CONFRONTING PREJUDICE IN A POST-ETHNIC-WAR ENVIRONMENT:
NGO EDUCATION FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA

By

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Educational Studies
The Sociology and Anthropology of Education Program

We accept this thesis as conforming
To the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
September 1998

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Date **Sept 16/98**
Abstract

Education against chauvinism in a post-ethnic-war setting may share a similar vocabulary with anti-racism education when it addresses chauvinistic attitudes and actions. However, much war-related chauvinism differs significantly from racism rooted in colonialism and slavery. Psychoanalytical theory suggests that war-related chauvinism may be strongly influenced by unhealed historical trauma, experienced both at individual and social levels. Conflict transformation theory suggests that there may be a definite order in which educational methodologies can be introduced as they not only address chauvinism, but also assist in transforming a relationship in conflict from one that is highly polarized to one in which dialogue and collaboration are possible.

This research examines 14 manuals and outlines of local and international educational programs in Bosnia and Croatia which attempt in some way to address ethnic chauvinism. Supported by background interviews with educators and administrators of 26 educational programs in the two countries, the study highlights patterns suggested by the manuals in an effort to explain why such programs take the form that they do. Although the focus of the research is on Bosnia, comparing Bosnian programs with those in Croatia reveals how contextual differences, including levels of security and the degree of ethnic homogeneity, may influence the nature of post-war educational programs. Similarly, comparing programs designed for a range of groups, from children to adults and from the general public to specific professions, reveals important opportunities for, and obstacles to, educational programming for different target audiences.
The study found that few programs surveyed deal directly with anti-chauvinism education and no programs focus exclusively on it. However, programs attempt to improve interethnic relations and challenge chauvinism by applying a wide range of methodologies, from teaching active learning and trauma healing to encouraging interethnic mixing and promoting media and political literacy. By applying models of trauma healing and conflict transformation, such educational methodologies may be understood, in large part, as assisting grieving, trauma healing, and a process of rehumanizing the "enemy" at both individual and community levels.

The important interrelationship between local and international educators is also discussed. International educators may contribute an external, comparative perspective and draw from valuable educational methods and materials that have been developed in other countries, but local educators are usually the ones who make this material meaningful to participants. The research found that, although most educators I spoke with are local, much more needs to be done to make the general, international material, which dominates the manuals, more context-specific.

The educators developing these programs seem to be very sensitive to the state of trauma and grieving of participants and their communities. As a result of this sensitivity, however, some may be overly hesitant to introduce methodologies that directly challenge chauvinism and refer specifically to the issues of the war. A few programs suggest that such direct engagement with these issues may be both beneficial and well-received. Further research needs to be done on how manuals and programs which deal directly with chauvinism and the issues of the war are used and received.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my tremendous appreciation for the efforts of my committee: Dr. Kogila Adam Moodley, Dr. J. Donald Wilson, and Dr. Heribert Adam. Their knowledgeable input, clear guidance, and excellent feedback were invaluable in shaping this thesis. A special note of gratitude must go to my advisor, Dr. Kogila Adam Moodley. Her unwavering support and confidence in me empowered me to take on this research and the excellent example of her own academic work guided me well in my efforts.

Much of the research could not have been done without the valuable assistance and insights of my translators, Nikki Baric, Lidia Lukic and Armen Aksamovic. I am also greatly indebted to the many educators and administrators I spoke with during my stay in Bosnia and Croatia. Their observations have been invaluable to my analysis of the manuals and outlines, and the thoughtfulness, openness, courage and hospitality they demonstrated to me greatly inspired my work. I would especially like to thank Barry Hart and my friends at Eastern Mennonite University for introducing to me a new way of thinking about conflict and chauvinism. Their wealth of ideas, experience and knowledge about war, peacemaking, and conflict transformation efforts world-wide have greatly influenced this analysis.

Finally, I would like to thank my family who have not only been a continuous source of encouragement and support, but who, through their own dedicated efforts to promote peace, global responsibility and a cosmopolitan understanding of the world, have inspired me greatly in my work.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the months and years that follow an ethnic civil war, there is calm but there is not yet peace. After the fighting has been stopped, after the peace accord has been signed and imposed, choices must be made and processes begun, at both an individual and leadership level, that will shape the future of a traumatized nation.

In Bosnia, as in many other post-ethnic-war situations, the period immediately after the fighting has stopped may be a critical one. Through whatever means, the peace accord has been signed and a time of mourning, recovering, rebuilding and building anew begins. It is a time of tenuous peace; peace agreements are inherently tenuous. The wounds, fear and hatred are fresh; the ethnicization of the population is almost complete. These add considerable weight to whatever tensions existed that led to the war in the first place.

In this unstable time, if the conflict is not going to erupt again, if the outcome is not going to be settled through violence alone, programs and policies must be in place that reduce the tensions, help people mourn and rebuild their lives, and which address the structures feeding the ethnic hatred and fear that is named as both a part and a product of the war.

Since the war ended, non-governmental organizations in Bosnia, both local and international, have been attempting to build material, social and political structures that will sustain peace in the country. Many of these efforts include educational programs directed at civil society building, human rights, professional instruction, conflict resolution, trauma healing and promoting tolerance.
Given the ethnic nature of the war, it seems logical that addressing interethnic relations, fighting ethnic chauvinism and prejudice, and promoting a view of Bosnian nationhood and citizenship which can encompass citizens of many ethnic backgrounds would be a critical area of post-war educational efforts. In North America, interethnic hostility, stereotyping and prejudice of the sort that is commonplace in Bosnia would normally be understood as racism, and would appear to be relevant to a theory on racism and multiculturalism. Yet the language of, and theory on, racism and multiculturalism is not widely related to in the region. Programs directly targeting ethnic chauvinism and building an understanding of multi-ethnic citizenship are extremely hard to find.

In this thesis, I examine how NGO-sponsored educational programs in Bosnia address, and attempt to relieve, interethnic tensions and why these programs take the form that they do. I have done this by examining manuals and outlines describing the programs. Where possible, I interviewed NGO staff in Bosnia for further clarification. I have also used theoretical writing in political science, psychoanalysis, Bosnian history, multicultural and anti-racism education and conflict transformation to examine how inter-ethnic antagonism may be understood in an ethnic nationalist context such as Bosnia and in comparison to the Canadian understanding of nationhood, citizenship, racism and multiculturalism. The major issues I will consider are:

- How do we speak in precise and meaningful terms about chauvinism in the Bosnian context yet remain consistent with the rich terminology already available from the study of racism in North America and parts of Western Europe?
• What determines the content and nature of educational programs that address issues of ethnic chauvinism: environment, dominant hegemonies, governments, NGOs, participants? What are the patterns that appear?

• What are the rhythms of post-ethnic war anti-racism and multicultural citizenship education? What is possible when? What has to happen first? What influences these rhythms?

• Are there other tensions which are not ethnically based, such as class or rural-urban tensions, that played into the war and need to be addressed? How does this affect our analysis of education against ethnic chauvinism?

Much has been written about nationalism in the fields of political science, history and even psychoanalysis. Peace studies and psychiatry provide a wealth of information on conflict resolution, conflict transformation, trauma healing and the process of reconciliation. In the field of education, there is extensive writing on multicultural, anti-racism and peace education.¹ Many books give practical advice on educational approaches and activities for post-war regions. Yet, although considerable educational work aimed at peace building is being carried out and documented in post-war regions, there has been very little theoretical analysis of those programs from an educator’s perspective, especially where they relate to interethnic relations.

This three-part paper attempts to fill that gap. In the first part, the diverse and extensive literature on nationalism, peace education, multicultural and antiracism education, the history of the former Yugoslavia, and concepts relevant to the programs

¹ Most work in peace education, however, is aimed at children in the West and teaches about abstract concepts of peace, human rights and weapons of mass destruction.
examined are reviewed. This provides a framework for understanding and evaluating the theoretical basis of the programs. Based on this material and on my experience in Croatia and Bosnia, the nature of interethnic hostility and divisions in Bosnia will be discussed. Ethnic chauvinism and ethnic nationalism are analyzed in relation to racism and multiculturalism to see how, or whether, the language and concepts of racism are useful in Bosnia. That review and analysis of the relevant concepts informs the analysis of the educational programs themselves.

In the second part, 14 manuals or outlines of educational programs are described and discussed. These were collected during my six-week stay in Bosnia and Croatia in January-February 1998. Programs were chosen that attempt in some way, through their content or structure, to improve inter-ethnic relations or promote multi-ethnic cooperation and citizenship. I heard of very few programs dealing exclusively and directly with ethnic chauvinism. However, I observed that education promoting tolerance or addressing prejudice may be found as a component of other programs or incorporated into their structures.

Although the manuals and outlines I collected do not represent a comprehensive list of all NGO-run educational programs in Bosnia and Croatia, they do represent the broad range of the work I came across.2 They are run by both local and international NGOs and they serve a variety of students, from children and youth to adults and professionals, from community leaders to ordinary citizens. They all address interethnic relations but they do so in different ways. Some address the subject by enabling direct

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2 I am not concerned about keeping the scope of my research broad. I consider this research to be preliminary and feel that the variety of the programs provides a good basis for comparative and relational analysis.
interethnic contact; others incorporate discussion of prejudice and stereotyping into programs aimed at human rights education, skills development, or leadership, conflict resolution or professional training.

The focus of my research is on Bosnia. However, I have chosen to analyze programs in both Bosnia and Croatia for two reasons. First, the wars in both countries were closely inter-related. Some programs were initially developed after the earlier Croatian war and that experience was later used in the Bosnian context. There is also cross-border co-operation between both local and international NGOs in both countries and citizens of both jointly participated in, and developed, some of the programs discussed.

Second, the contrasts between programs in Croatia and Bosnia may be significant. Partly because the war in Croatia ended earlier than the one in Bosnia, by comparing and contrasting programs in the two countries we may learn something about the rhythms of citizens' needs in the post-war period and the consequent timing of programs.

The situations in Croatia and Bosnia are different in other ways. Unlike in Bosnia where no side was “victorious,” Croat nationalists won the war in Croatia. The country has effectively been “cleansed” of its Serb citizens. In some ways Croatia does not have to address the issue of multi-ethnic citizenship, in other ways it is in a position to be generous to the small minority groups that are left. Because Croats in Croatia dominate the government and are no longer threatened by the expansionist interests of other ethnic

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3 During the Bosnian war, some international organizations kept their headquarters in Croatia as this was a safer base.
groups or foreign states, Croats may feel secure enough to participate in, or at least tolerate, discussion of tolerance, stereotyping and prejudice.

Bosnians, on the other hand, are in a much more unstable situation. Not only have they had less time to recover from the war, the country is still multi-ethnic, yet ethnically divided. In the minds of many nationalists, the war is not yet over and, they believe, it is just a matter of time before borders are redrawn to their liking. Although the economy of Croatia is not doing well, the economic situation in Bosnia is much worse. People are more concerned about immediate economic and security needs and recovering from the trauma of the war than about addressing abstract systemic change.

I also chose not to confine myself to education of only adults, youth or children. I am examining programs aimed at each of these groups. I suspected that, as in Canada, much of the direct programming in multicultural, anti-prejudice and human rights education would be aimed at primary school children. Such education for young children often remains at an abstract, idealized and depoliticized level. These subjects, when taught to adults, directly challenge entrenched attitudes and social structures. Such adult education programs are therefore much more politically and personally charged. This creates a double-edged situation: educational programs addressing ethnic chauvinism may not be as common or as direct for adults, as compared to children. However, they will likely reveal more about both the unique circumstances of an ethnic nationalist conflict and the range of ways in which educational programs address ethnic chauvinism in such a context.

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4 The desperate situation in Croatia led to huge protests against poverty and unemployment in Zagreb in February, 1998.
Finally, I decided not to limit myself to either international or local NGOs, but instead to study both. I was not only interested in analyzing the programs per se, I wanted to understand the relationship between international and local NGO programming and staffing in this area. I wanted to know the constraints, goals and opportunities of international and local educators and the way their program methodologies assist or detract from one another.

In the third part of this study I use the theoretical literature to analyze the programs as they have been described in the manuals and outlines. This literature should help explain why the programs take the form that they do when they address interethnic relations. It should also help pinpoint potential program problems and opportunities, and ideas for consideration, not only by educators in other ethnic nationalist conflict situations, but also by North American multicultural and anti-racism educators.

Coming from Canada, I found one of the greatest challenges of carrying out this study was the issue of terminology and conflicting conceptual frameworks. In some ways this parallels conceptual conflicts affecting the war itself: that between Serb and Croat conceptions of nationhood based on ethnicity, and Muslim and Yugoslav conceptions which were either based on religion or on civic ties. Like many of the international educators working for NGOs in Bosnia and Croatia, I am rooted in a civic understanding of nationhood, a framework which clashes with the ethnic and/or religious conception of nationhood which is prevalent in the former Yugoslavia.

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5 When the Bosnian war broke out, many people identified themselves as Yugoslavs or Bosnians, adopting a civic conception of nationhood. Even though the 1991 Yugoslav Census put the number of people identifying themselves as Yugoslavs in Bosnia at 5.5%, down from 7.9% in 1981, this number may represent fewer people than actually did identify as Yugoslavs because it forced people to choose between two identities that they held: an ethnic one and a civic national one. It also does not include those who identified as Bosnians.
I also hold a view of ethnic discrimination and prejudice that is rooted in the racist policies and economic structures of West European colonialism. Much of the theoretical literature which has shaped my views grew out of the well-documented American experience of slavery and the exploitation by colonial powers of indigenous and imported workers for cheap labour. The historical use of racist ideologies and spurious “scientific” research to attempt to justify such economic exploitation differs significantly from the experience of the former Yugoslavia. Although ethnic nationalist ideologies also have an economic motivation, especially where they are used to attempt to justify the conquest or exclusive control of land by one ethnic group, the primary appeal of an ethnic sense of nationhood for most group members rests with the preservation and nurturing of a community and culture.

I hope that this research will be useful for local and international educators and NGO program administrators concerned with ethnic chauvinism. By pinning theory to practice, it should make explicit some of the reasons for work that may have been developed intuitively, reactively or based on experience but without theoretical grounding.

However, it may be of particular interest to international educators and NGO administrators, many of whom, like me, come from nations and countries which have constructed themselves in civic terms and in which the predominant vision of ethnic chauvinism was shaped by the history of colonialism and racist labour exploitation. This research should help them understand views of nationhood and ethnic chauvinism prevalent in the former Yugoslavia, and how their own theoretical background may influence the programs they teach or administer.
Part I

Chapter 2: The Story in Brief

Introduction

All nations, whether civic or ethnic, are contrived entities. All nations create a story, a mythology, a romantic idea of how their members came to be who they are and what binds them together. Such mythologies or selective views of history have the benefit of creating a community of people who feel in some way bound to each other and mutually responsible for one another. These mythologies can, however, be deliberately manipulated to create an illusion of irreconcilable differences between nations, and to rally a national population against a conveniently chosen “other.”

The recent wars in the former Yugoslavia provide excellent examples of such manipulation of history. The telling of history was as much an event in those wars as the historical events themselves. Nationalist leaders and intellectuals have long selectively interpreted history to claim a distinctive identity, play off their constituencies’ fears, their sense of loyalty to their families and ancestors and instil a sense of historical inevitability. In the recent war, many of these claims seem to have convinced local citizens and foreign policy makers alike. This chapter will briefly review the history upon which some of these nationalist historical arguments are based as well as more recent events directly related to the war itself.

The story of the events and structures that contributed to the Bosnian war is complex and no brief history could do it justice. This chapter will not present a comprehensive history. Instead, it will review the primary social and political forces that shaped the war and which are of relevance to the work of peace educators. This includes
the location of Bosnia next to two states, Croatia and Serbia, both of which had ambitions to absorb it; the rise of Croat and Serb\(^6\) nationalism in the 19th century; and nationalist attempts to develop racial theories and use a selective telling of history to inspire unity and create a sense of trauma and obligation among the ethnic groups concerned. The communist legacy, the outcome of the war and the current context will also be discussed.

More than anything, events in Bosnia have been shaped by two forces: foreign occupation and Croat and Serb ambitions to absorb it. From the first century BC until the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the territory of Bosnia has been ruled by foreign imperial governments.\(^7\) Since the arrival of the Croats and Serbs in the early seventh century, Bosnia has also been crushed between two giants, both with ambitions to control its territory. This constant threat has shaped the policies and decisions of many Bosnian leaders throughout the centuries. In the following section, I will outline only those historical facts and events that would become important to the arguments of nationalist leaders and thinkers or to events in the recent war.

**Early history: From the Illyrians to the Ottomans**

Serb and Croat nationalists tell an uncomplicated story about ethnic identity. They tend to talk about ethnicity as if their respective ethnic groups were easily identified and had generally remained “pure” throughout the centuries. Bosnian Muslims, they say, are simply Serbs or Croats who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule, and therefore, as Islam is not an ethnicity, Bosnia can have no claim to nationhood. Instead, its territory

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\(^6\) The terms Croat, Serb and Muslim (or Bosniak) are ethnic labels. In contrast, the terms Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian describe a person’s citizenship.

\(^7\) The only exception to this was a brief period of autonomy in the 12th century (Malcolm, 1996).
belongs to Serbia and/or Croatia. But the story of how Bosnians arrived at their respective ethnic identities is not that simple.

Bosnia has been populated over the centuries by diverse groups of people. Some came to settle and trade; others came for military purposes but they all left their marks. In 9 AD, Roman forces completed their occupation of most of Bosnia and the Dalmatian Coast, bringing settlers from many parts of Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East to live alongside the region’s original Illyrian inhabitants. In the 3rd century, the Roman Empire was invaded and the Romans were eventually defeated by the Germanic Goths. The following three centuries would bring waves of Iranian Alans, Asiatic Huns, Avars and Slavs to the region. The Goths, in turn, were defeated by the Byzantine Empire in the early 6th century (Malcolm, 1996).

In the early 7th century, the Croats and Serbs, two separate but long-interconnected Slavic tribes, arrived in the region. Serbs occupied what is now south-western Serbia, Montenegro and Herzegovina; Croats settled the land of modern Croatia and most of Bosnia. According to Malcolm (1996), “Most scholars believe either that both Serbs and Croats were Slavic tribes with Iranian ruling castes, or that they were originally Iranian tribes which had acquired Slavic subjects” (p. 7).

The first surviving record of Bosnia as a distinct territory was found in a book by Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus in 958. He described “the territory of Bosona” (Malcolm, 1996, p. 10) as being within the Serbian princedom, though under Byzantine sovereignty. Two years later, Bosnia would fall under Croat rule, and by the

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8 The Croats were invited by the Byzantine Emperor to fight the Avars; the Serbs were not engaged for that purpose but entered in the same period (Malcolm, 1996).
early 12th century it was ruled with increasing independence under the remote authority of Hungary (Malcolm, 1996). In spite of popular nationalist thinking, however, it is meaningless to argue about who Bosnians “really” are based on these pre-Ottoman occupations. As Malcolm (1996) states:

As for the question of whether the inhabitants of Bosnia were really Croat or really Serb in 1180, it cannot be answered, for two reasons: first because we lack evidence, and secondly because the question lacks meaning. We can say that the majority of the Bosnian territory was probably occupied by Croats - or at least by Slavs under Croat rule - in the seventh century; but that is a tribal label which has little or no meaning five centuries later... All one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were the Slavs who lived in Bosnia. (p. 12)

By the 1380s and '90s, the Ottoman Turks, who had been invading westward during the previous decades, arrived in Serbia and began to cross into Bosnia. The Serbian ruler, Prince Lazar, refused to accept Turkish rule. With the help of his ally, King Tvrtko of Bosnia, his army fought the Turkish armies in the famous battle of Kosovo Polje in June 1389 (Malcolm, 1996). Malcolm (1996) writes:

Though Serbian myth and poetry have presented this battle as a cataclysmic defeat in which the flower of Balkan chivalry perished on the field and the Turks swept on through the rest of Serbia, the truth is a little less dramatic. Losses were heavy on both sides, and Prince Lazar was captured and executed, but the remnants of both sides withdrew after the battle, and for a while the Serb and Bosnian forces believed that they had won. It was not the battle itself which brought about the fall of Serbia to the Turks, but the fact that while the Serbs had needed all the forces they could muster to hold the Turks to an expensive and temporary draw, the Turks were able to return, year after year, in ever increasing strength. (p. 20)

All Serbian Orthodox land, except Bosnian-ruled Hum (Hercegovina) fell under Turkish rule by 1392. In 1463, the Turkish army, led by Mehmet II, successfully invaded most of Bosnia. The occupation was complete by 1527 (Malcolm, 1996).
During the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was essentially a military system. Although the ruling class in Bosnia was made up of Muslim military administrators, and many Christian boys were taken to Istanbul, converted to Islam and trained as soldiers, government officials or servants of the Sultan, it was not Ottoman policy to convert Bosnians to Islam. The main objective was to supply the empire with "money, men and feudal incomes" (Malcolm, 1996, p. 49) to meet its needs. Christians and Jews were allowed to maintain their religious traditions and institutions, although certain restrictions applied (Malcolm, 1996).

The conversion to Islam by much of the Bosnian population took almost 150 years. Most evidence indicates that the conversions took place voluntarily, without significant coercion. However, there were definite advantages to being Muslim. Christians could be successful merchants but one had to be Muslim in order to work in the Ottoman state structure or enjoy a privileged legal status (Malcolm, 1996).

The experiences of the Christian churches varied. The Catholic Church, which was identified with the Hungarians, suffered during Ottoman rule. The Orthodox Church, in contrast, was officially accepted by the Ottoman government. At the time of the Turkish invasion, few Orthodox churches existed in Bosnia and many Orthodox Christians came to the region as a result of the settlement policies of the Ottoman administration. For strategic reasons, Orthodox Vlachs and Serbs, were encouraged to settle in the

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9 Christianity was weak in many parts of Bosnia. In areas "poorly served by priests, Christianity... had probably become little more than a set of folk practices and ceremonies... The shift from folk Christianity to folk Islam was not very great" (Malcolm, 1996, p. 58).
10 Christians, for example, could not take Muslims to court or testify against them (Malcolm, 1996).
11 Vlachs and Serbs were distinct ethnic and cultural groups. Although Vlachs were often bilingual and tended to speak the Slav language of their surroundings, their indigenous language was Latin-based. Many Vlachs were Orthodox, but some (primarily in Croatia) converted to Catholicism and many in Bosnia adopted Islam (Malcolm, 1996).
depopulated areas of Bosnia, in particular along the military border in north-west Bosnia and neighbouring Croatia, in an area which became known as Vojna Krajina (military frontier) (Malcolm, 1996). This area later became critical to the 1990-95 dispute between Croatian Serbs and Croats.

As Sarajevo began to develop as a trading city in the early 16th century, Jewish settlers began to arrive. Although, as with other non-Muslim groups in Bosnia, Jews lacked legal equality with Muslims, their relations with both the Ottoman government and Muslims in general appear to have been good. In fact, Sarajevo was one of the few European cities which did not have a Jewish ghetto. By the early 19th century, the Jewish population in Bosnia was around 2000. By 1900, the population, attracted largely by Austro-Hungarian economic policies, had risen to 9311 (Malcolm, 1996).

The Roma are currently the largest non-dominant minority group in Bosnia. Because they have left few written or other material records, their time of arrival in Bosnia is not known. Some were likely converted to Islam during the early years of Ottoman rule. By the end of that rule, most Roma were Muslim (Malcolm, 1996).

Even this brief history shows that many people mixed to form the population of modern-day Bosnia. As many Bosnians converted to Islam, Serb Orthodoxy and

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12 In contrast to fairly positive relations between Jews and Muslims in Sarajevo, Christians in much of the Ottoman Empire appear to have resented Jews. Malcolm (1996) writes: "This was partly because anti-Semitism grew more easily in the soil of Christian theology; but it was also because some of the Ottoman governors relied on Jewish physicians and merchants as personal and diplomatic advisors" (p. 112). This latter situation was common throughout Europe and is well described in Hannah Arendt’s (1979) The Origins of Totalitarianism.

13 In fact, a Jewish leader I spoke to in Sarajevo said there had been very little experience of anti-Semitism in Sarajevo over the centuries and that Jews there have always mixed with the general community.

14 A law written in 1530 distinguished Roma who were Muslim from those who weren’t. The two groups paid different taxes and were not permitted to live together (Malcolm, 1996).
Catholicism, even religious labels fail to demonstrate the ancestry of Bosnian citizens.

Malcolm (1996) argues:

To call someone a Serb today is to use a concept constructed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries out of a combination of religion, language, history and the person's own sense of identification: modern Bosnian Serbs can properly call themselves as such, regardless of Vlach ancestry. (p. 81)

The Rise of Nationalism in Europe

Although nationalist movements did exist in the 18th century, it took the spread of print capitalism to enable large-scale nationalism in Europe. As Benedict Anderson (1991) argues, mass marketing of print, beginning in the late 15th century, turned certain languages in Europe into vernaculars. These became "unified fields of exchange below Latin" (p. 44) the language spoken by many monarchs and nobility, and "above the spoken vernaculars" (p. 44) of political administrations. As such, it created "languages-of-power" (p. 45) which dominated over and homogenized the multitude of languages and dialects that existed across Europe at the time. This gave the vernacular languages a stability which, over time, would allow them to be portrayed as ancient, a quality which is important for the concept of nation. Serbo-Croat was one of these literary languages. Its development as a literary language was credited largely to the efforts of Vuk Karadzic in the 18th century.

Print capitalism allowed information to be disseminated more broadly than ever before and led to challenges to the old order. French and American revolutionaries

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15 The Jewish community has long had a sense of nationhood. Nationalist movements also existed in Scotland and Peru before the 18th century (Anderson, 1991).

16 Changing ideas, between the 16th and 18th centuries, led to eventual challenges to the legitimacy of the domination of Crown and Empire. The Reformation, made possible by the mass printing of Martin Luther's writings, challenged the unquestioned authority of the Roman Catholic Church (Anderson, 1991). From the late 17th century, there was a revolutionary new sense of potential progress in thinking. Divine or ancient wisdom was no longer considered as necessarily providing all the answers; modernity
demanded that governments be responsible to, and legitimized by, the people that they
governed. As Hobsbawm (1990) writes, the nation, as it was conceived during the
Enlightenment:

...was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a
state which was their political expression. For, whatever else a nation was,
the element of citizenship and mass participation or choice was never
absent from it... The equation nation = state = people, and especially
sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure
and definition of states were now essentially territorial. It also implied a
multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary
consequence of popular self-determination. (pp. 18-19)

The concept of a people expressed in the French and American Revolutions, however, was
defined by citizenship, not ethnicity or language. Both states, at the time, were far from
homogeneous\(^\footnote{As Hobsbawm (1990) points out, consistent with a civic conception of nationhood, "language had
nothing to do in principle with being English or French" (p. 19). In fact, French academics fought hard
against any effort to make spoken French a national criterion. They argued that nationality was only
determined by French citizenship. The languages of the Alsatians or Gascons "remained irrelevant to
their status as members of the French people" (p. 20).}

In 1806, Napoleon invaded and occupied the German principalities. In the
backlash that followed against the French conception of nation state,\(^\footnote{This included granting full civic (and attempting to give legal) rights to Jews (Arendt, 1979).}
the ideal of “nation as Volk” was born.

The notion of Volk came from the writing of Johann Gottfried von Herder, a
humanist who was inspired by the great civilizations around the world: in China, Japan,
Southeast Asia, India and Latin America. He began to see European civilization as only
one of many distinct civilizations. In the late 18th century, Herder wrote: “For every
distinct community is a nation, having its own national culture as it has its own language”

\(^\footnote{As Hobsbawm (1990) points out, consistent with a civic conception of nationhood, “language had
nothing to do in principle with being English or French” (p. 19). In fact, French academics fought hard
against any effort to make spoken French a national criterion. They argued that nationality was only
determined by French citizenship. The languages of the Alsatians or Gascons “remained irrelevant to
their status as members of the French people” (p. 20).}

\(^\footnote{This included granting full civic (and attempting to give legal) rights to Jews (Arendt, 1979).}
This conception of nationhood “linked to a private-property language” (Anderson, 1991, p. 68) had a tremendous impact on 19th-century Europe and on subsequent ideas about the nature of a nation. The German Romantics declared that, contrary to Enlightenment views, the state did not create the nation. Rather, the nation, the people, the Volk created the state. They believed that:

What gave unity to the nation, what made it a home, a place of passionate attachment was not the cold contrivance of shared rights but the people’s pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs and traditions... (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 7)

In France, Britain and America, nationalism served as a modernizing ideology. Among the Romantics, it became an antimodernist creed... Romantic nationalism became a flight from individualism and from individual rights, toward a vision of society in which the individual achieved inner freedom through an intense experience of belonging to the Volk... (As Herder remarked,) ‘Every nation has its center of happiness within itself.’ (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 86)

Nationalism, the South Slav movement and the creation of Yugoslavia
Croatia and Serbia were no exceptions to this awakening nationalism in Europe and the combined use of language and racial theories to support it. Just as Bosnian nationalism must be understood as an effort to remain autonomous when faced with the expansionist ambitions of Croatia and Serbia, Croatian and Serbian nationalism and the South Slav movements reflect their separate struggles for autonomy.

The situations facing the two groups were significantly different. Croatiens were a minority within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and they were denied the right to govern themselves. Up until World War I, their hope for more self rule rested with the possibility of becoming part of a triad government within the empire, in which South Slavs’ interests would balance those of Austria and Hungary (Cohen, 1993).
In contrast, after 1817 the Serbians had their own semi-independent state within the Ottoman Empire. They had good reason to believe that they would eventually gain autonomy. Their primary goals were to win that independence and to unite Serbs, and those they considered to be “really” Serbs, in a Greater Serbia. If co-operating with other South Slavs would help achieve this goal then such co-operation would be considered, but Serb nationalism was the primary objective (Cohen, 1993). As Cohen (1993) writes:

Whereas most Croat Yugoslavists sought a gradually restructured Hapsburg monarchy, giving the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Serbian minority of Austria Hungary greater autonomy and influence, the citizens of Serbia were interested primarily in the rapid destruction of Hapsburg and Ottoman power in the Balkans and also their own political paramountcy in South Eastern Europe. (p. 8)

It is not surprising, then, that the South Slav movement was born in Croatia. The form it took, in the Illyrian movement of the 1830s and ’40s, also reveals the tendency within such nationalist movements, to manipulate history to either “prove” ethnic distinctiveness or rally people around certain select historical events. The Illyrianists attempted the former. Its advocates, led primarily by Ljudevit Gaj, presented the idea that the South Slavs were really of Illyrian descent.¹⁹ This argument mainly appealed to the Croatian upper classes, but it “provided an important stimulus to new thinking about South Slav nationalism and unity” (Cohen, 1993, p. 4). According to Malcolm (1996), this theory, as with other theories of ethnic ancestry which were to follow,²⁰ was more a

¹⁹ They argued that South Slavs are comprised of Serbs and Croats as the two dominant groups, but they also include Slovenes, and Slavs of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cohen, 1993).
²⁰ Two other equally unsubstantiated theories served obvious nationalistic arguments. During World War II, a popular theory among Bosnians declared that they were descendants of Goths and therefore distinct from the Slavic Croats (Malcolm, 1996). This was a response to domination by the Croatian fascist state at the time. Similarly during World War II, some Croat nationalist theorists selectively used evidence of Iranian ancestry for Croats but not for Serbs. At the time, ancient Iranians were further up the Nazi hierarchy than Slavs.
reflection of political circumstances than historical fact and there is little evidence to support it.

