CONSTRUCTING GLOBALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES:
LABOUR, LAND AND IDENTITY ON MANILA'S INDUSTRIALIZING PERIPHERY

by

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ABSTRACT

'Globalization' has become a powerful icon in academic, policy and business circles. This thesis seeks to trace some of the consequences of both the process and the idea of globalization in the Philippines.

The thesis starts by arguing that theories of globalization - economic, technological, political and cultural - have invested in the process an aura of inevitability and necessity. These 'logics' of globalization, widely promulgated by both the political left and right, imply a particular construction of scale that privileges the global above all other levels of analysis. This construction has been used as a discursive legitimation of neoliberal policy prescriptions for development. In seeking to destabilize this construction of the global scale, the rest of the thesis demonstrates the ways in which global flows (particularly of capital and cultural meanings) are in fact embedded, mediated and activated in local social relations in the Philippines.

This empirically-based argument starts with a brief historical account of Philippine relations with 'global space' from pre-colonial times to the present, demonstrating that the relationship has been contingent and politically contested over time and has owed as much to national level power relations as to global forces. In the last few decades, in particular, 'globalization' has been both a key material process in the Philippine economy, and an important part of the Ramos administration's legitimation of its development strategies. These have included deregulation, decentralization, trade liberalization, and encouraging foreign direct investment in export manufacturing. This investment has exhibited a spatial concentration in the core region around Manila, and particularly in the province of Cavite. Through multiple scales of analysis - provincial, municipal, village, household and individual - I explore the ways in which experiences of 'globalized' development in Cavite and two of its villages are embedded in
‘local’ social, economic, environmental, political and cultural processes. These experiences come principally in the form of: changing local labour markets, land conversion from agricultural to urban-industrial uses, and the reworking of cultural identities.

One central argument is proposed throughout: that viewing globalization as an inevitable and unavoidable context for development is inappropriate; instead, the processes of globalization must be seen as embedded in social processes and power relations operating in particular places. This argument embodies two further points. First, that the 'places' in which globalization is embedded are at multiple scales which must be seen as interlinked and overlapping rather than distinct and hierarchical. Secondly, while globalization, and its embeddedness in places, operates as a material process, it is also a social construction and political discourse which, by locating the 'driving force' of social change at the global scale, serves to legitimize certain practices and construct a particular relationship between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’.
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Forgiveness will also be needed from my many friends and colleagues at UBC who have contributed so much to the life surrounding this thesis over the last four years, but who are too numerous to mention individually. Some, however, do need to be singled out. Above all, Terry McGee has guided this project with his unique combination of savoir faire and joie de vivre. Terry provides a model of the scholar cum bon vivant to which the rest of us can only aspire. Among those trying are the past and present members of the ‘McGlee Club,’ who have provided me with much support and assistance along the way; in particular, Rex Casinader, Catherine Griffiths (who produced the maps in this thesis), Charles Greenberg, Nick Kontogeorgopoulos, Deirdre McKay, Scott MacLeod, Andrew Marton, Jean-François Proulx and Gisele Yasmeen. I also owe a great deal to Robyn Dowling, Martin Evans, Kris Olds, and Juliet Rowson. Finally, other members of my supervisory committee at UBC - David Ley, Geoff Hainsworth and Aprodicio Laquian - have provided support, encouragement and very prompt readings of an earlier draft.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

*International finance knows no borders.... we cannot stop globalization, we need to adjust to it.... Globalization is imposing a healthy discipline that will result in healthier economies in the long run.* Jean Chretien¹

*The determining context of economic policy is the new global market. That imposes huge limitations of a practical nature - quite apart from reasons of principle - on macroeconomic policies.* Tony Blair²

*There is a new reality that underscores our national life. We are part of a new global economy - in which every nation must compete, if it is to prosper. [We must] imbibe and expand the culture of globalization... [or] be left behind in the march toward progress and prosperity for all.* Fidel Ramos³

The leaders quoted above represent political parties of diverse ideological stripes, and they govern in strikingly different political, economic and cultural contexts. Yet each employs a common rhetoric based on assumptions about a process or phenomenon called globalization. All three politicians (and many more like them) represent globalization as inevitable and inexorable - a fact of life, a contemporary political reality. Globalization is, furthermore, seen as a healthy and progressive influence on national economies and cultures. It is these assumptions that this thesis seeks to question.

The process of globalization is usually taken to mean the increasing porosity of physical and social barriers to world-wide flows of capital, goods, people, ideas, imagery and institutions.⁴ It is found in the flows of capital between the world's financial centres ('hot money'), and in flows of foreign direct investment.⁵ It is found in the transfer of goods and services across global space

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¹ Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, quoted in the Globe and Mail, 20th May 1996.
⁴ Appadurai's (1990) five 'scapes' - finanscapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes and technoscapes - which refer to accelerating international flows of capital, people, images, ideas and technologies, are widely cited as capturing the multiple dimensions of what is termed globalization.
⁵ Empirical examples are provided in books such as Corbridge, Thrift and Martin (1993), and Dicken (1992).
- from Coca-Cola to coconuts and from microchips to missiles. It is found in the passage of people between places - tourists, refugees, migrants, and contract workers. It is found in the ideas and information that pass freely, or sometimes not so freely, across space - everything from environmentalism and human rights to neoliberalism and organised religion. It is found in the imagery to which many are exposed - Hollywood, high fashion, and hard rock. Finally, it is found in the political institutions that bring together sovereign territories into broader frameworks: the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund.

There are two reasons why such flows, none of which are new, have received increasing attention in the 1990s. First, we are told, the geopolitical context has shifted from a bi-polar world of competing ideologies and spheres of political influence to one of a triumphant market system and liberal democratic ideals. The Cold War has been 'won' and the world is being drawn into a logic of political and economic liberalization, freed from the dogmatic agendas of dirigiste regimes. Secondly, technological change has facilitated many of the flows described above. Telecommunications, containerization, air travel and computer linkages have created a period of time-space compression in which distant places can be materially and virtually connected far more easily and economically. This has allowed an acceleration and increased volume in flows which already existed, and the emergence of new flows (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 1989).

All of this has brought a popular representation of globalization and especially economic globalization as the determining context for action, and one to which individual governments (and other institutions) must open themselves and adjust. The assumption is that allowing such flows to pass free and unhindered between places in the world will ultimately be unequivocally beneficial for all concerned. It is a belief that finds its roots in the classical political economy of David Ricardo and is now widely promulgated by the 'gurus' of globalization. Kenichi Ohmae, for example, talks of "putting global logic first", and provides a stark choice: "If a country genuinely opens itself up to the global system, prosperity will follow. If it does not, or if it does

---

6 This is as true of academia as it is of politics - simply searching the UBC library catalogue in February 1997 for books with 'globalization' in the title yields 139 texts, less than a dozen of which were published before 1990.
so only halfheartedly, relying instead on the heavy, guiding hand of central government, its progress will falter" (Ohmae, 1995a: 123). Implicit in Ohmae's argument are two fundamental assertions: first, that the globalization of economic activities is inevitable and inexorable; and secondly that only complete compliance with the requirements of global capital will bring prosperity to any particular place. This is the context in which politicians and policy-makers concerned with economic development currently operate. It is, furthermore, a view that is represented as objective and apolitical. John Naisbitt, another guru of global business strategy, argues that with free trade and economic liberalization, "ideology is giving way to economic and political reality" (1995: 121)

In the chapters ahead, I will explore this discourse of globalization, but the empirical focus of the research is deliberately more parochial. The national context for the study is the Philippines, a country that is no stranger to 'global' influences after centuries of contact with traders, proselytizers, colonizers and creditors. While this history will be discussed in some detail, the principal period of interest will be the last ten years of Philippine development (1986-1996). It is during this time, and especially over the course of the Ramos administration since 1992, that 'globalization' has been both a key feature of the Philippine economy, and an important part of the administration's legitimation of its development strategies.

While the national scale provides one context for the empirical research presented here, the consequences of national development strategies are traced to the scale of a province (Cavite), a municipality (Tanza), and two villages (Bunga and Mulawin), where the bulk of my fieldwork was conducted. Cavite is located immediately south of Metropolitan Manila and has seen a substantial share of the foreign investment in the country over the last few years. The result has been a booming manufacturing sector and a vibrant land market as Manila's agricultural hinterland is converted to industrial estates and residential subdivisions. Tanza, for

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7 This obviously applies more broadly that just the Philippine case. It is worth noting that 'globalization', if it is taken to mean social relations operating across world space, has been intensified rather than created over recent years. Writers such as Janet Abu-Lughod (1989), Eric Wolf (1982) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) have clearly shown that economic and cultural relations across large parts of the world have existed for many centuries.
example, located southwest of the metropolis along Manila Bay, was a small, rice-growing market town with a population of just 43,657 in 1980. By 1995 it had far exceeded its 1990 census population of 61,785 (National Statistics Office, 1990). Much of this growth has been driven by migrants arriving to work at new factories in the Cavite Export Processing Zone (referred to throughout as CEPZ) in the neighbouring town of Rosario. In 1995, Tanza contributed over 6,000 workers to factories on the sprawling 275 hectare industrial estate. In total, the CEPZ employed close to 40,000 workers in 1995, and had been joined by many other industrial estates across the province. Tanza, then, like many other towns in Cavite, has experienced the process of globalization through the location of foreign-owned, export-oriented manufacturing facilities. The consequences for such towns have been major structural changes in local labour markets and the rapid conversion of agricultural land to industrial estates, residential subdivisions, golf courses and other 'urban' land uses. In a town like Tanza, then, it would seem that the transformative effect of globalization should be clearly manifested.

These processes occurring in Tanza could, however, be interpreted through many intellectual lenses. As a process of urbanization, the changes could be seen as illustrative of the desakota phenomenon. The desakotasi process refers to the way in which the transactional environments of Asian primate cities create the conditions for extended 'urban' areas with dense populations and mixed urban, industrial, leisure and agricultural land uses (McGee, 1991; McGee and Greenberg, 1992; Greenberg, 1994). Equally, Tanza and its neighbouring municipalities could be interpreted within a modernization paradigm as a case study of industrial development responding to the appropriate government policies to stimulate growth, and a socialization of the rural workforce into the regime of factory employment (Ong, 1987; Torres, 1988). Alternatively, the rich literature in peasant studies and rural industrialization could be used to interpret Tanza as a case of agrarian change in response to shifts in the markets for land and labour (Brookfield et al., 1991; McAndrew, 1994). To some extent all of these approaches are drawn upon in this thesis, but my central theme revolves around the issue of globalization and how it is both constructed and experienced in a particular locality. I believe
this is important precisely because it is globalization that is used politically to legitimize and explain what is happening in Tanza and elsewhere in the Philippines. The imperatives of global competition and a globalizing context for development have been a central part of the Ramos administration's strategy for national development. They have been used to justify deregulation, decentralization, and liberalization, and to allow foreign direct investment in infrastructure, export manufacturing and service industries. It is these policies that have provided the national and provincial context for socioeconomic transformation in Tanza, and thus it is important to explore their discursive roots and material consequences.

The principal theme addressed in this thesis revolves around how the process of globalization is constructed and experienced in particular places. The central question, then, that guides this inquiry is: how do social processes (economic, political, cultural and environmental), embedded in place, mediate and construct a particular experience of globalization?8

In order to address this question, several further arguments must be disentangled from it. Firstly, the 'places' in which globalization is embedded are at many different scales - national, regional, provincial, municipal, village, household and individual. These scales cannot be seen as distinct and hierarchical, with social processes at one scale determinant over another. Instead, they are simultaneously interlinked and overlapping. The global exists only in multiple 'locals' and the local and the global are not 'natural' and distinct scales of analysis, but are instead mutually constitutive of each other. To argue this point it will be necessary to show that the way in which globalization is experienced is fundamentally a product of social processes operating across a variety of scales.

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8 The concept of embeddedness originates in work on the sociology of economic institutions (Granovetter, 1985). Granovetter defines embeddedness as the argument that "behaviour and institutions [of economic action]... are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding" (1985, 482). In recent years this point of view has been influential in economic geography through institutionalist and network approaches to economic entities (Thrift and Olds, 1996; Dicken and Thrift, 1992, Yeung, 1994; Amin and Thrift, 1994). More generally, a concern with the embeddedness of economic change in local social relations can be identified in Doreen Massey's work on spatial divisions of labour (1984, 1994), the 'localities' research that it later inspired, and in other non-essentialist theories of economic geography (Barnes, 1996).
Secondly, while globalization, and its embeddedness in places, operates as a material process based on time-space compression, it is also a social construction and political discourse. In other words, globalization is both a real phenomenon that is experienced by people in the Philippines, but it is also an idea that carries with it powerful implications for the geography, experience and social justice of development. As a political discourse, globalization serves to legitimate certain practices and construct a particular relationship between 'global spaces' and 'local places'. Thus the material processes of globalization create a discursive frame around them, but equally, material processes are called into being by the discourse that constructs them. This means that appeals to 'embrace' globalization as inevitable and unavoidable are not the realism that their rhetoric implies, but rather political judgements that can be deconstructed.

These two key points, then, will guide the material presented in this thesis: that globalization is a material process embedded in the social relations of particular places across multiple scales; and, that globalization can be seen as a social construction that has been deployed for political purposes. The thesis explores these issues in the following way. Part I is entitled 'Theory and Method'; it begins with an elaboration in chapter 2 of the theoretical themes, sketched in brief above, that inform the later presentation of empirical material. The chapter reviews a number of theoretical accounts of globalization, presented as global 'logics', which have been the basis for much of the academic discussion of globalization. I will argue, however, that such attempts to come to terms with the material processes of globalization are limiting in two respects. Firstly, they locate the 'driving force' of social change as residing at the global scale, rather than embedded in local contexts where political choices could be, and are, made.

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9 A discourse is a set of assumptions, models, knowledge and language through which the world is represented and imagined. Discourse provides us with the means to render objects and relationships meaningful and significant - "the social framework of intelligibility within which practices are communicated and negotiated" (Duncan, 1993: 233). J.M.Keynes famously noted that "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood" (cited in Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 196-7). The idea of discourse incorporates two extensions to Keynes' insight. Firstly, it includes not just the theories and models that are translated into power relations, but also the whole way of thinking that allows certain models to be imaginable. Secondly, in the post-structuralist ontology of discourse theory, a discourse is neither 'right' nor 'wrong', but is inevitably implicated in relations of power. The application of post-structuralist discourse theory to development studies will be reviewed in chapter 2.
Secondly, in prioritizing the global scale in this way, they feed directly into a construction of scale that has political implications. This construction of scale forms the basis for development policies predicated on free trade and regulatory liberalization. These policies, and the discussion of globalization, will then be placed in the context of development theory as it has unfolded over recent decades. Before the thesis moves on to explore how this political construction of scale has been operationalized in the Philippines, chapter 3 discusses some of the issues and methodologies involved in researching globalization. In particular, I argue that global research is ethically necessary and I describe the logistics and techniques used in gathering data for this thesis.

Part II is entitled 'Constructing Globalization in the Philippines' and it is largely here that I pursue the second point made above, concerning the constructed and political nature of globalization discourse. Chapter 4 starts this argument by tracing the historical roots of Philippine relations with 'global space' from pre-colonial times to the present. The account shows that this relationship has been contingent and politically contested over time and has owed as much to domestic power relations as to global forces. In making this point, the chapter also lays out some of the historical roots of the social, economic and cultural structures that will later be shown to form the place-based context in which contemporary globalization is embedded. Chapter 5 describes this contemporary formulation of globalization in the Philippine political economy and the ways in which it has been translated into economic development policies and spatial patterns of growth over the last three decades. In it is in chapter 5, then, that the national scale politics of globalization are explored. Like chapters 4 and 5, chapter 6 explores the historical roots and contemporary constructions of globalized development, but this time at a provincial scale in Cavite, where fieldwork for this thesis was conducted. The chapter shows that the social processes in which globalized development is embedded are also constituted at a sub-national scale. An understanding of Cavite's historically-rooted system of power relations is essential in understanding contemporary experiences of globalization. In particular, these relations are explored for two processes which represent the principal means through which
material globalization affects the lives of Cavitenos: the transformation of local labour markets and the conversion of agricultural land to urban uses. Together, chapters 4, 5 and 6 aim to substantiate the argument that globalization must be viewed as simultaneously both a material process and a political discourse. At the same time, they point to the embeddedness of the material processes of globalization in national and provincial power relations.

Part III of the thesis is entitled 'Labour, Land and Identity in Globalizing Places'. The scale of analysis is reduced still further to the level of the village, the household and the individual, and again evidence is presented to suggest that globalization as a material process is embedded in the particularities of places, which are constituted at various scales. Chapters 7 and 8 make this point with data on the two key dimensions of globalization identified for Cavite: the transformation of local labour markets, and the conversion of agricultural land to residential and industrial uses. Chapter 7 shows how the specificity of the local economy shapes the way in which globalized development is experienced, and brings distinctive responses to changes in the local labour market. Chapter 8 argues that land use conversion can only be understood in the context of local social, political and ecological processes. Chapter 9 examines the cultural dimensions of globalization. Based on discussions of the changing cultural significance of gender, youth and work, the chapter argues that the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization cannot be divorced and that cultural change is a reflexive process of hybridization between existing meanings of gender, youth and work, and the new horizons offered by globalization. Part III is concluded in chapter 10 which considers what the embeddedness of globalization might mean for 'local' resistance to the 'global'. I argue that given the evidence of locally constituted experiences of globalization, to talk of 'local' resistance is meaningless, since the globalization process itself is already local. Chapter 11, the conclusion to the thesis, briefly draws together the main themes that have been addressed and returns to the arguments outlined in this introduction.
PART I

THEORY AND METHOD
CHAPTER TWO
GLOBAL LOGICS: THE PRODUCTION AND POLITICS OF SCALE

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 briefly outlined two key points regarding the process of globalization: first, that as a process operating at multiple scales it is significantly mediated by embedded social relations in particular places; and secondly, that as both a material and ideological process it shapes a political discourse. In this chapter, I will elaborate on these points at a theoretical level before they are explored empirically.

The first section of the chapter addresses what I have called the 'logics’ of globalization. Here I will outline some of the theoretical frameworks that indicate the various dimensions of the globalization process. These theoretical constructions provide some explanations of the material processes which are usually included under the rubric of globalization. At the same time, they illustrate the way in which the global has been discursively constructed in the academic literature as having a logic of its own. In the second section, I discuss recent literature on the production of scale to suggest that these 'logics' of globalization can be viewed as social constructions of scale, rather than providing objective divisions of space or a priori levels of analysis. This forms the basis for arguing that 'globalization' must be seen as a process that operates at multiple scales and is therefore embedded in place-specific social relations. The third section of the chapter argues that the social construction of scale must also be seen as political because it has been used to legitimize a neoliberal approach to economic development. It is in this sense that I will later refer to the political discourse of globalization that is deployed at national and provincial scales. Finally, the chapter enters a brief detour into development theory in order to locate my approach within that literature.
2.2 Logics of Globalization

Talking of globalization implies certain universalities of process and experience which bind together people located in diverse parts of the world (McGrew, 1992). In this section, I will lay out some of these universals by describing the frameworks that have been used to understand the processes of globalization. In particular, I will focus on the underlying structural causations to which they appeal. Presenting the selected authors in this way is not to suggest that they hold narrowly conceived views of globalization - on the contrary, it is the richness of their accounts that has made them so influential. But each account is distinguished by a different logic which is seen to be determinative of globalization - some with a greater degree of essentialism than others.

2.2.1 The Economic Imperative

Many theories of globalization are ultimately rooted in an understanding of the logics of the capitalist mode of production. The most authoritative and influential voice within geography on this matter is David Harvey, through his ongoing project to develop a spatialized marxism, or historical geographical materialism. Harvey's argument is based on the profit-seeking imperative of capitalism, which leads to three fundamental characteristics of the mode of production: 1) it is growth-oriented in terms of output and value; 2) growth in real values rests upon the exploitation of living labour in production; and, 3) it is technologically and organizationally dynamic in the search for profit (Harvey, 1989a, 180).

Arguing that these imperatives are ultimately contradictory, it was Marx's insight that capitalism is prone to periodic crises of overaccumulation, and Harvey shows that there are certain systemic choices available to manage these crises. These choices consist of: devaluing commodities, productive capacities, or money; crisis containment through macro-economic control (as in the Fordist-Keynesian regime); and, the temporal and/or spatial displacement of overaccumulation. It is in this last set of options that Harvey sees the most promise and the clearest geographical implications (Harvey, 1982). Temporal displacement is conducted through
the investment of resources in future needs or the acceleration of the turnover time of capital, while spatial displacement entails the creation of new spaces for capitalist production across the globe. The two might also be combined in time-space displacement, where capital flows are diverted to new spaces to build infrastructure or capital equipment for future output and productivity (this would, for example, be the structuralist explanation for investment flows to Latin America and Asia after the crisis of global capitalism in the 1970s) (Corbridge, 1993c). For Harvey, these are the structural processes which underpin the 'time-space compression' characterizing the condition of postmodernity from the early 1970s to the present. As the Fordist regime of national economic regulation broke down in the industrialized core, so strategies of time-space displacement drew the global periphery ever more closely into the world economy. Harvey concludes that if there is anything distinctive about the current nature of capitalism it is to be found in its financial flows and the role of credit, and, if there is to be any stability in the current regime of accumulation, it will derive from further rounds of temporal and spatial "fixes" (Harvey, 1989a, 196).

While Harvey's historical-geographical materialism, and the Regulation School from which it draws much of its vocabulary, focus on social relations in capitalist production to derive their theories, other approaches lay greater emphasis on relationships of exchange. These include many classics in the development literature, such as Frank's development of underdevelopment, Emmanuel's unequal exchange, and Amin's accumulation on a world scale. The place of these authors within the broader context of development studies will be discussed later in this chapter, but clearly, like Harvey, much of radical development theory also identifies the economic imperative as the driving logic behind globalization.

While these radical theorists all retain a certain antipathy for globalization and its consequences, at the opposite end of the political spectrum are the 'business gurus', such as Kenichi Ohmae (1995b) and John Naisbitt (1995), mentioned in chapter 1. While they seldom rehearse theoretical arguments, the work of such authors is rooted in the neoliberal economics of Johnson, Friedman, and Bauer, and latterly writers such as Krueger. These economists argue that
any government 'interference' in the market mechanism is inefficient and counter-productive. Their positions are based on a critique of the Keynesian model of demand management and they seek to replace it with a monetarist analysis of the causal mechanisms for economic growth together with assumptions about economic rationality and the universality of economic theory. Globalization fits neatly into this paradigm, as it allows for the construction of a universalised economic subject and the denigration of the role of the nation state in economic management. The emergence of this school of thought will be placed in the context of the development literature later in the chapter.

2.2.2 The Technological/Informational Age

To separate a technological 'logic' from economic imperatives is in some ways a misrepresentation, but the distinction is worth making because a number of writers strongly emphasize the importance of technological change in creating and facilitating both economic and cultural flows around the world. The most notable proponent of this view is Manuel Castells. According to Castells, a new technological paradigm emerged in the two decades between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. The scientific and technical core of this paradigm lies in microelectronics, but it also includes the application of these technologies to telecommunications and biotechnology (Castells, 1989, 12; 1996). The key feature of Castells' new paradigm is that these technologies are based on information processing - information becomes a raw material and an economic output:

Because processes, unlike products, enter into all spheres of human activity, their transformation by such technologies, focusing on omnipresent flows of information, leads to modification in the material basis of the entire social organization. Thus, new information technologies are transforming the way we produce, consume, manage, live, and die; not by themselves, certainly, but as powerful mediators of the broader set of factors that determine human behaviour and social organization. (1989, 15)

It is the interaction and articulation between the informational mode of development and the restructuring of capitalism that creates the framework shaping the dynamics of our society and our space (1989, 28)
Castells sees the complex interacting system of technological and organizational processes in production as underlying economic growth and social change, and constituting a 'mode of development' (Castells, 1989, 17). It is this mode of development that has switched from industrial to informational, and which, in interaction with restructured capitalism, leads to new, globalized, spatial forms: "...[W]hat is new is the increasing interpenetration of all economic processes at the international level with the system working as a unit, worldwide in real time" (1989, 26).

In his account of the reformulation of capitalism, Castells follows the same crisis-resolution argument as Harvey. The point at which Castells diverges from Harvey, however, is in seeing technological change and the informational mode of development not as responses to crisis but as historically coincident with capitalist restructuring:

Advances in telecommunications, flexible manufacturing that allows simultaneously for standardization and customization, and new transportation technologies emerging from the use of computers and new materials, have created the material infrastructure for the world economy, as the construction of the railway system provided the basis for the formation of national markets in the nineteenth century. (1989, 30)

The corollary for Castells is the emergence of a space of flows dominating the historically constructed space of places through the "powerful medium of information technologies" (1989, 6)

Castells' theorization finds parallels in works focusing on the nature of 'post-industrialism' and its spatial manifestations. The key dynamics in post-industrialism are technological and organizational dynamism in production, which facilitates the global reach of economic and cultural flows (Lash and Urry, 1987). Lash and Urry (1994) have pursued their analysis of economic restructuring to suggest that 'disorganized capitalism' leads to 'reflexive accumulation':

We propose...that there is indeed a structural basis for today's reflexive individuals. And that this is not social structures, but increasingly the pervasion of information and communication structures. We propose that there is tendentially the beginnings of the
unfolding of a process in which social structures, national in scope, are being displaced by such global information and communication (I & C) structures. (Lash and Urry, 1994: 6-7, emphasis in original)

Lash and Urry's disorganized capitalism is controlled from core regions - the key nodal cities in the global cultural economy. They form the hub of sign production and information generation, constituting the "information-soaked and service-rich, communications-laden core of the post-organized capitalist economic order" (1994, 28).

Broadly speaking, arguments based on informational and organizational logics of globalization also find equivalents in orthodox economic theory (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Castells' locus of analysis in the firm and the technological advances in production and producer services sits easily with concerns of neoliberal economics revolving around the changing nature of the firm and global corporate strategy.

2.2.3 The Political/Military Realm

Anthony Giddens' account of globalization is distinct from those described above, as he accords a certain autonomy to political institutions from economic control. For Giddens (1990, 1991), the process of globalization is a direct consequence of modernity, and modernity has four central characteristics: capitalism, industrialism, surveillance, and state control over the means of violence. The process of modernization, starting in the eighteenth century, involves three changes in the way in which social life is experienced (and, following Giddens' ideas of structuration, the experience of individual agents is reflexively linked with social change). The first change is the distanciation, meaning separation, of time from space. From diurnal and seasonal rhythms, time became standardized and universalized in the eighteenth century through the mechanical clock. Similarly, space was no longer an experientially perceived space, but could also be universalized in maps. These developments allowed the universalization of human activities across spatial and temporal distances. A second change associated with modernity is the 'disembedding' of social relations from local contexts, through 'symbolic tokens' (particularly
money) and 'expert systems' (for example, technical knowledge). An awareness of the role played by information and knowledge, and the risk involved in trusting expert systems, make modern individuals, according to Giddens, particularly reflexive in a way that human subjects have not been in the past.

Giddens' three characteristics of modernization - time-space distanciation, disembedding, and reflexivity - promote universalizing tendencies that render social relationships across space more inclusive, thereby allowing globalization of social interaction. This is the basis upon which Giddens can proceed to explain the current trends of globalization in terms of his dimensions of modernity (capitalism, surveillance, military order, and industrialism). Capitalism has constructed a world system, as discussed by Wallerstein (1974), incorporating the globe into a single market for commodities, labour and capital. Surveillance has also been globalized by international organizations of nation-states. Military globalization is incorporated into the 'global' alliance system (and, after Giddens wrote, into a so-called "New World Order" focused on the UN Security Council) (Waters, 1995). Finally, the globalization of production involves the spread of industrialism and diffusion of technology around the globe and the incorporation of local production systems and labour markets into the international division of labour.

In short, Giddens provides a multi-dimensional explanatory framework for understanding globalization processes, but the main thrust of his argument seeks to balance the economistic theories of writers such as Wallerstein with a consideration of the role of the nation-state and military/political order in generating globalized structures and subjectivities.

...it is surely plain to all, save those under the sway of historical materialism, that the material involvements of nation-states are not governed purely by economic considerations, real or perceived (1990, 72)

If capitalism was one of the great institutional elements promoting the acceleration and expansion of modern institutions, the other was the nation state. Nation states, and the national-state system, cannot be explained in terms of the rise of capitalistic enterprise, however convergent the interests of states and capitalistic prosperity have sometimes been (1990, 62).
Other writers have identified the political roots of globalization in the need for a liberal hegemonic power to assure a world order in which global interconnectedness is secure and viable. The implication is that "globalization is shaped primarily by a political logic: the rise and decline of hegemonic powers in the inter-state system" (McGrew, 1992, 72). Further elements of a globalizing polity might also be mentioned, for example, the networks of non-governmental organizations based on issues such as environmentalism and feminism which are clearly global in scope. The recent gatherings of such organizations around governmental conferences on the environment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and on womens' issues in Beijing in 1995, illustrate the globalization of these issues in a public sphere beyond national boundaries (see, for example, Fisher, 1993).

2.2.4 Global Cultures

Discussing cultural globalization separately is not to suggest that other accounts neglect the issue. The cultural consequences and processes of capitalist restructuring, for example, are central to Harvey's (1989a) work on postmodernity. Many other accounts, grounded in political economy, draw on a theme of 'cultural imperialism' (Tomlinson, 1991), suggesting that 'local' cultures are overcome and eliminated through the proliferation of consumer goods and advertising images emanating from a Western, usually American, heartland. Armstrong and McGee (1985, 49), for example, detect a process of "convergence" of consumption patterns in Third World cities, focused on primate cities as 'theatres of accumulation' and 'centres of cultural diffusion'. Elsewhere, McGee (1985) writes of "mass markets... invading and destroying 'little markets'" (1985, 227). Several writers suggest that transnational corporations are heavily implicated in these trends through strategies of advertising and market control (Jenkins, 1988; Dannhaeuser, 1987; Wimberley, 1991; Wimberley and Bello, 1992).

Notwithstanding these accounts, it is worth distinguishing cultural logics of globalization since many authors, particularly those that would identify with the paradigm of 'cultural studies',.
resist the tendency to subsume culture into an economic or informational logic. The work of
these authors is considerably more difficult to characterize as a global logic since many dispute
the existence of a system in the structuralist sense (Robertson, 1992, 45-46). There is, however,
a 'logic of flows' identifiable in the work of cultural theorists and global sociologists
(Featherstone and Lash, 1995, 23). In this section I will discuss two approaches to the global
logic of culture, one emphasizing the role of the imaginary and its construction at a planetary
scale, the other concentrating on the role of human agency in the global spread of common
cultural meanings and significations.

Sociologist Roland Robertson exemplifies the view that globalization is a product of the
social imaginary, such that "there is a general autonomy and 'logic' to the globalization process -
which operates in relative independence of strictly societal and other more conventionally
studied sociocultural processes" (Robertson, 1990: 28). Robertson provides a two-part definition
of globalization as: "the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the
world as a whole" (1992, 8). While the first part of this definition shares common ground with
the likes of Harvey and world systems theorists, Robertson chooses to distinguish his position by
emphasizing the rise of global consciousness, through a variety of events and institutions:

...conceptions of the world-system, including symbolic responses to and interpretations of
globalization, are themselves important factors in determining the trajectories of that very
process. (Robertson, 1992, 61)

Robertson sees reflexivity and relativization (that is, the way we perceive ourselves
and the world in relation to each other) as central to the process of globalization. This global
relativization occurs in four spheres: the self, national society, the world system of societies, and,
humankind (1992, 27). Between each sphere, Robertson sees a 'universalization of
particularisms' where, for example, individuals or national societies become conscious of their
place in broader spheres, thereby allowing increasing interaction. A second element is the
'particularization of universals' meaning that global flows are adapted and indigenized in
specific contexts.
In focusing on reflexivity, particularly in relation to the nation state, Robertson's account has much in common with that of Giddens. But while Giddens considers this reflexivity and self-consciousness to be a component of modernization and therefore a necessary precursor to globalization, Robertson sees it as the defining characteristic of globalization. Robertson's ideas finds considerable resonance in Arjun Appadurai's (1990) influential work on global flows. Appadurai too focuses on the role of the human agent and the social imaginary in constituting globalization by identifying five sets of flows, or 'landscapes' (based on people, finance, technology, media and ideas). He emphasizes that:

the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part by their own sense of what these landscapes offer. These landscapes thus, are the building blocks of what...I would like to call 'imagined worlds', that is, the multiple worlds which are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe (Appadurai, 1990, 296-7).

Appadurai's work clearly leaves space for theorizing these flows, for example through Harvey's account of financial flows, but as Buell notes, he sees the social imaginary as the constitutive logic of globalization:

...the imagination is no longer the superstructure of an economic base; it has become equally determinative with economic factors in a world that is now 'a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes'. In this world, imagination no longer represents transcendence or escape, but is crucial - indeed, the most crucial - form of social construction, of productive work. (Buell, 1994:314; cited in Olds, 1995: 40)

A second, and more systemic, way of viewing globalization in a cultural register is to focus on the actors and agents involved in the production and diffusion of 'global cultures'. Thus for Friedman, "in global terms, the culturalization of the world is about how a certain group of professionals located at central positions identify the larger world and order it according to a central scheme of things" (Friedman, 1995, 82). In this way, what Friedman criticizes as Robertson's overly "mental and semantic" approach is recast by situating actors in their political and economic contexts (Friedman, 1995, 72).
Several writers, particularly those concerned with 'culture industries', have pursued Friedman's point about a system of agency. Some focus just on a small elite cadre of 'cosmopolitans' (Hannerz, 1990) or 'third cultures' (Featherstone, 1990, 7), such as diplomats, financiers, academics, aid officials, and media representatives, who act as cultural intermediaries. These groups, according to Featherstone, are establishing "sets of practices, bodies of knowledge, conventions and lifestyles" increasingly independent of national origins (Featherstone, 1995, 114). Others, however, engage more broadly with the role of individuals involved in generating a globalized set of 'signs'. These actors, operating in sectors such as advertising, music, tourism, publishing, design and the media represent the 'tendential' beginnings of a process in which information, communication and signs form the building blocks of what Lash and Urry (1994) call 'economies of signs and space'. In this world a 'logic of flows' replaces a 'logic of organizations' (Featherstone and Lash, 1995, 23). Several studies pursue these ideas in empirical detail. Olds (1995), for example, traces the role of internationally renowned architects - the so-called Global Intelligence Corps - based in centres such as Paris and London, in the creation of new urban landscapes in Shanghai. Leslie (1995) traces the globalization of advertising agencies and their use of the 'global' in marketing campaigns - the United Colours of Benetton, for example, or Coca-Cola's desire to 'teach the world to sing'.

The globalization of signs is not, of course, the same as the globalization of meaning (Friedman, 1995, 86). It is clearly unlikely that these signs are received and made meaningful in the same way in different places. But the raw materials of identity formation - the foundations of Robertson's globalized consciousness - are being dispersed even if they are incorporated into contexts devoid of their original referents, for example in Tobin's account of Japanese 'domesticating the West' (Tobin, 1992). In this way, both the 'globalization of consciousness' and the 'culture industries' approach provide a sense of how globalization might be seen to have a cultural logic. There is something irreversible and cumulative about the formation of reflexive consciousness, based on the postmodern cultural economy of signs.
2.3 The Production of Scale

The logics of globalization provide a foundation for believing that the world is moving unavoidably towards ever greater interconnection. They suggest that in various spheres - economic, technological, political and cultural - all peoples and places are being inexorably manoeuvred into a globalized frame. Here I will argue that far from being an inexorable logic, this is in fact a social construction of the global scale that imbues it with determinative influence.

When we talk of globalization, global logics and the global system we seldom stop to question what is implicitly understood as being the global scale. The same is true, as Neil Smith points out, when we talk of national, regional, local, household and even bodily scales (Smith, 1992a, 1993). The implicit assumption is that the spaces being referred to are understood and the discussion can proceed to the more interesting questions concerning social processes at, and between, these scales. But we only need to think about individual events to realize that to understand something at any given scale - to prioritize one scale above others - is a rather arbitrary and perhaps devious tactic. Consider, for example, the widespread representation by governments around the world of war and suppression in East Timor as a 'local issue', while Iraq's incursions into its neighbours became a 'global crisis'. In each case, the construction of the scale at which these events are explained reflects specific sets of economic and geopolitical interests. The key process is the production of scale, the creation of a level of resolution at which phenomena are deemed understandable. To take another example, industrial growth in East Asia might be explained in terms of a 'Confucian' culture of individual entrepreneurialism and hard work (the scale of the body), the proactive role of the state in directing growth (the national scale), or, the operation of free market forces and open trading relationships (the global scale). Each scale provides a quite different perspective on the issue and a different set of political judgements.

