TOWARD A USABLE PEACE:
UNITED STATES CIVIL AFFAIRS IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

by

KAREN GUTTIERI

A.A., San Joaquin Delta College, 1984
B.A., San Francisco State University, 1987
M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1991

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
July 1999

© Karen Guttieri 1999
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date August 21, 1999
United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the post-conflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace?

Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes.

Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention.

The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural
tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of
the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a
usable peace.
### Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................. ii  
Table of Contents .................................................. iv  
List of Figures ...................................................... vi  
Acknowledgment .................................................... vii  

[1] **A Usable Peace** .................................................. 1  
   Soldiers and the Shape of Peace ........................................ 5  
   Intended Contributions of This Study .................................. 10  
   Organization of the Study ............................................. 12  

[2] **On the Civil Dimension of Strategy** ............................. 14  
   Theory and Policy .................................................. 16  
   A Clausewitzian Loop ............................................... 20  
   Transformations .................................................... 24  
   Civil Affairs ....................................................... 31  
   Transition Influences ............................................... 37  
   Conclusion .......................................................... 38  

[3] **Interpretations of Clausewitz** ................................... 40  
   Themes ............................................................... 40  
   Civil-Military Relations ........................................... 42  
   Strategic Studies .................................................. 53  
   Views on Civil Affairs ............................................. 63  
   Conclusion .......................................................... 70  

[4] **Continuity and Change in US Civil Affairs** ...................... 72  
   Doctrinal Development .............................................. 72  
   1. Martial Law and Military Government: Early Practice and Doctrine 75  
   2. Laws of Armed Conflict from the US Civil War .................... 77  
   3. Indirect Rule and Civilianization at Century’s Turn ............... 81  
   4. Improvisation after World War I .................................. 84  
   5. Formal Doctrine and World War II ................................ 85  
   7. Militarization of Pacification in Vietnam .......................... 111  
   Conclusions on Historical Construction of Civil Affairs ............ 121  

[5] **Framework for Case Analysis** .................................... 125  
   Case Study Analysis ................................................ 125  
   Policy Analytical Framework .................................... 139  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The US Invasion of Grenada: 1983-1984</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXPLICIT OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NARRATIVE</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPLICIT OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OUTCOME</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LESSONS AND MODIFICATIONS</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The US Invasion of Panama: 1989-1992</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXPLICIT OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NARRATIVE</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPLICIT OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OUTCOME</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LESSONS AND MODIFICATIONS</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Case Comparison</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFTER INTERVENTION</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MULTILATERALISM</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAKING TRANSITIONS</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE CIVIL DIMENSION</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE NATURE OF CONFLICT</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FUTURE DIRECTIONS</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Phases of Military Intervention</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clausewitzian Continuum</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clausewitzian Loop</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Helix Configuration of Policy and Force</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Two Interpretations of the Clausewitzian Formula</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Conflict Spectrum—Conventional View</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Phases of US Civil Affairs from Valley Forge to Vietnam</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Goals and Objectives in Military Operations</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Refined Temporal Focus of the Study</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgment

The individuals to whom I owe gratitude, and my appreciation of them, are too many and too great to be contained on this page. I have had the wonderful fortune to work under the supervision Brian Job; meaning that someone who is exceptionally smart has consistently challenged me in a sustained conversation about this work. Ivan Head reminded me why I cared about strategy and inspired me to begin this inquiry into civil affairs. Kal Holsti provided me research assistantships that enabled me to observe the production process, the craft of scholarship, from a true master of it. Roy Licklider generously offered insights and thought-provoking questions. My thanks are due also to Michael D. Wallace, David Schweitzer and Jean Barman.

I am grateful to have received doctoral fellowship support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and appreciate the support of the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia. I would like to express my appreciation of the University of British Columbia Political Science Department in general. The institution provides a framework, and the people provide its essence. Robert Jackson and Dick Johnston, among others but in particular, have inspired and challenged my thinking on many topics and many occasions. Fond thanks go to Lorae Charlton, Dory Urbano, Petula Muller, and Nancy Mina, who have given beyond the call of administrative duty.

The dissertation would not have been possible without information provided by practitioners and derived from archives. David Mitchell at the US Department of Defense has kept a continuous conversation going with me on the subject of civil affairs and introduced me to other members of the diverse civil affairs community. Background interviews too numerous to count helped me to put pieces of the puzzle together. I was fortunate to have access to relevant policy statements, reports, and field manuals. The US Army Center of Military History in Washington DC and the Special Operations Library at Fort Bragg opened their archives to me and their librarians were generous with assistance.

I have had the opportunity to discuss US civil affairs and military history with some of the foremost experts, including Stanley Sandler and John Fishel. Larry Yates gave me helpful criticism on case chapters. I have learned a great deal from my discussions with Max Manwaring. I am thankful to Larry Pippen for his observations about Panama.

The United States Army War College provided funds and the National Defense University provided site support so that I could convene a conference, “The Civil Dimension of Military Operations,” to put concepts in this dissertation onto the agenda. I am indebted to Mike Dziedzic, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and all participants in that conference.

Personal thanks are due to my family and to my friends, Jaye Ellis, Robyn So, Mary Goldie, Peter Suedfeld, Iza Laponce, Doug Ross, Yoram Minnes, Kathleen Zang and the community of St. Anselm’s, Vancouver.

Although much credit belongs to those identified above, I accept responsibility for any errors, omissions or contrary opinion in these pages.
The use of military force, according to the famous dictum of the nineteenth century Prussian strategist Clausewitz, must serve the ends of policy. In wars, military interventions, and recent multilateral peace operations, American political leaders have ordered US troops abroad to implement policy.\(^1\) It is common to associate soldiers with war, and war with engagement with armed forces of an enemy in combat. It is less common, or has been so until the so-called peace operations of the last decade, to associate soldiers with implementing peace and caring for civilians. However, foreign civilian populations have been a persistent factor in operations in which US troops control foreign territory. Military commanders are responsible for civilian protection and American soldiers frequently must perform quasi-civilian functions; troops provide relief, manage displaced persons, and even conduct civil administration. American military forces attempt to serve the ends of policy by effecting a transition to peace.

The political objective of military intervention is to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to national interest, that is, a usable peace. Such an undertaking presents a daunting task for US military forces. A transition to peace requires military troops to give special consideration to the civil realm and to the post-conflict environment. Ironically, many of the soldiers' resources for conducting post-conflict operations, and indeed the target of these operations, are in the civil, as opposed to the military, realm. US military forces are rarely able to conduct military operations in the service of policy without also conducting civil-military operations.

This study focuses upon civil affairs in American strategy in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? The central thesis of this study is as follows: if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs are a means by which US military forces attempt to make a transition to a renewed mode of policy. The involvement of

\(^1\) The term "American" is used in this study to refer to the United States.
military forces in constructing peace is an issue of general theoretical and global practical interest, but a particularly significant issue for the United States.

Civil affairs are military concerns about and activities pertaining to the civil sphere, including military government and civil-military operations. Within the US defense establishment, civil affairs refers to doctrine, operations and, since World War II, dedicated Civil Affairs (CA) forces. The US Department of Defense focused upon activities in a recent definition of civil affairs:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.²

Civil affairs as practiced in military operations has been described also as “a capillary action, a leavening action between combat, the transition to peace, and the reconstruction of government under the rule of law.”³

In American strategy, civil affairs constitutes a civil-military interface. A military commander might refer to civil affairs as a civilian leader might refer to foreign affairs, to signify a set of relations with others or ‘outsiders.’ Given that US military culture places a premium on bravery in battle against enemy armies, civil affairs as ‘non-warfighting’ activities garner little status. American civilians have also had mixed feelings about the soldiers operating in the civil realm.⁴ Nonetheless, civil affairs have been part of US military operations since the earliest days. The US Navy and Army both have had to deal with civilians to obtain goods and information, to prevent civilians from aiding enemies, to remove civilians from the path of military operations, to provide for and control civilian populations during and after hostilities, and to establish or

---
⁴ One might look to Section 660 of the US Foreign Relations Act that prohibits the US military from training foreign police once combat ends as evidence of civilian desire to keep civilian and military spheres distinct.
protect civilian authorities. The use of military forces in non-combat and post-hostilities operations may be vital to the shape of the subsequent peace.

Consideration of the civil reflects the strategic significance of the civil dimension of conflict. The prominence of this civil dimension varies with the means of warfighting and normative orientations about the use of force. These determine at what point in operations military forces must consider management of civilian populations, the extent of consideration they must give, and the degree to which the shape of the civil order they leave behind is essential to the mission itself.

The recent wave of American involvement in peace operations has drawn interest in the civil dimension of military operations because these missions typically focus explicitly upon civilian protection and humanitarian assistance. However, the civil dimension has also been significant in large-scale military operations. The most obvious examples include the American effort after World War II to reconstruct Japan and Germany during US military government and the American effort to win ‘hearts and minds’ in Vietnam during a US counterinsurgency campaign. Civil affairs is a historical phenomenon that has continued through US military actions in the 1990s in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and other contingencies.

Today, civil affairs is a growth industry. The US military is revisiting its doctrinal orientation toward civil affairs and doctrinal development is under way recently in Canada, France, Australia, and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). No other military force in the world matches the depth and breadth of the US military force structure regarding civil affairs. American leaders call upon the United States military to play a global role. Long after the conclusion of the World War II military government operations that prompted the establishment of dedicated US Civil Affairs active and reserve units, these forces are in frequent use.

If the use of force is indeed an implementation of policy, a good fit between policy goals from Washington DC and military operations in theater is essential. However, in any military operation the dynamics that go along with the use of force, including the commander’s concern
with 'force protection' to ensure the safety of soldiers, is in tension with the humanitarian requirements of the laws of armed conflict. As military forces operationalize policy objectives, there are points at which policy intentions may be lost in interpretation. These observations suggest that a policy implementation analysis of civil affairs will be useful to illuminate the transition from a mode of force in military intervention to a mode of policy.

Through case analysis, this study identifies factors that affected the implementation of civil affairs in three cases of US successful military intervention in the Western Hemisphere: American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, and the US invasion of Panama in 1989. These represent roughly similar cases of US efforts to influence civil order following combat success in essentially unilateral military interventions in the Central American - Caribbean region. United States interventions since 1989 have become more multilateral in character, in that they have been conducted under the auspices of international or regional organizations and alongside other contributing militaries. This study focuses upon essentially unilateral US missions rather than multilateral missions with many layers of civilian authority and military command. A chronicle of the historical US approach to civil affairs and identification of conundrums of implementation in comparatively straightforward operations provide a point of departure for research on more complicated multilateral operations. Before embarking upon inquiry into US participation in recent peace

---


6 Although token regional military forces accompanied US troops in the Dominican Republic and Grenada, these interventions, like the action in Panama, were essentially unilateral, thus limiting the field of actors and enabling a more thorough examination of US foreign and defense policy. Because US military interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama achieved combat success, the US had greater leverage to shape a usable peace than protracted counterinsurgency afforded the US in Vietnam or non-combat peace operations afford the US and its partners in various locales today.
operations, intended to secure a peace that is usable to the world, it is worthwhile to gain a sense as to how the American military has attempted to create a peace that is usable to United States national interest.

Despite their broad similarities, the American political vision for the military interventions examined here, and pre-existing conditions in the different countries, provide points of comparison. Between the intervention in the Dominican Republic and the invasion of Panama, US policy demanded achievement of increasingly ambitious civil affairs goals for military implementers. This study investigates how this ambition has been manifest in doctrine and operations.

**Soldiers and the Shape of Peace**

The normative political framework for treatment of civilian populations by external military forces is evolving. To illustrate, when Niccolo Machiavelli offered his prince advice regarding the people of a defeated republic, he presented but three simple options: one was “to despoil them,” another was to occupy, and a third was “to allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute of them, and creating within the country a government composed of a few who will keep it friendly to you.”

Due to the development of norms of armed conflict, annihilation and annexation are now unacceptable options. The pertinent question for US military forces is not *if* but *when* they will withdraw. The degree to which desired changes are left as a result of the military adventure are a measure of its success. At essence the military is asked to leave behind a usable peace.

The concept of a usable peace seems to be situation-specific. American attention to civilian concerns in the post-hostilities environment likely depends upon the following: how vital the target population is to American national interest; the amount of resources the Americans are willing to commit to their rehabilitation; and the receptiveness of those people to American

---

involvement in civil reconstruction. The concept is not completely ambiguous, because it refers to a consistent American foreign policy emphasis upon stability. In contrast to the notion of 'end state' for American operations, a usable peace encapsulates an American foreign policy that emphasizes institutions and processes, including democratic elections that make peace continue to work after US forces have departed.

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the concept of a usable peace in an address in 1954 in which he blamed diplomats for the failure of peace before World War II and he credited soldiers who fought to regain it. When his comments turned to the development of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals and the potential devastation of nuclear war, he lamented, “The soldier can no longer regain a peace that is usable to the world.”

It is typical to separate concepts for understanding the use of force from the conceptual realm of policy. The decision to use military force, according to convention, marks a transition. Likewise, it is natural to think about peace and war as alternative states in which civilian and military agents, respectively, make policy or use force. Such conventions are problematic in Eisenhower’s comment, as we see in a closer look at two assumptions in it.

First, the comment identifies a usable peace as a central concern of strategy. Like Clausewitz, Eisenhower has characterized peace as an ultimate strategic end. He urged prudent use of force because the manner in which force is used, as a general rule, affects the viability of the ensuing peace. Intended as a warning to diplomats about the danger of reliance on nuclear weapons, the comment speaks to a relationship between means and ends. It implies that there exists a threshold after which the use of force is futile. That threshold exists because the purpose of military force is political, designed to create a post-hostilities environment favorable to US national interest. There is no utility to using military force that leaves little prospect for political order in its wake. By implication, strategy ought to be concerned with the post-conflict order.

---


9 As in the words of Calgacus observing the Roman pacification of Britain, “Solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant” -- they make a wasteland and call it peace. Tacitus, Agricola 30.
The 1954 version of the US Army’s most important doctrinal statement, *Operations*, issues a similar caution: “victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the realization of national objectives.”

A second assumption in Eisenhower’s comment is relevant to this study: that it is the soldier’s role to regain the peace. This view is consistent with Eisenhower’s experience in civil affairs, as a World War II military leader. American troops fought and defeated enemy militaries and liberated friendly populations. After hostilities ceased in Africa, Europe and Asia, American soldiers remained to ensure that the peace they left behind was viable and congenial to national interests. Military government duties involved General Eisenhower in the realm of activity conventionally labeled ‘public administration,’ although it was a foreign public that he governed. General Eisenhower’s wartime and reconstruction experience bridged war and peace, as well as the conduct of ‘US military operations’ and the conduct of ‘US foreign policy.’

*Military Intervention*

Eisenhower’s dim view of the prospects for true victory from nuclear war was widely shared. Pessimistic about the outcome of nuclear war, American scholars during the Cold War had little incentive to contemplate post-conflict military operations. However, US military forces continued to conduct civil affairs through the Cold War, most notably in military interventions to establish and sustain an order congenial to American interests within the US sphere of influence. As in Machiavelli’s third option, American military interventions this century have attempted indirect rule, to establish or support friendly regimes.

---


11 Eisenhower had been a World War II US military commander and leader of occupation forces in North Africa, commanding general of the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) and commander in chief of the US occupation forces in Germany.

12 Given the superpower impasse, American nuclear strategists with few exceptions portrayed the utility of force in two ways. First, the utility of nuclear weapons was in the threat rather than the use of force. Second, that utility was in preventing loss rather than creating opportunities to shape a post-conflict political order.
Armed intervention has been described as “dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state for the purpose of altering the actual condition of things.” External intervention attempts to force that state to alter its policies, its regime or entire civil order to the satisfaction of an outside party.\textsuperscript{13}

One tends to think of an intervention as following a linear progression: it typically begins with crisis in the target country, followed by the insertion of military forces. If troops successfully enter, a combat phase is followed by stability operations in which military presence continues and rehabilitation begins. Figure 1 illustrates this progression.

\textbf{Figure 1}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Action</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Problem identification or crisis</td>
<td>Insertion of armed forces</td>
<td>Consolidation of military operations</td>
<td>Military presence or occupation</td>
<td>Political and economic reconstruction</td>
<td>Exit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Post-conflict Transitions}

One can imagine numerous variations on the sequence depicted above. For example, military forces may be present prior to a crisis incident, or military forces may depart without occupying or engaging in reconstruction activities. These nuances will often be overlooked, because investigations tend to skip from the insertion of external military forces to declaration of success or failure. The zone between, the \textit{post-conflict} environment, is a very gray area for scholars of international relations. Especially when it is under control by foreign military forces,

the state, defined as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory,” is problematic, and with it services typically provided by a civilian government.\footnote{Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1918), p. 78; cited in Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 210, fn.11.}

Military forces in control of foreign territory are obligated to ensure civilian protections. US troops must provide for civilians as best they can when indigenous government is unable to meet civilian needs. Thus, effective civil-military relations are essential because occupying soldiers must look to civilian partners within their own government and from among the local population in order to effect a transition to civilian rule. In order to plan that transition, it is important to have a sense as to what resources will be available in the post-conflict environment, as these resources in part determine the civil affairs obligation.

As noted, the scope of the civil affairs task will depend upon the stated objective of the intervention. If the operation is intended to ‘restore democracy,’ post-conflict transitions are more complex. Given the different stated intentions of American political leaders regarding Panama and Iraq, for example, it seems obvious that US troops would be required to perform more civil affairs in Panama after the 1989 invasion of Panama than in Iraq following the Persian Gulf War. In the latter case, the US had no intention to occupy or democratize, and the major civil affairs effort was concentrated in liberated Kuwait.

Eisenhower’s comment about the inability of the soldier to rebuild after nuclear war illustrates that the conduct of external military forces during hostilities is relevant to the peace that follows. Civil affairs are often viewed as an afterthought in American military interventions, but these considerations are relevant throughout the operation. If they destroy critical infrastructure or alienate civilians, US military forces create more burdens for themselves and their partners in post-conflict economic and political reconstruction.
Strategic Significance of the Civil Realm

The civil realm broadly conceived is the ultimate consideration of strategy. The civil dimension at home is the locus of policy leading to war. The civil dimension abroad is the locus of proof for the policy’s merits after war. Thinking about the post-conflict order led one of America’s most prominent nuclear strategists to argue the strategic relevance of civilians. In *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling looked to the civil dimension because “[e]ven total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy population.”15 A student of nuclear deterrence, Schelling understood that coercive force could serve a purpose without being exercised. In other words, force may have utility when latent.

Schelling puts no candy coating on his description of the post-conflict problem:

How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military science does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.16

Schelling’s concept of latent force is well suited to the study of military occupation and other military functions specifically oriented toward civilian populations. Battlefield victory purchases the opportunity to exercise influence in the post-conflict environment. Having defeated local armed forces, military occupants have demonstrated a capacity to inflict pain—even if held in check—that purchases influence with respect to the enemy population.

**Intended Contributions of This Study**

By recognizing civil affairs functions as a use of force, this study problematizes some popular constructs in strategic studies, including the alleged dichotomy of force and policy. If war is a continuation of policy by other means, this study shows the requirement for a reciprocal

---

15 Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1966), p. 31. There is some irony here. Schelling, one of America’s most famous nuclear strategists, took up the problem of post-conflict strategy in an era when other strategists did not bother to imagine constructing post-conflict order because war, if it came, seemed likely to be nuclear.

16 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 31.
transition to a mode of policy. The specification of a reciprocal relationship between policy and force developed in this study thus opens a new realm of inquiry in strategic studies.

The empirical contribution of this study is to demonstrate the role of civil affairs in translating the use of force into construction of a usable peace. In United States military operations, the civil affairs function is designed to control civilian populations and to facilitate post-conflict transition to civilian and indigenous authorities. The study shows how the requirements of civil affairs evolve, both within the course of a particular military intervention and within US strategy in response to increasing prominence of the civil dimension.

Over time, the American military approach to civil affairs, as the study will show, has exhibited both continuity and change. The most persistent feature of the American military approach is the military desire to limit civil affairs obligations. However, the American military has been forced to adapt to an increasing prominence of civil affairs. Non-combat and post-hostilities military operations shape public perceptions about the legitimacy of the military action and transitional regimes. The prominence of civil affairs is directly related to the degree to which the center of gravity in conflict is situated in the civil dimension. Several developments indicate a shift in the center of gravity to the civil dimension since the laws of armed conflict introduced civilian protections earlier this century. Not the least of these is a wider reference to and enforcement of civilian protections. Moreover, internal conflicts, which have become more numerous than interstate conflicts, are by nature focused upon the civil dimension. No less significantly, when American political leaders order military intervention to settle an internal conflict or remove an unfriendly regime, they have with greater frequency referred to the civil dimension for their rationale for intervention, promising to promote democracy and freedom.

Finally, this work establishes a historical referent and theoretical base for assessment of American involvement in peace operations, and civil-military tensions that accompany them. Civil-military operations are prominent in peace operations because these missions in effect use external military forces to create order. A review of past American experience with civil affairs can help to identify factors that will affect the success or failure of these efforts. Just as
Eisenhower viewed the soldier’s role as regaining a peace in the event diplomats failed to keep it, soldiers today tend to view peace operations as a use of the military to compensate for a failure of civilian institutions. A review of the tradition of civil affairs in American strategic thought can help to identify the civil-military organizational tensions and rivalries that affect peace implementation.

**Organization of the Study**

The next chapter borrows from Carl Von Clausewitz to develop a conceptual framework for thinking about post-conflict military operations, and to address claims in the strategic studies literature that the nature of war is undergoing a transformation. Chapter 3 draws upon academic literature on civil-military relations and conflict analysis to examine the relationship between the use of force and the ends of policy in post-conflict operations. The reciprocal relationship between policy and force is conceptual and as such, not directly observable. However, we can advance conceptual understanding by inferential description of material and observable phenomenon. United States civil affairs doctrine and operations are observable, and imbued with both force and policy.

How do prevailing political norms and evolving military doctrine affect the character of post-conflict civil-military operations? The evolution of American doctrinal focus from military government to civil affairs has reflected these changes, as shown in chapter 4. That chapter presents an overview of historical American civil affairs experience and the evolution of civil affairs in military doctrine.

How well do military objectives meet the goals of American foreign policy? Chapter 5 presents a policy analytic framework that enables to-down and bottom-up analysis of the intervention. The framework is then applied to case studies similar enough to provide internal validity for the comparison. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 apply the framework of policy analysis to US

---

implementation of civil affairs in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama scenarios. Chapter 9 compares them. Did military actions promote American national security and also American aspirations to promote liberal governance in the host country? The influence of political intentions that led into the conflict and the way the conflict itself is fought are both easily observed through case study. In considering particular instances of civil affairs, it is possible to consider how these may reflect changes in the nature of war. Chapter 10 concludes the study and presents a research agenda for the study of US civil affairs in light of increasing requirements for military involvement in contemporary peace operations.
On the Civil Dimension of Strategy

The art of strategy is generally conceived as the art of selecting the best course of action to realize goals. Strategy also implies interaction, that one attempts to choose the best course of action in light of the moves or potential moves of others.¹ The main concern of traditional military strategy tends to be upon the best threat or application of military force to counter the moves or potential moves of an opposing army. An opposing army is the focus, the center of gravity, in traditional military strategy.² However, once military commanders have attained effective control of foreign territory, they become increasingly concerned with issues arising in the civilian rather than military realm.

Post-conflict military operations tend to focus upon civilian populations and civil institutions of governance. The center of gravity becomes civilian rather than military. We might think of civilian-centered concerns, such as those military commanders encounter after conflict, as part of a civil dimension of strategy. The civil dimension of strategy can factor into military calculus in at least four ways.

1. Military calculus must consider civilians present in the operational environment. These civilians might be in the way, participants in the conflict, or victims to be rescued.


2. Military calculus must include potential reactions of the civilian public watching back home. A “public opinion timer” motivates military commanders to achieve objectives and terminate operations quickly.

3. Civil-military relations between policy-makers and the armed forces figure into military calculus because military commanders must obey national command authority.

4. Military calculus must resolve how to operationalize the policy declared by civilian leaders. The civilian realm sets the criteria for a peace that is compatible with national interest, in other words, the criteria for victory.

This chapter presents a conceptual framework for thinking strategically about civil affairs in post-conflict environments. The first task is to situate the study within theoretical perspectives in international relations. The second task is to situate the study within strategic thought by developing a general conceptual formulation of the relationship between policy and force based upon the seminal work On War by Carl Von Clausewitz. The third task is to introduce the consideration of change into the relationship between policy and force, that the civil dimension can change over time. Finally, the American military doctrine on civil affairs is presented as the most articulated embodiment of the American military response to the civil dimension.

---

3 Military concern regarding domestic public opinion is especially acute in an era of satellite television and internet communications. This focus reaches into the domain of Michael Mann's “arm chair militarism” and Michael Howard's “social dimension of strategy.” Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Howard credits Clausewitz as “was the first major thinker to draw attention to the social dimension [of strategy].” Michael Howard discusses four dimensions of strategy: the operational, the logistical, the social and the technological. Howard defines the social dimension as “the attitude of the people” which included “commitment and readiness for self-denial.” Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 1979, pp. 975-986, p. 977.

4 Col. Robert B. Killebrew, USA, “Force Projection in Short Wars,” Military Review, (March 1991), 28-37, p.31. Military concern regarding domestic public opinion is especially acute in an era of satellite television and internet communications. This focus reaches into the domain of “arm chair militarism” that concerns Michael Mann and what Michael Howard has called the “social dimension of strategy.” Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Howard credits Clausewitz as “was the first major thinker to draw attention to the social dimension [of strategy].” Michael Howard discusses four dimensions of strategy: the operational, the logistical, the social and the technological. Howard defines the social dimension as “the attitude of the people” which included “commitment and readiness for self-denial.” Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 1979, pp. 975-986, p. 977.
After war and before peace, the realms of policy and force are juxtaposed in a way that defies classification according to the disciplinary paradigms of political science. Some specialists are concerned about the use of force. Others are more interested in economic development or foreign policy over time. Few consider these facets carefully together. Although the use of force is well examined, there is a dearth of works on the role of military forces in the transition from the mode of force back to a mode of policy.

International relations scholars tend to be concerned about relations between, rather than within states. When the use of force brings about foreign military control of territory, issues of domestic governance emerge. If, as Geoffrey Demarest expects, the United States armed forces, “will create a police expeditionary force distinctly different from warfighting units” for operations other than war, the domestic concept of policing is transferred to an international

---


context. State-centric theories of international relations seem to be of little utility in the ambiguous zone in which foreign military forces control territory.

Liberal international theory seems promising because it does attempt to cross the domestic-foreign policy divide. Liberal theory emphasizes the role of civil society and institutions to rein in the proclivity to use force. At the heart of liberal theory is "a search for principles of political justice that will command rational assent among persons with different conceptions of the good life and different views of the world." Some liberals emphasize the potential for international organizations to fill a vacuum of authority at the international level. Another variant of the liberal school relies upon the character of states themselves for peace, claiming that liberal states are more stable and peaceful. An article published by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 fits the second stream. This article was significant, but not only because of

---


8 According to the tradition of American diplomatic thought, foreign and domestic spheres are distinct. The international sphere is an amoral realm characterized by structural anarchy. There is yet no international equivalent to the domestic state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, governed by rule of law and constitutionalism, containing hierarchically structured authority relations. The domestic sphere, by contrast, is hierarchical and, presumably, harmonious. Public policy scholars may dispute that presumption. Domestic theories of public policy seek to explain policy outcomes with respect to social conflict produced by self-interested policy actors or group conflict.

9 John Gray in the preface to his volume on liberalism characterizes the perspective as individualistic, egalitarian, universalist and meliorist. That is, liberal theory tends to emphasize the rights of individuals, viewed as equals, irrespective of culture or time, and perhaps most significantly, the possibility of progress for social and political institutions. John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 91, p. x.

10 This approach effectively extends the so-called 'domestic analogy,' or the democratic procedures for settling disputes within democratic states, to the international realm. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Idealism of an earlier era resonates in David Held’s recent advocacy of an international governance system based upon a model of cosmopolitan democracy.

11 Michael Doyle observes that liberal states create a 'separate peace.' Making reference to Kant's depiction in an essay on "Perpetual Peace," written in 1795, the liberal thesis of democratic peace holds that war is not thinkable between democratic states. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 1" Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983) and "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 2" Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983); also Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

its seeming prescience about the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama’s argument had political consequences, legitimating the American model of governance and the drive to export democracy. This approach in the end affords us little more than a rationale for American foreign policy behavior.

American foreign policy leaders, certainly since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, have echoed the optimism in liberal theory. The 1995 United States strategic framework, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, shifted emphasis from countering the communist threat to promoting democracy and economic opportunity. The document echoes the democratic peace thesis:

> While democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we, and the entire community of nations, will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another.

This document’s emphasis upon free market capitalism is a familiar liberal theme, dating to the ideological struggle between liberal capitalism and communism. Indeed, early liberals hoped that industry would replace militarism as society progressed.

The democratic peace thesis is really a rehash of an ideological argument long at play in American foreign policy. As Laurence Whitehead describes the American way of thinking, “all

---


15 *Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p.2.

good things" go together, including liberalization abroad and US influence and security. Proliferation of democratic regimes was operationalized as liberal governing systems; peace was conceived as stability, and a liberal peace was the goal of the American struggle against the expansion of Soviet communism. More specifically, American efforts to install liberal democratic regimes and to promote civilian control over the military in allied states were part of the Cold War strategy to stabilize foreign governments vulnerable to communist insurgents.

The recent US strategy's vow to "secure the peace won in the Cold War" evokes the metaphor of reconstruction, specifically the postwar reconstruction of Germany and Japan. Although "democracy by imposition" sounds like a contradiction in terms, the United States promoted democracy by force of arms with perceived success in Europe and Japan after World War II. American interventions since then have often been dressed as actions that will promote democracy or liberalization. Americans encourage host country nationals to organize free and fair elections, subordinate military to civilian institutions, and adopt practices consistent with principles of human rights. American military operations have been given monikers like 'Restore Democracy,' and 'Promote Liberty.' American armed forces are not occupiers, but benevolent stewards of a liberal democratic project. However, these labels also may generate expectation, both at home and abroad, that in some measure the recipient will be better off as a result of the intervention, that reality will follow American rhetoric.


Thanks to Robert Wright of the Center for Military History, who pointed out to me that 'Power Pack' and 'Urgent Fury' (the Dominican and Grenada actions, respectively) were randomly generated names. After the appeal of the latter, the randomness was removed and political leaders assigned the operation names.
One might argue that this American foreign policy emphasis upon liberalization is merely rhetorical.\textsuperscript{21} Frederick Kempe laments that “the United States has borne the responsibility of the invader - to rebuild what it has torn down and to help establish a real democracy,” but has failed to meet this obligation.\textsuperscript{22} One might also question the efficacy of forced liberalization. An early analyst of military occupation wrote in 1903, “...a military government is by no means a short cut to the millennium.”\textsuperscript{23} Opportunities for deeper, needed institutional change might be created by the insertion of a foreign military force, but it is also imaginable that foreign military presence will be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{24} Given the possibilities for skepticism, it is remarkable that the role and activities of American forces in the reconstruction phase following military intervention have been given so little attention. These activities merit both empirical and theoretical attention. A necessary first step is to identify the phenomenon civil affairs activities represent.

\textbf{A CLAUSEWITZIAN LOOP}

The decision to use military force implies a transition in which a mode of policy gives way to a mode of force. Policy implies a general direction for state action. In war the state takes up arms and military as opposed to civilian instruments are the locus of movement. Post-conflict military operations are concerned with a \textit{return} transition, in which the mode of force gives way to a mode of policy. The transition from force to policy can be understood in this light as the natural reciprocal of the transition from policy to force.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} There is in the first instance the damage produced by non-permissive entry of foreign troops. Secondly, the target population may prefer even indigenous tyranny to foreign military rule. A discussion of harms of military intervention and alternatives to military means can be found in Tom J. Farer, “The United States as Guarantor of Democracy in the Caribbean Basin: Is There a Legal Way?” \textit{The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations} vol. 11, no. 3, and (1989): 49-63.
\textsuperscript{25} The reciprocal relationship between policy and force is often overlooked but is truly part of the richness of \textit{On War}. My framework takes advantage of a pre-existing circularity in Clausewitzian thought. Edward Luttwak
A conception of the reciprocal relationship between policy and force is derived from a Clausewitzian definition of war as an inherently political act. When a nation uses military force—whether in war or operations other than war—its leaders have done so in order to promote the national interest. War is then the continuation of politics by other means: “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy,” wrote Clausewitz, “but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” This definition is to remind leaders that force is not an end in itself. In addition, the formulaic conceptualization of war and politics generates conceptual relationships including an authoritative relationship between military and civil realms, and a definitive relationship between force and policy instruments.

The relationship between policy and force is easily conceived as a continuum from diplomacy (or policy) to war (or force). The progression from a mode of policy to a mode of force begins with less coercive expressions of foreign policy such as transmission of a diplomatic note. It escalates with suspension of trade or aid; general sanctions might be organized. It goes further when force is threatened or employed. Its ultimate form is interstate war that engulfs entire societies mobilized for its ends. It is also conceivable that a foreign power might attempt to push backward along the continuum, using instruments short of war to change conditions so that the use of force is not required to achieve policy goals. Figure 2 depicts a progression from policy to force according to the perspective of an intervening state:

---

26 Clausewitz used the term war and I will follow him insofar as the term is synonymous with the use of military force. By his definition, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 8th ed., trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.75. As we know, it is common in this century for organized military action to take place without formal declaration of war necessary to some definitions of the term.


28 I owe this insight to Davis Bobrow. His idea is echoed in a report on civil military operations in El Salvador which concludes that “civil military operations is an area in which proper actions -- taken early -- can help prevent
Military forces in war seek to control territory. However, when a nation’s armed forces successfully take territory by force, these armed forces do more than grab real estate: they take and in some form they hold that real estate. Even amid a political settlement such as a negotiated truce or peace agreement, troops are present in foreign theaters until withdrawal. The effective control of territory by these military forces, by definition, constitutes a form of rule, however benign or temporary. Unless the territory is uninhabited, or the use of force was so destructive as to create a wasteland, indigenous populations are a factor in both the taking and holding of this territory.

Foreign troops that control territory assume a quasi-political role with regard to the civilian population. At this time, military personnel are obligated under the international law of occupation as expressed in The Hague and Geneva Conventions, to protect civilians. Unless military forces seek to annex or indefinitely administer this territory, their next concern is for an exit strategy. Intervening military forces that had perhaps sought to displace a foreign regime may now switch tasks, to ensure the safety of a new one. The transition to local self-rule conceptually involves a transition from a mode of destruction to one of restoration. This return

---

transition transforms the Clausewitzian continuum depicted earlier. As illustrated in Figure 3, the return transition implies a circular relationship in the Clausewitzian formulation of war as a continuation of policy by other means—a Clausewitzian Loop. This transition is not only one of rule; it is also a transition from war to other modes of politics.

![Figure 3
Clausewitzian Loop](image)

As the loop is completed, policy instruments are changed, so that the job of the military is done and local nationals again govern the site. Two transitions are then involved in a successful military intervention:

1. The forceful insertion of troops in foreign territory marks a transition from policy to force.

2. Post-conflict military operations mark a transition from force to policy.

In the first transition, the initiator of armed intervention shifts from a non-military foreign policy mode to a warfighting mode. Although policy must continue to guide military action, the imperatives of war tend to increase the discretion of military as opposed to civilian leaders. Meanwhile, the target of armed intervention shifts from a mode of self-rule to a mode of subordination to foreign control.

In the second transition, the intervening power shifts from a warfighting mode to a stabilization mode, troop exit and normalization of diplomatic relations. Military forces during interventions have a complex task then to implement national policy while at the same time accommodating the needs of the target peoples for order or even governance. Reconstruction or
construction of a functioning society becomes a concern for military leaders seeking to consolidate military operations and depart. Meanwhile, the target of armed intervention shifts from a mode of subordination to foreign control to restoration of self-rule. However, the new mode of policy is not the same as the mode that preceded military intervention. The helix configuration, as in figure 4, illustrates the process.

Figure 4
Helix Configuration of Policy and Force

The helix configuration illustrates the ultimate predominance of policy, and the complex challenge for military commanders who must implement it. As an intervention progresses, military forces shape and also must adapt to new conditions in the policy environment. Military intervention to create or support a friendly regime depends upon non-military processes for the mission to bear fruit. Intervening troops seek to win indigenous, or host-country civilian cooperation to establish order and depart, as quickly as they are able. Intervening forces hope to establish a friendly regime capable of self-defense, however, the regime may continue to rely on the intervening military forces for public order and service provision for some time. In sum, the cyclical nature of war and peace sets the context for a civil dimension to military operations.

TRANSFORMATIONS

The civil dimension of military operations is historically situated because constructions of civil and military realms have evolved over time. Historians identify the demilitarization of the nobility around 1576 in England, for example, as setting in motion a concentration of the
prerogative of the deployment of armed force in the state. The state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force sets the terms for current thinking about civil-military relations. Moreover, a differentiation between domestic police and armies oriented against external attack that Americans take for granted today is more recent still in European history. Civil and military constructs, and the relationship between these spheres, can change rather quickly in the modern era. Adjustments to security institutions, such as congressional legislation to re-channel the path of authority or advice will also create new junctures where civil or political and military considerations are weighed. Technological advances in weapons and communications that alter the nature of threat environments (and the salience of populations in warfighting) can very rapidly alter the civil dimension of military operations.

A growing number of observers today compare the pattern of warfare in this century to previous generations and claim that a transformation in war has occurred. These observers cite differences in conflict purposes, civilian roles in conflict, and institutional manifestations of war. The notion of transformation predates the wave of intrusive United Nations peace operations in the 1990s. William Cohen told the US Senate in 1986 that "a new form of warfare has emerged in recent years, a form of warfare we have not properly understood, and that we have not effectively deterred."

29 Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 65. This allocation of coercive authority constitutes a form of relationship between civil and military spheres, and is one of the defining features of the modern state.


More recently, observers note advances in information, precision strike and sensing technologies that enable heretofore-impossible movements in time and space as evidence of a modern revolution in military affairs (RMA). Strategist Edward Luttwak has declared that "a new season of war is upon us."\(^{33}\) Defense correspondent Christopher Bellamy compares the transformation of war to scientific revolution described by Thomas Kuhn, arguing that "revolutions in warfare embody all the characteristics of a paradigm shift," and that the most interesting dimension of the new paradigm is the emergence of "wars of conscience."\(^{34}\) Any such transformation is inherently multidimensional. It reflects societal and technological developments that affect definitions of security, locations of threat, and methods of warfighting.\(^{35}\)

These observers do not necessarily agree as to the direction of the transformation. One hears alternatively of the obsolescence of total war and the obsolescence of the Cold War conception of conflict short of war.\(^{36}\) At the same time academic writers warn of a "coming anarchy,"\(^{37}\) others assert an "emerging right to democratic governance"\(^{38}\) and a controversial obligation to "save failed states."\(^{39}\)

Coincidentally enough, a common referent in transformation claims is the 19\(^{th}\)-century strategist Carl Von Clausewitz. His major treatise *On War* was written at a previous juncture, a


\(^{39}\) Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *89 Foreign Policy* 3.
revolution in military affairs coinciding with and related to the dissolution of the monarchical
preeminence in France, and emergence of the First Republic and the Empire. The era of
Clausewitz was one of massive engagements in a total war that predates the technological reality
of the modern battlefield. Napoleon seized upon the idea of comprehensive national commitment
and used nationalism as a weapon against his enemies. Clausewitz, advising Prussian leaders on
strategy against Napoleon, emphasized the relationship between political and military realms.
Warfare was identified as the business of government, as opposed to that of the church, perhaps,
or the business of the military alone. Clausewitz described war as a trinity composed of the
popular passions or social forces it expressed (the people), operational instruments (the military),
and political objective (the government).

Clausewitz, revered for decades in American military academies, is currently under
revisionist attack. Martin van Creveld argues in The Transformation of War, that a Clausewitzian
differentiation between governments, armies and the people is an intellectual relic of bygone
era. Van Creveld devotes a chapter to what he sees as the breakdown of the Clausewitzian
trinity of soldiers, statesmen and society, saying that “trinitarian war is not war with a capital W
but merely one of the many forms that war has assumed.” Kalevi J. Holsti similarly observes
that the Clausewitzian conception of interstate war fits our mental maps because it was pervasive
between 1648 and 1945. Holsti goes further to say, “the Clausewitzian image of war, as well as
its theoretical accoutrements, has become increasingly divorced from the characteristics and
sources of most armed conflicts since 1945.”

---

42 Van Creveld says war was Trinitarian between 1648, (and particularly between 1848-9 when armed uprisings ended) and World War II. pp. 41 and 57. Van Creveld ignores that the world is now completely divided into states. States are compelled to respond to conflict. It is an omission that points to an inconsistency, because van Creveld earlier recognized the (Max Weberian) concept that the state must retain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (33-62). My reading of the trinity as interdependent is different from that of van Creveld's, as he takes Clausewitz to mean a sharp differentiation between the three elements. Given that Clausewitz was writing at the time of levee en masse, the interdependence should be obvious.
Conventional conflicts retain essential differentiation between military and civilian realms, combatant and non-combatant elements, and the conditions of peace and war. Unconventional conflicts, also identified as operations other than war (OOTW) wreck havoc with these distinctions. Unconventional conflicts shift the center of gravity, as for the US forces in Vietnam, "to the social-political milieu of the opponent's system - a concept evolving out of Sun Tzu."  

In fairness, one ought to differentiate the Clausewitzian era from Clausewitzian thought. The latter has acquired meaning over time. The seminal contribution of *On War* is the definition of war as the continuation of policy by other means. The Clausewitzian formulation is foundational in two important ways. First, it illustrates the relationship between means and ends in strategy. This relationship was and remains essential, a "permanent injunction." Second, it serves as a core principle in structuring civil-military relations. The subordination of armed forces to civil authority has acquired greater importance since the time of Clausewitz, and constitutes a defining feature of modern liberal democracy. Liberal democracies have no interest in purposeless violence, and by definition will not surrender civilian control of their militaries.

Although Holsti describes modern war as "de-institutionalized," it should be noted that institutions are highly contested by definition in civil conflicts. Indeed, institution building is the focus of activity in the aftermath of conflict. Institutions are an expression of the nature of community, the organization of social forces, so that wars of conscience or any intervention to change domestic order are in this sense, trinitarian. In any transition of rule, one authority must replace another or a vacuum thereof.

---

44 Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B. Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 40. It is not easy for military institutions to maintain means-ends and authority demarcations in operations other than war. Strategists might look to Chinese strategist Sun Tzu for advice on the psychology of adversarial relations, but must also maintain clear conceptions of means and ends and clear authoritative relations between military and civil spheres.

45 Luttwak, "Reconsideration: Clausewitz and War," p. 263.

46 Holsti, *The State, War*, p. 27.

47 The nature of community in Iraq after the Coalition success in the Gulf War was not at stake, but the nature of community in Bosnia has been very much so.
How can military forces generate conditions for political order? US President John F. Kennedy, thinking of Vietnam in the early 1960s, identified skills needed for effective execution of 'the other war':

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action must be blended to produce success.... To win this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.\(^{48}\)

The experience of the United States armed forces in Vietnam was trying due to the ambiguity of the conflict and the blurred differentiation between combatants and civilians in it. The troops felt a painful loss of American public support for military operations. As part of a US civil-military rapprochement, the Weinberger Doctrine in the 1980s declared the US would limit engagements to those with identified purpose and enemy, public support, sufficient commitment of forces for timely achievement of ends and likelihood of success.\(^{49}\) Since Vietnam, some American military thinkers have embraced the idea of military operations other than war, but others advocate an all or nothing approach to war.

American military planners have had to grapple with changes in the character of conflict as they developed US approaches to execution and consolidation of military action. The US military has constructed institutional adaptations to address unconventional warfare and operations other than war (OOTW) as part of a broader institutional transformation. Military adaptation can be shaped by developments in civil institutional structures, and it can shape them.

Thinking about operations other than war predates the dissolution of the Cold War, but is made more obvious by its end. Moreover, American peace operations as they are formulated today have roots in American military occupations since confederation, including the internal roles for the armed forces in following the American Civil War and the grand projects to seal the


victory won in World War II. It was not so long ago, Martin and Joan Kyre remind us, that the use of peace treaties at the conclusion of hostilities was replaced with military occupations. In 1968, they observed:

The present generation seems to be observing the replacement of major wars by unconventional limited conflicts within which military civil affairs plays a leading role. It may occur that a modernized hybrid version of military occupation will become a standard vehicle of foreign policy.\(^{50}\)

The use of military occupation in some form as a ‘vehicle for foreign policy,’ is a use of coercive authority to generate a more lasting, friendly, and indigenous authority regime. Two tiers of authority relations merit attention. First, foreign military forces in a successful intervention or a victorious war have established one type of authority with respect to the population. Second, as those troops depart a new or reformed state must establish a legitimate authority with respect to the society. This transitional authority would seem to play a significant role in post-conflict transitions, yet one that is difficult to conceptualize under a systemic, state-centric perspective on strategy. Carl Von Clausewitz wrote, “It follows that a transformation in the art of war resulted from a transformation in politics.”\(^{51}\) The construction of a usable peace involves an interface of civil and military considerations. This interface, the civil dimension of strategy, is historically situated.

Recently the civil dimension of strategy has been prominent in US military operations in places like Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. However, the civil dimension of strategy has always been an issue in US civil affairs operations. The context of national policy means that other elements of the civil dimension of strategy are at play in civil affairs operations, including the integration of political and military objectives of operations, military legitimacy at home and abroad, and civil-military relations broadly conceived.

---


\(^{51}\) Clausewitz, *On War*, p.610.
American military doctrine confronting the civil dimension is likewise an evolving framework, if not a new one. In the wake of the post-World War II experience, Americans began to consider seriously a role for the military in shaping the societies in which it was involved through occupation or military intervention. Civil affairs, as a doctrinal referent for United States armed forces civil-military operations, developed out of postwar doctrine on military government.

Civil Affairs

Civil affairs or civil-military operations play an important role when the center of gravity of armed conflict rests in the civil, rather than purely military dimension. Civil affairs can be defined as simply as “the management of military-civilian relationships to the interest of the military and its mission.” These operations are different from warfighting because “their ultimate objective is not to defeat an enemy with overwhelming force, but to achieve political objectives through public support both at home and in the area of operations.”

The term “civil affairs” refers variously to activities or to “the specialized military forces that interface with the civilian population in war and peace.” All US military commanders in


53 I use the terms ‘civil affairs’ and ‘civil military operations’ interchangeably here. The latter term is technically reserved for reference to operations that handle civilians during combat, but is often used as a general reference to civil affairs. To complicate matters, when the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Warfighting Center assessed joint doctrine on civil affairs, they argued that the concept needed to be broadened beyond a focus upon the Army. They suggested renaming the field manual from Civil Affairs to Civil Military Operations. The US Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Corps suggested in May 1998 that the Army field manual be split into two.


charge of operations are responsible for civil affairs. Special Forces (Green Berets) and members of the 10th Mountain Division (infantry) often perform civil affairs tasks. However, a designated occupational specialization called civil affairs (CA) exists in the US Armed Forces today. For example, in 1999 there were 250 Active Component civil affairs soldiers and 5,000 in the Reserve Component of the US Army. There are two civil affairs units in the US Marine Corps Reserve (250 personnel). Also of relevance is a US Air Force Air National Guard unit comprising 400 personnel with legal expertise. Activities, assets, the chain of command and policy framework are explained below.

**US Civil Affairs Activities**

Many different terms have been used over time to describe civil affairs activities. The expression civil affairs is centuries old, but American soldiers during World War II knew civil affairs as a component of military government. Military government is a political order implemented under the condition of military occupation. The 1988 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff *Official Dictionary of Military Terms* sets out three phases of military government:

1. **assault**—That period which commences with first contact with civilians ashore and extends to the establishment of military government control ashore by the landing force.

2. **consolidation**—That period which commences with the establishment of military government control ashore by the landing force and extends to the establishment of control by occupation forces.

---


58 These terms include the following: military government in post W.W.II Germany and Japan; civil rehabilitation in Granada 1983 and Panama 1989-90; civil assistance to foreign government in Kuwait; refugee assistance to Iraq's Kurdish refugees 1991; foreign disaster relief in Bangladesh 1991; domestic disaster relief post-Hurricane Andrew 1993; and support to contingency tactical operations in numerous operations. DoD briefing slide, “Typical Civil Affairs Operations” OASD (SO/LIC) Master 5/15/95.
3. occupation—That period which commences when an area has been occupied in fact, and the military commander within that area is in a position to enforce public safety and order.\(^59\)

Military government attempts to balance humanitarian concerns for civilians and security concerns for the military’s own welfare against enemy forces. The operational environment for US forces conducting military government is typically resource poor, unorganized, and unhealthy, as described below:

Military government runs the gamut of human affairs. It finds a chaotic welter of dazed human beings of all ages; of smashed buildings; shattered communications; hospitals in rubble; empty court rooms; broken water lines; pocked roads; burned food warehouses; shelled churches; destroyed schools; pillaged libraries and looted galleries and museums. Out of this physical and human debris of war it must speedily bring order; establish law; get a government going; provide food, water, shelter, and medical care and carry off wastes; organize and supply labor to itself and the combat forces.\(^60\)

Today debate surrounds a proposal to retitle FM 41-10 Civil Affairs; the US Army field manual, as Civil Military Operations.\(^61\) The latter term has been used in the past to define a subset of civil affairs, specifically the practice of civil affairs to support combat operations.

Operational requirements of civil affairs cover a spectrum of authority. Operations may involve considerable authority, exercising executive, legislative and judicial control when performing civil administration in hostile territory. Operations may involve a lesser degree of authority, involving “only a relationship between the military forces and the civil population, government and institutions of the area” when performing routine military-civilian

---

\(^{59}\) Cambridge: Hemisphere Publishing Co. 1988, p.272. This definition implies that the phases are more discrete than the evidence suggests.

\(^{60}\) Malcolm S. MacLean in Kyre and Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security p. 4.

\(^{61}\) In May 1998, US civil affairs doctrine is without a service proponent. An assessment of joint doctrine concluded that civil affairs concept should be broadened and renamed. United States Special Operations Command responded that if so, civil affairs would no longer be SOCOM responsibility. Civil affairs funding derives from major force program (MFP) 11, budget categories to finance atypical operations, as a result of the Nunn-Cohen amendment in 1987.
Some examples of possible functional areas of activity under the rubric of civil affairs include the following, culled from various US military publications:

- Control of movement of people such as establishment of camps for displaced persons and prisoners of war and issuance of identification cards
- Coordination of public finance such as property control, coordination of development loans, collection of taxes, currency control, rationing, licensing and price controls
- Supervision of civilian activities such as political meetings, rallies and demonstrations
- Labor management including hiring locals and the setting of wages
- Determination of matters relevant to public education including closure or re-establishment of schools, supervision of curricula and the selection of instructors
- Provision of public security functions such as the establishment of police forces
- Control of legal institutions such as the operation of courts and prisons
- Protection of cultural assets such as art, monuments and archives
- Operation of public communications, transportation and public works including electrical water and sewage treatment
- Provision of public welfare including that necessary to meet the nutritional and medical needs of the population

---


63 This list might be interestingly compared to the “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services” currently under draft at the Department of Defense that identifies well over one hundred services for evaluation as to status and need in civil affairs operations. My list here reflects reading of numerous editions of Army and Joint field manuals, but most especially a reading of United States Army US Army Military History Institute, Civil Affairs School *Doctrinal Study on the Theater Army: Civil Affairs Command* (Fort Gordon, Georgia, 15 August, 1959).
US Civil Affairs Assets and Institutional Framework

Although all US military services confront the civil dimension, the US Army is the service primarily responsible for civil affairs. In contrast to the Navy and Air Force, the Army “moves in an environment that is peopled, and the enemy is immediate, individual, and personal.”64 The Army is “the force that protects and controls populations, restores order and facilitates the transition from hostilities to peace.”65

Specialized Civil Affairs assets are designated Special Operations Forces (SOF). Thus, the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) is responsible for joint (more than one military service) civil affairs strategy, doctrine and tactics. In conflict, the US military switches to operational command channels. USCINCSOC obtains combatant command (command authority) over US Army civil affairs forces.66 The theater commander in chief (CINC) is responsible for civil affairs activity in the operational area.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) has been the principal civilian advisor on US civil affairs policy and planning since that office was created in the late 1980s. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.67 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides civil affairs guidance to commanders of geographic Unified Combatant Commands and advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

---

64 James E. King, Jr., Civil Affairs: The Future Prospect of a Military Responsibility, Operations Research Office CAMG Paper, no. 3 (June 1958), p. 4. An important exception to Army responsibility is the administration of islands by the US Navy, for example, in the Caribbean in the early decades of this century.


66 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs 21 June, 1995, ix.

Institutional Dilemma

There is an institutional dilemma for civil affairs. Many in the US military believe, as Harry Summers has testified, that "the main purpose of a peacetime military establishment is to prepare for the day when armed forces might have to be used against a first class enemy." Army leaders have never welcomed the civil affairs function, but viewed these operations as necessary to realization of victory. "The Army is not a welfare organization," wrote a leader of postwar Allied Military Government, but then again, "lack of a condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort." General Fred C. Weyland complained in 1977 that civil affairs was neglected: "[T]oo much of our effort has been devoted to coping with outside pressures trying to emasculate Civil Affairs...they don't understand that we can't win without it."

There is little institutional incentive for soldiers to specialize in civil affairs. First, aside from active corps Civil Affairs Battalion, CA specialists are primarily located in the lesser status Reserve Corps. Second, a specialization in civil affairs is not generally viewed as a step toward career advancement. Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre relay anecdotally that transfer to a military government company during World War II was a punishment for incompetence. The institutional dilemma has been summarized as follows:

CA seems always to be wavering between two worlds: conventional versus special operations missions, a peacetime versus wartime chain of command, and

---


70 It is not clear exactly who 'they' or 'the outside pressures' are. Presumably, Weyland means other elements in the US armed forces. Addressing the Annual Civil Affairs Conference at Charleston, South Carolina, May 14, 1977 in Swarm, "Impact of the Proconsular Experience on Civil Affairs Organization and Doctrine," in Robert Wolfe, (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls. pp. 414-415.

active versus reserve component control. It has no champion, no sponsor, and therefore, in spite of its great potential, tends to be lumped together with the ‘ash and trash’ units.\textsuperscript{72}

**TRANSITION INFLUENCES**

Civil affairs in post-conflict environments attempt to complete the Clausewitzian loop, or rather, to progress along the helix depicted in figure 4 into a policy mode. If the use of force was an extension of policy, civil affairs and reconstruction bring policy back in. Soldiers may temporarily become governors, as part of a deeper transition. This focus situates analysis at an interesting juncture of policy and force. The elements commingle in the 1993 US Army Field Manual:

- CA missions are dynamic because they are directly affected by politico-military considerations. A change of national security policy or strategy may alter the nature of a CA mission.\textsuperscript{73}

It is intuitively obvious that the mode of force in the aftermath of war should differ from the mode of force in war. The proposition applies not only to the so-called classical interstate wars as they were fought between major powers, but also to military interventions including those labeled peace operations. It remains to be articulated how the mode of force might shift, and under what conditions. For example, environment and intentions are two likely variables affecting the use of force in post-conflict scenarios.

Presumably characteristics of the environment will shape the conduct of foreign forces operating in it. The extent of infrastructure damage sustained during conflict, the intensity of the conflict, and the related issue of the relations between the host country and the United States will in part determine the challenges for US civil affairs. Pre-existing characteristics of the nation’s social order will also condition the environment. Environmental factors include the following:


\textsuperscript{73} FM41-10 Jan. 1993, p.3-1.
whether the nation had been hostile or friendly to the intervening power, the physical damage created by insertion of external military forces, the nation's economic, social and political structure, and the presence of acceptable and effective leadership within the target country.\textsuperscript{74}

The political intentions for which the armed forces are employed will presumably govern their conduct.\textsuperscript{75} These intentions are set at the highest levels. At one extreme is the intention to conquer, in which case armed forces seek to annex territory. Military operations aim to integrate conquered peoples. At another extreme is the intention to observe a cease fire or peace agreement, in which case lightly armed forces seek to remain impartial.\textsuperscript{76} In between these extremes are the examples of major interstate wars in this century. The victors in these wars did not wish to permanently govern defeated states, but to fashion particular forms of states upon defeated territory. Unilateral interventions are not typically accompanied by formal declaration of war or concluded by peace agreement. But as in the aftermath of interstate war, the action of intervening troops be consistent with the post-conflict objectives of their political leaders.

**Conclusion**

The argument presented here is that civil-military issues rise and fall within operations, but also that these processes shift over time. International conflict has changed in form, some say. Conflict is increasingly manifest not as interstate war with clear differentiation between combatants and civilians, but as complex operations other than war. American attitudes toward militarism can be presumed to have likewise undergone transformation.

\textsuperscript{74} A defeated state is more likely than a failed state to possess local human and material resources for reconstruction.

\textsuperscript{75} The proposition establishes the role of a nation's military force in the aftermath of conflict as a foreign policy problem. One might inject into this approach another level, and examine domestic American influences on foreign policy objectives. Marc Peceny, for example, has weighed the influence of a liberal American Congress against considerations of stability in the international system as determinants of American efforts to democratize after intervention. Marc Peceny, "Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy During US Military Interventions," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995): 371-401. Deborah Avant identified structural characteristics of American and British political systems as influencing the ability of their militaries to adapt to the requirements of operations other than war. Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994).

\textsuperscript{76} Arguably, states contributing troops to traditional peacekeeping operations employ military force toward a vision of political order in the target territory.
Civil affairs seem to be two things at once: civil-military in an institutional sense, and civil-military in an operational sense. Toward a fuller understanding of these meanings, the next chapter returns to Clausewitz, to examine the formulation of war as the continuation of politics by other means from two perspectives in political science: civil-military relations and strategic studies.
The American imperative of a usable peace is to establish a post-conflict order that is congenial to US national interest. This imperative is very Clausewitzian: to ensure that the use of force serves policy. As the last chapter demonstrated, Carl Von Clausewitz provided a formulaic relationship of force and policy that is reciprocal and dynamic.

Two streams of political science scholarship in this century have carried forward Clausewitz’ theme, that war is a continuation of policy by other means. These streams have carried the formula’s meaning, in parts, and along different paths. One stream, predominantly comparative, is concerned with *civil-military relations*. Another stream, predominantly prescriptive, is concerned with *strategic studies*, specifically the warfighting process.

This chapter explains how the formula applies in civil-military relations and strategic studies literatures and how these literatures apply to issues in civil affairs operations. Although civil-military relations scholarship has done little to directly address civil affairs, these operations create controversial roles for the military. Strategists are familiar with civil affairs as ‘operations other than war,’ that occur in a zone between war and peace. Civil affairs are part of American unconventional warfare strategy that posits a role for military forces in nation building.

**Themes**

The streams of inquiry in political science that apply the Clausewitz formula in different ways have likely picked up on a duality in the formula itself. Clausewitz did not pretend to present a dichotomous relationship between war and policy. As Samuel Huntington observes, Clausewitz embraced a duality in the nature of war in relation to policy:

[W]ar is at one and the same time an autonomous science with its own method and goals and yet a subordinate science in that its ultimate purposes come from outside itself.¹

---

Two general propositions emerge from the Clausewitzian formula. The first is that policy and force exist in a hierarchical relationship in which the civil dimension dominates. This theme is treated at length in civil-military relations literature. This body of scholarship treats the relative power of those institutions within the state as a dependent variable. The second proposition is that war is a continuation, a next step or progression of policy. This theme is implicit in a separate strategic literature on the nature of war and escalation across a spectrum of conflict. Figure 6 illustrates the basic divisions:

Figure 6
Two Interpretations of the Clausewitzian Formula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Comparison</th>
<th>Civil-Military Relations</th>
<th>Strategic Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the relationship between policy and force?</strong></td>
<td>Hierarchical: policy ends rule the means; civilians govern the use of force</td>
<td>Progressive: policy moves into a military domain with the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How might one portray the relationship between civil and military realms?</strong></td>
<td>Civil military</td>
<td>Civil → military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the locus of study in the literature?</strong></td>
<td>Institutions: structure and character, interference by one into another</td>
<td>Conflict: process and means, escalation of intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the dependent variable to be explained?</strong></td>
<td>Distribution of power in domestic context</td>
<td>Achievement of victory in foreign territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How would civil affairs operations be described?</strong></td>
<td>Phenomenon in which soldiers act as governors in foreign territory</td>
<td>A form of ‘operations other than war’ or ‘low intensity conflict’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These perspectives are both relevant to understanding US civil affairs. Civil affairs functions are civil-political in a manner relevant to civil-military relations scholarship; they are military in a manner relevant to scholarship on the nature of conflict. The two literatures can then be compared both as to the influence of Clausewitz in each, and on the basis of their relevance to civil affairs.
Clausewitz depicted an institutional trinity composed of the people, the armed forces and the government as relevant to the process of war. The hierarchical primacy Clausewitz gave to policy over war may be interpreted as a corollary to the relationship between political and military institutions. As Martin van Creveld puts it, "if war was to be subordinated to politics, it would also have to be subordinated to politicians." Such is the focus of scholarship on civil-military relations. Civil-military relations has been broadly defined as "that complex of behavior in which civilian and military interaction takes place and, as such, may encompass political, economic or cultural interaction." The study of civil-military relations supposes two realms—one is civil, "of or belonging to citizens; non-military," the other is military, "of or characteristic of soldiers or armed forces." The military may be considered as concrete organizational structures, or, as Davis Bobrow suggests, it may be viewed as "an 'analytic structure' whose members have that status as they are primarily concerned with external coercive threats and coercive instruments to handle them." Civil-military relations scholarship has generally sought to examine the balance of power between civil and military institutions.

---


3 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 43. Van Creveld argued that in the post-Napoleonic era, it became increasingly difficult to concentrate military and state affairs in the hands of one person, and was commenting about a power struggle between Molike and Bismark.


6 The former is more useful to studies on military intervention; the latter more useful to studies on militarism.

7 Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, use the word "equilibrium" in "American Civil-Military Relations: A Review of the Recent Literature," in US Civil-military relations: In Crisis or Transition? ed. Don M. Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995):201 - 224, p. 201. Empirically oriented comparative scholars of civil-military relations have developed a variety of criteria to measure the level of military influence in civilian affairs. Three general areas of civilian control of the military were described in 1970 by M.D. Feld: the recruitment and indoctrination of officers (reflecting the composition of society), the allocation of status (accountability), and the determination of goals. M.D. Feld, "Professionalism and
Civil affairs operations of the American armed forces are indeed civil-military in nature, and historically controversial. In military government soldiers act as governors in occupied territory after the conclusion of formal hostilities. This extreme expression of civil affairs doctrine is effectively military rule over civilians, albeit foreign civilians. Nonetheless, civil affairs have received mention in scholarship on civil-military relations only recently and then, indirectly as a part of a controversy over the civil-military mix of roles for US military forces in peace operations.

