CANADIAN INDIAN POLICY
AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING THEORY

By

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Abstract:

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This thesis addresses questions of how development planning theory has influenced policy-making for Indians in Canada and how it could be improved for making better policies in the future. These questions are considered around a nexus of central state-Indian relations. There is a focus on the multi-dimensional problems of poverty faced by many reserve communities, especially of those located in more rural and remote regions. The thesis criticizes the serious dualism within and between prevailing development doctrines and proposes remedies through a 'relational' approach.

An original typology categorizes 'substantive' development planning theories into two opposing doctrines. The more dominant liberal assimilationist doctrine centers on modernization theory and internalizes blame on Indians for their "own" problems, but is challenged by radical autonomist doctrine which centers on underdevelopment theory (UDT) and its 'internal colony' variant, and contrarily externalizes blame onto the state. A third body of reformist planning is grounded in the practices of welfare statism.

Relational analysis of the history of Indian policy shows that underdevelopment of Indian communities has been caused by the interaction of both external and internal causes. Liberal doctrine strongly influenced the central state's assimilative agenda during the 'traditional' era of Indian policy, including its oppressive 'reserve system' and landmark 1969 White Paper. It is agreed that radical criticism properly reveals the racism and
economic exploitation underlying state-sponsored process of 'internal colonization,' and also helps to explain the consequent rise of Indian ethnic nationalism. However, it is concluded that radical criticism does not adequately explain events in the 'contemporary era' where Indian leaders have more influence over policy-making, but have expended much of their energies pursuing a 'modernist' nationalist agenda in a power struggle with the central state. The resulting policy vacuum between the deadlocked liberal state and radical Indian positions has been filled by default with misguided reformist programs of welfarestatism, with terribly destructive effects in many reserve communities.

The criticism of current development theories when applied in practice is reinforced by their criticism as theories. The deficiencies of current 'substantive' development theories are shown to be endemic because of shortcomings in their underlying 'process' planning theories. In particular, the reductionist dualism of extreme liberal and radical development doctrines, which contributes to polarization in practice, is revealed. Instead of the current practice of applying single explanations and prescriptions to Indian policy-making, a relational approach is advocated which selectively combines liberal, reformist, and radical perspectives.

The thesis concludes with an exposition of how a relational approach can be applied to examine widespread poverty and dependency in reserve communities as an interconnected 'external/internal' problem, and, leading from this, to propose mutually-reinforcing state and community actions.
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Proposal

This dissertation came about from the writer’s first hand experiences working with Indian people, concerns about endemic problems of poverty in many reserve communities, and interests in development theory. The dissertation has three purposes. First, to analyze the historical evolution of Canadian Indian policy and how it led to contemporary problems of Indian poverty. Second, to trace the direct influence of development theory on the making of Indian policy, and to also examine policy critiques by development theorists in the field. Three, to identify what is valid in current development theories and what are serious shortcomings, and to propose improvements which could be applied to future Indian policy.

The analysis of Indian policy covers two distinct eras. The first era of ‘traditional’ policy-making covers unsuccessful attempts by colonial and then federal/provincial governments to force Indian assimilation by means of the repressive ‘reserve system, against strong but largely passive Indian resistance. The second phase of ‘contemporary’ policy-making starts with the federal government’s watershed 1969 White Paper which proposed to totally dismantle the failed reserve system and to remove the Indians’ special status, but which had to be withdrawn in the face of strong opposition from an emerging Indian nationalist movement. It continues with the Indians more active role in policy-making, the expansion of welfare state programs into reserves, the failure to make reserve communities more economically self-sufficient, and recent attempts to deal with Indian demands for self-government.
Canadian Indian policy is viewed as the product of relationships involving Indian peoples and the central state. A focus is maintained on status Indians living in reserve communities, and particularly on those residing in rural and remote areas where problems with poverty are the most acute. However, considerable cultural, political, and economic diversity is recognized to be a characteristic of Canada's Indian peoples. The central state is viewed as constituting federal and provincial/territorial levels of government, although most attention is given to the federal government because of its special responsibilities for Indians. A focus on the state's relations with Indian people is appropriate because of the considerable power which it exercises over their everyday life, through such mechanisms as the federal Indian Act and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND). However, as will be elaborated, the "state" is not intended to be presented as one monolithic entity. Recently, at least, it incorporates a diversity of political and bureaucratic interests, as well as of public opinions as to what should be appropriate treatment of Canada's Indians.

So called "Indians," as opposed to other Canadians of native ancestry, derive their special status from the federal Indian Act which stipulates complex criteria for determining who should be entered on DIAND's Indian Registry. Essentially, being an Indian denotes ancestry within a Band which has been allotted its own reserve lands, although the individual in question does not need to live or have lived on a reserve. Reserves are allocated to specific Bands under a unique system of tenure whereby federal Crown lands are held for their "special use and enjoyment" (in the Territories, some Bands are allocated Crown lands but they are treated as de facto reserves). In 1985 eligibility for Indian status was broadened through Bill C-31, with the primary purpose of correcting the previous
discriminatory provisions in the Indian Act whereby Indian women (but not men) and their offspring lost their special status upon marriage to a non-Indian spouse. The Inuit of northern Canada have been seen to also have special status by the courts, but less so in practice (they do not have reserves). Collectively, Indians and Inuit are referred to here as "aboriginals," and aboriginals together with other people of substantial native ancestry as "natives," except where sources who use other terminology are quoted. Reference is also made to Indians' "aboriginal rights" with respect to their unextinguished claims to traditional territories and claims for recognition of their self-governing powers. We also refer to Bands in contemporary contexts as "Indian First Nations" (IFN's), which is what they prefer to call themselves.

There are ten main Indian linguistic groups in Canada, as well as the Inuit group. The two most widespread, Indian linguistic groups are the Athapaskan across northern British Columbia and the southern part of the Territories and into the northern Prairies; and the Algonkian extending across much of the southern parts of the Prairies and across Ontario and Quebec and into the Maritimes. Other groups in British Columbia are the Kootenayan in the south east, the Salishan in the south-west, and, extending further up the coast, the Wakashan, Haidan, Tsimshian, and Tlingit. The Iroquoian are located in southern Quebec and the Siouan are spread along the Prairie stretch of the Canada-U.S. border. All the southern groups overlap into the United States. All the Indian linguistic groups include a number of dialects, except the Haida.

Recently, the number of Indians in Canada has been expanding rapidly, because of high natural growth rates and additions to the numbers of registered Indians through Bill C-31.
In 1967 the Indian population stood at 230,902, but by 1992 had risen to 533,500 persons -- a 57% increase. Nearly all Indians are members of one of the 604 Indian First Nations across Canada with rights to a total of 2,283 reserves. The biggest concentrations of Indians and reserves are in Ontario (with the largest proportion of Indians) and British Columbia (with the largest proportion of reserves), but there are many in Quebec and across the Prairies (where occur the largest reserves). The smallest concentration is in the Maritimes and the Territories (although in the latter, Indians together with Inuits make up a large proportion of the local population). Some Bands only have one reserve, but most have a number, though not all these may be occupied. The largest Indian community is the Six Nations Iroquois reserve in Ontario with 14,000 members, but about half of Canada's reserve communities have less than 1,000 Indian residents. However, many Indian communities also contain other native and non-native residents, but their precise numbers are unknown.

Some 38% of reserve Indians are located in what DIAND designates as 'urban' areas (though many of these are in reality small communities), while 42% are located in 'rural' areas. The remainder are located in 'remote/special access' areas. The proportion of Indians who live on reserves has been declining rapidly since 1967 when 78% of Indians lived on reserves, and by 1992 was down to 59% per cent. This decline is attributable both to large out-migrations of Indians from reserves to cities and towns, as well as to the recent addition of Bill C-31 registrants -- many of whom already live in urban areas.

"Poverty" in its multiple senses of high unemployment and low incomes, dependency on transfer payments (primarily from the federal government), and severe social problems is
widespread across many of Canada's reserve communities. At the time of the 1991 Census, Indians on reserves had a 31% unemployment rate, which is about 2 1/2 times larger than the national jobless rate. Many of the unemployed live on rural and remote reserves where job opportunities are relatively scarce. Of those looking for work, about two-thirds reported that few or no jobs were available, but 40% said they lacked the education or experience to get jobs where these are available. Largely because of lack of employment, 43% of Indians were reported in 1994 as being dependent on social assistance, compared with 10% of other Canadians. Most Indian communities are also heavily dependent on the central welfare state for housing subsidies, essential community infrastructure, programs for public health, welfare and safety, economic development assistance, and First Nation administration. DIAND's total budget for Indian people in 1994 was about $4-billion, of which about one quarter was expended on social assistance.

Of course, care has be taken not to unduly point to Indian dependency on the welfare state when its numerous programs are benefiting all Canadian families, and when some business corporations receive huge subsidies and other such assistance. But it is true that many Indians as inordinately dependent on outside assistance just to maintain their everyday existence, and that such dependency often carries forward from one generation to the next. Indian poverty grounded in welfare dependency is manifested in numerous indicators. For instance, Indians on the average enjoy eight years less life expectancy than other Canadians, their suicide rate is four times the national average, violence inflicted among them is also a major cause of death, and alcoholism and substance abuse continues to be a major problem. Indians also suffer a comparatively high incidence of incarcerations
and family violence.

This dissertation addresses such problems of Indian poverty and their origin in the deplorable history of misguided and ineffective state policies towards Indians. We also consider the recent role played by Indian leaders in reacting to state oppression, but also in perpetuating the dependency of their communities on the central welfare state. Diametrically opposed development doctrines have contributed to both sides of this drama. We criticize elements of both liberal 'assimilationist' doctrine which has largely guided state policy-making, and radical 'autonomist' doctrine which has influenced criticism of state policies and extreme Indian nationalist positions.

It is argued that the deadlock between opposing state and Indian positions has created a policy vacuum, which, by default, has been filled with a reformist program of dependency-creating welfare statism. This deadlock is partly caused and perpetuated by deficiencies in current development doctrines. In particular, there are dualist tendencies in both liberal assimilationist and radical autonomist doctrines which lead towards extremely polarized and mutually-exclusive viewpoints on the nature of Indian development problems and appropriate solutions. Whereas liberal assimilationist doctrine is prone to "blame the victims" for their own poverty, radical autonomist doctrine is equally prone to externalize all responsibility on to the state. As we will see, each of these viewpoints is based on its own set of distinct assumptions about power relations in society and the nature of the public interest, as well as have their own distinct epistemologies.

We propose a new "relational" approach to development theory which would provide a
framework for maintaining what is valid and useful in both current development doctrines, while dispensing with what is not. This approach synthesizes elements from liberal and radical, as well as reformist viewpoints. Instead of analyzing Indian poverty only from the perspective of state-Indian inter-actions (as is presently done), a relational approach also considers the reciprocal connections between these and intra-actions within Indian society. As a consequence, widespread problems of poverty and welfare dependency on many Indian reserves should no longer be seen from entirely external or internal points of view; rather, they are simultaneously "external" and "internal," and should be addressed accordingly.

1.2 Methodology

Extensive reviews were made of primary and secondary literature, placed in context by the author's twenty-five years of involvement with Indian development issues. Experiences in government and, latterly, private consulting have provided varied insights of state-Indian relations from different perspectives. As Regional Planner for the B.C. Region of DIAND, the author had twofold roles for coordinating funding, advisory and training support to Indian First Nations (IFN's) to control and undertake their own community-based planning, and for promoting supportive planning among the Department's various Program areas (and was not an uncritical, bureaucratic bystander in these roles). The authors' consulting clients have included some thirty IFN's. All together, the author has advised over one hundred IFN's located throughout British Columbia on settlement planning, natural resource management, community economic development, socio-economic and environmental impact assessment, and institutional development. As methodological caveats, this research project is both informed and influenced by these experiences.
The research method is described with reference to the planning paradigm model illustrated on the following Figure 1, adapted from one originally presented by Friedmann and Weaver. 3 By a "paradigm" of planning is meant a like-minded body of thought on the appropriate ends and means of planned intervention in society, and which is grounded sufficiently in the structure of the society in question to be significantly reflected in actual practice. Opposing planning paradigms may coexist in society and although one may dominate over a considerable period of time another may grow in importance to challenge its dominance. Such a transition may be described in Kuhn's phrase as a "paradigm shift." 4

The various elements of the planning paradigm model are summarized as follows.

Referring to Figure 1, 'socio-economic and political conditions' (1), denotes the practical context of problems and opportunities in which 'planning practice' (2) operates. Our particular research addresses the roles of the Canadian state and Indian peoples in the historical evolution of Indian policy practice, and its contribution to contemporary conditions of poverty within Indian reserve communities. Planning practice is a pragmatic response to changing political and bureaucratic exigencies, but is also framed by the particular 'development planning doctrine' (3) which influences policy decision-makers, whether consciously or unconsciously. Such doctrine comprises the accumulated knowledge which guides particular practices of planning, and includes "popular wisdom" and more formalized theories about development. Both the knowledge which constitutes planning doctrine and its application in planning practice are, in turn, structured by the prevailing 'ideological/institutional framework' of society (4), including the influence of
Figure 1  Planning Paradigm Model

4. Ideological/Institutional Framework

3. Development Planning Doctrine

3a  Process Planning Theories

3b  Substantive Development Theories

2. Planning Practice i.e. Development Policy

1. Socio-Economic and Political Conditions
fundamental ideological beliefs and institutional biases towards one form of action or another.

The planning paradigm model distinguishes between two types of theories within development planning doctrine, ‘process planning theories’ (3a) and ‘substantive development theories’ (3b), i.e. what Hightower describes as theories "of" and "in" planning respectively. Substantive planning theories try to make sense of the phenomena with which planning practice deals, i.e. in the case under review here, examining problems of Indian underdevelopment and proposing development solutions, and criticizing other theories and practice in the field. By comparison, planning "process" theories deal with such questions as why and when planning should be undertaken, by whom and for whom, and by what means. As will be shown, particular process theories are linked with particular substantive theories, including the sharing of similiar assumptions about the prevailing ideological/institutional framework. Specifically, linkages are drawn respectively between ‘liberal’ process theory and ‘assimilationist’ substantive theory, and between ‘radical’ process theory and ‘autonomist’ substantive theory. A linkage is also drawn between ‘reformist’ process theory and practices of the welfare state, though the latter is not associated with a well-defined body of development theory.

The process/substantive distinction is an important one because process planning theory effectively sets a priori rules for designing substantive theory in two ways. First, process theory influences perceptions of what constitute development problems that need to be addressed, as well as of the appropriate nature and scope of planned interventions for correcting those problems. Second, process theory delineates how to go about selecting,
bounding, and interpreting knowledge about substantive phenomena, and how this knowledge should be applied in planning practice. Thus, the assumptions of process theory may be strongly determinant of the assumptions in substantive theories. As will be shown later, it also follows that if development theory is to be improved, so must process theory.

Following the above, the dissertation is organized into two main parts. The first part contains an historical analysis of Indian policy, how it has been influenced by development doctrine, and how it made changes in Indian society. The historical analysis is guided by our proposed relational approach which focuses not only on the inter-actions between the state and Canadian Indians, but also on their connections with intra-actions within Indian society. The second part of the dissertation contains a detailed review and critique of current development doctrines. It also includes a proposed planning process model which both provides a basis for the aforementioned critique and for a detailed presentation of our proposed relational approach. The second part ends with an exposition of how a relational approach can be applied to address the problem of welfare dependency on reserves, including proposals for a dual strategy of mutually reinforcing state and community action to both change "external" state-Indian relations and "internal" relations within reserve communities.

1.3 **Typology of Development Theories**

A typology of substantive development theories is provided below as background to the historical analysis in part one, and to provide a framework for the review and critique of theories in part two.
The development planning literature contains a considerable variety of theories, many of which have been applied at some time or other in the formulation or criticism of Indian policy. However, after searching the literature no comprehensive typology of theories could be found, probably due to the fact that they cross so many disciplinary lines. An original typology is presented here which incorporates disciplinary distinctions and the division of development doctrine into two major paradigms.

Different disciplines have evolved development theories for application to four different scales of social groupings, as shown in the following Figure 2. The four categories of theories each focus on a particular type of social group which has particular relevance to the specific discipline involved. The definition of these social groupings differ across two dimensions: first, the relative inclusiveness of the social group's institutional organization, and, second, the relative importance ascribed to the spatial context of social relations in a group's development or underdevelopment.

**Figure 2** Differentiation of Development Theories by Social Groups

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<td>inclusive/</td>
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<td>1. Societal</td>
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<td>2. Regional</td>
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<td>3. Class</td>
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<td>4. Community</td>
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The societal focus of theories in category 1 refers to what sociologists refer to as "inclusive societies," encompassing a full range of major institutions for economic production and distribution, socialization of new generations, authorization and use of power, communications between individuals and groups, and the maintenance of social cohesiveness. Societies are often co-terminous with nation-states, or their history probably includes previous periods of political autonomy. Indeed, different versions of societal development theories have sometimes been evolved for inter-state and intra-state applications to meet these two situations. By comparison, regional theories in category 2 focus explicitly on the spatial significance of social relations at an intra-state level, though they have been applied for this purpose both internationally and domestically by Western theorists. A region may constitute an "inclusive society" as in the case of a nation within a larger state, though not necessarily so as exemplified by a region which is primarily defined in terms of its common economic interests but is less integrated according to social and cultural criteria.

The other two categories of development theories focus on specific parts of the more inclusive social groups described above. The class theories in category 3 separate out specific socio-economic classes for analysis (unlike some Marxist class-based theories in category 1 which are intended to reveal the class structure of society in total, i.e. as in a "social formation"). Finally, community theories in category 4 may be divided into two groups. First, are social organization theories which can be seen as spatial analogues of class theories. Second, are community economic development (CED) theories which have a more specific focus on individual communities than the regional theories with which they are closely associated.
Probably very unusually in the development field, all these categories of theories have application to the problems of reserve Indians in Canada. This is because Indian underdevelopment or development can simultaneously be viewed from perspectives of their overlapping memberships in a number of social groups, e.g.

(a) Indians constitute a minority society, or better still, number of societies in Canada with their own distinct characteristics and problems.

(b) Indian societies contain an inordinately, high proportion of a lower socio-economic class which is marginalized from mainstream opportunities.

(c) Many Indians are located in rural or remote regions, often with limited economic opportunities.

(d) Indian reserve communities are among the most disadvantaged communities in poor regions (and even in the cases of reserve communities located in rich urban areas, many of their members share societal and class problems with other Indians).

To summarize our typology to this point, the following Figure 3 is a list of development theory categories which focus on different target social groups and applications of development assistance.
Cutting across all the above categories of development theories are the two principal paradigms of 'assimilationist' and 'autonomist' development doctrines. These can be distinguished according to two sets of classification criteria. In many cases theories within the respective doctrines are distinguished by both criteria, but in some cases only one set of criteria applies.

The first set of distinguishing criteria refers to how different theories ascribe causality for underdevelopment and development to either the social group in question (i.e. Canadian Indians) or to an external agent (i.e. the Canadian state). All development theories break the universe down into power relations between two mutually exclusive entities, the internal ‘object’ which is to be developed and the external ‘subject,’ which, depending upon the doctrine, plays a role in either undeveloping or developing the object.

Assimilationist doctrine holds that the object group is underdeveloped because of its own internal, inferior traits (whether political, economic or cultural, or some combination thereof) and thus will have to be developed exogenously by the object group. Autonomist
doctrine counters that the object is only undeveloped because of its external relations with the subject, and therefore should undertake its own endogenous development. The following Figure 4 illustrates these distinctions.

Figure 2 Primary Distinctions Between Development Doctrines
(Figure 4 in thesis)

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<td>ASSIMILATIONIST</td>
<td>internal (Indians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMIST</td>
<td>external (State)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second set of distinguishing criteria refers to whether the target group should be developed by an external development agency in its own image, or whether the target group should develop itself according to its own desired characteristics. These alternative propositions give rise respectively to our nomenclatures of "assimilationist" and "autonomist" development doctrines. Other theorists have used the first set of criteria to distinguish doctrines. For instance, H. Brookfield breaks down societal development theories according to whether they prescribe "exogenous" or "endogenous" development solutions. Similarly, a distinction is now commonly made in regional and CED theories.
on the basis of whether they propose that development should come from the "top down" or the "bottom up." Our nomenclature was selected because it reflects an important debate in Indian policy as to whether the Indian minority can only effectively develop by being completely assimilated into the universal norms of the majority Canadian society (i.e. the dominant assumption of state policy makers until quite recently), or whether the Indians would be better off if they developed themselves according to their own perceived particularist norms (i.e. the contemporary position of most Indian leaders and many academic critics).

A typology is now presented of development theories according to: (1) their disciplinary distinctions, and (2) division into opposing development doctrines. As shown in the following Figure 5, both assimilationist and autonomist doctrines contain their own "counterpart" societal, regional, class and community theories (their disciplinary foci are also shown). Societal theories are the most complex and complete. Indeed, modernization theory and UDT can be considered as "core theories" within assimilationist doctrine and autonomist doctrine respectively. Modernization theory was the first development theory to evolve and all other assimilationist theories are, to varying degrees, its derivatives. On the autonomist side, UDT occupies a similar but not quite so central influence. Some of the other theories are not yet as well-developed as the core theories, notably in the case of CED theories which are highly derivative of regional theories and contain little original content of their own (because of this they may better referred to as "approaches" rather than theories).
Table 5  Counterpart Development Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET GROUP &amp; primary application</th>
<th>DOCTRINE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assimilationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Society</td>
<td>Modernization theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Inter-state</td>
<td>(sociology/economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social distance theory</td>
<td>Internal colony model (sociology/economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Intra-state</td>
<td>(anthropology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Region</td>
<td>Functional theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-state: International &amp; domestic</td>
<td>(regional science) (regional planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Class</td>
<td>Culturalist theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>(anthropology) (sociology/social policy studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Community</td>
<td>Locality development approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Social Organization</td>
<td>Liberal approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Community Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Lastly, the two doctrines with their component theories can be viewed respectively as thesis versus antithesis, with autonomist theories usually being developed as explicit criticisms of their counterpart assimilationist theories, e.g. UDT came about as a reaction to modernization theory and practice, and regional territorial theory as a reaction to regional functional theory, and so on.

Many of the development theories shown on Figure 5 can be distinguished as either 'assimilationist' or 'autonomist' according to both sets of classification criteria described above. However, there are some exceptions of less important theories which only fit one set of criteria:--

(1) 'Social distance' theory is located within the assimilationist paradigm because it is a variant of modernization theory, and shares its assumptions that Indians should be developed exogenously by the state and assimilated into larger Canadian society. But unlike most assimilationists, some social distance theorists identify the state as having played an important role in undeveloping Indian society.

(2) 'Situationalist' theory is located within the autonomist paradigm because it shares UDT assumptions that disadvantaged classes within society are the "victims" of state-sponsored underdevelopment. But unlike most autonomists, situationalist theorists advocate that the solution to the victims' underdevelopment is to fully assimilate them into the majority society. Similar comments can be made about community 'social planning' and 'social action' approaches in the autonomist paradigm.
1.4 Applications of Development Theories to Indian Policy

Some readers may not be conversant with all the theories which have been applied in Indian policy-making. Rather than interrupt the flow of the historical analysis, a very brief summary follows of societal, regional, and class development theories. Community development theories are not dealt with until part two.

(1) Modernization Theory and UDT

Modernization theory has its roots in the writings of classical economists and sociologists such as Adam Smith, Durkheim and Tonnies, but was formally codified in the 1950's by largely American theorists, most notably W.W. Rostow. It has been applied extensively to Third World countries through foreign aid programs, and still remains dominant in development thinking. Under modernization theory, traditional "underdeveloped" societies are placed at the bottom of an evolutionary continuum while modern "developed" societies are located at the top, with "developing" societies lying at various points in between. Traditional societies can only "progress" to modernity by imitating the recent historical experience of western capitalist societies. However, this process can be accelerated by the "diffusion" of modernizing influences from developed countries through trade, investment, technology transfers, social contacts, and systematic acculturation of traditional peoples to new skills and values. After passing through a number of evolutionary stages, all developing societies will eventually converge on the universal liberal ideal (according to modernizers) of individualist democratic institutions and capitalist free-enterprise.

From at least the 1840's, Canadian Indian policy was committed to a modernizing strategy
with the end objective of culturally assimilating Indians into Western-European norms. In the 1960's a number of academics advocated Indian assimilation, but they subscribed to social distance theory which is a version of modernization theory (see below). Modernization theory was the basis of the federal government's landmark 1969 White Paper, but when this had to be withdrawn after intense Indian opposition, modernization theory declined in influence. However, it has regained some of its previous dominance with the recent movement to the right in Canadian politics (notably, the Reform Party seems to advocate a modernization, assimilationist strategy towards Indians).

Modernization theory has come under intense criticism from advocates of underdevelopment theory (UDT), which was evolved first by Latin American social scientists such as A.G. Frank. They criticized modernization theory's ethnocentric bias and its liberal clothing of what, underneath, was perceived to be naked U.S. imperialist exploitation and aggrandizement. These theorists countered that so-called underdeveloped countries had previously been developed, and it was the imperialist powers who had undeveloped them for their benefit. Under this one-sided relationship, underdeveloped countries would continue to provide the necessary raw resources, cheap labour, and expatriated profits to fuel growth in the imperial "core," while the "peripheral" countries would remain relegated to being "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Marxist underdevelopment theorists predicted that the class conflicts generated in these skewed dependent economies would inevitably, but not immediately lead to socialist revolution. The more influential neo-Marxist UDT school could not wait so long. They proposed that class coalitions should organize on a nationalist basis to disengage from imperial domination and reassume their own indigenous development path.
UDT has provided much of the inspiration for critiques of assimilationist policies towards Indians, though not so much directly because of its focus on economic exploitation of the periphery through either the extraction of its "surplus labour value" (in Marxist versions) or "surplus capital value" (in neo-Marxist versions). These calculations are not so relevant to Canada’s Indians because their labour and capital were not exploited in the way that concerned Latin American theorists. One notable exception, which will be discussed at length, is Mel Watkins’ analysis of the Dene Indians’ rights to resource rents in the Mackenzie Valley. However, for the most part UDT thinking has been influential through its internal colony model (see below).

(2) Social Distance Theory and the Internal Colony Model

Lithman distinguishes two types of approach which have been applied to explain Indian underdevelopment in North America. The first "explains underdevelopment in terms of social and/or cultural distance between the underdeveloped entity and the surrounding world," while the second claims "that the relationships between the underdeveloped entity and the surrounding world are exactly the root cause of underdevelopment and/or the reason for the phenomenon of underdevelopment." 7 The first approach is the basis of social distance theory, which is a particular version of modernization theory. The latter approach refers to UDT and its internal colony model.

The concept of socio-cultural distance is essentially an anthropological tool. Margaret Mead, for instance, interpreted the social and cultural forms of a society before contact with Euro-American society, and then measured their linear acculturation from this ethnographic baseline. Cultural convergence has commonly been seen as progressive by
many social distance theorists. However, others have cautioned that specific contact conditions can be an important development variable. A more forceful assimilation strategy (as compared with relatively permissive acculturation) may have the opposite if unintended effect of provoking strong opposition to change by traditional groups.

Still other anthropologists have gone even further to consider the contemporary social and cultural forms of reserve communities as the consequence of something that went wrong in the intended transformation from traditionalism to modernism. R.W. Dunning, who will be referred to later, was well-known in the 1960's for identifying the Indian Affairs Branch as the culprit in Indian maladaptation to Canadian society (although he was sometimes ambivalent about whether Indians should completely give up their minority culture.) At times, some critics in this school of anthropology could almost be regarded as underdevelopment theorists, except that they hold to the modernization goal of eventual assimilation. At the farthest extreme, Carstens suggests that the situation of Canadian Indians is analogous to South African apartheid, referring to reserves as "little colonies," (but simultaneously advocates assimilation). 9

The internal colonial model extends UDT assumptions of the "core" exploiting the "periphery" to the intra-state level and, in doing so, often adds a dimension of ethnic exploitation to UDT's focus on class exploitation. This makes it most appropriate for analyzing the situation of Canadian Indians. The original development of the model and its emphasis on class divisions owes much to two American sociologists, Michael Hechter and Robert Blauner who were principally concerned with the plight of American blacks. Some of their arguments are outlined below.
Hechter's famous internal colony thesis focussed on Britain's "Celtic Fringe," but was intended as a case example for comparing the respective validity of two competing models which attempted to explain Black alienation in the United States. The first model was what he calls the "assimilation" model, incorporating notions of social distance theory and culturalist class theory (see below), which argues that because Blacks have been isolated in ghettos they have become socialized to failure, and consequently need to be resocialized into the national culture. The second model Hechter calls "nationalist," reflecting the counter-tendency of more militant Blacks to blame White society for their predicament and to organize collective ethnic opposition. In his case analysis, Hechter extends the UDT notion of the core exploiting the periphery, and concludes that the "Celtic Fringe" has been exploited along ethnic lines overlain on class exploitation. To Hechter, his internal colony thesis supports the interpretation that external economic exploitation along ethnic lines is responsible for the continuing underdevelopment of Black society, to which their ethnic nationalism is a logical response.

Robert Blauner's seminal article has been pivotal in the development of the internal colony model. His concern was to explain the 1960's American phenomena of "ghetto revolt." Blauner makes a distinction between colonialism as a social, political, and economic "system," and colonization as a "process" which he proposes is as applicable to the U.S. domestic situation as much as it is to overseas colonialism. Classical colonialism of the imperialist era and American racism share common features, he says, because they likewise "developed out of the same historical situation and reflected a common world economic and power stratification." He identifies four components which are common to both external and internal processes of colonization: (i) the colonizer's forced
assimilation of the ethnic group, (ii) their systematic attempts to destroy its culture, (iii) their manipulative administration of ethnic group members, and (iv) their racist dominance over them. Most recently, Blauner’s colonization process has been applied by Frideres to the experience of Canadian Indians, and is also used here in the historical analysis of Indian policy. 13

(3) Regional Functional and Territorial Theories

Regional development theories add a more explicit spatial dimension to societal theories. Functional regional theory can be seen as a spatial analogue of modernization theory. Regional scientists translated modernization theory’s underpinnings of liberal, neo-classical economics into spatial mechanisms for diffusing growth outward from more developed regions towards less developed ones. Functional theory’s essential propositions are: (1) economic production in each region should be specialized according to its respective ‘comparative advantage,’ (2) growth will necessarily be polarized in urban centres and their leading industrial sectors, which stimulates demand for the supply of raw materials from hinterland regions, (3) unless hinterland regions themselves develop into urban centres, it is most efficient for them to import most of their required goods and services, and (4) job opportunities will necessarily be limited in hinterland regions and much of their labour force should migrate to growing urban centres to find work.

Functional theory was the dominant force in Canadian regional development policy from the 1960’s through to the 1980’s. As will be shown, it had considerable influence on the 1969 White Paper which recommended that not only should Indians be culturally assimilated, but that they should move away from their remote reserves and be spatially
assimilated into Canada's modernizing urban-based economy.

Territorial regional theory emerged as an explicit critique of what its adherents perceive as functional theory's centralizing, homogenizing, and exploitative agenda. Territorial theory is linked to neo-Marxist UDT, often through its internal colony model, but it also contains a strong strand of anti-materialist philosophy. These sometimes conflicting genealogies surface in territorial theory's mixed proposals for distinct societies in the periphery to counter the core's control by regional nationalist movements (the neo-Marxist influence), and/or by movements inspired by communalist or anarchist ideals (the anti-materialist influence). The periphery should be "delinked" from the core, they argue, by strategies for political and economic decentralization to enable it to develop according to its own indigenous values. Territorial thinking is a major influence on theorists who propose that Indians should return to a way of life consistent with their traditional values.

(4) Class Culturalist and Situationalist Theories

Class theories cluster around opposing cultural and situational theories of poverty. Culturalists, such as Oscar Lewis, "blame the victims" for their own predicament by arguing that they manifest patterns of values and behaviour inherently different from those of the dominant society and culture, and which are transmitted intergenerationally through internal socialization. This "culture of poverty," they argue, is the determinant of the poors' low-economic status. Hence, it logically follows that the prescribed solution for them is to adopt the value and behaviour patterns of the non-poor. In response, situationalists claim that the exhibition of untypical values and behaviour by the poor is no more than a functional response to their deprived and externally imposed environment.
They contend that the poor fundamentally share the same values as larger society, but are prevented from realizing their aspirations by a restrictive social system. The situationalists disagree that the poor have the onus for changing themselves and, instead, point to society’s responsibility for creating opportunities for their economic enfranchisement.

Tanner summarizes a number of Canadian studies which follow a situationalist line of argument, with common themes of social stigmatization and prejudicial barriers against native people attempting to access mainstream economic opportunities. The most notable example of this interpretation is by Elias who insists that Indians’ poverty arises not because of any cultural difficulties they have in adapting, but from their position as part of the "underclass" in Canadian society. On the other side, culturalist arguments were part of the intellectual arsenal of the White Paper planners. Its negative assumptions also underlie simplistic contemporary critiques by the New Right of Indian welfarist dependency.

With this background information in place we now turn to an historical analysis of Indian policy.
PART ONE:

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
2.1 Overview

This chapter analyzes certain aspects of the historical evolution of Indian policy from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 up to the early twentieth century, tracing important changes which took place under imperial control, colonial government, and federal-provincial government, as well as Indian reactions to those changes.

Starting in the 1760s, the primary concern of the British imperial government in setting Indian policy had been to secure strategically placed Indian tribes as military allies. However, by the turn of the century when the Indians' military usefulness declined (and their participation was reduced in the declining fur trade), the need to 'assimilate' Indians became the primary objective, abetted by the other two policy principles of imperial policy to purposefully 'civilize' Indians according to western cultural norms, and to 'protect' them until they were assimilated and could look after themselves. These paternalistic, although at the time humanitarian principles were subsequently transformed by colonial administrators in Central Canada and then by the new Dominion government into a fundamentally racist agenda for persecuting Indian peoples.

This transformation of policy undoubtedly reflected increasing intolerance towards Indians who were seen as standing in the way of Western settlement and expansion, but, in large part, it was also an unintended consequence of the failure of the 'reserve system' which had been designed by the state to bring about the Indians' assimilation into White society. As will be described, the reserve system evolved to incorporate four mutually reinforcing components: the segregation of Indians in settlements located on specially set-aside
reserve lands, special legislation to control most aspects of Indian life, establishment of a large Indian Affairs bureaucracy with intrusive powers of tutelage over their Indian 'wards,' and state-sponsored Church proselytization and teaching. However, the reserve system was fatally flawed, and for two reasons. First, the goal of assimilation was perversely intended to be achieved by segregating Indians, spatially, socially, economically, and politically, from the very European settler society into which they were supposed to be assimilated! Second, when the reserve system failed to achieve its desired results, as it inevitably would, the state subjugated Indians even more in attempts to force their assimilation and, in doing so, alienated them further away from White society.

These events are interpreted from the perspective of our 'relational approach' to development theory, which addresses the interconnections between evolving state policies and Indian responses. It will be shown, particularly, how state attempts to force Indian cultural assimilation through the flawed reserve system failed, and only served to provoke Indian resistance and, ultimately, separatism. This was despite the fact that many Indian leaders were not opposed to the need for economic assimilation, being well aware that their previous, traditional pursuits were being irrevocably eroded by expanding European settlement. But instead of then changing direction when faced with opposition from Indian leaders, government administrators responded by intensifying their attempts to force cultural assimilation through the reserve system, which in turn provoked even more Indian resistance. Thus ensued a viciously escalating spiral of increased Draconian measures to force Indian submission but also hardening Indian resistance. As a consequence of this dynamic, it became increasingly more difficult over time for the state to reach a reasonable compromise with Indians.
To some degree, the events during this period sustain the claim by modernization 'social distance theorists' that today's "Indian problem" is the consequence of something which went wrong in a transformation process from traditionalism to modernity. More particularly, it could be asserted that bureaucratic bungling prevented Indians from being successfully assimilated. On the other side, many UDT theorists disagree that the notion of assimilating Indians was or is a desirable goal. Undoubtedly, there is considerable evidence in this period to support accusations by UDT 'internal colony' theorists that Indian policy was highly oppressive and racist (though issue will be taken later with UDT theorists when interpreting more contemporary events). This is confirmed by comparing the events against Robert Blauner’s previously mentioned four components common to both external and internal processes of colonization. Blauner’s components are quoted below, more fully:

(1) The first component refers to how the racial group enters into the dominant society .... Colonization begins with a forced involuntary entry.

(2) Second, there is an impact on the culture and social organization of the colonized people which is more than just a result of such "natural" processes as contact and acculturation. Rather, the colonizing power carries out a policy which constrains, transforms, or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life.

(3) Third, colonization involves a relationship by which members of the colonized group tend to be administered by representatives of the dominant power. There is an experience of being managed and manipulated by outsiders in terms of ethnic status.

(4) A final fundament of colonization is racism. Racism is a principle of social domination by which a group seen as inferior or different in terms of alleged biological characteristics is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and physically by a superordinate group. 1
2.2 Three Principles of Indian Policy -- 'Assimilation,' 'Civilization' and 'Protection'

The starting point of this historical analysis of Indian policy is the Royal Proclamation of 1763. To this day, the Proclamation is a continuing symbol of betrayal but also of hope for native Indians, because of the promises made by the European newcomers to respect Indian rights to aboriginal title and status as self-governing nations. However, recognition of distinctive Indian rights was soon compromised by historical events with the result that the primary goal of Indian policy became assimilation, to be achieved concurrently by purposeful civilizing and protection. Under British Imperial direction, these principles had some humanitarian purpose but they were to sow the seeds for much more repressive control when the colonies, and finally the new Dominion of Canada assumed primary responsibility for Indian policy.

The effective territorial scope of the Royal Proclamation was all those lands west of the Atlantic Seaboard colonies. The Proclamation recognized the rights of Indian nations to aboriginal title in those areas as follows: "And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interests, and the Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of our Dominions and Territories as not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds." 2 The Proclamation also stipulated that the Crown's prior approval was required for all acquisitions of Indian lands: "And We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure, all our loving Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands above reserved, without our especial leave and Licence for that purpose first obtained."
Very importantly, the Proclamation also laid out a process of how Indian lands should be acquired for other purposes: "if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of such Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us in our Name, at some public meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony...." The latter provision forms the basis of subsequent treaty-making between Indians and representatives of the Crown. This process, together with other language in the Proclamation such as references to Indian "Nations," provides one of the buttresses for contemporary Indian demands that aboriginal title should be negotiated on a "government to government" basis.

Although the Proclamation has lasting legal and constitutional significance for Indian-White relations, it was originally conceived to meet pressing military contingencies of the day. The Proclamation followed the Seven Years War and was signed in the same year as the Peace of Paris, whereby France ceded nearly all of its title and claim to territories within the northern part of the American Continent. British memories were still fresh on how Indian tribes loyal to France had assisted them to be victorious on land until the situation was saved by a successful Royal Navy blockade of French supply lines. Indian loyalty was motivated by the French giving of presents but, more significantly, by perceptions that French economic interests, which centered on the commerce of the fur trade, matched their own interests to protect their hunting grounds from agricultural settlement. The British were now anxious to copy France's success in cultivating strategically located Indian allies, both to forestall threats of future Indian attacks on colonial settlements but, also, increasingly, to provide insurance against the growing restlessness of the American colonies under British rule. Thus, the Proclamation was intended to signal to Indian tribes
that the British would protect their interests in return for military support.

The Proclamation’s protections against uncontrolled acquisition of Indian lands had been prompted, in part, by the fraudulent practices of unscrupulous American land developers, but its enforcement was a further irritant to the American colonies who wished to expand their agricultural frontiers westward. Indeed, enforcement of the Proclamation was one of the causes of the Revolutionary War and in being so, ironically, played a role in defeating the very protection of Indian territories which it was supposed to uphold. The Proclamation did pay military dividends to the British against the American colonies when Indian tribes such as the Mohawks and the Iroquois proved to be valuable allies on their side. The first erosion of the Proclamation’s promises followed, however, at the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, when British negotiators surrendered all claims to the Americans over Indian territory south of the Great Lakes. They repaid some of their Indian allies by subsequently resettling them in areas of what soon would become Upper Canada (e.g. the Six Nations at Mississuaga).

The usefulness of Indians as military allies was again proved in the War of 1812, when loyal tribes such as the Mohawks in Upper Canada and the Shawnee and other western tribes led by Tecumseh in American territory, assisted greatly in turning back an invasion by some of the more land-hungry American states. And, again, the Indian allies acted to protect their own interests in attempting to contain agricultural settlement. After the War of 1812, however, relations were normalized between Britain and the American states and the Indians’ military value waned accordingly. At the same time, the fur trade centered on Montreal ended, and consequently the natives’ importance as commercial partners also
declined. Thus, "an Indian population that had ceased to have commercial and military utility to the Europeans became, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, an obstacle to the settlers who now outnumbered them." 4 The focus of imperial policy now shifted to facilitating agricultural settlement -- the population in Upper Canada increased tenfold between the end of the War of 1812 and the census of 1851.

Three essential principles of a new Indian policy emerged around the goal of eventual assimilation of the Indian minority, which was to be achieved concurrently by means of their adaptive civilization from traditionalism to modernity, and their temporary protection until they were ready to fend for themselves. 5 In the evolution of these principles, significant shifts were to occur between how they were applied by the British Colonial Office and imperial military authority and, later, when responsibility for Indian policy was devolved to local Indian Affairs bureaucrats and then to colonial governments. 6

Imperial controlled Indian policy in the early nineteenth century undoubtedly had an enlightened reformist flavour, abetted, no doubt, by the fact that Indians did not threaten economic interests in London as they directly did the colonial settlers. It also reflected, however, Britain's new Humanitarian Movement which had petitioned successfully for factory reforms at home and the abolition of slavery abroad, as well as the better treatment of indigenous populations in imperial colonies through such causes as the Aborigines Protection Society. As has been shown, the roots of protection under imperial policy towards Indians were concerns about wrongful intrusions into, and acquisition of Indian lands, though corrupt business dealings with natives was also a concern. Imperial policy did not pretend to preserve aboriginal culture, however, as this was considered
neither practicable nor desirable. The well-intentioned belief gained wide currency that Indians would best be protected against ethnic extinction by cultural assimilation.

The Indians' subsistence and often migratory life-style was considered to be culturally inferior to sedentary agricultural pursuits, and, since the day was foreseen when it would soon completely disappear, continuation of their traditional ways would only serve to delay their effective adaptation. Thus, considerable importance was placed on purposeful civilization to assist Indians make the necessary adaptations to modernity. Despite these assumption about the inevitability of assimilation, however, the pace of change under imperial policy was to be set by the Indian tribes themselves.

As well as being humanitarian for its times, imperial policy was also flexible. Until the colonies assumed almost total responsibility for Indians, imperial policies were differentiated across British North America according to a regional approach. In the Atlantic colonies the Colonial Office attempted to "insulate" the MicMacs on reserves until they were ready to assimilate. In Rupert's Land it was thought that the fur trade was already bringing about a useful "amalgamation" of Indians and Whites -- especially through miscegenation as evidenced by the Metis -- so the Hudson's Bay Company was left to its own devices. On Vancouver Island and the adjoining mainland colony of New Caledonia, the Colonial Office also relied on locally administered policy which consisted of insulating Indians in areas close to White settlements and amalgamation in other areas. It was in the Central Canadas that, besides miscegenation, the greatest emphasis was placed on education in the broadest civilizing sense to bring about amalgamation. Notwithstanding all these differences, however, there was a belief in the Colonial Office that the best
interests of all Indians could only be assured through continuation of the imperial connection.

Does Imperial-controlled Indian policy after the 1763 Royal Proclamation fit with the assumptions of the "internal colony" critique? Taking Blauner's aforementioned four components of the colonization process as yardsticks the answer is yes and no. First, there had not been, as yet, "forced involuntary entry" of Indians into the settlers' society, and the Royal Proclamation was intended to control the worst impacts of contact. Second, European impacts on Indians had been what anthropologists call "non-directed" in that they resulted from two-way cultural contact and adaptation, rather than "direct" imposed change -- though this was starting to alter with the presumption that Indian assimilation was inevitable and should be encouraged. Third, there was little evidence of colonizers administrating the colonized, or in Blauner's words of being "managed and manipulated by outsiders in terms of ethnic status." Lastly, there is a narrow line between imperial administrators' benevolent humanitarianism towards Indians and Blauner's fourth component of "racism," but as will be seen the trend was certainly towards the latter.

2.3 Setting Up the 'Reserve System'

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, certain precedents were set for a more intolerant and inflexible Indian policy. Two developments were influential in this change. First, was the almost complete withdrawal of Colonial Office responsibility for Indian policy and with it, erosion of the imperial humanitarian ethic towards Indians. Second, was a planned policy in Central Canada of forcing the segregation of Indians into reserves so they could be systematically civilized in preparation for eventual assimilation into White society.
Centralizing Indians on reserves also had the not incidental benefit of freeing their lands up for settlement.

The overall development ethic towards Indians was, as before, ideas about modernization, but they were undergoing a significant shift. Previous humanitarian ideas about civilizing Indians so that they could be better equipped to assimilate, were now increasingly coloured with pseudo-scientific concepts of racial superiority versus inferiority, such as Social Darwinism. Under this change of emphasis, Indians should be forced to assimilate so they could improve rather than survive.

The modernization of Indians now became closely intertwined with their purposeful, if not always systematic sedentarization. With the declining fur trade, the migratory lifestyle followed by many Indians no longer served a useful economic purpose, so now they were exposed to the salutary vigor of the "Bible and the plow." Missionaries and government officials also made the case that they could better carry out their responsibilities for Indian tutelage and wardship if families were centralized in permanent settlements. (The first reserve settlements had been set up in New France during the seventeenth century by the Jesuits, but while the intent of these missionaries was to convert the inhabitants to Christianity and agriculture other aspects of native culture were left alone, such as their language, and the state was not involved in these efforts). In the 1830s, a number of reserve villages were established in Upper Canada for Indians to be taught farming, and to receive religious instruction and general education. This was the beginning of the reserve system as a "social laboratory" for civilizing Indians and preparing them to cope with White society, soon to became a cornerstone of Colonial and then Canadian policy.
A surprising amount of deliberate planning went into testing the use of centralized reserve communities for advancing social policy of the day, including policy experiments and study of analogous case study material, but with the wrong results. Almost immediately, different schools of thought arose about whether segregating Indians on reserves did them more harm than good. It was also queried whether Indians should be located on reserves close to colonist settlements so they could become more quickly assimilated through social interchange, or should be located further away to protect them against certain uncivilized traits of the settlers themselves. In 1856, a Royal Commission which studied the issue concluded that forced isolation of Indians was not fostering their civilization as originally supposed. They cited evidence from a study in neighbouring Michigan demonstrating that where reserves were located near colonial settlements, Indians were not only civilized by their influence but, eventually, were completely assimilated into them. Nevertheless, the Commission remained optimistic about the Indians' eventual civilization and assimilation, and ended by advising against, but not totally rejecting separate reserve communities.

Similarly, experiments proceeded with Indian education. Following the so-called Bagot Commission inquiry in 1842, education policy was reorientated from day schools to residential schools. The Commission concluded that day schools were a failure and, moreover, that this resulted from the undoing of all efforts to assimilate children in the classroom by the influence of their parents when they returned home. New residential schools were established on a wide basis, following experiments with earlier such institutions, which combined industrial and agricultural training for Indian children together
with religious indoctrination. The new education system was enthusiastically supported by missionaries who ran the schools and by Indian Department officials who were convinced of their effectiveness in assuring assimilation. At first, local tribal leaders also supported the schools for Indian children to learn necessary new economic skills, but bitterly opposed their assimilative agenda. 14

The imposed social engineering by Indian Affairs bureaucrats and missionaries was a departure from imperial practice whereby tribal councils had decided the rate of cultural change. They had been able to exercise discretion over whether schools should be allowed on reserves, the use of reserve lands for agriculture and other resource development, and the extent to which income from land sales would be devoted to development projects. 15 The new controls over Indians coincided with the increasing hand over of responsibility for Indians to colonial governments. In the new imperial free-trade era which followed repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, all responsibilities (and especially expenses) of colonies deemed to be ready for self-government were anathema to British politicians responsible for the public purse. In 1860, the imperial government formally transferred responsibilities for Indians to its colonial governments.

Even before imperial devolution of Indian responsibilities was formally completed, the United Canadas Assembly legislated its own Indian policy which, strictly speaking, was in contravention of the Royal Proclamation. 16 The Gradual Civilization Act of 1857 was testament to the increasing erosion of tribal autonomy. In addition to the modernization strategy already in place for skills training, education, proselytization, and agricultural development on reserve lands, it proposed that Indians be introduced to Western, liberal
virtues of private property ownership. Previously, tribal councils across the colony had flatly rejected the concept of reserve subdivisions. So, the purpose of the 1857 legislation was to circumvent tribal authority by offering to adult Indian males twenty freehold acres alienated from their reserves, if they elected to become enfranchised as a citizen of the colony, and were deemed sufficiently civilized! Attempts to privatize Indian reserve lands struck directly at the Indians’ communal tradition and they refused to cooperate (very few Indians took up the government’s offer and only one application was approved). The colonial government blamed the failure of their enfranchisement offer on traditional tribal leaders who were increasingly seen as a major impediment to assimilation.

By the 1860’s, all three principles of civilization, protection, and assimilation originally introduced under imperial guidance had been remolded by the Central Canadas’ colonial government into the embryonic reserve system. The goal of assimilation was no longer just an end to be promoted but to be enforced against the wishes of Indian leaders, if necessary. The assimilation of Indians was to be achieved also by the contradictory means of their socio-spatial segregation on reserves, so that they could more easily civilized and protected. However, increasing colonial control exercised through the reserve system had the not unexpected result of provoking increasing Indian resistance. This, in turn, drew even more repressive control, resulting in more resistance ... and so on. Once this social engineers’ "Frankenstein" development model of contradictory bits and pieces was created, it became increasingly difficult to stop.

The pattern of repressive Indian policy was in place when, under the terms of the British North American Act of 1867, overall control over Indians and reserve lands was ceded to
the federal government of the new Canadian Dominion. The national policies which would be put in place by the federal government for dealing with Indians drew largely from Central Canadian experiences.

