NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN QUEBEC, SCOTLAND AND BRITTANY

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis makes two broad claims. It contends firstly that there is considerable variation in national consciousness across the population of a stateless nation. People can and do feel minutely, partly or wholly Breton, Scottish or Québécois. Moreover, these are not merely differences of degree. Underlying the uneven intensity of nationalist sentiment within stateless nations is qualitative variation in the buttresses of national consciousness. Some — typically those with weaker national identities — are "pragmatist nationalists": people whose sense of belonging to a distinct community is firmly grounded in tangible sociological differences, be they ethnic, linguistic, religious or political. Others, more taken with the nation, are "idealist nationalists"; their sense of national belonging is more the product of an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness than hard and concrete sociological difference. This basic difference in the underpinnings of national identity, along with other attendant contrasts between pragmatist and idealist nationalists, are explored through historical analysis of various nationalist organizations and activists in Brittany, Scotland and Quebec.

The second central proposition is that this qualitative variation in national identity is an important determinant of political behavior. Many of the wide-ranging attitudes and behaviors seen among exponents of the nationalist cause can be traced back to the conditioning effects of national identity on the outlook and political disposition of different nationalist players. In making this case, the analysis proceeds thematically, drawing examples variously from the three cases; it offers, in places, quantitative evidence based on analysis of the original data from previously conducted surveys. Various attitudinal and behavioral phenomena are thus explored: perceptions of the legitimacy of different means of effecting changes in the nation's political status (e.g. violence versus democratic means); the rationality of different nationalist players; their patterns of
participation in nationalist projects; and overall mobilization trends. While these phenomena are somewhat disparate, they are linked by an overarching theme: idealist nationalists are less sensitive to empirical realities than their pragmatist counterparts. They are consequently more intransigent and uncompromising in their attitudes and behavior, and for this reason often play an important vanguard role in the process of nationalist mobilization.
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The preparation of this thesis began in earnest in early 1994. In June 1995, some initial research results were presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Montreal ("Radicals, Moderates and the Rise of Quebec Nationalism"). Portions of chapter six have recently been published (Paul Howe, "Rationality and Sovereignty Support in Quebec," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 31(1), March 1998, pp. 31-59).

Scholarship funding from several sources - the University of British Columbia, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the IODE War Memorial Graduate Scholarship Program - provided ongoing financial support through my doctoral program and facilitated field research.

I would like to thank the members of my supervisory committee for their assistance. Philip Resnick, the thesis supervisor, offered valuable advice and guidance at key junctures, while also providing the free rein necessary for an open-ended exploration of a multi-faceted topic. Jean Laponce's incisive comments on early drafts helped tighten the analytical framework and overall organization of the thesis. Richard Johnston's close review of the quantitative sections was much appreciated, as was his consistent enthusiasm for the project as a whole.

Thanks are also due to Hilde Colenbrander, Brian Kroeker and other staff at the University of British Columbia data library. Their assistance in accessing data files at U.B.C. and acquiring datasets from elsewhere has been greatly appreciated.

A number of individuals offered organizational assistance during field research. In Montreal, Sarah Fortin of McGill University provided numerous initial contacts. Christian Guyonvarc'h of the Union Démocratique Bretonne and Michel Nicolas of the Université de Rennes likewise opened doors in Brittany, as did William Wolfe and Kevin Pringle of the SNP in Scotland. My appreciation also goes out to Norman Cooper and other members of the Cooper clan for their hospitality during my time in Edinburgh.

Finally, I would like to thank Anna Cameron for her constant support throughout this extended project and dedicate the thesis to her.
Nationalism and national identity are among the more intractable phenomena social scientists have tried to crack. On the one hand, the principle seems straightforward enough. People who share a common language, religion, and/or culture, naturally feel a sense of solidarity which expresses itself in their desire to fashion a common life together free from outside interference. On the other hand, a quick glance around the globe and through the annals of history suggests that national identity admits of significant variation over time and place. This diversity has prompted researchers seeking greater understanding to break down nations and national identities into a variety of sub-types.

Often this typologizing is applied to nations as a whole. There are, it is said, political nations and cultural nations, nations based on religion, nations grounded in language, risorgimento nationalism and integral nationalism, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. The literature is replete with such distinctions.

Variation within nations, on the other hand, has attracted less attention. In some cases, this may be entirely justified, for there undoubtedly are nations where the population is uniformly animated by unvarying fidelity to a specific brand and strength of nationalism. But this is generally not true where stateless nations are concerned. Within such nations there are often vast differences in the strength and tenor of national identity from one person to the next. Some people want statehood for their nation, others some lesser status, while others still are wholly disinterested in the nationalist cause. Despite sharing the outward insignia of nationhood, be they linguistic, cultural or religious, members of stateless nations seem to differ greatly in their national consciousness.

There are those who would contend that this apparent variation is greatly exaggerated. The sense of belonging to a distinctive community does not really vary much from person to person within a stateless nation; the differences lie primarily in the implications they derive from this sentiment.
Whether, for example, someone wants a state for their nation depends largely on factors that intervene and affect the way in which national identity translates into political preferences. Many such mediating factors have been identified: economic considerations especially relevant to certain social classes; variations in people's level of confidence about going it alone; different reactions to the variously tolerant and intolerant actions of the central government; and so on and so forth. In the literature on stateless nations, and the nationalist movements they produce, this basic model, presented schematically in Figure 1 - common identity + mediating factors = diverse political preferences - informs much existing analysis.

**Figure 1: A Model of Nationalist Politics**

![Figure 1](image1.png)

A different model, shown in Figure 2, is favoured here, however. National identity, it is contended, varies across the population of a stateless nation in ways that directly affect a wide variety of political attitudes and behaviors. The objective of this thesis, then, is to develop a typology of identities within stateless nations, apply it to several cases, and explore some of its general implications for nationalist politics.

**Figure 2: An Alternative Model of Nationalist Politics**

![Figure 2](image2.png)
A) The Cases

The cases examined in detail in this study are Quebec, Scotland and Brittany. All are stateless nations whose long-term prospects looked a bit dim at the start of the twentieth century, but which, despite their subjection to powerful assimilating forces as minority groups in states largely controlled by others, have managed to retain some manner of distinct culture and national consciousness down to the present day. From these basic elements of nationhood, numerous political movements have sprung over the years, especially since 1960, seeking power ranging from limited control over some subset of the nation's affairs to outright independence.

Quebec, Scotland and Brittany are taken to be representative of the larger set of cases where uneven national identity has decisively affected nationalist mobilization. For all three are culturally or ethnically distinct regions that have been part of democratic states for a lengthy period of time, but have experienced only periodic and sectional nationalist unrest.¹ In other words, both the potential grievance, incorporation in a foreign body, and viable avenues of protest and mobilization, have long been in place, so that a key barrier to the emergence of a commanding nationalist movement seems to have been the absence of uniform nationalist ardour in the hearts and minds of the people themselves - that is to say, an uneven national consciousness. For this reason, some might be reluctant to call these communities "nations," though for the purposes of this thesis we will provisionally use that term (or the term "stateless nations") and offer refinements and qualifications as we proceed. But certainly it must be granted that the three cases under examination, and others like them, differ from places where peoples with an intense and pervasive national consciousness have been forcibly confined against their will. The nations, for example, kept under wraps by the former Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies - the Chechnyans, the Croats, and so on - do not seem to have suffered from an enervated identity in

¹ As discussed below, the degree to which this is true varies considerably across the three cases. But there has never, in any of them, been near unanimous support for the nationalist program.
sections of the population at any stage. Judging by the intensity and speed with which these nations have taken advantage of the collapse of the Communist regimes, it seems fair to say these communities had a uniformly strong national identity despite living for years as minority nations under highly oppressive conditions. Analysis of such cases rightly focuses on factors external to the nation itself, in particular the political opportunities for mobilization that emerge as cracks start to appear in the governing regime. Analysis of nations with a less robust national consciousness can greatly profit from close examination of the obstacles and barriers within.

The three cases selected for investigation also are alike in that all are stateless nations of the developed world. This commonality is useful because it holds many potentially confounding factors reasonably constant: level of economic development, presence of democratic norms, and so on. The downside, of course, is that the scope of the study's theoretical conclusions is reduced. If we can tentatively say that propositions derived from the experience of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany are likely to hold in Corsica, Wales, and Catalonia, the same cannot be said of nationalist movements of the developing world. So while this is a theoretically-pitched study that seeks to formulate ideas about nationalism and national identity of general applicability, the hard and firm conclusions that can be taken away are more limited and modest.

While sharing much in common, the three chosen cases do differ in at least two respects. First, there has been some variation in the degree of tolerance towards minority nationalism exhibited by the French, Canadian and British governments. These differences were probably more pronounced in the past, but are still apparent today despite the recognition in all three countries of basic democratic norms, such as the right to associate, protest, and so on. The French government has historically been

---

highly intolerant of minority nationalism, whether in Brittany, Corsica, or the Basque region; it is only in the past 15 years that it has allowed some deviation, but this still relatively minor, from the "France, one and indivisible" model that dates back to the French Revolution. Canadian governments, presiding over a federal system where provincial governments exercise considerable power and authority, have been more tolerant. Yet at the same time, they have been reluctant to accept that the Québécois (or, in the past, French-Canadians) are a nation, typically viewing federalism as a framework to accommodate many diverse regions, not two founding nations. In Great Britain, the Canadian situation is reversed. Scotland, as part of a unitary state, has fewer concrete powers than Quebec, but probably enjoys greater national recognition. British governments have typically been happy to concede that the Scots constitute a nation, even if they have been stingy in granting them leave to govern their own affairs. These assessments concerning the three countries are further developed at later points in the thesis. At this stage, suffice it to note that while this study seeks in the first instance to identify commonalities across three cases, in doing so it lights upon certain differences, which are partly explained by invoking the government tolerance and recognition factor.

Another salient contrast between the three cases lies in their mobilization records. Each region witnessed an upsurge in nationalist activity starting around 1960, but their success over the longer haul has varied considerably. Quebec's is today a vibrant movement on the cusp of statehood. But for a stutter step in the early 1980s, it has moved steadily towards the finish line, very nearly crossing it in the October 1995 referendum when 49.4% of Quebeckers voted in favour of sovereignty. Scotland's is a middling movement that initially matched Quebec's quick pace, suffered a sharper decline in the early 1980s, but has since regained significant momentum, with independence now enjoying about 30% support in the general population. Brittany's is a stalled movement that showed early promise but never really blossomed, and is now largely kept alive by a party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB), which failed, in elections held in Brittany in 1986 and 1992, to reach the 5% threshold required
for representation in the Regional Assembly. The divergent trajectories of the three cases over time allows for some tentative exploration of the ways in which national identities and related political phenomena vary across different stages of popular mobilization.

B) The Theory

The initial premise of this investigation is that national consciousness within stateless nations varies in interesting and analytically tractable ways. The study starts with the observation that within minority nations, there are only some people whose national identity is rigid and unconditional, people who feel Scottish, Breton or Québécois, period; others are more comfortable with a divided or hyphenated identity - French-Canadian, Scottish-British, Breton-French. While this variation has certainly been noted by others who have gone before, in many cases, the observation is taken no further. This study, on the other hand, closely scrutinizes the unalloyed and hyphenated brands of national identity.

The common sense view would be that these simply represent varying intensities of the same basic nationalist sentiment. On the surface, this appears a fair assumption. There certainly seems to be some elemental nationalist impulse behind both the pure and hyphenated nationalist identities. Seemingly too, the space between them is a continuum not a chasm; people can and do occupy essentially any position on the spectrum of nationalist identity, with tiny increments and decrements of nationalist sentiment separating the millions of people who feel "somewhat" Québécois, Scottish or Breton. But this apparent blur of identities may mask important differences. Do the sentiments of hyphenated and unalloyed nationalists differ in intensity or do they differ in kind? It can be argued that in moving from a moderate, muted nationalist identity to a radical and unconditional one, a qualitative transformation occurs, even if the steps along the way are small and incremental with no obvious discontinuities. Such might be the case if the various positions on the spectrum, rather than
representing different strengths of a single sentiment, represent varying mixes of two qualitatively different sentiments. It would then be sensible to say that the endpoints, where the mix is thoroughly dominated by one or the other sentiment, differ in kind even though connected by a continuum.

The chapters ahead make the case that the spectrum of nationalist sentiment in the three minority nations under consideration here does indeed seem to conform to this type of pattern. At this stage, it may seem an abstruse conceptualization, but over the course of the thesis this way of thinking about national identities will, it is hoped, acquire greater substance and resonance.

The first task in the pages that follow, then, is to examine up close the distinctive sentiments that feed into the spectrum of national identity. This leads to an extended analysis of the political dynamics of nationalist movements, drawing on the historical experiences of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany. The chapter overview to which we now turn maps out the route that is followed in moving from start to finish and describes some of the detours and highlights encountered along the way.

C) The Chapters

One distinctive aspect of this study is that its principal focus is an explanatory variable rather than an outcome variable. That is, instead of starting with a conundrum to be solved and canvassing all potentially relevant explanatory factors, the analysis begins with an explanatory factor - national identity - and uses it to explain a variety of political outcomes. Though these outcomes are related and indeed pulled together at the end in an examination of one central issue of concern to students of nationalism - the dynamics of nationalist mobilization - the unifying element in the thesis is the identity typology.

The chapter layout reflects this conceptual orientation. Chapter 1 seeks to substantiate the claim that the continuum of nationalist attachment evident in most stateless nations represents a complex melding of two distinct sentiments. What those two sentiments are emerges out of a
theoretical analysis of the impact of the state on national identity. Nations that have states, the argument runs, tend to be imbued with a heightened sort of national identity. Those within stateless nations who see the attainment of independent statehood as an essential goal for their nation tend to be animated by a similar sort of identity. Those, on the other hand, within stateless nations content with less than independence tend to be possessed of a national consciousness of a lesser order.

The argument, then, is that underlying the divergent political demands of the moderate and radical groups within stateless nations are distinct brands of national identity. Chapter 1 ends with an overview of those types. The moderate element, those content with less than independence, are termed "pragmatist nationalists": people whose nationalism is pragmatically derived, whose sense of belonging to a distinctive community is firmly grounded in tangible sociological differences, be they ethnic, cultural or political. Separatists, on the other hand, are "idealist nationalists": their sense of belonging to the nation is more a product of an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness than hard and concrete sociological difference. Idealist nationalism, unlike its pragmatist counterpart, produces clear, sharp, unhyphenated identities, and it is these unambiguous identities that give rise to unconditional demands for independence.

Any given individual can combine pragmatist and idealist nationalism in varying measure - hence the continuum of nationalist sentiment - for the two are not so much mutually exclusive identities, as they are distinctive ways of feeling part of a nation. Yet the two ways of belonging do differ in kind. This qualitative distinction is especially evident when comparisons are drawn between those who are decidedly pragmatist and those who are staunchly idealist in their nationalist sentiment.

Comparisons of this sort form the underlying structure for the historical overview of the three cases presented in chapters 2 through 4. Looking in turn at Brittany, Scotland and Quebec, these chapters examine the evolution of national identities in the three regions, along with their manifestation in various nationalist movements, parties and historical episodes. This analysis touches
on the entire period in which nationalist agitation has been in evidence in the three places, but concentrates on the twentieth century. Apparent, in each case, are abiding differences between idealists and pragmatists on a number of important counts that reveal the fundamentally different nature of their national consciousness.

Having developed and applied the pragmatist-idealist typology to the three cases of interest, the remainder of the thesis, spread across four chapters, explores the political consequences attendant thereon. Most of the material in chapters 5 through 8 is organized thematically, rather than on a case-by-case basis, but it draws extensively on evidence from the three cases of interest. Numerous contrasts are drawn between the political behavior of pragmatist and idealist nationalists. While the phenomena explored are somewhat disparate, they are linked by the overarching theme that idealist nationalists are less sensitive to empirical realities than their pragmatist counterparts, and consequently are more intransigent and uncompromising in their attitudes and behavior.

Some of this behavioral analysis involves observations that have been made before. The distinctive contribution of this study lies in the invocation of national identity as a crucial explanatory factor. The pragmatist-idealist framework, it is contended, provides a deeper explanation than is sometimes offered of the diverse range of political attitudes and behaviors evident in stateless nations. Figure 3 provides an overview of the chapter layout and conceptual orientation for the entire thesis.

**Figure 3: Chapter Layout**

![Diagram of chapter layout]

Figure 3: Chapter Layout

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Chapter 5 tackles one particular point of difference between pragmatists and idealists: their opposing views as to legitimate means of pursuing the nationalist cause. Idealists often are fairly oblivious to public opinion, without and within the nation, and consequently feel themselves justified in working for national emancipation regardless of the nation's feelings on the matter. Pragmatists, by contrast, tend to be more concerned with what the nation thinks and to move in step with public opinion. It is a point of contrast interesting in itself, but also of relevance because it lends credence to the identity typology developed in Chapters 1 through 4.

The sixth chapter picks up on a larger issue hinted at in Chapter 5: the rationality of the two nationalist types. Using a fairly strict definition of "rationality," it is argued that idealists are generally less rational than their pragmatist counterparts. This tendency is partly demonstrated by qualitative evidence, on nationalist organizations, activists and leaders. However, the bulk of Chapter 6 examines attitudes in the general public, as captured through survey data. Because there is little survey data for the Breton case, Chapter 6 focuses on Quebec and Scotland.

Chapter 6, in outlining some broad differences in the modes of reasoning typical of pragmatists and idealists, focuses on phenomena hidden from direct view. Chapter 7 considers political attitudes and behaviors more accessible to the outside observer, examining patterns of nationalist activity. Among the topics considered are the timing and extent of pragmatist and idealist participation in nationalist projects, and the social origins of the two nationalist types. At various points, the pragmatist-idealist contrasts identified in Chapter 7 are linked to the distinctive modes of reasoning discussed in Chapter 6. Idealist irrationality and pragmatist rationality, it is suggested, help account for their divergent patterns of support for nationalist projects.

Having canvassed several related dimensions of the political behavior of pragmatists and idealists, the pieces are pulled together in Chapter 8. A model of nationalist mobilization is assembled around the attitudinal and behavioral precepts developed in prior chapters. The model is applied to
each of Quebec, Scotland, and Brittany, revisiting, in the process, many of the themes and historical material touched on previously.

In summary, then, this study of nationalist politics in Quebec, Scotland and Brittany focuses on an aspect of the subject so basic and central that it is sometimes treated as an irreducible given admitting of little analytical tractability: national identity. It does not pretend to offer a comprehensive account of nationalist politics in these three places, but it does seek to enhance our understanding of one crucial variable and the way it conditions the basic outlook and predispositions of nationalists before other factors enter into play. By examining the wellsprings of national identity and connecting this to the strands of evidence traditionally used to understand nationalist politics (political attitudes and behaviour, social origins), this thesis, it is hoped, will provide some new perspective on the political dynamics of stateless nations.
Chapter 1

Pragmatist and Idealist Nationalism

Introduction

The objective of this first chapter is to introduce the proposition that nationalist movements typically embody an idealist and pragmatist tendency. The pragmatists within stateless nations are those whose sense of belonging to a distinctive community is firmly grounded in tangible sociological differences. They typically are relatively flexible and moderate in their political demands. Idealists, on the other hand, have a more abstract and idealized sense of their nation; and they, unlike their pragmatist counterparts, usually see the possession of a sovereign state as essential for the nation.

Pragmatist nationalism is probably the less contentious of the two theoretical categories. It represents the common sense understanding of nationalism. People have a sense of connection to others of their national community because of shared tangible traits and social practices - language, religion, cultural norms - to which they are attached. Idealist nationalism, on the other hand, is perhaps a less resonant classification. It is not immediately clear that the national identity of some involves an abstract and idealized sense of community at some remove from the tangible sociological differentiae that make nations distinct. Much of this chapter, then, focuses on idealist nationalism: what this type of national identity consists in, why it is a common phenomenon, how it relates to theories of nationalism advanced by other scholars, and so on.

As a first step towards understanding idealist nationalism, this chapter begins by considering how it is that the possession of a state conjures up an idealized sense of national community in established nation-states. The answer is found in the modalities of state behaviour and the general arc of state-society relations in the modern era. This analysis, though seemingly far removed from the task
at hand, leads by chapter's end to an explication of the pragmatist/idealist division within stateless nations.

A) The State: The Political Shell of Nations

The phenomenon of idealist nationalism is intimately linked to the political shell of nations, the state. As the structure that successful nations inhabit and some element within stateless nations covets, the state is an integral part of modern nationhood, moulding national consciousness in a highly distinctive fashion. The decisive impact of this political shell arises from the way in which it encourages the development of a heightened sense of national consciousness. If nations are the product of some combination of objective characteristics like shared language, religion, culture, and/or political and social values, and a more subjective component, national consciousness, the attachment to the state decidedly alters the mix in favour of the latter.

Many theorists of nationalism take a contrary view, emphasizing instead the primacy of the concrete elements of nationhood. State or no state, people feel themselves to be part of a nation because of shared ethnic attributes,¹ an ability to communicate better with one another than outsiders,² certain common skills forged in the mass educational and social systems of a modern industrial society,³ or common social and political values. Others, on the other hand, do lay emphasis on the subjective side, suggesting that the substantive bases of nationhood are not of the essence, that nations are more properly seen as "imagined communities," bound largely by an abstract sense of connectedness that transcends the differences and distances separating the many millions of people


who comprise a modern nation. The idea of being a community, by this view, matters as much or more than any tangible commonalities the members of a nation may share.

The first group of thinkers, in emphasizing the objective aspect of nations, do not entirely deny that their members share some sense of belonging. Karl Deutsch, for example, who pointed to the concrete (if hard to measure) "communicative efficiency" as the essential binding agent of nationhood, did allow that groups thus conjoined generally exhibit some communal self-awareness - in other words, a national consciousness. But the implicit assumption for Deutsch and his fellow objectivists is that this consciousness consists in little more than a blank cognizance of the group's tangible distinctiveness, and is therefore an ultimately superfluous element of nationhood: were the underlying bases of the sentiment to disappear - the communicative efficiency in Deutsch's case - so too would the consciousness. What is distinctive to the subjectivist approach is the proposition that national consciousness may come to be independent of its objective underpinnings: independent in that the perceived gap between those within and without the nation may grow larger than the sociological evidence would seem to warrant; independent in that the labels "national" and "non-national" may come to be attached to aspects of life seemingly devoid of national content; independent in that the diminution of tangible differences between nations may not lead to a waning of national consciousness; independent, not least of all, in that minority groups initially excluded for failing to

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6 Ibid., pp. 170-177.

7 Writes Deutsch: "National consciousness, like all consciousness, can only be consciousness of something which exists....If Ruritanians do not communicate more easily with each other than with outsiders, if they cannot understand more readily each other's behaviour...then all attempts to cultivate among them a sense of 'Ruritane'...will retain an artificial flavour." (Ibid., p. 173)
conform to the nation's ethnic or cultural archetype, may at a later date find themselves ushered into the national fold as objective membership criteria recede in importance.\(^8\)

In these and other ways, national consciousness does indeed seem to be capable of taking on a life of its own. But if the subjective element in nationalism is capable of exerting an independent influence, it doesn't do so uniformly over time and place. In full-fledged nations, those whose members are unanimous in their desire to either attain or retain sovereignty, subjective consciousness does assume an important autonomous role. But at an incipient stage, when a group hasn't, and hasn't the desire, for a state, objective elements of community matter more, and national consciousness essentially consists in the unmediated apprehension of tangible difference from others.\(^9\) The two distinctive ways of thinking about nations, then, sometimes thought to be antithetical, can be seen as complementary: nations do originate in an awareness of tangible sociological difference (ethnic, cultural, political, what have you), but as national consciousness is hitched to the demand for an independent state, it drifts from its sociological moorings and starts to find its own way in the world.

This is no coincidence, for it is the imbibing of the state ethos by the ethnic or cultural or political community in question that largely fuels this process. A community that wants a state must present itself, and more to the point will eventually come to see itself, as an entity conforming to the rather precise configurations demanded of those populations deemed fit for statehood in the modern world. This entails a fairly major rethinking, for there is a certain looseness to most communities defined by objective criteria alone - an uneven observance of cultural norms by members (non-

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\(^9\) Eric Hobsbawm offers an insightful discussion of such groups, terming them "proto-nations." These communities, sharing some type of common trait like language or religion but attaching no political implications to that fact, are, he suggests, very different from the full-fledged nations they sometimes grow into (see Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 46-79).
practising Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, for instance), a blurring of ethnic distinctiveness at the borders between groups (are Serb and Croat fraternal dialects or two distinct languages?), a variable commitment to the political values of the group (does every single American believe equally in the principles that inspired the Revolution?) - that does not sit well with the precepts of modern statedom. States the world over, since the inception of the age of nationalism, have claimed their charges to be much more crisp in their internal alignment and sharp in their division from outsiders. States, along with the nations they sometimes house, maintain: 1) that their members are all equal to one another; 2) that together they form an indissoluble community; and 3) that they are fundamentally distinct from outsiders. It is a rigid institutional - and ideational - structure that hardly suits the untidy dimensions of most large-scale sociologically distinct communities, but one way or another the successful ones manage to squeeze into the allotted space. Given the poor fit, however, between social animal and political shell, some rethinking of the ties that bind is required. As nations accommodate themselves to the architecture of states, they come to take their unity largely from an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness that glosses over the bumps and imperfections manifest in any community defined by its objective substance alone.

Sometimes they are invoked explicitly, these three attributes of equality, indissolubility, and fundamental distinctness that states cum nations claim to possess. But more often they are taken for granted and underwrite the state's most basic operating principles. A presumptive equality of the members of a nation is implicit in the state's granting of citizenship to all nationals and the recognition of certain common basic rights. Most states today make reference to such rights in their constitution and invoke them in the course of day to day governing. These rights are, of course, sometimes disregarded in practice. But even then, the notion that all citizens are equal permeates political discourse, for it typically informs the denunciations of critics who speak of inviolable rights that must be respected in recognition of the essential equality of all within the state. In the age of nationalism and
nation-states, this principle glides easily into a perceived essential equality of all members of the nation.10

The sense of uniformity fostered by the abstract parity implicit in equal rights is enhanced by the absence of intermediaries between citizen and state in the modern world. Government today, in theory at least, presides over a sea of equal individuals, free of islands of special authority or privilege. It is quite unlike the conception of representation that prevailed in most parts in the pre-modern era. In Europe, for example, feudal society was expressly corporatist; it was various social orders and classes that enjoyed rights, representation and privileges, not individuals. Modern states have dismantled these pockets of particularism, starting with the Absolutist monarchs who moved to invest all authority in themselves, and accelerating as revolutionary movements arrived on the scene in the late eighteenth century to claim power for the people. Carlton Hayes describes how the French Revolution of 1789 led to a "nationalistic leveling process" involving the "abolition of feudal survivals, of serfdom, of class privileges, of the hereditary judiciary, of the university corporations, of the guilds."11 Others states have followed suit, and though they haven't always acted so quickly and boldly, they have worked slowly to pull apart the corporatist lattice that made feudal society a patchwork quilt. Swatches of privilege remain, of course, but substantial progress has been made; moreover, official doctrine, influential in shaping perceptions and mindsets, holds that the process is complete, and that the modern state rules over a wholly seamless community of equal individuals.12

10 The emphasis on equality in nationalist doctrine is also noted by Liah Greenfeld (Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity [Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1992], p.10); and by Benedict Anderson who observes that "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Imagined Communities, p. 7).


Even states set up on federal principles, with intermediate levels of government between citizen and the central state, invoke principles and behave in ways that presuppose an essential equality of all individual members and hence a community free of variegation. If the devolution of power to regional units is warranted for two basic reasons - the recognition of the national status of one or more regions or as a way of improving governance for one and all - states very much emphasize the latter because it allows them to meet the demands of malcontent regions without admitting any tear in the national fabric. A corollary of the attitude that devolution is justifiable only if to the good of the wider community is the insistence of states and their supporters on symmetry in federal arrangements. For if the wider community consists of equal, undifferentiated citizens, then the collections of citizens who comprise the various regions of a federal state must also be equal, and what's good for one region must also be good for the others. Asymmetry, often desired by the minority nation which seeks more powers than any other region cares for, is treated by the state as unjustified and highly suspect.13

A quick glance around the globe reveals the reluctance of modern states to permit asymmetrical federal structures. For the most part they are disallowed; where permitted it is but sparingly and grudgingly. In Spain, the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Communities do currently possess powers some of the others lack, but the Spanish Constitution makes provision for all regions to graduate to the same status.14 Quebec was granted nothing beyond the standard set of provincial powers in Canada's founding agreement, the British North America (BNA) Act, save provisions for bilingualism in Parliament and the courts, and has intermittently struggled ever since to gain a more substantial special status within Confederation. Belgium has probably conceded the most to regionalist


sentiment, introducing in recent years a complex system of federal government with considerable elements of asymmetry to accommodate differences between its Flemish, Walloon and Bruxellois populations.\(^\text{15}\)

Generally speaking, even in these places where some asymmetry has been permitted, the concessions have not been profound, and resistance to further change has been the rule. Canadians and their government in Ottawa have exhibited this tendency when it comes to the francophone province in their midst. In the 1960s, for example, Quebec opted not to participate in numerous programs the federal government was then establishing, preferring to undertake its own parallel initiatives. None of the other provinces expressed a desire to do likewise, but the government in Ottawa nevertheless felt it imperative to extend them the right in principle to follow Quebec's lead.\(^\text{16}\)

The result was a modest asymmetry in practice, but symmetry in theory, the theory carrying with it a great deal of symbolic weight that seemed to reassure anxious quarters no breach in the uniform governance of Canada had occurred.

Recourse to uniform devolution as a way to rebuff Quebec's special demands has also been evident in the constitutional wrangling of the past ten years, prompted by Quebec's deep discontent with the amendments to the BNA Act of the early 1980s. In the end, the agreement reached at Meech Lake in 1987 by the provincial premiers and the federal government did grant Quebec a special status of sorts, calling for the introduction of a clause recognizing Quebec as a "distinct society" in the


\(^{16}\) As one group of observers puts it, "The only way to meet decentralizing demands based on Quebec's two nations theory without violating the rival equal provinces view was to make the powers given to Quebec available to all of the other provinces" (Keith Archer, Roger Gibbins, Rainer Knopff and Leslie A. Pal, *Parameters of Power: Canada's Political Institutions* [Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1995], p. 117). For a discussion of the additional powers acquired by Quebec in this fashion, see Kenneth McRoberts, "Unilateralism, Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Approaches to Canadian Federalism" in Richard Simeon (Research Coordinator), *Intergovernmental Relations*, Volume 63 in the series produced for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 82-87.
Canadian constitution. The agreement floundered, however, as the Canadian public, egged on by several intransigent leaders, railed against this asymmetrical provision.\textsuperscript{17} Within the large body of opinion opposed to a special status for Quebec are some who want no change at all in Canada's constitutional arrangements. Others are willing to countenance reform - provided it involves changes applying equally to all. Such thinking was already evident in certain provisions of Meech; in fact, all of the proposed devolutionary reforms, save the distinct society clause, were to apply to each and every province.\textsuperscript{18} The same penchant for uniformity also has surfaced more recently in the calls for administrative decentralization all round as an alternative to another round of constitutional negotiations aimed at satisfying Quebec's desire for greater autonomy.

Canadians, then, have deflected the asymmetrical thrust of Quebec's nationalist demands in two ways: through outright rejection and by the expansion of devolutionary schemes to include all the provinces. The latter is arguably ambiguous evidence of an insistence on uniform governance, for it might equally be seen as a reflection of other deeply embedded regional identities. It seems more likely, however, that the calls for devolution all round represent first and foremost a reaction to Quebec's demands from a Canadian nationalism deeply sensitive to any derogation from equal treatment for all Canadians and consequently equal treatment for all regions of Canada. After all, before Quebec nationalism emerged as a force to be reckoned with in the early 1960s, the other provinces stood quietly by as the federal government went about building a Canadian welfare state by encroaching on numerous provincial jurisdictions. It was only after Quebec began forcefully to pursue

\textsuperscript{17} A March 1990 Gallup poll indicated that 19% of Canadian English speakers were in favour of the Meech Lake Accord while 51% were opposed. Cited in Stéphane Dion, "Explaining Quebec Nationalism" in R. Kent Weaver (ed.), \textit{The Collapse of Canada?} (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), p. 113.

\textsuperscript{18} The additional powers granted all the provinces were: the right to negotiate immigration agreements with the federal government; a say in Supreme Court appointments; the right to opt out of shared cost programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction; and a constitutional veto over proposed changes to Canada's national institutions. See Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, \textit{The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics}, 2nd ed. (Peterborough, Ont.:
the acquisition of additional powers from 1960 on that the other provinces started to clamour for decentralization. The timing suggests that their attitudes were formed less by distinctive provincial identities and more by the indignity their Canadian identity would suffer were Quebec to gain a status they lacked.

Similar attitudes have been evident in Great Britain at various points over the last century. The demands for devolution issuing from Ireland, Scotland and Wales have often been treated as matters that cannot be addressed in isolation, but must instead involve some rejigging of Great Britain as a whole. When the Liberal Party under Gladstone decided in 1885 to support Home Rule for Ireland, this was quickly altered under pressure from various quarters to Home Rule All Round, even though at the time it was Ireland alone champing hard at the bit. As one historian puts it, the initial Irish-only measure was widely unpopular and had to be "toned down in tandem with some wider and less revolutionary plan. That, rather than a subterranean popular aspiration, raised the question of Home Rule all round."\(^{19}\) To placate British opinion, no special arrangements were to be offered the Irish. "I will consent," said Gladstone, "to give to Ireland no principle, nothing that is not upon equal terms offered to Scotland and to the different portions of the United Kingdom."\(^{20}\)

This initial Liberal scheme and others put forward over the years have at least had the merit of proposing assemblies for the historic nations of the United Kingdom. In other places, state authorities have carved up the country with scant regard for historical boundaries and regional identities, as the French did, for example, with their system of départements following the Revolution. In addition, asymmetry has not been abhorred to the quite the same degree in the U.K. as elsewhere. Though, for

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example, Winston Churchill's 1911 plan for devolution envisaged parliaments for Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and seven English regions, the Labour Party in the 1970s and again in the 1990s did propose that Assemblies be established in Scotland and Wales only. In the U.K., then, demands for uniform decentralization have been heard, but overall the British have been more accommodating than most of the special aspirations of their minority nations. More will be said on this topic further on; for the time being, suffice it to note that the norm for the modern state is to insist on symmetry, but there is some modest variation around this norm.

In a variety of ways, then, states and the substantial body of public opinion that supports them in their endeavours, have tried to structure federalism to ensure its compatibility with the principle of national uniformity. So long as no region has special powers, the presumptive equality of all citizens is not compromised. In symmetrical federal systems, sovereignty is seen to ripple out in smooth concentric circles from the ultimate authority at the centre, rather than being cobbled together from the states's constituent elements. It is a conception in keeping with the image of undifferentiated community held in great favour by the modern state.

If the ostensible equality of all citizens, and a concomitant tendency to favour uniform treatment for both individuals and regions, represent one pillar of the governing practices of modern states, another is the presumed indissolubility of the communities they rule over. This is plainly evident in the opposition in principle to secession to which most states hew tenaciously. Even those rife with centrifugal forces refuse to give ground. For example, the Organization for African Unity, a

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22 To see that this is so, we might consider a counter-example of a federation (or confederation) where the sovereignty of the constituent elements is at this point essentially uncontested - the European Union. Here asymmetrical provisions are quickly multiplying (two track convergence towards a common monetary policy, the Schengen Convention, opting out of Maastricht's social charter) as the union deals with the divergent desires of countries like Germany and France, on the one hand, and Great Britain and Denmark on the other. These "anomalies" seem entirely legitimate because the EU's members are seen as sovereign entities. Units within federal states are not, and this is why such states generally refuse them desired asymmetries.
body whose members preside over some of the globe's most fractious populations, expressly forbids secession. The attitude differs somewhat among democratic states, who are more inclined to prevaricate and negotiate rather than forbid secession outright, but there is still a deep reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the action.\textsuperscript{23} It is a puzzling attitude, given that much democratic theory points to people's fundamental right to organize themselves into self-governing communities through the mechanism of voluntary social contracts. Contracts typically require the express consent of all parties; if some opt to withdraw their consent, there is rightly no stopping them. Yet denying this right - denying the legitimacy of the secessionist program - is very much the norm among modern states.\textsuperscript{24}

As John Breuilly observes, states today claim an absolute sovereignty in breadth, if not in depth; they may leave citizens to their devices in a sizable private sphere, but in the public realm they claim an inviolable authority over all citizens.\textsuperscript{25}

Opposition to secession might conceivably be inspired by many different motives, but invariably, it seems, one chief factor is a deeply embedded sense of the state's indissolubility. Those attached to the state and the community it houses have grave difficulty abiding the departure of one of its component parts. "My Canada includes Quebec" the saying goes, a sentiment that naturally spawns intransigent political positions. "There is such a thing as a national will from which no one can opt out," Pierre Trudeau warned his opponents as he set out (unsuccessfully) to impose a constitutional package on the provinces in 1980.\textsuperscript{26} This is more than mere dejection at the prospect of lost territory; it suggests an utter failure to see the world through the eyes of those imbued with an alternative

\textsuperscript{23} Preston King, \textit{Federalism and Federation} (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 108-120.

\textsuperscript{24} A case in point is the support given by the Canadian government to a recent action before the Supreme Court to have a unilateral declaration of Quebec independence ruled illegal.


\textsuperscript{26} \textit{CBC News in Review Series. The Meech Lake Special [videorecording]} (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1990).
nationalism, who think it their right to exit at will. The concessions that are made, consequently, tend to be responses to the force of political realities - votes, demonstrations, and in some cases bombs - rather than a genuinely sympathetic response to the minority nationalism in question. Former French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing, for one, appeared unwilling, perhaps unable, to step into the shoes of his nationalist opponents when he declared, "Contrary to what one often says and writes, there is not a Corsican problem, there are problems in Corsica."\textsuperscript{27}

These first two postulates informing modern state governance, a belief in the abstract equality of all members and an insistence on the indissolubility of the state's community, are regularly joined by a third, the notion of a clear and sharp distinctiveness from outsiders. The divide between those inside and outside the state manifests itself in a variety of ways. For example, while states speak fulsomely of the universal human rights that link all people regardless of nationality, when it comes to the crunch - the acceptance of binding obligations to others - the gap between insiders and outsiders becomes clear. Whereas in the domestic context rights are buttressed by a legal and social infrastructure aimed at ensuring their provision, those outside the state receive no such succour and their rights often remain mere abstractions.\textsuperscript{28}

Instead of assistance to the oppressed being the norm, non-intervention is the default principle of modern international relations, to be circumvented only in the most egregious instances of human rights abuse. States, the dominant thinking has it, should rightly be seen as something like the free-floating individuals of classical liberalism, each enjoying the greatest possible freedom compatible with equal measures of freedom for everyone else. Thinking of states in this fashion means that the real individuals who inhabit them sometimes find their basic desires and rights subjugated to the will of


metaphorical collective individuals. The image usually remains implicit, but is sometimes made explicit: "We can consider the state as a moral person whose head is the sovereign, and whose limbs are the individual citizens...the state is a society animated by a single soul." 29 States are by no means the only political or social organizations that invoke this type of imagery to justify their actions, but few collective individuals enjoy the inalienability states possess by virtue of the doctrine of state sovereignty. Political power and authority give muscle and weight to what might otherwise remain a 98 lb. notion. It is a metaphysical way of thinking that applies in the first instance to states, but inevitably spills over onto the nations that inhabit them. A member of one nation has no obligations to a member of another, it is supposed, because both are in the charge of some higher being whose right to exist and develop free of outside interference remains a largely unchallenged axiom of the modern political order.

A sharp distinction between insiders and outsiders serves also to justify the restrictions and controls placed on new entrants to the state. Immigration controls are generally stringent and justified by appeal to a national interest that weighs the interests of insiders 100% and outsiders 0%. Note that this holds even of those nations that claim to practice civic rather than ethnic nationalism, for these "social contract" nations, rather than welcome all who are willing to abide by the terms of their contract, instead take the nationalist line and make it wholly the nation's prerogative to decide which potential immigrants will be let in and on what grounds (usually economic not political, as when "immigrant investors" become Canadians by the simple, and seemingly irrelevant, act of investing large sums of money in Canada).

The absence of a consistent link between like-mindedness and membership in civic nations is seen also in the inclusion of people whose actions suggest a deep antipathy towards the norms of their

national community. Criminals may commit heinous crimes, yet their rights as Canadians are upheld. Why? Because they are Canadian. Criminals may be the black sheep of the family, but they are still part of the family in a way that outsiders are not. States, through their practices of unconditional inclusion and exclusion, generate a sense of connectedness that transcends tangible agreement and difference.

It hasn't always been this way. In their early days, some social contract nations tried to establish a tighter link between the ostensible bases of community and membership criteria. The USA, after its founding revolution, advertised itself as open to the world's migrants, so long as they were committed to upholding the political principles of the new republic. France, in its declaration of war in April 1792, declared that it would "promote by all means in its power [the] settling in France" of those willing to "range themselves under its banners and consecrate their efforts to the defense of liberty." The flip side was that any French citizen forswearing allegiance to The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was to be "cut off from the community by civil excommunication." The notion of contingent national membership was also perhaps at work in the old British policy of banishing convicts to Australia and other far-off colonies. The black sheep of the British nation of yesteryear were expelled and disowned in a way that the criminal element in today's civic nations is not.


31 The reality even then, however, fell far short of the rhetoric, as non-whites were largely excluded from the American political community. See H.P. Schuck and M.R. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p.51.

32 Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 56.

33 Ibid., p. 54.
The extent to which people actually entered and exited these nations was always more limited than the principles would have seemed to call for. Yet still, it is possible to detect in places in the past a stronger sense that individuals might form themselves into nations on the basis of rational affiliation. The existence of such an ethos of community, to return to an earlier point, perhaps helps explain the susceptibility of certain states to secessionism. Where the national will is nothing but the sum of individual wills pooled together, rather than a force in its own right, the nation can be dismantled - at will - by disaffected individuals. Liah Greenfeld gives the example of Britain at the time the American colonies chose to split away: "The logical consummation of the inherent tendencies in English nationalism...was the absolute sovereignty, self-government, or independence of every individual," and consequently "there was no presumption [in British nationalism] of the existence of some metaphysical unity that made the formation of the political union natural and necessary." Without some sort of metaphysical glue, nations are susceptible to secession when some part of their population comes to support a different vision of society than the rest, a lesson the United States was to learn, in its turn, in 1861.

At times and in places, then, nationalism has rested to a greater degree on individual adherence to particular principles, so that the divide between insiders and outsiders has been contingent and easily bridged, and the bonds between insiders, contingent and easily severed. But these practices and tendencies have nowhere survived. Over the years - no precise dating is possible - all liberal nations have acquired a stronger sense of collective self as they have increasingly embraced the exclusionary and internally homogenizing practices of modern statehood. As Greenfeld notes, the United States, through the Civil War and its aftermath, revealed itself to be more like other nations in insisting on the indissolubility of its union. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies promoted a growing sense of

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the divide between American insiders and non-American outsiders. Countries like France and Canada have experienced a similar evolution. These countries may claim to house social contract nations, but an aversion to open free-agency is manifest in their governance practices: a strong preference for internal uniformity; a generalized prohibition on secession; the inclusion of seeming miscreants (when measured against the national creed) and exclusion of like-minded outsiders. Civic nations only ostensibly derive their legitimacy from what Renan called an "everyday plebiscite," for in some important ways, they are deeply ascriptive and organic in their self-conception, much in the manner so-called ethnic nations. They may be individualistic in providing for important freedoms within (not to be scoffed at), but in some of their basic dispositions and actions, they are broadly the same as any sort of nation.

Established nations, then, ensconced in states, adhere, with some modest variation, to a few basic operating principles, which are underwritten by a homogenizing and exclusionary conception of community. Seamless and uniform, indissoluble, sharply distinct from outsiders: this is the way modern states tend to present the populations they rule over and the way those populations see themselves in most peaceful and prosperous nation-states.

36 Ibid., pp. 438-40.


39 Another who has questioned whether civic and ethnic nations are really all that different is Kathryn A. Manzo, Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 18-23.
But more to the point for present purposes, it is also the way that aspiring nations come to see themselves. Faced with a world where a sovereign state is the prize worth vying for, stateless nations naturally refashion themselves, whether consciously or unconsciously, to fit the dominant mould, claiming for their own community the selfsame attributes of uniformity, indissolubility and sharp distinctiveness that established nations purportedly possess. It is very much a change in self-perception not substance, for nations usually look much like the proto-national communities they grow out of: sociologically homogeneous to a degree, yet at the same time undeniably more internally diverse and more externally affiliated than the ethos of the nation-state would have it. The key change that marks the passage from proto-national community to full-fledged nation is the development of an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness with insiders and disconnectedness from outsiders. In short, nations are born of changes in the realm of ideas not sociological reality. They are a product of the heightened sense of national consciousness that is part and parcel of the demand for an independent state.

But we speak too glibly here of proto-national communities and full-fledged nations. For many sociologically distinctive populations are neither wholly one nor the other, but hybrids. They have in their ranks some who are animated by idealist nationalism (and seek to emulate the nation-state model) and others who are not. The latter are not necessarily devoid of communal sentiment, but they are not imbued with the same heightened identity characteristic of the idealist element. Instead, their national consciousness is a more direct and unmediated reflection of the tangible elements of nationhood. It is this mixed bag of nationalist sentiment within stateless nations that generates many of their interesting political dynamics. This basic point is further developed later in this chapter, and indeed is the point of departure for the analysis in the rest of the thesis.

But before taking up that theme, some more background might be offered in order to provide further elaboration on this special category of national consciousness that we have dubbed idealist
nationalism. The next section considers some of the connections between idealist nationalism and two influential theories of nationalism developed in recent years, while the next again section examines the historical forces that have ensured the ascendance of this brand of national consciousness. The final two sections of the chapter return to the distinction between pragmatist and idealist nationalism, developing this typology further in preparation for the case studies of Chapters 2 through 4.

B) Idealist Nationalism: Affinities and Contrasts with Two Theories of Nationalism

The conceptual category of idealist nationalism owes something to the ideas of John Breuilly, whose principal contention in *Nationalism and the State* is that the doctrine of nationalism has been decisively shaped by the political goal it has been formulated to meet, the quest for state power. In the age of popular sovereignty, suggests Breuilly, those hoping to control the state found that nationalist doctrine nicely jibed with their need to co-ordinate and mobilize support and offer up some legitimacy for their actions. These political purposes shaped the standard ideological assumptions of the nationalist: that there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character, whose interests and values are paramount, and which must be as independent as possible. To these oft-cited aspects of nationalist ideology, we have added others that specifically reflect the idealism inherent in the statist conception of community: the essential equality of all members, the indissolubility of their union, their sharp distinctiveness from outsiders.

Breuilly's contention that nationalist ideology has been shaped by the structure of the political realm wherein it is formulated and deployed, applies equally to these added idealist dimensions. States, in the modern age, exercise considerable powers of inclusion and exclusion, powers applied with vigour and enthusiasm by invoking an image of indivisible community. This holds even of those states - federalist states, states housing civic nations - where freedoms within allow for considerable

40 Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 2.
individual autonomy and diversity. The legitimization of state sovereignty, in both its internal and external dimensions, requires a seamless rendering of populations that few, if any, could ever hope to match in actual fact. These idealist propositions seep into the nationalist ideology of both nations in possession of states and nations striving for states.

But the acceptance of the statist ethos by nations and nationalists is not simply an artificial and cynical manipulation of ideas for political ends. Breuilly comes close to this position, without quite embracing it, emphasizing the non-nationalist motives that trigger the development of nationalist ideology - a wide range of desires for social, economic, and political change, all of which require state power to effect. Nationalist ideology is a rational choice for many people and groups because it lends weight to their claims in a system where states are the key to effecting political change. Nationalist symbols and ideology, Breuilly concedes, may have some independent appeal, but will not, he hastens to add, induce political action unless some concrete social interests are involved.\(^{41}\) By contrast, that nationalist ideology and consciousness can be independent influences on nationalist activity is a guiding precept of this study. Idealist nationalism is capable of moving people in its own right and transcending more concrete considerations and concerns. Breuilly is too quick to discount the influence of nationalist consciousness on nationalists and nations - or such, at least, is a principal contention of the chapters ahead.

Another influential work bearing on the conceptual category of idealist nationalism is Benedict Anderson's provocative \textit{Imagined Communities}. For Anderson, nations are imagined "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."\(^{42}\) This image has a powerful effect on those under its influence; for Anderson, \textit{pace} Breuilly, ideology isn't

\(^{41}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 387.

\(^{42}\) Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, p. 6.
epiphenomenal, it is a powerful force in its own right. But if nations, as imagined communities, have an air of invention to them, it shouldn't be taken that they are mere fabrications.\footnote{Ibid., p. 6.} Nations, suggests Anderson, do sometimes grow out of communities of a certain substantive homogeneity. In Europe, for example, nations typically sprang up among populations sharing a common vernacular language. That these nations brought together people nameless and faceless, one to another, meant there was an imagined element to them, but this was more in the nature of embellishment than fabrication, since they did share some manner of tangible connection. Anderson's formulation is similar to our proposition that nations involve an idealized sense of connectedness with insiders and disconnectedness from outsiders, originating in, yet moving well beyond, some measure of concrete commonality. This, we might add, helps account for the power of idealist nationalism: its precepts, generally speaking, are not pure artifice, but rather exaggerated versions of reality, which for this reason strike a resonant chord among many.

But while there is much in Anderson's work that accords with the interpretation of nations favoured here, there are again differences of emphasis. Anderson emphasizes bottom-up factors, that is societal changes, that have catalyzed the formation of imagined communities. There was first the decline of religion, which prompted the search for other objects of fealty: "What was then required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning....few things were...better suited to this end than an idea of nation."\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} The frontiers of these new articles of devotion were established by technological and political factors, differing from one epoch and world region to the next, that determined people's imaginative reach. In Europe, for example, the dramatic expansion of print-capitalism (i.e. books and newspapers) from the 16th century onward led to an increased usage and fixity of vernacular languages, promoting a sense of connectedness in people hitherto largely
indifferent to one another's existence: "What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity".45 "Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper."46

Anderson is no doubt correct that social forces from below have played their part in the imagining of national communities, but not to be discounted is the top-down influence of the state. This political shell, the principal carrier of nations in the modern age, has also been a key formative influence. Anderson, for his part, does in places point to the state and other administrative boundaries as important determinants of the limits of imagined communities. Colonial frontiers, for example, helped establish the images of community that emerged in the New World, which explains how a series of colonies sharing a common language came to form independent nations in the Spanish holdings of the Americas.47 Similarly, most of the colonies that gained their independence in the twentieth century were content to take over the rather arbitrary territorial allotments established by the European powers.48

But while recognizing the practical effect of borders in establishing the frontiers of new national communities, Anderson perhaps under-emphasizes the ideational impact of modern state governance. He alludes to this element primarily in one chapter (new to the revised edition of Imagined Communities) where he speaks of some of the administrative tasks performed by colonial

46 Ibid., p. 44.
48 Ibid., pp. 113-140.
administrations. Census-taking, map-making and the "museumizing" of indigenous culture, observes Anderson, involved the application of a "totalizing classificatory grid" to what were generally diverse and fractious populations.\(^{49}\) In the end, this grid came to be accepted by the colonized, and national communities coalesced much along the lines that the colonial powers had imagined them. The administrative tasks Anderson identifies (census-taking and the like) reflect and reinforce the statist ethos of community, and as such are of the essence in the imagining process; for the legitimacy of such totalizing classifications rests on the principal conceit at the heart of sovereign states, the idea that the populations they rule over are seamless, indissoluble and sharply distinct.

One important implication of this position is that the sense of community in groups lacking, and lacking the desire for, the rigid political shell of the state will be less totalizing and less imagined, or conversely, more amorphous and more concrete. Communities sharing tangible traits like language, religion or culture, but relatively moderate and flexible in their political demands, will have a more diffuse and grounded sense of themselves. The differences perceived between their community and others will be more blurred and conditional unlike the "totalizing" distinctions drawn by state-based communities. Theirs will be a less idealized and more pragmatist sense of difference.

This type of modest and pragmatist community consciousness is possible on both a small and large-scale, contrary to Anderson's suggestion that "all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact...are imagined."\(^{50}\) A community is not necessarily imagined simply because it is large, even if it is so large that most of its members remain unknown to one another. If one person shares with a stranger something tangible - religion, language, cultural practices, political values - there is no reason the two can't feel an authentic and readily comprehensible sense of connection. Multiplied

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 184.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 6.
many times over across a large territorial expanse, such connections would naturally generate a pragmatist sense of community rooted not in the imagination but in sociological realities.

This is the contention then: that members of large-scale communities sharing some mix of tangible elements in common (language, religion, ethnicity, political values), yet unaffected by the idealism inherent in the statist mode of organization, generally have a pragmatist sense of self closely tied to the empirical content of community. Ethnic, cultural and political communities that demand a state and have imbibed the statist ethos, on the other hand, are more imagined. The sense of connectedness animating their members is idealized, exceeding any substantive connections that may exist between them. Members of a full-fledged nation (i.e. a nation demanding a state) see themselves as wholly equal to one another (in spite of their unequal possession of the pertinent national traits and uneven observance of relevant cultural or political norms); their community as undifferentiated and indissoluble (even in the face of demands for devolution or outright independence on the part of some portion of their citizenry); and insiders as sharply distinct from outsiders (despite the heterogeneity within and points of contact with outsiders). It is the superimposition of the state's political and ideational structure that transforms pragmatist, empirically-based communities into idealist, imagined communities.

This distinction between pragmatist and idealist nationalism is given more extensive treatment later in this chapter. But before proceeding to that task, some further groundwork might be laid by considering why idealist nationalism has historically been such a powerful ideological force.

C) The Historical Dominance of Idealist Nationalism: States versus Nations

The gist of the argument in the preceding section is firstly, as Breuilly argues, that the state decisively shapes nations and nationalist doctrine, and secondly that the result is, as Anderson argues, imagined - though not wholly invented - communities. In arguing that political structures mould
nations, an alternative outcome is implicitly dismissed: that nations might mould political structures. By this, we mean not that no stateless nations have ever gained independent statehood, but rather that those stateless nations which have won a state have typically, in the process, experienced a profound transformation. The sense of national consciousness animating their members has been heightened and intensified, as they have embraced the ideational infrastructure of the modern state, idealist nationalism.

This dynamic can be seen in the typical life-cycle of a nation. Most, it was suggested at the outset, start out life as communities with a limited sense of self closely harnessed to the objective elements in their make-up, and consequently are reserved in their demands. But many subsequently develop a more radical and idealist face, calling for a state to satisfy their aspirations. Others have also remarked on the pattern. John Hutchinson, for example, has observed that nations are generally modest in their nationalism at the outset, focusing their efforts on the cultural regeneration of their community and making few demands of the public authorities: "Typically cultural nationalists [the groups that precede Hutchinson's 'political nationalists'] establish informal and decentralized clusters of cultural societies and journals, designed to inspire a spontaneous love of community in its different members by educating them to their common heritage of splendour and suffering...cultural nationalism remains in 'normal' circumstances a small-scale movement that promotes progress through communal self-help." But the track record of these early nationalists in attaining their limited ends in a political arena dominated by states is dismal and most young nations - and certainly all successful ones - end up striving for independence. Hutchinson again: "In terms of its communitarian goals, cultural

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51 John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: the Gaelic Revival and the creation of the Irish nation state* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 16. Eric Hobsbawm also notes that in Europe from 1780s to the 1840s, there was a cultural and linguistic revival in many parts, but few activists working for independent statehood (Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 102-4)
nationalism fails... [and] it is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies"; "cultural nationalists...are frequently driven into state politics to defend the cultural autonomy of the nation."\textsuperscript{52}

Why have political structures had the upper hand over social forces, moulding communities in their image rather than vice versa? The answer probably lies in timing: historically, the state succeeded in exerting its authority well before society started to throw its weight around. The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw relatively little in the way of social agitation and empowerment, but did witness important enhancements to state sovereignty: the elimination of internal challenges to the state's authority through the eradication and delegitimization of corporatist modes of representation; the spread of uniform administration across the state's territory; the consolidation of power at the centre in the person of the monarch; the levelling effects of that consolidation, as all within the king's realm became his or her subjects and therefore equally subordinate; the development of sharply delineated borders to replace fuzzy zone frontiers.\textsuperscript{53} Since these important developments in early modern Europe preceded the rise of popular rule, they were well entrenched by the time the people came on the scene towards the end of the eighteenth century, making various demands on government for the satisfaction of their political, economic, social and cultural aspirations.\textsuperscript{54}

The people, gradually establishing themselves in their newfound role as sovereign authority, largely adjusted to the mechanisms of governance already in place. Sometimes revolutionary governments committed to universalist principles appeared on the scene and tried to break down

\textsuperscript{52} Hutchinson, \textit{The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism}, pp. 17 and 16.


existing political norms and structures; witness, for example, the French revolutionaries, who at the start drew little distinction between the rights of those in France and those elsewhere. But radical revisions of the existing order were thwarted by existing states who quite rightly perceived such ideas as gravely threatening to their entrenched authority. In a similar vein, many cultural and ethnic communities within multi-national states might well have been content to see the system of total and sharply demarcated sovereignties replaced with one of divided and overlapping sovereignties capable of accommodating their partial and varied commitments to their national communities. But again states were, for the most part, having none of it. So instead, the various groups bound by concrete elements of community and modest in their communal consciousness, took up (or tried to take up) the governance structures and practices inherited from the past. This entailed some rethinking of the nature of their union. In order to act (or endeavour to act) in the internally homogenizing and exclusionary ways that states do, these communities and their leaders had to invoke a very modernist conception of the nation, one based, to borrow from the post-modernist lexicon, on homogenizing conceptions of insiders, binary oppositions between insider and outsider, and the positing of essential differences between the two. In other words, an ideology had to be developed that posited an abstract and idealised sense of connectedness with insiders and disconnectedness from outsiders - in short, idealist nationalism. Communities initially defined by a conditional and partial sense of loyalty came to have an unconditional and total sense of commitment.

Once a few dominant nation-states started to establish themselves along these lines, a system came into being that was largely self-perpetuating. New nations - that is communities that were starting to develop a national consciousness and make demands for recognition and some control over their own affairs - would stake claims to a place in the state system (or rather, nation-state system) rather

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55 Similarly John Armstrong observes that "modern nationalism has sought permanent 'essences' of national character instead of recognizing the fundamental but shifting significance of boundaries for human identity" (Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, p. 4).

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than trying to dismantle the structure that made having a state the *sine qua non* of control over matters of culture and identity in the modern world. This partly represented emulation of a dominant form (the established nations), and was partly a response to the poverty of the alternatives. After all, for much of the last two centuries, nations that have been modest in their sense of national self, and mild in their political demands, have found themselves oppressed, if not assimilated, by the dominant nationalism of the group controlling the state. It is only recently that concessions to minority nationalist sentiment in the form of more nuanced structures of governance have started to appear, but even now these remain in their infancy. The system of nation-states, and nations striving for states, arose first in modern Europe, but was transplanted to the rest of the world through colonization. First the rigid governance structures were put in place, along with the attendant administrative paraphernalia of census-taking, map-making and so forth identified by Anderson. Later the legitimizing ideology of idealist nationalism was imported by indigenous leaders and, often enough, embraced by local populations, as power passed from colonizer to colonized.

From this whirlwind account of the long-term evolution of state-society relations flows the counterfactual proposition that had popular rule emerged in medieval times, when political power was more diffuse, we might well have a less modernist conception of nations today. The sense of community binding ethnic, cultural, and political groups would be more pre-modern (or, as some might prefer, more post-modern) and political structures accordingly less rigid. Arguably, this sort of ethos does find some expression in the modern world - in the pragmatist element within nationalist movements. Henri Bourassa, for example, whose moderate French-Canadian nationalism contrasted sharply with the radical views of contemporaries like Lionel Groulx, felt that nationalist feelings had

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been most healthy in medieval times when "particularistic feelings were contained in a higher universality." Superimposed on the Canadian social landscape, Bourassa's medievalism led him to pronounce in favour of a country where French Canadians would be free to develop their language and culture, but would share with English Canadians a political commitment to Canada, while at the same time deferring to the transcendent authority of the Catholic Church on certain important matters. Similarly, the moderate leader of the Welsh nationalists in the 1920s, Saunders Lewis, found little to recommend in the regular coupling of nation and state and declared that "The aim of Welsh nationalists should not... be the creation of an independent Welsh-state, for to advocate this would be to accept the principle of nationalism which [has] caused so much harm. The aim should be a 'return to the medieval principle' and with it a 'denial of the benefits of political conformity'. The same discomfiture with the notion of indivisible sovereignty was apparent in the efforts of the Scottish Evangelists in the early 1840s to halt the creeping encroachments on the authority of the Church of Scotland by the British government: "That to which they took so grave an objection was the claim laid down by the authorities of the State, to an absolute jurisdiction over every department of civilised life. They admitted, in brief, her sovereignty over her domain; it was when she entered a field they held to be without her control that the challenge was flung down....They urged the essential federalism of society, the impossibility of confining sovereignty to any one of its constituent parts."

The viewpoint of these advocates of moderation gives some further indication of the differences that exist between seekers of sovereignty and their more moderate counterparts. The

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58 Ibid., pp. 20-36.


apostles of independence have imbibed a vision of community that is abstracted from the tangible ties that bind; for sovereignty, when vested wholly in a single community presupposes a flat uniformity within and a stark division between insiders and outsiders. It is only when the sense of community is decoupled from the demand for absolute sovereignty that more modest conceptions of community, more closely harnessed to empirical reality, are possible.

D) The Pragmatist-Idealist Typology: An Overview

That there are often within stateless nations moderates, who take a different view of the nation and its proper place in the political firmament, brings us back to this crucial point: stateless nations contain a variety of protagonists whose conceptions of their community differ fundamentally. The idealist nationalists are, by definition, those imbued with the idealist sense of nationhood; they promote the notion that their national community is seamless, indissoluble and sharply distinct, thus aping the behaviour of established nation-states. Pragmatist nationalists, often more numerous in the early stages of a nation's development, have a markedly different conception of their community. They do perceive it as a distinct grouping but their sense of belonging is not imbued with the nation-state ethos and its attendant idealism. Instead, theirs is a nationalism more closely harnessed to sociological realities - the tangible differences of language, culture, and sometimes political and social values, that make their community distinct - and is therefore more pragmatist and grounded. The populations of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, stateless nations all, contain both idealist nationalists and pragmatist nationalists, who operate with quite different conceptions of their national communities.

Of course, there are usually others still within stateless nations who remain blissfully unaware of their membership in the nation of deep concern to others. Many in today's Brittany fit this description, as do some in Scotland and Quebec. This lack of consciousness marks them off from both idealists and pragmatists who, while differing in the quality and intensity of their attachment to the
national community, do share some common sense of national belonging. (Given this variegated
national consciousness, can these three communities rightfully be called nations? If that term is
reserved for peoples uniformly animated by idealist nationalism, the answer must be no. But this seems
unduly restrictive. Communities can be nations in varying degrees, depending on the relative weight
within of idealist nationalists, pragmatist nationalists and the nationally incognizant. For this reason,
we continue throughout the thesis to use the term stateless nation to describe Quebec, Scotland and
Brittany. In the course of reviewing each case, their respective degrees of "nationness" will become
clear.)

Other scholars have also voiced the opinion that national consciousness admits of significant
variation from one nationalist to the next. Nationalism, wrote Max Weber, is a "sentiment of solidarity
in the face of other groups," yet it is a sentiment that is highly variable: "An unbroken scale of quite
varied and highly changeable attitudes toward the idea of the 'nation' is to be found...within single
groups to whom language usage ascribes the quality of 'nations'." To establish more precisely the
sense of communion binding a people, it must be asked, "What conclusions are a group of people
willing to draw from the 'national sentiment' found among them?" Weber believed that the desire for
a state was indicative of an especially potent form of communal attachment, for which sentiment alone
the term nationalism should be reserved. "If one believes it is at all expedient to distinguish national
sentiments as something homogenous and specifically set apart, one can do so only by referring to a
tendency toward an autonomous state." Weber's analysis accords with the viewpoint expressed here,

61 Max Weber, "The Nation" in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills (eds. and translators), From Max Weber:


63 Ibid., p. 175.

64 Ibid., p. 179.
that groups and individuals set on a state are imbued with a consciousness of a different order from those content to remain stateless.

The qualitative distinction between a delimited national consciousness, and an idealized sense of national connection linked to the desire for political sovereignty, has perhaps received its most extensive treatment at the hands of political philosophers, particularly liberal philosophers. If there was a time when liberal thinkers abhorred all manifestations of nationalist sentiment,65 there is a growing tendency today for advocates of this creed to recognize some nationalist aspirations as legitimate. To the extent such aspirations are rooted in a simple desire to protect concrete and tangible elements of culture and ethnicity, many contemporary liberal philosophers are inclined to give them their blessing. Among those who have taken this position in recent years are Yael Tamir, Neil MacCormick, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor.66 The same thinkers also tend to stipulate that the demand for a state to satisfy nationalist claims is usually excessive.67 For sovereign statehood for a nation implies a sharper and more unconditional divide between people than is generally warranted by the sociological facts. Language, religion, and culture may set the members of a nation apart from non-members. But the members of nations rarely possess such traits in equal measure. Moreover, there invariably are other traits that are shared with outsiders. The sociological reality that needs to be accommodated by

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65 Ostensibly anyway: after all, most liberals did not question the legitimacy of existing nation-states.


political structures is a complex web of interconnected clusters, not a series of sharply demarcated, holistic and homogeneous communities.

Though political philosophers treat this as an important normative distinction, it is also a potentially useful empirical one. Some nationalists respect the liberal injunction to maintain a delimited sense of national difference and consequently practice pragmatist nationalism. Others, however, do not heed the philosophers and embrace an idealized vision of their national community that marks them as idealist nationalists. Distinctions of this sort have not, however, been much utilized in the empirical literature on nationalist movements.

If there is a typology applied to nationalist tendencies within stateless nations that bears some resemblance to the pragmatist-idealistic classification, it is the division sometimes drawn between cultural and political nationalism. Cultural nationalism refers to the aspiration to protect the nation's distinct cultural heritage; political nationalism refers to the desire to gain some manner of political power for the nation, often independent statehood. The first is similar to pragmatist nationalism, the second to idealist nationalism. But the two typologies are not synonymous. In the first place, the phrase "cultural nationalism" can be unduly restrictive in its connotations. "Culture" is taken by many to refer to only a subset of the elements that make people tangibly distinct, things like language and religion, literature and music. Pragmatist nationalism is more explicitly all-encompassing. It refers to any tangible sociological differentiae that set people apart, including, for example, the distinctive political values of a community. Of course, "culture," in its broadest sense, means essentially the same thing, but the phrase "cultural nationalism" can be misleading. Another shortcoming of the cultural/political nationalism typology - for present purposes anyway - is the implication that only political nationalists

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68 This is how these terms are used, for example, in Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism, pp. 1-3, inter alia. The same terminology is sometimes used to differentiate established nation-states: cultural nations are those that derive their sense of national unity from a common culture (e.g. Germany), whereas political nations are those whose sense of community is the product of living together in a state over an extended period of time (e.g. the United States). See Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), pp. 14-18.
seek political power for the nation. Cultural nationalists do sometimes make political demands, even if these are typically more limited than those put forward by political nationalists (viz. autonomy rather than independence). Yet even if this potential misunderstanding is addressed up-front, and political nationalist is expressly defined to include only those who seek independence for their nation, another problem remains. The phrase "political nationalism" presupposes that the distinctiveness of this creed lies in the nationalist objective sought; for many, it is a felicitous phrase because it implicitly avers that it is a bald desire for political power that fuels nationalist demands for a state. The argument of this chapter, on the other hand, is that underwriting the "political" nationalist's goal of independent statehood is not an avaricious appetite for power, but rather a heightened national consciousness, an idealized and abstract sense of national community. This is what sets the apostles of independence apart from their pragmatist counterparts. "Idealist nationalist" is better suited to present purposes, then, because it makes transparent the hypothesized connection between identity and nationalist objective.

If it was not apparent already, these remarks bring forth the important point that the pragmatist-idealist typology, like any other social science classification, is not simply a means of ordering subject matter. It embodies assumptions about the salience of certain real-world divisions and the causal relationships between various phenomena. The main theoretical propositions underlying the pragmatist-idealist typology are as follows. Many nations have taken over the dominant political institution of the modern world, the state, and as a result, have adopted some idealized conceptions about the nature of their union. Stateless nations typically have a faction within who embrace a parallel idealist nationalism and consequently seek to secure a place in the nation-state system. Others eschew the state and its ethos of community, and consequently are more pragmatist in their national consciousness, and more moderate and flexible in their political demands. The application of the
pragmatist/idealist typology, in the three chapters that follow, to the nationalist movements of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, seeks to substantiate these basic ideas.

These chapters also aim to flesh out other differences that separate pragmatists and idealists. To that end, the final section of this theoretical chapter expands on the pragmatist-idealist typology. For the discussion to this point has identified only the most basic and defining differences between the two nationalist types. What is needed before proceeding is further specification of certain attendant contrasts between pragmatist and idealist nationalism.

E) Pragmatist and Idealist Nationalism: Attendant Contrasts

Other contrasts between idealist and pragmatist nationalism flow from their distinctive conceptions of the nation. Recall that for pragmatist nationalists, the nation is a direct function of tangible difference - that is, some combination of differentiating cultural traits and social practices that make insiders substantively distinct from outsiders. In many cases, religion and language are the principal bulwarks of this moderate nationalist consciousness, but as we will see in the case studies, other more subtle distinguishing traits and social norms can also play a role in buttressing pragmatist nationalism.

Because this nationalist sentiment is tightly hitched to the substance of communal difference, the nation, from the pragmatist's vantage, possesses little abstract or metaphysical character. It is seen simply as the sum of the cultural, social and political distinctiveness of its members, where the whole is but the sum of the parts, nothing more, nothing less. No seamless fabric of community is woven from the ties that bind, no abstract sense of connectedness spun from the substantive elements of communion. Consequently, the political demands that flow from the pragmatist identity are relatively modest and delimited. Sometimes they seek functional powers that will allow for the protection of specific elements of difference (language, religion, social or political norms); other times they pursue a
more generalized autonomy. But in general, pragmatists are open to the notion of distinct spheres of communal activity, and will readily concede that the political and the cultural, the social and the economic, can operate independently of one another. For this reason, they eschew the unconditional demand for complete sovereignty that a more thoroughgoing and holistic sense of national community tends to produce.

The manner in which pragmatists apprehend their nation contrasts markedly with the idealist's thinking on the matter. The initial and most basic point of difference is the dissociation of the idealist's national consciousness from the tangible substance of community. The nation, from the idealist's perspective, is the entire community contained within certain sharply-drawn political borders. Sociologically speaking, this community is usually a quite diverse population, and so at first blush this seems nothing more than a territorial sort of nationalism. But on closer inspection it is seen to have an idealist metaphysic embedded deep within. For it is a nationalism in imitation of established nation-states, and these political entities, the predominant agents of inclusion and exclusion in the modern world, generally do not justify their sovereignty simply by invoking the sanctity of borders per se. Instead, in this, the age of nationalism, the state typically justifies its activities by invoking idealized images of the community contained within its territory, images that presume and promote an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness in the population. Virtually any nation-state or nation on the rise lacks - tangibly speaking - the seamlessness that statist doctrine presumes, and it is an abstract sense of idealized connectedness that animates true believers in the national creed.

That idealists move beyond the tangible aspects of community in their nationalism is not immediately clear, for often they do, in their speeches, pamphlets and manifestos, celebrate the nation's culture, its history, its political values - all seemingly concrete underpinnings of nationalist sentiment. To detect the imagining of the nation implicit in their discourse, it is necessary to delve into some of the subtle differences between idealist and pragmatist attitudes towards the empirical stuff of
nationhood. For instance, while it would be erroneous to claim that idealists so abstract from the concrete elements of community as to leave their nation wholly devoid of empirical content, it is often the case that the substance of the nation, for the idealist, is simply whatever cultural, social and political material issues from the people who are contained within the nation's borders. Every population produces some such material; it is usually, as we have emphasized previously in this first chapter, a rather eclectic mix. Inevitably too, this substantive material undergoes substantial evolution over time, some might even say transmutation. The idealist is untroubled by this lack of uniformity and constancy, contending that the diverse social and cultural panorama unfolding over time constitutes the substantive aspect of their national community. What this means is that the idealist's nation, rather than being defined by its cultural, social or political freight, is more of an empty vessel that can load and unload cargo from time to time without losing any of its essential continuity. The idealist's focus is not on the cargo, which is disposable, but on the unalterable vessel - the national community - that carries it along. For the future, the idealist envisages and advocates much the same. The nation can continue to evolve howsoever it chooses. What matters, vitally, is that it be set free, through the vehicle of a sovereign state, to pursue this open itinerary unfettered.

This, in some instances, is the extent of idealist thinking on the matter of substantive difference and it is possible to find nationalists making demands for independence that essentially consist in the "We are a nation; nations must be independent; therefore we must be independent" syllogism. No further explanation is offered, nor is one thought to be necessary, since the objective is not to mould the nation in any particular fashion, but simply to liberate it so that it can find its own way in the world. All that is tendered is a nebulous, yet heart-felt, appeal for national freedom. In these tendencies, we see an initial difference from the pragmatist, who will typically offer, and feel compelled to offer, a substantive rationale for the concessions demanded of the state authorities; and who also, because concerned primarily about some tangible aspects of the nation's existence, will be
open to the idea that sovereign authority in a delimited sphere might suffice to address their concerns. From the idealists, no hard rationale is forthcoming, nor is any quarter afforded the notion of multiple spheres of sovereignty - precisely because their sense of community is holistic, diffuse, and detached from the concrete elements in the nation's make-up.

But if it is the national community *per se* that moves the idealist nationalist, rather than any specific qualities the community incarnates, saying this out loud does have a bit of a hollow ring. Idealists themselves will sometimes sense this, and so will embrace nationalist doctrine that offers a stronger justification for sovereignty. The empirical heterogeneity of the nation, and its continual evolution over time, are facts that cannot be wished away, so a certain sleight of mind enters into play that allows idealists to forge unity out of diversity. If the motley collection of individuals who comprise the nation is not as uniform as the idealist conceives them to be, idealists will turn to a vision of the nation that resembles a collective individual and which, to their minds anyway, makes the claim for national independence more compelling. In such a vision, the national whole is typically held to be more than the sum of its parts. The objective elements in the nation's make-up - patterns of language usage, religious affiliation and observance, social and political values, and so on - may not mark individuals unambiguously as members and non-members, but the idealist will declare that the particular combination of elements contained within the nation's borders is something special and unique, and therefore emblematic of a distinct community. This abstract transformation effected, the nation, which to the outsider seems a bit of an untidy and arbitrary conglomerate, becomes, for the idealist, a complex organism with many parts, each with its own look and function, but essential, all of them, to its continued health and vitality.

Another idealist motif that helps smooth out the bumps in the concrete stuff of nationhood is the special importance accorded one particular element in the nation's make-up: its history. The attraction to history derives from its elasticity, which allows, as with organic imagery, for seamless
renderings of the nation. For a nation's past is not, contrary to common wisdom, simply one of the objective building blocks of nations, alongside language, religion, culture and so on. Rather, it is something that can be manipulated and shaped to the nationalist's ends, in at least two ways. First, there is always a vast set of events to choose from when recounting a community's past, some of which show the nation at its united best, others of which betray its intermittent fractiousness. Nationalists naturally pick and choose from the historical menu and divert attention from any unsavoury episodes; as Renan observed, nations may remember many things, but invariably they must forget their fair share too. National history is elastic too because it is typically treated as an attribute of communities, not individuals. This sets history apart from the other items in the standard list of objective national traits, for the others are characteristics that individuals can possess or not possess (think of language or religion). Conceivably, of course, it might be claimed that events like the Battle on the Plains of Abraham or the Battle of Culloden are actually the private historical preserve of those whose ancestors fought in the conflicts, but this is not the way they are treated in nationalist discourse. Instead, such episodes are deemed to be part of the historical heritage of some much larger group, in this case the Québécois and Scottish nations. Precisely who is part of those larger groups is ambiguous and open to debate - which has a certain appeal for those who want to make the case in favour of a seamless nation contained within certain fixed territorial borders. Often, then, idealists wrap up their demand for national independence in a selective national history, which is deemed to be an integral, collective characteristic of that conveniently nebulous entity, the nation.

Both of these collectivist renderings of the nation - the organic arrangement of the nation's bits and pieces, and the appeal to a selective and collective national history - help generate the sort of seamless images of community that, it was suggested earlier in this chapter, are at the heart of idealist

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nationalism. First, they allow for the incorporation into the national community of all who live in the territory claimed as the nation’s. In other words, they justify the claim of national indivisibility. Idealists will sometimes argue, for instance, that those groups within the nation's borders of a culture or language different from the majority are nevertheless an integral part of the rich and mottled tapestry that is the nation's unique and valuable culture; or they will declare that all resident in the territory wherein a nation's history has unfolded are, for better or worse, part of the nation, and cannot opt out at this stage of the game. Either way, all are held to be part of the nation, regardless of any superficial differences that might divide them.  

Collectivist renderings of the nation not only make the community appear indissoluble, they also give it a seamless look, another of the features of the idealist vision of community discussed above. This they do by lending credence to the idea that everyone who is a member of the nation is a wholly equal member. Were membership tied to tangible attributes of individuals, like language spoken or values espoused, this would be a difficult notion to sustain, because people often possess such traits in degrees. But under the idealist dispensation, membership in the nation derives from things more abstract. It turns, for example, on living in the territory wherein the nation's history has unfolded, which, it is typically asserted, has shaped members of the nation in some vague and ill-defined way; or it hangs on being one small part in a larger organic whole, whose spirit, the more unyielding idealist will sometimes proclaim, permeates the consciousness of each and every member of the nation. In these sorts of conceptualizations, the stuff that makes someone a member of the nation is not on the surface ready for inspection, it is buried deep within - which makes it easy for the idealist to think all members equal members, that is, to presume that all possess in precisely equal measure the

Admittedly, nationalists do not always seek to incorporate minority elements; sometimes an exclusionary ethos creeps in and ethnic minorities are deemed to be unassimilable interlopers who should be expelled from the nation. However, even in this case, those who fit the nationalist bill are deemed to constitute an indivisible community, with organic imagery and history figuring heavily in the justification. More will be said about this variant of idealist nationalism below.
vague, indeed ineffable, qualities that make someone part of the nation. It is no surprise, then, that idealists steadfastly deny the possibility of demi-Québécois, half-Scots, or demi-Bretons.

If the first two aspects of nation conceptualization characteristic of idealist thought - indivisibility and the equality of all members - are promoted by organic and historical renderings of the nation, so too is the third, the sharp divide between insiders and outsiders. For another way of saying that the qualities determining membership in the nation are thought to sit deep within, is to say the differences between members and non-members are seen less as differences in surface traits (like language spoken or religion practised), and more as differences of essence. This may not always be the phrasing used, but there does seem to be something of this in the way idealists think. Nationalists of said temperament will often criticize those who focus on the superficialities of community life when what is really at stake is the national soul of their fellow nationals. But if being part of the nation depends on being possessed of a national soul, it is easy for the idealist to decree that no outsider can attain this quality, no matter how successfully they may fashion themselves after members of the nation in certain cosmetic ways (e.g. learning the language or adopting the same political values).71

The sense of a sharp divide between insiders and outsiders is greatly intensified when membership in the nation is thought to be a function of a national essence buried deep within.

Something more might now be said about the pragmatist's conception of the nation, in light of the foregoing discussion of idealist tenets. As we have noted already, the nation for the pragmatist is less organic or metaphysical than it is for the idealist. Pragmatists, in other words, think more in terms of "superficial" national attributes rather than a pervasive national essence, so that if a motley collection of people resides in the territory where the nation predominates (e.g. the province of Quebec, the region of Brittany), the diversity of the population is taken at face value, rather than being

71 Conversely too, membership in the nation, if it depends on being stamped with a national soul, can be bestowed upon people (immigrants say) or foisted upon people (ethnic minorities within a stateless nation), without their changing themselves in cosmetic ways. This point is discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.
metaphorically melted down into a grander unity. Pragmatists, in other words, do not recast a heterogeneous collection of individuals as a seamless collective individual. Pragmatists also are less captivated by historical renderings of the nation. If idealists regard the nation as an age-old vessel taking on new cargo at every port while maintaining an essential continuity over time, pragmatists tend to feel that eventually the new cultural, social and political baggage taken on board can alter the character of the community. There may be threads of continuity to the past, but the sociological change that communities everywhere experience means that today's nation is not the selfsame community as yesteryear's. This being their assessment, pragmatists tend to focus attention and effort on the community as it exists today, rather than treating the contemporary nation as simply one incarnation of a grander pan-historic entity.

Because their way of conceiving the nation differs in important respects from the idealists', pragmatists tend towards a different viewpoint on the questions of national indivisibility, homogeneity, and the insider/outsider divide. Pragmatists accept that the population within the nation's territorial borders is divisible because their vision of community is more genuinely pluralistic, accepting diversity rather than recasting it as unity. Pragmatists are also open to the notion of partial membership in the national community, since they focus on the surface traits (language, culture, religion) that go into the nation's make-up, and people, quite clearly, can possess such traits in degrees. In addition, pragmatists, seeing the difference between insiders and outsiders as one of attributes rather than essence, feel the divide is less profound than the idealists would have it. Members of the nation do differ from non-members but only in some delimited aspect of their being.72

72 There is an affinity between this analysis and Donald Horowitz's observation that ethnic identity often does not remain "compartmentalized" because it is subject to a process of "seepage" which gives it an all-encompassing quality (Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 6-12, esp. 7-8). The current analysis might be seen as an attempt to specify what this seepage consists in. From a national membership dependent on traits observable and potentially acquirable, to a membership dependent on a hidden essence deep within; from the nation as collection of individuals to the nation as collective individual; from a pragmatist nationalism grounded in things concrete and palpable to an idealist nationalism based more on abstract qualities: in all these ways, there is identity seepage.
These, then, are some of the basic differences between the idealists and the pragmatists. The idealist's sense of the nation is largely dissociated from the tangible aspects of community. Abstract renderings, shot through with collectivist imagery and historical justifications sustain the idea of a community traversing past, present and future unaltered in its essence. In this vision, the substantive elements of community like language, religion, culture, social and political values - integral to the pragmatist's sense of national identity - recede into the background, overpowered by an abstract sense of national community.

Yet all of this is only a first approximation. For it must be admitted that idealists do sometimes concern themselves with the substantive differences that their pragmatist counterparts hold as their primary focus. There remains, however, a subtle difference between the two groups. For pragmatists, the empirical stuff of community is generally an end in itself. Pragmatists seek to protect their language because they value the warp and woof of their native tongue, their religion because they cherish their faith, the social values of their community because they hold them in high esteem. Idealists, on the other hand, often take an instrumental interest in the substantive elements of national differentiation. There is a strong political commitment - the desire for national independence - that informs and colours the idealist's concern for the nation's sociological distinctiveness.

Idealists recognize, for example, that those who learn the language of their ancestors or take an interest in the nation's cultural and social ways, sometimes come to support independence. In other words, the promotion of a nation's culture - or, more generally, any of those elements that make it distinct - can have a mobilizing effect. Nurturing the tangible elements of differentiation can also help serve the purpose of justification, for it often helps a nation, when trying to convince outsiders of the

as a group moves from seeing itself as an ethnic or cultural community to viewing itself as a properly sovereign, territorial nation.

Seen in this light, the unconditionality of the idealist's demand for sovereignty, sometimes puzzling to the outsider, perhaps becomes more comprehensible; for it is underwritten by a national identity that derives not from the outwardly observable elements of nationality, but from an all-encompassing sense of nationhood.
justness of its cause, to have some traits that set it apart from its neighbours. The empirical stuff of community, then, appeals to the idealist for its symbolic effect.73

With these as their objectives, idealists tend to develop distinctive attitudes towards protecting the sociological countenance of their nation. For example: Since the encouragement of participation in activities distinctively national is partly designed to serve the purpose of mobilization - that is, the raising of national awareness among the unaware - idealists needn't necessarily immerse themselves. Already imbued with the nationalist geist, the idealist is not in need of the enlightenment that sometimes comes through the absorption of national culture. The idealist may participate in cultural activities and the like as a sideline to their main political project, especially if indigenous ways come naturally (language to a Breton-speaking Breton, for example). But idealists generally do not consider it crucial to fashion themselves after those who represent the nation at its most tangibly distinct.

In a similar vein, idealists, thinking the existence of things distinctively national important for symbolic purposes, do not feel it essential that each and every member of the nation fall into line. So long as there is a group of some critical mass that can keep a nation's culture alive, this subset can stand as representatives of the nation's distinctiveness. Idealists do, however, think it important that this culture be taken seriously. Numbers can help in this regard, but equally significant is the quality of a nation's cultural wares: if these are to serve as the symbol of a nation unjustly deprived of its independence, they must not look shop-worn or anachronistic. For this reason, idealists look disparagingly on any cultural product that tends towards the folkloric - even when such enjoys widespread popularity among the general population. In such cases, idealists find themselves at odds with the people of their own nation and struggle to generate support for what they see as more authentic and impressive cultural projects.

73 This argument closely follows Breuilly's contention that nationalist ideology typically serves the purposes of coordination, mobilization and legitimization. See Nationalism and the State, pp. 381-390.
In these matters, pragmatists diverge from the idealists in ways that evince a greater concern for things distinctively national in their own right. Pragmatists, for example, usually don't just cheer from the sidelines, but are themselves deeply immersed in the distinctive aspects of the nation's way of life. Often they are people to whom this comes naturally, those who speak the nation's language fluently, espouse its values adamantly, practice its religion faithfully. Pragmatists also tend to be more content with the culture produced by the people themselves, even if this is not up to the task of symbolizing a vibrant, thriving nation ready to take its place among the rank of nation-states.

Two general points then: first, while idealists sometimes favour the empty vessel conception of the nation, along with the attendant notion that the empirical stuff of nationhood is whatsoever the nation makes it, they do sometimes intervene and try to alter the sociological landscape of the nation; and second, these interventions are driven less by enthusiasm for language, religion, or other things distinctively national, and more by perceived political imperatives. Note that in attributing to the idealists an instrumental interest in the substance of distinctiveness, the claim is not that they are insincere in their nationalism. It is, to reiterate, that they are moved by a more abstract sense of connectedness, a sense of community quite unlike the pragmatist's unmediated attachment to the concrete aspects of national life.

So, as we delve deeper into the idealist and pragmatist mindsets, we see that while the tangible stuff of community occupies both, the accent and underlying motives are quite distinct. The contrast between idealists and pragmatists holds true too of a special variant of idealist nationalism. This subspecies is one that has emerged at certain points in the life of many stateless nations, and which often carries some disturbing implications. We are thinking here of those idealist nationalists who have entertained the notion that it might be possible to make their nation in actual fact, culturally, linguistically, religiously, or even racially, seamless, through some mix of persuasive and coercive policy. Often, these nationalists wax nostalgic about an idyllic past that needs to be recreated in the
present; so unlike some of their idealist counterparts, they look to the nation's history not as a justification for the sovereignty of an ever-changing nation, but as a model for present cultural and social policy. It might be said, to cast this in the language of the current analysis, that these idealists hope to refashion their community to render it congruent with the homogeneous and sharply distinct image of community embedded in their abstract idea of the nation. The trouble with these plans is that the pursuit of national purity is usually held to require the exclusion and sometimes physical expulsion of those minority elements deemed to be unassimilable to the national archetype.

The ambition of these idealist nationalists to reforge their nation into a sociologically homogeneous community bears little resemblance to the pragmatist project. The latter strive to protect and shore up the actual sociological terrain of their society; their objectives are a reflection of the nation in its present form. The idealists who dream of a society seamless in its external aspect engage in an exercise in projection, pressing a vision originating within onto a community without. They claim that their model is lifted from the nation's past, but usually the community they envisage is more thoroughly pristine and unadulterated by outside influence than the real nation has ever been. Rather than seeking the re-creation of an earlier state, it would probably be more accurate to say that these idealists hope for the realization of a new virgin order, at best loosely inspired by the past. The powerful element of projection and the gap between ambition and reality (past or present) make the nationalism of these idealists very different from that of the pragmatists who labour on behalf of the nation's extant culture.

The desire to render the idealist's abstract homogeneous community a reality is usually associated with elements of national culture (e.g. language and religion) and sometimes race: idealists of a certain mindset want an unblemished nation purged of foreign cultural and racial elements. Yet a similar dynamic also is evident with another tangible element of communal differentiation, social and political values. There are empty vessel idealists who avoid identifying any particular set of values as
archetypical of their community, and instead anoint as the nation's values those favoured by the nation itself at any given point. There are other idealists who look to the political values associated with their community as a means of mobilization or as a symbol of its distinctiveness, but who are not themselves necessarily enthused about those values or set on becoming so. And, then, there are those idealists who posit some sort of natural political proclivities that reside in all members of the nation and who dream up grandiose plans for their realization. Usually these idealists see some political extreme, often a species of communism or fascism, as the doctrine to which members of the nation are programmed to flock as one. Again, as in its cultural manifestation, this idealism involves considerable projection from nationalist onto nation and a sizeable gap between ambition and reality. Additionally, just as idealists operating in an ethnic or cultural vein sometimes want to exclude unassimilable ethnic minorities, at times political idealists want to have done with a small element deemed incorrigible in their political mindset (e.g. where communism is felt to be the doctrine natural to the nation, the bourgeoisie). In all of this, there is a marked contrast with those pragmatists whose sense of national belonging arises from a more realistic appraisal of the nation's distinctive political values. These pragmatists typically strive for changes that might allow this tangible difference some expression in the political arena, but do not make distinctive values the basis for a more absolute and unconditional sense of difference between the nation and outsiders.

Note, however, that while the pragmatists may be off in a separate corner, there is a certain affinity between those idealists who dream of unblemished cultural and political nations and those who are of the empty vessel persuasion - which is why both can be lumped together in the single category of idealist nationalist. The powerful element of projection that is apparent in the perceived need for a linguistically, religiously or politically uniform community is, we will later see, evident too in the insistence of empty vessel idealists that their fellow nationals are part of their national community - even if those fellow nationals currently show no signs whatsoever of possessing any national
consciousness. The two sub-types of idealist are similar too in that while both sometimes invoke national history - the one as a unifying anchor for an ever-evolving nation, the other as a pseudo-model for the future - it would be erroneous to label either as traditionalist or conservationist. Idealist nationalists, as a rule, do not gaze wistfully into the past; rather their sights are focussed on the nation's brave new future. Though the contents of the vision may vary from idealist to idealist, all rhapsodize about the day when the nationalist spirit will animate the nation as a whole. Pragmatists, by contrast, are much more rooted in the here and now. They seek to preserve the distinctive features of the nation in its current incarnation, and for this reason are at once more conservative and more realistic than their idealist counterparts. These and other themes are developed at length later on, but are mentioned in passing here to give an initial indication of some of the important common denominators in idealist nationalist thinking.  

But most will agree, of course, that while the two modes of idealist thinking may share something in common, the one certainly has more harmful practical effects. Happily, though, the social engineers usually remain a small fraction of the idealists. Most are content to leave their sense of communal seamlessness detached from the sociological substance of their community, and allow the actual people who comprise the nation to generate the empirical stuff of nationhood largely as they please.

This, then, brings us to the end of this overview of some of the additional salient features in idealist and pragmatist thought. Their focus fixed firmly on the future, idealists, many of them, see the

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74 Richard Handler has presented similar ideas in his analysis of nationalist ideologies in Quebec. Handler suggests that two distinct metaphors have been used to help create the sense of a seamless Québécois nation: the nation as collective individual and the nation as species (Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988], pp. 39-47). They are seemingly very different because the first allows for diversity of culture, language, political values and so on, while the latter treats people like so many undistinguishable lemmings. Handler suggests that there are affinities though, and I think he is right. The collective individual image is, I have argued, accompanied by the idea of a national essence that runs through all, which means people of the nation are only superficially diverse. They are free to be different on the surface, but deep down they remain, to the idealist's mind, Québécois, Scottish or Breton - which creates certain expectations...but more on this aspect of idealist thought below.
nation as an empty vessel that needs to be independent, for no particular purpose other than that it may thereby forge ahead on its self-actualizing odyssey through time. Idealists often bolster this somewhat empty rationale for national sovereignty by presenting the nation as a collective individual, drawing on organic imagery and unifying renditions of national history. Sensitive also to the political imperatives of mobilization and justification, idealists sometimes turn to the tangible elements of communal differentiation as a means of rousing national sentiment and as a potentially powerful symbol of the nation's distinctiveness. On occasion, the idealism of some leads them to think about a wholesale re-landscaping of the nation's sociological terrain, but such plans usually fall flat, winning few adherents.