The Civil-Military Problematique

Civil-military relations scholarship has traditionally been concerned with a pathology of governance, the problem of military overthrow of civilian government. It is praetorian rule, government by a nation’s own military forces, rather than rule by a foreign military force, that has to date preoccupied civil-military relations scholars. For American scholars this concern has been comparative, that is, a study of countries other than the United States.

---


The Clausewitzian imperative that soldiers must be subordinate to civilian authority – civilized control – is the defining principle of the field. The ‘problematique’ of civil-military relations arises from an internal security dilemma. Strong military forces might usurp civilian authority, but weak military forces are inadequate to protect society against external threat. Society delegates coercive power to the institutions of its armed forces to secure itself against external threat, but must ensure civilian control of the institutional depository of coercion. Due to civilian reliance on military protection and expertise, civilian control has been defined as “even in the best of circumstances... a chancy thing; under ordinary conditions a convention, and in critical times an unwarranted luxury.”

American scholar Samuel Huntington has presented the most widely accepted model of civilian control. Key components of Huntington’s model include military specialization, professionalism and a separation between military and civilian spheres, including non-intervention by one into the other. Huntington’s theory on military professionalism assumes that military forces are dedicated to external as opposed to internal defense. Professionalization

---


12 Huntington credits Clausewitz for creating the “theoretical rationale” for professionalization of the military. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. See Machiavelli by way of contrast, that military affairs “ought not to be followed as a profession by any but princes or commonwealths; if they are wise, they will allow none of their subjects to make it his sole occupation.” Excerpted in “The Professional Soldier and the State” in Wilson C. McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in New States (San Francisco: Chandler, 1976). According to Samuel Finer, professionalization is “necessary but not sufficient” for civilian control. The Man on Horseback, p.57.

is essential to the concept of objective civilian control, which focuses upon separate institutional roles.¹⁴

Some disagree with Huntington's insistence upon separating the spheres, arguing that interaction between military and civilian institutions may be a more effective structure for healthy civil-military relations.¹⁵ Peter Feaver observes that even prominent critics of Huntington agree in principle with a division of labor between what is civilian and what is military.¹⁶ Huntington acknowledged that a politicized military might be subordinated by means of subjective control if the armed forces adhere to the ideology of the ruling civilian regime. However, he argued for a system of objective control in which a non-politicized military will likely be too busy with technical considerations to be concerned with political affairs.

Even stable countries like the United States experience tensions in civil-military relations, although in issues of less consequence than the primary concern of coup d'état.¹⁷ Civilian and military leaders may hold different perspectives on national security questions, such as what threats to counter, whether to go to war, and what tools and approaches are best to achieve the purposes of war.¹⁸ The decision to go to war puts military lives on the line, and military leaders


¹⁵ Morris Janowitz, in the 1960s and more recently Rebecca Schiff, for example, argue for a more integrated civil-military relations. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1960), p. 148. Rebecca Schiff complains that the ethnocentric view of American theorists of civil-military relations has caused them to overlook more integrated approaches that are nevertheless stable, citing Israel and India as examples. Schiff criticizes current civil-military relations theory for its emphasis on institutions to the neglect of cultural and sociological factors. Schiff, "A Theory of Concordance," pp. 3-4. R.D. McKinlay views the association with civilian control an unduly narrow definition for discussion of the political dimension of civil-military relations, and the mode or level and motivation of military political activity matter as much as the means of political control. See McKinlay, "Professionalization."

¹⁶ Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force," p.117. Even Rebecca Schiff's theory of "concordance" analytically separates the military from the political leadership and citizenry. As Feaver points out, "if the spheres are not at least analytically distinct, the theory is no longer about civil-military relations." Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," p. 168. Finer is the most prominent critic of Huntington, having argued that Huntington's civilian control becomes tautological, that when armies accept civilian control they will not reject civilian control. Finer, *Man on Horseback*, 24-27. See also Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

¹⁷ See Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," in which Feaver incorporates secondary issues into a framework of civil-military relations.

¹⁸ These categories are discussed also in M.D. Feld, "Professionalism and Politicization," 275-6.
understandably seek to influence political leaders to adopt their institutional perspective on national security. As the US executive branch has centralized its control of civilian decision-making on national security, the US armed services matched that centralization with more sophisticated efforts to influence the White House.\textsuperscript{19}

An effective military is presumably influential. Deborah Avant argues that military influence in domestic politics is partly a function of how well the military adapts to changes in the strategic environment.\textsuperscript{20} She argues that particularly after Vietnam and in the early post Cold War, there were prominent American civilians who believed that the military did not understand the strategic environment, and that the military was not taking accurate cues from foreign policy. This concern with ways in which the distribution of power among domestic institutions drives military doctrine is a popular theme in recent academic literature on military doctrine. In a similar vein, Elizabeth Kier has written,

\begin{quote}
Indeed, it is the distribution of power at the domestic level, and the military’s organizational culture that structures civilian and military preferences.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The military possesses specialized knowledge. Civilian leaders may be well educated regarding military affairs, but tend to depend upon military advice.\textsuperscript{22} In this regard it is noteworthy that the most significant legislation in American defense policy—the National Security Act of 1947 and 1949, and the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier}, pp. 363-367. Nuclear strategy in particular concentrated the decision authority in the executive, due to the nature of the weapons in question. The Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s established the National Security Council to bring together key officials like the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as an observer). The National Security Council was the most important forum of deliberation during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.


\textsuperscript{22} Increasing numbers of civilian strategists in think tanks and universities have opened American strategic discourse beyond military circles. See Colin Gray, \textit{Strategic Studies: An Assessment} (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982).
\end{flushright}
Goldwater-Nichols Act) -- adjust the flow of military advice to civilian leaders.\(^{23}\) Goldwater-Nichols streamlined advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to civilian leaders, but also had the effect of increasing the autonomy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commanders in Chief of Unified Commands (CINC). In 1986 the US Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.\(^{24}\) The act was reportedly “drafted entirely by military staff officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the committee staffs.”\(^{25}\) Edward Luttwak called the Act the biggest Washington scandal by far...The Great Pentagon Reform has since shown us that the only thing worse than interservice rivalry is interservice harmony.\(^{26}\)

In time of conflict, the “caste expertise” of the professional military seems a rationale for an influence shift away from civilian leadership. When the armed forces are asked to implement policy, civilian control in civil-military relations becomes a question of *operational control* of the armed forces in the field. Although it is in war that some argue civilian control is most needed, military commanders tend to prefer freedom of action. The supremacy of civilian leadership in operations is and has long been highly contested. Although the primacy of politics suggests a primacy of civilian institutions, “war is too important to be left to the generals,”\(^{27}\) numerous generals have thought otherwise. According to Raymond Aron, German military leaders went so far as to falsify the second edition of *On War* in order to justify more freedom of

---

\(^{23}\) According to Avant, the expansion of congressional staffs in the 1970s weakened the dependency of Congress upon military advice. The rise of congressional interest in national security policy made civilian control more difficult: “Army leaders used congressional interest in military affairs to insulate themselves from presidents' attempts at intervention.” Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, p. 30.

\(^{24}\) Public Law 99-433 was sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) and Congressman Bill Nichols (D.-Ala.) and is known as “Goldwater-Nichols.” In war, the Service Secretaries hand forces over to a geographic CINC (CINCCENT in the Gulf War) that are returned to service control after the conflict. The CINC for Special Operations (CINCSOC) is CINC of a functional command, and handles unconventional tasks such as civil affairs.


\(^{27}\) See SE Finer's discussion of war as an opportunity for the military to intervene. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp.64-66.
action for themselves. Max Manwaring takes the notion from Clausewitz that the goal of policy is the “destruction of an opponent’s military forces or the means for waging war,” to mean “it is the military that *dominates* to create conditions that other means could not make.” Military decisions in conflict often have political consequences. After conflict, military forces often assume directly political roles in territory under their control.

**Soldiers as Governors**

Control or authority of soldiers over foreign territory and people adds a new set of ingredients into the civil-military mix. American civil affairs doctrine today is still, in the minds of many, associated with military occupation. According Adam Roberts, a working definition of military occupation is

---

28 According to Raymond Aron, Chapter Six of Book Eight of Clausewitz’ *On War* was falsified after the second edition. In it, Clausewitz advocated persistent cabinet-level intervention in operations. The wording was changed to imply that Clausewitz advocated freedom of action, a doctrine he in fact explicitly rejects: “...Clausewitz contemplates the possibility of the sovereign and the commander-in-chief not being united in one and the same person. It is then appropriate, he writes, that the war leader (Feldherr) should become a member of the cabinet in order that the latter could participate at decisive times in the action of the former. It was enough in German to replace ‘es’ (das Kabinett) with ‘er’ (der Feldherr) to give the passage a meaning completely contrary to the author’s intention.” Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, tans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 105.


the armed forces of a State exercising some kind of domination or authority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their State and its dependencies.\textsuperscript{31}

The United States, like most military occupants in this century, has not acknowledged its status as an occupier since post-World War II occupations came to a close. A "juridical gap" divides state practice and the international law of occupation set out in Hague and Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{32} Although it would serve to legitimate military operations to evoke international legal frameworks, the international law of occupation brings unwelcome encumbrances. There

\textsuperscript{31} Adam Roberts, "What is a Military Occupation?" \textit{British Yearbook of International Law} 1984. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 249-305, p. 300. Definitions of occupation vary. The Hague Regulations focused upon belligerent occupation: "[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army." (Art. 42 of \textit{Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land} Signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. ENTRY INTO FORCE: 26 January 1910 gopher://gopher.law.cornell.edu/00/foreign/fletcher/HA07-IV.txt) The Geneva Conventions in 1949 expanded the definition to apply even when occupation "meets with no armed resistance." The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff describes military occupation as a situation in which "territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force." US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), \textit{Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs}, Joint Publication 3-57, 21 June 1995, GL-7. Eyal Benvenisti defines occupation as "the effective control of a power (be it one or more states or an international organization, such as the United Nations) over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory." Eyal Benvenisti, \textit{The International Law of Occupation} Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 4. Although there are limited purposes for which a state may send troops to another, the legal validity of military intervention by invitation is disputed by Louise Doswald-Beck, "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government," \textit{British Yearbook of International Law} 1985, 56, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 189-252. Presumably also, then, is the invitation to occupy, removing violation of consent from the criteria used to define an occupation. Another reading is dramatically more limited: "Technically, the law of military occupation becomes effective when the actual battle line has passed and the enemy population is clearly within the territory belonging to the invading army. The precise moment at which legal occupation replaces the former law of the country may be difficult to determine." Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre, \textit{Military Government and National Security} (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p.5. The occupation question is commonly discussed in the Pentagon. The best guess is that the US decides for itself if it is an occupation. The United States prefers an "invitation" to enter. [Various interviews] The United States can decide not to occupy as in Iraq or, more frequently, establish control but decide not to declare an occupation.

\textsuperscript{32} Guttieri, Karen. "Symptom of the Moment: A Juridical Gap for US Occupation Forces." \textit{International Insights} 13,4 (fall 1997): 131-156. A juridical gap might exist where new technology, such as telecommunications, presents a frontier about which a body of law has yet to be developed. In this case, I refer to a juridical gap in which state practice does not acknowledge the application of existing legal frameworks. This is not to say that field manuals of the United States armed forces do not make reference to international conventions on armed conflict, which they do, or that soldiers routinely violate the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Rather, I am noting that policymakers do not acknowledge their status as military occupants in instances that meet characteristics accepted by legal scholars. If the credibility of international law is dependent upon both enforcement and obedience, public international law with regard to occupation suffers a credibility problem. Davis P. Goodman, "The Need for a Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation," \textit{Stanford Law Review}, Vol. 37, No. 6, (July 1985), pp. 1573-1608, p. 1573.
are at least four reasons why American officials today are likely to find acknowledgment of 
military occupation problematic:

1. Acknowledging occupation is tantamount to acknowledging imperialism.

2. The international framework of The Hague and Geneva Conventions was 
developed for application after interstate wars and is awkward to apply outside 
that context.\(^{33}\)

3. The international legal framework allows an occupying power to create new 
administrative bodies, but does not permit the occupant to construct new 
ingeniadous government, or remove an undesirable sovereign (defined as 
resting in the leadership regime) as the Americans have sometimes desired to 
do.\(^{34}\)

4. Alternatively, the so-called powers of the occupant to administer territory can 
be viewed as unwanted responsibilities.\(^{35}\) As the welfare state has become an 
international phenomenon, Hague convention responsibilities have become 
more taxing.

The US armed forces have typically resisted civil affairs roles. James King calls the 
history of American military government “an example of unanticipated challenge and reluctant 
response.”\(^{36}\) Military reluctance is further reflected in the subtitle to a US Army volume that 
reviewed American civil affairs experience after World War II: “The Army Must Take on an 

\(^{33}\)For example, what is a 'prisoner of war' if war is not declared?

\(^{34}\) The early conventions -- drawn by sovereigns -- assumed sovereign governments in exile to be stable. Moreover, 
they were “taken seriously.” The framework for the documents was the Rousseau-Portales doctrine that viewed 
occupations as both provisional and inviolate of the sovereignty of the deseised sovereign. The occupying power 
may obtain de facto sovereignty, but the ousted sovereign retains it de jure. Davis P. Goodman, “The Need for a 
Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation,” p. 1579, also Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law 
of Occupation*, p. 29; for a critique of the Rousseau Portales Doctrine, pp. 27-28.

\(^{35}\) For this reason, international legal scholars present conflicting views regarding the powers of the occupant in 
general, whether these powers have expanded over time or whether they have been severely constrained. 
Benvenisti argues that the powers of occupants have expanded over time, Demarest takes the position that armed 
forces are severely constrained. Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*; LTC Geoffrey Demarest,  
“The Strategic Implications of Operational Law.”

Research Office (The Johns Hopkins University Operating under Contract with the Department of the Army, June 
Uncongenial Task. Military writers insist that civilian unpreparedness for post-conflict tasks of reconstruction left the chore to them. "It is not that the military has some deep-set desire to increase its power," claim Johnson and Metz, "but rather that it feels compelled to do so." In the aftermath of World War II, American civilian leaders in Washington were reluctant to take on an administrative role in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and gave deference to the armed forces ability to maintain order. As James King Jr. explained:

It was only when the Army found itself in possession of former enemy territory after the termination of active hostilities that the absence or unacceptability of local government called the function of military government into existence.

More recently, Gordon Rudd concludes from his study of the US effort to provide relief to the Kurdish people of Northern Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War,

the capacity of military forces to provide immediate relief on a vast scale to resolve a crisis situation significantly exceeds that of civilian organizations primarily oriented for such tasks.

Those who have written on American civil military relations have taken surprisingly little interest in the role American generals have played in making peace. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington discussed military government and military advisory groups (MAG) to nations receiving foreign assistance as examples of conjoint positions, "combining military and political

---


40 King, Civil Affairs, p.1.


42 McKinlay observes: "Bismark never permitted his generals even to play a role in treaty making, whereas after World War 2 the American generals not only played a major role in treaty making but also in the subsequent rehabilitation program, cf. the Marshall Plan, and indeed in American politics generally." McKinlay, "Professionalization," p.253.
functions."\textsuperscript{43} Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, remarked that "the American people will never take kindly to the idea of government exercised by military officers."\textsuperscript{44} Nonetheless, Huntington saw military governance as a temporary problem with respect to separation of functions, and conjoint positions, which he accurately predicted would increase in importance, should not, said Huntington, "present insoluble difficulties."\textsuperscript{45}

Civil-military relations literature, to recap the discussion above, does not directly addresses the problem of soldiers as governors of foreign peoples, but confronts relevant problems. The first is the problem of civilian control, the subordination of military forces to civilian rule. A professional military sphere separate from the civilian realm tends to remain subordinate to civilian authority. Military leaders can influence civilian policy makers in the determination of ends, more specifically, strategic assessment and roles and missions. Military leaders desire clear mission statements from political leadership.

Clear mission statements are difficult to deliver in unconventional conflicts, in which the line between peace and war is not clearly drawn. The next section reviews the strategic studies stream of scholarship that focuses on conflict processes and the requirements of victory. The United States military was involved in ideological struggle and direct military interventions during the Cold War, and military interventions under the rubric of peace operations in the 1990s. Strategic studies analysts who categorize these conflicts have observed the importance of the civil dimension in them. The prominence of what Huntington called ‘conjoint’ positions, then, has had to do with particular conflict forms that US troops have encountered.

\textsuperscript{43} A role for military forces in domestic reform is considered at length in Samuel Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p.355.

\textsuperscript{44} Earl F. Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” in Robert Wolfe, (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, pp. 52 - 66, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{45} Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 356-7.
As discussed above, the relationship between policy and force is hierarchical when these constructs are manifest in civil and military institutions. However, one can also view policy and force as evolving from one to the other. To say that force is instrumental implies that it is one instrument of policy among many, a form of policy that “takes up the sword in place of the pen.”\textsuperscript{46} Clausewitz said, “As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form.”\textsuperscript{47} The language of strategic studies, and typologies of conflict in particular, illustrate the implicit progression of policy and force.

In order to determine military requirements against potential threats, American military analysts have developed terminology to distinguish among conflicts. Flexible response doctrine developed under the Kennedy Administration in the 1960s, for example, would require military forces to be prepared to respond with appropriate force at various levels of conflict. By setting out conflict scenarios in a spectrum ending in nuclear exchange with another superpower, military analysts can recommend appropriate weapons and actions. In his study of low-intensity conflict, Claude Sturgill provides a seventeen-item checklist of escalation.\textsuperscript{48} The critical difference in Sturgill’s list between low-intensity conflict and “real war” is that in real war outside foreign powers send on large number of troops and exchange fire. Sam Sarkesian’s depiction of a conventional conflict spectrum is replicated below in Figure 5. In this illustration, conflicts short of war are ‘operations other than war’ (OOTW), divided into categories including shows of force and ‘low intensity conflict’ (LIC).

\textsuperscript{46} ibid.


Figure 5
Conflict Spectrum—Conventional View

Level of Intensity in Policy Terms
Low \[\rightleftharpoons\] High

Operations Other Than War
Non-combat \[\rightleftharpoons\] Low-Intensity \[\rightleftharpoons\] Conventional War \[\rightleftharpoons\] Nuclear War

Shows of Force
Special Operations \[\rightleftharpoons\] Limited or Major
Low-Intensity Conflict

The transition to peace after conflict evokes American military doctrine relevant to operations other than war (OOTW) or “other military operations.” Other terms currently used are “small scale contingency” and “stability and support operations.” Contingencies that are not combat, combat preparation or deterrence-focused tend to be ill defined. These operations are conducted in a “gray area” between peace and war. Those conflicts below the threshold of conventional war but above the threshold of a show of force are the most contentious in

49 Adapted from Sam C. Sarkesian, *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* 2nd ed. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p.34. However, Sarkesian revises this spectrum because of a “reshaping” of the middle area “to focus primarily on humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacemaking missions under the rubric of coalition strategies and United Nations operations.” The current administration has overlooked, according to Sarkesian, the potential for any of these contingencies to become an unconventional conflict.

50 The OOTW category is general thought to include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, refugee control, foreign internal defense and development (IDAD), disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuations (NEO), counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism. See Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters, *Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army* (Arroyo Center: RAND Report No. MR-566-A, 1995), p. 2. Sources in the US defense establishment familiar with doctrinal reviews have suggested the possibility that the name for operations will change to ‘stability and support.’

American strategy today. Even the choice of words to describe these conflicts has been controversial.

Operations Other Than War

One observer has noted, “[m]uch bureaucratic blood was spilled in arguments over the definition of what actually constitutes low-intensity conflict.”52 The Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the concept, which became prominent in the 1970s, in 1985 as follows:

Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives...Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.53

The terminology of conflict short of war is not fixed.54 Sarkesian’s review of the various terms associated with unconventional conflict over time include the following: “insurgency, counterinsurgency, special warfare, guerrilla warfare, wars of national liberation, people’s wars, and internal conflicts...special operations, low-intensity conflict, small wars, low-level wars, operations short of war, and secret armies.”55 Low-intensity conflict is usually described as somewhere below conventional war and above “the routine, peaceful competition among

---


On the one hand, these definitions seem vague. On the other hand, it is arguable that the ambiguous nature of these conflicts themselves makes a precise definition difficult.

Manwaring provides a conception of limited war that shares common features with Sarkesian's conception of unconventional conflict. For Manwaring, limited war is a broad term that can describe very different types of conflict. Manwaring lists the following five: peacetime contingency operations, peacekeeping efforts, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and limited interstate conflicts. Unconventional conflicts are usually limited for the United States and total war for the other side, making them "asymmetrical." Furthermore, unconventional conflicts are tactically unconventional, ambiguous, and loaded with political and moral elements. For this reason, Sarkesian revises the conflict spectrum to separate special operations from low-intensity conflict. Although special operations are unconventional, "short duration, a specific focus, an identifiable target, and a quick strike/withdrawal" characterize them. In contrast, low-intensity conflict requires attention to the socio-political milieu, the civil dimension.

What, then, is appropriate strategy given the nature of unconventional conflict? American unconventional conflict strategy has emphasized infrastructure and institutions. This view follows in the vein of scholarship emphasizing the importance of "effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action" to "political order in changing societies." Therefore, military requirement in unconventional war is not to gain territory, but popular support. In low intensity conflicts, as in counterinsurgency campaigns, the center of gravity is not enemy armed forces in war, but in civilian populations in operations other than war. American counterinsurgency strategy "focuses on building viable political,

59. Huntington defined a civic culture as having highly developed institutions relative to group politicization. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968.
economic, military and social institutions that respond to the needs of society." Institutions are the key to reconstruction accompanying contemporary forward presence (or low intensity conflict) operations as they were key to nation building accompanying Cold War era counterinsurgency campaigns such as in Vietnam and later in El Salvador.

The writing of Sun Tzu is considered more relevant to unconventional conflict because it emphasizes "deception, psychological warfare, and moral influence." The application of indirect force is meant to achieve lasting, rather than short-term change. Following Sun Tzu, strategy in unconventional conflicts emphasizes the use of moral power to undermine the legitimacy of the opposing force. The strategy focuses upon "winning the hearts and minds" of the populace. Shifting the emphasis from military violence to the legitimacy struggle enables achievement of "total objectives (e.g., the overthrow of a government) instead of simply attempting to obtain leverage and influence for "better terms" in the classical dimension."

Sarkesian observes that Clausewitzian principles "place the center of gravity within the armed forces of the state," and so do not necessarily rule unconventional conflict. One more step is needed. The center of gravity in unconventional conflicts may be in the people, but the objective of nation building is to channel conflict into a venue with rules, that is, state institutions that permit non-violent resolution of contests over resources and values. Although Manwaring is ostensibly arguing that the principles of Clausewitz do not apply, he achieves the opposite:


63 Sarkesian, US National Security, p.41. Sun Tzu also advised military commanders to ignore the sovereign. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's biography of Sun Tzu tells a story in which Sun Tzu tells his sovereign: "Having once received His Majesty's commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." SHI CHI, ch. 65 quoted in "Sun Wu and his Book" Lionel Giles, trans., ed., "Sun Tzu and the Art of War," http://www.kimsoft.com/polwar03.htm [kimsoft.com/polwar03.htm] (downloaded January 20, 1999).

64 Manwaring, "Limited War and Conflict Control," p. 60

[V]irtually all the conflict the world has experienced since the end of World War II do not appear to have been merely tools of policy—they were policy.\textsuperscript{66}

In other words, these conflicts were, as Clausewitz insisted, political. These conflicts have been about "who gets what, when and how."\textsuperscript{67} Matthew Klimov placed the root question of any conflict in blunt terms of "who rules when the fighting stops."\textsuperscript{68} The question refers to the outcome for the inhabitants of the conflict zone, but is also pertinent to a victorious outside power or a military intervention force. Military intervention forces seek to establish internal control in the area of operations, albeit for their external purposes. As would the leaders of a military coup, the American government deploys military force to create what Huntington has called "transitory order." Huntington said that military assets include "some capacity for generating at least transitory order....":

The coup is the extreme exercise of direct action against political authority, but it is also the means of ending other types of reconstituting political authority. In a situation of escalating conflict the military coup thus has the immediate effect of reducing the level of participation, inducing the withdrawal from the streets of the competing social forces, and producing a feeling of relief and harmony.\textsuperscript{69}

Whether the consequence is intended or not, control of territory by an external military will cast a shadow upon the legitimacy, with respect to the effective sovereignty, of a state.\textsuperscript{70} De facto occupying powers exhibit little desire for de jure status. Publics tend to resent an occupation army.\textsuperscript{71} To replace rule by an indigenous cadre of military leaders with control by a

\textsuperscript{66} Manwaring, "Limited War and Conflict Control," pp. 59-76.


\textsuperscript{69} Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies}, p.217.

\textsuperscript{70} A comment on the sovereignty of Haiti is a good example: "...we must understand that we have temporarily taken over Haiti's sovereignty...let's not kid ourselves: full sovereignty will not be restored until all foreign troops depart. Gabriel Marcella, \textit{Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, October 20, 1994), p.2. Counterbalancing Marcella's point is the comment that because of sovereignty issues, "Once Aristide touched down, no more US Army trucks could be used to haul food," Confidential interview, Washington D.C. 1995.

foreign army, as the US did in the Haiti, Panama or the Dominican Republic, is on one level the replacement of one form of military rule with another. The local political system must wean itself from dependency on American arms. At the same time, it must not regress to indigenous praetorian rule. As the agents of their own state, the American armed forces must work their way out of the job of civil affairs, to make the transition back to policy in the completion of the Clausewitzian Loop.

**Nation-building**

If US military forces are able to persuade a host country population that despite or because of American intervention those people will be better off, the US forces are likely to have an easier time moving through civilian terrain and gathering information about potential threats. These people may have been hoping for domestic political reform and economic progress, and the arrival of American troops might hold out a promise for them. A separate empirical question is whether US interventions have been sincere about promoting democracy or economic welfare for the host country peoples. If American foreign policy truly seeks to promote democracy, its defense policy will seek to consolidate military gains, establish order, and take steps to set the stage for a legitimate indigenous governance regime.

The question here is not only *can* the United States use military force to open windows of opportunity for positive change, but *should* the United States do so? The use of military forces to impose America’s vision of order on other peoples seems a contradiction of American principles of civilian control and anti-imperialism. Harry Summers has argued that using the armed forces for nation building is not practical and unwise for civil-military relations:

...[G]rowing out of civilian academic conceits that one can change the world with the tools of social science, this wrongheaded notion that political, social and economic institutions can be built with the sword flies in the face of not only our
Vietnam experience, but also the centuries-old American model of civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{72}

American strategic thinking about these elements together stems from an historical sociological theory about the role of military forces in nation-building. The language in more recent literature refers to ‘the state’ rather than ‘the nation.’ This language reflects a recognized differentiation between the identity bonds of the nation and the institutional manifestation of the state. The main point of this thinking for civil affairs is that institutions are key to the establishment of a stable peace following intervention.

The nation-building focus in American military doctrine contains a paradox. On the one hand, Americans seem to believe in the importance of building civil institutions of governance for a viable post-conflict order. On the other hand, Americans seem willing to violate the principle that is, according to military historian Robert Coakley, “embedded in American tradition,”\textsuperscript{73} that military forces ought not to impose civil order. United States civil-military structure makes two separations of policy and force:

- American structure separates civil and military institutions.
- American structure separates coercive power for internal and external control.

Historical sociology posits that these institutional structures are contextual. Charles Tilly reminds us that the institutional differentiation between “armed forces oriented to attacks on external enemies (armies) [and] those oriented to control of the national population (police) [is


\textsuperscript{73} Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military forces in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1989), p.3. In the post-revolutionary period, there was early opposition to a standing army for fear of its use against domestic rather than foreign adversaries of a central government. Nonetheless, given the memory of numerous rebellions during the colonial era, pragmatism trumped philosophy in the mandate given the early American militia: “...in truth it was, from its beginnings, also an instrument for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion...” In the early years of the republic the armed forces were involved in many internal disturbances. Their role in the Civil War and Reconstruction was of course their most profound exercise in internal control.
one that] developed only slowly, and never became complete." As applied to United States civil-military relations, the critical element of Tilly's theory is that "extractive apparatuses came to contain and constrain the military forces" as the purse strings of Congress do today. As applied to American attempts to impose stability, the critical element of Tilly's theory is the emphasis upon assisting others to build functional state structures that promote peace (internal order and external defense) and prosperity. The coercive nature of the state is at the heart of this discussion. Two perspectives follow. The first is how that coercion is to be applied. The second is how application of coercion itself shapes the state.

First, the state might be depicted as coercive against and in defense of its own. Scholars have remarked on the Janus face of the state, turned on the one hand toward its peoples and on the other toward its external enemies. According to this view, the arrival of US troops in foreign territory signals a new game of governance. The face of the state turned against an external enemy has failed to prevent the foreign troops from entering. The face of the state turned against its own people may have oppressed them or failed to provide for them. American armed forces in the post-conflict environment in varying degrees assume administrative roles of states that have weakened or collapsed, from without or within.

Robert Jackson has characterized the functional role of the state as 'a protectorate.' As applied to civil affairs, this characterization draws attention to another civil dimension of

---


75 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, p 206.

76 Theda Skocpol cited in Job, Insecurity Dilemma. An illustration of Skocpol's principle may be Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, that grants Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," in Job ed. Insecurity Dilemma, pp.11-36.

strategy, American public support for its military. If the people rely upon military forces for defense, it may be difficult to persuade that population to lend its resources—armed or otherwise—to the restoration of others. During World War II, and in contrast to today, the United States military had a surplus of military personnel. The nation had been mobilized for total war. However, mobilization is costly. Furthermore, if society views warfighting as a matter of using technology, support for mobilization may be less likely. Today most civil affairs personnel are reservists, for the very reason that civilian life provides training that is useful when these personnel are mobilized. One crucial difference between US operations in Somalia and Kuwait was the mobilization of reservists for the latter and—perhaps more greatly—the outpouring of public support to bolster the morale of the troops.

Second, according to historical sociology, the coercive apparatus of the military might be viewed as the stuff of which states are made. Samuel Finer discusses how this had been a factor in the emergence of nation states in Europe. John DePauw observes,

‘The military has played a major role in the emergence of new nations that transcends combat missions and shapes the culture of the society of which it is a part.’

A military role in nation building is justified in this light, and by extension, a foreign military role in nation building. The US military experience in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II lent further credence to this perception. The American experience in Vietnam in the 1960s-1970s, on the other hand, led to US disenchantment with the concept of nation building and a renewed focus on limited conventional engagements endorsed by the American public.

---


Nonetheless, Vietnam was by no means the end of American military interventionism. The persistence of military intervention as a policy mode means the persistence of civil affairs. The relationship between the organization for policing and war on the one hand, and the nature of civil society on the other, is an important matter for further inquiry.

**VIEWS ON CIVIL AFFAIRS**

The Clausewitzian formula has been a conceptual touchstone in the discourse on civil-military relations, and in the articulation of a spectrum of conflict. Scholars in these fields bring forward alternative emphases in their interpretations of the formula. Civil-military relations scholarship provides a hierarchical model of the relationship between policy and force. This literature focuses on institutional control of the military by civilian authority. Strategic studies scholars provide a progressive model of policy and force. This literature focuses on warfighting as it is conducted at various levels of intensity. These literatures are both relevant directly to the practice of civil affairs. Civil affairs are the rubric by which American soldiers have directly governed foreign populations. They are also activities that occur across the conflict spectrum but are differentiated from combat operations.

Winston Churchill observed, “It is not possible in a major war to divide military from political affairs. At the summit, they are one.” If so, the prospects for dividing military from political affairs in civil affairs operations are not promising. Civil affairs responsibilities cross the civil-military divide: “even though the civil affairs officer does not make basic policy, these skills are not, in practice, merely executionary.” Directives may be unclear, exigencies unforeseen. And “because officials issuing the directives generally feel dependent upon the recommendations and information of people on the spot,” the US Army concluded after World

---


83 Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, pp.3-4
War II, “civil affairs requires more than the ability to follow orders...the soldier...must become, as best he can, something of a statesman.”

The remainder of this section proceeds as follows: 1) to identify auxiliary roles of the armed forces and attitudes toward them, 2) to explain how the controversy over roles fits into a larger debate about roles and missions in US civil-military relations.

US Development of Auxiliary Military Roles

US military participation in post-conflict transitions has a long history, but these civil-dimension operations have been called “nontraditional use of the military.” The US armed forces identify peace operations and civil-dimension operations generally as among their most important concerns in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, these activities are expected to increase in relevance in the future. ‘Non-military’ uses of the military are neither new and nor free from controversy. Civil affairs have been characterized by “bitter debate” each time the Army has performed that role in conflict between the war with Mexico and World War I.

The fact that American military forces have developed capabilities useful in the civilian sphere complicates civil-military relations, as evident in recent US debate. Although internal

---

84 ibid.
86 Other important post-cold war issues include downsizing, retrenchment from foreign basing, reconfiguration of the regional commands, the Gulf War and the reserve-regular ratio. A study of the impact of non-traditional deployments upon the US ability to engage in operations other than war and prepare to fight and win two major regional conflicts (MRC) can be found in a 1995 GAO report: United States General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Information on US and UN Activities, GAO/NSAID-95-102BR (February 1995). However the public might think about humanitarian interventions, for example, from a military perspective these are armed in that they include military units, even if they are non-combat or service support units. On this point see Klimov, Moral versus Practical, pp.7-8.
87 Johnston, Forward to In the Aftermath of War. Also Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, “Introduction: The Use of Soldiers and Peacekeepers in Coping with Disasters,” in Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters, ed. Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp.1-12. It is expected where the US is most likely to be involved in future combat, a mix of conventional and special operations forces will be used.
88 Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers Become Governors, p. 4.
control or military takeover is not a danger in US civil-military relations, there is some controversy over military resistance to internal functions (domestic disaster relief, riot control) and other so-called nontraditional functions (peace operations).  

In order to carry out their primary mission to secure society against internal and external threats, military forces have generated more, or different, auxiliary capabilities compared to those of previous eras. Members of armed forces possess skills in engineering, medicine, policing and construction that are useful in disaster relief and reconstruction. The use of military forces in military civic action, to dig wells, inoculate children, repair roads and so on in order to aid civilians, illustrates an application of auxiliary skills. Military civic action involves US personnel as advisors or direct participants in development programs under the rubric of civil affairs. Military civic action reflects a view of most armies as "skill centers." MCA is defined by joint doctrine as

the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population...which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

Frequent call for performance of civilian focused tasks such as humanitarian assistance, civic assistance and civil administration has led to comment that the United States military "is a victim of their [sic] own success." The assets of the armed forces include among them "an organizational base, material resources including food, fuel and medical supplies, and a

---

89 American armed forces have performed domestic internal control missions, and there is some functional equivalence to military governance in foreign states.


presumed capacity for rapid response." Consequently, military assets are attractive to leaders seeking to respond to civil crises at home or foreign conflicts short of declared conventional war. The US military has been compared to "a government on the shelf." The United States Army "can feed itself, transport itself, police itself." From there follows its call to humanitarian assistance in Somalia and peace enforcement in Bosnia.

Auxiliary attributes might be to the advantage of the armed forces, enabling them "to justify the maintenance of their budgets by casting themselves as a multi-purpose force."

Retired US Colonel Harry Summers has lamented,

Some today within the US military are...searching for relevance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with war fighting.

The focus on prewar and postwar operations may be relevant, but seems of little advantage otherwise to military forces.

First, the US armed forces are not resource winners thanks to non-combat missions.

These tend to tax military personnel, either through call-up of reserves, which takes them away from their jobs and lives, or through frequent rotations of the active corps. Second, some

---

96 Kenneth Bush, "Towards a Balanced Approach to Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," Canadian Foreign Policy, 3: 3 (winter 1995): 49 - 69, pp. 54- 55. Bush argues that the armed forces are attempting to "civilianize" peacekeeping (incorporate civilians) in order to gain position in the "domestic budgetary battle field."
97 Harry Summers, "When Armies Lose Sight of Purpose," Washington Times, December 26, 1991, p. D-3. Like Col. Summers, I am interested in pre and post war or armed intervention civil operations, cognizant that these functions have been used of late in connection to natural disasters as well as man-made ones. This study is primarily interested in post-conflict CA following armed intervention, but humanitarian missions may be relevant examples tasks performed are functionally similar, and particularly if coercion is used.
98 The Personal Tempo, or PERSTEMPO measure of deployments of personnel away from home stations are uncommonly long in peace operations deployments. George T. Raach, "Military Perspectives on Peace Operations," in Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy ed. Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995): 83-102. In Fiscal Year 1994, for example, Navy waivers of PERSTEMPO doubled over FY93 due to peace operations. A Marine Corp unit was deployed off the coast of Haiti only three weeks after returning from six months off the coast of Somalia. The US Army's 10th Mountain Division, which has supplied civil affairs for numerous
military analysts have expressed fear that expanded definitions of US national security lead to over-extension of the armed forces through cross-function performance and loss of preparedness for warfighting.\(^{99}\) Civil affairs roles are non-combat, and are often dismissed by other members of the forces as “quasi-military.”\(^{100}\) Third, members of the armed forces deliberately choose non-civilian careers and often find political affairs distasteful. Like Colonel Summers, military leaders seem to have little appetite for civil affairs.\(^{101}\) Even General Eisenhower, who would later preside over the administration of the US government, confessed to finding those administrative tasks burdensome in his letter to General George Marshall from North Africa in 1942,

> The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be. Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.\(^{102}\)

operations, participated in the clean-up after Hurricane Andrew in Florida, was deployed to Somalia in December 1992, and shortly after that disaster moved on to Haiti in September 1994.


\(^{100}\) Richard Shultz explains that the military defines its role “as either deterring wars or fighting wars and winning them.” Shultz cites Army resistance to counterinsurgency in Vietnam and to two other developments, the creation of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and within the Pentagon the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Shultz, “In the Aftermath of War,” p. 19.

\(^{101}\) Even military leaders in Latin American, a region notorious for military coups, are now presented as disinclined to enter into rule in the civilian realm. Robert Dix posits that military coups in Latin America have been less frequent in recent years due to the disenchantment of military leaders with governance. Conflicts over policy affected military leaders as they would do civilians and have factionalized the armed forces hence undercutting a primary interest of military leadership in organizational strength. Robert H. Dix, “Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America,” Armed Forces and Society, 20,3 (spring 1994): 439-456, p.448.

Controversy over Roles and Missions

Military discomfort with civilian roles is a significant issue among others in an alleged "crisis" in US civil-military relations. US military leaders have taken unconventionally public positions on policy issues. Recent debate in American civil-military relations includes argument that military leaders are gaining too much influence, and counter arguments that civilian leaders are asking too much of the military. A controversial article depicting a hypothetical military coup in the US exemplifies the latter position, that the military is at risk of losing sight of its combat purpose.

Charles Dunlap's, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" is a polemic against nontraditional missions. Dunlap writes of a possible future coup by the American military against its government due to changed assumptions about the role of the military in society. Interestingly enough, one precursor in Dunlap's scenario is the legitimization of humanitarian and civic assistance as military missions that enable the US military to constitute the de facto government of many foreign nations. Soldiers may be uncomfortable with roles other than deterrence and warfighting for two basic reasons:

---

103 Disrespect toward the President and Commander in Chief by uniformed officers is cited in evidence of civil-military tension in the US See David H. Hackworth, "Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs., the President," Newsweek, 28 June 1993, 24-25, "Who's in Charge of the Military?" New York Times, 26 January 1993, p. A18. The civilian effort to end discrimination against gay and lesbian service members and Clinton's non-military record during Vietnam are two points of discussion. More significant perhaps is the suggestion that the military officers have excessive authority in the determination of the size and shape of the US military and decisions to use force. Johnson and Metz describe a recent debate about civil-military relations in the United States as stemming from the military's internal reforms and from the Goldwater Nichols Act that strengthened the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1986. Johnson and Metz, "American Civil-Military Relations: A Review," p. 203.


106 US armed forces may appear to be “exercising some kind of domination or authority over inhabited territory” characteristic to military occupation. Adam Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation?” British Yearbook of
The core function of the military is to deter and fight external enemies.

Military forces view civil roles as having to compensate for inadequacies of civilian institutions.

The determination of roles and missions is a major sticking point in United States civil-military relations today. Claude Welch has argued: "Perhaps the best measure of the strength and extent of civilian control of the military is governmental ability to alter the armed forces responsibilities." As such, the debate over nontraditional roles for the military presents a test of US civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations scholarship follows Clausewitz by prescribing the subordination of military to civilian institutions. Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz make an important point that civil-military relations seemed easier in the era of Clausewitz because conceptual and physical divisions between the civil and the military were clearer:

Civil-military relations were simplified in the nineteenth century by the quarantine of the military, both intellectually and geographically, and by the rigid distinction between war and peace.

Huntington supposed that the United States military had only temporarily crossed the boundaries separating civil and military spheres in the postwar reconstruction of Europe and Japan when American soldiers became governors. And yet today the quest to clearly define


Perhaps ironically, the main concern in recent political debate about US civil-military relations has been less about military intervention in politics than about civilian intervention in military affairs. According to Huntington's model, if the armed forces ought not to interfere in politics, civilians ought not to interfere in the military domain. One solution is to narrowly define roles and missions. Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force," p.113.


military’ roles continues. Dunlap’s coup scenario illustrates the attachment in American military culture to an identity apart from civilian culture.

Military culture likewise values the distinction between war and peace, in part because it provides a rationale for operational control by the military during conflict. According to this argument, in the fog of war the grammar of war is best understood by the military. Therefore operational control must be a military domain. The specialized nature of military knowledge and the exigencies of war make civilian control difficult or even counterproductive once the line is crossed. And yet, that line is sometimes ambiguous in conflict. After even formal conclusions of active hostilities, military control of territory situates forces in an ambiguously civilian realm until exit. If operational control by the military rests upon a distinction between war and peace, military leaders will likely be uncomfortable with missions in which that distinction is unclear.

**Conclusion**

Civil affairs operations provide an interesting context from which to investigate the Clausewitzian formula, because they are a critical juncture at which force and policy meet. The locus in which the circular relationship of policy and force completes itself is civil affairs. Success in the transition from force to policy is critical to attempts to realize American policy goals—to Seal the Victory, Promote Liberty, Win the Hearts and Minds and so on—by means of military force.

In a conventional war, civil affairs is the mode assumed in the culmination of victory; in operations other than war, the civil dimension tends to be prominent throughout. The distinction between peace and war is thereby blurred and the mission’s center of gravity shifted. When the differentiation between the combatant and civilian and between war and peace are obscure, the normative relevance of the formula remains.

The strategic studies literature is a forum in which scholars attempt to map out the spectrum of conflict, to give form to the sometimes blurry lines between war and peace. The

---

110 US Commission on Roles and Missions, *Directions for Defense.*
strategic studies literature on operations other than war indicates that the civil dimension is likely to persist as a problem in conflict. This forecast makes it timely now to conduct a detailed study of US military experience with civil affairs, addressed in the remainder of the dissertation. In making decisions about the responsibilities of the armed forces, civilian masters will want to equip themselves with understanding of the nature of possible threats and present military posture and capabilities.

The United States defense establishment has been reluctant to draw attention to civil affairs. It seems understandable that American civilian academics have paid little attention also. Scholars, like practitioners, may have found civil-military operations less interesting than the drama and requirements of combat. Moreover, international relations scholars might have found it difficult to fit civil affairs into disciplinary paradigms. It is also plausible that the US military has changed its terminology so often that civilian academics have missed important continuities in the development of this area of American defense strategy. In particular, scholars seem to have lost the thread of military government in civil affairs doctrine. The next chapter picks up that thread, and pulls it through seven phases of US civil affairs development.
Civil affairs doctrine guides military forces attempting to complete a cycle of war with a usable peace. Doctrine provides general principles for action that must be interpreted in terms of an immediate context. This chapter highlights civil affairs in United States practice and doctrine, historically from Valley Forge to Vietnam. This history shows an evolving relationship between policy and force in US military doctrine and operations. This survey of American civil affairs doctrine shows that American approach to civil affairs – like the civil dimension of strategy itself – is historically situated. Warfighting methods and attitudes about the use of force have over time changed conditions for the degree and terms of contact between military forces and civilians. The evolution of civil affairs has been likewise marked by a series of innovations to support combat and care for civilians in areas of military operations under different conditions.

**DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT**

United States military doctrine expresses the US military approach to post-conflict environments. Although political scientists commonly define doctrine as a belief system, American military practitioners see doctrine in more concrete terms, as in the form of a field manual. For example, when United States Army personnel anticipate playing a role for civil...
affairs, they reach for a manual such as Field Manual 41-10 (1993), *Civil Affairs Operations.*

Doctrine, as defined by practitioners, is thus closer to the archaic meaning of the term as "something taught; a teaching." The United States military has a tradition of written doctrine, expressed in general orders, reports and field manuals. Doctrine as such provides a blueprint for many types of military action. The Americans did not view development of a cohesive doctrine as necessary until the Second World War, in part because military government was seen as the natural course of a military occupation following victory and did not merit differentiation from other elements of strategy. The traditional place of civil affairs has been as an *afterthought* to the combat mission.

The American concept of civil affairs has assumed different forms since the early days of the republic. US civil affairs doctrine has been adaptive, first making distinction between supporting civil government and supplanting it, and later making distinction between military

---

3 Joint operations, multinational and interagency operations are guided by Joint Pub 3-57 (1995) *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.* Both Army and Joint Doctrine are currently under review. Although the United States Army and Navy had a long history of civil affairs, there was no special attention given to these functions in doctrine (field manuals) until World War II. FM 27-10 on the Law of Land Warfare included legal questions of military government, but ignored policy and organization. Other manuals touched upon aspects of military government, but issues of military government were not dealt with "systematically and exclusively" in any manual until 1940. Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers become Governors,* p. 7, fn. 4


5 If so, this context has changed and new grounds for consideration of civil affairs emerge. See William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954* Technical Paper ORO-TP-29. Bethesda, MD: Operations Research Office and The Johns Hopkins University, May 1961, p.2. It seems ironic that some today object to civil affairs, because they are not warfighting, as not 'strategic.'
government in hostile territory and civil affairs in allied or neutral territory. This doctrine has incorporated lessons from experience to bring forward two fundamental principles: civilianization and indirect rule. US civil affairs doctrine has been consistent in attempting to balance a tension between principles of military necessity and humanity. American doctrinal development might be divided into seven phases as follows in Figure 7:

Across these phases, one finds continuities as well as changes in civil affairs. One continuity is that the United States has as a rule been unprepared to practice civil affairs in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Representative Doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>American Revolution to War with Mexico</td>
<td>Early practice of martial law and military government emphasizing civilian supply and loyalty.</td>
<td>General Order 20 (1847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>US Civil War</td>
<td>Total war and intensive Army involvement in post-war governance and reconstruction.</td>
<td>The Lieber Code (1863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Monroe Doctrine Occupations</td>
<td>Indirect rule and civilianization emphases emerging after long episodes of military government.</td>
<td>Magoon's Report (1903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Institutionalization and establishment school and formal doctrine on military government and civil affairs.</td>
<td>FM 27-5 Basic Field Manual on Military Government (1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Philippines and Korea</td>
<td>Development of military civic action framework to augment indirect rule.</td>
<td>FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Military Government Operations (1957); Draper Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conflict. There is continuity in that civil affairs operations have been relevant in war as well as after, but changes in how civil affairs have been relevant, depending upon the type of conflict and how it was fought.

1. MARTIAL LAW AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT: EARLY PRACTICE AND DOCTRINE

Early American civil affairs doctrine established rules of warfare and distinguished between civil affairs at home and abroad. Its initial focus was upon meeting the needs of the military forces as the United States established and consolidated its expansion across North America. The early American Army valued civil affairs to procure civilian supply – goods and labor from civilians to advance a war effort. Major General Andrew Jackson created a controversial moment in history when his order of martial law would put the resources of New Orleans to use in an impending battle against the British in December 1814 and January 1815. Likewise, the Army sought civilian loyalty to deny civilian supply and intelligence to the enemy. The Army was involved also in a broader range of relationships with civilians in the early days. As the nation consolidated independence the US Army was an agent of expansion and nation building, for example, initially governing the Louisiana Territory after its acquisition in 1803.6

Early American experiences in civil affairs, like its early wars, were on North American territory. Although US General Winfield Scott’s military occupation in Mexico in 1847-1848 is commonly thought to have been the first American civil affairs experience, General George Washington confronted civil affairs problems when wintering at Valley Forge.7 Stanley Sandler’s comprehensive study of US Army tactical civil affairs and military government opens with the “unmitigated disaster” of military government in Canada following the 1775 US invasion.8 The Continental Congress believed that the inhabitants of Quebec might have been persuaded to side

---

6 The Army conducted treaty negotiations, its topographers mapped out the territory for expansion, and Army engineers undertook major construction projects.

7 Benedict Arnold was sent by Washington to Philadelphia to serve as military governor in 1778. Daugherty and Andrews, A Review of US Historical Experience, p. 43.

with them against the British, as a fourteenth colony in revolt. The Americans were led by General David Wooster, whom Sandler describes as “a religious bigot with little understanding of the people in his charge and of his opportunity.”9 Wooster alienated the Quebecois by closing Roman Catholic churches on Christmas Day. His troops were “a mutinous, unpaid, underfed, disease-ridden mob, and now the object of French Canadian scorn.”10

The Mexican War of 1846-48 was a significant era for US civil affairs that can be given only cursory discussion here. As in Canada, Major General Zachary Taylor’s effort to persuade the civilian population in Mexico to switch allegiance to the United States was undermined by undisciplined behavior of his troops toward them. Another interesting feature is that friction developed over civil affairs during the Mexican War, both in the field between military leaders and between military leaders and civilian officials in Washington.11

The US Army administering California Territory made a distinction between martial law and military government that marks a significant development in doctrine. Theodore Grivas explains, “Martial law supports civil government; military government supplants it.”12 This distinction foreshadows the distinction to be made during World War II reconstruction between civil affairs and military government. Furthermore, new doctrine was written (and in two languages).

US Major General Winfield Scott issued General Order 20 (GO 20) on February 19, 1847. These orders have since been regarded as “cornerstones of US civil affairs policies.”13 GO 20 identified ‘Rules and Articles of War’ that prohibited certain offenses:

---

11 Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience*, p. 45. Note that the United States Navy and Army were both involved in civil affairs, for example in California.
... Assassination; murder, malicious stabbing or maiming; rape; malicious assault and battery; robbery; theft; the wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices and fixtures, and the destruction, except by order of superior officer, of public or private property are such offenses [that if committed in, by, or upon the Army will be severely punished].

Finally, although not explicitly prescribed in doctrine to do so, Scott and Brigadier General Stephen Kearny in New Mexico both assigned military government duties to volunteer officers. Kearny assigned Colonel Alexander Doniphan in a shadow governor role alongside a less powerful civilian governor. This precedent would be followed at home after the Civil War, and in American possessions of islands during the 1890s. This move seems to foreshadow also heavy reliance upon reservists in later civil affairs.

2. LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT FROM THE US CIVIL WAR

The US military role seemed as profound in peace as it had been in the Civil War itself. US Army officers were aware, at least since Andrew Jackson's supervision of New Orleans in 1812, that their decisions affected civil-military relations. Yet, "[e]ven more so than the Civil War," according to historian Robert Coakley, "the era of Reconstruction in the South was one during which the Army played an abnormal role in civil government." The depth and complexity of Federal military operations during and after the American Civil War were remarkable:

The Civil War found Union generals concerned with such problems as the care and relief of refugees (freed slaves); the recruitment of civilian labor; the censorship of news media; the supervision of such civil courts as remained open; the appointment of local government officials possessing Union sympathies; and the control of many aspects of the civilian economy.

---

14 General Order 20 excerpted in Kyre and Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security, p.183. The order was expanded and reissued as GO 287 at Mexico City. It was enforced in Tampico, Veracruz, and Mexico City.


Complex civilian issues in the Civil War created problems for the military. Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia and Virginia were “each under a different commander, without uniform doctrine or policy,” as to, for example, whether their people should be afforded the rights of belligerency or treated as traitors. In response, the Army developed doctrine.

In 1863, Dr. Francis Lieber, a professor at Columbia College, was commissioned to develop a manual for Union forces. The Lieber Code, United States Army’s General Order No. 100 (GO 100) was issued mid-point in the four-year conflict, on April 24, 1863. The Lieber Code was hailed as “the first significant attempt either in Europe or in America to translate the phrase ‘laws of war’ into a developed code.”

The law of armed conflict can be distilled into related principles. First, the humanity principle limits the violence of war, to the kind and degree (proportionality) necessary to the purpose of war. Second, the principle of military necessity enables actions for which there is a “compelling requirement” necessary to the objectives of the war (usually enemy submission) and that are not prohibited in international law. Whereas the humanity principle is designed to protect the civilian population, the principle of military necessity is designed to consider the

---

19 Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience*, p.94. The rules of international law, rather than internal disorders, were practiced in the conflict. See Robert W. Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878*, p. 227. An important caveat was issued that humanity toward rebels “does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgment of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent and sovereign power...It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future relations between the contending parties.” Art. 152, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863, Washington 1898: Government Printing Office.


requirements of armed forces in the field. GO 100 Paragraph 14 is commonly cited on military necessity:

Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions...and in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.\(^{23}\)

GO 100 covers a wide range of interactions between an invading army and a civilian population, and provides guidance to the commanders in their dealings with affected peoples. According to the Lieber Code, any place occupied by an enemy stands under martial law, whether or not there has been a martial law declaration. Section 1, paragraph 4 defines martial law as “military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war,” and military oppression as an “abuse of power.” Lieber distinguished between civil affairs and military affairs:

[\textbf{W}hen the war is ended and the military government ceases to be an instrument to promote actual warfare and devotes itself simply to civil affairs instead of military affairs, limitations at once attach.\(^{24}\)

The Lieber Code was developed later into the US legal doctrine on war, \textit{The Laws of Land Warfare}.\(^{25}\) GO 100 also provided a model for European and later, international regulations. The 1899 Hague Conference developed an elaborate code of warfare that emerged from the US Army’s 1863 GO 100, by way of the Conference of Brussels declaration in 1874.\(^{26}\)


\(^{25}\) The volume was revised and published as \textit{Rules of Land Warfare} in 1914, in part to take into consideration international conventions. It was revised in 1934 and 1940. In 1956 \textit{The Law of Land Warfare} was published and revised again in 1976, ostensibly cognizant of the breakdown between combatant and civilian. Donald A. Wells, \textit{The Laws of Land Warfare}, p. 17; full discussion pp. 1-20.

1907 Hague Conventions (also known as the Hague Regulations), were the first multilateral agreements relevant to military occupation. The Hague Conventions form the cornerstone of the international law of armed conflict. These are referenced in later American policy regarding treatment of civilians in conflict.

Ironically, the same war that introduced a code to address abuses was a total war riddled with abuse. The name of US Civil War General William T. Sherman is associated today with the practice of total war, and the expression “war is hell.” Total war is characterized in part by a sacrifice of humanity for military necessity. Sherman decided to make a base of the city of Atlanta, and ordered the evacuation of civilians. In his rationale, he cited lessons from Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez and New Orleans:

[S]uccess was crippling our armies in the field by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile population.

General Andrew Johnson, as a military governor in his native Tennessee, was an exception to the Civil War-era rule of harsh military governors. Johnson left the military to become Lincoln’s Vice President, and President after Lincoln’s assassination. President Johnson advocated a mild approach to military government that was not appreciated by the US Congress.

---

27 See specifically Articles 42-56 of the 1899 Hague II Regulations and the 1907 Hague IV Regulations. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907.

28 The story of military involvement in civil life during the Civil War and Reconstruction cannot be fully addressed here. Suffice it to note that American adherence to the spirit of the Lieber Code after General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox has been judged inadequate. Daugherty and Andrews, A Review of US Historical Experience, p.111.

29 Total war makes little distinction between combatant and non-combatant. Sherman’s Union forces violated the Lieber Code in their notorious march through the South, pillaging, plundering, raping, and destroying even churches and pianos. Sherman claimed he did not order such actions, but expressed little regret about them. These tactics did little to advance amity between North and South. Ironically, Francis Lieber’s hometown of Columbia, South Carolina was the site of widespread destruction in violation of the Lieber Code in February 1865. Rudolph Barnes, Military Legitimacy pp. 9-15.


31 The hard-line of Benjamin F. Butler and Philip H. Sheridan was less successful in bringing Louisiana back into the Union than the mild military government practiced by Andrew Johnson. Johnson gave no quarter to participants in resistance; he attempted to keep the economy and government functioning. Johnson personally led the defense of Nashville when Confederate forces put the city under siege.
What had been a fairly lenient ‘Reconstruction’ in 1865 became “outright military rule in the South under the auspices of a Radical Republican Congress” after the First Reconstruction Act of March 1867.32 Vindictiveness and hatred characterized national policy for Southern reconstruction. Among the military instruments of control were martial law, arbitrary arrests, trial by military commission, provost courts, overrule of civil court decisions, removal of officials, and use of military commanders as governors.

Formal conclusion of Union occupation of the South in 1877 did not end the Army’s civil role, but the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 restored presidential direction and legal formalities to the use of troops to quell civil disorders.33 Attempts to change the political culture of Confederate peoples demonstrated that “although the military governor appears to come with unlimited power, there are limits to his ability to effect permanent changes in the culture of the people of an occupied region.”34

3. INDIRECT RULE AND CIVILIANIZATION AT CENTURY’S TURN

Charles E. Magoon conducted an institutional study in 1903 to identify practices and guidelines based upon previous American civil affairs experiences. Magoon’s report developed many ideas that are familiar today, about the use of local labor, cooperation with local leadership for administration, transfer of authority to civilian rule, and the role of elections in ending occupation.35 The civil tasks for the armed forces in foreign territory expanded during this era. These tasks at time fell to service personnel inadequately trained for civil roles.36 Operational

---

32 Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Civil Disorders 1789-1878, p. 268. This is not to say that Congress provided the Army with adequate resources, “generals had only about 20,000 men to police ten states with a total population of over eight million,” in part because the elections supervised by the military failed to produce Republican state and local governance. See p.288

33 Discussion of the Reconstruction is found in Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Civil Disorders 1789-1878, pp. 268-292.


problems in this era were not dissimilar to those confronted in later ventures. They included those of interagency cooperation between the US military and civilian agencies of the US government, and divisions within the military itself.

At the turn of the century, the Spanish-American War and the Filipino Insurrection brought civil affairs issues forward in US military engagement abroad, in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. These included deep reforms of the occupied societies. The warfighting in the Philippines in 1900 provided lessons that Americans would apply to unconventional warfare in Central America later in the century. The US approach to Cuba differed from the latter two, because the Americans did not intend to retain possession of Cuba. Military Governor Brigadier General Leonard Wood ordered codification of law, established a public health system, feeding kitchens, and “coaxed the local police out of hiding, providing for their personal and professional needs,” before turning Cuban government over to indigenous civil administration in 1902. The Americans would return four years later.

Three US services, the Army, the Marines, and the Navy were involved in declared military government in four Latin American countries between the Spanish-American War and World War I: Cuba, Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Haitian and Dominican interventions early this century were motivated by American interest in debt collection. The Dominican Republic, like Haiti, was seriously in debt to European powers. In keeping with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Americans wanted to keep Europeans out of the Caribbean. One of the first tasks in the Dominican Republic was a disarmament program, including house-to-house searches. The Americans withdrew after a new constitutional government was installed there on July 12, 1924.

---


38 Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, p. 99.

39 The US occupied Veracruz, Mexico for six months in 1914. The occupation of Haiti lasted almost 20 years, between 1915 and 1934. The Dominican Republic was occupied between 1916 and 1924.
In September 1906 Secretary of War William Howard Taft found Cuba "without any government" and declared a provisional regime that he initially directed until appointing Charles Magoon.\(^{40}\) An interesting feature of this occupation, which lasted until 1909, is that Magoon’s vision did not seem to be about business interests:

It was not a businessmen’s government in the sense that the requirements of the large sugar and tobacco planters and the banking and commercial institutions received highest priority. Rather it was a government of lawyers, judges, bureaucrats and soldiers ruling, largely, by balancing what they conceived to be in the national interest of Cuba with the demands of American foreign policy.\(^{41}\)

Another interesting aspect of the occupation of Cuba is that Americans struggled with their reliance on questionably moral \textit{politicos}, Cuban civilians who shared power with American Army officers. Although the US Army officers attempted to reform the Cuban Army, it would become — as would other Caribbean military forces influenced by Americans — merely more effective at internal rather than external defense. The strengthened military strengthened the ability of the \textit{politicos} to retain power. Stanley Sandler explains this early dilemma of indirect rule, resulting from American recognition that they would soon leave the island again:

They also sincerely wished to leave Cuba as a well-administered, prosperous and democratic land...However, democracy would probably open the way to power for those Cuban \textit{politicos} who had so far evinced little enough interest in good government. All the Americans could hope for was to leave in place so well-established a system of laws and so efficient an administration that even the \textit{politicos} would be under some public pressure to maintain them.\(^{42}\)

In the civil affairs ventures of this era, as later, the US military attempted to shift responsibility to local leaders, drawing upon US civilian assistance and providing training in

\(^{40}\) Daugherty and Andrews, \textit{A Review of US Historical Experience}, p. 156. Besides addressing customs and treasury issues, the American forces applied themselves to public works and education projects. Col. Enoch H. Crowder headed a board that supervised elections in Cuba in August of 1908. In Puerto Rico, General Miles employed local workers to bring supplies; in Cuba, General Shafter diverted combat troops to labor details when forced to feed thousands of destitute civilians.


order to *civilianize* military government. This focus on constitutional transition to indigenous civil governance would become a persistent foreign policy emphasis accompanying American interventions. However, it is not clear that the US military was retaining institutional memory of its experiences. Given “the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico [sic] Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere,” the United States surprisingly failed to provide peacetime training for military government, a failure that was sorely felt in World War I.43

4. IMPROVISATION AFTER WORLD WAR I

Because World War I battle lines had been relatively fixed, and civilians largely evacuated from combat areas, military government awaited the Armistice to begin in earnest.44 The US occupied German territory for 4 years, from the time of US Civil Affairs Proclamation of 3 August 1917, to the formal conclusion of military government 27 January 1923. General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force encountered problems that included large numbers of French refugees, disease, housing and supply shortages, and inflationary spirals (these resulted from the presence of the American servicemen themselves). Two improvisations, a General Purchasing Board and the position of Town Major were designed to address post-conflict problems. Staff and personnel diverted from combat units directed these, rather than specially designated personnel.