During the second half of the 19th century, other Croats began to promote the South Slav concept. Among them were the Catholic clergymen Franjo Racki and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer who envisioned a “supranational ideology expressing the common origins, cultural ties and spiritual bonds among the South Slavs” (Cohen, 1993, p. 5). These would transcend religious, political and ethnic divisions. Like Illyrianism, their ideas mainly appealed to members of the intelligentsia, liberal bourgeoisie and the liberal Catholic clergy. To the agrarian majority, who had little formal education and lacked information about other Slavic people, such expansive ideologies held little attraction (Cohen, 1993).

Nationalist arguments held more appeal as they were rooted in the very folk traditions that most citizens could relate to. The ideas of Serb nationalist thinker and language reformer Vuk Karadzic were more broadly received. Karadzic published five popular epics and “did more than any other single person to create a modern Serbo-Croatian language, based on his own Hercegovinian dialect, but broadly accepted in the following years by both Croats and Serbs as their own” (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 132). Whereas previously a concept of Serbian ethnicity was based on adherence to Serbian Orthodoxy, Karadzic, like other promoters of ethnic nationalism at the time, drew on the folk traditions of the Serbian people as the expression of Serbian culture. As Crnobrnja (1996) writes, Karadzic succeeded in popularizing a Serbian “national awakening” (p. 36) by arguing that “the foundations of an autonomous Serbian principality had been laid by simple peasants. Though their vision of nationhood may have been poorly defined, the
insurgents' success lifted Serbian national pride far more effectively than scores of learned treatises" (p. 37).

During the mid- to late-19th century, the concept of Serb or Croat ethnic nationality began to spread from Croatia and Serbia to Catholic and Orthodox Christians in Bosnia. Given the history of inter-ethnic relations and religious conversions in Bosnia:

Of the three basic criteria by which the Croat and Serb nations established and distinguished themselves during this period - history, language and religion - only religion could apply in Bosnia, a country which had its own separate history and in which the contours of the linguistic map cut across all religious boundaries. (Malcolm, 1996, p. 149)

The expansion of secondary and higher education at the turn of the 20th century expanded public engagement in political and social discussions. Newly created youth organizations became active in debates about national autonomy and unifying the South Slav people (Cohen, 1993).

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the outbreak of World War I pitted Austria against Serbia. Croats, Slovenes and even those Serbs still living under the rule of the Dual Monarchy were expected to fight Serbia and its allies. The Ally victory therefore put Serbia in an excellent position to negotiate the formation of a South Slav state dominated by Serbia. With the breakdown of the Hapsburg Empire and the threat of an invasion by Italy, Yugoslav-oriented politicians in Zagreb finally requested the Serbian government to lead in forming a South Slav State. (Cohen, 1993, p. 12)

And so, in 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later to be called Yugoslavia, was created.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) One such youth group in Sarajevo was *Mlada Bosna* (Young Bosnia) whose most famous member was Gavrilo Princip, the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. After Austro-Hungary announced the full annexation of Bosnia in 1908, talk within *Mlada Bosna* and other student groups began to shift from Serb nationalist arguments to a broader campaign in support of a unified Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1996).

\(^{22}\) As Cohen (1993) describes, "The New Yugoslav state was multiconfessional, including three large and historically divided religious communities (Eastern Orthodox, 46.7 percent; Roman Catholics, 39.3 percent; and Moslems, 11.2 percent), and was comprised of several different nationalities (e.g., Serbs together with Montenegrins, approximately 42 percent; Croats, 23 percent; Slovenes, 8 percent;
While Croats and Slovenes advocated a balanced, federal system, the Serbs pushed for a highly centralized state which they dominated. In 1921, despite protests by the Croatian Peasant Party, the democratically elected Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia adopted the centralized, unitary state model in the new constitution (Cohen, 1993). The imbalance that resulted caused:

...irreparable harm to future state unity by seriously alienating the country's two major non-Serb ethnic groups... The general atmosphere of inter-regional and international distrust and recrimination tended to strengthen the respective ethnic loyalties of young people coming to maturity in the new state, and simultaneously eroded any enthusiasm for the 'Yugoslav idea.' (Cohen, 1993, pp. 14, 16)

In 1929, King Alexander attempted to end the debilitating conflicts between ethnic groups. He imposed a state of dictatorship, banned ethnic, religious and regionally-centred organizations, attempted to establish cross-ethnic symbols and organizational structures, and renamed the country the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He was unable to stifle ethnic nationalist fervour, however, and was assassinated by a joint team of Ustase and Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in 1934 (Cohen, 1993).

The fascist Ustase movement was created in the early 1930s by the extreme nationalist Croatian politician, Ante Pavelic. Pavelic fled to Italy and, with the help of Mussolini, organized the movement to push for Croatian independence. In April, 1941, Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany and its allies and Hitler invited Pavelic to govern as

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Macedonians, 5 percent; the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandjak, 5 percent; and Albanians, 4 percent” (p. 13).

King Alexander was part of the Karadjordjevic dynasty which ruled Serbia until the formation of Yugoslavia. In the new state, the King shared power with the National Assembly (Cohen, 1993).
the *Führer* of the newly proclaimed Independent State of Croatia (NDH) which incorporated both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina\(^{24}\) (Malcolm, 1996).

World War II devastated Yugoslavia.\(^{25}\) It was not one single war, but rather many wars fought simultaneously. There was the original German invasion of Yugoslavia, the more famous war between Axis powers and the Allies, and two civil wars. One was between the *Ustase* and the two resistance organizations, the *Cetniks* and the Partisans, that formed to defeat it; the other was between the resistance organizations themselves (Malcolm, 1996). Because the events of World War II had such a big impact on the recent fears of Serbs, especially in Croatia, they are worth briefly discussing here.

The *Ustase* movement quickly grew, in 1941, from a membership of no more than 12,000 to a popular mass movement. Although a small percentage were fascist ideologists, most Croat supporters saw the *Ustase* as a means of escaping the Serb domination of government (Malcolm, 1996). Malcolm (1996) writes:

> After two decades of political resistance to the centralism of Belgrade, the great majority of Croats regarded the setting up of any ‘Independent State of Croatia’ as something to celebrate, whatever the circumstances of its birth and however spurious its ‘independent’ status. (p. 175)

Over time, this latter group became increasingly disenchanted with the *Ustase* until by 1943-4 many began to join the Partisan resistance movement (Malcolm, 1996).

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\(^{24}\) Once again Bosnian Muslims were forced to engage in a balancing act between Zagreb and Belgrade. Partly because of the Serbian dominance of the Yugoslav government in the inter-war years, Bosnian Muslims began to identify more with Croats. Malcolm (1996) writes: “Faced with a choice between being ruled from Belgrade or Zagreb, most of the Muslim politicians and senior clergy would have chosen Zagreb, so long as they had some guarantees that the practice of Islam would continue unmolested. And that is what Ante Pavelic took care to promise to them within days of coming to power” (p. 185). Many Muslims, seeing the brutality of the *Ustase*, quickly became disillusioned with the regime. Muslim clergy issued a series of public protests in 1941, denouncing violence against Jews and Serbs (Malcolm, 1996).

\(^{25}\) Malcolm (1996) writes that “at least one million people died, and it is probable that the majority of them were Yugoslavs killed by Yugoslavs” (p. 174).
The new government of Croatia soon began carrying out the anti-Jewish policies of its Nazi sponsors. However, the primary goal of Ustase ideologists was to “cleanse” the NDH of Serbs who comprised just under a third of the territory’s 6.3 million inhabitants at the beginning of the war. Thousands of Bosnian Serbs responded to the genocidal attacks by joining one of the two resistance movements. One was the Serb nationalist, pro-monarch organization known as the Cetniks which carried out massive “cleansing” of Muslim communities. The other was the Communist Partisans, led by Josip Broz, known as Tito. While Cetniks favoured the Serb-dominated status quo, the primary goal of Partisans was Soviet-inspired social revolution (Malcolm, 1996).

Although sweeping generalizations are often made about Croats supporting Ustase and Serbs supporting Cetniks during World War II (and indeed such statements fed the fear and rhetoric of the recent wars) such statements are dangerously simplistic. People of all ethnicities supported the Partisans in resisting both Ustase and Cetniks. Muslims fought on all sides, and people often changed allegiances, especially as the more brutal policies of the Cetniks and Ustase became clear (Malcolm, 1996).

The Tito era

In 1945, the Partisans took control of Yugoslavia and a new era of Communist rule, under the leadership of Tito, began. Today in Bosnia, it is common to hear romanticized statements about the wisdom and benign rule of Tito. In contrast to the horrific events of the past eight years, the Tito era must seem almost idyllic but it was not without its share of terror and oppression. By late 1946, as many as 250,000 Yugoslavs are estimated to have been killed in forced death marches, concentration camps and mass

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26 An estimated 12,000 of the 14,000 Jews in Bosnia were killed during the war (Malcolm, 1996).
27 Many Serbs felt that the Muslims had sold out to the Ustase regime (Malcolm, 1996).
executions. Religious organizations also became targets. Tito, who initially modelled his policies on Stalin's, described the goal of his secret police, the OZN, as striking "terror into the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia" (as cited in Malcolm, 1996, p. 193) and they were zealous in carrying out that mission.

According to Malcolm (1996), Tito’s image as an independent and fairly liberal statesman was largely due to almost accidental circumstances. In 1948, to Tito’s surprise, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform. In the years that followed, “Yugoslav history was... being rewritten to show that Tito had always pursued an independent, liberal-minded and anti-Stalinist line” (p. 194). Similarly, by the 1950s, communist Yugoslavia found itself in the embarrassing position of being out of the Cominform and dependant on financial and diplomatic support from Western democracies. In 1955, during a tour to Ethiopia, Egypt and India, Tito conceived a policy that would allow him to save face. The Non-Aligned Movement, encompassing many developing nations, including many Muslim ones, was born (Malcolm, 1996).

As a result, the conditions facing Muslims improved. Whereas, during the previous decade, Islamic sacred law had been banned, religious schools were closed and women were forbidden to wear the veil, soon Muslims were “being sent around the world to appear as token Muslims in all kinds of Third World and non-aligned gatherings” (Malcolm, 1996, p. 197).

**Nation Building**

The communist government under Tito had an ambiguous relationship with Yugoslav nation building. While “Yugoslavism” was recognized as a useful tool for

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28 At first Communist officials hoped that the Muslim identity would simply disappear as Muslims began to identify with either Croat or Serb ethnicity (Malcolm, 1996).
reducing ethnic divisions, nationalism was not part of communist philosophy. The goals of the Marxist government was initially to create a supra-national workers’ state in which, it was anticipated, reform of economic and social structures would gradually break down ethnic barriers and national loyalties (Cohen, 1993). Ethnic nationalist and religious expression were severely restricted. Instead, the idea of “brotherhood and unity” was promoted in an effort to create a structure which balanced the claims of the major ethnic groups. As Crnobrnja (1996) writes, “The emphasis was on ‘brotherhood,’ which is to say equality and mutual respect of nations” (p. 69).

Discussion about the events of World War II was also suppressed with the hope that, in time, wounds would heal and reconciliation would take place. In contrast to West Germany, where intense public debate regarding the war was encouraged, Tito abruptly “closed this chapter of history” (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 69) a policy which appeared to work while Tito’s firm grip remained over the country. Yet official denial or suppression of historical trauma does not dissipate the pain, but in fact may exacerbate it: revictimizing the victims by not permitting them to tell their stories. The Yugoslav traumas, which may have been suppressed, did not disappear from people’s minds. After Tito died, it soon became evident that those memories were only internalized and festering (Crnobrnja, 1996).

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29 This does not mean that there was no discussion of World War II. Although the inter-ethnic fighting during World War II was played down, much was made of Partisan resistance against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. As J.D. Wilson describes, “Every little community has a war memorial to the Partisans - not for fighting Chetniks but for resisting the Germans. Stories of resistance fighters abounded and statues to them were everywhere... Much popular support for Tito derived precisely from the fact that the Partisans were the only resistance group that consistently fought against the Germans” (personal communication, April 10, 1998). People I met in Sarajevo also describe being taken as school children to concentration camps and to memorials of mass executions of Jews. It was suggested to me, though, that these were represented as Nazi (therefore external) atrocities, not internal ones.
Over the years it became clear that ethnic loyalties and identification were not going to go away. In the late 1960s and '70s, the Tito government increasingly accepted this pluralism and tried to balance it within a newly created federal system of government. Although there were times when officials cracked down on nationalists, the government gradually adopted the outlook which Cohen (1993) has described as “pluralist socialism.” Intergroup tensions were no longer a taboo subject. He writes:

Increasingly, there was recognition that different and conflicting interests were normal and long-term phenomena during socialist evolution and that such plurality of interests would best be channelled and institutionalized through a politically more vital federal system that distributed power among all levels of governmental authority (Cohen, 1993, pp. 29-30).

Over time, as this pluralism was being allowed expression, and in spite of the ambiguous government conception of Yugoslav nationalism, more and more people, especially young people, were identifying themselves as Yugoslavs (Cohen, 1993).

Civil Society

Many Westerners argue that a major reason for the rapid disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was the lack of civil society. Consequently, much foreign aid is devoted to building institutions of civil society: a free press, local NGOs, and independent avenues for critical dialogue. Ignatieff (1998) observes, however, that there was an active civil society in Yugoslavia. People not only had considerable freedom to travel and could see other systems of organization, “Yugoslavia enjoyed one of the freest civil societies in

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30 In 1971-2 the Tito government arrested many Croat nationalists, including Tudjman, as well as “liberal political forces” (Cohen, 1993, p. 31) in a number of other republics.
31 By the early 1970s, Cohen (1993) reports, survey research indicated that most “young people supported the notion of nurturing a more ‘unified Yugoslav nation’” (p. 32). He also contrasts the government’s “statist” conception of Yugoslav identity with young Yugoslavs’ reasons for supporting Yugoslavism, which he attributes partly to idealism and the large number of mixed marriages (Cohen, 1993). Little and Silber (1996) note the strong Yugoslav identity felt by many members of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from all ethnic backgrounds.
Eastern Europe, with opposition journals, philosophical discussion groups like the Belgrade Circle, a vivid cafe life, art, theatre, and cinema” (p. 40). He argues, however, that: “It was a cultural opposition, not a political opposition” (p. 41) and its relative openness was also its weakness. Unlike in more oppressed countries such as Czechoslovakia, “It never challenged the regime in the name of an explicitly democratic opposition” (p. 41).

Ignatieff’s democracy-centred perspective blinds him to the political opposition to communism which did exist: ethnic nationalism. Other sources describe a lively political dialogue in the 1970s and 1980s. Cohen (1993) notes that, largely because of the pluralistic reforms developed by Edward Kardelj in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was considerable leeway within the one-party state to express critical and diverse views.

Thus major defects of the regime, such as the party’s continued interference in the economy, the expanding size and influence of the administrative apparatus, the impotence of the delegate legislative system, the oligarchic power distribution in Yugoslav enterprises, and growing interregional and ethnic tensions, were the subject of vigorous debate by opposing political factions and were candidly discussed by the country’s lively media and scholarly community. Parameters on political dissent existed, but they were fuzzy and arbitrarily interpreted according to the changing whims of the central and regional party elites (Cohen, 1993, p. 37).

Another political observer with extensive experience in the region described lively political debates which commonly took place in the 1970s, especially in Belgrade and Zagreb. Many of the debates were about nationalism vs. communism, both of which, he noted, are communal philosophies.

While civil society may not have been to the extent and of the type that is common in the West, it would be inaccurate to say there was no civil society or even that there was
no political civil society. Perhaps because the political debate was largely between the two hegemonies of nationalism and communism, it was not acknowledged by Western authorities who are caught in their own hegemony of capitalism and democracy.

**Rural-Urban Conflict**

The historical literature I came across provided little information on class relations during the Tito and pre-war era. Malcolm (1996) gives a good overview of the feudal system that existed before and during the Ottoman Empire, and from time to time one reads a phrase in passing about Muslim landlords and Christian peasants, but such generalizations are too simplistic to be helpful.

During the Tito era, Yugoslav cities became increasingly mixed and cosmopolitan. Access to high school and higher education was greater than in smaller communities. The secular policies of the Communist government reduced the importance of religion as a barrier between ethnic groups, especially among young people. In Bosnia, in cities like Tuzla, Mostar and Sarajevo there were many mixed marriages.\footnote{Petrovic (1995) writes that, by 1991, approximately six million Yugoslavs “had become kin-related through inter-ethnic marriage” (p. 121).} In spite of the ambiguous government policy on nation building, in the urban areas at least, a cross-ethnic, Yugoslav identity was being formed.\footnote{Many young, urban Bosnians describe the common culture that they shared with their friends, regardless of ethnicity (Anderson, 1996).}

In contrast to urban Bosnia, rural villages were more ethnically homogeneous. Heavily dependent on agriculture, they were organized along more traditional, hierarchical lines. Opportunities for education and social and occupational mobility were limited. Cohen (1993) suggests that, at the turn of the 20th century, the South Slav interests of the educated elite of the day were not shared by the rural inhabitants who made up the
majority of the population. It seems likely that a similar division existed throughout this century. Also, as both World War II and the recent wars proved, rural villages were more vulnerable to attack than cities like Sarajevo. As one political observer pointed out, rural citizens who felt threatened would justifiably find it in their self-interest to support those who they perceived would protect them. In a time of crisis, protection would not be seen as coming from those who favoured dialogue, but rather from strongmen with guns. That is exactly what the militant Serb nationalists counted on.

**The break-up of Yugoslavia**

Although insiders and outsiders alike often talk about “historic enmities” and the “inevitality” of war in the Balkans, there was nothing inevitable about the Croatian and Bosnian wars. They were carefully orchestrated wars of opportunity carried out through “ethnic cleansing,” an extreme product of ethnic nationalism which attempts to rid a territory of target ethnic groups. The economic and political crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s provided the opportunity; an ethnic nationalist hegemony provided the logic.

This section will not provide an overview of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Instead, forces will be highlighted that shaped the actions and attitudes of ordinary people thrust into a terrible situation. These people are, for the most part, the participants in peace education programs. The ethnic nationalist hegemony which exists in the former Yugoslavia created the foundation of logic for the war and will be discussed at length in

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34 There are a number of excellent books available on the wars. One of the most detailed is *The Death of Yugoslavia* by Little and Silber (1996), in which they interviewed hundreds of the top officials involved in the wars for a five-hour BBC television documentary by the same name. Also recommended are Mihailo Crnoberja’s (1996) *The Yugoslav Drama*, Lenard J. Cohen’s (1993) *Broken Bonds*, and, for a good overview of Bosnian history, Noel Malcolm’s (1996) *Bosnia: A Short History*.

35 The educational programs I looked at tended to try to be balanced in the way they approached ethnic groups, dealing with people on a human level and not holding them responsible for actions done by others in their name. However, it would be unfair to write about this history as if there were no clear aggressors; there were, and the illustrations that I use indicate this.
chapter four. Here, I will describe the propaganda frenzy in the years before the war which created a climate of terror, appeals to loyalty to family and ancestors by politicians, and the self-fulfilling, ethnically-based divisions created by the policy of ethnic cleansing.

Brutality of the scale and organizational level of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia do not happen overnight. People need to be prepared to accept that level of violence, to feel so threatened and so implicated that there seem to be few other alternatives (Little and Silber, 1996). Malcolm (1996) observes that a distinct pattern was used repeatedly in both wars:

Three techniques were at work, one general and two particular. The general method was to radicalize the Serb population with a non-stop bombardment of misinformation and fear-mongering through the media and the local politicians... The second method... involves staging an incident... to invite a crackdown or reprisal, and then distributing arms to the villagers, telling them that the police are planning to attack them... And the third technique... (involved) creating violent incidents and then asking the army to intervene as an impartial arbiter.” (p. 217)

The events of the late 1980s and early '90s vividly illustrate step one: setting the scene. Over the years, a self-perpetuating climate of hysteria in Serbia was deliberately developed. This provoked reactions in other regions which “verified” the initial fears of Serbians in an endlessly reinforcing cycle.

Even before Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia was beginning to show economic and political stress. A rising debt load and inefficient investment resulted in rising unemployment and declining real incomes. In addition, the 1974 constitution, which gave each province and republic “theoretical ‘statehood’” (Cohen, 1993, p. 33) resulted in increasingly divisive tensions “generated by the autarkic policies of Yugoslavia’s regionally entrenched political elites” (Cohen, 1993, p. 33). Throughout the 1980s the
economic situation became drastically worse. As inflation and unemployment soared, Yugoslavia began to experience severe food shortages. Although there were many institutionalized ways in which people could express their criticism of governmental economic and political mismanagement, they began to take to the streets in mass demonstrations and strikes (Cohen, 1993).

In 1986, a widely circulated Serbian daily newspaper, Vecernje Novosti, published excerpts of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The document claimed that Serbs were victims of political and economic discrimination by Croats, Albanians and Slovenes. In the primarily Albanian province of Kosovo, the memorandum claimed, Serbs, who comprised 10 percent of the population, "faced total genocide" (Little and Silber, 1996, pp. 31). The document also stated:

Except during the period of the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia, proclaimed in 1941 by the pro-Nazi Ustase), Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political question. If a solution is not found, the consequences will be damaging on many levels, not only for relations within Croatia but also for all of Yugoslavia. (Little and Silber, 1996, pp. 31-2)

Serbian journalists and political leaders alike strongly attacked the memorandum. In fact, Dnevnik, a Slovene daily newspaper, praised the media in Belgrade for its strong stance against ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, many liberals throughout the country, who disagreed with the memorandum’s argument, nevertheless supported the right of the Academy to freely express itself (Little and Silber, 1996).

Serbia did have genuine grievances. In an effort to balance Serbia’s power, the 1974 constitution had created two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, with de facto republican power within Serbia. This weakened Serbia’s position both internally
and in federal negotiations. Laws passed in Serbia, for example, needed the approval of
the two provincial legislatures whereas those passed in the provincial parliaments did not
need Serbian approval (Crnobrnja, 1996). As Crnobrnja (1996) writes, however:

...these authentic national grievances were processed through a self-asserting elite, that is to say the Communist Party bureaucratic structure, which was ill suited to compromise and convergence. On the contrary, the party autocrats in the republics and provinces saw this as an opportunity to amplify and maximize politically those characteristics that would in turn solidify particular interests and positions. (p. 95)

In the early 1980s, a group of dissatisfied Kosovo Serbs began to protest the position of Serbs in Kosovo. Secretly backed by the Serbian government, three local Serb activists circulated a protest petition which received only 75 signatures. Over the next four years, however, the group, which was called the Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins, attempted to spark the emotions of Serbs. They told alarming stories of forced moves, harassment and rapes. In fact, according to Little and Silber (1996), incidents of rape were much lower in Kosovo than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The activists repeated the slogan, “This is our land. If Kosovo and Metohija are not Serbian then we don’t have any land of our own” (p. 35) By 1986, the group was easily able to collect more than 50,000 Serb signatures demanding changes in Kosovo (Little and Silber, 1996).

Kosovo has special meaning to Serb nationalists. It is the site of the battle of Kosovo Polje on June 28, 1389, described above, in which the Serbs, with their Bosnian allies, fought the invading Ottomans. The story has been made into the most famous of Serb epics, and Prince Lazar became its most famous martyr. June 28, St. Vitus Day, is an important day for Serbs in recognition of that event.
By April 1987, when Slobodan Milosevic, then head of the Serbian Communist
Party, went to Kosovo Polje on behalf of Serbian president, Ivan Stambolic, for talks with
Kosovo leaders, he was hailed as a protector by the crowd of thousands of Kosovo Serbs,
who had gathered around the meeting place. This was a turning point in Yugoslav history.
Milosevic was not a nationalist, but he recognized an opportunity to gain power (Little
and Silber, 1996). His speech to the crowd was revealing:

No one should dare to beat you... You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when it's time to fight... You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and Yugoslavia. (as cited in Little and Silber, 1996, p. 37-8)

By the end of 1987, Milosevic had manoeuvred his way into the presidency of Serbia. His manoeuvrings and dramatic speeches at mass rallies, likened by Little and Silber (1996) to “religious revivals” (p. 58), led to the toppling of the governments of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1988. The rise of Serbian nationalism correspondingly fuelled the arguments of ethnic nationalists in Slovenia and Croatia and led to those republics’ eventual declarations of independence. Once international recognition of the Croatia and Slovenia seemed certain, Bosnia was forced to do the same (Little and Silber, 1996).

In spite of the existence of a dynamic political culture and a relatively free press, intellectuals and media, with few exceptions, jumped on their respective nationalist bandwagons. As Crnobrnja (1996) writes, “Intellectuals played the role of chief
ideologues for the nationalist movements and spreading of mutual hatred” (p. 116). The
media became the nationalist politicians’ mouthpieces.

Shortly after his return from Kosovo, Milosevic, with the help of Dusan Mitevic, Deputy Director of the state-owned Belgrade Television, effectively took control of the major Serbian television stations and newspapers (Little and Silber, 1996). Crnobrnja (1996) describes the unusual “readiness, even eagerness with which the media accepted this new role” (p. 118). There were a few, marginalized exceptions of independent coverage, but most media soon reported events in an “us” vs. “them,” good vs. evil, light. Eventually the Slovenian and Croatian press jumped into “the terrible propaganda warfare in which the first and most important victim was the truth” (p. 119). Pre-war newspaper reports fabricated sensational and alarming stories, certain to create a climate of fear.36

After the fall of the governments in Kosovo and Vojvodina, puppet governments loyal to Milosevic were quickly installed, giving Milosevic increasing control over the Yugoslav central government. As Serb nationalist hysteria and control grew, the governments in Slovenia and Croatia began to push for independence. Buoyed by local reactions to nationalist fervour in Serbia, nationalist governments were elected in both republics in the spring of 1990. Franjo Tudjman, a strong Croat nationalist with a long

36 Crnobrnja (1996) cites two examples: a 1990 newspaper article declaring “Serbs subjected to fascist genocide,” and a headline in a Slovenian daily stating “INA (the Yugoslav army) amassing troops for an attack,” which he says “completely fabricate(ed) the substance of the article” (pp. 119-20). Croatian leaders were commonly referred to, in Serb media, as “Ustasa” (Little and Silber, 1996). Edit Petrovic (1995) adds: “In the beginning of the conflict it was still possible to buy and read daily newspapers from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia in Belgrade and to watch television programs from parts of the disintegrating country. I remember being struck by the similarity of the media rhetoric used by all ethnic groups (‘we should defend our land; we should protect our national and historical borders; we are not going to leave our brothers outside of the republic borders; our people did not deserve this; we suffered enough; we have only deteriorated, regressed and declined in the post war Yugoslavia; we want what belongs to us, what is ours...’)” (p. 120).
history in the Croat nationalist movement and an “obsession... to deliver Croatian statehood” (Little and Silber, 1996, p. 84) became president of Croatia. Soon the red-and-white chequered Croatian flag, an ancient flag which had been used by the Ustase regime during World War II, was resurrected, Cyrillic street signs were removed (Malcolm, 1996; Little and Silber, 1996), and Serb police officers began to be dismissed. A draft constitution, produced two months after the election, “defined the state of Croatia as the sovereign state of the Croatian nation” (Little and Silber, 1996, p. 97) with no mention of Serbs or other minorities. These reminders of the last big war, combined with Serb media hysteria, led the large Serb minority in Croatia to fear a resurgence of the vividly remembered policies of the Ustase regime. The fear made it possible for extreme nationalist Serbs living in the Croatian Krajina, to gather support among Serbs in the region. In August 1990, within months of the Croatian election, the “Knin rebellion” in the Krajina, the first major acts of violence in what was to become the Croatian war, had begun (Little and Silber, 1996).

These examples illustrate how nationalist actions by one group created fear and reactions in other groups, pushing people into supporting nationalist politicians they might not otherwise support. Even those who might not normally identify primarily with ethnic categories and who supported common political structures, as many Croatian Serbs did during the 1990 election, felt threatened by nationalist rhetoric vilifying their group and by symbols insensitive to their historical experience.

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37 Tudjman was fired as Head Political Commissar in 1967 because of his nationalism. He was also jailed twice in crackdowns on nationalists. Tudjman was also clear in his “total disregard for Bosnia-Herzegovina... (which he declared to be) a ‘national state of the Croatian nation’” (Little and Silber, 1996, p. 86). Bosnian Muslims, in his view, were Islamicized Croats and had no claim to national status.

38 In the previous constitution, Serbs had been a “constituent nation of the republic of Croatia” (Little and Silber, 1996, p. 97).
In a similar fashion, the “ethnic cleansing” that was part of the logic of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, was intentionally self-reinforcing and created enormous gulfs between ethnic groups concerned. Ethnic cleansing is not the sadistic product of a few deranged criminals. Unspeakable acts of violence were carried out with the deliberate intention of making it psychologically impossible for people of different ethnicities to live together again or for the victims to return to their homes. As Little and Silber (1996) write:

Humiliation, terror and mental cruelty were almost universally deployed... The technique had a clear political purpose that went far beyond the sadistic gratification of the perpetrators, beyond, even, the desire to send hundreds and thousands of people fleeing. It was designed to render the territory ethnically pure, and to make certain, by instilling a hatred and fear that would endure, that Muslims and Serbs could never again live together. (p. 245)

Serb forces used ethnic cleansing as a means to capture the land that they claimed and to create a corridor between Serb-held territories. By November 1991, five months after Croatia and Slovenia had unilaterally declared independence, Serb rebels, with the help of the JNA, had captured a third of Croatian territory, mostly in the Krajina and Western and Eastern Slavonia. They cleansed ethnically-mixed Croatian towns such as Vukovar and Petrinja and created a land strip between the Krajina and the Glina region in central Croatia, the two largest Serb-held areas in the country. Half a million Croats and 230,000 Serbs had been forced to flee their homes. Similarly, Serb forces targeted a strip across north-west Bosnia, including Banja Luka and Bihac, as a way of uniting Serbia and the Krajina (Little and Silber, 1996).

