to its ultimate end, forcing the Dutch to the bargaining table to negotiate the terms of their surrender. The new U.S. policy was the result of a decision taken in the White House, which came largely in response to Indonesia’s decision to go to war if necessary. To avoid this result, the Kennedy administration was willing to back neutralist Indonesia against its Dutch ally.

The shift started just days after the UN voting. Robert Komer, an influential national security assistant, joined Robert Johnson in urging a shift: “with the failure of our UN gambit,” he wrote, “the time has come to take the gloves off, and adopt a frankly pro-Indonesian stance while there’s still time to get some political capital out of it.”\textsuperscript{257} The State Department was soon making similar noises, and
the president was brought into the decision-making loop.\textsuperscript{258} The State Department, with the exception of Harriman’s Far East division, remained resistant to an outright move to side with Sukarno, however.\textsuperscript{259} Kennedy’s occasional direct interventions were aimed at trying to make his State Department as hard-nosed as his national security staff. The president said he simply “could not understand the Dutch.”\textsuperscript{260} Conflict over West Irian still bedevilled any improvement of the American position in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{261}

Sukarno on December 8 intimated to Jones that Indonesia was considering an early attack. There was little doubt in Washington that he was serious. As Robert Kennedy recalled, “They would have had a war ... It would have been the white men against the Africans, the Asians, and the Communists. It would have been a very bad, a very dangerous situation.”\textsuperscript{262} The next day, Jones was back bearing a letter from President Kennedy that expressed “deep concern” at the threat and essentially offered the long-requested American mediation if Indonesia would refrain from starting a war.\textsuperscript{263} The accompanying guidance to Jones asked him to “seek to persuade Sukarno that if he does not give a signal for force on Monday, we can and will intensify our efforts with Dutch and Australians and will hope to be able to indicate significant progress to him as these efforts proceed.”\textsuperscript{264}

Sukarno’s reply of December 12, however, tossed the problem back into Kennedy’s lap:

I hope that your efforts will make the Netherlands transfer of administration to Indonesia take place in a smooth way, so that a conflict will become unnecessary. On the other hand I hope to have your understanding that as long as the Netherlands continue with their preparations for the proclamation of Independent Papua (the so-called Papua flag and national anthem have already been introduced into West Irian) there is no alternative left to us but the use of force in order to face this illegal, forceful occupation of West Irian by the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{265}

Indonesia was willing to fight or, if transfer was agreed, to talk; the choice was up to the United States. Its choice was made easier by events in Australia, which from December 1961 was shifting to a less pro-Dutch stance.\textsuperscript{266} “No responsible Australian would wish to see any action affecting the safety of Australia on the issues of war and peace in this area except in concert with our great and powerful friends,” Menzies told parliament.\textsuperscript{267} Two key policy shifts were made: Australia for the first time urged the Dutch to agree to bilateral talks, and the Australian chiefs of staff downgraded the strategic significance of West New Guinea to “less than vital.”\textsuperscript{268}

. After the naval clash, Kennedy addressed the issue in a news conference, saying the U.S. was now working actively in support of a peaceful settlement.\textsuperscript{269} Sukarno continued to use the Communist
threat as a lever. He sent Subandrio and the secretary-general of the foreign ministry to Washington to raise the question of succession. “Go and meet Kennedy” he told them. “Don’t argue with him. Just give him the benefit of answering my single question. Which one does Kennedy prefer: Nasution or [PKI leader] Aidit?” In March 1962, the threat was given weight when Sukarno named the first two Communists to his cabinet. Washington was clearly listening. The naval clash had prompted arms embargoes from Denmark, Britain and West Germany, but the U.S. continued to supply arms to Indonesia in the face of criticism from its NATO allies.

Jones believed Sukarno’s Trikora speech had stopped short of a declaration of war because of Kennedy’s intervention. There was plenty in the speech to be alarmed about, however. The next call for restraint came from UN secretary general U Thant, who saw the issue as diversion from priority issues like the Congo but agreed to work in tandem with Kennedy. He sent identical cables to Sukarno and Dutch prime minister J.E. de Quay. “It is my most sincere hope that the parties concerned may come together to seek a peaceful solution of the problem,” Thant wrote, an implicit call for bilateral talks, which was Indonesia’s long-standing demand. Sukarno had not won West Irian, but his confrontation diplomacy embodied in Trikora had won, in the space of a few weeks in December, exactly what Indonesia had sought throughout the 1950s.

The United States also took direct action to limit Dutch military forces in the region, while being careful not to foreclose all avenues for reinforcements. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had strongly objected to American arms being used to defend West New Guinea as far back as 1959. This stance was now extended to Dutch troop transfers. Dutch troops were being reinforced by civilian flights via Alaska and Japan. In February 1962, under Indonesian pressure including student demonstrations in Tokyo and at the Japanese embassy in Jakarta, Japan asked the Netherlands to stop sending troops this way. The Dutch were outraged and tried to circumvent the ban by dressing their soldiers in plainclothes for the flight, but after several weeks of acrimony agreed to stop using Tokyo as a jump-off point.

In February, the US withdrew landing rights “in the interests of a peaceful solution” and closed the Panama Canal to Dutch ships, although the ships eventually got through after announcing they were bound for Vancouver. Even Australia refused to allow Dutch ships to refuel in Australia, “a refusal as symbolic as the request.” The only countries willing to allow open Dutch refuelling of
planes carrying soldiers were Peru and France, which may have obtained clearance from the United States for its decision to let the Dutch refuel at its Pacific colonies.\textsuperscript{278}

Further presidential action came in February in the form of a mission to Jakarta and the Hague by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, whose job was to press both sides to the bargaining table. The president took a personal hand in drafting State Department telegrams at this time.\textsuperscript{279} The Dutch had insisted at first that they were willing to talk on the condition that self-determination was recognized, but dropped their precondition in December 1961.\textsuperscript{280} Indonesia’s precondition, in Jones’ words, was that “purpose of talks should be to effect transfer of administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia and to discuss matter in which this should be accomplished.”\textsuperscript{281} The Attorney General’s job in Jakarta was to get Sukarno to drop his precondition, which the Americans believed was achieved by the visit.\textsuperscript{282} However, it does not seem that Sukarno in fact did this. His next major speech insisted upon “negotiations which really discuss the procedures as to how the Dutch shall transfer the administration, the authority, over West Irian.... We clearly reject negotiations without condition.”\textsuperscript{283}

The visit was probably more significant as another charm offensive in which Robert Kennedy declared that the US “welcomes the new forces which have come on the world scene because they correspond so closely to the forces which sparked our own revolution for independence.”\textsuperscript{284} He apparently succeeded in convincing Indonesians that the United States was trying to help and would pressure the Dutch. Meanwhile, Indonesians seem to have also converted the president’s brother to almost all-out support for their claim. His comments on Papuan unfitness for self-government outraged the New Guinea Council, which cabled a protest to the president.\textsuperscript{285}

In the Hague, Kennedy’s job was to lay down the law, letting the Dutch know in no uncertain terms that the United States would not support them.\textsuperscript{286} Luns came to Washington soon afterwards, sounding a more conciliatory tone. President Kennedy asked Luns not to send ships to West New Guinea immediately, and appealed to the greater interests of the West. If Indonesia went to war, he said, it might well go communist, a “disaster for the free world position in Asia [which] would force us out of Viet Nam.” West New Guinea, he said, had no strategic significance, and “by concentrating too much on the welfare of the Papuan population we may be forgetting our other obligations in Asia and free Europe.”\textsuperscript{287}
d) West Irian talks, West Irian struggle

Unofficial talks finally opened on March 20, 1962, at an estate near Washington. Indonesian ambassador Adam Malik sought a direct transfer of administration. His Dutch counterpart J.H. van Roijen, who had been a lead negotiator of the agreement for Indonesian independence, wanted to see a transfer to the UN, followed some years later by an act of self-determination.\(^d\) The job of reconciling these positions fell to Ellsworth Bunker, an American diplomat who officially was an agent for U Thant, although he in fact reported to Washington and only sporadically to the UN.\(^e\) Bunker’s eventual formula for a settlement took the Dutch idea of transfer to the UN, grafted it to Sukarno’s notion that one or two years of interim UN administration would be acceptable, accepted the Indonesian contention that transfer to Indonesia was a given, and retained the Dutch desire for an eventual act of self-determination. However, by putting transfer to Indonesia first and self-determination later, the Bunker plan essentially favoured the Indonesian position and granted the Netherlands only face-saving devices. Van Roijen called this “abject surrender” and professed shock that Western strategic interests were placed ahead of the rights of the Papuans. Bunker “agreed bluntly his thinking was in fact in those terms.”\(^f\) In presenting this formula, Bunker made himself “a central player in the mediation process,” backed by the prestige of the UN and US.\(^g\)

That weight was quickly expressed in a letter from the American president to de Quay which again asked for priority to be given to overall Western interests:

This would be a war in which neither The Netherlands nor the West could win in any real sense. Whatever the outcome of particular military encounters, the entire free world position in Asia would be seriously damaged. Only the communists would benefit from such a conflict. If the Indonesian Army were committed to an all out war against The Netherlands, the moderate elements within the army and the country would be quickly eliminated leaving a clear field for communist intervention. If Indonesia were to succumb to communism in these circumstances the whole non-communist position in Viet-Nam, Thailand and Malaya would be in grave peril and as you know these are areas in which we in the United States have heavy commitments.\(^h\)

Kennedy was now willing to let the Dutch blame the U.S. if it would achieve a settlement: “We’re prepared to have everybody mad,” he told reporters, “if it makes some progress.”\(^i\)

Sukarno quickly accepted the formula after reading a letter from Kennedy that the United States would be “seriously disturbed” if talks did not resume, but Luns presented a note to the American ambassador which stated his government was “shocked and dismayed” by the Bunker plan and “deeply hurt” that the US government was backing it and thereby pursuing “appeasement.”\(^j\)
In the Bunker plan, the broad outlines of the eventual peace deal were clear. However, five months of intermittent battles, megaphone diplomacy, threats and counter-threats were to ensue before the deal was signed. The United States and Australia now began to exert maximum pressure on both sides to close the deal along the lines laid out by Bunker.