The notion of the production, and the politics, of scale has been explored by Neil Smith over the last few years (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1996; Smith and Katz, 1993). This work draws on
ideas of the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1989a, 1990), and on notions of metaphor in geographical theory (see Barnes, 1996). The production of scale is metaphorical in the sense that something 'known' is employed to explain and understand something else - usually something new. To locate the explanation for a phenomenon in a particular scale is frequently to substitute a spatial scale for social relations. For example, the expression 'urban problems' is not a literal description of homelessness, poverty, crime etc., but a metaphor in which the scale of the city is employed to produce an explanatory discourse of such issues. Scale metaphors might also be more specific, for example the metaphor of the 'Pacific Rim', which has usurped categories such as Third World-First World, Developed-Developing and North-South in recent public discourse in parts of that 'region' (Woodside, 1993; Cumings, 1993; Forbes, 1993). The Pacific Rim is metaphorical in the sense that it produces a scale at which common interests can be constructed. Such a metaphor is more than just academic: it sets agendas, shapes policy, and implies a "new ecumenism" for a post-colonial, post-Cold War, investment-oriented era (Nonini, 1993, 176).

Furthermore, scale can be constructed when social processes experienced at one scale are explained with reference to another. Thus, for example, in current neoliberal economic discourse the global scale (of emerging markets, competitive advantage etc.) is deployed as the scale of explanation at which auto factory closures in Detroit, Ontario or Oxford are understood and explained. Conversely, the body (as lazy, slothful, indolent) was frequently the colonial rationalization for poverty in the tropics. Social processes at one scale thus substitute for relations that actually operate at many scales.

Globalization discourse also incorporates metaphors of a more explicit kind, which try to capture the essence of the global scale. Most commonly, the global is represented as a 'space of flows' or a network, in which individual places serve merely as nodes (see Castells, 1996; Smith, 1996). It is this metaphor that denies the agency of people and the social processes embedded in particular places. By representing the world in this way, places become defined as mosaics beneath flows, and scales are rendered as hierarchical with the global as paramount. But if we
see scale as arbitrary, relative and constructed as this discussion suggests, then there are significant implications for how we think about globalization. Rather than coming to terms with the ways in which globalization has 'local', 'regional' and 'national' impacts (see, for example, the extended geographical debate on 'localities' reviewed by Barnes, 1996) it should instead be recognized that social processes happen at none of these scales exclusively, but at all scales simultaneously. Thus no scale can be claimed as the privileged level for explanation (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). Expressions such as the local-global dialectic or 'glocalization' are therefore helpful only in the extent to which they assist in the collapsing of such a dualism. The local and global, or place and space, should thus be seen as dialectically related - scales that are 'nested' rather than distinct (Merrifield, 1993; Swyngedouw, forthcoming, 6). A further corollary is that globalization is in fact activated through the social relations existing at and between each of many scales. This perspective, which views globalization as embedded in 'places' at multiple scales, will form the basis for the empirical investigations in later chapters.

2.4 The Politics of the Global Scale

I have suggested that by viewing scale as produced or constructed, globalization can be seen as a spatial metaphor to understand, explain, and legitimize experiences. If globalization is interpreted in this way, we can start to destabilize the sense of inevitability that envelopes it, and begin to recognize that it is a construction of scale that has political implications which need to be scrutinized. To explain experience, justify practice and promote a worldview based on globalization is not politically neutral, even though the pervasiveness of this understanding across the political spectrum makes it appear so. In other words, explaining a phenomenon at a particular scale ends up being a political judgement not a technical one: "scalar narratives' provide the metaphors for the construction of 'explanatory' discourses.... Scale is, consequently,
not socially or politically neutral, but embodies and expresses power relationships"  
(Swyngedouw, forthcoming, 4)

What, then, are the politics of globalization and 'global logics'? It would be wrong to suggest that the construction of a global scale is a conspiracy among those with a particular ideological leaning or a powerful few who stand to gain. Instead, globalization is a construction in which many are complicit and the diversity of the authors cited earlier in this chapter is a testament to that fact. Nevertheless, as Agnew and Corbridge argue, the idea of globalization creates a Lefebvrian 'representation of space' in which it is primarily neoliberal political practices that are legitimized (1995: 204).

Globalization, then, serves as a particular discourse of development that is used to justify neoliberal economic policies in which the state is viewed as a hindrance to economic development. Globalization gives authority to neoliberal arguments for market access and free trade - what has been called the "counter-revolution" in development theory. The global logics described above create the context in which openness to the global market is seen as the inevitable and common-sensical route to prosperity and progress - what Broad and Cavanagh call the "Washington consensus" (1993: 156). Broadly speaking, this neoliberal orthodoxy holds that:

...markets offer a guarantee against the corruptions of government (and Leviathan), and they embody the most reasonable way of dealing with, and making sense of, a world based around fluidity, flows, change and movement. States, in this discourse, are about stasis, sedimentation and distortions; markets offer an antidote to such self-willed sclerosis and entrenched hegemonies (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 200)

The 'counter-revolution' in development theory has brought the 'principle' of the free market to the centre of development economics (Toye, 1993). The work of neoliberal theorists

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10 The theoretical foundations of the 'counter-revolution' in development theory will be discussed in the next section.
has created, or perhaps merged with, a consensus in policy circles around the 'fundamental' objectives of fiscal discipline, tax reform, financial liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and support for property rights. In terms of domestic economic management this translates into policies to reduce price controls and subsidies, eliminate state marketing boards, and limit wage indexation. The key component of the consensus, however, relates to trade liberalization. This involves policies such as exchange rate flexibility, eliminating trade licensing systems, providing export incentives, liberalizing conditions for foreign investment, reducing tariffs and eliminating quota restrictions (Biersteker, 1995, 177-8).

Interestingly, although 'the market' is portrayed as being the efficient determinant of resource allocation, in fact the state plays a significant role in many of the policies listed above. The establishment of export processing zones, the provision of tax and other incentives, human capital formation, infrastructure development and support of property rights all require strong state involvement (Douglass, 1991). But government activities go further. The state is also engaged in the selling of places to promote global investment and travel within its territories (Harvey, 1989b). Thus globalization leads to the construction of places through a globalized vocabulary. As Robertson argues, we are seeing a global creation of the local, where "much of what is often declared to be local is in fact the local expressed in terms of generalized recipes of the locality" (1995, 26). But this promotional drive, evident in the Philippines at national, provincial and even municipal levels, goes further than simply 'selling' the attractions available for investors or travellers. It also provides a signal that the state takes seriously its role as facilitator and provider of a stable political environment for international business. As Gordon points out in relation to foreign direct investment flows, what matters most is not relative wages and other factor costs, but "...the general institutional climate and its prospective evolution over a decade's time" (1988, 59).

It is globalized markets, however, which provide the hegemonic motif of neoliberal development discourse. This dominance is, moreover, reinforced by an individualistic philosophy that equates capitalist relations of production and exchange with personal freedom.
This philosophy is to be found in Milton Friedman's 'Capitalism and Freedom' (1962) and Robert Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' (1974) (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 199).

The rhetoric of libertarianism and 'freedom' goes a long way towards explaining the appeal which neoliberal economics and neoconservative politics held for several developed societies in the 1980s (for example, in the Thatcher and Reagan governments). These ideas have similarly found their way throughout the developing world in a variety of ways. Biersteker (1995) provides four explanations to account for the spread of neoliberal ideas throughout the developing (and developed) world in the 1970s and 1980s. The first is a social learning explanation based on a diffusion of neoliberalism, with highly capable, foreign-trained technocrats such as Chile's 'Chicago Boys' as 'vectors'. A second explanation is that policy changes might represent the power of international institutions, particularly the IMF and World Bank, to impose a particular line of thinking through the conditions attached to financial support in the form of lending or multilateral aid. This is certainly an explanation which elicits a lot of sympathy from critics of those organizations (e.g. Bello, 1994; Amin, 1995). Thirdly, changes in the global economy, including increased global production and competition, could imply a different context in which new policies become rational. Here several of the logics of globalization described in the first part of this chapter are pertinent - they create the intellectual justification for a particular way of 'being in the world'. Finally, new policies might be seen as emerging in response to the failure of prior models of accumulation, and particularly the collapse of planned economies in the late 1980s. Despite the evident failings of 'actually existing socialism', its collapse has clearly led to some uncertainty and pause for self-evaluation on the political left.

11 Rabkin (1993) extends this line of argument to suggest that in Chile, such ideas have not just become influential, but have also been incorporated at some level in Chilean political thinking, such that they have also been adopted by democratically elected centrist or left-wing parties.
Biersteker favours a combination of these explanations, but to this explanatory mix, he also adds the role of local vested interests in promoting neoliberal policies, and in many ways, this is perhaps the most important of all:

In general terms, ideas that have the capacity to empower or enhance the position of nascent local allies (often groups who had long been advocates of a particular policy position or view) are likely to have greater influence and potential impact than those that are entirely imported (Biersteker, 1995, 185)

Here Biersteker makes the important point that development strategies cannot be divorced from their political economic context. But what he omits to mention is how these ideas, whatever their means of diffusion, are justified for local political consumption. In many cases, this is where the discourse of globalization has been operationalized.

2.5 Globalization and Development Theory

At several points in this chapter the work of various development theorists has been invoked. World systems and dependency theorists first brought global relationships to radical development studies. Neoliberal writers have provided the intellectual foundations for contemporary global ‘boosters’. Post-marxists, meanwhile, have attempted to define a critical approach that pays closer attention to the specificity of place and ‘other voices’. Post-structuralists have drawn attention to the discursive foundations of development itself and its construction as a product and reinforcement of power relations. In this section I will briefly place these various perspectives in the broader context of development theory’s ‘evolution’ over the last 40 years.
2.5.1 Modernist Paradigms

Orthodox development theories in the early postwar decades were based on a broadly Keynesian model of macroeconomic management which, it was assumed, would lead to modernization processes and eventually the state of high productivity and mass consumption already enjoyed in the developed world (Brookfield, 1975). The classic formulation of this approach was Rostow's linear stages model which provided a universalized trajectory along which Third World countries would pass if they initiated the appropriate 'tricks of development'. One such 'trick' was provided by the Harrod-Domar equation which related GNP growth to the national savings and capital/output ratios (Todaro, 1994). Development was thus conceived as the surmounting of certain obstacles to growth, such as low savings rates. Another such obstacle was the traditional agricultural sector - hence W. Arthur Lewis' dual sector model and Hollis Chenery's focus on structural change both emphasized the shift from agricultural to industrial production (Todaro, 1994). In overcoming these 'impediments' to growth, a key role was envisaged for national government, and the nation-state was the dominant agent in inducing and managing economic growth. The corollary in policy terms was import substitution industrialization (ISI) and protectionist policies to assist the emergence of 'leading sectors' in manufacturing industries. A collection of other philosophical baggage was also associated with such modernization theories, including ethnocentrism, universalized theory, teleological tendencies, technocentrism, and a tradition/modernity dualism (Brookfield, 1975). Coupled with these was an assumption of universalized economic rationality that reduced diverse peoples to a single 'modern subject'.

Radical theorists, meanwhile, developed approaches informed by a very broadly marxian interpretation of underdevelopment. The dependencia school represented a reaction to the notion
that individual countries were in a position to 'take-off' if they would just implement appropriate policies. Dependency theorists like Andre Gunder Frank used the earlier work of Paul Baran to argue that underdevelopment represented the corollary of core countries engaging the periphery in a trading relationships of exploitation and unequal exchange (Frank, 1972; Amin, 1974). The historical antecedence of this relationship was further elaborated by Wallerstein and other world system theorists (Wallerstein, 1974). Thus, unlike the state-centred focus of the modernization school, neo-marxists highlighted the role of international economic relations in the creation of underdevelopment.

Classical marxists, however, such as Bill Warren (1980), asserted the progressive role of capitalism as a transitional phase to socialism, while others criticized the neo-marxist dependency position for focusing on exchange relations in defining a capitalist system, rather than relations in production (Brenner, 1977). By the late 1970s, writers such as Ernesto Laclau and Fernando Cardoso (who would both later distinguish themselves with decidedly post-marxist positions) attempted to give greater specificity to the universalized scheme of dependency and world systems approaches, for example in discussions of the articulation of modes of production (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). To many, however, the enlightened promise of social justice was getting lost in pedantic arguments turning on semantic and esoteric details of marxist theory. Such debates bore little resemblance to the reality from which they were abstracted, and arguments were beginning to resemble a case of theoretical 'involution'.

2.5.2 The 'Crisis' and Beyond

The shortcomings of marxist debate were paralleled by a growing realization that orthodox modernization approaches to development were not working either. The first United
Nations ‘development decade’ in the 1960s had left the ‘Third World’ more impoverished than ever. ‘Development’, it seemed, was an illusory dream. But the worldly context of both radical and orthodox theories was changing too. The global recessions of the 1970s brought an end to the prosperous post-war years of Fordist mass production and consumption in the industrialized countries. The New International Division of Labour, a product of changes in the production process and in transportation and communications, brought low paid factory jobs to parts of the Third World and led to de-industrialization in the economic heartlands. Modernity was arriving, but in ways predicted by neither marxian nor orthodox theories. By the 1980s, then, development theory was perceived by many to be in ‘crisis’, both in theory and in practice (Booth, 1985). While existing lines of thought continued in modified forms, a variety of approaches were already in place to diagnose the malaise of, and reconstruct, development theory. Three broad movements will be discussed: neoliberalism, post-marxism and post-structuralism.

The emergence of a neoliberal orthodoxy in development theory was discussed earlier in this chapter and in many respects it represented a direct attack on the liberal orthodoxy of state-centred Keynesian demand management economics. John Toye (1993) traces the intellectual lineage of ‘new right’ thinking from Harry Johnson’s (1958) critique of Keynesianism, through Peter Bauer’s (1972) market-oriented approach, to the emergence in the 1980s of a group of influential scholars, such as Deepak Lal (1983) and Anne Krueger (1995). These writers seek to trace the roots of the global economic crisis of the 1970s to the socialist, dirigiste and Keynesian policies which held sway in the post-war decades (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 199). It is from this theoretical position that the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ receives its intellectual nourishment. Their work translates into the policy positions described earlier: minimal market
distortions, the privatization of the economy, and an emphasis on human capital formation over public investment in physical infrastructure and public spending in general. The World Bank's (1993) account of the 'East Asian Miracle', for example, adheres to the neo-liberal "fundamentals" necessary for successful development, going through considerable conceptual contortions to account for the evident government involvement in the East Asian successes, and eventually settling for a compromise which emphasizes the 'market friendly' nature of these interventions. In glorifying Asian economies as successes for its own theoretical framework, neo-liberal approaches have provided another 'crisis' for marxian development theory - a crisis which was already brewing within the radical literature following Warren's (1980) work emphasizing development in the periphery from a classical marxist perspective.

From within the radical school of development studies has emerged a series of post-Marxist critiques from writers such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Booth (1985), and Corbridge (1986). They point to several key inadequacies in both radical and orthodox approaches which led to an 'impasse' in development theory by the early 1980s: the universalist ethnocentrism of theoretical accounts derived from the experiences of core countries; the implicit teleological tendencies which suggest that all societies must follow the path taken by the 'advanced' societies of Western Europe and North America (Pieterse, 1991); and, essentialism, meaning that one 'essence' of society, usually the 'logic' of capitalism, is identified and invested with totalizing explanatory powers. This critique of development theory was particularly concerned to incorporate a broader range of social processes which are locally constituted - for example, politics, culture, gender, religion, and the state, as well as class. The intention, then, is to adopt a 'critical' stance but to do so without reducing social reality to class relations (Corbridge, 1986, 1988; Watts, 1988). In general, the broad rubric of post-marxism encompasses approaches that
attempt to construct contingent and locally specific narratives. Regulation theory, for example, has been adopted by some post-marxist writers as an example of the context-specific theorizing which is needed (Lipietz, 1987). More generally, however, with the withdrawal from universalizing theories of underdevelopment, there has been a growth in what might be termed lower-level or 'inductive' theories of development (Drakakis-Smith, 1990). It is in the development of these theories that geographers have made an important contribution, compared to their rather derivative use of global theories of development. Examples, many of them specific to Southeast Asia, include concepts such as dualism, the informal sector, agricultural and urban involution, circular migration and mobility, moral economy, ersatz capitalism, the desakota, region-based urbanization, and female marginalization. The distinctive character of these concepts is that they tend to be 'working' theories rather than universalizations and, in the case of 'desakota', represent an attempt to localize and indigenize theory.

A more fundamental movement out of the 'crisis' in development theory has been through post-structuralist attention to the concepts of discourse and social constructionism. A discourse naturalizes and implicitly universalizes a particular view of the world and the position of subjects within it (Gregory, 1994a). During the 1980s and 1990s increasing attention has been paid across the social sciences and humanities to 'deconstructing' the conceptual categories of established theories - a trend which is often traced back to the post-structuralism of literary critics such as Derrida, and the Foucauldian emphasis on the social construction of reality and the consequent power relations inherent in discursive formations. Several strategies can be adopted in deconstructing discourses, including: finding hidden meanings in 'texts' (broadly conceived); tracing the history of such 'texts' to demonstrate their contingency; analyzing the power
relations and interest groups that define and benefit from a particular discourse; and, identifying alternative forms of knowledge and other ways of seeing the world.

The discourse of 'Development' has been interpreted as "the form in which it makes its arguments and establishes its authority, [and] the manner in which it constructs the world" (Crush, 1995). Thus writers such as Arturo Escobar (1995), James Ferguson (1992), and Cowen and Shenton (1996) have traced the origins of the Development discourse and have attempted to show the way in which it is implicated in unequal power relations (Watts, 1993). This has led to a 'post-developmentalist' school which is no longer to prepared to accept even the premise that 'Development' can be a basis for theory and practice (Sachs, 1992).

Deconstructions of development discourses have found common ground with a growing interest in grassroots activism and social movements (Kelly and Armstrong, 1996). The 'alternative development' literature focuses on popular movements based on a variety of social causes (explicitly not just class-based) and suggests that it is through these movements, and local activism by intellectuals and others, that real change can be effected. Alternative development reflects both a dissatisfaction with class-based struggle alone and the extent to which praxis has been neglected by many marxist development thinkers. Escobar (1992) identifies four features of these 'new social movements': they are essentially local and address particular problems or direct instances of power; they are pluralistic and seldom associated with one ideology or party politics; their struggle is not conceived in purely economic terms; they do not accept at face value the knowledge of 'experts' or government agents. In other words, these movements represent a new element in the civil society of 'Third World' polities. According to Slater, "the new social movements have expressed [a] sense of plasticity, renewing amidst the ruins, living beyond the ghosts of old paradigms" (Slater, 1993, 431).
2.5.3 Perspectives on Globalization from Development Theory

This brief account of the state of development theory allows some connections to be drawn with the current concern for globalization. In many ways, interest in the rise, or acceleration, of globalization parallels the 'crisis' of modernist development theory from the mid-1970s. Global economic relations made the orthodox approaches based on nation-state look outmoded; industrialization and expanding mass consumption in the 'periphery' made dependency theory seem inadequate; the decline of existing state socialism in the late 1980s made marxist rhetoric passé; global concern for environmental sustainability, womens’ equality etc. made economistic theories too narrow and new social movements more attractive; and, interest in deconstructing the discourse of development with its simplistic dualisms - developed/underdeveloped, North/South, First World/Third World - made the implicit equality of a global arena seem more attractive (McGee, 1995).

Globalization, then, has been a seductive motif for 'post-impasse' development theory. But as this chapter has shown, it has also provided a discursive legitimation for neoliberal prescriptions to development. In offering a critique of these prescriptions and their consequences, this thesis draws on both post-marxist and post-structuralist approaches. From post-structuralism I take an emphasis on the discourses that construct a particular picture of the world and the position of individual places and people within it. Such constructions are always imbued with power relations. From post-marxism, I draw a sensitivity to the specificities of social relations in places which are not simply the manifestation of processes theorized as universal. These social processes cannot be reduced to economic relations, but also incorporate the cultural, environmental, and political dimensions of lived experience. The purpose of this thesis might be seen, then, as the writing of a critical development geography of globalization.
2.6 Summary

The logics of globalization described earlier - economic, technological, political and cultural - capture the theoretical dimensions of globalization as a material process. These are indeed processes that, for practical purposes, set a context that cannot be chosen or readily altered. They are, as the politicians and gurus of globalization suggest, an inevitable context for policy-making and action. But, to paraphrase Marx, what is lacking in many contemporary representations of globalization are the "people", or even institutions, who are "creating history, but not in conditions of their own choosing". This, I believe is the point at which an intervention is needed. The leap in logic from the context provided by globalization to the necessities that it implies must be questioned, because it is here that the construction of the global scale becomes politicized.

Governments, and in this thesis that means the Philippine state, have readily subscribed to the supposed imperatives of globalization and elided them with a neoliberal agenda of free trade and economic liberalization. Globalization is not synonymous with neoliberalism, but it has been constructed as such - it has become part of a discursive legitimation for thinking about the relationship between particular places and global space. In this sense, globalization is a political discourse serving to naturalize development policies that should be contested and questioned.

The basis of this discourse is a production of scale in such a way as to make the relationship between places and global space understandable. It encourages us to think about our 'places in the world' in a particular manner. Specifically the appeal to the notion of globalization enframes places as 'nodes' in a 'network' of global flows in which states, places and actors are denied any proactive role. Social processes that operate at the local scale (whether this be national, provincial, village etc.) are represented as subordinate to the global scale. In other words, scale, particularly the global scale, is being socially constructed in the deferral of political options to the necessities of globalization.
This brings us back to the two key arguments presented in chapter 1. First, a corollary of constructing globalization as a determining context for social and economic development is to denigrate social processes operating at, and between, other scales. The global becomes paramount in a hierarchy of scales in which power operates in one direction only - the 'global' asserting itself over the 'local'. In this thesis I will argue instead that the material processes of 'globalization' must be viewed as 'locally' constructed and experienced rather than some deus ex machina to which political choices have to be deferred. This theoretical point is necessarily explored at a variety of scales, where the dominant social actors are not distant, abstract and inanimate forces of globalization, but human agents with motives and agendas that are considerably more parochial. These scales range from the national and provincial (Part II) to the municipal, village, household and individual (Part III).

The second key argument is that the deferral to a constructed global scale is not, in many cases, naive. Power, as Vincente Rafael argues, is frequently a product of the ability to broker relationships between the 'inside' and the 'outside' - to "lay claim over the site of circulation" (1995, 5). The construction of scale and the discourse of globalization are, then, political manœuvres rather than statements of 'reality'. One of the purposes of this dissertation, particularly in part II, is to argue this point for the case of the Philippines. In short, I will present evidence suggesting that 'globalization', while based on the material processes of time-space compression, is also a social construction with political implications. Its use as a development discourse in this way can be seen in the strategies and policies that it is used to legitimize. In chapters 4 and 5 this point is made with reference to national policies for economic growth, the management of spatial patterns of that growth, and 'place-marketing' strategies that construct a particular relationship to global space. In chapter 6 a similar point is made at a provincial level, but the focus is on political regulation of markets for land and labour. Before this presentation of empirical material, however, the next chapter will explore some of the issues involved in researching globalization and will describe the methods used.
3.1 Motivations

Recent intellectual interventions have served notice to social 'scientists' that speaking for others is problematic and representation is in 'crisis' (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Clifford, 1988). This has particular importance for those who conduct research in the developing or post-colonial world where a history of imposed hierarchies based on nation, race, gender, and creed has created power relationships from which no one can escape. These are serious concerns, especially among those who 'create' knowledge and perpetuate paradigms. In an era of post-colonial scholarship and a widely discredited developmental imaginary, the days of entering 'the field' with a missionary zeal to improve the world are over (McGee, 1991). Nor is a justification of pure intellectual curiosity adequate.

I would argue, however, that research beyond one's immediate context - other places, other cultures - should not be 'off-limits'. It would be both intellectually and politically stifling to deny powers of authorship to any except those native to a place, class, gender etc.. Instead, I believe the imperative that must guide research in other societies is a will to understand the global processes in which we are all complicit - especially those of us in economically and politically powerful societies - and which are implicated in transforming the lives of others. To restrict research to the known and the most readily knowable is to neglect the interconnectedness of all human societies. While I will argue that globalization is a political discourse, it is also a sufficiently real and material process that the lives of 'distant strangers' are inevitably but unconsciously touched by decisions made elsewhere. The clothes we wear, the computers we use are just one part of the ties that link places together. The clothes and computer equipment that I use were at least partially made in the Philippines and these sorts of linkages tie directly into the processes of industrial development and socioeconomic change that this thesis is about.
Less directly, but perhaps more powerfully, the ideas brought by North American academics and consultants to projects in the Philippines shape the changes occurring there; Canadian financial institutions and businesses are deeply involved in financing and building the economic boom that the Philippines is currently experiencing; and, Canadian involvement in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) create an institutional and political context for Philippine development. This list merely scratches the surface of mutual ties that link 'my place' and an 'other place'. There is, then an imperative to understand the changes wrought elsewhere in the lives of 'distant strangers'.  

In addition to the ethical concerns of understanding globalization processes, there is also a political imperative to understand the spread and impact of the idea of globalization over the last few years (Biersteker, 1995; Agnew and Corbridge, 1995). Economic ideas based on free trade and liberal economic policy have now become the orthodoxy which fewer and fewer states can resist; they have become the new international context for development (Stallings, 1995). These ideas imply certain political practices and have profound impacts on lives. A local study is an important foundation for broader politics of social justice. This need not mean that an inquiry such as this is pervaded by political messages and judgements, but the understandings derived are inevitably politically implicated (Harvey, 1996).

3.2 The Networks of Knowledge Production

While there are these linkages between places that I believe ethically necessitate the type of research that I have conducted, there is obviously still a great deal that separates me as a researcher from the lived experiences of the people who participated in this study. The obvious barriers and distinctions of distance, race, class, education and language fed into all the more complex ways in which I found Filipino society and culture subtly different despite some

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12 This argument has been developed in a more philosophically sophisticated way by Stuart Corbridge (1993a and b) using the philosophy of justice proposed by John Rawls.
elements of superficial familiarity. Even with networks of friends and some rudimentary language skills, I was still trying to make sense of a society whose 'sense' I could not internalize, and in which I was always an outsider, observing and acting but not fully participating. This does not negate the work presented here, but does imply a necessity to acknowledge the personally situated nature of the research process. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to outline the elements of design and serendipity that shaped this thesis (and to acknowledge in footnotes the many individuals who assisted along the way).

The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 was not the framework with which I approached my fieldwork in the Philippines. As the following extract indicates, my initial research proposal shared the same empirical focus as this thesis, but it was couched in terms of urban-rural relationships rather than discourses and material processes of globalization:

The objectives of the proposed research are to explore how industrial development is integrated with agricultural activities in the hinterland of Manila, and particularly how a rapidly expanding waged labour force in manufacturing is linked to the continuing agricultural activities. The key questions that arise relate to decisions concerning labour allocation, sources of income, agricultural production, consumption, the family, and the household. Given the interaction of these spheres, the research will attempt to describe how development is experienced by local households, what factors determine the differential nature of this experience between social groups, and how agricultural activities are affected in the process.

The emphasis on globalization was added later, as a reflection of the importance the concept evidently had in the development policies of the national and local governments. But in embarking on fieldwork and in seeking a case study area, my focus was on the household level linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors.

My first research trip to Manila (and my third to the Philippines) was in July and August 1994. Residing at the University of the Philippines (UP), I was able to explore the sources of government data on land use conversion and industrialization and to consult scholars and
activists who were examining similar issues. In particular, it was through the guidance of Professor Frederico Silao at UP's School of Urban and Regional Planning that my attention was directed towards the changes occurring in his native province of Cavite. Professor Silao was, at that time, directing a team of students who had been contracted to prepare a development plan for the municipality of Tanza. After a personal introduction to the mayor of Tanza and various officers of the municipal government it became clear that Tanza suited my requirements for a fieldwork site in several ways. Firstly, Tanza is a 'rural' town economically based on rice farming but which is experiencing rapid land conversion to non-agricultural uses and is heavily influenced by the nearby export processing zone. Thus the processes of socioeconomic transformation were as evident there as anywhere else in Manila's hinterland. Secondly, Tanza still has a substantial farming population, thus allowing research on the impact of recent development on the farming sector (in other towns, such as Rosario where the export processing zone is located, agricultural land has disappeared completely). Finally, the cooperation of the local government, while not legally required, was an important precondition for the necessary access to data and my general legitimacy in the town.

The main period of fieldwork began in January 1995 and was completed in August of the same year. Until the end of February I stayed in Manila, taking intensive Tagalog tuition and visiting government offices to collect data, reports and conduct interviews (see Appendix A for a list of agencies visited). My institutional base was once again the College of Public Administration. The assistance of Dean Proserpina D. Tapales at the UP College of Public Administration, and the friendship of Gary Auxilian, Agnes España, Emelyn Tapaoan, Teresa Popplewell and Marc Carey at that time made my brief visit both fruitful and enjoyable. I am also grateful to Dr Prod Laquian who facilitated my stay at UP. I am grateful to Mayor Hermogenes F. Arayata for his cooperation and to various members of staff at the municipal hall in Tanza, particularly the Planning and Development Officer, Cora Tahimic.

While English is widely spoken in the Philippines and is the official language of government and education, many Filipinos, especially in rural areas, who have little formal education, speak very little. In Cavite, the vernacular dialect is Tagalog (which is also the national language of the Philippines). Eventually my ability in Tagalog progressed so that I could conduct simple conversations, ask interview questions myself and comprehend most of the responses. Throughout my fieldwork, however, I needed help from a research assistant. This was important because my knowledge of Tagalog was fairly rudimentary, but for several other reasons too. Firstly, in speaking Tagalog, Caviteno will sometimes use archaic words (referred to as 'deep Tagalog') where non-native Tagalog speakers might simply use a Spanish or English equivalent. This meant that it was important for me to have the assistance of someone from the province who would understand such expressions. Secondly, Filipinos often tend to use their
Administration at the University of the Philippines, where I was formally appointed as a Visiting Research Associate. It was my landlady in Manila, Dr Helen Mendoza, who facilitated my accommodation in Tanza. Through an intermediary in Manila, I was introduced to Mrs. Rufina E. Solis, a pharmacist and landowner in Tanza who became my 'Lola' (grandmother) for the duration of my fieldwork (March-August). My association with Mrs Solis, quite apart from easing the logistical and emotional trials of field research, also provided me with a social positioning in the town when it came to introducing myself and my purpose.

Another piece of good fortune was my acquaintance with Dr Rosario 'Geles' Sosa and her cousin, Ms Berna Javier, both residents of Tanza. Dr Sosa provided friendship, occasional research assistance, and both academic and medical attention. Berna Javier became my full-time research assistant. As a teacher, part-time helper in her uncle's market stall, and a lifelong resident of Tanza, Berna was well-known to other people in the town. This made introductions to villagers much smoother than they might otherwise have been and further aided my social positioning with informants, who had no experience in dealing with researchers. The usual 'pigeon hole' for foreigners (universally assumed to be Americans) is as Peace Corps volunteers.

Language in subtle ways, through figurative expressions, word plays, contractions and particles which slightly change the tone of a sentence - the full meaning of these turns of phrase could not be understood through a simple translation of the words used. A much deeper knowledge of the language is necessary and for that I needed assistance. Finally, my ear for Tagalog was not sufficiently developed to transcribe interview tapes accurately word for word, and so the help of a native speaker was necessary to ensure accuracy in transcription as well as translation.

The office staff at the CPA assisted with logistical matters and I was fortunate to enjoy the friendship and support of Dean Jose N. Endriga. Others at UP Diliman who kindly discussed my work and made suggestions were Clemen Aquino, Sylvia Guerrero, Arsenio Balisacan, Rene Ofreneo, Ledivina Carino, Benjamin Carino, Teofilo Luna, Meliton Juanico, Darlene Occena-Gutierrez, Dickton Rye. In addition helpful suggestions were made by Jeanne Illo at Ateneo de Manila University and Cecilia Ochoa at the Philippine Peasant Institute.

This was just one of the kindnesses extended by Helen Mendoza. I should also acknowledge the friendship and support of others at Apo Avenue, particularly Amanda Clarke and Eri Fujieda with whom shared the fun and frustration of learning about the Philippines.

My debt of gratitude to Lola Pina is enormous. For six months I lived in her house and was treated as a member of the family. Her unconditional kindness and hospitality was an education in the best Filipino traditions of humanity and generosity. I also treasure the friendship of Remia, Sally and Ruby and others at the Farmacia San Agustin, together with Chito and the extended Estacion family in Tanza.

I should acknowledge the role of Gisele Yasmeen, my colleague at UBC, who was a close friend of Geles in Bangkok while conducting her own field research. In a classic instance of research serendipity, Geles' permanent home in the Philippines was just around the corner from my residence at the Farmacia San Agustin. My research could never have been completed within six months had it not been for the diligent assistance of Berna and Geles. They also became my closest friends in Tanza and I was shown constant kindness by their families.
or missionaries. My identity as neither of these took some explaining, but my association with Mrs Solis, Berna, and eventually several other families, gave me credibility on which to build trust. In addition to acting as my 'PR' agent, Berna's principal role was as interpreter during interviews, and then afterwards when we transcribed tape recordings.

It was largely through Berna's social networks that I arrived at the two villages used as case studies later in this thesis. I had decided that although I would live in the town centre of Tanza, the municipality as a whole was not a realistic scale at which to conduct ethnographic interviews and collect survey data. By picking two barangays (villages) I would be able to familiarize myself with the place and people (and vice versa). It seemed appropriate to select barangays that exhibited the impact of recent urban/industrial development in different ways. I thus decided to work in one barrio with little land conversion and a largely intact agricultural base, while the other barrio would be a site of substantial land conversion. This seemed to be a 'before' and 'after' scenario, although in reality it became clear that the two villages were simply at different stages in, and experiencing different dimensions of, the same process.

In barrio Bunga, Berna knew a family from her work in the market and it was the Porcionculas who became my adopted 'parents' in the village. Bunga has no new residential developments and an economy based predominantly on agriculture. It is also one of the most remote villages in Tanza, lying several kilometers along a very poor road, accessible only by motorcycle. In such a community, with tight social bonds, I was fortunate to have an adopted family to provide credibility and contacts. The second village, Mulawin, presented a contrast with Bunga. Although visible from Bunga across an expanse of rice fields, Mulawin lies on a main road linking Tanza and the provincial capital, Trece Martires City, and has experienced substantial land conversion from agricultural to residential uses. In Mulawin, it was Berna's sister's father-in-law, Demetrio Armintia, who provided us with hospitality and introductions.

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20 Romana and Emming Porcioncula and their family provided detailed information on the village, fed and accommodated us and introduced me to their extended family. Their daughter Myrna and Manny Bobadilla also showed great kindness and honoured me with 'kinship' as a godfather to their daughter.
3.3 Research Strategies

My research proceeded along several fronts between February and August 1995. In particular, I gathered government reports/statistics and local literature as secondary sources, and conducted surveys and taped interviews as primary data generation. In addition, throughout my fieldwork I kept a newspaper clippings file and a detailed journal recording the progress of my work and my thoughts on the experiences it provided.

3.3.1 Secondary Sources

The data and literature gathered at various offices and institutions were broadly related to agriculture, urban development, industrialization and economic development policy. In the case of new industrial developments and agricultural land conversion, I have figures updated to June 1995. For a few data series, I have figures that includes part or all of 1996. In some instances, just secondary material was gathered at government agencies and other institutions, but frequently I was also able to interview key personnel. While my status as a white, male, English/Canadian researcher created obstacles to understanding, it was also an enormous benefit in dealing with officials at governmental and non-governmental offices. An 'outside' identity frequently opened doors that would be closed to those within the local social hierarchy. This meant access to senior politicians, officials and academics was possible, while at the same time providing enough curiosity value that farmers, storekeepers etc. were often keen to engage in discussions. My association with the prestigious University of the Philippines also assisted in facilitating access to the bureaucracy. A complete list of agencies visited is provided in Appendix A.
3.3.2 Interviews

During the course of my research I conducted taped interviews with over 70 individuals, lasting from half an hour to three or four hours. These were predominantly with members of farming families in the villages of Bunga and Mulawin, but also with other residents of Tanza. Although a few interviews were conducted in English, most were in Tagalog. Interviews were transcribed a few days later in abbreviated form - taking notes in English for factual information, but transcribing in full passages of a more qualitative nature. These transcripts are used extensively in later chapters, and all quotes will be given in both English and Tagalog.