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Groups targeted by “ethnic cleansers” included not only Muslims, Croats and Serbs, but also Roma. In January 1992, the European Union, pushed by Germany, reluctantly gave official recognition to Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. With the prospect of Croatian and Slovenian independence, Bosnia was forced to apply for independence or be swallowed up in a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia (Little and Silber, 1996).
Because the UN did not have a mandate to actively protect the victims, aid organizations and the UN ended up unwillingly helping the ethnic cleansers. In one instance UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) aid-workers escorted 7,000 surviving victims of the cleansing from north-western Bosnia, which was now under Serb control, into the Croatian city of Karlovac, which was under UN protection. As one aid-worker said, "We’re becoming collaborators... It’s blackmail. The choice we face is either to become agents of ethnic cleansing, or to leave tens of thousands of people to continue living their nightmare" (as cited in Little and Silber, 1996, p. 247).

The scale of the violence will affect victims, perpetrators and their families for many generations to come. While peace education attempts to address these wounds, the level of fear, complicity, stereotyping and anger, which are the legacy of ethnic cleansing and continuing propaganda, will take time and considerable effort to alleviate.

**Dayton and beyond**

By the end of 1995, a fragile peace had been agreed upon, but one that left Croatia primarily mono-ethnic and Bosnia ethnically divided. It is worth briefly reviewing these end results as they are relevant to a comparative analysis of projects in Croatia and Bosnia. The Dayton agreement provides the framework within which (or towards which) many of these educational projects operate.

In mid-1995, events took place in Croatia which enabled the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Over the past year, the Belgrade government had been feeling the weight of international sanctions, and rifts were beginning to appear between it and the Serb leadership in Bosnia and Croatia. In August 1995, when Croat troops entered the
Krajina, the Krajina Serbs had no help from Belgrade. Tens of thousands of Serbs fled and an estimated 500 were killed in Knin alone on the first day of fighting (Little and Silber, 1996).

In October 1995, Tudjman and Milosevic agreed that Eastern Slavonia, including the town of Vukovar, would be administered by the UN for an interim period and would eventually be handed over to the Croatian government (Little and Silber, 1996). (The hand-over finally occurred in January 1998). Little and Silber (1996) write:

> Four years after declaring independence, and promptly losing a third of its territory to its rebel Serbs and the JNA, Croatia emerged, in 1995, with the backing of the United States, as the great power in the region... Of the 600,000 Serbs who lived in Croatia in 1991, little more than 100,000 remained. The Serbs of Croatia had been part of the Croatian national identity, a legacy Tudjman wanted to destroy. (p. 381)

With the Croatian government's major concerns addressed, and Milosevic willing to cooperate, a Bosnia peace accord was possible. The Dayton Peace Agreement, the American-brokered agreement that ended the Bosnian war, was signed in November 1995. Some of the main features of the accord are as follows:

- Bosnia was divided into two entities, Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Each controls around half of Bosnia.  
- Although the Federation has jurisdiction over most internationally-related policy including foreign policy, trade, immigration, and monetary policy, each entity has its

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41 Little and Silber (1996) describe it as "the first stage in what would become, during the next few days, the biggest single forcible displacement of people in Europe since the Second World War" (p. 358). They cite one observer as saying, "The population of Knin fell from 35,000 to 40,000 to around 500 or 600 in less than twenty-four hours. It was chaos. Absolute chaos" (p. 358). Although Tudjman publicly said that "loyal" Serbs could stay, many elderly Serbs who stayed behind were killed even weeks after the Croatian army was in firm control of the area (Little and Silber, 1996).

42 The Federation controls 51% of Bosnia; RS controls 49% (Crnobrnja, 1996).
own parliament and is responsible for those governmental functions not specifically assigned to BiH, including judiciary and education (Crnobrnja, 1996).

- All displaced people and refugees “have the right to return to their homes of origin and have their property restored or else be compensated for its loss” (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 276).

- The international community agrees to provide military, financial, institutional and police training support (Crnobrnja, 1996).

Malcolm (1996), Crnobrnja (1996), Little and Silber (1996) all argue that the Dayton agreement, while ending the war and establishing some human rights criteria, entrenched ethnic divisions. Little and Silber (1996) write:

The rise of a powerful Croatia illustrated two aspects of the war and the peace that the US hoped to achieve to end it: it demonstrated that might rather than reason, brought rewards; and it showed that the carving out of ethnically pure territorial units produced neater maps on which to build a peace settlement. The war had been fought in pursuit of ethnic separation; the war would end only when that was achieved. To that extent, the Dayton talks represented the pursuit of peace through ethnic cleansing. The ramifications for those areas of former Yugoslavia (most of them now in Serbia) that were still ethnically mixed were ominous – casting a shadow over prospects for long-term stability. (p. 382)

Current situation

Today, Bosnia remains mostly ethnically divided. Although cities like Sarajevo remain ethnically mixed, smaller communities and cities like Mostar maintain the divisions. Mostar, for example, has a Croat side and a Muslim side, and the rickety

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43 Crnobrnja (1996) writes, “The Muslim and Bosnian Croat leaders lauded the agreement because, according to them, it spelled the end of the ‘Greater Serbia’ project. The Serb leadership (both in BiH and Serbia) agreed but with a different meaning of the word ‘end.’ For them recognition of the Serb Republic has cleared the road toward a ‘Greater Serbia,’ albeit smaller than originally envisaged and desired” (p. 276).

44 However even in the larger “cleansed” cities that I visited, such as Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, there are a few minorities. Some stayed throughout the war, others have returned. But generally being a
suspension bridges that connect the two communities (replacing centuries-old stone bridges, destroyed during the war) are apt metaphors for the feeble ties that bind them.

It is worthwhile describing Mostar here because it parallels the situation in most of Bosnia. On the Croat side of Mostar, one could just as easily be in Croatia. Croatian flags are everywhere and, at the time this research was being conducted, the currency was the Croatian kuna. On the Muslim side, the currency was the Bosnian dinar. A half-hour drive away, in the newly formed Republika Srpska, the currency was the Serbian dinar. Everywhere, the German deutsch mark can be used. Cemeteries are featured prominently in all communities.

It is extremely difficult to phone from West Mostar to East Mostar or visa versa. One phone call took me half an hour of repeated dialling. It is easier to call another country. Similarly, people described how difficult it is to phone the Republika Srpska from the Federation. It was not unusual for people to say they had been trying for days to get through. This is just one of the ways in which people are deliberately being prevented from communicating with people in regions dominated by other ethnic groups.

Another source of recent artificially-created division is language. Until this war, the people of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia all spoke Serbo-Croat, with minor regional variations. That was the language they were educated in and Bosnians describe learning to read and write it in school in both Roman letters and Cyrillic on alternating weeks before the war. Now, nationalist officials on all sides are dividing the language into three.

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In June 1998 a unified currency, the convertible mark, was introduced as the common currency of Bosnia. Similarly, in February 1998 a unified licence plate for motor vehicles was introduced as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

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Croat officials are finding old words or creating new ones to replace words they consider to be too Serbian. Bosnian nationalists are inserting ‘h’s in words where they didn’t appear before. Schools are expected to teach these new versions and students should learn the version that is ethnically appropriate to them (Uzelac, 1997). Although, for the most part, people still speak Serbo-Croat, nobody calls it that any more. In Croat-controlled areas it is called Croatian, in Muslim-controlled areas, Bosnian, and in the Republika Srpska and Serbia, Serbian. Otherwise it is called the “Local Language.”

Similarly, the formal education system is reinforcing divisions between ethnic groups. Although in October 1997 an attempt by the Bosnian Federation’s Croat and Muslim co-ruling governments to segregate Muslim and Croatian students was abandoned because of local and international protests, schools are still largely divided, if not in their attendance then in their curriculums. Even in the fairly multi-ethnic Sarajevo, schools are controlled by separate Muslim, Croat and Serb educational systems, each with a corresponding curriculum. In the Federation, “Little-known Muslim and Croat authors and poets dominate curriculums, displacing classic writers such as Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andric, for whom historical revisionism has been a disaster” (Walker, 1997). Children on the Republika Srpska side of Sarajevo are taught to think of the Federation territory as if it were “another foreign country” (Uzelac, 1997). Graphic, one-sided histories are taught to children as young as grade four, leaving no doubt who the “enemy” is46 (Walker, 1997,

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46 An unpublished translation from a mandatory grade four “Nature and Society” school curriculum unit (n.d.) used in Mostar identifies the “enemy,” and then reads, “Criminals started accomplishing their plans on the most horrible way. Terror dashed against the villages and town. Robberies, rapes and slaughters developed vastly. Screams and cries of wrecked ones were echoing from one end to another end of Bosnia.” This reinforces children’s trauma and entrenches ethnic divisions. The translation continues: “But there were people who fled of fear and weren’t ready to involve in defense of their country. People as such are waiting carelessly somewhere abroad for another ones to free the country, for them to return when the conflict finishes. This deserves the sentence because the act of not helping the bleeding country
Uzelac, 1997). As a result of these skewed curricula, segregation of students tends to occur without official enforcement. As a British educator working in Bosnia said, “Education is the political battlefield.” All sides are scrambling to implant their vision of Bosnia in the hearts and minds of children.

is betrayal and the worst crime” (Refugees and displaced persons, trans., Grade four “Nature and Society” school curriculum unit, n.d.). (Note: In this thesis I use many translations from Serbo-Croat into English. There are many grammatical errors in these translations. I will leave them as they are, without writing “(sic)” after them, to avoid disrupting their content.)
Chapter 3: Racism and ethnic chauvinism: Finding common ground

When television and newspapers first carried reports of ethnic genocide in Bosnia, most North Americans would have attempted to understand what was happening in terms of the construction of ethnic hatred that they know: racism. Indeed there are many parallels between the actions of the ethnic nationalists who carried out the slaughter and the violence of racist regimes: a dehumanizing of the “other”; an attitude of superiority by those doing the killing or discriminating; violence towards an individual based solely on ethnicity or race; enforcement of separation of ethnic groups on the same basis.

But ethnic nationalist conflicts are different from colonial racist conflicts and the difference is not simply one of degree of categorization. While attitudes and acts that result from the ideologies of racism and ethnic nationalist chauvinism are very similar and can be discussed using the same terms for both contexts, the ideologies themselves and the psychological processes that relate to them are distinct. This chapter will attempt to develop a framework for understanding those similarities and differences.

Racism as ideology

The idea of race is a relatively recent social construction. As Allport (1958) points out, most prejudice and persecution throughout history have been based on ethnicity and religion. Unlike ethnicity, however, race has no positive meaning. In practice, racists use certain visible physical features, such as skin colour, of an individual and attach to them essentialized notions of culture, character and ability (and corresponding views of worth and rights). Our understanding of racism has been shaped by three historical events and the extensive writing that arose from them.
First, racism was part of a specific historical economic project: that of establishing a captive, visible and cheap body of workers. It was developed in the 19th century, by people of European descent, as a “pseudo-scientific ideology of inferiority and superiority” (Adam & Moodley, 1997, p. 13). Its aim was to justify the exploitation for cheap or slave labour, and deprivation of political, social and economic power of people deemed to be of other races. This powerful historical experience led to the production over the years of a huge body of literature on the subjects of racism and colonialism which has greatly influenced the understanding of racism, discrimination and prejudice in societies which shared the colonial experience. Over the past century, in Canada alone, the discussion has gone from challenging legally entrenched inequities to challenging individual racist attitudes, and back to challenging ethnocentric structures which reflect unquestioningly the cultural and institutional heritage of European Canadians and do not reflect the experiences of other Canadian citizens.

Second, and relatedly, the same ideologies of racism and religious chauvinism were used to justify and facilitate the seizure of land from indigenous people around the world during the colonial era. This land appropriation was part of the same colonial and imperial systems that produced slavery and the ideology of racism no doubt facilitated the process.

47 In the 19th and 20th centuries, the extremes of colonialism, legally entrenched racial discrimination, and racially-based labour exploitation were headed on a collision course with the democratic visions that grew out of the Enlightenment and which were being espoused by European thinkers and leaders. Africans, Indians and North Americans of Chinese, Japanese, First Nations and African descent could not fail to see the hypocrisy of fighting for supposedly democratic ideals in World War II and returning to subservient colonized or second-class status back home. Although writers and leaders like W.E.B. DuBois, James Weldon Johnson, Mahatma Ghandi and many less known writers and intellectuals fought against racial discrimination before World War II, it was no coincidence that, after that war, anti-colonial and anti-discrimination writing and political activity gathered new momentum. Since then, a large body of post-colonial and anti-racism literature has emerged and a lively debate has ensued.
However, it is worth mentioning this experience separately because, in some ways, it bears greater resemblance to the use of ethnic nationalist ideologies to justify seizing land in Bosnia than to the racialized institution of slavery. In terms of the ideologies used to take this land, the main differences between the First Nations and Bosnian experiences are the category of discrimination used (race as opposed to ethnicity) and the consequent psychological processes involved in maintaining that ideology. (This will be discussed in chapter five).

Although much has been written recently about the First Nations experience in Canada, that literature has had a rocky relationship with the concepts of racism and multicultural citizenship. Its influence on the way racism is conceptualized and taught in North America has therefore been minimal. The reason for this is, perhaps, most easily illustrated by a pivotal event in Canadian governmental policy towards First Nations.

In 1969, prime minister Pierre Trudeau attempted to reform the Indian Act in favour of a “colour-blind” constitution. This move, which was praised at the time by most politicians and media as a “triumph for liberal justice” (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 144) was largely inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States and the spirit of racial equality that was growing in the United Nations.

First Nations people, however, were furious. In the discussion that followed, an important distinction was revealed between the experiences of historically exploited minority groups and conquered nations. When used against minority groups, such as African Americans and Chinese Canadians, racist ideologies ensured a captive and politically impotent labour market. By contrast, racist and religious chauvinist ideologies were used to deny conquered nations, especially First Nations, their right to land. The
former's initial demands of equality within a Eurocentric society, which had been the main goal of the American civil rights movement, did not meet the needs of First Nations communities. National groups within Canada, including French Canadians and First Nations, were not seeking equality within a Eurocentric or Anglocentric society dominated by the majority; they sought a degree of autonomy so that they could protect and develop their languages and cultures (Kymlicka, 1989). These groups felt that being lumped into a discussion on racial equality and multiculturalism would put them on the same footing as immigrant groups and diminish their special claim to national status. (This will be discussed in chapter four).

The third event that influenced our understanding of racism or ethnic chauvinism was the Nazi holocaust. In many ways the holocaust literature may provide the most useful vocabulary for describing and understanding the ethnic nationalist violence in Bosnia and Croatia. It is significant, however, that most literature on the subject uses the word “anti-semitism” instead of “racism,” again drawing a distinction between contexts.

**Ethnic nationalist chauvinism as ideology**

Ethnicity, in contrast to race, has a more concrete, identity-based meaning. Allport (1958) defined it well as “characteristics of groups that may be, in different proportions, physical, national, cultural, linguistic, religious or ideological in character. Unlike ‘race,’ the term does not imply biological unity” (pp. xi-xii). Thus, while people’s racial labels are immutable, they can change their ethnic identities, over generations, by adopting the main identifying characteristics of another ethnic group.
Therefore in multi-ethnic Bosnia, where people of different ethnic backgrounds have long mixed and converted from one religion to another, ethnic labels tend to be more representative of religion than ancestry and Malcolm (1996) could correctly observe, in a citation in chapter two: “modern Bosnian Serbs can properly call themselves as such, regardless of Vlach ancestry” (p. 81).

Yet although ethnicity is socially constructed and not biologically deterministic, perceived ancestral links are part of an individual’s construction of ethnic identity. While culture, language and religious beliefs may be some of the visible markers of ethnicity, not just any culture, language or religion with which an individual happens to identify is considered part of his or her ethnic background. Rather, one’s ethnic identity is related to the culture, language or religion of one’s parents, grandparents or ancestors.

Ethnic chauvinism is the belief that one’s own ethnicity is superior to others. Because its effects are very similar to those of racism, it is tempting to equate the two. However, there are important distinctions between ethnic chauvinism and racism. While racism was constructed as a formal ideology, ethnic chauvinism is not. The fear and dislike of strangers, especially those nearby and therefore in competition with the same resources, can be observed all over the world. This often manifests itself in stereotyping of, and prejudice and sometimes violence against, the “other,” and while it can be used by ideologies, like Nazi fascism, it does not, in itself, constitute an ideology.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is an ideology. And while it is not necessarily chauvinistic, it can – and in ethnic nationalist conflicts, it usually does – use chauvinism as a tool for dehumanising the “other” and invalidating the latter’s citizenship, and territorial, or other economic or political rights. Like racism then, ethnic nationalist
chauvinism can be described as an ideology used to achieve power and resources at the expense of a specifically targeted “other.” Those subscribing to that ideology can be referred to as ethnic nationalist chauvinists.

Wanting to be with people who share the same cultural or linguistic background, especially in the private realm, may be ethnocentric, but it is not necessarily racism or ethnic chauvinism. It is normal to want to socialize with people who share the same language, culture and values, whether they are defined ethnically, ideologically, religiously or in other ways (Allport, 1958; Adam & Moodley, 1997). Members of a religious community, for example, may want to have their children taught in a separate school which supports their values and beliefs. However, when desiring to be with one’s “own kind” becomes feeling oneself superior to other ethnicities, denying citizenship, membership or employment rights to others based solely on ethnicity, or preventing people from relating as they naturally would, according to what they feel they have in common, the otherwise admirable qualities of community loyalty can rightly be seen as racism or chauvinism. As Adam and Moodley (1997) write, “when such segregation is sought on grounds unrelated to the purpose of an institution or with the intent to exclude others for the purpose of privilege maintenance or exploitation, it is racist in its effects” (p. 13).

Similarly, a belief in an ethnic interpretation of nationhood, which will be discussed later, is not, in itself, chauvinistic. Indeed as we will see in chapter four, a nation-centred focus may provide a valuable rallying tool through which conquered nations or oppressed minority groups can politicize their members, demand recognition and control over their own resources, and push forward their legal claims. However when people of one ethnically-defined nation consider themselves superior to those of another ethnic nation or dismiss the legitimate claims to nationhood of people who define themselves as a nation on other grounds, usually in an effort take their land and resources or deny them political or economic influence, that may be considered chauvinistic.
The psychology of difference

A second important distinction between racism and ethnic nationalist chauvinism lies in the nature of creating an “other” in the minds of those discriminating. While racists use easy, visible physical variations in people to create a comfortable impression of difference, ethnic nationalist chauvinists have to work harder at the task. As people involved in ethnic nationalist conflicts often share very similar cultures, language, physical characteristics and values, ethnic nationalist chauvinists are usually obsessed with finding differences between the groups.

It has become cliché to point out how difficult it is, if not impossible, for a foreign visitor to distinguish a Serb from a Croat in Croatia; a Catholic from a Protestant in Northern Ireland, a Turk from a Greek in Cyprus, or a Canadian from an American, for that matter. Yet to a person from an ethnic or national group feeling the need to discriminate, the differences are obvious and extremely important.

This is a normal way for an individual or group to define identity and does not have to include a feeling of superiority. However, ethnic nationalist chauvinists will try to artificially create and enforce these differences, and ensure that they divide people who were not previously divided. One example is the division, by Croat, Serb and Muslim nationalists, of the one language, Serbo-Croat, spoken by most Yugoslavs before the war, into three languages: Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian, each with new words or new letters added and others eerily erased.

Psychoanalysts like Vlamik Volkan have made some interesting observations regarding the need to create difference and establish an “other.” These will be discussed in chapter five.
Ideologies in action: common ground

Adam and Moodley (1997) distinguish between racism as an ideology and racialism as an act. A person can hold racist beliefs and not act on them, and they can carry out racist acts without holding racist beliefs. One more distinction needs to be made: that between ideology (regarding a system and how people relate together), and attitudes or beliefs about targeted groups of people. The words “prejudice,” “stereotype,” “intolerance” and, in Bosnia and Croatia, “bias,” are commonly used to describe both racist and chauvinistic attitudes or beliefs about people, but they are devoid of recognition of any ideological background. Although stereotypes and prejudices are inherent in chauvinistic ideologies, they do not necessarily indicate that the latter exists. Many people hold stereotypes, biases and prejudices without subscribing to chauvinistic ideologies. Because of that, these words do not seem as satisfying as descriptors of ideological systems like racism or ethnic nationalist chauvinism as the richer vocabulary surrounding racism itself. There is the danger of mystifying common processes and setting double standards when common words are used that are too mild to fully capture the serious ideological or systemic implications behind chauvinistic attitudes or beliefs, or when completely different words are used where common words would be appropriate. The results of such double standards, cloaked in polite relativism, can be devastating.

A wider range of common words is available to describe racialism or ethnic chauvinist actions, including “discrimination,” “persecution,” “ethnic violence,” and

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49 These views are problematic and chauvinistic, but they are distinct from the ideology itself.
The use of these words will be limited more by political and social resistance to them than by the limits of the words themselves.

**Multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, human rights and citizenship**

In immigrant societies like Canada and the United States, where people have settled from all over the world, a discussion of citizenship often includes multicultural citizenship, and education against racism often addresses acceptance and inclusion of many cultural traditions in a multi-ethnic, multicultural state. In such a society, an ethnically diverse citizenry is taken as given and discussion often centres around how to represent, value, and intermix diverse cultural, religious and linguistic heritages.

The very notion of multi-ethnic co-citizenship in a nation, however, runs counter to the logic of the dominant ethnic nationalist framework that exists in the former Yugoslavia. Multi-ethnic citizenship education is perhaps a first step, stressing that people of different ethnicities can be co-citizens in the same nation, the same imagined community. This is different from recognizing that people of different ethnicities can administered under the same state apparatus, whose primary loyalty is to one dominant ethnic group. The state is a cold mechanism; the nation is an emotional bond of mutual recognition, appreciation and responsibility.

Education for multicultural citizenship asserts that people with different cultures and cultural traditions can be co-citizens in a nation. Multiculturalism is not necessarily the same as multi-ethnicity. People of different ethnicities can share the same day-to-day

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50 It should be noted, however, that physical genocide (as opposed to cultural genocide which involves the deliberate destruction of a culture) is not generally part of a racist system which attempts to capture a cheap source of labour. In such systems, the groups involved are interdependent: the dominant group relies on the discriminated group for its labour (Adam and Moodley, 1997). Racial, ethnic and religious genocide usually take place when groups are fairly independent of each other. As in Bosnia, one group may want the land, resources or political power of another or, as in the German holocaust, a group becomes a scapegoat.
culture while people who are grounded in different cultures – occupational, rural/urban, gender or age – can share the same ethnicity. Multicultural citizenship education facilitates cultural literacy and diversity appreciation regardless of the source of cultural difference. It also develops an understanding of the kind of governmental, social and economic support needed to maintain that diversity.

Similarly, human rights education, which is one of the most common forms of NGO education addressing interethnic relations in Bosnia and Croatia, is not the same as multi-ethnic citizenship education. Established human rights, as embodied in international and national charters and declarations, may represent a minimum that the signatories can agree on, but they remain an abstract ideal for most people in war-torn countries. It is one thing to talk about abstract, minimal rights that people all over the world ought to share; it is entirely another thing, and much more personally challenging in a post-war context, to discuss concrete rights of representation and citizenship for all state citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religion.

Summary

If the only differences between the concept of racism and that of ethnic chauvinism were that of category title, the difference between the words would be almost trivial and meaningless. To really understand where words and concepts describing racism and chauvinism can be used in common, a distinction needs to be made between the ideological level, the psychological level, and the attitudinal and action levels.

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51 In urban Bosnia, for example, people have long intermixed, both socially and often through marriage. Many institutions under communism were secular and a large portion of the population shared essentially the same culture. Even in rural areas, where the greatest traditionalism exists, day-to-day cultures were very similar.
Racism is an ideology whereas ethnic chauvinism alone is not. When ethnic chauvinism is combined with the ideology of ethnic nationalism, however, it is, similar to racism, a manipulative ideology designed to rid a certain target group of its power, and thus its resources, including its own labour and land. While both relate to power, the ideology of racism and the ideology of ethnic nationalist chauvinism must be seen as distinct.

Similarly at the psychological level, racism and ethnic chauvinism rely on different processes. The former uses visible differences to create the “other”; the latter demands “enemy thinking” (described in chapter five) and an obsessive need to create difference. At the attitudinal and action levels, on the other hand, racialism and ethnic chauvinism have much in common and the same words can be used to describe the same kinds of actions or attitudes in both categories. If these different levels are recognized, a more meaningful dialogue about terminology can take place.

Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between education for multicultural citizenship, education for multi-ethnic citizenship, and human rights education. Although all three are interrelated, they fulfill different roles. Multi-ethnic citizenship education promotes the acceptance and representation of multiple ethnic groups within the nation-state. Multicultural citizenship education promotes both an appreciation for the cultural diversity within a country and an understanding of the social, political and economic support needed to maintain that diversity. Similarly it must be recognized that human rights education is not a substitute for education about multi-ethnic citizenship. Discussion of human rights is fairly safe and abstract; the fine points of multi-ethnic co-citizenship, in a country just out of an ethnic civil war, hits much closer to home.
Finally, much of the writing and educational material on racism, prejudice and discrimination has been shaped by the colonial and imperial systems of labour exploitation, the legacies of which continue to this day. This may or may not be suited to other contexts of ethnic chauvinism. Educators and program developers from post-colonial countries need to understand that chauvinism may be different in other contexts; Bosnian and Croatian educators need to be aware of these historical and systemic differences in order to use or adjust material rooted in post-colonial countries.
Chapter 4: Nation and nationalism

The Bosnian and Croatian wars rested on the popular conception in the region that a nation is ethnically based. This differs significantly from the civically-based understanding of nationhood which prevails in North America and many European countries. Because of the central position ethnic nationalism played in this war, and because many foreign educators and trainers, and the anti-bias programs themselves, are rooted in civically defined nations, the differing concepts of nation and nationalism are worth reviewing in some depth.

Benedict Anderson’s (1991) famous description of a nation as an “imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 6) provides a useful starting point. Nations are imagined because, as members cannot possibly know all other citizens of the nation, the union must live in their minds. Common language, symbols, religion or sense of common ancestry often facilitate and reinforce this mental conception. Nations are, by definition, limited. If there are members, then there must be non-members. Even the largest nation has finite borders. And nations are sovereign, Anderson argues, because the first major nationalist movements arose out of the Enlightenment and out of democratic challenges to authoritarian dynastic rule. Perhaps more precisely, the concept of nation grew out of historic struggles for democracy, a structure which demands that citizens see themselves as having mutual interests and as being able to work together in national decision making. Finally, a nation is perceived as a community because it provides a form of equality among all its members. “Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1991, p. 7).
The nation, then, is not synonymous with the state. The state is concrete, the mechanics of government; the nation exists in the minds of the people represented. It is at once emotionally created and appeals to the emotional need to belong to a community. It draws from commonality between members of the in-group: symbols, language, history, heroes, even tragedies.

Unlike the popular usage in the former Yugoslavia, which equates “nation” with ethnicity or religion, the word nation is a flexible concept and should allow room for people to be bound by many identities and many types of cultural communities. It should incorporate the possibility of including all those who consider themselves to be co-citizens in a state. Where a specifically ethnic or civic conception of nationhood is being discussed, I will use the adjective “ethnic” or “civic” with it.

Nationalism is a politicization of the quality that binds a group together as a people: ethnicity, religion, language, ideology, geography and/or culture. Gellner (1983) defines it as “primarily a principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (p. 1). He declares that nationalism comes before nations:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality. (Gellner, 1983, pp. 48-49)

Civic nationalism claims that a nation is comprised of all citizens of a state, regardless of ethnicity. They may or may not be bound by a common culture, historical experience, or language, but they share a belief in a democratic process and institutions. Although a range of political systems have adopted a civic construction of nationhood from Scandinavian socialism and American conservatism to Brazil’s rich pluralism, it is
part of a liberal, individualistic philosophy which stresses that people should be able to pursue their own conceptions of "the good" as long as that pursuit does not infringe on the rights of others. Individuals should be free to forge their own identities. They should not only be recognized as equals under the law, they should understand themselves to be "the authors of the laws that bind (them)" (Gutman, 1994, p. ix).

Critics of the traditional liberal perspective argue that people are not isolated individuals; they develop their ideas and identities within their cultural communities. Sandel writes, "Liberals exaggerate our capacity to distance or abstract ourselves from these social relationships and hence exaggerate our capacity for, and the value of, individual choice" (as cited in Kymlicka, 1997, p. 1). Moreover, a liberal system is far from neutral. A *laissez-faire* approach often leads to an ethnocentric tyranny of the majority or the richest. The interests of minority communities are therefore not adequately represented by such a system (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1997).

Ethnic nationalists support this criticism of liberalism. They argue that ethnicity (and, by implication, ethnic culture) is central to who an individual is. A nation should therefore be ethnically defined. Political and social structures should be controlled by members of the ethnic nation as all nations have the right to self-determination. Each ethnic nation needs the power, resources and land base to protect the concerns of their members, no matter where they live. Those living within their own state apparatus should feel responsible for members outside their borders as they are all part of the same people. There is good reason for this. Within an ethnic nationalist framework, since a state only feels that it represents members of its ethnic nation, people of other ethnicities are generally on their own within their territory. During the Bosnian war, in a context of
hyper-ethnicization, for example, Bosnian minorities with well-organized and strong external protection, like Slovenian and Jewish-Bosnians, fared relatively well. The Roma, on the other hand, who had few external or internal resources, suffered a great deal (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Hercegovina).

The self-fulfilling logic of an ethnic nationalist framework explains part of the Serb expansionist project at the beginning of the war. Serb nationalists believed that Serbs would not be safely or properly represented until each group was united in its own state or was able to dominate the political structures of the existing state. They were proven right when, after the 1990 election of a nationalist government in Croatia, many Croatian Serbs were dismissed from their jobs and Croat ethnic symbols were resurrected (Little and Silber, 1996).

An ethnic and/or religious view of nationhood is popularly held in the former Yugoslavia. When people speak of ethnicity, they use the words “nation” or “nationality.” Groups such as Bosnian Muslims, even those who might otherwise hold a non-ethnicized, pan-Bosnian or pan-Yugoslav view of nationhood, are then forced to use the dominant, ethnic-nationalist framework. Lacking a strong, ethnically-based identity, they have had to claim a distinct national identity on religious grounds in an effort to fend off absorption by Serb and Croat nationalists who simply do not recognize Bosnia as a nation, and therefore deny the legitimacy of Bosnia as a state (Little and Silber, 1996; Malcolm, 1996).

