GOVERNING REFUGEES

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ABSTRACT

Practices directed at refugees emerged in the inter-war period. Thousands of Europeans were maintained in camps, selected, and then resettled in the decades that followed. By the 1960s, what had been *ad hoc*, small scale, temporary international responses in Europe had become routine, distinctive practices directed at crises and millions of people around the world. In the Canadian context, practices of government directed at refugees have only recently arisen. The present thesis focuses on these Canadian practices as a governmental regime. By adopting Foucault's methods of discourse analysis and genealogy, the overarching research question, 'How is the Canadian refugee regime constituted and governed?', is pursued. Research procedures included forty-eight interviews with authorities active in the regime, attendance at a refugee conference, collection of documents, and examination of indices of the humanities and social sciences.

The thesis begins by discussing conditions of possibility of the Canadian regime's emergence. It explores the development of the international refugee regime as one of these conditions, and in so doing, suggests the potential relevance of concepts and themes drawn from governmentality studies to understanding international regimes. The rise of an advanced liberal rationality in Canadian selection, determination, and resettlement practices since the 1970s is then discussed. In all three areas, refugees' conduct and fate can be seen gradually becoming governed less by state agents and more by agents at a distance from political authorities. In
resettlement during this period, however, an advanced liberal rationality can be seen deferring to a pastoral rationality, thereby suggesting the Canadian regime has been constituted by more than one rationality. Developments consistent with the ascendancy of advanced liberalism or otherwise making the governance of refugees possible are then explored. These include: the 'partnership' as a form of association; refugee studies; psychological knowledge revealing the resettling refugee's soul; economic knowledge identifying the economically risky refugee; knowledge developing early warning systems: and technologies such as the documentation centre. Finally, the thesis argues that while resistance, understood as obstruction to (liberal) governance, is evident during this period, the presence of a pastoral rationality suggests a more complex view is required.
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INTRODUCTION: GOVERNING REFUGEES

Human beings have undoubtedly migrated from place to place to seek refuge from harm since time immemorial. Practices of government directed at refugees have only recently emerged. It is only in the inter-war period that what had been *ad hoc*, temporary responses of relief, selection, and resettlement of various European groups began to occur. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans were maintained in camps, selected, and then resettled in the decades following the First and Second World Wars (Zolberg, et al., 1989). By the 1960s, *ad hoc*, small scale, temporary international responses to events and human beings in Europe were becoming routine, distinctive practices directed at events and human beings around the world.¹

In the Canadian context practices of government directed at refugees have also only arisen recently. Between the inter-war period and the early 1970s there were several Canadian responses, in conjunction with international reactions, to refugee crises and groups, including the Displaced Persons in 1947, Hungarians in 1956, Czechoslovakians in 1968, and Ugandans in 1972. These Canadian responses were made possible only by sudden, temporary suspension of standard operating immigration procedures and relaxing of screening and selection criteria through Orders-in-Council (Dirks, 1995: 61). Though eventually resulting in admission and resettlement of large blocs of human beings, these Canadian intervention efforts were regarded by authorities of various kinds as *ad hoc*, temporary, not necessarily to be repeated
in kind. These efforts were not predicated on arrangements specifically targeting refugees beforehand. It was not until the mid-1960s that Canadian authorities even began to make a distinction between the admittance and resettlement of refugees and that of immigrants. Dirks (1985: 124) writes:

Until very recently, many of the refugees who have been admitted to Canada have not been regarded as distinguishable from routine economic migrants. The government historically did not classify newcomers according to either their reasons for leaving their states of origin or for choosing Canada as a new homeland (emphasis added).

The 1966 White Paper on Immigration, the programmatic statement of the period, referred to Canadian responses to refugees abroad (Dirks, 1977: 229). Following this there were attempts to define a refugee, to carve out and classify an object/identity to be governed from a Canadian perspective. In 1969 Canada became a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol on refugees and adopted the corresponding refugee definition. In 1973 'refugee' was introduced into Canadian legislation for the first time in an amendment to the Immigration Appeal Board Act (Canada, 1995b: 2). Following release of the programmatic Green Paper on Immigration in the mid-1970s, 'refugee' was written into a new Immigration Act as a distinct legal category, separate from 'immigrant' (Lanphier, 1981). In 1978 the regulations accompanying this Act referred, for the first time, to procedures for annual refugee plans and the determination of Convention refugee status, as well as provisions for selection of refugees abroad and their resettlement (Hawkins, 1989). With these developments an
assortment of state and non-state Canadian authorities and agencies has emerged. Some are refugee-specific but before the early 1970s none were both refugee-specific and assumed permanent. Since the late 1970s Canadian practices directed at refugees have been undergoing significant change.

The present Canadian refugee regime comprises a variety of practices directed at refugees both beyond and within Canada's territorial and conceptual borders. These include Canadian Mennonite women taking Hmong refugee women to shopping malls to show them how to shop; psychiatrists employing specialized techniques to diagnose and treat refugees eliciting symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder; legal professionals presenting their refugee claimant's cases in status determination hearings; visa officers examining human beings in refugee camps abroad to determine their suitability for selection; Canadian refugee experts conducting longitudinal studies to monitor adaptation and adjustment of refugees in Canada (e.g., Johnson and Beiser, 1994); Canadian immigration officials consulting representatives of refugee advocacy and other organizations to set annual refugee selection intake levels; Refugee coordinators promoting refugee sponsorship among Christian church congregations; and innumerable others.

These practices can be grouped into three types: selection, determination, and resettlement. Refugee selection occurs abroad and involves Canadian visa officers periodically visiting refugee camps, detention centres, and transit points. They select human
beings that pass security screening and fit Canadian refugee
categories. Once selected and screened, refugees are transported
to Canada for resettlement. Determination involves human beings
who have travelled to Canada to make a legal claim to Convention
refugee status. Once in Canada the refugee claimant is
represented by legal professionals who develop the claim before it
is presented at an oral hearing. Usually after several months, the
refugee claimant is either deemed to be a refugee, granted legal
immigrant status, and resettled or, following appeals, literally
removed from Canada. Finally, refugee resettlement occurs within
Canada. Those selected and transported to Canada are either
sponsored by the Canadian state or by private refugee sponsorship
organizations and groups. Once transported, refugees are met at
ports of entry and then helped to obtain housing, employment,
education, medical coverage, and financial support and directed to
conduct themselves as workers, consumers, and citizens.

In his later writings on 'governmentality' Michel Foucault
characterized the practice of government in the West as a 'conduct
of conduct' (Gordon, 1991: 2). For Foucault, government involved
authorities seeking to shape the direction of citizens' lives. By
focusing on programmes, rationalities, technologies and knowledges
rather than the state, Foucault and others writing about
'governmentality' (e.g., Rose and Miller, 1992) offer a way of
making sense of the varied Canadian practices directed at refugees,
as well as how they have been changing.
PURPOSE

This thesis seeks to make intelligible these varied Canadian practices directed toward refugees, and how they have been changing, as a governmental regime. Simultaneously it attempts to lend insight into governmentality generally. Using Michel Foucault's methods of discourse analysis and genealogy this thesis attempts to problematize these practices, to render them strange, to get beyond their self-evidence, to destabilize and unsettle comfortable views about them, including their connections with necessity, humanity, and progress.

This thesis takes up Foucault's challenge: to engage in research and analysis that is critical - in that it problematizes practices and corresponding objects/identities taken as given- and effective - in that it refuses to provide refuge to other practices and their related objects/identities (cf. Dean, 1994c: 164). Such an endeavour does not seek chaos, irrationality or despair, but inventiveness, the possible creation of new ways of governing and resisting, and new forms of identity. But if there is another purpose of this thesis, it is this. If the varied practices that make up this regime and the ways in which they have been changing are seen to have pernicious effects, such as inequitable identification and treatment of refugees based on perceived gender, class, race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, or world region; the production and reproduction of the refugee, refugee claimant, and other non-citizen objects/identities within Canada; or if there is a broader dissatisfaction with relating to human beings as refugees and
refugee claimants—whatever negative effects might be perceived—then it makes sense to focus attention on the constitution and workings of this emergent regime before seeking strategies aimed at ameliorative change.

RESEARCH QUESTION(S)

Given these purposes, the overarching research question of this thesis becomes: How is the Canadian refugee regime constituted and governed? This question implies at least six others: (1) What were the conditions of possibility under which the Canadian regime began to emerge? (2) What are the current discursive assumptions about the refugee object/identity among relevant authorities? (3) What are the programmes and rationalities that have constituted and organized the regime since its emergence? (4) What is the form of association among authorities that is consistent with one of these current rationalities? (5) What are the forms of knowledge and the technologies that have made the regime and changes within it possible? (6) How is resistance to be conceived?

STATEMENT OF THESIS

In previous research, including recent studies in governmentality, there has not been recognition of Canadian refugee selection, determination, and resettlement practices as comprising a unique historical governmental regime. Nor has there been problematization of these practices as such. There has been little effort to make this regime intelligible by elucidating that which constitutes it: rationalities, forms of association, knowledges, and technologies. Instead of being problematized, the Canadian
refugee regime has been taken for granted, most often seen as an exceptional humanitarian development devoid of politics, power, and resistance, but also as necessarily relevant to racism, reducible to the inner workings of the Canadian state, fully explained by reference to Canada's international relations with other nation-states, or fitting with the logic of capitalism.

International refugee programmes and organizations began in Europe following the First World War as temporary, small-scale, and specific to groups defined by ethnicity or nationality. By the 1960s these programmes had become permanent, large-scale, and directed at a universal category. A brief review of this international regime since the First World War reveals governmental programmes, rationalities, and technologies making possible and shaping relevant practices, thereby suggesting that the themes and concepts of governmentality studies may be relevant to attempting to understand both national and international regimes. It is in this international sphere that 'refugeeness' started to become more useful to Western authorities after 1947 within intensifying Cold War relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations exemplified in international responses to events in Hungary in 1956 and later within the context of de-colonization in Africa and elsewhere. 'Refugeeness' can be seen as a Western moral-political tactic in international power relations. The fact that a Canadian refugee regime emerged in the period between the mid-1960s and early 1970s was not a matter of course. It was contingent on certain conditions, the crystallization of this international
refugee regime being only one. Others include Canada's attempt to become a more influential citizen in the international community; a renewed interest in Canada's population size and composition; and a recognized scarcity of desired labour for the national economy.

The Canadian refugee regime is assumed largely distinct from immigration, as is the refugee from the immigrant, the latter distinction being predicated on the basis of a capacity for choice. Since the 1970s changes in three types of practices of the refugee regime consistent with the rise of an advanced liberal rationality are evident. During this period refugees' conduct and fate can be seen gradually becoming governed less by state agents and more by a variety of agents and authorities at a distance from political authorities. Though consistent with this, the resettlement practices of private sponsors and Host volunteers, mostly from Christian churches, that also emerged during this period, are of a character that suggest the presence of a Christian pastorate. Advanced liberalism has in this instance deferred to a pastoral rationality, a broad discourse that to date has received little attention in governmentality studies. Consistent with the ascendancy of an advanced liberal rationality is the rise to dominance of the 'partnership', a flexible, active form of association among authorities that is present throughout the regime. A new science of refugee studies has also arisen during the period in which the Canadian refugee regime has emerged and can be seen making Canadian (and international) practices directed at refugees possible. New emphases on economic, psychological and
early warning knowledge can be seen accompanying and making possible significant changes in selection, resettlement and, to some extent, determination (and international) practices respectively. A variety of technologies including statistics, icons, camps, and examinations can also be seen making practices directed at refugees possible. Among those that have come to complement the ascendancy of an advanced liberal rationality are special psychological assessment and intervention techniques in resettlement and the documentation centre in determination. Resistance is evident in relation to the Canadian refugee regime and can be understood as obstruction to governance, as leading to failure of governmental programmes and occasionally, as in determination during the 1980s, crisis. Resistance from at least three sources converged at this point to spawn a new determination programme consistent with an advanced liberal rationality. The notion of the presence of more than one rationality in a regime, in this case a pastoral and an advanced liberal rationality in the refugee regime, suggests, however, that resistance is more complex than this.

Overall this thesis contends that the Canadian practices directed at refugees and the changes they have been undergoing since the 1970s are best seen as a contingent governmental regime that first came into being as a result of certain conditions that happened to come together in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This regime is a shifting historical assemblage of heterogeneous rationalities, forms of association, technologies, and knowledges.
Besides lending support to what others have observed about liberal government in other contexts, the exploration of this regime contributes to governmentality studies by highlighting the relevance of migration, as well as the significance of an international sphere of politics and a pastoral rationality. Those who perceive pernicious effects stemming from the practices that make up the regime, and the ways in which they have been mutating, would do well to recognize the new arenas of contestation that have opened up and those that have been dismantled.

CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

The chapters of this thesis are organized in the following manner. Chapter one describes previous research on refugee policy and practices with an emphasis on the Canadian context. Chapter two moves from this previous research to begin to elaborate an appropriate conceptual approach exemplified by the work of Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller, Mitchell Dean, Ian Hacking, and others who have extended the insights contained in Michel Foucault's writings, especially those on 'governmentality'. This is accomplished in part by discussing themes and features of the historical sociology of the state and state theory. Chapter three discusses discourse analysis and genealogy as methods consistent with such an approach. Following this, but in the same chapter, the research procedures carried out for this thesis are detailed. The remaining chapters that discuss the results of these procedures are largely organized around the research questions above. Chapter four discusses the formation of the international regime since the First World War and
its object, the relevance of themes and concepts drawn from the
governmentality literature to it, and then other conditions of
possibility of the emergence of the Canadian regime. After briefly
discussing the distinctiveness of the Canadian regime, as seen in
the appearance of refugee-specific authorities and agents and
assumptions about the refugee among authorities, chapter five
examines relevant Canadian refugee programmes and rationalities
that have constituted and organized the refugee regime, and how
they have changed, since the 1970s. Chapter six proceeds to
discuss the form of association among authorities -the
'partnership'- consistent with an advanced liberal rationality, a
logic that presently constitutes this regime. This chapter also
discusses the appearance of refugee studies as a new science and
other forms of knowledge, technologies, and, finally, resistance.
Chapter seven, the concluding chapter, discusses how the thesis
contributes to existing research literatures. It suggests that
this research contributes to refugee studies by offering an
alternative account of Canadian refugee policy and practices and to
governmentality studies by lending support to what previously has
been noted about liberal rule and law in other contexts and
pointing to significant omissions, especially attention to a
pastoral or other rationalities and an international sphere of
politics.
1. Formal refugee bureaucratic structures of determination, selection, and resettlement are rarely found outside the West.

2. Directing attention to the Canadian refugee regime, as this thesis does, undoubtedly risks exaggerating its importance relative to other domains within Canada. It should be made clear at the outset, therefore, that the volume of human and material resources associated with these varied Canadian practices is undoubtedly far less than longer-standing fields such as 'the national economy' (Miller and Rose, 1990b). Similarly, the branch of the Department of Immigration that explicitly targets refugees is dwarfed by the remainder that targets immigrants.

3. These three types form the 'core' of Canadian refugee policy (cf. Adelman, 1984a: 1-2) and it is for this reason they are focused on. A fourth type not focused on would be the provision of funding, through the Canadian International Development Agency, for international agencies such as the International Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees that deliver refugee emergency aid and development. There is no distinction to be made between Canadian and international emergency aid and development practices.

4. Convention refugee status determination also takes place at Canadian embassies and consulates abroad prior to selection.

5. With few notable exceptions, until the mid-1980s Foucault's writings have been used as a supplement for a variety of theoretical (e.g., Giddens, 1984) and political (e.g., Fraser, 1989) projects to adjust or refine a particular theoretical or historical claim within a larger endeavour (see also Hunter, 1996). Accompanying this has been a clamouring in the background suggesting that for these writings to be of any (further) use, they must be 'positioned' (cf. Leonard, 1990: 3; Garland, 1990: 173) - it must be determined beforehand whether they are, for instance, structuralist, anti-structuralist, neo-conservative, Marxist, feminist, anti-racist, anarchist, or whatever. I am not so sure about this suggestion. As Dean (1994d: 36) argues, perhaps this lack of positioning is less an 'Achilles' Heel' and more a strength. It is for this reason that I seek to avoid grounding this thesis in a system of values (Dean, 1994d: 36), while simultaneously abstaining from the old liberal view that knowledge and values are somehow separate.

6. Burchell (1993: 276-77) suggests this problematization stems from a specific experience. He writes:

   There often appears to be a motivating experience for adopting the kind of approach that Foucault called the 'history of the present' which seems to involve the experience of not being a citizen of the community or republic of thought and action in which one is,
nevertheless, unavoidably implicated or involved. It is an experience of being in a goldfish bowl in which one is obliged to live but in which it seems impossible to live, that is, to think and act... The experience is not at all just a matter of holding a different opinion than everyone else, but of finding oneself not knowing what or how to think... This experience... calls... for a kind of criticism by which our view from inside of our goldfish bowl is made to appear as not more than the historically contingent effect of a kind of selective determination by a particular outside of practices. Foucault's work provides us with a number of splendid examples of 'ways out' in relation to certain features of our goldfish bowl. His genealogies work in this way by revealing to us the (often quite recent) inventedness of our world. His descriptions enable us to discern the broken lines of the irregular contours of our goldfish bowl, of our present, taking shape in all their necessarily contingent exteriority.

7. Precisely because of these connections, problematizing the Canadian refugee regime risks eliciting the same reaction as sending a slice of a neighbour's apple pie to the local health department for chemical analysis, or volunteering a family pet for medical research experiments (Waldron, 1987: 1)- there is little doubt that some readers will find it distasteful.

8. If there is dissatisfaction with relating to human beings as refugees or refugee claimants requiring regulation, one might note Hunt's (1993: 316) passing comment that "if objects of regulation can be created, then they can similarly be dismantled and abandoned."

9. As seen in chapter three, this question is in part an historical one, as regimes are constituted by historical elements. The distinction it makes is analytical, as regimes do not exist separate from their governance.
CHAPTER ONE: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Though there are no governmentality studies that have focused on international or Canadian policy and practices directed at refugees, there is other previous research that has.¹ This chapter critically reviews this research with an eye to identifying similarities with and deficiencies in relation to the approach adopted for this thesis. In seeking to describe and assess this previous research on refugee policy and practices, two basic types are immediately discovered: one that approaches these subjects as an international concern, and the other that sees them as a concern of particular Western nations.² There is a large body of research that takes a decidedly international approach, and distinct literatures, themselves internally fragmented, that pertain to the policy and practices of single nations (e.g., research on British refugee policy and practices).³ The international literature is dealt with first. Following this, attention is paid to research that relates directly to Canadian⁴ refugee policy and practices, thereby excluding that which relates to similar policy and practices of other nations, such as Germany, the United States, Australia, France, or Britain.⁵ I have chosen in both instances not to limit discussion to previous research that proclaims itself sociological, as such research -particularly regarding refugee selection and determination- can be characterized as meager at best.⁶ With these qualifiers in mind, as well as by limiting discussion to the English language literature, in what follows I describe and assess previous research on refugee policy and
practices.

THE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE

The international literature focuses in some way on the international refugee regime that began to emerge in Western Europe following the First World War and that has since become extended across the world. It includes a burgeoning body of research on international refugee law (cf. Hathaway, 1991, 1992; Goodwyn-Gil, 1983, 1990; Grahl-Madsen, 1990) that explores the legal ramifications of Conventions and agreements about refugees in various world regions. It also consists in historical studies that centre on the development of relevant international organizations and their practices (cf. Woodbridge, 1950; Holborn, 1956; 1975; Marrus, 1985). Other studies that adopt an international approach, some of which are historical (Gordenker, 1987; Sjoberg, 1991; Skran, 1995), draw on international relations theory (Loescher, 1993; 1988; Loescher and Scanlan, 1985; Loescher and Monahan, 1989; Weiner, 1993). These works tend to view refugees as weapons used by nations or alliances of nations, here conceived as rational actors in an international field of politics, to embarrass, destabilize, or otherwise weaken enemy nations or alliances.

There is also a body of research making up part of the international literature that discusses refugee policy and practices in the context of international migration (cf. Zolberg et al., 1983; 1989; Kunz, 1969; 1973; 1981). Some studies of this kind pledge their allegiance to social geography, but also to the 'sociology of involuntary migration' (Harrell-Bond, 1988).
latter is part of the broader sociological study of migration (cf. Richmond, 1988; 1993; 1994), a fragmented sub-field compared with other areas of sociological interest (Marshall, 1994: 329). While some studies remain mired in an outmoded 'push-pull' perspective that directs attention to individual motivations and interprets refugee policies as an intervening 'variable' (cf. Lee, 1966) in an international refugee migration process (e.g., Kunz, 1981), others, such as Zolberg (1983; 1989), are historical in character and point to the formation and reproduction of nations and resulting conflict between them as an important source of refugee migrations.

Neo-Marxist research on international migration also makes up part of the international literature. Here migrants are conceived as a reserve army of docile, 'unfree' labour (cf. Cohen, 1987; Miles, 1987). 'Unfree' (the neo-Marxist equivalent to 'involuntary') refers to a subordinate status under which workers cannot sell their labour-power as a commodity in the market of their own free-will, but are instead legally or physically forced to do so. The capitalist mode of production is said to entail "free and unfree labour regimes" not, as Marx had argued, free labour exclusively (Cohen, 1987: 25). Unfree labour takes several forms, including slavery, serfdom, prison and convict labour and, more recently, migrant contract labour. Large blocs of human beings are constituted as unfree forms of labour to be exploited either in the core or the periphery of regional political economies (e.g., North America) (Cohen, 1987). Policies of Western nations operating in the core are seen making possible the recruitment of
unfree labour; the legitimation of this labour force; and the management of the boundaries of core zones (Cohen, 1987). In such discussions of the role of states in international migration, refugee policies and practices are often mentioned, but they are then either awkwardly dismissed as outside the area of interest (e.g., Satzewich, 1991b: 8; Cohen, 1987: 31; Sassen-Koob, 1981: 68n; see Richmond, 1988: 9) or dubiously claimed to be indistinguishable from other state policies and corresponding forms of migrant labour (e.g., Castles and Kosack, 1985: 11) (cf. Miles and Satzewich, 1990). With the former tendency, refugee policies and refugees are viewed as inherently political rather than economic phenomena and therefore an exception to the rules regarding unfree labour. With the latter, refugee policies are reduced to the logic of broader immigration policies that merely respond to the changing needs of a regional or global political economy by creating and admitting or excluding a docile, unfree labour source as required.

A recent detailed historical study by Kay and Miles (1992; 1988), entitled Refugees or Migrant Workers?, situates itself in this structuralist neo-Marxist problematic that uses the concept of unfree labour. It represents a rare exception to both tendencies above in that it neither dismisses refugee policies nor reduces them to the logic of immigration. In rich, historical detail the authors describe the implementation of the British state's temporary programme, the European Volunteer Worker (EVW) scheme that targeted the recruitment of large numbers of persons from
European Displaced Persons camps from 1946 to 1951. The authors show how the British state, through the introduction of this programme, brought about the migration of docile, unfree labour to counter an extreme labour shortage Britain was experiencing in the years immediately following World War Two. The authors also describe the resistance of those targeted by the scheme after their arrival in Britain (Kay and Miles, 1992: 95-119). The authors conclude that those selected from Displaced Person camps in this instance were neither obvious migrant contract labourers nor refugees and, therefore, that the EVW migration was of a "hybrid nature" (Kay and Miles, 1992: 6). The authors point to three kinds of political process that can form such a surplus population: conflict over national borders; change in a national government; and "the dynamic process of nationalisation" (Kay and Miles, 1992: 185). Kay and Miles (1988: 186) conclude:

> if the surplus population was created in the political sphere, its insertion into British capitalism was dictated primarily by an economic imperative.

They argue, then, that "surplus populations can also be constituted by predominantly, but not exclusively, political processes" (Kay and Miles, 1992: 185; see also 1988: 231). The process, in this instance, is the division between communist and capitalist nations in Europe (Kay and Miles, 1992: 6).

But all of this raises a key question: if the relevant surplus population was created mostly within political processes, why attempt, as these authors do, to reduce the EVW programme or policy to the *telos* of capitalism? While those occupying refugee
categories have undoubtedly served as a source of labour of one kind or other within Canada's capitalist economy after their selection and resettlement, it is very questionable whether reducing the practices directed at them, and how they have been changing, to an unfree labour regime of capitalism could render them intelligible. For one thing, as is seen in chapter five, since the 1970s refugees are clearly imagined within contemporary Canadian refugee selection and resettlement programmes not only as a source of labour, but as potential liberal citizens. In such schemes they are imagined not merely becoming submissive, docile workers, but acquiring the subtle skills and knowledge required to exercise their citizenship in a liberal manner.

While this thesis does not seek to investigate particular refugee policy and practices to construct or refine universal theories of international law, relations, or migration, choosing to deal with them as a contingent national governmental regime instead, the research above is helpful nevertheless. The work in international relations, in particular, points to the existence of an international field of politics that, while not of immediate interest here, is necessarily discussed in chapter four and occasionally referred to in later chapters. Attempting to accomplish the latter by relying exclusively on international relations, legal, or migration theory, however, would be futile, as one kind of practice at issue here -resettlement- occurs within rather than between nations. The perspective of Kay and Miles (1992) is also helpful in terms of its emphasis on politics, power,
and resistance, which are also concepts and themes central to governmentality studies. For this reason it will be useful and instructive to compare the latter two approaches in the next chapter, to take a closer look at their similarities and differences before proceeding to investigate Canadian refugee policy and practices.

THE CANADIAN LITERATURE

Previous Canadian research can be divided for analytical purposes into historical, legal, and state-centred studies. These and some of their findings are discussed below.

Historical Studies

Some studies have been decidedly historical in their orientation (e.g., Kapriellian-Churchill, 1986; 1990; 1994; Bassler, 1992; Luciuk, 1986; Abella and Troper, 1983). Abella and Troper (1983) —undoubtedly the most widely read study of this type to date— examine Canadian practices as they pertained to Jews attempting to flee Nazi persecution in Europe from 1933 to 1948. The authors describe in detail how Department of Immigration officials systematically prevented Jews from entering Canada. They conclude that exclusionary practices in this instance can be better explained by racist attitudes among Canadian state agents than changing domestic economic conditions, namely the onset of the Great Depression. In a very similar study, Bassler (1992) focuses on Newfoundland's restrictive practices in relation to Jews between 1906 and 1949 when it became a province of Canada. Kapriellian-Churchill (1986; 1990; 1994) similarly documents the reluctant
Canadian response to Armenian women refugees from 1919 to 1930 following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and Luciuk (1986) the response to Ukrainians immediately following World War Two. These works tend to concentrate on refugee selection in relation to a particular nationality or ethnic group over a circumscribed period.

These studies describe past Canadian practices in detail. They highlight state agents' perceptions of refugees' race, political ideology or gender as the most important determinants of policy. The main point is usually the same in each—Canadian policy was not what it ought to have been for a particular group, to the extreme detriment (i.e. death or continued persecution) of the excluded refugees. Unfortunately, these studies focus exclusively on the historical context surrounding selection of a particular group and offer little detail about resettlement. While these studies are historical, they are not informed by a coherent conceptual approach. Furthermore, they say little about power, politics or resistance explicitly, all of which are concerns in studies in governmentality. Like several studies below, they examine Canadian refugee policy and practices in ways that take the present institutional framework for granted, rather than call it into doubt.

Legal Studies

There are a variety of studies that have adopted a broad legal approach to Canadian refugee policy and practices (cf. Matas and Simon, 1989; Mandel, 1994; Barsky, 1994; Macklin, 1995). Matas and Simon (1989), for example, examine Canadian refugee policy and
practices from 1978 to 1989. The authors highlight the Department of Immigration officials' apparent racist practices and mistakes, primarily concerning the determination of refugees. They contend that Canadian state agents have denied access to legal refugee status by employing 'techniques of denial': using a narrow legal definition of a refugee that excludes those fleeing 'generalized violence'; implementing arbitrary legal procedures of refugee determination; deterring those who might reach Canadian borders through visa restrictions abroad; and making diplomatic asylum and selection unavailable. A major conclusion is that while the Canadian state accepts the ideal of refugee protection, it denies it in practice.

In a more recent study, Barsky (1994) attempts to make sense of refugee determination hearings in Canada by reference to 'the othering process'. Drawing primarily from the discourse theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, Barsky traces in considerable detail the transformation, over three distinct stages of the hearing process, of a (whole) human being into a constructed 'other' (ie. a Canadian refugee claimant). This is accomplished by analyzing hearing transcripts from two Chilean refugee claimants who arrived in Canada in 1987. In so doing he demonstrates the utility of discourse theory for legal studies and suggests several specific reforms of the refugee determination process.

Mandel (1994) studies Canadian refugee determination policy and practices since the enactment of the Charter as one of several examples of the 'legalization of politics'. That the Singh
decision in 1985 resulted in rights for refugee claimants, an oral hearing and other features of the new determination process, is interpreted as "an essential and expensive element of the sophisticated fortifications that Canada and other wealthy nations have thrown up around themselves" (Mandel, 1994: 257). He argues that in this instance the effect of the Charter has been to "legitimate repression by reconciling it with our ideals of humanity" (Mandel, 1994: 257). In other words, law is merely ideological cover for repressive practices directed at those existing outside affluent nations such as Canada. This emphasis on the maintenance of legitimacy is also seen in some state-centred studies below.

Not surprisingly, these legal studies focus almost entirely on determination, as this is the area of the regime where law has become intimately involved. Except for Barsky (1994) and Mandel (1994), they do not proceed with an explicit conceptual approach, or make reference to power, politics or resistance. Barsky's attention to discourse, however, does resonate with studies in governmentality.

State-centred Studies

There are also studies that have sought to make sense of Canadian refugee policy and practices, usually over a specific period, by referring to the objective interests or workings of the Canadian state. By the late 1970s Dirks (1977) was undoubtedly the most comprehensive study of this or any kind. It traces Canadian refugee policy and practices from 1789 – the period of the Loyalist
migration to the present and attempts to see why Canadians sometimes actively welcomed and admitted refugees and, at other times, were indifferent to their situations. Dirks interprets refugee policy, mostly in the decade preceding 1977, as the result of alliances between government departments and the efforts of individuals within the Canadian state, though he grants some importance to prevailing domestic economic conditions. In a more recent but similar work, Dirks (1995) describes what has occurred during the 1980s in relation to refugee policy and practices as part of a larger immigration policy.

In a similar way, Hawkins (1989; see also 1991) researches Canadian refugee policy from 1945 to 1986, with an emphasis on the period from 1972 onward, and as part of a broader immigration policy. She attempts to make sense of refugee policy by reference to the endeavours of individual political authorities and Department of Immigration officials. Though remarkably detailed, both Dirks (1977; 1995) and Hawkins (1989) tend to depict state agents as largely unconstrained actors shaping progressive policies as they see fit. Canadian refugee practices, and how they have changed, are to be understood by reference to the foresight and failings of a succession of Ministers and high-rankling federal state bureaucrats. Perhaps as a result, these studies are devoid of explicit references to power or resistance.

Howard (1980) examines Canadian refugee policy and practices during the period 1945 to 1979, though with an emphasis on the two years before 1977. She attempts to assess the relative influence
of humanitarian, racial, economic, and ideological factors on both
determination and selection practices. She concludes that, before
1945, perceived race and domestic economic conditions were the most
important factors. She suggests, however, that the relative weight
of state agents' perceptions of refugees' race and political
ideology changed in the late 1970s, with perceived race becoming
less and perceived political ideology becoming more important
influences. Howard also suggests that since 1945 the minor
ideological bias in selection and determination has been against
socialist refugees fleeing right-wing governments and on behalf of
right-wing refugees fleeing socialist governments.

Dewitt and Kirton (1983) interpret refugee policy as part of
broader immigration and foreign policies. The authors examine
refugee policy in the context of six crises abroad: Displaced
Persons of Europe, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Uganda, Chile, and
Indochina. The authors argue that since Canada was apparently not
responding to the dictates of powerful nations such as the United
States, and Canadian political and economic interests were part of
the decision to intervene in each crisis, refugee policy can be
understood less as an instance of racism, as seen in the selection
of White European refugees, and more a reflection of the neo-
realist pursuit of national interests. They also conclude that
taken together these cases suggest humanitarianism was an important
determining factor.

Creese (1991) examines change in Canadian refugee policy and
practices during the 1980s with an emphasis on the period
immediately before passage of new refugee legislation in 1988. She interprets this new legislation as the culmination of the Canadian state's efforts, begun during the arrival of large numbers of refugees who had not been pre-screened and selected as such, to reduce the levels and types (based on their skill and political ideology) of refugees entering Canada. Like other authors above, Creese suggests the introduction of this refugee legislation was also consistent with ethnic and racial politics internal to Canada, and with its external political economic relations with other nations. As part of this study, Creese conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles about refugees published during a crucial period prior to 1988. She found that most articles advanced an image depicting refugees as criminals and a stress on Canadian society. For Creese the creation of this negative image for the public supported the state's goal of passing the new legislation. She therefore views the Canadian state as actively attempting to shape civil society in a way that allows its interests to be realized. In these ways Creese attends -to use a less than eloquent phrase- to the 'hows of rule', that is, how rule is possible in a particular domain. Though approached in a different manner, this is also a theme in governmentality studies. Like Barsky (1994), Creese's attention in this study to discourse, as seen in the content analysis, also resonates with the approach adopted for this thesis. Unfortunately, Creese's critical conceptual approach remains largely implicit.

Whitaker (1987) explores refugee policy as part of a broader
immigration policy from 1945 to 1987. Like several authors above, Whitaker suggests political and ideological factors are more important than racist attitudes among state agents in influencing Canadian refugee policy and practices. He suggests there is a systematic bias, a 'double standard', in favour of refugees fleeing socialist regimes and against refugees fleeing right-wing governments. Besides the perceived political ideology and race of refugees, he also points to national security and domestic economic need as factors affecting Canadian refugee policy during this period. By conceiving of the Canadian state as a nation, Whitaker contends that changes in refugee policy, as seen in the new legislation, reflect patterns in political Cold War arrangements among Western nations. Unfortunately, like Dewitt and Kirton (1983), Whitaker tends to reduce refugee policy and practices to the logic of Canada's immigration policies and, in turn, to external political relations with other Western nations.

Simmons and Keohane (1992) is the final state-centred study to be discussed. The authors examine the making of Canadian refugee policy as an example of immigration policy between 1987 and 1988 and before passage of the new legislation mentioned above. The authors document, in detail, how state agents systematically shaped and limited debate over this legislation during consultation procedures with various non-state actors. In so doing, and unlike Hawkins (1989) and Dirks (1977), Simmons and Keohane do not presume Department of Immigration officials to be unconstrained actors shaping policy at will. Instead they see them as considerably less
powerful agents who have to negotiate with and persuade groups in civil society to achieve the state's objective goals. In part by drawing on the work of neo-Marxists such as Offe and Ronge (1982) and Habermas (1975), the authors adopt an explicit approach that imagines the state as having three broad, objective goals or interests: (1) sustaining economic well-being for itself and society; (2) pursuing a rational-bureaucratic agenda; and (3) attempting to maintain legitimacy, which is dependent on (1) and (2). They assert the "state's hegemony... must always be worked out within a larger cultural context over which it has only limited control" (Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 427). They argue the state's goal, as it pertains to refugee policy, as part of a larger immigration policy, is to "exercise legitimate power and control" (Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 428). More specifically the Canadian state

... gears immigration policy toward the smooth running of the economy, the mediation of major social conflicts, and the preemption of crises and challenges from oppositional social movements. Policy over recent years may thus be interpreted as the operation of these strategies for state legitimacy in a changing national and international social context (Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 428).

This study is more explicit about the conceptual approach it adopts than most work above and is important in the way it highlights how various non-state authorities are brought into alignment with the interests of the state in one context. In this respect, like Creese (1991), it also explores the 'hows of rule'. Unlike Kay and Miles (1992), this study avoids interpreting refugee policy and practices simply as the creation of an unfree labour source to
satisfy economic needs, in that it also points to the state's effort to maintain legitimacy as a separate (though dependent) interest. These interests the authors describe, however, are static rather than historical— they are assumed to remain the same over time. Though this study's reference to non-state authorities is important, the 'oppositional social movements' phrase it employs raises a question about whether these agents and authorities are always 'oppositional', or whether they are occasionally brought into alignment with the efforts of state and other agencies and authorities to achieve certain goals.

What is to be made of all these Canadian studies? Though none adopt a governmentality approach, they nevertheless make an important contribution. Except those which rely heavily on humanitarianism as an explanation, by studying refugee policy and practices as a legal or historical phenomenon, as the will of the state or, like their international counterparts, as fitting the logic of capitalism, these studies together suggest that these phenomena are not demanding of an exceptional conceptional approach. This is quite contrary to popular accounts of refugee policy and practices, in which they are depicted as purely humanitarian and devoid of power, politics, and resistance. The historical studies in particular show that aspects of Canadian refugee policy and practices have a history, that they have changed over time. Other kinds of studies above point to the significance of discourse in understanding how rule is accomplished in this context. Finally, all studies mentioned above are important in
that they themselves serve as data to be drawn on to explore the regime and point to other relevant sources - both documentary and human - that can be consulted in carrying out the present research endeavour.

Despite their contribution and importance, however, there are significant deficiencies evident in the studies above. First, several conflate Canada's refugee and immigration policies and practices. Though there have been exchanges between them, as seen in chapter five, the distinction between them has become a discursive fact. Second, most studies above ignore the relevance of non-state actors in relation to refugee policy and practices. While all studies above address either determination or selection (though the latter only as it pertains to a particular nationality or ethnic group), another type of practice, resettlement, is rarely mentioned in these works. Third, virtually all studies above depict the refugee as essential, as though the refugee was other than a contingent and historically constructed object/identity. Finally, some studies above are reductionist. They describe Canadian refugee policy and practices as necessarily about racism (Matas and Simon, 1989; Abella and Troper, 1983; see also Richmond, 1994); the inner workings of the Canadian state; external relations with other nations; or capitalism.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous research on refugee policy and practices is both international in its orientation and specific to particular Western nations such as Canada. The relevant international literature
includes research on international law, relations, and migration. The Canadian literature includes historical studies, legal studies, and those that place the state at the centre of analysis.

Given the deficiencies of previous research, to make sense of Canadian refugee policy and practices, and how they have been changing, a governmentality approach must be adopted, one that places them "within a wider discursive field in which conceptions of the proper ends and means of government are articulated" (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 5). In seeking to elaborate a governmentality approach in the next chapter, studies that focus on the state, because of their attention to power, politics and resistance, will be an excellent place to begin. Some previous research above has used a metaphor of a door (e.g., Adelman, 1991: 176; Knowles, 1992; Matas and Simon, 1989; Canada, 1988a; Malarek, 1987; Zucker and Zucker, 1987; Loescher and Scanlan, 1986) to refer to refugee policy and practices. This thesis is concerned not so much with why this metaphorical door opened or closed and even less with why it should be opened or closed; it is preoccupied with the door itself. It seeks to take it off its metaphorical hinges to find out where it came from, what it is made of, and how it works. To accomplish this a different approach is required, one that avoids placing the state at the centre of analysis.
1. It should be mentioned at this point that though I discuss previous research here primarily to determine what is collectively lacking and to begin to forge an appropriate critical approach, each of the studies mentioned is a form of knowledge referred to in chapter six.


3. Refugee aid and development practices of particular nations are rarely included here. Instead they are subjects taken up in policy research carried out in relation to the international regime, studies that, like their Canadian counterparts, I have chosen not to discuss.

4. A rationale for choosing the Canadian context to explore, rather than that of another Western nation, is that it is convenient to do so—this is where I happen to live and most data about Western contexts available here centre on the Canadian one. As a graduate student I simply lack the resources to access previous research, documentary materials, and authorities and agencies organized in relation to other Western nations.

5. See, for example, Zucker and Zucker (1987) and Loescher and Scanlan (1986) on the United States and Cohen (1988) on Britain. Canada's refugee policy and practices have been systematically compared to Australia's (see Hawkins (1989; 1991) and Adelman et al. (1994) but also see Robinson (1993) on Canada and Britain, Hardy (1994) on Canada, Britain and Denmark, Adelman (1991) on Canada and the United States, and Lanphier (1987) on Canada, France and the United States). Most of these are theoretically impoverished policy studies that I have chosen not to discuss here. Refugee policies associated with 'settler societies' (Anderson, 1991: 19) such as Canada undoubtedly differ from those of Western European nations in that the former tend to include annual refugee selection in their repertoire. On the other hand, like Canada, most Western European nations have refugee determination systems and provide regular funding to international organizations (e.g., the UNHCR) for emergency refugee aid and development. Some neo-Marxists, such as Gaucher (1987), claim treating the Canadian 'social formation' as similar to European social formations conflicts with Marx's call for specificity. This may be so, but it remains difficult to see where this specificity ought to begin or end, or why the conceptual borders of a 'social formation' (i.e. a nation-state) ought to be singled out as defining the parameters of a study if, following this logic, as Trotsky pointed out, 'socialism in One Country' is a contradiction (Magnusson and Walker, 1988: 48). Perhaps the nation-state is best seen as "one, albeit special, agency among others" (Dean, 1994c: 165; see also Hirst and Thompson, 1995). It was nevertheless with some trepidation that I chose to recognize the nation-state form as a defining parameter of this thesis (an issue separate from which
Western nation's refugee regime to examine). Whether Canada can be assumed to elicit the same general patterns as other Western nations is not resolvable. This thesis leans more to the idiographic pole that emphasizes uniqueness and that proceeds from the assumption that a given nation has particular historical features, than to the nomothetic pole that assumes a given nation's historical trajectory is merely an instance of larger regularities (Marshall, 1994: 233).

6. That which has been carried out is fragmented and proceeds from varied assumptions. The fact there is a profound lack of acknowledgement of previous research within the text of any given study is evidence of this. Harrell-Bond (1988: 1) posits several mundane reasons for its traditional neglect within sociology. Another reason—especially concerning determination and selection practices—may be that two of three writers traditionally viewed as the founders of sociology, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx, said little about the modern state as a nation-state involved in political relations with other nation-states (Giddens, 1987: 22). The practices at issue here come into view when placed in such an interpretive frame.

7. Conventional and well-known works in international relations and the political economy of international relations (see Keohane and Nye, 1977; Waltz, 1979; Krasner, 1978; Keohane, 1984) have ignored refugee policies and practices.

8. Cohen (1987) departs from world-systems theory (cf. Wallerstein, 1979) here by arguing that 'unfree' forms of labour exist both in zones (often previously colonized non-Western spaces) on the periphery of regional political economies and in core areas of capitalist development—typically metropolitan areas of the modern West.

9. Immigration programmes since 1950 have similarly imagined immigrants as potential citizens (see, for example, Vernant, 1953).

10. These three categories are not mutually exclusive, of course. For instance, there are works that I have called state-centred, such as Dirks (1977), that are historical in their orientation. They are not, however, carried out by historians per se and seem to better fit the other two categories. A work that does not fit any of these categories is Harp (1981), a study of 'Project 4000', an ad hoc Canadian refugee advocacy group that arose in conjunction with the resettlement effort directed at tens of thousands of Indochinese refugees in 1979 and 1980. A more sophisticated social movement study of this ilk (see also Matas and Simon, 1989: 216-30; Stastny and Tyrnauer, 1993), though carried out in an American context, is Coutin (1993), an ethnographic exploration of the sanctuary movement in the United States during the 1980s. Other similar American studies, though directed more to a popular than an academic readership, are Golden and McConnell (1986), Tomsho
(1987), and Bau (1985). There are also numerous Canadian policy studies that evaluate refugee policy by uncovering factors that led to its success in achieving its objectives or that reveal the miscalculations that resulted in its failure, but these are more a source of data for later chapters than works worth considering here.
CHAPTER TWO: APPROACHING THE CANADIAN REFUGEE REGIME

In the previous chapter it was suggested that the conceptual approach adopted for this thesis would take its lead from studies that focus on the state. In this chapter the scope and focus of this conceptual approach and the reasons for adopting it need clarification. This is best accomplished by briefly discussing first, neo-Marxist state theory and the historical sociology of the state, and then, a critical Foucauldian alternative. In so doing, the first part of this chapter also attempts to show that despite efforts to draw rigid distinctions among these kinds of approaches, there is, in their assumptions and themes, overlap among them.

NEO-MARXIST APPROACHES

In the late 1960s the state as an object of contemporary social theorizing came into view. This overcame pluralist conceptions of the state predominant in sociology since World War Two (Brodie, 1990: 62). There has since been a large volume of research and writing produced about the role of states in the West. Much of this contemporary work has stemmed directly from the writings of neo-Marxists where attention has been paid to, among other issues, the definition of the state and how state power is related to the mode of production (Dean, 1994a: 142).

Several competing conceptions and lines of argument have emerged. One of these is instrumentalist, a conception of the state associated with Marx himself that suggests the state is "a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx
and Engels, 1967: 82). In contemporary work this conception is associated with the writings of Miliband (1969). The state is seen to operate as a passive instrument of capital, at its behest (Ratner, et al., 1987: 85). Such a conception highlights the overlap of the economic and the political, the class nature of the power of the state. This conception is now widely seen as outmoded, reductionist, economic determinist, and lacking specificity.

Another basic line of argument is referred to as structuralist and is most often associated with the writings of Poulantzas (1973). The structuralist argument suggests there is an objective relation between capital and the state, whereby the latter operates in the long term interests of the former. This occurs irrespectively of proponents of capital being actively involved in state action. To maintain the political economic status quo, the state acts on behalf of capital, rather than at its behest. State policies are reducible 'in the last instance' to the struggle between labour and capital, and serve two functions: legitimation and accumulation. The state is seen to have 'relative autonomy'.

For Poulantzas, the state is relatively autonomous from classes. For other structuralists, like Offe and Ronge (1982), the state is relatively autonomous from capital accumulation processes. The concept of relative autonomy is a much debated one, and there are several structuralist positions represented within this debate.

One way to critically approach Canadian refugee policy and practices, then, would be to adopt a structuralist neo-Marxist
position (see Poulantzas, 1973; Habermas, 1975; Offe and Ronge, 1982; Panitch, 1977; Albo and Jenson, 1989). As suggested in the previous chapter, in a structuralist approach refugees would be understood as a form of docile, unfree labour and refugee policies and practices as ultimately responding to the needs of capital by creating and controlling such a labour source (cf. Sassen-Koob, 1981; Miles, 1987; Cohen, 1987). Here refugee policy is perceived to be completely consistent with the logic of immigration policy. In recent years, structuralist approaches have come under fire and are also now widely seen as outmoded and lacking specificity (Mahon, 1991).

A neo-Marxist line of argument garnering considerable attention of late is associated with the writings of Antonio Gramsci. This approach has been called "class-conflict" (cf. Ratner et al., 1987: 94). Here the state "has a central function in developing a moral (class-based) consensus that organizes social, civil, and intellectual life around the structural tendencies set by the economy" (Ratner et al., 1987: 94). This conception is allied to the concept of 'hegemony', "a historically specific organization of consent" (Carroll, 1992: 9). Hegemony refers to the notion that, in the modern West, ruling class ideas become universal ideas. Rule is accomplished not so much by coercion, as by popular consent to authority (or authorities) (Hall, 1988). As Carroll (1992: 9) writes:

In Gramsci's formulation, power is both centralized in the coercive apparatuses of the state and diffused across other institutional sites such as the Church, the family and the school.
In this approach the capitalist economy and objective class interests do not decide the direction of state policies and practices (Hall, 1988: 54). The character of the state is not deducible from a general theory. Instead, the state is a location where hegemony is struggled for and can be understood in its specific, historical context (Ratner et al., 1987: 98). The state and civil society are shaped, not through monopoly of the means of repressive violence, but through (non-violent) ideas. In such an approach attention is paid to the role of ideology (ie. discourse), understood here as constitutive, in assembling alliances among varied authorities in civil society (Hall, 1988: 53). In discussing this aspect of Gramscian analysis, one of its leading proponents, Hall (1988: 51), writes:

...we do not in any way refuse the advances made by the development of the analysis of the discursive. No social practice exists outside of the domains of the semiotic—the practice and production of meaning. This necessarily modifies, in a radical way, the traditional material/ideal, base/superstructure dichotomies of classical theories of ideology (emphasis in original).

From the above, a set of similarities between a neo-Marxist class-conflict approach and the approach adopted for this thesis can be seen. Governmentality studies also proceed with a focus on the specificity of national contexts (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996: 11); with the assumption that rule is accomplished rather than given and dependent on non-state authorities; and with a conception of discourse as constitutive.
STATE-CENTRED APPROACHES

In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a move toward 'bringing the state back into' analysis (Jessop, 1990: 278). The varied contemporary works in this area (cf. Poggi, 1978: 1990; Katzenstein, 1978; Block, 1980; Mann, 1988; Giddens, 1985; 1990a) have been characterized as anti-Marxist (Jessop, 1990: 278), neo-Weberian, and neo-institutional (Brodie, 1990: 66). Skocpol's (1979) study of the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions is an important text associated with this intellectual movement (Mahon, 1991: 123n). Skocpol directs her critique toward neo-Marxist theorists of the state, criticizing their structuralist assumption that state agents automatically possess an awareness of the long term interests of capital (Mahon, 1991: 123).

Such studies approach the state as an independent source of power, that is, independent from capital and forces in civil society (Jessop, 1990: 278). The assumption is that "[t]he state is a force in its own right and does not simply reflect the dynamic of the economy and/or civil society" (Jessop, 1990: 279). It is assumed state agents have their own interests and that there is a capacity for autonomous (not relatively autonomous) state action. Skocpol (1985: 20-21), for instance, writes:

...states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society.

A theme in Skocpol's (1979) study above was the state as a nation involved in external political relations, including war, with other nations. This external set of factors is seen to affect
the internal development of the nation and itself leading to some independence for state agents from domestic capital or other forces. This concern with the state as a nation in the 1980s gradually led to "a more profound questioning of issues of power, domination, and rule" (Dean, 1994a: 145). Inquiry was increasingly directed toward how the state obtains independent or autonomous power, and how this power is brought to bear on civil society.

Regarding the first issue, for example, Mann (1988: x) writes that "states are essentially centralized and territorial, and that autonomous state power derives from these twin characteristics." Mann (1986; 1988) attempts to account for state power in terms of the mechanisms of state rule (Dean, 1994a: 146). He distinguishes 'despotic power'—characterized by the king shouting 'off with their heads' and having that order obeyed—from the 'infrastructural power' of the state that seeks to penetrate the far reaches of civil society and the lives of citizens. Mann (1988) directs attention to the logistical techniques from which this infrastructural power stems. These techniques include literacy, rapid communication and transportation, taxation, information collection, and welfare provisions (Dean, 1994a: 146).

Giddens (1985; 1990a) work on the nation-state includes similar themes in addressing this form of power, here called 'administrative power'. Giddens points to the centrality of practices of communication, transportation, information-gathering, and discipline. Dominant in his analysis is the concept of 'power containers', which are "circumscribed arenas for the generation of
administrative power" (Giddens, 1985: 13). Examples include the prison, factory, and school, where what Giddens calls allocative and authoritative resources are concentrated. According to Giddens, in this sense the nation-state is itself a power container, albeit a special one. The exercise of administrative power by state agents, then, consists of the surveillance of the population within the borders of the nation-state, but also of external political conditions and relations. Surveillance, put simply, is either direct supervision of human beings or indirect information control and is seen to flow from administrative power (Giddens, 1990a: 59). In Giddens's view, communication and transportation technologies are resources for the concentration of administrative power in the nation-state, though such power is apparently also generated in much smaller organizations (or institutions) (cf. Giddens, 1990a: 58). In keeping with a state-centred approach Giddens (1990a: 57) writes:

The characteristics of the nation-state... must be explained and analyzed separately from discussion of the nature of either capitalism or industrialism. The administrative system of the capitalist state, and of modern states in general, has to be interpreted in terms of the coordinated control over delimited territorial arenas which it achieves.

For Giddens (1985; 1990a), administrative power, the surveillance that flows from it, and the nation-state itself cannot be reduced to the workings and history of capitalism (Giddens, 1990a: 62). This departs from neo-Marxist approaches that see warfare and political relations among nations as elements of class struggle (Dandeker, 1990).
So in this and other state-centred research attention has been paid to mechanisms, techniques, and the logistics of rule, particularly as they comprise state power. It is in this attention that a set of similarities can be seen between governmentality and state-centred approaches. There is considerable overlap, for example, between what Giddens identifies as 'power-containers' (e.g., the school) and what Rose and Miller (1992), advocates of a governmentality approach, understand as 'technologies'.

There is a risk of overstating the difference between neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches briefly described above. As Jessop (1990: 91) writes:

Although adherents of the movement to 'bring the state back in' sometimes suggest that their approach is both novel and somehow anti-Marxist in its implications, many so-called statist themes can also be found within the Marxist tradition.