The Indonesian diplomatic style in this period was to alternately advance demands, then retract them as apparent concessions, all the time keeping the Dutch and Americans off balance by their unpredictability. Backed by continued low-intensity warfare, Subandrio and Malik posed as restraining influences while in many ways fuelling the campaign. In fact, the low-intensity war in West New Guinea was designed not for military purposes, but to back up the diplomatic campaign and create the impression of action for the home audience — although the credible threat to launch a full assault was always there, visible to American U-2 surveillance flights. While the army declared publicly it could throw 1,750,000 men into the fight, its chief of staff told one group of paratroopers their job was “principally to give support to our diplomatic efforts to negotiate with the Dutch. We have to be in a position to prove that we own the territory seized.” This particular offensive, for symbolic reasons and because of the area’s remoteness from the main Dutch forces, was aimed at Merauke. These feints continued without interruption even as talks resumed in July, with new paratroop drops and attempted landings from submarines reported even after the signing of a final agreement. Sukarno saw this policy as fair since the Dutch had proved they could not be trusted. Outside warnings against the use of force were essentially irrelevant. Struggle continued, was even intensified, as an inseparable track alongside diplomacy. As far as Indonesia was concerned, it was already at war. Even as Subandrio reported acceptance of the Bunker principles, Nasution announced on April 3 that volunteers had landed. Indonesian forces were soon reported laying siege to some towns, taking control of others. Sukarno announced Indonesia had taken possession of Mig-19 supersonic jets, and Subandrio returned to Moscow for a fresh infusion of arms.

Dutch diplomacy, on the other hand, tended to a series of grudging concessions which often came too late to meet escalating Indonesian demands. As Subandrio said, “the Dutch have always been one step behind Indonesia’s minimum demands.” After sustained American pressure, the Netherlands announced it accepted the Bunker plan “in principle.” Since Sukarno insisted this was nothing more than Dutch trickery, the United States continued to press for more. At the NATO Council
meeting in Athens in May, Luns accepted Bunker’s plan conditional on being allowed to raise other issues, an offer which was rejected by Indonesia. On May 22, the United States formally requested the Netherlands accept the Bunker plan in toto. The next day, Thant let the Dutch know he would publish the Bunker proposals if the Dutch did not make a clearer acceptance soon; a day later Kennedy publicly endorsed Bunker’s plan. De Quay then accepted “on the basis” of the Bunker formula.

Sukarno continued to say publicly that he could not tell whether the Dutch had accepted Bunker or not. Throughout June, an exchange of cables between Sukarno and Thant debated whether or not the Netherlands had actually accepted Bunker’s timeline, until a formal statement meeting Sukarno’s requirements was delivered. Western pressure now shifted to Indonesia to resume talks, with Menzies, for instance, calling on Indonesia to “stop making war.”

When Indonesian negotiators did return, it was with the knowledge that they had foreclosed any chance of Dutch departure from the Bunker plan and that they were negotiating from a position of unassailable strength. As the second round of talks opened, the National Defence Council decided Trikora would continue to be implemented “in whatever circumstances and whatever situation.” Malik again advocated direct transfer, but then retracted the demand. Subandrio then called for partial direct transfer of the areas controlled by Indonesian guerrillas (Jones backed this, suggesting that Merauke be transferred for symbolic reasons), but this proposal was also blocked. The central issue became the timing of the transfer from the UN to Indonesia, an issue over which the Dutch were willing to break off talks.

In this round of talks, the principle of self-determination was abandoned. This is perhaps not surprising, given American attitudes towards the Papuans. Rostow worried that the Dutch “may continue to insist upon self-determination, however little sense that makes for the stone-age Papuan population of New Guinea.” Komer dismissed self-determination for “a few thousand square miles of cannibal land.” Kennedy himself rejected comparisons to West Berlin, saying “that’s an entirely different matter.... those Papuans of yours are some 700,000 and living in the Stone Age.”

The Dutch proved willing to abandon the substance of self-determination in exchange for the appearance. Dutch promises to consult Papuan leaders were never followed up. Instead, their top priority was to resist the humiliation of direct transfer to Indonesia, their second to preserve the appearance of the promises they had made. The idea of transfer to Indonesia followed by an act of
choice had been floated by Subandrio in the November 1961 UN debates, where it was rejected by the Dutch ambassador as "a mockery of the principle of free choice." Now, the Dutch agreed to the idea in exchange for keeping the period of interim UN administration. Dutch negotiators did not hold out for a plebiscite run by the UN but agreed to a write into the agreement the idea of a popular consultation (musyawarah) conducted by Indonesia in accordance with Javanese tradition — in other words, the style of consultation under guided democracy. They raised no complaint when Indonesian negotiator Zairin Zain denounced the long-held notion of an autonomous province. Even the word "Papuans" was dropped from the final agreement in favour of "inhabitants."

Pushing for further Dutch concessions, Subandrio on July 25 said he would break off talks. This proved too much for the Americans, who called in Kennedy to speak with Subandrio. No records of this meeting exist, but Kennedy's talking points suggested he tell Subandrio:

... a sudden attack on West New Guinea when a peaceful solution seems possible would raise grave problems for the United States at a time when we have assumed major responsibilities in Southeast Asia.... if a major attack is mounted against West New Guinea the United States would be faced with very grave decision with respect to our own attitude and course of action. We can not be indifferent to the safety of lives in West New Guinea if fighting occurs at a moment when a peaceful solution is clearly in sight.

Kennedy seems to have gone further, suggesting that the Seventh Fleet might fight on the side of the Dutch — at least, this was the impression left upon the Dutch and Indonesian delegations. Although some Indonesian generals still wanted to attack in order to win a clear-cut military victory, Subandrio had reached the limit of concessions, and so agreed to the deal that had emerged. De Quay's report to parliament dispelled any doubts as to the winner. "We are ashamed before the world," he said. "We were forced into it against our will and against everything we honor... The Netherlands could not count on the support of its allies, and for that reason we had to sign."

The final deal was signed at the UN on August 15, 1962. This came just in time for Sukarno's independence day speech, in which he noted that the struggle for West Irian had consumed all of Indonesia's resources, and promised to turn to the final point in his cabinet program, the provision of basic needs. Kennedy immediately circulated a memo to all government departments asking for suggestions on how to "capitalize on the US role in promoting this settlement to move toward a new and better relationship with Indonesia."
Even at this stage, Indonesia sought and obtained a few minor but symbolically powerful victories, particularly over the question of which flags would fly over the next year, which nearly broke the deal. In the end, it was agreed that the Dutch flag would be lowered on the day of transfer to the UN, then raised alongside the UN flag. On Dec. 31 it would be lowered for the last time and the Indonesian flag raised in its place, fulfilling Sukarno’s vow that the red-and-white banner would fly in West Irian “before the cock crowed” on a new year. On May 31, the UN flag would be lowered and Indonesia’s banner fly alone. This sequence was followed scrupulously, and across the country third flagpoles that had been reserved for the West Papuan flag were removed. The first day of Indonesian sole administration was then celebrated with a bonfire of West Papuan flags.

e) A nation gels: the West Papuans on their own

Less than one year passed between the Luns plan and the New York agreement ending Dutch rule in West New Guinea. In this period, however, the Papuan nationalist movement took on a new assertiveness in reaction to the movements of powerful outside forces — Indonesia, the Netherlands and the United States. Papuan nationalists sought accommodation through one or more of these patrons. Regardless of which patron was preferred, however, Papuan nationalism was no longer pro-Dutch or pro-Indonesian, but pro-Papuan.

New Guinea Council leaders lobbied actively at the UN, stressing racial solidarity with African governments, with special appeals made to the most vocally anti-colonial states. A new anthem was floated, “Dutch New Guinea is New Africa.” Nicolaas Jouwe led the charge, writing:

Many, many times you have heard about us from the Dutch and Indonesians, without having known us. Now we will take the floor ourselves. We are living in the Pacific, our people are called Papuans, our ethnic origin is the Negroid Race.... We do not want to be slaves any more.... Why do we Papuans have to become victims of a battle for prestige between certain groups which feel powerful? ... Indonesia as well as the Dutch are strange to us.