Ethnic nationalism attempts to address laissez-faire liberalism’s neglect of the value of culture but, in the end, it adds to those concerns. It provides only two answers to the vulnerable minorities that the concerns are aimed at: secession or domination of one’s own state apparatus. It is an unapologetically ethnocentric framework in which each
group addresses the immediately perceived needs of its own. In a world that has long been a great mix of people, however, it does not provide sustainable systemic solutions to multiple identity needs. It operates both at the expense of minorities within a state and those citizens whose primary identity is not ethnically based.

It is worth discussing here Will Kymlicka’s illuminating attempts to address the concerns of cultural communities within what he claims is a liberal framework. Both his theoretical work and its weaknesses advance our understanding of the legitimate claims of cultural communities. Although he is primarily concerned with minority groups in North American immigrant societies, his arguments also enhance our understanding of the claims of ethnic communities in the former Yugoslavia.

Kymlicka (1989) argues that liberals should be concerned about “the fate of cultural structures, not because they have some moral status of their own, but because it’s only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value” (p. 165). When those structures are destroyed, as they were in Canada through the federal government’s assimilationist Indian residential school policies for much of this century, children lack adequate role models and the results can be devastating. Cultural membership should therefore be recognized as a primary good because of its connection with individual self-esteem (Kymlicka, 1989).

Existing cultural institutions *per se* do not have an inherent right to be protected. Members of a cultural community may choose to reject an institution without endangering the existence of the culture itself. Kymlicka (1989) provides the example of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec during the 1960s, when French Canadians rejected the dominance
of the Roman Catholic Church without threatening the existence of a French Canadian cultural community. However, a liberal government should provide additional protection or support for non-dominant minority cultures which are valuable in and of themselves yet cannot survive in competition with majority or market forces.

Kymlicka (1997) distinguishes between a minority ethnic group and a “nation.” He equates the latter with an ethnic group, a people or a culture, a “historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture” (p.11). He claims that his view of nationhood should not be descent based:

In talking about national minorities... I am not talking about racial or descent groups but about cultural groups. Such descent-based approaches to national membership have obviously racist overtones and are manifestly unjust. It is indeed one of the tests of a liberal conception of minority rights that it defines national membership in terms of integration into a cultural community, rather than descent. National membership should be open in principle to anyone, regardless of race or colour, who is willing to learn the language and history of the society and participate in its social and political institutions. (Kymlicka, 1997, p. 23)

Kymlicka (1997) cites the example of Germany, in which “membership in the German nation is determined by descent, not culture,” (p. 23) as such a descent-based system. However, while the distinction he makes between a culturally-defined nation and a descent-based nation may be a useful one, and one which is flexible enough to incorporate also religiously-conceived nations, in practice the examples that he gives: North American First Nations, Puerto Ricans, native Hawaiians, appear to be similarly determined descent-based nations. What distinguishes them from the ethnic nationalist

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52 Non-vulnerable minorities within the dominant group, such as white supremacists, have no such claim to extra support or protection. What is important here is relative power relationships (Kymlicka, 1989).
groups he finds problematic seems to be the distinctness of their traditional cultural foundation from the dominant cultures, and their minority and historically oppressed status.

When Kymlicka tries to distinguish the rights of ethnic minorities from minority nations within a country, he runs into difficulty. He raises three reasons why minority nations should have a permanent political identity or constitutional status which may involve self-government, a separate land base, and the ability to protect the community from outsiders:

- because their cultures are threatened by the dominant culture which may be inconsistent with minority cultural values,
- because of the history of oppression of these minority groups, and
- because these fully functioning nations were unwillingly absorbed into the modern state.

These three reasons need to be discussed individually.

Based on the relationship that exists between an individual's cultural community and his or her self-concept, there may be good reasons to protect and enhance those ethnic communities which, because of their minority position or disadvantaged economic position, could not otherwise survive within the dominant society. This would apply both to ethnic minorities and minority ethnic nations.

Ethnic communities and ethnic nations also may have similar rights to compensation for historical, ethnically-based (often racist) oppression. Although, the reasoning behind the racist oppression of African Americans and First Nations people in
North America may have been different, both experienced deliberate efforts to destroy their cultures. Both should be entitled to some form of financial, land-based or structural (institutional) compensation for the significant historical exploitation of their labour or land. They may also justly demand resources and affirmative action to attempt to repair the damage that has been done.

Neither of these arguments on its own distinguishes minority ethnic groups from those that claim national status. The claims that they make can be addressed under the same categories of minority cultural assistance, redress and compensation for past injustices, and affirmative action. Neither justifies permanent action should the disadvantaged position of the group change – for example if the minority group was eventually able to maintain its culture without government assistance. The third argument clearly distinguishes the two groups. Pre-existing nations which have been conquered or otherwise forcibly absorbed into a state apparatus may make a legal or moral claim to special representation, which may include language rights, land rights, separate institutions, or special representation in government. In any case, these are arrangements made to compensate for an illegal historical act.

Kymlicka's arguments point to the responsibility of the state in supporting disadvantaged minority groups, in particular those nations within the state to which it has legal and historical obligations based on past injustices. However, he does not distinguish between these three arguments when he defends the rights of minority ethnic nations to special representation. As a result, the claims are easily mixed and confused.

53 These claims may be, and indeed probably should be, negotiated and settled outside of the courtroom, but they are still guided by the standards of both international and national laws.
Kymlicka's discussion reveals that there is more than one form of nationalism. All ethnic nationalist movements will use the language of a nation under threat from outside forces, and their members will likely genuinely feel that threat. Most will talk about oppression. These have proven to be effective rallying calls and are useful in attempts to justify violent actions. However, there is a considerable difference between the claims of the clearly historically oppressed ethnic groups, such as First Nations, and those of expansionist nationalist groups such as Serb and Croat nationalists.

Similar to the rallying philosophies of other disempowered groups, including feminism and the black consciousness movement, which sought equality and the renewal of self-esteem for their members, nationalism may be useful for politicizing historically oppressed groups. Just as the female-centredness of the feminist movement has not damaged a male-dominated society and has permitted some long-overdue attention to be paid to women's concerns in the workplace or at home, First Nations, may justifiably promote a nationalist perspective. First Nations nationalism serves to unite and politicize First Nations people, advances self-government and long-existing land claims, and rebuilds undeniably devastated ethnic pride and confidence after years of discrimination and deliberate destruction of their cultural institutions by European Canadians.
Chapter 5

Loosening enemy bonds: Trauma, identity and reconciliation

Chosen traumas and the narcissism of difference: the contributions of psychoanalysis

It is often observed that the most violent conflicts of the past decade have been conflicts between people who are often so similar that an outsider cannot distinguish a member of one group from a member of another. Yet to many of those involved, the differences are blatant and tremendously important. To understand this, English-speaking Canadians need only think of the multitude of examples of differences they typically assert should an unsuspecting foreigner suggest that Canadians and Americans are basically the same. When this natural need to assert identity through identifying differences is compounded by competition for land, resources or representation, or by a history of enmity, the need for difference can become obsessive and destructive. Freud called the obsessive need to create barriers of difference the “narcissism of difference.”

Psychoanalysts Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) argue that, in an ethnic war, a group’s sense of its own ethnic identity is intimately tied to the negative identity that the group has created for the “enemy.” Children are often taught to think positively of their group in contrast with negative qualities projected onto a socially-shared “enemy” or “other.” Post (1996) writes:

There is a readiness in the human psyche to fear strangers and seek comfort with the familiar. Under duress, stranger anxiety and fear of the other mount, and the paranoid capacity to project hatred is mobilized. Significant others – parents, teachers, peers – sponsor “suitable targets of externalization” for the developing child, and “group-specific externalizations” tie the children together... The strangeness of some things (and the comforting familiarity of others) take on political significance as the child grows into adulthood. (p. 27)
This fear of the stranger and projection of hatred upon the other are the psychological foundation of the concept of the enemy. The crystallization of the shared comfort of the familiar is the psychological foundation of nationalism. (p. 27)

Such projected qualities are not reflections of the “other” at all; they reflect the fears of the person doing the projecting. It is significant that the same derogatory comments about “others” or “enemies” can be heard world-wide. Montville (n.d.) writes:

Almost always deeply rooted in the belief systems of ethnic and religious groups with a history of violent conflict are dehumanized images of the other side. Common beliefs are that the enemy is deceitful, aggressive, heartless, often sexually licentious, with unclean personal habits and incapable of change for the better. One way to define the goal of facilitated communication is to *delegitimise* stereotyped beliefs about the enemy by introducing new information which is cognitively dissonant, i.e. which challenges the negative stereotype. (p. 113)

Often, much has been invested in that enemy relationship, including much of the cultural content on which that identity bases itself. Challenging that enemy image, then, may seem to be a betrayal of the sacrifices of one’s family and ancestors. Tremendous social pressure can be applied against such a challenge as it not only upsets the individuals involved, but also those they care about.

As education which challenges nationalist chauvinism may seem to threaten an individual’s very identity, such education needs to be psychologically astute. Simply presenting a list of rights and moralistic arguments against chauvinism will not likely change internalized beliefs. Education needs to help individuals recognize, understand and confront their own biases and the biases of their communities. It needs to help them transform their identities into ones that are based on positive characteristics, not negative views of others.
Negative images of the “enemy” are not entirely created by projection, however. Such views commonly interweave projected images with a certain element of historical fact. As Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) write:

Thus, we understand Stein’s remark that the enemies of an ethnic group ‘are neither “merely” projections, nor are they “merely” real.’ They are both. The enemy who kills us is real, but he is also a reservoir of our shared projections supported by the people in our own group. (p. 6)

Some of this “knowledge” of the “other” may come from first-hand experience; some may come second hand, from media reports or the experiences of those we trust. In many cases, however, “knowledge” of a generalized “other” is passed on through generations, in the form of stories and myths, often highlighting humiliations and traumas imposed by a named “enemy.” As Ignatieff (1996) writes of Rwanda, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia:

…the past continues to torment because it is not the past. These places are not living in a serial order of time, but in a simultaneous one, in which past and present are a continuous mass of fantasies, distortions, myths and lies…
This makes the process of coming to terms with the past, this makes the whole business of healing, much more complicated than simply making the facts known and punishing the guilty. It means working through the inner recesses of the psychic systems of millions of people so that a serial sense of time replaces the nightmare of pure simultaneity. (p. 37)

Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) refer to these unresolved traumas as “chosen traumas.” They define these as “an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group” (p. 7). Although no group chooses to be victimized, groups do “‘choose’ to psychologize and mythologize – to dwell on the event” (7). The group incorporates the mental representation of the events into its identity and passes these on to future generations. As
Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) write, “mental representations of chosen traumas and defences against them become vital markers of ethnic identity. Once a trauma becomes a chosen trauma, the historical truth about it does not really matter” (p. 7).

It was such a chosen trauma, dating back more than 600 years, and a sense of loyalty to the sacrifices of ancestors that Slobodan Milosevic appealed to in his famous speech in Kosovo Polje in April 1987, described in chapter two. As the site of the legendary battle of the Serbian army against the Ottoman Turks in June 1389, the choice of Kosovo Polje as the starting point for the push for Serb control of the Yugoslav government was not coincidental. It was a place of special meaning to Serb nationalists despite the fact that Serbs comprised only an estimated 10% of the Kosovo population.54

Also unresolved for many Serbs were the memories of Ustase “cleansing” of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and the murder of Jews, Roma, Serbs and Croatian communists in Ustase work camps during World War II. These were never properly addressed after the war, when the Yugoslav Communist government was in power. Communist education focused on the victorious Partisan war against the German Nazis rather than on the divisive civil war between Ustase, Cetniks and Partisans (Ignatieff, 1994).

Montville (n.d.1) writes that victimhood is typified by three main components: “a history of violent, traumatic aggression and loss; a conviction that the aggression was unjustified by any standard” (p. 113); and “a deep rooted fear that without explicit acknowledgement that the acts were a crime by any standard, the aggressor is simply waiting for another opportunity to commit the crime” (n.d.2, p. 7).

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54 It is not possible, at the time of writing this, to determine the demographic composition of Kosovo because of the current fighting there.
Unlike Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitsky's public acceptance of responsibility for the complicity of Austria in the Holocaust (Montville, n.d.2, p. 8), there was no public acknowledgement by Yugoslav political leaders of the responsibility of their historical communities for wounds inflicted on other groups. Lacking public acknowledgement of responsibility for historical acts of genocide in the not-so-distant past, Croatian Serbs had good reason to believe that such events could recur. In 1990, the Croatian government began dismissing Serb police and judiciary from their jobs and the *Ustase*-linked, red-and-white chequered shield, the Sahovnica, was resurrected on the state flag\(^{55}\) (Ignatieff, 1994). These moves, combined with alarmist reports by Serb media and memories of the genocide, first hand or passed down through stories, caused a sense of panic among many Croatian Serbs (Little and Silber, 1996).

Time alone does not eliminate chosen traumas. Steps toward reconciliation need to take place, including public acknowledgement of what happened and acceptance of responsibility for the damage that was done. Chosen traumas also need to be mourned on both an individual and group basis. Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) write:

> A group is (not) like a flesh and blood organism, but its members will share reactions to drastic events... When drastic losses occur, the survivors experience unconscious guilt for outliving the relatives, friends, or important other persons who have perished. Depending on the impact of the event, society will provide means to perform a shared work of mourning... But, under certain circumstances, mourning may be very difficult. The victimized group may be too humiliated or too angry to mourn... (The) inability to mourn a chosen trauma and the evolution of shared mental defences against it will influence the social and political ideologies of large groups. In effect, an attitude is created that says: 'We have been hurt enough. Now we should be given what others owe us.' This may result in a new generation embracing an ideology of entitlement. (pp. 8-9)

\(^{55}\) The Sahovnica was a traditional Croat emblem but it was also the emblem of the *Ustase* regime.
The paradox, Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) say, is that reactivating a chosen trauma may increase the self-esteem of the group. Members of the group may take on the project of trying to “repair” the trauma of their ancestors (p. 9). These factors may lead individuals and groups dealing with unhealed traumas to be particularly susceptible to the influence of nationalist rhetoric.\(^{56}\)

As John Mack argues, chosen traumas may lead to the “egoism of victimization,” in which the traumatized group may have little or no empathy for (its) enemy’s losses, ‘even if the victimization on the other side is palpably evident and comparable to or greater than one’s own... The lack of empathy, the inability to identify with the anguish experienced by the members of a national group toward whom one bears hostile feelings, removes one of the central deterrents to... waging war’” (as cited in Itzkowitz and Volkan, 1994, p. 10).

Milosovic’s speech and the stories and symbols of chosen traumas all appeal to moral virtues. They appeal to co-operation, caring for loved ones, commitment to community and religion, personal sacrifice for a higher ideal, and loyalty to past and future generations. As Bateson and Hinde (1989) point out, these virtues, more than individual aggression, support the “institution of war”\(^{57}\) (p. 11) and are used to justify otherwise unthinkable actions. In studying soldiers’ attitudes towards war, they found that: amongst the combatants, aggressiveness plays only a small part, as ex-soldiers will testify, though some may enjoy the excitement or companionship of military life. Propensities to co-operate with others and to obey superiors, potentiated by feelings of nationalism, are certainly

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\(^{56}\) Similar to chosen traumas, groups have “chosen glories” which also are greatly mythologized. A chosen glory is described by Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) as “an event that induces in the members of a group intense feelings of having been successful or of having triumphed deservedly over the members of another group” (p. 10). Both chosen traumas and glories, conveyed through storytelling, festivals and history lessons, are an important part of instilling a sense of identity in a child. Both are easily tapped by ethnic nationalist rhetoric.

\(^{57}\) In describing what they mean by “institution of war,” Bateson and Hinde write, “Modern war is properly considered as a human institution in which the individuals have specific roles, each with its attendant rights and duties” (p. 11).
crucial. They may also hope for individual rewards at the end of the war. Primarily, however, they fight because of their beliefs. They believe that by so doing they can avoid a worse fate and protect their loved ones and values they hold dear. (Bateson and Hinde, 1989, p. 11)

Bateson and Hinde (1989) argue that education needs to make students aware of the ways their behaviour and beliefs may be influenced by the institution of war. It needs to expose:

... the psychological mechanisms at work in the creation of the enemy image and in other processes whereby the institution of war influences individuals. At the same time it must promote knowledge of other peoples to render the acquisition of an enemy image less likely in the future (Bateson and Hinde, 1989, p. 14).

**Trauma healing**

The existence of unresolved current or historical trauma, then, may influence chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. Education against chauvinism in a post-war environment typified by trauma needs to be sensitive to the nature of trauma healing. Non-governmental organizations in Bosnia have responded to this by making trauma healing programs a major target area of their peacebuilding efforts. Psychosocial work is valued not only for the health benefits of the individual but also because of the cyclical link between unhealed trauma and violence.

According to psychological theory, people usually integrate routine experiences into their memory at many levels: visual, behavioural, verbal, and somatic. Some events, however, are too traumatic to integrate. As Semeniuk (1995) explains:

In a kind of self-protective reflex, the mind fragments or dissociates the information. Sometimes we deny or “forget” the traumatic event at a verbal level, but it haunts us in our visual memory, erupting in flashbacks or nightmares. Sometimes the behavioural level of memory will force us into

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58 This is not to say that all chauvinism is rooted in trauma – even all chauvinism within a war context. A chauvinistic ideology used only to gain power is distinct from chauvinism rooted in historical trauma, even though both might use the language of fear.
a repetition of the event... And sometimes we will recall the event only at
the somatic level, suffering stomach pain or headaches. (p. 42)

A traumatic experience which is too overwhelming for an individual may be
mentally set aside until it can be gradually integrated into the victim’s own life story. But
while the trauma is not being dealt with, it often resurfaces in physical ailments, feelings of
depression or aggression, repetitive acting out or telling of an undeveloping, unchanging
story, or, often, a desire for revenge. In that stage the trauma controls the individual; he
does not control it (Semeniuk, 1995).

Semeniuk (1995) observed children in the Gaza Strip acting out their war traumas
and experiences, over and over, in a game of “Arabs and Jews” which they played on a
daily basis. The game never really changes or develops and does not help the children
recover from their trauma. However, play can also facilitate trauma healing. Therapeutic
play can help children integrate their experiences of trauma into their life story. He writes:

Through the slow, sensitive process of play therapy, children can use props
to draw on both the verbal and behavioural levels of memory to reconstruct
a traumatic incident. By remembering it precisely and perhaps play-acting
some kind of control over it, they can stop denying or avoiding it and can
transform it from a haunting memory into a comprehensible event
(Semeniuk, 1995, p. 43).

If such trauma is not integrated, however, a cycle of violence can occur which can
last for generations. Semeniuk (1995) cites psychiatrist Eyad el-Sarraj, founder of the
Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, who writes that such cycles of violence can
be witnessed in the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Israeli-occupied territories:

The Israelis, survivors of a long history of persecution... are still bearing
the scars of victimization... which culminated in the horrors of the
Holocaust... Violence has to end with the victim... If we want to stop the
Palestinians from humiliating and violating their own children with the
anger of the Nazis against the Jews that was then projected onto the
Palestinians, we have to empower the victim in order to break the cycle. (as cited in Semeniuk, 1995, p. 46)

Barry Hart, an educator who has worked with war victims in Northern Ireland, Liberia, Croatia and Bosnia, presents a model, illustrated in diagram 5.1, based on one by Olga Botcharova, depicting the cycle of violence which occurs in war-torn areas and a possible route to recovery. This model operates at both an individual and community level.

According to the model, after suffering or witnessing an act of aggression, individuals typically experience feelings of denial, anger and depression. They also commonly want revenge, a feeling which is often reinforced by similar desires of other victims of aggression within the community. Thus, the trauma takes on a social momentum which often reinforces it. Together, the group may develop a story of events, similar to that in the grade four curriculum cited in chapter two, which mythologizes the trauma in the form of a chosen trauma. This often includes the creation and glorification of martyrs to the cause in stories which may attempt to justify retaliatory acts of aggression. Such justification is supported by the egoism of victimization described above.

This cycle can be a reinforcing trap, especially as retaliatory violence often provokes the same cycle of victimization and violence in the “enemy.” This trap is represented in the diagram by a person or group repeatedly going around the inner circle. In a game of tit for tat which can be witnessed in many conflicts around the world, it soon becomes unclear and irrelevant who started the violence and why. To end the violence, according to the model, the cycle needs to be broken by beginning a process of grieving,
Breaking the Cycle of Violence

Diagram 5.1

Barry Hart (1997)
which is facilitated by groups and individuals acknowledging and taking responsibility for crimes that were committed.\textsuperscript{59}

Based on his educational work on trauma in Liberia, Hart (1995) feels that dealing with trauma through educational programs enables participants to address the “primordial issues and situational conditions” (p. 216) that contributed to the conflict and continue to shape it.

This new self/group knowledge becomes important for aiding comprehension of the development of and reasons for “self-enhancing” and “protective” stereotyping within and across group boundaries – before and during the war – as well as how certain malignant stereotyping leads to “enemy thinking” and eventually to conflict and acts of violence (p. 217).

By informing people of the natural feelings that follow trauma, they might begin to understand their feelings of revenge, for example, as a “universal urge”... brought on by trauma, but not something that has to remain pre-eminent and/or permanent with traumatised persons/groups. The desire for revenge can be, through a thorough healing and problem-solving process, greatly reduced and even eliminated over time” (Hart, 1995, p. 217).

Hart (1995) argues that addressing issues like stereotyping and prejudice by centring the discussion on war and war-related trauma also “levels the playing field or creates common ground and power equality among average citizens”\textsuperscript{60} (p. 216). While it must be cautioned that Hart is referring to a specific war context in which few people were left unscarred, he raises an important point. In a war like the latest war in Bosnia,

\textsuperscript{59} War victims who commented on the diagram said that the feelings depicted in the outer circle are not the simple continuum that the drawing implies. In fact, a person might go back and forth between the inner and outer loops or within the outer loop many times before he is able to recover from the trauma.

\textsuperscript{60} I do not agree that focusing on the effects of war and trauma creates a situation of power equality among participants. Power dynamics are always present.
there may be a clear overall group of aggressors and some nationalists may have been motivated by a chauvinistic ideology, but the experience of the average Bosnian of any ethnicity was typified by trauma, fear and considerable loss. For primarily this reason, all educational programs I came across in Bosnia made no distinctions, or assumptions of guilt or victimhood, in their approach to educating or training people of different ethnicities.

Trauma healing and reconciliation

*What does it mean for a nation to come to terms with its past? Do nations have psyches the way individuals do? Can a nation’s past make a people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? Conversely, can a nation or contending parts of it be reconciled to its past as individuals can, by replacing myth with fact and lies with truth?* (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 168)

Trauma healing not only contributes to personal and community health, it also helps re-establish healthy relationships between individuals and communities. Trauma healing education may contribute to reconciliation but it is not the same as reconciliation.

This becomes apparent especially at the individual level. A person can finally manage to grieve her loss and incorporate her traumatic experience into her life story so that the anger and despair over the event no longer control her, but that does not mean that she will be willing to, or should, have a relationship with the individual who perpetrated the crime against her. As she begins to mourn and release her anger, however, she may re-examine the stereotypes that may have been created out of that anger, those which hold whole communities responsible for acts perpetuated by a few. In other words,

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61 While this approach might be appropriate in such contexts as Bosnia, Croatia, Northern Ireland, Liberia and possibly Israel and Lebanon, it would not be an appropriate approach to addressing white racism in South Africa or chauvinism in the context of political oppression as in Chile. In spite of possible individual losses by an oppressive elite, there can be no claims to a level playing field based on trauma in such a context.
she may hold individuals accountable for the crime instead of a generalized community. She may then be able to reconcile with that community, developing positive relationships with its members.

Individual trauma healing and reconciliation are difficult, however, if the group the person belongs to continues to hold its chosen trauma. In Croatia, for example, graphic flashbacks of the war were played repeatedly on national television. In schools in Bosnia, children are retraumatized as they are taught about the brutality of their “enemies.” Such environments inhibit individual trauma healing and do not necessarily end the cycle of hatred and revenge aimed at a stereotyped “enemy” in future generations. Clearly the trauma also needs to be mourned and incorporated into a story at the very public, community level.

Just as public clinging to chosen traumas can impede individual trauma healing, public acknowledgement of the crimes committed and support for retribution assists trauma healing of individuals. Chancellor Vranitsky’s public apology for the Austrian complicity in the Holocaust demonstrates that the public nature of acknowledgement and retribution is important. Formal public acknowledgement, both of what was done and that it was wrong, goes a long way toward enabling victims to begin the grieving process. It also sets a moral standard that encourages members of perpetrating groups to reflect on their roles and responsibilities in the crimes that took place.

Jean Paul Lederach (1997) conceives of reconciliation as a social space, a “point of encounter… between the open expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the articulation of a long-term interdependent future, on the other hand” (p. 29). He identifies truth, mercy, justice and peace as enabling reconciliation but
acknowledges the tensions and paradoxes that exist between them. Truth, he says, is the “acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences” (p. 29) but it is paradoxically linked to mercy, or the “need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning” (p. 29). Similarly justice, which requires restitution, social restructuring and respect for individual and group rights, is tied to peace which stresses interdependence, security and well-being. He represents this model in diagram 5.2:

![Diagram 5.2](image)

As this illustration indicates, reconciliation after an intergroup conflict involves both the private and community levels. Healing, forgiving, compassion, respect and remorse (the latter of which is not mentioned in the model) are personal. Nobody can forgive for anyone else or require someone else to forgive. But there is a complex interrelationship and interdependence between the public and private aspects of the reconciliation process, noted above, and between the components (truth, mercy, justice and peace) that facilitate the reconciliation. These are represented in the diagram by dotted arrows.
According to Lederach (1997), reconciliation centres around a *relationship* between conflicting communities and between individual members of those communities. He writes:

> That relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long term solution... Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups' affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship.” (Lederach, 1997, p. 26)

Lederach applies a conflict transformation model to his peacemaking work. The model is centred on the continuing relationship between the parties in conflict. There will always be tensions and conflicts that arise within a relationship; the important thing is the way in which the parties respond to the conflicts when they do arise. The goal of peacemaking and of reconciliation efforts, according to the conflict transformation model, must be to transform a polarized, acrimonious relationship into a more collaborative one in which dialogue and mutual acknowledgement are present (Lederach, 1995). Diagram 5.3 illustrates what this might look like.

The arrow in the diagram represents the continuing relationship between conflicting parties or groups. The space in the arrow indicates the many ways in which conflicts can be handled. The approaches listed on the left side of the arrow indicate confrontational ways of handling conflict which are typical of war. These are unlikely to improve the relationship between the conflicting groups and do not usually produce just or sustainable resolutions of conflict issues. Instead, victory is seen as weakening or inflicting harm on the “enemy” and emphasizing one’s own victimhood. The approaches

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62 Even in a war, even when people go to great lengths to separate communities, a relationship exists between the groups involved.
listed more to the right side of the arrow indicate more collaborative approaches to
dealing with conflict which are more likely to lead to an improved relationship and more
sustainable solutions.⁶³

During a war, the relationship between conflicting groups is characterized by a
lack of dialogue, polarized positions, blaming the “enemy,” attempts to justify away one’s
own crimes, and a dehumanization of the enemy in the form of derogatory stereotypes. At
this point the enemy is not an individual. He is one of a mass of people who are usually
depicted as both threatening and inferior. Chauvinism, whether based in ideology or not,
needs to be understood as this form of dehumanization.

The efforts of peace workers, including peace educators, must be to transform this
polarized relationship towards one where dialogue and mutual recognition and
acknowledgement can take place. The parties do not need to agree with each other, but
they need to be willing to listen. Through this process, they will begin to rehumanize the
“other,” seeing them as individuals with whom they share commonalities. Thus Hart, who
uses this approach, stresses the common ground of trauma-related experiences shared by
people who have lived through war, whether they were victims, attackers or both.

The relationship between the conflict transformation process and educational
programs addressing ethnic chauvinism is illustrated in diagram 5.4. Educational
methodologies, aimed at addressing chauvinism in some way, are presented in stages in
relation to the steps they facilitate in the conflict transformation process. The diagram

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⁶³ By listening to others’ concerns and by having their own concerns listened to, they may begin to work
collaboratively to resolve what they now see as common problems. Because both sides have been involved
in the actions taken to resolve the problems, they are more likely to accept, carry out, and understand the
solutions.
suggests, for example, that in a highly polarized society, educational programs will need to be designed to prepare people for dialogue and to address the enemy thinking and trauma that lead to a lack of dialogue. Educational programs in stage one, therefore, may need to prepare individuals for stage two in the conflict transformation process. Programs appropriate for later stage social relationships where there is dialogue, mutual acknowledgement and a willingness to collaborate may be ineffective or even counterproductive when groups are still highly polarized. The reverse, however, would not hold. Education suitable for a highly polarized environment, such as trauma healing education or active learning, may continue to be useful after intergroup dialogue and a collaborative relationship have been well established.

Stage one educational programs can play an important part in assisting the first step of conflict transformation from a polarized, divided society (the left-hand column in the conflict relationship arrow of diagram 5.4) toward the beginning of dialogue (the middle column in the conflict relationship arrow). In Bosnia, NGO programs create some of the few forums where people of different ethnic backgrounds can meet, talk and listen while they address common needs such as trauma, civil society development, or development of active learning skills. As participants share experiences, note commonalities, and acknowledge each other’s losses and pain, they begin to see each other as human beings with similar fears and feelings. Thus respectful dialogue alone in this context can be seen as a form of anti-chauvinism education.

Stage two educational programs which specifically aim at educating about prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination, can develop a deeper understanding of how chauvinism works, as well as greater media and political literacy. At this level, discussion
may centre on chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. Chauvinistic ideological and institutional structures and “common sense” ways of thinking are not yet examined.

Once people are listening to and acknowledging each other, they can begin telling their stories and can work towards developing a shared history. As they become less defensive, the theory suggests that they will be more receptive to stage-two educational programs which teach concepts relating to human rights, chauvinism, media and government. These concepts help participants critically examine their own roles in the conflict and take responsibility for those roles. They can agree to work collaboratively when problems and conflicts arise (the right-hand column depicted in the conflict relationship arrow). Finally, with the help of stage-three educational programs, they can begin to re-examine institutional systems and hegemonic ways of thinking that inhibit dialogue and the building of a just relationship.

