TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
AS IF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD MATTERED: PART II

A CASE STUDY OF THE BROADWAY SKYTRAIN STATION IN VANCOUVER, B.C., CANADA

by

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We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

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Abstract

Although the region has acquired expertise in the physical dimensions of rapid transit implementation, that expertise has not translated into a better understanding of social impacts on communities which host this regional amenity. The Broadway Station area is such a community. Although the City of Vancouver is responsible for planning the Broadway Station area community, many provincial decisions have had far-reaching consequences and do not correspond with municipal policy for the community. The province has introduced region-serving programs and facilities into the community despite municipal policy that the Broadway Station area would not serve a regional role. As a consequence, the community is becoming increasingly unlivable. There is a de facto policy vacuum. Moreover, there is a lack of coordination and an absence of protocols for managing and sharing data. There is little, if any, coordination of senior government actions, and the actions of various levels of government and their agencies have resulted in the Broadway Station Area failing to achieve the goal of community livability, for the resident community.

The City of Vancouver, within which the case study station resides, has so far been unable to respond to the challenge that the station poses. The degree to which the station area is becoming dysfunctional is not known to the city. Consequently, the thesis question “Is the Broadway Station Area worse off than before SkyTrain” posed a significant challenge. In addition to a review of the case study planning process, which was conducted by the thesis researcher in the latter half of 1996, this thesis adds interviews with professional planners and a limited empirical study to answer the thesis question. By looking at a limited number of key census indicators, and cross comparing that with other data sources, the thesis found that the community’s perception has merit, although a great deal more data must be compiled. To better understand what works in the Canadian context of transit-oriented planning, we need to support ongoing qualitative community planning with the empirical work that would assist in monitoring the effect of policies and program implementation and can address the dynamism of this regional transit node.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALRT</td>
<td>Advanced Light Rapid Transit [requires grade separation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BART</td>
<td>Bay Area Rapid Transit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAP</td>
<td>Broadway Station Area Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAPAC</td>
<td>Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecona</td>
<td>Cedar Cottage Neighbourhood Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTED</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Census Tract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTES</td>
<td>Downtown Eastside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTNW</td>
<td>Downtown New Westminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Enumeration Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVRD</td>
<td>Greater Vancouver Regional District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICO</td>
<td>Low Income Cut-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRT</td>
<td>Light Rapid Transit [grade separation not required]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHR</td>
<td>Ministry of Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMBY</td>
<td>Not In My Backyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTPO</td>
<td>Rapid Transit Project 2000 [or office]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONC</td>
<td>Save Our Neighbourhood Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>Security Resources Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenderloin</td>
<td>The area bounded by Broadway, Clark Drive, Commercial Drive and North Grandview</td>
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Acknowledgement

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I want to thank my thesis team, Alan Artibise, Darlene Marzari and David Baxter. I especially owe a debt to Darlene who helped with the original case study, lent me books, helped keep me fit and convinced me to accept the shortcomings of this thesis, to believe that they have more to do with the academic format of the thesis model rather than the quality of the case study itself, which was more important than this formal review.

Thanks to my family who left me alone (sometimes) and gave me first dibs on the computer (always) even when their own school assignments were due.
The study area is the blue SkyTrain line between Broadway and Columbia Stations.
Illustration 1.2. Broadway Station Area Study Boundary

Source: GVRD & Author

Illustration 1.3. Vancouver East Stations’ Boundary

Source: GVRD & Author
Illustration 1.4. Burnaby Stations' Boundary

Illustration 1.5. DTNW & 22nd Street, Station Boundaries

Source: GVRD & Author
1.0. Introduction to the Research

1.1. The Context For This Thesis:
Rapid Transit Implementation in the Lower Mainland

The B.C. provincial government recently announced its decision to expand the local rapid transit system with a major new investment in advanced light rapid transit (ALRT) technology. First selected in the early 1980's for Phase One of SkyTrain, this technology was so controversial that the regional mandate for transit planning had to be rescinded by the provincial government in order to derail municipal opposition. The decision to expand reliance on this technology for Phase Three extension of the SkyTrain system is a choice that has occasioned additional controversy. Although the overriding concern expressed by municipal politicians and regional authorities today is focused on the cost rather than the experimental aspect of this capital-intensive technology — and the means through which it will be financed — the communities through which the newest phase of SkyTrain will go have focused on concerns about how rapid transit will affect the neighbourhoods in which they live.

This is not necessarily because the community objects to the principle of providing affordable and effective public transportation. An Angus Reid survey of Lower Mainland public attitudes show 55% in favour of improving transit services. This is somewhat lower support than the 75% in favour of improving traffic flows — but, it could be argued, one way to improve traffic flows could be by improving public transit and so these goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In addition, although the numbers are very close, expanding public transit enjoys the greatest degree of public support. Of the population polled, 82% supported expanding public transit over other, more automobile-centred choices such as “building new roads” (79%) or “building new bridges” (81%) and “new infrastructure” (79%). The Angus Reid Group’s interpretation of one study finding notwithstanding — “People agree that the main solution to air quality problems is the reduction of SOV1 use but some data may suggest that their underlying attitude is it
should be up to others to get out of their cars and not them personally
— the public opinion survey suggests that communities in the vicinity of a rapid transit line would value the benefits it confers on the community as a whole.

Nevertheless, objections have arisen and crime, lower property values, and dissection of established communities are among the most prominent concerns raised. Broadly speaking, what the community says about the crime issue is that it fears a rapid transit line coming through their area because it will cause higher crime, that crime-ridden neighbourhoods will lose value in the marketplace, and that overhead guideways are an undesirable form of transit development. These concerns are separate from being opposed to rapid transit in and of itself.

1.2. The Case Study Community

This community objection echoes the public debate in regard to Phase One SkyTrain implementation in the early-mid 1980s. In the Broadway Station area the overhead guideway, land speculation, and loss of affordable housing were the prominent issues for that particular community at that time. Given the circumstances in the Vancouver housing market in the early 1980s, it is not surprising that these would be the prominent issues. The significance of this history in the current transit planning episode is in the cautionary tale regarding the community’s response to alienation caused by provincial government actions and how that alienation can derail effective planning, which can in turn lead to negative and unforeseen outcomes.

By the end of 1980, residents of the Broadway Station area had become active, proposing a tunnel along Commercial Drive from North Grandview to beyond the commercial district’s south edge at 16th Avenue. The Save Our Neighbourhood Committee (SONC), organized by station area residents, tried to persuade the province and city to invest in the underground option. When the provincial government rejected this city council-supported proposal, it is widely acknowledged by both community and city staff that the community’s leadership was decimated. It was also the opinion of most Broadway
Station Area Planning Advisory Committee (BSAPAC)\textsuperscript{iv} participants interviewed for the TransPlan case study, and this belief was not contradicted by city staff involved, that city council nevertheless continued to give the community as many of its proposed solutions to various issues as, one presumes, good governance could allow.

This fact may explain the community dynamics, which led to the failure of the Broadway Station Area Plan to address the regional pressures and opportunities, presented by the Broadway SkyTrain Station. As the thesis attempts to clarify, the subsequent outcome is a street environment that the resident community contends is hostile and unsafe. \textsuperscript{v} Despite its high amenity value the station area has failed to attract significant market investment. Increasingly it is playing a regional role for which it has no policy guidelines; and it is an area which feels to the community “as if a drug culture is replacing a neighbourhood culture” (Hurmuses 1998).

The community’s failure to secure the underground option may have been the catalyst to the subsequent failure of the Broadway Station Area Plan to successfully address the dynamic transition that has since occurred in the station area. Alienated by what it saw as the province’s high-handed actions, it appears that it became trapped in its opposition to what was happening, unable to reconcile the apparent injustice of the decision against generating a new vision for the community which the province’s decision made necessary.

Instead, the community’s focus appears to have split, with SONC continuing its unsuccessful lobby for the tunnel option before it eventually petered out, and the BSAPAC reluctantly turning to other issues such as ensuring fair compensation for affected land-owners and maintaining affordable rental housing along with other transit-oriented adjustments to traffic and land-use issues. The BSAPAC minutes chronicle an angry, mistrustful spirit in the community throughout the early planning period, which never abated. It also chronicles a committee active in many issues peripheral to the main purpose of developing a plan for the station area. One of the planners, Pat Wotherspoon,
observed that while he believed that those who continued to participate with the advisory committee were committed to being constructive and were successful to a significant degree, that the community's words and actions subsequent to the guideway decision could only be described as "pure democracy, completely unfiltered stuff."

Moreover, this outcome and the resulting lack of continuity in community leadership had an impact on subsequent community organizing efforts. As new leaderships developed in the community in the early 1990s, the results of this planning underwent scrutiny largely by individuals who were more recent to the community and so had not participated in the Broadway Station planning episode. For good or for ill this led to intense questioning about the outcomes experienced there. Without the integration of newcomers into the community by others who had been active before, this new leadership was unenlightened about the rationale for certain decisions and attendant policy outcomes. Left to rely on its own sense of what the community was becoming, it looked at these decisions with fresh eyes, unencumbered by the debates of the past.

Prominent and contentious outcomes are that the Broadway and Commercial Drive retail node increasingly failed to provide the goods and services the community wanted while, simultaneously, enforcement campaigns mobilized drug dealers and sex trade workers from adjacent communities. As a consequence, the Broadway Station area's dysfunction became more visible. In response to the effect of these pressures, a number of community-driven initiatives were proposed. These included the Broadway Station Crime Prevention Office, a pilot project to build a community Greenway, various public education series and seminars were organized for the community, and the city was lobbied to test its CityPlan visioning exercise in the community. Community organizers also lobbied for a review of the nine acre Cedar Cottage Industrial Lands (CCIL) "let go" status, with an attendant request for the city to intervene in the sale of GVRD works yards in the CCIL when it became apparent that the outcome of the GVRD tender would most likely result in single family housing although it was a key location for increased density.
This final intervention was conceived to ensure that a planned industrial land review would happen before the property was sold.

One additional initiative was a study, *Transportation Planning As If The Neighbourhood Mattered* (TransPlan). After Vancouver City Council refused the community’s request for further planning in the area (CityPlan occurred a few years later but due to its iterative process it was insufficiently focused to address the Broadway Station’s issues), the researcher approached the province to fund a study of SkyTrain impacts. Based on the uniqueness of two rapid transit corridors meeting, that request was approved. That study, and further empirical work conducted since its publication, is the basis for the thesis conclusions presented here.

**1.3. Researcher Bias**

The researcher is a resident of the neighbourhood in which the Broadway Station lies. Through research into the community’s urban development issues undertaken as part of her undergraduate studies in urban geography at UBC, she came to believe that opportunities for community development consistent with city policy and with good urban planning were not being addressed. As a consequence she organized her community to form the Cedar Cottage Neighbourhood Association (Cecona).

It was the researcher who approached the provincial government to fund the TransPlan transportation impact study after leading the unsuccessful effort to convince Vancouver City Council to address the resident community’s needs with an area plan. Cecona was enlisted to sponsor the grant and to oversee and provide resources for involving the community in the project.

As a researcher-participant she does not attempt to pretend disinterested objectivity. She recognizes that she cannot avoid being influenced by her experiences living in, organizing and working with the community she is writing about. A two year leave of absence between conducting the case study, and conducting the empirical work and writing up thesis conclusions, however, gave the researcher the advantage of time away from both
the subject and community organizing which improved perspective and afforded the opportunity to consider TransPlan study conclusions in relation to subsequent events.

1. 4. Why The Problem Is Important

To any observer, and certainly to the resident community, it appears that the Broadway Station area has been a failure in the nearly 20 years since planning for transit implementation began. Moreover, the community believes that the area is spiraling downward despite strong pressures to the converse in the adjacent area which has since become a trendy and desirable location to live and recreate.

The Broadway Station area community indicates that there is a crisis; that the street "feels" as if it's falling apart; that too many services for at-risk populations have been located there; that neighbourhood retail and services are being supplanted by too many fast food outlets, banks, and other region-serving uses.\[^{vi}\]

Determining whether these observations are accurate, and what the regional implications may be, are in themselves important to the practice of successful transit implementation. When communities erupt with these concerns about the effects of implementation, they are often chastised by policy-makers for NIMBYism.\[^{vii}\] But the fact is that governments do not always engage in remedial planning to address unanticipated consequences, they have not developed data management systems which would ensure the necessary empirical work to create a framework for monitoring rapid transit nodes, and as a consequence, do not use all the tools at their disposal to determine best practices in the delivery of transit oriented planning in the context of the Canadian legal and regulatory framework.

This is understandable, given that the economy of data collection has radically improved only in the last decade. Nevertheless, there is no indication that any level of government is preparing to address this issue adequately, although the development of a new rapid transit line in the GVRD makes the need for such baseline data imminent.
From the community’s perspective, the result is that governments are thus far unprepared to support their decisions with readily available empirical evidence. Moreover, they have demonstrated an unwillingness to take corrective action even when the need for it is palpable, as it is in the Broadway Station area. It is not surprising, therefore, that communities are concerned when new rapid transit lines are proposed and that the degree of commitment to either public participation or scientific study are demonstrably lacking. That in this context their objections are often loud, public, and intransigent are effects that are detailed in the literature regarding community participation studies. 

Attempts to gloss over these shortcomings in collecting and analyzing data as an adjunct to community planning are increasingly untenable. The personal computer revolution ensures that the availability of information is increasingly expected and that if the government does not provide it, special interests will. The community’s objections may not simply reflect NIMBYism but can be argued to be an entirely rational response to the gap between what the community wants to know and knows is available and the answers they get from the governments and their planning agencies.

1.5 Assumptions On Which The Thesis Is Based

An underlying premise of this thesis is that rapid transit is overdue in the region and that the best regional outcomes can best be achieved when the public is engaged in the process, when there are ample opportunities for public education, and when the community’s role is to assist the decision-makers to achieve a clear and realizable vision of the community’s future role. Another underlying premise is that it is in the long term interest of the political structure, the future of transit implementation and land use decisions, and urban planning in general that their participation as advisors should be seen by the community and by the decision-makers to be effective, legitimate, and to the point.
A further premise is that, in order to achieve these goals, the general public good is served when the public advisory body enjoys opportunities to become knowledgeable about all of the issues surrounding transit and transit-oriented land use and to use this knowledge to participate in the process of achieving effective transit implementation which is essential to achieving a livable region. One model for this form of civic responsibility is that of “The 1000 Friends of Oregon.” It has proved to be an enduring vehicle for public education and political action on regional livability issues. Successfully copied in Washington state, it has since been proposed as a functional model for the civic-minded public in this region to safeguard the political will to implement the GVRD’s Livable Region Strategy.

In addition to the work of Jane Jacobs, and Harry Lash, these assumptions are primarily based on the work of Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson. In The Rebirth of Urban Democracy they found that, in the five sample cities in the U.S. in which ongoing public consultation structures exist, public process does not unduly delay decisions. City officials and politicians surveyed agreed that although there is a tension between participation and efficiency, the benefit of improvements to the plan and approbation of the public toward decisions made — even on the part of individuals who did not agree with the decision — ensured a more stable outcome. Twice as many of the politicians and system administrators felt that delays due to public participation were in service of superior outcomes than otherwise.

Although this is a study based in the American political system — and there are significant differences between the American and Canadian polities — there is reason to posit that achieving goals such as the Livable Region Strategy and its companion policy, Transport 2021, will continue to be a highly politicized exercise and one which may fail in the face of community opposition to individual strategies, unless the public understands and supports the small scale changes which this will entail. Furthermore as is concluded by Berry, et. al., to achieve this understanding, public participation must include control over specific elements of implementation (subject, as is necessary in
Canada, to the agreement of municipal politicians in whom the province invests the pertinent mandates and responsibilities).

Writing on these same issues in regard to the Canadian context, in his report Planning In A Human Way, Harry Lash writes about the experience of community planning in the GVRD in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Lash describes a public response to planning initiatives much like the one’s which still occur in the GVRD municipalities. It makes the case for public involvement, and it may explain some of the reluctance of both politicians and planners to embrace community-centred planning.