Before 1947 there was a prevalent view in the United States that humanitarian assistance abroad was a function to be performed by the private sector, but war relief was an exception.45 The private sector was unable to meet wartime needs. American government coordination of private relief, led by Herbert Hoover, marked a first step toward development of US


humanitarian aid agencies. In the meanwhile, the burden of humanitarian relief was upon occupation forces in the field.

Dougherty and Andrews refer to the “field of civil-military relations” in the World War I era as “now officially defined as civil affairs.” This vocabulary choice is interesting given their finding that “there is no evidence of any extensive political direction afforded marshal Foch by the allied governments or General Pershing by the US government” in Luxembourg and the German Rhineland occupations between the time of Armistice (20 November 1918) and the signing of the peace treaty (28 June 1919).

After the war, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, issued a report noting that the occupation was “a real factor in the situation,” but the magnitude of responsibilities was underestimated. Apart from “perhaps a half-dozen men, there was probably no one who had the faintest conception of the German governmental system, of its functions, limitations or channels of communication,” he wrote.

The Hunt Report concluded:

[T]he American Army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.

The development of a field manual devoted specifically to civil affairs would not take place until another global war was under way.

5. Formal Doctrine and World War II

One might presume that the lessons of the last war would not be lost in preparation for the next. Even so, William R. Swarm, onetime chief of the military government department of

---

the Provost Marshal General's School, Camp Gordon, Georgia, recalls that "the United States had entered World War II unprepared doctrinally and organizationally to carry out its CAMG [Civil Affairs/Military Government] responsibilities."\(^5\) Swarm's assessment is astonishing given that considerably more preparation and commitment of troops and materiel went into the occupations following World War II than ever before or since. The United States conducted post-World War II military government and civil affairs operations in North Africa, Europe (Sicily and Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria), and the Pacific (the Philippines, the Ryukyus, Japan and Korea).

The execution and impact of the Second World War totally engaged the societies of all states involved. This was true as well for post-conflict military operations. For example, civilian relief was a strategic consideration for General Eisenhower when contemplating US troop advancement in Europe. A warning from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) planners persuaded General Dwight D. Eisenhower to postpone the liberation of Paris as long as possible. The military engagement itself would be costly, SHAEF warned, but the greater cost would come "in feeding and supplying it once it was free."\(^5\)

The scope of civil affairs requirements in Europe did not surprise Eisenhower, who had experience in military government in North Africa. Integration of economic, political, and social objectives came to be viewed as key to securing victory. In the wake of war, US and Allied troops, despite their rapid demobilization, were required to establish and maintain social order in the interest of their own safety and in conformity with the Hague Regulations.


The first edition of the War Department's Basic Field Manual on Military Government (FM 27-5) was issued on 30 June, 1940. The field manual was based upon the experience of the United States in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I. The first manual was revised and issued again in December 1943 and in October 1947. FM 27-5 outlined five basic policies:

1. Military necessity was an established principle of the rules of war.
2. Welfare of the governed would protect also the occupying power.
3. Flexibility was needed to suit the time and place.
4. Economy of effort referred to meeting minimum requirements.
5. Permanence was meant to provide for continuity of personnel and policy.

The Americans established a School of Military Government in 1942 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. The school drew from a British school and the US experience in World War I. The address of the school president expresses hope that graduates will translate Thomas Jefferson's ideal of "democratic government of free men...into reality within lands torn by war and still suffering from fresh wounds of battle" and lay "foundations for a lasting peace."

Recruitment of students for the civil affairs school was sought among officers with backgrounds

---


53 Welfare of the governed referred to the possibility that “just, considerate and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying power will convert enemies into friends.” FM 27-5 (1940), p. 3.

54 Major Joseph M. Scammell, CMP, AUS, “The Role of Military Government: Modern Warfare Calls for Careful Supervision of the Civilian Population So Fighting Units Can Fight Without Looking Over Their Shoulders,” in The Fourth Classbook, School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia May to August 1943, pp. 10-11, p. 10. Political scientist Arnold Wolfers was a professor at the school. A British “Political-Military School” at Cambridge University was attended by an American military observer, leading to the recommendation by Major General John H. Hilldring (then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 and later chief of Civil Affairs Division, War Department), that a US school be established. The British school was discontinued, but a British Civil Affairs Staff Center was opened after the former commandant of the Cambridge school visited Charlottesville.

55 J.L. Newcomb, “A Message from the President of the University of Virginia to the August 1943 Graduates of the School of Military Government,” in The Fourth Classbook, School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia May to August 1943, p. 3.
in “engineering (electrical, civil and sanitation), accounting, law, economics, sociology and the like.”

Over a three to four week period, each class received twelve hours of instruction on their assigned country. The average age of military government officers selected for training was forty years.

In keeping with the tradition of “what is taught” in American understanding of military doctrine, the Charlottesville school helped to assess the first field manual on military government. The school identified three important problems in FM 27-5:

- First, there was skepticism about the ability of the military to cope with impending problems.
- Second was the balance of principles in the laws of war.
- Third was the principle of minimal interference in the civil life of occupied territory.

These problems played out through the course of US postwar occupations. Initially, debate surrounded what was to be defined as civil as opposed to military jurisdiction over military governance. One solution was to assign political advisors to commanding generals. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially assigned direction of civil affairs in North Africa to the State Department. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson did not contest the primacy of civil power.

---

56 Memorandum of [Col. Jesse I. Miller, Provost Marshal General's Office, War Department, to Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion Provost Marshal General]; “School of Military Government,” 10 January 1942, p. 5, in Daugherty and Andrews, A Review of US Historical Experience, p. 199. The school was inspired by the British training at Cambridge University for liaison officers serving in East Africa, a program that was discontinued until 1942 when the British established one similar to the American school at Wimbledon.


60 According to State Department veteran James W. Riddleberger, “it was often convenient to the military to let their political counselors assume the responsibility for decisions unpopular in the United States.” James W. Riddleberger, “Impact of the Proconsular Experience on American Foreign Policy,” in Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, pp. 392-397, p. 392.
However, General Eisenhower acquired the burden after a series of civilian agencies were unable to handle the situation in North Africa.

Given diplomatic and political problems encountered by the Allies in North Africa, the War Department created a Civil Affairs Division (CAD) in 1943. The director was Major General John H. Hilldring. CAD became a joint Army-Navy civil affairs and military government planning agency, and led to improved coordination and implementation. Still, conflicts among relief agencies were rife.

Despite his initial insistence that the administration of occupied territories be a civilian responsibility, President Franklin Roosevelt by 1943 came to be increasingly inclined toward the thought that “the occupation when it occurs should be wholly military.” The armed forces possessed an organizational capacity that was lacking in civilian institutions. Sandler notes that civil affairs was by this time made a command responsibility, meaning that civilian supplies would be handled by the Quartermaster, movements handled by the Transportation Corps and so on.

A persuasive argument for military responsibility stemmed from the recognition that civil affairs operations take place in a netherworld between war and peace. The military leadership insists anyway upon formal authority for commanders in theaters of war. In this way military necessity is a rationale for military control. A civilian, it was argued, “would be lost that quickly after the close of the hostilities.” Civilian agencies would focus upon long-term relief. Military forces would be needed in the interim, “[a]s long as bullets fly too thick for civilians.”

Although there have been instances of rule from beginning to end by a senior military officer (Cuba 1899-1902, German Rhineland 1919-1923, Korea 1945-1948, Japan 1945-1952),

---


64 Coles and Wienberg, *Soldiers Become Governors* p. 5.
elsewhere a civilian commissioner replaced the military governor before occupation ended (Philippines 1900, Germany 1949, Austria 1950). Civilian personnel “nearly always” gradually replaced military staff officers, in the process of civilianization.65

Second, early evaluations focused upon the difficult balance between the principles of military necessity and humanity, conceived as welfare of the governed. A Charlottesville lecturer criticized the new field manual,

In fact, you get the impression from the text that our principal objective in invading a foreign country is to bring light to the heathen. Now I can assure you that is not realistic. There is only one legitimate objective of military government and that is to win the war.

It is a method of fighting behind the lines, and is done by holding the civilian population in subjection.... Military government is not a missionary enterprise, and while you do pay attention to the welfare of the governed, you do it because you are inherently decent and because paying attention to their welfare where you can will tend to avoid the more violent kinds of outbreaks against you; but it is utterly misleading to put the welfare of the governed on par with the military necessity.66

A third problem had to do with the principle of minimal interference. In part, the notion of minimal interference served the functional needs of the armed forces to limit the scope of chores falling to them. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy cautioned Colonel William O'Dwyer not to be too extreme with regard to his duties with the Allied Control Commission for Italy:

He said that he personally knew some of the big industrialists of Italy who were sound practical men and the only men who knew how to get the economic machine running again. Naturally, living under Fascism they had to conform, but that was pure expediency.67


The principle of minimal interference also conformed to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (IV), which has been called the “cornerstone of the law of occupation in the twentieth century.” Following the spirit of balancing the needs of the populace with those of the occupying power, the law of occupation spells out obligations, as well as rights of the occupant. It makes clear, for example, that the occupying power should meet the basic needs of the populace with respect to police and social functions. The critical passage follows:

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

There has been some confusion about the implications of Article 43. It implies on the one hand that the occupant must respect “the laws in force.” This instruction seems to limit the occupant’s power. On the other hand, it implies that the occupying power possesses “legitimate power.” As they were constructed by sovereign leadership intent upon establishing rules of conduct among themselves, the Regulations privileged leadership regimes. They made the occupying power a trustee for the sovereign in exile. The occupant administers territory until a return of the sovereign is negotiated.

An inherent feature of the American “seal the peace” approach to post-conflict environments is to strengthen indigenous government capacity and to introduce or revitalize democratic practices. This approach requires consolidation of a successful military operation and establishing momentum toward the reconstruction or construction of a functioning civil society in the area of operations. Accordingly, Americans encourage host country nationals to organize

---

free and fair elections, subordinate military to civilian institutions, and adopt practices consistent with principles of human rights. Non-warfighting tasks may include participation in armistice negotiations, demobilization of indigenous military forces, establishment of disarmament programs, provision of essential services, and involvement in the process of indigenous elections.

Americans believed that something pathological had taken root in German and Japanese societies that led them to war. Total war by definition required government and society to work together in execution of war. Thus, an intensive effort was necessary after the war to change the political culture of these nations. More immediately, there were questions about laws and tribunals established under Nazi rule in Germany and occupied territories. Americans planning the occupations thus questioned the implied limitations on occupant-initiated reform. An internal US memo argued, “It will not always be easy to define the legal status quo and it may be highly undesirable to support it when it is defined.”

It seems clear that Article 43 intends to protect the interests of the population, and to balance the principle of humanity with that of military necessity. Americans interpreted the article in a way that left the door open for military necessity to define Nazi ideology as a threat to the security of the occupant’s army. Edmund H. Schwenk, writing in *The Yale Law Journal* in 1945, argued that theoretical limitations on the occupant’s power were mitigated by practical considerations. He concluded,

> in the present war situation AMG (the American Military Government) is faced not only with the task of supervising the administration and judiciary of the enemy country, but also with the job of abolishing existing and enacting new laws and decrees.

---

71 Memo for Info No. 56 OSS on MG, pp. 5-8 of appl. to Memo, Donovan, Dir., OSS, to Deane, Secy., JCS, 12 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-42), sec. I, quoted in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, p. 145.

72 It remains unclear who is to define the interests of the population. If the locus of sovereignty rests with the people, the Hague Regulations acquire different meaning.

The American military effort called upon American psychology and sociology scholars to confront the civil dimension. The American postwar propaganda effort included operation of radio stations, printing of daily newspapers, production of newsreels and control of commercial films, mail censorship, troop education programs, and cultural centers. After World War II campaigns were long over, academics continued to advise intelligence operations:

[T]he army's former Psychological Warfare Division (now reincarnated as part of the Army's Civil Affairs Division) [were characterized as] a massive campaign for strengthening ideological unity among US forces and for remolding attitudes among the enemy population.\(^{74}\)

De-Nazification in Germany caused the dismissal of 100,000 from public employment in the United States zone, and the arrest and internment of 82,000 party officials by September, 1945.\(^{75}\) American occupants of Germany attempted the following:

- to purge the country of important Nazi leaders, to transform the society through a systematic program of denazification, reorientation and education of the populace, and to conduct an intensive decartelization and deconcentration of certain key industries.\(^{76}\)

As one observer noted, “We did not have enough lawyers.”\(^{77}\) Military courts have commonly accompanied American occupations, but in postwar Germany Anglo-American and Roman systems were combined with US Army courts martial as part of the program of

---

\(^{74}\) Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945-1960* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 35. In November of 1945, Brigadier General John Magruder of the OSS testified to the US Senate that a contribution from American social scientists was expected toward “the intelligence that enters into waging of war soundly and the waging of peace soundly.” Quoted in Simpson, *Science of Coercion*, p.32. The postwar propaganda effort was supported by public opinion surveys by academics Frederick W. Williams, Leo Crespi, Herbert Passin and John W. Bennett.

\(^{75}\) Ziemke, “Improvising,” p. 62.


The punishment policy was so broad that it deprived the occupying Americans of trained indigenous personnel necessary for indirect governance. However, the American concept of punishment would not play out, as after the program was passed to German officials, "German denazification boards were restoring Nazis to full rights after letting them off with fines that were easily payable in inflated money." Due to a shortage of civil affairs personnel in Sicily and Italy, removal of Fascist government leaders was limited.

*Expressions of Military Government in World War II*

Military government in the American occupations of Germany and Japan differed from shorter, multilateral occupations in Italy and Sicily. These occupations also differed from US practices in liberated territories. In North Africa, France, Belgium, Holland and the Philippines, US soldiers were "forced by military necessity and the dictates of humanity to assume in varying degrees and for varying periods of time many functions normally carried out by governments."

The problem of military operations in friendly terrain led to the innovation of the term "civil affairs" in lieu of "military government":

In France, Belgium, and Austria (which latter we included among the "liberated" areas), our terminology caught up with us and we found ourselves conducting "civil affairs" operations, under the coordination of a "civil affairs division" - with "military government" units. We found also that the problems of refugee control

---


79 Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 66.

80 "On Sicily and Italy we imposed allied military government, jointly with the British - even though the Italian government fell apart and an element of it made peace for the parts of Italy under Allied control. We devised the term "co-belligerent" and went on with military government, because it was the only means we had of dealing with the problems of a war-disrupted society threatened with chaos and starvation. James E. King, Jr. *Civil Affairs: The Future Prospect of a Military Responsibility*, CAMG Paper No.3 Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University under contract with the Department of the Army, June 1958. p.6.

and relief, sanitation and local police, of clearing the roads and organizing labor parties to assist the advancing armies, were not confined to enemy territory.\textsuperscript{82}

So as not to present themselves as occupiers of friendly territory, the Americans described the performance of civil administrative functions as "civil affairs." Nonetheless, the principles of military necessity and humanity cited in this rationale are fundamental conceptual elements of the law of armed conflict and the law of belligerent occupation. The American solution to military government on friendly or neutral territory was to conclude a civil affairs agreement.\textsuperscript{83} Civil affairs agreements were drawn with the \textit{de jure} governments-in-exile of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Norway, in order to ensure the fullest possible understanding about pending liberation.\textsuperscript{84} Civil affairs agreements are still mentioned by international legal scholars and authors of field manuals for the US Army, but these citations are something of a red herring.\textsuperscript{85} In several cases, the agreements were negotiated after the arrival of allied forces. Once subordinate to the concept of military government, civil affairs eventually became the dominant conceptual framework with military government defined as one possible expression of it.

\textsuperscript{82}James E. King, Jr. \textit{Civil Affairs: The Future Prospect of a Military Responsibility}, CAMG Paper No.3 Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University under contract with the Department of the Army, June 1958. p.6. Likewise, Kyre and Kyre note that "while international lawyers have shown little interest, military officials because of the urgency of their responsibilities were forced to restate and redefine their terminology." Martin and Joan Kyre, \textit{Military Government and National Security}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{83}A Civil Affairs agreement is perhaps most easily explained as the reciprocal of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). As a former Pentagon official explained, "A Civil Affairs Agreement is what we can do to them, a Status of Forces Agreement is what they can do to us." These bilateral agreements, when in effect, operate in supplement to international regulations. SOFAs are commonplace, but were more so during the Cold War. Both types of agreement have to do with the presence of the foreign forces. A SOFA is an agreement between nations concerning jurisdiction over foreign forces present there, for example, "the extent of jurisdictional immunities accorded to members of the visiting force." In 1983 the US was estimated to have 359 bases and 1200 related facilities abroad. Note that the large network of US military bases overseas in the postwar period has been regarded by military historians as unusual, because lengthy deployments in the past were associated with colonial rule or military occupation. John Woodliffe, \textit{The Peacetime Use of Foreign Installations under Modern International Law}, Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{84}In doing so, Americans followed the lead of the British, who had more experience in these matters, and responded to their own experience in North Africa in which Eisenhower's dealing with the French in North Africa had been difficult. Likewise, Eisenhower was to confront an ambiguous political situation in France given the Administration's reluctance to confer exclusive recognition upon Charles de Gaulle.

\textsuperscript{85}For example, Adam Roberts, "What is a Military Occupation?"; John Woodliffe, \textit{The Peacetime Use of Foreign Installations}, p. 16. I was unable to find an example of a recent civil affairs agreement, and found few individuals who knew what these are about.
Finally, the US occupations of Germany and Japan differed from one another. There were institutional differences between these occupations at the highest levels. In April of 1945 Roosevelt created an Interim Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), but a different group, the State-War-Navy coordinating Committee (SWNCC) concentrated on Japan and Korea. High-level planning for Germany included America’s wartime allies. But Japanese planning was effectively unilateral, as was MacArthur’s implementation. In May of 1945 Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay assumed the post of Deputy Military Governor in Germany. A soldier was thus chosen rather than a civilian, reportedly because Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy wanted “to ward off being appointed civilian military governor of Germany.” Clay agreed with Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman after him, that governing civilians was a task for civilians, but transfer to a civilian agency would not be practicable for some time.

The personalities of the soldiers in charge of the German and Japanese occupations differed. While General Lucius Clay in charge in Germany comes across as a reluctant proconsul, “one gets the impression that General MacArthur enjoyed, so to speak, his reign over Japan.” In Germany, the Department of State kept a separate office for political and economic issues, but MacArthur in Japan was in control, with State playing a minor role for most of the

---

86 Once Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau had influenced President Roosevelt to pursue a pastoralization policy in Germany, many in the State Department resigned. Borton, “Presuppositions” p. 2.


88 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was the United States military governor, andcommanding general of United States Forces European Theater (USFET), the command that replaced SHAEF. When occupation zones were assigned SHAEF command was dissolved.


90 Willard A. Fletcher, “The Realities of Implementation,” in Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, pp. 75 - 92, p. 75. This view of MacArthur may be questionable. In September of 1945 MacArthur announced a reduction of occupation troops to 200,000. Worried that demobilization was proceeding too rapidly, MacArthur was rebuked in the press by Dean Acheson, who said “the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy.” Quoted in Finn, Winners in Peace, p. 48.
In contrast to the remaking of German institutions, the Japanese civil service was largely preserved.

Although there were many difference in the American occupations of Germany and Japan, these occupations also had much in common. First, both nations were defeated, rather than failed states. Japan’s bureaucracy was able to continue functioning, and Germany certainly possessed indigenous capacity for governance. Second, in both countries, policy direction from Washington reflected both anger and fear of economic (and war-industrial) revival. The initial American plan for Germany set out a “let-them-stew-in-their-own-juices approach to economic affairs.” Japan was also initially precluded from more than a minimal standard of living. As the rise of communism became a perceived threat to the United States interest in Europe and the Korean Conflict loomed in Asia, the American approach to reconstruction of these former enemies changed remarkably.

Germany

Robert Wolfe recalls that “[i]n terms of personal freedom and security, the Third Reich was an easy act to follow, even for a military occupation...” The occupation of Germany lasted twenty-one months, beginning September 15, 1944 and ending in June 1946. Germany at the end of World War II was much worse off than it had been at the end of World War I, according to Lucius Clay, who was there both times. In his view, the United States conducted a much more comprehensive and effective military government after World War II. Clay wrote, “If it had not been for that, I do not know where Germany would be today.” Nonetheless, two factors

---

91 Finn, Winners in Peace, p. 38.
mitigated the effectiveness of planning for postwar Germany. One was confused interagency participation in the planning in Washington. Another was the void in policy direction beyond insistence upon unconditional surrender of Axis powers.\textsuperscript{96}

Guidance for US forces in the occupation of Germany was set at high policy levels, in field manuals, and in doctrine emerging from military government schools. And yet Earl Ziemke recalls, "When the first military government detachments entered Germany in September they did so without any approved guidance on policy."\textsuperscript{97} There was turmoil in policy circles but pressing demands in the field of operations:

> [T]he government detachments in the field had work to do, and they did it. There were mayors and administrators to be appointed, people to be registered, curfews to be enforced, food supplies and rationing systems to be organized, weapons and other prohibited articles to be collected, public health and safety to be provided for, utilities to be restored and operated, debris and rubble to be cleaned up, and dozens of other jobs that had become the responsibility of the occupying forces.\textsuperscript{98}

In a sense, US military government in Germany was "the servant of two masters,"\textsuperscript{99} the armed forces and national civilian leaders. The first two tasks for General Clay were to get the rails running and to establish military government units that would take over from tactical troops:

> The tactical troops did not want to give up, because as along as they were in charge they could commandeer houses, and whatever they wanted, and they liked that sense of power.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{96} Daugherty and Andrews, \textit{A Review of US Historical Experience}, p. 313. The Allied powers agreed at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October 1943 that occupation and military government would be conducted in Germany, and diplomats argued about how the territory would be carved up among the victorious states.

\textsuperscript{97} The US Combined Chiefs of Staff had established political, economic and relief requirements for the period prior to surrender, CSS 551. The Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) dealt with forms of military government in its guide, "Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe." In 1944 the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Germany Country Unit produced a handbook to guide military government. Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. thought the policy too soft, and persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to have it withdrawn. Ziemke, "Improvising," pp. 54-55.

\textsuperscript{98} Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 55.

\textsuperscript{99} Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 52.

\textsuperscript{100} Lucius D. Clay, "Proconsul of a People," in Wolfe (ed.) \textit{Americans as Proconsuls} pp. 103-113, p. 107. The rails were important to enabling coal shipments to elsewhere in Europe.
The military government deployment strategy was to lay a "carpet" of military government behind an advancing Allied combat front. By April 1945, 150 military government detachments had already been sent to Germany, and provisional detachments were organized. Germans were not considered to be wards of the occupation in the way that displaced persons were, "and the Army assumed no direct responsibility for their welfare." The main concerns for the troops on the ground in the spring of 1945 were the still unplanted fields and the shortage of coal for the coming winter.

The essence of American policy in Germany after World War II is often summarized as 'the three D's': demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization. Allied plans emerging from a conference in Quebec called for de-industrialization of Germany. This was the so-called Morgenthau Plan that influenced directive JCS 1067. From JCS 1067 the US issued to its soldiers an austere occupation handbook that admonished against promoting the German economy, tolerating Nazis in public office, or providing supplies beyond those needed to prevent disease and unrest.

The Americans came to realize that JCS 1067 would be difficult to implement and "would have made Germany vulnerable to Soviet domination." The terms of the Morgenthau Plan were softened in the Potsdam protocol of August 2, 1945, enabling political rehabilitation, local self-government, and opening the possibility for a German standard of living on par with the rest of Europe. Economic recovery was justified not on the basis of friendly feeling toward Germans, but on pragmatic grounds. The occupation was costing the government and relief in

---

101 Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 57. Military government was responsible as well for over five million displaced persons. This figure includes liberated prisoners of war.

102 The Morgenthau Plan for Germany, in the form of JCS 1067, was issued in the spring of 1945. JCS 1067 was an American directive, not negotiated with allies. James W. Riddleberger, "Impact of the Proconsular Experience on American Foreign Policy," in Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, pp. 392-397, p. 393.

103 John J. McCloy, "From Military to Self-Government," in Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls pp. 114-123, p. 119. According to McCloy, copies of the original plan were "buried."
occupied areas (GARIOA) budget several hundred million dollars a year. Communist party
growth in Europe was strong, and Germany was viewed as a key to total European recovery.\textsuperscript{104}

The conclusion of the war in the Pacific in mid-August 1945 had two major effects on the
situation in Germany. First, it triggered a sentiment at home in the US to demobilize quickly.
Second, it brought with it a removal of censorship and criticism of the occupation for perceived
inadequacies in the de-Nazification program. Ironically, press scrutiny increased the workload of
military government. Criticism of the de-Nazification efforts led to Military Government Law
No. 8, prohibiting Nazi party members from private or public employment above the level of
common laborer. A morass ensued, as "military government property offices became trustees for
thousands of establishments ranging from barber shops to factories."\textsuperscript{105} Lucius Clay lobbied for
more attention to German reconstitution as the needs of allies and the requirements of a strong
West Germany against the Soviet-dominated East became apparent.

Lucius Clay took two important steps toward bringing the military component of the
occupation to a close. First, in September 1945 Clay ordered German elections for January 1946.
Second, on October 1, 1945, Clay created OMGUS, the Office of Military Government (US).
Control was turned over to a civilianized OMGUS after local military governments and regional
detachments removed themselves from direct supervision of German civilian administrations by
November 15 and December 15, 1945, respectively. By June 30, 1946, the local detachments
were to be disbanded and replaced by two-officer liaison and security detachments. These were
prohibited from interfering in German affairs except in outright emergencies, serving merely to
observe and report.\textsuperscript{106}

\footnotetext{104}{See Clay, "Proconsul of a People," p. 107.}
\footnotetext{105}{Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 65. Leading into this law were US press reports on September 24, 1945 of remarks by
General George S. Patton, military governor of Bavaria, implying that there was little difference between German
Nazis and US Democrats and Republicans.}
\footnotetext{106}{Ziemke, "Improvising," p. 65.}
Japan

The US occupation of Japan (1945 - 1951) has been called the “single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed change in world history.”\(^{107}\) The US Department of State began studying the possibility in 1942, and established a Subcommittee for the Far East (SFE) of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).\(^{108}\) Execution of policy was the responsibility of Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur.\(^{109}\) MacArthur effectively performed three roles: Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Far East (theater commander); United States Representative on and Chairman of the Allied Council; and SCAP “responsible for both the military and civilian aspects of the occupation of Japan.”\(^{110}\)

Planning for the occupation of Japan was influenced by decisions already taken with respect to Germany.\(^{111}\) A basic directive on the Japanese occupation assumed that there would be a prolonged “wake-of-battle” occupation as invading troops secured the Japanese islands. It also followed the US model of military government responsibility for governance functions as in the German model.\(^{112}\) Neither of these assumptions was accurate.

---


\(^{112}\) Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan, pp. 6-7.
The transition to occupation in Japan was orderly. Emperor Hirohito accepted the terms of the Americans on August 14, 1945. The Japanese accepted the war-ending terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. On August 28 an advance group of American soldiers arrived southwest of Tokyo. The first group of military government personnel arrived at Yokohama on August 31 and September 1. The Potsdam terms enabled the Japanese government to continue to function. A purge was later organized but did not affect civil administration to the degree that it had in Germany. Imperial institutions were preserved, despite the emperor's renunciation of his claim to divinity. More importantly, the Japanese government was not supplanted. MacArthur was instructed that "Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results." There were military government officers (in July 1949 these became civil affairs officers), but no "military governors" as there had been in Germany. Eighth Army troops and Japanese police jointly manned checkpoints around the initial occupation zone.

113 At the time of General MacArthur's arrival on August 30, there were 4,200 US soldiers in the vicinity and 300,000 of the Imperial Army's best troops in Tokyo. The total number of Imperial Army soldiers on the home islands was estimated to be around 3 million. MacArthur's SCAP General Headquarters numbered 8,700; the Far East Command General Headquarters (GHQ) at its height included 230,000 troops of the 8th Army and 230,000 of the 6th Army. By the end of 1945 there were only 200,000 of the 8th Army remaining. That number was reduced to 117,500 by the end of 1948. Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp.7 and 35.


115 On January 4, 1946, the directive, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office," (SCAPIN 550) provided a basis for a purge of Japan's wartime leadership. It is estimated that over 200,000 people were removed or barred from their positions. In 1950 the directive was used to remove communists, by targeting individuals who opposed or resisted the occupation. The purge was most effective in dispelling the influence of the military, but had less impact on the civilian bureaucracy. Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan," in Wolfe (ed.) *Americans as Proconsuls* pp. 188-197, p. 189. See also John Montgomery, *Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.


The Military Government Section in Japan was effectively disassembled on September 22, 1945. Instead there were military government units or teams, composed of civilian and military personnel, within SCAP. These teams exercised little more than surveillance and reporting mandates. Teams were deployed in 53 places, each staffed with 50 individuals. Military government was inadequately staffed and "poorly informed about what the Tokyo headquarters was doing." 

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued the imperial government directives (SCAPINS), which were implemented by prefectures. This system helped the Americans to work around their scant understanding of Japanese culture and organization. Likewise, MacArthur was able to consolidate his control of policy by claiming that the Far Eastern Commission in Washington knew little about the situation.

"United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," on August 29, 1945, set forward the political and economic characteristics of the occupation. Political dimensions included disarmament and demilitarization, apprehension of war criminals, and "encouragement of the desire for individual liberties and democratic processes." Economic measures, as initially in Germany, called for recovery to a minimal level. Hugh Borton recalls deliberately seeking to ensure that JCS 1067, the directive notorious for embodying the Morgenthau Plan, would not also be policy for Japan. However, the attitude in the directive for Japan was that "It is up to them to repair the damages of a war they started." Japan needed to import supplies to avert starvation or collapse, but so did America's wartime allies:

119 Braibanti, "MacArthur Shogunate," pp. 81-91, p. 82.
121 Japanese government officials were furthermore helpful in translating SCAP directives into Japanese law. Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan," in Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls pp. 188-197, p. 196.
123 US Department of State, Occupation of Japan, pp. 73 - 81.
These imports at best take United States credits which might better be used elsewhere to help friends and Allies of the United States, many of which are in an equally desperate situation; at worst they may never be repaid and thus represent a continuation of the drain on the resources of the United States taxpayer by the Japanese which all hoped and believed had been ended by V-J Day.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Allied Occupation of Japan}, pp. 95-96. According to Richard Finn, Japan paid more than $4 billion in occupation costs, and received only half that much from the United States in economic assistance. Finn, \textit{Winners in Peace}, p. 37.}

The Japanese, for their part, saw the occupation itself as an impediment to recovery: industry cartels were disrupted under the occupation program that decentralized its industries, an economic purge caused uncertainty, labor unions grew in influence, and the occupation forces themselves were expensive to support.

After the United Nations Security Council issued a condemnation of aggression against North Korea on June 25, 1950, it was immediately clear that a byproduct of the Korean conflict would be an improved economy and a partial rearmament of Japan.\footnote{Most of the disbanded Military Government Section in Japan was sent to Korea, despite their training for work in Japan. Daniels, “The American Occupation of Japan, 1945-52,” p. 164.} The Japanese supported the American effort, providing personnel for transport ships, mine sweeping, even blood for wounded US soldiers. The propriety of these activities in aid of an occupying power was not legally challenged by Japanese or Americans.\footnote{Finn, \textit{Winners in Peace}, p. 266.}

\textit{Lessons of World War II}

American military government in World War II presented many lessons for future policy:

1. There is a need for effective interagency coordination, and machinery to coordinate policy planning and its implementation.\footnote{The Civil Affairs Division within the Department of the Army solved coordination problems in Washington. However, control of occupation policy effectively was to be found in the field. Roy Licklider, “State Building after Invasion: Somalia and Panama,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, California, April 1996, p.6. As a consequence, the vital role of trained civil affairs personnel was evident, as was the need to understand the "psychology and national aspirations" of the population. Daugherty and Andrews, \textit{A Review of US Historical Experience}, p. 407.}

2. A cellular type of organization may be preferable to a fixed structure.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Allied Occupation of Japan}, pp. 95-96. According to Richard Finn, Japan paid more than $4 billion in occupation costs, and received only half that much from the United States in economic assistance. Finn, \textit{Winners in Peace}, p. 37.}
3. Operation requirements vary with population density and complexity of a country's economy.

4. Highly specialized technical personnel may be less effective than personnel with general knowledge.

5. Efficiency is enhanced when the organization of military government is parallel to the organization of the territory's political and social institutions.

6. The situation elsewhere in Europe brought attention to the need to differentiate between military government in occupied territory and that conducted on allied terrain.

At the conclusion of World War II, the Civil Affairs Division was responsible for development of civil affairs annexes for all military plans, the Army having been appointed executive agent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Seventy peacetime United States Army Reserve CAMG units, fourteen groups and fifty-six companies were created by 1949, many of which were supplemented by reserve special units.\textsuperscript{130} Three active Army CAMG units, the 95\textsuperscript{th} Group and the 41\textsuperscript{st} and 42\textsuperscript{nd} Companies, were also formed between 1948 and 1949, enabling for the first time instant deployment of CAMG units.\textsuperscript{131}

Some civil affairs innovations emerging from World War II have been long lasting. The Marshall Plan, undertaken in 1947-48, was the first major American bilateral assistance program. The United States committed 2.5 percent of its gross national product to provide food, establish a foundation for Western European economic reconstruction, and establish a bulwark against communism.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{129} Given the variety of cultural contexts in which civil affairs may be practiced, a large number of personnel and variety of skills are required. These soldiers must be flexible enough to confront different problems in different countries.

\textsuperscript{130} Swarm, "Civil Affairs," p. 401.

\textsuperscript{131} Swarm, "Civil Affairs," p. 401.

\textsuperscript{132} See David Forsythe, "Humanitarian Assistance," p. 71.
United States military occupation of Europe set a model against which current literature on reconstruction, or rebuilding war torn societies, identifies itself.\(^{133}\) The postwar experiment is said to have proven the utility of military governance "for reform - some would say retribution - in those areas where local authorities did not measure up to our standards" and as a way to heal civilian populations "for whom we [Americans] had only the most compassionate feelings."\(^{134}\) In the wake of this experience, Americans began to consider seriously a role for the military in shaping the societies in which it was involved.\(^{135}\) In this way, civil affairs came to be viewed as a "force multiplier."\(^{136}\) Because some US forces remained in Europe after the war, and a host-nation liaison capacity was needed. Military government was inapplicable and the broader definition of civil affairs was more appropriate.

6. MILITARY ASSISTANCE: THE PHILIPPINES AND KOREA

As states sorted out their ideological and institutional structures after World War II, the Americans needed to develop a response to insurgency. The post-World War II era marked an increasing emphasis on the Military Assistance Advisory Group or MAAG concept. A MAAG or Military Mission chief would serve as the Department of Defense representative on the US Ambassador’s country team, a planning, control, coordination and liaison team sent to ensure tangible benefits from US civil assistance programs.\(^{137}\) In the Greek Civil War between 1947 and

---

\(^{133}\) In *After the Wars* Anthony Lake compares current and post-war reconstruction efforts. Lake and others examine post-war reconstruction efforts in various parts of the globe but do not focus upon a dimension that was quite remarkable about the post-war plan: the soldiers-as-governors phenomenon. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder mention the postwar occupations in their discussion of democratization successes: "...the obvious successes were the democratization of Germany and Japan after 1945, due to occupation by liberal democracies and the favorable international setting provided by the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods economic system, and the democratic military alliance against the Soviet threat." Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74,3 (May/June 1995) p.95.


\(^{135}\) John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, *Winning the Peace*.

\(^{136}\) See Swarm in Robert Wolfe (ed.) *Americans as Proconsuls*, p. 415

1949, the United States provided advisory services pertaining mostly to military activity. The
“baptism” of US experience with insurgency came in the form of US involvement with the
regime of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{138}

Counterinsurgency is a military strategy dominated by socio-economic and psychological
considerations.\textsuperscript{139} Its essence is to deny the enemy access to the population. The
counterinsurgency program conducted primarily by the Philippine government with the aid of
American advisors was highly successful. Magsaysay met the insurgency by the Hukbong Bayan
Laban Sa Hapon (Hukbalahap or Huk) with a focus on internal defense (merging the rural police
and army into a single service). Magsaysay also reformed his armed forces, and began a
“program of attraction” directed by a newly established Civil Affairs Office of the Secretary of
National Defense. Troops were to behave in a friendly manner toward the people, carry more
food than they needed for themselves, and to liberally distribute candy and gum to children. The
idea of civic action for an army in combat was innovated in response to the Huk challenge.
Meanwhile, psychological warfare schemes on the American model were employed.

US influence in the Philippines was exercised mostly via the embassy and the economic
and military aid missions. Members of the US MAAG team were not necessarily pleased with
the unconventional tactics exercised there, even though it was Magsaysay’s American military
advisor, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Edward G. Lansdale, who suggested that

\textsuperscript{138} The term is used by Douglas S. Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance: 1950 to
involved lesser threat, according to Blaufarb, and thus a light US military commitment.

\textsuperscript{139} The debate about counterinsurgency would not begin in earnest until evaluations of US actions in Vietnam.
Andrew Krepinevich argues that the Army was not persuaded, and after him Deborah Avant argues that
congressional funding provided institutional incentives to sustain its preparations for large-scale encounters in the
European Theater. In response to the president’s desire for a counterinsurgency doctrine, Army manuals defined
more areas as counterinsurgency but always as special warfare within conventional conflict. In contrast, Harry
Summers blames the failure in Vietnam to too much attention to counterinsurgency. Kennedy appointed Brigadier
General Rosson as special assistant for special warfare, but accounts characterize Rosson as cut off, limited to
focusing on Green Berets, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., \textit{The Army
and Vietnam} Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Deborah D. Avant, \textit{Political Institutions and
soldiers use their assets to assist civilians. General Lansdale wanted to preserve US military assets for employment in Korea.

Unconventional warfare came to the fore in the Korean Conflict (1950-1953), when the North Korean use of guerrilla forces prompted a confused American response. North Korea struck behind army lines and the Americans sought a means to strike back. The US armed forces pieced together special strike units and employed US Army Ranger units capable of quick strike and long patrols. The US Central Intelligence Agency responded more fully to the spectrum of unconventional operations under the Joint Advisory Commission Korea (JACK), led by a military officer assigned to the CIA.

General Douglas MacArthur was ordered to avoid a complete imposition of government administration as he advanced into North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided MacArthur with the directive for civil affairs that stated,

However, it will be necessary to establish a temporary substitute for the Central North Korean Government and also to establish and maintain supervision and control over North Korean De Facto Provincial and Local Govts.

When China entered the war in November 1950, relief in South Korea became a more immediate concern than government in the North. There were civil affairs successes in Korea, in the areas of refugee evacuation, disease eradication, enhancing electricity, potable water, crop production and undertaking land reform. However, many of the problems of previous civil affairs were repeated during the Korean conflict. The United Nations, which sponsored the operation, did not undertake extensive planning and coordination until two years into the campaign. A study of Civil Affairs personnel indicated education was below average for officers

\[140\] Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*, p. 30. General Lansdale became a key advisor on unconventional warfare to governments confronting insurgency. It is unclear whether Lansdale wore two hats at the time, as a military leader and as a CIA agent.


and even many CA personnel believed Civil Affairs/Military Government was for “surplus” and “undesirable” soldiers. A report in 1951 described policy as handicapped by confusion about the locus of authority, given four separate agencies with independent channels of communication dealing with the Republic of Korean government, who attempted “to play one organization off against the other.” All military Civil Affairs units eventually came under the Korea United Nations Civil Assistance Command umbrella, but this was only one month before the armistice in 1953.

The Korean experience brought new awareness of “the problems of waging war in underdeveloped countries,” meaning popular support. Doctrine and tactics for Special Forces contingents remained conventionally oriented and were relatively ineffective. Thus, the Korean experience according to Sam Sarkesian, “did little to create enthusiasm within the conventional military for unconventional warfare.” Likewise, coordination with civilian agencies in the theater of operations was troublesome for US commanders. General Mark Clark, Commander in Chief in the Far East recalls,

I couldn’t afford to let a group of UN economists decide to rehabilitate textile factories, for instance, with money we sorely needed to dredge a harbor or make way for our supply ships. I had to have the authority to make decisions which would funnel relief and reconstruction aid money into projects that would be beneficial to the war effort at the same time that they helped the Korean economy.

These economic and financial affairs of South Korea were a continuing headache to me. I would have been delighted to turn them over to almost anyone, with the

---

143 Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, p. 329. To add insult to injury, a Republic of Korea minister described them as “cookie pushers.”

144 The four agencies in September 1951 were the UN Commission on Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), the UN Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the US Department of State and the US Army. C. Darwin Stolzenback and Henry Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51. Operations Research Office T-184. Chevy Chase, 1952, p. 40 quoted in Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, p. 328.


proviso that his first concern would be to use relief money in a way to help, not to hurt the prosecution of the war.148

Significant outcomes of the Philippine and Korean experiences include use of the rising prominence of the MAAG concept and the use of reserve forces for civil affairs. Ad hoc effort by the US military to develop special strike forces to counter North Korean guerrilla activity is also worth note. It would be many years before civil affairs and psychological operations would be rolled into a general Special Operations Forces category. Civil affairs field manuals in this era did begin, however, to consider their integration with psychological operations and the importance of interagency cooperation in the field.

The Army field manual FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Military Government Operations issued in 1957 incorporated the idea of employment of civil affairs in combat. The manual retained as well much military government terminology, in particular, forms for proclamation of civil affairs in liberated territory, proclamation of military government in occupied territory, and notice specifying hours of curfew. A new joint manual written by the Army, 1958 FM 41-5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, followed up on the differentiation of terms in the Army’s 1957 FM 41-10 to deliver the combined term, civil affairs/military government (CA/MG).149

The US Army Chief of Staff approved activation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in April 1952. This was redesignated the Special Warfare School in 1956. The Civil Affairs and Military Government School was upgraded and expanded. A major study, known as the Draper Report, put CA/MG at the top of its list of military agencies with a capacity to contribute to economic and social progress in developing nations. According to Kyre and Kyre:

The Army could now expect authorization to conduct programs for actively influencing civilians within the periphery threatened by communist actions. This


149 In military parlance, “joint” refers to more than one service -- Army, Navy, Air Force -- but it is noteworthy that FM 41-5 was an Army production.
was a function which the Army had consistently been reluctant to assume except in emergency situations growing out of open warfare.\textsuperscript{150}

The subordination of the US doctrine of military government to the doctrine of civil affairs was complete by the end of the 1950s; the former term was dropped from titles of field manuals. In 1959, the CAMG Branch was redesignated as the Civil Affairs Branch.\textsuperscript{151} The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a “Statement of Current Policy on Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Operations,” which made CA the umbrella term for overall policy, and CA was designated to the Joint Chiefs.

7. MILITARIZATION OF PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM

Vietnam opened a new chapter in the American experience with the civil dimension of conflict. Whereas the bombing campaigns of the total war of World War II had targeted civilians from a distance, American soldiers on the ground in Vietnam witnessed the impact of the war as it happened. Insurgent propaganda literature directly targeted the civilian population rather than attempting to dissuade enemy military forces, as enemy literature had done in World War II and Korea.\textsuperscript{152} Due to the nature of the Vietnam conflict, the temporal distinction between combat and civil operations did not apply.\textsuperscript{153} Foreign and domestic perceptions of military legitimacy suffered as a result. Second Lieutenant Philip Caputo recalls his acquittal in general court-martial for the deaths of two captured civilian Vietnamese:

The killings had occurred in war. They had occurred, moreover, in a war whose sole aim was to kill Viet Cong, a war in which those ordered to do the killing often could not distinguish the Viet Cong from civilians, a war in which civilians in ‘free-fire zones’ were killed every day by weapons more horrible than pistols or

\textsuperscript{150} Kyre and Kyre, \textit{Military Government and National Security} p. 15.
\textsuperscript{151} See the history in the 1993 field manual, FM 41-10 1993, p. 4-1. In 1955 the Civil Affairs/Military Government Branch was established as a United States Army Reserve Branch, replacing civilian volunteers with reserves. This change also meant that CA units would not lose civilian skills when their reserve troops were mobilized for duty in artillery or armored units, for example. Affairs and Military Government was removed from the Provost Marshal’s Office in the mid-1950s. The Military Government Group at Fort Gordon, reactivated in 1955, was redesignated as the Civil Affairs Group in 1959. See Sandler, \textit{Glad to See Them Come}, pp. 336-337.
\textsuperscript{153} Although the Geneva Conventions of 1949 built further civilian protections into the laws of war, the ambiguity in the Vietnam conflict made adherence to international law difficult.
shotguns...As I had come to see it, America could not intervene in a people’s war without killing some of the people.\textsuperscript{154}

Vietnam showed how challenges inherent to indirect rule, reliance on indigenous civil administration and indigenous military force, can present problems. In an allegedly limited war, civilian control of military operations and interagency coordination issues came to the fore. Military resentment of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s preoccupation with minutiae in the Vietnam conflict has been well noted.\textsuperscript{155} It is less well known that the US military did not go in first, as in major wars, and shift military government responsibilities in a process of civilianization. Instead, the US military involvement in Vietnam put the armed forces among a number of civilian agencies already in the field. Management from Washington was thus a paradox of central control without a central agency.\textsuperscript{156} The answer to this problem, although incomplete and late in the game, was militari\textit{zation} of the pacification effort.

If the Philippines represented America’s baptism with counterinsurgency, Vietnam was its trial by fire. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration expressed a strong interest in the nature of war. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 124, released in January of 1962, characterized insurgency as a form of politico-military conflict, and called for doctrinal development and interagency cooperation to meet the challenge. Training of MAAG personnel was given particular attention.\textsuperscript{157}


\textsuperscript{156} Sarkesian, \textit{Unconventional Conflicts}, p. 158. Sarkesian contrasts the American organization for Vietnam with the British organization in Malaya, which delegated to the field but had a coordinated and unified effort there.

\textsuperscript{157} Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era}, p. 68.
The Other War

American support for Magsaysay’s unorthodox approach in the Philippines had been controversial, but the consequences of that dispute were minor compared to internal US disagreements over strategy in Vietnam. The Americans took on a conventional struggle with South Vietnam against the North and a counterinsurgency battle to win the support of the Vietnamese people against the Viet Cong. The goal of the ‘other war’ in Vietnam was pacification, designed to stabilize the civilian environment and nurture public perceptions of legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government:

The program mix comprises two broad types of activities. They are designed on the one hand to establish and maintain a significant degree of physical security for the population and, on the other, to increase the communication and ties between the government and the people through a variety of selected non-military programs.\textsuperscript{158}

United States counterinsurgency thinking in this era gave rise to a connection between CA and Special Operations Forces (SOF) including Special Forces (SF) that persists today. Already US Strike Command had been established in 1961 to focus on rapid deployment and the Caribbean Command reorganized to form the US Southern Command oriented toward Latin America.\textsuperscript{159} Kennedy attempted to revitalize the ‘Green Beret’ soldiers, or Army Special Forces. Within three years of Kennedy’s tenure the Special Forces grew from a force of 2,000 to a force of 12,000. The mission of organizing guerrilla units behind enemy lines grew to include civic action, engineering, communications, sanitation, medicine and other skills useful to winning populations in an area of operations.\textsuperscript{160} The “unity principle” of counterinsurgency advanced


\textsuperscript{160} When Special Warfare Headquarters at Fort Bragg North Carolina was upgraded to the Special Warfare Center under a brigadier general and Kennedy authorized the wearing of the green berets. Lawrence A. Yates, \textit{Power
that "coordinated military, political, and economic effort was required to ensure effectiveness."\textsuperscript{161}

The Kennedy White House sought to exploit American and allied military skills such as engineering, medicine and education in military civic action (MCA) programs directed toward improving the lives of the population and thereby undermining insurgent causes. The Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in 1962:

While the military nation-building role is not foreign to the United States—it having been a major task of our military forces in the latter half of the nineteenth century—it has certainly fallen into disuse. Its revival now, largely as part of our military assistance program, represents a major change in practical orientation.\textsuperscript{162}

MCA represents a progression from previous doctrine of indirect rule, in that the programs involve the use of mostly local military forces in projects to benefit the population thereby improving their relationships with the community. Military civic action involves non-military uses of the military, forming one part of a counterinsurgency mixture that includes local police and military forces. "While counterinsurgency cannot succeed through civic action alone," Edward Glick wrote in a 1967 volume on MCA, "neither can it be lastingly successful without it."\textsuperscript{163} The focus in military civic action is the conduct of the US-supported regime. US forces provided training and support for MCA programs. In 1962 the US Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg established a four to six week long Military Assistance Training Adviser course for those who would be advisors to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).\textsuperscript{164} The School also trained ARVN officers.


\textsuperscript{164} Stewart, et al., "To Free From Oppression," p. 38.
Not surprisingly, the vocabulary of counterinsurgency predominated in a 1966 revised edition of the joint manual FM 41-5 titled *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*. The conventional principles of civil-military operations also persisted, as exemplified in the doctrine’s recognition that “[m]ass irrationality of civilians in the battle area during fluid situations may impose a serious threat to the success of military operations.” The new FM 41-5 prominently featured military civic action, and severely downplayed military government roles. The manual notes that in most of the new and developing states, the military forces may represent the cornerstone of political stability. In some, government activity is administered to a considerable extent by military units and officers.

Thomas Scoville’s study of American pacification efforts in Vietnam points to a fundamental divergence over whether the priorities of the pacification effort in Vietnam should be military/security or civil/developmental. So much so, according to Stanley Sandler, that President John F. Kennedy put 400 US Special Forces in Vietnam under CIA authority. This move reflected a still-pervasive conventional view in the Army about non-military aspects of the conflict – the ‘other war.’ The US became committed to pacification, the ‘other war’ in 1968 but this was not the Army’s first priority. On either side of a debate about unconventional warfare there are allegations that the lessons of World War II were misapplied in Vietnam. On the one hand, there is a view that seemingly successful military government in Japan after the war set a precedent for social-scientific approaches to conflict:

---

165 Population management was considered in relation to “modern warfare” (nuclear, biological and chemical warfare) that involves larger areas of territory and civilians in greater numbers. FM 41-5 *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*, (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 18 November 1966), p. 4-7.

166 FM 41-5 *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*, p. 4-5. The passage seems to cast a positive light on military involvement in political administration, and it is not clear whether this was intended.


169 Ironically, as the United States Army began to commit more seriously to the effort to ‘win the hearts and minds’ in Vietnam, the enemy “forsook his own doctrine...and swiftly conquered South Vietnam with a conventional, armored-tipped, blitzkrieg from the north...” Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, p. 363.
For Vietnam was not only a species of military failure. It demonstrated that area studies, technical prowess, and varieties of indirect occupation cannot always triumph over hostile circumstances.\textsuperscript{170}

On the other hand, there is a view that conventional combat success in Asia and in Europe during World War II ought to be blamed for a conventional approach to an unconventional war. In particular, some have accused the US armed forces of a “preoccupation” with conventional warfare.\textsuperscript{171} Deborah Avant alleges that the Army in Vietnam never accepted the counterinsurgency doctrinal emphasis on denial of civilian support to the enemy. The Army instead judged success by body counts, viewing pacification as “part of mopping up.”\textsuperscript{172}

\textit{Indirect Rule}

US military involvement in Vietnam had grown out of advisory roles, beginning in the 1950s with the establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Group to assist French efforts in Indo-China. But reliance on indirect rule had its drawbacks. According to Benjamin Schwarz, The crux of the failure of the other war, in Vietnam—the absence of any political foundation for a program purporting to engage the population on the side of the government—was immedicable by American influence.\textsuperscript{173}

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem insisted, to American chagrin, on division of security responsibility between the military command and provincial governments.\textsuperscript{174} Diem ignored American suggestions for reform because, in the assessment of John Kenneth Galbraith, “He senses that he cannot let power go because he will be thrown out.”\textsuperscript{175} The Americans in


\textsuperscript{172} Avant, \textit{Political Institutions and Military Change}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{173} Benjamin C. Schwarz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador,” p.76.

\textsuperscript{174} Blaufarb, \textit{The Counterinsurgency Era}, p. 90.

Vietnam did not practice military government as such. Indeed, the United States provided training and support for, but did not control the South Vietnamese Army. Pacification was nominally the responsibility of the South Vietnamese government. This in itself was administratively problematic after a coup ousted Diem in 1963.

Large numbers of US combat troops poured when South Vietnam faced military defeat in 1965. Civil Affairs trained personnel were in short supply. Although US Army Civil Affairs personnel began active duty tours, the pacification effort was subordinated for the next two years. A division of labor between US and Vietnamese forces established in 1965 committed US troops to combat and against North Vietnamese main-force units, and committed nearly half of the South Vietnamese Army to local security. Deborah Avant faults this strategy, arguing that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) had been trained as an offensive force and was inappropriate for pacification activities. The division of labor made sense, however, given superior American firepower and the principle of indirect rule in US doctrine. In 1966 the number of American military advisors to South Vietnamese units increased with the build-up of combat forces; they outnumbered American civilian advisors and did constitute an increase in American military involvement in pacification.

---


177 Surprisingly, reserve CA units were not mobilized for Vietnam. Sandler notes that shortage of CA personnel was a major internal problem. Three CA companies included 454 personnel, 165 of which were officers. Their short one-year tours, lack of reserve call-up, and demands for skilled troops elsewhere caused CA assets to fall short. Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, p. 365.


179 Scoville, *Reorganizing*, pp. 16-17. The policy began in 1965 when most US troops arrived, but was formally adopted in October 1966.


Coordination

Civil-military coordination in Vietnam was complex, both within the United States and between military and civilian agencies of the United States and Vietnam. The American campaign to “win the hearts and minds” was an interagency effort, that is, one involving US civilian and military organizations. These included the US Agency for International Development, the CIA, and a Military Assistance Advisory Group commanded by a three star general. A Central Intelligence Agency’s Revolutionary Development Cadre Program trained local defense platoons that worked in and among the people on political indoctrination and motivation. The CIA program used Vietnamese fighting power that combat commander General Westmoreland viewed as scarce and needed for military operations. The military war was in competition with the pacification effort.

Inadequate integration among the various US agencies, unpredictable funding, and other impediments to implementation are cited in assessments of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Control problems were compounded when President John F. Kennedy attempted to direct the war from the White House, and beefed up the MAAG with a full assistance command headed by a four star general. Accountability was a problem: “no agency saw pacification as its central responsibility, and none was willing to let any other take full responsibility for the entire program.”

Attempts to reconcile civil and military implementation efforts brought attention to problems of the “country team” approach privileging the role of the US Ambassador, and led to

---

182 Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 12.
184 Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 5. Because the four star general had the same rank as the Ambassador. This move thus compromised the ability of the latter to manage the military and other agencies under the “country-team” concept established during the Eisenhower Administration.
the innovation of an overall coordinating agency to resolve interagency conflicts. Given the degree of liaison required for operations involving another government on the one hand, and the number of US civilian agencies in country on the other, the US embassy is a seemingly obvious place to look for leadership. The “country team” concept dates to an agreement in 1951 between the Departments of State, Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration (later the Agency for International Development) that the ambassador would provide leadership, direction, and coordination. Successive ambassadors, Henry Cabot Lodge and later Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, were unable to pull the overall effort together. In 1966 Robert Komer was appointed special assistant to the president for the other war. Komer would later reflect, “By God, we had a mandate to run the other war. We didn’t know what the other war was; nobody else did either.” Komer, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and eventually President Lyndon B. Johnson came to view the military as the logical lead for pacification efforts. For McNamara and General Wheeler, this included giving General Westmoreland the kind of power that General Douglas MacArthur held in Japan.

On May 9, 1967, Johnson directed the formation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization. CORDS embraced all US agencies relevant to civilian field operations and pacification (except the Central Intelligence Agency activities). It was a component of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) under military commander General William C. Westmoreland. Its chief was a

---

186 Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 4.
187 Maxwell Taylor had been Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff under Kennedy. An advantage of his experience was that the military commander General Westmoreland respected him. A possible disadvantage was that he did not want to interfere in the military chain of command. Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 11 and Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares New York: WW Norton & Co., 1972, p. 316.
188 Interview with Komer, 6 November 1969, cited in Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 27.
189 Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 47. When civil agencies sought bureaucratic leverage in pacification in 1966, they were given an Office of Civil Operations. The military began preparations to take over the entire pacification program. Message, JCS 6339-66, Wheeler to Sharp and Westmoreland, 17 October 1966, in Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 40.
civilian, and so CORDS represents a first, in that civilians in wartime field organization commanded military personnel and resources to embrace all American agencies. One consequence that followed the establishment of CORDS was that for the first time, the focus was on field execution rather than Washington organization. Once CORDS was established and governance of civil affairs was integrated with military command structure, the military took on more of the financial burden for the pacification effort. From militarization US policy turned to Vietnamization. President Richard M. Nixon came into office in 1968 and the American forces prepared to withdraw by 1973.

After Vietnam

Backlash against unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency approaches also followed from American failure in Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine in the 1970s was one of US retrenchment from direct engagement, and increased US reliance on indigenous troops. The US Congress cut military and economic aid to developing countries, and the Pentagon turned its attention to conventional deterrence in Europe. Special Forces were reduced in number from 13,000 in the 1960s to less than 4,000 and control of Special Forces was divided among five different army commands. The US Southern Command scaled back its activities and the Strike Command

---

191 AID was formally charged with New Life Development, CHIEU HOI, Refugees, and Public Safety. The CIA was charged with Revolutionary Development Cadre, Montagnard Cadre, and Census Grievance. MACV was in charge of Regional and Popular Forces and US Forces Civic Action and Civil Affairs. The Joint US Public Affairs Office was charged with Field Psychological Operations. MACV Directive 10-12, in Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 67, and p. v. Civilian agencies retained influence after CORDS.

192 The Agency for International Development had been the single largest contributor to the budget of the Office of Civil Operation in 1966 at 44 percent (the CIA contribution was slightly less). In 1967, AID contributed only 19 percent of the CORDS budget, dropping to 5 percent in 1970. In the same time, the Department of Defense contribution rose from $485 million to $729 million, and from 81 percent of the CORDS budget in 1967 to 94 percent in 1970. CORDS Fact Sheet prepared for Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Feb. 1970. CORDS Briefing Paper, 4 may 70, sub: Trends in Pacification Funding--1968-1970. In Scoville, Reorganizing, p. 81.

193 Even so, day and night “Christmas bombing” of North Vietnam was conducted in late 1972 in order to compel the North Vietnamese to agree to cease-fire and release US prisoners of war. See Sarkesian, pp. 102-103.

was abolished. Institutional changes and force structure cutbacks following Vietnam might seem to have been only indirectly related to civil affairs. However, America's attempt to reconstruct a capability in low-intensity conflict and special operations led to legislation reconstructing civil affairs within a new, joint framework.

At first the reaction of the US Army to Vietnam was one characterized as "avoidance." The American public insisted upon no more Vietnams, and the Army was happy to comply. The rhetoric of counterinsurgency fell into disuse, with entire chapters removed from field manuals on operations written in the 1970s. When retrospection did occur, it reflected unhappiness with the American people for failing to support the effort and with the civilian leadership for failing to provide clear military objectives. The notion emerged that in future, preconditions would have to be met before civilian leadership would commit troops abroad.

CONCLUSIONS ON HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

World War II doctrine refined distinctions in the nature of military occupation that had begun in the War of Rebellion. The Lieber Code made a distinction, critical in its time, between occupation and conquest. The former was regarded as a temporary state of affairs, in contrast to the conventional expectation that annexation follows from invasion. After World War II, that distinction was less critical, given the reluctance of occupants to annex territory. Instead, the critical difference to be made was between post-conflict administration in enemy territory and that conducted on allied terrain. Current doctrine has been progressively adapted since the first published doctrinal statement in 1940 of FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual - Military Government.

195 Thompson, Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 8.
198 In the 1898 treaty of peace with Spain (Paris), the occupant renounces claim to fruits of conquest - disclaiming an intention to stay permanently in Cuba. This was considered a "recent rule of modern times regarding military occupancy" Charles Magoon, The Law of Civil Government, pp. 386-7.
199 War Department, 30 June 1940. Before the Field Manual, efforts were "quasi official" according to the history provided by the Operations Research Office. They included Lieber's Code (1863); Magoon's Reports (1903);
At that time, the military answer to what happens after the use of force was military occupation and government.

American civil affairs experience was an outgrowth of war, and the occupations that followed. Today the term military occupation is anathema, despite the role of American armed forces in enforcing public safety and order. Military occupation as a rubric is too restrictive both because of its legal dimensions and because of its narrow strategic utility. “Military government, by itself, is viewed as obsolete because of the new strategic requirements and limitations imposed by international law,” explain Kyre and Kyre, “But when the new elements of civil affairs are added, the total concept which emerges is a politically realistic military policy for the nuclear age.”

The rubric of civil affairs acquired more dimensions in times of peace. One development was the need for liaison between military forces and civilian agencies given the extensive basing arrangements of American forces abroad during the Cold War. Another development was the increasing significance of the military civic action (MCA) component of civil affairs in the Cold War era. Believing that “[p]olitical construction...is the cynosure of counterinsurgency,” US military forces worked with host-nation military forces on civilian-oriented projects.

The civil affairs concept therefore came to hold more importance than the doctrine of military occupation and government which spawned it, as is reflected in the change of title of the manuals, becoming Civil Affairs and Military Government (FM 41-5, 1958) and then, finally, simply Civil Affairs (FM 41-5, 1966). The transition in doctrinal titles to civil affairs represents

---


200 Kyre and Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security, p. 16

201 More detailed discussion of MCA can be found in John W. DePauw and George A. Luz (Eds.), Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action (New York: Praeger, 1992).


in part as a break from the “traditional, legal implications “of military government to the “broader and more political context” of civil affairs.204

In US historical experience, the greatest determinant of the degree of control exercised by US forces reflects the conditions of the environment in which they attempted to implement these principles. James King, writing in 1958, concluded on the basis of US experience thus far,

In each and every experience the degree of control we exercised was determined, not by the status of the territory—whether it was ‘liberated’ or ‘occupied’—but by the existence or absence of an acceptable and effective local government.205

Warfare, whether total or unconventional, sets the context in which military necessity and humanity are defined. In unconventional conflicts, the differentiation between combatant and non-combatant can be problematic. Likewise, the difference between combat phases can be ambiguous. For the purposes of diplomacy and humanitarianism, and for the purposes of establishing rules of engagement, it is important to determine when hostilities cease, where they take place, and whom the troops may fire upon or detain.