Because of the conviction that many Indians were being uncooperative and were deliberately opposing government policy, they became a target for state sponsored abuse and persecution, which, compared with its alleged assimilative purposes were, in fact, perversely discriminatory. Under colonial government, traditional tribal leaders in Central Canada in particular had been increasingly viewed as an impediment to Indian assimilation. The new Dominion's first piece of Indian legislation met this challenge directly. 17

The 1869 Indian Enfranchisement Act included provisions for replacing traditional tribal governments with the British-style municipal model. The legislation was primarily directed to more "civilized" Bands in Central Canada but quickly set the precedent for all Indian policy. The Act provided for externally controlled procedures of democratic elections for chiefs and councillors who could, however, be subsequently dismissed by Indian administrators if found wanting. Powers could be delegated to these elected leaders for passing bylaws within their respective reserves, but on specifically designated matters and subject to ministerial veto, limitations which still largely stand today. Besides attempting to substitute troublesome traditional leaders with political institutions more amenable to outside manipulation, imposition of the municipal model had the more general assimilative purpose of replacing Indian traditions of collective governance with liberal, individualistic practice. 18
A significant landmark was reached in Indian policy when numerous, scattered legislative provisions pertaining to Indians were consolidated into one comprehensive piece of legislation, the 1876 Indian Act -- the direct forerunner of today's Act. It laid out a complete blueprint for nearly every aspect of reserve life. Its codification of the reserve system was so complete that it even circumscribed Indian ethnicity largely by reserve boundaries. Thus, an Indian was defined under the Act as "Any male of Indian blood" (together with any legally-married wife and child of such a person) reputed to belong to a particular band, which in turn was defined as a body of Indians whose funds are held in trust by the federal government or, most commonly, have reserves (or their equivalent) held in trust by the Crown.

The 1876 Indian Act was explicit in prescribing how reserve lands could be managed, protected from encroachment and damage, subdivided, used for different purposes, and disposed or leased, and how land revenues should be invested. The Act also defined who could live on reserves, what social and cultural practices they could carry on there, how they should be educated, and what form their political institutions should take. The most important innovation of the Act in the eyes of the Government was the reintroduction of "location tickets" as another enfranchisement device. Echoing earlier legislation in Upper Canada, reserves were to be surveyed into lots and then allocated by the Band Council to individual members who would receive a form of title for their lots through location tickets, and, after a three-year probationary period, be awarded citizenship (but this was largely thwarted by Indian leaders who feared erosion of their Bands’ communal lands and imposition of municipal-type property taxation). In all, the 1876 Indian Act not only carried forward unchanged the objective of complete Indian assimilation into Canadian
society, but also the contradictory logic of attempting to achieve this by complete segregation of Indians from Canadian society. 19

In amendments to the Indian Act in 1880, the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) was formally established with broad powers over Indians on reserves and, indeed, over their movement on and off reserves. By this time, therefore, all four components of what we call the "reserve system" were firmly in place, i.e.

(1) The segregation and containment of Indians on reserve lands with unique federal Crown tenure for the special use and enjoyment of individual Bands.

(2) Ethnically-defined legislation of the Indian Act establishing federal regulatory domain over most aspects of Indian political, economic and socio-cultural life.

(3) Sweeping and intrusive powers of Indian wardship and tutelage entrusted to the special-purpose federal bureaucracy of the Department of Indian Affairs.

(4) State endorsement of the Church's central role not only for Indian religious instruction, but also for education and training.

2.4 Westward Expansion, Treaty-Making, and Indian Economic Exploitation

The new Dominion of Canada's most immediate challenge was to forestall American territorial ambitions and quickly establish its own sovereignty westward over the Prairies and on to the Pacific Coast. This it did by financing the building of the CPR railway,
opening up land for settlement, and encouraging an eventual flood of new immigrants. The Indians in the way were seen as obstacles to be cleared to realize the "National Dream," and, worse, as mere impediments to development and wealth-making. The fate of Indians caught by the western-rolling juggernaut of state, business, and settlement revealed that 'assimilation' of Indians did not signify any serious intent to integrate them as equals in Canadian society. They would be the targets of intense efforts of 'civilizing,' not to prepare them for useful jobs and lives, but rather to erase their supposedly, inferior ethnic traits. More than ever, Indians were to be "protected from themselves," but, increasingly they were also left largely defenceless against theft and misappropriation of their lands by outsiders (including by federal and provincial governments). There was, thus, near complete erosion of the principle of Indian 'protection.'

The main mechanism for opening up Indian territory across the Prairies was the treaty-making process, but, in what became the western province of British Columbia it was not applied to any great degree. In the latter, the reserve system found its worst expression in mutually-reinforcing practices of segregating Indians to facilitate their cultural genocide and to clear the way for speculative development and settlement (partly as a result of the particularly intense competition which took place over B.C.'s valuable natural resources, and partly because the opening of its frontier coincided with the trend to more reactive Indian policies generally). What is especially striking in this era was the limited assistance given for Indians to adjust to new economic conditions, and, indeed, the frequent blocking of Indians in acquiring what they themselves perceived as necessary new skills and jobs.
Treaty-making in the Prairies had its roots in the Royal Proclamation's requirement to remove Indian aboriginal title before settlement, a procedure which had already been followed in some areas of Ontario (e.g. the so-called "Robinson" treaties). By 1871, the first treaties in the Prairies were in place, and conclusion of the so-called "numbered treaties" continued rapidly until much of the southern Prairies had been cleared of Indian title by the end of 1880. (Treaty-making continued afterwards in the north and into the Territories). Although the government piously evoked Christian morality as a reason for Parliament to vote the considerable funds needed for treaty-making, it also pointed out that it was a considerable less costly alternative than the American strategy of Indian Wars "to open the west." 20

The decline of the traditional Indian economy based on the bison, compelled many Plains Indians to enter into Treaty negotiations. Government representatives were concerned with keeping the costs of treaty-making to the minimum, and while they were prepared to negotiate limited areas where the Indians could adapt to sedentary agriculture, it was the Indians themselves who often pressed, not just for larger payments, but also for larger tracts of land to support themselves and for continuing assistance in acquiring livestock, tools and agricultural implements. 21 In the lands reserved under the treaties for Indian use, DIA agents promoted sedentary agricultural pursuits as a Western cultural ideal, as well as to facilitate the missionaries' work among previously-nomadic Indians. Many Indians were prevented, however, from making the transition to economic self-sufficiency in agriculture, even though they constantly demanded help. Thus, Indians were induced to take up peasant farming on small lots rather than commercial-scale farming. Indian farmers were also required to acquire permits from local DIA agents for all their buying and
selling. They were still restricted to using hand tools when surrounding White farmers started to make extensive use of mechanized equipment, and credit was unavailable for them to buy equipment themselves. Yet the blame for unsuccessful Indian farming fell on the Indians themselves. 22

In the Province of British Columbia, the requirements of the 1763 Royal Proclamation to secure Crown title of Indian land before settlement were simply ignored. Aside from the few, small "Douglas" treaties already in place on Vancouver Island and an overlapping of Treaty 8 from the Northwest Territories into the north-east corner of British Columbia, the treaty-making process was not extended into the province. When the previous colony of British Columbia started to negotiate joining Confederation, Indians there were aware of the first treaties in the Prairies and hoped that the same system would apply to them. Their hopes were sorely dashed when, in the face of strong provincial objections, a motion was withdrawn by the federal negotiators to extend Dominion Indian policy in its entirety into the future Province. Instead, this now infamous reference to Indian policy was made in clause 13 of the 1871 Terms of Union:

The charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and management of the lands reserved for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the Dominion Government, and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government shall be continued by the Dominion Government after the union.

To carry out such a policy, tracts of land of such an extent as it has hitherto been the practice of the British Columbia Government to appropriate for that purpose, shall from time to time be conveyed by the Local Government to the Dominion Government in trust for the use and benefit of the Indians .... 23

The wording of the clause "a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British
Columbia Government," was a travesty, for in the years directly preceding Confederation its policies were decidedly illiberal. As in Central Canada, however, there had been a significant change in dealings with Indians between the times of imperial and colonial administration, even though the Colonial Office had always largely delegated responsibility for Indians to local officials.

Up to 1858, Indian exposure to the White man in B.C. was largely limited to fur traders and some missionaries. Indian matters were ably handled by James Douglas, Hudson's Bay factor and later colonial governor. He had already concluded seven small treaties with Indians on Vancouver Island, when the 1858 gold rush in the Fraser Canyon heralded rapid expansion of agricultural settlement. Douglas quickly attempted to provide protection for Indians on the Mainland. But, in 1859, the Colonial Office advised Douglas they would not burden the British taxpayer any more with the costs of extinguishing native title (this was in the same year that the United Assembly of the Canadas had been allowed to legislate their own Indian policy). Neither were monies forthcoming from the colonial government. Partly because of fiscal restraints, reserves were subsequently laid out in British Columbia without treaties or any other form of compensation. Another probable factor was that Douglas now saw reserves as only a half-way house on the way to the goal of complete assimilation, which would only be delayed by special Indian dispensations.

When, in 1964, the responsibility for Indian policy devolved on Joseph Trutch, Chief Commissioner for Land and Works in the colony, the moderating influencing of both Douglas and the Colonial Office had completely passed. Whereas Douglas had embodied many attitudes of the old fur trading frontier, Trutch represented the interests of the new
settlement frontier. 26 The fur trade had not adversely impacted Indians because of fairly equal reciprocity in their economic relations with the White Traders and, if anything, the newcomers had to accommodate to Indian ways. The settlers, by comparison, made no attempt to compromise with those who they looked down upon as savages and who, not coincidentally, were in direct competition with them for the valuable river lands laced through British Columbia’s mountainous landscape. The conflict was simple, "Indians had the land and the settlers wanted it," and, it can be added, that whatever lands the settlers wanted they usually got with complete collusion of the colonial government and later the Province. 27

So one-sided was this imperative of opening lands up for development in British Columbia that even assimilation of Indians into the settler economy, rather than being encouraged, was actively obstructed. When, starting in 1866, White settlers were allowed to purchase an additional 480 acres of Crown lands over their basic pre-emption of 160 acres, Indian reserve allotments were cut back to 10 acres per family (by comparison, the practice under recent treaties in the Prairies had been to allocate out reserves on the basis of 80 acres per family). Individual Indians were effectively denied any pre-emption, even though some had shown considerable interest in ranching, particularly in the Merrit area which quickly became one of the centres for cattle ranching in the province. Similarly in the Okanagan, where although Indians had demonstrated considerable expertise in stock raising and familiarity with horticulture before permanent settlement, they were deliberately restricted from accessing rangelands and from obtaining necessary capital so as avoid competition with Whites. 28
When British Columbia continued its highly "illiberal" dealings with Indians after Confederation, the federal government did not seriously intervene until the Victoria legislature passed its first Land Act in 1874 which completely omitted any provisions for reserves. The Act was disallowed, and Ottawa also attempted to make the Province abide by the principles of the 1763 Royal Proclamation to negotiate with Indians prior to settlement, but eventually backed down.

The Indians' loss of their lands was also paralleled by rapidly declining control over their society as federal Indian policy across Canada became increasingly repressive. Indian recalcitrance to cooperate with the government's forced assimilation agenda simply attracted more and more reactive persecution. For instance, B.C. Indians were the targets of legislation which outlawed the "Potlatch" ceremony, and the Prairie Indians' "Sun Dance" also suffered the same fate. Continuing measures were taken to diminish the powers of traditional leaders in order to substitute a more acquiescent leadership whose power derived more from external government relationships than from their own communities. Indeed, legislation was passed enabling the Minister to depose troublesome, traditional chiefs and councillors, even if they had been democratically elected into office. Attendance at residential schools was enforced more rigorously to immerse Indian children in religious and educational indoctrination.

To enforce the multitude of restrictions on Indians, DIA expanded its staff of Indian agents in the field to reach a total of 460 by the end of the nineteenth century. Even though by this time some senior bureaucrats in the Indian Affairs Branch were beginning to question the utility of the reserve system to achieve Indian assimilation, it was, nevertheless,
carried forward unabated into the twentieth century. Indeed, under the direction of Duncan Campbell Scott who served as the Branch’s senior bureaucrat from 1913 to 1932, the treatment of Indians became even more explicitly racist. Also, the principle of ‘protecting’ Indians against exploitation was also diminished to the point of irrelevancy, when in the early twentieth century restrictions against the acquisition of reserve lands was eased to facilitate urban growth, natural resource exploitation, and expansion of local transportation networks in the West.

2.5 Conclusions

As described at the beginning of this chapter, the internal colony theorist, Robert Blauner identifies four components common to all colonizing processes. Measured against those criteria, Indian experiences under British imperial administration did not entirely fit the internal colony model. However, the subsequent treatment of Indians by the colonies and then by the new Canadian state more completely epitomizes Blauner’s colonizing components, i.e.

(1) The "reserve system" was certainly intended to bring about "forced involuntary entry" of Indians into the more dominant White society. Although the objective of Indian assimilation was not achieved, Indian society itself was severely impacted.

(2) Further to the preceding point, Indians were subjected to a colonizing policy which "constrains, transforms or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life."
Indians were unquestionably subordinated in a colonial relationship where they were "administered by representatives of the dominant power ... in terms of ethnic status." This was reflected in all aspects of the reserve system: the segregation of Indians on special lands, control of all aspects of their social, economic and political lives by ethnically-prescribed legislation, administration by a special-purpose bureaucracy (DIA), and targeting of Indians by state sponsored religious indoctrination.

Lastly, the reserve system was predicated on a racist ideology whereby Indians were seen "as inferior or different in terms of alleged biological characteristics," which provided the partial justification for them to be "exploited, controlled, and oppressed."

The other part of Blauner's internal colony hypothesis is that the continued oppression by the more dominant society will promote the rise of a defiant nationalist movement within the oppressed ethnic minority. As described in the next chapter, this is exactly what resulted in the case of Canadian Indians in the second half of the twentieth century. But, as will also be shown, the internal colony model starts to lose relevance when some Indian leaders can no longer be described simply as resistant "victims" to external oppression but rather, in their own dealings with the central state, become architects more of their own fate.
CHAPTER THREE. THE FAILURE OF THE 1969 WHITE PAPER

3.1 Overview

The previous chapter described how the flawed 'reserve system' locked the Canadian state into increasingly oppressive attempts to force assimilation against the Indians' hardening resistance. The longer this viciously escalating spiral of state oppression and Indian alienation was allowed to continue, the more difficult it became for the state to resolve the "Indian problem." This is what the new Trudeau Liberal Government found to its cost when it attempted the most serious reform of Indian policy since Confederation in its 1969 White Paper, Statement of the Government on Indian Policy. This chapter describes the White Paper’s modernizing agenda, as well as the events leading up to its introduction and its subsequent withdrawal in the face of intense Indian opposition.

One of the primary purposes of the 1969 White Paper was economic. Its planners properly realized that segregating Indians apart from other Canadians had deprived them of the necessary skills to compete successfully in the modern post-war economy, as evidenced by their now alarming unemployment rates. They were also rightly concerned about increasing Indian dependence on the welfare state programs which had recently been extended into reserve communities. But from our relational perspective of state-Indian interactions, it can be seen that the White Paper planners seriously failed to take into account other effects of the reserve system.

The Liberal Government’s proposed small "I" liberal plan to resolve the Indian problem "once and for all" appeared to be simplicity itself. First, they proposed to free Indians
from the oppressive restrictions of the reserve system by according them the same individual citizen’s rights and responsibilities as all other Canadians. Second, they proposed to encourage Indians to move away from rural reserves and seek remunerative jobs in Canada’s rapidly growing urban labour markets. But, in fact, this attempt to "clean the slate" in Indian-White relations was too simplistic, given the past promises made to Indians in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, as well as the irreversible changes which had been wrought by over one hundred and twenty years of imposition of the reserve system. The Indians’ heightened sense of self-identity which had perversely been fostered by segregating them from other Canadians, together with anger over the threatened loss of their special rights after they had lost so much in the past, was catalyzed by opposition to the White Paper in an emergent Indian nationalist movement which organized to defeat it.

This chapter also compares the White Paper with another important contemporary policy document, the Survey of Contemporary Indians in Canada, or so-called "Hawthorn Report," which was prepared only two years previously for the Indian Affairs Branch. This comparison brings into sharp focus both the nature of the White Paper proposals and the repercussions of their outright rejection. The Hawthorn Report, which is described first, shared with the White Paper its pessimism about the economic future of rural Indian reserves. But, whereas the White Paper proposed complete termination of special Indian group status in favour of Indians having the same individual rights as any other Canadians, the Hawthorn Report proposed that Indians should enjoy both sets of rights under the innovative concept of "citizen plus." But other contents of the Hawthorn Report insidiously buttressed the case of the Indian Affairs bureaucracy to further expand its massive and debilitating intrusions of welfare state programs into reserve communities.
When rejection of the White Paper left a policy vacuum, it was filled by the Hawthorn Report's negative legacy of increased welfarism.

As will also be shown in this chapter, much of the White Paper debacle can be attributed to the allure of simplistic development theorizing. Like their predecessors, government policy-makers were still committed "modernizers," but were further misled by the apparent irrefutable "scientific" logic of contemporary modernization theories for defining the causes of the "Indian problem" and prescribing its solution. Perhaps what is most striking during this era of policy making towards Indians, is the mutual reinforcement of formal modernization theories and more general liberal ideology which completed blinded policy makers from recognizing other legitimate viewpoints and seeking a less doctrinaire approach.

3.2 Seeking New Directions: The Hawthorn Report, 1966-1967

The assumptions of the reserve system had remained largely unchallenged until the 1950's when concerns for Canada's aboriginal peoples began to change, almost imperceptibly at first, but building up by the 1960's to strong public support for their better treatment. These new attitudes probably owed something to the examples provided by post-War decolonization of Third World emerging nations and the American Black protest movement. There was also a growing awareness, coinciding with rapid expansion of the Canadian welfare state, that not all groups were sharing in post-War growth of national prosperity. A Joint Commons-Senate report in 1961 concluded that there had been little progress in assimilating Indians and, even worse, that there was growing evidence of widespread impoverishment and dependency in reserve communities. In retrospect, this can be seen
as the result of two coincidental and mutually reinforcing trends. First, the inability of many Indians to adjust to new economic realities and, second, rapid expansion of welfare state programs into reserve communities.

There was something of an economic revival for Indians during the Wartime economic boom, but many did not survive the restructuring of staple resource industries starting in the 1950s. Although the volume of forestry, fishing, and mining production and exports expanded rapidly, the total number of workers employed declined because of increasing mechanization and the remaining jobs were centralized in larger and fewer plants, often remote from reserves. Throughout all their previous involvement in the mainstream economy, most Indians had worked either on or from their reserves. Now they were considerably disadvantaged by their immobility and archaic residential school education in the modern, competitive labour market.

The impacts of these changes were particularly devastating because Indian employment was by now vulnerably concentrated in a few staple resource industries. For instance, a contemporary survey of B.C. Indians by some social scientists at the University of British Columbia, concluded that the Indians' position in the economy was marginal "and in some respects potentially precarious" because of their almost complete dependence on commercial fishing and forestry. This led the authors to recommend two broad measures for Indian economic survival: (1) increase the flow of Indians to manufacturing and service industries in urban centres, and (2) secure the competitiveness of a smaller proportion of Indians in the natural resource industries. One of the co-authors of this strategy was Professor Harry Hawthorn, who was soon to have a formative influence in
the development of Indian policy.

Coinciding with widespread Indian unemployment, the programs of Canada’s new welfare state were rapidly extended into reserves. Starting innocently enough with the old age pension and family allowance, welfarism infiltrated downward into every interstice of reserve life. For instance, by 1966 the incidence of welfare dependency among Indians living on reserves in British Columbia was estimated to be eight times that of the general provincial population. 5 The result was a debilitating dependency on government transfers and even further erosion of local autonomy as Indian Affairs' staff increasingly intervened in numerous aspects of reserve community life, such as family health, childcare, care of the aged, job training, education, seasonal employment, and housing -- a process which R. Paine evocatively describes as "welfare colonialism" 6

By the mid 1960’s, Indian Affairs’ officials were aware they had some serious problems on their hands but did not know how to deal with them. A number of their recent program initiatives had failed, welfare costs were ballooning alarmingly, the provinces had rejected a proposal to take over Indian services, and the Branch was increasingly being blamed as the cause of Indian problems. Especially vexing was the conundrum of reconciling special Indian protection with the goal of assimilation. A senior official phrased the dilemma as "special rights versus equality," because" if protection -- and the special rights historically developed to ensure this protection -- were too overpowering, integration was jeopardized; if the legal and administrative protection were minimized, integration could be enhanced but possibly at the cost of special rights and security of Indian lands." 7 And, of course, if special Indian protections were removed Indian Affairs bureaucrats could eventually be
Enter stage right: some academic researchers on white chargers come to rescue the besieged and confused Indian Affairs officials. A team headed by Harry Hawthorn, was commissioned by DIAND to undertake a comprehensive national review of the Indian situation and to submit detailed recommendations for improving programs. The result was the famous Survey of Contemporary Indians of Canada published in two large volumes. The "Hawthorn Report" is one of the most significant Canadian examples of social science research applied to public policy. Many of its more than 150 detailed recommendations for Indian development were to eventually find their way into Branch programs. Its proposal for "citizen plus" status for Indians was used by Indian associations in opposing the 1969 White Paper, and later was partly embodied in Canadian government policy.

Because of the Hawthorn Report's voluminous size and, it has to be said, less than rigorous editing, it could mean many different things to different people. There was also a major dichotomy in the Report, reflecting quite different approaches by the research team's political and constitutional experts on the one hand, and its economists on the other. The first group of social scientists, untypically for the times, departed from liberal individualistic ideology by strongly advocating that Indian group rights continue to be recognized rather than be terminated, as would soon be proposed in the 1969 White Paper. They proposed, innovatively, that the conundrum of special rights (protection) versus equal rights (assimilation) be resolved by according Indians perpetual enjoyment of both sets of rights under the concept of "citizen plus." As a corollary of Indians retaining special "group rights" distinct from other Canadians, the assimilative goal of Indian policy
would, of course, have to be abandoned. Indians themselves, the report maintained, should choose whether to maintain their lifestyles in reserve communities or leave to join the majority society.

One concrete application in the Hawthorn Report of the concept "citizen plus" was rejection of the accepted constitutional view of Indians as solely a federal responsibility and, instead, it was argued they also had "individual" right to provincial services like all other Canadians (this viewpoint is presently gaining wider popularity in some academic circles). Similarly, the concept was given some substance in inventive proposals for what were later characterized as "federal municipalities," which would receive normal provincial services while also retaining their own special communal identity under an appropriately revised Indian Act (not dissimilar, in fact, to special legislation passed in 1987 for the Sechelt Indian Band in British Columbia described below). The Hawthorn Report vigorously attacked another liberal shibboleth: that "equality of opportunity" is, in itself, sufficient to guarantee "equality of condition." Alan Cairns, senior legal researcher for the team, cautioned "that the equal treatment in law and services of those who at the present time do not have equal competitive capabilities would not suffice for the attainment of substantive socio-economic equality." 8 To redress the present imbalance, it was recommended that large infusions of capital funds be made into reserve communities, especially for economic development.

The socio-political concepts of Indian development proposed in the Hawthorn Report were, however, completely contradicted by its own economic argument. Indeed, it bore considerable resemblance to the case which would be made in the White Paper for
completely removing special Indian status. The Hawthorn Report's argument was pure liberal, neo-classical economic thinking, dressed up in the rhetoric of then fashionable Third-World modernization thinking and sprinkled with assumptions from related 'functional' theories of regional development. Thus, after evaluating the opportunities for reserve communities to develop an economic base in an "increasingly complex urban industrial economy," it was concluded that chances were slim, except, perhaps, in the case of urban reserves. On the other side, the Report did not even attempt to present an argument that Indians could retain a significant cultural identity within an urban context.

It has to be questioned from the above reasoning how meaningful the "choice" would be for Indians to retain their special status but remain impoverished on reserves, or to move to the cities for jobs and face probable assimilation. The Reports' obvious, urban-biased development doctrine precludes any other options. Indeed, contradicting the Report's recommendations for injecting economic development monies into reserves in rural and remote areas was the assumption that most Indians could not and should not continue to live there. Serious concerns were expressed that a large majority of Indians would be permanently left out of the modern Canadian economy, and that the ensuing lack of jobs and income would "tend to become increasingly demoralizing and give rise to a host of costly and destructive social and psychological problems." The lack of significant economic opportunities on reserves was contrasted with the "great contribution to prosperity made by steady wage and salaried employment off the reserve." Accordingly, it was recommended that Indian Affairs should "assist Indians in "securing employment off reserves and guidance in making the transition to urban living," while they should also
perform a "secondary role for those who do not choose to seek outside employment." 10

Concern was expressed that a number of existing municipal-type assistance programs "are giving an air of permanence to communities which have no logical economic justification for their existence." 11 The Report's ultimate undercutting of its own local government proposal was the conclusion that "Indians are too small a proportion of the population, and most of the communities they reside in are too small, scattered, and limited in resources to provide viable economies that could support anything like independent societies." 12 These two contradictory faces of the Hawthorn Report do not appear to have been questioned by other social scientists either at the time or later. Even the Report's major contemporary critic, Richard Dunning, an anthropologist at the University of Toronto, found no fault with the research base of the Report. Given his own research into the role played by Indian Affairs in "underdeveloping" reserve communities, Dunning understandably did take considerable exception to the Reports' most obviously contentious recommendation to continue, and indeed temporarily enlarge the size of the Indian Affairs bureaucracy to better "facilitate" Indian development. This philosophy, he complained, was "worthy of 1867" and in answer to Hawthorn's suggestion that the Branch "should act as a national conscience to see that social and economic equality is achieved between Indians and Whites," Dunning retorted, "In what better way would paternalism be made permanent?" 13

Sally Weaver, in analyzing the "life cycle" of the Hawthorn Report as a case study of social science contributions to public policy, claims that: (1) though it did not have any inherent deficiencies, (2) it was not purposefully related to the public policy process and,
hence (3) it had little, practical impact. However, Weaver is mistaken on all three accounts, as explained below.

Much of the Hawthorn Report's social science research was inherently deficient. The contradictions between its pessimistic neo-classical economic assumptions and its reformist socio-political proposals have already been noted. Additionally, the Hawthorn Report can be seen to fall under the category of what Lithman calls "itemistic and inventorial theories of underdevelopment and change." In somewhat tautological fashion and without relation to a wider theoretical perspective, itemistic theories select a specific factor in explaining the cause of underdevelopment (eg. lack of capital) and for prescribing development (eg. injection of capital). The low utility of this type of research is only made worse when lengthy inventories are made of one development factor after another. The Hawthorn Report, for instance, submitted over 150 separate recommendations relating to economic development, federal-provincial relations, political development, welfare, local government, and education. Government planners thus stood considerable risks of either adopting a large number of recommendations with excessive implementation costs, or being more selective but choosing the wrong combination of recommendations for effective development.

The Hawthorn Report was very closely and deliberately related to the policy-making process of the Branch. By Weaver's own evidence, senior officials in the Branch commissioned the Report in the first place, continued extensive discussions with members of the research team throughout the Report's progress, and confirmed many of the recommendations before they were included in the final report. Indeed, Dunning's mistrust
of Hawthorn's recommendations for an increased role by the Branch in Indian development did not go far enough to recognize that the entire Report can be seen as a de facto Indian Affairs' policy document.

Lastly, the Report has had very significant influence on Indian policy, including Indian use of the concept of "citizen plus" to reject counter ideas in the White Paper and DIAND's use (or misuse) of many of the Reports' recommendations to fill the policy vacuum left after the White Paper was withdrawn. In the end, its reformist recommendations for delivery a plethora of political, social and economic programs to Indians won the day. Though not by intent, the Hawthorn Report reinforced DIAND's top-down control over Indian people with dependency-creating, welfare programs by legitimizing them as "developmental." 16

3.3 A "Final Solution" to the Indian Problem: Planning the 1969 White Paper

The 1969 White Paper was presented in Parliament by the recently elected Trudeau Liberal government as a supposedly innovative solution to resolving the Indian problem, "once and for all." The new master plan shared exactly the same assimilative goal as preceding Indian policy, but proposed very different means to achieve it. The forced segregation of Indians from other Canadians under the reserve system was now seen as the cause of the "Indian problem" rather than as an eventual solution. The White Paper proposed to "integrate" Indians into Canadian society (the word "assimilation was never used), through a twofold strategy of removing Indians' distinct group rights and promoting the migration of those living in rural areas to the cities and greater job opportunities. The intent was to both remove what was acknowledged to be a serious social wrong and to relieve the state
from the increasing burden of expenditures for Indians.

There were three significant influences which formed the White Paper proposals. First, was the new power accorded under the Trudeau Liberal Government to "expert" technocrats for planning public policy. Second, and hitherto not recognized in analyses of the White Paper, was the faith of those experts in economist regional development programs for removing disparities in society. Third, and most influential, was the new government's adherence to fundamental liberal ideological values; including the paramountcy accorded to universal individual rights and distrust of special group status, as well an abiding faith in the empowering economic and political benefits of self-directed individual effort.

One of Trudeau' first innovations on coming to power was to rapidly and dramatically modernize the federal government's previous ad hoc planning processes to better implement the rational liberal policies he had in mind for Canada's future. Central agency planners were given positions of unprecedented power in a strongly top-down policy structure. The purpose was to weed away career bureaucrats, whom Trudeau instinctively distrusted, from the incremental approach to public policy which he knew they preferred. 17 A greatly expanded Prime Minister's Office (PMO) urged civil servants, and for that matter their ministers, to go beyond narrow and short-sighted views of policy change and to consider real innovations. The Privy Council Office (PCO) received a strengthened mandate for inter-departmental coordination. It borrowed modern methods from the Kennedy Administration of system analysis and management by objectives (MBO), to promote more rigorous evaluation of policy alternatives than could be expected
from individual line agencies acting alone in their own vested interests. The PCO was to play a central role in devising the White Paper.

One immediate priority of Trudeau's planning technocrats was to reform the federal government's regional development programs, and this was to spill over into planning the White Paper. By the mid-1960s the "value orientation" of Canada's regional development programs had already been changing as calculations of overall economic efficiency were rapidly displacing the traditional focus on alleviating rural poverty in marginal agricultural areas. Dissatisfaction with rural-based and "scattergun" regional development planning had led the Economic Council of Canada in 1968 to call for sweeping policy changes. Taking their cue from liberal neo-classical economics, the Council asserted that persistent regional disparities in Canada did not result from the dynamics of the market place, but rather were attributable to inefficiencies in the economic system which inhibited the markets' proper functioning. The Council expressed concern that "a definite pyramiding of mere subsidies to the lower income regions, made possible only at the cost of retarded growth in the higher income regions, would clearly be inconsistent with both sound regional development and high and substantial rates of national growth." The Council accordingly called for closer national and international integration of the Canadian economy, to be achieved by a regional specialization, increased labour mobility, and concentrated investments in urban infrastructure -- primary elements of the now dominant 'functional' approach in regional development theorizing.

A new commitment to regional development was one of Pierre Trudeau's election promises, and when his government came to power the modernizing and integrating logic
of the Economic Council was given concrete substance. The new Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) was established in 1969 (prior to release of the White Paper), with a large budget and a powerful mandate to coordinate numerous planning and program activities previously dispersed across various ministries. There was less commitment to subsidizing rural regions which were seen as having no chance of economic revival and, instead, an emphasis was placed on assisting certain urban "growth poles" to achieve their potential in Canada's new industrial economy. 20

Compared with regional development, the "Indian problem" was not an important priority in the new government's political agenda, and had hardly come up as an issue during the preceding election. However, the impoverished conditions of many reserve communities were starting to attract media coverage. A growing body of public criticism united in condemning Indian poverty and dependency as a public disgrace, blaming government paternalistic policies as the root cause of the evil, and calling for reforms. Aware that the Indian problem could become a very contentious political issue, central agency planners began to question Indian Affairs Branch officials on the progress of an Indian Act review process approved during the preceding Pearson Liberal administration.

The Branch was now placing more importance on a policy of "decolonization." 21 However, instead of approaching this incrementally, the PCO planners preferred a more sweeping review and fundamental shift of Indian policy. Besides, like Richard Dunning at the University of Toronto, they were predisposed to see the continuing relationship between the Indian Affairs Branch and Indians, in whatever form, as the problem. Some four months after public hearings on the Indian Act review had commenced, Trudeau
requested Jean Chretien, Minister for the recently consolidated Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND), to undertake a rigorous and impartial review of Indian policy for subsequent submission to Cabinet. This internal planning process proceeded secretly and in isolation from the public Indian Act review.

The Indian Affairs Branch's first response to a request for imaginative new policy proposals could hardly have been reassuring to PCO staff. Supported by the findings of the Hawthorn Report, the Branch merely submitted its recently prepared five-year budget package for a vast and costly expansion of their programs. Branch officials estimated that a massive infusion of dollars and additional staff could bring the Indian population up to general Canadian standards in employment, housing, education, and health in some twenty to thirty years. The PC rejected this "simple exercise in "mathematics" for resolving the Indian problem. Indian Affairs' recent spending increases were enough to suggest serious concerns to the PCO, for they had increased seven-fold between the 1956-57 and 1968-69 fiscal years.

Henceforth, the PCO would involve themselves more intimately in the review of Indian policy, and the views of Jim Davey, their senior official responsible for Indian policy, would be particularly influential. From his perspective as a systems theorist he saw the Indian problem as a specific case of racial discrimination overlain on the more general case of regional disparities. Peel away the Indian's special status, he argued, then the fundamental economic problems which they shared with other disadvantaged Canadians could be tackled on a common regional basis by the newly created Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). In systems language the Indian problem would thereby be
"bounded and simplified" and, hence, could be more easily managed. Davey also balked at any suggestion of consultation with Indian leaders because he considered them unrepresentative of the general Indian population. 23

The new breed of scientific planning technocrats also analyzed the Indian problem from the perspective of "social distance" theory which was in vogue at the time. Following this particular variant of modernization logic, it was reasoned that the forced segregation of Indians on reserves and their discriminatory treatment as citizens "apart" had actually conspired to prevent their adaptation to Canadian society. Indeed, because of rapid industrialization, the "social distance" between Indians and others threatened to diverge even further in the future, leaving them physically marooned in rural regions with diminishing opportunities to find jobs in the modern economy. This reasoning was quite similar to that of the Hawthorn Report.

The rationale behind the White Paper was to differ from the Hawthorn Report, however, in holding that just as the problem included both social and spatial isolation so a two-fold integration strategy was called for. First, as has been widely commented on, the government proposed to remove all discriminations against Indian people by extinguishing their special constitutional and legislative status. Second, but less commented on, it was proposed to target Indians for training and relocation assistance under the Liberal’s regional development policies for promoting industrial and service sector jobs in the new urban economy. By comparison, the Hawthorn Report advocated something similar to the second measure but did not advocate removing special Indian status.
The White Paper planners were no doubt inspired by some of the ideas and rhetoric of the American "War on Poverty." Although the context of most Canadian Indians was different, it was perceived that they had been encapsulated through a similar process into something akin to "rural ghettos" which intensified and reproduced negative, adaptive cultural traits among their residents. The planners pointed to the special treatment of Indians as the cause of this, which to their minds was nothing less than state-sponsored discrimination. As a consequence, they claimed, Indians were locked into a "poverty cycle" on reserves and screened from any fresh winds of change from the outside. The White Paper planners did depart from the War on Poverty's focus on experimental catch-up programs to combat segregation and, instead, sought to extinguish constitutional and legislative recognition of Indian group status and all their special government support. This part of the White Paper master plan was, in fact, closer to the United State's own recent Indian policy of "complete termination" which was abandoned after disastrous psychological damage to the first tribes who lost their reserves and were dispersed. The White Paper Planners also ignored valuable lessons on how the threat of termination had pushed other U.S. tribes into a reactionary and fortress-like nativist movement which actually thwarted the goal of assimilation.

Extinguishment of special Indian constitutional and legal status was not expected, by itself, to eradicate widespread poverty among Indians as long as they continued to reside on reserves. The supposed genius of the White Paper strategy was to attempt redefining the Indian problem from its traditional cultural/ethnic group characterization into a more generalizable and, hence, manageable, social problem. It was concluded that most reserve communities were located in regions offering little long-term employment potential and,
which, like many other small remote communities, were anachronisms in the modern consumer orientated, industrially based, and urban-biased economy. Take away the Indians’ special treatment, and their economic problems and opportunities would not be unlike other Canadian workers in rural regions impacted by structural economic changes. Most ideally, Indians, emancipated from their cocoon-like collective existence on reserves, would be "pulled off" reserves by their own desire to seek a better future and to make the same choice as other Canadians in the same situation by looking for work in an urban employment centre. And if their self-motivation was not enough, the Indians’ loss of special subsidies would provide an additional incentive for them to be "pushed off" reserves.

Underlying much of the White Paper theorizing was a strong adherence to traditional liberal principles. The influence of liberal laissez-faire doctrine was very apparent in the emphasis placed on forcing Indians to face the supposed realities and benefits of individual economic choice and responsibility, and efficient market location of jobs. The impoverished and dependent conditions, under which many Indians lived on reserves, were seen as an aberration of liberal ideals where all individuals in society were supposed to have equal opportunities by the dint of their own efforts with as little interference and support from the state as possible. It was hoped that, given the opportunity, most Indian people would seek work wherever they could find it and discard their closeted and welfare-dependent existence on reserves.

The White Paper also exhibited the traditional liberal faith in equality between individuals and its distrust of any group’s pretensions within the state to special status and claims,
and all the more so when they were associated with emotive appeals to nationalism as was becoming the case with some Indian leaders. In this respect Trudeau’s influence was seminal for he had come to the Prime Ministership as Canada’s most trenchant academic proponent of a liberal individualistic conception of the country. Trudeau was not especially interested in the Indian problem per se but, influenced by his cause célèbre of averting Quebec separatism, he did have strong views on their claims for unique status in Canada. In twenty years of writings he had vehemently castigated the intellectual Left’s assertion in Quebec that it was entitled to independent statehood according to the principle of national self-determination. He scorned nationalism as the modern day equivalent of “primitive tribalism” which would inevitably lead to reactionary discrimination against individual rights in the name of group survival. And, in any event, Trudeau strongly disagreed that cultures could be kept alive by state guarantees, reasoning in Social Darwinian style that they could only survive through their own competitive efforts. State intervention would only serve to produce in his words, "a weak hot-house culture," or a "ghetto mentality," or bringing it right down to the issue at hand, "a wigwam complex." 28

When called upon later to defend the White Paper, Trudeau rejected the Indian’s historical claim to be a distinct political entity in Canada as follows:

We can go on treating the Indians as having a special status. We can go on adding bricks of discrimination around the ghetto in which they live and at the same time perhaps helping them preserve certain cultural traits and certain ancestral rights. Or we can say you’re at a crossroads -- the time is now to decide whether the Indians will be a race apart in Canada or whether they will be Canadians of full status. And this is a difficult choice... It’s inconceivable, I think, that in a given society one section of the society have a treaty with the other section of the society. We must all be equal under the laws and we must not sign treaties amongst ourselves ... What can we do to redeem the past? I can only say as President Kennedy said
when he was asked what he could do to compensate for the injustices that the Negroes had received in American society: "We will be just in our time." This is all we can do. We must be just today. 29

The neat, tidy logic of the White Paper master plan was irresistible to the central agency technocrats, who pushed their ideas through against opposition from DIAND officials and even against some misgivings by their Minister, Jean Chretien. 30 Could it be too good to be true that in one fell swoop the Government could dispense with its onerous responsibilities for Indians, forestall growing public criticism, close down the ill-regarded Indian Affairs Branch, stop the drain of welfare dollars, and integrate Indians as useful members of the body politic and national economy?

3.4  What the White Paper Said, and How it Was Received

The White Paper was approved by Cabinet and then presented to Parliament on June 25, 1969. In its historical summary, the White Paper attributed past policy failures to "discriminatory" special treatment of Indians. It pointed to three sets of problems caused by this setting apart of Indians from other Canadians: rapidly rising government financial responsibilities, the vulnerability of Indians to social stigma, and the lack of Indian economic competitiveness and resultant welfare dependency. The Paper evocatively described rural Indians' lack of competitiveness in the modern economy as follows:

With the technological change in the twentieth century, society became increasingly industrial and complex and the separateness of Indian people became more evident. Most Canadians moved to the growing cities, but the Indians remained largely a rural people, lacking both education and opportunity. The land was being developed rapidly, but many reserves were located in places where little development was possible. Reserves were usually excluded from development and began to stand out as islands of poverty. The policy of separation had become a burden. 31
The White Paper proposed the following six-point plan to integrate Indians into Canadian society:

1. Remove all constitutional bases for special Indian rights, and repeal the Indian Act.

2. Promote a "third choice" for Indians other than living in reserves or completely assimilating, to contribute equally with other Canadians in a multi-cultural society.

3. Transfer responsibility (and some monies) to the provinces for providing services to Indians, eventually on the same basis as other Canadians. Concurrently, close down the Indian Affairs Branch of DIAND and transfer all remaining federal responsibilities to other agencies such as DREE.

4. Provide some special economic development support, including interim federal funding, for Indians who need help the most to catch up with other Canadians. Other Indians would have to help themselves. This special support as well as other programs available to all Canadians would assist Indians to find new jobs in the urban economy.

5. Appoint a Commission to review how the Federal Government's lawful obligations under the treaties, which were considered minimal, could be equitably ended. More general aboriginal rights would not be legally recognized but would be morally discharged under Point #4.
Remove federal protection of reserves and transfer lands to local Indian control so they could be legally taxed, leased and sold.

This six-point plan was to be implemented in five years. It shared the general assimilative purposes of previous policy but differed completely on the strategy to achieve this. The White Paper proposed to completely abandon past efforts to civilize Indians on reserves and provide them with protective wardship until it was no longer needed. Instead, Indians would be thrown into the "deep end," where, depending largely on their own efforts, they would either sink or swim.

Elaboration of point four of the strategy on economic development made it quite clear how Indians could expect to be treated under the Liberals' proposals to expose them to the cut and thrust of laissez-faire competition. Echoing (but not citing) the pessimistic economic analysis of the Hawthorn Report, it was very conservatively estimated that a few reserves close to growing industrial areas, or with agricultural potential, could if "properly developed ... provide a livelihood for a larger number of family units than is presently the case." But the majority of reserves were considered to have little economic development potential because of their limited size and geographical isolation. Even if the available resources on these reserves were fully utilized they could not properly support their present Indian population, much less future population growth. Thus the bottom line was that most Indians would have to relocate elsewhere, closer to employment opportunities. Common solutions for Indians and other Canadians alike would be sought in regions with little development potential under DREE's framework of regional development plans, together with normal regional adjustment services from the Canadian Employment
Public reaction to the White Paper was slow, and even the provinces raised no strong objections, which was surprising since the federal government was proposing, in modern jargon, to "download" some of the costs for Indians on to the Provinces. 33

Contemporary critiques by academics seem to have been muted, in contrast with retrospective assessments which are invariably negative. One explanation for the contemporary academic silence can possibly be found in the fact that most studies of Indians in the 1960's were undertaken by anthropologists, who, if they concerned themselves with modern day problems at all, approached them from the assimilative assumptions of "social distance" theory. Thus, Carstens, who applied the analogy of South African apartheid to describe Indian segregation on reserves, criticized White Paper proposals to give Indian communities more autonomy for managing their own affairs such as control of reserve lands. 34 In other words, Carstens thought the White Paper did not go far enough to ensure assimilation.

The most notable academic critic of the White Paper was Richard Dunning. Of considerable interest is a debate between Dunning and Jean Chretien in successive issues of the influential Canadian Forum. Dunning’s position on the proposed extinguishment of special Indian rights differed significantly from his previous endorsement of assimilation. Dunning did reiterate his previous criticism of the Hawthorn Report for advocating a larger role for the Indian Affairs Branch which, if implemented, would make it into a "super-Federal organization" with so much power that it would impede Indian autonomy. 35 But he thought the White Paper was going to the other extreme in its proposals for removing
special protections for Indians because it would expose them to the loss of their lands, integration into nearby provincial municipalities, and ultimately loss of their greatest asset, ethnic identity. Lastly, Dunning questioned the utility of applying existing development models to the special case of the Indian minority as proposed by both the White Paper and the Hawthorn Report. He proposed that the newly-formed National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) be supported to design an uniquely Indian model. This is exactly what the Federal government did after the White Paper debacle, with equally disastrous results as will be shown below.

As for Indian reactions to the White Paper, immediate disappointment was followed by growing hostility, and, once their grievances were known, they were joined by supportive public opinion. Indian opposition centered both on the process of planning the White Paper and its substantive content. Leaders of national and provincial Indian associations felt betrayed that the White Paper had been designed secretly behind their backs by government officials when at the same time they were being actively encouraged to participate in public hearings for revising the Indian Act. And from the many briefs presented by Indian leaders at the hearings there was clear evidence of a consensus on making the Indian Act less paternalistic, but without diluting special Indian rights. The White Paper planners had completely missed the subtle ambiguities of Indian feelings towards the Indian Act as both a constraint on their autonomy but also a guarantee of their special ethnic recognition.

To Indians, after years of subjugation and injustice, the federal government was merely seen to be abrogating its special obligations, denying Indians their proper rights, and
completing its program of cultural genocide which it had attempted so many times before. The White Paper was most vehemently opposed by Prairie Indians who were especially concerned with the threat to their treaty rights. Nor were Indian leaders enthused by the prospect of being reduced to a benign curio piece in Canadian multicultural society. As Harold Cardinal the leader of the Alberta Indian Association (AIA) put it, the Indian "is to learn his place in the Just Society by disappearing." 36 A brief presented by Harold Cardinal and A.I.A Chiefs to Prime Minister Trudeau in June, 1970, which, although popularly referred to as the "Red Paper," was titled "Citizen Plus" after the concept introduced in the Hawthorn Report. They claimed that their position was unique in Canadian society because, by virtue of their special aboriginal and statutory rights, they were more than just citizens of Canada.

Although no official retraction was made, a speech by Chretien in March 1971 seemed to confirm that the Government had abandoned the White Paper. Before that, during the Alberta Indian Association's presentation of the Red Paper even Trudeau admitted that he may have made a mistake:

And I'm sure we were very naive in some of the statements we made in the paper. We had perhaps the prejudices of small "I" liberals and White men who thought that equality meant the same law for everyone ... But we have learned in the process that perhaps we were a bit too theoretical, we were a bit too abstract.... 38

The planners drawing up the White Paper had made two cardinal miscalculations. First, they overestimated support from general public opinion for their seemingly elegant laissez-faire solution to the Indian problem, at a time when everyday operations of the welfare state in contemporary society had cut rather deeply into the abstract logic of liberal
ideology. By the 1960's, the realities of the interventionist welfare state had very perceptibly pervaded the daily life of Canadians. Subsidization of producers, which had always been a salient characteristic of Canada's "National Policy," was now accompanied by increasingly intrusive economic management and regulatory controls, as well as a plethora of universal and special needs assistance programs to individual Canadians. The Government's proposed Draconian measures for cutting Indians loose and leaving them to their own devices just did not fit many Canadians' expectations of the role of the modern state. In an era where public sensibilities were sharpened by international examples of the plight of the poor and by guilt about the mistreatment of Canada's own indigenous peoples, it was felt by many that the state should do more for Indians, not less.

Second, and most importantly, The White Paper planners seriously underestimated potential Indian opposition. Over one hundred and thirty year's imposition of the reserve system had spawned the rudiments of a modern Indian nationalist movement which became catalyzed in opposition to the White Paper. Unsuccessful attempts to assimilate Indians by segregating them on reserves had, if anything, perversely ensured their continued existence as distinct ethnic groups with reduced but still persistent beliefs and hopes which marked them off from other Canadians. In particular, the oppressiveness of the reserve system provided the raw materials common to many such nationalistic movements, of a collective historical consciousness of externally-imposed injustices and triumphant acts of defiance. Ironically enough, therefore, the White Paper was defeated principally as a result of the very reserve system which it proposed to eliminate. Even worse, as Sally Weaver recognizes, the Trudeau Government's misguided plan for extinguishment only served to exacerbate Indian nationalist feelings:
The White Paper became the single most powerful catalyst of the Indian nationalist movement, launching it into a determined force for nativism -- a reaffirmation of a unique cultural heritage and identity. Ironically, the White Paper had precipitated "new problems" because it gave Indians cause to organize against the government and reassert their separateness. 39

3.5 Conclusions

Generally, the White Paper was an extremely simplistic if not naive response to the complexities of Canada's Indian problem. Beneath all the modernization theorizing, liberal ideological postulations, and moralizing political calculations lay the irreducible and fundamentally flawed premise that the Indian problem could be made to disappear by merely redefining it in a way that made sense to the policy-makers. Unfortunately for them, the vast majority of Indians saw the problem differently from their own contextual and historical perspective.

Not only was the White Paper properly defeated because of its inherent failings, but it has left policy makers with a legacy of even more unsurmountable difficulties to resolve the Indian problem. First, the previous primary goal of culturally assimilating Indians has rightly been abandoned, but the contingent requirement to define special Indian rights has remained very muddy and disputatious. Second, hope that the majority of Indians would eventually migrate to areas of economic opportunity has been replaced with the much more problematical challenge of providing jobs for Indians in regions with limited economic opportunities (to say nothing of the many Indians who have migrated to cities and remain unemployed). Third, the assumption had to be abandoned that reserve communities would be a temporary stepping stone on the way to final Indian integration. This has forced the central state to continue subsidizing all reserve communities though it remains unsure how
many have realistic prospects of becoming economically viable.

Compounding the above difficult problems has been the need to avoid any repeat of the secretive manner in which the White Paper was prepared, and to concede Indians a proper role in preparing policies which intimately effect their futures. And the challenge of coming up with solutions which are agreeable to all parties is, in turn, compounded by the often militant and reactive demands of an Indian nationalist movement spawned by the reserve system and vitalized by its successful opposition to the White Paper.