The idealism evident in these tendencies and dispositions differs from the pragmatism apparent among those whose sense of community is more closely tied to concrete elements of nationhood. Theirs is a more deeply pluralistic vision, containing little of the collectivizing imagery of nation as diverse organism or historical vessel. The pragmatist's nation is simply the collection of individuals who, at the present time, differ in some palpable and relevant way from other populations. Preserving the distinctive features of the national countenance is the key objective of the pragmatist, who is open to a variety of political mechanisms whereby this might be achieved. It is, all told, a more grounded sense of community that motivates the pragmatists and informs their political activity.

Conclusion

It must be remembered, when considering the actual play of these distinctive elements within nationalist movements, that the idealist and pragmatist views of the nation represent tendencies, not fixed categories. Though the analysis in this first chapter has lapsed at times into talking about pragmatist and idealist nationalists as though everyone displaying some nationalist sentiment could be labelled one or the other, this is not so. Pragmatist and idealist nationalism are not mutually exclusive identities, so much as distinctive ways of feeling part of a nation. Any given individual can be both a
pragmatist nationalist, cognizant of and concerned about the tangible ties that bind, and an idealist nationalist, imbued with and moved by an abstract and idealized sense of connectedness to his or her community. Moreover, different individuals can variously combine the two sentiments of belonging to produce their own particular nationalist amalgams. The aggregate result is a continuum of national identity within most minority nations, with differences most sharply drawn at the two extremes and a blur of alloyed nationalisms in-between. With this as the underlying opinion base, it is no surprise that many nationalist parties are umbrella organizations embracing people of varying nationalist inclinations, and that nationalist movements as a whole are often an unruly tangle.

Yet, the complexity of the task notwithstanding, empirical analysis of cases along the lines outlined here can provide a useful corrective to certain unwarranted generalizations. Most importantly, it is too often assumed that everyone involved in some capacity in a nationalist movement has a roughly similar sense of national identity, which derives from their common immersion in a community with a distinct language, religion, culture, and/or history; and that if we wish to understand the divergent political demands of different individuals and groups, we must immediately turn to other factors that affect the way in which national identity translates into political demands. Or if variations in identity are recognized as salient, they are often not subjected to any intensive scrutiny. The current analysis suggests that it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at the nuances of national identity. Careful attention to subtle shadings along the pragmatist/idealist continuum suggests that in moving from the end dominated by advocates of moderation to the other extreme haunted by the apostles of independence, national identity undergoes a qualitative transformation, in which the concrete elements of nationality recede in importance and an abstract sense of nationhood looms ever larger. This difference of identity is largely responsible for the divergent devolutionary demands of pragmatists and idealists, and, as we will see later on, for other contrasts in the political attitudes and behaviors of the two types.
But if uneven national identity is a key influence, the political demands of nationalists are affected by other factors too. Consequently, the comparisons drawn in the chapters that follow hold mainly within nationalist movements, not across them - for these other factors can and do vary somewhat from one case to the next. In the cases considered here, for example, the actions of central governments and their general tolerance towards secessionist movements have been somewhat variable and have had a certain impact on the outlook and political discourse of nationalists. In the Breton case, for example, the French government has traditionally been highly intolerant of voices opposed to the "France one and indivisible" mantra, and nationalist groups in Brittany have consequently sometimes hidden their true colours, toning down their rhetoric and sometimes even scaling back their objectives in recognition of the barriers before them. There are groups within the Breton movement that have at points demanded only limited powers for their nation, but whose philosophy seems to contain strong elements of an idealist nationalism that might, in other circumstances, have produced more clear-cut demands for national independence. Differences like this render comparisons across cases problematic. But comparisons of groups and individuals within cases remain valid because these extraneous factors (extraneous for our purposes anyway) apply equally to all within a particular nationalist movement. The attitude of the French government may have shifted nationalism in Brittany in the direction of moderation and circumspection, but it remains the case that the groups within the movement who come closer to demanding an independent state show more idealist tendencies than do those who steer clear of this option.

We move on to the cases, then, remembering that the pragmatist/idealist distinction in part manifests itself in a nation's transition over time. At an early stage, many within stateless nations adhere to a pragmatist nationalism, closely linked to the nation's tangible sociological distinctiveness. Within such nations, there often develops, in a section of the population, an idealist national consciousness that looks upon the community as a nation like any other and wants to see it make the
leap to national independence. At the same time, however, there persists alongside this minority idealist sentiment, a pragmatist sense of community embedded in broad sections of the population. The idealists often make slow progress in winning adherents to their more abstract creed and any stateless nation continues to show signs of both strains of nationalism for long periods of time. This type of pattern is apparent in the long-term evolution of national consciousness in each of Brittany, Scotland, and Quebec, examined in turn in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Chapter 2

Brittany

Introduction

The next three chapters examine the sense of national identity that has, down the years, animated various nationalist organizations, factions, and sections of the general public in each of Brittany, Scotland and Quebec. Some basic history is recounted in the process, but these chapters do not aim to provide a detailed and comprehensive chronicle of each case. Their primary purpose is to apply the pragmatist-idealistic framework to bring out certain abiding differences between two nationalist tendencies within stateless nations.

The defining difference between the two tendencies is their sense of national community. Pragmatist nationalism is closely wedded to the tangible sociological differentiae that make a nation distinct whereas idealist nationalism issues from a more abstract and idealized sense of the nation. Differently put, pragmatists are concerned with qualities the nation incarnates, whereas idealists focus on the nation per se. Other attendant contrasts are also brought out in the pages that follow: the pragmatist's acceptance of partial and conditional national membership versus the idealist's more rigid and unconditional demarcation between insiders and outsiders; the pragmatist's willingness to countenance a delimited sphere of sovereignty for the nation versus the idealist's holism; the pragmatist's citation of concrete reasons for desiring greater power for the nation versus the idealist's grounding of demands in the rather nebulous imperative of national self-determination; the pragmatist's concern with culture as an end in itself versus the idealist's more instrumental motivation for supporting cultural projects.
While comparisons of this sort between pragmatists and idealists are the focus of analysis in Chapters 2 through 4, the reader will no doubt note that pragmatist national consciousness seems to vary considerably over time and place. Sometimes, it is relatively weak and localized; at other times, it is significantly stronger and more prevalent. Such differences tend to reflect the degree to which a minority nation is tangibly distinct. Quebec, for example, is a place where two important sociological traits - religion and language - have combined to make the populace markedly distinct from the Anglophone majority in the rest of Canada. In Brittany, on the other hand, the Breton language is not widely spoken (today anyway) and Catholicism is a religion shared with the rest of France (though the Bretons have tended to be more devout than others). Since pragmatist nationalism is, by our definition, an unmediated reflection of sociological distinctiveness, it is to be expected that the size of the sociological gap will affect the reach of pragmatist national consciousness. But this does not necessarily represent qualitative variation. Pragmatist nationalist consciousness may vary in strength over time and place, but it remains a uniform phenomenon, insofar as it represents a specific and unvarying way of conceptualizing a national community. The same is not true of pragmatist-idealist variation, which represents a qualitative shift in the nature of national consciousness. In this analysis, then, we focus on the important differences that divide pragmatists and idealists, but recognize that pragmatist nationalism has its own internal gradations.

The most immediate effect of pragmatist-idealist variation is divergent political demands. Unvarnished idealists typically demand independence pure and simple for their nation. Pragmatists, on the other hand, are more moderate in their political demands. Again, pragmatists are not unvarying over time and place. In some cases, the demands of pragmatists are very modest indeed; instead of seeking a regional or provincial assembly (where one is lacking), they simply pressure the central government for greater say in their own affairs, via existing political structures. Such has been the case with some pragmatist groups in Brittany. In other cases, pragmatists are more demanding. In Quebec,
for example, there have been elements seeking to protect the tangible elements of their nation's distinctive culture that have called for a special status for the province within Canada, and have even, at certain points, used the separatist threat as a way to prompt action on the part of the federal government. Yet even these more strident pragmatists are quite unlike their idealist counterparts, in that they avoid making unconditional demands. Pragmatists, as a rule, make political demands that are more flexible and conditional. The devolution of power is, to them, a means to protect the nation's distinctive sociology, not an end in itself. Thus, while the precise degree of autonomy sought by pragmatists does vary depending on circumstance, and while pragmatists are, at different times and places, to be found at various points on the spectrum of devolutionary demands, there is something common to these nationalists that sets them apart from idealists.

In places in the next three chapters, the terms moderate and radical are used in place of pragmatist and idealist. But this is merely a shorthand, and they should not be taken as synonymous. Moderate and radical are generic terms, and the point of this exercise is to shed some light on what nationalist moderation and radicalism consist in. The contention is that it is a pragmatist sense of national community that fosters moderation and idealist nationalism that engenders radicalism on the part of nationalist agitators. This basic proposition about the conditioning effects of national identity feeds into the analysis of the final four chapters of the thesis, where it provides insight into the diverse political behavior and attitudes seen in stateless nations.

In this chapter (and the next two), we focus first on pragmatist nationalists, and then turn to consider their idealist counterparts. However, the analysis of the two nationalist types is not completely segregated. Direct comparisons between pragmatists and idealists on specific points are scattered throughout each chapter.

In Brittany, the nationalist agitation and activities that have ebbed and flowed over the course of the twentieth century are sometimes referred to by the Breton term "emsav" (uprising or movement).
As is typically the case with restless stateless nations, Brittany has witnessed a wide variety of expressions of *bretonnité* that span the full spectrum of nationalist sentiment. The differences between these diverse manifestations of Breton nationalist spirit reveal many of the pragmatist/idealist tensions outlined in Chapter 1.

A) Pragmatist Nationalism in Brittany

The roots of Brittany's sociological distinctiveness can be traced back to the region's earliest history. In the distant past, Celtic peoples from the British Isles settled in the western part of the Armorican peninsula on France's Atlantic coast, in the area now known as Lower Brittany, bringing with them their Celtic language and customs. To the east lay the area that would come to be known as Upper Brittany, where Gallo, a cognate of the French tongue, was the language spoken (see Map 1).

In the year 848, this area was united under the rule of Nominoë, a governor in the Carolingian monarchy, who gathered under him sufficient military force to establish an independent kingdom. But this period of Breton independence was soon interrupted by the arrival of Norman invaders. Their expulsion after some fifty years led to the re-establishment of a united Brittany, of sorts: for the next several hundred years, Brittany was a loosely-governed duchy, as the Breton nobility accepted an overarching authority but refused to recognize a full-fledged monarchical sovereign. Increasingly the Duchy of Brittany came under the influence of the French monarchy, and the two were joined when Duchess Anne married Charles VIII in 1491. This became a formalized union in 1532, when a pact of union was negotiated with the États de Bretagne. In exchange for recognition of French monarchical authority, Brittany's fiscal, judicial and, to some extent, legislative autonomy was guaranteed.

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1 For a recent overview of research into the evolution of language borders in Brittany, see Francis Favereau, *Bretagne contemporaine* (Morlaix: Skol Vriézh, 1993), pp. 22-40.
Map 1: Brittany

Source: Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward and Howard Machin (eds.) Developments in French Politics (Houndsmills, U.K.: Macmillan, 1990), p. xiv

Nevertheless, for many modern-day nationalists, 1532 marks the official loss of Breton independence, the date when Brittany passed from independent Duchy to French province.

Following the French Revolution, this autonomous status was lost, as the Breton representatives to the National Assembly accepted the abolition of the Breton rights and privileges retained since 1532. Brittany was henceforth divided into five départements, the administrative units put in place to curb all provincial passions in revolutionary France. The arrival of revolutionary rule brought out another element of Brittany's sociological distinctiveness. In addition to its Celtic heritage, the region (more so in the past than present) has been seen as distinct in virtue of its deeply conservative and religious bent. From 1789 on, in the ongoing battle between the two Frances - republican versus conservative - the Bretons were strongly supportive of tradition and determined to keep France safe for the monarchy and the Catholic religion. For several years after the Revolution, there were intermittent insurrections in Brittany (and Normandy), known as the Chouannerie, that continued until Napoleon quelled the unrest in the early 1800s. For many in the past, being Breton meant being a devout and conservative Catholic, characteristics that, it was thought, served to differentiate the Breton and French masses. It may at times have been overdone, but it was not a wholly fictive difference. Nor did it disappear quickly, as André Siegfried uncovered in his 1913 study of the politics of Brittany and other parts of Western France. Many parts of the peninsula, he found, were largely untouched by the radical ideologies that had swept over other parts of the country, remaining deeply clerical and conservative in their outlook.²

In the early days of Breton unrest, then, the tangible characteristic of greatest import to many Bretons was the devout Catholicism and the traditional rural way of life that predominated over much of the peninsula. In more recent times, the Breton language, along with other elements of Brittany's

Celtic past, such as music and dance, have been more of a focal point for those concerned with the tangible stuff of *bretonnité*. Although Breton had no official recognition after the Revolution, it long remained the principal vernacular tongue in Lower Brittany and was still widely spoken in the first half of the twentieth century (though today less than 20% of the Breton population are able to speak it). At the same time, there has also been, particularly since World War II, considerable pragmatist discontent centred around the concrete social and economic problems of modern-day Brittany. In this first section, we focus principally on these pragmatist forces, and in the second section turn to consider the idealist element within the *emsav*.

It was at the end of the nineteenth century that the first Breton nationalist organization of note came into being. Formed in 1898, the Union Régionaliste Bretonne (URB) was a pragmatist nationalist organization, dominated by the landed nobility and clergy, along with those closely linked to these dominant social groups in the liberal professions and other non-industrial occupations. Its program reflected a preoccupation with the destabilizing impact of modernization on the Breton way of life. The URB cared little about any abstract political rights that might be due the Breton nation, concentrating instead on more concrete objectives. As the president of the organization noted in 1903, "Nous ne faisons pas de politique, nous faisons seulement oeuvre de préservation sociale." To be preserved were the Breton devotion to Catholicism, the conservative social and political values of the people, and the predominantly rural character of the peninsula. Accordingly, the URB emphasized in

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3 There was one earlier group, the Association Bretonne, active at various points in the nineteenth century. It too was dominated by aristocratic interests and was very moderate in its nationalism.


its declarations the need to maintain the faith, arrest the influx of socialist thought, and staunch the flow of peasants from countryside to city.\(^7\) For the elite pragmatists in the URB, the substance of *bretonnité* was of the essence.

The political demand that grew out of this circumscribed sense of the Breton community was decentralization of power to the various French regions. It was a very moderate demand, always couched in assurances that the URB meant no disloyalty to France. The initial appeal circulated among the Breton elite that led to the URB's formation, ended with the advisory: "Dire que nous rêvons de porter atteinte [à l'unité française] serait une calomnie et une sottise."\(^8\) The URB did not deny that Frenchness was an integral part of its members' identity, but rather took issue with the uniformity imposed upon the country by the French mode of governance. Their aim was simply to defend Brittany's "mores and local traditions against the cosmopolitan spirit that tends more and more to make everything uniform."\(^9\)

Later pragmatist groups have been less aristocratic, but have nonetheless followed in the URB's footsteps in taking as their primary goal the protection of the nation's sociological distinctiveness. One such group was a cultural organization formed in 1905, Bleun Brug (Fleur de Bruyère), led by the Abbé Jean-Marie Perrot. Its principal demand of the public authorities was for rights to education in the Breton language to combat creeping francisation. But the demand for language rights was not entirely, or even primarily, linguistically motivated. Rather, the maintenance of Breton as a means of everyday communication would, Perrot thought, serve as an effective barrier

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\(^8\) Union Régionaliste Breton, "L'appel au peuple breton" (1898) in Nicolas, *Le séparatisme en bretagne*, pp. 227-228.

\(^9\) Minutes of 1902 Congress of the URB, quoted in Reece, *The Bretons Against France*, p. 56.
against the spread of secular ideas. Keeping Brittany pious was his principal goal; language was but a
"rempart de [la] foi et [des] traditions."\(^{10}\)

Another pragmatist movement that also garnered significant grassroots support appeared in the
1930s. Ar Brezoneg er Skol (Le Breton à l'école) was an initiative aimed at securing the teaching of
Breton in the schools of Bretonnant Brittany.\(^ {11}\) It was an undertaking less religious in orientation than
Bleun Brug, operating in close conjunction with a group of secular teachers with similar goals in the
organization Ar Falz (La Faucille).\(^ 12\) Both groups saw protection of Brittany's native tongue as an
important end in itself, and a viable one at that, since there remained in the 1930s about a million
Breton speakers, the majority of them monolingual.\(^ {13}\)

During the Second World War, Breton nationalists of the pragmatist ilk made considerable
headway. They won important concessions from the Vichy government, such as provision for the
teaching of Breton history and language in Brittany's schools and the establishment of an advisory
council on Breton culture (the Comité Consultatif de Bretagne). But because this leave came from a
collaborationist government, the emsav was held, by many in France, to be in collusion with the
enemy. Following the war, many Breton activists were brought to account for misdeeds, real and
perceived, and were either executed, jailed or driven into exile.

In the wake of this retribution, the Breton nationalist movement, in both its pragmatist and
idealist guises, was slow to regain momentum. In the first few years after the war, nationalist activity

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\(^{10}\) Jean-Marie Perrot quoted in Alain Déniel, _Le mouvement breton, 1919-1945_ (Paris: François Maspero,
1976), p. 105. The discussion of Bleun-Brug in this paragraph draws largely on this same work, pp. 104-110, and

\(^{11}\) Reece, _The Bretons Against France_, p. 138.

\(^{12}\) For a discussion of these groups, see Marcel Guieysse, _La Langue Bretonne: ce qu'elle fut, ce qu'elle est, ce
qui se fait pour elle et contre elle_ (Quimper: Nouvelles Éditions Bretonne, 1936), pp. 246-251. The Ar Falz
program is reprinted in Nicolas, _Le séparatisme en Bretagne_, pp. 251-2.

\(^{13}\) Favereau, _Bretagne contemporaine_, p. 28.
was very limited, with musical troupes and dance groups occupying the nationalist stage, while others waited quietly in the wings. Through the latter half of the 1940s, many Bretons came together in Celtic circles to celebrate their bretonnité in innocuous displays of indigenous music, dance and costume. Over one hundred of these circles banded together in 1951 to form the Fédération Kendalc'h, with thousands of mainly young members.

A more robust pragmatist nationalism materialized when the Comité d'Études et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons (CELIB) was launched in 1950 by Joseph Martray. This was essentially a pressure group of influential Bretons - politicians, business leaders, representatives of professional organizations - that sought customized remedies for the economic and social problems of Brittany. It did not seek any form of autonomy for the region, limiting itself instead to the demand that the French government take greater account of the special needs of Brittany when formulating policy (Brittany was at that time one of France's poorest regions, with a woefully underdeveloped economic infrastructure). Despite its very modest goals, CELIB, in the 1950s, became the fulcrum of much nationalist activity, establishing linkages with a wide range of cultural, economic and political groups. Most significantly, CELIB persuaded Brittany's elected deputies to come together in a parliamentary commission, headed by René Pleven, to defend the region's interests against the perceived indifference of the Parisian government. This body succeeded in winning the first regional development plan for Brittany in 1956, and for a time there was much optimism that this was but the beginning of great changes to come. Social agitation in the late 1950s and early 1960s - Breton farmers marching on Paris, worker unrest in many parts of Brittany - further fuelled expectations. But CELIB's stock fell precipitously in the early 1960s, especially among the more radical nationalist element, when its demand for a loi-programme - a wide-ranging set of investment and economic planning initiatives

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14 On Brittany's social and economic development over the last 50 years, see Jacqueline Sainclivier, La Bretagne de 1939 à nos jours (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 1989).
aimed specifically at Brittany - was shunted aside by the government. Instead a France-wide system of CODERs (Commissions de Développement Économique Régional) was put in place in 1964, their powers very limited, with Martray, to the dismay of militant Breton activists, agreeing to become the first Secretary General of the CODER de Bretagne, and Pléven its first President.

As for others of the pragmatist persuasion, bretonnité, in the eyes of CELIB's leading lights, was rooted in concrete elements of social differentiation. But it was not primarily language, religion, or culture that made Brittany a distinctive community; instead it was the high incidence of certain social and economic problems in the region. In the book where he put forth the case for a loi-programme for Brittany, Pleven focused on such issues to the exclusion of all else, summarizing his thoughts with the observation that "dans toute la France la Bretagne était la région où les problèmes posés par la structure démographique et économique étaient les plus aigus. Il serait donc juste qu'elle fût la première a être dotée d'une loi-programme." It clearly was an attenuated sort of nationalism, not only because rooted in tangible differences and therefore lacking metaphysical mettle, but also because tied to characteristics not unique to Brittany. Indeed, regionalism would be a more appropriate label to apply to Pleven's diluted communal identity.

As the hostility towards the emsav generated by the events of World War II has gradually faded, there has been more activity on the cultural and linguistic front, particularly in the last thirty years. These cultural activists in the emsav have been split into a wide variety of small groups, with no single dominant organization emerging to consolidate their efforts. Though these groups are similar to

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15 A summary of the loi-programme proposed by CELIB can be found in Nicolas, Le séparatisme en Bretagne, pp. 268-272.

16 Much has been written about CELIB's activities. Summaries can be found in Michel Philipponneau, Geopolitique de la Bretagne (Rennes: Ouest France, 1986), pp. 55-59 and 67-79, and Sainclivier, La Bretagne de 1939 à nos jours, pp. 178-186.

older pragmatist organizations in that they are decidedly moderate in their nationalism, the objectives of the pragmatist element have changed very much over the course of the twentieth century. For today's pragmatist nationalists, religiosity and social conservatism are not the defining traits of the Breton people; rather it is the Breton language first and foremost, and secondarily Breton culture (as expressed through music, dance, theatre, and so forth) that constitute the substance of bretonnité and which need to be protected against erosion.

In recent years, one group that has received considerable media attention, and support from those concerned about maintaining a distinctive Breton visage, is Diwan ("seed" or "germination"). Started in 1977 and still going strong today, Diwan has established bilingual schools, more Breton than French, for students of various ages. It was initially a small, wholly private undertaking, but the organization has since succeeded in securing public funds. In 1994-95, there were 23 Diwan schools with over 1200 students. The modest success of this initiative has drawn some further concessions from the state. Breton is now taught in a few public schools with about 700 students receiving bilingual instruction.

These numbers are, of course, not sufficient to replenish the Bretonnant population, which in 1992 was around 480,000 (a figure including both native speakers and those with a more limited knowledge of the language). Nevertheless, it is thought that the continual efforts, in the postwar era and especially since the 1960s, to safeguard Brittany's distinctive culture have altered the mindset of the typical Breton. Though the Breton masses may not rally, march, or wave placards to save their language and culture, they no longer consider such efforts derisory or futile. To wit: a petition

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19 Ibid., p. 21.

20 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

21 Favereau, Bretagne contemporaine, p. 139.
circulated in 1967 by the group Emgleo Breiz, appealing for the teaching of Breton in Brittany's schools, collected 150,000 signatures\textsuperscript{22}, and a recent poll found that 88% of Bretons say they are attached to the Breton language, while 80% support its continued teaching.\textsuperscript{23}

These then are some of the principal organizations and opinion trends that have underwritten pragmatist nationalism in Brittany over the past century. There are certain characteristics common to these groups that underscore the pragmatist nature of their nationalism and which set them apart from their idealist counterparts. Firstly, these pragmatist groups have tended to draw support predominantly from those Bretons who are tangibly distinct. This is a logical consequence of the nationalism propounded by pragmatists. Pragmatist nationalism endeavors to protect concrete attributes shared by individual members of the nation; thus, those who possess the relevant differentiae are the most likely to be interested in this project. For idealists, on the other hand, bretonnité is a more holistic and diffuse sentiment, drawing sustenance from abstract, collective renderings of the nation. Consequently, there is not the same tight connection between possession of concrete national traits and adherence to the more radical brand of nationalism.

In the Breton case, these propositions can be substantiated fairly easily because the population is neatly split into two geographically distinct groups: the Bretonnants, who live primarily in Lower Brittany and are possessed of a key differentiating trait, a distinct language; and the non-Bretonnants, who are concentrated in Upper Brittany and who, sociologically speaking, are more similar to the French majority. Pragmatist organizations that have sought to protect the sociological countenance of Brittany have typically drawn the bulk of their support from Lower Brittany. For example, Bleun Brug and the journal it published (\textit{Feiz ha Breiz} or \textit{Foi et Bretagne}) gained support overwhelmingly from


the Léon region of Finistère, the western-most département of Brittany. Finistère was then, and remains today, the most thoroughly Bretonnant of the five Breton départements. Similarly, a petition circulated about the peninsula in the 1930s calling for Breton instruction in schools received much greater backing from those in Lower Brittany. Over three hundred municipal councils lent their support to the appeal, 90% of them in Lower Brittany. This modest initiative aimed at protecting an integral sociological element of bretonnite - the national language - roused little interest among those lacking the specific cultural trait under duress.

Idealist organizations, on the other hand, because of their promotion of a more abstract nationalist creed divorced from tangible differentiae, have had a more uniform allure for Bretons of Lower and Upper Brittany. Consistently over the twentieth century, radical nationalist organizations have drawn fairly uniform support from all areas of the peninsula. Indeed, at times they have even fared better in Upper Brittany. For example, most of those involved in separatist parties in Brittany prior to the Second World War were natives of the more francophone portion of the peninsula. Similarly, support for the Union Démocratique Bretonne, the most important nationalist party in the postwar period, was originally strongest in Upper Brittany. It did come to attract a greater following in Lower Brittany, especially Finistère; by the late 1970s, some 40% of its members were from that département. But it has never been overwhelmingly a party of Bretonnant Brittany in the way that certain pragmatist groups have been, and maintains a significant presence today in the less manifestly Breton areas of the peninsula.


26 Reece, The Bretons Against France, p. 29.

Survey data confirm that those palpably distinct often have a sense of connectedness to their nation that is relatively weak and lacking in political implication compared to those whose nationalism transcends narrow sociological concerns. A 1975 poll asked a sample of 800 Bretons whether they felt more Breton than French, equally Breton and French, or more French than Breton. Thirty-seven percent of those who understood the Breton language said they felt more Breton than French compared to only 9% of those who did not understand the language. Meanwhile, the survey also asked everyone if they supported Breton independence; only 2% of the Bretonnants did compared to 4% of the non-Bretonnants. This suggests that the level of support for independence among Bretonnants who felt more Breton than French was 6% (i.e. 2%/37%) compared to 44% (i.e. 4%/9%) among non-Bretonnants who felt more Breton than French. Feeling Breton, it would seem, means different things to different people. Among those - the Bretonnants - for whom it represents the recognition of certain palpable and obvious differences, it is not generally of political import. Among those for whom it represents a more abstract sense of connectedness divorced from surface attributes, feeling Breton often carries more weighty implications.

The tight linkage between personal sociological distinctiveness and adherence to the moderate nationalist creed is, then, one common thread running through Brittany's pragmatist groups. Another is their tacit acceptance of a notion that is anathema to the idealists - partial membership in the nation.

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29 There are a few possible fallacies in this reasoning that can only be acknowledged here, not addressed, because the original data for this survey were not available for independent analysis (the figures cited here are based on cross-tabulations produced by the organization that conducted the survey). First, it is assumed in making the calculations that all supporters of independence felt more Breton than French. Secondly, sample sizes for the various sub-groups were not available; if one of those sub-groups (e.g. the Bretonnants) was especially small, the statistical estimates for that group would not be very reliable. Thirdly, there are other important variables in the survey that affect support for independence and are almost certainly correlated with the Bretonnant/non-Bretonnant variable (e.g. age). For this reason, multivariate analysis would be required to isolate the true effect of the Bretonnant/non-Bretonnant variable on support for independence. That said, however, it is rare that an effect of this magnitude (6% vs. 44%) would wholly disappear with the introduction of other variables into the analysis.
Again, the difference between the two nationalist types derives from the role of sociological distinctiveness in their respective brands of nationalism. For pragmatist nationalists, national culture lies close to their hearts as an end in itself. Consequently, they sometimes look upon those who possess the relevant traits as more important members of the community and in this way tacitly accept the idea of graduated membership in the nation. This notion runs directly counter to the idealist tenet of the essential equality of all members. For idealists, cultural differences are collective emblems of a seamless Breton nation, not badges of individual membership.

The pragmatist proclivity on the membership question was evident in conflicts that emerged within the URB. One project of this aristocratic group was to pressure the French government to provide Breton instruction in schools, but no concessions were forthcoming. The lack of progress generated some conflict within the organization as some of the Bretonnants called for the application of greater pressure to force the government's hand. Debates ensued in which the Bretonnants were heard to express the view that the Gallos - those hailing from Upper Brittany and unable to speak the Celtic tongue - were less Breton than they. Conservative, devoutly Catholic and bucolic in origin and outlook wouldn't suffice; to be fully Breton, one was required, so the thinking ran, to speak the nation's distinctive language. The issue embroiled the URB for a time and in the end the Gallo element prevailed, with a few of the Bretonnants leaving in frustration.30 That questions like these could rend the URB points up the organization's preoccupation with the substance of bretonnité. Both the Gallos and the Bretonnants had a sense of communal identity rooted in the tangible stuff of community; when the latter tried to work language into the equation, it made for a two-tiered Breton nation, and created an inevitable rift.

The implicit ranking of members of the nation has led to conflicts in other groups too. In Diwan, for example, disputes have sometimes triggered the charge that members who also belong to

the more radical political organization, the Union Démocratique Breton - often less than fully proficient in the Celtic tongue - are not full Bretons. The President of the organization, a UDBer, reportedly said in exasperation at one point, "'I've had enough of being told that I'm not Breton every time I make a decision or try to structure the organization and ensure its future'."\(^{31}\) The UDB, with many members from Upper Brittany (most of whom do not speak Breton), has taken a clear position on this matter: "pour nous, il ne saurait y avoir...d'un côté des Bretons à part entière et de l'autre des demis-Bretons."\(^{32}\) For this more radical nationalist party, all Bretons are equally Breton, regardless of the degree to which they possess the external appurtenances of *bretonnité*. The types of conflict experienced in Diwan have not been an issue within the UDB, which has skated over the sociological heterogeneity in its own ranks and the population at large in favour of a more abstract and idealized sense of the Breton nation.

A third common feature of pragmatist thinking, closely related to the partial membership idea, is an acceptance of diversity within their national community. Whereas idealists favour seamless images of their nation, pragmatists accept the pluralism of their community at face value. This helps explain why pragmatists groups have tended to make limited demands in the area of language rights. The URB, for example, sought to maintain the Breton tongue in a limited area of the peninsula only - much as would be expected from a group of pragmatist inclinations, for Brittany was not at that time, and never had been, linguistically uniform. Only Lower Brittany was historically Bretonnant, and even there French was far from uncommon at the turn of the century. The URB's pronouncements on language were tailored to this sociological configuration: they called for the teaching of Breton in


\(^{32}\) Union Démocratique Bretonne, *Bretagne = Colonie*, p. 15.
Lower Brittany concurrent with French, and were content to leave Upper Brittany alone. These pragmatists were reconciled to the realities of the situation and harboured no idealist aspirations of bracing Brittany with an orchestrated infusion of bretonnité.

Idealist groups, on the other hand, have had such ambitions. The first separatist party, the Parti National Breton, for example, took a very different position from the URB on the question of language rights. Whereas the moderate organization took the pragmatist position in favour of the protection of Breton in its area of traditional usage, Lower Brittany, the PNB, in its initial manifesto, declared that Breton was to be the sole national language of an independent Brittany: "Nous reconnaissons la Langue Bretonne pour notre seule langue nationale, et nous voulons que sur tout le territoire de la Haute et Basse-Bretagne, elle soit enseignée comme telle aux enfants de notre pays." It is a type of aspiration sometimes in evidence among idealists, the hope of creating a nation outwardly seamless and homogeneous like the noetic nation within. Pragmatist nationalism, on the other hand, is more closely fitted to the actual contours of the nation's sociological landscape.

Another characteristic element of pragmatist nationalism is its limited temporal focus. Whereas idealists often gaze into the distant past and far-off future, pragmatists focus their nationalism on the nation as it exists in the here and now. These divergent tendencies have sometimes surfaced in disputes over the proper territorial scope for Breton activism. CELIB, the regionalist pressure group, was very flexible in defining the geographical scope of its action. Sometimes, the organization showed a willingness to file the Breton issue under the larger question of underdevelopment in France's...
imprecisely defined "Ouest" region. Meanwhile, CELIB's actual operations were organized around the four département Brittany that was one of the economic regions established by the Vichy regime for administrative purposes. Missing from this territorial dispensation, in the eyes of more militant nationalists, was one crucial département, Loire-Atlantique, and its largest city, Nantes. As the seat of the ancient Duchy of Brittany, Nantes, along with Brittany's other major city, Rennes, was considered essential to the nation's territorial integrity; as one radical militant put it, the two were Brittany's "deux testicules" and parting with one was out of the question.

The difference of opinion concerning the legitimacy of a four département Brittany can be traced to the temporal focus favored by pragmatist and idealist nationalists. For CELIB, the Breton nation was a product of the here and now, not an outgrowth of the distant past. This sentiment is evident in the reasoning Pleven used to counter the contention that Loire-Atlantique was an essential component of Brittany. Pleven didn't dispute that the linkages were strong in the past, agreeing with the idealists that "Historiquement, Nantes et son département sont...bretons sans conteste." It is the relevance of this in light of subsequent events that he questioned:

Mais Nantes a grandi, prosperé plus qu'aucune autre ville de l'ancien duché....L'activité maritime et industrielle de Nantes, son négoci avec les Antilles et l'outre-mer, sa position géographique lui ont fait prendre, au cours des siècles éculés, une orientation toujours plus nette. L'Économie s'est affranchie de l'Histoire.

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36 These are: Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, Côtes-du-Nord, and Finistère.

37 For a discussion of different viewpoints on this issue, see Caerleon, La Révolution bretonne permanente, pp. 235-241.

38 Ibid., p. 241.

Lorsqu'en 1938 ont été créés les Régions Économiques, Rennes a été naturellement le chef-lieu de la VIᵉ de ces Régions, dont le superficie couvre l'Ille-et-Vilaine, les Côtes-du-Nord, le Morbihan, le Finistère, mais non plus le Loire-Atlantique. Cette dernière est devenue la tête d'une autre Région Économique...distinct de la Bretagne...

Le mouvement de différenciation est si prononcé qu'il a débordé le secteur économique...

La destinée de Nantes et de la Loire-Atlantique ne se confond pas avec celle des autres départements bretons.40

In short: history had been superseded by subsequent events. The five départements that uncontestably comprised the Breton nation in the past had evolved down different roads to the point where it was no longer justifiable to speak of an indivisible Brittany. Compare Pleven's here and now nationalism to the there and then cum here and now reasoning of the more radical interwar nationalist Maurice Duhamel: "Le mouvement autonomiste actuel n'est, en Bretagne, que l'expression moderne d'un état d'esprit séculaire, le dernier anneau d'une longue chaîne, dont le premier maillon s'est forgé dans les années qui suivirent l'Acte d'Union de 1532."41 For idealists like Duhamel, today's nation is but one incarnation of a more transcendent entity; past and present are inextricably intertwined. The two ways of looking at the nation - today's distinctive community versus yesterday's, today's, and tomorrow's timeless vessel - place the nationalist accent in very different places.

From this overview of the pragmatist element in Brittany, some initial points of difference between the two principal variants of nationalism within stateless nations are apparent. The contrasts continue as we turn to consider some of the groups that have been prominent promoters of a more idealist Breton nationalism over the past century.

40 Ibid., pp. 14-17.
41 Maurice Duhamel, La Question Bretonne dans son cadre européen (Quimper: Éditions Nature et Bretagne, 1978).
B) Idealist Nationalism in Brittany

We have seen that for Brittany's pragmatists, the nation has been defined by elements of its sociological distinctiveness. These groups, their support base often confined largely to Lower Brittany, have focussed variously on the nation's religious, cultural, economic and/or linguistic features and put forth, at most, limited political demands. In this section we examine idealist nationalist organizations. These have typically gathered support more uniformly from Upper and Lower Brittany and have moved beyond the pragmatists in demanding significant political autonomy for Brittany, sometimes even an independent state. These groups have also placed greater emphasis on Breton history as the binding element of community, and while they have not been wholly indifferent to the tangible elements of *bretonnité*, their interest in this aspect of the nationalist struggle has shown some of the idealist idiosyncrasies identified in Chapter 1.

The first group in modern Breton history to demand independence for the nation was the short-lived Parti National Breton (PNB). The party was formed in 1911 by a clutch of young Gallo intellectuals dissatisfied with the URB's timid demands for decentralization. It was, however, a tiny organization that was to disappear with the coming of war in 1914.

The interwar period witnessed a stronger upsurge in idealist Breton sentiment. As groups like Bleun Brug were taking steps to protect the pith and substance of their distinctive community, elsewhere within the *emsav*, idealist activists were following in the footsteps of the pre-war PNB. This idealist Breton nationalism, statist and separatist in its thinking, centred during this period around the journal *Breiz Atao (Bretagne Toujours)*. The name has since become a moniker used to refer to the more radical nationalist element as a whole in this period, including the numerous reviews, intellectual groups and political parties spawned by the journal.

Although *Breiz Atao* and its offshoots showed a certain moderation on questions of Breton nationalism in the early 1920s and turned increasingly radical over the course of the next two decades,
this was not so much a slow evolution of nationalist thinking as it was a gradual revelation of true
colours. This, at least, is how one of the key players of the time, Olier Mordrel, was to later
characterize those years, calling the earlier period one of "pure hypocrisy" - independence for Brittany
is what they were after from the start.\textsuperscript{42} The intolerance of the French state towards separatist
movements made the Breiz Atao activists circumspect at first, but at heart they were deeply radical and
idealist in their nationalism all along.

In 1927, the Breiz Atao nationalists formed the Parti Autonomiste Breton (PAB). As the name
suggests, the party sought an autonomous status for Brittany within France. The degree of autonomy
envisaged was considerable. In the Déclaration de Chateaulin, adopted as party policy in 1928, the
PAB pointed to the "illégitimité de l'autorité souveraine de l'Etat français sur notre pays," and declared
that Brittany had the right to decide its own future.\textsuperscript{43} It sounded very much like an affirmation of
Brittany's inherent right to self-determination, and sure enough, in the long run, the PAB hoped to see
the creation of a federal Europe of freely associating small nations. It was only in the interim that the
PAB wanted an autonomy statute freely negotiated between a Breton Parliament and France.\textsuperscript{44}

The PAB did not survive long, falling prey to factionalism that tore the party apart. The hard
core nationalists, the nucleus of the Breiz Atao group from its earliest days, quickly formed a new Parti
National Breton (PNB). At the outset, the party had only a handful of members, but it gained
significant support through the 1930s, attaining a membership of some 2,000 to 4,000 during the

\textsuperscript{42} Olier Mordrel, Breiz Atao ou Histoire et actualité du Nationalisme breton (Paris: Éditions Alain Moreau,

\textsuperscript{43} "Déclaration adoptée par le congrès du Parti Autonomiste Breton," Chateaulin, 18 August 1928, pp. 5 and
7. The text is reprinted in Déniel, Le mouvement breton, 1919-1945, pp. 343-349.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., pp. 9 and 15-19.
Second World War. The new PNB, like the old, supported full independence for Brittany, but realized too that there was some merit in lesser alternatives: if conceded they might serve as a stepping-stone to independence, if rebuffed, would point up the government's intransigence in these matters. The interwar PNB, then, kept its options open while making no secret of its ultimate aim.

The fascist sympathies among some within the PNB, along with their ardent Breton nationalism, led them to engage in activities during World War II that badly tarnished the emsav in the eyes of many non-sympathizers. The movement was first deeply discredited when two representatives of the party (Mordrel and Fanch Debeauvais) travelled to Germany on the eve of the war for the purpose of negotiating an agreement whereby Brittany would become independent should France fall (a plan in which the Germans took some initial interest). Etched in many memories, too, is the image of a small group of Breton militants, who had previously been involved in violent nationalist activities, marching in S.S. uniforms in 1944.

Its image badly tarnished by these events, the radical wing of Breton nationalism was slow to resurface after the war. It was not until after CELIB's supposed capitulation to the French state in the early 1960s that new idealist groups emerged. One of the groups taking a relatively uncompromising nationalist line since that time is the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB). The UDB came into being in 1964 when a group of young socialists quit the Mouvement pour L'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB), a political party associated with CELIB. Since its formation, the UDB has come to be the strongest and most enduring organization in the post-war emsav. Strong in relative terms, that is: its


46 The group, Gwenn ha Du (Blanc et Noir), had planted several bombs during the 1930s, blowing up what they saw as symbols of the French occupation, such as a statue at the town hall in Rennes commemorating the union of Brittany and France.
membership, which peaked at 2,000 (at most) in the late 1970s, is today around 500, and support for the party in elections, both municipal and regional, has only rarely broken into the double digits.

Like others idealist in their nationalism, the UDB has insisted on a five département Brittany and has made political power for Brittany an essential element in its program. It has not, however, come out in favour of independence, seeking instead an autonomous status for Brittany. This demand cannot simply be taken at face value, however, for strategic compromise on the part of the UDB has always been part of the equation. First off, the wartime association of fascism and radical nationalism lingers even today, and has made most postwar emsaveriens, the UDB included, anxious to avoid the separatist label. Secondly, the UDB has sometimes struck alliances with the French Left at election time, which has necessitated some toning down of the nationalist rhetoric.\(^47\) Considerations like these have led the UDB to adopt a relatively moderate nationalist discourse.

But there are signs the party is not wholly adverse to more radical options. Occasionally, the s word slips out, as in 1977 when a UDB leader candidly stated, "Le séparatisme est un droit. Les Bretons sont un peuple, et le peuple breton a le droit au séparatisme."\(^48\) When the Socialists took power in 1981, promising significant concessions to minority nationalist sentiment in France, but failed to deliver all that Breton nationalists had expected, the UDB became less inclined to curry the favour of the French Left, and in the 1992 regional elections formed an alliance with two parties openly supportive of Breton independence (Emgann and the POBL, of which more below). Today, while the UDB still officially favours autonomy, there seems to be significant support for something more among the party rank and file. A recent survey of UDB members, for example, found that 66%


\(^{48}\) Cited in *ibid.*, p. 197.
answered yes when asked "would you like Brittany to become an independent state?" (though admittedly autonomy was not offered as a possible alternative answer).\textsuperscript{49}

Given such attitudes, it is not surprising to find that the UDB has operated with a fairly elastic definition of "autonomy." The party's immediate and most oft-cited goal has been autonomy within France, defined in a 1973 policy statement as an elected legislative assembly with executive power, that would allow for autonomy "dans toutes les directions, dans tous les secteurs de la vie sociale et politique."\textsuperscript{50} The Socialist government did in fact establish a Regional Assembly in 1986, but the UDB has deemed this inadequate due to its limited powers.\textsuperscript{51} It is questionable, however, whether even a fully-equipped assembly would permanently placate the UDB. The party has made it clear that, in the long run, it seeks a drastically altered relationship with France. The same 1973 policy statement indicated that "le cadre français sera peut-être une étape" but that further down the road, the UDB wanted a European federation based not on the present member-states but on the "peoples" of Europe.\textsuperscript{52} Nowadays, the UDB pays more attention to this long-term objective. The most recent detailed policy statement published under UDB auspices calls for France, in the short-term, to retain its authority in only a few domains (diplomacy, external security and currency), all of which would


\textsuperscript{50} Union Démocratique Bretonne, \textit{Bretagne = Colonie} (Brest: 1973), p. 101.


\textsuperscript{52} Union Démocratique Bretonne, \textit{Bretagne = Colonie}, p. 111.
eventually be handed off to a reconfigured European federation of "regions" (such as Brittany).\textsuperscript{53} Effectively, then, while the UDB still prefers to be called an \textit{autonomiste} party, its current policy is independence in Europe, a position it shares with nationalist organizations elsewhere like the Scottish National Party. What is distinctive about the UDB's policy is that it advocates a stronger European Union than most.\textsuperscript{54}

Apart from the UDB, the other notable left-wing organization animated by idealist nationalism in the postwar period has been the Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB). Beginning in 1966 and petering out after 1980, the FLB carried out numerous bomb attacks in Brittany and other parts of France, its targets always property not persons.\textsuperscript{55} Many of its members were arrested and jailed for their part in these activities. The FLB had no formal linkages with the UDB, which has always been opposed to the use of violence. The two also have differed in their stated objectives, the FLB supporting independence pure and simple to the UDB's autonomy. But despite their official differences, there have been informal connections between the two groups. A few individuals were members of both organizations, and the UDB did at one stage take it upon itself to raise funds for the families of FLB arrestees, as well as organize a petition for their release.

Organizations on the political right have generally been less influential in Brittany since the time of the interwar PNB. There has, however, usually been some sort of political formation of

\textsuperscript{53} Yann Fievet and Christian Guyonvarc'h, "Une Bretagne responsable dans un monde solidaire" (Lannion: Presses Populaires de Bretagne, 1994), p. 20.

\textsuperscript{54} For a detailed argument that the UDB is more nationalistic than meets the eye, see Nicolas, \textit{L'Emsav: politique et thematique du mouvement breton}, pp. 847-854.

\textsuperscript{55} A number of violent Breton nationalist organizations have been active at various points over the past 30 years. The FLB early on established a military wing, the Armée Républicaine Bretonne (ARB), which carried out its bombing attacks. At points in the 1970s, splits in the FLB led to the formation of various FLB offshoots. The relatively few attacks of the past 15 years have mainly been carried out by a group called the Armée Révolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB). The twists and turns of these small militant groups are described in Nicolas, \textit{L'Emsav: politique et thematique du mouvement breton}, pp. 484-508. The brief overview here of the violent wing of the \textit{emsav} speaks of the FLB, but this is meant to denote these various groups as a whole.
marginal influence pursuing Breton nationalism from that side of the political spectrum. Among the more notable, there was first the Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB), formed in 1957, closely tied to CELIB, and which gave birth to the UDB; there was next Strollad Ar Vro (SAV, or Parti du Pays), which ran in elections in the early 1970s without much success and soon faded from the Breton scene; and currently there is the Parti Pour L'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre (POBL), formed in 1982 and a struggling concern since that date.

The public posture of these groups has become progressively more radical. The MOB initially positioned itself as the political counterpart of CELIB, calling for a regional assembly for Brittany as a way of giving effect to proposals for Brittany's social and economic development; after the failure of CELIB's _loi-programme_, the MOB, and later the SAV, became a bit bolder, calling for stronger forms of Breton autonomy; while the POBL makes no secret of its desire for a Breton state. One of the individuals who has played a leading role in all three groups, Yann Fouéré, reports that this apparent radicalization is really the product of increasing relaxation and tolerance on the part of the French state. In 1957, vivid memories of World War II and its aftermath meant that the MOB had to be very cautious in its nationalism, a trepidation that has dissipated only slowly over the intervening years.

These, then, are some of the key organizations that have espoused a more idealist Breton nationalism over the years. While these various groups differ from one another in certain respects, they also share some important commonalities. In the first place, there has at times been a certain baldness to their reasoning. Instead of arguments about how separation from France would bring concrete

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56 Nicolas, _Le séparatisme en Bretagne_, pp. 201-203.


58 Interview with Yann Fouéré, 19 June 1995.
benefits to the people of Brittany, the rationale put forth by the idealists has been more unconditional and declamatory. As the pre-WWI PNB opined, "nous pensons que le premier devoir d'une nation...c'est l'Indépendance. Quand un peuple a perdu son indépendance, il doit tendre uniquement à la reconquérir et ne jamais cesser de la revendiquer....C'est pourquoi nous la réclamons pour notre pays, estimant que tout autre état que l'état d'indépendance est indignes de la Bretagne." No need to offer a list of reasons for independence, the PNB seemed to feel, since the first step, indeed the only truly essential step, was to liberate the Breton nation, which would then decide for itself what to do with its regained freedom.

As outlined in Chapter 1, those hewing to this type of unconditional nationalism often are more concerned about the nation per se than any particular qualities the nation incarnates. They treat the nation as an empty vessel free to load and unload sociological cargo over time without losing any of its essential continuity. This empty vessel sentiment was evident in the first PNB. Bretonnité for these radical nationalists was largely divorced from the type of tangible bulwarks of social differentiation championed by groups like the URB. Whereas the pragmatist group held certain social and political values to be quintessentially Breton, the PNB was of the empty vessel school of thought, promoting the slogan that was to be taken up by many a radical Breton nationalist throughout the twentieth century, "ni rouges, ni blancs, Bretons seulement." Contrary to the URB's assessment that a true Breton was deeply conservative in social and political outlook, the PNB took the position that one could be inclined to the left or right, monarchist or republican, and still be a Breton in good standing.

The rejection of a sociologically delimited bretonnité was taken further by later idealist groups. The Breiz Atao group was the first to expressly reject the connection between religion and

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60 Nicolas, L'Emsav: politique et thematique du mouvement breton, p. 124.
bretonnité in the 1920s. Whereas for the URB, the Catholic religion was "an integral part of the Breton idea,"\(^61\) and for Bleun Brug, one of the "éléments essentiels de la nationalité,"\(^62\) Breiz Atao opined, "On peut défendre toute la nationalité bretonne sans prendre parti dans la question religieuse; on peut être nationaliste breton en étant neutre vis-à-vis du catholicisme romain."\(^63\) For these empty vessel idealists, it was the community that was Brittany that was to be preserved, rather than the way of life that was Breton. As the PAB put it, "Un peuple ne retourne pas plus en arrière qu'un fleuve ne remonte vers sa source. Nos regards sont tournés, non vers le passé, mais vers l'avenir. Nous sommes des Bretons modernes."\(^64\)

Among the postwar groups, it is those on the political right that have maintained the empty vessel approach. In political matters, they have adopted a slogan similar to that invoked by the pre-World War I PNB, "ni droite, ni gauche, breton seulement." Opponents are sometimes sceptical about the possibility of rising above partisan politics, but in public pronouncements, groups like the POBL are adamant about their neutrality: "C'est au peuple breton, et à personne d'autre, que la décision du choix de la société future doit appartenir en fin de compte."\(^65\) The POBL disavows any interest in imposing a particular projet de société upon Brittany and will be satisfied, it says, if the Breton nation is liberated to move in any direction it sees fits.

The empty vessel conception has, then, been one strand running through the idealist discourse of twentieth-century Brittany. A second strand has also been evident. There have been those idealists


\(^63\) Ibid., p. 67.

\(^64\) "Déclaration adoptée par le congrès du Parti Autonomiste Breton," Chateaulin, 18 August 1928, p. 1.

\(^65\) POBL, "Pour une Démocratie Bretonne," p. 75. On SAV, which took a similar line, see Nicolas, L'Émsav: politique et thématique du mouvement breton, pp. 470-471.
who have entertained the idea that it might be possible to re-mould the nation to make it sociologically seamless in actual fact. These idealists, like their pragmatist counterparts, have identified certain qualities as quintessentially Breton. But they have gone a step further, blending these tangible national ingredients with an abstract image of a seamless Breton nation to produce visions of a homogenous national community completely free of sociological blemish.

There were, for example, elements within the interwar PNB who wanted to re-shape Breton society so that it might more closely conform to their idealized image of the Breton community. Nationalist doctrine, heavy with fascist overtone, was developed by party ideologues calling for national purity. The nature of this manner of idealist nationalism is evident in the thinking of one of its leading advocates, Olier Mordrel. Reflecting later about some of the divisions within Brittany that had weakened the interwar movement, Mordrel suggested "pour [les Bretonnants], la Bretagne était un fait linguistique; pour les Gallos, une entité politique. La synthèse des deux points de vue devait se faire petit à petit et aboutir à la parfaite unité morale et culturelle d'aujourd'hui." It was this perception of perfect national unity that led Mordrel (so we might speculate) to believe that imposing homogeneity in other departments of national life was entirely justified. He hoped, for example, like the pre-WWI PNB, to fashion a purely Breton-speaking Brittany, calling for the "restauration intégrale de notre langue nationale." He took the drive for social homogeneity a step further than his idealist predecessors, however, when he called for the exclusion from Brittany of foreigners - especially those of the "Latin" and "coloured" races - because they could never be part of the Breton "spiritual community."

66 Mordrel, Breiz Atao ou Histoire et actualité du Nationalisme breton, p. 60, footnote 13 [emphasis added].

67 "Le Programme SAGA," Breiz Atao, no. 170 (12 March 1933). Reprinted in Déniel, Le mouvement breton, 1919-1945, pp. 380-384. SAGA (Strollad ar Gelted Adsavet, or Réunion des Celtes Relevés) was a program developed by Mordrel in this and other Breiz Atao articles.
Organizations on the political left have also engaged in some projective idealism, particularly with respect to political values. In the 1960s and 1970s, class analysis and the need for revolutionary changes in the social and economic structures of society were key themes in both the UDB’s and FLB’s discourse. This Marxist outlook at times produced a homogenizing tenor, akin to the PNB’s fascist-inspired pursuit of national purity. As the FLB wrote, "Le peuple breton n'étant qu'un peuple prolétaire et de prolétaires...nous ne pouvons donc concevoir notre combat que dans une adhésion aux principes généreux du socialisme." 68 Unlike Breton idealists who have allowed that there are no particular political values proper to the Breton nation - "ni droite, ni gauche, breton seulement" - these leftist groups believed there was a single set of values natural to the Breton people and were unwilling to entertain alternative viewpoints.

This manner of thinking also affected the UDB's thinking on the question of appropriate political structures for an autonomous/independent Brittany. While the UDB did not publicly pronounce on the matter, internal discussions did take place. Drawing on his recollections as former leader of the party, Ronan Leprohon suggests that most UDB members would have approved of two distinct post-liberation phases: an initial, single-party stage to consolidate Brittany's political gains, with the UDB at the helm; and a subsequent phase, once all was secured, when the political arena would be opened to organizations of the left and right, save fascist parties and those advocating a return to "the colonial situation." This seemed legitimate to the UDB militants, Leprohon believes, because they were confident of the essential single-mindedness of the Breton people: "je suis persuadé que dans notre esprit c'était cet idée que le peuple Breton reconnaîtrait naturellement qu'il avait un parti qui était le parti de sa libération et que donc il le suivrait." 69 There was, then, a UDB tendency, at least


69 Interview with Ronan Leprohon, 24 and 26 June 1995.
in the 1960s and 1970s, to project political homogeneity onto the nation, and thereby gloss over surface difference and diversity.

The UDB has since abandoned its dogmatic Marxism and become more tolerant of alternative political viewpoints. Thus, today's idealist nationalists in Brittany are predominantly of the empty vessel persuasion. But the emergence of a homogenizing ethos at certain points should not be dismissed as an aberration. For it is but an extension of the general doctrine of idealist nationalism, which posits, so we have argued, a seamless, indivisible nation peopled with insiders fundamentally distinct from outsiders. When this idealist nationalism is applied a bit too rigorously to the sociological countenance of the nation, it can lead to some utopian schemes for social re-engineering.

The common thread running through the two sub-species of idealist nationalism is also apparent in another element of their nationalist discourse: their preoccupation with nationalist history. The pre-WWI PNB set the tone for later idealists, emphasizing the unifying force of Brittany's past. In a 1914 essay, the party's founder and chief mover through its brief existence, Camille Le Mercier D'Erm, declared "voilà qui explique et justifie pleinement l'attitude des Nationalistes bretons: c'est que nous sommes les héritiers...de toute cette longue et glorieuse Histoire qui figure un perpétuel conflit entre la Bretagne et la France." 70

A common element in the reasoning of idealist groups who valorize the national past is that history represents a shared national "trait" that has had a profound moulding effect on the current members of the nation. The interwar PNB, for example, often invoked national history as the common denominator serving to unite contemporary Bretons diverse in their sociological make-up and political outlook: "Tous les Bretons, quelles que soient leurs opinions, sont les fils d'une même mère bafouée, les occupants d'un même sol délaissé, les victimes d'une même oppression. Il doivent s'unir pour

70 Camille Le Mercier d'Erm, "Les Origines du Nationalisme breton" (Quimper: Party Nationaliste Breton, 1914), p. 23.
triompher."

The UDB, too, often points to Brittany's history as the essential feature, common to all, that renders the nation seamless. That history, the UDB says, has been one of internal colonialism, where Brittany has played hapless satellite to Paris's domineering metropole. The nation thus conceptualized, such variations in language and culture as exist within contemporary Brittany are rendered superficial and immaterial; it is a shared history of oppression that makes all Bretons members of a single nation. "Certes, la Bretagne dont le caractère est le plus marqué, celle qui paraît la plus étrangère pour un Parisien est la Bretagne bretonnante. Mais le fait de procéder d'une même économie sous-développée met les Bretons de Nantes ou de Brest dans la même situation. D'autre part les liens qu'a tissés l'Histoire entre les deux communautés de Haute et de Basse-Bretagne ...ont fait naître ...un sentiment d'appartenance à un même peuple et, à tout le moins, à une même communauté, celle des Bretons."  

The FLB offered a similar characterization of the Breton nation, citing historical oppression as the common factor, touching one and all, that had rendered the nation seamless. "Sans revenir sur cet accident de l'histoire qui fait que le peuple breton, après mille ans d'histoire glorieuse et de luttes pour son indépendance, a été réduit par la force des armes à accepter une domination étrangère ...nous retenons surtout le fait que cette domination n'a été qu'un 'génocide' permanent sur tous les plans: politique, économique, social et culturel qui ont façonné les traits majeurs de notre visage d'aujourd'hui et ont fait de nous ce que nous sommes, une [sic] peuple dépossédé et dépersonnalisé, une [sic] peuple de pauvres, un peuple de prolétaires, sans âme et sans voix."  

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71 Parti National Breton, "Le nationalisme Breton: aperçu doctrinal" (Rennes, 1932), p. 27.

72 Union Démocratique Bretonne, Bretagne = Colonie, pp. 14-15. An extended discussion of the Upper/Lower Brittany issue, that makes much of the importance of a common history, can be found in: "Les Gallos sont-ils bretons," Le Peuple Breton, No. 145 (December 1975), pp. 8-9; and "Les Gallos sont-ils bretons (suite de notre enquête)" , Le Peuple Breton, No. 146 (January 1976), pp. 7 and 10.

73 "Le Front de Libération de la Bretagne s'adresse à l'opinion," p. 1 [emphasis added].
The invocation of national history as a unifying force, then, is one commonality uniting idealists of different stripes. Idealists are also alike in another respect. While some favour the empty vessel conceptualization, and others seek a sociologically homogeneous nation, all tend to take a somewhat instrumental interest in various elements of national culture. Rather than valuing national culture as an end in itself, idealists often are more concerned about its potential mobilizing impact and symbolic effect.

Language, for example, has often been treated by idealists more as a mechanism for consciousness-raising than as a precious national artifact. Once again, the first PNB set the tone, noting that the Breton language was not so much a "fin en elle-même" as it was a "moyen de renationalisation." This type of thinking also underwrote some of the linguistic and cultural projects undertaken by the Breiz Atao militants in the interwar period. The journal Gwalarn (Nord-Ouest), a supplement to Breiz Atao that first appeared in 1925, was edited by two activists, Mordrel and Roparz Hémon, who were among the more resolute nationalists of their day. In the first issue, and last in French, the editors made it clear that it was not language and literature exclusively that moved them. They also were hoping to kickstart a complacent nation. "Il n'est past de renaissance nationale sans renaissance linguistique....le sort de notre littérature, auquel est lié celui de notre langue, et par suite, celui de notre nationalité, est entre les main de l'elite...Le but de Gwalarn n'est pas d'élever de petits piédestaux à de petits talent, mais de déclencher un mouvement général dans l'elite bretonnante." The cultural projects of idealists also have important symbolic goals. Hémon, for example, made it clear that his enthusiasm for Breton derived not from a sentimental attachment to the language per se, but from a desire to stridently affirm his national identity: "Si nous choisissons notre langue, ce

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74 Breiz Dishual (Bretagne Libre) 8 (February 1913), quoted in Nicolas, L'Emsav: politique et thematique du mouvement breton, p. 130.

n'est pas parce qu'elle est 'la langue de nos pères' et 'notre langue bien-aimée', ni 'la langue du coeur'....Nous choisissons notre langue 'parce que nous voulons la choisir' et nous abandonnons l'autre 'parce que nous voulons l'abandonner'...Le Breton est pour nous la liberté, le français, l'esclavage. Nous choisirons le breton, ou nous ne serons que des enfants, pis, des gens sans courage."

For this interwar idealist, the Breton language was essentially a political weapon, a way of rousing support for the nationalist cause and affirming his own unconditional bretonité.

In keeping with the political objectives informing their activities, those involved with Gwalarn, and Hémon in particular, set out to standardize the Breton language. The need existed because Breton had been irregularly used as a written language and consequently differences of dialect persisted between four main regions within Bretonnant Brittany. By codifying Breton orthography, and introducing new words for modern objects and thoughts, Hémon and his allies endeavoured to create a language fit for a full-fledged nation. It was a task previous Bretonnant writers and language activists had largely left alone, preferring to work with Breton in its natural state and making no attempts to iron out the local kinks in the language. Among aficionados of Breton, then, there was a difference of approach between those content with things as they were, more naturalistic and pragmatist in their attitude, and those hoping to create something new and improved. The Breton language, the latter felt, was an important emblem of nationhood, but it needed some spit and polish if

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76 Roparz Hémon, "A-enep ar gelennadurezh divyezhek" ("Contre l'enseignement bilingue"), Breiz Atao (1925). Quoted in Fanch Morvannou, Le Breton, la jeunesse d'une vieille langue (Brest: Presses Populaires de Bretagne, 1980), p. 66.

77 The four dialects were Cornouaillais, Léonais, Trégorrois, and Vannetais. The first three, however, were often considered to be a single dialect, referred to as KLT.

78 Lebesque, Comment peut-on être breton?, pp. 181-184; and MacDonald, 'We are not French!', pp. 127-133.
it was to attain the vitality and dignified bearing that activists in Flanders, Catalonia and Bohemia had managed to fashion for their languages.\textsuperscript{79}

Similar attitudes are apparent in the UDB. While the party has, compared to earlier groups, been relatively unexercised about the Breton language and culture, it has sometimes sensed their potential utility. Thus, the UDB allows that what it calls "les appareils extérieurs de l'identité" may be of some use in generating national awareness and thereby mobilizing support for its political project. Sitting back, drinking in Breton culture, "le spectateur Breton: urbain, 'assimilé'...peut retrouver une conscience embryonnaire d'appartenir à un peuple différent."\textsuperscript{80} Similarly, the UDB has not been wholly indifferent to the battle for Breton language rights, but does often tend to view the matter in an instrumental light. One researcher who has spent much time among the militants reports: "The autonomy that the UDB seeks wavers between regional autonomy and separatist nationalism, in either of which the Breton language is a means of awakening the 'Breton people' into self-conscious definition. They will then become a 'nation', and, ultimately, a 'state'. It was in terms of these three stages that the party's strategy was commonly presented to me by UDB members."\textsuperscript{81}

But if Breton culture is to serve this goal of making the people of Brittany feel part of a full-fledged nation, it must, the UDB feels, be of the right stuff. Thus, the UDB has been critical of what it sees as insipid manifestations of Breton culture. It has, for example, shown no patience for the widely popular festivals held each summer to celebrate Brittany's traditional music, costume, and dance. An early article in the UDB's journal \textit{Le Peuple Breton} spelled out the party's position on such spectacles, which remains much the same today: "A cet égard, notre position est claire: effectivement, faire porter,\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item A comparison drawn in Hémon and Mordrel, "Premier et dernier manifeste de Gwalarn en langue française" (reprinted in Nicolas, \textit{Le séparatisme en Bretagne}, p. 239).
\item McDonald, \textit{We are not French!}, p. 7.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
d'une manière réactionnaire, l'effort sur la conservation, sur la maintenance, voire sur la marche en arrière, traduit une volonté - consciente ou non - de fixation, donc de mort pour une culture réelle.\textsuperscript{82}

Idealists are not, unlike their pragmatist counterparts, satisfied with the limited project of preserving the nation's extant culture. They have grander goals issuing from an idealized sense of the nation, which colours their approach to cultural projects.

These proclivities do not always sit well with the pragmatists. The result, sometimes, is conflict in the nationalist ranks. Such has been evident in the internal dynamics of some of the cultural organizations that have drawn membership from a broad spectrum of nationalist opinion. Le Front Culturel Progressiste Breton (FCPB) was an umbrella group formed in 1977 that brought together representatives of the UDB with other groups more reserved in their support for the Breton cause. The FCPB was strong prior to the 1981 victory of the Socialists in France, and indeed part of what fueled its unity was a common desire to see the Socialists come to power "with the platform of Breton language and culture providing one ready platform for opposition of this kind."\textsuperscript{83} Diwan, the group responsible for the establishment of Breton schools, has likewise drawn considerable support from UDB members, while also attracting a number of less politically-driven types.

Within these culturally-oriented groups, one issue that has caused some tension is the degree of spontaneity that should be permitted the nation. Should activists content themselves with the national culture that the nation itself naturally produces or are there requirements of a proper national culture that compel intermittent intervention by an enlightened elite? The answer varies: pragmatists generally want to let the nation be, whereas idealists want to intervene. Writes Maryon MacDonald, whose work puts a magnifying glass to some of the internal dynamics and tensions within the emsav, the moderates in the FCPB sought "'concrete respect' of family and local milieu, and a 'rooting in


\textsuperscript{83} MacDonald, \textit{We are not French!}, pp. 89-90.
popular culture', as opposed to an 'élitist and abstract vision of culture'.

The UDB representative on the FCPB, on the other hand, criticized Celtic circles and the like as a prostitution of Breton culture, and supporters thereof as "folklore enthusiasts" with a "low level of consciousness"; what the Breton nation needed was a "real popular culture".

In Diwan, similar differences have emerged, on a microcosmic level, in disputes over appropriate teaching methods. There have been those, including many of the teachers, wanting the schools to eschew the structured pedagogy of French education in favour of a looser system of teaching. This has, in part, involved allowing students to speak whichever language comes naturally to them, which often is French rather than Breton. Others - administrators, parents - including many from the UDB, have favoured a structured, more rigidly Breton, approach.

For the idealists within these cultural organizations, what comes naturally is not always acceptable. If Breton culture is to serve as a symbol of bretonnité and abet the project of national emancipation, it must be taken seriously by its practitioners, which sometimes necessitates discipline in the ranks.

Thus, idealists in Brittany have taken a fairly consistent approach to cultural matters. Their concern has typically not been to preserve the extant stuff of bretonnité. Instead, they have looked to culture as a means to an end, as a way of mobilizing support for the nationalist cause and providing some symbolic cultural differentiation - effects which hold the promise of furthering their ultimate objective of national emancipation. This, then, is another common thread uniting the various idealist organizations active in Brittany during the twentieth century.

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84 Ibid., p. 95.

85 Ibid., p. 91.

86 Ibid., pp. 191-193.
Conclusion

More might be said about the *emsav*'s general evolution and its internal dynamics, but at this point, certain broad patterns seem clear. The policies and actions of the key organizations involved in the Breton nationalist movement over the past one hundred years reveal persistent pragmatist/idealist tensions. The pragmatists have had as their chief objective the preservation of the sociological distinctiveness of the Breton community. For earlier organizations like the URB and Bleun Brug, this meant keeping Brittany Catholic, conservative and rural. For later groups, it has more often entailed safeguarding the Breton language and other elements of Breton culture. Whatever the particulars, the pragmatists have tended to draw support disproportionately from Lower Brittany, the most tangibly distinct region of the peninsula; have entertained the idea of graduated membership in the nation; have been moderate and flexible in their political demands, evincing a national identity that is Breton, but only partially so, because rooted in certain delimited aspects of social differentiation; and have been content to let the culture of the nation be, even when tending towards the folkloric.

The idealists, on the other hand, have been more thoroughly Breton in virtue of the abstract sense of *bretonnité* that underwrites their nationalism. Though there are differences between the various groups that have demanded significant autonomy or outright independence for the Breton nation - the first pre-World War I PNB and its interwar successor, the *Breiz Atao* ideologues, the UDB, the FLB, and their right-wing postwar counterparts - they also share much in common. All have turned to the nation's history as the ultimate backing for their claims; all have felt that the changes the nation has experienced down the decades and centuries are cosmetic, that the Breton nation has retained a certain a fundamental continuity over time; all have insisted on the seamlessness and indissolubility of the Breton nation; and all have looked upon culture less as an end in itself than as a useful tool to further their project of national emancipation. The national identity of these idealists, decoupled from tangible markers of *bretonnité*, has been at once more abstract and more radical.
This examination of the nationalist ideologies propounded by different nationalists and groups in Brittany over the years is in keeping with the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 1. Those groups relatively radical in their political demands have tended to operate with a more idealized sense of nationhood than those more moderate. This has been in imitation of the statist mode of organization, which rests on the supposition of seamless, indissoluble and sharply distinct communities. In presenting their community in this light, the idealists in Brittany have come to de-emphasize the empirical substance of bretonnité in favour of more abstract qualities and renderings. Pragmatists, on the other hand, have concentrated their sights more narrowly on the sociological substance of the Breton community. Similar conceptualizations of the nation, generated in like fashion, can be detected in the case of another stateless nation, Scotland, to which we now turn.
Chapter 3

Scotland

Introduction

The story of nationalist unrest in Scotland is, as in Brittany, hardly that of a nation rising as one to boldly reclaim its independence. Idealist nationalist sentiment has always been a minority enthusiasm among the Scots. More prevalent, in both the past and the present, has been a relatively muted sense of Scottishness that has manifested itself in various demands for limited political power for Scotland.

Even this, however, was largely absent for many years following the 1707 Treaty of Union, which saw Scotland merge its Parliament with England's, thus completing the integration process set in motion by the union of the Crowns in 1603. Scotland was henceforth to be an integral part of a unitary British state, an arrangement that seemed satisfactory to most Scots. Throughout the eighteenth century, they showed little interest in undoing the pact that had brought them into the British fold. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, a nascent Home Rule movement did emerge, its goal the restoration of a Scottish parliament. This movement has slowly gathered momentum ever since, to become today a widely subscribed program for Scottish national rejuvenation.

The sociological bases of Scottishness underpinning this desire for a limited measure of Scottish autonomy, have evolved over time. Scotland's Celtic roots and its Presbyterianism were integral elements of Scottishness in the past. More recently, distinctive Scottish social and political values have come to assume a more central role. These evolving bases of Scottish pragmatist nationalism, along with the political movements giving expression to this moderate communal sentiment, are examined in the first section of this chapter. The second section focuses on idealist
Scottish nationalism, a more abstract creed, less preoccupied with distinctive Scottish traits, that has slowly gained strength through the twentieth century.

A) Pragmatist Nationalism in Scotland

Pragmatist nationalism was slow to take hold in Scotland and there was little nationalist agitation for many years after the merger with England in 1707. The absence of nationalist unrest early on is not especially surprising, because the Scots entered the Treaty of Union a divided and fractious people. Despite occasional shows of unity, there was, up to the 18th century, little Scottish national consciousness to speak of because of the important divide that separated Highlands and Lowlands. People's sense of belonging, by most historical accounts, was at that time closely tied to the concrete elements of differentiation that rendered the two areas highly distinctive in culture and social organization. Those of the Lowlands, whose lifestyle and language were heavily influenced by the English, looked upon the tartans and bagpipes, the clan system and Gaelic tongue, as "the badge of roguish, idle, predatory, blackmailing Highlanders who were more of a nuisance than a threat to civilized, historic [Lowland] Scotland."\(^1\)

Once British political authority was firmly established after the battle of Culloden in 1745, the palpable division between Lowlands and Highlands gradually faded. The making of a more uniform Scotland was partly a product of the eradication of Highland culture as a tangible bulwark of Highland life. Immediately upon their defeat at Culloden, the clan chiefs were stripped of their hereditary powers and became henceforth, in many instances, little more than glorified landlords.\(^2\) Laws were struck

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banning all outward insignia of the vanquished way of life, such as the wearing of the kilt.\textsuperscript{3} These restrictions were kept in place for a time, but after an adequate interval, Highland culture, broken and tamed, was allowed to show its face once again and was even actively promoted by the authorities. Formal re-instatement of a sort came when King George travelled to Scotland in 1822 and the tartan topping was laid on thick for ceremonies surrounding the monarch's visit. But it was, henceforth, to be something reserved primarily for moments of pomp and circumstance; never again would clan culture form the pith and marrow of everyday life in the Highlands.

The Highland/Lowland divide has faded too because Highland culture, in its emasculated form, has been enthusiastically adopted by the Lowlands. With the outer reaches of Scotland safely under control, and the bitterness of past schisms gradually fading from memory, empathy developed between the two regions and clan culture, slowly, almost imperceptibly, became a shared heritage.\textsuperscript{4} This may at first have had an air of appropriation for those who knew the truth of it, but soon enough tartans, kilts, bagpipes and the rest seeped into popular consciousness to become the cultural heritage of all Scots.

But if Lowlanders and Highlanders, from the early 19th century on, came to share some distinctive cultural plumage that helped stimulate a wider Scottish consciousness, this newly formed communal identity was decidedly lacking in depth, generating warmth and collegiality but little nationalist passion. As a result, for much of the 19th century, there were no radical demands for changes in Scotland's political status, no calls to withdraw from the Union. Unlike other parts of Europe at the time, overt and organised Scottish nationalism was nowhere to be seen.\textsuperscript{5} It was not until


\textsuperscript{5} The one exception would be the short-lived National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights, a group active for a few years in the first half of the 1850s, which had a moderate impact at the time but little long-term effect.
the final twenty years of the century that a nationalist organization of note would arrive on the scene (the Scottish Home Rule Association formed in 1886), and it would be another 40 years before voices in favour of Scottish independence would make themselves heard.

The general absence of political agitation has to do with the secondary role assigned to things distinctively Scottish in the society of the time. As something reserved for times of pomp and circumstance, Scottish culture was a sideshow to events in the centre ring. Of primary import to many, and certainly the upper crust, was the pursuit of opportunities made available to Scots through Union with the English. Scots availed themselves in numbers of business opportunities and careers in the civil service, both at home and elsewhere in the British Empire, which helped create, most observers agree, a genuine sense of partnership with the English. This joint activity had the effect of creating a broader sense of community that diluted the Scottish national consciousness; as one historian notes, "Scottish nationalism [in the mid-nineteenth century] operated as a sub-section of a wider British imperial nationalism."\(^6\)

In effect, then, the Scottish culture of kilt and clan represented, to 19th century Scots, a pleasant diversion to be enjoyed for its own sake. It was not treated as the symbol of an extirpated way of life and a nation done wrong. Unlike other minority nations, the Scots at this stage were not abstracting, from their history and culture, the image of a nation undergoing superficial evolution over time while maintaining some essential continuity. Instead of idealist nationalism, the Scots had a largely pragmatist sense of community that recognized and accepted the changes wrought by time, a nationalism rooted in current cultural connections, political values, and social aspirations. "The Scottish national identity [in the 19th century] was in little need of succour from the past. Scottishness

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was determined by the here and now, not by what had once been" - the here and now serving to make the people of Scotland as much British as Scottish. Without some greater emphasis on the nation's history and future, without a sense of today's nation as but one incarnation of a community moving implacably through time, the undeniable heterogeneity and external connectedness of the nation in its present condition impose themselves heavily on people's consciousness. Only idealist nationalism, with its glossing and abstracting tendencies, produces the pureness of identity that results in strident demands for political emancipation.

If the pragmatist sense of communal self, that made the Scots a wee bit Scottish without placing the Union in question, was partly the product of a shared Highland cultural heritage, it was also reinforced, for a great many years, by another important element of tangible differentiation, religion. To be a true Scot, popular thinking had it, one had to be a member of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland (or Kirk). An integral element of life in large parts of Scotland prior to Treaty of Union in 1707, the Kirk had its autonomy safeguarded in that agreement, without which provision the Parliamentary merger would likely have never gone forward.

This Scottish Presbyterianism served as a social barricade once Catholics started to pour into Scotland from Ireland in the latter half of the 19th century. Presbyterian zealotry generated, in certain quarters, a marked hostility towards the Catholics, particularly in Glasgow where the new arrivals were concentrated. Antagonistic relations continued into the twentieth century, with "sections of the presbyterian church, as late as the 1920s, [making] a determined effort to keep the label Irish on the catholics, and to suggest their disloyalty to Scotland."  

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7 Ibid., pp. 130-1.


Clearly then religion was a solid bulwark of social differentiation in Scotland through to the twentieth century. But that, in the main, was the extent of it. That is to say, for many Scots, their religion represented a concrete aspect of the Scottish way of life that needed to be protected from incursions by the state and attenuation by unassimilable outsiders, but it did not take on idealist overtones, did not become the emblem for a nation in need of independence (as it did in places like Ireland). It was sufficient, then, that Scotland be accorded some limited form of sovereignty in order to protect its distinct way of life against outside erosion. In its conflict with the British state in the 1840s, the church called for sovereignty in the ecclesiastical realm, that is respect for the Church's established rights (in particular, the appointment of ministers). With increasing secularization of society, there was less talk of an inviolable sacred realm and the Church came to conceptualize matters more politically, continuing, however, to conceive of the Scottish nation in relatively muted terms and to support moderate political options. Since the 1940s, the Church has tended to favour Home Rule for Scotland (a Scottish Parliament with limited powers), a position defended in a 1989 Church report in language reminiscent of the 1840s conflict. "It is not possible to resolve the question of the democratic control of Scottish affairs and the setting up of a Scottish Assembly apart from a fundamental shift in our constitutional thinking away from the notion of the unlimited or absolute sovereignty of the British Parliament, towards the Scottish and Reformed (e.g. Presbyterian) constitutional principle of limited or relative sovereignty." It is significant that aversion to absolute sovereignty - of either the British or Scottish variety - has come from an institution that embodies one of the principal concrete building blocks of Scottish identity.

Religion and a tamed Highland culture, then, were the key components comprising Scottishness in the 19th century, and since both were primarily valued in and of themselves rather than

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10 Marr, The Battle for Scotland, p. 32.

11 Quoted in ibid., p. 41.
being pressed into the service of an idealist nationalism, it was a muted pragmatist Scottish nationalism
that flourished in the private sphere alongside a more public Britishness. Others have made a similar
argument, but with a slightly different twist, suggesting not only that Scottish nationalism was more
private than public, but also that it was not really much the weaker for it: the national identity of the
Scots in the 19th century was, near enough, the equal of other small European nations more expressly
political in their nationalism. Lindsay Paterson has made the case most forcefully, contending that
Scotland at that time desired and possessed as much autonomy as nations like Finland, Norway, or
Hungary that were in possession of a Parliament (and would eventually become independent). 12 How
so? "If - as in Scotland - the essence of the nation resided in popular culture...then, in a world where
states kept out of private matters, cultural nationalists could prefer to develop the culture autonomously
by their own efforts."13 Since the British government allowed civil society ample elbow room, the
Scots felt "they were exercising real national autonomy even though mostly not demanding a
parliament."14 But while it is true the United Kingdom has generally been less centralizing and
intrusive than other multi-national states, allowing Scots and other groups the freedom of a long leash,
it remains the case that a nationalism content to remain private will always be a pale imitation of one
that seeks to go public. If a nation believes - as 19th century Scots seemed to - that culture and politics
can be allocated to separate spheres, and nationalist energies poured into the former exclusively, they
are allowing that their community is a community only in virtue of certain cultural commonalities. It
may be a laudable viewpoint, but it is not one that makes for a forceful, strident national identity. For
true idealists, there can be no division of national life into discrete departments, no segregation of the

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cultural and the political, the social and the economic. For idealists, there is one simple and overwhelming reality: the existence of the national community which must have full independence in order to realize its true self in all divisions of national life.\(^\text{15}\)

But the idealist viewpoint had few adherents in 19th century Scotland, nor in the twentieth century did it capture the imagination of significant numbers of Scots until the 1960s. Instead, a more pragmatist Scottish nationalism continued to flourish, as indeed it still does today. The bases of this muted communal consciousness have changed, however. Religion, for example, has become increasingly marginal to Scottishness. Although rates of religious observance remained relatively high well into the 20th century - in the 1950s church membership in Scotland was nearly 3 times the level in England\(^\text{16}\) - like all other Western societies, Scotland has become increasingly secularized, with the churches dictating far fewer social norms, so that "religion is probably now of small...importance in reinforcing a sense of Scottish identity."\(^\text{17}\) Evidence from surveys confirms this impression; one 1992 poll found that Catholics in Scotland were actually more likely than other Scots (26% vs. 19%) to choose "Scottish not British" as their national identity.\(^\text{18}\) While religion has clearly fallen from prominence, the contribution of tartans, kilts, and the rest to Scottishness probably remains about what it has been for much of the last two centuries. These colourful insignia of Scottishness are, as always, ubiquitous, yet they remain marginal to the sense of community consciousness that animates the

\(^{15}\) It is true enough, however, that in other small nations of Europe this was not the dominant viewpoint until later on. But still I would contend that Scotland had a more enervated sense of national identity through much of the 19th century than did those other nations, given the absence of political demands on behalf of the nation.


\(^{17}\) Smout, "Perspectives on the Scottish Identity," p.106.

typical Scot. For many tartanry is simply a diversionary aside, while for a vocal minority, it is a
cloying anachronism that acts as a hindrance to the cultural development of modern-day Scotland.\textsuperscript{19}

But if these older marks of Scottishness have faded over the years, other more subtle
differentiating traits have come to the fore in this century to take their place. Chief among these are
certain of the social and political values that enjoy wide currency in Scotland. Scots, it is often said,
attach greater importance to egalitarian values than their neighbours to the south, implying a
preference for government intervention in the workings of society. Yet at the same time there is a
fiercely individualistic strand in the Scottish outlook that is wary of possible constraints on personal
liberty. These twin principles have joined to produce widespread support for what is usually termed
"radical democracy," a political philosophy tempering veneration for individualism with an insistence
on equal opportunity for all.\textsuperscript{20} These values, it is usually said, have long been present in Scottish
society, but have perhaps become especially salient now that other tangible elements of Scottishness
have receded into the background.

Like most generalizations about the political and social values of a people, the notion that
Scots are staunch advocates of radical democracy is often overdone by pundits and partisans alike; yet,
equally, the hyperbole turns out on closer inspection to be at least partially borne out by the evidence.
Typically cited as the first evidence of a distinctive Scottish viewpoint is the rejection of absolute
monarchy in the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320. That document, issued by the Scottish nobles to
petition the Pope for independent recognition following the expulsion of the English, stipulated that
were the Scottish King to try to place Scotland once again under English rule, he would be summarily

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London, NLB

\textsuperscript{20} For a similar argument, see Keating, Nations against the State, pp. 182-184.
deposed.\(^{21}\) That the Scots were early and strong supporters of the people's rights is evident also in the practices and ideals of the Presbyterian Church. From the earliest days of Protestantism in Scotland, for example, congregations elected their own ministers. The Kirk took an interest too in the intellectual development of its flock, calling for the establishment of a school in each parish so that every child might acquire a basic education - an objective never realized by the Church, but a striking ideal for the time, nonetheless.\(^{22}\) Accessibility to educational opportunities was greater at higher levels too, with the four Scottish universities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, St. Andrews and Aberdeen) traditionally admitting significantly more students per capita than their English counterparts. For a long time, Scotland's educational system was renowned throughout Europe for its quality and accessibility, and the common perception was that the lowly "lad o' pairts" stood a markedly better chance of social and economic advancement through individual merit than did his counterpart in class-bound England. These broad differences in social and political culture suggest that equal opportunity for individual promotion has long been an important value to many Scots.

The principles of equality and individualism can, of course, sometimes tug in opposite directions, and it would probably be fair to say that equality has come to assume a greater importance in Scottish political culture in the latter half of the 20th century. Whereas in earlier times, support for radical democracy was sometimes part and parcel of the desire to keep Scotland rural, traditional and untouched by big government, today most Scots accept that theirs is a modern, technocratic society and they welcome state intervention to level the playing field among individuals. Consequently, equality nowadays seems to be the uppermost concern, and Scots show quite distinctive attitudes on this dimension of political temperament. A 1986 survey, for example, which asked whether people felt

\(^{21}\) Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, pp. 8-9.

"welfare benefits [were] too low and cause hardship," found 70% agreement in Scotland, compared to 53% in the north of England and 29% in the south.\textsuperscript{23}

Divergent values have given rise to distinctive Scottish political behaviour at various points over the past two hundred years. In the 19th century, the Scottish electorate voted overwhelmingly - much more than the English - for the Liberal party, support climbing as high as 85% in the 1865 election.\textsuperscript{24} Precisely what this indicates is not immediately obvious, 19th century British Liberalism being a fairly ecumenical creed. But it was of course, broadly speaking, more progressive than Conservatism; moreover, the Scots were, historian Michael Fry tells us, especially supportive of the radical aspects of the Liberal programme, which included "the destruction of privilege, the limitation of government power, the extension of civil liberty and the improvement of popular education."\textsuperscript{25} As the Liberals went into slow decline around the turn of the century, Scots stuck with their traditional party for a time, but in the 1920s, many abandoned Liberal ship for the Labour Party. For a time, Scotland looked to be a Labour stronghold in the making, but as the century progressed Scottish voting patterns gradually became less distinctive from other parts of the U.K., and for most of the period from 1945 to 1970, Scotland and England voted in the same party.

The consolidation of a Labour-Tory two party system in Scotland and other parts of the U.K. gave rise to the idea that Britain's was a homogeneous polity dominated by class divisions that were

\textsuperscript{23} Isobel Lindsay, "Divergent Trends", \textit{Radical Scotland}, No. 29 (Oct./Nov. 1987), p. 14. Analysis which takes into account other variables confirms that Scotland's distinctive values are not a mere reflection of social structural differences from other regions of Great Britain. See John Curtice, "The North-South divide" in Roger Jowell, Lindsay Brook, Gillian Prior and Bridget Taylor (eds.), \textit{British Social Attitudes, the 9th Report} (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 71-87.


\textsuperscript{25} Fry, \textit{Patronage and Principle}, p. 98.
everywhere the primary determinant of political behaviour. There was some truth to this, but the dramatic decline of the Tories in Scotland since the 1970s - Tory support fell to around 25% by the late 1980s, barely half the level of support in England, with markedly lower support across all social classes, and in the 1997 election the party won no seats in Scotland - has made analysts think again, not only about the present but also about the past. The rethinking has it that Conservatism only found a sizable audience in Scotland when its programme consisted in a moderate, paternalistic conservatism, as it did for much of the twentieth century until Thatcher took over the party. Thatcherism, seen by its critics as the promotion of rampant individualism at the expense of social equality, is felt by many to be antithetical to basic values widely adhered to in Scotland and has, so the argument goes, been viscerally rejected there by much of the body politic.

Giving preponderant support to British parties most closely aligned to their manner of thinking is one way that Scots have expressed their distinctive political and social values, but these substantive elements of Scottishness have also at times spurred large sections of the Scottish population to support Home Rule as a way of affording their differences political expression. Albeit, the Home Rule movements themselves have not always articulated their goals in this fashion. What they have publicly demanded is a Parliament in Scotland with authority over Scottish affairs, the definition of "Scottish affairs" varying considerably from one Home Ruler to the next. Common to all, however, is a reluctance to go the full distance and declare Scotland a nation that should rightfully occupy an independent state. The analysis of the previous chapter would suggest that underlying this moderate political stand is the feeling that the Scots are not quite a full-fledged nation requiring sovereignty in

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26 For an overview of this viewpoint, see Kellas, *The Scottish Political System*, pp. 96-102.


28 Ibid., pp. 60-62 and 144-45.

29 A key theme developed in ibid.
every department of national life, but more a population distinct in certain specific and delimited ways. Unlike idealists, who see the nation as a transcendent historical vessel, sharply distinct regardless of its current sociological content, these pragmatist nationalists derive their sense of Scottishness and their political projects from present substantive differences and imperatives.

The tight link between extant tangible distinctiveness and pragmatist nationalism helps explain why support for Home Rule has come predominantly from those who, at any given point, are strong advocates of Scotland's distinctive political values. This has long been the case. Some of the movements fighting for the extension of the franchise and social justice in the 18th and 19th centuries, such as the Chartists, though not making Home Rule a central plank, did sometimes allude to the merits of devolved power. Notes Keith Webb of this extra-parliamentary agitation, "As the nineteenth century progressed, the Scottish point of view was increasingly seen as being different from the British interest, and if not expressed in Parliament, it would be proclaimed elsewhere."30 It was towards the end of that century in 1886 that the first nationalist organization of note, the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), was formed to press the case for a Parliament in Scotland. This was largely a Liberal organization, but more specifically, it was primarily the work of radical Scottish elements within the party, who, from the early 1870s on, had been agitating for changes consonant with Scotland's radical sentiment, such as franchise extension and land reform. The feeling among these early pragmatist nationalists was that "Scotland's natural radical tendencies were being suppressed by the dead hand of London government, including the permanent Tory majority in the House of Lords...Home Rule, then, gradually emerged as an integral part of the radical programme."31 After 1900, continued pressure on the Liberal party to live up to its Home Rule commitment came from an


internal ginger group, the Young Scots, many of whom would join the Labour Party after the war.\textsuperscript{32} Strongly supportive too was the Scottish Labour Party, an organization that eschewed strict working-class socialism and class analysis in favour of a programme catering to the concerns and political perspective of the common man, an emphasis more in keeping with the radical democratic precepts popular in Scotland.\textsuperscript{33} Given these beginnings, it is not surprising that with the fading of the Liberal Party's star and the growth of Labour as the new vehicle of radical politics (albeit with stronger socialist overtones), the revived SHRA, which came into being in 1918, was dominated by Labour party supporters, thus maintaining the tight link between radical political views and Home Rule enthusiasm.

Yet despite being in power, Labour briefly in 1923-4 and from 1929-31, and the Liberals for much of the earlier 1900s, these parties did not live up to their Home Rule commitments. The reasons for this are complex, with various Home Rule bills coming unstuck at different stages of the legislative process, but one key obstacle was a general lack of perseverance once in office. No doubt this, in part, simply represented the standard procedure of putting promises to the back burner once in power, but it may also have partly resulted from a reduced sense of urgency for those whose Scottish nationalism was pragmatically based. If the dominant sentiment within Labour, for example, was that the Scottish community was distinct in virtue of tangible political differences only - one historian tells us that Labourites thought the "Scots were a democratic and egalitarian people and Labour was the natural party to represent those needs"\textsuperscript{34} - it makes sense the party would feel a lesser need to introduce Home Rule once in power: the Scots were, after all, at long last being rightly governed. For many in the Home Rule movement, including large parts of the Liberal and Labour parties, power for the Scots was

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 49-52.

\textsuperscript{34} Finlay, "Controlling the Past," p. 138.
a means to an end, the end being governance consonant with Scottish political values. It was not an unconditional demand for freedom for the Scottish nation. As one delegate to the 1919 conference of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party remarked, "[Scots] could not have social reconstruction in Scotland while they were held back by England. Freedom of government was necessary for Scotland in order that progress would be made in harmony with the aspirations and wants of the people."³⁵

The Home Rule initiative started to lose steam in the latter half of the 1920s and the SHRA was dissolved in 1929. It was not until the 1940s that a new organization appeared on the scene seeking to revive the project. The Scottish Convention, formed in 1942, was, like the SHRA, a non-party organization whose purpose was the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. In this it did not succeed. Its main accomplishments were the convening on several occasions of a Scottish National Assembly, widely representative of Scottish society, which formulated proposals for a Scottish Parliament, and the organization of a massive petition in the late 1940s in favour of Home Rule. The document, to which two million Scots (purportedly) put their names, was the Scottish Covenant; its signatories pledged themselves "in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a parliament with adequate legislation in Scottish affairs."³⁶ The initiative had little impact though, as the government refused to recognize the legitimacy of any such extra-parliamentary action.

The Scottish Convention was led by John MacCormick, former leader of the Scottish National Party who left the party at its annual conference in 1942. His departure was the result of running battles within the party which, broadly speaking, pitted MacCormick's moderation against the radical nationalism of others. Of interest are the conceptions of the Scottish nation favoured by the opposing

³⁵ Quoted in Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 113.