When should citizens be involved in the planning process? From the beginning. During my time with Greater Vancouver I watched two municipalities draw up plans for the development of major parts of the region, publish them, and invite public comment. It was not long coming — with a roar. The public said the plans were wrong, the planners had been given the wrong terms of reference, the people had not been consulted, the whole thing had been inspired by the developers... the councils withdrew the plans. Back at square one, they set up local committees for citizen involvement, drew up new terms of reference, and started over. In the end, the public working with the planners came up with the proposals that were not very different from those that had been scrapped. But citizens had been able to define issues and community values as they saw them; the planners had a chance to learn as the plans developed, and the public was able to support the final result. But, in the meantime, two years had passed, and an original investment of tens of thousands of dollars had been largely wasted. Does this mean that the councils should have preceded with their original plans? No, for in that case the delays, frustrations, temper tantrums, and loss of dollars and time would have continued; probably, as well, several political fortunes would have sunk.\[9\]

This final point in Lash's statement is the crux of the matter. No one argues that the Lower Mainland is overdue for more rapid transit. Nor is there much argument about the location of the rapid transit lines. Such disagreement as exists is not in the whether and where, but in the what and the when. With the value of one part of the “T” line being as good as another, insofar as anything has been proved, it is not difficult to understand how the public becomes disaffected, focusing instead on the issues which are local and which appear to be more easily challenged such as crime, lower land values, traffic and the apparently ubiquitous “parking problem”.

9
Why does the public concern itself? Lash posits that “Man, individually, is a planning animal.” The trained planner as with any professional who has invested time to learn their art adds a special dimension to the process of community planning but the results, which are felt in the everyday commonplaces of community life, are there to be judged by everyone. And as both Lash and Berry find, judge they will, vociferously and disruptively if that is the only avenue available. This issue of trust and community approbation is also addressed in a 1992 report by Michael Fogel, Debriefing Report: Arbutus Industrial Area Planning Process in which the city had to bring in an outside consultant to defuse a community rebellion in Vancouver’s Kitsilano neighbourhood. The community threatened to pull out of the planning process altogether when the community perceived city council to have an unspoken agenda on built form and density for the redevelopment of the brewery site.

According to the Fogel report, the majority of City Council’s expectation that the site would have higher density than the community envisioned was evidently not well communicated to the community at the outset. It is illustrative of the effect of alienation referred to by Berry, which appears to have influenced the BSAPAC, and is indicative that Lash’s observations about GVRD residents’ sensibilities still have currency in Vancouver over 20 years later.

It may be that the public is unfairly harsh in their judgment of policy decisions. It may be, as Lash illustrates, that they would be unlikely to substantially improve the outcome given their own efforts with the same set of circumstances. But the planning process opens itself to extreme and unanswerable criticism when the public which pays for, and lives with, these outcomes can observe that they are not what was promised, or implied, and that the politicians no longer have any inclination to address their issues. It is particularly problematic when obtainable empirical evidence is eschewed in favour of short-term expedience.
If there is one thing to be learned from the Phase One Broadway Station planning exercise it would appear to be that one outcome of government failure to bring the community along with the process is alienating it and derailing its purpose until the outcomes are highly politicized decisions which do not serve either community or government objectives.

The final assumption on which this thesis is based is that a healthy community is based on socio-economic diversity and that, in Canada, a mix of market and non-market housing, ideally distributed throughout neighbourhoods when in an urban setting supports this diversity. This is not a statement about the efficacy of either the market or of publicly funded housing. Other societies appear to successfully weight their strategies differently to achieve similar objectives. It is simply recognition of the Canadian context.

1.6. What The Thesis Attempted To Prove

"Is the Broadway Station Area worse off than it was before SkyTrain?" was the most significant question of the TransPlan study. In addition to drawing thesis conclusions from the original TransPlan case study, this thesis attempts to add empirical research to the primarily qualitative exercise of the community study. The researcher’s intention was to add census and other data to determine whether those indicators would support the community’s belief that the Broadway Station area was in decline and that the decline had occurred after SkyTrain planning and implementation.

Whether this could be attributed to SkyTrain itself was beyond the scope of this thesis, primarily because designing a study to prove a causative link is beyond a master level thesis. Moreover, it is impossibly simplistic to attribute neighbourhood dysfunction with a single catalyst when it is clearly, intuitively, the result of a combination of actions, policies, and coordination (or lack thereof) between all levels of government which contribute to the direction of the community.
Some other important questions raised in the community research phase are outside the purpose of this thesis. The thesis does not attempt to prove or disprove the community's perception that it has been targeted as a replacement for the Downtown Eastside to house the displaced tenants of that low income, high crime neighbourhood.

While the thesis reviews some of the primary goals of the BSAP, it does not offer a technical analysis of why specific policies achieved or failed to achieve these goals. Nor does it attempt to consider all of the goals of the BSAP, some of which have been successful. Instead it considers only those key goals which have been less successful and which contribute to a better understanding of the thesis problem.

The thesis is a review of the Transportation Planning As If The Neighbourhood Mattered findings and has attempted, through further empirical research and interviews with city staff involved with the Broadway Station Area Plan and other pertinent city programs, to determine whether the Broadway Station Area is in decline as is the community perception. Although the researcher interviewed professional staff from the city, region, and transit authority for this thesis, she did not return to the community for further qualitative research, but rather relied on the material gathered for the original TransPlan case study document.

1.7. The Problems and Opportunities Which Had an Impact On The Thesis Study

In addition to census indicators, which could identify trends in the community over the study period, a significant issue regarding the potential decline in the community is the issue of crime. Discovering that historic crime statistics were unavailable at the time of the TransPlan study, the researcher limited focus on crime issues to community prevention techniques. Since that time, Rapid Transit 2000, Ltd. commissioned a safety review on rapid transit-related crime issues. Rather than attempt to duplicate that work of that report, the Security, Safety and Rapid Transit report findings, along with
Transportation As If The Neighbourhood Mattered, and Census Canada data were the key resources for the thesis conclusions.

The TransPlan study gave the researcher the opportunity to work with the community currently residing in the station area in addition to meeting with Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee (BSAPAC) members in order to develop some understanding of the process and policy outcomes as they recall them. These interviews with the BSAPAC chair and several of the committee members garnered personal files from those participants which included nearly all of the minutes of the committee, several of the reports distributed to the committee, and a file of news clippings from the events at that time.

For both the TransPlan and for this thesis, literature regarding social impacts in rapid transit station areas was sought. Theoretical work and empirical studies regarding the impacts of rapid transit stations on their host communities at the community-scale level was the main focus for this search. A serious problem for the study became the lack of relevant literature.

Virtually no literature addressing the fine-grained enumeration area-scale (or for that matter the census tract level) social impacts was found. Such that was discovered was through secondary sources referring to papers and lectures given at conferences. What is more, little related to the Canadian experience. This was a significant issue because the United States, which shares significant similarities in the built form and age of its cities and suburbs with those of Canada, has different laws regarding the transit authority's mandate to purchase property.

Whereas in Canada, some of the most successful transit implementation schemes included public management (including purchase when necessary) of development opportunities which can support public transit, notably in Toronto and elsewhere in the GVRD, in the US this option is rarely possible and is a limiting factor in understanding
the Broadway Station area via studies conducted on US examples. Of these Canadian examples, the researcher could find no studies representing data collected as a consequence of monitoring downstream outcomes of policy decisions in station areas.

1.8. Introduction To The Case Study Report:
Transportation Planning As If The Neighbourhood Mattered (1998)

1.8.1 Research Method for TransPlan

Due to the absence of current Census Canada data or historical crime data, the researcher proposed that the TransPlan study should focus on key-informant interviews and a series of workshops, which would be used both as research tools and as an organizing tool for Cecona. The planning oversight committee (POC) recommended this course of action to the Cecona executive.

In addition to the policy and literature review, the workshops were designed to address issues, which had been identified by the community over three years of building the neighbourhood association. Workshop leaders were recruited from different areas of expertise in the private and public sector. Gregory Saville, a Ph.D. researcher and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) consultant conducted a workshop focused on those techniques. Peter Van Giles, VanCity Credit Union’s Manager of Community Economic Development (CED) gave a workshop on how communities can access the banking sector for community economic development funds. Gavin Davidson, of Better Environmentally Sound Transportation (B.E.S.T.), gave a workshop on alternative transportation issues, while Darlene Marzari, former city councilor and provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs presented on community access to government. In addition, municipal planners and BC Transit managers and staff acted as observers and as resource people in workshops.
1.8.2. Volunteer And Time Constraints In The Community

At the time of the TransPlan study Cecona was undergoing a reorganization of the leadership, developing procedures for its new executive and, in the process, shifting its focus from community organizing to community advocacy. As a result the board of directors was unable to greatly assist the study. Organizing the first meeting of the POC, for example, took Cecona the first four months of what was originally anticipated to be a six-month study period. One consequence was that the community research phase was pushed back by several months, crowding the deadline for completing the project under the time constraints of the grant. Another was that the degree of volunteer capacity on which the grant's budget was based was unachievable.

While the researcher was able to compensate somewhat by donating time to the study, the delay in reaching the community for its input necessarily delayed the report which suffered somewhat by the haste with which it was written, edited, and re-edited to meet the grant completion deadline and a subsequent delay in publishing. In the researcher's opinion, the report's failings due to these constraints were primarily literary rather than substantive.

1.8.3. Collaborative Approaches

Building on work begun earlier in the community, the researcher developed further opportunities for collaboration as a function of the study in order to advance the relationships between the resident community and the policy makers charged with making the decisions which would most affect the community. BC Transit and the City of Vancouver Planning Department were invited to participate in the oversight committee. BC Transit participated in the exercise but the city planners were busy with their own transportation plan. Other relationships with city planners were more effectively pursued.
Collection and analysis of 1991 Census Canada data presented an opportunity to exercise at least a limited collaboration with the municipality. The researcher approached the city's CPTED planner. She agreed to take on a student intern from the Simon Fraser University criminology program. The researcher and city planner collaborated on defining the issues to be studied. The city planner supervised the student's information gathering.

Less successful were attempts to involve the police and fire departments although the newly created Community Crime Prevention Office participated in the committee. Nor did the community centre or neighbourhood house opt to participate. In the latter case, the neighbourhood house director was on maternity leave and the organization was stretched to maintain their basic functions. Unfortunately, access to the adult ethnic communities in the neighbourhood proved nearly impossible without the assistance of the neighbourhood house. This problem was somewhat overcome by mapping workshops conducted at the local high schools whose students were part of the many ethnic minorities that comprise the community.

Another form of assistance from BC Transit was access to archival information from their properties and planning departments. This furnished reports and photographic records of the community.
Chapter One: Footnotes

1 Single occupancy vehicle

2 GVRD; 1995 TDM Public Opinion Research: page 2

iii Portland, Oregon’s success with achieving broad public support for transit development within their region indicates that the public can be persuaded to accept whatever dislocations are necessary in order to achieve a public good. In fact, Portland’s most significant failure in the realm of public transit — its ridership is low — offers a positive note in that it demonstrates that support for the transit system can be developed even among people who do not initially intend to use it.

iv The Broadway Station Advisory Planning Committee was a community-based group of individuals either living or working in the Broadway Station area who were given the mandate by city council to advise on the issues to do with rapid transit implementation. That group had its first meeting in December 1982 and met until the Broadway Station Area Plan report was published in 1987. Their work and terms of reference were similar to Local Area Planning advisory committees. The group participated in developing a terms of reference, participated in the advisory group throughout the planning episode, and disbanded when the plan was complete. To create a terms of reference for the group, the City of Vancouver planning department submitted a proposal for the BSAPAC to vet. A determination of which issues would be discussed, the length of term for the chair and vice-chair, and attendance requirements for maintaining a vote were among the issues discussed among the advisory committee members. The vetted document was in turn presented to Vancouver City Council for its approval.

v Hurmuses, 1998: In workshops the community described the situation as one in which it feels “as if a drug culture is replacing a neighbourhood culture” : page A-8

vi April Dea Hurmuses, 1998: page 27

vii Not-in-my-backyard

viii Jeffrey M. Berry, 1993: page 209

ix Alan Artibise, Vancouver Sun: November 9, 1995

x Jeffrey M. Berry, et. al.; 1993: page 210

xi Harry Lash; 1976: page 25

xii Michael Fogel; 1992: page 6

xiii “U.S. transit agencies cannot legally acquire with federal funds land beyond what is needed for the transit system. There are some other mechanisms for land assembly, such as redevelopment agencies in ‘blighted’ areas, but in general the only assembled land transit agencies have to offer is their park-and-ride lots.” Transportation Research Board; June 1995: page 19

xiv While Chair of Cecona, the researcher actively promoted the crime prevention office as a vehicle for closer collaboration with the city and police force on crime issues and, in turn, between Cecona and the Queen Alexandra group which was then active in the immediate station area. After the Queen Alexandra group committed to continuing that work Cecona stepped away from the project and the two groups thereafter maintained links via sharing a board member from each of their respective Board of Directors.
2.0 DATA COLLECTION

2.1 Literature Review Guidelines For Light Rapid Transit Impacts

Definitive academic research determining the correct boundaries to consider could not be found, but research of land value effects of rapid transit in San Francisco's Bay Area shows an effect to no greater than 5000 feet from the station. In Baltimore, studies on the same issue were limited to 2000 feet from the station. An assumption was made that the 5000 ft level referred to in the Bay Area study was more likely to represent a suburban station, and the 2000 ft limit in the Baltimore study a more urban environment. With the 5000 ft mark from the Broadway Station reaching Venables in the north and King Edward and Kingsway in the south, it appeared for the purposes of this study that the 5000 ft mark covers too large an area in the Vancouver context.

As a consequence, these measures were used as a rough guideline to test for reasonableness, with the 2000-ft. mark assumed to be the more pertinent guideline of the two for the inner-city sample and control stations. The BSAP boundary was selected as a starting point in creating the sample. The Local Area Boundaries established for the city of Vancouver were also considered. Physical attributes such as arterials, hills, and known higher-traffic pedestrian corridors were considered in regard to the influence that the station could be expected to exert for the indicators selected. After these criteria were evaluated EAs were selected, and their boundaries determined the fine level boundary selection.

2.2 Station Selection For Control Data

The stations selected for the controls on the census analysis were selected according to the following criteria:

1. The stations were part of the Phase One SkyTrain development.
   
   This factor was selected so that all of the stations in the study would have had the same period of time for changes within the surrounding community to be manifested.
2. The stations were non-Central Business District (CBD) stations. This factor was selected because the CBD stations have additional multiple factors which influence the data being analyzed. In addition, city of Vancouver policy differentiated between the CBD stations and all others in the system vis-à-vis the regional function each was identified to perform. Although Metrotown as a regional town center was also intended to perform different region-serving functions from the residential stations, including Broadway Station, the inability to separate Metrotown Station from the adjacent stations made selecting out this station from the control data impractical.

2.2.1. Setting The Control Station Data Boundaries
The other station boundaries were selected according to these same distance criteria of 2000 - 5000 feet indicated in the literature and the boundary selected for the sample station, there was a modestly greater geographical latitude for the suburban stations. Although it was presumed that communities that are designed in relation to the car would have wider geographical effects, the increase in distance from the suburban control stations was limited to prevent excessive skewing of the results. Due to proximity of the stations to each other this resulted in the three Vancouver Stations east of Broadway Station being grouped together as Vancouver East Stations. The Burnaby stations of Patterson, Metrotown, Royal Oak, and Edmonds were also amalgamated as Burnaby Stations.

Likewise, the New Westminster Station and Columbia Station were grouped together due to shared boundaries within certain EAs although, strictly-speaking, the Columbia Station was not part of Phase One, but was built in preparation for the Phase Two across the Fraser River into Surrey. The Census Canada boundaries made including this station necessary, and the station’s proximity to the 8th Avenue (downtown) New Westminster Station. In addition, Columbia Station is within the Universe and so could not be easily
separated from the study. Only the sample and the 22nd Street Station in New Westminster were treated as single stations.

As a result, the station data were collected on the following basis:

**Broadway Station:** the sample

**Vancouver East:** including the Nanaimo, 29th Avenue and the Joyce Stations

**Burnaby:** including the Patterson, Metrotown, Royal Oak & Edmonds Stations

**22nd Avenue Station, New Westminster:** which is a suburban station

**Downtown New Westminster:** including the New Westminster & Columbia Stations

**Universe:** Vancouver, Burnaby and New Westminster [excluding the station areas]

**GVRD:** Greater Vancouver Regional District [including the station areas]

For the purposes of analyzing the non-market housing data, the Vancouver East Stations were separated into:

- Nanaimo - 29th Avenue
- Joyce Street

Due to comparing data from two separate data sources, the City of Vancouver’s non-market housing inventory and Census Canada data, there may be minor discrepancies in the result. However, any discrepancies involved due to relating data from separate sources will be the same for all of the control areas for which the non-market housing data are compared. Any discrepancies that may occur will have an equal chance of affecting both the sample and control data, which in this case refers both to the other Vancouver East station areas and the Local Areas into which the data are organized by the City of Vancouver. Finally, the percentage of non-market housing is relative to net increases in housing and will not reflect any market or non-market housing which replaced itself in the same period.
2. 3. **Census Indicators**
The indicators selected were to respond to community concerns that the Broadway Station area had contributed more than its share of region-serving functions and to determine whether the area had, as the community believes, become worse-off than it had been before SkyTrain implementation. The main criteria selected to illustrate whether this perception is borne out by the facts were the following:

- Unemployment rates
- Incidence of low income (owner or renter spending more than 30% of income on shelter costs)
- Tenure (owned or rented)
- Major repairs
- Mobility (5 year)
- Age distribution

In addition population changes were identified. The first two criteria listed above were selected to identify whether there are a significantly greater number of individuals and families that are in at-risk populations. The issue of major repairs needed to a dwelling was selected as an indicator of incivilities in a community, but may also reflect a relative lack of income on the part of property owners. The issues of mobility and tenure are issues that can indicate the degree of residents’ commitment to their community.