The majority of interviewees were members of farming families - either husbands, wives or adult children. This was a reflection of my research goal to understand the impact of industrialization and land conversion on such families and their responses to recent changes. In addition, however, I also sought out the following groups: workers at the CEPZ, landless agricultural workers, developers, agricultural technicians, youth leaders, teachers, and older people both in villages and in the town proper with a good recollection of local history. In addition to the taped interviews I also spoke to numerous others in less formal circumstances and recorded our discussions in written form.

Almost all of the interviews were conducted in the respondent's house, but occasionally in a field or other place of work. The interview usually started with an explanation of my purpose ("to study the effects of land conversion and industrialization on the lives of local people") which would frequently generate an immediate response from interviewees. Given the magnitude of the changes occurring, few interviewees were without opinions that they were willing to share. The rest of the interview would proceed through a series of issues depending on the particular circumstances of the respondent. While guided by a series of predetermined, but open-ended, questions, most interviews went off on tangents determined by the interviewee.

Two issues emerged during the course of interviews which had a bearing upon the opinions which I heard. The first related to a gender and age bias which appeared initially to be
affecting the group to which I had access for interviews. It often seemed to be assumed that my business was with the 'man of the house' and with the older members of the household. Sometimes, only after completing an interview with a husband could I interview his wife or their children. The other issue was the 'performative' nature of some of my interviews. They felt too formal and staged - a result of my peculiarity (which often led to a small crowd of spectators), the tape recorder (which establishes an 'OK we'll start now' scenario), and the translation which was usually needed. Where I returned to interview individuals more than once, this became less of a problem, and, later in my fieldwork I found the performance element could be eased by using my formal written survey at the start of the interview, thereby finishing the 'formal' questions and releasing the discussion into a less constrained atmosphere.

3.3.3 Surveys

Three surveys were conducted during the course of my research in Tanza. The first survey instrument was a short (two pages) household questionnaire used to gather socioeconomic information in Bunga and Mulawin (the original survey and English translation are provided in Appendix B). The survey was written in Tagalog and tested on a few households before full implementation. It requested details of family members, educational attainment, migration, sources of livelihood (primary and others), current or returned overseas contract workers, responsibilities for household chores, and ownership of household appliances. The survey was developed only after a period of open-ended interviews which allowed me to develop questions that would be relevant and acceptable. In both Bunga and Mulawin, the bulk of the surveys were conducted over two or three days, with the help of my research assistant and several volunteers.
from the barangay youth groups (Sangguniang Kabataan or Kabataan Barangay), who were given a short briefing and training session.\footnote{I am very grateful to Menes Lucido and Che Che Sosa and to the members of the Kabataan Barangay in each village for their help with these surveys, and to Barangay Captains Benny Reterta and Domingo Porcioncula for their cooperation and support.}

In Bunga, we were able to complete 230 surveys out of a total household population of 260 (a coverage of about 90 per cent). In Mulawin, 205 surveys were completed but this represented only about one third of the total household population. In Mulawin, this was not a random sample but represented the core area of the village which includes several housing developments of various ages. Two large developments which are technically within the village boundary were excluded because they are separated from the main part of the village and because it was necessary to keep the survey down to a manageable size. Maps 4 and 5 in later chapters indicate the areas surveyed.

The second survey was aimed specifically at farming households and sought information on the economic and technical details of their farming activities (see original and translation in Appendix C). Like the household survey, this questionnaire was also designed after a period of open-ended interviews, but was administered exclusively by my research assistant and myself. In Bunga we covered 43 of the 65 tenant farmers, and in Mulawin 9 of the 13 who remain.

The third survey was administered within the Tanza National Comprehensive High School. The purpose of the questionnaire, which was completed during classes, was to gauge the family backgrounds, attitudes and aspirations of young people (see Appendix D). These might have been gathered in more detail through in-depth interviews, and while this technique was also used, many teenagers were uncomfortable with interview situations or open-ended survey questions. The brief questionnaire was therefore designed in consultation with the school's counseling office and consisted mostly of short answer responses.\footnote{Members of the counselling and guidance staff were most helpful in facilitating the questionnaire at the high school. In particular: Mrs M.Clamosa, Mrs E.Rovero, Mrs L.Bobadilla, Mrs A.De Castro, Mrs L.Lacson, and Mrs M.Timpoc.} After a pre-test with 10 students, the survey was administered to 136 final year students (mostly aged 16).
3.3.4 Mapping

Hand-drawn sketch maps were elicited from several local people and were then incorporated into maps of the two villages which I drew myself based on observations. These sketches were then used to produce the villages maps in chapters 7 and 8. They feature all houses - included those omitted from the household survey - together with institutional buildings, physical characteristics and general land use patterns for June 1995.

3.3.5 Analysis

The household surveys and Bunga farming surveys were entered into the Microsoft Access relational database management system. This software allowed several data tables to be compiled relating to personal characteristics, household characteristics and farming practices. Cross-tabulations could then be generated both within and between these data tables to provide descriptive statistics for a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics in Bunga and Mulawin. Access was also used for some secondary data gathered from government offices, for example on industrial establishments in Cavite. For data sets with smaller populations or more limited uses - such as the farming survey in Mulawin or the high school survey - manual calculations were performed to generate quantitative output.

3.4 Research Themes

Four key themes informed my interview and survey questions and the data gathered from secondary sources. It is these themes that inform the empirical analysis of globalized development presented in chapters 6-10:
a. The politics of development in Cavite and Tanza

It was constantly apparent that much more than 'economic' forces determined the nature of development in Tanza, and in Cavite (and the Philippines) as a whole. Two areas in particular were of interest. Firstly, the ways in which development strategy at a national level was politically justified - and this is where the importance of globalization discourse became apparent; secondly, at a smaller scale, in the power relationships and influence wielded by public officials and land owners. This is a theme that underpins many later chapters.

b. The changing local labour market

A major complaint of farmers, and observation of others, was the impact of employment growth at the export processing zone on labour supply for agricultural activities, especially the harvesting and transplanting of rice. This has led to both changes in farming production techniques and to substantial migration into the area. The availability of local jobs is, however, selective according to age and gender, with a strong bias towards young single women. Factory work is not, therefore, usually an option for displaced farmers. Another important drain on the local labour market (though also an important source of income through remittances) is migration overseas for contract work - mostly as seamen, domestic helpers or construction workers. The process of local labour market change in response to globalized development is explored in chapter 7.

c. Land conversion and agrarian change

The second major manifestation of globalized development in Tanza is the conversion of farmland into residential subdivisions. A variety of economic and social factors are driving this process. There are also changes occurring in farming that continues in the municipality, both in terms of the crops being cultivated and the techniques used. These themes are examined in chapters 7 and 8.
d. Cultural Change - Work, Generation and Gender

Adjustments in labour markets and land use represent one dimension of globalization as a material process experienced locally, but the consequences and causes of these changes are to be found beyond the socioeconomic and political spheres. Cultural changes too are both driving and being driven by the process of globalization. Three themes in particular became apparent during interviews: the shifting gender identities associated with growth in female waged employment at local factories; an emergent youth culture that adopts globalized 'signs' and reflects changing attitudes towards family, careers and social institutions; and, finally, a changing meaning attached to particular types of work, especially agricultural work, as new opportunities open up in factories, offices and overseas. These themes are examined in detail in chapter 9.

3.5 From Research to Writing

Gathering primary data in Tanza was a process suffused with a constant tension in assimilating individual experiences into an academic research process. Throughout my fieldwork, one of the main issues I faced was the need to break down 'big' questions - questions which drive a thesis or research project and which have relevance in an academic context - into smaller ones which would enable local people to relate to my purpose. There would have been little point in talking directly about political discourses of development, local relationships of social power, the changing culture of work or shifting gender relations. Instead, a translation was required both between languages and from academic debates to questions which could be posed to farmers about their everyday lives and productive operations - questions which would be easily answerable and yet would speak to larger issues.

After fieldwork was completed, the opposite problem arose - how to present the experiences of people with whom I lived in terms of an academic thesis. One instance of 'translation' is in the incorporation of the themes listed above into a broader theoretical
framework based on the issue of globalization. More practically, however, as time passes the 'complete' lived process of fieldwork fades into memory and experience becomes distilled into survey forms and interview transcripts. What follows, then, inevitably carries these tensions within it, although I hope that the use of quotations wherever possible, and details of the places where fieldwork was conducted, go some way towards softening the process of dehumanization and separation.
PART II

CONSTRUCTING GLOBALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTRUCTING A PLACE IN THE WORLD: THE PHILIPPINE PAST

4.1 Introduction

In theoretical terms, I have argued that globalization can be seen as a discourse incorporating a particular construction of scale. This part of the thesis begins the process of making that argument for the Philippines in particular. Inevitably the construction of globalization in the Philippines is a product of historical experience rather than an instant creation and so this chapter reaches back into the Philippine past to explore the ways in which powerful actors have produced the country's 'place in the world'. This is not, then, a comprehensive historical account, but rather an interpretive history to illustrate that point. This overview is necessary to the argument made in the thesis for several reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that the dominant vision of the Philippines as a place in 'global space' has varied over time and is historically contingent and politically contested. Secondly, the account shows that the construction of globalization in the Philippines is to be found not, or at least not just, in the exogenous forces of colonialism, global capital, multilateral institutions or post-colonial geopolitics, but in the articulation of all of these forces with powerful local agents. Thus 'global flows' are not simply acting upon local political, economic and cultural structures, but are interacting with them. Thirdly, the chapter provides some of the historical roots of an economy and a culture that is strongly oriented towards the material processes of globalization. Understanding this orientation is essential in developing an analysis of how globalization could become such a powerful discourse in the Philippines' recent history. Finally, the chapter provides a broader context for the historical account of the province of Cavite that will be provided later.

In making these points, this chapter is structured chronologically, starting with the precolonial society that the Spanish encountered, followed by the experience of Hispanic colonialism (1521-1896), then the American period (1898-1946) and finally the post-war (and
post-independence) Philippine state. Beginning with a description of the precolonial Philippine archipelago is important because it draws attention to distinctive elements of Filipino cultural development sometimes forgotten in accounts of colonialism. This is not to say that there is a foundational Filipino identity to be unearthed, but it does highlight the fact that subsequent outside influences encountered a culturally complex society that already had substantial contact with the outside world. The processes of colonialism were, therefore, closer to hybridization than assimilation.

The nature of this hybridization under Spanish rule will be discussed in several areas: trade and production; social structure and government; religion; and, gender relations. In the case of trade and production, we see how economic interest groups, such as Spanish merchants and colonists, and British and American trading houses, vied to define the nature of the colony's articulation with the world economy in order to advance their own interests. In the realms of government, religion and gender relations, I will suggest that the significant effect of colonialism was less a reworking of social and cultural frameworks - most were kept in place in a modified form - but more their formalization and expansion so that hierarchies concluded not with local chiefs or shamans but with authorities far removed. It is in this process - the colonization not of territory or resources, but of consciousness - that the roots of a globalization discourse can be located.

The American experience in the Philippines also worked on both economic and cultural levels. Through an ostensibly more benign, but perhaps therefore more insidious, brand of colonialism, the US sought to advance both its own interests and those of a particular class of Filipinos. As an exogenous influence, US colonialism represented an input to a pre-existing structure of local power relations that left hierarchies and hegemonies even more entrenched. The post-independence era saw a similar pattern persist, with outside support being used for domestic political purposes. At the same time, domestic political constituencies have multiplied to create a variety of views with regard to Philippine relations with the outside world. It is those constituencies that have jockeyed for influence in recent years and have arrived at the
contemporary political economy of globalization that holds sway. By presenting this contemporary perspective in its broader historical context it is my intention that it should start to look rather less conclusive and more contingent and contestable.

4.2 The Pre-Colonial Philippines

When, in 1521, Ferdinand Magellan arrived and claimed for the Spanish crown what would become the Philippines, he found an archipelago whose political structure bore no relation to the contemporary Philippine state and indeed where the nation-state was an unfamiliar concept. No unifying pre-colonial empire existed as it had elsewhere in the Malay world, for example under Majapahit (centred on Java) and Srivijaya (on Sumatra). Instead there existed a system of local sultanates and fiefdoms controlling limited hinterlands from coastal and riverine settlements (Constantino, 1975). Different cultural, linguistic and social systems existed in the archipelago's various regions - differences that still carry some weight today in the construction of regional identities, for example as Ilocanos, Tagalogs, Bicolanos or Visayans (and extending to subgroups within such regions). For the purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient to concentrate on Tagalog society - the cultural group living in 16th century Manila and the surrounding region.

The word 'Tagalog' is thought to be a contraction of the phrase *taga ilog*, meaning 'from the river' or 'river dweller', which gives some indication of the topography of the region - low-lying riverine plains draining to Manila Bay or the freshwater mass of Laguna de Bay, but also extending into the surrounding uplands to include what is now Bulacan, Manila, Rizal, Cavite and Laguna (Scott, 1994).

Rice was then, as now, the staple of the Tagalogs, but swidden agriculture also yielded root crops. In a few areas complex, labour intensive irrigated field systems had developed for rice cultivation, although seasonal flooding also provided natural irrigation. Prior to Spanish missionization neither ploughs nor draft animals were used, and land was plentiful with large
areas uncultivated. Fish formed the other main staple, with coastal waters and rivers exploited for this purpose. Craft production was well developed by the sixteenth century and while local goods were for subsistence purposes, surpluses would be traded with other communities.

By the time the Spanish arrived, Manila was already the archipelago's major entrepôt port, with a population of around 5-10,000, and acting as a centre for trade between other islands and the rest of the region. Merchants from Borneo, China, Japan, Siam, Cambodia, India and the Islamic and Malay worlds frequented Manila and had done so for several hundred years (Reid, 1993: 60). The old Tagalog word for Chinese reflects this: *sanglay* is a contraction of two Chinese words, *chang* and *lai*, meaning 'regularly come' (Scott, 1994).

Exports from Manila were mostly primary products such as wax, honey, leather, deerskins, raw cotton, palm wine, and gold, but given the port's significance as a trading centre, foreign goods such as Chinese silks and porcelain were also traded there. Imports to Manila were predominantly manufactured items such as textiles, crockery, kettles and swords, and commodities such as copper, pepper and precious stones. Tagalogs traded these goods with other settlements throughout the archipelago via well-established inter-island or upland-lowland trade routes.

But Manila-based trade in the archipelago did not imply any form of political control emanating from the growing core region. Instead, dispersed *barangays* of 100-500 people were mostly engaged in subsistence cultivation and formed self-contained fiefdoms. The word *barangay* itself indicates something of the nature of these communities. Meaning 'boat' in Tagalog, the word refers to the initial settlement of the islands by individual boatloads of migrants and implies the close ties that bound members of the same community, through kinship, allegiance or alliance (Reid, 1988).

The 'captain' of a village was a *datu*, and together they formed an aristocratic *maginoo* class in Tagalog society. Some villages were grouped together as a *bayan* or town, with one *datu* taking precedence over others by virtue of superior economic or military power. The *datu* would act as the military, political and legal chief and could command services, agricultural produce
and respect from his people. Two of the most powerful of these rulers were to be found in the settlements of Tondo and Maynila, at the mouth of the Pasig River where Manila is now sited.

The *datu* class formed one part of a three-tiered social system that was essentially feudal, but with important differences from the European equivalent at the time. Beneath the *datu*, there was a class of 'freemen', called *timawa* or *maharlika*, who had rights to a portion of agricultural land in the barangay and who owed the *datu* nothing but their occasional labour. Beneath the *timawa*, there were slaves, or *alipin*, who were subordinated in a system of debt peonage (Scott, 1994). Their debt, and therefore their own allegiance, could be transferred between *datu*s making them similar to bonded slaves in the European context, but like the *timawa*, they too could claim and inherit agricultural land from which they would have to pay a tribute at harvest time. Their position was not, therefore directly equivalent to slavery in a European understanding and such distinctions were to cause confusion among Spanish colonizers. On observing Filipino society in the late sixteenth century Legazpi noted that

> The inhabitants of these islands are not subjected to any law, king or lord... He who owns most slaves, and the strongest, can obtain anything he pleases..... They recognize neither lord nor rule; and even their slaves are not under great subjection to their masters and lords, serving them only under certain conditions. (Legazpi, 1569, 54; cited in Reid, 1988, 120)

As Reid points out, across Southeast Asia there was "a combination of sharply stratified hierarchy with seeming looseness of political structure which would baffle European travellers, empire builders, and ethnographers for centuries" (Reid, 1988, 120)

In summary, several features of pre-colonial society are worth emphasizing because they address the 'bafflement' which European colonizers would feel, and they create a complex relationship between the Philippines and outside influences (which continues into the present). Firstly, precolonial society was based on close familial ties and networks which defined social standing and represented the first call on personal loyalty. The origins of the barangay as an extended kinship grouping meant that families remained closely knit and in close proximity - a
system that continued and was extended through the practice of fictive kinship. Secondly, the relatively loose system of power relations meant that allegiance was owed not to a place or an institution, but to an individual with whom a personal relationship was established. This was, moreover, a relationship between patron and client, with mutual responsibilities, not one of absolute sovereign power of one person over another. Thirdly, land ownership was not a European system of private property, but one in which usufruct rights were assigned and understood while ownership, to the extent that it was a relevant concept, remained communal.

Fourthly, pre-colonial Tagalog society was characterized by a dispersed pattern of settlements with little political coherence, meaning that diverse regional identities remained powerful. Fifthly, despite the insular nature of communities, they nevertheless had trading links and familiarity with a range of other material and symbolic cultures with whom they were exchanging goods, ideas, linguistic traits and occasionally blows. Thus although ethnologically of Malay descent, and with languages of Malayo-Polynesian origin, by the sixteenth century Tagalog culture and economy was a blend of distinctive local characteristics and the influence of others.

Sixthly, gender relations were decidedly at odds with those who came later. Women enjoyed considerably greater economic independence in sixteenth century Tagalog society than was true of European societies at the time. Women were family accountants and could administer assets without their husband's consent. In general, men controlled social and sexual realms, but women exercised authority in productive and ritual domains (Eviota, 1992). Finally, religious observance was based on animistic beliefs. These practices were latterly influenced by Malay customs through contact with Borneo and supplemented or replaced by the spread of Islam, also from the south.

It was into this setting that the variously bemused, scandalized and assertive Spanish inserted themselves. Yet despite the best efforts of the colonizers and missions over several centuries, these are also characteristics that can be seen to varying degrees in contemporary Filipino society. Beyond the symbolism and piety of Spanish Catholicism and the materialism of
American-style modernization, elements of pre-Hispanic Filipino culture endure in modified forms.

4.3 Spanish Colonialism: Galleons, Governors and Godliness

While 'galleons', 'governors' and 'godliness' form the popular conception of Spanish colonialism (with the addition of 'gold' in the Americas), it is in fact very difficult to generalize about the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines. The complexity of the Islands' experience of colonialism derives from several sources. Firstly, colonialism had its own geography as different parts of the archipelago experienced subjugation in distinct ways. From the plantation workers on Visayan sugar estates, to the tenant farmers of Luzon, to urban dwellers in Manila, to the swidden cultivators of the Cordillera mountains, the Spanish presence meant very different things, and, in the case of the latter groups, not much at all. Indeed, Spanish influence during the first two hundred years of colonization was geographically highly circumscribed. The influence of colonialism beyond Manila and its hinterland waned rapidly. As McCoy points out:

The Philippines did not develop as a unitary colonial economy oriented towards a single satellite entrepôt at Manila. Instead, the archipelago emerged as a series of separate societies that entered the world system at different times, under different terms of trade, and with different systems of production. (McCoy, 1982, 8)

The second pitfall in discussing Spanish colonialism in toto is to neglect the historical dimensions of the colonial project. The early boom decades of the galleon trade, the later stultifying effects of its limitations on trade, and finally the incorporation of the Islands into the nineteenth century world economy, all mean that it is possible to talk of a colonial legacy but not of a generalized colonial experience in the Philippines.

As well as spatial and temporal variability, there was a social dimension to colonialism. As colonists and missionaries attempted to impose a European social structure (and morality) upon the native population, the pre-existing social structure was reworked but not replaced. Thus those with different social positions prior to colonization experienced the process in distinct
ways. Finally, since the Spanish encountered a oral rather than written culture, accounts of colonialism are almost entirely derived from the records of the colonists. As Vincente Rafael (1988) compellingly shows, the complexity of translating experiences and the gulf between the lifeworlds of colonizers and colonial subjects mean that being limited to one side of the story is a substantial drawback.

These factors make a comprehensive account of the colonial period impossible within the space available here (see Cushner, 1971, or Phelan 1959, for such an account). Instead I will highlight several features of the Spanish colonial period that demonstrate the complexity of the relationship between the 'inside' and 'outside': the 'global' force of colonialism articulating with 'local' social processes among subjugated peoples. Each feature continues to exert an influence over contemporary patterns of Philippine engagement with its 'global' context.

4.3.1 Trade and Production

The extensive trading network already established in Southeast Asia by the sixteenth century was known to the Spanish. Similarly, the cultural, religious and linguistic interaction between different parts of the region stretching from the Arabian Gulf to China must also have been evident. When Magellan landed on Cebu in 1521, his Sumatran slave was apparently immediately understood by the local people (Reid, 1988). Spanish conquest was at least partly based on a desire to profit from these existing trading networks by bringing their products to European markets. Caoili (1988) argues that the three principal motives behind Spanish colonialism were: to secure a share in the spice trade then under Portuguese monopoly control; to establish direct contact with China and Japan for trading purposes; and, to convert the inhabitants of the islands to Christianity.

While Magellan's first contact with the people of Cebu was amiable and yielded both tradeable goods and some religious converts, his involvement in local political rivalries resulted in his death at the hands of a Cebuano warlord. Over the next few decades three colonizing
expeditions failed to overcome local resistance and it wasn't until 1565 that the Spanish returned to Cebu with a successful colonizing force led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. By 1571, Legazpi had moved his capital to Manila due to food shortages in Cebu, and had become governor-general of the new colony.

Much of Manila's wealth in the years after conquest was derived from its status as a trading port for galleons carrying Asian goods to Spain's colony in Mexico. Galleons sailed regularly between 1565 and 1813, carrying mail from Spain and Mexican silver to Manila, and Chinese merchandise, particularly textiles (from the pre-existing Manila-China trade), back to Acapulco (Caoili, 1988). The trade, dependent on demand for Asian products in Central and South America, proved highly profitable and peaked in 1605 when the united Spanish and Portuguese thrones allowed goods from across East and Southeast Asia to pass through Manila on their way to Mexico.

Merchants in Seville and Cadiz, however, resented the competition from Chinese silk that undermined their monopoly in the Americas (Cushner, 1971). Pressure from this constituency led to tight controls over trade starting in 1593. Spanish authorities imposed a limit of one merchant fleet per year on the Manila-Acapulco route, attempted to enforce a system of quotas on the volume of trade, and restricted non-Asian Philippine trade to Mexico. This prevented the full incorporation of the colony into a growing world system and restricted its role to that of an entrepôt port on the periphery of the Spanish empire. Local wealth accumulated through trading relationships and rental arrangements rather than value added in production - an early incarnation of the system that Yoshihara (1988) has described as 'ersatz capitalism' in the post-colonial era. As de Morga pointed out in the early seventeenth century:

The Spaniards have not needed to apply themselves to, nor do they engage in, any other business. Consequently, there is no farming nor agricultural work of any significance done by them nor do they work or exploit the many mines or gold placers. Nor do they take any interest in many forms of business that they could very profitably turn to if the China trade were to fail them. In this respect, then, this export-import business has been very harmful and prejudicial; it has also hurt the natives who are gradually abandoning
their former occupations and labour skills. (Antonio de Morga, 1609; trans. by J. Cummins, 1971; cited in Caoili, 1988)

The principal beneficiaries of this system were the Spanish merchants of Manila and the Chinese traders ghettoized in Manila's Parian who, despite occasional harassment and expulsions, monopolized the retail trade and credit markets. Chinese and Chinese-Filipino mestizos were to become the leading entrepreneurs during the 19th century (see Wickberg, 1965).

Because of the limitations on the galleon trade, the Philippine colony was not a money-maker for the Spanish crown. Indeed, Cushner (1971) suggests that the colony was a financial liability until the nineteenth century, and only the threat of English, Dutch and French advances, plus the obligation to evangelize, kept the Spaniards there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But this poor economic performance was self-imposed by the Spanish. Every aspect of the galleon trade was closely regulated and its profits simply supported the Spanish elite of Manila (Cushner, 1971). Control over trade gradually became concentrated among fewer and fewer families, and the volume of trade actually declined from 1650 until the 1780s (McCoy, 1982). Only then did technologically induced time-space compression bring the Philippines 'closer' to Europe.

But a more open trading regime and a sharper focus on economic development was also induced by other events. The British occupation of Manila and Cavite in 1762-64, at the end of the Seven Years' War, ended with onerous terms for the Spanish colony and Manila was left in economic ruin. The task of reconstruction fell to an enlightened (in the eighteenth century sense) governor, Don José Basco y Vargas Valderrama y Rivera, who provided impetus for change. Basco y Vargas, governor for nine years from 1778, was a reformer in the Bourbon tradition that by that time had a firm grip on the Spanish throne (Cushner, 1971). The Bourbons viewed colonies as sources of income for the mother country, leading to a concerted effort to develop local economic resources to the full. Numerous projects conducted by individual entrepreneurs sought to exploit resources such as pepper, clove, cinnamon, sugar cane, indigo, cotton, tobacco
and timber. Incentives were also introduced by Basco y Vargas to encourage agriculture, mining
and silk production.

The establishment of a Spanish trading company, the Real Compañía de Filipinas, in
1785 also hastened the exploitation of the islands' natural resources and allowed direct exports to
the Spanish market. The company's activities led to the commercial cultivation of a wide range
of products, particularly sugar which extended to all parts of the islands by 1809 (Cushner,
1971). Another group, the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Manila translated
scientific papers on agricultural and botanical techniques and undertook research on the natural
resource potential of the islands. The late eighteenth century, then, was a period of economic
expansion in the Philippines, at least for those few Spanish and mestizo merchants and
landholders who were in a position to take advantage of economic opportunities.

Foreign traders were permitted to operate in Manila for the first time from around 1789,
and included American, British, Portuguese and French ships (Cushner, 1971). By 1816 so many
American ships were trading in Manila that a consul to the Philippines was appointed for the first
time (McAndrew, 1994; Cushner, 1971). By the mid-nineteenth century considerable amounts of
foreign and local capital had been invested in Philippine agriculture to supply the export trade.

The port of Manila was finally opened to free trade in 1834, by which time the extensive
operations of British and other trading houses had made the restrictive colonial trade regime
anachronistic. Provincial ports, such as Iloilo, were similarly opened to direct foreign trade in
1855. Throughout the nineteenth century it was British, not Spanish, capital that dominated the
Philippine export economy, and British imports and exports accounted for over half of the
Philippines' trade throughout the mid-nineteenth century. Sugar in particular was a focus of
British attention (Larkin, 1992).

By the mid-nineteenth century, the cultivation of cash crops had become widespread.
Light industries also started to develop around Manila, which remained the colony's main port.
By the late nineteenth century, the Philippines had become an exporter of primary products to the
rapidly expanding world markets for sugar, hemp, tobacco, coffee, indigo and other
commodities. Central Luzon became a major rice granary for both the country and the broader
East Asian region, Bicol developed hemp for the American market, the Cagayan valley grew
tobacco, and the Western Visayas, especially Negros, cultivated sugar.

The emphasis on cash cropping led to further land concentration, indebtedness and
impoverishment in rural areas. In the case of tobacco, for example, where the colonial
government exercised a marketing monopoly, a British consul, writing in 1873, observed that:

Cagayan is the great tobacco field of the Philippines. The labour is forced as every
native is obliged to cultivate a certain amount of tobacco land, the produce of which, if
equal to the standard size and quality is received and paid for in receipts made payable
by the Philippine government whilst the remainder is either burnt or returned to the
farmer who cannot sell it in that district and is not permitted to sell it to any other. The
money to pay for the tobacco crop of 1871 left Manila for Cagayan in 1873 and in the
meantime the natives have been driven by necessity to sell their receipts at absurd and
ruinous discounts to the Governor, Magistrate or some other government employee....
How can the Spanish government expect that the natives are happy with them or
(although I suppose they are the most patient people in the world) desirous of remaining
under the Spanish rule which so far from being as they pretend, a civilized and
enlightened one, renders the natives in some districts worse than slaves, in as much as
that slaves are always provided with the main necessities of life whilst on the other hand
the Philippine system at present in vogue tends to deprive them of both food as well as
liberty. (Acting British Consul Oswald Coates, 1873, cited in Cushner, 1971, 203)

The emergence of the Philippines as an agricultural export economy had two important
features. Firstly, it was conducted by, and for the benefit of, foreign trading companies, with
little or no benefit accruing to the mass of the indigenous population. Only higher status natives
and mestizos benefited, leading to the development of a rural landed 'gentry' and an urban
professional middle class, some of whom grew wealthy enough to educate their children in
European universities. The other group that continued to profit were Chinese traders who acted
as middlemen in the export trade and where thus scattered through the provinces.

Secondly, this colonial economy had a definite geography, with various regions
incorporated into the world economy in different ways through different products and systems of
production. Thus McCoy argues that even as the colonial economy was being drawn ever more
closely into the world system, it was not in the form of a regional hierarchy with Manila acting as the gateway to the outside, but rather as parts of a network of relationships at different scales (McCoy, 1982: 12-13).

Most of the economic changes in the early decades, and even centuries, of colonization were experienced only in the hinterland of Manila. There, colonial rule was being exerted through a tribute tax, compulsory labour, and the forced purchase of agricultural products. Local datus became cabezas de barangay and were exempt from these obligations, thus providing a local comprador class that buttressed Spanish authority. For the rest of the population, however, these obligations meant that agricultural production had to be intensified to avoid starvation. The cultivated area also increased as Manila's hinterland became its granary. Some, however, simply left the oppression of rural life and migrated to the city, leading to a stream of rural-urban migration and the rapid growth of the capital.

The growth in demand with the city's expansion made agriculture more lucrative and the provinces around Manila became prime agricultural land. Land concentration continued and by the eighteenth century Catholic religious orders were the largest landowners around Manila. These friar estates produced sugar, rice, fruit, tobacco and other crops, while the institution of private property meant that farmers themselves became tenants or farm labourers (Caoili, 1988). Tagalog opposition to the impositions of their friar-landlords led to periodic peasant unrest culminating in an agrarian revolt in 1745. This anti-clerical theme was also the basis of the more concerted and successful revolt based on nationalistic aspirations in 1896.

4.3.2 Social Structure and Government

In the late sixteenth century, Legazpi was able to bring large areas of the islands under Spanish control and in many places this was done without resorting to force. Instead, effective control was established through the work of missions and through the governor's application of diplomacy to take advantage of the disunity and rivalry between native rulers (Caoili, 1988).
The Spanish did not attempt to reorder the existing social hierarchy but instead coopted it to act as the local colonial government. Existing *datus* became the *principalia* class from which officials were chosen. The power of the few was further enhanced as the Spanish implemented a policy of *reduccion* in which dispersed settlements were amalgamated into towns and the population was forcibly resettled around the municipal hall and church. This facilitated a more intrusive form of colonial government.

*Datus* were eager to take advantage of the new concepts of alienable private property, title deeds and other novel legal instruments in order to enhance their wealth. Religious orders and private speculators, meanwhile, were in need of the land which the *datus* readily supplied - from their own usufruct holdings, that of their families and slaves, and from uncultivated land in the barangays (Scott, 1994). In addition, many communal areas simply became parts of land grants made by the Spanish crown to wealthy Spaniards, native *principales*, and religious orders.

But beneath the imposed authority of the Spanish, an antecedent system of power relations continued to operate at a local level. Dynasties descended from datus dominated regional political economies and in many cases had a strong vested interest in the continuation of colonial rule. Colonial rule both solidified their power and legitimized its extension. A new hierarchy of administration was imposed by the Spanish that superseded but also incorporated traditional systems of authority. Figure 1 illustrates that hierarchy.
In addition, a social hierarchy organized along racial lines developed and became integrated with the administrative and economic hierarchy. That hierarchy established the level of social mobility in the colonial system (Figure 2).

But the most telling aspect of the changes wrought by the Spanish was not simply the rigidification of the existing social structure according to European notions of power and subordination. More powerful still was the way in which the preexisting social hierarchy was
extended far beyond the existing level of the datu to reach a regional, national and global level through municipalities, provinces, colony and the throne of Spain. The scale at which power was exercised had thus been telescoped to the global, with local ruling elites buying into this system because of their vested interest in the consolidation of power and exemption from the duties that the colonists were in a position to insist upon - namely, corvee labour, tribute and forced purchase of agricultural goods.

4.3.3 Religion

A defining goal of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines was the conversion of the native population to Catholicism. Even Legazpi had brought a team of Augustinian missionaries for this purpose in 1565 (Caoili, 1988). But the relationship between church and state was a complex one. Under a papal edict of 1508, Pope Alexander VI had granted the Spanish throne the rights of church patron and conferred responsibility for the conversion of natives in the New World. The rights of the patron to appoint bishops and secular priests was not formally a part of this agreement with the Vatican but it became standard practice. This gave considerable influence to the Spanish state in the Philippines and the church was closely implicated in colonial control. The religious orders - Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits - however, were less influenced by the crown, a fact which led to frequent disagreements and conflicts (Cushner, 1971). The state was, however, dependent on the missionary orders to extend colonial power into the remote rural areas of the colony and so a balance of power was usually maintained.

The evangelization process spread outwards from Manila and extended to Cagayan in the north and Zamboanga in the South. Missionaries used native languages as the medium for teaching the church's doctrines, but limitations of vocabulary meant that Spanish words were used for key theological concepts. The result seems to have been that foreign concepts became incorporated into local understandings but only *through* those local imaginations. Thus it
appears that the native population interpreted the pillars of Catholic theology through the prism of their own worldviews and beliefs. Vincente Rafael (1988) argues that this was particularly true in the case of ideas such as conversion, submission, hierarchy and exchange which were translated by the Spanish through indigenous cultural concepts such as hiya (shame) and utang na loob (debt of gratitude). The result was that "attempts to subordinate Tagalog idioms of reciprocity to Christian concepts were problematic and inconclusive" (Rafael, 1988, 123). Ultimately, then, it seems that Tagalogs and others managed to circumscribe, at least in the early colonial era, the subordination that the Spanish attempted to impose:

To the Spanish demand that converts make their bodies speak the language of God, the Tagalog converts responded by performing token payments designed to appease the figure of authority and deflect the force of hierarchy. They eluded the interiorization of the interrogative language of the Law carried by the insistent voice of the dominant other. (Rafael, 1988, 135)

The process of conversion was therefore a rather partial one and Christianity was adopted in a form hybridized with local practices. One must be suspicious at the ease with which the Spaniards accumulated both 'sovereignty' and 'converts' to Catholicism. Given the very different understanding of power, authority and spirituality among native people, it seems likely that the easiness of the task reflected the fact that the Spaniards' requirements for pledges of allegiance and faith meant little to the local people. Rafael provides a convincing argument that this is because native notions of a debt of gratitude were based on an ongoing relationship of indebtedness in which the debt is never fully repaid, for example to one's mother. The whole concept of power and subordination is therefore different. Similarly, Rafael points out that the word tauad (or tawad - to bargain, haggle or evade) represents the Tagalog translation of confession or pleading for forgiveness. Clearly the implication is that one bargains with the figure of authority (ultimately, God) for forgiveness and salvation, a notion that would have scandalized the Spanish friars. Several accounts also suggest that worship of ancient gods and the continuation of pagan festivals and rituals was widespread for several centuries after
conquest (Cushner, 1971). Even in the late twentieth century, Catholicism has not eradicated apparently incompatible beliefs in witchcraft, spirits and the power of talismans (Lieban, 1967).

