The Making of a Livable “Queen City”: Local Government Capacity Building in Urban Service Management, Iloilo City, the Philippines

By

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B.Sc. (Hons), Michigan State University, 1995

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in

The Faculty of Graduate Studies
School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December, 1999
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Date December 29, 1999
ABSTRACT

Confronting an ever-worsening scarcity of resources for urban services, developing countries have sought new ways to cope. Both decentralization of government services and greater public participation in service management have emerged as mechanisms to mitigate this scarcity. In the Philippines, these mechanisms were recognized in the early 1990s in the form of a major decentralization policy, the Local Government Code of 1991.

This thesis looks at Iloilo City, a mid-size urban city in the Southern Philippines as a case study to examine urban public services of a local government unit (LGU) in light of the new decentralization policy.

As the Local Government Code of 1991 was inaugurated, Iloilo City integrated a multi-stakeholder process in its solid waste management (SWM) planning and implementation, with the support from a national government's capacity building support body—the Local Government Support Program (LGSP).

Iloilo City's SWM planning process revealed various constraints for a local government in wielding the power and autonomy given by the Code, as well as challenges in the inclusion of civil society organization in the planning processes. These constraints do not only include the technical, administrative and managerial skills of the officials, but also a lack of understanding and willingness among political leaders in pursuing service provisions responsive to the public needs.

This thesis argues that institutional strengthening from external forces such as the Code is insufficient without capacity building supports which address local constraints of LGUs. Such supports are vital because it is the LGUs that choose whether they will use the power, autonomy and participatory principles derived from the Code to manage their services effectively. In the Iloilo case, a political culture that weighs against leaders' pursuing responsive service provisions is a major local constraint that needs to be addressed. It perpetuates the under-development of effective intra-and inter-organizational communication, a lack of technical, administrative, and managerial skill upgrading of city officials, and a sense of unpreparedness in leading productive government organization (GO)-civil society partnerships.

Therefore, local government capacity building efforts must focus on such local constraints, and address them in order to make the development of specific service management responsibilities function. In the case of Iloilo City's SWM, clearly defining the actors and responsibilities involved in solid waste management, conducting ongoing training programs for officials involved in SWM issues, and resolving conflicts over the establishment of the environmental office are some of the immediate actions necessary. Over a longer period, elected leaders and civil servants need to develop both the ability to better analyze the costs and the benefits of pursuing participatory service management and the ability to effectively coordinate GO-civil society collaborative program implementation processes.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ iii
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... v
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF BOXES .......................................................................................................... vi
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................ vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. viii
DEDICATION .............................................................................................................. ix

Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Urban service management and local governments in the Philippines ........... 1
  1.2 Conceptual framework ..................................................................................... 2
    1.2.1 Definition of "good governance" ................................................................. 5
    1.2.2 Governmental organization (GO) and civil society partnership in governance ...................................................... 7
  1.3 Methodology .................................................................................................... 8
  1.4 Implications of the study .................................................................................. 11
  1.5 Limitations of the study .................................................................................. 13

Chapter 2: Background of Iloilo City's Solid Waste Management Program ........ 15
  2.1 Geography and situational factors .................................................................. 15
  2.2 History ............................................................................................................. 20
  2.3 Garbage in Iloilo City ..................................................................................... 22
  2.4 Negative impacts ............................................................................................ 23
  2.5 Current status of Iloilo City's SWM ................................................................ 25
  2.6 Identified problems in the city's current SWM system ..................................... 29
    2.6.1 Collection and disposal ............................................................................. 29
    2.6.2 Beyond collection and disposal ................................................................. 30

Chapter 3: Iloilo City's Solid Waste Management Planning ............................... 33
  3.1 Making solid waste management planning participatory ............................... 33
  3.2 The course of events ...................................................................................... 34
    A. Urgency heightened ....................................................................................... 34
    B. Participatory SWM planning suggested by trained officials ......................... 35
    C. Executive Order for the creation of Task Force issued ................................. 36
    D. Series of meetings and seminars held ............................................................ 38
    E. SWOT analysis conducted ........................................................................... 41
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft of SWM Action Plan completed</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Hurdles during the SWM planning process</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Political split among leaders</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Business interest of some officials involved</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3 Conflict over the creation of the City Environment and Management Office (CEMO)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Lack of willingness and understanding of the leaders to lead the process</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Significance of people's participation in the Iloilo City SWM planning</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Iloilo City's Capacity for Responsive Service Management</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 The city government's capacity to implement SWM programs and projects</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Appropriateness of the city as an initiator in SWM</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 Inter-organizational relationships</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 What capacity is missing?</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Capacity to take the lead in GO-civil society partnership in service management</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 The underlying constraints: political culture and politics</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1 Political culture and responsive service provisions</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2 Impact of the political culture in public participation</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Financial capacity: is it a major problem for Iloilo City?</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Local Governments Capacity Building and the Local Government Code of 1991</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Need of decentralization in the Philippine context</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Local Government Code of 1991</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 People participation and the Code</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 The decentralization policy as one tier of capacity building</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Conclusion</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Workable and immediately needed actions for improvement of Iloilo City's SWM system</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Areas of the future capacity building</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Space for improvement of SWM at the national level</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Future study areas</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References .................................................................................................................. 91

Appendix A  List of key informants ............................................................................. 96
Appendix B  Interview questions and summary of answers ..................................... 97
Appendix C  Local ordinance of Iloilo City ................................................................. 99
Appendix D  National legislative framework of SWM .................................................. 100
Appendix E  SWOT analysis form used in the SWM Workshop .................................. 102

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Land use of Iloilo City .................................................................................. 17
Table 2  Top 6 Wastes in Iloilo City .......................................................................... 22
Table 3  Common diseases associated with solid waste pollution .............................. 24
Table 4  Collection vehicles for the city's collection .................................................... 29
Table 5  City budget allocated to any SWM activities ................................................. 30
Table 6  4Es in Iloilo City's Solid Waste Management ................................................. 32
Table 7  Process of multi-stakeholder SWM planning .................................................. 35
Table 8  Task Force members ..................................................................................... 37
Table 9-1  Handling hazardous waste materials ............................................................ 42
Table 9-2  Waste disposal ............................................................................................ 42
Table 9-3  Segregation ................................................................................................ 43
Table 9-4  Collection system ....................................................................................... 43
Table 9-5  Education and values .................................................................................. 44
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 What makes "good governance" in Iloilo City? ....................... 3
Figure 2 Location of Iloilo City .................................................. 16
Figure 3 Existing land use plan ................................................... 19
Figure 4 Origins of the waste ..................................................... 23
Figure 5 Organizational chart of the Iloilo City government ............... 27
Figure 6 SWM Task Force and Technical Working Group ................. 38
Figure 7 SWM Action Plan as a part of EM Action Plan .................... 40

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1 Criteria of "good governance" ............................................ 6
Box 2 Conflict over CEMO/CENRO ............................................. 49
Box 3 The meeting with political leaders .................................... 51
Box 4 Kanya-kanya and ningas cogon .......................................... 54
Box 5 Characteristics of an agency which may affect the performance in decentralization programs (Cheema and Rondinelli) .......... 59
Box 6 Personalism and particularism in Iloilo City ......................... 64
Box 7 Types of decentralization ................................................. 74
**ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Build-Operate-Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMO</td>
<td>City Environment and Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENRO</td>
<td>City Environment and Natural Resources Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUI</td>
<td>Canadian Urban Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>Department of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Department of Agrarian Reform</td>
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<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
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<td>EM</td>
<td>Environmental Management</td>
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<td>EMB</td>
<td>Environmental Management Bureau</td>
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<td>EMPAS</td>
<td>Environmental Management and Protected Areas Sector</td>
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<td>Environmental Resources Management</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Internal Revenue Allotment</td>
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<td>ICSC</td>
<td>International Centre for Sustainable Cities</td>
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<td>KSP</td>
<td>Kahublagan Sang Panimalay Foundation Inc.</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
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<td>SWEEP</td>
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<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats</td>
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<td>TCI</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Technical Working Group</td>
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</tbody>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank people I encountered in the Philippines for their warm and generous support in my research and my stay there. I owe, especially, the staff of the Canadian Urban Institute, who provided me with not only the research materials but also insight into the culture and life of Iloilo, great appreciation for accepting me as a friend.

I am thankful to Dr. Aprodicio Laquian for arranging my stay in the Philippines, and guiding me over the research. As well, the advice of Dr. Michael Leaf and Dr. Leonora Angeles were also invaluable for my research and my personal growth throughout the process.

The Small Research Award by Northwest Regional Consortium for Southeast Asian research of Ford Foundation made my field research possible.

Finally I thank my partner Jason for his unconditional love and support.
To my family
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Urban service management and local governments in the Philippines

Throughout the developing world, there is an increasing scarcity of resources for urban public services. Rapid industrialization, an increasingly globalized economy, population growth and urbanization have led to economic and social volatility, and exacerbated inequalities in the distribution of wealth.

The failure of centrally planned and managed public service systems in many countries to respond to local needs and meet diverse and complex responsibilities has argued for decentralization as an inevitable need for such highly centralized government structures (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983: 3). At the same time, governmental organization (GO)-civil society partnership has been identified as an essential part of public service management, without which responsive service provision may be unachievable.

In the Philippines, the importance of a more decentralized government structure, and extensive public participation to provide services responsive to local needs was recognized by the central government in the early 1990s. The Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160) became a landmark which devolved a large scale of political power and responsibility onto local government units (LGUs). The Code also mandated the inclusion of non-governmental sectors in certain decision-making functions, and promoted public participation in public service management.

1 Local government units in the Philippines are provinces, cities and municipalities, and barangays (indigenous political units equivalent to villages or communities).
Garbage collection and disposal has traditionally been a responsibility of municipalities and cities in the Philippines. In 1991, the city's responsibility for solid waste management (SWM) was "re-iterated and strengthened" (ERM & TCI, 1999: Section 2-8) through the Code, meaning the tasks of planning and implementing programs to manage solid waste were added to existing responsibilities. This required the city to view SWM as part of a more comprehensive responsibility in environmental protection that was devolved by the Code. Accordingly, Iloilo City, like other LGUs, started planning solid waste management actions as part of its efforts in environmental management, instituting a multi-stakeholder planning process.

This thesis intends to explore how the capacity of one LGU can be strengthened in order to achieve urban service provisions responsive to the needs of its residents. In so doing, this thesis looks at a LGU in the Southern Philippines, Iloilo City, as a case study to examine solid waste management in light of the Code. Specifically, the objectives of the thesis are the following:

1. To understand the SWM situation in a local city in the Philippines
2. To examine the participatory SWM planning process of the city, and identify the practical difficulties encountered in the process
3. To investigate the existing capacity and constraints for the city government in carrying out service provisions responsive to the need of the constituency, as well as in initiating GO-civil society partnership in governance
4. To analyze the relationship of decentralization policies, in the Philippine context, with local governments' capacity building
5. To indicate specific recommendations on how the local government's capacity can be enhanced for more responsive urban service provisions or governance

1.2 Conceptual framework

This thesis seeks ways of building capacity of a local government to pursue efficient and responsive urban service provision, or good governance in the context of decentralization.
Figure 1. What Makes for "Good Governance" in Iloilo City?

Local Government Code of 1991
(Promotion of public participation, Taxing power, Increase in IRA share, Local Autonomy)

Structural capacity of LGU

GO-civil society collaborative management of urban services

Good/ responsive governance

Enhancement of urban services provisions

Two-tiers

Internal capacity of LGU

-Preparedness in taking initiatives of GO-civil organization partnership
-Leadership quality

Locally unique factors

Technical, administrative, and managerial skills
As Figure 1 illustrates, the thesis supports the assumption that the achievement of good local governance requires a two-tier institutional strengthening. One is the structural support from the national policy through which power and autonomy to plan and implement the local government units' own service programs and projects are provided, and public participation is institutionalized and legitimized. In the Philippines, this is done through the decentralization policy, the Local Government Code. The other is the need to develop the internal capacity of the local government unit in order to use the mechanism effectively. The internal capacity of a local government needs to be developed on not only the areas of technical, administrative and managerial skills of the government officials, but also areas related to the preparedness of the government in taking initiatives in a governmental organization (GO)-civil society partnership. The participation of civil society may be through various organizations which represent individuals' or a groups' interest in social (including educational, health, and recreational causes), political and economic affairs.

The term "civil society organization(s)" in this thesis includes both non-profit organizations and private businesses. For example— community development organizations, cooperatives and environmental groups, gender, language, cultural and religious groups, charities, business associations, trade unions, social and sport clubs, professional associations, academic and policy institutions, and media outlets— are considered as civil society organizations (UNDP, Oct. 1998). Civil society is sometimes referred as the non-governmental sector in this thesis.

The preparedness of government in initiating service management partnered by civil-society organizations is not only based on technical aspects, but also on areas that are locally specific, such as the political culture or particular leaders' leadership quality. The increase of local government units that can pursue good governance— providing services needed in an
adequate, fair and prompt manner—will ultimately help achieve a higher level of development of a nation as a whole.

1.2.1 Definition of "good governance"

Good governance is a method of conducting public affairs in such a way that it is responsive to the needs of the people. This means that it is able to provide public services needed in a fair, adequate, cost-effective and prompt manner.

Governance can mean different things to different people. Most broadly put, governance may be "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs (UNDP, 1997)." Or more specifically, it is "the ways of an authority structure that sets policy goals, chooses its leaders, specifies and adopts various programs options, raises and allocates resources, executes programs and projects, and processes (Laquian, 1995)." And to ensure that people's needs are adequately, properly and fairly met, governance will function as a "shared and collective undertaking of government and its people (Tordecilla and Tumbaga, 1997:57)."

A key element of good governance is how responsive the government can be in its provision of public service to the constituency.
Box 1. Criteria of "good governance"

ASIAWEEK (December 11, 1998) featured an article ranking Asia's 40 best cities to live in. Thriving Cebu City and Metro Manila both placed 14th out of all Asian cities. Davao City followed in the 19th position. In the article, listed were the criteria for "what makes good governance" by United Nations Development Program.

- **Rule of law:**
  Legal frameworks that are both fair and fairly enforced

- **Transparency:**
  A free flow of information so that the members of the public can understand and monitor the institutions and processes affecting their lives

- **Responsiveness:**
  Serving the interest of all stakeholders

- **Consensus:**
  Mediating different aspirations to reach broad agreement in the best interest of the community

- **Equity:**
  Opportunity for all men and women to improve their well-being

- **Effectiveness and efficiency:**
  Meeting need through the best use of resources

- **Accountability:**
  Decision-makers (in government, private sector and citizen groups) must answer to the public as well as to their own organizations

- **Strategic vision:**
  A long-term perspective on what is needed for society to grow

One criterion that ASIAWEEK omitted, but one that was listed at the top of the criteria of the UNDP Governance Policy Paper (UNDP, 1997) is:

- **Participation:**
  All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.

From the above, it is clear that what takes good governance is the close involvement of civil society in controlling their respective well-beings and ensuring that the governments are effectively and efficiently providing what is needed by the public.

The criteria of UNDP, including Participation, provide a good indicator to measuring local governance of the Philippines. Since the Code is considered progressive (with respect to the degree of participation granted to non-governmental sectors), these criteria serve the purpose of measuring the capacity of a local government enhanced by the decentralization policy.

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2 The ranking made by the ASIAWEEK is not based on the criteria of what makes good governance. The ranking is based on the quality of life index by the magazine, assuming that good governance would achieve a high quality life.

3 The fact this was omitted from the list is an interesting illustration itself of how the involvement of civil society in political decision-making processes may still be a foreign concept to Asian culture. It is suspected, however, that the not-well-accepted concept may rather be the "freedom of association and speech," than participation itself. Participation can mean different degrees of public involvement, from a mere consultation to the public involvement in decision-making.
From a consideration of what constitutes good governance, it is clear that responsiveness cannot be achieved without extensive integration of public opinions and demands. The adequate provision of public services, moreover, requires a wider range of support from the public than just airing their opinions and demands. Likewise, effective urban management is possible only by having governmental, non-governmental and private sector collaboration, which utilizes each sector's comparative advantages and minimizes its disadvantages (Sanyal, 1998).