Some of the strongest Papuan anger was directed at the United States, once seen as the land of hope and racial equality, but now looking like an accomplice of Indonesia in denying the very existence of a Papuan nation. In April 1962, an angry telegram to Kennedy declared: “We Papuans are not Indonesians ... forced participation in Indonesian administration would be equivalent to a slave trade carried on by members of the United Nations.” All these efforts failed, however, to extend their African support
beyond the Brazzaville group — and even these states began to falter in their support.\textsuperscript{328} With the Melanesian/African avenue closed, race as a unifying factor finally gave way to territory.

Indonesian pressure, meanwhile, served to solidify resistance, in much the same way that Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia in 1963-5 transformed a shaky federation into a unified state. Nothing brings a country together like an outside threat. More than three quarters of students in West Papua's high schools in early 1962 supported Dutch rule and decolonization, with just 1% favouring Indonesian rule.\textsuperscript{329} “Now we are only for our own country,” said Parna figure Frits Kirihio, the first Papuan to attend university.\textsuperscript{330}

International realities, however, made accommodation necessary. By early 1962 it was apparent that the Dutch were giving in to American pressure, a tendency confirmed when they grudgingly accepted the Bunker formula, step by agonizing step, between May and July. Kirihio was the first leader to make the transition, touring eastern Indonesia with Sukarno in January and then telling a German audience that West Papua could prosper only as part of Indonesia, whose language it shared, and not in partnership with Papua New Guinea, since few West Papuans spoke English. His preferred solution was autonomy within Indonesia, followed by a plebiscite, the intervening period allowing time for Papuans and Indonesians to become friends.\textsuperscript{331} Kirihio seemed to be tacking to accord with the eventual winner, but also remained true to the nationalist cause. His party, Parna, re-affirmed its call for independence by 1970 even after his tour with Sukarno.\textsuperscript{332} In 1968, he argued that 95% of educated Papuans opposed Indonesia.\textsuperscript{333}

Other leaders also took ambiguous stands interpreted as pro-Indonesian. Markus Kaisiepo, vice-president of the New Guinea Council, was now reported to be “secretly pro-Indonesian along with a large number of influential Papuan political leaders.”\textsuperscript{334} So was Takoro, the Council's only woman member, who had previously signed many nationalist proclamations.\textsuperscript{335} Amos Indey led a student delegation to meet Sukarno, saying that “since Bunker forwarded his proposals for the settlement of West Irian, we then understood that our future lies in Djakarta.”\textsuperscript{336} When Indey's group returned, the New Guinea Council resolved to send a delegation to Jakarta as well, a proposal which the Dutch colonial administration accepted only on the unlikely condition that Indonesian attacks stop.\textsuperscript{337}
Meanwhile those the Indonesians called puppets cut their last strings. "I spit on the Dutch who promised us so much and gave us tears," said Herman Womsiwor, vowing to lead guerrilla struggle against Indonesia from exile. Jouwe and his supporters left West Papua with the Dutch, but there is no evidence that remaining "pro-Indonesian" Papuan leaders criticized the "pro-Dutch" camp. Allegiance to Indonesia was always temporary, pending the act of free choice promised for 1969.

The cry for independence persisted. Parna, the party of Bonay, Kirihio and Takoro, renewed its call for independence by 1970 as the first point in its program drawn up days after the New York Agreement. A new National Council also met, agreeing to the Dutch-Indonesian deal but demanding that the UN authority recognize their flag and anthem and that a plebiscite be held by the end of 1963. It sent a delegation to Jakarta in October, and was able to secure a meeting with Sukarno. A delegation from the New Guinea Council followed, led by Bonay, and eventually met Sukarno as well. Both delegations tailored their rhetoric to the political demands of their future rulers, including a call for a shortened period of UN administration, but stressed two messages: they were not Dutch puppets but authentic voices of the Papuan people, and West Papua had not dissolved into chaos on the Dutch departure, proving the people's ability to govern themselves.

For Indonesia, however, the Papuan people were secondary to a symbolic taking of possession of the land, the completion of the territorial extent of the revolution. The role of the Papuans was simply to complete the Indonesian revolution, as seen in stage-managed enactments of Youth Pledge Day and a recitation by Papuan youths of the Indonesian Youth Oath (one country, Indonesia; one people, the Indonesian people; one language, Indonesian) with two added points: one flag, the sacred red-and-white; one state, the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Sukarno arrived for his first visit to his newest province on board his largest warship, the Irian, to accept the title Maha Putera Irian Barat, Great Son of West Irian. Plans were announced for a superhighway, complete with tunnels, running from Sabang to Merauke. Nor was Boven Digul forgotten: in 1964, the first stones were laid for a new Heroes' Monument on the site. In Jakarta, it was all symbolized with the erection of a new Irian Monument.
5. Aftermath

The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Dutch-Indonesian agreement wholeheartedly, although the Brazzaville states (along with France and Haiti) abstained in protest at the lack of safeguards for Papuan self-determination. The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) took over on October 1, 1962, the first time the UN had administered a territory. Pro-Western Muslim countries provided both the civilian administrator (Djalal Abdo of Iran) and the security forces (1,500 Pakistani soldiers), who were joined by a handful of air force personnel from the United States and Canada. The UNTEA administration has been heavily criticized for allowing Papuan rights to be crushed by Indonesian officials, and these officials have conceded they paid little attention to UNTEA. However, this criticism makes the dubious assumption that UNTEA was meant to be impartial, even after the earlier abandonment of the self-determination principle.

Sukarno eventually announced that there was no need for the act of free choice, a declaration that raised little protest, even from the Dutch. Indeed, the Netherlands was now a close friend of Indonesia, even to the point of professing neutrality in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation while the United States and Britain backed Malaysia. The legacy of this period is a long-running insurgency dismissed by Indonesia as a “Dutch time bomb” but in fact representing the aspirations of many Papuans, which has only grown under Indonesian rule. The West Papuan flag, in particular, is raised with reverence as a symbol of resistance to this day.

When Sukarno was toppled, his successor Suharto said the act would be held after all. However, he also told the Papuans that any move to separate would be regarded as an act of treason. In the event, 1,025 hand-picked delegates assembled and voted unanimously to remain with Indonesia. Throughout the 1969 events, it was clearly the territory, and not its inhabitants, that was of interest to the Indonesian regime. General Ali Murtopo told one group:

Jakarta was not interested in us as Papuans but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find us a place there.

Two nationalist movements had clashed in the struggle for West New Guinea, a struggle that was waged of necessity in the international arena. Both were shaped by international developments stemming from the West Irian struggle and from more “important” global events, from Berlin to the
Congo. Injecting themselves into a global setting, they were in turn shaped by that setting. Both were future-oriented nations-of-intent, but also looked to events in the past to support their sense of nationality. Indonesia recalled the formative experience of revolution against the Dutch and looked to Javanese antiquity to bolster that further. The formative events of West Papuan nationalism took place in the 1960s, but were also bolstered by projecting the West Papuan nation into the past — in this case to the 1942 millenarian declaration of independence and the symbols of the Koreri movement.

While their modernized traditions were diametrically opposed, Indonesia and West Papua shared a common national language. The most contested question was territorial: was this half-island an integral part of Indonesia, or the homeland of a separate West Papuan nation? It was on this territorial ground that the struggle was waged, but it was international factors that determined a winner. The United States alone had the power to settle the question. Given the mental maps of American policy makers in 1960-62, on which New Guinea scarcely registered, an Indonesia which loomed large was certain to be the winner. The dates are important, however. The Kennedy administration spanned a unique historical setting in which the conditions for this outcome were likely. At an earlier period, with cold war raging, the United States would not have acquiesced in an Indonesian takeover of any additional territory. The same is true for the later period: although Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia was not an irredentist challenge, it was resolutely opposed by the United States and this contributed in large measure to the collapse of the Sukarno regime. This was not simply a matter of presidents, however: the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations were all firmly committed to anti-communist containment. In the 1950s, the United States considered itself to have a free hand in Southeast Asia. From 1960, as it began a more direct involvement in the affairs of the region and superpower confrontation shifted more towards the Third World, the United States felt compelled to seek accommodation with states like Indonesia and less constrained by the wishes of allies like the Netherlands and Australia. Once American forces were firmly committed to a particular course of action in Southeast Asia, as they were by 1964, the logic of that course dictated a tougher stance towards Indonesia once again. Different currents in the cold war would very likely have led to different outcomes in West New Guinea, and thus to a different sort of West Papuan nationalism.
Abbreviations used in notes:

DOSB (US) Department of State Bulletin
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (year, volume number, page number)
IO Indonesian Observer (Jakarta)
JFKNSF John F. Kennedy National Security Files (reel, page number)
NYT New York Times
OR Official Records (of the United Nations General Assembly)
PIM Pacific Islands Monthly (Sydney)
ROI Report on Indonesia (Washington)
YUN Yearbook of the United Nations

1 Even to name the territory in question is to reveal a bias. The Dutch called it Netherlands New Guinea, the Indonesians Irian Barat (West Irian) and later Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian), the indigenous nationalist movement eventually declared their country to be Papua Barat (West Papua), while some later preferred West Melanesia. West New Guinea, while favouring the Dutch terminology somewhat, is the most common choice of those seeking a neutral term. This paper uses the terms interchangeably, depending on the viewpoint being examined, while using West New Guinea at first as the most recognizable term. The people of the territory are referred to with their own preferred term, Papuans. For more on the power of names, see below & appendix A.