³⁶ The full text is cited in Allan Macartney, "Constitutional Change and Strategic Thinking," Radical Scotland, No. 39 (June/July 1989), p. 25.
factions. MacCormick, for his part, had a very grounded understanding of the nation, and wrote of his disagreements with those radicals whose Scottish nation was more of a "nostalgic dream than the reality with which we must contend." For him the Scottish nation was but individual Scots in the aggregate and he resisted attempts to introduce, into Scottish nationalist doctrine, idealist conceptions of the nation as collective individual. In a pamphlet prepared for the Scottish Convention, MacCormick wrote "the community has no other moral purpose than to provide the setting for the individual person's growth and development. The community is not an end in itself. Of itself it has no moral significance at all....The kind of patriotism that makes the conception of one's country something greater and more important than the individuals who compose it [is highly immoral]." In evidence here is strong resistance to the idea that the nation might be treated as a pan-historic entity with some transcendent claim over and above the desires of the individuals who currently comprise it. "The nation," MacCormick later wrote, "was not an abstraction...but a living reality composed of millions of living individuals. It was with the people we had to contend and it was their mood which we must seek to interpret."

Thus, as with other pragmatists, MacCormick's nationalism was aimed at accommodating the current aspirations and distinctive characteristics of the Scottish people. He was therefore flexible in his political demands, open to various alternatives whereby his nationalist objectives might be attained. This manner of nationalist reasoning is very different from the idealist insistence on independence engendered by a more abstract and idealized sense of the nation.


After the Covenant failed to win the desired Parliament, the Scottish Convention faded from public view and there was another long lull in Home Rule activity from the early 1950s until the SNP started to capture considerable support in the late 1960s. When the nationalists took 22% of the vote in the general election of February 1974, Labour was sufficiently convinced of the force of nationalist sentiment to introduce a new Scottish policy. The promise was made that a Labour government would introduce legislation establishing a Scottish Assembly. This reversal of policy was in significant part electoral ploy, aimed at staunching the flow of votes to the SNP. There was certainly no groundswell of support within the Labour rank and file and many helped bring about the defeat of the 1979 referendum on a Scottish Assembly.

But if Labour's commitment to devolution was soft in the 1970s, it firmed up considerably through the 1980s. The changes in conservative philosophy and public policy introduced by Thatcher and the Tory party since 1979, have sparked a powerful reaction in Scotland that has brought to the fore Scotland's distinctive political values and made the desirability of increased power for Scotland a near axiom of Scottish political life. There is, in Scotland these days, a widespread feeling that the Scots differ in palpable ways from the English, that left-leaning parties better reflect Scottish ideals, and that a Scottish Assembly would allow Scots to express some of this political distinctiveness - without breaking with Britain altogether. One signal of the new breadth of Home Rule support is its popularity among Labour's grassroots in Scotland. A ginger group within the party, Scottish Labour Action, has kept pressure on the leadership to stay the course and introduce an Assembly with significant powers; the group reportedly enjoys widespread support among the Scottish Labour rank and file. In addition, Labour voters - who represent 40% of the population - have come round in force, with 62% supporting a Scottish Assembly according to one 1992 survey.40

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40 Brown et al., Politics and Society in Scotland, Table 7.10, p. 155.
Nor is Labour alone in its enthusiasm. The party has joined forces with those active in the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA), an organization formed in the aftermath of the 1979 referendum defeat to keep the Home Rule spirit alive. Labour and the CSA - in conjunction with representatives of the Scottish trade unions, the Scottish churches, the local authorities, and other political parties (save the SNP and the Conservatives) - established, in 1989, the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which assumed the task of working out the structure and powers of a proposed Scottish Assembly. The plan that was formulated by this body goes beyond that proposed in the 1970s, contemplating an Assembly with all the powers now in the hands of the Scottish Office and limited tax raising authority as well. Following the successful referendum held in Scotland in 1997, such an Assembly will be established presently.

Again, in this, the latest and probably strongest wave of Home Rulery, enthusiasm for a Scottish Assembly is largely a result of the chafing that has occurred as a community distinct in its social and political values has been rubbed the wrong way by an overbearing central authority. Supporters of a Scottish Assembly are not so much concerned about abstract and unconditional rights of the Scottish nation as they are determined to protect and uphold that which is distinctively Scottish. Others observers offer much the same interpretation of the recent surge in Home Rule support. Lindsay Paterson suggests that the current demand for a Scottish Parliament is a product of both a social democratic impulse to protect the welfare state and a desire to create a more participatory democracy in the wake of Tory attacks on the institutions of public life. Andrew Marr sees bodies like the CSA and the Constitutional Convention as evidence of a profound disaffection with traditional political channels, and support for Labour and the SNP as a reflection of Scotland's different political culture.

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Participants in the events of the past 15 years offer confirmation of these interpretations. Says one participant: "The [Tories'] accountancy-driven approach to the health service and to public utilities...was seen as an attack on the ethos of the Scottish nation" and "offended Scotland's social Christian sensibilities." George Robertson, then Labour's Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, offered a similar rationale for Home Rule: "The poll tax, opted-out schools and hospitals, the manic drive to privatise public services, the robbery of powers from local government and the relentless acquisition of decision-making and spending power by unelected quangos were all...politically disastrous. None of them would have happened in a Scotland with its own devolved Parliament."

Thus moderate Scottish nationalism has been a constant and pervasive feature of the Scottish social landscape. The Lowland/Highland divide; the historic link between Presbyterianism and Scottishness; the present Home Rule movement inspired primarily by differences in social and political values: many Scots, down the years, have derived their communal identity from the tangible differences of culture, language, religion, and social and political values that have served to mark them off from outsiders. This pragmatist nationalism, grounded in concrete traits of social differentiation, has been an important band on the spectrum of Scottish nationalist sentiment.

B) Idealist Nationalism in Scotland

The link between tangible national traits and Scottish identity is not so apparent among advocates of independence, to whom we have alluded in our discussion of Scotland's pragmatist nationalists, and whose viewpoints we will now examine more closely. The idealist assessment of the

43 Ibid., pp. 173.


sources and nature of Scottish distinctiveness is quite different. At the most general level, the idealists' sense of Scottishness is less closely harnessed to tangible aspects of social differentiation. This is not to say that their sense of nationhood is fabricated out of thin air; it is simply to suggest that they take the raw material of nationhood and spin a more seamless weave than their pragmatist counterparts. Theirs is an abstract and idealized sense of nationhood, originating in, yet moving well beyond, the substantive stuff of Scottishness. This is apparent in some of the attitudes and arguments proffered by various promotors of Scottish sovereignty over the years.

Within this idealist nationalist cohort, there have been two distinct streams of thought. When idealist nationalism first appeared on the Scottish political scene in the 1920s, as certain small groups dismissive of the Home Rule project started to demand outright independence, there were some who hoped to create in Scotland a seamless cultural community that might match the homogeneous sense of the nation permeating their own political vision. At the same time, and increasingly dominant within the idealist ranks from an early date, there has been a strand of idealist nationalism tending more to the empty vessel way of thinking, accepting the diversity of Scotland's sociological countenance and its gradual evolution over time, yet perceiving nevertheless some sort of transcendent Scottish national unity.

The first variant of idealist Scottish nationalism had its origins in the Scots National League (SNL). Created in 1920, the SNL was one of several organizations that would come together in 1928 to form the National Party of Scotland (NPS). The SNL - particularly in the first few years of its existence - was the promoter of a radical, romanticized vision of Scotland. Its simple, sharp constitutional position - independence, full stop - was accompanied by an equally unyielding sense of the Scottish nation.

The SNL activists - or at least the leading lights - were Celticists who wanted to completely recast Scotland's extant cultural terrain. They were critical, Finlay writes, of "Scottish culture which had been tinged with 'Anglo-Saxon Teutonism'. The SNL wanted to purge Scotland of all these cultural blemishes, and, using some Irish nationalists as a model, create an unadulterated Celtic state." In glorifying the Celtic elements in Scotland's national make-up, the SNL was clearly drawing inspiration from Scotland's past, but their brand of nationalism should not be mistaken for some guileless yearning to transport Scotland back to an earlier, simpler time. The new, thoroughly Celtic, Scottish nation envisioned by the SNL, was, significantly, to comprise not only areas once ruled by the clans and suffused with their distinctive culture, but also parts where clan culture had never been the order of the day - in short, all of modern-day Scotland. The nationalists of the SNL, then, not only showed scant regard for Scotland's contemporary social and cultural landscape, hoping to level it and start anew, they also based their plans for the future but loosely on Scotland's past. For the SNL idealists, Scotland's past was more inspiration than model. From it, they extracted Celtic symbols of Scottishness, joining these to an inner sense of seamless national community to create the vision of a perfect, unblemished Scottish nation ready to be created within the borders of contemporary Scotland.

One historian has described the thought processes that led the SNL's founder, Ruairidh Erskine of Mar, to promote this purified vision of Scotland: "The main feature of Erskine's thought was a sort of eighteenth-century rationalism which made him wish to create a new Scottish political system de novo. He had come to the conclusion that the existing system was a bad one, that the culture of the people had been debased, and that is must be re-created on a Celtic rather than an Anglo-Saxon basis." Erskine, in other words, in the manner typical of idealist thinkers through the ages, started

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48 Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 124-5.

49 Ibid., p. 136.
with a tabula rasa and produced a nationalism little constrained by empirical realities. His was a nationalism projected outward from nationalist onto nation rather than vice versa, an ordering also evident in Erskine's views on social and economic matters. "Celtic communism", a rather ill-defined set of predispositions and beliefs, was, Erskine believed, an "intrinsic value of the Celtic peoples" this despite manifest evidence of diverse political views among the Scottish population. Erskine's nationalism glossed over these divisions by presuming some sort of intrinsic homogeneity, which, if currently obscured by partisan politics, was nevertheless deep within each and every Scot waiting to emerge from its cocoon in a liberated Scotland. It is a conceptualization very different from the Home Ruler perspective that typically has regarded the Scottish nation as a community disproportionately of certain political inclinations, and distinct for that reason, but has not conceived of the nation as a seamless entity with a single political outlook intrinsic to all.

Another key figure in the SNL, along with many other nationalist organizations over the years, was renowned poet and novelist Hugh MacDiarmid (pseudonym of Christopher Murray Grieve). One of MacDiarmid's achievements was his leading role in the revival of Scotland's languishing traditional languages, Gaelic, the Highland tongue, and Lallans, the vernacular of the Lowlands. MacDiarmid's works didn't win him a wide readership among the Scottish public, but they did spark something of a renaissance among the Scottish literary elite from the 1920s on. The rationale behind the poet's cultural activism reveals something more about the contours of idealist nationalism. For while MacDiarmid's efforts were no doubt partly motivated by a simple and sincere attachment to Scotland's native speech, they also were shot through with political purpose. It has been suggested, for example, that

50 Finlay, Independent and Free, p. 33.

51 Lallans, which shares a common origin with English is somewhat comprehensible to the English speaker but is sufficiently peppered with distinctive words and idioms to make it, in the eyes of Scottish nationalists certainly, more than a mere dialect.
MacDiarmid looked on Lallans as "a vehicle for national differentiation and political mobilisation. The idea of preserving the old community was secondary." 52, 53

In keeping with the political purposes MacDiarmid hoped a cultural revival might serve - national differentiation and political mobilisation - he was insistent that Scottish literature take itself and the nation seriously. Otherwise it would be entirely ineffective. Hence the disdain MacDiarmid displayed towards authors like Robbie Burns, whose works, he felt, were nationalist "self-parody" and ultimately detrimental to the Scottish cause. 54 Such attitudes were not unique to MacDiarmid, and have become commonplace in recent years as a spate of hard-edged cultural productions - books, films, plays, music - has appeared on the scene, depicting the rougher side of Scottish life. Coincident with the Scottish nationalist revival that began with the Thatcher years, this cultural renaissance has challenged and partly displaced the "quaint shortbread-kilts-and-bagpipe version of Scotland." 55 As for MacDiarmid, then, so for today's artistic vanguard: "Scots who have projected a confident, even strident, image of Scotland through the arts have often...been highly critical of more popular Scottish culture." 56

The political ends which MacDiarmid and other literary figures hoped a revived Scottish culture might serve have been largely absent from the thinking of more moderate cultural nationalists, whose primary concern has been Scottish culture as an end in itself. Paul Scott, for example, who has


long been active in Scottish affairs as a member and sometimes office holder in the Scottish National Party, as well as a leading figure in the Scottish literati, is one who has tended to take a more flexible stand on Scotland's political future. Through the 1980s, Scott played an active part in the Campaign for A Scottish Assembly, even as the SNP came to dissociate itself from any Home Rule initiatives over the course of that decade. In an article written in 1982, the politically moderate Scott voiced the view that Scots should make efforts to prevent the erosion of Lallans. His five-part rationale: Lallans is the vehicle of communication that comes naturally to many Scots; it allows for the expression of sentiments that cannot be captured in English; there is a "pleasure and expressiveness of Scots words in themselves" that "give colour and smeddum to speech"; the language provides access to a rich literature that might otherwise be lost; and finally, it represents an element of global cultural diversity that it would be tragic to lose.\(^{57}\) There is, in this reasoning, no political overtone, no hint that Lallans might serve purposes, like symbolic differentiation and political mobilisation, that would push the independence project along. Instead, Scott's reasoning evinces an affection for Lallans as a cultural artifact worth preserving for its own sake. This is not to wholly discount political motives on his part, but there certainly seems to be a difference of emphasis between his way of thinking and the idealist nationalism of people like MacDiarmid, more rigid and intransigent in their demand for an independent state. For those pragmatically inclined in their nationalism, culture - or more generally the substantive aspect of communal life - is of greater significance in itself, and their minds wander freely over various political arrangements that might help preserve the nation's tangible distinctiveness. For idealists, on the other hand, culture is often just a tool used to further their primary and non-negotiable objective, national independence.

But for all their ardour and grandiose vision, the influence of people like Erskine and MacDiarmid within the idealist wing of Scottish nationalism, should not be exaggerated. Their role was early on reduced when the National Party of Scotland was formed in 1928 by the merger of the SNL with elements of the SHRA, as well as two other organizations (the Scottish National Movement and the Glasgow University Students Nationalist Association). In 1934, the NPS effected a merger with the more moderate Scottish Party, to create the Scottish National Party (SNP). The first program of the SNP made no mention of independence, calling rather for the establishment of a Parliament that would be "the final authority on all Scottish Affairs."\(^58\) The party would later move back to a more hardline position, but it has never fallen into the hands of the SNL-type idealists harbouring visions of a culturally seamless Scotland. Instead, the party and its supporters have favoured the empty vessel approach to idealist nationalism, allowing, even encouraging, social diversity, yet distilling from this unlikely brew, an essential national unity.

But before pursuing that line of argument, the qualification should be added that the moderation shown by the SNP early on has not been uncommon, and to portray the party as the purveyor of an unremitting idealist nationalism would be inaccurate. For many years, it tended to call for "self-government" for Scotland, not independence, and made explicit reference to the need for continued ties with Britain.\(^59\) This remained the party line until the electoral successes of the 1960s and 1970s brought about a change in Labour's Scotland policy, which forced the SNP to take a stand on devolutionary proposals well short of its stated objective. The party's general approach was to support the Scottish Assembly initiative, while retaining and making no secret of its long-term goal, the establishment of an independent Scotland. At times it sounded, however, as though the SNP was actually developing a principled commitment to independence by steps. One party pamphlet from the

\(^{58}\) Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 164.

1970s noted that "the achievement of a democratic, independent government in Scotland is the SNP's primary aim," yet also stipulated that "we believe that the establishment of a Scottish Parliament is the essential first step." The defeat of the 1979 referendum led to some turmoil within the party, as various factions jostled for position, and for a time the SNP promoted more vigorously an "independence nothing less" position. But it has since, in various ways, moved back to a more moderate stand. For example, the party has altered its policy on Scottish membership in the European Community. Opposed to E.C. membership at the time of U.K. accession in 1974, the SNP at its 1988 convention wholeheartedly embraced a pro-Europe policy (which today includes support for monetary union, Maastricht's social chapter, and so on). Independence in Europe is now the SNP's flagship policy, figuring heavily in party literature and public statements. In sum, then, while the SNP has for most of its history supported Scottish independence, or near enough, as its final goal, it has not been entirely closed off to other options.

But more than the party itself, moderation has come from that significant segment of Scottish public opinion that supports political power for Scotland, even independence, but places a low priority on the matter. A number of early polls show levels of support for independence and lesser nationalist options to have been remarkably high; given the SNP's sometimes derisory results at election time, the issue simply can not have been very important to voters. SNP activists canvassing over 5,000 homes in Ayrshire in 1935, for example, found 75% support for Home Rule for Scotland. In 1949, 85% of the electorate in the town of Kirriemuir were polled, and it was discovered that 23% wanted an "independent Scottish Parliament", and a further 69% "a Scottish Parliament [to deal] with purely

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Scottish affairs.\textsuperscript{63} Then, of course, there was the Covenant movement, with its two million signatures collected in favour of a Scottish Parliament, a project that surely would have been helped along if only more people had been willing to put pressure on the major parties by voting SNP. It can only be presumed that the constitutional issue did not weigh heavily in the minds of Scottish voters prior to 1960.

Of course, the wasted vote consideration always enters into play when people contemplate casting their ballot for a party that has no hope of winning a riding. And eventually the SNP managed to overcome this hurdle, convincing people, via gradual gains in popular vote at various elections over the course of the 1960s, that it stood a credible chance of taking seats and wielding influence. Today a decent proportion of independence supporters vote SNP, with most of the others voting for Home Rule parties (Labour or Liberal). Yet still, there continue to be indications, even as the movement has taken off, that few in the Scottish public are truly adamant about Scottish independence. There has been a broad willingness to compromise and accept lesser outcomes that seems incongruous with a truly radical, idealist stand. In the \textit{1974 Scottish Election Study}, for example, 97\% of those who supported independence were willing to accept a Scottish Assembly\textsuperscript{64} - this despite the notion, popular with British politicians, that an Assembly would take the wind out the separatists' sails. Compare this to Quebec, where the idea of a special status for the province within Confederation has also been seen by separatists as a mixed blessing, a tempting appetizer perhaps, but one that might sate the less committed, leaving them with no room for the main course. Quebec separatists have been much more wary of the lesser option. In the \textit{1968 Canadian National Election Survey}, only 66\% of separatists supported a special status for Quebec; in a July 1977 poll, support for a special status among

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\textsuperscript{63} Mitchell, \textit{Strategies for Self-Government}, p. 149.
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separatists was 41%. Comparatively speaking, then, there are relatively few diehard separatists to be found among the Scottish electorate.

What all of this means is that Scottish nationalism, with its long and powerful Home Rule tradition on the one hand, and its tractable separatists on the other, is a bit more of a blur than some other movements, with the pragmatist and idealist elements often meeting and mingling halfway. This is always to be borne in mind when analyzing the differences that exist between various groups within the Scottish nationalist movement. But if the idealist/pragmatist differences are not quite so sharply drawn in Scotland as they are elsewhere, there remain some salient differences. Compared to other elements in the Scottish movement, the SNP and the body of opinion that supports it do show certain idealist tendencies in their nationalism.

In the first place, the SNP advocates what would usually be called territorial nationalism, contending that all who live in Scotland can be considered Scottish. The official SNP policy states that in an independent Scotland "citizenship shall be open to anyone who is permanently resident in Scotland at the date of independence, to anyone who was born in Scotland, and to such other persons as the Parliament of Scotland may prescribe." Though the implications of this territorial nationalism are not always spelled out, it seems to suggest that being Scottish does not turn on qualities possessed primarily by the native born, immersed from their earliest days in Scottish mores and culture. Instead, for the SNP, Scottishness is a more abstract quality that cannot be pinned on tangible sociological traits.

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65 Author's calculation based on 1968 Canadian National Election Survey (N total = 632, N separatists = 70); and CIPO #402, July 1977 (N total = 248, N separatists = 54). For further details on these and other surveys cited throughout, see Appendix 1.

66 Keating, Nations against the State, p. 184.

This has been the position of the nationalist party since its foundation. At the time the SNP's precursor, the NPS, was formed in 1928, there was, it will be recalled, still a feeling in some quarters that being Scottish meant being Presbyterian. The Catholics who had arrived from Ireland were considered by a sizable number of native Scots to be unassimilable outsiders. But this was not a theme the NPS or SNP ever chose to take up. For the more radical nationalists, being Scottish did not rest on anything so shallow as mere religious affiliation, it was something that ran much deeper.

Nor has the SNP elected to hang Scottishness on the vestiges of Celtic heritage that have survived down to the present day. Scottish culture, for the SNP, is not the tattered tartan fragments of yesteryear, that would only be meaningful to some, but rather the fusion of all that issues from the diverse population residing within Scotland's borders. The SNP policy on the arts, for example, advises that the need "to restore and fructify the national culture of Scotland must be paralleled by fair treatment for others for whom this culture is not central, and by a strong attempt to encourage cross-fertilisation."68 The SNP, it would seem, is content with an evolving cultural hybrid, not seeing in this any barrier to the continued existence of a distinct Scottish community.

The one element of the past that the SNP has shown a greater interest in preserving is the Gaelic language. This is likely because of the importance sometimes attached to a distinctive language within nationalist discourse and the dignified status Gaelic has retained compared to some of the more mawkish elements of Scottishness. The official SNP policy is that Gaelic, in an independent Scotland, will enjoy "equal status with English...so that either could be used in dealing with the state and its public services anywhere in Scotland."69 Resources are also promised to promote the teaching of the language in the schools. But if the SNP is interested in staving off the extinction of a language on the brink, it does not seem to be out of a deep veneration for Gaelic per se, and it's not likely SNP


members will be lining up for lessons. As William Wolfe, party leader through much of the 1960s and 1970s, once noted, Gaelic is symbolic of Scottish distinctiveness and he would never favour making it compulsory throughout Scotland.\textsuperscript{70} The language can remain a symbol so long as some people, somewhere in Scotland, continue to speak it.

At one stage, an organization was briefly active that hoped to generate within the nation a deeper reverence for Scotland's Celtic past, and which included among its membership some SNPers. Formed after the 1979 referendum, Siol Nan Gaidheal (Seed of the Gael) was one of the factions that appeared within the idealist nationalist camp at that time in response to political defeat. Ardent supporters of Scottish independence who hinted they might be willing to turn to violence if other means of advancing the cause failed, the SNG activists were best known for their demonstrations and marches, where they would parade in full Highland regalia, complete with dirks and broadswords. For some of the youthful members of the group, it was probably more of a lark than anything, but for others there was a more serious purpose. As the SNG leader explained, "We intend to show that everything Scottish does not have to be comic, we want to give the Scottish people their respect back."

\textsuperscript{71} In its actions and objectives, this idealist group displayed a tendency seen elsewhere within the ranks of idealist nationalists: the rejection of the culture produced by the people themselves, in this case a Tartan pastiche, and the attempted refashioning of a strident culture more befitting a genuine nation.

But this type of attitude towards the Celtic elements of Scotland's heritage has been the exception and the SNP mainstream has preferred to avoid cluttering the nationalist stage with distinctively Scottish props. The same applies, more or less, to the social and political values that, it was suggested above, have been at the heart of much pragmatist nationalist agitation in this century.


The Home Rulers, it was observed, have often been promoters of radical democracy - the loose blend of individualism and social equality popular among the Scots - and have seen in a devolved Parliament a way of allowing this dimension of Scottish society fuller articulation. The SNP has not entirely eschewed this type of political discourse, but it would be fair to say that for much of its history, the party has de-emphasized the distinctive political and social values of the Scottish people so as not to ostracize any who hold contrary views.

It was not always clear this would be the route taken, for there was early on some sign that the SNP might make radical democracy a cornerstone of its programme. An early statement of SNP philosophy, "Some Principles of Scottish Reconstruction", written by party leader Robert McIntyre in 1944, emphasized the merits of individual initiative and freedom from government control, tempering this with a significant nod to equality - "Every Scot...must be sufficiently independent, from an economic point of view, to exercise his democratic rights in freedom, without fear of the State, the Combine, or the Laird."\(^{72}\) But over the years, this philosophy did not really translate into a restrictive ideology of any sort. Instead the SNP tended to develop ad hoc policies on the issues of the day, sticking close to the middle of the political spectrum and hoping to stay above the left-right fray of British politics. A 1967 party pamphlet proclaimed, "We deny as false the doctrines of the Class War and of Hereditary Ruling Castes and we reject the false divisions of society which spring from both."\(^ {73}\) It was, as Hanham suggests, an approach designed to appeal to the average Scot rather than any particular sub-section of the nation.\(^ {74}\)

The SNP mainstream, then, has differed from the idealist nationalists of the interwar years who claimed to have identified a single political creed intrinsic to all Scots (the SNL and its Celtic

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\(^ {72}\) Robert McIntyre, "Some Principles of Scottish Reconstruction" (1944), p. 2.

\(^ {73}\) "The Scotland We Seek" (Glasgow: Scottish National Party, 1967), p. 3.

\(^ {74}\) Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 179.
communism); and has also, unlike the Home Rulers, been wary of locating Scottish distinctiveness in values widely, but by no means unanimously, espoused, for this would exclude some Scots from its idealist net. Instead, it has perceived and presented the Scottish nation as an empty vessel to be filled and re-filled by the Scottish people: whatever they choose as their social and political creed has been, and will continue to be, quintessentially Scottish. The SNP's main concern is that the Scottish nation be set up in its own independent state, so that it may get on with developing by its own lights.\textsuperscript{75}

Because the SNP, for much of its history, has avoided identifying selective traits as archetypically Scottish, and has furthermore been less inclined than nationalist parties elsewhere to use culture as either a symbol of the nation's distinctiveness or as a mobilizing tool, its political discourse over the years has consisted primarily in the call for an independent Scotland, and secondarily in criticism and demands revolving around a whole host of practical issues of current concern to Scotland, from unemployment and emigration to factory closures and North Sea oil revenues. It is sometimes said that this focus on economic and social concerns, and the de-emphasis of things distinctively Scottish, has led to a rather empty demand for independence, making the SNP look less like a nationalist party and more like some sort of regionalist pressure group. Such a claim fails to recognize the other important source of legitimacy the SNP regularly turns to, one that effectively envelopes the nation and gives added sustenance to the call for national independence: Scotland's history.

Consider, for example, the argument presented by Gordon Wilson in a 1985 article. The then SNP leader bemoaned some of the economic difficulties that had been plaguing Scotland for many years. High unemployment, emigration and the centralisation of economic decision-making authority were among his concerns. But rather than take these matters at face value, as problems facing

\textsuperscript{75} This comment applies to much of the SNP's history and remains an important vein of thought within the party; we will see below, however, that in the past ten years or so the SNP has taken up a stricter political ideology, on the left of the political spectrum, as a new leadership has taken control.
contemporary Scots in need of redress, Wilson embedded them in the much larger issue of Scotland's decline over the past half millennium from a "fully fledged state" able to secure and defend its "national integrity" to its current demeaning status as "a region only of the United Kingdom."\(^{76}\) Today's concrete problems, then, are only symptoms of the much deeper and more profound injustice that is Scotland's historic loss of independence. For Wilson and others of the idealist mindset, grievances over quotidian matters have not created the Scottish sense of community and the desire for independence; rather it is the powerful sense of community that renders especially egregious the day-to-day difficulties of modern-day Scots.\(^{77}\) That the past weighs heavily on the present for those radical in their nationalism is apparent too in the reasoning of James Halliday, long-time SNP stalwart and staunch defender of independence against partial compromises: "Without [Scottish] history, and without [Scottish] heritage it would be exceedingly difficult to make a case for Scottish identity and then for Scottish independence....Our past gives us an extra political option and an alternative solution to our problems, which would not be available to us if Scotland had to be created by some act of will here and now. Our former existence gives to our present claims a special justice and an extra urgency."\(^{78}\)

There is nothing incongruous, then, about claiming to be moved by a strong sense of attachment to the Scottish nation, yet evincing a concern for contemporary problems that are not unique to Scotland. Much the same happens with the idealist nationalists of other movements too; none are above adding to their primary demand for independence complaints about the nation's current


\(^{77}\) For a general argument along these lines - that a focus on quotidian matters does not warrant the conclusion that such is the sum and substance of nationalist discontent - see Walker Connor, "Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism" in Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, pp. 145-164.

\(^{78}\) James Halliday, "Scotland the Separate" (undated essay), p. 1.
economic and social situation. This does not change the basis of the idealist national identity: it is an abstract sense of identity, divorced from things distinctively national, and instead rooted in a sense of the nation as an abstract collectivity knitted together by a common history and destined to move towards the future as one. From this idealist sense of the nation, other elements of nationalist discourse follow.

Yet, this point made, it should be added that there have been elements within the SNP closer to the Home Rule tradition in tending to locate the essence of the Scottish nation in tangible differences of social and political outlook between Scots and the English. This tendency has been less moved by the image of an historic Scotland soldiering through time and more concerned with the substantive elements of Scottishness manifested in contemporary Scotland. This more pragmatist nationalist attitude became prominent in the aftermath of the 1979 referendum defeat, when a faction emerged within the SNP, the 79 Group, that wanted to alter party policy to suit this type of pragmatist conceptualization of the nation.

The principal change the 79 Group called for was the adoption of socialist policies by the SNP. The socialism the group had in mind was heavily tinged with the anti-bureaucratic ethos characteristic of the radical democratic tradition that has been at the heart of much of the Home Rule agitation of this century. The other policy the 79 Group reputedly tried to press on the party was a softening of its independence stance. There was a perception that many in the group were more interested in socialism than independence, or, worse still, were closet devolutionists willing to take whatever scraps Westminster might throw Scotland's way. The feeling that the 79 Group was trying to put independence on the back burner caused considerable conflict within the SNP, sapping its strength.

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through the early 1980s, and it was not until several key members of the group were expelled in 1983 that the party regrouped and started to regain its former strength.\textsuperscript{80}

In some cases, the suspicion that members of the 79 Group were half-hearted nationalists was unfounded. There were those for whom the adoption of left-wing policy was essentially a mobilization strategy: Labour was increasingly the dominant party in Scotland and the SNP needed to capture some of its working class vote. But others saw socialism as more than a convenient mobilizing tool, thinking it incumbent on the SNP to promote certain left-of-centre values because these constituted an essential element of Scottishness. A case in point: Isobel Lindsay, another key figure in the 79 Group, who has voiced the opinion that Scottishness derives largely from the distinct social and political outlook of the population: “the lack of identification with the current brand of English nationalism combines with the rejection of the possessive individualism it also represents, to make it alien to three-quarters of Scotland and there are even many of the remaining quarter who are not entirely comfortable with it. We have, therefore, a divergence from English politics.”\textsuperscript{81} Lindsay's sense of Scottishness is, in some measure at least, a product of tangible characteristics of Scottish society, and it is perhaps no coincidence that she, less inclined to view the Scottish nation in abstract and unconditional terms, has since joined the Labour Party now that it seems more sincerely committed to the cause of a Scottish Assembly.

The strain of thought that appeared within the SNP with the emergence of the 79 Group was in many ways a harbinger of what would become a more widespread sentiment in Scottish society at large during the Thatcher years (and beyond). Some of the leading figures in the 79 Group were not far removed from that strain of Home Rule thought, in ascendance throughout the 1980s and into the


\textsuperscript{81} Lindsay, "Divergent Trends," p. 14.
1990s, that views the Scots as substantively distinct from the English and has sought various political remedies to give expression to that difference. For the idealists in the SNP, this was, and remains today, too confining a vision of Scotland. The values of the Scottish nation are whatever the people of Scotland proclaim them to be and Scottishness should not be restricted to any particular political creed.

Writes Donald Stewart, long-time MP for the Western Isles and staunch defender of unqualified independence for Scotland: "Scottish Nationalism is not a vehicle to deliver Socialism, protect birds, prevent fluoridation of water or whatever; however desirable any or all of these may be. They can be pursued by other channels and can be achieved in the post-independence situation if that is what the Scottish public demands." For Stewart and others of the idealist persuasion, the substance of the Scottish nation is an open-ended question. What matters is that its independence be secured so that it can develop by its own lights.

Though the viewpoint expressed by Stewart has been predominant within the SNP for much of its sixty-year existence, a discussion of SNP ideology would not be complete without some mention of the changes that have occurred in recent years. The influence of the 79 Group on SNP policy was relatively minor for a time, but the ideas it propounded have gained currency as some of the group's former members have come to occupy key positions within the party, most notably, the leadership, now held by former 79 Group member, Alex Salmond. With this changing of the guard, the party has moved to the left on most social and economic matters, and it does not shy away from the social-democratic label that it rejected in the 1970s. At the same time, the party has come to embrace as its ultimate goal a lesser status that was resisted for a long time - independence within a relatively strong European Union. Today's SNP is something of a broad church, with both pragmatist and idealist tendencies enjoying a measure of influence within the party. Overall, then, the SNP has been the

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principal vehicle of idealist nationalism for the past sixty years, espousing a nationalist doctrine distinct in certain respects from that promoted by its pragmatist counterparts; but it also has, at various points, been home to some relatively moderate in their Scottish nationalism.

Conclusion

To summarize, there are certain broad patterns evident in the evolution of community consciousness in Scotland from days of yore down to the present. In the past, people's sense of belonging to a distinct community was typically tied to any number of pillars of tangible distinctiveness; for many this has continued to be so in the twentieth century. The substantive bases of community have, however, changed somewhat over time. Religion and tartanry today exert less influence on the pragmatist mindset, and have been largely supplanted by certain social and political values that are held to mark Scots off from outsiders. Common to the pragmatist way of looking at Scotland has been the perception that the differences between Scot and non-Scot are surface differences, that is, more differences of attribute than essence. This has allowed for a residual Britishness within the pragmatists' national identity and has left them open to various mechanisms whereby the sociological countenance of Scotland might be preserved intact.

Alongside this pragmatist nationalism, there has developed an idealist sentiment in the twentieth century, closely linked to the demand for independent statehood, that conceives of the Scottish nation in more holistic and essentialist terms. In some early proponents, this idealist nationalism generated the desire to re-mould the nation as a seamless community free of any foreign elements. But more predominant has been the idealist cast of mind that has treated the substantive stuff of Scottishness as a superficial aspect of the Scottish nation that can freely evolve and transform itself over time. More central to the nationalism of these idealists is the sense of Scotland as a historic community destined to fashion a future - whatever that might be - as one. In short, most idealists have
been wary of setting limits on Scottishness, seeing the nation more as an empty vessel loading and unloading its sociological freight as it moves implacably through time. The detachment of the idealist's nationalism from things distinctively Scottish makes it both more abstract and more potent than the pragmatist's grounded sense of community.

Consideration of the Scottish case brings to the fore a point raised in Chapter 1. There it was noted that the cultural/political nationalist typology sometimes applied to the factions within nationalist movements bears some resemblance to the pragmatist/idealist framework developed here, but is not wholly synonymous. One drawback of the former is that the word cultural is sometimes interpreted rather narrowly. Those searching for "cultural nationalists" among the Scots might be inclined to home in on aficionados of kilts, bagpipes and the like, and fail to recognize that those whose Scottishness is tightly hitched to Scotland's distinctive political and social values belong in the same category. By labelling that category "pragmatist nationalists", the current typology expressly encompasses all whose nationalist sentiment is a direct and unmediated function of tangible sociological difference. By the same token, the political nationalist classification, if applied to the Scottish case, might be misleading, or at least ambiguous. Would it refer to all who seek some measure of political power for Scotland, Home Rulers and separatists alike? Or would it refer only to those desirous of full statehood? If the latter, what would be distinctive about these nationalists? Their appetite for power or something else? The phrase "idealist nationalist" implies a definite position on this matter: those who seek a state for their nation are typically driven by an idealized national consciousness that will not rest content with partial measures of sovereignty.

Thus, the pragmatist/idealist typology is distinct from the cultural/political nationalist classification. It isolates nationalist tendencies in its own particular way and embodies causal claims about the relationship between identity and political demands. These assumptions and propositions
continue to inform the analysis, as we turn to consider the evolution of national consciousness in another stateless nation, Quebec.
Chapter 4

Quebec

Introduction

It is commonly said that nationalism in the province of Quebec has evolved in two distinct ways. First, Catholicism, once the essential binding ingredient of nationhood, has been supplanted, since around 1960, by the French language. And secondly, the comity Quebeckers feel with French-Canadians in other parts of Canada has diminished, if not altogether vanished, so that French-Canadian nationalism has today been replaced by a Québécois nationalism attentive only to the population residing in the province of Quebec.

But as in Brittany and Scotland, there is also evidence in both past and present of certain enduring differences between pragmatist and idealist nationalism. If it is true that nationalists before 1960 uniformly hitched their nationalism to the Catholic religion, it is also the case that for some this nationalism was pragmatist in orientation, focussing narrowly on religion as an end in itself, whereas for others, more radical in their outlook, Catholicism was only the starting point to a more idealized and abstract sense of national difference. By the same token, if it is true that the attachment to the French-Canadian diaspora was strong in the past, it is also apparent that early idealists, unlike their pragmatist contemporaries, were willing to countenance the idea of shifting their allegiance to a territorial nation housed in Quebec.

Similarly, if today's nationalists as a rule hold language to be the principal defining characteristic of the Québécois nation, it is also apparent that for some language per se is the object of their national ardour, whereas for others, it is the Québécois nation, a more abstract and idealized entity. And if the connection to French-Canadians in other provinces has diminished across the board,
the break has been most decisive among those idealists who espouse independence pure and simple for their nation.

In short, in tandem with the evolution from a religious-based French-Canadian nationalism to a modern, language-based Québécois nationalism, that has affected the entire spectrum of nationalist opinion in Quebec, there have been abiding differences between those whose sense of community is closely harnessed to the tangible elements of social differentiation and those who have embraced a more abstract and idealised nationalism. These contrasts between pragmatist and idealist nationalists, along with other attendant differences, are evident in the discourse of nationalist activists and leaders from 1760 down to the present day.

A) Pragmatist Nationalism in Quebec

The powerful pragmatist nationalism of the past emerged from a natural sense of difference issuing from the manifest sociological differentiae separating French-Canadians and their anglophone counterparts. Catholicism was, most observers would agree, the principal defining trait of French-Canadians, who managed to maintain the Catholic faith in a North America that was predominantly Protestant. The religious divide was, however, reinforced by a language barrier, since most francophones were Catholic and most Anglophones Protestant. Both were seen as important bulwarks of French-Canadianness; language, while perhaps, in and of itself, less central to the French-Canadian identity in the past, was nevertheless seen as an indispensable element because of its insulating effect against religious assimilation.

That the sociological divide between French and English in Canada remained in place after France's military defeat in 1760 and the inauguration of British rule can be partly attributed to the relative benevolence of the victor. While Canadian authorities, and before them, the British colonial authority, were reluctant to bestow the label nation on French-Canadians, they were, compared to
conquerors elsewhere, relatively accommodating of the patent sociological differences separating French and English Canadians. After 1760, a *modus vivendi* developed between French and English elites, and though there would be intermittent attempts at assimilation, this remained the dominant strain in their relationship. The quickly-quashed 1837-38 rebellion in Lower Canada - the first attempt to win French-Canadian independence - prompted the union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 and the declaration that English would henceforth be the only official language, but this attempted subjugation was soon abandoned. The French quickly won official recognition of their language, and the Church continued to be the dominant institution in the daily lives of French-Canadians. The same pattern continued after Confederation. If, after 1867, the Canadian government often allowed the provinces to play fast and easy with the rights (especially education rights) of francophones outside Quebec, French-Canadians did have a province to call their own, with considerable powers to safeguard their language and religion. In the 250 years since the takeover of New France, then, English Canadians, if they have often failed to actively promote and protect the French-Canadian way of life, have not, unlike majority groups elsewhere, engaged in deliberate extirpation.

With both religious and linguistic pillars of community firmly in place, the nationalist sentiment evident among French-Canadians in the past represented, first and foremost, a natural and uncomplicated desire to protect these distinctive sociological features against attenuation. Something of this appraisal is evident in the observations offered by various Quebec commentators. In 1958, Jean-Marc Léger wrote that French-Canadian nationalism "was and still is to a large extent, a simple healthy reflex, a spontaneous automatic reaction of an individual or group naturally striving for survival....a normal attachment to a type of civilization, a way of life, a language, customs, and a religion believed to be in danger."[1] It involved, consequently, none of the exaggerated sense of difference that is the

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hallmark of idealist nationalism. As Pierre Trudeau once observed, there were important differences between "what is sometimes (incorrectly) called 'our practical, down-to-earth-nationalism' (which is nothing else than the exercise for better or for worse of everyday common-sense patriotism by an ethnic group" and the "theoretical nationalism" developed by leaders and nationalist agitators.\(^2\) Marcel Rioux similarly identified distinct variants of communal consciousness among French-Canadians, and suggested that the ethos prevailing after the failed rebellion of 1837-38 was closely tied to sociological differentiae: "The Quebec group was no longer a nation that had one day to obtain its independence, but an ethnic group with a particular culture (religion, language, customs); this culture would have to be preserved as a sacred heritage."\(^3\) This type of identity within stateless nations is what has here been dubbed pragmatist nationalism. It is, as others would concur, a muted sense of community consciousness, muted because consisting in the unmediated apprehension of tangible difference from others.

This pragmatist nationalism was nurtured by the principal institution embodying French-Canadian distinctiveness before 1960, the Catholic Church. In the years after 1840, Church leaders in French Canada developed the doctrine of \textit{la survivance}. Though the basic idea had informed the Church's stance towards the British authorities since the time of the Conquest, it was developed more systematically in these later years. The premises were simple enough: French-Canadians, a small pocket of francophone Catholics in a continent dominated by Anglophone Protestants, were a markedly distinct people; maintaining that distinctiveness required that interaction with the outside world be minimized; French-Canadians, therefore, should adhere to traditional patterns, living quiet lives of honest toil and pious devotion in rural areas. This arrangement was perfectly compatible with


continued partnership with the English, as long as English-Canada respected the Church's sphere of authority.

_La survivance_, then, did not entail denying a Canadian political identity. What it did require was that room be made for the maintenance of a strong Catholic identity alongside the Canadian identity; and for this it was necessary that the church be given the leeway to tend to its flock. English Canada largely acceded to this desire, recognizing the importance of maintaining good relations with the Church, which had, after all, remained loyal to the Crown in 1837, thereby averting a wider rebellion. The Church's power grew after that date, so that the second half of the nineteenth century saw clericalism reach its apogee in Quebec, and it continued, through the first half of the twentieth century, to be the dominant institution in Quebec, shaping communal consciousness up until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s.

That the French-Canadian sense of community predominating prior to 1960 was tied to the possession of tangible sociological traits can be seen in various attendant attitudes prevalent in those years. First, to be a French-Canadian in good standing it was essential to obey the norms of the community or face ostracization. More than this, excommunication from the religious and national community were one and the same; as one observer noted in 1955, the French-Canadians were "a people with a single faith where non-believers are considered errants who have abandoned their caravan."4 Furthermore, if people could be excluded for failing to conform to the rigid norms of French-Canadianism, they could, conversely, be granted admittance if they met the requisite entrance requirements. Although pre-1960 French-Canada has sometimes been painted as a wholly exclusionary community, there was some assimilation of Irish newcomers to Montreal, whose

Catholicism made them eligible for membership in a community where religious fealty was of the essence.\footnote{Louis Balthazar, "The Faces of Québec Nationalism" in Alain G. Gagnon (ed.), \textit{Quebec: State and Society}, 2nd edition (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1993), p. 6.}

Thus, under the pragmatist dispensation, membership in the French-Canadian community was contingent because linked to the observance of prescribed French-Canadian norms. Of course, in point of fact, the portal governing exit and entry was hardly a revolving door. Most French-Canadians obeyed the requisite norms, for French-Canada in the past was a pastoral and tightly-knit community, steeped in tradition, with high rates of enogamy, all factors conducive to the stable observance of societal norms. Nevertheless, that it was possible for people to be shunned or embraced for fashioning themselves in certain ways points up the contingency of membership in the pragmatist's nation and its close link to tangible social traits.

Further evidence of the centrality of distinguishing sociological features to the pragmatist outlook is to be found in the strong empathy Quebeckers felt with French-Canadians outside their province, and the anger generated when the tangible distinctiveness of their far-flung fellow nationals was threatened. Following Confederation, the reaction in Quebec to the 1885 hanging of Louis Riel was the first strong manifestation of this bond. Fellow French feeling extending well beyond Quebec's borders was in evidence again in the 1890s controversy over the abolishment of Catholic educational rights in Manitoba. This conflict brought forth a wave of empathy from French-Canadians in Quebec, a pattern that was to repeat itself in the early part of the twentieth century when access to French education was severely limited in the province of Ontario. The ready response from Quebeckers to actions detrimental to the maintenance of their cultural consorts elsewhere attests to the comity engendered by the common traits shared by members of the French-Canadian diaspora.
At various points, leaders emerged to give voice to this nationalism in the political arena. In the first part of the twentieth century, Henri Bourassa was the principal pragmatist spokesperson. Though only intermittently an elected representative, Bourassa, whether in parliament or in the political wings, exerted a powerful influence on the French-Canadian political scene, from the turn of the century up to the Second World War. Bourassa's moderate nationalism might be summed up by observing that he was at once a Canadian and French-Canadian nationalist. The former was in evidence when he first stepped into the limelight by opposing Laurier's decision to send Canadian troops to help fight the Boer War; Bourassa denounced the move as an affront to Canada's right to choose its own battles. But if Canada was an object of Bourassa's loyalty, so too was French-Canada; he emphasized always the need for provincial autonomy and respect for the rights guaranteed French-Canadians under the terms of Confederation. Yet if Bourassa recognized legitimate spheres for the provincial and Canadian governments, he recognized too the supranational authority of the Catholic Church, deferring, on important issues, to papal edicts that others disregarded. Michael Oliver's description of Bourassa's political outlook as a type of latter-day medievalism, wherein sovereignty was dispersed among several objects of loyalty, is apt. So too is his characterization of the thought processes that informed Bourassa's nationalism: "Theory and principle he never neglected, but he continually sought to relate them to actuality. He was interested in action more than abstraction; he valued people more than logical elegance. Accepting the complexity of Canadian society, he did not look for, nor desire, the attainment of static, rigid order." Bourassa's pragmatist approach to the definition of community and the formulation of political demands was commonplace in French-

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6 This was the case, for example, in the Sentinelle affair. Protests in 1929 against the anglicization of Franco-Americans in Rhode Island roused much sympathy in Quebec among the nationalist element. When the Pope ruled against the protestors, Bourassa sharply criticized those who refused to recognize this ruling.

7 Oliver, The Passionate Debate, p. 22.

8 Ibid., p. 61.
Canada, and he spoke for many when he railed against English-Canada without ever brandishing the separatist option.

Others, perhaps less principled in their motives, also tapped into the pragmatist nationalist sentiments of French-Canadians. The Union Nationale (UN) was formed in 1935 by a merger of the moribund Conservative party and a Liberal Party breakaway faction, the Action Libérale Nationale (ALN). The party quickly fell under the tight control of its leader Maurice Duplessis, who governed Quebec from 1936 to 1959 (but for a Liberal interregnum from 1940 to 1944). Duplessis regularly criticized the centralizing thrust of the new programs and initiatives being launched by the Canadian government. His complaints were certainly not groundless - the federal government did take over areas of provincial jurisdiction during and after World War II, which it subsequently failed to relinquish - but he offered no constructive alternatives. For Duplessis was a conservative anxious to see Quebec maintain its traditional ways, unhampered by intrusive governmental authorities, whether federal or provincial. His philosophy complemented that of the Church, which continued, but for a few reformist voices, to promote the virtues of la survivance - survival through insularity and respect for tradition. It also struck a resonant chord with many Quebeckers. Together, then, the Church and Union Nationale presided over a society that remained deeply conservative and religious, anxious to protect its distinctive culture and way of life from outside influences and forces that were pressing at the gate.

Matters remained thus until 1960, after which date Quebec experienced a profound societal transformation. The most significant change was the reduced role of the Church. Emblematic of this were the reforms to the education system, introduced by the Liberal Party in the early 1960s, that saw the establishment of a Ministry of Education and an end to the Church's domination of teaching in the province. In tandem with a reduction in the institutional power of the church, Quebec experienced a precipitous decline in religiosity and rapid changes in related attitudes and behaviors; Quebec's birth rate, for example, once well above the norm, became the lowest in Canada. As the Church's bailiwick
shrank, the provincial government's expanded dramatically - in the economy, in political affairs, in social matters. In short, Quebec came to look much like other modern, secularized societies. There was nothing unusual about its evolution, other than the tight time frame into which it was compressed. The result is that the Quebec social and political landscape is today less tangibly distinct than it was in the past.

But one principal defining feature remains, the French language, and it is this that is the new focus of pragmatist nationalism. There has, then, in one sense been a sea change in the moderate strain of Quebec nationalism, with religion falling by the wayside, to be replaced by the French language as the bulwark of community. Yet there is also a thread of continuity. For despite the dramatic makeover, there are similarities that mark the religious-based nationalism of the past and today's linguistic nationalism as common manifestations of an enduring pragmatist nationalism. In both cases, the national community is taken to be distinct in virtue of tangible sociological differentiae. The sense of difference animating the pragmatist nationalist is neither exaggerated nor idealised, consisting instead in an unmediated apprehension of the concrete differences separating national insiders from non-national outsiders. The principal objective of the pragmatist, consequently, is simply the protection of the nation's distinctive sociological traits; he or she is flexible as to the political means whereby this might be achieved.

If this is fair statement, it is reasonable to say that Pierre Trudeau, often portrayed as an arch anti-nationalist by his opponents, qualifies as a latter-day pragmatist nationalist. For Trudeau has always been strongly in favour of protecting and cultivating the traits that make French-Canadians distinct, in particular language. In 1961 the left-leaning Trudeau wrote "[The true socialist realizes] Canada is very much a federal society from a sociological point of view."9 Thus, the question French-

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Canadians should ask themselves was "[H]ow can we protect our French-Canadian national qualities?" The answer Trudeau favoured is manifest in his many writings and political actions.

Certainly, the solution to French-Canada's desire to preserve its national visage was not to be found in the actions and attitudes of Canadian governments past. Trudeau assailed English-Canadians over past episodes that had seen the subversion French-Canadian rights and aspirations, such as the language controversies in Manitoba and Ontario, and the conscription crises of the two World Wars. The best way to protect French-Canada and nurture a French-Canadian identity within Canada lay in more enlightened policies. Trudeau had a vision - a Canada peopled by bilinguals from coast to coast, and governed federally, with power squarely divided between the two levels of government - that he expounded in his political writings and sought to put into practice as Prime Minister. It was a preferred solution linked, like Henri Bourassa's, to a pragmatist definition of the French-Canadian nation. As Trudeau wrote, federalism - and presumably his own penchant for the doctrine - was "born of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face facts as they are, particularly the fact of the heterogeneity of the world's population."

To these prescriptions for French-Canadian national survival and Canadian harmony, Trudeau added another: no special status was to be granted Quebec, which was to be treated as a province like any other. It is this injunction that has blackened his name in many circles - and not just among


11 Ibid., p. 162.

12 For example, Trudeau, though an inveterate foe of Duplessis, did support the Premier in his refusal to accept grants from the federal government for Quebec's universities in the 1950s, because education was a provincial responsibility.


sovereigntists - in Quebec. But Trudeau's approach, at least at the outset, was not dismissed by all Quebeckers; indeed, under his leadership, the federal Liberal Party generally enjoyed strong support in Quebec. It was not until the constitutional conflict at the start of the 1980s that the Conservative Party managed to break the Liberal stranglehold over the Quebec electorate. This event precipitated a marked decline in Liberal fortunes\textsuperscript{15} because it focused public attention on a principle, antithetical to the idealist vision, that Trudeau had always espoused, and which underwrote his opposition to a special status for Quebec. Canada's newly patriated Constitution included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that was couched principally in the language of individual rights. Under this new constitutional dispensation, the invocation of collective rights by Quebec governments as a justification for policies aimed at furthering the interests of the French-Canadian, or Québécois, nation, was rendered illegitimate. Rightly so, to Trudeau's mind: for him, the French-Canadian community was nothing more than a collection of individuals sharing certain demonstrable sociological traits and attendant individual rights that, in the aggregate, represented the rights of the French-Canadian nation; and the Quebec government, like any other provincial government presiding over groups enjoying such rights, could find protection in the framework of the 1982 Constitution - no special powers required. But for more ardent nationalists, the nation is more than a mere collection of individuals; it is a collective individual that sometimes has rights over and above the rights of its individual members. Quebec, as the guarantor of this nation, had a right to special powers that might sometimes override the individualistic Charter of Rights. Trudeau's definition of the French-Canadian nation has never shared this abstract notion of the collective individual and instead goes to the other extreme, where the French-Canadian nation is but a collection of sociologically-wedded individuals, nothing more.

\textsuperscript{15} In the 1980 election, the Liberals won 67\% of the popular vote in Quebec; in the 1984 election, they won only 35\%. It should be noted that the replacement of Trudeau as Liberal leader by the anglophone John Turner also likely hurt the Liberals in Quebec.
nothing less. He is a French-Canadian nationalist of sorts, but he is a pragmatist in the extreme, focusing exclusively on the tangible sociology of the matter.

If Trudeau is at one extreme on the pragmatist-idealist spectrum, many others fall somewhere in-between. While the concerns informing their nationalism are not dissimilar to Trudeau's, they have, for one reason or another, come out in favour of greater power for Quebec (though still remaining well this side of the independence nothing less faction). For example, political scientist Léon Dion, whose writings span the several decades since Quebec has emerged from its religious cocoon, broadly shared the same concerns as Trudeau where French-Canada was concerned. The protection of culture, and especially language was paramount; and political power was a means to this concrete nationalist end, not an end in itself: "pour moi, le statut politique et constitutionnel du Québec n'est qu'un moyen, mais un moyen indispensable, en vue de la réalisation de la seule fin acceptable dont il ne saurait déroger, c'est-à-dire la protection et l'essor du français et de toute autre composante considérée sous le même angle."\(^{16}\) But if Trudeau developed a political blueprint early on, which he applied assiduously thereafter, Dion's designs for the French-Canadian nation evolved as events unfolded. In the early 1960s, Dion was a federalist, serving on the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the investigation launched by the federal government to canvas possible ways of providing some meaningful accommodation of French-Canadian aspirations within Canada. But he increasingly came to feel that some special powers were needed if the Quebec government was to effectively protect French-Canadian culture. Consequently, he voted yes in the 1980 Quebec referendum in the hopes that a sovereigntist victory might trigger some significant reform of the Canadian federation.\(^{17}\) When something of the sort was at last on the table - the 1987 Meech Lake Accord, with its centrepiece


\(^{17}\) Dion, Québec, 1945-2000, tome 1: à la recherche du Québec, pp. 10-12.
clause recognizing Quebec as a "distinct society" - Dion was strongly supportive, seeing the pact as a step in the right direction. At the same time, he indicated his willingness to countenance the independence option if Meech failed to be ratified by all the provinces.¹⁸

The evolution in Dion's political thinking is by no means atypical. Many Quebeckers who have shared his pragmatist goal - the protection of things distinctively French-Canadian - have also come to see the devolution of power to Quebec as an essential step towards satisfying this basic nationalist impulse. In this, they have broken with Trudeau, whose efforts to protect French-Canadian culture, via different means, they have found wanting - and with good reason. Trudeau's vision - of a Canada where constitutional guarantees of individual rights and a policy of official bilingualism could make a flourishing French-Canadian diaspora secure in its language and culture - has failed to materialize. Though people may communicate with the federal government in either English or French, though English students have been enrolled in immersion programs for more than two decades, there is little genuine grassroots bilingualism to be found in Canada. Montreal is the only large Canadian city where the two languages comingle freely on the streets; even the national capital, Ottawa, which sits on the Quebec-Ontario border, is predominantly Anglophone outside the corridors of government. Moreover, disparaging attitudes towards bilingualism are rife in English Canada, where people living thousands of kilometers from Quebec simply do not accept the promotion of pan-Canadian bilingualism as an urgent necessity.

The manifest shortcomings in Trudeau's design have led many Quebeckers, pragmatist in their nationalism, to become increasingly favourable to the Quebec-oriented approach advocated by observers like Dion. Although the case can be made that moderate elements within the sovereigntist Parti Québécois tend in this direction, the most important political vehicle for this type of nationalist thinking has been the Quebec Liberal Party. Since its renaissance at the start of the 1960s, the party

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 127.
that introduced various reforms which thoroughly modernized and secularized Quebec society has also sought to protect French-Canadian culture - in particular the French language - by using the existing powers of the provincial government and negotiating for more still. Various Liberal Party slogans have conveyed the sentiment that Quebec requires a special niche to ensure the continued survival of its distinctive culture: special status in the 1960s, cultural sovereignty in a profitable federalism in the 1970s, and distinct society in the 1980s. These formulations have been the basis for the Liberal Party's position in various constitutional negotiations with the Canadian government and the other provinces, but no agreement, whether at Victoria in 1971, Meech Lake in 1987, or Charlottetown in 1992, has ever been successfully ratified and implemented.

For this reason, the Liberal Party's pragmatist nationalism has been effected principally through policies implemented by the party when in power in Quebec City (as it was from 1960 to 1966, 1970 to 1976, and 1985 to 1994). One key piece of legislation was Bill 22, the language law introduced by the Liberals in 1974. Though sometimes seen as a mere wisp of what would follow three years later in the PQ's Charter of the French Language (or Bill 101), Bill 22 in fact contained important provisions that broke sharply with past practice in the area of language rights. It declared French to be the sole official language of Quebec; it dispensed with free choice in education, restricting enrollment in English-language schools to children deemed to have a sufficient knowledge of the language (thus barring some children of immigrants); and it contained measures aimed at increasing the use of French in firms that had dealings with the provincial government. Certainly if its reception outside francophone circles is any measure, it was a bold initiative; Quebec's minority groups, traditionally strong Liberal supporters, were profoundly alienated by Bill 22 and their defection to other parties (principally the Union Nationale) probably cost the Liberals the 1976 provincial election. But equally


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significant was the Liberal Party's action - or rather inaction - on the language front when it returned to power in 1985. Despite pledges to repeal key provisions of Bill 101, the Liberals only tinkered with the PQ legislation. Left in place was the stipulation that the children of immigrants were barred from attending English schools; and rather than dispensing altogether with the PQ ban on the use of English on commercial signs, it was only conceded that English could appear on signs inside establishments - this despite a ruling of Canada's Supreme Court that restrictions of this sort were unconstitutional. Over time, then, the Liberal Party has increasingly come to advocate stringent measures to strengthen the position of the French language in Quebec.

The slowly stiffening resolve of the Liberal Party on the language issue is mirrored in the evolving attitudes of the general public. If the general thrust common to Bills 22 and 101 - that many, if not most, new immigrants to Quebec should assimilate into the francophone majority and long-time Anglophone residents become at least passingly proficient in French - was bitterly divisive in the mid-1970s, it is no longer so today, at least among francophones. Survey data reveal the change in attitudes. In 1974, 41% of francophones in Quebec thought that the educational provisions of Bill 22 should be "made less restrictive" or "abolished altogether." But by 1996, only 17% thought that the Charter of the French language - a more restrictive piece of legislation - was "too severe." Over the last twenty years, then, a broad consensus has developed among Quebec francophones that efforts to protect the French language can and should include forceful action by the Quebec government.

The inclination among today's Quebec pragmatist nationalists to favour decisive action at the provincial level over the pan-Canadian initiatives championed by Pierre Trudeau reveals something about the evolving sense of community underwriting their nationalist sentiments. The heightened emphasis on the province of Quebec as the locus of nationalist action implies an increasing detachment

20 Ibid., p. 757.

from French-Canadians outside Quebec. This is something the pragmatists share with their idealist counterparts, who have been unreservedly promoting a strictly Québécois national identity since the early 1960s. Yet there is a subtle difference between the two types of nationalists. For pragmatists, the change seems to reflect a resigned acceptance of certain inescapable realities: on the one hand, an acknowledgement that effective bilingualism is probably a quixotic goal for a vast country where the two main language groups are not, for the most part, intermingled; and, on the other hand, a recognition of the dwindling French fact outside Quebec, as a trend that started long ago - the assimilation of French-Canadians in other provinces - continues apace (in 1991, of the 946,760 Canadians living outside Quebec whose mother tongue was French, only 582,985 used French as their home language). A diminishing sense of communion with French-Canadians elsewhere is not something pragmatists in Quebec have actively promoted. Quite the opposite: Premier Lesage, shortly after his 1960 election victory, observed that French Canada "doesn't stop at the borders of the Province of Quebec" and that the Quebec government had a duty to "safeguard [the] identity" of francophones elsewhere. Robert Bourassa, Liberal leader at various points from the late 1960s through the early 1990s, evinced a similar reluctance to sever the tie when he described himself "not as

22 Calculated from Statistics Canada, Language Retention and Transfer, 1991 (Ottawa: Industry, Science and Technology Canada, 1993), Table 1. 1991 Census of Canada. Catalogue number 94-319. In addition, the size of the French-Canadian population outside Quebec has been decreasing relative to the Quebec francophone population. In 1921, the ratio was about 1 to 3.5; by 1991, it was about 1 to 6 (see ibid., and Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, Volume II Population [Ottawa: Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1924], Table 80). Note that these are figures based on mother tongue, not language of home use, since the latter statistic was not available prior to 1971. In 1921, it is likely that most whose mother tongue was French used that language in the home; thus, the drop in home users of the language from 1921 to 1991 would be considerably steeper.

Why this sharp decline? In the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, the number of French-Canadians outside Quebec remained high because they were concentrated in tight-knit, highly endogamous communities, and fertility rates were high. Both factors changed after World War II, however, and since that time, their numbers have been declining fast outside Quebec (except in parts of Ontario and New Brunswick). See Roderic P. Beajot, "The decline of official language minorities in Quebec and English Canada," Canadian Journal of Sociology, 7, 4 (1982), pp. 367-389.

23 Jean Lesage quoted in Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec, p. 106.
a Canadian, or a Quebecker, but a francophone."24 But despite the best intentions of Liberal politicians
and like-minded allies in Quebec, circumstances have conspired to undermine the French-Canadian
identity that once dominated the thinking of pragmatist nationalists. The Liberal Party today focuses its
attention almost exclusively on cultural and language issues within Quebec, and Québécois has
become the moniker widely, though not uniformly, used by pragmatists to describe their national
community. It is significant, however, that the impetus for the pragmatists' shifting nationalist horizons
lies largely in real world changes. In this sense nothing has altered. If early pragmatist Henri Bourassa
was animated by a strong sense of French-Canadianness because there were, in his day, a sizable
number of French-Canadians scattered about the country whose future prospects as a culturally distinct
community seemed, if not assured, at least encouraging, his latter-day counterparts have a much
attenuated French-Canadian consciousness that faithfully reflects the gradual cultural demise - and
woeful outlook for the future - of the French-Canadian community outside Quebec. As one
commentator notes, "the French Canadian elite in the early part of the twentieth century was mainly
concerned with the promotion of bilingualism and sought to debate the issue in the federal arena. It
was failure...that led them to turn their attention to Quebec."25

If the pragmatists have accepted a slow atrophying of their French-Canadian identity, the
idealists have severed it more deliberately and decisively. Québécois was a neologism introduced by
supporters of independence in the early 1960s to emphasize the wholesale change of national identity
they strongly favoured.26 The absence of the French-Canadian comity of yesteryear is apparent when


25 Eric Waddell, "The Vicissitudes of French in Quebec and Canada" in Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams
(eds.), The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986),
p. 78.

26 Guy Bouthillier, "Le mouvement indépendantiste: de la mystique à la politique" in Gérard Boismenu,
Laurent Mailhot and Jacques Rouillard (eds.), Le Québec en Textes: Anthologie 1940-1986 (Montreal: Boréal,
inveterate indépendantiste Pierre Bourgault differentiates "the québécois and...the French-speaking minorities in Canada"\(^{27}\) for idealists like Bourgault, former consorts outside Quebec are not even French-Canadian anymore, but merely French-speaking Canadians. The decisiveness of the break reflects the general nature of idealist nationalist doctrine. Whereas pragmatists experienced a gradual change in outlook because their nationalism is closely tied to sociological realities, the idealists severed the link overnight because their nationalist doctrine was more abstract, issuing from an idealized conception of a seamless Québécois nation that was less constrained by empirical actualities.

This overview of the devotees of pragmatist nationalism in Quebec society since the time of the Conquest suggests that all share certain basic nationalist precepts with one another, and indeed with their counterparts in Brittany and Scotland. The primary aim of pragmatist nationalists is to protect the tangible distinctiveness of their national community. The specific traits of import - religion, language - can vary over time and place, but the focus on concrete sociology is the essential common denominator. One important consequence is that pragmatists consider power for the nation a means to substantive ends (unlike idealists for whom it is typically an end in itself). Furthermore, because the pragmatist sense of community is tied to tangible characteristics, the possibility exists for individuals to enter and exit the national community by acquiring or shedding the relevant traits. In practice, such movement may not occur very often - it certainly didn't prior to 1960 - but the theoretical possibility alone says something important about the pragmatist mindset: theirs is a nationalism concerned primarily with tangible sociological traits of individuals, rather than a more abstracted sense of national community. The same disposition is apparent when the pragmatist's national horizons shift in response to an evolving sociological landscape. As French-Canadian national qualities have gradually come to be concentrated in Quebec, pragmatist nationalists have increasingly focussed their attention

on the provincial theatre. Thus, while there undeniably has been a shift from a religious French-Canadian nationalism to a Quebec-centred and language-based nationalism, this represents, at a higher level, an enduring pragmatist nationalism.

B) Idealist Nationalism in Quebec

There have also been continuities in the idealist nationalism that has been espoused by various groups in Quebec over the past two centuries. While superficially the discourse produced by the proponents of independence has changed tremendously from one epoch to the next, there are also important commonalities that mark them as advocates of a common mode of nationalist thought.

Idealist nationalism has differed from its pragmatist cousin, however, in that it has not uniformly been a significant force in Quebec society. The first group to take up the cause of French-Canadian independence was the Parti Patriote in the 1830s. With numerous grievances against their English overseers, including both a lack of popular representation and insufficient French-Canadian influence in the colonial government, the party, dominated by members of the liberal professions, initially pressed for reform but when their complaints went unheeded, they took up arms in a short-lived rebellion in 1837-1838. After their defeat, this radical sentiment was pushed to the margins. For many years thereafter, cooperation was the guiding principle of French-Canadian leaders and there was little talk of separation. Instead Quebeckers were preoccupied with taking measures to preserve French-Canada's distinct characteristics, the Catholic religion in particular, a task that seemed attainable within the existing power structure.

But idealist groups did re-emerge in the twentieth century, and it is here that we will focus our attention, tracing the common thread of nationalist thinking across two periods that appear, on the face of it, quite dissimilar. The apparent dissimilarity lies in the fact that like their pragmatist
contemporaries, the earlier group emphasized the Catholic religion, the later the French language. But as we will see, there have been important commonalities across the two periods.

In the interwar period, revived enthusiasm for a more radical Quebec-centred nationalism was evident in the programmes of various groups. An important, if intermittent, proponent of a fully independent Quebec was the periodical *Action Francaise*, published from 1917 to 1929, with a circulation of about 5,000.28 A key contributor to this publication, and organizer of nationalist organizations like the Groupes d'Action Française and the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française, was Abbé Lionel Groulx, holder of the chair of history at the Université de Montréal. His writings influenced many in the province throughout the interwar period and he is rightly seen as the spiritual figurehead of the radical stream of Quebec nationalism in these years. Groulx's contribution, however, was largely intellectual. In the 1930s, small political organizations and parties, often xenophobic in their nationalism, took a more active approach. These included Jeune-Canada, a group popular with young students in Montreal, which focussed primarily on job concerns and other concrete grievances when established in 1932, but became increasingly sympathetic to the separatist cause as the 1930s progressed.29 Journals promoting an independent Quebec at this time included *La Nation* and *L'Unité Nationale*.30 Though these various nationalist forces never coalesced into a separatist party of any electoral importance, there was an unmistakable upswing in idealist nationalism in the interwar period, especially in the 1930s.

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Similar stirrings were apparent at the tail end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s. The first group to revive the call for an independent Quebec was the Alliance Laurentienne, formed in 1957. More influential was the Rassemblement pour L'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), formed in 1960. This group's initial purpose was simply to raise awareness and build support for Quebec independence, but it soon found itself contesting elections, and in 1966 took 5.5% of the provincial vote. With some 8,000 members at the time of its dissolution in 1968, this was the most important vehicle of idealist nationalism through much of the 1960s. Another political party of this period supportive of independence was the Ralliement National, which won slightly under 3% of the vote in 1966. Other groups of note include the numerous leftist organizations that influenced the thinking of many young intellectuals who came to be important activists within the RIN in the latter half of the 1960s. These included the Action Socialiste pour l'Indépendance du Québec, formed in 1960, and Parti Pris, which produced an influential journal of the same name. Allied in its thinking, if not its methods, to these intellectual groups was the Front du Libération du Québec (FLQ), responsible for dozens of bombings and other violent actions that periodically rattled Quebec from 1963 through to 1970.

This renewed agitation was both widespread and vehement, and unlike the interwar period it produced a sovereigntist party, the Parti Québécois (PQ), enjoying wide support in the general population. The party came into being in 1968 upon the merger of the Ralliement Nationale and the Mouvement pour la Souveraineté-Association (MSA), the latter an organization created by Liberal Party defector René Lévesque the year previous. The RIN quickly dissolved itself and most of its members joined the new party. With an important coterie of supporters drawn from the radical, indépendantiste left and other more moderate discontents hailing from the Liberal Party, the PQ has always been something of a broad nationalist church. Some within the party, and many among its followers, have sought first and foremost a renewal of Canadian federalism, based on a spirit of partnership between two nations, while others have been ardent idealists willing to accept nothing less
than a fully independent Quebec state. Thus, while the PQ has been the principal vehicle of idealist nationalism in post-1960s Quebec, its policies and political discourse have not been wholly uncompromising, and have instead reflected the diversity of viewpoints among its backers.

This catholic approach has won the PQ wide support. Only two years after its formation, the party won 23% of the vote and seven seats in the April 1970 provincial election. Its electoral breakthrough came when it won the 1976 election with 41% of the vote and a majority of seats. The 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association organized by the PQ government failed, but the party was nonetheless re-elected in 1981. After a spell in opposition, the PQ returned to office in 1994, and in 1995 held a second referendum on sovereignty (with the proviso, as in 1980, that an attempt would be made to negotiate an economic and political partnership with Canada). This too failed, but only just, as slightly over 49% of Quebeckers voted in favour.

Though the two periods of idealist upswing - the interwar and post-1960s - are sometimes said to be wholly dissimilar, they are not without their common elements. The most immediate commonality, indeed their defining one, is their focus on the province of Quebec and desire for independence, or something close to it. On the whole, the earlier agitators were less consistent on these points. What made their political discourse consistently distinct from the pragmatist nationalism in common currency at the time was their insistence that the French-Canadian nationalist struggle could not be contained to a single sphere alone. While some of their fellow nationals were content to work for language rights in the Ligue des Droits du Français, and others to focus on the religious sphere, those more radical in their nationalism insisted it was necessary to effect change simultaneously on the cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic fronts. "Une action française," wrote Groulx, "qui voudra être efficace devra être faite d'autre chose que ces revendications partielles, si nobles, si urgentes soient-elles. La langue ne saurait survivre comme une force isolée, indépendante....La sage coordination de toutes les activités sera requise pour maintenir l'équilibre et le progrès d'une
communauté humaine." As one scholar observes, "Groulx's nationalism was an integrated whole, an organic blend of all good things French-Canada had been in the past and all promising things it might be in the future." From this holistic conception flowed Groulx's belief that considerable political power for Quebec was needed, rather than simply stricter observance of French-Canadian religious and language rights within an unchanged Canadian federation. This manner of conceptualizing the national question clearly pointed in the direction of Quebec independence, about which Groulx, though notoriously evasive, did on occasion speak plainly: "to be ourselves, absolutely ourselves, to constitute, as soon as Providence intends, an independent French state - such must be, from now on, the hope that guides our efforts, the flame that never dies." This desire, though not always front and centre, informed much of the idealist writing and political ferment of the interwar period.

The nationalist organizations active since 1960 have, on the whole, been more forthright in expressing their constitutional preferences. For many of these groups, especially the initial ones, independence pure and simple for the Québécois nation was the goal, a viewpoint shared by the Alliance Laurentienne, the RIN, the RN, the FLQ, and others. A twist was added to this unambiguous formulation when René Lévesque developed the concept of sovereignty-association, which became the constitutional policy of the PQ. Detailed in Lévesque's 1967 manifesto, An Option for Quebec, sovereignty-association prescribed that a sovereign Quebec maintain an economic association with the rest of Canada, including a monetary union, common market and the coordination of fiscal policies.


The result would be the creation of a "New Canadian Union." Those who called this separatism were, Lévesque intoned, "falsifying the meaning of [this new] alternative." In this way, the separatist clarion call of the RIN was toned down to a more moderate and palatable demand for greater sovereignty for Quebec. The PQ, then, has moderated the indépendantiste program of the 1960s. It has generally been more closely aligned with the idealist viewpoint than with the pragmatist approach advocated by organizations like the Quebec Liberal Party, but, as discussed further below, it does embrace elements of both types of nationalism.

The political agenda common to the idealists of the interwar and post-1960 period - sovereignty for a territorially-delimited nation - is linked to broader features of their nationalist discourse. Although superficially dissimilar - like their pragmatist contemporaries, the early idealists emphasized the Catholic religion, and the later ones, the French language - there have also been consistent idealist motifs running through the two periods. In contradistinction to the pragmatists, the idealists have projected a certain seamlessness onto the populace, defining their nation in ways that embellish markedly upon the sociological facts of the matter.

The idealists have, however, done this in two distinct ways. The interwar group were akin to some of their contemporaries in Brittany and Scotland, seeking to create a sociological nation as seamless as the abstract nation within. Groulx, the leading nationalist thinker of the period, was typical in this respect. In his writings, he promoted a highly idealized vision of the French-Canadian past. To his mind, there were particular behaviors and traits native to French-Canadians - piety, fecundity, sobriety - that had found their fullest expression in New France prior to the Conquest, and it was to this


35 Ibid., p. 36.
golden age that contemporary French-Canadians should look for inspiration.\textsuperscript{36} But Groulx did more than simply celebrate French-Canada's past; he enjoined his contemporary French-Canadians to use the past as a template for the present and future. "[Les ancêtres] nous ont transmis, avec un sang pur, les vertus morales qui devaient continuer la transmission de la vie....notre impérissable gloire, et demain si nous le voulons, notre force victorieuse, ce sera de savoir...qu'aucun foyer de notre race n'existe où ne survie la présence morale de quelques aîeux aux genoux desquels il soit noble de tomber, comme devants des saints."\textsuperscript{37} In Groulx's nationalism, French-Canada's history was not simply a heritage to honor and respect, it was a model to emulate.

This sounds, of course, not dissimilar to the doctrine of \textit{la survivance} promoted by the Church and moderate political leaders in Quebec, which, it was argued above, represented a pragmatist desire to protect the tangible bulwarks of French-Canadian sociological distinctiveness. It must be admitted that there was a certain affinity between the two doctrines. Yet at the same time, there was a difference of emphasis that should not be overlooked. Groulx, in his nationalist prescriptions, was more oblivious to empirical realities: whereas the pragmatist nationalists in the Church and elsewhere largely sought to protect society in its extant condition, Groulx reached back into the past to extract certain essential qualities of French-Canadianness, which he then imposed on the present and future. If Michael Oliver is right to identify a certain pragmatism in the nationalist thought of Groulx's contemporary Henri Bourassa - "Theory and principle he never neglected, but he continually sought to relate them to actuality"\textsuperscript{38} - he is equally on target in opining that Groulx was more oblivious to "actuality." For

\textsuperscript{36} See, for example, Lionel Groulx, "La Famille Canadienne-Française, Ses Traditions, Son Rôle" in Lionel Groulx, \textit{Notre Maitre, le passé, tome I} (Ottawa: Editions internationale Alain Stanké, 1977), pp. 115-151.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 149 and 151.

\textsuperscript{38} Oliver, \textit{The Passionate Debate}, p. 61.
Groulx, French-Canadian history was "an idealized past, and its projection onto the future made a blinding screen from present reality."\(^{39}\)

Consonant with Groulx's unblemished image of the French-Canadian nation was his insistence that there could be no blurred borders between nationalist insiders and non-nationalist outsiders. To Groulx's mind, there was no room "for imprecision, for mixture, for hazily defined boundaries"\(^{40}\); as he wrote in 1935, "there is no longer a place for the 30 or 50 percent French Canadian; only one French Canadian has a chance to survive: the 100 percent French Canadian."\(^{41}\) If there was probably some element of rhetorical ornamentation in such statements, there was also likely some heartfelt sentiment.

For Groulx's outlook is typical of the idealist nationalist ethos which, we have argued, seeks clarity and fixity by skating over sociological ambiguity and complexity. One manifestation of this belief system is the presumption that members are wholly equal members ("100 percent French Canadian") and therefore sharply distinct from outsiders.

In short, then, Groulx and his interwar acolytes differed from the pragmatists in that they idealized the differences separating French-Canadians from others. But the distinction between pragmatist and idealist is finer in this case simply because French-Canada was, in the past, a society more sociologically homogeneous than most. Thus, the discourse of pragmatists hoping to protect the tangible elements of nationhood, and the discourse of idealists projecting an imagined seamlessness onto their nation, were not at odds to the usual degree; and devotees of the two nationalist tendencies consequently found common cause in any number of social and political projects in the interwar period. The distinctiveness of the idealist program is more transparent when a nation is patently heterogeneous: witness the Celticists, active in the Scottish National League in the 1920s, whose

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 71

\(^{40}\) Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*, p. 48.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 48.
utopian dream was to Celticize the whole of modern day Scotland. In the Quebec case there is only a
difference of emphasis between the pragmatist doctrine of *la survivance*, and Groulx's idealist
nationalism. The former sought to protect a society that was homogeneous and pristine, the latter to
create something more homogeneous and pristine still.

But the manner in which Groulx and other interwar idealists projected seamlessness onto their
nation represents only one of two approaches idealists sometimes embrace. Rather than attempting to
fashion a homogeneous nation out of a diverse population, idealists sometimes treat their nation as an
empty vessel, possessed of an essential continuity despite a variegated and ever-changing freight. In
this variant of idealist nationalism — common among today's idealists - it is more plainly evident that
this group is not principally inspired by qualities the nation incarnates, but rather by an idealized
conception of the national community.

The empty vessel conception of the Québécois nation informs the proposition, consistently
affirmed by most of today's sovereigntists, that all who live in Quebec are Québécois, regardless of
their cultural background or ethnic heritage. The PQ, for example, has consistently taken this position
since its inception. It follows that the sociological substance of the nation for these nationalists should
simply be the sum total of the cultural, economic, linguistic, and religious material produced by those
currently residing in Quebec. This, indeed, is the position typically taken by the PQ, at least in
statements of broad intent. "[Both the minorities and the Francophone majority] are full-fledged
Québec citizens, and all have a right to expect the government to provide the collective facilities and
cultural instruments necessary to their complete development."42

This, however, is a first approximation only of the nationalist doctrine espoused by today's
idealists. Despite affirmations of the essential equality of all Quebeckers and the championing of

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42 Ministère d'État du Développement Culturel, *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* (Quebec City:
sociological diversity, idealists do not support unfettered laissez-faire in the cultural realm. Instead, there is one element of Québécois culture close to their hearts, the French language. In their consistent support for measures designed to maintain its preponderant position in Quebec society, today's idealists share something with contemporary pragmatists. There are, however, subtle differences in the motivations that inform the French language ministrations of the two nationalist types. Pragmatists are principally driven by a concern for the French language in and of itself, whereas idealists sometimes see language as a powerful instrument that can be put to the service of other nationalist goals.

As with many aspects of Quebec nationalism, the Parti Québécois embraces elements of both the pragmatist and idealist approach. Its language policies have partly been inspired by a basic and uncomplicated desire to protect the language close to the hearts of many francophone Quebeckers. If the party has at times been more strident on language matters than the Liberals, this in part simply represents the PQ's view that the Liberals are lax, and more stringent measures are needed if French is to survive and prosper in the twenty-first century. This assessment, for example, probably explains one of the key points of divergence in the PQ and Liberal language legislation bills of the 1970s, the treatment of immigrants. With the precipitous decline in Quebec's birth rate after 1960, it became increasingly clear that Quebec's immigrants - who historically had tended to attend English schools - needed to be integrated into francophone society if the French language was to survive.\footnote{Fernand Harvey, "Les groupes ethniques: enjeu de la lutte linguistique au Québec," \textit{Journal of Canadian Studies}, 23, 4 (Winter 1988-89), pp. 37-43.} Bill 22, the Liberal legislation introduced in 1974, channeled some immigrant children into French schools by implementing language competency tests. The PQ's Bill 101 was much stricter, stipulating that all whose parents were not educated in English in Quebec had to attend French schools.\footnote{In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in Canada's new constitution, extended to all Canadians schooled in English the right to send their children to English schools.} The effect of the latter measure on allophone school enrollment patterns has been dramatic. From about 15% in the late
1960s, the percentage of allophones enrolled in French schools rose to 39% in 1980 and 75% in 1990. In effecting this dramatic change, the PQ has only done what many would now concede was clearly necessary. Current demographic realities in Quebec - a low birth rate among native Quebeckers and high levels of immigration - have made the francophonization of newcomers imperative. This has since been recognized by the Liberal party, which left the education provisions of Bill 101 intact upon its return to power in 1985. In part, then, the PQ's approach to language issues has, like the Liberals', been informed by a pragmatist concern with the French language as an end in itself.

Yet this, it must be said, is not the full extent of it. The PQ may value the French language for its own sake, but the Gallic tongue also serves another indispensable function: its continued survival offers testimony to the transcendent vitality of the Québécois nation. A Cultural Development Policy For Québec, the PQ's comprehensive statement from 1978, makes this clear when it suggests that the French language in part represents a national vestment valued for its adorning effect on the nation rather than in and of itself:

The first thing that strikes the observer in Québec is the existence of a linguistic area within which a culture has found expression. The second is the three hundred-year old history of this phenomenon and the third is the awareness of identity which reflects the actual situation. In other words, the relative vitality of the French language which gives Québec its distinctive character is immediately recognized as the sign of a culture which in turn is the product of a permanent and organized social group...

There is therefore an organized social group, which has long had a coherent structure and is determined to retain it.

Preserving the language for its own sake is, then, not the only PQ concern. The party also tends to the French language because it is a tangible manifestation of the organized social group, of three hundred years vintage, that is the Québécois nation.

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45 Harvey, "Les groupes ethniques," p. 42.


This idealist strand in the motivational base that has inspired PQ language initiatives has sometimes pulled the party in a different direction than the Liberal Party. Rather than simply seeking to ensure the survival of French as a functioning language of everyday use, the PQ has, at times, tried to establish its near monolithic dominance in Quebec society, in order to demonstrate its vitality. This impulse is apparent in the sign law aspect of the PQ's language legislation; as part of Bill 101, it was stipulated that signs in commercial establishments had to be in French only, in order to create a more francophone visage for Quebec. The Liberals promised to change this provision in 1985, but decided, in the end, to permit English on interior signs only. Still, it was a softening of the wholly uncompromising PQ law. Since returning to power in 1994, the PQ has left the Liberal modification in place, though the party leadership has faced intense pressure from radical party activists to revert to the original policy of French only, both inside and outside commercial establishments. The same language militants have also called for stricter enforcement of the current law, complaining that in predominantly anglophone neighbourhoods the sign laws are flouted with impunity.

The radical position on the sign law issue - no English, period - is at odds with public opinion. If there was early enthusiasm for this aspect of Bill 101, by 1984, only 20% of francophone Quebeckers supported French only signs.48 Even at the high point of nationalist discontent in 1990, after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord - which was fueled in part by a hostile reaction in English Canada to Bourassa's "English inside" compromise on the sign law - only 40% of francophone Quebeckers were opposed to a further relaxation to allow English on outdoor signs as well.49 Yet at the


49 Author's calculation based on CBC/Globe and Mail Survey, July 1990.
same time, 95% did feel that the French language needed special protection in Quebec to ensure its survival.\textsuperscript{50}

The low level of support for stringent sign laws likely reflects their relative inefficacy as a means of language protection. Unilingual signs, unlike educational restrictions, are unlikely to produce higher levels of French competency among Quebec's minority groups. Learning a few words to identify the supermarket and drugstore is not going to make anyone proficient in French. Idealists, in the main, do not disagree on this point. The sign laws are important to them not for their substantive impact but for their symbolic effect. The small percentage in the population and the radical faction within the PQ who support a strict French-only sign law seek to wipe out all visible signs of English and thereby create a purely francophone Quebec, at least in some superficial sense. Their purpose in doing so is to win the Québécois nation the dignity and respect they feel has been so long denied it. Such thinking is evident in the reasoning of Raoul Roy, founder of the \textit{Action Socialiste pour l'Indépendance du Québec} and, like other veterans of the nationalist struggle from the early 1960s, a consistently inveterate \textit{independantiste}. In a 1985 book that is highly critical of the direction in which René Lévesque and the PQ had taken the nationalist movement, Roy denounces the continuing colonial status of the Quebec nation. It is this assessment that informs his analysis of the language question. "Nous avons besoin d'un visage plus français que celui de la France," he writes, decrying among other things the continued use of "Stop" rather than "Arrêt" on Quebec stop signs.\textsuperscript{51} "Le STOP chez nous est le symbole du forcage artificiel de l'anglais dans notre environnement qu'on nous oblige à tolérer depuis 270 ans."\textsuperscript{52} For Roy, English signs are a symbolic issue concerning the dignity of the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., pp. 178-179.
Québécois nation; he makes no pretense that a wholly French visage is necessary for the French language to survive in Quebec.

It is a matter of judgment, of course, where the line is crossed that separates perfectly reasonable measure to protect the French language from idealist endeavor to create a monolithic francophone Quebec for the sake of demonstrating the vitality of the Québecois nation and affirming its dignity. Some critics would say that the education laws, which severely restrict freedom of choice, cross the line, but this seems an unfair judgment given the current demographic realities in Quebec. But regardless of where the division lies, there do seem to be certain abiding differences in the motivations that have inspired pragmatists and idealists to come to the aid of the French language. For pragmatists, the principal objective is simply to protect the language itself. For unvarnished idealists, who are less interested in qualities the nation incarnates than the nation per se, language is a tool that serves other ends.

The position taken by today's idealists on the language issue means that their discourse does diverge somewhat from the pure empty vessel model. But the point should not be put too strongly. There remains a strong empty vessel strand in the idealist nationalism of contemporary Quebec, particularly when held up against idealist doctrine of yesteryear. The idealist nation of today has much less substantive content than that envisaged by Groulx and his contemporaries. Catholicism, for one, is no longer an essential ingredient. And while language is important part of Québécoisness for today's idealists, this is less significant, since a language, unlike a religious creed, embodies no behavioral prescriptions or proscriptions. Consequently, a common language is consistent with considerable social and cultural diversity, as the PQ is quick to point out: "it must not be concluded that the coexistence of parallel impermeable societies is an ideal. On the contrary, the common weal and the interest of the minorities themselves dictate that these groups should be integrated with a Québec entity which is essentially Francophone. However, once this basic requirement is set forth and respected, the presence
of strong, active minority groups can only be an asset for everyone. These minorities can and should, the party asserts, retain their own diverse values, which, when transmitted through a common language, will help shape the Quebec society of tomorrow. For most idealists, then, non-francophones need only adopt French as a *lingua franca* and do not have to embrace French values and mores. In this sense, there has been a decided loosening of the definition of Québécoisness; most of today's idealists envisage a diverse sociological countenance for their nation.

The sociological diversity welcomed by today's idealists is, of course, at odds with the abstract image of a seamless and sharply distinct Québécois nation that, we have argued, typically underwrites the desire for national sovereignty. Under the current idealist definition of Québécoisness, it is impossible to enumerate particular concrete traits that define members of the nation by unambiguously differentiating them from outsiders. As Léon Dion notes, "même si, outre la langue, il est possible...d'énumérer nombre de traits qui constitueraient l'identité nationale québécoise, il reste vrai, d'une part, que les Québécois possèdent ces traits à des degrés bien divers et il est possible que nombre d'entre eux en sont complètement dépourvus et, d'autre part, que ce n'est pas par l'énumération d'une liste de pareils traits, même si elle se voulait exhaustive, qu'on rapprocherait d'une réponse acceptable: chacune des ces assises de l'identité québécoise se trouverait être également l'apanage d'autres nations."

This problem could simply be faced square on by recognizing and embracing the irremediable pluralism of Quebec society, as pragmatists tend to do. But idealists are not so inclined. They tend instead to embrace other imagery and ideas that gloss over the empirical facts of the matter and present

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54 Louis Balthazar, "The Dynamics of Multi-Ethnicity in French-Speaking Quebec: Towards a New Citizenship," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 1, 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 82-95, esp. 92.

a more unified image of the nation. In these legitimations, the idealism of their nationalist doctrine is readily apparent.

Idealists, for example, sometimes appeal to an intangible essence that resides deep within members of the nation and renders them a community apart. *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* identified as one of the distinctive aspects of Quebec society "a certain mentality, a special spirit...[which] can be felt in the same way you can detect a feeling in the air: it is not tangible but can be sensed."56 Another idealist tendency is to dismiss the collection of individuals conception of the nation in favour of more holistic imagery. As Camille Laurin, one-time PQ cabinet minister, put it,

"it is very important to make a basic distinction between a nation and an ethnic group. An ethnic group is determined by a set of characteristics and traditions whose existence and persistence [sic] can be observed among families and individuals. A nation is an all-encompassing society, a complete social entity, with its own characteristics as such, its own form of organization and operation, its own historic continuity, a legal and political tradition, and a clearly defined territory. A nation, then, is not a given number of individuals having common cultural characteristics, but a community nurtured by history and therefore as a distinct and recognizable social unit, possessing a culture of its own."57

Idealists, then, tend to conceive the nation in abstract fashion, as a holistic entity peopled by members sharing some common intangible essence, rendering the sociological substance of the nation of secondary import. Consequently, their demands for sovereignty are not grounded in specific social or cultural projects, but are instead linked to a more nebulous and open-ended objective. Laurin, for example, wrote of "l'objectif depuis toujours visé et qui est l'épanouissement de l'être collectif"58; what

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that épanouissement was to consist in was left undefined. Similar reasoning is offered by other committed indépendantistes. Political scientist Denis Monière, for example, takes issue with those who wish to establish some blueprint for an independent Quebec - a so-called projet de société - before taking the sovereignty plunge: "on fait comme si l'indépendance ne valait pas par elle-même et devait être subordonnée à un projet de société."59 "A mes yeux, l'indépendance est en soi un projet de société dans ce sens qu'elle implique la promotion d'une valeur fondamentale qui est l'égaleité. Elle est l'application du principe démocratique aux relations entre les peuples....elle permet à chaque peuple de disposer de lui-même."60 In similar fashion, early separatist leader Marcel Chaput offered this justification for independence: "One hundred and fifty pages is not very much space to prove the advantages of an independent Quebec....And yet one hundred and fifty pages is a lot. In fact, it is a lot too much - unless of course we used them to write the same word over and over - Dignity."61 For these empty vessel idealists of modern Quebec, independence is an end in itself that promises to liberate the Québécois nation, thereby allowing it to develop by its own lights and regain its dignity.

This argument - that the tangible sociological concerns at the heart of pragmatist nationalism are of lesser importance to idealists, who instead embrace an abstract sense of community; that this abstracted nationalism generates a desire for independence grounded in the nebulous imperative of national self-determination - applies not only to the post-1960s idealists but also to their interwar counterparts. For although the latter had a more rigid sociological template for the nation, it remains the case that their preoccupation with the nation's concrete traits was more of a consequence than a cause of their nationalist sentiment. The primary focus of idealist nationalism, even in this case, was

60 Ibid., p. 142.
not qualities incarnate in the nation, but the national community per se. Looking beyond the immediate factors that differentiate the interwar and post-1960 idealists, it is evident that both have seen the nation as a historical community linking today's members to those of both the past and future; the implication for the empirical substance of the nation has been a secondary issue flowing from this primary preoccupation. For the interwar idealists, attachment to a transcendent national community generated a desire to connect to the past by re-creating the nation's golden age and ensuring its continuation into the future. For today's idealists, communion has come from the sense that an essential continuity has been retained even as the nation has remodeled itself over time.