This is especially true when one moves away from extreme positions on state autonomy (Jessop, 1990: 93). For example, both state-centred and neo-Marxist theorists suggest the state's need for tax revenue to finance its own projects and activities leads to policies that support capital accumulation which is, ultimately, the source of such revenues (Jessop, 1990: 93). An instance of this can be seen in the previous chapter in the work of Simmons and Keohane (1992). It will be recalled that while claiming to depart from neo-Marxist structuralist approaches, the authors of this particular study asserted the state has three general interests: (1) sustaining economic well-being for itself and society; (2) pursuing a rational-bureaucratic agenda; and (3) maintaining
legitimacy. Given that the state's economic well-being can be achieved in part through immigration policy (by creating and legitimating a docile labour source on behalf of capital) and by confiscating tax revenues from the resulting accumulation process, does this study embody an approach that is state-centred or neo-Marxist?

This lack of distinction is evident in another Canadian example. Ratner et al. (1987: 100), cited earlier, ask: "What are the state's sources of power to be able to achieve relative autonomy in a capitalist society?" In response the authors point to three basic sources: accumulation, storage, and distribution of information about the population that leads to far-reaching surveillance capacities; monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; and the state's contradictory character (1987: 100-104). But is this response remarkably different from one expected from the (state-centred) works of Mann (1986) or Giddens (1985)? It is in this theme of the logistics, techniques, and mechanisms of rule that some overlap between neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches becomes apparent as well.

There are, then, similarities or overlap among neo-Marxist, state-centred, and governmentality approaches. The originality of the latter approach adopted for this thesis, described in the pages that follow, should therefore not be overstated. Nor, however, should the findings that result be assumed irrelevant to these other traditions of thought. It will be prudent to keep similarities above in mind as the 'hows of rule' or, more
specifically, answers to the overarching question stated at the outset, 'How is the Canadian refugee regime constituted and governed?', are explored. Unlike neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches, and despite similarities and overlap, seeking these answers does not require placing the state at the centre of analysis.

DE-CENTRING THE STATE: A FOUGAUDIAN ALTERNATIVE

Just as the state as an object of inquiry had seemed to have become more important to historical sociology and social theory, through the varied work of Foucault (1977a), Smith (1987), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Bowles and Gintis (1986), Magnusson and Walker (1988), and several other writers in the 1980s, it underwent a de-centring (Mahon, 1991). This development occurred alongside a wider recognition of sites of politics and resistance outside the state, such as the workplace and the domestic sphere (Mahon, 1991). It should be made clear, however, that de-centring does not deny the state's existence. For example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 162) assert at one point that the creation of 'public spaces' is carried out not in the form of subordination. It is here that we have to look for the terrain on which numerous struggles emerge against bureaucratic forms of state power (emphasis added).

Similarly, Bowles and Gintis (1986: 184) write about Marxist theory's "overarching focus on class exploitation at the expense of more sustained attention to state despotism" (emphasis added). Nor does Foucault in his later writings on governmentality (cf. Foucault, 1991b), and writers such as Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller,
Vikki Bell, Ian Hacking, and Mitchell Dean who have drawn from them (see below), anywhere assert that the state does not exist. Instead, in their writings the state is seen more as the historical effect, resultant, or residue of governmental practice. Rather than denying its existence, the latter writers suggest the state be attributed less importance and attention directed beyond or behind it (cf. Valverde, 1994a: vii; See, for example, Rose and Miller, 1992: 189).

A critical alternative to approaches that focus on the state, then, is one inspired by Michel Foucault's later writings on 'governmentality', which he describes as the

...ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power... (Foucault, 1991b: 102)

on sexual harassment, O'Malley (1992) and O'Malley and Palmer (1996) on crime prevention, Simon (1994) on campus life, Murdoch and Ward (1997) on agriculture, and Walters (1994) and Dean (1995) on unemployment. As suggested in the previous chapter, neither the Canadian nor any other (international or national) refugee domain has been approached in the ways exemplified in these studies. Taken together these studies do not constitute a grand theory to be applied or confirmed (Valverde, 1996: 367). Instead, they have been described simply as a Lakatosian 'research programme' (Miller and Rose, 1995a: 592).

Some of these studies have focused on specific rationalities. Liberalism as a rationality of rule in its classical, welfare, and advanced modes has been explored to a considerable degree (cf. Minson, 1985; Dean, 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992; Burchell, 1993). Other studies have paid close attention to specific governmental technologies that complement liberal rationalities, such as accounting (Hopwood and Miller, 1994) and the public inquiry (Ashenden, 1996). Still others have centred on ethical self-formation (Foucault, 1993) or what Dean (1994c: 162) calls the 'self-self game' (e.g., Dean, 1995; Baistow, 1995; Cruikshank, 1994; 1996; Valverde, 1996). This 'third axis' (Dean, 1995: 560) refers to "practices, techniques, and discourse of the government of the self by the self by means of which individuals seek to know ...and act on themselves" (Dean, 1994c: 156). While making ethical self-formation intelligible is an important endeavour, this thesis limits its attention to governmental rationalities, technologies,
and knowledges in one sector or domain.\textsuperscript{12}

It is necessary to point out the significant differences between this Foucauldian approach, and the state-centred and neo-Marxist approaches above. As suggested, one of these concerns the state. Toward this end, Gordon (1991: 4) writes:

State theory attempted to deduce the modern activities of government from essential properties and propensities of the state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and to swallow up or colonize everything outside itself. Foucault holds that the state has no such inherent propensities; more generally, the state has no essence (emphasis added).

In his later writings, then, Foucault is not developing a general theory of the state (or of government), but is rather advocating analysis of how governmental power works, and through which techniques and schemes (Dean, 1994b: 179). In keeping with this, Rose and Miller (1992: 177) write:

[T]he state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a 'political sphere', with its particular characteristics of rule, from other 'non-political spheres' to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another.

Such an approach, then, avoids treating the state as an actor, as an anthropomorphic, essential entity. There is a move here from the state as an actor to

...a broader field identified by policies, programs, strategies, projects, and tactics; the 'practices' thus generated extend well beyond the traditional boundaries of the state apparatuses (Hunt, 1993: 311).

To employ the broadest of definitions, government is

...the historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies, and
manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances, or their environment (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).

It follows that analyses of governmental practice cannot be carried out in terms of the historical development of states and the accompanying concepts of law, legitimacy and sovereignty (Dean, 1994b: 179). The concept of 'social control',¹³ often associated with state theory and conventional political sociology (cf. Cohen, 1985; Cohen and Scull, 1983) is similarly inadequate. At present 'social control' is obscure and ill-used. Cohen (1985: 2) suggests that "[i]n everyday language, it has no resonant or clear meaning at all." Rothman (1983: 106) similarly writes: "For as much as the term is currently used, so often is it abused, pasted on with little or no effort at clarification." But the problem is not merely one of clarification or, as Mayer (1983) suggests, of a need to 'broaden' the concept to refer to the 'broader field' that Hunt (1993) mentions. Whatever analytical value the concept may still have, it is simply too blunt to connote the varied historical elements of particular governmental domains (cf. Hindess, 1996: 144-5). Indeed, proponents of this Foucauldian alternative explicitly seek to separate their endeavours from such a concept (cf. Valverde, 1994b: 25; Miller and Rose, 1988: 172; Rose, 1987: 72). Furthermore, if what has been termed 'advanced liberalism', a rationality of relevance to contemporary domains, attempts to "govern without governing society" (Rose, 1996a: 61), and tries instead to structure outcomes through the choices of independent agents, one wonders what the 'social' in 'social control' would
then refer to, if this latter concept were used. 'Regulation' is Hunt's (1993) term of choice. It too is more limited in its connotations than 'govern' in that it suggests control through the law exclusively. Seen this way, 'social control' and 'regulation', are perhaps better understood as particular ways of governing the conduct of human beings, rather than the only way. This Foucauldian approach focuses on how practices of government\(^4\) (and the accompanying categories of human beings they specify) are made possible by rationalities, technologies, programmes, and knowledges rather than, for example, their formal legal codification; how they represent political authorities' trans-historical quest for legitimacy; or how they exemplify 'social control' or 'regulation'.

This Foucauldian approach differs from conventional state-centred and neo-Marxist approaches in other important ways (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177-8). First, it differs in terms of sociological realism.\(^5\) The conventional approaches discussed in the first part of this chapter, other than those which draw from Gramsci, promote the discovery and identification of changes in, usually during specific periods, the actual configurations of and relations between individuals, groups, organizations, and events. Foucault's project (and the conceptual approach it has inspired), on the other hand, is as much "about the changing shape of the thinkable, as it is about the 'actually existing'" (Gordon, 1991: 8).

A second difference, related to the first, concerns a Foucauldian attention to knowledge (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177).
The production of knowledge is necessary for a domain to emerge and governmental practices are assumed dependent upon knowing their objects (Miller and Rose, 1988: 174; Hunt, 1993: 317-18). An analysis of government involves asking questions about what knowledges have emerged along with a regime or subsequent changes within it. In an analysis of government, the focus is not only on ideas, as in nineteenth century idealism, but also on more practical knowledges, what Rose and Miller (1992) call 'technologies'.

A third important difference concerns discourse. In most of the conventional approaches described above the necessary task would be to determine, for instance, how the language of political authorities or state agents mystifies, legitimizes, and covers over real objective state interests (e.g., capital accumulation or repression). In other words, there is a focus on discourse as the legitimation of power relations, as a kind of camouflage for the exercise of power. An analysis of government involves an interest in discourse, but this is not so much an attention to ideology as an attempt to discover and make intelligible "systems of thought and systems of action" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177). In the Canadian refugee regime there are undoubtedly striking discrepancies at certain sites and periods between, on the one hand, images of practices directed at refugees as seen, for example, in the accounts of authorities and, on the other, the practices themselves. This disjunction, however, is simply not the focus here: an analytic of governmental practice is not about
exploring the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality of the Canadian refugee regime.

Besides these differences, it should also be noted that this Foucauldian conceptual approach highlights the idea that government is dependent, not only on political authorities and state agents, but a variety of other kinds of authorities in the form of specific organizations, groups, and individual identities. Though this is widely acknowledged among state theorists (recall Carroll's (1992) description of Gramsci's formulation of power above), if previous research in the context of the refugee policy and practices is any example, this idea has been ignored. Dean (1994c: 152) writes:

This restriction to the state... ignores the multiplicity of agencies and authorities involved in the governance of the life-conduct of individuals, families, groups, and populations. This is clearly illustrated by the multiple and overlapping jurisdictions involving local, regional, national, international, and global authorities within which actors are located.

To be consistent with this, and as described in the next chapter, it is non-state authorities and agencies that some research procedures are directed at.

Miller (1987: 207) writes that governmentality "refers to the practices which characterize the form of supervision a state exercises over its citizens." As seen in chapters that follow, the targets of 'the form of supervision a state exercises' are not limited to 'citizens', if by 'citizens' Miller means self-regulating entities assigned legal citizenship status within a liberal order. It also extends to 'non-citizen' categories within and between the conceptual and territorial borders of nations.
Those human beings who occupy, seize, fall, or are forced into these categories may or may not be eventually transformed—primarily through resettlement programmes—into citizens.

What else should the approach described above attend to? First, governmental practices can be analyzed in terms of governmental rationalities. These rationalities are defined as:

the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects, and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among various sectors (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).

They include thoughts about the proper targets and limits of politics and the suitable allotment of tasks to various authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992). More specifically, a rationality is

...a way or system of thinking about the nature of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed) capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practised (Gordon, 1991: 3).

Rationalities are not merely theories or political philosophies. They neither automatically arise when political authorities consult their objective interests, nor do they come from some natural or essential capacity for making rational decisions. Instead, rationalities are historically developed—they come from the past—though not in unmodified forms (Dean, 1994b: 182). A rationality can be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition of governmental practice.

The other side of governmentality, alluded to earlier and consequently a focus of this approach, are technologies.
are instruments, means, and mechanisms that make different forms of rule possible (Dean, 1994b: 188). They include:

...techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the standardisation of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms... (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 8).

Technologies of government are assembled within particular programmes by rationalities. Technologies and rationalities are therefore complementary. A particular technology can be used for different purposes, depending on the rationalities they articulate with (Valverde, 1996: 358). Technologies are either logically or historically associated with specific rationalities (Valverde, 1996: 358). Concerning these technologies, a rough distinction can be made between "representation of and intervention into specific governmental domains" (Dean, 1994b: 188). In this way, governmental and scientific practice are analogous, as Hacking (1983: 31) writes:

Theories try to say how the world is. Experiment and subsequent technology change the world. We represent and we intervene. We represent in order to intervene, and we intervene in the light of representations...

As seen in chapter six, mundane technologies that represent and intervene have made the different sites of the Canadian refugee regime governable. Besides knowledge, then, governmental practices are made possible by rationalities and technologies.

Several other terms need to be defined before proceeding. One of these is 'programme'. 'Programmes' are idealized schema for the
ordering of social life (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 14). They articulate knowledge of a particular domain (Gordon, 1980: 243). Programmes "constitute a space within which the objectives of government are elaborated, and where plans to implement them are dreamed up" (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 14). Programmes are more than wishes or intentions of individual programmers (Gordon, 1980: 248). Programmes assume a sector of reality is "subject to certain determinants, rules, norms and processes that can be acted upon and improved by authorities" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 183). Governmental programmes and rationalities are translated into one another to form specific regimes (Miller and Rose, 1992: 181).

'Regime' is another important term, one which is consistent with Foucault's (1991a: 75) well-known phrase, 'regime of practices'. It is meant here to refer to an 'administrable domain'

...which is formed when it is possible to delineate a specific historical complex of various practices - including theoretical discourse, more 'practical' knowledges, state and non-state interventions, and administrative techniques - which constitute a relatively coherent and distinct field, with definite objects of knowledge and targets of intervention, specific agents, modes of organization, and aims (Dean, 1991: 221n).18

Canada's national economy is an example of a regime and, as the chapters that follow show, Canadian practices directed at refugees are another.

Another term used in the chapters that follow is 'discourse'- a central feature of a Foucauldian alternative. The term 'discourse' has several different meanings in the social sciences.19 This definitional issue is part and parcel of theoretical debates among proponents of competing theoretical
perspectives and about ontology or theories of reality. When considering the status of discourse, a central issue that has arisen is whether it should be considered as representational or constitutive (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 9; Eagleton, 1991: 206). In a representational understanding, discourse is assumed to represent, name, show, indicate, point to, stand for, or passively reflect, some underlying pre-existing reality (Eagleton, 1991: 206). In this conception, discourse is seen as something of a medium for reality to express itself. This means a recognized change in discourse (ie. the signifier) indicates or reflects a change in, most often, a political economic reality (ie. the signified). In this conception, discourse is strictly determined by power relations. This conception associated with classical Marxism is one I wish to explicitly reject.

The conception of discourse as constitutive, though relevant to the neo-Marxist class-conflict approach mentioned earlier, is most often associated with perspectives variously referred to as post-structuralist and post-Marxist. It is also associated with Foucault's writings and others who have extended his insights. With the emergence of perspectives under these labels, there has been a concomitant 'withering away' or 'displacement' of classical Marxist conceptions of ideology (Zhao, 1993: 82; Eagleton, 1991: 8; Hall, 1988: 51).20

As stated earlier, interest in discourse, in the approach adopted for this thesis, is not tantamount to an interest in ideology21 understood in the sense of pure legitimation of power.
relations. Instead, discourse is understood as performative and constitutive. Miller and Rose (1990a: 180) write that

...an analysis of political rationalities requires an attention to the constitutive role of language. The discourse of politics is more than mystification, legitimation or ideology, more than the thin surface of contact between social interests and the exercise of domination.

Valverde (1991b: 10) writes that discourses are "organized sets of signifying-practices that often cross the nineteenth-century boundary between 'reality' and 'language'." Conceiving of discourse as constitutive is therefore not tantamount to adopting an idealist and rejecting a materialist position (cf. Miller and Rose, 1995a: 592; Hall, 1988: 51; Minson, 1985: 122). As Valverde (1991b: 10) notes, in this conception of discourse

...language is not a transparent window giving access to the world but is rather itself a part of the world, a kind of object among objects, [an insight which] eliminates the old dichotomy between idealism and materialism.

Minson (1985: 124) similarly writes:

The radical bottom line of Foucault's reworking of the term 'discourse' is that knowledges are no longer to be regarded as part of the order of representation or signification. The idea is to treat discursive materials less as representing things on which they bear, than as means of attempting to organize them.

The knowledges that target refugees discussed in chapter six, for example, can be understood as discourses that seek to organize raw materials -bodies, conditions, processes, memories and so on- to form the object of a distinct assemblage of governmental practice. But discourses conceived in this way should not be seen as causal or determinative agents in their own right. Seeing them this way
comes close to seeing events as other than the outcome of human subjects. Though in later chapters analysis is pitched at the broad use of language, it does not necessarily follow that there is some automatic effect.

Discourses are constitutive in that they at once organize and help produce a world of social, political and material practices. 'Practices' can be defined as "common groupings of discourses and technologies" (Wickham, 1983: 480). 'Discourses' can be separated analytically from 'practices' while simultaneously recognizing they overlap and constitute one another (Ericson and Haggarty, 1997: 84). Understood in this sense, governmental rationalities are broad discourses, a 'sphere of language' that sets out in a programmed way, the proper means by which government of a particular population is to be carried out (Miller and Rose, 1990a: 166). Contemporary liberal rationalities, for example, presuppose that government is to be carried out in terms of 'policies', such as refugee policy, and directed at 'claimants' and 'clients', such as the refugee claimant.

Two more terms that will be used throughout the thesis need to be defined: 'refugee' and 'refugee claimant'. In this thesis I take 'refugee' not to signify a given or natural entity, but as the name of a historical construct. The status of 'refugee' is therefore directly analogous to 'madness', 'sexuality', and 'delinquency' in Foucault's well-known histories (i.e., 1965, 1978, 1977a), in that it is used without presupposing the essential characteristics presently attached to it. At present 'refugee' is
simultaneously an object of the exercise of governmental power and a contingent, historically constructed identity (hence the use later on of the admittedly awkward term 'object/identity'). As noted previously, this is definitely not how previous research has understood 'refugee'. In this regard and in the chapters that follow, therefore, it will be useful to keep in mind the United Nations Convention definition adopted by Canada in 1969, which is as follows:

Any person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, (a) is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or, (b) not having a country of nationality is outside the country of his former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to return to that country (UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 as cited in Dirks, 1984: 280).

'Refugee claimant', a category that has emerged more recently, is also at once an object of governmental practice and a contingent, historically constructed identity. It refers to human beings who have claimed Convention refugee status under Canadian law and are awaiting determination. These persons may or may not eventually be determined to be refugees following their processing through the Canadian refugee determination system.

Finally, one might ask how it is this Foucauldian alternative to neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches is critical, especially given its rejection of the concept of ideology. Toward this end, Foucault (1988b: 154) writes:

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on
what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest.

Though this issue is taken up in the next chapter, it should be noted here that the Foucauldian approach adopted in the chapters that follow is critical in that it is genealogical, and that genealogy is a form of 'exemplary' critique (Owen, 1995).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There is overlap between a Foucauldian approach and at least some neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches (the latter two also overlap) in terms of an attention to discourse as constitutive, the mechanisms of rule, the role of non-state authorities, and historical specificity. In this way the Foucauldian alternative outlined in this chapter, that looks beyond or behind the state toward knowledges, rationalities, technologies, and programmes, can be understood to have the potential to address some themes found within research that has placed the state at the centre of analysis. The next chapter discusses methods and research procedures appropriate to such an approach.
1. Significantly, a recent issue of *Economy and Society* was devoted to studies that involved "articulating elements of the governmentality literature with aspects of other traditions (most notably feminism and Marxism)" (Pearce and Valverde, 1996: 307). Pearce and Valverde (1996: 309) describe the distinction made between a Foucauldian alternative and these more conventional approaches as sometimes "hostile."

2. In keeping with the effort to point out links between neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches and a Foucauldian alternative in this chapter, it should be noted that in his later writings Poulantzas drew directly from Foucault's writings (Jessop, 1990). In a chapter within his larger work on state theory, Jessop goes as far as to suggest that Poulantzas "actually was far less 'Marxist' and far more 'Foucauldian' than most of his critics suggest" (Jessop, 1990: 223).

3. Mahon (1991: 121) suggests this common portrayal of the debate as instrumentalist-structuralist oversimplifies the position of Miliband, and that the Marxist debate in the 1970s was instead about how to conceive of 'relative autonomy'.

4. For excellent summaries of the various positions regarding the relative autonomy of the state, see Ratner et al. (1987: 85-125), Jessop (1990: 79-104), or Albo and Jenson (1989).

5. Renewed interest in Gramsci is undoubtedly as much a response to the failings and deficiencies of classical Marxism as the writings of Foucault and his followers. It seems that for advocates such as Hall (1988), however, pointing to faults in classical Marxism sometimes is not enough to justify a turn to Gramsci, and it is then that Foucault is taken out to the shed and placed in position of 'whipping boy' (Foucault has been placed in such a position by advocates of different approaches but for similar reasons- see Ashley (1990) on Jurgen Habermas or Nancy Fraser (1989)). Those taking Foucauldian insights seriously are alleged to have been placed under the spell of their "permanently radical gloss", "gospel", or "magical terms" (Hall, 1988: 52), the latter of which, when compared to Gramsci's concepts, are alleged to be "thin, undernourished abstractions" (Hall, 1988: 56). In this chapter, instead of resorting to this kind of sniping, coupled with grand pronouncements of the "superiority" (Hall, 1988: 53) of one thinker's concepts (including Foucault's) over all others, I attempt to point out some links between conventional approaches and a Foucauldian approach- the reader is left to decide questions of superiority. It should be said, however, that while Hall (1988) grants some importance to Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish* in lending insight into Thatcherism as a discursive formation, he might have discussed Foucault's later writings on governmentality and the similar direction that Gramsci's writings and the Foucauldian alternative discussed in this chapter can be taken. For an example of a study that uses
Gramscian and Foucauldian insights, see Pearce and Tombs (1996). Hall's treatment of Foucault's writings here is expressive of how the latter has been received and criticized in Britain generally (Gordon, 1996). Parenthetically, it was not the polished, Judeo-Christian, or mystic qualities of Foucault's writings that seduced and led me to adopt a governmentality approach, it had more to do with certain experiences.

6. The need for such a shift was an illusion because the state had already been a subject within historical sociology where it was explored in its concrete forms across time and in a loose comparative way (cf. Eisenstadt, 1963; Moore, 1966; Anderson, 1974; Tilly, 1975).

7. While Jessop (1990: 278) uses the term 'anti-Marxist' to refer to a wide variety of writings that centre on the state, it should be emphasized that some of these approaches are sympathetic to Marxism. The irony here is that Jessop's (1990) own strategic-relational approach has been criticized precisely because it is difficult to see in what way it is Marxist (Block, 1992: 872).

8. It could also be referred to as bureaucratic power, which is, of course, associated with Weber's trenchant analyses of the bureaucratic state. What seems to underlie attention paid to this form of power, at least in the work of Mann (1988) and Giddens (1985), is a suggestion that the aim of critical social theory cannot be limited to aiding the neo-Marxist goal of a transformation from capitalism to socialism (or hypothetical radical transformations associated with gender, ethnicity and race), that it must also address an associated potential for totalitarianism (Giddens, 1985: 294-341; cf. Arendt, 1973). This suggestion is misplaced, at least at this historical juncture—'advanced liberal' government (see chapter five) relies upon domains of freedom that must not be hindered by political authorities.

9. This seems to be the main point of a recent neo-Marxist critique (Curtis, 1995) of Rose and Miller (1992).

10. Foucault's (1977a) popular work on disciplinary power and the prison, as well as several earlier works, of course, are not entirely consistent with his later writings on governmentality. Despite this, Giddens (1984; 1987) uses the former popular work to argue that disciplinary power is merely a type of administrative power. Giddens depicts Foucault (1977a) in a manner that would not fit what is described here as a Foucauldian alternative. It is similarly interesting that Mahon (1991) -cited earlier in this chapter- attempts to resurrect state theory through Jessop (1990) and along the way conveniently refers only to Foucault (1977a), rather than his later writings.

12. This thesis is not focused on ethical self-formation specifically or those undoubtedly most directly affected by the Canadian refugee regime generally. These would include asylum-seekers prevented from seeking refuge in Canada or at its posts abroad, those who seek refuge but are systematically prevented from making claims or deemed not to be refugees and, lastly, those deemed to be refugees by determination or selection practices abroad and who are then resettled in Canada. Exploring the practices of human beings who occupy, seize, or fall into these categories carried out upon their selves would be worthwhile, not merely in Canada during 'adaptation', as in resettlement research that examines their mental health (e.g., Johnson and Beiser, 1994), but rather before and after using a Foucauldian approach. Doing so would be fraught with significant logistical problems (see Yu and Liu (1986) for a discussion of such problems in an American context), however, including locating those willing to relate their perceptions of their practices. It is because of such problems that interviews for this thesis were limited to focusing on other authorities of various types (see chapter three) who were more accessible.

13. The intellectual roots of the term 'social control' lie in nineteenth century classical sociology (Cohen, 1985: 5). Cohen and Scull (1983: 5) relate that "the concept of social control was at the centre of the enterprise-- both in relating sociology to political philosophy and in solving the emergent debates of macrosociology." During this period it referred "to the capacity of a social group to regulate itself." The use of the term in this sense continues but along the way it has been re-defined to refer to "either socialization or social repression" (Janowitz, 1975: 82). In the early twentieth century thought of G.H. Mead and E.A. Ross, the term 'social control' was used to refer to "how people associated together to perform common endeavours, how voluntaristic cooperation marked social activity" (Rothman, 1983: 107). Rothman (1983: 108) points out: "At its birth, something very conservative clung to the notion of social control, both in its content and its orientation" and that "those ready to explore the concept wished to understand the roots of order, not to examine the roots of change, and certainly not to foment change" (Rothman, 1983: 108). The members of the Chicago school of the 1920s and 1930s fostered the understanding of social control as socialization, particularly as it applied to the conduct of new immigrants in America. It is through such American sociology that the "connection between social control and a contemplation of the state became weaker and weaker"
(Cohen, 1985: 5). After a hiatus in the early 1940s, the concept of social control came back into use (cf. Parsons, 1951). By the 1960s, mostly through sociologists associated with the societal reaction (or 'labelling') perspective (e.g., Becker, 1963), the connotations of coercion, conflict, and repression were attached to social control (Rothman, 1983: 109). The use of the term in this latter sense, of course, has continued in the tradition of the 'new' or neo-Marxist criminology of the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Ratner and McMullan, 1983). At present the meaning of social control remains unclear. I doubt that if 'deviant behaviour', on which concepts of 'social control' tend to rely, were defined (cf. Cohen, 1985; Horwitz, 1990) that this would clearly demarcate differences in meaning. The concept of 'deviant behaviour' was left behind in the early 1970s (Summer, 1990), 'social control' ought to be thrown into the conceptual dustbin with it.

14. There is some variance in the terms used in the governmentality literature. For example, Hunt (1993) uses 'regulate' and Hunter (1988), Rose (1990), and Dean (1995) use 'govern'. Regarding a recent 'Rethinking Regulation' workshop, Valverde (1994b: v) writes that "[o]ne of the recurring debates... concerned the implications and connotations of choosing to use a term such as 'governance' as opposed to terms such as 'regulation' and 'social control'" (See Valverde (1994b: 25-26) for an excerpt from one such debate).

15. One might notice an absence of the terms 'description', 'explanation', and 'cause' associated with realist social science in the text of this thesis. To be consistent with a Foucauldian alternative I have used 'make intelligible', 'make sense of', 'elucidate', and 'conditions of possibility' throughout. The word 'undoubtedly' is a similar device that is agreeable with the latter approach whenever reality needs to be referred to.

16. This approach is reacting to a classical Marxist view of ideology as static and expressive, as coming directly out of objective social interests. Were it a reaction to much recent concrete neo-Marxist research, including that which draws on Gramsci, it would be inappropriate. In this sense the foil chosen is admittedly a facile one.

17. While Dean (1994b: 187-8) briefly distinguishes among technologies, techniques, and intellectual technologies of government, for simplicity 'technologies' is used in chapter six. What the introduction of 'intellectual technologies' suggests, however, is that the difference between governmental rationalities and technologies is not a straightforward mental-manual one because this distinction can apply to technologies themselves (Dean, 1994b: 188).

18. Mitchell Dean takes 'administrable domain' from Castel (1988) who coined it in his study of psychiatry in France. 'Regime' is also a theoretical concept widely used in the field of
international relations (See, for example, Skran, 1995: 7; Walker, 1993: 163) which, given the discussion of international programmes in chapter four, is fitting. See Keeley's (1990) excellent attempt to develop the concept of 'regime' in the context of international relations.

19. Discussion of this term arose in a 'Rethinking Regulation' workshop (mentioned in endnote 14; see Valverde (1994b)) attended by several major proponents of a governmentality approach. This suggests it is necessary to discuss this term a bit further here.

20. In studies of ideology of the neo-Marxist variety there has been a move toward seeing discourse as constitutive (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). This is seen much earlier in the work of Althusser (1971), but also more recently in the writings of many neo-Marxists as varied as Hall (1988) and Jessop (1990). In this understanding, ideology is seen as a material process, whereby it becomes forceful through other practices (MacDonell, 1986). This conception of ideology is consistent with elaborate, sustained responses to the 'end of ideology' thesis (See Eagleton, 1991; Zhao, 1993; Simons and Billig, 1994).

21. I began this thesis intending to use a concept of ideology in the context of a non-class realm, the nation-state system generally and the Canadian refugee regime specifically. Zhao's (1993: 79) statement that "[i]deology not only works along class lines, but also along other axes, for example, sex, race, and nation-state" (my emphasis) supported this intention. Despite numerous attempts, however, I failed to arrive at an adequate understanding of the essential functions of the state as they relate to refugee policy and practices and I therefore abandoned the idea of using a concept of ideology.

22. To the extent that it is concerned with how objects/identities of government are made possible, this approach is consistent with the philosophical doctrine of dynamic nominalism (cf. Hacking, 1986).

23. Giddens (1990b: 214) goes as far as to say that "Foucault's history tends to have no active subjects at all. It is history with the agency removed." This is a misplaced criticism as Foucault's later writings are inconsistent with it. As Gordon (1991: 5) writes: "In his 1982 essay 'The subject and power', Foucault affirms, on the contrary, that power is only power... when addressed to individuals who are free to act in one way or another. Power... presupposes rather than annuls their capacity as agents." Power associated with liberalism, for example, works through these capacities.

24. The term 'political rationality' is also used in governmentality studies.
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD AND RESEARCH PROCEDURES

So far in this thesis I have discussed previous research about Canadian refugee policy and practices and an appropriate critical conceptual approach to study these topics. In this chapter I elaborate a method and research procedures for this thesis. In the introduction I mentioned Foucault's methods of discourse analysis and genealogy. Now I should like to say more about them. Following this I discuss the research procedures carried out to respond to the research question(s) posed earlier.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

I mentioned 'discourse analysis' in the introduction and discussed 'discourse' in chapter two. Like 'discourse', 'discourse analysis' has a variety of meanings. Seidel (1987), for instance, describes no less than seven forms of political discourse analysis. It will be recalled that Creese (1991) and Barsky (1994), mentioned in chapter one, both employed discourse analysis, one a content analysis of Canadian news articles about refugees and the other a Bakhtinian analysis of Canadian refugee determination hearing transcripts. These types of discourse analysis, however, are not what I have in mind here. Because of this, it is obviously important to elaborate what I mean by 'discourse analysis'. Toward this end, it is worth repeating Potter and Wetherell's (1994) instructive typology of four basic kinds of 'discourse analysis'. The first type of discourse analysis Potter and Wetherell describe stems from what is known as speech act theory. Such analysis examines the way conversational exchanges are organized.
The second type is firmly established in the discipline of psychology and examines the structure and effects of discourse on, for example, an individual's ability to recall and understand specific items on a questionnaire. The third stems from the sociology of science and explores how scientific authorities attempt to make their accounts persuasive. The fourth type of discourse analysis is exemplified by the early work of Foucault (1971), who refers to his distinctive 'archaeology' as 'discourse analysis' (Potter and Wetherell, 1994). This type is also commonly referred to as 'semiology' or 'post-structuralism' (cf. Barthes, 1973, 1977; Derrida, 1976). The kind of discourse analysis employed in this thesis is most akin to this last type.\textsuperscript{3}

So what does this type of discourse analysis entail? To identify a discourse an analyst should look for

recurringly used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events, and other phenomena... [often] organized around specific metaphors and figures of speech (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 149).

It involves exploring, broadly, what is common in a set of materials and then finding out how these discourses work to constitute particular domains. Since a discourse is less than everything that is said and written, not all talk and text falls into one or another discourse (Minson, 1985: 124). An analyst, therefore, should not expect to find entire discourses in a set of materials, but rather 'pieces of discourse' (Parker, 1990a: 193).

Discourse analysis is not tantamount to the notion of refusing to accept the image of the world that it presents of itself, associated with, for example, the sociologist Mills (1959). The
concern here is not with images (or ideologies) of the world. The effort is not to 'scrape off the surface' or 'peel back the layers' to reveal an essence lying underneath images or discourses. If discourses are understood as constitutive, then there is a sense in which there is nothing underneath. A discourse analyst is interested in constitution, not in image. To deploy our previous metaphor, it is not the shadow that the door casts that is interesting to the discourse analyst, it is the door itself: what is it made of and how does it work?

GENEALOGY

Genealogy was also mentioned in the introduction. What does it entail (cf. Foucault, 1977b; Drefus and Rabinow, 1983; Minson, 1985; Poster, 1989; Leonard, 1990; Wickham, 1990; Prado, 1995; Viskar, 1995)? First and foremost, genealogy should be understood as a form of critique (Sarup, 1993). The neo-Marxist studies in chapter one involve what is termed 'legislative' critique (Owen, 1995). They are critical by their reference to Marxist humanist values or scientific laws. Genealogy cannot be critical in this way because it does not recognize, for example, an explicit system of laws (Owen, 1995: 492). It cannot draw on laws for purposes of critique because it has nothing to fashion them with in the first place (Owen, 1995: 492). Genealogy is instead an instance of 'exemplary' critique (Owen, 1995). In Foucault's studies, genealogy exemplifies the value of autonomy by what it says and by what it shows (Owen, 1995: 491).

More specifically, genealogy "attempts to reveal the
multiplicity of factors behind an event and the fragility of historical forms" (Sarup, 1993: 59). The principle historic forms at issue here are the Canadian refugee regime and the refugee object/identity. In Foucault's (1988b: 155) words, the aim of genealogy is to show "that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such." Connolly (1981: 155) writes that "genealogy strives to distance us from the rationale implicit in past and present practices." It attempts to do so without invoking the nostalgic, conservative suggestion that the past is a viable alternative to the present (Poster, 1989: 92). As Garland (1990: 136n) writes: "The point... is to cast light on a contemporary issue or institution by investigating those historical conditions that brought it about" in order to "problematicize and destabilize the present." A genealogist should focus on the 'emergence' and the 'descent' of an issue or, in this case, regime of practices (Prado, 1995: 36).

How does genealogy compare with orthodox history (cf. Foucault, 1977b: 152)? Although the alleged founders of sociology - Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber - engaged in historical inquiry (Skocpol, 1984), until the 1980s the relationship between sociology and the discipline of history could be described as a "dialogue of the deaf" (Burke, 1980: 13). At this point, however, historical sociology underwent a significant resurgence (cf. Abrams, 1982; Skocpol, 1984; Tilly, 1981). The historical sociology of the state mentioned in chapter two is part and parcel
of this development. Skocpol (1984: 362) identifies three major strategies used by historical sociologists: applying a given theoretical model to historical facts; discovering causal regularities that account for defined outcomes; and using concepts to construct a meaningful historical interpretation. Of the three, genealogy is most similar to this last type, in that it too rejects grand theoretical models (or Theory) and causal hypotheses present in the former two methods.

'Cause' is replaced in genealogical analyses by 'conditions of possibility', a phrase used throughout chapter four and, to some extent, five, to highlight Foucault's (1977b: 148-52) understanding of 'emergence'. In this way, genealogy can be seen to oppose history, if history is a quest for origins, or is essence-seeking (Foucault, 1977b: 144). It is the beginnings of the Canadian regime, not its 'origins', that are mostly discussed in chapter four. Like those of punishment (Foucault, 1977a), the purposes of what I call 'refugeeness' have not stayed the same over time. Genealogy, in other words, rejects "the idea that behind events is a guiding hand or set of regulatory principles that are the grand determinant of the present" (Prado, 1995: 33-4). Genealogy refuses, in Foucault words (1977a: 31), "the unity of the past in terms of the present."

The genealogical enterprise

is directed by questions of intelligibility rather than exhaustiveness, and seeks progressively to understand particular dimensions of the past, which are always open to revision and extension, rather than a complete reconstruction (Dean, 1991: 220; cf. Dillon, 1989).
Genealogy is, therefore, a modest project compared to much orthodox history in that it does not seek exhaustive reconstruction. Genealogy requires history, however, if the latter is understood as the collection and analysis of documents of the past (Prado, 1995). Whereas historical inquiries tend to adopt a style of writing characterized as a "narrative description of a sequence of events" (Giddens, 1990b: 213) or a "tracing of chronological developments" (Hewitt, 1983: 226), writing associated with genealogy can be organized around certain elements such as a particular programme or series of programmes, with only passing attention paid to sequence and chronology. The remaining chapters of the thesis are organized with this in mind.

How, then, does discourse analysis compare with genealogy? Discourse analysis or 'archaeology' is associated with Foucault's earlier and genealogy with his later writings (Macdonell, 1986; Bevis, Cohen, and Kendall, 1993). Genealogy requires 'archaeology' and adds a serial component (Dean, 1994d: 34): 'Archeology' is contained within genealogy. The two are, therefore, not contradictory methods (Connolly, 1981: 155).

Because governmental regimes are constituted by historical elements, such as specific rationalities, knowledges, and technologies, the overarching research question, 'How is the refugee regime constituted and governed?', is partly an historical one. The chapters that follow include suggestions -although very brief in places- about the emergence and descent of the constitutive elements of the present Canadian refugee regime.
Given this, it is genealogy, rather than discourse analysis, that best characterizes the general method deployed in this thesis. Overall this thesis is genealogical in that it problematizes, it questions, it calls into doubt, that which is assumed to have always been the case -the present Canadian refugee regime and refugee object/identity- by drawing attention to that which has made it possible (cf. Poster, 1989). To return to our metaphor one last time, in addition to the questions of the discourse analyst, the genealogist asks: where did the components -the hinges, knob, wood, lock, and screws- from this dismantled door come from?

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

With the above discussion in mind, coupled with a recognition that a Foucauldian approach does not insist on standardized research procedures, I carried out a variety of qualitative manoeuvres: I attended a conference, conducted interviews, sought out a variety of relevant documentary materials, including secondary historical sources, and searched several indices of the humanities and social sciences. The broad purpose of these procedures was to get to know the Canadian refugee regime, how it has changed, and to discover that which has made the regime and this change possible.

Refugee Conference

I attended, as an observer, a four-day bi-annual conference held in late May, 1995 by a national refugee advocacy organization. It was attended by over a hundred Canadian representatives of organizations, groups, and provincial and federal levels of state.
Attendance at this conference allowed for the identification of authorities and agencies active in the Canadian refugee regime; the creation of a common point of reference for interviews later on; and the collection of relevant documents of various groups and organizations available at a conference display table and not easily accessible otherwise.

Interviews

As suggested in chapters one and two, governmental practices directed at refugees are not restricted to the efforts and activities of state agents and political authorities. The interviews discussed below were, therefore, directed primarily at non-state agencies and authorities presently active in the Canadian refugee regime. More specifically the interviews (see Appendix II for the schedule) were intended: (1) to obtain a broad sense of the scope and features of the refugee regime; (2) to reveal rationalities, knowledges, forms of association, and technologies that constitute it; and, more pragmatically, (3) to facilitate access to documents of a given authority not available through other means that would also help to realize (1) and (2).

The interviews consisted of three basic parts. The first gathered background information about when a given authority or agency began to emerge and their practices in relation to refugees. The second part involved asking broad questions about their practices in relation to Canadian refugee policy, as well as, where relevant, their associations with other authorities in this regard. The third involved asking broad questions to encourage
interviewees to talk about various contemporary facets of Canadian refugee policy and their understanding of the refugee category. With regard to (2), it was assumed that relevant discourses would be present, although in 'pieces', in both the talk of these interviewees and in relevant documentary materials or texts. This is in keeping with Foucault's main emphasis: "a broad middle range (between spontaneous speech and abstract scientific theory)" (Dean, 1994d: 32), in that this talk was analyzed not in relation to its specific, concrete context (an interview situation with a university-affiliated researcher), but rather in a general way and 'pooled' with documentary materials or texts. The interviews were, therefore, thought of as one, rather than the source of data for this thesis.

To conduct these interviews as described I first had to identify prospective individuals, groups, and organizations with significant involvement in the Canadian refugee regime. Besides attending the conference, to accomplish this I consulted previous research described earlier (e.g., Simmons and Keohane, 1992; Hawkins, 1991), as well as Canadian newspaper articles, a Canadian associations directory (Associations Canada, 1995), and a directory of services (The Red Book, 1994) pertaining to the lower mainland area of British Columbia. Once several individuals, groups and organizations were identified, I then consulted these two directories, as well as relevant metropolitan telephone directories to find addresses and telephone numbers. When this procedure failed to produce a reasonable number of relevant groups,
organizations and individuals, I then contacted a spokesperson of one of the major refugee advocacy organizations (who later agreed to be interviewed) to request their extensive membership list that contained relatively up-to-date addresses, telephone numbers, and names of representatives. Early interviews sometimes also revealed names, addresses and telephone numbers (or only one of these) of additional prospective interviewees.

Once they were identified I contacted prospective interviewees by letter using University of British Columbia letterhead in which I identified myself; indicated the topic and purpose of the research; assured the confidentiality and anonymity of prospective interviewees; and indicated that an abstract of the final research report would be made available upon its completion (see Appendix I). Approximately one week after mailing the letter I telephoned these individuals to inquire about a response and to answer any questions raised by the letter. If the prospective interviewee's response was positive, I then arranged a time and place for the interview. Some groups and organizations had offices in the Vancouver area and, hence, representatives who could be interviewed. Others, however, had representatives or offices only in Ottawa-Hull, Toronto, Montreal or Winnipeg metropolitan areas (or several of these). To simplify access to these representatives, travel to these areas was required.

Following a brief introduction and the signing of the consent form (see Appendix II) by the interviewee, I asked their permission to audio-tape the interview to facilitate analysis. In the three
instances where interviewees were unwilling to be audio-taped, I took notes and elaborated them immediately following the interview. At the end of the interview, and only if it seemed appropriate at the time, I asked interviewees about relevant documents that might provide additional background or that described practices involving them and/or their organization or group.

By employing these research procedures described above, between May, 1995 and August, 1996, I conducted 48 interviews with individuals or representatives of groups and organizations with significant involvement -at the time of the interview- in the Canadian refugee regime. Interviewees resided in five provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, although there was a definite emphasis (31 of 48) on individuals and representatives of groups and organizations in the lower mainland area of British Columbia. The aim was not to generate a random sample, but to cover a wide range of important authorities and agencies active in the regime in part to obtain a sense of the regime's scope and features, how it had been changing, and those elements that have constituted it. Interviewees included prominent lawyers and academics/experts, as well as representatives of refugee-specific organizations, women's groups, Judeo-Christian organizations, immigrant settlement organizations, an anti-racist group, ethno-cultural organizations, international development and humanitarian organizations, and federal government bureaucracies and agencies. Most interviews were carried out at interviewee's places of work or residences, although several were conducted in
more public locations: three in coffee shops, and one each at a restaurant, high school, and university campus. The duration of interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to three hours, with the majority taking about an hour to complete.

Documentary Materials

I collected a variety of documents suggested by previous research on Canadian refugee policy and refugees, and by interviewees. These included: the White Paper, the Green Paper, government research reports, federal government commissioned public opinion polls, press releases, minutes of meetings, research proposals, speeches, pamphlets, as well as recent mission statements, correspondence, newsletters, legal briefs, and research reports associated with individuals, groups and organizations with significant involvement in the Canadian refugee regime. Of particular note here was the periodical, *Refuge*, which was consulted extensively. I also examined existing histories of international and Canadian refugee policy, several of which were cited in chapter one. This latter procedure is consistent with other studies in governmentality (e.g., Dean, 1991; Rose, 1984) and genealogical analyses generally.

Technologies and Knowledges

Within both interview and documentary data there were references made to particular technologies and knowledges. To explore technologies of government and knowledges I did not employ one particular research procedure. Instead, I pursued each in an *ad hoc* manner using whatever means were available.
For technologies, once identified, I made further inquiries about them. For example, an authority indicated during an interview that the creation of the documentation centres in Canada had been 'a major advancement' in refugee policy (interview 28/07/95). To learn more about this technology I arranged a two-hour guided tour of a centre with one of its practitioners during which I took fieldnotes. I then arranged an interview with an individual authority who had been intimately involved in the centres' development. In addition, I collected and drew from available accounts contained in previous research such as legal reports (e.g., LRCC, 1991; Houle, 1994). For other technologies, such as the refugee camp, inquiries were limited to consulting secondary sources.

To aid in the identification and examination of forms of knowledge produced about refugees I consulted several indices of the humanities and social sciences in electronic database (Sociofile, PAIS, and PsychInfo) and, since most do not cover the period that precedes 1980, their equivalent paper form (e.g., the paper equivalent of 'Sociofile' is 'Sociological Abstracts'). Together these indices cover an array of disciplines. For each I searched for the subject 'refugee' over the past three decades. From there I established which knowledges were represented in the generated records and when they emerged.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Genealogy, which requires discourse analysis and has a serial element, best describes the method used for this thesis.
Qualitative and varied best describe the research procedures for this thesis, as they include attending a conference, conducting interviews, accumulating relevant documents, and searching indices of the humanities and social sciences. In the chapters of the thesis that remain, the results of these procedures are presented.
1. How are technologies, the other side of governmentality, to be analyzed? Miller and Rose (1990b: 8) provide only limited insight here: "The analysis of such technologies of government requires a 'microphysics of power', an attention to the complex of relays and interdependencies which enable programmes of government to act upon and intervene upon those places, persons and populations which are their concern."

2. For another example of a study that employs this form of discourse analysis as it relates to media coverage of refugees—although in an American context—see Hufker and Cavender (1991).

3. Two terms often used in discussions of discourse analysis are 'discourse' and 'text'. It is important to distinguish the two. A discourse is actually realized in or finds its expression in text (Parker, 1990a: 194). One text, therefore, may be the expression or realization of several contradictory or competing discourses (Kress, 1985: 27). Discourse analysis is not meant to refer here to a method drawn from hermeneutics or, more specifically, the work of Gadamer (1975) (cf. Sharples, 1994). In drawing attention to discourse this thesis is not concerned with "the problem of meaning" (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 7).

4. It is important to note that, like 'the State', 'policy' is an historical effect of certain governmental rationalities. I used 'policy' to have a common point of reference for the interviews.

5. An alternative to this part of the interview would have been to observe authorities doing relevant refugee work (ie. determination, selection and resettlement). This would have presented great difficulties, not the least of which would have been the prohibitive cost and convincing university bureaucrats that such an activity would be in line with ethical guidelines.

6. I experienced several minor difficulties while conducting these interviews: Some interviewees were simply unwilling to be interviewed; prospective interviewees, after agreeing to an interview, failed to show up at the time and place agreed to; and several interviewees chose not to respond to the occasional question.

7. A positivist social scientist might refer to the resulting sample of interviewees as a nonprobability purposive sample (cf. Weisberg et al., 1989: 32-3).

8. When I directed inquiries to this authority and another whom I had not interviewed previously, I first identified myself, my university affiliation, and briefly described my research endeavour before asking questions about a given technology. I also had them read and complete a consent form.
9. It is, of course, bordering on the contradictory to use these databases "as a tool, a technological fix, that perfectly reproduces printed information" as though it will "provide a transparency of knowledge or data reproduction without any loss of meaning or corruption of text" (Poster, 1990: 96) and then in chapter six problematize determination practices in terms of the documentation centres that are highly dependent on similar databases.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME
AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY

Particular governmental domains emerge under certain conditions of possibility. Circumstances in apparently unrelated realms can converge to give rise to a new regime. The Canadian refugee regime is an example. At present it co-exists with a massive international refugee regime and regimes of other nations. In the area of refugee aid and development there is little distinction to be made between the two.\(^1\) In contrast, refugee selection, determination, and resettlement programmes are presently understood as national (ie. Canadian) and distinct from the continuing international governance of refugee crises and situations.\(^2\) While the Canadian regime really only began to emerge with the release of the White Paper on Immigration in 1966, an international regime had already begun to take shape around the time of the First World War and had fully formed by the mid-1960s. While the Canadian regime is the main focus of this thesis, the formation of this international refugee regime and its object warrants some attention in order to show how it was to become a condition of possibility under which the Canadian regime could begin to emerge. At the same time, discussion of the formation of the international refugee regime presents an opportunity to examine the relevance of concepts and themes drawn from the governmentality literature in analyzing an international (as opposed to a national) regime. The latter has been ignored in studies in governmentality, remaining the sole preserve of 'international relations theory'.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the emergence of the international regime and its object, the refugee,\(^3\) as well as Canada's (mostly lack of) participation within this regime as a nation from the First World War to the 1960s. Some concepts and themes drawn from the governmentality literature are then elaborated in the context of this international regime. Finally, other conditions of possibility for the emergence of a Canadian refugee regime — during a period between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s — are elaborated: a renewed concern about Canada's population size and composition; a recognized scarcity of desired labour in the West for the national capitalist economy; and a renewed interest in becoming an influential citizen in the community of nations.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century Europeans did not regard large masses of human beings forced to migrate to seek refuge from persecution as experiencing victimization of a kind distinguishable from other forms of oppression (Marrus, 1985: 8). As the historian Marrus (1985: 8) writes:

> People were used to being ruled by foreigners of one sort or another in the days when the next valley or a nearby town was 'foreign' in most respects. Assuming refugees survived to find refuge, their trials merged with the history of Jews, Moriscos, Protestants and Catholics, other resident aliens, or whomever; they would not have understood our modern preoccupation with a condition they shared— that of the refugee.

Zolberg et al. (1989: 3), in discussing this matter in regard to the late nineteenth century, similarly note: "The need for precise categories did not arise under conditions of unlimited immigration, and so the distinction was not made explicit." But while these
Europeans may not have 'understood our modern preoccupation' with the refugee condition, and there may not have been a 'need for precise categories' during or before this period, it is my contention that there is a sense in which there was no refugee condition and no such distinction to be made. Put simply, there were no refugees until the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. At first this may appear startling, for it seems to suggest oppression, migration, war, mental illness, impoverishment, physical torture and death—all those things presently associated with the refugee condition—did not exist before this period. This is not my intention. Nor is it to argue that refugees are 'social constructions'—as that phrase has come to be understood—, that they had always existed, but increasingly came to be recognized by Western authorities only after this period. Instead, this statement is meant to convey the notion that before the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, one simply could not be a refugee as one can be one today, that it was not an 'opportunity' that presented itself. It is to say that after the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries refugees came into being at the same time as the category of refugee was being invented, that the two went hand in hand (cf. Hacking, 1986: 228).

During the nineteenth century there were no significant administrative barriers to migration between nations in Europe (Marrus, 1985: 92). Regarding Britain, for example, the historian Porter (1979: 4) writes:

For the best part of the nineteenth century... the British government deliberately denied itself any control
over immigration, and appeared indeed for the most part to take no interest in it.

There were a few individuals, known as 'exiles', during this period. However, upon becoming such, these individuals tended to be well-received by political authorities and the citizenry of liberal European nations (Sjoberg, 1991: 24; Marrus, 1985: 14-15).

A somewhat glaring exception to this was briefly seen in Britain in the mid-Victorian period when legislation to bar their entry appeared. But even at this point, as Porter (1979: 3) notes:

...these Acts were considered to be justified only by very extraordinary circumstances, and in 'normal' times it was not thought proper that governments should have any powers at all to exclude or expel aliens, except under extradition treaties for crimes committed abroad. Consequently from 1826 until 1848, and again from 1850 to 1905, there was nothing on the statute book to enable the executive to prevent aliens from coming and staying in Britain as they like.

This short-lived 1848 British legislation was not an element of a programme that imagined doing something about masses of innocents forced to seek refuge, entities who now would be understood as refugees. Around the time of the First World War, however, something quite remarkable started to happen. An international refugee regime and the refugee, a domain and a 'kind' of person never seen before, began to emerge.

THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME

Immediately following the First World War international relief organizations such as the Red Cross, Near East Relief, the American Relief Administration, and Save the Children Fund delivered relief to the thousands in Europe who had left Russia after the Russian Revolution, civil war, and famine (Simpson, 1939: 198-9). But
relief resources were nearing exhaustion (Sjoberg, 1991: 24-5; Marrus, 1985: 58) and these masses could not simply be repatriated to Russia because of a 1921 All Russian Central Executive Committee decree that revoked Soviet citizenship for those who had resided outside the Soviet Union for greater than five years or had left Russia after November 7, 1917 without permission (Kaprielan-Churchill, 1994: 283; Marrus, 1985: 88).

Thousands of those receiving relief were without valid passports. These documents had become widely required again for travel from one nation to another at the start of the War (Gordenker, 1987: 20; Cohen, 1987: 145; Marrus, 1985: 92). Passports were required before this, of course, including within the territories of Tsarist and Ottoman Empires, but when travelling from one European nation to another they generally were not essential (Marrus, 1985: 92). Because of this sudden development, these masses experienced severe difficulties living and working in a particular European nation or migrating to another (Kaprielan-Churchill, 1994: 283). Among the varied authorities already dealing with these masses, this was deemed a technical problem requiring a practical solution. Though there was no fanfare surrounding it, a new type of organization and a new 'kind' of person were about to be brought into being in Europe.

In response to this problem, in February, 1921, a meeting was held by the International Committee of the Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies (Simpson, 1939: 199). It was decided at this meeting that an office of High Commissioner for Refugees should be
created under the League of Nations. The Office of the "High Commissioner on behalf of the League in connection with the problems of Russian refugees in Europe" (Sjoberg, 1991: 25) was subsequently created in September, 1921 (Simpson, 1939: 198). Within the Office programme, besides coordinating the delivery of relief, the Office was imagined easing the resettlement of Russians who had no identity documents and were being refused entry by other nations (Sjoberg, 1991: 26). This was to be accomplished through the invention of an identity document for refugees, the 'Nansen Passport' or 'Nansen Certificate' (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994; Marrus, 1985: 94). The League Office was to become involved in the examination and screening of refugees, and the issuing of this document. From there, refugees were foreseen being admitted to live and work in nations such as France and Belgium (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 303). The use of this special passport gradually expanded. In 1924, thirty-eight nations were accepting these documents for Armenians who were without national passports following their flight from Armenia and by 1928 fifty-one nations had agreed to issue and recognize this document for Russians (Marrus, 1985: 94-5).

A condition of possibility for the emergence of an international refugee regime was the rise of the unique features of the European nation-state form (Zolberg, 1983), one of which was citizenship. A notion of citizenship began to be developed earlier within what has been termed the 'absolutist state' form (Anderson, 1974), but it was in the nation-state that it was fully realized
(Giddens, 1985: 83-121). Before this, persons did not necessarily understand themselves as citizens, as Giddens (1985: 210) writes:

In many cases the mass of the population of traditional states did not know themselves to be 'citizens' of those states, nor did it matter particularly to the continuity of power within them.

With the rise of the nation-state form also came intensively surveilled borders where there were previously only frontiers (Giddens, 1985: 4). One way that both citizenship and the policing of borders associated with the nation-state form were made possible was through the invention of the passport. Though there were undoubtedly other conditions of possibility of the rise of an international refugee regime, none of which will be discussed here, it is the case that without the passport and the prevalence of notions of citizenship and borders there would not have been a technical problem in this instance demanding a practical solution.

The principles for the Office that were laid down by the League in 1921 included "protection of certain classes of refugees" (Simpson, 1939: 192). From the outset, the Office's programme imagined not a universal category of person, but specific groups defined by ethnicity or nationality. In fact, throughout the 1920s the Office's programme was limited to several specific groups, at first Russians, and beginning in May, 1924, Armenians (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 284). Another principle established in 1921 was that League intervention would be "'on a temporary basis.'" (as cited in Simpson, 1939: 192). The programme associated with this Office did not address a permanent problem requiring continuous intervention (Sjoberg, 1991: 37). The High Commission Office had
only a ten-year mandate. It was inconceivable at this juncture that the specific refugee problems being targeted would continue beyond this period (Sjoberg, 1991: 37). This first programme was exceedingly modest. In 1922, for example, the High Commissioner was to be granted a trivial operating budget of four thousand francs and no salary (Simpson, 1939: 200).

It was another explicit principle of this League Office's programme that private international voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross and others mentioned above would continue to have responsibility for funding the relief effort (Sjoberg, 1991: 25; Marrus, 1985: 89; Holborn, 1975: 7). 'Continue', because immediately before the creation of the League Office, for example, during the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, "it was the International Red Cross that organized assembly camps, provided food, set up disinfecting stations and supplied transport for repatriates" (Marrus, 1985: 88). As the historian Sjoberg (1991: 227) writes: "At the time of the outbreak of World War One all help for refugees was still based on private philanthropic efforts" (cf. Bramwell, 1988: 2). Relief to maintain refugees' lives was not funded through public donations of Western nations, later in the 1920s, either; it remained a philanthropic endeavour financed through private donations, with the Office merely coordinating delivery among organizations of various types. This public/private opposition, this discursive fact, will be seen again and again within programmes targeting the international refugee. Its significance is discussed later in this chapter.
In the late 1920s another agency, the Nansen International Office for Refugees, replaced the first League Office (Sjoberg, 1991: 37). The new Office was "concerned with Russian, Armenian, and some smaller groups of Refugees" (Simpson, 1939: 191). The League Assembly of 1931 set the last day of 1938 as the date of its termination (Simpson, 1939: 207). Two other organizations created by the League Assembly followed: the 'Nansen International Office for Refugees' and the 'High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany'. Each of these League organizations was also created as temporary (Sjoberg, 1991: 28). In May, 1939 a final League organization, the 'High Commissioner for Refugees under the protection of the League of Nations', was established on a similar temporary basis: It was planned to last only five years (Sjoberg, 1991: 37). There was never an attempt associated with these League organizations to create a general definition of a refugee (Sjoberg, 1991: 37-38). At this point refugee problems were atypical, ethnic or nationality-specific, and limited to Europe. There is a sense in which there were no permanent refugee problems outside Europe until the 1950s.

By sending a one-time twenty-five thousand dollars to the High Commissioner for Refugees to provide housing and food in the field in September, 1922 —the first year of the operation of the Office—Canada had provided some temporary, limited public funding (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 293-4). Canadian authorities, however, refused to accept the Nansen Passport created under this Office (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 285). Their rationale for this
refusal centred on 'returnability' or the capacity to deport holders of the Nansen Passport after their admittance to Canada. The suggestion was that if such individuals stepped off the path to becoming liberal citizens once in Canada, they could not be easily disposed of (See Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 286-92). An official of the Canadian Dominion later signed an agreement at a European conference on the matter of Nansen Passports in 1926, but unlike other Western nations whose representatives had signed, Canadian Parliament did not immediately ratify the agreement (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 286). Instead, authorities of the Dominion made clear they would accept holders of these documents only if they could be admitted under the same conditions and through the same mechanisms as immigrants (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 286-7). As the historian Kaprielian-Churchill (1994: 288) writes:

Refugees, the Immigration Department held, must comply with all regulations governing voluntary immigrants, including the valid passport ruling. They were not to be 'considered apart from other ordinary immigrants'.

From the creation of the first League Office in the 1920s through to 1959, Canadian state officials did not keep refugee-specific statistics or records (Simpson, 1939: 489; Vernant, 1953: 557; Fairclough, 1963: 2; Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 298; Canada, 1995b: 1; cf. Dirks, 1977: 228-30) and it was not until the early 1970s that there was to be a refugee-specific category in Canadian law and a refugee-specific state agency. As Dirks (1995: 61) writes:

For most of Canada's immigration history, neither politicians nor officials made any distinction between immigrants and refugees. The reasons for people's
departures from their homelands seldom interested officials responsible for processing those who wanted to settle in Canada.

During the 1920s Canadian officials selected and admitted Mennonites from Russia (Dirks, 1977: 38-9) and over one thousand Armenians (Karpielian-Churchill, 1994). But while both admitted groups have been referred to as refugees by Canadian Department of Immigration officials and Canadian historians (e.g., Dirks, 1977; Karpielian-Churchill, 1994) since the emergence in the late 1960s and early 1970s of a Canadian regime, it is important to recognize that they were selected and admitted to fill immigrant categories—themselves deemed either to have fulfilled immigrant requirements themselves and/or to have had an immigrant sponsor within Canada at the time (Karpielian-Churchill, 1994: 303). This suggests that for most of the twentieth century there is a sense in which there were no Canadian refugees. By 1938 the Nansen Refugee Passport had not been recognized by Canadian political authorities, nor had the 1926 international agreement been ratified in Parliament (Karpielian-Churchill, 1994: 292).

Following an international conference in Evian, France in March, 1938 the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was established (Sjoberg, 1991: 13). The IGCR was not part of a larger programme to deal with refugees as a universal category. Like the previous League organizations it targeted specific groups, namely the thousands of German and Austrian Jews fleeing Nazi-dominated territories (Rystad, 1989: 8). The IGCR programme foresaw resettling these groups, in part by seeking to mediate between
German political authorities and representatives of European nations of potential resettlement (Sjoberg, 1991: 14). The IGCR was the first international refugee agency created on a permanent foundation (Sjoberg, 1991: 13).

In 1943 this agency was re-organized and its mandate broadened to deal with all refugees from the continuing Second World War (Rystad, 1989: 8). The IGCR became at this point the first refugee programme in the modern West to deploy a 'universal' definition of a refugee (Rystad, 1989: 8). It was not geographically universal, however, as the definition continued to be limited to 'events in Europe' (Sjoberg, 1991: 16). The IGCR was not expected to become "a powerhouse of assistance and protection" (Gordenker, 1987: 22), but this programmatic re-organization does mark the first time regular public or state funding was explicitly marked for actual refugee relief (Sjoberg, 1991: 16). The IGCR, despite having been established as permanent, was dissolved in July, 1947 (Holborn, 1975: 30). What is important, however, is that it was expected to be permanent when it was invented, indicating assumptions about international refugee problems and refugees were changing.

Canadian delegates attended the conference in Evian, France in 1938 along with representatives of thirty-two other nations. According to the historian Skran (1995: 213):

The Canadian delegation adopted the position that it was prepared to participate in a discussion of the refugee question, but under no circumstances would it agree to a special admissions quota for refugees.

For Canadian political authorities, then, the 'refugee question' at this point continued to be regarded as a European problem, not one
that demanded assistance through resettlement from non-European nations such as Canada (Kelley, 1987: 5). Canada was a member of the IGCR until its expiration (Dirks, 1977: 102).

The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created in November, 1943 by representatives of forty-four nations in the midst of the Second World War (Gordenker, 1987: 22). Though in recent years this organization has been depicted as a prototype of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), an organization discussed below, the UNRRA was not explicitly associated with a refugee programme. Easing the resettlement of refugees outside their nation of origin, for example, was not part of this organization's mandate (Gallagher, 1989: 579). As Gordenker (1987: 22-3) writes:

A major part of its anticipated work was to be directed at displaced persons, not refugees with political fears... The UNRRA only incidentally provided assistance for refugees escaping from untenable political situations.

The UNRRA programme was to entail "relief, rehabilitation and repatriation" (Gallagher, 1989: 579). To the extent that the UNRRA incidentally targeted those deemed to be refugees within international refugee schemes, it should be noted that it imagined sharing responsibility with private international voluntary organizations in the management of camps at this juncture (Gordenker, 1987: 23). Thus, in this instance as well, private organizations were foreseen working with an organization receiving public funding from Western nations. The UNRRA had a temporary mission and, like the IGCR, ceased operations in July, 1947.
In 1947 the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was established "as a non-permanent Specialized Agency of the UN" (Holborn, 1975: 30). Therefore, like organizations that had come before other than the IGCR, the IRO was created as temporary, explicitly avoiding permanent obligations for member nations within its programme. Initially it was granted three years of life. This was later extended by eighteen months (Gordenker, 1987: 26). Despite its name, its programme imagined maintaining the lives and aiding the resettlement of 'displaced persons' (Gallagher, 1989: 579; Gordenker, 1987: 27; Holborn, 1975: 32), not necessarily 'refugees' (Gallagher, 1989: 579). Like the UNRRA and other organizations discussed above, the IRO programme foresaw the involvement of both privately and publicly funded agencies. According to the historian Holborn (1975: 31-2):

This complex operation could be accomplished only through joint effort by the member nations of the IRO, the governments of asylum and resettlement, the international and national voluntary agencies, and several UN organizations.

The IRO led to the resettlement of more than one million human beings and was dissolved in 1951 (Gallagher, 1989: 579).

Canada was one of the eighteen original member nations of the IRO (Sjoberg, 1991: 222n). In November, 1946 Canadian political authorities issued emergency orders to bring 'displaced persons' to Canada (Wyman, 1988: 190; Hawkins, 1972: 90) and two Canadian selection programmes subsequently appeared: a bulk labour system and a close-relatives plan (Wyman, 1988: 190). In January, 1947 a
Canadian immigration official arrived in Germany and by March two teams were actively selecting people from camps (Wyman, 1988: 191). Initially, selection and admission of displaced persons were carried out by reference to existing immigration legislation covering dependents of Canadians (Green, 1976: 28). In June, 1947, however, an Order-in-Council, immediately followed by several others, proclaimed the specified admission of 'displaced persons', which all subsequent arrivals were referred to (Vernant, 1953: 559). Regarding this selection, according to the historian Wyman (See also Luciuk, 1986: 476-7), there was a "lack of public debate on the issue; the federal cabinet made all major decisions on which nationalities and ethnic groups could be admitted" (Wyman, 1988: 190). The Canadian federal cabinet had decided among themselves, as a critic at the time asserted, "'to let these touchy questions be settled in private'" (Wyman, 1988: 191). As seen in the next chapter, this is not unlike how refugees have been selected abroad for resettlement in Canada since the mid-1970s. Later in July, 1947 Canada became part of the IRO General Council and Executive Committee (Dirks, 1977: 121). Though more than one hundred and fifty thousand displaced persons were eventually selected and resettled (Marrus, 1985: 344-5), Canada's response, like the IRO itself, was assumed to be special and temporary. During its life, Canada contributed seventy staff and some eighteen million dollars to IRO operations (Canada, 1974: 101). As the IRO was dissolving, new international refugee schemes foresaw the invention of new international agencies. In the fall of 1951 political
authorities of the United States sponsored a conference in Brussels to discuss the creation of one of these organizations (Dirks, 1977: 186). In 1952, the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) was established by Western nations to assist in the transportation and resettlement of European refugees and other migrants (Gallagher, 1989: 580). ICEM took over much of the staff and technologies that the defunct IRO had left behind (Dirks, 1977: 186; Marrus, 1985: 365). ICEM was foreseen screening refugees and providing air and ocean transport facilities. It was also imagined mediating with political authorities of nations, such as West Germany and Italy, within which refugee camps were situated (Marrus, 1985: 365). These tasks were assumed to be outside the UNHCR programme that had appeared a year earlier (see below) (Dirks, 1977: 185-6).

Canada was a founding member of ICEM (Dirks, 1977: 187). Canada's representatives in this organization were drawn from the Canadian Department of Immigration. In 1953, and again in 1955, these officials advocated Canada's withdrawal. The rationale for this was the inconsistency in the interests of the two bureaucracies evinced by ICEM representatives' efforts to take over responsibility for selecting refugees and immigrants destined for resettlement in Canada (Dirks, 1977: 187-8). Canadian Department of Immigration officials regarded such selection to be a national concern, not an international responsibility (Dirks, 1977: 1987). Canadian Department of External Affairs officials, however, occasionally resisted withdrawal, suggesting in 1953 that doing so
would "no doubt engender much ill will, particularly on the part of some of our overcrowded NATO allies" (as cited in Dirks, 1977: 187). Canada, they argued, would be viewed by other Western nations as rejecting its responsibilities. Immigration officials argued in 1955 that Canada's public funding for ICEM should not subsidize transportation of selected refugees to other nations such as Australia and that this was interfering with efforts to select those thought desirable for Canada. A decision was made at this time to withdraw from ICEM to become effective in 1957, but an interdepartmental committee comprising representatives from both Departments - Immigration and External Affairs - decided at a meeting in 1957 to suggest to Cabinet that Canadian participation continue. In 1962 Canada finally withdrew, the rationale this time being that the refugee problem in Europe had largely diminished and that ICEM was at this point mostly assisting in the transportation of migrants within Europe (Dirks, 1977: 226). In 1970, rejecting the idea of rejoining ICEM as a full member, Canada's Minister of Immigration wrote in a background paper that "this might lead to the introduction of foreign matters which would be contrary to the principle that immigration is essentially a matter of domestic concern" (as cited in Hawkins, 1989: 160). This concern over Canada's membership in ICEM shows what in later chapters will become important - that Canadian selection of refugees from abroad lies between two broad spheres of power relations, an international and a national one.

In 1951 the United Nations approved a proposal for the
creation of the UNHCR (Holborn, 1975: 87). At this point the UNHCR, like the majority of refugee organizations that preceded it, was created as temporary, to last only three years. It had tentative beginnings (Gallagher, 1989: 580; Canada, 1986e). As the historian Gordenker (1987: 28) writes, to form the UNHCR

...they rescued some bits and pieces of IRO practice while allowing others to disappear. From the rubble [it] was constructed, slowly and at irregular intervals...

The UNHCR was created as 'non-operational' which meant that, unlike the IRO, it was not expected to deliver emergency aid to displaced persons or refugees directly (Adelman, 1982: 32). It was initially granted a "miniscule" (Gordenker, 1987: 29) operating budget in part to facilitate "the coordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees" (Holborn, 1975: 101). Here again the public/private opposition is seen. The UNHCR was not initially granted authority to set up refugee camps or arrange for the transportation of refugees (Gallagher, 1989: 581). The UNHCR programme distinguished voluntary repatriation, local integration, and third nation resettlement as 'solutions' to international refugee problems (Gallagher, 1989: 581). In the years between 1951 and 1956 there was little support for it from its member nations (Marrus, 1985: 351; Gallagher, 1989: 582). In 1956, the UNHCR's 'new' temporary mandate was again set to expire, but it happened that this was the same year hundreds of thousands of Hungarians fled from Hungary to Austria and Yugoslavia (Gallagher, 1989: 582). After a request from Austria, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in November, 1956 allowing the
UNHCR to continue to receive public funding and to coordinate emergency relief for Hungarians in these areas (Gallagher, 1989: 582).

Canadian representatives eventually selected and admitted more than thirty thousand Hungarian refugees in conjunction with this event (Dirks, 1984: 125). As with other responses that occurred prior to release of the Green Paper in 1975, such as those associated with World Refugee Year in 1959, the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, and the 1973 crisis in Chile, this effort was made possible through a special, temporary, Order-in-Council (Green, 1976: 32) that, as such, was not expected to be repeated in kind. In keeping with this, at this point Canada had not acceded to the 1951 UN Convention, although Canadian representatives had been involved in writing it. Indeed Canada did not sign it or the 1967 Protocol until September, 1969 (Dirks, 1977: 188; Immigration Manual. IS. 3.05; Hathaway, 1992: 73). Included in this 1951 international agreement was a provision known as non-refoulement: the prohibition of the return of refugees to "the frontiers or territories where life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (as cited in Hathaway, 1992). As had happened concerning the League Office and the ratification of an international agreement in relation to the Nansen Passport decades earlier, the technical issue of 'returnability' -or capacity to deport individuals- was the Department of Immigration officials' rationale for resisting efforts to accede during this period.
(Hathaway, 1992: 73; Kelley, 1987: 5). If Canadian representatives were to sign the Convention, Immigration officials argued, refugees who went astray after being admitted to Canada could not be deported because of the *non-refoulement* provision. This resistance to a formal, explicit refugee policy among Department of Immigration officials has continued in the decades that have followed.

Canadian political authorities denied an invitation to become part of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR in 1955 (Dirks, 1977: 184), doing so only after the events in Hungary in 1957. Since then Canada has served as a member of the UNHCR's Executive Committee. In 1952 Canadian political authorities rejected a proposal that would have seen a representative of the UNHCR operate in Canada (Dirks, 1977: 185). A UNHCR 'correspondent' was briefly allowed to do so during Canada's temporary World Refugee Year programme (Dirks, 1977: 185) and a part-time 'correspondent' was permitted to enter and function in Canada beginning in 1962 (Adelman, 1982: 41). It was only following release of the Green Paper in 1975, however, -the point at which 'refugee' became recognized as a distinct category in Canadian law and refugee-specific state bodies, namely Refugee Affairs and the Refugee Status Advisory Committee, were established- that a full-time UNHCR representative was permitted to regularly operate in Ottawa (interview 30/08/96; Adelman, 1982: 41).

Immediately following intervention associated with this Hungarian movement, in 1957 the UNHCR began emergency refugee
efforts to aid Algerians in Morocco and Tunisia (Rystad, 1989: 9). This was to be the first time an international refugee organization targeted refugees in a socio-political space outside Europe (Rystad, 1989: 9). The UN Assembly followed this by allowing the UNHCR to aid Chinese who had migrated to Hong Kong in 1959 (Gallagher, 1989: 582). Besides Africa and Asia, the UNHCR subsequently began emergency refugee operations in other non-Western regions of the world such as Latin America (Gallagher, 1989: 583; Melander, 1988: 10). In 1964 it was decided that both the time and geographical limitations on the UNHCR programme would be removed. This took the form of the 1967 UN Protocol (Gallagher, 1989: 583). In the 1960s as the refugee problem disappeared in Europe, refugee crises, movements, and refugees continued to appear in various non-Western spaces.

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention, through which the UNHCR had operated, referred to human beings who had been affected by "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951," but as the historian Hawkins (1989: 158) writes:

> Within a few years of the framing of this definition, it was becoming increasingly clear that all refugee movements did not originate in World War Two or its aftermath, and that refugees might well be a continuing feature of the international scene.

From a "non-operational agency with limited resources" (Rystad, 1989: 7) in 1951, the UNHCR has since grown in scope and size. The present UNHCR's mandate remains 'non-political', but its resources have grown considerably: In 1996 the annual budget was 1.43 billion dollars U.S. (UNHCR, 1996: 12). The present organization is headed
by a High Commissioner appointed by the United Nations Security Council. The High Commissioner reports to the Executive Committee (Excom), currently comprising forty-four nations, that approve the annual UNHCR budget (Cuncliffe, 1995: 283). While the administrative budget comes directly from the United Nations, the operational budget comes from voluntary donations from public sources of EXCOM nations, most of which —other than Japan— are Western (Gordenker, 1987: 35). The scope of UNHCR refugee programmes has also increased significantly since 1951 (Adelman, 1982: 32; Cuncliffe, 1995). By the 1970s the UNHCR, as well as regional, national, and international governmental and non-governmental organizations, had become linked into a massive refugee aid and development network (Gallagher, 1989: 584). Whereas in 1962 ninety-two organizations were involved in UNHCR programmes in sixteen nations (Tabori, 1972: 298), in 1996 the UNHCR has four hundred and ninety-five "operating partners" (NGOs), as well as two hundred and fifty-five offices in one hundred and twenty-three nations, targeting the lives of millions of refugees on several continents (UNHCR, 1996: 12).

THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE

Contemporaneous with and inseparable from the emergence of the international refugee regime described above was the emergence of the refugee as an object of the aspirations of Western authorities and a new 'kind' of person or identity. Objects of government are not self-evident, ready-made, or natural (Hunt, 1993: 316) and each has a unique historical trajectory (Hacking, 1986). Just as there
is no original international refugee organization that determines the present form of the UNHCR, there is no 'proto-refugee' that determines the present character of the international refugee (Malkki, 1995: 497).

The term 'refugee' was originally coined in the West to specify French Protestants who fled from the forced conversion policy of the French state in the late seventeenth century (Wong, 1989: 279). In the eighteenth century the term 'emigres' was used by individuals who had left France following the Revolution to refer to themselves (Marrus, 1985: 9). It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, following the American Revolution, that 'refugee' began to be used to refer to human beings that 'leave their country in times of distress'. Despite this usage, through the first half of the nineteenth century French and English dictionaries continued to refer to 'refugees' as those people who were victims of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (Marrus, 1985: 9). Since this was an event obviously limited in time and space, this suggests 'refugee' did not yet have a universal meaning. Throughout the nineteenth century German dictionaries included the French word 'refugies' and this earlier reference to the French Protestants (Marrus, 1985: 9). It was only after the First World War that 'Fluchtling' -the modern German term for refugee- came to dominate other German terms, including 'Heimatlos' or 'staatenlos' (Marrus, 1985: 9). To this point, then, 'refugee' did not refer to a legitimate object of government and to a 'kind' of person. As suggested earlier, the nineteenth century was to
involve 'exiles', understood as "individuals who left their native
country for political reasons" (Marrus, 1985: 9). Regarding the
difference between the two Said (1984: 160) writes:

Exile originated in the age-old practice of banishment. Once banished, the exile lives an anomalous and miserable life, with the stigma of being an outsider. Refugees, on the other hand, are the creation of the twentieth century state. The word 'refugee' has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas 'exile', carries with it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality.

The millions of Jews who left Tsarist Russia and Eastern Europe in the years immediately preceding the First World War were occasionally called 'refugees', but they were also referred to as 'emigres' (Marrus, 1985: 9; Skran, 1995: 13). The latter term was later widely used prior to and during the Second World War to refer to Jews who had fled to the United States from Nazi-dominated territories in Europe, but it is only infrequently used today. The discourse of 'exile' presently has currency, but mostly in referring to a condition in which individuals find themselves (e.g., Bauman, 1992: 225) or to a stage within what is now presumed to be a typical 'refugee experience' (e.g., Stein, 1986; Immigration Selection Manual), rather than to large masses of innocent human beings forced by something or someone to seek refuge and to related programmes that target their lives (cf. Wong, 1989: 279; cf. Llambias-Wolff, 1990; Kunz, 1981; Tabori, 1972; See also Refuge. 1986 6(2): 11).

Immediately following the First World War, as refugee organizations were invented within international programmes,
'refugee' began to subsume -albeit not completely- 'emigres', 'exile' and similar terms (cf. Zolberg et al., 1989: 6). At this point, however, the refugee was still not (yet) a self-evident object/identity. As the historian Kapriellan-Churchill (1994: 298) writes about the mid-1920s in Europe,

> while the term 'refugee' was widely used in immigration circles... [it] was used inconsistently by international agencies, government officials, and non-government organizations alike.

Immediately following the Second World War, 'displaced person' was introduced to refer to groups of Europeans outside their nations of origin in need of relief and resettlement (Gordenker, 1987: 23). After 1947 'displaced person' also began to be subsumed by 'refugee'. By the 1960s an international refugee regime had solidified, a new administrable domain had fully formed. So had a new 'kind' of person. The international refugee had become 'always-already' there, its existence as an object of government and an identity widely and fully acknowledged.

**GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME**

The discussion above also shows that international refugee programmes did not emerge separate from certain governmental rationalities, as though this realm was one of anarchy, as international relations theorists might suggest. What is consistently seen in these programmes above is an assumed opposition between either 'public' and 'private', 'governmental' and 'non-governmental', or 'political' and 'non-political' authorities and organizations. From the inception of international refugee programmes, private international organizations, later to
be referred to as 'NGOs', were imagined carrying out tasks distinct from those thought appropriate to governmental or primarily public bodies. The presence of this opposition has continued. The following excerpt from a 1981 article describing NGO/UNHCR consultations held in Geneva in Refuge, 'Canada's national newsletter on refugees', for example, suggests how these NGOs have been conceived within these programmes. It notes

...the advantages of the diversity and independence of NGOs... the flexibility to assist people... to act quickly and pragmatically, since they often already have connections within the relevant country, and to deal with refugees in an informal, person-to-person manner (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 6).

In a study of American refugee programmes in the post-war era, Nichols (1988: 87) gives a similar sense of NGOs' imagined role:

The NGOs could move more swiftly, arrive at a disinterested appraisal of a situation free of political influence, experiment with an open style, and most importantly, make contact with the people at a level well below official governmental contacts.

The division or opposition between, for example, 'governmental' and 'non-governmental' in the field between nations is not dissimilar to the public-private division assumed within Western nations such as Canada where liberalism prevails as a rationality of rule (see chapter five). Within the latter, only certain realms and authorities are assumed 'political' while others, such as the family and the church, are assumed 'non-political' and private (Valverde, 1996; Rose, 1987). Hirst and Thompson (1995: 432) have recently suggested that "the category of non-governmental organization [NGO] is a misnomer" because they also 'govern' as seen, for example, in the practices of Greenpeace and Oxfam in
relation to the ocean environment and to famine relief respectively. But 'NGO' is not a 'misnomer', an error or mistake in naming; it is the logical extension of liberal rationalities that are present in the international sphere.

In this way international refugee programmes _between_ nations during the twentieth century can be seen as broadly comparable with poor relief programmes _within_ Canada (cf. Valverde, 1991a; Strange, 1995), and undoubtedly other Western nations. Within Canada, from the nineteenth century through to the 1920s, it was primarily private philanthropic organizations that sought to govern the conduct of 'the poor'. This was followed in the 1940s, as seen in the rise of the Welfare State that reached its zenith in the late 1960s (Valverde, 1991a), by a significant movement of responsibility for their conduct to the state. In relief of 'the poor' since the 1970s, however, a shift in rationalities is evident that has involved a gradual, though uneven, shift in emphasis (back) to the private sector (e.g., introduction of provisions for private food banks and tax breaks allowing increases in donations to private charities).

As seen above, through the 1920s and 1930s, as the international refugee regime was beginning to form, refugee practices were a decidedly private philanthropic endeavour, with public funds and agents being used mostly to coordinate efforts of voluntary private international organizations (or 'NGOs') or facilitate resettlement. With the creation of the IGCR in 1938, and within the IRO, UNHCR and other organizations that followed,
international refugee practice began to depend more on public funding and agents drawn from Western nations, although NGOs continued to be imagined playing an important role. Despite its initial limited mandate, for example, the UNHCR gradually began, from at least 1957 on, to carry out refugee aid and development in the field on several continents (Tabori, 1972: 298). To the delivery of emergency aid or relief—shelter, food, water, medical intervention—were added extensive education and social services for refugees. In the mid-1980s, however, a shift in rationalities can begin to be seen. This is particularly transparent in relation to programmes that targeted African and Indo-Chinese refugees (cf. Harrell-Bond, 1989: 55-6).

In Africa this shift is seen in the appearance, in 1983, of a Voluntary Repatriation programme regarding Ethiopian refugees in refugee camps in Djibouti, one that was stepped-up beginning in 1986 (Harrell-Bond, 1987: 8-10; See also Kibreab, 1993: 328-9 on Somalia during this period). This was accompanied by claims that the regular dispensing of aid within refugee camps was ruining the potential of refugees, leading them to adopt a 'dependence mentality' or experience 'dependency syndrome' (See, for example, Tucker, 1982; Harrell-Bond, 1986; Luciuk, 1986). It is also visible in the appearance in 1990 (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 18) of related programmes to 'empower' inhabitants of refugee camps in Africa, whereby refugees are imagined becoming more responsible for their own relief and development and less dependent on regular aid. The resemblance here to the contemporary critique of welfare and
its effects on 'the poor' within nations of the modern West (cf. Rose and Miller, 1992: 198; Dean, 1995: 578-9) is remarkable.

Indo-chinese refugees had previously garnered considerable media attention through resettlement programmes launched by several Western nations including Canada (see chapter five) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the mid-1980s, however, voluntary repatriation began to be touted more and resettlement less a 'solution' for the situation of those refugees still living in Hong Kong camps (local integration was apparently never deemed a 'solution' in this context) (Gilad, 1990b: 138; Canada, 1991: 7). A UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation programme appeared here in early 1989 (Hitchcox, 1990: 117; Cuncliffe, 1995: 286). NGOs operating in the region, in conjunction with the UNHCR programme, then sought to implement a new approach "under which the Khmer themselves took a far greater share of responsibility for the programmes at a management and decision-making level" (Fordham, 1990: 5). This was accompanied in 1992 by a large (25 percent) reduction in UNHCR funding for the educational and social programmes that had targeted Hong Kong refugee camps (Cuncliffe, 1995: 288). Though discussed in the next chapter in relation to the Canadian regime where similar mutations are occurring, it has to be noted here that what can be called 'advanced liberalism' is a rationality that demands a more active or enterprising subject (Rose, 1992: 145). The appearance of discourses of 'empowerment', 'voluntary' repatriation, and 'self-management' in Africa and Asia in the mid-1980s are undoubtedly manifestations of its rise in the
international refugee regime.

Other general and more recent changes consistent with a shift from a 'liberal welfare' to an 'advanced liberal' rationality (see chapter five) in this international realm are evident. A reduction of the operating budget of the UNHCR was first seen in 1985 (Kibreab, 1993: 329). In 1989 for the first time donor (mostly Western) nations refused to approve the UNHCR's annual operating budget and began calling for a further scaling back of its relief operations (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 2). During the early 1990s there have been shortfalls of one hundred and fifty million dollars between the predicted cost of UNHCR programmes and the available resources (Cuncliffe, 1995: 279). Following creation of a task force comprising representatives from donor nations and a subsequent audit of UNHCR records, it was decided to significantly reduce public contributions (by 20 percent) to the UNHCR (Cuncliffe, 1995: 285). These mutations have been closely accompanied by a shift in knowledge, a new emphasis on early warning discussed in chapter six.

Governmental programmes described above did not emerge separate from the invention of certain technologies, such as the refugee camp (see chapter six) and the refugee passport. These technologies were borrowed from other domains and modified within programmes of the League organizations, IRO, ICEM, UNHCR, and private voluntary international organizations such as the Red Cross. In myriad ways these technologies allowed these programmes to intervene upon diverse populations and places.
Take the refugee passport for example. The Nansen refugee passports created in July, 1922 specifically for refugees from Russia were a modification of the national passport. With this document the holder could move from one nation to another to work or join up with dispersed family members. The Nansen passport did not replace a national citizen's passport, however, in that it did not give its holder the right to return to the nation that issued the document without a special provision to that effect approved by the issuing nation (Kaprielian-Churchill, 1994: 283).

The predecessor of the national passport was the passeport, a document that allowed a sailing vessel to leave or enter a seaport. The predecessor of the passeport was the 'safe-conduct', a written pass giving permission to individuals to travel through a dangerous area without risk of arrest by authorities. While in North America national passports were issued before the American Revolution (Rule et al., 1983: 225), prior to 1914 they were not generally required by authorities to travel from one nation to another in the modern West (Cohen, 1987: 145; Rule et al.; 1983: 225; Gordenker, 1987: 20). The national passport was a technology that promised to produce certainty about individuals (Rule et al., 1983: 223), about who was a citizen, and therefore entitled to certain rights and benefits, and who was not. At the time of its invention the passport had several important features. It allowed for the storage of information specific to the Western citizen. The passport translated the characteristics and features of the citizen into material form. Besides a date and place of birth, given
names, and citizenship, an image of the bearer in the form of a photograph was permanently affixed to it. The passport served as a multi-page journal through which travel patterns could be recorded: which countries were entered, on what dates, and in what sequence (it was not, therefore, as dependent on files stored elsewhere as other kinds of documentary identification, such as the birth certificate). This was accomplished through the use of specially-designed and restricted ink stamps representing a given nation. As a slim, compact booklet this technology could be easily carried in the pocket or in the limited belongings of the citizen travelling abroad. Those travellers who lost their passport knew their identity could be placed in official jeopardy: "The consul banged on the table and said; 'If you've got no passport you're officially dead'" (Malkki, 1995: 495). Following the First World War "refugees were non-persons. They usually had no valid legal identification" (Gordenker, 1987: 20). But through the loss of a national passport an individual's identity was not only officially in doubt— the passport was officially and literally an identity document. Precisely like statistics (Hacking, 1986) that are discussed in chapter six, the national passport became a device for 'making up' the modern citizen and, with the slight modification mentioned above, the refugee. After the First World War national passports became part of a technical problem and, with a minor adjustment by Nansen, promised to become part of the solution.

The appearance of a programme following the First World War that imagined solving a technical problem through the creation of
a special organization and passport was followed by identification of its failure. In fact, 'failure' was explicit in the rationale used to justify the establishment of each subsequent international refugee organization, including the UNHCR. This suggests 'failure' was a kind of catalyst or impetus for the re-thinking and re-engineering of programmes (O'Malley, 1996b: 310). Indeed, Miller and Rose (1990: 4) write that

> the 'failure' of one policy or set of policies is always linked to attempts to devise or propose programmes that would work better... the identification of failure is thus a central element in governmentality.

In each instance above 'failure' led, not to programmes that foresaw giving up on the international refugee organization, passport and camp as ways of dealing with international refugee crises and situations, but to the invention of new programmes. In this way the international refugee organization, passport, and camp are similar to the modern prison. As Foucault (1977a: 277) writes:

> So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half of 'failures', the prison still exists, producing the same results and there is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it.

'Failure', as seen in later chapters, is also consistently evident in the Canadian refugee regime. The consistent presence of the identification of 'failure' here, however, shows the relevance of a theme from the governmentality literature in making an international regime intelligible.

What was it about 'refugeeness' that permitted it to gain such currency and to gradually subsume the other discourses mentioned above despite a succession of 'failures'? Whereas 'displaced
person' suggested a temporary aberration requiring 'replacement' and related terms such as 'exile' and 'emigres' similarly avoided the connotation of a cause of the condition, 'refugee' better suggested masses of innocents, of victims, forced to flee from something or someone. It was above all this feature that would allow it to be so versatile and to gain such currency.

Though effectively deployed at the birth of the Soviet Union following the First World War, with the start of the Cold War, when the proliferation of nuclear weapons had rendered war between the international alliances a non-strategy (cf. Dillon, 1989; Hirst and Thompson, 1995), 'refugeeness' became more useful. This is especially so after the appearance of the UN Convention and the invention of the UNHCR and ICEM in the early 1950s. The identification of and responses to groups fleeing (or trying to flee) the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations by the Western alliance of nations as refugees highlighted differences between the two alliances and their accompanying systems of government and citizens' ways of conducting themselves. It fit with a notion that the Soviet Union and nations of the Eastern Bloc, as well as their rulers and citizens -the 'something or someone' in this instance- were illiberal and uncivilized. If the type of governing and way of living that was predominant in these nations were adequate, why would their citizens attempt to flee to the West with nothing but a few belongings? Identification of refugees and responding to them as such simultaneously fostered the cohesion of the Western alliance of nations and rulers by assuring them that their approach
to government was the civilized and decidedly liberal one.

'Refugeeness' would later be useful during the rise of nationalism in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as in other non-Western spaces where previously there had been colonial arrangements. Since de-colonization Western authorities have assumed these new nations (with their rulers and citizens) to be deficient. Typical is Gasarasi's (1996: 4) comment in a recent article in Refuge:

> The word 'state' is written in quotation marks to indicate that there is doubt that most refugee-generating countries, particularly in Africa, qualify to be called as states, at least in the modern liberal sense (emphasis added).

Post-colonial African nations have been assumed to require aid and development of one kind or other so as to be brought into line with requirements of liberal nationhood and associated ways of ruling and conduct among their citizens. The deployment of 'refugeeness' allowed Western 'non-political' intervention through the UNHCR and NGOs in these regions during this period where 'political' interference would have been impossible, first through emergency refugee aid and later through additional programmes of refugee development (cf. Malkki, 1995: 506). 'Refugeeness' was a way in which such intervention was made possible and justified. Since something or someone forced refugees in these socio-political spaces to flee it could be assumed that 'something or someone' was deficient and needed correction through intervention. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from a report on Africa from the mid-1960s by the High Commissioner for Refugees:
...the process of de-colonization and the internal strife that all too often accompanies it- these problems call for solutions that are humane, practical, immediate and adapted to the realities of life in Africa. In response to the drama of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children fleeing their villages and their homelands, the international community has entrusted my Office with the task of helping these uprooted people, first to survive and then to create a new existence if it is clear there is no hope of their being able to return voluntarily to the homes they have left behind. For the countries that so spontaneously and so generously welcome them are in general beset with their own development problems and are not in a position to meet even the most vital needs of all the refugees that cross their borders unless they receive outside assistance (as cited in Tabori, 1972: 268).

This is a prime example of governmental discourse in the international sphere. These technical 'problems' need 'practical' and 'immediate' 'solutions' provided by the UNHCR on behalf of an international community dominated by the West. But the UNHCR is not expected to merely solve these problems; it is foreseen doing no less than aiding the 'creation of a new existence'. The assumption above is that since de-colonization, African nations, and the ways of ruling and the conduct of citizens that prevail within them, continue to be inferior. In fact, in this instance both the new nations fled from and those fled to are deficient, for while the former are obviously so (otherwise why would citizens flee their villages with only a few belongings to cross into another nation?), the latter are also inadequate, unable to 'meet even the most vital needs', carrying the burden of 'their own development problems' as they are. Through 'outside assistance' from the UNHCR and NGOs, these newly de-colonized spaces and their inhabitants could be, in effect, re-colonized by the West, but this
time in a decidedly 'non-political' way. 'Outside assistance' for refugees in these spaces, precisely like 'non-political' philanthropy and later welfare for 'the poor' within Western liberal nations, promised to help create this new existence, to bring these nations, and the kinds of ruling and conduct taking place within them, into line and up to grade.

Therefore, both in the intensifying international Cold War with the 'Second World', and in the nationalizing 'Third World' (which, of course, were not mutually exclusive historical events) 'refugeeness' became a Western moral-political tactic within a much broader objective, a way of relating to and intervening into that which was deemed illiberal and uncivilized and it was the accompanying assumption of being forced to flee from something or someone that allowed it to be so. Consistent with this assertion it will be noted that the relevant programmes and organizations described above were -without exception- products of Western rather than a community of equal nations (cf. Tabori, 1972: 293). When the first League Office of the High Commissioner was created in 1921, for example, the Soviet Republic, the nation of origin of the Russian refugees was neither a member of the League, nor recognized by political authorities of Western nations (Simpson, 1939: 191). Later the United States and Britain were to fund the operational expenditures of the IGCR after its reorganization exclusively (Sjoberg, 1991: 18n) and the U.S. was to be the largest contributor of funds to both the short-lived IRO and UNRRA (Gordenker, 1987: 24-5). The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies did not
participate in the UNRRA, IGCR, IRO, or ICEM. Only Yugoslavia was involved in the UNHCR's operations, and by 1972 no nation from Asia had acceded to the UN Convention (Holborn, 1975: 177). Non-Western nations were uninvolved, were mere members -with the exception of Japan- rather than benefactors of the League and the latter organizations, or simply did not yet exist as nations. 'Refugeeness' has been deployed through these Western 'non-political' international organizations and directed at nations and groups in non-Western socio-political spaces or -in more recent decades- at individuals who have fled these spaces to the West. This is not simply to suggest 'refugeeness' has been a fraud, merely ideological cover for the exercise of power and, more specifically, camouflage for Western nations' domination of the non-Western world. Instead, it is to say that in the international sphere of power relations 'refugeeness' has been at once a target of governmental power and a tactic. Though this point is returned to briefly in the final chapter, the foregoing discussion should begin to suggest the relevance of concepts and themes drawn from the governmentality literature in making sense of international regimes.

A CANADIAN REFUGEE REGIME

Having made an extended excursion into the international refugee regime and its object, it is time to return to the Canadian refugee regime and the main focus of this thesis. By the mid-1960s international refugee crises and movements, those events deemed to be uncivilized, illiberal, and unpredictable, and refugees, their
human products, had not been eradicated. By this point Western political authorities generally had begun to recognize that the world was in such a state that it could be relied on to regularly produce refugee crises, refugee movements, and refugees. This is not to suggest a specific refugee crisis (e.g., sudden social and political upheaval in Uganda) was viewed by authorities as permanent, as lacking a capacity for resolution, but that refugee crises and movements were now generally expected to *routinely and regularly* arise. A single crisis had become regarded as typical rather than unique. From the mid-1960s Canadian programmes of selection and resettlement became predicated on this assumption, on the notion that there would be refugee crises in the world followed by mass movements of refugees into camps outside Europe who could then be selected and then resettled in Canada. It was at this juncture that permanent Canadian refugee programmes imagining the continuous selection of refugees became possible, for prior to this the product of these crises, the refugee, was assumed to stem only from a fleeting, atypical problem. In other words, before the 1960s the international regime and its object, the refugee, were still forming rather than self-evident. It is in this sense that the international regime was a condition of possibility for the emergence of a Canadian refugee regime. In the same way, it was not much before the 1960s that the Canadian Minister of Immigration could declare that "[g]reater attention will be given to the acceptance of refugees for resettlement in other parts of the world" (as cited in Dirks, 1977: 230). This is because before the
mid-1950s, -while there was undoubtedly oppression, migration, death, physical torture and so on-, there is a sense in which, just as there were no international refugee organizations, refugee camps and refugee passports, there were no refugees 'in other parts of the world'.

Before the 1970s Canadian refugee inland determination did not exist. Before the mid-1960s refugee selection and resettlement -as seen above- were episodic and ad hoc. Until the early 1970s Canadian political authorities occasionally responded through Orders-in-Council, temporary selection guidelines (Dirks, 1977: 182; 225), and arrangements designed for the resettlement of immigrants (Interview 30/08/96). Before this there simply were no permanent, coherent Canadian refugee programmes of selection and resettlement. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, there was a sign that the temporary, ad hoc character of responses to refugees was shifting and that a new Canadian governmental regime was developing. A programmatic statement, the 1966 White Paper on Immigration, explicitly refers to refugees:

There will be continuing obligation to accept individuals or families who have fled their own country for one reason or another. However, neither the extent of the obligation nor our capacity to fulfil it can be predicted with any accuracy (as cited in Dirks, 1977: 229; emphasis added).

Nevertheless the White Paper proceeds to suggest that

[t]he past policies on refugees have been reactions to emergencies such as the Hungarian revolution or to appeals for aid from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. If Canada is to accept its fair share of international responsibility for refugees... more formal arrangements than now exist are required, including the annual appropriation of funds on a continuing basis (as
Canadian responses to refugees were no longer regarded as temporary and *ad hoc*, they were to be 'continuing' and 'formally arranged'. Following the White Paper, however, no specific provisions for selecting, resettling and determining refugees were introduced in the revised immigration regulations introduced in October, 1967 (Canada, 1995b: 2; 1974: 104).33

A major document prepared by the federal Department of Immigration a few years later, the 1975 four-volume Green Paper, was a precursor to the 1976 Immigration Act. A chapter simply entitled 'Refugees' provides a historical account of Canada's sporadic, *ad hoc* responses to refugees. Another volume of the Paper, 'Immigration Policy Prospectives', includes a recommendation that legal provisions for admitting refugees be created. Similar to the thrust of the White Paper, the programmatic Green Paper states: "Whatever the responses made by Canada or the international community in the past to refugee crises, there is no reason for complacency about the future" (Canada, 1974: 117; emphasis added). The Green Paper proceeds to suggest that "[t]he only certainty for which Canadian policy in this area must be prepared is the unhappy prospect that grave refugee crises will continue to erupt" (Canada, 1974: 117; emphasis added). Canadian refugee programmes suggested by the Green Paper foresaw the regular and continuous selection, resettlement, and determination of refugees to match the assumed permanence of international refugee crises and refugees that continued to appear despite the sustained efforts of international
refugee organizations.

OTHER CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY

Besides the full formation of an international refugee regime and its object, there were changes in several long-standing Canadian governmental fields that served as conditions of possibility for the rise of a Canadian regime during a period between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s.

Population, the National Economy, and Immigration

Population, the collective mass of citizens, displaced the family as an object of government in the West in the eighteenth century (Miller and Rose, 1990a: 167). Through the science of demography, population was rendered intelligible and made amenable to intervention. The size, rate of growth, distribution and composition of the population from then on could be thought and dreamed about. Immigration programmes imagined intervening in this domain. They sought to adjust the size of a national population and its rate of growth by adding or subtracting numbers of bodies and to adjust its age and sex composition to proportions demographic knowledge had revealed desirable.

A field that had also developed long before the mid-1960s as an object of government and knowledge was the national economy (Miller and Rose, 1990b). Since it was consistently deemed unavailable within Canada, immigration programmes envisaged recruitment of labour of one kind or other from abroad for the national capitalist economy from the nineteenth through the twentieth centuries (Green, 1976; Satzewich, 1991a; 1991b). More
recent immigration programmes have also foreseen assisting the economy by explicitly recruiting capital(ists) through investor and entrepreneur categories (Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 423). Immigration programmes have targeted, then, both the composition and growth of the Canadian population and the well-being of the national economy. While enhancing the population was certainly recognized to be related to the well-being of the national economy and vice versa, one concern was not necessarily reduced to the other at every juncture.

In the early to mid-1970s demography revealed the Canadian nation to have a declining birth rate and a renewed interest in population issues appeared (Hawkins, 1976: 46). Consistent with this latter development Canadian representatives attended the United Nations World Population Conference held at Bucharest during this period (Hawkins, 1988: 382). Although in 1947 there had been renewed interest in population growth through immigration (Vernant, 1953: 570; Kelley, 1987: 4), in the decades that followed there was less concern about it, as Dirks (1995: 113) writes:

Interest in determining an optimal population size for Canada diminished substantially during the 1950s and 1960s, pushed aside partly by unprecedented economic growth and partly by a birth rate that, at the height of the 'baby boom', approximated three children for every woman of child-bearing age.

It is significant, therefore, that the Green Paper released in 1975 after two years of consultations with a variety of state and non-state organizations and agencies was entitled the 'Canadian Immigration and Population Study' (Canada, 1974). This programmatic Paper promised to stimulate a national debate on
immigration practices that included the development of a population policy (cf. Hawkins, 1988: 381). In 1975 a Special Joint Committee of Parliament—established to transform the Green Paper's recommendations into law (Canada, 1986d: 3)—also concluded that immigration and population policy were closely related (Hawkins, 1991a: 399). Reflecting this renewed interest in population, in a statement accompanying release of the Green Paper the Minister of Immigration suggested: "'We need a set of flexible guidelines to which policies which affect our population future may be related'" (as cited in Hawkins, 1988: 381). The historian Hawkins (1976: 46) remarks that "[n]othing so explicit had been said about the role of immigration in population growth throughout the postwar period." Securing the demographic needs of the nation would become one major objective of the Immigration Act a year later (Immigration Act, 1976). Concern about population and an interest in comprehensive demographic analyses has continued since the 1970s (Dirks, 1995: 114).

During the time of the Green Paper incidents involving the sudden admittance to Canada of large numbers of refugees had been deemed to be increasing. The sudden selection and admittance of the Czechoslovakians, Tibetans, Ugandans, and Chileans had all occurred in a seven-year period preceding its release. The unpredictable character of these arrivals resulting from decisions made in the international sphere of politics and morality was hardly consistent with a renewed interest at this juncture in rationally managing the growth and composition of the population of
the nation. A coherent, visible refugee programme, however, was. During the period between the mid-1960s and early 1970s it had also been recognized that desired labour was scarce in the West, and it was concluded that it would have to be regularly recruited by Canada and other Western nations from outside (Hawkins, 1974: 146; Castles and Kosack, 1985). At this point the recognition that the world was producing crises, movements and, eventually, refugees in camps outside the West, fit well with this conclusion in that recruitment efforts would not necessarily have to be as far-ranging or costly as they might be otherwise (Interview 30/08/96) - refugees would already be assembled, sorted, and rendered docile in these disciplinary enclosures (see chapter six). These programmes anticipated taking advantage of those already in camps in various spaces outside the West through the 'successful establishment' requirement that was based, in part, on a conception of desired labour.

Foreign Affairs

Foreign affairs, as a governmental domain, has been deemed to affect the health and security of the population. Responses to the 1956 Hungarian, 1968 Czechoslovakian, and other refugee movements in the decades following the Second World War had been recognized among some authorities to have enhanced Canada's role in relation to other Western nations. A regular, visible Canadian refugee selection programme could be even more advantageous in relations with these nations. A regular Canadian refugee programme along with accession to the 1951 Convention could do what an immigration
programme simply could not. It could regularly assist in alleviating the international refugee 'burden' (Girard, 1990: 113) that had by this time been recognized as permanent. This would allow Canada to assert itself as a nation where other -mostly Western- nations could not (Dirks, 1990: 95), not as a super-power such as the United States, but as a capable liberal citizen of an imagined international community. Such a programme that included accession to the Convention was promoted by officials of the Department of External Affairs before this. As seen earlier and as Hathaway (1992: 74) writes:

Since at least 1954 External Affairs appealed to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to agree to the Refugee Convention as a means of securing gains within 'the broad context of international relations'.