American civil affairs operations and civil affairs doctrine since Valley Forge have increasingly emphasized indirect rule, peacetime uses of military forces, and minimal interference. Military participation in governance abroad strains domestic civil-military relations. Indirect rule mitigates this tension and enables burden sharing. Indirect rule is closely related to the conceptual innovation of civil affairs as opposed to military governance. Both minimize direct interference by the US armed forces in the arrangements of the societies in which they are present. However, indirect rule depends upon the existence of a recognized, legitimate

form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.” A military governor is “the military commander or other designated person who in an occupied territory exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from his government or from his superior.” AR 320-5 (1958), pp.293-94.

204 Martin and Joan Kyre, Military Government and National Security, p. 15.

indigenous government. When Americans support an indigenous regime, insurgency becomes the greatest threat to the viability of the US mission, and insurgents become American enemies.

Civil affairs present two faces in military operations. On the one hand, civil affairs are designed to meet expectations in international conventions on land warfare regarding the protection of civilians. International conventions on the law of occupation oblige an occupying power to provide civilians with essential services and general public administration. On the other hand, civil affairs are instrumental to the combat effort. This chapter has shown how this dual role has evolved over time in the development of US military doctrine over the course of American experience with military government. Moving from a historical to a social scientific perspective, the next chapter introduces the case study method, analytic perspectives on policy implementation, and rationale for case selection. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 detail civil affairs in US military intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama.
Framework for Case Analysis

There exists both an overt relationship between civilian and military institutions according to the doctrine of civilian control, and a purposive relationship between policy ends and military means. So far we have established a general normative rule: war ought to serve the ends of policy and soldiers ought to obey civilian leaders. Following this rule, the transition from war to peace ought to be one from military to civilian rule. Also following this rule, the transition from war to peace ought to be a transition to a usable peace. Thus, in civil affairs operations, military forces are in effect policy implementers. Yet important questions remain about what happens after intervention:

1. Before, during and after military intervention, what aspects of the civil dimension of strategy are considered in American civil affairs operations, by whom and when?

2. What is the interplay between political motivations and military objectives over the course of the military involvement in foreign terrain during civil affairs operations? How effectively do military means match political ends?

3. What are the environmental conditions that affect the realization of US goals and the transition to stable and democratic self-governance of the affected peoples?

This chapter presents a framework for analysis of specific instances of US civil affairs operations, or cases. A theoretical framework, borrowed from a well-developed literature in public policy, enables analysis of both civil affairs policy implementation and the feedback effects of implementation upon policy.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

An effort to explain how an institution such as the military “fits together and how it adapts to its environment” is interprettive, an effort to make social practices intelligible. The

---

previous chapter described the changing expressions of civil affairs in United States military history. This historical perspective helps to identify key components of the civil dimension of strategy. Self-awareness adds another dimension to the course of human events, because the past provides lessons. Policy makers draw upon their experience of history, make use of historical analogy, to guide actions that shape the future.  

Historical investigations tend to seek out change and continuities. The use of history presents two dangers to students of politics. The first is that the investigator may miss continuities in the forest of details. If historical events are sui generis, the study of them is a curiosity but seems of little use for solving current problems. The second is that the investigator may seize continuities, ignoring important circumstantial differences that make lessons drawn from the past inapplicable to the present. The investigator must not only draw valid lessons from the past, but determine valid applications for them in the present.

Disciplined inquiry mitigates these problems, because it requires the investigator to be explicit about the subject of study. A study grounded in history identifies critical conditions and variables that are consistent or that alter from one case to another. One task for the researcher is to sort out systematic components of a phenomenon that are more or less persistent (cultural orientations, for example) from nonsystematic components that are unpredictable (an incident at a border crossing, for example). Analysis of one or more cases of a general phenomenon is a method that is useful for testing theory already formulated. Case studies are also useful in earlier stages of theory building, when the comparison is controlled. Here the literature on comparative

---


method emphasizes the selection of cases belonging to the same class, but that differ from one another. Identification of the class of activity for investigation is the first step in a discovery-oriented or heuristic study of cases such as this one.

This study is concerned conceptually with a transition from force to policy, the completion of the Clausewitzian cycle. Based upon observations of US civil affairs, we may make descriptive inferences about this transition. Americans draw lessons from warfighting, military government and civil affairs experiences to decide upon new approaches to warfighting, and reshape thereby the civil dimension of strategy.

Selection of Cases

The following three chapters focus upon specific cases of American military intervention in the same geographic region. These are the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, and the US invasion of Panama in 1989. The cases all concern interventions intended to quickly bring about regime transitions. In each country a crisis in regime governance preceded the US intervention and a regime change took place in the wake of American intervention. This genre of cases can be compared to others. On the one hand, in none of the three cases did the United States declare war or acknowledge itself as a legal occupant of foreign territory. On the other hand, none involved support to insurgencies in a protracted civil war as in Nicaragua (where the US supported the insurgents) or Vietnam (where the US supported the regime). Instead, the United States sent overwhelming numbers into each of

---


8 Descriptive inference as a method has been defined as “the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations.” King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 55.

9 This feature sets the cases apart from post-World War II activities in Japan and Germany, for example, but makes them similar to post-Cold War ventures.
the countries examined. It is possible to identify both the insertion and subsequent withdrawal of US troops. American de facto control in the interim presumably also translated into leverage for the US to fashion a usable peace.

In the Dominican Republic, Grenada and again in Panama, the United States military action reflected the American leadership’s conception of US national interest. In each instance American action met the general disapproval of the international community. In the first two but not in Panama, US forces were augmented by contingents from elsewhere in the region. However, these were essentially token forces. Therefore, the cases discussed here do not exhibit the complexities of more recent military interventions in Bosnia under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations. More to the point, American peacekeeping rhetoric during interventions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada do not make these impartial interventions by the United States.

The essentially unilateral character of the selected cases precludes drawing many specific lessons from this study about multilateral operations. However, linkages between American political and military objectives are important any time the United States contributes military troops. These linkages are easier to identify in unilateral missions. First, command authority and the lines of policy implementation are much cleaner than in truly multilateral operations. More importantly, American military control of foreign real estate is easier to establish in unilateral operations. This is conducive to determining the size of the “footprint”—the extent of coercive influence and institutional engineering—made by US forces. It is still unclear how much military force fits with different conditions of occupation, the resource commitment needed to support or replace a governing regime, for example.  

---

10 The post-World War II era is certainly one in which civilian agencies of the US government had a hand in post conflict operations, but non-governmental organizations are much less prominent than in later American operations in Somalia and Bosnia.

11 My thanks to Roy Licklider for discussion on the comparative demands on the US military presented under different types of conditions: ‘state creation,’ ‘regime replacement,’ or ‘support to an existing regime’. Another way to think about different contexts is in terms of host country support necessary to establish indirect rule. That support is missing in ‘state creation’ (as in Somalia). Regime change requires hostile entry. Combat victory against a ruling regime gives the occupation force more, but not perfect opportunity for change, as the limitations
The cases are close enough together temporally that US military doctrine on civil affairs did not differ seriously among them. Going into the Dominican Republic and Grenada, the doctrinal referent for civil affairs was a manual written in 1958. A new joint publication was issued in 1966, and a revised Army field manual was issued in 1984. For the purposes of this study, it is more important that these events took place after American military doctrine on civil affairs was established as differentiated from military government, but before the recent era of multilateral peace operations. However, two factors differentiate the last case, and lengthen the discussion of Panama relative to discussion of the earlier two. First, the Americans actually planned for civil affairs operations in Panama in advance. Second, a significant change in US defense institutions owing to Congressional legislation in 1986 increased civilian oversight of the operation.

The National Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 -- known as “Goldwater-Nichols” -- was a congressional initiative primarily intended to streamline US military advice to the president through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This legislation strengthened the independence of the Chair of the JCS with respect to the service chiefs and concentrated control of information (and hence, power) in the Chair. The Act also attempted to respond to new conflict imperatives by creating the Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) division within the Department of Defense. Partly in consequence, Civil Affairs shifted from Army responsibility to the recently established functional unified command, Special Operations Command. These changes, as discussed in more depth later, affect the way in which American defense policy fits civil affairs into US strategy.

For the purposes of discovery, it makes sense to limit the geographic and temporal range of cases and thereby the number of variables. Once plausible causal linkages are identified, it will be more appropriate to expand the number of cases in later studies. Because current military...
doctrine follows threads of past engagements and lessons, as shown in the previous chapter, there seems little danger that insights regarding American civil military operations in the cases selected here, if heeded, will fail to be relevant to future study of American military actions of the 1990s. Differences between these cases must be considered in light of the general backdrop of US geo-strategic interest in the region.

**US Interest in the Central American-Caribbean Region**

US foreign policy was by no means static between 1964 and 1989, given the demise of the Cold War at the end of this era. Nonetheless, differences in the particulars of American interest in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama are differences of degree more than of kind. A consistent backdrop to the three cases of intervention is an enduring American strategic interest in Latin America and the Caribbean. United States policymakers tend to treat these states as pieces of a general puzzle, the whole of which is the Central American and Caribbean strategic corridor. The United States saw the corridor's value after 1900 when it was seen that a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific would enable the US to quickly concentrate naval forces in either ocean.

The Central American-Caribbean region has been a nearly ever-present national security concern for the United States, even if it has fallen and risen in prominence on the foreign policy

---

13 The US military actions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada were very much situated in the larger geopolitical contest between the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war. the United States move against Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega coincided with the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international security environment. Although the United States closely monitored the Cuban and Nicaraguan responses to the 1989 Panama invasion, anti-communism was not a motivation for the US action. If the interventions were meant to have a demonstration effect, the US messages conveyed by the earlier interventions were meant to travel farther. As the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Americans were preoccupied with Vietnam and made major troop commitment to Vietnam shortly after the Dominican operation. The United States had suffered a difficult defeat in Lebanon shortly before taking an easy success in Grenada.

14 Toward this end, the United States supported the secession of Panama from Columbia, and built a right of American intervention into the constitution of the new state.
This region has been the domain of American interventions, the subject of US foreign policy contests, and a practice ground for civil affairs as operations other than war.

US claims to hegemony in the Western Hemisphere were first expressed in a message to Congress from President James Monroe in 1823 known today as the Monroe Doctrine. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Roosevelt corollary used language similar to that used today to discuss weak or collapsed states. Its effect was to proclaim American police power in the region:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized societies...may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

After 1913, President Woodrow Wilson's corollary added the interests of American private capital to those covered by the Monroe Doctrine. The United States exercised its self-
proclaimed right to intervene in the Central American - Caribbean region on numerous occasions in the early twentieth century. The United States occupied Cuba between 1899 and 1902, and intervened again there between 1906 and 1909. Woodrow Wilson ordered US troops to invade Veracruz Mexico in 1914. The US Marines occupied Nicaragua between 1912 and 1925 and again to stop a civil war between 1926 and 1933; Haiti between 1915 and 1934; and the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924. These interventions were often unabashedly rationalized as necessary to protect and promote US economic interests, even if the interventions supported repressive regimes. The prominence of economic considerations in the rationales and the length of these interventions set them apart from American military interventions later in the century. Although it does not seem so from the perspective of contemporary anti-occupation norms, it was considered a progressive advancement in that era of international relations that the Americans occupied but declined to annex territory.

Private business interests were not the only themes evoked in rationales for the early era of US interventions. More normative themes evoked in the long era of American interventions under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson would persist into the late twentieth century: Roosevelt had emphasized “order,” and Wilson emphasized “democracy.” Under Wilson’s leadership, the Americans promoted elections, and sometimes situated American sailors at voting booths to safeguard them. The US viewed self-government in these territories as preferable to deep American involvement, as seen in US acceptance of questionable election results in order to withdraw from Cuba in 1921-24 and Honduras in 1923-24. An exit strategy pattern established

---


19 After the post-World War II occupations ended, US leaders avoided use of the word “occupation” in conjunction with military intervention.

20 According to Paul Drake, these emphases are more alike than they seem today, since Wilson promoted an elitist conception of democracy involving gradualist change by “enlightened gentlemen.” Paul W. Drake, “From Good Men to Good Neighbors” p. 15.
during these interventions included US training of local constabulary forces to take the place of departing US troops (in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti).

The 1930s onward was an era in which US foreign policy declared a commitment to non-intervention. The United States signed the Pact of Paris and accepted a principle of non-intervention in 1933 at the Seventh Pan American Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay. Nonetheless, the United States wished to safeguard its dominance of the Americas despite the decline in European expansion after World War I. Having realized the importance of maintaining sea lines of communications (SLOCs) during World War II, the United States thereafter pressed for defense cooperation with the rest of Latin America. A military alliance would come in the form of the Rio Pact of 1947 and the subsequent Organization of American States in 1948.

During World War II, American military presence in the region expanded. During the Cold War, American involvement intensified further, in part because of resource interests in the region. The United States considered potential disruption of sea routes resource access, or Soviet weapons deployments in the region to be a military threat. Indeed, the Soviets themselves during the Cold War described Latin America as the “strategic rear” of the United States.

The spread of communist ideology added a new dimension to American concern that outside forces would win the region, that the victory might be from within. Socio-economic and political conditions made many Latin American societies seem ideal breeding ground for revolutionary ideologies, and the Soviets saw obvious strategic advantages there. United States

---


24 Thus, when Juan Bosch was elected President of the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, his leftist sympathies troubled Washington officials, despite little evidence of direct Soviet influence there.
policy elites were concerned about advancing communist influence in the region.\textsuperscript{25} The Soviet relationship with Cuba was a base from which the Soviet vision of political life was shared with other nations in the regions. In response to Fidel Castro’s revolutionary victory in 1959-60, the United States supported a group of anti-Castro Cuban insurgents who then faltered at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Soviet nuclear weapons deployed to Cuba in 1962 created a crisis that engraved the region on the American security agenda.\textsuperscript{26} The United States succeeded in compelling the Soviets to withdraw nuclear-armed missiles from the island, but the longer-term project to resist further ideological gains or military deployments was far from over, especially since Castro remained in power.\textsuperscript{27}

The essence of the US approach to the region, experts agree, was and remains a drive for stability.\textsuperscript{28} It is not surprising that a status quo power like the United States defined stability as thwarting revolution. Toward the latter half of the twentieth century, US observers recognized Latin America’s inegalitarian societies as breeding ground for revolution, which seemed inevitable. Hans Morgenthau argued this inevitability, that “The real issue facing American foreign policy...is not how to preserve stability in the face of revolution, but how to create stability out of revolution.”\textsuperscript{29} However, a rift developed in the Washington foreign policy

\textsuperscript{25} The prominence of revolutionary figures like Fidel Castro and Che Gueverra troubled many Americans. Castro was known by the CIA in 1959 to be planning invasions of Haiti, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Castro launched small incursions to export revolution. An expedition of 102 Cubans landed in Panama in April and were defeated. In June, 70 unsuccessful Nicaraguan expatriots landed in Nicaragua from Cuba. Later that month, Cuba launched air and sea attacks against the Dominican Republic, involving 224 men, and Trujillo’s air force destroyed the ships. Ethridge, Can Governments Learn?, pp. 128-129.


\textsuperscript{29} Cited in La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 16.
community about the cause of instability. Conservatives tended to view communism as its
fundamental cause, and instability as a threat to US interests. In contrast, liberals tended to view
poverty as the cause of instability with the spread of communist ideology a secondary effect.
Liberals also tended to be more sanguine about the danger presented to US security as a result of
instability.30

In either case, US concern for stability has not translated into sustained engagement in
Latin America.31 Despite US interest in the region, American presidents have often been
preoccupied elsewhere, turning attention to Latin America only in crisis. Presidents have also
understood since the early 1970s that mobilization of US domestic support for military action in
Latin America is problematic. The Vietnam War produced both a long-lasting resistance of the
American public to foreign involvement and the War Powers Act of 1973 which gave Congress
more leverage in foreign policy, traditionally the domain of the executive. When the Reagan
Administration became interested in the region in the 1980s, conservative hard-liners in the
White House National Security Council (NSC) sought short cuts to advance their policy
preferences.32

US conservatives had seemingly triumphed in 1987, with the emergence of the Reagan
Doctrine, promising support to foreign nationals seeking to overthrow communist dictators. The
triumph was incomplete because Reagan was unable to convince the wary American public of
the need for a full commitment in the Americas, and unable to rein in the various competing
factions within his own government branches, among them the State Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and Congress. Not only the simple geopolitical questions of American

30 Linda Robinson, Intervention or Neglect: The United States and Central America Beyond the 1980s (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1991); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin

University Press, 1987).

32 After January of 1983, the NSC took on policies congress would not back, operating as “a mini-State Department
interest in the region, but also experiences elsewhere in the world and government inertia therefore had to be factored in to US responses. In this context, low-intensity conflict strategy and support for indigenous insurgency movements became the operative framework for American responses to instability in the region aimed at preserving friends and containing potential threats.

Since the end of World War II military occupations the Americans ruled out long term occupation as a means to generate stability. In 1984, a commission on El Salvador directed by Henry Kissinger explicitly explored and rejected direct administration of territory. Despite the need for social revolution, implementation problems precluded such a direct and overt role for the United States. The Kissinger Commission Report is significant beyond the El Salvador case, since this became the national policy statement on low intensity conflict.\textsuperscript{33} In contrast to preparation for nuclear or high-intensity conflict in the European theater, American strategy for the region envisioned conflict below the threshold of war.

After interstate war between uniformed armies in World War II, the Americans focused on the civilian milieu or civil dimension to “seal the victory.” In war, and in unconventional or counterinsurgency efforts, the Americans focused on the civilian milieu for the ability to win. In a strange twist, developmental objectives for captured populations become incorporated into strategic military objectives. As the Americans realized that dictators are superficial and unstable allies, true reform came to be incorporated into a strategic plan to generate stability in the region in the longer term. US counterinsurgency strategy emphasized programs to change or sustain governments rather than direct US administration. This strategy worked around the constraints of an American public unwillingness to sustain involvement, and recognized the need for development in order to ensure stability. However, the US also supported undemocratic leaders for fear of a communist alternative.

Military civic action programs that built inter-military relationships with indigenous armed forces were a new emphasis in US strategy.\(^{34}\) Military civic action was designed not only to strengthen the fighting capabilities of indigenous armed forces, but to build legitimacy of the government among its public. This approach was not without its critics, since it implied US acceptance of unsavory governments in theory and possibly employed military forces in locales of high civilian unemployment.\(^{35}\) One consequence of MCA, as we shall see, is that United States armed forces in the region developed significant relationships with military forces and military leaders in the region.

**Situating Case Analysis**

The primary concern of this study is not the formulation of US foreign policy, but its implementation.\(^ {36}\) Historical review of US civil affairs policy in chapter 4 shows that enduring features of governance responsibilities accompany military control of foreign territory. In US military occupations there are military objectives, given that conflicts are fought to determine who rules, and there are liberalization goals, given that states tend to want to remake others in their own image. The US military task is then not only to export democracy, but to impose it. Moreover, in proclaiming liberalization goals, the US armed forces seek to persuade local actors that US interference is driven by good intentions and that it serves their interests.


\(^{35}\) LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, p. 203. In US doctrine, potential MCA projects must be evaluated for impact on the local economy, including employment. Moreover, providing wages to civilian laborers in MCA projects and involving local residents in planning and carrying them out is expected.

\(^{36}\) Here my focus differs from writers such as Mark Peceny, who focuses on presidential decisions. Peceny is concerned whether or not a US administration chooses openly to advance liberal goals in American interventions. My interest is not confined to pro-liberalization policies set in Washington. Limitations to Peceny's analysis are readily apparent, given the exclusive focus on US efforts, and the hothouse of purely American influences (American definitions of threat, American combat losses, American Congressional interest) upon presidential motivations. In none of the cases does he consider the pre-existing social and economic conditions that make reform a possibility, which ought to weigh into Washington's calculation of risk with respect to pro-liberalization efforts. Mark Peceny, "Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy During US Military Interventions," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, 3, September 1995, pp. 371-40.
Between 1965 and 1989, American rationales for intervention increasingly emphasized pro-liberalization goals. In other words, the civil dimension of strategy became more prominent earlier in the intervention. There are several mutually reinforcing influences to account for this prominence. One explanation is that Americans figured out that liberal democratic regimes are more stable, therefore support for tyrannical regimes is a greater risk than pushing for democratic transition. Looking to domestic politics for an explanation, it is arguable that Congress acquired more influence in foreign affairs and forced the executive to pursue liberalization. Looking to warfighting itself, a third explanation is that military effectiveness, particularly in operations other than war, is in part a function of legitimacy at home and abroad. Good warfighting therefore depends upon incorporation of good governance into military strategy, in rules of engagement, and in treatment of local populations. Not only is it morally correct, but it is also seemingly expedient, politically and militarily, to tread carefully in intervention and occupation scenarios.

Presumably, the point at which the blunt instrument of force opens the window for change is a point of opportunity and risk. It remains to be clarified in what ways the civil dimension of strategy is a cause or an effect of liberalizing policies, it has only been established that the civil dimension is a context in which intervention scenarios play out. Washington declaration of desire for liberalization is an insufficient measurement of US-driven reform after interventions. Instead, we might ask about the attributes of military action, the extent of US military control, relief programs, whether soldiers patrol civilian areas, whether the US military attempted to destroy or reform indigenous military and police forces and so on. What are the constraints and opportunities for the US forces on the ground? The focus of this study enables us to consider the friendliness and capabilities of host country officials and specific US actions (like disarmament of rival factions) to expedite transition. It is possible that Washington will espouse ambitious pro-liberalization goals, but equip US troops with inadequate mandate or resources. In that event, we might determine that policy rationales for the intervention is insincere rhetoric for the consumption of the American public or American allies. It is also possible that the US armed
forces will fail to achieve combat aims. In that event, even sincere Washington desire to invest in post-conflict reconstruction can be rendered moot.

**Policy Analytical Framework**

How then, to construct a policy analytical approach to consider the civil dimension of strategy in American interventions? Policy implementation literature offers several avenues of approach to the general problem of means-ends alignment. If ends are given as the mission statement set forward by policymakers in Washington, the means are constituted by US military activities. Successful implementation is defined in part by a fit between the two. Adaptation of a policy implementation framework to the substantive issue of US military civil affairs is unconventional but conceivable, given the instrumental relationship of war to policy.

Policymakers in Washington, D.C. establish objectives for intervention, and it is the responsibility of US troops to bring them to fruition. What happens after US troops are on the ground in American interventions? Their conduct is nominally governed by the goals and policy established by civilian leadership, but also by situationally specific warfighting plans, and the general doctrine expressed in military field manuals. The logic of the overall American policy in the region therefore influences what follows, as does the fit between policy and both military doctrine and operations that implement it.37 Completing the policy cycle is an evaluation stage in which testimony to Congress assesses American efforts in the target nation and military after action reports seek to identify lessons learned as a result of the engagement.38 This study is primarily concerned with the middle, implementation, stage of the policy process.

Bearing in mind the dynamic relationship between policy and force, a logical starting point for analysis is the linear ends-means relationship between the purpose of US military action (in Clausewitzian terms, the ‘policy’) and execution (or ‘force’). Thus, civil affairs is an implementation, a carrying into effect, of policy.

---

37 Military doctrine designates military means to be applied in the implementation of policy.

38 Academic and government studies are also used in the policy evaluation stage.
Implementation

A large literature in the field of public policy is devoted to the question, what makes implementation successful? When speaking of success or effectiveness of policy implementation, the referent can be either specific policy objectives or the problem the policy was designed to address. Implementation can fail due to non-compliance, when implementers refuse or are unable to comply with specific terms of the policy, or the spirit of the policy. On the other hand, an impeccably executed but poorly designed policy can fail to address the underlying problem it is intended to resolve.

Richard Simeon’s “funnel of causality” depicts the socioeconomic environment as an outermost ring in determining policy outcomes. Power, culture, ideology and institutions constitute a middle layer, and the decision-making process is nearest to the core. Simeon’s critique of existing public policy literature is that it tends to focus on one or the other end of the funnel. Therefore, the analyst makes a choice between account of setting or process. One solution to this dilemma is to clarify the aspect of the phenomenon under investigation, and to identify relevant connections between various influences. It is worth considering the vantage point from which we gaze upon civil affairs in American interventions.

One general approach in policy implementation literature is to focus on a central (i.e. made in Washington) goal. In domestic public policy a goal might be defined as increasing the percentage of high school graduates or decreasing the toxins in a water supply. In American interventions the goal might be defined as removal of a dictator or promotion of democracy.

---


40 For a discussion of these points as applied to a different substantive area, see Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, “Compliance with International Environmental Accords,” *Global Governance* 1 1995, pp. 119-148.

Another analytic approach is to focus upon a problem. In domestic public policy a problem might be defined as teenage crime levels or environmental degradation. In American interventions the problem might be defined as specifically as the persistence of criminal activity by a foreign leader or as generally as the presence of a communist foothold in the Americas or even (as we have seen) instability.

How does one determine the relevant goal or problem? A goal as defined in Washington - promoting democracy, for example - might look very different when operationalized in the field. A problem as defined in Washington - instability, for example - might take on more particular, immediate or even contrary characteristics when viewed from the field. The solution for the purposes of this study is to accept the stated purpose of the US military action as defined by political leaders, but to revisit those goals after investigation of events that followed. Likewise, it makes sense to consider not only the problem prompting the action as defined in Washington but also the problem as it became apparent in the course of military action and those that emerged with it.

*Top-Down Analysis*

Top-down analysis begins with a policy decision by government officials and traces its execution, with particular concern as to whether objectives were achieved over time and why. As seen from this perspective, implementation is supposedly hierarchically directed and straightforward in its execution. Public policy literature suggests a set of generic questions that relate to the setting of goals and the definition of meeting them. Analysts employing this framework ask whether the objectives of the policy were met, whether the actions of implementing officials were consistent with the policy objectives and procedures, what factors affected the outcome, and how the policy was reformulated in light of the experience. First, what was the policy to be implemented? Second, did the policy include clear and consistent objectives? Third, what was the causal theory underlying the policy? Fourth, did the implementing actors comply with the policy? Finally, were policy objectives met? A top-down
view of the cases in the following chapters is effectively the view from the office of the executive
and interested Congressional committees in Washington.

It is not difficult to tailor this generic set to the problem of US civil military operations in
the course of American interventions, or to find implications for alternative findings. If
Washington espouses aims for an intervention for which the armed forces are not given a
mandate, we might question whether professed rationales for the interventions are merely
rhetorical proclamations designed, for example, for the consumption of the American public or
American allies. Likewise, if the armed forces failed to achieve combat aims, planned restoration
activities would be rendered problematic.

Critics of the top-down approach note its assumption of a unified structure to the stated
goal, when most public programs reflect a variety of objectives, and sometimes conflicting ones.
The top-down framework often neglects other actors in its focus on program proponents. These
considerations apply to analysis of the US military role in civil order during interventions.
Military action brings its own set of warfighting imperatives that are a step removed from goals
set in Washington. What happens in the operational realm must serve the purposes of the policy
realm, but the fit is imperfect. American objectives do not seem unified, but appear instead as
policy objectives and operational (military) objectives, as depicted in Figure 8.

Goals and Objectives in Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY REALM</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL REALM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place:</strong></td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong></td>
<td>democracy; promote market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives:</strong></td>
<td>depose tyrants; support host nationals committed to democratic governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tools:</strong></td>
<td>negotiation; armed conflict; civil military aid following conflict with transition to authority of civilian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belief:</strong></td>
<td>democracy is necessary to peace and stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives:</strong></td>
<td>regional stability; trading partners; national reputation; “taking action”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area of operations</strong></td>
<td>attain military objectives with minimum casualties; jump start restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>secure territory for legitimate government; restore services; transfer; exit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>reconnaissance; military action; civil military operations; coordination with US, non-governmental and host nation agencies; withdrawal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>civil affairs (pacification / reconstruction) is necessary to victory</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patriotism; desire for closure; humanitarianism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top-down approach is more helpful for evaluating policy effectiveness than it is for drawing out the influence of actions at lower levels. Supplementing a top-down view with a bottom-up perspective promises to uncover the dynamic relationships between civil and military actors in the course of implementation.

**Bottom-Up Analysis**

In contrast to the top-down framework, a bottom-up analysis begins not with the point of policy formation, but with the point of implementation, connecting “policy decisions directly with the point at which their effect occurs”\(^4\) Richard Elmore’s backward-mapping analysis of policy in relation to problems begins with the problem. Therefore, the policy questions must be supplemented with questions pertinent to the problem. First, what was the nature of the problem

---

to be addressed? Second, did the policy and implementation together effectively address the problem?

Bottom-up analysis draws attention to the influence of local actors who "often deflect centrally-mandated programs toward their own ends."44 The bottom up approach frees the analyst to focus upon critical points in the policy process where those closest to the problem are able to describe what is needed to solve it.45 Elmore asks, "What is the ability of this [administrative] unit to affect the behavior that is the target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have that effect?"46

Although it is reasonable to consider the role of American armed forces in creating an environment in which liberal democratic order can flourish, it seems unreasonable to put the entire weight of that objective upon the troops on the ground. The standard for bottom-up policy evaluation is one that is conditional:

...definition of success is predicated on an estimate of the limited ability of actors at one level of the implementation process to influence the behavior of actors at other levels and on the limited ability of public organizations as a whole to influence private behavior.47

Authority relations in civil affairs operations are multi-layered. These include first the military's own switching system of peacetime and wartime command structures, so that lines of authority differ at the commencement of a military operation from those normally in effect during peacetime. Second, the authority relations between the national civilian policymakers and the armed forces constitutes another level. Added to these two sets of relations are those between US military forces in the area of operations and host country officials whom they support, officials from international or non-governmental organizations, other militaries, and private


45 For example, Benny Hjern, "Implementation Research - the Link Gone Missing," *Journal of Public Policy* 2 (3): 301-8.

46 Elmore, "Backward Mapping," p. 604

civilians in the field. Moreover, the challenges for domestic public organizations to influence the private behavior of American citizens at home seem simple in comparison to those for American troops with respect to foreign nationals.

When the area of operations is far from Washington, the position of those on site becomes privileged. The expertise and skill of the armed forces, the danger of their circumstances and the immediacy of the problems they must manage in the field seem to amount to a rationale for some deference to be afforded to them by those farther removed from the field. The backward mapping framework developed by Elmore likewise recognizes the requirement for discretion at the point where the problem is the most immediate. This framework is attractive as an analytic heuristic of civil affairs because it rests upon a theory of reciprocity of authority relations. 48 Formal authority travels from the top down; informal authority travels from the bottom up. Those closest to essential tasks develop expertise and skill critical to effective problem solving. 49 Unintended consequences of policy are more easily identified when the analyst begins with the problem and the people closest to it.

Backward-mapping of civil affairs operations begins with a very different conception of security as a problem than would a top-down review. The operational environment is a major consideration in the implementation story as told from the area of operations. Beginning analysis in the field draws attention to the warfighting imperative of secure movement of American armed forces. Civilian populations are often part of the mix of the combat environment and must not interfere with or impede their operations. Whether friendly or hostile, civilians must be given humane treatment by American intervention troops. Although the armed forces serve the policy leadership, commanders are compelled to refer to the fundamental - sometimes contradictory - principles of military necessity and humanity. However, we might recognize also that security objectives change once combat aims are met. At this point, the civilian population becomes the primary focus of security following the achievement of political settlement to hostilities. The

problems inherent in creating or restoring civil democratic society are personalized as the program is implemented through close cooperation with host country nationals. The doctrine of indirect rule introduces a need for soldiers to consider the interests and actions of indigenous government, armed forces and civilians, considerations that top-down analysis might miss.

The shortcomings of a bottom-up analysis mirror those of the first approach: top-down analysis is likely to over-emphasize the importance of the top of the policy-making hierarchy, or the center; bottom-up analysis is likely to over-emphasize the importance of the bottom-rung, or the periphery. Those who deliver services in the public policy model have room for maneuver only within the policy parameters and the resources set by the makers of policy. Likewise, so too do the armed forces as implementers of strategy have room to operate only within the framework of government policy and resource allocations determined at the upper echelons, the highest of which is the Commander in Chief at the White House. Implementers of domestic public policy are unlikely to overcome flaws of a policy framework based upon an unsound theory of cause and effect in relation to the problem they must address. Likewise, US forces in control of foreign territory are unlikely to affect desired changes where the goals of the intervention were unrealistic, unworkable, or otherwise ill-conceived. The Clausewitzian formulation of policy and force is here a reminder that without a strategic vision emerging from national politics, warfare—and intervention—is pointless and without sense.

**Synthetic Analysis**

The analysis so far leads to a recognition that a balance of both top-down and bottom-up perspectives is needed to shed light on US post-conflict operations. One way to synthesize the two approaches is to situate actors and interests as identified in the bottom-up approach in the context of socio-political factors that structure behavior.\(^5^0\) Paul Sabatier's method of synthesis begins with the bottom-up view of the problem, tempered by a top-down concern regarding “the

\(^{50}\) I am liberally adapting from the analysis of Paul Sabatier, “Top-Down and Bottom-Up,” p. 35.
manner in which socio-economic conditions and legal instruments constrain behavior."51 By situating particular intervention scenarios in the context increasing prominence of the civil dimension of strategy, we might overcome the limits of international relations theories and consider both ‘domestic’ considerations of the operational environment and ‘foreign’ policy goals set for the intervention.

**Temporal Parameters: Considerations**

This study is concerned with a temporal zone between war and peace. Within that zone, control by US military forces as effectively an occupation force is the primary subject of interest. How does the American political leadership conceive of the best use of latent force in the post-combat phase and how does the US military conceive its role? As illustrated in Chapter 2, political decisions to employ the armed forces are situated in particular socio-economic context, as well as in light of international norms governing the use of force. International conflict has changed in form from interstate war with clear differentiation between combatants and civilians to complex operations other than war. Likewise, attitudes toward militarism have undergone significant transformation. As discussed in chapter 4, the evolution of doctrinal focus from military government to civil affairs has reflected these changes.

A time line depicting the refined temporal focus of the study (depicted in Figure 9, below) begins with a contextual setting in which the US intervention is situated.

---

51 Sabatier, “Top-Down and Bottom-Up,” p. 39
The primary focus of the study is upon post-combat phases, divided into two parts. First, stability operations are an early post-combat phase in which US military control is predominant. Second, the historical review of US occupations suggests a transition occurs after combat, known as civilianization, in which the US policy lead can be transferred to US civilian government officials. Throughout these post-combat phases, US military and civilian officials seek to establish authority for indigenous leaders according to the doctrine of indirect rule.

The post-combat environment does not emerge in a vacuum. It reflects the goals of the intervention handed down from national leadership in Washington and is situated in the context of local conditions, some of which have been profoundly altered by attrition resulting from the insertion of US forces. It is therefore essential to proceed with an understanding of the historical context of the intervention, the particular crisis to which the American leadership responded, and the impact of forced entry. The goals or ends pursued in the intervention influence the warfighting plan in which US troops are inserted. The structure of the plans for intervention are also a function of strategic analysis about the opposition the Americans anticipate, based in part upon US intelligence about no only potential on-site adversaries, but also about potential onsite allies.

Analysis based upon top-down/bottom-up synthesis attends to the context for implementation. In Sabatier's work, the context was socio-economic. The relevant context for foreign military occupation is a set of historical events that sets the stage for the entry of intervention troops, and the operational environment that meets them. The status quo ante
presumably factors not only into Washington’s approach to intervention, but the course of the warfighting and military occupation in the area of operations. Here relevant questions include the following. First, what is the historical experience of the target country’s relations with the US leading up to the intervention? Second, what is the nature of civil unrest prior to intervention? Third, what is the status of the host country’s indigenous police, armed forces, and host country governance regime? Fourth, what kind of reception could US troops expect from the civilian population?

Historical experience suggests a pattern whereby warfighting plans are executed to achieve military objectives typically conceived in the acquisition of control over territory (occupation). The breadth and depth of military occupations—the “footprint”—varies from case to case. The footprint is more or less what creates the room for the American intervention to affect the target population. The American occupation of Veracruz in the war with Mexico was sufficient to extract desired concessions from that government. In post-World War II Germany, the Americans and their allies captured much larger tracts of foreign territory and delved more deeply into the governance of the population.

The force structure necessary for these different levels of aspiration also affects the forces available for sustained control in the aftermath of combat. It makes sense then to consider the following: the number of troops sent into the target country; the intensity of combat; the length of time that the US armed forces exercised control; the expanse of territory under US military control.

There are a number of empirical questions about the practice of the civil dimension of strategy that emerge from consideration of the problem of transitions, from combat to post-combat, from military to civilian lead, from direct control to indirect rule. First, how were combat and post-conflict stages identified? Second, did planning for the intervention include consideration of post-combat conditions? Third, did the force structure (for example, deployments of infantry assault troops, Special Forces, psychological and civil affairs teams)
vary over the phases of the intervention? Fourth, did third party involvement (aid agencies or other militaries) factor into post-conflict activities?

A series of empirical questions relates to the depth of the footprint. First, did the Americans assume governance functions? Second, in order to make the transition to indirect rule, what sort of relationships were established between US forces and host country officials? Third, did the US attempt to demobilize or reform the armed forces? Fourth, were humanitarian relief programs conducted by US troops?

The bottom-up framework suggests that in addition to those setting the goals, a variety of actors and their motivations play a role at the point of implementation. Although this study is concerned with the fit between political and military objectives, it is also concerned with relations between its corresponding policy (civilian) and military actors. First, was there coordinated planning for warfighting and civilian-directed programs? Second, did military and US civilian agencies cooperate effectively during the planning or implementation? Third, were military forces trained to deal with governance and other civil affairs problems deployed in a timely manner and in adequate numbers?

The following chapters will structured in a similar manner. Each will begin with general discussion of the context in which the Americans intervened. Next, the discussion notes goals and objectives of the intervention as declared in Washington.

Scholars of public policy have long recognized that explicitly stated actions and goals of government are but a portion of the whole of government activity. At times there is a discrepancy between what the decision-makers intend when setting goals, and what they actually do. There may also be rhetorical expedients creating a discrepancy between explicit and implicit purposes of government actions.52 One solution for the policy analyst is to make inferences, relying upon

---

52 Phil Tetlock, for example, suggests that during elections candidates deliberately simplify issues. My concept of rhetorical expedients is related to, but less ambitious than his concept of impression management. Tetlock takes the added step of asserting that leaders are capable of altering not only the content of their statements, but also they are capable of manipulating the cognitive structure underlying them. Philip E. Tetlock, "Pre- to Postelection Shifts in Presidential Rhetoric: Impression Management or Cognitive Adjustment?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1981, Vol. 41, No. 2, 207-212.
observations rather than government statements. But inference is a problematic methodological strategy in policy implementation research. If the investigator infers goals from actions, the game is rigged to fit the two.

Explicitly stated goals must be examined in order to compare their fit with implementation. On the other hand, successful implementation depends upon what policy analysts call the logic of the policy, the soundness of theory upon which the goals are constructed. Here the de facto policy, the implicit goals, are more relevant. For this investigation, the implicit goals must be examined. My strategy is to present both.

Each case study will include a narrative account of the combat phase insertion of US forces, and the civil affairs operations that accompany and follow on from there. The crucial empirical questions at this juncture in each chapter have to do with the footprint of the occupation, its depth and breadth. In light of this information, discussion can then return to the stated American goals of the military action, to challenge the policy rhetoric and to consider possible alternative but unspoken aims. The final step in assessment of each case is to search out lessons and bureaucratic revisions that stem from the American experience, as part of the ongoing American response to the civil dimension of conflict. In Chapter 9 the cases can be examined together, with discussion designed to identify from the historical cases considered in the study variables to fuel theory, namely, continuities and ruptures in the evolution of civil affairs.

---

The US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 used American troops in combat in the region for the first time in more than thirty years, effecting what would become briefly known as the “Johnson Doctrine.”\(^1\) The episode has perhaps been most well known as an instance of US intervention in Latin American affairs, and the basis for continuing resentment from fellow members of the Organization of American States (OAS).

More recently, similarities between the Dominican episode and contemporary peace operations have attracted interest.\(^2\) US troops positioned themselves between warring factions in an internal conflict that included military factions and armed civilians. As in conventional peacekeeping, Americans adhered to strict rules of engagement. Although at first a unilateral intervention, the Dominican episode acquired a multilateral dimension when, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, the Inter American Peace Force (IAPF) became involved. War was not declared, but US troops conducted relief as they would in a post-war environment. The action in this way prefigured later US participation in multilateral peacekeeping, characterized by a civilian milieu and developmental objectives.

President Lyndon Johnson’s conduct in the Dominican intervention attracted criticism by members of the US Congress, raised suspicions among the US media, and disgruntled American soldiers. The operation thus prefigured issues that surfaced with a vengeance later regarding US operations in Vietnam. In the big picture, the American intervention in the Dominican Republic appears to have been something of a side-show to main stage action in Vietnam. The combat planning for the Dominican intervention was not fully developed going in, and there is no


indication that civil-military operations received special attention in planning. These deficiencies were somewhat ameliorated by pre-positioned civil-military and military to military cooperation in the country and post-conflict relief provided by the IAPF. "Loyalist" elements of the Dominican armed forces cooperated with US troops in the beginning of the intervention; that, and early combat success isolating a rebel faction, simplified the operational environment for the US troops. New thinking about unconventional warfare (UW) was not tested in the Dominican Republic as it was in Vietnam. The civil dimension was nonetheless prominent enough that civilian leaders in Washington were inclined to exercise intrusive civilian control of military operation. This planted a seed of acrimony in US civil-military relations that became evident in later missions with high civil dimension content.

A complicated interplay of American political and military objectives developed over the course of the Dominican intervention. At the time, US warfighting doctrine on limited engagements emphasized civilian direction of affairs that were normally the prerogative of the military commander; this civilian intervention characterized the Dominican intervention. As Lawrence Yates observed, "The idea of a president or secretary of defense issuing orders directly to a commander violated the basic tenets of sound military doctrine up and down the chain of command." Several accounts suggest that the US warfighting commander General Maxwell Palmer was concerned with political objectives at the possible expense of military necessity in

---


the Dominican Republic. The objective of this chapter is to explain the misfit between these, and to investigate the environmental conditions that shaped the operation from the bottom up.

This chapter begins with an examination of the policy funnel, namely contextual elements that framed the US intervention. A top-down analysis of the Dominican intervention requires attention to explicitly stated US objectives for the intervention provided by the Johnson Administration are introduced. A narrative account of events that followed Johnson’s order to intervene shows that US military forces in the Dominican Republic implemented an implicit policy directive that was much broader than the policy Johnson originally provided. Discussion then returns to US objectives, to assesses the US approach to the Dominican Republic in light of implicit objectives and considerations of the operational environment, as well as the military struggle to accommodate civilian direction from Washington to keep the intervention limited. The chapter concludes with brief observations as to the impact of the experience on future American encounters with the civil dimension of strategy.

**CONTEXT**

The most significant contextual elements framing the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 are as follows: 1) the historical relationship between the US and the Dominican Republic, 2) US posture toward dictators, 3) communist threat in the region, 4) the American counterinsurgency strategy to respond to instability, and 5) the specific civil disturbance in the Dominican Republic that precipitated the intervention. These added up to more than a specific US policy in 1965, they shaped American capabilities in response to the crisis and the character of the operational environment in which US troops were to impose order. These factors influenced both the American vision of a usable peace, and the way in which it was implemented.

---

The historical relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic has been influenced by geopolitical concerns. The Dominican Republic is situated on the eastern portion of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti. The Spanish, who imported African slaves, primarily ruled the island until the 1600s, when French buccaneers captured the western portion and founded Haiti. Since the end of Spanish colonial rule, the republic was ruled by prominent families, or caudillos who brokered power among them. The United States also was an active influence on Dominican history, as a dominant outside force, and an anti-revolutionary one. The United States as a status quo power in the region desires stability, and has militarily intervened numerous times in the Dominican Republic in order to impose it.

The United States considered annexing the Dominican Republic in 1869, when Ulysses S. Grant sent the Marines to stop pirates raiding US shipping from Haiti. President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Marines again in 1905 to circumvent a European move to seize the island in order to collect loan payments. The Americans control of the customs house continued until 1941. The longest US intervention in the Dominican Republic began in 1916, under President Woodrow Wilson, and lasted eight years. That intervention was in response to domestic unrest, and involved extensive governance by the US Navy Department over Dominican affairs. The

---

6 Hispaniola is situated to the north of Venezuela on the Caribbean Sea, between Cuba and Puerto Rico. Christopher Columbus discovered the island in 1492 and his brother Bartholomew founded Santo Domingo, the first permanent Spanish settlement in the Americas, in 1496. The Spanish imported African slaves for the production of coffee and sugar on the island. Much of the history between that time and the independence of the Dominican Republic in 1844 is a story of conflict between Haitians and Dominicans. For a detailed account of early Dominican history, see Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928.


8 President Grant seriously considered annexation of the country for the offered price of $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in armament credits, but the senate refused to pass annexation legislation. See Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution New York: New American Library, 1968, p. 151.

State Department gradually assumed more control of Dominican affairs until elections and the end of occupation. The American policy proclaimed non-interventionism.\(^\text{10}\)

Dictatorship governance in the Dominican Republic is a second factor. The Dominican Republic was ruled since 1930 and for much of the post-US occupation era by Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. Trujillo was "the bastard son of the occupation forces," who had used a vestige of US occupation, the national guard, to rise to power.\(^\text{11}\) By breaking up caudillos or regional powers controlling local barracks and police forces he brought to fruition "new possibilities for national power."\(^\text{12}\) A US State Department report written in 1946 analyzed the US role in the Dominican Republic since 1930. The report concluded that although much material progress has been made in the Dominican Republic during the last sixteen years Trujillo has established and maintained during that period a brutal and virtually complete dictatorship, though under constitutional forms.\(^\text{13}\)

US foreign policy toward the Dominican Republic since the conclusion of the long occupation in the 1920s fits a general pattern identified by Robert Pastor: the US identifies with a dictator, seeks to distance itself from the dictator, follows closely what moderates do, looks out for influences of neighboring or long-distance US adversaries, and finally encourages the military to support a third force.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{10}\) Following on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, the United States had endeavored to avoid direct military intervention in Latin American Affairs. President Harry S. Truman reaffirmed that policy and worked toward regional security cooperation in an effort culminating in the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States in 1948. One incentive for regional cooperation was concern over the expansion of communism, but the Truman Administration did not provide much support to economic development or political reforms.

\(^{11}\) Howard J. Wiarda, *The Dominican Republic* (NY: Praeger, 1969, 31)


Although the prospects for democracy "or really decent government" were nonexistent under Trujillo, the State Department reported prospects for democratic government were unsure even without Trujillo. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had said of Trujillo, "He may be an SOB, but at least he's our SOB." A Secret Policy and Information Statement of June 15, 1946, stipulated that the US "views Trujillo without favor, but as a Dominican problem, for solution by the Dominican people." The Americans sought a third force in order to avoid direct military intervention.

Third, there was a long distance threat of Soviet communism and a closer threat from Cuba that made an impact on the Eisenhower Administration at the same time that the US began to distance itself from the dictator in the Dominican Republic. The Trujillo regime would not survive the Republican Eisenhower Administration's reassessment of policy regarding dictators generated by the "loss" of Cuba to the Soviet camp in 1959-60. Washington thinking was now that "Batistas tend to be followed by Castros," and reform, although risky, would remove an incentive for the people to choose communism. The dictator became an indirect threat. US-Dominican relations were strained by revelations that Trujillo had authorized an assassination attempt against Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela. Trujillo resigned, and vice-president Joaquin Balaguer officially assumed the presidency in 1960, even as Trujillo ruled de facto. Eisenhower

---

16 Quoted in OCL -4190, p. vii.
19 Progressive leaders elsewhere in the region, in particular Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela and José Figueres of Costa Rica, were uncomfortable with the Trujillo regime, and these leaders had influence in Washington as supporters of sanctions against Fidel Castro. Following revelations that Trujillo had authorized an assassination attempt against Betancourt, in 1960 the Organization of American States and the US issued economic sanctions, cutting the US import sugar quota by $22 million. Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, p. 8.
broke relations with the Dominican Republic and authorized CIA support for Dominican groups to overthrow Trujillo.  

The Democratic John F. Kennedy Administration pledged to fight communism and support democracy in Latin America by means of developmental assistance, diplomacy, and liaison with Latin American armed forces. The Administration established the Alliance for Progress, a government and privately funded economic aid package that was to be Latin America’s Marshall Plan. Not long after the plan was announced, US-sponsored Cuban exiles were defeated at the Bay of Pigs attempt to seize Cuba from Castro. The Kennedy Administration began to define Castro, rather than poverty, as the immediate problem in the region, and security came to dominate developmental objectives of the Alliance.

Kennedy Administration thinking about counter-insurgency was a fourth factor that influenced the American approach to instability in the region, bringing together development and security programs and agencies under a politico-military conceptual framework. The US trained Latin Americans in counterinsurgency at the School of the Americas, and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) provided in-country training. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) of Green Berets, were on call to give “more specialized instruction in civil affairs, psychological operations, engineering and construction, medical assistance, intelligence and interrogation, riot control, electronic security, civic action, and counterguerrilla tactics and techniques.” The Agency for International Development (AID) which implemented economic aid, had an Office of Public Safety that trained indigenous police in riot control and interrogation.

---


22 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, pp. 150-151.


24 Yates, Power Pack, p. 11.
Information Agency (USIA) used propaganda to promote the US government and regimes friendly to it. The CIA gathered intelligence and conducted covert activities.

The Kennedy Administration inherited the Trujillo problem, but not for long. Trujillo was assassinated in May, 1961. Balaguer held on as President with US support. Between 1962 and 1965, approximately $152 million in US aid was committed to the Dominican Republic. Balaguer was beset from left and right, and was overthrown by General Pedro Rafael Rodriguez on January 17, 1962. The OAS lifted sanctions, the US resumed diplomatic relations, and the Alliance for Progress now included the Dominican Republic. A countercoup followed shortly thereafter, led by Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, and a new council headed by Donald Reid Cabral held elections in December 1962.

The Dominicans elected Juan Bosch, setting the stage for a series of events that make up the fifth contextual factor influencing US policy in the Dominican Republic. Bosch was inaugurated 27 February 1963. The US provided the Bosch regime with economic aid and military assistance, including more MAAG advisers. However, journalists Dan Kurzman and Theodore Draper would later allege that Kennedy’s integrated strategy was in effect “double edged”:

It supported Bosch, but it sought to take out reinsurance by simultaneously supporting the old military establishment. In effect the State Department gave aid

25 During an attempted coup against Balaguer by two brothers and the son of Trujillo, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned against a reasserting of the Trujillo regime, and a US naval task force consisting of fourteen ships came within sight of the capitol of Santo Domingo. As Lawrence Greenberg notes, a show of force, “visible but not sent ashore” was consistent with postwar US policy, and successful for the time being. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 7.

26 US Department of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education, Fact Sheet: The Dominican Crisis, p. 2. Folder: Facts for Members of the US Armed Forces on Duty in the Dominican Republic, OMH files, 228-01 HRC Geog Dominican Republic, 091, Permanent. Only $500,000 in educational grants were provided during the last three years of the Trujillo regime.


28 Yates, Power Pack p. 16.
and comfort to Bosch, and the Pentagon took care of the Dominican armed forces.  

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations disliked Bosch, who legalized Communist parties, developed a liberal constitution, and effectively alienated American officials. George Ball would later say that Bosch “did not seem to me a Communist...but merely a muddle-headed, anti-American pedant committed to unattainable social reforms.”

When Bosch attempted to assert civilian control of the military and demanded the resignation of Wessin y Wessin, the military leader captured Bosch and sent him to Puerto Rico. At first Kennedy expressed displeasure by severing diplomatic relations, suspending aid and recalling personnel, but he then decided to recognize the new regime, a triumvirate headed by Reid, inaugurated on September 26, 1964. The new regime promised free elections, declared the constitution invalid, and banned Communist activities.

A month after taking office following Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon B. Johnson recognized Reid’s triumvirate government. Reid had strong American connections, and was known as “El Americano” among Dominicans. The Johnson administration did more to support Reid, Theodore Draper would later write, “than the Kennedy administration had ever done for Bosch.” Reid’s government received $100 million in American grants and aid within a month of taking the helm. However, the economy was poor. Reid cut the military budget, and attempted to stop smuggling enterprises. The Trujillo-era officers were alienated, and the younger officers were dissatisfied with the pace of reforms.

---


31 Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 9.

32 Draper, “The Dominican Crisis,” p. 36.

33 Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 25.
On Saturday, April 24, 1965, Reid heard news of a planned coup attempt and sent General Riviera Cuesta, Chief of the Armed Forces, to collect the commissions of three young lieutenant colonels. However, the colonels seized the general and broadcast news of their revolt and support for the deposed Juan Bosch over Dominican radio. The US Ambassador, William Tapley Bennett, and 11 of 13 Military Assistant Advisory Group staff happened to be away from the Dominican Republic at the time.

It is estimated that rebel strength consisted of two army bases, (about 1,500 soldiers), the navy’s frogmen, and civilian men, women and teenagers to whom the rebels distributed guns at city parks. Importantly, the rebels captured Radio Santo Domingo, the official state radio station. Rebel leader Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño would become president of the rebels’ “Constitutionalist” government. Allied with him were the leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC). However, also associated with the rebels were three communist parties. The Fourteenth of June Movement (1J4) was pro-Castro, the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) was pro-Chinese, and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) was pro-Soviet. In the view of the US embassy, there were more armed civilians under the control of the PRD and 1J4 than there were rebel soldiers under Caamaño. Caamaño recognized that his control of these groups was questionable.

The Dominican Army before the revolt was oriented against external attack. Numbering about 10,000, it included seven infantry brigades. The Dominican Navy consisted of about 3,500, and the Dominican Air Force had about 4,000 in its ranks, with 120 aircraft. About 2,500 served in an effectively separate army at the Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA), commanded by General Wessin y Wessin at San Isidro airfield. The police force numbered around 8,500.

---


The chiefs of the Dominican Navy and Air Force and General Wessin did not commit their troops against the rebels in support of Reid. General Imbert offered to help in return for an appointment as secretary of the armed forces, an offer Reid refused at first but later accepted. The service chiefs agreed to fight and called themselves "Loyalists." Reid was captured by rebel forces that overran the presidential palace on April 25.

On April 27, Constitutionalist leaders Molina Ureña and Caamaño requested that the US Embassy help in ending the conflict and they were refused. Rebel and irregular forces managed nonetheless to turn the tide, with no small role played by direction from Radio Santo Domingo. They confronted Wessin's tanks with small arms and Molotov cocktails, and attacked police stations inside Santo Domingo. As told by Jerome Slater, "Post after post fell to the Constitutionals, whose armaments increasingly swelled as they captured new armories, until finally the main fortress at Fortaleza Ozama was overrun." As the rebels overtook the city of Santo Domingo, the police force disappeared and law and order collapsed. Rebels harassed a group of American and other foreign citizens at the Hotel Embajador. The military established yet another provisional junta led by Air Force Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit, who officially requested US military intervention at midnight, April 28-29. Johnson ordered a non-combat evacuation on April 27. On April 29 he ordered the 92nd Airborne and more Marines to the island to force a cease-fire and enable the Organization of American States to negotiate a political resolution to turbulence in the Dominican Republic.

**Explicit Objectives**

The above contextual factors created a funnel of causes leading to Johnson's order for US military intervention in the Dominican Republic. Johnson initially told the American people that the US armed forces were in the Dominican Republic to protect American lives. Only later did

---

he add the objective to stop communist expansion. Johnson’s initial declaration of a non-combatant evacuation led by US Marines was met with support by more than 76 percent of the Americans polled, but support dropped to less than fifty percent with the introduction of the US Army.41

The initial justification implied that the US would be satisfied with internal disorder as long as US citizens were out of harm’s way, but the expansion of the intervention implied a much greater change was needed to create a usable peace in the Dominican Republic. Members of Congress challenged the President on the latter point, and Senator J. William Fulbright accused Johnson of “arrogance of power.”42

Despite Johnson’s initial declaration of impartial intervention, the goal of US military forces was to thwart communism. A fact sheet distributed to American troops described the mission of the US Armed Forces in the Dominican Republic as follows:

1. Protect the lives of US and foreign nationals.

2. Evacuate US and foreign nationals who desire to leave the Dominican Republic.

3. Perform humanitarian missions as ordered by the President including distribution of food and medical supplies without regard to nationality or faction.

4. Assist in the establishment of stable conditions conducive to the development of an effective political settlement under the aegis of the Organization of American States.

5. Help prevent, in keeping with the principles of the inter-American system, the establishment of another Communist state in the Western Hemisphere.43


42 Senators Joseph Clark, J. William Fulbright, and Wayne Morse and Congressman Sam Rayburn opposed Johnson after the introduction of the 82nd Airborne.

43 Folder: Facts for Members of the US Armed Forces on Duty in the Dominican Republic, OMH files, 228-01 HRC Geog Dominican Republic, 091, Permanent. The undated document was provided to US troops in the theater.
A non-combatant evacuation was successfully implemented. However, the mission must be evaluated in light of Washington’s shift in policy during the intervention to explicit anti-communism. The US troops who operationalized this imperative used consent and coercion to shape a usable peace in the Dominican Republic.

**NARRATIVE**

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff did not wait for a White House order to intervene in the Dominican Republic; they ordered precautionary measures to protect US citizens “without direct presidential authority” as civil order disintegrated in late April 1965. At their disposal was a contingency plan for options developed during Trujillo’s last days in power and updated under Kennedy: Commander in Chief, Atlantic, Operation Plan (OPLAN) 310/2. It is curious that White House officials discussed the Dominican affair since April 24, but it was not until April 29 that JCS chairman Gen. Earle G. Wheeler was included in their talks. By that time, 536 Marines had landed and Johnson had already, on the evening of April 28, addressed the nation explaining that American lives were in danger. General Bruce Palmer, at the time serving as Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was selected by President Johnson to command all US forces in the Dominican Republic (Commander, US FORCES DOM REP). Maj. Gen. Robert H. York was designated commander of the US ground forces on April 29, 1965. The 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, arrived on Friday April 30. The late selection of warfighting

---

44 Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 23. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron, with a marine battalion landing team, was positioned for ready evacuation of US citizens. Airlift elements at Tactical Air Command in Langley, Virginia and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were alerted.

45 The plan initially covered amphibious and airborne troop movement, but had been revised in 1963 to include the options of a show of naval force, blockade, and army troop movements to Puerto Rico. However, when the Army and Air Force received their first alert on April 26, neither had updated contingency plans based on the revised OPLAN, TAC’s planning agency had not published the airlift portion of its component plan, and the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne division did not have copies. To complicate matters, there was a jurisdictional dispute between STRICOM and LANTCOM. Yates, *Power Pack* p. 59.

46 Yates, *Power Pack* p. 35; Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*

commanders might be explained in part by the Johnson Administration’s approach to handling military affairs, but also in part by the broadening of the scope of the mission to include an interpositioning force on April 29.

The US intervention in the Dominican Republic went through several phases. It began as a non-combatant evacuation, broadened to include stability operations, and narrowed to a peacekeeping mission after the OAS negotiated a cease-fire and an Inter-American Peace Force arrived.

Evacuation

President Johnson ordered evacuation of US and foreign civilians, setting in motion the first phase of the military operation. On April 27, national police guard took the first evacuees over land, without US military escort because the route was held by friendly Loyalist forces. On April 28, a Marine battalion landing team was dispatched to evacuate more foreign citizens, to reinforce the Embassy and the hotel, to secure the polo field and establish helipads. This established what would be known as the International Security Zone, (ISZ). The American entry bolstered the morale of Loyalists. Significantly, these troops thus prepared the way for a larger deployment of the US Army’s 82nd Airborne that followed.

Although Johnson had declared American lives were in danger, and the American forces were characterized as impartial, reporters aboard the USS Wood County overheard radio communications between Bennett and Benoit revealing US assistance to Loyalist forces. Many small US military teams were put throughout the countryside, doing surveys and working to

---

48 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 25. 1,176 civilians were taken from the Hotel Embajador to the naval facility at Haina. Commodore Dare aboard the USS Boxer, and Marine commander Maj. Gen. Tompkins managed the operation without the benefit of intelligence about the “size, composition, or strength of the potential opposition ashore.” Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, pp. 31-32.

49 Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 34.

50 Yates, Power Pack p. 53.
ward of further defections to Constitutionalists. These were Special Forces in civilian clothes, “ostensibly functioning, in their well-known style, as medical teams.”

Loyalist Dominicans at San Isidro opened the airport control tower and turned on the runway lights for US Marines. The US mobilization effort, called ‘Power Pack,’ sent a stream of more than 150 C-130 aircraft to the Dominican Republic. US troop strength between April 30 and May 4 rose from 4,200 to over 17,000. A May 17, 1965, estimate of US forces in the Dominican Republic included 14,775 Army, 7,945 Marines and 958 Air Force, and 41 MAAG officers, to make for a total of 23,889. Ground forces included “two airborne brigades (six airborne battalions), one civil affairs company and 1/3 Marine Division Wing/Team plus special warfare forces.”

Washington took steps to negotiate a cease fire with the aid of the OAS. Former US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John Barlow Martin, traveled to Santo Domingo to contact the Constitutionalist forces. Meanwhile, General York helicoptered to meet Admiral Masterson and Commodore Dare aboard the USS Boxer in order to plan a battalion-size advance from the airfield to secure the Duarte Bridge. These military leaders understood from transmissions from State and JCS that a military solution to the crisis, namely eradication of the rebel forces, would be their likely job. This belief affected their approach to a cease fire, and resulted in US political and military measures seeming to work at cross-purposes.

---

51 Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 55.
52 A joint Army-Air Force exercise underway at Fort Bragg called Blue Chip V had a negative affect on planning. Troops had to unload Blue Chip equipment and reload equipment for the airlift portion of the operation. Some of the soldiers deployed had gone more than 72 hours without sleep. Yates, Power Pack p. 61. On the airlift, see Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, pp. 31-34. There were 1,538 sorties delivering 14,650 personnel and their equipment. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 44.
53 Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, p. 44.
54 Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 3. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.
55 ibid., p. 5.
56 Yates, Power Pack p. 78.
American troops soon controlled Santo Domingo's eastern approach, the airfield, the western approach and the coastal highway to the port of Haina, and an expanded area around the American embassy to include most of the foreign embassies (in order to remove them as targets of rebel harassing fire). The President would not grant approval for forces to close ranks without agreement from the Organization of American States. On May 2, General Palmer met with representatives from the OAS, who agreed to the plan of a corridor between the eastern and western flanks. Johnson approved the plan, and at midnight, the 82nd began a leap-frog maneuver to establish a corridor between the Duarte Bridge and the ISZ. The chosen route was one that would meet the least rebel resistance.