A powerful sense of connection to the past is evident in the writings of the leading idealist nationalists of the two eras. Historical communion is, for example, a dominant strain in Groulx's writings. The title of one of his works, *Notre Maître, le passé*, says much about the orientation of his nationalist thought. In this three volume work, Groulx speaks of "la fidélité aux morts," a theme to which he returns at various points: "C'est le magistère de l'histoire, incessante transfusion de l'âme des pères dans l'âme des fils, qui mantient une race invariable en son fond. Pour des petits peuples comme le nôtre, mal assurés de leur destin, exposés à douter de leur avenir, c'est l'histoire, conscience vigilante et collective d'une société fière d'elle-même...qui détermine les suprêmes fidélités." Groulx's loyalty to French-Canadians of the past was seconded by one of his nationalist cohorts, and open proponent of independence, Antonio Perrault: "Pour connaître les nécessités du présent, prévoir les conditions de l'avenir, il faut se pénétrer des directives de l'histoire." Contemporary French-Canadians were dutybound, these interwar idealists felt, to obey edicts issuing from the past and carry them forward to the future.

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64 Antonio Perrault in *ibid.*, p. 306.
If Groulx's deepest loyalty was to French-Canadians of the past, it suggests that those commentators who have seen him as first and foremost a Catholic - indeed an ultramontanist - may have matters back to front. One scholar, for example, suggests that "The guiding element of [Groulx's] social homogeneity was Catholicism....His personal commitment and indeed his entire nationalist doctrine were anchored to this solidarity, which puts him in the ultramontanist stream running from Tardivel to Msgr Paquet: the national and the religious became identical." But was Groulx simply an ardent Catholic who, in consequence, naturally felt a strong attachment to his fellow French-Canadians? More likely, it was the other way around. Groulx's principal loyalty was to the French-Canadian nation, the pan-historical community glorified in his writings that was successfully weathering the vicissitudes of time to maintain an essential unity across past, present and future. This idealist nationalism led him to idealize the qualities that made French-Canadians distinct, to venerate the Catholic religion and associated social mores; Groulx's nationalism preceded and informed his appraisal of the nation's sociology. A simple and unmediated attachment to Catholicism was unlikely to generate the sort of nationalism Groulx exhibited. Many French-Canadians prior to 1960 felt a deep and visceral attachment to their religion, but were perfectly content to remain part of a Canadian state that allowed them full freedom of religious expression. Indeed, some were probably more devout than Groulx; most observers would suggest, for example, that Henri Bourassa, the cautious proponent of a strong French-Canada within a strong Canada, was the more zealous Catholic of the two. As historian

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Fernand Ouellet once observed, it was fidelity to the past that distinguished Groulx and his idealist allies: "No other nationalist wing has ever attached so much importance to history."67

Ouellet's observation, accurate at the time it first appeared in 1962, stands in need of some revision, for there has since emerged another current of nationalist thought which attaches equal importance to the past: the idealist nationalism that has become a powerful force since the early 1960s. This continued loyalty to the past is less immediately obvious, however, because today's idealists, unlike their interwar counterparts, have welcomed the profound reforms that have transmogrified Quebec's sociological landscape in the past forty years. Not for them the re-creation of a golden age when Catholicism dominated the lives of French-Canadians: the idealists of the 1960s were enthusiastic supporters of the secularization of Quebec society; indeed, the most radical separatists were among the most forceful proponents of the dismantling of Church authority. But to suppose that this offers evidence of idealist disengagement from the past is to miss a crucial point. Contemporary idealists are, for the most part, empty vessel idealists, and empty vessel idealists, though welcoming of sociological change, still have a profound sense of connection and loyalty to the nation's past. The cargo may change, but the vessel remains the same, and it is to that pan-historical vessel that idealist sentiment is anchored.68

The continued attachment to the past is clear in many of the key postwar tracts that have inspired Quebeckers to support independence. In the late 1940s and 1950s, a number of seminal works appeared that offered a new interpretation of Quebec's history. If many previous historical works were either paeans to French-Canadian religiosity ( penned by traditional French-Canadian nationalists) or


68 Others have also pointed out similarities in the use of history by the interwar and the post-1960 nationalists. See André-J. Bélanger, "Construction d'un imaginaire" in Boismenu et al., Le Québec en Textes: Anthologie 1940-1986, pp. 344-346.
indictments of an antediluvian people hostile to modern ways (written by English-Canadians), this new scholarship presented a third viewpoint. French-Canadian traditionalism - and in particular the continued attachment to Catholicism - was not to be celebrated, for it had undeniably stunted the nation's growth and progress, but neither was it cause for denigration, since it was not a freely chosen path of development. Instead, the traditionalist proclivities of French-Canadians were the product of unfavourable circumstances. Stripped of its nascent bourgeoisie, which quickly departed for France after the Conquest in 1760, the French-Canadian nation had inexorably fallen under the influence of those elites who stayed behind, that is, the clergy. Rather than developing into a prosperous, modern society, French-Canadians had stagnated ever since,\textsuperscript{69} their thinking dominated by ideals antithetical to modern development, viz. an attachment to a rural and agricultural lifestyle, an aversion to governmental intervention in the workings of society, and a belief in the spiritual mission of French-Canadians to preserve and spread the Catholic faith.\textsuperscript{70} None of these pathologies, it was contended, had been in evidence prior to the Conquest. This type of historical analysis, promulgated in the first instance by a clutch of historians at the University of Montreal, was highly influential in nationalist circles from the 1950s on.\textsuperscript{71}

Implicit in this reading of the past was an assessment of French-Canadians as victims and an empathy with their plight. Where others were apt to blame French-Canadians for remaining mired in tradition, these scholars were quick to spring to their defence. "Parfois nous sommes tentes d'accuser nos hommes politiques d'avoir manqué de clairvoyance. Rappelons-nous qu'ils n'étaient pas maîtres des événements, même s'ils en avaient l'illusion. Il nous a manqué une classe éclairée et riche qui aurait

\textsuperscript{69} Michel Brunet, "La Conquête Anglaise et la Déchéance de la Bourgeoisie Canadienne (1760-1793)," in Michel Brunet, \textit{La Présence Anglaise et les Canadiens} (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1964), pp. 49-112.

\textsuperscript{70} Michel Brunet, "Trois Dominantes de la Pensée Canadienne-Française: L'Agriculturisme, L'Anti-Étatisme et le Messianisme", in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 113-166.

été économiquement intéressée à défendre les intérêts supérieurs de la nationalité."72 There was, then, in this historical analysis, a strong attachment to the past. If interwar idealists valorized the traditional French-Canadian way of life, these post-war nationalist scholars sympathized with their bygone confrères for being forced to adopt a way of life that had not served them well.

Their sympathy was heightened by the fact that Quebec's distorted past had profound implications for modern-day Quebeckers. The effects of excessive religiosity and traditionalism were still being felt, in the general impoverishment of French-Canadians and their subservient position in the Quebec economy. The lack of French-Canadian managers and owners, the dominance of English in the workplace, the lack of French-Canadians trained in modern, technocratic subjects: all could be traced back to the traditional, religious attitudes that had become central to the French-Canadian way of life following the Conquest.

This assessment of French-Canadian - or rather Québécois - history quickly became dominant on the political left, where the most ardent separatists were to be found in the 1960s. These radical nationalists, anxious though they were to see Quebec shed all shibboleths, were not lacking a sense of connection to the past. Their thought - which drew not only on the work of Quebec historians but borrowed also from anti-colonial tracts like Frantz Fanon's Les Damnés de la Terre - was a blend of leftist and nationalist doctrine: the Québécois, like other national groups about the globe, had been colonized by an alien power, and as an oppressed ethnic class were in need of both a socialist and nationalist revolution to set matters right. This type of thinking could be found in the pages of Parti Pris, which started publishing in 1963 and quickly gained a significant following among Quebec intellectuals and students. Passages like the following were typical: "la société canadienne-française fut toujours une société mineure, infériorisée; une société coloniale où le rôle du colonisateur fut joué

d'abord par l'Angleterre puis par le Canada anglais. C'est une constante qui traverse les différents régimes."\(^{73}\) In adopting this style of analysis, these idealist nationalists repudiated the nation's past while embracing their national predecessors. Their nationalism, then, was grounded less in the needs and aspirations, both cultural and economic, of extant Québécois, and more in an attachment to a historical community unjustly held in abject subservience for two centuries. And it was this idealist nationalism that underwrote their demand for unfettered independence. A compromise arrangement might bring concrete improvements to the lives of contemporary Quebeckers, but would not redress the intolerable injustice of centuries-old national oppression.

Such thinking was not confined to nationalists on the far left of the political spectrum. Marcel Chaput, a separatist relatively conservative in his social and economic beliefs, once observed, "If the French-Canadian acts as he does, if he remains the immediate author of his own misfortunes, it is because he too has been conditioned by the milieu in which he has been living for two hundred years, and especially by the minority status which he has 'enjoyed' for the ninety-four years of Confederation....repeat the French-Canadian experiment with another nation, and you will obtain exactly the same results - economic bondage, inferiority complex, a bastard language, political patronage, abuse of authority, corruption, petty demands for bilingual cheques, continual protests invariably ignored, and on top of it all, a group of well-off people who consider the situation entirely normal."\(^{74}\) A deep sense of communion with previous passengers aboard the national vessel is a common feature of the thinking of those who seek independence for their nation.

It is also a feature that sets idealists apart from their pragmatist counterparts. In varying degrees, pragmatists feel markedly less connected to the nation's past. As suggested in the first chapter,


\(^{74}\) Chaput, Why I am a Separatist, pp. 87 and 89 [emphasis in original].
pragmatists may allow that there are threads of continuity to the past, but the sociological change that communities everywhere experience means that today's nation is not the selfsame community as yesteryear's - for the simple reason that the pragmatist's nation is defined by its sociological substance. Prior to 1960, Quebec was a deeply religious and conservative community, but it has since been remade into a dynamic, progressive society, distinct primarily in virtue of the continued vibrancy of the French language. The substance of the community has changed dramatically; consequently, today's pragmatists feel detached from the nation's past.

Part of the difference between pragmatists and idealists on this count lies in the degree of volition attributed to their predecessors. Pragmatists typically feel that circumstances may have limited the range of options in the past, but, in the final analysis, there remained some room for maneuver. If poor choices were made, some blame must lie with members of the nation themselves. Thus, Pierre Trudeau, a staunchly pragmatist nationalist, was much more critical of traditional French-Canadian society than were those who attributed its shortcomings to colonial oppression: "il [est] plus urgent de fustiger l'indolence des nôtres, de réhabiliter la démocratie et d'attaquer nos idéologies clérico-bourgeoises, que de chercher des coupables chez les Anglais." 75 This type of critical assessment of French-Canada's past figured prominently in the pages of *Cité Libre*, the influential review Trudeau helped found in 1950. 76 The shared goal of its contributors was to democratize Quebec society, by ridding it of complacency, clericalism and political corruption. Once this was achieved, Quebec would be a very different society, and future reform efforts would naturally focus on satisfying the cultural and economic aspirations of French-Canadians in the here and now. This has since become the dominant way of looking upon the past among Quebec's pragmatist nationalists.


In brief, then, the nationalism of pragmatists is informed by the tangible distinctiveness of the nation in its current incarnation, rather than a more abstract sense of the nation as a pan-historical vessel immune to any fundamental alteration. For pragmatists, the nation changes when its sociological contents are altered, whereas for idealists, such change is perfectly consistent with national continuity.

If it is possible to identify these two patterns of nationalist thinking by looking to the extremes of nationalist opinion in Quebec, it is less easy to define the position of those located somewhere in the middle. The PQ, for example, has not wholly embodied either the pragmatist or idealist approach, but has instead incorporated elements of both. Certainly, it has absorbed some of the idealist critique that has painted Quebec as an oppressed colony and has identified an unbroken link between past and present; after all, most of the ardent separatists active in the first part of the 1960s did become members, and in some case leading members, of the PQ. But this idealist nationalism has been balanced by a pragmatist counter-weight, comprised in the main of disenchanted Liberals, whose principal concern has been to protect extant French-Canadian national qualities. René Lévesque, leader of the party from 1968 to 1985, epitomized the party's bifurcation, combining elements of the two nationalisms in his thought. In a 1976 article, for instance, Lévesque allowed that Quebec was a colony, but wasn't willing to adopt the radical critique unreservedly. "All told, it hasn't been such a bad deal, this status of 'inner colony' in a country owned and managed by another national entity. Undoubtedly, French Quebec was (as it remains to this day) the least ill-treated of all colonies in the world.\footnote{René Lévesque, "For An Independent Quebec," Foreign Affairs, 54, 4 (July 1976), p. 737.} Since Lévesque saw Quebec's past offering less cause for resentment, he did not reach back as far as others to find the source of the nation's current desire for independence. "To understand the rise of Quebec's new nationalism and its unprecedented drive toward self-government, we must go back at least as far as World War II.\footnote{Ibid., p. 738.} Though there had been an "outline of a nation\footnote{Ibid., p. 738.} in the French
colony that came under British rule in 1763, and some inchoate nationalism at other distant points (in 1837-38 for example), Quebec had not truly come of age until more recently. It was only after the war, when Quebec's modernization created rising expectations and the province increasingly came into conflict with a federal government indifferent to Quebec's needs, that the situation became untenable and Quebeckers began to reflect seriously on the merits of independence.\textsuperscript{80} Lévesque, then, while not wholly adverse to the radical critique, did not trace an unbroken line of oppression stretching from 1760 to the present day, instead grounding his nationalism largely in a critical assessment of the thwarted aspirations and desires of modern-day Quebeckers.

In striking a balance between the idealist and pragmatist outlook on the imperatives underlying Quebec nationalism, Lévesque's analysis is emblematic of the PQ's tendency to represent a wide range of nationalist opinion. The PQ, like the SNP, is the main vehicle of idealist nationalism in today's Quebec, but it also, at times, has been home to some who espouse a more pragmatist nationalism. The two nationalist tendencies do sometimes co-mingle.

Nevertheless, it is possible to distil a distinctive idealist creed advocated by elements within the PQ and staunch idealist allies in other organizations. The severing of the French-Canadian link in favour of an empty vessel conception of a Québécois nation; the symbolism attached to French language dominance in Quebec; the heavy emphasis on the nation's historical ballast: all are tendencies especially apparent among those contemporary nationalists most adamant about Quebec independence. This idealist ethos, which holds partial sway within the PQ, has come to be a potent force in today's Quebec.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 735.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., pp. 739-740.
Conclusion

From these observations about the evolution of nationalist thinking in Quebec, it is apparent that pragmatist-idealist divisions have persisted over different epochs of Quebec history and continue to divide the populace today. Prior to 1960, pragmatist nationalism sought to protect the Catholic religion and the traditional rural way of life valued by many French-Canadians; since that time, language has been the main object of concern for most of the pragmatist element. Prior to 1960, idealist nationalists, who felt deeply connected to the nation's past, idealized traditional national qualities and sought to create a pristine French-Canadian society based on a vision of a golden age from the past; since 1960, idealists have retained this empathy with the nation's past, even as they have sought to remould many features of the national countenance (though they have been less accommodating of diversity on the language issue, in view of its symbolic import). Thus, in step with the sea change that is commonly said to have swept over the entire nationalist spectrum in Quebec - the replacement of religion by language as the focal point of nationalist concern - there have also been enduring differences between pragmatist and idealist nationalism. As in Scotland and Brittany, these two modes of nationalist thinking have consistently marked the nationalist landscape in Quebec.

Having identified the principal variants of national identity to be found in stateless nations, and applied this typology to the cases of Brittany, Scotland and Quebec, the second major task of this thesis lies ahead: to explore some of the implications of the pragmatist-idealistic typology for political behavior. This task is taken up in the next four chapters. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 explore various facets of this topic, examining in turn: perceptions of legitimate means of pursuing the nationalist cause on the part of pragmatists and idealists; the rationality of the two nationalist types; and their respective patterns of nationalist activity. Chapter 8 pulls the pieces together, drawing on material from throughout the thesis to assemble a general account of the process of nationalist mobilization. The analysis of these four chapters offers evidence in support of the central contention of this thesis,
namely that variation in national identity along the pragmatist-idealistic axis is an important explanatory factor relevant to a variety of political phenomena seen in stateless nations.
Chapter 5

Pursuing the Nationalist Cause: Pragmatists, Idealists and Legitimate Means

Introduction

The previous three chapters have provided a historical overview of nationalist unrest in Brittany, Scotland and Quebec, grounding this in an analysis of the distinctive shadings of national identity present in these stateless nations. The aim of the next four chapters is to explore some of the characteristic political attitudes and behaviors associated with pragmatist and idealist nationalism. The discussion from this point forward is organized thematically, and examples are drawn variously from the three cases, which allows for a more systematic presentation of ideas; in places, quantitative evidence derived from public opinion surveys is used to back up the propositions put forward. The behavioral phenomena thus explored are somewhat disparate, but are broadly linked by a common theme: that idealist nationalists are less sensitive to empirical realities than their pragmatist counterparts and are, consequently, more intransigent and uncompromising in their attitudes and behavior.

The supposition throughout this analysis is that identity is a key factor conditioning the outlook of different nationalist actors. In making this claim, the analysis counters the presumption sometimes made that identity within stateless nations is fairly constant and that it is other factors, independent of identity, which generate diverse political attitudes and behavior. This contrast, discussed in the introduction to the thesis, is shown schematically in Figure 5.1.
This, the first of the four chapters examining nationalist political behavior, looks at the divergent attitudes of pragmatists and idealists on the issue of legitimate means of advancing the nationalist cause. Idealists are generally less mindful of public opinion, believing themselves to be justified in working to liberate the nation, even in the absence of widespread public support for that goal. Pragmatists, on the other hand, are more sensitive to the nation's feelings on the national question, and tailor their efforts on its behalf to the sentiments of the people themselves. Evidence of the phenomenon, and an explication thereof, are presented in Part C of this chapter. Part B sets the stage by considering two closely related points of difference between pragmatists and idealists: the epistemological basis of their nationalist sentiment and the expectations they hold of their fellow nationals.
Before proceeding, however, a word should be said, in order to avoid any potential misunderstanding, about the causal linkages presumed to underlie the various political processes examined in the next four chapters.

A) A Word about Cause and Effect

The central theme of this and the following chapters is that national identity, and specifically variation along the idealist-pragmatist axis, is a key determinant of nationalist political behavior. In making this case, the analysis sometimes uses the constitutional preferences of members of a stateless nation (support for the status quo, autonomy, independence, etc.) as a measure of their national identity. This is particularly true for the quantitative material, much of which examines the relationship between support for different constitutional options and various outcome variables. This chapter, for example, looks at support for different means of effecting constitutional change by constitutional preference.

But while relying on data pertaining to constitutional preferences, the observed differences are attributed to the nature of the national identities that putatively underlie those preferences. The justification for this inferential leap lies in the idea that support for political independence is closely associated with an idealized national identity and support for lesser options with a more muted and sociologically-grounded identity - a proposition expounded in the first four chapters. In short, constitutional preference and the nature of national identity are strongly correlated variables, so that the one can reasonably be substituted for the other.

This is not to suggest, however, that constitutional preferences are the prime mover in the causal chain of nationalist politics. The reader might start to form this impression, not only because of the use of constitutional preference as an explanatory variable, but also because of the argument laid out in Chapter 1. There it was contended that, from the perspective of l’histoire à la longue durée, it is
the nature of political power in the modern world that has moulded national identities into their
distinctively modern form. The rise of the state, and the doctrine and practice of absolute sovereignty,
fostered the development of an idealized sense of difference among populations. Rising nations,
striving to assert their rights, often emulated the dominant model of political organization and
community self-definition; that is, they demanded a state on behalf of their nation, which they claimed
to be seamless, indissoluble, and sharply distinct. In a sense, then, political structures caused national
identities to develop in a particular fashion.

But this is a macro-historical statement, and the cause-effect relationship does not carry over
to the micro-level of the individual nationalist. At this level, it is the possession of an idealized national
identity that causes the individual to support independence for their nation, rather than support for
sovereign statehood preceding and causing an idealized identity to form. The causal scenario would
typically run thus: within sociologically distinct populations contained within larger states, there
sometimes emerges a small idealist element; these early nationalists emulate the discourse of the state
and promote an idealized image of their nation; exposed to this idea, some members of the community
readily imbibe it, others do not; those who do are much more inclined to support political
independence for their nation than others. In short, national identity is the prime mover in the causal
chain of nationalist politics, generating constitutional preferences, along with other nationalist
phenomena.

Thus, the causal model informing the current analysis might be visualized in the manner
displayed in Figure 5.2a, where identity is the key explanatory variable and constitutional preference is
simply one outcome variable among others. However, in light of the supposition that idealized
identities emerge as a natural emulation of statist discourse, the case could be made that constitutional
preferences will typically be the principal and most immediate effect of national identity, and that there
will be an intimate connection between the two variables. The causal model flowing from the current

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theory is, then, closer to the schema shown in Figure 5.2b, with identity and constitutional preferences tightly linked.

Figure 5.2: Causal Framework of Analysis for Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8

a) National Identity → Constitutional Preferences
   ↓
   Legitimate Means of Effecting Change
   ↓
   Other Phenomena

b) National Identity → Constitutional Preferences
   ↓
   Legitimate Means of Effecting Change
   ↓
   Other Phenomena

This, then, explains why constitutional preference is sometimes used as an explanatory variable in the analysis that follows. It is serving as a proxy for identity. The presumption is that constitutional preference is a good proxy because of its close connection to national identity.

Why use a proxy rather than identity itself? Where this is done in the pages that follow, it is usually because useful surveys - surveys with data on outcome variables of interest - contain no questions that measure national identity. For many years, such questions appeared only occasionally on political polls in Quebec, Scotland and Brittany. It is only in the past ten or fifteen years that they have become more common. Questions concerning constitutional preferences, on the other hand, have nearly always been included since the earliest days of survey research in these places.
In other instances, a proxy for identity might be preferred because questions pertaining to national identity are not sufficiently refined. Typically, surveys that gather data on national identity ask respondents the most obvious question, the relative strength of their national identity: for example, do you feel more Scottish than British, equally Scottish and British, or more British than Scottish? Such questions are clearly a good first cut at measuring national identity, but they should not be taken as the final word, for they may fail to capture certain subtle shadings.

Results from a 1977 Canadian survey illustrate why caution is in order when using data based solely on the strength of identity reported by respondents. The survey asked people across the country whether they identified more with their province or with Canada. Among French-speaking Quebeckers, 30% indicated they identified more with their province, compared to 16% for all Canadians - no surprise there. More striking is the fact that 35% of non-French speakers in the Maritime provinces said they identified more with their province than with Canada. While it is certainly true that people in the four Maritime provinces have exhibited regionalist tendencies over the years, and did express some initial skepticism about Confederation, they have, since their induction into Canada, never made themselves out to be distinct nations deserving, for that reason, of special political powers or outright independence. One conclusion that might be drawn is that identity is not a significant motivational force behind movements which seek large measures of autonomy for a region; other factors must be at work, since Maritimers, with their strong local attachments, have been content to remain in Canada. But another possible conclusion is that this particular survey question failed to detect that the Québécois identity is of a different order than provincial identities in the Maritimes. It must be recognized that the answers respondents give to survey questions are conditioned by the political environment in which they are situated. Given the absence of nationalist agitation in the

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1 Bernard Blishen, "Perceptions of national identity," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 15, 2 (May 1978), Table 1, p. 129.
Maritimes, it would have been relatively inconsequential for a Nova Scotian, in 1978, to declare herself primarily attached to her province. In the Quebec of the late 1970s, on the other hand, a sovereignist party was in power and the province seemed on the brink of separation; opting for Quebec over Canada in those circumstances was a more weighty affirmation. In other words, those Quebecers who called themselves Quebecers first and foremost probably felt a greater attachment to their community than did the Nova Scotians who called themselves Nova Scotians first and foremost. This, of course, is conjecture, and further probing with questions designed to tap into other aspects of national identity - its importance relative to other social and political identities, for example - would be needed to substantiate it. But there is reason to suspect that there were, and are, qualitative differences between the Québécois and Maritimer identities.

Even within a particular region, there may be variation in the way identity questions are received by different people. Consider the Breton public opinion data cited in Chapter 2. The 1975 survey revealed that Bretonnants who reported feeling more Breton than French were not especially political in their nationalism: only 6% supported Breton independence, compared to 3% for Bretons as a whole. Again, this might be taken as evidence that identity is not an especially important determinant of constitutional preferences. But the political impact of identity among non-Bretonnants in the same survey was much stronger. Of those who felt more Breton than French in this group, 44% supported independence.2 The uneven impact of identity points to a different conclusion. Further probing might have revealed qualitative differences in the identities of the two groups. The Bretonnants' bretonnité may have been more pragmatist in orientation, grounded in a distinctive Breton sociology. Bretonnants, that is, who said they felt more Breton than French, were thinking of the quotidian aspects of their lives that marked them as visibly distinct - their language, their customs, their rural way of life. When non-Bretonnants said they felt more Breton than French, on the other hand, they were reflecting

2 These figures are subject to the caveats listed in footnote 29 of Chapter 2.
on Brittany's history as an oppressed nation within France and contemplating their attachment to Bretons of the past, present and future - were, in short, musing on the more abstract and idealized aspects of bretonnite. It is the latter type of nationalism that is especially likely to generate a desire for national independence, and this is why a strong identity exerts more leverage over constitutional preferences among non-Bretonnants.

This reasoning suggests that qualitative differences in identity may be consistent with common responses to questions that ask simply about the strength of one's national identity. It might be anticipated that idealized identities will tend, on the whole, to be stronger than pragmatist ones, but the correlation may be far from perfect. This is why circumspection is order when dealing with surveys that measure the strength of respondents' national identity and nothing more. It is also why constitutional preference may sometimes be a reasonable substitute measure for identity in modelling different aspects of nationalist politics. For the political future one prefers for one's community reveals something important about the quality of the attachment felt to that community.

For these various reasons, then, the quantitative analysis below sometimes uses constitutional preference as a proxy explanatory variable, particularly in cases where questions about identity are not available. Where national identity questions are available, these are used instead. But since these questions typically probe only the strength of national identity, potential measurement difficulties of the sort discussed here are taken into account in assessing the results.

What types of questions might be used to tap into qualitative differences in national identity? A few suggestions: 1) Respondents might be asked how essential a distinctive national culture is to their sense of national identity. For example, would there still be a Québécois nation if the French language were to disappear? 2) People might be asked to explain what makes them Scottish, Québécois, or Breton, with "I simply am" as one possible response; idealists would favour the bald affirmation. 3) People could be asked questions aimed at gauging the historical embeddedness of their nationalism. For example, are there any rights of the Breton nation that take precedence over the sentiments of contemporary Bretons?

The drawback with such questions is that they are rather abstract and convoluted, and it is important in survey design to keep questions simple and to the point. The potential benefit, however, is that they might help differentiate people with qualitatively different national identities.
The end product is a body of quantitative analysis that works on two levels. That there are differences on a number of counts between moderate and radical nationalists - as defined by constitutional preferences - is quite firmly established. That these differences can be traced back to a qualitative distinction between pragmatist and idealist national identities, on the other hand, is not directly demonstrated; the pragmatist/idealist framework is invoked, nonetheless, in an attempt to offer a deeper explanation of the observed results. Those who are skeptical of this conjecture are free to treat the quantitative analysis as nothing more than an exploration of the differences between moderate and radical nationalists. It is hoped, however, that the combination, throughout the thesis, of quantitative material a bit removed from the typology at hand, and qualitative analysis more immediately linked, serves to demonstrate the utility of the pragmatist/idealist framework.

B) The Epistemological Bases of Pragmatist and Idealist Nationalism

One important point of difference between pragmatists and idealists is the epistemological basis of their nationalist sentiment. The pragmatist's sense of community has an empirical basis, whereas the idealist's vision of the nation is, at least partly, grounded in faith. It is a difference that affects both their expectations of their fellow nationals and their views concerning the legitimacy of various means of gaining greater power for the nation.

That the pragmatist sense of community is empirically-based is the less contentious proposition, for it flows directly from the way in which pragmatist nationalism was defined in previous chapters. Pragmatists are those whose sense of community is grounded in extant and tangible sociological differences between national insiders and non-national outsiders, be they ethnic markings, cultural traits, or distinctive social and political values. Membership in the pragmatist's nation is a direct function of these palpable traits: people who possess them only somewhat are lesser members of the nation, and people who lack them altogether lie beyond the national pale. Pragmatists, then,
conceive of the nation as it presents itself to their senses and do not conjure up anything grander. Their sense of nationhood, as a direct function of the substantive elements of community, is empirically-grounded.

That the idealist's sense of community is underwritten by faith is less immediately clear, but such a position has also been implicit in much of the previous analysis. It will be recalled that the basic argument presented in Chapter 1, and substantiated through a historical examination of the three cases, was that idealist nationalism represents an ideology tailored to the ideational configurations of the modern nation-state. Like the populations of nation-states, idealist nationalists presume their national community to be peopled with wholly equal members, who are sharply distinct from outsiders, and whose union is indissoluble. This might be, and indeed sometimes is, interpreted simply as territorial nationalism: certain nationalists, it is charged, are primarily interested in carving out, and ruling over, a sizable portion of territory, and try to justify their realpolitik ambitions by tacking on a legitimizing ideology that paints the nation in the appropriate way. But we have suggested that these people are generally more sincere in their nationalism, operating with an idealised sense of the nation that fuels their radical demands and sustains them in their endeavours. This noetic nation is underwritten by potent abstract ideas that sustain a seamless image of national community even in the face of the contravening empirical evidence of sociological diversity.

One such idea is the belief that the nation is not defined by its empirical substance, so that despite its ongoing sociological evolution over time, it retains, to the idealist's mind, an essential continuity. The nation is a sort of transcendent vessel, unaltered by the superficial changes in character introduced as new passengers come on board and old ones depart. This conception of the nation is typically bolstered by a selective national history that is held to demonstrate unequivocally the nation's

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4 This, it was suggested in Chapter 1, is a position that John Breuilly comes close to in Nationalism and the State.
past unity and provide ballast for the present and future. Another sustaining image common to idealist thought is that of nation as organic entity, whose parts may be different in look and function, but which together form an indivisible whole. What looks to the outsider like a motley collection of individuals, sociologically diverse and ever-changing, is seen by the idealist insider as a collective individual moving implacably through time.

One important consequence of these abstract ways of conceptualizing the nation is that membership in the nation is not something readily detectable at the individual level. Quebec's history, idealists claim, makes Quebeckers Québécois, a status reputedly enjoyed by all those living in the province, not just those with a genealogical link to Quebec's past. The Breton language, the emsaveriens tell us, is a defining feature of the Breton nation, yet at the same time, it is not essential to speak Breton to be part of that nation (ditto for Gaelic in the Scottish case). Collectively there is substance to the idealist's nation, but at the individual level there sometimes is not. Individual membership, for the idealist, is not directly contingent on possession of specific traits susceptible to empirical apprehension.

Instead, at the individual level, membership in the idealist's nation is typically held to be a function of a national soul or essence residing deep within - the phraseology varies, and sometimes is omitted altogether, but the basic sentiment is nevertheless generally in evidence among the idealist element. This national essence is the "quality" that all members of the nation share, and which renders them wholly equal in their membership.

One notable feature of essences is that they are notoriously difficult to detect. They can't be seen, felt, or heard, for they are impalpable. To know of, or rather to intuit, their presence requires some imaginative input on the part of believers. Idealist nationalists posit the presence of a national essence stamped on the soul of all who are part of the nation. Effectively, then, for the idealist virtually any empirically apprehensible characteristics are consistent with membership in the nation, and the
belief that a particular individual is or is not part of the national community is non-falsifiable. The idealist's unswerving conviction, despite the absence of corroborating physical evidence, that some are members of the nation, wholly equal members no less, and others unequivocal outsiders, renders idealist nationalism a type of faith.

Note that it is, by this argument, the idealization in the idealist's nationalism that lends it its distinctive epistemological underpinning. The more modest claim, favored by the pragmatist, that the individuals of a particular territory, distinct in some tangible way, form a type of community, is not an article of faith, for it is empirically verifiable. But the idealist takes this a step further, claiming that the people of their territory comprise a seamless and undifferentiated community, of the sort that can legitimately claim a state, and it is at this stage that faith enters the picture. For it is not possible for the nationalist, or anyone else for that matter, to provide compelling concrete evidence supportive of this grander claim.

The role of faith in sustaining idealist nationalism is not always immediately apparent. When idealist claims are widely accepted by those within and without the nation, the role of faith is obscured by its ubiquitous hold over people. Virtually all Canadians outside Quebec, for example, feel strongly that they are Canadian, a designation rendered meaningful by an idealist Canadian nationalism: Canadians believe they are equal members of an indissoluble and distinct community; they point to collective traits, like multiculturalism and a generous spirit, as emblems of nationhood that set Canadians apart from outsiders, especially their southern neighbours; they skate over the troublesome fact that, at the individual level, there is no bundle of traits that clearly marks off Canadians from non-Canadians, for not all Canadians are more caring than all Americans, and individual Canadians are usually unicultural. In the final analysis, the only unambiguous marking of Canadianness is citizenship, which amounts to saying that all are Canadian who have been labelled as such by other Canadians, with no real substantive backing to the designation. The idealist faith that is apparent among a minority
element within stateless nations is also in evidence, and indeed in ubiquitous currency, in established nations ensconced in states.

But if Canadianness is, in one sense, devoid of substantive content, it is, in another sense, a very real force, politically and emotionally potent, because Canadians and others are convinced of its validity. Together, Canadians form a community of faith, strong because of the resilience of their conviction and its acceptance by others. In the case of established nations, there often is no dissension within, nor any tension between insider conviction and outside opinion, making the element of faith difficult to detect.

This discussion brings to mind the adage that the most compelling evidence of nationhood is people's sentiments: when a group of people feel they are a nation, they are one, or at least as much one as any other group claiming the same status. Sometimes, as outsiders, we can see that the nation is not as seamless and indissoluble as insiders might claim it to be, but if they feel strongly about maintaining their union, this is generally considered sufficient. "The desire of nations to be together is the only real criterion that must always be taken into account," wrote Ernest Renan, a sentiment echoed by Rupert Emerson, who suggested, "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel they are a nation." The best measure of nationhood, most impartial observers agree, is the sentiments of the people themselves.

But not everyone accepts this voluntaristic way of identifying nations, least of all the idealists in the eye of nascent nationalist movements. These radical nationalists sometimes make presumptuous claims about others deemed to be of their national community. Idealists will demand support for the nationalist cause from their fellow nationals, even when many of those people are unmoved by the

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nationalist appeal (a situation that has prevailed over much of the twentieth century in Scotland, Brittany and Quebec). Whereas the outside observer, relying on the best measure available to the uninitiated, the sentiments of supposed members themselves, would be drawn to conclude that the indifferent are at best potential members of the nation and that it is unreasonable to demand their fidelity to the nationalist cause, the idealist nationalist is typically much more aggressive and unyielding in his or her assessment.

This intransigence exposes the important element of faith that underlies idealist nationalism. This epistemological foundation conditions the expectations idealists have of others held to be of their nation. Imbued with a faith impervious to counterfactual empirical evidence, idealists contend that people are members of the nation because possessed of a national essence, regardless of cosmetic, outward appearances. Often included among these immaterial appearances are the express preferences of the people themselves. Disavowal of, or indifference to, the nationalist cause on the part of the population in question is brushed aside by the idealist nationalist who will soldier on, in the absence of a widespread national consciousness, making claims that appear imperious, engaging in actions that seem precipitate, insisting all the while that their behavior is entirely justified, because others are part of the nation regardless of what they themselves might believe.

This type of nationalist faith was evident in the thinking of Brittany's first separatist group, the Parti National Breton, which, at its inception in 1911, had but a few dozen members who were essentially alone in their desire for an independent Brittany. They seemed unperturbed by this absence of public support, however, proclaiming in the party's initial manifesto, "il y a encore dans l'âme bretonne quelque chose qui résiste et qui survit, quelque chose...qui demeure aujourd'hui aussi vivace..."
et robuste qu'au temps de notre indépendance, et cela, conscient ou inconscient, c'est le sentiment national." Aware of it or not, the people of Brittany were active members of the Breton nation.

The presumptuousness in this notion that nationalist spirit pervades one and all is rarely evident to those caught up in the swirl of events, though they sometimes come to recognize the nature of their thinking later on. Olier Mordrel, one of the key players in the radical branch of the Breton nationalist movement in the interwar period, wrote in 1973 that the mistake he and his fellow idealists made back then was to believe that "le sentiment national [breton] assoupi, alors qu'il était bel et bien mort dans la masse du peuple." Yet the same thinking continues in the modern movement. The Union Démocratique Bretonne does sometimes show great sensitivity to the dangers of intemperate nationalist ideology, reining in its ideological statements with caveats like "Nous disons les Bretons and non le Breton....[parce que] nous appréhendons le monde dans le respect de la diversité de ses composants," and consistently making a point of describing today's Breton community as a people, not a nation, to emphasize the point. Yet it sometimes ignores its own prudent counsel, as when it suggests that Bretons cannot take control of their future unless they "redeviennent eux-mêmes du point de vue psychologique et culturel," or when it implies that Bretons are unable to decide for themselves what constitutes freedom: "Les Bretons même s'ils se croient libres sont dépossédés de tout pouvoir, privés de toute autodétermination." Nationalist groups on the political right in today's Brittany also operate on the assumption that all Bretons, regardless of their personal sentiments on the matter, are

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7 Manifesto of the first Parti National Breton, reprinted in Nicolas, *Le séparatisme en Bretagne*, p. 231 [emphasis added].


10 Ibid., p. 109 [emphasis added].

11 Ibid., p. 36.
members of the nation, and make fewer efforts to curb or conceal this idealist outlook. Writes the Parti pour l'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre (POBL): "ceux qui se désintéressent d'eux-mêmes, de leur sort et de celui de leurs enfants, de l'avenir de la communauté humaine à laquelle ils appartiennent, ceux qui croient pouvoir se sauver eux-mêmes sans sauver cette dernière, sont mûrs pour l'esclavage d'abord." The bold declarations of Breton idealists, past and present, in the face of a largely indifferent nation evince the faith that underwrites their conception of the Breton nation.

Pragmatists, owing to the vision of national community to which they hew, tend to be more accepting of the sentiments of others, even if these differ from their own. Conceiving of their community as a collection of individuals connected by shared tangible traits and adherence to cultural norms - bound, in other words, by surface attributes rather than a pervasive and determinative national essence - they tend to look upon others of their community as autonomous individuals, free to form their own preferences on matters national, rather than as servants of the nation. One group that exemplifies the tendency is Diwan, the Breton organization formed in 1977 that has opened numerous bilingual schools in the hopes of stemming the decline of the Bretonnant population. The President of Diwan, André Lavanant, believes it is not incumbent on the government to yield to the demands of groups claiming to represent minority nations until they have demonstrated significant support from the nation itself. State authorities need only respond to active organization, not empty demands. This self-help philosophy has been apparent in the organization's activities: lacking state support, Diwan took the initiative and opened its first school with strictly private funding in 1977; after the Socialists came to power in 1981, an agreement was reached to allocate some funding to support Diwan in its activities; with growing enrollments over time, Diwan has pressed for more funding to recognize the

12 POBL, Pour Une Democratie Bretonne, p. 7.

13 Interview with André Lavanant, 24 June 1995. The remark was actually prompted by a question about the Gallo movement that has tried to make claims on behalf of a distinctive Upper Brittany, but M. Lavanant suggested that it applied equally to the Breton movement.
public demand for bilingual teaching; and a key part in its strategy has been the organization of public
demonstrations at various points that serve to "démontrer la vitalité de l'école."\textsuperscript{14} The emphasis in
Diwan, then, is different from that in evidence among the Breton idealists of this century, who have
regularly made demands far in advance of the public sentiment evident in their small organizations, on
the assumption that the Breton nation has certain inalienable rights, irrespective of current levels of
national consciousness. For M. Lavanant and those who think like him, Bretons are free to make up
their own minds on these matters. For his part, he will try to persuade others of the merits of his
viewpoint, but it is not for him or anyone else to step in and make decisions on their behalf.

The proviso that the people must decide for themselves their national status has sometimes
been invoked by pragmatists in the ongoing debate over the inclusion of Loire-Atlantique in Brittany.
Joseph Martray, secretary-general of CELIB, who, tellingly, referred to Brittany as a nation "en
puissance,"\textsuperscript{15} argued that it was unfair to criticize CELIB for excluding this \textit{département} from its
bailiwick: "C'est un manque de courage de la part du mouvement breton de nous [CELIB] rendre
responsable d'un état de fait: c'est à lui de faire en sorte que les gens de Loire-Atlantique se sentent
bretons."\textsuperscript{16} To Martray's mind, there would be no Breton nation until the people of Brittany made it so.

For pragmatists, then, the nation, or rather the people of the nation, can speak for themselves.
Idealists, on the other hand, feel themselves entrusted to speak on the nation's behalf, since many of
their fellow nationals - because stamped with a national soul but silent on the national question - are

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\textsuperscript{14} André Lavanant quoted in "Le dernier rendez-vous de Diwan," \textit{Ouest-France} 18 March 1995, reprinted in
Service de la Langue Bretonne, Institut Culturel de Bretagne, "Actualités de la langue Bretonne," (May 1995), p. 35. In March 1995, 2,000 people demonstrated in Quimper, an action that helped secure public funds to reduce

\textsuperscript{15} Quoted in Nicolas, \textit{Le séparatisme en Bretagne}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{16} "Interview de M. Joseph Martray, secrétaire général de C.E.L.I.B.," \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 3 (March 1964), p. 2.
clearly benighted. Again, examples can be drawn from both past and present. The Conseil National Breton, formed in 1940 by the leaders of the second Parti National Breton (PNB), intoned in its opening declaration, "Sont seuls qualifiés pour parler en son nom [le relèvement Breton] les patriotes bretons qui, au peril de leur liberté et de leur vie, n'ont cessé de défendre la cause bretonne par la parole et par l'action.... ils sont le noyau autour duquel se cristallisera la Bretagne de demain." The POBL argues in the same vein today, "C'est presque toujours en quelques hommes qu'à un moment donné de l'histoire s'incarne véritablement l'âme d'une nation et sa volonté de survivre." At this juncture, the guardian of the nation's soul is none other than the POBL itself: "Le P.O.B.L. est... un Party authentiquement national at porte parole de la légitimité bretonne foulée aux pieds depuis l'anéantissement par la contrainte des assemblés représentatives propres au peuple breton."

Whether an idealist minority can claim to speak for the nation is an issue that has divided nationalists elsewhere too. In Scotland, for example, it will be recalled that John MacCormick, one-time SNP leader, was a moderate who often ran up against the more radical nationalists in the party. Among their number was Douglas Young, whose election as SNP leader at the party's conference in 1942 precipitated MacCormick's departure. In that same year, the intransigent Young wrote, "The word 'quisling' has come, in ordinary use, to mean any person who acts against the national independence and national interests of his own nation. Thus, in Scotland, any born Scot who is opposed to national independence and the prosperity of the Scots nation is a quisling." This rejection of current majority sentiment among the Scottish people was unacceptable to MacCormick, who was always more tolerant of views divergent from his own. In his memoirs, he recalled that he had, to no

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18 POBL, Pour Une Démocratie Bretonne, pp. 7 and 10.

19 Douglas Young, "Quislings in Scotland" (Glasgow: Scottish Secretariat, 1942), p. 1. For an overview of Young's political views and personal history, see Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 166-169.
avail, implored the 1942 conference delegates to exercise due circumspection: "We in this hall, I suggested, were not the Scottish nation, however much we might be tempted so to picture ourselves."20 Moderation was demanded by their modest numbers: "We in the National Party were still a minority in Scotland...and we had no shadow of a right to claim that we spoke for the nation."21 In more recent years, MacCormick’s injunction has been largely heeded by the SNP, which has been relatively unassuming in its declarations. But on occasion it too has tried to arrogate the voice of the nation. A 1967 document, discussing the European Economic Community, for example, began with the pronouncement, "The Scottish National Party, being the sole political body competent to speak for the Scottish Nation, serves herein due notice..."22

In Quebec, the Parti Québécois has, like the SNP, largely eschewed imperious official declarations. But the party is home to nationalists of many stripes, including some apostles of the idealist article of faith that all Quebecers are part of the Québécois nation, regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. Pierre Bourgault, for example, who is active in today's PQ and was leader of the RIN through most of its eight year existence, has on numerous occasions weighed in with bold, unleavened declarations. Shortly after the RIN's formation, he volunteered in a speech delivered in Montreal, "Il y a moins d'un an, nous existons à peine. Aujourd'hui, nous [le RIN] représentons la nation."23 Developing the theme further, Bourgault opined:

Nous croyons sincèrement, sans vanité mais aussi sans modestie, représenter la vie même de la nation.


21 Ibid., p. 96.

22 Quoted in Marr, The Battle for Scotland, pp. 132-133.

23 Pierre Bourgault, "Révolution", discours prononcé à la salle de la Fraternité des Policiers à Montréal, undated, p. 3. Since the speech refers to the founding of the RIN one year earlier, it presumably was delivered in 1961.
Nous avons oublié les défaîtes, nous avons oublié nos malheureux complexes, nous avons fait taire nos futile agressivité et nous nous consacrons tout entiers à redonner la vie, à redonner la fierté à notre peuple, à nous-mêmes, à la nation québécoise.

Par notre action, par notre foi et notre confiance dans le peuple québécois, nous sommes la vie même de la nation....

Nous sommes la nation, parce que nous représentons son désir de liberté.  

We see in these, and like statements from idealists elsewhere, a proclivity to bypass the express preferences of others deemed to be of the nation in favour of an interpretation of the national will less compromised by empirical realities. This tendency has a direct impact on the idealist's assessment of the various means whereby national liberation might be achieved: in brief, they sometimes opt for methods that rely little on active public support. Similarly, the pragmatist tendency to let the people of the nation speak for themselves affects their assessment of mechanisms of change and leads them to the conclusion that public input to the process of altering the nation's constitutional status is essential. This connection between nation conception and acceptable ways of effecting national change is substantiated and explicaded in the next section. Before proceeding, however, several caveats might be attached to the observations proffered thus far in this initial exposition of implications deriving from the pragmatist/idealist typology.

First, it is generally at the far end of the moderate-radical spectrum that idealist nationalism, and its imperious tendencies, are revealed in unvarnished form. The examples cited above of idealist nationalism's blind faith come primarily from groups and individuals within the three nationalist movements who have been singularly adamant about independence (the hallmark of unadulterated idealist nationalism). For the most part, the parties that today dominate the nationalist agenda in Brittany, Scotland, and Quebec (the UDB, the SNP and the Parti Québécois) hedge on independence to varying degrees and are home to a broad spectrum of nationalist opinion. In their official statements,

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24 Ibid., p. 9.
these parties are rarely dismissive of public opinion in the way that individual members, or smaller organizations further to the nationalist fringe, sometimes are. In short, many, if not most, of the people involved in the Breton, Scottish and Québécois nationalist movements are sensitive to public opinion and think the express support of the nation for nationalist projects important to their legitimacy.

This said, however, the precise degree of public support thought necessary varies substantially. Many assume majority backing is sufficient to warrant changes in their nation's constitutional status, but others contend that more is needed in view of the issue's importance. We will see that the more idealist someone is in their nationalism, the lower the level of public support they deem acceptable. (Whether this makes some nationalists democratic and others undemocratic is something we will leave for others to decide.)

A second qualification to the observations above is that the faith convincing idealists of the righteousness of their cause even in the face of contravening evidence is apparent mainly in the early stages of a nationalist movement. Later on, when many people support the nationalist cause, the tension between desired goal and the realities of public opinion melts away; after all, there is no conflict between a strong desire for independence and a propensity to act in accordance with the wishes of the people, when many or most people want independence. In the early stages of a nationalist movement, however, there is a strong tension, and it tends to be those willing to bend, or dispense with, democratic principles who rally to the idealist call for radical changes desired only by a few. Though it is not a point we have dwelled on here, idealists willing to proceed in the absence of public backing were more prominent in the early stages of the two movements - Quebec and Scotland - where support for independence is no longer negligible.

To these first two caveats might be added a third: as with most ideologies that presume others can be re-connected to their true selves but must be shown the way by an enlightened vanguard, the possibility always exists that the ideologues are right. The small groups of idealists who came together
in the Alliance Laurentienne, the RIN and the FLQ to lead the people of the Quebec nation to the light must feel vindicated now that half of all Quebecers have come to recognize the Québécois spirit within. Of course, these idealists were convinced of the people's Québécoisness before the fact, and were willing to support fairly radical actions based on the unassailable conviction they were right. It could well be argued that they were presumptuous in their early certainty, for they had no way of knowing what would eventually transpire - but it is hard to argue with success.

More plausibly, these early idealists might contend that their blind conviction played a key role in ensuring they were proven right by subsequent events. Without it, the nation would not be where it is today. The pragmatist's respect for public opinion, which we have treated as a consequence of conceiving the nation as a collection of autonomous individuals connected only by surface traits, is, the idealist might counter, actually the product of a deep conservatism: pragmatists are simply content with the status quo and will not budge until the weight of public opinion overcomes their inertia. Thus, idealists willing to go against the current are essential to a dormant nation's revivification. It is not an implausible argument. So while it may be stretching matters to say that the early Quebec idealists were right all along, that widespread Québécoisness was present from the start, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that their singular conviction helped ensure that Québécoisness did eventually find a place in the hearts of many Quebecers.

A fourth caveat might be mentioned too. Idealist nationalists, if sometimes willing to brush aside public opinion in their effort to win independence for the nation, are certainly not illiberal on all counts. Those we have termed empty vessel idealists, who have generally been dominant within the idealist stream of each of the three movements under investigation here, are often progressive and respectful of difference in much of their thinking, typically more so than their pragmatist counterparts. For the empty vessel conception of the nation has little in the way of behavioral prescriptions or cultural restrictions; the nation is free, these idealists believe, to evolve sociologically as it will. It is
only on the issue of national independence that empty vessel idealists are blinkered in their outlook. Their nationalism is underwritten by a sense of the inescapable oneness of the people who are, all of them, stamped with a determinative national essence. The nation may be an empty vessel taking on and unloading sociological freight over time, but it is a vessel shared by national denizens of the past, present and future, so that those currently at the helm are not the sum and substance of the nation, but merely its present representatives with certain obligations to those who went before and those who will go after. The empty vessel outlook is exemplified by former Quebec journalist Jean-Marc Léger, who was, on the one hand, an early critic of Maurice Duplessis and proponent of progressive social and economic reforms that promised to break Quebec out of its traditional mold, and on the other hand, an ardent supporter of independence as an early member of the RIN.  

He writes in a recent essay:

Un peuple a non seulement le droit, mais le devoir de se défendre, surtout lorsqu'il est menacé dans son existence. Le premier impératif du salut, c'est le respect de soi-même; le deuxième, c'est la lucidité envers soi-même et envers les autres; le troisième consiste dans la solidarité avec les siens, solidarité dans le temps autant que dans l'espace, car nous sommes redevables aux générations d'hier, et comptables envers celles qui viennent, de l'état de l'héritage.

For empty vessel idealists like Léger, the people are free to choose on many social, cultural and political issues, but not independence, for they are part of a transcendent community which is ever-changing, but which is also possessed of a fundamental, inescapable continuity. Intransigence on the independence question is a characteristic they share with those idealist nationalists who do want a nation that is cosmetically pure. Though the empty vessel idealists differ in some important ways from

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25 Léger's views on various matters are described in Behiels, Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960, pp. 48-53 and 102-103, inter alia.

26 Jean-Marc Léger, Vers L'Indépendance: Le Pays à Portée de Main (Ottawa: Leméac, 1993), pp. 21-22 [emphasis added].

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those who seek a culturally or racially homogeneous nation, both types of idealist agree that fellow nationalists are not free to renounce the nation.

That empty vessel idealists act in this fashion should not come as a great surprise. For their aspirations simply mirror the practices of those established nation-states that provide for individual freedom and social diversity within, but exhibit a deep-seated intolerance on the basic issue of national unity. This is the one matter where personal choice is generally not permitted in the modern world. This brings us to one final caveat then. It is not, to return to the theme of the opening chapter, anything inherent in group loyalties or ethnic ties that generates the idealist mode of thinking. Rather it is the political status to which idealists hope to see their community graduate that largely conditions their manner of thinking and political comportment.

These various qualifications to the analysis presented in the first part of this chapter suggest that idealist faith, and the attendant inclination to wave off the views of others, are not rampant within the nationalist ranks of stateless nations. They also suggest that idealist nationalism is, in many ways, a perfectly comprehensible phenomenon, and potentially an important motor of social change, though people will differ as to whether this is for good or bad. These points made, we now turn to an important pragmatist/idealist contrast that flows from their differing conceptions of the nation.

C) Legitimate Means of Effecting Change

To this point, the evidence of pragmatist/idealist difference has consisted largely of statements of attitude and opinion on the part of nationalist protagonists. These could be taken as mere rhetorical flourishes to which their advocates are not deeply committed, perfunctorily invoked to justify a movement with ulterior motives and concerns. However, the differences outlined above between idealists and pragmatists also lead to conflicts over concrete policy questions and differences in political behavior, which suggest a more sincere and solid attachment of the two nationalist types to
their respective brands of nationalism. This section considers one policy question in particular - what means can rightly be used to further the nationalist cause? - and the revealing differences in the responses favoured by pragmatists and idealists.

The methods commonly used to alter a nation's constitutional status require widely varying levels of public support. Five mechanisms of change sometimes used and advocated by nationalists, ordered from least reliant on public support to most, are: 1) engaging in violent actions (bombings, riots, kidnappings, etc.), with the quixotic goal of seizing power in the name of the oppressed nation, and the more realistic goal of stimulating a wider national consciousness; 2) contesting elections on the understanding that an election victory by the nationalist party constitutes sanction for its constitutional policy; often elections can be won with less than a majority of the popular vote, so this method can entail proceeding with less than majority backing; 3) conducting a referendum on constitutional changes and stipulating that majority support is required to carry the day; 4) holding a referendum and maintaining that supra-majority support is needed to sanction change (a procedure sometimes advocated but rarely used); and 5) adopting consensual decision-making procedures, which usually involves gathering extensive public input into constitutional options through public commissions or a constituent assembly; with this method, the views of the vast majority of the people are collected and melded to arrive at a compromise solution.

This ranking is not uncontentious. In particular, some might argue that the referendum option deserves more credit: while it is true that 50% plus one can carry the day, 100% of the people are free to vote, and in this sense referenda take into account the views of one and all. This, however, is a rather facile assessment. It is true that a referendum does secure public input and superficially treats everyone equally in that all are given a vote. But in allowing for the possibility that a bare majority can dictate a community's future to one and all, it opens the door to a tyranny of the majority that runs roughshod over important individual preferences. In presuming that the losers must defer to the winners, the
referendum mechanism assumes, before the fact, that the people being consulted represent an indissoluble community - even if the referendum result reveals them to be deeply divided. In effect, the legitimacy of the referendum procedure rests on a blithe acceptance of one of the tenets of idealist nationalism.

For this reason, some would argue that majority rule, when applied to basic questions of community affiliation - do I want Quebec to be independent, part of Canada, or perhaps a bit of both? - is not sufficiently respectful of people's preferences. In such important matters, individuals preferences are better served by another mechanism: political communities should derive their legitimacy from a tacit or explicit social contract, laying out basic principles of governance and communal affiliation, to which all members of the community subscribe.

Most would agree that a perfect social contract is never attained in practice, but its proponents would contend that the model can serve, nonetheless, as an ideal against which practice can be assessed and improved upon. In the case of referenda, the social contract model could be more closely approximated in a variety of ways. For example, rather than allowing a separatist majority, victorious in a referendum vote, to take the non-separatist minority with them, the latter could be allowed to stay behind as part of Canada, Britain or France, keeping their fair share of territory. Generally, though, this type of proposal introduces the intractable problem of interspersed populations. More practically, if 51% want independence and 49% do not, both sides could agree to split the difference and call this a vote for substantial change, based on a weighted average of people's preferences. To make this a workable framework for decision-making, a different referendum procedure would likely be needed: a multi-option referendum, for example, with preferential ranking of options by voters, and some sort of system for weighting preferences to determine the outcome. This method would, in cases of a divided populace, typically yield a result in favour of intermediate change. Generally, however, these first two options are not given much serious consideration, and it is more common for those committed to a
social contract ideal to seek input from the people at an earlier stage, through public hearings or a constituent assembly, resulting in a consensual proposal for changes in the nation's constitutional status. This is then accepted or rejected by majoritarian procedures (an election or a referendum). This final approach allows for much greater input from members of the nation than a winner-take-all referendum based on a strictly partisan proposal. Hence the ranking suggested above: the methods commonly used to alter a nation's constitutional status, ordered from least reliant on public support to most, are violence, election victories, majoritarian referenda, supra-majoritarian referenda, and consensual decision-making procedures, such as public commissions or constituent assemblies.

The basic correlation that seems to hold is that the more idealist someone is in their nationalism - in other words, the closer they come to supporting full-out independence - the more likely they are to advocate methods of change little reliant on public support. The reason why should be fairly clear in light of the foregoing discussion of the pragmatist/idealist epistemological difference and its implications for the expectations held of fellow nationals. The pragmatist conception of the nation is empirically-grounded, consisting in an apprehension of the surface traits that palpably connect people. Pragmatists do not impute to their fellow nationals a determinative national essence, seeing them instead as autonomous individuals free to embrace or renounce the nation as they will; consequently, they tend to think public support necessary for nationalist projects. Idealists, on the other hand, are imbued with a nationalist faith that causes them to think the nation present even in the absence of solid empirical evidence to that effect. Members of the nation who fail to realize that they are part of a historical community and stamped with a national essence must be guided by an enlightened vanguard to re-discover their true national selves. The result: the idealist does not think public support for the advancement of the national cause essential.

This is most clearly evident at the idealist extreme. The nationalists least sensitive to public sentiment are those who have used violent methods to advance the nationalist cause. These groups
have operated at various points in the three cases of interest here, but have tended to be most prominent
in the early stages of nationalist mobilization. In the discussion of Brittany in Chapter 2, we spoke
briefly of Gwenn ha du, the militant group active before and during World War II, and at greater length
of the group prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, the Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB). In the
Quebec case discussed in Chapter 4, the activities of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in the
1960s were discussed. No mention was made in Chapter 3 on Scotland of similar groups active there,
but since the 1970s there have in fact been a number of explosions and bank robberies attributed to
groups seeking Scottish independence, collectively dubbed the Tartan Army. In comparison to the FLB
and FLQ, the Tartan Army has been relatively lacking in organization and numbers; if those involved
in violent activities have likely numbered in the low hundreds in Brittany and Quebec, they have
probably numbered in the dozens in Scotland, and their sporadic actions have had little public impact.27
We would do well to remember, however, that while in all three cases active participants in violent
activities have been thin on the ground, supporters of those activities have been more numerous. A
1963 Quebec poll, for example, found that 1% of the people interviewed felt that a coup d'état was the
most desirable way to bring about the independence of Quebec.28 It seems a relatively negligible
proportion, until you consider that with a population of slightly over 5 million at the time, this
translated into 50,000 Quebecers willing to see their government overthrown in order to liberate their
country.

In turning to violence to further the nationalist cause, these groups, and presumably their
supporters, did not seem to feel that the active backing of the nation was a necessary pre-condition for
its liberation. It seems likely that had the opportunity presented itself, these militants would have

27 The most detailed account of the various groups who made up the Tartan Army can be found in Andrew
Murray Scott and Iain Macleay, Britain's Secret War, Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-American State

28 Author's calculation based on Study of Separatism, 1963.
seized power and declared their nation independent. It did not present itself, however, for they were far too weak to bring down the government, and so they tended to justify their activities as necessary stimulants to the people's national consciousness: necessary because the people, though clearly members of the nation, were woefully unaware of it. This sorry state of affairs was, groups like the FLB and FLQ forcefully argued, a product of the nation's history as a subjugated colony that had rendered it a nation of proleterians unable to recognize their own dismal plight. The current representatives of the nation had, the reasoning ran, been disconnected from their true selves. "Except in times of crisis and revolution," wrote FLQ ideologue Pierre Vallières, "when workers can take advantage of the weakness of the system to deal it a mortal blow, their long-enforced degradation often engenders fatalism, resignation, and even indifference to everything, including themselves."29 The colonial situation that prevented them from fulfilling their national vocation was, these idealists reasoned, itself a form of violence which justified the use of counter-violence to snap the people from their lethargy.30 Braced by this ideological backing, these groups saw themselves as the vanguard of the nation,31 so that statements like "Nous nous proclamons aujourd'hui comme la conscience du peuple Breton"32 tripped off the tongue and violent acts were committed without compunction.

Along with their willingness to use violence, these organizations shared something else: their support for untrammelled independence for the nation. In the 1960s, it was these radical groups that most vehemently rejected the distinction between economic and political spheres that other nationalists


31 See, for example, the FLQ document "Revolutionary Strategy and Role of the Advance Guard" reprinted in Gérard Pelletier, translated by Joyce Marshall, The October Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), pp. 206-211.

32 "Le Front de Libération de la Bretagne s'adresse à l'opinion," p. 1.
found acceptable, and sought instead to liberate the nation in all departments of national life. In Quebec, for example, the FLQ adamantly opposed the PQ's attempt to decouple political and economic independence through the notion of sovereignty-association. The unqualified goal of these radical groups and the means thought acceptable to achieve the goal were linked because both emerged from a highly idealized conception of the nation. Seeing their national community as a transcendent vessel and today's members as representatives of that community, each stamped with a national soul, led, on the one hand, to the idea that they were a people distinct in their essence and therefore in need of full independence; and it also generated, on the other hand, the sentiment that they could be pressed to attain this status, in spite of their own present feelings on the matter.

That nationalists willing to take up arms would want independence, and nothing less, might seem rather unremarkable and unworthy of observation. Perhaps more striking is the flip side of the coin: the fact that no one in the Breton, Scottish or Québécois nationalist movements has ever taken up arms to fight for devolution, or a special status, or even sovereignty-association. The lack of violence on the part of those making lesser political demands is a telling absence. For it undermines the schema that has been presented as an alternative to the model of nationalist politics favored here. If we have been making the case that national identity, within most stateless nations, admits of significant variation across a spectrum of nationalist sentiment that directly affects numerous dimensions of nationalist politics, the alternative model, favored by many, conceptualizes matters thus: common identity + mediating factors = diverse political preferences and behaviors. But such a model cannot easily explain why violence is never used to pursue lesser ends. If people share a common identity, and it is only mediating factors, unrelated to quality or strength of identity, that lead some to prefer less than independence for the nation - Home Rule, say, or a special status - then why is no violent response forthcoming when these alternative modes of self-determination are thwarted by the powers that be? National identity and the need for national self-determination are, it would seem, less keenly felt by
some. Identity varies over a continuum of nationalist sentiment in ways that directly affect certain aspects of nationalist politics - first and foremost the constitutional status thought fitting for the nation, but equally, as we are starting to see, other aspects too, such as the methods deemed acceptable to bring about changes in the nation's status.

If this identity continuum, and its effect on ideas about legitimate methods of change, is evident at the idealist extreme, it is also apparent within that section of minority nations - and it is a broad section in the three cases of interest here - that looks to various democratic methods of achieving their nationalist goals. There have been a number of debates within two of the movements (Scotland and Quebec) about the virtues and shortcomings of different democratic methods of advancing the nationalist cause.

In Scotland, for example, there have been notable differences between the SNP and the more moderate Home Rule groups on this issue. The SNP policy has always been that an election victory would suffice to secure Scottish independence. A referendum would follow on a new Scottish constitution, but the question of independence itself would not be put to the people directly. With four parties gaining significant portions of the Scottish vote (the Tories, Labour, the Liberals and the SNP) under the British first-past-the-post system, this means independence could easily be secured with less than majority support; since 1974, Labour has four times taken a majority of Scottish seats with less than 40% of the popular vote. The warrant in an SNP election victory is made more questionable by the fact that an SNP vote is not necessarily a vote for independence. Clearly, then, the

33 In the late 1980s, there were elements within the SNP ("the gradualist wing" according to Mitchell) who favored a multi-option referendum. The idea came about as part of the SNP's response to the Constitutional Convention initiative: if the SNP was going to participate in this Home Rule project, it wanted its preferred option, independence, to be on the ballot in any referendum that might be held on Scotland's future. The idea had the strong support of Alex Salmond, the party leader, and shortly after the 1992 general election it was endorsed by the SNP national executive; and when Labour decided to hold a referendum on an Assembly if elected, it was pushed strongly by the SNP. Note, however, that the multi-option referendum was proposed only as an alternative to a referendum on an Assembly alone. It is not something that would follow an SNP election victory. See Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, pp. 165-166, 292, and 296.
SNP is willing to proceed and declare independence without the overwhelming backing of the Scottish people.

Those in the Home Rule stream of Scottish nationalism have generally sought greater public input and support for their projects. For example, the Scottish Convention, which generated considerable Home Rule enthusiasm in the late 1940s, was ever-anxious to ascertain the views of the Scottish people and move to their rhythm. In the first place, the organization convened a Scottish National Assembly on several occasions to deliberate on Scotland's political future. As a pamphlet from the time proudly noted, "The first meeting of the Scottish National Assembly was held in Glasgow, on 22nd March, 1947....All Local Authorities, Church Presbyteries, Trades Unions, Business Associations, and other similar organisations in Scotland were invited to send delegates to the Assembly, and the response to the invitation was so widespread that the Scotsman newspaper, was able to describe the Assembly as 'perhaps the most widely representative meeting ever held to discuss Scottish affairs'."\(^{34}\) Input was, the Convention implied, being solicited from the whole nation (or at least their representatives).

Indicative, too, of the Convention's interest in the views of all Scots, is the high level of public support it tried to secure for the proposals that were being developed. In the organization's literature, references appear to the importance of demonstrating the support of the "great majority" of the Scottish people for a Scottish Parliament.\(^{35}\) When the Covenant initiative (the petition reputedly signed by two million Scots) was first underway, John MacCormick, leader of the Home Rule movement in the 1940s and 1950s, said they must strive to collect three million signatures - this at a time when the total

\(^{34}\) "Practical Proposals for Scottish Self Government," National Covenant Committee, undated pamphlet from the Scottish Convention/Scottish Nationalism file at the Edinburgh Central Reference Library.

\(^{35}\) See, for example, *ibid.*
Scottish electorate was only some 3.4 million!\textsuperscript{36} Around the same time, the Scottish Convention tried to persuade the Scottish municipalities to put pressure on the government to hold a referendum on the Home Rule question. The plan was to hold a plebiscite and "if two-thirds of voters supported a Parliament then a Royal Commission should be established to recommend the best means of implementing Scottish home rule."\textsuperscript{37} The injunction informing the efforts of these moderate nationalists was, MacCormick suggested, to find the "highest common factor of agreement among all parties."\textsuperscript{38} In these various ideals and proposals, there is a sense that the objective was to create a sort of Scottish social contract, formulated by representatives of the people, and sanctioned by the overwhelming majority of Scots.\textsuperscript{39} The respect for individual preferences implied by such a project is not surprising in view of the pragmatist tendency to stick to the empirical facts and look upon the nation as the people who currently comprise it, rather than injecting idealist notions into the mix that treat the nation as something grander and more transcendent, with certain timeless, unconditional rights.

The same Scottish pragmatist nationalism lives on today in the Constitutional Convention that came into being in the late 1980s. Again, the initiative has respected the imperative that the people of Scotland must have significant influence over proposals to change their nation's constitutional status.\textsuperscript{40} "There are," declared these moderate nationalists in their initial statement of principle, \textit{A Claim of}


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 152 [emphasis added].

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{39} Mitchell, on the other hand, argues that the elitism and partisan maneuvering have undermined the claim to speak for the nation made by Scotland's various constitutional conventions (see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 132-133). But if imperfect in practice, the use of the constitutional convention mechanism does suggest a greater sensitivity on the part of its practitioners to the need to consult the people of the nation before proceeding with changes on their behalf.

\textsuperscript{40} For a similar appraisal, see Keating, \textit{Nations against the State}, pp. 210-211.
Right, "two kinds of choice; choice from what is offered, and choice of what is to be offered. Only the latter is effective choice." To afford the people of Scotland some say over constitutional offerings, the Convention gathered input from a wide cross-section of the people's representatives, including 80% of Scotland's MPs and MEPs, along with representatives from 59 of 65 local Scottish authorities. The solicitation of a broad cross-section of Scottish opinion was important to these moderate Scottish nationalists; as Canon Kenyon Wright, one of the Convention's leading figures, noted, "any scheme we put forward must be [based on] consensus, the highest common factor of our common thinking which gives no political grouping or party everything it wants."

The resultant proposal for a Scottish Assembly has now been put to a referendum (following the Labour victory in the 1997 election). Originally, the plan was to enact the relevant Assembly legislation without a referendum. This original provision meant that a Scottish Parliament could have been established with less than 50% express support from the people. However, it was generally conceded that support for an Assembly is a supra-majority sentiment in Scotland - a belief confirmed when three-quarters voted in favour in the actual referendum - so it could be argued that a referendum was unnecessary. In any event, irrespective of the method of final sanction, in drawing on a wide spectrum of opinion in formulating its proposal, the Constitutional Convention has followed procedures more reliant on public input and control than the SNP's independence option.

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41 Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), *A Claim of Right for Scotland* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), p. 28. The quotation is actually intended as a criticism of the British government, but presumably the philosophy it embodies would apply to constitutional matters too.


43 Quoted in Alex Salmond, "A century of Labour deceit and betrayal; Alex Salmond argues that the Scots must learn from history," *The Independent*, 2 July 1996, p. 13.

44 Some feel that Labour, under Tony Blair's leadership, decided to hold a referendum because of a lack of commitment to a Scottish Assembly; a referendum would serve as a hurdle that might serve to block devolution. This raises an important issue: whereas we have presented high thresholds of approval for nationalist projects as a
In fairness to the SNP, the caveat of Chapter 3 should be reiterated, namely that the party has not pursued independence nothing less to the exclusion of all other constitutional options. A willingness to consider other courses of action, at least as stepping stones, has been a common feature of SNP policy from the beginning; and the idea of a Constitutional Convention has sometimes featured among those alternatives. Indeed, SNP leader, Gordon Wilson, was among the first to dust off the Constitutional Convention idea in the early 1980s and present it as a promising way forward at a time when nationalist fortunes were at a low ebb; and while others outside the party became the chief movers of the project through the 1980s, the SNP was committed to participating in the initiative. It is the case, however, that the SNP's potential involvement in this exercise created division within the party, with enthusiastic support coming from its moderate wing, and opposition from the more radical elements. As noted previously, there is a blur in Scotland between Home Rulers and moderate SNPers that is probably more pronounced than in nationalist movements elsewhere, so that this meeting of minds on methods of constitutional change across party lines should come as no great surprise. When the Constitutional Convention actually came into being, with Labour as the strongest force, the SNP declined to participate, citing among other reasons, its inadequate representation. Soon after, the SNP turned against the idea of constitutional conventions in principle, as the radical wing within the party gained the upper hand. Overall, then, the SNP has been lukewarm to alternative methods of advancing the nationalist cause, reflecting the significant range of nationalist sentiment within the party (and within the nation at large), rather than uniform ambivalence.

natural concomitant of pragmatist nationalism, such thresholds can also be used by opponents of the nation in question as barriers to any change. In the case of the Constitutional Convention, both considerations have probably been at work, with the more Machiavellian motive present in certain sections of the Labour party. This question of ulterior motives is discussed further towards the end of this chapter.

45 For details of the events leading to the SNP's pull-out, see Marr, The Battle for Scotland, pp. 202-205.

Constitutional conventions have not been the only proposed alternative to the SNP policy of treating an election victory as sanction for a declaration of Scottish independence. Another procedure sometimes advocated has been to hold a referendum on the independence question to ensure that this is what a majority of Scots really want. Such a procedure has been presented as a way of addressing the democratic shortcomings in the SNP policy, noted above: namely that the SNP might take a majority of seats without a majority of votes, and that people might vote SNP for reasons other than its constitutional policy.

This idea of holding a referendum on independence has not been mooted often in Scotland - perhaps it has not seemed a pressing issue because the SNP has never come close to taking a majority of seats - but it was at one point the subject of a brief debate. The mover of the referendum idea was Neil MacCormick, past office holder and parliamentary candidate for the SNP. MacCormick, son of John MacCormick, takes a stand on Scottish nationalism similar to his father's. Very much in the moderate wing of the SNP, he has consistently supported an Assembly as a worthwhile intermediate option that should be given the SNP's full support; and in his conception of the Scottish nation, he bluntly rejects the idealist proposition that contemporary Scots are meant to serve the nation, rather than vice versa:

Scottish independence may be seen as a means to an end or as an end in itself. To see it as an end in itself is to adopt a very pure nationalist principle: simply because Scotland is a nation, she ought to become a separate state....To accept pure nationalism, however, one must accept a variety of metaphysical beliefs about the nature of nations, beliefs about which rational discussion can scarcely be conducted; one takes pure nationalism, or one leaves it. For my part, I leave it....

A utilitarian nationalism, on the other hand, is concerned to propose independence as being the best means to the well-being of the Scottish people. That is a proposal about which rational argument can, and should, be held. 47

This pragmatist conception of the nation has prompted MacCormick to propose the general principle that "we should seek to go at the speed of the greatest majority in promoting constitutional change."\(^{48}\) This has, on the one hand, led him to support the various initiatives favored by the Home Rulers, including the constitutional convention strategy. But it has also led him to question the legitimacy of the SNP's flagship policy. In an article written in 1976, MacCormick argued that, in view of the gravity of the question of constitutional change, "there must be a majority of votes for independence before it is democratically justified."\(^{49}\)

The response from the SNP's Research Officer at the time, Donald Bain, was that the SNP policy of holding a referendum on a new Scottish constitution only was perfectly adequate; after all, Bain argued, the procedure of selecting a party, via the first-past-the-post system, to implement its program is the "established and accepted procedure for decision-making" in the British political system.\(^{50}\) It would be unfair to characterize this reasoning as wholly spurious, but one suspects other factors were at work convincing Bain, and other idealists, of the righteousness of their position. In contrast to pragmatists within the SNP, like MacCormick, the idealist element tends to believe that the national will of their oppressed nation is not simply the aggregate preferences of its current constituents. This sentiment was evident in a less politic response to MacCormick that came from a reader who took grave exception to the referendum proposal. In its invocation of Scottish history as the backing for nationalist claims, and its dismissal of the relevance of contemporary Scottish opinion, it offered a candid statement of the thinking that often animates those within the hardline idealist camp:


\(^{50}\) Donald Bain, "Mandate and Majorities," Q, no. 13 (October 1976), p. 2.
[MacCormick] will certainly be aware of the undemocratic circumstances in which the Treaty of Union was signed and he must know that the Union was brought about by a combination of bribery and threats of military force, and imposed on a hostile population...

The SNP is engaged in a struggle to undo this injustice and restore Scotland to her soul. Unfortunately, this struggle has to take place in a situation where the minds of the Scottish people are conditioned by British mass media...

Independence is...a generally recognised national right, and it is an aberration that the Scottish nation should have sunk so low that the issue is regarded as debateable.\(^5\)

In Scotland, then, we see marked division of opinion within the ranks of those committed to democratic methods of altering the Scottish nation's constitutional status. Different nationalists take different views as to the precise level of public support required to justify such changes. Pragmatists, more concerned that the people of the nation speak for themselves, have tended to favour those methods that secure significant public input, such as constitutional conventions. Idealists, thinking the views of the people less crucial, opt for methods dependent on the minimal levels of public support compatible with democratic norms, such as an SNP election victory.

The pattern is evident not only within the elite groups that have formulated various plans for constitutional change, but also within the general population. The 1979 Scottish Election Study asked respondents a number of questions that spoke to the issue of legitimate means and thresholds of support required for constitutional change. One question, for instance, asked whether the respondent felt that the recent referendum on a Scottish Assembly had demonstrated that the Scottish people wanted an Assembly. The referendum result, it is important to note, was ambiguous. While 51.6% of those who went to the polls were in favour of an Assembly, only 63.6% of the electorate voted; in other words, only 32.8% of the total electorate voted for an Assembly. Since it had been stipulated by the Labour government that the support of 40% of the total electorate was required for the referendum

\(^5\) Letter from Dr. David Purves, Q, no. 13 (October 1976), p. 6.
to pass, this meant it was a failure, officially speaking. But clearly those in favour of an Assembly might be expected to see matters differently.

It turns out that many nationalistic Scots did reject the official verdict on the 1979 referendum. But their opinions varied considerably, depending on how ardent they were in their nationalism. Table 5.1 breaks down people's evaluations of the referendum outcome by constitutional preference, revealing a marked difference between moderate and radical nationalists. Among those favoring an independent Scotland, 85% felt that the referendum result provided evidence of Scots' desire for an Assembly. Those more pragmatist in their nationalism - supporters of an Assembly - were less impressed. Only 49% thought the referendum demonstrated that an Assembly was desired. Despite wanting an Assembly themselves, the pragmatists were less willing than the idealists to declare that the nation did too, until they had more unambiguous evidence to that effect.

Table 5.1: Opinions on 1979 Scottish Referendum by Constitutional Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Preference</th>
<th>Opinion on Referendum:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want an Assembly</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not want an Assembly</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: "Indecisive Result" and "Don't Know" responses excluded in calculation of percentages. Scottish Assembly category combines those who wanted a Scottish Assembly with control over "some" Scottish affairs with those who wanted an Assembly with control over "most" Scottish affairs. 
Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1979. For further details, see Appendix 1.

Similar differences emerged when respondents were asked what sorts of actions would be justified if the government were to thwart attempts at constitutional change favourable to Scotland.

52 The relatively low number of independence supporters is attributable to two factors. First, there was something of a decline in support for Scottish independence in the late 1970s. Secondly, the question concerning constitutional preferences offered respondents two Assembly options (see notes to Table 5.1). With a strong Assembly as a distinct option, it is not surprising that the number of independence supporters is relatively low on this question (compared to questions that simply present "a Scottish Assembly" as an alternative to independence). One implication of this is that the independence supporters on this question are relatively hard core supporters of that option.
First, it was asked what response would be appropriate if the government were to drop all plans for a Scottish Assembly now that the referendum was over. Next it was asked what action would be justified if the SNP won half the seats at a future election, yet the British government refused to negotiate Scottish independence. In both cases, a series of possible responses was suggested to respondents, ranging from inaction up to actions "which may lead to people getting hurt."

The answers, summarized in Table 5.2, indicate that those supportive of Scottish independence were more likely to support vehement and, in some cases, violent responses. If their aspiration for an independent Scotland (backed, presumably, by the approximately 40% of the Scottish electorate needed to take half the Scottish seats) were rebuffed, only 12% were in favour of doing nothing. Over half (56%) indicated they would support relatively innocuous actions (signing petitions or demonstrating), while 26% said they would favour occupying buildings, damaging property, or engaging in acts that might lead to people getting hurt. Supporters of a Scottish Assembly, on the other hand, advocated on the whole a more docile response to a shelving of their favoured constitutional reform. If the government were to drop all plans for an Assembly, 35% said they would prefer that nothing be done; another 55% indicated that participating in petitions or demonstrations would be a suitable response, while only 3% were favourable to occupying buildings, damaging property or undertaking actions that might cause people to be hurt.

It might be argued that this comparison is invalid because it compares apples and oranges: the Assembly initiative had recently failed by the official rules of the game and the independence scenario spelled out for respondents involved a denial of Scottish independence rightfully won by the rules of the game (at least as the SNP had defined them). There was, in the latter case, greater justification for an angry response. However, similar differences between the two groups of nationalists are evident in the actions they deemed appropriate to defend constitutional reforms other than their preferred option. The supporters of a Scottish Assembly were considerably less supportive of violent actions to protest a
denial of Scottish independence than their more radical counterparts; while the radicals were markedly more willing to spring vigorously to the defence of a Scottish Assembly than their moderate allies (see Table 5.2).  

Table 5.2: Action If Scottish Constitutional Change Rebuffed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Preference</th>
<th>If Scottish Assembly Dropped, Appropriate Response Would Be...</th>
<th>Scottish Assembly (n=394)</th>
<th>Independence (n=50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No action</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing petitions</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations such as street marches</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupying buildings</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaging property</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions which may lead to people getting hurt</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Independence Denied After SNP Majority, Appropriate Response Would Be...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No action</th>
<th>Signing petitions</th>
<th>Demonstrations such as street marches</th>
<th>Occupying buildings</th>
<th>Damaging property</th>
<th>Actions which may lead to people getting hurt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Columns do not total 100% because "Don't Know" and "None of these Actions" responses have been excluded. Scottish Assembly category defined as in Table 5.1.

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1979. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The differences that are apparent in these data confirm that the pragmatist/idealist divide evident in the actions and words of the elite groups that have formulated various plans for Scottish constitutional change also finds expression in the Scottish public. Pragmatists think higher levels of support are required to sanction constitutional change because their sense of nationhood is more

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53 Another relevant comparison between the two groups is their general propensity to support these various forms of political protest, irrespective of the issue involved. The independence supporters were more likely to support radical actions in general. For example, 42% of the independence supporters thought occupying buildings is occasionally or frequently justified, compared to 29% of the Assembly supporters; similarly, 14% of independence supporters said actions that might lead to people getting hurt are sometimes acceptable, compared to 7% of Assembly supporters. These differences are substantial; but they are less pronounced than the differences that are evident between the two groups when the issue of constitutional change is invoked. Furthermore, it may be that independence supporters have in mind the issue of Scottish nationalism when they voice support for radical action in general.
closely harnessed to the present sentiments of those who currently comprise the nation. Idealist supporters of independence, their sense of nationhood less constrained by the empirical here and now, are comfortable proceeding with relatively low levels of public support, and will, when the opportunity presents itself, seize upon ambiguous results, like the 1979 referendum, as evidence of the Scottish nation’s desire for emancipation. Furthermore, if their efforts to free the nation meet with resistance, these idealists are more apt to pursue the matter through some mix of democratic and para-democratic means, evincing a deep conviction in the righteousness of their cause.

Other nationalist movements show similar divisions within their ranks over this question of legitimate means of effecting constitutional change. In Quebec, there have, at various points, been lengthy debates on different aspects of the issue. Perhaps most notable was the conflict over whether a referendum was required to sanction Quebec’s independence, rather than merely a Parti Québécois (PQ) election victory, a question that brought out the latent divisions within the party between its militant and moderate wings. It hadn’t been an important issue in the earlier stages of the modern Quebec nationalist movement, when more radical groups were at the helm. The policy of the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance Nationale (RIN) was that an election victory would be sanction enough for a declaration of Quebec independence, and the same policy was adopted by the PQ when it was formed in 1968. As in Scotland, the first-past-the-post system used in Canadian elections meant that independence, by this policy, could be declared with less than 50% support from the population. When, however, the issue came to the fore, it sparked a protracted and fractious debate.

It was in the early 1970s that Claude Morin, an influential newcomer to the PQ from the ranks of Quebec’s civil service, proposed that a referendum be held following a PQ election victory to ensure that there existed majority support for sovereignty. Some have seen this largely as a reflection of realpolitik considerations on the part of an ambitious PQ leadership: voters uncertain about sovereignty might be persuaded to vote PQ if a referendum promise were in place (a judgment borne
out by the 1976 election result). But the proposed modification reflected, too, a sense that the PQ had to abide by the wishes of the Québécois nation, defined, à la pragmatist nationalism, as those people currently living in Quebec. As Morin wrote in defense of the referendum mechanism in 1974, "it is essential for the party to demonstrate its intention of guiding Quebec to a state of sovereignty in a manner that is closer to the Québécois environment and Québécois thinking, and thus more acceptable to our population."54 In his concern to respect the preferences of the people, Morin was joined by Lévesque, and the two together were successful in pressing the change in policy on a party fraught with hostile elements. Because of the bitterness roused by the issue, the change in policy was introduced in piecemeal fashion, but by the time of the 1976 election, the referendum promise was firmly in place as the PQ swept to its first election victory.55

Resistance to the change in policy came, according to Morin, largely from those within the PQ who had previously been members of the RIN.56 These people were, for the most part, ardent supporters of independence, wary of Levesque's sovereignty-association concept, which Morin enthusiastically endorsed. Again, then, the linkage is evident between support for the pure nationalist project - independence - and the feeling that this status can be claimed without majority backing.

Describing later the more enthusiastic types in the militant wing of the PQ, with whom he locked horns on the referendum and other issues, Morin suggested that they were positively evangelical in their nationalism. Convinced of the righteousness of their cause, they were not unlike people he had known in earlier years who had poured their zealotry into the Catholic movements of the


55 A year-by-year summary of the evolving referendum policy (and other events) from 1973 to 1976 is in *ibid.*, pp. 73-171. Morin's account of the referendum struggle can be found in Claude Morin, *Les choses comme elles étaient* (Montreal: Boréal, 1994), pp. 311-324.

56 Interview with Claude Morin, 26 May 1995.
1950s. These new apostles had a different object of faith - the nation - but their belief in it was similarly unshakeable.  

As in Scotland, the nation's unconditional existence and attendant right to independence are not the public rationale typically offered by idealists to justify their standpoint. Other reasons are proffered. For example, there are those in Quebec who, like some Scottish nationalists, have appealed to parliamentary practice to argue that an election victory is warrant enough for independence. Pierre Bourgault writes that under the British parliamentary system, the elected party has a right to implement its program; hence the PQ could legitimately proclaim independence upon winning an election victory. But again, it must be asked whether this is the sole legitimating factor sustaining this idealist belief. This is after all the same Pierre Bourgault who felt in 1961 that the RIN were the nation, that their belief in the need for Quebec independence made them the repository of national wisdom. If a party with a membership numbering in the hundreds could claim to speak for the nation, then surely today's PQ would be justified in doing likewise.

Since the referendum question was settled in favour of the moderates' viewpoint in the first half of the 1970s, it has only come to the fore at one other point. At the PQ conference in December 1981, delegates incensed by the recent constitutional negotiations in Ottawa that had seen Quebec left standing alone outside the constitutional fold, voted to remove virtually all references to "association" from the PQ program and passed a resolution stating that a majority of PQ seats in an election would henceforth be sufficient for independence. Lévesque and other moderates were taken aback by this turn

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57 Morin, *Les choses comme elles étaient*, pp. 254-256. In an interview, M. Morin suggested too that there was a similarity between the attitudes of the PQ's militant wing and Lenin's views on the role of the revolutionary party: both were of the view that the benighted masses must be guided to the light by a small, determined vanguard. The parallel is apt. The common element in these different movements is, it might be argued, that they spring from belief systems involving an idealist faith that convinces true believers of the righteousness of their cause.

58 Bourgault, *Now or Never!: Manifesto for an Independent Quebec*, pp. 121-126, esp. 125. Bourgault does say, however, that his preference is for a referendum to be held.
of events, and the offending resolutions were reversed when Lévesque organized a referendum of the full party membership in which overwhelming support for sovereignty-association and a referendum were expressed.\(^{59}\) Today, there is virtually no open questioning of the referendum mechanism, but certainly there are PQ activists happy to reveal that they accept the referendum more as a political necessity than an essential legitimizing procedure. Proceeding with less than 50% support would, these idealists feel, be legitimate, but highly impolitic.

Of course, holding a referendum on a single constitutional option is hardly, it was suggested above, the zenith of public consultation that it is sometimes made out to be. There are other mechanisms of change that afford each individual member of the nation a greater say over the future of their community, and thereby more closely approximate the social contract ideal. One is the constitutional convention approach that the pragmatists in Scotland have regularly and enthusiastically employed in their efforts to change their nation's constitutional status. In Quebec, this method of plumbing the nation's most basic aspirations has not been used to the same extent.

There has, however, been one notable effort to undertake such an initiative in Quebec. This was largely the work of traditional nationalist elements within Quebec society, elements that, as argued in Chapter 4, hewed to a pragmatist nationalism rooted in the concrete elements of French-Canadian distinctiveness, quite different from the idealist nationalism that has come to gain a very sizable foothold in Quebec society. It was, in 1963, Jean-Jacques Bertrand of the Union Nationale who put forth a motion in Quebec's Legislative Assembly "calling for a special committee to study ways of convening an estates-general of the French-Canadian nation with a view to preparing a new constitution."\(^{60}\) And in 1966, it was the traditionalist Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec (SSJB) that took up that call, organizing a congress of French-Canada's "Estates-General" in November 1966


with 1800 delegates, to carry out "une étude objective et impartiale des problèmes consitutionnels de la nation canadienne-française."61 Those assembled to deliberate on these matters represented the 108 counties of Quebec, as well as French-Canadians outside the province. Many were "picked at local conventions where members of any organizations grouping French Canadians were free to nominate representatives....Others were selected by corps intermédiaires, that is, special interest groups, on the provincial level [such as Chambers of Commerce, women's organizations, and student groups]."62

It is not surprising that the SSJB found this broad public consultation the most salutary way to proceed in matters constitutional, for it was the advocate of a staunchly pragmatist nationalism. The SSJB was among those groups still clinging, in the 1960s, to the idea of a French-Canadian nation consisting of the French-speaking diaspora scattered across the country: "les canadiens-français...sont des canadiens, c'est-à-dire des citoyens du Canada, et de langue française....ils se retrouvent partout au pays, de l'atlantique au pacifique."63 Moving with the times, the religious component of French-Canadianness was increasingly downplayed, and greater emphasis was laid on French language and culture, but still the sentiment prevailed within the SSJB that it was important concrete attributes, nothing more, nothing less, that made the French-Canadians a community with certain delimited rights.64 Those favouring this pragmatist sense of community, more closely harnessed to sociological realities than the idealist vision of a seamless Québécois nation, were mindful of the diversity of


64 Note that these comments pertain to the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec, the organizer of the Estates-General initiative. A related organization, the Fédération des Sociétés Saints-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, was more radical in its thinking and in 1969 came out in favour of the independence of Quebec. On the differences between the two organizations, see ibid., pp. 64-65.
viewpoints within their far-flung community - hence their enthusiasm for the constitutional convention model. The respect for individual autonomy implied by this preferred approach to constitutional change was made explicit, at the SSJB's 1969 conference, in a pronouncement concerning non-partisanship in elections: "comme dirigeants de la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec...nous croyons qu'en cette matière [of electoral choice], il faut respecter scrupuleusement la liberté individuelle du citoyen et ne rien faire qui puisse, de quelque façon porter atteinte à cette liberté."\(^{65}\) The people of the SSJB's French-Canadian nation were free to make their own choices on basic political matters because the nation was not, for these pragmatists, an all-encompassing entity crowding out the autonomy of the individual.

But despite its efforts to appeal to the people at large, the Estates-General initiative failed to generate sufficient popular enthusiasm and it had relatively little impact on events. The reason why constitutional conventions have featured less prominently in Quebec than Scotland is fairly clear. Canada's is a federal political system, and the provincial government of Quebec is therefore the natural locus of public consultation and decision-making concerning Quebec's constitutional future. Here too certain pragmatist/idealist contrasts are apparent, in the distinctive approaches in this regard favored by different Quebec governments. The records of the two major Quebec parties - the PQ and the Liberal Party - in securing and respecting the views of the citizenry, vis à vis Quebec's constitutional future, are subtly different, with the idealist PQ sometimes showing less interest in hearing from the full spectrum of opinion within Quebec.

It must be said, however, that both the PQ and the Liberals have at times followed British parliamentary tradition and simply plowed ahead with their own nationalist agenda when afforded the opportunity to do so by an electoral majority. The PQ, after taking power in 1976 did not sound out the views of Quebecers at large, but instead held a referendum in May 1980 on its preferred constitutional

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 68.
option, sovereignty-association. The Liberals, on taking power in 1985, proceeded to negotiate the
Meech Lake Accord with the other provinces and Ottawa, without first ascertaining if this was the will
of the people. The method, in both cases, could be deemed presumptuous of the nation's desires -
though the Liberal project did, in point of fact, enjoy much greater support than the PQ's (one poll, for
example, found 61% of Quebecers in favour of the Accord and a mere 16% opposed). 66

At other points, both parties have engaged in public consultations to determine the views of
the nation on the important matter of its constitutional future, and it is here that some
pragmatist/idealist differences are apparent. Following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the
Liberal government of Robert Bourassa launched the Commission on the Political and Constitutional
Future of Québec. Also known as the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, one of its co-presidents was a
sovereigntist (Jean Campeau), the other a federalist (Michel Bélanger). Other commissioners were also
drawn from various points on the spectrum of nationalist opinion within Quebec. Over the course of
three months, the commission heard submissions from supporters of independence, proponents of
renewed federalism, and those more or less content with the status quo. Thus did the commission, in a
variety of ways, "[reproduce] within itself the basic divisions riddling Quebec society." 67 With the
population at large represented, the commission proceeded with its broad mandate, which "was to
consider all Quebec's political and constitutional options, save for the status quo and union with the
United States, and prepare a consensus position by March 1991." 68 The Liberals, then, came close to
the constitutional convention model in the composition and mandate of the Bélanger-Campeau

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66 Cited in Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, third edition with a postscript


68 Ibid., p. 151.
Commission (though it was, of course, a body appointed by the government rather than selected by the people).