Department of Immigration officials, however, had resisted such a commitment, arguing that it -like participation in ICEM that was deemed to lead to a loss of control over selection- would later lead to the inevitable production of a Canadian 'burden' since during resettlement refugees might not follow a path to becoming liberal citizens and could not then be easily disposed of because of non-refoulement (ie. their 'returnability' would be in question under the Convention). In the late 1960s, however, there was a sudden renewed interest among authorities in pursuing Canada's well-being and security within the imagined international community, in making the nation a credible, capable citizen on the international stage (Satzewich, 1991a: 306; Hathaway, 1992: 75; interview 30/08/96; cf. Page, 1977; Bothwell, 1977). This fit well with the prospect of acceding to the United Nations Convention and
introduction of a regular, visible refugee selection programme. The Deputy Minister of Immigration suggested to External Affairs that Canada ought to adhere to the Convention in 1964 (Hathaway, 1992: 74). As a senior Department of Immigration official wrote at this point, Canada was already carrying all the burdens of responsibility in refugee matters, but [its] highly legalistic refusal to accede to the 1951 Convention has prevented [Canada] from getting much of the credit [it] should have (as cited in Hathaway, 1992: 75).

The circumstances in these and undoubtedly other domains happened to come together during this period to give rise to a Canadian refugee regime. In 1976 'refugee' appeared in the new Immigration Act as a distinct legal category for the first time (Lanphier, 1981). Regulations accompanying this Act were enacted in 1978. They spelled out procedures for selection; an Annual Refugee (and Immigration) Plan; resettlement; and Convention refugee status determination within Canada (Creese, 1991; Hawkins, 1989; Dirks, 1977). Regarding the Annual Refugee Plan a senior Department of Immigration official active throughout the 1970s relates:

...until we began very deliberately to table an immigration plan with numbers, we tended always to respond to situations in an ad hoc [way] as far as refugees were concerned... the government wanted more predictability... it meant as well that in a year when we wouldn't necessarily have a crisis per se, there still would be a refugee response going on (interview 09/01/96; emphasis added).

The new Canadian refugee programmes that followed release of the Green Paper foresaw refugee levels being set annually and a two-step process of refugee selection, the second of which would be
determining whether the person was capable of "successful establishment" (Immigration Manual. IS 3.02). For this the requirements of the immigrant points system (See Hawkins, 1989: 295-7), first put in place in the 1967 and continued in the 1978 regulations, would be "relaxed" (Immigration Manual. IS 3.02). Through the setting of annual refugee levels these programmes sought to render predictable the otherwise unpredictable responses to crises abroad that tended to result in sudden influxes of large but varied numbers of bodies that could be out of line with precise needs of the Canadian population rendered knowable by demographic analyses. From this point onward, political authorities were no longer to react by passing Orders-in-Council; respond without knowing the numbers of refugees that should be selected; rely on existing welfare arrangements for 'the poor' or those designed solely for maintaining the well-being of immigrants; or dispose of unwanted non-citizens without a way of considering possible harm befalling them from events, deemed to be illiberal and uncivilized, taking place elsewhere. The chapters that follow show, among other things, that these new Canadian refugee programmes did not anticipate eradicating international refugee problems as the first League Office had; they were merely about averaging and spreading out their effects on the Canadian population, 'making-up' new Canadian citizens by taming their individual human products, and later surveilling and disciplining non-Western nations and populations where the source of these problems was assumed to lie and whence their products came.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

International refugee programmes and organizations began in Europe following the First World War as temporary, small-scale, and specific to groups defined by ethnicity or nationality. By the 1960s the international refugee programmes and organizations had become permanent, large-scale, and directed at a universal category. Contemporaneous with this the international refugee arose as an object of authorities' interest and as a new 'kind' of human being.

Besides suggesting the newness of refugee policies and practices in the Canadian context and how the international regime served as a condition of possibility for their emergence, the brief discussion of international refugee programmes and organizations above, also reveals the relevance of concepts and themes drawn from the governmentality literature in attempting to understand an international regime. Certain rationalities and technologies can be seen shaping and making possible this international regime. The 'failure'-new programme-'failure'-new programme sequence seen in this context suggests the present international refugee regime should not be simply understood as the end result of inevitable progress in responding to a growing, intractable international refugee problem (a Foucauldian 'facile gesture' if there ever was one). Instead, the fact that international refugee programmes and organizations were not abandoned or subsumed in each instance of 'failure' ought to be seen as due to their usefulness in international power relations. 'Refugeeness' started to become
more useful to Western authorities after 1947 within intensifying Cold War relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations exemplified in international responses to events in Hungary in 1956 and later in relation to de-colonization in Africa (and other socio-political spaces), first seen in a response to events in Algeria and Morocco in 1957. In these instances - between the Western and Eastern alliances (or 'First' and 'Second Worlds') and between North and South (or 'First' and 'Third Worlds') - 'refugeeness' can be seen as a Western moral-political tactic, a kind of 'transfer point' (Foucault, 1978: 103) in international power relations. As seen in the next chapter, in the late 1960s and early 1970s 'refugeeness' was to become useful to the Canadian nation. In the 1980s in relation to determination, however, it was to become problematic and unruly.

The fact that a Canadian refugee regime emerged in the period between the mid-1960s and early 1970s was not a matter of course. It was contingent on certain conditions besides the crystallization of an international refugee regime and its object. Among them are a renewed interest in seeing Canada become a more influential citizen in the international community; a renewed interest in Canada's population size and composition; and a recognized scarcity of desired labour in the West for the national economy.
1. Canadian state agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency have been directly involved in refugee aid and development through bilateral arrangements since the emergence of the Canadian refugee regime, but more often they have provided funding for agencies constituted as 'international' such as the UNHCR (Adelman, 1982: 42). Similarly, Canadian private agencies such as Canadian Christian organizations and the Canadian Red Cross operate through their international affiliates, the International Red Cross and the World Council of Churches (Adelman, 1982: 37). These and a complex array of non-state organizations are the "operational arms" (Adelman, 1982: 37) or, to use the advanced liberal phrase, the "implementing partners" (Rogers, 1992: 1116) of the UNHCR and Western nations operating in this sphere.

2. There is some overlap between them at certain sites, however. Nor is this to suggest that Western nations have not entered into bilateral or multilateral agreements to harmonize determination. Western European nations have entered into such agreements among themselves and Canada and the U.S. have recently signed a similar agreement (Canada, 1995d). Canada is also part of the multilateral "Comprehensive Plan of Action" (CPA), a temporary international programme involving refugee determination in countries of first asylum; forced repatriation of those deemed not to be refugees; and third-country resettlement in nations such as Canada (Canada, 1995b: 7). The CPA is scheduled to be completed in mid-1996 (Canada, 1995b: 7).

3. Attention is paid to international programmes and organizations rather than practices here because previous historical research pertaining to the former is readily available. The history of international refugee practices, particularly within refugee camps, is, with few exceptions (e.g., Wyman, 1988), one that is yet to be written.

4. There were no refugee movements, practices, or refugees in the same sense that there was no sexuality until the eighteenth (Foucault, 1978) or human beings with multiple personality disorder until the late nineteenth centuries (Hacking, 1995: 4).

5. See Hacking (1986: 226) and Pires and Acosta (1994: 20-22) for insight into the differences between the two perspectives. The discussion that follows is not an attempt to respond to the question, 'Are refugees real?', which is nonsensical as it stands because it requires both a noun and an alternative (Hacking, 1995: 11). To supply a noun would be to employ the following question structure: 'Is a refugee a real N?' (or 'Are refugees real N's?'). To make it intelligible, one is also required to suggest how a refugee fails to be an N. It is to ask, for example, 'Is a refugee a real N as opposed to an X'?
6. There were large movements of human beings outside Europe in the two decades that followed the 1920s within colonies and nations. For example, there was a mass migration from 1937 to 1939 of some 30 million Chinese during a conflict with Japan (Skran, 1995: 3).

7. This is not necessarily the case regarding Newfoundland prior to Confederation with Canada in 1949. According to the historian Bassler (1992: 223), unlike Canada, Newfoundland had a 'refugee clause' in its 1906 Aliens Act. One might note, however, that clause 1(d) of this Act was not referred to as a 'refugee clause' at the time. It referred instead to 'an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this Colony solely to avoid persecution or punishment on religious or political grounds' (as cited in Bassler, 1992: 40). No one was admitted under this provision between 1919 and 1930 (Bassler, 1992: 225).

8. There was, however, a non-State refugee-specific organization—the relatively short-lived Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR) created on December 6, 1938 under the auspices of the League of Nations Society in Canada (Dirks, 1977: 62; Knowles, 1992: 112; Holborn, 1975: 597). It established branches in several Canadian metropolitan areas to respond to the temporary European international refugee situation. Members of the CNCR included church groups, the Business and Professional Women's Association, and the YMCA (Dirks, 1977: 64). After 1947 it was disbanded (Holborn, 1975: 597). A similar temporary organization, the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR), was created in 1947 after Canadian selection of Displaced Persons abroad began (Vernant, 1953: 564; Adelman, 1980: 107). It included six Canadian Christian and ethno-cultural organizations: Catholic Immigrant Aid Society, the German Baptist Colonization and Immigration Society, the Canadian Lutheran Relief, the Latvian Relief Fund of Canada, the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, and the Sudetan Committee (Hawkins, 1972: 304-5). The CCCRR's mandate was to "organize the assembly abroad, selection, presentation to Canadian offices, and onward movement to Canada of refugees and displaced persons who did not come within the mandate of the IRO" (as cited in Hawkins, 1972: 304). In other words, the CCCRR was imagined making referrals to Canadian visa officers (or their equivalent at the time) for selection abroad. It later became one of four groups of the new Church Approved Program established in 1953 for a brief period allowing selection of unsponsored immigrants and approve and process sponsored ones (Hawkins, 1972: 305).

9. The efforts of the IRO were combined with those of some sixty private voluntary agencies (Gallagher, 1989: 579).

10. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in December, 1949 and commenced its operations in 1950 (Tabori, 1972: 288). The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) was established a year later in December, 1950. The
first programme imagined directing aid to Palestinians who had fled from the events of 1948 in what is now the state of Israel. The second sought to "assist the Korean people to relieve the sufferings and to repair the devastation caused by aggression" (As cited in Tabori, 1972: 288). Like the UNRRA neither was necessarily directed at refugees and although both were assumed to be temporary at the outset (Tabori, 1972: 289) the UNRWA continues today.

11. As refugee problems appeared outside Europe, the ICEM dropped 'European' from its name. More recently it became the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Rogers, 1992: 1115).

12. By 1954 the six nations that had signed the Convention were: Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, and Australia (Holborn, 1975: 177).

13. Following the events in Hungary, Canada was contributing from between a hundred and twenty-five and two hundred thousand dollars to the UNHCR annually for emergency refugee aid (Dirks, 1977: 183). This reached three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in 1965 (Dirks, 1977: 183), seven hundred and fifty thousand in 1977, and two million in 1979 (Adelman, 1982: 40). By 1991 Canada was contributing over seven million dollars of public funding to the UNHCR through CIDA annually (Adelman and Cox, 1994: 262), a rather remarkable difference from the temporary, limited public funding sent to the first League Office seventy years earlier.

14. Only about one percent of the UNHCR's budget, therefore, is guaranteed (interview 10/04/96).

15. As noted in the third edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1796 (Marrus, 1985: 8).

16. Zolberg et al. (1989: 8) mention in passing the development of 'a community of discourse' about the refugee as having "...followed a 'Kantian' progression, beginning with particularistic judgements... contingent on the circumstances prevailing in a given country at a given time; to which, over time, other categories were added; and gradually becoming more universalistic until, after World War II, the general criteria for identifying refugees were institutionalized in a body of international law administered by a bureaucratic organization staffed by appropriate experts." This is consistent with the foregoing discussion.

17. Of course some NGOs, such as Oxfam that began in 1963, have received up to half their funding from public sources, in the case of Canada through matching funds from the Canadian International Development Agency (Oxfam, 1995).
18. See, for example, Simpson's (1938: 549-50) discussion of the "steps which cannot be taken by private organizations" from this era.

19. This was a consistent theme during a workshop held in December, 1985 that was jointly sponsored by the International Council of Volunteer Agencies and the UNHCR (Kibreab, 1993: 323).

20. In October 1990 there was a seminar organized by the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University regarding literacy and education in refugee camps (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 18-23). A participant notes: "It is important to find out what the refugees themselves perceive to be their basic needs and to let them define their own needs on a priority basis." Another notes: "We need to empower refugees to take control of their own situation and not become passive recipients of international aid" Refuge. 1990 10(2): 19). At the third international symposium in Britain "Refugees from at least eleven different countries currently residing in the UK or Canada, also participated in the overall programme" (Refuge. 1988 8(3): 10).

21. For discussions of 'empowerment' in the context of governmentality, see Cruikshank, 1994; Baistow, 1995; Rose, 1996b: 348.

22. In 1992 the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that the 1990s was to be no less than the 'decade of repatriation' (Rogers, 1992: 1129). At this point Canada's Department of Immigration was also touting this renewed emphasis on repatriation on the part of the UNHCR in conjunction with statements about refugees levels (Dialogue. 1992 1(1): 3).

23. Recently the UNHCR has begun referring to NGOs as 'partners' (cf. UNHCR, 1996: 12; Rogers, 1992: 1116) and 'empowerment' has become a theme in international refugee research (e.g., Cooper, 1994: 7) both of which, as seen in chapters six and five respectively, is consistent with a broad advanced liberal discourse.

24. Canada's Department of External Affairs and CIDA had undertaken a less thorough audit of UNHCR activities and expenditures earlier in the 1980s (Adelman, 1982: 42). The greater dependence on the audit is itself a feature of advanced liberal governance (Valverde, 1994b).

26. In this way the term 'displaced person' can be understood to have been invented "for the expressed purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence" (Arendt, 1973: 279).

27. Giddens (1985: 272), for example, suggests regarding post-colonial nations in Africa that compared to Western nations "it is obvious enough that their origins and character are mostly quite discrepant."

28. Refugee development, as opposed to emergency refugee aid, was first seen in experimental work projects in Palestinian camps after 1948 (Gorman, 1993: 8), but it was not until the early 1960s in Africa that refugee development began to supplement refugee aid programmes on a massive scale (Gorman, 1993: 8).

29. None of this is to suggest that this tactic has not been resisted from time to time by the inhabitants of these spaces, as seen in relation to New Guinea during the Macias dictatorship, Uganda in 1982 (see Gordenker, 1987: 113), and more recently in African nations when entrance by representatives of the UNHCR and NGOs has been denied by political authorities.

30. Yugoslavia was, however, by 1985 making contributions to the UNHCR (Marrus, 1985: 370).

31. Significantly, by 1969 African nations had formed their own refugee definition that is presently not recognized by Western nations: "The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his places of habitual residence to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality" (Holborn, 1975: 189).

32. This was not lost on Department of Immigration officials and the Minister of Immigration (cf. Girard, 1988; Weiner, 1988).

33. Though a small-scale, temporary Handicapped Refugees Program was introduced at this point (Canada, 1974: 106).

34. See Daly (1976: 61-5) on what he refers to as a "population policy movement" that appeared beginning around 1971.

35. According to Dirks (1995: 114): "In the late 1970s and the early 1980s immigration officials attempted to weigh demographic factors to some extent when processing applicants at overseas posts" He adds that "their efforts were not especially successful."
36. For example, in 1985 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration suggested that immigration be used to smooth out the age imbalance of the Canadian population (Kelley, 1987: 8); Canadian representatives attended the United Nations International Conference on Population in Mexico City in August 1984 (Canada, 1988c: 24); and the comprehensive National Demographic Review was subsequently carried out by Health and Welfare Canada between 1987 and 1992 (Canada, 1989a). See also Canada (1990d).

37. According to a senior Department of Immigration bureaucrat, this arrangement

...provided comfort to the community because they had some coherent touchstones and it made policy visible... as ongoing and not just ad hoc. But it also made it easier to budget for the settlement services that refugees needed because you would say: 'well we're going to admit 13,000 refugees this year under the government plan so we need this much money set aside to finance their selection, their language training, their transportation to Canada and their basic settlement services on arrival (interview 09/01/96; emphasis added).
CHAPTER FIVE: ASSUMPTIONS, PROGRAMMES, AND RATIONALITIES

Canadian refugee programmes that appeared in the 1970s imagined protecting refugees from immediate physical damage and death through selection and determination and from moral and mental dangers through resettlement. In this rather lengthy chapter the Canadian refugee regime is broken down for purposes of analysis into three basic types of practices—selection, determination and resettlement. Taking the regime apart in this way will better allow rationalities and programmes, and how they have been changing, to be discerned. The discussion that follows, therefore, is not an exhaustive, detailed account of these three types, but a broad inspection of the ways of thinking about government that have made them possible, and the schema in which they have been imagined since the release of the Green Paper in the 1970s. Before proceeding it is first necessary, however, to show that the refugee regime is assumed distinct among relevant authorities, that it is thought irreducible to other regimes and their objects, especially to immigration and immigrants. It is also necessary to look at authorities' assumptions about the refugee as an object/identity. This is accomplished primarily by drawing from interviews with authorities.

Assumptions about the Canadian Regime and the Refugee

There are presently both Canadian state and non-state refugee-specific agencies or bodies in existence. The Refugee Status Advisory Committee (RSAC), consisting of representatives from the Departments of External Affairs and Immigration, was created in
1975 to deal with determination of refugee claims. In 1989 it was replaced by the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) that continues at present. At the federal level of the state there is also presently a permanent Refugee Branch of the federal Department of Immigration that deals with refugee policy. From its creation in 1975 (interview 30/08/96), until 1988, 'Refugee Affairs' was a division within a branch directed by a low-ranking bureaucrat (Dirks, 1995: 132).

The Department of Immigration underwent significant reorganization in 1983 when five branches were established at its national headquarters. Refugee Affairs was then re-located as a division within the 'Policy and Program Development' branch (Dirks, 1995: 130). Another re-organization occurred in 1988 leaving national headquarters with four major branches. One of these became 'Refugee Affairs and Settlement' (Dirks, 1995: 131). In 1990, when policy and operations within the Department were split and six branches added (Dirks, 1995: 134), Refugee Affairs then became a branch unto itself. In 1993 Employment and Immigration became two separate departments -Human Resources Development and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration- and two branches were created, 'Refugee Affairs' and 'International Refugee and Migration Policy'. The former was to cover operations; the latter policy. In 1995, yet another re-organization was announced that imagined the eventual partition of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration into three sections, each consisting of several
branches. The core of these sections is to be 'Service Lines' and the 'Refugee Branch', one of this section's four branches (Canada, 1996a: 3). Throughout the period since release of the Green Paper, then, there have been distinctive state or state-funded bodies specifically concerned with refugees.

There are also national, non-state, refugee-specific organizations operating at present: the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) based in Montreal and the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees (ICCR) located in Toronto. The CCR is a small, permanent umbrella advocacy organization established in 1978 during meetings about the selection of Indo-Chinese refugees. It was volunteer-based until 1989 at which time two and one-half permanent salaried staff were added (Hardy, 1994: 285). It presently represents one hundred and thirty-eight Christian, citizenship, immigrant settlement, ethno-cultural, regional refugee advocacy, and local refugee sponsorship organizations, as well as refugee research centres, refugee lawyer associations, and groups of (rather than 'for') refugees (CCR, 1995a). The ICCR is a slightly larger umbrella organization created in 1980 that presently has ten salaried staff (ICCR, 1995a). Its membership currently consists of ten major Christian churches. Prior to the establishment of refugee sponsorship provisions in the 1978 immigration regulations (see below), there was a National Inter-faith Immigration Committee operating, but no similar refugee-specific organization.

In Canadian urban areas there are also presently permanent
regional organizations that have adopted similar refugee advocacy roles. These include the Toronto Refugee Affairs Council created in 1983 (interview 22/08/95) and the Vancouver Refugee Council and Table de concertation de Montreal pour les Refugies also established in the 1980s (CCR, 1995b; Refuge. 1984 3(4): 17). In addition, over the past two decades Amnesty International has had a small Refugee Affairs unit within its English Section that has advocated in Canada on behalf of individual refugee claimants (Refuge. 1987 7(2): 9; 1989 9(2): 4). From their inception, representatives of the CCR, ICCR, and these various advocacy organizations have made oral and written submissions to annual levels consultations (see below) and various legislative committees, and have participated in numerous public fora regarding refugee policy (cf. Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 432). Since release of the Green Paper, then, there have been distinctive non-state agencies and bodies specifically concerned with refugees in Canada. Associated with these state and non-state bodies and agencies are a variety of individual identities that similarly show the distinctiveness of the regime. At present these include: refugee board member, refugee hearing officer, refugee coordinator, refugee sponsor, refugee lawyer, refugee consultant, refugee worker, and refugee expert.

Across the talk and texts of various authorities the distinctiveness of the regime is also evident. A recent Department of Immigration strategy document, for example, notes:

The refugee program will be managed separately to distinguish its protection and burden-sharing objectives
from the different objectives of the immigration program (Canada, 1994b: 2; emphasis added).

A senior Department of Immigration bureaucrat similarly observes in passing:

...more today then ever before the refugee program is a separate program from the... overall levels. (interview 06/11/95).

A refugee coordinator operating on behalf of a major Christian church notes:

I'm not dealing with the context of immigrants coming into the country... I'm merely interested only in the refugee part (interview 28/08/95).

Though 'immigration' and 'immigrant' are not present in interview questions (see Appendix II), most authorities interviewed make perpetual reference to immigration and immigrants in talking about refugee policy and refugees, but they do so without reducing the latter to the former. Consider these two excerpts from interviews with representatives of ethno-cultural organizations:

...so we deal a lot with post-traumatic stress disorder, people that came from countries, you know, torn by war etc. civil wars, and they need, they're not a normal immigrant... (interview 03/10/95; emphasis added).

...a refugee is different because I think refugees, because they come under a difficult situation, they don't have the financial resources to be self-sufficient right away, immigration is different, immigrants are, if you are talking of immigration as a whole... The refugees are bottom of the ladder and usually they have to be dependent on, you know, like government welfare at the beginning (interview 16/10/95; emphasis added).

Absent are suggestions that refugee issues are fully reducible to or 'really about' immigration, or for that matter, international development, the economy, foreign affairs, or some other longer-
standing domain.

At present the refugee is instantiated in the talk and texts of various authorities of the Canadian refugee regime in a distinctive way. In a major report a few years ago, Canadian refugee experts, for example, note that

...people usually do not choose to become refugees: they are either forced out of their homelands by hostile governments... or forced to leave because of fear of political reprisals... (Beiser et al., 1989: 190; emphasis added).

In the talk and texts of these authorities the refugee is assumed to lack voluntarism. A representative of an ethno-cultural organization, for example, observes:

These people are different and what goes unrecognized is the fact that they didn't choose, they are forced out, and that fact is very important (interview 17/10/95; emphasis added).

The refugee is distinguished by a lack of choice and this is assumed to be important for, among other things, their integration into Canadian society. A Christian church-based refugee worker and representative of a national refugee advocacy organization relates:

An immigrant has choices and power and a refugee has none of those things... they are in, put in a position in their home country prior to flight where they are deprived of choice and are deprived of power and so that I think is a fundamental difference. I believe that refugees are persons who do not choose to leave their country and come to Canada, that they are persons who are put into a position where they have no choice but to leave. They suffer tremendous losses, in every aspect of their life... by leaving. And this affects the way in which they resettle because there was no choice to leave, therefore, there is no choice to come, and no choice to be here (interview 23/06/95a; emphasis added).

A representative of an ethno-cultural organization similarly relates:
they're people that come here because they didn't have any other choices, sometimes leaving all their families behind and their support. In addition to having to overcome all the sort of so-called normal integration problems as happens to everybody, they have their own personal problems to deal with... So its... a very specific type of population I should say (interview 03/10/95; emphasis added).

From these examples it is evident that the refugee is assumed to be an entity lacking choice that is contrasted with the choice assumed to be exercised by the immigrant. In North America the immigrant has become an established object/identity in its own right and has its own historical trajectory. As Wong (1989: 278) writes regarding the United States:

The attribution of status and identity by virtue of the act of migration emerged only in the wake of the establishment of the United States of America as an independent nation-state... Not until 1868, however, did the term 'immigrant' acquire officials' recognition in that the lists of steerage passengers on incoming ships were referred to as alien immigrants rather than alien passengers. The term 'immigrant' thus emerged as a 'discursive fact', as denoting a particular type, not of population movement, but of population of a particular breed of humanity...

The refugee has emerged only recently as a discursive fact in Canada, the United States, and other nations of the modern West, and, is in a sense, carved out of the immigrant object/identity on the basis of a capacity to exercise choice. A representative of an immigrant settlement organization notes:

...refugees and immigrants, which often get lumped together under the banner of newcomer or immigrant, have very distinctive needs. One chooses, one group of newcomer chooses to come to the country, the other one [sic] are forced or do not have any choice in that matter and we have continually strived to... promote the unique distinction between those groups and the corresponding challenges and needs of those two groups because they are very different (interview 14/09/95; emphasis added).
A widely disseminated Canadian 'Resource Kit' concerning immigrant women with a separate section on refugee policy and refugees reads:

There is a lack of specific funding for programs geared to meet the needs of refugees. It is assumed that their needs do not differ from the needs of immigrants. Programs for refugees should be integrated to address their fears for loved ones back home, their emotional stability and deteriorated physical health. The programs must also address their experiences of persecution, incarceration, and torture. Refugees do not choose to emigrate (Moreno and Persad, 1990: 46; emphasis added).

It is in this way, then, that the refugee is defined against the immigrant: the latter chooses to migrate and then is assumed to undergo normal integration while the former does not. Consider two more excerpts from interviews that illustrate this. A representative of an ethno-cultural organization relates:

...they're different in that they didn't choose to come here, they were forced out of their countries, big difference between the average immigrant that sells everything and has planned to come to Canada... (interview 17/10/95; emphasis added).

A psychiatrist specializing in the treatment of immigrants and refugees during their resettlement notes that

...the basic difference between an immigrant and a refugee is an immigrant has time to prepare for their trip... Refugee is [sic] completely unprepared. When the right time comes for them, they just leave from their own country either by air, by boat, walk, or swim or God knows [and]... end up in a refugee camp. For sometime they have no idea where they would go to. They have no choice about what their future is like, about what the settlement country is like... of course this group of people cannot contribute much when they first come here, you know, given what they went through, it take them [sic]... a long time even to function... (interview 29/01/96; emphasis added).

These examples are enough to show that in the texts and talk of a variety of Canadian authorities, the refugee is assumed to be a
distinctive object/identity that lacks a capacity for choice. This is important because it is this assumption that underlies all efforts to govern refugees as refugees. It is consistent with the notion of the refugee within international programmes as an entity forced to flee from something or someone. In selection it is what has made the refugee useful to the Canadian nation in the international sphere of politics; in determination it is the moral-political causes of this assumed lack of choice that programmes foresee identifying; and in resettlement it is what justifies special—as opposed to normal—intervention in refugees' lives after they arrive in Canada.

LIBERAL GOVERNMENT

It will be seen below that when the three types of practices of the regime are investigated, liberal rationalities can be discerned. It is necessary to draw attention to several distinguishing features of liberalism as a rationality of rule before proceeding to show the varied ways in which it constitutes and shapes the regime. Governing in a liberal manner—since at least the nineteenth century—has assumed an opposition between public and private realms (Rose, 1987) or between the state and civil society (Burchell, 1991). Liberal government places limits on political intervention and presumes a domain of freedom and action outside the legitimate reach of politics (Rose and Miller, 1992: 179). It confronts subjects in civil society who are presupposed to possess rights that must not be violated by immediately political authorities (Rose, 1993: 289). Civil society
is nevertheless to be shaped in preferred ways by 'non-political' authorities (Rose, 1993: 290). Another feature of liberalism is its insistence that subjects be rulers of their own conduct and fate, that they be self-governing entities (Valverde, 1996: 357).

Liberal government is not arbitrary government. Instead it entails a perpetual critique, an on-going suspicion of political authorities who might impose their will across a territory (Rose and Miller, 1992: 180; Rose, 1996a: 44). It spawns the perpetual questions: Is government proceeding as planned, is it intervening enough, is it interfering too much? Liberal government is reflexive and seeks to ensure the continued existence of institutional spaces such as universities, public fora, mass media, and advocacy organizations, through which reflections on the actions of political authorities and on public policy become possible (Rose, 1993). With the aim of good, proper government, academics, citizens, journalists, capitalists, trade unionists, and advocates of one kind or other are encouraged, and in a sense, required to criticize these actions and policies in civilized ways. It is in this way that liberalism relies on expertise of various kinds, as well as the social sciences (Rose, 1993: 291).

In a wide range of domains from health care to higher education to policing in Canada and other Western nations, as well as in international domains (as suggested in the previous chapter), a shift in governmental rationalities continues to take place. While each of these domains has its own specific trajectory and conditions of possibility, the way they are transforming is
consistent with a shift from what can be called a 'liberal welfare rationality' (cf. Ashenden, 1996: 85n), characterized by what has been traditionally understood as the Welfare State, to a rationality variously referred to as 'neo-liberal', 'post-Keynesian' and 'advanced neo-liberal' (Rose and Miller, 1992: 198-201; O'Malley and Palmer, 1996; and Valverde, 1996 respectively), but perhaps best termed 'advanced liberal'\(^\text{12}\) (Rose, 1993: 294-6).

It was mentioned in the previous chapter that one feature of 'advanced liberalism' as a rationality of rule is that it presupposes a more active or enterprising subject (Rose, 1992: 145). Governing in an advanced liberal way specifies actors who are "subjects of responsibility, autonomy, and choice" (Rose, 1996a: 53-4). Another characteristic is that it entails less reliance on the social sciences and more on knowledges such as accounting and econometrics and related techniques like the audit and 'marketization' (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 150; Rose, 1996a: 54-5). It also involves 'localization', the movement of responsibility to more local levels (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 141-2). In general, advanced liberal rule involves the introduction of more distance between decisions of political authorities and a variety of social actors (Rose, 1996a: 53).

While there is no clear-cut point\(^\text{13}\) at which this shift commenced in the context of the Canadian refugee regime, as is seen below, signs can begin to be seen in the mid-1970s.

Refugee Selection

From the release of the Green Paper to the present, the
Canadian selection programme has envisaged visa officers\textsuperscript{14} in Canadian embassies and consulates entering refugee camps and crisis situations abroad\textsuperscript{15} (Hawkins, 1989: 293) to select refugees to fulfil annually set levels. Within the selection programme two basic types of refugees have been imagined: the Convention refugee and the Designated Class refugee (Canada, 1995b: 7; Nash, 1989: 40). The former refers to the UN Convention definition; the latter to groups designated by the Minister of Immigration to be in 'refugee-like' situations who might not otherwise fit the Convention definition (Canada, 1995b: 7; Nash, 1989: 41). These two types are to be selected abroad using special criteria, one of which is the potential for 'successful establishment' in Canada, as mentioned previously (Hawkins, 1989: 295-7; Nash, 1989: 40-1; Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 431; Lanphier, 1990: 82).\textsuperscript{16} The first designated classes to be established in 1978 were the 'Latin American Designated Class' (referring to persons in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay); the 'Self-Exiled Designated Class' (referring to non-Yugoslav Eastern Europeans); and the 'Indochinese Designated Class' (referring to Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese) (Canada, 1995b: 7-8). The first of these was renamed - when Poland was added - the Political Prisoners and Oppressed Persons Designated Class in 1982 (Canada, 1990b: 10; 1995b: 7-8). Guatemala and El Salvador were added to this Class after 1982 and remain the only nations to which it now refers (Canada, 1995b: 8).\textsuperscript{17} In 1990 the second of these was altogether cancelled and the third replaced by an 'Indo-chinese Designated Class,
Another significant development during this period has been the addition, in 1988, within these two basic types, of a Women at Risk programme that foresaw the selection of individual women refugees deemed to be in immediate danger of harassment, physical/sexual abuse, or refoulement within refugee camps (Canada, 1995b: 8; Macklin, 1995: 220). Prior to this, Canadian refugee programmes had constituted the refugee as an uncivilized, immoral man, sometimes accompanied by his wife and children. Women were mentioned within these refugee programmes to the extent they were a source of labour outside the domestic sphere in Canada, but even then they were referred to as 'wives' of refugees, rather than as 'refugee women' (e.g., Canada, 1973; 1976a). This point is returned to in chapter six when resistance is discussed.

When the Immigration Act was proclaimed in 1978, annual consultations with provincial representatives regarding levels of refugees and immigrants to be selected from abroad, preceding the presentation of an Annual Plan to Canadian Parliament, became required (Nash, 1989; 72). Consultations for an Annual Refugee Plan were imagined being carried out at the same time and in the same way as an Annual Immigration Plan (Canada, 1986d: iii). Besides provincial representatives, the Act also allowed non-governmental organizations to be included in these consultations to be decided on a discretionary basis by the Minister of Immigration.

Non-state refugee-specific organizations, such as the CCR,
were briefly consulted through special meetings on selection levels of Indo-Chinese refugees in 1978 and have been regularly consulted since 1980 (Canada, 1986d: 1,4). Department of Immigration officials carry out these annual consultations first by contacting representatives of this and other organizations and groups by letter. Several broad questions about levels are put forth and responses through written submissions and/or attendance at meetings hosted by immigration officials in various regions of Canada are encouraged (Canada, 1986c: 15). Since 1981 Department of Immigration regional representatives (e.g., Ontario, Quebec, or Alberta/N.W.T. regions) - as opposed to those from the Department's central planning headquarters in Ottawa exclusively - have become involved in both these aspects of consultations (Canada, 1988c: 15). In 1982 through to 1984 the number of groups and organizations consulted in the manner above significantly increased (Canada, 1986d: 4). Refugee experts and other academics were invited to participate in consultations by Department of Immigration officials beginning in 1984.23

Refugee levels were identified by world area for the first time in 1980 (Canada, 1988c: 12). The world regions specified within these consultations were consistent with those implied by the Designated Classes mentioned above. Initially they included 'Indo-china', 'Eastern Europe', and 'Latin America/Caribbean', as well as an 'Other' and a 'Reserve'.24 In 1981 'Africa' and in 1982 'Middle East/West Asia' regions were added (Basok and Simmons, 1993: 140). These specified regions have, for the most part,25
remained in place through the 1990s.

The presence of these annual consultations reveals selection's liberal character. These yearly routines of receiving letters containing several questions about levels and responding through attendance at meetings and/or composing and submitting written responses are instances of political subjectification that seek to 'make' liberal citizens out of the varied participants. These procedures seek to summon participants' assumed potential to exercise their choice. These routines endeavour to encourage and conjure up participants' opinions, objections, arguments, calculations, and grievances and in so doing simultaneously seek to ensure that the setting of levels is scrutinized. Liberal forms of government seek to

prevent the collapse of types of rule into mere domination by invoking the capacities and powers of the self-governing individual while at the same time undertaking to foster, shape and use those capacities and powers (Dean, 1994c: 163).

These exercises make this possible in the area of selection. Liberal government can demand that even the routines themselves be reflected upon in an attempt to ensure that levels are not arbitrarily set. In 1986, for example, following concern expressed by some participants about whether the Department determined levels in advance of consultations and whether their input was being seriously considered (Canada, 1986d: 8), a comprehensive review to "streamline and deepen" the consultation process was almost immediately initiated and studies (e.g., Canada, 1986d; 1988c) of varied aspects of the consultative process undertaken (Canada,
In conjunction with this effort, as an addition to the 1987 levels consultations and standard questions about proper levels, those receiving letters were encouraged to respond to eight questions about the levels planning process itself (Canada, 1986d: 7).

But these annual levels consultations are just that— they target levels, the numbers of refugees to be selected in the coming year(s). Criteria for deciding the distribution of these numbers abroad are not necessarily made transparent or discussed in this or other contexts. Within the selection programme there is virtually no regular public debate about distribution of these spaces or, in other words, discussion over possible answers to the inherently difficult question of 'who is a refugee?' (ie. which nations are refugee-producing or which group has been or was likely to be persecuted by this or that group within a particular nation). At most, debate regarding levels for the private-sponsored component of the overall Refugee Plan within a particular world region has occurred within the context of the consultations (interview 21/06/95a; Refuge. 1981 1(3): 6; 1984 4(2): 4). As Adelman (1984: 1) writes:

Selection of refugees abroad is a matter of government policy. The private sector may advocate a specific number in its distribution, and may be consulted by government on that number and distribution. The private sector may augment those numbers and affect the numbers brought from a particular source country through private sponsorship... [but] the primary basis of selection policy is rooted in government decisions. In the global approach to planning and allocating a limited number of spaces, the government must distribute those spaces among many source countries (emphasis added).
The target of the selection programme, then, is an annual refugee level, the numbers of refugees to be selected in the coming year(s). Since annual refugee planning began, the extent to which the numbers of individual refugees actually selected abroad has been in line with these set annual levels for a specific world area in which visa officers operate has been closely monitored (interview 30/08/96; Dialogue. 1(3): 8 1992). From within Canada, however, it appears distribution has been left to the whims of Canadian political authorities and visa officers. Canadian refugee selection, outside of a concern over levels, seems to have a decidedly despotic character. Despotism is defined by the limits of liberal liberty (Valverde, 1996: 359) and is more evident from what is absent in the realm of selection than what is present. This is a point that requires further discussion.

How refugee spaces are allocated, in sharp contrast with determination and resettlement discussed later (as well as the setting of levels above), is remarkably unreflexive. Consider that since 1979 no less than five major state or state-commissioned, widely disseminated, comprehensive studies of determination have been carried out: Robinson (1981), Ratushny (1984), Plaut (1985), LRCC (1991), and Hathaway and MacMillan (1993) (cf. Refuge. 1989 9(2): 2).²⁷ There have also been large-scale state-commissioned public opinion research conducted focusing on perceptions of determination (e.g., Canada, 1985c; 1989b; 1990c). During the same period there have been numerous large-scale, state (mostly state-commissioned), widely distributed studies of refugee resettlement
(e.g., Neuwirth, 1984a; 1984b; Canada, 1981a; 1981b; 1982a; 1982b; 1985; 1986b; 1987a; 1989c; 1989d; Nann et al., 1984; CRESH, 1984; Adelman, 1984b; Johnson, 1984; Samuel, 1987; Dorais, 1991; Johnson and Beiser, 1994). During this same period the Department of Immigration has hosted: a 'National Symposium on Refugee Determination' in 1982 (Refuge. 1981 1(7): 5); an 'Ontario Consultation Conference on Refugee Resettlement' in 1984 (Refuge. 1984 4(2): 16); public consultations on the Plaut Report (1985) in 1985; a comprehensive 'Review of Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program' begun in 1991 (Refuge. 1992 12(3): 4-5); Canada, 1990b: 11.; and numerous other public fora pertaining to these two types of practices. But neither the Department of Immigration, External Affairs, nor any other state agency, has sponsored or conducted public opinion or comprehensive research, or hosted a public symposium or conference, focusing on how Canadian refugee spaces are distributed abroad (interviews 30/08/96; 28/07/95).28 The prevailing assumption is that how refugeeness is deployed abroad by Canadian authorities does not require continual scrutiny through the production of formal knowledge (the kind of knowledge that is abstract and systematic), forms of expertise, or public debate in the free spaces of Canadian society.

To be sure, there have been several scattered and very limited studies of selection over the past two decades by non-state researchers,29 but these can be understood as brief instances of resistance (see chapter six) rather than an integral component imagined within the regular selection programme. Only one of these
studies, carried out by the CCR, has been comprehensive in scope (CCR, 1992a). The response of political authorities and state agents to this study, however, is itself suggestive. After meeting with External Affairs and Department of Immigration officials in 1989 to discuss the possible creation of a task force that would eventually hold public hearings and prepare a report about all aspects of refugee selection practices (including how refugee levels are distributed), CCR representatives received a short letter containing the following response: "'I regret that I can agree with neither your estimate of the need for such a task force, nor with the fundamental premises of your recommendation'" (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 12). After the study commenced—without cooperation of relevant political authorities and Department officials—the CCR again requested a meeting with Canadian visa officers temporarily recalled to Ottawa for briefings "to talk with them about the processing of refugee claimants abroad" (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 12). This request was flatly denied, officials simply suggesting that "visa officers were too busy" (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 12). When the seventy-seven page CCR study was completed in September, 1992 and sent to Department of Immigration officials for comment, included was a major recommendation that Canadian visa officers select all those persons referred (see below) to them by UNHCR officials abroad. This received the following formal response from the Executive Director of Immigration Policy: "Decisions as to whether referrals meet the Convention refugee definition are left to sovereign states, like Canada, which have signed the United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees" (Dialogue. 1(3): 7 1992). The formal response to a suggestion in the CCR report that "the system of overseas protection of refugees is not working" reads: "We agree that this program is not beyond criticism. The fact that the announced target was not met in 1991 is a source of serious concern that we are addressing" (emphasis added; Dialogue. 1(3): 7 1992). Note that it is the fulfilment of the "announced target" or refugee level that is a "serious concern," the only aspect of selection mentioned as such in this instance.  

This is significant because it supports the notion above that it is set refugee levels that are to be monitored within the Canadian selection programme not how, other than within world regions, these spaces are allocated in practice. This comprehensive study of Canadian refugee selection, when completed, nevertheless illustrated the apparently despotic character of how refugee spaces are distributed by visa officers. The study concludes that their decisions are "arbitrary and capricious" and that there are "inexplicable variations between visa offices and even between visa officers at the same visa post" (CCR, 1992a: 4).  

It also points out that there is no review or appeal process associated with or legal counsel allowed during individual refugee selection interviews (Refuge. 1993 12(3): 4; CCR, 1994: 2). In addition it notes that Canadian visa officers are not subjected to a competency test before being allowed to carry out refugee determinations (Refuge. 1992 11(1): 9) and that refugee expertise is generally not attributed to these agents (Refuge. 1992 11(1): 9).
In practice visa officers have used Designated Class categories in place of the Convention Refugee category to fulfil a level for a world region within the Annual Refugee Plan (Nash, 1989: 65). Because they refer to 'refugee-like' situations, Designated Class categories can be used without the visa officer having to carry out an individual refugee determination (Gilad, 1990b: 125). It will be recalled that nationalities and groups are 'Designated' by Canadian political authorities at another time and place. Individual refugee selection interviews often take place after Canadian political authorities - who are freed to deploy refugeeess in the international sphere - decide which nations are refugee-producing and which groups are refugees, and then visa officers are directed to appropriate camps and crisis situations to carry out individual selections. The distribution and sequence of tasks in the realm of refugee selection is not necessarily kept secret or otherwise concealed from the Canadian citizenry. During interviews, for example, many Canadian authorities active in the refugee regime demonstrate an awareness of these arrangements. They do not, however, regard them as an important area of concern. In more than forty interviews with authorities, only the refugee advocate quoted above raised serious concerns about them. Consistent with this, Dirks (1984: 280) writes that:

...individuals outside Canada seeking to gain entry as refugees through application and processing at immigration offices around the world... normally cause no major problems for the Canadian government (emphasis added).

Two recent developments also illustrate the apparently
despotic way in which refugee spaces have been allocated abroad. In 1993 members of the CRDD of the IRB became required to provide written reasons for not complying with the IRB Guidelines on "Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution" that were established that same year (Canada, 1993b). But establishment of a similar requirement that would have allowed monitoring of visa officers' application of this criterion was not instituted (CCR, 1994: 1; ICCR, 1995b: 2-3). Similarly, in 1996 a formal agreement was made between the IRB and the Department of Immigration regarding knowledge-sharing such that "the IRB can now make specific inquiries to CIC [the Department of Immigration] about refugee claimants and the circumstances surrounding their claim" (Canada, 1996a: 7). But in programmatic statements this 'sharing' agreement is foreseen enhancing determination in Canada, not selection abroad. Whereas those involved in the determination process are presumed to require additional knowledge produced by visa officers to make proper deliberations, visa officers are not thought to require additional knowledge produced or relayed about these 'circumstances' by those in the determination process or the IRB's documentation centres (see determination below and chapter six) in order to improve the quality of refugee selections. Instead, the guidelines for refugee determination abroad instruct visa officers to rely primarily on informal knowledge of these conditions (Immigration Manual IS 3.24; Gilad, 1990b: 130). These two absences—of a requirement to monitor application of new guidelines abroad and of a need for
additional knowledge for determination abroad— are consistent with
the notion that visa officers are imagined deciding less which
human beings are refugees, and more which refugees in refugee camps
or specific crisis situations in a particular world region should
be selected to come to Canada to live permanently. Visa officers
are pursuing not so much the question of 'who is a refugee?', as
'which refugees should be selected?' or, in other words, which
refugees will work submissively, produce and raise moral children,
make their consumer choices wisely, save for a rainy day, vote from
time to time, and otherwise exercise their citizenship in a
civilized manner if selected to come to Canada (e.g., Gilad, 1990b:
129; Hathaway, 1992: 81). The 'successful establishment'
criterion, as it is the second of a two-step selection process, is
entirely consistent with this notion (cf. Hathaway, 1992: 78, 81;
Mandel, 1994: 253). As a refugee advocate notes concerning the
emphasis and knowledge of state agents involved in refugee
selection abroad:

> Visa officers are mostly doing immigration cases so that they think in immigration terms and that's basically their knowledge and experience... they're diplomats abroad and like all diplomats abroad basically they know what people sitting at hotels and bars in foreign countries know, which is very little... the visa offices don't go through that many processes. They don't know. They don't have access to information... (interview 28/07/95; emphasis added).

Similarly, Dirks (1985: 124) has noted regarding Canadian refugee
selection practices:

> Immigration officials, when screening and processing applicants, primarily focused attention upon the health, age, and skills of the individuals. Whether the applicant has been politically persecuted in his state of
former residence was of no consequence (emphasis added).

The distribution of refugee spaces abroad is unreflexive and not necessarily reliant on expertise or formal knowledge in the form of the social sciences. In making their individual selection decisions visa officers do rely, however, on informal knowledge in the form of referrals from agencies such as the UNHCR, the International Red Cross, and international Christian organizations operating abroad (interviews 18/08/95; 09/01/96; 06/11/95; Refuge. 1982 2(2): 8; 1989 9(2): 13-14; 12(3): 5 1992; CRESH, 1984: 33; Canada, 1982c: 11; 1995e; CCR, 1995c: 3; Hitchcox, 1990: 123). As the Minister of Immigration related in 1984:

It must also be remembered that there are special logistical problems in operating a refugee program which is truly global in scope, and in which we often cooperate with third parties -such as the UNHCR and church groups - in locating and interviewing those persons who are in need of resettlement (emphasis added).\(^38\)

In sharp contrast with the setting of levels, as well as determination and resettlement discussed below, formal, regular relations are not established between state agents (ie. visa officers) and these non-state agents who make referrals. They are not imagined, for example, entering legal agreements or annually consulting one another in public fora (interviews 09/01/96; 30/08/96).\(^39\) Referring to these non-state agents a career Department of Immigration official relates:

They will, as well, if they're asked, provide referral services with certain profiles, but generally speaking there's no uniformity in that respect we, we have always said, as have most other recipient countries, we will make our own selections. You can do some pre-screening for us. If you say a person's a refugee, we won't necessarily agree with you, we're not even bound to
accept that they're a refugee, and we won't necessarily admit them either, but we often solicited their help in the referral mechanism (interview 09/01/96).

In practice, regarding fulfilment of the private sponsorship (see resettlement below) component of the Annual Refugee Plan, camp inhabitants and those in crisis situations who have a willing Canadian sponsor are referred to visa officers (Hathaway, 1992: 78-9; Refuge. 1990 9(3): 2-3; Hitchcox, 1990: 125; Canada, 1982c: 11). This sponsorship obviously brings them more in line with the 'successful establishment' criterion (cf. Hathaway, 1992: 78-9): their referral assists visa officers in deciding not so much who is a refugee, as which refugees should be selected to live to Canada.

It should be recognized that how refugee spaces are distributed abroad by Canadian authorities is not formally limited by the dictates of international refugee law and the UNHCR (cf. Nash, 1989: 68; Immigration Manual. IS 3.06). The 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol that Canada acceded to in 1969 suggests it is "the responsibility of governments, not the UNHCR, to determine who qualified under the subjective definition of refugee owing to a 'well founded fear of persecution'" and that these decisions are presumed to be "a sovereign area of discretion" (Cuncliffe, 1995: 282). Nor does the UNHCR dictate to Canadian political authorities which nations are refugee-producing or which groups are refugees (interview 22/08/95), although as mentioned above, its agents will refer individuals to Canadian visa officers for possible selection. Instead, since its creation, the UNHCR has tended to commence its aid (and referral) activities in a
particular socio-political space after political authorities of Western nations -freed to identify and address a refugee situation as such- request the UNHCR assist (interview 22/08/95; Adelman, 1982: 38; Dirks, 1977: 191; Tabori, 1972: 298n). The UNHCR's reports of the numbers of refugees in need of resettlement in a given world region for a given year have been consistently used as a rationale for the refugee levels that are finally decided upon in the Annual Refugee Plan. They are used to justify to what extent and sometimes how -only in terms of distribution among world regions- refugeeness will be deployed in the coming year(s). But it should be noted that prior to the appearance of Annual Refugee Plans, the UNHCR did not report on those refugees in need of resettlement on an annual basis and by world region, a format that now precisely fits the demands of the Canadian selection programme (interview 30/08/96; UNHCR, 1995). Canadian Department of Immigration officials at this juncture encouraged the UNHCR in Geneva to begin publicly reporting these numbers in this manner (interview 30/08/96). This clearly shows the UNHCR has not had the task of formally limiting Canadian selection since then, but instead has been one more non-political organization whose autonomy, in this instance liberal government, seeks to at once preserve and use.

Within the Canadian selection programme, therefore, liberal government shapes selection in such a way that there are annual levels consultations, but this is the point at which it reaches its limit. From there it defers to what from within a Canadian or
national perspective appears as despotism—political authorities distributing refugee spaces abroad as they so desire. From an international perspective, however, of nations as actors operating in another realm of politics and morality, the Canadian distribution of spaces can be seen not to occur in a despotic way, but one consistent with liberal rationalities present in that sphere. For it is exclusively non-Western nations (or groups within them) which have been 'Designated' and from which Convention refugees have been selected—nations assumed to be something less than the ideal of liberal nationhood (as suggested in chapter four). Consistent with the presence of liberal rationalities in the international sphere and, as seen above, outside the Canadian selection programme, the deployment of refugeeness abroad has allowed Canada to relate to these non-Western nations and groups deemed to be illiberal, uncivilized—and until 1989—enemies, in ways discussed in the previous chapter. Simultaneously, this deployment has allowed the fostering of alliances with other Western nations (e.g., either single nations such as Britain and the U.S. or groups such as the Commonwealth and NATO), as they have sometimes lacked the capacity for such responses on their own. In this way, refugeeness can be seen as a moral-political tactic associated with Canadian authorities, and sometimes other Western nations with which Canada is assumed to have much in common (cf. Anderson, 1991: 26), operating in an international field.

It is important to recognize that it is the existence of refugees once identified and selected as such, their collective
(either national or group) persecution that has been useful in the international domain, not the fact that any given individual was persecuted. Nor within the Canadian selection programme have persons in refugee camps or crisis situations abroad been presumed to be liberal subjects, rational agents whose freedom must not be interdicted by Canadian authorities. Instead, here refugees have been assumed to be little more than a reliable (assembled and disciplined in refugee camps as they are) non-Western immigrant resource to be mined by visa officers to fulfil levels. As is seen below, it is only after these human beings leave or are transported from these camps and crisis situations and -in one way or other- come into the range of Canadian determination or resettlement programmes that they are assumed to be juridical subjects or entities with a potential to become liberal citizens and confronted accordingly.

The move to include, in regular levels consultations, representatives of the provinces and of various Regional headquarters of the Department of Immigration, rather than merely the Department's central planning headquarters, as forms of 'localization', show a shift to an advanced liberal rationality taking place. This is also evident in a gradual though uneven reduction in the planned or programmed levels of state-sponsored refugees in the Annual Refugee Plan since 1979. This reduction began in 1982 and continued in 1983 (Canada, 1986e; 1988c: 16). The 1983 levels were continued in 1984 (Canada, 1988c: 19), but were subsequently lowered slightly in 1985. For both 1986 and 1987
numbers were returned to 1984 levels (Canada, 1988c: 27; 1985b: 13) and for 1988 raised slightly (Canada, 1986c: 11). The levels of state-sponsored refugees planned for 1988 were continued until 1993 when they were significantly reduced (by 23 percent) to the lowest mark since 1979 when planning began (Canada, 1991: 6). For 1994 the planned levels were again significantly reduced by the same amount as the previous year (Canada, 1994c: 3), thereby bringing refugee levels in the 1994 Annual Refugee Plan to about half 1984 and a small fraction of 1981 levels. From 1994 to the present these significantly reduced planned levels have been maintained (Canada, 1995a: 13; 1996b: 5). This shift in liberal rationalities is also evident in the regular inclusion of refugee experts and other academics in levels consultations commencing in 1984—expertise is seen moving out of the state.