While none of these indicators are in themselves a predictor of individual behaviour, as a group of indicators they can form a profile of the neighbourhood which may assist in determining whether the dysfunction which the community perceives is part of a historical pattern or whether there have been changes since SkyTrain was introduced.
2. 4. Variations in Census Data Collection, Comparing Census Data
With Other Data Sources and Suppressed Data

Some of the census indicators were unattainable at the EA level. Low-income data, for example, is suppressed at the EA level in order to protect confidentiality. As a consequence ‘Incidence of Low Income’ was collected for Census Tracts (CT) 37 and 50.02, within which the majority of the Broadway Station area lies. CT 37 includes a section of Mount Pleasant between Broadway, 15th Avenue, Clark Drive and Fraser Street that lies outside of the station boundary. The area includes a significant pocket of heritage housing, some West Coast Specials recently built and some low rent apartment areas along the Broadway corridor. Whether the profile of this area is similar to the part of the CT within the study area is outside the thesis investigation. Nor did the study attempt to test against the control stations. The universe and the GVRD were the exclusive controls for this data.

Another source of data suppression affecting the study was in the area of youth employment. To identify whether the sample showed variations within the boundary for some indicators, the neighbourhood was broken down into precincts. The precinct lines within the sample were based on the following criteria,

♦ arterial boundaries
♦ residential zoning schedules

to assist in comparing census data with non-market housing, human resources, and crime data. When comparing unemployment rates among 15 - 24 year olds at the precinct level, this cohort is sufficiently small as to offer a relatively high degree of error due to data suppression in nine of the Broadway Station’s 23 enumeration areas. Data are randomly rounded between 0 and 5 to maintain confidentiality. For the relatively small sample size the margin of error suggests that this data is less reliable than for the station area as a whole. Nevertheless, within this limitation, the sample size is sufficient in most cases to be indicative of levels of unemployment in station area precincts.
Due to limited resources attaining closely comparable EA boundaries between the 1981 and the 1996 Census Canada data was not attempted. Only 1996 precinct data was used for comparison purposes within the Broadway Station Area and, in some cases, against the control data for 1996.

2.5. Non-Market Housing Data

Non-market housing data was collected only for the City of Vancouver from its Department of Housing and Properties. These data are collected by Local Area and are listed by date of approval, number of units per project, by address, and by housing type such as seniors, families, urban native, and other.

The data were broken down by the three residential station areas of Broadway, Nanaimo-29th Avenue, and Joyce Street Station Areas. For the purposes of comparing this data, EAs west of Rupert were attributed to Nanaimo - 29th Avenue Stations, EAs east of Rupert were assigned to Joyce Street Station. There is one EA primarily in the Joyce Street Station Area with a triangle piece along 29th Avenue to the Station. The majority of the triangle within the 29th Avenue catchment constitutes the park adjacent to the 29th Avenue Station and so it is anticipated that the majority of the data affects the Joyce Station catchment area. The data for that EA were attributed to the Joyce Street Station.

The data were further broken down by pre and post SkyTrain planning. For the TransPlan report this date was determined to be at the end of 1982 based on the date of the inaugural meeting of the Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee, which was held on December 15, 1982.

Adjustments were made with some of that data for this thesis. In order to correspond with the census data the cut-off date between pre and post-SkyTrain development for non-market housing data, both for the study area for the three control stations in Vancouver, was changed to December 31, 1981. Data conclusions in TransPlan were based on December 31, 1982.
In addition to harmonizing the data collection dates, this change is a consistent reflection of the SkyTrain planning phase at the time. The first public meeting to discuss the underground tunnel alignment was held on January 30, 1980 and so, especially for the purposes of housing, the SkyTrain could reasonably be expected to have influenced development decisions. This is particularly so a year later when the data better corresponds with census data for cross-comparison. Although the Census data reflects a snapshot based on the date May 14, 1981, because the non-market housing data is listed only by year, the entire year of 1981 was included as pre-SkyTrain data. Only one development in the Broadway Station Area was attributed to pre-SkyTrain development due to this seven-month discrepancy.

2.6. Ministry of Human Resources

The management of welfare services has changed from being a municipal program to a provincial jurisdiction over time, making comparisons of service delivery virtually impossible. Historic data since that centralization was unavailable due to changes in the ministry itself. The social assistance office at 2350 Commercial Drive (at 8th Avenue), now under the auspices of the Ministry of Human Resources (MHR), was able to produce a snapshot of their case load for this office and the others in Region 1 (City of Vancouver) as of February 1999 only. Distribution of their client base within the Midtown area was unavailable due to concerns about client confidentiality and so direct comparisons with census and other data was not possible.

2.7. Traffic Data

Collected from the City of Vancouver, this data was analyzed first for the TransPlan report in 1996. Data for this thesis is extrapolated from that study. To determine traffic counts and changes over time two-way normalized traffic count data from the City of Vancouver engineering department were analyzed. These data are collected at various
locations throughout the city periodically and catalogued by location including times and directions of traffic in the count. All of the arterial street traffic counts for the community of Cedar Cottage were analyzed and the dates were selected according to the schedule of transportation changes effected by senior levels of government.

Traffic counts prior to and immediately after those construction projects were analyzed and general trends were reported in TransPlan. In addition to this individualized schedule for various streets, all of the study and control streets’ traffic counts for the early 1970s were also compared with traffic counts generated by the Transportation Plan project for the City of Vancouver as part of the CityPlan project and were also reported. New research was not undertaken for this thesis but the summary information from that report is cited as required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION OF TRANSPORTATION ACTION</th>
<th>RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT OR AGENCY</th>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>Second Narrows Bridge</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Upper Levels Highway Highway #99</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TransCanada Highway Arthur Laing Bridge</td>
<td>Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Railway Relocation Act</td>
<td>Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>SkyTrain Alex Fraser Bridge Delta Highway approaches</td>
<td>Federal &amp; Provincial Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>GVRD loses transit planning mandate</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Cassiar Connector North Grandview improvements</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Alex Fraser Bridge improvements</td>
<td>City of Vancouver</td>
</tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Knight Street left turn bays</td>
<td>ICBC and City of Vancouver</td>
</tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Clark Drive left turn bays</td>
<td>ICBC and City of Vancouver</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future:</td>
<td>Broadway-Lougheed LRT</td>
<td>Provincial Government &amp; GVRD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 2.1 Source: Transportation Planning As If The Neighbourhood Mattered
Chapter Two: Notes

¹ Transportation Research Board; June 1995: page 17.
3.0 Literature Review

3.1. General Issues

As previously mentioned the literature review for this thesis offered some difficulty. Little if any empirical evidence on downstream social impacts at rapid transit nodes exists, and so there are no data on which to develop theoretical positions regarding which outcomes are transit-related and which are due to other or multiple causes. The literature review undertaken for TransPlan, and summarized in this thesis, were selected based on the issues raised in the interviews and workshops conducted in the community. In addition to literature on public process, criminal behaviour theory, and other related issues, relevant policy was reviewed to determine whether actions taken by either market or government corresponded to municipal policy goals. Most policy issues are addressed in the body of the thesis text only, the exception being that of city policy regarding categorization of SkyTrain Stations and the respective regional and local roles each was intended to perform, which are further reviewed in this section.

3.2. Slums

In her highly influential The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs offers insights into the dynamics of displaced populations. Writing specifically of the migration of slum dwellers she writes,

The constant departures leave, of course, more than housing vacancies to be filled. They leave a community in a perpetually embryonic stage, or perpetually regressing to helpless infancy. The age of buildings is no index to the age of a community, which is formed by a continuity of people.

In this sense, a perpetual slum is always going backward instead of forward, a circumstance that reinforces most of its other troubles. In some drastic cases of wholesale turnover, it seems that what is getting a start again is hardly a community but a jungle. This happens when new people flooding in have little in common to begin with, and those who are most ruthless and bitter begin to set what tone there is.\(^1\)
Making the case that the Broadway Station area is, in fact, a slum, Stan Tonoski, manager for the Enterprise Property Group building on the Northwest corner of Broadway and Commercial Drive describes the problem of this new commercial building maintaining stable tenancy in part on the mix of the community surrounding it. “Only 10% of the population is there [in the Broadway Station area] by choice”, said Tonoski using a figure which he attributes to the principal of Queen Alexandra School, “And that limits the commercial tenants that can be successful here. The community is very mobile, and is quite poor, and haven’t the economic ability to purchase much. Primarily the threat to the community is that the fast food enterprises that are locating there are servicing the station and young people. There is significant potential for social unrest under these circumstances.”

Continuing on to describe the dynamics of the station area he commented that the bank has been “hit” several times lately and observed that McDonalds too considers the location high risk. “McDonalds is very aware of the risk factor of the location. Obviously,” he said, “they have determined that they can make money despite those risks to staff [in case of a hold up].”

Indeed, if David Short and Stan Tonoski’s interpretations of the community are accurate then, as Jacobs describes it, “Those who are the most ruthless and bitter begin to set what tone there is...” may apply not only to residents trapped in the Broadway Station area but also a certain element of a substantial transient public which finds services which are dedicated to their custom and the preconditions and external cues which imply that the station area is a suitable place for anti-social behaviour. These cues refer to “broken windows” and other criminal behaviour theory and the probability that it is a substantial element driving criminal and nuisance activity in the station area.

3.3. Broken Windows

Summarizing her research on "broken windows" theory, Hurmuses describes the Broadway Station dynamics:
There are some theories about criminal behaviour, which may offer clues to what happened in the Broadway Station area. The "broken window" theory tells us that places that are derelict will attract criminal and nuisance behaviour while a tidy cared-for place will not. If a place looks derelict people will abuse it. This means, literally "broken windows" or graffiti, trash, deteriorated and vacant houses, abandoned cars, sidewalks in poor condition and other cues to passersby that a place has no 'natural guardians' who would interfere in anti-social acts. The Broadway Station exhibits most of these characteristics.

There is some speculation that the deterioration not only influences criminals, but also changes the way residents behave and the way they regard other residents. If true, it suggests that we are affected in ways that are very much more personal than what goes on outside our doors.

Another interpretation of criminal theory suggests that nuisance behaviour cause the most difficulty to the public. This is based on the fact that nuisance behaviour is more common than criminal behaviour, and targets more people. Being pan-handled; confronted by loiterers, or sex trade workers, or harassed by men "cruising" for prostitutes, are all more likely incidents than the relatively rare muggings and assaults. Fear or dislike of nuisance behaviour will influence someone's decision to go to a particular place. This is significant when individuals are prevented from accessing public amenities or goods or services. This absence removes natural guardians from the scene, resulting in an environment conducive to criminal behaviour.

In a recent study of crime rates in the vicinity of SkyTrain Stations, SFU Master's student, Jennifer Buckley, observed a variety of conflicting uses and nuisance behaviour at the station itself. On the Sunday afternoon when she was there, she saw a group of drunk men playing a dice game on the sidewalk in front of the bank machine, a prostitute just inside the entrance along with a number of other loitering individuals. This certainly suggests the sort of nuisance behaviour that would dissuade residents or anyone who felt vulnerable from using the bank machine or the SkyTrain entrance.

Buckley found the day of the week to be incongruent with the behaviour she detailed. In fact, of the days when the researcher went and watched activities in the area for this study, Sunday was the day when the most open displays of drug dealing and drug use on the street were seen.

Since days, times and types of activities are known to influence criminal and nuisance behaviour, we will likely have to look more closely at these aspects of

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1 During the mapping workshops with the Gladstone High School students, one girl referred to experiences she had had being solicited by men in cars around the Broadway Station area. As she spoke the other girls heads began to nod, some murmured assent. Students at Eastside Alternative School independently raised the same issue in mapping workshops conducted there. Kingsway was another area identified, which has similar problems.
community life. The preponderance of services, many of them medical services, has a large influence on the times of day when the area is active. They also house services which at-risk populations use. Fast food outlets are also recognized magnets for problem behaviour. The Enterprise Property Group building on the southwest corner has two such outlets, a Subway, as well as a Starbucks. Subway has a blue light bulb in the washroom to deter intravenous drug users. Both shops control access to the washroom facilities.

Criminal theory suggests that individuals commit crimes in familiar places. They do not stray far from their path to look for opportunities. In the Broadway Station area there is a methadone clinic whose proprietor allowed clients to deal drugs openly in and around the facility at 14th and Commercial Drive. There are ample opportunities for the homeless in the Grandview Cut and evidence that it is being used to stash drugs as well.

3.4. City of Vancouver Policy for The Broadway SkyTrain Station

The first goal listed in the New Commercial Development Opportunities section of the Broadway Station Area Plan is:

1. To strengthen Broadway/Commercial Drive as the community’s core commercial area.

Other goals listed do not include any provision for specifically SkyTrain-related development although higher density development including a residential component was deemed an ideal outcome for high-density development at the corner of Broadway and Commercial. This resulted in a CD-1 zoning for the northeast corner that was never built.

By failing to create a policy to specifically address the needs of the station, those needs have been addressed in an ad-hoc fashion. This outcome was specifically rejected by the BSAPAC. There are two apparent reasons that this seemingly basic requirement of addressing the pressure that the station would exert on this location was not addressed. One is the community planning process itself and the degree to which it was derailed by the provincial government’s actions. The other may be found in the policy statements adopted by the city itself as overarching principles to apply to all stations.

This policy was made explicit early on in the planning process when city council adopted the following guidelines for station outcomes:
General Guidelines call for:

* fostering mixed uses near ALRT stations
* encouraging housing near all stations
* concentrating regionally-significant uses in the central area or at regional town centres outside Vancouver

Core Area Guidelines (Seabus, Discovery, Granville, Stadium and Main Street Stations) indicate that:

* downtown plans and zoning are suitable for ALRT-related development
* downtown developments and stations should be closely linked and integrated
* industrial zoning east of the Main Street station should remain while mixed-use new development occurs through a new comprehensive plan at the station

Suburban Area guidelines (Broadway, Nanaimo, 29th and Joyce Stations suggest that:

* the dominant use around suburban stations shall be residential
* commercial uses in these areas should serve the local area
* changes should occur primarily on the basis of new neighbourhood concept plans

Clearly this policy has not been adhered to by the city planning department, nor have successive city council’s addressed the issue. The planning department’s response to new developments and services that have located here could hardly be otherwise. By failing to address the pressure which the station was bound to exert on the immediate area the policy, in this regard, clearly proved to be unworkable. The planning and permit departments have been faced with real-life proposals in the context of policy that did not foresee the regional pressures on the community.

3. 5. Using Public Funds To Ensure Successful Rapid Transit Implementation and Integration

Although spending public money to ensure successful station area development was used effectively, most notably in Toronto, it was not implemented at the Broadway Station. By comparison, in Toronto, the development of the Scarborough Town Centre was part of a regional plan to develop a multi-centred, hierarchical urban form with downtown Toronto, two regional sub-centres and several intermediate centres connected by various forms of
public transportation. To achieve this goal, Toronto adopted higher zoning densities and made infrastructure improvements, which helped attract development at transit nodes. They also took advantage of their ability to invest public money by building institutional buildings in Scarborough.

This strategy appears to roughly correspond with the strategy pursued at Metrotown (and at Gateway) Station. That there were only three large industrial property holdings in the area undoubtedly added to its success. This is a probability which is supported by similarly successful station area developments; Edmonds, Joyce Street and New Westminster — all had large tracts of industrial and undeveloped land with few owners, a situation which improves the economics of re-zoning.

Another issue that has affected the Broadway Station area is the lack of market response to opportunities. A number of the station area’s problems detailed in the thesis point to an environment which is unstable and zoning which may signal to investors that the station area will, in time, be up-zoned. A clear vision on a particular area’s role being key to investor confidence in property development, the highly politicized atmosphere within which policy was determined for the Broadway Station may have resulted in a plan which failed to generate this confidence.