4 ibid, p. 175-8.

5 The question of language will not be addressed here, save to note that the same language, called Bahasa Indonesia in one area and Malay in the other. In both, it served as a common second language that was beginning to unite linguistically diverse areas.

6 “By nation-of-intent I mean a more or less precisely-defined idea of the form of a nation, i.e. its territory, population, language, culture, symbols and institutions. The idea must be shared by a number of people who perceive themselves as members of that nation, and who feel that it unites them.... In some aspects, conceptually, ‘nation-of-intent’ is not dissimilar to Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined political community.’ ... However, nation-of-intent is a more open-ended concept. It is more positive, pro-active and forward looking. It has a programmatic programme of action articulated in realpolitik....” Shamsul A.B., “Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia,” in Stein Tønnesson & Hans Antløv, eds., Asian Forms of the Nation (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1996), p. 328-9.


13 Hatta, “The Digoel Tragedy of Dutch Colonial Imperialism,” (1929), Portrait of a Patriot: Selected

14 Sukarno interview with UPI, 28 Dec. 1957, ROI Nov. ’57-Jan ’58: 21


16 Lijphart, Trauma, p. 100-10.


18 Lijphart, Trauma, p. 114-23; Anak Agung, Formation, p. 654.


20 Yamin’s speech is reprinted in Background to Indonesia’s Policy towards Malaysia: The Territory of the Indonesian State, Discussions of the Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapkan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1964), pp. 1-14.

21 Hatta’s speech, ibid, p. 18.

22 For instance, the Australian representative at the talks, T.K. Critchley, recalled: “Hatta was the one Indonesian I met who did not seem emotionally concerned about the issue. He agreed with me that postponement was better than a breakdown of the Conference and that it was an issue that could be more readily and realistically solved after the Dutch had taken the major step of transferring sovereignty.” Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1987), p. 160-1. According to one account, Hatta forced his Federalist compatriots to compromise by offering to walk out over the issue as they wanted if they would agree in return to take up arms against the Dutch. Ali Sastroamijoyo, Milestones on My Journey (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 208.


24 Ali, Milestones, 206. “We do not intend to give one inch on the West Irian issue,” their chief negotiator told Anak Agung. “Formation,” p. 646. A similar account of Dutch bluntness is given by the American representative. Embassy in The Hague to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, FRUS 1949, 7: 552.

25 This approach had the active support of the American government, which dispatched an order to “support the Dutch position” on West New Guinea. Memo by Frederick E. Nolting Jr, office of West European Affairs, to Acheson, Oct. 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, 7: 543.

26 This was firmed up by an Indonesian-Dutch exchange of letters containing the identical paragraph: “The clause in article 2 of the Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty reading: ‘the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained’ means: ‘through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands.’” Letters printed as annex to Netherlands memorandum to UN, Nov. 3/61, A/4954.


30 van der Veur, “Political,” p. 60.


33 West Irian and the World (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1954); The Question of West Irian.

34 The old PKI leadership had envisioned a two-state league grouping independent Indonesia and West Irian. Feith, Decline, p. 161 fn. Dutch Communists had also opposed handing West Irian to a state headed by Sukarno or Hatta. A younger leadership under D.N. Aidit reversed this policy, helped by a similar shift by the Dutch Communists and a Soviet Union that had reclassified Indonesia into the progressive camp.

35 Willem Oltmans reported that Hatta felt “cheated” by his Dutch friends. “The agreement I made with the Dutch government in private and behind the scenes stipulated a transfer of the Residency of New Guinea, as soon as the shock of the transfer of the Netherlands East Indies as a whole would be digested by the Dutch people.” Oltmans memo to Rostow, April 5, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 337ff.

36 One Dutch New Guinea governor recalled his early wish for “a tie between West New Guinea and Indonesia.... The dissolution of the [federal states], though, left us with no choice but to keep the territory.... After letting down so many other groups, we had to show that at least this one people we would protect.” van Baal, 1992 interview, Markin p. 26 fn.


38 Lijphart, Trauma, p. 163-77.


40 “The Republic of Indonesia did not want to be regarded as of no significance in the world,” Ali wrote in his memoirs. “Our territories were extensive, our inhabitants numbered millions. We had natural resources in abundance and our country was situated very strategically in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.” Ali, Milestones, p. 255.

41 Hansard, June 5, 1956, pp. 4778-80. While Indonesian case for West Irian as Indonesian territory continued to rest on legal arguments based on the territorial unity of the Indies, increased stress was also laid on anti-colonial arguments. An unreasonable Dutch government was stifling attempts at peaceful resolution, it was argued, most notably by incorporating Netherlands New Guinea into the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the 1953 revision of the Dutch constitution. Dutch arguments that this was simply an overdue recognition of fact, replacing the old reference to Indonesia as part of the Kingdom, cut no ice with outraged Indonesians who saw a new Dutch claim to part of their own national territory. More and more attention was paid to the repression of fighters for Indonesia inside West Irian, and to the role of war hero Silas Papare, founder of the pro-Indonesian political party PKII. United Asian and African support for Indonesia’s anti-colonial claim also received increased stress. The Question of West Irian; The Truth About West Irian (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, 1956); The Case of West Irian (West New Guinea) (Cairo: Indonesian Embassy, n.d. [1955?]), 1954 memo to UN, A/2694.

42 Lijphart, Trauma, p. 29-30. The Indonesian case for a resolution is given in explanatory memo A/2694.


44 “The Secretary [John Foster Dulles] said he very strongly opposed Indonesia’s getting control of New Guinea,” according to the notes of one meeting. “This might not always be the case if a strong and stable government should emerge in Indonesia, but under present conditions for the territory to come under the control of Indonesia was neither in our interests nor in the interests of the inhabitants of New Guinea. He recognized, on the other hand, that an important political factor was the emergence of a slightly better government in Indonesia which he would not want to rebuff. The Secretary said that if a resolution failed of adoption in the Assembly, without our being tagged with its defeat, he would not


46 YUN 1956: 125, YUN 1957: 77-80; A/3644.


48 *West Irian Liberation Campaign #4* (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, n.d. [1957]), p. 29-31. This booklet is primarily concerned with demonstrating the united claim of all forces in Indonesian society to West Irian. Along the same lines, Sukarno said: “I am only expressing what is in the hearts of our society, what was in the hearts of our youth when, on October 28, 1928, they took the pledge of ‘One Nation, One Country, One Language’; what was in the hearts of all of us when we made the Proclamation of August 17, 1945: At those times, there was no split — once again, there was no split in the inner self of the Indonesian Nation.” Speech of Feb 21/57, Herbert Feith & Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-65* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 88.

49 *West Irian Liberation Campaign #4*.


51 Sumitro Dyoyohadikusumo, “Irian, Indonesia and the Summit,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 18, 1960. The rebel government was led by Syafruddin Prawirenegara, the same man who led a Sumatra-based Emergency Government after Sukarno and Hatta were captured by the Dutch in 1948.

52 YUN 1957: 77-80.


54 “I was informed that in private conversations in the UN corridors it was made clear that the United States would not be offended if the resolution should be defeated.” John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairies, or Allison Wonderland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 335. See also Department of State to UN mission, Nov. 15, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 502.


59 “The Rediscovery of Our Revolution,” speech of Aug. 17, 1959, in *Toward Freedom*, p. 45, 61. This speech was retroactively declared the Political Manifesto of Indonesia.

60 Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 167.

62 Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 97-8, 143.

63 A Dutch government pamphlet produced for the 1954 UN debates argued for a Dutch “sacred mission” in West New Guinea: “The corresponding inner motive on the Netherlands side, in refusing to relinquish a task which holds out no hope of material gain — though it does offer prospects of a worthwhile contribution to general world improvement — is the natural self-respect of a guardian who has begun the upbringing of an infant and does not want to relinquish the responsibility until the child can stand on its own legs.” *Western New Guinea and the Netherlands* (The Hague: State Printing Office, 1954), p. 19.


66 One particularly effective Indonesian pamphlet skewered the Dutch developmentalist rhetoric, using Dutch figures to show that over half the budget went to providing facilities to government and Western private business, over a quarter to the administration itself, just over 20% to everything else. In short, it concluded, “the Irianese are to be ‘inserted’ into an export economy as the producers of export goods and as labour power in the Western sector.” *Colonial Purposes in West Irian: A Exposé of Dutch Intentions* (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1962), p. 35-6.

67 The United States ands Britain first announced their neutrality in advance of December 1950 talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Robert Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea* (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1958), p. 110. The neutrality policy was affirmed by the Eisenhower administration on joint recommendation to the National Security Council of the secretaries of state and defence. “Both sides have solicited United States support. United States relations with either country would suffer seriously if the United States were to support the other’s claim. President Sukarno and the preponderance of Indonesian political parties concentrate on the New Guinea issue the fervor of nationalism and the fear of resurgent colonialism. The United States has pursued a policy of avid neutrality in this issue.” Memo by Secretary of State (Dulles) and Acting Secretary of Defense (Robert B Anderson) to NSC, Aug. 27, 1953, FRUS 1952-4, 12: 378. Neutrality on New Guinea was part of the administration’s Indonesia policy outlined in NSC 171/1, FRUS 1952-4, 12: 395-400. NSC 5518 saw US influence in Indonesia limited by the neutrality policy but unable to move due to Dutch and Australian opposition: “Thus far the U.S. has maintained a position of neutrality between the conflicting claims. Any other U.S. approach would open us to violent condemnation and loss of influence with one side or the other.” NSC 5518, May 3, 1955, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 155.