Inseparable from these specific changes in the area of selection and the more general shift in liberal rationalities has been the appearance during this period of a new emphasis on econometric analyses that endeavour to quantify the contributions and costs to the economy of each type of entrant or migrant (e.g., refugee, independent) after their arrival in Canada (e.g., DeVoretz, 1995). This point is elaborated in chapter six when knowledge is discussed.

Refugee Determination

Unlike refugee selection, determination underwent considerable change during the period from its inception to the present. Though no specific provisions regarding determination appeared in the new
immigration regulations in 1967, the Immigration Appeal Board was created that year to deal with deportation case appeals launched by non-citizens (Dirks, 1977: 230; Nash, 1989: 38). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Canada acceded to the UN Convention in 1969 and this fit well with Canada's renewed attempt to assert itself as a nation in the international sphere. Accession announced to all that Canada was adopting a regular, visible refugee selection programme. This would allow (but not require) Canada as a nation to wield refugeeeness abroad on its own and begin receiving the accolades from other Western nations, especially those without such a refugee policy. But now what was required as a result of accession was a determination programme targeting those who had fled to Canada to escape persecution elsewhere, one that would be in line with the UN Convention and Protocol and the non-refoulement provision. At this moment, such a determination programme was merely an afterthought, little more than a minor consequence of accession, largely hidden from the Canadian citizenry within the state and potentially relevant to but a handful of individuals per year. By the 1980s, however, determination would become the site of a rather dramatic reversal in broad relations of power.

New guidelines were subsequently established in 1970 and in 1973 an amendment was made to the Immigration Appeal Act that explicitly recognized refugees. The latter amendment allowed -but did not require- Immigration Appeal Board members to quash deportation orders if they deemed the non-citizen in question was a Convention refugee (Canada, 1974: 106, 116; Hathaway, 1992: 75).
As this was not a requirement, at this juncture refugee status was deemed a privilege rather than a right in Canada (Mandel, 1994: 241). Also established in 1973 was an ad hoc interdepartmental committee to review refugee claims and make recommendations regarding status to the Minister of Immigration (Nash, 1989: 39; Canada, 1988b). At this point, the programme imagined a two-stage process, the responsibility for which was located solely within the corridors of the state. As is seen below, the rise of an advanced liberal rationality has since encouraged a gradual re-shaping of determination, such that there has been considerable movement of responsibility for determining refugee status in Canada out of the state.

A new determination programme, made possible through the 1976 Immigration Act, foresaw the creation of a four-stage process and RSAC (Canada, 1974: 116). At this point refugee claimants were assumed to have a right to counsel and to receive a copy of the written transcript of the refugee claim made during an interview with a Department of Immigration official (Nash, 1989: 42). Drawing on knowledge of refugee-producing conditions in the world generated through experience with previous deportation cases or specific ad hoc inquiries through its small research unit (Goodwyn-Gil, 1987: 27), it was foreseen that the RSAC would examine these written transcripts and present advisory opinions to the Minister of Immigration regarding status (Canada, 1974: 116; Nash, 1989: 42; Hathaway, 1992: 81). To accomplish this, every RSAC member would also receive training sessions from an expert in international
refugee law (interview 10/04/96). The quasi-diplomatic UNHCR representative, mentioned in the previous chapter and who began operating in Canada in 1975, was to be a resource person who would review claims and then provide an opinion -but who would not vote- during RSAC sessions (Adelman, 1982: 41; Nash, 1989: 43). The rationale for these arrangements was to reduce the discretion of the Immigration Appeal Board in this area (Nash, 1989: 41).

Significantly, this new determination programme also foresaw the refugee determination status process beginning before a deportation order was made. This was deemed to be an improvement that would reduce "the tribulations of a person who may indeed be a refugee, and eliminate unnecessary work for the immigration service and Immigration Appeal Board" (Canada, 1976b: 29). This suggests that, virtually from the outset, determination was seen to be creating problems for on-going immigration schemes. A few years later this improvement would be observed to be causing difficulties considerably more serious than 'unnecessary work' for the Department of Immigration.

Immediately following release of the Green Paper and enactment of the Immigration Act, then, Canadian determination programmes envisaged RSAC officials deciding whether non-citizens who had made claims were indeed refugees and whether, therefore, they had no choice but to remain in Canada. Beginning in 1980, the numbers entering Canada's refugee determination process began to increase dramatically from a few hundred, to thousands annually (and by the late 1980s to more than ten thousand annually).42 This immense
increase in refugee claims constituted a crisis of resources (cf. Ashenden, 1996: 66): It was imagined that future increases could be avoided by deploying a proportionate volume of staffing and funds and that, with a few minor reforms, the existing system could be made adequate (interview 21/02/96; Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 432; cf. Jackman, 1988; Creese, 1991: 11-12).

Besides the invention of a determination programme, this crisis arose under certain conditions of possibility during the early 1980s. Among them was a decrease in cost and an increase in availability of international air travel from outside the West to North America via Europe, thus making populations in these regions more mobile and Canada more accessible (cf. Dirks, 1985; Gilad, 1990b). Another condition was considerable Canadian and international mass media coverage of Canada's effort to select and resettle more than fifty thousand Indo-chinese refugees in 1979 and 1980 -subsequently touted to be the most generous effort among the Western nations involved (cf. Canada, 1982c)- that made Canada appear as more of a haven for refugees than previously (cf. Adelman, 1980). This was followed, beginning in 1983 and continuing through 1985, by a reduction, not only in planned levels of state-sponsored refugees, as seen above, but also of immigrants. The latter were reduced to the lowest levels since World War Two. This potentially extended the waiting time to immigrate by years (Nash, 1989: 70, 86; Beaujot, 1991: 145; Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 423; Dirks, 1995: 83). If some refugee claimants were later 'queue-jumpers' (unfairly moving ahead of those waiting patiently
in the immigrant line ('queue') by entering ('jumping into') the faster-moving refugee line on the way to receiving immigrant status), this was undoubtedly because the queue itself was imagined being squeezed at this point, effectively pushing those within it out at its seams, and otherwise encouraging those seeking immigrant status to find alternative ways to come to Canada.\textsuperscript{44} After 1985 another condition was a decrease in access to determination in Europe through changes exemplified by the implementation of the Schengen agreement among European nations (Hathaway, 1992: 91n) that encouraged those fleeing persecution to continue on to Canada or to the U.S. and then Canada.

Systematic mass arrest and deportation of hundreds and later thousands of would-be refugee claimants as they arrived at Canadian ports of entry (e.g., airports, land border-crossings, or harbours) to enter the determination process over this period would have been inconsistent with liberal government. There is an Enforcement Branch of the Department of Immigration in each of the Regions that regularly carries out similar practices on a small scale, but undertakings such as this -the naked force of political authorities and the state- have an inherent potential to upset the Canadian citizenry. They can be unstable in their effects and if constantly used on a mass scale can call into question the assumptions upon which liberal government rests (cf. Stenson, 1993a: 375; Dean, 1991; Valverde, 1991a: 105). While arrest followed by deportation certainly has been carried out to dispose of immigrants deemed to have gone seriously astray (Roberts, 1989; Avery, 1979), and was
later used to remove some arrivals eventually determined not to be refugees, such efforts can be understood more as a last resort than a liberal response to crisis. In the period following 1980, liberal government showed itself to be much more inventive and experimental than this.

A task force on determination was created in September, 1980 that culminated in the Robinson (1981) Report, mentioned above in relation to selection. Among its recommendations were for RSAC to be made independent of the Department of Immigration and External Affairs and for every refugee claimant to be granted an oral hearing as a central part of the determination process. It was further suggested, that while oral hearings for all claimants would be more expensive than an administrative review, minor changes in the process would make up for this increase by improving efficiency (Nash, 1989: 45). In February, 1982 the Minister of Immigration convened a National Symposium on Refugee Determination in Toronto announcing structural changes that would effectively remove RSAC from the Department of Immigration (Refuge. 1982 1(7): 4). The creation of RSAC had already placed determination further away from the influence of the Departments of Immigration and External Affairs than it had been at the outset (ie. when the ad hoc committee was in operation), but this arrangement would place it even further away. The head of RSAC, however, was foreseen continuing to report to the Minister of Immigration (Dirks, 1995: 84). In line with the task force's recommendations, the Minister of Immigration also announced in May, 1983 an Oral Hearings Pilot

Following introduction of these programmes and termination of the practice of delivering AAP benefits (see resettlement below) to refugee claimants in the Quebec Region in October, 1982 (Globe and Mail, 1982: 9), refugee determination continued to be deemed to be creating problems for continuing immigration programmes. In 1984 another major report observed that these problems were serious, that determination

...has been the subject of abuse by some claimants with little chance of success, who claimed refugee status in order to be permitted to remain in Canada while their claims were being processed. The laborious procedures imposed by the Act, together with a dramatic increase in claims, have created serious delays in the disposition of cases, with repercussions throughout our system of immigration enforcement (Ratushny, 1984: 10-11; emphasis added).

Nevertheless, in the same report the pilot projects were judged to lead to fewer adjournments, oral interviews of shorter duration, and overall improved efficiency (Ratushny, 1984: 10).

The Plaut (1985) Report, also mentioned earlier, was commissioned in 1984. Among its many recommendations when it was released was to allow refugee hearings to take place before a 'refugee board' that would be part of a larger Immigration and Refugee Board independent from political influence; to train members of the Board through the inclusion of an Education Division; to allow two oral hearings and an appeal; and to make hearings before this board public unless the claimant requested otherwise (Plaut, 1985: 60-143). Liberal government demanded that
as determination became both visible and problematic that it be intensively and continuously scrutinized through: increased production of knowledge by an Education Division; liberal law in the form of hearings, appeals, and legal representation on both sides; public display; and a board freed from arbitrary intervention by political authorities through, in particular, the Department of Immigration.

In April, 1985 the *Singh* decision was rendered in the Supreme Court. It was decided that the "everyone" in section seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that happened to be entrenched in 1982, referred to everyone physically present in Canada as well as "anyone seeking entry at a port of entry" (Mandel, 1994: 241). It required refugee determination in Canada to be brought in line with a notion of 'fundamental justice' (Canada, 1995b: 5; Jackman, 1988: 321). In practical terms this meant that at least one oral hearing had to be granted to refugee claimants in place of a minor administrative review of a written transcript representing the claim (Nash, 1989: 48). Hence by 1985, refugee claimants, upon reaching Canadian territory and unlike the human beings in camps and crisis situations abroad targeted by the Canadian selection programme, had become juridical units with rights that had to be respected by political authorities. Broad power relations had undergone something of a reversal. In 1985 another task force was created to begin drafting legislation for a new refugee status determination system (Dirks, 1995: 88).

At this moment, sovereign efforts were undertaken to limit access
to determination from abroad (Creese, 1991: 13). Explicitly intended to restrict the numbers accessing determination, in June, 1985, transit visa requirements were put in place for fourteen nations (Creese, 1991: 20). These allowed visa officers abroad to pre-screen prospective visitors to Canada, including those who might later claim refugee status. Despite this, in practice in the months that followed the backlog of refugee claimants entering the system continued to grow.

There was considerable mass media coverage of the crisis between 1981 and 1985, but beginning in 1986, until passage of new legislation in the summer of 1988, it increased significantly (Creese, 1991). The image of the crisis became one of Canada's territorial borders being flooded by non-citizens making refugee claims ultimately to collect welfare or otherwise gain status to live permanently in Canada (Creese, 1991: 13). The four thousand Portuguese and two thousand Turks who arrived in 1985 and 1986, the eight hundred Brazilians in early 1987 (cf. Creese, 1991: 21-2, 24; Hawkes, 1988: 255; Jackman, 1988: 323), as well as the more dramatic arrival of one hundred and fifty-five Tamils off Newfoundland's coast in lifeboats in August, 1986 and a similar number of Sikhs on the shores of Nova Scotia in July, 1987, became the focus of the crisis during this period (cf. Mandel, 1994: 246; Dirks, 1995: 90; Goodwyn-Gil, 1987: 27). Following their arrival these and other groups were thought to have made fraudulent refugee claims or to have travelled to Canada using fraudulent documents, or both. These events produced a general image of these
refugee claimants as criminals and queue-jumpers (cf. Hawkes, 1988: 254; Creese, 1991: 13; Mandel, 1994: 248). Here again refugee determination was seen as a problem for on-going immigration schemes. But besides immigration, at this juncture the increase in the numbers of refugee claimants also began to be perceived as pressuring Canadian provincial (and municipal) welfare programmes by, for example, dramatically increasing the numbers of welfare claims (See Creese, 1991: 23; Dirks, 1995: 87-8).

It is in 1986, then, that the crisis began to expand from a mere concern over the arrival of increasing numbers of refugee claimants, to the determination process itself. The crisis of resources began shifting to one of governability (cf. Ashenden, 1996). A crisis of governability is not tantamount to a 'crisis of the State' (Simon, 1994: 17), as that phrase has come to be understood. Nor, in this instance, was it simply a crisis 'whipped up' by Department of Immigration officials through mass media, as Creese (1991: 4) argues, to justify gaining greater control of the types and numbers of refugees entering Canada. Consonant with the problems determination was assumed to be creating for both immigration and welfare programmes, the crisis that had been centred on a need for allocation of more staff and funds to RSAC to deal with increased volume, now expanded to the capacity of the determination system to identify refugees. As more instances of claims deemed fraudulent became known and were then dispersed through mass media, the question became: can the system distinguish the motivations of those travelling to Canada and entering the
process as refugee claimants? Did these claimants have no other choice but to enter the process because they feared persecution or had been persecuted? Had they merely done so because they had chosen to collect welfare ('welfare burdens') or to gain Canadian permanent resident status ('queue-jumpers')? Had they merely done so as a result of choosing to flee prosecution from political authorities elsewhere ('criminals'), or was it some combination of the latter three scenarios? The system was increasingly deemed to lack the capacity to make such distinctions.

In March, 1986 a new effort foresaw dealing with the backlog that had formed from the increase in appeals of RSAC determination decisions by expanding the Immigration Appeal Board from eighteen to fifty members. This was imagined being accomplished by the fall of 1986 through passage of new legislation (Dirks, 1995: 82; Nash, 1989: 51). Legislation was announced in May, 1986 (Jackman, 1988: 322) that also foresaw a new determination system being put in place. At the same time, an Administrative Review was introduced that envisaged the transfer of all refugee claims from the RSAC backlog to a temporary *ad hoc* body (Canada, 1995b: 11; Creese, 1991: 12; Nash, 1989: 48). Such a programme imagined Department of Immigration officials deciding whether claimants demonstrated 'successful establishment' in Canada (Canada, 1986e: 50; Nash, 1989: 49). The following criteria were to be used: stability in employment, the length of time employed, frequency and reasons for changes in employment, present income and future prospects, and family obligations (Canada, 1986e: 50; Nash, 1989: 49). If this
establishment could not be shown, then the potential for establishment was to be considered using criteria similar to those used for selecting immigrants abroad. This Review was not, therefore, a new refugee determination programme: Those receiving positive decisions were to be selected and counted as immigrants. Those receiving negative decisions from Department officials were to be transferred back to the regular refugee determination process to have their claims decided by RSAC (Canada, 1986e: 51; 1995b: 11). This was not a whole-sale amnesty programme either. Instead, it sought to circumvent the difficult question of 'who is a refugee?' while awaiting effects of sovereign measures used abroad that promised to reduce the numbers of claimants accessing the determination process. It sought to deal with these claimants in a way comparable to the manner in which they would have been approached by state visa officers working abroad -as potential citizens of a liberal order- while simultaneously avoiding a full amnesty -'amnesty' being completely absent in programmatic statements- (e.g., Canada, 1986e: 50-1) that was assumed to have a potential of attracting still more refugee claimants to Canada (Canada, 1986e). \(^{48}\) It sought to "avoid creating incentives for a new influx of claimants in the transition period" (Canada, 1986e: 50). More than twenty thousand claimants were dealt with in this manner in practice.

Those persons not covered by this temporary Administrative Review (claimants arriving after May, 1986), if from nations on a list of nations assembled by political authorities (that became
known as the 'B-1' list), were imagined entering a process involving the automatic granting of Minister Permits and work permits. This would allow them to remain in Canada while preventing them from entering the existing backlogged determination process (Canada, 1986e: 51). The 'B-1' list was claimed to include nations that Canada did not deport persons to as a result of their having been deemed to be refugee-producing by RSAC in the past (Nash, 1989: 51). In effect, 'who is a refugee?' would now be answered on the basis of RSAC's past practices. The Designated Classes decided by the Minister and mentioned earlier in this chapter comprised many of the nations on the B-1 list. Those persons not covered by the Review and whose nationality was not on this list were envisaged entering a 'fast-track' determination process. Additional resources were to be allocated to the latter (Canada, 1986e: 51). In other words, resources thought to be required for several years here and in relation to the Immigration Appeal Board were finally to be increased, but by this point it was too late- the crisis had already changed in kind. It was no longer simply about a lack of resources, it was about the way in which determination was carried out, the rationality that guided it.

Despite the introduction of sovereign measures, mentioned earlier, and these new programmes, by the summer of 1986 another backlog was quickly forming. The number of claims, particularly those associated with the 'B-1' list, continued to grow (Nash, 1989: 51). In February, 1987 the expansion of sovereign measures was announced. Those nations requiring visitor visas -now extended
to ninety-eight nations—were now required to have transit visas (visas allowing persons to enter Canadian territory by aircraft to await for travel elsewhere) (Canada, 1987c: 1). The rationale for this was to "reduce the number of non-bona-fide visitors who abuse the transit privilege to claim refugee status" (Canada, 1987c: 1). Another measure was then announced that foresaw private international airline personnel being assisted in detecting false documents of travellers in order to stop them abroad before their travel to Canada (Canada, 1987c: 1-3). There was also cancellation at this time of the distinction between claimants represented in the 'B-1' list and those entering the 'fast-track' process, thereby requiring all claimants to be dealt with in the same way. The rationale for the elimination of this distinction was the 'failure' of the previous blanket approach to distinguish the motivations of those entering the process: It made "no distinction between economic migrants and refugees" (Canada, 1987b: 2). This new programme was also introduced because of:

Fairness - protection was granted to the oppressor as well as the oppressed. Further, people from unaffected regions of a country benefited from the policy. Case-by-case review will allow the government to remove people where there are no personal consequences from this action... it recognizes that we need to view each individual's need within the specific context of the country to which they might be returned... [c]ase-by-case procedures will allow the government to remove those who are not genuine refugees i.e. economic migrants, or those who are undesirables because they are criminal offenders or security risks (emphasis in original; Canada, 1987b: 2-3).

The 'failure' of the previous approach can be seen above to be centred on the inability of the system to distinguish motivations
of claimants so as to answer the question of 'who is a refugee?' and, by implication, who could be simply disposed of. Sufficient answers to this question were now deemed to require considerably more detailed knowledge of specific contexts from which the individual claimant had left. Allowing political authorities to dictate answers to 'who is a refugee?' through use of a 'B-1' list after only eight months was deemed to have 'failed'. This reinforced the perception of a need for a new system.

Unlike those human beings in camp and crisis situations within the gaze of visa officers, the refugee claimant within the determination process in Canada had, in 1985, become a juridical subject equipped with rights that were not to be interfered with by political authorities. It should be recognized that in determination after the refugee claimant came to be deemed as such and a crisis of governability occurred, what became important was individual victimization, rather than a mix of collective (either nation or group) and individual victimization, as seen for the eight months preceding February 1987, or collective (either nation or group) victimization exclusively, as in selection abroad. As refugee claimants were now assumed to be juridical units in Canada, liberal government demanded that the question of 'who is a refugee?' be continually scrutinized.

The Refugee Reform Act (Bill C-55) was passed in the summer of 1988 during an emergency sitting of Parliament that followed extensive mass media coverage of the dramatic arrival of the Sikhs mentioned above (Creese, 1991). A few months prior to its passage,
however, one last effort that would allow political authorities to dictate answers to the question of 'who is a refugee?' is seen. This would occur in May, 1988 when the debate over the Bill in the Senate came to be centred on a proposed 'safe third country' provision (Dirks, 1995: 94) that would allow refugee claimants to be returned to a 'safe country' without having their claims determined. Which nations were 'safe' was foreseen in the provisions of the Bill to be dictated by Canadian political authorities. A 'safe third country' list, like the earlier Administrative Review, promised to allow Canadian political authorities to side-step the difficult question of 'who is a refugee?', answering instead 'which nations are not refugee-producing?'.

The latter question was recognized, however, as having the same potential effect as the former because the number of nations at any moment is finite. As Nash (1989: 56) reports:

Witnesses before the Committee pointed out that this might 'bring refugee issues into the political arena' because the absence of countries from the list would involve a public judgement on those countries (emphasis added).

As a compromise the Senate Committee recommended a 'safe third country' list be compiled, not by political authorities, but by the Chairman of the proposed independent IRB in consultation with the CRDD, the Department of Immigration, External Affairs, the UNHCR, and refugee experts. In doing so these latter authorities were foreseen taking into account the human rights records of nations (Nash, 1989: 56-7). On July 15, 1988 the Minister of Immigration,
rejecting this compromise, amended the 'safe third country' provisions in the Act just prior to its passage four days later, such that "claimants could be sent back only to countries that they had 'lawful authority to be in'' (Nash, 1989: 57). As political authorities of other nations normally decide who could 'lawfully' be within their national territories, in effect this amendment imagined them, rather than Canadian authorities, deciding which nations were safe third countries for the purpose of the Canadian determination system (Nash, 1989: 57; Dirks, 1995: 94). Once again, the inherently difficult question of 'who is a refugee?' had been side-stepped. After passage of the Bill, another temporary administrative review (Dirks, 1995: 95-6) was created to deal with the backlog of over eighty thousand claims that had appeared by the end of 1988 (it was completed three years later) (Canada, 1995b: 11). It too managed to avoid the question of 'who is a refugee?'.

The period between 1986 and 1988 demonstrates, perhaps more than anything else, the remarkable inventiveness of liberal government in dealing with opposition and crisis.

The continuing crisis of governability over this period had encouraged a new programme that anticipated a three-stage process to replace RSAC beginning in 1989. A large, quasi-judicial decision-making body, the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was invented. A division (CRDD) of this independent 'non-political' body would oversee refugee hearings and held out the promise of effectively and continually responding to the question of 'who is a refugee?' in Canada. This programme imagined legal professionals
representing refugee claimants through the provision of legal aid and developing their claims prior to presentation at an oral hearing. These hearings would be attended by a refugee hearing officer and overseen by two members of the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the IRB, of which only one needed to decide in favour of a claimant for status to be granted (Hathaway, 1992: 82). The members would be appointed by political authorities for multi-year terms. Whereas within RSAC there was little or no emphasis on the need for formal knowledge about refugee-producing nations and specific contexts from which refugee claimants had migrated, the new process was to be highly reliant on the production of such knowledge outside the state.

A new technology, the documentation centre, was deployed within this programme to allow IRB members, refugee hearing officers, refugee claimants' counsel and, more significantly, the Canadian citizenry to this knowledge (see chapter six). Considerably more resources would be directed toward the CRDD for staff and these centres than had been foreseen required for RSAC to counter the crisis of resources before 1986 (Dirks, 1995: 90). Through the documentation centres the facts would be provided and then subjected to legal judgement in the hearings. The new process, therefore, sought to govern the difficult question of 'who is a refugee?' by transforming it into a technical (in the documentation centre) and then a legal question (during oral hearings). Formal knowledge and law would seek 'the Truth' of 'who is a refugee?' and, by implication, who was merely a criminal
fleeing prosecution, welfare burden, queue-jumper, or some combination of these objects/identities assumed within a liberal order to be worthy of quick disposal. Once claims were determined, the refugee claimant would be either granted immigrant status and resettled or, following appeals, encouraged to leave and later literally removed from Canadian territory.

Such a programme held out the hope of rendering determination governable again. As seen in the next chapter, through the introduction of the documentation centre that promised to allow this new system to operate, something else was accomplished besides. Before the 1980s refugeeness was deployed in the international sphere by Canadian political authorities to great advantage (fostering alliances with other Western nations, managing and replenishing the Canadian population, fulfilling the economy's labour needs, and so on). But during the 1980s there occurred something of a reversal in this broad power relation: Refugeeness, previously implanted in populations outside the West by Western authorities to the latter's advantage, could now be used by these same populations who sought to enter Canada to escape persecution or to otherwise improve their well-being by prolonging or securing their stay in Canada to demand certain rights. With the introduction of the documentation centre, however, a panoptic device that promises to allow non-Western regions, nations and populations to be intensively surveilled (see chapter six), as well as other changes that have followed its appearance, this particularly broad relation has begun to be reversed again. To see
this, as well as several other instances of the inventiveness of liberal government in the context of determination, changes since 1989 require discussion.

After three years of operation, the determination system was to be significantly altered again. Through passage of Bill C-86 in 1992 the initial 'credibility' stage of the new process was removed. Deferment of landing until satisfactory identification of refugees and the entering into agreements with other nations over responsibility for the examination of refugee claimants were also to be made possible through this legislation (Canada, 1992a). The latter measure sought to deter those who would otherwise travel to Canada without passports or other identity documents and then enter the determination process. The Bill also allowed for the introduction of guidelines for determination to be used by the IRB. This amendment to the Immigration Act came into force in February, 1993 (Canada, 1992a). The rationale for these changes was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the refugee status determination system without compromising the protection which Canada has provided to refugees. The Minister hopes to avoid future backlogs which weaken the determination process and delay the acceptance of genuine refugees (Dialogue. 1(3): 1 1992).

These changes were not aimed at restoring governability to determination—this had been already accomplished. Instead, they sought to respond to specific opposition, similar in kind to that levelled against the RSAC process early in the 1980s. Since the coming into force of this amendment, the guidelines on "Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution" mentioned
earlier have been established (Canada, 1993b). Political authorities and state agents of Canada and the U.S. have also entered into an agreement regarding responsibility for refugee claimants who have accessed these two nations' determination systems (Canada, 1995d).

In March, 1994, another -albeit smaller- temporary administrative review (again, rather than an 'amnesty') was announced. This Deferred Removal Order Class (DROC) was to screen the thousands of claimants who had had their claims rejected and who were in a backlog for more than three years waiting to be deported to nations that, as of 1994, had become thought of as refugee-producing (Vancouver Sun, 1994a: A4; 1994c: B1). This scheme, which in practice involved mostly those persons destined for China, but also Somalia and Haiti, also allowed the question of 'who is a refugee?' to be avoided (Canada, 1997). In December, 1996 it was announced that it would come to an end in 1997 (Canada, 1996f). Similarly, since introduction of the deferment of status scheme mentioned above, it has, in practice, created precisely what it explicitly sought to avoid, yet another backlog. This time it is made up of persons who had their claim determined to be valid but, because they do not possess identity documents, cannot be granted immigrant status (CCR, 1995b: 24; 1995c: 7; Canada, 1996a: 13). Following sustained opposition to the appointment of members to the IRB (Vancouver Sun, 1994b: A8; Refuge. 1993 12(6): 5) by political authorities that suggested political interference in determination, in 1995 an advisory committee on member appointments
was created with the original chair of the IRB as its head (Canada, 1995m: 1), thereby attempting to re-establish the IRB's 'non-political' character.

As the new (ie. 1989) determination process was being anticipated, the deployment of sovereign measures to reduce the numbers of persons accessing the determination process in Canada from abroad was to continue. The Refugee Deterrents and Detention Act (Bill C-84) was passed at the same time as legislation allowing for the new claims process (Bill C-55). The former included provisions for expanding the sovereign measures abroad that had been announced in February, 1987. Among other things, it allowed for more severe penalties to be levelled against private international airlines that transported inadmissible passengers to Canada\(^5\) and granted new discretionary powers to Department of Immigration officials for boarding and turning around of sea vessels containing undocumented persons without Canadian status (Nash, 1989: 23; Hathaway, 1992: 81; Mandel, 1994: 254). In 1990 an Operation Shortstop programme was launched explicitly to decrease access to the refugee determination process. It imagined the Enforcement Branch of the Department at national headquarters monitoring use of fraudulent documents to travel to Canadian borders and coordinating the deployment of officials at transit points around the world to educate private international airline personnel in identifying illegal travellers destined for Canada with fraudulent (e.g., altered or counterfeit) passports and visas (Mandel, 1994: 254; Stoffman, 1992: 20, 22). These airlines were
to be alerted about trends in the use of fraudulent documents (Stoffman, 1992: 23). In practice, these private agents have administered Canadian sovereign measures abroad (cf. Feller, 1989: 48). By 1994 the sovereign tactic of visa restrictions begun in 1985 had been extended to over one hundred nations (Mandel, 1994: 254; Hathaway, 1992: 90n). It will be noted that these sovereign measures above have been carried out, like the distribution of refugee spaces, in the international sphere of politics and morality rather than a Canadian one. An exception is seen in 1995 with the introduction of measures aimed at stopping non-citizens convicted of criminal offenses from accessing the determination process from within Canada and allowing for their quick deportation made possible by another amendment (Bill C-44) (Canada, 1994a). It will also be recognized, however, that these measures target those deemed to be criminals, not liberal citizens equipped with rights.

In determination, the rise of an advanced liberal rationality is seen in the gradual movement of responsibility out of the hands of Immigration officials and political authorities -the state- and into those of representatives of a division, the CRDD, of an independent 'non-political' board, the IRB. It is also evident in a new dependence on law and the production of formal knowledge, and a corresponding reliance on legal professionals and refugee, human rights, and other experts operating outside the state. As seen below, this rise is also evident in resettlement.

Refugee Resettlement

Like determination, resettlement has undergone significant
change since release of the Green Paper in the 1970s. Certain aspects of resettlement have been problematized during this period, but there has not occurred a crisis of governability similar to the one associated with determination above (although there has been some overlap between the areas of determination and resettlement as is seen below).

Liberal government shapes and makes possible refugee resettlement by attempting to ensure subjects do not become susceptible to political authorities' direct, arbitrary control, while at the same time ensuring conduct in private and public realms will be consistent with certain norms of civility and orderliness (Hindess, 1996: 131). Rose (1993: 291) writes that liberalism is implicated in specifying the subjects of rule in terms of certain norms of civilization, and effecting a division between the civilized member of society and those lacking the capacities to exercise their citizenship. It thus becomes dependent upon devices (schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic asylum, the reformatory prison) that promise to create individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves.

Refugee resettlement is such a device. It attempts to mediate, over a more or less discrete period, between the established Canadian citizenry thought to be civilized and the recently-arrived refugee assumed to be uncivilized. As suggested in relation to selection, power associated with liberalism "seeks a direction of conduct rather than a violent or gross form of corporeal domination" (Dean, 1994b: 177): It is less about repressing citizens and more about 'making them up' (Hacking, 1986; Rose and
Some refugees in Canada have undoubtedly undergone 'violent or gross forms of corporeal domination', but in resettlement their active capacities are not to be crushed or annihilated; they are to be nurtured, promoted, shaped and, in a sense, created. Liberal government insists there be devices present to encourage a choosing capacity among those who are deemed to lack such powers. A liberal subject, then, must have the capacity for choice (Hindess, 1996: 100) and it is precisely this feature, it will be recalled from above, that refugees are assumed to lack. This is evident in, among other places, the talk and texts of relevant authorities described above—there is an assumption that because of persecution or fear of it, refugees (but not necessarily refugee claimants) do not have a choice to migrate to Canada, that they have no choice but to stay after arriving, and that this affects their potential for integration. It is their ascribed lack of choice that allows and justifies special intervention into their private and public lives. Refugees are presumed to require the inculcation of knowledge and skills in order to develop into self-governing entities that exercise choice.

Resettlement programmes imagine a metamorphosis, a transformation, of an undifferentiated mass mined from remote refugee camps or crisis situations into individual self-regulating citizens: a conversion of entities lacking a capacity for choice entering Canadian society's conceptual margins, to liberal subjects freely exercising choice at its centre. Since release of the Green Paper such programmes have envisaged financial assistance and
special services delivered to refugees that promise to foster such a significant change. Far from being assumed to naturally adapt after arriving in Canada, refugees are thought to require considerable care and attention and this is expected to come, not from Canadian political authorities, but a vast and complex array of agents and authorities distant from the political sphere.

In 1974 the Immigrant Settlement Adaptation Programme (ISAP) and the Adjustment Assistance Programme (AAP) were invented. The former was to be a system of 'contracting out' to immigrant settlement agencies to provide services to immigrants and refugees (Lanphier and Lukomskyj, 1994: 142). The latter was to provide direct financial support to destitute immigrants and refugees during a discrete period following their arrival in Canada (Lanphier and Lukomskyj, 1994: 142) All state-sponsored refugees were foreseen receiving AAP. The AAP programme was distinct from provincial welfare programmes, but like welfare foresaw serving those deemed to require concentrated services when and where other sources were unavailable, rather than seeking to provide for all those immigrants and refugees who might be eligible (Lanphier and Lukomskyj, 1994: 142).

These new state funding arrangements were to be monitored by a Settlement Branch of the Department of Immigration (Lanphier and Lukomskyj, 1994: 142) which at this juncture was located within a larger Department (ie. Manpower/Employment and Immigration). There and within these newly-funded immigrant settlement agencies, immigrant counsellors were to deliver special orientation and
counselling services to immigrants and refugees and make referrals
to Manpower/Employment Centres for work placement, labour-skills,
and language training as deemed necessary (interview 08/06/95;
Heipel, 1991: 348). From at least the release of the Green Paper,
the Multiculturalism Branch of the Department of the Secretary of
State was also foreseen providing funding to ethno-cultural
organizations for immigrant and refugee integration, but over the
longer term (Canada, 1982c: 13). This branch of the state was
not anticipated supplying direct financial support similar to AAP,
however (Indra, 1987: 154). Other programmes have specifically
targeted the lives of refugees in Canada over this period,
including those associated with the federal state bureaucracy
targeting health and numerous municipal departments of health and
social planning (interview 23/05/95; Ma, 1983; BCASW, 1980: 27).
Where state bureaucracies at the provincial level have been
involved, they have generally sought to provide funding to
immigrant settlement organizations through arrangements that
complement ISAP, rather than initiate refugee-specific services on
their own. Since release of the Green Paper (interviews
21/06/95a; 08/06/95; 06/11/95; 09/01/96), compared to programmes
associated with the Department of Immigration, these others have,
until recently, been of limited importance. Among state agencies
it has been the federal Department of Immigration that has
dominated the refugee resettlement realm and it is, therefore,
programmes associated with it that are discussed below (cf. Indra,
The ascendency of an advanced liberal rationality can be seen in resettlement in the appearance, first of all, of the ISAP programme. Where previously refugee resettlement had been carried out by agents of the state, ISAP foresaw non-profit organizations providing "basic social services in a more personal, integrative and less bureaucratized way than government" (Indra, 1987: 152). Six basic services would be 'purchased' from these newly-created or merely re-named (interview 08/09/95) settlement organizations across Canada: reception; information; orientation; counselling; interpretation and translation; and referral (Canada, 1996d: 9; Indra, 1987: 152). Employment-related services, previously the preserve of Canada Employment Centres located within the state, were later added (Canada, 1996d: 9). Through ISAP each of these services was converted into hourly cash terms. The resettlement of immigrants and refugees, therefore, was in a sense 'privatized' and responsibility shifted out of the state. ISAP created considerable distance between political authorities and those who increasingly claimed expert knowledge about what to do with immigrants and refugees after their arrival to bring them in line with the requirements of liberal citizenship. State agents, known as settlement officers, were imagined monitoring these new organizations by occasionally visiting their sites and conducting audits of their records that were to be kept in accordance with ISAP agreements (Canada, 1996d: 8). Through ISAP immigrant settlement agencies in Canada became quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations or what in Britain are referred to as
'quangos'—(cf. Rose, 1996a: 56) neither a state bureaucracy subject to the direct commands of political authorities nor obviously a private enterprise. Along with this 'privatization', there has emerged over this period a trend toward professionalization. This includes the introduction of specialized training in larger Canadian cities that imagines fostering appropriate self-identity and organization among settlement workers. As a representative of a large immigrant settlement agency active from this period to the present relates:

The programs have grown. We now have the settlement houses, the reception houses, which has been a major change and a positive change. So I think the settlement business in Canada has become really professionalised over the last decade from being sort of amateurish... now people are better qualified, agencies are stronger, they're delivering better settlement services, they know what to do, they've dealt with so many of the problems like post-traumatic stress syndrome and torture and all the social problems that people come with inevitably (interview 21/06/95a).

In 1985 it was announced that resources for ISAP would be significantly increased and since then such arrangements have continued (Canada, 1988c: 22).

The quotation above points to another development consistent with the movement of responsibility for resettlement of refugees out of the state: the 'responsibilization' of the 'psy' professions. This is seen in the establishment, in the mid-1980s, of two centres to deal exclusively with survivors of torture in Canada: the Canadian Centre for Survivors of Torture in 1984 in Toronto and the Association for Survivors of Torture in Vancouver in 1986, both of which offer psychiatric counselling as well as
several other services such as English as a Second Language courses (interview 23/05/95; British Columbia, 1995: 12; McMahon, 1994: 61n; Simalchik, 1992; CCVT, 1990). The majority of the clientele of both centres deemed to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder are refugees and refugee claimants (British Columbia, 1995: 13; CCVT, 1990: 12, 17). The director of the Canadian Centre, Simalchik (1992: 27), writes:

The impact of losing one's country, family and past life is greatly exacerbated by memories of intense personal violation and maltreatment. Specialized service is necessary, but recognition and support from the larger community remains vital for those who have endured and survived the torment of torture.

That refugee claimants have been anticipated as a significant portion of the clientele of these centres is interesting because it shows the 'responsibilization' of the 'psy' professions has also occurred in relation to determination. The introduction of the second Centre in 1986 corresponds to the announcement of a new determination system that would be more reliant on formal knowledge about refugee conditions abroad (relevant legislation, though announced in 1986, was not passed until the summer of 1988). Just like the formal knowledge made available through documentation centres (see chapter six), psychiatric assessments (and medical examinations in search of scarring from physical torture) carried out at these Centres promised to get at 'refugee conditions' that were already here, namely the refugee's soul (and body) ruined by persecution abroad. The psychological knowledge produced at these centres would then also be deployed by legal professionals in hearings. These latter points are returned to in chapter six when
knowledge is discussed.

Other evidence of the rise of an advanced liberal rationality in the area of resettlement includes the appearance of programmes that imagine refugees taking more responsibility for their own resettlement in a variety of ways. Beginning in the late 1980s this 'responsibilization' is evident, first of all, in the sudden appearance of notions of 'empowerment' in the realm of resettlement. Conferences\textsuperscript{55} were held where the prevailing theme was 'empowerment', such as the 1993 'Empower the Most Vulnerable' workshop:

Improving refugee programs implies using resources more efficiently, increasing the opportunities for refugees to assume responsibility for their own management and programmes, and ensuring that programs benefit everybody in the community—men, women, children, and the most vulnerable (Refuge. 1993 13(4): 21).\textsuperscript{56}

This 'responsibilization' is also seen in the announcement, in February, 1995, of a nine-hundred and seventy-five dollar Right of Landing fee to be paid by refugees and immigrants, one that is also consistent with the deferment of landing provision introduced after 1993 and mentioned above (Canada, 1995g: 3; Bout de Papier, 1995: 8). This fee was to be in addition to the five hundred dollar fee for processing an application for permanent residence (Canada, 1995g: 3) which had been doubled from one hundred and twenty-five to two hundred and fifty dollars in the early 1990s and then doubled again in 1994. In addition to the five hundred dollar fee per adult, there also has been a hundred dollar fee for each dependent introduced (CCR, 1995b: 21). In case introduction of these fees seems trivial, it should be noted that for 1996 the
Right of Landing fee is expected to generate more than half the total annual federal cost of resettlement programmes (including AAP, ISAP, and Host) (Canada, 1996a: 18).\textsuperscript{67} After being determined as refugees in Canada, or selected abroad, refugees' next legal status (landed immigrant and later citizen) is now to be a right to be purchased.\textsuperscript{68} This imagined increase in responsibility is also seen in the CCR's efforts to bring recently created local groups of (rather than 'for') refugees into its membership, including the Montreal Coalition of Refugees and the Toronto Ghana Refugee Union and to ensure refugees' presence at its conferences and on its executive committee (Hardy, 1994: 287, 293; cf. Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5). It is also evident in new resettlement models that include as "partners" (see chapter six), "refugees themselves as well as the government and private sectors" (Refuge. 1983 2(5): 8) and in the fact that refugee research "has also begun to stress the practical need for greater refugee input" (Indra, 1989: 221). The Refugee Studies Programme at York University in Ontario now "emphasizes the participation of refugees" (Refuge. 1985 5(2): 19).\textsuperscript{69} Good research about the resettlement of refugees has become "refugee-centred" research (Indra, 1988: 169; See also Refuge. 1988 7(4): 6). In an evaluation of a recently-proposed resettlement programme, for example, it is suggested that "[m]ore attention should have been awarded to comments of refugees themselves" (Refuge. 1986 6(2): 6). Refugees are increasingly imagined purchasing, advocating, and researching their way to liberal citizenship; they are increasingly foreseen resettling themselves.
Late in 1995 it was announced that the Settlement Branch of the Department of Immigration that continued to be involved in monitoring the delivery of ISAP and AAP, would be completely dismantled (interviews 06/11/95; 24/05/95). This remaining responsibility for resettlement would be transferred from federal to provincial levels of the state. Consistent with the rise of an advanced liberal rationality, refugee resettlement was not only to be 'privatized'; but now would be further 'localized'. Professional 'private' settlement agencies would now receive funding from provincial levels of state.

Besides the changes mentioned above, a shift toward advanced liberal rule in resettlement is seen in a shift in knowledge. There has developed since about 1985, for example, a new emphasis on the mental health of refugees in Canada and the development of related techniques to confront post-traumatic stress disorder thought to be common among them (e.g., Canada, 1988a). The refugee's soul has become an object of knowledge. Those with traumatic memories are now to be 're-ordered', set on a path to advanced liberal citizenship where ideally their tortured pasts are forgotten and their futures are brought into the present and made calculable.

Provisions for private refugee sponsorship appeared in the 1978 immigration regulations (Adelman, 1980: 83). Immigrants had been sponsored to come to Canada through private sponsorship long before 1978, but when refugees from Europe were resettled during World Refugee Year in 1959, from Czechoslovakia in 1968, and from
Chile in 1973, to mention but three examples, the vast majority were financially provided for by the Canadian state. These new provisions anticipated groups of at least five Canadians providing financial support to refugees for one year after their arrival or until they became self-supporting, whichever was shorter (Adelman, 1980: 83; Nash, 1989: 40). In addition, sponsors were to provide refugees with "moral support and general orientation" (Indra, 1988: 155; Canada, 1995b: 7; Adelman, 1980: 84). This programme also foresaw established national non-state organizations guaranteeing sponsorship of large numbers of refugees on behalf of smaller affiliated groups. This was to be realized through special umbrella contracts to be known as Master Agreements, with these organizations becoming Master Agreement Holders (MAHs) (Adelman, 1980: 83-4). MAHs would be left to govern the resettlement activities of their constituent groups without interference from political authorities or Department of Immigration officials. With the particularly large effort to select thousands of Indo-chinese refugees first announced in December, 1978 and expanded in July, 1979 (Canada, 1982c: 8, 11), the Private Sponsorship programme was promoted across Canada. The appearance of this programme is consistent with the rise of an advanced liberal rationality in that it also seeks to move responsibility for refugee resettlement out of the state and further from the reach of political authorities.

Shortly after introduction of this programme and arrival of thousands of Indo-chinese refugees in 1980, concern began to be voiced about differences in the resettlement of privately-sponsored
refugees and those who were state-sponsored. At this point, upon their arrival, state-sponsored refugees were provided with temporary accommodations, as well as basic orientation classes that included information on shopping, banking, home budgeting, modes of dress, and personal hygiene (Canada, 1981a: 14-6). Refugees were to be aided by CEC counsellors in arranging for lodging, furniture, food, clothing and various basic household needs, the use of household appliances, as well as enrolling children in school and making medical or dental appointments (Canada, 1981a: 14-5). They were also to receive language and employment training through Canada Employment Centres (CECs) (Canada, 1981a: 14-5) and be provided with AAP support until employment was found (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4). But a 1981 announcement in Refuge, 'Canada's national newsletter on Refugees', reads:

CECs Often Not Enough (headline)... newcomers needed a greater degree of support and personal attention than most CECs in Toronto could provide... For many this is sufficient for them to find their way in their new home... [but] some personal contact with members of the older community seems essential to full integration into society. In some areas the Manpower Officers [CEC counsellors] have taken this role on themselves, going into the refugees' homes to show them how to cook cheap meals when they can't make ends meet on their allowance, running English conversation groups, inviting people to dinner in their homes. In other cases, sponsors have endeavoured to help the friends of the people they sponsored. But in many communities, organized volunteer programmes evolved to meet this deficiency (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4).

This concern was not only associated with non-state organizations and groups. A state report on the impact of the resettlement of Indo-chinese refugees on CEC and CIC operations published this same year notes:
There was also universal agreement among CEC staff interviewed that these refugees needed considerable personal attention... The majority of [CEC] counsellors felt that, while the general orientation sessions given by CECs were useful, they lacked the specificity required by these refugees to cope with the 'culture shock' encountered in such areas as language, custom, food, climate, distances from homeland, disrupted family units, physical/mental health problems... (Canada, 1981a: 16).

The resettlement experiences of state-sponsored refugees were, in other words, problematized.\(^7\)

In several Canadian cities, where the vast majority of these state-sponsored refugees were being resettled (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4; Woon, 1987: 135; CRESH, 1984: 13), 'Friendship Families', 'Foster Friends', 'Be A Friend', 'Canadian Friends', 'Mes Amis de Partout' and other organized volunteer programmes to target this 'deficiency' arose during this period. These programmes foresaw some responsibility for the conduct of state-sponsored refugees during their first year in Canada -previously assigned to state agents exclusively- being shifted to private groups and organizations:

We asked volunteers to work for one half day a week escorting people to medical appointments, helping to enrol children in school, explaining public transit or helping a family with their shopping (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5).

A former home economics teacher spends three afternoons a week explaining the complexities of shopping in a North American supermarket and showing families where they can find the oriental groceries necessary for their cooking (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5).

Such programmes sought to eradicate or at least smooth over assumed differences between state and private modes of resettlement. In some cases volunteers were matched with state-sponsored refugees
and would then visit their homes (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5). In others, such as in Sudbury, 'Home Placement' programmes appeared and foresaw refugees being placed within volunteers' homes to live until alternative housing could be found:

Previously, these people were put into a local hotel and sometimes spent two to three weeks isolated and often very lonely. The Home Placement programme helps overcome some of these initial fears and frustrations because there is someone to help in those first few weeks. And for the refugees it is also a chance to learn first-hand the Canadian language, culture, and way of life (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5).

A temporary Indo-chinese Refugee Settlement Grants Program was introduced in 1979 and was intended to last until 1981. It was to be administered by the Department of Immigration and envisioned providing "coordination and back-up" services to private sponsors (Canada, 1982c: 13), but it eventually covered administrative costs of these 'Friendship Family' and 'Home Placement' programmes that first appeared at this time to target state-sponsored refugees (Canada, 1982c: 13). The Friendship Family programme foresaw the 'befriending' of "new arrivals in whatever way possible, in order to build a relationship of mutual trust which would support the refugees in their search for identity and acceptance in a new culture" (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4). In Toronto 'Friendship Families' did much of the administration of the programme, including general office work, organizing social activities, speaking to their church groups to recruit more volunteers, and giving interviews to the media to publicize the programme (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5; CRESH, 1984: 14-6).

In Windsor, a representative of 'Friendship Families' notes: "we believed that a close personal association with a Windsor family,
person or group of persons would help alleviate the overwhelming task of resettlement" (Refuge. 1982 1(6): 7).

In each case it was the increased efficiency of these varied programmes targeting state-sponsored refugees that was touted. It is noted in the newsletter Refuge, for example, that "Each host family is given $45 a week per person for room and board, which represents an enormous savings to the government" (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4-5). The same was claimed of private sponsorship efforts generally, as the number of Indo-chinese arrivals dwindled (Woon, 1987: 133, 141; Indra, 1988: 159; 1993: 231; Canada, 1995a). A 1982 state report reads:

...private sponsorship is a superior way of resettling refugees. It is both an efficient method of providing for material needs and, even more importantly, it is an effective method of meeting psychological and emotional needs... The main lesson of the Indo-chinese programme is that voluntary sponsorship works- and that it works exceedingly well. It provides a better and more personal base for refugee resettlement, self-sufficiency and integration (Canada, 1982c: 18).

It can be seen above that a central element in the argument that the various 'Friendship Family' and Private Sponsorship programmes were more efficient than state modes was the use of volunteers:

Overcoming these obstacles seems to have been made possible by the fact that counsellors in Operation Lifeline's employment office were volunteers... able to provide an atmosphere of friendliness and support, and a degree of personal time and attention that paid workers in a professional organization simply could not duplicate (emphasis added; Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5).

...private sponsorship of refugees was significantly less costly than government sponsorships because of a number of factors... the savings in settlement costs of 50 to 60 percent were not the result of bureaucratic inefficiency or extravagance, but simply due to the fact that volunteer members of the community could do certain
things that no civil servant could be expected to do (emphasis added; *Refuge*. 1984 4(2): 16).

After 1981 the Private Sponsorship programme continued but 'Friendship Family' programmes did not. Several years later, however, in March, 1985, a national pilot Host programme for refugee resettlement was launched in seven Canadian cities (Lanphier, 1993; *Refuge*. 1984 4(2): 16-21). This programme anticipated volunteers aligned with Canadian private groups and organizations, the type of authority already imagined resettling private-sponsored refugees within that programme, also becoming involved in assisting in the resettlement refugees sponsored by the state (ie. those expected to receive AAP), just as they had within the earlier 'Friendship Family' programmes (Lanphier, 1993: 255). This programme imagined the transfer of state AAP funds (*Refuge*. 1988 7(4): 1) to cover costs. It foresaw a program co-ordinator recruiting volunteer Hosts or Host groups, matching them with newly-arrived refugees or refugee families, and then surveilling the Hosts' subsequent practices. The latter were to include assisting refugees in learning English or French and obtaining employment (*Refuge*. 1988 7(4): 1). The co-ordinator was envisaged keeping daily contact with and mediating between the 'community' and the Host group (*Refuge*. 1988 7(4): 1). This scheme's rationale was to reduce costs of the adaptation of refugees, reduce CEC counsellors' workloads, and achieve "more rapid adaptation to community life in Canada" (Canada, 1987a: 2). Notice 'community' here and in several quotations above. This was the other consistent theme. Refugee resettlement was to be enhanced "through
community-based human resources" (Refuge. 1988 7(4): 1) and to operate from "an established community organization" (Refuge. 1988 7(4): 1). Three years later, in 1988, the Host programme was extended to ten Canadian cities in six provinces (Refuge. 1988 7(4): 1). Again it was 'community' that was prevalent within programmatic statements and in claims of Host Program Coordinators (e.g., Canada, 1987a; 1994c: 25; 1996c: 1, 9; Refuge. 1988 7(4): 5-6, 9; 1990 9(3): 11). It was once again "volunteers who form the backbone of this program" (Refuge. 1988 7(4): 2). A 1990 advertisement for volunteers for the Metro Toronto Host programme in Refuge, 'Canada's national refugee newsletter', reads:

Being a host is a lot like helping a good neighbour. It means someone to talk to over a cup of coffee, to show the newcomer around or explain things about the community. Most importantly, it means someone simply to be there, to ease the loneliness- to care. A host can make the adjustment to Canadian life that much easier (Refuge. 1990 9(3): 11).

The answers to the question of 'Why Be a Host?' within this particular advertisement include: "enhancing their opportunities for employment" and "becoming integrated into Canadian society sooner." In 1990 it was announced that the pilot Host scheme would be made permanent and expanded to target immigrants (Canada, 1990b: 15; 1991: 6). The Host Program helps the integration process in very concrete ways: immigrants who are paired with a Canadian host find jobs sooner; they learn English or French faster; and they generally develop a better sense of well-being and optimism about their new lives in Canada (Canada, 1990b: 15).

Again the rationale for the programme continues to be efficiency. The Host programme will be 'sooner', 'faster', and 'better' than
state resettlement efforts alone.