US military actions trapped as much as eighty percent of the rebel forces in one part of the city, Ciudad Nueva. The Marines held to the west, the line of communication (the "All American Express") corridor blocked them off from moving to the north, dashing rebel hopes for building insurgency in the countryside. The US controlled the bridge in the east and the southern coast and the US Navy was positioned beyond to the south. "By now it was abundantly clear," reflected General Palmer, "that the corridor operation was the key military move in the entire Dominican venture." Yates characterizes this point in operations as the beginning of a 'political' phase, because President Johnson now used the US presence as leverage in negotiations. Soldiers on the ground remained in harm's way, but subject to increasing restrictions.

American soldiers, having completed the major portion of what combat they would see in the Dominican Republic, experienced the effects of the

57 The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry secured the eastern approach to the bridge at daybreak, thereby controlling Santo Domingo's eastern approach. The 1st Battalion of the 505th secured the airfield. 1,700 Marines controlled a now expanded area around the embassies.


subordination of military to political considerations...it was a distasteful lesson and one that no amount of political-military coordination could make palatable.\textsuperscript{60}

*Stability Operations*

The term “stability operations” was used deliberately in lieu of “special operations” because Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson believed re-establishing stability would be a major, not a “special” Army mission. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. used the term in reports from Santo Domingo. Indeed, says Yates, Palmer “elaborated its definition” as follows:

to establish a climate of order in which political, psychological, economic, sociological and other forces can work in a peaceful environment.\textsuperscript{61}

There is some disagreement as to when this second unilateral phase of the intervention began, whether it was with the conclusion of the evacuation or the beginning of the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{62} The establishment of the corridor seems the critical marker, as it consolidated the American military position and it separated the antagonists so that negotiations could proceed. By the afternoon of May 3, before hostilities concluded, US troops were providing food and medical care to civilians.

One of the first items on Palmer’s agenda was to tighten the rules of engagement (ROE) for US forces, once their positions were secure with overhead cover and sandbag emplacements. The ROE shifted from no-firing first, and returning only in self-defense, to fire and maneuver if positions were in danger of being overrun.\textsuperscript{63} Weapons were restricted to small arms; mortars and

\textsuperscript{60}Yates, *Power Pack*, p. 96.


\textsuperscript{62}Greenberg, *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations* divides the operation this way, but in Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*’s account, initial operations end May 2, and stability operations began May 3.

artillery, tanks, naval gunfire and close air support were inappropriate for populated urban areas.64

The US embassy requested above-normal medical support for civilians, more than was anticipated in OPLAN/310. The operation required some clever financing.65 According to the US Army, the 82nd Airborne distributed supplies such as flour, corn meal and vegetable oil as well as 71 tons of rice, three tons of powdered milk, five tons of beans, and 1000 pounds of medical supplies. Medical aid at US Army field hospitals was provided regardless of political affiliation.66

The main civil affairs mission, according to a report to Congress, “was to provide needed relief and to assist in the restoration of the major functions of government [sic], including public safety, health, welfare, and public works and utilities.”67 The 42nd Civil Affairs Company arrived by May 7, 1965. Its 186 personnel included 8 operating teams (20 officers and 4 enlisted members), 8 foreign language teams (2 personnel each) and a linguist augmentation of 7, and also teams in specialties of economics, food and agriculture, public safety, public health, public welfare, public education, public works and utility, refugee and displaced persons, civil

64 Small arms included rifles, pistols, machine guns, a shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon called the LAW, and a shoulder-fired grenade launcher. Firing of the one heavy weapon, the 105 mm recoilless rifle mounted on a jeep, was restricted to use against buildings. Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 52.

65 Financing of Army operations in 1965 -- $12,328,000 from OMA and $931 from MPA appropriations -- came from reprogramming within FY 1965 appropriations. For FY 1966 the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided $17 million to OMA and $5.5 million to MPA in additional obligational authority. Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-OORC/OPS-9, 1 August 1965, p.2. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.


67 Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-OORC/OPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.9. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files. Yates described the mission of the US civic action/civil affairs program as follows: “to provide humanitarian aid, assist in stabilizing the country, and win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Dominican people.” Yates, *Power Pack* p.136.
information, a labor team and a legal team. The Civil Affairs Officer of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) was Army School trained, but had no Civil Affairs troops.\(^68\)

US Army psychological operations (PsyOp) elements of the 1st PsyOp Battalion arrived early in the deployment, and by the ninth day the 36 officers and 161 enlisted men were in-country. Loudspeaker operations began May 1, 1965.\(^69\) Army Special Forces were used “to support and train District Brigades in the outlying areas, to distribute food and medical aid to civilians, to interpret for other US units at check/control points, and to assist in the training of OAS forces.”\(^70\) The unit also conducted intelligence activities, civic action missions, coastal surveillance and attempted to capture rebel communication centers.

A cease-fire between Constitutionalist and Loyalist forces, the “Act of Santo Domingo,” was arranged by the OAS commission and signed on May 5.\(^71\) At this time, Adlai E. Stevenson defended US actions as necessary to prevent Communists from taking advantage of unrest. Stevenson asked the United Nations Security Council to leave resolution of the crisis to the OAS.\(^72\) Washington began searching for an alternative Loyalist leader with a popular base of support, in order to “preclude outright occupation rule if the revolution should spread to the interior.”\(^73\) The Loyalist junta formed a “Government of National Reconstruction” (GNR), headed by Antonio Imbert. Between May 13 and May 21, Loyalist forces under command of

\(^68\) CB McCoid, AOC Team Chief, “Following information on Status of US Civil Affairs Capability in Dominican Republic supplied by Lt Col. Cardin, Civil Affairs Section, ARLANT,” 151640Q May, memo in response to request 15 May 1965, Geog G. Dominican Republic 388.5 Civil Affairs, CMH Files.


\(^70\) Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-O LCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.8. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files. The Army Medical Service reports cooperating with the 7th Special Forces in the countryside and providing assistance in emergency conditions as requested by the J-5 (civil affairs). Darrell G. McPherson, The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965, (Department of the Army Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, DC, [no date]), p.51.


\(^73\) Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 58.
General Imbert swept and destroyed Constitutionalist forces remaining north of the corridor. Palmer concedes that he had been planning a similar move, and Lawrence Greenberg notes the similarities between General Imbert’s move and the US plan ‘Strike Breaker.’ Afterward, US forces grounded the Dominican air force and bottled up its navy.

**OAS Participation**

On May 14 and 15, the first IAPF forces began arriving, although the Act Establishing the Inter-American Force (later, the Inter-American Peace Force, IAPF) was not signed in Santo Domingo until May 23, 1965. Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the United States participated. Brazil chose General Hugo Panasco Alvim to head the force. General Palmer became Deputy Commander. After this time, the soldiers wore “OEA” armbands. US forces were separate in the chain of command from the Brazilian battalion and the “Fraternity” battalion (composed of all others). Because many Latin American officers had attended the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas or the US Army’s School of the Americas, they shared with the Americans a basis of common understanding.

Crowd control and military policing had been a problem for Palmer, and the first IAPF operations were MP patrols beginning May 24. The IAPF worked to demilitarize the Dominican Republic, and conducted civic action because “The victims of the April revolution were not only political, but also belonged to the civilian population which was the victim of a

---

75 Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, pp. 5.2-5.3. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.
76 The US Navy participated separately, due to a long-standing policy against serving under foreign command. Some eyebrows were likely raised when Vice Adm. Jack McCain, commander of US Amphibious Forces, Atlantic, put on an OEA armband at the signing ceremony. See Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, pp. 72-75.
77 Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 78.
78 Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 76.
bloody fight.” IAPF medical and dental assistance are emphasized in OAS literature, as are water projects. Military engineers helped to build a floating bridge over the Haina river, bringing favorable publicity to the IAPF. “Operation Cleanup,” a joint venture of the IAPF and Dominican civilians, cleared over 600 tons of trash. Dominican children were provided baseball and other sports equipment. Thanks to the arrival of OAS peacekeeping forces, the US was able to reduce its commitment. On May 26, 1965, US forces began to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. All Marines were withdrawn by June 6, 1965.

In June the OAS committee had still not brought the two sides together on the issues of reintegration of the rebel military and the turnover of civilian arms. A provisional president was found, however, in the form of Hector Garcia Godoy. In order to smooth the transition, the US, via the OAS, assumed payment of GNR salaries and arranged to finance OAS recovery programs. The total cost of the IAPF mission has been estimated at $311 million.

Some of the most serious fighting took place after the establishment of the peace force. A rebel offensive was launched on June 15, and the 82 responded. Caamaño lost 56 square city blocks. Palmer later recalled,

confronting me was the most disagreeable task I ever had to do, to order that the successful operation under way be halted and that the 82nd consolidate its position in the most defensible locations available.

Afterward, a plan was devised to demilitarize downtown Santo Domingo in which regular police and former rebels were enticed to participate with back pay and bonuses. At the same time

---


82 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 93.

83 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 83.
time, rebel forces would be escorted to a military camp to begin the process of reintegration. The move took place on October 13 and 14, 1965. Violence continued in Ciudad Nueva.

On October 23, after reports of plans by the extreme right to denounce the provisional government negotiated by the OAS and to establish an autonomous government in the second largest city, Santiago, Palmer developed a plan to clear the city. The night of October 24-25, Palmer's forces moved, a US brigade of three paratrooper battalions and a medium tank company, followed by a Latin American Brigade of two battalions. Later, Palmer called on other principals to brief them, describing “how peaceful and bloodless the occupation of the city had been.”

In November of 1965 the banks were reopened. Foreign troops were reduced to 1,800 Latin American and 5,400 US. In January 1966 the IAPF leaders Alvim and Palmer were replaced by more junior officers. The IAPF moved to an observation post system. Elections were scheduled for June 1. The night of April 23-24, IAPF forces were withdrawn from the city. Dominican Republic police or Army units took over IAPF positions, and the IAPF forces turned attention to civic action. Juan Bosch and Dr. Joaquin Balaguer competed in the June election which was deemed free and fair. On July 1 Balaguer was sworn into office. On September 21, 1966 the last of the IAPF troops departed the Dominican Republic.

**Implicit Objectives**

The story of the Dominican intervention is replete with real or seeming contradictions. Because the United States sought to minimize involvement, an overwhelming military force was sent to the island. Although the best articulated objective of the mission was to promote democracy, the US sought in fact to prevent restoration of democratically elected Juan Bosch.

---


The legitimacy of the various juntas that replaced Bosch was questionable, but the forces supporting them were called 'Loyalists.' The US established a buffer zone between warring factions, but this move effectively enabled Loyalist troops to defeat the Constitutionalist forces seeking to reinstate Bosch. American policy was professedly neutral, but US troops took offensive actions and even occupied former rebel zones in the city of Santo Domingo (ironically in order to avert a right wing coup). The OAS mission implied multilateralism, but funds, firepower and effective control were predominantly American. It is widely believed that involvement of the OAS forces would not have been possible if the United States had not moved unilaterally.  

In the midst of so much contradictory evidence, it remains to sort the real from the rhetorical in US objectives in the Dominican Republic. General Palmer concedes that the mission he was given in Washington had two levels:

- My stated mission was to protect American lives and property; my unstated mission was to prevent another Cuba and, at the same time, to avoid another situation like that in Vietnam. The US forces needed to assure the success of that mission would be made available.

Fearing a leftist victory and communist coup, Johnson ordered US intervention of sufficient scale to prevent that scenario. The US troops meant to stop more trouble, “or, at worst, to prepare for a nationwide occupation.”

Johnson was predisposed to intervene, to take “symbolic action,” given “the shadow of past failures and present problems elsewhere.” Following criticism of President Kennedy for

---


89 Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, p. 55.

refusing to provide American air support for Cuban insurgents in 1961, Johnson was cautious. Non-intervention was no longer sacred. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 following deployment of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles on that island reinforced perceptions as to America’s national security interest in the region. Under Johnson economic but not military components of the Alliance for Progress were severely curtailed.

In 1965 deepening US involvement in Vietnam was the most significant item on the Administration’s security agenda. According to John Martin, Lyndon Johnson asked him as the crisis developed, “What can we do in Vietnam if we can’t clean up the Dominican Republic?” From the perspective of Latin American nations, the Dominican intervention of 1965 was a significant episode. From the history of US foreign policy, this episode is greatly overshadowed by the Vietnam conflict. Despite the important place of the Caribbean in the configuration of American security interest, the Dominican crisis was something of an aside. When General Bruce Palmer Jr. was ordered to command US military intervention in the Dominican Republic, he was pulled from Pentagon meetings discussing the build-up in Vietnam. And, in the later stages of US presence, the Defense Department was content to turn Dominican affairs over to the State Department, given that the commitment to ground war in Vietnam had been made by that time.

A common theme in both engagements was anti-communism, although communism’s significance as a social movement was much less developed in the Dominican Republic.

---

91 The Bay of Pigs fiasco has been called “John F. Kennedy's most humiliating moment.” Theodore Draper, “The Dominican Crisis: A Case Study in American Policy,” Commentary December 1965, pp. 31-68, p. 31.


93 First, the intervention in 1965 signaled that the US would act unilaterally. Second, a consensus emerged that the US had overestimated the communist danger in order to bring the Organization of American States on board for peace keeping. Resentment over the latter made it impossible for Jimmy Carter to assemble a similar OAS force to stop the Nicaraguan revolution. See LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 159.

94 General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1989, p. 1, p. 79. When the Dominican crisis began in April, 1965, the United States had committed air power and deployed ground troops to Vietnam. The decision to begin the ground war there was made in July 1965, in the midst of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic.
The Johnson Administration sought to exhibit strength in addressing the problem of instability in the Dominican Republic. The general threat environment was moderately high, after the Cuban missile crisis, even if Juan Bosch’s Constitutionalist forces did not pose much of a specific threat to US security interests.

US policy objectives shifted with the configuration of power among the various factions in the Dominican Republic. The US and the OAS both held out the hope early on that Loyalists would win control of the country. This made for a US policy with contradictory objectives, causing confusion to those soldiers tasked with implementing it. According to Yates, the first group of US armed forces in the Dominican Republic were told to tell the press that the purpose of the mission was protection of American lives. The American press witnessed for themselves the size of the US commitment, and reporters had overheard communications between the US and Loyalist forces. The policy was neither limited to non-combat evacuation nor was it neutral: the failure to square political pronouncements with military deployments produced confusion about US intentions and marked the beginning of the military’s confrontation with the theretofore friendly media.95

As an example of “mission creep,” the Dominican venture is interesting study. According to Abraham Lowenthal “It would prove to be more difficult...to get the troops out than it had been to get them in.”96 American servicemen were told that the evacuation mission changed to an anticommunist one when, in the midst of unrest, “known communist agents took control of the rebel forces.”97 At the time the US corridor was established, US forces “unequivocally supported the loyalists.”98 Information sheets distributed to US soldiers in May described a Cuban plan to

95 Yates, Power Pack, p. 75.
98 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 51.
subvert Latin America, a “new policy of infiltration and subversion.” Objectives shifted over the course of the intervention from evacuation of US and other foreign nationals to fighting communism to maintaining neutrality, and the means shifted from offensive action to civic action.

It is not clear that Congressional interest in the Dominican intervention caused the Johnson Administration to move from a non-liberalization policy to a pro-liberalization policy, as Mark Peceny argues, or how much it matters. Juan Bosch did run for president in the 1966 elections, but out of fear for his life he would not venture from home in order to do so, and his candidacy was not much of a threat. US policy before 1965 was not entirely without liberalizing elements. The US encouraged the Dominicans to rid the country of the dictator, and to hold elections, and rewarded Dominicans with inclusion in the Alliance for Progress after Trujillo was removed. Although some would argue that the military civic action projects conducted by the US military reinforced the status quo power of the indigenous armed forces, defenders might respond that the theory behind these programs was nonetheless to liberalize from within, to foster civilian control of the military and provide a stable framework of civil-military relations from which the country could make a non-violent transition to democratic governance. Although the military civic action programs failed to prevent the overthrow of Juan Bosch or the countercoup against the Reid triumvirate, they were useful to the Americans when they did intervene. Cooperation from Loyalist forces on the ground made the US entry that much easier, and limited the need for widespread occupation of the country. This cooperation may also have shaped the American objectives.


100 Members of Congress took an interest in the Dominican intervention partly, as Peceny argues, because they were interested in promoting liberal democratic values, but more likely because they were suspicious of Johnson's proclivity to use force.
It is not surprising that some interpret the immediate objective of the US intervention to have been the preservation of the Dominican military. At the same time, the armed forces were also a locus of threat. Because the IAPF focused upon protecting governments negotiated by OAS representatives, the threat switched from the communists early in the venture to the extreme right later on.

The desire to avoid combat and quickly redeploy troops to Vietnam would explain both US initial support of Loyalists and later, US acceptance of Bosch’s participation in the 1966 Dominican elections. The policy to be implemented depended upon cooperation from indigenous forces, and was intended also to accommodate OAS participants in the conflict resolution.

IMPLEMENTATION

US warfighting doctrine on limited war implied both civilian intervention and removing victory, in the traditional sense, as an objective. These, and restrictions on rules of engagement, were controversial from a military perspective. Washington policymakers, according to limited war theory, would take on responsibilities normally delegated to the theater commander, including “the nature, scope, and acceptable limits for military operations in the field.” Limited warfare theory put war and peace on a continuum,

in which military capabilities served primarily as political and diplomatic instruments that could be orchestrated not so much to effect military victory as to affect the intentions of the combatants and make them amenable to political solutions.

---

101 Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 53.

102 Yates, Power Pack p. ix. Johnson personally managed the US response to the crisis, as George Ball said, “to the point where he assumed the direction of day-to-day policy and became, in effect, the Dominican desk officer.” Quoted in Yates, Power Pack p. 35. See also Damon Coletta, “The Military Option in the Dominican Republic 1965: A Case Study in the Use of Force,” paper delivered to the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 18, 1996.

103 Lawrence Yates, Power Pack p. 35, italics in original.
Johnson’s style of civilian control crashed head on with military tradition that accepted political determination of ends but insisted on preserving military autonomy as to means. The Dominican affair has been called a demonstration of the “often inescapable incompatibility between political objectives and military considerations.”\textsuperscript{104} Civil-military tensions in 1965 can be attributed to civilian intervention, military concerns for force protection, military desire for victory, and military confusion about the mission.

The US military implemented policy as directed by Washington, but in Lawrence Greenberg’s view, “General Palmer supported the political goals of the president and secretary of state first, and military expediency second.”\textsuperscript{105} The ROE in the Dominican Republic are best remembered in military historical accounts as having put American troops in unnecessarily dangerous and sometimes untenable positions. Two decisions, the US decision in May 1965 to create a corridor that avoided a fight, and the decision one month later to pull back from a highly successful counteroffensive, implied that Washington denied US troops a vision of victory. Once on the ground, the Americans shifted between partisan positions and attempts at neutrality. The Johnson Administration confused the American troops by attempting to shift from a combat posture to one of neutrality. Yates explains,

Few American troops, particularly those in the first waves, had been adequately briefed, yet almost to a man, they assumed that the rebels were the enemy...Military briefers quickly adopted the practice of referring to the Loyalists as “friendlies,” the Constitutionalists as “unfriendlies.” Talk among American soldiers about “killing commies” or going downtown to “finish them off” also betrayed more than a hint of partisanship. As one “exasperated” colonel put it, “What the hell, those who shoot at us are the enemy and those who don’t are friends.”\textsuperscript{106}


\textsuperscript{105} Greenberg, \textit{United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations}, p. 96.

Despite the large numbers of US troops sent into the Dominican Republic, the intervention had a very small but effective geographic footprint. Combat damage was not widespread. The rebellion did not take hold in the countryside, and was confined to the capital. The American forces denied the enemy access to the country-dwelling population by conventional military means, bottling the rebels in Santo Domingo surrounded by Marines, the sea, a river and the 82nd Airborne. The US force structure was overwhelmingly large in the early stages of the intervention, and significantly reduced even as the mission scope nominally became broader with the occupation of formerly rebel-held territory.

From the bottom-up perspective of implementers on the ground, a critical feature of the operation was the relationship between US troops and the Dominican warring factions. The US did not attempt to demobilize the entire armed forces, only to negotiate terms for reintegration of former Constitutionalists. The indigenous armed forces were instead valuable allies to the Americans as they sought to extricate themselves from local affairs. US involvement in economic and social issues set a bigger footprint than suggested by US troop deployments. Finally, the United States had help in the final stages of the intervention from a multilateral peace force organized under the auspices of the OAS.

The structure of Palmer’s intervention force suggests that short-term combat, and not long-term commitment was on the agenda. OPLAN 310/2 went no further than the introduction of US forces into an area for missions involving simply the evacuation of American citizens and the protection of US property. Lacking was an appreciation of the key places - government buildings, foreign embassies, telecommunication centers, TV and radio sites, news media offices, major utilities, and the like - that would have a significant bearing on broader missions involving stability or peacekeeping operations.107

107 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, pp. 42-43. Texaco road and city maps were mentioned several times as references in meetings in the field.
A short supply of Military Police in the US force structure hampered the implementation effort, and led to an incident that hurt the American image in the Dominican Republic. A group of Constitutionalist “detainees” was captured by the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, and turned over to the Dominican police. The Dominican police assembled them into a courtyard and shot them. The Americans changed to a policy of screening and “evacuating” detainees. One assessment of this scenario is that the shortage of military police (MPs) which caused the problem was understandable “when you remember that US forces were there to fight a war and had not planned on prisoners.” Moreover, the plan designed to implement the policy, the OPLAN, had not enabled priority introduction for psychological operations. Instead, the focus was on bringing a large force to bear on the area of operations in a short time.

The story of the Dominican intervention shows that despite limited objectives, the US military preferred to send overwhelming force. The size of the force may have also reflected the uncertainty of the situation on the ground, for example, whether the coup leaders would be friendly to the American soldiers. As it turned out, US forces were able to rely upon Loyalist cooperation in order to dock at Haina and to make the initial landing at San Isidro airfield. Likewise, Palmer relied upon cooperation of a defeated Caamaño to persuade rebels in the Ciudad Nueva not to resist the US occupation in October. Host country support was sought to facilitate operations and to keep a semblance of governance. This idea is consistent with the World War II finding that indigenous leadership is a route to an early exit for US military forces.

---

108 Bullock, “Peace by Committee,” p. 31. Although technically not “Prisoners of War” according to the Hague and Geneva Conventions (because war was not declared), detainees are a responsibility of intervention forces and the US ought to have planned for them.


110 Damon Coletta, “The Military Option in the Dominican Republic 1965: A Case Study in the Use of Force,” paper delivered to the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 18, 1996., p. 14. Damon Coletta has concluded that the Dominican intervention fits neatly into neither of allegedly dichotomous types of warfighting: limited engagement or all-or-nothing. On the one hand, the US executive was keen to exert maximum civilian control as fits a limited objective engagement. On the other hand, the overwhelming size of the intervention force suggested an all-or-nothing type encounter. Another possibility is that interservice rivalry, the desire for the various US military services to play a role, is responsible for the large size of the US invasion force.
The implementation was less successful addressing the underlying problem of strongman than it was in the immediate problem of instability. Given the legacy of military coup in the Dominican Republic, one would expect post conflict reforms to focus on the armed forces. However, the resolution of the crisis did not include dismantling or greatly altering the Dominican armed forces. Balaguer closed the Constitutionalists’ separate base; they were not in fact reintegrated since they were required to live outside military installations.

The post-conflict effort seemed to focus on the civil dimension. A relief program in general was driven by a combination of humanitarian and military considerations, the same motivations that had governed these activities in the past:

Thus, the large-scale emergency relief and economic-assistance program, begun shortly after the troop landings, stemmed not only from humanitarian impulses but from the desire to eliminate conditions that might intensify the crisis, particularly major food shortages precipitated by the breakdown of the Dominican economy. Although the actual physical damage from the fighting was not very great, internal communications and distribution processes had been disrupted during the revolution.

Humanitarian considerations led to unanticipated activities. Psychological operations and humanitarian assistance both targeted the civilian population rather than an organized and armed adversary. Unconventional roles for the armed forces were prominent, in keeping with counterinsurgency’s focus on the civilian population.

The Americans portrayed the threat in the Dominican Republic as a bid by a small group of communists that affected a large number of innocent civilians. In theory, the US would

\---

111 Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 170.
113 Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 54.
114 The 82nd Airborne Division for a short time was responsible for the Santo Domingo Zoo’s starving creatures, including pets left behind by American and foreign nationals. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 160.
address the civil dimension by allying with these civilians, rather than right or leftist forces. In practice, the Americans focused instead on the local armed forces as agents handling the civil dimension. Already the US had a Military Assistance Advisory Group working with the Dominican armed forces. In the course of the occupation military civic action would be a major emphasis.

US Army medical facilities treated over 48,000 civilians. Civil affairs personnel surveyed civilian hospitals and provided supplies and equipment to them. The 42nd helped to restore electric power and sanitation services, and to obtain port and storage facilities for use by US forces. Army personnel assisted AID relief and the US Emergency Relief Group in the attempt to restore normal economic activity.\(^{116}\) US Information Agency (USIA) operational control of psychological operations units was said to “represent a significant step in Inter-Departmental coordination,” as was the OAS and AID coordination with the Army Special Forces 7th Special Forces Group (reinforced).\(^{117}\)

Civil aid programs were identified as the most significant medical activities in the Dominican intervention. The numbers and types of medical units sent “were determined as much by humanitarian and public relations considerations as by the basic mission of the Medical Service—to maintain fighting strength.”\(^{118}\) Assistance stations were closed for a short time in May 1965, when it was deemed that the patient load produced by the revolt had played out, and it

---

\(^{116}\) Congressional Fact Paper. Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.9. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.

\(^{117}\) Ibid. The United States Information Agency, under Carl T. Rowan, was responsible for the following: production and dissemination of leaflets and other printed material; conduct of air and ground loudspeaker operations; conduct of radio broadcasts; monitoring and interception of rebel propaganda; and development of PsyOp intelligence requirements.

\(^{118}\) Darrell G. McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965*, (Department of the Army Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, DC, [no date]), p.6. Dental care was a significant issue, due to high sugar content in the Dominican diet, and so an Army dentist was added to each team. Although these dentists provided mostly emergency care, resident nuns at Colegio Maria Auxiliadora received restorative and reconstructive services, in "partial payment for the work the nuns did, such as doing the laundry without charge, after all the troops moved in." Darrell G. McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965*, (Department of the Army Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, DC, [no date]), p.44.
was time to return to civil affairs policy whereby civil affairs officers organize local professionals and provide them with supplies. However, the 82nd requested permission to reopen its stations to provide civil aid because its own troop requirements were low and the public affairs benefits were high. The US forces received a number of tips on arms smuggling and other activities from patients at these stations. The activities became more like a charity program than an emergency operation. By mid-June 1965, 24,000 outpatient visits were recorded; by the end of June the number rose to 39,454, and the mission total was 54,000. \(^{119}\) In 1966 attention turned to preventative health. \(^{120}\)

The effort "was directed to the civilian populace of DOMREP." \(^{121}\) The coordination with USAID proved to be important, because the Psychological Operations (PsyOp) team was weak in language proficiency and area knowledge, resulting in "a shortage of qualified or trained propagandists." \(^{122}\) In August of 1965 it was reported that "there are 39 PsyOp personnel...providing continuous propaganda support of OAS activities." \(^{123}\) Trips into the countryside by Special Forces, medical and intelligence personnel in civilian clothes in helicopters painted solid green were part of the so-called "Green Hornet Caper." These missions in May 1965 established that the conflict was confined to the capital, there was goodwill toward the Americans, the Dominican armed forces were in control, and few foreign troops would be needed. Palmer recalls that "We therefore immediately started planning to reduce the US forces involved." \(^{124}\) In August 1965, 133 Special Forces personnel remained in the Dominican

---


\(^{120}\) Preventative health includes control of insects and rodents, sanitation, venereal disease control, water testing, even restaurant inspection (the latter was intended primarily to protect US soldiers frequenting them).


\(^{123}\) Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.8. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.

\(^{124}\) Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 56.
Republic. Although these troops are not designated civil affairs personnel, Special Forces in the Kennedy-Johnson era emerge as important military assets concerned with the civil dimension of strategy, assessing popular support and working to win it.

How significant was the role of the OAS and the IAPF? Although in his report to the nation on May 2, President Johnson declared that “We have been consulting with the Organization of American States...we have been acting in conformity with their decisions,” many were unconvinced. “Despite Washington’s carefully orchestrated campaign to cloak the political negotiations in the trappings of the Organization of American States,” John M. Goshko wrote in *The Washington Post* in June 1965, “they remain very much a US managed operation.” The US essentially footed the bill and provided logistics. The IAPF was nominally headed by a Brazilian general, who was unaware that General Palmer, his deputy, was reading his mail.

The presence of the IAPF helped the American troops to lower their profile as “occupants” of the Dominican Republic. The OAS troops made up for American shortages of MPs, but complicated the American effort in other ways. The Latin American troops were not as well-equipped, or as well-disciplined with respect to the rules of engagement, as were the US soldiers. At the operational level, General Palmer had to consult, sometimes retroactively, with his nominal superior General Alvim. At the policy level, the Americans had to surrender some control of the political solution to a committee of OAS diplomats. The one level affected the other, as an agreement brokered by the OAS committed the troops to protection of

---

125 Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.8. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.


Constitutionalist forces. Although General Palmer did not favor this policy, he was in the position of making sure that General Alvim, who liked it less, abided by it.

**Outcome**

A military stalemate imposed by the US and IAPF stabilized the situation in the Dominican Republic, backed by the threat of an imposed settlement by the United States. The net effect of this settlement was a military loss for the left in the Dominican Republic. As a military venture for the United States, the intervention was a success. Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, conceded that stability was restored more quickly due to intervention, but argued that the United States sacrificed principles of international law and the reputation of the Organization of American States in order to serve that end. The resolution of the crisis is generally regarded as a diplomatic failure, despite the intense US diplomatic effort working with the OAS and Dominican leaders.

The development outcome of the intervention is mixed. The economy was restored to an estimated 75 to 80 percent of its pre-crisis level within months of the intervention. Serious problems persisted. General Palmer reflected upon his ability to change that in 1989:

> Military action can stabilize conditions but cannot alone solve political problems, much less basic social and economic inequities; indeed, military efforts can make matters worse.

The United States managed to address the problem of short term stability and to turn management of the crisis over from military to diplomatic actors. Presidential elections were held within one year. Balaguer served as president throughout most of the post-intervention period, for 22 of the 30 years between 1965 and 1995. Throughout the 1970s, challenges by politicized

---

130 Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, p. 133.
131 *The Arrogance of Power*
132 Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, p. 54.
133 Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, p. 156.
armed forces from the left and right persisted, and a declared state of emergency was declared in 1973. However, there was a significant milestone in 1978, when governance changed hands from one political party to another. President Jimmy Carter persuaded Balaguer to accept opposition victory.  

The country has not been free of domestic unrest since the intervention. In 1984 when secret service agents of the National Police arrested opposition party leaders following demonstrations against the high cost of living and an agreement signed by President Salvador Jorge Blanco with the International Monetary Fund. The government closed two radio and one television station shortly after. *Radio Popular* was put under military control because it had "disturbed the peace" by informing the public about incidents in the capital. Joaquin Balaguer returned to power in 1986. In his fifth term in office Balaguer failed to solve the economic problems of the Dominican Republic, including 43 percent inflation in 1989 and a $4 billion debt.

In 1990, Balaguer, age 83, was challenged for the Presidency by Juan Bosch, age 80. The tally in that election was very close, and former US President Jimmy Carter brokered a recount. Balaguer was re-elected, but his regime was plagued by demonstrations and strikes, and he called for new elections in 1992, two years before his term expired. He held onto

---


power until losing an election in 1996 to opposition leader Leonel Fernandez. Given the long path from the 1965 US intervention to the 1996 presidential election in the Dominican Republic, it seems difficult to credit the former with the latter.

General Palmer attempted to summarize the impact of the military intervention on the political playing field some time after he commanded US forces there:

Yet even though the United States showed that it can orchestrate with finesse the political, economic, and military actions required in a complex, sensitive situation, the nation fell far short of developing a convincing psychological climate within which its public affairs efforts could bear fruit. Palmer implies that the American effort was unconvincing, but it is not clear to which audience he refers. If he means the Dominican people, he implies that the unconventional mission did not achieve the objectives of counterinsurgency, to build stability from the bottom up. If he means the American people, he implies that the Administration failed to convince the American people to commit its forces to impose stability from the top down.

LESSONS AND MODIFICATIONS

The Dominican intervention left the armed forces with an uneasy relationship with an administration inclined to intervene in field-level decisions, change objectives during an operation, and to calibrate the use of force. “Muddling through” was quite unlike the traditional American military notion of victory.

There is much that the Dominican intervention could have taught American strategists about the civil dimension that it did not. First, military operations might have learned seemingly small lessons about the importance of early introduction of radio and television capability and

---


141 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 154.
seemingly basic lessons, like the importance of planning for stability operations and assembling an appropriate force structure for post-conflict activities.\footnote{This includes small details, like the popularity of American Armed Forces Radio in Santo Domingo (intended for the entertainment of US troops) among the Dominican population.}

Second, the full benefits of collaboration with multilateral partners in the Organization of American States were not realized by Washington or the implementers in the field. A more genuine commitment to multilateralism would be necessary in order to fit military actions to the requirements stemming from OAS negotiations, and to integrate OAS partner military and civil agents into the post-conflict reconstruction operations.

Third, the United States had yet to master the art of friendly regime or host country support. Host country cooperation was important to the American effort, but longer term stability requires deeper attention to host regime legitimacy. The “hearts and minds” concept was certainly echoed in Vietnam, as was inter-agency cooperation on that front. Because the US corridor operation created military conditions that set the stage for negotiations, the Dominican case suggests that observers should scrutinize official proclamations of impartiality, such as in later peace operations.

Finally, American civilian policymakers perceived the apparently successful Dominican intervention as validation of limited war theory. As Stanley Sandler noted, Kennedy-Johnson civilians “would try their hand on a far larger scale in Vietnam.”\footnote{Sandler, \textit{Glad to See Them Come}, p. 353. See Chapter 4 of this study for discussion of the US approach in Vietnam.} Thus, the consequences of failure in Vietnam incorporate the Dominican experience. After the Vietnam debacle, ‘nation-building’ became an unpopular concept. STRICOM was disbanded, Special Forces reduced, and SOUTHCOM scaled back. One favorable development is that the Civil Affairs School moved to Fort Bragg, the locus of Special Operation Forces training, in 1972 as part of the Institute for Military Assistance.\footnote{Sandler, \textit{Glad to See Them Come}, p. 372. The various SOF training schools were later rolled together in the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School by 1986.} The Army concentrated again on the European theater and the liaison
function of civil affairs. Military-to-military cooperation, the use of American troops to train Latin American militaries, substituted for direct intervention. Special Operations did not regain favor until the 1970s, after the leftist Sandinista regime came to power in Nicaragua. Still, as the next chapter shows, there was some way to go before the United States would incorporate the civil dimension up front when preparing for military intervention.
The US invasion of Grenada—at a cost $75.5 million—has been cited as a textbook case of conventional action. The title of the US operation that began the night of October 24, 1983 was ‘Urgent Fury.’ Like ‘Power Pack’ for the operation in the Dominican Republic, this name was randomly generated. The moniker ‘Urgent Fury’ was so popular that future missions were intentionally given names that conveyed a message that appealed to the American public. The unsurprising victory in Grenada provided a boost for US military morale sought by President Ronald Reagan and a distraction of the public’s attention from a recent disaster in Lebanon. Had US public opinion as a civil dimension consideration been the top-down policy objective of the invasion, as many believed it was, the policy appeared to have been successfully implemented.

The US invasion of Grenada might also be cited as a textbook case of failure according to a number of measures. A study by the US Congress’ Military Reform Caucus found serious shortcomings in the US military operation in Grenada. These focused mostly on the combat aspects of implementation. Some soldiers did not receive maps until shortly before the invasion, and then the maps provided lacked grids so that communication about locations was difficult. There were delays, intelligence failures, communications problems, and episodes of friendly fire. There were 18 US servicemen killed in Grenada and 116 wounded. Ten of the eighteen killed

---


2 The Military Reform Caucus included 38 Republicans and 37 Democrats. The study noted that the SEALs failed in three of its four missions, and the Delta Force (its former name, the new name is classified), the Army’s antiterrorist unit failed to capture the Richmond Hill prison on Grenada. Nine of about 100 US helicopters used in the Grenada assault were destroyed. “A loss rate of 9 percent in three days against an opponent with no antiaircraft missiles, only guns . . . is not easy to pass over,” noted William Lind, a congressional defense aide. Brad Knickerbocker, “Study Criticizes Invasion tactics in Grenada,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 6, 1984, p. 1.

3 Benjamin F. Schemmen, “Grenada Highlights One of DOD’s Major C3 Problems But Increased Funding is Bringing Solutions,” *Armed Forces Journal* 23 April 1984, p. 49.

were victims of accidents or friendly fire.\textsuperscript{5} Although it was a showcase in some ways for Special Operations Forces capable of quick strike and rapid deployment, their role was both conventional, in the sense that they were combat focused, and less successful than expected.\textsuperscript{6} By the time the combat joint task force (JTF 120) that led the invasion October 24 was disestablished on November 2, the hostilities phase of the operation as a whole had lasted much longer than anticipated. This suggests some failure in US intelligence. Failure to move efficiently from force to policy in a small island like Grenada indicates more general problems in the implementation of US military and civil-military operations.

The invasion had negative consequences for US foreign policy in Europe, at a critical time in the European debate over cruise missiles. The American media were furious at being denied access to the island to cover the invasion. The US claim that the intervention was justified to protect human rights in Grenada was greeted with alarm by international legal scholars.\textsuperscript{7} Moreover, the intervention also raised Grenadian expectations about development that did not materialize. As a precedent for future operations, the Grenada intervention left much to be desired on military and political grounds.

The US invasion of Grenada in 1983, like the Dominican intervention, began as a noncombatant evacuation, in this case to rescue American medical students.\textsuperscript{8} This implied limited


\textsuperscript{6} 'Urgent Fury' was a joint operation, meaning that all services of the armed forces were involved, but the focus was upon Special Operations Forces. Ironically, these forces did not fare well for the most part. The surprise of the operation was that US forces that expected to be fighting for several hours instead fought for several days.

\textsuperscript{7} See the discussion, for example, in Maurice Waters, \textit{"The Invasion of Grenada, 1983 and the Collapse of Legal Norms,"} \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 23 (3) 1986:229-246.

\textsuperscript{8} Dorothea Cypher uses the words "what was originally only a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)" in "Urgent Fury," p. 100. Admiral MacDonald explained that the planning began as a noncombat evacuation but changed on October 19\textsuperscript{th} in light of the shoot-on-sight curfew and a new nonpermissive environment. United States Congress, 98\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, \textit{"Lessons Learned as a Result of the US Military Operations in Grenada,"} January 24, 1984. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 46.
objectives, limited application of force, and limited relevance of the civil dimension of strategy during implementation. However, as in the Dominican intervention, the stated rationale for intervention disguised American intentions to influence political order in the target country. The Reagan Administration explicitly raised the stakes in Grenada when tacking "restoration of democratic institutions" onto the justification for a military action.\(^9\) The White House added missions from the beginning of the evacuation planning, causing some confusion and planning delays. One challenge for this chapter is to sort out the American motivations in the Grenada episode, and the consequent fit of American political and military objectives.

Another challenge is to identify the character of the American occupation footprint. The American invasion force included a large number of Special Operations Forces, among them Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. American troops covered the country and created a large footprint for US forces. The use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) implied a relatively early prominence of the civil dimension of conflict. SOF were used as short term specialized combat troops rather than long term unconventional warriors. The warfighting phase of the conflict proceeded on the fly, so specialized planning for civil affairs was negligible. The US civil affairs effort in Grenada, hastily assembled and short term in implementation, seems to have been a casualty of the US military effort to reclaim control of operations in the sense that military, i.e. combat considerations were predominant from the bottom-up view of the military commander.

This chapter reviews contextual considerations relevant to the US invasion of Grenada that precipitated the decision to invade. The objectives of the venture as stated by White House officials indicate a concern for civil liberty more so than combat victory. The chapter provides a narrative account of the military action that indicates a military focus upon the former in the

implementation. Given that Reagan shared the military view of special military forces as support
to combat rather than as instruments for winning hearts and minds, and given that he delegated
the conduct of the operation to the field, the sincerity of his commitment to his official objectives
is open to challenge. Policy implementation of the civil realm objective was not surprisingly
hampered by inattention to the civil dimension in the military plan and by bottom-up snags that
stemmed from US military requirements to keep up the image of a legitimate government of
Grenada hastily assembled by US diplomats. Finally, the chapter turns to outcomes and lessons
derived from the US invasion of Grenada.

CONTEXT

Events in the 1970s, and the final year in particular, would change American thinking
about low-intensity conflict. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, fueling American and
international fears of an expansionist tendencies in their most threatening enemy. In the last two
years of the Jimmy Carter administration, Marxist revolutionaries waged insurrections in Africa
and Latin America. Sandinista forces in Nicaragua successfully overthrew the dictator Anastasio
Somoza and turned attention to neighboring El Salvador. Iranian students took sixty-six
Americans hostage in a crisis that was punctuated by the failure of Desert One, a special rescue
mission. Ronald Reagan came into office with an intention to improve American ability to wage
unconventional and low-intensity conflict. This implied that the Reagan Administration would
have to prepare the American military, which had focused on high intensity conflict in the
European theater since Vietnam, for low-intensity conflict operations in the Third World.¹⁰ “The

¹⁰ Michael J. Kryzanek, “The Grenada Invasion: Approaches to Understanding,” in United States Policy in Latin
America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge, ed. John D. Martz, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska
Press, 1995: 58-79, pp. 69-72. Although the term “Global South” is considered more appropriate today, this
chapter refers to “Third World” in order to remain in the parlance of the time. For an exemplary description of the
South, see Ivan Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: University
US government,” says Robert Pastor, “seemed delighted with the opportunity to change the Grenadian government by force.”

Grenada is a small island in the English-speaking Caribbean, the southernmost of the Windward Islands. Although it encompasses 433 square kilometers, the main island is a mere 310 square kilometers (about the size of Detroit). The island sits above Trinidad and Tobago, on Galleons Passage, which is one of three used by tankers entering the Caribbean from the Persian Gulf and West Africa.

Relations between the United States and Grenada had been poor leading up to the event that sparked the US intervention, a coup against the Cuban-backed government of Maurice Bishop. Bishop was a leader of the New Jewel Movement (NJM). The New Jewel Movement consisted of young Marxist-Leninists who had also seized power by means of coup d'état. Bishop and others overthrew the Westminster-model parliamentary government of Eric Matthew Gairy in 1979 and formed the People’s Revolutionary Government.

As unpalatable as the leftist government in Grenada may have been to the United States, a greater threat was posed by Nicaragua’s new regime the same year. And, as in the Dominican

---


13 The strategic significance of the region was established in World War II. The US acquired 11 bases from Britain in exchange for forty out-of-date destroyers, as part of the Lend-Lease Agreement of 1941. Disruption of shipping in the Caribbean by German naval power during World War II was a lesson remembered by American planners in the 1980s, who contemplated possible future operations in Europe.

14 The Grenada government had been dominated by Eric Matthew Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party for three decades.
intervention, Fidel Castro was seen as a threat waiting just offstage. The presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in 1979 was alarming enough that a Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force was established under President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980). Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 and the international security climate, although not characterized by annual war scares as earlier in the Cold War, was more tense than in previous years. The Reagan Administration announced a regional trade and aid package, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in 1982. The Administration also boosted US military aid and presence in the region. US military aid to the Eastern Caribbean rose from less than $100,000 in 1981 to $17 million in 1982 and $17 million again in 1983. Although a Regional Security System (RSS) was already in the works in the Eastern Caribbean, the Reagan Administration had failed to develop a regional coast guard including Barbados, Jamaica and other Caribbean countries. The correction of that oversight would be accelerated by events in Grenada.

Bishop’s regime was very popular at first, owing to the charisma of its leader, despite his failure to hold early elections as promised. The New Jewel Movement sought to create a socialist state and economy. At the same time, the government wished to improve the economy through increased tourism, and accepted a World Bank loan to build a runway capable of handling large planes. Cuba’s involvement in the construction of the airport preoccupied Americans, as the US government widely advertised that the new runway would be suitable for larger military aircraft

---


16 The CJTF was put together with the Antilles Defense Command in Puerto Rico to form the United States Forces Caribbean Command December 1, 1981, comprising Navy, Air Force, Army and Marine Corps assets. Meditz and Hanratly (eds.) Islands of the Caribbean, p. 601.


and a security threat to the United States. Canadians Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau recollect, “This particular allegation of Grenada’s intentions bemused the government of Canada, which was funding the construction of a modern airport terminal at the end of the runway as a stimulus to the potential tourist industry of this beautiful island.”

In February and March of 1983 there were reports that Bishop’s government had suppressed freedoms, and President Ronald Reagan’s officials complained that the construction of a 10,000-foot runway in Grenada represented Cuban-Soviet militarization there. Grenada’s Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman alleged that the US was preparing to attack. An American official characterized the charge as ridiculous.

On October 19, 1983, Bishop was arrested by his former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. A crowd freed Bishop, who headed for Fort Rupert in the center of St. George’s. The capital, located on the southwest coast of the island, is guarded by fortresses. Coard escaped to Fort Frederick, organized supporters and attacked Fort Rupert. Among others, Bishop and Whiteman were both killed in the coup. Bernard Coard and Austin Hudson established a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). A twenty-four hour shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed. The events were seen to represent a crisis in the Caribbean. The instability of Grenada’s revolutionary regime was later cited as causing alarm in other Caribbean nations which then supported the US operation. Leaders of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) approached the US to request military assistance. The Americans already had plans in the works.

---


22 Fishel, “The Grenada Intervention,” p. 12. It might also be noted that Eugenia Charles of Dominica had been the target of an attempted coup in 1981.

23 As the Bishop regime collapsed, members of the regional organization CARICOM (Caribbean Community) met in an emergency meeting and discussed economic sanctions. A meeting of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
At the time of the intervention, the US did not have an embassy in Grenada, only an ambassador for the Eastern Caribbean located in Barbados. US, Canadian and British diplomats flew to Grenada on October 22 at the invitation of the new government. According to Eugenia Charles of Dominica, Sir Paul Scoon, (the Governor General of Grenada under house arrest at the time), secretly requested military assistance during this visit. The Governor General is the constitutional Head of State, with special powers only in emergencies. A US Defense Department official characterized Scoon as “the sole remaining legitimate authority on Grenada.” Coard’s 16-member military council warned the nation to expect an invasion by neighboring states.

Two recent and wrenching experiences were on the minds of American military leaders as they prepared to invade Grenada in October 1983: the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran in 1979 and the bombing of barracks housing US Marines as part of a peacekeeping force in Lebanon in 1983. Thus it is more than coincidental, first that the official characterization of the

---

24 Admiral Wesley McDonald, Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), had been warned on October 13 to prepare an evacuation plan for American students at the St. George’s University Medical School. Following the OECS request, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General John Vessey ordered McDonald to prepare a military option against the PRA. On October 20 ships on route to the Mediterranean were diverted toward the Caribbean.

25 It may be that too little was known about other possibilities for indigenous leadership, and the armed forces were treated as hostile.

26 A diplomatic team tried to go in on October 19, but they were turned back at that time.

27 See Adkin, p. 99 for disagreement that the request took place.


29 These events are often mentioned in conjunction with discussion of the US invasion of Grenada. Another event prior to the invasion, the Soviet downing of KAL007, had also increased the level of tension in superpower relations.
use of force in Grenada was as a rescue mission to pull American medical students from a climate of instability, and second that it was one that put the US Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces in front.

**Explicit Objectives**

Given the policy context, an invasion of Grenada appeared a relatively painless policy option for the Reagan Administration. In a national address, President Ronald Reagan said that the US military action in Grenada was intended to protect US citizens, to forestall further chaos, and to help restore democratic institutions. The latter point was problematic, because the legitimacy of the Governor General of Grenada to request US aid was in doubt, and because the intended restoration of democratic institutions was not spelled out. Reagan also cited a request by leaders of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) for US military assistance. The United States claimed its intervention was legal as a preventative action. The claim of self-defense requires one to envision Grenada’s military buildup as indication of imminent attack on the United States, an exercise requiring considerable imagination. The potential threat to American nationals in Grenada, attending St. George’s University Medical School, provided a more expedient rationale or, at a minimum, one that served the home front civil dimension of strategy. This rationale, that American lives were in danger, was easier for the American public to appreciate.

**Narrative**

Although planning for non-combat evacuation (NEO) had begun well before, on the night of October 21 the White House directed an expanded mission to be implemented by the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command. Urgent Fury proceeded from a “no-plan”

30 Mark Adkin, who took part in the intervention and wrote a popular book on the subject, summarizes Reagan’s goals as follows: “Although worded for public consumption...this statement contains the two primary grounds for Urgent Fury: humanitarian and strategic-political considerations.” Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 108.

scenario. A viable concept plan existed, but the requirements of operational security precluded the inclusion of critical players in the planning process, including the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps and, unfortunately, the Defense Mapping Agency. Critical US players may have been excluded, but Coard knew to warn his people to prepare for a US invasion on October 22.

Admiral McDonald of Atlantic Command was unified (theater) commander; therefore he would exercise operational command of all forces. On October 22, 1983, the JCS Execute Order to Admiral McDonald was to

...conduct military operations to protect and evacuate US and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants assist in the restoration of democratic government on Grenada.

McDonald designated Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Commander, Second Fleet, to be the on scene commander. Metcalf commanded Joint Task Force 120 (JTF-120), with operational control of subordinate task forces. Of a possible command and control staff of 88, Vice Admiral Metcalf chose to work with only 22, despite the use of three separate ground elements and an Amphibious Squadron at sea. Even more serious was that a single commander, possibly due to interservice rivalry, was not designated for the ground forces. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was the product of reorganized Special Operations Forces (SOF) after the failed attempt

---

32 See Stephen J. Andriole, “A Decision Theoretic Analysis of the Reagan Administration’s Decision to Invade Grenada,” in Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson (eds.) American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury,” Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 73-97. When there is no contingency plan for a crisis that is a complete surprise, “no plan” characterizes the scenario. When there is a skeletal plan for a foreseen contingency, it is a CONPLAN (concept plan). When there is a developed plan for an anticipated situation, it is an OPLAN (operations plan). From Fishel, “Grenada Intervention,” p. 14.


34 Quoted in Mark Adkin, p. 129. A CINCLANT plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 23.

35 CTF 121 82d Airborne Division, CTF 123 Special Operations task force, CTF 124 Amphibious Task Force (Navy and Marine Corps), CTF 126 Air Force, cited in Fishel p. 15.

36 Fishel, p. 18. The first ground element was JTF 123 Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Although the Rangers were not considered special operations at the time, they were included here with the SEALs, Delta, Special Operations Aviation and Air Force special operations elements. The second was Task Force 121, the 82d Airborne. Third, the 22 MAU was part of Navy’s TF 124 until ashore.
to rescue American hostages in Iran. JSOC provided the control headquarters for eight of thirteen planned SOF missions. However, the 82d Airborne Division rather than the JSOC was the control headquarters for the Army Rangers, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 4th Psychological Operations Group.\(^{37}\)

In addition to attack helicopters, warships, naval aviation and naval gunfire, the United States put 10 regular infantry battalions against a paper threat.\(^{38}\) The operation was also supported by the Carrier Battle Group of the \textit{USS Independence}, and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. Admiral McDonald later told the US Congress, “Overkill, yes, we did overkill and we did it deliberately...”\(^{39}\) So much so, it would become a problem for the military command to turn off the tap of arriving military forces onto the tiny island. Peak deployment of US troops on Grenada (an island with a population of fewer than 100,000) was 6,500. The People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) of Grenada, by contrast, had an estimated strength of 500-600, plus 2,000 - 2,500 militia. Also on the island were 750-800 Cubans “of whom perhaps 25 percent were regular military.”\(^{40}\)

\textit{Combat Operations}

Near midnight, October 24-25, 1983, a Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team conducted reconnaissance in the area of Pearls airport, on the northwest side of the island, followed by an amphibious task force at 2 a.m. An air assault was decided upon, and helicopters left the \textit{Guam} at


\(^{38}\) Fishel explains that the US battalions went up against “no more than 10 undertrained and underequipped battalions one of which was a Cuban engineer battalion, seven Grenadian militia (existing more on paper than in reality), and only two were Grenadian infantry., “Grenada Intervention,” p. 15.


\(^{40}\) Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” p. 3. US intelligence estimated twice as many in the armed forces, backed by a militia of up to 5,000. It was also thought that there were 30 to 50 Cuban military advisors and 600 construction workers.
3:15 a.m., landing at an unused racetrack south of the airfield because of antiaircraft threat from 12.7mm guns in the hills. They secured the airfield by 7:30 a.m. The US Army Rangers had a more difficult time at the Salines area, site of the new runway on the Southeast end of the island, after landing early in the morning of October 25. They engaged Cubans just east of the True Blue Campus of the St. George’s school. Reinforcements in the form of the 82d arrived to help the Rangers repel a Cuban counterattack. They managed to secure the airfield and proceeded to the nearby campus in order to evacuate the American students. Troops moved 138 students out under the cover of night. As explained in the statement of Major General Edward Trobaugh,

> We learned that night because the students informed the US forces, that over at Grand Anse Campus, which was another part of the medical school, there were reported to be 180 American students over there. In true blue American innovative fashion, one of the Ranger officers picked up the telephone and dialed the campus and a student picked it up and we confirmed that yes, they really were there.

A rescue mission was planned for the next day.

Navy SEAL unconventional warfare specialists sent to secure Governor Scoon’s position at the Governor’s Mansion in St. George’s were surrounded and reinforcements had to be sent in to support the special mission forces. Tanks and Cobra helicopters landed on the western side of the island. As the US helicopters attacked Fort Frederick, overlooking St. George’s, they also struck an adjacent mental hospital.

Rear guard support for operations at St. George’s arrived at Grand Mal Bay on the western side of the island (and north of the capitol). Company G of the Marine Amphibious

---


43 The fog of war played out here. Company G of the MAU was loaded in amphibian tractors at 3:45 am for a 4:30 landing that was postponed three times and then canceled. They reloaded for a 1:30 p.m. landing that was
Unit (MAU) advanced on the Governor’s mansion in the middle of the night, there they linked up with the 22-man special mission team. The Governor General, his wife, and nine civilians were evacuated to the Guam. Company G then moved on to Fort Frederick. The night assault and helicopter attack had stunned the PRA, who left uniforms behind as they departed the fort.\(^44\) Company E continued operations in the northeast, and Companies F and G captured points around St. George’s. Company F met up with two dozen foreign nationals, mostly Canadians, at the Ross Point Hotel, who did not want to be evacuated. The Marines who proceeded into St. George’s met no resistance and began taking suspected PRA members into custody. US Army Rangers and Marine helicopters cooperated in a mission at Grand Anse, south of St. George’s, on October 26. Major Frank L. Brewer, leading the first division of helicopters, recalled the failure of Desert One, a devastating special operations failure during the Carter Administration, “The Iranian hostage rescue attempt was on everyone’s mind.”\(^45\) To the surprise of US troops, there were many medical students in housing off campus. The parents of these students had to be contacted in the US in order to ascertain the whereabouts of their children.

The island was under US control by the end of day three after landing (D+3), and Caribbean forces arrived for instruction. A raiding party was dispatched to seize a PRA camp near the town of Sauters, and did so without opposition. Company E of the MAU brought large numbers of spare rations to Sauters, and with Red Cross workers and local clergy, established a

canceled and were sent to bed at 5:50, only to be summoned for a landing at 6:30. Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” pp. 13-14.

\(^{44}\) Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” pp. 16-17. In underground tunnels below the fort, arms agreements between Grenada, Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union were found. Americans found light and heavy machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, and ammunition in the fort. Also nearby were trucks with 82mm mortars and others with antiaircraft ammunition. Conveniently, they also discovered situation maps noting island defenses and locations of PRA forces.

\(^{45}\) Nine CH-46s touched down at 4:15 p.m., twenty seconds after supporting fire by artillery, mortars and air support on suspected PRA and Cuban positions ceased. The nine helicopters carried a company of Rangers to a narrow strip of beach and left them there to secure the students and prepare them for evacuation. Next, four CH-53 helicopters came in to lift the 224 students from the Grand Anse site. Finally, the nine CH-46s then moved back in to lift out the Ranger company. Included in the story of the Grand Anse mission as told by both General Trobaugh and the Marine Corps historian is the tale of 11 Rangers who, after their helicopter was disabled on the beach, hid in the forest and then found a raft in order to sail out to the Navy. Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” p. 18.
food distribution point. Blocking positions were established and patrols of the town began. The towns of Gouyave and Victoria were taken without opposition. The 82d relieved the Marines of all positions on the main island by October 31. A Marine amphibious force was dispatched to take the island of Cariacou, between Grenada and St. Vincent, before daylight on November 1. Their welcome there was reportedly jubilant, and the 19 members of a PRA platoon were paroled to their homes and told to return at 8 a.m. Paratroopers of the 82d relieved the Marines on November 2.

Post-conflict Operations

It is difficult to measure the degree of US military involvement in everyday governance of Grenada after the intervention, but it is clear that US forces were in effective control of the island. US military accounts of the operation describe restoration of services and government, and it must be remembered that this was in an initial context in which the ‘government’ was the Governor General, and there was no US ambassador on the scene. US military entry brought physical destruction onto the island. US military works projects set about reconstruction.

Post-conflict operations and mopping up began October 28, before hostilities ended November 2. In addition to governance functions, these included others that affect society, including repatriation of captured Cuban prisoners and Soviet bloc diplomats, arrest of fugitives, interrogation and debriefing prisoners, and accounting for seized arms caches. According to Mark Adkin, the searches brought allegations of looting, and he concedes that “looting occurred, but how extensively or who was to blame has never been acknowledged.” The 82nd’s military police improvised a detention center for hundreds of suspects, for the most part arrested on


47 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 310. Some American soldiers who brought Makarov pistols and AK-47 assault rifles back into the United States as war souvenirs were caught and subjected to court martial and imprisonment. His account also tells of a Grenadian woman who had a note saying, “Sorry we had to bust your door down. We walked your dog... We used your stove to heat up our C-rations. Have a nice day. First Squad, Third Platoon, A Company, 505th Infantry.” (p. 311)
information from other Grenadians. Civil Affairs troops were continuing deployment at this
time, as combat troops were redeployed elsewhere. Hostilities, which had continued far longer
than expected, were not to be declared ended until November 2, at which point the JTF 120 was
disestablished.

One problem was that no single agency coordinated the different military units
responsible for civil-affairs projects, including engineers, medical and military police (MP)
units. The Active Corps 96th Civil Affairs Battalion of about 120 was committed to the
operation and Army reservists were brought in. According to John Fishel, the 125 or so
members of the 358th volunteered en masse, without assurance they would even be paid. The 4th
Group PSYOP unit, the only active US PSYOP asset, produced leaflets, newsletters and wanted
posters. Using specially configured C-130s of the 193d Special Operations Squadron of the
Pennsylvania Airguard, the Revolutionary Military Council's Radio Free Grenada was
overridden and provided electronic (television and radio) communications until ground
transmitters were located and appropriated. Several days into the combat action, local citizens
pointed out microwave and television transmitters and allegedly encouraged the American troops
to take them over.

In the report of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, the operation is broken into three phases:

1) a contact, coordination and deployment phase from 28 October - 14
November, 1983;

48 Adkin describes the experience of one prisoner, who was held until questioning for two days at Salines in a large
wooden packing case eight feet in height, width and length. Major Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for

49 A Command of US Forces in Grenada, COMUSFORGRENADA, was established in place of JTF 120, assuming
command of all US forces, locating and seizing caches of arms, and neutralizing remaining resistance.

50 Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, p. 375.

51 Fishel, "Grenada Intervention," p. 27. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) - a globally oriented active
component (AC) CA unit - is aligned with the US Army Special Operations Command.

52 Fishel, "Grenada Intervention," p. 27.
2) a rehabilitation and construction phase from 15 November, - 15 December 1983;

3) an infrastructure-repair and transition phase from 16 December 1983 - 31 January, 1984.53

In the first phase, troops identified assets to assist with tasks in the areas of Public Welfare, Public Works and Utilities. Reservists were to complement the Active Corps teams and support US Agency for International Development (AID) projects.54 AID provided money and Reserve Corps Civil Affairs provided expertise. Public welfare functions were operating at close to normal levels, but infrastructure damage required attention.55

In the second phase, the impact of $3 million Congress approved on November 10 began to be felt when $500,000 was released to the Area of Operations on November 15, including $150,000 for road maintenance.56 Tasks in the rubric of “Relief Assistance” came first, generators to hospital and medical stores, reactivation of essential services at the Mental Hospital, repairing telephone systems. The water supply system, electrical generation, education and road systems also needed attention, but not owing specifically to the US invasion.57 The Americans conducted a study to determine ways to revive the tourism industry, which normally accounted for a large portion of the Grenada’s gross national product and had suffered in recent


54 Authorization of funds for six week orders for reservists was arranged. Operational coordination was complete November 8.

55 Damage estimates for rehabilitation of infrastructure and the mental hospital damaged in the raid on Fort Frederick was undertaken. One of the early requests was a call for additional school desks. The Americans focused on the buildings because Grenada used an unfamiliar educational system and ideological differences were a problem in curricula.

56 Report of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, p. 10. A $15 million aid package was approved by the President, but was not immediately anticipated.

57 Report of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, p. 22.
years. The American’s had to deal with the consequences of their large physical presence, including generation of garbage. The Governor General urged the US to repair fields and clear them of troops in order to enable Grenadians to make them available for cricket, the national sport, on the grounds of national pride.

In order to provide more funds for Grenadians as Christmas approached road repair and construction efforts was made as labor intensive as possible. There was a discrepancy about wage rates that was resolved through central coordination of hiring. The once strong trade union leadership seemed nonexistent. Civilian claims were brought to the US Army Claims Agency, but it closed December 12, 1983. As a solution to a backlog of claims arriving at the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), Civil Affairs assets were sent to conduct repairs between January 17 and March 17, 1984.