The extension of RS-4 zoning into what had previously been RS-3 is one of the key factors in attracting non-market housing. It may have simultaneously discouraged other, market-oriented, investors from developing their properties. From a pro-development perspective the station area has the infrastructure and nearby amenities (with the possible exception of adequate park space) to support high rise development. Indeed, due to the strong edges provided by its arterial boundaries (including the added buffer of the Grandview Cut rail line) the Tenderloin has a further advantage in that high rise development would enjoy significant downtown and mountain views without undue overshadowing or incompatible scale with adjacent properties — a common problem at the edges of high rise districts.

Moreover, thus far the effect of the community’s success in convincing city council to reject the planning director’s recommendation to maintain the high rise zoning then in
place in this sector of the station area has been at best a mixed success. By relaxing the
assembly requirements to maximize floor space ratio (FSR) the new zoning was better
tailored to non-market housing requirements. This new opportunity has been successfully
exploited by the non-market housing industry.

That it simultaneously prevented the economies and view amenity potential of high rise
construction, however, appears to have had a negative consequence in the market sector.
The market has likely determined that this area is uneconomic to develop with its current
zoning, the risks associated with the area are too great, and there have been sufficient and
superior opportunities elsewhere. As a consequence, the neighbourhood is approaching
saturation limits for non-market housing which is likely, in the absence of the anticipated
unslumming of other properties in the community, a contributing factor in the increase of
low income high-risk populations identified as a trend in the census data. Most
importantly, in the absence of a policy correction by the city, the non-market industry could
occupy the void created by the current downturn in market development, to the further
detriment of sustaining a healthy socio-demographic mix in the station area. The trend
toward a monoculture of poverty and other risk factors is evident in the data and suggests
that corrective action is an imminent necessity.

3.6. The Broadway Station Area Plan Advisory Committee Concerns
About Gentrification Of The Station Area

As has been referred to earlier, throughout the Broadway Station Area Planning process
from 1982 - 1987, community attitudes concerning the effect of SkyTrain was that the
community had taken on a great burden with the overhead guideway and it should not be
expected to absorb further intrusions on the neighbourhood. This position was supported
by city council in numerous decisions arising from the Broadway Station Area planning
process. In the commercial district especially, concern about “spot” re-zoning is referred to
in the BSAPAC minutes on numerous occasions with unwelcome forms of development
and speculative land acquisition oft-cited concerns. Although understandable, and perhaps
made politically necessary by the provincial government’s actions regarding the overhead
guideway, these decisions do not appear to have served the best interest (or the stated goals) of the community.

One concession to this was approval for a higher density development as a focal point for the station. Referred to as an urban design benefit, the northeast corner was identified as the optimum site for this focal point. It was a highly controversial proposal although the community supported elements involved, such as zoning designed to encourage residential in mixed-use commercial buildings. The scale of Intercon’s subsequent CD-1 development proposal for 1700 East Broadway was opposed by many of the community who had not participated in the station planning process, in addition to which there were also objections within the BSAPAC. The public meeting for the CD-1 proposal attracted over 400 people from Cedar Cottage and Grandview-Woodlands with strong opposition to the proposal’s spanning of the Cut.

Illustration 3. 1.
Intercon site proposal
1700 East Broadway

Source: TransPlan

Speaking about the development proposal, both Cameron Gray, City of Vancouver Housing and Properties, and Bill Montgomery, BC Transit Property Department, consider that the successful Intercon bid for the property and subsequent re-zoning yielded a development proposal that was at the limit of viability and dependent on complementary development occurring in the same area. In fact the property was never developed and was recently purchased by the provincial government for the expansion of the Broadway Station to accommodate the new line. What will happen to the air rights they purchased with the property is yet to be determined.
It is clear from both interviews with participants and from the minutes of the BSAPAC that one of the community's overarching concerns was that a new Metrotown would emerge, based on speculative investment, which would price then-current residents out of the area. Studies on transit-oriented development indicate that their concerns were only valid under certain circumstances:

The effects of metros, or subways, on land development were studied as early as 1930. In his review of this work, Boyce (1972) found that “the subway reflects the condition of the area through which it passes...If the district is growing rapidly, the subway accelerates such growth; where it is stagnant, the values along the route change little; where influences are such as to cause land values to drop, the subway fails to pull the area in question out of the slump it is experiencing.”

Other studies of property value impacts near rapid transit stations in San Francisco and Atlanta showed results that are potentially significant to the Broadway Station. Although one study on San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) showed a positive effect on housing prices and rents near the station (Blaney Associates 1978) to a limit of 5000 ft., and similar effects were noted in Atlanta “…when stations are designed with sensitivity to surrounding neighbourhoods (Nelson and McClesky 1990)”, negative effects have also been studied:

An opinion survey conducted by Baldassare et al. (1979) found less preference for homes near elevated BART stations. Burkhardt (1976) and Dornbush (1975) also note value decreases around BART because of such nuisances as noise and vibration, increased automobile traffic, and the perceived accessibility of different social classes and ethnic groups to otherwise homogenous neighborhoods. Collectively, these studies suggest the land-value impact of rail investments to be highly localized.

But in fact what was not apparent then, is very apparent now. Commercial Drive was not a stagnant area; it was a growing area. It was a community which not only developed new transit-friendly housing, much of which addressed the Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee’s concern for maintaining affordable housing, the street was also developing as the region’s trendiest, hippest commercial strip. City planner Pat Wotherspoon who joined the planning program in its second year described Commercial Drive at that time, “No, we didn’t know what was going to happen [on Commercial Drive] at all. There was still real grit on the street, not the affected grit now in fashion.”
While finding less attractive blocks at the margins of otherwise effective and desirable commercial districts is not unusual, the extreme dysfunction of the area around and south of the station is noteworthy. In other similar marginal areas such as 4th Avenue east of Burrard, or 41st Avenue east of the Boulevard these blocks are literally at the edge of the shopping area. There are fewer significant pedestrian-generating functions. Not so the station area. There are fully seven blocks of uninterrupted, dysfunctional commercial area. Yet the station is a large pedestrian traffic-generator, and Commercial Drive south of the station is identified as a pedestrian pathway in the community (Hurmuses 1998) Clearly, some other issues are influencing the area. What are they?

3.7. Structural Issues In The Broadway Station Area

The most significant destabilizing element is the overhead guideway itself. Hurmuses refers to this in TransPlan:

The negative effects are many and include: destroying public and private views; infrastructure whose scale is not pedestrian-friendly; and “locking out” properties on the east side of Commercial Drive, thereby destroying significant commercial development potential. In addition, the station design itself, oriented as it is to Broadway, may encourage criminal activity.
Another difference between this area and the core of Commercial Drive farther north is the adjacent housing stock. Although Cedar Cottage has significant pockets of heritage, it does not have the concentration, the continuity of similar vintage housing or the larger, more impressive houses that dot the Grandview Woodlands streetscape.

The BSAP describes the area southeast of the station as declining. The area to the northwest, including the Tenderloin, is acknowledged in the plan to have had poorly designed buildings with compatibility problems with neighbouring single family housing, owing to the lack of controls offered by the RM-3 zoning for low rise wood-frame construction. Contrasting this, the adjacent areas northeast and southwest of the station were described as well kept, desirable areas whose zoning should attempt to preserve the existing housing stock. A walkabout of these areas indicates that some homeowner improvements can be seen in these areas, with heritage retention and improvements common in the southwest and new detached single family construction more prevalent in the northeast.

Likewise, in the commercial district a number of differences between Cedar Cottage and Grandview Woodlands are evident. Cedar Cottage’s main shopping district was originally off the present-day Victoria-Commercial Diversion at 18th Avenue. Consequently, there are few quality masonry buildings at the Broadway commercial node, such as you see farther north. In addition, the area has three medical buildings, which dominate the east side of Commercial Drive. They are not pedestrian friendly and add to the dis-continuity
of retail and commercial space along the east side of Commercial. This discontinuity extends from North Grandview at 8th Avenue to 12th Avenue.

Illustration 3. 4.
Medical buildings
11th Ave. & Commercial Dr.

Source: TransPlan

Commercial Drive south of 12th Avenue is further dedicated to automobile-oriented, region-serving businesses, and that orientation is further supported by zoning. There is a strip mall at 12th Avenue and Commercial, which is oriented away from the west side of Commercial Drive but which nevertheless has impeded access to its limited parking, owing to heavy regional traffic on 12th Avenue. There is a medical building and the IWA hall directly to the south, all of which are poorly designed for pedestrian comfort. As previously noted, however, this stretch of Commercial Drive was identified by the community as a natural pedestrian pathway for residents living southwest of the station, \( ^{xvi} \) and so the appropriateness and efficacy of that zoning are in question.

As a consequence, the street has considerable obstacles to overcome and these problems are reflected in the failure of what might otherwise be viable commercial incubator space. For example, although there are storefronts in the block leading up to Clark Park they failed to achieve success until recently occupied by the Compassion Club. It is too soon to determine whether this use will remain stable: the Compassion Club is dependent on the approbation of the provincial government toward its still-illegal activities. Ironically, the Compassion Club, which is clearly a regional resource, has improved the livability of the block with its plant-filled windows, which alone recommend this block as a pedestrian-friendly space.
3.5. The elevated guideway runs down the east alley limiting commercial property development along these 10 blocks.

10th Ave. & Commercial Dr.
Source: TransPlan

3.8. The History of A Place And Its Influence On Public Perception

Although the overhead guideway may be the primary contributing factor limiting desirable commercial development in the station area, and the lack of a coherent vision for the station area’s future a factor limiting both its commercial and residential development; one might reasonably point to the historic absence of architectural interest in the station area (there truly is no “there” there), the community’s reputation as a tough working class neighbourhood, and its function as a place where fragile populations are ‘helped’ — as significant indigenous contributing factors in its failure to unslum. In The Experience of Place, author Tony Hiss discusses the possibility that our recollections of a particular place may carry on with us even after it no longer has the same attributes:

Kevin Lynch, a highly regarded city planner who taught for many years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was able to show, in an innovative book called The Image of the City (1960), that the mental maps of our home towns which we all carry around with us have a lot more precision and detail if we live in places that offer us richly detailed and well-defined experiences. (In his famous example, a typical mental map of Boston was an intricate diagram, and a typical mental map of New Jersey was practically a blank.) That Times Square’s reputation as a pornography center has lived on despite a quietly effective cleanup effort suggests that in times of rapid change, our mental maps of places quickly get obsolete. Certainly if we’re not in the habit of checking up on the experiences around us, we will be slow to recognize either a deteriorating environment or one undergoing a process of renewal.

One of the apparent problems in the Broadway Station area is that the resources dedicated to its health and development are insufficient given the dynamic rate of change. This
applies to a range of possible community resources, but is nowhere more evident than in the municipal planning model. There has been to date no differentiation in planning resources given to this major regional transportation node in relation to other residential areas in the City of Vancouver. Yet it is one of the most dynamic in the city. The downtown stations benefit by a central area planning team that maintains ongoing planning for the CBD, no such ongoing planning and monitoring takes place in the Broadway Station Area.

The station area is treated as yet another example of a neighbourhood which has a few outstanding issues, no greater or lesser than any other. This was amply demonstrated in the CityPlan ‘visioning’ pilot project which dedicated the same level of planning and technical support to the Dunbar community as it did to the Kensington - Cedar Cottage (KCC) Local Area.xviii

Dunbar - Southlands Local Area with 21, 420 population at the time of the study had only one half the population of the Kensington - Cedar Cottage Local Area, which had 42,400.xix Cedar Cottage and Kensington participants requested a compromise: specifically that the two communities in its Local Area be severed, that resources be divided on a per capita basis between the two Local Areas, or that a major focus of the KCC study be directed to the Broadway Station in recognition of the destabilization it visits on the community. The City of Vancouver planning department did not concur.

A further indication that neither the city nor the province has yet apprehended the nature and degree of the problem at this station can be inferred from the resources that have been deemed appropriate to the current Broadway Lougheed Corridor Station planning episode for the Broadway Station. The city has responded to the province’s new rapid transit initiative by putting more planning resources into the Broadway Station area. But to date no public advisory committee with a defined terms of reference has been struck, nor has any comprehensive approach to identifying potential corrective action on current Broadway Station policy been approved for study. A review of the commercial zoning is underway but it is extremely limited in scope, no review of the RS-2, RM and RT residential zoning schedules are planned.
One systemic approach to addressing the problems of planning, not just for this station but for all major rapid transit interchanges, would be to create a Station Area Precinct much like the Local Areas for which data are currently collected, to monitor change in this dynamic environment. Even if it is necessary to limit expense due to budget considerations, these Station Precincts could be phased in, addressing the major hot spots first with other Station Precincts added when possible. Another complementary change would be to assign dedicated staff, much as staff is dedicated to the central area team, to maintain a monitoring and intervention function. By addressing the dynamism of station areas, this model could serve to enable planning staff to intervene when station area livability is threatened, by making recommendations to council for the timely fine-tuning of city policies to attain stated goals. What is more, this model has the potential for focusing significant volunteer resources by dedicating an individual or group within the city to develop the anecdotal dimensions and empirical research via community participation.

Other cause and effect uncertainties exist within the Broadway Station Area, but are anecdotal and their precise relationships are difficult to determine. They do, however, echo the issues raised by Hiss. For example, the historic problem of Clark Park was a subject for discussion in the community workshops, including the high school mapping exercises.

Known as Buffalo Park to long-time residents, it has suffered a variety of problems over the years. Many still remember the youth “gangs” of the 1960’s. Even in the Gladstone High School students’ mapping exercise Clark Park was frequently referred to as a hot spot, with "gangs" marked as the reason for selecting it. Yet in other community workshops, even residents from the park area do not believe that the activities in the park have been teenage gang-related for many years. But the reputation clearly persists.

That reputation can only have been further ingrained when a methadone clinic opened across the street from the park (which is just five blocks south of the station). Until 1997 this dispensary served 400 customers. The doctor associated with the clinic had his license to practice revoked and the pharmacist permitted an environment where illegal drug
sharing and peddling was allowed on and around the premises. The pharmacy has since been limited to 75 clients (it is grandfathered, new dispensaries are permitted a maximum of 25). According to area residents, drug dealing in and around the clinic spilled over into the children’s play area.

Illustration 3.6. Clark Park, across from the methadone clinic

Source: TransPlan

Hurmuses goes on to note that the east side of the park has been abandoned by families and their children: a Grandview Community Centre (Trout Lake) summer program conducted from a trailer at the east playground was discontinued during the period the dispensary was attracting drug dealers. That it had genuine effects on Clark Park appears certain, yet a question remains: Was the abandonment of the east playground by families due to a general and long standing perception of Clark Park, causing the community to view it as indefensible space? Or is it a reflection of the problems created by an opportunistic service attracted to transit nearby? Whichever has the greater effect is uncertain, and illustrates the difficulty of drawing conclusions regarding which is the cause and which the effect of incivilities.
Then principal, David Short, in 1996, referred to the extreme transience in the school as one of its central destabilizing issues. He described turnover as high as 90% - 100% in some recent years.

Since this report was published a long time local restaurant, Tommy O’s, closed and a McDonalds and Quinzo Subs has opened in the now-sub-divided building. Another pizza restaurant that is, like Quinzo Subs, a food chain take-out usually seen in shopping mall food courts is moving into the vacant portion of the building.

The city did budget more for KCC printing and distribution costs.

Southlands, which had a recent plan, was eliminated from the study and a section of Kerrisdale, MacKenzie Heights, was added.

After a television news crew filmed dispensary clients openly selling and sharing their drugs in and around the clinic, the provincial government introduced legislation limiting new methadone clinics to 30 clients. This dispensary was "grandfathered" with the right to service 75 patients. Broadway Station Area Plan Advisory Committee members recalled that the location of the methadone clinic was presented to them as a resource for local users. It is difficult to imagine that 400 methadone users then lived in close proximity. The SkyTrain amenity appears to be an additional attractor for this business.
4.0 The Broadway Station Area Planning Process: 
Background

4.1. The Community and SkyTrain Planning circa 1983

By the end of 1980, nearly two years before station planning officially began in the
neighbourhood, the Broadway Station area community was active with public events and
a strategy to inform the public of what they saw as a disproportionate threat to the
community if a tunnel option was not pursued. Their efforts gathered a great deal of
publicity and the support of city council. These efforts failed to persuade the provincial
government. i

A city of Vancouver planner assigned to the Broadway Station Area Planning project
stated that one cannot really understand the Broadway Station Area Plan without
understanding the context in which SkyTrain implementation occurred. The choices
which were made by the province were not only socially unjust, he states that "[he] cannot emphasize enough how brutally the community was treated." He described
incidents such as the province holding meetings on routing selections, then going off and
making unilateral decisions about where it would go and creating a physical profile which
was counter to the wishes of both community and the city. "At one point the city pulled
all of us out of there. No one was working on it at all." ii

Although the province claimed that time and money were factors in their rejection of the
$14 million tunnel option, the planner rejects this interpretation. He believes that there
were no serious timing issues that were irresolvable, noting that the province did at-grade
and suppressed-grade guideways and stations at Nanaimo and 29th Avenue station areas
despite the higher cost and time involved.