There were some notable differences in the PQ's approach when it undertook a similar exercise upon regaining power in 1994. A draft bill declaring Quebec's independence was passed forthwith by the new government, after which hearings were held around the province in early 1995 to gather public input. Only one avenue for Quebec's future was open for discussion at these hearings; participants were invited to submit opinion and commentary that would allow the government to iron out the details of Quebec sovereignty. Because of this foreclosure of other options, the hearings were boycotted by the Liberal Party and other advocates of a more moderate Quebec nationalism. Those dissenting groups that did appear argued, to no avail, that the hearings should be opened up to the full range of constitutional possibilities. Despite this peremptory circumscription of choice, Jacques Parizeau, PQ leader at the time, felt justified in declaring at the outset, "We are discussing an unprecedented exercise, one of the most profoundly democratic exercises in our history...From this exercise will flow our future." Democratic perhaps in that anyone could appear before the commissioners, but in its exclusion of certain shades of nationalist opinion, it was an exercise

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69 The report of that came out of these hearings recommended that some limited form of political association with Canada be maintained in a sovereign Quebec. This laid the groundwork for the PQ, the Bloc Québécois and the Parti Action Démocratique to paper over their differences concerning the desirability of complete independence; a referendum on sovereignty would be held, the three parties agreed in June 1995, and an offer of limited political partnership with Canada would be made in the event of a Yes vote. In this sense, some consensus-building did come out of the PQ's public consultation exercise, but this took place strictly within the sovereigntist camp, rather than across all sectors of Quebec society.

70 See, for example, Canadian Jewish Congress representative Max Bernard's comments cited in "Ethnic leaders get rough ride at sovereignty hearings," Canadian Press Newswire, 2 March 1995.

significantly less solicitous of the full gamut of Quebec opinion than the Bélanger-Campeau Commission.\textsuperscript{72}

In Quebec, then, patterns emerge that are similar to those seen in the Scottish case. Those more pragmatist in their nationalism, hewing to a sense of community deeply suffused with the empirical aspects of nationhood, favour methods of constitutional change that treat members of the nation as autonomous individuals free to hold any preference for the nation’s future that they so choose. Idealists favour a conception of the nation less constrained by empirical realities, underwritten instead by a fortifying faith that generates the belief that being part of the nation is not a function of external appearances, but of something deep within. Thus, others are deemed to be members of the nation, regardless of their own feelings on the matter; and methods of acceding to independence that

\textsuperscript{72} This brief account of events of the 1990s glosses over some important facts and alternative interpretations. First, there are those who would argue that Bourassa may have solicited a wide range of views from the people, but he did not abide by those views. The Bélanger-Campeau Commission recommended that a referendum be held on Quebec sovereignty in 1992 and that offers from the rest of Canada for constitutional renewal be considered in the meantime. An offer was made by the federal government and the other provinces - the Charlottetown Accord - but it fell far short of most Quebeckers' expectations and indeed of the Liberal demands outlined in a recent statement of the party’s position on the constitutional question, the Allaire Report. Nevertheless, Bourassa agreed to hold a referendum on this new offer. It was rejected by Quebec (and most of the other provinces) in October 1992, and no subsequent referenda were held under the Liberal government.

From this sequence of events, Bourassa’s critics conclude that the Liberal leader was not interested in the views of the people if these did not coincide with his own preference for a modestly reformed federalism. They also surmise that to the extent Bourassa was mindful of public opinion, it was not due to any deep veneration for public sentiment, but rather to a desire to hold on to power. These ulterior motives on the part of the Liberal leader certainly cannot be dismissed; Bourassa, as a professional politician, is not necessarily a prime example of a pragmatist nationalist sincerely deferring to the views of the nation at every turn. However, the process that unfolded after the failure of the Meech Lake was not one person’s doing; Bourassa was constrained in his actions by sentiment within his party and the province at large. For many, finding a consensus among the people and trying to bring it to fruition was the appropriate route to follow, and this sentiment likely had its effect on the actions taken by the Liberal government.

As for the PQ, it should be noted that it did participate in the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (though as the opposition party at the time, its choice was to participate or have no influence over events). Furthermore, the October 1995 referendum could be seen as the long overdue fulfillment of the recommendations of Bélanger-Campeau - a new offer had been made that was inadequate and rejected by the people of Quebec, so the time had come for a referendum on sovereignty (though this rationale was not invoked much at the time). Finally, it could be argued that since reformed federalism was not going to fly in the rest of the country and most Quebeckers did want significant changes, a referendum on sovereignty might serve to break the impasse.

These considerations suggest that other factors may have been partly responsible for the different procedures followed by the Liberals and the PQ in their respective exercises in public consultation. But if the current argument is sound, their particular brands of nationalism also likely conditioned their respective approaches.
disregard the present preferences of the people are felt to be acceptable. It is a rigid sort of nationalism, often open-minded and progressive on other social and political issues, but unyielding on the question of national independence.

It is important to be clear about the phenomenon identified here, for it is not simply a matter of opponents of a stateless nation trying to thwart its aspirations by raising the threshold for change unreasonably high. The examples cited here of staunch proponents of public input on the national question focus on those who would be happy to call themselves nationalists, who sincerely want enhanced powers for their nation, but whose conception of that nation is decidedly modest and unassuming. The marked tendency for these pragmatist nationalists to think high levels of public input necessary to legitimize nationalist projects is not simply a way of thwarting changes they oppose, for it applies to any nationalist project, including their preferred one. In effect, though these pragmatist nationalists have a personal preference for the nation's future, they also have an overriding meta-preference, which is to let the people of the nation decide for themselves the constitutional arrangements properly accommodating of their communal aspirations. Theirs is not an idealist nationalism projected from nationalist onto nation, but rather a pragmatist nationalism projected from nation onto nationalist. As John MacCormick once put it, the aim of moderate Scottish nationalists was to "find a unity of purpose and not to impose it." 73

We have spent some time analyzing this particular point of difference, not only because it is of inherent interest as an occasional bone of contention within stateless nations, but also because it speaks directly to the distinctive ways in which pragmatists and idealist conceptualize their nation. For idealists, the nation is an abstract entity that has an existence above and beyond the people who currently comprise it. For pragmatists, the nation is grounded in the empirical realities of a distinctive sociological community and its current level of self-awareness and political aspiration. It is a

difference that has a decisive impact on their evaluation of different means of advancing the nationalist cause. We now turn to consider further differences in the political behaviors and attitudes that flow from the distinctive shadings of identity present within stateless nations.
Chapter 6

The Rationality of Pragmatists and Idealists

Introduction

Whereas Chapter 5 focused on one rather narrow point of difference that sometimes divides different nationalists, this and the following two chapters are more broadly pitched, analyzing some of the general political phenomena produced by pragmatist/idealist variations in national identity. In this chapter, attention is directed to the internal thought processes and motivations that shape pragmatist and idealist political behavior. Of particular interest is the rationality of the two nationalist types. Chapters 7 and 8 move from internal thought processes to focus more on those aspects of behavior readily apparent to the outside observer (patterns of nationalist activity and general mobilization trends). The presumed causal linkages underlying this analytical approach are shown in Figure 6.1. Variations in national identity, it is posited, are largely responsible for the modes of reasoning distinctive to pragmatists and idealists, which in turn generate visible differences in their political behavior and attitudes.

Figure 6.1: Overview of Analytical Approach of Chapters 6, 7 and 8
Throughout this chapter, quantitative evidence from survey research is used more extensively than before to substantiate hypotheses. That quantitative evidence is drawn from the Scottish and Quebec cases only, because there is little such material available for Brittany. The data are also drawn from various points in time, from the start of the 1960s, when researchers first began probing nationalist opinion in Quebec and Scotland, through to the present day. For the most part, contextual details are not drawn into the analysis, because the observations speak to abiding differences between pragmatists and idealists that, in theory, hold over time and place. That said, however, the analysis does reveal certain ways in which the Scottish case deviates from theoretical expectations. Scottish nationalism is, on the whole, more pragmatist, a theme alluded to earlier in the Scottish case study, where it was suggested that there is something of a blur between pragmatist and idealist nationalism in Scotland. Once this basic difference is taken into account, the political behavior of Scottish nationalists becomes more intelligible, conforming reasonably well to the predicted patterns.

As Figure 6.1 implies, and for reasons outlined at the start of Chapter 5, national identity is not always used as the explanatory variable in this analysis; constitutional preference (e.g. support for independence or devolution) is sometimes used instead. Typically, this is because identity questions are missing from otherwise useful datasets - ones with data on outcome variables of interest - and constitutional preference is held to be a reasonable proxy for national identity. Where questions about identity are used, they are treated with circumspection, for they generally gauge only the strength of people's identity, and do not tap into the more qualitative pragmatist/idealist dimension of nationalist sentiment. They are a good first cut at measuring national identity, but should not be taken as the final word.

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1 For further discussion of Breton public opinion surveys, see Appendix 1.
A) Pragmatists, Idealists and Rational Choice

To understand the political behavior of pragmatist and idealist nationalists, it is first necessary to explore the internal thought processes that underwrite said behavior. An attempt must be made, in other words, to see the world as they do, for perceptions are paramount in determining behavior, and perceptions are not always an ungilded reflection of reality. Instead, they are sometimes coloured by prior belief and conviction.

Others would contend that people are generally rational in their political behavior, and that nationalists are no exception to the rule. People may act in accordance with their perceptions, but those perceptions generally represent an honest and unbiased appraisal of social and political realities. It is a viewpoint typically associated with the rational choice school of thought, which has become influential in the field of political science of late, and informs many recent studies of nationalism and specific nationalist movements.

This chapter, in its examination of nationalist thought processes, finds that the rational choice framework is an inadequate conceptual tool for understanding the full gamut of nationalist thinking and behavior. The rational choice approach sheds some light on the thought processes that underpin pragmatist behavior, but offers less illumination of idealist nationalism.

The weaknesses of rational choice theory lie in its most basic assumptions. Simply stated, rational choice theory assumes:²

1) That people are moved to take a particular action or hold a particular viewpoint, when the net benefits to be derived are thought to be positive; or, more formally, that people act when \( p(B) \times B > p(C) \times C \), where \( B \) represents all benefits associated with an action, \( C \) all costs, and \( p \) the probability of those costs and benefits being realized.

2) That people have a realistic assessment of the relevant probabilities.

3) That people have a realistic assessment of potential benefits and costs. "Realistic" is not easily defined in this case, for the value people attach to things is highly personal and subjective. Rational choice theorists usually take realistic to mean that people concern themselves with tangible costs and benefits only. Some narrow the definition further, assuming that people's cost/benefit assessments are largely a reflection of strictly economic considerations. In the case of nationalist movements, however, rational choice theorists might also deem relevant potential gains and losses in the cultural realm: the protection of language, culture, distinctive political and social values, etc. What rational choice theorists largely agree on is that symbolic or intangible gains and losses are not part of realistic cost-benefit assessments, and therefore are not important determinants of political behavior.

The evidence presented below suggests these rational choice assumptions may hold for pragmatist nationalists, but do not apply so readily to idealists. The second assumption, that people have a realistic sense of relevant probabilities, is doubtful, for idealists sometimes have skewed perceptions of the likelihood of different outcomes. The third assumption also is suspect, because
idealists often seem to care more about intangible costs and benefits than tangible ones. Specifically, it is an idealized national identity, an irreducible and, to the outsider, largely unfathomable, consideration, that primarily moves them. The result is distinctive behavior on the part of the idealists, behavior that the rational choice theorist would deem irrational.\(^3\)

In arguing that the rational choice spotlight fails to illuminate all points on the nationalist spectrum equally, a further claim is also advanced: namely, that it is qualities intrinsic to pragmatist and idealist nationalism that make the one less rational than the other. This is a corollary of the more general hypothesis, and guiding postulate of this thesis, that variations in identity have a decisive impact on nationalist politics. Rational choice aficionados would, for the most part, take a contrary stand, contending that the politics of nationalism are better conceived as follows: common identity + mediating factors = different political behaviors and attitudes. The mediating factors they would deem especially relevant are differences in people's cost-benefit calculations, viz., common identity + differing assessments of the cost-benefit calculus = different political behaviors and attitudes. The analysis below takes issue with the relationship this model posits between identity and cost-benefit calculations. Whereas the rational choice approach typically assumes that variations in cost-benefit calculations are independent of identity, the following pages contend that they are partly - perhaps even largely - a function of identity.

The distinction between the two approaches is presented visually in Figure 6.2. Part B shows the conceptualization favored here: there may be differences between pragmatists and idealists, other

\(^3\) This analysis does not challenge the first and most axiomatic of these three assumptions of the rational choice school of thought, that people act when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs. Like many axioms, it is not really susceptible to refutation: if people act in ways that seem, at first blush, irrational, it must be because of a failure on the part of the researcher to measure all costs and benefits relevant to their behavior. The contentious part of rational choice theory lies in the ancillary assumptions that significantly narrow the range of outcomes consistent with the theory. It is these validity of these assumptions that the current analysis assesses.
than identity, relevant to their political behavior and attitudes, but they can, at least in part, be traced back to their distinctive national identities. It is this proposition that this chapter seeks to substantiate.

**Figure 6.2: Alternative Models of Nationalist Cost-Benefit Assessments**

![Diagram of Alternative Models of Nationalist Cost-Benefit Assessments]

Before proceeding, however, a few words might be said about the alternative viewpoint. A great many researchers, particularly those interested in the wave of nationalist unrest that swept the developed world from the 1960s on, have adopted a conceptual framework akin to that shown in Figure 6.2a, and undertaken to demonstrate that nationalist politics owes less to national identity than it does to other factors. Occasionally, the position is taken to the extreme, and the case is made that national identity is essentially immaterial; other concerns are, in themselves, sufficient to generate nationalist agitation (and thus the identity box could simply be deleted from Figure 6.2a). More often
the implicit thinking is that national identity may be a necessary pre-requisite for the emergence of nationalist politics, but it is not sufficient. The usual assumption here is that national identity does not vary much from person to person within a stateless nation (as in Figure 6.2a); therefore other factors must be responsible for the marked variation in nationalist activity from one individual to the next. Sometimes the same logic is applied in trying to account for variation in nationalist agitation over time. Again the common presumption is that the strength of national identity does not greatly fluctuate from one period to the next; hence, variation in political mobilization must be due to other factors that do show movement over time.

Analyses of this type include those accounts of post-war nationalist unrest in the developed world that have identified socio-economic change as the reason why previously dormant national identities became unexpectedly politicized. In the 1960s and 1970s, theories of this sort often focused on particular classes who were heading the nationalist charge, for reasons, so it was argued, of class interest, and deemed this to be evidence of the pivotal role played in nationalist politics by factors other than national identity.4 In the past ten or fifteen years, researchers on the lookout for motivations

4 Such theories would include the "new middle class" hypothesis used to explain the rise of Quebec nationalism. Educated, ambitious Quebeckers in technocratic occupations, some researchers suggested, saw separation as a means of furthering their class interests. See, for example, Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," Journal of Political Economy, 72, 2 (April 1964), pp. 376-386; Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," Queen's Quarterly, 71, 2 (Summer 1964), 150-162; Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia," Queen's Quarterly, 72, 1 (Spring, 1965), 150-168. A more recent study that finds the theory wanting can be found in André Blais and Stéphane Dion, "Les employés du secteur public sont-ils différents?", Revue Française de Science Politique, 37, 1 (February 1987), pp. 76-97.

In Scotland, similar arguments were advanced, with special attention focused on the enthusiasm for Scottish nationalism among upwardly mobile Scots with working class roots and middle class ambitions. See, for example, Stephen W. Kendrick, Social Change and Nationalism in Modern Scotland. Ph.D. Thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1983), esp. pp. 267-278; and H.M. Drucker and Gordon Brown, The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution (London: Longman, 1980). Others pointed to increased awareness of Scotland's status as an "internal colony" within the U.K. as the factor that tipped the scales in favour of political separation. Rather than blocked ambitions, it was economic oppression and injustice that made the Scottish identity especially salient to some. See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and Phillip M. Rawkins, "Outsiders as Insiders: The Implications of Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales," Comparative Politics, 10, 4 (July 1978), pp. 519-534.

In the Breton case, some have argued that a self-interested Breton bourgeoisie was one of the key social classes involved in the post-war Breton movement, particularly in the activities of CELIB (see Renaud Dulong, La Question Bretonne (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques / Armand Colin, 1975). More often,
other than identity that inspire nationalist discontent, have tended to move away from class-based analysis. Recognizing that members of classes do not necessarily think as one, the preferred tack today is to search for distinctive attitudes that are correlated with nationalist political preferences. Chief among these are people's assessments of the tangible costs and benefits associated with separation or devolution, such as economic gains and losses of various kinds.⁵

Many of these more recent works, especially those in a quantitative vein, have made one significant improvement over previous efforts. They recognize that national identity does vary considerably from one person to the next, and take this into account. In most contemporary multivariate analysis of nationalist attitudes, for example, national identity is included as a control variable. In this way, attempts are made to determine the impact of tangible considerations, such as perceived economic costs and benefits, net of identity effects. This strategy is essentially a modified


Interest in the Breton movement has waned along with the fortunes of the movement, and relatively little has been written in the past few years.
rational choice approach, in that it recognizes both tangible considerations and more intangible matters - viz. national identity - as important determinants of nationalist attitudes. In the analysis below, a similar approach is followed, but is taken one step further. The argument is made that controlling for identity in the standard fashion may not suffice, and that the conditioning effects of identity on nationalist attitudes have, for this reason, probably been understated.

In sum: whereas other researchers have assumed either that identity is unimportant, or that it is more or less constant and therefore not responsible for variation in nationalist attitudes, or that it varies, but is easily controlled for, the analysis below suggests that more attention still should be directed to this crucial variable in our efforts to understand nationalist attitudes and behavior.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first two address, in turn, the second and third assumptions of rational choice theory. A mixture of theoretical reasoning and quantitative evidence is used to demonstrate that pragmatist and idealist identities influence both perceptions of the probability of different political outcomes, and the relative salience of tangible and intangible costs and benefits. The third and fourth sections undertake quantitative analysis of support for independence in Quebec and Scotland, the results of which serve to reinforce the tentative conclusions derived to that point. This analysis lays the groundwork for the following chapters, where the discussion turns from the internal thought processes that motivate nationalists to more readily observed behaviors.

B) Evaluations of the Probability of Success

One contrasting element of pragmatist and idealist thinking is their differing evaluations of the likelihood that their nationalist movement will succeed in its endeavours. Idealists tend to be highly optimistic, pragmatists more pessimistic. Most outside observers would say that the pragmatists are
more realistic, in that their assessment of the situation is a more honest reflection of actual levels of national consciousness and political will in the population.

The difference in outlook derives from an aspect of the idealist-pragmatist typology already alluded to in the previous chapter's discussion of legitimate means of effecting the nationalist program. Idealists, it was suggested, operate with a faith-based nationalism that involves an element of projection from nationalist onto nation. They tend to presume that others, cognizant of it or not, are full-fledged members of their nation, which leads them to support methods of enhancing the nation's power that are not reliant on high levels of public input and support.

These projective tendencies also affect the idealist's assessment of the probability of their movement's success. If others are uncategorically members of the nation, it follows that they will inevitably come to realize this themselves in due course, and throw their support behind the nationalist cause. For the pragmatist, on the other hand, who is more apt to look upon fellow nationals as free agents rather than servants of the nation, the prospect that others will continue to renounce the nation is a distinct possibility. Success is far from certain.

The idealist tendency to think victory assured is apparent whenever people are asked questions about the likelihood of their nation someday becoming independent. Those supportive of independence are much more likely to believe their nation will attain that status than are non-supporters. The data in Table 6.1 show the phenomenon clearly at work in the Quebec and Scottish cases.\footnote{The data in Table 6.1 are not quite up to the analytical task at hand. To demonstrate a difference between idealists and pragmatists, further data would be required: specifically, data showing the perceived likelihood of some lesser change in the nation's status coming into effect. This might reveal, for example, whether supporters of a special status for Quebec tend to hold unrealistic expectations about the future prospects for that particular political reform. The expectation would be that pragmatists would not be excessively optimistic about their preferred option, that they would, in other words, not project their personal desires in the same way that idealists do. This was the type of analytical strategy used in the previous chapter. In an attempt to show that pragmatists and idealists differed in their assessments of various means of bringing about desired changes, data were presented showing people's views on this issue for their preferred option (a Scottish Assembly versus Scottish independence). In this case, however, data were not available for the requisite comparisons. The same, it must be said, is true of other results presented in this chapter. Thus, in places, the analysis is essentially focused on}
Table 6.1: Perceived Likelihood of Independence/Separation by Personal Constitutional Preference, Quebec and Scotland

a) Quebec, 1990 (francophones only*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood of Quebec Separation</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposed to Separation** (n=230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Favour of Separation** (n=136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Likely</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Unlikely</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the definition of francophones on this and all other Quebec surveys, see Appendix 1.
** Those in favour of separation include those who thought Quebec should "become totally separate from Canada"; and those who thought Quebec "should move towards separation but retain some links to Canada", but also felt that the differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada were "too serious to ever be overcome." (Combination of Questions 59 and 62). The second group were added because of the relatively small number (n=52) who supported total separation. All others were deemed to be opposed to separation.

Source: Author's calculation based on CBC/Globe and Mail Poll, July 1990. For further details, see Appendix 1.

b) Scotland, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In 10 years Scotland will be an independent country...</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independence (n=264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree Strongly</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree Strongly</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents undecided as to constitutional preference have been excluded.
Source: Author's calculation based on MORI 1978. For further details, see Appendix 1.

That these sentiments should go together - the personal desire for national independence and the belief that such will someday come to pass - is not terribly surprising. Wishful thinking is a common phenomenon. But it is not a uniform phenomenon. Sometimes the accent belongs on idealists and their distinctive viewpoints. Proper comparisons with moderate nationalists are not possible because the relevant questions have not been asked on surveys conducted to date.
"wishful," as when people uncertain about the future offer glib assurances of success to come largely as a way of affirming their support for a cause. Other times, the emphasis lies on "thinking," this when people sincerely anticipate future success because of genuine, if mistaken, perceptions they hold of current conditions. The idealist's confidence in eventual victory seems to be of the second type. Idealists hold certain beliefs about the current state of the nation and the nationalist cause that buttress their optimism about prospects for the future.

Evidence to this effect be found in the 1968 Canadian National Election Survey. Quebec respondents in that poll were asked whether they themselves supported separation and were also asked to estimate the level of support for separation in the province. The survey revealed that support for separation was actually about 10%, with a further 18% undecided. People's perceptions, though, were dramatically different, and a principal determinant of those perceptions was their personal constitutional preference. As Table 6.2 shows, 56% of those personally in favour of separation thought that a majority of Quebeckers felt likewise, compared to only 23% of non-separatists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Level of Support for Separation</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposed to Separation (n=401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Favour of Separation (n=68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% or more</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents undecided about separation have been excluded.

Source: Author's calculation based on 1968 Canadian National Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.

There was, admittedly, considerable misperception on both sides of the separatist divide. Many misgauged the true level of support for separation. Understandably: after all, this was a time

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7 Author's calculation based on 1968 Canadian National Election Survey.
when there was much talk of separatist mania sweeping the province, and opinion polls, which might have tempered the hyperbole with hard factual evidence, were rarely conducted. On the other hand, a fair number of people must have been aware that in the provincial election two years previous, the separatist parties (the RIN and the RN) had received only 9% of the vote. It is useful, in cases where misperception is rife, to control for levels of political awareness to ensure that this important factor is held constant in comparing the perceptions of different groups. Since education is one of the key determinants of political awareness, it was included as a control variable in a multivariate regression model, to see whether it was partially responsible for the observed difference between separatists and non-separatists in their perceptions of separation support levels. However, the gap did not diminish with the inclusion of this variable (results not shown here).8

This perceptual difference suggests that the idealist's is not a superficial or glib optimism. The causal chain that ends in idealist confidence about the future does not pass directly from a desire for separation to the belief that separation is likely to come about. Instead it passes through intervening beliefs about the current condition of the nation that bolster this sanguine assessment. Separatists, because of their deep belief in the vitality of the nation and the righteousness of the national cause, hold distinctive views about factual matters, which underwrite and reinforce their optimism that victory will be theirs in due course.

The data also suggest that it might be fair to deem idealists unduly optimistic. This is a judgement that cannot be rendered based solely on data concerning the likelihood of separation, since the true probability of some future eventuality is always unknown. But skewed perceptions of current conditions relevant to future evaluations allow for firmer conclusions. Idealists - in Quebec in 1968, at

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8 Typically, it would be assumed that higher levels of political awareness would lead to more accurate political knowledge. However, in the case of a movement that has been somewhat marginal (as Quebec's separatist movement was through the early 1960s), higher levels of awareness might lead to overestimates of a movement's strength - events to which many were oblivious would register among the highly aware. In this case, it appears that political awareness, as measured by the proxy variable of education, does not have much effect either way.
least - were well off the mark in their assessments of existing levels of support for separation. If they were wrong about the present, it is probably fair to say they were overly optimistic about the future.

Further evidence of the potential for prior nationalist sentiment to shape opinion on factual matters, leading to skewed evaluations of the prospects of success, comes from the 1963 Study of Separatism. This survey asked respondents whether various prominent figures in the province openly favored the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada. Some of the figures mentioned were involved in the separatist movement, others were not. Among the latter group, most were outright opponents of separatism, while one - René Lévesque, then a minister in Jean Lesage's Liberal government - had made public statements about the need for drastic change in Quebec's relationship with the rest of the country. These seemed to evince some sympathy for the separatist movement, but it would have been stretching matters to call Lévesque a separatist at that point in time, on the available evidence.

Table 6.3 shows the perceptions of respondents concerning the separatist sentiment of these various public figures. The data are broken down by respondents' personal feelings about separation, with education used as a control variable in order to take into account potential differences in levels of political awareness between separatists and non-separatists. The results in Part A indicate that there was considerable misperception in the separatist camp about the political views of non-separatist public figures in the province. For example, 33% of separatists thought that Cardinal Léger was in favour of separation, compared to only 5% of non-separatists. This gap of 28% is not altered when education is introduced as a control variable, so levels of awareness do not seem to be the source of these differing perceptions. Similar gaps, some bigger, some smaller, none greatly affected by education, are evident for all the public figures not in favour of separation. The average gap (controlling for education) is 22%. Just as Quebec separatists have been off the mark in their estimates
of overall levels of support for separation, so they seem to have held significant misperceptions concerning the viewpoints of prominent Quebeckers.

Table 6.3: Perceived Position of Public Figures by Personal Constitutional Preference, Quebec 1963 (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Figures</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
<th>Opposed to Separation</th>
<th>In Favour of Separation</th>
<th>Difference Controlling for Education (OLS Regression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (n)</td>
<td>% (n)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Gérin-Lajoie, provincial cabinet minister</td>
<td>16% (196)</td>
<td>45% (49)</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Lévesque, provincial cabinet minister</td>
<td>51% (249)</td>
<td>83% (90)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Pinard, provincial cabinet minister</td>
<td>9% (113)</td>
<td>15% (34)</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Laporte, provincial cabinet minister</td>
<td>24% (123)</td>
<td>37% (43)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Marchand, trade union leader</td>
<td>29% (118)</td>
<td>47% (43)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normand Hudon, editorial cartoonist for La Presse</td>
<td>47% (198)</td>
<td>74% (61)</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger</td>
<td>5% (305)</td>
<td>33% (70)</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard Pelletier, journalist</td>
<td>30% (165)</td>
<td>45% (58)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Figures</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
<th>Opposed to Separation</th>
<th>In Favour of Separation</th>
<th>Difference Controlling for Education (OLS Regression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (n)</td>
<td>% (n)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André D’Allemagne, former leader of RIN</td>
<td>86% (22)</td>
<td>94% (16)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Bourgault, leader of RIN</td>
<td>56% (34)</td>
<td>70% (20)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond Barbeau, founder of Alliance Laurentienne</td>
<td>71% (66)</td>
<td>90% (41)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Chaput, former member of RIN, founder of Parti Républicain du Québec</td>
<td>99% (372)</td>
<td>98% (117)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05
** p < .01

Notes: a) There were 987 respondents in this survey. However, only those who were aware of Quebec’s separatist movement were asked this battery of questions (784 respondents).

b) Respondents undecided about separation have been excluded.

c) For each public figure, those who answered “do not know [whether x is a separatist]” have been excluded. This accounts for the great variation in sample size for the different public figures.

d) At the time of the survey, Marcel Chaput was in the middle of a well-publicized hunger strike; hence the high levels of awareness concerning his political beliefs.

Source: Author’s calculation based on Study of Separatism, 1963. For further details, see Appendix 1.
However, there is another element to consider here: non-separatist respondents also were mistaken in some of their beliefs. Specifically, they were more likely than separatist respondents to identify leaders of the separatist movement as non-supporters of separation. This suggests that there may be nothing unusual about the separatist tendency to hold skewed beliefs that represent a projection of their own personal desires onto the political landscape. Non-separatists do likewise, deeming people who openly espouse separatism to be non-separatists like themselves.

Note, however, that the differences in Part B of Table 6.3 are reduced when education controls are introduced. This is because non-separatists in Quebec have tended to be less well educated than separatists - less well educated and therefore more likely to be mistaken in their assessments due to a sheer lack of political knowledge (as opposed to the projective power of personal preferences). With this factor taken into account, the differences between separatists and non-separatists decrease, and the reduced differences are not particularly large. The average perception gap in Part B of Table 6.3 is only 7%, compared to 22% in Part A. There may be some skewing of perception among non-separatists, but it does not seem to be of the same magnitude as it is among the separatists.⁹

Some might be skeptical of this analysis, finding it hard to accept that the separatist supporters were sincere in their survey responses. Did 33% of separatists really think Cardinal Léger was among their number? Surely, these people were wilfully misrepresenting their true beliefs. It is impossible to discount this possibility, but there are certain general features of public opinion that lend plausibility to the contention that these were, in fact, genuine mistaken beliefs. Firstly, public opinion researchers have convincingly argued that people's opinions do not always take full account of all available information. Instead fragments of information are retained, from which beliefs and opinions are

⁹ Again, it would be useful for comparative purposes to have data showing whether people supportive of, say, a special status, tended to think that public figures were of the same mindset. The expectation would be that moderate nationalists would not project their own preferences onto others and would therefore hold more realistic perceptions. But the relevant data to test this hypothesis are not available.
constructed.\textsuperscript{10} If prior convictions (e.g. support for separation) partly determine which fragments are retained and which fall by the wayside, it is easy to see how people could be sincerely mistaken in their beliefs.\textsuperscript{11} Secondly, people inevitably interpret survey questions in their own particular way. The question put to respondents asked whether the various public figures \textit{openly} favored separatism.\textsuperscript{12} But it is possible that some decided to place in the separatist camp those public figures they deemed to be covert supporters of separation. This, of course, might bring more into the separatist fold. In short: survey responses which seem implausible do not necessarily represent wilful misrepresentation. There is often significant room for personal beliefs to shape answers to seemingly straightforward factual questions.

If the current argument is correct, much of the personal input shaping the responses of separatists originates with their national identity. Ardent idealists propound a nationalism which presumes that others, if currently oblivious to their national calling, are nonetheless, at base, full-fledged members of the nation, from which it follows that idealists tend to think eventual success highly probable. Because the idealists' sunny assessment of the nation's future is not an isolated optimism, but rather a corollary of other beliefs, it is a deeply embedded element of their political world view.

There is, however, a potential flaw in this argument. The assumption to this point has been that support for separation (which is serving as a proxy for an idealized national identity) causes various tendencies, such as a propensity to believe public figures to be in favour of separation. But it is


\textsuperscript{11} Roger Levy, for example, suggests that the SNP has sometimes tended to put more stock in its own polls of public opinion than those conducted by others. Levy characterizes this as a "suspension of belief" rather than a public relations exercise, and suggests that it has, at times, led the party to adopt strategies at odds with public sentiment (viz., stepping up the independence rhetoric when most Scots are opposed to independence). See Levy, \textit{Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads}, pp. 71-73.

\textsuperscript{12} This is true for all but the four cabinet ministers; in these cases the word "openly" was not included.
possible that the causation runs in the other direction, that people are separatists because of the misperceptions they hold. If people tend to follow the lead of prominent public figures, for instance, it may be that the separatists in the 1963 survey were those who - for reasons other than their personal desire for separation - had come to believe that many elites in the province favoured separation. Similarly, to the extent people are inclined to follow majority opinion, separatists in the 1968 survey may simply have been those mistakenly of the view that separation enjoyed majority support in the population.

The 1963 poll allows for some assessment of this alternative account, since it asked respondents directly whether they would change their opinion concerning separation, if the viewpoint of the majority conflicted with their own. Most people said no, it would make no difference. Only 15% of the separatists said they would change their views if they learned that a majority were against separation. Similarly, 14% of the non-separatists said they would move over to the separatist camp if they thought this was where the majority had pitched their tents. On questions of such import, most people, it would seem, are not prepared to take their lead from those around them.

Thus, the idealist national identity seems to have a significant impact on at least one factor relevant to political behavior. Idealists often have skewed perceptions of the vitality of their nation, believing others to be part of the nation uncategorically, and sometimes thinking them supportive of separation even when the evidence would suggest otherwise. This makes them believe that victory is eminently attainable, which often constitutes a decidedly optimistic assessment for the time and place. The political behavior of idealists may be influenced by the perception that they will eventually succeed in their endeavours, but that perception is heavily influenced by their powerful national identity.

13 Author's calculation based on 1963 Study of Separatism.
C) Substantive Costs and Benefits

The perceived likelihood of success is not the only element of the cost-benefit calculus conditioned by the national identities of pragmatists and idealists. Another is the relative importance of substantive costs and benefits in determining political attitudes and behaviors. Idealists take less account of these than do their pragmatist counterparts, and are therefore, to judge by rational choice precepts, less rational. This section suggests theoretical reasons for the phenomenon, while the next two sections offer quantitative evidence of the phenomenon in the Quebec and Scottish cases.

In one sense, the differing importance of substantive costs and benefits is directly linked to the distinctive national identities that animate the two types of nationalist and which were the focus of discussion in previous chapters. Pragmatists are those whose nationalism is a direct and unmediated function of the substance of a sociologically distinctive community - its language and culture, its particular blend of political and social values, and so on. Pragmatists want to preserve these concrete elements of social differentiation against dilution. The pragmatist is then, by definition, principally concerned with substantive aspects of the national question.

For idealists, on the other hand, the object of their nationalism is the national community per se, rather than any particular qualities the community incarnates. Their sense of national identity is abstracted from the tangible qualities of nationhood, consisting primarily in an abstract and idealised sense of Scottishness, Québécoisness or bretonnité. This national identity, at once more nebulous and unconditional, impels the idealist to support sovereignty as an end in itself, since it is this status alone that will allow for the fulfillment of their open-ended aspirations for the nation. In short, the identity/sovereignty nexus is the central motif in their political behavior, and the substantive rationale behind their political demands is not immediately apparent. Though idealist sentiments and aspirations are real enough to those in their grip, they are less accessible to the outside observer than the concrete
grievances and objectives of pragmatists. Idealists are largely preoccupied with symbolic or intangible matters - identity and national freedom - and are, in this sense, less rational than pragmatists.

The idealist mode of thinking is sometimes apparent in the reasons provided for supporting nationalist projects. In the 1979 Scottish Election Study, for example, respondents were asked what they saw as the principal advantage of devolution. Their answers are recorded in Table 6.4, broken down by constitutional preference. The advantage cited most often (34%) by supporters of independence was that every nation needs a parliament - greater power for the nation was, in other words, essentially an end in itself for these radical nationalists. By contrast, only a few Assembly supporters (8%) selected this option. Instead, they largely opted for the other responses, which offered a more substantive rationale for their political preferences, such as "A Scottish Assembly would give people more say in government" and "[it] would have more time to consider the special laws needed in Scotland." Certainly, significant numbers of independence supporters also chose these responses, but the aggregate difference in emphasis is clear.

| Table 6.4: Most Important Advantage of Scottish Devolution |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Most Important Advantage** | **Personal Constitutional Preference** | **No Change** *(n=188)* | **Scottish Assembly** *(n=393)* | **Independence** *(n=50)* |
| Help reduce excessive workload at Westminster Parliament | 19% | 9% | 4% |
| More time to consider the special laws needed in Scotland | 19% | 17% | 4% |
| Inspire Scots to solve their own problems | 13% | 19% | 16% |
| Protect Scotland's natural resources against exploitation | 11% | 15% | 12% |
| Every nation should have its own Parliament | 3% | 8% | 34% |
| Give people more say in government | 15% | 28% | 24% |
| Don't Know | 4% | 2% | 4% |

*Combines respondents who wanted no devolution and those who wanted an ad hoc committee in Scotland

**Combines respondents who wanted a Scottish Assembly with control over "some" Scottish affairs and those who wanted an Assembly with control over "most" Scottish affairs.

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1979. For further details, see Appendix 1.
This, then, is one sense in which substantive costs and benefits matter more to pragmatists; it is simply that pragmatists tend to be more concerned with the substantive elements of nationhood and less taken with the idea of national power for its own sake. But there is another aspect to the matter as well. Pragmatists generally take greater account of substantive costs and benefits that have no obvious connection to the national question, in particular economic costs and benefits. This tendency can be traced to the relative salience of the pragmatist and idealist national identities.

The pragmatist's national identity, because sociologically grounded, is often muted by other identities that are also rooted in concrete elements of social differentiation. These include such linkages as the class identities sometimes generated by common economic interests and conditions, the personal bonds with family and friends formed through shared experience and mutual affinity, and the ties established by adherence to a common religious creed. Though these various groupings can sometimes overlap with national communities, more often they are, to a degree, cross-cutting: people are connected to various sociological groups with different memberships, and consequently sometimes find themselves pulled in multiple directions. In other words, national identity is not exceptionally salient to pragmatists, and other considerations impinge on their political behavior. In today's world, these other considerations are often economic in nature, as people contemplate the impact of different courses of action on the economic well-being of their family, friends, others of their social class, and so on.

Idealists also have multifarious sociological connections to others, but their non-national bonds do not have the same muting effect on their political behavior. Instead, the idealist's national identity tends to operate in a realm of its own. It is not entangled with other identities, but sits on a separate plane and sometimes trumps other potential influences on political behavior.

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Pragmatist and idealist identities differ, then, in their relationship to the larger sociological lattice. The difference is in keeping with the theories of social connectedness expounded by the classical proponents of pragmatism and idealism. Hume, pragmatist philosopher of the eighteenth-century, saw social identities emerging from the web of real life experience and connections in which the individual is embedded. The presumption Hume made was that people only feel connected to those with whom they are palpably linked, either through actual acquaintance or the sharing of some concrete bond. Identities, and an attendant sense of moral obligation, form concentric circles, with a strong sense of connection to those nearest the centre (such as the family) and a diminished devotion to those further out, with all manner of gradation and ambiguity in-between. The pragmatist nationalist thinks like Hume in these matters, her national identity assuming a place, but not pride of place, in a complex network of empirically-grounded identities.

For idealist nationalists, national identity is more salient than this, because of a different nature. If there is something Humean about the pragmatist's identity, there is a Kantian flavour to the idealist's sense of national connection. This is, on the face of it, an odd statement, since Kant argued in favour of a cosmopolitan identity based on the essential equality of all individuals around the globe. But the idealist national identity does not take its scope from the Kantian vision, so much as its form. For Kant counselled that people could, and should, feel a largely unconditional sense of connection and obligation to others, regardless of any sociological linkages that might or might not unite them. In effect, Kant argued for an identity of a wholly different order from those grounded in concrete experience, attributes and circumstance. Idealist nationalists take a Kantian view of community, transposing his vision onto a less than universal community. Idealists see their community -

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15 In the words of one scholar, Hume's theory of moral sentiments holds that "sympathy...may be a universal principle in human nature, but it varies with the closeness of relations: 'We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us; with our acquaintance, than with strangers; with our countrymen, than with foreigners'." (Páll S. Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise* [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966], p. 117).
comprised, in the main, of nameless, faceless, far-flung strangers - as one of wholly equal members, equal because of a national essence residing deep within that binds them unconditionally (the analogue, perhaps, of Kant's categorical imperative).\(^{16}\) That this identity stops neatly at the nation's borders rather than carrying over to all of humanity does not alter the Kantian form of idealist national identity.

This, then, helps explain why idealists have a stronger, more decisive, sense of national identity. Whereas pragmatists throw national identity into the pot with other sociologically-grounded identities, for idealists, national identity involves an idealized sense of connectedness, and consequently assumes a special status. It sits on a separate plane above the fray and sometimes acts as a trump in political matters: I may be a worker and a Catholic, but I am also Québécois, which cuts through all the rest and renders it immaterial. For the pragmatist by contrast, these competing social identities carry more weight. Thus is the idealist's identity more salient than the pragmatist's.

This salience difference is evident in the importance accorded the national question by pragmatists and idealists. For idealists, it is of far greater concern than for those more pragmatist in their nationalism. Respondents to the 1979 Scottish Election Study, for example, were asked how important the general issue of the form of government for Scotland was to them. With this open-ended wording - "the form of government for Scotland" - each respondent was free to read into the question their own personal preference for Scotland's future, be it an Assembly, independence or the status quo. The responses, shown in Table 6.5, indicate that the more radical nationalists were much more inclined than pragmatists to think the issue of Scotland's rightful place in the political firmament an extremely important issue. Idealists, then, are more single-minded, focussing on the national question to the

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\(^{16}\) Elie Kedourie points to Fichte, the German philosopher of the early nineteenth century, as the thinker who first wedded Kantian principles and communitarian sentiment (German national sentiment in this case) to create a new nationalism of a different order. See *Nationalism*, 4th ed., pp. 24-86.
exclusion of other considerations, whereas pragmatists are more apt to show a greater concern with non-nationalist issues.

Table 6.5: Importance of "Form of Government for Scotland" Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Government for Scotland...</th>
<th>Personal Constitutional Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Important</td>
<td>(n=188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Important</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Important</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Important</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Table 6.4 for definitions.

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1979. For further details, see Appendix 1.

To sum up, variations in national identity condition evaluations of substantive costs and benefits in two distinct ways. Pragmatists are more preoccupied with substantive aspects of the national question - language, culture, and so forth - and, for this reason, are also more heavily influenced than idealists by non-national considerations. Idealists, with their Kantian sense of national connectedness, are principally driven by an abstract national identity that overrides the influence of substantive considerations on their political behavior. Again, identity is the source of significant differences in pragmatist and idealist patterns of thinking.

D) Multivariate Analysis of Sovereignty Support in Quebec

The observations offered to this point might be further illustrated and substantiated by taking a close look at the reasoning that underlies the constitutional preferences of different nationalists in the cases of particular interest here. This requires a shift in analytical approach. To this point, identity and constitutional preference have been treated as intimately linked variables, with the latter serving as the explanatory variable in much of the quantitative analysis. But the supposition all along has been that

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identity is the prime mover in the causal chain of nationalist politics, shaping constitutional preferences along with other nationalist phenomena. This assumption explicitly informs the analysis of this section, where constitutional preferences are treated as the dependent variable, to see how national identities, along with other factors, influence those preferences.

This analysis yields findings in keeping with those reported above. To recapitulate, it has been argued to this point that variations in identity are responsible for some important differences in the cost-benefit calculations undertaken by pragmatists and idealists, and consequently, their political attitudes and behavior. Idealists may be rational in that the probability-weighted benefits they anticipate from their actions and attitudes outweigh the probability-weighted costs, but the manner in which they derive their assessment of probabilities, benefits and costs is not wholly rational because it is heavily influenced by their identity. Idealist nationalist sentiment leads, for example, to skewed assessments of the probability of success: idealists, convinced of the nation's vitality, think it highly likely the nationalist movement will gain its objectives even when the evidence would suggest otherwise. Idealists also are preponderantly influenced by an abstract national identity - a somewhat ineffable Québécoisness, Scottishness or bretonnité - that generates inscrutable reasoning of the "I feel Québécois and therefore support independence" variety. Pragmatists, on the other hand, are principally exercised about the substantive aspects of the national question and seek to protect the tangible elements of nationhood. They differ from the idealists, too, in the importance they accord extra-national considerations, such as economic concerns. Whereas an idealized national identity tends to trump such considerations and render them immaterial, the pragmatist's sociologically grounded identity is more subject to influence from competing identities and considerations. These tendencies - both the projective power of idealist nationalism and the relative importance of substantive costs and benefits to pragmatists and idealists - are apparent in the reasoning that informs the constitutional preferences of different nationalists. We first consider the Quebec case, and then the Scottish case.
i) The Projective Power of Idealist Nationalism in the Quebec Case

In the Quebec case, evidence of these phenomena can be found in data from the 1992-3 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey (CRES). The CRES consists of five different surveys administered before and after the October 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord and the October 1993 Canadian election. For the first part of this analysis, comparable data from the 1992 "pre-referendum" and 1993 "campaign-period" surveys have been pooled in order to maximize the sample size. Some people participated in both these surveys; for these people the pre-referendum data have been used.¹⁷

The dependent variable used in the analysis is based on the question, "What is your opinion on Quebec sovereignty, that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada?" Possible responses, and the values assigned to them, were: very opposed (0), somewhat opposed (0.333), somewhat favourable (0.667), very favourable (1), neither favourable or opposed (0.5), and don't know (0.5). This coding protocol deviates from the practice followed by other researchers, who have tended to use a binary dependent variable (sovereigntists versus non-sovereigntists). Dichotomization admittedly has the merit of simplicity and does allow for analysis that speaks to the issue of greatest practical relevance - will there be majority support for sovereignty in the next referendum? But it also represents a loss of information. It is well established that supporters of sovereignty, on a simple yes/no question, differ considerably in the intensity of their sovereigntist yearnings. Some apparent sovereigntists would

¹⁷ The 1,091 francophone respondents from Quebec used in the analysis include 784 from the pre-referendum survey and 307 from the campaign-period survey. For the campaign-period respondents, data for the national identity variable are taken from the "post-election survey," a follow-up that took place very shortly after the election; this is because the relevant questions were not asked in the campaign-period survey. It is for this reason that pre-referendum data have been used in preference to campaign-period data, where both are available for a particular respondent. For full details of the CRES design, see David A. Northrup and Anne E. Owram, The 1993 Canadian Election Study, Incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord: Technical Documentation (Institute for Social Research, York University, 1994).
actually prefer that Quebec remain part of Canada with some sort of enhanced status and powers.\textsuperscript{18} By not collapsing sovereignty responses, this pertinent information - variation in sovereigntist sentiment - is retained for present purposes.\textsuperscript{19}

Table 6.6 shows support for sovereignty among the 1,091 Quebec francophone respondents included in the analysis. The mean value of this dependent variable is 0.50.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} For an analysis of differences of opinion among Yes voters in the 1980 Quebec referendum, see Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard, "Les Québécois votent non: le sens et la portée du vote" in Jean Crête (ed.), \textit{Comportement Électoral au Québec} (Chicoutimi, Que.: Gaétan Morin, 1984), pp. 335-385. Hamilton and Pinard estimate that two-fifths of Yes voters were hoping, first and foremost, to set in motion negotiations for a renewed federalism. Large numbers of Yes voters were also, they suggest, ill-informed, believing that Quebec would remain a province of Canada under sovereignty-association (p. 356). Such misperceptions are still widespread today. For example, according to a 1994 poll, many Quebeckers think that in a "sovereign" Quebec they will continue to pay Canadian taxes (26\%), send MPs to Ottawa (27\%), and "be part of Canada" (42\%) (see Richard Mackie, "50% see win as mission nod for PQ," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 15 July, 1994, p. A4). These figures indicate that some sovereignty supporters actually want greater powers and an enhanced status for Quebec, rather than independence proper.

\textsuperscript{19} Embedded in the specific numeric values assigned to the sovereignty response categories is an important assumption: namely, that there is a constant change in the intensity of sovereignty support in moving from "very opposed" to "somewhat opposed", from "somewhat opposed" to "somewhat favourable", and from "somewhat favourable" to "very favourable"; the distance between each pair of response categories is 0.333. The validity of this assumption might be questioned, in particular the supposition that the gap between "somewhat opposed" and "somewhat favourable" is equivalent to the other two. Crossing the sovereignty threshold, some might contend, implies a larger shift in intensity of sovereignty support. For this reason, the quantitative analysis in this section was subjected to further testing, using alternative values for the sovereignty response categories - for example, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 (thereby increasing the distance between the "somewhat opposed" and "somewhat favourable" categories). Though such variations do affect the precise magnitude of regression coefficients, they do not affect the general thrust of any of the results reported here.

\textsuperscript{20} As part of a question wording experiment by the designers of the 1992-3 CRES, half of the respondents in the pre-referendum survey, selected at random, were asked a soft version of the sovereignty question, which omitted the phrase "that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada." Among this group, mean support for sovereignty was markedly higher (0.56 versus 0.46 for those asked the question with the phrase included). In order to see if this variation in question wording was important, the analysis was carried out separately for three different sub-groups: the two groups of referendum respondents and the campaign-period respondents (who were also asked the hard version of the sovereignty question). No differences relevant to the results reported here were observed.
Table 6.6: Support for Quebec Sovereignty, 1992-93 (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion on Sovereignty (n=1091)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very opposed (0)</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat opposed (0.333)</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither favourable or opposed / Don’t know (0.50)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favourable (0.667)</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very favourable (1)</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Value</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author's calculation based on 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.*

The bivariate relationship between sovereignty support and the three independent variables of interest is shown in the first three columns of Table 6.7.21 All seem to have a sizeable effect on sovereignty support. For example, the perception that the French language is threatened in Quebec increases support for sovereignty by 0.17 points.22 Among those who believe that their standard of living would be "a little worse" in an independent Quebec, support for sovereignty is 0.19 points higher than among those who feel it would be a "lot worse",23 while the level of support among those who think their standard of living will "get better" or "stay the same" is 0.37 points greater than in the comparison group.24 National identity, a variable based on the difference between a respondent's

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21 The data in this and all subsequent tables are based on ordinary least squares regression. Weights have been applied in all analyses to compensate for differences in the probability of being selected as a respondent in households of varying size. Though such household weights are provided in the CRES data file, new ones were required for the present analysis because of the particular mix of respondents used. These were calculated in the manner described in Northrup and Owram, The 1993 Canadian Election Study, Incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord: Technical Documentation, pp. 9-11.

22 The precise question wording: "In your opinion, is the French language threatened in Quebec?"

23 The precise question wording: "If Quebec separates from Canada, do you think your standard of living will get better, get worse, or stay about the same as now?" Respondents answering "get better" were then asked, "A lot better or only a little better?"; respondents answering "get worse" were asked, "A lot worse or only a little worse?" Those who answered don't know to these follow-up questions were coded as "a little better" and "a little worse."

24 The "get better" and "stay the same" categories are collapsed into one because there is relatively little difference in sovereignty support between the two. As others have argued and demonstrated, it is fear of economic loss more than anticipation of economic gain that seems to affect support for sovereignty in Quebec. See Martin, "Générations politiques, rationalité économique et appui à la souveraineté au Quebec," pp. 354-55.
strength of attachment to Quebec and his or her strength of attachment to Canada, shows stronger effects still.\textsuperscript{25} Among those with a very strong Québécois identity, support for sovereignty is 0.58 points greater than in the base category (those whose attachment to Canada is equal to, or greater than, their attachment to Quebec). Lesser effects are seen for those with weaker Québécois identities. Thus, national identity is an important determinant of constitutional preferences but it does not seem to act alone, for substantive considerations, both national in nature (language worries) and non-national (economic concerns), appear to have significant impacts on support for sovereignty too.

Table 6.7: Determinants of Support for Quebec Sovereignty, Bivariate and Multivariate Comparison (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-Canada Attachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 19</td>
<td>0.21 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 29</td>
<td>0.26 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 50</td>
<td>0.43 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 100</td>
<td>0.58 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of Living</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a little worse</td>
<td>0.19 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no difference/better</td>
<td>0.37 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened</td>
<td>0.17 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.29 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.40 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>1091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(p < .01\) for all variables in all models

**Variable Definition:** All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: identity, Quebec - Canada ≤ 0; standard of living, much worse; and French language, not threatened.

**Source:** Author's calculation based on 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{25} The precise wording for the two questions is, "How do you feel about Quebec [Canada]?", with a feeling thermometer, running from 0 to 100, used to measure responses. Although feelings about Canada show greater variation than feelings about Quebec, it was decided to use both variables together because this led to a considerable increase in the R-squared value for the various models.
The same result seems to hold true when these variables are conjointly analyzed using multivariate regression techniques. Results are shown in the fourth column of Table 6.7. All three variables, identity, language concerns, and economic considerations continue to have statistically significant impacts on support for sovereignty. The coefficient for the language variable is fairly small (0.05), but this is partly because it is based on a question that asks about the current condition of the French language. Other researchers have found similar effects for such variables, and have also shown that larger impacts are apparent when survey questions tap into prospective and comparative evaluations of the language situation. The question used for the economics variable is structured in this way, asking people to compare their future standard of living in an independent Quebec to their current standard of living, and its coefficients are somewhat larger (0.11 for those who think their standard of living would be a little worse and 0.23 for those who feel there would be no change or an enhancement). The initial evidence, then, suggests that there is considerable rational evaluation of substantive costs and benefits underlying the constitutional preferences of people in Quebec.

The preliminary results and conclusions offered here do not differ greatly from those previously reported elsewhere. The inclusion in multivariate analysis of a variable that measures national identity allows for estimation of the impact of linguistic and economic variables - the substantive concerns that seem to have considerable influence over constitutional preferences - net of identity effects. Figure 6.3 visually depicts the conceptual framework that informs this approach, with the three explanatory factors standing side by side as independent influences on sovereignty support. This method of analysis, it should be noted, represents a marked improvement over those approaches.

26 For example, a CROP survey from September 1993 asked "Si le Québec se sépare du Canada, pensez-vous que la situation du français au Québec s'améliorera, restera la même ou se détériorera?" Multivariate analysis, incorporating identity and economic expectations, found a difference of 0.21 (where the dependent variable was coded 0 and 1) between those who thought the situation of the French language would deteriorate in a separate Quebec and those who thought it would improve. With the same controls in place, it also found a coefficient of 0.08 for a variable based on the same question as that used in the current analysis. See Nadeau and Fleury, "Gains linguistiques anticipés et appui à la souveraineté du Québec," pp. 42-43.
which assume identity to be constant and search for variation in nationalist attitudes in other factors exclusively. Researchers have, for the most part, come to recognize that identity is both important and highly variable, and therefore regularly include it in multivariate analyses. The result is better estimates of the impact of substantive considerations, both linguistic and economic, estimates which suggest these effects are far from negligible.

Figure 6.3: Sovereignty Support in Quebec, Model 1

But the importance of these tangible considerations is still perhaps overstated, for while previous analyses of sovereignty support expressly recognize the centrality of identity as an explanatory factor in its own right, they generally do not take adequate account of the conditioning effect of identity on other explanatory factors. In the first place, it often goes unnoted that the coefficients associated with linguistic and economic factors change dramatically from the bivariate to the multivariate case. Specifically, the effect of these substantive considerations on sovereignty support is markedly reduced when they are run together with national identity, while the impact of identity is diminished but slightly - a result that appears consistently in multivariate analyses with these particular
variables. In this case, the coefficient for language is reduced to about 30% of its former level (0.05 versus 0.17), while both the economics coefficients are nearly halved (0.11 versus 0.19; and 0.23 versus 0.37). Meanwhile, the identity coefficients remain at about 70 to 80% of their previous level (compare columns 1 and 4 in Table 6.7). These changes from the bivariate to multivariate case indicate something important: the explanatory variables are highly correlated, and part of the apparent effect of linguistic and economic considerations in the bivariate case is simply a reflection of identity effects.

A reasonable interpretation of this result is that national identity partly shapes people's perceptions of the substantive costs and benefits associated with separation. That is to say, the stronger someone's Québécois identity is, the more likely they are to think that the French language is threatened in Quebec and that their standard of living would improve, or at least not deteriorate, in an independent Quebec. These perceptions, in turn, make people more supportive of Quebec sovereignty; but the root cause of this increased support is a strong Québécois identity. Figure 6.4 presents a revised version of Figure 6.3, with identity now preceding and conditioning economic and linguistic expectations, rather than standing alongside as an independent explanatory factor. This is a more

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27 Compare, for example, the bivariate and multivariate results presented Blais and Nadeau, "To Be or Not to Be Sovereigntist: Quebeckers' Perennial Dilemma"; Nadeau and Fleury, "Gains linguistiques anticipés et appui à la souveraineté du Québec"; and in Blais et al., "Attentes économiques et linguistiques et appui à la souveraineté du Québec: une analyse prospective et comparative".

28 It is also possible that the causation runs the other way. For example, a sense that one's standard of living would improve in an independent Quebec might tend to make people feel more Québécois (if this were so, the decrease in the coefficient associated with the economics variable would indicate that economic perceptions, in part, influence sovereignty support only to the extent they alter national identity). The assumption here is that the formation of national identity is likely to be causally prior to assessments of the tangible consequences of sovereignty. This interpretation seems to jibe with common sense. National identity is something that people feel from a relatively early age (childhood or adolescence), whereas evaluation of technical questions like the economic impact of sovereignty is something people would typically start to reflect on at a later stage of life (early adulthood). This is, however, an area that merits further investigation. Survey research might play its part by asking respondents retrospective questions about these matters. For example: When did you first become aware of your Québécois identity? Did you support sovereignty at that point? Did economic factors play a role in your decision to support sovereignty?

The timing of national identity formation is an issue examined in the next chapter, though largely through anecdotal evidence. This analysis does point to the importance of the formative years in the shaping of national consciousness.

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complete picture of the processes that generate sovereignty support, incorporating, to use the phraseology previously adopted, the projective power of national identity. It suggests that the utopian quality of idealist nationalism manifests itself not only in a tendency to idealize the nation in question, but also in a proclivity to idealize the nation's economic and cultural prospects as a sovereign entity.

Figure 6.4: Sovereignty Support in Quebec, Model 2

But if perceptions of the substantive consequences of sovereignty are partly shaped by identity, it does not necessarily mean that their independent impact on sovereignty support has been overestimated. If identity is controlled for in estimating language and economic effects, then so too is the projection phenomenon - or so it would seem. But a closer examination of the reasoning that underlies people's evaluations of the tangible impacts of sovereignty suggests that the projection and rationalization phenomenon may run deeper than this. Consequently, controlling for identity in the standard fashion may not suffice.

Consider, for example, the considerations that feed into people's opinions about the economic consequences of sovereignty. It has already been suggested that identity is one important factor affecting these evaluations, and Table 6.8 confirms this. The table shows the results of bivariate
regression analysis, where the dependent variable is now respondents' assessments of the impact of sovereignty on their standard of living. For the purposes of this analysis, the variable has not been collapsed as it was before (and therefore takes on five values ranging from "a lot worse" to "a lot better", which have been transformed to a 0 to 1 scale). National identity is the sole independent variable.29

Table 6.8: Determinants of Standard of Living Perceptions, Quebec, Bivariate Analysis (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-Canada Attachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 19</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 29</td>
<td>0.16 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 50</td>
<td>0.18 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 100</td>
<td>0.21 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.30 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .01 for all variables

**Variable Definition:** Standard of Living Perceptions: a lot worse (0), a little worse (0.25), stay the same / don't know (0.50), a little better (0.75), a lot better (1). Quebec-Canada Attachment: all categories are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison group (value 0) is Quebec - Canada ≤ 0.

*Source:* Author's calculation based on 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The coefficients in Table 6.8 suggest that people's evaluations of the economic consequences of sovereignty are heavily influenced by their national identity. Those with the strongest attachment to Quebec differ in their assessment of the economic impact of sovereignty by 0.21 (i.e. nearly one full category) over the comparison group. This is no great surprise, of course, since the large change in coefficients in the multivariate analysis of sovereignty support in Table 6.7 indicated that these two variables were significantly correlated.

29 For reasons indicated below, the analysis is now based on data from the campaign-period survey only. The number of campaign-period respondents in Table 6.8 is larger than reported above. This is because those who participated in both the pre-referendum and campaign-period surveys, previously classified as pre-referendum respondents, are now classified as campaign-period respondents.

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But identity does not tell us all there is to know about people's economic assessments, and it is
in searching for other inputs to this reasoning that a more striking result emerges. The implicit
assumption to this point - and the assumption in most quantitative analyses of sovereignty support in
Quebec - is that these other inputs, whatever they may be, are external to the sovereignty support
model. Something or other, unaffected by variables in the model, influences people's evaluations of the
impact of sovereignty on their standard of living, and these evaluations, in turn, affect support for
sovereignty. The economics variable, in other words, is assumed to be exogenous, its values
determined exclusively by factors external to the model (or included as independent variables in the
model). It is possible, however, that the economics variable is endogenous - that its values are partly
determined by the dependent variable in the model. The causation, in other words, may run the other
way, with support for Quebec sovereignty leading people to anticipate an unchanged or improved
standard of living in an independent Quebec.

This seems a distinct possibility because of the difficulty encountered in trying to find external
factors that affect evaluations of the economic impact of sovereignty. It seems reasonable to assume
that these factors, for the specific question at hand, will be of two sorts: those affecting people's
expectations of their standard of living in an independent Quebec and those influencing people's
perceptions of their current standard of living.\(^{30}\) In the campaign-period survey only, there were
numerous questions asked that would seem to be relevant to these perceptions (hence the exclusive
reliance on this survey for this particular piece of analysis). People were asked, for example, whether
they were "better off or worse off financially" than they were a year ago, and whether they expected to

\(^{30}\) Others also emphasize the comparative element in the reasoning that underwrites support for sovereignty. Stéphane Dion, for example, points to the confidence and fear components of such reasoning, by which he means "the fear of being weakened within the union, and the confidence of increasing the group's well being outside the union." (See Dion, "Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec," p. 273.) People, in other words, compare the independence scenario to their current (and future) situation as part of the larger union.
be "better off financially, worse off, or just about the same as now" a year in the future. Such assessments would presumably be closely related to people's feelings about their current standard of living (and expectations for the future, should Quebec remain part of Canada). There were fewer questions relevant to people's expectations of their standard of living in an independent Quebec. However, respondents were asked whether the policies of the federal government had made them "better off [financially], worse off, or [had not] made much of a difference." If the federal government were deemed to have had a baneful influence on someone's financial well-being, then presumably the removal of its influence, via separation, would be expected to improve one's lot.

Several other seemingly pertinent questions were also asked in the campaign-period survey. Those used in the analysis that follows are listed in Boxes A and B in the revised model of sovereignty support shown in Figure 6.5. Their placement in the model indicates that they are presumed to be factors external to the model, influencing expectations of the economic consequences of sovereignty, and thereby exerting an influence over support for sovereignty. National identity, as Figure 6.5 indicates, is also presumed to exert causal influence over economic expectations. Another important feature of the model is that it is not assumed that economic expectations cause support for sovereignty; instead it is speculated that the causation might run in either direction (hence the double arrow between the two boxes). This model, then, embodies competing explanations for people's assessments of the impact of sovereignty on their standard of living: either these are a function of the external factors grouped together in Boxes A and B, or they are the product of national identity and sovereignty support (or, of course, some combination of these factors).31,32

31 This modelling of personal economic expectations is not contentious. It draws, in part, on sociotropic assessments pertaining to the Quebec and Canadian economies. It might be questioned whether such assessments are of any relevance to people's assessment of their personal economic situation, since some previous research has found virtually no correlation between personal and sociotropic evaluations (see Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," British Journal of Political Science 11, 2 (April 1981), pp. 129-161, especially p. 139). However, in this case, the two types of evaluation are related. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the three personal-sociotropic pairs of variables in Box A that pertain to the same
Further analysis sheds light on the relative importance of these different variables. Table 6.9 shows multivariate regression results, with standard of living expectations in a sovereign Quebec as the dependent variable, and the external factors in Boxes A and B, along with national identity, included as explanatory variables. For each of the external factors, the bivariate relationship with the dependent variable has been examined, and response categories collapsed to capture any salient effects. In addition, all have been coded so that the anticipated sign of the regression coefficient is positive.

This analysis yields a result significant for its non-significance: the factors deemed external to the sovereignty support model have very little effect on standard of living expectations. In some cases, time frame are significant (personal financial position compared to 1 year ago / economic conditions in Quebec in past year, 0.25; personal position compared to 1 year ago / economy of Canada in past year, 0.23; expected financial position 1 year from now / economy of Canada in next 12 months, 0.28). Thus, in this case, sociotropic evaluations are relevant to people's assessments of their personal economic situation - though whether they are relevant to people's expectations about their personal standard of living in a sovereign Quebec is another question, to be addressed shortly.

32 For simplicity's sake, perceptions concerning the situation of the French language are now excluded from the model.
the sign of the coefficient is negative, contrary to expectations. So, for example, the perception that one will be "worse off" financially, rather than "much better off" a year from now (in a Quebec that will, presumably, still be part of Canada) is associated with relatively pessimistic assessments of the economic impact of separation (B = -0.14). Only one of the external factors (the effect of federal government policies on the Quebec economy) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (B=0.05), but this still has much less causal influence than national identity. Further analysis examining interaction effects for some of these variables (e.g. being financially worse off than a year ago and blaming the federal government for that state of affairs) also yields insignificant coefficients (results not shown here). This finding - the absence of a connection between external (and seemingly relevant) considerations and expectations of change in one's standard of living in an independent Quebec - indicates that said expectations are primarily determined by something else.

It must be said that the exogenous factors included in this analysis relate primarily to current and future standard of living expectations for a Quebec remaining part of Canada. Most, as Figure 6.5 suggested, are not relevant to people's expectations for an independent Quebec. It is possible, then, that the latter assessment is the source of variation in people's perceptions of the economic impact of sovereignty. It is possible, too, that it is external factors unmeasured in this analysis that cause people to be optimistic about their standard of living prospects in an independent Quebec. Among such factors might be, for example, people's perceptions of the economic management capabilities of the Quebec government or their views about the natural resource endowments of Quebec.

Failure to measure relevant external factors is one possible reason for the results seen here. But there is another explanation that is perhaps more compelling. Whereas Quebeckers have a reasonably good idea of what their standard of living will be if Quebec remains part of Canada, their standard of living in an independent Quebec is a largely unknown quantity. This does not mean there is any shortage of opinion on the matter. Those in the sovereigntist camp, backed by studies and expert
Table 6.9: Determinants of Standard of Living Perceptions, Quebec, Multivariate Analysis (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>(SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-Canada Attachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 19 (less Québécois)</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 29</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 50</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 100 (more Québécois)</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial position compared to 1 yr. ago</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected financial position 1 yr. From now</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic conditions in Quebec in past yr.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy of Canada in past yr.</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy of Canada in next 12 months</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of fed. gov’t policies on respondent</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of fed. gov’t. policies on Quebec economy</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of fed. gov’t. policies on Canadian economy</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj. R-square: 0.13  
N: 684

*p<.05  **p<.01

Variable Definition:

**Standard of Living in a Separate Quebec**: a lot worse (0), a little worse (.25), stay the same/don’t know (.50), a little better (.75), a lot better (1).

**Quebec-Canada Attachment**: all categories are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison group (value 0) is Quebec - Canada ≤ 0.

**Personal financial position compared to 1 yr. ago**: better off or the same (0), worse off (1)

**Expected financial position 1 yr. from now**: much better off (0), somewhat better off (0.333), the same (0.667), worse off (1)

**Economic conditions in Quebec in past yr.**: gotten better (0), stayed the same or gotten worse (1)

**Economy of Canada in past yr.**: gotten better or stayed the same (0), gotten worse (1)

**Economy of Canada in next 12 months**: get better or stay the same (0), get worse (1)

**Effect of fed. gov’t policies on respondent**: made R better off or no difference (0), made R worse off (1)

**Effect of fed. gov’t. policies on Quebec economy**: made better or no difference or made somewhat worse (0), made much worse (1)

**Effect of fed. gov’t. policies on Canadian economy**: made better or no difference (0), made worse (1)

Note: All somewhat worse/better categories include those who answered "don’t know" when asked "Is that much worse/better or somewhat worse/better?"

Source: Author’s calculation based on 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.

opinion, contend that an independent Quebec would be better off economically. Opponents of Quebec independence, supported by their own studies and policy mavens, counter that sovereignty would have calamitous economic consequences. In such circumstances, opinion in the general public is likely to be
shaped primarily by political conviction rather than independent rational assessment. In other words, those who support sovereignty will tend to be optimistic about their standard of living prospects in an independent Quebec, while those opposed will be inclined to anticipate harmful economic consequences. In short, as the revised model of sovereignty support shown in Figure 6.6 suggests, there may well be a feedback effect of sovereignty on economic assessments, channelled through that part of people's reasoning that is subject to the greatest uncertainty, speculation, and partisan analysis.

**Figure 6.6: Sovereignty Support in Quebec, Model 4**

This account is more plausible in view of the significant impact of national identity on economic evaluations, apparent in the coefficients for the identity variable in Table 6.9. If national identity affects economic assessments, so too might support for separation. Why? The argument throughout this thesis has been that support for separation is indicative of a particularly potent national identity, an idealized and unconditional identity. It might be expected that survey questions asking people the strength of their national identity would capture this qualitative dimension of nationalist
sentiment, that those with the strongest identities would be those with an idealized sense of their national community; thus, the inclusion, in models of sovereignty support, of variables based on such questions would capture any and all projective tendencies on the part of idealist nationalists.

Undoubtedly, there will generally be a strong correlation between strength of identity and the qualitative dimension of nationalist sentiment. But surveys from other places, discussed at the start of Chapter 5, suggest that a strong national identity can sometimes be deeply rooted in tangible aspects of social differentiation (such would seem to be the case among some Bretonnant Bretons, for example). Such a national identity is sometimes deemed very strong by survey respondents, but it is, nonetheless, less likely to have the same determinative impact on their political thinking that a more idealised identity has. More detailed probing, using questions designed to capture the qualitative differences between pragmatist and idealist nationalism, might yield more refined measures of national identity; and such measures might be capable of accounting for more of the variation in variables such as people's perceptions of the economic impact of sovereignty. But in the 1992-3 CRES, identity is measured by two questions that simply ask people how strongly they feel about Canada and Quebec. Because identity is imperfectly measured (by the requirements of the current theory), sovereignty support likely exerts some independent influence over factors affected by identity, since it probably provides information not captured by the identity variable.33

This interpretation can, then, be summarized as follows. Factors thought to be external to the model of sovereignty support have essentially no bearing on people's sense of whether their standard of living would improve or deteriorate in an independent Quebec. However, the particular factors examined here speak more to people's perceptions of their standard of living in a Quebec remaining part of Canada than to their economic expectations for an independent Quebec. Thus, it may be

33 One implication of this reasoning is the prediction that it should be possible to assemble a battery of identity questions that would better predict sovereignty support and that would further reduce the effect of economic considerations in multivariate analysis.
unmeasured external factors that determine the latter expectations. But it is also possible, in view of the uncertainty around the issue, that people's opinions on sovereignty are an important causal influence. This seems plausible in view of the strong impact of national identity on economic perceptions, and the proposition that support for sovereignty itself reveals something important about one's national identity. Hence, there is reason to suspect that one of the key determinants of the perceived impact of sovereignty on people's standard of living is support for sovereignty itself.34

Although this analysis focuses on economic perceptions, it seems plausible that national identity and sovereignty support would also condition people's expectations concerning the impact of

34 This reasoning is admittedly rather speculative, and there is a statistical method available - two-stage least squares regression - to test more formally the proposition that causation runs partly from dependent to independent variable. The initial step in this procedure is to identify external factors (usually called instrumental variables) that have a strong causal influence over the independent variable which is thought to be endogenous (in this case, standard of living expectations). This is precisely what the Table 6.9 seeks to do. It looks for significant relationships between economic expectations for a sovereign Quebec and a series of seemingly relevant external variables. Unfortunately, the relationships are very weak, which renders the two-stage least squares procedure untenable.

If the procedure were feasible, the next step would be to use the regression results of Table 6.9 to generate predicted values of people's standard of living expectations. These predicted values would represent the exogenously determined component of that variable. These predicted values would then be regressed on sovereignty support, to estimate the impact of the exogenously determined component of people's standard of living expectations on the dependent variable. Any potential reverse causation would thereby be removed, and a better estimate would be generated of the extent to which economic expectations are a cause (rather than an effect) of sovereignty support.

But, of course, the very fact that the two-stage least squares procedure cannot be carried out, owing to the weakness of the relationship between the external factors and standard of living expectations, suggests something is awry: if people's economic expectations are derived independently of their views on sovereignty, there must be some external factors that help determine those expectations. The challenge, it would seem, for researchers who believe that causation runs from economic expectations to support for sovereignty is: 1) to identify external factors that do significantly affect people's perceptions of the likely economic impact of sovereignty; and 2) to demonstrate, using two-stage least squares analysis, that there is a significant relationship between the exogenously determined component of economic expectations and sovereignty support.


There are also simpler methods that might serve as a starting point for investigation of the reverse causation issue. For example, survey respondents might be asked hypothetical questions, e.g. "If it could be demonstrated to you that your standard of living would improve (worsen) in an independent Quebec, would you be more (less) favourable to sovereignty?" Alternatively, they might be asked to provide a rationale for their evaluation of the economic consequences of sovereignty, viz. "Why do you think your standard of living would be worse (better) in a sovereign Quebec?"
sovereignty on the French language. There is some initial evidence for this in the results reported above, where it was observed that the impact of language concerns on sovereignty support greatly decreases when identity is controlled for (see Table 6.7). This indicates that identity and language perceptions are strongly correlated. If it is again assumed that identity is causally prior, then part of the story behind sovereignty support involves identity shaping perceptions of the language situation in Quebec. It is entirely conceivable that a search for exogenous factors responsible for the remaining variation in language perceptions would yield results similar to those just seen for economic expectations - negligible effects, suggesting the presence of reverse causation, from sovereignty back to language perceptions. These findings, tentative though they are, cast some doubt on conclusions previously reached about the influence of rational evaluation of substantive considerations on sovereignty support. Such considerations may be considerably less influential than meets the eye, because of the conditioning impact of national identity and sovereignty support on the relevant assessments and perceptions.

ii) The Relative Significance of Substantive Costs and Benefits in the Quebec Case

The colouring of perception is only one of the ways in which the cost-benefit calculations relevant to nationalist behavior are affected by national identity. Another is the differential weight accorded substantive considerations by pragmatists and idealists. There are, it was suggested above, theoretical reasons for thinking that such considerations will have a greater influence over the political behavior and attitudes of pragmatists than idealists. Substantive factors, then, not only matter less than is commonly supposed; their effect, such as it is, is also differentially distributed across the spectrum of nationalist sentiment.

This proposition is borne out by further evidence from the 1992-3 CRES dataset. Specifically, it is the interaction effects between identity on the one hand, and language and economic concerns on
the other, that reveal the differential impact of substantive considerations on the thinking of different nationalists. Table 6.10 shows results of a regression model where the language and economics variables have been replaced by interaction variables, so that the effects of these two factors are now estimated separately for each of the five identity categories.\(^{35}\) The economics variable has also been recoded so that it takes on two values rather than three. The respondents used for this analysis are the same group used in Table 6.7 (the combined pre-referendum and campaign-period respondents).

It would appear that the influence of economic and language concerns varies considerably across the spectrum of national identity. For those with the weakest Québécois identities - those whose attachment to Canada is greater than or equal to their attachment to Quebec, and who account for 40% of the sample - the belief that one's standard of living will stay the same or improve in an independent Quebec increases sovereignty support by 0.19 (i.e. slightly more than half a category, given the way the sovereignty variable is defined). In the next category of identity, comprising 16% of the sample, the estimated effect of this economic consideration is also 0.19, and in the third category, again some 16% of the sample, it is 0.22. All these effects are fairly strong. In the last two identity categories, however, the impact of the economics variable tails off considerably. In the next to last group (19% of the sample), the estimated effect is 0.11, and in the final group (9% of the sample), it is 0.03.\(^{36}\)

\(^{35}\) Modelling these interaction effects with a single continuous variable rather than five discrete dummy variables was also tried, but was rejected because it glossed over some relevant differences. Because the interaction effects are modelled with dummy variables, it is not necessary to include the main effects of economics and language in the model - each dummy variable coefficient captures both a main effect (which is the same across all identity categories) and the interaction effect for that particular category.

\(^{36}\) The caveat should be added that these coefficients may be overestimates, if there is reverse causation at work. This caveat applies to all that follows in this analysis of interaction effects.
Table 6.10: Determinants of Support for Quebec Sovereignty, Interaction Effects (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-Canada Attachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 19</td>
<td>0.18** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 29</td>
<td>0.20** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 50</td>
<td>0.34** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 ≤ Quebec - Canada ≤ 100</td>
<td>0.65** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less Québécois)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(more Québécois)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identity/Standard of Living interactions

| Quebec – Canada ≤ 0, no difference/better       | 0.19** (0.03) |
| 1 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 19, no difference/better | 0.19** (0.04) |
| 20 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 29, no difference/better | 0.22** (0.04) |
| 30 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 50, no difference/better | 0.11** (0.04) |
| 51 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 100, no difference/better | 0.03 (0.07)   |
| (less Québécois)                               | 0.06* (0.03) |
| (more Québécois)                               | 0.02 (0.04)   |
| 20 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 29, Fr. language threatened | 0.01 (0.05)   |
| 30 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 50, Fr. language threatened | 0.13** (0.04) |
| 51 ≤ Quebec – Canada ≤ 100, Fr. language threatened | 0.01 (0.06)   |
| (more Québécois)                               | 0.19 (0.02)   |

Constant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adj. R-square</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05  ** p<.01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: identity, Quebec - Canada ≤ 0; standard of living, somewhat worse or much worse; and French language, not threatened.

Source: Author’s calculation based on 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The interaction effects for language do not trace so smooth a trajectory as the coefficients for the economics variable. A sense that the French language is threatened in Quebec has a modest impact on sovereignty support in the first identity category (0.06), and negligible effects in the next two (0.02 and 0.01). Its impact then jumps to 0.13 in identity category 4, and falls back to 0.01 in the fifth and final identity category. These are only estimates, of course, and it might be speculated that the true distribution of language effects across the spectrum of national identity would be smoother than this, rising slowly to a peak, and then tailing off among the most radical nationalists, much like the
distribution of economics effects. It seems likely too that its apogee would be further along on the spectrum of national identity than is the case for the economics variable; in the current data, the impact of economic considerations peaks in the third identity category, while language concerns are most influential in the fourth category.\textsuperscript{37}

Regardless of the precise configuration, these estimates suggest that the effect of substantive considerations on sovereignty support is greatest among those with national identities of intermediate strength. They indicate too that the impact of these factors is quite small for those with the strongest national identities.

There are then quite different rationales underpinning the political preferences of different sovereigntists. The average person falling into the third identity category, for instance, who believes sovereignty would have a positive or neutral impact on their standard of living and who feels that the French language is not threatened in Quebec, would, according to the model in Table 6.10, have a value of 0.61 on the sovereignty variable - in other words, would come close to being "somewhat favourable" to sovereignty. This preference would issue partly from a relatively weak national identity (0.20), but equally (0.22) from a positive assessment of the economic impact of sovereignty (the remaining 0.19 would, of course, simply be the constant term in the regression equation). The rationale behind this weak sovereignty support differs very much from the thinking underlying the sovereigntist sentiment of someone in the fifth identity category. The average person in this group, also of the view that the economic impact of sovereignty would be neutral or positive and that the French language is not threatened in Quebec, would, according to the model, have a value of 0.87 on the sovereignty scale. Identity would be the principal factor underlying this stronger sovereigntist position, contributing 0.65

\textsuperscript{37} It would be interesting to know what these identity interaction effects might be for variables that tap into prospective and comparative evaluations of the condition of the French language. As noted above, other analyses have shown that the effects for such variables are considerably larger than those typically found for the type of language variable used in this analysis. Though I suspect that the shape of the distribution for other language variables would be similar (a mound shape across the identity spectrum), its peak might well lie elsewhere.
of the total; the economic consideration would only add 0.03 (the remaining 0.19 again coming from the constant term in the regression model). The rationale behind this individual’s much stronger support for sovereignty is dominated by national identity, while the economic consideration is largely immaterial. It appears, then, that there is considerably less rational deliberation among strong supporters of sovereignty than there is among more moderate sovereigntists.38

This conclusion may, at first blush, seem to offer nothing more than confirmation of the rather obvious point that hard-core sovereigntists are less likely than moderate sovereigntists to withdraw their support for sovereignty in view of economic or language considerations. But, in fact, it suggests something more: such considerations are not only less likely to induce hard-core sovereigntists to become non-sovereigntists, they are also less likely to move hard-core sovereigntists at all along the spectrum of sovereignty support. When identity, economics and language are modelled additively, it is assumed that economic and language considerations cause uniform shifts in sovereignty support across the identity spectrum;39 thus, hard-core sovereigntists who fear economic hardship in a sovereign Quebec are presumed to be, for that reason, less hard-core, even if still supportive of sovereignty. The additive model presented in column 4 of Table 6.7, for example, suggests that someone in the

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38 Something to consider, in assessing these results, is the relevant null hypothesis: would a constant effect of economic considerations across the identity spectrum be represented by a constant economics coefficient for each identity category or a constant ratio of the identity coefficient to the economics coefficient (i.e. the larger the identity coefficient, the larger the anticipated economics coefficient, so that the relative importance of the two variables would be constant across the identity spectrum). If the latter is the appropriate null hypothesis - for which a case can certainly be made - then the minimal influence of economic considerations in the upper identity categories is more striking still.

39 This is the case, for example, in the graphics presented by Blais, Martin and Nadeau, showing the impact of economic and language variables in different identity categories ("Attentes économiques et linguistiques et appui à la souveraineté du Québec: une analyse prospective et comparative," p. 652). Although the effect of these variables appears to vary by identity category, this is simply a by-product of the use of logistic regression to model the data (the effect on probability scores of a given change in logit value always varies across the spectrum of probability values). This is why the constant effect, in logit terms, of the economics and language variables in the model, translates into differing probability effects across the various identity categories. Such modeling should not be seen as capturing interaction effects (though, of course, there are other reasons for choosing to use the logistic regression model).
uppermost identity category, who believes that sovereignty would make his or her standard of living no
different or better, would stand at 0.85 on the sovereignty support scale (0.13 + 0.49 + 0.23), but would
fall to 0.62 (0.13 + 0.49) if persuaded that sovereignty would in fact make his or her standard of living
much worse. When interaction terms are introduced in Table 6.10, however, the data suggest that
movement, regardless of whether it pushes people over the 0.5 threshold, is concentrated in the
intermediate categories, and that those at the far Québécois end are essentially anchored in place. This
distinction may be irrelevant to strategists who hope to alter the aggregate level of support for
sovereignty in a future referendum and naturally focus on the ambivalents hovering around the 0.5
threshold. But for those investigating the reasoning that underwrites sovereignty support, it is a
meaningful distinction. In effect, it offers quantitative verification of a phenomenon that many
observers sense intuitively: namely, that some people support Quebec sovereignty unconditionally and
are wholly unmoved by any rational evaluation of economic or language considerations.

But before drawing the firm conclusion that the impact of substantive considerations is
differentially distributed across the spectrum of national identity, there is a potential flaw in this
analysis to be addressed. It may be that such considerations have a stronger impact within the fifth
identity category than estimated here, but this is not detected by the regression analysis, partly because
of the method used to measure sovereignty support, and partly because of the powerful impact of
identity on this variable. The maximum value for the sovereignty variable is 1.0 (for someone who is
very favourable to sovereignty). The average person in the fifth identity category, who believes
sovereignty would have a negative economic impact and that there is no threat to the French language
in Quebec, would, according to the model in Table 6.10, have a value on the sovereignty variable of
0.84 (0.19 + 0.65). This makes it impossible for the language and economic coefficients for this
category to be greater than 0.16 (if, for example, everyone who thought the French language threatened
was "very favourable" to sovereignty, the relevant coefficient, ceteris paribus, would be precisely
0.16). In other words, there is a ceiling in place because the maximum value of the sovereignty variable is 1.0 and a strong Québécois identity takes someone nearly all the way there.\footnote{If sovereignty support were measured on, say, a 0 to 100 scale, stronger effects might be seen for the substantive considerations within the final identity category. A sovereignty thermometer of this sort might reveal significant variation within the group who "strongly favour" sovereignty, and this variation might be partly explained by economic and linguistic considerations.}

Is this ceiling effect responsible for the seemingly weak impact of economic and language concerns in the final identity category? It seems unlikely that this is the sole reason for the small coefficients. In the first place, the effect of the economics variable is considerably smaller for the fourth identity category than for the first three categories, even though the ceiling effect is not nearly such a problem for this group. Identity by itself puts someone in identity category 4 at only 0.53 (0.19 + 0.34) on the 0 to 1 sovereignty scale. There would still seem to plenty of room for upward movement due to economic considerations - if these were as important to those in category 4 as they are to those with weaker Québécois identities. The impact of economic considerations is already tailing off considerably before ceiling effects enter into play. In the case of the language variable, the coefficient estimated for the last identity category is 0.01. While there may be less room for upward movement in this category than the others, a coefficient of 0.01 does suggest that the variable has a negligible impact among the most radical nationalists (though, of course, there is a sizeable standard error around this estimate). Clearly, further research needs to be done, and it would be premature to put too fine a point on any conclusions. However, it seems safe to say, on the current evidence, that the impact of substantive considerations is greatest in intermediate identity categories and smaller amongst those with the strongest national identities.

It would appear, then, that the two phenomena discussed earlier in this chapter - the projective power of nationalist sentiment and the differential concern with substantive considerations across the spectrum of national identity - are evident in the thinking that leads people to take up different
positions on the scale of sovereignty support in Quebec. Identity is a crucial variable, not only for its
direct influence on sovereignty support, but also for its conditioning effect on the impact of other
variables. Behind the cost-benefit calculations of tangible matters that some would argue are a vital
element in shaping nationalist attitudes, lies a national identity that colours and informs those
calculations. In this fashion, the rationality of nationalists is checked and circumscribed by the
pervasive effects of national identity.

E) Multivariate Analysis of Independence Support in Scotland

If the powerful impact of identity, both direct and indirect, on the formation of constitutional
preferences, can be seen in the patterns of support for sovereignty in Quebec, the same phenomenon is
not so readily apparent in the Scottish case. The analysis that follows, based on Scottish survey data
from the 1992 British election, examines similar variables for the Scottish case, and looks for
comparable relationships among them, but yields findings that deviate from the Quebec results. To
accommodate these results, consideration must be accorded contextual factors that have made the
Scottish situation somewhat anomalous, resulting in a nationalist movement that is, on the whole, more
pragmatist in orientation. Once this is recognized, the findings fall into place: broadly speaking, the
behavior of Scottish nationalists is similar to pragmatists in Quebec. In other words, theoretical
propositions at the level of the individual nationalist still hold, and the primary difference between the
two movements lies in their aggregate composition.

But before making that case, it is first necessary to examine the anomalies in the Scottish data.
Table 6.11 shows frequencies for the dependent variable used in this analysis, support for Scottish
independence. As the table indicates, all respondents who supported independence, either within or
without the E.C., are coded as 1, while all others are coded as 0 (except for the don't knows, who are
coded as 0.5). In this survey, 23% opted for Scottish independence over an Assembly or the status quo.
Table 6.11: Scottish Constitutional Preferences, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Preference (n=929)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No change (0)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Assembly (0)</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent as part of E.C. (1)</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent and not part of E.C. (1)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know (0.5)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Value 0.24

Source: Author’s calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.12 show the bivariate relationship between support for Scottish independence and two explanatory variables: national identity, and a question that seems to tap into perceptions of the economic impact of independence on Scotland - "Would independence make Scotland better off than now, worse off, or would it make no difference?" Column 3 of the table shows results of multivariate analysis based on these same variables. In the bivariate case, both

41 All data in this analysis of support for Scottish independence represent the author’s calculations based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. See Appendix A for details.

42 Although the dependent variable is now binary, we continue to use Ordinary Least Squares regression. Other regression methods are sometimes used in this situation, in particular probit and logit. The principal advantage of OLS regression is the relative ease of interpretation of the regression coefficients: they represent the change in the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in the explanatory variable. In this case, there is another advantage: using OLS makes the Scottish results more comparable to the Quebec data; and the Quebec data, because based on a dependent variable with more than two values, could not be easily analyzed using the probit or logit methods.

The idea that comparisons might be drawn between the Scottish and Quebec data, even though the dependent variable has two categories in one case and four categories in the other, raises an interesting issue. In the Quebec case, the dependent variable is clearly a measure of the intensity of respondents' support for Quebec sovereignty (very opposed, somewhat opposed, etc.). In the Scottish case, the dependent variable is binary and would, for this reason, typically be treated as the probability of someone's supporting independence. But it is also possible to conceptualize this variable as the intensity of support for independence. This seems a bit odd, because the variable only has two values, 0 and 1 (aside from a few don't know at 0.5), but there is no reason these values cannot be conceptualized as intensities.

When a variable represents a probability, it is usually said that predicted values outside the 0 to 1 range are nonsensical; and one of the merits of probit and logit is that they, unlike OLS regression, do not produce such values. But if a variable represents an intensity, then predicted values outside the 0 to 1 range seem reasonable. A predicted value of 1.1 based on the Quebec data, for example, would indicate that someone was strongly favourable to sovereignty and then some. Since support for Scottish independence can be conceptualized either as a probability or as an intensity, it is not self-evident that it is important to keep predicted values within the 0 to 1 range.

Neither is it self-evident that the curvilinear modelling of logit and probit is to be preferred to the linear modelling of OLS. It makes sense to fit a curve to a set of data when it is believed there are diminishing returns at
explanatory variables have a significant effect on support for independence. However, the impact of the substantive consideration - would independence make Scotland better off? - is larger than the identity effect, and this difference increases substantially when the two variables are analyzed conjointly. As the third column indicates, a strong Scottish identity increases the probability of supporting independence by only 20% (over the comparison category), whereas a sense that Scotland would be better off if independent increases that probability by 43%. Given the sizeable change in the coefficient for identity from the bivariate to multivariate case, it is safe to say that, as in the Quebec case, the two explanatory variables are quite strongly correlated. If it is assumed that identity is causally prior to a sense that Scotland would be better off if independent, these results suggest that identity, in some measure, affects support for independence only to the extent it makes someone think independence would make Scotland better off. It does have some independent impact, but it is not nearly so large as in the Quebec case. Furthermore, the sense that Scotland would be better off is less a reflection of national identity than in the Quebec case. Instead, it seems to be a largely independent factor, and one with a very strong effect on support for independence at that.

work - i.e., a one unit change in an independent variable has less impact as the maximum value of the dependent variable is approached. If the dependent variable represents a probability, then diminishing returns will almost certainly enter into play as the value 1 is approached. But if it represents an intensity, this will not necessarily be so. In the current set of data, for example, diminishing returns might only start at the point where people are "extremely supportive of Scottish independence". Since the maximum value of the dependent variable is "supportive of Scottish independence", the point of diminishing returns has not been reached, and using OLS regression is appropriate.

The upshot is this: OLS coefficients are easier to interpret and facilitate comparison with the Quebec results, and the curvilinear modelling of the probit and logit methods is not necessarily preferable to the linear modelling of OLS. Hence, OLS is used in this instance. For further discussion of the merits and demerits of these different regression methods, see Richard Johnston, André Blais, Henry E. Brady and Jean Crête, *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 261-262; and John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984).
Table 6.12: Determinants of Support for Scottish Independence, Bivariate versus Multivariate Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 B (SE)</th>
<th>Model 2 B (SE)</th>
<th>Model 3 (B) SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05* (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>0.33 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Independence Make Scotland Better Off?&quot;:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better off</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.48 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.43 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.12 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p = .08. For all other variables in all models, p < .01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: Identity (British not Scottish, More British than Scottish, Equally Scottish and British); Independence Make Scotland Better Off? (worse off).

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

Table 6.13 shows further results, that also differ from those seen in the Quebec case. In this regression model, support for independence is again the dependent variable, with the interactions between identity and perceptions of the impact of independence on Scotland now included as explanatory variables (along with the main identity effects). Whereas in Quebec, the coefficients for the interactions between identity and substantive considerations formed a mound shape that sloped slowly upward, reached a peak and then tailed off considerably among those with the strongest national identity, all that is apparent in Table 6.13 is the upward slope. For those in the first three identity categories (39% of the sample), the belief that independence would make Scotland better off increases support for independence by 0.35, compared to 0.45 and 0.52 for the "more Scottish than British" and "Scottish not British" groups (which account for 41% and 20% of the sample respectively). There is no point at which identity becomes the dominant consideration, overriding concern for the concrete consequences of independence. Instead, those with the strongest Scottish
identity are affected more than others by the substantive consideration of whether independence would make Scotland better off.