US Forces in Grenada worked on the transition to the Caribbean Peace Force for security responsibility and on the US troop reduction between November 2 and December 15, 1983. After December 15, the US Military Support Element in Grenada was organized around a military police company, and included only 300 US troops in support of the CPF. The CPF became the police force for the entire island, and then turned over responsibility to a Grenadian police force. The United States made available $15 million for the Caribbean Peace Force. The role of Grenada’s former military and police forces was resolved by involving Britain with the CFP to help form a ‘renewed’ public security force.

---

58 COMUSFOR Grenada specifically requested Major Paul R. Decker, an expert on tourism, to be ordered to active duty. Decker served with the Commander in Vietnam, and was at the time Deputy Director of Tourism for the City of Philadelphia.

59 Report of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, p. 23.


Combat troops were fully withdrawn by December 15, 1983, but support elements remained. The third phase of the rehabilitation involved big projects in telecommunications, water systems, roads, landfills, sewage disposal and the schools. The Civil Affairs troops worked directly or as liaison on an extensive list of projects. Potholes were filled and 61 miles of road were cleared of vegetation. Toys were distributed. Personnel with expertise in areas such as plumbing, carpentry, masonry and electronics were selected for deployment on January 17, 1984.

**Implicit Objectives**

The official justifications for the US military action in Grenada fare poorly under scrutiny. First, although Reagan called the safety of the estimated 1,000 Americans on the island his “paramount concern,” the invasion force landed on the island not having investigated the whereabouts of the campuses of the St. George’s Medical School nor the location of its students. John Fishel argues that it was only in the mind of American officials (and even that is dubious) that there was a probable threat to foreign nationals in general and the medical school students in particular. Others have gone farther, to insist that the American military operation endangered, rather than ensured, the safety of the students. A rescue attempt implies limited objectives, and yet the Americans used overwhelming force. The level of force deployed was more suited to the larger objective, to take down a government.

Second, the restoration of democratic institutions implies a political objective. In analyses of the intervention, this dimension has been ignored in comparison to the attention given to the combat effort, except by those who have noted Reagan’s democracy promotion goals in order to

---


mock them.65 With the important exception of recent work by John Fishel, studies of the intervention have also ignored the role of civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP), the military forces that are ostensibly key to legitimization of the operation.66 American military planners understood that without combat success post-conflict operations would be unnecessary. The combat effort was the first priority, and the planning fuse was short. However, if democracy promotion were a serious goal of the venture, planning for post conflict operations would be highly developed going into the combat phase, and such planning was not evident.67

The third justification, a request by the OECS, might help to explain the inclusion of democracy promotion as a US objective. Although approximately 490 Caribbean forces participated in the venture as peacekeeping troops, they were “seen by US commanders as necessary, but operationally irrelevant, window dressing.”68 The OECS peace force was not valued so much for its post-conflict role, but for its legitimizing function. It is plausible that the US promoted democracy in the Grenada intervention so that others in the region might view the operation as more legitimate. However, the legitimacy of the OECS request as a basis for intervention is itself questionable. Isaak Dore has noted two problems with the OECS request. First, the OECS organ that would make such a request must act unanimously, but St. Kitts/Nevis, Montserrat and Grenada itself did not participate. Second, Barbados and Jamaica, who requested assistance, and the US, which answered the request, are not OECS members. Dore asks, “Can an

---


67 Fishel, “Grenada Intervention,” p. 16.

intervention be characterized as ‘collective’ (as was repeatedly asserted during the Grenadian intervention) when the invaded state is not linked to the invading state by a collective security treaty?"  

A top-down view of the military operation with respect to the stated objectives from Washington makes little sense when those objectives fare poorly upon examination. If none of the three explicit rationales fits the US intervention, what was the purpose of US military action? One factor often cited is the desire of Reagan and his officials to boost the morale of the US armed forces that had suffered since Vietnam. A more obvious answer is the desire to distract public attention from Marine deaths in Lebanon. The most obvious answer is that unrest associated with a coup in Grenada presented an opportunity for the US to send a strong signal to Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union about US commitment to dominate the Caribbean. Five days after the invasion, administration officials presented Reagan’s decision to invade as an effort to dispel the idea among allies or adversaries that the United States is a ‘paper tiger.’ The Americans signaled intolerance of growing East Bloc influence so close to sea lines of communication. As Fishel characterizes the US objectives:

They were to remove a communist government from power in Grenada and replace it with a non-communist, democratic government that would be friendly to the United States, and a responsible partner in the Caribbean. In a broader sense, then, it was to stabilize the region.

The scope of political and military objectives is much broader in Fishel’s characterization than the much more limited objective of a noncombatant evacuation as stated in Reagan’s early broadcast. It remains to examine the fit between political and military objectives over the course

---


70 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 108.

71 New York Times October 30, 1, 1:3.

of implementation, and conditions in the operational environment that might have hindered or facilitated the attainment of US goals.

**IMPLEMENTATION**

Urgent Fury has been cited as an instance in which military policy brought about foreign policy. Military leaders exercised control of the operation, meaning that political advisors supported the military operation rather than the reverse. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been 'privately reluctant' to send troops to Lebanon, publicly supported the Grenada invasion as a proper use of force. The balance of political and military control in the Grenada intervention favored the latter. Military predominance is evident in the military latitude with respect to the US media, the rules of engagement and force structure.

The US military had extraordinary room for maneuver with respect to the press. In contrast to Vietnam, where reporters had great freedom of movement, in Grenada the press was prevented from entering and violators were escorted out. Only an escorted 12 were allowed on October 27. The American media loudly protested the restrictions on press access. The responsibility for the decision was passed between military and administration officials, and finally resulted in the resignation of Les Janka from the White House Press Office.

From a study of the rules of engagement and force structure John Fishel concludes, "warfighting was the centerpiece of 'Urgent Fury'." The rules of engagement for US forces in

---


74 Fishel, p.20.

75 *New York Times* October 27, 1, 23. The Lebanon venture was seen to be more 'political' than military.


77 *New York Times* November 1, 1 17:1. Senior officers in the armed forces were willing to take responsibility for the decision.

78 p. 22
Grenada were more suited to warfighting than peace operations. Admiral Metcalf’s rules of engagement can be broken down as follows:

1. use force and weapons as may be essential to the accomplishment of the mission;
2. minimize the disruptive influence of military operations on the local economy commensurate with the accomplishment of the mission;
3. execute initial tasks readily with minimum damage and casualties.\(^79\)

Two episodes in the combat phase of the operation illustrate that the troops gave some consideration to the spirit of the rules of engagement. First, field commanders were relieved that they had decided against “prepping” Fort Adolphus with fire from tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire guided missiles, (TOW) and heavy machine gun fire when they met the Venezuelan ambassador and discovered that the unfamiliar flag flying over the fort was that of Venezuela, and the fort was the Venezuelan embassy.\(^80\) Second, Cobra helicopter pilots remained on fixed course in order to minimize collateral damage, leading to American losses.\(^81\) This same attack nonetheless destroyed a mental institution.

If the US commitment to reconstruction after intervention is going to vary with the nature of the overall military operation and the purpose of it, then it is important to understand that in Grenada, the combat component of the intervention was the primary focus for American planners. Although combat and special operations strike forces were more than adequate, there was less attention in the force structure to Military Police, Medical, Engineers, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units necessary to establish law and order, restore administrative services, and establish the conditions for the holding of free elections.\(^82\)

---

\(^79\) 22d MAU Operation Urgent Fury AAR, 15Jan84 (Grenada Files, MCDEC), cited in Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” p. 5.


\(^81\) Their approach is thought to have led to the loss of two helicopters, one shot down and the other destroyed while providing cover for a rescue mission for a soldier wounded in the first incident. The story of the action at St. George’s is compelling. A well-written account is found in Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” pp. 10-12.

\(^82\) Fishel, “Grenada Intervention,” p. 16.
Because the Reagan Administration did not conduct a 100,000-troop call-up, the Grenada intervention was a test of not only active service warfighting but also civil affairs operations without mobilization. Assets specifically dedicated to civil affairs are mostly reserve, their deployment speed for the Grenada operation was handicapped by the US system of force mobilization. According to a report of the 358th Civil Affairs brigade, a reserve component (RC) brigade that participated in Grenada, “By approximately D+4 it was evident that a clearly defined procedure was not in place for RC Civil Affairs personnel to participate in CMO on Grenada.”

The need for civilian functional specialties and cultural expertise must be met through reserve forces, which “are precluded by civilian employment, their peacetime chains of command, and regulations from taking part in various theater operations.” The location of most Civil Affairs assets in reserves was and continues to be a problem for planners, given that Civil Affairs units are some of the most frequently deployed.

Two Civil Affairs representatives from the 96th CA Battalion, the only active Civil Affairs unit, participated in a combat support role, and two officers were assigned to the CINCLANT (Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command) Joint Operation Center, but communications regarding civil military operations (CMO) did little for CINCLANT J-5. Civil military operations are more or less part of every military operation in which civilians are present. CMO as a form of combat support has been said to “reflect the wartime primacy of force

83 US Army Reserve CA units are regionally oriented. Planners must decide upon the mix of active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) CA that will be used in an operation, taking into consideration the reluctance of the National Command Authority (NCA) to issue mobilization orders as was done in the war against Iraq, to draw these soldiers away from their peacetime careers and their families.


over political objectives.” 87 By way of contrast, post-conflict CA such as humanitarian assistance
and nation assistance is then intended to bring the political back into primacy over the military.
Surprisingly then, in the report of the 358th CA Brigade, the reserve unit seems to accept having
been overlooked for CMO, but stresses the significance of Civil Affairs governmental support
operations that are conventionally associated with post conflict efforts:

...CMO in a command support role functions within the bounds of the supported
unit and does not necessarily need to call for assistance on a priority basis during
early stages of conflict.

...CA governmental support, however, is required during the first few days of a
Grenada-type operation because of the rapid advance of maneuver elements and
absence of governmental support personnel in the rear. 88

A 17-person element from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was not inserted until D+5.

Unanticipated bottom-up considerations thus emerged in the immediate post-hostilities that
impeded consolidation of warfighting success. For example, Fishel notes that “no one seems to
have given much thought to what to do with Cuban and Grenadian prisoners of war.” 89 The
political objectives Washington presented in public were problematic in the first place. Short-
term thinking about the post-conflict environment and inadequate communication did
presumably not advance regional stabilization between civilian leadership and military
commanders.

The US State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Langhorne Motley assured Congress that “there was close coordination throughout”
between State and Defense Department actors, but his assurance is unconvincing. 90 As late as

87 Barnes, Military Legitimacy, p. 167.
89 Fishel, “Grenada Intervention” p.17. The Marines established a detention center in St. George’s. The CPF
assumed responsibility for the “prisoners of war,” until US military policed relieved them.
90 Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, US Department of State, in Congress,
98th Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, “Lessons Learned as a Result of the US
October 22, military theater planners complained that the State Department had given insufficient guidance about the mechanics of evacuation, including who was eligible. The absence of an embassy in Grenada presumably hampered US interagency coordination. One of the early tasks in the wake of US military success was to establish an embassy to coordinate the influx of civilian agencies and their projects over the longer term.

A report issued by the reserve 358th Civil Affairs Brigade of CA in the “rescue operation” uses two labels to describe its operations, civil-military operations (CMO) and disaster relief. A survey of activities performed by designated Civil Affairs units in Grenada included comparatively little in the way of civil-military operations, since there was not a real forward presence of Civil Affairs units and CMO was in the hands of troops in the field. The activities of designated units are more consistent with nation assistance, in which functional expertise of Civil Affairs assets was provided to the governments that replaced the defeated PRG leaders. Certainly nation assistance is a more accurate description than disaster relief. The latter usually implies that there had been an earthquake, hurricane, famine or other such humanitarian emergency, but physical damage in Grenada was man-made.

The moniker disaster relief is furthermore puzzling because the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within the US Agency for International Development (AID) is designated by the Foreign Assistance Act as the authority to handle disaster assistance. Under the rules of the Economy Act, the military cannot provide disaster relief independently, and must be part of a State Department mission. The designation of post conflict operations as disaster relief nominally subordinates military efforts to those of civilian agencies. One can only speculate that this designation was intended to expedite the transfer of these responsibilities as quickly as

Motley’s comparison of early presence of a State Department officer with that of Robert Murphy in North Africa in World War II is audacious, given that Murphy’s role is widely regarded as counterproductive. For a description of the mess Murphy created for Eisenhower in North Africa, see Eric James Bohman, Rehearsals for Victory: The War Department and the Planning and Direction of Civil Affairs, 1940-1943 Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1984.

91 Spector, “US Marines in Grenada,” p. 3. Awaited helicopters bearing State Department officials did not arrive.
possible following the cessation of hostilities. This would be challenging in the Grenada operation because the US did not have an embassy on site at the time of the invasion.

Operational Considerations

Although it is officially called a “rescue operation,” the Grenada intervention was much more extensive in this sense than the “stability operation” in the Dominican Republic. US military objectives were broader and political objectives for stability meant more than settling a domestic dispute; they meant expulsion of communist hard (military) and soft (ideological) influence. These objectives, combined with the lack of local agents, made for an overwhelming military operation. The US set an enormous footprint upon the island of Grenada. Military forces took all strategic positions including towns with any population to speak of.

The most important consideration from the bottom-up view of the military commander was that US forces in ‘Urgent Fury’ had no on-site military allies. Without the benefit of an established military civic action (MCA) history in Grenada, military leaders had little knowledge of the island or its armed forces. As a consequence, US troops went in shooting, and actively engaged an enemy. There was a consistently identified enemy, and the Reagan Administration never wavered from its definition of threat as stemming from communist influences.

The Americans had to look hard for a viable host country regime in order to enable the doctrine of indirect rule. The political commitment to the Governor General Scoon was risky, in that the legitimization of the operation came to rest upon him, his unwavering position, and his safety. The political commitment to Scoon necessitated a rescue mission tailored to securing him. That rescue mission was a SOF mission that became bogged down until relieved by conventional line forces.

It was fortunate for the US troops that they met with a generally positive reception from civilians in Grenada. For example, on October 25 Lieutenant Colonel Amos led an assault on the

---

92 This point is emphasized in Fishel, “Grenada Intervention.”
town of Grenville, south of Pearls airport, landing in a soccer field surrounded by a high wall. The position would have been untenable if the landing were opposed, but Colonel Amos “could see the people in Grenville waving, in apparent welcome to the Marines.” Local citizens not only welcomed the Marines at both locations, they also pointed out individuals belonging to the PRA and militia, helped uncover hidden caches of arms, and even loaned vehicles to the Marines to gather the confiscated weapons and ammunition.

The Administration had promised US troops would be out by Christmas, so the Americans worked to turn over their chores as soon as possible. Despite a generally warm reception, indirect rule was not easy because few Government of Grenada officials wished to volunteer for the Post Rescue Operation. Once officials were identified, Reserve Corps (RC) Civil Affairs personnel assisted them with their agencies. It was a challenge to keep a low profile:

...the preponderance of people conveyed the attitude that they wanted RC CA people to make the decisions, or moreover to run the Government. It was a quiet (but consistent) struggle to maintain the relationship of advisors.

Although it seems that multilateralism, the role of the Caribbean Peace Force, was not viewed as an essential element, it proved to be useful to the US as the deadlines for troop withdrawal approached. Moreover, Fishel argues that the CPF had much more to offer at the outset of planning in terms of human intelligence, for example, than US leaders appreciated. The military insistence upon “operational security” may have been the reason these resources were not consulted.

95 Report of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, p. 21.
One critic has cited as an immediate consequence of the US invasion “the establishment of an indefinite American occupation of the island.” From that viewpoint, the purpose of the invasion was to consolidate a counterrevolution, and indigenous government autonomy was a fiction. The empirical fact is that regardless of who held the strings, political transition proceeded apace. Governor General Scoon appointed an Advisory Council (interim government) under Nicholas Braithwaite.

The interim government reinstated the pre-New Jewel Movement constitution but retained some judicial provisions of the People’s Revolutionary Government. Therefore, Leaders of the Revolutionary Military Council were brought to trial under their own rules and some of them hanged. “Intervention” in Grenadian affairs by regional neighbors did not end with their call to the US that launched ‘Urgent Fury.’ Amid alarm in the region at the prospect that Gairy would return to government and that party leadership would fail to form a governing coalition, Tom Adams of Barbados offered ‘mediation’ services and the New National Party was formed in August of 1984 with the Grenada National Party (led by Herbert Blaize) as its senior partner. The Blaize regime often worked around Parliament, for example, handling budget issues in cabinet. Blaize’s government reoriented governance toward a market-controlled economy and emphasized key sectors of agriculture and tourism where government support was viewed to be most productive.

US aid between the intervention and September 1986 totaled around $85 million. One of the consequences of the US intervention was a rise in expectations among the people of Grenada.

---


about development that was not met by reality. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) declined 2.9% in 1983, but rose 2% in 1984, 3.7% in 1985 and 4.3% in 1986. The US Army’s Area Handbook analysis links growing prosperity to the Port Saline airport (the “military” runway). Ironically, as the New Jewel Leaders claimed it would, the new runway actually did benefit island tourism.

The strategic outcome of the Grenada intervention may have been more satisfying to American planners than many observers assumed at the time. The relationships the New Jewel Movement established with Eastern Bloc countries were broken and US forces expelled their nationals. Grenada was integrated into the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System in 1985. US military assistance to the region in Fiscal Year 1985 was $10 million, and was the same in 1986. By 1989 Grenada would no longer have armed forces but a police force of 520. However, Grenada’s “paramilitary” force would include 80 troops, State Security Units (SSU) participating in the Regional Security System of Eastern Caribbean States. The SSU are US Green Beret trained.

LESSONS AND MODIFICATIONS

The success of ‘Operation Urgent Fury’ in Grenada seemed to exorcise some of the ghosts of previous American disasters, certainly the ghost of Lebanon and Iran, and arguably the ghost of Vietnam. The emphasis on victory, overwhelming force and military control was

100 Haggerty and Hornbeck, “Grenada,” pp. 356-357.
101 784 Cubans, 17 Libyans, 15 North Koreans, 49 Soviets, 10 East Germans and 3 Bulgarians were expelled by US forces. 24 of the Cubans left in body bags. Meditz and Hanratly (eds.) Islands of the Caribbean, p. 601.
102 Meditz and Hanratly (eds.) Islands of the Caribbean, p. 627.
103 When US Marines captured Pearls Airport on D-Day, they temporarily renamed it Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Douglas to honor a sergeant major killed in Lebanon. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald H. Spector, US Marines in Grenada 1983 Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1987, p. 9. The sign is now in the Marine Corps Museum. The Marine landing force in Urgent Fury, the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), was on its way to Beirut to relieve the 24th MAU; the latter was victim to a suicide truck bomb attack that killed 241 American soldiers. John T. Fishel, “The Grenada Intervention of 1983,” unpublished manuscript, p. 11. One week after the 22d MAU returned to ships, celebration of the 208th Marine
probably welcome in the US Armed Forces. American response to the failures of Special Operations Forces in the combat phase was not to abandon but to improve capabilities for waging rapid low-intensity conflict. Special Operations Forces that received $440 million in funding in fiscal 1981 received $2.5 billion in fiscal 1988.\(^{104}\) Sam Sarkesian identified a turning point,

by 1985 special operations and unconventional warfare had not only become fashionable again in the military services, but Congress and a number of policy makers were slowly recognizing the need for such forces.\(^{105}\)

This was a significant decade for civil affairs. Civil affairs activities and troops became part of the larger rubric of Special Operations Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff activated a Joint Special Operations Agency in 1984, and the National Security Council formed a board for low-intensity conflict. More significantly, Congress in 1986 approved the US Congress Defense Reorganization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-433) which restructured the role of the Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to the president and the service chiefs (and so helped to address the problem of interservice rivalry). An amendment by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and William Cohen (R-Maine) restructured the Pentagon’s organization for low-intensity conflict and special operations. US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a functional command specially designated for low-intensity operations, was activated in April 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.

The reorganization created the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), the current civilian oversight for operations

---


\(^{104}\) Thompson, *Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. 10.

other than war. SO/LIC is principal staff officer to the Secretary of Defense to issue administrative and general policy development guidance for the joint staff, the CINCs, and the Services. For operational purposes, OSD/SOLIC guidance is issued to the Chairman of the JCS, who relays it to the CINCs.

**Force Structure**

In 1987 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger assigned Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units to Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Following a redesign by Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), five Civil Affairs units were configured toward Foreign Nation Defense/Unconventional Warfare infrastructure development missions between 1987 and 1990. Civil Affairs units support Special Forces with advice about economic, social and political matters. In support for existing regimes in Central America, such as El Salvador, US civil-military operations were described as important “to achieve the political, social, economic, and psychological objectives of governments.”

An Army that has traditionally defined its role “as either deterring wars or fighting wars and winning them” resisted theories about counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the creation of SOCOM and the creation, within the Pentagon, of SO/LIC. Since the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment of the same year the effort has been underway to forge

---

106 Barlow, "A Planner's Guide," p. 120. The conventional support mission is nonetheless the main focus of most CA unit configurations.


108 Max G. Manwaring and Courtney Prisk, “Civil Military Operations in El Salvador,” (Quarry Heights, Panama: United States, Southern Command, February 17, 1988). Short-term, mitigating action of humanitarian assistance was judged to be ad hoc depending upon brigade commanders and long-term, developmental civic action “virtually nonexistent.” Civil defense forces met with mixed reviews, but one merit is that it would turn a town filled with “fence sitters” into one that had declared a commitment to the government.

a Special Operations Force (SOF) community under the unified Special Operations Command (SOCOM). This effort has meant putting together Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) — "white" SOF—with Special Forces, SEALS, and Rangers—"black" SOF. The latter have been viewed as the core of SOF, and the "white" forces have been regarded as "distant cousins." The inclusion of PsyOp and Civil Affairs in the Special Operations Forces has been controversial at the highest levels, and there are many Civil Affairs soldiers who also, according to Dennis Barlow, "feel the FID/UW missions are mere aberrations of the core raison d'etre for civil affairs."111

Warfighting

The warfighting lessons the Americans took from Grenada were low-intensity conflict lessons, but not appropriate lessons about the civil dimension. The American venture in Grenada in 1983 was low-intensity, by comparison with potential engagement against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, and in contrast to a US commitment in the 1980s in Lebanon, but it was not a counterinsurgency effort with strong ideological objectives. Invasion planners focused on combat and practices relating to the civil dimension were ad hoc and temporary. This was mirrored in the weak commitment to multilateralism in US policy toward Grenada and failure during implementation to capitalize on regional resources.

One might speculate here that American military planners for Grenada, ready for combat and not dependent upon large numbers of host country forces, felt themselves freed from the constraints of counterinsurgency philosophy, as in very restrictive rules of engagement and extensive, time-consuming projects to build popular support for US policy. Alternatively, the welcome afforded US troops might have been seen to vindicate this call.

110 In part because of the failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission Desert One, Nunn-Cohen created SOCOM to bring SOF command into one headquarters.

Majority approval of the American people for the US action in Grenada suggested that protection of American lives, whether a real or contrived need, was legitimate justification for the use of force. Moreover, the application of force in Grenada made good after the US disaster in Lebanon, where American soldiers were seen to have been put in unsafe positions.

In contrast to the situation in Vietnam, the rescue rationale in Grenada also suggested limited action that would be swift and decisive. Noting that many of the key Reagan Administration foreign policy officials were part of the Bush Administration, Steve Ropp expresses certainty that the positive and negative lessons on the use of force under Reagan "all seem to have had an impact on the decision to invade Panama."\(^{112}\) A major difference between the two must be noted, however. The White House publicly espoused limited objectives in the Grenada intervention but the goals of military action had more to do with regional stability and (however unrealized) Grenada’s economic and political order. The White House in Panama publicly espoused ambitious democracy-promotion objectives, but many viewed the goals of the military operation as an effort to bring one man to trial in the United States. Without a holistic approach to planning and unless the civil dimension is considered at the front end of planning (as it was not in Grenada), the prospects are not auspicious that civil affairs will serve a project as ambitious as restoration of democratic institutions.

---

The United States launched its invasion of Panama, operation 'Just Cause,' shortly after midnight on December 20, 1989. Novelist John le Carré has asked about the event, “Can you invade a country you already occupy?” Approximately one half of the 26,000 United States troops participating in the invasion were already located in Panama. The invasion effectively transformed what had been a military presence into effective control of territory, an occupation. In 1991 the Chairman of the US Congressional committee discussing the Panama invasion told his colleagues, “an invasion, like a war, creates an opportunity in its wake.” He wanted to determine how the United States had failed to seize this opportunity.

Everyone seems to agree that ‘Just Cause’—at an incremental cost of $163.6 million—was a military success. There is little surprise in the US military victory: the 24,000 or so American troops were opposed by the 15,000 member Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), of which only 3,500 were soldiers. Night assault was definitely to the US advantage. It would be reasonable to expect that an unprecedented mix of light, heavy and Special Operations Forces in

---


4 The incremental cost of the invasion is the cost beyond normal operations. Figure according to a Department of Defense estimate. The Army spent $155 million, the Navy $2.9 million, and the Air Force $5.7 million. Reported in “Pentagon Estimates Panama Costs,” Washington Post September 18, 1990, ISLA: 1062.

5 Taw, Operation Just Cause, pp. 1-2.
warfighting would be associated with problems of joint operations such as plagued ‘Urgent Fury’ in Grenada, but these did not recur in ‘Just Cause.’

In the course of ‘Just Cause’ the Americans defeated Panama’s armed forces and US Drug Enforcement Agency officials arrested Panama’s leader. These achieved goals as defined from the top-down in Washington. In the course of implementation planning, US military planners anticipated a dislocation of authority, and even prepared a discrete plan for post-combat operations. Nonetheless, a military operator’s summary characterization of the reconstruction of Panama was “band-aids on attrited areas.” Given preplanning, one would expect a better performance with respect to the civil dimension of strategy than was given. US military leaders enjoyed a favorable balance of power in US civil-military relations, and did not suffer undesired civilian intervention in the planning and execution of the Panama invasion. However, compartmentalized planning and lack of interagency coordination impeded the integration of US political and military objectives in Panama during implementation. Although the US armed forces were equipped with plans for civil military operations in Panama, those plans were premised on a different scenario than occurred in the warfighting phase. John Fishel strongly words criticism on US failure to manage a vacuum of authority in Panama City that resulted from a changed war plan:

any one who would argue that the breakdown of law and order symbolized by the looting in Panama City came as a surprise is either being disingenuous or confessing to a gross error in judgment. What is more important is the fact that invading a country, with or without the request of the government, conveys a responsibility to restore and maintain public order.

Washington espoused aims for the invasion that were incoherent when delivered to the military for implementation. American troops entered Panama with neither a fully articulated vision of democracy at the policy level nor, because Washington decided against a military

---

6 Personal telephone interview with Civil Affairs officer, April 11, 1995.
7 Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 29.
government model for civil affairs, the means to secure public safety at the operational level. The US venture in Panama thus promised Panamanians, and the American public, more than it delivered.

The first section of this chapter sets the context for the US invasion, identifying factors that shaped both the policy and the implementation. The next two sections note explicit US objectives and give a chronological account of events. The following section returns discussion to implicit US objectives, so that the implementation of US policy can be considered from the top down, and considerations of the operational environment, so that implementation can be considered from the bottom up. The chapter concludes with a look at the impact of the Panamanian experience on institutional structures relevant to the civil dimension of strategy.

CONTEXT

The 1989 US invasion ought to be viewed as one episode among many in a long and complex relationship between the United States and Panama. The driving factor in the outside portion of the causal funnel in US–Panama relations is the Panama Canal, built to meet a need for more expedient shipping passage in the Western Hemisphere. After Panama was formed by secession from the Republic of Columbia, the first flag of Panama was raised in 1903—by a member of the US Army Corps of Engineers. The United States gained sovereignty over the Canal Zone in perpetuity, according to the terms of the Hay-Brunau-Varilla Treaty, making Panama an unofficial protectorate of the United States. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, and the Hull-Alfaró Treaty that followed from it, brought about a lessening of overt US influence in the 1930s.

---

US influence rose again in the 1940s and 1950s as the Americans attempted to strengthen defense cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. In this period, the Americans negotiated two base agreements and built the School of the Americas for the US Army to train Latin American military officers. The Panamanian National Guard was established, and through it General Omar Torrijos came to power in 1968, in a coup against President Arnulfo Arias Madrid. Torrijos was killed in a plane crash in 1981 and seceded by General Manuel Antonio Noriega. The Guard was restructured in 1983 to become the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), under command of Manuel Noriega.

Richard Millett explains that the PDF was both Panama’s military and police, and controlled “prisons, customs, immigration, airports, and a host of subsidiary enterprises.”

Noriega’s role evolved from one of praetorian guardianship to increasingly severe praetorian rule. With the PDF as his main power base, populist civilian support, links to powerful American officials, and a divided civilian opposition, Noriega was able to weather a number of challenges to his rule. Noriega formed “Dignity Battalions” whose main purposes were to demonstrate personal loyalty to him and to fend of a potential “Yanqui invasion.”

A war on drugs, rather than a Cold War, seemed to have framed the US move against Panama in 1989, although it is arguable that the Cold War enabled Manuel Noriega to hold power as long as he did. The US Central Intelligence Agency and the US Drug Enforcement Agency both had developed ties with Noriega. The Reagan Administration (1980 - 1988) was

---


more tolerant of Noriega in the early 1980s, when Soviet influence in the region appeared to be on the rise, than in the later half of the decade as the Soviet Union unraveled.

The Republican administration was preoccupied in its first term with support of the Contra effort to bring down the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At the same time, the US sought to strengthen neighboring states to prevent the spread of leftist regimes.\textsuperscript{12} Mean annual US military assistance to Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) between 1985 and 1988 was $179.64 million, compared to the period between 1977 and 1980, in which mean annual assistance the region (including the above countries and Nicaragua) was only $6.98 million.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1984, the Reagan Administration signaled commitment to Noriega's regime, despite evidence that Arnulfo Arias, not Noriega's hand-picked candidate Nicolás Ardito Barletta, had won the presidential election that year. The Administration had a favorable view of Barletta, a former World Bank vice-president. The de facto result of the election was thus seen to be more stable.\textsuperscript{14} Secretary of State George Shultz attended the Barletta inauguration, effectively "endorsing the election it knew he [Noriega] had stolen."\textsuperscript{15} Noriega tossed Barletta one year later, replacing him with Eric Arturo Devalle, Barletta's vice-president. Noriega had some leverage

\textsuperscript{12} Reagan's officials made much of a linkage between Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in El Salvador. The White House embraced Guatemala after its military regime decided to relinquish control to civilians in 1985. In El Salvador, for example, US "civil-military operations" were conducted "to achieve the political, social, economic, and psychological objectives of governments." Max G. Manwaring and Courtney Prisk, "Civil Military Operations in El Salvador," (Quarry Heights, Panama: United States, Southern Command, February 17, 1988). Short-term, mitigating action of humanitarian assistance was judged to be ad hoc depending upon brigade commanders and long-term, developmental civic action "virtually nonexistent." Civil defense forces met with mixed reviews, but one merit is that it would turn a town filled with "fence sitters" into one that had declared a commitment to the government.


\textsuperscript{15} Kempe, "Panama Debacle," p. 6.
against American displeasure, because he was involved in the private Contra war undertaken by the now notorious US National Security Council staffer Colonel Oliver North and others. This also insulated him somewhat as his arms and drug dealings became more widely publicized.  

If the threat of communism was a motivation for the US to remain friendly with Noriega, it might also be true that it is precisely the absence of a significant internal or external leftist threat that accounts for a “US policy of status quoism” in Panama. According to Thomas Carothers, anti-Communists in the US had encouraged a pro-democracy US policy, focusing on bringing about elected civilian governments, where the perceived threat was greater (in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras).

The US shifted policy against Noriega’s Panama in the late 1980s at the same time that the US generally shifted focus from a communist threat in Nicaragua to another threat closer to home. Epidemic drug abuse in the United States was a major issue in the 1988 election that made George Bush president (and put a Republican in the Oval Office for a third consecutive term). At the same time that the exposure of the Iran-Contra fiasco exposed the moral poverty of Noriega’s champions in Washington, evidence mounted about Noriega’s drug involvement.

Criticism came from the American right and left. As long ago as 1978, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) argued that Torrijos and Noriega were breaking an arms embargo with Cuba and trafficking in drugs. Seymour Hersh, an investigative reporter for the New York Times, brought public notoriety to Noriega, making similar connections in June 1986. On June 7, 1987, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, a former PDF Chief of Staff, publicly accused Noriega of various

18 See Kempe, “Panama Debacle.” Helms made these arguments in order to resist ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty negotiated between President Jimmy Carter and then-leader of Panama General Omar Torrijos.
offenses including election rigging, drug trafficking, money laundering, and murder. The US cut off economic and military aid to Panama in 1987. In January 1988 prosecutors in Tampa and Miami won two indictments on charges of narcotics trafficking and racketeering against General Noriega. Senior White House officials were reportedly reluctant to speak out against the indictments:

in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal, they feared being quoted either in the next day’s newspaper or cited in a future congressional hearing for impeding justice.

The indictments forced the hand of the American Executive with respect to General Noriega. President Delvalle attempted to remove Noriega in February of 1988. The Legislative Assembly, controlled by Noriega, ousted Delvalle and his Vice Presidents and installed Manuel Solis Palma as President. During this time, the US continued to recognize Delvalle and escalated economic sanctions. The US government ordered suspension of payments of canal revenues and taxes by American companies in Panama to local authorities, and cooperated with Delvalle’s order to freeze $50 million in Panamanian assets. Short of US currency, the banking system in Panama ground to a halt. Military police and other US troops were dispatched to Panama. US psychological operations attempted to exploit restlessness within the PDF. An internal solution was obviously preferred, and Washington pursued interagency efforts to bring this about. The

---

20 Noriega was thought to have murdered his nemesis, Hugo Spadafora in 1985, and was accused of conspiring with the CIA to plant a bomb on the plane of Omar Torrijos, who was killed in a plane crash in 1981. Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 1. On the Herrera testimony’s influence see also Brook Larmer, “Panamanians Applaud Invasion,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 1989, p.3.

21 Panama had already received $26 million in economic aid and $6 million in military aid, and there was no attempt to reduce or eliminate the Reagan Administration’s planned $33 million in military assistance for the next year, leading observers to conclude that the 1987 cuts were “mostly symbolic.” Taw, Operation Just Cause, p. 4, fn. 2; Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1991, pp. 90 - 91.


24 Taw, Operation Just Cause, pp. 4 - 5.

25 Taw, Operation Just Cause, pp. 4 - 5.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also ordered US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to begin planning for a use of force against the PDF in February 1988.

Noriega survived coup attempts against him in March 1988 and October 1989. Panama City’s police chief led the March attempt, which was quickly quelled. Major Moises Giroldi, commander of the very company that had saved Noriega from the attempt in March, led the October uprising. Giroldi asked for US help, but American officials were cautious of him, and worried that his advances were a ‘dangle,’ a ploy to trick the Americans into an embarrassing situation.26 Giroldi’s attempt came much closer to success than the earlier one. US President George Bush was heavily criticized for failure to support the coup leaders, even though Giroldi had received “limited US cooperation” at the time.27 Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado) noted the failed coup attempt in a stinging critique of Bush’s foreign policy:

We should remember, first, that the Bush Administration fumbled a clear opportunity to assist the attempted Panamanian coup last October, and second, that Noriega himself is the toxic waste of a polluted Reagan-Bush foreign policy...Noriega was A-O.K. as long as he did our bidding.28

On May 7, 1989, early returns on national elections favored Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderon and Billy Ford of the Civil Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC). Noriega annulled the election. His paramilitary force, the Dignity Battalions, attacked opposition

---


27 John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 15, 1992, p. 4. According to Woodward, US troops blocked a road as requested by Gilardi’s forces, but refused the request to block the Bridge of the Americas traversing the Panama Canal, because the latter could not have been disguised as an exercise. The Commanders, p. 121.

28 “Legislators Express Concern On the Operation’s Future,” New York Times, December 22, 1989, A-20. Not all were critical of Bush’s decision to refrain from supporting the Gilardi coup attempt. Abraham Lowenthal, a leading scholar on the region, praised the Administration in a column in the Los Angeles Times. Conceding that the Panama episode was “humiliating” for George Bush, Lowenthal assured him that entanglement was best avoided. The administration was allegedly preoccupied by arms negotiations with Moscow and a visit by Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Reticence on Failed Coup Spared Us a Bigger Mess,” Los Angeles Times October 18, 1989.
candidates, and Noriega installed Francisco Rodriguez as provisional President. The United States began intensified military exercises in Panama. All US military personnel in Panama relocated to US bases, and US military and civilian dependents left Panama by executive order between May 11 and July 1, 1989. The US government announced that Panamanian-flagged ships were not to be allowed to enter US ports after January 1, 1990. Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One on May 13, 1989, Bush called upon the Panamanian people to do away with Noriega themselves. On November 3, a Justice Department report cleared the way for the FBI to make arrests abroad, clearing the way for capture of Noriega.

On December 15, 1989, Panama declared a state of war. Incidents on December 16, including the death of a US marine at the hands of the PDF, and the harassment of a US naval officer and his wife, precipitated the Bush decision, made on December 18, 1989, to authorize invasion. The US Army XVIII Airborne Corps, including paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division, conducted emergency deployment exercises on December 19. That evening, a Panamanian judge swore in Guillermo Endara and two vice Presidents at Quarters 72, Fort Clayton. Despite a team of three to four dozen in Panama dedicated specifically to tracking Noriega, the dictator was lost at 6 p.m. and his whereabouts were unknown at 11:30 p.m. the night of December 20.

---

29 Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 3.
31 Woodward, *The Commanders*, pp. 139-140. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the US military to make arrests in the United States, and was thought to be a possible impediment to action against Noriega.
34 Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 28.
Explicit Objectives

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater explained on December 20, 1989 that the United States conducted a military operation in Panama that day in order to “restore democracy to Panama, to protect American lives and to capture General Noriega and bring him to the United States for prosecution on drug-trafficking charges.” US Secretary of State James Baker added to this list a fourth rationale, namely defense of US rights under the canal treaties.

Narrative

The story of the American invasion of Panama begins almost a year before combat began, because planning for the event was under way at the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in 1988. Invading troops entered with a general plan, ‘Elaborate Maze.’ ‘Elaborate Maze’ was a family of plans that was compartmentalized, so that the Civil Affairs planners did not have access to the combat portion of the plan. ‘Elaborate Maze’ included the following elements: building up combat forces; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO); combat operations; and post-combat restoration of the Panamanian government and services. The plan was broken into two basic sub-plans, ‘Blue Spoon’ for the use of force, and ‘Krystal Ball’ for post-conflict operations. ‘Blue Spoon’ was later renamed ‘Just Cause’ and ‘Krystal Ball’ became ‘Blind Logic’ before finally being renamed ‘Promote Liberty’ upon execution.

---


38 The plan, later renamed ‘Prayer Book,’ was composed by SOUTHCOM’s Directorate of Policy, Plans, and Strategy (the J-5 directorate).

39 Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 10. “Read off” access meant also that planners returning from Panama could not discuss modification with other unit members. P.15.

40 The last element was added by the CINC, General Fred F. Woerner, after the JCS approved the initial cut. List adapted from Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 7.

41 Brigadier General Gann insisted that the name of ‘Blind Logic’ be changed, and proposed ‘Promote Liberty’ as a name that would meet with approval of the JCS. Interview with BG Gann in Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 32. Civil
Because the plans were conceived not as phased plans but as a series of separate plans, a change in the combat plan was not accounted for in the civil military operations plan.\footnote{Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 31. 'Blind Logic' had also been developed in a SOUTHCOM Directorate different from the others, by Reservists on special tours of duty, making it something of an orphan.} ‘Blue Spoon’ – the first combat plan constructed under former SOUTHCOM commander, General Fred F. Woerner – concentrated forces in Panama City, assuming that conflict would be contained there. After the failed October 3 coup attempt, the new SOUTHCOM commander, General Maxwell R. Thurman saw a broader than anticipated PDF capability. The combat plan was therefore revised to take out a large number of PDF targets simultaneously, leaving larger portions of the city uncovered than would have been under the original plan.\footnote{On planning see Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. New York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1991.}

The initial civil affairs plan followed the post-World War II military government formula, rather than an expanded version of military civic action:

> The [Commander in Chief] CINC...directed them to assume that the CINC would be in charge of military government for a period not in excess of 30 days...General Woerner assumed that he would be in charge after a military operation based on doctrine, historical precedent and the recommendation that he had made to JCS.\footnote{Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 8.}

A team of officers from the 361\textsuperscript{st} Civil Affairs Brigade, were called in to work on a full plan.\footnote{The 361\textsuperscript{st} was the SOUTHCOM CAPSTONE reserve unit called in to augment the SCJ5’s four full time Army Reserve Officers. CAPSTONE aligns Reserve and active units for training and warfighting. The 361\textsuperscript{st} was a logical choice, since they had a history of civic action operations in Panama. A disadvantage was that the teams served as volunteers for only 31 day tours. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1993, p. 20.} The lines of authority for civil military operations (CMO) went to US Brigadier General Bernard Gann, who functioned as Commander of the Civil Military Operations Task Force.
According to the Operations Order for Blind Logic (later renamed 'Promote Liberty'), the CMOTF establishes a civil military administration (CMA) at the national level to the extent required to ensure basic services to the people of Panama. Contacts are to be made with designated Panamanian leaders to insure law and order is restored and maintained and that a democratic GOP [Government of Panama] is established. Zone P TF [task force] establishes CMA in the city of Panama less Ancon District...

The concept of operation was to conduct operations in three phases: immediate, sustained and long range. The immediate phase (1) viewed operations [other than for Panama City ] as beginning at Fort Amador for most teams and moving to other towns, except for the team directed toward Panama City less Ancon District. The first phase involved assessment of government functioning, provision of essential services including “food and water, shelter, health services, public order, transportation network,” liaison with combat forces, and providing basic security. In the sustained phase (2), the plans called for establishment and maintenance of essential government services, and to determine “reliability of law enforcement assets in subareas of zone.” The long range phase (3), called for reconstitution and training of the PDF military police force on order, separation of military and police agencies, and “On order transition from

---


49 ibid.
civil administrative control, as soon as possible, but only as the area is prepared to assume that responsibility.\textsuperscript{50}

The declassified plan provides insight into how the military operationalized the political objective in Panama. According to the concept of operations for civil affairs,

The ultimate goals of the civil administration mission are the establishment of an efficient and popularly elected government supportive of US objectives; stable economic and financial conditions; and respect for law and order.\textsuperscript{51}

The package of orders was directed toward a series of teams of which an abbreviated list includes the following: public health, public works teams, public administration, economics, legal, property control, food and agriculture, civil supply, education, religious/culture, and arts and monuments. The plan called for a military police company to provide law enforcement under direction of a zone provost marshal. The detail of the civil affairs annex to OPORD 1-88 includes astounding detail, from the obvious (listings of schools and hospitals) to the mundane (the price of milk).\textsuperscript{52} The package also included a Psychological Operations annex to encourage popular support to US troops.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} ibid. In parts of the order, assumed responsibilities would be transferred to the US country team and ROP [Republic of Panama] institutions in the second stage. The "O" in ROP is consistently blacked out.

\textsuperscript{51} Annex G (Civil Affairs) to CMOTF Order 1-88, p. G-1. The paramount concern of the commander's intent in Zone D, for example, "the safety and wellbeing of all personnel in Zone D," would be met by identification and disarmament of potential adversaries, quick re-establishment of essential services, and a PSYOP campaign. "Existing government officials, at all levels," the intent continues, "will be required to continue in office and will be responsible to me for the uninterrupted continuation of service." pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{52} The Civil Affairs annex to the OPORD contains a list of newspaper, magazine, radio and television stations. In the case of radio stations, the appendix identifies frequency, new hours, and names of commentators and station owners. The plan describes check cashing procedures and lists minimum producer price supports for essential foodstuffs and consumer prices for items subject to price control (e.g. rice 0.32 per pound and milk 0.58 a quart).

\textsuperscript{53} The PSYOP annex stressed themes having to do with civil-military relations, the rule of law, the traditionally friendly relations between the US and Panama, that the US sought to minimize damage to Panamanian citizens and non-military facilities, that the good will and support of the people of Panama is a more important goal to the US than the Canal, that the US can assist Panama in development but that the future is in the hands of Panama's people, and so on. BLIND LOGIC CMOTF OPORD 1-88, Appendix 4 to Annex C (Psychological Operations), pp. C3 - C8.
Operational control of the American forces was clearly in the hands of Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and commander of the Joint Task Force South (COMJTF-SO). Above him was General Maxwell Thurman, US Southern Command’s Commander in Chief (CINCSO). Thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, Thurman’s position had greater authority than commanders in chief of unified commands had held in the past. The sorting out of command relationships stemming from Goldwater-Nichols was not fully complete in 1989, but it is clear, says Fishel, that the combatant command was greater in extent in ‘Just Cause’ than it had been in ‘Urgent Fury’ six years before. Thurman had been made USCINCSO in the late summer of 1989.

**Combat Operations**

The day before (D-1) ‘Just Cause’ members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion in the continental US were on queue for an alert. Combat operations began at H-hour of 12:45 a.m. the morning of December 20. The operations order ‘Blue Spoon’ called for simultaneous

---

54 Stiner was special operations ground commander in Sicily during the 1985 *Achille Lauro* incident. When Italian authorities refused to surrender the hijackers, Stiner shadowed the planes to Rome without permission. Woodward characterizes him as a great soldier, “As long as Stiner was not made ambassador to France, he could be handled.” *The Commanders*, p. 102.


56 SOUTHCOM J-5 personnel were called into the “Tunnel” on December 19, a secure facility in the side of a hill in Quarry Heights. Major John D. Knox, company commander, Oral History Interview JCIT 049, “Joint Task Force South in Operation Just Cause, 20 December 1989 - 12 January 1990,” Group Interview Company B, Civil Affairs Battalion, Interview Conducted 11 April 1990 at Hardy Hall, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Interviewer: Major Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment. Department of the Army XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and US Army Center of Military History, Washington DC, p.1. Cited hereafter by “speaker’s name, OHI.” General Gann in his report regretted that many of those called to the tunnel the night before the insertion of US troops were sent home because they did not have TS/SCI clearance, and few who remained were familiar with ‘Blind Logic.’ Gann, “History of Actions,” p. 85.

57 The H-hour had been set for 1 a.m., but was moved back in the last hours of preparation due to possible operational security leaks.
conventional and special forces attacks on 27 Panamanian targets. The Americans had the benefit of mass and surprise. With night-vision goggles and AC-130 gunships illuminating large areas with infrared searchlights, the Americans owned the night.

US forces were broken into four conventional task forces, the COMJTF-SO Air Component Command (ACC) and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The latter controlled six additional task forces. Close coordination was a paramount concern. US Army Rangers were scheduled to drop only one minute after F-117A stealth bombers made their runs at the PDF base at Rio Hato. 'Acid Gambit,' a special operations plan to rescue CIA operative Kurt Muse from prison in Panama, was rolled into 'Blue Spoon.' The closeness of the prison to the Comandancia meant that AC-130 'preparation' (bombing) of the Comandancia had to be carefully timed with respect to 'Acid Gambit' just before, and the arrival of infantry just after.

Helicopters arriving to rescue Muse from the Modelo Prison at 12:45 brought the first exchange of gunfire. Fifteen minutes later, report came into the Crisis Situation Room at the Pentagon's National Command Center that the commander of one of the PDF's seven military zones had ordered his units to stand down. The PDF was reportedly retreating from Albrook Air Force Station. More reports of PDF post abandonment followed.

Panamanian forces continued to broadcast from Radio Nacional, but the government television station Televisora Nacional, was taken by US troops at 2:30 a.m., about two hours

---

58 Taw, *Operation Just Cause*, pp. 9 - 10. Joint special operations task force (TF) units conducted a diverse array of missions, including a mechanized assault on the Comandancia by TF *Gator* and an attempt by TF *White* to secure the Paitilla airfield, and disable Noriega's private plane. Four SEALs were killed in action at the airfield, seven were wounded out of fifteen. TF *Red* included members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Rangers, and elements of the 4th PSYOP Group, that secured the Omar-Torrijos International Airport following a parachute assault. TF *Black* conducted four missions, including disabling a television tower and interdicting the movement of the PDF Battalion 2000 across the Pacora River Bridge. Taw, *Operation Just Cause*, pp. 7-8. Conventional operations included the following: Task Force (TF) *Pacific* blocked eastern routes into Panama City, and TF *Semper Fidelis* blocked the western approach. TF *Bayonet* took the central canal zone and hit PDF barracks at Fort Amador by air assault. TF *Atlantic* took on PDF infantry at Colón and naval infantry near Coco Solo. Others defended US housing and captured an electrical plant and the Madden Dam -- security of the dam was critical to keeping the canal in operation.
after the invasion was launched.\textsuperscript{59} The PDF took American hostages at the Marriott Hotel, these were freed by US troops on the second day of the invasion. The Comandancia was in flames by 2:40 a.m. Although the helicopter carrying Muse had crashed, the CIA man survived and made it to safety.

The chief of Panama's 5\textsuperscript{th} Military Zone sent the civilian population the message that "If we fall, all of Central America will fall."\textsuperscript{60} Carlos Duque, leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) called on the rank and file to "go out into the streets and resist the US Army invasion."\textsuperscript{61} It seems, instead, that many people cheered. As reported in the \textit{Christian Science Monitor},

Throughout the country, US troops have been greeted with cheers. On Christmas, Panamanians in Bermuda shorts and sunglasses offered food and gifts to troops blocking the road to the Vatican's embassy, where Noriega sought refuge Sunday...

In the provincial capital of David, hundreds of civilians surrounded the military garrison last Friday, watching soldiers turn in their arms and waiting for US troops to come. When 16 mostly American journalists stumbled into town instead, the crowd applauded and chanted, as though hailing conquering heroes.\textsuperscript{62}

On December 20, D-day, SOUTHCOM assumed responsibility for the new Panamanian leaders, and sent an element to the Legislative Palace to set in motion the restoration of public services. On December 21, coordination began at the Palace for the new Public Force (including procurement of new uniforms), arms and drug seizures, humanitarian assistance flights,


\textsuperscript{60} "Military Zone Chief Sends Message to Civilians," [Message from Lieutenant Colonel Luis Del Cid, chief of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Military Zone], \textit{PA 2012172789 Panama City Domestic Service in Spanish 1226 GMT 20 Dec. 89. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) FBIS-LAT-89-244}, 21 December 1989, p. 27. Del Cid surrendered on December 25 and turned his garrison over to a captain loyal to the new president, Guillermo Endara.


reopening of the Tocumen Airport, evacuation of US citizens, handling of detainees, in sum a wide ranging list from trash collection to handling those killed in action (KIA), since the morgues were overwhelmed. The following is a description of civil affairs priorities identified between December 20-22, 1989 at SOUTHCOM:

Priority one: Medical, fire fighting, water, power, communications, postal service, sanitation, and the return to work program.

Priority two: Build a national police force, weapons turn-in, and provide security for GOP officials...

Priority four: Neighborhood night watch program.
Priority five: Protection of property, and security of GOP facilities.
Priority six: City clean-up, GOP funding, GOP rebuilds PANAMA, removal of graffiti, and graves registration.
Priority seven: Print a Spanish newspaper.
Priority eight: Grass roots, [undefined]
Priority nine: Counternarcotics, military flight requests, civil aviation, human rights, and the detainee program.
Priority ten: Fuel.

Within 48 hours of the invasion, most Panamanian garrisons had surrendered without a fight. One former member of the Dignity Battalion reported that after conducting guerrilla operations against the invaders for several days, a PDF lieutenant told him to give up because Noriega had committed suicide. He suspected later that this false report was the work of SOUTHCOM-directed PsyOps.

By December 21, Pentagon spokesmen announced the cessation of organized resistance within Panama, and a shift in focus to support President Endara, to which end US forces moved into Panama City. Widespread looting was taking place in the Panamanian capitol. American

---

reinforcements arrived that day. The US Army’s 7th Infantry Division and the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade closed that morning, the latter providing command and control and police assets in Panama City. Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told that, 

...I don’t think this is a long-term operation for the reinforcements. I don’t think they’ll be there months or years, but we don’t have time lines. They probably will be there a period of time. They’ll be there long enough to get the job done.67

When President George Bush was asked at a press conference whether “we really are in a kind of open-ended military occupation there, aren’t we, sir?,” the President replied,

Well, I wouldn’t say it’s open-ended, except it’s open-ended as far as going after Noriega – open-ended in terms of the restoration of order in Panama...But we will keep whatever force is necessary there until our military are satisfied and recommend to the President that they be withdrawn. I want them out of there as soon as possible.68

Democrat Congressman Les Aspin recalled the situation in Grenada in 1983, and expected a lengthy occupation: “It would not surprise me to find that there are still certain members of the US military in Panama by Christmas of next year.”69 ‘Promote Liberty,’ the operation dedicated to the reconstruction of Panama, was still ongoing as late as 1992.70

Post-combat Operations

Civil Affairs personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs Brigade were in Panama by the morning of December 22, 1989. They anticipated staying in Panama six months; instead, they stayed only four weeks.71 These soldiers, along with Special Forces and Psychological Operations teams, were part of special task forces. These troops established a displaced civilian

---

70 Fishel wrote that “Promote Liberty” had not yet been terminated in his study published in April of 1992. Fog of Peace, p. 52.
71 OHI, p. 11. Major Knox, OHI, p. 17.
camp and relieved a group of employees of the Smithsonian Institution. The Smithsonian people and their families had been forced marched by the PDF through the jungle, but had smuggled a couple of marine band radios. Once released by the PDF and rescued by the Americans, it was the job of the CA personnel to get them shelter and food at Fort Clayton, and to help them contact their families. The officer assigned to that task later became liaison officer to the 16th Military Police Brigade. Captain Dooner, Oral History p. 12.

Other tasks included a weapons turn-in program and distributing food and relief supplies. A member of the Civil Affairs brigade recalls his experience at the Comandancia,

Initially, also, there was a bit of problem in that the battalion commander was still focused on the tactical issues and concerns, and not so much the civil affairs side. But I think that...the pressure was coming down through the JTF that we need to start looking at the nation-building needs now. He saw that and started leaning on me more and more for what I needed to do for him.

Civil Affairs personnel experienced a transition at the same time that combat troops were in transition. Disentangling the tactical units was their primary concern. As the tactical commander worried about a riot among the civilian population if food supplies were not forthcoming, at the same time he worried about apprehending the remaining PDF troops. “So he was urging us to, you know, start looking at means of food distribution,” one member of the Civil Affairs team recalls,

We had confiscated food stuffs in the following warehouses and so we needed to find out how, when, and how soon we can start distributing these items to the people to keep them from pillaging through the stores and breaking into them.

A veterinarian first had to clear the food supplies, which “required kidnapping the veterinarian from the displaced civilian camp.”

Because it was Christmas time, Civil Affairs personnel were able to confiscate Christmas bags for PDF soldiers containing food supplies and provide that food to civilians. This was

---

72 The Smithsonian people and their families had been forced marched by the PDF through the jungle, but had smuggled a couple of marine band radios. Once released by the PDF and rescued by the Americans, it was the job of the CA personnel to get them shelter and food at Fort Clayton, and to help them contact their families. The officer assigned to that task later became liaison officer to the 16th Military Police Brigade. Captain Dooner, Oral History p. 12.

73 Captain Daniel F. Jacobs (Team Leader), Oral History Interview JCIT 049, p. 9.

74 Sergeant First Class Cecil E. Roper (Platoon Sergeant) Oral History Interview JCIT 049, p. 10.

75 Major Knox, OHI p. 11. It is not clear how figuratively Major Knox was speaking, but this episode does put a new twist on “civilian supply.”
fortunate because the resupply mission from the United States was behind schedule and food
supplies would not be forthcoming for at least two weeks. US troops confiscated about a
hundred new bicycles and other toys from the PDF cache, which they distributed to children at
the distribution centers. The PDF cache was also a site for medical supplies.

Noriega was still loose days after the American arrival. On December 24, Noriega arrived
at the Papal Nuncio, the residence of the Vatican’s representative in Panama, and requested
political asylum. American troops mounted speakers outside the nunciature and blasted rock
music, in order to aggravate Noriega and to prevent eavesdropping on SOUTCOM negotiations
with the Nuncio. The Americans burned grass in the neighboring lot and shot out the lights in
the mission courtyard.

December 25, US troops occupied David, the third largest city in Panama, close to Costa
Rica’s border, without firing a shot. Panamanian citizens reportedly cheered and applauded as
US soldiers replaced Panamanian soldiers on guard in front of the garrison. When US ground
troops took out the garrison in David, the balance shifted in their favor. The PDF commander
flew a white flag and began negotiations with officials at US Southern Command. The result was
an agreement in which the PDF accepted the government of Guillermo Endara:

In return, the PDF would remain intact and help maintain order and stop looting in
the city.
As a result, hundreds of PDF troops and members of the infamous Dignity
Battalions have turned in their weapons, hoping also to pick up the $150 the US
government promised for every relinquished rifle.

---

76 SFC CHEYSOBHAN, OHI, p. 18.
This story seems characteristic of the weapons programs. The US military offered up to $5,000 cash for weapons, including bullets, grenades, pistols or automatic weapons. Civil Affairs personnel involved in the program recall that

Initially a whole lot wasn’t known about the program...I did some checking around to find out exactly who’s in charge of this thing and came to find out there was a civilian fellow...at JTF who had overall command and control of the program. He had put this document together and this plan; and it was ... somehow or other it fell through the crack and the plan was never approved—formally. And then all of a sudden I guess he took it upon himself and just started it. And then all of a sudden the general said let’s go. So initially there was at least three major turn-in points. One was at Ancon Gym, which was the outskirts of downtown. One was on the back side of Albrook Air Station [near Chorillo Fire Station]....And it was you get like fifty bucks for a hand gun; and then a couple of hundred bucks for an automatic weapon; and so much for a shotgun; so much for grenades, ammunition, that kind of thing.\(^{80}\)

By December 28 the American troops were assisting in clean-up, and were assigned to deter looting. According to the report of General Gann (SOUTHCOM’s J-5), personnel trained in CA/CMO did not arrive to take over the mission until the new year.\(^{81}\) On January 1, 1990, 114 Civil Affairs Reservists arrived to augment those already in theater.\(^{82}\) The President did not authorize a reserve call-up, so utilization of volunteers had to suffice.

In little more than a week after military action began, the US Treasury Department released some of the $375 million in Panamanian assets frozen under 1988 Reagan Administration sanctions.\(^{83}\) Inter-agency meetings on Panama featuring the State and Treasury

---

\(^{80}\) CPT Jacobs, OHI p. 12. Security for the weapons program was a paramount concern, given that these sites were a locus of both large amounts of weaponry but also cash. Those turning in weapons were given a receipt, and went to a pay site to collect. However, “a lot of them didn’t get paid. So this became a black eye for the United States Army.” The local commander stepped in and sorted things out so that those with receipts were paid. SFC Roper, p. 14.

\(^{81}\) Gann, “History of Actions,” p. 87.

\(^{82}\) These Reservists did not configure in way Blind Logic anticipated because of in-theater changes in structure. Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 36.

Departments began in the United States, as Panama dispatched economist Guillermo Chapman to engage the Panama Economic Reconstruction Committee.\textsuperscript{84}

On January 2, 1990 when the first US combat troops returned home, Noriega was still inside the Vatican mission. The dictator surrendered on January 4.\textsuperscript{85} He was taken to Howard Air Force Base, and arrested by DEA agents.\textsuperscript{86}

Although warfighting command was very straightforward, it is very difficult to sort out the command and execution responsibility for CMO in Panama. As Fishel describes it,

On January 2, there were three separate headquarters echelons in SOUTHCOM charged with the conduct of CMO-COMCTOF, in overall control of CMOTF which commanded the CATF [Civil Affairs Task Force]. This was not all, however, for under the command of JTF-South were two other organizations...with CMO responsibilities as well as the combat units (augmented by elements of the 96 CA Battalion) which also were responsible for some CMO.\textsuperscript{87}

There seems to have been something of a division of labor among the various organizations. The COMCMOTF handled what appear to have been more immediate security issues: security for Endara and the others, protection of water and power facilities, banks and government offices, reopening of the Tocumen Airport, and the establishment of a refugee camp at a high school. The refugee camp provided shelter, food and medical assistance to 1800 at the initial site.\textsuperscript{88} The CMOTF and the Civil Affairs Task Force worked on government support. CMOTF designated Civil Affairs personnel to each of the GOP ministries to assist them with restoration of public services such as health, transportation, and schools.\textsuperscript{89} After January 17,

\textsuperscript{86} Woodward, \textit{The Commanders}, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{87} Fishel, \textit{Fog of Peace}, p. 36. The postconflict mission was assigned to the Army component of SOUTHCOM, US Army South (USARSO), on December 12. The transfer to ARSO was a non-starter. On December 20, Thurman gave the job of Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF) to SCJ5.
\textsuperscript{88} Fishel, \textit{Fog of Peace}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{89} Shultz, “Post-Conflict Use of Military Force,” p. 158.
1990, the organizational structure for CMO was simplified by the establishment of the Military Support Group (MSG), explained below.

The CMOTF worked on health-related projects including mosquito control, distribution of four million dollars worth of DoD Phase IV special medication, distribution of two million dollars of Project Hope clinical supplies, distribution of five hundred thousand dollars in USAID grants for medicine and equipment, and delivery of four renal dialysis machines donated by DoD. By December 29, CMOTF personnel assisted distribution of 22 flights with 540 tons of food and medicine. They also provided security for these supplies against looting. These personnel assisted Panamanians in requesting DOS assistance with their sugar cane harvest, leading to an increased sugar quota to the US CMOTF personnel visited about one in four Panamanian schools, organized the communities to work on repairs and acquired supplies to replace looted stocks.\(^90\) By January 13, there were 2700 refugees at the camp established by US troops, and a larger camp was made.\(^91\)

Combat troops had been diverted to police duties early into the military operation. On December 22, United States Southern Command chief of contingency operations Lieutenant Colonel William Bennett told reporters in Washington that “about 3,000 of the 24,000 American troops now in Panama would be temporarily taking over police duties in the capital.”\(^92\)

Major General Marc Cisneros, Deputy Commander of JTF-South and Commander of USARSO, stepped in to establish the US Force Liaison Group (USFLG) to work on the transition to a police force. On the first full day of ‘Just Cause,’ Cisneros had seen that CMO was in difficulty. He had his Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) gather a group that included a Civil Affairs person and a logistician. It was this DCSLOG who set up the US Forces

---


\(^{91}\) Gann, “History of Actions,” p. 90. Most of the displaced were low-income former residents of the Chorrillo area, where the Comandancia containing the PDF Headquarters was also located. The area was destroyed in fire, displacing 10,000. USSOUTHCOM worked on development of the Chorrillo housing project.