To sum up, responsive governance can be achieved only: when the government can enforce appropriate laws fairly towards all people, when it can provide any appropriate information of what it is doing when demanded by citizens, when it can reach a broader consensus, when it strives to increase equity among different social groups, when it can provide what it promised in a timely fashion, when it can foresee the future needs of society, and when it opens relevant venues to the public to reflect their opinions on public affairs by participating in the decision making.

1.2.2 Governmental organization (GO) and civil society partnership in governance

The most important role of government may be that of a facilitator, "a catalytic force for enabling the innovative sharing of responsibilities and creating enabling environments that provide incentives and support people and partners to pursue their legitimate objectives (UNDP, Apr. 1998)." The coordination and initiation of all the related efforts by non-governmental sectors and private sectors may be best conducted by government.

Meanwhile, non-governmental sectors and private sectors can contribute to the management of public services using their organizational advantages. Non-governmental organizations can utilize their proximity to the grass-roots, and can learn what the needs are and inform the government. They can also mobilize people's participation in the implementation of
service schemes, organize them to pressure policy makers by advocating their demands and opinions themselves, and monitor a government's performance. The private sector can participate in the provision of financial resources by investment, providing services for the government, and helping the government function more effectively by providing business management techniques.

Hence, public participation in governance will ensure the responsiveness of the activities. As a partner, civil society organizations can ascertain that the government is providing what was promised and protest when the promise is not kept. They can also provide the human, technical and financial support needed to reach the widest possible population with the service, assume the service for a fee, and strive to create equal opportunities among different groups in society.

1.3 Methodology

This thesis has utilized the following research methods:

1. Primary and secondary data review/collection on Iloilo City's SWM
2. Literature review on decentralization and governance
3. Observation of the Iloilo City's SWM planning process and informal dialogues with actors involved in the process
4. Key informant interviews of actors in the city’s SWM planning process

1. Primary and secondary data review

Some statistical data and studies about Iloilo City and the city's SWM profile were gathered. They mainly helped to understand the quantitative aspect of the solid waste situation and the socio-economic layout of the city. As well, a preliminary study of Solid Waste Ecological Enhancement Project (SWEEP), the background study in establishing the proposed sanitary landfill in the city, provided some background knowledge of solid waste generation and
the constraints in the city's garbage collection. SWEEP is a project of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), funded by the World Bank, and the preliminary study was conducted by Environmental Resource Management (ERM) and Test Consultant Inc. (TCI), both British-based consultants. Although technical aspects of the proposed sanitary landfill are not directly relevant to this study, there are some important implications that are applicable to other aspects of SWM, particularly the inter-organization communication issue in the process of project implementation.

In addition, the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis on the SWM of the city, conducted by the Local Government Support Program (LGSP) and the Canadian Urban Institute (CUI), revealed the constraints of the city government in conducting SWM. This analysis became another source of data for analyzing the capability (or lack thereof) of the Iloilo City government in managing public services in a responsive manner.

2. Literature review on decentralization and governance

A number of articles on the decentralization policy of the Philippines have been published since the introduction of the Code. The literature collected for this study was mainly from journals published by universities in the Philippines, books dealing with urban management in Southeast Asia, articles and manuals on public participation in developing countries, and policy statements by international organizations like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

3. Observation of Iloilo City's SWM planning process and informal dialogues with involved individuals

The SWM planning process of Iloilo City was directly observed over a three-month period. The researcher attended a number of meetings on SWM planning, including some of the Technical Working Group meetings, sub-committee meetings, and the SWM Action Plan
presentation meeting. These observations allowed for the opportunity to study the role of interpersonal relationships, the level of understanding of involved parties, and operational obstacles, among other factors. The observation of the process is described mainly in Chapter 3.

More informally, the residents in Iloilo expressed their sentiments regarding the relationship between the city government and people on a daily basis and in a variety of settings. The daily interaction illuminated the complexity of the political culture and people's perception of the government at an empirical level.

4. **Key informant interviews of persons involved in the city's SWM**

The key informant interviews were conducted in Iloilo City. Twelve individuals, who were involved in the city's environmental or SWM planning, were asked a set of open ended questions concerning the city government's capacity in carrying out the SWM programs. Thus the range of answers to any particular question is broad, allowing the answers to extend to their feelings and opinions of related issues. The informants included city government officials, officials of the DENR-Region VI, which is a national government agency (NGA), representatives from media, academia, non-governmental organizations specializing in solid waste issues, business groups, and officials involved in the LGSP. Their comments are anonymously quoted to support points made or explained as general sentiments. The key informants are listed in Appendix A, and the interview questions are listed in Appendix B.
1.4 Implications of this study

Through this study of the SWM planning process in Iloilo City, some important issues have emerged:

1) The creation of a good GO-civil society partnership necessary for responsive urban service provisions depends on how prepared the government is to take the initiative.

2) The key factors in a government's preparedness for more participatory governance are not only practical skills and abilities, but also the understanding of the local political environment.

3) Decentralization policy facilitates conditions for good local governance, but does not automatically make it happen.

1) The creation of a good GO-civil society partnership in governance depends on the government's preparedness

The willingness of non-governmental sectors in Iloilo City to collaborate in SWM is very high. On the other hand, the willingness and preparedness of the political leaders to establish a good partnership with civil society is lacking. This case study of Iloilo City reveals that unless the government is ready to take initiatives in the partnership, responsive service management is destined to be inadequate no matter how willing non-governmental and private sector are to support the government. With an absence of administrative capability, transparency and smooth information flow, good intra-organizational relationships, and the ability to attract a wider spectrum of public involvement, Iloilo City is not yet ready to start productive partnerships with non-governmental sectors in SWM.

In order to make participatory public service management bear fruit, the government must understand the benefits of participation, the roles of each sector (including the government itself), and how to orchestrate efforts in each sector. And it is up to the local government to
utilize the vehicle of public participation provided by the Code in order to achieve responsive
governance.

2) The key factors in a government's preparedness are not only practical skills and
abilities, but also the understanding of the local political culture.

Certainly, the Code's weakness in mandating public participation beyond special boards
and councils has contributed to a lack of genuine inclusion of the public in governance. The
major constraints in Iloilo City, though, lie in factors rooted in the local political culture and
context as well as the individual leaders' competence and understanding of effective service
management.

The case study of Iloilo City indicates that the major constraints of having a successful
GO-civil society partnership are local factors, such as a political culture that fails to realize the
substantial benefits of public participation, leader feuds in local politics, and the quality of
leadership.

Political culture can be defined as the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations
toward politics among members of a political system. It is the subjective realm which underlies
and gives meaning to political actions (Almond and Powell, 1966). The political culture in the
Philippines is highly relevant to various constraints to good governance. A capacity building
program needs to be aware of the unique political culture in the locale, in order to understand
what capacity building to emphasize, why the government lacks the capacity, and how long it
may take to make the government understand the importance of the particular capacity
improvement.
3) Decentralization is not a panacea; it is a legal framework

The decentralization policy of the Philippines has provided a chance for local government units to be more responsive to the needs of their constituents by strengthening decision-making power, freedom in revenue generation, and means to include public voices in policy and project planning. Such institutional empowerment is a necessary condition, but not sufficient in itself for the effective service provision by the local governments. This is because capacity to exercise power and functions sufficiently cannot be enhanced by the decentralization policy itself. Decentralization simply gives local government units an opportunity to build the capacity with a "learning by doing" method. For the "learning by doing" method to work, capacity building supports that show how to maximize the power and functions have to accompany the process. And it is, ultimately, the will of local governments that makes the difference—especially that of political leaders.

1.5 Limitations of the study

This study tries to concentrate on the issue of local governments' capacity to pursue fair, adequate, and effective service provisions. Due to constraints in time and resources, the surrounding issues such as the technical aspects of solid waste treatment, environmental aspects of the Code, financial power devolution, and issues regarding various levels of public participation are not discussed in depth. As well, this thesis focuses on the capacity building of the government, rather than laying out the capability of non-governmental and business sectors needed for a successful GO-civil society organization partnership. This focus is from a belief that the chief determinant for a meaningful GO-civil society organization is the level of the government's capability in initiating the partnership. In other words, no matter how organized
the civil society organizations are, no matter how willing they are to support the government, the collaboration will be unsuccessful unless the initiator (i.e. the government) of the effort understands the benefit of such a partnership, knows how to coordinate the efforts, and is willing to initiate the effort.

There were also limitations in the field research practice. The interviews were held with a limited number of informants, due to the time constraints and the availability of individuals. Moreover, the opinions that the researcher was exposed to were those of people who were highly committed to the issues. This could create a certain bias by not directly asking those who were not committed why they were not committed.

The position of the researcher as an intern at a Canadian NGO which has been doing the facilitation of the SWM seminars and planning processes in Iloilo City was largely advantageous in learning about the complexity of the socio-political culture and the inter-personal relationships of the people involved. It was unavoidable that such a close and a successful relationship could create a certain degree of bias.

While it was mostly advantageous, the affiliation with the NGO made it difficult to communicate with the individuals who were apprehensive of the role of that particular NGO. Moreover, the NGO and some members of the planning group who shared common opinions and beliefs became naturally more available for interviews, while some other members with differing views were distant to the NGO and, as a consequence, to the researcher. As tension during the SWM planning process grew, these individuals with dissenting views to the NGO became less forthcoming, making their input and ideas more difficult to collect.
Chapter 2

Background of Iloilo City's Solid Waste Management Program

2.1 Geography and situational factors

The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago consisting of about 7,100 islands and islets. The country can be grouped into three main island regions—Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The total land area of the country is 300,000 square kilometers.

The Philippines is politically grouped into 14 regional areas, and Iloilo City falls into Region VI or Western Visayas, including Panay Island. Region VI contains six provinces: Antique, Aklan, Capiz, Iloilo, Guimaras, and Negros Occidental. The Province of Iloilo is located on eastern Panay Island (Figure 2). Iloilo City is the capital of the Province of Iloilo, and the city is located about 283 kilometers southeast of Manila, an hour by airplane, and 21 hours by boat.

The island climate is typically distinguished by a dry season (November to May) and a wet season (June to October). Throughout the year, the mean monthly temperature is 26 to 28 degrees Celsius. The city is subjected to flooding every year, due to the heavy rains as well as its low elevation. The lack of proper drainage system design and garbage disposal in the rivers contributes to the flooding.

The main river systems in Iloilo are the Jaro River and the Iloilo River, and there are several smaller rivers such as the Tigum, Agnan, and Sibalom Rivers which flow into the two main rivers. Due to the low elevation, the city is particularly susceptible to flooding during the rainy season. The highest monthly rainfalls are recorded between June and October, with mean monthly rainfall in excess of 200mm. The mean monthly rainfall in August is 384mm.
Figure 2. Location of Iloilo City
It is estimated that the population of Iloilo City is currently around 400,000\(^4\). The total land area of the city is 68.52\(km^2\), which is divided into six districts—the city proper, Arevalo, Molo, Manduriao, Jaro, and La Paz. Approximately two-thirds of the total land is used for agricultural production, and close to one quarter is residential (Table 1 and Figure 3). There are a total of 180 barangays (the smallest political unit in the Philippines, equivalent to a village or community) in the city. The annual rate of population growth is 2.4%, slightly higher than the national average of 2.3%.

**Table 1. Land use of Iloilo City**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION (%)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>66.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>23.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City Assessor's Office, in Octavio, et al., 1997

Simple literacy (referring to the ability of a person to read and write with understanding a simple message in any language or dialect) of the city in 1994 was 98% for both sexes, 98.27% for males and 98.92% for the female population. Similarly, functional literacy (the ability of not only reading and writing skills but also numerical skills) was 86.94% for both sexes, 85.02% for male, and 88.60% for the female population (CPDO, Iloilo City, 1997). The poverty incidence rate indicated by the city in 1997 (the figures were of 1994), which is calculated based on the food threshold and the number of the family falling under the threshold, was 15%. This is low

\(^4\) The city's official statistics use 1995 data of the National Statistics Office, which gave the population as 334,539.
because it is only on food. The national data on poverty threshold indicators of the same year shows that the average rate of poverty incidence in urban areas in the Philippines was 28%, and that of Region VI was 35%. Rüland's (1990: 471) figure of 1985 seems closer to a more accurate figure, which was 60%.
Figure 3. Existing land use plan

LEGEND:

- RESIDENTIAL
- COMMERCIAL
- INSTITUTIONAL
- INDUSTRIAL
- AGRICULTURAL
- PARKS & OPEN SPACES
- OTHER PLANTATION
- FISH PONDS
- SALT BEDS
- RIVER/CREEKS
- ILOILO CITY AIRPORT
- CITY BOUNDARY

Source: City Planning and Development Office, 1997
2.2 History

Iloilo is one of the most historically significant cities in the Philippines, dating back to before the Spanish colonization of 1521. Legend talks of ten Bornean datus (tribal chiefs), who fled from their chief Datu Sumakwel, and came to settle on the Island of Panay. The chief of the native Atis (aboriginal inhabitants) gave away the lowland and coastal areas of Panay for a golden salakot (a kind of hat) and necklaces, and receded to the mountains. One of the Bornean settlers, Datu Paiburong, was given the Southern territory, which is now Iloilo City proper. This land is sandwiched by two rivers, Iloilo River and Salog River, and is shaped like a nose, which is "irong" in the local dialect. Hence this territory was called "irong-irong". The name was later pronounced as Iloilo, influenced by Chinese who came to Irong-Irong for the silk and earthenware trade.

The city government of Iloilo was formally established in 1890, more than 350 years after the settlement of Borneans. In 1896, the city was given a coat of arms with the inscriptions "La Muy Leal Y Noble Ciudad De Iloilo (the Ever Loyal and Noble City of Iloilo)” in recognition of the city’s loyalty to the Spanish Crown. In July, 1937, Iloilo became a chartered city.

Iloilo City's hand-woven textiles saw a boom in the mid-18th century. The textile industry was later replaced by the import of British machine-woven cottons. Sugar also became an important product, which was shipped in the return cargo for British freighters. As the trade between sugar and foreign goods developed, some forty European-American trading companies and foreign banks built their branch offices in Iloilo City. With a developed commercial role and imported cultures, Iloilo became "the Queen City of the South."
The 19th century was the most prosperous time for Iloilo City. The hacienda style sugar production, which later replaced the textile industry, also created a boom in the local economy. However, the dependency of the sugar industry on the world market resulted in crippling the economic resiliency of the city. Devastated by the war with severe bombing by the Japanese, the city has not seen a revival since. McCoy describes the decline of this city as follows,

So it happened in Iloilo City during the 1930s and 1940s. ... The leading Ilongo families, whose wealth had lent the city social glitter and economic substance for the better part of two centuries, quit the city to build their new sugar palaces at Bacolod and Manila. No longer were there the dynamic entrepreneurs who build the textile and sugar industries, the finance of the Philippine National Bank and guaranteed access to the American sugar market. Ostentatious, wealthy and generally indolent, Iloilo's surviving urban elite were uninterested in alternatives to the sugar industry and generally lacked the capital and managerial skills to implement any plans they might devise. The Queen was dead (346).

The sentiment described by McCoy is still observed today. No new major business opportunities are occurring, many lots in the middle of downtown remain vacant, and the general mood of disappointment of the public with how the government is handling its economic development plans is apparent.

Yet there is a lot of potential for Iloilo City to do better economically than it currently does. For instance, the city has the highest number of financial institutions per capita, and the highest saving rate per capita in the Philippines. Although overtaken by "a rival Visayan port, Cebu" (McCoy, 1982: 297), it still has an excellent port that has been used for international trade. The land is blessed with most fertile soil—the reason why the region is called "the food basket of the Visayas." The lack of infrastructure, though, including public services such as SWM, has been a major impediment against investment by outside entrepreneurs.
2.3 Garbage in Iloilo City

Existing studies by different parties show that the generation of garbage in Iloilo City is estimated at about 150 to 180 tonnes per day (ERM & TCI, 1999: Section 3- 10, CCSCL 1997, and Western Institute of Technology, 1998). It also accounts for roughly 0.35kg to 0.5kg per person per day of waste generation.