70 Memo of conversation, Rusk & Ambassador van Kleffens, Nov. 4, 1949, FRUS 1949: 564; Rusk to Dept. of Defense, March 22, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 985

71 Gardner 140-1.

72 Allison to State, Nov. 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 487.

73 “[W]hatever the legal rights might be,” Allison wrote in his memoirs, “the political realities were that if Indonesian desires were not, in some manner, recognized, Sukarno could, and probably would, lead his close to 100 million people into the Communist camp. At the same time I was sure that if the
Indonesian demands were granted, the slightly more than 10 million Dutch would protest vigorously, threaten to leave NATO, castigate the United States — if we had helped Indonesia — and then accept the situation. There was nothing else for them to do. They certainly did not wish to become Communists. In view of the strategic location of the Indonesian islands, lying as they did across the lines of communication between America's Philippine and ANZUS allies, and because of the all important Indonesian oil production, it seemed to me that our interest lay more in keeping the Indonesians out of the Communist camp than in worrying about ruffling the feelings of the Dutch.” Allison 304. See also Allison to Robertson, Aug. 12, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 409; Allison to State, Aug. 27, 1956, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 426-9; Allison to State, Dec. 9, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 537. The same position was taken by the commander-in-chief Pacific (CINCPAC) Adm. Stump to Chief of naval operations Adm. Burke, Dec. 26, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 657; Audrey R. Kahin & George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), p. 109-11.

74 Casey, Foreign Minister, p. 297-8, 309, 310, 324; Mackie, World Affairs, p. 303; Embassy in Australia to Rusk, Aug. 27, 1958, FRUS 1958: 271; Memorandum of conversation, Casey with Dulles, Sept. 8, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 279.

75 Rusk to DoD, FRUS 1950, 6: 986. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred that there was “no major United States strategic interests at this time in the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea so long as it remains in the hands of a nation friendly to the United States.” FRUS 1950, 6: 1074. This estimate was confirmed regularly thereafter.

76 Secretary of Defense to Acheson, Nov. 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 1092.

77 Secretary of Defense to Acheson, April 14, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 780.


79 Hastings, New Guinea, p. 201.


81 Bruce Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), p. 38, 82.

82 “The Australian and Netherlands Governments are therefore pursuing, and will continue to pursue, policies directed toward the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples in their territories in a manner which recognizes the ethnological and geographical affinity. At the same time, the two Governments will continue, and strengthen, the co-operation at present existing between their respective administrations in the territories. In so doing the two Governments are determined to promote an uninterrupted development of this process until such time as the inhabitants of the territories concerned will be in a position to determine their own future.” Memorandum on Netherlands New Guinea vol. 2, p. 1. See also Verrier, p. 61-87.


88 Peter Savage, “Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony,” in Politics in Melanesia (n.p.: University of the South...
89 Luns told John Foster Dulles in 1958 that pro-Indonesian infiltrators were present, but that Papuan natives “either apprehended and reported these agitators to the local administration or they ate the agitators. He said there was only one variation to this latter practice and that existed among the more Christianized natives who would only eat fisherman on Fridays.” FRUS 1958-60, 17: 122. Governor Rudy Plateel, while pursuing localization, never had any real faith in Papuans. His true attitude of Papuan government was expressed privately to an Australian colleague: “There is a large round table with a pile of money on it. Around it are seated a number of black men. Behind each is a white who tells him how much money to ask for.” Hastings, New Guinea, 207 fn.
90 van der Veur, “Political,” p. 63; Lijphart, Trauma, p. 264-9.
92 One Australian district officer saw the plan as “deliberately designed to embarrass the Australian Government, or force its hand.” Its announcement sent Hasluck (who thought 30 years was an appropriate time-frame) scurrying to the Hague to plead for a delay, and made prime minister Menzies announce for the first time that independence was the eventual Australian goal. Verrier, p. 85, 93; Albinski, p. 377; J.J. West, “The New Guinea Question: An Australian View,” Foreign Affairs 39 #3 (April 1961): 504.
94 “During the liberal era,” army chief Nasution said, “we have given opportunity to the Dutch to gradually and systematically suppress all pro-Indonesian elements in West Irian and to educate and indoctrinate West Irian intellectuals to hate Indonesia. We must stop it.” A.H. Nasution, To Safeguard the Banner of the Revolution (Jakarta: Delegasi, 1964), p. 63.
95 Jan van Reconstructie, 210.
99 Harsono, p. 216.
101 Mortimer, p. 190.
105 Harsono; Soviet Ambassador Zhoukov, Indonesian Spectator, Feb 15, 1957: 15.
106 Army attaché in Indonesia (Collier) to Dept. of Army, Dec. 21, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 558.
110 IO Jan. 9, 1961; CIA Intelligence weekly summary, 16 Feb. 1961, JFKNSF 2: 282. Nasution recalled that he had originally sought arms from the United States but been refused. “Because of this, I went to the Soviet Union. When I arrived at the Kremlin, Krushchev embraced me. He said, ‘You can have anything you want. I am not afraid of the Dutch.’” Interview conducted 1994, Gardner 178.


Markin, p. 56-7.

In 1958, Sukarno had asked whether “we wish to be a great and united nation with its own identity, in a strongly united State, procuring the equipment and building the bridge towards a just and prosperous society which will bring happiness to all the people? Or do we wish to become a nation which in fact is not a nation at all, but merely a conglomeration of numerous clans, devoid of a strong international identity?” *A Year of Challenge*, speech of Aug. 17, 1958, p. 5.


Frederick Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy 1960-5," *Indonesia* # 2 (Oct. 1966): 42. In Subandrio's words: "The path we have taken has been full of sacrifice, sometimes suffering. But this path that we have taken has also hardened and strengthened us, and this is an asset for our struggle. Every nation must go through this phase at one time or another." "The Impact of the Indonesian Revolution on the World," *Indonesia on the March*, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d. [1963]), p. 328.

Reinhardt, p. 122.


Sanskrit for “five principles.” The principles were belief in one god, nationalism, internationalism, democracy through consensus of representatives (mufakat and musyawarah ), and social justice. The five could be compressed into one, gotong royong or mutual cooperation. "The Birth of Pancasila," speech of June 1, 1945, in *Toward Freedom*.


Legge, p. 373.


Subandrio’s report to parliament on Irian, 1957, in *Indonesia on the March*, p. 32.


Sukarno, *The Era of Confrontation*, speech to Cairo non-aligned summit (Jakarta: Department of Information, n.d. [1964]).
57


132 Joint communiqué on occasion of Premier Chen Yi’s visit to Jakarta, IO, April 2, 1961. See also Sukarno’s comments at a return visit to China, IO June 15, 1961.


134 Mozingo, p. 185; Lea E. Williams, "Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics," The China Quarterly #11 (July-Sept. 1962); Yahuda, p. 199.


137 Nishihara 158-60; Embassy in Tokyo to Rusk, Sept. 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 531.


139 Basic Information on Indonesia (New York: Indonesian Mission to UN, n.d. [1971?]).

140 The first reference in an Indonesian government pamphlet published internationally is in The Truth About West Irian (1956), which also invokes the Hindu epic Ramayana, equating its “snow-covered mountains” with West Irian (p. 7).

141 Mohammad Yamin, A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia’s Sovereignty over the Ages (Manila: Indonesian Embassy, n.d. [1959]). See also Yamin’s comments on the Negarakertagama in the 1945 debates over Indonesia’s territorial extent, in Background to Indonesia’s Policy.

142 Control over Majapahit’s tributatories was nominal at best, and the two areas identified with West Irian cover only short stretches of coast. G. Th. Pigeaud, Java in the 14th Century, A Study in Cultural History: The Negara-Kertagama by Pakawi Parakanca of Majapahit, 1365 AD (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), vol. 4, p. 29. 34. Se also G.J. Resink, Indonesia’s History Between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1968), p. 21.


144 Subandrio, An opening address to the UN Political Committee, p. 8.

145 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 175-8.


147 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 178.


149 This point has been made about the peripheral regions of Japan by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Frontiers of Japanese Identity,” in Tønnessen & Antlov, Asian Forms of the Nation, p. 62-4.


154 A People on the way to Self-Determination, p. 46. It has been pointed out that the anthropologist-driven picture of New Guinea as impossibly diverse overlooks many elements of commonality across the


160 “Another Congo cannot happen here,” said Parna leader Herman Wajoi. “The Congolese kicked out European officials. We will not do that. We know we have to work together at first, and we want Dutch economic help.” “Nationalist stir felt by Papuans,” NYT April 3, 1961.

161 Albinski, p. 379.

162 Verrier, p. 203. Race was also the basis of unity for Seth Rumkorem’s Republic of West Papua declared in 1983. Provisional Government of Republik Papua Barat, “Appeal to All Member States of the UN,” cited in Justus van der Kroef, *Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977), p. 5. The same themes are struck by the anti-Indonesian resistance to this day, which insists that the “natural environment” for Papuans is Melanesia, not Indonesia. Nicolaas Jouwe, “Conflict at the Meeting Point of Melanesia and Asia,” PIM April 1978: 12.