At this third stage, education against ethnic nationalist chauvinism can be effective at three levels:

1. It can help people learn to solve problems and address tensions collaboratively while building and maintaining a positive relationship as described in the conflict transformation model.

2. It can support fact-finding and information-sharing mechanisms to help people develop a shared view of the history of the war.

3. And it can encourage naming, understanding and examining “common sense” or hegemonic ways of thinking, such as ethnic nationalism, ethnocentrism, and enemy thinking, which are either explicitly chauvinistic or chauvinistic in their implications.

It is worth briefly discussing the latter two levels here.
Finding a shared history

As Ignatieff (1996) points out, finding a common history is not a matter of finding a compromise story. Mechanisms need to be developed that help determine a common set of objective facts about the war. This can involve official means of putting events on record such as truth commissions, war crimes trials, and studies by reputable historians, journalists, writers and film makers.

Such inquiry and education can also take place at a less formal level, in which groups of people can share stories in an effort to determine a common view of the events of the past. Montville (n.d.2) describes “psychologically sensitive problem-solving workshops” (p. 9) for community leaders and historians as one way of developing a shared history. This important historical work provides a foundation for intergroup co-operative efforts. Further,

After initially creating a sense of safe space for the participants, psychologically sensitive third parties will attempt to make room for them to walk through history with each other... (encouraging) the thoughtful expression by representatives of each side of the unhealed wounds in their historical relationship. (Montville, n.d.2, p. 11)

This is almost always a profound learning experience for each side since victimizers traditionally employ the psychological mechanism of avoidance and denial of unpleasant truths about their behavior and that of their forebears. And victims are ordinarily so intensely absorbed by their own losses that they rarely understand the complexities and moral ambiguities their oppressors might have experienced in the past. It is especially important to consider the fact that the victimizers may also have been victims at some point. This is why revision of history books – getting the story straight – is common in successful political reconciliation processes. (Montville, n.d.2, pp. 11-12)

Challenging hegemonic ways of thinking

When people are situated or “centred” in a society that is dominated by their own culture, the dominant ways of thinking and doing things may appear to be natural or “just
common sense.” In an ethnic nationalist environment, it may appear to be common sense that people should only socialize and live with their ethnic group; in other societies people may not even know or care about the ethnic background of their friends and colleagues and such divisions do not seem natural at all. When a person is centred in a culture without contact with contrasting frameworks, his own frameworks and customs may appear invisible and outside the possibility of questioning. These frameworks are not recognized as belonging to a certain social and historical context. They are seen as natural. Education can encourage examination of such common sense or hegemonic ways of thinking, especially those which may lead to injustice or enemy thinking, rendering them visible and open to questioning. Anti-chauvinism education can facilitate critical examination of frameworks, such as ethnic nationalism, which may be explicitly chauvinistic or chauvinistic in their implications. At the same time it can encourage examination of ways institutions and systems reflect these biases and perpetuate chauvinism.

Being centred in a dominant culture may also blind one to the cultural imbalance in one’s society and to the threat that one’s culture poses to non-dominant groups. English-speaking North Americans with European cultural roots, for example, cannot fully appreciate the degree to which they dominate North American society because, again, much of their culture seems to be natural or common sense. For this reason, they are also unlikely to understand the degree of threat that unity with less dominant cultures poses for those cultures unless steps are taken to rectify the imbalance.

Similarly, many Serbs have long argued for a unified Yugoslavia, but Serb nationalists argue – often using the language of equal rights and ancestral loyalty – for a
Yugoslavia that is, in effect, Serb dominated. Because they are immersed in the dominant culture, many Serbs may not recognize that there is an imbalance, and that an unbalanced, unified state may offer fewer opportunities for other communities to develop their own cultures. The distorted perception caused by the cultural centring of dominant groups may have contributed to the frustration of all communities in the years leading up to the war. Stage three education might benefit from exposing this natural process.

Finally, the theory on trauma, grieving, and conflict transformation are interrelated as they relate to post-war anti-chauvinism education. An individual or community's approach to conflict and their relationship with members of the enemy group will be strongly influenced by their level of trauma healing and the degree of security that people feel. A society which is still caught in the cycle of revenge depicted in diagram 5.2 can be expected to be highly polarized and lacking dialogue between conflicting groups. Members of the enemy group will often be dehumanized in stereotypes. The theory suggests that when people and communities begin to grieve their traumas, they are in a better position to “rehumanize” members of historical enemy groups and deal with conflict collaboratively. Similarly, a community in which the threat of violence is high will more likely be highly polarized. Dialogue and self-reflection are easier in a more secure environment.

Conclusion
The preceding theoretical discussion indicates that chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour in a post-ethnic-war environment may be shaped both by a problematic ethnically-based understanding of nationhood, and by a history of mutual enmity and unresolved trauma at the individual and community levels. In this context, education
against chauvinism needs to incorporate, or be closely linked to, trauma healing and conciliatory processes. In other words, the degree to which individuals and their communities are suffering from trauma, and the stage that they are at in the reconciliation process may determine the nature and success of anti-chauvinism programming.

We normally think of trauma healing as suitable for the victims of violence, and anti-chauvinism or anti-racism education as appropriate for the perpetrators of ethnically-based violence or discrimination. However, in a context of tit-for-tat ethnic violence or when the perpetrators have also been historically traumatized, as in Israel, the two may be closely linked.

The theory suggests that existing frameworks of thinking about nationhood, identity and citizenship which may contribute to chauvinism, and institutional structures that reflect those hegemonies, must be examined as part of anti-chauvinism education. However, there appears to be a definite order in which educational methods which challenge chauvinism should occur. Theory on conflict transformation, trauma and reconciliation, for example, indicate that such discussion will be most effective after some degree of intergroup dialogue and mutual acknowledgement has occurred and after attitudinal and behavioural aspects of chauvinism have been discussed.

As Bateson and Hinde argue, feelings of family and group loyalty and construction of ethnic identity are closely tied to the enemy relationship itself, resulting in tremendous feelings of guilt by those who challenge conceptions of the enemy group. Educators will need to help people recognize these influences and construct positive social identities without relying on negative views of others. Through political and media education,
students can also be helped to recognize ways in which the institution of war manipulates positive feelings of love, loyalty and protectiveness to gain support.
Chapter 6: Research Methodology and Findings

Data collection
During my six-week stay in Bosnia and Croatia in January and February 1998, I contacted many NGOs, inquiring about whether they had, or knew of, educational programs which attempted to address inter-ethnic hostilities in some way. I then arranged interviews with educational project co-ordinators and administrators. The objective of these interviews was to collect written documentation of their educational programs and to gather information which might be useful in understanding the nature of the programs as they attempt to improve interethnic relations and/or address chauvinism.

I initially focused on international NGOs as that enabled me to gather information in languages that I speak. This approach not only informed me about projects, it also gave me a good overview of the Bosnian and Croatian NGO contexts.

In finding these agencies, I relied heavily on word of mouth and the invaluable ICVA Directory of humanitarian agencies operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia (1997). ICVA, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, also publishes a list of microprojects that it supports, a useful resource for helping me locate local NGOs.

During the second half of my stay, I visited mostly local NGOs. In many cases I could speak English or German with the project co-ordinator but I also hired Bosnian translators to set up appointments and interpret when interviews were conducted in the local language. A translator also accompanied me to a two-day librarian’s workshop in Lipik, Croatia.
Because of time constraints, I focused my efforts in Bosnia on NGOs with offices in Sarajevo. Many programs working around the country, especially within the Muslim/Croat Federation but also, to a lesser degree, in the Republika Srpska, have their headquarters there. Where I went to other cities in the Federation, namely Mostar and Zenica, it was specifically to visit a project which had been highly recommended to me. I also spent a day in Banja Luka, in the RS, and was able to visit four organizations there. My only other visit to RS was during a school visit to Ljubinje, about a half-hour drive from Mostar, where I attended an afternoon CARE-sponsored workshop for teachers. Similarly, the data I gathered in Croatia was centred in Zagreb, the capital. The Lipik workshop was the only exception to this.

This was an efficient way of gathering information about projects but it limited my perspective to that of urban, fairly cosmopolitan centres. As my research continued, I began to see that this urban-centredness, while convenient, was both problematic and a possible indication of some of the weaknesses of projects I was looking at.

Another limitation of my research in Bosnia is that the data was collected primarily in Muslim-dominated areas. The divided city of Mostar and Serb-dominated Banja Luka were exceptions to this. Although I interviewed people of all three main ethnic groups, as one program administrator in Bosnia cautioned, "Geography is everything here." It is in the interest of members of minority groups in a region to promote multiculturalism and human rights. Members of the same group may not feel the need to support those rights in areas which they dominate.

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64 I did not ask people about their ethnicity but some told me in the course of our discussion.
I do feel, however, that the information I gathered gives a fair impression of the breadth and nature of work that attempts to address interethnic relations in Bosnia and Croatia, and highlights some of the issues and relationships that need to be considered in this work.

The theory of the preceding chapters indicates that education against ethnic chauvinism in a post-war context will be influenced by a number of factors including: the degree of traumatization of participants and their communities; approaches to inter-community conflict resolution; the fears, hopes and needs of participants; their stage in grieving their losses; the stability of the social context; other educational methods used; and local, common sense frameworks of thinking. Other influences will include the age of participants and the mandate, and biases and location (local or international) of the educators. The analysis of the data attempts to examine those influences as depicted in diagram 6.1.

Findings

The findings are presented in two sections. In the first section, I examine all the relevant programs I contacted, whether or not I received a manual or outline from them. I have considerable information on some of them; others I have only a few details of. By presenting their methodologies in tables, some patterns emerge that might be helpful in later analysis. While this research is not designed as a quantitative analysis, the tables provide me with a rough, preliminary overview of the programs which may highlight some trends and relationships which are worth investigating further in the more detailed analysis of the manuals and outlines described in section two.
Diagram 6.1

Influences shaping the methodology and nature of NGO education against ethnic chauvinism
In the second section of my findings, I examine in depth 14 programs, for which I have manuals or outlines. The documents are analyzed as text, and the findings are contextualized with the help of background interviews with educators and program managers and two participant-observer sessions. The patterns that emerge from this detailed analysis will be discussed in part three, chapter seven.

Section I: The broad overview: Early patterns revealed

During my field work I collected information about 26 educational programs currently in place or completed, 19 in Bosnia and seven in Croatia. These are run by 18 organizations, 16 of which are NGOs and two of which are government-funded organizations, but their programs are run fairly independently of government and enjoy considerable NGO assistance. Eight of the organizations are local; the rest are international. I also looked at two local projects and one international project which have funding but which were only beginning operation at the time of my visit to the region. These are indicated separately in the tables which follow.

The tables below describe some common ways in which the programs attempt to address interethnic relations. Table I lists the organizations, the target groups, the country the project is located in, and whether the sponsor organization is local or international, in relation to the methods used to address interethnic relations. The methodologies indicated do not represent a comprehensive list of the approaches used by the organizations, nor do they claim to be a representative sample. However, they do provide insights into the

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65 The two government-tied organizations are the Pedagogical Institute at the University of Zagreb, and Medvescak Children’s Library. The Croatian government does not fund the extra programs at the library so no government permission for, or input into, the programs is required.

66 I consider the Helsinki Citizens Assembly to be local, even though it is part of an international coalition, because it is locally controlled and run.
<table>
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<th>Stage 2: Peace, politics and rights to rehumanizing the other</th>
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Table 1: An overview of the programs and methodologies for peace, politics and rights.
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Table 2: Target Group and Educational Program Chosen

Comments:
general methods noted in the text and/or background interviews. For a brief description of the projects, see Appendix A. For descriptions of the methodologies see Appendix B.

The order in which the methodologies are presented in the tables reflects the conflict transformation model illustrated in diagram 5.4 in the last chapter. More than one methodology is usually used and the goals of the methodologies often overlap. Overlaps and complementary relationships are useful to note. Some project designers use combinations of methods, such as trauma healing and anti-prejudice education, because they feel that this enhances learning in both areas.

Table 2 indicates possible relationships between the methodologies used, the target recipients and the recipient country. The first row for every target group category indicates the total number of programs in that category using a particular methodology. The second line in each category divides the programs using that methodology into those in Bosnia (out of a total of 19 projects) and those in Croatia (out of a total of seven projects). Therefore, for example, a total of six programs for youth use inter-group mixing as an educational method. Six youth programs out of a total of 19 programs in Bosnia use that method, no Croatian youth programs use that method.

Other useful information might be whether the groups are ethnically mixed or homogeneous, whether the projects are carried out in urban or rural settings, and whether the program co-ordinators are local or international. I do not have enough information for all groups to consistently record these.

For a methodology to be included, it needed to be an explicit part of the program or specifically mentioned in the literature or interview.
Comparing programs in Croatia and Bosnia may provide some useful insights into program timing. As Croatia has had longer to recover from most of the fighting, Croatians might be expected to have recovered more from the traumas of the war and to be in a better position to benefit from later stage educational methodologies. They might also be more prepared for later-stage methodologies because of the greater degree of security that Croatia enjoys. Croats in Croatia, unlike Bosnians of all ethnicities and religions, have reason to feel territorially and politically secure. It is easier to address bias, prejudice and human rights from a safe position. However, because Croatia lost most of its Serb population, programs there are not likely to incorporate inter-ethnic mixing and cross-group co-operation as ones in Bosnia can.

The contrasts between project findings in Croatia and Bosnia are interesting. Most of the seven programs I came across in Croatia dealt in some way with diversity appreciation (the most popular category); bias, stereotyping and prejudice; human rights; and conflict resolution. The former three methodologies were mostly used with children and child workers. In Croatia, working with children on these issues seems to be viewed as fairly safe and depoliticized as the subjects could be approached fairly abstractly, without necessarily bringing up the animosities of the war. Teaching the same material to adults would be recognized as being much more politically sensitive.

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68 The Vance Plan led to the withdrawal, in early 1992, of the Yugoslav army from Croatia and the establishment of United Nations Protection Areas in territory roughly corresponding to that held by Serb or JNA forces (Little and Silber, 1996). This did not represent an end to all fighting in Croatia. In May of 1995, Croatian troops recaptured Western Slavonia and, in August, they regained the Krajina. However, with the exception of the period in 1995, Croatia has not been in a state of actual fighting since early 1992.

69 I had anticipated that much of the work on bias, stereotyping and prejudice would be targeted at young people and NGO workers. Work with children would be fairly safe and depoliticized and would not necessarily address the specific groups in conflict with each other, but would deal instead with prejudice in an abstract, general way. Those working for large NGOs that attempt to help many groups may need to
The importance of diversity appreciation, stereotyping and prejudice is interesting because this indicates a desire to be receptive to diverse people within Croatia after the country has largely rid itself of much of its diversity during and after the war.

The Bosnian situation is very different. Only a small percentage of the programs use diversity appreciation or education on stereotyping and prejudice. Human rights education, which tends to deal more abstractly with interethnic intolerance and antagonism, was the most common method used. Intergroup mixing and intergroup cooperation were also popular, reflecting the greater ethnic mix of the population in general. Programs for children tended to use human rights education, peace education and active learning.

The relative lack of programs that I came across in Bosnia dealing with bias, stereotyping and prejudice is interesting. It is especially notable that I found only one such program currently in place for children, an area that seemed relatively apolitical in Croatia, and that program took place outside of government-supported structures. This difference is probably largely attributable to the fact that Bosnia is in a state of relative insecurity compared to Croatia. Unlike in Croatia, many Bosnians do not recognize the war as over. Children are viewed by many as the ones who will later complete a war that the Dayton agreement cut short. The education of children, then, is seen as very political.

Mixing, which typically meant bringing people together from different parts of the country and from all major ethnic groups to work constructively together at a conference...
or workshop, was commonly used in Bosnia, especially with youth. That group might be expected to be most open to such exchanges, in the spirit of the youth exchanges that are popular with young people around the world. Mixed educational projects often lead to other co-operative projects, such as media projects.

Where the will to mix and work together intensely on a common project was not as great, NGOs sometimes required at least some degree of inter-community cooperation for training or educational programs they funded. Together, most of the programs in Bosnia involved some form of mixing or inter-community cooperation.

Only one Croatian program specifically mentioned using mixing as a method of improving intergroup dialogue and relations. Given the current absence of significant ethnic minorities in Croatia and the ethnic national definition of the Croatian state as the state of the Croat people, the difference in the use of inter-ethnic cooperation and mixing in Bosnia and Croatia is not surprising.

The information in these tables is derived from the texts and background interviews. The data cannot claim to be representative of all such programs in Bosnia and Croatia, but it does allude to some of the patterns and influences that might shape the program manuals and outlines, described in the following section.

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71 The category “inter-community cooperation” in tables 1 and 2 therefore represents both the end result of a previously mixed educational program, and efforts to bring reluctant members of communities together. Projects in the former group were scored under both categories in table 1; projects in the latter group were only scored under “inter-community cooperation.”

72 One library program was attempting to address problems of intolerance and misunderstanding that occurred when people of different cultures and ethnicities took part in their programs, but the librarian did not specifically describe the mixing that took place as a learning opportunity.
Section II: The manuals and outlines

Over the course of my stay, I was able to collect program manuals, outlines, and exercise books. In this section, I will describe them briefly and examine in more depth some of the relationships and patterns suggested earlier in this chapter. In particular, I will examine the goals of the program, the methodology used, the reasons for choosing that methodology, the relationship between the work of local and international educators, and the connection between methodology, timing, and the target audience.

I Programs for children and child workers

We need to understand the nature of anti-chauvinism work with children, not only by considering what is appropriate and beneficial for the children, but perhaps more importantly, by considering what material and approaches the adults involved in the education process are willing to accept. In Bosnia, where both children and educators have been severely traumatized by the war, where the war is often perceived as incomplete and unresolved, the battle, as one international observer said, is for children’s hearts and minds. In the minds of many educators it is a political battle and the children will be the ones who will carry on the fight in the future. Most schools are removing the literature and perspectives of people of the other major ethnic groups. A skewed version of history is being taught on all sides. Barriers to mutual understanding, cooperation and dialogue are being erected, most notably with the division of Serbo-Croat into three languages and the implementation of that linguistic division in schools, but also in a common, though not universal, refusal to collaborate between groups or to represent the “other” in the curriculum (Uzelac, 1997; Farrell, 1998).
In Croatia, as mentioned above, educators are operating from a much more secure position. Although many schools in the war zones had been destroyed or badly damaged, central educational institutions had been much less interrupted than in Bosnia. There is a definite sense that the war is over in Croatia and Croats in Croatia have little reason to feel threatened by other ethnic groups. That gives Croat educators of children much more flexibility than those in Bosnia.

Although the focus of this research is on Bosnia, I will begin by discussing a Croatian manual because it influenced at least two of the Bosnian programs for children and child workers. This influence is to be expected. Some organizations operate in both Croatia and Bosnia and their educational staff have worked in both countries; others, both local and international, co-operate with organizations across state borders. As Croatia was relatively more stable earlier, it is not surprising that programs might be developed there first and then the material was adapted for Bosnia.

1. **UNICEF Croatia (International), McMaster University (Canadian), CARE (International), Croatian Ministry of Education and Sports Croatian, Mali Korak/Small Steps (Centre for a culture of peace and non-violence, Zagreb)**

   - **Project:** Trauma healing and peace education training in primary schools
   - **Location:** Osijek and Pakrac, Croatia
   - **Contacts:** Local administrator, International educator
   - **Methods:** Active learning; trauma healing; education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; diversity appreciation; conflict resolution

   **Documentation:**

   - *School-Based Health and Peace Initiative: Trauma Healing and Peaceful Problem Solving Program for primary schools in Western and Eastern*

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73 All information in this section of chapter six is from the documents listed under each NGO heading. In most cases, the document which is the source of the information being discussed will be obvious. Citations will be made only where this is not the case. Where a direct quotation is being used, a page number will be given.
Introduction

The two editions of *Za Damire I Nemire* and the evaluation report provide an excellent opportunity to understand the goals, methodologies and teacher response to a peace education program. Designed to be used by fourth to sixth graders in the war-affected areas of Croatia, it was developed as part of a pilot training and research project jointly sponsored by UNICEF, McMaster University, and CARE evaluated by the teacher participants, and then updated.

Objectives:

- To “promote and potentially institutionalise the understanding and practices of trauma healing, conflict resolution, bias awareness and reduction, and peace-living through the schools training medium” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 7);
- To work not only with children, but also with parents and teachers, to “creatively help children address the past and (the) related trauma of war and at the same time help them prepare for a peaceful future” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 5);

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At the time of the extension project in Eastern Slavonia, the region was under the control of the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) and would eventually return to Croatian control. Many Serb local and displaced people were living in the area and they did not know whether they would be able to live with their Croat neighbours once the latter returned (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997). Indeed in Vukovar, one of the extension project sites, people were being killed shortly after the January 1998 transition.

Although UNICEF Croatia, CARE and Health Reach at McMaster University sponsored the early development of the project, other local partners, such as the Croatian Ministry of Education and Sports and *Mali Korak*, became involved in later stages.
Methodology

These objectives were to be accomplished by teaching the material in the trauma healing and peace education manual to teachers and primary school students, measuring how effective the program was in changing attitudes and behaviour, and developing mechanisms (such as training trainers and developing local partnerships) which could lead to the institutionalization of the material in schools throughout Croatia and other regions of the former Yugoslavia (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997). (For a more detailed description of the project, see Appendix C).

The project integrated concepts of trauma awareness and healing with bias awareness and prejudice reduction, conflict resolution, peaceful living and reconciliation. The project designers felt that integrating these concepts enables students to learn about and experience each one of the categories more effectively (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997). In other words, for the purposes of this study, the authors believe that bias awareness and prejudice reduction become more acceptable and meaningful once the fears, anger and trauma of the war have also been addressed. This is consistent with the conflict transformation model and trauma cycle described in chapter five.

Za Damire I Nemire (1996) contains five chapters: trauma healing; bias and prejudices; conflict resolution; affirmation - communication - cooperation, peaceful living. Each chapter contains a brief theoretical introduction to the subject for teachers, and then is divided into thematic sections with corresponding activities and exercises. The bias and prejudices chapter, for example, is divided into “Similarities and differences” in which children discuss or demonstrate ways in which they are similar or different, “Appreciation of differences”; and “Where do we belong?” in which children discuss stereotyping and
why people form groups. Although this chapter might seem to provide an excellent opportunity to address ethnic chauvinism, interestingly it does not directly deal with local concerns about inter-ethnic prejudice, in particular that between Serbs and Croats. The examples that are given in the introduction are from Northern Ireland. This does not mean that Serb-Croat hostilities will not come up in classroom discussions; the exercises offer opportunities for these issues to be raised.

The section on human rights and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, however, does deal specifically with concrete wartime and post-war issues. After introducing the Declaration, the children are asked to apply those rights to ethnic and war-related conflict situations. (See Appendix D for examples).

It is interesting to note that the chapter on bias and prejudice, which does not deal directly with the prejudices of the war, is written by Hart, an American. Where the issues are dealt with directly, it is in the section written by Maja Uzelac, a Croatian.

War-related hostility, and the difficulties in talking about that hostility with others, are also directly discussed in the final chapter on “Peaceful Living,” written by both Hart and Uzelac. In that chapter, in the section, “Can I Work on Peace,” the focus is on peace work and on introducing steps towards reconciliation. Children are asked to work in groups and brainstorm about kinds of peace making work that can be done at home, in the community/country and in the world. The children are then asked to discuss “Which of the measures you proposed would be really possible for you to implement? Which would be the hardest? Would you have the courage to talk with your father about peace and peacemaking? Would you like to discuss about forgiving the enemy with your mother, neighbors, friends?” (Bezic, et al., 1996, p. 79) (italics mine).
The first edition of *Za Damire I Nemire*, while presenting many creative exercises, seems to be fairly universally applicable to any conflict-ridden context. Other than the examples given above, and the names inserted, there is little sense of the Croatian context in it. The second edition, however, which built on the first, was informed by the evaluation and was written primarily by Uzelac, contains more critical analysis of Croatian society. For example, the chapter “Affirmation - Communication - Cooperation,” which was moved to the beginning of the book in the second edition, began with a discussion of Croatian culture. In that chapter, the Bezic wrote that Croatians tend to view things and people negatively, employing a “negative paradigm” (p. 1). “It’s easier for us to talk about something that we don’t like or that’s bad, whether it’s about ourselves or others, than to talk about things we like or which are good” (p. 1). She writes that a paradigm is “like glasses, usually coloured glasses” (p. 1) and shapes the way people view the world. She suggests that Croatians need to change to a positive paradigm, focusing on positive things and common interests and goals.

It is notable that the chapter on bias and prejudice was not changed in the second edition. This seems to be a missed opportunity to localize the material, and thus make it more relevant to the Croatian context. This may reflect simply the distribution of authorship or it may indicate that these topics are still too sensitive to deal with directly. The format, as it stands, gives teachers room to decide how directly or abstractly they want to deal with these topics.

**Outcomes**

According to the evaluation, the effect of the anti-bias component of the project is ambiguous. The researchers reported that although the program “did not dramatically
influence the student’s attitudes towards other ethnic groups,” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 45) it did have some positive results in improving attitudes toward Serbs. The research found that “Long term effects were demonstrated in (a) significant decrease in social distance toward Serbs” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 45).

It was interesting that when asked about the most important or useful chapter in *Za Damire I Nemire*, no teacher listed the category “Liking/Bias awareness” as most useful to children. Only 3.6% listed it as personally most important, 7.1% as most interesting, and 21% as most challenging (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997).

It is not clear whether most classes involved in the pilot study were ethnically homogeneous or mixed. At least one class in Pakrac was mixed and this seems to have contributed to a generally positive learning experience for the children. The class teacher reported that she “saw Serbian children with heads down, as if they were ashamed to talk about the war, but similarities about children’s losses provided very powerful insights and a first pivotal moment in the workshop” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, pp. 56-7).

There was a notable gender difference in the findings. Females rated “significantly higher than males on statements about tolerance and readiness to forgive, and (on) their knowledge about children’s rights” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 47). The active parental involvement was also important. Most parents said they “were well informed about the content of the program and used to talk about it with their children” (Ajdukovic, et al., 1997, p. 46). This indicates that there may be positive learning effects beyond the students and teachers directly participating.

Generally, both sections of the project seem to have been enthusiastically received. The degree of training of local teachers, the updating of the manual through *Mali Korak*,
and the active involvement of the Ministry of Education and Sports indicates that the project has good chances of being institutionalized in the Croatian school system. As one observer remarked, if anything can unite the people of Croatia, it's their obvious love of children.

*Za Damire I Nemire* has also proven its usefulness as a resource for at least two educational projects in Bosnia, a CARE-sponsored drama-in-education project and an UMCOR peace education project, both of which are described below.

2. **“Pax” Project. CARE Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina (International)**

| Project: | “Pax” Project: Drama-in Education |
| Locations: | Bihac and Mostar, Bosnia |
| Contacts: | Two international educators |
| Methods: | Drama-in-education; active learning; trauma healing, conflict resolution training |

Documentation:
- Lesson plan for teaching the poem: *Mornar* by Tag McEntegart.

**Introduction**

This drama-in-education program has two phases. The first phase was a pilot drama-in-education (DIE) training project which took place in two primary schools around Bihac; the second phase is taking place in and around Mostar and involves teacher training in DIE and the development of a DIE manual. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to be a participant-observer in one teacher training session near Mostar.76

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76 The program also has a theatre-in-education component involving work with the Mostar Youth Theatre, which will be discussed later.

Objectives

The first phase of the project, led by Roger Chamberlain, provided drama-in-education training to teachers and students in two primary schools in the neighbouring towns of Bihac and Bosanska Krupa. In the report, Chamberlain listed the objectives as:

- To use drama and metaphor, to develop conflict transformation and peace building skills, and to promote trauma healing and reconciliation;

- “To help everyone in the group - teachers and young people alike - to look at their ‘life-experiences’ safely in order to understand them”; (pp. 4-5)

- To enable a catharsis which could lead to “regeneration and reconciliation... at the personal, social and universal levels”; (p. 4)

- To train teachers in DIE techniques which they can use in the classroom and share with colleagues; and

- To “create, build, train and support a strongly knit small local core team of TIE (theatre-in-education) and DIE experts” (p. 9) who could continue to carry out this work in Bosnia.

Methodology

Chamberlain describes drama-in-education as follows:

DIE works through fiction and metaphor to create imaginative distance for young people to explore and express their thoughts and feelings about carefully chosen themes and concepts... Educationally DIE is open-ended and not prescriptive. It aims to enable an exploration of the issues, problems and questions that disturb (young) people about the chosen concept - in this case war and peace. (pp. 3-4)

The pilot project in Bihac involved four volunteer teachers and a teacher-administrator at each school and 15-25 volunteer students, aged between 12 and 15, in
DIE training. The sessions were carried out twice a week for two hours at a time. Some sessions were held with the teachers alone to discuss the educational theory behind DIE and to analyze the work with the student volunteers. Eight teachers also attended a two-day trauma symposium in Zagreb.

The early sessions were recorded, transcribed, translated and returned in written form to the teachers who participated to be used as guidelines for their own classroom work. CARE plans to use this work as part of a DIE manual described in more detail in Phase II.

Example and outcomes

The participant teachers at Kulen-Vakuf/Orasac school in Bihac chose the theme “The Return” for their DIE project. This reflected the fact that the school was planning to return to their village later that year after being away for five years. The students developed this initial theme to include the themes “The Journey” and “The Separation.” The three themes were united in a logical sequence: separation, journey and return.

The group then chose a favorite historical period: the Stone Age, which “became the ‘fictional’ context for their subsequent exploration of their wartime experiences - their trauma” (p. 6). The students worked first as archaeologists from the University of Sarajevo, then as the cave dwellers from the Stone Age civilization, to create a story about the dilemma their tribe faced about whether to leave their cave or stay. The students eventually decided to divide their tribe into two. Chamberlain writes:

At this point the young people were deeply exploring the reality of their own lives. When the DIE work moved into negotiations between the two tribes the young people were interactively developing their conflict resolution skills. Later when the negotiations were completed the work was in the long-term or ‘vision’ areas of reconciliation and democratization. (p. 6)
The interplay between the two roles (archaeologists and cave people) enabled them to explore dialectically the underlying tensions between their present day reality and their more subliminal hopes, fears and aspirations... Throughout this work young people were able to choose and decide the specific details of their individual roles as well as those of the collective tribes, and develop them in the direction they felt most comfortable with. Thus they were learning about the empowerment that comes through informed freedom of choice and democracy in action. (p. 6)

The educator said that, in the role play, when a conflict between the two tribes, arising out of a need to share resources, began to become violent, the students were able to “freeze” the situation, take some steps back in time, and discuss other options that could transform the situation into a more positive one. They were then able to enact the new scenario.