Table 2 and Figure 4 illustrate that the bulk of wastes disposed in Iloilo City come from households and other everyday activities. Another study done by a Japanese chemical engineering company, Chemical Clean Service Co. Ltd. (CCSCL) also indicates that 30% of the entire wastes disposed to the city's only disposal site, Calajunan dumpsite, were household wastes (1997).

| 1. Food Waste | 39.2 |
| 2. Cartons | 9.9 |
| 3. Plastics | 9.6 |
| 4. Yard Waste | 9.0 |
| 5. Paper | 7.3 |
| 6. Wood | 6.7 |
| 7. Other organic materials | 7.6 |
| 8. Inorganic materials | 10.7 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

(From Engineering Research Center, College of Engineering, Western Institute of Technology, September, 1998)
Paper, cardboard, plastic and polystyrene wastes are produced mainly from commercial areas, such as shopping malls, restaurants, and markets. Although small in volume relative to other forms of waste, the lack of proper treatment for hazardous wastes generated in hospitals has been a serious problem. The CCSCL study indicates that 2 to 3 tonnes of hospital wastes, including used needles and glass containers, blood containers and human tissue, low level radioactive waste, and out-of-date medicines are disposed of daily (dumped in the dumpsite) without any treatment.

2.4 Negative impacts

As in any highly urbanized city in the Philippines, insufficient collection and treatment equipment, lack of new landfill sites, and unsanitary disposal practice have created serious problems in Iloilo City. As Cuevas states (1996), urban solid wastes— which include household refuse, street litter, food waste, commercial and industrial waster, and hospital waste—have "a variety of properties that make it a threat to the environment and to health if mishandled during collection, transport and disposal."
Poor management of solid wastes has caused severe problems in human health, the environment, natural resource dependent industries and local businesses of Iloilo City.

Abandoned waste on the ground and bodies of open water clogged due to waste dumping have created massive breeding grounds for mosquitoes, flies, cockroaches and rats. These animals are carriers of such diseases as Malaria, Dengue-H fever, and Colitis (Table 3). In the table, diseases with bold letters are within the top ten leading causes of infant morbidity of Iloilo City.

Table 3. Common diseases associated with improper waste disposal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VECTOR</th>
<th>DISEASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flies</td>
<td>Gastro-enteritis, Colitis, Measles, Pneumonia, Tuberculosis, Gonorrhea, and Influenza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosquitoes</td>
<td>Encephalitis, Yellow Fever, Sleeping Sickness, Dengue (H) Fever, Filariasis, and Viral Flu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cockroaches</td>
<td>Gastro-enteritis, Food Poisoning, Asthma and High Fever, Dermatological Leprosy, Allergic Reaction and Hepatitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mice and rats</td>
<td>Bubonic Plague, Leptospirosis and Ebola Virus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Octavio, et al., 1997: 40 and 62)

The outbreak of these pathogen carrying animals has indeed been a threat to the residents of Iloilo City, marking the highest causes of morbidity.

Scavenging activities on the dumpsite pose serious and direct health risks to both individuals and their family members involved in the process. The risks include accidents involving dumping trucks and other heavy equipment, or the exposure to chemically hazardous or infectious substances on site.

It is not only the soil that is permeated with hazardous chemicals, but also the water and the air that are seriously polluted through the poor SWM system. For example, odor and gas emissions from the open dumpsite not only cause discomfort, but also affect human health, especially among children and the elderly. In addition, deterioration in the quality of water has
affected the local fishery. Tap water is no longer drinkable, which has made the purchase of potable water from retailers a necessity. Such problems are exacerbated during the rainy season.

Local businesses have been seriously affected as well. The generally poor aesthetics and unclean environment have discouraged the commercial climate. Poor infrastructure provisions have discouraged investors, driving them away to neighboring cities such as Bacolod and Cebu. Despite the historical significance of the city, tourism has slumped. Traditional public markets lose out to new private shopping malls because they can hire their own garbage collectors and maintain their facilities better than the old markets can.

2.5 The current status of Iloilo City's SWM

The units in charge of solid waste management in the Philippines vary from one LGU to another. In Highly Urbanized Cities (HUCs) such as Iloilo City, and Independent Component Cities (ICCs), waste collection and disposal are carried out by the General Services Office, the Planning and Development Office or the Engineering Office. Other LGUs have units attached to the office of the Mayor, while in some cases, no system is existent.

How (badly) is the SWM of Iloilo City being handled? Current waste collection and disposal activities of Iloilo City government (Figure 5) are conducted by the Office of Public Services (OPS), and their scope is limited to the collection of unsegregated wastes, their disposal at the dumpsite in Mandurriao District, and maintenance of public spaces like parks and

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5 These two cities are considered rivals to Iloilo City. A newspaper article, for example, described, "Bacolod City is more progressive, dynamic, and peaceful than her sister city 27 kilometers across the Guimaras Strait. Cebu is not only historically a rival Visayan port as McCoy states, but also a city that enjoys the country's number two city status in its economic and urban development.

6 HUC is a city that has a population of at least 200,000 inhabitants and an annual income of at least P50 million based on 1991 constant prices. It is independent of the province and, hence, its voters cannot elect provincial officials. ICC is a component city that is independent of the province, and whose charter prohibits its voters from electing provincial officials (Legaspi et al., 1998; Panganiban, 1994).
markets. The OPS has contracted out the collection service to only one private company (J.S. Layson) for more than 20 years. The collection rate of the entire waste generated by the OPS collection staff and the private collector is estimated at 80%, leaving 36 barangays unserviced (ERM & TCI, 1999: Section 3-5). Another study by Western Institute of Technology (1998:1) observes that the "big bulk of uncollected garbage litters at the roadsides of the main streets of the city everyday despite reports of 80 % collection. … Many barangays in the city are not reached by garbage collection services. If there is, only those found along the roads are collected and the rest are not".
Figure 5. Organizational chart of the Iloilo City Government

**Sangguniang Panlungsod**  
(City Council)  
- Vice-Minor  
- Council Members  

**City Mayor**  
(Executive)  

**Local Development Council**  
(1/4 membership by NGOs mandated by the Code)  

**CAO**  
Building and equipment  

**CEO**  
Utility services  

**CSWD**  
Public services  

**CHO**  
Supply and property  

**GSO**  
Public market and slaughterhouse  

**CPDO**  

**CTO**  

**OM**  

**OCA**  

Source: City Human Resource Management Office  

Departments (from the left)  
City Assessment Office  
City Engineering Office  
City Social Welfare and Development Office  
City Health Office  
General Services Office  
City Planning and Development Office  
City Treasurer's Office  
Office of the Mayor  
Office of the City Accountant
Unserviced residential areas and commercial areas are often serviced by small garbage collectors on a neighborhood basis for a fee. These small garbage collectors collect garbage with tricycles, jeeps, and small trucks. These collectors do not always travel all the way to the city's dumpsite. They often dump the garbage in vacant lots, streets and parks. Some informal settlements, which are often along the rivers and coast lines, are exposed to health and environmental hazards more directly. In such settlements, the majority of the residents cannot afford to hire private garbage collectors, and therefore often dump the wastes right into the river or the sea.

Occasional seminars on composting and recycling have been conducted for the barangays, with representatives from academe, media, and businesses and government officials. The main initiators of such activities are DENR, international consultants, and local NGOs, though some city engineering, planning, health and public services officials have also participated. The consequences of such educational programs have been difficult to judge at a wider public level, though the awareness of participating officials and individuals has been heightened.

Recycling activities are almost exclusively done at the dumpsite by the waste pickers. There are currently 98 households dependent on material recovery activities. The recovered materials (including glass, plastics, aluminum, wood, organic waste for feed, and metal scraps) are sold to some 25 "junk shops" in the city. The junk shops then sell the materials to industries in Cebu. There is no large used material processing industry in Iloilo. Little composting, segregation of materials, or incineration is practiced at either household level or commercial and institutional levels.
2.6 Identified problems in the city's current SWM system

2.6.1 Collection and disposal

The major constraints for the city's SWM in the areas of garbage collection, disposal, and maintenance of public spaces have been identified by the ERM & TCI as 1. Manpower deficiency, 2. Collection inefficiency, and 3. Insufficient operation and maintenance (O&M) funds, allied with the bureaucracy required to access such funds.

For example, there is a serious shortage of available vehicles and equipment for the city's collection services (Table 4).

Table 4. Vehicles for the city's garbage collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capacity (m$^3$)</th>
<th>Government Owned</th>
<th>Privately Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compactor truck</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route packer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open dump truck</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container van</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended dump truck</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skip hoist trolley truck</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(OPS /Survey Records in ERM & TCI: Section 3-12)

Currently, only four of the government owned trucks are working, and they are constantly in need of repair. The government owned trucks were all donated by the Japanese government. The budget allocation for maintenance is extremely limited (Table 5), and the broken-down trucks are left unused. To have a better idea of the shortage, it takes about 110 trips every day by the largest truck (1.5 tonne capacity) of the four to transport the wastes to Calajunan (the site of the landfill). Even if combined with the other government-owned trucks and trucks by a private company, each truck needs to make about 10 trips a day. One trip from the city proper to the dumpsite takes about two hours, which makes four to five trips by one truck maximum per day.
The inflexible budget allocation, following the previous allocation patterns and not investigating the changing needs of budgets on different services, results in a loss of government resources, since the government has to pay the contracting company a large sum of the city funds (Table 5). Since there is only one company contracted and no review for the bidding process, there is no incentive for the company to be effective, which has resulted in a situation in which the OPS does not have strong control over the quality of the services provided by J.S. Layson.

Table 5. City budget allocated to SWM activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual budget (pesos)</th>
<th>% of budget allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General administration</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection crew</td>
<td>934,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street maintenance</td>
<td>5,096,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and plaza maint.</td>
<td>6,960,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public markets</td>
<td>5,215,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughterhouses</td>
<td>226,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle maintenance</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private contractor fee</td>
<td>8,931,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumpsite: fuel, oil supplies and materials</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,118,694</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(PS/Survey Records, 1997)

2.6.2 Beyond collection and disposal

The issues regarding the constraints in conducting effective SWM, however, go beyond the realm of garbage collection, disposal and occasional clean-ups of public places. The general lack of understanding of what SWM entails in local government is a more complex problem to deal with. Octavio, et al.\(^7\) (1997) identified specific aspects (4Es: Education, Engineering, \(\)

\(^7\) In 1999, the budget allocated for the contractor is close to 10 million pesos (City Accounting Office data).

\(^8\) Ms. Christina Octavio is currently an officer at the City Planning and Development Office and the Coordinator of the Urban Basic Service Program of the city. Mr. Jose Roni Penalosa is the Project Development Officer at the City Planning and Development Office and the City Pollution Control Officer of the city. The paper was created, with Engineer Helen Sotomil, professor at the Western
Enactment of Laws, and Enforcement of laws/Enhancement of existing services) that compound and complicate the city's solid waste problems (Table 6).

Particularly, enactment and enforcement of local ordinances add to the difficulties of problems. Existing city ordinances (Appendix C) are "numerous but only a few focus on SWM by local government units (Octavio, et al., 1997: 67)." They are also very fragmented in the coverage of areas, responsibility, and types of waste, as well as being weak in their enforcement power. Moreover, these ordinances were created reactively rather than proactively, and therefore lack preventive measures. "Little (has been) done in optimizing local policies and finding means to implement these with more desirable results (17)."

Some ordinances are mere duplicates of national laws, and do not suit local needs or social characteristics. Others are "inconsistent with national policy." 

Often, not only do ordinances not address the need for regulation in certain areas, sectors, and kinds of wastes, but also they are not accompanied with strong enforcement power. This is due to some favoritism of enforcement officials to certain individuals, where violations of the law are overlooked, or the penalty is dispensed as personal favor, as well as the general lack of understanding of the ordinances by some residents.

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Institute of Technology, in a partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Certificate in Environmental Resource Management at the University of the Philippines, Miag-ao campus. The Certificate program was granted to both officers through the scholarship programs of the LGSP in Region VI.

9 A comment by an official who is familiar with the legal aspects of city ordinances

10 See Box 6 on page 63.
### Table 6. 4Es in Iloilo City’s Solid Waste Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **A. Education** | - lack of knowledge about laws, policies, and good SWM practices on a household level  
- lack of volunteerism  
- "kanya-kanya" (mind your own business) attitudes  
- lack of awareness education  
- lack of an orchestrated effort by private sector  
- inadequacy in knowledge and technique among city government officials  
- lack of funds for SWM education |
| **B. Engineering** | - inappropriately designed and user-unfriendly garbage bins  
- poorly designed garbage collection trucks  
- no segregation facilities on the dumpsite  
- poor road access to the dumpsite  
- absence of treatment facilities in hospitals  
- absence of sanitary landfill  
- lifespan of the Calajunan dumpsite  
- poor research and development efforts |
| **C. Enactment of laws** | - inappropriate and ineffective local policies and regulations that respond to specific problems at the barangays, open lands, public buildings, public conveyances, shopping malls, urban poor relocation sites  
- lack of laws and policies at the barangay level  
- absence of an ordinance enabling ecological approach to SWM  
- lack of baseline data needed for the formulation of local SWM policies and laws  
- "softness" of some ordinances  
- absence of an office that comprehensively manage EM and SWM  
- absence of a legislation defining the city’s role in monitoring SWM practices in different sectors of the city  
- absence of pollution taxes, garbage fees, and other "polluters-pay-principle" schemes |
| **D. Enforcement of laws and enhancement of existing services** | - non-compliance of laws among some residents  
- lack of a specialized office with adequate human, financial and material resources for EM and SWM  
- inefficient garbage collection  
- absence of specialized SWM systems for medical facilities, squatter areas, and other critical residential zones along coastlines, riverbanks, etc.  
- poor linkages with the DENR  
- proliferation of garbage dumped on idle lands  
- lack of grass-root involvement in area-based SWM systems  
- unsustainable implementation of existing programs (e.g. Matahum Ka Iloilo Program, Clean and Green, Saturday Habit, etc.) |

(From Octavio, et al., 1997: 58-61)

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11 See Box 4 on page 54.
Iloilo City's Solid Waste Management Planning

I love this city for its beauty, historic significance and most of all for the people that live right here. ... I am challenging our political leaders, business sector, the academe and my colleagues in the media field to take part in this worthwhile endeavor as we make Iloilo City a garbage-free City.

-February, 1999, A speech by a media representative and resident of Iloilo City

3.1 Making solid waste management planning participatory

Solid waste is one of the issues that are most relevant to the everyday lives of Iloilo City residents. Everyone in the constituency is both a producer and a recipient of the impact of solid wastes. Iloilo City's first trial in participatory planning for solid waste management (SWM) of the city has helped establish a closer partnership between the government and civil society. It is, however, only a beginning.

The involvement of the non-governmental sectors in this "multi-stakeholder" planning process has been limited to a handful of individuals who were mostly from a relatively highly educated middle-class group\(^\text{12}\). General lack of trust by the residents for the government has perpetuated the reluctance to deal with the government, and the residents normally act themselves to find their own solution. Even city and other government officials living in the city pay neighborhood private garbage collectors to have their home garbage collected. Committed individuals involved in the planning process have started to be worn out by the slow progress of countless meetings and other members' poor commitment to their responsibilities. Two years had passed before anything was implemented.

\(^{12}\) In Iloilo City, there are 102 accredited NGOs, 34 non-accredited NGOs, including professional organizations, clubs, civil organizations, charities, business organizations, groups for the poor, women, children and youth, academe, and media. They are not clearly classified by the type of organizations in the city's data.
3.2 The course of events

A. Urgency heightened

In 1996, Iloilo City received the dubious distinction of being "the dirtiest city\textsuperscript{13} in the Philippines," which became an impetus for the city and willing individuals and groups to start campaigning for a better SWM system. In fact, the initiative for the effort had already been taken in preceding years by some individuals from the non-governmental sector. These individuals included staff of a non-governmental organization (Kahublagan Sang Panimalay Foundation/KSP—Movement of the Community) which had dealt with community SWM for some years, professors in an engineering school, and a national media officer, who all had also been long time residents of the city. The Office of Public Services (OPS) of Iloilo City had also been involved in the activities. In preceding years, some education programs on a community basis, studies on the waste disposal practices, and pilot collection projects had been conducted, though they made impacts on only a small scale. As well, such programs were on an ad hoc basis and not sustained.