164 Osborne 24, Verrier 225. Only fifteen councillors, twelve Papuans and three Dutchmen, were elected, the rest were appointed, “New Guinea vote hailed by Dutch,” NYT March 6, 1961.

165 “Everyone was there but America,” PIM April 1961: 20.


168 Ryan, p. 194.


172 The flags had to be manufactured in Amsterdam, however. “Colony’s name changed,” NYT Dec. 1, 1961; IO Nov. 30, 1961.


176 Bone, p. 8.

177 van der Kroef, “Dutch Opinion,” p. 284. Exports as a percentage of imports, however, were increasing. *A People on the way to Self-Determination*, p. 19-21, 32.


180 Nicolaas Jouwe formed a Japanese-financed timber company. PIM March 1960: 18. Herman


184 “There is no intention that the territory shall be closed to the world as it certainly is today. All nationalities shall be freely given the opportunity of reasonable exploitation of the economic potentialities of the vast area for their own benefit and for the benefit of the people of West Irian.... It would be wrong to regard West Irian as being a ‘reservation’ for the Irian people. If this system is adopted, then the territory will be lost to the rest of the world. The Case of West Irian, p. 34-5.  


188 McMahon 105-8.  


190 Brackman, p. ix-xi; Fifield, p. 4-6.  

191 Kennedy, p. 4-5.  


195 Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 543; Sukarno, Autobiography. The writer of the autobiography was an anti-Communist American journalist who says she was often used as a back channel by the ambassador. Adams 13.  


197 Gardner 198.  


Yet to permit West Irian to continue indefinitely as a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands is to afford Communism an opportunity to spread in Indonesia.... The West Irian question thus represents a tragedy. The United States, the Netherlands and Australia, all equally afraid of the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, are carrying out a policy which in fact strengthens Communism. For, so long as West Irian is in Dutch hands, that long will the Communist Party of Indonesia be able to carry on a violent agitation, using nationalism as an excuse, to oppose colonialism and thereby touch the soul of the newly-emancipated Indonesian people whose memories are still afresh with the struggle against colonialism.” Hatta, “Between the Blocs,” p. 487. The same argument was made frequently by Sukarno and Subandrio.


There is no doubt in my mind,” he argued, “that for President Sukarno West Irian (West New Guinea) is the test case by which he determines who his friends are. Contrary to often expressed views, this is to him not a diversionary move ... but a nationalist obsession.” Pauker wanted any shift to support the Indonesian claim to be contingent on abandoning NASAKOM in favour of a national front that would abolish political parties, the elimination of the PKI from governing bodies, and curtailment of arms buys from USSR. “Indonesia Today,” p. 1, 12-3, JFKNF 4: 306ff. See also the following articles by Pauker: “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); “General Nasution’s Mission to Moscow,” Asian Survey 1 #1 (March 1961); “The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia,” Foreign Affairs 40 #4 (July 1962). This last paper was definitely given to Kennedy to read. Transmittal memorandum, Feb. 24, 1961, JFKNF 2: 285. Pauker was summoned to White House meetings with Rostow and other twice in March 1961. A similar line was stressed by modernization theorist Lucian Pye, who also wanted an end to Sukarno’s “childish behaviour” through a shift to economic development and a show of American determination in Southeast Asia, but who saw a deal on Irian as perhaps a pre-requisite to such a shift by Sukarno. Notes of Lucian Pye, March 23, 1961, JFKNF 2: 289.

Kahin saw an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea as imminent unless the United States shifted to support the Indonesian claim. Of Pauker’s conditions, he dismissed all but one (an end to large arms deals with the USSR) as counter-productive. Kahin insisted that Indonesia would lose any immediate plebiscite in West New Guinea, and wanted the money saved on arms to be supplemented by American funds and redirected to the development of both Indonesia and West New Guinea — a tactic that could help build support for Indonesia among Papuans. Johnson to Rostow covering Kahin paper, April 19, 1961, JFKNF 2: 382 ff.


Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 88; David Marr, Barwick (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 169. This also influenced the debate in Washington. Rostow informed Kennedy that the “position of the Australians is central in the Secretary of State’s thinking.” Cited in Pemberton, p. 95. Bundy and Robert Johnson made the same

215 Hilsman, p. 50, 378; Bunnell, Initiatives, p. 85-90; Jones, p. 203.
216 Jones, p. 199.
217 “Like Hitler, he is an open book, there to be read. Those who refuse to draw the proper conclusions may not be victims of Sukarno’s charm, but victims of self-delusion.... Only his removal from power would offer some hope that trends that now seem inexorable can still be reversed.” Attachment A to CIA Indonesia paper, March 1961, JFKNSF 2: 299ff. Lifting an image from Pauker’s “Indonesia Today,” the paper also argued that a bloodless victory on Irian would weaken the army just as Hitler’s win over Sudentenland had weakened the German general staff.
218 “We consider it likely that Indonesia’s success in this instance will set in train the launching of further irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in lectures given by Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist. Success would be bound to cement relations between Indonesia and the USSR.... Even assuming that it were the weight of United States power and prestige which gained Indonesia a bloodless and prestigious victory, we would not gain that country’s respect, let alone affection.... by backing Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the United States.” ibid.
221 Delegation list, DOSB May 15, 1961: 714. For examples of the great hope placed in the new US government, see IO editorials Jan 20, April 15, April 26, 1961.
224 Johnson memo, April 17, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 380; Memo from Assistant Secretary (Far East) Parsons to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Hare, Feb. 13, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 310; memoranda of discussions with Luns, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 345-63.
225 Statements by Edward Heath and Robert Menzies, IO April 14, April 28, 1961.
227 Johnson memorandum, April 17, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 377; Assistant Secretary (Europe) Kohler to Rusk, April 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 341. The opinion seems born out by an IO editorial of March 30: “We are satisfied with the firm attitude of the United Stated [sic] in rejecting the invitation to be represented at a Dutch colonial puppet show in West Irian.... [The boycott] is a major diplomatic defeat” for the Netherlands. See also “Worth our greatest appreciation,” IO editorial, April 2, 1961.
229 Memoranda of conversion with Luns, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 345-63. The idea of a visiting UN mission to start the process, included in the eventual Dutch UN resolution, was in fact an American suggestion. Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 405. The Dutch floated an early draft UN resolution with the state department in July 1961. Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 543. American draft resolutions circulated over the summer and found their way into the Dutch version eventually presented - see drafts at FRUS 1961-3, 23: 409, 460; Memo from Assistant Secretary IO (Cleveland) to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 452.
234 Luns speech to UNGA, 8 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1049, p. 589; explanatory memo A/4954.
235 Rusk to UN mission, Oct. 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 438; Johnson to Bundy, Nov. 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 449; Cleveland to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 452-8. Only in mid-November did anyone in Washington begin to realize that although the Luns plan may have served Indonesia's ultimate goals, American support for it was alienating Indonesia. "However, from the Indonesian point of view we have now entered the lists against them.... Thus, the end results of all the months of work has been to put us in a worse position vis-à-vis the Indonesians than we have ever been in the past. In the past we have at least not actively opposed them in the UN." Johnson to Rostow, Nov. 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 458.
240 Bingham speech to UNGA, 22 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1061, p. 774.
244 See, for instance, the order of the North Sulawesi regional commander, in M. Silaban, Irian Barat (Medan: Pustaka Sri, 1963), p. 54-6.
245 Heroes’ Day speech, IO Nov. 11, 1961; speech to army leadership, IO Dec. 1, 1961; speech to Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani), IO Dec. 16, 1961.
246 Sukarno, The People’s Command.
248 Later president. Suharto named one of his sons after this period, Hutomo Mandala Putra (son of Mandala).
249 Indonesia insisted that the clash had taken place in international waters, Admiral Sudomo and Indonesian diplomats admitted much later that they had “lied to the United Nations.” Markin 74fn.
250 His name is now part of the map of Irian: Jos Sudarso Island is part of the district of Merauke.
252 Syahrir, Indonesia’s first prime minister and a friend of many Americans, former foreign minister Anak Agung, Masyumi leader and former minister Roem, and ex-federalist leader Sultan Hamid were arrested. Technically, the order was signed by Nasution and Subandrio. Surveillance of Hatta was stepped up. At another time, all this would have drawn sharp protests from overseas, but with war looming it received little attention. Rose, p. 199-200; Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1994), p. 465; Arrests Alarm Indonesians,” NYT, Jan. 18, 1962 . IO reports on mobilizations included 19,000 in East Java (reported Dec. 29, 1961).
254 Sudomo interview, Markin 58.
256 Nasution speech to the West Irian People Consultation in Sukarnopura, 9 May 1964; Bandung speech


258 Telegram from Bundy to Kennedy in Palm Beach, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 473; State department executive secretary (Battle) to Bundy, undated (Dec.), FRUS 1961-3, 23: 489.

259 Carl Kaysen, the new number two national security staffer, wrote: “I suspect that, while FE is perfectly clear on the point that our task is to facilitate the achievement of the inevitable outcome in a way which minimizes the Dutch defeat, the rest of the Department may not be. They are still concerned with the rightness or wrongness of Sukarno behavior....” Kaysen to Bundy, Jan., 12, 1962, JFKNSF 2: 838.