To summarize the argument to this point, the first, most costly mistake in the history of Canadian Indian policy was to introduce the reserve system and then not abandon it when it was patently obvious that it could not work. This mistake ultimately led to Indians being left out of the Canadian economy and dependent on the central state for continuing subsidization of their reserve communities. Imposition of the reserve system also had the perverse result of promoting feelings of Indian separateness which over time evolved into a nativist movement preoccupied with maintaining its boundaries against other Canadians Indians. The second most costly mistake in Canadian Indian policy was the bungled attempt in the White Paper to impose an updated modernization agenda, which, while recognizing the failure of the reserve system, ignored the simple fact that it had irrevocably changed White-Indian relations and that the clock could not be turned back.
CHAPTER FOUR. THE DECLINE OF RESERVE COMMUNITIES INTO WELFARISM

4.1 Overview

The 1970's witnessed both large population increases in reserve communities and a rapid expansion of welfare state programs to Indians. This chapter describes the failure to stop the decline of many reserve communities into welfarism during this period, which occurred because of the deadlock over policy-making between the central Canadian state and the Indian political leadership. In "traditional policy-making" up to the 1969 White Paper, the state had unilaterally set policies for Indians, albeit against their determined but largely passive resistance. However, the confrontation over the White Paper led to fundamental changes in state-Indian relations. Public disapproval of how Indians had been left out of preparing the White Paper, together with heightened Indian nationalist feelings from successfully resisting its implementation, forced the state to consult with Indian leaders on new policies. Thus, Indian leaders became active participants in "contemporary policy-making," and, in doing so, must share responsibility for not making improvements which may have helped to overcome dependency on central state welfare programs.

The deadlock in contemporary policy-making has come about both because of the central state's inability to act decisively and Indian leaders' sometimes erratic and intemperate demands, and the way these factors interact together to polarize the situation even further. For their part, government policy makers were left rudderless after rejection of the 1969 White Paper. While no longer able to proceed with a direct program of assimilating Indians completely into Canadian society, they have been beset with uncertainty about whether, or at least how far, equal individual rights for Indians along with all other
Canadians should be compromised in order to concede special rights to Indians as a group. Or to put in another way, government policy makers have neither had the resolve to pursue a liberal "laissez-faire" agenda of Indians assuming individual responsibility for themselves, or to compromise on the liberal principle of democratic individualism and concede Indians an unique position in federation. Of course, both these positions carry severe political risks, the first that those individuals least able to help themselves would not survive "equal" treatment, and the second, that a nasty precedent would be created for Quebec separatists. Faced with these seemingly intractable contradictions, compromise does not appear to be part of government policy-makers' perceived options. Thus, they do not do very much of anything which is new or innovative.

For their part, the Indian political leadership came out of its successful resistance to the White Paper with a new confidence and resolve to press radical demands against the state for substantial powers of self-determination, often buttressed by claims to nationhood for each tribe. Their assertiveness has been further emboldened by the federal government's inaction, which has left Indian politicians without any realistic bounds for their own ambitions and ever suspicious about whether the government has another secret agenda, such as implementing the White Paper under the table or just waiting them out. The longer government policy-makers remain inactive, the more Indian nationalists assert spiralling demands for even more concessions, and the more difficult it is for the state to respond to them in any meaningful way. Thus, just as was the case under traditional policy making, the contemporary trend is to more polarization rather than convergence of positions, and for much the same reasons. That is, the more the state delays on finding a real solution the Indian problem, the more difficult the problem becomes.
To this point, neither the state's defensive "liberal" position nor the Indians' assertive "radical" positions on development have gained ascendancy over the other. Instead, the de facto policy vacuum which has resulted from this deadlock has been filled by a narrow "reformist" strategy of providing continuous welfare support to reserve communities. While this strategy attempts to placate some concerned public opinion that "something" is being done for Canadian Indians, other segments of public opinion have been alienated by the appearance of Indians receiving "free hand-outs." The consequences have also been disastrous for Indians themselves. Despite substantial infusions of welfare dollars, the situation in many reserve communities has probably not improved much or, in some cases, may have actually worsened. This is certainly the case with the deepening dependency of most reserve communities on central welfare state programs and associated problems of welfarism such as social stigma, persistent unemployment, high incidences of social pathologies, and widespread human despair. But contrary to the viewpoint of "internal colony" theorists, it is too simplistic to solely "blame the state" for this sorry situation. In reality, some government policy makers share some of this responsibility together with some leaders of the Indian nationalist movement.

The Indian nationalist movement which came to prominence in the 1970's, certainly was an outcome of Indian oppression by the state. As was shown, the Canadian Indian experience closely matched Robert Blauner's model of an "internal colonization" process. Blauner also identifies the rise of ethnic nationalist movements in opposition to the central state as a logical response to these experiences. Indeed, the Indian nationalist movement reflects some of the same characteristics which Blauner associates with such ethnic nationalist movements. First, Blauner describes how the oppressed ethnic minority seeks
to define themselves in terms of their own distinct "cultural nationality," in attempts to recover their own sense of self-identity after its erosion by colonization, and to mark themselves off from the colonizers. Second, the ethnic minority typically employ nationalist and anti-colonialist rhetoric to denounce the illegitimacy of the "foreign" central state in controlling their affairs. Third, they strive for the transfer of as much power as possible from the state to themselves so that they can better control their own affairs. This decolonizing nationalist process obviously bears considerable similarities to the experiences of Third World countries in disengaging themselves from imperial control.

Thus, the internal colony model is useful for describing Indian experiences of ethnic oppression by the state and the response to those experience in terms of an emerging nationalist movement. However, it is not useful to look at the present underdevelopment of Indian reserve communities and to blame that solely on past colonizing experiences. In the case of Canadian Indians, the internal colony model starts to lose relevance at the point where they moved away from their previous strategy of passive resistance to outside direction of their affairs by the colonizers, to more actively exercise power for redirection of their own futures. When the previously colonized Indian minority still remains undeveloped in these circumstances, it is inaccurate to continue portraying them as "blameless victims" -- as they often are by internal colony theorists -- because their predicament is now partly of their own making or, at least, is a consequence of the actions of their leaders (which many internal colony theorists will also not admit because they disavow any form of internal class analysis of the colonized group).

The internal colony model certainly does not tell the whole story very effectively when the
Indian nationalist movement emerged to such a position of power as to influence much of policy-making, and often to no better effect than the Canadian state. Rather than Indians being victimized by the systematic power of state exploitation, as they clearly were in the past, in the contemporary era of policy-making they now are often intimately interlocked in relations with the state as determining actors in the continuing process of their own underdevelopment. Both sides have frequently been preoccupied with a game of advancing and counter checking opposing claims to power which, to date, has done more to uphold the status quo of reserve problems than it has done for advancing any effective remedies.

One of the most serious repercussions of the deadlock in policy-making has been the failure to come to terms with the growing problem of widespread poverty and economic dependency on reserves. The government’s disavowal of its White Paper proposals ruled out any possibility of attempting to resolve the problem by encouraging Indian migration to areas with greater economic opportunities. For the first time since the advent of the reserve system, the federal government had to, tacitly at least, concede that reserve communities were not a temporary stopping place on the road to complete assimilation and that most were there to stay in some form or other. That left the difficult problems of how to increase the number of jobs in reserve communities and their surrounding regions, to expand Indian employment, and to reduce their dependence on government transfer payments.

But, as will be illustrated with two case studies from the 1970’s, some promising opportunities to start rebuilding local Indian economies were squandered by negative
interactions between the state and Indians, e.g.

(1) The first case study concerns a Socio-Economic Development Strategy under joint preparation by the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and the Department of Indian and Northern Development (DIAND), during the period from 1973 to 1979. This very promising approach to community economic development (CED) was intended to provide Indian Bands with the self-governing powers and planning tools to combat welfarism on reserves. However, the NIB scuttled the enterprise because the federal government would not meet their demands for handing over centralized control, and because they were threatened by the prospect of allowing more grassroots autonomy for the Indian communities they were supposed to represent.

(2) The second case study involves the failures of regional development planning in the Northern Canada to provide a sustainable economic base for Indians and other native peoples effected by mega energy projects. The 1975, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) followed a somewhat "top down" functional development strategy which failed to adequately consider local needs. On the other hand, the 1974-77, Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (the "Berger Inquiry"), proposed a purely "bottom-up" territorial development model which was not realized, partly because of the local Dene Indians' intemperate nationalistic demands.

The evolution of the Indian nationalist movement was a significant force throughout these events as Indian leaders changed their strategy from making ethnically distinct demands on
the state for fair treatment, to pressing for changes in the distribution of state power itself. 2 Indian nationalism also figures largely in the conflict over Indian self-government described in the next chapter. Therefore, some background comments are provided about the Indian nationalist movement before describing the case studies.

4.2 Background Comments on the Indian Nationalist Movement

This section comments on the Indian movement's adoption of a "modernist" West-European nationalist ideology, the intimate reinforcement of such ideology by autonomist development theories, and the pros and cons of Indians adopting a Western nationalist platform to advance their political goals.

As Boldt and Long observe, the nationalist ideology espoused by many Indian political leaders is not indigenous to their cultural traditions, but is adopted from Western-European culture. 3 Thus, in the 1970s many Indian leaders started to formulate their demands against the Canadian state in terms of what Taylor describes as the "basic trilogy" of nationalist core doctrines. 4 These involve recognition as nations with their own territories and with accompanying rights of sovereignty, i.e.

(1) It is claimed that Indian peoples must not be treated merely as an unique ethnic group in Canadian multiculturist society, but rather should be recognized as nations within Canada and as part of the international order. The implication is that Indian nationalist claims against the central state have inherently higher standing than other ethnically-defined group interests.
(2) By virtue of being "naturally occurring nations," Indians have inalienable rights to their own historical territories which precede and supercede any externally-imposed proprietary interests. This adds moral and philosophical reinforcements to legal arguments for aboriginal title.

(3) Indians possess aboriginal rights to sovereignty akin to that of nation-states, both within their own territorial boundaries and in external "government to government" relations with the Canadian state. This bolsters the notion that Indian rights of self-determination naturally accrue from aboriginal proprietary title, and are "innate" rights rather than needing to be conceded by Canada.

The first two of the above doctrines were explicitly evoked in the Dene Declaration described below in the case study about the Mackenzie Valley Inquiry. The third doctrine came to the forefront during Indian constitutional demands for self-government, described in the following chapter.

Of course, not all Indian political leaders or the groups they represent should be categorized as committed ethnic nationalists. Indeed, the political outlooks of Indian leaders are quite diverse, ranging all the way across the spectrum from those who espouse outright separation from Canada to a few who favour complete assimilation. Also, Indian use of nationalist doctrine only started to come into prominence with the Dene Declaration, and it has appeared that the appeal of nationalism to the Indian movement may have started to wane by the mid-1980s, though the recent confrontation with the Mohawks at Oka and its aftermath suggests that this conclusion may be premature.
A rigorous survey undertaken in 1981 by Menno Boldt certainly testifies to the widespread nationalistic feelings among Indian leaders at that time. 6 Boldt’s final sample group of 69 leaders was determined by the survey respondents themselves through "peer referencing" (significantly, not one leader was identified for achievements in business). No less than 45 per cent of leaders considered complete independence of their tribal group from Canada as the "ideal" political status, although about 45 percent of them, in turn, conceded that very substantial autonomy within Canada would be the next "best possible" alternative. Boldt’s alternative questionnaire format does go some way to distinguish between belief and rhetoric, but it still may be prudent to observe A.D. Smith’s caution that "since it is generally difficult to be sure when a given [nationalist] strategy represents a sincerely held belief or is only a tactic (and this may vary within the overall movement), it seems wiser not to make too sharp a distinction between autonomism and separatism." 7 Even bearing this caution in mind, however, Boldt’s findings seem highly indicative of strong nationalistic feelings.

Boldt also correlated data on the nationalistic attitudes of each leader with selected information on their personal backgrounds, and with very interesting results. It was found that nationalistic Indian leaders had typically been exposed to more "internal colonial" experiences than others in the sample group, including deprived living conditions, discriminatory treatment, and exclusion from opportunities in mainstream society. Thus Boldt’s findings collaborate the internal colony proposition that the emergence of minority nationalist movements owes something to state-sponsored exploitation along ethnic lines.

As was illustrated in the previous chapter on the White Paper, there is an intimate
relationship between liberal political ideology and "top down" assimilationist development doctrine. As will be illustrated here, a similar parallel relationship exists between nationalist ideology and "bottom up" autonomist development doctrine. National movements have often employed autonomist development theories to buttress their demands for decolonization and recognition of national status, and the Canadian Indian movement, including Indians themselves and their supporters, is no exception to this. UDT thinking, for instance, has become imbedded in the consciousness of many Indian politicians and supporters for their cause. By attributing total blame to state-sponsored processes for underdeveloping previously viable societies, practical and de jure justification is provided for Indians to determine their own redevelopment without government interference. The call for Indian self-determination assumes an especially unassailable aura of morality and natural inevitability when direct analogies are made with the post-war liberation of Third World countries from imperial control and exploitation. Again, these connections were made implicitly by the Dene during their opposition to the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline.

UDT and the internal colony thesis have little to say about the specifics of how underdeveloped societies should actually go about "redeveloping" themselves to make their nationalist mission concrete. That role is largely filled in by "bottom-up" regional territorial theory. It echoes UDT's retrospective theme of underdevelopment, but adds an accompanying program for autonomist redevelopment based on indigenous, regional cultural values and purposeful separation from outside political and economic control. This provides both internal and external legitimacy for the Indian nationalist movement. Among its own members, territorialism gives credence and content to the imperative, which A.D.
Smith says is common to all ethnic nationalist movements, of coalescing around a mission of "community self-regeneration" which is both retrospective and forward-looking. 8 Territorialism’s renascent values of intimate, Gemeinschaft personal relations and communal self-help, combined with its development program for autonomous survival against homogenizing modernization, evokes continuity between a fondly remembered (or imagined) Indian past and hope for a recovered future.

Besides promoting "in group" national solidarity, the vision of a continuum between the Indian’s past and future makes their demands for self-government more appealing to others. The "Small is Beautiful," anti-technology and pro-environment imagery of territorial development is seen by many supporters of Indian causes to be congruent with Indian cultural heritage and their plans for regaining stewardship over traditional lands. It is striking, for instance, how many "Indian" and "environmental" causes are frequently perceived to be synonymous. Indian self-determination, it is claimed, will liberate Indians from underdevelopment and enable them to pursue a distinctive development path which is both appropriate to them and can provide a superior model for emulation by society generally. Tom Berger’s Inquiry team obviously followed a regional territorial development model, and territorial thinking also found its way briefly into NIB positions on the Socio-Economic Strategy described in our first case study. More recently, Indian demands and academic support for their local "territorial" control have framed much of the Indian-White conflict over contested natural resources in Canada’s hinterlands.

What about the utility of Indians adopting a nationalist program for advancing their political goals? In adopting a nationalist program, the Indian movement certainly clashes directly
with the widely-held norm (in English-Canadian society, at least) of liberal democratic individualism. Nationalism, of course, has long been an anathema to liberalism -- Lord Acton's famous critique was first published in 1907 -- and, in Canada, the debate is already sharpened by Quebec separatism. Does the insertion of the Indian cause into this already fractious conflict of "isms" in Canada make sense as political strategy for the Indian minority? There are good arguments "for" and "against," but the weight of support should go to the latter.

It can be argued that appeals by the Indian minority to moral and legal principles, which, although controversial, are recognized by the majority society itself (including internationally) is a pragmatic response to the present asymmetry of power relations. "Beat them at their own game," goes this line of argument. For instance, Paul Tennant makes the point that the Indian minority's adaptive acculturation of selected innovations from the dominant society is necessary to secure their long-term survival against complete assimilation. Tennant, a political scientist, employs Frederik Barth's "transactionalist" criticism of traditional anthropologists use of "social distance" convergence theory. By this line of thinking, the cultural continuity of indigenous groups such as Canadian Indians is seen to depend, not on maintaining any particular cultural elements, but rather on preserving general cultural boundaries vis-à-vis other cultures. This inversion of modernization theory is seen by Tennant as effectively refuting the common claim that the Indians' acculturation of non-traditional elements diminishes their cultural continuity and, consequently, the force of their aboriginal claims. Tennant does caution, however, that by employing a strategy of political adaption "in response to internal colonialism an indigenous people is choosing a precipitous path lying between alienation and assimilation."
On the other hand, the rationale for Indians adopting a "modernist national strategy" can be criticized both on moral-philosophical and on practical grounds. The first counter argument rests partly on the obvious fact that the historical experiences in Europe which gave rise to the growth of western nationalist ideology are completely different from the circumstances of traditional Indian nations. Boldt and Long point to the serious anomaly in Canadian Indians adopting a "European-western concept of sovereignty ... to establish the legal, moral and political authority that will allow them to nurture and develop their traditional tribal customs, values and social institutions," because the two stand in absolute contradiction.

Essentially, Boldt and Long argue that the "imported" doctrine of national sovereignty rests on assumptions of absolute authority, hierarchal power relations, and a distinct ruling entity which stand in fundamental contradiction to the organization of traditional Indian nations. By comparison, Indians followed norms of communalist social integration with intertwining individual and group interests, equal sharing of privileges and responsibilities based on customs and traditions, and a respect for individual autonomism in reaching group consensus. Similarly, Boldt and Long note that the notion of "statehood" as an essential requirement for the exercise of sovereignty is contrary to the traditional Indian view of "nationhood" which did not conceive of separating the state from the community. Indian nations, they claim, had no distinct administrative institutions, and their internal and external relations were regulated by the community at large. Lastly, Indian notions of territoriality were not conceived in terms of precisely-defined territorial boundaries but on more fluid concepts of sharing in the use of resources to be available for all life forms, and the respecting of other communities' needs.
Boldt and Long assert that "by adopting the European-Western ideology of sovereignty, the current generation of Indian leaders is buttressing the imposed alien structures within its communities, and is legitimizing the associated hierarchy comprised of indigenous political and bureaucratic elites." Indeed, "the legal-political struggle for sovereignty could be a Trojan Horse for traditional Indian culture by playing into the hands of the Canadian government's long-standing policy of assimilation." To avert the threat to native institutions of consensus democracy, the two authors call for return to traditional concepts of Indian nationalism. Such a strategy is discussed later below.

The more practical problems of a modernist national strategy relate directly to the standoff in Indian-state relations which, so far, has blocked any change of the status quo of widespread poverty and dependency among reserve communities. Indian development problems are already exceedingly complex because of their long-rooted history and wide-ranging scope, and the infusion of nationalist claims makes them even more difficult to resolve, or what Rittle and Weber describe as "wicked planning problems." Some examples are given below:--

(1) Nationalism, as A.D. Smith says, is a "total phenomenon." This means that Indian political, socio-cultural and economic grievances all tend to get more intertwined together, and often in subtle ways, making it more difficult to define or "bound" specific policy issues for analysis and resolution, e.g. the issue of "poverty" on reserves.
Nationalist ideology is utopian by nature, and consequently the perceived ends and means of development may curve back into each other. As Smith says, "Only through the exercise of autonomy, or preferably sovereignty can the group realize itself; but contrarily the goal and embodiment of such "self-realization" is separate existence." Thus, for instance, some Indian leaders seem to assume that economic development will simply flow from the achieving of nationhood (as have many decolonized Third World countries assumed to their cost).

Nationalist ideology tends to extremism. Incremental improvements to the status quo are frequently dismissed by Indian leaders as inadequate, diversionary compromises. It is either "all or nothing." And, conversely, Indian nationalist rhetoric is extremely threatening to many in the majority society, provoking similarly extreme reactions from them.

The above observations about the relative merits and demerits of a modernist nationalist strategy do not apply uniformly to all IFN's. Nor are they meant to detract from the Indians' status as original peoples of Canada, or from their contemporary needs to assert increased rights of self-governance vis a vis the Canadian central state. Rather, the issues revolve around practical questions about what powers Indians can obtain which reasonably meet their needs.

It will be shown below that Indian First Nations do require expanded governmental powers to successfully develop their communities, though the scope and nature of required powers will vary according to each IFN's individual circumstances and aspirations.
Doubtless, the Indian leaders' nationalist strategy has induced federal and provincial
governments, the media, and the public to take their concerns more seriously than they
may have done otherwise. Also, to some degree, the limitations of popular terminology
make it difficult to persuasively present a more moderate case for Indian self-governments
with relative autonomy in the Canadian federation.

However, appeals to the extreme language of national statism for procuring more powers
do carry serious risks. The achievement of "Indian nation-states" within or - outside - of
Canada is clearly impossible, but hopeless attempts to sustain this illusion, even at a
rhetorical level, divert the energies of Indian leaders away from achieving realistic long-
term goals and more immediate improvements for their communities. Also, the divisive
symbolism of Indian nationalist claims, especially during a critical time when Canadian
unity is seriously threatened by Quebec nationalism, alienates many potential supporters
for Indian self-government. Lastly, it is all too easy for the state to seize on the
imprecision, intractability, and impracticability of Indian nationalist demands as an excuse
for doing nothing.

4.3 Case Study One: The NIB/DIAND Socio-Economic Development Strategy

The NIB/DIAND Socio-Economic Strategy has to be placed in the context of two significant
changes in federal funding policy for Indians which took place in the 1970s. First, was a
rapid expansion of Indian programs which had started in the previous decade but was now
accompanied by increasing delegated responsibility for program delivery to individual Bands
or to Tribal Councils representing groups of Bands. During the period from 1968 to 1978,
DIAND's annual funding for Indians increased steadily by an average of 11 - 12 per cent in
most years, and by 1978, spending powers for 35 per cent of Indian funds were delegated to Bands and Tribal Councils. Most of the increasing budgets were taken up in reserve communities for the almost complete subsidization of rising costs for housing, infrastructure, education, social assistance, and local administration. Some of these rising "fixed" costs were due to increasing program standards to try to catch up with general Canadian standards, as well as to rapid population increases on reserves (the 1970s witnessed both increases in the total Indian population and the proportion living on-reserve). Another important factor was the lack of economic development in reserve communities and their consequent inability to pay their own way.

Partly as a corollary of these rising "fixed" costs, perhaps, only 6.6 percent of DIAND's annual budgets were available during the 1970s for economic development purposes (i.e. "variable" costs). Most of these monies were provided as contributions, loans, and loan guarantees through the Indian Economic Development Fund (IEDF), but with mixed results. Some additional funding was also made available through programs from the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC), but largely for make-work projects. Contrary to a central thrust of the White Paper, only a small amount of funding was made available to reserves through the Department of Regional and Economic Expansion (DREE), and most of that took the form of general infrastructure investments with sometimes tenuous connections to long-term economic development. The lack of adequate investments into economic development meant, of course, that reserve communities became even more dependent on the welfare state.

The increasing dependency of reserve communities on government transfers came at a
high cost, not least to their political leadership. DIAND, under the guise of welfare reformism, expanded its penetration into the political affairs of reserve communities by its financial control over transfer programs and, in doing so, undermined community leadership and accountability. As Dyck notes, "Band Chiefs and Councils had become so intertwined with the Department in partnership arrangements to have become almost a sub layer of the federal administrative apparatus." Some Indian leaders became dependent on outside funding agencies to maintain their internal community power base as financial brokers. According to Dyck, such leaders may appear to represent the interests of their communities in strongly pressing funding requests, but they cannot go too far in biting the hand that ultimately serves to sustain their position of power.

The second significant change in federal funding for Indians was massive financing of Indian national and provincial associations to consult on future policy changes. This followed widespread criticism of the high-handed manner in which Indians had been excluded from preparation of the White Paper. Support of Indian associations represented a complete turn around from previous federal policy which had frequently attempted to suppress collective Indian organizations, notably in British Columbia and to a lesser degree in Saskatchewan. British Columbian Indians had the longest experience with modern political organizations and it was not unexpected, therefore, that some of them were to play a very central role in Indian political organizing during the 1970s policy era. In 1969, status Indians from all across the Province had come together in the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) to oppose the White Paper. Meanwhile, largely at the initiation of Prairie provincial organizations, the powerful National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) was also formed. However, within two years a Shuswap Indian from British Columbia, the
late George Manuel, took over presidency of the NIB and held the position for six years until 1976.

Manuel's two major priorities at the NIB were consensus-building among the highly diverse member Bands of the Brotherhood and the promotion of community development. Manuel was also at the forefront of an international movement to organize indigenous minorities of the "Fourth World," which bore fruit in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) of which he was the first president. He was greatly impressed by Tanzania's "ujamaa" approach of decentralized rural development, championed by its president, Julius Nyerere. Manuel attempted at all times to keep a cooperative but arms-length relationship with the federal government. But, in 1974, against Manuel's wishes, the NIB did agree to participate in a new consultative mechanism on Indian policy. This was the so-called Joint NIB/Cabinet Committee (JNCC) which came into being largely through the initiative of John Turner, then Minister of Finance in the Trudeau Liberal Government. Shortly afterwards, Manuel resigned from the presidency because of poor health, and control of the NIB was taken up by a young Prairie Indian, Noel Starblanket.

In contrast to Manuel's grass-roots leadership style, Starblanket built up a large staff of well-educated Indian bureaucrats like himself. Power was centralized within an Internal Policy Development Secretariat (IPDS) which prepared policy proposals for consideration by the NIB's Executive Committee. The individual Band linkages so carefully nurtured by Manuel were severed, and decision-making became more centralized within NIB staff and representatives from member provincial associations, who together made up the Executive.
The NIB Executive joined the JNCC together with Federal Ministers from the Cabinets' Social Planning Committee. Underneath were two supporting tiers of consultative mechanisms, the lower of which comprised five Joint Working Groups (JWG’s) made up of NIB technocrats and federal (largely DIAND) bureaucrats. One of these groups had responsibility for formulating a joint Socio-Economic Development Strategy for consideration by the JNCC, which is the subject matter of this case study. It soon became apparent that both sides had gone into the JNCC with different expectations. The federal government, wishing to avoid repeating the White Paper debacle, sought to consult Indians on how best to implement federal policies so that it could avoid confrontation later. In contrast, the NIB came to the JNCC with high expectations of sharing policy-making powers on an equal basis. When these expectations were not fulfilled, it went to the other extreme of demanding control over designing Indian policies and programs to be funded by the federal government. The Socio-Economic Strategy was one casualty of this power struggle.

As described below, planning of the Strategy proceeded in three phases each culminating in a report:--

**Phase One: NIB/DIAND Socio-Economic Development Strategy.**

First, DIAND provided funding to the NIB for defining general development objectives. Similar to what Richard Dunning had proposed in his critique of the White Paper, DIAND’s idea was that Indians should be allowed to design their own development strategies. The phase one Report was prepared by a largely non-Indian group centered in Victoria, and approved by the NIB General Assembly. 26
Much of the first report is pure territorial development theory, and its main inspiration appears to have been Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*. Concern is expressed about the forces of homogenization, specialization, and centralization which have been unleashed on small communities by industrial society, but which are seen, nevertheless, as a transition before the inevitable movement towards a global "post-industrial society." Small communities are seen as best placed to manage transformation to the new era where the emphasis would be on conservation rather than consumption, decentralization rather than bureaucratization, and on meeting social needs rather than those of economic man. Furthermore, Indian communities are envisaged to have a particular advantage for meeting this challenge because of their traditional form of organization, and, indeed, could serve as models for post-industrial reconstruction elsewhere.

The report recognizes that reserve communities in the welfare state are not what they used to be, and will need themselves to undergo "cultural educational processes." They would also require a plethora of additional transfer funding, including "federal basic services funding," "equalization grants," "employment subsidies," and "equity capital." Apparently, the bottom line was that Indian communities could only become models for "post-industrial" society with considerable support from the present "industrial society."

The Report borrowed from the Canadian Council for Rural Development’s recent *Development Strategy for the Mid-North of Canada*. Specifically, it picked up its idea of local communities coordinating senior government programs to maximize local benefit. Given the purpose of the CCRD Report which was to redirect DREE’s regional development programs, it was striking that the Strategy planners did not look beyond the boundaries of Indian communities to seek ways for them to build a sustainable economic base.
Phase Two: NIB/DIAND Socio-Economic Development Strategy

If a regional dimension was lacking from the phase-one report, the complete deletion of a community focus was even more striking in the following phase-two report. 32 DIAND funded the NIB in this phase to canvass responses from its member provincial organizations to the development objectives laid out in the phase-one report. Also, they were to compile inventories of potential development resources on reserves. The findings were described in a report, again prepared by a largely non-Indian task force with some overlapping membership from the first task force, including the first and second chairpersons (both non-Indians).

The second report bore hardly any resemblance to the first, but likewise was approved by the NIB General Assembly. No references can be found to any "bottom-up" development theme or, indeed, to any coherent development strategy at all. Instead, the new report mundanely enumerated techniques and justifications for extracting more transfer funding from the federal government. Its major recommendation was for DIAND to immediately invest $72.4 million in "Band master planning mechanisms," so that Bands could total up their needs for federal programs. A special point was made, which will be explained below, of demanding that the NIB would negotiate Indian funding levels directly with the Treasury Board, and that all agreed federal monies for Indians would be transferred to them through DIAND under a "one-agency concept." 33

In complete contradiction to the community-based nature of the first report, the NIB also proposed to assume DIAND's present top-down control of Band funding as its own prerogative. Specifically, a three-tiered structure would be established under the auspices
of the NIB for progressively "rolling-up" Band funding requests into provincial association plans, which in turn would be consolidated into one national plan by the NIB's Internal Policy Development Secretariat (IPDS), and then the budgets transferred from DIAND would in turn be allocated back down through the three hierarchal tiers. This proposal bore more than a passing resemblance to DIAND's own programming and budgeting procedures. A greater abortion of George Manuel's vision of decentralized community control would be hard to imagine.

Some explanation for NIB's financing proposals can be found in their response to a Cabinet-approved Indian Relationship Paper of that same year. 34 This policy gave shape to the government's attempt to recognize a more distinct Indian identity, somewhat similar to the concept of "citizen plus" originated by the Hawthorn Report. Elements of government responsibilities for Indians were grouped into two categories, the first covering particular Indian status rights connected with the Indian Act, reserve lands and local government, and the second covering programs of general application to status Indians (along with other disadvantaged Canadians), such as for social services, housing and economic development. The Government's new policy paper raised a broad range of concerns which were roundly criticized by the NIB. 35 Of particular significance for subsequent progress of the Socio-Economic Development Strategy was the government's recognition of considerable diversity among different Indian groups, and the consequent need for consultation at not only the national (i.e. NIB) level, but also at provincial and individual band levels. This, of course, would serve to bypass the NIB's centralized role for dealing with the federal government on policy issues. Even worse for NIB aspirations, the present government made it abundantly clear that although they were prepared to
consult with Indians, they would not delegate what it considered was its own proper executive and legislative responsibilities for social policy.

The Indian Relationships Paper also indicated the Government's intent to consult on making "programs now in place" more cost-effective "in full awareness of the galloping inflation in costs for Indian programs and the continuing need for restraint in government spending" 36 More cost-sharing with other federal agencies and the provinces was also implied. Considerable Indian concerns were also raised by placing programs such as education in the "general" category of government responsibilities which were widely regarded by Indians as a "particular" right. Understandably, many of these measures were seen as highly reminiscent of the recent White Paper. These threats to Indian funding are what lay behind the NIB proposals in the phase-two strategy report to institutionalize a new budget mechanism which would afford them more direct leverage on central funding agencies, while still ensure that all funds be directed through DIAND to avoid competing directly against other interest groups.


Regrettably, it was in this atmosphere of considerable Indian distrust of government intentions that phase-three of the joint socio-economic strategy proceeded. DIAND, by this time was clearly looking for more creative and realistic proposals to lessen reserve dependency than had previously been advanced by the NIB alone. A joint National Indian Socio-Economic Development Committee (NISEDC) was established with independent status under the presidency of Jack Beaver, a Mohawk Indian who had previously been a vice-president for Ontario Hydro. In the meantime, however, the NIB suddenly and
somewhat inexplicably withdrew from the JNCC, although it had provided them with an unprecedented level of access to the federal cabinet. One probable factor in their withdrawal was probably the confrontation which had occurred in JNCC meetings over the question of special Indian rights, with Marc Lolande, speaking for the Cabinet, saying that "you have not convinced us that these special areas (e.g. education) are properly areas of special rights for Indians over and above the larger population." 37 The NIB may also have been trying to position themselves away from the Liberals in expectation of the Conservatives winning the next election.

Because of the NIB’s withdrawal from the JNCC and their opposition to Jack Beaver’s independent status, the phase-three strategy report was completed without their involvement. 38 To Have What is One’s Own, or the "Beaver Report" as it is commonly known, marked itself from the NIB’s narrow budgetary focus by observing that, despite large infusions of transfer funding into Indian reserves, there were still unacceptably low rates of improvement in their social and economic conditions. The Report presciently attributed this to both the continuing colonial role of DIAND and the power-seeking pretensions of Indian political associations locked together in "antagonistic mutual dependence" 39. The Beaver Report neither rejected nor reaffirmed the idealistic portrayal of a renascent territorial Indian society presented in the original strategy report, but instead placed pragmatic reliance on culturally-sensitive, adaptive development. Beaver remained true, however, to the community-based focus of the first report, although his report was similarly deficient in the limited attention given to regional development.

Beaver straightforwardly proposed to replace DIAND’s current top-down development
policies with the following two-part strategy for community economic development, as quoted from his report:-

(a) **Indian self-government**, which will give bands the option to exercise full powers to manage their own affairs; and,

(b) **Community-based planning and development** which will set the conditions enabling Indian communities to move out in the direction of self-reliance and to root out the devastating effects of dependency. 40

Beaver’s proposed strategy involved decentralizing sufficient political powers to the Band level for them to take the initiative in redeveloping their economies. Rather than specifying **a priori** any specific model of development, it was expected that individual Bands would plan their own individual development paths. This was similar to Dunning’s proposal, mentioned above, that Indians should evolve their own development models in place of those imposed by government, but Beaver differed in rejecting any such role for the NIB. Indeed, not only did Beaver recognize considerable diversity among Bands, but he contended that nothing would happen as long as DIAND and the NIB were locked into "Indian versus Government" competition for control of policy-making. 41 Thus, it was as much to escape the top-down constraints imposed by national and provincial Indian associations as it was to become unshackled from DIAND’s colonialist control, that he advocated Indian self-government at the Band level.

Beaver’s concepts on the form which Indian self-government would take were somewhat vague. He did propose that a larger scope of potential Band powers could be allowed for in a revised Indian Act, to be drawn upon by individual Bands when needed and according to their own level and rate of development. Over the longer term, it was also envisaged
that there would be an evolution towards even more autonomous Band powers through constitutional revision. The Beaver Report was not altogether clear on the precise interrelationships between "Indian self-government", on the one hand, and "community-based planning and development" on the other. It seemed to suggest, however, that community-based planning and development should both derive from, and reinforce more autonomous political development. This would be achieved by using the planning process for community revitalization, designing programs to meet local needs instead of merely administering DIAND programs, and increasing levels of local competencies for self-management.

The NIB's response to Beaver's report are recorded in their 1979/1980: Annual Report on Socio-Economic Development. They attempted to discredit all of Beaver's report by picking on one of his recommendations for DIAND to continue in a different form as a facilitator for the proposed Strategy, which was somewhat hypocritical considering their own proposed "one-agency concept," to say nothing of the NIB's previous silence over the White Paper's proposal for dismantling DIAND. What aggravated the NIB most, however, was Beaver's unfortunate, overly trenchant criticism of their shared blame in delaying progress at the Band level. The NIB Assembly reaffirmed their demands for investment funds made in the phase-two report, backing this up with a resolution that "economic development is a treaty and aboriginal right." They also requested that the Minister for DIAND transfer more funding to them to continue planning the Strategy, including setting up nine different task forces and sub-committees under its own aegis to research sectoral and regional issues. In reply, Jake Epp, the Minister for DIAND in Joe Clark's short-lived Conservative Government, pointedly questioned whether "the creation of national
mechanisms such as you propose are a necessary precondition ... to support appropriate planning and development procedures at the Band level." 44 However, the Government did not have the resolve to implement the Beaver Report's proposed community economic development approach on an individual Bands basis. A valuable opportunity was lost.

Some commentators have ascribed the impasse in Indian-state relations during this period to manipulative attempts by DIAND to regain control of Indian policy after defeat of the White Paper. 45 This conclusion can certainly not be supported by the evidence of this case study. Also, DIAND had clearly lost much of its previous autonomy over Indian policy by the 1970s, and was more subordinated to the larger political environment of the federal government, including strong central agency control. 46 What about the role of Indian groups in creating this impasse with the state? Clearly, the new Indian nationalism played a part in strident demands for taking over federal government powers. Tanner also notes that Indian leaders have been adept at using their disadvantaged position of wardship to embarrass the government and assert their special rights, but in protecting this valuable bargaining resource from being weakened in their political competition for power and resources, they have, paradoxically, "tended to perpetuate their own colonized status." 47 This may also help to explain why the NIB opted for the status quo rather than to cooperate in improving the plight of dependent reserve communities.

4.4 Case Study Two: Northern Regional Development Projects

The minimal attention given to a regional perspective in the joint NIB/DIAND Economic Development Strategy was especially surprising, given contemporary events unfolding in the North. The planning of mega projects to extract the North's rich energy resources
brought pressures for settling unextinguished aboriginal claims across broad tracts of land. The James Bay and Mackenzie Valley projects, in particular, also catapulted the issue of what was an "appropriate" regional development strategy to the forefront of the Indian policy debate in the latter part of the 1970s.

Federal government policy towards Indians in the North during this time was largely guided by its "comprehensive claims policy," introduced in 1973. In contrast to the White Paper, the new claims policy clearly acknowledges the principle of aboriginal rights both in areas without treaties, such as in James Bay, and in areas where there are treaties but these have not satisfactorily extinguished aboriginal rights, as was thought to be the case in the Mackenzie Valley (partly, because no reserves had been created). The new policy specifically requires that respective provincial governments join in trilateral agreements together with the federal government and affected aboriginal groups, because of their jurisdiction over lands and most natural resources (which occurred in the case of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement). The settlement packages can be quite flexible. Rather than being straightforwardly assimilative, they can be designed, for instance, to provide not only "concrete and lasting benefits in the context of contemporary society," but also to "keep and protect Indian and Inuit peoples’ sense of identity." This can be achieved through a mix of land and financial compensation, as well as protection of hunting, fishing, and trapping rights, and participation in managing the regional resource base.

At the time the new claims policy was introduced, preparatory work had already started on the huge James Bay hydro developments, and recent completion of the U.S. Alaska
pipeline had prompted proposals for pipelines through the Mackenzie Valley. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 provided an example to Canadians of a claims settlement which was used not only to extinguish native title, but also as an explicit vehicle for social development of aboriginal peoples in the region. The Act came into being as a means to unlock the deadlock on the proposed 900-mile Alaska oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the Gulf of Alaska, brought about by a Federal freeze on the disposition of State lands until aboriginal native title was extinguished. Under the leadership of Senator (Scoop) Jackson ANCSA was also used, according to one of his aides, as a vehicle for "a very radical effort at social engineering ... done on a very, very calculated basis." This grand design for regional development focused on using oil revenues to assist Alaskan natives leave the "culture of poverty" associated with their marginal hunting and fishing lifestyle, and to join the modern industrial sector.

Influential members of Congress blocked any attempts to extend the reservation system from the "lower forty-eight" into Alaska. When Alaska natives agreed to completely extinguish their aboriginal title in perpetuity, a vast, hierarchal system of regional and village corporations was established on business-like principles to manage native shareholders' portfolios of land allocations and cash payments. Modernization, it seemed, did not even need to follow a sequence of "Rostowian" stages but could be done in one big jump. At the time, even a Canadian legal advocate of native rights, Doug Sanders, praised this "imaginative social planning" as a way to "combine resource development, native claims, and economic and social development in one scheme." But, as was to become readily apparent later, the whole design of ANCSA was predicated on a "top down" functional approach to regional development, which was not so much concerned
with meeting the special needs of Alaska natives as it was with clearing the way for
development and assimilating Indians into an Alaskan economy dominated by southern
metropolitan interests. More recently, many of the numerous regional and village
corporations which were set up under ANCSA are sliding into bankruptcy, and corporation
shares are now open to outside purchasing after the lapsing of a moratorium period. The
latter feature of the agreement, especially, illustrates its terminationist intent to remove
Alaska natives' special status and to bring about their complete assimilation.

ANCSA had considerable influence in Canada, beginning as a positive model for emulation
by government to supposedly mitigate the impacts of energy resource extraction on
aboriginal peoples but, later, when its assimilative implications became fully understood, as
a negative model to be avoided at all costs by aboriginal groups.

James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), 1975
The Alaska settlement model clearly provided inspiration for the later James Bay
Agreement signed by the James Bay Cree, the province of Quebec, and the Canadian
federal government. But, the JBNQA does not share ANCSA’s terminationist and,
therefore, assimilationist goals. Like Alaskan natives, the Cree (as well as some
neighbouring Inuit) did extinguish their aboriginal title in return for a settlement of cash and
selected lands. These lands are differentiated into three categories: 'I' for settlement
purposes with similar status to reserve lands; 'II' for exclusive Cree hunting and fishing,
and; 'III,' making up the largest bulk of the allocations, for restricted traditional uses. A
hierarchial system of institutions has also been established, although, unlike the Alaskan
agreement, they are more political than economic in nature. Specifically, municipal
corporations are established for each of the eight Cree Bands under a Cree Regional Authority (CRA). The latter serves as an umbrella organization for coordinating program delivery, participating in provincial consultative mechanisms on resource management and environmental protection, and controlling spin-off economic development corporations.

All Cree social programs are accountable to the appropriate Quebec ministries in each sector of health, housing, welfare, etc., although much of the costs are defrayed through federal block funding. Thus, it can be seen that JBNQA shares much of the assimilative character of the Alaska agreement. But, reflecting the flexible nature of the Canadian government's comprehensive claims policy, provisions are also included for protecting the traditional sector economy by means of an innovative trappers' income maintenance program, as well by the aforementioned land protection measures and Cree consultative role on natural resource and environmental decisions. To this degree, the JBNQA model can be seen to mitigate its primarily "top-down" functional approach to regional development with aspects of a "bottom-up" territorial approach.

The James Bay Agreement was strongly denounced by other Indian groups across Canada as a "sell-out," and some of the Cree themselves now have second thoughts. However, Billy Diamond, the Cree's Grand Chief, has convincingly argued that he was left with very limited options at the time. The Cree were under immense pressures because Quebec was adamant about pushing through their vast hydro plans as quickly as possible, and the federal government acted as an acquiescent junior partner rather than as protector of aboriginal rights. George Manuel, as President of the NIB, was very concerned that the Agreement could be used as a precedent against other Indian groups across Canada, and
he quickly intervened to stop a similar settlement being reached in the Yukon. Of special concern was the "municipalization" of Cree political institutions and the "provincialization" of control over Indian programs, which rekindled suspicions that the federal government was intent on implementing White Paper policies through the back door.

One serious flaw of the James Bay Agreement which has not drawn too much scrutiny, is the failure of Quebec and the federal government to assure long-term economic self-reliance among the Cree, as opposed to perpetuating their dependence on state transfers. Salisbury claims that the Crees' material situation, as well effective power and regional cohesiveness, all greatly improved after the Agreement was signed. 54 Also, a number of high-profile economic ventures such as the well known Air Cree-bec airline have been successfully established. Salisbury attempts to turn the table on internal colony critics of the Cree's acquiescence, by accusing them of being "ethnocentric" because they fail to recognize that the final agreements closely follows what the Cree wanted all along. 55 It should be noted, however, that Salisbury cannot be assumed to be an unbiased chronicler of these events because, like some other McGill University anthropologists, he had taken an activist role as an "anthropological mediator" in clarifying communication between the federal and Quebec governments, and the Cree. 56

Certainly unconvincing is Salisbury's contention that the Cree's achievements with their regional service economy provide a useful model for replication generally. By his own evidence, much of this so-called service economy is a huge, overbloated, Cree regional bureaucracy almost completely dependent on continuing federal and provincial subsidies. Over 1,000 Cree are so employed, but even then there are an additional 350 non-Cree
employed, largely in the more skilled jobs. Future prospects look even bleaker because of the Cree's rapid population growth in a region where job opportunities are scarce. 57 Part of the problem appears to be the federal government's tardiness in funding its share of the JBNQA and other related agreements, and especially its failure to live up to commitments for promoting economic development. In 1987, only 2.4% of DIAND expenditures on the James Bay agreements were for economic development and were limited to approved uses under standard program criteria. 58

The Quebec Liberal Government had proposed to expand the James Bay hydro developments with the "Big Whale" project, but it is not surprising that the Cree strongly resisted a return performance of the first disaster. They have been so effective in raising international support for their cause that, in October 1994, the Parti Quebecois government announced it has no intention, at this time, of proceeding with the project. Their motivation appears to have been to calm international concerns about the future of native peoples in Quebec as the time approached for holding a separatist referendum.

Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (The "Berger Inquiry), 1974-77

Tom Berger's famous inquiry commenced just prior to signing of the James Bay Agreement. The Dene Indians in the Mackenzie region rejected both the Alaska "corporate" assimilation model and the James Bay "municipal/provincial" integration model. Instead, the Dene presented a dramatically nationalistic program for self-determination. On July 1975, they issued their famous Dene Declaration, which was subsequently endorsed by the NIB. As shown by the following abstract it echoed appeals made by many colonized Third World Countries for the right to national self-determination.
We the Dene of the Northwest Territories insist on the right to be regarded by ourselves and the world as a nation.

Our struggle is for the recognition of the Dene Nation by the Government and peoples of Canada and the peoples and governments of the world....

The New World like other parts of the world has suffered the experience of colonialism and imperialism. Other peoples have occupied the land -- often with force -- and foreign governments have imposed themselves on our people.

Ancient civilizations and ways of life have been destroyed. Colonialism and imperialism are not dead or dying. Recent years have witnessed the birth of new nations or rebirth of old nations out of the ashes of colonialism....

What we seek then is independence and self-determination within the country of Canada. This is what we mean when we call for a just land settlement for the Dene Nation. 59

The Dene’s nationalistic agenda for self-determination was reinforced by theories on how to best reverse internal colonization through "appropriate" regional development. This contribution was made by various social scientists working directly with northern native groups, notably the anthropologists Michael Asch, Steve Brody, and Peter Usher, and the political economist Mel Watkins, and by Berger himself. Berger has rightly received acclaim for his innovative planning process of taking the Mackenzie Valley pipeline inquiry process into the most remote of native settlements. The economic foundations of his regional strategy, however, were strongly derived from arguments presented to the Inquiry by Mel Watkins. Watkins’s UDT/territorial concepts for Dene regional development are very explicit and worth summarizing at some length. 60

To explain the predicament of the Dene, Watkins extended his previous "Innisian" staple thesis of Canadian underdevelopment vis-à-vis the United States to dependent core-peripheral relations within Canada’s North. 61 Citing Harold Innis directly, he noted that
the exploitation of northern energy resources reflected a further "shift to a new staple" from the previous fur trade, which will result in a "period of crisis," including "painful adjustments" for regional residents. Watkins explained that the fur trade had not seriously underdeveloped native inhabitants of the North because of its particular "mode of production." Specifically, neither the Indians' labour time nor their land had become marketable commodities, so they had not been drawn into dependent capitalist relations with White commercial interests. However, under the new staple of mineral and energy production things would be completely different. While such a capital-intensive industry would not be much concerned with native labour, it would wish to appropriate Dene land for its own benefit without paying them proprietary resource rents.

Building on his previous application of export-base analysis in resource hinterlands, Watkins was not any more sanguine that economic benefits from the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline would "trickle-down" to northern natives and other residents, as pipeline advocates alleged. In the absence of any effective state control, which Watkins assumed would be the case, industry would simply reinvest their "super-profits" of appropriated surpluses from non-payment of resource rents somewhere outside the region, wherever they could gain the highest returns. Nor would there be any appreciable regional "spread" effects from pipeline construction, because the benefits from inter-industry backward and forward linkages would accrue to metropolitan industries in the South. This, together with the fact that most pipeline construction jobs would largely be taken up by temporary in-migrants from the South (operational jobs would be minimal), meant that final consumption demand would also be very limited in the non-export or "residiary" goods and services sector.
Watkins's pessimism did not stop here, however. Not only would the Dene be excluded from any economic benefits from the Mackenzie Valley project, but uncontrolled mineral exploration would also impact negatively on what they did have, that is the natural resource base which supported their traditional hunting, fishing, and trapping activities. Watkins strongly denied any possibility that these lost benefits and imposed costs would be prevented through intervention by the central state -- and this is his essential argument for Dene regional autonomy. Seeming to echo Poulantzas' extreme structural-determinist interpretation of the capitalist state, Watkins asserted that the large oligopolist corporations in the northern mineral sector which constitute the "dominant institutions, are difficult to alter, and the Government is an alien institution subservient to corporate needs." 64

From Watkins's assumptions of corporate-state hegemony, it logically followed that the Dene themselves would have to obtain sufficient control and resources under a claims settlement to undertake their own traditional "alternative development" alongside the modern sector. 65 The traditional and modern sectors of the regional economy would be based on renewable and non-renewable resources respectively. Resource rents accruing to the Dene from the non-renewable sector would be used to modernize a renewable sector under Dene control and ownership to make it materially viable. The non-renewable sector under White ownership would also be subject to Dene control to limit environmental degradation of the resource base. This "mixed economy" approach differed sharply from modernization theory's so-called "dual economy" approach whereby the "backward" traditional sector is collapsed into the modern sector, which, for example, was the explicit objective of the Alaskan Agreement.
For his part, Berger strongly endorsed Watkin’s mixed economy approach, and in his final inquiry report he advocated renovation of the traditional sector to expand Indian employment through such measures as increasing the yields from renewable resources and adding more value-added production. However, Berger departed from Watkins’ recommendation that necessary capital for strengthening the traditional sector be obtained through rents and royalties for the Dene paid from non-renewable resource extraction. He was concerned, after what he had seen in Alaska, that the Indians would not be able to withstand pressures to use such monies for purposes other than economic development. Instead, he placed reliance on the traditional sector being strengthened by injections of grant monies from DREE and other federal departments which would be tied to specific economic purposes. This would also enable the Dene to reorganize their economy before they experienced the worst onslaughts of pipeline construction. To allow sufficient time for Dene adaptation and their negotiation of a complex settlement with the federal government, Berger recommended that a ten-year moratorium be imposed on all pipeline construction. Prime Minister Trudeau accepted Berger’s recommendation and promptly instituted the moratorium.