The immediate need to solve the city's solid waste problem finally pushed city-wide SWM planning into practice in 1997. The principle of citizen participation within the Local Government Code of 1991 then became an opportunity to enhance the responsiveness of the city government, by institutionalizing memberships from non-governmental sectors into the planning process, including media, academe, and business representatives as key actors in the creation and implementation of the city's SWM plan.

\textsuperscript{13} This was adjudged out of 14 Highly Urbanized Cities in the Philippines by a team of assessors that included DENR and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) staff.
Table 7. The process of multi-stakeholder SWM planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
<pre><code>   | Local Government Support Program of Region VI launched |
</code></pre>
<p>| 1995 | Iloilo City Comprehensive Development Plan issued |
| 1996 | City labeled &quot;the dirtiest city in the Philippines&quot; |</p>
| 1997 April | EO 06, Creation of the Task Force (TF) and Technical Working Group (TWG) for SWM  
            | Critical Inputs to the Integrated Solid Waste Management Framework Plan of Iloilo City by Octavio, Peñalosa and Sotomil |
| 1997 July | First meeting of the Task Force/Technical Working Group for the SWM planning and implementation |
| 1998 Jan. | Scoping/Stakeholder analysis for SWEEP  
            | Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Framework Plan |
| 1998 Sep. | EM planning Workshop  
            | CEMO proposal |
| 1998 Oct. | SWM planning Workshop  
            | SWEEP study on a landfill reviewed by a Canadian engineer  
            | Communication planning Workshop on EM |
| 1999 Jan. | Rapid Solid Waste Assessment of Iloilo City was submitted to the Mayor  
            | TWG study trip for Bulacan and Manila SWM |
| 1999 Apr. | EM Action Plan (including SWM Action Plan) draft completed |
| 1999 June | Reflection meeting by leaders, TF, TWG and other non-governmental groups |

B. Participatory SWM planning suggested by trained officials

The Local Government Support Program (LGSP) of Region VI had been implementing capacity building programs and projects for the LGUs at all levels (province, city, municipality, and barangay) to support effective decentralization since 1992. The LGSP is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), under the Philippine-

14 J. Paul Henderson, an engineering officer in the City of Vancouver and a consultant, reviewed the SWEEP EIS and pointed out some shortcomings of the study, and suggested that the cost for the construction of the sanitary landfill would be higher than estimated.
Canada Bilateral Agreement of Aid\textsuperscript{15}. Its capacity building focuses on development planning, local legislation, financial administration, improvement of management systems, community mobilization and environmental management. Gender and Development (GAD), and the Environment are the cross-cutting themes in all the interventions it makes. The involvement of LGSP in 1996 became part of what made the SWM planning process more participatory.

Through one of LGSP's capacity building program for the city, two planning officials had been granted a scholarship to pursue a certificate program at the University of the Philippines to enhance their knowledge and expertise in environmental management. The Code itself, as well as the strengthened expertise of the officials, both served as starters to the participatory SW planning process.

\textbf{C. Executive Order for the creation of Task Force issued}

In April, 1997, the Mayor of Iloilo City issued EO No. 06, by which he designated personnel from the following offices and groups (Table 8) for the Task Force:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Task Force Chairperson & Task Force Chairperson \\
City Mayor & Vice-Chair \\
Kahublagan Sang Panimalay (KSP) & Vice-Chair \\
DENR VI & Member \\
Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) Committees on Barangay Captains and Environment & \\
Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council) & \\
Office of Public Services & \\
City Engineer's Office & \\
City Health Office & \\
City Planning and Development Office & \\
Western Institute of Technology & \\
Media & \\
Iloilo Business Club & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Task Force members}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{15} Local Governments Support Projects for developing countries by CIDA prioritize the participation of community groups in decision-making (CIDA 1997).
Kahublagan Sang Panimalay (KSP) is a local NGO which has been dealing with solid waste problems since before the Code. The Task Force was assigned the responsibility to "coordinate all efforts and functions pertaining to and relative to solid waste planning and management in the city and assist the various government departments in plan implementation and policy formulation (EO No. 6)." From each Task Force member office and group, twelve permanent members were designated to act as their representatives in the Technical Working Group (TWG) (Figure 6).

The Order promised that, upon the completion of the SWM action plan in the name of the Task Force (though the practical planning work is done by the TWG), the Internal Revenue Allotment Development Fund would be released. The amount of pesos from the Fund necessary for implementation would be determined by the Task Force.

Figure 6. SWM Task Force and Technical Working Group

(Primary responsibility in making SWM plan & budget approval)

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Task Force

Send representatives  ↓  Make plans, report progress

Technical Working Group

(Actual plan making body)
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D. Series of meetings and seminars held

The city government requested that the LGSP be involved in the facilitation of the SWM planning process, in which the Technical Working Groups of the SWM Task Force meet and make decisions on the future actions as practical arms for the creation of the plan. The LGSP contracted out the facilitation work to a Canadian NGO, the Canadian Urban Institute (CUI).\(^{16}\)

In the meantime, the feasibility study for the Solid Waste Ecological Enhancement Project (SWEEP), which would assist six LGUs in the Philippines (including Iloilo City) in constructing a new sanitary landfill, was launched. This program was conducted by DENR and British consultants, and was funded by the World Bank. It intended to assist DENR in defining the roles of both national agencies and LGUs, and to assist DENR in enabling to provide LGUs with support they need to manage their solid waste in the future.

The indirect participation of the city government caused an information gap between the city's SWM planning participants and DENR. There was no direct communication about SWEEP with the TWG, nor direct participation of a representative from SWEEP in the city's SWM planning. The information of the latest status of the project did not seem to reach the TWG and this often confused the consultant agencies and solid waste related service companies from outside the city. Nor was the output of TWG meetings reflected in the future direction of a sanitary landfill construction by SWEEP. SWEEP is now waiting for another five LGUs to issue respective Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) in order to enter into the project.

\(^{16}\) The CUI has its head office in Toronto, and consists of only long-time local residents of Iloilo at this office, while occasionally having Canadian interns who work as support staff.
Since SWEEP is a national project, an official Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted\(^\text{17}\) . The scoping and multi-stakeholder consultation conducted for the project involved representatives of local residents (of the community the dumpsite is located in), waste pickers, the Recycling Movement of the Philippines Foundation, and the Center for Advanced Philippine Studies (from non-governmental sectors). The last two organizations are not located in Iloilo City.

During 1998 and the beginning of 1999, the LGSP carried out a series of workshops and seminars with facilitation of CUI. Through the workshops and seminars, TWG members developed an understanding of both the needs of a more comprehensive, strategic plan for both SWM and Environmental Management (EM), and quality necessary for such plan. In the workshops, not only TWG members, but also officials from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), representatives of the City Health Office, some barangay representatives, representatives from media and academe attended.

As the result of the Environmental Management workshop in September, 1998, all environmental issues were divided into the areas of: 1. Air, 2. Water, 3. Land, and 4. Solid Wastes. Each area would be handled by an appropriate Task Force and its subordinate Technical Working Group (which would be newly formed). With this, SWM of the city was integrated into a spectrum of environmental issues. Since SWM already had both a Task Force and an organized TWG, and solid waste is by far the most urgent issue to deal with, the TWG for SWM planning went ahead and started the detailed action planning (Figure 7).

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\(^{17}\) EIA is currently not required unless the project is at the national level.
Another critical decision from the EM planning workshop was the proposal for creation of the City Environment and Management Office (CEMO), which would deal with environmental issues comprehensively, including solid waste. The creation of CEMO would not only enable the city government to deal with various environmental issues comprehensively, but it would also strengthen SWM function by addressing all related issues, not only collection and disposal. The drafting of this proposal was assisted by the LGSP through CUI.

A subsequent Communication Planning Workshop on EM occurred in November, the objectives of which were to: promote awareness of environmental issues with media members, encourage various stakeholders to initiate actions, and develop a communication campaign plan.

In January, 1999, the TWG made a trip to Bulacan and Manila (both in Central Luzon) to observe their waste management practices. The president of the Wastepickers' Association
also participated in the trip. Many participants noted that the tour made a deep impact on their understanding about solid waste issues, and made them even more committed to the work necessary in order to solve the problem as soon as possible.

**E. SWOT analysis conducted**

At the SWM planning workshop in October, 1998, a SWOT analysis (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis) was conducted. It was to identify the problems surrounding SWM of Iloilo City in terms of the physical solid waste situation, as well as surrounding factors of SWM operations. The SWOT analysis form can be found in Appendix D.

Through the SWOT analysis, the participants of the workshop identified 5 major areas of concern in the SWM system (see also Figure 7):

1. Handling hazardous waste materials,
2. Waste disposal,
3. Segregation,
4. Collection system, and
5. Education and values (later called, education, communication and values).

For each area, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats around the area for improving the situation were discussed and laid out (Table 9-1 to 5).

**Table 9-1. Handling hazardous waste materials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. political will</td>
<td>1. poor monitoring system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. participation of NGOs and the different government agencies</td>
<td>2. lack of manpower with technical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. willingness to fund mitigating measures</td>
<td>3. lack of sustainability of the program implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. community involvement</td>
<td>4. lack of support from the private sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. support from funding institutions</td>
<td>1. health hazard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. cooperation among the institutions involved
3. available technology on handling and treatment of hazardous waste available transfer of technology and information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. available landfill site with remaining 8-10 year life span (existing dumpsite)</td>
<td>1. no disposal facility for toxic and hazardous wastes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Task Force on SWM with capabilities to evaluate proposals</td>
<td>2. unsanitary disposal practices at the dumpsite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. health and environmental impacts caused by the present condition of the dumpsite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. inadequate equipment for the disposal of solid waste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. availability of proposals for various technologies and treatment</td>
<td>1. conflicting national government regulation on hospital waste disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. networking with foreign agencies</td>
<td>2. conflicting land use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. available national program on solid waste disposal</td>
<td>3. decrease of land values adjacent to the dumpsite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. an informed community fully aware of 3Rs (Reduce, Reuse, &amp; Recycle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. willingness to cooperate on sanitary solid waste disposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. organized waste pickers at the dumpsite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. occasional funding from DENR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9-3. Segregation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>Weaknesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. city government's willingness to support the funding of the SWM of barangays</td>
<td>1. lack of awareness on SWM at barangay level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. active involvement of some barangay</td>
<td>2. lack of involvement of barangay officials in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-2. Waste disposal

Table 9-3. Segregation
officials in enforcing mandatory segregation and anti-littering ordinances

the dissemination of information to educate the people in their barangays handling their household to the collection points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. available funds support from the national government and non-government organizations for the procurement of garbage bins to segregate biodegradable and non-biodegradable wastes</td>
<td>1. lack of barangay or community support to enforce the barangay and city ordinance on mandatory segregation in the households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. viability of recycling center as a source of revenue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. available funds for recycling programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-4. Collection system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. full supervision by the Office of the Public Services</td>
<td>1. monopoly in collection system by private contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. experienced stewardship</td>
<td>2. lack of manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. growing trend towards city funds being allocated for community-based garbage collection system</td>
<td>3. lack of facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. no budget for maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. lack of monitoring of private collection efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. unsanitary collection system by private contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. no identified collection points in some barangays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. poorly-engineered collection and storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. lack of information of collection schedule in the barangays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. poor implementation and monitoring ordinance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. inaccessibility of certain sites due to limited road network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. availability of other contractors who are able and willing to contract collection and</td>
<td>1. impacts on the capacity of the concerned to pay collection system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ability to provide motivation and incentives</td>
<td>1. lack of political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. available educational information campaign</td>
<td>2. weak implementation of laws and ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. lack of participation among local officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. presence of media outlets for the SWM awareness campaign</td>
<td>1. lack of unity and cooperation among community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the inclusion of SWM in school curriculum</td>
<td>2. people's <em>ningas cogon</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. people's low level of literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. people's lack of service orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. <em>kanya-kanya</em> system of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. people's lack of involvement (in livelihood projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. people's lack of ambition and interest to improve standard of living</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-5. Education and values

(Solid Waste Management Planning Workshop Report by CUI)

F. Draft of SWM Action Plan completed

From the SWOT analysis conducted in the workshop, the participants made recommendations for implementation. These actions were further developed in detail for programs and projects by the sub-committee members, which consisted of TWG members and other individuals familiar with the issues. These individuals included medical experts,

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18 See Box 4 on page 54.

19 See Box 4 on page 54.
lawyers, national radio staff, teachers, and business owners. The draft of the Action Plan for SWM, including detailed scheduling and estimated budgets for the projects and programs was completed this April. The Action Plan for SWM is part of the Action Plan for EM (which also includes land, air and water), though only the SWM section had such detailed recommendations of actions at the time.

**Summary of Action Plan for the 5 sub-areas of SWM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handling hazardous waste materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Public information programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Barangay level seminars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Situation study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Training (the City Government, Hospitals, Barangays, etc.) for a health impact monitoring team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Finance for equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Law enforcement (study RA No. 6969)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Site design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Review and recommend zoning ordinances, by-laws &amp; regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Unify disposal methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Seek technical assistance by various government agencies for sanitary landfill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Waste pickers &amp; families’ welfare and education programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Cover waste disposal site at the end of the day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segregation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Collection truck designs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Awareness education through schools, churches, business establishments, and barangays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ More garbage collectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Demonstration projects (e.g. Barangay level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Ordinance enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Access roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Campaign residents participation in the implementation of SWM ordinances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Educator training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Plan was presented to the political leaders of Iloilo City in June, and is currently at the stage where the approval from the Mayor and Sanggunian Panlungsod is awaited.

3.3 Hurdles during the SWM planning process

The nearly two year process of SWM planning, which was significantly more participatory than in the past, produced a plan that is largely reflective of the public voice. Yet, the process of plan creation was not an easy one. The insights gained from the process are valuable in order to understand what constraints the city's participatory management is facing, and what kind of capacity building is necessary for the future.

The major difficulties in conducting the multi-stakeholder SWM planning were: 1. Political splits among government officials, 2. Business interest of the officials involved, and 3. Conflict over the creation of the City Environment and Management Office (CEMO).
3.3.1 Political split among leaders

The current Mayor and some Council members are known to have an adversarial relationship. The relationship has split the city government into two factions, one friendly to the Mayor, and one opposed. This conflict has affected the solidarity of both the Task Force and the TWG. Since Task Force members consist of members of both factions, and the Mayor is the chairperson, the willingness to cooperate among some TWG members who belong to the opposition group was weak from the beginning.

Avoiding direct conflict, or out of a reluctance to cooperate\textsuperscript{20}, both Mayor and Council leaders would send staff to represent them at some important Task Force meetings, which diluted the sense of importance of the matters that were to be discussed. Even if they made an appearance, often they would not stay for the entire meeting. Eventually, the members who would regularly attend the meeting were either those on good terms with the Mayor, or those who were neutral. Hardly any representatives from the Council would attend the TWG meetings. A respondent described it as, "even if the two parties have common goals and interests, they will focus on the differences and do not make an effort to work together. In my opinion, if this is corrected, everything will fall into place." At this point, there is no sign of such a reconciliation.

3.3.2 Business interest of some officials involved

Many respondents attested that certain top officials of the OPS have their own businesses in garbage collection, though this had never been officially spoken of, let alone criticized or

\textsuperscript{20} The Mayor's shyness in appearing in public was mentioned by many individuals. It was also argued by some respondents of the interview that this is because the Mayor lacks confidence in his
considered as abuse of their authority. It is suspected by many of those involved in the SWM planning process that this contributes to the OPS not keeping a clear record of the collection schedule, and why the OPS does not strictly control the private contractor. The existence of conflicting business interests by the very officials of the administrative body, which is supposed to take initiatives in improving the public collection system, fundamentally questions the achieveability of effective waste collection system planning. The reasons for reluctance of the OPS to promote transparency and to let capacity building support intervene in its operation becomes clear in the light of such conflicts.