Like the secular government, the Spanish clergy imposed a particular conception of social hierarchy. Through church administration and theological doctrine, the laity learned that authority resided elsewhere. Starting with local priests the hierarchy spread upwards to bishops and the Archdiocese of Manila but ended with the Spanish crown and the Pope. An entirely new and 'globalized' hierarchy was imposed upon the native population. In its most insidious form, this hierarchy was evident in the use of language. Rafael notes that while native tongues were used by missionaries, Spanish was retained as an elite language not to be used by locals. Throughout the colonial period, although Spanish words were used in Filipino dialects - most significantly for the holiest of religious concepts that missionaries did not feel could be translated 'downwards' - Spanish remained the language of the elite. Beyond Spanish there was Latin, the language of the senior clergy and learned laity.

Thus in both church administration and in cultural translation, an implicit hierarchy was established that placed native ways of life at the bottom and privileged those brought from, and dictated by, the outside. It would perhaps be overstating the point if this feature of colonialism were too directly linked with contemporary deferral to, and privileging of, Western culture, but it seems that at least some of the current authority that a globalization discourse draws upon consists in the sense of hierarchy established through linguistic, moral and religious aspects of colonialism.

4.3.4 Gender Relations

In a process closely linked to the changes occurring in political, economic and spiritual life, gender identities were also being reworked by colonialism. The codification of a pre-existing social structure to comply with more rigid Spanish ideas of social hierarchy led to the exclusion of women from administrative posts. Thus positions from household head to cabeza
de barangay to gobernadorcillo were the sole preserve of men. At the same time, the co-optation of male labour left women with greater responsibility in the home and in subsistence production. The private sphere was closed off more tightly from the public, and women were firmly forced into the former. This is not to suggest that gender did not play an important role in defining identities prior to colonization, but the constant implicit inferiority of women was not a characteristic of indigenous gender systems (Eviota, 1992, 44). Instead, a complementarity of roles had existed based on gender, and included positions of considerable power for women, for example as babaylanes or spiritual media.  

Many Spanish ideas regarding gender relations were reflected, and perhaps even rooted, in the nature of femininity propagated by the Catholic church. The image of the Virgin Mary was a powerful one (Marian cults still exist in the Philippines) and defined womanhood through the roles of virtuous handmaid and mother. Thus the identity of Filipina women was emphatically derived from, and practiced in, the home, and was constructed as inferior to their husbands. 

Additionally, in femininity, as in other aspects of social and economic life, colonialism established a hierarchy. Lower status women would have to work to contribute to the support of their family, as they always had, but a new ideal of femininity became established by Filipina women of greater means. A focus on the home and the family became established as the model of the woman as a bourgeois lady, removed from the public sphere of administration and economics. The embodiment of this model was the figure of Maria Clara, a central character in the novels of Jose Rizal (Eviota, 1992). In the form of Maria Clara, "centuries of economic, political and religious impositions had transformed the lively sexual assertiveness of Filipino women into a more prudish, cautious image of womanhood" (Eviota, 1992, 61).  

In summary, several points emerge concerning the legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. Firstly, the experience tightly restricted economic expansion and when resource development did occur it was conducted by European and North American trading houses investing in export commodities. The result was a lasting legacy of dependence on selling
primary products in volatile world markets. Secondly, colonialism led to the formation of an elite social class with a vested interest in continued outside involvement. Existing hierarchies were both rigidified and extended to form a social structure that reached ultimately to the Spanish crown as the font of power. Thirdly, the colonial experience produced a profound and yet partial absorption of European practices and beliefs. Finally, the Spanish attempted to establish a cultural hierarchy privileging the outside and foreign. This was evident in religious, racial, gender and linguistic relations.

4.3.5 The Rise of Filipino Nationalism

By the late nineteenth century, the commercialization of agriculture and the excesses of the colonial and religious regimes had brought poverty to many areas of the country, and particularly to the more comprehensively colonized area around Manila where estates owned by religious orders kept farmers in a state of tenancy. But rural disaffection alone cannot explain the surge of nationalism and revolt that expelled the Spanish. A rebellion that depended upon the mobilization of the rural and urban masses required more than simply oppressive conditions against which to rally - Spanish rule had been punctuated on several occasions over the centuries by rural unrest and banditry (Sturtevant, 1976). What was needed for successful rebellion was a subversive vocabulary with which to challenge Spanish rule at a conceptual and cultural level. In this sense the seeds of rebellion were sown by the colonial power itself. In the case of largely illiterate rural Filipinos, Ileto (1979) argues that it was the folk Catholicism that emerged from the fusion of evangelization and pre-existing beliefs, especially in the form of Passion plays during Holy Week, that fueled a subversive imagination. The story of Christ's trial and crucifixion became an allegorical folk tale inspiring resistance. Christian teaching had therefore become divorced from church institutions and it was against the latter that much of the rural unrest was focused. At the same time, there were movements, for example that led by Gregorio Aglipay, which sought to establish indigenous churches, and a widespread disaffection with the
lack of opportunities provided to Filipino Catholic priests who were being denied parishes controlled by priests from the religious orders (Agoncillo and Alfonso, 1961).

While such unrest grew in the middle and late nineteenth century in rural areas, wealthier Filipinos were able to send their children to European universities. There, a new class of Filipino intellectuals, known as *ilustrados* or enlightened ones, was absorbing liberal ideas and developing a notion of Filipino nationalism in the European sense. Ironically, many of the early Filipino nationalist writings were composed in Barcelona or Madrid (Agoncillo and Alfonso, 1961). The most distinguished of the *ilustrados* was the polymath Jose Rizal whose novels satirized the pomposity and irrelevance of the Spanish church and colonial regime.

The events that led up the rebellion of 1896 were complex but two events served to intensify anti-Spanish and anti-clerical feelings. The first was the execution in 1872 of three Filipino priests who had been advocating the secularization of parishes (that is, their transfer from friars to Filipino priests). Their martyrdom galvanized opposition and when events in the 1890s led to the execution of Jose Rizal in 1896 and the subsequent reign of terror against his associates, a coalition of ilustrados, rural leaders and peasants effectively gained control of much of the country (Steinberg, 1987).

The eventual Spanish collapse, however, was related as much to geopolitics as to local resistance. Spanish financial and military resources were concentrated in the war with the United States, which had its focus in Cuba and the Caribbean, rather than on the Philippines. In the conclusion to the war, the fate of the Philippines was sealed in the Treaty of Paris without any Filipinos present. For control of the colony the US government paid $20 million and between 1899 and 1902 waged a brutal repression of Filipino nationalist forces.

4.4 "Hi Joe" - America's Colonial Experiment

One consequence of being a Caucasian in the rural Philippines is that one is invariably assumed to be American - a missionary, or perhaps a Peace Corps volunteer. In this way one
experiences first-hand the ambivalence and complexity of the relationship between the Philippines and the US. While Spanish colonialism lingers as a legacy, American imperialism, even five decades after independence, still reverberates through Filipino life.

"Hi Joe, What's your name?" is the customary greeting from Filipino youths to assumed Americanos. It immediately suggests certain things about the nature of American colonial rule in the Philippines. Firstly, and most obviously, the greeting is delivered in English, indicating the influence the American regime was able to exert on popular education in the space of a few decades. While the Spanish had retained their language for themselves and for the local elites, the Americans set about developing a comprehensive countrywide education system, and establishing English as the lingua franca of their new territory. American rule likewise left its mark on other areas of public service provision, notably government and healthcare. The friendly familiarity of the greeting also implies a degree of affection for the US. Certainly, the American colonial project is often seen as distinct from others in that from the beginning it was represented as a high-minded, although highly patronizing, presence. But the amiability in the greeting veils a more complex relationship. Often, from adolescents or adults, its tone seems to take on a harsher edge. It implies more a challenge than a salutation. Will the 'Americano' respond in an equally cheery manner, or will he ignore the greeting and continue, aloof and superior? Will he deign to talk, or will he exhibit that superiority that makes him and what he represents so distasteful and yet at the same time so appealing? Such is the ambivalence and complexity in Filipino relations with the West and with the US in particular. Conscious of this complexity, I will highlight three main themes in American colonialism that are germane to this chapter: the forging of economic dependence; the establishment of new political and social structures; and, the reworking of cultural understandings through the educational system.
4.4.1 American Colonialism and Economic Dependence

The early American regime in the Philippines was keen to divert trade in commodities to the US market, but showed little interest in reshaping the basic structure of its colony's economy (Owen, 1971). Indeed US tariff policy deepened the dependence of the Philippine economy on a small number of agricultural exports. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 led to virtually free trade with the continental United States. American manufactured goods were imported duty free and Philippine commodities such as sugar, abaca and coconut oil passed freely into the growing US market. Tariffs were, however, applied to Philippine manufactured exports with more than 20 per cent non-Philippine content.

The depression of the 1920s and 1930s changed the economic context of US relations with its colony. Quotas were imposed on agricultural goods such as sugar, cigars, cordage and coconut oil through the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. Beyond these quotas, import duties would be charged. The duty-free quotas were intended to be phased out with the move towards political independence, but in practice lasted until 1974.

It is important to recognize that these American policies towards the Philippines were a complex mixture of vested interests and an ingenuous belief that they represented the best interests and will of the Filipino people. The vested interests at work were the lobbies representing American manufacturers and agricultural producers who favoured free export of goods and restricted importation of products respectively, and the Filipino landholding elite who had, by the end of the Spanish period, amassed considerable wealth. The interest of the Filipino elite was in continued access to the immensely profitable US market and these views were heard by the US authorities. They were joined by a growing lobby of American business interests in the Philippines. Given the almost non-existent state of Philippine export manufacturing at that time there was no constituency calling for greater protection from imported manufactured goods. Nor was there any politically powerful voice calling for a more equitable distribution of land holdings. The American ideal of the manifest destiny of frontier expansion and a benign
civilizing mission might have underpinned the colonial experiment, but it certainly did not extend to ensuring that the Jeffersonian model of small independent farmers replaced the tenancy model inherited from the Spanish. Even in the case of the appropriated religious estates in Cavite, little was done to prevent them falling into the hands of already powerful local families (Endriga, 1970).

What emerges then, is a picture of the American regime motivated by both self interest and altruism. Self interest in ensuring a supply of agricultural commodities and dumping manufactured goods in the Philippines, and altruism in the belief that in doing so they were acting benignly and according to the wishes of the Filipino people. But the Filipino people with a voice were exactly those with a vested interest in the arrangement that developed. Little wonder, then, that many in the Filipino elite saw no particular advantages in seeking independence from the US and that letting go of the 'special relationship' was a slow process.

The result was that in the end, US rule had little structural effect on the economy of the Philippines. In the 1890s, as in the 1930s and the 1950s, the economy was characterized by: "[over]dependence on a few exports, tenancy, indebtedness, low productivity, corruption and inefficiency, undercapitalization, [and] miserable working conditions" (Owen, 1971, 55). In 1946, political independence was granted to a country firmly dependent on agricultural exports, with just four crops accounting for nearly 90 percent of all Philippine exports (as they had in 1894). The profits from such exports - and it was an immensely lucrative trade - were concentrated among a small number of elite families.

4.4.2 Colonial Government and Society

A second feature of US colonialism that yielded greater change than economic policy was the nature of political and social organization that was installed. Like the Spanish, the Americans did not neglect to notice that a class structure already existed and they drew upon its upper echelons for government officials. The result was that the voices that the Americans heard were
those of the elite. This doesn't necessarily exonerate the American regime from responsibility for the continuing extreme poverty in many parts of the islands. But it goes some way towards explaining why a regime ostensibly based on high-minded ideals could pursue policies so contrary to the interests of so many.

In the early years of colonial rule local elections were initiated, in line with the 'enlightened' American mission to train their Filipino counterparts for self-government. But the institution of elected office was grafted onto a circumstance of highly unequal economic and social power relations and an authoritarian political culture. The result was that local democracy served solely to entrench the power of economic elites in the political sphere (Doronila, 1992; Cullinane, 1971). Local political dynasties were able to perpetuate their control with the added legitimacy afforded by 'democratic' principles. Just as had occurred under Spanish rule, local elites were able to use the influence, ideas and institutions of outsiders to entrench their own power.

While enfranchising, at least in theory, rural populations, the American political system also made each level of government dependent on higher ones (Lopez, 1966). Just as the Spanish had extended the social and religious hierarchy, so the Americans extended the political pyramid from villages, to municipalities, to provinces, to Manila, and ultimately to Washington. Improvements in communications and transport infrastructure made centralized decision-making feasible and local politicians operated in this system through the centuries-old system of patron-client relationships.

4.4.3 Teaching Modernity

Perhaps the most profound impact of American rule in the Philippines was exercised through the educational system. Golay describes the American-staffed public school system as "a tool for communicating the idea of change to the grass roots of Philippine society.... instrumental in intensifying the Western identification of Filipinos who had been bypassed by the
Spanish cultural impact (Golay, 1961, 409). School history and culture texts, for example, invariably had (and still largely have) a "they-taught-we-learned" presentation in which the Filipino subject "stands naked and in need of being dressed in foreign gear" (Mulder, 1990, 91). The nationalist historian Renato Constantino goes further and suggests that education was a key tool of American colonialism. In a 1966 article entitled 'The Miseducation of the Filipino' he argues that the purpose of the public school system was to train Filipinos to be good colonial subjects, conforming to American ideals:

The new Filipino generation learned of the lives of American heroes, sang American songs, and dreamt of snow and Santa Claus. The nationalist resistance leaders... were regarded as brigands and outlaws. The lives of Philippine heroes were taught but their nationalist teachings were glossed over. (Constantino, 1966, reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, 47)

According to Constantino, the impact of this sort of cultural indoctrination was also felt in the economic sphere. He argues that a generation grew up with a perception of their country based on bucolic rural imagery, for example in the landscape paintings of Amorsolo. This imbued a belief that the Philippines was essentially an agricultural country and destined to remain so. Consumption habits, meanwhile, became oriented towards American manufactured products and the implication of foreign superiority was subtly inculcated: "Our books extolled the Western nations as peopled by superior beings because they were capable of manufacturing things that we never thought we were capable of producing" (Constantino, 1966, reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, 48-9).

In summary, the results of American colonialism were the continued dependence of the Philippine economy on agricultural exports and its domination by an elite landholding oligarchy that had enjoyed a deepening of their control and its legitimation through democratic processes. Thus US power fed into local networks of power. More insidiously, US rule saw a cultural orientation towards the West in identifying modernization as desirable and in defining its
direction. The centralization of political power and the establishment of a public school system, notwithstanding the high ideals of many involved, played an important role in colonizing consciousness. What is now popularly referred to as 'colonial mentality' in the Philippines, together with the difficulties in fostering a nationalist vision of development, can be attributed in part to this legacy.

4.5 The Post-colonial State

Philippine independence in 1946 represented the culmination of a planned transfer of sovereignty starting in 1935 with a Commonwealth government, but interrupted by a destructive wartime occupation by Japanese forces (1942-45). In the years after 1946, as in the years before, American commitment to political self-determination for its former colony was notably higher than to ensuring economic autonomy for the Philippines (Doronila, 1992, 19). Perhaps because independence was achieved without the 'clean break' of a revolutionary struggle, American influence continued to be exercised in a variety of spheres.

Studies of US involvement in the Philippine political economy provide detailed accounts of the postwar period (for example, Doronila, 1992; Hawes, 1987; Boyce, 1993; Cullather, 1994). Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive summary of this literature here, I will use the case of trade and industrial policy to highlight the continuation of a negotiated relationship between the Philippine political economy and outside influences.

Independence had been legislated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1935 in the US Congress, that allowed for a ten year transition in which preferential trading arrangements would end on July 4th 1946. Wartime destruction and the decimation of the Philippine economy, however, led to a reassessment of the situation in the form of the Bell Trade Act of 1946 which was to establish the trading relationship between the two countries for the subsequent 28 years. It dictated free trade until 1954, followed by a gradual increase in tariffs until 1973, when full duties would be imposed. In addition, the Philippines could not impose taxes on exports to the
US, absolute quotas were established on seven important Philippine commodity exports, and the peso exchange rate was fixed to the dollar. Finally, the Act required the Philippines to extend parity rights to US nationals in resource exploitation activities and public utilities (Doronila, 1992). The result of these conditions was to establish a postwar economy that retained its dependence on agricultural commodity export, to continue the dominance of Philippine politics by the landed oligarchy, to ensure US control over significant areas of the economy, and, finally, to allow the US some powerful economic sanctions with which to exercise its influence as political and military 'patron'. It was in this capacity that the US was able to insist on a Military Bases Agreement in 1947 that allowed a continued military presence in the islands.

Given the terms of trade under which the country operated, it was inevitable that a foreign exchange crisis would be precipitated eventually. In 1948, the Philippine government persuaded Harry Truman to assent to exchange and import controls in the form of Republic Act 330, The Import Control Act. Controls were intensified during the 1950s to become an instrument for an import substitution industrialization (ISI) programme (Doronila, 1992). This was less an example of altruism on the part of the US than a reflection of the fragility of the new Philippine state that the Americans worried would collapse and fall into the hands of the communist Huk rebels who were then riding on a wave of rural unrest (Kerkvliet, 1977). Just months before, tumultuous events in China had jolted American policy makers, and they hoped that the Philippines would serve as an example of 'moderate nationalism' in opposition to communism (Doronila, 1992). In achieving some level of economic autonomy, then, the Philippine state was able to play on wider geopolitical concerns.

In addition to quota limits on imports, new import substitution industries enjoyed tax exemptions, liberal credit facilities, and windfall profits due to the over-valued pesos but the programme also provided opportunities for political patronage in the allocation of foreign exchange licences and incentives. A predominantly agricultural economy became reoriented towards packaging, assembly and light manufacturing, with the share of manufacturing in net GDP rising from 10.7 per cent in 1948 to 17.9 per cent in 1960 (Doronila, 1992, 55).
The dominance of export producers, such as sugar planters, was clearly compromised by the ISI programme and several writers frame this period as one of diversification in the Philippine social structure as it divided along sectoral and ethnic lines (Hawes, 1987; Rivera, 1994; Yoshihara, 1985). The economic interests of the elite landowning class, mostly Spanish creoles or Chinese mestizos, became widened to include entrepreneurial manufacturing in the import substitution sector. But the ISI sector also included two other domestic groups. With the passing of the Retail Trade Nationalization in 1953, Chinese entrepreneurs were banned from a sector they had dominated and began to move their capital into manufacturing enterprises. 'Malay Filipinos', meanwhile were also entering the manufacturing sector and taking advantage of preferential access to government resources and privileges (Yoshihara, 1985; Rivera, 1994). Foreign interests, notably American, also entered the domestic manufacturing sector to take advantage of favourable economic opportunities. These interests, benefiting from production behind the new trade barriers, moved away from a political orientation in favour of free trade. At the same time as it satisfied these economic constituencies, the ISI programme also went some way towards meeting the demands of a growing nationalist movement in the country led by politicians and intellectuals such as Claro Recto and Jose Diokno. There was thus both a political and a transnational economic coalition of interests behind import substitution.

By the late 1950s, however, a slowdown in growth occurred as the marginal returns from local assembly of 'knocked-down' manufactured goods began to diminish. A balance of payments crisis also emerged due to the import of machinery, raw materials, tools, parts etc. by ISI industries (Ofreneo, 1995). These circumstances started to increase pressure on the government to move away from trade and exchange controls. But the national and transnational coalition supporting ISI had already grown politically powerful. Thus when decontrol was initiated in 1962 by a newly elected President Macapagal, it was a piecemeal process that represented a compromise between interests. Macapagal had stood on an electoral platform of free enterprise and was under political pressure from the US via the IMF, which was responding to the interests of its export sector. As a result of this external pressure, the peso was devalued
and the system of exchange controls was dismantled, but Macapagal was able to assure the business community that they would still be afforded some protection by a tariff system (Doronila, 1992, 66). Some writers characterize this compromise as having been hammered out between rival groups, but as Rivera (1994) demonstrates, the dominance of elite landed families continued into the manufacturing sector. Thus the conflict was between vested interests of the same groups, rather than between different groups.

Over the subsequent decade of prevarication, a class of professional technocrats emerged with increasing influence. Most notably, the conservative economist Gerardo Sicat was developing a critique of protectionist policies and arguing for the depression of wages to promote industrial expansion, rather than policies of import control. Sicat was later to become an influential member of President Marcos' economic staff and his ideas were largely implemented in the 1970s (Doronila, 1992). Technocrats such as Sicat were not, however, gaining increasing influence simply through the merits of their arguments. During the 1960s the political climate was changing. The oligarchy that had dominated the political and economic life of the country was starting to experience a 'breakdown of cohesion' (Hawes, 1987, 36). The Philippines' foreign exchange crisis in the late 1950s had led to IMF involvement in the economy in the form of policy prescriptions and financial assistance, although first hand accounts suggest that the IMF agenda was being driven largely by US interests (Doronila, 1992, 114). The shift from bilateral relations with the US to dealing with the multilateral international financial institutions was a significant change in the Philippine political context. As Doronila points out:

Against these international and domestic contexts of change, the Philippines' decision to end the regime of controls meant more than a change in strategy to revive the stagnating economy. The policy change opened the Philippines to more diversified sources of intervention in the economy. It broke ground for the introduction of institutions and processes which were to make an impact on the domestic political scene. (Doronila, 1992, 116)

The rising fortunes of Filipino technocrats were one result of this changing context, but despite their preference for an export oriented strategy of development, economic policy during the
1960s remained essentially based on import substitution. Although the peso was devalued and exchange controls were relaxed, tariffs were increased, and tax exemptions and cheap credit were still provided to domestic industry. A significant lesson to be drawn from this is that competing policy prescriptions were played out through the political culture of the Philippine state in a distinctive way. Macapagal was able to garner US and IMF support by devaluing the peso, and yet at the same time, other political pressures meant the retention of many elements of the ISI programme.

Eventually, however, this balancing act proved impossible to sustain and a deteriorating economy and further balance of payments crisis saw deepening involvement from the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF. In addition, a growing constituency of US and Filipino export producers were looking for a more favorable business climate. Thus under Ferdinand Marcos in the late 1960s legislation started to appear that began the process of constructing an export oriented industrial (EOI) development programme: the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 (RA 5186), establishing the Board of Investments and giving preference to investors going into export-oriented production; the Export Incentives Act of 1970 (RA 6135), giving additional incentives to export producers; and the Foreign Business Relations Act of 1970 (RA 5455), that removed restrictions on the repatriation of profits (Ofreneo, 1995).

The decisive factor, however, in establishing an export-oriented industrial policy in the early 1970s was the declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972. The abolition of Congress, and the suppression of labour organizations and dissident intellectuals enabled the President to give his technocrats a free hand in reorienting the economy. But Marcos was careful, even in declaring martial law, to ensure the support of the US government and the IMF. Numerous accounts indicate that he first sought, and received, assurances that such an action would receive no condemnation or retribution from his allies in Washington (Bonner, 1987). In fact, martial law was received with considerable enthusiasm in some quarters. The American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent Marcos the following telegram a few days after martial law was declared:
The American Chamber of Commerce wishes you every success in your endeavours to restore peace and order, business confidence, economic growth and the well being of the Filipino people and nation. We assure you of our confidence and cooperation in achieving these objectives. We are communicating these feelings to our associates and affiliates in the United States. (Reproduced in Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p230)

In the 1970s, Philippine development policy became increasingly oriented towards export production, but the politics of this period are complex. Several different themes have been emphasized in coming to terms with the forces at work in the Philippine political economy at that time. Some choose to portray the period in terms of an emergent transnational technocracy in support of an export-oriented industrialization strategy. Thus there was a domestic, though often foreign trained, technocratic corps whose thinking reflected that of officials with the IMF and World Bank. The constant need for support from these institutions meant that such policies could be forced upon the Philippine government, or rather the constituency within the government in favour of such policies could be strengthened (Broad, 1988).

Another point of view would emphasize the role of economic interests in shaping policy. Domestic and foreign export manufacturers clearly had a strong interest in the sorts of incentives being offered, and producers of primary export commodities favoured a weak peso. Both sectors wished to see a close linking of the domestic economy with international capital flows, but at the same time, the domestic 'merchant class' retained certain elements of a self-interested protectionist position (Koppel, 1990).

Yet another approach is to view the emergence of an EOI regime in terms of the personalized brand of political economy that became predominant during Marcos' martial law regime. Modelled after Korean chaebols or Japanese zaibatsu, Marcos attempted to create agro-industrial conglomerates that would lead the way for Philippine products in the global economy (Ofreneo, 1980; Hawes, 1987). Heading these organizations were close friends and relatives of the President. Supporting the economy, and disguising the system's inefficiencies and corruption, was the flow of money coming from the IMF. This source of outside funding enabled the President and his 'cronies' to insulate themselves effectively from the opposition of those families who were not within his circle of influence and patronage. Added to this was the
continued military, political and financial support being provided by the US. But it is important to note the subtlety with which Marcos managed these outside supporters. While US influence was considerable, Marcos could play a power game in which he emphasized the threat of communist insurgency and played on American fears of losing a non-communist foothold in the region. At the same time, the IMF continued, in a sense, to fool itself that Marcos was implementing the sort of reforms they wanted through the good offices of like-minded technocrats. Marcos was indeed employing a rhetoric that was pleasing to international financial institutions, but in practice the economy was far from an undistorted free market. It was dominated by monopoly marketing boards for export commodities and 'cronies' eliciting preferential treatment from the government. Gary Hawes emphasizes the highly political nature of Marcos' rule:

Ferdinand Marcos, unlike the international actors who supported the Philippine state, was always clear that his interests were not completely synonymous with those of the multinationals, or the US government, or the World Bank/IMF group. His primary goal was to remain in office.... As long as Marcos remained president, he was able to use the coercive and administrative organizations of the state to his own end. He threatened, bluffed and took action whenever possible to see that, while he followed the prescribed path to development, while he enlarged the role that foreign investors could play, he did nothing to endanger his own continued rule. (Hawes, 1987, 152-3)

Marcos' politicization of the economy also provided a tool with which to deal blows to his political enemies. Some of the wealthiest families in the country, most notably the Lopez clan of Negros, were ostracized on account of the political rivalry with Marcos (McCoy, 1994b). Many took refuge abroad, but those who stayed were prevented from taking a leading role in investing in domestic industry. Marcos could do this because foreign rather than domestic capital was the major source of investment generation in the country, allowing him a certain insulation from the landed oligarchs who had dominated the economy to that point. The result, however, of the foreign capital influx in the 1970s, particularly from multilateral agencies, was the accumulation of massive debts (Koppel, 1990).
The unviability of this economic structure meant that the government was continually dependent on flows of credit from the IMF and the World Bank. As a result, the policy prescriptions of these institutions became more deeply entrenched, especially as the World Bank started to attach conditions to its loans under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) established in the late 1970s (Bello et al. 1982; Broad, 1988). The SAP dealt some heavy blows to domestic industry at a time when worldwide recession was also undermining the markets for export commodities. The result was a deep recession in the Philippines and growing social unrest. The assassination of the opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, in 1983 added to the sense of political crisis and eventually resulted in the 'EDSA' revolution of February 1986 in which his widow, Corazon Aquino, was swept to power. Even in his final days in office Marcos was playing on US relations and employing his international connections to attempt to stay in office. His final departure was in a US Navy helicopter.

Before discussing the post-Marcos political economy of the Philippines, some general points can be made concerning the ways in which the preceding discussion connects which the broader themes raised in this chapter. They apply explicitly to the Marcos regime, but as Doronila shows, the tendencies which Marcos took to extremes were already well established in the post-independence Philippine state (Doronila, 1992).

The first point concerns the balance of power between internal and external forces in determining economic policy. Foreign influences have always represented one set of actors playing roles of varying importance on a Philippine stage, but those directing the production remain domestic players. It is misleading to portray this relationship, as it has often been portrayed, as neo-imperialism on the part of the US and multilateral banks - their role has always been mediated by, and dependent upon, a certain constituency of technocrats and vested interests within the Philippines. Equally, however, it would be incorrect to imply that these institutions were in any sense impotent in their dealings with domestic politics. Marcos was a powerful phenomenon and while sometimes impervious to the wishes of his international supporters, he
was ultimately dependent on them. These supporters provided economic aid to 'insulate' the regime from civil society, but also lent ideological support, legitimacy, prestige and military aid to the Philippine government. The relationship between the Philippine state and its international context is therefore a complex dialectic of agency and dependency.

A second point that emerges is the highly personalized nature of politics in the Philippines, even at the highest levels. As Rivera (1994) points out, little can be understood of the post war Philippine political economy without reference to the web of connections that joins certain groups of families and divides others. In attempting to characterize the Philippine political economy many have employed the 'patron-client' metaphor to indicate the nature of cultural understandings that underpin personal loyalties and a 'moral economy' of political largesse (Hollnsteiner, 1963). Recently, the notion of 'bossism' has been suggested as a more accurate portrayal of the realities of political-economic power at provincial and national scales (Sidel, 1995; McCoy, 1994a).

Thirdly, various overlapping interest groups form the cast of actors who compete to define political priorities. Classifications are numerous but they include: Chinese capitalists / ISI bourgeoisie / local landlord class / foreign capitalists (Rivera, 1994); mercantile state / merchant capital / land-owning class / international capital (Koppel, 1990); domestic Chinese capital / Filipino capital / foreign capital (Yoshihara, 1985); state capitalists / crony capitalists / domestic market bourgeoisie / export market bourgeoisie (Hawes, 1987). Each of these categories might be broken down further, and others might be added (for example, Filipino technocrats from the 1960s onwards), but the important point to note is the cultural, ethnic and political complexity of the Philippine economy. Each change in the direction of development strategy has been derived from struggles within and between these groups as they try to define their best interest and attempt to ensure that it is acted upon. The outcome of these struggles is thus a mixture of structural conditions, institutional constraints, economic sociology and individual agency. Over the last ten years the result of such a mix of factors has been the formation of a solid coalition espousing the importance and even inevitability of orienting the
state's development strategy towards attracting investment and promoting export-oriented development.

4.6 Contemporary Philippine Development

In retrospect, the lasting achievement of the Aquino government was to reestablish democratic processes in the Philippine political system and to go some way towards restoring international confidence in the government. But the 'People Power' revolution of 1986 did not produce the sort of social justice agenda for which many of its participants had hoped. Instead, many of the same figures continued in power, and in a sense the events following the EDSA uprising represented a reversion to the old system of landed oligarchs that Marcos had gone some way towards undermining (Anderson, 1988). Elections for local governments and Congress in 1988 returned most of the Marcos era caciques to power and Congress was overwhelmingly dominated by landed elites (Guttierez, 1993). Despite distortions in the democratic process, Aquino maintained a fervent faith in its sanctity and so failed to use her extensive administrative powers to act on social reform in 1986-88. Thus, for example, agrarian reform was deferred to a Congress dominated by land owners and its redistributive component was comprehensively undermined (Riedinger, 1995).

Aquino's government was constantly under threat from a restless army and survived numerous coup attempts, while trying to contain the insurgency movement organized by the New People's Army. These military threats, combined with economic fragility meant continued reliance on political and economic support from the US and multilateral institutions. The government therefore continued to profess a neoliberal economic framework of faithful debt servicing, reduced expenditure, deregulation and export-oriented development.

The Ramos government (1992-98) has persisted with these policies, achieving considerable success in establishing political stability through closer control over the military, an
amnesty for rebels and negotiated peace with the NPA, and settlements with Muslim secessionists in Mindanao. Since 1992 economic indicators have portrayed a booming economy as foreign investments flow inward and exports expand. The wisdom of the development orthodoxy is now firmly entrenched among conservative Philippine economists and government officials (Balisacan, 1994; Habito, 1993). Chapter 5 will outline the ways in which the Philippine government has gone about realizing such a strategy over the last few years.

4.7 Constructing Global Imaginaries

What can be gleaned from this selective précis of Philippine history? Firstly, it is evident that an economy and cultural consciousness oriented towards globalization can be traced to the legacies of colonial rule. In a variety of ways both Spanish and American regimes fostered an economy geared towards the export of primary commodities and the import of manufactured goods. Meanwhile, Filipinos were inundated with social and cultural hierarchies culminating not locally but in Madrid, Rome or Washington, and with images of the West as superior. All conducive cultural groundwork, as Constantino argues, for a development policy agenda dominated by the privileging of the global scale. At one level, then, the historical account in this chapter suggests some of the foundations of a contemporary political discourse predicated on globalization. But other themes also emerge that are germane to the key arguments outlined in chapters 1 and 2.

First, in addition to dependent trade and 'colonial mentality', a significant legacy of colonialism was an entrenched social structure, latterly legitimized by democratic processes and based on land ownership. Throughout the colonial period, precisely because they derived their wealth and prestige from it, this oligarchy of families carried a vested interest in the type of
economy being established. Thus the globalization of the Philippines was not simply by colonial fiat, but was achieved with the collaboration of the local elite. Indeed a recurrent theme is the appropriation of outside power for domestic interests in the Philippines. In the second half of the twentieth century the social structure and economic interests of the domestic elite became more complex, but still development policy was defined through an articulation between outside influences and domestic political-economic interests. At a national level, then, the roots of globalization must be viewed as embedded in 'local' power relations rather than just the power of the outside actor.
CHAPTER FIVE

PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIALIZATION: POLICY, PERFORMANCE & PLACE

5.1 Introduction

I have argued that over the last few decades the Philippines' "place in the world" has been constructed from within a national and international arena of political contestation. The result of these struggles has emerged as an emphasis on a 'globalized' model of development in which growth is predicated upon foreign investment flows and export-oriented industrialization. Meanwhile the agricultural sector is becoming increasingly geared towards agri-business production, and national food security is declining. This chapter explores the results of the globalized model of development in terms of government policies, economic performance and the geography of economic development.

The first half of the chapter focuses on the translation of the 'globalization' model into policies employed by the Philippine government, and the performance of these policies in terms of industrial growth. The discussion is divided into two periods: 1966-1986, and 1986-1996. For each period I describe: the policy instruments used in promoting industrial development; the less tangible appeals to global capital in the form of 'place marketing' campaigns; and, the performance of industrial development. The data presented suggest that the Philippine economy has become increasingly dependent on foreign capital and on export-oriented industries. It is also evident that such capital is highly vulnerable to domestic political conditions (i.e. stability) and to world economic cycles. In the second half of the chapter I examine the spatial dimensions of economic policy, arguing that the 'globalized' model of development has resulted in an economic geography of industrialization characterized by a spatial concentration in the existing core region around Manila, and particularly in its adjacent provinces. The locations referred to in this and subsequent chapters are featured in Maps 1 and 2.
Map 1 - The Philippines

Northern Luzon
Baguio City EPZ

Central Luzon

Metro Manila (National Capital Region)
Bataan EPZ

Tagalog

Bicol

Southern Visayas

Western Visayas

Sulu Sea

Mindanao

Eastern Visayas

Cebu City EPZ

Erdon Visayas

Davao City

Philippine Sea

China Sea

Metro Manila

China Sea

Philippine Sea

Philippines

Map Area

Indonesia

Malaysia
5.2 The Emergence of Export-Oriented Development 1966-86

5.2.1 Policies

Early efforts at export promotion included the various pieces of legislation mentioned in the last chapter: the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 (Republic Act 5186); the Export Incentives Act of 1970 (RA 6135); and the Foreign Business Relations Act of 1970 (RA 5455) (Ofreneo, 1995). The incentives provided by these policies are summarized in Appendix E. The Board of Investments, established by the 1967 legislation, offered a broad range of tax incentives to export producers including tax credits on raw materials and imported capital equipment. The Export Incentives Act extended these benefits with a ten year tax holiday on most materials and capital goods used in manufacturing and processing.

These incentives were largely designed to match those offered elsewhere in East Asia. Strategies employed by Taiwan and South Korea, in particular, provided models for several policy initiatives in the early years of the Marcos government. A particularly successful example of foreign investment and export promotion was found in the export processing zone (EPZ) established in Kaoshiung, Taiwan in 1965 (Guerrero et al. 1987). The Taiwanese zone provided infrastructure and incentives for global capital spreading towards the periphery under the 'new international division of labour' and became a model of 'open' development among international institutions such as the UNIDO, UNCTAD and World Bank. In 1969 President Marcos established the Philippines' first EPZ (through RA 5490) in the town of Mariveles on the mountainous Bataan peninsula northwest of Manila. Insufficient funds and support hampered initial development of the site and only when martial law was declared in 1972 did further development occur. With Marcos fully in control, and with his team of technocrats able to implement their strategies unhindered for the first time, Presidential Decree 66 established the Export Processing Zones Authority to oversee Bataan and to develop other zones elsewhere in the country. The Mactan EPZ, near Cebu City in the Visayas, was designated at the request of the local government and established in 1978 (Guerrero, 1987; Chant and McIlwaine, 1995).
The Baguio City EPZ in northern Luzon followed in 1979 (PD 1825), but the impetus in this case came largely from the US semiconductor manufacturer Texas Instruments. The Cavite EPZ, just to the south of Manila was designated in 1980 under Presidential Decrees 1980 and 2017, and construction started in 1981 (McAndrew, 1994). By locating in these zones, firms were eligible to benefit from a variety of financial incentives, simplified regulatory frameworks, and established infrastructure and services.