Table 6.13: Determinants of Support for Scottish Independence, Interaction Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>0.13* (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity / &quot;Independence Make Scotland Better Off?&quot; interactions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish, More British than Scottish, Equally Scottish and British / no difference</td>
<td>0.15** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British / no difference</td>
<td>0.09 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British / no difference</td>
<td>0.21** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish, More Scottish than Scottish, Equally Scottish and British / better off</td>
<td>0.35** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British / better off</td>
<td>0.45** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British / better off</td>
<td>0.52** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05  **p<.01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: Identity (British not Scottish, More British than Scottish, Equally Scottish and British); "Independence Make Scotland Better Off?" (worse off).

Source: Author’s calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The remainder of this section endeavours to make sense of these results, in light of both factors peculiar to the Scottish case and the general theoretical propositions developed to this point. This re-assessment leads to the conclusion that Scottish nationalism, in the general population, is more pragmatist and less idealist than nationalist sentiment in Quebec. This pragmatism is partly rooted in an abiding concern with the economic dimension of national life, but is also linked to other concrete concerns, in particular, protecting a distinctive Scottish political culture. These contentions are explicated and substantiated by considering, in turn, each of the three variables examined in Table 6.12, including both independent variables and the dependent variable.
Variable 1: "Would Independence Make Scotland Better Off?"

Consider first the variable based on the question of whether independence would make Scotland better off. The results reported in Table 6.12 seems to indicate that this substantive issue is an important determinant of nationalist sentiment in Scotland, that economic considerations are of the essence. There is nothing new in this idea, of course. Ever since the discovery of North Sea oil, which predated the SNP's peak electoral success in the October 1974 election, the notion that economics considerations are the driving force behind Scottish nationalism has been widespread; and evidence in support of the hypothesis has sometimes been derived from the same type of survey questions used to generate the results shown in Table 6.12. Mughan and McAllister, for example, report that SNP supporters in the mid-1970s were especially prone to think Scotland would be better off if independent, and use this finding in support of their contention that it is a sense of relative economic deprivation that has made the Scottish identity politically salient from the 1960s on. More recently, other researchers have used data based on this same question to back their claim that support for Scottish independence arises, in part, "from a feeling that the perceived economic deprivation of Scotland would not occur in an independent state." In short: the high level of support for independence (or for the SNP) among those who think Scotland will be "better off" if independent is said to demonstrate the significant impact of economic considerations on Scottish nationalism.

It is questionable, however, whether this is a wholly valid inference. The assumption other researchers have made is that survey respondents interpret the question "Would independence make Scotland better off?" to mean better off economically. But the questions on which their analyses have

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42 Mughan and McAllister, "The mobilization of the ethnic vote," esp. Table 3, p. 197.

been based do not specify this. They simply say "better off." And there are many ways in which political independence can make a community better off: economically, certainly, but also socially, politically and culturally. If the nature of potential benefits is not specified, people are free to interpret the question "Would independence make Scotland better off?" in whatever way they choose.

Table 6.14 shows the results of regression analysis designed to demonstrate that this ambiguous question is indeed susceptible to multiple interpretations by survey respondents. In both Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is support for Scottish independence, with identity included as an explanatory variable. The key variables in the table are the interaction variables. These are used to compare the effect of the "Scotland better off" variable in two different groups: those who are economically-minded, and those who are less economically-minded. If, as has previously been assumed, people interpret "better off" to mean better off economically, then the effect of the "Scotland better off" variable should be greater among those who are economically-minded.

Economic-mindedness is defined in two different ways in Table 6.14, as a validity check. First, it is defined using two questions concerning the benefits of gaining power for Scotland: one asked respondents what they felt was the most important advantage of Scottish independence, the other, the most important advantage of a Scottish Assembly. All were classified as economically-minded who answered, to either of these two questions, 'it would help the Scottish economy' or 'it would help protect Scotland's natural resources' - the two economically-oriented responses. Those who answered both questions with a non-economic response were coded as less economically-minded.46

45 The full text of the question used in the Mughan and McAllister analysis is "If Scotland became completely independent of the rest of Britain, do you think a) Scotland would be better off, worse off, or would [sic] make no difference; b) you personally would be better off, worse off, or would it make no difference?" (Mughan and McAllister, "The mobilization of the ethnic vote: a thesis with some Scottish and Welsh evidence," Table 2, p. 195). The analysis of Brand et al. is based on the same dataset and question used here.

46 These non-economic responses were: 'it would mean more time for Scottish laws'; 'Scots could solve their own problems'; 'it would mean more say in Scottish government'; and 'it is every nation's right'. Those who, to either question, responded 'don't know' or 'there would be no advantages', or did not respond, have been
This first measure of economic-mindedness, then, gauges whether people are economically-oriented in matters of Scottish nationalism.

The second way of measuring economic-mindedness is more generally pitched. It makes use of the materialist/post-materialist questions asked on the survey, and classifies as economically-minded all who gave the two standard materialist responses - those, in other words, who felt that 'maintaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices' were more desirable goals than 'giving people more say in important political decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech.' All others were deemed to be less economically-minded.47

The data in Table 6.14 indicate that the impact of the 'Scotland better off?' variable on support for independence does not vary by economic-mindedness. Results are displayed for two regression models, one for each of the two measures of economic-mindedness. In the first model, the coefficient for those who are economically-minded, and who responded 'no difference' to the question 'Would independence make Scotland better off?', is 0.08. For those economically-minded and of the view that independence would make Scotland better off, the coefficient is 0.43. The corresponding coefficients for the less economically-minded are 0.12 and 0.42 - in other words, essentially no different.

excluded from the analysis. Of the 957 total respondents, this left 742 available for the analysis, with 425 coded as economically-minded, and 317 as less economically-minded. The sample sizes in the regression models below are slightly smaller than 742 due to missing data on other variables.

47 The materialist/post-materialist distinction is usually operationalized a bit differently. Those who choose the two materialist values are classified as materialists. Those who choose the two post-materialist responses - 'giving people more say in important political decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech' - are classified as post-materialists. Those who choose one of each are slotted into an intermediate 'mixed' category (see, for example, R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society [Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1990]). In this case, the post-materialists have not been classified as a separate group because of their small numbers. Instead the mixed group and the post-materialists have together been classified as non-materialists. In addition, those who selected only one value have been included in this group, if they selected a post-materialist value.

The questions used for this classification are taken from a self-completion survey which only some respondents completed. In total, there were 726 cases available for the analysis based on this classification, with 278 coded as economically-minded, and 448 as less economically-minded. The sample sizes in the regression models below are slightly smaller than 726 due to missing data on other variables.
Table 6.14: Impact of "Independence Make Scotland Better Off?" Variable on Support for Independence: Economically-Minded vs Non-Economically-Minded Scots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>0.06 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>0.22** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.19** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Important Advantage Economic-Mindedness</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions: Most Important Advantage Economic-Mindedness / 'Scotland Better Off?'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-minded, no difference</td>
<td>0.08 (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded, no difference</td>
<td>0.12* (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-minded, better off</td>
<td>0.43** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded, better off</td>
<td>0.42** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism Economic-Mindedness</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions: Post-Materialism Economic-Mindedness / 'Scotland Better Off?'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-minded, no difference</td>
<td>0.07 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded, no difference</td>
<td>0.14** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-minded, better off</td>
<td>0.36** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded, better off</td>
<td>0.44** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05  **p<.01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: identity (British not Scottish / more British than Scottish / equally Scottish and British); Economic-Mindedness (less economically-minded); Interaction Variables (independence would make Scotland worse off).

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The absence of a stronger impact among the economically-minded is also evident when economic-mindedness is measured using the materialist/post-materialist questions. In fact, in this case, both coefficients for the economically-minded are somewhat smaller than those for their less materialist counterparts: 0.07 and 0.36 versus 0.14 and 0.44 (though the associated standard errors suggest that these differences are not statistically significant). A sense that independence would make Scotland better off has, it would seem, no greater effect on support for independence among
materialists than it does among non-materialists. These findings suggest that the ‘Scotland better off?’ question does not capture economic considerations exclusively.

Table 6.15 adds a comparative element to ensure this reasoning is sound. It examines the effect on support for independence of the interactions between the two measures of economic-mindedness and a perception that clearly is economically-oriented. The latter variable is based on the question, ‘Compared with British families in general over the last 10 years, would you say that your household’s income has risen more than average, stayed about average or fallen more than average?’ Those who felt their incomes had fallen, and who, on a subsequent question, said this was the result of government policies, were compared to all other respondents. Results are shown in Table 6.15. Again separate regression analyses have been conducted for the two measures of economic-mindedness.

Table 6.15 indicates that the effect of this expressly economic variable on support for independence does vary by economic-mindedness. Using the first measure, the coefficient for this variable is 0.09 among the economically-minded, compared to -0.03 among the less economically-minded. Using the second measure, the respective coefficients are 0.11 and -0.01. These results confirm that the two methods of classifying respondents do serve to differentiate economically-oriented respondents from their less materially-minded counterparts, and furthermore, that economic-mindedness does affect the causal significance of variables that tap into economic considerations exclusively.

This adds weight to the contention that the question "Would independence make Scotland better off?" is not uniformly treated by respondents as a query into the economic impact of independence. Some, no doubt, take it this way, but others give it their own gloss, taking into account different dimensions of the independence issue.
Table 6.15: Impact of Changes in Household Income on Support for Independence: Economically-Minded versus Non-Economically-Minded Scots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>0.12** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>0.35** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.31** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Important Advantage</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-Mindedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions: Most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Advantage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-Mindedness /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Economically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minded, income fallen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than average due to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gov't. policies</td>
<td>0.09 (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income fallen more than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average due to gov't.</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-Mindedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions: Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindedness / Changes in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-minded,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income fallen more than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average due to gov't.</td>
<td>0.11 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less economically-minded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income fallen more than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average due to gov't.</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.16 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-Square</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05  **p<.01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: Identity (British not Scottish / more British than Scottish / equally Scottish and British); Economic-Mindedness (less economically-minded); Interaction Variables (household income risen more than average / stayed about average / fallen more than average for reasons other than gov't policies).

Source: Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

What are those other dimensions? A tentative answer can be found in responses to one of the questions used to measure economic-mindedness. Many of the respondents, when asked "What is the most important advantage of Scottish independence?," did not choose the economically-oriented answers - only 15% chose "help the Scottish economy" and a further 9% "protect Scotland's natural resources." The others chose responses that seem to speak to concrete political concerns: "it would mean more say in Scottish government" (28%), "Scots could solve their own problems" (18%), and "it would mean more time for special Scottish laws" (4%).
These non-economic reasons for finding independence attractive might be interpreted as manifestations of a pragmatist Scottish national identity. That identity, it was argued in the Scottish case study, is, for many, a product of the Scots' distinctive political culture, which emphasizes radical democratic precepts (respect for the individual, coupled with a strong belief in social and economic equality). Many Scots desire independence because it will afford them "more say in Scottish government" and allow them to "solve their own problems", which will allow Scottish political values greater expression. That this type of rationale lies behind Scottish nationalism is seconded by close observers of the Scottish political scene, who have seen the revived Scottish nationalism since the late 1980s, in both its Home Rule and independence guises, as a reaction to Thatcherite policies from a community distinctive in its political culture.\(^{48}\) It is not simply narrow economic interest driving Scottish nationalism, but also distinctive political sensibilities, affronted by the political dimension of Conservative policies. The contraction of the British welfare state, the lack of public consultation over major reforms such as the poll tax: actions like these have rubbed many Scots the wrong way, creating a sense of grievance that has only been exacerbated by the dearth of Tory MPs north of Hadrian's Wall.

This is not to say that economic motivations are wholly absent. The North Sea oil, the slow postwar decline of the British economy, the prosperity other small nations have found within the European Union: no doubt, some are thinking of these economic factors when they say Scotland would be better off if independent. But it is not economic considerations exclusively that are being captured by the "Scotland better off" variable.\(^{49}\)


\(^{49}\) None of this, of course, addresses the endogeneity problem: it may be that support for independence causes people to think Scotland will be better off if independent, rather than vice versa. An attempt was made to address this issue by carrying out the two-stage least squares procedure. There were quite a few economic variables that seemed suitable to use as instruments. When the "Scotland better off" variable is predicted using these variables, its relationship to independence support remains robust (it is, in fact slightly larger). But there were few, if any, questions on the survey that might have been used as instruments to predict the political culture component of the...
This helps explain the influence of this variable on independence support. Its impact is considerable (with a regression coefficient of 0.43 in Table 6.12) because it is a catch-all variable. Whereas in Quebec, surveys typically ask separate questions about the economic and linguistic consequences of sovereignty, in Scotland the substantive considerations that affect support for independence are bundled together in one question. This suggests, then, that the Scottish results are not so out of line as they might first appear. In the Quebec case, the belief that sovereignty would improve one's standard of living increased support for sovereignty by 0.23. The effect of the language variable was considerably smaller (.05), but this, it was noted, is because it is based on a question that is not prospectively oriented (see Table 6.7); analyses based on prospective language questions yield regression coefficients of about 0.2. In other words, economic and language concerns together increase support for Quebec sovereignty by about 0.4 - roughly the same as the catch-all variable in the Scottish case.

ii) Variable 2: Support for Scottish Independence

Examination of the first variable in the Scottish independence equation offers some clarification of the substantive considerations that motivate Scottish nationalism. The twin components that motivate pragmatist nationalism in Quebec also are at work in Scotland: an abiding concern for the substantive elements of nationhood, those tangible, sociological differentiae that make a community distinct, and considerable attention to non-national matters, specifically economics. But if the effect of substantive considerations is not greatly different, the impact of Scottish identity is. Why does national identity in Scotland have markedly less influence over constitutional preferences than in Quebec?

"Scotland better off" variable. Consequently, the correlation between the predicted and actual values of the variable is quite low, making the two-stage least squares result rather suspect.

50 See, for example, Nadeau and Fleury, "Gains linguistiques anticipés et appui à la souveraineté du Quebec," Table 2, p. 43. The table also reports similar coefficients for standard of living expectations to those found here.
Consideration of the other two variables in the independence equation sheds some light on the matter. The relative insignificance of the identity variable can, in the first place, be partly attributed to the character of the dependent variable. At first blush, the dependent variable examined in the Quebec case, support for sovereignty, and the variable considered in the Scottish case, support for independence, look roughly equivalent. Though the response categories differ, it is possible, in both cases, to collapse them in order to classify people as supporters and non-supporters of sovereignty/independence. However, sovereignty supporters in Quebec and independence supporters in Scotland may be quite different, for people who claim they want a separate state for their nation are not uniformly ardent in their nationalism. It was reported earlier, in the Scottish case study, that a 1974 survey revealed that a very high percentage of supporters of Scottish independence (97%) also supported a Scottish Assembly, whereas significant numbers of Québécois indépendantistes do not support a special status for Quebec. Willingness to consider lesser options is indicative of a decided moderation on the part of Scottish supporters of independence. Their temperance is evident too in the high proportion who vote for parties other than the SNP - 43% in the 1992 SES sample. In Quebec, support for independence nearly always entails support for the PQ, suggesting a more singular mindset on the part of Québécois nationalists; in the 1992-3 CRES, only 9% of those somewhat or very favourable to sovereignty supported a party other than the PQ. Of course, the SNP cannot possibly win a British general election, whereas the PQ can emerge victorious in Quebec provincial elections, which means the wasted vote consideration may play a greater role in Scotland. However, supporters of Quebec sovereignty have also given overwhelming support to the Bloc Québécois, a federal party formed in 1990 that cannot possibly win the national elections it contests; again, only 9% opted for other parties in the 1992-3 CRES sample. The failure of Scottish supporters of independence to fall in behind their nationalist party suggests they are less zealous than their counterparts in Quebec.51

51 The cited figures represent calculations by the author based on the Scottish Election Study, 1992 and the
Of course, direct evidence to support this somewhat speculative reasoning would be desirable. Ideally, data from the two places, based on identical questions concerning constitutional preferences, would be collected and compared. A representative sample of Scottish respondents might, for example, be asked the same question asked of Quebeckers in the 1992-3 CRES: "What is your opinion on Scottish sovereignty, that is, Scotland is no longer part of Great Britain?" If Scottish and Québécois nationalists do, in the aggregate, differ in the intensity of their desire for independence, the ratio of "somewhat favourable" to "strongly favourable" responses would likely be larger for Scotland than it was in the Quebec results reported above.

But the data at hand do provide some suggestive evidence for the contention that Scottish nationalists are, on the whole, a more moderate breed. The models in Table 6.10 (Quebec) and Table 6.13 (Scotland) are not perfectly comparable, but they are broadly similar. Both include a national identity variable, along with variables intended to capture the key substantive considerations influencing support for Quebec/Scottish independence. They also incorporate the substantial interaction effects for these variables. With independence support thus modelled, the largest predicted value in the Scottish case is 0.67 (0.02 + 0.13 + 0.52), for someone who falls in the "Scottish not British" identity category and believes independence would make Scotland better off. Unlike the corresponding Quebec model, no one is predicted to take the values like 0.8 or 0.9. Instead, those who favour Scottish independence have predicted values in relatively close proximity to the 0.5 threshold. Many of these people, presumably, would be more likely to declare themselves "somewhat in favour"
of independence, rather than "strongly in favour", if presented with the appropriately worded question.52

These predicted values suggest that Scottish nationalism is decidedly moderate in the aggregate, with fewer radical nationalists to be found in the Scottish population at large. They also lend weight to the contention that apparent differences, between the Scottish and Quebec cases, in the determinants of independence support, are not so pronounced as they might first appear at the individual level. For if most supporters of Scottish independence are clustered around the 0.5 threshold, the relevant comparison group from the Quebec case becomes those respondents with similar predicted values on the sovereignty variable. And these people are, according to the coefficients from the Quebec model of sovereignty support in Table 6.10, quite differently motivated from their more radical confrères. Substantive considerations are of considerably greater import to these lukewarm supporters of Quebec sovereignty. The example was cited above of the average Québécois respondent in identity category 3, sanguine about their economic prospects in an independent Quebec and believing the French language not to be threatened. This person's 0.61 value on the sovereignty variable is a near equal reflection of economic considerations (0.22) and identity (0.20). Were data available for the appropriately worded language question (one prospectively-oriented), this too might exercise considerable causal influence in identity category 3. In both Scotland and Quebec, then, weak supporters of independence, open to alternative constitutional futures, are partly motivated by their national identity, but also to a considerable degree by substantive considerations. The principal difference between the two cases is the dearth of hard core supporters of

52 Arguably this comparison requires a recoding of the dependent variable for the Scottish case. In the Quebec case, the possible values for the sovereignty variable were 0, 0.333, 0.5, 0.667, and 1.0 (ranging from "very opposed" to "very favourable"). In the Scottish case, the two categories of the dependent variable are simply supporters and non-supporters of independence (and a few don't knows). Since we do not know the intensity of their support, it might be assumed that half are strongly in favour of independence and half somewhat in favour. This would entail assigning the values 0.167 and 0.833 - the mid-points between 0 - 0.333, and 0.667 - 1.0 - to opponents and supporters of Scottish independence, respectively. But this recoding would not have a great impact, and would only move the predicted values closer to 0.5.
Scottish independence unwilling to countenance any other future for their nation because of an unconditional Scottish identity.

**iii) Variable 3: National Identity**

The final question is, then, why this difference? Where are the Scottish nationalists who feel Scottish to the point that their predicted values on the independence variable are 0.8 or 0.9 and substantive considerations hardly register? To answer this question, and round out this account of the thinking that underlies support for Scottish independence, the third variable in the independence model, national identity, must be drawn into the equation.

Certainly, on the surface of it, there seem to be significant numbers of Scots with a powerful Scottish national identity. After all, some 20% of respondents in the 1992 BES said they felt "Scottish not British." This, though, may be an example of a response to an identity question that is misleading. Many people may report that they feel strongly Scottish, but there are reasons - reasons other than the rather weak correlation with independence support - to think this sentiment may not carry the same weight as a declaration of unalloyed Québécoisness.

The unequal weight attached to national identities in Scotland and Quebec is likely a reflection of the divergent paths of historical development in the two places. Typically, it was argued in Chapter 1, modern states, even those that permit sociological diversity, try to deny the status of nation to minority groups within; instead, they promote an abstract and idealised sense of nationhood in their efforts to unite what is often a heterogeneous population. The reaction from disaffected elements within minority communities parallels the behavior of the state. Idealist nationalists react in kind and idealize their community, conceptualizing it as a seamless nation with an unconditional right to independence. Idealist nationalism in minority nations is the mirror image of the state's efforts to impose an idealized state-based nationalism on the population.
But this was a general statement, making reference to broad patterns of historical development in the modern age, for the purpose of developing a general model of identity formation within minority populations. Like most generalizations, it admits of exceptions: undeniably there are some differences in the way states have treated minority groups within. Indeed, Chapter 1, though not pressing the point forcefully, did allude to some of the ways in which the Scots have, historically, been treated with greater deference than like groups elsewhere. This idea might now be developed further. Differential treatment of the Scottish and Québécois nations at the hands of the British and Canadian governments has, it can be argued, significantly influenced the development of minority national consciousness in the two places; and one latter-day consequence, manifested in the data above, is that a strong Scottish identity does not today have the same leverage over constitutional preferences as a strong Québécois identity.

The origins of this differential treatment likely pre-date the incorporation of the Scottish and the Québécois into their respective states. Prior to the merger of the English and Scottish Parliaments in the 1707 Treaty of Union, there existed, in both Scotland and England, a reasonably strong national consciousness. The Scots, having won their independence from the English in 1320, developed as a sovereign state for four centuries, and consequently took their place at the Treaty of Union negotiating table as a mature nation with a reasonably strong national consciousness.53 Certainly, as Chapter 3 observed, there were marked divisions between Lowland and Highland Scots that only time would bridge; but, at the same time, the Scots were hardly in 1707 an unformed mass ready for quick assimilation into a larger population. Of equal, if not greater, significance, however, was that the English also saw themselves as a distinct nation at that point, national consciousness having taken hold

Thus, while the English were certainly the dominant partner, the Treaty of Union was conceived, on both sides, as the joining of two nations.\textsuperscript{55}

This spirit of partnership meant, as many have noted, that the English were content to include provisions in the Treaty of Union for the maintenance of certain key sociological aspects of Scottishness, embodied in the Church of Scotland, the Scottish legal system, and the Scottish education system. But an equally important (and oft-overlooked consequence) was that the English were, and have continued to be, willing to allow the Scots to claim the status of nation. They are a nation without much political power, certainly, but they are accorded more symbolic or ideational recognition than like groups elsewhere, and for this reason constitute an anomalous entity in the modern world.\textsuperscript{56} This recognition takes many forms: separate Scottish teams in international sporting events; bodies designed to accommodate Scottish interests within the unitary British political system, such as the Scottish Office and special parliamentary committees that deliberate on Scottish legislation; a greater than average willingness on the part of English parties and politicians to consider a Parliament for Scotland only, rather than insisting on uniform devolution; not least of all, a reflexive manner of speaking about Scots and Scotland, common to politicians, journalists, and laypeople alike, that reveals a general acceptance of the national status of Scotland.\textsuperscript{57} Scots, unlike other minority populations, have not been pressed to be British ideationally and Scottish sociologically. Instead, they have managed to


\textsuperscript{57} These, and other ways that the Scots are recognized as a distinct entity within the British polity, are discussed in Kellas, \textit{The Scottish Political System}.
gain acceptance for an abstract Scottish identity. Compared to minorities elsewhere, the Scots hear much less of the statist mantra that they are, at base, Britons, who differ from their fellow nationals only in superficial, sociological ways. It is widely, if not uniformly, accepted that they are Scots at their core, and therefore not merely an "ethnic group" or "cultural community", but a full-fledged nation. Precisely what the powers of this nation should be is a highly contentious issue, but its existence is not a matter for debate.

Quebec's experience, on the other hand, has been more typical, in that Canadians have been largely unwilling to concede national status to the Québécois. Again, conditions at the time of merger were a crucial factor in determining the course of subsequent events. Like the Scots, the French had a reasonably strong sense of national consciousness at the time of Canada's creation in 1867. Ever since the political link to France had been severed a century before by defeat on the Plains of Abraham, the French-speaking people of what would become Canada had, most historians would agree, come to see themselves as a distinct community; episodes like the 1837 rebellion in Lower Canada attest to the potent communal consciousness that had taken root over the years.

The relevant contrast with the Scottish case is that the group the French merged with in 1867 did not have a strong national consciousness. There was, most observers would agree, little English-Canadian nationalism to be found at that time. Instead, the community with which most identified was Britain and the British Empire, of which the newly-minted Dominion of Canada remained an integral part. When war came, as it did in 1898 and 1914, many young English-Canadians sprang reflexively to the defence of the Empire. And though the colonial connection slowly atrophied, this did not produce, in the hearts and minds of English-Canadians, the bi-national ethos that French-Canadians might have hoped for. As the attachment to Great Britain ebbed, it was replaced not by English-Canadian nationalism, but by a pan-Canadian nationalism seeking to incorporate all from sea to shining sea. Rather than Confederation symbolizing a pact between two nations, it has come to be seen by many
English-Canadians as the melding of two populations to form a new nation superseding all previous attachments.\footnote{The failure of English-Canada to develop an English-Canadian national consciousness and the resultant reluctance to recognize French-Canadians as a nation is analyzed in Philip Resnick, \textit{Thinking English Canada} (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994).}

The result has been a certain intransigence on the part of the dominant group. Canadians outside Quebec have generally been content to allow French-Canadians their sociological differences, that is, the Catholic religion and French language. At times they have left French-Canadians to fend for themselves in this regard, which has led to assimilation of many French-Canadian pockets outside Quebec, but in the past three decades, more positive initiatives, such as the introduction of official bilingualism, have been undertaken to protect and promote the French language and culture. Yet there has generally been a marked reluctance to grant the type of symbolic recognition that the Scots have historically enjoyed; in the ideational realm, many Canadians insist on a strictly Canadian identity. There may be, the thinking runs, tangible differences between Canadians of different language and culture groups, but at our core, we are all unhyphenated Canadians. With the shift in consciousness from French-Canadian to Québécois nationalism, Canadian nationalists have demonstrated their ongoing intransigence by insisting that Quebec is a province like the others, deserving of no "special" treatment. Quebec may have more concrete powers than Scotland - Canada's is, after all, a federal political system, and a highly decentralized one at that - but it does not have the same symbolic or ideational recognition.\footnote{Charles Taylor, "The Deep Challenge of Dualism" in Alain-G. Gagnon (ed.), \textit{Québec: State and Society}, 2nd edition (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1993), pp. 82-95.} Whereas it has been largely taken for granted that the Scots constitute a nation, the notion that the Québécois are one has been highly contentious.

The difference is evident in public attitudes towards major constitutional reforms advertised as ways of satisfying the national aspirations of Quebeckers and Scots, while keeping Canada and Great
Britain intact. Levels of opposition to the Meech Lake Accord outside Quebec rose as high as 70%, as English Canadians took umbrage at an initiative painted by its critics as the constitutional entrenchment of a "special status" for Quebec. In Great Britain the issue of Scottish favouritism has also been played up by opponents of an Assembly, yet a majority in England still favour the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. One 1995 survey, for example, found that 68% of English respondents thought that if a majority of Scots voted in favour of an Assembly in a referendum, they should be allowed one, while only 17% were opposed. The English, it would seem, are more open to solutions that implicitly recognize the Scots as a nation.

One important consequence of the denial of recognition in the Quebec case has been a more typical pattern of identity development, with a significant polarization of nationalist attitudes. In the past, many francophone Quebeckers did not question the official line and accepted that they were Canadian - French-Canadian, certainly, with a keen awareness of the tangible elements that set them apart from other Canadians and for which some accommodation was made, but not possessed of a different abstract national identity. Others, especially since the 1960s, have rejected the Canadian identity with a vengeance. In response to an idealist Canadian nationalism seeking to deny their national status, these ardent Québécois identifiers have retaliated with their own strongly idealist identity. If being Canadian meant one could not be Québécois, then Canadianness would have to go. Though intermediate national identities have not been wholly absent, the denial of national status has

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61 Levels of opposition to the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 were lower, but this is a less accurate barometer of English-Canadian attitudes to Quebec because that agreement contained many additional reforms to Canada's constitutional structures, some expressly designed to win over English-Canadian opinion.

62 "Britons show appetite for radical change," The Scotsman, 11 September 1995, p. 6. Responses for the remaining respondents were not reported; they presumably were undecided or refused to answer.
tended to generate a wide spectrum of national identities, with sharp contrasts between the archetypical pragmatist and idealist.

When a government does recognize a people as a nation, by contrast, there will generally not be the same polarization of identity, the same sharp divide between pragmatists and idealists. Recognition of Scotland's national status has meant that an abstract sense of national identity is very widespread in the Scottish population. But it is not of the same intensity or quality as it is in Quebec. Since Scottishness can peacefully co-exist with Britishness, there has not been the same need to valorize an unconditional and highly idealized Scottish identity. The result has been a prevalent national identity of mainly intermediate strength. The abstract sense of Scottishness is relatively weak, and blends smoothly with the pragmatist identity rooted in an attachment to things distinctively Scottish.

If this reasoning is sound, it suggests there should be less variation in national identity in Scotland than in Quebec. The empirical evidence in favour of this proposition is, however, less than overwhelming. Table 6.16 shows survey data from Scotland and Quebec based on questions about national identity that use similar response categories. In both cases, the incidence of some measure of identification with Scotland or Quebec is very high. Quebeckers do opt for "Quebecker only" slightly more than Scots choose "Scottish not British"; they also select the "Canadian only" and "Canadian first" identities more frequently than Scots choose "British not Scottish" and "more British than Scottish." But the differences are relatively small. It is not immediately clear, then, that the range of national identities is significantly greater in Quebec than in Scotland.\(^63\)

\(^{63}\) Furthermore, both sets of data include respondents who, arguably, should be excluded since they are unlikely to identify with the Scottish or Quêbêcois nations: non-francophone Quebeckers (who account for slightly less than 20% of Quebec's population) and residents of Scotland born elsewhere (about 10% of Scotland's population). The exclusion of these respondents would, in both cases, likely eliminate most the responses in the first two identity categories.
Table 6.16: National Identities in Scotland and Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Canadian only</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Canadian first</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Quebecker and Canadian</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Quebecker first</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Quebecker only</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1992. For further details, see Appendix 1.

But such data may be somewhat misleading, for the principal difference may lie in the meaning Scots and Quebeckers attach to the identity categories presented them. Being Scottish not British does not necessarily mean the same thing as being a Quebecker only. It may well be a less forceful declaration of identity.

There is an important terminological difference between the two cases that must be taken into account in order to assess the meaning respondents attach to their professions of national allegiance. In Scotland, there is only one term used to describe pragmatist nationalism, idealist nationalism, and all blends and mixtures thereof: Scottishness. Feeling Scottish can indicate an attachment to the tangible elements that make the people of Scotland distinct - kilts and tartan, a distinctive accent, Scottish social and political values, and so forth - but can also signify a more abstract, idealized, and unconditional sense of attachment to a timeless Scottish nation. Just as there are Bretons - Bretonnants primarily - whose bretonnité likely derives from their immersion in a distinctive Breton culture, and others whose national identity is more the product of an idealized sense of connection to Bretons past, present and future, so it seems likely that there are various wellsprings of Scottishness for different Scots.

The point is illustrated by a recent study of Scottish national identity that focuses on a group whose identity is very much tied to tangible elements of Scottishness - members of an organization dedicated to the preservation of Scottish heritage sites and buildings, the National Trust for Scotland (NTS). A survey administered to a sample of the membership offers insight into the bases of their national identity. First, it reveals a tendency on their part to make a firm distinction between history
and heritage. History, these NTS members opined, is remote and distant, while heritage, the tangible remnants of yesteryear that have survived down to the present day, is more alive and resonant. For these people, "heritage was more meaningful than history...because it connects more intimately with everyday life." As one respondent, who gave "priority to being Scottish", said, "History is more theoretical. It studies what has happened in the past, and it's not really concerned about what remains, merely what happened then. Heritage on the other hand is primarily concerned with conservation. It's more personal." The authors of the study further report that "the most mentioned characteristics of Scotland's heritage are the country's scenery (mentioned by 30 per cent), its geography (25 per cent), and its monuments, especially its castles (23 per cent). Other non-physical characteristics are its culture of perseverance and hardship (18 per cent), its language and culture (16 per cent), the specific heritage of Highland clans and the Highland Clearances (10 per cent), as well as its folklore (5 per cent)." Asked why these largely concrete elements of nationhood were important to them, "respondents articulated a deeply personal sense of heritage rather than choosing to answer the question in terms of a specifically Scottish, that is, national, dimension. Fully 50 per cent answered this question in terms of their own need to give an account of their personal history, while 22 per cent spoke in more orthodox ways of protecting and conserving the national past."

The responses to these detailed probes suggest that NTS members largely favour a pragmatist nationalism, in that their primary concern is to protect certain concrete, extant elements of Scottishness. Unlike some of their fellow nationals, they do not embrace a more abstract and idealized nationalism. As would be expected, the NTS members are not strong supporters of radical political

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64 McCrone et al., Scotland - the Brand, p. 163.

65 Ibid., p. 180.

66 Ibid., p. 167.

67 Ibid., p. 163-4.
change for Scotland. Only 4% of the 92 respondents were SNP supporters\textsuperscript{68} - in the general population, support runs about 20% to 25%. But while SNP support was far below average in this group, their sense of Scottish identity was much closer to the norm. Eight per cent said they felt Scottish not British, 45% more Scottish than British, 34% equally Scottish and British, 10% more British than Scottish, and 4% British not Scottish.\textsuperscript{69} The corresponding percentages for the population as a whole, reported above, were 20%, 41% 33%, 3% and 3% (see Table 6.16). Thus, NTS members, who tend very much towards a pragmatist Scottish nationalism, do have reasonably strong national identities.

Feeling more Scottish than British, and in some cases Scottish not British, is, then, consistent with a highly pragmatist sense of the Scottish nation. Questions that ask about the relative strength of one's Scottishness do not allow for the possibility that some, in their responses, may focus on the tangible aspects of nationhood, which do not carry the same political implication that a more abstract sense of Scottishness does. Differentiating the two feelings of national belonging is not easy, however, because there is only one term - Scottishness - that is meaningful to people and that naturally forms the basis for identity questions asked on public opinion surveys.

The lack of a differentiating terminology for the two types of nationalism is probably a product of the recognition factor. If the English had been more domineering, like other numerically preponderant groups, they might, subsequent to the Treaty of Union, have dubbed Scotland "North Britain" or something of the sort. Efforts to inculcate a strong sense of Britishness would have followed; North Britons would have been regarded as distinct in virtue of certain superficial, sociological traits, with no allowance made for symbolic recognition of the Scottish nation. Many people living in North Britain would probably have accepted this state of affairs, but others would have rejected the attempt to relegate Scottishness to the historical archives. In response to an idealist British

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p. 175.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 172.
nationalism, disaffected Scots would have retaliated with untrammelled Scottishness, an identity different in kind from North Britishness. In this way, idealist nationalism would have come to be equated with Scottishness, pragmatist nationalism with North Britishness, and a strong Scottish identity would today be a better predictor of support for Scottish independence. But this chain of events did not transpire. Instead, the term Scottishness thrived and remains the sole means of describing a range of nationalist sentiments varying greatly in quality and intensity.

In Quebec, events have unfolded in such a way that two distinct terms with quite different meanings and connotations have been used to describe national identity. The term used in the past, when pragmatist nationalist was dominant, was French-Canadian. As the wording suggests, the phrase denoted Canadians who were different in virtue of concrete sociological traits, specifically their language and religion. This is certainly how English-Canadians tended to use the term; it was also, as previously argued in this thesis, the way that many French-Canadians conceptualized their community in the past. Idealist nationalists, seeking to dislodge this muted sense of nationhood, introduced, in the 1960s, a new term to that end - Québécois. These radical activists found this neologism better suited to their purposes because it dispensed with Canadianness altogether. As one Quebec academic notes, "Chez les premiers indépendantistes, l'identité québécoise était précise et nettement distincte de l'identité canadienne: on était l'un ou l'autre, on n'était pas l'un et l'autre." Historically, then, being


71 Jean Laponce argues, on the other hand, that the term French-Canadian is an example of a compound word used to denote a singular, not a hyphenated, reality: French-Canadians, when the term was in vogue, did not see themselves as Canadians who were French, but rather, if you like, as Frenchcanadians (see Jean Laponce, "L'identité ethnique du simple au composé: essai de typologie," in Jean-William Lapierre, Vincent Lemieux, and Jacques Zylberberg (eds.) Etre Contemporain: Mélanges en L'Honneur de Gérard Bergeron (Sillery, Que.: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1992), pp. 266-267. This contrary, but plausible, interpretation makes it clear that the nature of national consciousness cannot be deduced from semantic evidence alone. Other types of evidence are needed to demonstrate what "French-Canadian" meant to those actually using the term.

Québécois is linked with the denial of Canadianness and the affirmation of an impassable divide between Canadians and Quebeckers - in short, with idealist nationalism.

It is true that the term French-Canadian has since fallen by the wayside, and Québécois has gained a wider usage. People today are asked on surveys to indicate whether they feel Canadian or Québécois, not French-Canadian or Québécois. But given the origins of the latter term and its idealist connotations, today's pragmatist nationalists probably opt for "equally Québécois and Canadian", or perhaps "more Québécois than Canadian", leaving the unconditional affirmation - "Québécois not Canadian" - to those who conceptualize the differences between Quebecker and Canadian in idealized terms. Hence, the tight correlation observed between strong Québécoisness and support for Quebec sovereignty.

Much of this is rather speculative reasoning, of course, not easily substantiated with empirical evidence. But it is necessary to deal with such matters, for it would be facile to take the identity questions asked on surveys in Scotland and Quebec at face value and treat them as equivalent. Where differences of connotation and nuance exist, the underlying reality represented by response categories used in identity questions will not necessarily be the same. If the "Scottish not British" category is shared by idealists and pragmatists, while the "Québécois not Canadian" category is the exclusive preserve of idealists, then the true gap between "Scottish not British" and "equally Scottish and British" will likely be smaller than the true gap between "Québécois not Canadian" and "equally Québécois and Canadian." Consequently, the degree to which identities in Quebec are polarized, compared to Scotland, will be greater than is apparent in data such as those in Table 6.16.

If this is a sound assessment of the identity variable in the Scottish case, then it is apparent why it has less impact on support for independence than is the case in Quebec. Identities in Scotland are fairly closely clustered together because the status of nation has not been denied the Scots by the English. There has not been the polarization of identity engendered by a more intransigent attitude on
the part of the dominant group. Most Scots feel somewhat Scottish only, and many who do declare
themselves "Scottish not British" are not necessarily thinking about matters in quite the same way as
those who makes analogous declarations elsewhere. With fewer people at the extremes, there is a
dearth of Scots whose Scottishness alone impels them to strongly support independence - hence the
weak effect of the identity variable in Table 6.13.

The absence of ardent idealists also helps explain the interaction effects seen in the data for the
Scottish case. A sense that Scotland would be better off if independent is, it will be recalled, a more
important consideration to those who feel Scottish not British than to those with weaker identities (see
Table 6.13). Unlike the Quebec case, where similar interaction effects formed a mound shaped
distribution, there was no tailing off in the Scottish data for those with strong identities. This now
seems a more intelligible result: if there are few Scots whose national identity is the equal of
Québécois idealists, it stands to reason that the interaction effects for the Scottish case will only reveal
the rising part of the mound. It may be that the impact of substantive considerations does peter out
among some small group, who are more strongly Scottish; but the identity question from the survey
used for this analysis has just the five identity categories, with 20% of respondents falling in the
Scottish not British category. It is not possible, in this instance, to isolate a smaller group who are more
ardently Scottish still.

In much of the previous analysis involving Scotland, this consideration has quietly been taken
into account, in that those deemed to be idealists have generally been a small, select group. For
example, where data from the 1979 Scottish Election Study were cited in the previous chapter and first
part of this chapter, the group deemed idealists consisted of those who selected independence as their
constitutional preference from among five options; these people represented only 7% of the survey
sample. To the same end, the qualitative analysis of Chapter 3 focused on nationalist activists and
leaders, a small section of the Scottish population who are, as in most social and political movements,
more ardent exponents of their cause than the average passive supporter in the general public. The supposition informing the previous analysis, then, has been not that idealist-pragmatist tensions are missing from the Scottish case, but simply that the idealists are less prevalent.

**Conclusion**

Having examined each of the three variables in the basic model of support for Scottish independence outlined earlier in this chapter, the distinctive character of the Scottish nationalist movement seems to be confirmed. In Scotland, a diffuse and prevalent sense of Scottish identity combines with careful deliberation on more substantive matters, both economic and non-economic, to generate relatively muted support for independence. Scotland's movement is more pragmatist, and, as such, is characterized by greater than average rationality.

But the Scottish nationalist movement is exceptional, for most governments do not accord minority populations much in the way of symbolic recognition. Quebec's experience as part of Canada is probably more typical. Denied, for the most part, ideational recognition as a nation and advised to be loyal French-Canadians, some Quebeckers have capitulated, while others have tried to fight fire with fire. There has developed, in others words, a wide spectrum of nationalist sentiment, ranging from the highly pragmatist, grounded in the concrete, sociological attributes of French-Canadianness, to a highly abstract and idealized Québécoisness. Associated with these differences in identity are different modes of thinking about power for the nation. For ardent idealists, their potent Québécois identity is the dominant factor. It colours perceptions of other relevant considerations (the probability of succeeding in their nationalist endeavours, the likely costs and benefits of sovereignty), and moreover,

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73 A recent survey, for example, found that 90% of SNP members support independence, compared to only 64% of SNP voters. See Jack Brand, “SNP members: the way of the faithful” in Pippa Norris, Ivor Crewe, David Denver, and David Broughton (eds.), *British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1992* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), Table 5, p. 86.
tends to trump whatever independent impact these factors might have on their political attitudes and behavior. Pragmatists, on the other hand, are both more objective in their assessment of relevant considerations, and more heavily influenced in their political thinking by those considerations. These conclusions, derived from quantitative analysis of a case whose developmental arc is more typical of the general experience, are probably of greater theoretical relevance, offering insight into the modes of thinking that often guide the political behavior of pragmatist and idealist nationalists.
Chapter 7

Pragmatist and Idealist Patterns of Nationalist Activity

Introduction

The previous chapter outlined some broad differences in the modes of reasoning that inform the political attitudes and behavior of pragmatist and idealist nationalists. It was suggested that rational thinking, defined in accordance with rational choice precepts, is unevenly distributed throughout the nationalist ranks, and furthermore, that qualitative differences in identity are the root cause of this variation. The muted, sociologically-grounded identity of pragmatists makes them relatively sensitive to concrete concerns and attuned to political realities, whereas an idealized identity tends to colour perception and inures idealists to the potential moderating influence of other factors.

In this and the following chapter, the focus turns from modes of reasoning hidden from direct view to attitudes and behaviors more accessible to the outside observer. A series of closely related points is discussed. We begin, in this chapter, with observations pitched at the level of the individual nationalist that speak to patterns of nationalist activity - how and when different nationalists become involved with the nationalist cause. The following chapter offers a more broadly-based account of the general dynamics of nationalist mobilization, illustrated by the historical experiences of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany. The two are closely linked: the micro-analysis in this chapter points to the rigidity of idealists and flexibility of pragmatists, and it is from these basic behavioral tendencies that a macro-model of nationalist mobilization is assembled in the next chapter.

Some sections of these two chapters are short and largely theoretical, others longer with more attention to empirical detail. In general, quantitative evidence, based on survey data, is drawn upon more sparingly than in the previous chapter, and greater attention is given to the behavior and attitudes
of nationalist activists, leaders, and political organizations. This is partly owing to a lack of pertinent survey material. However, this approach also allows for a more effective integration of the new material with the historical evidence presented in the case study chapters.

A) Reactive versus Independent Nationalism

The first point of contrast in the behavior of pragmatists and idealists was largely implicit in the analysis of previous chapters: pragmatist nationalism reacts to a variety of external factors whereas the nationalism of idealists operates more independently. This difference derives from the modes of reasoning characteristic of the two types of nationalists. The thinking common to pragmatists, it has been suggested, is, in the nationalist scheme of things, relatively rational. Pragmatists are aware that success might not be theirs, since they are more circumspect than their idealist counterparts in imputing nationalist sentiment where none appears to exist. Additionally, their nationalist objectives are relatively concrete - the promotion and protection of things distinctively national - so that power for the nation is primarily a means to more substantive ends rather than an end in itself. The nationalism of idealists, by contrast, is governed by an abstract national identity that trumps other considerations which might warrant moderation and engenders unflagging support for independence nothing less. It is a manner of thinking exhibited by political scientist Denis Monière when he writes, in a tract promoting the virtues of untrammelled Quebec sovereignty, "Mon désir d'indépendance pour le Québec relève fondamentalement du problème de l'appartenance que me pose le Canada....mon identité n'a de sens qu'au Québec....Le Canada est pour moi un pays étranger."¹

The modes of reasoning underlying the two types of nationalism condition their reactiveness to external forces. With multiple considerations and rational evaluation impinging on their thinking, pragmatists are more calculating and deliberate, whereas idealists, their nationalism springing from a

¹ Monière, L'Indépendance, p. 136.
single dominant and monolithic sentiment within, tend to be implacable. Consequently, pragmatist nationalism is relatively reactive and susceptible to outside influence, whereas idealist nationalism operates more independently.

So, for example, pragmatists are more likely than idealists to react to variable economic conditions that affect the nation's prospects for material prosperity. They are also more prone to respond to threats from the central government designed to intimidate, and to overtures aimed at accommodation. Fluctuating levels of nationalist support make pragmatists stop and think too, since greater (or lower) levels of mobilization make it more (or less) likely that the nationalist movement will succeed in its endeavors; consequently, pragmatists tend to rally in times of growing support and lose interest when popular support wanes. Idealists, by contrast, are relatively oblivious to such vicissitudes. They stick to their guns, consistently voicing the selfsame rigid and principled demand for unconditional national liberation.

In contending that idealists are less reactive than pragmatists, the claim is not simply that those fervent in their nationalism flip-flop on the independence issue less often than borderline sovereignists. This would be an obvious point, since zealous supporters are - if sovereignty support is measured on a 0 to 1 scale - positioned farther from the 0.5 threshold than those who are more ambivalent. The claim, instead, is that the intensity of radical nationalist sentiment is more stable. If it is supposed, for example, that nationalist opinion in a population is distributed in a bell-shaped pattern, changes in this opinion do not, by this argument, consist in a uniform shift to the left or right, but rather in a contraction or swelling of the fat middle section of the bell, with the far right-hand tail more or less anchored in place. Whereas pragmatists move freely along a considerable portion of the spectrum of nationalist opinion, idealists are generally rooted to the spot. This type of rigidity is evident in the words of Jim Fairlie, a former member of the SNP executive and vocal critic of moderates within the nationalist camp: "If you compromise, you're retreating onto their ground, and they're not arguing on
your terms, you're arguing on theirs...Independence is like pregnancy - ye canna be a wee bit pregnant."²

This proposition about the reactiveness of different nationalist types is congruent with notions introduced in previous chapters. If idealist nationalism is fixed in place, it is because it issues from a nationalist faith that convinces idealists of the nation's vitality and prospects as an independent entity, empirical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. Idealist nationalism, in other words, resides largely within, and is, consequently, impervious to external influence. As radical Quebec nationalist Pierre Bourgault has written recently, "it doesn't make any difference whether they want us or not. You don't choose independence for or against others; you do it for yourself. It's a value in itself. Independence isn't reaction; it's action."³ Pragmatist nationalism, on the other hand, is as much reaction as action. Various external factors alter the behavior and outlook of pragmatists because theirs is a nationalism more tightly harnessed to empirical realities.

B) Nationalism by Accretion versus Nationalism by Conversion

If reactiveness to external factors is one dimension of political behavior that distinguishes pragmatists and idealists, another involves the manner in which their nationalist sentiment forms. Pragmatists tend to accumulate nationalist sentiment gradually, in piecemeal fashion, while idealists often point to a brief, intense period when their nationalist perspective was seared on their political consciousness. The first might be termed nationalism by accretion, the second nationalism by conversion.

A related point of difference involves the subjective degree of volition experienced by pragmatists and idealists as their nationalist sentiment develops. Pragmatists generally feel themselves

² Interview with Jim Fairlie, September 7, 1995.

³ Bourgault, Now or Never!, p. 20.
to have freely chosen their nationalist political preferences. They are able retrospectively to recount the processes of reflection and deliberation that led them, step by step, to their current location on the spectrum of nationalist opinion, and can conceive of future movement, either forward or backward, as a result of further deliberation. Idealists, on the other hand, often claim to feel, and to have felt, powerless against the siren call of nationalism. They did not choose to be nationalists. Instead, nationalist sentiment claimed them. Consequently, they do not anticipate any change of heart in the future, and cannot conceive of bringing one about of their own volition. There is, for this reason, a greater decisiveness to their nationalist transformation.

This difference in the formation and embeddedness of nationalist sentiment is linked to the nature of pragmatist and idealist nationalism. An idealized national identity, it was argued previously, involves the projection of certain abstract and idealized qualities onto a sociologically distinct population - seamlessness, indissolubility and sharp distinctiveness. In other words, nothing in the real world has to change for idealist nationalism to take hold. It is simply for the individual to see the nation in a new, idealized light. Profound alterations in perspective of this sort can, and often do, take hold of the individual in a sudden flash. Like scientists lighting upon a new paradigm (à la Thomas Kuhn), or converts to a religious faith suddenly seeing the light, idealists sometimes experience an epiphanal moment when the nation is revealed to them in all its idealized splendor. Thereinafter, this vision often retains its hold, much like other deep transformations in consciousness.

Pragmatist nationalism, on the other hand, is less a function of ideas about the nation, issuing instead from an unmediated attachment to the tangible qualities of nationhood. For this reason, pragmatist nationalist sentiment relies less on ideational, and more on experiential or empirical input. Pragmatist nationalism develops as people become more deeply immersed in the distinctive culture of their community, or grow increasingly aware of its precarious situation, or come into contact with outsiders whose disparaging attitudes generate a reactive cultural pride. Typically, no single event or
episode is capable of overwhelming the store of past experiential input; thus, pragmatist nationalism tends to accrete slowly. At the same time, there is, in the pragmatist's political thinking, significant cost-benefit analysis, as pragmatists reflect on the gains and losses, both national and non-national, along with all associated probabilities, of various political stances and courses of action. In stable times, the parameters that feed into these cost-benefit calculations are likely to change only slowly. For this reason too, pragmatists are more likely to exhibit a gradual accumulation of nationalist sentiment.

The formation of nationalist sentiment in idealists and pragmatists also seems to be related to life-cycle dynamics. Idealist nationalists often become engaged with the nationalist struggle at an early age - commonly in adolescence or early adulthood. It can happen even sooner, of course, if someone grows up in a household where nationalist ideology is inculcated from the earliest age, but such households are usually, in nascent nations anyway, few and far between. Instead, most members of these nations receive conflicting messages. They - Quebecers, Scots, and Bretons - are advised by many around them of their Canadianness, Britishness, or Frenchness, yet at the same time importuned by the nationalist element to recognize their true national selves. It is at the point that people are old enough to think for themselves about such matters, and are starting to come into contact with a wider range of social influences (peers, teachers, public figures, books, newspapers), yet are young enough still that their basic sense of self is not yet wholly formed, that they are most likely to experience a Québécois, Scottish or Breton nationalist epiphany and embrace idealist nationalism.

Pragmatist nationalists, on the other hand, sometimes gravitate more slowly towards nationalist politics, often taking to the cause at later stages of adulthood. Their nationalist sentiment

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4 More formally, it might be said that people are often drawn to nationalist ideology in adolescence or early adulthood because it is at this stage in the life-cycle that agents of secondary socialization are especially important, and the primary agents of socialization - parents, in particular - have less influence. Useful overviews of the political socialization literature can be found in: David O. Sears, "The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions" in Ladd Wheeler and Phillip Shaver (eds.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 79-116; and Richard Dawson, Kenneth Prewitt and Karen Dawson, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
often develops, in other words, at a point when the socialization process is largely complete. Their basic attitudes and sense of self are already in place, and changes in their outlook are more apt to reflect experiential input and cautious deliberation, rather than a deep rethinking of their national identity.

Anecdotal evidence from Scotland, Brittany and Quebec demonstrates the distinct processes that underwrite the formation of idealist and pragmatist nationalism, and while all the elements of nationalism by conversion and nationalism by accretion do not invariably cluster as one, certain broad differences are apparent. Idealist motifs, for example, are apparent in the nationalist biography of one of the more radical campaigners on behalf of Scottish independence through much of the twentieth century, Wendy Wood. Active in nationalist politics from the time of the First World War, Wood was an intermittent member of the S.N.P. who was expelled from the party on more than one occasion for her extra-curricular nationalist activities; these included the formation of numerous shadowy, fringe groups that sought to expedite Scotland's accession to independence, rather than stick to the SNP's by-the-book approach. In her memoirs, Wood speaks of the parental influence that nurtured a basic Scottish consciousness in her from the start, but points to one specific moment when the penny dropped full force. Visiting the Wallace Tower in Stirling at about age twenty, Wood looked upon the statue of William Wallace and "suddenly realized why that sword was raised, why truth is greater than death, and how inexplicably one is integrated in the history, not just past, but present and future of one's nation. From the top of the tower, looking across the fertile lands to the high peaks, to the life-giving Forth, to Stirling Castle rising in sudden pride from the plain where Bannockburn was fought, roused a determination in me which neither poverty, mockery nor setbacks have ever been able to extinguish in fifty-five years of work for Scotland's independence."\(^5\)

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Granted, not all idealists are able to isolate a single pivotal moment when their nationalist outlook was suddenly altered or intensified. For some, the formation of their national consciousness occurs over a period of time, but nevertheless dates back to a relatively brief interval, early on, when they were still finding their own feet in matters political. Jim Fairlie, for example, says that no one in his family was a nationalist, and that his national consciousness developed quite independently when, at a young age, he started to read detailed accounts of Scottish history; he subsequently joined the S.N.P. at age 15. Since that time, Fairlie has consistently maintained an independence nothing less position, opposing the Scottish Assembly proposal of the 1970s, the Scottish Convention initiative of the 1980s, and, most recently, the S.N.P.'s adoption of an Independence in Europe platform.

The development of nationalist attitudes is typically more gradual and deliberate for those more moderate in their outlook. Consider, for example, William Wolfe, chairman of the SNP from 1969 to 1979. Wolfe was generally a voice of moderation within the party. At one point in the early 1960s, he proposed that the S.N.P strike an electoral pact with the Liberal Party, an idea that was anathema to certain diehard elements. He also, as chairman, used his influence to ensure the party threw its support behind Labour's Assembly initiative in the 1970s. The path Wolfe took to his more moderate nationalism was rather more circuitous than the route Wood and Fairlie followed. While conscious of his Scottishness as a youth, he was not especially political and felt for many years that independence was "a bit too much." After serving in the army for five years, he joined the Saltire Society, an organization devoted to fostering the cultural heritage of Scotland, home to both SNPers and many others less political in their nationalism. When the Covenant movement emerged in the late 1940s, Wolfe helped in that undertaking to collect signatures in support of Scottish Home Rule. In the

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6 Interview with Jim Fairlie, 7 September 1995.

7 See, for example, the negative comments on the Liberal's Home Rule policy made by Arthur Donaldson, party chairman at the time, in The Scots Independent, 24 December, 1966.
1950s, he became keenly aware of the problem of Scottish emigration, and towards the end of that decade, decided that party politics was the only way to effect the changes he thought imperative to improve the social and economic situation in Scotland. He wrote to the main political parties, including the Communists, and was most impressed by the SNP's arguments and enthusiasm (a party member showed up on his doorstep). Thus, it was, at age 35, that Wolfe decided after much deliberation to join the local branch of the SNP. ⁸

Another who came late to the nationalist cause was Jim Sillars, a leading figure within the S.N.P in the 1980s who was instrumental in its adoption of the Independence in Europe policy towards the end of that decade; unlike some in the party who have accepted this as a political exigency, Sillars is enthusiastic about the European dimension and supportive of a powerful E.U. Like Wolfe, Sillars acquired his moderate nationalist sentiment in piecemeal fashion. Growing up in a working-class family, he was little exposed to nationalist ideas and was not particularly politically-minded. He worked on the railways after leaving school, but it was not until he joined the Royal Navy at age 17 that he started to read and reflect on political matters, developing strong socialist sympathies. ⁹ After leaving the navy, he became, through the 1960s, increasingly involved with the trade union movement and the Labour Party. The SNP victories in the late 1960s started him thinking about the Scottish dimension of political life, and he came to the view that some limited measure of self-rule was required. ¹⁰ His experiences with the Scottish Trade Unions Congress also affected his outlook. "With the STUC reaching a new level of importance, it was impossible not to recognise that ... a separate

⁸ Interview with William Wolfe, 7 August 1995. Some of these details can also be found in Wolfe's autobiography, Scotland Lives (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973).

⁹ Biographical details are taken from Jim Sillars, Scotland: The Case for Optimism (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986), pp. 1-80.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 23-4. Sillars was a vociferous critic of devolution for a short time, but explains that this was largely a reaction to the disparaging attitude of S.N.P. stalwart, Winnie Ewing, towards the Labour party.
Scottish institution could advance the cause of the Scottish working people without in any way endangering and weakening the cause of British labour. Working at the centre of trade union activity in Scotland, I could not fail but be influenced by my experience of that reality."11 In 1970, Sillars became a Labour MP and from that time on grew increasingly adamant about the need for a Scottish Assembly with significant economic powers. Labour took office in 1974 promising to deliver something of the sort, but fell far short, to Sillar's mind, with the proposed Scottish Assembly outlined in its 1975 White Paper. At that point, Sillars quit Labour to form the short-lived Scottish Labour Party. Though the new party's official position was independence in Europe, Sillars suggests that many were "in favour of maximum devolution", viz. "something really substantial in a UK context."12 It wasn't until after the referendum failure of 1979 that Sillars decided independence (or something close to it) was truly the ticket, and he joined the SNP in 1980. As a profile in The Scotsman observed, "[Sillar's conversion to nationalism] was not a Damascus road. It was a slow chiselling away at the foundations of personal belief."13 The gradual development of nationalist sentiment in the case of this moderate SNPer is quite unlike the rapid transformation experienced by more radical nationalists such as Wood and Fairlie.

In Brittany, the stories of Breton nationalist activists offer numerous examples of nationalist epiphanies akin to that experienced by the idealists in Scotland. Historian Jack Reece, in his closely observed history of the emsaw, notes that "instantaneous conversion to Breton nationalism is a recurrent theme in the literature of the movement."14 Citing a variety of activists from the interwar period, Reece observes, "Each stressed the revelatory aspect of his unexpected confrontation with the

11 Ibid., p. 31.

12 Ibid., p. 60.


14 Reece, The Bretons Against France, p. 28.
idea of a Breton nation and described its subsequent influence on his life in salvationist terms.\textsuperscript{15} Théophile Jeuseet, for example; who in the 1930s formed a tiny party, the Parti Nationaliste Intégral de Bretagne, which fashioned itself after the National-Socialists in Germany, \"became a nationalist at the age of thirteen when one day in 1923 he happened upon the leading Breton nationalist publication of the period, Breiz Atao.\textsuperscript{16} Others \"report they were instantly converted to nationalist views upon reading patriotic histories of Brittany,\" while François Debeauvais, a principal figure in the Parti Nationaliste Breton and also involved in the small 1930s paramilitary group Gwenn ha du, apparently was \"instantly transformed\" into a Breton nationalist at the age of fifteen after the 1916 Easter uprising in Ireland.\textsuperscript{17}

Reece speaks mainly of the interwar emsaveriens, but similar stories are told by U.D.B. militants of their entry into the nationalist fold. One activist writes, \"un jour, je suis tombée sur le livre de Morvan Lebesque...J'ai acheté le livre et, pour parodier une parole célèbre: j'ai lu, j'ai réfléchi, j'ai compris ce qui me tracassait confusément dans ma condition de Bretonne. Cela a vraiment été une révélation pour moi.\textsuperscript{18}\" Another reports, \"A 12 ans, j'exprime ma surprise d'entendre une langue étrange et décide, après explication, de n'être rien d'autre que Breton.\textsuperscript{19}\" Others speak of the impact of the events of May 1968, which in Brittany represented both social upheaval and nationalist unrest;

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 28.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 28. Factual details concerning the Parti Nationaliste Intégral de Bretagne can be found in Déniel, Le mouvement breton: 1919-1945, pp. 145-146.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 89 and footnote 16, p. 238. Biographical details for Debeauvais can be found in Déniel, Le mouvement breton: 1919-1945, p. 424. It might be noted that Reece himself is rather skeptical of these stories of instantaneous conversion, seeing them as rationalizations concocted, consciously or unconsciously, after the fact. See ibid., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{18} Monique Kervinio-Carlevan, \"Lettre d'exil,\" Le Peuple Breton, no. 123 (January 1974), p. 3. The book alluded to is presumably Lebesque's nationalist work, Comment peut-on être Breton?

\textsuperscript{19} Aldrig Russon, \"Pourquoi moi, Nantais, j'ai adhéré à l'U.D.B.,\" Le Peuple Breton, no. 119 (September 1973), p.3.
these left an indelible imprint that marked the political consciousness of many a soixante-huitard thereafter.\footnote{See, for example, Jean Appriou, "Pourquoi je suis à l’U.D.B.,” \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 124 (February 1974), p. 3; and Jean-Yves Guengant, "Pourquoi, à 17 ans, j’ai adhéré à l’U.D.B.,” \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 118 (August 1973), p. 3.}

The personal histories of radical nationalists in Quebec also point to two distinct modes of national consciousness formation. Jacques Parizeau, for example, since his move to the sovereigntist camp, has always been counted among the pur et dur within the PQ leadership. He has consistently voiced his opposition to association with Canada (economic or political) as a pre-condition for Quebec sovereignty and was a staunch opponent of the referendum procedure when this became PQ policy in the mid-1970s. Like idealists elsewhere, Parizeau's well-known story involves a dramatic conversion: boarding a train in Montreal as a federalist in 1967, Parizeau disembarked in Banff three days later a separatist, after which he "turned to sovereignism with the fervour of the born-again."\footnote{Paul Wells, "Separated at Birth," \textit{Saturday Night}, November 1994, p.22. Further biographical details for Parizeau can be found in Rhéal Séguin, "The Parizeau parallax," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 11 September 1994, pp. D1 and D5.} Many would suggest that the story needs to be taken with a grain of salt, but it does seem that Parizeau experienced a rapid and decisive change in political perspective that has anchored his political thinking ever since.

In Parizeau's case, the conversion to nationalism came relatively late in life, at age 37. More often such abrupt transformations take place earlier on. This was the case, for example, for Jean-Marc Léger, former journalist and early member of the RIN, who points to the conscription crisis of World War II as the catalyst of his national consciousness. Mackenzie King's decision to hold a plebiscite on the conscription issue triggered much discontent in Quebec, leading to the formation of a nationalistic anti-conscription party, the Bloc Populaire. Attending \textit{collège classique} at the time, Léger says he and his adolescent classmates were deeply struck by this turn of events, and that he personally developed a
strong national consciousness at that point which has remained with him ever since.\textsuperscript{22} Léger's nationalist sentiment, then, formed quickly and decisively, at an early and impressionable stage of life.

Not so for the moderate PQ leaders who have tried to rein in idealist cohorts like Parizeau and Léger. There was, for example, much incrementalism in Claude Morin's adoption of the sovereigntist cause. Serving as deputy minister of inter-governmental affairs from 1966 to 1971, Morin had first-hand experience haggling with Ottawa for the transfer of greater power to Quebec. Following much reflection on Quebec-Canada relations, summarized in two books of the early 1970s, Morin decided in 1972 that the time had come to cross the threshold. "Mon adhésion au fédéralisme avait duré la plus grande partie de ma vie et ... au bout de compte, l’expérience et une longue réflexion m’avaient aidé à changer d’avis,"\textsuperscript{23} writes Morin in his memoirs. "J’étais devenu souverainiste! Pas de chemin de Damas, pas de révélation soudaine de la Vérité. Ça m’est arrivé graduellement....Par étapes, disons."\textsuperscript{24} Morin's allusion to \textit{étapisme} is apropos: just as he was a proponent of a moderate and gradual accession towards sovereignty-association, so he himself had taken to Quebec nationalism in step-by-step fashion.

The same might be said of René Lévesque, whose gradual \textit{virage} towards Quebec nationalism is well-documented. A journalist for the first part of his career, it was not until the 1960 provincial election that the thirty-seven year-old Lévesque threw his hat in the political ring, becoming a minister in Jean Lesage's Liberal cabinet. As a politician, he was always a staunch defender of Quebec's interests, but uncertain about the constitutional status he thought necessary for \textit{la belle province}. In his memoirs, he discusses the lengthy thought process that unfolded over the course of the 1960s: his early

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Interview with Jean-Marc Léger, 2 May 1995.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Morin, \textit{Les Choses comme elles étaient}, p. 269.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Morin, \textit{Les Choses comme elles étaient}, p. 223. Biographical details on Morin can also be found in Fraser, \textit{René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power}, pp. 190-195.
\end{itemize}
flirtation with special status, his deep aversion to RIN-style independence, and his gradual development of the concept of sovereignty-association. Like Morin, it was a politically seasoned and reflective Lévesque who finally decided in 1967 to pledge himself to the nationalist cause when he left the Liberal Party to form the precursor to the PQ, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association.

Another who followed a meandering migratory pattern before alighting in the sovereigntist camp is Lucien Bouchard, the current PQ leader, who is seen as considerably more moderate than his predecessor Parizeau. As a student, he was, he says, "an ardent nationalist," but not committed to independence. Indeed, he was a Liberal Party supporter in the late 1960s, campaigning on behalf of Pierre Trudeau in his early years as Liberal leader and the provincial Liberal Party under Robert Bourassa. The FLQ crisis, however, marked the start of a rethinking process that eventually led to his taking up the sovereigntist cause and joining the PQ in 1971 or 1972 (in his early thirties). "I can't remember the day or the week," writes Bouchard, "because there was no critical turning point." He remained less convinced than other péquistes of the need for sovereignty, however, and in the 1980s took up Lévesque's so-called beau risque, electing to serve in the Mulroney government in the late 1980s in order to help bring about the passage of the Meech Lake Accord. But as the Meech consensus began to unravel, Bouchard quit the Conservatives to form the Bloc Québécois, a party whose goal was a sovereign Quebec that would maintain links, both economic and political, with the rest of Canada, along the lines of the European Union. Morin, Lévesque and Bouchard, then, followed similar paths, each easing down the nationalist spectrum in a gradual, deliberate fashion, and never really giving themselves over to the separatist cause with quite the same abandon as their idealist counterparts.

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27 Ibid. pp. 56-58.

28 Ibid., p. 60.
These personal stories of nationalist activists and leaders admittedly represent anecdotal evidence only, and do not set out established routes travelled by pragmatists and idealists without exception. Nevertheless, they are suggestive of certain revealing differences in the way the two types of nationalist arrive at their respective positions on the spectrum of nationalist opinion. Those who are more radical often become zealous supporters of independence quite abruptly, a transformation that generally occurs early in their lives, and over which they feel they exercise little control. More moderate nationalists, on the other hand, tend to move gradually, and often later in life, towards their more equivocal nationalism, and are conscious of moving there under their own steam. The differing patterns are consistent with the proposition that radical nationalist sentiment has a powerful ideational component: new perspectives on the nation, new ideas about the nation, transform and transfix the idealist's political outlook in short order. Moderate nationalism, by contrast, is more empirically-grounded and rational, and its incremental development therefore relies on the accretive processes of experiential input and careful deliberation.

C) Cohort and Period Effects

The ideas presented in the preceding two sections are closely related. Idealists, it was argued in the first section, operate with a nationalism that is largely independent of fluctuating external factors. This is consistent with the proposition that the idealist's nationalism often develops early in life, and becomes a deeply embedded element of the individual's political consciousness thereafter, not subject to questioning or alteration. Pragmatists, on the other hand, have a more reactive nationalism. Their opinions on the national question, rather than crystallizing at an early age, respond over time to a variety of external influences.

This section presents longitudinal analysis, showing support for different constitutional options over time, that reinforces these propositions. The basic difference reported is that support for
idealist nationalism - i.e. support for independence - shows relatively strong birth cohort effects, whereas support for pragmatist nationalism - i.e. lesser constitutional changes - shows stronger period effects. Birth cohort effects exist when there is constant support for a particular position over time among those born in particular birth cohorts. Their presence suggests that the considerations feeding into people's viewpoints become operative early in the life-cycle, and remain stable thereafter. Period effects exist when there is uniform movement over time across different birth cohorts in the level of support for a particular position. Their presence suggests that the considerations underwriting people's opinions are subject to modification, as people of different birth cohorts react in like fashion to ongoing developments. (The third phenomenon that can be detected through longitudinal analysis is an age effect; this consists in uniform changes, over the life-cycle, for different birth cohorts, regardless of period. In the case of nationalist movements, it has sometimes been suggested that age effects are the principal demographic effect: people may be attracted to nationalism when they are young, but this typically fades as they age and become less inclined to support radical and potentially destabilizing political changes.\textsuperscript{29} The data presented below, however, do not appear to support this hypothesis, either for moderate or radical nationalist attitudes.\textsuperscript{30})

The Quebec case is best suited to demonstrating the birth cohort and period effect phenomena. There is a wealth of cross-sectional survey data available for this case, with relatively consistent question wording and response categories. The latter is an important consideration when tracking

\textsuperscript{29} See, for example, T. John Samuel, \textit{Quebec Separatism is Dead: Demography is Destiny} (Ottawa: John Samuel & Associates Inc., 1994).

\textsuperscript{30} It should be noted that untangling cohort, period and age effects is a tricky business. Each of the three variables is a linear function of the other two, which means that a given effect can always be interpreted instead as a combination of the other two - e.g. an apparent cohort effect may actually be a combined period and age effect. Often, however, the simpler explanation is more plausible. For a discussion of these and other issues involved in cohort analysis, see Norval D. Glenn, \textit{Cohort Analysis} (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1977).
movement in attitudes over time, for it allows the researcher to eliminate any such variation as the source of observed changes.31

The data used in the Quebec analysis are taken from numerous surveys conducted in the province from 1962 through 1994. From these surveys, cohort data were assembled for two dependent variables - support for the separation of Quebec and support for a special status for Quebec within Confederation. Support for separation, rather than "sovereignty" or "independence", was used as a measure of radical, idealist nationalism because this is the description of a Quebec/Canada split that Quebeckers seem to find the most unambiguous, consistently, over the years, according it less support in surveys than either "independence" or "sovereignty."32 Support for a special status for Quebec, associated with the traditional nationalism of the Duplessis years and before, and the constitutional arrangement favored by the Quebec Liberal Party for much of the last 35 years, is taken to represent a more pragmatist nationalism. The differences between the two sets of results are instructive.

Table 7.1 shows support for separation over a 32 year period, using two different groupings of birth cohorts (the advantage of Part A is more cohorts; the advantage of Part B is larger sample sizes for each cohort).33,34 Ignoring for the moment the post-Meech Lake period (1989/90 on), there is

31 For details on the consistency of question phrasing and response categories on the surveys used in this analysis, see Appendix 2. Aside from question wording consistency, other criteria used in selecting survey datasets for the analysis were availability, sample size, and consistency across surveys of birth cohort categories.

32 Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Quebec Electorate: The 1973 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 2 (June 1977), footnote 58, pp. 245-246. The main reason for such inconsistent responses may be an ill-informed public. For example, according to a 1994 poll, a sizable proportion of Quebeckers thinks that in a "sovereign" Quebec they will continue to pay Canadian taxes (26%), send MPs to Ottawa (27%), and "be part of Canada" (42%) (see Richard Mackie, "50% see win as mission nod for PQ," Globe and Mail 15 July 1994, p. A4). If these misperceptions change with question wording - e.g. very few think that a "separate" Quebec will continue to be part of Canada - then the inconsistent responses to questions about separation and sovereignty become more intelligible.

33 Two important technical points:

1) All results, except for 1962/63, have been weighted. Two variables were used to calculate weights: birth cohort (based on five-year cohorts) and educational attainment (primary, secondary, or university). These were chosen because support for separatism in Quebec has consistently varied with birth cohort and education; and the frequencies for these two variables on the various surveys showed substantial variation.
considerable stability of opinion on the question of separation, especially within the older cohorts. In the period from 1962 to 1979, those born before 1944, and particularly 1933, show very little movement on the question of separation, despite this being a time of unprecedented nationalist foment and mobilization. Support for separation in the 1913-43 cohort as a whole (Table 7.1, Part B) stood at 12% in 1962/3; over the next three points of observation it moved but slightly (10%, 12%, 14%).

Instead, it was cohorts newly arrived on the scene primarily responsible for the overall increase in support for separation through to the late 1970s. Once arrived on the scene, these younger cohorts did show somewhat more movement over time than the older cohorts, with modest increases in support for separation at subsequent observation points. But overall, the data up to the late 1970s

The objective of the weighting was not, as is typically the case, to provide a representative picture of the population at each given point. Instead it was to capture each cohort in Table 7.1 at later points in time as it stood in 1962-63 - i.e., as if it had moved through time unaffected by either random sampling error or by exit from, and entry to, the cohort (through deaths and migration in and out of Quebec). To this end, target percentages for the various cells defined by five-year birth cohort and education level were based on the combined data for the 1962 and 1963 surveys, not census data. For cohorts too young to be included in these earliest surveys, target percentages were based on data for the survey where they first arrived on the scene. Weights were then applied to data for all subsequent surveys to achieve the relevant target percentages in the various cells. (On this technique, see Paul Abramson, *Political Attitudes in America* [San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983], p. 61).

For the youngest cohorts - those born in 1954 or after - it was deemed likely that education levels might well have changed over time due to people increasing their level of educational attainment (by completing their education or returning to school). For these cohorts, education weights were not applied. Given the purpose of this type of weighting - to capture each cohort as it stood at an earlier date - it is only appropriate to apply weights if the composition of a cohort changes from one survey to another due to differential entry and exit rates for different sub-groups within the cohort, or random sampling error. If the composition of a cohort changes because members of the cohort acquire new "traits" (e.g. a university education), then weighting is not appropriate.

2) The two sets of cohorts shown in Table 7.1 are based on the finer cohorts (five-year cohorts for the most part) used in the 1962/63 surveys. All other surveys, with the exception of the 1972 and 1973 surveys, asked people for their precise age or birth year, which allowed for perfect matching of cohorts.

The 1972 and 1973 surveys used age categories rather than exact age; furthermore, when converted to birth years, these categories did not match the birth cohorts used in 1962-63. For this reason, a more complex estimation procedure was used. In brief, a logit model was run, with support for separation as the dependent variable and age and education as the independent variables. The coefficient estimates obtained from this model were then used to estimate support for separation in 1972 and 1973 for every possible combination of birth year and educational attainment. Calculations of support for separation in the cohorts of interest were then generated by applying the target percentages used in the cohort weighting procedure (see above) to this data matrix.

The various birth cohorts cover different numbers of years for two reasons: 1) the older cohorts had to cover more birth years to ensure reasonable sample sizes for the later surveys; 2) the observation points are not evenly spaced.
would suggest that many people make up their minds about separation before entering adulthood; that
the opinions of a smaller fraction remain susceptible to modification into their twenties; and that very
few alter their views after that point in the life-cycle.

Table 7.1: Support for Quebec Separation By Birth Cohort Among Francophone Quebeecers, 1962-1994

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* 50 < n < 100  All other n's greater than or equal to 100.
+ Unweighted to avoid applying extreme weights to very small sample sizes.

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<td>1973-1976</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n = 80  ** 130 < n < 150  All other n's > 200
Note: For question wording and other details, see Appendices 1 and 2

Sources: Author's calculations based on:
1994: Combined data from CIPO #9406, 9408, 9409, 9410, 9412.
These findings shed some light on previous research into the relationship between age and nationalist support in Quebec. First, while the youthfulness of Quebec nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s has been noted many times before, Table 7.1 indicates that support for separation is largely a function of birth cohort not age. The young radicals of the movement's take-off phase have maintained their support for separation as they have aged.\textsuperscript{35} Secondly, looking at the most radical wording used on surveys - "separation", rather than the oft-misinterpreted "sovereignty" - it shows how strong these cohorts effects have been, pointing up the nearly complete absence of older people among new adherents to the idealist nationalist cause. Other cohort analyses that have looked at more ambiguous manifestations of nationalist sentiment, such as PQ voting,\textsuperscript{36} or have looked at variations on the separation theme at different points in time (separation and then sovereignty-association),\textsuperscript{37} have found considerably weaker cohort effects, with older cohorts joining the nationalist cause sooner and in greater numbers.\textsuperscript{38} Ignoring post-Meech events, Table 7.1 would suggest a fairly rigid rule of thumb: a separatist early in life or never; and once a separatist, always a separatist.

What then of the Meech Lake blip? The 1989-90 observation point certainly represents a deviation from the general pattern of birth cohort stability. In Part A of Table 7.1, we see that support


\textsuperscript{37} Jean Crête and Réjean Landry, "Vieillesse Québécoise et Changement Politique," \textit{Anthropologie et Sociétés} 6, 3 (1982), Table 7, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{38} Another reason for the discrepant results may be that these previous investigations did not apply weights to adjust for the distribution of education levels within cohorts (see footnote 33 on this technique). In the surveys used for Table 7.1, the birth cohorts, even the oldest ones, tended to have markedly higher average education levels over time. This may be related to differential life expectancies for people of different socio-economic (and therefore educational) groups; or it may be related to declining response rates on surveys over the years (if response rate varies with education level). Whatever the reason, the application of these weights has a considerable dampening effect on what would otherwise appear to be steadily rising levels of support for separation in the older birth cohorts.
for separatism rose by 13 to 21% across all cohorts from the previous point of observation in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{39} The typical explanation for this is that the failure of Meech Lake made separatists out of many federalists; and since it apparently did so across all cohorts, it seemed to represent a period effect. This explanation undermines the argument here that support for separatism is driven by a type of unvarying idealist nationalism that is, in most cases, a product of the individual's formative political years.

No doubt, there was a certain hardening of opinion across the nationalist spectrum around the time of Meech. But there are reasons to doubt that there really was much of an increase in pur et dur separatism among older cohorts. Note, first of all, that nationalist proposals in Quebec, even the most radical ones, have always attracted a certain amount of strategic support. In the 1973 poll, respondents were asked early in the interview if they supported separatism, and it is the answers to this question that provide the data shown in Table 7.1. But later in the same interview, respondents were asked what they would like to see happen to the federal system with several possible answers, only one of which - "abolish for independence" - amounted to support for the separation of Quebec. Of the 164 francophone respondents who had indicated they supported separation on the first question, only 56% chose the independence option on the latter question. Most of the others opted for the more moderate "give more powers to Quebec" (32%), while a few were undecided (8%) or wanted to keep the federal system as it was (4%).\textsuperscript{40}

There is evidence to suggest that in the late 1980s, when a lot of Quebeckers suddenly started giving the nod to separatism on surveys, strategic support for this option was especially elevated. An

\begin{footnotes}
\item[39] We should note that these increments in support are slightly misleading, insofar as the more telling statistic is probably the percentage of converts to separatism within each cohort (see Zaller, \textit{The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion}, pp. 146-7). Since the younger cohorts, in 1979, contained more separatists than did the older ones, a given increase in separatist support from 1979 to 1989-90 would translate into a higher rate of conversion in the younger cohorts. But even using this more appropriate measure of change, it would remain the case that there was a sizable increase in support for separatism among the older groups, comparable to that seen for younger cohorts.
\item[40] Author's calculation based on \textit{Quebec Provincial Election Study, 1973}.\
\end{footnotes}
analysis of data from a panel survey of people in the Montreal area, interviewed in February, March and April/May of 1990, focuses on those individuals who converted from federalism to sovereignty over that period. It turns out that support for the provincial Liberal Party was the dominant characteristic of converters. Whereas only 36% of all respondents in the panel study were Liberal Party supporters, 62% of those who converted to sovereignty between the first and second wave of interviews supported the party, as did 73% of third wave converters.\textsuperscript{41} The failure of many of these converts to brace their support for sovereignty with backing for the party most likely to bring it about (the PQ) says something about their commitment to the cause.

Not surprisingly, separatist support did fall back by 1994, the next point of observation in the cohort analysis in Table 7.1. Note, however, that this only holds true of the pre-1948 cohorts. For those born after 1948 and before 1973 (i.e. those in the 18-40 age group around the time of Meech), support for separatism remained at virtually the same level as five years earlier. Among younger Quebeckers, then, the damage wrought by Canadian intransigence (whether real or perceived) over the course of the 1980s looks to have been permanent; for them, Quebec's exclusion from the 1982 constitution and the failure of Meech to rectify the situation represent important formative events. It is only for older Quebeckers that Meech (and its antecedents) represents a short, sharp disturbance whose salience has quickly faded with the passage of time. This pattern is, of course, basically consistent with a generational account of separatist support: after a brief period of unsettled separatist sentiment, long-term birth cohort stability has re-established itself.

The cohort analysis looking at support for a \textit{special status for Quebec} over time (Table 7.2) is somewhat less satisfactory, with fewer points of observation and less consistent question wordings.\textsuperscript{42}


\textsuperscript{42} Because support for a special status for Quebec did not consistently show a strong relationship with any socio-demographic variables in the same way that support for separatism did with birth cohort and education, no weights were applied in this cohort analysis.
Nevertheless it does present a notable contrast to the dynamics of separatist support. In brief, there is no evidence of cohort stability at any point in time; and while all cohorts did not move equally over time, there is no apparent pattern to the observed differences. In Part A of Table 7.2, we see that over the period 1968 to 1977/78/79, support for a special status for Quebec dropped 18% among those born between 1903 and 1922, 17% in the 1923-32 cohort, 5% in the 1933-43 cohort and 19% in the 1944-47 cohort. The respective changes for these same cohorts over the period 1977/78/79 to 1981 were a drop of 1%, and increases of 16%, 10%, and 16%. Part B of Table 7.2 reveals a similar pattern of relatively even change across cohorts over time, including an observation in 1989.43

These results suggest that moderate nationalism shows stronger period effects than does radical nationalism. In other words, moderate nationalists react to new events and circumstances, while radicals are more implacable in the face of ongoing developments. In 1968, support for special status was running quite high because, we might speculate, Quebec nationalism had been brewing anew for nearly a decade with few concrete reforms to show for its efforts. By the late 1970s, the prevailing winds had shifted direction, with many among the moderate element apparently satisfied by the reforms of the past 10 years, such as the Official Languages Act of 1969 which introduced official bilingualism to the federal government. Hence, support for a special status declined. By 1981, however, the tide turned again as many Quebeckers were ready to take Ottawa up on its offer of renewed federalism made during the 1980 referendum campaign. The course of constitutional negotiations over the course of the 1980s, culminating in the failure of Meech Lake, angered those who had put their faith in a new deal for Quebec within Confederation, leading to another rise in support for the moderate nationalist option (which, we have suggested, also manifested itself in temporizing support for separatism).

43 A small sample size precluded the inclusion of the 1989 data in Part A of Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Support for A Special Status for Quebec By Birth Cohort Among Francophone Quebecers, 1968-1989

Part A: Support for A Special Status for Quebec (%) (unweighted data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1903</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-1922</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1932</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1943</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1947</td>
<td>39*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1953</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1959</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1963</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 50 < n < 100  All other n's greater than 100.

Part B: Support for A Special Status for Quebec (%) (unweighted data)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1913</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24**</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 50 < n < 81  ** 81 < n < 100  All other n's > 100

Note: For question wording and other details, see Appendices 1 and 2

Sources: Author's calculations based on:
1977/78/79: Combined data from CIPO #402, 419 and 432A.
1989: CIPO #004-1.

What we see, then, is a certain instability and reactiveness among the moderate nationalist element, which contrasts with the generally steady and consistent support separatists have given to their cause. Pragmatists tend to react fluidly to the events of the day, idealists do not. While the differences are not carved in stone - some people do come to support separation later in life after the formative years have passed - the broad difference between the two seems clear.

Are the same behavioral patterns evident in the Scottish nationalist movement? Unfortunately, it is more difficult to carry out a longitudinal cohort analysis in this case, for several reasons. First,
question wordings and structures have often varied on polls conducted by different researchers; this limits the number of polls that can be analyzed conjointly. Secondly, many polls use age categories, rather than asking respondents their exact age, which does not allow for precise matching of birth cohorts. Thirdly, most polls ask only one question about people's constitutional preferences - e.g., do you prefer the status quo, a Scottish Assembly, or independence? Such questions do not provide independent measures of support for moderate and radical nationalist options: if support for an Assembly goes up, support for independence must almost certainly go down (since the status quo has relatively few supporters). Fourthly, support for different constitutional options has generally been more evenly distributed across birth cohorts than in Quebec; furthermore, there has, over time, been less aggregate movement in these attitudes. Both factors make it more difficult to distinguish birth cohort, period, and age effects. The absence of strong age or birth cohort differences is especially true of Scottish Assembly support. Therefore, the analysis below looks at independence support only.

Appendix B provides the raw data used in the Scottish cohort analysis. Table 7.3 shows smoothed, interpolated data, for matching birth cohorts, derived from the raw data. This smoothing

44 See Glenn, *Cohort Analysis*, p. 54. Consider an extreme case where the level of support is the same across all birth cohorts at time one, and precisely the same at time two. This is consistent with birth cohort effects, age effects, and period effects. As with any statistical analysis, some variation in the dependent variable is needed to get some purchase on the relative importance of different causal effects.

45 The smoothed data were calculated by using OLS regression to fit a curve to the raw data, and using the regression coefficients to calculate independence support in matching birth cohorts at each point in time. The curve used to model the data was, in each case, of the form $Y = a + b(1/X)$, where $Y =$ percentage independence support in a given age group and $X =$ the mid-point of each age group. This functional form was used because it provided a markedly better fit to the data than a straight line.

46 Data from 1978 were also available for this analysis, but it was decided not to include them. The late 1970s was a period when independence support dipped quite rapidly; in the survey data available for this analysis, independence support was only 17%. This decrease affected all birth cohorts, suggesting that a period effect was at work. This is not, however, convincing evidence of the tractability of independence support. In the late 1970s, public attention was focussed on the proposed Scottish Assembly. The question on the 1978 survey about constitutional preferences asked people - as such questions nearly always do - to choose between several options, including a Scottish Assembly and Scottish independence. Those whose first preference was independence, but who also favoured an Assembly, may, at this particular juncture, have been inclined to opt for the Assembly
and interpolation is necessary because of the problem of mismatched birth cohorts on the different surveys. The raw data used to generate the results are provided so that others may see for themselves the alterations effected by the smoothing procedure.

Table 7.3: Support for Scottish Independence By Birth Cohort (%), 1974-1992 (unweighted data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-1905</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-1910</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1915</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1920</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1925</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1930</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>1931-1935</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936-1940</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>1946-1950</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1968</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1972</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1977</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For question wording and other details, see Appendices 1 and 2.
Sources:
1974: Author's calculations based on combined data from MORI 1974a and MORI 1974b.
1997: Cross-tabulations from ICM polls for the Scotsman, April 1, April 14, April 21 and April 28, 1997

option. It is entirely possible that a simple "Do you support independence, yes or no?" question would not have revealed changing support levels between 1974 and 1978.

This reasoning is supported by subsequent events: independence support quickly climbed to earlier levels, once attention shifted away from the Assembly option, following the March 1979 referendum. By 1981, independence support was around 25% (see figures in Allan Macartney, "Summary of Scottish Opinion Polls Relating to Voting Intentions and Constitutional Change" in H.M. Drucker and N.L. Drucker (eds.) Scottish Government Yearbook 1982 [Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing,1982], p. 295). Indeed, if the late 1970s period is excluded, survey data reveal a slow, steady growth in independence support in Scotland, from about 20% in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to 25% in the early 1980s, to 30% later in that decade and into the 1990s (the 1997 dip in independence support seen in Table 7.3 is discussed below).

For a summary of earlier poll results (late 1960s and early 1970s), see Miller, The End of British Politics?, Table 3.1, pp. 100-101. Data for many years since the late 1970s can be found in the annual Scottish Government Yearbook.
The first conclusion that might be drawn from Table 7.3 is that there is no evidence for an age effect. Although, in the 1974 to 1987 period, some cohorts - specifically, the older ones - showed higher levels of support for independence over time, this runs counter to the hypothesis usually advanced - that the older people become, the less inclined they are to support independence, because of their increasing sensitivity to the risk and uncertainty involved in such a political project. Moreover, even if a plausible aging hypothesis were developed to explain the increased support in aging cohorts, it would not account for the decrease in support seen in those same cohorts between 1987 and 1997.

It seems more likely that the changes in independence support at later observation points reflect period effects. The increase in support across the older cohorts from 1974 to 1987, which seemed to accelerate after 1984, may well be a reflection of the negative Scottish reaction to the Thatcher's Tory government and its neo-conservative policies; this, it was suggested previously, largely manifested itself in increased support for lesser constitutional changes, but there may also have been some impact on independence support. This increase in support remained in place right through to 1996. However, by the time of the 1997 polls, which were conducted in April of that year, it had evaporated; independence support fell back to 1974 levels in all cohorts (and even lower in some). Presumably, the impending Labour victory in the general election (held on May 1) served to remove the anti-Tory motivation for backing Scottish independence.

Suggesting that period effects may have affected support for Scottish independence runs contrary to the conclusion reached above. Support for radical nationalist options, it was contended, generally reflects birth cohort, not period, effects. However, elsewhere in this thesis it has been suggested that the Scottish case is a bit atypical in that many independence supporters are rather moderate in their views, supporting lesser constitutional changes to a greater degree than is evident in other nationalist movements. It might be speculated that relatively moderate supporters of
independence, of which there are many in Scotland, were responsible for most of the increase seen in older birth cohorts from 1974 to 1987, and the 1997 decrease.

In any event, if period effects have, at times, altered independence support levels within some birth cohorts, the fluctuations have been fairly modest. Indeed, considering the sizable overall rise in support for independence taking place from the early 1970s through to the 1996, there was considerable consistency within many birth cohorts. For example, in 1974, support for independence among those born between 1946 and 1950 was about 27%; at the subsequent observation points, it was 26%, 31%, 30%, 32% and 23%. Other cohorts show comparable degrees of stability in their attitudes. Meanwhile, support levels in the youngest cohorts have been reaching new heights, and are now above the 40% mark, suggesting that the most important source of change in independence support is likely to be rising generations.

The conclusion: Whereas older Scots are to a considerable degree set in their political thinking, showing only modest changes in support for independence over time, younger generations are more open to the deep rethinking of their political loyalties and national identity that is typically a principal bulwark of independence support. But admittedly all conclusions must be more tentative in the Scottish case. It cannot, for example, be said whether there might be stronger period effects for the more moderate Scottish Assembly option, though the current theory would predict this. There does seem to be a significant birth cohort effect underlying independence support, but period effects have also played their part. However, if birth cohort effects are weaker in the Scottish case, this is not entirely unexpected, for independence supporters in Scotland are less diehard than separatist supporters in Quebec. In general, the more idealist someone is in their nationalism, the stronger birth cohort effects will be; since Quebec separatists are more idealist than Scottish supporters of independence, it makes sense that the cohort effects among the former would be stronger.
If there are marked cohort effects underlying radical nationalist sentiment, and stronger period effects for more moderate nationalist attitudes, an explanation can be found in the nature of idealist and pragmatist nationalism. Idealist nationalism, tied to an abstract national identity that crystallizes in the individual's formative years, is generally not subject to questioning later in life; political attitudes associated with idealist nationalism therefore exhibit strong cohort effects. Pragmatist nationalism, a more empirically-grounded and rational doctrine, is, on the other hand, subject to later modification, and consequently responds, at various points of the life-cycle, to a variety of relevant external factors.