3.3.3 Conflict over the creation of the City Environment and Management Office (CEMO)

The creation of CEMO became the major cause of conflict among TWG members including the OPS official. This was due to the direct effect on the officials' respective career paths by the creation of CEMO. Mainly due to this conflict, no representatives from OPS were participating in the TWG meetings at the last stage of planning. The details of the incident are described in Box 2. The conflict is one of the most critical reasons why the Action Plan of SWM has not yet reached the stage of implementation. For some TWG members, the feeling at the last stage of planning that "it does not matter which proposal goes through, I just want to get the plan we made implemented." This incident was most unfortunate and quite damaging, because it caused recriminations on a personal level, not easily reconcilable.

There were additional frustrations felt in the process. Two years of volunteer work by attending numerous meetings fatigued many of the non-governmental members of the TWG and sub-committee members. Frustrations would emerge occasionally. TWG meetings started to qualifications, and is afraid to be criticized. Council members tend to send representatives as a way to show their reluctance to cooperate, also recognized in interviews by some individuals.

48
have more personal tensions, though most members remained positive about the solidarity of the group. Over the course of the process, some non-governmental participants of SWM related that meetings have been discouraged by the fact that some governmental officials always come to the meeting late. "They are getting paid to come to the meetings. But still, they come 30 minutes or even one hour late. Some government officials lack professionalism," a non-governmental member complained.
Box 2. Conflict over CEMO/CENRO

The OPS was a department in the City organizational structure before 1991. Upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, the city government decided to locate the OPS under the General Services Office as a division. The ranking of the chief official as a department head was, however, maintained on the premise that the position would dissolve upon his retirement. This structural change eliminated the second top official's opportunity to be promoted as a Department Head in the future. Yet, it would at least have maintained the status quo for his career—as a division head.

The content of the CEMO proposal, however, became a threat to the existence of the OPS, since the creation of CEMO would mean the dissolution of the OPS. Moreover, the qualifications deemed necessary would necessarily exclude the present OPS official from a candidacy. His position threatened, the official created an alternative proposal, suggesting the automatic upgrading of the OPS to the City Environment and National Resources Office (CENRO). He then handed the proposal in place of the TWG proposal to the Mayor without notifying the TWG.

Since the official is also a TWG member, the Mayor believed that the proposal that the official handed him was the same proposal as the one that had been promised by the TWG, and he endorsed it.

In the meantime, another TWG member noticed the CENRO proposal on the Mayor's desk, and reported it to the rest of the TWG. After emergency meetings in which the OPS official did not attend, the rest of the TWG decided to submit both proposals to the Mayor, letting him select.

In an informal dialogue with the OPS official, some of his concerns were revealed. The OPS official claimed that the content of the CEMO proposal gave other officials (who are the main creators of CEMO proposal) in the TWG an advantage in getting the positions because of the qualifications required matched them. His concern could be sympathetically perceived, in the light that his career course would be changed. Yet, he failed to take a right venue to claim his concern.

The official's selection of the strategy to get his claim across also revealed, among other things, the lack of any mechanisms for conflict resolution within the government. Instead of talking over concerns directly to the creators of the CEMO proposal, the official resorted to complaining to the Mayor and Council. As well, it had been the convention (and more effective means) that anything needed should be solicited personally through direct request to an individual or group head, instead of reaching consensus among colleagues.

Any future government's capacity building program practitioners need to consider such aspect in the behavioral patterns based on the political culture, and integrate components that would facilitate an improved conflict resolution model in the management structure within the government.
There were some members who never attended the meetings. A portion of the group members were always changed. This made it difficult to keep track of how much information was actually disseminated to all members, though minutes of each meeting were handed out to the attendants. Some members complained that the new information disseminated in the latest meetings never reached them. "How can they complain when they never show up?!" a regular member exclaimed.

3.4 Lack of willingness and understanding of the leaders to lead the process

The largest disappointment was felt when the joint meeting with the TWG, Task Force members and political leaders was held to present the SWM Action Plan. The attitude of the executives and political leaders of the city revealed their passiveness in dealing with the SWM issue, lack of understanding of their role in the process, and lack of support and appreciation to the members of the TWG, many of whom were volunteers. This deeply disappointed them (Box 3).

Some TWG members now want to start implementing some programs and projects without waiting for the approval of the Action Plan to go through. "Even if we spend our pocket money, we will start it."
Box 3. The meeting with political leaders

The meeting was very important for the next stage for the SWM—implementation of the plan. It was not only for the presentation of the Action Plan, but it was intended to sit all the political leaders together so that they would have a chance to close the gaps between opposition groups and reach the common objectives. Unless this could be achieved, all knew that the implementation of the plan would be a long way away. The attempt was unsuccessful.

First of all, the Mayor was absent and sent a representative, despite the plea of the TWG chair-person, because of the importance of the meeting. Secondly, Task Force members from the city government, who are the superiors of the TWG members, complained that they had not been informed about anything in the SWM plan for two years, until that day. "For these two years, they (the bosses) never cared what was happening in the meeting, and never asked. Now they are using that fact against us."

"All the meetings were funded by LGSP, not the city. And we have very limited budget for meetings. But they expect us to create reports every time we have meetings so that they can skim through. If they want to know, why don't they just ask?"

There was also a complaint from the Task Force members that there had been too much discussion, and not enough implementation, as if they were not a part of the process. They were also unaware of the fact that the implementation of the projects would come after the approval of the Plan. And they are the ones who were to approve it.

Practically, the responsibility of the Task Force was completely transferred to the TWG and the two groups became different entities over the two years of the planning process. The Task Force was effectively dissolved. The TWG now functions independently from the leaders who designated them. In the eyes of the political leaders, the responsibility of making the plan was transferred to the TWG, and they simply await for the paper to be sent to them for approval. The dedicated city officials were stuck in between. Though they were trying to keep a low profile and do their jobs as city officials, they also grew to be at risk of being isolated within the city government.
3.5 Significance of the people participation in the Iloilo City SWM planning

The multi-stakeholder planning, represented by the TWG activities, provides a valuable lesson for the future expansion of public participation in Iloilo City urban management. First of all, the TWG produced a plan that reflected the voice of a comparatively wider public, concerning the well-being of the waste-pickers on the dumpsite, education at the household level, and community level implementation. It means that the participation of non-governmental and private sector in the planning process ensures, to a certain extent, that the plan responds to the need of a wider public, and transcends the sense of ownership to the issue into a wider public as well.

Secondly, some individuals and the city gained the experience of participating in a multi-stakeholder planning process. The experience can be used and applied for other services or development planning in the future. The facilitator of participatory planning will know better what to expect in the course of events, including the time needed, effective ways of communication, contents of workshops, and ways to build cooperative ties among participants. For the SWM planning process, the TWG has been the main engine. It has had a strong commitment from many of the members, and membership ties have grown stronger over the process. The regularly participating members of the TWG will be able to support a future participatory planning process by sharing their experiences during this course of events.

Thirdly, the SWM planning process revealed the capacity of the government in taking initiatives in GO-civil society organization partnership. The behavior of the political leaders during the two year planning process and the time of the Action Plan presentation vividly illustrated that greater public involvement can bear fruit only when the government is ready and understands the benefits and functions. And in Iloilo's case, the government is not ready
because the political leaders are unwilling to work together to adopt the plan, nor do they understand the roles of involved parties in the planning and implementation process.

Why is the government not ready to take an initiative in the partnership? What are the factors for the "unreadiness/unpreparedness"? The next chapter analyzes the existing capacity of the Iloilo City government, as well as constraining factors that hinder the government from achieving service provisions responsive to the needs of the constituency, or good governance.

**Box 4. Kanya-kanya and ningas cogon**

"I don't want to think we are primitive and dirty," a business owner said. "In fact we like to clean our space very much. The problem is that some people do not care if the whole city is dirty as long as their place is clean. A lot of people hire somebody to take their garbage away from their places, only to place it somewhere else. That is why many empty lots and parks are filled with garbage."

There are a number of garbage collectors informally working for their neighbors. Even government officials hire them in their neighborhood, because it is a faster solution than getting the Office of Public Services (OPS) to establish an effective garbage collection system.

"The business sector of Iloilo City does not want to bother the government because they are afraid of retaliation. The government can give the business unfavorable treatment. Business wants to play safely. That is why the business sector does not push too hard even though they are very frustrated by the poor waste collection by the city. This kind of individualism (Kanya-kanya=mind one's own business) system is deeply rooted into the psyche of the residents."

"People tend to put off dealing with problems, or doing new things (Ningas cogon)," another resident explained. "It takes long time for Ilonggos to accept a new idea. ... An important thing for them to understand why they are doing what they are doing (, or they will not do it)."

Kanya-kanya and ningas-cogon are two values in Ilonggo culture that Ilonggos and Illongas themselves perceive as negative—values that hinder a group effort to achieve a larger objective. It was pointed out in the SWM SWOT analysis that these two values are threats to the SWM. "Such values need to be re-oriented through future education," said some of the residents.
Chapter 4

Iloilo City's Capacity for Responsive Service Management

This chapter intends to do two things. First, it provides an overview of what the participants of the city's solid waste management (SWM) planning process perceived as weaknesses of the government in conducting SWM. Such weaknesses perceived were the capacity to take the initiative in GO-civil organization collaboration, as well as the technical knowledge and skills on how to deal with solid waste. Secondly, it discusses some important and locally unique factors that seem to affect some of the weaknesses—namely, the political culture and politics.

In addition, this chapter argues that financial capability is NOT a major constraint in achieving satisfactory SWM and explains why.

4.1 The city government's capacity to implement SWM programs and projects

What do the individuals who have participated in the multi-stakeholder SWM planning think about the government's capability to manage solid waste? Some of the interview questions addressed this question. The first is whether the respondents think a city/municipality is the appropriate institution to initiate SWM. The second question is how sufficiently the city government is getting the support from other government agencies. And the third is an open question on what capacity the respondents think is missing in the city government.
4.1.1 Appropriateness of the city as an initiator in SWM

According to the interviews conducted for this research, all respondents thought the city was an appropriate level of government to initiate SWM (question 1). The reasons for this were:

- The city has direct contact with barangays, while larger governments do not, so it is better to manage solid waste with the cooperation of barangays.
- DENR is a mere monitoring body, and we cannot expect DENR to do everything.
- It has been the city who handled SW for many years. It should be them given that the tax the residents pay must come back to the residents in the form of public services.
- There are a lot of engineers and technical people in the city government. They (the city government) can do it right if they want to.
- Only the city government can deliver SWM services to the city scale. It is a big scale project that affects everybody in the city and requires a large amount of budget.

Yet many thought it would work only by certain conditions, which are the existence of:

- Political will of the leaders' part
- A good body in the city organizational structure that can adequately deal with SWM and environmental management
- Strong public participation in a form of private contracts on public services
- Strong community support
- Understanding of the importance of environmental issues on the leaders' part

4.1.2 Inter-organizational relationships

Regarding the inter-organizational cooperation with related national government agencies (question 2), most respondents felt it was insufficient:
Some staff from NGAs are actively participating in the TWG activities, but more from individual commitment (rather than a policy). Not enough in tangible terms. If they are helping enough, there should be less problem now. The level of NGA support is only advocacy and planning in a limited scope. DENR is not giving enough support because it has its own limitations to support, too. DENR itself does not have enough technical persons and additional budget to assist the city's SWM. DENR can assist only upon request. If the city does not make a request, DENR cannot do anything.

A city planning official explained that the relationship was improving in a sense that "the city has now accepted its shortcomings and is open to intervention by assisting agencies. DENR's assistance in technical advice has been helpful." On the other hand, a DENR official felt, "we have exhausted all of our efforts to support the city."

The lack of inter-organizational communication between the city and DENR was evident in the observation, though the work of TWG in SWM planning was well informed between city officials and DENR officials. It even appeared, in the eyes of observers, that DENR was implementing the SWM or environmental management activities while the city was exempted from getting involved in any implementation because it was busy planning.

For example, when DENR conducted a water cleaning activity, mobilizing non-governmental organization members to go through the river and coastal areas of the city to pick up garbage one day, there was no involvement of the city government. The Mayor was supposed to give the opening speech of the event, but ended up sending a representative to give the speech instead.
4.1.3 What capacity is missing?

The interview question 3 specifically asked the respondents' perception on the capacity that is missing in the government, in order to pursue effective SWM. The following is the summary of the answers. (〇〇 many respondents/ 〇 a few respondents)

- Political will of the leaders to solve the SW problems 〇〇
- Willingness of politicians to eradicate corruption 〇〇
- Political maneuvering skills/ leadership of the leaders 〇
- Champions who can orchestrate and mobilize various efforts by different sector and governments 〇
- Business management mind of leaders 〇
- Proper planning 〇〇
- Environmental planning skills, including the monitoring and environmental state study 〇〇
- Simple management skill 〇〇
- Administrative skills 〇〇
- Engineering design capability 〇
- Skills to judge the appropriateness of all sorts of proposals on methods and techniques by outside consultants 〇
- Knowledge to make proper ordinances 〇
- Organizational structure that effectively deals with environment/solid waste problems 〇

The major constraints of the government can be divided into two domains: one (the first five answers) is related with the willingness and mindset of political leaders, and another (the rest except for the last) is technical, such as administrative and management skills of the city officials. The last answer addresses the existing organizational structure, rather than the capacity of manpower.

It is interesting to see that the missing capacities pointed out by the respondents are comparable with the list of criteria, by Cheema and Rondinelli in their decentralization study in Asia (1983:20), of the characteristics of an organization which may affect its capacity to
implement decentralization programs. These criteria apply whether the programs are decentralized or the traditional responsibility of the government, because traditional tasks have not necessarily been implemented according to plans and policies\textsuperscript{21}, either. Since the Code now mandated the city to plan the policy and programs on either devolved or traditional service provisions, their criteria are useful to compare with the missing capacity addressed by the interview respondents.

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<tr>
<th>Box 5. Characteristics of an agency which may affect the performance in decentralization programs by Cheema and Rondinelli</th>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Technical, managerial, and political skills of the agency's staff</td>
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<td>➢ Capacity to coordinate, control and integrate decisions</td>
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<td>➢ The agency's political resources and support among executives, political leaders and interest groups at the national level</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ The nature of internal communication flow</td>
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<td>➢ The agency's rapport with the target groups</td>
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<td>➢ The effectiveness of the agency's links with non-governmental, or constituency organizations</td>
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<td>➢ Quality of leadership within the agency</td>
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<td>➢ The acceptance and commitment of the staff to program objectives</td>
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<td>➢ Location of the agency within the administrative hierarchy</td>
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The city's institutional links (excluding personal relationships of leaders) with non-governmental, constituency organizations had just been formalized through the multi-stakeholder SWM planning. There was a gap in the levels of commitment between officials from different department/offices. From the observation of the planning process, the communication between TWG members and Task Force, between the city government leaders, between the city officials, and between the city government and DENR proved to be insufficient.

\textsuperscript{21} Cheema and Rondinelli state, "the reality of the situation in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific does not support the proposition that the implementation of development plans and policies is a
It is clear, from both the interviews and Cheema and Rondinelli’s criteria, that the city government largely lacked capacity to competently implement SWM programs and projects.

4.2 Capacity to take the lead in GO-Civil society partnership in service management

The success of the partnership between the government and civil society in public services management is the key to good governance. What are, then, the factors for the government's preparedness to lead the partnership? From the interaction with the political leaders and the observation of the process of how TWG work has been conducted and received by the leaders, the following factors can be noted about Iloilo City's preparedness:

1. **Cohesiveness and intra-organizational flow of information:** The low cohesiveness of the city government, among leaders and among offices confused the willing participants in SWM planning and implementation, because they did not know which party had the latest and most accurate information.

2. **Existence of a coordinator of all the efforts:** The city needs personnel or an office that can lead the coordination process. At this point, nobody is taking on the coordination task. The coordinator needs to understand which group—non-governmental, business, academe, media, and NGAs—can take what roles, and which government functions are connected with each role.

3. **Sense of ownership of the issue:** The sense of ownership of the problems associated with solid waste in the city was absent in its leadership. They were aware of the problems, but were passive about taking an active role in the implementation of programs and projects. This seems to be related with the ingrained traditional attitude that they wait until outside parties come to solve problems due to the long-centralized government system, and the general lack of interest or stake in doing the unseen but necessary work (see the next section).