When asked why the province made the decisions they did, he stated that the province
had no sense of social justice and equity, which explained the Broadway Station. As for
their agreement on depressing the Nanaimo and 29th Avenue station areas, although he
was the planner for all the Vancouver East stations, he stated that he had no rational explanation but believed that they may have been inclined to be more conciliatory after the "brou ha ha" about the Commercial Drive alignment.

He has many other recollections of the community involved at that time. He has strong feelings that the people who maintained their involvement after the guideway decision worked at being constructive despite the social injustice of the province's actions but that people were no longer willing to compromise. The planner recalls that regional-context issues could not come forward under those circumstances.

After describing this scenario, he posited that the plan that emerged was the only plan that could have resulted from the tumultuous effect the province's actions had on the community reiterating that "the guideway decision coloured everything from then on". These events may explain the failure of the Broadway Station Area Plan (1987) to ensure that region-serving consequences of the station and development-limiting consequences of the guideway were anticipated and addressed.

In the absence of the trust on which Lash and Berry posit that community planning is ideally based, it appears that the community was driven by its reaction to a perceived injustice rather than gaining the perspective to engage in the important regional implications of the Broadway Station. In turn, the province failed to address the consequences of their implementation decisions: there were no property purchases except for properties directly required for construction, no public-private partnerships were effected for severely affected sites adjacent to the guideway, nor was there any other significant mitigation for the broader community. Such mitigation as was negotiated in the planning stage for east Vancouver stations was minimal, and related almost entirely to issues to do with pedestrian access to stations, landscaping for the guideway (with the use of City of Vancouver trees), physical property encroachments, business dislocations due to guideway and station construction, noise fencing at four locations along the right of way and other such essential accommodations.
That the loss of community leadership occurred and that the attitude of those remaining became coloured by the province’s decision is evident both in the committee minutes, and in the structures they elected to construct. For example, the BSAPAC discussed forming three sub-committees: i) a lobbying sub-committee, ii) a zoning and development sub-committee, and iii) a publicity subcommittee. The city planner, Kent Smith dissuaded the group from forming all of these sub-committees at that time, recommending instead that the group limit itself to a tunnel lobbying sub-committee. Indicative of the priorities of the group it nevertheless elected to form both a lobbying and publicity sub-committee. Significantly, it apparently considered the zoning and development sub-committee a lesser priority, although at least one consideration may have been that the city itself was motivated to ensure that zoning and development issues maintained sufficient prominence.

Moreover, several issues which were repeatedly discussed by the BSAPAC suggest that the options which it chose to pursue were biased toward ensuring that individuals were not victimized by what was viewed by many as a disproportionate and unjust burden. For example, according to recollections of participants and planners, many homes that the province declined to purchase would have a guideway within inches of their properties, sometimes within a few feet of the house. Future SkyTrain passengers would be looking into bedrooms.

In response to their concern that there would inadequate compensation, if any, for severely affected individual landowners, the Broadway Station community sought to aid these individuals. One strategy of their publicity sub-committee was to interest the media in these affected homeowners’ stories, presumably to politically embarrass the province into what they considered fair compensation: one approach was to conduct walkabouts, another to take photos of affected properties.
Some property owners wished to have their properties expropriated or purchased, but they weren't. Some who were to be expropriated did not want to be. One prominent case involved a family who participated in the planning committee for a period of time. They had purchased their properties as a retirement income with their adult children occupying a unit in one of the conversions they owned on the future right-of-way. The committee discussed their situation on a number of occasions with updates regarding negotiations noted in BSAPAC meeting minutes. The BSAPAC supported this family's attempts to get what they considered a fair price that would allow them to purchase similar properties to maintain a retirement income.

Further evidence that the community was focused on local and immediate concerns rather than future regional issues are found throughout the minutes of the BSAPAC. Arguing that SkyTrain should serve the community rather than the community serving ALRT ridership, the community repeatedly objected to anticipated speculative investment in the station area. A strong response was elicited when a draft report to the City of Vancouver Planning and Development Committee specified 5000 additional units for the Broadway Station Area: the community was further incensed that this assumption should be made when the BSAPAC had not yet determined what, if any, should be the increase in housing at this location.

The BSAPAC committee further strongly supported the development of long term affordable rental housing in the station area to maintain a stable housing base for this marginalized community. Their often-stated concern was that the low-income community would be displaced by market redevelopment of the largely obsolete rental accommodation in the Tenderloin northwest of the station. How this would be accomplished without an increase in housing was less clear both in the minutes and in the subsequent BSAP. Given what was happening elsewhere in the city, this expectation and concern is entirely understandable. Kerrisdale, the West End, and Kitsilano all had wholesale demolition of affordable rental housing and rental apartments converted to condominium ownership. One thousand people were being evicted from the Downtown
Eastside in preparation for Expo 86. City housing activists were challenging these outcomes. From elderly widows in Kerrisdale to the 13 people deemed to have died as a direct result of the Downtown Eastside evictions, and in the context of the housing crunch of the early 1980's, this was a topical issue.

Given this context it is understandable that the community expected similar developments to be attracted to the Broadway Station area. While some new research was underway, historically little research into transit and land use issues had been conducted and what did exist was far from conclusive. Nor it is likely, according to the city planner, that the community could have "heard" the information even if it was conveyed.

Confirming the implications of BSAPAC minutes, when discussing the dynamics of the committee after the guideway decision, the planner describes meetings with the community where he left at the end of the evening with a pound of his flesh left behind, observing with some humour "and they liked me". When speaking before city council the community was angry which, although not an ideal planning environment, struck him as necessarily the outcome of a community which both he, and they, felt had been shafted by the province.

Nevertheless whether information regarding the likelihood of certain outcomes was unavailable, or simply could not be effectively conveyed, the Broadway Station area did not experience the housing changes the community feared. As a consequence the policies which they demanded that the city pursue did not achieve the intended outcome. The actions of the provincial government having truncated the planning process, neither the community nor city council addressed the correct questions.
Chapter Four: Notes

i Vancouver Sun, Saturday, October 2, 1982: page A14

ii Vancouver Sun, Wednesday, August 10, 1983

iii Under the subsequent Harcourt government, however, BC Transit's plan to put Handi-Dart overnight parking under the guideway was overturned, and a small linear park built in its place.

iv BSAPAC minutes; Wednesday, February 23, 1984: page 2

v BSAPAC minutes; Wednesday, February 9, 1983: page 3

vi BSAPAC minutes; Wednesday, February 23, 1984: page 1

vii ALRT's foes vow to fight monster, an article in the Vancouver Sun dated Tuesday August 3, 1982 includes a photograph of a young child carrying a placard which read “PUT IT 10 FEET FROM JACK DAVIS'S BEDROOM”.

viii Vancouver Sun, Tuesday, August 3, 1982

ix BSAPAC minutes; Wednesday, June 1, 1983: page 4

x Security Resource Group; 1999: page 16
5.0 Data Analysis

5.1. SkyTrain Implementation In The Construction Phase

In the area between North Grandview (8th Ave.) and 12th Avenue, 20% of the ground-level retail were immediately displaced or moved for the SkyTrain guideway. They provided continuous retail frontage before dislocation. City planners hoped to counter some of this degradation by encouraging BC Transit to assemble various properties, most notably those between 14th Avenue and 16th Avenue, and south of the proposed Croatian Centre to the Stainsbury triangle and the northeast corner of Commercial and Broadway (1700 East Broadway). Much of the latter had already been expropriated for the SkyTrain right-of-way. These efforts were unsuccessful. BC Transit did work with businesses to help them relocate, although how many were relocated out of the area is not known.

Some that stayed in the area, such as Betty Brite dry cleaner, ended in a markedly inferior location and eventually closed. While no baseline data was ever published to monitor the downstream effect of the dislocations, it is not unreasonable to assume that this displacement was a contributing factor in the subsequent decline of the station area.

5.2. Census Canada Findings: Population and Dwelling Increases

At the time of SkyTrain planning and subsequent implementation, the Broadway Station Area was already a densely populated station area. Population increased by 2996 between 1981 and 1996, raising the population at the station to 18,221. This relatively modest increase may reflect the fact that the area already had significant three story wood-frame apartment building stock and a few high rises close to 1st Avenue, in addition to its single family areas. Moreover, many of the single-family houses in the station area were conversions, and as such already contained multiple households. The community, as a consequence, was already substantially built out for its zoning schedules albeit that many of its apartment buildings are obsolete.
Although the number of dwellings in the sample increased by 25% between 1981 and 1996, its population increased by only 20%. To some degree this discrepancy can be explained by the loss of children living in the sample area. The number of children of both sexes in all age cohorts, except males between five and nine years of age, exceeded the Universe average in 1981, at 24.48% of the station area population. In 1981 the Universe average was 21.9%. In 1996, the Broadway Station area maintained its higher number of children as a percentage of total population at 21.2% when compared to the Universe at 19.9%, but the gap narrowed a significant 100%, from 2.6% to 1.3%, in that period.

Even more significant is that the absolute number of children has declined from 3850 to 3550, or 7.8% over this 15 year period; whereas the Universe, by contrast, experienced a very modest 0.67% decline in the number of children and youth, from 129,815 to 128,935 over the same period.

Illustration: 5.1. Chart: Broadway Station and Universe Age Distribution, 1981. Source: Author
5.2.1. The Ameliorating Effects of Non-Market Housing

An interesting issue affecting the data is that while this overall decline in the number of children has occurred, there have been significant increases in family-oriented social housing in the Broadway Station area. This will have militated against the loss of children in the community and may also represent a relatively captive population due to provincial government policies which have targeted these developments to core-need residents with less economic ability to leave the neighbourhood.\[5\] If we were to assume that these core-need residents will remain in this category, the children under ten who are in the community now might be expected to age in place which would result, presumably, in a higher than average number of children and youth in the 10-20 year age cohort. Were this the case, however, the children in the youngest group would be less likely to be replaced in this housing until the first group is through the system and the unit is turned over to another family.

That non-market housing is a more significant issue in the Broadway Station community can be extrapolated from the data on market vs. non-market housing. Non-market housing increases in the Broadway Station area have been on a different order of magnitude than at either the Nanaimo-29th Avenue Station area or the Joyce Street Station area although there are a modest number of non-market cooperatives just south of Kingsway, outside the Joyce Street Station study area boundary.

**Illustration: 5.2. Chart: Market and Non-Market Housing: Net Increase 1981-1996 Source: Author**
Of the 1455 net increase in dwellings in the Broadway Station area 54.8% were non-market. This is in contrast to the Nanaimo-29th Avenue Station area with 25% non-market out of a net gain of 515 new dwellings. At the Joyce Street Station where significant redevelopment of its industrial lands yielded an additional 1785 units, only 131 non-market housing units were built representing 7.3% of net new development. Although outside of the study area, if the 255 units south of Kingsway and Joyce are included, this percentage would rise to 21.6%. However, due to the increase in land value that the re-zoning of these industrial lands conferred, the researcher expected to find a larger number of non-market housing developments in the immediate area of the station. Because this is a long-term development project it may be that non-market housing will be included in later phases.

The development of stable affordable family-oriented rental housing was one of the strategies proposed by the community involved in the Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee, and as such the increase in non-market housing represents a successful achievement of this goal. In the absence of the market developments anticipated by the community, however, it appears to have had unintended consequences which are counter to the result which the committee wanted. The desired outcome of this strategy is expressed in the second and third statement of goals in the BSAP:

2. To provide the potential for more residential units oriented to families.
3. To ensure that new development respects the diversity of existing households in the Broadway Station Area and that a range of housing options are provided in the community for both new and existing residents. vi

This second goal appears to be undermined by the degree of non-market relative to market development. Maintaining the community’s diversity was referred to a number of times in the minutes of the BSAPAC. Clearly, the end result was intended to be maintenance of a family-oriented community with a socio-demographic mix. As the data suggest, however, that is not what is occurring. Not only have the relative numbers of
children dropped in relation to the universe average, but key indicators show an increasingly poorer community, with higher levels of unemployment, increased numbers of individuals and families living below the poverty line, a lower level of home ownership and a deteriorating housing stock. When coupled with the correlation of crime to the station area, this has implications for the viability of this community as a suitable environment, particularly for families with children.

Illustration: 5. 3. Chart: Broadway Station and Universe Age Distribution 1996 Source: Author

This outcome may reflect a concern among parents in the Broadway Station area about poverty issues in the community, which are in turn reflected in the schools. Hurmuses refers to this concern in the TransPlan report:

Among the problems are significant poverty and ESL issues in the schools. Queen Alexandra, in particular, draws many of its students from the poorest sections of Grandview Woodlands and Mount Pleasant. Parents express concern about local schools because of perceived (and real) problems. Many, who can, send their children to alternative schools inside and outside the community. This appears to be a cross-cultural phenomenon, which should be studied further to ensure that this situation is not allowed to fester.vii
The age distribution of children who do live in the neighbourhood leaves open the question of whether this trend will continue. The largest concentration of children are in the pre-school age cohort when parents will often remain in a community which they plan to leave before their children begin their schooling. Evidence that this tendency may be exerting itself in this community can be observed in the shrinking numbers of children and youth between 10 and 20 years of age, who are now a lower percentage of the community than we find in the Universe.

This phenomenon is cited by Hurmuses (1998) who refers to attitudes expressed by residents that they have a higher tolerance for personally experiencing incivilities in their environment than they feel is acceptable for their children. This was a theme of discussions in the case study workshops, in which the current community expressed concerns that a monoculture of poverty is developing in the station area (a more varied social environment was considered ideal). The data supports the perception of the community that the station area is moving in this direction.

5.2.2. Non-Market Housing: Broadway Station and Vancouver Local Areas.

This increase in social housing in the Broadway Station Area is unique in its scale, not only in relation to other Vancouver SkyTrain Stations, but also within the city as a whole. Non-market housing has increased in the city overall, increasing from 6.09% of total dwellings in 1981 to 8.8% in 1996 and this increase is mirrored in many of the Local Areas. The Broadway Station Area, however, experienced an increase from 10.34% to 18.2% in this same period, unlike changes seen elsewhere in the city. An increase at this order of magnitude was not experienced in any other Local Areas in the city during this same period, although equally significant increases on smaller overall percentages were seen.

Moreover, neighbourhoods which had traditionally exercised this role as host communities for non-market housing experienced overall declines in net housing increases, in one case only minimal gains. In 1981, the neighbourhoods with the
largest non-market housing components were Downtown, which dropped from 39.48% to 17.72%; Strathcona (including the Downtown Eastside) which dropped from 62.92% to 47.59%; and Killarney which saw a modest increase, from 23.08% to 25.25% during the study period.

Of the two other communities that had similar percentages of non-market housing to the Broadway Station area in 1981, Fairview (8.50%) and Sunset (9.16%), both experienced only slight increases, to 9.6% and 10.68% respectively.

As a result of the increases in non-market housing which occurred after SkyTrain was announced, the Broadway Station Area has ascended into the four highest-ranking communities in the provision of non-market housing. The effect of this role in these respective communities, however, appears to be quite different.

In Killarney, for example, the majority of the non-market units are cooperative housing and were part of a planned community in the Champlain Heights area in the 1970s. A few others are scattered through the community with a small concentration of four projects, 255 units, south of Kingsway and Joyce. Because these co-ops were primarily built under the old rules they will include a significantly more varied socio-economic mix than is likely to be the case in Broadway Station area “core-need” social housing.

Downtown has experienced a high degree of market housing development during the study period. Moreover, the percentage of social housing in relation to the increase of housing overall has resulted in a dramatic decrease in non-market housing as a ratio of the net increase in housing downtown. Therefore the effect of non-market housing downtown is one of maintaining diversity in an area that might otherwise become unaffordable to any but the wealthy, the childless, and the upper middle class.

In Strathcona and the Downtown Eastside, social housing addresses long-term populations who are being housed in situ. The social housing which is being provided
there are superior accommodations to the SRO’s which tenants formerly occupied and which are now being, increasingly, converted to tourist accommodation and other uses. By contrast, Broadway Station area social housing appears to be displacing homeowners in an ad hoc fashion, without adequate planning and monitoring of outcomes.