Liaison Group to advise Panamanians establishing a new Public Force. The Panamanian army, thus renamed the Panama Public Force, began street patrol with US units. General Cisneros also had the USARSO civilian international lawyer organize a Judicial Liaison Group (JLG) by to work with Panama’s Attorney General’s Office and the courts in order to bring the latter back into operation.

In January of 1990 a program called “RC Cop” used a team of four – two Special Forces with language skills and two Reservists who were police officers in civilian life – to train the PNP. This program was replaced when on February 7, 1990, Congress exempted the military from Section 660 prohibitions on support of police, but renewed the prohibition on training. In order to deal with the problems of policing Panama without breaking US law, the military turned to the US Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a civilian agency dedicated to supporting already established police departments in Latin America. The PNP of 10,000 served in eight hour shifts, returning home rather than to military barracks. Their weapons included sidearms or shotguns, but some special units were equipped with assault rifles.

On January 17, SOUTHCOM established a Military Support Group (MSG), yet another ad hoc organization. The establishment of the MSG was based on a recommendation from General James Lindsay, the Commander in Chief of US Special Operations Command

---

93 Colonel Al Cornell, a former US Defense Attache to Panama, was able to advise about PDF members, and it was this advice that was followed when Endara and the two others appointed Colonel Roberto Armijo to command the Panama Public Force. Armijo, because of a Noriega taint, was found unacceptable and later replaced by Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan.


95 ICITAP was established in 1985. It advises on forensic, investigative, education and administrative functions.

The plan in use was not, concluded Lindsey, "built around the kind of organization that was needed...in order to transition from war to peace." General Lindsay wanted a structure that was entirely military. The proposal was to put under one command (subordinate to the Joint Task Force) Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Combat Service Support assets.

The MSG mission was to deal with nation building in Panama, “to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama.” MSG tasks included establishing the Panamanian National Police, reconstructing Panama’s infrastructure, using “information” to bolster public perceptions of the government of Panama (GOP) and the new police force, conducting liaison with the GOP and other US agencies. The MSG was given one year to operate, until January 17, 1991.

Latin American specialist Colonel James Steele, (selected to become a Brigadier General), had CMO experience and became the Commander of the Military Support Group, with a staff of forty members. The MSG divisions included the following: Public Force Liaison (replacing the USFLG), Civil Affairs, Military Police, PSYOP, and Special Forces.

---

97 The colonel communicated with relevant players, examined doctrine, and drew upon his Vietnam nation-building experience. Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 39.
99 His colonel initially considered an inter-agency structure modeled on the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development System (CORDS), that was implemented late on in Vietnam. Brigadier General William Hartzog, SOUTHCOM J-3 (Operations) approved a modified version of the proposal, but not before questioning the similarity between the new ‘US Military Support Group’ and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and MILGROUP (like MAAG, an embassy country team Security organization) structures of eras past. Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 39-40.
100 MSG mission statement in MSG Briefing, UNCLAS, ca. July 1990, quoted in Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 43. Neither nation building nor democracy were defined in the mission statement.
Affairs personnel under the MSG included engineer and medical specialists. The latter were deployed also to rural areas.

The CMOTF and the CATF consolidated their operations and the result became subordinate under the MSG. By March 31, the command structure for the MSG was markedly simplified. The joint patrols with the RC Cops continued between February and April, 1990. In May, the organization shifted focus of military advice from the PNP staff to ICITAP, but MSG links to the PNP continued to be strong. After ten months of joint patrols with Panamanian officers, Colonel Jack Pryor of the Military Support Group announced that US troops were getting “out of the police business.” The US scheduled joint patrols to end November 11, 1990 in Panama City, and November 28 in Colón and Chorillo.

The MSG PSYOP division was drawn from the 4th Psychological Operations Group that had been part of ‘Just Cause.’ In addition to the operation to aggravate Noriega, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force conducted a more wide ranging campaign, including loudspeaker, radio and television broadcasts, posters and leaflets, a Spanish language newspaper, and cards for the PNP inscribed with an oath of office on one side and “the Policeman’s Ten Commandments” on the other. The US Embassy later asserted its authority and insisted that PsyOps be concluded, leading this element of the MSG to be the first to depart Panama, on June 7, 1991.

---


104 The oath on the wallet cards promise to God and to country to act with loyalty, under the authority of the President of the Republic, the Constitution and the laws of Panama, in defense of democracy. The commandments (“mandamientos”) include inter alia, a promise to protect and serve the community with courtesy, dignity and respect for human rights, trying to treat each person as one would like to be treated oneself; promises against corruption, torture (even when ordered by a superior), use of arms for intimidation, use of position to gain personal favors, transportation or loans; to seek out fugitives from justice and those with illegal arms; and to use minimum necessary force and moral force only as a last recourse. My translation based upon reproduction of wallet card in Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, Appendix F, p. 99.

105 Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 49. Initially there were 48 PSYOPs specialists operating in Panama, from the 8th Battalion. This number was drawn down to 18 in April 1990. Ambassador Dean Hinton made it clear in his
The late 1980s was a time of US military confidence. Military strategists emphasized the basics of ways, means, and ends. Despite this, John Fishel would write that the planning for the Panama invasion was conducted “in a context of a partial vacuum of strategic purpose.”\textsuperscript{106} The objectives provided by the Bush administration, to protect American lives, restore democracy to Panama, arrest Noriega, and protect US canal treaty rights, have been widely criticized.

Abraham Lowenthal wrote after the invasion that it was “specious to suggest” that armed intervention could bring democracy to Panama, “spurious to argue” there was sufficient threat to American lives, and “ludicrous to contend” that the American use of force in violation of the Panama Canal treaties would preserve the integrity of those agreements.\textsuperscript{107} Many Americans believed that the 24,000 - 26,000 US troops invading Panama in 1989 were there to accomplish objective number three, the arrest of Manuel Noriega. Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley’s posed the rhetorical question of the day when he asked, “Do you send 24,000 troops to arrest somebody?”\textsuperscript{108}

Capture of Noriega is more appropriately viewed as a short-term objective. The long-term American goal was to create stability in Panama. The US was soon to leave control of the Panama Canal in the hands of Panamanians, and feared that Canal access would be hostage to Manuel Noriega’s regime. If the US could not assume that a democratic regime would be

\textsuperscript{106} John T. Fishel, \textit{The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama}. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 15, 1992, p. 4. Lt. Col. Fishel served as deputy chief of the Military Support Group’s Public Force Liaison Division in Panama. In retrospect, there is some irony in Colin Powell’s testimony during his confirmation for the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Senator Sam Nunn asked Powell about former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s criteria for the use of force. Powell’s answer was reportedly that he did not sense that the Joint Chiefs “go down the Weinberger checklist and say, ‘Ah-ha, condition number three has not been met.’” Condition number three would be that the use of force “should be carried out with clearly defined political and military objectives.” See the account in Bob Woodward, \textit{The Commanders}, pp. 117-118.


friendly to the United States, the prospects for stable relations were still better than they were with Noriega. By endorsing the Endara regime, the US also overcame some of the diplomatic embarrassment of the invasion. They could claim that they were invited to invade by the legitimate (i.e., democratically elected) government of Panama. The Americans would attempt to make the rightful, (if not de jure), leaders of Panama de facto governors of the state.

The Bush Administration explicitly cited the promotion of democracy as a rationale for the US invasion of Panama in 1989. The combat operation was called ‘Just Cause’ and the post-combat operation was called ‘Promote Liberty’: these choices exhibit strategic rhetoric’s triumph over tradition – the armed forces prior to Panama used a random but functional code naming system. However, the rhetorical objective, the promotion of democracy, proved difficult to operationalize in military terms.

IMPLEMENTATION

One might posit that the glitches in civil-military operations and civil affairs at the time of the ‘Just Cause’ stem from the absence of an institutional “champion,” since the command for civil affairs was different than the combat path. The organization of ‘Just Cause’ reflected some institutional reorganization resulting from passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. Stiner later credited Goldwater-Nichols with facilitating a clean command structure. Goldwater Nichols created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a functional command and a new ‘home’ to civil affairs; the Act also created the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). Prior to 1986, the US Army was Executive Agent (EA) for civil affairs, meaning the Secretary of the

---

109 According to Bob Woodward's journalistic account of the operation, General James J. Lindsey, Commander in Chief of the Special Operations Command, thought that the original name for the warplan, 'Blue Spoon,' was terrible. Their suggestion, 'Just Cause,' was sent up the chain of command and approved. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1991, p. 173.

Army and the Army Chief of Staff could issue guidelines for their Army field commanders on civil affairs. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the geographic CINCs, who do not report to the Army, are the locus of military operations command. The combat CINC then decides on delegation of responsibilities.\footnote{Because civil affairs is a function of command, all Services are required to support it. The Army has traditionally conducted the bulk of civil affairs chores. The Army Component might be given EA for CA by the CINC in a permanent directive, but that directive might be ignored when an operations order for a specific operation is issued by the CINC. This happened when the USMC was given the lead in Restore Hope in Somalia -- formal EA designation was ignored. Although CINCCENT assigned EA for CA to Third US Army, in Desert Storm, they maintained most CA at CENTCOM Headquarters. In the reconstruction of Kuwait, the post-conflict lead for restoration went to the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO). This technically cut CINCCENT and JCS out of the command and control chain, since the Kuwait Task Force reported through the DRAO and Secretary of the Army to the SECDEF. Personal correspondence, June 12, 1995.}

Inadequacies of US implementation of plans for the reconstruction of Panama can be traced to a list of factors. A list of these factors, loosely following Richard Shultz, follows:

1. Conceptual shortcomings as in the absence of a vision of democracy that was to follow, and contextual understanding of civil society in Panama.

2. Process errors such as arrangements to preserve secrecy during planning stages that cut relevant US civilian agencies out of the loop, and bifurcation of the warfighting and reconstruction plans.

3. Reliance upon unquestioned assumptions about the post-conflict environment.

4. Personnel shortages (especially due to deployment glitches for Reservists), eleventh hour staff changes and confusion of organizational structure.


These factors are interrelated. Inadequate attention to articulation of the strategic mission to build democracy, for example, might have been alleviated by inclusion of civilian agencies in the planning loop.
According to Bob Woodward’s account, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney replaced General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr. as SOUTHCOM CINC in July of 1989 because Woerner was not sufficiently eager to use force in Panama. When relieving Woerner, Cheney reportedly told him, “It’s a political decision.” The White House intervened, not to impose restraint on the use of force, but to put in place someone likely to use it. Inadvertently, these changes would affect the integration of political and military aims over the implementation of the segregated plans for combat (‘Just Cause’) and post-combat (‘Promote Liberty’) activities. The segregation of plans seems inconsistent with a doctrinal integration of CMO and civil affairs, support for combat and governance obligations, civil dimensions of the operation, throughout the course of a conflict or intervention. Plans for the post-combat phase did not reflect changes the new military commander made to the combat plan.

The warplan as executed under Thurman left a vacuum of US coercive force in Panama City that invited widespread looting. Civil unrest was an immediate impediment to the reconstruction of the economy and the legitimization of the Endara regime. The looting ought to have been anticipated, and there is indication that it was. In a pre-invasion meeting at the White House, General Colin Powell reportedly cautioned National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that “There will be loss of life and there will be chaos. We are going to be taking down the law enforcement operation.”

The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were characterized as extremely restrictive. US troops in Panama were instructed to use armed force as a last resort. They were to avoid combat, use


114 Woodward, The Commanders, p. 169. Powell understood that minimizing casualties, including those of soldiers asleep in their barracks, would be important to manning and sustaining US public support for the post-invasion task to put Panama back on its feet. p. 177. Woodward used direct quotations when at least one participant “specifically recalled or took notes on what was said [at meetings]. Quotation marks are not used when the sources were unsure about the exact wording.” Woodward, The Commanders, p. 32.

115 According to the US Southern Command, 202 noncombatants were killed, but human rights group put the number closer to 300. Many Panamanian civilian deaths occurred at checkpoints Laura Brooks, “Panama Probes US Troop Conduct,” Christian Science Monitor September 14, 1990, ISLA: 1052.
loudspeakers and warning shots to encourage surrender. Nonetheless, 'Just Cause' has been used as an example in which post-combat operations would have benefited from more military restraint in combat, given hundreds of civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{116} Another stain on the operation was the entry of US troops into the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador.\textsuperscript{117} Jennifer Morrison Taw credits Psychological and Civil Affairs teams with minimizing the lethality of combat,

> These teams were usually attached to the maneuver battalions and served as advisors to commanding officers, translating, acting as liaisons to the local government, assisting in controlling and supporting the huge refugee population, and assessing where assistance was most desperately needed. They also helped persuade barricaded PDF soldiers to come out of their barracks, using implicit threats (attack helicopters hovering overhead, for example), loudspeakers, knowledge of the language and culture, and sincere promises of fair treatment.\textsuperscript{118}

A gap emerged between the combat and stability phases. Taw identifies this shift between these two phases in 'Just Cause' as "one of the most problematic aspects of the operation."\textsuperscript{119} Warfighting commander General Carl W. Stiner, Commander of the XVIII Corps, similarly remembers the Panama operation as having had the benefit of a great warfighting plan, but not much of a post-conflict strategy.\textsuperscript{120} Military planners, perhaps understandably, focused on operational planning, the military action, rather than the political-military environment, where the attainment of strategic objectives would have to be realized.

\textsuperscript{116} Rudolph Barnes Jr. has characterized 'Urgent Fury' in Grenada in 1983 as a restrained use of military force causing minimal collateral damage, in contrast to a more violent combat phase in 'Just Cause.' Barnes, \textit{Military Legitimacy}, p. 141. Panamanian resident Giblerto Arosemena reports that he and his neighbors received help from US Military Police to set up barricades against looters. On December 22, they cheered as three armored troop carriers arrived, but then the US forces mistakenly began firing .50 caliber machine guns upon the residents, killing two and wounding four. Laura Brooks, "Panama Probes US Troop Conduct," \textit{Christian Science Monitor} September 14, 1990, ISLA: 1052.


\textsuperscript{118} Taw, \textit{Operation Just Cause}, p. 25.


The original Woerner invasion plan would not have produced a shortage of US troops to provide civilian security in Panama City. General Thurman changed the combat plan, but did not revisit the civil reconstruction plan. The vacuum in coercive force in Panama City was not recognized.\textsuperscript{121} Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, commander of the XVIII Corps, was instructed to absorb SOUTHCOM's Joint Task Force. The XVIII Corps had its own communications and intelligence capabilities, and "an operations staff three times the size of the CINC's staff in Panama."\textsuperscript{122} The reconstruction plan, called 'Blind Logic' at this point, was not Thurman's main concern: "I did not spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC in August," he recalled. Blue Spoon was rehearsed frequently, Blind Logic was not practiced.\textsuperscript{123}

Upon arrival in Panama in September Thurman believed,

the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic...We put together the campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.\textsuperscript{124}

The personnel shortage forced US troops to improvise. Until adequate personnel arrived, "combat units were thrust into situations where they were responsible for stability operations for which they were neither trained nor prepared."\textsuperscript{125} Compounding these problems, relief from reserves was not in sight. A hoped-for Civil Affairs Reserve call up, which required Presidential authorization to activate units for up to 90 days, never took place.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{121} Fishel says that the Corps planners treated SOUTHCOM staff as "irrelevant" p. 21.
\textsuperscript{122} When a new Joint Task Force was activated – the XVII Corps, the SOUTHCOM staff were not given much consideration. Woodward, \textit{The Commanders}, pp. 101-102.
\textsuperscript{123} Shultz, "Post-Conflict Use of Military Force," p. 152.
\textsuperscript{126} One reason advanced for this is that the director of operations (J-3) for the JCS held a dismissive view of civil affairs. See Grant Willis, "Panama: Did Politics Railroad Reserve Call-up?" \textit{Army Times}, 11 June 1990, 3, pp. 20-21.
Well into the operation the Americans attempted to innovate, but by this time a variety of other US agencies were present in Panama. General Thurman in February of 1990 called for the MSG to develop a campaign plan (CAMPLAN) or country action plan that considered the roles of not only the US military, but other US agencies operating in Panama. A resulting proposal for an integrated strategy attempted to define the process aspects of democracy in order to build legitimacy. The proposal was submitted to the US Embassy, and some elements were incorporated into the US Government program, but the attempt fell short of a holistic program.¹²⁷

Nation-building might have seemed a distant dream. Rather than building, the focus was on repairing. According to Richard Shultz, the nation-building program in Panama “would be more appropriately described as infrastructure reconstruction.”¹²⁸ Neither Congress nor civilian agencies were forthcoming with the resource support to sustain a serious nation-building effort, so the MSG drew upon active and reserve engineers to repair roads and schools.

The Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) dedicated to post-conflict duties was described as being “overwhelmed” the Embassy in “disarray.”¹²⁹ US inter-agency coordination was inadequate, and the seeds for bureaucratic turf wars were laid early on. SOUTHCOM planners did not include US civilian agencies in the planning stages, and did not integrate civil-military operations with the tactical concept developed for ‘Just Cause.’ Not surprisingly, problems emerged during implementation due to differences between military and State Department and other US civilian agency approaches.¹³⁰

Meanwhile, close relationships were established between the US military and the new government of Panama. Colonel Jack Pryor forged a close bond with Arias Calderón, protecting

¹²⁷ Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 52. Fishel attributes this to Thurman’s illness and inability to press the plan with the Embassy.


him from flying glass and ricocheting bullets when they were under attack at the National Police headquarters, and Pryor became a regular attendee of Endara’s Wednesday morning breakfast group. As Shultz writes, “US Army colonels are not supposed to become advisors to foreign heads of state and when it happened in Panama it disturbed the US Embassy…”131 The new government recognized that the military had resources to get things done expediently. By way of contrast, it was several months before US AID had personnel and offices functioning in Panama.

Had the initial Woerner expectation for military government and turnover to Embassy lead been realized, this would have eased the burden of the political-military objective on US troops. An alternative solution would have been for the US Ambassador to provide interim governance. That latter course would have been problematic, given Fishel’s observation that the planning was closely held for reasons of operational security and “no coordination with the Embassy was done except for those parts of the NEO plan which affected the Embassy.”132 As it was, the SCJ5 planners assumed that after thirty days the US Embassy would take over responsibility for supporting restoration.133 Whether the Embassy would be prepared is another question. Just prior to Just Cause, the staff of Embassy Panama was reduced to fewer than 45 US personnel.134 When asked in the fall of 1992 about the Embassy’s country team structure, Ambassador Hinton replied, “it is something I’m wondering if we have now,” and cited staff turnover and other problems.135

At first glance there was much that was right about the implementation of US policy in Panama. The rules of engagement were restrictive. There had been some forethought to the civil dimension of strategy. The forces were structured so that civil affairs were part of special

131 Shultz, Aftermath, p. 62.
135 Shultz, Aftermath, pp. 63-64.
operations task forces on the ground. Unfortunately, the operational environment after combat was problematic, and the transition was awkward. The bifurcated planning scenario was one impediment. Another was the lack of elaboration in the logic of the post conflict policy. Fishel laments that “Nowhere... had anyone defined how the end state of democracy in Panama was to look.”136 Given the clarity of operational objectives and the murkiness of strategic objectives, it is perhaps understandable if the US troops attended to operational objectives at the expense of the strategic. Those rearming the PDF as a new police force and would be as affected by the strategic murkiness as those fighting the PDF in the combat phase. Knowing that time and US resources were limited, the Americans would have to make compromises and administer band-aids that made rapid troop reduction possible.

Operational Considerations

The US set a large footprint in Panama with Operation ‘Just Cause,’ and its companion, ‘Promote Liberty.’ The country had been devastated by American sanctions beforehand. The American military effort was successful. The new government relied heavily upon the US for security and relief after the invasion. However, in contrast to a smooth and quick invasion and military victory, the tasks for US forces in Panama afterward—rebuilding economic and political institutions—would be time consuming and complicated.137 Once US troops had effectively occupied Panama, the prospects of attaining political-military objectives looked grim, and not only because US troops failed initially to capture Manuel Noriega. The country was beset by widespread looting, the new government of Panama (GOP) suffered from a credibility and control problem, and the Americans were forced to make a decision on what to do about the PDF.

136 Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 5.

137 Shortly after 'Just Cause,' Peter Bell was asked about his view that the future of US troops in Panama, not the invasion, was the more crucial, fragile situation. His reply addressed the post-conflict processes. Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, “Q&A with Peter Bell: Expert Calls Future of Panama, Not Invasion, Main Issue.” Community White Plains, NY Gannett Winchester Newspapers, January 8, 1990.
The operational environment for civil-military operations in Panama was very different from what had been anticipated. First, an eleventh hour change in the war plan from one that emphasized mass to one that sought surprise meant that large numbers of US troops were not located in Panama City in the early days of the invasion. A report issued in 1993 has criticized General Thurman’s military operation for emphasizing the destruction of the PDF at the expense of attention to the civil aspects of the missions, to establish a legitimate democratic regime in Panama.\textsuperscript{138} Indeed, earlier American planning scenarios were to support PDF troops overthrowing Noriega.

The decision to fight the PDF had been a major turning point in American planning. First, it made the combat phase more destructive. Americans did not anticipate some of the requirements for military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) that they confronted in Panama.\textsuperscript{139} Unlike a conventional battlefield in which civilians are assumed to have been evacuated, operations other than war on urban terrain must be prepared to control refugees and keep them clear from combat and at the same time not divert combat power. Combat service support has to think about the civilian population as well as its own forces, and does not enjoy the same degree of security in the rear as in an “amorphous” combat area in which the front is not well defined. US troops did not have adequate numbers in the city. Echoing the intelligence failures in Grenada, US troops did not have adequate maps to identify buildings, and were lacking some needed equipment (flashlights and wirecutters). Identification of friend or foe was very difficult.

This decision to fight the PDF also created a vacuum in the post combat phase. If the PDF and the regime the Americans supported were incompatible, then the establishment of a legitimate democratic regime in Panama depended upon eradication of the PDF. However, in the post-conflict phase, the demobilization of the PDF meant also a shortage of personnel to police the streets of Panama’s cities. Combat troops like the US Army 193d Infantry Brigade attempted

\textsuperscript{138} Carnes Lord, \textit{Civil Affairs: Perspectives and Prospects}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{139} This discussion is based on Taw, \textit{Operation Just Cause}. 
to fill the gap, and their commanders became anxious to extricate troops from police work, but access to American Reserves was limited. The use of US troops in policing did little to advance the Embassy’s policy to portray ‘Just Cause’ as a “liberation” rather than an “occupation.” Indigenous replacements had to be recruited (and screened) and trained to take over policing responsibility.

Dealing with criminals required that courts and jails be made functional. Unfortunately, millions of pages of trial documents were lost due to the invasion, causing a worsening backlog of cases from even that under the corrupt previous regime. As late as September of 1990, no jury trials had been held since the invasion, a reported 17,000 awaited processing; many were already years waiting for trial. The system had yet to try one of the 1,400 arrested after the invasion for crimes associated with the Noriega government. A wave of new crime compounded the situation.

Initial US plans anticipated a US military government in Panama, in the post-World War II model. Instead, the swearing-in of Endara, Calderon and Ford left the US forces with the burden of “making truth out of diplomatic fiction.” The New York Times reported confessions by senior officials that Endara’s success in elections in May of 1989 were insufficient to establish him as Panama’s head of state, and that Latin American nations balked at recognizing him. Endara’s delegate to the United Nations was challenged, and his Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) was rejected. “If we want to convince the Latin Americans, Endara has to get some legitimacy,” one official told the New York Times, “We’ve got to get the government functioning.” This was a tall order. The government so far consisted

---

140 PDF military barracks were located in the central courthouse in Colón, and the building was burned in fighting. The Supreme Court was sacked, “stripped even of its type-writers,” and fire-damaged. Members of the former government destroyed many documents in court offices before fleeing. Mark A. Uhlig, “Panama’s Courts Stalled by Chaos,” New York Times September 6, 1990. ISLA, 1058.

141 Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 34.

142 They were Eduardo Vallarino and Lawrence Chewning Fabrega, respectively. “US Forces Enter Central Panama City,” New York Times, December 22, 1989, p. A-17.

of three individuals who were mostly concerned with their own security and the allocation of cabinet posts among them. Richard Shultz described the Civil Military Operations Task Force Command as "unprepared to reshape the security forces, lacked a coherent organizational structure, and found itself short of personnel as the crisis unfolded."\(^{144}\)

For the time being, the CMOTF was forced to take the lead in the governance of Panama, "couching its actions in the form of suggestions and recommendations to the 'government' and the Chargé [American Chargé d'Affaires, John Bushnell]."\(^{145}\) In keeping with the doctrine of indirect control, the MSG sought always to consult with the government of Panama before attempting reconstruction projects, and to make certain that credit for positive results went to the new government.\(^{146}\) There were challenges due to a historic communication problem between different levels of government there that had to be overcome.

Internal legitimacy was slow in coming to the new Panamanian regime, and Endara's curfew order "seemed to have little if any effect."\(^{147}\) The new regime needed to gain effective control of the coercive apparatus of the state, the PDF. "Endara really needs the PDF," a senior official is quoted as saying, "both to establish control in the countryside and to show that he's really in charge."\(^{148}\) Reconciliation became significant in the drive to turn the governance of Panama back to Panamanians. The Endara government promised Noriega's backers that there would be no purge. As one Latin American diplomat pragmatically explained,

\(^{145}\) Fishel, Fog of Peace, p. 34. Fishel clarifies that relations among these groups were harmonious.
\(^{146}\) Shultz, Aftermath, p. 56.
This is a very small country and you cannot run it just with those who remain completely untainted during 20 years of military dictatorship, because that is an awfully small group.\footnote{149}

US civil military operations were assigned to support the establishment of democratic governance in Panama, but had to do so with “an essentially unreformed PDF in place and dominant, hardly an auspicious democratic beginning.”\footnote{150} The Commander’s Intent in “Blind Logic” was “to be prepared to change, on order, the PDF as a military institution.” The transformation of the PDF to a police force presented special problems that the US military was not legally empowered to handle. Section 660 of the US Foreign Relations Act prohibits the US military from training foreign police once the combat officially ended in January. ICITAP, a civilian agency, was able to step in. Most assess ICITAP as having been unequal to its task.\footnote{151} ICITAP had to deal with a police force used to belonging to a more military organization. Its mandate was extended from 1992 to 1995. Meanwhile, its presence in the field and ongoing confusion over US civilian agency and military responsibilities made a rocky course for the US assistance to reform the PDF.

The economy was another operational consideration in the post conflict phase. The US had done almost too effective a job before the larger number of troops arrived, devastating the Panamanian economy with economic sanctions. Two years of economic war wrecked havoc on the Panamanian economy prior to the invasion. US sanctions imposed in 1987 and 1988 led to a 20\% drop in growth of the gross national product between 1987 to 1989.\footnote{152} Another estimate is that there was a 20\% drop between 1987 and 1988, and a 7.5\% drop between 1988 and 1989.\footnote{153}


\footnote{150} Fishel, \textit{Fog of Peace}, p. 15.

\footnote{151} For example, Taw, \textit{Operation Just Cause}, p. 28.


A third estimate puts losses at one-third of the economy's value between 1987 and the day of the US invasion.\textsuperscript{154} International debt stood at $7 billion. Billions of foreign deposits were withdrawn from Panamanian banks.\textsuperscript{155} Unemployment in 1989 was a precipitously high 20%.\textsuperscript{156}

In addition, collateral damage from the US invasion resulted in an estimated one billion dollars in losses in housing, business inventories and capitol goods, and left 16,000 to 25,000 people homeless.\textsuperscript{157} For example, the Americans took control of the Panamanian army base in Colon, but then withdrew to the outskirts of the city. The looting that followed devastated the business center. The US and Panamanian administrations agreed to focus on private sector leadership for reconstruction. Panama had been a major banking center in the 1980s, but this sector suffered under Noriega and US sanctions. Major infusions of cash and credit would be necessary to reestablish normalcy. Transfers to the banking centers would presumably help establish Panamanian elite support for the new regime, but would presumably do little to affect most Panamanians in the near term.

Local people willing to help are critical to the mission of soldiers in these environments. Fortunately, in Panama, there are examples of this help, as when local parishes provided people "almost like a duty roster on who was going to help us on a day to day basis."\textsuperscript{158} Churches helped with language support, food distribution, and even crowd control. As US diplomats dealt with problems establishing the credentials of the Endara regime in international arenas, US troops were dealing with more mundane, but important credibility issues as to the locals upon whom they relied. Sometimes American soldiers would be told not to trust a local resource, and that information was accurate. However, the troops also received false information:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} SFC Roper, p. 16.
\end{itemize}
Just like when I was in Grenada. They did the same thing. They... used to tell us these guys... were with the PRA [Peoples Republican Army] and they could have turned them in, and they would take their jobs after they were turned in and everything.\textsuperscript{159}

In an early post-conflict environment, people tend to be concerned with immediate needs and local authority relations. As one veteran of civil affairs explained, people have a hierarchy of needs that begins with fundamentals. Those who are seen providing the fundamentals win hearts and minds.\textsuperscript{160} Democratic processes are important toward the longer term goal of a viability and legitimate government, but in the immediate sense people are concerned about crime on the street and feeding their families.

\textbf{Outcome}

The US did not meet the expectations of the new government leaders. Endara would later say,

With regard to US help, I had some frustrations that first year... We had the idea at first when we heard President Bush that we were going to get a massive dose, a jump start. Actually, we never received a jump start.\textsuperscript{161}

For 13 days in March, Endara fasted in order to draw attention to hunger, homelessness, unemployment and business ruin in Panama. Endara claimed that his fast was not directed at the United States Congress, which had stalled a $1 billion emergency aid package to Panama, but noted that if the aid were forthcoming, his strike would have been unnecessary.\textsuperscript{162} Congress finally approved an emergency aid package of $720 million in late May.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{159} Major Knox, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{160} Personal telephone interview, May 12, 1995.

\textsuperscript{161} Interview with President Endara quoted in Fishel, \textit{Fog of Peace}, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{New York Times} March 12, A, 1:3.

\textsuperscript{163} Among the Capitol Hill problems with the Panama aid package was an amendment tacked onto the bill relating to financing abortions in Washington, DC. \textit{New York Times} May 25, A, 3:1.
Opinion polls showed the people of Panama felt themselves to be no better off or worse off since 'Just Cause.' In Colon ten months after an invasion that many cheered, criminals outgunned the police, the hospital was inadequately supplied, and business owners were buying shotguns to protect themselves. A lawyer and Catholic priest told the Washington Post, “Our ‘liberators’ were not conscious of their obligations, and now we’re sitting on a time bomb.” By October of 1990, $1 billion returned to the banks (some viewed this as a sign Panama was again laundering drug money) and the economy began improving. Panama’s recovery was highly uneven, benefiting the economic elites (the ravi blancos), but leaving behind the 40% of the population living in poverty.

By September of 1991, reports were coming in that drug trafficking and use, money laundering, and crime generally were greater in Panama than before the invasion. The Endara government was concerned with foreign debt servicing and free-market reforms, and failed to address adequately issues of hunger, education and housing. Vice President Guillermo (Billy) Ford, a follower of the Chicago School monetarist economics, told the Center for International Policy delegation,

> Almost all the benefits of indemnifying losses from the invasion went to the upper and middle classes. We are not in the business of doling out welfare; we decided to eliminate ‘paternalism’ from the Panamanian dictionary.

Just as short term relief supplies were two weeks late, Capitol Hill politics disrupted the long-term funding. Instead of $1 billion promised by Bush, Panamanians had been budgeted $420,000, of which only $77,896 had been disbursed as of February 28, 1991, mostly to public investment, public sector reactivation, improving police services, and reimbursement to the

---

167 Task force on Panama Today, p. 9.
office of foreign disaster assistance. The US-provided housing for 15,000 displaced in the fire in the Chorillo area were “so skimpy that they had to put their beds outside during the day to maneuver inside.”

Expectations among Panamanian civilians were dashed as American thoughts on Panama focused on the Noriega trial in Florida. In the 1990s, Washington seemingly lost interest in the region. The Education Ministry in 1990 rewrote history books in Panama to portray the US invasion as a liberation, but by the end of the Endara presidency, the leader was participating in memorials for the US "invasion." The US spent more than $9 billion in military and economic aid to Central America in the 1980s. Panama received $420 million in 1990, but was not scheduled for aid in 1991.

Some efforts of the MSG were long lasting. Between April and August of 1990, the Fuertes Caminos 90 (strong roads) project involved engineering and other units in repair of “50 schools, 14 clinics, 70 kilometers (km) of roads, 17 bridges, and 10 other projects.” Another project called Cosecha Amistad 90 repaired another 19 schools, 7 clinics and 22 kilometers of roads. These engineering exercises established early support, they became routine and have since taken place on a yearly basis. However, an invasion explicitly intended to promote democracy has left many Panamanians with a reinforced sense of dependency vulnerability with respect to the United States. As a result of Just Cause, says Frederick Kempe,

…the United States reinforced the client-state relationship with Panama that still haunts Panama today, leaving many Panamanians viewing their country as a US

---

protectorate instead of a sovereign country responsible for its own future and for building a real democracy.\textsuperscript{173}

A report by the Center for International Policy in 1991 recommended that SOUTHCOM end its Civic Action program, arguing that it drew attention to the ineffectiveness of the Panamanian government, and was viewed in Panama as a ploy to make the US military popular enough to stay after the deadline for US withdrawal from the country in the year 2000, according to the terms of the Torrijos-Carter treaty.\textsuperscript{174}

Reform of Panamanian civil-military relations after American intervention went further than would have been possible from re-arrangements of internal coalitions or a military coup.\textsuperscript{175} Twenty percent of the 12,000-member PNP were purged in September, 1990. The official rationale was retirement, but many believed the real cause to be a combination of factors, including suspicions about reliability of some members and incidents in which the PNP used teargas and birdshot against demonstrators.\textsuperscript{176}

In early December of 1990, there was a disturbance which the Endara government called an attempted coup, and for which the US military was called in to restore order. According to Bob Woodward, Eduardo Herrera Hassan was the only PDF officer Colin Powell identified as a decent possibility when looking for a coup leader in the Spring of 1989.\textsuperscript{177} After the US invasion, Herrera served as police chief between December 20 and August, when he was forced to retire. Panamanian authorities arrested Herrera in October, alleging his involvement in a coup plot. On


\textsuperscript{176} Students were protesting economic austerity under the new government. Tim Coone, “Panama Purges Police Force,” Financial Times, September 14, 1990, ISLA: 1059.

\textsuperscript{177} Woodward, The Commanders, p. 133.
December 4, 1990, former PDF officers arrived in a helicopter arrived to free him from jail. The next morning Herrera and 100 Panamanian police ran US Army roadblocks and Marched on the National Assembly to present grievances on December 5, 1990, leading to a tense stand-off with US troops. Herrera was taken into custody by Col. James Steele, commander of the US Military Support Group.\textsuperscript{178}

One assessment of the episode is that it indicates a continuing reliance of the Endara regime on US military support. If the Endara government was unable to rule Panama on its own, it did not possess de facto sovereignty and the Endara invitation to the United States to intervene in Panama loses legitimacy.\textsuperscript{179} Another view of this episode is that it indicates the failure of ICITAP and the MSG to develop an effective policy to transform the PDF.\textsuperscript{180} The coup attempt points to the failure to recruit non-PDF members into the Public Force, so that the perceived legitimacy of the Endara regime suffered. In April of 1991 Endara fired senior leaders, including military and police leaders, and removed his vice president from his positions as Minister of Justice and Minister of Government in "what in effect is a constitutional coup."\textsuperscript{181} Robert White, President of the Center for International Policy, complained to Congress that the United States, "by its invasion, has exchanged a corrupt general for an inept and unpopular government."\textsuperscript{182}

In November of 1992, Panamanians rejected an indefinite ban on armed forces. Although polls showed support for the ban, voters rejected a package of constitutional reforms in order to


\textsuperscript{180} Fishel, \textit{Fog of Peace}, p. 51.


show disapproval of the Endara government.\textsuperscript{183} When Manuel Noriega's party was restored to power in 1994 Panamanian elections, many saw a major setback for long-term US objectives in Panama.\textsuperscript{184} Since peaceful electoral leadership transition is often cited as a sign of democratization, this election result brought some irony to American foreign policy.

**LESSONS AND MODIFICATIONS**

There had been a plan for the reconstruction of Panama, and more attention to it than in the Dominican Republic or Grenada interventions. In this sense, the US civil affairs in Panama appears to have represented an advancement. The perceived failure of the reconstruction there requires a hard second look. US problems of indirect rule in support of the Endara regime indicate that a previous election victory does not necessarily guarantee internal legitimacy. It is arguable that the regime's reliance on the US eroded its legitimacy. The United States did not have the good will of the international community to enhance the external legitimacy of the Endara regime, but would have been unlikely in any case to have raised multilateral support for the invasion. In deciding to take out the PDF in addition to its leader, Manuel Noriega, the Americans committed themselves to the establishment of the new regime and civilian security functions as well as the expected post-conflict relief effort. If the Endara regime failed to establish internal legitimacy the blame for that failure must be shared. The type of legitimacy that comes from the barrel of a gun does not promise long-term viability.

The case of the US in Panama is interesting because there was not only a plan for civil affairs, there were many post-conflict operations relevant to the civil dimension of strategy, including noncombatant evacuation, displaced civilian relief, humanitarian assistance, civic action, and administrative assistance to the host country. The US government failed, however to match the ambition of the warplan with a commitment to realizing its strategic end.


There was no shortage of US planning for Civil Military Operations in Panama, but it might be said that there were deficiencies in that planning as well as execution. One lesson from the Panama invasion is to avoid compartmentalization of planning that excludes relevant US civilian agencies. If the embassy had anticipated something more than non-combat evacuation, perhaps the State Department would have had an easier time assisting Panama with its transition. Another lesson is to avoid bifurcation of planning, that considers separately warfighting and post-conflict operations. Those who compiled the ‘Blind Logic’/'Promote Liberty’ post-conflict plans had to consider a wide range of possible conditions that could follow from warfighting, depending upon the level of resistance and the success of the US combat troops. Without access to the warplan, how would post-conflict planners know to anticipate the situation that occurred in Panama City?

The American combat footprint was larger than expected under a combat plan that would have supported a PDF coup, and this might have translated into greater leverage for the American reconstruction. However, the combat footprint was dispersed so widely that US troop numbers in vital areas were smaller than anticipated. The numbers in parts of Panama were already short, and the failure to draw upon reserves, and the limited time of volunteer tours added to this problem. The path of civilianization did not flow smoothly. If two weeks was too long for the US military to bring food relief into Panama, two months was also too long for civilian agencies to be up and running. Certainly the need for improved interagency coordination and communication is a powerful lesson from the Panama operation. A more serious lesson on the politico-military dimension is the need to have a conception of a usable peace as an end-state when democracy promotion is a given goal.

General Thurman said of Panama, “one of the lessons is that we have not been good at implementing the post-conflict termination phase...we do not teach it in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work.”\(^{185}\) This comment seems odd given that a revised civil affairs

\(^{185}\) Quoted in Shultz, “Post-Conflict Use of Military Force,” p. 151.
field manual had been published in 1984. There is doctrine. The critical question as the United States moves forward into a post-Cold War era of "Peace Operations" is how effectively that doctrine is to be used.
Case Comparison

This study of civil affairs has attempted to identify potential influences on American efforts to construct a usable peace. Although the basic process is the same in each case studied in the previous three chapters—a transition from a mode of force to a mode of policy—characteristics of the transition vary from case to case. The challenge for this chapter is to draw out points of comparison and contrast to identify factors conditioning the civil dimension of strategy that will be useful in subsequent theoretical development on post-conflict transitions.

Although such an heuristic study is not amenable to causal statements, it should indicate directions for subsequent study of causation. Therefore, the investigation of the civil dimension in these pages has attempted to include potential influences from the outer to inner-most rings of Richard Simeon's "funnel of causality." A reading of history suggests that American foreign and defense policy from above and characteristics of the operational environment from below together shape US civil affairs. This chapter begins with a discussion of contextual elements shaping US involvement. Next, the chapter turns to three general empirical questions:

1. What happens after intervention?

2. How do political motivations and military objectives interact over the course of engagement?

3. How did the operational environment make a difference in the creation of a usable peace?

The chapter turns to a broader discussion of US foreign and defense policy that considers evidence from the cases and reviews institutional changes since 1989. The chapter concludes with a discussion, based on the case studies, of US military efforts to make a transition to a usable peace after intervention.

---

Contextual features influence American goals in intervention and the requirements for post-conflict and civil dimension operations. Washington has professed desire to promote stability and democracy in the cases studied. We might expect American military strategy to focus then upon the civil dimension. Contextual factors that mitigated American attention to the civil dimension included the American assessment of threat, the availability of indigenous allies for indirect rule, trends in American defense policy, and the attentiveness of the American public to the intervention.

Threat Assessment

First, study of the three cases reveals significant problems with the use of public pronouncements of goals from the White House. If the goals stated by the White House are misleading, understanding of the problem is likewise also often ambiguous. A bottom-up analysis directs attention to the problem civil affairs is meant to address. Despite Washington’s rhetoric about limited rescue missions and expansive democracy promotion projects in the target country, we find in the case studies that Washington tended to view salient threats as outside the target country. These threat assessments make the civil dimension of secondary importance to demonstration of US resolve in the Cold War and the war on drugs. Given the security context of these interventions, the civil dimension was important in so far as a transition of US military authority to friendly and stable civilian regimes eliminated the need for continuing US military occupation.

\[^2\] The influence of the larger international security environment upon American motivations to insert troops in each case was surprisingly significant given that American theories regarding the threat in each case put the most serious dangers at arms length. These were the possibility of growing Soviet influence in the region (in the Dominican Republic and Grenada), the possibility of a threat to SLOCs (in Grenada and Panama) and the residual effects of drug-related activities upon the American public (in the case of Panama).
American fears about Cuban/Soviet expansion in the Central America/Caribbean region shaped the first two cases studied. It is necessary to conduct a more detailed measurement of threat perception in a larger number of Cold War interventions in order to illuminate the influence of international systemic forces on the extent of US civil affairs. However, such a study might build upon the insight here, that policy leaders use analogical reasoning.

US concerns in other parts of the world notably affected US actions in both these countries. The American action in the Dominican Republic took place not long after the loss of Cuba to communism. It also occurred just before the commitment of large numbers of US ground troops in Vietnam, so that President Johnson speculated what the world would expect from the Americans in Vietnam if they could not take successful military action in the Dominican Republic. The American action in Grenada took place not long after the loss of Nicaragua to the leftist Sandinista regime. It also occurred in the wake of Congressional challenge to the Executive regarding the use of troops in Lebanon. The White House evoked the Lebanon analogy in statements on Grenada. The US invasion of Grenada sent a message to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and any party who doubted US military effectiveness after the debacles in Iran in 1979 and Lebanon in 1983. American leaders linked viewed success in the Dominican intervention as a precedent for operations prepared for Vietnam.

The expansion of Soviet influence into Panama was not an American concern, except that ironically, the Americans were more likely to support rather than overthrow Noriega during the Cold War. Instead, Washington worried about both the consequences of the drug trade on American society and the friendliness of future Panamanian governments as the canal hand-over

---

3 American political leaders cited anti communist rationales to intervene in both the Dominican Republic and Grenada, but more substantial evidence that communist gains would threaten US interests was present in the latter case. The US actions in Grenada and the Dominican Republic were set in the context of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Dominican Republic, the prospect of a left-leaning Juan Bosch returning to power was unpalatable. In Grenada, a military relationship between a leftist government and Soviet and other communist states was much farther along.

approached. Panama’s leader was effectively demonized in the US popular media before the US invasion. The desire to rid the region of an unstable dictator who facilitated the drug trade and threatened long-term American access to a major shipping route seems quite simple. The American desire to build democracy in Panama, built into the very labels ‘Just Cause’ and ‘Promote Democracy’ seems much more complex. Although a strictly unilateral military action, the United States justified the Panama intervention in a language borrowed from international legal discourse. The US described Guillermo Endara as the legitimate ruler; by implication, self-determination for Panama depended upon corrective surgery to remove the dictator Manuel Noriega. The Americans under Bush were equipped with the rhetoric, if not the sentimentality, of the democracy-promotion discourse that would come to dominate its post-Cold War foreign policy.

It is telling that in all three of the interventions the Americans defined the problem as instability, but in none of the interventions was that instability attributed to socio-economic considerations. Remembering President Eisenhower’s view that diplomats lost the peace before World War II, this study suggests that US long-term socio-economic policy regarding the countries in question merits future examination to identify warning signs before soldiers are put in to regain the peace. However, judging by narrative accounts of the military interventions, short-term instability seems to have been a more salient trigger than was long-term instability. The US focused upon a violent trigger for each of the three interventions. In the Dominican Republic civil unrest and apparent endangerment of American lives gave President Johnson the pretext for a rescue mission. In Grenada there was also a pretext of a rescue mission for American medical students. In Panama, the death of an American service officer and the harassment of another and his wife by Panamanian Defense Force elements were the final straw.

---

5 In a 1993 survey on the American public’s willingness to use military force, surprisingly strong support was evidenced for foreign interventions having to do with domestic motivations, such as to stop illegal drugs coming in from abroad (82 percent), or to stem illegal immigration (70 percent). By way of contrast, fewer than 50 percent supported the use of American force to stop genocide or to protect innocents in a civil war. See discussion of the 1993 Roper survey in Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 6, November/December 1994, pp. 47 - 61, p. 56.
for President Bush. Future study might also delve into the details of regional relationships. The murder of Maurice Bishop and the specter of violence in the streets of St. George terrified Grenada’s neighbors. The appeal of some other Caribbean nations for US action contributed to President Reagan’s decision to use the opportunity to eradicate leftist elements.

*Indirect Rule*

Second, America’s historical relationship with the target country sets the stage for the size of the military footprint and the amenability of indigenous civilian leaders to US involvement. The United States had played an active role in the histories of the Dominican Republic and Panama. The US had embassies in both countries and the US military had established relations with the Dominican and Panamanian armed forces. In Panama, the Americans had a military advantage owing to prior relations, namely a tremendous foothold in the form of troop basing around the Canal Zone, including the presence in theater of the US Southern Command. Having sought for some years to find an internal solution to the problem of Panama’s Noriega, the United States had developed contacts inside the Panamanian Defense Forces, providing insight into the internal dynamics of Panamanian affairs. The Americans had the advantage of dealing with an English speaking population in Grenada, but knew considerably less about the internal politics there. The island had been for much of its history in the British sphere of influence. Given what the Americans knew in Panama and did not know in Grenada, it did not seem safe in either case to occupy a small portion of territory as the US had done in the Dominican Republic.

In part because pre-existing diplomatic and military relations were absent in Grenada, the American combat plan ‘Urgent Fury’ relied on no one. The plan set down a broad footprint of military control that presumably created a generous amount of space for US control of the post-
conflict environment. In contrast, US troops in the Dominican Republic had the advantage of both an Ambassador on the scene and a relationship with Dominican military leaders. That relationship enabled a much more limited footprint by US combat forces. In Panama, American military relations with anti-Noriega elements in the Panamanian Defense Forces augmented US human intelligence. These relationships were useful when the Americans realized that the Panamanian policing would need rapid revitalization.

Trends in US Defense Institutions and Policy

Third, American defense policy created a contextual backdrop because this policy determines the emphasis, or lack of it, upon unconventional civil dimension operations and the force structure to conduct them. The rise and fall and rise again of low-intensity warfare on the American defense agenda affected the force structure and posture in the interventions studied. Although a modified civic action program appeared most influential in Dominican intervention, counterinsurgency gained influence shortly after in Vietnam. Skepticism about nation-building was a lesson from America’s perceived counterinsurgency failure in Vietnam thus may have affected operations in Grenada. The US civilian leadership in the 1980s wanted to revitalize its approach to fighting small wars, but did not want to become trapped in the muck of unresolved conflict under media scrutiny as in Vietnam. The US military responded with an approach that emphasized victory in small wars, using ‘unconventional forces’ for ‘conventional’ operations in Grenada.

Institutional approaches to the civil dimension nonetheless evolve as civilian policymakers and defense implementers seek to learn from history. Partly in response to glitches in the Grenada operation, the American defense establishment channeled more influence through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created Special Operations Command, and enhanced linkages between civil affairs and psychological operations and the other Special Operations Forces. We might speculate that these changes played a role in the planning for post-conflict operations in the intervention of Panama (that is, that planning occurred). Unfortunately,
implementation of the civil affairs plan in Panama was problematic due to changes in the separate war plan, that sets the initial US military footprint. In other words, the US military concerns about uniformed, armed opponents again prevailed over military concern about the civil realm. Given the failure to integrate the combat and civil elements of the plan for Panama, we must assume that American institutional culture did not lend itself to thinking about the goals that would have to be realized in the civil realm—neither democracy promotion nor the less ambitious goal of stability.

Attentiveness of the US Public

Finally, the wariness of the American public about US military commitments combined with an increasingly powerful press provides another contextual backdrop. After Vietnam, Americans were suspicious of Washington’s military adventures and the American media vowed to be a watchdog rather than an agent of US propaganda. This home front civil dimension consideration acts on the one hand as a constraint on the time the troops spend in theater and even the ambition of the rationale for intervention. Certainly from the viewpoint of the watching American public, Washington’s proclamations of ‘non-combatant evacuation’ and ‘rescue’ missions in the first two cases seemed limited and perhaps benign uses of American troops.

On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, the attentive public and intrusive press seem to want the Americans to do the right thing concerning the target country. That imperative begs for ambitious proclamations about democracy promotion from Washington. It also acts as a constraint on military necessity in the theater. Troops that violate the humanity principle in the combat phase are liable to appear on television back home. No doubt to the chagrin of some, the experiment with press access restrictions in Grenada cost a White House official his job and settled the matter that the media would be yet another element for consideration in the civil dimension of military operations.
What happens after American troops intervene? The answer in this study is "civil affairs."
This study has therefore emphasized processes rather than perceived outcomes. The study of the
process nonetheless provides some insight for future study of outcomes, as discussed below.

Process Assessment

Before World War II, US military planners did not give separate attention to civil because
this aspect of military operations was viewed as part of victory in war. This study has shown how
in US history civil affairs is what happens after intervention. Civil affairs confronts the civil
dimension – the realm where civilians exert influence on military operations as partners, clients,
victims or belligerents. History teaches that civil affairs has been instrumental in the success or
failure of US operations.8

A subordinate question about what happens after intervention is, who thinks about the
civil dimension in interventions, and when? The answer to the question in the Dominican
Republic and Grenada is evident in the absence of a post-conflict plan and inadequate numbers of
troops with civilian-type expertise deployed to the field. Civil affairs was an afterthought to
combat. That is not to say that the Americans did not learn over time. For example, the US in
Grenada seemed to have learned the lesson of the Dominican Republic that information is power,
and quickly acquired radio and television assets. Nonetheless, US troops in Grenada seemed to
have put more emphasis on "mopping up" than upon reconstruction, the former being defined as
search, seizure and interrogation, and the latter defined in nation-building terms. Public
statements from the White House nonetheless acknowledged a "vacuum" of de facto indigenous
civilian authority in the wake of the invasion. Creating a usable peace meant that post-conflict
operations needed to generate order so that the improvised "de jure" regime of the Governor
General could get to its feet.

8 See the discussion in Chapter 4, in particular the failed US occupation of Montreal and successful US involvement
in the Philippines during the Huk rebellion.
A comparison of the US actions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada suggests that one can not measure the ambition of effort by professed aims. The Reagan Administration allegedly sought more in the way of democratic revitalization in Grenada than the Johnson Administration sought in the Dominican Republic, and yet the commitment to the Dominican Republic has been described as more onerous. There are at least four possible explanations. The most obvious one is the smaller size of Grenada. Another is, as Whitehead suggests, that Grenada had more human resource potential upon which to build in its political reconstruction than did the Dominican Republic. Grenada had a history of a well-functioning, democratic civil society that was easier to restore. A third possibility, subject to more investigation, is that alliance management with the Organization of American States during the Dominican intervention was more difficult than was management of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States during the Grenada intervention. Finally, it is possible that the thrust of US intervention in the Dominican Republic did not cut deeply enough, or in the right direction, to provide the Americans leverage to push reform. In Grenada, extensive “mopping up” operations at the conclusion of hostilities took many (left-leaning) individuals unacceptable to the US out of the picture of Grenada’s future democracy.

The American compromise on reform of the Panamanian Defense Forces in 1989-1990 echoes the US experience in the Dominican Republic. However, in contrast to the other two cases, US military planners not only anticipated the post-conflict transition, they developed a plan for administration of Panama down to the price of meat and potatoes. Here it seems to matter who thinks about the civil dimension. By his own admission, the combat commander in Panama did not take notice of the civil affairs plan until the imperatives of the post-conflict transition were upon him. The bifurcation of the combat and civil affairs plans meant that the use of force by US troops in combat did not create a condition (concentration of US troops in Panama City) assumed in the post-conflict plan. In the wake of ‘Just Cause,’ the implementers of ‘Promote Liberty’ scrambled to generate conditions for civil order in a rather chaotic environment. Extensive aid to civil administration for the new regime was in order, as was the
employment of military assets familiar with members of the PDF to make the first effort to reconstruct indigenous policing. Whether more far reaching reform and demobilization of the PDF was in the realm of the possible is a matter for later, more refined inquiry.

**Outcome Assessment**

This study has focused upon process rather than long-term outcome in part because it is difficult to attribute 'success,' in terms of long term liberty and prosperity in the target country simply to US intervention. For example, we can look to the most celebrated US reconstruction effort, after World War II. Edward N. Peterson has noted that the conventional wisdom on US World War II occupation in Japan and Germany has tended to make assertions about long term success for those nations:

The occupations “succeeded” and the United States deserved the gratitude of Germans, Japanese and the world for having brought peace by its military power and prosperity by its economic power.\(^9\)

It might surprise many that Peterson found a scholarly consensus that the popular association of military government with the resurgence of Germany and Japan is misleading; the conventional wisdom is but a “half-truth.”\(^10\) Peterson observes that Germany and Japan were defeated, but in possession of industrial infrastructure and human resources that made their recovery work, and that Americans have overestimated the significance of US aid. The focus on the process of civil affairs in this study differentiates among American definitions of ‘success’

---


\(^10\) Peterson’s research on policy implementation points to anti-democratic practices, poor economic policies, obsession with standard operating procedures, failures in de-Nazification, failures of interagency coordination, and general arrogance. Peterson, “The Occupation as Perceived,” p. 417.
and attempts to isolate influences to provide tools for more refined analysis of long-term outcome in future studies.

Given the multiple goals in American interventions this study has shown that ‘success’ is an ambiguous term that must be clearly defined in order to assess US policy. Future research might investigate variables besides US civil affairs that affect long term success or failure. The empirical research provided in this study suggests some directions for assessment of long term outcomes of the US interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama. Future researchers might ask why the Dominican Republic was so slow to its feet as a democratic nation after the 1965 US intervention. This study has noted evidence that the Americans did not push very hard for reform of the Balaguer regime. The US and OAS diplomats appeared to facilitate a compromise between factions in the Dominican Republic, but in military effect the resolution amounted to a victory for the status quo regime.

Grenada’s democracy fared better, but the US role there is often dismissed, as by Laurence Whitehead who wrote,

In Grenada it was possible for the United States to withdraw rapidly and comprehensively leaving a fairly broad-based multiparty democracy to function on its own. Such an outcome is likely to prove far more problematic in Panama.¹¹

Whitehead’s intuition attributes local considerations to ‘success’ of US policy in Grenada. Was the overwhelming application of US military force unnecessary? A counterfactual exercise might ask whether the United States could have supported opposition to the New Jewel leaders instead of an intervention. But that exercise should bear in mind the evidence presented in this study that the United States had few local contacts in the country as well as the evidence suggesting the scope of American military action enabled a fresh start in Grenada as compared to the Dominican case. Nonetheless, researchers interested in peace-building might identify the features of Grenada’s political culture that enabled the country to rebound from the New Jewel experiment.

We might also wonder whether American policy makers shared Whitehead’s view that development of legitimate government would be more problematic in Panama than in Grenada. The US sponsored President Endara expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the US and unmet promises of support. Did the US miss an opportunity to play a more constructive role in Panama’s democratization? This study has noted that physical attrition from the intervention, the incomplete transformation of the PDF, and the targeting of US reconstruction funding did not serve the promotion of liberty in Panama.

In sum, we might use the empirical findings in this study to more finely tune the investigation of outcomes. A more finely tuned approach ought to be more helpful to theorists and practitioners than a study that provides a series of yes or no questions about whether the US intervened and a series of yes or no questions about whether the local population later held elections. The use of empirical findings here should provide a better elaboration of both US and host country visions of a usable peace.

**Political Motivations and Military Objectives**

How do political motivations and military objectives interact? The initial public goal of the Dominican intervention was the least ambitious of the three cases examined; the initial public goal of the Panama intervention was the most ambitious. American policy goals became more ambitious regarding the civil dimension between the first case in 1965 and the last in 1989, but not more coherent. When speaking of goals, however, we must first bear in mind a differentiation between rhetoric and reality. Second, we must consider the possibility for slippage in translation

---

12 Interview with President Endara quoted in Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, p. 60. The defense force reform was unsatisfactory to many, US military forces intervened to suppress a coup attempt against the leader they installed, and Manuel Noriega’s party survived to win a subsequent election. For example, Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., *Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium*, London: Frank Cass, 1996, p. 141.

13 The focus on the banking industry reinforced perceptions of social injustice, and failed to solve the problem of money laundering in Panama. The incomplete transformation of the PDF, the coup attempt against Endara and the resurgence of Noriega’s party are blemishes on the success of ‘Just Cause’ only insofar as a deeper US postconflict involvement in social order in Panama was expected to accompany the invasion.
as the military implementers interpret policy goals. Third, we must bear in mind that the White House has on occasion shifted stated goals once the mission was in progress.

The civil dimension of strategy as defined earlier involves a set of relationships between civilian and military actors. The civil dimension in post-conflict involves not only an interface between US military implementers and host country actors; it also involves an interface between military implementers and civilian policy makers. One might view the implementation of policy as seen in civil affairs as involving two channels of authority. The first is from the leadership in Washington that establishes US foreign policy goals. The second is from the implementing agent in the field, as these agents assess the operational environment first hand and, in light of doctrinal orientation, tailor the implementation of policy.

A top-down, bottom-up analysis of implementation of civil affairs provides a view of the fit between US political and military objectives and actors over the course of the operation. Implicit, as well as defined goals factor into the way implementation is carried out and assessed.

When policy goals are established, the military forces must operationalize them in terms of military objectives. The way in which these objectives are defined and prioritized will be conditioned by the requirements of warfighting and the hierarchical structures inherent to US military command relationships. Consequently there is a potential for loss in translation between policy goals and military action. In Panama the troops on the ground were unsure what was intended by civilian leadership’s use of the term ‘democracy.’ Despite the loud complaints about civilian interference in the Dominican intervention, the military operation had an effect other than a simple interposition between two factions. The outcome of US military action in the Dominican Republic, intended or otherwise, was to strengthen the Loyalists by creating a shield for their military action against the Constitutionalists. The latter were ultimately escorted or expelled from Santo Domingo by US troops. Because the US intervention had the net effect of preventing a return to power of an elected Dominican leader, one might judge military operations as counterproductive to promotion of democracy. On the other hand, if the political goal of the
US leaders was precisely to prevent Juan Bosch’s return, military operations accorded rather well with political goals.

The magnitude of logistical considerations and the complexities of deployment authorizations make it difficult for the military to shift force structure in mid-stream when Washington decides to shift emphasis from one goal to another. The policy goals in the Dominican intervention shifted from one limited set to another. First, the goal was noncombatant evacuation, and this was accomplished with little difficulty. US troop deployment in number sufficient to occupy the Dominican portion of Hispaniola seem incongruous with that limited objective. Next, the US goal was to sustain a de facto, if not de jure, indigenous regime. Finally, the goal was changed to remain impartial amid two belligerents in a civil conflict as a negotiated solution was sought. These were not in themselves difficult goals for the military implementers to operationalize, but in succession they presented problems. Moreover, General Palmer remembers some variance between publicly stated and actual missions. The former was simply “to protect American lives and property;” the latter was “to prevent another Cuba and, at the same time, to avoid another situation like that in Vietnam.”

The goals of the US intervention in Grenada in 1983 would not have been any more ambitious than in the Dominican Republic in 1965 if they had been limited to the rescue of American students, but the military action did not stop there. One might expect sustaining a de facto regime as in the Dominican Republic to be more difficult than replacing a de facto governing regime in Grenada (holding constant the difficulty of taking territory upon entry). Certainly, American post-conflict operations throughout its history have emphasized indirect rule, the utility of local leadership, for this reason. To stabilize the Caribbean region, as John

---

14 The eleventh hour negotiation of permissive entry for US forces into Haiti in 1994, for example, created a crisis for military personnel in charge of the chain of transport of equipment and personnel to the theater.

15 Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p. 55.

16 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 6.

17 Note that earlier it was suggested that it would be easier to establish viable and legitimate government in Grenada because the mopping up enabled a fresh start. That proposition can be placed against the proposition that it is easier and/or more effective to support an existing regime in a study with a larger number of cases in future
Fishel describes the US goal, was more ambitious. This required conducting a military intervention in such a way that the Americans would leave behind friends willing to work with other Caribbean leaders toward an integrated security force against leftist threats.

The US goals in ‘Just Cause’ in Panama in 1989 were said to be to “restore democracy to Panama, to protect American lives and to capture General Noriega and bring him to the United States for prosecution on drug-trafficking charges.” If the American goal in Panama was simply to arrest Manuel Noriega, this goal was modest. By linking capture of Noriega to engagement with the Panamanian Defense Forces, the US attempted a more ambitious goal. Given that the US intended at first to demobilize the Panamanian defense forces, US goals in Panama were more ambitious than the demobilization effort in Grenada. The ambition to promote democracy in Panama involved the deepest commitment yet. As mentioned, however, it was unclear to military personnel implementing policy on the ground how this democracy was supposed to take shape, who was to be responsible for it, and what resources were to be made available to nurture it.

**THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

How did the operational environment make a difference in the peace that followed? A comparison of the Dominican intervention and the invasions of Grenada and Panama reveals some interesting ways in which more or less pre-existing features made a difference in terms of civil affairs. First, as noted above, cooperation with local authorities can make the military job

---

empirical research. James Meernik attempted to test the hypothesis that when the United States opposes the pre-intervention regime, promoting democracy will require (and presumably be met with) “more compelling change (i.e., Grenada and Panama).” However, his operationalization of opposition as “anti-US sentiment” expressed as “nongovernmental violence directed at US citizens” is inadequate, as he concedes. It seems more plausible to me that if the people are favorable toward the US, American postconflict measures to promote democracy will be better received. The key is that the New Jewel regime in Grenada was opposed to the US, but the public was welcoming. James Meernik, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33:4 (1996): 391-402, pp. 398-399.