4. **Sense of ownership of the process:** The people participation process of the SWM was highly dependent on the work of LGSP and CUI. Although LGSP and CUI were sensitive to the ownership of the process, and always emphasized that the participatory process was run in the name of the city government, it was in fact run by them and a few city government officials who believed in the benefit of public participation. The city government as a whole and the leadership were largely unfamiliar with and indifferent to the significance of public participation.

"routine, apolitical process." Iloilo City's traditional SWM certainly supports this.
5. **Strong leadership to mobilize both governmental and non-governmental sectors:**
Given the volatile relationships between different groups in the government, which also split both officials and barangays, there needs to be (as some of the interview respondents suggested) a "champion" who would reconcile, if not unify, those relationships. Non-governmental sectors would follow once the government ceased the conflict, and would present their willingness to work together for a common goal. The Mayor, because of his position and mandate, would be the natural choice in the role of "champion."

Naturally, improved administrative, technical and managerial skills of city officials would only add to the credibility of the city, and it would encourage civil society organizations to help the government in any service management program or project. Many respondents of the interviews confided that the willingness of both non-governmental sectors and the residents in helping the government was very high, particularly regarding solid waste issues. This is a good chance for the government to fully exploit the advantage of having willing partners outside government and to learn how such an advantage could be made into an opportunity to earn credibility as an institution.

### 4.3 The underlying constraints: the political culture and politics

It is essential to consider the political culture, as it is the most important factor to understand the action of the individuals and groups associated with the government in the Iloilo City context. Political feuding among groups within the city government is by far the largest impediment to the development of government capacity, as expressed by the respondents of the interview conducted for this research. The word "politics" is used highly negatively by all the respondents, indicative of corruption, indifference of the leaders in providing public fair services, favoritism, and a preoccupation in undermining adversaries' reputations. One of the few informants who did not mention politics as the problem of governance expressed his
opinion as "politicians will always be politicians. One should not expect too much from them, and should seek other venues to get things done."

Yet, politics is hard to get around in Iloilo City. The feud between the Mayor's faction and the opposition faction has been acute, and detrimental to the city's healthy development.

Iloilo politics is said to have distinctly elitist traits and, the city council has (with the exception of the initial martial law era) always been a major forum for intra-elite conflict (Rüland, 1990: 465). The major conflict is that between the Mayor and Sanggunian Panlungsod (City Council) members, who are all elected politicians. The Mayor was elected for the first time in 1992, which marked "a manifest expression of the people's brewing resentment against traditional politics (Your Guide, 1998)." A resident also stated that "we elected him because the Mayor before him was sort of a dictator and he never listened to the people, minding only his own interests. We (voters) got tired of that kind of politics." The Mayor already carried other leaders of the traditional politics as his enemies from the beginning of his first term.

For any programs, projects, and policy decisions, except those under the direct control of the Mayor's Office, both Mayor and the City Council must give approval. The annual budget is also the case. Some particularly vocal members of the Council belong to the "anti-Mayor" faction, which makes any decision making in the city so deliberately slow that the project or policy becomes pointless to implement. "No matter what project it is, how good it is, the proposal will be turned down as long as it came from the Mayor," a resident explains. In the Fiscal year 1998-1999, the City Council passed only one ordinance. "Only one! I know the Council has other things to do, too. But I do not understand how it is possible to have only one ordinance passed in one year."
To make the matters worse, such leadership conflict divides barangay captains. If barangay captains do not like the Mayor, they will not collaborate in any programs or projects. This means that the conflict also splits the villages in the city. A DENR official exclaimed, "When we do barangay level projects like ecological management seminars, we have to do it through the city. ... We try hard to explain to the barangay captains that it is not for the Mayor, but it is for all of us." The problems such over politicization causes are abundant.

4.3.1 Political culture and responsive service provision

In general, the perception of the Iloilo City residents on the accountability of the city is negative because "political leaders are basically uninterested in providing what was promised in the official policy statement at the election because they can buy votes." Whether or not the political leaders can hold their seats is often determined more by other factors than their pursuit of equity, accountability, or honesty to the wider public. And the "other" factors seem to lie, as Timberman describes, on a sort of personalism and particularism in the political culture (Box 6).

Personalism and particularism condition the leaders' behavior in policy and project decision making. It is witnessed that projects done by leaders without proper planning do not serve a wider public. "Because the leaders listen to only a small group of individuals, whatever building done by them is often inappropriate. For example, this leader (name not specified) built a walk bridge on the main street, but few use it because it is not located where many people walk." There are fewer incentives for political leaders to provide services and projects to a broader range of constituencies because, ultimately, what earns them votes are the ties through personalism, which better serve to preserve their personal economic and political power. As a result, compared to more flamboyant means of vote-earning, providing more mundane, administrative services such as regular garbage collection pales as a priority.
Box 6. Personalism and particularism in Iloilo City

David Timberman's analysis (1991) of the Philippine political culture still prevails in regional urban cities, and certainly in Iloilo City. Projects and programs are implemented on the basis of a political leader's motive driven by these cultural traits:

**Personalism:** According to Timberman, most Filipinos believe that the decisions and events that shape their lives are determined more by particular individuals than by impersonal systems and institutions. As though perpetuating the belief, many public services and projects to the constituency are provided in the name of particular leaders, rather than the government. In Iloilo, too, Congressman A's projects, or Mayor B's projects are prominently advertised with their names loudly featured on the signs.

Such projects funded by an individual leader make people indebted to the particular congressman or other leaders, not the government as an institution. This personal indebtedness between leaders and recipients of the services is closely related with a kind of patron-client politics or clientelism (Scott, 1977) through which votes can be manipulated and secured. Thus, political leaders are most interested in maintaining ties with the few individuals who can bring them votes through their subordinates in the patron-client structure.

The maintenance of clientelism is also an important factor that explains the weak enforcement of laws and regulations. It is part of the obligation for the patrons (who are often government officials and leaders) and is a way of continuously rewarding subordinate individuals and groups by exempting them from legal obligations regarding violations of laws and ordinances.

**Particularism:** Particularism refers to the behavior of political leaders when they base their decision making on their interest in preserving and increasing the benefit of a few.

Timberman states that the power of particularism in the Philippines has made most politicians more concerned with securing funds for highly specific 'pork barrel' projects and opportunities for patronage than with creating national or even regional socio-economic development programs.

Iloilo's politics is observed as "distinctly plutocratic, being controlled by a minuscule elite that often holds ultraconservative political beliefs and at the center of which stands the prime interest of protecting and promoting personal (or family-based) political and economic fiefdoms (Riland, 1990: 463)

Particularism also reinforces the expectation of special or preferential treatment for a family member or friend. As a result, different rules apply for different people, undermining the concept of equality under the law.

The intensity of the feud between leaders also explains why the leaders are so preoccupied with undermining each other's respective political influence, and not with providing...
efficient and fair services. The party politics of Iloilo City have been observed as unstable, largely attributed to "the legacy of de-institutionalization strategies of the Marcos regime. Philippine political parties have lost in importance as actors in urban politics, and the local party structure today is even more fragmented, factionalized, and fluid than on the national level (Rüland, 1990: 467)." Such fragmentation in the party structure serves only to add further feuding.

In a highly mobilized but resource-strapped political area like Iloilo..., only a minority of the population is reached by pork barrel benefits. It is easy for the opposition to utilize these particularistic resource allocation patterns for discrediting the incumbents as corrupt and self-seeking. Hence, the impression to the outside observer is that political conflicts do not so much revolve around urgent developmental problems as around questions of constituency building, clashing personal interests, patronage, and corruption (470).

The economic stagnation of Iloilo has followed a policy atmosphere along a "winner takes all" line, adding to the over politicization of leaders. "Power struggles then become a zero-sum game that increases pressure on politicians to resort to unconstitutional means in the political contest (ibid.)." This explains the behavior of some council members who would prevent any successful projects by the Mayor, and the Mayor's overly defensive attitude by not appearing in meetings.

4.3.2 Impact of the political culture on public participation

What is the nature of the existing GO-civil society ties in Iloilo City? Rüland states that voluntary associations, which are largely middle- and upper-class groups, have served a role in building leadership reputation, a public image, and clientele (468). If there is not such a direct service to the leader's interests, "their participatory contribution is limited by the widespread practice of only inviting representatives of association deemed sympathetic to the political cause of the incumbent city administration (ibid.)."
The membership of the TWG from non-governmental organizations, though the individuals are committed to provide socially and economically diverse groups with the same SWM services, is certainly not an exception. The non-governmental members of the TWG were selected and invited by the Mayor, and they are all educated, middle-class residents of the city. Unless the leaders see the immediate and tangible benefits in including other sections of the constituency—such as lower-economic class citizens and the socially and politically weak—the direct participation of a wider public is likely to be limited to selected groups and individuals from the middle-class and educated Iloilo population for now. This approach of the leaders—failing to accept the inclusion of a wider public and considering some groups of citizens as vehicles for enhancing their own interests—endangers the sustainability of support from willing individuals and hinders the expansion of public participation. Even with the TWG members, an LGSP official warned, "if they see the membership is only for lip service, ... the effort will die down."

Barangays, which were revived by Marcos during his dictatorship, are one possibility in operationalizing public participation in public services. Although it is a political unit, it can also be viewed as a community organization since it organizes each neighborhood as a group, and the barangay captain owes the residents the responsibility of bringing their needs to the city government. This was meant to be a function of barangays when they were revived.

At this point, however, barangays are not capable of being the vehicle of public participation. At the information dissemination level, barangays function considerably well as the broadcaster of policy and program information from the city government to barangay residents. In a sense, barangay leaders also carry the demands of their barangay residents to the city government. Yet, the barangay system functions more as "the lowest level of a vertically
structured pyramid of power brokers whose main task is to mobilize electoral support for the contending political factions (Rüland, 1990: 468)." The barangay system will not bring about a genuine citizen participation process since the interest vested in the vertical relationship is more of taking a bigger benefit from personal ties with the leaders, than how the government can institutionally gain credibility by equitably distributing the services needed.

The media in general has tended to cover "sensational, partisan, personality-oriented issues" of politics which "contributes to the preservation of idiosyncratic divisions among politicians—and thus to a rather parochial political culture—instead of in shaping an issue- and development-oriented political process (ibid.)." TV programs tend to cover scenes, for example, such as a Council meeting in which the members were yelling at each other, and a member was throwing something at her adversary. This seems partly due to the fact that media access is traded as a commodity. In effect, "they are hardly in a position to perform an effective watchdog function in society (ibid.)." This tendency was recognized and pointed out by some residents of Iloilo City.

Although there are several individuals in the media who are committed to advocating people's participation in service planning and implementation in Iloilo City, they will do so by cautiously maintaining a friendly relationship with political leaders. Thus, media influence is only within an acceptable range of discourse for political leaders, who would be unlikely to accept a challenge to the legitimacy of the system from which they thrive.

The political culture of Iloilo City has hindered fair and effective public service provision from occurring, and a wider GO-civil society organization partnership from developing. The absence of political will in implementing responsive service provisions, in

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22 This particular incident was broadcast in June, 1999, during the field research.
solving the problems, and in putting aside personal interests for the benefits of the public will predetermine any attempt to enhance governance to failure. No matter how much the technical, administrative, and managerial skills of the government are strengthened (if the willingness to strengthen them is there), whether they are used to enhance responsive governance is entirely up to the political leaders' will. Therefore, there needs to be capacity building efforts from within the LGU (internal capacity building) that specifically address factors conditioned by the local political environment and politics. Such capacity building efforts should encourage the leaders to take initiatives in responsive service management, enhance the understanding of the leaders in the benefits of doing so, increase individual officials' technical and administrative skills, and improve intra-organizational relations communication and coordination through better personal relationships.

4.4 Financial capacity: is it a major problem for Iloilo City?

The current collection system is very inefficient in its financial resources. For example, the city pays a large sum of fees to its contractor, while it could fix the five trucks that are not working if it allocated more of the budgetary resources for maintenance. Nor does the city utilize past studies and research materials well. The pilot studies and community projects which had been done in the past on an ad hoc basis are no longer available to view.

Although financial limitations were sometimes mentioned by city government officials, the government has not sufficiently exploited alternative financial resources, either through revenue generation or cost rationalization. A LGSP official said, "the city has several million pesos budget for the collection. But the way it has been spent is inefficient." An NGO person attests, "the city has enough money if it is not diverted to their (politicians') private pockets."
It is also the government's willingness to strategically borrow money from private financial institutions that is lacking. As for the programs and projects that are planned for the SWM, the funding is supposed to be drawn from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for development programs and projects. This will yet not cover the costs of all the programs and projects. There has been no talk, however, of the possibility in inducing local investment or lending. It was assumed that the supplementary funding would come from the International Center for Sustainable Cities (ICSC), a Canadian NGO newly in charge of implementation support, even though it is not a funding agency. No option had been discussed, during the SWM planning process, on how the government can raise funding from local private financial institutions. This reveals an atmosphere that considers it easier to get funding from outside, particularly from international agencies, than mobilizing its own government to do the fund raising. As a respondent exclaimed,

"Iloilo City has more banks (per capita) than anywhere else (in the country). ... The saving rate of our city is higher than anywhere else. In fact very few are borrowing money here, which is a problem for the banks because they lose money paying interest to customers. It is the only city where the banks go around to ask people to borrow. Why do they (the government) look for aid from foreign countries? They don't have to borrow from outside."

Putting the 'pork barrel' issue aside, it is the political culture that discourages leaders from making efforts to solve the financial problem by asking private institutions for their assistance.

Some cities in the Philippines have overcome the financial problem by being innovative on saving government expenditures, launching programs for cooperative business development, mobilizing the savings of the citizens, and educating the constituency on the values "of credit worthiness, thrift and community involvement" (Guiza and Fernandez, 1997: 87).

These examples prove that financial shortage can be alleviated if there is strong leadership and a willingness to seek alternative solutions. Said one respondent, "we cannot just
keep complaining that we don't have any money or we don't get enough funding from the
national government. We make money. The government can move some of the budget to SWM.
They have to re-orient their mindset and start considering that SWM is an important issue for
the city."
Chapter 5

Local Governments Capacity Building and the Local Government Code of 1991

Chapter 4 illustrated what has affected Iloilo City's capacity in achieving responsive urban service provisions and effective GO-civil society partnership from the perspectives of internal factors—existing technical, managerial, and administrative skills as well as willingness and quality of a leadership conditioned by the local political culture and politics. Enhancement of a local government's capacity from such internal factors is one part of the two-tier institutional strengthening.

This chapter discusses the other component of institutional strengthening—the decentralization policy of the central government. First, it describes the significance of decentralization in the Philippine context. Secondly, it briefly explains how the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) contributed to the increase in the institutional power of Local Government Units (LGUs) such as Iloilo City in order to pursue their public services. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the relationship of the Code with the principle of public participation—how it enhances or fails to enhance. At the same time, this chapter explains the dependency of the Code on the relative internal capacity of the individual LGU, which determines whether the particular LGU understands and is able to maximize the benefits of power and functions the Code provides.

5.1 Need of decentralization in the Philippine context

Although it is strategically rational, to a certain extent, that the Philippines has had a strong center to maintain the unity of hundreds of different ethnicities as a nation, the highly
centralized political system of the Philippines has its root in its colonial past. Tapales (1992: 101) states,

To better colonize the islands, they (Spanish) established *encomiendas* (gift of land to favored persons), which gave way to the *provincias* (provinces), *pueblos* (municipalities) and *cabildos* (cities). The *barangay* (the indigenous socio-economic unit) was reduced into the status of village (*barrio*) with the *datus* who were at the helm of collecting tribute for the Spanish government (Laurel 1926; Marcos 1976; Corpuz 1989).

Thus was effected a highly centralized system of local government following what Alderfer (1964) called the French model, or what the International Union of Local Authorities (1971) classifies as southern European. The countries falling under such classification have local government systems characterized by hierarchy and centralism.

After independence, the country stayed the course of a development strategy within a centralized structure. As Cheema and Rondinelli (1983:2) describe,

Soon after independence, many governments in developing countries opted for a highly centralized system of economic planning because the capital-intensive industrialization by national governments in investment and production processes and because the international assistance agencies that were providing the capital for industrialization insisted on the preparation of comprehensive plans for national development.