Also in 1990, a comprehensive review of private refugee sponsorship was announced—the first since its inception in 1978—and was to involve a committee comprising representatives of refugee advocacy organizations and the Department of Immigration (interviews 30/08/96; 26/06/95; Canada, 1990b: 11; Refuge. 1991 10(3): 2; 1992 12(3): 8). It was to be chaired by a refugee expert from the Centre for Refugee Studies (see chapter six) (Refuge. 1911 10(3): 2). Its explicit aim was to invigorate private sponsorship in part through the re-design of the Master Agreements. Stemming in part from this continuing review (Canada, 1995a: 15; 1995i: 1), in September, 1995 another resettlement pilot programme, the 3/9 model, appeared. Its rationale was to allow more refugees from the former Yugoslavia than would have been possible otherwise to be resettled in Canada (Canada, 1995e). For the first time refugees would receive neither state assistance nor private sponsorship exclusively during their first year in Canada. Instead, the first three months would be funded through state and the next nine through private arrangements and hence '3/9' (Canada, 1995b: 8). The distribution within this programme shows a shift in responsibility away from the state in yet another way. Though this programme expired in May, 1996, in programmatic statements the '3/9' is touted as a project that could, if given broader application, serve as a catalyst to private sponsorship and stretch the benefits of public sector funds (It costs the taxpayer approximately half as much to resettle a privately sponsored refugee as one resettled by the government (Canada, 1995a: 14).
Since the release of the Green Paper, then, refugee resettlement has moved out of the direct reach of political authorities and the state. Responding to a question of how refugee policy has changed since 1969 a representative of a refugee sponsorship group responds:

...the refugees have been reduced in numbers, it's been more expensive to sponsor them because they've added a lot of the cost... onto the refugee or the person sponsoring them. The settlement of refugees has [been] cut back, the language services, the resettlement services and everything you can imagine... (interview 23/06/95c).

This has not simply been a shift to the private sector, but rather from the state to a complex mixture of 'private' settlement agencies, sponsors, Host volunteers, the 'psy' professions, and refugees themselves. In 1996 ISAP, AAP, Host and Private Sponsorship programmes continue.

PASTORAL GOVERNMENT

A characteristic of nineteenth century European philanthropy was that the state provided a legal framework and supported philanthropic campaigns with funds and information (Rose, 1990: 128), but left the actual moralizing work with 'the poor' to private philanthropists. The Department of Immigration uses funds to produce and disseminate information about both Private Sponsorship and Host programmes (e.g., Canada, 1994d; 1995h). The practices of private refugee sponsors and Host volunteers are only vaguely specified within these programmes and in accompanying information. The Master Agreements of the Private Sponsorship programme imagine only that financial assistance, as well as
furniture, housing, and clothing and "moral support and general orientation" be provided. The programme coordinators and the Host Programme Coordinators train and monitor sponsors and volunteers, but they are not foreseen specifying precisely what is to be done with refugees. Through these agreements and arrangements the autonomy of refugee sponsors and Host volunteers is assured. The Master Agreements, besides guaranteeing financial assistance for refugees, effectively create freedom for these groups and organizations to resettle refugees as they so desire. Indeed, 'freedom' is used to describe what these instruments provide, although for sponsors, not for resettling refugees (interviews 21/03/96; 23/02/96).

Christian, Jewish, and ethno-cultural organizations have been active in refugee resettlement since the emergence of a Canadian Refugee regime, but it is Christian groups that have been dominant. This is evident in the Private Sponsorship programme in particular and with regard to the sponsorship of Indo-chinese refugees (Canada, 1982b: 16, 26, 57; Adelman, 1982: 107-8, 139): Of the almost seven thousand sponsorship groups that emerged between 1979 and 1980, some sixty-five percent were Christian in orientation (Canada, 1982a: 7). A similar pattern is seen in sponsorship since then. Of the seventy active MAHs in 1992, two were Jewish, nine ethno-cultural (e.g., the Canadian Polish Congress) and the remaining fifty-nine (or 84 percent) Christian (Immigration Selection Manual. 3.39: 2a). The volunteers recruited within first Friendship Family and later Host programmes mentioned
above also came primarily from contact with Christian churches
(Heipel, 1991: 349; Refuge. 1988 7(4): 9; 1981 1(3): 5). This
dominance is seen in the very existence of the Inter-Church
Committee for Refugees (Whitaker, 1987: 257; Refuge. 1987 7(2): 9),
as well as in the CCR's institutional membership which includes
large numbers of smaller Christian groups.

But what does refugee resettlement in these locales entail in
practice? Since at least 1978 refugee sponsors have provided
refugees, upon their arrival, with food (interview 21/03/96),
clothing (Canada, 1974: 112, 114; interview (21/03/96); Chan and
112; interviews 23/02/96; 21/03/96; 04/04/96; Chan and Lam, 1983:
4; CRESH, 1984: 13-4, 16-7; Indra, 1988: 158; 1993: 230; Woon,
1987: 135; Neuwirth and Clark, 1981: 132), and furniture (Canada,
1974: 114; interviews 21/03/96; 04/04/96; Chan and Lam, 1983: 4;
CRESH, 1984: 13; Indra, 1988: 158; 1993: 230; Neuwirth and Clark,
1981: 132). Host volunteers and private sponsors have sought to
find refugees employment and then accompany them to interviews
(interviews 23/02/96; 04/04/96; Canada, 1982a: 18; 1974: 109;
Refuge. 1981 1(6): 4; 1988 7(4): 8; Chan and Lam, 1983: 4; Woon,
1987: 138; 65, 68; CRESH, 1984: 14-5, 17-8; Indra, 1988: 158; 142;
Neuwirth and Clark, 1981: 136), demonstrate where and how to shop
wisely (interviews 21/03/96; 04/04/96; Refuge. 1981 1(3): 4-5;
Canada, 1981a: 15; 1982a: 19; 1962: 10; Indra, 1988: 158; Adelman,

So while law, as seen in the Immigration Act or the Criminal Code, has been relevant to refugees' conduct while they are being resettled and allows for their removal from Canadian territory should they engage in prohibited behaviours, sponsors and volunteers have targeted the subtle aspects of refugees' conduct in conversations, at places of work, on city buses and subways, on streets, in shopping malls, in places of religious worship, in doctor's offices, and in homes. From the moment they are met at the airport, through the first year, and sometimes beyond (interview 04/04/96; Winland, 1994: 38; Woon, 1987: 142; Neuwirth and Clark, 1981: 136), refugees' conduct has been constantly monitored by sponsors and volunteers:

Most sponsorship groups seem to have made a point to be sure that at least one member of their group visited or had some other... activity with the sponsored refugee every day during the initial moments of resettlement... [there was] a kind of constant contact and guidance (Indra, 1988: 158; emphasis added).

Those not shaping up receive, not necessarily total removal from Canadian territory through deportation, but more intensive individual care and attention. Particularly problematic cases are to be transferred to and receive special intervention from the 'psy' professions (interview 21/03/96).

In sponsors' practices in particular there is little respect for refugees' privacy (BCASW, 1980: 19). Indeed, sponsors sometimes sleep in a room in refugees' new accommodations in the first days following their arrival (interview 21/03/96; Woon, 1987: 139). Consistent with this Indra (1988: 166), in her review of
refugee resettlement, has noted that "refugees often felt that they were treated like children and that they were often required to do things which they did not want to do or did not understand" and that "they were shown how to do things without being allowed to observe or comment on them." Indra (1988: 166) adds: "Sponsors were intimately involved with things which traditionally were strictly family matters, and yet were not family members." There is no presumption on the part of sponsors of consent on the part of refugees. The reason for this lack of both privacy and presumption of consent is that within these programmes refugees are not (yet) imagined to be liberal subjects capable of freely exercising choice.

What is to be made of this dominance and these practices? As responsibility for resettlement has shifted out of the state, a Christian pastorate has formed. More significantly, a liberal rationality is not the only rationality making possible and shaping the Canadian refugee regime. Advanced liberalism has deferred to a pastoral rationality in this instance.

Because a pastoral rationality is not well-known, some of its features need mention. A pastoral rationality takes the form of "care for the life of individuals" (Foucault, 1988a: 67). Pastoral power, Foucault (1988a: 62) writes, is "a matter of constant, individualized, and final kindness." It seeks "to constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one" (Foucault: 1988a: 67). Themes of pastoral power are seen in Hebrew literature and Jewish thought (Foucault, 1988a: 61-2). It shows
itself, but not in unmodified form, in later Christian practices (Foucault, 1988a: 68-71). "Christianity gave those Hebrew themes importance in the Middle Ages and in modern times" (Foucault, 1988a: 63). Foucault (1988a: 62) writes that pastoral power is characterized by

constant kindness, for the shepherd ensures his flock's food; every day he attends to their thirst and hunger... for the shepherd sees that all the sheep, each and every one of them, is fed and saved.

It is not difficult to discern how the character of practices of volunteers and sponsors described above resonates with such a conception. Consider an example. Foucault writes:

Everything the shepherd does is geared to the good of his flock. That's his constant concern. When they sleep, he keeps watch... he acts, he works, he puts himself out, for those he nourishes and who are asleep (Foucault, 1988a: 62).

Host volunteers 'put themselves out':

Volunteers help people through the maze of government and agency officers -they act as advocates- they help to locate more suitable housing- they drive people to the hospital regardless of the hour- they take families on friendly outings- they seldom say 'no' (Refuge. 1981 1(3): 5).

Consider another example. Foucault (1988a: 69) remarks:

The shepherd must be informed of the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary.

Refugee sponsors attend to individual refugees' 'hunger' and 'material needs' by providing food and, among other things, furniture. Foucault (1988a: 69) goes on to write that the shepherd

...must know what is going on, what each of them does-his public sins. Last and not least, he must know what goes on in the soul of each one, that is his secret sins, his progress on the road to sainthood.
Volunteers and sponsors seek to 'know what is going on' by visiting refugees in their new accommodations almost daily. "The shepherd's role is to ensure the salvation of his flock" (Foucault, 1988a: 62). While Foucault's use of 'ensure salvation' and 'soul' here are undoubtedly meant to refer to a range of practices directed at individuals, rather than religious conversion exclusively, it might be noted nevertheless that the practice of taking refugees to Christian churches and other proselytizing exercises can occur in this context (interviews 21/03/96; 04/04/96; BCASW, 1980: 19; Indra, 1988; Winland, 1994; Canada, 1982a: 31; Woon, 1984: 64, 70; 1987: 136, 140).

'Care for the life of individuals' is also instantiated in the talk and texts associated with these resettlement practices. There is much talk about 'care' (e.g., Woon, 1987: 140). Winland (1994: 39n) describes Mennonite women sponsors' practices as assisting in "the mundane tasks of daily life" (emphasis added). Indra (1988: 158) describes sponsors' practices as "informally instructing refugees about the basic necessities of life" (emphasis added). A refugee coordinator for a Christian church suggests to sponsorship groups awaiting refugees' arrival: "We're dealing with lives" (interview 21/03/96; emphasis added).

The refugees in these locales are not specified as liberal subjects capable of exercising choice, they are the 'live individuals' of pastoral power. These resettlement practices are not to be explained by a sudden resurgence of 'humanitarianism', an explanation which, as suggested in chapter one, much previous
research depends upon. As suggested above, refugee resettlement in these locales shares some characteristics with early twentieth century philanthropy. One way to understand the latter has been by reference to the generation of 'moral capital' (Valverde, 1994c). Another, however, is by reference to the presence of a pastoral rationality; a point relevant to studies in governmentality and returned to in the final chapter. Refugee resettlement is a device not unlike the modern school described by Hunter (1996: 164), that emerged through a series of exchanges between a State that conceived of it as a bureaucratic instrument for the social governance of citizens, and a Christian pastorate that saw it as a means for the spiritual disciplining of souls.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

At present the Canadian refugee regime and the refugee are assumed distinct from immigration and the immigrant, as seen in the rise of refugee-specific agencies and authorities and in the talk and texts of a variety of Canadian authorities. The refugee is an object/identity defined against the immigrant and one that lacks choice. After breaking the regime down into three types of practices that target this object/identity a number of conclusions can be drawn.

The selection programme imagines ordering refugee levels through consultations and then monitoring their implementation abroad. It foresees, in other words, averaging the effects of refugee crises and movements abroad on the Canadian population. At present an advanced liberal rationality can be discerned in this area. However, beyond levels, the distribution of refugee spaces
abroad by political authorities and visa officers' within a Canadian or national perspective appears despotic and illiberal. This is because these authorities have been effectively freed to act outside of Canadian programmes. Selection levels are an area of national concern; the distribution of these spaces an international one. The latter appears despotic from within Canada or a perspective of a particular nation because it lies in a separate sphere of politics and morality. Canadian refugee selection, therefore, is shaped by liberal rationalities present in both Canadian and international domains and takes place between these two mutually constitutive spheres of power relations.

In determination programmes, a change to an advanced liberal rationality can be discerned in the gradual movement of responsibility out of the hands of Department of Immigration officials and political authorities and into those of the representatives of a quasi-autonomous board, the IRB. Undoubtedly this has allowed political authorities to avoid the difficult question of 'who is a refugee?' in Canada. The political causes of refugees' lack of choice will now be decided through production of and access to formal knowledge and then law. At the same time, as liberal government shows itself to be remarkably inventive in this area, it does so alongside the deployment of what appear from within Canada to be sovereign measures.

In resettlement responsibility for refugees' conduct and well-being similarly has been gradually moved out of the state. This undoubtedly allows political authorities to avoid being held
accountable for refugees who wander wide of a path to liberal citizenship. This responsibility has been taken up by new professional settlement workers in 'privatized' organizations, the 'psy' professions, and refugees themselves, but also religious and ethno-cultural sponsors and volunteers.

A general conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that 'advanced liberalism' is replacing 'liberal welfarism' in all three areas of the regime. The changes in the regime are consistent with the features of the onset of advanced liberalism suggested by others and described at the outset. No longer will refugees be governed through "the politically directed, nationally territorialized, bureaucratically staffed and programmatically rationalized projects of a centrally concentrated State" (Rose, 1996b: 352). Visa officers working abroad will continue to select refugees on behalf of their political masters, but federal state agents will no longer have a direct hand in refugee determination or resettlement. The discussion of the latter, however, suggests that something else has occurred since the mid-1970s that cannot be made fully intelligible by reference to the rise of what has been characterized as an advanced liberal rationality. This 'something else' is most clearly seen in relation to the resettlement practices of private sponsors and Host volunteers. The practices of these agents are consistent with the presence of a pastoral rationality, a governmental rationality that has received little attention to date in the governmentality literature and that raises issues that are returned to in the final chapter. Nevertheless,
the shift in liberal rationalities described above has been accompanied by certain kinds of association, knowledges, and technologies. To achieve a more complete understanding of the Canadian refugee regime (and to some extent the international one), as well as how it has changed, it is to these subjects that the next chapter must turn. There a subject mentioned only in passing thus far—resistance—will also be discussed.
1. These are not water tight compartments—there has been leakage from time to time. For example, discussions during levels consultations periodically refer to how refugees are being resettled and the numbers of refugees being determined in Canada. Similarly, in the new centres for survivors of torture the activities of the 'psy' professions are relevant to both determination and resettlement.

2. While these rationalities are presented below in abstract form, they should not be assumed separate from the practices they shape, or unmodified across spatial and temporal contexts (Miller and Rose, 1990a: 172).

3. The special, meagre refugee programmes organized in conjunction with the provinces and aimed at assisting resettlement of those with special needs, such as the Disabled Refugee Program (see Immigration Selection Manual 3.07.), are not discussed here.

4. 'Refugee Sponsorship Programs' also became one of five divisions under the operational 'Settlement Branch' in 1990 (Dirks, 1995: 171).

5. 'Department of Immigration' is taken here to refer to several state agencies: the Department of Citizenship and Immigration from 1966 to 1969; the Department of Manpower and Immigration from 1969 to 1976; the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission from 1977 to 1992; and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration from 1993 to 1995. Refugee selection officially came under the jurisdiction of the federal Department of External Affairs for several years in the 1980s, but shifted back to the Department of Immigration in 1991 (Dirks, 1995).

6. Another re-organization was announced in 1993 that foresaw Refugee Affairs transferring into a 'Ministry for Public Security' (CCR, 1993), but in the years that followed this was never realized.

7. The ten churches are the Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Baptist Ministries, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Council of Reformed Churches in Canada, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada and Canadian Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Presbyterian Church in Canada, Religious Society of Friends in Canada (Quakers), the Salvation Army, and the United Church of Canada (Inter-church Committee for Refugees Pamphlet, 1995a).

8. In 1967 the National Inter-faith Immigration Committee was established. Immediately prior to this, the churches communicated with the Department of Immigration regarding immigrant sponsorship separately (Dirks, 1977: 231).
9. Indeed as Dirks (1977: 231) noted immediately prior to the introduction of these sponsorship provisions:

   The [National Interfaith] Committee... is primarily involved in providing services aimed at easing the anxieties of immigrants on their arrival in Canada. Its refugee sponsorship activities are, therefore, not extensive (emphasis added).


11. As a senior Department of Immigration official notes during an interview:

   ...by the very nature that I'm here, I can talk to you in this way. This is again a strength of government because it doesn't, you know, its not out to squash people who don't tow a line... and not only is it not out, it can't, it hasn't got this capacity... (interview 06/11/95).

12. 'Advanced liberal' may be preferable because it refers to a set of changes broader than what is implied by these other terms: 'Post-Keynesian' is limited to economic life (but see O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 152n) and 'neo-liberal' (used most often in the governmentality literature) is limited to the ideas of several specific writers, including Friedrich von Hayek (1991) and Robert Nozick (1974), rather than changes that encompass, among other things, critiques from the Left and the Right.

13. As Stenson (1993a: 386n) writes: "One should not see the modalities of government as sharply differentiated from each other or replacing each other in periodization; rather they interpenetrate and transform each other."

14. Since 1979 Quebec's immigration officials have made individual refugee selections as visa officers abroad and have set a sub-target for refugee levels, but they do not decide, as Canadian political authorities do, which nations are refugee-producing and which groups are refugees (Canada, 1982c: 9; 1995a: 17; interview 09/01/96).

15. There is no uniformity in this regard (interviews 30/08/96; 09/01/96). In some areas and instances, such as in Vietnam, visa officers have made relatively regular visits to camps (Hitchcox, 1990: 146). In other instances, selections are carried out from within embassies such as the one in Nairobi, Kenya, after refugees are referred and granted permission to travel there from a particular refugee camp (ICCR, 1995b: 3).
16. According to Immigration Selection Manual 3.07 and 3.09, selection of individual Convention refugees is to be based on four criteria. The individual in question must: fit the Convention definition; "be unlikely to be voluntarily repatriated or locally resettled"; be "able to establish themselves successfully in Canada, taking into account any assistances available from governments and other sources" and "not yet been resettled on a permanent basis in another country." Finally, the second step of selection requires that the refugee must not be inadmissible (according to categories in section 19 of the Immigration Act that pertain to, among other things, criminality). Selection of individual Designated Class refugees is to be based on these same criteria except that individuals need not fit the Convention definition (Nash, 1989: 41).

17. In December, 1996 it was announced, however, that a "more flexible and inclusive" Refugee from Abroad Class (RAC) selection programme would become effective, and Designated Classes cancelled, beginning in March, 1997. The RAC is to be made up of three categories- 'Convention Refugee', 'Asylum Country', and 'Source Country'. The first of these is the same as the Convention Refugee category above. The third refers to refugee source countries that have been designated by the Minister and which are to include: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Sudan (Canada, 1996f; 1997: 8-9). Both these categories are, therefore, largely indistinguishable from the two Classes mentioned above. The separate 'Asylum Country' category, however, is a new development in that, unlike the older Designated Class and the newer Source Country category, it refers to refugees who can only be privately-sponsored, rather than either privately or State-sponsored (1996f). Nevertheless, for all three categories visa officers will continue to decide which individual refugees will be selected using the same 'successful establishment' and admissibility (with regard to Section 19 categories in the Act pertaining to security, medical, and criminality) criteria (Canada, 1997: 9). Refugee levels will also continue to be set following annual levels consultations (Canada, 1997: 8).

18. This change is in conjunction with Canada's signing in 1990 of a Comprehensive Plan of Action (see chapter four, endnote 3).

19. According to Immigration Selection Manual 3.13, individual women selected under this programme must still be either Convention refugees or members of the Designated classes described above. What distinguishes the Women at Risk programme is that the women to which it refers can still be selected if it is deemed they are not fully capable of 'successful establishment'.

20. Section 7 requires a report be made before Parliament specifying "a) the number of immigrants that the Government of Canada deems it appropriate to admit during any specific period of time; and b) the manner in which demographic considerations have
been taken into account in determining that number." Section 7 of the Immigration Act, 1976 requires only that the views of provincial representatives be considered (Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 443). Constitutionally responsibility for immigration is shared by federal and provincial governments (Canada, 1988c: 7).

21. Section 7 of the Immigration Act, 1976 also allows (but does not require) "other persons, organizations and institutions" to be included in consultations.

22. For example, fifteen such meetings were held in 1986 (Canada, 1986c: 16), twenty-two in 1987 (Canada, 1987d: 18), and at least eight in 1993 (Canada, 1994c: 9).

23. Late in 1984 three academic seminars were hosted by Department of Immigration officials concerning levels (Canada, 1986d: 1).

24. In 1984, it was announced that the contingency reserve would be cancelled (Canada, 1988c: 23), but it was replaced nevertheless two years later and at present remains in place.

25. Although 'Indo-china' became 'Southeast Asia'; Latin America/Carribean became 'Latin America'; 'Eastern Europe' became 'Europe'; 'Middle East/West Asia' became 'Middle East' and 'Asia' and then 'Middle East' and 'Asia Pacific' during this period (Canada, 1986c; 1987d; 1990b; 1994c; 1995a).

26. There is no breakdown available for the Annual Refugee Plan. For the 1987 annual consultations generally, however, Department of Immigration officials contacted more than one hundred and fifty national non-state organizations to encourage them to make submissions, particularly regarding "the current policy of increasing immigration levels in a moderate and controlled manner; the immigration planning level for 1987; and the appropriate planning range for each component" (Canada, 1986c: 15). For 1988 one hundred and seventy such organizations were contacted and encouraged to submit views on their preference among three levels options: no growth; moderate, controlled growth; and accelerated growth; as well as on family-related immigration (Canada, 1987d: 19). For the 1990 consultation one hundred and twenty-five national organizations were contacted and similarly asked to submit their views (Canada, 1989f: 7). For the 1991 annual consultation participants were invited to discuss four issues: the total number of immigrants and refugees to be selected, the distribution of this number among categories (ie. refugee, independent, family class), settlement arrangements, and the geographic distribution of levels within Canada (Canada, 1990a: 2). For the 1994 annual consultation more than five hundred participants were encouraged to submit views on: "the future level and mix of immigration; how the immigrant categories should be managed; a proposal for a new Humanitarian Designated Class; and (except in Quebec) current issues in immigrant settlement and integration" (Canada, 1994c: 9).
Discussion of which world regions or nations abroad are refugee-producing or which groups within these regions or nations are refugees were not encouraged in these or other consultations since 1978. For a detailed discussion of one set of meetings associated with these annual consultations see Simmons and Keohane, 1992: 338-43.

27. The Standing Committee on Immigration also completed a report on determination during this period.

28. There were two single items included within larger public opinion research comprising focus groups and survey research centring on perceptions of the Canadian distribution of refugees spaces abroad, one of which was limited to 'Changing the Number of Refugees by Area of Origin' (Canada, 1990c: 72) and the other on 'Where government-sponsored refugees currently come from and where they 'should' come from given changing world conditions' (Canada, 1989b: 16). Like the former, the latter was limited to 'areas of the world' (Canada, 1989b: 16-17) rather than specific nations.

29. These include: Pereira, Adams and Bristow (1980) on attitudes of selection officers toward their decisions to select Ugandan refugees; Gilad (1990b: 128-40); Basok and Simmons (1993); and Hanff (1979) regarding Chilean refugees. Noel Saint-Pierre carried out a study of Chilean refugees applying from Argentina in 1987 and St. Barnabas Refugee Society in Edmonton conducted research in 1989 on refusals of applications for refugee sponsorship from Alberta. Phil Ryan reported to the then federal New Democratic Party Immigration Critic Dan Heap in July, 1988 on the selection of Central American refugees (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 12). Most of these are limited, speculative studies carried out with little or no cooperation from Department of Immigration or External Affairs officials and at best involving individual officials who were "willing to cooperate on the basis of confidentiality" (Refuge. 1989 9(2): 12).

30. A senior Department of Immigration official expressed similar serious concern about this (interview 30/08/96).

31. In a more limited study of Canadian selection, Basok and Simmons (1993: 157n) similarly conclude: "There is wide variation between how different officers handle these matters in the field... [and] considerable room for discretion on the part of the officers making choices." See also Gilad (1990b: 123).

32. Although 'refugee selection' generally is part of visa officers' training (Dialogue. 1992 1(3): 7).

33. Although not without discussion with senior Department of Immigration officials (interview 30/08/96).
34. Interviews (28/07/95; 4/07/95; 23/06/95a; 21/06/95a; 08/06/95; 31/05/95; 24/05/95; 23/05/95; 04/08/95; 03/10/95; 26/09/95; 14/09/95; 16/09/95; 18/08/95; 16/09/95; 21/06/95c; 15/06/95; 30/10/95; 08/09/95; 17/10/95; 06/11/95; 04/04/96; 16/10/95; 30/08/96).

35. Dirks (1984: 290) adds:

[t]he exclusion of overseas claimants from the advisory committee [RSAC] process has not been a particularly contentious issue, either during the time the 1976 legislation was being debated or since.

36. It was only in 1995 that a telex was sent to all Canadian embassies and consulates abroad explaining the existence of the IRB Gender Guidelines (CCR, 1995e: 1).

37. During a recent published interview with a senior Department of Immigration official who oversees refugee selection, an interviewer is asked about the need for knowledge for determination of refugee claims in Canada: 'Could the visa officers play a role in supplying information to the IRB on conditions in certain countries, on selection decisions, or maybe give information on refugee movements?' The Assistant Deputy Minister responds: "Yes indeed... we can be instrumental in clarifying questions such as whether certain minorities are vulnerable in certain places as is alleged by a number of claimants or whether the documentation that are being presented are valid ones... because there is much interest in enhancing the quality of decisions-making at the IRB." In a similar interview the Minister of Immigration remarks: "I believe the IRB and its documentation centre should make full use of overseas analysis and information gathering. This would allow all IRB members, lawyers and community groups to get a good up-to-date reading of situations abroad" (Bout de Papier. 1995: 8). A notion that refugee selection decisions require enhancement, that knowledge associated with determination should be made available to visa officers to facilitate better individual refugee selections is completely absent.

38. This is an excerpt from a letter to the President of the Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees (later re-named the CCR) from the Minister of Immigration, as reprinted in Refuge. 1984 4(2): 4). The Tubercular Refugee Programme within the larger World Refugee Year programme also imagined the UNHCR and ICEM carrying out such practices (Canada, 1962: 6-7), as did the selection of Indochinese refugees (Canada, 1982c: 11).

39. There is no specific policy regarding relations between visa officers and NGOs abroad (CCR, 1995c: 5).
40. These include references to: Iran (Canada, 1986c: 12); Iran and Indo-China (Canada, 1987d: 10, 16); Eastern Europe (Canada, 1987d: 10, 16); Central America (Canada, 1989f: 5); Papua/New Guinea (Canada, 1986e: 42); Africa (Canada, 1990b: 11); Yugoslavia (Canada, 1992d: 6; 1995a: 13); and general shifts (Canada, 1991: 7; 1992d: 6; 1994c: iv; 1995a: 13).

41. The four stages were: examination of the refugee claimant by a senior immigration officer; review of the transcript from that examination by RSAC and a recommendation made to the Minister of Immigration or her delegate; decision by the Minister; potential re-determination of the Minister's decision by the Immigration Appeals Board (Nash, 1989: 41). At the third stage the Minister could decide (1) that the person was a refugee and could stay in Canada; (2) that the person was a refugee, should not be permitted to stay, and be removed; or (3) that the person was not a refugee and should not be permitted to stay in Canada. Under the first two possibilities the individual would undergo a further inquiry to determine if he or she were inadmissible according to the Immigration Act (whether the individual fit, for example, one of the criminal or other inadmissible categories in section 19 of the Act). Under the second possibility a refugee could appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board and then to the Federal Court of Appeal. Under the third possibility an informal procedure was carried out whereby the case was reviewed by a Special Review Committee comprising Department of Immigration Officials on 'humanitarian and compassionate grounds'. If the decision was positive then the first possibility described above became relevant. If the decision was negative the claimant could reapply with the Immigration Appeal Board. The latter would then determine whether to grant an oral hearing of the claim. If this decision was negative the applicant could then appeal it to the Federal Court of Appeal. If it was positive there would be a hearing before the three member committee of the Immigration and Appeal Board (Nash, 1989: 43).

42. In 1974 there were only eighty-nine refugee status claims reviewed (Canada, 1974: 116). The number of refugee claimants was 1165 in 1979 and 15,805 in 1987 (Creese, 1991: 8). By the middle of 1986 there were also more than twenty thousand claimants backlogged (Plaut, 1985: 42-43).

43. Many claimants travelled through Europe, as there were (and are) few non-stop flights from outside the West to Canada (Hathaway, 1992: 84; Stoffman, 1994: 55). This increase in mobility of these populations was no doubt in part a result of the de-regulation of the international airline industry that began during this period and that continues today.

44. The resources and processing times of the queue varies considerably with more visa officers and generally shorter processing times within than outside the West (cf. CCR, 1995b: 30).
45. As refugee hearing officers representing the case against the claimant were imagined being selected from the Department of Immigration and then seconded to the refugee board for a minimum of three years, determination was not (yet) imagined as entirely free or independent of political authorities.

46. Similar programmes appeared during the 1980s that sought to limit access to national refugee determination systems in Britain, Italy, Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Belgium, the United States, and Australia among others (Malarek, 1987: 85-95; Matas and Simon, 1989: 233-47; Nash, 1989: 23-30; Loescher, 1993; and UNHCR, 1993: 35-40).

47. By the mid-1980s many provinces granted welfare to refugee claimants while they awaited the determination of their claims (Dirks, 1995: 87). Claimants were not given work permits until May, 1986 when the 'B-1' list was first established. Work permits ceased being issued a few months later in February, 1987 (Canada, 1987a). In 1993 claimants began being issued work permits again (Canada, 1994c: v).

48. This was the standard 'magnet effect' argument promulgated by senior Department of Immigration officials who resisted establishment of inland refugee determination (Hathaway, 1992: 76).

49. In the first stage eligibility was to be determined. If this was passed the claimant entered the second stage where credibility was determined during an oral hearing. If rejected at this second stage the claimant could appeal to the Federal Court, which was the third stage (Dirks, 1995: 90).

50. In 1995 the size of the IRB hearing panel was reduced from two members to one (Canada, 1995b: 5).

51. Though RSAC had a small research unit, the emphasis on such knowledge is first highlighted in the Plaut (1985) Report. The process is also, of course, dependent on informal knowledge such as that generated among lawyers about which IRB members are likely to prefer certain kinds of evidence and which are not, or which are likely to decide in favour of claimants from certain nations over others, and so on (interview 18/08/95).

52. As Dirks (1984: 280) suggests, "the determination of refugee status for individuals already in Canada, the second aspect of policy, generally causes more administrative problems and political controversy."

53. Western European nations have entered into such agreements among themselves and Canada and the U.S. have recently signed a similar agreement (Canada, 1995d).
54. Provisions for carrier sanctions were present in the original 1976 Immigration Act (CCR, 1992b: 13), but penalties were significantly increased in Bill C-84 and then ten-fold in Bill C-86 in 1992. In practice, since passage of Bill C-84, several airlines have been fined for each person arriving in Canada without proper documentation (The Vancouver Sun, 1997a; 1997b).

55. A refugee is assumed to be resettled "when they have become self-supporting members (or units) of Canadian society" (Canada, 1981a: 9; see also Canada, 1997: 10).

56. Social service agencies dealing with the resettlement of immigrants exclusively and specifically have a history that goes back farther than the 1970s. Toronto's International Institute created in 1956 (Iacovetta, 1992: 268) and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society established in 1921 (Adelman, 1980: 108) are two well-known examples of such organizations. Before the early 1950s, however, it is only the latter that was well-established (Vernant, 1953: 570-3; 578). Permanent arrangements for federal funding (ISAP) for such non-profit organizations was, nevertheless, new in the 1970s. By 1972 the Department of Immigration had created Immigrant Reception Centres to be run by state agents in five Canadian cities, but as the historian Hawkins (1972: 297) writes, at this point: "The funding of voluntary agencies which attempt to provide some vital services to immigrants is still in a confused and undeveloped state." Since then immigrant settlement organizations have received anywhere between fifty and ninety-five percent of their funding in the form of ISAP (Interviews 08/09/95; 15/06/95; 24/05/95; 08/06/95; 21/06/95a). In 1994 some one hundred and sixty-five organizations were receiving ISAP funding across Canada (Canada, 1994c: 24).

57. While the Department of Immigration was assumed to have responsibility for the resettlement of refugees during their first three years after arrival, after the first year it was to be shared with the Secretary of State (Canada, 1981a: 9).

58. Consistent with a change from a liberal welfare to an advanced liberal rationality during this period, it is interesting that 'Health and Welfare Canada' became 'Health Canada', suggesting that the population's 'welfare' now resides somewhere else, somewhere outside the federal level of the State.


60. This is despite the fact that immigration is a joint federal/provincial jurisdiction (interview 09/01/96). Besides Quebec, provinces most involved in resettlement (not surprisingly) are Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta where the majority of
refugees have been resettled during this period. All four provinces were involved in resettlement of Indo-chinese refugees in the early 1980s (Adelman, 1980: 63-82).

61. The provincial government in British Columbia, for example, created a Community Liaison Branch in 1992. It also provides funding through the Ministry Responsible for Multiculturalism, Immigration and Human Rights for 'Storefront Orientation Services', an agency focusing on refugee claimants specifically (British Columbia, 1995: 22-23).

62. It was announced in the early 1990s that a new database, 'SMIS', was to be introduced in ISAP-funded organizations to ensure 'accountability' by gathering and storing information on services provided to individual refugees and immigrants that would allow for improvements in auditing (CCR, 1995c: 9). Following resistance from these organizations, it was terminated in December, 1995.

63. In the lower mainland area of British Columbia, for example, special workshops are offered to settlement workers. In 1995 a certificate program in settlement began to be offered at Vancouver Community College (Continuing Education Brochure, Vancouver Community College/Langara College. Fall, 1995: 41). In addition, settlement workers in British Columbia, as well as in other provinces, are represented by their own professional associations (interview 14/09/95).

64. In this way the medical profession was also 'responsibilized' in area of determination.

65. In June, 1988, for example, there was such a conference held regarding refugee women (Canadian Woman Studies. 1989: 5-15).

66. This theme is seen in another major event of the same series held a year later: "the prevailing mood of the event- empowerment" (Refuge. 1994 14(7): 1); cf. Winland, 1994: 21).

67. The fee is expected to generate between one hundred and thirty-six (Canada, 1996a: 18) and one hundred and fifty million dollars (Canada, 1995g: 5) in revenue, while these programmes are estimated to cost a total of only two hundred and fifty million dollars (Canada, 1996a: 18).

68. Canadian permanent resident status was first explicitly commodified in the mid-1980s with the introduction of entrepreneur and investor immigrant categories and the onset of econometric analyses regarding the economic contribution of different types of immigrants.

69. A similar emphasis is seen in the refugee studies programme at Oxford University (Refuge. 1989 8(3): 10) and in the new Journal for Refugee Studies that is produced there (Zetter, 1988: 6) (see
70. Contrary to Adelman (1980), private refugee sponsorship did not begin in the 1970s following release of the Green Paper. For World Refugee Year in 1959 a programme of private sponsorship appeared that foresaw private groups assuming "full and continuing responsibility for the cost of health and welfare services for the refugee families until they could qualify for these services under public auspices..." (Canadian Welfare, 1960: 79-80). However, their responsibility appears to have been imagined to refer to only a small proportion of those selected within this larger programme (Canada, 1962: 1-13). Of the more than five thousand refugees resettled during a two year period beginning in July, 1959, the official start of World Refugee Year, about seven hundred were sponsored by private organizations. Czechoslovakians (Canada, 1975: 14-5; 39) and Chileans (Canada, 1976a: 6) also appear to have been mostly State-sponsored. To the extent that the Displaced Persons of Europe who began to be selected in 1946 were considered refugees, they appear to have been primarily sponsored by either relatives and private employers, rather than the State (see Vernant, 1953: 546-53).

71. Though regulations were enacted in 1978, the private sponsorship program began in 1979 (Adelman, 1980).

72. Some concern continued to focus on CEC language training (Calgary Herald, 1982: F3; Globe and Mail, 1982a: 10).

73. In 1994 some thirty organizations were funded within this programme (Canada, 1994c: 25).

74. Concerning debate over the Green Paper, for example, some forty-five of the one hundred and twenty-six organizations that came before the Special Joint Committee on Immigration established to oversee responses to the programmatic Green Paper were Christian in orientation (Adelman, 1980: 108). Of the two hundred written briefs received on this occasion, fifty were from such organizations. Two of the five groups allowed to later appear before the Commons Committee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration to discuss the new Immigration Act in April, 1977 were Christian organizations (Adelman, 1980: 180).

75. In studies of the resettlement of Indo-chinese refugees by private sponsors Johnson and Beiser (1985: 9) found that seventy-nine percent and Neuwirth (1984b: 120) fifty-seven per cent of their respective samples were Christian organizations.

76. Indra (1988: 159, 1993: 231) suggests two-thirds of sponsorship groups have been Christian organizations.

77. The 'psy' professions were 'responsibilized' beginning in the mid-1980s.
78. Humanitarianism is no more adequate an explanation for the rise of these sites than it is for charities that suddenly appeared in mid-eighteenth century London (Andrew, 1989: 3).
CHAPTER SIX: ASSOCIATIONS, KNOWLEDGES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND RESISTANCE

At this point in the thesis, several conditions of possibility of the regime's emergence, as well as programmatic changes regarding three types of practices consistent with the onset of an advanced liberal rationality have been discussed. This chapter identifies associations, knowledges, and technologies relevant to the refugee regime generally and to advanced liberal government specifically. Inevitably in doing so some reference is also made to the international regime. This chapter concludes by briefly discussing resistance.

ASSOCIATIONS

Central to the possibility of modern forms of government... are the associations formed between entities constituted as 'political' and the projects, plans and practices of [other] authorities... (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).

Liberal government both in welfare and advanced modes requires and relies upon alliances between 'political' and a variety of 'nonpolitical' authorities and agencies. As a liberal welfare rationality continues to be displaced by advanced liberalism there is occurring a gradual shift of responsibility from the state to such 'non-political' authorities. Legal, spiritual, medical, psychological, ethno-cultural, and professional settlement authorities, among others, are becoming more responsible for refugees, more involved in governing their conduct and fate in light of conceptions of what is lawful, good, healthy, sane, normal, and efficient (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). The
associations among these authorities form a governmental network that makes the Canadian refugee regime possible. There is no obvious, explicit chain of command running through, for example, the Minister of Immigration, church sponsors, immigrant settlement workers, refugee experts, psychologists, refugees and others. Instead, there is a complex and loose assemblage of a variety of agents and authorities working toward completion of this or that project and bearing down in some way on refugees' lives. Each authority remains formally autonomous. The Minister of Immigration and senior officials, for example, have no line authority over volunteers from the Catholic church, Amnesty International's representatives, or those of immigrant settlement organizations in Canada. But the extent to which the regime works, the extent to which refugees can be determined, resettled or selected, is the extent to which these associations can be installed and nurtured over time, whereby one authority comes to convince another that their problems or goals are intrinsically linked, that their interests are consonant, that each can solve their difficulties or achieve their ends by joining forces or working along the same lines (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 10).

It is in this way that Amnesty International's concern for the political prisoner, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women's lobbying on behalf of physically and sexually abused women, Christian congregations' need to spiritually discipline souls, ethno-cultural organizations' concern about those of similar ethnicity, immigrant settlement organizations' recognition of the inefficient adaptation of 'abnormal' immigrants, the 'psy' and
medical professions' scientific curiosity about traumatized survivors of torture, and the legal profession's defence of those threatened by the state, converge at certain sites and points in time to form this network, to effectively govern refugees in ways discussed in the previous chapter. Together these varied associations allow refugees to be 'governed at a distance' (Rose and Miller, 1992). They create a capacity to achieve particular goals, such as successfully resettling a fixed number of refugees in Canada, in the case of MAHs, or providing systematic 'non-political' analysis leading to the generation of facts about human rights violations in particular regions and nations for use in determination hearings, in the case of Amnesty International.

As state agents administer the lives of refugees less and these various authorities more, a question arises about the form these alliances are taking. To be sure, some associations, especially those between the Department of Immigration and professional immigrant settlement organizations, are maintained primarily through funding arrangements such as ISAP and related periodical audits, but for others language, understood here as performative, is more important. Establishing these associations is not so much a process of making an appeal to essential interests as "the construction of allied interests through persuasion, intrigue, calculation, or rhetoric" (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 10). One form of association that has currency in the refugee regime is the 'partnership'. Partnerships are not present in early programmatic statements, such as the White and Green Papers, but
since the late 1970s such discourses have become dominant. During interviews a representative of a refugee sponsorship group notes in passing:

I also think that if there was a greater partnership between the NGO community and [Department of] Immigration when the process first begins... it would be a much more effective system (interview 23/06/95c).

A Department of Immigration official suggests:

We're dealing with settlement, because the government has declared, and declares, we're stopping administering settlement programs and I'm now with... the provincial government working through a process to get them in a position so that in two years time they can take it over. Well how does that happen and here we're into partnership... (interview 06/11/95).

Advanced liberal programmatic statements are to include 'partner'. At the Ontario Conference on Refugee Resettlement held in November, 1984 a brief presented by the ICCR reads:

The resettlement of every refugee in Canada is the shared responsibility of the government and private sector, working in partnership to ensure the successful reception and integration of refugees in Canadian communities... the several partners which contribute to the resettlement of refugees should be allowed to contribute what their particular organizational form, powers, insights, and limitations allow them to do best. Partnership responsibilities should be determined according to the skills, and limitations of each partner (Refuge. 1985 4(2): 21; emphasis added).

A pamphlet of a provincial chapter of the Mennonite Central Committee reads:

"MCC Refugee Assistance works in partnership with: the Government of Canada and the Province" (MCC advertising pamphlet, 1995).

'Partnerships' abound in the Canadian refugee regime and are instantiated in the talk and texts of various state and non-state authorities in regard to selection, determination, and
resettlement. But partnerships in the refugee regime are not only to be alliances between state and non-state agencies, as these quotations might suggest. They are also to be formed within and between state departments and among non-state agencies. The former is seen in a recent Department of Immigration report suggesting that Departmental priorities are to include:

- Supporting effective partnerships within the department and between the department and its key stakeholders. CIC will continue to work to identify opportunities to create and strengthen partnerships in each region and to work together with traditional and non-traditional partners (Canada, 1996a: 9; emphasis added).

An example of the latter is evident in a recent issue of the Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter (February, 1997: 9):

This project has allowed the Centre for Refugee Studies to develop further partnerships with professionals in NGO settings, especially those associated with the Canadian Council for Refugees, our organizational counterpart in this endeavour (emphasis added).

Everyone now wants to partner with everyone else.

'Partner' is a noun but it is also a verb, an action word. It has acquired moral overtones. To 'partner' has become the proper, civilized, ideal way to relate. Good associations are now good partnerships, bad associations bad partnerships. Alliances between authorities are problematized in terms of partnership. Responding to a decision by Department of Immigration authorities to change their earlier position on sponsorship arrangements in 1979, for example, the Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees, later to become the CCR, responds:

We demand recognition of our expertise and insist on our right to participate in decision-making. We want a regular process of consultation and dialogue before
decisions are made if we are to be true partners... In the light of the above we urge the government to reconsider its recent policy decision to change the nature of our partnership (as cited in Adelman, 1980: 25-6; emphasis added).

To be 'true' partners in this instance, 'consultation and dialogue' are required of authorities. Similarly, a representative of an immigrant settlement umbrella organization relates during an interview:

...the ongoing problem with the federal government is that they haven't -all the federal governments- they haven't really been able to work with the agencies in a partnership way and then really hear what people are telling them and that's very different than the settlement branch of the province... they have filled in the gaps. Where the federal government will not serve refugee claimants, the province has stepped in and said 'yes we will serve them'... That's a whole different way of working and that's been a very effective partnership (interview 08/06/95; emphasis added).

The 'partnership way' is to 'really hear' one another. Again it is dialogue that is important in such a relation.

In their analysis of community policing discourses, O'Malley and Palmer (1996) write that "the partnership relation is often an illusion at the level of practice." The same is undoubtedly the case with the Department of Immigration and non-state organizations in the refugee regime, but it would be a mistake to interpret the 'partnership' relation as pure illusion, as merely obscuring, for example, the essential interests of the state to dominate and swallow up that which operates outside itself. 'Partnership' should be seen as organizing and constituting such interests rather than simply covering them over.

It is not difficult to see how 'partnership' fits with a
broader advanced liberal rationality. In other words, such a rationality presupposes the state is unfit to accomplish the 'conduct of conduct' of citizens on its own. The rise to prominence of such a relation occurs as the Welfare State declines. State agents are to continue to be involved in forging the habits of the citizenry to be sure, but in different, reduced capacities. They are now to be accompanied by a variety of other authorities who are seeking to accomplish specific goals. 'Partnership' fits with an advanced liberal rationality that specifies this reduction in the reach and power of the state and a commensurate demand for its alignment with other authorities to accomplish 'government at a distance'. Such a rationality stipulates that there be more 'parts' to be filled. 'Partnership' also fits with the enterprising subject specified in advanced liberal discourse: a rational, active, bold subject that is assumed to have an inclination to associate with like-minded entities in the fearless pursuit of particular goals.

'Partnerships' are inconsistent with emotional devotion, spiritual obligation, social bonding, or rigid bureaucratic demand. Partnerships, whether between management and labour, two cultures within a previously whole nation, two individuals in co-habitation, or state and non-state agencies to resettle refugees, are to be flexible business ventures. They are to be investments where everybody wins, undertakings where the parties involved do not remain silent, subsist and survive, but consult, prosper, and thrive. Notions of culture, emotion, and oppression are, of
course, unthinkable in such a relation. Meaning, feeling, and perpetual outcomes to the advantage of one partner rather than another are unthinkable here. They are omitted from the rosy partnership pictures that are always framed a bit in the future, that are always slightly out of reach in time and, according to a given project's quarterly business report, never quite accomplished. It is not through such notions, but rather dialogue, flexibility and adherence to their 'parts' in the venture that partners will accomplish the larger goal next time around.

KNOWLEDGES

Power and knowledge directly imply one another... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault, 1979a: 27).

The Birth of Refugee Studies

The connection between power and knowledge cannot be avoided. The emergence of specific knowledges has accompanied the historic rise of specific regimes and their objects. In the eighteenth century, for example, the appearance of criminology closely accompanied both the rise of the prison as the primary form of punishment in the West and the emergence of the delinquent as a new object of authorities' attention (Foucault, 1977a; Pasquino, 1991). In 1939 the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science dedicated an entire volume to the discussion of the international refugee phenomenon for the first time. Since then several isolated scholarly works about post-World War Two refugees, such as Vernant (1953), have also appeared. These have been,
however, mostly descriptive, examining refugee crises and movements as individual historical events, not as a general phenomenon ripe for comparison, experimentation, and theorizing. Prior to the 1960s most knowledge produced about refugees was in one way or other connected to the operations of international refugee organizations (Kunz, 1973: 127; Harrell-Bond, 1988: 1). The formation of the international regime went hand in hand with the production of this knowledge. One required the other: one made the other possible. Governing refugees led to knowledge of refugees while knowledge of refugees allowed for their governance.

It was suggested in chapter four that by the 1960s Western authorities began to recognize that the non-Western world was in such a state that it could be relied on to regularly produce refugee movements. With this came the recognition that these movements were not atypical, that their characteristics and stages, as well as the behaviours of the refugees they produced, were patterned in some way. Since then there has been a dramatic growth in the production of formal knowledge about refugees (Gilad, 1990b: 295, 300; Robinson, 1993: 6; Hein, 1993: 43; interview 10/04/96). The previous research discussed in chapter one is part and parcel of this. As Canadian and other national Western refugee regimes began to appear, the knowledge produced about refugees expanded from a focus on management and effects of the international provision of aid and development through the UNHCR and NGOs that were conceptually outside the control of particular nations, to various aspects of resettlement and determination within them. The
knowledge focusing on international policies, practices and their effects has continued to be produced (cf. Cuncliffe, 1995; Gorman, 1993; Harrell-Bond, 1986; 1990; Stein, 1990; Christensen, 1990; Pask, 1990; Bramwell, 1988; Rogge, 1987; Smyser, 1987; Waldron, 1987; Edwards, 1986; Cuny, 1981; Thomas, 1981); but in the early 1980s those of the national variety also became objects of knowledge. The rise of these national refugee regimes has at once fostered and been made possible by the birth of a new science.

One of the first attempts to construct a general theory of refugee movements or migrations in the English literature is found in the work of the Australian scholar Kunz (1969; 1973; but see Jolles, 1965). Kunz (1973: 126) lays out a typology of refugee movements, applicable to "both past and present refugee phenomena." Comparing the movement of refugees to "the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction, their path governed by kinetic factors" he identifies two kinetic types—anticipatory and acute movements (Kunz, 1973: 131n). The former refer to movements involving individuals who "leave before the deterioration of the military or political situation prevents his orderly departure"; the latter to movements made up of those who "flee either in mass or, if their flight is obstructed, in bursts of individual or group escapes" (Kunz, 1973: 131-2). But it is less the content of this attempt than the assumption that underlies it that is important. In this regard Kunz writes at one point that there is the need to look at refugee situations not as individual historical occurrences, each distinctly different and circumscribed in its locus and time, but as re-occurring phenomena, with identifiable and often identical sets of
This call for scientific inquiry is seen in works that have appeared since. In 1980, for example, the American refugee scholar Stein similarly suggests that

...scientifically, it is possible to develop a perspective that sees certain consistencies in the refugee experience and refugee behaviour... Refugees should be seen as a social psychological type whose behaviour is socially patterned: Refugee problems should be analyzed from a general, historical, and comparative perspective that views them as recurring phenomena with identifiable and often identical patterns of behaviour and sets of causalities. Specific refugee situations should not be treated as unique, atypical, individual historical events but rather as a part of a general subject; refugee behaviour, problems and situations that recur in many contexts, times, and regions (Stein, 1986: 5; emphasis added).

A year later in a special issue of The International Migration Review on refugees, Stein and a co-editor argue that "such work should build the foundations of a new field of Refugee Studies... the development of a new body of knowledge" (Stein and Tomasi, 1981: 6). In the years that have followed, the growth of such a science is evident in the appearance of new sites where it could be practiced, and fora where its findings could be displayed and debated in the special ways of the social scientist.

The Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University in Britain began in 1982 with a three-year state research grant to a prominent social anthropologist (Leopold, 1992: 81). The programme later formally became part of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford's well-known International Development Centre. Though others have emerged since, the Refugee Studies Programme and the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University mentioned below, remain the two most
important sites where this science has been practiced both within Britain and Canada (and internationally) (interview 10/04/96). In 1985 an 'Inter-University Consortium for Refugee Research' involving government officials, scholars, and refugee workers (Refuge. 1985 5(2): 19) was also initiated at Oxford (Refuge. 1985 5(1): 6). It was imagined as an information network for those engaged in the production of formal knowledge about refugees.

In 1988 the first issue of an international scholarly journal dedicated to the exclusive publication of research on refugee issues, The Journal of Refugee Studies, was also established there. This publication was not another forum for refugee workers and representatives of public and private international organizations to debate different approaches to working with refugees in international settings. It was unlike the international Refugee Participation Network Newsletter that also appeared at Oxford at this time. Nor was it comparable with the UNHCR's Refugees that reported, in journalistic style, changes in international refugee policies. The Journal was an outlet where the results of systematic inquiries could be methodically peer-reviewed and shaped into the concise, rigid form now typical of the social sciences. It was to be an opening within which patterns in policies, movements, and behaviours could be identified, explanations given, empirical evidence shown, and theoretical concepts introduced, dismissed, and debated. On the occasion of the first issue the editor repeats the now familiar call:

...through the launching of JRS, one feature is preeminent. It is the universality, now, rather than the
uniqueness of refugee phenomena. We are thus dealing with general issues not just unique and particular instances. First, it enables the field of refugee studies to draw on a much wider spectrum of theories and methods from the mainstream of academic disciplines. Second, it permits the construction, examination and validation of general conclusions from what, in the past, have often been seen as individual circumstances. Building up material case by case, situation by situation, we can begin to present something of more general significance from and about refugee studies (Zetter, 1988: 4; emphasis added).

Refugee studies was by now well on its way to becoming a new science. A similar international scholarly journal, the International Journal of Refugee Law, was inaugurated at Oxford the following year (International Journal of Refugee Law, 1989).