The more concerted focus of the Marcos regime, however, was on the export of primary commodities through monopoly marketing boards (Hawes, 1987). Establishing state corporations to export coconuts, sugar and fruit products, satisfied several goals: firstly, export conglomerates were intended to play a role similar to that of the industrial chaebols in Korea by participating in a diverse range of activities but with commodity export as their base; secondly, by taking a firm grip on the agricultural export sector, Marcos was able to control the source of wealth on which many of his opponents in the landed oligarchy depended (in addition, the suspension of the Congress, which they had dominated, effectively curtailed their formal political influence); finally, control over the export conglomerates provided lucrative patronage appointments for loyal supporters.

Despite an avowed belief in export promotion, the 1970s also saw a continued adherence to some aspects of import substitution strategies due to local political expediencies (Ofreneo, 1995). Examples included regulations concerning the nationality of ownership in certain sectors of the economy and tariff protection for certain goods. The development of the auto industry in the Philippines illustrates this synthesis of conflicting policy directions. The Progressive Car Manufacturing Plan, initiated in 1973, sought to rationalize the Philippine auto industry which, to that point, had been characterized by the import of Complete Knocked-Down (CKD) units for local assembly (in 1968 there were 19 such assemblers). The government invited bids for membership in the Plan which would allow for just two manufacturers, but due to intense
lobbying by the industry this was finally increased to five (Tolentino and Ybanez, 1983). The Plan provided a framework that essentially encouraged import substitution and export simultaneously. Local assemblers were required to meet a specific local content quota, but at the same time, this quota could be written off by export receipts. In the event, many firms bypassed the regulations by importing the parts they needed and avoiding penalties by contracting trading companies to export other products in their name. In this way, the 1970s saw General Motors exporting furniture and Toyota shipping shrimp from the Philippines (Doner, 1991; 1992). The PCMP was a failure in terms of technology transfer and industrial linkages, and by the mid-1980s most of the participants had withdrawn from local production. The program is illustrative, however, both of the ambivalence in economic policy with respect to export versus import-substitution strategies, and of the context of domestic politics and personal patronage that characterized economic policy in the 1970s.

5.2.2 Place Marketing

In addition to fiscal and regulatory incentives aimed at foreign investment and export promotion, the Marcos government also embarked upon aggressive marketing campaigns to represent the country as a 'desirable' node in the global matrix of travel and investment opportunities. A few months after martial law was declared in 1972, Fortune magazine carried the following advertisement placed by the Philippine government:

To attract companies...like yours... we have razed mountains, felled jungles, filled swamps, moved rivers, relocated towns, and in their place built power plants, dams, roads... an executive centre and a luxury hotel. All to make it easier for you and your business to do business here. And we've done more. Much more.24

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23 The Ford Motor Company was particularly aggressive in lobbying to keep its Philippine operations, sending Christina Ford to intercede with Imelda Marcos, and promising to invest in the Mariveles EPZ.
This piece was specifically directed towards potential investors in the Bataan EPZ, but advertisements in subsequent years emphasized the country's broader appeal and reiterated the government's willingness to put in place everything necessary to satisfy foreign capital:

Recent Presidential decrees have simplified conciliation and arbitration of labour disputes (both strikes and lockouts are prohibited), lifted work restrictions on Sundays and holidays, liberalized the employment of women and children, and expanded the scope of the apprenticeship program.

Labour costs for the foreign company setting up plant in Manila could work out from 35 to 50 percent lower than they would be in either Hongkong or Singapore...

The country is lovely. And loaded. Beneath the tropical landscapes of our 7,000 islands lies a wealth of natural resources... (New York Times, July 28th, 1974, cited in Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, 227)

At the same time the government, largely through the activities of Imelda Marcos in her capacity as Governor of Metro Manila, pushed through a variety of urban mega-projects in a successful attempt to attract high-profile world events, such as the 1974 Miss Universe beauty pageant and the 1976 IMF/World Bank conference. The purpose was to establish Manila as a 'world-class' city. Most infamous among these projects were the concrete modernist monuments constructed on reclaimed land in Manila Bay: the Philippine International Convention Centre, the Folk Arts Theatre, the National Film Centre and the Cultural Centre of the Philippines (Pinches, 1994).

5.2.3 Performance

As the example of the Progressive Car Manufacturing Plan suggested, the government's inclinations towards free trade in the 1970s were always tempered by self-interest and domestic politics. The choice of Bataan as a location for the first Export Processing Zone was a classic piece of personalized politics. At the tip of a mountainous peninsula, the site had no obvious locational advantages, except that it served to benefit a close Marcos ally in whose political bailiwick the project was located (Guerrero et al., 1987). By the end of the 1970s, it became clear that the zone was not performing as expected. Between 1972 and 1977, 91 per cent of total investment in the Bataan zone was from domestic, not foreign sources (Warr, 1984). The
maximum number of companies operating in the zone at any one time was 56, but turnover was rapid and between 1972 and 1985, 45 enterprises pulled out (Guerrero et al., 1987). Other zones did not fare much better. By 1986, the Baguio, Mactan and Cavite zones together housed just 19 firms and employed less than 8,000 workers. In the period 1973-1978, EPZs accounted for just 1.6 per cent of foreign investments and by 1979-1984 this had fallen to 1.3 per cent (Guerrero et al., 1987, 36). Table 1 shows the trend in EPZ employment levels over the course of their existence.

Table 1 - Employment Generation in Philippine Export Processing Zones, 1973-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bataan</th>
<th>Baguio City</th>
<th>Mactan</th>
<th>Cavite</th>
<th>Special EZs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,321</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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Sources: Export Processing Zones Authority, unpublished data, 1995; Warr, 1984, 1985; Province of Cavite, unpublished industrial data.
The export processing zones were also disappointing in terms of their local multiplier effects. Data for the Bataan EPZ indicate that domestic raw material usage in 1982 amounted to only 2.9 million pesos - compared with administrative costs for the zone in the same year of 23.5 million pesos (Warr, 1985). For the Bataan EPZ, Warr concludes that "far fewer firms located in the zone than were expected and the form of development which did occur promoted neither economic development nor economic welfare" (Warr, 1985, 43).

Figure 3 includes data on foreign and domestic investment outside of the EPZs for the period until the end of Marcos' rule in 1986. Except for a period of expansion in the early 1980s, investment under incentives programmes was also disappointingly low. This can, in part, be attributed to global economic conditions in the mid- and late-1970s that significantly reduced both investment from, and market demand in, North America, Europe and Japan (McAndrew, 1994). But the decline in foreign investment from 1983 to 1986 suggests the impact of domestic political circumstances. International confidence in the Marcos regime gradually ebbed following the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the realization of a deep crisis of foreign indebtedness. As figure 4 shows, this period was also one of declining trade with the value of exports almost unchanged between 1980 ad 1986.

Other indicators also tell a story of relative economic stasis in the 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 6 shows a declining trend in GDP growth between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, including dramatic contractions in 1984 and 1985 of about 8 per cent in each successive year. These figures were further compounded by a consistently high rate of population growth. If the authoritarian years are compared with those preceding them, GNP per capita per year exhibited a 3.1 per cent expansion in 1962-1974, but only 1.0 per cent over the subsequent 12 years (Boyce, 1993, 23). Estimates of the proportion of the population below the poverty line suggest an incidence of 43.8 per cent in 1971 increasing to 58.9 percent by 1985 (Boyce, 1993, 46).
5.3 Post-Marcos Industrial Strategies, 1986-1996

5.3.1 Policies

The establishment of a new administration under Corazon Aquino resulted in a variety of policy initiatives that firmly focused the government's agenda on attracting foreign investment and encouraging export production (Ferreria et al., 1993). In 1987, the Omnibus Investments Code (Executive Order 226) reworked the financial and regulatory incentives for those establishing manufacturing activities, regional headquarters or warehousing facilities in the Philippines. The code established the current framework in which foreign and domestic investments in 'priority' and export sectors are provided with incentives by the Board of Investments or the Export Processing Zones Authority. The Foreign Investments Act (RA 7042) of 1991 extended regulatory leeway for investors by allowing total foreign ownership of companies except in a few strategic areas. The Act also reduces regulatory control over foreign enterprises that are not receiving incentives, allowing them to be wholly foreign owned, and permits export enterprises receiving incentives to sell up to 40 per cent of production in the domestic market.

A further component of the government's investment incentive framework is the 'Build-Operate-Transfer' (BOT) scheme (RA 7718). Under the scheme, a contractor constructs, operates and maintains a facility for an agreed period of time during which they may charge user fees to recover investment and operating expenses. The facility is then transferred to government ownership. Major projects such as power plants, roads and Manila's Light Rail Transit system have been financed in this way.

The four established export processing zones continue to offer financial benefits, regulatory incentives, land and utilities to export producers but they have been supplemented in the last few years by a variety of Special Economic Zones and private Industrial Estates that share some of the same privileges. In 1995 the Export Processing Zones Authority was
reconstituted as the Philippine Economic Zones Authority to reflect this broadening mandate (RA 7916).

A variety of regional centres and growth areas have also been incorporated into the national government's industrial promotion strategy. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, for example, has created a significant centre for investment using the infrastructure from the Subic Bay US naval base that closed in 1991. Other more dispersed growth corridors/areas have been established with integrated planning frameworks to foster industrial growth. An example is the East Asian Growth Area (EAGA), incorporating Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The EAGA adopts the 'growth polygon' model to bring together capital and other factors of production in a free trade zone, in this case focused on Davao City on Mindanao (Turner, 1995). Another example is the Calabarzon area (see Map 2), incorporating the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon, which has a coordinating council and a physical framework plan to channel foreign assistance and investment into local infrastructure. These explicitly spatial development frameworks will be discussed in more detail later.

Since 1992, the Ramos administration has maintained the Aquino government's commitment to export-led growth and has moved in several ways to extend the incentives offered to foreign investors and exporters. The Export Development Act of 1994 (RA 7844), styled as the "Magna Carta for Exporters," was implemented from the beginning of 1995. In a preamble, the Act dictates that:

The State shall instill in the Filipino people that exporting is not just a sectoral concern but the key to national survival and the means through which the economic goals of increased employment and enhanced incomes can most expeditiously be achieved.25

In support of the legislation, the Speaker of the House of Representatives wrote:

It is no coincidence that South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and other Newly Industrializing Countries which have grown continuously at an average rate of 7% or more, are all export-oriented economies. As I have said, "we produce or we

"Perish, we export or we die" is now an accepted principle that we must seriously consider in the great saga to push the Philippine economy forward.26

The Act reduces the proportion of an 'export' firm's output that must be exported to 50 per cent, thus allowing more companies to claim the set of incentives offered. These incentives include duty free importation of capital goods and tax credits for imported raw materials and inputs and to reward increases in export revenues (see Appendix E). A similar piece of legislation to foster foreign investment is currently being considered by Congress. Deregulation and liberalization policies in the banking, oil and retail sectors form further components of the government's investment promotion agenda, all of which have drawn praise from multilateral financial institutions and creditors.27

These various programmes are coordinated through the government's Medium Term Philippine Development Plan, 1993-98, (MTPDP) but the galvanizing slogan for the programme of reforms has been the President's 'Philippines 2000' vision - the ambitious goal of becoming a 'Newly Industrialized Country' (NIC) by the year 2000. The plan contains many laudable goals - including a stated commitment to 'people empowerment' along with achieving 'global competitiveness' (NEDA, 1995a). But as Alex Magno (1993) points out, the most powerful characteristic of the plan and the vision is as an icon. Like other symbolic political gestures - Mahatir's 'Vision 2020', Suharto's 'New Order' - Philippines 2000 captures an optimistic mood and places the government on the side of positive thinking and the continually deferred dream of better days ahead. The result is that opposition is cast in the role of negativism, defeatism and pessimism (Magno, 1993). The government has even developed its own model of Filipino subjectivity in support of the MTPDP and 'Philippines 2000':

The efforts of communicating the MTPDP/Philippines 2000 have been pushed into a more personal but dynamic dimension through the conceptualization of a modern Filipino role model - Juan Kaunlaran ['Johnny Progress']. As conceived, Juan Kaunlaran is the modern Filipino, empowered and globally competitive, who has risen above the self-deprecating images of the indolent Juan Tamad ['Johnny Lazy'] and the submissive Juan de la Cruz. (NEDA, 1995a, 47)

The MTPDP places a heavy emphasis on global competitiveness, a theme that the president has repeatedly propagated. In his 1995 State of the Nation address, Ramos declared that "we must press on with deregulation and liberalization and bring down the last of our self-imposed barriers to economic growth left over from the age of protectionism".28 Again in his 1996 Ulat sa Bayan (Letter to the Nation) address he emphasizes the point: "There is a new reality that underscores our national life. We are part of a new global economy - in which every nation must compete, if it is to prosper".29

5.3.2 Place Marketing

In addition to the incentives offered to investors and exporters, the government has marketed the less tangible attractions of industrial location in the Philippines. These pronouncements are certainly toned down from the pitch of the martial law period two decades earlier, but some of the themes are the same. Several stand out prominently in the government's 'place-marketing'.

Firstly, the 'strategic' geographical location of the country in the Pacific Asian or Pacific Rim region prompts an appeal to the boosterist tendencies of what Cumings (1993) calls 'Rim-speak'. Spatial metaphors abound, including the 'foothold' or 'gateway' to Asia, the 'heart' of the region, and a 'crossroads' for global flows and Eastern and Western culture.30 As a recent government document on economic strategy noted: "essential to crafting the export-led balanced

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28 'FVR: Roll out carpet for foreign investors', Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25th 1995
30 Examples can be found in the brochures entitled "The Philippines: Back in Business in the Gateway to Asia and the Pacific" (National Economic and Development Authority, 1995b), and, "The Philippines: Your Competitive Advantage" (Board of Investments, nd).
agri-industrialization strategy is a reading of the global environment, with emphasis on our Asian setting" (DTI, no date, 3).

Secondly, the country is marketed as a conducive environment in which to do business with the support of a reliable and cooperative government. As Douglass (1993) points out, global investment decisions are as much about stable and supportive political environments as they are about specific locational incentives. Philippine promotional literature attempts to assure potential investors of the government's commitment:

The Philippines has been steadily and firmly putting in place all the elements needed to become an industrializing country: adoption of open-door policy; a spirited domestic and foreign investments drive; massive infrastructure development; government decentralization; tariff structure rationalization; a flexible exchange rate policy; vigorous export promotion and streamlining of export procedures; and import liberalization. (NEDA, 1995b)

In a recent advertising supplement to Scientific American magazine entitled 'Globally Competitive Philippines', for example, President Ramos' introduction emphasizes "our unwavering commitment to uphold the Western democratic tradition and the institutions founded upon its principle". The government seeks to project its own managerial style as being efficient, modern and attuned to the imperatives of globalization. The APEC summit at Subic Bay in November 1996, for example, was heralded as a tribute to the competency of the Ramos administration and a threshold crossed in terms of global credibility.

Thirdly, promotional literature highlights the attractions of a Filipino workforce as a pool of low-cost, technically competent workers with English language proficiency. In this sense, like the model of 'Juan Kaunlaran' above, the Philippine government seeks to construct a Filipino identity that is attuned to the needs of the globalized economy. The components of this identity occasionally verge on orientalism, emphasizing the "highly trainable" nature of the Filipino workforce. Visual representations of Filipinos in promotional brochures are almost always female and, without exception, take one of two forms. Workers are depicted either seated neatly

31 Scientific American, February 1996, supplement, p3
in row after row of sewing machines, computer terminals or microscopes; or, images evoke "paradise", featuring smiling young women on beaches fringed with palm trees.

5.3.3 Performance

Economic indicators for Aquino's first two years in office were impressive. The removal of Marcos in 1986 brought a wave of new investment and international assistance to the Philippines over the subsequent three years (see Figure 3). In 1989-1992, however, political instability caused by recurrent coup attempts, communist insurgency, and Muslim unrest in Mindanao, combined with a global depression in economic activity, led to a slowdown in Philippine growth. Having expanded to record levels, foreign investment declined between 1990 and 1992, exports and imports levelled off, and GDP actually declined in 1991 (see Figures 3, 4 and 6). Only since 1992 has the national economy begun to perform strongly in terms of aggregate economic indicators in the same way as its neighbours. Substantial amounts of investment capital flowed into the country in 1994, and in 1994 and 1995 GDP was once again growing at around 5 per cent (Figures 3 and 6). Data for 1996 suggest a continuation of this trend with GNP growth in the first quarter of 1996 reaching 6.2 per cent. Estimates for the whole of 1996 place annual growth at 7.1.\textsuperscript{32}

Clearly, numerous factors account for these trends since 1992, and the liberal Foreign Investments Act of 1991 and growing political stability are important. But, equally, longer term trends in foreign investment also show a close adherence to international economic cycles, with pronounced declines in the middle and late 1970s and again in the early 1990s. Similarly, growth in the mid-1990s reflects wider expansionary trends in the world economy and Southeast Asia in

\textsuperscript{32} See National Economic and Development Authority, Internet Site: http://www.ph.net/neda/overall.html
particular. This would suggest that current growth trends are susceptible to future recessionary conditions in the world or regional economy. Furthermore, Philippine vulnerability to international economic trends, while it has always been high (as chapter 4 demonstrated) has evidently increased substantially over the last decade. The ratio of trade to GDP provides a widely-used indicator of openness of an economy to the world system. With a ratio of around 40 per cent, the Philippines now ranks as one of the most 'globalized' economies in the world.\(^{33}\) Future changes in international market demand, exchange rates and relative factor costs will therefore be keenly felt in the Philippine economy.

\(^{33}\) In 1992, the Philippine trade to GDP ratio was 32.5 per cent, which placed the country in 16th place in the world in terms of economic openness (see ‘World Competitiveness Report’, EMF, 1994)
Figure 3 - Investment in the Philippines under Incentives Laws, 1971-1994

Source: NEDA, 1995c
Note: Constant 1990 Value calculated using IMF GDP deflator

Figure 4 - Philippine Exports and Imports, 1966-1995 (at constant 1990 prices)

Note: Constant 1990 values calculated using IMF GDP deflator
Figure 5 - Philippine Trade to GDP Ratio, 1966-1995
\( \frac{\{\text{Exports} + \text{Imports}\}}{2 \times \text{GDP}} \)


Figure 6 - Annual Change in Philippine Real GDP (per cent), 1967-1996

5.4 Spatial Dimensions of Growth

5.4.1 Regional and Urban Policies

Until the 1960s, regional policy was not a significant issue in Philippine development planning (Pernia, 1988). Agricultural processing and export had been dispersed across the various regional economies specializing in different crops, and import-substituting manufacturing was concentrated around the prime market of Manila (McGee, 1967; Pernia and Paderanga, 1983). Only in the 1970s did government policy start to contain an explicitly spatial component, with benefits for regional dispersal being added to the incentives for investment and export production. By locating in certain BOI-designated areas, companies could receive a doubled tax credit for direct labour costs and a tax deduction for the cost and maintenance of infrastructure work undertaken by the firm (Reyes and Paderanga, 1983). Other regional dispersal incentives were effectively provided through the export processing zones, three of which were located well beyond the capital (Bataan, Mactan and Baguio City). Despite these incentives, investment and productive activity in the 1970s continued to be concentrated in the Manila region. Between 1970 and 1977, 73 per cent of firms registered under the Export Incentives Act (RA 6135) were located in Metro Manila, with a further 12 per cent in the two adjacent regions of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog (Reyes and Paderanga, 1983).

In 1973 a further and more explicit regional policy initiative aimed at decongesting Metro Manila was introduced (Reyes and Paderanga, 1983). New manufacturing plants would need a locational clearance from the Ministry of Human Settlements (headed by Imelda Marcos), and there would be a ban on locating within a 50 km radius of Manila (of which Mrs Marcos was the governor). The result of this ban, however, was the location of many factories on the edges of the exclusion zone where they could still take advantage of the transportation infrastructure and market in the capital. Thus in the period 1974-78, 48 per cent of locational clearances were in the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions, and despite the regulations, a further 28 per
cent were exemptions granted to locate within the National Capital Region (Reyes and Paderanga, 1983).

Another explicitly spatial piece of development policy in the 1970s and early 1980s was the establishment of Integrated Area Development Projects. These projects, such as the Bicol River Basin Development Project, were intended to coordinate infrastructure programmes in various regions and direct them towards the requirements of industrial development. Despite these programmes, Pernia and Paderanga (1983) argue that incentives for regional dispersal were outweighed by the implicit concentrating tendencies in export promotion policies. The need to be near government offices, major banks and transportation facilities meant that most firms located within the core region.

Further efforts at administrative and industrial decentralization were undertaken by the Aquino administration. Perhaps the most significant has been the programme of administrative devolution initiated by the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160). Under the code, local government units (municipalities and cities) were granted greatly increased powers in land use classification and planning, thereby allowing them to control a key factor of production. Responsibility for approving development plans for residential subdivisions, commercial premises or industrial estates no longer rests with the National Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, but with local government officials. The result is that municipalities are free to establish industrial zones within their jurisdictions and to try to attract industrial investment. But, since all municipalities have this capability, it is those with adequate infrastructure and with the closest links to transportation and communications facilities that can benefit. The result has been that municipalities closest to Manila have been most successful in this respect.

The BOI incentives outlined earlier also incorporate a regional component through the provision of further incentives for industrial location in depressed areas (Lamberte et al. 1993, 33). But as Herrin and Pernia (1986) demonstrated on the basis of a survey of 100 corporations, the principal locational factors for export-oriented companies are transportation, power,
communications and land and physical plant availability. These factors appeared to outweigh any fiscal advantages offered to locate in peripheral regions.

Another form of regional dispersal policy has been pursued through the Export Processing Zones, and, more recently, through a number of specially designated private industrial estates. These estates can provide incentives such as tax exemptions or deductions, waivers on local taxes, simplified export procedures, and existing infrastructure (Lamberte et al., 1993, 44). The national impact of such estates on regional dispersal is limited, however, since most are located within Region IV in the provinces of Cavite and Laguna.

Individual regional success stories in recent years have been based more on local circumstances than on concerted government efforts to decentralize growth. One such success has been the redevelopment of the US Naval Base at Subic Bay into a free port and industrial estate. The area has positioned itself as a hub for regional headquarters in Southeast Asia and by March 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority had approved investment projects worth US$1.5 billion. A second example is the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA), first mooted in 1993 and formalized in 1994. The EAGA involves a partnership between Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The model for this type of development is provided by the Singapore growth triangle and the intention is to bring together the complementary resources of capital and professional services (Singapore, Brunei) with agricultural areas and cheap labour pools (Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines). On the Philippine side the main beneficiary is Davao City, which will receive investment in transport infrastructure (Turner, 1995).

The most prodigious of the Philippines' developmental regions, however, has been the area around Manila itself. In a pattern that has characterized other Asian cities, Manila has expanded into a zone of intensively mixed agricultural, residential and industrial uses. This

34 'Spirit of Subic', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 27th 1996, p16
35 Theoretical discussion and case studies of these landscapes are provided by Ginsburg, Koppel and McGee, 1991 and McGee and Robinson, 1995.
zone has become known as CALABARZON - an acronym that groups the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon lying to the East and South of the capital (see Map 2).

The project was initiated in 1990 by the Department of Trade and Industry as a coordinated effort to transform agrarian economies into urban-industrial ones through export-oriented industrialization (JICA, 1991). The Philippine government sought technical assistance from Japan and in 1991, the Japan International Cooperation Agency produced the 'Master Plan Study on the Project Calabarzon', a thirteen volume report on all aspects of the area's future development. The plan provides a framework for development until 2010 in three principal categories: the 'socioeconomy' (intensification of agriculture, industrialization, tourism, and human capital development); infrastructure (highway construction, port development, housing, water and power supply, and industrial estates); and spatial development (including the suburban expansion of Manila and the development of satellite centres such as Batangas). The funding for these developments is envisaged as coming from the Philippine Assistance Plan, particularly Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and from private investors. The projected public expenditure for various project was estimated at US$615 million in 1991-95 and then US$713 million in 1996-2000.

The spatial development framework favoured by the Calabarzon masterplan involves moderate expansion of Manila's suburban fringe coupled with 'leap-frog' development in secondary industrial centres such as the port city of Batangas (JICA, 1991; Laquian, 1996). While the area has been successful in terms of attracting investment, as a spatial planning exercise its vision has not been realized, as the next section will demonstrate. The reason appears to rest with the administrative structure of the plan which has been based on realpolitik rather than the framework recommended by the JICA planners. As an entity, 'Calabarzon' exists in the form of a Coordinating Council and a small secretariat, but control effectively resting with the respective provincial governors.
5.4.2 Trends in Regional Development

The last fifteen years have seen little change in the overall spatial pattern of economic activity in the Philippines. As Figure 7 illustrates, regional\textsuperscript{36} share of GDP has remained largely static since 1981, with a slight increase in economic activity in the core region. Despite explicit policy goals aimed at dispersal, the primacy of Manila and its adjacent regions persists.

Figure 7 - Regional Share of Philippine GDP, 1981-1994

Source: NEDA, 1995c

The growing dominance of the core region (NCR, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog) is especially evident in data on regional employment generation through government incentive schemes for foreign investment in export and 'pioneer' sectors. Table 2 shows the regional share of employment generation over the last fifteen years.

Table 2 - Regional Employment Generation Under Investment Incentive Laws, 1981-96 (per cent of national total)

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<td>266,780</td>
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Source: Calculated from unpublished data, Department of Trade and Industry, Board of Investment, 1995; Population data calculated from NEDA, 1995c 'Philippine Statistical Yearbook'.

* Including those projects without a specific region indicated
+ Data include only January-September 1996.

The core region accounted for approximately 37 per cent of the national population in 1990, but received between 54 and 85 per cent of employment generated in each of the two year periods in

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37 Regional definitions are provided in the previous footnote and shown in Map 1.
the table. Peripheral regions, meanwhile, such as Bicol and Mindanao, have received static or declining shares. The most dramatic trend has been the regionalization of the core area spreading from the NCR into, particularly, Southern Tagalog. Furthermore, as table 3 shows, within the Southern Tagalog region 134,912 of the 139,743 jobs generated in the period 1991-96 were in the Calabarzon provinces.

It would seem therefore that government policy has been ineffective in dispersing industrial development from the congested core, but rather has extended the core area into adjacent provinces. As table 3 shows, over the first four years of the Calabarzon project, the area gained 29 per cent of all new jobs generated by BOI-registered projects across the country (and to this must be added the strong performance of the Cavite Export Processing Zone shown in table 1).

Table 3 - Employment Generated by BOI-approved Projects in Calabarzon, 1991-94

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavite</td>
<td>4,553</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td>21,121</td>
<td>4,491</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>43,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>6,693</td>
<td>18,162</td>
<td>8,082</td>
<td>7,804</td>
<td>50,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangas</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>15,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>4,266</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>22,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quezon</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabarzon Total</td>
<td>20,460</td>
<td>15,456</td>
<td>18,990</td>
<td>49,282</td>
<td>17,052</td>
<td>13,672</td>
<td>134,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tagalog</td>
<td>20,837</td>
<td>15,589</td>
<td>19,758</td>
<td>52,177</td>
<td>17,369</td>
<td>13,772</td>
<td>139,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines Total</td>
<td>63,068</td>
<td>49,483</td>
<td>59,106</td>
<td>145,513</td>
<td>80,401</td>
<td>58,764</td>
<td>459,452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A finer geographical pattern is also apparent in table 3. Of the Calabarzon total for employment generation in the 1991-1996 period, 87 per cent of jobs are located in the provinces adjacent to Manila - Cavite, Laguna and Rizal. Thus while the Calabarzon Plan seeks to direct industrial development into satellite centres, in a 'leap-frogging' pattern, the reality is that
industrialization is being concentrated in an extended metropolitan region around Manila. The capital's hinterland is thus witnessing a proliferation of industrial and residential developments juxtaposed with agricultural land (a process that will be examined in more detail later). What this indicates, I would argue, is the regional geography of a globalized economy. While the government seeks to position the country internationally to attract investment, the spatial corollary at a national level has been a concentration of economic activity in the core area.\footnote{38}

Several factors seem to be operating in this process. The obvious impetus for spatial concentration is the set of locational needs of export-oriented firms. Herrin and Pernia (1986) found that the primary needs of firms in the Philippines were proximity to transportation facilities (shipping, air freight, and highways), reliable power supplies, communications, and land/physical plant. Pernia and Paderanga (1983) also suggest the importance of locations close to government offices, major banks, and professional services. Since all of these facilities (and market demand might be added to the list) are overwhelmingly concentrated in Manila, the core region retains its attractiveness.\footnote{39}

The spatial inequality in infrastructure and service provision reflects an explicit attempt to be responsive to the needs of foreign capital, resulting in public investment disproportionately concentrated in this region. As table 4 shows, the Southern Tagalog region featured prominently in public infrastructure investment in the period 1989-1992, and future plans indicate that its share of regionally designated programmes will become dominant.

\footnote{38 Forbes (1986) and Forbes and Thrift (1987) find a similar pattern of spatial concentration for foreign direct investment in Indonesia.}

\footnote{39 As Fuchs and Pernia point out, however, firm-specific determinants of location may vary by sector. The example of Texas Instruments locating in the Baguio EPZ for climatic reasons is a case in point.}
Table 4 - Regional Shares of Public Investment, 1989-92
(per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Luzon</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Luzon</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Manila</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tagalog</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>16.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicol</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Visayas</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Visayas</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Visayas</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>9.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-regional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.66</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.67</td>
<td>36.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL*</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such a concentration of public infrastructure investment is found, for example, in transportation projects. The Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 1993-1998 (NEDA, 1995a) lists eleven major transportation projects under the BOT scheme with an estimated total cost of 82.1 billion pesos (approximately US$4.1 billion). All eleven are in Metro Manila or its adjacent regions and include the Light Rail Transit System, the Manila Circumferential Road and the Manila-Cavite Expressway.

But locational needs and government responses do not provide a complete picture of the processes involved in the geography of Philippine industrial development. Even when the issue is growth management rather than growth generation, as in the Calabarzon framework, the data on industrial expansion that have been presented suggest that public regulation has been largely ineffectual. Why have plans been contravened in this way and subsumed under an overarching imperative to attract foreign investment capital wherever possible? The answer appears to lie, at least partly, in the highly politicized nature of economic planning. Among other provisions, the Local Government Code allows municipalities and provinces to take a highly proactive role in
land use planning, infrastructure development and investment promotion, meaning that each attempts to maximize its economic base (and the enrichment of local political leaders), often in disregard for broader planning frameworks. In Cavite, for example, a province that according to the Calabarzon Master Plan should be preserving its agricultural areas, large tracts of irrigated rice land have been converted to housing or industrial uses due largely to the context of industrialization in a complex local political economy. It is, therefore, important to consider the ways in which national development strategies (implicit or explicit) are mediated at smaller scales. By focusing on Cavite, the next chapter will explore this issue in more detail.

5.5 Conclusion

Several points emerge from the empirical data presented in this chapter that bear directly upon the broader arguments introduced in chapter 1 concerning globalization as a development discourse. The historical struggle described in chapter 4 between various interest groups vying to define Philippine economic policy resulted by the 1960s in an ambivalently export oriented strategy. Political changes within the country in the 1970s, most significantly the imposition of martial law, resulted in a more concerted drive to attract foreign investment in export manufacturing. By the time of the Aquino and Ramos administrations the political consensus around this strategy had solidified and the government had started to deploy a rhetoric and policy framework firmly grounded in the discourse of globalization.

The rhetoric of place marketing confirms the construction of global-local relations to which the national government has subscribed over the last few decades. It is one based on selling the 'strategic' location of the country in a global space of flows. This chapter has described the policy framework inspired by this perspective and its results in terms of aggregate economic and regional indicators. A striking feature of recent growth has been its spatial distribution, with a high concentration in the core region, and particularly in the vicinity of
Manila. In part, this obviously reflects the locational preferences of foreign investors (Pernia, 1988), but two other factors must also be noted.

First, a priority of the government, based on its reading of globalization, has been to attract as much investment as possible, with goals of regional equity effectively marginalized. The government has thus allowed industrial development to locate in the core region that is preferred, for various reasons, by international investors. This preference has been further reinforced by public infrastructure investment that is also heavily concentrated in the national core. Thus despite decentralization policies, it has been the provinces adjacent to Manila that have attracted the bulk of recent investment flows. In terms of spatial equity, then, the consequences of a globalized development strategy are highly political. This supports one of the two key arguments, concerning the political nature of globalization discourse, presented in chapter 1.

The other key argument running through this thesis is the importance of local social relations in shaping experiences of globalization. The account of policies and economic performance provided here indicates that this is true at a national level. The corrupt, personalistic and kleptocratic tendencies of the Marcos regime make that point clearly - even while the Philippines was pursuing policies that copied its successful neighbours, its globalized development strategy was undermined by the system of economic power relations that held sway during the 1970s and early 1980s. Equally, domestic power relations were influential in undermining spatial dispersal policies - for example in the case of exemptions to the 1970s ban on industrial location in the National Capital Region. But as the final section of the chapter briefly suggested, political power at other scales has also been influential in determining the spatial distribution of industrial development. A key component of the national government's programme of decentralization has been the devolution of various powers and responsibilities to other administrative scales, for example through the Local Government Code of 1991. This, combined with the networks of political power that already existed at municipal and provincial levels, has allowed these scales to find an active role in shaping the localized process of
globalization. The next chapter will pursue this point by examining the construction of globalization in the province of Cavite.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis of the previous two chapters, but focuses on the province of Cavite alone. Cavite lies to the south of Metropolitan Manila but the continuous urban sprawl of the capital region spreads into Cavite's northern municipalities (see map 3). The province consists of two distinctive topographical regions - the lowlands to the north, drained by a series of streams into Manila Bay, and the rugged, occasionally mountainous, region to the south culminating in a ridge at Tagaytay.

The purpose of the chapter is to pursue the argument that globalization is a process that is both constructed and mediated by social, cultural, economic and political structures at other scales. In this case, the most marked dimension of globalization is the flow of direct foreign investment into the province of Cavite which is driving processes of rapid industrialization and urban expansion. The chapter starts with an account of the historical formation of the province's social, political and economic structure. This provides the context for understanding the close connections between recent experiences of globalized development and local political power. Two issues are then dealt with in some detail: the political regulation of the industrial labour market and the process of agricultural land conversion. The result of this analysis is a strong indication that 'place' or locality, conceived at various scales and recognized through the exercise of political power, is where globalization is actively constructed and shaped.
Map 3 - Province of Cavite
6.2 Historical Context

To understand the nature of contemporary change in Cavite, it is necessary to revisit some of the historical themes covered in chapter 4 and apply them to the province specifically. In particular, issues of land use, tenancy, and social structure in the colonial period are crucial in explaining current processes of industrialization and urbanization.

From the early years of Spanish colonialism, the town of Cavite itself, located at the end of a peninsula jutting out into Manila Bay, became a major port and ship-building centre servicing the galleon trade, but for the remaining rural areas of the province, the changes of the Spanish period were mostly in the spheres of cropping and tenure patterns. Although some agriculture existed before Spanish colonization, Cavite's landscape was predominantly forested and the food system was based on pastoralism, fishing and gathering. With the need to sustain a non-productive urban population, the Philippines' first Spanish governor introduced an encomienda, or land grant, system to extract a surplus from rural populations. The largest of these royal land grants were known as estancias (ranches) and between 1571 and 1626, fifteen were created in Cavite (Cushner and Larkin, 1978). These represented most of the lowland northern half of the province, and while in theory they excluded land already in use, in practice they incorporated many cultivated or common land areas. In the early decades, most of these areas were used for livestock grazing with many Spanish encomenderos unwilling or unable to exploit them more intensively. The transience of the Spanish population, the restricted market for livestock, and the rich rewards to be gained from focusing instead on the galleon trade all provided incentives for urban encomenderos to sell their holdings, which eventually became

40 Other land grants of estancias in this period included: 39 in Tondo (roughly equivalent to what is now Metropolitan Manila), eight in Pampanga, four in Cebu, three in Camarines, three in Cagayan, and one each in Bulacan and Laguna (Cushner and Larkin, 1978, 105).
consolidated into larger *estancias* (Roth, 1982, 134). Over time, the majority of these holdings were either donated or mortgaged to wealthy Spanish religious orders, whose estates expanded to include land donated or sold by Filipino chiefs (*principales*), although the legitimacy of such transactions was doubtful under traditional tenure systems (Cushner, 1976).

Religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, replaced cattle ranching with more intensive land uses such as sugar, fruits and rice (Roth, 1982). Wet rice cultivation was aided by the construction of an irrigation system and brought with it requirements for careful water control on small dyked fields, thus favouring small-scale farming. In this way, the early Spanish regime initiated an intensification of agricultural output and the expansion of cultivated areas, together with a two-tiered tenure system of landowners and subsistence tenants farming small plots (McAndrew, 1994).

Colonial government in rural areas was conducted through the designation of mission towns which were mostly contiguous with the friar estates and administered by the orders. In Cavite, the dominant orders were Dominicans, Recollects and Augustinians. The growth of the colony in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to increased demand for agricultural surplus in Manila. In Cavite, production of both rice and export crops such as sugar, indigo and coffee on friar estates was intensified (Medina, 1994). In addition, several new towns were established in the latter half of the nineteenth century, reflecting both population growth and the continuing Spanish policy of *reducción bajo el son de la campana*, or regrouping of settlements.

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41 "Due to the union of Church and State, in the *pueblo*, the parish priest, who was a white man, was the real power. He represented the majesty of Spain. He supervised local elections, education, charities, morals, and taxation. He was the representative of religion and government. His decisions in everything were without appeal", (Province of Cavite, 1981, 18). Medina (1994) gives a detailed account of the development of Cavite's mission towns. Silang was established in 1595, Cavite Viejo or Kawit in 1600, the port of Cavite in 1614, Indang in 1655, Bacoor in 1671, Maragondon in 1727, San Francisco de Malabon (later General Trias) in 1748, Santa Cruz de Malabon (later Tanza) in 1770, Imus in 1775, and Naic in 1791 (McAndrew, 1994)
to within the sound of the church bells (McAndrew, 1994; Medina, 1994). Those benefiting from intensified agricultural production were not, however, the cultivators themselves. Traders and merchants, many of them Chinese or Chinese mestizos, accumulated wealth as creditors and middlemen, while a wealthier class of non-cultivating tenants, or *inquilinos*, sublet the land of farmers who could not meet the requirements of their leasehold and became sharecroppers (Borromeo-Buhler, 1983). This further stratification was a welcome development for the religious orders who could rely upon their non-cultivating tenants for prompt rental payments. The result by the end of the nineteenth century was a three-tiered pattern of estate owners, non-cultivating tenants and sharecroppers (McAndrew, 1994; Roth, 1982). With growing demand for export crops in the nineteenth century, it was to the first two of these groups that benefits accrued:

One of the consequences of the type of export growth experienced by the Philippines was that its fruits fell almost exclusively to a highly select group of the population. The new exchange and monetary economy intensified the sway of the money lender and usurer in Philippine rural society without establishing the foundations for industrial development or a viable internal market. (Roth, 1982, 143)

The nineteenth century also saw increasing rents for farmers, payable to two tiers of 'landlords'. Roth (1982, 147) notes that eighteenth century rents on the Hacienda of San Francisco de Malabon (now General Trias) were 28 *cavans* (about 1,400 kilos) per *quiñón* (5.76

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42 The Jesuits had also been a significant early presence in Cavite, but after their expulsion from the Philippines in 1768 their haciendas passed to the Dominicans (Province of Cavite, 1981; Medina, 1994).
43 Rosario in 1845, Ternate in 1856, Carmona in 1857, Bailen in 1858, Alfonso in 1859, Perez-Dasmarias in 1866, Noveleta in 1867, Caridad in 1868, Amadeo in 1872, Mendez Nunez in 1875, and Magallanes in 1878.
44 In the 1750s Chinese from Manila's Parian had started to migrate into Cavite, and numbers increased after 1790 when the Parian was destroyed. By 1800, 12 per cent of Cavite's population was Chinese mestizo (Wickberg, 1965). In the 1850s the number of Chinese in Cavite reached its peak at around 16,000.
45 Borromeo-Buhler (1983) argues that by the end of the nineteenth century there was a further social division identifiable between the wealthiest of the principalia formed from the one or two most prominent families in each...
hectares), but by the late nineteenth century they had risen to 50 cavans (approximately 2,500 kilos). The position of the wealthier tenants was, however, also vulnerable to the whim of estate administrators, thereby providing an incentive to "wrest the maximum amount of short term utility from ... sharecroppers" (Roth, 1982, 146). Thus it seems likely that there was less sense of the patron-client relations or 'moral economy' that would sustain and legitimize social relations in ways identified elsewhere in the Philippines and Southeast Asia (Scott, 1975; Kerkvliet, 1990).

The resulting hardship for sharecroppers provided the basis for social unrest in Cavite. Popular protest had long occurred in the province, including a widespread uprising in 1745 over the acquisition of common land by religious orders, and further unrest in the 1820s and 1860s (Roth, 1982; Province of Cavite, 1981). More commonly, however, banditry and brigandage in the form of holdups, murders, kidnapping and cattle rustling were directed against friars, merchants, foreigners and wealthy townspeople (Medina, 1994). Bandits, usually disaffected peasants from religious haciendas, were often concealed and supported by villagers, making it fair to assume that their activities contained an element of social protest in the context of a dysfunctional 'moral economy' and exploitative tenurial arrangements (McAndrew, 1994; Medina, 1994).

It was on the basis of such agrarian unrest that Cavite became the focus of anti-friar and nationalist rebellion in the late 1890s, as peasants fought for less onerous leaseholds and wealthier non-cultivating tenants sought to eliminate their ecclesiastical overlords.

Three important features of Cavite's political culture and economy can be identified as emerging from Spanish colonialism. Firstly, a class structure (albeit with some potential for

town, a 'middle class' of inquilinos with some diversified business interests such as craft production, and the poorest class of sharecroppers and landless labourers.

46 Medina (1994) argues that by the nineteenth century in particular, banditry, or tulisanismo, was a more organised activity and a reaction to the imposition of colonial government in the form of rentals, forced labour and the policy of reducción.
mobility) consisting of wealthier tenants (*inquilinos*) who rented directly from the religious orders, and impoverished subtenants (*kasamas*) and landless labourers (*jornaleros*) whose position was economically and socially vulnerable and had little legal standing (Roth, 1982).

Secondly, these social relationships were defined through the tenure system, thus making land ownership the key to broader economic and political power. Thirdly, a culture of banditry emerged as a response to inequity and provided the foundations for the subsequent integration of organized politics and extra-legal activities in the province.

After the American suppression of Filipino resistance in 1899-1902, the new regime set about establishing instruments of government and seeking legitimacy. The issue of the friar lands in Cavite and elsewhere, as a major source of disaffection behind the uprising of 1896, was given high priority by the new regime. After negotiations with the Vatican, the US government paid $6.9 million for 158,676 hectares on 23 estates, of which 47,111 hectares were in Cavite (Endriga, 1970).

The stated intention of the colonial regime was to redistribute the land to farmer-cultivators, but since many leases were actually held by non-cultivating tenants who subletted to sharecroppers, much of the land was sold to wealthier *inquilinos* or, in a few cases, to American investors (Endriga, 1970). The desire of the US government to see the issue speedily resolved made selling off large tracts of land to those who could afford them an attractive proposition - as a means of both yielding a return on an (overpriced) investment and quelling social unrest. By 1910, 568 leases and sales were transacted with an average area of 43

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47 The Recollect estate of Imus amounted to 18,243 hectares, the Augustinian estate at San Francisco de Malabon (General Trias) was 11,449 hectares, and the Dominican estates at Naic and Santa Cruz de Malabon (Tanza) were 7,624 and 9,795 hectares respectively (Endriga, 1970).
hectares. Given that the maximum a family could farm would be approximately 5 hectares, much of the land clearly remained under the *kasama* (or sharecropping) system. Endriga (1970) estimates that 45 per cent of the friar lands were sold to about 1.5 per cent of the eligible tenant population.

During the course of the American regime, there was a substantial increase in Cavite's cultivated area, from 10,848 hectares in 1871 to 52,914 in 1938. But the incidence of tenancy rather than owner-cultivation (and therefore social inequity) also increased from 25 per cent in 1918 to 56 per cent by 1938 (McAndrew, 1994). Manufacturing, meanwhile, was limited to small-scale household craft production of textiles and processed food.

6.3 Political Economy and Lawlessness in Cavite, 1946-72

Rural unrest continued in the American period with peasant movements, notably the *Tangulan* and *Sakdalists* in the 1930s, emerging in Cavite. Nevertheless, peasant organization remained weak in the province leading several authors to argue that banditry remained the main outlet for peasant grievances (McAndrew, 1994; Sobritchea, 1984-86). Highway robbery and killings were common in the 1950s and 1960s, but the bandits were not outlaws in a literal sense as many of their activities were carried out on behalf of, or with the acquiescence of, elected politicians (McAndrew, 1994; Sobritchea, 1984-6). It appears that the complicity of political and

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48 This excludes several special leases and sales, for example the 1,050 hectares leased to General Emilio Aguinaldo in Imus. If such transactions are also included in the calculation the average size becomes 126 hectares (Endriga, 1970).

49 These movements combined an agenda based on peasant grievances - for example equitable ownership of land - with demands for immediate independence from the US. See Sturtevant (1976) and Kerkvliet (1977) for detailed accounts of these and other post-war peasant movements.
law-enforcement authorities was such that some bandits in the 1950s and 1960s were able to live relatively open and public lives. Others, such as the infamous Leonardo Manecio (alias 'Nardong Putik') were intensely hunted by authorities at certain times, but apparently protected by opposing factions or sympathetic villagers on other occasions. Sobritchea (1984-6) suggests that Manecio was widely admired among peasants and elevated to the status of folk hero - even the administration of justice was sometimes entrusted to bandits by peasants who saw government law enforcement efforts as futile.

John Sidel (1995), however, suggests that the representation of banditry as social rebellion has been overstated, at least in the post-war years. He argues for a perspective on crime that is more closely tied to the local political economy. In particular, it is the powerful influence exerted by local politicians (particularly mayors and governors) over the appointment of law enforcement and security officers, leading to a decentralized, politicized and personalized system, that creates a 'structural weakness' conducive to criminalization (Sidel, 1995, 64). Thus, the law enforcement authorities become "predatory apparatuses geared not for the suppression of 'crime' and the administration of 'justice', but for the regulation and exploitation of illegal economies..." (Sidel, 1995, 64-5). Political office, then, provides an opportunity not to regulate or eliminate illegal economic activities, but rather to monopolize them. Moreover, when public offices change hands, the personal enforcement apparatuses associated with political leaders

50 Not all banditry, of course, could be ascribed to social protest. Many of the victims were themselves poor peasants losing valued livestock (Sobritchea, 1984-6).
51 Sidel (1995) provides detailed account of Manecio's career, which included time served as a policeman, periods in prison and the operation of extensive cattle rustling and other illegal activities in Cavite's central lowland towns. At all times, however, Manecio's fortunes were subject to the patronage of various opposing factions in the local politics of these towns. He was therefore far from the social rebel that some suggest. He died in a shower of bullets after an operation by the National Bureau of Investigations to capture him in 1971.
52 Sidel (1995, 52) points to three representations of banditry that have circulated in Cavite: the state as besieged by rebels and outlaws; banditry as social protest against inequitable capitalist transformation; and, the outlaw as
become circulated into mafia-like crime syndicates engaged in the same activities of banditry, car theft, cattle rustling, illegal lotteries, smuggling, robberies and kidnapping. Viewed in this way, the majority of postwar banditry cases in Cavite are examples not of social protest but of a local political economy of violence that connects public office, law enforcement, and criminal activity. Sidel shows that through the use of public office for private, and often illegal activities, local politicians can control the 'commanding heights' of the local economy. The representation of such activities in general as those of folk heroes is thus simply a discursive legitimization for a far more complex political economy: "Crime... constitutes not a form of primitive rebellion, but rather a particular mode of political domination and economic accumulation" (Sidel, 1995, 128).

The integration of politics, economics and criminality in Cavite is illustrated by activities in Tanza in the 1950s and 1960s. In a period when protectionist policies imposed tariffs on imported goods, Tanza's coastal location made it a prime site for smuggling goods (particularly cigarettes and firearms) from the north coast of the island of Borneo (shared by Malaysia and Indonesia). Capipisa, one of the municipality's coastal barrios, earned a reputation for its ostentatious residences and well-paved streets. These operations grew to a considerable scale, with the distribution of smuggled goods extending into Manila, under the acquiescence of government officials at all levels. Indeed, according to Sidel (1995, 363), protection from leading politicians - notably governor Delfin Montano of Cavite, his father Senator Justiniano Montano, and their allies - was essential in diverting the attentions of law enforcement agencies. Military units "not only turned a blind eye to the syndicate's smuggling operations but in fact provided the coercive resources of the state for the policing and enforcement of the syndicate's monopoly against potential competitors." (Sidel, 1995, 364). This system of protection broke

romanticized peasant hero. He argues that while the latter two depictions might hold true in the case of a few bandit
down with the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 who harboured considerable enmity towards the Montanos. But rather than closing down the operation, Marcos simply inserted himself as its patron and ensured the victory of the syndicate's leader, Lino Bocalan, in the election for provincial governor against Delfin Montano in 1971 (Sidel, 1995, 368).

As the example suggests, Cavite's violent political economy encompassed the electoral process. In a surprisingly frank statement, with a curious switch from the past to present tense, the province's official history notes the violent nature of Cavite politics during the post-war years:

Cavite had the bad reputation of having dirty politics. The politician in Cavite seemed to be eternally bound to guns in order to survive. And with gun in hand, he is always tempted to eliminate his political enemies. Or else, he perishes first. Other honorable politicians who manage without guns usually end up victims of their untenable political convictions. They dare break the pattern and in so doing end up victim of the system. Commonly, the voters have no freedom of choice. The dictates of the political leader usually with a gun must prevail. If ever there's freedom to vote the election results were commonly altered to the satisfaction of the political kingpin of the locality. The ballot then was a farce. It did not reflect the true voice of the people. (Province of Cavite, 1981, 43-44)

Violence also characterized politics beyond election periods. Since 1986, five Cavite mayors and two municipal councillors (all opponents of the provincial governor) have been murdered, and several others accuse of murder (Sidel, 1995, 236).

In one sense these events represent the rivalries of an elite class that occasionally extend to embroil their followers and retainers. But the importance of this political culture goes well beyond 'politics' per se. The imbrication of politics and economics in Cavite means that an

'celebrities', they are undoubtedly a minority.
understanding of local systems of power relations is essential to an account of recent trends in the province's economic development and articulation with global flows. As McCoy explains, with reference to the Philippines in general:

Although violence is their most visible aspect, all warlord families must seek rents or state revenues in some form to assure their political survival. Despite some striking differences, political families at both the provincial and national levels thus share common involvement in rent-seeking politics, a process of turning political capital into commercial opportunity. (McCoy, 1994a, 22)

6.4 The Political Context of Contemporary Development

By the 1970s and 1980s, Cavite's political economy of violence was based on even greater economic rewards as industrial development started to locate in the province and urban expansion accelerated. It is in the context of local (municipal and provincial), but nationally connected, networks of political machines and loyalties that global flows of industrial investment must be viewed.

Some mayors have achieved considerable wealth through the judicious application of the powers of office. This extends well beyond the local political control of law enforcement and includes the abuse of regulatory, employment, revenue dispersal and contract-granting powers. The result is that "municipal mayors, through their institutionalized control over the local coercive and extractive apparatuses of the state, exercise considerable regulatory powers over the - legal and illegal - economies of their respective municipalities" (Sidel, 1995, 230).

The application of these powers has reached even higher stakes with the rapid southward suburbanization of Manila and the development of export-oriented industrial developments in the
province over the last decade. In particular, control over land use and zoning ordinances has become the prime source of regulatory leverage over the formal economy open to municipal mayors in Cavite. As pressure grows for conversion of agricultural land into residential subdivisions, industrial estates, commercial developments and leisure facilities, mayors are also able to exert influence through the issuance of building permits, the use of government lands, the allocation of public works, and the implementation of agrarian reform (Sidel, 1995, 246).

Agrarian reform is especially important because designation for redistribution under the programme would prevent the conversion of farm land to other uses. "With such mechanisms of land-use regulation at their disposal, Cavite's municipal mayors have evolved into the province's leading real estate agents and brokers" (Sidel, 1995, 247)

But as in the early post-war decades, municipal 'kingpins' have remained dependent on patrons at higher levels in the political 'food chain'. In the years 1979-1986 and 1986-1995, this patronage was extended by Governor Juanito Remulla. A native of Imus, Remulla was his fraternity brother Marcos' chosen candidate for the governorship, having been persuaded to renegue on his allegiance to the Montanos. Remulla enjoyed close ties with Marcos and facilitated business ventures in Cavite for several prominent 'cronies', but his position was also strengthened by strong links with the powerful Puyat family in Manila, whose interests extended from banking to manufacturing and, of course, politics. In addition to these powerful connections beyond the province, Remulla also retained a formidable political machine within his jurisdiction. Many of Cavite's mayors, councillors, provincial board members and congressmen have owed their electoral successes at least in part to their status as Remulla's

paragraphs later the book extols the virtues of Martial Law in returning order and good government to the country.
protégés. In the local elections of 1980, 1988, 1992, and even in 1995 when Remulla lost his office, over three-quarters of the province's elected mayors have been on the Remulla 'slate' (Sidel, 1995). These political ties have in turn translated into mutually beneficial economic opportunities in the public, private and 'informal' sectors.\footnote{Public sector opportunities include the granting of contracts and other revenue dispersal; in the private sector, many elected officials have business interests in the construction industry and recruitment for factory jobs and overseas contract work; and, in the 'informal' sector, there are widespread allegations that politicians are involved in illegal gambling (or 
\textit{jueteng}) syndicates.}

These political power relations, operating at various connected scales have formed the context for inward flows of industrial investment. The province's success in attracting investment has clearly been partly driven by systemic considerations such as proximity to Manila's market and transportation/communication linkages, and the structural reasons for overseas investment among other East Asian economies (particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea). But the provincial government has also played a key role in 'globalizing' the province's economy. In the rest of this chapter, I will outline some of the strategies employed by Remulla's administration to attract and mediate the 'globalization' of the province.

\textbf{6.5 The Promotion of a Province}

Remulla's government took a number of steps in order to attract investment to the province. Publishing its own promotional brochures (in English, Chinese and Japanese), the local government sought to emphasize the conducive atmosphere for low-cost manufacturing in

\footnote{In addition to Remulla and Marcos, the University of the Philippines Upsilon fraternity also included Benigno Aquino and the current congressman for the second district of Cavite, Renato Dragon, among its members. Dragon is now rumoured to be a potential candidate in the next gubernatorial election.}
the province. The governor's introduction to a promotional brochure stresses the attractions of the place to global capital:

Cavite as a declared "Industrial Peace and Productivity Zone" of the Philippines provides not only a climate of harmony suited for business growth, but also the ambience of leisure in our tourist spots with world class amenities, six golf courses in international standards combined with executive villages, and the refreshing country air of our greeneries.

The sociopolitical setup in Cavite that produced the consensus for a single development-oriented team is pledged to assist and support all those that have decided to invest in Cavite. We can do no less for those who will heed our invitation. (Province of Cavite, nd, 1)

The government's commitment is also exemplified in several campaigns, which have found their way onto billboards around the province. One slogan heralds the arrival of "Cavite's Second Revolution", consisting of "Industrialization, Urbanization, Tourism Development and Agro-modernization". Another declares Cavite an "Industrial Peace and Productivity Zone", ostensibly by popular acclamation of the "People of Historic Cavite" in May 1991. While on one level innocuous boosterism, at another these intrusions in the landscape, directed at both workers and investors, leave no doubt as to the priorities and determination of the provincial government.

Before turning to consider the involvement of Cavite's political power brokers in the specific processes of industrial labour market formation and land conversion, I will provide a brief picture of the nature of the province's industrial development

6.6 Industrialization in Cavite

Table 5 provides some aggregate indicators of social and economic change in the province over the last three censuses.
Table 5 - Selected Socio-economic Characteristics of Cavite, 1970-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>520,180</td>
<td>771,320</td>
<td>1,152,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average population growth p.a.(%)</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households</td>
<td>87,743</td>
<td>138,435</td>
<td>222,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (%)</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate (%)</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force in Agriculture (%)</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with Electricity (%)</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with a Television (%)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the decreasing agricultural workforce suggests, the provincial government's political commitment to globalized development has translated into considerable success in attracting global capital, principally in the form of foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing. As table 6 shows (and chapter 5 also indicated), the bulk of this industrial development has been concentrated in Northern lowland towns, particularly Carmona, Dasmarinas, Imus, General Trias and Rosario. All are located on the agricultural fringe of Manila, beyond its suburban sprawl into Bacoor and Noveleta, and all are within the prime agricultural areas of the lowlands.
Table 6 - Characteristics of Cavite's Industrial Sector, June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality / Industrial Estate</th>
<th>Number of Companies</th>
<th>Capitalization (Million Pesos)</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfonso</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacoor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmona</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>10,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. People's Technology Complex</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>6,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Granville Industrial Complex</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mount View Industrial Complex</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Southcoast Industrial Estate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Outside Industrial Estates</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasmarias</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>6,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. First City Land Heavy Ind'l Centre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. DBB-NHA Industrial Estate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. First Cavite Ind'l Estate &amp; SEPIZ</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>2,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Outside Industrial Estates</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mariano Alvarez</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. GMA-NHA Industrial Estate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Outside Industrial Estates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trias</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>2,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. New Cavite Industrial City</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Gateway Business Park and SEPIZ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outside Industrial Estates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imus</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>8,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indang</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noveleta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosario</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>4,667</td>
<td>39,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. CEPZ</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4,591</td>
<td>38,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Outside CEPZ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silang</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>2,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavite City</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagaytay City</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trece Martirez City</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>376</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,236</strong></td>
<td><strong>74,889</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished Data, Province of Cavite, Planning Department, 1995

This industrial development has been concentrated in relatively few sectors. The principal sectors in terms of corporations located in Cavite are light manufacturing and
textile/garments, although electronics and food/agroprocessing firms are also represented (table 7). The same two sectors also dominate in terms of employment generation, together accounting for over 70 per cent of the industrial workforce.

Table 7 - Cavite's Industrial Sector by Type of Industry, June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Industry</th>
<th>Companies (per cent)</th>
<th>Employment (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agro-industry</td>
<td>40 (10.9)</td>
<td>2,704 (3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Manufacturing</td>
<td>179 (48.8)</td>
<td>30,274 (39.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>30 (8.2)</td>
<td>16,017 (21.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Garments</td>
<td>85 (23.2)</td>
<td>23,838 (31.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>8 (2.2)</td>
<td>1,293 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicrafts</td>
<td>11 (3.0)</td>
<td>752 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture &amp; Construction Supplies</td>
<td>12 (3.3)</td>
<td>925 (1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>2 (0.5)</td>
<td>41 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished Data, Province of Cavite, Planning Department, 1995

The ownership structure of Cavite's industrial sector highlights the globalized nature of development in the province. Only just over one-third (34.5 per cent) of companies are wholly Filipino owned, and nearly one-third (31 per cent) have no Filipino equity participation at all (see table 8). The most significant investors in the province are Japanese, Taiwanese and South Korean, who together account for nearly half (45.7 per cent) of the total.
Table 8 - Nationality of Equity Ownership in Cavite's Industrial Sector, June 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Sole Ownership (# of Companies)</th>
<th>Joint Ownership, with Filipino Partners*</th>
<th>Joint Ownership, with Non-Filipino Partners*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singaporean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished Data, Province of Cavite, Department of Planning, 1995

* Some joint venture companies may include more than two nationalities

Data on the characteristics of Cavite's industrial workforce are not available for the province as a whole, but some figures can be provided for firms at the Cavite Export Processing Zone (see table 9). Garments and electronics companies dominate the zone, with stark gender differentiation within the workforce. Among foreign managers, men dominate in all sectors, while among Filipino management and staff the overall total is approximately equal, due mainly to female representation in the garment sector. The most dramatic gender differentiation is, however, at the level of production line employees. In all sectors except fabricated metal
production, women constitute the vast majority of the workforce - 77 per cent of shopfloor employees in total.

Table 9 - Employment Structure of CEPZ Enterprises, April 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Management and Staff</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing Apparel</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Shoes and Gloves</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosiery</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Products</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated Metal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics &amp; Electrical</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>382</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,871</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished data, Cavite Export Processing Zone, Industrial Relations Division, 1995

The distribution of these employees across the province is diffuse (see table 10). Not surprisingly, Rosario contributes the largest single share of CEPZ workers, but several other towns house substantial numbers of workers. The impact of CEPZ on labour markets is therefore widespread. In Tanza, for example, 6,043 people work at the zone - representing approximately 10 per cent of the town's 1990 census population.
Table 10 - Spatial Distribution of CEPZ Workers by Residence, December, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosario</td>
<td>7,110</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanza</td>
<td>6,043</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trias</td>
<td>5,688</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavite City</td>
<td>2,879</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawit</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noveleta</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naic</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imus</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacoor</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indang</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maragondon</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trece Martires City</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Municipalities</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Cavite</td>
<td>3,022</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,549</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Employment at CEPZ is, moreover, growing rapidly. The December 1994 total of 35,549 (table 10) grew from a figure of zero ten years earlier (see table 1). Just four months later, in April 1995, nearly 3,000 more jobs had been added (table 9). This growth at CEPZ, along with other industrial estates in Cavite, has led to changes in the local labour market, as an agricultural labour force is increasingly geared towards factory work. In addition, migration to the province and growing demand has spurred a real estate boom that is causing the conversion of large areas of agricultural land into residential estates.

These processes of labour market formation and land conversion are the principal ways in which globalized development is experienced by people in Cavite. In the next two sections, I will examine these processes in the light of the political context described earlier.
6.7 The Labour Process in a Globalizing Province

The apparatus of local government has encouraged the process, and shaped the experiences, of globalization through intervention in the sphere of labour regulation. Few aspects of the labour process have escaped the influence of governmental regulation, non-regulation, or influence: recruitment, union organization, workplace conditions, pay and benefits, job security and industrial relations. The designation of Cavite as an "Industrial Peace and Productivity Zone" indicates the manner in which the government has sought to manage the labour process in order to attract industrial investment. Even after his election defeat in 1995, which was widely attributed to the province's 'no-strike' policy, Remulla remained unrepentant:

Cavite maintains the policy of industrial peace and productivity. In the late '80s and early '90s, when strikes paralyzed industry, Cavite remained peaceful and productive. I, as governor, personally mediated between management and labour to arrive at an amicable resolution of the issues on the basis of what is just, fair and equitable. I practised labor law before I joined politics, and it was as a practising lawyer that I realised how strikes can be disastrous for both management and labor. It was then that I resolved that, given the chance, we should avoid confrontational strikes and resort to amicable settlement. It is not only sound economic policy, it is also socioculturally appropriate for us non-adversarial Filipinos.

And yes, when militants resorted to violence I was willing to uphold the majesty of law. Those who are not willing to use the potent force of the law when the situation calls for it have no business being called leaders.56

At the recruitment stage, there is a widespread belief that preferential treatment has been given to those with connections to local political leaders. One such allegation concerns the close links between Remulla and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a Philippine protestant congregation that opposes union membership and is notorious for voting en masse in elections for the candidates endorsed by the church's leaders. It has been suggested that members of the church received

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preferential consideration for jobs in Cavite's industrial estates because of this connection (Sidel, 1995, 382; Coronel, 1995, 17). Municipal mayors and even village captains are also reputed to have influenced the recruitment process through an unofficial system in which an applicant receives the endorsement of a local official. This influence can also be exerted through official channels by granting or denying an applicant the necessary police clearance for employment. Political officials (along with other entrepreneurs) also operate recruitment agencies supplying workers to local factories. This arrangement allows the agency to take a commission from the new employee's wages, and in both official and unofficial placements, to establish a patron-client relationship with the employee for whom employment has been provided - a relationship which, it is assumed, will manifest itself at election time. Such recruiting agencies, some illegal, also operate for the deployment of overseas contract workers.57

Much of the influence of local political bosses on industrialization rests in their implicit sanctioning of abuses of labour laws.58 Regulations concerning health and safety at work are loosely applied with many reported cases of violations - in one factory in Cavite, for example, it was alleged that at least 15 workers had lost fingers without proper compensation.59 Workers also find themselves in positions where they are personally or physically abused by factory managers. The following press report emerged in 1995 about a garment factory in the Cavite Export Processing Zone:

Workers from a garments firm complained that their Korean manager has been maltreating and overworking them and has even called Filipinos "easy money". The Korean manager, a certain M.S.Lee punishes women by ordering them to squat for long periods of time. Male workers are punished by push-ups. The firm is called DAI Young Apparel and is located at the Cavite Export Processing Zone. The workers told

57 'Who are behind this syndicate?', Philippine Daily Globe, October 18th, 1990.
Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor over the telephone that toilets are locked during working hours and are only opened during breaktime. Lee and other Korean supervisors in the firm also have a habit of hitting them, they said.60

There are also cases of child labour, although parents are usually complicit in this practice since it is often on the basis of falsified records.

Regulations concerning wages and benefits also seem open to abuse. In 1995, the statutory daily minimum wage in the manufacturing sector was 138 pesos (approximately Cdn$7), but firms could employ workers at 98 pesos for a probationary or training period of six months. A widespread practice has been to keep employees at a probationary wage on a permanent basis (in one reported case a firm's employees were still on probationary wages after 3 years), or, to fire workers and recruit again after six months rather than regularize existing workers and pay them the full minimum wage.61 The constant supply of fresh recruits needed for this practice is provided by the recruitment agencies often established by local political bosses. There have even been allegations that Governor Remulla was personally being paid a commission from every employee's wage at the Export Processing Zone - with some suggesting amounts between 10 and 20 pesos a day - by companies wishing to ensure the Governor's continued acquiescence to abuses of labour laws. It would seem, however, based on evidence since Remulla was removed from power, that such accusations were probably apocryphal.62

In other cases, wage regulations have been ignored altogether. Reports suggest some companies pay far below even the probationary wage level and some also fail to pay salaries on time and neglect to make the appropriate contributions to the government Social Security System

60 'Workers hit Korean owner of Cavite firm', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 4th, 1995; 'Cavite labor officials deny no-strike policy', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9th, 1995
for their employees.\textsuperscript{63} In 1995, the Department of Labour and Employment itself estimated that 30 percent of firms in the country's Export Processing Zones were not complying with minimum wage legislation.\textsuperscript{64}

One of the key elements of the province's self-marketing as an 'Industrial Peace and Productivity Zone' has been an unofficial ban on unionization and strikes. Several factors have served to discourage the emergence of an organized labour movement. First, factories have overwhelmingly opted to employ young, single, female workers, who come either from local farming families or as new migrants to the area seeking wages to send home to their families in more impoverished provinces. These young women are generally supervised in the factories by older women and they in turn by male managers - in this way the age and gender-based seniority which exists at home is reproduced in the workplace. Labour unrest is thereby discouraged by the mores of familial discipline. Secondly, lessons have been learned from the experience of the more established export processing zones. In Bataan, for example, the dormitories established in the zone to house workers proved to be fertile ground for union organization. In Cavite, workers have instead been dispersed throughout the neighbouring towns, either in their home villages or in boarding houses. Thirdly, local political leaders exert influence on workers with varying levels of directness, from an unspoken sense that in joining a union a worker would be displaying ingratitude for a recommendation, to the use of direct physical force, which has been alleged in the activities of the province's paramilitary Industrial Security Action Group.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{63} 'Remulla scored for union busting', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1st 1995.
\textsuperscript{64} 'Export zone wage violators bared', Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 21st, 1995.
In a variety of ways, then, local political power relations have intersected with the process of industrial development to shape the way in which globalization is experienced. While based on a driving motive of personal enrichment and political entrenchment, this intervention has been legitimized using the same globalization discourse employed by the national government. Foreign capital is courted with assurances of compliant regulatory structures and labour control represented as "industrial peace and productivity".

6.8 The Politics of Land Conversion

The conversion of farmland has been a point of considerable debate within the Philippines, particularly among progressive groups concerned with the eviction of tenant farmers and issues of food security.\(^{66}\) The process in Cavite has been driven by the development of large industrial estates in a zone from East to West across the centre of the province, mostly over the last 5 years. Housing estates have also begun to sprout up, accommodating mostly factory workers and commuters working in Manila.

This real estate boom is evident in the population classified as urban for census purposes. The level of urbanization increased from one half to three-quarters between 1970 and 1990 (see table 5). The process is also reflected in dramatic increases in the cost of land in Cavite. In the province as a whole, the cost of home lots increased by an average of 20.4 per cent every year between 1990 and 1993 (this compares with a 5.5 per cent increase in Metro Manila).\(^{67}\) The conversion of farmland into industrial estates or residential subdivisions has been widespread,

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\(^{66}\) For example: Ramos (ed.) 1991; Ochoa and Descanz, 1993; Canlas, 1991; Sermenho, 1994;

but in many instances land has also been taken out of production and tenant-farmers removed as a speculative tactic pending future sale of the land.

Tables 11 and 12 indicate the land use pattern in 1988, and the subsequent conversions that have been registered with the provincial government.

Table 11 - Land Use in Cavite, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use Category</th>
<th>Area (hectares)</th>
<th>% of Total Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>106,080.12</td>
<td>74.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural</td>
<td>36,625.88</td>
<td>25.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built-Up</td>
<td>21,999.73</td>
<td>15.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodland</td>
<td>13,101.70</td>
<td>9.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland</td>
<td>1,542.45</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>142,706.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 12 - Land Conversions in Cavite Approved or Being Processed by DAR, 1988-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Residential</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Farmlot</th>
<th>Tourism</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>159.8</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>335.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>148.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>256.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>209.5</td>
<td>266.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>610.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>146.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>125.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>133.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995*</td>
<td>286.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>286.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>267.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1076.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>520.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>185.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>66.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>157.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,107.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As of June 30th.

Source: Unpublished Data, Department of Agrarian Reform, Quezon City.

Clearly, residential and industrial developments have been the major causes of land conversion, but there are reasons to suspect that these figures from the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) represent only a fraction of the land actually taken out of agricultural production. The owners of land which is lying idle, and therefore not technically converted, have usually paid off tenant farmers in order to avoid agrarian reform redistribution and are waiting for a more profitable moment at which to convert the land to other uses. But many lands have simply been converted without the knowledge of the DAR, usually because grounds have been established for exempting the conversion application from DAR jurisdiction (such as proving a non-agricultural land use or by invoking the municipal land use plan). Still more land has simply been converted illegally without the necessary clearances.

Data from the municipality of Tanza in Cavite indicates that while 367.3 hectares of agricultural land was approved, exempted or being processed for conversion between 1989 and 1994, a further 221.8 hectares had been converted without permission - in both cases the vast majority being for residential subdivisions. Data on rice lands in the municipality, meanwhile, gathered by local Department of Agriculture extension workers, suggests that over 400 hectares of land conversion was on irrigated rice land. If these figures can be extrapolated - and field observations suggest that Tanza is not atypical of lowland towns in the province - the implication is that official conversion figures must be scaled up by at least 50 per cent to account for illegal conversions, and that around two-thirds of conversion is on irrigated rice lands.

Numerous pieces of legislation exist to protect agricultural land from conversion. The land to be converted must be officially zoned as non-agricultural and it must be non-irrigated.

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68 This practice has been analyzed by Medalla and Centeno, 1994, and is discussed further in chapter 8.
69 'Cavite has high rate of illegal land conversions, claim farmers groups' Business World, June 10th 1991
70 Of the legal conversions, 254.2 hectares were for residential uses, 77.1 for industrial, 13.1 for institutional, 11.8 for tourism resorts and 11.1 were for unspecified uses. Source: unpublished data on land conversion, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Tanza, Cavite, 1995.
72 Administrative Order 20, 1992
must also not be eligible for redistribution from owner to tenant under agrarian reform legislation. But each of these conditions can frequently be sidestepped. The Local Government Code of 1991 (a piece of administrative decentralization seen as a key component of economic liberalization and global competitiveness) enables local officials to reclassify up to 15 per cent of land use from agricultural to other uses on the basis of vague conditions relating to its viability for agriculture. Many towns, however, do not even have precisely defined or publicly available zoning maps, leaving decisions over reclassification to local officials, particularly mayors. Such rezoning decisions often involve bribery and kickbacks. Certification that land is unirrigated is equally open to bureaucratic corruption and other means of circumvention. Areas designated for Regional Agri-Industrial Centres, Tourism Development Areas or socialized housing can be prioritized for land conversion with Presidential authority. Alternatively, land owners may deliberately vandalize or neglect irrigation canals and dikes in order to make a case that the land is unirrigated and unproductive.