D) Timing of Participation

A further behavioral distinction related to the pragmatist/idealist dimension of nationalist sentiment involves the willingness of different nationalists to participate at various stages of popular mobilization. Idealists are often willing to participate at an early stage in a movement's development, when the prospects of success seem rather dim. Pragmatists, on the other hand, tailor their efforts to a greater degree. At points when success seems unlikely, they are thin on the ground, but they become more prominent as the nationalist movement gains momentum.

The timing of idealist and pragmatist participation in the nationalist cause can be traced back to the rational and irrational thought processes that, it was argued in the previous chapter, underpin their respective brands of nationalism. One element of idealist irrationality is an excessive optimism that the nation will spring to life presently to make good their claim that independence is the order of the day. Even when objective factors would suggest otherwise, idealists persist in the belief that their agitation will have, or is having, its effect, and that success is imminent.

Idealist irrationality is also evident in the types of costs and benefits to which they attach value. Substantive gains and losses matter less than the objective of securing independence for their nation to allow for its full self-determination. They are often preoccupied with the symbolism
surrounding unfettered sovereignty, believing it crucial because it is the only status befitting a full-fledged nation like theirs. This abstract benefit is very important to idealists, overriding other costs and benefits that might affect their political behavior.

Idealists, then, have an abstract and, to them, vitally important objective that they believe is eminently attainable. This leads to a willingness to absorb the high personal costs that are generally involved in trying to get a marginal movement off the ground. In each of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, numerous people, most committed to outright independence for their nation rather than some lesser status, have made considerable personal sacrifices in the early stages of nationalist mobilization. The degree of self-sacrifice is particularly significant for nationalist activists - those actively agitating on their nation's behalf - as opposed to mere supporters, who vote a certain way or express certain opinions on polls. The activities of idealist foot soldiers in the early stages of nationalist mobilization often involve a considerable personal burden.

This is fairly self-evident for those who have engaged in violent activities aimed at achieving national liberation. Many of those involved in the FLB and the FLQ spent significant amounts of time in jail, as have several members of the Tartan Army. In France, there were several waves of arrests from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s that saw scores of FLB members charged and incarcerated. Despite the obvious determination of the French state to clamp down on such activities, the bombings continued, and while they are much less frequent today, do still occur from time to time. In Quebec, the violence was concentrated in the 1960s. It largely disappeared after the FLQ crisis of 1970, when a British diplomat and Quebec cabinet minister were kidnapped, and the Canadian

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47 It should be noted that the willingness of idealists to participate early on may also be related to their social origins. As the next section points out, students are commonly prominent among the idealists; and students typically are in a position to devote considerable time and energy to social and political causes (for a general statement of this type of approach to political mobilization, see Brady et al., "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation"). This is an important point to bear in mind, but the factors outlined in this section should not be overlooked either.
government came down hard, arresting hundreds of suspected FLQ members and sympathizers. Many paid a steep price for their nationalist activities, illicit or not. In Scotland, a few dozen people have been sent to jail since 1968 for violent actions aimed at promoting the nationalist cause, with some spending as much as twenty years behind bars.\footnote{Scott and Macleay, \textit{Britain’s Secret War: Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-American State}, p. 201.}

It has been suggested that it is, in some measure, the sense of adventure and danger that attracts people - young males primarily - to these groups, and that these "benefits" help account for people's willingness to chance incarceration.\footnote{Laurendeau, \textit{Les Québécois Violents}, p. 118-119.} This seems unlikely to be the whole story, however, for there is little frisson to be found in the prosaic, but nevertheless significant, sacrifices that others have made for the sake of their nation. There was, in the past, in each of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, a considerable stigma attached to nationalist activism. It was probably strongest in Brittany, where the fascist sympathies of a small element served to tar the movement as a whole in the aftermath of World War II. A number of people, whose nationalist activities seemed to be on the up and up, had to flee after the war, including Yann Fouéré, who, despite spending ten years in Irish exile, has continued his unflagging promotion of the Breton cause down to the present day. Hostility towards the nationalist element was also prevalent in Quebec; in the early 1960s, vocal separatist leader Marcel Chaput lost his job at the National Research Council for making speeches in favour of Quebec separation. In each of these places, of course, the stigma associated with participation in nationalist activities has largely disappeared, but it is important to remember the hostile atmosphere in which idealist activists were labouring early on.

Another cost absorbed by some who throw their support behind a fledgling nationalist party is foregone opportunities for the politically-minded. John MacCormick wrote admiringly of a number of key people he worked with in the SNP's incipient years that "any ... could easily have made for himself..."
a political career in one of the two major parties. Yet they preferred to remain comparatively unknown and to spend all their spare time and much of their spare cash in what they believed was their country's cause." The same disregard for personal political advancement was characteristic of many of those who rallied to the SNP in the first part of the 1960s. People with first-hand knowledge suggest that among the young Scots with whom they were acquainted at that time, the vast majority of career-minded politicos found their way into the Labour Party.

Of course, an alternative interpretation is that some active in a nationalist party early on are political entrepreneurs, willing to absorb short-term costs for the sake of potential long-term gain. Those who opt to militate on behalf of a marginal nationalist movement are gamblers who are less risk averse than those opting for a safer route to political fortune. It is, of course, never easy to tease out the motivations behind people's participation in a political movement, and certainly most, if asked point blank, will cite principle rather than self-interest. Admittedly, too, it is possible, in retrospect, to isolate a few individuals who have done well for themselves by pledging early allegiance to the nationalist cause: Gordon Wilson, for example, graduated from SNP student activist in the late 1950s to party leader and MP in the 1980s. But given the configuration of alternatives at the time, it seems something of a stretch to suppose that those active early on, who have since risen to positions of political influence, were making a calculated decision from the start.

Instead, those who are rational - i.e. who weigh up the tangible costs and benefits in a relatively objective way - generally are drawn towards a major political party that has a real chance of taking power and effecting change. In the early stages of nationalist mobilization, this is where many pragmatist nationalists are likely to be found. Thus, pragmatist nationalism, in the early going,

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51 A view expressed in interviews with both Margo MacDonald, former SNP MP, and Bob McLean, member of the Scottish Labour Party.
typically manifests itself in the nationalist tendencies - and they are often decidedly modest nationalist tendencies - of some element within the major parties; and conversely, those parties strictly devoted to the nationalist cause tend to be dominated by idealists. If there are distinctive pragmatist nationalist organizations at this stage of the game, they are more likely to be groups of lesser ambition and scope of activity - cultural groups, for example, concerned with one isolated sphere of the nation's affairs which involve their members in relatively casual and part-time projects. Pragmatist nationalists with political objectives are somewhat hidden from view, and only come into the open as the nationalist movement gains momentum.

Though this dynamic is probably more pronounced among party activists, it can also be seen in the evolving attitudes of nationalist party voters over time. At points when such parties are still on the margins of political respectability, most of their supporters are idealists who hope to see their nation gain its independence; but as a certain degree of success is achieved, more moderate nationalists quickly clamber aboard. In Quebec, for example, polls conducted from the mid-1960s through to the PQ's election victory in 1976 revealed an increasing gap between nationalist party support and sovereigntist sentiment. By the time of the 1976 election, only about half of all PQ voters favored independence. A similar dynamic is evident in Scotland: whereas 65% of SNP voters in 1966 supported self-government, only 58% did so in 1968, and 47% in 1974.


53 The first two figures are the author's calculations based on *Gallup Poll, September 1968* (the first figure is based on reported vote in 1966, the second on reported vote if there were a General Election tomorrow; it should be noted that there were only 26 respondents who had voted SNP in 1966). In both cases, self-government supporters include those who wanted a separate Scottish parliament with control over all affairs, and those who wanted a separate Parliament handling all affairs except defence and foreign policies. The third figure is the author's calculation based on the *Scottish Election Study, 1974*. Vote is based on reported vote in the October 1974 election, and self-government supporters include all who wanted Scotland to "run its own affairs." Admittedly, it would be preferable to draw on the same questions asked at different points in time, but variations in question wording and response choices on Scottish surveys of the time make this very difficult.
One implication of this reasoning is that the early idealists, who for a certain period carry the nationalist torch alone, are crucial to a nationalist movement's progress. Their willingness to make personal sacrifices by labouring on behalf of a marginal movement makes them key players, for their early efforts sometimes are the catalyst to further developments: small initial gains, hard won by the idealist element, are followed by a period of rapid growth, which leads to nationalist votes being captured, seats won, and influence attained.

Pointing to idealists as important instigators of nationalist mobilization speaks to a weak spot in theories grounded exclusively in rational choice precepts. As Mancur Olson argued in his classic work, *The Logic of Collective Action*, it may be rational for people to pitch in once a collective action is well underway, but it is rarely rational for them to help initiate it. But if everyone thinks this way, then collective action, especially large-scale collective action, will be relatively rare. In point of fact, it is not all that uncommon; the question is why? People have offered various responses, but one simple answer lies in the supposition that early participants - in nationalist collective action anyway - are not especially rational. Idealists may be rational in the axiomatic sense that the probability-weighted benefits they derive from their actions outweigh the probability-weighted costs, but their perception of


55 Another suggested reason for the prevalence of successful collective action is heterogeneity in the cost-benefit structure facing participants: some stand to benefit much more and are therefore willing to absorb the high cost of acting as trail-blazers. This is similar to the explanation favored here, in that both see heterogeneity among potential participants as conducive to collective action. It differs, however, in assuming that rational choice assumptions hold across the board - i.e. that all participants are rational in their appraisal of costs, benefits, and probabilities - and that the trail-blazers genuinely stand to benefit more than those who follow up the rear. The argument outlined in this thesis suggests that rational choice assumptions do not hold uniformly, and that it is a certain irrationality that makes idealist trail-blazers distinctive (and nationalist movements heterogeneous).

Another explanation for the prevalence of successful collective action points to the political opportunities that sometimes emerge as those in positions of power and authority alter their attitudes towards the movement in question. In the following chapter, this phenomenon is invoked to explain why pragmatists sometimes start participating in a nationalist movement. However, it is argued that this account is less relevant in explaining idealist political behavior.

For a useful overview of the collective action literature, and attempts to explain the conundrum raised by Olson's seminal work, see Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, especially pp. 13-27.
costs, benefits and probabilities may deviate sufficiently from rational choice assumptions as to render them irrational.

One important implication of these propositions about the timing of participation is that the long-term impact of the idealists may greatly exceed their numerical weight. With faint prospects at the outset, the RIN carried the nationalist baton through much of the 1960s; when it was passed to the PQ in 1968, nationalist sentiment had a solid foothold in the Quebec population. Yet at its dissolution in 1968 the RIN only had some 8,000 members. They were, however, nationalist activists willing to absorb personal costs for a cause in which they deeply believed, and they therefore pursued their goal assiduously. The zealotry of RIN activists in the 1960s - the marches and demonstrations, the fiery speeches, the fisticuffs - attracted much attention, which magnified the impact of their message and, arguably, had a catalytic effect on other elements of the Quebec population. As one observer noted at the time, "the RIN and RN [Ralliement National] have had the thankless but necessary task of acting as agents to ferment ideas which most people, consciously or not, still refused to consider seriously.....They were a useful and necessary stage that had to be gone through."56

The Scottish nationalist movement was also carried along on the shoulders of relatively few in the period when success still appeared far off. In 1962, the SNP had only 2,000 members. There was a steady growth in membership through the early 1960s, and by the end of 1965, the party had 20,000 members. It was in this period that the SNP was achieving some notable results that made many Scots sit up and take notice. In a Glasgow, Bridgeton by-election of 1961, the nationalist candidate took 19% of the vote, while a year later William Wolfe captured 23% of the vote for the party in a West Lothian by-election. In the 1964 general election, the party trebled its vote from 1959, and then doubled it again in 1966 (to 128,000 votes). Following these hard-fought gains, there came a rush of electoral success (a 1967 by-election victory in Hamilton, 30% of the vote in the 1968 municipal elections) and

56 Jean Blain in preface to Lévesque, Option Québec, p. 11.
mushrooming party membership (120,000 by 1968).\textsuperscript{57} The catalytic role played by those active in the first half of the 1960s, militating on behalf of a movement when it was still on the margins of political respectability and seemed unlikely to accomplish much, should not be underestimated.

Thus, it may be true that ardent idealists typically represent only a small percentage of the population, but this does not make them the radical fringe whose influence can be safely discounted. They are more important than that because of a willingness to act irrationally at an early date that sometimes triggers further developments. Sometimes, mark, for events do not always unfold as they have in Quebec and Scotland. In Brittany, despite the best efforts of the FLB, the UDB, and other small nationalist organizations, Breton nationalism has not developed into a significant political force. Like other minor nationalist parties labouring in difficult conditions, the UDB has been home to militant idealists willing to assume personal burdens to promote their cause,\textsuperscript{58} but the number of party members peaked at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{59} This apparently was not sufficient to trigger the type of snowballing process that has unfolded in Scotland and Quebec since the late 1960s. The subsequent fall in UDB membership - in 1992, it was only about 500\textsuperscript{60} - and general decline in the fortunes of the emsav suggest that some sort of critical hurdle was not surmounted. Consequently, the Breton movement has continued to languish on the margins of political life on the

\textsuperscript{57} Figures in the paragraph are taken from Kellas, \textit{The Scottish Political System}, pp. 132, 135, and 142.

\textsuperscript{58} The party itself admits that being a UDB member has tended to be an all-consuming occupation: see, for example, the comments made at the start of a 1977 membership drive "Une Charte, un Parti Pour le Peuple Breton," \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 158 (January 1977), p. 14.

\textsuperscript{59} The lower figure is from Monnier, \textit{Le comportement politique des Bretons}, p. 235. The upper figure is that sometimes cited by the party itself. Nicolas suggests that the membership at this time was around 1600 (see \textit{L'Emsav: politique et thematique du mouvement breton}, p. 543.)

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 235
peninsula. The paucity of idealists in the Breton case, where the nation has failed to spring to life, is again suggestive of their important role in stimulating political developments in a nascent nation.

E) Social Origins

Another salient dimension of the pragmatist/idealist divide is the social origins of those who advocate the two types of nationalism. Broadly speaking, scholars have identified two general types of social groups as important movers of the nationalist cause. The first is particular social classes, whose purpose in promoting nationalism at different historical junctures is, so the argument runs, to further their own parochial interests. Thus, early nationalist agitation (of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries) has sometimes been seen as the work of traditional elites whose dominant social position was coming under increasing threat from the forces of modernization; similarly, various postwar nationalisms of the developed world have been seen as vehicles for the articulation of the grievances and ambitions of a rising class of well-educated, professional people. But if some emphasize social class, others highlight the leading role played in nationalist movements by intellectuals within an emergent nation. While the term intellectual sometimes is used broadly, to designate all the better-educated sections of society - and can thus overlap considerably with certain social class designations - it often refers to a narrower intellectual stratum of professors, teachers, journalists, students, and the like.

For the most part, scholars emphasize the role in nationalist mobilization of one group or the other - either a specific social class or intellectuals - and do not attempt to parcel out the contributions of the two.61 The analysis of this section suggests that both of these elements play their part in

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61 One exception, however, would be Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 108-112, *inter alia*. Hutchinson also differentiates the two groups, pointing to the distinctive contributions to nationalist movements of intellectuals and the intelligentsia, the latter comprising those in "new occupational categories...in particular the modern professions" (see Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, p. 254).
nationalist politics, but they tend to promote different variants of nationalism. Specifically, certain social classes often figure prominently among the pragmatists, while intellectuals often take a leading role among the idealists.

This distribution of nationalist activity is consistent with the motivational bases behind different types of nationalism outlined in the previous chapter. Pragmatists, it was suggested are more rational in their nationalist thinking, weighing up the tangible costs and benefits of nationalist action to arrive at a fairly moderate position on the spectrum of nationalist opinion, while idealists are more irrational, acting largely in response to an idealized national identity which produces a more principled and unconditional nationalism. The motivations that scholars usually posit for class-based nationalism and intellectual nationalism parallel this reasoning closely.

When social classes pursue the nationalist project it is because, exponents of this approach contend, it is to their material advantage. Promoting nationalism promises to bring economic gain, improved social standing, enhanced prestige, and greater political power for certain social elites who feel they are not receiving their due. It is sometimes recognized that this argument is more compelling when applied to nationalist leaders rather than run of the mill supporters, for followers in a nationalist movement typically have fewer concrete material interests in promoting nationalism than do social and political elites. For this reason, the caveat is sometimes added that the masses - who, it is assumed, are relatively easily manipulated in these matters - respond to elite appeals because of their visceral attachment to the concrete elements of culture and ethnicity. Thus, if traditional elites - the landed classes, clerics, and so on - hope to protect their social position by putting a halt to modernizing incursions, the rural masses follow their lead simply because they are deeply attached to their particular way of life; if the rising professional classes want to establish a more favourable social and political position for themselves by acquiring greater power for their nation, others respond because
they recognize the threat to their cultural distinctiveness posed by strongly centralized rule. What is common to the analysis applied to these different social groups is the relative insignificance attributed to abstract and symbolic objectives. All participants, it is contended, have concrete goals that the outside observer can identify and readily appreciate; there is, in other words, a pragmatist rationale behind their nationalism.

If class-based nationalism is generally held to be underwritten by pragmatist concerns, the motivations proposed for intellectual nationalism are often similar to those that we have suggested inspire idealist nationalism. Though the specific formulation varies from scholar to scholar, many have suggested it is the search for meaning and fixity in an alienating modern world, the yearning for some sort of anchoring faith, that leads intellectuals - who are especially prone to these existentialist pangs - to valorize their nation. Usually it is suggested that this results in an attendant propensity of intellectuals to idealize their nation. Rather than taking a measured view, and looking upon the nation as a collection of individuals sharing some tangible cultural and ethnic commonalities, intellectuals exaggerate the national bond, conceptualizing the differences between national insiders and non-national outsiders in more idealized and essentialist terms. In short, owing to the import and meaning they invest in the nation, intellectuals usually champion idealist nationalism rather than pragmatist nationalism.

The theoretical framework developed here points to a similar explanation for the nationalism of intellectuals, though with more of a sociological, rather than psychological, spin. Idealists, it was argued above, are people whose conception of the nation has been radically transformed through some

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63 For example, see Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 96-100; Smith, The Ethnic Revival, pp. 90-107; and Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, pp. 14-17, and on the German case, pp. 358-360.
ideational input. It is for this reason that the life-cycle variable is important in the development of idealist nationalism: young people are more prone to take up idealist nationalism because they, compared to their elders, are relatively susceptible to the adoption of radical new ideas. It also helps explain why intellectuals are attracted to idealist nationalism. For the intellectual environment is one where people are both exposed to, and inclined to accept, unorthodox ideas. Exposure is high because intellectuals work in places - universities, for example - where novel viewpoints, such as revisionist national histories, are encouraged and nurtured. Acceptance is high because the intellectual environment is often fairly insular, so that intellectuals are influenced more by their peers than society at large. For these reasons, many intellectuals readily imbibe new ideas that alter their perception of their nation, helping them see it in a wholly new light. It is, then, not immersion in the cultural substance of the nation, but rather exposure to new ideas about the nation, that generates their nationalist sentiment. For this reason, the nationalism of intellectuals is likely to be an idealist nationalism, less closely hitched to empirical realities than the nationalism of pragmatists.

64 This account of the nationalism of intellectuals draws on Benedict Anderson's commentary on the same subject. Anderson, with his evocative phrase "imagined communities," draws our attention to the imaginative or ideational aspect of nationalism, the infusion of myth and metaphysics that transforms the raw material of nationhood - a grouping of individuals sharing certain tangible traits - into the seamless fabric of national unity that underwrites the claim to sovereignty. Though not primarily concerned with the social origins of this phenomenon, Anderson does point out that the construction of imagined communities - in particular, the burgeoning national consciousness that preceded (or sometimes followed) the accession to independence in many colonial territories - often began in universities located in the capital city. Here young elites from the far reaches of a large and diverse territory found themselves in an environment that "created a self-contained coherent universe of experience" (Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 121). In this rarefied setting, these impressionable leaders of the future found themselves able and inclined to imagine themselves part of a nation precisely co-extensive with the heterogeneous population contained within the old colonial borders.

65 This type of argument about social origins is, of course, not unique to nationalist movements. It is well-established that intellectuals are at the vanguard of many radical social and political movements, while other elements of society are more cautious in advocating change. In some sense, then, the reasoning here cuts both ways. The structure of nationalist belief systems helps explain the social origins of different nationalists; but the social origins of different nationalists also offers some confirmation of the observations made of nationalist belief systems, viz. since it is generally known that intellectuals tend towards radical and idealized positions, it can be adduced that the nationalist doctrine they usually espouse - independence nothing less, for the sake of national liberation nothing else - involves an important element of idealism.
Of course, the intellectual factor will be especially important when it operates in conjunction with the life-cycle variable: those most likely to take up idealist nationalism, at any given point, are young intellectuals, such as university students. However, it is important to note that if idealist nationalism does tend to be an enduring sentiment, staying with the individual over the course of his or her lifetime - as suggested by the cohort analysis presented above - these traits will not remain constant. Though a considerable number of student nationalists go on to pursue intellectual occupations, others do not; and all, of course, age over time. Thus, even if the flow of new idealist nationalists continues to be dominated by young intellectuals, this will not necessarily be evident when examining the stock of idealist nationalists at any given point. It is at times when there is a surge in support for idealist nationalism that the stock will most clearly reveal disproportionate support from young intellectuals, for at such points that stock will contain a relatively high proportion of newcomers.66

Other qualifications might also be added to these propositions about the social origins of idealists; for while the flow of new idealist nationalists will tend to be dominated by young intellectuals under a variety of historical circumstances, this trend will be especially pronounced when two conditions obtain: 1) Young intellectuals will dominate, firstly, when the distinct national identity of a stateless nation is denied by the state. In such cases, institutions of civil society become important vehicles for the articulation of an alternative national identity. Especially crucial are those institutions dominated by intellectuals, and principal among these are universities and other institutions of higher learning. Brittany is a prime example of a stateless nation whose identity has been consistently denied by the state: France one and indivisible has been the dominant official leitmotif since the Revolution.

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66 This may help explain why, in studies of the social origins of nationalists, the age factor is often emphasized more than the life-cycle factor. For it is at times of a nationalist upsurge that researchers are most likely to investigate the social origins of nationalist supporters; and at these times, young people are likely to be particularly prevalent.
Quebec too has suffered from a certain lack of recognition: as argued in previous chapter, the Canadian government has largely accepted the French fact in Canada, but has been loath to grant the Québécois the status of nation. Scotland, by contrast, has received greater official recognition from the British state, and Scottish nationalism therefore has been less dependent on those autonomous institutions of civil society dominated by intellectuals for the recovery and promotion of the Scottish national identity. Young intellectuals will also be particularly important players at the stage when a nationalist movement has relatively few supporters and consequently receives little publicity. As a nationalist movement gains momentum, it receives wider exposure, through various media, and people other than intellectuals are increasingly exposed to idealist nationalist discourse. In this way, new sources of idealist nationalist support are tapped, and the flow of new idealists is no longer dominated by young intellectuals.

To summarize then: the flow of new idealist nationalists tends to be dominated by young intellectuals, especially in places where minority national identities are denied by the state, and in the period when a nationalist movement has insufficient public support to generate widespread publicity. Furthermore, this characteristic of the flow of new idealists will be most apparent in the stock of idealists at times of increasing idealist support.

These social origin patterns are apparent in the bases of support for different nationalist organizations and positions in Quebec. The idealist wing of the nationalist movement, especially early on, was dominated by young intellectuals, while pragmatist options have found relatively high levels of support among certain social classes, more rational in their nationalism. The preponderance of young intellectuals among Québécois idealists can be seen, for example, in membership data for the RIN. The party, which espoused a strongly idealist nationalism, was in existence from 1960 to 1968 - a period when Quebec nationalism was still relatively peripheral, but definitely on the rise. These are conditions under which young intellectuals are likely to be dominant, and this was indeed the case with
the RIN. The party was peopled by students on the one hand, and teachers and professors on the other, to a very pronounced degree. One previous estimate suggested that these groups accounted for 15% and 19% of the party membership respectively; another estimate put them at 28% and 14%. But there are reasons to think that even these high figures, based on surveys of RIN members, may underestimate the role of intellectuals in the party and, in particular, the role of students. Most importantly, both surveys asked people their current occupation, rather than their occupation at the time of joining the party. But people are only students for a short time, and some, who were students at the time of joining, may have graduated by the time of the surveys. For this reason, it was thought that an examination of RIN membership records would be in order; this would provide information on people's occupation at the time they first became RIN members, as well as addressing other problems associated with surveys, such as low response rates. Based on a sample of 634 RIN membership cards, stored at Quebec's National Archives in Montreal, it was found that fully 45% of RIN members were students at the time they joined the party, and another 7% were teachers or

67 Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The class bases of the Quebec independence movement: conjectures and evidence," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 7, 1 (January 1984), Table 5, p. 35. The data are taken from two surveys of the RIN membership, carried out by Réjean Pelletier and F.P. Gingras, respectively. Both surveys were conducted in 1968. For further details, see Réjean Pelletier, Les Militants du RIN (Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1974); F.P. Gingras, Les Caractéristiques Sociales et Psychologiques Des Militants D'un Parti Indépendantiste Québécois (M.A. Thesis. Montreal, McGill University, 1969); and F.P. Gingras Contribution à l'étude de l'engagement indépendantiste au Québec (Doctoral Thesis. Paris, Université René Descartes, 1971).

68 See the questions concerning occupation reported in Pelletier, Les Militants du RIN, p. 80 and Gingras, Les Caractéristiques Sociales et Psychologiques Des Militants D'un Parti Indépendantiste Québécois, p. 107.

69 Other reasons why the number of students may have been underestimated are: 1) Both were mail-out surveys. Because students typically move more often than others, they may have had an elevated non-response rate. This could be significant, because both surveys had response rates around 40% (see Pelletier, Les Militants du RIN, p. 69 and Gingras, Les Caractéristiques Sociales et Psychologiques Des Militants D'un Parti Indépendantiste Québécois, p.7); 2) Pelletier's survey was not based on a representative sample. Instead, it oversampled local leaders within the party and therefore may have underestimated the presence of students.
professors. In other words, a majority of the membership was from these two groups, with younger intellectuals - that is, students - especially dominant.\textsuperscript{70}

Other data provide some indication as to which students were particularly drawn to the nationalist movement. A 1970 survey of 939 students at the University of Laval, conducted just prior to the April 1970 provincial election, found that 59% planned to vote for the PQ,\textsuperscript{71} a much higher level of support than in the population at large (the PQ won 23% of the popular vote in the election). Significantly, this strong student support was differentially distributed across faculties. In the social sciences, 85% planned to vote PQ; in law it was only 51%, in the sciences, 43%, and in administrative science, 32%.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, those students who were studying subjects likely to expose them to political, sociological and historical re-interpretations of the experience of the Québécois nation were the ones especially apt to rally to the nationalist cause. Those in more apolitical fields showed rather less enthusiasm.

But while the PQ did enjoy high levels of support among intellectuals and students, particularly among those in certain disciplines, it was not dominated by these groups to the same degree as the RIN. Students, for example, accounted for only 15% of the PQ's membership in 1971 and

\textsuperscript{70} The membership records stored at Quebec's National Archives were meant to be kept confidential until 1999. I was unaware of this, however, and was inadvertently granted access to them for a couple of hours, until the mistake was realized. During this time, the occupational data were collected. This fortuitous access to confidential records presented something of an ethical dilemma: should data gathered in this fashion be reported? But it seems clear that the confidentiality proviso was designed to protect information about individuals. Since I only collected (and was interested in) aggregate data, it seemed reasonable to report these results.

In total, 737 membership cards were examined. Given time constraints, these could not be selected in purely random fashion, though a rough and ready attempt at random selection was made. In any event, the records were organized alphabetically by surname, making non-random selection less problematic (the first letter of one's surname is unlikely to be correlated with occupation). In total, 291 records from Montreal were examined, 190 from Quebec City and 256 from other parts of Quebec. Fourteen percent were missing occupational information, leaving 634 valid records in total.


\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.
9% by 1979, much lower than the 45% in the RIN.\(^3\) This was essentially a function of the PQ's larger membership: even though the absolute number of students and teachers in the PQ was probably larger than in the RIN, they accounted for a smaller proportion of the membership. The point, then, is not that intellectuals and students began to lose interest over time, but rather that other groups held off until a more palatable political organization arrived on the scene. The RIN - the purveyor of a staunchly idealist nationalism - was dominated by intellectuals and students, while other social groups were reluctant to join. The PQ - a party with a vaguer nationalist message that looked more likely to achieve its goals - managed to attract other social groups and consequently represented a broader social coalition.

Who were these newcomers who started to support the PQ as the nationalist message was softened and the prospects of success improved? Survey data offer some insight into the matter. Certainly it was not a single social group, as nationalist support was generally becoming more diffuse. However, especially prominent among the moderates were members of the so-called new middle class.

This is apparent in the data shown in Table 7.4. The data in the table - derived from the 1973 Quebec Election Study - compare the social origins of two different types of nationalists: PQ voters and those supportive of independence. The former group consisted of those who had voted PQ in the recent provincial election and those who would have voted PQ had they voted. The latter group consisted of those who chose "abolish for independence" as their preference for Quebec's constitutional future, when presented with an array of alternatives, including "give more powers to

\[^3\] The first figure is cited in Murray, Le Parti Québécois: de la fondation à la prise du pouvoir (Montreal: Cahiers du Québec, 1977), p. 31; the second is cited in Pinard and Hamilton, "The class bases of the Quebec independence movement: conjectures and evidence," Table 5, p. 35. These seem, however, to be figures based on occupation at the time of data collection, rather than at the time of joining the party. Still, the percentage of students in the PQ does seem to be significantly lower than in the RIN.
Quebec." In this survey, half of the PQ supporters did not advocate independence, so the two groups do not overlap excessively.74

Logistic regression analysis was used to see which social origin factors were important predictors of membership in the two nationalist groupings. The specific objective was to find any differences that might exist between between intellectual nationalists and nationalists hailing from Quebec's new middle class. It was not possible, using this dataset, to identify those respondents in certain key intellectual occupations (students, teachers or professors), and even if it were, sample size considerations would probably have impinged, so instead education level was used as a rough measure of intellectualism. A question asking respondents' occupations was used to isolate members of the new middle class; those in a professional or semi-professional occupation were classified as members of this class, while all others were deemed to be non-members.75 Finally, age and place of residence (Montreal vs. other) were included as control variables because of their high correlation with the explanatory variables and the dependent variables.

74 The sample size for the party voting model is considerably smaller because many respondents refused to divulge how they had voted.

75 Those who have previously conducted research in this vein have relied on a variety of measures to identify the new middle class, laying emphasis variously on income, education, employment in a professional or semi-professional occupation, employment as a salaried professional, or some mixture thereof (see for example: Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," pp. 376-386, esp. p. 381; Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia," pp. 150-168; Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," p. 155; Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard, "The Bases of Parti Québécois Support in Recent Quebec Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science 9, 1 (March 1976), pp. 3-26; McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p. 90-91).

More recent analyses, working on the assumption that public sector workers stand to gain more from nationalist reform than those in the private sector, have often focussed on government employees, and have also suggested that provincial government employees, since they are most likely to reap the benefits of changes in Quebec's constitutional status, should be the most enthusiastic among the civil servants (see Blais and Nadeau, "L'appui au Parti Québécois," p. 294). In this case, a sector of employment variable was not available and therefore an older measure was used instead (those in a professional or semi-professional occupation - the same categorization used in Hamilton and Pinard's 1976 article, which also draws upon the 1973 Quebec Election Study data).
Table 7.4: Support for the Parti Québécois and Quebec Independence, 1973: Logistic Regression (francophones only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PQ Support B (SE)</th>
<th>Independence Support B (SE)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional / semi-</td>
<td>0.80* (0.32)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 to 13 years</td>
<td>0.21 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.73* (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 years or more</td>
<td>0.70 (0.36)</td>
<td>1.28** (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 43</td>
<td>-0.61* (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 or older</td>
<td>-1.31** (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.95** (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>0.61** (0.19)</td>
<td>0.49* (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.62 (0.32)</td>
<td>-2.34 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05  **p < .01

Variable Definition: All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: occupation (all other occupations); education (0 to 7 years); age (18 to 24); region (non-Montreal).

Source: Author's calculation based on 1973 Quebec Provincial Election Study. For further details, see Appendix 1.

The results show that there was a markedly elevated level of support for the PQ among members of Quebec's new middle class; the relevant regression coefficient in Table 7.4 is 0.80. However, there was, in this group, only slightly greater than average enthusiasm for independence - the coefficient in this case is 0.31 and not statistically significant. Meanwhile, although Quebeckers with high levels of education were more supportive of the PQ than those with less education (a coefficient of 0.70 for those with 14 or more years of education), the more striking difference lies in their support for independence (a coefficient of 1.28 for the most educated group). Thus, the social class variable seems to be more important in explaining PQ voting, while the educational variable tells us more about hardcore independence support.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76} To those who might produce other data showing high levels of support for radical nationalist options among the new middle class, there is another rejoinder: it is possible that the causation runs the other way, that it is radical nationalist sentiment that causes people to choose a certain career path. This seems especially likely for this
In the Quebec case, then, idealist positions and organizations, especially early on, were dominated by students and intellectuals and, more generally, those with high levels of education. These groups were also present in the PQ - where they continued to press the pure nationalist line - but they were joined by others who, as members of a rising social class, were more rational in their nationalism, and less inclined to take an independence nothing less stand.\textsuperscript{77,78}

particular juncture in Quebec history. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the private sector of Quebec's economy was still heavily dominated by Anglophones. Meanwhile, the Quebec government had been expanding its operations enormously since the start of the 1960s, providing multiple job opportunities for ambitious, young, francophone Quebeckers. It seems highly probable that a radical young nationalist, under these conditions, would have chosen the public sector over the private. Thus, an analysis of 1965-1969 graduates from the Université de Montréal - a hive of nationalist activity at that time - found that only 22.5% had taken their first job in the private sector, and that a mere 12.7% were working in the private sector still (cited in McRoberts, \textit{Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis}, p. 178).

That nationalism might, in some cases, inform career choice, rather than vice versa, is more plausible in view of the early age at which idealist nationalist sentiment often forms. As discussed above, there is evidence that for many idealists, their nationalist sentiment forms in adolescence or early adulthood, often in their student days - in other words, before many have settled on a career path. This sentiment can have an important impact on the career choices young people make. For example, a former FLQ member, who now teaches at a Quebec university, reported to the author in a personal interview that he had been involved in the nationalist movement since the age of 15 (as an early member of the RIN); he subsequently decided to study history - which he now teaches - in order to understand why Quebec independence was imperative. In this case, nationalist conviction clearly helped shape career choice.

This may help explain some of the differences in the RIN membership data reported above: whereas Gingras's survey, based on occupation at the time of the survey, found 28% students and 14% teachers and professors, our analysis of membership records, which provided occupation at the time of joining the party, found 45% students and 7% teachers and professors. If a large proportion of the latter group of students became teachers or professors after joining the party, but before Gingras' survey, this would help explain the discrepancy. It also would suggest that many nationalistic students were opting for a teaching career, i.e. that political sentiment was affecting career choice.

This conjecture suggests that the relationship between occupation and nationalist support may be more complex than is sometimes assumed.

\textsuperscript{77} It has been observed that teachers and professors continued to predominate in the PQ at higher levels of the party hierarchy: on average, about one-quarter of PQ convention delegates were from this group, about 35% of PQ election candidates, and over half of PQ cabinet ministers (see Pinard and Hamilton, "The class bases of the Quebec independence movement: conjectures and evidence," Table 5, p. 35). This is likely a reflection of another phenomenon: as discussed in the previous section, those who give themselves more fully to the nationalist cause tend to be those more idealist in their nationalism.

The correlation between level of activity and radicalism on the national question was apparent in a series of events that unfolded in 1981. At the PQ conference of that year, delegates, incensed by the recent constitutional negotiations in Ottawa, voted to delete the "association" in sovereignty-association and to return the party to the election victory method of acceding to independence. But when a referendum of the full party membership was held, 95% voted against these changes. Thus, delegates to the party conference - who would typically be activists heavily involved in the affairs of the party - were relatively radical; whereas, the party membership as a whole, many of whose total contribution to party activities likely consisted in paying their membership fees and nothing
Nationalists involved in the Breton emsav have been of similar social backgrounds to their Quebec counterparts. Idealist organizations, for example, have drawn preponderant support from students, along with teachers and professors, and other intellectuals. Hard evidence for groups from the earlier part of the twentieth century is difficult to come by, but the anecdotal observations of historians certainly point in this direction. The pre-World War I PNB, for example, was a tiny organization, composed, writes Michel Nicolas, of young people, students "for the most part." Similarly, the most militant among the interwar Breton nationalists were to be found in the UYV (Unvaniez Yaouankiz Vreiz, or Union de Jeunesse Breton), its members again, according to historical works, young intellectuals in the main.

Similar trends are evident for more recent idealist groups, with hard evidence closer to hand. The UDB, for example, was founded in 1963 by a clutch of geography and history students at the University of Rennes in Upper Brittany. Since its inception, members have continued to be drawn first and foremost from intellectual circles. Through the 1960s, approximately 60 to 70% of party members were either students or teachers. This did decrease somewhat in the 1970s, as party membership grew considerably, but the proportion remained high: in 1974, the party reported that 35% were from more, were significantly more moderate. It makes sense, then, that intellectuals, with their more radical nationalist outlook, would be more dominant at higher levels of the party hierarchy.

Those who have argued against the new middle class hypothesis, by pointing to the dominant role of intellectuals in the Quebec independence movement, have perhaps taken their arguments too far. Pinard and Hamilton argue convincingly that intellectuals have played a pivotal role and also observe that they have generally been supportive of pure independence (Pinard and Hamilton, "The class bases of the Quebec independence movement: conjectures and evidence"; see also Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "Intellectuals and the Leadership of Social Movements: Some Comparative Perspectives" in Louis Kriesberg (ed.) Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 11 (1989), pp. 73-107, especially pp. 90-97). But they do not pay as much attention to the distinctive traits of more moderate nationalists, and it would appear that membership in the new middle class - at least in the past - was one such trait.


these two groups and in 1976, it was 42%.\textsuperscript{81} Nor does the influence of intellectuals seem to have declined today. Though no occupational data for the membership as a whole have been reported for some time, a recent survey of UDB members did find that 61% had academic degrees,\textsuperscript{82} which is far in excess of the level in the general population. Furthermore, in recent elections, the proportion of teachers among UDB candidates has remained high, at around 40%.\textsuperscript{83}

Another measure of the social origins of supporters of more radical strains of Breton nationalism can be found in the sources of support for the FLB. Although William Beer, in his analysis of FLB arrestees, found that relatively few were teachers or students (only 5 of 49 arrested in 1969), this was based on a relatively small sample.\textsuperscript{84} A 1969 petition calling for the release of these prisoners and denouncing the government for its inattention to Breton issues was predominantly signed by intellectuals. Of the 2,225 signatories to the petition whose names and occupations were printed on the pages of Le Peuple Breton, 48% were students and a further 11% were teachers or professors.\textsuperscript{85}

If radical Breton nationalist groups have tended to find favour among the intellectual element, the social origins of those backing more moderate organizations have been quite different. The Union Régionaliste Bretonne, formed in 1898, was, for example, dominated by traditional social elites. By one estimate, 25% of its members were aristocrats and another 17% Catholic clergy. Middle class

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 566.

\textsuperscript{82} Drwiega, The Puzzle of Ethnicity's Persistence, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{83} Hervé Guillorel, "The Social Bases of Regionalism in France: The Breton Case," in John Coakley (ed.), The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements (London: Sage Publishing, 1992), p. 162. It should be noted that the French Socialist Party has also drawn disproportionate support from intellectual circles. Thus the UDB's espousal of socialist principles may partly explain the social origins of its supporters.


\textsuperscript{85} Calculated by author based on lists printed in Le Peuple Breton, nos. 65, 67, 68, 69 and 70 (April-August 1969).
groups were also important, including professionals (11%), shopkeepers (11%) and civil servants (6%). Intellectuals, on the other hand, played a small part; only 4% were teachers and another 4% students.\textsuperscript{86}

Comparable membership data are not available for CELIB, the postwar organization that was a vehicle for a moderate Breton regionalism, since its "members" consisted of organizations, rather than individuals. It is clear, however, that CELIB enjoyed wide support among Brittany's political and social elite. Arrayed among its supporters were hundreds of municipalities, chambers of commerce and agriculture, professional organizations, worker and farmer unions, and Brittany's parliamentary delegation. It was a base of support sufficiently broad, in the eyes of some, to warrant describing CELIB as a "veritable 'Estates General of Brittany.'"\textsuperscript{87}

It is more difficult to ascertain whether these patterns of support for different variants of Breton nationalism hold true of the general population, since the relevant public attitudes have been little measured. The one representative survey that has addressed Breton nationalism specifically did find somewhat elevated levels of support for a modest degree of devolution among certain sections of Breton society. The overall level of support for a Breton statute of autonomy in this 1975 poll was 12%, but there were higher levels of support from those in the "cadre moyen, employé" category (19%), those living in urban areas (16%), and those under the age of 50 (18%). Such people are perhaps not dissimilar to Quebec's new middle class - newly educated Bretons with a certain class interest in acquiring greater power for their region. France-wide surveys on the issue of regionalization

\textsuperscript{86} Cited in Guillorel, "The Social Bases of Regionalism in France: The Breton Case," p. 159. Other data, with a more detailed occupational breakdown, can be found in Hudson Meadwell, "A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism," \textit{Comparative Politics} 23, 4 (July 1991), p. 414. Meadwell's figures indicate that one-third of the URB membership were priests and another third were "agricultural proprietors," while only 6% were teachers or students.

also have found occupational differences in levels of support for devolution. While 63% of those surveyed in 1990 thought the region was the political unit of the future, 72% thought so among the "cadres moyens" group, and 75% among the "cadres supérieurs." Asked whether they thought their region should be involved in large projects or smaller ones, 36% of respondents said it should undertake large projects. The level of support among the cadres moyens group, however, was 44%, and in the cadres supérieurs category, 53%.  

It would seem, then, that nationalist support in Brittany has conformed to the pattern described above. Relatively moderate expressions of Breton nationalism have, at various points, found favour among particular social classes. The specific classes have varied over time: a century ago, it was traditional elites at the helm, but in the past fifty years, a new rising social and political elite has assumed a greater role in promoting a moderate Breton nationalism. The nationalism of these groups shares, so we might speculate, a common motivation: each has rationally deliberated on the matter and elected to adopt achievable nationalist goals likely to help them maintain or improve their own social position. More radical expressions of Breton nationalism, on the other hand, have enjoyed disproportionate support among intellectuals, especially young intellectuals. For it is in this section of society that an ideational nationalism - an ardent and principled nationalism grounded in an idealized sense of community - is most likely to find favour.

Support for nationalism in Brittany fits the typical pattern because it is a nation whose identity - in the past certainly - has been largely denied by the state. After the Revolution, most Bretons were imbued with a sense of Frenchness from the earliest age. That they had their own language, customs and traditions was, they were told, a superficial and immaterial distinguishing feature unworthy of

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88 Observatoire Interregional du Politique, "Le Fait Regional. La Région, la formation professionnelle et l'apprentisage" (Paris, 1990).

89 A detailed argument on these lines for the URB can be found in Meadwell, "A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism."
further reflection. Thus the Breton identity became very much muted, rooted in the concrete traits of *bretonnité*, and lacking a strong ideational component. For this reason, intellectuals, located in relatively autonomous institutions of civil society, have been key to the resurrection of a more abstract and idealized sense of *bretonnité*, and they, consequently, have been leading figures in the radical stream of the *emsav*. Intellectuals continue, moreover, to be the principal exponents of radical nationalist options, because Brittany provides an example of a nationalist movement that remains on the political fringes. This differs from Quebec, where the influence of intellectuals, while still significant, has been diluted by the induction of other social forces into the principal nationalist party, the PQ.

Scotland, by contrast, does not fit the social origins pattern to quite the same degree. This is not entirely surprising, given the anomalous situation of the Scottish nation, discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas most minority groups are denied recognition as a nation, the Scots have historically been treated with greater deference and respect by the British state. One important consequence has been a widespread sense of Scottish identity, spread evenly through many sections of the population, and a reduced role for the intellectual element in championing Scottishness. Whereas Québécois and Breton intellectuals have been crucial to the invigoration a marginal national identity, it has not fallen to Scottish intellectuals to take an equally dominant role in the project of national reclamation.

The role of intellectuals and students in the Scottish nationalist movement, then, has been more modest; but it has not been wholly insignificant, especially at the far fringes. The contribution of intellectuals to the nationalist cause was probably greatest in the 1920s, when idealist nationalist groups like the Scots National League (SNL) and the Scottish National Movement (SNM) appeared, issuing the first calls, in the modern era, for an independent Scotland. There seem to be no figures available on the social origins of these early idealists - none are reported in detailed histories of the movement - but impressionistic evidence points to the vanguard role of students and other intellectuals.
The Duke of Montrose, whose relatively moderate Scottish Party merged with the idealist NPS in the early 1930s, observed, "In their early days, the Nationalists were swayed largely by idealism. Novelists, essayists, and poets, rather than businessmen, were to be found in their ranks. Hence the insistence on such terms as 'sovereign power and independence'." As the description suggests, freelance intellectuals were prominent among these early activists, rather than academics. But if professors were not to the fore, the universities did contribute many youthful supporters. An important group at this early stage was the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association (GUSNA), formed around the time of the 1928 rectorial election at the university, which featured, for the first time, a nationalist candidate, Cunninghame Graham. In that election, Graham took 37% of the vote, and was runner-up (a result bettered in 1934, when the nationalist candidate, Compton Mackenzie, won the rectorship). This substantial student contingent joined forces with the intellectuals of the SNL and SNM in 1928 to form the National Party of Scotland (later to become the SNP).

For later periods in the history of the SNP, there is also little data on the social origins of the party's membership, but the scattered observations provided by historians seem to confirm the continuing role of young students and intellectuals. In 1943, when the party returned to a more hardline independence position, there was, Finlay notes, an infusion of new, younger, members. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, furthermore, it is generally thought that the party drew a disproportionate number of its members from the better educated sections of the population. Membership, however, was still not

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91 For an extended discussion of the attitudes of Scottish intellectuals towards Scottish nationalism, see Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, pp. 79-111.

92 Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 151.

93 Marr, *The Battle for Scotland*, p. 82.

94 Finlay, *Independent and Free*, p. 239.
concentrated among intellectuals at the Scottish universities, but rather among the pastoral elite spread throughout the small towns of Scotland: rural school teachers, lawyers and doctors were the archetypal SNPers of the 1940s and 1950s. The interest shown by these groups in Scottish national affairs might be seen as a function of a certain class interest: rural elites prominent in the SNP were promoting nationalism - and valorizing the rural lifestyle, as SNP policy did at the time - as a way of protecting their own social position, which was threatened by increasing urbanization and technocratic rule. But it is important to take note of the timing of their adherence to the nationalist cause. Hanham suggests - though he admittedly offers little backing for the point - that these people were typically turning to nationalism early in their lives: "at times in the past the S.N.P. has often appeared to be primarily a university graduates' party, because student nationalism was so much stronger before 1966 than was nationalism in the country as a whole. Graduates who had been student nationalists and went into teaching or law were spread about the country both before and after the war in such a way that they became the nucleus for all sorts of nationalist activities." Thus, the significance of the life-cycle and intellectual environment factors should not be discounted. SNP members may have ended up in certain traditional middle class occupations, but to attribute their nationalism to occupational interests would be rash, since many, according to the historians, became nationalists when they were young, impressionable students, likely to be impulsive and principled in their nationalist thinking rather than rational and deliberate.

In the early 1960s, young people, many of them intellectuals, continued to play a significant role in the Scottish nationalist movement. However, even for this more recent period, clear-cut

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95 Some evidence of this can be found in Drieux's analysis of the party's leaders from 1945 to 1967 (11 of 17 fall into one of these three groups). See Jean-Pierre Drieux, Le Scottish National Party, 1945-70. Doctoral thesis (Paris: Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1974), p. 103.

96 Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 204. Drieux, in Le Scottish National Party, 1945-1970, also observes that the phenomenon of student nationalists returning from university to take up nationalist activities in their home towns and villages was important to the SNP's implantation throughout Scotland (see p. 181).
evidence of the phenomenon is difficult to come by. The nationalist movement, around this time, was starting to attract increased journalistic and scholarly attention, but data on the characteristics of SNP members and activists are lacking for the first half of the 1960s. The difficulty, it would seem, was that membership records were not kept at party headquarters in Edinburgh. Instead they were held at each individual branch, of which there were several hundred by decade's end. A systematic analysis of SNP membership would have been a major undertaking, and was not, to this researcher's knowledge, ever attempted. Though data on SNP supporters became available later in the decade, as surveys of Scottish public opinion started to be conducted in the second half of the 1960s, information about SNP activists remained wanting. The principal sources of such information were figures on the social origins of election candidates or other unrepresentative groups.97

Nevertheless, for the initial years of the party's take-off, beginning in 1962 when there were 2,000 SNP members and ending in 1966 when there were ten times that number, there are again signs that young students were important movers of the nationalist cause. The Scots Independent, the weekly newspaper closely linked to the SNP, speaks of much activity in the student federations in the early 1960s - the University of Edinburgh nationalist club, for example, tripled its membership in late 1962, from 50 to 150.98 Other student nationalist groups, at Aberdeen and St.Andrews, experienced a doubling of membership in the same academic year.99 Observers have also noted the preponderance of

97 With the exception of one survey of SNP members conducted in 1992 (see Brand, "SNP members: the way of the faithful"), it remains true today that relatively little data are available on the social characteristics of SNP members. In the hopes of collecting data on SNP membership for the first half of the 1960s - a critical period in the SNP's rise, as argued in the next chapter - this researcher discussed the possibility of retrieving old membership records with SNP officials in Edinburgh. Unfortunately, these old records never were gathered together in a central location, so that any still available would be held at individual branches. After speaking with a few long-time party activists in some of the older branches, it became clear that locating and collecting such records would be an onerous and likely fruitless task.


students at certain key electoral junctures: Wolfe, in his 1964 by-election campaign in West Lothian, apparently relied heavily on student activists;\(^{100}\) similarly, it was observed that "an enthusiastic campaign by a band of young nationalists headed by students in 1966 secured 7,974 votes [in Midlothian]."\(^{101}\)

But if there was something of a nationalist buzz among students in the first part of the 1960s, it cannot be said that the university campuses came to represent key crucibles of nationalism, as they did in Quebec and Brittany. By 1970, there were only 700 members of student nationalist clubs at Scotland's universities,\(^{102}\) while the SNP had a membership of around 70,000.\(^{103}\) Instead, other young people, outside institutions of higher learning, were flocking to the cause in numbers. High school students, for one, were important supporters. It was observed in 1968, for example, that "one jibe...often made is that the party is largely made up of schoolchildren. Certainly lots of blazer lapels carry the very attractive [SNP] badges."\(^{104}\) If in Quebec and Brittany, it was university students who were the principal movers of the radical nationalist cause, in Scotland young people of more varied background stepped up to play their part, an observation confirmed by polling evidence: in one 1968 survey, for example, 46% of those in the 16 to 20 age group said they would vote SNP if an election were held tomorrow, compared to 26% for all other respondents.\(^{105}\)

Associated with the relatively high participation level among young people outside the universities was a greater contribution to the nationalist cause from Scottish school teachers and a

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\(^{100}\) Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, p. 175.

\(^{101}\) Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 184.


\(^{103}\) Kellas, *The Scottish Political System*, p. 142. This is the figure for the SNP's membership in 1971.

\(^{104}\) Jack Brand, "These are the Scotnats," *New Statesman*, May 1968, p. 648.

\(^{105}\) Author's calculation based on *Gallup Poll, September 1968*. 

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diminished role for university professors, a reversal of the typical situation in nationalist movements elsewhere. This was confirmed by two surveys conducted around the time of the 1974 general election. The polls, which drew on a representative sample of teachers and professors from across England, Scotland and Wales found that 6% of the entire sample of 1,100 supported a nationalist party - either the SNP or the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. Since the polls included respondents in both Scotland and Wales, and these two areas account for roughly 15% of the British population, it can be adduced that support for nationalist parties among Scottish and Welsh teachers combined was around 40% (6/15). But this support was very much concentrated at lower levels of the educational hierarchy. Among those teaching at universities, polytechnics and colleges of education, the levels of nationalist party support, for the entire sample, were 1%, 0% and 1%, respectively; among those teaching in the state secondary schools and state primary schools, the support levels were 10% and 6% respectively. If Scottish and Welsh respondents for each of these sub-groups represented 15% of the total, then support for nationalist parties among those in tertiary educational institutions was less than 10% (1/15), compared to 67% among Scottish and Welsh secondary teachers (10/15), and 40% (6/15) among primary teachers.

The relative indifference of those in institutions of higher learning to the Scottish nationalist cause was likely reflective of an important characteristic of the Scottish universities - the high

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106 For some comparisons on this score, see Pinard and Hamilton, "Intellectuals and the Leadership of Social Movements: Some Comparative Perspectives," pp. 90-97.


108 Data for Scotland only would be preferable, of course, but these were not reported in the TES. Efforts to acquire results for Scotland only were unsuccessful; the polling firm which conducted the survey no longer has the original data nor any more detailed results. However, Scotland's population is nearly double that of Wales, so the figures for Scotland alone could not be greatly different.

109 The figures for these sub-groups are from a second survey conducted after the 1974 election, in which 4 of 5 respondents from the previous survey were interviewed again. See "Labour support dropped sharply during campaign," Times Educational Supplement, 18 October 1974, p. 3.
proportion of non-Scottish faculty. This became especially pronounced after World War II, as the Scottish universities expanded considerably and brought in faculty from England to fill new teaching posts. In 1939, the percentage of professors in Scottish universities with their first degree from a Scottish university - a rough and ready measure of their geographic origins - was 73%. By 1969, it had dropped to 49%.¹⁰ In certain departments, the lack of Scottish representation was especially pronounced. In the history departments, only 37% of the faculty in 1969 had taken their first degree in Scotland.¹¹ In departments of politics, it was only 25%.¹² These are the types of departments - the social sciences - that were especially important bastions of radical nationalist support in both the Quebec and Breton cases. It is perhaps little wonder, then, that nationalism did not become a dominant force on the Scottish university campuses.

Meanwhile, however, secondary schools in Scotland were attending more closely to Scottish subjects in the postwar years. Prior to 1945, history was a subject taught only at the primary school level, with Scottish history receiving only a cursory treatment. After that date, however, history became a subject of examination for both the Higher and Lower grades of the Scottish Leaving Certificate. At first, relatively little Scottish history was included, but in 1962, a section devoted to that subject was introduced to the Lower Leaving Certificate, and in 1963 to the Higher Leaving Certificate.¹³ Another Scottish addition to the curriculum was Modern Studies, a mix of history,


¹¹ Ibid., p. 4.


¹³ For a more detailed overview of the teaching of Scottish history, see Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, pp. 106-112.
geography, and politics taught mainly to the "less able end of the pupil spectrum."\textsuperscript{114} Introduced in 1959, the subject is now taught in 90% of all Scottish secondary schools.\textsuperscript{115} These changes to the educational curriculum in themselves were likely not the catalyst of increased Scottish nationalist sentiment in the 1960s and onward, but they have probably helped make young Scots more receptive to the nationalist message of the SNP.\textsuperscript{116}

In sum, then, the role of young intellectuals in the radical stream of the Scottish nationalist movement has been somewhat atypical, but the anomalies are not necessarily any great mystery. Overall, this social group has not figured as prominently as elsewhere. Furthermore, those young intellectuals who have militated on behalf of Scottish nationalism have not been concentrated in the universities to the usual degree. Freelance intellectuals have been more important, taking a leading role in the formation of the NPS and in the radical wing of the early SNP. Other young Scots, outside the universities, have also been key supporters, especially in the SNP's rise since 1960. The relative insignificance of university-based nationalists can be attributed in part to the heavy Anglicization of the Scottish universities. The considerable level of mobilization achieved despite this Achilles heel can be linked to the degree of recognition accorded the Scottish nation - intellectuals, in a position to contest the received wisdom of the state, have not been necessary to make the average Scot aware of his or her Scottishness (a situation quite different from that prevailing in Brittany and Quebec). All of this said, however, the exceptionalism of the Scottish case should not be overstated. For young


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 336.

\textsuperscript{116} Others are skeptical about whether these changes were pivotal in generating a heightened national consciousness among young Scots. See, for example, Brand, \textit{The National Movement in Scotland}, pp. 111-112. For a different evaluation, see the views expressed by SNP member James Halliday in "Evil Influences on Scottish Education", \textit{Scots Independent}, 14 January 1961, pp. 1 and 4.
intellectuals have at certain points figured prominently among the idealists, especially in the prolonged period of the movement's history when idealist nationalism continued to languish on the margins of Scottish political life.

As in Quebec and Brittany, those propounding a more moderate Scottish nationalism have differed markedly in their social origins from their idealist counterparts. This is evident, for example, in the social origins of those associated with the Scottish Party, the relatively moderate nationalist organization that joined forces with the idealist NPS in 1933 to form the SNP. Many of the Scottish Party members were from the Liberal and Conservative parties; many hailed from the upper crust of Scottish society, with members of the Scottish aristocracy figuring prominently among their number. They were not unlike the traditional social elites who, in other places, have also sought greater local autonomy at times when their influence over society seemed to be on the wane (for example, the Union Régionaliste Bretonne).

Another measure of the social origins of pragmatist nationalists can be found in the bases of support for the SNP as it continued to gain momentum in the latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s. As discussed previously, the party was, around this time, starting to attract people more moderate in their nationalist outlook. This was also a time when the relative contribution of young intellectuals, such as it was, diminished considerably. "Since 1966...the graduate element in the S.N.P. has been reinforced by a host of other activists and it would no longer be true to say that the S.N.P. is dominated by its graduates."\(^{117}\)

If intellectuals were taking a backseat, who were the moderate SNPers flocking to the cause as the nationalist movement took off? Overall, there was not a strong class or occupational dimension to SNP support as the party moved from success to success in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but some modest trends are apparent. An analysis of the social backgrounds of candidates in the 1968 municipal

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\(^{117}\) Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 204.
elections - in which the SNP took 34% of the vote - found that many SNP candidates were "skilled tradesmen, white collar workers, technicians, managers and shopkeepers. Indeed the overwhelming impression is of a party for the little man, in business in a small way, who feels disenfranchised by the major party machines; he is neither a working class Socialist, nor a wealthy Tory; he is rarely a professional man; he is almost certainly not an intellectual." This profile of SNPers applied mainly to party newcomers: 67% of the candidates had joined the party in the past three years, 83% in the past five. Thus, if there was a class component to the relatively moderate Scottish nationalism that emerged as a potent force from the late 1960s on, it consisted in greater than average SNP support from those uneasy with class politics. Such people may well have felt that their interests were too often neglected by a political system in which class was the chief demarcation line between the major parties; and they would naturally be attracted by an SNP creed that emphasized the classless nature of Scottish society and called for government to level the playing field so that each individual could realize his or her potential. There were, then, fairly concrete reasons why "the little man" would find the SNP an attractive political option; the pragmatist nationalism of Scots uneasy with class distinctions was fuelled not only by their Scottish identity, but by more concrete considerations too.

Some variant of this reasoning is echoed by most researchers who have identified a class or occupational basis to Scottish nationalism. Aspirations for upward mobility among that portion of the Scottish electorate frustrated by Britain's class-bound society were expressed in elevated SNP support. Nationalism fueled in this manner, it is usually contended, has been concentrated among

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119 The most detailed expositions of this idea can be found in Drucker and Brown, *The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution* (London: Longman, 1980), especially pp. 41-51; and Kendrick, *Social Change and Nationalism in Modern Scotland*. Others who make similar arguments include Marr, *The Battle for Scotland*, pp. 116-117; and
upwardly mobile Scots of the skilled working class and lower middle class. What has not usually been added is that this argument applies most forcefully to a subset of Scottish nationalists - namely more moderate nationalists, relatively rational in their nationalism.

Evidence supportive of this contention can be found in data from the 1979 Scottish Election Study. SNP support, in this poll, was relatively high among those classes others have identified as important nationalist backers for reasons of blocked social mobility. The results of logistic regression analysis, displayed in Table 7.5, show that certain groups - skilled manual workers, intermediate non-manual workers (ancillary workers and artists) and salaried professional workers - did show greater than average support for the SNP; the regression coefficient comparing SNP support among these groups to all others is a statistically significant 0.90. However, their support for independence was no greater than that of other classes; the relevant regression coefficient is 0.03. Thus, the class-based account does help explain SNP support, but has less to say about the social origins of hard-core independence supporters.\textsuperscript{120}


120 It should be noted that in analysing other Scottish datasets it was found that there has, at times, been elevated support for independence among the skilled working class and lower middle class. However, an important difference between the 1979 study and these other polls is the overall level of support for independence: in the 1979 survey, only 7% supported the radical option. There are likely two reasons for this: the relevant 1979 survey question presented respondents with five options, including an Assembly with strong powers; and the survey was conducted shortly after the 1979 referendum, which concentrated public attention on the Assembly option. In any event, the important point is that the 7% who opted for independence on this poll were, presumably, relatively hard-core supporters of independence.

That class would retain some explanatory purchase on surveys with higher overall levels of independence support is probably to be expected. It has been noted at several points in this thesis that many independence supporters in Scotland are more compromising than their counterparts elsewhere, supporting lesser constitutional options, and exhibiting significant measures of rationality in their political thinking. By looking at a question that isolates hard-core independence supporters, the relative moderation of some Scottish independence supporters is taken into account.
Table 7.5: Support for the Scottish National Party and Scottish Independence, 1979: Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SNP Support B (SE)</th>
<th>Independence Support B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional workers (employees) / intermediate non-manual workers (ancillary workers and artists) / skilled manual workers</td>
<td>0.90** (0.26)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal Education Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 16</td>
<td>0.42 (0.38)</td>
<td>-0.70 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 or older</td>
<td>0.46 (0.41)</td>
<td>-0.89 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 43</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.49)</td>
<td>-0.56 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 or older</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.51)</td>
<td>-1.76* (0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.08 (0.58)</td>
<td>-0.90 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05   ** p < .01

**Variable Definition:** All variables shown are dummy variables, with a value of 1. Comparison groups (value 0) are: occupation (all other occupations); terminal education age (14 or younger); age (18 to 24).

**Source:** Author's calculation based on Scottish Election Study, 1979. For further details, see Appendix 1.

In each of the three nationalist movements under investigation, then, there seem to be distinct social bases of support for pragmatist and idealist nationalism. Young intellectuals have tended to support more radical nationalist options, while relatively moderate expressions of nationalism have found greater favour among particular social classes. This pattern is consistent with the proposition, common in the literature on nationalism and nationalist movements, that intellectual nationalism is typically less rational and more principled than class-based nationalism. To this observation has been added the thought that intellectual nationalism is more principled because it is more ideational, for the intellectual environment is one in which idealized national identities are especially likely to take hold. Thus can the social origins of nationalist activists and supporters be linked to the nature of nationalist belief systems.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined various differences in the patterns of nationalist activity seen among pragmatists and idealists. Pragmatists are relatively reactive in their nationalism, whereas idealists, whose political thinking is dominated by an abstract and idealized national identity, are more immune to external influence. Furthermore, pragmatist nationalism is a sentiment that frequently develops incrementally, whereas idealist nationalism sometimes takes hold of the individual in a brief, intense period, often in the formative years. Typically, this idealist nationalism stays with people over the course of their lifetime, leading to unflagging support for their preferred nationalist project, independence. Pragmatist nationalist sentiment, on the other hand, often ebbs and flows over time, exhibiting stronger period effects than idealist nationalism. The two types of nationalist also differ in the timing of their participation in nationalist activities: idealist irrationality produces a willingness to take a hard line at an early stage of mobilization, whereas pragmatist rationality leads to more carefully tailored promotion of the nationalist cause. Finally, the social origins of pragmatists and idealists are distinctive. Intellectuals often embrace idealist nationalism, whereas declining and rising social classes, more rational in their nationalism, often take a more pragmatist line.

Having canvassed various dimensions of the nationalist activity patterns typical of pragmatists and idealists, it remains to pull the pieces together into a more coherent narrative whole. The following chapter undertakes this task, developing a macro-model of nationalist mobilization around the behavioral precepts discussed above. This model is applied to the nationalist movements of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, revisiting, in the process, many of the themes and historical material touched on previously.
Chapter 8

A Model of Nationalist Mobilization

Introduction

Having examined a variety of pragmatist-idealist differences, it is now possible to build a general model of nationalist mobilization around this nationalist typology. This chapter outlines that model, invoking premises about pragmatist and idealist behavior developed in previous chapters, and drawing on historical evidence from the Québécois, Scottish and Breton cases.

This model is distinctive in its emphasis on mobilization as a contingent and somewhat unpredictable process. This distinguishes it from accounts of nationalist politics that leave the dynamics of the mobilization process largely unexamined, and instead look for relatively fixed characteristics of an emergent nation - its degree of cultural distinctiveness, the presence or absence of particular social classes - that are correlated with mobilization success. The two approaches can be seen as complementary. A correlates of nationalism approach tends to produce parsimonious theory, whereas a process-oriented approach offers greater detail and nuance. A correlates of nationalism approach speaks more to the why of nationalist mobilization, whereas a process-oriented account speaks more to the how of mobilization - if mobilization occurs, how will it unfold? Both approaches have their merits and demerits, but there has perhaps been too little attention given to process-oriented accounts in the literature on nationalist mobilization.¹

¹ The distinction between a correlational and a process-oriented approach can be seen in other areas of political science research. For example, in the past, studies of democratization tended to search for factors that were correlated with democracy (e.g. level of socio-economic development). Today, there is a greater emphasis on understanding the process of democratization, with closer scrutiny of the dynamic and interactive relationship between the governing regime, democratizing forces in society, the military, and so on. In studies of nationalist mobilization, process-oriented theories are relatively rare. Case studies of specific movements are often in this vein, but usually do not couch their observations in a generalizable analytical framework. Two notable efforts to develop general process-oriented accounts of nationalist mobilization are Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of
A) A Model of Nationalist Mobilization Applied to Quebec

The model developed here, with its emphasis on process, conceives of nationalist mobilization as a series of sequential stages that build one upon another. The previous chapter alluded to a phase of nationalist mobilization in which the ground is starting to move, as nationalist idealists make some notable gains that attract attention and catalyze further developments. But this often is preceded by a lengthy period of stable, low-level nationalist activity, during which few victories are won by the nationalist forces. This period of stasis is the first stage in nationalist mobilization, and it can be a very long stage indeed.²

In the stasis phase, there is typically a large gap in outlook and political disposition separating idealists and pragmatists. The idealists - young intellectuals and students in the main - are a small group of committed activists, who make significant personal sacrifices for the nationalist cause. Their goal is independence for their nation and they are not interested in lesser formulations, though circumstances may sometimes dictate a certain public prudence. It is a goal that seems unattainable, but idealists persevere because theirs is an independent nationalism springing from within that is little affected by external obstacles and barriers to success. If others do not rally to the nationalist cause, it is, the idealists feel, because they are unaware of their true national selves and must be educated by the enlightened few. Confident that victory will be theirs in due course, idealists usually show considerable perseverance over time. Granted, if their efforts fall completely flat, they sometimes fade from view.

² A similar model for the Quebec case is presented in Michael B. Stein, "The Dynamics of Contemporary Party Movements in Quebec: Some Comparative Aspects of Créditisme and Indépendantisme" in Wsevolod Isajiw (ed.), Identities: the impact of ethnicity on Canadian society (Toronto: Peter Martin, 1977), pp. 85-105. This, however, does not explore the motivational bases behind the behavior of different groups; it also deals with only some of the stages of mobilization identified here.
but even then it is not uncommon for the same individuals to resurface at a later date to resume their idealist endeavors.

By contrast, pragmatists, since they, with their reactive nationalism, are more inclined to adapt to circumstance, tend to be very moderate in the period of stasis. Their goal is some delimited form of autonomy that will allow for the protection of the concrete elements of national distinctiveness. The leading voices espousing this pragmatist viewpoint are often social and political notables, for whom the nationalist project is neither all-consuming, nor likely to undermine their privileged place in society. Followers consist of the large segment of the population who respond to the eminently tangible and resonant appeal presented by these elite groups. Given the circumstances prevailing in the stasis phase, pragmatist nationalism is the more rational creed. The objective pursued seems attainable, even if not always attained. There is often a willingness, on the part of pragmatists, to compromise on their goal. And their activities are aimed at securing concrete benefits, rather than the more abstract and symbolic benefits deriving from national self-determination.

The Quebec case can be used to illustrate this and subsequent stages of this model of nationalist mobilization (Scotland and Brittany are considered separately below). In Quebec, the period of stasis stretches from the quelling of the rebellion in Lower Canada in 1837 through to 1960. Through most of this early period, pragmatist nationalism, at the elite level, was dominated by the Church, though different political parties, such as the Union Nationale, also have at times pursued a similar nationalist program. The nationalism espoused by the Church was inspired by the philosophy of *la survivance*, which called for the protection of the distinctive elements of French-Canadian culture, without drawing into question the allegiance of French-Canadians to the Canadian state. It was a policy of accommodation, which recognized Canada as a legitimate and meaningful political community but demanded that some allowance be made for the sociological differences that clearly separated French-Canadians from their Anglo-Canadian counterparts. This common-sense message
struck a resonant chord with many among the French-Canadian masses; so it was that pragmatist nationalism was the dominant outlook in French-Canadian society prior to 1960.

Idealist nationalism was not a constant feature of Quebec's political landscape throughout this long period of stasis. But when idealists did arrive on the scene, they were decidedly tenacious in their efforts, particularly in light of the meager results achieved. The most notable stretch of idealist activity in Quebec's period of stasis came in the interwar period. At the fulcrum of this activity was Abbé Lionel Groulx. Groulx was one of the initiators of the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne-Française; in this capacity, and as chair of Canadian history at the University of Montreal, he exercised a heavy influence over many young students at both the collège classique and university level. Many would become active in the Action Française group formed in 1917, which, through its eponymous journal, took a critical view of French-Canada's place in Confederation and the subservience of its political elites. The activities of the group spawned various small political organizations openly supportive of separation, which gained a limited following, mainly among young students, in the 1930s. Groulx himself kept his cards close to his chest, sometimes alluding to the desirability of independence, but never really coming clean on the issue. This, however, was sufficient for the time to mark him as a renegade, and there was a large gap between his outlook and the more pragmatist nationalism of other French-Canadian elites. Long-time premier of the province, Alexandre Taschereau, was no friend of Groulx's, while Henri Bourassa, once an ally, became increasingly critical over time, denouncing Quebec separatism and those associated with it. In the period of stasis, then, Quebec idealists laboured away on the political periphery on behalf of an ambitious and idealized goal, while the pragmatists were decidedly moderate, accommodating themselves to the realities of their nation's situation and dissociating themselves from the idealist element.

This generally remains the configuration of forces throughout the period of stasis that is the initial phase in an emergent nation's awakening. However, on occasion, the pragmatists experience
ephemeral nationalist impulses, and thereby display the vacillation that is characteristic of their brand of nationalism. Though for the most part very moderate, pragmatists sometimes react to specific events that provoke a sharp and vigorous response. This reactive and episodic nationalism moves the pragmatists closer to the idealist camp for a time, but it typically fades quickly, unlike the steadfast nationalism of idealists.

Quebec history provides several examples of this sort of episodic nationalist flourish. In 1885, when the Métis rebel leader Louis Riel was hanged, with the blessing of the Conservative government in Ottawa, the response from the French-Canadian community was vigorous, but ultimately short-lived. The leader of the provincial Liberal party, Honoré Mercier, persuaded Quebec politicians of the left and right to come together in his new Parti National to defend the rights of French-Canadians. The party quickly gained popular support and won an electoral majority in 1887. Mercier governed until 1891, but the diversity of his party's constituent elements made it difficult to maintain its unity, and Quebec soon returned to a traditional Liberal/Conservative two-party system. The conscription crisis of World War I, another conspicuous event in Canadian history, had similar ephemeral effects. Imposed on French-Canada in 1917 by a federal government with little support in Quebec, conscription led to riots in Quebec City and the tabling of a motion in the Quebec legislature calling for Quebec independence (it never came to a vote). The rancor was again short-lived, however, and in this instance did not produce a nationalist political party to channel the discontent. The pattern repeated itself once again in World War II, when Mackenzie King reneged in 1942 on a promise not to introduce conscription. A plebiscite would be held, King announced, to allow Canadians to decide the matter for themselves. Quebeckers overwhelmingly voted no, but were easily outnumbered by English-Canadians in favour of the measure. This time round, the conscription issue did produce a new political party, the Bloc Populaire, which denounced King's government and called for greater autonomy for Quebec. The party ran in both federal and provincial elections, collecting as much as
15% of the popular vote, but it too was short-lived and was no longer in existence by 1949. In all three cases, then, it proved possible to shift significant numbers of Quebeckers from their moderate, pragmatist nationalism to a more radical position - but only temporarily and in response to the tangible threat represented by provocative federal policies and actions detrimental to French-Canadian interests. A reactive and episodic nationalism from the pragmatist element, then, is a feature that occasionally alters the usual alignment of opinion in a stateless nation's stasis phase.

If it is generally possible to identify external precipitants that generate pragmatist outbursts, the same is not true of idealist agitation, which is more steadfast and independent of circumstance. This certainly seems true of the next wave of idealist nationalism that began in Quebec in the late 1950s. Several small groups supportive of Quebec independence were formed in the space of several years, marking the start of an idealist upsurge that has continued (and grown dramatically) down to the present day. Unlike the pragmatist reactions triggered by Riel's hanging and the conscription crises, there was no specific incident or outside provocation that generated this new round of idealist nationalism; aside from some relatively mundane disputes over tax points, Quebec's relations with the Canadian government had been relatively placid for a number of years. It simply transpired that small pockets of Quebeckers came to feel they were Québécois not Canadian and as such wished to live in an independent Quebec, a bluff manner of thinking neither sparked nor dampened by any external stimulus.

This new round of idealist activism might have proven to be simply a continuation of the period of stasis. But as it turned out, it marked the start of a new phase, which might be termed the idealist breakthrough. A corner was turned, and the idealist option, rather than remaining a fringe concern, came to be viewed as a serious and credible political alternative. Instead of a nationalist party with a membership numbering in the dozens, or perhaps hundreds, the idealist ranks swelled to the thousands. Instead of independence support being too low to warrant measurement by pollsters,
surveys started to find support for separation creeping into the double digits. From 1960 to 1968, an idealist breakthrough of this sort unfolded in Quebec, as the RIN and other smaller nationalist groups started to command varying degrees of fear, respect and admiration from different quarters of Quebec society.

Naturally, the idealist breakthrough is a period of greatly increased activism. One notable feature of this activism is its uncompromising ardor, manifested in the occasional recourse to violent methods. The reason why is fairly clear: idealists are at this time gaining strength and are emboldened by their burgeoning numbers, while those more moderate in their nationalist outlook have not yet allied with the idealists to temper their zealotry. Voices calling for moderation and restraint are to be heard, but they originate from outside the strictly nationalist parties and organizations rather than from within, and therefore are easily dismissed by idealist true believers. In Quebec, the idealist breakthrough of the 1960s was the most violent period of nationalist mobilization seen in the province; the FLQ was very active, while RIN members were taking to the streets in marches and demonstrations that often turned violent, as the calls for restraint from more moderate nationalist elements within the Union Nationale and the Quebec Liberal Party went unheeded.

But this stage of nationalist mobilization often does not last long, for the idealist breakthrough soon brings in its wake another new development: pragmatist bandwagoning. The considerable section of the political elite and the general population sympathetic to elements of the nationalist program, but not of the strict idealist mindset, sidle down the nationalist spectrum towards a more radical position. This allows for a merger of pragmatists and idealists in a nationalist party representing a broader coalition of nationalist forces.³

It is possible for these developments to transpire within the confines of an existing nationalist party. But they also can result in the establishment of a new political party, as was the case in Quebec.

³ For a similar argument (not restricted to nationalist movements) see Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 156.
The Parti Québécois was formed in 1968, representing a merger of the nationalist wing of the Liberal Party, which had slowly become more radical over the course of the 1960s, and the idealist nationalists, from the RIN and Ralliement National, who had carried the ball to that point. Although few who could be called leaders within the Liberal party jumped ship immediately, René Lévesque did take over 100 delegates with him when he marched out of the Liberal Party conference in 1967 to form, shortly thereafter, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association. Prominent union leaders showed an immediate interest in Levesque's proposals, and within a few years, were supporting the MSA's successor, the PQ. At the grassroots level, the number of followers the party managed to scare up in short order also indicated that new sources of nationalist support were being tapped. The membership of the PQ was already 25,000 in 1968; by the time of the 1970 provincial election, this number had swelled to 80,000. Voters also turned to the party in droves. In 1970, the PQ took 23% of the popular vote compared to the combined 9% won by the RIN and RN in 1966. But if many new nationalist supporters were coming on board, they were not nearly so singular in their nationalist convictions as those who had been there all along. As noted previously, opinion polls showed that there was an increasing gap between PQ support and sovereigntist sentiment from 1966 to 1976; by the time of the PQ's first election victory, only about half of PQ voters favored independence. At the same time, the social origins of nationalist supporters were evolving, as the principled, young intellectuals of the earlier phase were joined by members of the new middle class, more equivocal in their nationalism. In short, there was a sudden rush of new nationalist support in Quebec in the late 1960s and early 1970s, along with increasing heterogeneity within the nationalist camp.

4 Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois, p. 16.

5 Ibid., p. 22 and p. 66.

Within the new political formation that forms as a result of pragmatist bandwagoning, there will typically be tensions, on various counts, between the original idealists and the newcomers to the nationalist cause. Will independence plain and simple be the goal, or will strings of various sorts be attached? Will any available means be used to pursue the nationalist cause or will the party use accepted political methods to gain majority support for its program? Will conciliatory offerings from the central government - the usual purpose of which is to sap nationalist strength - be entertained or dismissed outright? Questions like these were the subject of heated debate within the PQ. Compromises that most could abide were struck, though the moderate newcomers led by Lévesque generally had the upper hand: sovereignty-association, to be sanctioned by a referendum, was, within a few years, the party's constitutional objective; and, once in power, the PQ was not adverse to negotiating with Ottawa for various lesser concessions until the time came to hold a referendum.\(^7\)

This type of softening of nationalist goals will often follow the arrival of the pragmatists, for they generally are more numerous than the idealists. With their arrival, the complexion of the movement as a whole is altered, as the nationalist program is shorn of its more radical and intransigent edges. Idealists, for their part, are often torn between the success attendant upon these changes and the dilution of their goals and methods, however modest. A few may refuse to have dealings with the new coalition, but for the most part differences between idealists and pragmatists are papered over, and the coalition holds (for the time being anyway).

Some significant developments, then, take place in a nascent nation's development as it leaves behind the period of stasis. Most notably, the marked idealist-pragmatist divide of the period of stasis diminishes, though it does not disappear completely. The radicalization in pragmatist outlook that is largely responsible for this closing of the gap differs from the sudden shifts in pragmatist sentiment that sometimes occur in the period of stasis. Rather than an episodic and ephemeral change in response

\(^7\) McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp. 293-297.
to a specific event or action, the pragmatist bandwagoning that follows the idealist breakthrough represents a more permanent alteration, brought about by enduring changes in certain external conditions to which pragmatists are sensitive. Among those conditions is the level of support for the nationalist project in the population at large. When nationalism is a marginal sentiment, pragmatists look askance at the radical program envisioned by idealists, thinking it neither justified, nor likely to succeed (think back to the arguments offered in chapters 5 and 6). But as more come to support some form of nationalist change - independence, or, for many, a significant degree of autonomy for the nation - pragmatists are more impressed, and come to see reform as both more legitimate and more attainable. Another important change that catches the attention of pragmatists is the increasing pliability of the central authorities as nationalist sentiment gains ground. This too alters their measure of the nation and its chances of success. Thus, pragmatists, whose nationalism is relatively rational and sensitive to external conditions, become more radical as changes occur that behoove some revisiting of their position. They generally do not become ardent separatists, but they are increasingly willing to ally with the idealists, and countenance independence, even if their personal preferences for the nation's future remain rather more murky and subject to compromise.

This radicalization of the pragmatists can take place quite quickly, because changes in the conditions that underwrite their nationalism can occur rapidly. When it was suggested in the previous chapter that the individual pragmatist who becomes more nationalistic over time is likely to move slowly down the spectrum of nationalist opinion - a process summarized as nationalism by accretion - it was specified that this applies only in times of relative stability. To the extent relevant external parameters change quickly and decisively, pragmatists will show brisk alterations in their political outlook. There can, for example, be a snowball effect in terms of nationalist support: if pragmatists want their nation to be a living reality rather than an abstract ideal, then a virtuous circle is entered into as more and more people come to support the nationalist cause. Movement on the part of central
authorities is also likely to come in a sudden rush, for they often dismiss the nationalist ascendancy as a temporary aberration, and then quickly scramble to make some accommodation as a broader nationalist coalition forms and the magnitude of the problem becomes evident. Superficially, then, there may seem to be a rapid change in the underlying sentiments and preferences of those pragmatist bandwagoners who move quickly towards a more radical nationalist position after the idealist breakthrough, but it is perhaps more accurate to point to sudden alterations in their environment as the reason for the rapid change of heart. Just as the episodic nationalist outbursts of earlier pragmatists are clearly linked to external precipitants, so the more enduring shift of pragmatist bandwagoners is largely a product of a rapidly evolving political environment. ⁸

To recapitulate, then, the end result, once a nationalist movement has passed through the stages of stasis, idealist breakthrough, and pragmatist bandwagoning, is a heterogeneous nationalist coalition of significant political import. The next distinctive development, which may overlap somewhat with the preceding stages, consists of attempted changes designed to satisfy nationalist aspirations. Some of these changes, especially those initiated by the central government, will be modest reforms, likely to appeal to the moderate nationalist element only. Others, especially those initiated by the nationalist coalition itself, will be more bold and, if successfully executed, would represent a rupture of the political system. The timing and outcome of these various attempts at political reform and rupture help determine the subsequent course of nationalist mobilization.

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⁸ There is a similarity between this argument, and the "political opportunities" approach that has been used to explain the sometimes rapid development of collective action. It is, for example, initially puzzling that the communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed so suddenly in the late 1980s, when there were few prior signs of revolutionary pressure building within these societies. The political opportunities approach points to cracks that appeared in the communist regimes as the catalyst of change; dissidents jumped at the chance to express their discontent, and when this was not immediately suppressed, the more cautious section of the population quickly joined in. In other words, people didn't undergo some sudden change in their level of discontent and desire for reform; rather external changes suddenly made certain actions, which had been unthinkable (e.g. marching and demonstrating), seem much more rational. For an account along these lines, see Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, pp. 191-193.
In a democratic and responsive political system, modest reforms will typically precede nationalist attempts at rupture. Before the nationalist coalition is able to secure the support needed to effect some dramatic change in the status of their nation - independence, or, in Quebec, sovereignty-association - smaller changes are effected that have the potential to placate some in the nationalist coalition. In the Quebec case, numerous olive branches were extended by the Canadian government as it became clear that nationalist agitation in Quebec was not to be a passing phenomenon. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was struck in 1965, its mandate to "inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership."\(^9\)

Efforts were made to find a formula acceptable to Quebec for patriating the Canadian constitution; a deal satisfactory to the Liberal Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, seemed to have been struck in Victoria in 1971 but was nixed when Bourassa faced harsh criticism at home. A \textit{de facto} special status has been granted Quebec, as it has opted out of numerous federal programs since the 1960s. Official bilingualism was introduced by Pierre Trudeau in 1969, and concerted efforts have been made to ensure equitable representation of French-Canadians in the federal civil service.\(^10\)

The process of nationalist mobilization in Quebec, because it has taken place in a federal political system, has an additional feature that is absent from movements mobilizing in a unitary political system: moderate nationalist reforms have also been introduced by the provincial authorities. Important changes have, for example, been effected by different Quebec governments in the area of language policy. In 1974, the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa introduced Bill 22, which made

\(^9\) Cited in Hugh R. Innis, foreword to \textit{Bilingualism and Biculturalism: An Abridged Version of the Royal Commission Report} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart in cooperation with the Secretary of State Department and Information Canada, 1973).

French the sole official language of Quebec, restricted access to English schools for immigrants, and introduced incentives and regulations aimed at increasing the use of French in the private sector. When the PQ came to power in 1976, it took these reforms a step further, recognizing that rupture was not in the cards just yet, with support for sovereignty well below 50%. Among other provisions, the Charter of the French Language, introduced by the PQ in 1977, further restricted access to English schools and required that all public signs and commercial advertising be in French only. Thus, various measures, likely to appeal to a broad cross-section of francophone Quebeckers, have been implemented by both the Liberal and PQ governments.

Eventually, however, the PQ made its gambit for attempted rupture - though it was not quite the rupture the original idealists of the RIN would have liked. A referendum was held, in 1980, on a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association; the stipulation was added that if a mandate were granted, and an agreement reached with the rest of Canada, a second referendum would be held before any change would take place. This diluted version of the separatist blueprint failed to receive majority support, however, and the PQ was forced to regroup and rethink matters.

The events that followed the 1980 referendum demonstrate the significant impact that efforts at reform and rupture can have on a nationalist coalition. Such coalitions are susceptible to internal squabbling and defections if changes are achieved that satisfy the pragmatists or defeats suffered that make further gains appear unlikely. In the Quebec case, both occurred: various reforms, introduced by both the federal and provincial governments, had clearly demonstrated that the position of French-Canadians could be improved within the Canadian political framework, while a disappointing 40% of Quebeckers had voted yes in the 1980 referendum, suggesting that further changes were not likely in the foreseeable future.

Because their nationalism is relatively responsive to ongoing developments, the reaction from pragmatists is a significant softening of their nationalist outlook. In Quebec, the pragmatist elements
within the PQ were, after the 1980 referendum, willing to put aside sovereignty for the time being, and their preferences largely carried the day. The first sign of change came when the PQ promised, in the provincial election campaign of 1981, that it would not hold another referendum on sovereignty in its second mandate (which it was duly awarded by the Quebec electorate). However, the exclusion of Quebec from the 1981 federal-provincial agreement to patriate the Canadian constitution seemed, for a time, to reverse the moderating tide. Many in Quebec - including the Quebec Liberal Party - were angered by Quebec's constitutional ostracization. At the December 1981 PQ conference, the party expressed its disaffection by passing two resolutions that represented a significant radicalization of the party program: one stipulated that sovereignty would no longer be contingent on an economic association with Canada, the other that sovereignty could be declared with a parliamentary majority (rather than requiring a referendum). Lévesque, however, opposed these changes and organized a successful referendum of the full party membership in order to reverse them. Subsequently, moderation of the PQ program continued apace. When the Conservatives won the 1984 federal election, promising to undo the damage of the Trudeau years, Lévesque agreed that a place might be found for Quebec in Canada's constitutional fold and indicated he would entertain offers to that end (his so-called beau risque). In 1985, Pierre Marc-Johnson replaced Lévesque as PQ leader and adopted, for the election of that year, a rather vague slogan, "national affirmation", that was thought to represent a further moderation of the PQ program. In the first half of the 1980s, then, the moderates had the upper hand and the PQ increasingly distanced itself from an unequivocal sovereigntist program.

The outcome of various attempts at reform and rupture, and the pragmatist response thereby induced, can, in turn, have a considerable impact on the idealists. In this case, successful reform, failed rupture, and the resultant moderation of the pragmatist element, led to a hardening of the idealist position. Having compromised in the first instance by forming a nationalist coalition with pragmatist
bandwagoners, the idealists found their unalloyed objective of an independent state for the Québécois nation slipping ever farther away. Consequently, the idealists sought to return to first principles. PQ activists did so at the 1981 party conference when they tried to make sovereignty pure and simple, to be effected by a PQ parliamentary majority, the party platform. Hard-line party leaders similarly expressed their anger when seven ministers - fully one-quarter of Lévesque's cabinet - resigned after the beau risque strategy was adopted in 1984.

In short: successful reform and failed rupture - which often will be the pattern of events in a flexible and democratic political system - led to a re-polarization of the pragmatist and idealist forces. In the Quebec case, pragmatists remained in control of the nationalist party and the idealists were left out in the cold. This would have boded ill for idealist prospects, but for another process, running parallel to these other developments, that significantly affected the subsequent course of nationalist mobilization: idealist accretion. Slowly there had been, and continued to be, a build-up of idealist sentiment in the Quebec population, which gradually altered the balance of pragmatist/idealist forces.

Idealist accretion is a gradual process because of the way idealist nationalism takes root at the individual level. Typically, it was suggested in Chapter 7, idealist nationalism is the product of a deeply rooted nationalism that embeds itself early in the life-cycle. The cohort analysis seemed to bear out this proposition; supporters of radical political change for their nation generally adopt that position early in life and maintain their support thereafter. Idealist accretion, then, because it hinges on the development of a deeply embedded nationalism in rising generations, will typically progress more slowly than pragmatist bandwagoning. If pragmatist nationalism is reactive and can emerge rapidly as relevant external circumstances change, idealist nationalism is more stable and independent of circumstance. Its progress depends on the development of an idealized identity among those susceptible to radical rethinking of their political views - i.e., the young primarily - and this limits its immediate growth potential.
But if pragmatist bandwagoning does often surge ahead of idealist accretion for a time, the idealists will often regain ground slowly. This has happened in Quebec, where support for separation, in the population at large, has steadily increased, largely, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, through the arrival of new birth cohorts on the political scene. The sudden rise in support for separation at the time of the Meech Lake failure confuses matters somewhat, but the cohort analysis sheds some light on that event. The response to Meech partly represented an episodic nationalism - an ephemeral reaction, that is, to a specific event that faded within a few years time. This was the case primarily for older Quebeckers. But Meech, and other events of the 1980s, also seemed to stimulate high levels of idealist nationalism in younger generations, who are now permanently estranged from Canada. Once the distinctive impacts of Meech are untangled, the underlying trend of steady growth in hard-core support for separation is revealed.

One important result of the slow rise in idealist strength has been a return of idealist influence within the nationalist coalition. One of theirs, Jacques Parizeau, became the new leader of the PQ in March 1988 and returned the party to a sovereigntist platform. At the same time, the pragmatists have remained in the party, and one of theirs - Lucien Bouchard - has now replaced Parizeau as PQ leader. Thus, the nationalist coalition has, after a period of polarization and fragmentation, coalesced once again. Events might have unfolded differently, however, if the ongoing processes of reform and rupture had produced different results. The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords - attempts to secure Quebec's attachment to Canada's patriated constitution by granting key concessions such as distinct society recognition - might, for example, have helped placate some pragmatists; but the pacts failed and instead alienated the moderate element further (Meech in particular). Meanwhile, the nationalist coalition's second attempt at rupture, the referendum of October 1995, failed like the first, but this time only just, falling less than one percentage point shy of a majority. It therefore did not have the same enervating impact on pragmatists as the first referendum. For the time being, then, the
nationalist coalition is holding and future developments will depend on the ongoing processes of attempted reform, attempted rupture, pragmatist reaction, and idealist accretion.

The Quebec example demonstrates, then, how a model of nationalist mobilization can be pieced together by drawing on behavioral precepts about two distinct types of nationalist. Perseverance and rigidity on the part of idealists, and reactiveness and compromise from pragmatists, are micro-tendencies that lead to certain predictable macro-patterns. The mobilization of a nascent nation typically begins with a long period of stasis during which pragmatists - led by social and political elites who appeal to the common sense nationalism of the masses - work within the political system to achieve their modest goals. These pragmatists are fairly consistent in their nationalist outlook, save for the odd episodic hardening of their resolve occasioned by provocative events or actions. Meanwhile young, intellectual, idealist nationalists consistently seek a complete break and refuse to ally with compromisers. A new phase begins with the idealist breakthrough, which is often the result of much effort and personal sacrifice on the part of relatively few idealist activists. This is followed by pragmatist bandwagoning - which involves a certain radicalization of the pragmatist element - and the formation of a heterogeneous nationalist coalition, as those relatively rational and deliberate in their nationalism join with those whose nationalism is more deeply embedded and principled. Next comes a period of attempted reform and rupture with initiatives coming from the central authorities, and sometimes the nationalist coalition itself (depending on its access to positions of power). Typically, in a responsive political system, reform will precede rupture, which can undermine the cohesion of the nationalist coalition. Meanwhile, however, there can be, over the longer haul, a slow steady growth of idealists, which introduces new dynamics into the mix. The long-term outcome of nationalist mobilization depends on the timing and interplay of these various processes.