A move further in the direction of the development of the new science of refugee studies is evident in 1990 when the International Research and Advisory Panel (IRAP) for refugee studies was established at Oxford (Leopold, 1992: 83). In 1992 IRAP meetings were attended by some seventy international refugee scholars and representatives of refugee organizations. Subsequent IRAP meetings in 1994 (Cooper, 1994: 1) and 1996 (Koser, 1996: 353) have doubled in size, attended by no less than one hundred and fifty participants. Already by 1992, however, these IRAP meetings were deemed the most important international forum for the dissemination and discussion of formal knowledge about refugees (Leopold, 1992: 83).

The formation of refugee studies, the birth of this new science, is also seen taking place in Canada during the same period. In 1982 the Refugee Documentation Project appeared at York University in Ontario. Funding was provided by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) (Refuge. 1982 2(1): 11). In October, 1988 this Project was transformed into "a free standing organized research unit" of York University to be called the "Centre for Refugee Studies" (Refuge. 1988 8(2): 2). 'Project' had suggested a temporary arrangement whereas 'centre' implied something more permanent. The Centre was imagined as a site where refugee research would be carried out, the first Canadian academic programme of refugee studies offered, and public conferences on refugee issues held. Its mandate also included exposing the citizenry to refugee issues (Refuge. 1988 8(2): 2). In 1991 the Centre was designated a Centre of Excellence for International Development by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). At this point this state agency announced the Centre would be provided with an annual five million dollar grant for five years that was considerably larger than previous and continuing SSHRC provisions (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, October, 1991: 4; March, 1995: 1). While at its inception in 1988 the Centre had been focusing on "aspects of the movement and resettlement of refugees" (Refuge. 1988 8(2): 2), the new grant was foreseen encouraging research on repatriation and law; nurturing associations with other refugee research centres in Canada; and commencing publication of an annual refugee survey (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 24; interview 10/04/96). Without this grant the Centre could not have expanded its operations in these ways (interview 10/04/96). In the same year, a refugee law research unit, that had its beginnings at Osgoode Law School in 1986, as well as the
world's first and only graduate programme in refugee studies, formally became part of the Centre (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 24; Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter. October, 1991: 4; September, 1992: 4).

Other sites where refugee research would be carried out also sprang up in Canada during the 1980s, including the Refugee Research Project at McGill (interview 10/04/96; Robinson, 1993: xiv) in Montreal, the Research Resource Division for Refugees at Carleton in Ottawa, one each at Laval and Concordia, as well as projects at the two universities in Winnipeg (interview 10/04/96). All were modest in size and scope compared to York's Centre for Refugee Studies. Of the refugee research centres functioning in Canada by 1990 the Centre at York had by far the most scholars involved (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 24). By 1995 some forty-two university faculty members at York were in some way affiliated with it (Canadian Refugee Studies Newsletter, March, 1995: 1).

A Canadian newsletter, Refuge, concerned exclusively with issues pertaining to refugees, was launched by the Refugee Documentation Project at York in 1981. It provided for the first time an outlet for the discussion of refugee policy and issues in Canada. This 'newsletter' became a quarterly 'periodical' in 1982 (Refuge. 1982 2(2): 1). After 1990 it took on a more scholarly look and then expanded its focus significantly from description and discussion of refugee determination and resettlement policies in Canada, to the systematic identification and analysis of refugee situations in non-Western regions. In 1993 this periodical was
expanded from four to ten issues annually (Refuge. 1993 13(1): 15). Other publications about refugee policy and refugees, such as INSCAN, the newsletter of the Research Resource Division for Refugees, also were inaugurated during the 1980s, but Refuge has, nevertheless, remained the only significant periodical regularly produced about refugee issues in Canada.

In the years that have followed the seminal work of Kunz and others, refugee movements, refugees, and refugee policies have emerged in the West as the objects of a new science. More important than the mere fact of the ascendancy of this new science described above, however, has been the important part it has come to play in the international and national refugee regimes. Its rise is not to be made intelligible by referring to the individual efforts of Kunz, Stein and various Canadian refugee scholars who rose to distinction during this period; it has to do with the shifts in power relations discussed in previous chapters.

To see this in the Canadian context, consider how closely the developments above concerning the Centre at York and Refuge, the most important developments of their kind in Canada, correspond with significant events discussed earlier. The establishment of the Refugee Documentation Project and the appearance of Refuge coincide with the problematization of state modes of refugee resettlement in the early 1980s and the simultaneous appearance of 'Friendship Family' and related programmes.° The change in Refuge from newsletter to periodical format coincides with the beginning of a crisis in determination. The re-designation of the
Documentation Project as the Centre for Refugee Studies in October, 1988 occurs not long after passage of relevant legislation (Bills C-84 and C-55) and the formal opening of the new IRB's documentation centres (Rusu, 1989: 322), in the summer of 1988, and just prior to the new determination system's commencement date of January 1, 1989. It will be recalled that this new programme imagined a new reliance on the production of formal knowledge and the introduction of documentation centres to facilitate access to it. The appearance of the refugee law research unit in 1986, that later became part of the Centre, coincides with the height of the crisis over determination. The unit established the first digital database of Canadian case law regarding the Convention definition that was subsequently incorporated into and made available at the IRB's documentation centres (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter. September, 1992: 4). Since then Refuge also has been prominently placed on display shelves at the front of these centres (interview 19/03/96) (see technologies below). The subsequent expansion of the focus of Refuge to the analysis of refugee situations abroad in 1990 and of the number of issues annually in 1993 (by this point four issues were to focus exclusively on the situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter. September, 1992: 10) occurs as the demand from the IRB's documentation centres for more detailed formal knowledge of refugee conditions abroad increases (LRCC, 1991: 69; interview 19/03/96). In each instance knowledge production can be seen changing with shifts in power relations.
The birth of refugee studies and, more specifically, the appearance of the Centre at York and changes in *Refuge* are not, however, the cause of these shifts. Indeed, it should be made clear that neither scholars at the Centre for Refugee Studies nor editors of *Refuge* seek to collectively and regularly develop and make known their positions on aspects of Canadian and international refugee policies. Nor is the knowledge produced by the Centre or displayed in *Refuge* necessarily useful to advocacy organizations like the CCR and ICCR in influencing policy or to state and UNHCR bureaucrats in putting the former's efforts in a bad light. The Centre and this periodical are formally autonomous, neither extensions of national non-state refugee advocacy organizations nor the mouthpieces of the Canadian state or the UNHCR. As a founder of both the earlier Documentation Project and the newer Centre relates,

...though the Refugee Centre has influence its more a product of the people in it than, for instance, the Centre itself. It doesn't say anything. It takes no stand. It just develops a reservoir of expertise (interview 23/02/96).

This expertise is important in governing refugees in an advanced liberal manner, but not all the water in the reservoir can be consumed.

Consistent with a liberal welfare rationality most of the formal knowledge produced about the resettlement of refugees in Canada before the late 1970s (little or none was manufactured in relation to selection and determination) was produced by state agents, in particular those operating from within the Department of
Immigration (e.g., Canada, 1975; 1976a). Within this rationality the state is perceived as the centre of expertise for the management of specific populations (Valverde, 1994: 28). However, as an advanced liberal rationality has emerged to re-shape the regime, state agents are imagined generating this expertise less and seeking to secure the conditions for its production more; expertise is moved out of the state. This is evident in this context in the increased reliance during this period on contracting out relevant research to formally autonomous refugee experts that have emerged in the 1980s (e.g., Canada, 1989c; 1989d), and in the provision of grants for research projects and the hosting of public fora. The latter is seen in a SSHRC grant in the early 1980s and a large CIDA grant for the Centre for Refugee Studies in 1991; several major Health Canada grants for the study of the mental health of resettling refugees during this period; and a six million dollar, six-year grant beginning in 1995 from the Department of Immigration, Health Canada and SSHRC 'partnership' for the new International Metropolis Project. The latter imagines social scientific inquiries into the effects of immigrants and refugees on Canada's largest urban areas (Canada, 1995j).

Beyond changes in the organization of the production of knowledge about refugees consistent with a transformation in rationalities, are shifts in the kinds of knowledge being produced in Canada. Three such shifts, mentioned in chapters four and five, are discussed below. They are consistent with and have made possible governing refugees in an advanced liberal way. The first
two relate to changes in the Canadian, and the third to change in both Canadian and international refugee regimes.

As an object of knowledge the refugee has spanned the boundaries of several disciplines and sub-disciplines including history, political science, social geography, medicine, international relations, economics, demography, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, law, ecology, economics, nutrition, social anthropology, and sociology. Most of these disciplines emerged in the nineteenth century. Over the last three decades they have increasingly come to focus their attention on refugees in their special ways, each presupposing their object a bit differently, their practitioners, while maintaining formal autonomy, becoming loosely aligned with Canadian and international refugee programmes. Through a new science of refugee studies has been forming, this is not to suggest it has achieved dominance over these established disciplines. Indeed, from the first IRAP meeting on, there has been debate over whether refugee studies is merely another multi-disciplinary field or a discipline in its own right (e.g., Robinson, 1990; Cooper, 1994). Psychology and economics in particular have remained somewhat distinct from the sites and fora of refugee studies.

Psychological Knowledge

First, there has been a shift toward the manufacture of psychological knowledge about refugees during their resettlement in Canada (e.g., Beiser, 1984; 1985; 1987; Beiser and Flemming, 1986; Chan, 1984; Beiser et al., 1989). Psychology is the discipline
that aims for knowledge of the soul (Hacking, 1995: 216). The soul of the immigrant has been an object of such inquiries throughout most of the twentieth century (Allodi, 1978). Since 1945 psychological knowledge about refugees has been produced in conjunction with international refugee programmes (e.g., Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group, 1945; Pederson, 1949; Rahe et al., 1974). Around the time Kunz (1969; 1973) was calling for comparative research to develop a general refugee theory, David (1969: 73) was similarly advocating the development of a comprehensive body of research for addressing the mental health of refugees in place of what at the time were a variety of scattered international studies. Within psychology, refugees have become objects with a heightened propensity for mental illness or disorder that is intrinsically linked to their assumed lack of choice to migrate. A recent report from a major Canadian ten-year longitudinal study of Southeast Asian refugees, for example, reads:

Although immigrants and refugees share many common problems, they also differ in ways that have important mental health implications. People usually choose to become immigrants, whereas they are forced to become refugees. This increases the risk for emotional disorder (Johnson and Beiser, 1994: 3; emphasis added).

This kind of knowledge has been rarely produced specifically in relation to refugee resettlement in Canada before the early 1980s. But this situation began to change after this period with the gradual movement of responsibility for resettlement out of the state and into the reach of other kinds of authorities, including the 'psy' professions. This latter movement is exemplified by the appearance of the two agencies organized around survivors of
torture, as described earlier.

In March, 1986 two federal state Departments, Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Health and Welfare Canada, announced the establishment of a Task Force on Mental Health Issues (Canada, 1986a: 2; Williams, 1986: 16). The first part of this two-year programme imagined the publication of the results of a systematic, comprehensive review of previously produced, and widely dispersed, formal knowledge regarding the mental health of refugees and immigrants. The second part foresaw the Task Force overseeing public hearings and then eventually producing a comprehensive report that would include specific recommendations for reform. The twelve-person task force, made up of academic psychologists and psychiatrists, social workers, and representatives of immigrant settlement agencies, was to be chaired by a prominent Canadian psychiatrist and administered by a national non-state organization, the Canadian Mental Health Association.

This Task Force is consistent with what was asserted above about changes in the production of knowledge about refugees in two ways. First, it was to be administered by the Canadian Mental Health Association rather than within the two state Departments that jointly funded and announced it. Second, its introduction in March, 1986 coincides with the period during which the crisis of governability concerning determination had reached its peak. This latter point needs elaboration and is related to what was stated in the previous chapter about both resettlement and determination. In relation to resettlement it had become clear by 1986 that those
already in the determination process and some of those arriving at ports of entry every day would -in one way or other- be granted permanent status (thousands had already been granted status in the first years of the crisis). Significantly, this would take place without these individuals having been previously screened as potential immigrants by Canadian visa officers applying the second of two selection criteria. It was recognized that these claimants had been granted status without having been examined to see if they possessed qualities consistent with becoming citizens of a liberal order. This, coupled with the recognition that large numbers of family class immigrants had, also during the early 1980s, by-passed the screening of the immigration point system (it will be recalled from chapter five that immigrant levels began to be dramatically reduced only in 1983), became the subject of considerable moral concern (e.g., Canada, 1988: 2, 24). While the administrative review subsequently announced in May, 1986 promised to address this concern in relation to refugees, at this point so did intervention at a different site.

So what was this site? It was refugees' and immigrants' souls. If the capacities and character of those who were to eventually live permanently in Canada could not be assured beforehand through the application of the point system, such qualities were now to be addressed in Canada in a different way. Psychological interventions that were culturally sensitive and, for refugees specifically, techniques to confront post-traumatic stress disorder presumed common among them (e.g., Canada, 1988a: 85-8),
would be deployed (see technologies below). In relation to determination, it had also become clear by 1986 that a new system that would be independent of the influence of political authorities and reliant on the production of formal knowledge outside the state, consistent with the character of this Task Force, was forthcoming. Here assessment (rather than treatment) of post-traumatic stress disorder would become important for later use during oral determination hearings. The psychological knowledge produced about refugees since the mid-1980s has included attention to the development of techniques to assess and treat post-traumatic stress disorder. The creation of this Task Force promised to provide for their refinement in Canada.

During a presentation at an international symposium on refugees in 1989 (a precursor to IRAP) immediately following completion of the Task Force report (Canada, 1988a), the former chair noted that "overall some 30 per cent of refugees suffered from some combination of physical and mental health problems" (Refuge, 1991 8(3): 11). Since then the scholarly work of the former chair has become the most well-known of its kind in Canada (interview 23/02/96). Much of the production of knowledge about the mental health of refugees during their resettlement in Canada, since the Task Force, has been funded through grants from Health Canada and Secretary of State for Multiculturalism (e.g., Beiser, 1987: 461). During the 1990s, for example, the National Health Research and Development Branch of Health Canada has provided funding to the former chair of the Task Force for four major
research projects regarding the mental health of refugees (Canada, 1996e: 1).

Economic Knowledge

Second, there has been a shift toward the investigation of the contribution of refugees to the Canadian economy (Akbari, 1989a; 1989b; 1992; Canada, 1989a; DeVoretz and Fagnon, 1990; Economic Council of Canada, 1991; Globerman, 1992; Stoffman, 1992; Beach and Worswick, 1993; DeVoretz, 1995). Within this type of economic knowledge refugees have become, not souls with a propensity for mental disorder, but economic risks. An emphasis on this kind of knowledge also began to be seen in the mid-1980s as changes in the annual levels routine discussed in the previous chapter, such as invitations to scholars and refugee experts to attend levels meetings, also became evident. The production of this knowledge is, then, most immediately relevant to selection. Prior to this development economic studies sought to evaluate the effects of increasing or decreasing aggregate immigration levels (a process that involves rendering refugee levels invisible) on, for example, employment (e.g., Davies, 1976; Marr, 1976; Rao, 1980; Samuel and Conyer, 1986). Such studies continue to be produced (e.g., Foster et al., 1994), but new and arguably more sophisticated analyses that seek to quantify and otherwise account for the contributions and costs to the economy of various types of entrants as defined in the immigration regulations (e.g., family class, refugee, independent class, business class) have emerged. This latter type of study specifies refugees more than the former. The most well-
known of this kind of economic research has become associated with several economists from Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia.

Some of these studies divide the population of entrants into two cohorts or flows comprising different compositions of types of entrants. Akbari and DeVoretz (1992), for example, divide entrants into 'old foreign born' and 'new foreign born' based on whether immigrants were predominantly of 'Third World' origin. In another instance, a pre-1978-post-1978 division is used (e.g., DeVoretz, 1992: 193), with 1978 being the year that most of the current entrant classes (including family and refugee) were introduced. Grubel (1992: 114) asserts that cohorts of entrants after the mid-1970s are composed of mostly refugees and family class immigrants with "cultural and linguistic differences." Referring to the most recent immigrant flow Stoffman (1992: 24) similarly notes: "Currently fewer than 15 per cent are selected for their ability to contribute productively. We should aim to get back to the 1971 level of 32 per cent." This knowledge identifies which types of entrants are worthwhile economic investments, the working assumption of its producers being that "if we are going to have immigrants, it is better to have ones who do well economically than ones who don't" (Stoffman, 1992: 17).

An exemplar of this type of research is DeVoretz's (1995) now well-known edited collection, entitled, Diminishing Returns. The argument contained within it is as follows. Prior to 1978 a large proportion of the total number of entrants were admitted based on
their qualifications (i.e. on the basis of the assignment of points from the point system mentioned earlier) rather than other criteria, and the foreign-born units tended to generate more income than the Canadian-born. It follows that the former contributed more to the state treasury in tax revenues and used fewer state services than the Canadian-born. The result is a net economic contribution by these kinds of entrants (and their families).

After 1978 a significantly lower proportion of entrants of the total cohort were admitted on the basis of their qualifications, instead being granted immigrant status as refugees (primarily it is those determined as such in Canada that are referred to here, rather than those selected abroad) or as family members of Canadians (primarily those who themselves had been recently granted immigrant status) resulting in a lower net economic contribution and considerably greater costs to the treasury or, in DeVoretz's words, 'diminishing returns'.

This new kind of economic knowledge has been deployed within the Canadian refugee selection programme in conjunction with annual levels meetings and in presentations to parliamentary committees (Stoffman, 1992: 17). It is also instantiated in the talk of authorities where it legitimizes and creates positions on aspects of refugee policy:

Don DeVoretz is a professor of economics at Simon Fraser, a real authority on internationally [sic.] and Canada and the effects of immigration on economics. So he's a goldmine of information. He's just published that book, Diminishing Returns, which is a study of the impact of immigration on the Canadian economy... high levels of immigration would alleviate the economic index of recession and in effect what they found out was that in
British Columbia yes it did and in Ontario it was a disaster, it went the other way and that was largely a result of the kinds of classes of people who came. British Columbia gets over 50 percent of the economic class of immigrants, relatively small number of refugees and family class. In Ontario it was the other way around, Ontario gets a huge percentage of the refugees (interview 24/05/95).

You see many times people are saying that immigrants are a burden to our country. The statistics do not show that. Statistics show -I think Don DeVoretz at the S.F.U.-... the refugees who came here contributed more to the treasury than they took out in social services or anything. Now that doesn't mean that there are not abuses, some have been more productive than others... (interview 12/06/95).

It is important to make clear what the ascendency of this kind of knowledge has made possible in relation to both immigration and refugee regimes. It allows not only the setting of optimum aggregate immigrant levels, but optimum levels (including zero levels) for each type of entrant, based on their contribution to the Canadian, and increasingly (as 'localization' continues), provincial and municipal economies and treasuries. It has made possible the selection of what a representative of an immigrant settlement organization referred to in passing as 'the designer immigrants', those entrants who will eventually result in a net economic benefit and a minimal cost to the treasury (interview 21/06/95a).14 Simultaneously, it provides for the identification of the types of entrants who will be economic risks, those who will be threats to the Canadian treasury and economy.

So what types have been identified as risky? The family class category is one (cf. Globerman, 1992; DeVoretz, 1995). The first study to focus on the earnings and involvement in the labour market
of the family class immigrant, as opposed to entrants generally, appeared in 1988 (Samuel, 1988). The refugee, having been determined as such through the determination process, is the other (cf. Stoffman, 1992: 17-8). Regarding refugees, the Economic Council of Canada (1991: 39) concludes:

> From an economic point of view, our research has not documented any differences in the economic gain to Canadians from different classes of immigrant, with one exception. The exception is the self-selected refugee immigrants [sic.]- the only case where the economic costs seem likely to outweigh the economic benefits.


> The findings show that admission class does affect the immigrant's welfare dependency. Those who enter under the refugee policy are at a greater risk of welfare dependency. If the number of immigrants admitted under the refugee policy increases, it is likely that the number of refugee welfare recipients would also increase.

Here the family class and refugee categories together form the 'self-selecting' entrants (e.g., DeVoretz, 1992: 193; Vancouver Sun, 1992: B5; Toronto Sun, 1995: 20). Directly comparable to the 'queue-jumper' and 'asylum-seeker' object/identities that arose during the height of the crisis over determination, the 'self-selecting' are those who actively select themselves to come to Canada, rather than passively, properly, and patiently wait to have their capacities and moral character judged by state visa officers to determine if they have potential to become citizens of a liberal order. As suggested earlier, in the rise of advanced liberal government, actively resettling oneself as a refugee (or immigrant) is increasingly to be encouraged or even required; selecting
oneself as a refugee (or immigrant) is to be quite another matter. It is increasingly deemed to result in risk that must be managed and, if possible, reduced.

Notice 'likely' in both quotations above. Likelihood is central to the assessment of risk and to risk discourses. But how specifically are these newly quantifiable risks posed by the family and refugee categories and made possible by this type of knowledge to be governed? Regarding the family class, according to DeVoretz (1995: 7), one way is "to give the sponsoring immigrant a greater financial stake in the success of accompanying relatives; in that case, the sponsors themselves would reorder the family reunification queue." This would be accomplished in turn by requiring sponsors -usually presumed to be family members already in Canada- to purchase surety bonds15 (Devoretz, 1995: 7). It is here that this kind of knowledge becomes more relevant to resettlement than selection. If the family member after arriving does not succeed in the labour market and decides to draw on social assistance, the amount of the bond would be forfeited to the state treasury. In other words, the economic risk the family class immigrant poses is to be transferred from the state to the immigrant's family in Canada. A pilot project was initiated in 1995 by the Department of Immigration in Ontario to test this very technique (Canada, 1995a: 10; interviews 28/08/95; 19/10/95). Regarding the refugee, similar mechanisms have been proposed within new private sponsorship arrangements that began to be reviewed in 1991. Both these latter shifts are, of course, consistent with the
movement of responsibility out of the state that an advanced liberal rationality specifies. Like the production of psychological knowledge about resettling refugees, this new economic knowledge targets and creates concern over the quality of those whose "suitability to be Canadian citizens" (Toronto Sun, 1995: 20) cannot be judged until they have already arrived in Canada.

Knowledge About Early Warning Systems

The third and final shift to be discussed is a new emphasis (Gurr and Harff, 1996; Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1996; Cottey, 1996; Adelman and Schmeidl, 1996; Rupasinghe, 1996, 1994; Rusu, 1996; Demars, 1995; De Waal, 1995; Dedring, 1994; Frelick, 1993; Ramchararan, 1991; Fein, 1989; Onishi, 1987; Gordenker, 1987: 174-5; 1986) on formal knowledge that seeks the coordination of the flow of knowledge about refugee-producing conditions abroad that will allow the more efficient assessment of "where refugee-flows are likely to occur" (Refuge. 1991 10(4): 26). This new effort is "to detect a totally different 'menace' -the immanent mass flow of refugees as a result of natural, but primarily, human-made disasters" (Refuge. 1991 11(1): 19). As suggested at the outset of this section, this shift is relevant to both Canadian and international regimes. It fits with and makes possible the new Canadian determination system that began in 1989 and, more specifically, its increasing demand since then for more detailed formal knowledge of conditions abroad for use in legal hearings and the change in the international refugee regime consistent with a
move away from social and educational intervention and toward the identification and management of risky regions, nations, and populations. That this shift is relevant to both these changes is seen in, among others things, the fact that the same refugee expert has been involved in both (e.g., Rusu, 1989 and 1996).

Prior to the appearance of documentation centres, the IRB, and this stress on early warning, a representative of a private Ottawa-based consulting firm specializing in international affairs proposed to the RSAC a five-level classification system for nations (Kharas, 1982). It was to be based on two factors: political instability and suppression of human rights. "The level of coerciveness of a country, and hence the likelihood of its producing refugees, can thus be given a measurable dimension" (Kharas, 1982: 8; emphasis added). The uniform system "is fair to the extent of evaluating all countries according to the same method and data" (Kharas, 1982: 10). The five levels were: (1) Coercive, (2) Occasionally Coercive, (3) Routinely Coercive, (4) Broadly Coercive, and (5) Very Coercive. According to Kharas, at this juncture Canada approached (1), Brazil (3) and Albania (5). Kharas (1982: 9) recognized the system's limits: "the system proposed here classified whole countries only, not political sections or groups within countries." This system was never adopted by the RSAC and the requirements for formal knowledge since the appearance of the new system appeared in 1989 have gone far beyond what this scheme promised to provide. Its importance, however, is that it shows an emphasis on the assessment of risk emerging, consideration of what
is likely to occur and on an immense scale.

Attempts to develop an international early warning system (EWS) for refugee movements were first seen in the early 1980s (Schmeidl, 1996: 1). By the 1990s the prospect of such systems had become the interest of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and states. EWS entails "identifying high-risk situations" (Schmeidl, 1996: 3). Those flexible, pragmatic, 'non-political' NGOs described in chapter four, that were assumed so well-suited for dispensing refugee aid and development in earlier decades, are now to become responsible for the efficient monitoring and reporting of potential refugee situations abroad, as well as strategic intervention to resolve conflicts (e.g., DeMars, 1995; Cooper, 1994). The development of EWS is to include, among other things, further development of databases and use of the Internet (DeMars, 1995: 393).

A recent issue of Refuge lists no less than thirty-three on-going institutional efforts or research projects in the area of early warning, the vast majority of which are based in Western nations. These projects include those being conducted by NGOs, the UN, and UNHCR, state agencies, and university departments (Schmeidl, 1996: 29-42). An example is a pilot study by the UNHCR that seeks to develop indicators of refugee movements. It involves assessing situations in six nations that are "likely to generate refugee flows." Another is the massive American 'State Failure Task Force' that is seeking to analyze crises over the past forty years so as to develop a system that would be able to warn of a
coming crisis two years in advance (Schmeidl, 1996: 33-4). It is examining *six hundred!* potential factors, of which thirty-one have been found to discriminate between states that will fail and those that will not. State failure is assumed here to lead to refugee movements. The two best predictors drawn from the analysis of only the past twenty years are "infant mortality and low trade openness" (Schmeidl, 1996: 34).

As part of this new, general shift, the first major workshop on early warning systems in Canada entitled 'Towards Practical Early-Warning Capabilities on Refugee Flows' was held in May, 1991. It was jointly sponsored by the York Centre for Refugee Studies and the Office for Research and Collection of Information of the United Nations and attended by academics as well as representatives of NGOs and the UNHCR (Refuge. 1991 10(4): 26). Subsequent similar workshops, sponsored in part by the Centre for Refugee Studies, were held in November, 1991 (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, December, 1990: 3), May, 1993 (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, June, 1993: 4) and December, 1993 (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, March, 1994: 3). Another, called 'The Synergy of Early Warning Research', is planned for March, 1997 at the Centre (Refuge. 1996 15(4): 32). The present mandate of the recently created Documentation Centre at the Centre for Refugee Studies is to maintain a comprehensive collection in three areas: 'early warning', 'Canadian refugee policy', and 'repatriation' (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, September, 1992: 4). As they are listed under 'Other Areas', 'Resettlement in Canada' and
'Refugee Definition' are now to be of secondary importance. Whereas in 1995 the Centre for Refugee Studies was made up of four research units—gender, law, repatriation/development, and resettlement—, by 1997 an early warning unit had been added (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter, January, 1997: 9). A new electronic discussion group on early warning, consisting of more than ninety individuals and groups, also has been recently launched from this site (Refuge. 1996 15(4): 32).

The shifts toward the kinds of knowledge briefly described above have complemented and closely accompanied—in complex ways—the gradual ascendency of an advanced liberal rationality in the Canadian and international regimes. These shifts coincide with important developments during the 1980s described in preceding chapters: of economic knowledge with the gradual reduction in planned levels of state-sponsored refugees to be selected abroad; of psychological knowledge with a movement of responsibility for resettlement and determination out of the state; of both psychological and economic knowledge with a heightened concern over the quality of those gaining status through determination without having been previously screened and selected by visa officers; and of early warning knowledge with a new determination system that is highly dependent on the production (and flow) of knowledge from abroad and a shift in the international regime toward voluntary repatriation and away from the delivery of social and educational provisions. These are instances of Foucault's (1980) 'power-knowledge' knot. There is no cause-and-effect that can be
unravelled between these shifts in power relations, on the one hand, and knowledge production, on the other. In each case, however, one limits the other and one makes the other possible. In each instance the knowledge produced is not to be understood simply as neo-conservative ideology, covering over these changes, rendering them more palatable to the tastes of the Canadian citizenry on behalf of capital or the Canadian state, or in the case of the international regime, to all nations on behalf of a dominant Western alliance. Instead, they should be seen, as Rose and Miller (1992: 182) suggest, as

a kind of intellectual machinery for government, in the form of procedures for rendering the world thinkable, taming its intractable reality by subjecting it to the disciplined analyses of thought.

At the same time, these changes in efforts to govern refugees have rendered aspects of Canadian resettlement, selection, and determination, and international monitoring of and intervention in refugee crises, amenable to inquiries by psychologists, economists, and the refugee experts who now suddenly find themselves specializing in early warning.

TECHNOLOGIES

We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. (Foucault as cited in Hacking, 1986: 226).

Technologies of government deployed in the Canadian refugee regime are heterogeneous and infinite. It would be impossible to explore all relevant technologies here (or elsewhere). What follows, therefore, is not an exhaustive treatment, but a preliminary
discussion of several technologies discovered either during the course of conducting interviews, or during attendance at the refugee conference. Before proceeding it is first necessary to reiterate the status of these technologies as they are understood here, to make clear why they ought to be discussed at all. As stated in chapter two, practices of government involve not only programmes, rationalities, and knowledge; they also rely on a variety of mundane material and intellectual technologies (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 8). Programmes of government are not simply applied or implemented through these technologies; it is through these technologies that programmes, articulated by rationalities, become capable of deployment (Miller and Rose, 1990b: 8). There is not a one to one correspondence between particular technologies and rationalities, but there are complex relays between them (Valverde, 1996: 358). Together they work to make a domain responsive to government.

Some technologies below, at first glance, may appear obvious and otherwise unremarkable. This is, in large part, because they are not unique to myriad efforts to govern refugees, having been borrowed from other domains and then modified. They are not to be fully explained in terms of their presence in the refugee regime and in conjunction with a particular rationality. Recognizing their importance, however, requires thinking about how they have made governing refugees possible.

Refugee Statistics and Icons

Refugees are by definition mobile. They have an assumed
tendency to migrate across international borders without warning only then to become assembled -often temporarily- in refugee camps or Western determination systems. Unfortunately for authorities, refugee camps -themselves a technology of government discussed below- tend to be located far from what Miller and Rose (1990b: 9) refer to as 'centres of calculation' or sites where knowledge is produced, such as Department of Immigration headquarters in Ottawa, UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, or the Centre for Refugee Studies in North York. Once having entered the Canadian determination system refugees are only occasionally expected to show up at scheduled hearings, the rest of the time they are foreseen living out among the citizenry. The fact of entering a determination system, therefore, only periodically makes refugees less distant and more amenable to scrutiny. While a refugee camp and a determination system provide for their observation, the former is distant and the latter too sporadic. Unlike the refugee, technologies such as statistics and icons can be fixed, mobile, or immediate as required. In contrast to the refugee, they are much more amenable to comparison and examination (cf. Miller and Rose, 1990b: 7). It is in this way that statistics and icons complement liberal rationalities of government, for it is continual scrutinizing of governmental practice and avoidance of controlling the minutiae of refugees' lives by political authorities that liberal government demands.

Statistics are neither a neutral, apolitical representation of social facts nor a distortion of class or state interests, covering
over the Truth of the matter (Hunter, 1996: 154). Statistics, like the forms of knowledge above, serve not so much to obscure or conceal reality, as to problematize it in connection with certain objectives of government (Hunter, 1996: 154). They have a capacity to represent reality in terms of quantifiable fields, to relate to reality as a domain for government (Hunter, 1996: 154).

Statistics as a technology did not, of course, first appear in Canada in the 1970s; they were invented in seventeenth century Europe (Foucault, 1991b: 96). In post-Napoleonic Europe, states collected and published statistics that sought to represent a variety of domains. Simultaneously, new sites were created from which to collect and distribute these data (Hacking, 1990: 27-38). From 1820 to 1840 there was something of an 'avalanche of printed numbers', about which Hacking (1990: 3) notes:

There is a sense in which many of the facts presented by the bureaucracies did not even exist ahead of time. Categories had to be invented into which people could conveniently fall in order to be counted. The systematic collection of data about people has affected not only the ways in which we conceive of a society, but also the ways in which we describe our neighbour. It has profoundly transformed what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what we think of ourselves.

The refugee is such a category, although it first appeared much later than those Hacking is referring to and in an international rather than a national field of politics and morality. Detailed refugee statistics were first produced in conjunction with the international refugee programmes that appeared after the First World War. These statistics continue to be produced (e.g., UNHCR, 1996), but these are international statistics that
constitute their object within a variety of international schemes.

Canadian immigration statistics have been collected since 1852 (Canada, 1985a: 3), but Canadian refugee statistics were first compiled in conjunction with temporary schemes such as Canada's World Refugee Year programme only in 1959 (Canada, 1962). Their regular production and dissemination (i.e., when they were made available to researchers, non-state organizations or NGOs, and citizens) commenced only in 1981. The RSAC began to collect information to represent its object, the refugee claimant, when it began operations in 1975, but the Department did not see fit to make these statistics widely available until the early 1980s. Refugee Statistics, a comprehensive publication introduced in 1981 and discontinued in 1988, allowed authorities to begin to compare and combine statistics for the first time and during a crucial period. Publications containing immigration statistics prior to and throughout the 1970s contain no references to refugees. In the early 1980s, under 'special topics' in the Department's annual publication Immigration Statistics (e.g., Canada, 1985a), refugee statistics appeared and have appeared since. The Immigration and Refugee Board has, since its creation, also published refugee statistics similar to those released by the RSAC. The new science of refugee studies that also arose during the 1980s has been highly dependent on the distribution of these Canadian refugee statistics. Locating scholarly works about refugee resettlement and determination that are devoid of them has become a difficult task.

Liberal government requires technologies that not only allow
thinking about a domain and its objects, but also about the relations between relevant authorities and those they seek, in one way or other, to govern. Icons are such a technology. Consider a few examples taken from documents of state and non-state organizations presently involved in the Canadian refugee regime and gathered through the research procedures described earlier (see Figure 1.1). At first glance, the icons below may seem trivial and disparate. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that considerable thought—in instances where they have not been merely duplicated and then slightly modified—has been put into their design in an attempt to capture an entire regime, all that is expected to take place there. These icons can also be seen to have some common features. Though some have been reduced slightly to fit the page, none were originally more than 10 by 10 or less than 3 by 3 centimetres in size. These dimensions have made them exceedingly efficient—not too large to prevent them from being situated on the edge of a standard page or under the title of a small pamphlet, and not too small to prevent their recognition by unaided human eyes. These icons are found on the surface of pamphlets, newsletters, reports, correspondence, electronic websites, FAX cover sheets, and representatives' identity cards. They tend to be placed, not in the centre of these materials, but on their periphery. The icons are often found adjacent to or hovering above text, although no reference is made to them within this text. Nor are the icons placed so that they interfere with attempts to read this text. If, however, a reader's eyes should happen to wander to the frontiers
FIGURE 1.1: REFUGEE ICONS

1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  
12.
of a page, screen, or card, an icon awaits, a silent reminder of what is supposed to be going on in this domain, a subtle cue to return to thinking about what needs to be done in ways appropriate to the kinds of relations and objects represented there. In this respect, besides their dimensions and location, other features common to these icons can be discerned. There is potential danger depicted in several: figures are viewed through the sight of a rifle scope in 8, in an open (rather than covered) boat in search of land in 2, underground (rather than outside in the sun) in 6, and behind rows of barbed wire in 7. The presence of a few material belongings carried by these figures (rather than a large number of possessions) in 1, 8 and 11 suggest sudden forced movement (rather than migration stemming from reasoned choice). The shape of figures in icons 2 and 5 also suggest migration, and the presence of borders to be moved across in 6, 7, and 12, and doorways to be walked through in 5, 8, and 11, suggest it is of an international kind (modern Western urban areas rarely have functional walls with gates any more except, of course, in the newer 'gated communities'). There are roofs depicted above figures in icons 1-3, and a safety net strewn below figures in 4. Both suggest protection from harm or danger. In icons 3 and 8-10 there are hands pulling figures up and away (presumably the hands of authorities pulling refugees away from both physical and moral dangers). In icons 4-8 there are different sizes of figures that, when taken together, suggest a nuclear family, rather than merely a group of individuals in need of protection.
Icons are not merely the documentation of a now well-known kind of person, the refugee. Nor are they simply technical aids to intellectual processes. As Rose (1990: 149) notes, to suggest this is to give too much to the capacity of "abstract thought and too little to the technical mechanisms by which thought operates." These icons are technologies that provide for the visualization of a domain, of the relations between authorities and their objects, and of the object itself. Precisely like statistics, they work not so much through the assignment of ideological meaning, as through their capacity to organize thinking. In this way, they allow reality to be conditioned as a domain of government, to be exhibited in a way that allows it to come into a field of "conscious political calculation" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 182). Text is, of course, the primary way this is accomplished, though one that may be fading in importance (Rose, 1990: 134, 146). Icons and statistics are others.

A Refugee Thesaurus

The term 'thesaurus' derives from the greek word for 'treasure'. In November, 1986 at a conference of international refugee organizations in Geneva, Switzerland, a recommendation was made to establish, along with an international refugee documentation network, a special thesaurus (Aitchison, 1989: i). Begun in 1987, after two years of work by a variety of refugee experts, including one from Canada, the International Thesaurus of Refugee Terminology was published (Aitchison, 1989: ii). It was an internationally agreed upon tool that would bring the words of
assorted Western nations used to describe aspects of their refugee policies and refugees into one universal set of terms that could then be used anywhere, anytime. Though English was the prototype, the thesaurus since has been translated into French and Spanish (Aitchison, 1989: ii).

Documentation centres of the UNHCR in Switzerland, the IRB, the Centre for Refugee Studies, and other organizations presently use this thesaurus. There is a sense in which the trillions of bits of data in paper and digitized formats that flow from the surveillance of non-Western regions, nations and populations to these various documentation centres in the West, for the determination and resettlement of refugees, regularly pass through this thesaurus. It screens and orders them such that data that do not fit its special categories become irrelevant, no longer useful for legal determination hearings or in efforts to develop a set of best resettlement practices.21 At present this thesaurus is making possible the development of early warning systems, mentioned earlier, that are highly dependent on the efficient distribution of knowledge produced by NGOs and states about non-Western regions, nations and populations for the prevention and early warning of conflict and crises.

Regarding liberal government, Miller and Rose (1990b: 9) write:

It is, in part, through adopting shared vocabularies, theories, and explanations, that loose and flexible associations may be established between agents across time and space.

While associations were discussed earlier, it might be noted at
this point that 'shared vocabularies' are themselves made possible by technologies like this thesaurus. 'Partnerships', dependent on dialogue and consultation as they are, without some jargon common among potential partners, would be impossible. What a treasure this thesaurus is, a treasury of terms, and a governmental technology *par excellence*.

Examinations

Remarkably, Department of Immigration officials' interviews with those claiming refugee status are called 'examinations'. Foucault (1977a: 184-94) has written at length about the examination. The choice of terms in this instance is undoubtedly a remnant of an earlier reliance in the twentieth century, and before the onset of a liberal welfare rationality, on the medical profession to scrutinize immigrants as they arrived in Canada or were selected abroad (McClaren, 1990). With the appearance of a Department of Immigration (or equivalent²²) and specialized state agents, this reliance was lessened (although all those granted immigrant status are still required to undergo medical examinations). The examination technique, however, remains. Within the refugee regime examinations are carried out at visa posts or in refugee camps abroad by visa officers, at ports of entry by senior immigration officers, and inland during more formal and elaborate determination hearings involving several actors. The Robinson (1981: 26-34) report, mentioned earlier, provides a full description of the 'model examination'.²³ In 1981 oral hearings were not granted to refugee claimants: The Robinson (1981: 26)
report laments: "There is no opportunity to assess the sincerity of the claimant through the subtle techniques which are generally summarized as the 'demeanor' of the witness." Years later, in discussing the role of the documentation centre, Houle (1994: 21n) similarly notes:

Of course, documentary evidence is not the only tool with which to assess the credibility of a witness. The general attitude of a claimant and the fact he or she is answering in a straightforward manner can also be indices...

From this it appears that the ideal examination is not to be simply an assessment of what was said, for the written RSAC transcript - given adequate translation and recording practices- would have sufficed for this; it is to examine claimants' bodies and souls, to scrutinize not simply a story of persecution, but claimants' gestures, tone of voice, eye movements, facial expressions, physical scars, and memories. This kind of scrutinization through the examination is aided by the introduction of medical and psychiatric assessments, produced at the centres for survivors of torture, into oral hearings. Here claimants are obliged to disclose themselves and

...finer and more intimate regions of personal and interpersonal life come under surveillance and are opened up for expert judgement and normative evaluation, for classification and correction (Rose, 1990: 240).

While documentation centres allow surveillance of refugee conditions in non-Western regions (see below), the examination allows surveillance of regions of the refugee claimant's body and soul- 'refugee conditions' of a different sort. The oral refugee hearings that began in 1983 became required in law after the 1985,
Singh decision and have continued since then.

Refugee Camps

There were no refugee camps in Europe in pre-modern times (Marrus, 1985: 5). The quarantined city, according to Foucault (1977a: 198), was an ancient European method for controlling individuals through a careful partitioning of space. Authorities divided urban and rural areas into administrative quarters. In chapter four it was suggested the standardization of the refugee camp began to occur in the years following the first World War along with the emergence of permanent international refugee programmes. The refugee camp is a descendent of the quarantined city, and similar in several respects to barracks, asylums, schools, and prisons. The refugee camp has received scholarly attention (e.g., Mortland, 1987; Waldron, 1987; Hitchcox, 1990; Voutira and Harrell-Bond, 1995), but it has not been recognized for what it is— a disciplinary institution.

That the refugee camp is disciplinary can be seen in historical accounts of what occurred in the years following the Second World War in Europe. Within the international programmes in Europe the refugee camp promised to be an efficient means of dispensing aid to refugees. Like international refugee organizations themselves, these enclosures were first created in an ad hoc, improvised manner. Several types of refugee housing appeared in the immediate aftermath of the War— requisitioned schoolhouses, Black Shirt barracks, military centres, as well as former forced-labour and concentration camps (Wyman, 1988: 44).
Under the UNRRA an average camp had three thousand inhabitants and was run by a thirteen-person team, including a director and deputy director, clerk, supply officer, mess officer, warehouse officer, medical officer, nurse, cook, two welfare officers and two drivers (Wyman, 1988: 47). But from the outset it was not just food, water and medical aid that was dispensed, it was discipline. Simpson (1939: 549), cited several times earlier, proposed that refugees waiting in camps "must have their health and morale maintained by purposeful training under good conditions." The historian Wyman (1988: 47) similarly notes that "camp work meant rehabilitation: physical, psychological, vocational." In one instance: "Military drills kept some twenty-six hundred Soviet citizens busy for part of each day" (Wyman, 1988: 40).

The inhabitants of refugee camps, like those of the prison or asylum, are not assumed to be liberal citizens capable of exercising choice, but the camp, like these institutions, promises to bring them into line with the requirements of such citizenship. As suggested in chapter four, however, like being on welfare or in prison (or being a graduate student in university) for too long, prolonged exposure to the receipt of free food, water, and medical aid in the refugee camp has come to be assumed by authorities (e.g., Luciuk, 1986; Tucker, 1982; Harrell-bond, 1986) to ruin or spoil potential liberal citizens. The refugee camp is thought to strip inhabitants of this potential while simultaneously creating within them less palatable propensities, as an immigrant settlement worker notes during an interview:
...the longer you have been living in a refugee camp, the harder it makes it for people to settle in Canada and they create a very high amount of criminals who get into the country and then become a burden to the whole social network (interview 16/10/95).

Currently refugee camps are established and managed by host nations, the UNHCR and NGOs (Voutira and Harrell-Bond, 1995: 210). As during the years immediately following the Second World War, these camps vary in size and features (Gilad, 1990b: 100). Each NGO is typically made responsible through written agreements for a particular field within the camp, such as food and water, health, education, or agriculture (Voutira and Harrell-Bond, 1995: 210).

In the late 1960s the camp was imagined within the Canadian refugee selection programme accomplishing something beyond the delivery of aid and discipline. As suggested in chapter four, in keeping refugees contained in one administrable place, these camps promised to reduce the need for Canadian recruitment of labour and citizens to be as far-ranging and costly as they might have been otherwise (interview 30/08/96). The interior of the camps were divided into administrable spaces for the inspection of their inhabitants. These camps organized refugees into pools (of families or individuals) from which they could be selected. They served as observing and recording machines for recognizing individual human differences. Like barracks, factories, schools, and asylums of the modern West (but reducible to none of these), the refugee camp "established a regime of visibility in which the observed was distributed within a single common plane of sight" (Rose, 1990: 133). Working as a kind of "human sorting house"
(Rose, 1990: 133), they enabled the conduct of the inhabitants to be judged in terms of conformity and deviation. They allowed for identification of those who would be well-suited for referral for possible selection, and those who require significantly more training under watchful eyes.

Techniques for Assessing/treating Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that there has recently emerged a new emphasis on the production of psychological knowledge about refugees, that includes the development of special techniques for assessing and confronting post-traumatic stress disorder. These are another relevant technology of government. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a cluster of symptoms that follows a traumatic event out of the normal range of life experience, was first introduced in the third edition of the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 (APA, 1980: 236; Scott, 1990). Trauma, however, has a much longer history. Prior to 1874, 'trauma' referred to a physiological injury, but between 1874 and 1886 in France it obtained a new meaning: "a psychological hurt, a spiritual lesion, a wound to the soul" (Hacking 1995: 4).

Herman (1992), a psychiatrist, argues that 'trauma' has a tendency to be forgotten and to then re-emerge as a result of political movements focusing on a particular human population. For example, 'shell shock' appeared and later developed into post-traumatic stress disorder during the growth of the political movement against the Vietnam War (Herman, 1992). Hacking (1995)
has a different view. He sees these developments as instances of a 'politics of memory'. A commitment to PTSD is moral-political. Not only is the person eliciting the cluster of symptoms called PTSD ill, but something or someone is responsible for it. He argues that each of the political movements Herman identifies made use of a politics of memory legitimated and made possible by the discipline of psychology (Hacking, 1995: 213). These movements deployed 'trauma' as a tactic within a 'politics of memory' (Hacking 1995: 213).

Refugees are a human population upon which such a politics has more recently focused. The assumption is that the refugee's present memory is formed by trauma of the past. This trauma is discursively linked to the assumed lack of choice to migrate. In 1980 PTSD did not refer to refugees. Since then, in professional workshops and training courses psychiatrists and social workers have discussed and have taught the general effects of post-traumatic stress disorder to IRB members, refugee lawyers, and volunteers working with refugees (CCVT, 1990; Justice Institute of British Columbia, 1995: 33). Through psychiatric assessments the individual effects of this disorder have been used as evidence of persecution at IRB oral hearings (interview 29/01/96; CCVT, 1990: 17; Woods, 1990: 5).

Techniques to recover the refugee's lost traumatic memories include intensive group therapy or psychodrama, hypnotherapy, and the use of sodium amytal (Herman, 1992: 185-6). Whereas for combat veterans 'direct exposure' and 'flooding' were used (Herman, 1992:
for refugees a technique called 'testimony' has been invented to transform their memories (Herman, 1992: 181; Agger, 1994a; 1994b: 19). Two Chilean psychologists first reported on this method and it since has been revised. The point is "to create a detailed extensive record of the patients' traumatic experiences" (Herman, 1992: 182). First, sessions are recorded and then transcribed. Second, both therapist and patient read and revise the transcript together. Third, the final product is read aloud and the patient signs the document (Herman, 1992: 182). It apparently takes between 12-20 sessions to transform a memory. Herman (1992: 183) writes:

It appears, then, that the 'action of telling a story' in the safety of a protected relationship can actually produce a change in the abnormal process of the traumatic memory. With this transformation memories comes relief of many of the major symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

In the realm of resettlement, to allow refugees to function in society their memories will be 're-written' to conform to the lives they will lead as submissive workers, careful consumers, and patient parents. In advanced liberal rule the active citizen is encouraged "to bring the future into the present," instructed "to adopt a calculative prudent personal relation to fate" (Rose, 1996a: 58). To do this refugees must be made to come to terms with their past, that is, to recover their memories, and to then re-orient themselves to the future. There is nothing intrinsically 'advanced liberal' about 'testimony' and other techniques that seek to confront post-traumatic stress disorder. The former is, nevertheless, an active method in that the patient works with the
therapist in revising the transcript (Herman, 1992: 182) and in this way fits the kinds of techniques that complement such a rationality (Rose, 1996b: 348-9). Refugees' traumatic memories of victimization are first inspected and then 're-written' (Hacking, 1995). In this way, barriers (e.g., headaches, nightmares, flashbacks) to exercising their citizenship are to be eradicated and new memories constructed. The path to advanced liberal citizenship is made smooth.

None of this is intended to deny the mental pain that refugees and other survivors of torture experience. Nor is it to suggest the use of 'testimony' and similar techniques do not allow these persons to get on with their lives in Canada, but it is to say that PTSD and this technique are historical elements that have come to constitute the Canadian refugee regime. They have a history and they entered the regime and made possible the resettlement of refugees during a period when responsibility for resettlement has been shifted out of the state and to the 'psy' professions.

Documentation Centres

Earlier tracts about determination say nothing about the need for a documentation centre, but the Plaut (1985) report, the third major programmatic statement on determination, includes a section entitled "Informed and Expert Decision-Making." It reads:

to obtain a quality decision, information must be readily available on the conditions prevailing in various countries of the world. It is essential that there be a documentation and information centre where all participants in the process can quickly obtain the latest and most reliable information on conditions in refugee producing countries. This information may come from many sources: through the Department of External Affairs, from
the UNHCR, from private international organizations, as well as from reporters, writers, visitors, immigrants and refugees. The information should be readily available to anyone who is concerned with refugees, that is to say, to the decision-makers in the process, to counsel, as well as to the public. Such a documentation centre must partake of the independence of the RB [Refugee Board] and it is proposed that it form an integral part of that body (Plaut, 1985: 70-1; emphasis in original).

In chapter five it was suggested that during the 1980s there was a crisis surrounding refugee determination and that there then occurred a shift toward a greater reliance on the production of formal knowledge and law. The documentation centres were seen making this greater reliance possible by delivering the facts that were then to be used during determination hearings. During an interview a Department of Immigration official notes in passing that

...because the [determination] process is judicially driven, evidence is very important to it and so something like the documentation centre or some reliable pool of material that could be cited as evidence I think would almost be driven into existence (interview 05/12/95; emphasis added).

The centres promised to make formal knowledge about refugee conditions abroad "open and accessible to the public" (Canada, 1995: 3) and, therefore, to scrutiny. They were to receive funding from the chair of the IRB, rather than the Minister or the Department of Immigration or IRB members (Houle, 1994). They were to become an integral element of a kind of permanent public inquiry into the question of 'who is a refugee?' and in this way to complement a liberal rationality. Indeed, the documentation centre is clearly not a technology associated with sovereign power. It does not promise to produce haphazard public spectacles. In fact,
visitors to the centre would find little that is spectacular about it.

These standardized documentation centres in the major Canadian cities are linked to one another and to a major centre in Ottawa (interview 19/03/96) through a multitude of telephone cables and electronic circuitry. One of them occupies space in an office building towering high above a metropolis. Oral determination hearings are held in this same building. Visitors to the centre enter the building from the street, take the elevator to the appropriate floor, exit, and then confront a locked door with a large window. Looking through it technicians can be seen sitting working behind a counter separated from the rest of the centre. Visitors ring to be allowed in, make eye contact with a technician through the window, enter through the now unlocked door, and record the reason for their visit in a log resting on the counter. From there visitors are free to wander through the centre as they so desire. From the vantage point of the front area they would see news, human rights, legal, and refugee-specific periodicals and newsletters, including *Refuge*, prominently displayed nearby. Next to these display shelves are large reading tables and a photocopier. Toward the rear of the centre can be seen several rows of larger but less prominent shelves containing binders filled with previous 'requests for information' (see below), various reports, clippings from major Canadian newspapers from the past several years, reference books such as "Political Parties of the World" and "Encyclopedia of the Third World," and other holdings.
Also to the rear there is access to an office occupied by the centre's coordinator. There are windows on the right that provide some lighting and a view of the city below. Adjacent to these glass windows are windows of a different sort—computer terminals. These are more important for the functioning of the centre and permit access to several databases containing information about distant regions, nations, and events.