Clearances from the Department of Agrarian Reform that the land has "ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes" and that farmers on the land have been properly compensated are also open to abuse both by local officials and landowners. Numerous documented examples exist of pressure being brought to bear on farmers in Cavite who have resisted the decision to convert farmland. Farmers rights as agrarian reform

74 Executive Order No. 124, 1993
75 Requirements for Conversion from Department of Agrarian Reform, Tanza
76 Examples of popular protest against development in Cavite include a new dumpsite servicing Manila to be located in Carmona; the Export Processing Zone in Rosario; and various residential and industrial developments in Dasmarinas, most notably against a new industrial estate developed by the Japanese Marubeni Corporation in Langkaan, Dasmarinas, in 1991. The Langkaan controversy lead to the ousting of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. See 'Cavite dumpsite opposed', Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 16th, 1992; 'Cavite folk protest dump site project', Manila Chronicle, April 30th, 1993; 'More Cavite farmers lose lands', Manila Times, September 8th, 1991; 'NDC-
beneficiaries have also been compromised where redistribution has been prevented or withdrawn, often with pressure being applied to local agrarian reform officials. It should also be said, however, that many farmers have been only too happy to sell their tenancy rights given the marginal profitability of rice cultivation and the often generous compensation packages which are negotiated (these motivations will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters).

As a result of these various legal loopholes and extra-legal activities, municipal politicians have been able to exert considerable control over the land conversion process. The provincial authorities technically have little power to influence land conversion decisions, but in Cavite there have been widely circulated accusations of complicity on the part of Remulla's government (Sidel, 1995, 381). The principal ways in which this influence has been exercised are through the persuasion or coercion of uncooperative municipal officials and tenant farmers, supplying money to add a further incentive for compliance, and the provision of manpower for forced evictions.77

In numerous documented cases, he [Remulla] has dispatched armed goons, ordered the bulldozing of homes, and engineered the destruction of irrigation canals, so as to expedite the departure of "squatters" and tenant farmers demanding compensation for their removal from lands designated for sale to Manila-based or foreign companies for 'development' into industrial estates. Though Remulla typically tempers such hardball tactics with offers for a 'settlement', the 'carrot' is never as impressive as the 'stick'. (Sidel, 1995, 381)

In the case of the Cavite Export Processing Zone in Rosario, the national government was also involved. When President Marcos declared 275 hectares in two municipalities to be the site of the CEPZ in 1980 (under Presidential Decrees 1980 and 2017) it was then prime irrigated rice land under cultivation. Contractors employed by the EPZA (a national agency) and the provincial

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77 McAndrew (1990; 1994) and Coronel (1995) record various instances of provincial law enforcement officers or hired 'goons' being involved in tenant evictions.
government started to bulldoze the site in March 1981 but faced opposition from farmers on the site who organized themselves into the *Samahang Magsasaka at Mamumuwisan ng Cavite* (Association of Farmers and Leaseholders of Cavite) (McAndrew, 1994, 125). A Supreme Court ruling in August 1981 halted construction on the site, but was overturned when the government produced an unpublished Presidential Decree dated seven months earlier (PD 1818) that inhibited the courts from interfering with government development projects. As a result construction continued and most farmers succumbed to pressure and accepted a compensation package.

6.9 Politics and Place in Economic Globalization

As with the discussion of globalization in the Philippines as a whole, two broad conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of Cavite's complex political economy. Firstly, globalization, in this case as flows of industrial investment, must be seen as an inherently localized process, rather than a universal and homogenizing force. It is through local political and social structures, discussed in this case at the provincial and municipal levels, that globalized development is mediated. Secondly, globalization exists not just as an economic phenomenon, but equally as a discourse that legitimizes certain local political practices. By representing Cavite as a node or 'site' in a global network of investment flows, local politicians have been able to justify a set of practices with regard to two key factors of production - land and labour - in order to satisfy a third, capital. But the process is not one of unrelenting structural power on the part of 'capital'. Instead, industrial investment has been incorporated into the local political economy on terms dictated by, and beneficial towards, those in command.

Thus, as Massey argues, there is a "power geometry" to globalization, but the relationship to globalization at a local level is more complex than simply differential access to global flows
The very nature of such flows is not as disembodied phenomena, but refracted by local social relations in such a way that experiences of globalization both reflect and reinforce power (Massey, 1994, 62). Thus the ways in which individuals experience globalization is defined by their positioning in the local political economy. Local political power can construct an image of the global, mediate local experience of global flows and, at the same time, legitimize local practices with reference to the discourse of globalization to which it has contributed. Power is, as Rafael points out, "the capacity to lay claim over the site of circulation and thereby broker the exchange between the inside and the outside" (Rafael, 1995, xix).

Appadurai's reminder of the contextual construction of the global is useful here, because while globalization sets certain imperatives, their application at a local level is quite distinct: "the use of these words by political actors and their audiences may be subject to very different sets of contextual conventions that mediate their translation into public politics" (Appadurai, 1990, 10). Keywords thus evoke different practices in different places. Globalization has specifically local features and local consequences; it is, as Gregory argues, a "situated construction" (1994b, 204), and it is this 'situatedness' that the next part of the thesis will examine across other scales - the village, the household and the individual.
PART III

LABOUR, LAND AND IDENTITY IN GLOBALIZING PLACES
CHAPTER SEVEN
BARRIO BUNGA: THE GLOBALIZING VILLAGE LABOUR MARKET

7.1 Introduction

The context of globalized development at national and provincial scales has been described over the previous three chapters. This part of the thesis shifts the scale of analysis to examine the ways in which globalized development is embedded in social relations at the scale of the village, household and individual. The local manifestation of globalization of primary concern in this chapter is the transformation of local labour markets resulting from foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing industry. The issue of industrial labour market formation goes to the heart of how people in Tanza experience the changes wrought by globalization. The process is experienced both economically, in terms of livelihood and production, and culturally in shifting attitudes to work. The cultural and economic dimensions are closely connected, but for now issues of identity and culture will be deferred until chapter 9. In this chapter the focus is on economic issues, and particularly the ways that factory work, and other changes in the local labour market (for example, overseas employment), intersect with the farm economy, on which most villagers depend for their livelihood and subsistence. Thus the embedded social relations of place to be considered here revolve around the social and economic organization of agricultural production.

The chapter is structured in the following way. In the first section I present a detailed account of the socioeconomic arrangements behind farming in Tanza as a whole, including tenancy, cropping patterns, the economics of farming, and social divisions of labour within both villages and households. This section provides a picture of the social relations of agricultural production which form the context for recent changes to the local labour market. In the second section of the chapter, attention is focused on the village of Bunga in Tanza, one of the two villages where I conducted field research in 1995. While no formal claims of representativeness
can be made for the village (since, as chapter 3 makes clear, its selection was as much serendipity as design), I believe Bunga is illustrative of the impacts of labour market changes on rural areas in Cavite. The section starts with some background information on the history and geography of the village, and then moves on to describe the nature and dimensions of the labour market changes that have occurred. In particular, the emphasis is on the emergence of local factory work and overseas employment in the village. The final section of the chapter looks at how these changes have been experienced by farmers and some of the adjustments and responses that have developed in the agricultural sector.

7.2 The Socio-economics of Farming

7.2.1 Land Acquisition and Tenancy

For historical and ecological reasons discussed in chapters 4 and 6, most farmers in Tanza find themselves farming land that they do not own. For the vast majority their use rights to the land are based on a tenancy relationship. In the two villages (Bunga and Mulawin) where I interviewed farmers, just 5 of the 52 surveyed actually owned the land they tilled. At a formal level their tenancy involves paying a percentage of their crop to a landlord as rent (buwis). The usual payment would be 25 per cent of their rainy season harvest, remitted as sacks (cavans) of unhusked rice (palay). More informally, however, the relationship between a farmer and the landlord would usually extend to a 'patron-client' style bonding between the two families, wherein, for example, a landlord might act as the godparent to a tenant's child and lend money for medical or educational expenses. This relationship might, furthermore, pass through several generations as tenancies, like ownership, can be inherited by both male and female children. In

79 A cavan of rice is generally taken to be the equivalent of approximately 50 kgs, although Wolter (1983) provides an estimate of 44-46 kgs, depending on whether or not the rice has been dried. It is usual for unhusked or unmilled rice to be measured in cavans, but milled rice (i.e. ready for cooking), or bigas, to be measured in kilos.
fact, even during their own working life, tenant farmers are essentially free to allow whomever they wish to farm the land, as long as rental payments are made.

Data collected by government agricultural technicians suggest that farmers in Tanza cultivate an average of 2.28 hectares, and for the two villages of Bunga and Mulawin, the figures are 2.06 and 2.47 hectares respectively. My own survey data from these two village yielded an average farm size of 2.07 hectares. Although no time-series data are available, information from interviews suggests that there has been substantial subdivision of lands among heirs over the last few decades. This has left many tenant farmers with land holdings insufficient to support a family. As table 13 shows, 31 out of 43 farmers surveyed in Bunga, or 72 per cent, have two hectares or less.

Table 13 - Farm Size in Bunga, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Area (hectares)</th>
<th>Government Data</th>
<th>Surveyed Farms83</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


81 In Bunga, 43 of 65 farmers were surveyed. In Mulawin 9 out of 13 remaining farmers were surveyed.
82 This process has been documented elsewhere in Cavite by McAndrew (1994)
83 The evident discrepancy between official statistics and my own survey in some size categories is partly because survey only covered about two-thirds of farmers, and partly because the survey covered areas actually being farmed, whereas the government data covers official tenancies only.
In just a few cases farmers own the land they cultivate, usually because they have participated in an agrarian reform programme, such as Marcos' Presidential Decree 27 or Aquino's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme starting in 1988. But for the most part, the system of non-cultivating land owners and tenant farmers, with its roots in the colonial social structures described in previous chapters, still prevails.

There is substantial hearsay evidence that the agrarian reform process has been hindered or corrupted in many instances, thereby preventing tenant farmers from becoming owners of their land. Some farmers believe that landowners have sought to retain ownership by interceding with local government officials and ensuring that Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) are stopped. The motive for such an intervention is usually to ensure that landowners will still reap the benefits of conversion at some point in the future. Other farmers, however, prefer to remain as tenants rather than convert to ownership since amortizing their CLT would require onerous cash payments to the Land Bank. Rent, on the other hand can be paid in kind with a share of the harvest.

Without exception, the owners of land in Bunga and Mulawin live in other barrios of Tanza, the town proper of the municipality, or further afield in Cavite and even Manila. Tenants who started to farm in the 1940s or 1950s often did so on the basis of an informal agreement, having either approached the owner, or having themselves been approached with a request to farm the land. Most contemporary farmers, however, have acquired tenancy rights by inheritance (on both parents' sides). The general practice is to pass at least part of a land parcel onto a son or son-in-law on their marriage in order to provide a means of support for the new family. Alternatively, when a farmer gets too old to actively cultivate, unmarried sons may become the de facto tenants on the land. In other cases, land will simply be left to some or all children after death. Farm holdings are generally operated by nuclear households. Extended families and

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84 Putzel (1992) and Riedinger (1995) provide extensive accounts of agrarian reform programmes in the Philippines.
85 CLTs are amortized through regular payments to the Land Bank and on completion result in the transfer of land ownership to the cultivator.
children who have left to form their own households do not ordinarily take a share in the harvest. In many cases, however, farming relatives will ensure that their closest relatives do not have to buy rice and will give them what they need for daily consumption, although such generosity is always dependent on their own financial circumstances and their relationship with the particular relative in question.

The farming economy also extends far beyond those who have access to land through a formal tenancy agreement. Many others participate in, and depend upon, the agricultural system. Most are not, however, strictly landless labourers as there exists a variety of levels of access to land. Some will be de facto tenants because they are relatives (by birth or marriage) of the official tenant and are waiting to inherit the land. Alternatively, they may be temporarily farming a piece of land through an agreement with the tenant to use it either short term, for example to plant one season of a vegetable crop, or over the longer term to plant rice in a system of informal subtenancy. Others are permanent 'helpers' (katulong) on a particular piece of land and might work either for wages or a share of the harvest. There are many, however, who simply work wherever and whenever there is farm labour needed.

Just as diverse arrangements might exist between tenants and other agricultural workers, so the relationship between landlord and tenant is also subject to a variety of interpretations. While the statutory rental is 25 per cent of the rice harvest, some landlords will accept much less and only token rentals are usually paid on vegetable harvests. Others, however, will strictly enforce their rights, even to the point of sending observers at harvest time to ensure that an appropriate share is taken and that all debts are repaid. Thus, while the general picture might be simplified as one of a) absentee landlordism, b) tenancy and c) landless labour, there is in fact great variability and flexibility in both access to the land and in the relationship between owner and tenant.
7.2.2 Crops and Cropping Patterns

Traditional farming systems in Tanza allowed for one rice crop per year and some market gardening. Since the mid-1970s, however, new varieties of rice introduced under the 'green revolution' allowed two harvests per year and higher yields. At the same time, the new varieties required increased inputs of fertilizers and synthetic pesticides, which further enhanced yields. The use of machinery, such as handtractors for ploughing, also became more widespread.\textsuperscript{86} Farmers in Bunga reported an increase in yields from around 50 \textit{cavans}/ha to around 75 \textit{cavans}/ha. The faster growing new varieties also allow a second harvest during the dry season, although the yield for the second harvest is often considerably reduced (30-40 \textit{cavans}/ha) due to poor water availability even in irrigated areas.

The introduction of new varieties of rice in the mid-1970s was carried out by government agricultural technicians who also trained local farmers in the cultivation of a variety of vegetable and fruit crops.\textsuperscript{87} The result was their widespread adoption as farmers noted the substantial profits being made, for example in watermelon cultivation. But the diffusion of such crops was still subject to the marketing limitation imposed by poor transportation in some areas. In Bunga, for example, it was not until the village's road to the town proper was asphalted in the early 1980s and tricycles started to ply the route that vegetables were widely adopted. In contemporary farming in Bunga, the usual annual cycle of cropping is as follows:

---
\textsuperscript{86} The impacts of green revolution technology in the Philippines are documented by Feder (1983) and Boyce (1993).
\textsuperscript{87} Vegetables and other crops grown in addition to rice include: Chinese cabbage (petchay); onion; okra; watermelon (pakwan); garlic (pawa); string beans (sitaw); cucumber; tomato (kamatis); balsam apple (ampalaya); mungo; patola; guava (bayabas); eggplant (talong); bell pepper; baguio beans; sampaguita flowers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January - February</td>
<td>Dry season <em>(tagaraw)</em> rice <em>(palay)</em> is planted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some vegetables planted and harvested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March - April</td>
<td>Dry season rice is harvested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April - May</td>
<td>Vegetables are again cultivated on part of the rice land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - August</td>
<td>Planting (depending on rainfall) of rainy season <em>(tagulan)</em> rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October - December</td>
<td>Harvesting of rainy season rice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many farmers will also plant vegetables semi-permanently on small patches of land and, since the area of vegetable crops that can be adequately tended for is limited, some farmers may also allow others to plant vegetables on their land between rice crops. This arrangement is variable and may be based on sharecropping, payment of rental, or simply gratis. Some farmers are reluctant, however, to allow their land to be used in this way for fear that the temporary occupant will develop further designs upon the land and attempt to insert themselves as permanent tenants. The result is that the usual pattern is for vegetables to be cultivated with family labour alone or with extra labour brought in under a contractual or sharecropping arrangement. Vegetable cultivation can be extremely lucrative if a particular crop has not been widely grown and consequently is selling for high prices in the market. Among farmers rumours abound concerning families in other towns who have made millions of pesos from 'jackpot' harvests of watermelons. But without the benefit of a jackpot, farming families face their leanest months between August and October, when expenses for the rainy season rice crop are mounting, the harvest is not yet in, and rice stored from the dry season crop may already be exhausted.
7.2.3 The Economics of Rice

Despite rumours and aspirations of vegetable 'jackpots', the economic realities of rice farming remain harsh and profit rates marginal. Based on interviews and survey returns, I will piece together a picture of the typical balance of accounts for a notional farm in Tanza. The process starts with land preparation and moves through stages such as planting, fertilizing, harvesting and marketing (all cost estimates are for one hectare and are in 1995 prices).

The first set of expenses are dedicated to land preparation and planting. Water buffalo (carabao) are still used as draft animals both in ploughing and in transportation, but ownership of an animal is not universal and during lean times livestock may be sold off to pay for educational, medical or even household expenses (22 out 43 surveyed farmers in Bunga owned at least one carabao). Ownership of a motorized hand tractor is even rarer but the productivity gains from using one are substantial.\textsuperscript{88} One farmer estimated that he could plough in a week an area that would take a month to cover with a carabao. As a result, most farmers rent a machine at a rate of 5 cavans of rice per day on two occasions during each cropping. In addition, the farmer must purchase fuel for the tractor, costing about P1,000 for the ploughing of one hectare.

Farmers will sometimes keep their own stock of seeds from a previous harvest in order to avoid the expense of purchasing them from a dealer. Frequently, however, such a purchase is necessary because of the need for a new variety of rice. Each harvest with a particular variety of rice diminishes from the one before as plant diseases adapt to the genetically engineered strain. Farmers who are conscious of this process will therefore adopt a new variety every second season. Another reason for purchasing seeds is if the farmer is using a direct seeding technique known as sabog where the rice seed is cast directly on the field by hand. The irregular pattern of planting that results makes weeding difficult so farmers try to buy rice varieties which grow with a long stalk that will outgrow the weeds. Until four or five years ago few farmers used sabog regularly, but it is now becoming a more widespread practice (the reasons for this trend will be

\textsuperscript{88} A locally made hand tractor would cost P35-40,000.
discussed later). If rice seeds are purchased for this or other reasons, it is usually from a dealer and costs the farmer about P400 per cavan of seeds (or P8 per kilo). Approximately three cavans of seeds are needed on one hectare.

If the usual procedure of transplanting is to be used - as it must be in the more important rainy season rice cropping - a team of planters will be assembled and paid daily (or sometimes hourly) wages by the farmer. Between 1990 and 1995, the standard daily agricultural wage in Bunga increased from P80 to P100, but some farmers in Bunga reported that labour coming from other barrios was still asking just P80. In addition, farmers are often expected to provide mid-morning and mid-afternoon snacks for the planters, although some planters will not demand such benefits. For one hectare of rice land, approximately 15-20 person-days of labour will be needed.

During the growing season, new varieties of rice require inputs of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers in order to maximize yields. While farmers in dire straits will frequently apply less than the recommended dosage of pesticides and herbicides (known collectively as gamot or 'medicine'), estimates of total costs for one cropping range between P700 and P1,200. Around four sacks of fertilizer, at P3 50-400 per sack, will also be applied to one hectare.

Farmers are charged for irrigation water by the National Irrigation Authority, although many refuse to pay these dues, complaining that the supply is inadequate and unreliable. The source of the water depends on location. Some parts of Tanza are supplied from the Second Laguna de Bay Irrigation Project, a World Bank funded scheme to bring water westwards from Laguna de Bay into Cavite. Other areas, including Bunga, are irrigated from dams in local streams and rivers. During the rainy season the supply (combined with rain) is more than adequate, but in the dry season farmers frequently face a shortage and in some areas a system known as manggasahan is used, whereby a particular area receives water only once during a rotation lasting five years. Consequently, many farmers plant a dry season crop only once every five years and for the remaining time cultivate vegetables on their land. Those farmers who pay irrigation fees reported current costs of P600 in the rainy season and P900 in the dry season for one hectare.
Unlike labour at the planting stage, harvesters are paid a percentage of the rice that they harvest. From the farmer's point of view this encourages a speedy completion of the task, which is vitally important with a window of opportunity between ripening and wastage lasting only a few days. From the harvesters' perspective the share provides food for their families and or an automatically price-indexed income. The usual share of the yield for harvesters is 10 per cent, but this may increase to 12 per cent if the farmer does not provide snacks for the workers. In cases where the farmer has had to attract labourers from far afield (a trend that will be discussed later), it may also be necessary to provide transportation, food and lodging for the duration of their stay. Approximately 10-15 labourers could complete one hectare in a full day's work.

After harvesting, the rice must be threshed to separate the grain from the stalks. This task would once have been done by hand or, according to one farmer, through a traditional technique that involved allowing a *carabao* to trample the crop in a pit lined with its own hardened excrement. The use of a mechanical thresher is now standard, however, and farmers must pay 10 per cent of the harvest to the owner of the machine and the team operating it.

After the deductions for harvesters and threshers are subtracted the farmer must pay rent (*buwis*) to the owner of the land. The traditional *kasama* system of tenancy dictated that the landowner would pay for all of the expenses incurred in farming and then take a 50 per cent share of the harvest. Since the 'green revolution' of the 1970s (and the increased input costs that resulted) the relationship between landlord and tenant has instead become based on a 25 per cent rental payment in the form of *cavans* of rice, with the tenant meeting all operating expenses. In practice, however, this relationship varies and while some landlords will insist on their formal share, others are satisfied with a fixed amount that is sometimes significantly less and does not vary with the yield. One example of the latter type of arrangement in Bunga involved a farmer paying 15 cavans per year from 1.5 hectares which yielded approximately 180 cavans over two harvests.

After threshing and sacking the *palay* in the field, the harvest must be brought to a rice mill. Most barrios with substantial agricultural lands have at least one mill, but farmers must
usually pay for transportation from their fields unless they own a jeepney. This expense ranges between three and five pesos for each cavan being transported, depending on the distance involved.

All of these expenses must be met from a harvest that is susceptible to the vagaries of climate, pests and diseases. The official expectation is of 100 cavans of palay from one hectare of good, irrigated land during the rainy season if it has been appropriately treated with fertilizers and other inputs. In reality, the farmers surveyed in Bunga harvested an average of 56 cavans per hectare, because cash shortages result in inputs being below the optimum level. One farmer reported using just half of the recommended fertilizer dosage on his land. In the dry season, the total yield is inevitably lower because only land that has reliable water supply is cultivated. But on such land in Bunga the yield was 67 cavans per hectare, reflecting the fact that only the best land is used and that inputs of labour, fertilizer, pesticides etc. can be applied more intensively. If direct seeding, or sabog, is used, however, additional weed growth causes the yield to fall to about 35-45 cavans per hectare.

The palay is sold immediately to a dealer as few farmers have adequate storage facilities to keep either palay or milled rice (bigas) in commercial quantities. Of the 43 farmers surveyed in Bunga after the 1994 rainy season harvest, 17 sold palay to buyers from the neighbouring province of Laguna, 10 to buyers from the neighbouring town of General Trias, 2 to rice millers in other barrios of Tanza, 6 to local dealers in the village itself, and 8 did not sell their surplus crop at all. Farmers will attempt to get the best possible price for their harvest, but the government regulated prices for rice are frequently ignored by dealers and rice millers. At harvest time, it is inevitably a buyer's market:

The farmer here has a big problem including those who buy the palay. Even though you know that bigas is expensive, palay is being bought at a very low price. You as a farmer cannot control the timing of the harvest and you have to sell even at a very low price. You can see the buyer getting rich very quickly. We have a law but if we tell this to the buyer the response is "Sell it to the newspaper". So what can we do? (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)
The selling price will vary depending on individual negotiations and the quality of the rice, but in 1995, one cavan of *palay* in Bunga sold after the rainy season harvest for an average of P5.5 per kilo or P275 per *cavan*, and after the dry season crop for P7 or P350 per cavan. Against this purchase price can be set all of the cash outlays described above for one rainy season harvest. The total costs for one hectare are shown in table 14.

**Table 14 - Rainy Season Cash Expense Estimates for a 1 ha Rice Farm, 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor fuel (for two days)</td>
<td>P2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds (3 sacks @ P400)</td>
<td>P1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planters (15 for 1 day)</td>
<td>P1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesticide and Herbicide</td>
<td>P1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>P1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>P 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>P 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>P8,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various interviews and survey data, Tanza, 1995

This notional figure of P8,000 per hectare compares with an average estimated expenditure per hectare of about P6,318 among surveyed farmers during the 1994 rainy season cropping. The disparity between the two figures probably reflects the fact that not all expenses necessarily grow proportionally as farm size increases above one hectare, and because many farmers are not incurring all of the costs outlined above. Some, for example, were using their own seeds, not paying irrigation fees, not paying for transport and applying less than the recommended dosage of fertilizer and pesticide.
If, however, the inputs in table 14 are assumed to have been applied, then a harvest of 70 cavans is not unrealistic. Table 15 shows the claims that would be made upon that harvest.

Table 15 - Rainy Season Rice Account Estimates for a 1 ha Farm, 1995
(in cavans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HARVEST</th>
<th>70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minus Expenses :-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor rental</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesters (at 10 per cent)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshers (at 10 per cent)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent to Landowner</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NET SURPLUS</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various interviews and survey data, Tanza, 1995

At P275 per cavan, 36 cavans would fetch P9,900, leaving just P1,900 after cash expenses have been deducted - the net gain from three months of work.

In fact, most farmers would sooner retain rice for family consumption than sell it all on the open market. In the rainy season of 1994, 8 of the 43 surveyed farmers in Bunga sold none of their harvested rice, and instead retained it all for household consumption. After the dry season crop of 1995, 18 farmers sold no rice. Of the remaining farmers, most kept a substantial part of their net surplus for domestic consumption. The reason is clear enough: rice is a staple part of every diet and would cost P10-20 per kilo, depending on quality, to purchase in the municipal market.

Evidently, then, rice farming is an economic activity with very slim profit margins and most farmers find themselves short of the capital needed to finance the inputs for a cropping. As a result many take out loans for initial expenses or for other reasons (such as medical or educational expenses or emergency household repairs). Private loans are generally made on the "five-six" principle, meaning an interest rate of 20 per cent over the period of the loan (usually a few months). In the survey of 43 farmers in Bunga, over 75 per cent borrowed money to meet their needs for cash during the growing season. The overwhelming majority of these loans,
Moreover, were made within the village, between private individuals, relatives or the local farming cooperative (see table 16).

**Table 16 - Sources of Agricultural Financing for Farmers in Bunga, 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Financing</th>
<th>Number of Farming Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual outside Bunga</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual in Bunga</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers' Cooperative</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey of Farmers in Bunga, 1995

The result is a situation in which rice farming is only marginally, if at all, profitable. Several farmers described their situation using a metaphor of 'sinking' (*palubog*). Consequently, rice farming has, for many farmers, become simply a means of subsistence rather than profit. During interviews I frequently asked farmers why they would not abandon growing rice altogether and focus on more profitable vegetable crops. The response was invariably that rice provides a basic food staple. But in addition, the social relations embedded in the human ecology of rice (e.g. rentals paid with *cavans* of rice) make it more than just another crop to be cultivated. It provides a significant food source and a culturally important practice. To many farmers it would be unconscionable to purchase rice in the market and thereby be vulnerable to market forces for the most basic of necessities. Thus most adopt a strategy of growing palay for their food needs and relying on vegetable crops to provide for household expenses in the cash economy:

The profit we get from palay is for eating; and then the income from other crops is what we use for household expenses. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)
Iyong tubo namin sa palay iyon ang aming pangkain; tapos, iyong kinikita namin sa halaman, panggastos namin sa bahay.

In 1995, 35 of 43 surveyed farmers in Bunga were cultivating vegetables on plots ranging in size from 50 square metres to 3 hectares (in the latter case, the entire farm area was being used for vegetables between rice crops). For most, however, vegetables are cultivated on 300-400 square metres of land on a permanent basis. The costs and benefits involved in vegetable cultivation are far less predictable than rice, but if market prices are high at harvest time, the returns can be considerable. One farmer in Bunga was cultivating *sitaw*, or string beans, on a 300 sq.m. plot and the crop consumed just P400 for fertilizer and P600 for insecticide. All labour inputs were from family members and the yield after harvest was P6,000. But, as farmers repeatedly told me, vegetable cultivation leaves a great deal to luck or fate (*suwerte*), with respect to climate, water supply, diseases and market conditions.

Another source of occasional income is through livestock rearing. Livestock are owned by 35 of 43 surveyed farmers in Bunga, ranging from a single cow up to a profitable stock of cattle, poultry or swine. For most, however, livestock holdings consist of little more than a few head of cattle and some chickens, which will be consumed or sold in times of need or celebration.

7.2.4 Social Divisions of Labour

Two divisions of labour run implicitly throughout this account of the economics of rice farming. The first is the social stratification of households within the village according to economic well-being and access to resources. The second is the distribution of responsibilities according to age, gender, marital status, birth order and other culturally constructed categories which determine, in general, how household and productive tasks are assigned to individuals.

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89 See the earlier footnote for a list of commonly grown vegetable and fruit crops.
Village level stratification is complex and is not easily determined simply from survey returns on occupation, which was collected, or income, which was not. Nor can stratification be reduced to the concept of 'class'. While access to land as the means of production is an important factor in determining socioeconomic status, it is far from the only one. With every categorization scheme there inevitably arise overlaps and exceptions. It is, however, important to attempt such a categorization if only to dispel the myth that the village 'community' in some way represents a groups of individuals with a common agenda and identical experiences of change. Based on interviews, surveys and observation, the following categories usefully subdivide the village socioeconomy in Tanza.

Firstly, there are inevitably linkages with those who do not live in the village but exert a strong influence on social relations there. Most importantly, landowners who collect rent on land (and sometimes homelots) from villagers play a role both in this capacity and often as creditors in the agricultural process. In addition, local politicians must be included, given their influence on agrarian reform implementation, infrastructure development, land conversion, and employment.

Within the village, those with cash remittances coming regularly from relatives working abroad are usually among the wealthiest residents, even though their relatives might simply be a maid or construction worker. They will participate as part of a broader class of renters and creditors within the village, owning capital goods such as rice mills, threshers, and hand tractors and lending money to farmers for their operating expenses. In his study of a barrio in Central Luzon, Brian Fegan identifies this class of villagers as the principal beneficiaries of rice cultivation - what he calls "accumulation on the basis of an unprofitable crop" (1989, 169). Such individuals might also act as small business entrepreneurs or hold village-level government posts. This category will also often include professionals such as engineers and teachers who have no direct relation with the farming economy.

The wealthiest class of tenant farmers might form part of the renter/creditor category, but would also participate directly on their own account in the productive activities of agriculture. Those in a position not to borrow money for their own farming operations and to lend to others
are likely to be farming households with a diversified range of activities, including fruit and vegetable crops, flowers, livestock, and perhaps some entrepreneurial sidelines such as a variety (sari-sari) store.

The vast majority of farmers, however, are those who need to borrow money for their agricultural activities and yet still manage to make ends meet from a farm of viable size (over about 2 ha), some livestock, diversified crops and perhaps some money from children working at local factories. In a more tenuous position are those farmers who do not have legal tenancies, but who farm other's land either seasonally or semi-permanently through a variety of subtenancy arrangements.

Finally there are households who do not have regular access to land and who earn food and money by working on other people's land on a daily basis, for example at harvest or planting times. These households are by far the most economically marginal and have arrived at their current circumstances for a variety of reasons. Some simply haven't inherited any land from their parents who had tenancy rights but had too many children among whom to share them. Some are themselves the children of landless parents without the resources to have kept them in school beyond a few elementary grades. Others are migrants to the area and must therefore live with the double jeopardy of being without both land and a kinship network to support them.

These 'classes' are necessarily vague, but provide a preliminary understanding of the economic and social divisions or labour and power within farming villages. Alternative schemes have been proposed based on studies in other parts of the Philippines. Kerkvliet (1990), for example, identifies groups for a Central Luzon village based on the broad categories of 'class' and 'status' distinguished by Max Weber. Four status groups, based on standard of living, emerge in Kerkvliet's study: the very poor, the less poor, the adequate and the rich. Classes meanwhile divide into working class, peasants, petty entrepreneurs, and capitalists, with each category subdividing further. The groups I have identified bear some relation to Kerkvliet's, but combine elements of both class as relation to the means of production and status as standard of living.
Within the household a division of labour exists that allocates tasks to various members. When asked directly about divisions of labour, many interviewees, male and female, responded that there is no separation of responsibilities and that "they are just partners" (parehas lamang sila) who "help each other" (tulungan na lang sila). Even less direct questions about the generic characteristics of a 'good' wife or a 'good' husband did not elicit clear distinctions in roles - "you're together, you need to help one another" (magkasama kayo, dapat magkatutulungan). Despite these claims, a division of labour clearly does exist. For some activities it is not rigid and allows a variety of household members to participate in an activity while it remains the principal responsibility of one person. In other cases, where divisions are firmer, transgressions occur only in individual cases, and may draw comment and even mockery. For example, interviewees suggested that if a choice has to be made where work needs to be done in the fields but children must be supervised, then it will inevitably be the mother that stays behind.

In many cases, however, it is clear that women carry out numerous agricultural tasks such as watering, weeding, fertilizing, planting, harvesting and marketing produce, as well as acting as financial and commercial managers of the operation. Indeed one woman, whose household engaged in a wide range of farming activities including growing sampaguita flowers, keeping ducks for eggs, and growing rice, vegetables and fruits, described (only partly in jest) her husband's role in the following way:

He's just my sidekick here, I just order him around here, 'water the sampaguita, weed it.' The problem with your weeding is that you will just weed the bit at the end, and tomorrow you'll be somewhere else. You'll see him there. It's not connected [i.e. not methodical] (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)


Most farming activities are carried out by both men and women, such as planting and harvesting, although sometimes groups will be formed for these purposes that are exclusively
male or female. Some interviewees argued that a male-only group reflected the fact that men harvest faster than women and so it would be unfair on other members to admit a slower harvester. Others, however, suggested that women have many other responsibilities, particularly childcare, and so cannot commit to a formal grouping as easily (particularly one that takes life so seriously). A few activities are almost exclusively male preserves, such as threshing and applying chemical pesticides. But as in other activities there are those who transgress identities:

Here in our place I can see a man's work also being done by a woman. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

*Dito sa amin meron akong nakikita kung ano ang trabaho ng lalake trabaho rin ng babae.*

The precise division of labour between farming couples ultimately depends on the nature of the individual relationship, but there are few activities from which women or men are culturally excluded. In practice, however, women's additional responsibilities in the domestic sphere usually mean that most field work is assigned to men. Changes in this division of gender roles will be discussed further later in this chapter and in chapter 9.

In the domestic sphere most tasks fall primarily to women, although here too men participate to a degree that differs between individual relationships. As table 17 shows, women dominate all household activities except household repairs.

**Table 17 - Distribution of Household Chores in Bunga by Gender, 1995**
(number of survey respondents participating in each activity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Chore</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household repairs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bunga Household Survey, 1995
There are, however, a few cases where husbands stay at home to provide childcare and wash clothes etc. while their wives work at local factories.

Children also engage in farm and household work. Their level of participation depends on age, educational/occupational status and willingness to help. Those below six years old are generally not expected to contribute anything to household or farm work. Above six years, children can contribute to chores outside of school time, or on a full time basis if their parents have been unable to keep them in school - a decision that is usually precipitated by financial hardship:

At present, my third child is in second year high school and is close to a vacation. As a parent it is my dream for her to finish high school. And a parent, even if poor, dreams that she will go to college. But if the parent cannot afford it, then the child has to stop even in high school. (Farmer in Bunga)

The duties that children perform would revolve around minor household chores, looking after livestock and bringing food to workers in the fields. Older children (over 10-12 years), however, can participate in the full range of farming activities, including harvesting and planting. In both cases younger workers earn the same amount as an adult. For older children who have entered the industrial workforce, however, expectations regarding household and farming chores are usually reduced.

All of this assumes that children are willing to help. While they can participate in farming activities or household chores, they are often reluctant to do so. Most parents expressed exasperation at this, but would decline to coerce their children into helping. Much of this attitude towards farming among young people can be attributed to changing youth and work cultures, that
are themselves closely linked to broader processes of industrialization and urbanization in Cavite. These changes will be examined in more detail later in this chapter and in chapter 9.