One necessary condition for an "alternative" regional development strategy was thus put in place. But, the nationalist agenda of the Dene Declaration proved a serious stumbling block. A letter from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to the Dene association (then called the Indian Brotherhood) and to the adjoining Inuit, rejected any notion of "piggy-backing" nationalististic demands for self-determination on to a claims settlement. As the following extract from the letter shows, the Dene’s nationalist aspirations sorely clashed with the Trudeau Government’s strong liberal-democratic vision for the country.
In the North, as in the South, the government supports cultural diversity as a necessary characteristic of Canada. However, political structure is something quite different. Legislative authority and governmental jurisdiction are not allocated in Canada on grounds that differentiate between the people on the basis of race. Authority is assigned to legislatures that are representative of all the people within any area on a basis of complete equality...

Accordingly, unless Indian and Inuit claimants are seeking the establishment of reserves under the Indian Act, as in the South, the government does not favour the creation in the North of new political divisions, with boundaries and governmental structures based essentially on distinctions of race and involving a direct relationship of the Federal government. 68

Even before Berger's submission of his inquiry report, interest by the oil and gas industry in pipelines through the Mackenzie Valley was already on the wane because they were threatened by the Dene's extreme positions and the consequent threat of high costs to meet the necessary conditions for native development. But, most influential on corporate decision-making was changed market conditions which made the pipeline uneconomic. To this day the pipeline has not been built. In the late 1980s there was some re-emergent business interest, and the ultra-conservative Western Report was able to gloatingly report that in the 1970s the "Dene, schooled by white socialist activists from the south objected to industrial development, now feel desperate for once-despised development." 69

Benet has suggested that the "resurgence of aboriginal rights" in the regional debate surrounding northern mega projects is "both a particular response to the centralization of economic planning and a specific political strategy to resist the regional division of economic exploitation" 70 In the cases of Alaska and James Bay, however, native groups ended up joining, rather than resisting further regional economic division of the North into the "hinterland periphery" of the "metropolitan core," disastrously so in the first instance and rather ignominiously in the second (although, as said, the Cree have successfully
withstood proposals to extend the James Bay hydro developments). And, in the Mackenzie Valley, native resistance turned to nought when industry took their investments elsewhere, leaving the region’s Dene and other natives sidelined.

In terms of suggesting any models for wider application, therefore, the score card to date on these regional planning endeavors is as follows. Application of a top-down functional model of regional development has been a failure (ANCSA); implementation of a bottom-up territorial model never got off the ground (the Dene); and a somewhat mixed functional and territorial model has had mixed results (JBNQA).

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter described the deadlock which occurred over policy-making during the 1970’s between the central state and the Indian political leadership. As a consequence, valuable opportunities were lost to make reserve communities more self-sufficient through community and regional development. Instead, many of them deepened their dependence on welfare transfer payments and suffered the debilitating impacts of welfarism.

According to information from the 1981 Census and DIAND, 60 per cent of status Indians in reserve communities were now receiving social assistance, and the proportion of aboriginals’ income received through transfer payments was more than twice that of the non-aboriginal population. Aboriginal life-expectancy was ten years less than for non-aboriginals, the infant mortality rate for status Indians and Inuit was twice that of the non-aboriginal population, and status Indian children in care represented six per cent of children aged up to sixteen in reserve communities compared with one per cent amongst non-
aboriginals. According to the federal department of Health and Welfare, the incidence of alcoholism among aboriginals was sixteen times that for non-aboriginals. Incarceration and suicide rates among aboriginals also reached frightening proportions. These are some of the terrible costs of continuing Canada's reserve system into the 1970s.

As was shown, both the central state and the Indian leadership were actors in the continuing process of underdevelopment in reserve communities. While many problems were inherited from the previous period of "internal colonization," these were left to continue and, indeed, were exacerbated by the power struggle between, on the one side, the state's defensive and reactive liberal posture, and, on the other, the Indian nationalist movement's radical and uncompromising demands. UDT and its internal colony model are not very useful for describing this situation, because their uni-directional explanation of state-sponsored persecution of Indians no longer holds true in the contemporary era where both the state and Indians are active participants in policy-making. In this environment, the outcome of policy-making is a direct product of interactive relations between the parties involved. The longer the state delayed in taking positive action to solve the Indian problem, the more Indians' confronted the state with spiralling demands, and the more difficult it became to solve the problem. It will shown in this next chapter how this same pattern has been repeated in the conflict over Indian self-government powers.
CHAPTER FIVE. INDIAN NATIONALISM AND THE PUSH FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

5.1 Overview

The previous chapter described the deadlock which occurred in the 1970s between the state and the Indian nationalist movement, and how this obstructed some promising opportunities for economic development in reserve communities. As a result, many communities became even more dependent on transfers from the central welfare state and vulnerable to problems of welfarism. As will be shown in this chapter, the urgent necessity for Indian economic development was also largely ignored in the 1980s and in to the 1990s, because state and Indian leaders have been pre-occupied with abstract rights of Indian "self-government."

The federal government has generally favoured advancing Indian self-government through non-constitutional, legislative processes. Many of the alternatives which were considered, and certainly the few which were actually implemented, were only intended to move Indians towards the democratic-liberal model of municipal government with limited delegated jurisdiction. In other words, the present system of Canadian political institutions would remain unchanged, and Indians would be accommodated merely by being assimilated into them. There have been two notable exceptions to this general pattern, but, as will be described, they are special cases. First, the 1984 "Penner" Report of a Special Parliamentary Committee fully endorsed Indian nationalist aspirations, but its recommendations were not supported by the government. Second, Indian constitutional claims for self-government were recognized in the recent Charlottetown Accord, but this was brought about by the pressures of the consultation process and not by careful
consideration of Indian needs. Not only did the Charlottetown Accord go down to national defeat, but it was also rejected by many Indians.

For their part, many Indian leaders strongly rejected the state’s limited vision of their political future. They put most of their efforts into trying to obtain radical constitutional changes through a modernist national strategy of claiming "self-determination" as their rights as nations. They have largely shunned the legislative process, not only because its offerings are considered so minimal as to be insulting, but also because they fear that any legislative concessions of increased powers would in the long run compromise their nationalist agenda for constitutional change. Furthermore, most Indian leaders still remain suspicious of the Canadian governments’ real intentions after the 1969 White Paper and seek additional, constitutional guarantees of their special rights (such as was acquired with section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act). They also feel that they are on firmer ground challenging the dominant society at a more rhetorical level for symbolic nationalist claims than they would be negotiating changes to legislative text, where the advantage lies more with the dominant society. Lastly, the Indian nationalist leadership may have thought it easier to promote a constitutional program applicable to the common needs of all IFN’s, as compared with the inherent difficulties of trying to tailor specific legislative changes to satisfy the particular needs of individual IFN’s.

But as the Indians’ nationalistic rhetoric has became more strident when their full demands have not been met, the more this has alienated the many in Canadian society who share liberal antipathies towards nationalistic claims. 1 The fear of individual democratic rights being overwhelmed by the emotive and discriminatory "groupism" of ethic-based
nationalism, is a concern to many Canadians who may otherwise be supportive of Indian causes. Over the last fifteen years the debate over Indian policy has been dominated by the single-minded attempts of some Indian leaders to press sometimes extreme and unrealistic demands for constitutional recognition, and bungling attempts by the state to contain these demands without offering realistic alternatives. Particularly damaging has been the Indian leadership’s disavowal of a community-based approach to build upon practical successes in their communities for achieving more political and economic sustainability. Instead they have focused too much on attempting to gain recognition of abstract constitutional principles, in the faith that development will automatically ensue from their increased powers of self-governance.

Also damaging has been the inability of the Indian leadership and the state to carefully consider the "political economy" of self-government. There has been little recognition that Indian self-government and Indian economic self-sufficiency are necessary conditions for each other. So-called "self-government" will be a farce if Indian communities are unable to sustain more of their own economic needs, and instead remain vulnerably dependent on senior government transfers and consequent outside interference in their everyday affairs. As the earlier Beaver Report recognized, of course, Indian communities do need more tools of political self-governance if they are to develop economically. But, as will be shown, Indian leaders have failed to define clearly a desired approach to self-government which justifies the particular powers that their communities’ need to assist them in becoming more self-sustaining in ways which they consider appropriate.

The history of conflicts over Indian self-government is extremely complex. To assist
understanding the respective positions which have been taken by the state and the Indians, a model is presented below of alternative political arrangements for integrating Indian governments into the Canadian federal state.

5.2 A Comparative Model of Self-Government Powers

A focus of the following model is to show how different powers of self-government are needed to achieve different development strategies. Five mechanisms can be distinguished which governments can use for promoting development, namely (i) administration, (ii) arbitration, (iii) regulation, (iv) direct action, and (v) financial, monetary and fiscal control. Of these, the first four mechanisms are typically available in some form to local jurisdictions, although they may not all be used for economic intervention.

Typically, only part of the fifth mechanism of financial, monetary, and fiscal control is available to local jurisdictions in Canada. The level and scope of powers which local governments have for applying these mechanisms circumscribe the role they can play in local economic development. For instance, local governments would need far more powers to implement their own "bottom-up, territorial" development strategy as opposed to integrating into "top-down, functional" development, because under the first a larger proportion of decision-making would need to occur: (a) locally as opposed to within the central state, and (b) within government rather than the market place.

The starting point for constructing our model is a useful typology developed by M.G. Smith of alternative political arrangements for incorporating different ethnic groups into the state. He applied his typology to examine alternatives for integrating Blacks into South Africa, but it has also been applied by others to the situation of Canada's Indians. Although a
modernization theorist of sorts. Smith's ideas on the power of political institutions to maintain cohesiveness between otherwise pluralistic groups was intended to dispute mainstream modernization theory's requirement for cultural assimilation. Smith describes his different political arrangements as alternative "modes of incorporation," which vary according to the relative weights placed by the state on individual citizens' rights and special group membership rights respectively. As described above, the 1969 White Paper emphasized individual over group rights for Indians, while the Hawthorn Report proposed that both sets of rights should be accommodated under the concept of "citizen plus."

Smith draws a major dichotomy between "universal" and "equivalent" modes of incorporation. Under the universal mode, individuals are directly incorporated into the state without any significant intermediary role being played through their membership in an ethnic group. Equivalent incorporation, by comparison, involves more of a joining or consociation of ethnic groups. Whereas the universal mode focuses on individual rights within the state, both individual and group rights are accommodated in the equivalent mode. In practice, of course, both these modes can be seen as lying on a continuum. At one extreme of the universal mode on this continuum lies the possibility of apartheid, that is, "differential" distribution of civil and political rights between ethnic groups, and at the extreme of the equivalent mode lies the possibility of complete "separatism" when an ethnic group forms its own state.

Some Canadian theorists have identified more specific incorporation options for Indian governments which can be fitted into these general universal and equivalent modes. For
instance, within the universal mode a distinction can be made between what Valentine calls incorporation through "assimilation" or "integration," which he views as alternative outcomes of conflict between a superordinate Canadian state and subordinate Indian groups. 6 Assimilation denotes the achievement or, it should be added, intention of completely absorbing the subordinate group into either the dominant class or a sub-class of the superordinate group. The intended objective of traditional government policy was undoubtedly complete assimilation of Indians into the dominant European-Canadian society, but probably as a sub-class. 7

As for the integration option, Valentine sees it as being distinct from assimilation to the degree that the state concedes limited autonomy in one jurisdictional area (typically over socio-cultural affairs) for aboriginals to exert some measure of a distinct identity. However, maintenance of their individual rights as Canadian citizens would clearly take precedence. An example is the White Paper's limited concessions to an Indian identity within broader Canadian multiculturalism, which clearly would not have done much to preserve a truly unique Indian identity. It is with some justification, therefore, that Valentine believes integration will inevitably retrogress into assimilation over the long term.

Turning to options within the general equivalent mode of incorporation, Asch proposes what he calls a "consociational" arrangement. 8 Under this option, some balance would be sought between Indians' particular group rights and their individual rights as Canadian citizens by sharing jurisdiction between "segments" of relatively autonomous aboriginal control and overarching state control respectively, with the possibility of different arrangements between one area of jurisdiction and another. This is similar to the
Hawthorn Report's proposal for "citizen plus" status for Indians. A more extreme option within the equivalent mode is what can be called "autonomism," which is taken here as denoting the free association of largely independent groups in a shared state with minimum central powers (i.e. what seemed to be implied in the "Dene Declaration"). Under this option, Indian groups would be completely responsible themselves for protecting the individual rights of their own members. An obvious Canadian parallel can be drawn between this option and the notion of Quebec "sovereignty association," and, equally obviously, this option may be perilously close to complete separatism.

To summarize the self-government model to this point, M.G. Smith's original dichotomous distinctions between modes of incorporation can be further disaggregated into four incorporation options for Indian governments. Each of these options include different orientations to group and individual rights vis a vis the Canadian federal state, as shown on the following Figure 6:-
Figure 6  
**Incorporation Options for Indian Governments in Canadian Federalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General modes of incorporation</th>
<th>Specific options for</th>
<th>Respective emphases on individual versus group rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIFFERENTIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVERSAL</td>
<td>1. Assimilation</td>
<td>individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Integration</td>
<td>individual/group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIVALENT</td>
<td>3. Consociation</td>
<td>group and individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Autonomism</td>
<td>group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARATIST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The incorporation options identified above are now elaborated in terms of the respective scope, nature, and source of Indian government powers which could accrue in each case. The basis for this elaboration is a model of "local autonomy" for levels of government below the central state devised by the geographer, G.L. Clark, which so far had not found its way into the literature on Indian political development. Building on a theory of political powers by Jeremy Bentham, Clark distinguishes between local powers of "initiative" and "immunity." The first power of initiative denotes a lower government's discretion to choose "what" actions to take or not take, and the second power of immunity denotes its allowable discretion "how" to act without fear of review or supervision by a higher jurisdictional tier.
All other things being equal, the further a lower government is located along the continuum from "universal" to "equivalent" incorporation into the state, the broader will be its likely scope of powers. The simple reason for this is that the local government will have to govern more things associated with maintaining and exercising its more autonomous group status. But, Indian First Nations can already assume many jurisdictional responsibilities under the Indian Act. However, the scope of powers does not tell the whole story because they are delegated and prescribed by DIAND. What First Nations do lack, most seriously, are any substantial degree of powers of initiative or immunity to exercise more autonomous control.

Clark distinguishes four "ideal types" of local autonomy according to whether one, or both of the powers of initiative and immunity are present, as shown in the following Figure 7. Despite First Nations' broad scope of delegated responsibilities, most of them presently fall under the first "ideal type" shown below, and those which have been granted some additional powers can perhaps be placed in the second type, although the scope of their immunity is quite limited.

Figure 7  Ideal Types of Local Autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Type</th>
<th>Relative Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>no initiative or immunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>immunity, no initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>initiative, no immunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>initiative and immunity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In reality, the respective scope of powers of initiative and immunity could vary considerably between different areas of jurisdiction. Allowing for some such range in the distribution of powers, rather than the fixed ideal types assumed by Clark, then some general correlations can be drawn between powers of local autonomy and incorporation options. Specifically, the alternatives from the two previous tables can be combined into one matrix, as shown on the following Figure 8:-

Figure 8  Optional Political Arrangements and Associated Powers of Local Autonomy

Powers of "immunity"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1. Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Individual bias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNIVERSAL mode of incorporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>3. Consociation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Group &amp; individual)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clark considers that, between the powers of initiative and immunity, a lower government's power of initiative to take "what" actions it wishes is the most critical measure of its relative autonomy vis a vis higher tiers of government, even if its overall discretion may be impaired by lacking power of immunity on "how" it acts. As depicted in figure 8 above,
this primary distinction by Clark between levels of relative autonomy parallels M.G. Smith's major dichotomy between universal and equivalent modes of incorporation. Obviously, Indian governments wishing to pursue any substantial measure of autonomous development would have to relate to the central state through an equivalent mode of incorporation, and would need substantial powers of initiative to exercise any real discretion. This would be the case, as mentioned above, if an Indian government wished to pursue a more autonomous development strategy which would require them to have the choice to act in a number of jurisdictional areas which are normally federal or provincial preserves. (A topical example of this fact is the inability of some Bands to proceed with plans for gambling casinos on their lands because provinces will not allow it.)

Another of Clark's distinctions which is important for Indian self-government powers, is that lower governments with powers of initiative tend to derive their legitimacy bottom-up from the local group itself, whilst those without this power tend to have their legitimacy devolve top-down from a higher tier. But, what if the power of initiation itself is delegated by the central state? Obviously, this has symbolic repercussions for feelings of local self-determination and circumscribes a priori the effective scope of initiation powers. This helps to explain why differences on the source of Indian government powers was a substantial stumbling block in the constitutional debates, that is, whether such powers should either be recognized as innate to "pre-existing" Indian sovereign nations, or conceded by the Canadian nation-state.

Reference will be made to the model in describing legislative approaches to expand Indian self-government, and then constitutional approaches.
5.3 Legislative Approaches Towards Indian Self-Government

The present powers of most Indian governments are set out in the Indian Act which had its last major revision in 1951, and in the Federal Financial Administration Act which controls Bands' spending powers. Under these two pieces of legislation, Indian governments have neither powers of initiative nor immunity; they are merely administrative appendages of the federal government, or more specifically of DIAND. The federal government has attempted to enlarge Band powers through a number of different legislative and administrative mechanisms, that is non-constitutional options for advancing self-government.

Comprehensive claims settlements can be used as a vehicle for self-government in those areas where aboriginal title has not been extinguished. A notable example is the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA). As described above, the arrangements which it made for Cree local government involved creating local municipal structures which, although coordinated by the Cree Regional Authority (CRA), are clearly subordinate to the Province of Quebec. The Cree can only act in the public domain within those limits which have been specifically delegated to them by senior government, and are totally accountable to the appropriate Quebec ministries. Although they enjoy a wide scope of delegated responsibilities, the Cree are assimilated into the federal-provincial structure of the central state, and have limited powers of initiative and immunity (i.e. they have a set list of jurisdictional tasks which they have to perform in specific ways). As was also shown, the James Bay agreement has not proved to be a successful vehicle for economic development by the Cree, and their limited political powers may be partly responsible for this.
In 1985, a task force reviewed the comprehensive claims process, and recommended a number of improvements. 11 Bill McNight, then Minister of DIAND, responded affirmatively to many of them, including recommendations for strengthening the self-government components of claims settlements. 12 This is being applied in the Northwest Territories (NWT), where a series of land claims settlements have been reached with the Inuit, the Dene and the Metis. These also provide the foundation for imaginative approaches to transfer substantial powers of self-government to native peoples through territorial government reorganization. The NWT is being divided into two separate jurisdictions which, in time, will become fully-fledged provinces. In the western jurisdiction of "Denendeh" the Dene and Metis constitute about half the population (depending upon the criteria used for counting Metis), and the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic make up a clear majority in the eastern "Nunavut" territory. Thus, the demographic conditions exist for both ethnic groups to pursue their particular interests through "public," rather than "ethnically-based" regional governments.

There are unique circumstances in the territories which do not apply in the provinces. These include the aforementioned strong demographic representation of aboriginals, sole jurisdictional domain by the federal government, and, very importantly, a relatively small alienation of lands and resources to third-party interests. However, the claims settlement approach does have the distinct advantage of simultaneously providing an opportunity to negotiate self-government powers together with the necessary fiscal and land resources for sustainable economic development to support self-government. As exemplified by the Alaska claim settlement, however, available resources by themselves are not sufficient to sustain local self-determination when they are not used effectively to generate sustainable
local economic development -- the Alaskan native corporations set up under ANCSA are already running out of money. In the Province of British Columbia, where aboriginal title is largely unextinguished, an interesting "Treaty Commission Process" has been initiated by the Harcourt NDP government, together with the federal government and participating First Nations. This approach will be described later.

In the 1980s, the federal government also put some effort into examining how Indian self-government could be advanced through special-purpose legislation. Although very few enactments are in place, there have been numerous internal proposals circulated within the federal bureaucracy, as well as a number of rejected Cabinet proposals and a legislative bill that died on the order paper. What all these legislative schemes have had in common is the provision of an alternative mechanism for Bands to opt out of certain restrictive provisions of the Indian Act and to assume more autonomous powers in those areas. Some also proposed negotiated transfers of provincial powers. Two major variants are "general framework" or enabling legislation for Bands generally, and "Band-specific" legislation for application on a individual basis. However, these limited but practical schemes have been overshadowed by the radical proposals of the 1983 Penner Report.

The Penner Report was the creation of an all-party Parliamentary Committee led by its chairman Keith Penner, MP. It made sweeping proposals for "general framework" legislation through a "Indian First Nation Recognition Act," but to be followed up quickly by constitutional entrenchment. In fact, constitutional amendments would have probably been necessary in the first instance before all of its recommendations could have been implemented. The report was prepared after considerable consultation with Indian groups
across the country, and was strongly supported by the NIB. Although the report’s proposals were not adopted by the government of the day, many of its proposals were to surface later in the "native package" of the Charlottetown Accord.

The Penner Report proposed a radical transfer of powers to what it called "Indian First Nations" (IFN’s), which would result in them having at least "consociational" arrangements with Canada and, perhaps, even more "autonomous" status. Some of the more far-reaching recommendations were to create IFN governments as "third order" governments in Canada, with powers transferred from federal and provincial jurisdictional domains. These powers would be recognized as indigenous to IFN’s and not conferred by Canada, that is, the legitimacy of these governments would be assumed to derive from the "bottom-up," rather than from the "top-down." It was also recommended that the special group character of IFN’s be respected by exempting them from individual rights’ protections under the Constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of IFN’s essential group rights, according to the report, was unabridged powers to determine their own memberships.

Reactions by academics to the Penner Report have been mixed. Among the supporters are Paul Tennant, who welcomed the prospect of abandoning traditional assimilative policies for shaping Indian governments in the mold of western-style municipalities. Also supportive is Sally Weaver who conceives of the White Paper and the Penner Report (which were both prepared during Trudeau Liberal governments) as respectively "thesis" and "antithesis." The Report also has its critics, however. Gibbins and Ponting, picking up on Tennant’s municipal analogy and extending it out to the provincial level,
conclude that the Parliamentary Committee's proposed powers for IFN governments would actually exceed those of the provinces. They suggest that this imbalance of power would serve to divert the primary relationship of Indian people with the rest of Canada to the intermediary channels of their own governments, rather than directly from their citizenship (which is, of course, exactly the point of any political arrangements within an "equivalent" mode of incorporation). Gibbins and Ponting see this as being inconsistent with the principles of federalism. In a separate article, Gibbins expresses reasonable concerns about the possible outcomes in homogeneous Indian communities if group rights take precedence over individual rights, echoing James Madison's famous caution that where social and economic diversity are lacking the "tyranny of the majority" is most likely to prevail.

One very substantial criticism which should have been made of the Penner Report, but which has not, was its failure to consider deeply enough the economic implications of its political recommendations. A background report prepared by consultants for the Parliamentary Committee, The Economic Foundation of Indian Self-Government was of no help, despite its promising title. Apparently drawing their inspiration from very basic classical economics, the consultants identified "six basic economic factors ... common to Indian and non-Indian nations alike," that is, the factors of production of land and resources, capital, labor, organization, planning, and technology. Then, applying by now what has become a very tired UDT interpretation, they posited that Indians had been undeveloped by being deprived of control over these factors, but, when control was returned to them, they could become "developed" again! The Parliamentary Committee itself made some dutiful references to the Thalassa background report, but placed its
rather qualified support on aboriginal claims settlements to improve "prospects of economic development" (Recommendation 24). However, recognizing that IFN's should get on with the task of economic development "without delay" (Recommendation 25), it was concluded that they will require "substantial funding" in the interim (Recommendation 26). That, in a nutshell, was the Parliamentary Committee's thinking on an economic development strategy to support largely autonomous "Indian First Nations."

It is true to say that the Special Parliamentary Committee's recommendations reflected "the idealistic conceptions of the members comprising the committee," far more than it did that of the government's position. Indeed, the government attempted to distance itself as much as possible from the report. In its official response it explicitly rejected any possibility of entrenching Indian self-government in the Constitution as an aboriginal right, or of enacting unilateral federal legislation to allow Indian governments to occupy not only exclusive federal jurisdictions, but also jurisdictional domains which the federal government shared with the provinces. This repudiation of the Committee's recommendations was quickly followed by the tabling of Bill C-52, An Act Relating to Self-Government for Indian Nations, which was clearly intended by the short-lived Turner Liberal Government to define its position on Indian self-government as it went into an election. With defeat of the Liberals, the Bill died on the order sheet, but its contents are worth summarizing because it represented the Liberal government's position about self-government, which differed sharply from the vision presented in the Penner Report.

The essential elements of the proposed Bill-52 legislation were as follows. First, a "recognition panel" would be set up to review applications from Bands wishing to opt out
of provisions of the Indian Act. Second, Bands would submit proposed "constitutions" which must accord with certain "basic conditions" for local political and financial accountability, protection of individual and group rights, and independent review of their government's decisions for fairness. Third, upon "recognition," Bands would automatically be delegated many of the Minister of DIAND's responsibilities under the Indian Act. Fourth, other important governmental powers could be delegated under agreements with the federal government and, where applicable, provinces, according to limitations specified in the agreements. 22

The Bill obviously falls far short of the Penner Report's expansive and idealistic recommendations for self-government. Powers would be delegated and prescribed by "senior" federal-provincial governments, and Bands would not have gained any power of initiative to do "what" they wished to in their jurisdictional areas, or, for that matter, wished not to do. Power of immunity for "how" Bands governed their affairs would have been enhanced to the degree of how much discretion they were allowed to design constitutions which satisfied the federal government's "required basic conditions" in locally appropriate ways. Thus, Bill C-52 would have only ensured advancement from Indian "assimilation" to somewhat looser "integration" into Canadian political institutions. Paul Tennant claims that the Bill would only have allowed Bands to "possess delegated powers comparable to those held by Canadian municipal councils," though this is not quite true because they could assume some federal as well as provincial responsibilities 23 Indeed, the Bill's proposals are more similar to previous ideas for changing Indian Bands into "federal municipalities." 24
Bill C-52 stated unambiguously that "Indian Nations" ("First" was too unpalatable at the time) would abide by Charter provisions on equal individual rights. Of note in this regard, the new Mulroney Conservative Government enacted Bill C-31 in 1985 which remedied the long-standing anomaly in the Indian Act of forcing Indian women, but not men, to relinquish their status upon marriage to a non-Indian spouse. Bill C-31's protection of individual rights, of course, stands in direct contradiction to the notion of Bands controlling their own memberships, as had been proposed in the Penner Report. Some Prairie Bands, in particular, were adamantly opposed to this confirmation of women's equal rights, fearing that massive in-migration on to reserves by "C-31" band members and their families, many of whom are not even aboriginals let alone not being status Indians, would overwhelm their communities' resources and ethnic character.

More concerns were raised among Indian leaders when, in 1986, the Conservatives passed "Band-specific" legislation for the Sechelt Band. The Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act brought this long, politically active Band partly under the aegis of the Province of British Columbia. The Sechelt Band's primary motivations in the negotiations were developmental -- they wished to acquire more powers to manage their valuable land base. The motivation of the Socred provincial government was to show that self-government could be achieved without constitutional change and without settling land claims. The federal government, for their part, was attempting to show that self-government was not radical and threatening. The Sechelt legislation is less assimilative and more integrative in intent than the standard Indian Act. 25 One of its most notable features is to establish the Sechelt Band as a corporate entity with powers of a "natural person," which allows it certain manoeuvrability denied other Bands. It can enter into contracts, acquire and hold
property, and expend or invest monies, thus enhancing its ability to generate economic activity. The Sechelt Band also exercises jurisdiction over lands it owns near its reserves through the "Sechelt Indian Government District." Similar to what happened with the Cree, however, the Sechelt Act has been vituperatively attacked by other IFNs as a "sell out," because it appears to advance the White Paper agenda for removing the Indians' special federal connection through erosion by "provincialization" and "municipalization." The Band has countered to no avail that the door has been left open for it to obtain more powers when these become available through constitutional amendment.

In an attempt to replicate the Sechelt model, the federal Conservative Government introduced a negotiating process in 1986 called the 'Indian Self-Government Community Negotiations.' Although the community negotiations process is not intended to elevate Bands to the status of "third order" governments, it would allow "opting out" Bands significantly more powers than those who choose to remain under all sections of the Indian Act, and it does not require any constitutional amendments. Numerous Bands received money to enter negotiations, but the process has not yielded any successes.

5.4 The First Ministers' Conferences on Aboriginal Constitutional Rights

Most Indian efforts to obtain increased self-government powers have focused on obtaining constitutional changes through the aegis of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), which replaced the previous National Indian Brotherhood (NIB). The AFN has pursued what Hawkes calls a "principles first" strategy of attempting to have general aboriginal rights of self-determination entrenched in the constitution as a foundation for subsequent
negotiation of agreements with individual First Nations. This is to be compared with a "bottom-up" strategy of pursuing individual agreements and having them entrenched constitutionally. 28 In the 1980s, the vehicle for pursuing this "principles first" strategy was AFN participation in a series of First Minister Conferences (FMC's) held on aboriginal constitutional rights.

It is questionable whether the AFN’s commitment of so much of its valuable resources, including leadership, financing, and public credibility, to the unsuccessful FMC constitutional amendment process was a good investment, especially when pressing community needs for economic and social development were ignored. As will be seen, this viewpoint is shared with some other commentators. The AFN’s miscalculated and extremist nationalist strategy during this period, it can be said, is comparable to the federal government’s own failure with its 1969 White Paper.

After the NIB withdrew from the Joint NIB/Cabinet Committee (JNCC) in 1976, it spurned all DIAND offers of working together on amending the Indian Act. Instead, the NIB saw the supposed window of opportunity opened by Trudeau’s proposal to repatriate the Canadian constitution as irresistible. From 1978 to 1980, the NIB restructured itself largely to meet the constitutional challenge, emerging as the Assembly of First Nations. However, it was not until the midnight hour before passing of the 1982, Constitutional Act that Indians gained some constitutional recognition. Furthermore, this was the rather fortuitous outcome of extensions made from womens’ to aboriginals’ rights, as well as from the efforts of the federal New Democratic Party. 29
Of the Constitutional Act's sixty provisions, three deal with aboriginal issues. Section 25 confirms that aboriginal rights and freedoms are not adversely effected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms entrenched in the Constitution. Section 35.1, which was a bone of considerable contention between the federal government and some provinces, finally emerged as "the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed," the qualifier, "existing" being added to allay provincial concerns about aboriginal rights being too open-ended. The third reference to aboriginal issues in the Constitution Act was a requirement under section 37.2 that issues effecting aboriginal peoples be included on the agenda of a First Ministers’ Conference (FMC) to be called within one year to discuss constitutional amendments.

Aboriginal constitutional matters have been discussed at four First Ministers’ Conferences, including the initial conference in 1983 required under the Constitutional Act, and as agreed upon at that conference, three additional conferences called specifically to discuss aboriginal issues in 1984, 1985, and 1987 respectively. All four conferences passed without any measurable progress towards a consensus on any necessary changes as to how Indians should be incorporated into Canadian federation.

This failure was an unfortunate vindication of trepidations expressed by the political scientist Roger Gibbins that aboriginal groups were falling into a serious "policy trap" by placing all their eggs in the constitutional basket, because they were laying open their "domain-specific" concern for self-government to broader "environmental determinants" of public policy. 30 Gibbins’ examples of the latter include the liberal credo of protecting individual rights over group rights, changing fiscal constraints, and competing demands for
attention from other domains. Gibbins holds that, "In most cases groups have greater control over public policies that impact upon them when those policies are more shaped by domain-specific determinants. Conversely, control is weakened to the extent that environmental determinants are dominant; the clientele of public policy are left exposed to environmental forces beyond their political capacity to control." 31

In the 1970s, considerable progress was made on some "domain-specific" issues such as improved Indian housing and health care, and increased Indian control over education policy. The FMC constitutional amendment process by its very nature, however, was not conducive to achieving any major breakthroughs or even incremental improvements on self-government. The four conferences brought eleven diverse governments around the table, among whom substantial unanimity was required for any change of constitutional amending provisions. In the last three conferences all four aboriginal national associations were present, the AFN on behalf of status Indians, the Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI), the Metis National Council (MNC), and the Native Council of Canada (NCC) representing other non-status natives. Not only were there status/non-status divisions between these groups but the AFN itself was seriously divided along treaty/non-treaty lines and by competing regional camps. 32 The most conspicuous break in AFN solidarity occurred when Prairie Indians withdrew from the national association in 1985 after the Saskatchewan politician, David Ahenakew, was succeeded to in the leadership by George Erasmus, a Dene.

The Penner Report was released in 1983, and the AFN fully endorsed it because it fitted perfectly with their constitutional strategy, especially its recommendations for a "third
order" of government, recognition of aboriginal political and territorial rights, enhanced bilateral funding arrangements with the federal government, and exemptions from provincial control. However, as was shown above, Penner's recommendations departed considerably from how governments of the day viewed self-government policy (and this was true, not only of the Liberals, but also of the Conservative Mulroney government which presided over the last two FMC's). Moreover, the strong nationalistic rhetoric which the AFN used in the constitutional debates did nothing to advance consensus. The added difficulties of an Indian modernist national strategy for problem-solving, as described above -- its entwining of multiple grievances, utopian beliefs that ends will suffice for means, and extremist demands -- all tended to draw attention away from domain-specific issues and to engulf policy-making in an intractable mire of environmental constraints. The situation was particularly problematical in the FMC constitutional debates because of the involvement of all provinces.

It has to be remembered that native constitutional rights were no more than an afterthought in the process leading up to the Constitution Act, which was driven by three primary concerns: the independence movement in Quebec, federal-provincial conflict over the division of powers, and growing alienation of the West. 33 Further, agreement by all parties (excepting Quebec) to patriate the Canadian constitution was only reached after protracted and bitter federal-provincial conflict, especially over the provinces' demands to be directly involved in any amending formula. 34 Thirdly, the early 1980s witnessed both an economic slump and a movement to New Right fiscal conservatism. Fourthly, in the 1980s traditional liberal concerns for individual democratic rights were, if anything, heightened by Quebec language policy, poly-ethnic immigration, and the impacts of
Canada’s individual-biased Charter. Fifthly, there was the "environmental" policy issue of unsettled aboriginal claims in provinces such as British Columbia.

Considering the above environmental policy determinants, it is not surprising that one of the major sticking points in the First Minister’s Conferences was the AFN’s demand for Indian sovereignty to be recognized in the constitution as an existing right. Since this was not accompanied by any detailed proposals on the form of Indian governments, a final definition would likely rest on judicial interpretation. Over and above provincial concerns about their jurisdictions being eroded by "third-order" Indian governments, the AFN demand struck right at the heart of the provinces’ hard-won rights to control constitutional amendments through mutual negotiation. 35 Prime Minister Mulroney attempted to circumvent this roadblock by proposing that a principle of Indian self-government be entrenched contingent upon results of subsequent negotiations to define its precise form — and for his pains was labelled a "racist" by AFN delegates. 36 Some provinces would not go for this "empty-box" compromise either, not knowing exactly what it was that the Indians were seeking, and fearing, again, that the answer could be determined by the courts if no subsequent consensus was reached.

At later FMC’s, the provinces also had sufficient grounds from comments made in the recently leaked Nielsen Task Force Report on Native Programs to suspect that the federal government would try shifting some of the increased fiscal burden for Indian government on to them. 37 Such apprehensions were worsened by serious doubts about the long-term economic viability of many Indian governments. Also, the variety of options already advanced for Indian self-government under non-constitutional processes reinforced some
doubts as to whether the "additional" proposals of the AFN were really necessary. Nor should it be surprising that British Columbia was one of the provinces most wary of any constitutional change which could, even obliquely, tie in aboriginal land title with Indian political rights. Thus, there is much to agree with in Gibbin's contention that "Canada's constitutional debate has become a trap for Canadian Indians by elevating the discussion of Indian affairs to a plain where it is very difficult for Indians to win and where major losses are possible." 

At the end of last First Ministers Conference in 1987 the federal and provincial governments and the AFN were no closer together on the issue of self-government. Their opposite positions are summarized on the following Figure 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal/Provincial Governments</th>
<th>Assembly of First Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Incorporation</td>
<td>universal (assimilation/integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Indian Government Powers</td>
<td>no initiative, some immunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope and Source of Powers</td>
<td>prescribed/delegated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9 Respective Positions on Indian Self-Government During the 1980's
The impasse on constitutional rights during the 1980's prompted some academics to propose an incremental "bottom-up" political strategy which would circumvent both the above extreme positions. Gibbins recommended that "Indian sovereignty may be more successfully pursued through incremental policy decisions in non-constitutional areas, no matter how symbolically unappealing this may be." 40 Ponting advocated a strategy of "constitutional 'damage control,' while simultaneously building the institutions of local communities that can test the constitutional limits of Indian governments through the unilateral assertion of sovereignty on a daily basis." 41 Boldt and Long concluded that the greatest hurdle to Indian government may not be external approval at all, but the internal failure of Indian leaders to define what they mean by self-government and to be accountable to their own constituencies. They proposed that "Indians should consider bringing their own governments into being by unilateral, collective acts of will at the band and tribal levels through a process of drafting authentic ‘grassroots’ constitutions." 42 We will return later to such ideas for community-based political development.

5.5 The Self-Government Package of the Charlottetown Accord

There appeared to be an abrupt turnaround in self-government policy when the Charlottetown Accord was submitted for a national referendum vote on October 26th, 1992. The Accord had its origins in federal government attempts to appease Quebec's constitutional grievances, but its most notable feature was a component "native package" which would have conceded more powers to Indian First Nations than it would have to Quebec. A somewhat lengthy account of the Charlottetown constitutional process is included here because of its topicality and controversial nature. The events that took place strongly demonstrate the perils of attempting to entrench abstract constitutional
principles before the substance of Indian self-government requirements are known.

The proposals in the native package are summarized as follows:--

(1) Entrench aboriginals' "inherent right" to self-government as a constitutional principle which would not require concession by Canada, and would leave the eventual scope and limits of native governments' powers left open for subsequent negotiation.

(2) Endow aboriginal governments with the status of "third-order" governments within Canadian federation, and require the federal governments and respective provincial governments to negotiate with them on divisions of powers and on financial and taxation agreements, all within a five-year deadline, or face the prospect of court-enforced solutions.

(3) Commit federal and provincial governments to the "principle" of supporting aboriginal governments with fiscal and land resources, and include self-government agreements in future treaties and land claims agreements, but not impose absolute obligations on aboriginal native people to financially support their own governments.

(4) Allow aboriginal governments considerable latitude to override their citizens' individual rights in advancing their group rights, and not require them to extend democratic rights to non-natives residing on reserves.
These proposals would have granted to Indians all the powers recommended by the Penner Report, and matched the AFN's demands for more national autonomy made during the First Ministers' Conferences (see Figure 9 above). What is particularly striking is the native package's vagueness and open-endedness, especially as some provinces had refused in the past to come to an agreement without self-government powers being spelled out first. In fact, despite appearances to the opposite, federal-provincial government attitudes had not really changed very much towards aboriginal rights. The package had been left in the Accord despite misgivings expressed about it during the negotiations by Prime Minister Mulroney, federal officials, and by many of the Provinces, including the Conservative governments of Alberta and Manitoba, the Liberal government of Newfoundland, and, to a lesser extent, the NDP governments of British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Even if the Accord had passed, opposition would have undoubtedly surfaced afterwards to confound successful implementation of the native package. Of course, the Accord received a resounding "No" in the national referendum and the fact that many Indian voters were among those whose who voted it down was also very striking.

As will be shown, the inclusion of the native package, despite its lack of support, can be ascribed to two flaws in the Charlottetown process respecting Indian' aboriginal rights. First, the waters were muddied by throwing aboriginal rights in with a multitude of other pressing constitutional issues concerning, not just Quebec but federal relations with all the provinces. In the complex dynamics of negotiations which took place, agreement by all parties was only made possible by "neutralizing" the disruptive issue of aboriginal rights without giving it proper consideration. Second, attempting to negotiate with Indians
collectively on a "government-to-government" basis, when in reality they encompass a multitude of diverse constituencies, was shown to be a serious error.

The original impetus behind the Charlottetown Accord was to attempt once again, following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord two years previously, to bring Quebec back into the federal fold after they had been left out in the cold when the Canadian Constitution was repatriated in 1982. The most significant proposal of the Meech Lake Accord, and the one which led to its downfall, was that Quebec be declared a "distinct society," with special "group" powers to maintain and promote its legal, linguistic, and cultural differences compared to the other provinces. The Accord was also criticized for focusing too much on the concerns of Quebec and disregarding the needs of other regions, disadvantaged groups, and natives. To take effect, the Accord had to be approved by the House of Commons and all provinces, but it failed to pass the Manitoba legislature, thanks to the Indian MLA, Elijah Harper's strategic "no" vote (although Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells would have probably killed the Accord anyhow because of his distaste for Quebec special status). Harper's stand did, however, galvanize wide public support for including native rights in any future constitutional deal.

With Meech dead, separatist sentiments in Quebec increased again, and Prime Minister Mulroney decided to "roll the dice" a second time with a "Canada round" of constitutional negotiations. This time, he was intent on not repeating the same mistakes of the preceding "Quebec round," and particularly charges that the Meech Lake Accord had been cooked up in secret by the P.M. and collaborating premiers, and that it ignored needs other than Quebec's. Accordingly, a more open constitutional process was put in place to
embrace a broader constituency of interests. Senior cabinet member, Joe Clark, was charged with coordinating the constitutional process. It included public consultation conferences by a Special Parliamentary Committee, followed by a lengthy series of constitutional negotiation meetings with federal, provincial, and native delegates, chaired successively by Clark himself and then by Mulroney. The pace of the constitutional process became set by the Bourassa Liberal government in Quebec, who had committed themselves to a timetable whereby Quebecers would vote on a constitutional offer from the rest of Canada by June or October of 1992, or, if no offer was forthcoming, would vote on separation. Bourassa personally refused to participate in the constitutional process until he was sure a suitable agreement might be forthcoming.

Mulroney’s central objective on entering the Canada round had been the same as it had been before, to patch together broad enough support outside of Quebec for an agreement which Bourassa could sell in Quebec against anticipated strong opposition from the opposing, nationalist Parti Quebecois. But once the constitutional process was opened up to other numerous political and regional interest groups, it could not be closed again. Most dangerously for Mulroney’s intended appeasement of Quebec nationalism, were the opportunities which the more open constitutional forum afforded Indians to press their nationalist demands, some of which conflicted directly with Quebec’s. For, how could special national privileges be given to Quebec province without impairing the claims of Indian "nations" within its territory? Indeed, as was soon to become apparent, the AFN would successfully steal the thunder from Quebec by more successfully pressing its own nationalist demands.
The AFN was led by its recently elected and charismatic new Grand Chief, Ovide Mercredi. Mercredi’s two primary objectives were to avoid Indian issues being sidetracked by the federal government in attempts to please Quebec (especially the possibility of Ottawa and Quebec City striking a bilateral agreement on their own), and to gain a say with the federal government and the provinces in negotiating a final deal. His evolving strategy for achieving these objectives was to keep the Indian case up front with the media, capitalize on favourable public support, press the case that whatever Quebec received Indians deserved at least as much, and to play the "joker card" whenever necessary by threatening that no constitutional deal would be possible without native support. In all of this, Mercredi was very successful. However, the actual substance of what the AFN would demand with their constitutional voice, was far less clear. After ten years of constitutional lobbying, debating and researching, the AFN were seemingly incapable of defining their requirements with any degree of specificity which would also satisfy their diverse constituency.

When the federal government went into the Canada round it did not intend to give Indians and other natives any special attention beyond the minimum necessary to prove that they had been heard fairly. The government’s priorities were to work out distinct society status for Quebec and to promote their own pet project for an internal "commercial union" to complement the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. Other issues to be dealt with included the division of federal-provincial powers, Senate reform, and, a long way behind, aboriginal self-government. At first, Mercredi had problems penetrating the government’s organization of the constitutional process to push his particular agenda. However, at the fourth public consultation conference in Toronto, Mercredi and his aides cleverly
engineered a pretext for him to participate, and the government's attempt to contain the native constitutional genie was uncorked. 44

Incredibly, it appears that Mercredi came to the Toronto conference without any predetermined strategy of what exactly to say. 45 This assertion seems to be borne out when Mercredi dropped a bombshell in answering a question in his first press scrum, announcing that, although an inherent right to self-government was still important to natives, they deserved like Quebec to be recognized as "distinct." Although this usurpation of Quebecers' hitherto sacred constitutional property thoroughly alienated those of them at the conference, Mercredi's appeal for native rights was strongly endorsed by other participants, and he got extensive press coverage. However, one black cloud which settled over the AFN and refused to go away, was the coverage received by the Native Womens' Association of Canada (NWAC). They pleaded that any collective right to self-government be made contingent upon guaranteed protection of native womens' individual rights, preferably through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Other bombshells followed from Mercredi immediately after the fourth constitutional conference. At a hearing of the Special Parliamentary Committee the next day, Mercredi insisted that Indians receive the same distinct society status as Quebec, and he threatened that the current round of constitutional talks would fail if Indian demands were not met. He startled the Committee with extreme demands for self-government powers which exceeded those sought by the most ardent Quebec nationalists, fatuously adding that Indians had volunteered not to create their own army, or to have a separate monetary policy and currency. The very next day, Mercredi, not content with the equating of
natives’ national rights with those of Quebec, claimed that the Indians’ claims were actually superior because Quebec could not be a "true nation," and he did so in an address to a Quebec provincial legislative committee studying sovereignty! 46

Mercredi’s comments provoked outrage in Quebec, and although there is no evidence that this was a calculated ploy on his part, federal officials must have been concerned about the need to placate the AFN before Quebec became completely alienated. During the sixth public conference of the Special Parliamentary Committee in Vancouver, Joe Clark managed to patch up an agreement with Mercredi for him to give up on distinct society status for Indians while, in return, Clark promoted aboriginal self-government as "an inherent right." Clark was assisted in this by Ron George, leader of the National Council for Canada representing non-status Indians, who clearly regarded Mercredi as a dangerous "loose cannon" who could threaten the gaining of new constitutional rights for all natives. When the Special Committee tabled its final report it included recommendations to expand native rights, including an inherent right to self-government, and inclusion of natives in the subsequent constitutional negotiation meetings on issues which affected them.

Clark and the provincial delegates accepted the Committee’s recommendations, and they were joined at the first constitutional meeting by delegates of Canada’s four native organizations. These were the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) representing most status Indians on reserves, the Native Council of Canada (NCC) for non-status Indians, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, and the Metis National Council. Quebec did not enter the negotiations until later.
The main points of disagreement between federal and provincial representatives were over the Special Committee's recommendations for federal-provincial division of powers, senate reform, and Quebec's constitutional veto and distinct society status. For a while, these issues sidelined native demands, although serious concerns remained about the notion of an "inherent right to self-government." AFN leaders continued to argue that aboriginal self-government always existed and could not be handed down and prescribed a priori by Canada. As had been the case in the First Ministers Conferences during the 1980s, many of the provinces balked at this, arguing that they needed to know exactly what self-government meant before agreeing to entrench it in the constitution. Clark, himself, still promoted entrenching an inherent right to self-government, although up to the previous fall Ottawa had been adamant that this would be constitutionally dangerous because recognizing 633 independent Indian governments across the country would turn Canada sovereignty into "swiss cheese." 47

However, when Indian leaders were called upon to define what they meant by self-government the more contentious did their demands appear. This quickly became obvious at a federal conference devoted specifically to Indian constitutional issues. Clark had finally acceded to the leaders' requests for such a conference, and it opened the day after the start of his first constitutional meeting. The conference did not, in the words of one reporter, "shed too much light on the future form of self-government." 48 By this time, there were obviously some differences of opinion between Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney on aboriginal self-government, as there was on other constitutional issues. After the Indian constitutional conference failed to come up with any significant results, Mulroney demanded that an inherent right to self-government must be defined before it
could be entrenched in the constitution. To underscore his point he publicly praised Brian Dickson, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, who had warned at the conference that a "chaotic situation" would ensue if an inherent right is entrenched without any limits or safeguards. 49

Mulroney's obvious concerns about Indian demands did not seem to influence the government's negotiation position, which continued to be driven by Joe Clark. The PM was purposefully laying low to avoid incurring the same criticisms of his personal role in the failed Meech Accord. As was to be speculated later, Mulroney was also probably hoping that Clark would fail in his efforts to negotiate a deal so that he himself could then step in with a federal government offer. If this supposition is correct about Mulroney, and it seems to fit the circumstances and the man, he seriously underestimated Clark's determination to get a deal -- any type of deal -- even, if he had to give away the store to get it. Thus, when Mulroney was to step in later he found his hands tied about the native package.

At the second constitutional meeting in Halifax, Joe Clark and native leaders announced prematurely a "historic breakthrough" on self-government. 50 According to the "consensus agreement" supposedly reached by all delegates, an inherent right to self-government would first be entrenched as a principle, and then aboriginal "third-order governments" would initiate negotiations with the federal government and respective provincial governments for transferring jurisdictional powers, and for agreements on financing and taxation. If these negotiations were not successful, then both parties had the resort of seeking a court-enforced solution. These basic elements would survive to
form the basis of the native package in the Charlottetown Accord, even though they were not supported by many of the provinces and represented a complete turnaround of recent federal policy, including statements made by the PM himself only some weeks previously. As was soon revealed, Clark had misrepresented the positions of some of the provinces, notably Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland who were strongly opposed to the native self-government proposals. Clyde Wells, the premier of Newfoundland, went so far as to call them a "recipe for chaos." Benoit Bouchard, Mulroney’s Quebec lieutenant, said that it would be difficult to sell such a sweeping and complex native package to Canadians, particularly Quebecers. And, sources said that other provinces -- B.C. and Saskatchewan were thought to be among them -- were uneasy about effectively handing native leaders a blank cheque. The B.C. delegates were particularly anxious about the fallout from having to conclude self-government agreements for claims settlements in their province. The NDP governments of B.C and Saskatchewan had gone along with the proposals so far, said one newspaper source, because to do otherwise would be "politically incorrect." 51

In the ninth constitutional meeting, the negotiation process became deadlocked again over the question of a "Triple E" Senate (i.e. one which would be "elected" rather than appointed, have "equal" representation from all provinces regardless of population sizes, and have "effective" powers). This was strongly promoted by Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland, but adamantly opposed by Premier Rae of Ontario who was concerned about the consequent diminution of Central Canada’s traditional dominance in federation. He also intimated that Premier Bourassa of Quebec, who had not yet joined the negotiations, was also on side with him on this. A by now, very frustrated Joe Clark admonished provincial negotiators that this was their "last chance," and, if necessary, he
was prepared to ditch the issue of Senate reform, and that the government might present a unilateral federal offer to Quebec and back it up with a national referendum. The provincial negotiators, suitably chastened by Clark’s threat and very reluctant to go back home empty-handed, settled down to pulling a deal together.