This setting is equivalent to the central tower of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. The massive network of NGOs, journalists, human rights observers, anthropologists, refugee experts, refugees, and others that bear down on non-Western regions, nations and populations and produce and distribute knowledge about them is equivalent to the entire panopticon. It is this network that constitutes these world regions and nations as refugee-producing and their inhabitants as refugees. For this reason the organization of the office space above is less important for the functioning of the panopticon than the organization of the network through which knowledge is produced and transferred to its central tower. Surveillance is no longer accomplished in the architecture and geometry of a stone and mortar, or in this case, glass and steel structure, but through the geometry of a loosely organized global network of information gathering and knowledge production that renders events and situations far away in space, for example, what occurred two months ago near a small village in Sri Lanka thousands of kilometres away, immediately retrievable. This is surveillance of the highest order. This is the "Superpanopticon,
a global system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards" (Poster, 1990: 93).

There are about eight staff at 'Information Services', the Research Directorate of the Documentation, Information and Research Branch (DIRB) of the IRB in Ottawa, who respond to daily 'requests for information' launched from the centre through computer terminal stations by visitors (but only from IRB members and Refugee Hearing Officers or their equivalent) (interview 19/03/96; Houle, 1994: 11). Other staff write and publish standardized papers on particular nations such as Somalia (e.g., Canada, 19951), and recurring issues relevant to hearing outcomes such as claimants who have fled from civil war situations. The latter are known as the 'Question and Answer Series'. The nation profiles include maps that contain geographical and demographic information (e.g., population size, capital, area, currency), as well as detail on a nation's political, military, and judicial institutions, political parties, ethnic groups, and a chronology of recent political events. Authorship of the papers is corporate and initiated when trends in these 'requests for information' regarding a particular nation and/or issue are reflexively identified (interview 19/03/96). The DIRB also publishes a weekly Indexed Media Review covering those nations reflexively deemed to be refugee-producing (in 1995 this encompassed twenty-four nations) (Canada, 1995c). These agents, therefore, produce some knowledge on their own, but more often are engaged in assembling and distributing knowledge produced by others in the network (interview 19/03/96). The latter
would include the regular, comprehensive reports of human rights violations in the world. These are produced by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Representatives of these organizations identify situations within certain world regions and nations and then corroborate and report incidents of human rights violations (though not necessarily for purposes of refugee determination). The DIRB makes arrangements for such reports to be regularly sent to the centre through the mail and to link up with databases maintained by other agencies, such as the Human Rights Centre at the University of Ottawa, to facilitate easy access to specific answers to 'requests for information' initiated from the centre (interview 10/04/96). Through such arrangements in both paper and digitized form information regularly reaches and is made accessible through the centre.

The documentation centre is connected to at least fifteen major electronic databases (Canada, 1995c). Some are produced by the DIRB including a standard internal on-line catalogue of the centres' holdings; all papers, such as nation profiles, produced by the DIRB; the Indexed Media Reviews; and a collection of the full text of most of the 'Information Request Responses'. All four are organized by nation and then indexed using the International Thesaurus of Refugee Terminology mentioned earlier (Canada, 1995c). There are two other databases produced by the Legal Services Branch of the IRB, one on precedents, and the other on issues (Canada, 1992b). There are also five databases available produced by the
UNHCR: legislation of other nations; international law; case law; nation profiles; and a bibliography. Those produced by other organizations include an Amnesty International Report on one hundred and forty-eight nations; Reuters News Service; the U.S. Department of State that includes profiles on thirty-four nations; and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (Canada, 1995c).

These databases are a form of discourse that multiply the power of the visitor to the centre (Poster, 1995: 85). They are unlike those belonging to state agencies such as the RCMP, the Department of Immigration, and Canadian Security Intelligence Services that promise to ensure national security through monitoring movement across and within the nation's territorial borders and by linking up, in one way or other, with the databases of similar agencies of other Western nations. The centre's databases do not contain data deemed classified or secret (interview 19/03/96) or have records pertaining to specific individuals. This would defeat the centre's Canadian purpose. Instead, they contain publicly available data in fields that refer to nations, regions, and the categories established in line with those specified by the Convention refugee definition (e.g., race, religion, membership in a social group, and so on). In this way, the centre's databases, while otherwise similar to Gandy's (1993: 1) "panoptic sort," "the all-seeing eye of the difference machine," differ in that they direct attention to national actors (i.e., nations) and categories of persecution, whereas the latter mostly
referred to relations between private corporations and consumers and the personal information of individuals (e.g., Gandy, 1993: 13).

Bentham's panopticon had the capacity to determine what or whom the person occupying its central tower was gazing at (Rabinow, 1984: 19). The documentation centre similarly has the capacity to reflexively monitor what it sees by analyzing the log and the 'requests for information' from visitors. It can detect trends and then seek out more detailed knowledge in the identified areas (interview 19/03/96). The documentation centre should not be mistaken for a library (indeed the centre's 'research guide' explicitly makes this distinction) in that it does not lend its materials and is more apt to remove or destroy material when it is recognized they are not being used (interview 19/03/96). The aim is to always make accessible only those materials that are being used. There is, for example, no attempt to store complete collections of a particular human rights journal. The paper materials available are also time sensitive. There is an effort to ensure that only up-to-date materials are kept in the limited office space available and that as new ones arrive, older ones are removed or destroyed (this is not the case for digitized materials). For example, when the newspaper clippings mentioned above become more than two years old, they are simply destroyed (interview 19/03/96).

The doors to the documentation centre are locked to the public at four-thirty in the afternoon every weekday and is closed on
weekends. Surveillance, however, continues unhindered—somewhere a human rights monitor is putting the finishing touches on a report, a specialized journalist is interviewing someone who witnessed a significant political event, the latest issue of an academic journal is en route in the mail, a NGO refugee worker notices the origin of refugees seeking entry to her camp has changed from one region of a particular nation to another, and someone is working late in Ottawa to update the DIRB’s databases that are linked to the centres in other cities. Surveillance remains continuous.

Bentham’s panopticon segmented its gaze into prison cells, the prisoners being prevented from interacting with one another, spreading questionable behaviour, recognizing their common fate. The documentation centre similarly divides its gaze, first into world regions, and from there into nations, groups within nations, and more specific categories consistent with the UN Convention definition. Like the prisoner in the cell, each non-Western region or nation is alone, constantly visible, and therefore easier to watch, control and experiment with. The centre divides its gaze, however, not in accordance with the capitalist mode of production or the needs of the Canadian state or an alliance of Western states, but in a manner consistent with a broad liberal rationality present in an international arena of politics and morality. The centre imposes itself on these spaces and their inhabitants to normalize them, to pull them up to grade, and push them back on the path to progress. It attempts to provide continuous access to
these areas to distribute and order them along a graded scale, for example, by periodically reporting the top refugee-producing nations based on determination hearing outcomes (e.g., Canada, 1995m: 10).

When the documentation centre was opened to the public in 1989 it focused primarily on providing the nation profiles mentioned above (interview 19/03/96; LRCC, 1991: 69). These were "very useful in the beginning" (interview 19/03/96), but since then the demands for more detailed knowledge in the form of specific 'requests for information' sent to researchers in Ottawa through the computer terminals have increased (LRCC, 1991: 69). These 'requests' tend to be inquiries about

the meaning of acronyms, the standing of political organizations, the practices of other States in human rights and refugee matters, the laws and penalties applied in particular countries, and the treatment of political dissidents, religious and social minorities (LRCC, 1991: 69).

Another important feature of Bentham's panopticon was that to achieve the desired effect it did not matter who entered the central guard tower. Similarly, anyone can step inside the documentation centre, including the refugee claimant awaiting determination. The centre's technicians are prepared to deal with any and all visitors by introducing them to the centres' workings. The emphasis, however, is do-it-yourself- a free 'research guide' describing the centres' purpose and holdings is prominently displayed on the front counter. Visitors are free and, in a sense, required to choose the questions that will be pursued - what world region to monitor, what law of a particular nation to look up, what
group to research, what significant political event to read up on—and the source in which to explore them—which periodical to snatch off the display shelf, which database to access, whether to make a 'request for information' to researchers in Ottawa, and so on.

The imagined prisoners in Bentham's panopticon could not see who occupied the guard tower. They could not know for certain whether they were being watched at any moment. From their vantage point, rulers and their populations outside the West cannot see the visitor in the centre. They cannot perceive who is sitting in front of a computer terminal freely searching databases or sitting at a reading table casually perusing the latest issue of *Third World Quarterly*. Those outside the West cannot even know whether someone is in the documentation centre at any moment. Such is the efficiency of this technology. Nations, rulers, populations, and groups knowing they may be under surveillance by human rights experts, anthropologists, journalists, and NGO refugee workers of one kind or other become obliged to rule (to protect the integrity of their national borders, to limit political intervention, to ensure mass media are not just instruments of oppression, to hold elections involving more than one political party, and so on) and to live (to work submissively, produce and raise moral children, and so on) in a decidedly liberal manner. The centre works, then, not so much by connecting ideological meaning to real refugee-producing conditions, as encouraging within nations, rulers, and their populations a "state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault, 1977a:
If the centre works to perfection there will be no rogue nations, civil wars, despotic rulers, childless couples, demanding workers, revolutions, or refugee claimants.

Precisely like Bentham's panopticon the documentation centre is neutral and efficient. It also permits experimentation. It does so not within a particular prison cell, laboratory, classroom, or test tube, but on the decidedly larger (the largest?) scale of world regions, nations, populations, and groups. What happens to the dependent variable when the independent variable is manipulated in the special ways of the social scientist, when there is a little bit more aid or a little bit less aid or, to employ an 'advanced liberal' example, more trade (e.g., China) or less trade (e.g., Iraq)? (e.g., Canada, 1995f). It is here that considerable overlap between the centre's demands for knowledge and the new emphasis on the development of early warning systems can be clearly seen (recall from above the massive State Failure Task Force's identification of "low trade openness" as one of two predictors of state failure). What happens to the dependent variable thousands of kilometres away during experimental runs can be witnessed from the safe, anonymous, vantage point of the central tower located high above a Canadian metropolis.

On the one hand, members of the public are invited to enter, use, and then exit the documentation centre as they so desire. The centre encourages them to freely inspect the information that may be used in the oral refugee determination hearings that are taking place nearby. In other words, this technology works, not against,
but through the freedom of liberal subjects and, precisely like the levels consultations mentioned previously, is a form of political subjectification. It attempts to 'technologize' the visible moral-political question of 'who is a refugee?' and 'which regions and nations are refugee-producing?', to transform them into technical ones (e.g., 'Which database should I search?'). Through providing access to formal knowledge for hearings it tries to achieve a kind of 'scientization of politics' (Keat, 1981). Along with the creation of the IRB and several reforms since, it has undoubtedly restored governability to determination.

On the other hand, the documentation centre tries to accomplish something else: it seeks to discipline the socio-political spaces of the world that through a liberal rationality are deemed uncivilized. After the question of 'who is a refugee?' moved from an international to a Canadian realm of politics and morality there is a sense in which this centre allowed it to be shifted back to an international realm once again, but this time in an almost invisible manner. Like the distribution of refugee spaces mentioned in the previous chapter in relation to selection, the documentation centre is the point at which the question of 'who is a refugee?' re-enters the international sphere. The documentation centre, therefore, works between two mutually constitutive spheres of power relations, a Canadian one, the centre promising to allow the Canadian public to scrutinize determination consistent with the demands of liberal government, and an international one, the centre's network promising to provide
continuous surveillance of non-Western regions, nations, and populations to keep them on the path to liberal nationhood, rule, and conduct.

The documentation centre, this terrifying, magnificent machine, is not merely a source of power or a symbol of power (it does not, after all, point to anything outside itself (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 191)); it is the material (and digitized) form of power itself. It is a governmental technology where the 'will to Truth' and the 'will to govern' converge. It does not merely aid the search for the Truth or unTruth of refugee conditions and, therefore, answers to the question of 'who is a refugee?'; it creates the very possibility of Truth, unTruth, and refugees (cf. Hacking, 1990: 7n). At the same time, the existence of the documentation centre illustrates that Foucault's (1980: 71) 'panoptism' is not only relevant to those institutions—barracks, schools, hospitals, prisons, or private corporations—within Europe and those settler societies that presume to fashion themselves in its image but, as Said suggests, as "part of a much larger picture involving the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world" (as cited in Gregory, 1994: 29). The documentation centre may well allow surveillance on a scale never before imagined, but its targets are, by now, quite familiar—those colonized spaces and their inhabitants assumed to be uncivilized and governed accordingly since their 'discovery' centuries ago.

Though separate, detailed histories could be traced for each of these mundane material and intellectual technologies above, the
ways in which they have come to make governing refugees possible can be seen from the above nevertheless. Governing refugees has a definite technological character. Together these varied technologies help to form a complex assemblage of power. Statistics, icons, and a thesaurus are deployed within documentation centres and sites, such as the Centre for Refugee Studies, where the new science of refugee studies is practised. Determination hearings are a form of examination that are dependent on documentation centres and techniques for assessing post-traumatic stress disorder. Resettlement involves use of techniques to eradicate this disorder, to 're-write' the souls of refugees, and selection depends on the refugee camp and the examinations that take place within them.

RESISTANCE

...there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead, there is a plurality of resistances (Foucault, 1978: 95-6).

The weight of the discussion in preceding chapters has been on programmes, rationalities, knowledges, and technologies rather than resistance. This was intentional, but it may have resulted in an impression that resistance has been non-existent in relation to the refugee regime during the period covered by this thesis. It might have suggested that the partnership relation of an advanced liberal discourse has brought otherwise disparate authorities into alignment across space and time to form a governmental network; that forms of knowledges, in their distinctive ways, have revealed what needs to be revealed in every corner of the regime; and that
diverse technologies have worked in unison, resulting in the well-oiled, mechanistic, selection, determination, and resettlement of refugees. If this was the impression given, this was not my intention—resistance has been present in relation to the regime throughout this period. To be sure, several instances of resistance were mentioned in passing in chapter five, but the task in this final section is not to point out all other instances of resistance. Instead, it is to speculate, to begin thinking, about resistance in a way consistent with what has been discussed in the preceding chapters.

If the Canadian (and international) practices directed at refugees cannot be understood by reducing them to humanitarianism, a labour regime of capitalism, state domination, or international relations, it follows that resistance cannot be either. As Wickham (1983: 484) writes:

> Resistance or opposition, like power relations, has no fixed or unified form and no fixed or unified location. It exists in specific sites—specific intersections of practices formed around operational policies and the objectives they encompass. Resistances are the objects of power relations so long as the sites in which they exist continue to be reproduced and are repeated in definite forms with definite conditions of existence.

Resistance should be understood, then, as an obstruction to governance, a source of the perpetual failure of governmental programmes (Rose and Miller, 1992: 190; Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 83–5). Failure was seen in chapters four and five to be a component of liberal discourse. In governmentality studies, liberal governance is seen to require failure so as to become more efficient and refined (O'Malley, 1996b: 312).
To be sure, programmatic failure is not due solely to the resistance of human agents in every instance. Sometimes technologies upon which governmental practices depend, simply fail to live up to the way they had been imagined functioning within a particular programme. As Miller and Rose (1990a: 11) write:

Technologies produce unexpected problems, are utilized for their own ends by those who are supposed to merely operate them, are hampered by underfunding, professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions that would make them work.

The documentation centres, for example, fail miserably in both spheres of power relations within which they are situated. Internationally, some groups, populations and nations may not know that the documentation centres exist or that they are being monitored. The centres' holdings may not be recent enough to capture recent changes in conditions abroad that a claimant just fled from (cf. Houle, 1994) and, therefore, cannot provide facts for the oral determination hearings. This failure has, in part, led to efforts to produce the early warning knowledge mentioned previously that would make the flow of information from non-Western regions to the West more efficient. Generally, failure is evident in the obvious fact that there continue to be, despite the continuous operation of the documentation centre as a 'superpanopticon', despotic rulers, rogue nations, bloody civil wars, and childless couples in non-Western regions. From a Canadian perspective, as a form of political subjectification, the centre also fails. In practice, it is mostly legal professionals trying to prepare their cases, rather than members of the public seeking
to exercise their citizenship by scrutinizing the facts used in the legal hearings, who frequent it (interview 19/03/96).

Conceivably each of the programmatic changes discussed in chapters four and five can also be connected to resistance and failure of some form. Take, for example, the new determination programme that followed the RSAC and a crisis of governability. This is, of course, only one example, during one period, concerning one relevant type of practice, but it nevertheless can be used to illustrate this conception of resistance. 

As suggested in the previous chapter, Western and later Canadian political authorities had been deploying refugeeness abroad for most of the latter part of this century. Determination was added as an afterthought to Canada's acceding to the Convention in 1969. But in the early 1980s the question of 'who is a refugee?' was brought back to Western nations and eventually led to a crisis. During the period leading up to this crisis, resistance from three main sources converged.

First, it was mentioned in earlier chapters that Department of Immigration officials' have opposed, not the selection and resettlement of refugees, but first, accession to the UN Convention, and later, to the inland determination process that it required. This resistance among officials is evident from at least the 1950s to the present (Hathaway, 1992: 78, 84; CCR, 1995d: 5; Jackman, 1988; interviews 06/07/95; 09/01/96; 23/02/96). In 1975 a senior Department of Immigration official argues:

A policy of first asylum, established in law and universally proclaimed, would serve primarily to attract
to our ports of entry each year many hundreds, probably thousands of refugees and others seeking not temporary refuge but resettlement, persons whose applications could and should have been processed by our posts overseas (As cited in Hathaway, 1992: 76).

Ten years later a similar official reports in a Department memorandum:

It is evident that the very existence of such a universal [refugee determination] mechanism can act as a magnet for persons seeking admittance to Canada. This leads to exponential increases in the caseload faced by the status determining body and ultimately results in the collapse of the system and the desire for a general amnesty (As cited in Dirks, 1995: 85).

When Department of Immigration officials in British Columbia were surveyed by the Minister of Immigration in 1995 (Vancouver Sun, 1995a: B3; 1995b: B1), it was similarly suggested that the selection of refugees abroad should completely replace determination as a way of admitting refugees to Canada. A senior Department official for twenty-five years, in the same way, notes:

The model we've never had... is the idea that someone can self-select, that someone can decide I've got to go to country X and go to Canada... and say I wish to be a refugee. Canadians feel very uneasy about that model... (interview 09/01/96).

Resistance from these officials to inland determination has been, therefore, consistent throughout this period. It has been suggested, for example, that these agents may not have allocated resources to eradicate the first claimant backlog in the early 1980s in order to allow it to continue to increase in size to, in turn, bring about the collapse of the entire determination system (Jackman, 1988).

Second, national refugee advocacy organizations and their
varied memberships have pressed for reforms in the determination process since at least 1980 when these groups first emerged, including access to oral hearings for refugee claimants. This has taken a number of forms, including letter-writing campaigns, public protests, and legal challenges under the Charter (interviews 22/08/95; 28/07/95; 06/07/95; 04/07/95; CCR, 1992a; 1992b; 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1995c; 1995d; 1995e; 1995f; ICCR, 1985; 1987a; 1987b; 1995).

Resistance came from a third main source—those seeking to become refugee claimants: those outside the modern West who, for one reason or other, wanted to enter Canada to achieve status or at least stay for an extended period in doing so, but who wanted or were forced to avoid entry through immigrant and temporary worker categories or the refugee selection process abroad. Resistance on their part has taken myriad forms. They have altered passports and other travel documents to gain passage on private airlines to travel to Canada to make claims. This is accomplished by substituting photographs, altering dates of birth and given names, and inserting and removing pages in passports; posing as the person to whom a passport refers; and using completely fraudulent passports (Stoffman, 1992; Vancouver Sun, 1993d: B7; 1993e: A1; CCR, 1995a). Despite deployment of new sovereign efforts during this period, such as visa restrictions, these innovative techniques of evasion used by refugee claimants allowed them to reach Canadian soil and, in turn, allowed the backlog in the early 1980s to grow.

Hindess (1996: 101) writes:
Resistance, evasion and the costs of dealing with them may provoke refinement or modification of the techniques of power— and these, in turn, will provide conditions under which new forms of resistance and evasion may be developed.

The new determination system that was finally instituted was a 'refinement or modification' stimulated by these resistances—only glossed over above— and undoubtedly others that came together in the early 1980s. This period illustrates the 'strategic reversibility' (Hindess, 1996: 101; Gordon, 1991: 5) and instability of power relations, for as refugee claimants arrived in larger numbers and the backlog first appeared and then became unruly, the question of 'who is a refugee?' could then be used, not to the advantage of Canadian and other Western political authorities—although through the on-going selection programme and Canada's participation in the international governance of refugees this continued— but to those outside the West seeking status or an extended stay in Canada. Now would-be claimants needed only to travel to Canada to make a claim and use the problematic character of this question and the lack of resources put toward answering it to their advantage. The tables had turned, although only for a few years. Through deployment of sovereign measures and the new determination system this relation began to be 'reversed' again. Since its inception, however, this new system has 'provided conditions' of possibility for a new form of resistance.

Mentioned earlier was the success of Canadian feminist groups in pushing the IRB to adopt gender determination guidelines in 1993. The new system and its documentation centres responded to a
crisis, but they also created a new site of contestation that could be (and was) strategically seized. It provided for, in other words, a new form of resistance. Without the new accessibility of the system to the public this would not have been possible. Previously women outside the West wanting to enter Canada to live permanently, who could not enter through immigrant or temporary worker categories, were dependent on a gender-based Women At Risk selection programme that began only in 1988. Recall here that the UN Convention refugee definition does not explicitly include gender as one of the five criteria of persecution. Despite the fact that women make up the vast majority of those living in the world's refugee camps (Macklin, 1995: 220n), by 1993 this programme had resulted in the selection of but a few hundred women, compared to tens of thousands of refugee men selected over the same period through the regular refugee selection programmes described earlier. Since selection takes place abroad in another sphere of politics and morality, and in levels consultations only the total number of refugees to be selected in the coming year is open to debate (not their distribution according to gender or other categories), this situation was hardly conducive to opposition by Canadian feminists concerned about gender inequality in refugee arrivals. As suggested in chapter five, nor had distribution of refugee spaces abroad been viewed as problematic in Canada more generally. But when the new determination system was put in place, determination practices and the question of 'who is a refugee?' became more visible and accessible to feminist scholars and women's
organizations such as NAC (prior to this, feminist scholarship and interest in this area was limited) (interview 23/08/95). From there they were able to seize the opportunity (Vancouver Sun, 1993b: A9; 1993c: A7; Macklin, 1995) and achieve the introduction of the IRB's gender-based determination guidelines (Canada, 1993b), the first of their kind in the West. Through this achievement, refugeeeness could now be used to the advantage of Canadian feminist groups and organizations and women outside the West seeking entry as refugee claimants. The clear message it produced was not only that women, who had experienced or feared, for example, sexual assault, genital mutilation, bride-burning, forced marriage, domestic violence, or forced abortion or sterilization, and who had fled a nation where the state had failed to protect them as a result, were refugees, but also that these practices were forms of persecution (Canada, 1993b: 7; Macklin, 1995), rather than simply private matters between a husband and wife or peculiar cultural practices of the inhabitants of non-Western regions.

Resistance as obstruction to liberal governance, its common understanding in governmentality studies (O'Malley, 1996b: 311), can be clearly seen in the example of determination above. However, when the suggestion made in chapter five—that a pastoral rationality has also been present in the refugee regime—is factored in, resistance begins to look more complex than this. To continue with the example of determination, there has been some resistance flowing from representatives of church groups to the new dominance of the legal profession in this area. This includes
resistance to the 1993 appointment of members of the legal profession to the IRB to the exclusion of others (interview 18/05/95) and opposition to determination hearings having become so complex since the 1980s that only legal professionals can understand them or help claimants to make sense of them (interview 23/06/95a). Related and more well-known and publicized instances of resistance are church congregations providing 'sanctuary' to refugee claimants in Canada by allowing them to live on church premises (Stastny, 1987; Stastny and Tynrner, 1993: 188-9; Matas and Simon, 1989: 217; Telegraph Journal, 1995: A1). These were claimants who had been through the RSAC or new determination systems, had exhausted appeals, and were about to be deported. A church representative notes:

...the last few years have been really tough on refugees, particularly claimants, and we're faced with claimants who have been here, some of them for several years and who are sort of reaching the end of the line in terms of working their way through the system and so now what can we do? We can counsel and provide support and information to look at their other choices, one of which would be to go home. Another is to go underground... Do we provide sanctuary and under what conditions do we provide sanctuary? Do we enable people to go underground? Do we provide them with whatever they need in order to do that successfully? Do we drive them in the trunk of our car across the border?... There are some questions there, some of which we have answered (interview 26/06/95b).

Now to liberal government, sanctuary practice is resistance that leads to refinements in the form of new programmes, the introduction of the DROC programme mentioned earlier being one example. But to a pastoral rationality, what are these determination systems and threats of deportation? With the onset
of the modern nation-state system, church sanctuary practices, that
had been widespread in the Middle Ages, largely disappeared
(Stastny and Tyrnauer, 1993: 175). Did the old RSAC system and new
determination programme not lead to the re-appearance of sanctuary
as a programme in Canada consistent with pastoral power, to
overcome and adapt to the obstruction of first the arbitrary RSAC
process and later a complex, legal, knowledge-based determination
system that failed to secure, not the security of the citizen and
the national territory, but the well-being of the individual and
the flock? In terms of the respective objects specified by these
different governmental logics, sanctuary suggests a site of
conflict between those assumed worthy of quick disposal in a
liberal order (e.g., queue-jumpers and criminals) who have
exhausted appeals, and live individuals of a flock assumed to need
care and protection. Did liberal and pastoral rationalities
"articulate, mingle, and hybridize" (O'Malley, 1996b: 310) in these
instances? O'Malley (1996b) has recently suggested a more complex
understanding of resistance along these lines. In the context of
'indigenous governance' in Australia, he argues that resistance can
be understood as constitutive and integral rather than something
external to liberal governance, that rule and resistance inform
each other. A more sustained effort to explore resistance, and
rationalities besides liberal ones, than that provided in this
thesis, however, is the task of a future research endeavour.
Perhaps contemporary sanctuary practices could serve as the context
in which to carry out such explorations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As an advanced liberal rationality has appeared, the partnership relation has risen to dominance in the refugee regime to help form a governmental network. A new science, refugee studies, and related sites and fora have emerged during this same period. This knowledge of the refugee and the refugee domain make various practices of government directed at refugees possible. Three shifts in the kinds of knowledge produced have been particularly important: econometric analyses, psychological knowledge regarding resettling refugees, and knowledge directed at the development of early warning systems. There are also a variety of technologies that make the Canadian refugee regime possible that include statistics, icons, camps, examinations, psychological intervention techniques, and documentation centres. The programmatic changes discussed in previous chapters can conceivably be linked to failure and resistance of one sort or other. Resistance in the refugee regime can be understood as obstruction to governance, but the presence of two rationalities raises the possibility of another view, of resistance as constitutive. Overall this chapter has shown that the Canadian (and international) practices directed at refugees have been made possible by an eclectic, historical assemblage, not only of rationalities, but also forms of association, knowledges, technologies and, possibly, resistances. Most of these elements are not new; they were not invented within a Canadian refugee regime. Instead, each has a unique trajectory and has been
modified to fit new purposes. Although the Canadian refugee regime is an historically new configuration, it does not follow that the elements that have made it up are also new.
1. Partnership is also prevalent in the international refugee regime as seen in 'ParinAc' (Partnerships in Action), a joint UNHCR-NGO initiative that began in 1993. The refugee conference attended included one workshop on 'ParinAc' and another entitled "Defining 'consultation' and 'partnership'."

2. It should be noted that the division of knowledges and technologies in this chapter is analytical.

3. Malkki (1995: 506) writes: "Much social scientific research - whether resulting in policy recommendations, development reports or academic articles-has been conducted in more or less formal connection with (and often funded by)... international organizations."

4. This literature directs attention to myriad issues concerning international 'refugee solutions', including the allocation of emergency aid, long-term development, first country settlement, and repatriation. Factors that lead to success or failure of various programs and schemes are often isolated, and reforms suggested.

5. In the United States, in this year, the Committee on Refugee Issues was created for the first time as a special division of the American Anthropological Association and has overseen the publication of two volumes of selected papers on refugee issues since then (Malkki, 1995: 507).

6. There were no meetings held in 1993 and 1995.

7. The Research Resource Division for Refugees was established in 1985 as part of Carleton's Centre on Immigration and Ethno-Cultural Studies (Robinson, 1993: xiii).

8. The concept of Host groups may have come out of the Refugee Documentation Project in the early 1980s (Centre for Refugee Studies Newsletter. September, 1992: 10).

9. Other federal Departments such as Canadian Heritage are also contributing funding to the Project.

10. There are other shifts that have occurred besides the three discussed here. For example, in 1990 the introduction of a refugee law unit within the Centre for Refugee Studies takes place shortly after the commencement of the new determination system that relies on law. In the same way, a gender unit focusing on policy affecting women refugees as a distinct marginalized population appears with the rise of a Canadian Women at Risk selection programme.

11. For example, research by social anthropologists has been indispensable for international refugee aid and development (Waldron, 1988; Malkki, 1995). Within the new resettlement
programmes that imagined the adaptation of thousands of Indochinese refugees and that appeared in the early 1980s, it became important to know how refugees were adapting to Canadian society. Joining their sociologist counter-parts concerned about social structure and vertical mosaics, anthropologists went about studying these groups (e.g., Indra, 1987; Buchignani, 1988; Gilad, 1990a; Winland, 1994; Stephenson, 1995). To study non-Western cultures Canadian anthropologists traditionally had to travel abroad or at least temporarily move out of their comfortable urban settings to enter the field. Through refugee selection and resettlement, and later through determination these fields—in the form of communities of recently-arrived refugees—were literally brought home to Canadian urban settings for study. The traditional preoccupations of the discipline could now be addressed in Canada simply by driving short distances within cities to enclaves where refugees had settled. The 'other' in the form of the resettling refugee had become more accessible.

12. The thousands of immigrants admitted to Canada after 1978 from abroad by way of the family class category were not imagined undergoing as rigorous a screening as immigrants selected through the independent class (though more than refugee claimants).

13. The base for the production of this knowledge has not been the Centre for Refugee Studies at York. References to such work are rare in the periodical Refuge that is produced there.

14. The Globerman (1992) collection suggests the management of this risk could be achieved through better screening abroad (Vancouver Sun, 1993a: A3).

15. Though not discussed below, the surety bond is another technology of government that complements an advanced liberal rationality.

16. There have been at least two journal issues recently dedicated to the subject of early warning (Schmeidl, 1996; Gurr and Harff, 1994).

17. Other relevant technologies include and are as diverse as English-as-a-Second-Language teaching techniques and the architecture of port of entry buildings.

18. As Dean (1994a: 171) writes regarding discipline: "Although Foucault holds that the systematic concentration of techniques of discipline occurs in closed institutions, this does not stop those techniques being used in other contexts."

20. This particular icon was designed and donated by "Dreadnaught Cooperative, Inc." of Toronto in 1981 (Refuge. 1981 1(1), inside cover page).

21. The latter is one of the stated aims of the new Metropolis Project mentioned above (Canada, 1995j).

22. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was first established in 1950. Prior to this, similar work was carried out within the Department of Mines and Resources (Vernant, 1953: 551).

23. The Canadian NFB film "Who Gets In?" provides a rare glimpse of an examination taking place at a Canadian visa post abroad. See CCR (1992) for some actual questions that comprise an examination.

24. A large proportion of refugees are located in these settings (Refuge. 1990 10(2): 21).

25. Five requests chosen more or less at random from within shelved binders in the documentation centre that contained past 'requests for information' revealed the following: "Ghana: Information on an abortive coup d'etat attempt which took place around March 1992" (16 February 1993); "Lebanon: Information on the Armenian Community" (30 April 1993); "Honduras: Does a Honduran citizen lose its citizenship if he enters the military services of another country (El Salvador)?" (29 March 1990); "El Salvador: Information on the role played by Rene Francisco Guerra y Guerra in the government of El Salvador, 1977 - 1980)" (8 July 1992).

26. The centre allows for the surveillance of visitors through the visitor log, the 'requests for information', and the technicians that work inside the central tower.

27. One reading of Foucault's (1977a) well-known history of the prison yields a notion of resistance that apparently stems from the human body. As Garland (1990: 171) describes it:

[I]t is 'the body' which somehow represents the individual's instinctive source of freedom. It is the body that resists, the body which has to be dominated and ultimately the body which comes to be 'the prisoner of the soul'.

This is not the conception of resistance referred to here.

28. There is also considerable evidence of resistance in relation to resettlement programmes. Changes consistent with the onset of an advanced liberal rationality have not all gone unopposed in this context and have led to programmatic refinements and changes. These would include transfer to the private sector of what were deemed, in the late 1970s, as state responsibilities, (Adelman, 1980; Refuge. 1991 10: 2) and, in 1995, to refugees in the form of
the nine hundred and seventy-five dollar landing fee (CCR, 1995b: 22n; 1995f; NAC, 1995; Network for Immigrants' and Refugees' Rights Advertising Pamphlet, 1995; interviews 08/06/95; 31/05/95; 24/05/95; 21/06/95a; 15/06/95; 28/08/95; 05/07/95; 04/07/95; 23/06/95c 19/10/95; 26/09/95).

29. Women have occasionally accompanied these men as dependents and been eventually granted status as a result of him being granted refugee status, but this is not the same as women being granted status as a result of persecution on the basis of gender.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to make sense of Canadian practices directed at refugees, and how they have changed, and to simultaneously lend insight into governmentality. Popular accounts and some previous studies have depicted these practices as occurring in a realm devoid of politics, power, and resistance and, in this way, differing from practices directed at other kinds of objects/identities. The preceding chapters have shown that this depiction is unjustified— the exercise of power, politics, and resistance occurs throughout the refugee regime. Rationalities, technologies, and knowledges, as they do in other governmental regimes, make the governance of a specific object, the refugee, possible. An advanced liberal rationality and its accompanying 'partnership' relation, for example, can be seen in many other Canadian governmental domains, including crime prevention (e.g., Canada, 1995k: 1), community policing (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996), corrections (e.g., Canada, 1989e: 5), and the management of persons with AIDS (Kinsman, 1992). This thesis has also shown that Canadian practices directed at refugees cannot be reduced, as they are in much previous research, to humanitarianism, racism, relations between nation-states, capitalism, state domination, or other inevitable, unified processes. They are better understood as a contingent governmental regime, a shifting, assemblage of heterogeneous, historical elements. By offering this alternative account of these practices, this thesis contributes to the burgeoning refugee studies literature.
This thesis also lends insight into governmentality. Chapter four suggested that concepts and themes drawn from governmentality studies are not limited in their relevance to national contexts, as previous works in this area often imply. Miller and Rose (1990b: 3), for example, write:

...the notion of government draws attention to the diversity of forces and groups that have, in heterogeneous ways, sought to regulate the lives of individuals and the conditions within particular national territories in pursuit of various goals (emphasis added) (cf. Barry, et al., 1996: 11).

Instead, these concepts and themes, though treated in a preliminary fashion, were also observed to be relevant to an understanding of an international regime. This observation is significant because if 'international relations theory' is not to be separated from state theory (cf. Walker, 1993; Dillon, 1989; Giddens, 1985: 30-31), and if a governmentality approach is an alternative to the latter, then it follows that international, as well as administrable domains of a national kind, can be made intelligible by adopting such an approach.

Chapter four also revealed that the development of an international regime preceded the appearance of a Canadian one. This suggests that there is not a necessary relation between the international and national governance of a particular object (which the phrase 'condition of possibility' suggested), as is often implied by those who point to the appearance of international bodies as sure signs of the demise of the relevance of similar national organizations. This is an important point at a time when the number of international agencies, to deal with this or that
issue, continues to grow at a remarkable rate (Bowles and Gintis, 1986: 53; Giddens, 1987: 165; Held, 1991: 202) and, at the same time, previous arguments suggesting national bodies dealing with similar realms are in decline are now recognized to have been at best premature and at worst mistaken (cf. Giddens, 1990a: 73; Mahon, 1991: 140; Hirst and Thompson, 1995). It is perhaps better to see broad national and international spheres of politics and morality as mutually constitutive, each making the other possible, neither necessarily dominant, nor replacing the other over time.

The focus on national to the exclusion of international realms, a practice also prevalent in realist sociology despite consistent calls for correction (e.g., Giddens, 1985; 1987: 16; Bauman, 1992: 57-65), may also explain why previous studies in governmentality have completely ignored international migration.¹ These governmentality studies were inspired by the later writings of Foucault (1978: 140), who writes at one point:

> During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines - universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations (emphasis added).

Though Foucault may be referring here to rural-urban, rather than migration of an international kind, this lack of attention among those who have sought to extend his ideas is nevertheless unjustified. For all the attention to sexual regulation and its relation to the government of population, it is peculiar that
migration has received comparatively little attention. While it would be easy to see this neglect as the result of continental European bias (since international migration (refugee or otherwise) is commonly understood to have been less important to the development of European nations than to settler societies), it might be noted that several major contributors to the governmentality literature (e.g., Dean, 1991; Hindess, 1996) are situated in Australia, a settler society.

Chapter six also lends support to what others have noted about advanced liberal rule. As Rose (1993, 1996a), and others (see O'Malley in Valverde, 1994b) have suggested, advanced liberal government is not simply about a shift of responsibility to the private sector (though this is evident throughout the regime), it also involves a new relationship between political authorities and expertise. The movement of expertise out of the state is evident in relation to all three types of practices explored in this thesis. This movement is also linked with the new emphases, as discussed in chapter six, on the production of economic, psychological, and early warning knowledge outside the state.

Chapter five also supports the notion that liberal rule is incredibly inventive and experimental in character (O'Malley, 1996b: 312; Barry et al., 1993). That it is experimental is seen in chapter five in one pilot project after another, tentative stabs at doing things differently and usually more efficiently, efforts always poised to recoil or be abandoned at the first sign of significant opposition to their effects. Its inventiveness is
observed in this same chapter in the appearance, following opposition, of the administrative reviews, a 'safe third country' provision, and the advisory committee for selection of IRB members. Each is very different, but each allowed political authorities to side-step the visible, political question of 'who is a refugee?'. More generally, this inventiveness is evident in the variety of technologies that liberal government has enlisted in efforts to govern refugees, as discussed in chapter six, and in the way they have been borrowed from other current or past domains and modified for new purposes in the Canadian refugee regime. The panopticon, the quarantined city, techniques to confront trauma, and the lowly thesaurus, each with their own trajectory, take on slightly modified forms and functions in the Canadian regime as the documentation centre, refugee camp, testimony, and the international refugee thesaurus respectively.

Chapter five also highlights one of Michel Foucault's most important insights about power— it is not something that merely crushes and excludes; it is a form of creation. The shifts described in the preceding chapters can be observed creating objects/identities never seen before: the refugee coordinator, the refugee lawyer, the refugee hearing officer, and the refugee claimant among them. Through the creation of the Master Agreements within the national or regional programmes of major Christian churches a new identity, the refugee coordinator, was invented. The refugee coordinator was imagined actively promoting and coordinating refugee sponsorship among local congregations and
monitoring subsequent refugee resettlement practices in relation to
the Agreements (interviews 28/08/95; 22/06/95; 21/06/95c; 31/05/95;
Refuge. 1981 2(1): 1). Similarly, the crisis involving a backlog
of claims had the unintended consequence of leaving persons as
refugee claimants in Canada, in some cases, for more than five
years (CCR, 1995b: 3). This effectively created a new
object/identity within Canada that has since become a marginalized
sub-population to be policed and studied in its own right.2 This
category has become an addition to the various immigrant (e.g.,
independent, family, entrepreneur) and refugee (e.g., private or
state-sponsored) categories, as well as a variety of temporary (or
'guest') worker objects/identities. One might note that with the
formation of two new kinds of backlogs in the 1990s mentioned in
chapter five -the DROC claimants and those persons determined to be
refugees, but who have not been granted landed immigrant status
because they are without passports or other identification
documents- even more non-citizen object/identities are being
created. Each of these is imagined to have different rights and
revealed to pose different risks that must be governed. Each
occupies a distinctive location somewhere along the perilous path
to liberal citizenship, a route that has become considerably more
demanding of late with toll booths having been installed at every
station. It leads one to ask whether, despite its inventiveness
and creative potential, there is a limit to how many of these
explicit non-citizen object/identities liberal rule can govern,
while carrying on with the assumption that it is a citizenry, a
body of rational, self-governing subjects capable of exercising choice that is being ruled.

This thesis also suggests something about the role of law as governance. In selection it can be seen that Canadian liberal law dictates how refugee levels are set only to the extent that it includes provisions for annual consultations (it says nothing about what the levels should be or about the distribution of spaces abroad). In resettlement, liberal law governs the provision of ISAP and AAP funding and the Master Agreements, but from there the monitoring of the conduct of refugees' daily lives is left up to other modes, including a Christian pastorate. However, in determination, since 1989 law has become intimately involved, seeking to get at the Truth of the motivation of the individual refugee claimant who has travelled to Canada and entered the determination process. Power as a form of creation is also seen in this new determination programme and the related appearance of this new specialty in law. Presently there are, for example, small groups of legal professionals in Canada organized around refugee determination exclusively, the largest being the one hundred and twenty member Refugee Lawyer's Association in Toronto (The Globe and Mail, 1994: D4; Houle, 1994: 17n).\(^3\) More to the point, however, is that several critiques have suggested Foucault grossly underestimated the significance of law in the modern West, where he implied it was being superseded by other modes of governance (cf. Smart, 1989; Pavlich, 1992; Hunt, 1993; Hunt and Wickham, 1994). The case of determination lends support to these critiques—liberal
law —albeit alongside the deployment of sovereign measures that explicitly sought to reduce access to determination— emerged to restore governability to determination. This should not be understood as part of a monolithic, ultimately repressive 'legalization of politics' caused by the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter in this and other areas as Mandel (1994: 240-257) argues. It is no more or less than one of several efforts that sought to bring order to a specific protracted crisis of governability that emerged in the early 1980s, not as a matter of course, but as contingent on circumstances that happened to come together during this period, each with their own conditions of possibility, the entrenchment of the Charter being only one of them.

Chapter five also suggested that the way in which the three types of practices of the regime have been changing, while consistent with the ascendency of an advanced liberal rule as described in the work of, among several others, Rose (1993; 1996a) and Rose and Miller (1992), cannot be made fully intelligible by reference to this rationality. The appearance of the private sponsorship programme is obviously consistent with the rise of such a rationality in that it provides considerably more distance between political authorities and the governance of refugees' conduct during resettlement. However, the character of the resettlement practices (e.g., that they are carried out without regard to the privacy or consent of refugees) of church volunteers and sponsors suggests something else is going on here as well.
While philanthropy, often mentioned in the governmentality literature (e.g., Donzelot, 1979: 55; Minson, 1985: 187-93; Rose, 1990: 127-8; Valverde, 1991a; Hindess, 1996: 120-2), could be invoked in this instance, it too seems to have been taken for granted, rather than to have been made sense of. Valverde (1994c) proposes to rectify this, seeking to make sense of philanthropy and more contemporary social work practice by reference to the generation of 'moral capital' involving deferred returns of 'moral fibre' or 'character' and serving as one of three overlapping circuits of civil society (the other two being economic and cultural capital). While novel, this effort is obviously more consistent with the Marxist tradition than with the governmentality literature that takes its lead from a 'later Foucault'. It is more consistent to suggest, as it was in chapter five, that in this area since the mid-1970s an advanced liberal rationality has deferred to a pastoral rationality. Liberalism has been explored to a considerable degree in the literature (see chapter two). However, since Foucault's lectures about it (e.g., Foucault, 1988a), a pastoral rationality has been ignored. Indeed, the uniqueness and, in my view, one of the major contributions of Foucault's later writings on governmentality, was the suggestion that governance in the modern West was not to be characterized by a unified, singular process of instrumental rationalization, as Weber or Habermas suggest, but rather the simultaneous presence of different rationalities. More specifically, Foucault (1988a) suggested that the Welfare State problem was an instance of the 'tricky
adjustment' between the 'city-citizen' and 'shepherd-flock' game, between a liberal and a pastoral rationality. If the Welfare State is presently being dismantled, or at least being significantly 'rolled back', pastoral power may be moving out of the state, and into the reach of religious and, to some extent, ethno-cultural authorities. This is not to suggest that such a rationality is necessarily absent in the new immigrant settlement organizations where resettlement practices are also carried out. However, because each resettlement service delivered there is calculated in cash terms, 'purchased' by the Department of Immigration (mostly using 'cash' extracted from immigrants and refugees at an earlier point), and carefully accounted for in relation to ISAP agreements, the character of these practices seem directed less at the live individuals specified by pastoral discourses, and more at the subjects of advanced liberalism who are required to exercise their consumer choices in the marketplace.

One effect of the neglect of a pastoral rationality may well be the overstatement of the decline or irrelevance of the continued influence of religious authorities in the 'conduct of conduct'. Valverde (1996: 365), for example, writes:

The classification of what is or is not a bad habit, a vice, is today no longer the province of unitary institutions such as national churches, so that the content of moral action is not determined once and for all by supra-individual authorities.

To be sure, this is undoubtedly the case for the liberal citizen, with church involvement in citizen's lives (ie., secularization) decreasing dramatically since the 1950s in Canada. But is this
necessarily the case for marginalized objects/identities? Based on the dominance of Christian religious authorities in refugee resettlement observed in chapter five, such statements and the similar use of the adjective 'post-religious' (e.g., Valverde, 1994a: viii) in the context of governmentality studies, seem premature. Christian churches in particular, over the course of the twentieth century, seem to have adopted new objects for their 'home missions' (Valverde, 1991a: 114), as they abandon others, whether they be the poor, students, aboriginal peoples, or immigrants. As a liberal welfare rationality continues to rescind, new possibilities for Christian pastorates are appearing. One of these is refugee resettlement.

In chapter six it was suggested that while resistance as obstruction to liberal governance can be clearly seen in relation to the refugee regime, when the presence of a pastoral rationality is factored in, resistance begins to look more complex. Rationalities of government can conflict and resistance of a kind different from mere obstruction to liberal governance can be seen when they do. Future attention to rationalities other than liberalism can lend insight into resistance and be useful to those who seek social justice (Pavlich, 1992) or a transformational politics (O'Malley, 1996b). It is in these ways that this thesis has contributed to the governmentality literature.

This last point leads us to the third and final purpose of this thesis stated in the introduction. The shift in governmental rationalities and accompanying specific changes in determination,
resettlement, and selection practices will undoubtedly be recognized as differential in their effects with respect to class, gender, race/ethnicity and other dimensions of inequality. Those concerned about the well-being of refugees and who see these effects as pernicious, or those who seek to cash in on the continued currency of refugeeness (now that it has become more accessible in Canada), would do well to recognize that the configuration of politics has also changed within this new regime. The 'survey of the battlefield' (Foucault, 1980: 62) in the preceding chapters has shown that new arenas of contestation have opened up, while others have already been dismantled; that new authorities are calling the shots, while others have relinquished their responsibilities or have had them taken away. It is more these new sites -the documentation centres and oral determination hearings rooms in tandem, the sites and fora where knowledge is produced and debated, psychiatrists' offices, and the 'privatized' immigrant settlement agencies- and less the corridors of the state that politics and new ways of resisting can now occur. Canadian feminist groups clearly recognized this in the early 1990s and seized the opportunity it presented.
1. Foucault said little if anything about the international field of practices in the context of 'governmentality'. Rose and Miller (1992) mention it in passing with reference to Dillon (1989), but other proponents have ignored it.

2. Some programmes designed for refugee claimants exclusively were mentioned earlier. In terms of study, 1991 is the first year the Canadian population census sought to count refugee claimants as Canadian residents. The 1996 census counted them again. Public opinion research (e.g., Canada, 1989b); research regarding social provisions (Crepeau and Barutciski, 1994); and other studies (e.g., ICCR, 1995); have recently focused on refugee claimants specifically.

3. It might be noted, however, that while the Canadian Bar Association has a national immigration section, it does not have a refugee section. A Refugee Advocacy Staff Office was established on a three year 'pilot project' basis under the Ontario Legal Aid Plan in 1993 (Refugee. 1993 13(4): 20). Though lawyer fees accounted for between one-third and one-half of the estimated total two hundred million dollar annual cost for refugee determination in Canada in 1992 (Mandel, 1994: 257), there are only a handful of lawyers who deal with refugees exclusively and it is more often the case that immigration lawyers will represent refugee claimants from time to time (interviews 22/08/95; 18/08/95; 28/07/95; 30/10/95).

4. Hunter (1994) on the modern school and, to some extent, Pavlich (1992) on mediation or dispute resolution programmes, are recent exceptions.

5. Pavlich (1992), for instance, notes the significant involvement of the Mennonite Church in mediation programmes.


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APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

I. BACKGROUND OF GROUP/ORGANIZATION.

First I'd like to ask you some background questions about your group/organization.

1. How long has your organization been in existence?

2. Approximately how many members or staff does it presently have?

3. What is your group's/organization's mandate?

4. About HOW LONG have you been a part of the group/organization?

5. How is your group/organization funded?

   a. What proportion of funding would you estimate comes from government sources?

6. Would you describe your group/organization as a refugee advocacy group or organization?

7. What does your group/organization do in relation to refugees? Can you elaborate on that?

II. EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE CANADIAN REFUGEE POLICY GENERALLY.

Now I'd like to ask you some general questions about your group's/organization's efforts to influence Canadian refugee policy.

8. HAS your group/organization attempted to influence Canadian refugee policy during the period since 1969?

9. Do you recall what YEAR your group/organization first attempted to influence Canadian refugee policy?

10. In what GENERAL DIRECTION has your group/organization attempted to influence Canadian refugee policy during the period since 1969?

11. In trying to influence Canadian refugee policy what have been some of the PREFERRED WAYS OR TACTICS your group/organization has used to get its views across? HAS this CHANGED over time? IN WHAT WAY?
12. In trying to influence Canadian refugee policy during the period since 1969 what TYPES of people did your organization contact to try to get its views across?
   a. What about POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES such as cabinet ministers responsible for Canadian refugee policy?
   b. What about NEWS MEDIA?
   c. What about CIVIL SERVANTS or BUREAUCRATS responsible for administering Canadian refugee policy?
   d. What about INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES OR REPRESENTATIVES?

13. Is there a hierarchy among these? [If so what is it?]

14. In GENERAL do you think the VIEWS or CONCERNS EXPRESSED by your group/organization have been INCORPORATED into Canadian refugee policy during the period since 1969? Why or why not?

15. In trying to influence Canadian refugee policy during the period since 1969 did your organization JOIN WITH OTHER groups or organizations to try to get its views across?

16. [IF reported a large proportion of FUNDING FROM GOVERNMENT SOURCES.]
   You mentioned earlier that government provides about [ ] of your funding.
   a. Has this affected the KINDS OF VIEWS your organization HAS EXPRESSED about Canadian refugee policy since 1969?
   b. Has your group/organization tried to FIND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES of FUNDING or to otherwise REDUCE its RELIANCE on GOVERNMENT SOURCES during this period?

III. GENERAL VIEWS ON CANADIAN REFUGEE POLICY AND REFUGEES.

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your general views on Canadian refugee policy and refugees.

17. What has been the purpose of Canadian refugee policy since 1969?

18. In your view, in what way or ways has Canadian refugee policy CHANGED during the period since 1969? What have been some EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES of these changes? WHY do you think these CHANGES have occurred?
19. In your view, who do you think has BENEFITED from the creation and maintenance of a Canadian refugee policy since 1969? Can you tell me why you think this?

20. Do you think Canadian refugee policy has been FORMULATED in a DEMOCRATIC MANNER since 1969? Why or why not?


22. What do you think have been the CRITERIA the Canadian government has used in the SELECTION of refugees ABROAD since 1969?

23. Do you think the Canadian government has used the SAME criteria in the DOMESTIC DETERMINATION OF REFUGEES? [IF NO] What CRITERIA do you think were used in domestic determination?

24. Do you think the Canadian government's EXCLUSION of asylum-seekers by preventing them from travelling to Canadian borders to make a refugee claim or by making it difficult for them to make a refugee claim at a Canadian post abroad IS MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE? Can you tell me why you feel this way?

25. Do you think everyone in Canadian society has had EQUAL ACCESS to INFORMATION about HOW Canadian refugee policy HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED or PRACTICED since 1969?

[IF NO] Who do you think has had the advantage in gaining ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION?

a. Do you think this has AFFECTED the capacity of your group/organization to INFLUENCE Canadian refugee policy? Can you tell me a bit why you think this?

26. Do you think the Canadian government could have accepted MORE PEOPLE as refugees during the period since 1969? Why or why not?

27. In your view, what SHOULD be the DECIDING FACTORS that determine HOW MANY people are accepted as refugees to Canada annually?

28. In your view, what is a refugee?

29. Would your definition differ in any way from the current UN definition?