Moreover, during the dictatorship by Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s and 80s, the centralized power structure was "all the more reinforced (Tapales, 1992: 102)."

The highly centralized political structure has, however, failed to alleviate center-region inequity in economic growth rates, failed to provide effective and efficient public services in regional areas, and failed to create sustainable livelihoods for the people.

The need for more decentralized political functions had been realized from time to time. But "genuine autonomy was never implemented because national officials who stood to lose in the process resisted it (Brillantes, 1992)." For example, the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, the Decentralization Act of 1967, and the 1973 Constitution had provided various forms of autonomy and political power to local governments. Even Martial Law expanded citizen
participation in the villages, and restored the barangay system. All the movements in the past, however, had only limited effects on decentralization of real political power and authority. Local governments have continued to be "dependent upon 'imperial Manila' (ibid.)."

The speed of decentralization was accelerated by former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos. In fact, the Code is considered "the most radical—and substantial—piece of legislation passed during the six years of the Aquino administration (ibid.)." As well, in the State of the Nation Address of 1992, President Ramos stated,

We must devolve and decentralize more of national administration so that the government truly reaches out to our citizenry, wherever they may live in our vast archipelago.... Our goal is to promote speed in decision-making and action that yields quality results; and to increase effectiveness and impact in government operations despite funding constraints... (from Osteria 1996)

5.2 Local Government Code of 1991

The Section 17 (a) of the Code describes that, by this,

Local Government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the power and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated therein.

The Code was enacted the same year as the Ramos speech, and devolved many of the central government's functions to local government. The "new and far reaching law ... has the potential of changing the very nature of administrative environment at the local levels (Brillantes, 1993)." As Box 7 Illustrates, the degree of decentralization by the Code is highly significant, considering the Philippine past, since it is far more thorough than any policy made in the Philippines in the past.
Box 7. Types of decentralization

Decentralization is defined by the UNDP as "the restructuring of authority so that it is shared between governing institutions at the central, regional and local levels (UNDP, Oct. 1998)." Tabunda and Galang (1997: 2) also define decentralization similarly as "the transfer of power and authority from the central institution to the lower or local levels of a government system." Decentralization is not always the transfer of power from the central to the local level government. It may also be transfer of power within the same central government agency, one office being regional. Decentralization can also mean the transfer of power to non-governmental institutions. Sometimes, the government may delegate a non-governmental organization certain responsibility that involves services to the public.

Probably, a definition which captures the widest area of meanings is that of Cheema and Rondinelli, stating, "the transfer or delegation of planning, decision-making or management authority from the central government and its agencies to field organizations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional authorities, functional authorities, or non-governmental organizations (1983)."

The levels of power transfer also vary. Along with the area differences, decentralization can be categorized as the following:

Devolution:
Devolution is considered the most advanced form of decentralization as the local government unit forms a "mini-central" government, though regarding a specific set of functions.

Deconcentration:
Deconcentration is a transfer of power, authority, responsibility or the discretion to plan, decide, and manage from a central government to lower or local levels of government, but within the central government itself. Transfer of some work from the central office to some field offices is the most common form. This may be called administrative decentralization, and the nature of this transfer is sectoral. Thus, control remains within the central government.

Delegation:
It is a transfer of functions to parastatal organizations, special project implementation units or regional or functional development authorities, which can often operate outside of some central government regulations or may act as an agent for the state in performing prescribed functions. Ultimate responsibility for those functions remains with the central government.
Debureaucratization:

It is synonymous of Privatization or Divestment (UNDP, Oct. 1998)—the transfer of public functions and responsibilities, to voluntary, private, or non-governmental organizations (Tabunda and Galang, 1997: 4).

While "delegation and deconcentration are the dominant forms of decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli, p. 12)" in developing countries, the decentralization policy enacted in the Philippines in the early 1990s was significantly progressive, devolving many functions to local government units.

The Code devolved the policy and program decision making power in certain areas to LGUs, which are best able to articulate and deal with those problems. The Code also devolved the power to LGUs to determine their own organizational structure, to provide basic public services, taxing power; and it provided some financial support from the national tax (Internal Revenue Allotment/IRA). As for solid waste management, the Code prescribes that local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate and incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic service and facilities enumerated herein...services related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection disposal system and facilities.

5.3 People participation and the Code

The Code integrated participatory decision making processes in certain functions, and promoted civil society participation in public service planning and implementation. Popular participation in the decentralization process, however, has been questioned on the grounds that the participatory policy and project decision-making promised by the Code has not moved beyond a tokenistic practice and it has thus impeded speedier improvements towards effective urban management at the local government level (Santos, 1997).

For example, the Code recommends extensive participation by non-governmental organizations and private sector in basic service provisions, and encourages businesses to enter
into Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes\textsuperscript{23} with the government. But it does not give structural guidance or definition of the roles of each sector. The only mandates for public participation are that of local special bodies, such as the Local Development Council (LDC), Local School Board (LSB), and Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (LPBAC). Although encouraged, planning and implementation of public service provisions do not require the involvement of the public.

These activities of local special bodies are limited in their scope. For example, Iloilo City's Local Development Council meets only twice a year as mandated. The membership of the LDC requires attendance of all barangay captains, and no less than one fourth of the non-governmental sector in the membership. Since the attendance of 180 barangay captains and NGO members makes more frequent meetings impractical, the LDC's function is restricted to regular development policy review.

Moreover, an unclear definition of groups in the non-governmental sector, participation of only certain groups selected by the government, the tedious process of the recall system, unproductiveness and unwieldiness by too large a membership of special boards and councils, were all reported as hurdles for genuine civil participation (Romero, 1997).

The significance of the decentralization policy in the enhancement of public participation rather lies in local government support programs aimed at the capacity building of local governments in pursuing the principles of the Code. The Local Government Support Program (LGSP) of Region VI, for instance, has been the main engine that introduced participatory

\textsuperscript{23} A contractual arrangement entered into by a private sector proponent with the government for the funding, construction, operation and maintenance of an infrastructure facility for a fixed period, after which the infrastructure facility is transferred to the government. This arrangement is particularly useful to overcome the government's fiscal constraints in implementing infrastructure projects needed immediately (Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President 1999).
planning and implementation to local government. Yet, the outcome of the multi-stakeholder solid waste management planning process exercised by the Iloilo City government and civil society organization representatives indicates that the low commitment of political leaders to the process may be partly due to the absence of legal pressure. The criticism of the Code vis-a-vis public participation is based on the passive nature of the Code in promoting it.

5.4 The decentralization policy as one component of capacity building

In the case of solid waste management (SWM) in Iloilo City, the Code gave authority to the city to plan and implement programs and projects related to SWM, and autonomy to raise funds to implement the programs and projects. As well, the Code introduced participatory principles of planning and implementation, which the Iloilo City government adopted through the multi-stakeholder SWM planning process.

The devolution of power and autonomy to the LGUs is only an institutional strengthening. In order to be able to exercise the power and autonomy effectively, a LGU must be willing to ask for support, and must be willing to change the way it has been managing, if necessary. Unless the willingness is there, the decentralization policy alone will not achieve the objective of improving the effectiveness of LGU operations. The actions have to come from LGUs as well.

Likewise, the degree of acceptance of the concept of public participation depends on the biases and orientation of leaders. It has been observed that "to this date, ... popular participation in local governance is not seen by many in local government as essential in making these government processes sustainable and effective (Tordecilla and Tumbaga, 1997: 56)." Even though the national government is enthusiastic about public participation, it is totally up to the respective local governments to determine the level and intensity of participation by civil society.
organizations. In sum, the institutional strengthening from an external force such as the Code is null without internal capacity strengthening which re-orient local factors that hinder the government from maximizing the benefits of such an increase in power and autonomy.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Through the observation of Iloilo City's solid waste management (SWM) planning process, and interaction with the involved individuals, many constraining factors for the effective implementation of the SWM, as well as factors for the promotion of a good GO-civil society partnership, were revealed. As well, the limitations of external capacity strengthening—increased decision making power, autonomy and facilitation of public participation by the national decentralization policy—were identified. Due to the nature of many of these constraints and limitations, direct and easy solutions do not readily avail themselves. Yet, it is vital to realize the opportunities in the alleviation of such constraints, by prioritizing and strategizing what can be done both in the short- and long-term.

6.1 Workable and immediately needed actions for improvement of Iloilo City's SWM system:

1. **Toe the mark:** The most urgent need is to clearly map out the responsibility of each party—Mayor, Task Force, TWG and Sub-Committees, and DENR. In the city's SWM planning process, the declared responsibilities of each group at the beginning became blurred. This was clear at the meeting of all parties for the presentation of the SWM Action Plan. Since the Department of Agricultural Reform (DAR), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and the Department of Health will be involved more at the implementation stage, especially regarding SWEEP, the information network within the city and DENR has to be easy for them to understand and use. Making sure everyone is "on the same page," in terms of who is connected within the network, and who should be asking
what questions, who should be monitoring the schedule, is absolutely essential as an initial step.

2. **Extended training for city officials in technical skills and knowledge regarding SWM:**

   The LGSP was successful in providing the planning officials with training regarding environmental management. Now these officials are the engine for proper planning for SWM in the city. The LGSP can also provide engineers, health officials, and social welfare officials of the city with training programs that highlight the connections between their specialty and environmental management.

3. **Start with education programs:** Unlike other programs and projects in the SWM Action Plan, education programs on proper disposal practices are clear in their content. There are 3 public and 17 private universities, 23 middle schools (both public and private), and 70 elementary schools in Iloilo City.

   If the TWG and the sub-committee members are willing to start the action before the Action Plan goes through the Council and the budget gains approval anyway, the area of education is most feasible. Once school based educational programs are implemented, students and teachers can be mobilized to conduct community based educational programs. Churches would also be good institutions to start with.

   SWM education could provide an opportunity for political leaders to challenge barangay-based voting patterns based on traditional clientelism, by attracting the newly emerging middle-class population that pays more attention to the performance of the leaders and are less bound by personal ties.

4. **Involve university students in the necessary research studies:** As Octavio et al. suggest, it is still necessary to collect more and more accurate data on the residents' solid waste
disposal practices in different parts of the city. School projects like the garbage study can be funded by the LGSP or non-governmental organizations such KSP, CUI and ICSC. What needs to be ensured is the dissemination of the study results. Study results need to be informed to all parties in the city government and DENR, and, especially, the residents.

5. **Resolve CEMO conflict:** Unless the office can function as a coordinator of all the efforts, it is extremely hard to start implementing projects and programs recommended by the Action Plan. If necessary, the City should consult the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) with regard to the appropriateness of each proposal, and ask DILG to mediate the conflict. Third party intervention is more effective than leaving issues to the Mayor and the Council to solve the problem because a third party is independent of intra-organizational relationships and tensions, and thus can remain more neutral.

6.2 **Areas of the future capacity building**

The following must be considered as crucial areas of capacity building in the long term:

1) cost-benefit analysis skills of the leaders
2) intra-organizational communication
3) increase in skilled engineering, planning and environment officials
4) knowledge of legislative matters, and ability to revise ordinances according to future needs
5) coordination of GO-civil society collaborative program implementation processes

1) **Cost-benefit analysis skills of leaders and staff**

It is no easy task to shift Iloilo City's political culture in favor of responsive governance in which equal distribution of services, fair enforcement of law, and transparency of the government system are pursued instead of the personal gain of political leaders.

However, it is possible to map out to the leaders the costs and benefits involved in the public participation, including costs and benefits entailing their personal interests following
the subsequent effectiveness of public service management. In Iloilo's case, the situation is that the leaders are unaware of the benefits (such as credibility, popularity, and growth of consumer power which may ultimately benefit the leaders' own businesses) public participation and the subsequent effective service provisions may provide them in the long-term.

There are some success stories of cities such as in the Philippines in which a strong leader took the initiatives in participatory and innovative management, and brought the city to a more prosperous status (Institute of Governance, 1997). The leaders of such cities certainly gained the reputation of their excellent leadership in the country, raised the class status of the cities as well as the income of the cities. Learning from other cities' practices will make leaders understand both the process and the outcome of leadership in participatory and innovative management.

Additionally, the leaders must be informed that effective and efficient urban services, as well as support of the public in program and project implementation, will not hurt their reputation as leaders, but should rather serve to enhance it. It may be a chance to ease the over politicization of the environment, in which the leaders themselves may have unwillingly been trapped.

A cost-benefit analysis study that includes multi-area perspectives of the possible costs and benefits in promoting public participation and responsive governance will provide the leaders with a clearer picture of the costs and gains involved. Examples of these areas are the possibility of attracting more international financial assistance, national assistance, employment increase, increase in investment, and a strengthening of the consumer base which can benefit businesses the leaders may own privately. Planners as well as the
immediate staff of the political leaders should be trained to be able to map out costs and
benefits of a given proposal using established criteria that even include intangible personal
loss and gain of the leaders.

A clear mapping of costs and benefits will then foster both a sense of ownership of the
problem in public service provision, and a sense of ownership of the process in public
participation, as well as increasing the motivation of leaders to launch actions necessary to
make particular services and management more effective and efficient.

Many respondents think that all they need is a strong attitude of the Mayor to convince
the opposition leaders to cooperate for one time. "If only the Mayor would 'wine and dine'
with other leaders in an informal setting, they could reach the point of friendship and
collaboration." To a great degree, it is up to the Mayor's political maneuvering skill, and
more importantly, the willingness to use it. Whether the Mayor (or other leaders) will start
the collaboration process depends on whether the Mayor can see a clear benefit in taking the
action.

2) Intra-organizational communication

Communication within the city government is crippled by a lack of awareness for the
need of strong lines of information flow and by the political split of the individuals based
upon the feud between leaders.

A lack of communication between departments leads to confusion not only for city
government officials but also for national government agencies, international cooperation
agencies, and private consultants from outside the city. The need for an effective SWM
system in Iloilo City is known to many international donor countries. Many consulting
companies, including international and Filipino consultants, are constantly visiting the
government regarding the construction of a sanitary landfill, flood control, air pollution control, and night soil treatment facilities\textsuperscript{24}. They often get confused by who the contact person is, whose decision to follow, and which department is in charge of the particular responsibility. Some proposals by international agencies or consultants stop at one department without being informed to others. It was particularly problematic in the SWM planning because the TWG was supposed to be the only body to approve of every proposal related with SWM, but existence of any proposal was often informed later, or not informed at all.

A clear communication network throughout the government (legislative, executive and bureaucracy) is necessary so that any incoming agencies will know where to go to first, how to collect all the information needed and whose decision making is final.

3) Increase in skilled engineering, planning and environment officials

The national government through the LGSP (Region VI) has provided Iloilo City support by facilitating public participation in planning, providing knowledge about good SWM practices, developing communication skills, and explaining the relationships between SWM and other environmental issues. It also gave some able officials an opportunity to attain skills and knowledge in environmental management, which now became a leverage for a more responsive SWM.

Efforts such as the LGSP's have to continue to expand the pool of skilled officials in the government. The areas of knowledge for SWM are engineering, administration, health, communication and community development as well as environmental management. A city

\textsuperscript{24} In the researchers' knowledge, an Hong Kong consultant, a few Japanese consultants, an Australian consultant, a few Canadian consultants and a few Filipino consultants have contacted the city government within the past 2 years.
official observes that the city engineers are able, but their technical knowledge needs to be up-dated. The enhancement of skills and up-dated knowledge will enable the engineering officials not only to design locally appropriate roads, landfills, garbage bins etc., but also to evaluate relevant proposals coming from outside city. Administrative skill training will increase the consistency of the data the different departments have, and make the administrative work smoother. This is particularly important when financial transactions are involved in the future implementation of programs and projects. The importance of communication and information flow was pointed out in the last section. Knowledge in community development is essential, especially in SWM, because many efforts in segregation, disposal, and education of SWM are highly dependent on the mobilization of residents at the household and neighborhood levels. An increase of officials with environmental management training will help enhance the function of the future environmental management office, which will require more individuals who understand the complexity of the responsibilities and operational functions.