261 “Until a solution satisfactory to Sukarno is reached with the Netherlands, the West New Guinea dispute will continue to overshadow and strongly influence all other foreign and domestic issues in Indonesia. Sukarno will probably draw even closer to the Bloc position on major international issues as Indonesia continues to rely heavily on Soviet military aid and political support for the prosecution of the West New Guinea campaign. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) will continue to exploit the issue and to obstruct a negotiated settlement. The diversion of army energies into the West New Guinea campaign will continue to hamper its efforts to reduce PKI strength and influence.” National Intelligence Estimate, “The Prospects for Indonesia,” March 7, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 555-6.

262 Guthman, p. 315-6. Jones also warned that there could be action against US oil interests. Pemberton, p. 97.


265 Letter from Sukarno to Kennedy, JFKNSF 2: 808-9.

266 Marr. p. 170-1.


270 Harsono, p. 238.


275 Nishihara, p. 160-1; IO Feb. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 20, March 6, 1962.


277 Hastings, New Guinea, p. 210

278 The eventual corridor, once transit rights had been refused by the US, Britain and Japan, was via Peru, French Tahiti and New Caledonia. “Dutch Troops Arrive via French Airfields!” PIM April 1962: 24. A still-classified query from France to the US concerning Dutch overflights on Feb 8/62 is referred to in box contents list, JFKNSF.


Sukarno, Indonesia Wants Negotiations on the West Irian Problem Based on Transfer of Administration from Netherlands to Indonesia, speech of Feb. 21, 1962 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1962), p. 6-7. Despite Jones’ optimism, this can also be seen in diplomatic cables. On Feb. 18 Jones reported that “Indonesians would drop requirement for preconditions provided agreement could be reached with Dutch on agenda before formal talks commenced.” FRUS 1961-3, 23: 533fn. This seems likely to mean Indonesia would continue to insist that the agenda cover the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. In any event, Sukarno in their next meeting told Jones “I want a clear understanding that the purpose of the meeting is to negotiate the basis of transfer of administration to Indonesia. The Bob Kennedy proposal is not satisfactory.” Jones to Rusk, Feb 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 535. Two days later Jones reported that Subandrio had agreed on Sukarno’s behalf to drop preconditions. FRUS 1961-3, 23: 536fn.


"We protest strongly Robert Kennedy’s humiliating statements on television concerning backwardness Papuan people and lack university trained workers, seemingly indicating advise to Indonesia to eradicate Papuan people.... Independence and democracy can be understood and practiced by common people even if they have not seen Harvard and we have an unalienable right to such practicing and we ask technical aid for it from the more advanced people of the world. Robert Kennedy should be ashamed if he tries to play poker with the fate of backward people for no other reason than to appease a dictator." Cable in Voice of the Negroids, p. 30.

"It was quite clear that we wanted them to settle it, and we put a lot of pressure on the Dutch to get it settled.... Mostly political pressure, telling them that they should sit down, that we didn’t want to support this kind of a war, that we didn’t want to get involved in it. They didn’t want West New Guinea. They wanted to get out of West New Guinea, as I said. It was just a question of saving face.... So we made it quite clear to the Dutch that we thought, when it came that close, that they should settle it. I was quite frank about that with the Dutch when I was in Holland." Guthman, p. 319-20.


Markin, p. 15-7.

Markin, p. 144.


Kennedy letter to de Quay, 2 April 1962, from South Pacific Peoples Foundation files.


IO March 23, June 25, 26, 28, 29, 1962; Pour, p. 171-4. For the most part, paratroopers were utterly ineffective. See the accounts in Herlina, p. 81, 120, 245-6.


IO April 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 25, May 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 22, 29, June 1, 21, 29, 30, July 6, 9, 10, 11, 30, 31, 1962. In April volunteers were reported laying siege to the oil town Sorong on the western tip of New Guinea, in May to have claimed a beach-head on the Onin Peninsula (south coast), be engaged in heavy fighting near Fak Fak and Kaimana, and to have raised the Indonesian flag over the southwestern village of Teminabuan, the first liberated zone in West Irian. In June a second village, Sausapor in the northwest, was reported as liberated, Sorong and Manokwari as besieged, and paratroopers near Merauke and Kaimana as exchanging fire with Dutch forces. In July two villages near Merauke and one in the northwest were reported liberated, with Kota Baru (Hollandia) in danger and Merauke itself besieged.


De Quay had initially tried to make the acceptance conditional on UN support for his call for a cease-fire. Letter to U Thant, May 16, 1962, cited Osborne, p. 29. In reply, Thant wrote: “Your suggestion that I now approach the Government of Indonesia with an appeal would, if accepted by me, imply that I was taking sides in the controversy, which I believe would not be in the best interests of all concerned,” and it was therefore “inappropriate” to appeal to both sides to refrain from aggression. Van der Kroef, “Settlement,” p. 145 fn.


Verrier, p. 178.

Malik, p. 242-3.


Markin, p. 357-9.


Proposal on UN role by UN legal counsel Constantine Stavropoulos, reprinted in Markin, p. 515-8.

Markin, p. 365-6.

Rusk to Kennedy, July 26, 1962, JFKNSF 3: 16ff.

Markin, p. 381-4. A CIA Indonesia station report to White House referred to “the threat delivered by President Kennedy to Subandrio to the effect that the Seventh Fleet would intercede on the side of the Dutch if Indonesia attempted a full scale attack on West Irian.” JFKNSF 3: 38. Subandrio told Jones that Kennedy had told him the United States was on Indonesia’s side but would change sides if he left the talks. Jones to Rusk, Aug. 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 624-5.


McMullen, p. 65-70.


Anti-Slavery Society, p. 31.

Voice of the Negroids, p. 5.


The only exception was a short-lived plan for trusteeship floated by Tanganyika in April 1962. “Tanganyika offers plan,” NYT April 8, 1962. The following month, the Brazzaville group refused to accept a report by the UN ambassadors of Dahomey and Upper Volta on their trip to West New


332 IO Jan. 24, 1962. Parna also demanded new elections, the abolition of appointed members, and requested that the Dutch arm the people to “beat an Indonesian invasion,” but the Dutch minister of state for New Guinea Affairs refused on all counts.

333 Apple, West New Guinea Settlement, p. 120.


335 Herlina, p. 261-6.


339 Papuan members of the Dutch and Indonesian UN delegations, several related to each other, met at the 1961 UN debates on good terms. Herman Womswor of the Dutch delegation reportedly told J.A. Dimara of the Indonesian delegation “jangan merah, kita sama,” (don’t be angry, you and I are the same). IO Nov. 10, 1961. Warming up a crowd for Sukarno, Dimara insisted that Jouwe and Kaisiepo were nationalists who had been forced to join the New Guinea Council. IO Jan. 6, 1962.

340 Bonay, named as governor to fulfill the promise that a Papuan would be the provincial leader, was removed in 1964 as unreliable, and arrested in 1965 for distributing pro-independence leaflets. Sharp, Rule of the Sword, 16. The first Papuan to become an officer in the Indonesian army, Seth Rumkorem, led a declaration of independence in 1970 as leader of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Movement. Even as an Indonesian soldier, he had remained in close contact with exiled nationalist leaders. Savage, “National,” p. 990-1. Silas Papare, the most pro-Indonesian of all the Papuan elite, spoke out against rocket attacks and strafing of villages in 1967. Henderson, p. 223.

341 van der Veur, “Political,” p. 7.

342 Osborne, p. 31-2; Savage, “Reluctant Colony,” p. 90; IO Oct. 5, 6, 11, 12, 19, 1962. Papuan pro-independence actions were reported in the New York Times on Sept. 16, 18, 22 & 30, 1962.

343 IO Oct. 29, Nov. 1, 6, 10, Dec. 10, 1962. This delegation travelled under the name Dewan Papua Barat, West Papua Council, the first time the word Papua had been used openly in Indonesia in years.


345 van der Veur, “Political,” p. 72.

346 Ryan, p. 200.

347 YUN 1962: 127; UNGA OR, A/PV.1127 & 1150.


349 “We often forgot that the administration here was still in the hands of UNTEA,” one recalled. “We became quite good at playing hide and seek with this agency.” Herlina, p. 312. For criticisms of UNTEA as pro-Indonesian, see van der Veur, “The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique,” International Organization 18 #1 (1964). UNTEA after some debate banned the display of the West Papua flag. IO Dec. 11, 1962.


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Appendix A

What is in Three Names?
West New Guinea versus West Irian versus West Papua
What is in three names?

At least three names are in use for the territory in question, each with its own loaded political value.

The name New Guinea has its origin in the 1545 sighting by Spanish explorer Ortiz de Retes, who was struck by the similarity of its coastline and its inhabitants with West Africa. The name Papua, which is thought to have derived from a Malay word meaning “frizzy-haired,” was adopted in 1526 by Portuguese explorer Jorge de Meneses, who noticed the natives’ resemblance to Africans. It has also been translated as “no father,” a reference to the lack of strong leaders to protect locals from slave traders. In 1660, the Dutch East India Company declared itself “lord of the Papuans” by treaty with the Sultan of Tidore, in the process lending weight to Tidore’s claims to overlordship. Dutch claims were not formalized until the late nineteenth century, when the Netherlands moved to forestall German or British control by declaring a claim to the western half of the island, and it was not until this point that any Dutch presence was established.