In the difficult days which followed in accommodating all the diverse views on Senate reform and many other complex constitutional issues, to revisit self-government would have been exceedingly difficult, and Clark, who could now smell success, would not about to open that Pandora’s box again. His determination prevailed, despite suspicions by some provincial delegates that Ottawa might now be looking for a way to escape a process that got had out of control, "that gave too much to native people, too little to Quebec, and too much turmoil to Canadians who are wearying of the constitutional wars." On July 7th, 1992, Clark was able to announce that a tentative accord had been reached -- which left his boss, Mulroney, high and dry.

Mulroney, who was vacationing abroad at the time of Clark’s announcement, had, in the words of one newspaper analyst, "being playing a double game, publicly calling for the premiers to settle their differences, and privately expecting and planning for a breakdown of the talks. With parliament preparing for a special summer session, he would present his own package to save the country, in consultation with Bourassa." Indeed, the Privy Council had been feverishly preparing draft, back-up proposals based on Mulroney’s expectations that Clark would fail. Mulroney and Bourassa forces even attempted to join hands with secret proposals for radically altering Clark’s tentative accord, but were severely compromised when Mercredi obtained and released one of their planning reports.
When Mulroney took over chairing the negotiation meetings, now attended by Bourassa, the main stumbling block was still the proposals for a Triple-E Senate. It probably seemed inconceivable to Mulroney that the Triple-E proponents and Quebec could ever agree. Then, almost incredibly, at Mulroney’s second meeting Bourassa acceded to sweeping Senate reforms in return for comparatively minimal increases in Quebec’s parliamentary representation. It seems that he compromised on Senate reform in the mistaken belief that the other Provinces would return the favour when discussing other issues of critical concern to Quebec, especially its desire for “assymetrical federalism” whereby Quebec would take over more powers from the federal government than could other provinces.

After cutting a deal on the Senate, the PM and the premiers turned the next day to native self-government. But, with Senate reform agreed, that issue served once again to deflect any serious re-assessment of the July 7th native package, despite previous threats by Mulroney to do so. The main critics of the native package, Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland, had just realized their primary objective of a Triple-E Senate, and did not wish to see this jeopardized by getting hung up on self-government. British Columbia had already bought some time by getting a concession for extending the deadline for court imposed agreements for self-government from three to five years. Ontario, like B.C., craved constitutional peace so that they could get on with their first priority of economic development, and Ontario Premier, Bob Rae appears to have been the only provincial delegate clearly on side for self-government. As for Mulroney, his second attempt at rolling the dice on constitutional reform now looked as though it might come to fruition.
after all -- so, why rock the boat? (And, it must be said, Mulroney does seem to have had some aspirations of his government being favorably judged on its native record).

Bourassa’s bargaining strategy failed miserably, because after he had conceded to others what they wanted on Senate reform, they failed to reciprocate by granting him special powers under “assymetrical federalism.” Indeed, so that equal concessions could be made to all provinces, Quebec’s gain in powers was watered down considerably from its requests. Thus, under the distribution of powers, all provinces would have clear responsibility for areas of presently-shared jurisdiction, including forestry, mining, tourism, housing, recreation, and municipal and urban affairs, but would not be delegated any powers presently under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Similarly, in the area of immigration, all provinces would be able to negotiate agreements for increased control within their jurisdictions. With respect to a veto over federal institutions, again all provinces would enjoy a veto over amendments respecting the Senate, the House of Commons, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

When the text of the Accord was released to the public, attacks on the native package varied widely. Subjects criticized included, the threat of self-government being used as a lever in comprehensive claims settlements to acquire more lands and broaden native jurisdictions; the open-endedness of self-government powers and the loss of provincial jurisdiction; commitments for taxpayers to support self-government but with limited onus on natives to contribute their own financing; potential despotism by Indian leaders on reserves and the trampling down of individual rights (especially those of women); and the lack of democratic representation for non-native residents on reserves. All these were
very important issues that the prime minister and the premiers gave scant attention to in their undue haste to reach an agreement. Predictably, the Parti Quebecois seized upon Bourassa's failure to gain any substantial concessions when the Indians gained so much. PQ leader, Parizeau concluded, devastatingly, "Mr. Bourassa wanted the distinct society clause -- Assembly of First Nations chief Ovide Mercredi got it." 55

However, to the chagrin of the "Yes" supporters of the Accord, the most damning criticism of the self-government proposals came from many status Indians. No sooner had Mercredi come out of the constitutional talks, confident, in his words, that native people everywhere would go out to vote and support the deal, than his support started to ebb away. Many of his political enemies took the opportunity to settle old scores. Phil Fontaine, Mercredi's former friend and associate, but a loser in the leadership race for AFN Grand Chief, declared that he "can't take the leap of faith necessary ... because the Accord would diminish the fundamental relationship between First Nations and the federal Crown," and would put provinces in the driver's seat for negotiating native rights. 56 Elijah Harper, who with Fontaine and Mercredi had conspired to bring down the Meech Lake Accord in the Manitoba legislature, deployed his revered reputation among many natives to undermine Mercredi's position. He said that the proposed constitutional changes were too complex and were being forced on native peoples, so he urged them simply not to vote. Many Treaty Indians in the Prairies and Ontario, who were mistrustful of Mercredi, claimed that their existing treaties were all they needed to develop their own institutions if the federal government was forced to finance them (which the Accord did not do). The ultra-nationalist and very militant Mohawk leaders, who despised Mercredi's pacifist philosophy, said that their people were already self-governing and would not,
therefore, participate in Canada's referendum.

The "Yes" supporters viewed with alarm the looming possibility that one of the Accord's pillars would be struck down by Indian peoples themselves. Indian groups across the country were barraged with calls from the federal cabinet and the premiers to support the deal. The federal government even "strategically scheduled" several important treaty signings in the weeks leading up to the referendum. Further, after pledging to resolve all land claims in B.C. by the end of the decade, Mulroney flew to Saskatchewan and signed a $450 million deal to set up a process for settling land debts to Indians there. Federal fisheries officials in Vancouver were even directed not to pursue complaints that Indians were abusing their fishing rights in the Fraser River so as not to upset the constitutional applecart. 57 But all of this was to no avail.

Mercredi suffered his most pivotal, and personally humiliating defeat at a meeting of 400 AFN chiefs in North Vancouver, B.C., on October 16th. Before the meeting even started, 130 Ontario chiefs, who held the balance of power in the AFN, decided they would go to North Vancouver and press for deferring their ratification of the Accord for another six months, assuming it received popular support in the October 26th referendum. At the meeting, Mercredi was assailed by unrealistic demands to change the Accord, and, first and foremost, to obtain guarantees for financing and lands. Disaffected Fontaine supporters were said to have been behind much of the opposition. Joe Clark, who was present, urged moderation and told the chiefs, "this is as good as it gets." Before a vote could be taken, however, the Ontario delegates departed, leaving the meeting with an insufficient quorum. Bill Wilson, a B.C. Chief and one of Mercredi's strongest supporters,
expressed his bitter frustration: "The bigots and the racists must be chuckling," he said. "The No side sure must be wringing their hands saying, 'The aboriginal people can't even get together to make a decision.'" 58

On October 26th, 1992, the Charlottetown Accord went down to a crashing defeat. There was not majority support for the Accord in most of the Provinces, and the largest opposition was in British Columbia and Quebec. Many natives did not bother to vote. Of those Indians on reserves who voted, sixty-two per cent said "No."

Analysis of the Charlottetown Accord confirms two major flaws in its process for developing Indian policy: (1) the unmanageability of mixing in difficult aboriginal issues with other equally difficult constitutional issues, and (2) the impracticalities of reaching federal and provincial agreements with Indians as a collective whole. With regard to the mixing in aboriginal issues with other constitutional issues, mention has already been made of Gibbins' concerns about Indian "domain specific" concerns being sidetracked by wider "environmental determinants." But what happened in the Charlottetown constitutional process was somewhat different from what Gibbins had envisaged earlier, because "native rights," as a general concept, became elevated to the status of an "environmental determinant" in public policy. Thus, even if native issues had not directly been on the Charlottetown agenda, they would have had considerable impact, for instance, in seeking a balance between Quebec's national aspirations and the rights of aboriginal groups within its provincial boundaries. But the fact remains that heaping the constitutional table with questions about self-government for all Indians across Canada, as well as dealing with the needs of Inuit, Metis, and non-status Indians, and adding all this on top of distinct society
status for Quebec, the division of federal-provincial powers, senate reform, and so on, was not conducive to an effective policy-making process. And this was confirmed by the poor results.

In the final test, of course, the self-government proposals failed to pass muster with many Indians themselves. This was a partial consequence of too full a negotiation table, trying to meet everybody needs but satisfying no one, but it also reflected the other major flaw in the Charlottetown process of attempting to deal with Indians as a collective whole. The history of central state-Indian relations in Canada over the last two decades has been marked by largely unsuccessful attempts to develop national Indian policies on a representative government-to-government basis. One problem is that the more than 600 Indian "First Nations" across Canada do not have one directly-elected government (and presumably never will have), which can deal on equal terms with the federal government and the provinces. Instead, First Nation governments are only voluntary members of their "Assembly," and their leader is elected by assembly delegates and not directly by their constituencies. This loose coalition between First Nations reflects the huge diversity and sometimes serious schisms between them. Assembly "Grand Chiefs," such as Mercredi, simply lack the executive-government powers and majority-elected support to realistically negotiate on behalf of all Indians.

5.6 Conclusions

This account of the push for Indian self-government ends the part of the thesis devoted to an historical analysis of Indian policy. It demonstrates the lack of attention which has been given to political economy considerations of Indian self-government, and, specifically,
that Indian self-government and economic self-sufficiency are necessary conditions for each other. As was shown, the debate over self-government has been dominated by conflict over state attempts to squeeze Indians into the Western, liberal mold of municipal government against opposition by many Indian leaders who have adopted a radical nationalist strategy to press for abstract rights to national self-determination. This conflict has diverted attention from careful examination of urgent Indian needs to develop economically and the particular political powers they require to do this.

The other conclusion which can be made is that "principles first" constitutional approaches to increasing Indian self-government powers do not appear to work. This is partly because such approaches have been promoted by a national Indian organization which cannot realistically represent the diverse interests of all Indian First Nations across Canada. Nor should constitutional principles be established first when the substantive requirements of self-government are essentially unknown. As a practical consideration, it seems unlikely after the Charlottetown Accord debacle that politicians and public opinion will be so unquestioning again about constitutional change. Some sort of community-based approach is needed to break the impasse of waiting for a dramatic constitutional breakthrough, which may not materialize in the near future, and instead get on with the job of community rebuilding. Such an approach will be discussed later in the thesis.
PART TWO:

PROPOSALS FOR
INDIAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
CHAPTER SIX. REVIEW OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT THEORIES

6.1 Overview

The historical analysis of Indian policy in part one of this thesis described the conflicts between the central state and Indians, and how their respective positions have been buttressed by opposing ideas on development and, more recently, by formal development theories.

From the early nineteenth century onwards, successive governments in Canada have attempted to assimilate Indians into Western-style values and institutions, and only recently do there appear to be some concessions towards recognizing a more separate Indian identity. Ideas about modernization have dominated the assumptions of how Indians should develop, or to be more exact, how they should be developed, reaching a peak with the 1969 White Paper. Sometimes the influence of these ideas was explicit, as with attempts to "civilize" Indians so they could "catch up" with the superior White races, or with the White Paper's grand plan to move Indians into the industrializing cities. Often the influence has been more implicit, though no less insidious, because modernization doctrine formalizes the viewpoints which many Western European Canadians share of the "colonized" Indian minority. Thus, modernization thinking is not only a theoretical abstraction but a widely accepted doctrine or "world view" among many in the majority Canadian society.

On the other side, state attempts at assimilation were met at first by passive but firm Indian resistance. This changed dramatically after the White Paper when Indians placed
increasingly autonomist demands against the state. The counter agenda of the Indian nationalist movement is strengthened by critical ideas often framed from an underdevelopment (UDT) perspective. The UDT internal colony model has been particularly influential in this regard because its addresses situations which are directly analogous to those of Canadian Indians, who occupy a subordinate relationship within a modern state defined along ethnic lines. UDT thinking surfaces most explicitly in academic criticism of Indian policy, but has also influenced how many educated Indians see their predicament. Indeed, UDT is also taking hold as "world view" with a growing segment of public opinion which is sympathetic to the Indian cause.

In this second part of the thesis, a more detailed review and critique will be made of current development planning theories, and proposals put forward for a "relational approach" which can be applied to meet the circumstances of Canadian Indians. A review is made in this chapter of current development theories with the following purposes:--

(1) To illustrate the long, historical roots of modernization thinking, thereby reinforcing assertions made in the previous historical analysis about how modernization doctrine influenced Indian policy from the early nineteenth century onwards.

(2) To elaborate on the typology of development theories outlined in the Introduction to the thesis, and, specifically, to demonstrate the following:--

(a) The dualism of modernization theory and UDT as "core theories" of the assimilationist and autonomist paradigms respectively.
(b) The strong derivation of other development theories in each paradigm from their respective antecedents in the "core theories."

(c) The general parallelism between respective theories in the opposing assimilationist and autonomist paradigms, but also particular overlaps and "gray areas" between them.

Because of the later focus in the thesis on a community-based approach to Indian development, the linkages will be traced from "core theories," which address the development problems of broad societal groups, through regional development theories, and down to community economic development (CED) theories. The theories are reviewed in the order shown on the following Figure 10, to best elucidate their interconnections, commonalities and differences. A separate section is included to describe the unique contributions made by Canadian "staples theories" to both assimilationist and autonomist development thought. The section on territorial theory includes the internal colony model which is its primary linkage with UDT.
Figure 10  Organization of Development Theory Review

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assimilationist Doctrine</th>
<th>Autonomist Doctrine</th>
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<tr>
<td>Antecedent Societal Development Theories</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Modernization</td>
<td>2. Underdevelopment (UDT)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Canadian ‘Staples’ Theories</td>
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<td>Derived Socio-spatial Theories</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Regional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Functional</td>
<td>5. Territorial (inc. internal colony model)</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Community Economic Development (CED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.(a) Liberal</td>
<td>(b) Reformist/Radical</td>
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The descriptions in each of the above sections are, as far as possible, laid out in three parts starting with how the "development problem" is defined, followed by its explanation, and ending with proposed solutions. Theorists are identified who are most closely associated with significant development ideas. Common terminologies are used wherever appropriate to highlight connections between ideas, even though they may not have been used by the theorists themselves. Comparative descriptions have been made in the literature of societal modernization and underdevelopment theories, and of regional functional and territorial theories. 1 Cross-references have also been made between societal and regional theories (typically from the latter perspective), but often without
explicit clarity. No explicit cross-references appear to have been made previously between regional and CED theories. This review seems to be the first which explicitly interrelates and compares all these groups of development theories.

6.2 Modernization Theory

The roots of modernization thinking reach far back to the beginnings of capitalism in Western Europe. The logic of capitalist growth was transmuted by early theorists writing in the political-economic tradition into a virtuous, liberal rationale for individuals to pursue their self-interests in a laissez-faire state. Adam Smith extolled the efficiencies of economic specialization and international trade which would not only greatly benefit Britain (and Smith was an ardent nationalist), but would also serve a philanthropic mission of diffusing material and intellectual "progress" to less fortunate societies. True, not all political economists were so sanguine as Smith about either the inevitability or inherent goodness of capitalist growth. Malthus, in particular made dire predictions about population growth outrunning resources which would later greatly influence Charles Darwin's thinking about evolution and natural selection.

It is among the early classical sociologists, however, that can be found the most ambivalence about capitalism. While accepting the more optimistic models of economic growth, they expressed serious concerns about their social consequences. Indeed, Weber and Durkheim wrote with an obvious nostalgia for the past. But, like many intellectuals of the day, they were committed to social evolution, an idea with roots well back into the eighteenth century although greatly reinforced by Darwinian theory. Weber's distinctive contribution was to explain how the evolutionary process brought increasing spheres of life
under the control of rational thought, hence creating the appropriate social norms for capitalist advancement.

Writing closer to the end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim conceived of an evolutionary progression along a continuum between two opposite types of society. At the one end were traditional societies organized according to "mechanical solidarity," embodying subjective religious beliefs and intimate personal relations. At the other end of the continuum were modern societies organized according to "organic solidarity," emphasizing objective, contractual relations organized around the division of labour. Two of Durkheim’s key notions in this transformation from traditionalism to modernity are "differentiation" and "integration", which were to become central to modernization theory and, as will be shown, functional theory. As societies evolved, he said, they became increasingly more complex because of their differentiation into specialized, individual roles and institutions, but with consequent loss of consensus and increased anomie among individuals (a concern shared by Marx). Therefore, successful transformation to a modern society was also dependent on achieving social integration through a new value consensus to replace the previous "collective conscience." It is with such concerns about the adaptation of societies to modernity that the first, formal identification of the "development problem" is revealed: that is, the notion of "blockages" which have to be overcome to allow the evolutionary process.

A parallel evolutionary model was proposed by Tonnies in his distinction between interpersonal communities (Gemeinschaft) and impersonal associations (Gesellschaft), which was adopted later into Parsonian structural-functionalist theory and, hence, into
modernization theory. By the end of the nineteenth century, classical evolutionists like Durkheim and Tonnies were strongly opposed for a time by diffusionists associated with the Boas school of ethnography which focussed on both cultural relativism and historical peculiarism. Instead of a unilinear view of evolutionary change, diffusionists conceived cultural and technological innovations as originating from select sources (or from one source in extreme interpretations), and diffusing over time and space via social interactions, with varying impacts between different societies. One important conclusion drawn from this was that the modernization of some societies could be accelerated through diffusion of innovations from others. In fact, evolutionary and diffusion theories are often combined together in development theory, as had been anticipated in Adam Smith's ideas that progress already experienced in capitalist democracies should be diffused through world trade. Some economists took up the same theme in the 1920s and 1930s, supporting liberals' espousal of international trade based on comparative advantage.

However, one critical element in modernization theory was still missing. Under Smith's "invisible hand," optimization of the factors of production -- land, labour and capital -- was supposed to be achieved through the market place, but this implied having to wait for the benefits of modernization to diffuse "naturally." The last critical element in modernization theory was provided when the credo of laissez-faire liberalism was somewhat eroded in the Great Depression, and with the publication of J.M. Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936. It is tempting to view the adoption of Keynesian macro-economic management tools and the rapid expansion of the welfare statism which followed after the Second World War, as another emerging paradigm of development.
planning. But against this it should be emphasized that Keynes' "General Theory" is not even an economic growth theory per se, much less aspiring to being a broader development theory. The most appropriate way to view the emergence of welfare statism is as the next evolutionary stage in capitalist relations, following the preceding area where laissez-faire capitalism was more dominant. The central development ideology in the West remained modernization theory, but while theoretical reliance had formally been placed on Smith’s “invisible hand” to diffuse progress, Keynesian theory imbued post-War state interventionism with intellectual respectability.

What was true at home would be even more true abroad. The Pax-American containment of international communism in the post-War era provided the public policy justification for direct U.S. economic intervention abroad. American international hegemony could not be guaranteed by relying on market led trade and investment; instead, the benefits of capitalist progress had to be systematically exported -- and quickly. Economists and other social scientists were enlisted in the war against communism, and formal "modernization theory" was the result, the awkward blending of individualistic liberalism and reformist state interventionism being one of its major defining characteristics and ambiguities.

The first contributions to formal modernization theory were made by economists. Keynes’ General Theory was a considerable inspiration though it had only implicit pretensions as a growth theory. Two economists working independently in the early 1950s gave their names to the Harrod-Domar model, extending Keynesian equilibrium theory into an explanatory model of long-range growth. Focussing on marginal propensities to save and capital/output ratios as critical variables of growth, they concluded that the key to
unlocking poverty in less-developed countries (LDC's) was to clear any blockages preventing capital accumulation and investment. The burgeoning field of "development economics" quickly moved onward from this marginalist, micro-economic analyses to more structuralist development models. For instance, theorists such as W.A. Lewis analyzed the economies of LDC's using dual-sector models, incorporating a modern capitalist/industrial/urban sector and a traditional non-capitalist/agricultural/rural sector. Under this particular dualistic view, the modern sector is perceived as dynamic and the determinant of future growth, whereas the traditional sector is assumed to be stagnant and concealing disguised labour underemployment. Accordingly, it was reasoned that overall growth throughout the entire system could be induced by bringing the traditional sector into closer competition with the modern one.

There was a major debate among development economists concerning the best way to start up this process of sustained growth. On the one hand, "balanced growth theorists" (arguing from the logic that because poverty is a "vicious circle" of low living standards, savings, investment, and productivity, and, consequently, low purchasing power) asserted that it could only be broken by broadly increasing investments which would simultaneously expand production and consumption. On the other hand, "unbalanced growth theorists," led by A.O. Hirschmann, considered this wasteful of the very resources which LDC's had little, i.e. capital investment, planning and managerial decision-making, and entrepreneurship. Better, they argued, to focus growth on a few, carefully selected sectors which would rapidly create bottlenecks in linked sectors, thus forcing decision-making and inducing more growth. As will be seen, this argument for deliberately selective, unequal growth was to figure largely in regional functional theory and,
particularly, its concept of 'growth poles.'

However, the highly rational logic of development economics was soon confounded by apparent cultural and socio-political blockages to modernization. Farm workers did not migrate as supposed, subsistence farming was inexplicably resilient to change, and even in the modern sector greater productivity, capital accumulation and, above all, entrepreneurship were often pitifully lacking. Neo-evolutionist sociologists placed the blame for this on the inadequate competencies of Third World societies to adapt. Most influential in this line of thinking were the structural-functionalists led by Talcott Parsons. Under Parsons' social equilibrium theory, individuals faded out of focus for analysis to be replaced by faceless role orientations and institutional systems. Following Tonnies' dichotomy of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, traditional and modern societies were positioned at opposite ends of an evolutionary trajectory, each characterized by their own unique set of "pattern variables." 9 Behind a dense screen of apparently complex theorizing and impenetrable verbiage, an amazing tautological legerdemain was pulled off. Modern societies were described as ones exhibiting a particular polar set of pattern variables which, not incidentally, bore a remarkable resemblance to contemporary Western capitalist society. Conversely, traditional societies exhibiting the anti-pole set of variables were found inferior to modern societies because, essentially, they were not modern!

The structural functionalist model was first applied to Third World development problems by Hoselitz, in assessing potential impediments to diffusing Western technology. 10 Observing that much of Third World societies exhibited the "backward" set of Parsons pattern variables, Hoselitz cautioned that economic growth could be slower than expected
in many cases. But the dehumanizing logic of structural-functional thinking perversely held out the promise that individuals could be adapted by systematic modernization of their cultural and socio-political institutions. For instance, Smelser, arguing in Durkheim style about the need to compensate for increased social "differentiation" caused by rapid modernization, recommended that Third World societies adopt western, liberal political institutions to ensure necessary "integration." 11 Eisenstadt followed a similar line of thinking, but placed most of his faith in special entrepreneurs to bring about integration. 12 McClelland urged improved education so that Third World peoples would learn to become competitive and self-reliant, "achieving societies." 13

By now, the helping hand extended out to assist endogenous development in Third World societies had clearly given way to exogenously-forced modernization. At the head of this movement was the American historian and capitalist ideologue, W.W. Rostow. In his famous, The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Rostow laid out the path which he thought would have to be followed by less-advanced countries to become prosperous capitalist democracies, and bastions against communism. 14 From tracing Britain's rise to become the World's first industrial power, Rostow identified five stages through which all successful societies would need to evolve. These five stages are: (1) 'traditional society,' (2) 'the pre-conditions for take-off,' (3) 'the take-off to self-sustaining growth' (4) 'the drive to maturity,' and (5) 'the age of mass consumption.' The third stage of the so-called, 'take-off' was the threshold between traditionalism and modernity. According to Rostow, it could be achieved only when the following conditions are present:--
(a) Emergence of a political and social framework suited to exploiting opportunities for innovation in the new leading industrial sectors, including commitment of elites to ongoing economic growth.

(b) A surge of technological improvements, rapid growth in leading manufacturing sectors with positive feedback to other sectors, and increasing investment in further productive capital stock.

(c) An increase in savings and hence productive investments, rising from 5% to 10% of national income during the take-off stage.

Rostow had pulled together all the jigsaw pieces of modernization theory together, including socio-political and technological innovations, selective industrialism, and capital investment and accumulation, to the point that he argued placing one piece before another would be a "cart and horse" situation. The take-off conditions which had been endogenous to Britain he recognized had been partly exogenous elsewhere, due, in part, to diffusion effects of British colonization. According to Rostow, any less-developed countries wishing to emulate the success of Western industrialized democracies would have to imitate the path they had already passed along, and with their help.

6.3 **Underdevelopment Theory (UDT)**

Underdevelopment theory (UDT) is the antithesis of modernization theory, directly criticizing both its ethnocentrism and liberal, imperialist ideology. It should be qualified, however, that not all criticism of modernization theory comes from underdevelopment
theorists. For instance, structuralist development economics is considered as much a heresy by Western neo-classical economists as it is by Marxist underdevelopment theorists, sharing as they do a common heritage of liberal classical economics. 15 There is also some diversity in modernization theory itself so that some early critiques came from within. Notably Gunnar Myrdal, whose ideas are discussed in greater detail below, argued that despite accelerated growth in Third World countries, they would still continue to fall further behind the richer countries’ even more rapid growth. 16 Dudley Seers even questioned the accepted "meaning of development," arguing that economic growth by itself was insufficient to overcome fundamental disparities of income distribution within Third World countries. 17

By comparison with modernization theory, UDT contains far more diverse strands. Many of the original contributions have been made by Latin American theorists, clustering around two opposing Marxist and neo-Marxist schools of interpretation which differ both on substantive and ideological grounds. The key distinction is that for Marxists, Third World societies remain underdeveloped until being developed through the expansion of capitalism, while for neo-Marxists it is precisely because such societies have been incorporated in the World capitalist system that their development has been blocked or even reversed. In fact, Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy is not unlike modernization theory in approving the trend towards capitalism in the Third World, albeit en route to what is seen as an even higher evolutionary stage, socialism. Even more ironically, Marx himself directly contributed to the evolutionary underpinnings of modernization theory, as Brookfield explains:
There is a clear link between this ‘Western’ conception of modernization and the Marxist-Leninist view, and the link is Marx himself…. the ‘pure’ modernizers owe an immense debt to Marx’s interpretation of the historical sequence from medievalism to capitalism, and which was in turn based on the single-nation experience of Great Britain…. the whole sequence and processes which these writers propose have their roots in a ‘social Darwinist’ interpretation of history of which the prime originator was Marx. The difference between West and East therefore concerns essentially the meaning of modernity and the present trend of events, whether it is toward an American-model capitalist democracy, or toward the replacement of capitalism by socialism. 18

Neo-Marxists have often objected as much to classical Marxism as they have to modernization theory. A common theme in all UDT is capitalist penetration of subordinate "peripheral" societies by more dominant "core" societies, leading to a conjoining of core-periphery within an integrated world economy. But, different phases in the Marxist/neomarxist debate have focussed variously on inter- or intra-state relations in global integration, and on the consequent implications for either core or periphery societies.

Three phases of UDT may be distinguished in the following chronological order, with upper and lower case notations to denote their respective emphases:

(1) Classical Marxist-Leninist analysis of the historically changing internal structure of the developed core (A), and related expansion of capitalist relations into the underdeveloped periphery (b);

(2) Neo-Marxist analysis of underdevelopment in the previously developed periphery (b), as a consequence of external exploitation by the capitalist core (A);
(3) ‘Revivalist’ Marxist analysis of the historically-changing internal structure of the underdeveloped periphery (B), in its changing relations with the developed capitalist core (a).

These distinctions are important generally for recognizing the diversity in UDT. As will also be shown, they are also important for drawing connections between Latin American and Canadian "staples theory" variants of UDT, and from neo-Marxist UDT (via its internal colony model) to territorial regional theory. A brief summary now follows of each of the three phases of UDT.

(1) Classical Marxist-Leninist Analysis (Looking Outward from the Core)

The major influence here, of course, was Marx himself. Critical to any understanding of Marx’s ideas on the diffusion of capitalist relations to “backward” countries as he perceived them, is the central concept of "mode of production." In Marxist logic, somewhat analogous to Rostow’s stages, societies are conceived as evolving through sequential modes of production from traditionalism to modernity. Each mode of production contains two critical aspects in its "economic base," namely (1) the "forces of production" which are the sum of all material conditions of production such as raw materials, machines and human labour, and (2) the "relations of production" involving social organization of production, distribution and consumption.

The forces of production are changing continuously with the development of human knowledge and technology, requiring commensurate changes in the relations of production. But the latter tend to lag behind with conflicts between new emerging classes and those
established classes which benefit from the present relations of production, and have placed their stamp on the "social superstructure" of ideology, religion, laws etc., dominant in that particular society. Ultimately, however, the economic base is seen as the determining factor, and class contradictions reach a point when the "lower" mode of production is superceded by a "higher" one through social revolution.

It was not so much the materialist underpinnings of Marxist evolution theory that Rostow disagreed with, but rather with Marx's particular teleological assumptions of continued progress to socialism instead of to Rostow's final capitalist stage of "mass consumption." Otherwise there were considerable similarities between these two evolutionist ideas epitomized by Marx's well-known phrase from Capital, "The industrially more developed country shows the less developed one merely an image of its future," which, as has been observed, could have been written by Rostow himself. Marx's own Eurocentric viewpoint made him doubt whether other countries could imitate such an evolutionary process by themselves, because, being so "primitive," they could not even initiate their own development. Accordingly, imperial expansion was accepted as a necessary evil for introducing capitalism to colonial countries in their evolution towards socialism. True, V.I. Lenin took a somewhat more critical stance on imperialism, arguing that it would retard rather than promote capitalist growth in the colonies. In the last analysis, however, Lenin was more concerned with the implications of "imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism" for revolution in his own home country.
(2) Neo-Marxist Analysis (Looking Out From the Periphery)

From their perspective in the periphery, underdevelopment theorists were unequivocal in seeing undeveloped countries as the victims of imperialism. Although the thesis of the core "undeveloping" the periphery was popularized most by A.G. Frank, he borrowed heavily from earlier contributors. Notably, Raul Prebisch, one of the first 'dependistas,' questioned the so-called benefits of free trade. He argued that unequal terms of trade between developed and developing countries would preclude eventual equalization of factor prices, contrary to what had been supposed. Whereas the developing countries' resource exports could easily be "priced down" by mutually self-destructive competition, the core would always maintain its monopoly on manufactured goods. Thus early dependence theorists such as Prebisch were still largely wedded to liberal modernization theory, but they wanted it to work better.

A more radical dependency position was taken by Paul Baran who challenged Marxist assumptions that capitalist growth was being diffused outward to the periphery. He introduced the idea of peripheral underdevelopment as the other side of the coin to development in the core. Key to his line of argument, and hotly contested by doctrinaire Marxists, is the notion of the core expropriating 'surplus capital value' from the periphery (as opposed to the Marxist concern with 'surplus labour value'), thus depriving the latter of valuable capital for its own development. Baran concluded that the modernizers' viewpoint that LDC's were failing to develop because of their "culture lag" is fallacious; rather they are being held back from their own evolutionary path by outside imperialist exploitation.
Also worth noting is Aldo Sunkel's emphasis on the role of multi-national companies (MNC's) in extracting surplus value from the periphery to the core. In a later work available in English, Sunkel goes beyond the conventional viewpoint of international trade between countries as the units of analysis, to conceptualize a global system with two distinct but interacting structures. First, there is the MNC dominated structure of transnational capitalism, as represented by most of the economies of industrialized countries as well as by modern sectors of LDC's (i.e. the "core"). Second, there are the underdeveloped regions, which make up most of the LDC's, together with relatively small parts of core countries which have been marginalized (i.e. the "periphery"). According to Sunkel there were simultaneous tendencies in the global economic system towards transnational integration and national disintegration, a concept which, as will be shown, was taken up by internal colony theorists.

The most famous of the neo-Marxist underdevelopment theorists, A.G. Frank, synthesized the world system view with the concept of extracted surplus value. He rejects modern-traditional dualism, replacing it with the concept of "metropole-satellite" relations replicated in space downward through the world capitalist system to the most remote hinterlands of Third World countries. According to his model, part of the surplus in these remote satellite areas (p) is extracted by small metropoles (m) in their own regions which, in turn, have part of their surplus syphoned off to higher level metropoles and so on, with the largest surplus accruing to the world metropolis (M), which is the United States. Below this highest level in the hierarchy, all other "agents" of capitalist relations are simultaneously metropoles and satellites. For reference below to the connections between UDT and regional territorial theory, it should be noted that neo-Marxists often view cities
as parasitic, while tending to idealize rural life (although, they also tie this in with a distinct concept of rural-based class revolution). Of even greater significance for these connections, it should not be inferred from Frank's model of exploitative metropole-satellite relations leapfrogging over national boundaries that political units are considered unimportant. Indeed, neo-Marxists are usually strong nationalists, which marks them off sharply from internationalist, Marxist underdevelopment theorists.

Frank's more original contribution was a devastating critique of both the evolutionist and diffusionist assumptions of modernization theory. He unmasked Hoselitz's dualist distinction between traditional and modern societies by illustrating how supposedly dichotomous, Parsonian pattern variables can be found together in the same societies. Nor did historical evidence demonstrate that the relative distribution of pattern variables, either one way or another, is a critical determinant of underdevelopment or development. It follows that any derived notion of evolution between bi-polar opposites of traditionalism and modernity is completely wrong. Frank condemns Rostow's "stages of growth" as ethnocentric and ahistoric, on grounds that the present underdevelopment experienced by Third World countries is not their original "stage" but, instead, a decline from previous levels of development brought about by imperialist exploitation. Frank also turns the so-called benefits of foreign aid on their head by identifying investment, new technology, and organizational assistance as the very mechanisms by which the core undevelopes the periphery for its own benefit. Even more invidiously, Frank charges, the export of liberal ideology is intended to mask the intended exploitative nature of capitalist world relations.
(3) ‘Revivalist’ Marxist Analysis (Looking Inward at the Periphery)

This phase of analysis focusses on internal relations within developing countries vis a vis their external relations with developed countries. It includes a wide-ranging critique of neo-Marxist theories, their alleged abuse of Marxist method, and their ideological revisionism, notably by placing emphasis on national over class interests. Laclau, for instance, accuses Frank of being a "poor Marxist" by wrongly emphasizing the "relations of exchange" in capitalism, hence deviating from Marx’s fundamental definition of capitalism as a distinct mode of production according to its essential character of "relations of production." 25 This led Frank, he says, to ignore still remaining remnants of mercantilism in developing countries, and consequently to miss the real complexity of still continuing articulations between different modes. 26 According to Laclau, each case has to be considered on its own merits, because not only have some pre-capitalist social formations survived capitalist penetration, but they are strengthened by seemingly incongruous class coalitions.

In complete opposition to the neo-Marxist thesis, Laclau concludes that underdevelopment is the result of insufficient capitalist penetration, which takes us back in a full circle to Marx’s original proposition. But, contrary to classical Marxist analysis, such later theorists add the important dimension of internal class conflict within the periphery, an area of examination which is largely lacking in UDT applications to western countries as, for instance, in the application of the internal colony model to Canadian experiences.
6.4 Canadian Staples Theory

The earliest underdevelopment theorist may have been Harold Innis, whose works are the source of what later became known as Canadian "staples-theory." Innis wrote in the classical liberal tradition of political-economy but with unusual attention, for his times, on the dependency problems of Canada's export-based economy. He anticipated much of UDT and territorial regional theory by emphasizing such development factors as discrepancies in power between metropolitan cores and peripheral hinterlands, the consequences of external economic control, problems of capital leakages, institutional blockages to economic diversification, and frequent re-occurrences of economic disequilibria and crises.

The central Innisian thesis is that for Canada, unlike European countries, the motor of development is not manufacturing but rather the exporting of resource staples. Canada's development has been dominated, he argued, by a continuous search for new staples to exploit the changing demands of European markets and Canada's particular comparative advantages. The changes through successive staples -- furs, fish, timber, wheat, and industrial minerals -- have all brought economic crises in their wake, until successful transformation was made to the next staple. Innis was also interested, however, in the socio-political changes that accompanied transformations from one staple to another, which he saw as being partly determined by the particular characteristics of staple production itself. In addition to his 'staples' equivalent of Marxists' 'modes of production,' Innis also conceived a 'core-periphery' model of capitalist relations. He predicted that economic growth in Canada would ultimately be dependent on outside forces because its staple exports primed the imperial pump, not Canada's. Thus, Canada would remain a net
exporter of resources relying on borrowed technology, while being a net importer of manufactures.

Innis' staple theory has been immensely influential in Canadian development studies, both in its political-economy approach as well as its implicit socio-spatial perspective on the history of each successive staple. The following Figure 11 depicts some of the more significant connections in Canadian staple theory, which are then summarized.

Figure 11  Variants of Canadian Staple Theory

1. H. Innis: Staple Theory

2. W.A. Macintosh  "Steady Progress"

3. H. Innis/M. Watkins  Liberal Dependency Theory

4. Neo-Marxist UDT

5. Marxist UDT

6. Functional Regional Theory

7. Territorial Regional Theory
Referring to the above figure, the original Innisian staple theory has given rise to two liberal variants (2,3), and two Marxist variants (4,5). The division between the two liberal variants is the more striking, reflecting pivotal streams in Canadian schools of political economy thought which follow the contrary views of Innis and W.A. Macintosh. The Macintosh theme of "steady progress" (2) was, for a time, closely associated with Donald Creighton's "Laurentian thesis" of Canadian nation-building triumphing over the threat of American continentalism. Although professing to be inspired by Innis' staple theory, Macintosh took it in a completely different direction by extolling the role of staple exports in Canada's continuing development. Following classical trade theory, he perceived the key to colonial prosperity as lying in exporting staples to meet expanding European demands. Elaborating an early 'stages of growth' theory for settlement colonies, he described how expanded staple exports formed the basis for an evolving industrial economy to supply domestic needs, and later, foreign markets. Macintosh's reinterpretation of Innis' staple theory was a key influence on the American Douglass North's "export-base" model, which is central to much of functional regional theory (6). This connection will be elaborated later.

Macintosh's view, therefore, differed completely from that of Innis who saw dependence on staple exports as retarding Canada's progress to self-sustaining industrial growth. Innis' view has been elaborated by Melville Watkins (1963) into a more modern-day form of liberal dependency theory (3), with not dissimilar concerns to those of the early Latin American "dependistas" about the threat of U.S. hegemony. Drawing from A.O. Hirschmann, Watkins analyzes the potential for diversification around an export base economy by "spread effects" diffusing outward through backward and forward inter-
industry linkages, and through consumption linkages from expanded final demand. After assessing the impediments to achieving spread effects through these multiplier linkages, such as an insufficient population base and an "export mentality" among entrepreneurs and government, he concludes that there are serious dangers of the Canadian economy falling into a "staple trap." According to Watkins this would block the Canadian economy from evolving further through Rostow's stages of growth.

In attempting to give legitimacy to the staples approach, Watkins later claimed that he was constrained within "orthodox," that is liberal, economic analysis. However, two non-liberal themes have since diverged from liberal dependency theory. These may be called neo-Marxist UDT (4) and Marxist UDT (5), following similar divisions in Latin American underdevelopment theory. Marxist development theory is not well advanced in Canada but, true to the classical Marxist formula, is favourable towards capitalist growth to the point that Watkins has called it a Marxist version of Mackintosh's "steady progress" thesis. 34

On the other side, a number of major contributions have been made to neo-Marxist UDT (5), notably, by Tom Naylor who distinguishes between merchant and industrial capital, and points out the difficulty of the Canadian economy being able to transform itself from domination by the former to an economy emphasizing the latter. 35 Canadian theorists do have an abiding concern with blockages to domestic industrialism posed by foreign ownership, and especially of American-based MNC's draining off capital to be reinvested elsewhere. Furthermore, Canadian theorists have done considerable work examining one mechanism for extracting "surplus value," that is, the non-payment of resource rents by
MNC's and their appropriation in the form of "super-profits." This was the central theme in Watkin's alternative regional development strategy proposed for the Dene, described at some length above. These and other typical concerns in Canadian UDT overlap with the Latin-American UDT School and, also, territorial regional theory (7).

6.5 Functional Regional Theory

Functional regional theory is a close derivative of modernization theory. It represents a conscious effort begun by development theorists in the 1950s and 1960s to add an explicit spatial dimension to what, at the time, was the theory of development. This was done for two reasons. First was the somewhat mundane need for implementing modernization development plans by programming projects over space and time, and second was the more significant need to plan for overcoming problems of unequal regional development.

Much functional theory has a foundation in neo-classical economics with its focus on marginal efficiency rather than distribution, whereas, by comparison, the classical economists in the political economy tradition admitted distribution considerations. Efficiency considerations are reflected in a focus on locational decision-making, leading from Alfred Weber's models of industrial location and the central place models of Von Thunen, Losch and Christaller, which were elaborated by the likes of Walter Isard and William Alonso into a full-blown discipline of regional science. The essential theme of this new discipline may be described as "integration of the space economy." It includes spatial concerns with mobile factors of production around optimal locations, carefully calculated trade-offs between optimal site locations contributing to overall economic efficiency, and
the benefits of industrial concentration in urban centres to capture agglomeration and external economies. Functional theory also inherits an emphasis on structural analysis from development economics. Indeed, the dualism of modernity versus traditionalism has so often been conceived as a socio-spatial phenomenon that it can be seen as common core of both modernization and functional theories, the clearest example of this being the work of A.O. Hirschmann. 37

Surprisingly enough, one of the most significant contributions to spatial functional theory, the idea of 'growth poles' was originally conceived as a strong disavowal of traditional locational analysis. An important stimulus to the idea seems to have been Shumpeter's theory on the role of innovations in bringing about structural, qualitative change in the economy, which he conceived as being "development," as compared with just quantitative economic "growth." Shumpeterian ideas on the role of innovations in development strongly influenced the French economist Francois Perroux’s notion of 'growth poles,' which he conceived as points in abstract rather than concrete geographic space. Perroux argued for an understanding of innovation diffusion which was free from positivist considerations of spatial topology or what he called "banal space." 38

Unfortunately Perroux's arguments were not always clear and cogent, but he cannot be blamed for the complete misrepresentation of his central idea at the hands of numerous revisionists. His original concept of 'growth poles' in abstract space subsequently lost all its analytical cogency, as these, simplistically came to be regarded as synonymous with 'growth centres.' 39 The assumed virtues of such polarized growth are closely linked with a number of cardinal propositions about functional theory, namely (1) a focus on industry
rather than agriculture as the "engine of growth," (2) an urban bias in location decision-making for capital, technology, entrepreneurial and labour investments, and (3) a preoccupation with improving interconnectivity through the urban network to overcome blockages of "spatial friction" in order to bring about closer integration of the "space economy."

The concept of polarization was reinforced by a plethora of theories on urban system hierarchies and spatial diffusion. 40 Functional regional theory thereby closed the loop with modernization concepts of diffusion. Growth would be diffused by communications radii emanating from fixed points at the highest concentrations of giant metropoles and their surrounding galaxies, and reach all the way down to the remotest villages in the darkest corners of the terrestrial universe. Spatial diffusion of growth would also be evolutionary. Just as the modernizers conceived that economic and socio-political institutions would simultaneously become more differentiated and integrated, so would places and their surrounding regions. The spatial economy would become more urbanized and centralized, more specialized in economic activities from one location to another, and infinitely more complex with overlapping economic relationships. From this abstracted perspective, "communities" tend to recede in importance to become "places," as points in space organized on impersonal, individualistic "Gesellschaft" lines.

In another seminal contribution to functional theory, diffusionist and evolutionist motive forces were directly combined together. The economic historian, Douglass North, both borrowing from and contributing back to Canadian staples theory, originated the 'export-base' growth model. 41 North observed that growth in the U.S. Pacific Northwest had
not followed stages of economic growth paralleling the European experience. North's model recognized that economic growth in resource-hinterland regions followed changes in exogenous demand for their exports in metropolitan regions. He posited a two-region economy in which a metropolitan region I trades with a hinterland region II by exchanging manufactures and consumption goods in return for staple resources. Continued growth of the dynamic region I creates even greater demands for staple exports from region II, inducing sufficient growth over time for it to successively: (a) undertake local value-added processing of its staple exports; (b) substitute its own manufactured goods needed for resource extraction and processing, and (c) develop a residiency (i.e. non-basic) sector for meeting its own regional consumption needs. North concluded that the ratio of residiency production to the export base would eventually reach a stage equivalent to Rostow's "take-off," whereby growth in region II would be self-sustaining and converge towards the per-capita income levels of region I.

About the same time as North's article was published, however, a famous debate started on whether polarized growth in core regions would actually induce sufficient growth in peripheral regions to bring about convergence. The two most well-known contributors to this debate were the development economists, A.O. Hirschmann, an American, and the Swede, Gunner Myrdal. Hirschmann's view, as the leading proponent of the "unbalanced growth" school, was that deliberately skewed polarization was indispensable for generating development. 42 Hirschmann was one of the first economists to incorporate 'growth pole' thinking into a spatial elaboration of modernization theory, suggesting a concentrated focus on "propulsive firms" to induce growth through multiplier effects in related industries around a geographic point. While accepting that centripetal "polarization
effects" would first tend to produce spatial imbalances within surrounding regions, he was sanguine that opposite, centrifugal "spread effects" would later reverse these imbalances.

Myrdal was far less sanguine that regional convergence would ever be achieved. 43 Like Hirschmann, he distinguished between a number of unfavourable polarization effects and favourable spread effects but concluded, oppositely, that the former would outweigh the latter. Somewhat unusually for the 1950s, Myrdal rejected static equilibrium analysis, denying an automatic tendency to self-equilibrating economic systems. Even if there was some equalization of polarization and spread effects, he argued, this did not represent an equilibrium per se but merely a temporary balance. From his previous work on the vicious cycle of poverty among American blacks, he described a model of "circular cumulative causation" in which imbalances may be worsened even further by positively, reinforcing feedback (we will apply Myrdal's model to the issue of community-based development later). Therefore, according to Myrdal, regional inequalities in a capitalist economic system would tend to get worse before they got better.

On the whole, theorists at the time favoured Hirschmann's more optimistic scenario of interregional convergence. Empirical evidence was quickly marshalled to support his contentions. However, in one of the most famous examples (by Williamson) eventual convergence was seen to depend on the migration of many workers from the periphery to the more dynamic core. 44 A similar conclusion was reached in the classic Regions, Resources and Economic Growth by Perloff et al, which addressed the problem of "lagging regions" in industrialized countries. 45 The authors estimated the comparative advantages of different U.S. regions by their relative access to "production inputs" and "market
outputs." The bottom line of their complex and sophisticated analysis was the immutable fact, for them, that some regions will inevitably stay poor or decline. Their residents, they argued, would be better off migrating to ensure "people prosperity" rather than pursue the impossible dream of "place prosperity" in their own regions. This was the assumption, of course, behind the 1969 White Paper’s Draconian proposals for depopulating Indian reserves located outside of urban areas.

Functional theory was also applied in the Third World development. John Friedmann, describing his work for the Venezuelan government, very explicitly laid out a two-pronged approach for increasing the relative rate of growth in the periphery to decrease its inequalities with the core, and to simultaneously increase aggregate growth throughout the country. 46 He introduced a spatial dimension to Rostow’s stages theory by adding growth pole theory and fusing them together. Friedmann argued that each stage of development is characterized by its own distinct spatial pattern of economic activities, and consequently there will be an optimal spatial development strategy for progressing from one stage to the next. As the country’s economy matured, its activities would become more differentiated and more complex in space (i.e. analogous to Durkheim’s thesis of social differentiation). At the most advanced stage of development, the national economy would be organized around a "nested" hierarchy of urban regions dominated by large metropolitan centres with fully-integrated supply and demand markets. Friedmann proposed that progression to this higher stage be facilitated by systematic government intervention to extend the urban network out from the core to the periphery, where connections from the metropolitan centres could exercise a growth pole effect on emerging urban regions.
Friedmann's layering of more powerful and less powerful regions is a benign equivalent of A.G. Frank's more sinister metropole-satellite model of capital exploitation (published coincidentally the following year). But, Friedmann was soon to turn his own model on its head. A landmark article which he had written sometime previously, but not published till later, *A General Theory of Polarized Development* can be seen as a "hinge theory" in his personal radicalization and later defection to territorial regional theory. Friedmann describes functional theory as a special case only applicable in a few western countries where dualism between core and periphery is negligible. The fate of most peripheral regions, Friedmann warns, will be increasing subordination to the core region's polarized power (political, economic, and social) through its control over innovations. He concludes that such asymmetry would increase to such a point where peripheral regions would separate and start to develop their own competing cores in the world system.