5. 2. 3. Community Advocacy and City Resources in the Broadway Station Area

This different context alludes to another discrepancy between the Broadway Station area and the other inner city communities — the degree to which communities have city planning department resources, community advocacy funding, or social funding resources devoted to them. The differences are most acute between the Downtown - Downtown Eastside - Strathcona neighbourhoods, and the Broadway Station Area. Downtown has a permanent central area planning team, the DTES has ongoing and substantial planning resources including a recent commitment by all levels of government to coordinate resources for that community, Strathcona receives further special funding for the community centre to deliver various social programmes in addition to which the Downtown Eastside Resident’s Association (DERA) alone has 40 paid advocates. Even Grandview Woodlands has substantial extra funding for its community centre and community school. The discrepancy is easily understood. The other inner city communities have had a greater historical need, and an experienced community leadership to advocate for these resources. Moreover downtown districts traditionally command greater planning resources than non-downtown residential areas.

The Broadway Station Area has had historic needs but they were not as acute as the downtown communities. Moreover, the station area’s increased needs are a relatively recent manifestation. Perhaps because of both the velocity and the nature of change, this specific community has found itself without the volunteer resources to pressure government to address its issues. Nor does it have the advocacy funding afforded the downtown communities, which can supplement the volunteer capacity that it does possess. ix
The consequences of this are varied. For example, despite the apparent shortcomings of the Broadway Station Area Plan — most notably the policy assumption that the station area would not become a regional node — and in the context of a new rapid transit line meeting (likely terminating) at the Broadway Station, and despite the outcome of the CityPlan visioning exercise which acknowledged the need for a more comprehensive look at the station area, the city has nevertheless limited its review of the plan to a very small area in the immediate vicinity of the station. This funding decision occurred despite the known failure of either the residential or commercial areas to attract significant market development, despite the current BSAP’s apparent failure to articulate a viable vision for the community which has since demonstrated an increasingly region-serving character, and despite the foreseeable effect of a new rapid transit corridor whose implementation will, if the historic trend is any indication, further increase these regional pressures.

Another outcome of the lack of effective advocacy in the Broadway Station area relates to its inability to influence such decisions of city government as its policy on policing the Downtown Eastside which the community believes has had consequences for the Broadway Station area. The community’s anecdotal observation has been that increased policing in the Downtown Eastside (without additional policing in the immediate surrounding areas) correlates to increased sex and drug trade in the Broadway Station area. Elevated crime levels in the station area are identified in Geographic Information System (G.I.S.) maps but do not confirm elevated levels of drug traffic — the incongruity may reflect a lack of enforcement or reporting of such activities. It may also reflect a relative lack of legitimate activities to distract passers-by from illegal activities. The Broadway Station Area does show evidence of elevated incidence of other crimes although the causative factors and degree of change over time are not known. Yet the response of the city to date has been a narrowly focused effort on addressing the sex trade and drug traffic issues of the Downtown Eastside, the effect of which is almost certainly displacement rather than cessation of such traffic.
Given the proximity of the station area to the Downtown Eastside, and in the context of the uncertain future of the Broadway Station area, that these problems will and are migrating to the area is a reasonable interpretation on the part of the community. Without adequate volunteer resources, adequate funding for professional assistance to the community or a commitment by governments for remedial intervention to address the unanticipated effect of SkyTrain implementation, the Broadway Station community will, if this fragmented approach to social problems continues, maintain its downward spiral.

Contributing to this deficiency of local and provincial funding for planning, advocacy or remedial mitigation in the Broadway Station area may be governments' failure to create a data management system. A properly designed and resourced data management system is the key to creating the necessary empirical evidence to effectively monitor change, to support governments' identification and prioritization of resources and, in addition, to creating empirical data for further rapid transit implementation. The data collection sets currently being used cannot achieve these outcomes.

Since the 1960s, when the United Way developed the Local Area boundaries for social service delivery, Canada Census data have been organized into these groupings. The Broadway Station area primarily straddles Kensington - Cedar Cottage and Grandview Woodlands' Local Areas with some potential effect on sections of Hastings-Sunrise and Renfrew-Collingwood.

As a consequence the data which are most economically available -- the Local Area Profiles -- do not give accurate indicators of the activity, the changes, or the needs of the Broadway Station area. Addressing that failure is one of the recommendations of this thesis: By creating Station Precinct Areas, the empirical data to monitor and intervene in station areas would ensure that more responsive planning would be possible.
5.3. Dwelling and Mobility Data

In the case of ownership and mobility there is no clear-cut pattern among the sample and control stations in relation to the Universe or GVRD with the exception of increased diversification of tenure within the control stations' communities. Some stations have seen a rise in ownership, some a drop. This difference likely reflects the difference between station areas' composition at the time of implementation and the relative opportunity to develop and diversify housing forms and tenure options.

Broadway Station alone, however, shows a break from this pattern of increasing diversification. In 1981 the sample, at 40% ownership, was midway between the highest and lowest control station averages, and while significantly lower than the GVRD average ownership levels, it was within striking distance of the Universe average. However, since that time, it has dropped in rank from third of five to last place among Phase One station areas. During the same period the Universe showed a minor decline with ownership decreasing from 47% to 45% whereas the GVRD average grew from 57%
to 61% likely reflecting both lower house prices in newly developed suburbs away from the city core and the entry of the baby boom into the housing market.

To a far greater degree than in 1996, in 1981 the control stations exhibited atypical ownership patterns, either considerably higher or lower than the Universe or GVRD average. At the Vancouver East and the 22nd Street Station areas where ownership was the highest, significantly higher than either the Universe or GVRD average, the level of ownership did drop but to levels which are still higher than the universal controls.

Illustration: 5.5. Residential Ownership Patterns, 1981 - 1996

Burnaby and Downtown New West who had ownership rates significantly lower than the Universe or GVRD saw increases in ownership, in the case of New Westminster that increase was very substantial.
Because none of the stations were typical to begin with their change in ownership, although not in the same direction for all, demonstrates that increased diversity is a shared attribute among all the control stations. The Broadway Station alone has moved farther away from the average suggesting a decrease in diversity which is unique among the station areas.

Conclusive analysis about mobility, however, was not possible without access to cross-tabulated data that could show indicators more significant to answering the thesis question. For example knowing where the population has come from, to what form of housing it was attracted, and therefore to what degree the population is captive due to economic circumstances rather than mobile due to ownership opportunities, would help to differentiate the population and determine whether the effect of mobility is likely or not likely to indicate an improvement in the diversity of the population. These data were not available.

Based purely on the direct data, due to the massive increase in population (75%) and dwellings (73%) in the region over this 15-year period, we can infer that mobility was a significant issue throughout the region. In certain controls, the increase in ownership, which accompanied this increase, can be used to suggest a positive outcome. It is in the sample and the stations that show middling outcomes that the meaning of the mobility data is less clear.

As might be expected, the Vancouver East and 22nd Street station areas where home ownership is the highest, mobility is the lowest. The two stations where ownership had most increased, Burnaby and DTNW, showed the highest levels of mobility.

Broadway Station, which had a high level of mobility before SkyTrain was built, remained so, but there is little to distinguish it from all of the other controls although the decline in home ownership certainly suggests a captive population. In 1981, 56% of persons in the community had lived elsewhere within the previous five years. It still
exhibits this characteristic with a 58% five-year mobility rate in 1996. This is just modestly higher than the Universe or the GVRD both of whose mobility rates have risen somewhat over the same period to 57% and 56% respectively. At all other control stations, except the 22nd Street Station in New West, the increase in mobility has been significantly higher than the sample.

Illustration: 5.6. Mobility, 5 year; Non-Movers 1981 - 1996

Source: Author

In both Vancouver East and in DTNW where the catchment area is, like the Broadway Station Area, urban-oriented; the increases in mobility were accompanied by a larger increase in dwellings than the sample, suggesting that the mobility issue has more to do with development and ownership opportunities than in the sample. Vancouver East had a substantial increase in dwellings, (32%), as did Downtown New Westminster, (31%), which also had a significant 120% increase in ownership in conjunction with its mobility rate, the highest of all the study station areas and universal controls. Like the Broadway
Station, however, its population increase was somewhat lower than its increase in the number of dwellings: the number of dwellings increased by 31% whereas the population only increased by 25%.

Another trend, which differentiates the Broadway Station from other stations, the Universe and the region, is the increase in dwellings with major maintenance requirements. While the universe at 8% and the GVRD at 7% showed significant increases in major maintenance needs in the 1996 census, only Downtown New West, at 14%, showed a higher percentage than the Broadway Station, which rose to 12%. The rate of increase at the Broadway Station (140%), however, was significantly higher than New Westminster’s 75% rate of increase.

![Illustration: Dwellings Requiring Major Repairs, 1981 - 1996](source: Author)

There are issues to suggest that the New Westminster increases may also be of a different nature than those at the Broadway Station. Maintenance needs being a self-selected estimate in the census questionnaire; the leaky condo issue has proved to affect many of
the Westminster Quay market developments and is likely to be driving the average in the New Westminster totals. In addition the New Westminster developments, occurring on industrial lands as they did, would not have displaced obsolete housing. This is not the case in the Broadway Station and this fact must be considered when analyzing the statistics. This difference in the two station areas is a further indication that maintenance issues in the Broadway Station area are more likely to be due to other factors such as lack of disposable income, uncertainty about the return on investment, and anticipated redevelopment in addition to the leaky condo issue.

5.4. Low Income Cut-Off (LICO)

The incidence of low-income individuals and families in the Broadway Station area increased at a considerably lower rate than the Universe. Nevertheless, the sample totals were so elevated at the outset that even the discrepancy between the Universe’ 77.80% increase relative to the Broadway Station area’s 49.6% increase in low income economic families resulted in a Universe which has a ratio only modestly more than half that of the sample.

Closer in result is the ratio of low-income individuals. In 1981, the sample had 49% low-income individuals relative to the Universe’ 36%. In 1996, the numbers were 59% and 46% respectively. Although the Universe’ rate of increase was higher than that of the sample, the difference between the two remained nearly constant with the gap widening by a single percentage point.

Although the gap has narrowed in both these cases, the community’s perception that this is evidence of deterioration is supportable. Again, the community is worse off than before SkyTrain implementation but that SkyTrain causes the decline is not likely. It is more likely that this is an example of the effect, referred to in the literature, where the community was already in a state of decline from which a rapid transit amenity alone could not rescue it.
5.5. Unemployment Rates

Of the three station areas, 22nd Street, Burnaby and Vancouver East, where the unemployment rate was close to the Universe, only the 22nd Street Station remains below the average at 6.9%. Burnaby and Vancouver East are both at 11%. DTNW has improved in relation to the Universe with a gap of 2% narrowing to only .5% in 1996. Although the Vancouver East and Burnaby Station areas have a higher rate of increase, the gap between them and the Universe is 2.1% whereas the Broadway Station unemployment rate shows a 5.16% gap with the Universe. This is significantly higher than the difference of 2.6% that it had in relation to the Universe in 1981. Clearly, Broadway Station has fared worse over time than other stations.

Illustration: 5.8. Unemployment Data Broadway Station and Universal Controls: Age: 15+

Source: Author
Generally speaking, Phase One station areas have demonstrated higher rates of increase in unemployment than the Universe or GVRD. The two exceptions to this, both the 22nd Street and DTNW stations have ameliorating factors, which contribute to a different outcome. They also demonstrate that the increase is not inevitable. The 22nd Street station area is an affluent middle class neighbourhood with a suburban built form and although its rate of increase at 64.68% is close to the Universe and GVRD average, due to its lower unemployment in 1981, it maintains a lower than average unemployment rate.

DTNW is a striking example of a community whose development has so diversified the community that its rate of increase (24.67%) is the lowest of all the controls in this study. When we look at the age profiles we can see why its rate of increase is considerably less than half that of the Universe (59.64%) and the GVRD (65.38%).

Illustration: 5.9. DTNW and Universe Age Distribution 1981

Clearly what was driving its unemployment rate in 1981 was the disproportionate percentage of individuals in the 20 to 30 year age cohort. With the increase in the
diversity of its age profile, the proportion of high-risk individuals is more balanced and this is clearly influencing the unemployment numbers. Gender distribution may also be a contributing factor to the DTNW station area’s reputation for higher levels of incivilities, particularly drug dealing and nuisance behaviour. This history and the community’s historic function housing workers for its industrial workplaces, such as the B.C. Maritime Employers union hall and Scott Paper, are likely to be the greater influences in this gender discrepancy.

Illustration: 5.11. DTNW and Universe Age Distribution: 1996 Source: Author

In the remainder of the control station areas we see a higher than average rate of increase in unemployment. Although the rate of increase is greater in the Burnaby and Vancouver East station areas than in the sample, in keeping with its history the Broadway Station area remains the station with the highest level of unemployment.
The figures for the workforce aged 15 - 24 shows similar results - both over time - and between the sample and the station, universe, and GVRD controls. The unemployment rates for the universe and GVRD for this cohort are 15% and 14.3% respectively while the Broadway Station unemployment rate is at 21%.

After breaking down the Broadway Station area into precincts the results are even more striking. In Zones 4 & 6, the RM-4 zones southeast and northwest of the station, the combined unemployment rate is 17.3%. Southwest of the station the unemployment rate follows closely behind at 16.9%. The area north of the station between Commercial and Nanaimo has nearly the same 14.8% average as the Station area as a whole. Southeast of the station the rate is 12%. Only at the southern reach of the station area are the unemployment rates below the regional and universe average at 6%.
**Illustration 5.13.** Unemployment Data Broadway Station and Universal Controls: Age: 15 - 24

Source: Author
Illustration 5.14. Unemployment Data Broadway Station Zones, 1996

Source: Author
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Table 5.15. City of Vancouver Market and Non-Market Housing; Net Increase, 1981 - 1996

Source: Author
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<td>In the labour force</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Total population 15-24 years by labour force activity</td>
<td>In the labour force</td>
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Table 5.16. Unemployment Table

Source: Author
Chapter Five: Notes

1 Manager’s Report to Council; September 26, 1983: page 2

ii BSAPAC minutes; Tues. Sept. 13th 1983: page 2

iii Manager’s Report to Council; July 17, 1985: page 4

iv BSAP; 1987: page 19

v Earlier non-market projects were developed on a mixed income model where some renters paid market rents for their units; others paid a subsidized rent level, yielding a more balanced socio-economic mix. With the cessation of federal support for non-market housing in 1993, these mixed-income developments ceased as new provincial programs designed to fill the void left by Ottawa directed housing support to 100% core-need tenancy.

vi BSAP; 1987: page 27

vii April Dea Hurmuses; 1998: page 12

viii Grandview Woodlands and Kensington Cedar Cottage Local Areas were both excluded from the citywide averages because each contributes a significant part of their territory to comprise the Broadway Station Area. It should be noted that both have modest decreases in non-market housing as a percentage of total dwellings in the Local Area. However, in the case of Kensington-Cedar Cottage all non-market housing is in or adjacent to the station area and, with one exception, none are in Kensington. To address her concern that the numbers may be further misleading due to concentration issues, the researcher identified the dimensions of the sample, compared it to that of the Local Areas and looked at the distribution pattern for all the Local Areas to determine whether similar concentrations were typical. She observed that concentrations of social housing were nowhere similar to the Broadway Station Area except Downtown (including the Downtown Eastside, Chinatown and Strathcona) and the Broadway Station host communities.

ix Although special funding for Grandview Woodlands might be expected to serve Broadway Station area issues, and likely does provide some services; there is some evidence that the station area, being on the fringe of Grandview Woodlands, has not enjoyed the same degree of attention from its community organizations. For example, the Tenderloin area, formally part of Grandview Woodlands is not considered part of the mandate of their crime prevention office, which is attached to the Britannia Community Centre. That area has been ceded to the purview of the Broadway Crime Prevention office in Cedar Cottage. Nor has a sustained voice for the Broadway Station area emerged from Grandview Woodlands organizations. This suggests that the station area is outside the psychological boundary for Grandview Woodlands community whose center is somewhat farther north on Commercial Drive.

In Cedar Cottage, south of the Broadway Station, a significant element of its historic activist community were members or sympathizers of the Communist Party. Although active at various times in the community, and likely to have contributed to leadership functions due to their activist organizational experience, that cohort’s focus does not appear to be very neighbourhood oriented. Their presence in the community became evident during key informant interviews conducted for the case study research.
The influence of this politically motivated group in the community certainly introduces some issues including the lack of continuity in neighbourhood organizing efforts, which may in turn explain why the community has been unable to successfully lobby for significant resources for the station area. It is too large a topic for this thesis to do more than refer to these potential influences. It does, however, offer a topic of interest for further study into the influence of community dynamics in urban planning.