4) Knowledge in legislative matters, and ability to revise ordinances according to future needs

The TWG has already made a sub-committee consisting of some local lawyers and educators that would deal with the revision and strengthening of the ordinances related with SWM. To speed up the process, the 4E analysis by Octavio et al. should be reviewed. It is also beneficial to learn how other cities established their ordinances by contacting them and exchanging ideas. Bulacan and Manila, where the TWG has already visited to observe the disposal practices, may be good candidates. The communication could be done through the LGSP or between mayors.
The government also needs a team of staff that can revise ordinances according to future needs.

5) The coordination of GO-civil society collaborative implementation processes

Besides the communication network within the government, the establishment of a coordinating function which can orchestrate the responsibilities and work of city government offices, NGAs, non-governmental organizations, business, and media is necessary. This body can be in the future environmental management office or in the planning office. The coordinator needs to be given substantial authority, which will not be compromised by political feuds within the government, and needs to have strong political maneuvering skills.

6.3 Space for improvement of SWM at the national level

Iloilo City's SWM planning experience indicates that there are some factors which should be considered for improvement at the national level. First, creation of an office in the city and municipal level government that comprehensively deals with the SWM and EM should be mandated by the Code. It was already pointed out by Tabunda et al. (1991) that the fact that the positions of Environmental and Natural Resources Officials and Office (ENRO: equivalent of CEMO/CENRO in Iloilo City) at the provincial, city and municipal levels are only optional of the Code is problematic. A city official also attested, "Iloilo City's population is steadily increasing with emerging industry, which will cause more pollution of all kinds. A highly urbanized city like Iloilo must have the function (of environmental and SWM in the organizational structure) immediately." In Iloilo's case, it would have saved the time of organizational restructuring, avoiding the decision making that strained relations between officials.
Secondly, legislation regarding solid waste should be orchestrated and clarified at the national level. The current legislative framework is presented in Appendix D.

One of the main directives of SWM, other than Local Government Code of 1991, is the Philippine Environmental Code (PD 1152) of 1978, which states that "preparation and implementation of waste management programs shall be required of all provinces, cities, and municipalities." National legislation also provides the framework by involving national and local agencies, and specifies who is responsible for the enforcement and implementation of every task. For example, the enforcement of regulation and control of pollution by dumping on the sea (PD 979) is within the responsibility of DENR regional offices, while the Anti-littering Law (PD 825), in which all residents must undertake the maintenance of their surroundings, is enforced by DPWH. Toxic substances are supposed to be regulated by DENR-EMB.

The divisions of responsibilities regarding the areas and the natures of wastes by different agencies are not consistent. As described in the ERM & TCI study,

The national legislative framework specifically governing SWM in the Philippines is based on separate provisions contained in a series of individual pieces of legislation. … None of the existing laws provides an in-depth and comprehensive coverage of SWM. In addition, some of the functions of individual agencies may be duplicated or may sometimes overlap, which can lead to possible conflicts with regard to enforcement roles (Section 2-2).

Thus, the existing legislation needs to be re-organized to remedy inconsistencies, and present a clear guideline for governments that deal with SWM.

Thirdly, legislation should require a clear definition of each participating agency's responsibility and inter-agency relationship in the tasks will facilitate effective SWM by the cities and municipalities. It should also define the relationship between SWM and EM, by which LGUs can understand how to better collaborate with parties that are responsible for EM.
DILG should do the detailed and clear defining of the responsibilities by each agency, and map out in a way which is clear and easily understandable to any level of government.

Finally, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) should be mandated at the local government program and project level. The Code does not include the use of EIA, and it is mandated only at the national level of projects and programs. The standard procedure of EIA conducted at the national level will necessarily promote the participation of a wider stakeholder group, facilitating opportunities for the people to participate in scoping, planning, implementation and monitoring processes. This is another venue and a more practical tool to integrate public participation in the development planning and implementation than the Code.

6.4 Future study areas

This study intended to illustrate how good local governance may be enhanced through the decentralization process in the Philippines. The scope of this study was limited to the case of one city government, in one particular service that was not devolved but enhanced by the decentralization policy. Because of the limitation of the scope of the study, many aspects of local governance in the Philippines were left untouched. Moreover, although from a limited experience, Iloilo's case suggests that a local governance study would be better to focus on the local issues rather than what the national policy gave or did not give LGUs. For these reasons, the exploration of the following issues may be beneficial for the further enhancement of the local governments' capacity for good governance:

1. Possibilities of barangays' alternative role as apolitical community organizations
2. More case studies about how LGUs are handling traditional and devolved functions after the Code
3. Promotion of Build-Operate-Transfer schemes, cooperatives and private business intervention in local governance (including finance)
4. Relations between social capital study and local governments' capacity building
5. NGO capacity building on local governance
6.5 Conclusion

Responsive governance is still in the trial stage in the Philippines. So is the revival of the "Queen City of the South." Through the decentralization policy actualized by the Code of 1991, more responsive public service provisions became a reality for local governments in the Philippines. Officials from different levels of government interviewed agree that the decentralization has given city governments a great deal of autonomy, power and freedom. Yet, the Code only facilitates the improvement, and it is respective LGUs that must actually make use of them. What the Code has given LGUs is the power to determine their own destiny, to rise or fall.

In order to pursue good governance, many layers of constraints must be overcome. Such constraints are not only inexperience and a lack of knowledge or skills, but also politics and a political culture that often weigh against the pursuit of good governance. In fact, the latter constraints are much more difficult to alleviate because they are perpetuated by a small number of individuals in power for the purpose of preserving their power.

Yet political culture is as fluid as any culture, and is destined to change. Rüland suspects that, "only when the elite is challenged economically by new functional groups within a middle class background will the social base of political leadership gradually broaden (479)." It may be now that the new middle class population may gain power by innovating economic opportunities that the elite has ignored. Such opportunities may even be derived from SWM programs and projects, in the area of recovery of materials, private industrial waste treatment, or the financing of SWM projects.

In the meantime, the support ought to be in the area that assists LGUs with factors such as cohesiveness of the organization, sense of ownership of the problems, willingness to be
independent, willingness to manage better, and leadership skills in political maneuvering. An easy and clear communication system through intra- and inter-governmental structures will also strengthen the relationships between stakeholders, and reduce the confusion in planning and implementation processes. The capacity enhancement of these factors will help the government better prepare for initiatives in starting good partnerships with civil society organizations once the leaders see the benefits in more inclusive governance.

Such support of capacity building needs to be custom-made, considering the local factors which are also likely to be rooted in the local political culture and politics. For example, in Iloilo's case, the intra-organizational communication flow needs to be emphasized in the capacity building of the city because of a political feud within the government. As well, the acceptance of wider public participation may be a long, gradual process because of the government's inherently elitist nature. Even though some benefits of the participatory process may be recognized, only the participation of a small group of non-governmental persons that already have relationships with the leaders may be realistic at an initial stage.

The quality of leadership and an understanding of competent management are also major factors that are important in the process of the local governments' capacity building. The speed of capacity building may vary depending on how "insightful" the leaders are and how willing they are to ask for support. Thus, the capacity building effort must first look more into the local factors, and strategically prioritize issues in the capacity building process.

By pursuing more responsive governance, "the Queen City of the South" should be able to live up to its name once again, and stand with other top cities in the Philippines.
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Appendix A

List of key informants
(in alphabetical order by last name. Prefixes omitted.)

Ruben Calbo, Environmental Management and Protected Areas Sector, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (EMPAS-DENR)

Marylou Espinosa, EMPAS-DENR

Neonita Gobuyan, Philippine News Agency

Rosalily Mamaril-Belandres, Environment Advisor, Philippine-Canada Local Government Support Program, Regional Program Management Office VI, Western Visayas

Darrel Palabrica, EMPAS-DENR

Jose Roni Peñalosa, Project Development Officer & Pollution Control Officer, City Planning and Development Office

Rowena Regalado, Iloilo Business Club

Jessica Salas, President, Kahublagan Sang Panimalay Foundation Inc.

Helen Sotomil, Professor, Engineering Research Center, College of Engineering, Western Institute of Technology

Fred Tayo, Iloilo Mountaineering Club

Benjamin Yap, Board of Director, Pollution Control Association of the Philippines, and President of PCAP Region VI
Appendix B

Interview Questions and Summary of Responses
(© all respondents/ ○○ many respondents/ ○ a few respondents/ - no respondents)

On Iloilo City government's capability (See Chapter 4 for the detail responses of this section)

1) Do you think the Iloilo City government is an appropriate institution to initiate SWM? Why? Why not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>©</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Do you think the Iloilo City government and other national government agencies (NGAs) are cooperating closely to establish and maintain an effective SWM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>©</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
<td>○○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Please name 2 to 3 most importance capacities you think the City government needs to further develop in order to manage the environmental programs, including SWM.

See Chapter 4

On participatory planning

4) To what degree do you think the current SWM planning of the City is reflecting the public opinions?

| Very much | © |
| To some extent | ○○ |
| Not very much |   |
| Not at all |   |

5) What have been the difficulties during the Technical Working Group activities?

| Absence of some members | © |
| Late attendance | © |
| No difficulties | © |
6) What kinds of roles do you see non-governmental groups including non-profit, media, and academe taking in the future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Facilitation of processes, fundraising, liaising with governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Advocacy, information dissemination and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academe</td>
<td>Education and information dissemination, pilot research, base research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Investment, collection services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7) How do you perceive the willingness of the public to participate in SWM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness</th>
<th>00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat high</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not high</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On Local Government Code

8) Has the Local Government Code of 1991 had a positive impact on the City? (Government officials only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but problems in some aspects</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance No. and Date Approved</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 16: March, 1951</td>
<td>Prohibiting the burning of garbage within 50 m radius of a building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 55: December, 1951</td>
<td>Charging of fees for garbage collection and disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13: June, 1962</td>
<td>Requiring owners or possessors of lands or buildings to maintain premises in sanitary conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 26: November, 1963</td>
<td>Revising the anti-littering ordinance of the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2: January, 1972</td>
<td>Amending Section 5 of Ordinance No. 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12: January, 1972</td>
<td>Amending Section 3 of Ordinance No. 55, regulating the collection and disposal of garbage in the city of Iloilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 86: December, 1973</td>
<td>Charging fees for the collection and disposal of garbage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 106: January, 1974</td>
<td>Prohibiting the placing and/or allowing of animals to graze in any public school premises or playground in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 176: June, 1974</td>
<td>Imposing permit fees sanitary service fees, and garbage fees on establishments or persons engaging in business in Iloilo City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 249: August, 1982</td>
<td>Prohibiting the construction of Tenement Houses, barong-barong, makeshift houses or the like along esteros, river banks, creeks, canals within the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 129: June, 1986</td>
<td>Requiring the placing of any dead animals, dung, or any filthy, putrid, or offensive substance in unleaking plastic bag before throwing it in the garbage container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 74: September, 1989</td>
<td>Requiring all city residents to deposit or place their garbage inside plastic containers or any receptacle or wrapping materials for purposes of storing, concealing or to be subject in covering or enclosing into movable packages ready and convenient to be picker up by garbage disposal team for loading into dumptrucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 84: November, 1991</td>
<td>Banning smoking in certain public places and public conveyances in Iloilo City and imposing penalty for violations thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 146: Series of 1978</td>
<td>Prohibiting obstructions on any sidewalk, highway, road or street and providing penalties in violation thereof</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Octavio, et al., 1997: 16)
### Appendix D
National legislative framework of SWM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Enforcing (E) and implementing (I) agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Act No. 383, 1938</td>
<td>Prohibits dumping of waste into rivers. Punishment: imprisonment of not more than 6 months or fine of not more than P200 or both</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Order No. 13, 1972</td>
<td>Orders all residents to undertake the cleaning of their surroundings and prohibits throwing of garbage in public places. All owners must maintain idle lots clean and if unable to do so, government will undertake to clean at the owners' expense</td>
<td>DPWH (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD 825, 1975</td>
<td>Provides penalties for improper disposal of garbage. Violators shall suffer imprisonment of not less than 5 days or more than 1 year or a fine of not less than p100 or more than p2,000 or both</td>
<td>DPWH (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation Code PD 856, 1975</td>
<td>States that cities and municipalities shall provide an adequate and efficient system of collecting, transporting and disposing of refuse in their areas of jurisdiction in a manner approved by the local health authority</td>
<td>LGU (I) DOH/LHA (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Pollution Control Decree PD 600 as amended by PD 979, 1976</td>
<td>To prevent and control pollution of seas by the dumping of wastes and other matter which created hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine life</td>
<td>DENR Regional Office (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution Control Law PD 984, 1978</td>
<td>Includes provisions for prevention and control of pollution from solid, toxic and hazardous wastes. Section 81 caption (a) states that SW shall not be stored, collected, processed, or disposed in a manner to cause pollution to the environment. Section 83 caption (a) states that SW will be stored, collected, processed, transported and disposed of in such a manner as to control dust emissions, wind-blown material, odors and prevent harboring for vermin and insects.</td>
<td>DENR-EMB and Regional Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Code PD 1152, 1978</td>
<td>Title 43 of the code states that: &quot;preparation and implementation of waste management programs shall be required of all provinces, cities and municipalities.&quot;</td>
<td>DENR (E) LGU (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum Circular No. 39, 1987</td>
<td>Created the Presidential Task Force on Waste Management (PTFWM)</td>
<td>DENR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Order</td>
<td>Ordered the strict implementation of PD 825 by</td>
<td>MMA and other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| No. 432, 1990 | all law enforcement agencies and officials.  
Enjoined Metro Manila Authority (MMA) to support offices and agencies concerned. | agencies |
| Local Government Code  
RA 7160, 1991 | Provision in the Code States that:  
"local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate and incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic service and facilities enumerated herein...services related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection disposal system and facilities" | DILG (E)  
LGU (I) |
| Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act  
RA 6969, 1990 and IRR-DAO 92-29 | Regulates the use, movement and eventual disposal of toxic chemicals and hazardous and nuclear wastes in the Philippines | DENR-EMB (E) |
| Executive Order 192 | Setting up of the DENR, EMB functions include  
"formulate rules and regulations for the proper disposal of solid wastes, toxic and hazardous substances."
 | DENR-EMB |
| Administrative Order No. 90, 1993 | Created a Project Management Office on Solid Waste Management under the PTFWM with DENR As the leas implementing agency | DENR (E) |
| Memorandum Circular 88, 1994 | Reconstituted the PTFWM | DENR (E) |

(From ERM & TCI, 1999: Section 2-2)
Appendix E

SWOT analysis form used in the SWM Workshop (conducted by the CUI)

Worksheet p. 1/ SWM Workshop by LGSP and CUI

Assessment of City's Solid Waste Management Systems
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)

Purpose

• To understand the current situation of SWM system in Iloilo City
• To systematically identify important in addressing solid waste in Iloilo city

Procedure

1. Participants group themselves into seven (7) groups, representing the components of the SWM system: (a) Source, (b) collection/transfer, (c) disposal, (d) sanitary landfill establishment, (e) community awareness and education, (f) law enforcement, and (g) management capability.
2. Each group chooses a leader and a reporter. The leader will facilitate the team discussion while the reporter will record the proceeding of the team.
3. Each group secures pen/s and sheet/s of Manila paper from the Secretariat.
4. Based on the summary of key issues, the leader/facilitator poses the questions to be answered by each participant and each group:

   • What are the major challenges or problems expected in the SWM system in the city (threats)?
   • What are the greatest advantages or opportunities that can be used to promote SWM in the city?
   • What are the capabilities of your City Government in SWM (strength)?
   • What are the areas for improvement in the City Government in implementing effective and efficient SWM?

1. Leader asks the group to list critical issues. These issues will be broken into internal issues (strengths and weaknesses) and external issues (opportunities and threats). BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE.
2. Each group then summarizes the discussion using the format in Worksheet I for presentation.
3. Facilitators then summarize the key issues identified in the workshop to be used as basis in Workshop II.

Expected Output

A more defined planning context for developing alternative SWM actions
### Assessment of City's Solid Waste Management Systems

**Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)**

Solid Waste Management Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength (capabilities and resources)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opportunities (advantages)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Weaknesses (areas for improvement)** | **Threats (external problems)** |
| 1.                                  | 1.                               |
| 2.                                  | 2.                               |
| 3.                                  | 3.                               |
| 4.                                  | 4.                               |
| 5.                                  | 5.                               |