6.6 **Territorial Regional Theory**

Territorial regional theory is the antithesis of functional regional theory. It is quite heterogenous because it has linkages with the neo-Marxist strand of UDT through the internal colony model, and contains an additional strand of anti-materialist thought (which, as shown, is not lacking in UDT but is not so significant as it is in territorial theory). Because of this anti-materialist thread, territorial theory is equally opposed ideologically to both Marxist and liberal emphases on industrialization and urbanization. Because of these complexities, territorial theory is not as closely derivative of UDT, as functional theory is of modernization theory.
The anti-materialist contribution to territorial theory will discussed first, followed by the UDT contribution. It would be a mistake to suggest that the heterogenous nature of territorial theory is attributable to its status as an "emerging paradigm," for it has long historical roots which parallel the emergence of modernization theory. The nineteenth and early twentieth century modernization views of classical economist and sociologists have retrospectively tended to be awarded far more dominance than was contemporaneously true (reflecting, no doubt, modernization theory's later ascendance to virtual monopolization of western development thought). Even in nineteenth-century Great Britain, the "workshop of the world," capitalist growth was the target of much intellectual disapproval. Most notable was the rejection of liberal humanist ideals by some conservative neo-Hegelians, such as Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin and Matthew Arnold, who were very influential in their day. It is from the political Left, however, that modern day territorial advocates prefer to trace their genealogy. Clyde Weaver, particularly, focusses on the European contribution made by utopian socialists such as Charles Fourier, Robert Owen and Ebenezer Howard, as well as by anarchists such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon and Peter Kropotkin. Later intellectuals associated with the territorial "school" include American organic regionalists such as Howard Odum and Lewis Mumford. The social ecologist, Carl Schumacher, can also be seen as part of this tradition.

It is difficult to summarize the many diverse and sometimes contradictory ideas of the anti-materialist tradition, but three central and interconnected themes do stand out, populism, communalism, and regionalism, which are summarized below:--
First, and foremost, is the influence on territorial theory from populism in all its rather diverse connotations as: (a) a rejection of the claim that capitalism, industrialism and rational thought represent a "natural" and positive evolution, (b) opposition to modern urban life as dehumanizing and destructive of traditional rural ideals, and (c) distrust of large-scale, centralized forms of organization which threaten real political legitimacy residing with "the people."

Second, the latter populist concern overlaps with the emphasis in communalism on democratic ideals of decentralized decision-making in small local groups. Another linkage of communalism with populism is its concern with the atomizing impacts of capitalism on human relations. The communalist notion of economic cooperation is also influential with some territorial theorists, though they exhibit considerable ambivalence on the critical issue of ownership over productive forces, some leaning to full collectivization, others to cooperatives, and still others to volunteerism.

Third, the theme of regionalism denotes here a perceived holism between natural ecological regions and distinct human societies. Closely associated with this is the idea of bringing about an improved balance between city and countryside, which closely overlaps with the populist tradition. On the other side, regionalist concepts of urban decentralization, improved ecological stewardship, and territorially-grounded societies connect with communalist ideals of intimacy in economic and socio-political relations, and with related ideas on the shared use of natural resources.

Territorial theory also draws strongly on neo-Marxist UDT. Particularly influential has been
A.G. Frank's socio-spatial model of exploitative metropole-satellite relations extending downward through the world capitalist system. A number of neo-Marxist critiques of peripheral exploitation have found their way into the territorial literature, including studies of unequal trade relations, vulnerable dependence on select staple exports, and skewing of consumption away from real local needs. By comparison, little is drawn from Marxist UDT, and, like the neo-Marxists, territorial theorists give scant attention to explaining internal class relations. Two major obstructions to assimilating Marxist ideas into territorial theory seem to be its extreme materialist ideology and its economic determinist method. A singular attempt by Weaver to draw in debate from British and French "radical regional science" only serves to highlight the inherent anti-regionalism of doctrinaire Marxists. They accuse neo-Marxists, along with liberal intellectuals, of "spatial fetishism" by reifying the notion of "places exploiting other places," instead of understanding that regional disparities are merely the side product of uneven capitalist class relations.

Two of the most significant UDT regional contributions to territorial theory have been made by non-Marxist theorists writing from an internal colony perspective. Most notably, Stuart Holland’s and Michael Hechter’s theories are explicitly spatial, and, even worse for orthodox Marxists, deal with issues of nationalism. Holland in his Capital Against the Regions builds on Myrdal’s criticism of equilibrium growth models to propose a model of increasing regional disparities due to unequal trade. In similar fashion to Sunkel’s model of "transnational capitalism," Holland attributes regional exploitation to what he calls the "meso-sector" of oligopolist multinational corporations, which use the mobility of capital and labour to simultaneously exploit the less developed regions in their own countries (as well as less developed countries) by pitching them together into a mutually-
destructive bidding war for the sale of their resources and manufactures. Holland's conclusion is that functionally-organized capital has to be brought under national control by the territorial state.

Different conclusions about the state are reached by Hechter in his already described analysis of the underdevelopment of Britain's "Celtic Fringe." He sees the latter as victims of spatially uneven waves of modernization over state territory which left relatively advanced and less advanced groups in the core and periphery respectively. Rather than these differences giving way to convergence, the core used its power over the state apparatus to reinforce economic differences around cultural divisions of labour. Hechter argues, therefore, that core-periphery exploitation has to be conceived both in economic and cultural terms to explain the emergence of nationalist, regionalist movements attempting to exert territorial control against the central state.

The mechanisms described in the literature for exerting territorial control over functional capital mobility are diverse, but often imprecise. Two of the more clearly articulated ideas are briefly described, that is promotion of a "use-value economy" and strategies of "selective regional closure." The concept of a use-value economy draws inspiration from a number of anti-materialist sources such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon's idea of "mutualism" in free contractual relations between workers, Peter Kropotkin's notion of "mutual aid," and Robert Owen's ideas of cooperatives, as well as other shared ideas on useful and attractive work. Clyde Weaver pulls these traditional threads together with later UDT thinking on the subjection of regional economies by international capital, to propose an alternative in locally-controlled and relevant use-value economies.
Weaver describes the role of the exchange-value economy promoted under state capitalism in opening up local economies to capitalist penetration, and the focussing of local effort into producing commodities which can only be distributed for cash in the market place. It is by means of realizing this exchange value that national capital, and later international capital has been able to extract surplus value from regional labour and resources, providing a source of funds for their further exploitation. Not only does this result in a net loss of wealth from peripheral regions, but also regional economies become simplified to only meet export demands, while other local resources are left idle even though there are unsatisfied local needs. The solution Weaver advocates is return to an "informal economy" based on household and communal use-value production (i.e. without cash exchange) and simple commodity production (i.e. barter, or cash exchange without capital accumulation). Obviously, at this level of disaggregation the differences between "region" and "community" become blurred and, indeed, it is more appropriate to think in terms of a "region of communities." The concept of community which is implicit is one organized along intimate, interpersonal "Gemeinschaft" lines.

Obviously, not all needs can be met locally. Imports are necessary and have to be paid for by some export commodity production. This leads to the second concept of "selective regional closure." Interestingly enough, some inspiration for this came from A.O. Hirschmann when he was still a major advocate of the modernization school. He suggested that favourable conditions for development could be created if "open" regional economies were treated in the same way as relatively, "closed" national economies, and vice versa. His idea was to create the conditions which would maximize favourable spread effects and minimize unfavourable polarization effects. It was Stohr and Tohdting,
however, who formalized the concept of "selective regional closure" as largely a strategy for LDC's to control their outgoing transfers of raw materials and incoming transfers of technology, capital and managerial assistance. Instead of attempting to maximize efficiency of returns to productive factors at the international level, Stohr and Tohdting argue, the best strategy for LDC's would be to first integrate regional supply and demand markets for local benefit and, second, carefully select how they would participate in interregional trade for their own best interests. However, one searches the territorial literature in vain to find how the notion of selective closure, which admits of continued participation in the exchange-value economy, would articulate in practice with a use-value economy.

Closely intertwined with ideas for a territorial economy are proposals for complementary political decentralism (which appear to run the gamut of: (a) Platonic visions of participatory democracy, (b) communalist revisions of Chinese communism, and (c) a mixture of Jeffersonian agrarian republicanism and anarchism. What does seem to be common among territorial advocates is suspicion of any centralized authority, whether manifested in Weberian-style organizational statism or class-controlled movements of the Right or the Left. Thus, for instance, they do not place any store on class revolution by either the urban proletariat (as in Marxist UDT) or the rural peasantry (as in neo-Marxist UDT). However, one continuing theme in Clyde Weaver's works are demands for political autonomy made by renascent regional nationalities in the European periphery. By a process of elimination, therefore, it can be concluded that territorial theorists' hopes for social revolution lie somewhere within the scope of rural-based and neo-populist movements and/or nationalist regional movements.
6.7 Community Economic Development (CED) Theory

Because of the later focus in the thesis on a community-based approach to Indian development, the derivation of community economic development (CED) theories will be traced. As stated, the genesis of all contemporary development theories is in societal theories, whether of the modernization or UDT variants. Their closest derivatives are regional development theories, and it is through these that the principal linkages can be traced to CED theories, not unexpectedly so because of their common socio-spatial focus. Specifically, connections are drawn between modernization/functional theories and liberal CED approaches, and between UDT/territorial theories and reformist/radical CED approaches. Community economic development is a relatively new field and the literature dealing with theory per se is very limited. To illustrate CED's strong derivation from other development theories, three books are selected from the field which respectively following a liberal, reformist and radical approach.

(1) Ron Schafer, Community Economics: Economic Structure and Change in Smaller Communities (1989). 60

This very detailed textbook about what its American author calls "community economic analysis" generally follows a liberal CED approach in terms of its political economy assumptions, such as reliance on local individual entrepreneurship to generate economic development without significant government intervention. The ultimate sources of development are seen as external to the community at the national and regional levels, so that local residents can only "manipulate to some extent" their circumstances. 61 Shafer defines community tersely in gesellschaft terms as being a "geographic area, some kind of communications or social linkages, and a commonality of mutual interest," and the purpose of development is to promote "individual and group interests" within the
community. In turn, the end products of development are described solely as economic in nature, that is they are essentially limited to issues of economic efficiency and social justice, the latter being circumscribed to advancing "access to opportunity," without making any guarantees about how disadvantaged people would actually share in dividing the economic pie. Indeed, the author concludes that, "If a community chooses to pursue an economic development program, people in poverty need not be a specific target."  

Schafer describes two groups of development theories to support his premise that community economic growth is largely exogenously initiated. Both groups of theories are taken directly from the modernization and functional development schools (and many of the authors he cites were prominent in the international development field during the 1960s and 1970s). The first theories are supply-orientated and follow the neoclassical model, i.e. static equilibrium is reached throughout the economic system by capital and labour moving in response to market signals to those communities with the highest marginal returns. Human and capital resources are underemployed, it is said, "because they are immobile among uses and places." The second group of development theories are demand-orientated, with a particular emphasis on export base theories. It is assumed that investment shifts to communities with a comparative advantage for supplying natural resources to meet external demands, though, because of economies of scale local economies may expand around their export base.

To illustrate the need for careful selection of viable businesses which will survive in "open" local economies, numerous methods of community economic analysis are described in considerable detail. All the methods described are the stock and trade of functional
regional scientists, i.e. location theory, central place theory, market area analysis, operations of labour supply and demand markets, economic multipliers, economic base studies, and input-output analysis. In keeping with Schafer's functionalist assumptions about the space economy, his recommended implementation strategies are largely restricted to improving local competitiveness in the regional and national marketplace (and, indeed, are given very little attention). Responsibility for implementation is left largely to the private sector. Thus, where local government intervention is warranted, it should focus only on "generating an environment that facilitates the mobility of resources among uses and applications promising high returns in output, income and employment." 64


This American text describes a reformist approach for active community intervention in the local economy to ensure its long-term sustainability in the face of growing economic threats from the outside. 66 Instead of attempting to attract resources into the community, an emphasis is placed on "'endogenous development' policies using the potential of local human, institutional and physical resources." 67 Development is perceived as a "community determined process" with intensive involvement by the community's local government (and/or community based groups) acting in partnership with private enterprise.

Blakely follows a non-Marxist UDT line of argument to describe why communities should take their own initiatives for economic development. Two sets of exogenous forces are blamed for eroding local economic independence and viability. The first force impacting on local communities is the trend towards economic globalization, with the result that, "As
U.S. firms enter this competition (and some would argue, sponsor it), their loyalty to the national boundaries diminish," and many "are engaged in what has come to be known as exporting jobs." The second force impacting on local communities is the new mobility of international capital that manifests itself in "stock portfolio transactions, currency manipulation, firm takeovers, and buy-outs," where, "The driving force of the use of capital is for short term-gain rather than the production of goods." Other structural changes in the modern economy are seen as leading to increasing segmentation of the labour force into (a) "core" jobs, with adequate wages and security, and which tend to be more knowledge-intensive, and (b) increasing numbers of "peripheral" or marginalized positions. 68

Blakely's analysis of the negative exogenous forces acting on local communities leads him to recommend that they pursue their own endogenous development programs. "In too many instances," he alleges, "the combination of national economic interest and the motivations of multi-national firms do not coincide with the need or interest of local communities, workers, or disadvantaged segments of the community...." Thus, he concludes, communities will have to do the job themselves by taking on more responsibility for their own economic development. This is seen both as "a reaction to large-scale economic transformation and a positive response to the possibilities of formulating locally based economic solutions in spite of larger-scale economic and political forces." 69

Blakely reviews a number of functional regional economic theories, and while recognizing that they have some practical utility, he also concludes that they are often opposed to
community interests. For instance, neo-classical economic theory is criticized for its anti-interventionism stance, as well "as antagonism to the interests of communities as places with a raison d'etre beyond their economic utility." Similarly, the economic base model is seen as fundamentally flawed because of its orientation to external demand rather than internal need, and as potentially harmful because its overzealous application can lead to a skewed, dependent economy. Lastly, location theory is seen as being less relevant than it used to be because modern technology and tele-communications as well as reduced transportation costs reduce the importance of specific locations for the production of goods.

Taking the above shortcomings of existing theories as a point of departure, Blakely defines four principles for moving toward a theory of local economic development which are highly reminiscent of regional territorial proposals, i.e.

**employment:** the focus would be on economic opportunities that fully employ local supplies of human, natural, and institutional resources, rather than just satisfy external demand.

**development base:** building a new self-determining political and economic institutional base is now more important than just building up an export base of staple commodities.

**location assets:** local comparative advantage is now based on a quality environment instead of just on physical resources.

**knowledge resources:** local economic development will be dependent upon the ability of communities to use higher education and research to create their own development, instead of being dependent on outside innovations.

Although Blakely sees the central state as ineffectual in opposing the interests of multi-
national firms, or even to be aligned with them, he rejects the idea that local government should operate on laissez-faire principles. Instead, he oppositely assigns a leading role to local public/private planning processes to counter these external threats. But, the vulnerability of communities to exogenous forces leads him to discount those planning approaches which only tend to accommodate or lessen the impacts of these threats. Instead, "strategic planning" is favoured "as the most appropriate approach for all communities." This is defined as a "future-orientated planning approach that builds the economy of the community on the basis of a local needs perspective," and which emphasizes both a "long-range" view and "large-scale" public intervention. 71 Contrary to functional calculations of moving jobs and capital to optimize economic efficiency through specialization, Blakely proposes that local planning processes should further community goals to build quality jobs for the current population, achieve local economic stability, and build a diverse economic and employment base.

(3) David P. Ross and Peter J. Usher, From the Roots Up. Economic Development as if Community Mattered (1986). 72

This book has its antecedents in the same radical anti-materialism that provides one of the central threads, along with neo-Marxist UDT, in territorial regional theory. The two Canadian authors present a program to renew the traditional role of family and community for informal socio-economic activity, and to partly exclude the modernizing forces of both formally-organized big business and the centralized welfare state. Considering that territorial theorists who emphasize anti-materialism tend to narrow any distinction between ‘region’ and ‘community,’ it is not surprising that there is a very close similarity between their proposals and those of CED radical theorists.
Akin to territorial theorists, the authors eschew economist solutions of both the political Right and the Left to what, they perceive, are simultaneously economic and social problems. On the Right side they especially deplore the return to conservative economics, including beliefs in the automatic economic efficiency of the market place, renewed faith in the "trickle down" benefits of growth, and calls for post-Keynesian fiscal restraint. They note that on the Left side, those who believe in replacing capitalism with socialism place their faith in organized industrialization, and, like the Right, reject the informal economy as a viable alternative.

Older economies, the authors point out, relied on such traditional relations as family and community to get things done. However, these relations now play such a marginal role in our economic lives that we think of them solely as social, rather than as economic institutions also. Large corporations and governments have come to play an increasingly greater role in our lives, including providing a great deal of what people used to do routinely for themselves, and could again -- such as, providing food, clothing, shelter, and a wide range of personal and social services. A return to more informal activity would not only reduce local communities' dependence on the market place and government bureaucracy, but would also improve the quality of work experiences.

The authors describe some of the various ways in which the informal economy has been characterized, i.e.

- **pre- or non-industrial societies**: such as small-scale agriculture and fisheries, and aboriginal hunting and trapping economies.
- **the household economy**: organized around self-sufficiency in such staples as food, clothing, and energy production.
the neighbourhood or mutual-aid economy: where households exchange goods and services with each other on a non-monetized, or, at least, non-profit basis.

the alternative or counterculture economy: including traditional agricultural sects such as the Amish and the Hutterites, utopian or so-called "intentional communities," and the ex-urbanite "back to the land" movement.

small enterprises: as in the appropriate technology movement.

Adding together all the diverse concepts of informal economy activity, Ross and Usher summarize its salient characteristics as follows:--

...informal activity is associated with more face-to-face contact, both among those making decisions and those affected by them; by more consensus-type decision making; by less specialization and stereo-typing; by fewer regulations; by more direct attention being paid to personal development; by more flexible work routines; by increased local decision making; by a greater reliance on personal and community resources; by the benefits of production being distributed more according to need; by the absence of capital accumulation for its own sake, by the reduced emphasis placed on money; by increased direct concern for the community, the environment and the welfare of future generations; and by more cooperation. 73

It is recognized that in today's world both the informal and formal economies are required to meet peoples' needs. The authors argue for public policies to promote an appropriate mix of both economies so that people can make the choices which suit them best.

6.8 Conclusions

To conclude, this review has demonstrated the following:--

(1) Modernization doctrine, which has been the dominant influence behind the state's assimilative policies towards Indians, has long roots in eighteenth and nineteenth century British sociological and political-economy thought. UDT, which has played a
major formative role in criticisms of state Indian policy, has more recent origins in Latin American reactions against modernization theory.

(2) Modernization theory and UDT can be respectively viewed as "thesis" and "antithesis" because their opposing assumptions are perceived by their adherents as mutually exclusive. This dualism is manifested most clearly in their respective assumptions about the sources of development for the group in question, i.e. in our case, Canadian Indians. For modernization theorists, development is an exogenously, initiated and controlled process, whereas most UDT theorists tend to see "underdevelopment" as being exogenous and development as endogenous (but see below).

(3) Modernization theories and UDT are "core theories" respectively in the assimilative and autonomist paradigms of development thought. Regional development theories provide a more implicit spatial perspective than the primarily social orientation of the core theories. CED theories are, in turn, strongly derivative from regional theories.

(4) There is considerable parallelism between opposing "societal," "regional," and "community" development theories in each paradigm. However, there are some cases of overlaps between theories. Canadian "staples" theory, though often associated with UDT, has also contributed to modernization theory. Further, although Neo-Marxist underdevelopment theorists view development as endogenous, a smaller group comprising of Marxists and some liberal UDT theorists view development as exogenous.
CHAPTER SEVEN. CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT THEORIES

7.1 Overview

In the preceding chapter an examination was made of assimilationist and autonomist development theories, many of which have been applied in the formulation or criticism of Indian policy in Canada. This chapter criticizes the reductionism which is rampant in each of these opposing groups of theories or doctrines, as well as their mutual dualism. These shortcomings oversimplify and sometimes seriously misrepresent the nature of underdevelopment and development, and obscure other alternative explanations and prescriptions.

The critique is directed generally against existing development doctrines, and its complexity does not allow continuous references to be made to applications in Canadian Indian policy. However, important theoretical issues, which came up in the historical analysis of Indian policy in the first part of the thesis, are addressed. These include the superiority of our proposed relational approach for explaining how "external" changes in state-Indian relations interacted with "internal" changes in Indian society, and, connected to this, the false claims of existing "unidirectional" theories to provide complete explanations for all situations. The chapter closes with some proposals for elaborating our relational approach and how it can help overcome endemic problems of dualism in development theory, including the desirability of conceptualizing Indian groups as simultaneously constitutive but nevertheless distinct components in Canadian society. Although the issues discussed are complex they do bear to the heart of the policy debate between the Canadian state and Indians, and some of them will be taken up more directly in the final concluding chapter.
The critique starts by focussing on relationships between the "substantive" development theories described in the previous chapter and their underlying planning "process" theories (see Figure 1-1 in the Introduction). As already explained, "substantive" planning theories try to make sense of the phenomena with which planning practice deals, i.e. in the case under review here, examining problems of Indian underdevelopment and proposing solutions, and criticizing other theories and practice in the field. By comparison, planning "process" theories deal with such questions as why and when planning should be undertaken, by whom and for whom, and by what means. As will be shown, this theoretical distinction narrows in more radical planning perspectives which tend "to collapse substance and process," but the overall distinction is still a useful one.

As also stated, process planning theory effectively sets a priori rules for designing substantive theory in two ways. First, process theory influences perceptions of what constitute development problems that need to be addressed, as well as of the appropriate nature and scope of planned interventions for correcting the problems. Second, process theory delineates how to go about selecting, bounding, and interpreting knowledge about substantive phenomena, and how this knowledge should inform and be incorporated in planning practice.

A central argument in the critique is that the opposing assimilationist and autonomist doctrines are each associated with their own particular tradition of process theories, and that they respectively share similar ideological/institutional assumptions about the societal context in which planning takes place. More particularly, the assumptions underlying process theories may be strongly determinant of shortcomings in substantive theories. It
necessarily follows that if development theory is to be improved, so must process theory. Following is an idealized planning process model which provides a framework for criticizing current theories and making proposals for improvements.

7.2 Planning Process Model

A process model is proposed here which promotes the use of different planning approaches according to their relevance to the particular development problem at hand or, more probably, to various parts of the problem. Indeed, the model recognizes that many planning problems are of a complex multi-contextual nature and can often be viewed rightfully from many different perspectives. Only in rare cases is there a single right answer. The attempt here to synthesize different approaches contrasts with the prevailing tendency to see different planning process theories as inherently competitive or even mutually exclusive.

The rapid institutionalization of planning in the modern western state has been accompanied by a succession of theories which attempt to describe or model how planning presently works in practice, and to either argue for retaining the status quo or, more commonly, propose new directions. By the 1970’s, the range of different theories had expanded to the point where a secondary literature started to emerge which surveyed shifts between important schools of thought. 1 Typically, these surveys employ a comparative typology which categorized theories into a number of abstract ‘ideal types.’ In some cases an argument is made that different theories are suited to different applications (i.e. a "mix and match" approach), though the rules for applying this in practice are not well defined. 2 Sometimes, but rarely, paradigm shifts in theory are
placed in their respective historical and situational contexts. However, a review of the literature only revealed one serious attempt to propose a synthetic approach to planning theory, which will be examined below.

Our process model is constructed around a three-part typology of ‘liberal,’ ‘reformist’ and ‘radical’ planning traditions, which differ according to their respective concepts of fundamental elements in the planning process, namely knowledge, power, interests, and action. The interrelationships between these various elements are shown on the following Figure 12:

Figure 12  
Elements of Planning Process Theory

A. KNOWLEDGE  
- rationality in planning

B. POWER AND INTERESTS
1 Power relations in political society
2 Social integration in the state
3 The public interest

C. ACTION  
- planned intervention
The model reflects John Friedmann's assertion that bringing knowledge to action in pursuit of the public interest is at the core of the planning enterprise. As denoted above by the feedback loop from action to knowledge, this is often a reciprocal relationship because not only is reality changed continuously by planned intervention, but some forms of knowledge derive from "learning by doing." To impart more realism to Friedmann's assertion about the centrality of knowledge-public interest-action in the planning process, our model also includes the element of social power relations. Not only is planning concerned with manipulating power relations in society to promote the public interest, it is also constrained by these relations in terms of what it can achieve. In other words, planning is a political activity and thus intimately ideological. This is no less true of planning practice than it is of the theories which are supposed to be representative and formative of practice.

Thus, our process model encompasses those general elements which are integral to any category of planning theory, whether implicitly or explicitly. The core issues which each element attempts to address can be summarized as follows:--

A. KNOWLEDGE

Different epistemological definitions of rationality in the planning process: what is the nature of "true" knowledge?

B. POWER AND INTERESTS

1 Dimensions of 'power relations' in political society: in what ways can individuals and groups advance their own interests vis a vis those of others?
2 Perspectives on 'social integration' in the state: how is the state presently organized to determine and manage competing interests?

3 Definitions of the 'public interest': what is the symmetry/asymmetry between individuals' and groups' "real" interests and those which presently dominate in society, and what is in the larger interest of all citizens of the state?

C. ACTION

Different strategies of 'planned intervention': what is the appropriate nature and scope of state action for advancing the public interest?

Categories of planning theory can be distinguished according to how they differently conceptualize the above elements. Our model breaks out three 'liberal,' 'reformist' and 'radical' groups of theories or planning traditions, which each cluster around fundamentally different concepts of the above elements. At the same time, it is argued that the respective central contents of each tradition are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined in a holism. Extensive use is made of three scholarly contributions to synthesizing different theories in political science and the planning field. First, is a promising proposal by Weaver, Jessop, and Das for constructing a "new rationality" in planning, based on multi-dimensional ways of knowing. 6 Second is Steven Lukes' well-known model of three-dimensional power relations. 7 Third, is Alford and Friedlands' voluminous attempt to synthesize various theories of the state. 8 The following parts of our model can best be described as an attempt to synthesize these syntheses, and to elaborate their arguments where necessary.
7.2.1 Multi-Dimensional Ways of Knowing

Weaver, Jessop and Das present a typology of "historical planning paradigms," according to their respective assumptions about rational knowledge and the public interest. "Rationality in the public interest," they point out, "is the yardstick by which planning aspires to legitimacy for informing and guiding public affairs; however, definitions of what is rational and the nature of the public good have changed over time." 9 Unlike the model presented here, Weaver et al do not attempt to draw any systematic correlations between changing definitions of knowledge and interests. Their contribution focussed on here is how different planning theories are underpinned by different concepts of knowledge.

Planning has long based its claim to political legitimacy on its use of "scientific" knowledge, sometimes in the general sense of orderly presentations of facts, reasoning, and beliefs, but more commonly in the particular sense of employing rigorous rules of discovery and testing in constructing formal theories. After the Second World War, when the social and applied sciences were obsessed with achieving the same legitimacy as the natural sciences, planning became particularly dominated by positivism (or, more correctly, by Popperian neo-positivism, which substituted falsification in place of the more demanding test of verification). By the mid-1960s, however, neo-positivism itself started to come under attack from a number of directions. One source of attack has been from within the philosophy of science itself, including the upturning of previous verities such as the separation of knowing subject from externally observed object, and claims to value-free theorizing. Criticisms have also been made within the social and applied sciences as to whether the study of human affairs can practically, or should morally, mimic the empiricism of the natural sciences. 10
The reactions against positivism have greatly influenced the epistemology of recent planning theory, although few theorists have made explicit appeals for accommodating different styles of knowledge. One notable exception is John Friedmann’s proposal for a "transactive planning" model, to conjoin what he calls "technical" and "personal" knowledge and hence to narrow the gap between professionals and citizens through mutual learning. 11 Weaver, Jessop and Das go another step further by distinguishing three styles of "personal," "sociological" and "positivist" knowledge, which are summarized below:--

(1) **Personal knowledge** is experimental in nature embodying pragmatic "learning from doing." Rationality is derived from personal experiences and beliefs which intimately shape our lives, and which provide intuitive and reflective frames of reference. Personal knowledge is always unique to each culture.

(2) **Sociological knowledge** is the social construction of reality where "facts" are seen as values shaped by historical conditions, such as class structure or other socially-determined forces. The social purposes of sociological knowledge can be described in Weberian terms as "substantial," that is, concerned with the rationality of ends. Sociological knowledge is explicitly subjective, organized according to formal theories which are situational in nature.

(3) **Positive knowledge** is information gained from empirical observation of the external environment and from scientific experimentation. The social purposes of positive knowledge in Weberian terms are "functional," that is, concern with the
instrumental rationality of the means to ends. Positive knowledge claims to be objective and has consequent pretensions to universality.

Weaver, Jessop and Das apply their three-dimensional concept of knowledge in two ways. First, they distinguish a typology of "historical planning paradigms" according to their respective underpinnings of different types of knowledge. Second, the authors include a plea for combining different types of knowledge, each with their own distinctive epistemology and method, to suit the particular circumstances at hand. "Rationality is basically articulating some matter in the clearest, most transparent manner," they claim, "and no one style of knowledge is inherently more superior than any another if it is carefully selected and applied." 12 It should be emphasized that Weaver et al are not advocating relativism, where "truth" is infinitely variable by individual, place, and time. Instead, they propose that in the quest for a new holistic rationality, there is need to apply the right types of knowledge to suit the particulars of each planning problem and, it should be added, according to general contingent conditions in society.

7.2.2 Multi-Dimensional Power Relations

Steven Lukes developed his three-dimensional concept of power relations in reaction to more simplistic viewpoints. 13 Lukes is concerned with the exercise of power in political contexts, which he conceives generally as ‘A exercising power over B which is contrary to B’s own best interests in a significant way.’

Lukes describes the most popular Western viewpoint of power relations as "one-dimensional." As an illustrative example, he cites how power relations are viewed by the
pluralist sociologist Robert Dahl. Dahl's viewpoint on power can be summarized as involving 'a successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do.' In his most famous work, Dahl compares the relative influence of different political actors in an American city, by tabulating their relative "successes" and "failures" in advancing policies vis-a-vis those of their competitors. 14 Thus, as is fitting the positivist bent of all pluralists, he focusses on the study of concrete, observable behaviour. Generally, pluralists do not accept other possibilities, such as that real interests may not be observable or that some people may be unaware of their own best interests. Instead, they are limited to the study of what Lukes calls situational power, where the advancement of competing individual and group interests are played out through their overt participation in democratic processes.

The simple assumption that all competing interests are democratically mediated is challenged in a two-dimensional view of power. Lukes refers to Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) criticism that the pluralist view can give a misleadingly, sanguine picture of democratic politics. 15 These writers counter that power is not only exercised when A participates overtly in the making of decisions that effect B, but is also exercised in more tacit ways when A creates or reinforces organized biases in societal relations. These biases effectively "limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A." 16 Up to a point, Bachrach and Baratz's critique of the pluralists' one-dimensional view of power is anti-behaviourist, because they are in essence arguing that some real power conflicts are not allowed to even enter the observable arena of political decision-making. However, they softened their position by stressing "observable" conflict. Despite their qualified critique of
behaviouralism, Bachrach and Baratz do make a useful contribution by recognizing the second, important dimension of what Lukes calls structural power -- that is, an organized bias in institutions controlled by elites, which prevents some issues adverse to their interests even being placed on the political agenda.

Lukes criticizes Bachrach and Baratz's qualified anti-behaviouralism by arguing that it is inadequate to always associate power with observable conflict, for although "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do... he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants." 17 Thus, Lukes proposes a three-dimensional view of power which also recognizes such insidious biases throughout society of systemic power which cause the less-powerful to be kept unaware of their own best interests. Assumptions of this third dimension of power are fundamental to Marxist class theory but, according to Lukes, this is not a necessary prerequisite for its analysis.

There is an important correlation between Lukes' three dimensions of power and different definitions of interests. This is because normative judgments of valid interests in society are typically framed within one view of power relations or another. The dimension of power which is assumed in any analysis has important implications for how each individual's real interests may be perceived versus those which are dominant in prevailing forms of social integration in the state. Lukes is worth quoting at some length on this:

Extremely crudely, one might say that the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation. The reformist, seeing and deploring that not all men's wants are
given equal weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what they want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways -- in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and preferences. The radical, however, maintains that men's wants may themselves be a product of a system that works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice.

Lukes' distinction between 'liberal,' 'reformist' and 'radical' conceptions of interests is synonymous, both in terminology and partial meaning, with our typology of three planning traditions. Lukes holds that no one of these judgments of valid interests is more inherently correct than any other one on methodological grounds, though in specific situations one or two levels of power relations may be more, but not exclusively, relevant for analysis. Often, however, real world complexity can be best modelled from a three-dimensional viewpoint of power relations and their social integration in the state.

As will be obvious by now, Lukes' concept of three-dimensional power also has important epistemological ramifications. Under conditions of 'situational' power, the objective interests of all competing individuals and groups are observably revealed in their behaviour. But when the interests of the less powerful are manipulatively excluded from the public agenda by 'structural' power, their subjective nature can only be inferred from contrary evidence. And when the less powerful are kept unaware by 'systemic' power that their subjectively-held preferences are not even reflective of their own best, objective interests, then the positivist tenants of behavioural science are completely inoperable. Clearly, other ways of knowing have to be employed in the latter cases. Generally, as we move across the spectrum from liberal to reformist viewpoints, and then to the radical viewpoint, the emphasis changes from use of 'positivist' to 'sociological' knowledge because of an
increasing concern with divisions in society.

The connections of ‘personal’ knowledge with different planning traditions are more variable because of their association with social learning models, which are equally prominent in both reformist and radical traditions. Taking their cue from John Dewey’s pragmatism, social learning theorists hold that knowledge emerges from a dialectical process where understandings are enriched by experience and new personal learning is reinserted in practice. Instead of positivist beliefs that the social world corresponds to immutable "social laws," social learning theorists assert that behaviour or even, beliefs can be changed, and that the scientifically correct way to achieve this is through continuing planned experimentation. Friedmann’s "transactive" learning model is clearly in the radical tradition because the intent is to bring about a paradigmatic change in fundamental beliefs as to how society should be organized, and to simultaneously pursue radical action to bring this about. However, social learning theory was first elaborated by theorists in the reformist tradition with less ambitious political agendas, notably Lewis Mumford with ideas that planning should be a self-educating process which intimately involves ordinary citizens, and Edgar Dunn who conceived of planning as a continuously adaptive process of "evolutionary experimentation." 19

7.2.3 Perspectives on Social Integration

Alford and Friedland propose a synthesis of three dominant theories of the state. 20 Their model is useful for showing different ways in which interests may be perceived as being socially integrated or not integrated within the state. Consequently, its inclusion provides a useful corrective to the lack of an explicit political context in some other planning
Alford and Friedland acknowledge their debt to Lukes' typology, whose three dimensions of power underpin their three perspectives of the state, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State perspective</th>
<th>pluralist</th>
<th>managerial</th>
<th>(neo-Marxist) class theories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power dimension</td>
<td>situational</td>
<td>structural</td>
<td>systemic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alford and Friedlands' central concept is that there is a "home domain" within each perspective which provides a cogent description and explanation of one aspect of the modern, western, democratic state. Thus, "the pluralist perspective contributes to a partial understanding of the democratic aspect of the state; the managerial perspective contributes to an understanding of the state's bureaucratic aspect; and the class perspective helps explain the state's capitalist aspect." 21

The pluralist perspective's home domain is the image of society as an aggregation of interacting individuals who are socialized by common cultural values to support decision-making through the democratic process. This facilitates both the efficient allocation of resources and maintenance of the political system itself. Individuals are seen as determining actors in the democratic state, directly through public participation and indirectly through representative interest groups and elected representatives. Institutionalized government is perceived as independent of instrumental control by any one particular group or elite, and the state is able to operate for the benefit of all. The pluralist approach emphasizes political consensus and the evolutionary character of
political modernization (indeed, it serves as the political credo of imitative "modernization" for Third World development).

Pluralist theories have been criticized by those adhering to a managerial perspective. Central to this perspective is the viewpoint of society as a network of organizations commanded by elites which form political alliances and compete for control over scarce resources and maintenance of biases in the power structure. Centralization in Weberian-style bureaucratic organizations is seen by these theorists as an unavoidable concomitant of increasing complexity and rapid change in society, which exceed individual abilities to understand and control. However, it is recognized that elite-controlled, bureaucratic organizations often control much of the state, and often do not permit equal competition through democratic processes. Powerful corporations and their shareholders, government agencies with their own public constituencies, well-organized labour unions, and other influential special interest groups, each attempt to control the state apparatus with varying success, depending upon temporal alliances and differential access to political resources.

Lastly, both the preceding perspectives have been criticized by the neo-Marxist class perspective. The home domain of this perspective is a normative view of collective society (as implicit in the Marxist concept of 'social formation'), which is based on social relations imbedded in economic conditions of human life. In capitalist states, the societal contradictions of class are seen as imprinted in the operation of all institutions. There is a continuing and pervasive bias in the capitalist state's operations which supports owners of the means of production. (Unfortunately, Alford and Friedland do not deal with other radical interpretations which are both anti-materialist and anti-state, such as "territorial"
development theory).

Is any one of these state perspective more representative of reality than the others? Alford and Friedland say that each provides a powerful descriptive and analytical tool for modelling different but not mutually exclusive aspects of the modern state. Problems arise, they say, with attempts to endow each perspective with universal validity against competing claims from the other perspectives, which results in them being extended too far from their own respective "home domain," so that their relevancy is considerably weakened. They conclude that a balanced view is needed of all the state's roles, which takes into consideration the respective attributes and limits of each individual perspective. Specifically, the degree to which each of the pluralist, managerial, and class perspectives can contribute to an understanding of the state should be seen as historically and situationally contingent.

7.2.4 Closing the Loop: the Public Interest and Planned Intervention

The focus here is on alternative definitions of the collective "public interest," as well as on associated general assumptions about necessary planned interventions to bring about the public good. As Fagence observes, there are as many theories about the nature of the "public interest" as there are theorists, and "the concept certainly enjoys a confusion of descriptions, interpretations, translations and usages." 22 However, different viewpoints are useful to the degree that they reflect heterogeneous interests in society and the consequent impossibility of reducing the public interest to one theoretical calculus, whether quantitative or qualitative.
In our model, we are guided by Lukes' concept of how liberals, reformists, and radicals tend to formulate different conceptions of what they recognize as real interests and how they are presently dealt with in political society (including, whether they are overtly expressed, deflected, or even hidden). Lukes perceives these different conceptions of interests as resting on different dimensions of power, but, less abstractly perhaps, they also fit with different perspectives of the state under Alford and Friedlands' typology. Different modes of social integration in the state which typically coexist along side each other (though with variable levels of dominance and sub-dominance), tend to be associated with different perceptions about: (1) the nature of "real" interests in society, (2) the asymmetry/symmetry between those interests and the present dominant allocation of resources in society, and (3) the general nature and scope of any planned interventions which are needed to bring about a closer symmetry between present reality and future visions of the public good.

Our typology of different definitions of the public interest and appropriate planned intervention is summarized below:--

(1) Liberal
Liberals hold to an individualist view of the public interest, assuming that individuals are logically prior to society and that satisfaction of their material needs is the principal reason why they participate socially, including in the state. The public interest is a byproduct of pluralistic real interests, democratically expressed and cooperatively mediated in political and economic "marketplaces." The state is perceived as an honest arbiter of unresolved differences between individual interests, and between "social" and "economic" spheres in
Thus, in all, liberals do not perceive a large divergence between "what is" and "what should be." Relative trust is placed in the private sector for priorizing needs and wants, and allocating scarce resources. Accordingly, planned intervention by the state should be carefully circumscribed to necessary marginal adjustments for lubricating the existing system and making it work even better (such as providing necessary "public goods" beyond the capacity of individual producers, removing abnormal, market impediments to perfect competition, correcting for "externalities" not counted under market pricing, relieving producers from the social costs of labour reproduction, facilitating mobility of production factors, etc.).

(2) Reformist

Reformists have a more fragmented view of the public interest which recognizes that different groups and classes have different interests. It is also admitted that neither the representative democratic process nor the economic market necessarily allocates resources efficiently and equitably, because some powerful elites may bias the results. Reformists recognize that there may sometimes be more significant differences than are admitted by liberals between real interests and the present allocation of resources. Both government and industry should cooperate together to mediate between competing and ultimately, mutually destructive group interests. This may entail partial revisions to existing institutions for restoring social balance and, not incidentally, for purposes of forestalling more radical demands against the very principles of democratic capitalism.

The centrepiece of reformism has been, of course, welfare statism with its emphasis on
Keynesian central planning of the economy, public sector production of goods and services, and transfers of wealth from the fortunate to the less-fortunate. However, other institutional arrangements are possible, including 'corporatist' alliances between state and industry.

(3) Radical

Radicals deny the plausibility of existing class elites conceding power over a system which is inherently biased in favour of their interests. They call for a unitary public interest requiring a complete transformation of social institutions. Radicals go far further than even reformists in rejecting the idea that a broadly-based public interest should be entrusted to a solely, profit-orientated market place.

As shown in the following Figure 13, all the different pieces can now be put together in our typology of major planning traditions:--
Figure 13  Typology of Planning Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROCESS MODEL ELEMENTS*</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>REFORMIST</th>
<th>RADICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>positive/ sociological/ personal</td>
<td>sociological/ personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.1 Power dimensions</strong></td>
<td>situationalist</td>
<td>structuralist</td>
<td>systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.2 State perspective</strong></td>
<td>pluralist</td>
<td>managerial</td>
<td>class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.3 Definition of public interest</strong></td>
<td>individualist</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>unitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Appropriate planned intervention</strong></td>
<td>marginal adjustments</td>
<td>partial revisions</td>
<td>complete transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See cross references to Figure 12

Such a multi-contextual process model is suitable in applying our proposed relational approach to development theory, because it enables problems to be analyzed and addressed from different viewpoints. By comparison, current individual development doctrines each attempt to present mutually-exclusive explanations and solutions in themselves, e.g. underdevelopment and development is either "top-down" or "bottom-up"
but cannot be both. Not only do they just present partial viewpoints of reality but, in attempting to drive out other understandings, they also can stray out of their "home domains" and present simplistic hypotheses which, at the least, are misleading, or are fundamentally wrong.

7.3 Epistemological Critique of Development Theory

The previously described planning process model synthesizes three traditions of planning (liberal, reformist and radical) and proposes that each is best applied within its own "home domain," whether for purposes of explanation and prescription, or criticism of other viewpoints. More specifically, the model embodies a multi-dimensional approach to the application of knowledge in the planning process, and proposes that a balance of different epistemological approaches be applied according to the nature of the planning problem and contingent societal conditions. By comparison with the ideal criteria of the process model, it is now shown how some assimilationist doctrine is based on a narrow liberal construct and some autonomist development on a similarly narrow radical construct. More specifically, these sometimes rest on extreme and exclusive epistemological assumptions which oversimplify or misrepresent reality.

The critique includes some emphasis on the particular problems of regional functional and territorial theories. As was shown in the previous chapter, socio-spatial regional development theories are central between societal "core" theories and community economic development (CED) theories. Not only do regional theories inherit some of the epistemological problems of the "core theories" from which they are largely derived, but, in injecting a more explicit spatial dimension into development theory, they also exaggerate
these inherited shortcomings. These, in turn, are replicated in CED theories. There is some discussion under territorial theory on the issue of nationalism, which was a significant issue in the historical analysis of Indian policy in the first part of the thesis.

7.3.1 "Positivist" Assimilationist Theory

Modernization theory and its spatial derivative, regional functional theory, share a common positivist epistemology. Positivism was the most dominant and largely uncontested philosophy of science until the 1970s, holding unequivocally to the position that "useful knowledge" can only be gained by "scientific method," including empirical examination of existing phenomena, inductive theory-building from particular observations to generalized hypotheses, and the use of rigorous validation rules to prove or disprove theories. According to Novak, positivism, or more generally, empiricism, is closely intertwined with the advancement of liberal capitalism by virtue of its claims to naturalistic rationality, inherent materialism, and focus on individuals with experiential knowledge as the best judge of their own best interests. 23

Under positivism, the ultimate origins and causes of the subject matter are not considered knowable in any ultimate sense, but only by outward appearances of observable regularities which manifest its "inner essence." Positive knowledge, therefore, accords with neo-classical, idealist definitions of truth as agreement with criteria of knowing. This compares with classical realist definitions of truth as agreement of thought with reality, as typically represented by Marxist analysis. 24 In the social sciences, positivist method is the basis of economics, and was introduced into sociology, following Comte and Durkheim, by "pro-naturalistic" theorists wishing to emulate the objectivity of advanced
sciences such as physics. The result in the social sciences has been a marked preference for objective measurement and quantification, as distinct from more subjective interpretations of human values and beliefs.

As previously described, one of the most important underpinnings of modernization theory is the concept of an evolutionary progression from traditionalism to modernity. Following positivist method, the "scientific properties" of modernization are induced from what had already been experienced successfully by the more developed societies. Of course, there was one potential flaw in this imitative determinism of transferring what "has been" from Western society to "what should be" for less-developed societies. Perhaps Western societies themselves may continue to progress to some future unknown, which would be so different from the present that it could not be predicted by extrapolating from past trends. An apparent solution to this empiricists' worst nightmare was furnished by W.W. Rostow. His solution, as described above, was simplicity itself. When all societies attained the final development stage of "mass consumership," which the U.S. already had, the progression to capitalism would then be complete (just as, with the recent collapse of Eastern-European communism, some liberal theorists have been prompted to declare the "end of history"). Rostow's road map for reaching this millennium was an historical succession of "comparative statics," which measured Britain's rise to industrial prominence by such quantitative indicators as savings rates, technology growth, and the emergence of more democratic political institutions. This score card on the growth of liberal-capitalism did not attempt to discern any substantive meaning or final causes why Britain had "naturally evolved" this way. It was assumed that the "facts" of evolutionary progress spoke for themselves.
Similiar imitative determinism can be found in the structural-functionalist underpinnings of modernization theory. Although the Parsonian model appears to allow choice for individual actors to realize their goals in "action situations," this apparent concession to volunteerism is ultimately tautological because the postulated "systems ends" assume that the decision-maker will be modern, rational economic man. 26 Indeed, the impossibility of empirically testing these tautological propositions means that much of modernization theory is poor science when measured against its own positivist criteria. 27 A similiar criticism can be levelled even more strongly against functional regional theory. Not only are modernization theory’s deterministic assumptions on social convergence carried forward intact into functional theory, but they are made even more extreme when translated into more explicit spatial terms.

Functional regional theory, as Gore explains, is constructed on the least rigorous form of positivist validation. The most demanding positivist proof is the so-called "deductive-nomological" model which calls for parallelism between: (a) causal explanations of past events as contained in formalized statements of antecedent conditions and laws, and deriving from this, (b) testable predictions of future events. 28 By comparison, the "instrumentalist" proof on which much regional theory rests merely requires that observable regularities be calibrated to provide the best "fit" from one situation to another without causal proof of truth or falsity. Familiar examples are regional gravity models which can quite accurately predict flows of people, communications, and goods between geographic foci as though they followed Newtonian laws of physics, though no explanation is given why it works that way. 29
As a Marxist, Gore is ill-disposed to idealist method which he claims is only concerned with finding "recurrent regularities on the surfaces of appearances rather than identifying the underlying mechanisms which exist in the intrinsic structure of the real world." 30

The absolute merits of idealist versus realist method can, of course, be argued backwards and forwards without any ultimate conclusion. 31 More significantly, Gore effectively takes functional theorists to task on their own epistemological grounds by exposing how their theories are poor science and consequently are ineffective for informing regional policy on technical grounds. 32 Gore accuses functional theorists (in Sack's words) of "spatial separatism," meaning that they abstract spatial phenomena from underlying social forces and credit them with their own determinant causality. 33

According to Gore, the most notorious example of spatial separatism is the concept of 'growth poles.' In their haste to offer "scientific" applied theory to receptive governments in the 1960s, such as in Canada, the relatively new discipline of regional science transformed Francois Perroux's original analysis of growing economic units, such as firms or industries, to that of growing spatial units, that is urban agglomerations. This was despite the fact that, for Perroux, effective growth poles did not have to be close in space to be "propulsive" generators of growth. The error was then compounded by crediting urban centres with propulsive powers for generating growth "downward" throughout the urban hierarchy, and the tendency towards equalization of growth throughout the "space economy" by "spread effects."

The functionalist theoretical edifice does appear to have some truth to it because the close integration of specialized supply and demand markets by intensive communication
networks around urban centres of innovation is manifestly a phenomena of modern industrial growth. However, functional theory turns this around by attributing causal power to these objective phenomena rather than explaining the social forces which brought them into being. In other words, the empirical approach confuses cause and effect. But as Marxist theorists particularly have demonstrated, what is left out by not investigating these underlying social forces is the inherent bias in the capitalist accumulation process to produce unequal spatial distributions in development. To simply observe from empirical evidence that spatial imbalances can be reduced or eliminated through market-driven capitalist forces, or by government intervention to make these forces work better, fails to question how these spatial inequalities came into being in the first place. It should also be questioned whether capitalist "diffusion" does tend to really equalize growth, or gives the appearance of this by creating more growth throughout the whole system, two quite different things.

One important conclusion which can be drawn from this necessarily very limited discussion, is that empiricist functional theory is on far more safe ground in its own "home domain" when focussing on aggregate growth in free-market capitalist situations, than it is pretending to prove rather spuriously that such growth will also be equalizing. The other important conclusion is that functional theory’s narrow empirical formulations of abstracting from appearances of "what is," not only precludes more profound understandings of "how" and "why" it works one way, but also contributes to ideological dogma in development doctrine that there is no other way. Especially, with the current move to the "New Right" it is assumed by many that ideas originally propounded by Adam Smith over two hundred years ago about the advantages of specialization and free trade
are unassailable truths in all circumstances and at all times.

7.3.2 "Utopianist" Autonomist Theory
In this section, territorial regional development theory is criticized together with its companion procedural theory of "transactive" planning. The close intimacy between these two theories has roots in a common genealogy -- John Friedmann has been a major contributor to both. But it also reflects a tendency in all radical theory to collapse the distinctions between substantive and process theories. For instance, Marxists argue essentially that process cannot be understood separately from objective conditions, which leads them to criticize the alleged social control purposes of liberal/reformist planning practice and the ideological purposes of planning theory generally. Because of territorialists' anti-materialism they disavow Marxist method. However, they also collapses substance and process, but in a different way, by awarding centrality to "social learning" for both epistomological and social-organizing roles.