There is, admittedly, a certain indeterminacy in this model. It does not pretend to offer predictions about the final outcome of nationalist unrest (e.g. will Quebec separate or not?). What it
does provide is some insight into the mobilization process; it responds to the question, if mobilization occurs, how will it unfold? By isolating the patterns of activity typical of pragmatists and idealists, the model sheds light on the behavioral underpinnings of general mobilization trends.

B) The Mobilization Model Applied to Scotland

In Scotland, the history of various nationalist organizations and the evolution of public sentiment reveal a process of nationalist mobilization similar to that seen in Quebec. In this case, the period of stasis can be dated from 1707 through to about 1960. Superficially, the first part of this period was completely devoid of Scottish nationalism, for it was not until the 1880s that the Scottish Home Rule Association, the first nationalist organization of note, was founded. But in point of fact, as others have argued, there was considerable pragmatist nationalism early on that did not manifest itself in any expressly nationalist organizations or parties. Circumstances were such that these were not necessary, for the degree of autonomy afforded Scottish society and Scottish elites by the British political system was considerable. The Treaty of Union had left intact the Presbyterian Church, along with the Scottish educational and legal systems. This meant that Scottish elites controlled various institutions of local authority which were important elements in the fabric of Scottish society of the time, including the office of the sheriff, which acted as the judiciary and organized elections, and the church parishes, responsible for most social policy, in particular education and poor relief.\footnote{Paterson, \textit{The Autonomy of Modern Scotland}, pp. 34-36.} Since government at the time intervened sparingly in the workings of society, these offices represented a considerable sphere of authority. Thus Scots, even those aware of their Scottishness and desirous of maintaining the distinctiveness of their nation, found a comfortable niche in an accommodating political system, much like their French-Canadian contemporaries.
Pragmatist nationalism was turned up a notch when the Home Rule movement sprang into being in the mid-1880s. This came to represent the option of preference for many among the Scottish political elite - especially Liberal, and later Labour, MPs - who wanted to work within the political system to achieve relatively modest change that would allow for concrete changes favourable to the Scottish people. But if Home Rule was widely desired, efforts on its behalf were rather desultory and reaction to its regular rebuffal fairly muted. Between 1889 and 1927 a steady stream of Home Rule motions and bills - 14 in all - was brought before the House of Commons. Not all came to a vote, but on eight occasions they did; all but once, a majority of Scottish MPs voted in favour of Home Rule, usually by a very wide margin. These were preliminary votes, however, and the governments of the day did not pursue them to their conclusion, leaving Scotland without its Parliament. Despite this apparent disdain for the will of the Scottish people, as expressed through their elected representatives, the historical record offers no examples of aggrieved Scottish MPs resigning or undertaking to form new parties in order to pursue the Home Rule cause more resolutely.

There was, then, at best, a superficial perseverance and dedication in the thirty-year effort to pass a Home Rule bill. It clearly was not an all-consuming enterprise and eventually went out with a whimper, as plans for Home Rule were gradually shunted aside in the 1930s by its chief mover, the Labour Party. Henceforth, administrative devolution, via the Scottish Office, was the Labour policy of preference. Home Rule, in short, was viewed by many among the Scottish political elite as a desirable goal, but did not, compared to other projects, appear to excite a great deal of passion or commitment.

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13 Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, pp. 91-118. The only manifestation of any impatience was the formation in 1910 of the Scottish National Committee, a ginger group of 21 Scottish Liberal MPs that pressed for Home Rule up to World War I. See *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

If willingness to compromise and a lack of perseverance are features of Scottish pragmatist nationalism in the period of stasis, another is its reactiveness. The timing of the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association is significant, for it postdates the much stronger agitation in Ireland and the shifting political fortunes of Home Rulery in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Certainly, as Chapter 3 suggested, there was an indigenous component to the equation, as certain Scottish elements within the Liberal Party had been agitating for changes consonant with Scotland’s radical political culture throughout the 1870s. But this was a minority sentiment in the general population.15 Moreover, it did not take an expressly nationalist form - demands for autonomy for the Scottish nation - until such became propitious in light of changed conditions. Gladstone came out in favour of Irish Home Rule in 1886, and when he did, issued an open invitation to the Scots and Welsh to avail themselves of his party’s newborn munificence. Scotland and Wales might ask themselves, said Gladstone, "whether the present system of intrusting all their affairs to the handling of a body, English in such overwhelming proportion as the present Parliament is, and must probably always be, is an adjustment which does the fullest justice to what is separate and specific in their several populations....the desire for Federation, floating in the minds of many, has had an unexpected ally in the Irish policy of 1886 ... the chance of bringing such possibilities to bear fruit has thus been unexpectedly and largely improved."16 With such solicitous sentiments coming from the Prime Minister, it is little wonder the SHRA sprang to life in 1886.

It would seem, then, that the need for a Scottish Parliament to satisfy Scotland’s national aspirations was largely an afterthought, not only for the English, but also for many Scots. In the theoretical terms sometimes used to describe collective action, Scottish Home Rulery seems to have been a response to the political opportunity represented by the growing pressure for Irish Home Rule

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15 Hanham, _Scottish Nationalism_, p. 91.

16 Quoted in Hanham, _Scottish Nationalism_, p. 92.
and Liberal acquiescence to that pressure. It was, in this sense, largely reactive rather than independently generated, which is, of course, typically the case with pragmatist nationalist initiatives.

The next significant pragmatist activity in the Scottish period of stasis was the Covenant movement of the later 1940s. This, it must be said, represents something of an anomaly. In some ways, it bears a likeness to the episodic nationalism that marked Quebec's period of stasis, the brief flurries of nationalist agitation that followed the hanging of Riel and the conscription crises. The likeness lies in its ephemeral nature and the breadth of support generated: in a short space of time, two million signatures in favour of a Scottish Parliament were collected, but when the government refused to respond to a demand presented in this form, the movement quickly faded with little public outcry or dissent. It is dissimilar, however, in that there was no external precipitant for the Covenant initiative. It was an action initiated by concerned Scots, without any particular outside provocation, and in this sense was more like idealist nationalist action - independently generated rather than a reaction to outside forces.

That such a pragmatist initiative managed to get off the ground can perhaps be better understood by considering more closely the actions undertaken by different "participants." Firstly, those who simply signed the Scottish Covenant engaged in an essentially costless action. This is significant, because most Scots had shown themselves to be easily dissuaded from pursuing nationalist projects by smallish costs. For example: despite broad support for a Scottish Parliament, most Scottish voters were, around this time, not willing to cast their votes in favour of parties that might have brought pertinent pressure to bear - the Liberals, who supported Home Rule, or better yet, the SNP. For voting in this way would have entailed an important cost - a lack of Scottish representation on both government and opposition benches, and an attendant loss of Scottish influence at Westminster. Even after all the publicity generated by the Covenant, this type of thinking continued to inhibit Scottish voters, and they failed to take up the challenge laid down by the government when it refused to
respond to the Covenant: vote for MPs committed to Home Rule if that is your genuine preference. But if Scots were unwilling to accept the cost entailed by voting for a nationalist candidate, they were happy to sign a petition in favour of Home Rule, since this came without cost. Thus, while it may normally be difficult to generate a broad wave of pragmatist nationalism in the period of stasis without some sort of external stimulus, in this case the action required of mere signatories to the Covenant was costless and therefore easily elicited.

The part of the initiative that involved time, effort, and personal sacrifice was organizing the undertaking and collecting signatures. Significantly, people more radical in their nationalism figured prominently in this aspect of the Covenant initiative. The key mover of the Scottish Convention and the Covenant was John MacCormick, late of the SNP, though admittedly less adamant in his nationalism than others still in the party. More significantly, perhaps, the SNP, while it did not give its official blessing to the Covenant, did not prohibit individual party members from lending a hand, and many apparently did. James Mitchell notes that "the Scottish Covenant Association relied heavily on SNP members gathering signatures," an observation seconded by the SNP leader of the time, Robert McIntyre. In short, it was those more idealist in their nationalism who were making personal sacrifices. In this sense, the Covenant movement does not deviate entirely from theoretical expectations: idealists were shouldering the costs, and pragmatists joined what was, for them, essentially a costless action.

The important role of idealists in the Covenant initiative is indicative of their behavioral tendencies throughout the period of stasis. Their resolve, perseverance, and willingness to assume personal costs, even in trying circumstances, are distinctive traits that set them apart from their pragmatist counterparts.

Such nationalists were, as in Quebec, not a constant feature of the period of stasis, but when they did appear, they pursued their goal with dogged determination. The first Scottish idealists were the staunch supporters of independence in the Scots National League (SNL). Others were to be found in the Scottish National Movement, a group that broke away from the SNL in 1926. These two groups joined with the remnants of the Scottish Home Rule Association and the Glasgow University Students Nationalist Association to form the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1928, renamed the Scottish National Party in 1934. The subsequent history of the party says something about the commitment of its members. After some initial promising results, the SNP, for thirty years, had minimal public support - in elections of the 1950s, it won less than one percent of the Scottish vote. Yet it managed to survive as an active political force. Certainly not all individual SNPers stayed the course, but enough did to make the party a going concern. The SNP's continued existence in the face of abject failure is testimony to the determination with which some pursued their idealist objective.

But all was not constantly bleak, for early in the history of the nationalist party there were some promising results, which had the look of a possible idealist breakthrough. The National Party of Scotland, shortly after its formation, managed reasonable showings at a number of elections. After winning only about 5% of the vote in two seats in its first foray into electoral politics in 1929, the party polled 10 to 15% of the vote in various elections (mainly by-elections) held between 1930 and 1933. Meanwhile, party membership climbed quickly and had reached 8,000 by 1932. In that same year, a chain of events started to unfold that had the look of pragmatist bandwagoning. A few score members

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18 The SNP did manage to score one election victory, when Robert McIntyre was elected as MP for Motherwell in a 1945 by-election. This, however, was largely due to a pact formed by the major parties, whereby all agreed that no incumbent would be opposed in any by-election for the war's duration; thus, McIntyre was the only opposition candidate. In the general election of June, when electoral politics returned to normal, the seat was lost, and the SNP polled 1.3% of the total Scottish vote.


of the Liberal and Conservative parties, many of them notables of Scottish society, came together in 1932 to form the Scottish Party. Their goal was to bring some form of Home Rule to Scotland, though they were not of a single mind as to the degree of autonomy required. They were, however, keenly aware of the recent success of the NPS and anxious to find some common ground. As Hanham notes, "The programme of this new party was largely drawn up by Sir Alexander MacEwen, who took the precaution of consulting [NPS leader] John MacCormick in advance, so that it would not be needlessly offensive to the National Party. As a result, there was from the first every chance of the Scottish Party amalgamating with the National Party."\(^{21}\)

As indeed it did, in 1934, under the SNP moniker. Thus did a heterogeneous nationalist coalition come into being after an idealist breakthrough of sorts. In this case, the incoming pragmatists, though at first relatively few in number, had the upper hand within the new political formation. The NPS leader, MacCormick, sympathetic to their point of view and mindful of their supposed political clout, made every effort to present a welcoming face. The groundwork was laid at the 1933 NPS conference when the party's programme was moderated; the bailiwick of the Scottish Parliament demanded by the party would henceforth be the imprecisely defined realm of "Scottish affairs". MacCormick's initiative angered many hardline idealists in the party, mostly ex-SNL members. A few of the more vocal dissidents were expelled from the party, while many more - about 20% of the party membership\(^{22}\) - left of their own accord.

However, the process of mobilization did not proceed beyond this, and gradually sank back into the stage of stasis. The other phases that sometimes follow the formation of a heterogeneous nationalist coalition did not, in this instance, materialize. The SNP continued to run in elections, but

\(^{21}\) Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism*, p. 159.

could not make any progress beyond the double-digit results the NPS had scored. At the same time MacCormick received the party's backing, in 1936, to work towards the formation of a Scottish Convention involving all elements of Scottish society favourable to Home Rule for Scotland (the same project he would take up after leaving the SNP in 1942). Building a grander coalition of this sort, even if it entailed further compromise, would, MacCormick must have hoped, bring about some movement on the part of the major parties and some long-awaited change in Scotland's political status. But while there was some revived enthusiasm for Home Rule among Scottish elements within the Labour Party in the second half of the 1930s, it was both modest and short-lived, and MacCormick's pragmatist project fell by the wayside when war broke out in 1939. Apparently the SNP nationalist coalition was not a sufficient threat to move the Labour or Conservative leadership to action, or an adequate enticement to lure any tepid nationalists in the Scottish wings of those parties into the SNP fold.

Thus, no attempts at reform were forthcoming from those with the power to effect them, nor did the SNP have nearly the support needed to engage in any attempt at rupture. Matters were at a standstill, and, like the bicycle that must move forward or fall to the ground, the nationalist movement had either to continue building on its success or return to the stasis phase. Its immediate fate was to be the latter; the nationalist coalition fell apart, as the luminaries who had made their way to the SNP via the Scottish Party tired of a nationalist effort that was having minimal effect. It has been suggested that by 1937, most of the former Scottish Party members, less tenacious than their idealist allies, had left the SNP. "Although they had been outnumbered by moderates, their [the radicals'] depth of commitment was much greater and whereas the faint hearted were prone to leave when the going got

23 See figures in Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 164-5.

24 For discussions of this period, see Finlay, Independent and Free, pp. 190-199, and Keating and Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, pp. 126-128.

tough, the radicals braved it out." From this point on, the SNP increasingly came under the control of hardliners, though their ascendancy was not confirmed until MacCormick was ousted as leader in 1942, and the party returned to a more clear-cut independence platform in 1943. The idealists, once again in charge, would continue to press for Scottish independence, and refuse to ally formally with Home Rulers, until events some twenty years hence started a new sequence of nationalist mobilization.

The first signal of a change in nationalist fortunes came at the start of the 1960s, with another, more impressive, idealist breakthrough. In a short space of time, a flood of new members signed on and the SNP began to collect a respectable number of votes in by-elections held at Bridgeton (1962) and West Lothian (1963). At this time, the SNP emphasized its constitutional policy - independence for Scotland - to the near exclusion of all else, reflecting the preoccupations of its predominantly idealist membership. But this was soon to change, as the idealist breakthrough quickly attracted the attention of a wider audience, prompting a new round of pragmatist bandwagoning and the formation of a heterogeneous nationalist coalition. Unlike the Quebec case, the injection of the pragmatist element into the nationalist mix did not lead to the formation of a new political party. Instead the character of the existing nationalist party was altered, as fellow travellers less certain of their nationalist bearings came on board. This was evident, for example, in the constitutional preferences of SNP voters. The party's share of the vote in the 1966, 1970, February 1974 and October 1974 general elections was 5%, 11%, 22% and 30%, respectively; meanwhile, polls revealed that support for independence was holding fairly steady at around 15 to 20% from the late 1960s through to the mid-

26 Ibid. p. 253.

27 Ibid., pp. 235-236.
As with the PQ, many of the SNP newcomers were not proponents of independence, making the nationalist party an increasingly diverse coalition.

Those joining the nationalist cause during this period tended to exhibit the mixed motives characteristic of pragmatist nationalists. One study of local SNP activists, for example, found that political ambition was a significant consideration for those who joined the SNP after its sudden rush of success in the mid-1960s. "In the course of thirty interviews, it became clear that younger local leaders held a more career-oriented interest in party fortunes than did those who had been in the party for more than three years. As with much of the party's membership, many local leaders joined the S.N.P. after its striking victory in Hamilton in 1967, when it appeared that the nationalists were on the verge of widespread electoral success."

If political ambition was one alternative motive driving some of the pragmatist bandwagoning, another was the concrete desire to protect and promote a distinctive Scottish political culture. Scots who felt that their nation differed from England in its adherence to left-wing values and long tradition of radical democracy, started, once the nationalist ball was rolling, to look upon the SNP and some measure of power for Scotland as a potential means to that pragmatist nationalist end. There is a perception that this only became a significant phenomenon after Thatcher's 1979 election victory, as disenchanted Scottish Labourites, realizing that devolution or independence might be the quickest route to a socialist Scotland, infiltrated the SNP. It is true that the 79 Group, the SNP faction that embodied this type of Scottish nationalism, only formally came into being in August 1979, after the failed referendum and Thatcher's subsequent election victory. However, a 1983 survey of former 79

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Group members - the group was disbanded in 1982 - found that 47% had joined the SNP before February 1974 and a further 28% before the May 1979 election. They were, then, part of the nationalist coalition from an earlier date. The relatively moderate nationalist views of this group were reflected in the constitutional preferences expressed in the 1983 survey. Although the SNP at the time of the survey was wholly disavowing the Assembly option in favour of an Independence Nothing Less stand, 77% of these former 79 Group members supported "devolution as a means to independence". This was, at the time, an unpopular idea within the party, marking the 79 Group members as relatively moderate SNPers.

The pragmatist bandwagoning represented by the induction of these various groups into the SNP fold resulted in a formidable nationalist coalition, which gradually came into being from the late 1960s through to the mid-1970s. This prompted, as in Quebec, a series of reform efforts. The Tories were the first of Britain's two major parties to respond to the SNP's rush of success with a new Scottish policy. Leader Edward Heath, at the party's Scottish Conference in 1968, proposed that an elected Scottish Assembly be established - his so-called Declaration of Perth - and set up a committee to investigate the matter. But little was done by the Tories when in power from 1970 to 1974 to make good on their promise. Labour was slower to respond. Though the party did establish the Royal Commission on the Constitution (which would come to be known as the Kilbrandon Commission) in 1969 to investigate the issue of constitutional reform, this was widely seen as a way of forestalling real consideration of the Scottish issue. In 1973, the Commission issued its report, recommending the establishment of a Scottish Assembly, but still Labour held its ground. It was only after the SNP took 22% of the vote in the February 1974 general election that the party relented, coming out in favour of an Assembly prior to the October 1974 election.

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The SNP response to the evolving positions of the major parties was largely positive, reflecting the changing composition of its supporters, activists and leaders. Once Labour came up with a concrete devolution proposal, the SNP was critical on certain details, but essentially supportive of the project. Whereas the SNP, when dominated by idealists in the 1940s and 1950s, had avoided any formal sanction of the Covenant movement and its Home Rule initiative - despite its broad appeal to the Scottish population - the party now formally supported devolution. Independence remained the ultimate goal, but the party was willing to follow a circuitous route to its final destination. At the SNP's 1975 conference, it was decided that once an Assembly was established, the party would contest seats and work to increase the body's powers "until it becomes a real Scottish parliament", a motion that passed by a vote of 423 to 191.\(^{31}\) Though there was an apparent about-face in 1977, when the party adopted an Independence Nothing Less position after the failure of the Labour government's first referendum bill, this proved to be short-lived. The SNP soon reverted to its two-pronged approach, supporting the government's efforts to pass a second referendum bill, campaigning for the Yes side in the referendum of 1979, all the while asserting that independence was its true priority. It was a catholic constitutional position, likely to attract a broad range of supporters. Those interested in an Assembly only could support the party for the time being and abandon ship once devolution was achieved, while those hoping for rather more could continue to pursue their goal under SNP auspices.

The 1970s, then, saw a marked change of emphasis in the SNP's constitutional policy, which allowed the party to paper over important differences within and maintain itself as a potent nationalist coalition. It was a coalition that hung together reasonably well up to 1979. In that year, however, the outcome of the referendum on a Scottish Assembly - the principal reform effort in response to a burgeoning Scottish nationalism - undermined its unity. The failure of the referendum led, as in Quebec, to tensions between idealists and pragmatists, and a repolarization of the nationalist forces.

This derived partly from an idealist return to principles, and partly from a moderation of the pragmatist outlook, though the latter process was perhaps less marked in Scotland than in Quebec. The pragmatist reaction in Scotland was muted, in part, because their referendum represented a less decisive loss. Whereas a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association had received only 40% support from the Quebec population, a Scottish Assembly had been favoured by a slim majority of Scots - the rub lay in the 40% of the total electorate stipulation. It was a more ambiguous result, then, less likely to dishearten readily disheartened pragmatists. Another reason for the relative fortitude of pragmatists in Scotland was the absence of any other significant reform. In Quebec, those pragmatists who voted yes in 1980 in the hopes of seeing Quebec secure greater power within the Canadian federation could take solace from various other initiatives undertaken by provincial and federal governments alike in the past decade, including new laws to protect the French language and programs that had markedly improved the economic and social position of French-Canadians. For moderate Scottish nationalists, on the other hand, there was no consolation prize. An Assembly for Scotland was the only notable reform on offer and it had been denied them.

Thus, in the aftermath of the referendum, there was only a modest softening of the pragmatist nationalist discourse and reduction in pragmatist activity. It was at this point that the 79 Group coalesced within the SNP and made the case for significant alterations in party strategy. Their position was that the party, if it was to make progress, had to adopt social and economic policies that would appeal to working-class Labour voters. Some traditionalists saw this as an attempt to move independence to the back burner, in favour of the promotion of socialism; and certainly it was the first time that this type of argument had been forcefully advanced within the SNP. However, the constitutional preferences of 79 Group members, noted above, suggest that they were not simply socialists in nationalist clothing, for they continued to hew to the position associated with the moderate
wing of the SNP throughout the 1970s - independence as the final goal, combined with hearty endorsement of the Assembly option.

But 79 Group members were prominent party activists and the impact of the referendum defeat on rank and file pragmatists was probably greater. Membership in the party did fall off sharply after 1979; by 1983, there were only 20,000 members, down from 85,000 in 1974. Other developments would suggest that those leaving the party were pragmatists in the main. Delegates to party conferences between 1979 and 1983, for example, consistently voted for hardline leaders and policies. At the SNP conference in the fall of 1979, "traditionalists" within the SNP - party veterans for the most part, who wanted the SNP to pursue independence without distraction - won most of the key positions on the party executive. At the same conference, delegates supported by a wide margin a resolution stating that the SNP would "not engage in any more dealings in assemblies, devolution, or meaningful talks." For several years thereafter, the party stuck rigidly to its slogan of Independence Nothing Less, and there was increasing intolerance of alternative viewpoints. Opposition to the 79 Group grew, leading to the proscription of organized factions at the 1982 conference. Several 79 Group members were expelled when they tried to circumvent this ruling, while others left the party of their own accord; in the 1983 survey of former 79 Group members, 37% had, by that point, quit the SNP. The re-emergence of the idealist viewpoint, then, was not necessarily a product of increasing intransigence on the part of individual Scottish nationalists. Instead, it largely represented the reassertion of a long-held viewpoint that had, through the 1970s, been submerged by pragmatist bandwagoning, but was free to come to the fore as many pragmatists drifted away from the SNP following the referendum defeat.

32 Kellas, The Scottish Political System, Table 19(b), p. 142.

33 Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads, pp. 98-99.

34 Quoted in Mitchell, "Factions, Tendencies and Consensus in the SNP in the 1980s," p. 52.
Thus, the result of referendum failure was, as in Quebec, a re-polarization of the nationalist forces through the first part of the 1980s. In this case, the nationalist party fell back into the hands of idealists, who returned the party to a purer nationalist platform likely to appeal only to the idealist element in the population. The effect on party fortunes was predictable: SNP support dropped to 12% in the 1983 general election, down from 17% in 1979 and 30% in 1974. It was a different chain of events from Quebec, where the idealists tried without success to press a more radical program on the PQ. Instead, the pragmatists remained in control, the PQ program was moderated, and the party was able to maintain public support, winning the 1981 provincial election.

But the decline in nationalist fortunes in Scotland did not last long. Ongoing developments continued to alter the broad configuration of Scottish nationalist sentiment and the support base of nationalist organizations. Of greatest significance were the policies implemented by Thatcher's Conservative government. Throughout the 1980s, the Tories undermined the power of local authorities and introduced various neo-conservative social and economic policies. Both ran counter to Scottish political sensibilities and led to a growth in pragmatist nationalism, which manifested itself in the tartanization of the Labour Party and widespread support for the Constitutional Convention. This was, then, in large part a reactive nationalism responding to changing conditions. With the Tories in power, and no signs of a Labour renaissance on the horizon, there was a growing sense that Scotland would not secure the type of governance it desired without some measure of political autonomy.

Thus, pragmatist nationalism quickly re-emerged as a powerful force in Scotland. At the same time, the other important process affecting nationalist fortunes was also at work: idealist accretion. There has been a gradual increase in support for independence in the Scottish population as a whole, underwritten largely (though not exclusively) by elevated levels of support for that option among younger generations of Scots. While the SNP's fortunes have ebbed and flowed, support for
independence has increased more steadily as rising generations of Scots have taken to this position in
textbooks.

The SNP - in its composition and policies - has been affected by both this reactive pragmatist
nationalism and idealist accretion, and today, the party represents a new coalition of nationalists of
different stripes. The first signs of a relaxation in the SNP's post-referendum intransigence came in
1984, when the party proposed a Constitutional Convention, largely at the behest of then leader
Gordon Wilson. Soon 79 Group members started to return to the party to assume important positions,
where they were able to influence policy. One former 79 Group member, Jim Sillars, was the chief
mover of the Independence in Europe policy, which the party took up in 1988. Another, Alex Salmond,
who became party leader in 1990, is known to be very supportive of a Scottish Assembly as a stepping
stone to independence, though he publicly downplays his enthusiasm for the lesser option. Today's
SNP remains wary of championing Home Rule too enthusiastically - this is seen to have been an error
in the 1970s - but the tenor of its discourse has undeniably softened since the early 1980s, and it did
call for Scots to vote Yes in the recent referendum on a Scottish Assembly. In addition to these
changes in constitutional emphasis, the party has also taken to heart the 79 Group recommendation that
it shift its social and economic policies leftward in order to target Labour voters. The party today
places considerable emphasis on this aspect of policy, again suggesting a certain moderation of its
nationalist discourse.

These changes - especially the embrace of Europe - have alienated some hard-core idealists,
but the number who have actually left the party is small. Most remain in the SNP, which is once again
a fairly diverse coalition of nationalist forces. This heterogeneous SNP is, at the same time, part of a
broader nationalist amalgam that includes the many groups and parties supportive of some measure of
Home Rule for Scotland. Though the SNP does not work directly with those who have limited their
ambitions to a Scottish Assembly, it certainly does not discount their efforts.
Recent events promise to alter the evolution of Scottish nationalist opinion once again. The Scottish referendum of September 1997 was won handily and an Assembly in Edinburgh will be established presently. Once this happens, reform will have preceded rupture, as is to be expected in a relatively flexible, democratic political system. At the same time, with Labour in power, many whose nationalism is essentially a function of their desire to protect and promote Scotland's distinctive political culture, will find the need for greater Scottish autonomy less pressing. For these reasons, there is likely to be a vitiation of the moderate nationalist element in the near future.

But beyond that, other fluctuations may still occur. The precise powers of the Assembly will be contentious; inevitably haggling will occur. If the Tories are re-elected and try to undermine the Assembly's authority, another round of pragmatist reaction may ensue. The idealists, for their part, will be largely oblivious to these ongoing developments, and continue their fight for independence nothing less. They may be aided in their cause by idealist accretion (though the level of support that idealist nationalism will enjoy in rising generations is difficult to predict). At some point, there may emerge a coalition of sufficient strength - with the SNP at its core - to try for some form of rupture, though this may well involve a diluted version of independence (as did the 1980 Quebec referendum), depending on the relative strength of pragmatists and idealists within the SNP.

Prognostications aside, it is apparent that the history of nationalist mobilization in Scotland has many parallels with the Quebec experience. Idealist stoicism and pragmatist reactiveness generate certain predictable dynamics that have manifested themselves in different historical instances. Pragmatists, for the most part, tailor their nationalism to empirical realities and react to ongoing external developments, whereas idealists are more unshakable in their nationalist convictions and apt to hold their ground.
C) The Mobilization Model Applied to Brittany

In Brittany, similar behavioral tendencies on the part of different nationalist players, leading to comparable patterns of mobilization, are apparent. The key difference from the other two cases is that Breton nationalist mobilization hasn't progressed as far. It could be argued that Brittany has never left the period of stasis; at most, it might be said that it has progressed through some of the later stages, but on a lesser scale, and has now settled back into the stasis phase.

As in the other two cases, nationalism, of a sort, existed in the past among the upper crust of Breton society. Anxious to protect their social and economic position, traditional Breton elites supported the preservation of distinctive Breton ways and local structures of authority. This type of outlook was embodied in the Union Régionaliste Bretonne, formed in 1898, and dominated by landed notables, along with members of the clergy. Their demand for decentralization to the French regions was a modest one, tailored to both the pragmatist sensibilities of the rural masses, who were receptive to measures aimed at preserving the Catholic faith and Breton language, and the centralist attitudes of the French state. Unlike their Scottish and French-Canadian counterparts, however, these Breton elites were not successful in carving out a niche where they could maintain their traditional channels of influence over a society increasingly penetrated by the activities of the state. The French authorities were unwilling to grant concessions and instead made every effort to homogenize the administration of French society. So, for example, French was the only language permitted in schools despite the protests from various quarters in Brittany. In the face of this overwhelming intransigence, the elites of the URB seem to have resigned themselves to the demise of Breton distinctiveness, making little effort to step up the pressure on the French government. There was a rather desultory attempt after World War I to organize a political party to press the case for regional reform, but this failed to generate much
interest within the URB. Instead, the organization largely disappeared from public view after the war, its principal activities thereafter consisting in annual congresses and the preparation of publications.

There was a considerable gap between the pragmatist perspective of the social elites in the URB and the idealist views of the young activists involved with the Parti National Breton and other organizations in the interwar period. These groups, wedded to an idealized conception of the Breton nation, wanted more fundamental changes in Brittany's political status. Regionalism was, to them, an insipid doctrine and they had no interest in an alliance with the URB. Coupled with this more radical outlook was a greater determination to achieve their goals and willingness to take the necessary steps towards that end. Many among the Breiz Atao group were very determined in their efforts, persevering throughout the interwar period, devoting time and energy to a cause which generated little public enthusiasm. They, unlike the URB, undertook the task of organizing political parties to pursue their objectives. They also were involved in taxing cultural projects like the standardization of written Breton. For these young militants, there was also a considerable monetary burden to their activism; funds did not flow freely into their coffers, making finances a constant concern and constraint. Yet they showed few signs of letting up and many would likely have continued with their project of national emancipation if postwar reprisals against all perceived collaborators hadn't cut their efforts short. As is typical in the period of stasis, then, there was a marked difference in outlook and comportment between the pragmatists and the idealists. An accommodating and reactive pragmatist nationalism was pursued in a half-hearted and relatively costless way, while a rigid and determined idealism was pursued with greater determination, vigor and self-sacrifice.

Throughout the interwar period, the bulk of nationalist activity came from the small idealist groups, while the population at large was largely oblivious to the emsav. During the war, however, the

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35 Reece, *The Bretons Against France*, pp. 73-74.

Breton cause gained a wider following. This was, in large part, a reaction to changing circumstances - namely, increased tolerance on the part of the newly installed French authorities. Among other measures, the Vichy government: permitted the teaching, in Brittany's schools, of the Breton language, along with Breton history and geography; set up the Comité Consultatif de Bretagne (CCB) to advise the government on cultural matters; and established regional prefectures (though it excluded Loire-Atlantique from the Breton region and set up the four département Brittany that still exists today). Pragmatist nationalists, as is their wont, responded to these altered conditions with a marked increase in activity. The CCB started to make demands outside its assigned ambit, calling for a regional assembly with legislative powers and financial autonomy.\textsuperscript{37} Organizations interested in Breton cultural affairs sprang into being. New publications devoted to Breton issues appeared, while older ones experienced marked increases in circulation.\textsuperscript{38} Meanwhile, some of Brittany's daily and weekly newspapers increasingly incorporated a Breton perspective into their analysis and reporting. "Thus it happened", writes Reece, "that the culturally oriented Breton movement, led by nonpolitical moderates and encouraged from the sidelines by PNB nationalists, displayed notable vigor in these Vichyite conditions of relaxed vigilance."\textsuperscript{39} Political opportunity triggered increased activity on the part of Breton pragmatists.

In the aftermath of the war, however, nationalist activity came to a crashing halt, including both the modest endeavors encouraged by Vichy toleration and the more ambitious projects of the radical element. Hostility towards all manifestations of the emsav was deep and widespread. The first significant seedling to take root in these barren conditions was CELIB, the pressure group of


\textsuperscript{38} Reece, \textit{The Bretons Against France}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162.
influential Bretons that sought customized remedies for Brittany's marked social and economic problems. As the latter-day notables of Breton society, the *deputés*, mayors, and other political heavyweights involved in CELIB kept their demands very modest, in recognition of both the hostility generated by Breton nationalism in the recent past, and their own favoured position within the French power structure. In the 1950s and early 1960s, this modest manifestation of Breton sentiment enjoyed a very broad support base in Brittany and the French government responded positively, initially anyway, by making CELIB, in 1956, the first regional organization in France to be granted official recognition as a Comité Régional d'Expansion Économique.

The early success of CELIB led to an atypical phenomenon in the process of nationalist mobilization. Instead of the gap between idealists and pragmatists remaining large in what was still essentially a period of stasis, some idealists moved closer to the pragmatist position, when it appeared that modest reforms were in the offing. This happened when the Mouvement pour L'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) was formed in 1957 to make the case for a Breton parliament, arguing that this was an essential complement to the type of reforms CELIB was advocating. Although the MOB was relatively moderate, cooperating with CELIB and carefully avoiding any radical outbursts, there were, among its membership, individuals whose true preferences lay elsewhere. This would become manifest in later years, when the same individuals were involved in parties, like Strollad Ar Vro and the Parti pour L'Organisation D'une Bretagne Libre, that were significantly more radical in their political demands and critical of the regionalist perspective. The MOB was more flexible. Rather than avoiding any association with pragmatist projects, it elected to capitalize on CELIB's success and lend a hand to the regionalist cause.

This atypical behavior from those idealists involved with the MOB can be attributed to the unusual conditions prevailing in Brittany at the time. Wartime animosity towards Breton nationalism lingered for many years and was still palpable in the 1950s. Under these conditions, some idealists...
were willing to bend and scale back their ambitions - for the time being anyway. This then suggests a modification to the process of nationalist mobilization sketched in this chapter. In an open and tolerant democratic system, idealists will, in the period of stasis, typically demand independence and renounce, or remain indifferent to, the activities of pragmatists. But if conditions are such that simply voicing support for independence - let alone actively promoting it - is likely to spark a hostile reaction, then some idealists will bow to realities and move closer to the pragmatist viewpoint.

The coalition of forces that came together in CELIB and the MOB managed to extract certain reforms from the French government, though these were relatively inconsequential and less than had been expected. The Gaullists came to power in 1962, promising to introduce the loi-programme for Brittany demanded by CELIB and its allies. Instead, in 1964, the government established the France-wide Commissions de développement économique régional (CODERs), which were advisory bodies only and devoid of any real power. Despite this rebuffal, CELIB's leaders agreed to participate in this new regional structure. This acquiescence on the part of the pragmatist political elites of Brittany undermined the coalition of forces that had come together over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s. From this point on, the MOB, and the newly-minted UDB, dissociated themselves from CELIB's activities. As has happened elsewhere, then, reform (very minor reform in this instance) led to movement on the part of pragmatists and a return to first principles by idealists - in short, a polarization of the nationalist forces.

Since that time, the movement has experienced other ups and downs, but has never really managed to progress beyond the stasis phase. Throughout this period, the pragmatist-idealist gap has remained considerable, as the idealists have preferred to keep their own counsel, forming at most temporary alliances with more moderate groups to further their goals. The UDB, for example, in pursuit of its goal of an autonomous Brittany in a Europe of the regions, has, for the most part, maintained its independence from other political formations. It has sometimes formed electoral
alliances with the Socialists, particularly in the 1970s, but kept its distance even then, carefully delineating the points of convergence and divergence between its political agenda and the commonly agreed program of the left.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, since the early 1960s the gap between pragmatists and idealists has opened up and never been bridged in an enduring way.

Idealist groups have also shown considerable perseverance over this period, another of their typical behavioral traits. The UDB, for example, has been a fixture on the Breton political scene since 1963, despite a very disappointing electoral record. Its only success has come when it has created electoral alliances with the Socialists; forming joint lists of candidates has enabled the party to win some seats at the municipal level. However, when the UDB has run in France's national elections, it has received only about 2\% of the vote in those districts where it has presented a candidate. It has performed somewhat better in elections for the Conseil Général (at the level of the départements), usually winning in the neighbourhood of 5\% of the vote, and 10\% on the odd occasion. But its greatest disappointments have come in elections for the Regional Assembly. In the first such election, held in 1986, the party was part of a coalition of minor parties, running under the slogan "Décider et Vivre en Bretagne" that captured only 1.5\% of the vote. In 1992, when the UDB allied with the indépendantiste parties Emgann and the POBL, this rose to 2.8\% of the vote, an improvement, but still well short of the 5\% threshold that must be surpassed for representation in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{41} Despite these consistently discouraging results, the UDB, like the SNP in its barren years, has managed to survive as an active political party for over three decades.

Other idealists in Brittany have also shown a marked determination in the face of continued failure. Nationalist activists to the UDB's right, nowadays quite open in their call for an independent

\textsuperscript{40} See, for example, "L'U.D.B. et le programme commun de la gauche", \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 112 (February 1973), p. 12.

\textsuperscript{41} All figures from Monnier, \textit{Le comportement politique des bretons}, pp. 235-238.
Brittany, have sometimes allowed their organizations to fall by the wayside, but the same people have
typically resurfaced a few years later to form other groups: some of those involved in the MOB went
on to form Strollad Ar Vro in the early 1970s, and then the Parti pour l'Organisation d'Une Bretagne
Libre in the early 1980s. Similarly, while the violent activities of the FLB and allied groups have
largely petered out, many former members now strive more peacefully for Breton independence in the
party Emgann, formed in 1983 after FLB prisoners were released under a government amnesty.

But if these various idealist groups have been determined and persevering, they have been
decidedly lacking in numbers, and this remains the case today. There has, then, never been a true
idealist breakthrough in Brittany. It seemed as though one might materialize at points in the 1960s and
1970s; certainly, the movement was, during that period, receiving a considerable amount of publicity.
But this was largely a product of the FLB's violent actions, which attracted the attention of journalists,
academic observers, and the French authorities alike. The actual number of people involved in
organizations seeking a dramatic change in Brittany's political status was always quite small; an upper
estimate of the UDB's peak membership is 2000, which it attained in the late 1970s.42

The absence of an idealist breakthrough helps explain the persistence of the pragmatist-idealist
gap. Their differences have not been bridged because, absent an idealist breakthrough, there has never
been any significant pragmatist bandwagoning. The developments that typically impress pragmatists -
a burgeoning national sentiment in large parts of the population, a sense that significant reform is
imminent - never came to pass in Brittany because the idealists never generated sufficient support.
Thus, the UDB, the most likely vessel for pragmatist bandwagoning, has never experienced a rapid
influx of nationalists more moderate in their outlook. If this is true of party activists, it also holds of
political leaders. There was no Breton analogue to Quebec's Lévesque or Scotland's Sillars: "aucun
homme politique important ne fit le saut de rejoindre l'UDB ou l'un des autres mouvements Bretons,

42 This is the figure sometimes cited by the party itself.
malgré des sympathies souvent affirmées en privé... Rallier un mouvement breton pour un notable aurait consisté à prendre un risque politique majeur et l'on en vit plus d'un tenir des propos autonomistes, au sens exact et littéral du terme tout en demeurant fidèle à sa formation hexagonale d'origine.\textsuperscript{43}

The principal political formation where pragmatist Breton nationalists were to be found was the Socialist Party. As with other nationalist movements in the stasis phase, politically-oriented pragmatists remained in a major political party, one with a chance of taking power, and there tried to instigate changes in policy towards France's minority groups. It was a long, and only modestly successful, effort. The French Socialists traditionally were hostile towards ethnic minorities seeking to protect their cultural distinctiveness or reduce power at the centre, seeing this as a reactionary and conservative reflex. However, in the 1960s, the French left started to rethink its position. The first organization to take up the regionalist cause was the socialist splinter group, the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU). The devolution of power to the French regions was a natural concomitant of other New Left causes it espoused, such as \textit{autogestion} and decolonization. The party had a significant presence in Brittany and PSU activists there enjoyed an amicable relationship with the UDB, voicing many of the same opinions about the colonial status of the region and the need for some measure of local autonomy to redress the situation - though they differed from the UDB in tending to couch their arguments in universalist terms and downplay the specificity of the Breton situation. Most of the PSU leadership and many activists joined François Mitterand's Socialist Party in the 1970s. There they, along with other sympathizers, gradually brought about changes in party policy, which culminated in some key pledges made in the run-up to the 1981 presidential election. At its 1979 conference, the Socialist Party came

\textsuperscript{43} Monnier, \textit{Le comportement politique des bretons}, p. 347.

When the Socialists took office in 1981, it seemed as though major changes would be forthcoming, and the government's initial moves reinforced this impression. The 1982 \textit{loi Defferre} replaced \textit{département} prefects with "commissioners of the republic," transferred local executive authority from these representatives of the central government to the Presidents of the regional councils and \textit{départements}, and established elected regional assemblies, which came into being in 1986.\footnote{Details can be found in Sonia Mazey, "Power Outside Paris" in Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward, and Howard Machin (eds.), \textit{Developments in French Politics} (London: MacMillan Education, 1990), pp. 152-167.} The \textit{Savary Circular}, issued by the Minister of Education, officially recognized minority cultures and languages and promised that the latter would be taught in elementary schools on a three-year experimental basis. The \textit{Rapport Giordan}, commissioned by Minister of Culture Jack Lang, called for the government to take a much stronger role in the promotion of regional culture. These reforms and statements of intent went well beyond the administrative tinkering effected by the Gaullist government in 1972, and did represent a significant break from France's long centralist tradition. And contrary to expectations, the changes introduced by the Socialists have not been repealed since the right's return to power (though the pace of change has certainly tailed off). All of France's major political players, then, are now committed to - or at least willing to tolerate - some amount of decentralization and recognition of regional and cultural diversity.

The transformation of the Socialist Party (and latterly the Gaullists) is greater than would have been expected, taking account of events in Brittany only. The efforts of Bretons - both the pragmatists within the Socialist Party and the idealists militating in small nationalist organizations - would, by
themselves, likely have induced few changes. For typically, the absence of a reasonably powerful nationalist coalition, home to both idealists and a sizable cohort of pragmatist bandwagoners, means that relatively few reforms will be forthcoming from the major parties. The situation in France, however, was somewhat different, in that it simultaneously experienced ethnic unrest in a number of different regions of the country. In the 1960s and 1970s Occitanians, Corsicans, Basques and Alsatians joined Bretons in demanding increased regional powers, and while none produced a movement on a par with Scotland's or Quebec's, the cumulative weight of this agitation on the French periphery was sufficient to bring about some revisiting of the ethnic question by the major parties. The changes, though, have been tailored to the level of grievance evident in different regions. Corsica, where nationalist sentiment seems to run deeper, and violent nationalist activities continue unabated to this day, was granted a special statute in 1982, enhanced in 1990, which affords the Corsicans greater autonomy in the areas of education, culture, and social policy. The Socialist reforms, then, seen in the larger context, are not anomalous. Had the Bretons been the only minority group in France making waves, one suspects few reforms would have been forthcoming, which would be the usual outcome for a movement mired in the stasis phase.

And, in any event, it has transpired that the Socialist reforms have fallen well short of expectations: France remains, in the scheme of things, a highly centralized country. The elected regional assemblies established in 1986 have limited powers and small budgets. In 1993, only about 10% of local taxes went to support the activities of the region (whereas 36% went to the départements and 53% to the communes). Provisions for the teaching of the Breton language have been sorely lacking too. Approximately 20,000 students were receiving some Breton instruction in the first half of the 1990s, which represented only some 3% of students in the school system in Brittany.

46 Favereau, Bretagne contemporaine, p. 207.

Moreover, most of those 20,000 were receiving only a cursory introduction to the language; a mere
2,000 or so were receiving fully bilingual instruction, which is entirely inadequate if Breton is to
survive as a living language. Meanwhile those trying to achieve more off their own bat have been
thwarted in their efforts. Diwan, the educational organization committed to producing students fluent
in Breton, had hoped from its founding (in 1977) to be integrated into the national education system,
but despite favourable intimations from the Socialists, this was not to be; and as a private organization,
Diwan has had an exceedingly difficult time procuring public funds for its operations.\footnote{Vaughan Rogers, "Cultural Pluralism under the One and Incorrigible French Republic: Diwan and the Breton Language," \textit{Nationalism and Ethnic Politics}, 2, 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 550-581.}

Decentralization in theory seemed a major concession, but decentralization in practice has, many feel,
been a largely cosmetic sop to the disaffected from a government reluctant to materially alter France's
political or cultural landscape.\footnote{This is, for example, the opinion of Henri Giordan, author of the 1982 report \textit{Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence} (Paris: Documentation Française, 1982), commissioned by the Minister of Culture (Jack Lang), that called for the government to take an active role in the promotion of cultural pluralism. Ten years later, Giordan concluded that Socialist reforms had had a symbolic impact - minority languages were no longer derided - but little concrete effect, and that the regions needed political powers in the language realm if more was to be achieved (See Henri Giordan, "Les Langues de France: de l'hégémonie républicaine à la démission de l'État" in Henri Giordan (ed.), \textit{Les Minorités en Europe} [Paris: Editions Kime, 1992], pp. 129-144). Other commentators who suggest that the changes were superficial include Rogers, "Cultural Pluralism under the French Republic" and Yves Mény, "The Socialist Decentralisation" in G. Ross, S. Hoffmann and S. Malzacher (eds.), \textit{The Mitterrand Experiment} (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987).}

Certainly the reforms have been disappointing to nationalist activists in Brittany and
elsewhere. The UDB for one has been highly critical of the reforms and increasingly hostile towards
the Socialists.\footnote{See for example, "La décentralisation selon Defferre", \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 211 (July 1981), pp. 6-7; "Il faut un statut special pour la Bretagne," \textit{Le Peuple Breton}, no. 213 (September 1981), p. 4.} Since 1981, the UDB has preferred to align itself at election time with parties that take
a stronger stand on Breton issues - for example, the unabashedly \textit{indépendantiste} parties, Emgann and
the POBL, in the 1992 regional elections. It also has sought alliances with the Green Party and other
ecological groups, which have become a significant force in Brittany in the past few years (they took
15% of the vote in the 1992 regional elections) and are stauncher advocates of regional autonomy than the Socialists.\textsuperscript{51} The UDB does sometimes still team up with the Socialists in municipal elections, but this is partly because of the large number of candidates needed to form electoral lists for the many communes scattered across Brittany (the UDB simply does not have sufficient personnel to go it alone).\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, the UDB platform now speaks more plainly about the long-term objective of the party - an independent Brittany as part of a strong European Union - and puts less emphasis on the short-term goal of restructuring the French state.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, modest reforms have led to a weakening of what was already a weak alliance between pragmatists and idealists, and a greater polarization of the nationalist forces. The Breton movement has returned to the stasis phase, with no signs of imminent change on the horizon.

\textbf{Conclusion and a Coda}

The nationalist movements of Brittany, Scotland and Quebec can each be analyzed using a process-oriented model of mobilization constructed around variations in the political behavior of different nationalist players. There are several stages that nationalist movements typically move through, whose character is a reflection of the behavioral dispositions of pragmatist and idealist nationalists at different points. A period of stasis, sometimes dotted with episodic nationalism on the part of pragmatists, is the first stage. This is typically followed by an idealist breakthrough, pragmatist bandwagoning, and attempts at reform and rupture. The outcome of the latter efforts often generates sharply divergent responses from pragmatists and idealists. Polarization usually ensues, but does not

\textsuperscript{51} Monnier, \textit{Le comportement politique des bretons}, p. 357.

\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Christian Guyonvar'ch, 16 June 1995.

\textsuperscript{53} See Fievet and Guyonvarc'h, \textit{Une Bretagne responsable dans une monde solidaire}. 

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always endure, for ongoing pragmatist reaction, idealist accretion, and further efforts at reform and rupture continue to shape the configuration of nationalist forces.

If these are some characteristics of the typical trajectory of nationalist mobilization, the evolution - or rather stagnation - of the Breton movement makes it clear that there is nothing inevitable about these processes. Brittany's movement has shown occasional signs of progressing beyond stasis, but has never experienced a full-fledged idealist breakthrough. Consequently, the subsequent stages have unfolded only partially at most, and as a consequence of developments elsewhere in France.

This, then, raises the $64,000 question: why was there no idealist breakthrough in Brittany? The answer, however, is not spelled out in the preceding pages, for the process-based model developed here speaks primarily to the how of mobilization: if mobilization occurs, it will likely unfold in such and such fashion. Left unaddressed are the conditions under which mobilization is likely to occur.

The analysis does, however, carry some useful implications that might be used to help address the latter issue. First, it suggests that a crucial stage in the process of nationalist mobilization is the idealist breakthrough: it is this development, by the current argument, that unleashes pragmatist bandwagoning, which in turn triggers attempts at reform and alters the entire balance of forces in an emergent nation. Secondly, it points to the crucial role played by youth, and especially young intellectuals, in promoting the nationalist cause during the idealist breakthrough. This is not strikingly evident in Scotland, but, as discussed previously, there are reasons to think this an anomalous case; in Quebec and Brittany, young intellectuals certainly formed the bulk of the idealist vanguard.

It follows from these comments that one structural condition likely to induce an idealist breakthrough is a preponderance of young people in an emergent nation. It is significant, then, that all of Quebec, Scotland, and Brittany experienced a baby-boom after the Second World War that increased the proportion of adolescents and young adults in their populations in the 1960s and 1970s. In Quebec, however, the boom was bigger. As the figures in Table 8.1 indicate, 37% of Quebec's
(French-speaking) population was between the ages of 0 and 14 in 1961, compared to 26% in each of Scotland and Brittany. This sizable difference perhaps helps explain why Quebec’s nationalist movement has made such strides since that date.

Table 8.1: Proportion of the Population 14 and under, Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Proportion of Population 14 and under</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec (francophones only)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

Particularly important to a successful idealist breakthrough are young intellectuals. Again, in all three places, there was a sharp increase in the number of people falling into this social category from 1960 on, for this was a time of greatly expanding enrolments at universities throughout the developed world. The young people attending these institutions were exposed to various ideologies, one of which, in universities located on the territory of stateless nations, was idealist nationalism. This helps explain why these, and indeed other nationalist movements of the developed world, took off after that date (though again, it should be noted that this is a less crucial factor in Scotland).

The significance of a burgeoning intellectual section of society to the idealist breakthrough in many places also perhaps sheds further light on the stunted development of the Breton movement, for while Brittany did experience an educational expansion, it was less pronounced than in Quebec (the other place where young students were key players). In the first place, the sheer number of students was considerably smaller. In 1975, about fifteen years after significant expansion of universities began, there were 21.6 university students per thousand people in Quebec; in Brittany, there were only 11.2
Table 8.2: University Students in Quebec, Scotland and Brittany, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1) Total Number of University Students, 1975</th>
<th>2) University students per 1,000 population</th>
<th>3) Percentage originating from within region</th>
<th>4) &quot;Native&quot; students per 1,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>133,400</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>29,191</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>44,058</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources and Notes:

Quebec:
2) and 4) Total Quebec population from Statistics Canada, *Canada Yearbook 1976-77* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977), Table 4.6.

Scotland:
2) and 4) Total Scottish population from *Scottish Abstract of Statistics, No. 12* (Edinburgh: Scottish Office, 1983), Table 1.4

Brittany:
1) Habiba S. Cohen, *Elusive Reform: The French Universities, 1968-1978* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1978), Table 2. It is not stated whether this includes part-time students. The same is true of other sources of French education statistics; for example, a very comprehensive report produced by the Ministère de L’Education, Services des Études Informatiques et Statistiques - *Tableaux des Enseignements et de la Formation* (Paris: Service Central des Statistiques et Sondages, 1980) - indicates that in 1978-79 enrollment at Breton universities was 33,262, but again it is not stated whether this includes all students or full-time students only. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, it has been assumed that these figures represent all students and are therefore comparable to the Quebec and Scottish data.
2) and 4) Total Breton population from Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Economiques, *Recensement Général de la Population de 1975, Résultats du Dépouillement Exhauscit*, Bretagne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale)
3) Université de Haute-Bretagne, Cellule d'Information et d'Orientatoin, "Compte-rendu sommaire de l’enquête effectuée auprès des étudiants ayant quitté l’université en 1971 et 1972 (Mars - Juillet 1974)," Table 1; and Université de Bretagne Occidentale, "Origine géographique des étudiants de l’université de Brest, 1970-71." The former reports results of a survey of 358 students who had recently left the University of Rennes. The survey asked for their geographic origin; 55% were from Brittany. The latter document indicates that virtually all students at UBO (in Brest) in the academic year 1970-71 were from Brittany (treated as 100%). The 67% estimate for students at Breton universities as a whole is simply a weighted average of these two figures (weights based on number of students at the two institutions).
Moreover, approximately one-third of students at Brittany's two universities, in Rennes and Brest, came from outside Brittany; these people could not be expected to be particularly enthused about the Breton nationalist cause. In Quebec, by contrast, the geographic origins factor was insignificant, since virtually all the students attending the province's francophone universities were from Quebec (see Table 8.2). Thus, whereas there were 21.0 "native" students per thousand people in Quebec, there were only about 7.3 per thousand in Brittany. A threefold difference in the relative size of this crucial group is considerable. (We leave Scotland out of these comparisons, since students were less important in this movement. However, figures for the Scottish case are included in Table 8.2 for the sake of completeness).

Finally, one other condition that would seem to be favourable to an idealist breakthrough is a dearth of competing ideologically-based movements that can provide an outlet for the idealist proclivities of intellectual youth. For if young intellectuals are drawn to idealist nationalism in part to satisfy some inner longing for meaning in an unsettled modern world, and in part because their social setting exposes them to, and encourages them to adopt, radical ideologies, the same factors also facilitate the development of other radical social and political movements. Such alternatives can distract young intellectuals from the nationalist cause.

It is significant, then, that in Brittany, there were, at the start of the 1960s, other important political organizations, strong on the university campuses, putting forth radical critiques of society and offering idealized visions of alternative social orders. Both the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) and the French Communist Party fall into this category. Both political parties were significant forces on the French political scene: the Communists were much stronger nationally, but the PSU, a New Left

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54 It should be noted that much of this difference reflects the large number of part-time students in Quebec. See Table 8.2.
socialist splinter group formed in 1960, had a significant presence in Brittany.\textsuperscript{55} Both parties drew disproportionate support from intellectuals,\textsuperscript{56} and were organizationally strong at the Breton universities. The presence of these alternatives, according to early UDB members, significantly undermined the fledgling nationalist party's recruitment efforts.\textsuperscript{57} With three distinct organizations as powerful forces in student politics, the UDB never managed to assemble enough personnel to make Breton nationalism a force to be reckoned with.

In Quebec, by contrast, the only political organizations of any import at the start of the 1960s, aside from the burgeoning nationalist forces, were middle of the road parties unlikely to attract significant intellectual support. The major parties at the provincial level were the Union Nationale and the Liberals, and while the latter did launch a vast modernization program in the 1960s, bringing Quebec up to speed with the rest of Canada socially and economically, it was not the promoter of any sort of radical social or political ideology. At the federal level, the Liberals and Conservatives, both located near the centre of the political spectrum, were the dominant parties. The Social Credit party also enjoyed considerable success in Quebec, beginning in the early 1960s, but was largely scorned by intellectuals for its populist approach to complex social and economic problems. The only party of note remotely comparable to the radical left-wing organizations present in Brittany was the New Democratic Party, Canada's (relatively moderate) socialist alternative. But the party had a negligible


\textsuperscript{56} For example, a survey of the late 1960s found that teachers, professors, and students accounted for 33.8% of the PSU's membership. Cited in \textit{ibid.}, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{57} Interviews with Ronan Leprohon and Henri Guillmorel.
presence in Quebec. Thus, while young intellectuals in Quebec were principally attracted by the nationalist critique, in Brittany other alternatives beckoned.

If these are conditions important to the development of idealist nationalism, it helps explain why Quebec's nationalist movement has progressed much further than Brittany's. In the absence of competing radical movements, the large cohort of young Quebec intellectuals who arrived on the scene in the 1960s were drawn to idealist nationalism, laying the groundwork for future developments (pragmatist bandwagoning, etc.) that have moved the nationalist movement to another level entirely. Brittany's much smaller group of young intellectuals were, by contrast, pulled in multiple directions, never settling on a single cause to pursue, and its nationalist movement has inevitably suffered the consequences.

Clearly there are other causal forces underlying nationalist mobilization; these closing comments are hardly meant to provide a comprehensive account of that aspect of nationalist politics. Their purpose, instead, is to highlight certain structural differences, sometimes overlooked, that affect the prospects for mobilization success in stateless nations. The significance of these factors arises from close scrutiny of the contributions of different nationalists at various stages of popular mobilization and identification of the key players and time periods - the type of information provided by a process-oriented account of the sort developed at some length in this chapter. In this way, the pragmatist-idealist distinction offers some insight into both the processes involved in nationalist mobilization, and certain structural factors underlying mobilization success.

58 In the 1960s, for example, the NDP typically won less than 10% of the Quebec vote in federal elections and no seats. In the 1950s, the NDP's predecessor, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, fared worse still, taking about 1-2% of the Quebec vote.
Conclusion

While any number of propositions have been advanced in this thesis, there are two principal themes around which the investigation revolves. The first is the contention that national identity within stateless nations admits of significant variation, an idea developed in the first chapter of the thesis and applied to the three cases of interest in the subsequent three chapters. The second underlying theme, explored in chapters 5 through 8, is that this variation in national identity is an important determinant of political behavior. Many of the contrasting attitudes and behaviors seen among exponents of the nationalist cause can be traced back to the conditioning effects of national identity on the outlook and political disposition of different nationalist players.

The variation in national identity that frames and conditions nationalist political behavior is not merely one of degree. If it is true that people can feel minutely, partly or wholly Breton, Scottish or Québécois, it also is true that underlying these different sentiments is qualitative variation in the nature of national consciousness. Some people in a stateless nation, typically those with weaker national identities, have a predominantly pragmatist national consciousness. Pragmatist national consciousness consists in a direct and unmediated apprehension of the tangible sociological differentiae that make a community distinct. Others in a stateless nation are imbued with an idealist national consciousness, which is more removed from the concrete bulwarks of nationhood. Idealist nationalism - which tends to produce stronger nationalist sentiment - focuses less on the empirical building blocks of nationhood, and looks more to certain abstract and idealized qualities that purportedly reside in the nation.

If the pragmatist's perspective accords with the common sense understanding of nations - few would dispute that groups of people visibly distinct in their language, religion, culture or customs form a community of sorts - idealist nationalism is less immediately accessible. There is an imagined quality
to the idealist's nation. Idealists project certain abstract qualities onto their nation, proclaiming it to be seamless, indissoluble and sharply distinct, and this ideational veneer can generate some skepticism on the part of the outside observer. Be that as it may, the idealization of sociologically distinct populations is a ubiquitous phenomenon, because it is largely engendered by the state, the dominant mode of political organization in the modern world and the standard political shell of nations. The state, in its governance practices and principles, tends to paint the community contained within its borders as a holistic and seamless entity. It is no surprise, then, that those within stateless nations whose objective is independent statehood tend to conceptualize their nation in like fashion, nor that those relatively indifferent to independent statehood usually operate with a more pragmatist sense of their nation.

The first chapter, in addition to expounding these core ideas, also sketched other contrasts associated with the pragmatist and idealist creeds. Since pragmatist nationalists focus on the tangible sociology that makes their nation distinct, they are willing to concede that their nation is neither seamless, indissoluble, nor sharply distinct. Members of the nation differ in some delimited way, and in varying degrees, from outsiders, who, for their part, can become insiders by acquiring the requisite sociological traits (e.g. language). For idealists, on the other hand, the nation is seamless, indissoluble and sharply distinct, regardless of any sociological imperfections in its make-up. Idealists look beyond the tangible national qualities on which pragmatists fix their gaze to more abstract renderings of the nation. Sometimes, for example, idealists conceptualize their nation as a collective individual, greater than the sum of its individual parts. Other times, they allude to a national essence deep within all members of the nation that renders them wholly equal to one another and a breed apart from outsiders. Another salient contrast between the two nationalist types is their temporal focus. Pragmatists concentrate on the nation as it exists in the here and now, and consequently will allow that sociological change can alter the nation fundamentally, that today's nation is not the selfsame community as yesteryear's. Idealists, on the other hand, have a powerful sense of connection to fellow
nationals of the past and future and therefore look upon sociological evolution of the nation as superficial alteration. For idealists, the nation is an empty vessel that loads and unloads sociological freight at various points, but retains a fundamental and transcendent continuity nonetheless.

In general, then, it might be said that idealists - in contrast to pragmatists - are less concerned with qualities the nation incarnates than with the nation per se. It is true, of course, that there have been idealists who have appeared to be preoccupied with the tangible elements of nationhood, harbouring grandiose visions of fashioning a culturally or racially seamless nation. But the argument was put forward that even for these idealists, concern for cultural preservation is less the driving force behind their nationalist projects than a powerful idealist nationalism residing within. And in any event, such idealists have been the exception not the rule. Empty vessel types have tended to be dominant in the three movements under consideration, particularly in recent times.

These various idealist nationalists and their pragmatist counterparts are the main focus of chapters 2 through 4. In those chapters, an attempt was made to isolate the two distinct strands of national consciousness as they have manifested themselves in various nationalist organizations and historical episodes in each of Brittany, Scotland and Quebec. In Brittany, the main bulwarks of pragmatist nationalism have been the conservative, Catholic proclivities of the Breton people, and their Celtic cultural heritage, in particular the Breton language. Over the course of the twentieth century, various nationalist organizations have emerged with the primary goal of preserving various components of this distinctive cultural visage. At the same time, numerous idealist groups have also made their presence felt. The bretonnite they have championed has been less tightly hitched to tangible differentiae. Instead they have been moved by an abstract and idealized conception of a seamless Breton nation, unjustly shackled in 1532 and ready now to rise as one to reclaim its independence. When examining the Breton case, the caveat was added that idealist groups there have not always openly advocated independence, in the manner predicted by the theoretical framework of the thesis.
The French government's intermittent intolerance of separatist agitation has often necessitated a certain circumspection. In Brittany, it is probably fair to say that governmental intolerance has shifted the entire spectrum of emsaverien ambition in the direction of moderation. However, pragmatist/idealist differences still hold between those relatively moderate and those more radical in their political demands.

In Scotland, there has also been a blend of characteristics underwriting pragmatist nationalism. Scotland's Celtic heritage is one important element, though in earlier times tartan, the clan structure, and the Gaelic tongue served to divide rather than unite Scots of the Lowlands and Highlands. Also important to the pragmatist Scottish identity has been the Church of Scotland, which has retained considerable autonomy ever since the 1707 Treaty of Union. Another mark of Scottishness - this less obvious, but important nonetheless, particularly in this century - has been Scotland's distinctive political culture. Radical democracy, a political creed combining a healthy respect for both individualism and equality, has long been held in high esteem by many Scots. Attachment to such values has been a consistent characteristic of those advocating moderate changes in Scotland's political status throughout the twentieth century. Those who have advocated independence, on the other hand, have generally avoided tying their Scottishness to anything concrete. For these idealists, many of whom are active within the SNP, Scottishness is more ineffable. It is not something that can be broken down into a series of concrete attributes possessed by all Scots. Instead, it is a more abstract quality inhering in Scots by virtue of their membership in a historic national community, traversing past, present and future. To allow this nebulous Scottishness full freedom of expression, nothing less than complete independence will do.

Similar divisions of nationalist opinion are apparent in Quebec. In this case, religion and language combined to create a deep-seated and widespread pragmatist nationalism from an early date. In the past, the Catholic religion was the most important characteristic French-Canadians sought to
protect; today, it is the French language. In view of the precipitous decline in the French-Canadian population outside Quebec, pragmatists have increasingly focused their attention on the province of Quebec. Meanwhile, idealists have also made their voices heard. Faint rumblings in the interwar period have turned into a cacophony of nationalist discontent since 1960. While the idealist nationalists of the past and present have on some counts espoused antithetical ideals, common to their outlook has been a powerful sense of connection to the national past, and a desire for independence to provide their nation its unfettered freedom.

Having mapped out the dividing line that separates pragmatists and idealists, the final four chapters of the thesis identify various dimensions of political behavior affected by variable national consciousness. The phenomena explored are somewhat disparate, but are linked by an overarching theme: idealist nationalists are less sensitive to empirical realities than their pragmatist counterparts and are, consequently, more intransigent and uncompromising in their attitudes and behavior.

Chapter 5 examines a phenomenon that offers a clear example of the manner in which nation conceptualization can condition political attitudes. The chapter first outlines an important difference in the epistemological basis of pragmatist and idealist nationalist sentiment. Pragmatist nationalism, with its focus on tangible sociological difference, has a largely empirical basis. Idealist nationalism, which appeals to more abstract qualities not easily observed, rests at least partly on faith. These epistemological underpinnings affect perceptions of the ways in which changes in the nation's political status can legitimately be effected. Idealists, puffed up by their nationalist faith, will often presume others to be wholly of their nation, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding; and this leads them to think popular backing for their nationalist projects relatively unimportant. Some idealists go so far as to engage in violent activities. More commonly, they are willing to forge ahead with the minimum level of support compatible with democratic norms (e.g. an election victory by a nationalist party). Pragmatists, on the other hand, taking the nation at face value, tend to think the express support of
members of the nation vital. They consequently favour methods of change that approximate the social contract ideal, where all members of the nation voice their views and give their assent to a consensual proposal for nationalist reform. Summing up this important divide in nationalist opinion, it was suggested that pragmatist nationalism is projected from nation onto nationalist, whereas idealist nationalism, is, in some measure, projected from nationalist onto nation.

The sixth chapter continues to trace the connections between national identity and political behavior, taking up the question of the rationality of the two nationalist types. The case was made that rationality - defined in a fairly narrow manner - is not always evident in the thinking that animates idealist nationalists. Idealists are overly optimistic about their prospects for success - understandably, since for them the nation exists independent of the sentiments of its current representatives. They are, additionally, less concerned with the tangible costs and benefits associated with nationalist projects than they are with symbolic matters: for idealists, political power for the nation is sometimes an end in itself, whereas for pragmatists it is tied to the attainment of other, more concrete nationalist objectives. Furthermore, the powerful national identity of idealists and their support for the independence project tends to colour their assessment of the tangible costs and benefits associated with separation. All these idealist tendencies can, it was suggested, be traced back to the nature of their national identity. An idealized sense of the nation tends to skew perception, leading to an overly optimistic assessment of factors that feed into the cost-benefit calculations which help determine political behavior.

If chapter 6 tried to plumb the inner workings of nationalists to find out what makes them tick, chapter 7 examined aspects of political behavior more easily scrutinized by the outside observer. First, it was suggested that pragmatist nationalist sentiment tends to be fairly reactive, whereas idealist nationalist sentiment, issuing from a single monolithic sentiment within, operates more independently of external factors. The manner in which the two types of nationalist sentiment form was also addressed. Idealists sometimes report experiencing a nationalist epiphany, often early in life, whereas
pragmatists more often speak of a gradual and incremental build-up of nationalist sentiment through the life-cycle. These first two propositions were corroborated by quantitative analysis which revealed that support for radical nationalist options tends to be fairly stable within given birth cohorts over time, suggesting that radical nationalist sentiment does crystallize early in the life cycle and remain deeply embedded thereafter. Support for more moderate nationalist projects, on the other hand, shows stronger period effects, which is consistent with the notion that pragmatist nationalism is more vacillating and reactive. A further behavioral contrast lies in the timing of idealist and pragmatist participation in nationalist projects: the irrationality of idealists makes them more willing to participate in the early going, when the prospects of nationalist success often look decidedly dim, whereas pragmatists tend to hedge their bets. Finally, chapter seven examined the social origins of nationalists of the pragmatist and idealist persuasion. It was suggested that the social classes sometimes identified as principal movers of the nationalist cause have tended to favour pragmatist nationalism, whereas intellectuals - also sometimes pegged as nationalist stalwarts - have tended to adopt an idealist outlook. Both groups have played their part, but have been concentrated at different points on the spectrum of nationalist opinion.

The final chapter attempted to synthesize the previous material. Drawing on the behavioral precepts developed in chapters 5 through 7, chapter 8 revisited the historical development of national identity and political mobilization in each of Quebec, Scotland and Brittany. There is, it was suggested, a series of series of stages that nationalist movements typically pass through, the character of which reflects the behavioral dispositions of pragmatists and idealists at different points. Stasis - the initial period in which idealists and pragmatists are far apart in their objectives and comportment - is sometimes followed by an idealist breakthrough. This development tends to trigger pragmatist bandwagoning, which produces a powerful nationalist coalition. The emergence of this coalition leads to attempts at nationalist reform and rupture, with the former often preceding the latter. Reforms, in
turn, tend to have a polarizing effect on the nationalist coalition, with pragmatists responding positively to overtures and accommodation and idealists staying their ground. Running in parallel to these developments is an ongoing process of idealist accretion, as rising generations take to the nationalist cause and bolster the idealist ranks. The precise endpoint of this mobilization process is uncertain, but there do seem to be some identifiable phases that stateless nations typically move through as they spring to life. In addition to this process-oriented account of nationalist mobilization, chapter 8 also offered some thoughts about structural factors that are likely to affect overall mobilization success, pointing in particular to the significance of a large cohort of young intellectuals and a dearth of alternative ideologically-driven movements.

This, then, is the material addressed in this thesis. The fulcrum of the analysis is an independent variable - national identity - which provides explanatory purchase over a variety of interrelated dependent variables. The thesis claims to cover no more ground than this. But something might also be said, in these closing remarks, about the surrounding research landscape, in order to show where the current project is positioned and where future research ventures might be directed.

One significant omission is the absence of any lengthy discussion of other explanatory factors relevant to the various aspects of nationalist political behavior. These other factors are not, however, necessarily of uniform significance. For the most part, the analysis of political behavior in chapters 5 through 8 focuses on basic attitudes and preferences of nationalist players that are - arguably anyway - relatively proximate effects of national identity. Chapter 5, for example, made the case that perceptions of legitimate means of effecting nationalist projects are intimately linked to the way in which someone conceptualizes their national community. For phenomena like these, other explanatory factors may not be particularly significant. But the analysis of political behavior does, admittedly, also discuss aspects of political behavior farther removed from national identity in the causal chain of nationalist politics - for example, the final chapter examines the overall success of the nationalist forces in Quebec,
Scotland and Brittany in mobilizing public support. In such instances, factors other than national identity are almost certainly more relevant: nationalist mobilization may depend partly on national identity and the basic dispositions this engenders, but is also undoubtedly a function of other variables too, such as the institutional setting in which a stateless nation is situated. Quebec, for example, is part of a federal political system, and this naturally has affected the manner in which nationalist mobilization has unfolded, as well as the overall level of success - Quebec has had a platform for voicing grievances which is lacking in the other two cases. To fully explain mobilization failure and success, clearly other elements must be introduced. In general, then, it must be recognized that in moving from proximate to more remote effects, the explanatory purchase of national identity diminishes, and other factors might fruitfully be drawn into the analysis. But the thesis does not claim to provide a comprehensive account of nationalist politics in the three cases under examination. Instead, it focuses primarily on one explanatory factor, national identity, and the way this conditions attitudes and behavior before other variables enter into play.

Another area relatively underexplored in the preceding chapters is the formation of national identity. The thesis, that is, primarily treats national identity as an independent variable that helps explain aspects of political behavior, but does not treat national identity as a dependent variable in any systematic fashion. Clearly this is an important piece of the puzzle that would need to be put in place for a fuller account of nationalist politics. What are the sources of national identities of the pragmatist and idealist varieties? What accounts for differences in the tenor and strength of national identity across stateless nations? What accounts for the same differences between individuals within stateless nations? The thesis does have something to say about these matters, but addresses them in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. These thoughts might now be summarized more succinctly.

The first observation, implicit throughout, is that the sources of pragmatist and idealist national consciousness are not one and the same. Pragmatist nationalism is a function of tangible
distinctiveness - the more manifestly distinct a person or nation is, the stronger their pragmatist sense of nationhood. Thus, in Brittany, where the concrete elements of *bretonnité* have been steadily eroded over the past two centuries, pragmatist nationalism - the sense of being different in virtue of palpable sociological traits that clearly demarcate insider from outsider - is relatively weak. In Quebec, by contrast, where the old central pillar of Catholicism has been superseded by an equally sturdy bulwark, the French language, pragmatist nationalism has generally been stronger and more widespread.

For idealists, on the other hand, the connection between tangible distinctiveness and national consciousness is much weaker. Idealist nationalism is a product of ideas about the nation, not tangible traits inhering in the nation. Its implantation in the individual is dependent on the absorption of an ideology that paints the nation as a holistic, seamless entity, a historical vessel moving implacably through time, a collectivity greater than the collection of individuals who currently comprise it. It is for this reason that idealist nationalism in Brittany has typically drawn roughly equal measures of support from the Bretonnant and non-Bretonnant areas of the peninsula: possessing the outward insignia of *bretonnité* is not a necessary condition for the development of idealist Breton nationalism. Pragmatist nationalism, on the other hand, has been concentrated in Lower Brittany, where the Celtic tongue and other visible markers of *bretonnité*, such as adherence to traditional conservative values, have historically been more prevalent. The nature of idealist nationalism also helps explain the predominance of intellectuals in the idealist wing of nationalist movements. Intellectuals are situated in an environment where they are exposed to idealist nationalist doctrine - for example, historical renderings that paint the nation as a transcendent community weathering the vicissitudes of time unchanged in its essence - and consequently take to that cause in numbers. Pragmatist nationalism, on the other hand, does not find preponderant support in the intellectual circles of society. It is spread more evenly across those sections of the population that are tangibly distinct from outsiders.
But the decoupling of tangible distinctiveness and idealist nationalism should not be overstated. It may not be necessary for the individual idealist to be a carrier of the nation's distinctive traits but it almost certainly is necessary for the nation as a whole to be possessed of some sociological plumage if idealist nationalism is to emerge. Idealist nationalism involves the idealization of a sociologically distinct community; it is embellishment, not pure artifice. Idealist nationalism needs some raw material to work with, and if the people living in a particular region have no such material to offer, then idealist nationalism will not find a foothold.

This then raises another aspect of the issue of identity formation: does it matter how much raw material idealists have to work with? Will idealist nationalism always be weak in communities where only a small proportion of the population speaks a distinct language or adheres to their own peculiar cultural, social and political values? The cases studied here would seem to point in that direction. In Quebec, idealists have had plenty of material to work with and have spun an impressive idealist tapestry in which many Quebeckers have wrapped themselves. In Scotland, the tangible distinctiveness of the nation is not as immediately obvious, given the lack of a widely spoken native tongue; but on the other hand, the social and political values that are an important buttress of Scottishness are common currency among the Scots. The strength of idealist nationalism in Scotland seems to correspond to this middling degree of tangible distinctiveness. Finally, in Brittany, the eradication of the Breton language and the penetration of the language, culture and values of France have been more thoroughgoing, and idealist nationalism there is very weak. Thus, even though individual idealists involved in the nationalist movements of Brittany, Scotland and Quebec have not been the embodiment of all that is distinctively Breton, Scottish or Québécois, the overall strength of idealist nationalism in the three places does seem to be related to their aggregate level of distinctiveness.

But these are only three cases, and expanding the study might lead to other conclusions. The Basques of Spain, for example, are not dissimilar to the Bretons, sociologically speaking. Some
Basques still speak their ancient vernacular, but the majority do not, and the Basque language, like the Breton, appears to on a slow, inexorable decline. As in other places where the tangible traits of nationhood are unevenly distributed, possession of said traits is not a necessary condition for adherence to idealist nationalism. Surveys show that many who feel exclusively Basque do not understand the Basque language. At the same time - and this is the important point - idealist nationalism is a powerful force in Basque region. The parties and terrorist organizations that espouse a radical, independence-nothing-less nationalism enjoy considerable support in the population. In this case, then, a dearth of raw material does not seem to have been a handicap to the development of powerful idealist sentiment. It has been enough that some Basques, indeed a mere minority, are manifestly different from outsiders. Thus, the relationship between idealist nationalist sentiment and a nation's stock of sociological material may not be as clear-cut as the three cases considered here would suggest.

A second factor, aside from sociological substance, that affects the development of national identities was also identified in the preceding chapters: the attitude of the state. The most obvious way in which the state affects the course of identity formation is its tolerance and accommodation of sociological difference. If the state is relatively benevolent, as the Canadian government has been, then the nation can retain its distinctive sociological countenance, despite the assimilating tendencies of modernization. If the state is bent on assimilation, as the French government has historically been, then modernization will bring with it the imposition of a uniform sociological visage. These developments, in turn, will have the effects just noted - a definite and marked impact on pragmatist nationalist consciousness, and more ambiguous effects on idealist nationalism.

But there is another way in which the state can affect identity formation. It is not just tolerance of distinctive traits that matters but also willingness to recognize a people as a nation. Typically, this more symbolic or ideational form of recognition is withheld. This has certainly been the case in

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1 Linz, "From Primordialism to Nationalism," Table 10.13, p. 242.

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Brittany, where the French government has not only overseen the near eradication of the Breton language and other distinctive Breton traits, but has also, up until recently anyway, relentlessly promoted the "France, one and indivisible" ideal. The Canadian government, too, has been loath to admit that the French-Canadians, and more recently, the Québécois, might comprise a nation. Its position, for the most part, has been that they are Canadians deep down, who differ only in certain delimited and tangible ways from their fellow nationals.

The ideational denial of national status commonly practiced by the modern state can have two effects on those at whom it is directed: complete assimilation or retaliation in kind. A Breton told he is exclusively French, will either accept this and become a full-fledged member of the French nation, or reject it with a vengeance. In Brittany, the former outcome - assimilation - has been the most common. Many Bretons do not question that they are French exclusively, and only a few have reacted by taking on an idealized Breton identity. In Quebec, by contrast, fewer have been assimilated and many more have rejected Canadianess in favour of untrammeled Québécoisness.

But not all states deny national status to sociologically distinct peoples within. British governments have tended to accept that the Scots are a nation, on the same footing as the English nation. This ideational recognition has meant that an abstract Scottish identity has remained very widespread down to the present day. Wholesale assimilation has not taken place. But nor has intransigent retaliation been common. Scots have, on the whole, been less singular in their Scottishness – which is why, despite the prevalence of Scottish sentiment, support for radical political change in Scotland is fairly spotty.

There are also other factors that likely affect the formation of national identity; these have, at most, been adumbrated to this point. For example, one important implication of the proposition that there is a pragmatist and an idealist strain of nationalism is that differences in individual temperament will help determine patterns of nationalist sentiment. Those who are, in general, of an idealistic
temperament will be attracted to idealist nationalism, while those more pragmatic in their overall outlook will prefer the more circumscribed definition of the nation embodied in pragmatist nationalism. To some extent, this idea did underwrite the analysis of the social origins of nationalists presented in chapter seven. One reason why idealist nationalism is concentrated among intellectuals, and those in the early stages of the life-cycle, is that these are people who tend to be idealistic - not just in their nationalism, but in a more general sense too. But this line of reasoning was not pursued at any length. It was more of an assumed premise than a substantiated hypothesis.

To further explore this proposition about the connection between individual temperament and variations in nationalist sentiment, more data and theoretical refinement would be required. One might, for example, start by constructing an index designed to tap into variations in individual temperament along the pragmatist-idealist axis. This would likely consist of a series of questions pitched at a general and abstract level, at some remove from specific political issues (the psychological literature might offer some clues as to how this could be done). A survey might then be administered, which would provide data on individual temperament and nationalist attitudes. The relationship between the two variables could then be measured, as could the degree to which other factors thought to be relevant to nationalist sentiment (e.g. social origins) are simply reflections of variations in individual temperament.

This type of analysis clearly lies beyond the scope of this thesis. It is raised in these closing remarks merely to give a sense of the wider research landscape. If the pragmatist and idealist strains evident in nationalist movements are partly reflective of broader tendencies rooted in individual temperament, then other types of movements should also exhibit pragmatist-idealist tensions. Idealists involved in a wide variety of social and political movements are likely similar to idealist nationalists, their actions animated by an abstract and idealized vision that embellishes on the barren facts of the
subject matter with which they are concerned. And these groups of idealists probably have their pragmatist counterparts, who are more empirically-inclined and reject the extravagant elements embedded in the idealist vision. These distinct modes of apprehending the world and the ideologies they generate, in turn, likely foster divergent behavioral tendencies on the part of idealists and pragmatists, of the sort examined here in the case of three nationalist movements.

This, then, is the more general analytical framework within which the current project is situated. It is part of that broad school of thought which treats the realm of human consciousness, of ideas and ideologies, as an important and autonomous impetus behind political action. National identity, in its pragmatist and idealist guises, has a powerful conditioning effect on the outlook and disposition of different nationalist players. It is important not to skip over this rudimentary verity, before turning our attention to other factors also at work in the causal chain of nationalist politics. A sympathetic understanding of the nature of national identity can only help us in our efforts to understand the full gamut of ambitions and aspirations evident within stateless nations.

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**Newspapers**

Numerous articles from the following newspaper sources were used in the preparation of this thesis. References for specific articles can be found in the body of the thesis.

- Canadian Press Newswire
- *The Globe and Mail*
- *The Independent*
- *Ouest-France*
- *Le Peuple Breton*
- *Scots Independent*
- *The Scotsman*
- *Times Educational Supplement*
- *The Toronto Star*

**Polls**

In addition to the author’s analysis of the original data from numerous public opinion surveys (see Appendix 1), the following published and unpublished survey results were consulted.

ICM (1997), Cross-tabulations from *ICM polls for the Scotsman*, April 1, April 14, April 21 and April 28.

MORI (1984), Cross-tabulations from *MORI poll for the Scotsman*, Feb. 29.

Observatoire Interregional du Politique (1990), "Le Fait Regional. La Region, la formation professionnelle et l'apprentisage" (Paris: Observatoire Interregional du Politique).
SOFRES (1975), "L'Opinion en Bretagne," results of a survey conducted in Brittany by SOFRES for *Le Nouvel Observateur*.


**Personal Interviews**

In addition to informal conversations with academics and journalists during the field research for this thesis, personal interviews were conducted with the following individuals who have been active in various political and cultural organizations in Brittany, Scotland and Quebec. A few interviewees asked to not be identified.

**Brittany:**
Yann Fouéré, POBL
Herri Gourmelen, UDB
Christian Guyonvvar'ch, UDB
Ronan Leprohon, formerly of the UDB
André Lavanant, Diwan
Jean-Jacques Monnier, UDB
Pierre Morvan, UDB
J.M. Salomon, Emgann

**Scotland:**
Jim Fairlie, formerly of the SNP
Neil MacCormick, SNP
Margo MacDonald, SNP
Robert McIntyre, SNP
Bob McLean, Labour Party
Stephen Maxwell, SNP
Paul Scott, SNP
Gordon Wilson, SNP
William Wolfe, SNP

**Quebec:**
Jean Allaire, Parti Action Démocratique
Pierre Anctil, Quebec Liberal Party
André D'Allemagne, former leader of the RIN
Jean-Marc Fournier, Quebec Liberal Party
Jean-Marc Léger, former member of the RIN
Claude Morin, former PQ cabinet minister
Lorraine Pagé, Centrale de L'Enseignement du Québec
Monique Simard, PQ
Appendix 1: Survey Databases

Numerous survey databases have been used in the preparation of this thesis. Such databases seem to represent an under-utilized resource. Considerable time and effort is expended in gathering data, which are primarily used only by the original investigators. While later researchers will often find that the design of surveys and wording of specific questions are not always entirely to their liking, there is often considerable information that can be gleaned from re-examination of the original data.

The Quebec databases cited below were all obtained from the data library at the University of British Columbia. Most of the Scottish databases were obtained from the ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex; the 1968 Gallup poll was obtained from John Curtice at Strathclyde University in Glasgow. For Brittany, it turned out that there was relatively little survey data on nationalist opinion; consequently, no databases were acquired for independent analysis (see note below for further details).

Short form citations for the surveys, noted below in bold, are used throughout the text. Long form citations are provided here, along with additional information deemed pertinent by the original investigators. Citations in the text prefaced with "author's calculation" indicate calculations conducted by the current author using the original survey data. In all such cases, the current author bears sole responsibility for the calculations and interpretations presented.

In several places in the text, published data are also cited. References for these citations are listed in the bibliography.

Quebec

All survey analysis relating to Quebec has been limited to francophones only. The variable used to identify francophones is indicated for each survey.


Study of Separatism, 1963: Albert Breton, Raymond Breton, Howard Roseborough (investigators), Study of Separatism, 1963 (conducted by Social Research Group, Montreal) [computer file]. Francophone: investigators indicate the survey is of "French-Canadian residents of Quebec" but do not indicate how French-Canadians were identified.


CIPO #399: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Poll #399 [computer file], April 1977. Francophone: language first spoken and still understood.


Social Change in Canada Study, 1981: Data were generated by the Social Change in Canada Project directed by Tom Atkinson, Bernard Blishen, Michael Ornstein, and H. Michael Stevenson of York University, Toronto. The research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant #S75-0332). The data were collected by the Institute for Behavioral Research of York University, and the data files were originally obtained from the Institute’s Data Archives. Francophone: language first spoken and still understood.


CIPO #004-1: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Poll #004-1 [computer file], April 1990. Francophone: language first spoken and still understood.


1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey: Data from the 1992-3 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey were provided by the Institute for Social Research, York University. The survey was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), grant numbers 411-92-0019 and 421-92-0026, and was completed for Richard Johnston (University of British Columbia), André Blais (Université de Montréal), Henry Brady (University of California at Berkeley), Elisabeth Gidengil (McGill University), and Neil Nevitte (University of Calgary). Francophone: language first spoken and still understood.


Scotland

Gallup Poll, September 1968: Gallup Poll CS 8935 [computer file].


Brittany

There is relatively little survey data on nationalist opinion available for the Breton case. One such survey was conducted in 1975, but it has several shortcomings: 1) There were few supporters of independence in the survey sample (only 3% of those polled), too few for any meaningful multivariate analysis of their characteristic attitudes and behavior; 2) The survey did not ask questions pertinent to many of the outcome variables of interest in this thesis; 3) The poll was conducted by a private company (the polling firm SOFRES) on behalf of another private company (Le Nouvel Observateur), and has not, to this researcher's knowledge, ever been deposited in a data archive, making acquisition of the data and all relevant documentation an onerous task. Since a number of basic cross-tabulations from this survey were available anyway (see SOFRES reference in bibliography), and the additional information that would be obtained from independent analysis was likely to be minimal, it was decided not to pursue acquisition of the original data.

Another potentially useful survey is that conducted by Michael Drwiega as part of his dissertation research (see Drwiega, The Puzzle of Ethnicity's Persistence). This poll compares UDB activists with respondents drawn from the Breton population. The difficulty, however, is that it was conducted quite recently, and is not available at this point for other researchers to use.

Beyond these two polls focused directly on Breton nationalism, there is little quantitative material from Brittany of direct relevance to the current analysis. Other potential datasets considered for analysis, but ultimately deemed unsuitable, include: 1) The Eurobarometer polls. These surveys have been conducted since the start of the 1970s throughout the member-states of the European Union. Using the département coding for French respondents, it is possible to isolate Breton respondents. The shortcoming of these polls is that none extensively explores questions of minority nationalist sentiment. Occasionally, respondents are asked which geographical group they belong to first of all - their town, their region or county, their country, Europe, or the world as a whole. They also are sometimes asked how important they feel "self-government for the regions" is. Such questions tend to find quite high levels of regionalist sentiment; in other words, they cast a wide net and provide no means of separating moderate regionalists from more radical Breton nationalists - which is what the analysis in this thesis seeks to do. 2) Political polls, conducted in Brittany and other French regions, available through the Banque de Données Socio-Politiques. Again, these focus on "regionalism" and offer no way to pinpoint more precisely respondents' locations on the broad spectrum of regionalist/nationalist sentiment.
Appendix 2: Cohort Analysis Question Wording and Other Details

This appendix provides relevant details for the cohort analyses presented in Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

Table 7.1

In all cases, respondents answering don’t know, undecided, qualified answer, etc., have been coded as non-supporters of separation and included in the calculation of percentages. Question wordings as follows:

1962/63: "Some people suggest that the Province of Quebec separate from the rest of Canada to form an independent country, while others are opposed to that. Are you personally for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?" Response categories: 1) for 2) against 3) qualified answer [1962], undecided [1963] 4) don’t know [1962]. In the 1963 survey, only those respondents who knew that there were people actively working for the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada were asked whether they were in favour of separation. It was assumed that all who had not heard of the separatist movement would not be in favour of separation.

1968: "There has been quite a bit of talk recently about the possibility of the province of Quebec separating from the rest of Canada and becoming an independent country. Are you in favour of separation or opposed to it? Please tell me whether you are strongly in favour of separation, slightly in favour, undecided, slightly opposed or strongly opposed to separation." Response categories: 1) strongly in favour 2) slightly in favour 3) undecided 4) slightly opposed 5) strongly opposed. Those in the first two categories were classified as supporters of separation. This amounted to 11.1% of all respondents. A Gallup poll a month later using a question structure similar to the other polls in this cohort analysis found 13.3% in favour of separation. The difference between these two figures was not statistically significant, so it was assumed that collapsing the response categories in this way was reasonable.

1972/73: "Personally, are you for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?" Response categories: 1) for the separation 2) against the separation 3) undecided or do not know.

1977/79, 1989/90, and 1994: "There has been quite a bit of talk recently about the possibility of the province of Quebec separating from the rest of Canada and becoming an independent country. Would you, yourself, be in favour of separation or opposed to it?" Response categories: 1) in favour 2) opposed 3) qualified [1977/79 and 1989/90], don’t know [1994] 4) undecided [1977/79 and 1989/90].
Table 7.2

Except as noted below, respondents answering don’t know, undecided, qualified answer, etc., have been coded as non-supporters of a special status for Quebec and included in the calculation of percentages. Question wordings as follows:

1968: "Another question often discussed in the election concerned the relations between the governments at Ottawa and Quebec. Some people think that except for the question of language rights Ottawa should resist Quebec’s demands for special status. Others say that Quebec has special needs and rights which, in addition to the use of the French language, should be clearly recognized. What are your views? Do you think Quebec should be treated exactly like the other provinces or that it should occupy a special position in the Canadian confederation?" Response categories: 1) treated exactly like the other provinces 2) special position 3) other 4) no opinion. Detailed data on "other" responses were available; some were coded as special position.

1977/78/79 and 1989: "Do you think [the province of Quebec/Quebec] should have a special status within Confederation, with more powers than the other provinces, or do you think it should have the same powers as all the other provinces?" Response categories: 1) special status 2) same as other provinces 3) qualified/undecided [1977/78/79], don’t know [1989].

1981: "In your opinion, should the constitution give special powers to Quebec as opposed to the other provinces or should Quebec be treated no differently from any other province?" Response categories: 1) give special powers 2) be treated no differently 3) don’t know.

Table 7.3

Raw Data Used in Calculations in Table 7.3 (unweighted data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Support (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>14.2 (344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>15.1 (311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>18.9 (328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>21.7 (345)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>26.8 (370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>30.4 (319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.3 (2,017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases, respondents answering don’t know have been coded as non-supporters of independence and included in the calculation of percentages. Question wordings as follows:

1974: "For running Scotland as a whole which of these five alternatives would you prefer, overall [previous question]...Putting it another way would you like to see"...Response categories: 1) a completely independent Scottish Parliament separate from England 2) a Scottish Parliament as part of Britain but with substantial powers 3) no change from the present system 4) don’t know.

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1984 and 1987: "For running Scotland as a whole would you like to see"...Response categories: 1) a completely independent Scottish Assembly separate from England 2) a Scottish Assembly as part of Britain but with substantial powers 3) no change from the present system 4) don't know.

1992: "Which of the options on this card would you most like to see for running Scotland as a whole?" Response categories: 1) an independent Scotland, which is separate from both England and Wales and the European Community 2) an independent Scotland, which is separate from England and Wales but part of the European Community 3) Scotland remaining part of the UK but with its own devolved assembly with some taxation and spending powers 4) no change from the present system 5) don't know. Those in the first two categories were classified as supporters of independence.

1996: "For running Scotland as a whole would you most like to see"...Response categories: 1) an independent Scotland which is separate from England and Wales but part of the European Union 2) Scotland remaining part of the UK but with its own devolved Assembly with some taxation and spending powers 3) no change from the present system 4) don't know.

1997: "Which of these options would you personally prefer for running Scotland?" Response categories: 1) a completely independent Scotland 2) a Scottish Parliament with substantial powers, but within the framework of the British government 3) no change from the present system 4) don't know.