---

US troops received the most cooperation from local officials in the Dominican Republic, the country that was slowest to take on attributes of a liberal democracy. Second, long-term entrenchment of the Panamanian Defense forces in many aspects of society made reform of that institution especially difficult. Grenada, by contrast, had a smaller military, and there were few American reporters around to monitor US troop conduct toward them.

Third, the complexities of social and economic relations were greatest in the case of Panama. Ironically, Panama was the country that received the most attention to the civil dimension and the country whose leadership was the least satisfied with American post-conflict reconstruction. One of the many intriguing research issues raised by the case comparison is this whether Panamanians complained more vociferously about US failure to provide for them after ‘Just Cause’ because they expected more from “government”? Although US field manuals refer to international legal requirements to restore civil life, these international regulations were constructed before the advent of the welfare state. Given the differences in the size of the two, and hence the scope of government, administration of Panama was a more daunting prospect than administration of the island of Grenada.

Fourth, the degree of internal division in the country might matter less than the way the divisions are handled by American intervention forces. Like most US foreign interventions, the interventions examined in this study followed domestic disturbance in the target country. This context in one sense creates an opportunity for outside intervention to make a difference. The Americans seemingly reset Grenada’s political climate by removal of the New Jewel leadership. The US attempted to navigate the cross-currents of Panama’s elite leadership and military factions but a coup attempt against Endara indicates not everyone was pleased with the post-invasion regime. The viability of change resulting from foreign intervention presumably depends in part upon the local populations perception (at least in the near term) that US control is

---

19 A consistent role for dedicated US Civil Affairs personnel has been to identify leaders and to gather information about loyalties. A critical determination, according to one veteran, is the basis of the local people’s loyalty to certain leaders. Were the people truly supportive of that leadership, or were they simply trying to survive?

preferable to indigenous anarchy. The existence of civil unrest might on the other hand draw the US in no deeper than is needed to provide short term stabilization, hence the short-term commitment to Grenada.

Finally, the post-conflict environment in which US military forces move may be largely a function of the society itself, but it is also partly created by the US forces themselves. There are several ways in which the footprint of the insertion of forces creates its own opportunities and its own constraints. Large numbers of troops and high attrition create both more US influence and more damage to be addressed in reconstruction activities. Much US post-conflict reconstruction energy in Grenada and Panama was spent repairing damage relating to the violence of the intervention itself. For example, the US had wrongly destroyed a mental hospital in Grenada, and in Panama an entire neighborhood was destroyed by fire and its population needed to be fed and sheltered until alternative housing was made available. Fires and widespread looting in Panama did not constitute an auspicious start to 'Promote Liberty.' The devastation of war creates risk and opportunity for the invaders. Resentment of the local population will hurt the prospects for their cooperation, reporting guerrilla forces, for example.

On the other hand, there is a view that “the strongest bonds are created under duress.” A political psychology research effort on vulnerability and cooperation might make an effective compliment to analysis of military occupation generally. It seems fortuitous for the Americans that, despite resentment of the United States in the region generally, the civilian populations in each country were generally cooperative with US troops. Their cooperation appears to have been a function of two factors. The first is the level of uncertainty, violence and economic deprivation (due in part to US sanctions) prior to the entry of American soldiers on the scene. After months of sanctions, for example, the arrival of US troops – not by coincidence do they distribute chocolates to children they encounter – might be received by the population as indication that relief is in sight. More investigation into the interplay of economic sanctions and military

___

intervention is needed. The second is a willingness to hope that the Americans would bring humanitarian aid along with military force, leaving it to the US to prove their intentions after arrival. It may also have made a difference that Panama and Grenada were service economies (the canal and banking in Panama, tourism in Grenada), and more thorough economic analysis is needed to determine whether certain types of economies bounce back from intervention more quickly than others.

If an external actor takes on too much of the administrative burden of governance during military occupation, indigenous civilian leaders might rely upon the outside party but not accept responsibility for continuing projects, including reform projects. Civil affairs teams in Grenada and Panama recalled resisting the impulse to take charge of matters that should be in the hands of local civilians. The Americans perhaps had expertise and material resources, but local officials would be ultimately responsible for their own affairs as civilianization progressed. In-fighting within Endara’s government had more to do with pre-existing relations in Panama, but it focused the attention of those essential partners away from post-conflict reconstruction at a time when US military advisors were hoping to speed the transition to host country rule. The evidence is inconclusive here. On the one hand, extensive involvement in civil governance may facilitate reconstruction in the short term, but develop long-term dependence. Conversely, if it is true that new democracies are most vulnerable, a transition to civilian rule that is too rapid may solve a short-term crisis in establishing civil order, but endanger long-term liberalization.

The process of civilianization includes a transition to host country rule, as noted, but also a simultaneous process of transition of post-conflict responsibilities to US State Department and other US officials. This second process puts these other agencies into the operational environment for civil affairs. Military operations in ‘Just Cause’ had more autonomy with respect to the White House than in the Dominican intervention. But in contrast to the situation in the Dominican Republic, effective leadership from the US Embassy in Panama was not forthcoming.

---

22 Existing literature on economic sanctions tends to view sanctions as an alternative to the use of force, rather than as a ‘force multiplier.’
in the immediate post-conflict phase in part because of the secrecy of the plan. Meanwhile, US civilian agencies were attempting to set up operations and coordination with ICITAP, AID and other US programs created headaches for the military element.

**Multilateralism**

In Grenada and the Dominican Republic, there seems to have been another process besides civilianization, namely a *multilateralization* of operations. Multilateralization of the military operations in the Dominican Republic and in Grenada took place as OECS and OAS peacekeeping contingents came to ease the burden of policing for US troops.\(^{23}\) The mix of civilian and military actors in the operational environment, and the mix of multilateral forces constitute something like a “character” of the military footprint. At the policy level, it must be noted that Washington made little more than token gestures toward multilateralism in defining the purpose and international legitimacy of these missions.

US collaboration with regional organizations fell short, before and after the invasion of Grenada, as it did during the Dominican intervention. The US failed to consult about the Grenada invasion with Canada and Britain, close allies with interest in the region, and appeared, in the wake of the invasion, to have manipulated the mechanism of Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Again, as in the Dominican Republic, the failure to take multilateralism seriously translated into a taint on the overall legitimacy of the operation and inefficient employment of regional talent during the operation.

Multilateral and US government partners add coordination to the burden of civil affairs. US cooperation with the Organization of American States in the Dominican intervention produced an interesting dilemma. At the political level, this cooperation put pressure on the Americans to find a negotiated solution to the instability in the Dominican Republic. At the military level, the American forces were in a position of having to persuade General Alvim of

---

\(^{23}\)In both cases, the United States brought regional allies in after the combat phase. Despite participation by other military forces, the American military effectively held control of operations in the Dominican Republic and Grenada.
Brazil that leftist forces in the Dominican Republic be met with restraint rather than attempted eradication. The participation of the Organization of East Caribbean States peacekeeping forces in Grenada presented the Americans with an opportunity, an unexploited opportunity according to John Fishel, to bring to bear regional expertise. Instead, OECS cooperation reflected both the policy predilections of other Caribbean leaders who had sought eradication of the leftist junta in Grenada, and the military security trend to bring regional military forces into closer working relationships.

The US military personnel involved in the post-conflict transition in Panama enjoyed the seeming luxury of unilaterism.

US FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

The way in which any state constructs its interests, even a great power like the United States, ought to be considered not only in light of geopolitical concerns, but also with respect to the civil dimension of strategy as it plays out at home. In other words, even as Commander in Chief of the most capable military in the world, an American president is limited to construct American interests in terms that the American Congress and the American people will accept.

The American structure of governance imposes restraints on the US Executive. Congress has power to influence foreign policy if only by embarrassment, as seen in the Iran-Contra hearings of the 1980s. The power to authorize or withhold funding authorization is a critical lever of Congressional power. Fact-finding missions and hearings kept Congress in the know regarding the interventions, but as we saw in Panama, not necessarily persuaded to release funding for post-conflict projects.

---

24 This is Michael Howard's "societal dimension of strategy."

25 Interests tend to be defined with respect to capability, lest commitments exceed material resources or sustainable will. For example, changing the order of things in Grenada, with a population around the 100,000 mark, must have appeared to American leadership to be well within US capabilities.

26 Although Congress exerts more significant power to affect the Executive on domestic policy projects, Congressional influence in the domestic arena can serve as a bargaining tool in the foreign policy arena when Congress is displeased with the Executive.
Congress also produces legislation that shapes the structure of the US defense establishment that copes with the civil dimension, as in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Senator William Cohen, who told the US Senate in 1986 about a “a new form of warfare,” was one of the influential actors behind the Defense reorganization.\textsuperscript{27} The Act emerged in part from a climate of frustration with interservice rivalry that came to the fore in review of joint operations during ‘Urgent Fury.’ Congress attempted to push military and White House leaders toward a more expansive set of options for dealing with low-intensity conflict. Congress legislated a new path of military advice to the White House, strengthened the position of combat commanders in chief (CINCs), and organizational changes in the Pentagon that led to the incorporation of designated civil affairs units within the framework of Special Operations Forces.

US foreign and defense policy was not only attempting to shape the outcomes of US involvement in the three cases, but was also responding to lessons of these engagements, and the more wrenching experience of Vietnam. Authoritative analyses of the foreign policy belief structures of American elites have portrayed the Vietnam War as a watershed event leading to a breakdown in consensus.\textsuperscript{28} As anti-war protests and draft resisters challenged American executive leadership, decision-making elites were also divided about American involvement in that war. Jerel Rosati and John Creed summarize the consequence for the executive office as follows:

\begin{quote}
In the years before Vietnam, the problem was that the president could lead, but only in the direction of a fervent anti-communism emphasizing the role of force; today, it is difficult for a president to generate leadership in any direction for a
\end{quote}


sustained period. This explains why no post-Vietnam president has been able to restore a consensus in thinking about US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{29}

Congressional leaders, in the wake of Vietnam, sought to put greater constraints on presidential use of force. Presidents sought to work around institutional constraints, and to sell military action in terms that the American public would accept.

For their part, military leaders sought to set the terms of the use of force, and embraced the pronouncement of Reagan's Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984: 1) that military commitments should be restricted to matters of vital US interest; 2) that manpower and resources support should be sufficient to complete the mission; 3) that political and military objectives to US forces be clearly defined; 4) that there be a reassessment of the match between commitment and capabilities and necessary adjustment; 5) that elected officials and the American people support the commitment of US forces; and 6) that US forces be sent to combat as a last resort.\textsuperscript{30} After Vietnam, sustained nation-building commitment struck the US military as futile, inadequately supported by the home front, or both. Rather than slow conventional escalation, the new warfighting emphasis was upon quick victory. Setting the terms for the use of force also implied more operational control for the military, as discussed below.

The widely criticized Dominican intervention which preceded the major American commitment to Vietnam was perhaps as much a warm-up for the elite debate at home as it was for the armed forces about to engage North Vietnam in combat. Pre-positioned Military Assistance Advisory Groups in the Dominican Republic and the use in general of psychological and civil affairs operations, might at a cursory glance suggest counterinsurgency thinking was


operative there. While it is true that United States counterinsurgency thinking was under
development when the situation in the Dominican Republic deteriorated, the Dominican
intervention itself was not a good test of counterinsurgency. The situation did not call for
comprehensive counterinsurgency given that the Americans intervened before insurgency had an
opportunity to establish there. Moreover, US military commanders during the intervention tended
to view civil affairs activities as post conflict chores that were not emphasized early on the way
they would have been in a protracted counterinsurgency effort.

The strategic discourse at the time did have another effect, and that was upon American
civil-military relations. Civilian political leaders were encouraged by counterinsurgency and
limited war discourse in vogue during the 1960s to exercise more control over military
operations than they had done in previous, large-scale conventional conflicts like the previous
two world wars. Military leaders expect political authorities to set strategic objectives, even to
determine units to be deployed. However, President Johnson alienated many in the armed forces
in his attempt at direct control over military activity and operations and his exclusion of his
principal military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from critical meetings about military
issues. 31 US military relations with civilian leadership and with a newly intrusive press were
soured during the Dominican intervention.

The Dominican intervention opened also a “credibility gap” that would impair
presidential latitude in foreign policy, as academics and political leaders charged Johnson with
“arrogance of power” and misrepresentation of US intentions in the Dominican Republic. 32 The
issue of the Johnson Doctrine in the Dominican intervention created moral hazard for the
international legal scholars and practitioners who defended it. 33 President Johnson evoked the

31 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara often acted as a liaison between the JCS and the White House.

32 Senator William Fulbright charged Johnson with exercising the “arrogance of power.” Johnson released a CIA list
of alleged communist agents but the list contained duplicate names, individuals who were dead, in jail or out of
the country. Yates, p. 172-173.

33 My appreciation to Professor David Kennedy, as he presented me with the significance of the Dominican
intervention for the discipline of international law in this light, not unlike Richard K. Ashley’s portrayal of the
significance of the advent of nuclear strategy as a moral hazard for scholars of security studies.
communist menace in the Dominican Republic, but too many at home—perhaps dissatisfied with the stalemate in Korea and wary of administration intentions in Vietnam—were unconvinced.

Many of the perceived lessons of the Dominican intervention about media relations, rampant interventionism and political intervention in military operations became more prominent in Vietnam. Added to this was “a turning away from virtually anything that resembled counterinsurgency...” so that Special Forces and other low intensity conflict units were associated with the errors of Vietnam.\(^{34}\) For example, the 1976 army field manual FM 100-5 did not include three chapters on “sublimited war” that had been included in a previous version written during the Kennedy era.\(^{35}\)

Several outcomes of the American experience in Vietnam were relevant to the course of American foreign policy in general and the interventions in Grenada and Panama in particular. First, public relations requirements for US military actions were recognized. This implied gaining domestic support for action and, pursuant to that, the need to control or manipulate media coverage of American military action. Hence, we find press censorship in Grenada about which the press complained loudly. In Panama, press access was improved but channeled through more sophisticated executive and military public affairs machinery. Fourth, Vietnam fueled the armed forces resistance, as noted, to civilian interference in military operations.\(^{36}\) The perception of presidential interference in military operations in Vietnam had left a lasting impression. ‘Urgent Fury’ in Grenada was in contrast, a military show.

---


Second, the US had tried, and failed, to win hearts and minds in Vietnam, making counterinsurgency strategy and incremental use of conventional military force suspect in military circles. Third, the War Powers Act passed by Congress in 1973 limited the executive's room to insert US troops abroad.

Military operations in Grenada and Panama ought not to be confused with a revival, in the wake of Vietnam, of counterinsurgency thinking in the United States armed forces. Sam Sarkesian has warned that the broad rubric of low-intensity conflict led to a tendency to conflate special operations like hit and run raids, hostage rescue and spearhead operations with the counter-revolution work of Special Forces. The requirements of revolution and counter-revolutionary conflict are less well met by rapid, mobile firepower; they involve protracted engagement on economic, military and psychological fronts. In both Grenada and Panama, special operations served as short-term combat support. There was no protracted guerrilla conflict, no protracted struggle to win the hearts and minds.

Public and military skepticism about presidential authority and meddling in the internal affairs of other states combined with the War Powers Act to help shape what the Americans would commit to Grenada and Panama. Neither was an incremental insertion of force, both were rapid. In both events, the United States went in with sufficient numbers to blanket territory with American military control. That they did so quickly is significant: the American public and the Congress were presented with essentially a fait accompli in each invasion. The country tends to rally around the decision, once made, to use force. American timing had to be rather exact in order to avoid losing popular support. The short duration of combat was essential for several reasons internal to American politics including civil-military relations in light of the military's preference for overwhelming force, the executive's narrowed latitude with Congress, and the American public's intolerance for sustained involvement. These interventions had to be decisive as well as quick.

---

37 Sam Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, pp. 159-160.
Because Presidents seek to avoid reserve call-ups, civil affairs operations tend to work from what in baseball would be called a shallow bench. Ninety-five percent of US dedicated Civil Affairs assets are reserve, as opposed to active, military troops.\textsuperscript{38} Even civil affairs operations, it seems, have to be decisive and quick.

\textit{Doctrinal Revisions Since Panama}

Since Panama, US military doctrinal revisions have made more detailed differentiation among types of civil affairs operations, most notably a distinction between civil-military operations and civil administration support. In contrast to early versions, the later civil affairs field manuals construct a strategic rationale of civil affairs operations in reference to the operational continuum and the principles of war.\textsuperscript{39} Within the rubric of civil affairs operations, two supporting missions are delineated. Civil Affairs units plan and direct \textit{civil-military operations} (CMO) to support the mission commander in fulfilling responsibilities to the host country civil government and economy. It is clear in the 1993 field manual that CMO are directed as support to the military mission. In contrast, support to civil administration is meant “to stabilize a foreign government.” \textit{Civil administration support} involves the US military in civilian government. (See Figure 10)

\footnote{The skills of nation building are best maintained, and paid, in the civilian sphere.}

\footnote{The commanders of Special Operations Forces (SOF) for example, “especially apply the principles of war [objective, maneuver, offensive, mass, economy of force, surprise, security, unity of command, simplicity] to CA [civil affairs] operations since SO [Special Operations] are more sensitive to nonmilitary factors than are conventional operations.” (1-5)}
According to the 1993 Army Field Manual, “nonmilitary sources such as international aid organizations, may help Civil Affairs personnel in DC operations.”\textsuperscript{42} Civilians are segregated from enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian internees (CIs).\textsuperscript{43} Military police (MP) units handle issues such as movement of EPWs and CIs and establish camps. The population is

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS} & \textbf{SUPPORT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION} \\
\hline
\textbf{Populace and Resources Control (PRC)} & \textbf{Civil Assistance} \\
"denies the enemy resources and access to the population" & "to provide life-sustaining services, maintain order, and control distribution of goods and services" \\
\hline
\textbf{Foreign Nation Support (FNS)} & \textbf{Civil Administration in Friendly Territory} \\
to acquire goods and service locally\textsuperscript{41} & "reinforces or restores a friendly government" \\
\hline
\textbf{Humanitarian assistance (HA)} & \textbf{Civil Administration in Occupied Territory} \\
to lessen suffering & "when military necessity or directives require the Army to establish a temporary government in a US-occupied area" \\
\hline
\textbf{Military Civic Action (MCA)} & \\
"to enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and image of a foreign government or military" & \\
\textbf{Civil Defense} & \\
to deal with emergencies and restore essential services & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{40} Columns represent the differentiations made in the text of US Department of the Army Headquarters, Field Manual No. 41-10 (FM 41-10) \textit{Civil Affairs Operations}, Washington, D.C. 11 January 1993, p.1-2. Quotations are from that text.

\textsuperscript{41} The ability to supply locally requires that local supplies be identified, negotiated for and acquired. FNS shortens the logistics tail. This mission is vital to combat service support (CSS), particularly as the US moves to continental US-based defense (CONUS). In some cases there are specific agreements. The term Host Nation Support (HNS) is used in relation to some friendly governments based upon agreements and usually is procured “before forces arrive in theater.” (10-3) For example, HNS in the Pacific theater is called friendly allied nation support FANS, in NATO it is called civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). See pp. 10-2 to 10-6.

\textsuperscript{42} ibid., 10-7

\textsuperscript{43} CIs are “considered security risks or need protection because of committing an offense against the detaining power”(10-7)
considered by US policy to be the responsibility of the civil government in which they are found. There are two broad categories of civilians: "those who stay put and those who are dislocated."\(^{44}\) Dislocated persons have left home for a variety of reasons and can interfere with military operations.\(^{45}\)

Humanitarian assistance includes a variety of short-range relief programs (disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian and civic assistance (H/CA), nation assistance and DC operations).\(^{46}\) These programs are run from the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Humanitarian Assistance, and are primarily meant to support host national civil authorities or agencies.\(^{47}\) Both the host nation and USAID must review the project and certify that it compliments but does not duplicate other assistance projects.

Military civic action projects are usually military to military and unlike the H/CA projects noted above can benefit military and paramilitary forces. Mitigating MCA projects are those that emphasize short-term benefit. Developmental MCA projects are long-term and focus on infrastructure like building farm to market roads, irrigation systems, immunization programs, training local medics, building schools, training teachers, providing texts, work on harbors, airfields, railways, and so on. An extensive list of criteria for these projects must be addressed before they are undertaken.

\(^{44}\) ibid.

\(^{45}\) Movement control of DCs is complicated, involving selection and identification of routes, establishment and operation of control and assembly points, emergency rest areas and coordination with local and national agencies. Evacuation planning is more involved still, including transportation, security and documentation elements, provision of a briefing, rations, health care and eventual return. Civil Affairs units may establish camps, avoiding the vicinity of potential military targets like communication centers or other military installations.

\(^{46}\) Noncombatant evacuation operations are directed toward US citizens. The lead agency for NEO is the US Department of State (DOS) and each US embassy keeps a plan for NEO. An evacuation may be permissive, with the help of the host country, semipermissive, where there is some opposition from within the affected nation, or nonpermissive, in which forced entry is necessary (for example, the US Embassy in Saigon evacuation in 1975).

\(^{47}\) Chapter 20, Title 10 of the US Code—Humanitarian and Other Assistance is the "permanent authority for H/CA." Section 401 provides for humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations, Section 402 provides for transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries. The program procedure crosses the boundaries of tactical, operational and strategic levels. The regional commander administers the Title 10 H/CA program. Projects are nominated by US military personnel (engineers, medical or CA) or by the Host Nation through the country team. The nomination would then go to the theater representative for review and consolidation, and upward to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for formal approval.
Support to civil administration involves specialized military involvement directly in executive, legislative or judicial functions of the civil administration of the affected nation. The post-Panama field manual provides several options for enemy government: 1) to proceed with the previous governing regime, establishing reforms; 2) to bring new people into an existing government; 3) to replace the defeated government entirely. The 1985 civil affairs manual warned that the last option 'would necessitate a protracted occupation and a deep commitment by the occupying power.' These words are not repeated in the 1993 manual. Another interesting point of comparison is the change between 1985 and 1993 in wording that describes conditions for removing a previous regime. The 1985 manual says,

This course should be adopted only as a last resort. It should be necessary only if the old regime has completely collapsed, or if it is so hostile or such a threat to the peace that it cannot be allowed to exist.

In subtle contrast, the 1993 version reads:

Replacing the existing government and building a new structure is the most drastic [course of action] COA. The occupying power should adopt this COA only if the old regime has completely collapsed or is so hostile or poses such a threat to peace and stability that its continued existence cannot be tolerated.

In keeping with doctrine proclaimed (but not implemented) early this century, the 1993 Army field manual for civil affairs noted that

The US military's goal is to establish a government that supports US objectives and to transfer control to a duly recognized government as quickly as possible.

This may not be possible due to factors on the ground. For that reason, the US military has become increasing attentive to developing a clear statement of its obligations, and to involve civilian agencies wherever possible. In contrast to US implementation of de-Nazification

---

48 Civil Affairs FM 41-10 (1985) p. C-11
49 Civil Affairs FM 41-10 (1985), p. C-11
50 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations 11 January 1993, 11-5.
51 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations 11 January 1993, 11-4.
programs after World War II, the US insisted at Dayton upon host country civilian implementation of provisions to capture alleged war criminals. Although the theory of political reconciliation through transitional justice retains its status, its mechanisms have changed.

**Making Transitions**

Reflecting upon the cases, how did the US military construct and implement an idea of a usable peace? The experiences reviewed here show that the military leaders wished for defined missions, but their thinking did not generally extend beyond the battle plans. In the aftermath of hostilities, different visions of a usable peace were pursued. In the Dominican Republic, this vision incorporated pre-existing leadership and military forces on a path to reform that would thwart Cuban efforts to export Communism. In Grenada, this vision had to do with elimination of that leadership and the development of a regional security structure. In Panama, that vision included a military force capable of defending the Canal but it did not include General Noriega. These visions were all military-strategic, and along the way they involved US military forces to differing degrees with the societies concerned.

American civilian leadership set a foreign policy context for civil military operations. Playing perhaps to a domestic audience, liberalizing goals were more strongly proclaimed in each intervention. Civil affairs success in a given operation might certainly be considered in light of those goals, and the reasonableness of them. The United States armed forces may have had reasonable understanding of the military culture of the Dominican Republic and Panama, but it is not clear that this was sufficient. Political leaders who expected quick fixes and that all good things would follow from a free and fair election seemed not to have done much reflection on the outcome. As in past conflicts (see chapter 4), senior civilian and military US leaders seemed to ignore the civil dimension in advance of the use of force.

The debate in the 1980s to prepare the military to fight low-intensity conflicts was probably not intended to revive interest in nation-building type chores that had been out of favor since Vietnam. The Reagan Administration sent US military advisors to Central American countries with agendas to rework societies, but these largely worked quietly and indirectly
through local authorities. As such, the American military continued to be concerned with the civil dimension. However, American influence was more difficult to measure.

The more quickly the Americans were victorious, the more quickly the civil dimension came to the fore. Looking forward to the American refusal to occupy Iraq after the mid- to high-intensity conflict of the Gulf War, and extensive American involvement in the reconstruction of Kuwait, it becomes clearer that context matters for the decision to shape the peace. Occupation of Iraq was likely seen as a horrific prospect, and one that would have been perhaps unpalatable to American allies.

Civil affairs issues in the 1990s only expanded in complexity as the invasion of Panama seemed part of a dying genre of unilateral and predominately military controlled post-conflict environments. In future, coordination of US military operations with multilateral partners, host country actors, and US civilian programs gained greater significance as missions themselves became murkier.
Conclusion

Dwight Eisenhower believed that the soldier's job is to regain the peace. The story of the US civil affairs and the application of the concept in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama illustrates US military attempts to create a peace congenial to US national interest. United States leaders sent US military forces to address instability. The civil realm has been a factor in mission success or failure, particularly when civilian leaders espoused liberalization as a goal of military intervention. Since 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet threat, the civil dimension has become more prominent. This study has provided a base of research that will be helpful to examination of American attempts to meet civil dimension challenges in the 1990s and beyond.

American civilian leadership called upon the US armed forces to perform many more operations other than war since ‘Just Cause’ in Panama in 1989. For example, the US military Civil Affairs conducted reconstruction in Kuwait after the Gulf War against Iraq. The Armed Forces delivered relief during ‘Provide Comfort’ in Northern Iraq and during Operation ‘Sea Angel’ in Bangladesh in 1991. Operation ‘Provide Hope’ in the former Soviet Union and Operation ‘Provide Promise’ in Sarajevo followed in 1992. In Somalia in 1993-94, US operations ‘Restore Hope’ and ‘Provide Relief’ focused on the civil dimension, as did US operations in Rwanda in 1995 and in Central America in 1997. Tremendous complexity and scope are characteristic of these missions. They are typically multilateral interventions and as such, are weighted with another layer of civil-military relations. The armed forces operate under very restrictive rules of engagement, but in fluid situations as in Somalia, these operations sometimes include combat action. The involvement of US armed forces involvement in peace operations has been controversial.

---

This concluding chapter reviews the argument developed in the study so far. The discussion focuses upon the civil dimension and the nature of conflict. The chapter will conclude with discussion of avenues for future research considering recent developments.

**The Civil Dimension**

Clausewitz defined war as a continuation of policy by other means. This study arose from a genuine curiosity about the use of American 'military' action for 'political' purposes. Even if US troops are successful in taking territory, what follows from that? Military victory, Dwight Eisenhower seemed to insist, must be accompanied by a vision of, and a movement toward, a usable peace. This study has attempted to illuminate a transitional process from a mode of force to a mode of policy and peace.

The processes of war and peace are often considered in isolation, as if these terms are dichotomous. We know that complex policy processes at play in the decision to go to war, and the decision to sign an armistice agreement, but it seems that less is known about how processes of war and peace might interact. In one sense, the Clausewitzian formulation of war as a continuation of policy has conveniently put war in terms amenable to social scientific study. Policy drives the use of force, and the challenge to social scientists is to uncover the policies that lead to the use of force. Why not, then, investigate the uses of force that lead to policy?

For Clausewitz, the use of force must not only serve policy, it must lead back to it. This idea has not been widely recognized, and his formula has been only partly utilized. In civil-military relations, the Clausewitzian formula depicts a hierarchical relationship between institutions —military institutions must be subordinate to civilian, political institutions. In conflict spectrums, the Clausewitzian formula depicts a progressive relationship from policy as a mode of behavior to force as a mode of behavior. This study advanced earlier a theory based on Clausewitz, that incorporates something of both interpretations. According to this theory, the relationship between policy and force is hierarchical, in the sense that militaries and the use of force serve civilian leadership and policy purposes and it is progressive, in the sense that modes of policy become modes of force in war. However, the relationship between policy and force is
also *reciprocal*, in the sense that the end to which force is employed is peace, therefore the mode of force gives way over the course of engagement to a mode of policy.

The study then turned to material processes from which we might advance understanding of the conceptual, namely, civil affairs in completion of the Clausewitzian cycle. What happens in the transition zone between combat and troop withdrawal? In US defense policy, the key process is civil affairs. Civil affairs is in one sense a shorthand for US military interface with the other, civilian realm. On the other hand, civil affairs is embodied in a set of teachings, or doctrine, developed over a long history of American military encounters with the civil dimension of strategy.

The civil dimension of strategy is a concept this study has developed to describe the interface of civil and military aspects of conflict. At its most commonplace, the civil dimension is present in a US military engagement that requires soldiers to issue authoritative direction to civilians, as in civil-military operations that remove civilians from combat zones. At its most complex, the civil dimension of strategy is present in US military engagement that requires soldiers to advise indigenous leaders of a new regime in a manner that promotes American values of democracy, rule of law, civilian control of the military, and market economics. When US Army leaders lament that they won in Vietnam but lost at home, they refer to another dimension of the civil dimension of strategy, the base support from their own society for military operations abroad.

Because the civil dimension is a function of relationships between civil and military spheres, it is historically situated. These spheres are socially constructed and social relations are not static. Public attitudes towards and expectations of their armed forces, for example, have differed over time with the development of military institutions and the relative size of military forces in relation to them. Warfighting methods have changed over time, and these changes have made the civil-military interface in conflict assume different forms. In total war the home base logistic support was of prime strategic relevance. The Americans used massive force and viewed enemy populations as strategic threats due to participation in military-industrial production. In
operations other than war on urban terrain, Americans attempt discrete use of force in light of noncombatants mixed into the ‘battlefield.’

Having a sense that the civil dimension is historically situated, a review of past experience and doctrine helps to define the civil affairs processes under investigation. Most revealing is the longevity of the expression civil affairs, but the very different forms it has assumed, in American history.

From the Revolutionary War, civil affairs has been instrumental to military procurement and the American Army conducted military government after victory. Immediately, this historical review shows that civil affairs is not only a post-conflict issue, but one to be considered in the midst of hostilities. The US made some differentiation in the Mexican War in the 1840s, between purposes of military authority over civilian populations, whether defensive or offensive. The Americans thus applied martial law where military authority was used to support civil government and military law was applied where military authority supplanted civilian authority.² Likewise, the Lieber Code developed in the American Civil War set apart rules of military occupation for temporary control as opposed to the permanent control or annexation. The Lieber Code promoting the laws of war and peace in the Civil War was an important step in the development of military doctrine on civil affairs. Here the historical review reveals an interrelationship between legal rules and norms and the practice of civil affairs. The law of military occupation in the first Hague Convention in 1898 drew upon the Code developed by the Americans in the Civil War. This legal rubric identified two principles in tension in war that are fundamentally tensions of the civil military interface. These are the principles of military necessity and humanity. Leiber’s attempt to balance these interests can be directly traced to subsequent international regulations. As these regulations were promulgated, they fed back into the civil dimension by legitimizing civilian expectations of military regard during operations.

American military doctrine provides excellent insight into the civil dimension of strategy. It records how the US armed forces approached problems relating to civilians. The Hunt Report after World War I described American unpreparedness for the scope of military government requirements in Germany. Military government in declared occupation after interstate war was the dominant framework for the civil-military interface and an instrumental framework for transition to a new order. Civilianization – the transfer of military responsibilities to civilian agencies, and indirect rule – the use of local leadership and transfer of responsibilities to them – are two fundamental procedures in American doctrine.

The development of an Army field manual on military government in the Second World War was very much predicated upon an assumption of military rule after victory. The print was barely dry before military schools found potential problems for their doctrine. A civil-military division of labor debate emerged over State or War Department responsibility for civil affairs. The American sense that profound social changes were needed in occupied territories – again, a civil dimension of strategy – was also seen early to conflict with international regulations that required preservation of the status quo ante by occupying forces who were, in the legal view, custodians of the occupied order for sovereigns in exile. The premise of military rule also called for a semantic modification after World War II. It seemed impolitic to practice military government on Allied territory and the US improvised the term ‘civil affairs’ to refer to a genre of post-conflict military operations. American postwar occupations in Germany and Japan point to the relevance of US grand strategy to civil affairs. Occupation policies in Japan and Germany became more liberal as the Cold War showed the Americans that these economies needed strengthening rather than punishment. In Korea, military to military cooperation ensured domestic order so that US troops could return home. This approach to civil affairs was a progression of American experiences in the Caribbean building constabulary forces.

The spotlight on the civil dimension during Vietnam seemingly shifted in strategic discourse to the framework of counterinsurgency. Here the Americans combined the military to military cooperation of Korea with reconstruction-type activities in postwar Germany and Japan,
all within a context of assigning credit to local military forces. The doctrines of civilianization and indirect rule were both beset with problems in Vietnam.

Given these insights from a review of past US military experiences in civil affairs, this study considered in depth several cases of US military intervention in the Central America/Caribbean region. This study examined US civil affairs in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) from the top down, in terms of the implementation of goals given by the White House, and from the bottom up, with consideration of features of the specific environments where they occurred. Moreover, the review described the historical context of these operations to reveal a fuller range of potential influences upon US military efforts to make a usable peace. The comparison did not test causal theories about outcomes of intervention but did identify relevant variables for future causal analysis.

This study has developed the concept of an intervention footprint to differentiate among operations in terms of US military control. This footprint is a use of force that again affects policy. The footprint varies as to size, depth, and character. The numbers of troops and geographical breadth of their deployments determines the size of the footprint. Geographical breadth may involve small selected areas of strategic or humanitarian interest, or expansive coverage of terrain. On one level, the more territory taken under US control, the more local affairs responsibility for Americans troops. On the other hand, the more territory taken by force, the more devastation we can expect. American troops invaded Grenada, and then days later they were repairing the roads and buildings destroyed by their weapons. The depth of the footprint depends upon the intrusiveness of American involvement in the functioning of the target society. American soldiers in Panama arrested members of the Panamanian Defense Force and then turned around and put weapons and a license to police in their hands. The character of the footprint is determined by the mix of multilateral and national, civilian and military personnel. In the Dominican Republic, American troops used firepower to create a corridor between elements of their intervention force, but soon after put on arm bands of the Inter-American Peace Force.
The depth of the American military footprint, the degree to which the forces become involved in local affairs, presents an interesting subject for future research. This study has provided leads for such a project. One might argue that the civil dimension is causal. That is, in its simplest form, that the degree to which the civil dimension seems relevant to military efforts to create a usable peace will determine the extent of social engineering. Changes in the social order of postwar Germany and Japan struck the Americans as necessary to future peace. Changes in the social order of Panama (for example, changes to the concentration of economic power held by the banking industry or the Panamanian Defense Forces) evidently struck the Americans as less relevant than the removal of Noriega from power. More nuanced consideration of the influence of the civil dimension is a hoped for outcome of this study, which has posited that the perceived requirement for a deep footprint depends upon the following: historical relations between the US and the target country, immediate US foreign policy concerns and defense policy orientation, and conditions in the field.

This study has sustained an assertion of an implicit causal relationship between policy and force. The assertion that this relationship is reciprocal implies that just as policy affects force, force in return causes policy. Military government and civil administration support are very concrete manifestations of force leading to policy. Military forces, though still in uniform, don a policy hat when performing these roles. The phenomenon of soldiers as governors is not easily fitted into the frameworks of traditional international relations which focuses on foreign policy, because it introduces issues of domestic policy albeit by external forces. Civil-military relations theory has likewise had little to say directly on the phenomenon, because those scholars have until very recently been preoccupied with the problem of military coup. The subject becomes relevant through the back door in writing on US civil military relations: US civilian leaders do not fear military leadership’s return from civil affairs roles and supplanting them, but military leaders are resisting roles which seem ‘unmilitary’ and in violation of the US traditional separation of civil and military spheres.
The US armed forces jealously guard the prerogative of operational control. When the civil dimension looms large in the use of force, as in peacekeeping and reconstruction, civil-military relations are more likely to be in tension. General Palmer in the Dominican Republic was criticized for placing the concerns of the White House over 'military necessity' – measures to provide as much possible advantage to US troops in the field. However, General Palmer's rules of engagement may have given him more latitude than commanders of peace operations enjoy. A swing of the pendulum in 1983 favored the military commander. The Grenada intervention was conceived as a small scale conventional operation as opposed to some variant on nation building from the Vietnam era, and it was a military show. The US military might remember 'Urgent Fury' nostalgically, but too much military control is also a problem for civil-military relations. There was no civil affairs planning for 'Urgent Fury' and too few dedicated civil affairs assets. However, a by-product of Congressional reorganization of the Department of Defense in the later part of the decade provided civil affairs with an institutional home in Special Operations Command. The concept of the civil dimension was thus given a fighting chance of getting consideration in a military that prefers to have as little as possible to do with civil affairs.

**The Nature of Conflict**

The international security environment changed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the US military began a process of tremendous downsizing at the same time they increased involvement in multilateral peace and humanitarian assistance operations. The United States is enjoying both a general sense of security in the absence of a specific, i.e. Soviet threat, but defense planners are confronting a confusing array of possible contingencies. Major US strategic reviews have recently departed from the traditional method of identifying a specific contingency and determining what is required to prevail in it. Instead, the 1998 *Strategic Assessment* and the

---

Quadrennial Defense Review call for the United States to prepare for major theater war (MTW) as in the Gulf War, and small-scale contingencies (SSC). The latter term includes peace operations, humanitarian relief, and large-scale evacuations, and seems to be the next step in the evolution of terminology from low-intensity conflict and operations other than war.

The way in which civilian leaders construct peace and war sets the stage for particular roles and missions for the American armed forces. For this reason, a change in the nature of war is contingent, as Clausewitz argued, upon a change in politics. Force structure and the American view of war are connected at a fundamental, ideational level, in that "changing the intellectual construction of peace and war decisively shapes the construction of military power."  

Constructions of peace and war are significant at the highest level. The way in which Americans perceived external threats during and after the Cold War determines the types of missions assigned to the armed forces. Caspar Weinberger's doctrine on the use of force was a reminder to assess the will of the American people to engage in war, and this might be refined to think about the will to engage in different types of war.  

The story of American civil affairs in the reconstruction of Kuwait confirms the thesis that the civil dimension is relevant across the spectrum of conflict. Although only a cursory mention is possible here, several points are worth noting. First, we must observe that the United States did not sustain an occupation of Iraq. Although Saddam Hussein had been demonized by the Bush Administration, the US did not attempt to seize Iraq and undertake a reform of its society. We might speculate why the Americans refrained, the most obvious reason being the desire to avoid a power vacuum in the region. US Arab partner states may have been hostile to the idea of American occupation of Iraq. Moreover, the scope of such an undertaking was beyond contemplation.

---


5 Industrial restructuring, for example, may be required for victory in some conflicts, but not in others.
Second, although the integration of civil affairs into the operation had plenty of problems, the preparation for civil affairs was markedly improved over the Panama experience. This was due partly to George Bush’s use of Presidential 200,000 call-up authority to activate reserves, and partly due to good fortune. Dr. Randall Elliott, a Civil Affairs reservist, also happened to be a senior analyst in the State Department’s Near East Division and privy to information flows on US preparations for war in the Gulf as early as August 1990. He was able to brief key figures in the State Department about Civil Affairs capabilities, and initiated the process of coordination among US government and exiled Kuwaiti government agencies.

Third, the Kuwaitis in exile brought their own resources to the table. In an unprecedented move, the Kuwaiti Ambassador presented, on behalf of the Emir of Kuwait, a request to US President George Bush for assistance from the Department of Defense, “in putting together an emergency and recovery program.” The request was actually drafted in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations-Low-Intensity Conflict.

Fourth, following the Emir’s request, as during World War II, the Departments of State and Defense had to work out responsibility for the civil dimension. The Army was reluctant to

---

6 Even the Secretary of the Army complained about a lack of awareness about the nature of the civil affairs mission. Tactical commanders reportedly did not appreciate how they might make use of Civil Affairs personnel. Reservists arrived late and were criticized as unprepared. Active versus Reserve tensions were evident. On these problems, see Stanley Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, pp. 394-448. And, shades of Panama, Central Command initially held the planning for Kuwait's liberation closely, cutting out the Kuwaiti Task Force. See Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, p. 28.

7 Personal interview with Randall Elliott, Washington DC, May 1995. Fishel and Sandler both characterize Elliott's personal relationship with the designate US Ambassador to Kuwait, Edward Gnehm, as critical. For example, Ambassador Gnehm personally requested that General Norman Schwarzkopf assign some Kuwaiti Task Force Officers as liaison to ARCENT/CENTCOM. ARCENT is Army Component, Central Command.

8 Randall Elliott contrasts the resources for reconstruction of Kuwait with those available for Haiti. The availability of Kuwaiti funding certainly made US government agencies more amenable to committing resources to the effort, as agency directors knew they would recover their expenses.

become involved and argued that the job should fall to the State Department. The Department of Defense had absorbed the costs of civil affairs in ‘Just Cause’ when promises from other US government agencies were not met, and the Army in general was reluctant to become involved in a long-term reconstruction. However, OASD/SO-LIC viewed the reconstruction as within civil affairs doctrine. The Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) was activated in December 1990. Its eventual commander was Randall Elliott.

Three weeks before the ground war, the KTF became one component of an organization that included Active and Reserve Civil Affairs assets, similar elements from Kuwait and Saudi armies, representatives from the US Army Corps of Engineers, British Engineers, Explosive Ordinance Detachments from several nations, and liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and elements from USAID and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Relief. In sum, even in a major contingency such as the Gulf War, the civil dimension loomed large.

In a major contingency such as the Gulf War, military planners have more resources to choose from when planning for the civil dimension, especially regarding Reserve Corps assets. The problem of force structure to confront the civil dimension is perhaps more acutely felt in smaller contingencies. Remembering that the Americans expected engagement in Korea to be something like one on Europe’s central front, only smaller in scale, we must critically examine whether Cold War or Medium Theater Contingency force structure is transferable to application in small-scale contingencies. Coincidentally, the National Defense University’s 1998 Strategic Assessment echoes the argument in this study when describing small-scale contingencies:

\[ \ldots \text{SSCs do not call for the projection of massive strike power to destroy enemy forces, infrastructure and resolve. Generally, they entail small units, repetitive patrols, face-to-face contact, humanitarian deliveries, even-handedness, restrained rules of engagement, and performance of certain civil functions. (If Clausewitz} \]

---

10 If the Department of Defense was to do it, the Army wanted an ad hoc group. Historian Stanley Sandler observes, “It was as though the lessons of every US conflict at least since World War II were being studiously ignored.” Sandler, Glad to See Them Come, p. 398.
considered war as an extension of politics, he might have viewed SSCs as a reverse extension of war into politics.)

Ironically, the same conservatives in the United States who promoted military civic action during the Cold War, in Central America for example, are most dovish on "political" roles for the military during or after. Their objective is to keep the action short, overwhelming, low on casualties, and with a clear conception of military 'victory.' According to critics of the US intervention in Somalia, the point at which the exercise became one of nation-building was the point at which the operations came into difficulties. Once external military forces attempted to create order so that humanitarian aid could reach the Somali people, the United States stepped "deep into the muck of Somali politics."

A successful military intervention alters authority relations. If only to protect themselves, they bring weapons, which are instruments of coercion, that establish an unequal power relationship with the local population. The next step, according to strategist Thomas Schelling, would be to use that coercive capacity to create a gain for US national interest. Richard Sennett has defined projection of authority as "an attempt to interpret the conditions of power, to give the conditions of control and influence a meaning by defining an image of strength." A crucial step toward the construction of authority is to establish oneself as the "other" so that differentials of power will be rightly perceived by the weaker party. Troops from the world's most powerful military would seemingly have little difficulty in doing so. However, there is an inherent contradiction in the use of this authority-projection process during liberalizing peace operations. The legitimation role of civil affairs has become more prominent with increasing scrutiny of US military operations by the American public and international observers.

11 Strategic Assessment 1998, p. 266.
14 Richard Sennett, Authority (London: Faber and Faber, 1980, 1993), p. 18. Sennett delivers this as the most general way that authority operates.
In multilateral operations in particular, the United States turns to the international arena for legitimation of its military operations. However, potential developments in international norms of sovereignty create a new context for American efforts to legitimate the use of force. Recent discussion of a popular conception, in which sovereignty rests in the people rather than a ruling regime, changes the referent for allegations that interventions are a violation of sovereignty. The United States has in fact relied upon the popular notion when, in 1965, the United States argued at the United Nations that their intervention in the Dominican Republic was not an interference in its internal affairs, but an invited action to prevent outside interference, stating,

We believe that the Dominican people, under the established principle of self-determination, should select their own government through free elections....the people of that country must be permitted to choose the path of political democracy, social justice and economic progress.

The international debate about the Dominican intervention could well have revolved around the questionable legitimacy of a Dominican invitation to the US, given the lack of both evidence of a request and Dominican government authority to make it. Instead, what emerges of interest from the United Nations debate is its focus on the self-determination argument, which was denounced by most member states. The United States attempted a similar argument in defense of its intervention in Grenada in 1983. Some delegates expressed sympathy for the Caribbean states that requested US intervention, and sympathy for the people of Grenada, but determined nonetheless that the US action was an illegal intervention in the internal affairs of another country.

---


17 Member states also cited self-determination, denouncing the intervention as a violation of the self-determination principle because US forces were external agents.

The rise in prominence of "Chapter Six and a Half" UN peacekeeping operations, and "humanitarian interventions" in the 1990s suggests development of a norm at the international level that is eerily compatible with the United States arguments in the Dominican Republic and Grenada. Often what is missing from debate on these "benign" interventions in "defense of people" is discussion of policy behind the norm of non-intervention, "a recognition that countries intervene in practice for their own benefit and major powers have an interest in not allowing the influence of an adversary power to be strengthened in this way." The shaping of peace by external military forces must be presumed to reflect something of the interest of the intervening power.

Although Americans make much of the separation of an army against external threats and a police against domestic threats, the arrest of Manuel Noriega was in effect an instance of US soldiers enforcing a domestic arrest warrant against a leader of another country. Moreover, the stated intent to promote democracy in Panama puts American ideas of peace squarely in the realm of another people. In contrast to military operations in the nineteenth century for example, there is a prominence to the civil dimension in the declared purpose of military action that correspondingly raises expectations about the peace that follows from it. These issues became more, rather than less, relevant in the 1990s.

An example from Haiti illustrates how the local population might turn to the Americans, and how US civil affairs teams use their authority. After a local police outpost at Bon Repos was destroyed on the eve of President Jean Bertrand Aristide's return to Haiti, the mission of American engineer units was affected as "local nationals, viewing the Americans as the de facto law and order force in the area, gathered near the base camp and engineer work sites to lodge civil complaints and request protection." In response, the American civil affairs teams proceeded to determine "the root of animosity between the residents and the police while

19 Ibid., p. 252.
convincing the Bon Repos leaders to take charge,” and to find “policemen posted at Bon Repos and [convince] them to return.”

The Americans organized a town meeting that not only led to restoration of local policing, but also to improved relations between the US engineers and the local population.

US doctrine on civil affairs has increasingly recognized the military significance of local social structures. Civil affairs is not a purely post-conflict activity, because separation of the enemy military forces from its popular base is a force multiplier. This counterinsurgency principle is a lesson from Vietnam. The failure to achieve this separation in the former Yugoslavia, for example, creates serious problems.

At the highest levels, American diplomats visualize stability as a desired outcome of military intervention. This vision of stability requires attention to internal conditions, establishing authority that will endure. The inherently temporary nature of intervention precludes displacement of dysfunctional local authority with one’s own. The United States promotes indirect rule. The US sponsors indigenous authority and attempts to legitimate their authority in a legal-rational sense, based upon acceptance of the rules (such as election regulations) that establish the leader’s position. However, on the ground, the troops may uncover pre-existing authority relations built upon traditional authority derived from custom, heredity, even myths and legends. Or they may encounter charismatic authority, premised upon devotion to an individual marked as being exceptional. American troops in Somalia might have gained cooperation, respect, even the trust of some local residents, but it was well-understood that the US was not there permanently, and on their departure warlord leaders would likely regain position. In Latin

---

21 Snyder and Warshaw, “Force Protection.”

22 This second of Max Weber’s categories is described in Sennett as “belief in the legality of rules and on the right of those who occupy posts by virtue of those rules to issue commands.” These words appear in quotation marks as if citing Weber, but no specific reference to a point in Weber’s text is made. Authority, p. 21.

23 When an American military officer was asked at an academic conference about arresting war criminals in Bosnia, his answer was “the people we need to talk to are war criminals.” International Studies Association conference San Diego, 1996.
America, it may be easier to convince the local population that the United States will closely follow developments after the troops depart.

When John Fishel noted that the Reserve 360th Civil Affairs Brigade was the last element of the US invasion forces to depart from Grenada, he noted this to be “an interesting harbinger of future operations.” Warfighting doctrine, force structure requirements and the methods of civilianization and indirect rule in US civil affairs continue to evolve. This evolution reflects America’s foreign policy orientation as well as conditions met by troops in the field.

Coordination between military forces and civilian actors in the conduct of military operations is as important as ever, and more so as civilianization evolves with conceptions of roles. As the US military seeks to work to its strengths and limit its commitments, civilian partners, from US civilian government, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations are important. This civilianization might be perceived by the military as increasing civilian intervention. Civilian partners in the field before US military deployments might be concerned on the other hand, with militarization of their relief efforts. When an environment is dangerous, civilian agents may depend upon military assets for security. Soldiers are paid – and not very well – to risk their lives. These actors may well expect American military protection, even as they bring organizational cultural perspectives that collide with the military world view.

Although the US military and non-governmental personnel also work in a political context, their agendas may differ. Ever-increasing numbers of civilian US officials, or even non-governmental organizations, thus makes the civil affairs environment more favorable, in the sense that the military can shed some of the burden, and at the same time more difficult.

---


25 Americans tend to revere their armed forces, and one guess is that this admiration in part reflects the risk and sacrifice inherent to the military profession.


On the one hand, this study has given reason for pessimism about the future of civil affairs, simply because the United States military is not inclined to be concerned with the civil dimension. It is not prestigious within a military culture to be interested in civil affairs. More fundamentally, military involvement in governance is a last option when civilian institutions have failed. At the same time, it is also not surprising that US military doctrine and force structure relevant to civil affairs are receiving increasing attention in the US defense establishment. As American soldiers from multilateral peace operations report their experiences, the prominence of the civil dimension seems an inescapable fact of current operations. This is a time for the United States military to examine the suitability of its doctrine and force structure to the nature of likely conflicts. This is also a time for United States policy makers to examine their expectations, and to make difficult decisions about the use of force in light of the prospects for a usable peace.

New joint doctrine, changes the vocabulary of civil affairs once more in titling the manual *Civil Military Operations*. Another concept, purely in the discussion stage at this writing, is a proposal for construction of a regional engagement force (REF). This structure would attach a REF within a special operations component of the geographic CINC peacetime command structure, with the objective of facilitating coordination of Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations under one commander. Given the lesson of Panama, one challenge for contingency planning must be to keep open lines of communication between elements involved in operations. Because civil military operations are a responsibility of command, the lesson from the cases examined in this study (and indeed, the Gulf War) about

---

28 The Joint Special Operations Forces Institute recommended that Special Operations Command give proponency for new doctrine to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, but SOCOM retained control of the doctrine because JFKSWCS is Army. Instead, the contract to write the doctrine went to a private firm, OC Inc., and might bear similarities to the volume *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), which I understand was drafted by the same retired US Marine. The Special Warfare Center will be primary review authority on the new joint doctrine.

29 Unclassified briefing slides, US Army Special Operations Command, USAJFKSWCS, as of 9/07/98.
doctrine is that modifications or improvements to Army or Joint civil affairs doctrine will not make an impact unless civil affairs is integrated into the general strategic framework, for example, the Army manual FM 100-5 *Operations*.

As indicated in discussion of a Regional Engagement Force, the force structure that situates Civil Affairs personnel and all Special Operations Forces into the defense architecture merits re-examination. There are tensions within the US military that merit further examination: between force protection and civilian relief requirements, and in structure between Active and Reserve Corps as well as 'combat oriented' and 'civilian-oriented' career streams. The issue of force protection is a manifestation of the tension between military necessity and humanity in the law of land warfare. The US experience in Somalia in which many Army Rangers lost their lives led to insistence of military commanders in future operations upon force protection that some believe impeded the conduct of civilian-oriented programs. Noting the restrictive rules of engagement in small-scale contingencies, policy-relevant research to inventory characteristics of environments relevant to the military footprint and the lessons of force protection from previous operations may be useful to contemporary commanders.

There are strong disincentives to become a Reserve Civil Affairs officer, as this is not a fast-track to promotion, it is not highly regarded in the warrior culture, and involvement in operations disrupts the reservists’ civilian careers. The Active Corps 96th Civil Affairs Battalion is suffering from high operational tempo and the impact of these frequent deployments upon personnel with specialized skills and upon combat readiness in general merits study. As noted in a recent conference on the “Civil Dimension of Military Operations,” commanding officers have come to appreciate the contribution of dedicated Civil Affairs personnel too late in operations. The conference report notes that “on-the-job training tends to take place, moreover, during the riskiest, initial phase of these operations when the consequences for our national interests are highest,” and suggests that “it would be vastly preferable to have the learning take place in
military schoolhouses and exercise programs." There is certainly call for policy-relevant research into issues of civil affairs training and education in the US military.

There are numerous important directions for future research on the civil dimension of strategy suggested by this study. Chapter 9 has identified some of the questions that can improve our understanding of the historical cases. For example, a focus on outcomes in future study, from the perspective of the United States and the target country, will compliment the focus on the process of civil affairs in this study. More detailed analysis of indigenous capacity for regeneration will be useful in contemporary efforts to create an inventory of necessary tasks in state restoration. Future study might also be expanded into the dynamics of the home front of the civil dimension. Such a study might follow American press reports and proceedings in Congress to identify conditions in which the support of the American public for US military operations is most influential.

The inquiry here can be usefully expanded to include a larger number of cases to include, for example, interventions outside of the Central American - Caribbean region that was the focus here. We might envision an approach that considers not only the US foreign policy aspirations, but cultural influences upon the operation. Psychological operations became importantly connected with civil affairs during the counterinsurgency era. The specific modes of these operations together in American attempts to use latent force in construction of authority during operations is another line of study that will be of interest to peacekeepers managing dynamic situations in Bosnia and currently in Kosovo.

Multilateral cooperation has become a more common feature of US military operations. The multilateral aspects of the US intervention in the Dominican Republic and Grenada merit more detailed analysis, as mentioned in Chapter 9. By working within existing multilateral legal and political institutions prior to taking military action, the United States is better positioned to

---

argue that its military forces are serving to create a peace that is usable to the world, rather than one that is usable to the United States alone.

The United Nations identified more than sixty formal threats to international peace and security posed by instability since 1990. As the United States became increasingly involved in United Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, the civil dimension and became more prominent and the structure of civil-military relations became more complex. These operations require the military to take on more ‘political’ roles in carefully calibrated operations. However, the climate of peace implementation is ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so, as diplomats seek to encourage former warring factions toward peace without showing them in stark terms the price they will pay (if even to their own base of political influence) in armistice compromises. Military commanders, by contrast, tend to prefer a strong mandate for action, clear objectives, a defined enemy, and a unified command structure. How can these visions of operations be reconciled? The surface has not been scratched on a body of research required on the psychology of peace implementation. This line of inquiry promises to be fruitful and fascinating.

At the operational level we find more immediate problems that are beginning to receive attention, due to unfortunate instances of problems in the field. A recent study has concluded that the military has not provided, or been afforded the opportunity to provide, sufficient input into strategic decisions by the United Nations Secretariat; moreover, “in the field, there are clashes of culture, confusion over command and control arrangements and insufficient operational coordination.” Fortunately, these problems are receiving some attention, but will benefit from more attention to civil-military relations theory as discussed in this study. The concept of the

---


32 Manwaring, Guttieri and Dziedzic, “The Civil Dimension of Military Operations.” Based upon remark of participant.

military footprint developed in this study will also be useful for future research that includes the multilateral dimension in the character of the military footprint.

Likewise, given increasing interaction between military forces during interventions, and in humanitarian assistance and peace operations in particular, horizontal civil-military relations in the field are increasingly important.

The United States military has developed a concept of “unity of effort” to integrate its various components (for example, air, sea and land) in operations. The military may attempt to extend unity of effort to coordination with US civilian agencies. Future study might compare the performance of the Kuwaiti Task Force with the interagency effort in other civil affairs operations. That interagency effort, although seemingly ideal, was not without its problems, including those posed by the initial reluctance of the US Central Command which ran the warfighting operation, to work with the interagency group. Unity of effort with inter-governmental and non-governmental actors may be a more elusive ideal yet for the US military, as these civilian agencies often work from different cultural orientations and toward divergent agendas. The US military is taking steps toward becoming more inclusive, consulting civilian government agency and non-governmental representatives during the drafting of the new joint doctrine on civil affairs and going so far as to include representatives from these interests in training exercises. In general, future policy-relevant research is needed to develop architecture to effectively integrate the different civil and military participants in international interventions.

The most compelling direction for future inquiry suggested by this study is to revisit the issue of civil-military relations generally in relation to developments in the nature of war. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is currently considering expanding its strategic concept to include peace operations as a core function. We might examine the impact of this redefinition upon strategic thought in general but upon civil-military relations in particular. Western powers within NATO are currently conducting programs to train East European members of the Partnership for Peace in the western approach to civil-military relations that includes a depoliticized military, subordination of military to civilian control, and separation of the two
spheres. Paradoxically, this training is taking place at the same time that NATO troops are becoming more involved in Bosnia and elsewhere in civil-military operations that require more political savvy of military commanders and that seem to blur the distinctions between these spheres.

In sum, the evidence in this study suggests many avenues for continued research. The most pressing problem to overcome is the tendency in American defense planning to think about the civil dimension as an afterthought, and hence, too late in military operations. The cases examined in this study revealed American thinking on civil affairs to be largely an afterthought until 1989, (and even then, the effort on the civil front in Panama was something of a scramble). They showed that military objectives and political goals are sometimes an imperfect fit, as the imperatives of force protection or differences in interpretation can impact upon implementation. The cases showed that military occupation is not an undifferentiated phenomenon. They revealed the American military usage of indirect rule and civilianization and the tensions that correspond with them. These tensions became more pronounced in the 1990s. As complex as the American notion of victory seemed in the predominantly unilateral and non-permissive interventions examined here, the next generation of missions added even more layers to the evolving American conceptualization of a usable peace.
Bibliography


Bellamy, Christopher “From Total War to Local War: It’s a Revolution” *The Independent* (July 23, 1996).


Bobrow, Davis.


Congressional Fact Paper, Subject: Dominican Republic, CFP-ODCSOPS-9, 1 August 1965, p. 5.8. 228-01 HRC Geog G. Dominican Republic 370 Operations, CMH Files.


DoD briefing slide, “‘Typical’ Civil Affairs Operations” OASD (SO/LIC) Master 5/15/95.


FM 27-5 (1940)

FM 41-10 (1985)


Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1899 and October 18, 1907.


Helman, Gerald B., and Ratner, Steven R. “Saving Failed States.” 89 *Foreign Policy*.


le Carré, John “Quel Panama,” New York Times October 13, 1996 in Information Service on 
Latin America.


A-20.


Lewis, Gordon K. Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 

Licklider, Roy. “State Building After Invasion: Somalia and Panama.” Paper presented at the 
International Studies Association Annual Convention. San Diego, California, April 1996.

Lieber, Francis. Art. 152, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field. Originally Issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863, 
http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher-multi/texts/historical/LIEBER.

Doc. No. 79.

Lijphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political 

Loser, Eva, ed. Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama. Washington, D.C.: The 


Lowenthal, Abraham F. “Reticence on Failed Coup Spared Us a Bigger Mess,” Los Angeles 
Times October 18, 1989.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. “The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos” pp. 34-38 in Reform 
and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics, ed. A. Vancazar and R.R. Kaufman 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969.


Lowenthal, Abraham, ed. Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America. 

Luttwak, Edward N. “Reconsideration: Clausewitz and War.” In Strategy and Politics: 
Collected Essays, pp. 259-263. Edited by Edward N. Luttwak. New Brunswick and 


McCoid, CB. AOC Team Chief. “Following information on Status of US Civil Affairs Capability in Dominican Republic supplied by Lt Col. Cardin, Civil Affairs Section, ARLANT,” 151640Q May, memo in response to request 15 May 1965, Geog G. Dominican Republic 388.5 Civil Affairs, CMH Files.


Military Zone Chief Sends Message to Civilians,” [Message from Lieutenant Colonel Luis Del Cid, chief of the 5th Military Zone], PA 2012172789 Panama City Domestic Service in Spanish 1226 GMT 20 Dec. 89, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) FBIS-LAT-89-244, 21 December 1989, p. 27.


Sarkesian, Sam C.; Williams, John Allen; and Bryant, Fred B. *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995.


Schemmen, Benjamin F. “Grenada Highlights One of DOD's Major C^3 Problems But Increased Funding is Bringing Solutions” *Armed Forces Journal* 23 April 1984.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARIOA</td>
<td>Government and Relief in Occupied Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO 100</td>
<td>General Order 100 (The Lieber Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO 20</td>
<td>General Order 20 (General Scott’s Martial Law Proclamation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAPF</td>
<td>Inter-American Peace Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACK</td>
<td>Joint Advisory Commission Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Military Civic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Panamanian Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsyOp</td>
<td>Psychological Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANACC</td>
<td>State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAPINS</td>
<td>Supreme Commander Allied Forces Pacific Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Army Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFE</td>
<td>Subcommittee for the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied European Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO/LIC</td>
<td>Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>US Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>