The island was divided into Netherlands New Guinea, German New Guinea and Papua, a British protectorate administered by Australia. After the First World War, the German colony passed to an Australian mandate, and Australia began administering the eastern half of the island as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. The western half was officially known as Netherlands New Guinea (Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea) but more often referred to as West New Guinea in international circles.

At a Dutch-sponsored gathering in 1946 to discuss the future of Indonesia, composed of delegates from Dutch-controlled parts of Indonesia, Papuan delegate Franz Kaisiepo proposed a new, non-colonial name: Iryan (or Irian). The word was drawn from the language of Biak, Kaisiepo’s offshore island home, and referred to the New Guinea mainland. Its meaning was the heat that burns away the haze, giving the mainland the appearance of a “hot, shimmering land, rising from the sea. The word Irian was used in the legend of Koreri, so had ancient provenance. Irian apparently had different meanings throughout the territory, including “people and high places,” “our land,” “virgin nature,” “hot land,” and “band of slaves.” Both Franz and his cousin Markus Kaisiepo saw it as a nationalist replacement for Papua, which they saw as derogatory. It was also preferred by pro-Indonesian groups as shown in the name Partai Kemerdekaan Irian Indonesia.

Although Indonesians were still speaking of “Papua” in 1945, Sukarno would later transform the name into IRIAN, a slogan for Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti-Nederland, Follow the Republic of Indonesia Against the Netherlands. To distinguish it from the other half of the island, it was officially called Irian Barat, West Irian. “Irian” and “West Irian” were generally used interchangeably, since “East Irian” was not used for the Australian possession (eventually independent as Papua New Guinea, or in its nationalist pidgin spelling, Papua

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2 Brackman, p. 93; Waiko, p. 17.
5 Syamsuddin; “The Origins of the Name Irian,” article posted on IRJA.org home page.
Niugini). Irian Barat became the official name after the Indonesian take-over. The province was renamed Irian Jaya, Victorious Irian, by President Suharto to mark the inauguration of the Freeport mine in 1973. In 1999 it was announced that Irian Jaya would be divided into three provinces, East, Central and West Irian.

Partly because Irian was the preferred Indonesian term, the Papuan National Congress in 1961 decided that their independent country would be known as Papua Barat, West Papua. This name had been used by the Koreri movement, whose traditions the new nationalists were deliberately building upon in their nation-building project. In fact, it is possible that "Papua Barat" was also first suggested at that time by Markus Kaisiepo, a devout Koreri follower. The Dutch administration accepted the name West Papua but it was rejected in Indonesia, except when a delegation of the New Guinea Council (renamed West Papua Council) toured Indonesia in late 1962. West Papua remains the preferred nationalist term, especially by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), Free Papua Movement.

West Papua was also referred to (in English) as West Melanesia, to go alongside Middle Melanesia (PNG) and East Melanesia (the Solomon Islands) in the prospective Melanesian Federation. This name was Nicolaas Jouwe’s first choice. The term Melanesia was first coined by French explorer Dumont D’Urville in 1832 from the Greek Mela (black), and looked like a valid political counterpart to Indonesia (islands of India). West Melanesia is still used occasionally, as is West Papua Niugini.

To add confusion, the capital has been consecutively named Port Numbay, Hollandia, Kota Baru (New Town), Sukarnopura, and Jayapura (Victory Town).

Part of the international struggle was an attempt by all sides to have their preferred name used. When John Foster Dulles referred to "West Irian" in a Foreign Affairs article, Dutch foreign minister Luns took the time in their next meeting to object to the name as "Malayan" rather than "native Papuan." (Dulles apologized, saying he had thought Irian was simply a newer name, like Taiwan for Formosa."

Indonesians were equally adamant. “The name ‘Papuans’ is not popular, it is even insulting,” Ambassador Wirypopranoto said in the UN. “What does Papuan mean? Papuan means a people without civilization.”

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10 Verrier, p. 223.
11 Osborne, p. 1.
13 Speech to UNGA, 8 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1049, p. 599.
Appendix B
Maps & Figures
Maps of Majapahit

PRECOLONIAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Shrividjaja (Palembang) at the greatest extent of its control, c. 1000. The Sailendra dynasty in Central Java may have ruled both Mataram and Shrividjaja briefly, but after the relocation of Sailendra rule in Shrividjaja, c. 860, the center of Javanese power moved to East Java.

Madjapahit according to Prapança in the Nagarakertagama, part IV.

Madjapahit according to C. C. Berg. The expansive period of East Javanese history occurred c. 1275-1364. Earlier attempts at alliance making, c. 1275-1292, were abandoned by Majapahit prime minister Gajah Mada, who embarked on a policy of military conquest c. 1351-1364. The extent of his empire is disputed but it is likely that the out-lying regions were linked with Majapahit in some form of tribute-paying vassalage. Although the Nagarakertagama may not be accurate history, its list of tributary states is of great importance as a statement of historical myth.

Fig. 1: Extent of Majapahit according to the Negarakertagama, and likely actual extent. Map from Reinhardt, p. 17.

Fig. 2: Likely maximum extent of Majapahit, according Richard Ulack & Gyula Power, Atlas of Southeast Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1989), p. 18.
Fig. 3: West New Guinea as Dutch settler territory. From Karl N. Snijtsheuvel, Wij en Nieuw-Giunea (n.p., n.d.)
Fig. 4: "Free with Irian". Cover of Mahals & Jahja, *Merdeka dengan IRIAN* (Medan: Tagore, 1950).
Looking back: map-logos after the Indonesian takeover

Fig. 5: From Sabang to Merauke. From cover of Provisional Government of Irian Barat, *Kebulatan Tekad Rakjat Irian Barat* (Djajapura: Dinas Penangeran Propinsi Irian Barat, n.d.).

Fig. 6: Billboard commemorating Trikora, Jakarta, 1990s. Shown in front of the map are Mandala commander General Suharto, Commodore Jos Sudarso, and the other Indonesian sailor who died in the Jan. 15, 1962, naval clash. Sukarno appears in the far left background, giving his Trikora speech. From Hitchcock & King.
Cartoons: West New Guinea as logo and Papuans as quasi-logo

Fig. 7: Indonesia, the UN and the Netherlands debate the ownership of the map of West New Guinea. From Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1961, p. 25.

NAAR PAPA OF MAMA?

Fig. 8: "Do I Belong to Papa or Mama?" Sukarno and de Quay represent their countries; Papuans are represented by a child with exaggerated Melanesian features. A Dutch cartoon, from United Asia, Feb. 1962, p. 106.
Fig. 9: "Satu bangsa, satu djizuwa" (One nation, one soul). West Papua is shown in its island context, with Australia as its only neighbour. The bird is a *cenderawasih*, bird of paradise, which the island is said to resemble. The bird of paradise appears on the flag of independent Papua New Guinea. From top page of the West Papua Niugini/Irian Jaya homepage.

Fig. 10: The "Morning Star" flag used by the Koreri movement and adopted by the Papuan National Congress in 1961.
Mental maps: the United States and Australia

Fig. 11: New Guinea in Australian defence: the Pacific War. From Thomas F. Burton et al, Southeast Asia in Maps (Chicago: Denoyer-Geppert, 1970), p. 64.

Fig. 12: United States containment in Asia. Shown on the background map of SEATO members (Burton, p. 66) are the forward line of mainland Southeast Asia including South Vietnam; the "Great Crescent" running from Japan to India, and its "Malay barrier" component.
Appendix C

Article from Sydney Morning Herald
4 December 1999
Tensions remained high in this isolated mining town on the Irian Jaya south coast yesterday, a day after Indonesian troops opened fire on unarmed pro-independence protesters, injuring 55 people.

The protesters yesterday re-established their burnt tent embassy in the Catholic church grounds where the shooting took place.

Protesters continued to flaunt the banned Morning Star independence flag on T-shirts and hats, under the gaze of hundreds of armed troops.

The poorly equipped hospitals in the tiny town, carved into swamps and lowland jungles, were treating indigenous Papuans, a number of whom suffered severe injuries in the violence.

Most of those in hospital suffered gunshot wounds in the initial military attack on the church compound as troops sought to remove a rebel flag early on Thursday.

Human rights monitors from the local human rights group ELSHAM were also attacked by troops and had a vehicle and other equipment destroyed.

The military ordered Australian and American workers at the vast Freeport copper mine in the mountains nearby to stay out of town.

One woman who witnessed the shooting said: "The people ran and the soldiers just started shooting wildly. There was no reason. The people weren't carrying sticks or bows and arrows but the soldiers just shot them."

Witnesses said there was no provocation by the protesters, apart from their refusal to remove the Morning Star flag.

Timika's deputy chief of police, Colonel Edi Pramudio, insisted the people sustained the injuries as they tripped over firewood when they were fleeing the soldiers who fired into the air. Other Indonesian officials denied that shots were fired.

However, local people produced bullets extracted from the wounds of the injured as evidence the shooting occurred.

"They are liars," said one woman who witnessed the shooting. "They tell the outside world lies".

On the other side of Irian Jaya, tensions were mounting in the town of Nabire in the north-west. Locals seeking independence from Indonesia, some carrying bows and arrows, continued to fly the Morning Star flag in defiance of the authorities.