* Non-market housing shows a positive correlation to these numbers, but without access to cross-tabulation of unemployment data with non-market residency, no clear connection can be drawn.
6.0 The Broadway Station and Crime

6.1 Crime And Perceptions Of Crime

Already referred to in this thesis, one of the most significant elements of community life which was cited in the TransPlan workshops as an indicator of community dysfunction is the general “feel” of the street, and the belief that criminal activities are prevalent in the station area. One participant in a workshop described the feeling as one wherein a criminal culture had replaced a community culture in the immediate area of the station (Hurmuses 1998). Because this was a recurring issue in the community, the first research workshop was dedicated to this topic for the case study. Referring to the rationale for this, Hurmuses writes:

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design was chosen as the first topic of the public meeting series because the community frequently expressed fears and concerns about crime in the neighbourhood. In the four years since Cecona was first organized, questionnaires, public meetings, and ad hoc efforts such as the campaign to close the methadone clinic and the campaign to remove sex trade workers from residential streets and houses have shown that crime concerns are constant and cover a variety of different issues. The Community Crime Prevention Office is another manifestation of the concern with which the neighbourhood views crime.¹

Illustration 6.1 The Broadway SkyTrain Station entrance.  
Source: TransPlan
Crime data do show a correlation between crime and the Broadway SkyTrain, but those data are not conclusive as to the causative factors. The Rapid Transit Project Office recently published the most current report of crime data for SkyTrain as a whole.

6. 2. Security, Safety, And Rapid Transit:
   How The Study Relates To TransPlan Findings

Given the concern expressed by many of the communities which will host the new SkyTrain extension, that they anticipate similar problems to those found in the Broadway Station area, it is not surprising that the Rapid Transit Project 2000 (RTPO) would attempt to address these expectations by commissioning a report on crime issues. Conducted by the Security Resource Group [SRG] it illustrates the difficulty of gathering meaningful data at the present time. It also gave a clear example of the difficulties of accurate reporting in the media as the morning newspapers blared its headline “SkyTrain doesn’t bring crime to neighbourhoods, study finds”.

The report doesn’t make such an extravagant claim. Illuminating the difficulties for effective transit-oriented planning in the region, the report was limited by budget, access to information, and by the quality of the information available. What was there was not accessible or economic to evaluate. As this thesis claims, this problem extends beyond the limited field of crime statistics. The issues, as SRG articulated them, are as follows:

1. Historical data is not available -- in some cases this is because of changes to the laws, in all cases because the historical data is maintained in formats which are uneconomic for analysis, even within the data set. As a consequence, the planner cannot determine whether there have been changes over time in current station areas.

2. Current data is not maintained in a consistent fashion from one police jurisdiction to another, or between SkyTrain security and local law enforcement authorities. Nor is the accessibility of that data, in forms such as G.I.S. mapping, available from all jurisdictions. As a consequence it is not economic to compare data between data sets.
3. Data may not be a good reflection of reality because it requires consistent reporting by the public and consistent protocols for sharing between jurisdictions. This may not occur because if the environment is dysfunctional the likelihood of reporting may be less than in areas with fewer incivilities where identical behaviour would be reported. In addition, there is some concern expressed on the part of the authors that data may be reported to police rather than transit security at some locations, vice versa in others, and not shared consistently. This compromised the quality of data available to SRG researchers.

The report also states "Much of the concern being expressed about the extension of SkyTrain is based on partial or skewed information about the reality of crime trends and the existing system and not on scientific data". In fact, as the report illustrates, the scientific management of data does not occur, and as a consequence the experts are no more able to rely on scientific data than the public’s perceptions do.

6.2.1. Indicators for High Crime Areas: How They Relate To The Broadway Station Area

The SRG report conclusions confirm the general findings of the Hurmuses (1998) study. Although the limitations of the data prevent conclusive proof, by using their preconditions for increased crime and incivilities as a framework, we can evaluate the degree to which the Broadway Station is vulnerable. Those predictors are listed in the SRG report:

1. That an area is in the "awareness space" of a potential offender
2. Areas of older ill-maintained commercial and residential land uses
3. Major streets and roadways which also correlate with high levels of criminal activity
4. Enhanced mobility
5. An activity node exists which attracts many people
6. Land use which increases population within a limited area
7. That an area has a history of problems
1. The area is in the awareness space of a potential offender
It is evident that rapid transit increases the number of potential offenders who will have the station area as part of their awareness space. As the report notes, the SkyTrain increases mobility for illegitimate as well as legitimate uses. Simply by performing its intended function it therefore creates the potential for increased criminal activity by providing more potential offenders.

2. Areas of older ill-maintained commercial and residential land uses
Its older ill-maintained buildings characterize the Broadway Station area. One of the most egregious examples of incivility is at the station itself. Most of the northeast corner was assembled by BC Transit for guideway construction and was later tendered for a redevelopment proposal. BC Transit declined to require any performance guarantees in the tender. The site has, as a consequence, been allowed to lie derelict; even vacant for several years before recently being rented as an industrial dispatch hall. In addition, the area northwest of the station includes a large number of slum land-holdings. Human Resources Department staff indicate that many of these landlords specifically target MHR clients for tenancy and perform a minimum of maintenance on their buildings. Census Canada data shows a significant increase in dwellings requiring major maintenance in the station area since 1981. These findings are detailed elsewhere in the report.

3. Major streets and roadways which also correlate with high levels of criminal activity, & 4. Enhanced mobility
The report notes that incidence of crime can be found to correlate with major streets and arteries in addition to rapid transit stations. The report also acknowledges that different types of crimes are typically carried out by automobile than those that may be attracted to high pedestrian activity nodes that are serviced by transit. Certainly, one of the weaknesses of the organization of crime data is that it does not permit pertinent comparisons. For example, it would be more enlightening to be able to compare rapid transit station area crime data with pedestrian and transit-serving opportunities at other major transit transfer points. This could be a useful analysis and might more directly
address the communities' concerns about the degree of problem that must be anticipated, and to what cause they may be attributed, regarding crime and safety issues.

The difficulties of determining which of these indicators exercises the greatest influence is referred to in the SRG crime analysis report:

When looking at some of the other illustrations [G.I.S. mapping of crime rates], it becomes evident that crime can be attributed to major streets and roadways as much as it can to the placement of SkyTrain Stations… In conclusion, when looking at the official police statistics for Vancouver, it becomes apparent that many calls for service are unrelated to passenger use of the system and that there are other areas of the city that have higher crime rates or have greater instances of crime than areas that are near SkyTrain stations. It is also evident that one has to be careful about which incidents are attributed to the SkyTrain system, particularly in the downtown core, where there are a number of other factors at play. 

Hurmuses studied traffic patterns and changes over time primarily for the community south of the station. Its findings were that the community south of the station had experienced considerable increases in traffic. Multiple corridors in the community experienced agglomerated increases in region-serving traffic virtually unequaled anywhere else in the municipality. Although not part of that study's mandate, it is reasonable to extrapolate the effects extend to the area north of the station. Since parking restrictions were lifted along 1st Avenue in preparation for Expo '86, the area north of the station has been similarly influenced by the increase in region-serving traffic which dissects the neighbourhood, with some of the highest individual traffic rates in the city to be found along the 1st Avenue corridor.

The TransPlan findings also acknowledge that Granville Street and Oak Street, which were used as comparable regional corridors in the City of Vancouver, individually carry more traffic than either Knight Street or Kingsway, but notes that the highest agglomeration of heavily trafficked corridors are to be found encircling and dissecting Cedar Cottage. The only area in the city with similar traffic density is in the vicinity of City Hall although the report notes that area has neither the truck traffic, nor the excessive
speeds that the Knight Street truck route and other region-serving corridors appear to engender (Hurmuses 1998).

Illustration 6.2. Broadway Station Area Arterials
24 Hour 2 Way Normalized Traffic Count

Regardless of these recommendations, at the current time, the Broadway Station Area clearly meets two of the transportation-related criteria identified by SRG as correlating to more crime: it has heavily-trafficked arterial corridors and it has a rapid transit station. According to the SRG report, this may result in a crime rate higher than the municipal average.

5. An activity node exists which attracts many people
This issue is a multi-layered factor in the Broadway Station area. The station area is an activity node with a high number of transit-related movements. It is adjacent to a vibrant commercial district that is active for most of the evening, in addition to the daily retail and service functions it performs. There is a Chinese-language and an independent
theatre within a block of the station. Several fast-food restaurants are immediately adjacent to the station but the activities within them (and perhaps the custom they attract) do not promote guardian-type functions.

Many of the region-serving functions that this area provides leave the streets relatively unattended by potential guardians after office hours: they are dental, medical buildings, retail stores, and offices. Others contribute a large proportion of high-risk individuals: the methadone clinic, human resources office, casual labour hall, and the mental health patient resources office. By high risk one refers not just to potential offenders, more importantly these groups are also high risk for victimization — clearly a volatile situation as this puts all of the key elements for increased crime into the community — elevated numbers of potential offenders and potential targets in an environment which offers cues that there is an opportunity to commit a crime without intervention by ‘community guardians’.vi

Some of these region-serving functions, such as the dental/medical buildings precede the SkyTrain. Others do not, such as the methadone dispensary whose proprietor permitted activities in and around the premises which have put many high-risk individuals and community passersby in the path of drug dealers. Although the methadone dispensary was justified to the community as serving local intravenous drug users, it is notable that of the five dispensaries owned by the same pharmacist, the College of Pharmacists reports that three (possibly four) were located in the vicinity of a SkyTrain station. vii

Another regional-use pressure on the fragile street environment in the immediate station area is the introduction of the welfare office. Originally situated at Gravely and Commercial Drive the MHR office moved to its present location at 2350 Commercial in 1978. It has since increased its client base by an estimated 200 - 300% due to three office closures in Vancouver and a reorganization of the delivery system in 1998. Before the reorganization, the office boundaries represented approximately 12 square blocks bounded by Grant Street, 12th Avenue, Lakewood Drive and Clark Drive. Under the
current system two offices cover an area considerably larger, extending as far south as 33rd Avenue, although the still relatively small size of the Midtown Office catchment area is a graphic illustration that the Broadway Station area is now rivaling the Downtown Eastside for poverty concentration.

Ministry Offices

G - Gateway
PS - Program Support
G / PS - Gateway / Program Support
FMW - Family Maintenance
DC - Daycare

Illustration 6.3. Region 1 (City of Vancouver) Social Services Catchment Areas

Source: Ministry of Human Resources
Although approximately 75% of its clients receive their cheques by direct deposit, this would leave approximately 600 to 800 clients attending the office one Wednesday of every month, in addition to the regular traffic which occurs daily. Human Resources staff indicates that the line-up outside the doors on ‘Welfare Wednesday’ occurs for the entire morning.

If we are to agree that incivilities may dissuade the public from going to an area and using the transit and other public amenities, and if we are to agree that incivilities influence whether potential offenders are likely to commit a crime given a suitable target and opportunity, and if we assume that increased traffic will bring more potential offenders into a particular destination — all of which the report acknowledges — then a station area which demonstrates incivilities is likely to be a forgiving environment for further incivilities and even criminal behaviour.

This raises a chicken-and-egg problem for the researcher and for transit and municipal planners. In the absence of baseline data who knows whether the area is dragging down the station or vice versa?

7. An area has a history of problems

Do the problems in the Broadway Station Area reflect historic problems in the community? There is anecdotal evidence that there were some difficulties with drug dealing out of a local business when the original Broadway Station planning exercise took place. One of the concerns of the community, and of Vancouver City Council, was that the site be redeveloped so that the problem business would have to relocate. When the redevelopment did not occur, it may have provided an attractor for more similar behaviour, now exacerbated by the greater number of people with access to the location.
This happened despite foreknowledge of the problem. That the reputation of this business and location were known, that the CD-1 option for that location was, in part, motivated within the community as a solution that would promote the site’s attractiveness for redevelopment which would, in turn, remove the business from that location — suggests that there were genuine problems, rather than the perception of problems, here. Yet neither the city nor the transit authority’s efforts were successful and suggests that more active intervention was required. That transit would be likely to add to the problems of the Broadway Station area is an effect referred to in the literature cited regarding rapid transit implementation.

6.3. SRG Report: Additional Findings and Recommendations

A key finding of the SRG report is that addressing this perception or the reality of crime and nuisance behaviour at regional transit nodes has important implications, not only for the host neighbourhood but for the economics of the system itself. Identifying the business argument for addressing this nuisance value is one of the findings of the SRG report, and is further noted in the RTPO News Release of that report’s findings. The report notes that certain jurisdictions use the incidence of “choice riders” to determine the health of the system. A choice rider is identified as one who owns an automobile but opts for public transit. The implication of this observation is that the community’s belief in the safety of the system, and the environment of its stations, is key to the individual’s decision to choose this transportation option.

An additional issue the crime audit identified regarding analysis of crime statistics is the tendency to use intersections and landmarks such as the rapid transit station to identify locations of these events. The report also posits that this increases the public’s tendency to perceive all crimes in the area as having a relation to the station. Although there is some justification to this observation this still leaves questions about the cues for such behaviour happening in one place rather than another.

Recommendations include the following:
1) Respect perceptions of safety as significant because it decreases the likelihood of individuals who have alternative forms of transportation using the system: this can have negative financial repercussions for the system.

2) Involve and educate the community of residents and system users in station and station environment design using CPTED principles. A one-size-fits-all approach is not recommended since it is contrary to the principles of CPTED design, which is site specific. In addition, community ownership of the station and area is believed to be enhanced when the product is unique and tailored to the specific needs of the community. Assist the community to enact CPTED strategies for station areas and nearby properties, including enhanced:

- surveillance
- sightlines
- access and egress
- territoriality
- target-hardening, and, when appropriate
- user separation

3) Improve staffing to address higher crime hours, maintain territorial control over the entire station environment in addition to the platform areas, and to ensure fare compliance. This would be achieved through a detailed master security plan, higher levels of effective cooperation between jurisdictions with the objective of maintaining public confidence in the security of the system.

For further study it recommends:

- More effective and consistent statistical data collection methods by police departments, especially to maintain consistencies between jurisdictions.

- A time-series analysis study would be useful to understand crime impact when a new station is built. Crime statistics should be carefully studied related to before and after effects of crime around new stations.
♦ Special study of fare collection or payment methods and fare compliance, including cost/benefit analysis, etc.

♦ Cost benefit analysis of additional uniformed personnel at stations and on cars.

♦ Cost-benefit analysis of security monitoring of CCTV system.

♦ A special study on jurisdictional issues affecting the enforcement of provincial and federal statutes related to undesirable and illegal behaviour on the SkyTrain cars, the station platforms, and surrounding property should be considered. Policing on a system that crosses several jurisdictional boundaries should remain consistent. Variances in differential response to calls for service or threshold levels in investigations can adversely affect the system. *
Chapter Six: Notes

i April Dea Hurmuses; 1998: page A-7

ii Vancouver Sun; Tuesday, March 30, 1999: page A1

iii One workshop participant privately relayed to Hurmuses an incident, which had happened at the CIBC automatic teller, referred to in Buckley's thesis. She had stopped in to take out some cash and was strong-armed by a loiterer. She had taken out $100 and after doing so, he reached around her and took a $20 bill out of her hand with the comment that '[she] wouldn't be needing that'. When asked if she had reported the crime she replied that she had not. She explained that she 'felt too foolish for allowing [herself] to be in that situation'.

iv Security Resources Group; 1999: page 7

v IBID: page 31

vi ibid: page 9

vii The reporting of a correlation of AIDS and SkyTrain Stations, Vancouver Sun, Tuesday, April 20, 1999, page B1 Aids epidemic follows the SkyTrain route researchers say, is especially interesting in view of the location, the concentration of delivery, and the illegitimate activities in and around these particular methadone clinics. Although policies concerning the methadone delivery program have since changed, in no small measure as a response to the problems created by this one operator, it may be that persons on methadone have been relocating to the vicinity of the clinics and that the drug dealers preying on them have created a high-risk opportunity for the spread of HIV. Although speculative, if this were true it would be another argument in favour of maintaining a more diffuse delivery system in order to eliminate a known opportunity for drug-dealing predators.

viii Security Resources Group; 1999: page 57

ix One example raised to illustrate the point was an incident that took place last year. A shooting was first reported as having happened at the Broadway SkyTrain Station with speculation reported that Hispanic drug dealers were the culprits. It later transpired that Britannia and Vancouver Technical School students were involved. This mis-reporting was used by several planners and transit officials as an example of activities being improperly identified with the nearby station. While it is true that the shooting at the Broadway Station may not have had to do with individuals patronizing the transit at that time, one question still remains. Why did this occur at the Broadway Station rather than, for example, Nanaimo and Hastings? Did the incivility of the area and cues about its lack of community ownership influence their choice about where to meet? Did their awareness of the space convey that this was a safer place to conduct criminal activity without being caught? These are questions that have not been answered definitively.

x Security Resources Group; 1999: page 4
7.0 Conclusions
7.1. Broadway Station and Phase One SkyTrain Stations

According to the Census Canada data, the community's perception that the Broadway SkyTrain Station area is worse off than before SkyTrain is justified. In the commercial sphere, upsetting a retail node to the degree of 20% displacement for guideway construction and the resulting encroachment of that guideway on the building envelope is likely to have been a significant factor increasing the fragility of the street environment.