**Phase II: Drama-in-education training in Mostar, BiH. May 1997 - present. Objectives**
- To conduct “drama-in-education training for teachers and young people in trauma healing, problem solving, conflict transformation, peace-building and reconciliation in Mostar and the surrounding Hercegovacko-Neretvanski Canton, BiH” (p. 10); and, in the process,
- To develop a manual which, as Chamberlain writes, can assist educators in using DIE methods:

  in the form of both active, practical training and the production of curriculum materials for use in the classrooms. The overall aim of the manual... and its accompanying training is to assist in the process of trauma healing, problem solving, conflict transformation, peace-building and reconciliation in young people and teachers in the designated project area. (p. 11)

**Methodology**
In conducting DIE training with volunteer teachers and administrators in schools in Mostar and the surrounding region, the international educator draws on the professional...
knowledge and experience of the teachers, including their understanding of the school system, the curriculum and of students in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This training provides material for the manual, a copy of which will be received by all interested schools and personnel.

The manual will be designed so that it meets teachers’ regular curricular requirements. As the educator demonstrates regularly in her sessions with the teachers and students, the methods can be used for teaching almost any material.

Example:
In the session I attended in Llubinje, the educator used DIE with a group of educators to teach the poem *Mornar* which was part of the Serbian Language curriculum.

Among the aims she described in her lesson plan are:

- To show how the students can be offered an ‘alluring’ way to become creatively and educationally engaged with what is educationally mainly a ‘comprehension’ task; (McEntegart, 1998, p. 1)

- Through the fictional context created in the drama, to show how the students could be enabled both to comprehend the poem and imaginatively explore the narrative of the poem, bringing their own experiences and creativity to bear, as this curriculum demands; (McEntegart, 1998, p. 1)

- To show how to create the conditions for as many children as possible to be encouraged to speak ‘publicly’ and to engage in conversational exchanges with each other and with the teacher, both in and out of role. (McEntegart, 1998, p. 1)

During the *Mornar* sessions, the participants acted out the ship’s journey, described in the poem. Each chose a character and decided what that person would bring as a momento, who the person would have said farewell to, and what they were doing and thinking at the time the ship left port. Although this journey has obvious relevance to the
situation facing refugees, the main object of the class was to demonstrate a method of
teaching that would change the student-teacher relationship into a more interactive one.

Discussion

Bosnian schools tend to be extremely hierarchical, traditional learning environments. Teachers tend to use a banking system of instruction in which the teacher is the authority and students are required to memorize and accept the information given. Drama-in-education employs more experiential methods of learning and teaching. It is designed to create a deeper, and more critical, understanding of the material by engaging students actively in the subject matter.

Although in this second phase of the PAX project, the objectives are described as being similar to those of the first stage, including peace building, conflict transformation, and trauma healing, the educator considers her most valuable peace-building work to be work in which relationships are built between students and teachers, and between students themselves. Such work builds a love of learning, she said. “Students are engaged in the learning process and are disappointed when the class is over.” The educator said that although donors want more direct work in peace building, “it is often just more of what students are already getting: lectures that people have to be nice to each other.” This, she says, is cosmetic. Moral lectures often just teach young people politically correct words and words to avoid.

The DIE educator works with fairly ethnically “homogeneous” groups of teachers as almost all schools in and around Mostar are segregated. The only schools that are not completely segregated are in districts where a minority is too small to have its own separate school. She points out that, before the war, Mostar had one of the highest
proportions of interethnic marriages in Bosnia. (The degree of social engineering required
to “create” ethnically “homogeneous” groups in such a setting must be noted here).

Besides the divisions between ethnic groups, the educator notes both rural-urban
antagonisms and antagonism towards returned refugees. Some returned refugee children
cannot speak the local language and the situation is worsened by the fact that, in some
school curricula, their families are explicitly regarded as traitors (Refugees and displaced
persons, trans., Grade four “Nature and Society” school curriculum unit, n.d.).

3. **Unicef Bosnia (International)**
   
   Project: Children’s magazines
   Location: Bosnia (Head office: Sarajevo)
   Contact: Local administrator
   Method: Intercommunity co-operation; active learning; historical education.
   Documentation:
   - *Iskrice: List za odgajatelje* (Glitter: Notes for instructors), Feb. 1998
   - *Vesela Sveska* (Happy Notebook), Feb. 1998

**Introduction**

UNICEF’s efforts in Bosnia are notable for the difficulties the organization
encountered and the contrasts between the experiences of UNICEF Bosnia and UNICEF
Croatia. For this reason, instead of focusing primarily on the written material provided, it
is useful to describe UNICEF’s unsuccessful efforts to connect Bosnian children across
ethnic boundaries.

**Methodology**

The administrator said that few ideas which attempted to create inter-entity links
between children through educational programming have materialized because of
UNICEF’s inability to gain the co-operation of education officials in the two entities: the
Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS). For example, one project idea, called
“Common Ground,” tried to promote access to common reading material for children in
both entities. The plan was to donate two sets of ten books to school libraries across Bosnia. Ten of the books would be selected by a committee from the Federation and ten by a committee from the RS. Each would approve the other’s selection. This would ensure that Bosnian children had access to at least some common reading material. In the end, however, the committees would not agree on common material from the region. In spite of the wealth of material from within Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, they would only agree on neutral foreign classics.

Another idea was to provide computers and e-mail access to children in both entities so that they could communicate with one another. This too was rejected.

In the end, UNICEF was able to produce a magazine for children and teachers which contains common material, published in both Cyrillic and Roman scripts. The material is written by teachers in both entities and needs to be agreed on by all groups. The administrator says, however, that reaching agreement on content is very difficult. Besides general children’s stories and activities, the magazines also contain some short historical articles about Bosnia and poems and stories on peace themes.

As a result, UNICEF has focused on developing active learning skills, which tend to be well received. Its staff developed a mine awareness kit with pamphlets and a manual using active learning techniques. It also sponsored active learning projects in the pedagogical institutes of Zenica and Sarajevo and hopes to have one soon in Banja Luška.

Discussion

In its proposed projects, UNICEF has tried to employ the strategies of mixing (the e-mail idea) and intercommunity co-operation (the library project and the magazines) described above. Because UNICEF, both in Bosnia and Croatia, tends to work with
upper levels of government and because all three communities in Bosnia have elected nationalist leaders who are actively reinforcing divisions between them, these approaches are likely to encounter tremendous difficulties. The administrator did say that UNICEF Bosnia is considering working more at the municipal level in the future. Perhaps, given a less politicized context, UNICEF may find municipalities willing to participate in cooperative programs.

UNICEF Bosnia encountered much more enthusiasm towards its efforts to promote active learning in schools. This is a politically safe area of work and fits in with the desire, expressed by the urban elite of all groups, to be seen as progressive.

4. Peace Begins With Me. United Methodist Committee on Relief - Former Yugoslavia (UMCOR-FY) (International)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project:</th>
<th>Peace education training program for children and youth in BiH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Zenica, Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact:</td>
<td>Local administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods:</td>
<td>Active learning; diversity appreciation; education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; mixing; conflict resolution; peace education, human rights education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Documentation:**
- *Peace Begins With Me: A training program for children and youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina (n.d.)* by UMCOR-FY Conflict Resolution Program
- *UMCOR Conflict Resolution Program (n.d.)* by UMCOR-FY Conflict Resolution program

**Introduction**

UMCOR has designed a manual, *Peace Begins With Me*, to be used by teachers, youth leaders, community leaders and others working with children and youth. It focuses on four major areas: self awareness, diversity appreciation, effective communication, and peaceful conflict resolution. UMCOR uses this material in training workshops with teachers, community leaders and youth. Youth training has primarily occurred in non-governmental environments: summer camps which UMCOR sponsors for Bosnian youth,
in teenage mentor programs in Sarajevo, and conflict resolution workshops for teenagers (Conflict resolution program, n.d.). The manual is also aimed at helping these groups design their own workshops (Peace begins with me, n.d.).

**Objectives**

- To promote peace by developing communications and conflict resolution skills for children and youth.
- To “break the circle of misinformation about the others and initiate the process of respect and celebration of diversity” (p. 13).
- To facilitate the development of peace education programs by training educators and making the manual available for use.

**Methodology**

The material in *Peace Begins With Me* has been gathered from six resource books: *Za Damire I Nemire*, two South African texts, and three American ones. It was developed by the UMCOR Conflict Resolution staff, both local and international “in collaboration with Bosnians who work with children and youth” (p. 2). Given the high foreign content of the sources, it is perhaps not surprising that there is very little sense of the Bosnian context in the manual.

The manual has been divided into four chapters: Self Awareness Workshop; Diversity Appreciation Workshop; Effective Communication Workshop; Peaceful Resolution Workshop. Each chapter contains a set of complete workshop material with discussion questions and guidelines for trainers. Each begins with a brief theoretical discussion of the chapter theme.

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77 All written information on this program from this point is from *Peace begins with me* (n.d.).
A theoretical discussion of stereotyping and prejudice is provided in the diversity appreciation chapter but the chapter is very short, and primarily focuses on diversity (discovering ways in which people are similar and different and how it felt to be different). Stereotyping and prejudice were only brought up in the discussion questions of one exercise.\(^7\)

UMCOR strongly encourages ethnically mixed groups as part of its educational strategy. This is not difficult to accomplish with youth, but creating mixed groups of teachers is often more challenging. As an example, UMCOR once tried to organize a joint workshop for teachers in Gorni Vakuf, a divided community. Teachers from one side refused to go so, in the end, they conducted two separate workshops. As a result of that training, the administrator says, a workshop participant became the “first and best trainer” for UMCOR. She now manages a local youth centre and works with both communities.

5. **First Steps.** **Amnesty International (International)**
Project: Human Rights training manual for children
Location: Croatia
Methods: Active learning; education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; conflict resolution; and human rights education

Documentation:
- *First Steps: A Manual for Starting Human Rights Education*

**Introduction**

*First Steps* was developed by the international human rights monitoring organization, Amnesty International. It was written in response to a need expressed by Amnesty members and other human rights activists in Central and Eastern Europe. It is therefore not specifically designed for the Croatian or former Yugoslavian context. The

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\(^7\) The discussion questions asked, “Should we feel uncomfortable and unwanted just because we are different?” and “What is wrong with saying that certain people are not as good as other people?” (p. 14)
manual was introduced to me by an administrator of the Catholic Relief Services in Croatia. CRS staff use it in their training programs.

Objectives
This manual was designed to help teachers and children in Eastern Europe develop:

- Knowledge about human rights, including about local and international human rights documents and human rights violations, and

- Skills and attitudes that promote human rights.

Methodology
*First Steps* provides comprehensive yet easily understood theoretical overviews of human rights education and related concepts, practical advice for teachers,\(^\text{79}\) and activities to develop knowledge, attitudes and skills consistent with human rights. Designed for teaching children and teenagers in Central and Eastern Europe, it provides numerous exercises which promote understanding of human rights, stereotyping, diversity, responsibility and justice.

Most of the manual's content could be applied in many contexts around the world. A few examples, however, are drawn from Eastern and Central Europe. For example, when discussing name calling, it describes calling someone a Jew or a Gypsy. Another example is a description of parental claims that teaching human rights is "political indoctrination."

The manual stresses that teaching human rights involves three things: providing *knowledge*, such as information about human rights documents and an understanding that

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\(^{79}\) It discusses, for example, concrete ways in which human rights education can be made a part of most school subjects. It also discusses various active learning methods and ways in which the human rights environment at the school can be made consistent with the human rights concepts taught.
rights are universally applicable; developing *attitudes* conducive to respecting and promoting others’ rights; and teaching *methodology* such as participatory, active learning.

The section for younger children actively connects exercises with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and tends to be less specific and more generalized than those for older children. Exercises for younger children use photographs, drawing, and role playing, storytelling and discussion.

Exercises for older children, on the other hand, deal directly with the kinds of human rights abuses and chauvinism which students may associate with the war and its aftermath. These include exercises dealing with refugees, censorship, political killings, torture, non-violent political movements, gender issues and ethnic discrimination. These activities use newspaper articles, both to acquire information and develop media literacy, and are actively connected to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A class on stereotyping and prejudice for older children, for example, encourages students to explore the social and emotional roots of stereotyping, to look for examples of stereotyping in the media, culture and in the opinions of family and friends. Another class-long activity, called "The Imaginary Country," provides an opportunity to discuss citizenship by encouraging students to discuss the rights shared by all citizens. Other activities enable in-depth discussion of discrimination, gender, and refugee issues.

**Discussion**

Although *First Steps* draws examples of human rights abuses from around the world, not focusing on the former Yugoslavia in particular, it deals directly and deeply with many of the issues of discrimination, stereotyping, violence and other human rights abuses prevalent in the region. Many of these issues have been avoided by other
programs, possibly because they are seen as too sensitive. It would be very interesting to see how the manual is being applied in the region, which exercises are used, which are avoided, and what groups they are being used with.

6. **Medvescak Children’s Library (Croatian)**

   **Project:** Education for development of tolerance and co-operation in children’s libraries
   
   **Location:** Zagreb, Croatia
   
   **Contacts:**
   
   - Local children’s librarian
   - Two local professors of education and psychology.

   **Methods:** Active learning, education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; diversity appreciation; human rights education

   **Documentation:**
   
   - *Najljepse Je Biti Dijete: Djecja Prava* (It’s the most beautiful thing to be a child: Children’s rights), (1996), by Males, Dubravka and Stricevic, Ivanka.

**Introduction**

The children’s department of the Medvescak Library in Zagreb developed this program in response to a growing number of Croatian displaced people and Bosnian refugee children and parents using its facilities. As the librarian I spoke with explained:

Between 1992 and 1995 we had about 200 displaced people and refugees using the library. We realized we had to change our approach with children. It was not enough to lend them books and toys. Children had some problems with communication. Most of them were from rural areas and for them and for the parents it was a new situation to be in a big town. I wanted the library staff to learn about non-violent conflict resolution, children’s rights and human rights.

Many children came from Bosnia, she said. Some read Cyrillic. “It was difficult when we had people who speak Croatian and Serbian together at a time when Serbian aggression was the biggest. It was a complex situation.” The librarians felt they needed to learn more about conflict resolution and human rights.
Objectives
• To educate for, and promote, an atmosphere of tolerance, mutual understanding, and knowledge and appreciation of children's rights.

• To help other children's libraries in Croatia, especially those in war-affected regions, develop programs that promote tolerance, mutual understanding and human rights.

Methodology
The librarian and her colleagues began to introduce concepts of human rights to their library by adding structured activities and books promoting global understanding and human rights. By forming strong partnerships with UNICEF and the Pedagogical Institute at the university, the librarians began learning about team management and "education for development." Once the librarian and her colleagues, both within and outside of the library, saw the benefits of the programs they were developing, they felt it would be of use to other libraries in war-affected areas of Croatia. The librarian explained:

The main aim is to make a climate in school libraries or children's libraries where children can practice some skills in communication and where the main approach is human rights and practising tolerance. We wanted to encourage better communication between staff and parents, among parents and between children and librarians. We wanted to learn how to work as a team.

The librarian feels libraries in Croatia have a unique opportunity to conduct such education because of the autonomy of their programs. Public libraries fall under the Croatian Ministry of Culture whereas schools are under the Ministry of Education. Libraries do not need approval for extra programs, nor do they receive government

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80 This is a reference to a teacher's resource book, *Education for Development*, by Susan Fountain (1995) dealing with education for human rights and justice. Fountain gave some workshops in Croatia sponsored by UNICEF. Her work has strongly influenced the librarian and other educators and psychologists I met at Zagreb University.
funding for them. Small library membership fees help fund the programs; UNICEF contributes to expenses for seminars, brochures and some supplies.

I had the opportunity to be a participant-observer at a two-day librarian’s workshop in Lipik organized by the librarian and two professors from the pedagogical institute at the University of Zagreb. Children’s librarians attended, mostly at their own expense, from many war-affected areas of the country. The workshop gave the librarians the opportunity to learn about human rights, participate in active learning activities related to human rights, co-operative problem solving, and war trauma.

The organizers gave presentations on the concepts of human rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. One organiser said that many of the librarians were learning about human rights documents and concepts for the first time. The discussion of human rights is very recent in Croatia. The organizers said that that discussion may have to take place before discussions of citizenship, or who can be a Croatian citizen, can meaningfully occur.

The librarian and professors are currently working on a manual on education for tolerance and human rights for children’s libraries. They have also produced two books.


Medvescak Children’s Library has produced a small paperback booklet describing the philosophy of, and activities at, the library. One page of it describes, in illustrated form, ten rights of children according to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. Another page describes the library’s goals of promoting tolerance and understanding of cultural and social differences. This is accomplished in part through exhibitions and
activities organized "where children and youth meet and learn about (the) culture and art heritage of their own and other nations" (Males and Stricevic, 1995, p. 37).

*Najljepse Je Biti Dijete: Djecja Prava* (It's the most beautiful thing to be a child: Children’s Rights) by Dubravka Males and Ivanka Stricevic

This beautifully illustrated, hardback book, written by the project organizers, really captures the library’s approach to education for diversity, tolerance and respect for human rights. Every other page lists one of the UN convention’s rights of children; the facing page has related exercises. The children in the illustrations are from all over the world and they are dressed in the traditional dress of their country. Children also learn of the flags of different countries and stereotypical, traditional homes of children around the world. The book also addresses the rights of children with special needs.

However, while the book promotes an appreciation for diversity and equality of all children, because of the stereotyped nature of the drawings it does so in a way that indicates that each culture or ethnicity has its geographic place in the world. It does not leave room for a multi-ethnic or multicultural concept of nationhood or even state citizenship. The librarian and professors of education suggest that it may be too early for this discussion to take place; it may be that human rights concepts need to be introduced first.

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81 Here the word “nation” is used to indicate ethnicity, the popularly accepted use of the term in the region.
II Programs for youth

Some of the most exciting and daring programs I came across were programs for, and largely run by, youth. In many of these examples, youth did their own organizing, and, in some cases, their own fund raising. They seemed more inclined than other groups to defy the barriers imposed on them by war: crossing entity boundaries, mixing, and speaking out through their own media. This group, consisting of young people aged around 13 to 25, had to grow up fast during the war and that maturity was immediately visible. It was not unusual to hear of a 13-year-old radio station manager or radio-show host.

Many urban young people, often from mixed families, suffered greatly from the artificial war-time tearing apart of friends and family and squeezing them into neat, but often ill-fitting ethnic categories. It is not surprising that some would respond the way youth do world-wide: by defying the boundaries, getting together, talking, sharing and speaking out.

7. Schüler Helfen Leben (Students Help Living) (German)

Project: Youth network for common projects: conference, magazine, theatre
Location: Sarajevo, Bosnia
Contact: International educator
Methods: Intergroup mixing; intercommunity co-operation; conflict resolution; theatre-in-education; peace education, political education

Documentation:
- Nepitani: zajednicki magazin za mlade od mladih (Unasked: co-operative magazine from youth for youth), (1997), by Schüler Helfen Leben (SHL).
- Cross-Entity Youth-Conference: Outline, (1998), by SHL.
- Das sind wir: Informationen zu unserer Arbeit (This is who we are: Information about our work), (n.d.), by SHL.
Introduction

Schüler Helfen Leben was started in 1992 by students in Germany who were concerned about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and wanted to become personally involved in sending and distributing aid packages. The students campaigned to collect a deutsch mark from every German student and were able to raise 1.5 million marks this way (SHL, n.d.).

Today, in post-war Bosnia, the German students are still involved. Since 1996 their focus has been on “organizing multi-national, inter-entity activities” (SHL, “Cross-entity youth conference,” 1998, p. 1) working with Bosnian youth to provide opportunities for cross-entity dialogue and co-operation. As the co-ordinators write, “Our experience clearly shows that these activities give important experiences and precious opportunities for the youth of Bosnia-Herzegovina to break away from hatred-ridden political influence” (SHL, “Cross-entity youth conference,” 1998, p. 1).

Objectives

- To “pursue reintegration and reconciliation” (SHL, “Cross-entity youth conference,” 1998, p. 1) by bringing together youth from both entities and different ethnic communities to network, participate in common activities, and work co-operatively on common projects.


Methodology

Schüler Helfen Leben’s projects have included two “all-side” youth conferences in Hungary: the first was held in 1997; the second was a ten-day conference, involving 30 youth from nine Bosnian towns over New Year, 1998. Activities included workshops on
theatre, juggling, drumming, music, and non-violent conflict resolution. The latter included components on non-violent communication, active listening, consensus decision making, gender issues, creative conflict resolution, human rights, mediation, and discussions of national identity. Local co-trainers assisted workshop leaders before and during the conference, developing skills and knowledge which could be applied to future workshops.

Schüler Helfen Leben has also organized two other projects: one was a cross-ethnic theatre project in Mostar; the other involves the production by youth of the magazine Nepitani. This magazine, which is published in Germany and written in the local language using both Roman and Cyrillic lettering, is entirely planned, organized and written by youth from nine “often very troubled” towns around Bosnia, the co-ordinator I spoke to said. A few also come from Belgrade, Yugoslavia. In order to participate in the project, youths must be willing and able to travel in other’s territories, even though this is sometimes dangerous. Still, the co-ordinator feels the car rides are well worth the risk. “The conversations in the car are great,” he said, and about 60 of the young people have developed “really good friendships with youth on the other side” through the process of working together on the magazine and travelling to each other’s communities. One young person from Banja Luka is now living in Sarajevo with another from Mostar.

At the time I contacted them, SHL had contact with 150 youth from all over Bosnia. The co-ordinator I spoke to set his personal goal at 500. He feels that the

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82 The co-ordinator hinted that the non-violent conflict resolution section did not run as smoothly as planned and suggested I talk to the local educator who ran that workshop. Unfortunately, I was unable to reach the educator to pursue this further.

83 Cross-entity travel in private vehicles, especially with people entering from non-dominant groups, has been extremely risky. Also the young people have received many serious threats. For that reason they had to leave one town in Republika Srpska.
program has an impact far beyond the young people themselves as they influence their family and friends, dispelling myths and sharing experiences.

8/ Helsinki Citizens Assembly/Helsinki Parlament Gradjana (Bosnian and international)

- **Project:** Youth meeting (October 17-19), 1997
- **Location:** Laktasi Bath, RS, Bosnia
- **Methods:** Education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; civil society education; intergroup mixing; inter-community co-operation; peace education and political education

**Documentation:**
- *Youth Meeting/Festival: hCa Youth Network in BiH, (1997)*, Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa).

**Introduction**

The Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa) has been in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1991 and describes itself as an “international network of civic initiatives, movements, social and political groups” (hCa, Youth Meeting/Festival, 1997, p. 2) in eastern and western Europe which work towards the “democratic integration of Europe” (hCa, Youth Meeting/Festival, 1997, p. 2). It attempts to build “effective guarantees for freedom, democracy and respect of human rights in Europe” (hCa, Youth Meeting/Festival, 1997, p. 2). As a member of an international coalition, not a branch of an international NGO with its headquarters elsewhere, there is a strong feeling of local ownership of its projects which are conceived and organized by Bosnians. It advocates and supports “civic initiatives and groups as the only viable alternative to war and (the) nationalist tendency that prevails in the country” (hCa, III Women’s conference, 1997, p. 1).

The youth network in BiH was started by Bosnians from the hCa offices in Tuzla and Banja Luka in early 1997. By October 1997, it consisted of 35 youth organizations from both the RS and the Federation.
Objectives

- To bring together young people from all over Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as some from the other parts of the former Yugoslavia and abroad.
- To help overcome prejudices and fears through this contact.
- To develop organization-building skills by training young people in project proposal writing.

Methodology

The hCa organized a three-day youth meeting in Laktasi, Bosnia to bring youth together from throughout the country. Sixty young people from more than 30 organizations attended the meeting. Ten participants also came from abroad, including some from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

The meeting consisted of two parts: the official and the unofficial. The official part consisted of two workshops: a day-long workshop on project proposal writing and presentation, and a day-long workshop on “overcoming the differences between youngsters in BiH” (p. 10). The unofficial part, which the report describes as the most important, involved socializing, building friendships, making contacts, and confirming “once again that there is no significant difference” (p. 7) between the youth.

Outcomes

The workshop on proposal writing is an example of a common form of education for civil society. Such capacity building education often involves training community leaders and NGO staff in the skills they need to run an NGO. While this does not deal directly with ethnic chauvinism, these workshops may be designed so that there is contact

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84 Besides the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the meeting was also sponsored by the European Union’s PHARE programme, the Interchurch Peace Council (the Netherlands), and the Embassy of Local Democracy, Tuzla, Bosnia).
and co-operation between participants from different ethnic groups. The workshop participants created a proposal for a quarterly magazine which would be jointly produced by youth from the RS and the Federation. This magazine, *Contact*, would contain information of interest to Bosnian young people: on music, cultural events, computers, information on the work of member groups and on co-operative efforts between youth from different regions. Similar to capacity building civil society education, media projects seem to be primarily a means of bringing youth together on a co-operative venture.

The goal of the workshop on overcoming differences was to facilitate an open dialogue between Bosnian youth. Interestingly, when the youth explored the differences between them, they cited gender, "race", religion, political affiliation, social ties, and "relation between the youth from the town and from the villages" (p. 10) (italics mine). The youth observed that they have many similarities, including the language they speak, their way of dressing, age, lethargy, "rebelliance towards their parents and the environment" (p. 10) and interest in working together across boundaries. It is noteworthy that the conference report names the language of the region as Serbo-Croat, in an environment where even mentioning the word Serbo-Croat can prompt an angry reaction from people.

In a brainstorming session about how to overcome the barriers that continue after the war, participants again mentioned the importance of media, especially radio and television, to "break the media blockade which is continuing after the war" (p. 10). A youth radio station was proposed which would discuss common problems and interests of

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85 It is important to note that this document is a translation. However, the word "race" comes up often when referring to ethnic differences.
youth around the country. A joint New Year's celebration and improved e-mail linkages were also suggested.

Besides the friendships that developed and discussions that occurred at the Laktasi meeting, the outcomes included:

- A press release by the participants briefly describing the reasons for and outcomes of the meeting;
- The beginnings of the quarterly youth magazine *Contact*;
- Work on the establishment of a youth radio station; and
- Announcement of the next youth meeting in February 1998.

One interesting quote from the press release summarizes well the attitudes and objective of many youth programs: “besides the fact that the current political situation in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina is pushing the young people on the margin of social events, young people have enough strength to resist politics and try to make mutual cooperation and friendships” (p. 12).

9/ **Youth Bridge International (International)**

*Project:* Multi-ethnic media projects for youth; training for youth and adults in conflict resolution, peer mediation, counselling and human rights; sponsorship of joint projects for youth.

*Location:* Banja Luka, Bosnia

*Contact:* International co-ordinator

*Methods:* Intergroup mixing; inter-community co-operation; education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice; diversity appreciation, conflict resolution

*Documentation:*
Objectives

• "To promote peace and reconciliation among youth and a respect for diversity and human rights";

• To encourage and support youth in the utilization of their ideas and creative talents.

• To work with indigenous organizations in the development of programs targeting vulnerable groups and their self-sustainability.

Methodology

Youth Bridge International (YBI) is an international NGO which grew out of a project started by the Conflict Resolution Catalysts in Banja Luka, Bosnia. Some of the projects which the organization is involved in and which are relevant to education against ethnic chauvinism include:

• Sponsorship of the Republika Srpska’s only independent youth radio station,

• Support for a newspaper and magazine for and by young people,

• Sponsorship of joint events proposed and organized by youth in an effort to “promote exchanges and dialogue between young people of both entities,” and

• Training for youth and teachers in conflict resolution, peer mediation/counselling and human rights.

It is notable that, here again, work with youth tends to involve encouraging students to work jointly and co-operatively across boundaries through media and other joint projects. Project staff are mainly students from Banja Luka University. YBI also often works with the local NGO Youth Communication Centre.
YBI is currently developing an anti-bias, diversity appreciation and conflict resolution program for primary schools. The program has permission from the head of the Banja Luka pedagogical institute who is able to approve programs in and around the city, the co-ordinator I spoke to said. The co-ordinator feels that, with the new government in RS, more work in this area is possible and many teachers are supportive of such education. YBI will be working with a steering committee of local teachers to develop curriculum and training, drawing from material from the United States and adapting it to the local context. Notably, when the co-ordinator talks about training diversity, he talks about a rural-urban diversity as well as ethnic diversity.

10/ "Pax" Project. CARE Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina (International)

Project: Pax Project: Theatre in Education
Location: Mostar, Bosnia
Contacts: Two international educators
Methods: Intergroup mixing; inter-community cooperation; Theatre-in-education; peace education.

Documentation:

Introduction
CARE's theatre-in-education program grew out of the drama-in-education program in Bihac, described above. During trauma training for the primary school teachers, held in Zagreb, Chamberlain met members of the Mostar Youth Theatre and soon began exploring ways in which they could work together.

Objectives
- To train youth, who are members of multi-ethnic youth theatre groups, as actor/teachers

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86 The YBI co-ordinator said that human rights education in the eastern RS is still very difficult. Even in Banja Luka, the staff of human rights organizations receive threats.
• To bring educational theatre, on themes of the war and peace, into the community and schools.

Methodology

Theatre-in-education is theatre with educational value which is performed in schools. Chamberlain found that, while drama-in-education could be conducted with most interested groups:

It is very difficult for young people to train as actor/teachers if they do not already have a keen and developed interest in drama, theatre or one of the other performing arts... Training young people to be actor/teachers for performance based Theatre-in-Education (TIE) presentations is a lengthy and difficult process. (Chamberlain, 1997, p. 12)

Therefore, he works with pre-existing theatre groups, such as the Mostar Youth Theatre,87 to train members as actor/educators. The Mostar Youth Theatre is an ethically mixed group, a fact which enhances the message of peace that the performances portray.

Groups such as the Mostar Youth Theatre and the Zagreb Youth Theatre provide a base “from which to build the TIE work strongly and relatively quickly” (p. 12). As these theatre groups are part of a civil society sector, they have begun to collaborate with CARE’s Civil Society Project to link them up with other groups from other parts of Bosnia. Week-long TIE training programs, held in the summer and autumn of 1997, brought young actors together from many parts of Bosnia.

87 The Mostar Youth Theatre was founded in 1974 in Mostar, a city which has traditionally been known for its theatre. The nationally and internationally renowned group was the “pre-eminent youth theatre company of ex-Yugoslavia.” In spite of the loss of its rehearsal building and the imprisonment of some of its members, it continued to function throughout the war, producing a play, based directly on the war-time experiences of the teen-aged actors, called “Pax Bosnensis” (Chamberlain, 1997, p. 7).
III  Programmes for adults

Unlike the programs for children and youth, programs for adults were extremely varied. This group is interesting because it is the most politically aware and has invested the most either in the war or in fighting the mentality of war.