Territorial and transactive theories are examples of the "new humanism" in planning thought. They evolved in tandem as a reaction to functionalism's superficial, positivist scientism and levelling social homogenization. Of particular concern to territorialists is the threat to historic regions, each with their own distinct peoples, cultures, and self-directing political and economic institutions. Under the functionalist scheme, regions as distinct entities fade from view beneath the abstractions of hierarchal-ordered urban networks. Indeed, functional regional theory is most fundamentally anti-regional, as it is similarly opposed on ideological grounds to any scale of territorial integration, including localism and nationalism. By comparison, territorial planning is concerned not with amorphous
space, but with definable place.

This critique reveals the a priori rationalism inherent in the territorial/transactive view which largely deduces "truth" from first principles, and is as extreme in its subjectivity as the instrumental positivism of functional theory is in its objectivity. The critique focusses on the problematical assumptions of a collective, but particular "territorial will" in decentralized societies. It concludes that this gives rise to irreconcilable contradictions which lead to either: (a) a utopian vision of communal egalitarian societies which involutes back on itself to unrealistic assumptions of prior social consensus -- or, to escape this theoretical conundrum -- (b) a more pragmatic but ideologically inconsistent dependence on the nationalist option for unifying local societies against outside political and economic power.

Friedmann in collaboration with Clyde Weaver, positions all different forms of social organization in dualistic contradiction between "function" and "territory." Their distinction closely follows the differences between impersonal, Gesellschaft associations of contractual relations formed consciously for specific purposes, as opposed to Gemeinschaft interpersonal relations based on members' feelings that they belong together as a distinct group, with its own subjectively-held common identity and sentiment of solidarity. These exclusive categories are, of course, the same opposite markers of the modernization evolutionary scale. But, turning this on its head, they argue that whereas functional power has recently been dominant the "time is ripe" for its "subordination to a territorial will." 39
Except in rare cases where there are local societies organized according to Gemeinschaft relations, will not local inequities and competing interests nullify any possibility of the communalist value consensus needed to advance such a territorial will? Friedmann and Weaver move to counter this potential inconsistency by asserting that in a decentralized territorial society, "conditions of equal access to the basis of social power will be established." However, as Gore notes, this means that the emphasis placed on pursuing greater social equity in territorial planning is "thus not just a question of a change in values, or a reassessment of what sort of 'development' is necessary" in the future, but rather "is a logically necessary condition for the application of the approach." 

The need for "equal access to the basis of social power" as a prerequisite for consensus on a "territorial will" is problematic, to say the least. Equal social access is only meaningful if it results in equitable economic sharing, which itself presupposes sufficient territorial power over decentralized economic production, distribution, and consumption to avoid skewing by outside control (another principle of territorial theory). Putting aside any economic questions about the economic viability of bottom-up development, it can be asked: how would such economic decentralization come about politically? Territorial theory's answers lie in three of its key decentralist propositions identified in a sweeping critique by Hebbert.

(1) Substantial regional economic autarky is to be achieved through emphasizing self-sufficient local production and reduction of imports.
(2) The necessary conditions for implementing (1), revolve around achieving substantial political autarchy at the regional level against the central state and/or foreign state(s).

(3) In turn, the necessary conditions for supporting (2), involve, "A sense of regional identity ... which provides the initial impulse for change." 42

In other words, we have come in a full circle: socio-political consensual values are the intended outputs of territorial economic decentralization, but are also its necessary inputs.

Can the broad participatory base of transactive planning overcome this conundrum by creating a regional consensus? Transactive planning entails bringing about a conjunction between experts' "processed knowledge" and citizens' "personal knowledge" within an open-ended process of "experimental evolution," in which all participants would "learn to learn" better in mutual dialogue. 43 Participants in a learning society could, it may seem, learn to coalesce around a communalist regional vision. But, such a learning society patently does not exist now, and so Friedmann proposes that regional societies would have to engage in "learning to learn," and not at the initiation of the central state but "from below" (i.e. they would become aware of their own objective interests and how these have been subverted under conditions of 'systemic power'). But this only means that the first conundrum concerning equal social access has been replaced by another. Camhis says it well, "It is no accident that we end up exactly where we started, since utopianism, notwithstanding all good intentions, always works in a circle." 44 A learning society is required as a prerequisite to practice transactive planning, but the creation of a
learning society requires that its members learn to learn. In other words, to get there we are locked in a never ending circle of having to be there.

The unresolvable utopian contradictions of a "territorial will," based on a communalist value consensus, lead inexorably to the nationalist option. Weaver, especially, attaches considerable importance to regional nationalist movements in Europe as evidence of surviving territorial entities mobilizing in reaction to functional hierarchal control. 45 Rather than being considered specific nationalist phenomena with different causes and content, they are attributed with universal significance as vanguards in a general movement for reasserting territorial power. But, while modernist national ideology may appear to be highly compatible with territorial socio-economic and political agendas, the "national will" of a regional society may be quite a different thing in reality to the radical, philosophical concept of a "territorial will."

As Anderson makes clear, nationalist ideology derives its appeal from being simultaneously forward and backward looking: "In general a remote past -- typically a fabricated heroic version of it -- is used to highlight the inadequacies of the recent past and the present, in order to mobilize support for progress and development to a supposedly better future ... this Janus-faced characteristic of nationalism is a crucial aspect of its flexibility, and its ambivalent mixture of traditionalism and future promise is central to its potency as an ideology." 46 Nationalist ideology has, in effect, something to offer for everybody and Anderson given examples of how it has been used to coalesce support for widely disparate movements from conservatism on the one side to radicalism on the other. In the case of "radical" territorial theory which is, however, very conservative in its appeal to
traditionalism, a connection with nationalist ideology seems all too natural. Nationalism’s overt appeal to continuity with the past and future, and insular protection of the "in-group’s" national interest is especially strong in situations of rapid social change; indeed, this is the basis of a psychological theory of nationalism which sees concern with national identity as a response to the disruptions and uncertainties of "modernization." Without accepting this as a mono-causal explanation, the particular appeal to territorialism’s ideas on social change is readily apparent.

Equally apparent is the particular appeal of nationalist ideology to territorialism as spatial development theory because, as Anderson notes, it is two-sided with respect to space as well as time:

Nationalism generally defines people as belonging/not belonging to a territory and culture, rather than in terms of class or status divisions, and it seeks to play down internal divisions and conflicts, partly by externalizing the supposed source of the problems.... National territority functions like territoriality in general, but it is a particularly powerful form of "politicoterritorial identity"... It involves control over territory -- rights to it, access to it, exclusion from it. More subtly, it reifies power relations, making them appear more real and "natural"... More generally territoriality involves a "fetishism of space"... whereby relations between social groups and classes are observed by being presented as relations between areas or regions....

"Fetishism of space" is, of course, a familiar Marxist criticism of all overtly, spatial development theorizing, whether functional or territorial, and is made for the same reason that Marxists have castigated neo-Marxists’ embrace of the nationalist option -- the obfuscation of unequal class relations. Marxists are prone to their own fetishism of "the relations of production," which, among other things, results in them automatically and incorrectly identifying nationalist ideology simply with bourgeois economic interests, but
they do have a point nevertheless. Even from a non-Marxist perspective, nationalism as an ideology can seem as "systems of ideas which give distorted and partial accounts of reality, with the objective, and often unintended effect of serving the partial interests of a particular social group or class," typically by "appearing to represent the interests of all the various groups in society." Indeed, nationalism cannot be a tool to further all class interests equally, for two basic reasons. First, nationalism is not class neutral in the obvious sense that a national movement at any particular time has its own class content, with some classes being more prominent than others (which is not to say that all cannot be net gainers to at least some degree). Second, as Anderson points out, "national liberation per se is not opposed to class exploitation in general or the capitalist mode of production, rather its targets are domination coming from outside the nation." Even in its opposition to external economic exploitation, "the enemies are external capitalists not capitalism as such, and the removal of external exploiters may simply clear the way for internal ones".

It can be seen, therefore, that by embracing the nationalist option, the utopian contradiction in transactive planning is merely replaced by yet another contradiction, i.e. the incompatibility of a "territorial will," conceived in terms of a communalist-organized regional society with a "national will," which is unavoidably biased in favour of some interests. The particular consequences of failing to differentiate social relations in local regional society is to ignore the potential for some internal interest groups (perhaps, in combination with external ones) to exercise systemic power over others by concealing their real objective interests -- whether they be economic or cultural. So-called, "radical" territorial planning is sometimes not truly radical at all.
To conclude this section, our analysis shows that, on the one side, assimilationist functional theory is prone to extreme narrow positivist abstractions of past reality while, on the other side, autonomist territorial theory is commensurately prone to extravagantly idealized, normative propositions of a desired future. These opposites can be seen to mirror a classic dualism in the social sciences between extreme scientism which reduces all human behaviour to "natural" phenomena (i.e. Naturwissenschaft), and extreme humanism where subjective and moral elements are awarded exclusive status (i.e. Geisteswissenschaft). The next section takes a more general look at the problem of dualism in current development theories.

7.4 Critique of Dualist Assumptions in Development Theories

This section describes how assimilation and autonomist development doctrines are dualist in two ways. First, they divide perceptions of the universe into two irreducible parts and, second, they do this in opposite and mutually exclusive ways. This is not only true of modernization theory and UDT, the "core theories" of assimilation and autonomist doctrine respectively, but also of their derivative regional and community development theories. Examples of this duality are illustrated below in the modelling of 'causality,' 'variation,' and 'change' by development theories. It is not intended to claim that all development theories share all these characterizations but rather to show general tendencies.

(a) Causality in the Development Process

Assimilationist and autonomist development doctrines are distinguished most fundamentally by their respective modelling of causality for underdevelopment and development. They break the universe down into power relations between two mutually
exclusive groups, the internal "object" which is to be developed and the external "subject," which, depending upon the doctrine, plays a role in either undeveloping or developing the object. Assimilationist doctrine assumes that the object group is underdeveloped because of its own inferiority and will have to be developed exogenously by the subject group. Autonomist theory counters that the object is only undeveloped because of its external relations with the subject and therefore should undertake its own endogenous development. The definitions of subject-object groups in these power relations differ between the two doctrines and their individual theories, but are always expressed in some form of duality such as, for instance, 'developed societies' and 'less developed societies,' 'core' and 'periphery,' and 'function' and 'territory.'

Thus, both doctrines are oppositely but equally deterministic in how they attribute causality for underdevelopment and development to either the object or subject group. Assimilationists "blame the victim" for their own predicament and are loath to recognize any contributing role by outside exploitative interests. Conversely, autonomists are prone to externalize all blame on outside forces and ignore any possibilities that some internal interests may be subverted by power relations within the object group. Not only are these causal forces perceived as emanating exclusively from either "inside" or "outside," but they are also conceptualized simplistically as being unidirectional. It is not recognized that exogenous forces can change internal power relations within the object, which, in turn, could act upon subsequent external relations between the subject and object, and so on in a dynamically interactive process.
(b) **Variation in Socio-Spatial Integration**

Assimilationist and autonomist doctrines not only demarcate discrete "subject" and "object" groups, but they credit each of them with their own distinct characteristics. For instance, modernization theory conceives of development as an evolutionary progression from traditional *Gemeinschaft* societies to modern *Gesellschaft* societies. Territorial theorists draw the same dualist divisions, but turn the modernizers' argument on its head by arguing that whereas the universal spread of functional modernity has recently been the dominant force in development, the time is now propitious for re-emergence of territorially-based power. In other theories the nature of the demarcations may be less clearly defined. However, the general picture painted is of "them and us." Emphases are simultaneously placed on uniformity within in each group and differences between them.

These differential emphases are made on spatial as well as social lines through conceptual relationships, e.g. "metropoles" versus "hinterlands," or more concretely, though sometimes ambiguously, by territoriality, e.g. "central state" versus "internal colony."

Thus, the exercise of power in underdevelopment and development is portrayed as attempts to make one form of socio-spatial integration dominant over the other. In the case of assimilationist doctrine, this means integration of the object into the subject according to its own presumed universalistic norms. Autonomist doctrine counters this external homogenizing threat by urging that the subject pursues its own particularist integration.

The assumptions of these two opposing theoretical constructs are far too partial when compared with reality. They both tend to underemphasize the commonalities shared by
groups, however they are defined, as well as their respective internal differences such as conflicts over interests and fundamental class divisions. Indeed, if internal differences are recognized at all they are typically characterized in UDT as temporary aberrations induced by outside exploitation, and circumscribed within a socially and territorially bounded "enclave." Thus, they are excused as not really being part of the underdeveloped group. As already noted, there are some weighty problems associated with assuming internal homogeneity in the concepts of a "territorial will" and in suppositions about nationalistic solidarity in regional movements. However, such problems are no less fundamental than the supposition in functional theory that once localities come under the universalistic umbrella of the modernizing urban network they cease to exist as any type of distinct entity.

Comparable reductionism can be found in evaluations of the state, which only mention can be made of here. At one end of the spectrum are radical monolithic interpretations of the central state, such as Poulantzas' assumptions that "systemic" power biases against the less powerful completely permeate the entire state apparatus, and indeed, all social institutions in capitalist society. At the other end of the ideological spectrum are benign portrayals of the liberal state whereby all competing interests are openly and fairly mediated through the operations of "situational power" in economic and political "marketplaces" (but which conflict fundamentally with the reality of forced intervention into the underdeveloped object to assure it the benefits of liberalism!). By comparison, our process model argues that a multi-contextual interpretation of the state is far more reflective of reality.
One interesting problem raised by the insider-outsider dialectic pertains to the differential emphases placed by various development theories on various types of socio-spatial groupings (which, as described in the Introduction, often reflect disciplinary divisions). The problem is: how can the duality of external heterogeneity/internal homogeneity be claimed by different theorists for different scales of societal, regional, and community groupings? To point out the obvious, that such groupings are commonly overlapping clearly demonstrates the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking, for how can the object or the subject be simultaneously the same and different?

(c) The Nature of Change in Development

Both assimilationist and autonomist doctrines share truncated viewpoints of temporal change, both of the past and the future. For instance, empiricist modernization theory perceives contemporary problems in the object "as they are" and ignores the history of how they came about through articulations with the subject. It also goes on to propose that the object should develop in the identical image of the subject's already experienced past, that is to "imitate" rather than to "innovate." The object group, it seems, is perpetually relegated to playing "catch-up." By comparison, utopianist versions of territorial thinking propose that local groups should revert to a renascent and probably idealized vision of previous communal traditional life, or at least to some early form of capitalism. Little or no consideration is given to the likelihood that their economic choices and, indeed, social preferences may have been significantly and irrevocably changed by articulations with outside development forces, and that they would like to develop differently in the future. The two doctrines also tend to ignore that contemporary local circumstances may vary widely because of differing historical experiences before and
during these past articulations. Thus, assimilationist and autonomist doctrine tends to be both ahistoric and futurist.

7.5 Some Proposed Correctives to Dualism

Brookfield evocatively describes the tendency to dualism in development theory as follows:

Dichotomies, or polarized constructs, are basic to the simplest structuring of human perception into comprehensible order. Inevitably they grow into stereotypes: things that are. Even though they may be further subdivided, argument often returns to the simpler method -- 'as if' there were only two classes ... Orwell's famous reduction of the revolutionary creed of Animal Farm into the slogan 'four legs good; two legs bad' sums up something that is widespread not only in human perception and human politics, but human science as well. The world looks simpler in binary, and social science and the development field are no exceptions ....

But how can the tendency to dualism and its inherent dangers of reductionism be avoided? Some conceptual correctives are proposed here which derive from the American sociologist Chaim Waxman's attempts to transcend the dualism in "culturalist" and "situationalist" class theories of development by what he also calls a "relational" approach.

We will apply Waxman's concepts, although in ways which he would not have intended, to address the problematic notion of a minority society within a larger society, such as is the situation of Indians in Canada.

The opposing culturalist and situationalist theories came to prominence during the U.S. "War on Poverty" in the 1960s, but have also have been pivotal in more recent political and academic debate prompted by attacks on the welfare state by the "New Right." As summarized in the Introduction, both schools of thought address welfarist problems among the poor in terms of their dependent status as "sub-cultural" groups vis a vis the
larger dominant society, but in very different ways. According to the culturalist view, the poor lower class or "underclass" is seen as manifesting negative patterns of behaviour inherently different from those of the dominant culture. Furthermore, culturalists claim that these patterns are transmitted inter-generationally through socialization and have become self-perpetuating determinants of the poors' lower socio-economic status. The argument goes that if they are to be integrated as equals into the dominant society, then they will have to change themselves or be changed.

If K. Ryan's famous catch-phase "blame the victim" is evocative of the culturalist school, the opposing view of the situationalists can be conversely captioned as "blame society." Proponents of this view hold that the exhibition of untypical behaviour by the poor is no more than a functional response to their deprived and externally-imposed environment. The poor, they claim, share the same values as the rest of society but are prevented from realizing their aspirations by a restrictive social structure. Thus, instead of the poor having to change themselves or be changed, the situationalists argue that fundamental structural changes are needed in society to obviate economic biases against the poor.

Waxman effectively criticizes both the culturalists' and situationalists' claims to provide complete answers in themselves. He draws from Herbert Gans' call for a "dynamic perspective" to understand the norms, values, and aspirations of the poor in relation to the non-poor, and from Erving Goffman's work on the sociology of stigma. Waxman concurs with the culturalists and the situationalists that the poor can be distinguished as particular forms of "sub-cultures," sharing commonalities but also differences with other constituent sub-cultures which make up society at large. He recognizes that distinguishing sub-
cultures necessarily involves some imprecision, because instead of being clearly
differentiated into highly discrete categories they tend to be strung along a continuum.
Where such distinctions are made solely on the basis of socio-economic class, it would be
impractical to break them down into numerous specific categories, but it has to be expected that if less restrictive criteria are used, they will be less precise ones. But, as Waxman recognizes, the distinctions will be more marked where the stigmatized group is an ethnic minority and, indeed, this "makes it considerably more likely that the group will develop or retain its own status-honor and value system as a reaction to the stigma." 57

Notwithstanding the problems of categorization, Waxman still believes that distinctive patterns can be usefully distinguished between sub-cultural groups. However, he claims that these patterns are of both a culturalist and situationalist nature. He rejects the concept, deriving from many anthropologist's concerns with traditional societies, that cultures are deeply-rooted, multi-generational "recipes for living," while situational adaptations are merely immediate and transitory responses to particular circumstances. In modern and developing societies characterized by rapid change, he says, this distinction does not always hold up: "what emerges, therefore, is the realization that cultural patterns and situational adaptations are not necessarily contradictory; rather, we see that many patterns become cultural precisely because of their adaptive quality. Lacking any alternatives, real or perceived, these patterns become 'the way things are done' under the circumstances!" 58 And, it can be added that in the case of poor ethnic minorities "traditional" cultures can coexist with "adaptive" cultures, including Barth's aforementioned "boundary maintenance" functions, as well as adaptations of "welfarism." Indeed, Waxman does accept the proposition of a distinct "culture of poverty," a term
coined by Oscar Lewis, a culturalist, while also accepting that this may be very much a situational response to particular contemporary circumstances.

The question remains as to whether the "culture of poverty" is endemic to the poor and the cause of their poverty as culturalists maintain, or the mere result of imposed poverty as many situationalists maintain. Waxman argues that there is no compelling proof of it being solely one thing or the other. He marshals the results of considerable behaviouralist research, some of it undertaken by situationalists themselves, to refute their argument "that the only thing the poor share as compared with the non-poor is their economic situation." Against the culturalists he argues that there is no empirical evidence to prove the viewpoint which explains "the persistence of poverty as being solely the product of the culture of poverty, and which sees that culture of poverty as completely distinctive and isolated from the dominant culture." Furthermore, he argues, that their contentions are irreconcilable with the culturalist Oscar Lewis's own assertion that the culture of poverty is more likely to develop in class-stratified, capitalistic societies than in socialistic ones, for "if the nature of the distributive system is a variable in the development of the culture of poverty, then it would appear to be implausible to suggest that the culture of poverty exists in isolation, or completely independently of the dominant culture." 59

Waxman concludes that both the culturalist and situationalist arguments fail because they do not consider the external impacts of relationships between the poor and larger society, together with consequent changes in the internal relations of the poor themselves, i.e.:

... the culture of poverty" is not an independent subculture, but rather a dependent one; it is a subculture that develops and persists along with the stigma of
poverty as part of a vicious circle. Thus, the culture of poverty is neither solely internal, as the culturalists argue, nor solely external, as the situationalists argue, for it has both internal and external sources; it is relational, a dependent subculture. 60

While agreeing with Waxman's concept of interactive external relations between the majority culture and sub-cultural group and it internal relations, we differ fundamentally with his assumption that equality for those in the sub-cultural group, even if it is a cultural minority, will be best achieved through their complete assimilation. It should be understood that Waxman reaches this conclusion through negative reasoning. Waxman rejects the situationalists' call for complete structural changes in society, to obviate the causes of poverty, as hopelessly utopian. Fair enough. But, on the other side, Waxman perceives a basic flaw in the culturalists' programs in "that they are designed to assist the poor; as such they invariably contribute to the further isolation of the poor and enhance the stigma of poverty." He proposes that the most effective way of breaking the "vicious circle ... of the stigma of poverty" is to provide the same services to all members of society, including income maintenance. 61 But he concedes that this is unlikely because of difficulties with where the funds will come from and intense ideological opposition to welfare statism. He lamely concludes that the extent to which his proposals "can be accomplished remain in doubt: quite possibly there never will be complete integration. But along the path, services will be made available to both the poor and the non-poor, and they will, perhaps, reduce the isolation." 62 No recipe for a Brave New World, this!

In our relational approach to Indian development there is no end assumption of complete integration, just as much as there is not one of complete separation. This is also one of the reasons behind making another revision to Waxman's scheme: the substitution of his
notion of "sub-cultures" with that of 'sub-societies.' A societal definition not only subsumes cultural distinctiveness (that is the total set of attitudes, values and behavioural patterns of particular groups) but also connotes the idea of them having self-guiding institutional frameworks which are commonly but not exclusively ascribed to societies coterminous with the nation-state. Thus, in the case under consideration here the revised definition is explicitly intended to encompass some notion of "Indian self-government."

The possibility of continuing relative autonomy among "sub-societies" would do nothing to detract from the essentials of a relational approach. Indians can be conceived as a sub-society, or better still, as several sub-societies, within what sociologists may call a larger "inclusive" Canadian society; meaning that they are simultaneously constitutive but, nevertheless, distinct components of a larger whole. Indian sub-societies are variously integrated and variegated both internally and externally by, among other things, the interplay of power relations with Canadian society. Their differences come not only from inherited pasts which proceed European colonization and settlement, but also from continuing ethnically-based differentiation along social and economic lines, as well as along administrative, legal, and constitutional ones. Internal relations within Indian sub-societies have been differentially changed, both by a broad array of external impacts (coercion, forced acculturation, containment, displacement, stigmatization, etc.) and by varying internal responses (imitation, adaptation, rejection, dependency, etc.), which, in turn, interact on external relations, and so on. Such a relational view admits both deterministic and volunteerist bounds rather than having to be one or the other as in current doctrines.
7.5 Conclusions

The historical analysis in part one of the thesis illustrated the practical shortcomings of development theories when applied to Indian policy. This chapter criticized their deficiencies as theories. The deficiencies of 'substantive' development theories were shown to be endemic because of shortcomings in their underlying 'process' theories. This was demonstrated with use of an original, 'relational' process model which synthesizes what is valid from liberal, reformist, and radical planning theories with respect to their different conceptions about knowledge, power, interests and action in the planning process.

By comparison with the process model, current 'assimilationist' and 'autonomist' development doctrines each rest on often, extreme liberal and radical conceptions respectively. Not only is each doctrine individually prone to dualism in the way that it divides reality into two exclusive parts, but, together as thesis and antithesis, they are also dualist because they do this in mutually opposite and exclusive ways. Also, distorting biases are created by theories being pushed too far from the "home domains" of their core concepts in efforts to present single explanations for all aspects of development problems and solutions when, in fact, there are many.

To better deal with the issue of Indian development in Canada we propose application of a relational approach which would be interactive and variegated in its explanations and prescriptions, but without slipping into relativism. Our relational process model provides a vantage point for selecting what is most relevant and valid from different development theories. A relational approach means embracing a multi-dimensional approach for
explanation, prescription, and criticism in social theory which draws appropriately from the available scope of liberal, reformist, and radical thought to meet the problem at hand. In the following, concluding chapter a relational approach is applied to examining the pressing problems of widespread welfare dependency in reserve communities.
CHAPTER EIGHT. CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Overview

The relational approach described in the previous chapter recognizes that many planning problems are of a complex multi-dimensional nature which rightfully should be viewed simultaneously from different perspectives. It also recognizes that individual theories have different applicability and relevancy for analyzing different development problems, or more probably, specific aspects of problems, and for prescribing appropriate solutions. This contrasts with the prevalent tendency to endow individual theories with universal validity in all situations.

The relational approach is based on a process planning model which attempts to synthesize useful elements from three main traditions in planning process theory, that is 'liberal,' 'reformist' and 'radical, which effectively set the parameters for substantive development doctrines. The liberal tradition is associated with 'assimilationist' development doctrine, and most notably modernization theory, which has dominated development thought generally and has been the central influence on the Canadian state's formulation of Indian policy. The opposing radical tradition is associated with 'autonomist' development doctrine, including UDT and its internal colony variant, which has greatly influenced criticism of state Indian policy both in the academic literature and by educated Indians, and in the liberal press and some public opinion. The reformist tradition is not associated with a distinct body of development theory as such, but is manifested practically in the policies and programs of the modern welfare state.
In this concluding chapter the principles of a relational development approach are applied to examining how welfare statism is exacerbating rather than solving problems of Indian poverty. The dependence of Indian communities on the welfare state is perpetuating the process of their underdevelopment which started with imposition of the reserve system. Specifically, it is restricting the competencies which Indians need to take charge of their own development, and to become self-reliant and self-governing. It is strongly emphasized that the comments made about dependency are generalized for the sake of brevity, and some of their relevance to individual communities may differ considerably, or in some cases may not be applicable.

In our examination of welfare dependency we reject the pretensions of either liberal assimilationist doctrine or radical autonomist doctrine to, by themselves, adequately explain the problem of welfare dependency and to prescribe effective solutions. Indeed, these doctrines’ often polarized points of view, which are reflected in current political debate, appear to be doing more to obstruct rather than facilitate good Indian policy. Liberal modernizers tend to one extreme of viewing widespread welfarism in reserve communities solely as a consequence of their cultural uniqueness and different treatment by the central state. The proper solution, they claim, is to assimilate Indians into the cultural norms of the majority society, to reverse "discrimination through their special treatment" by making them "equal" with other Canadians, and to cut back sharply on welfare state support.

On the other side, radical critics totally reject the liberals’ now very familiar, historical agenda for Indian cultural genocide, but are equally extreme in their narrow assumptions
that welfarism is only perpetuated in reserve communities by outside agencies. They also suggest, naively in our opinion, that Indians would become totally independent if only the state would make amends for past injustices by recognizing innate Indian rights to self-determination, fulfilling aboriginal claims and treaty responsibilities, and by what is now another familiar, historical theme, transferring substantial government funding over to Indian control. If the state enabled Indians "to help themselves" by providing the requisite powers and resources, they argue, the need and justification for continuing intervention and assistance by the welfare state would inevitably, over time, become an non-issue.

We reject both the propositions that Indians can only develop by disappearing as distinct peoples, or that Indians have been in the past prevented from developing solely because of externally imposed conditions and that if these conditions are reversed Indian would automatically develop. By comparison, the relational examination of welfare dependency described here reveals the importance of conceptualizing welfare dependency from a multi-perspective viewpoint, which admits both the roles played by the central state and Indians themselves. Similarly, the relational examination leads to a proposed dual strategy for increased Indian self-reliance, which is simultaneously facilitated by the state and driven by community-based action. What is needed, it is argued, are both special responses by the state to change its "external" relationships with Indian communities by according them the necessary powers and resources, and the institution of community rebuilding processes by Indians to reform their own internal relations.

The concept of "community competencies" is used in this chapter to demonstrate the interaction between external and internal forces in perpetuating welfare dependency. This
is followed by an overview of some recent state initiatives to change external relationships (self-government powers and treaty negotiations), which leads to proposals to make those initiatives more achievable and successful through community action. Many of the issues described below are very topical in the intense and rapidly evolving political debate which has been occurring recently over Indian policy. Indian matters and problems are now more widely newsworthy in Canada than ever before. By necessity, the findings and recommendations which are presented here are contingent and thematic rather than being conclusive and detailed.

8.2 The Undevelopment of Indian Community Competencies

Before contact with the White Man and for some time after, Indian societies were economically self-reliant and possessed rich cultural traditions and self-governing systems which ensured a high degree of social balance and harmony with nature. Much of that changed under pressures from colonization, as Indians were driven off the lands which had provided them material and spiritual sustenance, and their political and socio-cultural traditions were attacked by systematic though largely unsuccessful attempts to assimilate them into Western society. Compounding erosion of the Indians' traditional lifestyles, was the state's failure to support Indian adaptations to new economic conditions and their deliberate exclusion from the rich natural resources surrounding their reserves which fuelled much of Canada's industrial development. Also, as will be focused on here, infiltration of welfare statism into all aspects of reserve life has particularly restricted the competencies which Indian communities need to participate on their own terms in contemporary Canadian society. Indeed, the future well-being of Indians will rest on how well and quickly they can rebuild these competencies.
The concept of "community competencies," which is central to this discussion, seems to have originated with the sociologist R.L. Warren as a measure of how well the social institutions of small communities can manage change in their external environments. 1 Ralph Matthews elaborated a more complete typology of social, political, and economic competencies to measure the "survivability" of small communities by more than just the criteria of economic efficiency. 2 Although not properly acknowledged, Matthews’ typology was popularized by Bowles as a tool for social impact assessment (SIA). 3 Bowles places far more emphasis on the role of traditional, informal institutions in determining community competencies than was intended by Matthews, who has rejoined that these should be balanced with modernist, structured aspects of community life. 4 With this caution in mind, the following definition is made of community competencies:--

**Political Efficacy:** refers to processes for mobilizing and maintaining power relations in political governance and public administration, which are commonly accepted by community members to be legitimate for taking internal public actions and dealing with outside agents in the community’s best interests.

**Social Vitality:** refers to processes for integrating and bonding community members through socialization and communication so as to develop mutual trust and obligation, share knowledge, and promote group participation and solidarity.

**Economic Viability** refers to processes for organizing the production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services, so as to adequately ensure the material and psychological needs of community members, as well as to ensure long-term economic sustainability. 5

Rick Ponting has applied the concept of community competencies to project what he thinks will be largely positive impacts on Indian communities from future self-government. 6 Also, in a case study on institutional-building in the Mohawk community of Kahnawake,
he proposes that political, social, and economic competencies should be seen as mutually-reinforcing by making up what sociologists call ‘institutional completeness.’ Where this is present, he says, it both assists internal cohesion of the group and external ‘boundary maintenance’ functions vis a vis the larger surrounding society. 7 But, as the present writer has already stated elsewhere, the mutual reinforcement of community competencies can be either positive or negative. 8 This can occur through a synergistic process akin to Myrdal’s previously described concept of upward and downward "cumulative causation" brought about by negative or positive reinforcing feedback. 9 Moreover, such processes can be perceived occurring at interactive levels of internal and external community relations, which helps explain why communities may become increasingly dependent or independent. The dependency case is discussed first.

The following Figure 14 shows examples of how competencies in Indian communities may be eroded through a process of downward cumulative causation. Although outside forces may play a major role in starting and perpetuating this process, there is also an internal dynamic which may compound their harmful impacts. Specifically, already diminished competencies may be further weakened by the community’s particular responses to outside threats and synergistic interactions between political, economic, and social competencies which, in turn, further diminish their ability to control outside events for their own best advantage. Thus, the community’s reduced competencies will render it even more incapable of reversing its situation, and leave it vulnerable to future external threats which could serve to repeat further downward cycles. Of course, this is a "worst case" scenario because its assumes continuous negative impacts which are simultaneously
Figure 14  Examples of Downward Cumulative Causation in Diminished Community Competencies

- Exclusion from surrounding regional resource base
- Marginalization from mainstream economic system

DIMINISHED ECONOMIC VIABILITY

- Loss of control over economic opportunities
- Diminished economic viability
- Reduced economic base for self-government
- Reduced life skills and motivation

DIMINISHED POLITICAL EFFICACY

- Diminished political efficacy
- Reduced social controls
- Loss of internal solidarity
- Disempowerment of Indian government
- Political alienation

DIMINISHED SOCIAL VITALITY

- Diminished social vitality
- Social stigmatization
- Social alienation
political, social, and economic over a period of time. But, this has often been the case in Indian communities.

Starting from the introduction of the ‘reserve system’ in the 1840’s, Indians have been the target of systematic attempts by the Canadian state to eradicate their traditional community competencies so that they could be more easily assimilated. Indian systems of governance were attacked by the purposeful isolation, coopting, and removal of traditional leaders; by programs designed to take away Indian status from other potentially troublesome individuals; and by replacing consensual political decision-making practices with Western democratic norms of elective representation. The state attempted to subvert traditional social beliefs and practices with Christian religious indoctrination, the removal of children from parental influence to residential schools, and the outlawing of cultural practices such as the West Coast potlatch. In the economic sphere: the Indians’ former land base was drastically reduced to small reserves; communal sharing of the land base was compromised by devices such as ‘location tickets’ to encourage private ownership; and traditional economic pursuits were denigrated and often made impractical by the incursion of state-promoted settlement and resource exploitation.

In contrast with these concerted attempts to depreciate traditional Indian competencies, the state’s efforts to substitute new modernist competencies were (outside of religious instruction) far less rigorously pursued. Preparation for adapting to the White Man’s economy was particularly lacking. The education provided to Indian children in residential schools was far below the standards enjoyed by White children. Skills training for Indians was also inferior, and was to leave them ill-prepared for jobs in the modernizing economy.
Little assistance was given for Indians to create businesses and employment on reserves to make up for the loss of traditional pursuits. Even in areas where agriculture was ostensibly promoted as a worthwhile pursuit for Indians, they were denied the necessary machinery and credit to operate successful farms.

For a long time many Indians managed to remain self-sufficient and, indeed, they had to be because very little government support was available. As Ralph Knight has described in the case of B.C. native workers, many had initially made a successful transition from traditional pursuits into new jobs as employees and operators in cottage industries, commercial agriculture, fishing and canning, sealing, shipping, forestry and mining. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s brought a massive collapse of Indian wage labour, although the immobility of native workers meant that its effects were felt differently from one region to another depending upon the fate of local industries. However, even during the worst depths of the Depression displaced native workers eked out a living from hitherto marginal agricultural work and part-time trapping. In 1935, the annual budget for Indian relief in B.C. was only $125,000 (i.e. $5.00 per capita per annum), but since this was considered a "staggering sum" the Indian Affairs Branch promptly reduced its budget the following year! 10

The situation does appear to have changed dramatically with the Post-War restructuring of Canada’s resource industries. With the centralization of plants and the move to smaller but better educated and trained work forces, many Indians did not have the necessary skills, or found it difficult to move away from their communities to seek work. At the same time, and very significantly, Canada’s new welfare state programs were increasingly
extended into reserve communities through the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND).

The alarming increase of Indian dependency on welfare programs was one of the primary motivations behind the 1969 White Paper proposals of the Trudeau government to dismantle the reserve system. But following the White Paper' withdrawal, hope that the majority of inhabitants on rural and remote reserves would eventually migrate to areas of economic opportunity was replaced with the difficult task of attempting to provide local jobs in many regions where economic opportunities are necessarily limited. Underlying this was the unspoken policy assumption that no matter how unviable the economic prospects of any Indian settlement, its continuation would be subsidized by the central state. Unlike other Canadians in depressed regions who received relocation assistance, reserve residents were not even prompted to seek jobs elsewhere. Lack of a sufficient employment base for reserve communities, together with the "policy vacuum" that was left after withdrawal of the White Paper, set the scene for DIAND to further expand its welfarist programs into reserves.

The policies of welfare state reformism, which have been practiced over the last forty years, have undoubtedly brought some significant gains. For instance, the standards of housing and infrastructure on many remote reserve communities have improved considerably and, despite many criticisms in the press, they are often superior to those of other Canadians living nearby or in similar areas who are dependent on government transfer programs. Indian education standards have also improved measurably in reserve schools, and many Indian students are going on to post-secondary education. But welfare
state programs have been notably unsuccessful in promoting economic development. True, there are increasing "success stories" of new Indian businesses starting on reserves, but the rate of business and job creation is nowhere close to what is needed to catch-up from the present low base levels on most reserves. The jolting reality is shown in recently released statistics from the Auditor-General's report for 1994, which record that 43% of natives living on reserves are on welfare as compared with 10% of other Canadians, and that expenditures on social assistance for natives on reserves has increased over the last ten years from $300 million to $1 billion! By the last measure, even allowing for inflation, improved program standards, and rapid population growth on reserves (which itself is a problem), it would appear that the situation is not getting better and, perhaps, is worsening.

While it is clear that the state's erosion of Indian community competencies has a long and deplorable history, it is contended that the biggest damage may have been perpetrated during the recent period of welfare state expansion.

Some contemporary critics of Indian policy point out the obvious: that many reserve inhabitants seem to be receiving disproportionately high subsidies from federal and provincial governments compared with other Canadians. For instance, Reform Party critics have recently opposed the large federal budgets for reserve Indians, arguing that they will never be able to become self-sufficient. Echoing the 1969 White Paper, they claim that if Indians want to enjoy the same economic lifestyles as other Canadians they should move to the cities to find employment. This simplistic judgement ignores that many Indian migrants to the cities live a ghetto existence which is as bad as the worst conditions on
reserves. Also ignored is how welfare statism has eroded the very competencies which would allow reserve communities (and their out-migrants) to become more self-reliant. To complain only about the observable symptoms of increasing welfare dollar flows going into reserve communities obscures the need to address underlying, fundamental problems of underdevelopment so that reserve communities can become more self-reliant.

Better understandings have to be gained of how welfarism operates in Indian communities, including the mutually-reinforcing roles of the central state and local communities themselves, so that practical solutions can be devised. Very little research has been undertaken in this area, and some of the observations made below are of a necessarily speculative nature. Following are some examples of how welfare statism undercuts political, social, and economic competencies in many reserve communities:

1) **Political Impacts**

Most funding for welfare state programs is now transferred through Indian governments at the Band and Tribal levels. These transfer funds constitute all or the majority of each First Nation’s financial resources, because their governments are either incapable of raising their own monies or are loath to raise taxes from their own members (though some receive revenues from leases). Indian administrations are, in effect, little more than the lowest tier in DIAND’s hierarchal bureaucracy for delivering what are essentially federal, and not local programs. DIAND sets the program objectives and application criteria, and First Nations have little flexibility to adjust programs to local circumstances or opportunities to learn from experience to doing things better. Many Indian governments, despite claims to the contrary, are not receiving valuable experience in running their own affairs. And as Menno
Boldt has presciently queried, how can Indian bands or tribal groups expect to achieve meaningful political autonomy when approximately 70% of their community members are unemployed, and when 90% or more of their operating revenues on most reserves comes from Canadian government grants? The old adage 'He who pays the piper calls the tune' is most apt.

Extreme dependency on outside funding does not encourage local accountability for public spending. The devolution of responsibility for delivering federal programs to bands and tribal administrations does not appear to have led to increased community control. The above mentioned Auditor-General’s report, points to a disturbing incidence of poor Band auditing and maladministration. The point here is not to personally denigrate Indian administrators, but to point to systemic problems in the present system of state-sponsored welfarism. In situations where transfer funds are not complemented with local financing, and programs are not perceived by community members to be their "property" but a state responsibility, it not surprising that local accountability is lacking. It is also all too easy to blame any problems on the failure of outside funding agents to provide adequate programs and budgets.

Boldt points to disturbing trends in Indian communities towards bifurcation into a "ruling elite class and a powerless lower class," which he attributes to breakdowns in traditional leadership and consensual decision-making practices. But the elite’s power base is also reinforced by their real or perceived ability to procure welfare funding. Ralph Matthews warns of the dangers of leaders in small communities who perform a function akin to that of a "bridgehead" between the community and the outside world. Such
leaders frequently have interests more in common with the outside world than with the majority of the population in their own community or area, and thus may find themselves in a position analogous to that of the "compradors" depicted in Latin American UDT, "who are agents of outside exploitation in their own community." Following Matthews' analogy, Indian leaders may be validated by community members for their outside connections to the central welfare state and be continuously pressured to secure their favoured position by bringing in more programs and more welfare dollars. Consequently, their personal interests may become closely aligned with those of DIAND officials for maintaining the present system of welfare dependency, though for public consumption at home they have to say otherwise.

Elites also have opportunities to exercise undue power by controlling welfare spending within their communities. The average Canadian would no doubt think it intolerable to be vulnerable to local politicking for receiving a house and perhaps land, a job, post-secondary education or other skills training, and income maintenance when needed, especially when the communities in question may be fractured along family or "clan" lines and any local accountability can be easily circumvented by blaming outside agencies -- but this is reality for many reserve Indians who are not in control. Thus, there are inherent risks in the current system of welfarism of both undue external dependency of Indian communities on the central state and of individual disempowerment of the majority of community members.
2) Social Impacts

Welfarism critically attacks those communal relations of sharing and mutual responsibility which used to be the hallmarks of native communities. DIAND and other outside agency funded programs have proliferated for child care, home care for invalids, support to seniors, special education, home school support, family counselling, substance abuse counselling, community health, and so on. The community social map has been redrawn by social workers. Professional role specialization and bureaucratic administration for satisfying external funding requirements encourages bloated Band staffs, and pushes out self-help and mutual aid among families and community members. This is a vicious circle, for as traditional support mechanisms succumb to formalized welfare systems, intrusions into community life deepen, feelings of anomie are worsened even further, and yet more welfare programming is required. Not only do welfare state programs depreciate traditional cultural values, but their delegated administration by Bands actively contributes to cultural assimilation through the mimicking of state bureaucrats' assumptions, rules, procedures, and criteria.

In Boldt's terms, the accumulative effects on Indian peoples from assimilative persecutions, loss of economic independence, and a state of dependency lead to an adaptive and socially transmitted "culture of dependence." On the converse side, Indian societies have undergone a process of "deculturation," the evidence of which, he says, "can be observed in the uncommonly high levels of alcoholism, substance abuse, suicide, violence, family disruption, sexual abuse, child neglect, theft, vandalism, and so on which prevail within Indian communities." 16
3) **Economic Impacts**

Among the most damaging economic impacts of long-term welfare dependency are the "de-skilling" of work abilities and loss of motivation. "Chronically" unemployed workers (as opposed to those who are temporarily or seasonally unemployed) are more likely to be victims of stigmatization and will be shunned by potential employers. Losses of personal self-esteem are often psychologically disastrous: unemployed Indian males are particularly vulnerable because of losing their traditional roles as providers, with sometimes tragic consequences for themselves and their spouses.

Most reserve communities are vulnerably dependent on state support for economic development funding, with state agencies and Band governments making many of the investment decisions. Compared with other small communities, little funding may be raised directly from lending institutions without government involvement, and little funding is raised within the community itself. The consequences can include insufficient profit motivation to make publicly funded projects successful, poor investment decisions which ignore market realities and favour projects with alleged "social spin-offs," and discouragement of a viable private economic sector embodying the benefits of individual entrepreneurship and risk-taking. The consequent high rate of businesses failures, together with the lack of a viable private sector alternative, may beget more desperate and failed attempts at interventionism. A sense of failure may envelop the community and sap their resolve.

Not only may welfarism thwart successful community participation in the modern economy, but traditional norms of volunteerism and self-help may also suffer when public
hiring programs set a "price" for all subsequent community activities. Mention should also be made about the effects of welfarism on socio-economic class divisions. Many salaried jobs on reserves are either involved in administering the transfer and distribution of incoming funds, or are in public service jobs financed by those funds. Where these jobs are paid relatively highly and there are few other economic opportunities, then class divisions may be arise around who works for the "Band government" and who does not.

The above description illustrate how welfare statism erodes the political, social, and economic competencies of Indian communities. Moreover, the examples which are given cross the typical spans of liberal, reformist and radical criticism, with their respective emphasis on "community" as: (i) a collection of ‘individuals,’ e.g. elitist control of political institutions, (ii) a network of ‘organizations,’ e.g. professional biases in social agencies, and (iii) as a ‘society’ with cultural norms and values, e.g. loss of economic traditions of communal self-help and sharing. No one perspective by itself would provide an adequate understanding. Only a relational approach reveals the complexity and interconnectedness of the many factors contributing to welfare dependency on reserves and indicates the immense difficulties of community rebuilding which is required.

What about the role of the central state in aiding and abetting reserve community dependency? Again, equally valid criticisms can be made from different perspectives. First, from a liberal perspective, it can argued that the welfare state has undemocratically imposed its centrally-controlled welfare programs on local Indian communities. Similarly, it has removed democratic control from community members over many aspects of their life by transferring undue power to political leaders, administrative staff and
professional specialists, and generally has impaired effective local polities. A strong liberal case can also be made that, whereas Indian policy was historically directed to trying to undermine Indian communal traditions, the effect of the welfare state has been to systematically "deindividualize" Indians by forcing them to relate only to their Band governments for meeting important social and economic needs, and limiting their personal access to outside public institutions.

Second, from a radical perspective equally valid criticisms can be made, but these focus on the sometimes insidious roles of central state agencies and intertwining interests between them and local elites. Criticisms are commonplace of DIAND’s role in perpetuating Indian dependency to ensure its own bureaucratic survival, but by themselves such interpretations are too limiting, and for two reasons. 18 First, they ascribe too much autonomy to DIAND operations within the central state and ignore the fact that its policy environment is either explicitly set or endorsed by the federal cabinet and central agencies or, at least, is implicitly condoned by their non-action. Second, it has to be appreciated that DIAND performs certain necessary roles for the central state vis-a-vis its relations with Indians. These are discussed below.

Rick Ponting provides a more searching critique of DIAND than is usual in the literature. 19 He juxtaposes a liberal, behaviouralist (and most insightful) interpretation of DIAND bureaucrats caught between the demands of their clients and their political masters, together with a radical, structuralist interpretation of DIAND’s roles in the central state. Whereas Ponting’s liberal critique rests on assumptions of, in Lukes’ terms, ‘situational’ interpersonal power relations, his radical analysis rests on assumptions of ‘systemic’
biases against the less powerful which permeate the state apparatus. Ponting goes beyond an internal colony accusation that DIAND manipulates its bureaucratic client group on ethnic lines, and instead he proposes that it serves as an agent of the central state for social class domination. The latent purposes of DIAND, he charges, are to act as a buffer for "buying off" troublesome Bands and to contain demands such as aboriginal claims, while diverting attention away from vested class interests who continue to profit from Indian exploitation.

Ponting also usefully recognizes that, in O'Connor's terms, DIAND generally acts to support the state's contradictory roles for facilitating "capital accumulation" and preserving "social legitimization," while also attempting to avert a "fiscal crisis" brought about by competing demands of both these state imperatives on public financing. One of the primary motivations behind the state's imposition of the reserve system (other than assimilating Indians) was to physically remove them from lands needed for economic development. But DIAND still performs a capital accumulation role for the state, not just by preserving and administrating the reserve system, but by mediating conflicts over Indians' aboriginal rights to their former territories and clearing the way for Canadian resource extracting industries and the multi-nationals. Thus, it is not just a matter of organizational convenience that responsibilities for northern development and the settlement of comprehensive claims are lumped into DIAND along with the Indian Affairs Branch, despite the obvious conflicts of interest involved. It should also be noted that the state has typically moved to settle claims in northern Canada when it was required to avert immediate threats to mega energy projects, as most clearly illustrated in the case of the James Bay agreement. It is also significant that the Province of British Columbia
started to take land claims seriously after it was reported how economic uncertainties about land and resource tenure in the Province were causing serious investment losses or delays. 22

As for the state’s "social legitimization" role, this bears directly on DIAND’s control of welfare state spending in Indian communities. Since the 1950’s, the poor living conditions of Indians on reserves (and latterly in urban areas) have been dramatically brought to the attention of the Canadian public, and have also earned considerable criticism from the international community -- even the previous White South African government cynically seized the opportunity to deplore the plight of reserve Indians! Increased scrutiny and public awareness of the Indian situation has brought responses by successive Canadian governments, acting both to meet criticism from their political opponents and for genuinely humanitarian reasons. But from a radical perspective there are also imperatives for the capitalist Canadian state to try to neutralize the "Indian problem" in the public view, both to assert the state’s general legitimacy in a democratic society and forestall damaging spillover effects on capital accumulation. DIAND plays an obviously important role in performing the state’s social legitimization role by delivering welfare programs to alleviate, both in fact and appearance, the extremes of Indian poverty and degradation. But, more insidiously, it also uses welfare dollars to attempt to buy off Indian opposition by coopting Indian leaders and promoting complacency among their constituents.

It should be emphasized that this radical interpretation is not meant to be a complete explanation of welfare state functions and DIAND’s particular roles. Other explanations of a liberal nature were presented above, and reformist viewpoints will be added below.
However, if anyone should doubt the significance of welfare funding in assisting the
diversion of radical action by Indians, they should examine some critical instances where
this has indeed occurred. For instance, although Indian organizations were highly vocal in
opposing the White Paper's general proposals for their complete assimilation, they were
silent about its specific recommendation to close down the very agency which had been
the primary instrument of their attempted assimilation in the past -- the Department of
Indian Affairs. Other explanations can be made for this silence, such as the Indians' desire
to preserve their "special federal connection," but they are by no means convincing as a
complete explanation, and the potential loss of DIAND's funding did have influence. Also,
as was discussed at some length in Chapter Four, the desire of NIB leaders to expand their
centralized control over transfer dollars was a major factor in them rejecting promising
opportunities for community-based economic development proposed in the 1979 Beaver
Report. Very recently, after the AFN Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi won extraordinary
concessions in the Charlottetown Accord to constitutionally entrench Indian self-
government rights, many Indian chiefs in the AFN undermined his achievements because
he had not also obtained ironclad (but politically impossible) assurances for government
financing of Indians. Not unrelated, a majority of Indians ended up voting against the
Accord.