Perhaps because it was the first rapid transit in the GVRD, the region-serving pressures which would come to bear were not fully addressed. That the BSAP did not address the defining issue for the Broadway Station Area community — its increasing role as a regional transit node — may well explain two of the major problems which have arisen at the station area. The first is the increase in region-serving and transit-serving functions — primarily driven by provincial government and agency actions although the market has supplied a significant number of fast food restaurants for the transit-user public. The other is the failure of the area to attract significant market development in either the housing or the commercial sectors. In the residential area, a crucial down-zoning coupled with an incomplete vision for the community's future may explain why the market was not motivated to reap the benefits of this high amenity location. And while affected by the guideway, this alone cannot explain the lack of commercial development given that Commercial Drive just north of the station has become one of the city's trendiest streets.

Although some of the regional functions precede SkyTrain, additional goods and service providers that have since located here do not primarily serve the local community, contrary to stated policy. Due to the gap between policy and reality incongruent uses have flourished, contributing to the public perception of crime and incivilities in the area (Hurmuses 1998). Whether this is an historic issue is not demonstrable, but it is fair to note that not all legitimate functions belong in every situation. For example, the Labour Ready office, which hires people for marginal industrial jobs (You Work Today: We Pay Today) may properly belong in an industrial area. The BC Maritime Employers' Despatch Hall for example, with the exception of parking violations, co-exists fairly
Today may properly belong in an industrial area. The BC Maritime Employers’ Despatch Hall for example, with the exception of parking violations, co-exists fairly successfully with the community in its location off Commercial north of Hastings. It could even be said to perform a positive guardianship function in that location through activities which are similar to those which seem incongruent at the Broadway Station.

Most importantly, there are glaring incongruities with increasing saturation of the neighbourhood with services to at-risk populations, while simultaneously targeting the same community for family-oriented social housing. What permits this to happen is that the proposals to house or build certain facilities in the community happen on an individual basis without any evaluation of the incremental effect of these individual decisions. There is no central inventory of provincially-funded services. There is no policy to guide municipal staff in evaluating the social impacts of providing potentially incompatible uses in proximity, nor are staff given the budget or the direction to monitor the outcomes. The Broadway Station Area Plan did not evaluate social impacts and the plan explicitly acknowledges that it failed to address these critical issues.¹

A key factor in the failure to develop policies to guide the region-serving pressures in the Broadway Station area is that the Broadway Station Area Planning process was a highly dysfunctional one. The city was estranged from the province and lacked what it deemed sufficient influence over transit implementation decisions. The community, alienated, was unwilling to trust either the province or (perhaps to a lesser extent) the city. It appears to have been unable to alter its focus from a reactive one to a pro-active visioning.

The goals set out in the Broadway Station Area Plan (1987) illustrate the lack of appropriate focus on solutions to regional pressures. In the section ‘New Commercial Development Opportunities’ the BSAP identifies six goals:

1. To strengthen Broadway/Commercial Drive as the community’s core commercial area
2. To encourage, subject to livability guidelines, residential development on upper floors to increase the vitality of the shopping area and add to the housing stock.
3. To promote the economic viability of the small scale retail establishments.
4. To enhance the Broadway/Commercial retail area’s social and physical character including retail continuity, diversity of goods and local services and pedestrian orientation.
5. To create a focal point on the corners of Broadway and Commercial Drive, adjacent to the ALRT station, through higher density development.
6. To direct to fringe commercial areas those auto-oriented retail uses that generate large amounts of vehicular traffic and do not contribute to transit ridership.

Not one of these goals has been met, with the possible exception of the final one. Only one significant commercial development occurred. It does not comply with the goals as stated above. Hurmuses writes:

The Enterprise Property Group building has four long, curtained, bank windows, a Starbucks, A Subway, an insurance office, a transit office, a video store, a restaurant and offices upstairs. There is no residential component, or retail continuity. Only Tim’s Bakery has survived the demolition of the block. The pedestrian weather protection is a small glass ledge 20 feet in the air. The ground level surface treatment is not a pedestrian-friendly presence. As for retail compatibility, the best that can be said for it is that it doesn’t provide any competition.

This is a particularly unfortunate outcome for this site. After the station planning exercise the site cater corner to it (1700 East Broadway) was selected to be an anchor development, despite engineering reasons why the northeast corner is less suitable.

The Broadway Station Area Plan militated against redeveloping the southwest corner [to achieve the goals of the BSAP]. The B.S.A.P. specifically recommends that commercial sites should not be rezoned on a project-by-project basis. This was intended to prevent up-zoning the community. Unfortunately, when this site changed hands, no contingency was in place for reviewing the B.S.A.P. conclusions regarding the building form at this prime location... Using the discretionary stream to direct development in desired ways is proving to be a problem where land values are moderate.

On sites where the time invested is not perceived to be justified by the return on investment, developers routinely build less, but build within the outright stream.
where scrutiny of the result is less stringent. In the case of the Enterprise Property Group development, this resulted in a building without a residential component.\textsuperscript{iv}

City policy on the station area — that its primary role would be residential and that its commercial area would serve local rather than regional needs — simply failed to address what has since occurred. Consequently it failed to create a vision or framework for the individual decisions whose aggregate effects are responsible for the pressures which have since come to bear.

Whether the reason’s owe more to one community with a history of tangential political interests, to marginalization by a community for whom the station area and its problems are literally, geographically peripheral, or to the lack of political support for budgeting an effective data collection system to enable monitoring which would identify growing dysfunction in the station area — the Broadway Station area community appears not to have enjoyed adequate government or agency economic support.

For the SkyTrain system generally, while we find some common effects between the sample and controls, there are notable differences between them. Broadway Station alone, for example, has not benefited as have other stations in the increasing diversity in housing tenure in station areas: New Westminster, by contrast, has been highly successful in diversifying its population, leading to a healthier demographic mix and higher levels of home ownership. As a result the unemployment rate in DTNW is, alone among the control stations, achieving averages similar to the non-station areas in the host municipalities. Broadway Station and DTNW share a significantly higher degree of problem with deteriorating housing stock, but there is reason to posit different causes. While understanding the differences requires further study those differences may be significant, reflecting market uncertainty in the Broadway Station area which is not shared to the same extent in DTNW.

Addressing the perception or the reality of crime and nuisance behaviour at regional transit nodes has important implications, not only for the host neighbourhood but for the
economics of the system itself. The SRG report notes that choice riders, those who opt for transit over their automobiles, are likely to be dissuaded from this practice if they believe that the transit environment is unsafe.\(^v\)

The development of cross-jurisdictional data management systems is one of the key recommendations of the Safety and Security Review. The report illustrates the need for this recommendation to be acted upon in light of current difficulties associated with monitoring the effect of rapid transit on a community's crime rates. The authors were:

- unable to collect consistent data from all jurisdictions,
- make comparisons of the current data between each municipality
- identify the data on a scale which is meaningful for station areas
- identify historic trends in station areas.

Although the SRG report observes that SkyTrain does not exert a causal effect on crime, it acknowledges that there is a correlation between SkyTrain Stations and crime. It is likewise the findings of the thesis that no causative relationship can be proved. By stressing the inability to identify a causal relationship, however, the SRG report does not address the main issue which is of concern to the community. Communities which will host the Broadway Lougheed corridor have indicated they have concerns and lack confidence that governments' will address their issues. The Broadway Station area community has been lobbying to have their own issues addressed for several years with no success.

In this region, different levels of government do not effectively coordinate their actions. Cross jurisdictional data management systems are not funded. As we can see in the Broadway Station area this fact, when combined with the lack of monitoring mechanisms, can lead to unintended and negative consequences. Addressing these weaknesses, the lack of a strategic approach to planning, monitoring and the data collection necessary to achieve healthy outcomes is the key thesis recommendation.
7. 2. Suggestions For Further Research

The primary research required for the Broadway Station Area is to address its role as a regional node. A radically new vision for the community is needed to create a set of policies that can reconcile its dual role as both a residential community and a regional transit node. Further research into best practises is needed to inform the community in order to ensure a positive and productive process.

7. 3. Recommendations

7. 3. 1. The System

Create a data management system to address the need for better understanding of the effects of rapid transit. Station Precincts should be created for the organization of data into comparable catchment areas. The data should include crime data, census data, development data, traffic data, health and welfare service delivery data and such other indicators as would assist in monitoring station areas.

7. 3. 2. Broadway Station

1. Review the Broadway Station Area Plan. Consider:
   - its applicability to the local and regional functions of the station area
   - reasons for market failure in residential and commercial development
   - review of RM-4, RT, CD-1 (1700 East Broadway), C-2 (Commercial Drive east side), and RS zoning schedules

2. Create Station Precinct Areas for Census Canada data collection. As with the Local Area data, it should be collected and published each census year. Establish additional baseline data for the station area before the Broadway Lougheed SkyTrain extension.

3. Create an inventory of social and medical services provided for at-risk populations and develop guidelines for their provision.
4. Create a monitoring mechanism for fine-tuning non-market housing strategies for the Broadway Station Area.

5. Investigate opportunities for government to enhance market development opportunities in the Broadway Station Area through purchase of properties, partnerships with private developers and cooperative strategies with other levels of government.

Gathering the information necessary to understand best practices in the Canadian context will require new studies. Data sources which are designed to facilitate this knowledge will be a key contribution to this understanding.

Offering hope for a positive outcome is that information has never before been so accessible, nor so economical to gather as it is today. Moreover the need for these studies is now internationally recognized among experts in the field and was a subject of much discussion at the conference “Towards Sustainable Transportation”, a Canadian Government and OECD-sponsored event which took place in Vancouver March 24 - 27, 1996. This conference was one of a series designed to carry on the work of the “Earth Summit”, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held June 3rd, 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At this ground-breaking conference, for the first time, world powers agreed to work toward sustainable development in all sectors of society.

Discussing Brazil’s inability to duplicate the success of its own world-renowned Curitba rapid transit system, Ricardo Neves of the Institute of Technology for the Citizen, Brazil opined, “What we need are new experiments, many of them. If we are to begin to understand how to make sustainable transportation a worldwide phenomenon we must know more about what works. And why.” vi
Chapter Seven: Notes

1 Broadway Station Area Plan; 1987: Preface

ii Broadway Station Area Plan; 1987: page 83

iii Tim's Bakery has since gone out of business.


v Security Resource Group; 1999: page 57

vi Author’s notes of Session Id; Tuesday, March 26, 1996.
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Reports:

City Engineering Department (February 1989) 1987-88 Travel Time Study. Vancouver.
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**Articles:**

Artibise, Alan. *Our new regional plan needs a new plan —to police planners and politicians*. Vancouver Sun, November 9, 1995.

Skelton, Chad. *Armed security officers urged on SkyTrain lines.* Vancouver Sun, March 8, 1999.

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**Other sources:**

Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee
Barbara Kappelli; Chair, Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee private files including:

- Broadway Station Area Planning Advisory Committee Minutes
- Reports to the BSAPAC
- Correspondence
- City of Vancouver discussion papers
- Mona Morgan; member, BSAPAC, private files including:
  - BSAPAC minutes
  - News clipping file from Vancouver area daily and weekly press on transit-related issues dating from the 1950s to the 1980s

BC Transit Properties Department Archives
Census Canada Data
City of Vancouver Community Services Group Housing Centre Data
City of Vancouver Engineering Department Traffic Data
City of Vancouver Planning Department Development Permit Data
City of Vancouver Police Department Crime Analysis Unit statistics
City of Vancouver Planning Department library and archive
City of Vancouver Web Page
Greater Vancouver Regional District library
Lord Selkirk Elementary School archive (for *Lucky To Live In Cedar Cottage* project) includes transcripts of interviews with residents and one work, *The History of Cedar Cottage,* author and publisher unknown. Courtesy of Seymour Levitan.
Interviews:

Theresa Baxter, University of Calgary
Donna Chang, Director, Cedar Cottage Neighbourhood House
Frank Ducote, City of Vancouver, Planning Department
Cameron Gray, City of Vancouver, Housing and Properties Department
Ken Hamilton, Ministry of Human Resources, Regional Administration Office
Peter Judd, City of Vancouver, Engineering Department
Scott Kennedy, Cornerstone Architects
Anne Kloppenborg, City of Vancouver, Social Planning Department
Glen Leicester, BC Transit (TransLink)
Ross Long, BC Transit
Randy Pilarski, City of Vancouver
Mary Beth Rondeau, City of Vancouver, Planning Department
Andy Socher, Ministry of Human Resources, Midtown Office
Stan Tonoski, Property Manager, Enterprise Property Group
Wendy Smith-Novick, City of Portland, Transportation Planning Division
Pat Wotherspoon, City of Vancouver, Planning Department
Appendix A: Maps

Sources

G.I.S. Crime Statistics:  
Traffic Volume:  
Broadway Station Area Zones  
Grandview-Woodlands Non-Market Housing  
Kensington-Cedar Cottage Non-Market Housing

City of Vancouver, Crime Analysis Unit  
City of Vancouver, Engineering  
Author  
City of Vancouver, Social Planning
Appendix B: Census Definitions

Census Tract (CT) Census Tracts (CTs) are small geographic units representing urban or rural neighbourhood-like communities created in census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (with an urban core population of 50,000 or more at the previous census).

Dwelling: Condition of Dwelling

Refers to whether, in the judgment of the respondent, the dwelling requires any repairs (excluding desirable remodeling or additions).

Regular maintenance refers to painting, furnace cleaning, etc.

Minor repairs refers to missing or loose floor tiles, bricks or shingles, defective steps, railing or siding, etc.

Major repairs refer to defective plumbing or electrical wiring, structural repairs to walls, floors or ceilings, etc.

Owner-occupied Private, Non-farm Refers to a private dwelling, other than one situated on a farm and occupied by a farm operator, which is owned or being bought by some member of the household.

Tenure Refers to whether some member of the household owns or rents the dwelling, or whether the dwelling is Band housing (on an Indian reserve or settlement

Enumeration Areas (EAs)

An enumeration area (EA) is the geographic area canvassed by one census representative. It is the smallest standard geographic area for which census data are reported. All of the territory of Canada is covered by EAs.
Income: Low Income Cut-offs (LICO’s)

Measures of low income known as low income cut-offs (LICO’s) were first introduced in Canada in 1968, based on 1961 Census income data and 1959 family expenditure patterns. At that time expenditure patterns indicated that Canadian families spent about 50% of their income on food, shelter and clothing. It was arbitrarily estimated that families spending 70% or more of their income on these basic necessities would be in “straitened” circumstances. With this assumption, low income cut-offs were set for five different sizes of families.

Subsequent to these initial cut-offs, revised low-income cut-offs were established based on national family expenditure data from 1969, 1978, 1986 and 1992. These data indicated that Canadian families spent, on average 42% in 1969, 38.5% in 1978, 36.2% in 1986 and 34.7% in 1992 of their income on basic necessities. By adding the original difference of 20 percentage points to the basic level of expenditure on necessities, new low-income cut-offs were set at income levels differentiated by family size and degree of urbanization. Since then these cut-offs have been updated yearly by changes in the consumer price index.

Labour Market Activities: Unemployed

Refers to persons 15 years of age and over, excluding institutionalized residents, who, during the week (Sunday to Sunday) prior to Census Day, were without paid work and were available for work and either:

a) had actively looked for work in the past four weeks; or
b) were on temporary lay-off and expected to return to their job, or
c) had definite arrangements to start a job in four weeks or less

Subsequent to these initial cut-offs, revised low-income cut-offs were established based on national family expenditure data from 1969, 1978, 1986 and 1992. These data indicated that Canadian families spent, on average 42% in 1969, 38.5% in 1978, 36.2% in 1986 and 34.7% in 1992 of their income on basic necessities. By adding the original difference of 20 percentage points to the basic level of expenditure on necessities, new low-income cut-offs were set at income levels differentiated by family size and degree of urbanization. Since then these cut-offs have been updated yearly by changes in the consumer price index.
Mobility 5: Mobility Status — 5 Years Ago

Refers to the relationship between a person’s usual place of residence on Census Day and his or her usual place of residence five years earlier. A person is classified as a non-mover if no difference exists. Otherwise, a person is classed as a mover and this categorization is called Mobility Status (5 years ago). Within the category movers, a further distinction is made between non-migrants and migrants: this difference is called migration status.

Population: Age

Refers to last birthday (as of the census reference date, May 14). This variable is derived from date of birth.¹

¹ Sex is expressed in this thesis with women to the left, or negative, side of the graph.