11/ Helsinki Citizens Assembly (Local/International)

Project: Human rights, political and civil society education through conferences, publications and posters.

Location: Sarajevo, Bosnia

Contact: Local administrator

Methods: Intergroup mixing, civil society education, political education, human rights education, diversity education.

Documentation:

Introduction

The Helsinki Citizens Assembly, described above, has a number of educational programs including poster campaigns promoting human rights and democracy; conferences on civil society, democracy building and multi-ethnic tolerance, the role of intellectuals in post-war Bosnia; and publication of the proceedings of those conferences. The conferences unite Bosnians from different regions and ethnic backgrounds, providing forums for dialogue and cooperation.

Objectives

- To build civil society and to strengthen “a commitment to democratic development, human rights, peace and social justice” (hCa, “III Women’s conference, 1997, p. 1), and
• To promote intergroup dialogue and cooperation.

Methodology:
Poster campaign
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly has a hard-hitting poster campaign which promotes independent political thinking, interentity integration and human rights. The administrator regards fear as the main obstacle to democracy building in Bosnia and the posters reflect that concern. Their messages include: “If you’re afraid of everything, when are you going to live?”, “It’s not too late to enter into interent,” referring to building a community encompassing both entities: the Federation and RS, and “The government feeds itself with the nation’s fear.”

Conferences, forums and publications
Helsinki Citizens Assembly promotes inter-ethnic and inter-regional dialogue and democracy-building education by supporting conferences and forums. Conference themes include the role of intellectuals in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and civil society and the Dayton Peace Accord. Other conferences aimed at assembling target groups, such as women and youth, to discuss common issues of concern. Publications were produced from the proceedings of all the conferences. Bringing people from diverse regions and groups together not only facilitates dialogue, it breaks the isolation and encourages activists who are swimming against a tide of strong public and official nationalism.

A former professor herself, the administrator feels that intellectuals have an important role and responsibility in fighting ethnic nationalism and providing critical political and social perspectives. This may be an acknowledgement of the role many intellectuals played in promoting nationalism, sometimes even in leading nationalist violence, while those intellectuals opposed to such ethnic nationalism remained largely
silent in the years leading up to the war. Currently, a small but extremely active group of academics and professionals are involved in a number of think tanks, human rights and humanitarian organizations.

Conference on the role of intellectuals in the post war Bosnia-Herzegovina Neum, Bosnia, July 11-13, 1997

Academics and other Bosnian professionals met to present papers on, and discuss, intellectuals' roles in the war, their political and ethical responsibilities, and their relationship with civil society, education and culture. This provided an opportunity to examine both the history of the war and the current divisions and opportunities within Bosnia. However, as some participants observed with frustration, the presentations generally examined these issues at a very abstract level, rarely citing concrete examples to support their statements.

Many speakers did take the opportunity to address historical points such as Bosnia's tradition of multiculturalism and the role that academics, writers and artists played in the latest war. As one described it, intellectuals incited nationalist fervour and participated in "the creation of those 'great historical values,' great ideas, which (they have), unfortunately, created (themselves), and which ended in bloodshed" (Vol. 1, p. 18).

Although many speakers regarded historic multiculturalism as a good thing, and something that made Bosnia unique in the region, they seem to regard recognition of a multi-ethnic Bosnia as divisive. One speaker argued that such recognition only serves to

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88 To name some of the most widely-publicized examples, the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was written by Serb intellectuals and Radovan Karadzic, the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader was a psychiatrist.
89 Two prominent organizations that were repeatedly mentioned by academics I spoke with were Circle 99, a group of independent intellectuals who meet to discuss social and political issues, and the Shadow Government, an unofficial oppositional cabinet that examines policies parallel to the official government.
90 All information on this conference is from the Role of Intellectuals series. Only the volume and page number will be cited.
facilitate the artificial divisions that are being created in the country. Another expressed concern that, by stressing the multi-ethnic nature of Bosnia, politicians are given fodder for “political instrumentalization” (Vol. 2, p. 4), leading to school curriculum being divided along ethnic lines, three different versions of each subject being taught, and in effect, school children being segregated according to ethnic labels. This creates a “total divergence in understanding of history, philosophy, society, even geography” (Vol. 2, p. 4). Thus the multicultural history of Bosnia, which recognizes the coexistence of cultures, is becoming a thing of the past.

In spite of tremendous efforts by many of the participants to promote a multicultural democracy in Bosnia, comments by some participants revealed why their ideas may remain marginal to most of the community. One speaker noted that independent intellectuals are speaking to the converted, using academic language and not attempting to “speak to the people outside” (Vol. 1, p. 30). Another participant commented that only “potential nationalists” and the “naive and uneducated” (Vol. 2, p. 8) shared the perspective of ethnic nationalist candidates in the elections. This latter remark reveals a common way of dismissing the views of people, especially those from rural areas, who are often referred to, by urban professionals, as “uneducated.” It is unlikely that people conveying such a lack of respect for, and understanding of, rural citizens will make much headway in rural areas.

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91 Even without official segregation, when curriculum is divided so that each is antagonistic towards the other ethnic groups, children will tend to feel more comfortable in schools that most represent them.
Third Women's Conference, Mostar, July 3-6, 1997

Objectives
- To bring women together from both Bosnian entities and especially to emphasize the "participation of women from both sides of Mostar" (p. 3),
- To discuss the main theme of tolerance as it relates to democracy building, reconciliation, and the building and re-establishment of multiculturalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Methodology
This conference brought 70 women together from all over Bosnia. For some women, it had been the first time they had been able to cross an entity border since the war. One of the special focuses of the conference was promoting dialogue between women from the deeply divided host city of Mostar. Although 22 women attended from Mostar alone, III Women's conference implies that more women from Mostar wanted to attend than were able to because of limited space available.

Three workshops were held:
1. Tolerance and politics - Tolerance as a precondition for democracy
2. Tolerance - Dialogue and solidarity
3. Culture and tolerance - Tolerance and rehabilitating multiculturalism

Outcomes
The workshops provided space for women to discuss war experiences and their fear of dialogue itself. The implications of such dialogue went beyond the personal level; the women expressed fear that such dialogue could endanger their families.

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92 All information from hCa, III Women's conference: Room for conversation, 1997.
The women discussed the need to get politically involved, to support electoral candidates who promote peace, and to lobby governments to change a number of institutional and political policies. This included lobbying against practices of state-controlled media which, the women felt, currently promotes "hate and differences" (p. 30); resisting increasing pressure by all nationalist governments to encourage women to return to the home and to bear children for the state and ethnic nation; and lobbying against divisive educational curriculum and teaching practices which, the women feared, could lead to "generations of educated but nontolerant people" (p. 31). The women recommended that religious literacy, democracy and human rights should be taught at all levels of school and proposed to lobby to make such courses compulsory.

Like the youth, the women felt that the media, especially women's newspapers, have a role to play in overcoming borders between communities.

The women argued that, in addition to helping displaced people return to their homes, more tolerance is needed in relations between traditional urban citizens and displaced people from small towns and rural areas now living in the cities.

The women felt that the latest war was only a "temporary downfall," and Bosnia's history of religious tolerance and multiculturalism is a model for rebuilding a tolerant society. They agreed to call this historical tolerance the "Bosnian's model of living. (Although) this model was terribly damaged by war, ... there is significant space for its revitalization" (p. 31).

However, they acknowledged that a lot of work needs to be done in asserting women's right to equality in the work force and public sphere, freedom from violence and reproductive choice. The women noted "significant violence in (Bosnian) culture and
traditions” (p. 33), and “dangerous beliefs in our traditions and legends” which need to be challenged (p. 20).

12/ United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

Project: Conflict Resolution Program
Location: Bosnia (Headquarters in Zenica)
Contact: Local administrator
Methods: Conflict resolution education; anti-chauvinism education

Documentation:
• UMCOR Conflict Resolution Program.

Introduction
UMCOR developed this program in 1996 “to promote the rebuilding of civil society and relationships destroyed by the war” (p. 1). The organization wanted to create programs that would “foster mutual understanding and tolerance among individuals, groups and communities” (p. 1). They have since trained more than 400 Bosnians, including teachers, students, academics, NGO staff, other professionals and business leaders in conflict resolution, mediation, negotiation and peace building. All training is conducted by local trainers.

Objectives
• To work with, and empower, “individuals and groups working at the grass roots level... (on) community development, psycho-social and peacebuilding efforts” (p. 1).
• To “teach participants new skills and awareness that will help them as they become leaders and are called upon to understand conflict and constructive ways of conflict resolution for others as well as for themselves” (p. 12).
• “To encourage reconciliation efforts at various levels of Bosnian society” (p. 1).

Methodology
The manual provides an excellent and extensive overview of conflict. It argues that conflict is a natural part of life and is often a positive thing. Our response to conflict
determines whether the outcome is positive or negative. Through exercises, participants are helped to consider their conflict style and are taught that conflicts do not have to be resolved competitively in a win-lose framework but can instead be approached collaboratively in a win-win fashion. None of the content of the manual is specific to Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia.

The manual provides some good exercises that help participants understand conflict, their own personal conflict styles, effective communication strategies, and the peaceful coexistence of differing views and values.

The manual contained one exercise on bias, stereotyping and prejudice, designed to help participants understand how stereotypes are formed and to become aware of their own biases and prejudices. The exercise was a general one which could be applied in any context. In contrast to the excellent discussion on conflict, however, there was no theoretical discussion of chauvinism leading up to the exercise.

Mixing is also part of the program strategy. The administrator observed that joint workshops are more likely to be supported if the sponsoring organization has a presence in the community, to build people's trust. UMCOR had had its head office in one community for two years and had run a shelter program there. When, in 1996, the women's group *Federalna Zena*, asked for its support in sponsoring a training workshop, the workshop was only able to reach one ethnic community at a time; the second workshop, however, was able to be ethnically mixed.

UMCOR also stressed mixing in an international conference it organized on peace building. Two of the speakers were from the Republika Srpska and some participants
came from Banja Luka (in RS). For most of them, it was the first time that they had been able to cross the inter-entity boundary.

**Discussion**

In its theoretical discussion of conflict, the manual describes the sources of conflict as threefold: conflict over resources, over psychological needs and over values, the latter being the most difficult to resolve and the former being the easiest. The manual describes identity as being strongly connected with values. The authors write, “Conflicts over values are the most difficult to resolve because they involve the things we hold most dear – the beliefs that shape our identity and give meaning to our lives” (Chapter B, no page number).

This may be sometimes be the case, but it also feeds into one of the problematic perceptions of the war: different identity labels become symbols that imply different and opposing cultural values. In fact, as many observers have noted (Itzkowitz & Volkan, 1994; Ignatieff, 1998), the culture and values of warring groups in many ethnic conflicts are often imperceptibly similar. The ethnic base of the conflict is not as much about differing values as it is about fear of losing the things people value - often the same things across ethnic groups. In the former Yugoslavia, all sides appeal to love of children and family and, in religious communities, to love of God. These values are tapped in the many nationalist music videos and programs on television. Rather than talking directly about value differences themselves, the trappings of religion, culture and now language are being used as symbols implying such differences.

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93 Chapter 2 illustrates how nationalists played up on those fears to enlist support.
94 Another example is the ubiquitous number signs on houses in Zagreb which depict a blonde man and woman holding a baby, another symbol of the strong love of family which seems to be behind much of the passion and fear that fed the war.
The discussion of conflicting values, however, seems to be much more applicable to the rural-urban tensions in Bosnia. Exercises that highlight both illusory and real value differences would be beneficial. These could draw on the "similarities and differences" exercises of UMCOR's children's manual *Peace Begins with Me* and expand that into a discussion of value differences, real and perceived.

Conflict resolution training may indeed have an impact on those chauvinistic actions and attitudes caused by feelings of threat to an individual's family, beliefs and lifestyle. By reducing perceptions of threat and fear of conflict, by humanizing those involved in the conflict, and by presenting the possibility of collaborative solutions, some reasons for bias and discrimination may be eliminated.

13/ Catholic Relief Services (International)

*Project:* Conflict Resolution Skills Training for Trainers  
*Location:* Osijek, Croatia  
*Contact:* International administrator  
*Methods:* Conflict resolution training  
*Documentation:*  
- Project proposal for the conflict resolution skills workshop for CRS/Croatia team, Osijek, Croatia, November 14-15, 1996, by Davor Dakovic and Marko Lovrekovic.  
- *A Synopsis of the Conflict Partnership Process and Skills for Effective Conflict Resolution and Relationship-Building* by Dudley Weeks.

**Introduction**

This workshop, run by and for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) staff in Croatia, was based on a previous conflict resolution workshop given by Dudley Weeks in Bosnia. The CRS workshop was intended to help staff prepare for future activities in regions with high conflict risk, including the difficult reintegration of refugees and displaced people into Eastern Slavonia. Weeks' training materials were used in the Croatian workshop.
Objectives

• To teach skills for effective and collaborative conflict resolution and relationship-building.

• To explore issues of identity.

• To help participants move beyond prejudice and move towards forgiveness and reconciliation.

Methodology

In his workshop material, Weeks outlines what he describes as a "conflict partnership process for effective conflict resolution and relationship-building." Similar to the conflict transformation model, Weeks encourages a collaborative, relationship-centred approach to dealing with conflict. Those in conflict need to create a positive atmosphere of partnership in the conflict, with a focus on individual and shared needs.

Weeks encourages participants to broaden the way they see their own and other people's identities, not allowing only one or a few aspects of their identities to become dominant. He argues that:

the more narrowly one defines herself or himself, the more likely it is that damaging conflicts will occur with those people and groups categorized in a differing "identity." If a person sees herself/himself primarily in terms of one gender, race, culture, ethnicity, nationality, class, or other exclusive identities, the critical need of inclusiveness as a global society will likely go unmet.

He asks participants to examine how individuals define themselves and how they develop a secure identity and self respect, observing that many people do this by developing prejudices, finding fault with others instead of developing their own positive

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95 This material has no page numbers so none will be cited in this section.
attributes. By broadening their concepts of their own and other identities, individuals can more easily find commonalities on which they can base collaborative efforts.

In addition to the discussion on identity and finding common ground, Weeks gives considerable space within his workshop for discussing prejudice and stereotyping as obstacles to collaborative conflict resolution. In examining sources of prejudice, he discusses both prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory social and institutional structures. He suggests ways of identifying one’s own prejudices and strategies of overcoming those prejudices, not explicitly as a moral or human rights goal, but in the interest of building effective conflict partnerships. Some of those strategies go beyond individual conflict resolution; they aim at changing patterns of dealing with broader social conflicts.

Participants are encouraged to challenge stereotypes and prejudices by others in their group, to question the limited perceptions of leaders and the media, doing their own research on topics they raise, and to “take the first step” in reaching out to those who have “been stereotyped as (their) ‘opposition’ or ‘enemy.’”

In many severe conflicts, people are trapped in a cycle of “refighting the same old battles about interpretations of the past.” Instead, they should try to take steps to reduce tensions and threats within the current situation so that “constructive possibilities” may be opened up. When the past is addressed, Weeks encourages people to “focus on what could have been done differently” if conflict partnership skills had been used.

Weeks talks about the importance of forgiveness and apology for building a collaborative problem-solving relationship which may be “liberating for all parties.” He asserts that forgiveness “is not condoning past behaviour... it is saying, ‘What was done in the past should never be done by anyone to anyone.’” Similarly, apologies are also signs of
“being positively powerful.” An apology acknowledges that “I have contributed to our problem, and I want us to work together to heal the wounds our past behaviour has caused.”

Discussion

Weeks' material goes further than any of the material I examined in encouraging people to examine their prejudices in depth, to take steps to overcome their prejudices, and to come to terms with the past in a constructive way. This was among the reasons that the CRS administrator I spoke to felt it was important for CRS staff. In addition to the valuable mediation and conflict resolution skills developed, she felt it was important for all staff to explore their own biases and prejudices before working in high conflict areas.

It is significant that those who proposed the Osijek workshop and who organized and facilitated it were local Croatian staff:

14/  Centre for Peace Studies (Croatian)
    Project:  Peace-building education
    Location:  Zagreb and Eastern Slavonia in Croatia; Banja Luka in Bosnia
    Contacts:  Two local co-ordinators/educators
    Methods:  Peace education; civil society education; human rights education; conflict resolution training
    Documentation:
    •  Centar za mirovne studije: Update (Centre for Peace Studies: Update) (May-Nov. 1997).

Introduction

The Centre for Peace Studies sponsors a number of conferences, seminars and training programs on peace-related subjects. Here I will briefly focus on three programs: MIRamiDA Basic, MIRamiDA Plus, and a peace school in Zagreb.
Objectives

- (In MIRamiDA Basic) To teach concepts of civil society, gender issues, and conflict management
- (In MIRamiDA Plus) To think critically about the above concepts and encourage people to come up with their own definitions, developing culturally-specific, localized models
- To build participants’ identities as peace makers, with a sense that they are capable of influencing structures.

Methodology

MIRamiDA Basic is a five-day basic workshop for NGO workers and organizers. It familiarizes participants with concepts of civil society, gender issues, conflict resolution and conflict analysis. It also introduces workshop techniques which are new to many participants. Organizers try to include people from different ethnic backgrounds in the workshops in an effort to cross and challenge boundaries. One organizer said that MIRamiDA is designed to help form participants’ identities as peacemakers. “There is a sense of connection with others” and a feeling of having the power to influence the structures around them, he said.

MIRamiDA Plus is a more advanced, ten-day program. Funding comes from international NGOs but the organizers assert that the training is “by locals for locals.” In the workshops, the concepts introduced in MIRamiDA Basic are challenged. It is a form of political education and the instructors “encourage people to seek their own definitions and to develop culturally-specific, localized models.” Local control is important. As one
co-ordinator said, “The Bosnian group presented their own model and it felt different from when, say, models were presented by Americans.”

In 1997, the centre began a Pilot Program in Peace Studies in Zagreb. Unlike the MIRamiDA programs, which are designed for NGO staff, this program is open to anyone interested in peace issues. As it is described in Update, “twelve lecturers with a range of activist, technical and academic experience... teach 10 courses covering areas such as conflict management, civil politics, civil society, understanding violence, human rights, women’s resistance movements, technology and communications for peace” (p. 1). Many of the lecturers are volunteers. The response has been excellent, the co-ordinator said. Although they had planned to accept 30 people, 47 enrolled and, at the time I spoke with them, 25 were regularly attending, which he felt was good. Many of those attending are students at the university but there are also working people and a few ex-soldiers. Interestingly, the co-ordinator said they may discourage soldiers from taking the course in the future because they are still dealing with other trauma issues.96

Discussion

Some interesting observations came out of my discussion with the program co-ordinators. Regarding the relationship between international NGOs and educators and local educators, one co-ordinator said that international educators and NGOs need to, above all, empower local NGOs and leave the latter “space for appropriation” of ideas which will then be adapted to the local context. She viewed words like “ethnic” as foreign

96 As a number of people pointed out, soldiers may be particularly traumatized, not only from their war experiences, but also because the official versions of what happened during the war may differ from what they actually saw and experienced.
constructions, inappropriate for the Croatian context where the word “national” is commonly used.

The co-ordinators said that it is difficult to talk about human rights in Croatia. The term is seen as too sensitive and a means of “protecting people who are considered guilty.” Some students feel depressed when they hear what human rights exist, they said, “because they realize how deprived they are.”

As for the concept of reconciliation, both regard it with suspicion. As one co-ordinator said, he hesitates to use the word “because it is so closely tied to religion. We try to get people to start to think rationally instead of emotionally. Reconciliation deals with emotions.”

97 I mentioned this comment to a well-known religious leader in Bosnia who has worked for years to promote co-operation and dialogue between religious leaders. Interestingly, he seemed to agree. “Too much religion is through emotion here; there is not enough religion as philosophy.” He feels that more religious literacy is needed to address that. He therefore organizes and promotes education about all Bosnian religious denominations at the local university.
Part III

Chapter 7: Analysis of findings and conclusion

Although ethnic nationalism and ethnic chauvinism remain major destabilizing forces within Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, education that attempts to promote ethnic reintegration and challenge chauvinism rarely deals with these issues directly. The many ways in which educators challenge the artificial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines highlight some of the complex intermix of influences contributing to war-related chauvinism. The diverse methods used also reflect the innovative ways educators find to establish common ground, not only between conflicting groups, but also between the goals of educators and participants. And they represent the common ground between this study’s concern, ethnic nationalist chauvinism, and the diverse objectives of the educators themselves.

In my search for programs, it quickly became apparent that little educational work in Bosnia dealt directly with chauvinism and I found no work that addressed citizenship or challenged an ethnic conception of nationhood, which I see as contributing to chauvinism. This encouraged me to broaden my view of anti-chauvinism education. All programs in this study were motivated by concerns about the quality of interethnic relations. This concern connects activities, such as active learning, which seem to be far removed from the goals of anti-chauvinism education, with education directly dealing with stereotyping and prejudice. The application of trauma healing and conflict transformation concepts provides a framework that links them.
Trauma healing, conflict transformation and the timing of anti-chauvinism methodologies

The data seems to support the idea that conflict styles and the degree of trauma healing of both individuals and their communities may strongly influence the methods used to promote reintegration and challenge chauvinism. In relation to trauma healing, most educators I spoke with seemed to be aware of the psychological sensitivity of participants, much of which can be linked to trauma, both current and historical. In relation to conflict styles, many of the programs whose manuals or outlines I examined include some conflict resolution training. At least four programs specifically link conflict resolution training and anti-prejudice education. In the school-based health and peace initiative in Croatia, Hart and Uzelac combine anti-chauvinism education with trauma healing and conflict resolution, suggesting that teaching them together might be more effective than teaching them separately. Amnesty International’s human rights program, UMCOR’s peace and conflict resolution programs, and Weeks’ conflict resolution skills training program also incorporate a similar combination of methods. Weeks especially links the two when he encourages participants to examine the limits they set on their conceptions of their own and others’ identities, arguing that a narrow definition of identity makes conflicts with people of other identities more likely to occur.98

The concern with trauma and conflict resolution skills is important for two reasons. It implies that educators concerned about chauvinism need to be psychologically astute, recognizing not only that changing chauvinistic thinking involves a step-by-step process of observation, reflection and learning, but also that attitudes towards “others”

98 Weeks’ argument may have parallels at the broader, social level. A society or nation which defines itself in a limited way may be more likely to feel threatened and less flexible than one which defines its identity broadly.
may be shaped by influences unrelated to ideology. It is also important because trauma healing involves a process, and conflict resolution involves skills, which can be facilitated through education.

In multi-ethnic Bosnia in particular, if there is strong resistance to dialogue and if people are still caught in a revenge, or enemy, mentality, discussion of chauvinism is not likely to take place – or to be constructive if it does. Trauma and its accompanying fear and anger need to be dealt with, new approaches to dealing with conflict need to be developed, and the possibility of dialogue and co-operation needs to be opened up.

The political arms of government harbour, and feed into, considerable enemy thinking. Therefore, in situations where groups have heavily invested in ethnic divisions and seem to feel they can benefit from a continuation of the conflict, education tends to focus on lower-stage methods which reflect personal needs such as trauma healing and active learning. Examples of these are CARE’s drama-in-education training for teachers in Mostar and UNICEF’s recourse to active learning programs after its failed or struggling efforts to create common ground between official teacher representatives. The choice of active learning was significant for both positive and negative reasons. For the CARE educator, active learning is a positive means of encouraging critical thinking, a love of learning, and building a degree of comfort with non-authoritarian, non-hierarchical educational methods and structures. These qualities, she says, serve as a foundation for building a democratic and just society. Indeed all programs for children and youth used active learning methods for these reasons.
The UNICEF example, however, shows that active learning can take on the role of the lowest common denominator in anti-chauvinism educational programming. It is one form of education that is acceptable and interesting to almost everyone and it still allows educators to feel they are contributing to peace efforts.

Stage one educational methods enable the eventual acceptance of stage two methods. They address personal or community educational needs, such as trauma healing, conflict resolution training, or NGO skills training, that may seem to have little to do with challenging chauvinism or improving intergroup relations. However, the programs are delivered in a way that encourages inter-group dialogue, co-operation and recognition of mutual interests. Conflict resolution training attempts to change the way people think of conflict. Trauma healing education helps people begin to grieve their losses. Civil society training programs provide an area of common ground and encourage acceptance and appreciation of the co-existence of diverse, and sometimes opposing, forces.

Some programs using stage one methods incorporate some level of co-operation between ethnic communities as a way of encouraging dialogue. This is consistent with the goals of many foreign aid projects which give assistance to communities that allow refugees from non-dominant groups to return. The UNICEF Bosnia experience, however, shows that such attempts to push people in the direction of co-operation can be frustrating and sometimes backfire. UMCOR, on the other hand, provided educational services to both sides of a divided community and maintained a long-term presence in the community as a way of building trust and eventual inter-group co-operation or integration. This method seemed to work for them. It may be that, with a continued presence and building
of trust, CARE’s drama-in-education training for teachers in Mostar will also eventually be able to run ethnically mixed training sessions.

Stage one and stage two methods may be usefully combined, not only for the reason, discussed above, that trauma healing, conflict resolution, and anti-chauvinism education may complement each other, but also because stage two methods may be made more accessible and easy to receive when they are tied with activities from stage one that meet emotional needs and establish common ground.

Bosnian programs which attract people willing to mix and engage in intergroup dialogue, people who are already in stage two of the conflict transformation process, were much more likely to use stage-two educational activities dealing with human rights, political structures, and stereotyping and prejudice. Participants in programs such as Schüler Helfen Leben’s youth camps or the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly’s youth conference seemed to welcome opportunities to work collaboratively with people of other ethnic backgrounds. Their goals seem to be to challenge inter-ethnic barriers created by the “institution of war” and to develop an understanding of concepts and institutions integral to peace in post-communist, post-war Bosnian society: civil society, human rights and democracy. As the discussions with the co-ordinators of the Centre for Peace Studies and those that arose out of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly conferences strongly assert, this understanding will not merely be a copy of Western European or American versions but will take a uniquely Bosnian form, with its roots in Bosnian political and social structures.
There seems to be a dividing line between stage two methodologies, which were often used, and stage three methodologies which were extremely rare. To a certain degree, this is not surprising. Most stage one and two methods were drawn from the educators themselves whereas I added the categories citizenship education and examining hegemonies.\footnote{These additional categories were added based on North American experience with multicultural and anti-racism education which I feel are relevant to the Bosnian and Croatian contexts.} Only two programs that I came across conduct historical education: CARE’s trauma education work in Bosnia and the book by Protector (see Appendix A for descriptions). Only one, the Weeks workshop, challenges a framework dividing people based on ethnic identity categories. Although citizenship education programs might offer the opportunity to discuss issues of what constitutes belonging as a citizen of a country, I came across no such programs.

The co-ordinators of the Medvescak Children’s Library suggested that the lack of discussion of citizenship and nationhood might occur because concepts of human rights may need to be introduced before discussion of multi-ethnic co-citizenship within a state and a nation can take place. It is possible that a basic theoretical understanding of democracy, human rights, prejudice, discrimination, and civil society provides a foundation for dealing with the far more sensitive topics of history, nationhood and citizenship. It is also likely, though, that the very sensitivity of these topics acts as a barrier to discussion, reflecting a reluctance by educators and participants to broach them.

In most NGO educational programs that I came across, the tremendous sensitivity of educators, both local and international, to the emotional and psychological state of participants was clear. They seemed to understand intuitively, experientially, and
sometimes theoretically, the connections between trauma, fear, and chauvinism. The
methods chosen often seem to be influenced by educators' *perceptions* of participants' 
fears, degree of traumatization and trauma healing, readiness to engage in cross-group 
dialogue and co-operation, and the concepts that they are comfortable with. The methods 
are determined, then, both by participants' willingness or reluctance to participate in a 
program, and by educators' perceptions of what participants will be emotionally ready to 
engage in.

At times, this presents the danger of over-restraint. International educators in 
particular express an understandable reluctance to impose foreign perspectives and values 
and therefore may choose to err on the side of caution. In what seemed to be an effort to 
be sensitive to the feelings of participants, the manuals tended to keep activities abstract, 
general and "safe." Such activities leave teachers room for incorporating more explicit, 
localized examples and discussion but the teacher is left on her own to decide whether or 
how to approach this sensitive ground.

**The relationship between local and international educators**

There seems to be a valuable interplay between the sensitivities and expertise of 
international and local educators, especially those developing manuals on trauma healing, 
conflict resolution, diversity affirmation, stereotyping and prejudice. Although they may 
work on similar or joint projects, and even present the same material, international and 
local educators seem to have distinct and complementary roles in the program design 
process.

All of the completed manuals I looked at: *Za Damire i Nemire*; UMCOR’s peace 
and conflict resolution manuals; Amnesty’s *First Steps*; and Weeks’ conflict resolution
skills training program, used primarily foreign material. This seemed to be the case regardless of whether the manuals were being developed by international or local educators or both. Educators expressed an appreciation for the abundance of material dealing with conflict, anti-racism, multiculturalism, trauma and peace education that has already been developed in other parts of the world. They were keen to tap into these ideas, which could then be modified to fit the local context. International educators, then, bring knowledge of methodologies and access to useful materials. They also bring new or outside perspectives which may remain elusive to those caught up in a conflict.

The next step is to choose foreign materials that are locally relevant. This tends to be done two ways: by local educators who have an understanding of the context but are immersed in local “common sense” frameworks, and by international educators who elicit local knowledge and perspectives and choose exercises which they feel will be “realistically” acceptable and constructive. The elicitive approach, used and documented extensively by Hart (1995), is useful because it respects and employs local knowledge. At the same time, however, it runs into the danger of creating double standards in the name of realism or cultural relativism, buying too much into local frameworks and failing to use the valid analytical tools regarding chauvinism and multiculturalism that one already possesses.

The elicitive approach also creates the danger of confusing perception with reality. In his writing on trauma healing education in the Liberian context, Hart (1995) focuses his

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100 Although the manuals that I came across used mostly foreign material, I do not mean to suggest that good material is not being developed in Bosnia and Croatia. Just to cite two examples, one educator mentioned the work of Dr. Arpad Barath, a psychologist and professor at the University of Zagreb medical school, who developed a 12-step trauma recovery program using creative expression and psychodrama; and Males and Strivenic of the children’s library program in Zagreb developed a good book on children’s rights, mentioned above, and are currently working on a human rights manual.
discussion on the threat to ethnic identity that occurs with war. In fact, war may threaten a person's life, resources and the monuments on which he ties his ethnic identity, but it does not threaten the identity itself. On the contrary, an ethnic war entrenches a person's ethnic identity, bringing it to the forefront of whatever other weave of identities he might hold. Still, the individual may perceive that his identity is being threatened.\textsuperscript{101} It may be that by affirming this perception, confusing perception with reality, the educational program is unwittingly entrenching some of the frameworks driving the war.