Lastly, we turn to a reformist perspective on the state. The preceding liberal and radical
critiques are direct frontal assaults on the reform tradition's centrepiece of the modern
welfare state. But some persuasive defenses came be made on behalf of the welfare
state. Without its assistance many Indians unable to help themselves after their economic
marginalization brought about by the reserve system, would have undoubtedly been in a
even worse situation than they are now with respect to meeting their basic needs for shelter, education, public health, and income security. It can also be advanced that, while the objectives of the welfare state have merit, the methods used need considerable improvement. Overly centralized and bureaucratized organizations often work more in their own interests (i.e. protection of mandates, staff and budgets), than they do to advance the interests of the people they are supposed to serve. Programs are imposed undemocratically without local input, their design often encourages dependency, and they are not always effectively targeted to the truly needy. Thus, a viable reformist response is to accept the need for considerable restructuring of the welfare state "without throwing out the baby with the bathwater."

As in the case of the examination of the impacts of welfarism on Indian community competencies, the admittedly brief examination of the role of the state reveals the many factors involved -- ranging from individualist bureaucratic motivations, through organizational biases for self-preservation and aggrandizement among government welfare agencies, to the structuring of the modern capitalist state -- which all conspire to maintain Indian welfare dependency. Add to this the previously described, personal motivations of some Indian elites to preserve the existing system (or, at most, to only remold it in a way which still protects their own interests), and the magnitude of the task to overcome welfare dependency becomes even more apparent. For instance, the oft-repeated calls by academic critics to remove Indian dependency by the mere act of dismantling DIAND do not make sense without a fundamental change in power relations between the state and Indians and within Indian communities, which would prevent DIAND's negative functions being simply assumed by other state agencies or Indian organizations.
All the above criticisms of the impacts of welfarism on Indian communities and the role played by the state have their merits. It should not be argued that one is so inherently superior to the others that it obviates additional and equally valid explanations. This not to say that different perspectives are always equally valid -- we are not endorsing relativism -- they have to be appropriate to the particular situation under examination. But from our examination certain general conclusions can be reached about the seriousness and nature of dependency in reserve communities and necessary responses:--

(1) The effects of welfarism in reserve communities are wide-sweeping in their erosion of political, social, and economic competencies. The scope of potential impacts (which doubtless differs considerably in severity from one First Nation to another) include constraining democratic local governance and individual participation; subverting the Indian leadership and diverting radical action; eroding individual values of self-responsibility and traditional communal values of self-help and sharing; wasting valuable human and financial resources; emaciating individual self-motivation and the 'work ethic'; and blocking private enterprise. Furthermore, losses in one area of competencies have cumulative effects on others such as the undermining of local political autonomy by economic dependency.

(2) Welfare dependency plays a major role in perpetuating and reinforcing the underdevelopment processes which originally started with imposition of the reserve system. Indeed, welfarism may be the pivotal problem in many contemporary reserve communities, though, as will be discussed, it is intertwined with other major problems of a limited resource base and restricted rights of self-governance.
The problems of welfarism are deep-seated and resistant to change. There are strong and overlapping vested interests among state political institutions and administrative agencies as well as elite classes within Indian communities, which have a stake in preserving the status quo of dependency. These may serve to exclude community members from making choices which may intimately effect their futures, or, indeed, which may even deprive them of full awareness of all the causes for their present problems and the potential scope of choices for the future.

The causes of welfare dependency are both external and internal to reserve communities. The state initiated the process by isolating Indians on reserves and deliberately eroding their traditional competencies while, at the same time, failing to support them adapt to new economic conditions. This set the scene in the Post-War period for rapid intrusion of centrally-controlled welfare programs into all aspects of reserve life. But the problem has now become internalized in reserve communities by their extreme dependency on the welfare state and the consequent erosion of necessary competencies needed for achieving self-reliance.

Just as underdevelopment has occurred from both 'without and within,' so must development. The state has to facilitate Indian development by enabling them to obtain necessary powers and resources. But Indian communities will also have to assume central responsibility for developing themselves through confronting and dealing with the realities of their own problems, such as over-dependency on outside support, and internal class manipulation and exploitation.
8.3 The Role of the State for Facilitating Indian Development

How can the downward processes of underdevelopment in reserve communities be reversed? We propose a dual strategy of mutually reinforcing state and community action which will both contribute to competency-building and substantive development in reserve communities. The role which the state can play in facilitating development is discussed first, focusing on the transfer of power and resources. Most Indian communities certainly need much larger land and resource base. Their generally small and low quality reserve land allocations are grossly insufficient to support economic self-reliance and long-term environmental sustainability. Expanded self-government powers are also needed for communities to preserve and promote their unique cultural identity, and to direct their own development in locally appropriate ways. It can also be agreed that until Indian communities are better able to provide for themselves, they need a more secure and locally controlled financial base. All these things are needed for Indian communities to develop, outside of any legal/constitutional considerations about aboriginal claims and rights to compensation.

There have been some significant turnarounds recently in state-Indian relations which suggest hope for the future. Three important policy initiatives are outlined below, the B.C. Treaty Process, a plan to dismantle DIAND operations in the province of Manitoba, and a newly announced federal policy on Indian self-government.

(1) B.C. Treaty Process

In British Columbia, after years of deadlock on claims issues, the B.C. Treaty Commission Agreement was signed in September, 1992, by the federal and provincial governments,
and the Summit of First Nations representing a majority of IFN’s in the Province. 23 The centrepiece of the agreement, the Treaty Commission was set up in April of 1993 with representation from the three signatories to the agreement. The Commission’s central role is to facilitate a treaty-making process involving six stages of negotiations: (1) submission of ‘statements of intent’ by IFN’s to negotiate a treaty, including identification of negotiation issues, (2) preparation for negotiations, including assessment of the different parties’ readiness, (3) negotiation of a framework agreement, including objectives and subjects for a final agreement, along with procedures and a timetable, (4) negotiation of an agreement in principle, (5) treaty finalization, and (6) treaty implementation.

Although the B.C. Treaty Process is very systematically laid out, the number of stages involved suggests that the negotiations will be lengthy to say the least. A lengthy time horizon is also indicated by the immense logistics of dealing with B.C.’s large number of First Nations. There are close to 200 IFN’s in the province, of which 114 had filed statements of intent by April 1995, and although some of them are grouped tribally this still translates into 43 separate treaties to be negotiated. Presumably other First Nations will join the process (but see below). Other indications of the immense logistics involved and the competencies required at the community level for successfully completing treaty negotiations, are the diversified array of issues which First Nations have identified for negotiation. These include an enlarged land base, compensation for loss of lands and resources, renegotiation of the treaties that do exist in the province, self-government arrangements, economic development initiatives in urban areas, expanded management roles in fisheries, forestry, and mining, and jobs in resource extraction and management.
B.C.'s Treaty Process is not without its problems. The Treaty Commission has criticized the three negotiating parties for not adequately informing the general public about the process. This failure has served to exacerbate the deep concern felt in many non-Indian communities dependent on resource extraction industries that they may lose their economic livelihoods. Also, despite assurances to the opposite, municipalities in B.C. have been excluded from negotiations which could materially affect their futures, and are dependent upon selective information provided to them by the provincial government. The Province did form a Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee (TNAC) to represent third-party business and industry interests which could be affected by aboriginal claims, but the committee members are prevented from releasing any details about their proceedings under threat of the Official Secrets Act. Members were also chagrined to find out that they had not been kept informed of about 100 "interim measures agreements" -- the Province itself did not know the exact number -- which may well have already, partly committed the Province's hands in subsequent negotiations.

There are deep political divisions between those First Nations who support the Summit group which was a signatory to the treaty process, and those who support the rival Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC), which may number sixty or more. The UBCIC takes a traditionalist stance on Indian rights and identity and opposes the treaty process because it does not recognize up front their claims of unextinguished sovereignty over all provincial lands. The problems within the Indian community have also been exacerbated by the Provincial NDP government's inept handling of the process. They started by seeming to have no clear idea of limits to their bargaining position, and unduly raised Indian expectations of large settlements of lands, financial compensation and sharing of
resource management powers, which also served to alienate (or further alienate) many non-Indian voters. When, after the fact, the Province attempted to appease voter alienation by hardening their positions on treaties, they then alienated many previous Indian supporters of the process (and provided considerable grist to the mill of UBCIC dissenters). This, and other mishandling of Indian issues, has resulted in a growing polarization between opposing Indian and White extremists who, as the well-respected Summit leader, Chief Joe Mathias ironically observes, are both equally opposed to the treaty process. 27

It is probable that the once very promising B.C Treaty process, is seriously but not mortally wounded, and will survive in some form (both the opposition Liberal and Reform parties indicate that they wish treaty negotiations to continue). Indeed, a successful conclusion is absolutely necessary to provide First Nations with the power and resources which they need to control their own destinies and relate to as true equals with other provincial citizens, as well as to ensure stability for B.C.’s natural resource industries. But, obviously, there are still many Indian leaders who are prepared to sacrifice the well-being of their constituents for abstract, nationalistic principles of absolute sovereignty, as well as White extremists who are not prepared to make any concessions to Indian needs.

(2) Manitoba Process for Dismantling DIAND Operations

One very positive development has been announced in Manitoba which may eventually lead to the closing down of DIAND’s offices in that province and exempting of local First Nations from the Indian Act. In December of 1994, Manitoba Grand Chief Phil Fontaine signed an accord with DIAND Minister Ron Urwin whereby both parties will work out
arrangements for dismantling DIAND's Manitoba operations and replacing application of the Indian Act with self-government arrangements. In signing, Ottawa has agreed to certain principles for the 60 IFN's in Manitoba to assume legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial powers of self-government. Final agreements resulting from the negotiation process will be protected under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (which recognizes "existing" aboriginal and treaty rights), so that aboriginal powers can not be taken back subsequently by future federal or provincial governments. The accord properly leaves open possibilities for individual First Nations to develop different forms of aboriginal government, as well as the option for some Bands to choose to remain under federal control. Most fairly, Ottawa remains responsible for any derogation of its past responsibilities, but once aboriginal governments are in power they are to be fully responsible for their own actions.

It is not clear, at this point, whether Indian institutions in Manitoba will merely replace DIAND or will fundamentally change power relations both outside and inside their communities though this process. So far, it appears to be community-driven. Also of concern is the lengthy time frame of ten years which has been set to reach final agreements, which by mutual consent could be further extended.

(3) New Federal Policy on Indian Self-Government

In August 1995, after the Manitoba breakthrough, the federal government announced a new policy on self-government called "The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government." The policy's title is significant, because it reflects the Chretien government's
recognition of aboriginal self-government as an inherent right under section 35 of the Constitution, and the attempt to implement its own understanding of the concept after no agreement was reached on its precise meaning during the First Ministers' Conferences (FMC's), and failure of the Charlottetown Accord's proposals to leave the eventual scope and limits of aboriginal government's powers completely open to negotiation. The new policy proposes practical measures for implementing the concept of self-government without attempting to define it in abstract terms, which would require constitutional amendment with agreement of the provinces and aboriginal representatives -- one stone which the Chretien liberals are particularly loath to turn over.

Under the policy, the government offers to negotiate the transfer of self-government powers to Indian First Nations (and the Inuit) which could exceed those of municipalities, but would be less than those of provinces. It does not prescribe what powers aboriginal groups should exercise (they can elect to stay wholly or partly under the Indian Act), but, as will be elaborated below, it does limit their exercise of "initiative" in selecting what powers they wish to assume. The policy statement also emphasizes that Indian self-governments will be located within the existing structure of Canadian federation, and dismisses any pretensions that an inherent right to self-government constitutes a right to sovereignty under international law. The exercise of self-governing powers would be subject to Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and the federal government's overriding authority for preserving "peace, order and good government" over the whole country. These and other restrictions would limit the "immunity" of self-governments to scrutiny and control by senior government over what powers they do exercise.
Individual agreements can be tailored with each First Nation according to the negotiable powers they wish to assume. The policy paper distinguishes between three sets of powers for purposes of negotiations. First are those powers which lie within the federal domain which the federal government is prepared to include as subjects for negotiation. The list is quite lengthy, including internal governing structures, elections, constitutions and membership; marriage, adoption and child welfare (but not divorce); aboriginal language, culture and religion; education, health and social services; administration of aboriginal laws, policing, and property rights; natural resource and land management; hunting, fishing and trapping on aboriginal lands; direct taxation and property taxation of members; and, management of public works and housing. Many of these subjects are currently covered under the Indian Act, and its provisions would be waived according to the scope of the individual agreements reached with each First Nation. Second, are powers which are shared with provinces or lie in their domains and would require their involvement for reaching agreement. These include labour and training, environmental protection, fisheries co-management, penitentiaries and parole, administration of justice, and gaming. Third, are federal powers which are not up for negotiation such as international treaty-making, national security and defence, banking institutions, and immigration. Thus, compared with the B.C. treaty process, the federal government is very clear up front on what it is, and is not, prepared to negotiate.

As for the financing of self-governments, the policy holds that it should be a shared responsibility among federal, provincial and territorial governments, and aboriginal governments. Specific funding arrangements will take into consideration each aboriginal group’s abilities to contribute, and, over time, it is expected that aboriginal governments
will assume an increasing share of responsibility.

The government’s self-styled "pragmatic" approach to defining self-government reflects their aversion to seeking a constitutional solution after past failures and, more particularly, a lack of confidence in working with the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). Indeed, according to DIAND Minister, Ron Irwin, discussions on drawing up the policy took place at the "grass roots" level with individual First Nations, and it appears that the AFN leadership was deliberately circumvented. Overall, the policy offers considerably less than "third-order" governments proposed by the 1983 Penner Commission, which greatly raised Indian expectations and served as a de facto blueprint for AFN leaders’ nationalistic claims during the constitutional debates. In terms of our self-government model described in Chapter Five, the Chretien government proposal probably lies just within the "consociational" mode of incorporation, with Indians relating to the central state in some areas of jurisdiction as distinct groups through the intermediary of their own governments, while relating directly as individuals in other areas. By comparison, previous federal policies and legislative approaches regarding self-government have been far more assimilative in intent, and based solely on municipal and individualistic styled models with delegated, rather than transferred powers.

In the last chapter, it was concluded that it would be useful to conceive of Indians as distinct "sub-societies" within a larger "inclusive" Canadian society, meaning that they are simultaneously constitutive but, nevertheless, distinct components of a larger whole. This compares with the liberal and radical polarized extremes respectively of complete individualistic assimilation into the larger whole versus autonomous, nationalist groupism.
Neither of these extremes are consistent with Indian traditions or are politically viable for the future of state-Indian relations. In the opinion of this writer, the new federal policy is a first step in the right direction towards according Indian communities the necessary relative autonomy for their own political governance, recognizing both their commonalities and differences with the rest of Canada.

8.4 The Role for Community Action

Our recognition of the need for the state to enable Indian communities to achieve an enlarged land and resource base, self-government powers, and an assured financial base, does not mean, as some Indian leaders and theorists seem to suggest that: (1) these are all immediately necessary conditions for any development to commence and, (2) that development would necessarily flow after these conditions are satisfied. It also has to be recognized that although, as was shown, hope is on the way for state transfers of powers and resources, it will take some time to reach fruition.

As for the first point, some communities are already progressing with the development tools which they have. For instance, a research project sponsored by the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), which focused on B.C., identified numerous economic success of Indian groups who are successfully implementing new business ventures and institutional arrangements for developing and managing forestry, fisheries, and mineral resources. Another IRPP sponsored research project includes case studies of Indian groups across Canada who have successfully negotiated devolution of program responsibilities from the federal and provincial governments, and are now implementing their own programs for education, social services, health care, local services, economic
development and resource management. These case examples are used by the authors of the two studies to respectively support the case for comprehensive land claims settlements and new constitutional arrangements for self-government, but they also show what can effectively be done in present circumstances. But, these achievements need to be built upon and applied across other activities and with other First Nations.

As for the second point, and on a more negative note, it can by no means be guaranteed that even under the conditions of transferred power and resources to Indian communities, that development will necessarily follow. This bears directly on reserve communities’ political, social, and economic competencies. In cases where competencies are seriously eroded, it would be prudent to consider the possibility that existing systems and practices of welfare dependency could be carried forward, for instance, under new land claims settlements. As shown by ANCSA and, to a lesser degree, by the James Bay agreement, large allocations of lands and financial compensation might not be used to achieve long-term economic sustainability for Indian communities. It can be asked, what is there to guarantee that future land claims settlements will not be subverted into giant welfare schemes where Indian leaders and bureaucrats participate in countless government joint-agencies for managing the natural resource base, and administer similarly countless Indian agencies for allocating compensation and revenue monies, delivering community programs, and managing tribal investment portfolios, but without getting all community members to work in building up a new, self-reliant economic base? That, unfortunately, is the experiences to date of the James Bay model. The lessons from ANCSA are even more sobering: most of the compensation monies are already spent and, as allowed for under that agreement, many of the settlement lands are reverting to private ownership. Indeed,
and very importantly, part of the failure of these ventures and others may be attributable to the fact that the Indian communities in question did not yet possess sufficient competencies to negotiate satisfactory agreements in the first place.

There is also the point that although there now appears to be some hope of successfully reforming state-Indian relations, it will still take some considerable time. Despite all the considerable efforts which have gone into the B.C. treaty process by all parties, not one treaty with a participating First Nation is close to final agreement, let alone implementation (there may, in fact, be some immediate agreement reached on the Nishga claim, but it is properly not part of the treaty process and has been over twenty years in the making). In Manitoba, the closing down of DIAND will take at least ten years. As far as the federal government's new self-government policy is concerned, its sheer complexity suggests that it will be a considerable time before the first agreements start to come into place. Nor can we reasonably expect that this federal initiative, worthwhile though it is, will forever forestall a return to constitutional debates about self-government, or will avoid litigation in the courts about what other parties think is the "true" concept of self-government. There is also the question of how quickly federal and provincial governments can pay the bills: for instance, B.C treaty claims alone may cost over 10 billion dollars. 33

Thus, the external conditions of self-governance and adequate resources, which it is agreed are necessary for the eventual successful development by Indians over the long term, will not be achieved overnight. Their achievement will probably be slow and piecemeal at the best, including the distinct possibility that advances made in some provinces will not be reached in others. But, everything cannot be put on hold until the
"ideal conditions" are everywhere put in place for development. This is not an academic issue: many Indian people will remain impoverished and be imprisoned in conditions of social despair unless development efforts are increased now.

What we propose is that the current movement to reform external state-Indian power relations be mutually supported with determined efforts to bring about equally substantial changes in internal community power relations. Specifically, we propose community action to rebuild community competencies through application in practice to the tasks of decreasing welfarist dependency and increasing economic self-reliance. In the time which will be needed for self-government and resource transfer agreements to be put into place, community action should lay the necessary internal foundations for improving their chances of success, both by improving the quality of the agreements which are reached and the quality of their implementation.

The general scope of community action processes we have in mind are encompassed by the emerging community economic development (CED) movement, together with more established traditions of community social organization. The objectives of CED, as Boothroyd and Davis assert, are for local communities to exercise control not only over the centralizing economic market place, but also over the bureaucratic welfare state. CED aims to reduce welfare state dependency by simultaneously seeking local substitutes for assistance which the central state is not effectively providing (and, increasingly, is less able to afford), and to pursue strategies for communities to become more economically self-sufficient so that less assistance is required in the future. Social organization theories and practices are more generally directed at the task of community mobilization, to bring
about community change for improving access to and sharing of power and resources, and for enhancing self-esteem and self-reliance. Its methods include promoting democratic participation and community education, putting pressures on central and local political institutions to be more responsive, developing indigenous leadership, and encouraging grassroots operation of social agencies and design of local social programs.

There is a need to improve community development theories just as described for development doctrine generally in Chapter Seven. Like other development doctrine, community development theories are currently divided into assimilationist and autonomist schools and share their same dualist assumptions, which is not surprising because of their highly derivative nature (see Chapter Six for the derivation of CED theories from regional development theories, especially). In CED theories this is reflected in tendencies to overemphasize either: (a) the need for local communities to more fully integrate themselves into broader markets according to modernist norms of social organization, or (b) the ability of local communities to act unilaterally to pursue autonomist and traditionalist development paths. Instead of community development theory being divided in this manner into mutually exclusive schools which each advocate a ‘value-correct’ choice for all situations, a more synthetic approach needs to be taken (as in our relational process model) which would draw upon multi-various concepts and strategies as appropriate to the circumstances.

In both CED and social organization theory there is a particular need to accommodate relational understandings (such as described in our community competencies model) of how the causes of community underdevelopment can be simultaneously external and
internal. It is understood that identifying the community as a "victim" and external agencies as "villains" is a powerful community organizing force, but if it is rooted in hypocrisy and self-denial some urgent community problems will not be recognized and dealt with.

Nor should the focus on communities be so overly abstracted, as it often is, to exclude complementary levels of analysis of state-community, regional-community and class-community relations. Some community development theorists of the autonomist school are among those most prone to such reductionism by drawing lines around individual communities and making overly exclusive distinctions between "them" and "us," as externally disparate but internally homogenous social groupings. Some other theorists of the assimilationist school go so far to the other extreme to make a focus on communities meaningless. Some correctives to this reductionism in community action theories are urgently needed, such as our concept of 'Indian sub-societies,' as well as regional perspectives of overlapping or conflicting interests between communities (both Indian and non-Indian). Lastly, and very importantly, the possibility of significant class divisions should be recognized in Indian communities, as well as cultural conflicts such as between "traditionalists" and "modernists." 36

The community action processes which we envisage should be community based, reflective, experimental, and locally controlled, i.e.

1. Processes which are truly based in local communities require equal, close and continuing participation by as many community members as possible, and are
directed by the mutual consent of all participants. Community-based processes will have to be deliberately planned with attention, not only to necessary procedures of information collection and processing, but also to needs for social mobilization and democratic participation.

(2) By community action being reflective is meant the creation of conditions which will encourage participants to examine not only the roles of outside agencies in processes of underdevelopment and development, but to look critically within their communities as to how things could be done better in the future.

(2) Through methods of planned experimentation, communities can be encouraged to freely test new ideas and opportunities. In doing so they can adapt their community competencies by learning from doing, while at the same time contribute to substantive improvements in their development. Different communities can also share the benefits of their experiences with each other.

(3) The state and its agencies should facilitate local experimentation by relaxing program rules and government regulations. It should not subvert community-based control by being overly directive or intrusive, or by maintaining community elites' positions of power over community members which emanate from their outside government connections.

Such community action processes should be immediately targeted to achieving fundamental reforms of welfare statism. A two-component approach is proposed involving
both: (a) changing the way welfare support is provided within communities to minimize its unwanted, destructive aspects and enhancing its positive benefits, and (b) promoting community economic development to improve community health and economic self-reliance and, thereby, also reduce the need for welfare support and concomitant dependency on the central state.

As a general guideline, welfare systems can be reformed in reserve communities by removing the destructive aspects of welfarism which contribute to dependency, such as declining individual motivation and eroding family and community self-help, while retaining worthy aspects such as meeting basic standards of human needs, promoting equal access to opportunities, and providing for the needy who cannot help themselves. There are many such opportunities.

For instance, instead of funding support being blocked separately for social maintenance needs (e.g. SA and UIC) and developmental needs (e.g. manpower training, and business and job creation), they can be merged to simultaneously meet both needs more effectively. Communities could consider properly organized ‘workfare’ programs which require social assistance recipients to do community work or take retraining if they are to continue receiving benefits, but without penalizing those whom for whatever reasons are incapable of participating (some Manitoba Chiefs have shown interest in such a scheme 38). SA and UIC recipients could also be allowed to retain more of their benefits if they are successful in getting part-time or low paying jobs. Communities could also design their own education and health programs from the ground up to meet local needs, instead of conforming to inflexible central agency standards. They could also apply their own criteria
for identifying who really need various types of program support, and relative priorities between needs. They could also assess whether some social needs now being provided through bureaucratic delivery agencies may be better served by returning to traditional, informal systems of mutual aid. Doubtless, there are many other such possibilities. It should be emphasized that the above are intended as illustrative examples of what might be done: individual communities would have to define their own needs and solutions.

Because of space constraints, not too much can be said about specific economic development strategies which could be followed. However, the range of possibilities should not be limited by any one "value correct," selection. The challenge of creating jobs and generating income on reserves located in remote regions with limited economic opportunities will be difficult enough without prescribing artificial, ideological limitations, such as development on strict socialist or free-market principles (which does seem to be an abiding concern of some CED theorists and practitioners). Development will need to satisfy essential criteria defined by each community at large: some examples could be broadening the basis of material well-being among all community members, ensuring long-term economic and ecological sustainability, or protecting certain cultural traditions or physical artifacts. But given some such community-defined parameters as a baseline, a wide variety of economic strategies can be entertained, ranging from private enterprises which conform to community objectives through to communally owned and operated businesses that are economically viable. And underlining all CED calculations should be the recognition that, except in rare cases, there likely can never be enough jobs created locally to provide for the rapid population growth being experienced in many reserve communities. Thus, part of the CED exercise should be to plan, not just for the physically
circumscribed community, but for the wider social community, so that outgoing migrants are far better prepared and supported to cope with urban living than many are at present.

As have been envisaged by other theorists, such community processes can be applied to other tasks in Indian development. More specifically, the community competencies which will be built up in reducing welfare dependency can be directed to the need which was identified above for improving the quality of self-government and resource transfer agreements, and the quality of their implementation. Boothroyd, for instance, has proposed three distinctive roles for Indian community-based planning to successively: (1) plan under present structures and thereby gain experience in self-management, including building up their planning competencies, (2) plan for self-government, and (3) plan within self-governing communities. 39

Similarly, Boldt proposes what he calls an "inductive-evolutionary approach to developing Indian nationhood," meaning that the objective should be to achieve a traditional conception of national self-determination through a participatory process of incremental learning in practice. 40 Boldt's proposals for adoption of what is called here a "traditionalist" national strategy follows his earlier criticism (together with Long) of some Indians' adoption of a "modernist" national strategy based on hierarchal, individualistic and materialistic propositions, as being inconsistent with traditional norms of consensual decision-making and communal sharing. Boldt is concerned that self-government agreements reached through high-level legislative or constitutional agreements will not aid and, indeed, will undermine Indians cultural survival as Indians. (And, if this was the case,
it can be asked why "Indians" should have or need particular rights to govern themselves any more than any other Canadian ethnic group). Underlining this concern are his fears that self-government may only serve to replace DIAND’s colonialist, self-interested, bureaucratic control structures with similar Indian elite-run structures.

"If the rationale for Indian government is decolonization of Indian people," Boldt says, "power must go to the people." Specifically, Indian leaders must actively "engage their people in planning and developing political and administrative structures and norms consistent with traditional philosophies and principles." The drafting of what Boldt and Long call "grass roots constitutions," would be useful for guiding internal matters of community life and how communities relate to the outside world. More particularly, they could also provide a useful foundation for negotiating self-government agreements with federal and provincial governments. Indeed, the new federal policy on self-government includes provisions for community drafted constitutions. Even its requirement for aboriginal groups to conform with the individualistic-framed Charter of Rights and Freedoms may not be such a potential tumbling block as it first appears to designing traditional, communal orientated constitutions (if that is what a First Nation wanted). Section 25 of the Charter directs that its provisions be interpreted in manner that respects aboriginal and treaty rights.

Indian policy in Canada has gone a long way since the Royal Proclamation of 1763 when the British imperial government, anxious to make Indian nations their allies, committed itself to treat them with fairness and dignity. In the years that followed, those commitments were broken. But events are starting to turn in favour of the Indians again.
as they and the mass media have confronted all Canadians with evidence of the injustices which have been inflicted and the need to make amends. Ahead we can have confidence that many problems of Canada's reserve communities will be resolved, but it is going to take a long time and will demand the considerable dedication of governments, the Indian leadership, and all community members, as well as the majority support of public opinion. The public are torn between justice and possible, property, financial and legal costs to themselves, but it seems possible that Indian and non-Indians can arrive at acceptable compromises of which both can be proud.
Chapter One: Footnotes and References

1 Statistics on Indians are drawn from DIAND, Basic Departmental Data - 1992 (Ottawa, DIAND), and Canada, Canada Year Book 1994 (Ottawa, Statistics Canada).

2 Some appreciation of welfarist dependency on reserves can be gained from categorizing the many programs of the welfare state which are variously directed to individuals, social groups, and corporations. According to Anderson and Boothroyd a distinction can be made between "maintenance" welfare for basic upkeep and protection of health, welfare and safety, and "developmental" welfare for expanding social production. Another distinction is between "institutional" and "residual" welfare: the first type of support is universally provided to meet common categories of needs for people as they pass through life (e.g. state-funded education), while the second provides a safety net for those displaced workers who, from time to time, are unable to compete in the market place through no fault of their own. It is indicative of the high levels of welfarist dependency on reserves that most spending is for maintenance rather than developmental purposes, and what was originally intended to be temporary residual support has often, over time, taken on the character of institutional support, e.g. inter-generational family dependence on social assistance. For the distinctions between forms of welfare support, see O.A. Anderson and P. Boothroyd, Patterns, Progress and Development, Saskatchewan Forum (Ottawa, DIAND 1984).


Chapter One (cont.)

8 R.W. Dunning, 'Some Aspects of Governmental Indian Policy and Administration,' Anthropologica NS 6 no. 1 (1962) 3-38.


12 Ibid., 395.


Chapter Two: Footnotes and References

1 R. Blauner, 1969, op.cit., 396, numeration added.

2 The 1763 Royal Proclamation is reproduced in M. Boldt, Surviving as Indians, The Challenge of Self-Government (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1997).

3 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens. A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1989).

4 Ibid., 89.

Chapter Two (cont.)

6 The distinction between Imperial and subsequent Colonial/Canadian Indian policy is not made by many authors writing in the "internal colony" tradition. They appear to have been particularly influenced by L.F.S. Upton’s ‘Origins Of Canadian Indian Policy’ Journal of Canadian Studies 8, no.3 (1973). However, a careful reading of Upton does not support convincingly his contentions that imperial Indian policy was totally self-serving, and provided the model which was "later generalized across the Dominion after 1867 and has guided the official conduct of Indian affairs down to the present day" (p.51). A more credible secondary source is Tobias’s (op.cit.) historical account of Canada’s legislation on Indian policy.


9 J.R. Miller, 1989, op. cit.


11 R.J. Surtees, ‘The Development of an Indian Reserve Policy in Canada’ Ontario History 61, No.2 (1969) 87-98. Upton suggests, interestingly, that the initiative for this concerted, social engineering effort came from the Indian Department of the Central Canadas to preserve their own bureaucratic survival. Apparently, faced with imminent loss of employment because of repeated demands for cost-cutting, they convinced Colonial Office officials of the merits of a humane mission to civilize Indians by settling them on farms and making them educated and Christian! L.S. Upton, 1973, op. cit.


14 J.R. Miller, 1989, op. cit.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
18 According to Paul Tennant, "The insistence on imposing an elective form of government on Indians has been the most consistent, though least evident element in federal Indian policy since Confederation.... The Indian philosophy was and is collective or corporate: the individual is seen as attaining his place and meaning within the traditions of the community and through performance of communal obligations.... The structures of band government were copied from the municipal model. A chief and a council, equivalent to a mayor and aldermen, were to be elected by adult suffrage. Each adult was to have the right to seek elective office. Political equality, elections, and access to public office are central tenets of individualistic philosophies." P. Tennant, 'Aboriginal Rights and the Penner Report on Indian Self-Government' in M. Boldt and J.A. Long, eds., with L. Little Bear, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1985).

19 Chamberlin describes these contradictions in the 1876 Act as follows: "From its initial promulgation, there have been those who questioned the sanity of a piece of legislation which actively discouraged, and indeed in some areas positively prohibited, the assimilation of the Indian into the social and economic life of the non-native population, while at the same time being the centerpiece of a broad policy of moving the Indians towards full citizenship and full participation in Canadian life. By existing to regulate and systematize the relationship between the Indian and the majority society, the Act codifies and often exaggerates the distinctions which it is its function eventually to eliminate." J.E. Chamberlin, The Harrowing of Eden (Toronto, Fitzhenry and Whiteside 1975) 90.

20 During the 1870's, when Ottawa's entire annual budget was $19 million, the Americans were spending $20 million each year on their Indian Wars alone! J.R. Miller, 1989, op. cit.

21 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


26 D. Madill, British Columbian Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective (Ottawa, DIAND 1981).
Chapter Two (cont.)


29 Scott variously portrayed Indians as morally inferior and in need of redemption, or as irresponsible infants whose lives should be organized by White superiors imbued with Rudyard Kipling’s evocation of the “White Man’s burden.” For Scott, the final solution for Indians would have to be through intermarriage with the superior Caucasian race, and the reserve system was nothing more than a transitional device. Scott’s views were obvious testament to the descent of Canada’s paternalistic attempts to assimilate Indians into outright racist oppression. See B. Titley, A Narrow Vision. Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada. (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press 1986).

Chapter Three: Footnotes and References


7 S. Weaver, Making Indian Policy. The Hidden Agenda, 1968-1970 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1981) 47.
Chapter Three (cont.)

8 H.B. Hawthorn and M.A. Tremblay, 1966 & 1967, op.cit. 392,

9 Ibid., 21.

10 Ibid., 7-27.

11 Ibid., 297.

12 Ibid., 3.


15 Y.G. Lithman, op. cit., 16.

16 Not only was the Hawthorn Report’s major recommendations well-known to senior DIAND bureaucrats who were involved in the report’s preparation, but the report was also "required reading" for many other staff and had an insidious effect on much bureaucratic thinking. In particular, the report’s comprehensive recommendations for political, social and economic "development" reinforced a rationale for expanding what were really Branch "maintenance" welfare programs for everything! It was claimed that whatever types of program funds which were pumped into reserves they would contribute to reducing dependency, for even if jobs and income did not directly result, "social investments" in human resources and physical infrastructure would assist Indian "human resource development." (personal observations.)

17 S. Weaver, 1981, op. cit.


20 T.N. Brewis, Regional Economic Policies in Canada (Toronto, Methuen Co. of Canada 1969).

21 A.D. Doerr, ‘Indian Policy’ in G.B. Doern and V.S. Wilson, eds., Issues in Canadian Indian Policy (Toronto, Macmillan Co. of Canada 1974).
Chapter Three (cont.)

22 S. Weaver, 1981, op. cit., 83.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


28 S. Weaver, 1981, op. cit., 55.


30 S. Weaver, 1981, op. cit.

31 DIAND, 1969, op. cit., 7

32 Ibid., 10.

33 A.D. Doerr, 1974, op. cit.

34 P. Carstens, 1971, op. cit.


39 S. Weaver, 1981, op. cit. 171.
Chapter Four: Footnotes and References


2. For the distinction between "ethnically distinct" and "nationalist" demands against the state see J. Lightbody, 'A Note on the Theory of Nationalism as a Function of Ethnic Demands' Canadian Journal of Political Science 2, no.3 (1969) 327-337.


Chapter Four (cont.)


15 Ibid., 548.


22 Ibid.


24 For instance, as early as 1909, the Nishga Land Committee coalesced with representatives from other North Coast tribal groups in an organization called the Indian Tribes of British Columbia to press for land claims settlements. Also, the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia (NBBC) was created on the Coast in 1931 largely to advance the fishing interests of their members, and is now the longest-lived Indian political organization in Canada. For a detailed history of B.C. Indian political organizations see P. Tennant, op. cit., 1990.

Chapter Four (cont.)


29 Ibid., 107.

30 Ibid., 124-128.

31 Canadian Council for Rural Development (CCRD), *A Development Strategy for the Mid-North of Canada* (Ottawa, Supply and Services 1976). The CCRD was acting at the time as an advisory council to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) which itself had recently gone through a major "decentralization" after a three-year, internal review process. The result was a new focus based on close multi-lateral collaboration between the federal government and individual provinces within the framework of General Development Agreements (GDA's). See D.J. Savoie, *Regional Economic Development. Canada’s Search for Solutions* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1986).


33 Ibid., 11-12.


36 DIAND, 1976, op. cit., 5.


38 J. W. Beaver, ‘To Have What Is One’s Own,’ ‘The Beaver Report,’ Report from the President, the National Indian Socio-Economic Development Committee (NISEDIC), (Ottawa, DIAND 1979).

39 Ibid., ii.

40 Ibid., iii., underlining added.

41 Ibid., ii
Chapter Four (cont.)


43 Ibid., 2.

44 Ibid., Appendix C.

45 See, for instance, N. Dyck, op. cit.

46 See R. Paton, New Policies and Organizations. Can Indian Affairs Change? Centre for Policy and Program Assessment, School of Public Administration, Carlton University (Ottawa, Carlton University 1982).

47 A. Tanner, 1983, op. cit., 6-29

48 DIAND. Native Claims: Policy, Processes and Perspectives (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer 1978).


52 Canada/Quebec, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBQNA) (Quebec, Editeur Officiel Du Quebec 1976).


55 Ibid., 6.

56 See D. Turton, op. cit., 147.

Chapter Four (cont.)


61 An example of Watkin’s staple approach at the Canadian national level is M.H. Watkins, ‘Resources and Underdevelopment’ in R. Laxer, ed., Canada Ltd. The Political Economy of Dependency (Toronto, McLellan and Stewart 1973).


65 Ibid., 84.


67 Berger’s rejection of raising capital for Dene development from rents and royalties in favour of applying normal federal regional development funding has been sorely criticized by Asch, who claims that the private entrepreneurial bias of the latter would quickly erode traditional Dene forms of economic organization. However, Asch’s use of a "modes of production" approach to criticize Bergers’ use of a "staples approach" is not convincing for the latter typically subsumes the former, as is clearly shown in Watkins’ work for the Inquiry, See M.I. Asch, ‘Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Commission Recommendations’ Culture 1 no.3 (1982) 3-9.


Chapter Four (cont.)

71 DIAND, Background Notes for 1985 First Ministers’ Conference, the Right Of Aboriginal Peoples. Social and Economic Conditions of Native Peoples (Ottawa, DIAND 1985b).

Chapter Five: Footnotes and References


7 Even though the means to achieve this involved differential distribution of rights between Indians and other Canadians, one cannot agree with Ponting and Gibbins that traditional Indian policy was akin to apartheid. In Canada it was intended that segregation of Indians on reserves be a temporary stage on their way to complete assimilation, unlike South Africa’s previous intent of permanently segregating its black majority, whether socially and/or geographically according to how its policies were applied over time. See J.R. Ponting and R. Gibbins, 1980, op. cit.

8 M.I. Asch, 1984, op. cit.

9 G.L Clark, ‘A Theory of Local Autonomy,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72 No. 2 (1984) 195-208. Clark's model is applicable to any lower-tier jurisdiction below the central state government. It is not relevant to potential mechanisms within central state institutions for advancing the rights of particular groups, such as proposals which have been made at various times for aboriginal groups to have a guaranteed number of parliamentary seats.
Chapter Five (cont.)

10 Variations in aboriginal powers between jurisdictional areas is accommodated in a model by D.C Hawkes Aboriginal Self-Government: What Does it Mean? (Kingston, Ont., Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs, Queen's University 1985).


12 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), Speaking Notes for Hon. Bill McNight, Minister, on Comprehensive Claims Policy (Ottawa, DIAND, December 18, 1986).


21 B. Schwartz, 1986, op. cit.
Chapter Five (cont.)

22 Ibid.

23 P. Tennant, 1985, op. cit, 331.


25 E.J. Peters, Aboriginal Self-Government Arrangements in Canada as Overview (Kingston, Ont., Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs, Queens University 1987).


31 Ibid., 2.


33 R. Gibbins, 1986b, op. cit.


35 Ibid.


37 Government of Canada, Indians and Natives: A Study Team Report on the Ministerial Task Force on Program Review, ‘The Nielsen Report’ Vol. 12 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre 1986). Erik Nielsen, Deputy Prime Minister, was given responsibility by Mulroney to review all government programs with the intent of shrinking them and making them more efficient. The volume on Indian programs blamed DIAND for perpetuating poverty in reserve communities,
and disagreed that Indian Programs they were a "right" which had to be continued. Instead, it recommended that DIAND be closed down and some of its programs be transferred to other federal agencies, and then all programs for Indians be transferred to the provinces. The reports' recommendations were never acted upon after a draft copy was leaked and Indians condemned it as a return to the White Paper.

38 W. Calder, 1988, op. cit.
40 Ibid. 8.
42 M. Boldt and J. Long, 1988, op. cit., 52.
43 The wording of the Charlottetown Accord was somewhat ambiguous about Indian financing of their own self-governments, because federal and provincial governments would conclude self-government agreements "taking into consideration ... the fiscal capacity of governments of Aboriginal peoples to raise revenues from their own sources."

44 Mercredi and his aides got the organizers of the Special Parliamentary Committee's fourth public conference to set up a native panel, including Mercredi, to discuss the so-called "Canada clause." When the conference organizers realized that Mercredi had a more radical agenda they tried to backtrack, but were too late! "Mercredi How He Made Them Listen," Vancouver Sun February 4, 1992.

45 Ibid.
Chapter Five (cont.)


55 "Parizeau Blasts Bourassa for 'Crawling on All Fours,'" Vancouver Sun August 31, 1992.

56 "Can't Take This Leap of Faith, Fontaine Says," Vancouver Sun September 26, 1992.


Chapter Six: Footnotes and References


3 Economists such as Bert Ohlins differentiated the productive forces which endow each country with its own particular comparative advantage. They reasoned that countries which were less technologically advanced should first exploit their labour and natural resources to the fullest, and in the meantime, import necessary capital goods. Thereby everybody would be winners because free trade would tend towards convergence of factor prices as well as bring much-needed technology for future development. See M. Blomstrom and B. Hettne, 1984. op. cit.


5 See ibid.

Chapter Six (cont.)

7 W.A. Lewis, *Theory of Economic Growth* (London, George Allen and Unwin 1955). Lewis reasoned that surplus agricultural workers would migrate into the cities for industrial employment, their higher savings rates would be available for investment, and the by now smaller traditional sector would be forced to adopt more efficient methods to meet enlarged urban demands for their agricultural products and other raw materials.


15 See P.F. Leeson, 1988, op. cit.


19 Marx himself distinguished 'primitive,' 'Asiatic, 'slave,' 'feudal' and 'capitalist' modes.

20 M. Blomstrom and B. Hettne, 1988, op. cit.

Chapter Six (cont.)


26 For such a complex ‘modes of production’ analysis see J.G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production, A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1979). Taylor, a Marxist, criticizes both modernization theory and neo-Marxist UDT.

27 H. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada. An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Toronto University Press 1930). This is probably Innis’s best known early work.

28 C. Weaver and T. Gunton, 1982. op.cit.


30 D.G. Creighton, The Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada 1970). Creighton was more pessimistic in his later works about Canada’s ability to stand up against continentalism.


34 Ibid.

Chapter Six (cont.)


37 A.O. Hirschmann, 1958, op. cit.


40 See J. Friedmann and C. Weaver, 1979, op. cit.


42 A.O. Hirschmann, 1958, op. cit.

43 G. Myrdal, 1957, op. cit.


50 J. Friedmann and C. Weaver, 1979, op. cit.
Chapter Six (cont.)

51 See G.N. Kitching, Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization (London, Methuen 1982).

52 See, for instance, W. Stohr, 1981, op. cit.

53 C. Weaver, 1984, op. cit.


55 M. Hechter, 1975, op. cit.


57 A.O. Hirschmann, 1958, op. cit.


59 For examples see respectively: (a) W. Stohr and W. Tohdting, ibid; (b) J. Friedmann and C. Weaver, op. cit., 1979; and (c) C. Weaver, op. cit., 1984.

60 R. Schafer, Community Economics: Economic Structure and Change in Smaller Communities (Iowa City, lo., University of Iowa Press 1989).

61 Ibid, 3.


63 Ibid, 277.

64 Ibid.


66 Ibid, 14.

67 Ibid, 58.

68 Ibid, 70.

69 Ibid, 49-51.

70 Ibid, 61.
Chapter Six (cont.)

71 Ibid, 82-86.


73 Ibid, 69.

Chapter Seven: Footnotes and References


6 C. Weaver et al, 1985, op. cit.


9 C. Weaver et al, 1985, op. cit., 145.
An excellent overview of various criticisms made against positivism can be found in M.E. Hawksworth, *Theoretical Issues in Policy Analyses* (Albany, N.Y. State University of New York Press 1988). Hawksworth criticizes the claims of positivist policy analysts to "expert knowledge," which in reality is often no more than scientism and serves to disguise personal biases, obfuscate important issues and deter broad public participation. Instead, he calls for "post-behaviouralist" policy analysis that is based on much broader understandings of rationality and, hence, will invoke "a more participatory concept of democracy" (193).


C. Weaver et al, 1985, op. cit., 146.

S. Lukes, 1974, op. cit.


S. Lukes, 1974, op. cit., 16.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 34-35, some emphases added.


Ibid., 21.


J.G. Taylor, 1979, op. cit.
Chapter Seven (cont.)


32 However, Gore does argue convincingly that functionalist regional policies do serve a political purpose by supporting the state's role of "capital accumulation" in favour of dominant socially-defined groups, while simultaneously fulfilling the state's other contradictory role of "legitimization" by appearing to mitigate inequalities between spatially-defined groups. Gore, 1984, op. cit.


39 J. Friedmann and C. Weaver, 1979, op. cit., 227. emphases added.
Chapter Seven (cont.)

40 Ibid, 204.

41 C. Gore, 1984, op. cit., 226.

42 M. Hebbert, ‘The New Decentralism - A Critique of the Territorial Approach,’ 1981, in P. Healey et al, eds., 1981a, op. cit. The order of the three propositions is reversed from Hebbert, but because of their circularity the same conclusions can be drawn.


44 M. Camhis, 1979, op. cit., 77.

45 C. Weaver, 1984, op. cit.


48 E.W. Soja, ‘The Socio-Spatial Dialectic,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70 no. 2 (1980) 207-225. Soja responds to traditional Marxist concerns about "spatial fetishism" by proposing "a new richer form of dialectical materialism" which defines the relations of production as "simultaneously social and spatial." (208) His proposal for a "socio-spatial dialectic" is appealing but it would be difficult in practice to differentiate between spatial and social structures in relations of production, as, for instance, in distinguishing between the extraction of surplus labour value in situ as opposed to through geographical transfers.


50 Ibid., 28.


52 Milliband, although also a Marxist, disagreed with Poulantzas' extreme structuralist perspective of the state. Poulantzas had criticized Milliband for only claiming that there were close ties between the state and dominant interests. For their famous "debate" see N. Poulantzas and R. Milliband, ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State,’ in R. Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science, Readings in Critical Social Theory (Bungay, U.K., Fontana Collins, 1972).

Chapter Seven (cont.)

54  H. Brookfield, 1975. op. cit., 53.


58  Ibid., 55.

59  Ibid., 65-66.

60  Ibid., 6.

61  Ibid., 114-15

62  Ibid., 124.

Chapter Eight: Footnotes and References


4  Bowles’ work was sponsored as background research for a flawed comparative model of community competencies applied to a small sample of Indian and non-Indian communities in British Columbia. See B.R. Blishen, A. Lockhart, P. Craib, and E. Lockhart, *Socio-Economic Model for Northern Development* (Ottawa, DIAND 1979). These authors merely invert Talcott Parson’s dualistic "pattern variables" to contrarily claim that a high incidence of Gemeinschaft institutions in communities is 'good' and will increase their resilience to harmful outside impacts, whereas a high incidence of Gesellschaft institutions is 'bad' and will lower their resilience.
Chapter Eight (cont.)

5 These definitions of competencies draw upon definitions in R. Matthews, 1983, op. cit, and in B. Painter, A. Sutton, and W. Warren, Community Development from Inside and Outside A Report on a In-house Study No. 5-03-42 (Vancouver, B.C. Research 1982).


9 G. Myrdal, 1957, op. cit.


14 Ibid, xvii.


16 M. Boldt, op. cit., 172-5.

17 Gunnar Myrdal, one of the architects of the Swedish welfare state, reflected that much the vast expansion of welfare programming in western democracies has, in fact, been imposed undemocratically on its citizens. G. Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press 1960).

18 Criticisms of DIAND’s concerns with self-survival were particularly common among ‘social distance theorists’ who saw DIAND as inhibiting the goal of Indian assimilation: see, notably, R.W. Dunning, 1962, op. cit., and P. Carstens, 1971, op. cit. However, this view can also be found in those strongly opposed to assimilation: for a recent example see M. Boldt, 1993, op. cit.
Chapter Eight (cont.)


20 From his reading of Panitch, Ponting appears to favour Miliband’s view of some relative autonomy in state institutions from capitalist relations, rather than Poulantzas’ extreme structuralist position. See L. Panitch ‘The Role and Nature of the Canadian State,’ in L. Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1977).


22 "Native Claims Proving Costly in B.C." Toronto Globe and Mail October 22, 1990. A Peat Marwick study commissioned by the B.C. Provincial Government estimated that uncertainties surrounding land claims were costing about $50-million a year in lost investment for capital investments and $75-million in delayed projects, mainly in forestry and mining


Chapter Eight (cont.)


33 The often cited figure in the press of a potential $10 billion plus bill for settling aboriginal claims in British Columbia is usually derived from extrapolating the per capita costs of a possible Nishga settlement. For instance, see "Land Claims Branch off into Timber Disputes," Vancouver Sun September 16, 1995. Federal and provincial governments have declined to provide their own estimates.


36 For a practical discussion of "traditionalism" versus "modernity" on Canadian reserves see B. Hanson, Dual Realities - Dual Strategies. The Future Paths of the Aboriginal Peoples' Development. A Programmers Handbook (Saskatoon, Bill Hanson Publisher, 1985). Similarly, for an American treatment see S. Haberfeld et al, A Self-Help Tribal Manual for Tribal Economic Development (Boulder, Col.: Native American Rights Fund, 1982).

37 For systematic methods of experimental projects applied to developing countries, see D.A. Ronidelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments. An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration (London and New York, Methuen 1983).


39 P. Boothroyd, To Set Their Own Course: Indian Band Planning and Indian Affairs (Prepared for B.C. Region, DIAND 1984).


41 Ibid., 143.

42 Ibid., 141.

43 M. Boldt and J. Long, 1984, op. cit., 52.
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Legend:

DIAND = Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DREE = Department of Regional Economic Expansion
NIB = National Indian Brotherhood


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