After the material has been chosen by local or international educators, local educators can use their unique understanding of the local context to make the material more precise and relevant. As one local educator said, there needs to be "space for appropriation" of internationally-derived material by local NGOs. In this way, she said, local NGOs are empowered in their work and the material becomes more meaningful.

It was surprising how little the manuals reflected the local context. Although this has the advantage of keeping the concepts more abstract and distant and thus emotionally safer, opportunities were missed to tie examples or theoretical explanations from the local context, especially from the war. When such connections were made, as in the "Affirmation" chapter of the revised \textit{Za Damire I Nemire}, the text appears to be rendered much more meaningful.

Interestingly, the material which dealt most directly with war conditions was introduced by two foreign sources: Amnesty International and consultant Dudley Weeks.

\textsuperscript{101} As Weeks (1995) suggests, above, the very narrowing of identity definitions leads to increased perception of threat to identity and increased chances of conflict occurring. I think Weeks is right in focusing not on threat to identity, real or perceived, but rather on how people define identity itself and its relationship with conflict.
Amnesty’s material, especially that for older children, deals directly with the kinds of conditions that surround an ethnic war, such as refugee issues, human rights abuses and discrimination. The manual challenges children to fight stereotypes and find examples of stereotyping and prejudice within their own media and political and social surroundings. Weeks’ workshop material used theory on conflict, identity and chauvinism to challenge unidimensional identity frameworks. It was interesting that his workshop material, though certainly provocative, was well received by Croatian Catholic Relief Services staff who, soon after, used the material to organize their own workshop.

This suggests that while international educators experienced in conflict situations should serve the needs of, and empower, local educational efforts by teaching skills and concepts that contribute to peace, and while an elicitive approach enables educators to learn about, and remain sensitive to, unique local circumstances; one of the assets that an experienced international educator brings is a broad comparative perspective. The educator should take advantage of that perspective and introduce relevant and challenging theory and well-directed examples. As Weeks’ workshop indicates, local workshop participants may be more receptive to direct and challenging material than many of the manuals and outlines imply.

Most of the projects that I came across, even ones sponsored by international NGOs, benefited from considerable local ownership and control. This was recognized by all program co-ordinators, whether local or international, as very important to their success.
Although, during much of my data collection, I was looking at the differences between international and local NGOs, this distinction did not appear to be as important as the differences between the work of international and local educators. Many international NGOs hire local co-ordinators and educators who are able to bring local perceptions and priorities to the fore. One educator did say, however, that because international organizations have more money available to them, they are better able to afford failure than local ones. They therefore can take more risks in project planning than local NGOs can.

**Bosnia and Croatia compared and the element of age**

Although there were many similarities between the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, some interesting differences can be observed between them which have implications for education. As Chamberlain (1997) observed:

> The differences at this moment in time between the two countries are more striking than the similarities. The desolation in Bosnia is chronic, whereas in Croatia it is much more patchy. Relatively this means, for example, that the city and population of Zagreb are in a different phase of development need than that of, say, Mostar. However, a warning note (should be given) that appearances can be misleading (p. 14).

The main differences between Croatia and Bosnia, as they relate to anti-chauvinism education, have been described above. By comparing the experiences and goals of educators in the two countries, we may learn more about the influences that shape anti-chauvinism programs. This also gives us an opportunity to discuss the way the target audience influences the education provided.

There seems to be more official support for education on human rights, stereotyping and prejudice in primary schools in Croatia than in Bosnia. Also, people who
were supporting tolerance training and human rights education in general in Croatia often worked for publicly funded institutions: schools, libraries and universities. This suggests to me that such education for children, in Croatia, while recognized as sensitive, is seen as relatively politically safe and important for children's well-being. Primary school-aged children are taught in a generalized way which does not necessarily challenge the structures around them. Such education aimed at youth or adults would be more inclined to challenge the political status quo.

In Bosnia, however, where many people, including the nationalist political leaders who dominate the government, do not recognize the war as settled, the education of children is seen as very political. It is not seen as in the nationalist interest to educate for tolerance and against chauvinism; indeed those who develop school curriculums are going to great lengths to divide communities. In Bosnia, I came across only one NGO program for children which dealt with diversity appreciation, stereotyping and prejudice. It took place outside of the school system. One other was seeking approval - and that was to be carried out in schools in RS.

It seems that youth in Bosnia are in the vanguard of protest against ethnic divisions. Youth, especially urban youth, many of whom fit into no neat ethnic labels and who had friends of many ethnic backgrounds, suffered greatly from the divisions that were created during the war. Youth organizers respond by defying the divisions in the most direct way they can: by mixing and collaborating with youth of other regions and other ethnic labels. That often forms a basis for building friendships and discussing media, human rights, prejudice and discrimination. Many youth in Bosnia told me they are “not
political,” but they seem to be associating politics with nationalist politics. The activities that the youth engage in have strong political lessons and implications.

The Bosnian youth programs tend to be conceived and organized by youth and this gives the programs a quality of daring and breaking ground as the young people challenge barriers and conventions of all sorts.

Among adult groups in Bosnia – of intellectuals, religious leaders, child workers, NGO workers and women – mixing was commonly, though not universally, used as a method to improve intergroup relations. In contrast, largely because of the relative ethnic homogeneity of Croatia, mixing was rarely used as an educational method. The exception to this was the Centre for Peace Studies in Zagreb which has worked with NGO workers in Bosnia and Croatia. The example of the mixed class in the Croatian school-based health and peace initiative, in which the primary school teacher commented that discussing the war and “similarities about children’s losses” in a mixed class provided “powerful insights” (Ajdukovic et al., 1997, p. 57), indicates that such a strategy could enhance the effectiveness of educational programs in Croatia too.

Rural-urban divisions
Perhaps the most interesting and unexpected thing that I encountered during my data collection was the animosity and prejudice towards displaced people from rural areas that came up almost consistently during my conversations with urban Bosnians. In fact, I heard many more prejudicial statements about rural people than I did about people of other ethnicities. The most common comment was to dismiss rural people as “uneducated.” Other comments were even less polite and reflected the kind of stereotypes

102 The exception to this is the Mostar youth theatre which is supported by an adult director and an adult theatre-in-education consultant.
about "others" that are common world-wide. It was also interesting that the \textit{ethnic} slurs that I heard from urban people seemed to apply stereotypes about rural people with an ethnic label pinned on.

Some of this sentiment may be attributed to snobbery and some may be attributed to a real clash of cultures and values between rural and urban Bosnians of all ethnicities – a far greater clash than that between people of different ethnicities within the same urban or rural environment. However I felt that, to a certain degree, urban Bosnians, especially those that believe in a multi-ethnic Bosnia, blame rural Bosnians for the war.

On the rural side, people spoke of an historic disparity between limited resources available to rural areas compared with more abundant state resources in urban areas. This would also lead to animosity towards urban residents.

It seems ironic that those advocating cross-ethnic tolerance, respect and cooperation voice intolerance and disrespect towards other groups of people. On reflection, however, this animosity is not surprising at all. From most reports, people in, and from, rural areas, tend to be more nationalistic than urban people for two reasons. First, rural people have been far more vulnerable to attack, both in this war and in ethnic attacks during World War II, memories of which still linger. In an emergency situation, real or perceived, this vulnerability would naturally lead many to support those who could – and would – defend them militarily: strong nationalist leaders. Second, urban areas have long been more ethnically mixed than rural areas, including more mixed families and friends. This tradition of mixing has occurred in urban areas for centuries and is regarded as one of the hallmarks of Bosnian society. Therefore, when rural Bosnians were forced to flee their
homes and settle in urban areas, a clash of values occurred, one which would play itself out in urban schools where nationalist, segregationist values were pitted against values that promoted multiethnic and multicultural mixing.

A number of the Bosnian conferences and workshops mentioned these rural-urban tensions, and talked about the need for intergroup tolerance. At the “role of intellectuals” conference, one speaker also observed that intellectuals promoting a multi-ethnic Bosnia are speaking to the converted, possibly referring to this disparity (Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Role of Intellectuals, vol. 1, p. 30).

When urban Bosnian educators spoke to me of developing educational programs in rural areas, they spoke of agendas set by the urban-based organizations themselves, providing information that rural people “need to know.” There was little sense of rural ownership of the proposed projects, of meeting the needs and wishes of urban participants and involving them in the planning. Local ownership appears to be important to the success of the programs examined here; there is no reason to believe that rural ownership of programs would be any less important to their success. Perhaps the urban-rural relationship would be analogous to the relationship between international and local educators described above.

An American organization, the National Democratic Institute, on the other hand, sought to develop educational programs in rural areas by working through existing local community structures.\(^{103}\) As a result of this approach, the administrator I spoke to feels, “we’re being hugely successful... We start with people’s needs.” And the results are

\(^{103}\) As the National Democratic Institute administrator explained, NDI worked with the lowest levels of official organization in the community. They were able to get input from local people through this organization, which they recognized as having “a lot of informal power.”
encouraging. “People are coming back for discussions on democracy, which is a theoretical type of discussion.” Many participants are beginning to talk more about advocacy work to meet community needs, such as proper water facilities, he said.

This rural-urban tension seems to be tremendously underexamined, at least by foreign commentators and peace makers who have focused on ethnic and religious divisions. Such analysis, the nationalist frameworks, and the Dayton Peace Agreement, froze Bosnia into an ethnic and religious triage, wiping out the many other identities, groupings and friction that may have had more real meaning for the people involved. Not only Bosnians of mixed ethnicity, and those that considered themselves to be primarily Bosnians or Yugoslav, suffered. Citizens of other ethnicities, in particular the Roma, no longer have a place in the divided political (and possibly aid) frameworks. Rural-urban value differences are ignored in a myth in which people who share ethnicity are supposed to be culturally similar.

Keeping elements of rural-urban cultures, gender, class, citizenship, religion, and broader ethnic identity (incorporating mixed ethnicity and ethnicity outside of the dominant three), among others, into the discussion of improving inter-group relations and challenging chauvinism, would broaden the debate and bring it closer to people’s real experiences.

Also, by focusing on the three dominant ethnic labels, international NGO staff and aid donors can run into the danger of working mainly with those with whom they have the most in common and with whom they can communicate the easiest. These local allies tend to be well educated, urban-based and at least bilingual. Similar to the way I conducted my
research in major urban centres, for the sake of speed and convenience, international NGOs are usually based in the major cities. 104 Focusing on ethnic labels can disguise whether one is working with the converted, or with people in or from regions more reluctant to integrate with people of other ethnicities.

**Gender**

Gender issues were not a major part of this study. The issue of gender and war is a whole subject in itself and a superficial handling of it runs too easily into simplistic generalizations. It is worth noting, however, that most NGO educators I spoke to, both local and international, were women. A number of programs focused specifically on women or had gender issues incorporated into their program. This was only partly because of their vulnerability during and after the war, described in the Helsinki Citizens Assembly Women’s Conference. It was also because, as one Bosnian educator explained, “Women’s organizations started early in the war and women were the first really to talk about reconciliation.” She noted, though, that an increasing number of men are attending the organization’s conflict resolution training sessions.

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104 This is not to say that NGOs are not working extensively in rural areas. Many are, but this seemed to be an area of tension and discomfort.
Conclusion

In the years following an ethnic civil war, it is tempting to want to find educational programs that quickly diffuse the tensions and reduce the chauvinism that is both a part and a product of the war. The Bosnian example shows that there are no quick educational fixes. Education against ethnic or religious enemy thinking is a slow and complicated process which is intimately interwoven with the state of trauma, grieving and approaches to conflict resolution of participants and their communities.

Educational programs which challenge chauvinism caused by trauma and enemy thinking, however, offer two important things. They provide a forum where people who question the divisions and enemy logic of the war, can meet, form alliances and friendships, develop their understanding of concepts related to war, peace and chauvinism, and develop joint strategies for pursuing peace. They also help participants who are more reluctant or less able to give up enemy thinking, work through their feelings of trauma and change the way they look at, and deal with, conflict, moving towards a situation where dialogue is possible. Through self-understanding and dealing with emotional needs, such as grieving, they may then begin to empathise with the “other” and explore their own enemy frameworks at a rational level.

Although much of the stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination during an ethnic or religious civil war appears to be very close to that which typifies North American racism, the two have many differences. Colonial racism is based on an ideology of exploitation, whereas, for the average Bosnian and Croatian, ethnic chauvinism is often closely tied to the trauma, anger and fear that come from a belief in the historical inevitability of enmity, a belief played up by the fatalistic myths of nationalist politicians,
intellectuals and media. All of the educational programs I came across dealt with this kind of chauvinism, which is closely tied to enemy thinking.

However, there is a second form of chauvinism in the former Yugoslavia which is related to the exploitative, imperialistic form of chauvinism North Americans are familiar with, and which will not be revealed by examining only the educational programs that currently exist. Many Croat and Serb nationalists believe that Bosnia has no right to exist as a nation-state, and that Bosnian Muslims are simply converted Croats or Serbs who have no legitimate claim to be part of a nation outside of the Serb and Croat ethnic nations. This ideology, which was used as an excuse to invade Bosnia, is clearly both chauvinistic and expansionist. Although nationalist leaders may manipulate people’s trauma and grief to encourage enemy thinking which supports the institution of war, the ideology itself is not based on enemy thinking or current or past traumas.

By focusing too closely on human needs, such as trauma healing, grieving and the need for security, educators run into the danger of interpreting all chauvinism as trauma based. Chauvinistic ideological beliefs cannot be effectively addressed through educational programs which focus on trauma healing, grieving and reconciliation. Confronting the ideological aspect of the war needs to be made an explicit part of anti-chauvinism educational programs in the former Yugoslavia. Educators need to help people recognize chauvinistic ideologies for what they are: expansionist land and resource grabs. They should also expose the ways in which nationalist politicians manipulate traumatized people to mobilize their support for expansionist campaigns. Certainly, as this topic did not come up at all in the programs I examined, there are tremendous barriers to carrying out such discussions. The conflict transformation theory outlined in diagram 5.4 suggests that such
discussion may occur along with stage two and three educational methodologies. Clearly, much more research and educational effort need to take place in this area.

Ignatieff (1996) notes that, in Germany, after World War II, this process of learning about the history of the Holocaust took decades. It was not the Nuremberg trials that made most Germans acknowledge the horrors of the Holocaust – those were considered by many to be victors’ justice. While the German war crimes trials in the 1960s and ‘70s had more of an impact, it was, as he writes:

...an accumulation of a million school visits to concentration camps, a thousand books – even the Hollywood television series *Holocaust* contributed something – which accomplished that vast molecular reckoning between generations which is still going on. (Ignatieff, 1996, p. 37)

Bosnia and Croatia cannot afford to repeat the mistake of brushing the horrors of history under the carpet or only telling one side of the story. Educators need to find ways to help people deal with and grieve the traumas, not only of this war but also of previous wars, accepting responsibility for their own roles, and the roles of their communities, in the pain inflicted on others. Montville’s method, walking through history, and the honest examination of personal, lived history, rid of myths, may be a place to start.

This study reveals that, through experience or intuition, educators seem to know the links between trauma and chauvinism. Their sensitivity and methodologies reflect this. However, they may at times be too cautious. International educators sometimes seem to buy into the ideas of ethnic nationalism. They may become too sensitive to ethnic barriers and the primacy of ethnic identity in situations where they know, from their own experiences, that such divisions are not natural or inevitable. Because of their comparative
perspective, they have an opportunity to introduce new and challenging concepts and they should take advantage of this.

Local educators are really the ones who make the externally-drawn ideas meaningful. They have the invaluable knowledge of local research and work in the area, and of local conditions and perspectives. Much foreign material seems to be deliberately vague, perhaps so that it can be applied in many contexts. I believe that this material can be more powerful and effective if it is reworked to fit the local context more directly.

Every ethnic war is unique, as the contrasts between even the closely-related Bosnian and Croatian examples indicate. However parallels can often be drawn between the psychological experiences of individuals or communities caught in a war or post-war context. The impact of trauma, community-based chosen trauma, fear, and enemy thinking which, as Itzkowitz and Volkan argue, binds an individual and community’s identity to the identity of the “other,” are very similar in many ethnic or religious war situations. Similar patterns can also be witnessed in the way people address conflict with a named enemy. By being sensitive to both the psychology of war, trauma and grieving and by applying notions of conflict transformation, educators concerned with chauvinism can better understand the timing of post-war educational methods.

Directions for future research

There is tremendous room for future research in the area of post-war education. Similar to the Croatian school-based health and peace initiative (Ajdukovic et al., 1997), follow-up studies are needed which examine the way programs are received and how effective they are in achieving their goals. In particular, it would be useful to examine how
those programs which engage directly with sensitive subject matter, such as Amnesty's First Steps program, are being used and what the impact of those programs is.

Much more also needs to be learned about rural-urban dynamics in Bosnia and the way in which NGO educational programs are affected by, and affect, them.

Finally, systematic comparative studies of successful or innovative educational programs in post-war societies would contribute greatly to our understanding of the policies and practices that have proven effective in challenging and reducing war-related chauvinism around the world. Much work has been done in the fields of political science, psychology, and peace studies, and through the efforts of community and aid organizations. It is time for educational researchers to synthesize this knowledge to broaden and deepen the base of our understanding of post-war education in general.
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Appendix A:
A brief description of all projects

In Bosnia:

CARE Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina “Pax” Project:
These drama-in-education and theatre-in-education programs, described in detail in chapter six, use drama and theatre in schools to teach active learning and conflict resolution skills and to contribute towards trauma healing of Bosnian youth and children. The programs have been carried out in Bihac and Mostar.

The pilot project in Bihac trained primary school teachers and youth in drama-in-education methods and worked with primary school students to allow them to look at their war experiences from the safe distance that drama permits.

In Mostar, teachers are being trained in drama-in-education methods to help them use, and feel comfortable with, active learning in their classroom. A manual will be developed out of this work.
Also in Mostar, a CARE consultant works with the Mostar Youth Theatre on educational theatre projects.

CARE Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina
A CARE consultant gives trauma healing workshops to community leaders and refugees. They discuss their war experiences and learn about typical stages of trauma, loss and grieving. The consultant uses an elicitive approach to create personal meaning out of the theory. He uses Monteville’s history workshop methods to discuss the history surrounding the war.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Catholic Relief Services conducts leadership skills training in multi-ethnic communities in an effort to build civil society. With the help of a multi-ethnic community advisory group, they find neighbourhood leaders and train them to develop and organize voluntary neighbourhood projects, building on a tradition of neighbours helping neighbours. By encouraging co-operation between ethnic groups, this training aims to improve inter-ethnic co-operation and relations.

Helsinki Citizens Assembly/Helsinki Parliament Gradjana
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa), described in detail in chapter six, sponsors ethnically-mixed conferences, workshops and seminars for women, youth and intellectuals, to discuss issues of concern to their NGO work and to a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and to plan ways in which they can collaborate more effectively to address those issues.

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Helsinki Committee organizes lectures on human rights for high schools and for the police academy. Most lecturers are lawyers, ombudsmen, staff of international organizations or professors. The organization published a book called Human Rights and the Police which the police academy is trying to incorporate into its regular
training program. It is also making a book for primary school outlining basic human rights. They continue to write newsletters describing the state of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization is concerned, not only with the major three ethnic groups, but also with the rights of such vulnerable minorities such as the Roma.

National Democratic Institute
The National Democratic Institute has two programs: a political party development program in which they help opposition and ruling parties become more democratic; and a civic program in which they “help ordinary people become more involved in democratic structures.” As part of this latter objective, they organize civic education programs in which educators meet monthly with groups in 60 villages and discuss democracy-related topics. The villagers come up with the topics to be discussed. They have had good success in attracting and maintaining participants, the NDI administrator I spoke with said. They also try to promote inter-ethnic co-operation and understanding by creating links between communities.

Open Society Institute/Soros
Soros trains journalists in basic journalistic skills in an effort to achieve more objective coverage.

Protector
This project, which had just received funding and had not yet been carried out when I was in Bosnia, plans to compile a book depicting the positive things people did for people of other ethnic backgrounds during the war.

Schüler Helfen Leben/Students Help to Live
Schüler Helfen Leben brings youth together from towns across Bosnia and from all ethnic groups and engages them in cultural and educational programs. To this end, it organized a cross-entity youth conference and a multi-ethnic youth magazine, described in detail in chapter six. It uses mixing and inter-ethnic co-operation explicitly as a means of improving inter-ethnic relations and challenging ethnic barriers.

United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)
UMCOR has created workshop manuals and conducts training on peace education for children, child workers and youth, and a conflict resolution skills for community leaders. Both contain exercises on diversity appreciation and minimal exercises dealing with stereotyping and prejudice. UMCOR tries to incorporate mixing as part of its educational structure, in some cases working towards it as a long-term goal. The programs are described in detail in chapter six.

Unicef Bosnia
Unicef Bosnia has tried a number of educational programs to try to establish common ground between children in different regions of Bosnia but, because of political resistance by educational decision makers, has had little success. The organization has been able to develop magazines with the same content printed in Cyrillic for distribution in RS and in Roman letters for distribution in the Federation.
Unicef has had more success promoting training in active learning educational methods. These programs are described in more depth in chapter six.

**Youth Bridge International (YBI)**
Youth Bridge International, described in more detail in chapter six, tries to "promote peace and reconciliation among youth and a respect for diversity and human rights" by sponsoring and assisting media projects and other programs run by and for youth. Among its projects, it currently sponsors "the only independent youth radio station in RS." The project ideas come from the youth and they need to meet certain criteria, including targeting vulnerable groups: minorities, displaced people and refugees. YBI has also proposed a series of training workshops for teachers on stereotyping and prejudice. At the time of my visit, this was still going through the approval process.

**Zajedno/Together**
Zajedno is an inter-denominational project run by the International Multireligious and Intercultural Centre in Sarajevo. It tries to promote dialogue and reconciliation between Catholic, Muslim, Serb Orthodox and Jewish leaders in Bosnia. As part of its efforts to promote knowledge and understanding of all major Bosnian religions, the director teaches religious literacy seminars at the university for political science and other interested students. Topics include introductory courses on Islam and Christianity, and "religion and human rights."

**Zenska akeija Vidra/Women’s Action Vidra**
This business school, which, at the time of my visit, was just about to start operating, is run by minority women in Serb-dominated Banja Luka. It will teach business skills to women of all ethnicities, including mixed marriage women who face particular discrimination.

**In Croatia:**

**Amnesty International**
Amnesty International has an excellent human rights manual for children and teenagers which was being used by CRS Croatia and which is described in detail in chapter six. Exercises cover human rights issues, conflict resolution, stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. The material facilitates a detailed examination of topics relevant to war and oppression, all of which are tied to either the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

**Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Croatia**
CRS staff organized a conflict resolution skills training workshop for other CRS staff based on material from a previous workshop by consultant Dudley Weeks. The material, described in chapter six, deals with issues of identity, discrimination, and facing history, as factors in successful conflict resolution. It encourages the examination of social and identity-related structures that lead to chauvinism.
Department of education, University of Zagreb

The Education for Development course is based on the work of Susan Fountain who wrote a book by that title. Fountain was a consultant for Unicef Croatia and provided training in this area to NGO workers and professionals in Croatia. The course covers such subjects as global interdependence, social justice (primarily children’s rights), images and perceptions (stereotyping and prejudice), conflict resolution and political and social change.

Medvescak Children’s Library

The children’s library offers diversity appreciation, human rights and conflict resolution education and training for children, parents and children’s librarians both within the library and across the war-affected regions of Croatia. The program is described in detail in chapter six. The librarians work co-operatively with Unicef Croatia and professors in the education department at the University of Zagreb.

Centre for Peace Studies

The Centre for Peace Studies offers courses and workshops for NGO workers and the general public in concepts related to peace and democracy. These include gender issues, human rights, conflict management and civil society. These are described in chapter six. Its courses and workshops encourage students to examine these concepts critically and to try to develop them as they would suit the Croatian and Bosnian contexts.

School-based health and peace initiative (Unicef Croatia, CARE, and McMaster University)

The school-based peace initiative, described in chapter six, provides education in trauma healing, bias and prejudice, conflict resolution, communication and peaceful living for primary school students in war-affected regions of Croatia. The program manual, Za Damire I Nemire: Opening the Door to Non-violence, has been evaluated and a second, updated edition was created. This provides an excellent opportunity to see teacher and student responses to it.
Appendix B

Methodologies aimed at improving inter-ethnic relations and challenging ethnic chauvinism

Active Learning:
Active learning is a broad, umbrella term which covers a range of teaching and learning methodologies which attempt to engage students actively and critically in the learning experience. In contrast to the traditional, one-way, banking style of education, active learning methods encourage students to engage in two- or multiple-way dialogues with the teacher and with each other. Active learning methods often use drama or physical movement to make the educational experience more memorable, interesting and enjoyable.

Trauma healing:
Trauma healing training teaches about the impact of trauma and the process of healing and grieving after a loss. Exercises may help people express their trauma or grief either verbally, physically or through art. Participants are helped to work through the grief process and to mourn.

Inter-community co-operation:
Inter-community co-operation may either represent an effort by educators to incorporate some form of inter-group co-operation into their education programming when full mixing is not possible, or it may be a co-operative project that has resulted from a mixed program. Examples of the former may be civil society training projects which require some joint decision-making; an example of the latter are joint media projects that were initiated at mixed youth conferences.

Conflict resolution training:
Conflict resolution training raises awareness of individual responses to conflict and teaches about ways of improving communication skills and approaches to conflict and conflict resolution.

Civil society education:
Civil society education is used broadly as an umbrella term for education aimed at teaching about democratic processes and strengthening the elements of civil society, including effective voluntary and non-governmental sectors and a free press.

Peace education:
Peace education is education raising awareness of the institution of war and of processes that promote and sustain peace.

Political education:
Political education is education that raises awareness of political processes and the role of individual citizens in those processes. Such education should reveal the way
politicians try to influence or manipulate citizens and the ways in which social and economic structures influence and constrain political leaders.

**Human rights education:**

Human rights education is education which promotes knowledge about human rights and skills and attitudes that promote human rights (Amnesty International, 1995).

**Intergroup mixing:**

Intergroup mixing means the mixing of participants from conflicting ethnic groups in one educational program as a conscious policy designed to enhance the learning experience.

**Media literacy:**

Education for media literacy is designed to raise critical awareness of media, not only as an important part of a democracy, but also as text with its own biases.

**Diversity appreciation:**

Diversity appreciation education promotes awareness of, and appreciation for, the many ways in which people differ in a society. It attempts to broaden definitions of one’s own and others’ identities.

**Bias, stereotyping and prejudice:**

Education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice is education raising awareness of the attitudes and behaviour involved in chauvinism.

**Historical education:**

Historical education can take a variety of formal and informal forms, from truth commissions and books, to formal classes and historical workshops. It attempts to teach, in as objective a manner as possible, the events that influenced the war and the events of the war itself.

**Citizenship education:**

Citizenship education would involve a discussion of what it means to be a citizen of the country concerned, who belongs as a citizen, and what kind of representation that involves.

**Anti-chauvinism education – examining hegemonies:**

Anti-chauvinism education that examines hegemonies would take a broader, systemic look at discrimination than anti-chauvinism education which focuses on chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. It would also examine dominant ways of thinking that are chauvinistic or discriminatory in their implications.
Appendix C

Croatian school-based health and peace initiative:  
_Za Damire I Nemire_

The pilot project, from 1995-96, consisted of four stages:

1/ Materials were developed and research instruments were chosen. The training materials were compiled from three existing manuals and one book on trauma healing and conflict resolution. Two were produced by local writers, including Uzelac; the other two manuals were written by Hart based on his work in Liberia.

2/ Educators and school psychologists from the selected schools were trained in a series of workshops. Pre-testing of teachers and students took place in this stage.

3/ Teachers in the three participating schools worked with their students on the material for two hours a week. They received professional help bi-weekly from counsellors and trainers connected with the project. All trainers met monthly to share their experiences.

4/ Post-testing and analysis took place (Ajdukovic et al., 1997).

The Project extension
   After the pilot project was complete, the project was extended to 29 primary schools in Eastern Slavonia and the Baranja region. Local educators and psychologists were trained so that they could, in turn, train other teachers involved in the project. The trainers then supervised and supported the teachers throughout the project. As Hart writes:

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105 At the time of the project, this area was under the control of the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) which would eventually (in January, 1998) return to Croatian Control. At the time of the project, many Serb local and displaced people were living in the area and they did not know whether they would be able to live with their Croat neighbours once the latter returned (Evaluation, p. 11).
In this way the teachers and children were being helped by skilled local persons who knew well their fellow teachers as well as many of the 1200 students who participated in the 20 week training. This approach also allowed for more direct support of the teachers in the form of clarification of training materials, advice regarding teaching methodologies and in some cases direct interaction with the children. The teachers were given new understanding about the interactive learning methods. (Ajdukovic et al., 1997, p. 12)
Appendix D
From Bezic, Hart, Mitrovic and Uzelac

Example 1: AT THE SAME BENCH

There is a new pupil in the classroom. The teacher says her name is Lili. She sits at one of the desks next to Mira. The next day Mira - as soon as she comes into the classroom - attacks her new colleague at the desk. Lili is hurt. Mira suddenly asks the teacher to move her to another desk away from Lili, because her mother told her she must not sit next to an enemy.

If somebody yells at and hurts another person, which human rights do you think are being violated? And what if the reason is that someone belongs to a certain ethnic group?

Example 2: THE FANS

The children from a school in Osijek (town) took a trip to Zagreb (capital). While looking around the city, they chatted about soccer and upcoming match between two main clubs in Croatia. A group of boys from Zagreb who were nearby began to make fun of and imitate their dialect. Soon fisticuffs broke out.

What human rights were being violated in this conflict?

Example 3: WAR CONFLICT

The war in Croatia and Bosnia meant for many people the loss of a home, running away, fear, insecurity, and separation from loved ones. The Lovrenovic family fled from Bosnia and dwelt in an abandoned house in Pakrac. The war conflict in Croatia had forced out of this sad house the Croatian family Novakovic who found refuge temporarily in Austria with relatives. They wish to return to their house now, but now there are Croats from Bosnia living in it.

What human rights were violated here?