Even where children are willing to help, however, not all farmers will use the pool of labour provided by the family to offset their labour costs, even where these costs are onerous. This is for several reasons: the need for labour far exceeds the number of people who could be called upon for free labour within the immediate family; farmers often find it difficult to coerce their children into working in the fields; and, many of the tasks involved in crop tending require care and skill and so many farmers would not risk entrusting them to family labour.

7.3 The Local Labour Market

On the basis of this detailed description of farming and farm life in Tanza, we can now proceed to examine some of the recent changes that rural households have experienced as a result of globalized development. The most significant change in the village of Bunga, and many other villages like it, is a transformed labour market in which farmers must compete with other new economic activities for the services of the workforce.

The most significant of these new opportunities is the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ) in the neighbouring town of Rosario. The zone first started to attract investment in the late 1980s (see table 1) and by 1995 the CEPZ had a workforce of 38,264, of whom 7,110 lived in Rosario itself and 6,043 in Tanza (see table 10). In addition approximately 800 more residents of Tanza worked in the three factories established in the town itself. Most of these workers are between the ages of 16 and 30. Meanwhile, over the last few decades, many others have taken jobs overseas, usually as domestic helpers in East Asia, Europe or North America, construction workers in the Middle East, or merchant seamen. The result has been significant changes in the local labour market as a predominantly agricultural town in Manila's rural hinterland has become
swept up in changes resulting from the rapid industrialization of the 1990s described in chapters 5 and 6.

A large literature exists on the subject of non-farm employment in rural areas of Asia. Much of this work assumes, however, that non-farm work is still centred on the farming family, for example in household craft production, rather than full-scale factory-based industrialization (Islam, 1987). A literature has also emerged that examines the socialization of rural workforce into a 'modern' factory regime (Ong, 1987; Wolf, 1992; Pinches and Lakha, 1992). Little, however, has been written of the impact of factory work on agricultural activities. Nevertheless, the development plans envisaging globalized development for Cavite assume that farm and factory production will coexist harmoniously. The key word throughout is "balanced" development. A major objective of the Calabarzon Masterplan, for example, is to "sustain high level of growth on the balance between agriculture and industry by promoting their complementary linkages, improving the industrial structure and inducing related service activities" (JICA, 1991, 4). The Cavite Provincial Development Plan strikes a similar tone and provides a land use plan based on "the assumed development thrusts of the province, namely, industrialization, agricultural modernization, tourism development, and rapid urbanization... integrating urban functions to that of agricultural development" (Province of Cavite, 1990, 50, emphasis added). Even the Tanza municipal development plan proposes that "the municipality should promote and establish a self-sustaining economic structure within the context of a balanced agro-industrial type of development" (Municipality of Tanza, 1995, 109, emphasis added).

What none of these documents addresses is the way in which industrial development actually intersects with the experiences of farming households. But the export-oriented
industries that have developed in Cavite draw, to a large extent, on the same local labour force as existing agricultural activities. In the rest of this chapter, I will examine the ways in which globalized development has intersected with farming activities through the transformation of the local labour market. The village of Bunga will provide a case study for this examination.

7.3.1 Background on Bunga

The village of Bunga lies alongside the Canas River about 5 km from the town proper (bayan) of Tanza. Before the war (1941-45 in the Philippines), Bunga still had large areas of forest and uncultivated scrubland. At that time there were just nine houses in the village, but the Japanese occupation of General Trias (commonly known by its old name of Malabon) across the Canas River drove several more families to move to the village to avoid the brutalities of war. One woman in Bunga remembers her mother suffering a miscarriage after a severe beating from Japanese soldiers who suspected her of feeding guerrillas. By the end of the war there were 15-16 houses in the village and about six extended families. Even now, most of the village is related through birth or marriage to one of these six families.

At that time there was no road to the town, but just an 'alley' (eskinita) along which villagers could walk for two hours to reach the bayan. It was in 1952 that a dirt road was opened up to link the village with the town. Children would have to walk to school in the town, meaning that many of the older generation did not complete beyond a few years of elementary education. In addition, a small canoe (banca) connected the village to General Trias across the Canas River.

In 1975 a horse-drawn carriage service (kalesa) started to provide transportation between the village and the town. The major improvement in transport, however, came in the early 1980s when the road was asphalted in 1980 and a motorcycle service started between Bunga and the bayan in 1983. This service is still the main means of transportation (although the road is now

---

90 Historical dates and figures are drawn from oral histories collected during interviews with villagers.
badly potholed) and allows easier delivery of produce to the market and children to school. With the growing number of young people working at CEPZ in the 1990s, the tricycle service has become more frequent. A further result of improved communications has been that outside buyers now visit Bunga to purchase both rice and vegetables, meaning that transportation to market no longer limits vegetable cultivation. Nevertheless the village is still relatively secluded (liblib) from the rest of the municipality.\footnote{I have learned that the road to Bunga was concreted in December 1996. Transportation services to and from the village are therefore greatly enhanced. It will be interesting to see how this greater connectivity - the creation of a new transactional space - will affect development in Bunga in the years to come. I am grateful to Manny Bobadiilla for this information.}

The village's infrastructure has expanded over the last two decades. Bunga's elementary school was constructed in the 1970s and in the early 1980s electrical power was first supplied to the village. In 1994 a bridge, road and aqueduct were constructed across the Canas River by the National Irrigation Authority to link Bunga with General Trias (see Map 4).
According to the 1990 census of population, 1,103 people were living in Bunga in 205 households. My own survey in 1995, covering 230 of the 260 houses in the village, recorded 1,154 people, which by extrapolation would suggest a total population of approximately 1,300. This represents an annual increase of around three per cent, which roughly corresponds to the national rate of population growth over the same period. Map 4 shows the contemporary settlement geography of this population. The age-sex distribution of the population is shown in figure 8.

**Figure 8 - Age/Sex Structure of Bunga, 1995**

The occupational structure of the village is provided in tables 18 and 19. These tables provide primary and secondary household incomes, but it was evident during qualitative interviews that sources of livelihood often extend to a diverse range of activities. The concept of 'a job' or 'a career', which is easily assumed in designing survey instruments from a 'Western' perspective, clearly did not apply. While only two occupations have been included here, the fact that the total number of secondary occupations is almost as high as primary occupations strongly
implies the prevalence of livelihood diversity. To give an indication of the overall economic structure of the village's economy, these figures are aggregated in table 20 and figure 9. The data demonstrate the essentially agrarian nature of the village economy, and importance of factory employment as a secondary income source.
## Table 18 - Primary Household Occupation by Gender, Bunga, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Occupation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural/Resource Based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Farmer or Farmer with land TF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/helper on a relative's land FR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer attached to other's land FO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Labourer FL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Planter on other's land VG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresher Operator TO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay Dealer PD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator and Seller of Sampaguita SC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catching Fish FS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factory Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker at CEPZ EZ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker elsewhere FW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine National Police Officer NP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces, military/civilian PN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and Related Sectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction/Contract Worker Overseas CO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter CP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker CW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician/Mechanic/Welder EL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer ER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason MS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painter PT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Worker MW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agent RE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retail/Distribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Boy DB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Vendor FV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson SL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari-Sari storekeeper SS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant Waiter/Dishwasher RS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junk Dealer JD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper DH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaker/Home Sewer DM+SW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver DV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle Driver TD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman SE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Guard SG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical/Dental Assistant MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber BB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Programmer CM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Bunga, 1995
Table 19 - Secondary Household Occupations by Gender, Bunga, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Occupation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural/Resource based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Farmer or Farmer w/ land TF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/helper on a relative's land FR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm labourer FL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable planter on other's land VG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresher Operator TO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay Dealer PD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Miller RC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring for other's livestock LC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping livestock LV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampaguita threading/selling SM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Cheese Vendor CV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable vendor in market VS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factory Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker at CEPZ EZ</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker elsewhere FW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage Collector GC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Employee GE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Government Official GO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher TC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and Related Sectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction/other OCW CO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker CW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician/Mechanic/Welder EL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer ER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Worker MW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retail/Distribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish vendor FV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari-Sari storekeeper SS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snack Vendor SV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Store Assistant DS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant Waiter/Dishwasher RS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junk Dealer JD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle Driver TD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper/Cook DH+CK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaker/Home Sewer DM+SW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling Coordinator GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labandera / Laundry LB</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwife MD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanny/Babysitter NN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman SE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary SR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Bunga, 1995
Table 20 - Total Occupational Structure of Bunga, by Sector, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of working population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural/Resources</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction &amp; Related Sectors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail/Distribution</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Services</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Working Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Student</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Bunga, 1995

Figure 9 - Occupational Structure of Working Population in Bunga, 1995

Source: Household Surveys, Bunga, 1995
7.3.2 Overseas Work

Since the early 1970s, the Philippines has been a major exporter of labour. In 1995, about 6 million Filipinos lived overseas - 2.5 million documented overseas contract workers, 1.8 million undocumented workers, and 1.8 million permanent residents overseas. In 1995 remittances from overseas workers reached a record US$4.9 billion. Like most other Filipino villagers, people in Bunga aspire to the foreign currency earnings of working abroad and the financial security which it can provide in local terms. Relatively few households have had such an opportunity, but the benefits to those that have are immediately apparent. Solidly built houses, electrical appliances and comfortable furnishings all indicate that someone in the household has been, or is currently, working overseas. In Bunga, 25 out of 231 surveyed households included someone who had worked abroad in the past. A further 16 households currently had members working abroad (two households had two people, giving a total of 18 individuals currently abroad). Tables 21 and 22 provide a breakdown of this total by destination, gender and occupation.

Table 21 - Currently Deployed Overseas Workers from Bunga, by Destination, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Work</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Household Surveys, 1995

---

### Table 22 - Currently Deployed Overseas Workers from Bunga, by Occupation, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Type</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Programmer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Household Surveys, 1995

Although the numbers involved in overseas work remain relatively small - currently removing only 18 individuals from the labour market - its effect is felt beyond this number alone. For every person that is abroad, or who has previously been abroad, there is one, or perhaps more, others who need not engage in the gruelling work involved in harvesting or planting rice because of the 'dollar' income that is coming in. Also, as chapter 9 will describe, the possibility of working abroad has an effect on the aspirations and work attitudes of the younger generation. Thus, in one case, a farmer's son could refuse to work for his father while he did nothing but wait for his papers to come through to become a seaman.

#### 7.3.3 Factory Work

For many, overseas work is unavailable or undesirable, and so for the majority of people in Bunga the main point of contact, in economic terms, with a globalized economy is through employment at a factory in the CEPZ. Finding work there is known to be relatively easy. Job vacancies are usually filled through word of mouth as workers tell their friends and relatives who then approach company managers in person. Although the broader literature on the labour process in Cavite, particularly in the publications of progressive groups, suggest that political connections are the key to employment, only a few workers living in Bunga secured their jobs
with this kind of help. More important was to have a 'backer' inside the factory itself who could vouch for you and act as 'padrino' (literally godfather, but in this case sponsor or go-between).

Individual firms vary in their recruitment practices, with garment factories known to have less stringent requirements than those in the electronics sector. A minimal process would involve the completion of an application form and an interview either with supervisors (usually Filipino) or even factory managers (usually foreign nationals). Some firms may also administer an exam and require a letter of recommendation from a barangay captain, councillor or the municipal mayor. The documentation required includes a birth certificate, police clearance, barangay clearance, residency certificate, Social Security System papers and educational transcripts. The clearances are intended to assure the employer that the worker has no criminal record and has a fixed address in a local barangay.

While these are the formal mechanisms for recruitment, there also appear to be other selection criteria at work in filling vacancies at the CEPZ. According to the law, a person must be 16 years of age to hold full time employment. Many, however, falsify their age and are taken much younger, including 13 year olds. Villagers believed that factories turned a blind eye to this practice because they prefer to take younger workers who will be more malleable and socialized into a parental mode of discipline that can be transferred to the factory floor. Single and childless individuals are also seen to be preferred, leading some women to conceal their marriage and motherhood from factory recruiters. The invisible ceiling for employment appears to be around 40 years.

Educational status also appears to be a sensitive issue for recruiters. While garments factories will accept workers with only elementary school graduation, many in the electronics sector require high school completion, and, for supervisory positions, college graduation. At the same time, interviewees in Bunga felt that the desire for well-qualified workers was limited:

There are those who were able to work at EPZA and yet didn't finish schooling. They just borrow a diploma. They don't like bright people at EPZA. There's someone from Santol who was very intelligent and yet wasn't accepted. She [or he] was studying law. Why?
Intelligent people know about unions. They don't like unions there at EPZA. Those people know the ins and outs of it [a union]. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

*Meron din namang hindi nakakatapos ay napasok sa EPZA. Manghiram lang ng diploma. Mas ayaw pa yata sa EPZA ng mas marunong. Iyong taga Santol, masyadong marunong, ayaw tanggapin. Nag-aral ng abogasya.*

Q. *Bakit?*

*Ang marunong ay maalam ng union-union. Ayaw ng may union diyan sa EPZA. Alam nila ang pasikot-sikot.*

The most significant filter on the employment process, however, appears to be based on gender. As a whole 77 per cent of employees at CEPZ are women (see chapter 6), but in Bunga the proportion is 90 per cent. It seems likely that selection on the basis of gender aims to draw upon the same culturally-rooted power relations as the age-bias. Women are socially constructed as being under the protection of men, with role-models for girls (as outlined in chapter 4) providing images of nurturing wives and mothers. Such cultural constructions, fostered at home and school, are employed on the factory floor where supervisors are generally older women and managers are men.

One young man expressed his perception of the situation in the following terms:

*It's really easy for women to be accepted. It seems they trust women, but men they don't seem to trust. Because I think men must be very bad [said sarcastically].... Maybe it's on trust. Companies trust women much more than they trust men. Because men really fight back, women do not, they are soft-hearted [or weak].* (Young man, Bunga, 1995)


The typical profile of a line worker at CEPZ then, is a young single woman with at least some high school education. Middle aged male farmers and farm labourers do not fit the profile for employment at the CEPZ. "I don't fit there..." *(Hindi na ako maaari doon...), one commented, reflecting on his age and lack of formal education.*
Many factories run shifts around the clock and so employees find themselves working for eight hours in time slots that can vary from month to month. Thus while many women working at CEPZ have ambitions to continue studying, it is difficult to plan any sort of further education around the variable working hours at the factory. Most workers get to CEPZ by catching a tricycle from Bunga to the main highway in Tanza and from there a jeepney or bus to the gates of the zone.

Workers are paid every two weeks either through direct deposit to a bank account or in cash, with deductions for Social Security contributions. The legal minimum daily wage in the manufacturing sector is P138 after deductions, but companies can legally pay a lower wage of P95-120 during a probationary period lasting six months. These regulations are adhered to by some companies, but others breach them flagrantly. In one case, a probationary worker was started at P25 a day, and wages of P80 were not uncommon. In some cases, companies also failed to pay wages on time or omitted to make appropriate Social Security contributions.

Working conditions in factories varied. Garment factories are generally acknowledged as being harder work than electronics firms, as the work often involves standing for hours at a time. Some workers also complained about the coldness of the air-conditioned factory environment. The working week is six or seven days, although some factories will lay off workers temporarily if there is a period of low orders. Shifts are eight hours long with 30 minutes for lunch and two 15 minute breaks.

The compensation for this work, if the minimum wage is paid, amounts to about P2,000 every two weeks (equivalent to approximately C$100). From this must be subtracted the costs of transportation and food:

EPZA helps a little. The children that have work can help.... But they can't save, because, firstly, the income is small, it's not large there. The expenses with that work,

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93 A tricycle is a motorbike with a sidecar attached. It is used as a mode of public transport for routes not plied by jeepneys. Up to six people might be seated on board (less if one of them is a large Englishman) and fares range from 2 pesos upwards, depending on distance.
for transportation a large amount is deducted, and the food - they're eating in the canteen [at the factory]. Almost nothing is left to them. (Parent in Bunga, 1995)

\textit{Nakatulong-tulong na rin ang EPZA. Nakakatulong-tulong ang mga anak na may trabaho... Hindi na makaipon, gawa ng, una maliit ang gana, hindi naman malaki ang gana natin. Magastos naman itong magtrabaho, sa pasahe lang, halos napakalaki ng nababawas, eh, yung, pagkain pa. Nakain sa canteen. Wala na rin gasinong natitira.}

Many observed that the salary is barely sufficient for one person, and workers at the CEPZ are often in a position of having to borrow money from their parents for transportation. Yet many workers are also able to pass on a part of their salary to their parents.

The sharing of income from CEPZ with parents is usually voluntary, but undoubtedly expected. The amount contributed ranges from a few hundred pesos to half or even the whole salary, in which case parents will provide them with an allowance. In farming families, the additional cash income can preclude the need for borrowing to cover farming expenses. Two parents reflected on the benefits of employment at CEPZ:

Wife: It's a big benefit because they're working and they're giving money.  
Husband: EPZA is also a big help for people from the barrio. Young people who don't have jobs just go and work there at EPZA, helping the parents. (Couple in Bunga, 1995)

Wife: \textit{Malaki ang karagdagan kasi nagtatrabaho nakakabigay pa ng pera}  
Husband: \textit{Malaki rin ang tulong ng EPZA dito sa mga taga barrio. Walang hanapbuhay ang mga bata, ipapasok mo sa EPZA, nakakatrabaho doon, nakakatulong sa magulang.}

Some interviewees compared the relative contributions of sons and daughters.

Sometimes, like my daughter who works at a factory, this last season, she's the one who helped me with the planting. My daughters help. That's why I can say, I will say, that daughters are really better [than sons]. She gave me money for expenses. I'm not really asking her. For example, [I will say] 'Neneng, we'll be planting soon, and I have no money, I'll have to borrow it'. She gives it to me, voluntarily. (Farmer in Bunga)

\textit{Minsan, tulad ng anak kong nasa pabrika, eh, itong nagdaang ito, eh, siya ang tumulong sa pagpapatanim. Nakakatulong yang mga anak ko. Kaya sabi ko, masasabi kong magaling pa ang anak na babae talaga. Binigyan ako ng panggastos. Yan namang anak, eh, hindi naman ako humihingi sa kanila. Halimbawa, yan Neneng, eh,}
In another case, a farmer compares his son and his daughter. For his son, aged 22, who lives at home and works as an agricultural labourer: "if his parents don't ask he will not give" (kung hindi hihingi ang magulang, hindi magbibigay). But for his daughter, aged 19, who works at a CEPZ garments factory, "she's giving, just like that, naturally as she's living in my place" (nagbibigay, katulad nga niyan, siyempre dito siya nakatira sa akin). In addition to contributing to the family expenses, working children also cover their own costs of living:

That's a big help for us parents, because whenever she lacks money, if we spend for her it's just a little. It's not like when you're with your parents and you don't have a job. Your every move, every time you eat, and your clothes - all will be shouldered by your parents. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

Malaking tulong na rin yon para sa kanya kung siya man ay magkulang ang kanyang kita, gumasta man ang magulang ay kaanti na lang. Hindi katulad ng ikaw ay nasa iyong magulang, wala kang trabaho. Bawat kilos mo, kain mo, hanggang sa pananamit, dala ng lahat ng magulang mo.

One could be left with the impression that these young women are in a situation of double exploitation - working for low wages in a factory and then persuaded by gentle moral coercion to turn over their earnings to parents at home. But daughters too expressed their willingness to contribute and actually spoke of their contribution as enhancing their status in the household, "because, actually, if you are earning a salary, you can help a little" (kasi, actually; makakasweldo ka na iyon parang nakakatulong-tulong ka na) (Female EPZA worker in Bunga, 1995). The share of the income kept for themselves can also be spent on consuming items that would otherwise be unaffordable - for example, trips to go 'malling' in Manila and buying clothes and fast food (consumption decisions that will be explored further in chapter 9).
7.4 Agriculture and Labour Scarcity

The result of overseas and factory work has been substantial changes in the local labour market in Bunga. The pool of agricultural labour that was once available to be tapped at harvest and planting time is now absorbed by other activities:

From when factories first started to multiply in Cavite, many people didn't work in farming, like harvesting, many don't like to harvest, like planters they have disappeared. That's why it's difficult for farmers. That's a big loss. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)


A variety of responses to these circumstances have emerged. Many farmers have adapted production techniques to use less labour power, migrant agricultural labour is being widely used, harvesting teams have developed in the village, farming households have increased the use of family labour in a few instances, and cultivation of labour-intensive vegetable crops have been limited. These responses are described in the following sections.

7.4.1 Direct Seeding

A common reaction to labour shortage has been the increased use of the direct seeding, or sabog, technique mentioned earlier. This hand-casting of seeds onto the field precludes the need for labour in transplanting seedlings from nursery fields. The random dispersal of seeds, however, does mean that fields are more difficult to weed than a crop planted in uniform rows, and so yields are typically less. One farmer estimated a decline in yield from around 60 cavans per hectare with manual planters to only 35-40 cavans using sabog. Other farmers broadly confirmed this magnitude of yield reduction. Another disadvantage encountered in using sabog is that seeds are highly sensitive to water conditions and are prone to rot if water-logged. In
general, therefore, *sabog* can only be used in the *tagaraw* (dry season) cropping, when water from irrigation canals can be closely controlled.

Despite these drawbacks, the use of *sabog* has become increasingly common in the face of labour market changes:

... If we don't have planters, we use *sabog* instead. That's our way, we are then free from expenses. There are many who are doing it. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

...*pag walang nagtatanim sabog na lang ginagawa. Iyon ang paraan, libre pa sa gastos. Iyon marami ang gumagawa.*

Since 1990, in particular, when employment at local factories started to proliferate, the use of *sabog* has become widespread, as table 23 indicates.

**Table 23 - The Emergence of Sabog Utilization in Bunga, 1975-1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year when sabog was first used</th>
<th>Number of farming households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not using sabog</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Farming survey, 1995

These figures do not imply, however, that 30 farmers are now always using *sabog* during the dry season cropping. Farmers will decide according to the apparent availability of labour and their own financial circumstances whether the use of direct seeding is economically rational. In the 1995 dry season cropping, for example, 15 of the 43 farmers surveyed used *sabog*. What is clear,
however, is that its use has increased sharply during the 1990s as a response to changing labour market conditions, with reduced crop yields as a direct consequence.

7.4.2 Migrant Agricultural Labour

A second consequence of the changing local labour market has been the migration of agricultural workers into Tanza. In some cases, migration is temporary, as workers from other provinces, particularly Batangas, are transported to Cavite and stay only for the duration of the harvesting period. The arrangements for this circular migration are informal but well established. A representative of a team of harvesters will visit Tanza and assess the likely peak harvesting time for crops already in the ground. He (such groups are, to my knowledge, exclusively male) will then make arrangements with various farmers to return at the appropriate time with a team of harvesters. The farmer will pay for their passage from Batangas and will also provide accommodation (usually a thatched *nipa* hut near the fields) and meals for the duration of their stay. Alternatively, a farmer might be forced to seek out harvesters either from among teams brought by other farmers or by actually travelling to towns in Cavite or Batangas to find them. In either case, the farmer incurs additional expenses in the form of transportation and board and lodging for the harvesting team.

Migrants from further afield, particularly the Visayas, have opted to stay semi-permanently in Tanza, living either on the farmland of their employer if they work for an individual farmer, or in small 'ghettoes' that have emerged in several of Tanza's rural villages. While the reason for selecting a particular village to settle in may be a family connection, however tenuous, the broader structural reason for migrating to the area is the availability of agricultural and other work opportunities. Tables 24 and 25 show the place of birth, year of arrival and occupational characteristics of migrants to Bunga. The data confirm several qualitative impressions about the nature of migration to the area. Firstly, migration into Bunga
has accelerated over the last three decades and figures for the five years since 1990 suggest continued growth in the immigrant population. Secondly, the most important source of migrants into the area is the Visayan region of the Philippines - more important even than Manila and the adjacent regions of Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon. Finally, for those immigrants in the workforce, the agricultural and construction sectors are clearly the most important.

Table 24 - Birthplace and Arrival Date of non-Cavitenos in Bunga, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>S. Tagalog &amp; C. Luzon</th>
<th>Metro Manila</th>
<th>Northern Luzon</th>
<th>Visayas</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of Arrival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Survey, 1995
Table 25 - Birthplace and Occupation of non-Cavitenos in Bunga, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Sector</th>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Visayas</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural/Resource based</td>
<td>S. Tagalog &amp; C. Luzon</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Work</td>
<td>Metro Manila</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sector</td>
<td>Northern Luzon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and related sectors</td>
<td>Metro Manila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and distribution</td>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Services</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Survey, 1995

These data suggest that just under 10 per cent of Bunga's population was born outside of Cavite. In relative terms this is a small proportion (as will be apparent in chapter 8 which describes recent changes in barrio Mulawin). Nevertheless, people in Bunga still spoke of "the Visayans" in a way that suggested their presence, even on account of marriage or other relationships, does not go unnoticed and that they are identified as different. The social tensions that occasionally result from different linguistic and regional identities will be discussed in the next chapter.

7.4.3 The Formation of Harvesting Teams

The shortage of agricultural labour has made the harvest a tense time for farmers. A window of only about five days exists between the rice fully ripening and the crop being ruined.
It is essential, therefore, to have access to the services of harvesters at the appropriate time. Before recent changes in the local labour market, a sufficient pool of labour existed within each village to meet the needs of its farmers. Now, in conditions of labour shortage, those harvesters that do still work locally have begun to develop teams in order to carry out the work more efficiently. Rather than try to scrounge together sufficient labour, a farmer can simply approach a team - either local or migrant - and secure their services for a specific period:

We formed the group for a reason. Because it's now the trend here. If you're not with a group then you cannot harvest. Farmers like to harvest the palay all at once, that's why we formed the group. (Agricultural worker, Bunga, 1995)

Dahil sa isang pakay, kaya kami nakabuo ng grupo. Dahil usong-uso sa amin dito. Kapag ika'y walang grupo, hindi ka makaka-ani. Yung mga tao, gusto biglaan ang ani nila, kaya kami nagtayo ng grupo.

The formation of harvesting groups is beneficial for both farmer and harvester. The farmer is provided with an efficient labour supply when it is needed, and the harvesters can group together to work faster and harvest a greater area. Membership of a group is not, however, open to all. Some groups are all male, and even where they are mixed, women may be unable to join because domestic responsibilities mean that they cannot provide a full-time commitment to the group.

7.4.4 The Use of Family Labour

A further consequence of labour shortage is an increased dependence, in some cases, on household labour:

EPZA has a big impact on us. We don't have harvesters now. Even planters, none also. When it's rainy season, the palay often rots because there are no harvesters... What do people in Bunga do about that? They themselves are the ones harvesting, the owner. The family harvests. The whole family. We're the ones harvesting. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)
This farmer's statement did not, however, hold true for many other households. Both survey returns and qualitative interviews suggested that household divisions of labour remain intact, not least because it would require an exceptionally large and energetic family to replace the labour input of hired workers. In addition, the changing attitudes towards agricultural work among the younger generation, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9, leave farmers exasperated at their children's unwillingness to help in farming tasks.

7.4.5 Limiting Vegetable Cultivation

The shortage of agricultural workers also places limitations on the extent to which farmers can take advantage of the profitability of vegetable cultivation. Even if help could be found, hiring waged labour at current rates would substantially offset the profits of cultivation. Some farmers also expressed reluctance to hire workers for vegetable plots because the constant and careful attention that they require leave them vulnerable to workers who are either less than conscientious or decide to pursue other opportunities in the middle of a cropping. The result is that most farmers limit their vegetable cultivation to an area that they can maintain with their own labour and that of family members. This appears to be at least part of the answer to a question I asked farmers repeatedly during interviews. Why would they not cultivate a greater area of vegetables when such crops were clearly more profitable than rice? The rest of the answer would seem to lie in a cultural attachment to rice cultivation, and the embeddedness of certain social relationships - most notably between landlords and tenants - in the process of rice farming.
At a broader level, these limitations suggest that the supposed intensification of agriculture with urbanization that orthodox theory and planners would predict is not happening in Bunga, precisely because of the labour market changes associated with urbanization and industrialization. While farmers are growing more vegetables than in the past, due to increased accessibility and technical assistance, expansion of such activities is limited by both socio-cultural factors and by the shortage of wage labour in agriculture.

7.5 Conclusions

The cultivation of rice remains at the core of the economy for a barrio such as Bunga. Even though a detailed accounting of the household economics of rice farming indicates its marginality, it persists because it provides a key dietary staple and forms a central axis for the social and cultural relationships that structure rural life. Various social and gendered divisions of labour are embodied in the human ecology of rice farming. This context fundamentally affects the ways in which globalized development is activated in the lives of men and women in a village like Bunga.

The nature of Bunga's economy means that access to land is a fundamental axis of social differentiation. For historical reasons described in earlier chapters the predominant model of access is through a tenancy with an absent landowner. Rental payments are remitted to the owner after each rainy season cropping in the form of sacks of rice. After this and other expenses have been met, the profitability of rice farming is very marginal. But farmers persist in cultivating rice because it is the basis of their access to the land, which can also be used for more profitable crops such as vegetables. Rice cultivation also continues because it provides the dietary staple of farmers and their families. For many farming households rice is now as much a subsistence activity as it a commercial operation. These are the economic rationalities for rice farming, but
the cultural significance of the practice should also be noted. It defines the rhythm of rural life and the social structure of the village.

The experience of globalization in Bunga takes two principal forms: the expansion of overseas work, and, more significantly, the growth in local factory employment in the first half of the 1990s. But these opportunities are only selectively available. Only just over 16 per cent of Bunga's working population are employed in local factories and such opportunities are certainly not on offer to middle-aged farmers with little formal education. Instead factory work is predominantly directed towards young single women. This reflects the techniques of labour regulation imposed in many export factories, which are predicated upon local constructions of gender (this will be discussed more extensively in chapter 9). But in agricultural activities, the gendered division of work is more equally shared, with women active in many farming tasks. This is particularly true at labour-intensive times such as harvesting and planting. Similarly, while young men might not be official tenants, and only some can expect to inherit the tenancy rights to a piece of land, they have in the past been counted on to provide farm labour at planting and harvest times. Their withdrawal from the agricultural workforce to take jobs in construction, local factories or overseas, further exacerbates labour scarcity.

The consequence is that farmers are left scrambling to find the labour that they need for cultivation, and paying a higher price for it. Labour intensive rice cultivation persists for the reasons mentioned earlier but adaptations have to be made. Increasingly, this means using alternative farming techniques such as direct seeding, or sabog, and a few depend more heavily on family labour. Harvesting teams have also formed to increase the efficiency of the process, and migrant agricultural workers from other provinces - notably Batangas - have also been drawn upon to meet labour needs. Some will concentrate a little more on profitable vegetable crops, but for most this is limited to an area that they themselves can manage. Some local practices have been adjusted, for example through the formation of harvesting teams, but the fact remains that the labour-intensive cultivation of rice is a central part of rural social relations and so labour scarcity results with the onset of globalized development.
The incomes earned in factory employment, construction or overseas work can serve as a subsidy to farming operations, for example in eliminating the need to borrow. But while supporting cultivation in this way, the shortage of agricultural labour is at the same time cutting away at the economic and social sustainability of agriculture. For example, where the sabog technique is used in rice planting, it translates directly into reduced yields.

Two conclusions, then, can be drawn concerning the consequences of globalized development in Bunga. First, the effects of globalization, most notably the changes in local labour markets, cannot be understood except through the complex social relations and cultural ecology that characterize a rice-growing village such as Bunga. Access to land, social and gendered divisions of labour, and the labour demand cycles of rice cultivation are all key relations, constituted locally, that shape experiences of globalization. Secondly, the consequences of globalization, far from fostering a 'balanced' form of development in which agriculture and industry co-exist harmoniously, instead appear to be undermining agriculture through the changes cause in the local labour market. Thus, even in a predominantly agricultural village such as Bunga, globalized development must be viewed as a political choice to prioritize industrial growth over support for improvements in agrarian productivity.
CHAPTER EIGHT

FROM RICE TO RESIDENTIAL: LAND CONVERSION IN MULAWIN

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 described the situation of farmers in the village of Bunga, where farming households have experienced the impact of globalization primarily through changes to the local labour market. But Bunga has not (yet) seen the widespread land conversion from rice fields to residential subdivisions that has occurred elsewhere in Cavite (see chapter 6). Five kilometres of unpaved road appears to have deterred property speculators and developers thus far. A few kilometres away, however, across a creek and some gently undulating rice land, the village of Mulawin has been subjected to extensive property development and land conversion. Little agricultural land in the village has escaped the attention of speculators and developers, and by 1995 only 12 farmers were still cultivating crops (compared with 25 in 1989). One local official even predicted that 1996 would be the last year that rice would be grown in the village.

Large areas of rice land have been either converted to residential estates, or left idle as tenant farmers are removed and owners speculate on rising land prices. In Mulawin, then, globalized development has brought significant changes to both the social fabric and physical landscape of the village. As I will demonstrate, the driving force behind these changes has been the globalized development most clearly manifested in the nearby export processing zone.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which these changes occur through local social and political structures and a specific environmental context. In particular, the relationship between land owners and tenant farmers creates a set of social circumstances in which land conversion is judged to be economically rational and socially feasible. The local structures of political power create an environment in which bureaucratic regulations relating to

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94 The current figure is from my own survey and fieldwork; the 1989 figure is from unpublished data prepared by the Department of Agriculture, Municipality of Tanza.
land conversion can be manipulated or circumscribed. Finally, the ecology of rice cultivation results in conflicts with the environmental changes brought about by urbanization, thereby creating an impetus for all remaining land to be converted. This chapter, therefore, provides some evidence of the locally embedded nature of globalization as a material process.

The first section of the chapter deals with the historical development and socioeconomic characteristics of Mulawin, highlighting its very different social and economic composition from the village of Bunga. The next section addresses questions concerning the nature of property development in the village: who is building residential subdivisions; what type of environment do they create; who lives there? In the third section, I will describe the context of land conversion in terms of local social and political relations between landowners, developers, tenant farmers, and politicians. The fourth section identifies some of the areas of environmental incompatibility between urban and agricultural land uses and the consequent problems facing farmers - problems which add to the already immense pressures to sell their tenancy rights. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the limitations placed upon agriculture in a context where crops can be grown profitably, and agricultural land is legally protected, but more powerful forces dictate that the land be used for other purposes.

8.2 Barrio Mulawin

8.2.1 Historical Development

Mulawin lies along the cemented national road linking Tanza with the provincial capital in Trece Martires City (see Map 5). Its relative accessibility, compared for example to a village such as Bunga, has resulted in an experience of globalized development that is striking in both the social and physical landscape of the barrio. Indeed, the village owes its very existence largely to the recent boom in industrial employment and property development.
Map 5 - Sketch Map of Barrio Mulawin: June 1995
Until 1986, Mulawin was a sitio, or neighbourhood, of the adjacent barrio of Sanja Mayor, rather than a barangay in its own right. In the 1940s, just a handful of extended families occupied the area, living in 10-15 houses alongside the unsurfaced road that led towards the central and southern uplands of the Cavite. The area that would later become Trece Martires City was then the remote barrio of Quintana (also in Tanza) and a stronghold for leftist Huk rebels and the New People's Army (NPA). In the 1950s, however, Delfin Montano, a native of Tanza and son of a prominent senator, became provincial governor and moved his administration from Cavite City to the newly created Trece Martires City. The road was asphalted at that time but sitio Mulawin was still populated by just a few families.

It was in the late 1960s that the first substantial growth occurred, with the construction of the Maria Cecilia residential subdivision on rice land alongside the National Road, followed by the Santa Cecilia subdivision completed in 1972, and Retirees I in 1980 (see Map 5). Electricity was first supplied to the area in the late 1970s. Other major housing projects have been developed over recent years, including Amore (1990) and Monteverde (1992), spurred on by the cementing of the national road in 1989. Six residential subdivisions now occupy much of Mulawin's land area, along with vacant land being held as speculative investments by owners or developers. Farm land only remains in areas set well back from the road.

By 1986, the population had grown sufficiently to justify designating Mulawin as a barangay, and the 1990 census recorded 1,830 people in 341 households. My own survey covered 1,047 people in 208 households - approximately one-third of the barrio's total households in 1995. On the basis of this survey I estimate the barrio's total population at approximately 2,750 in 550 households by 1995 - an increase of 50 per cent over five years. This trend, driven by new migration to the village and facilitated by recent housing

---

95 This estimate is derived from a mapping exercise that identified approximately 450 houses, plus a further 100 houses in areas that were not mapped. The estimate of total population is then calculated on the basis of 5 persons per house, an average that holds true for both survey data and government statistics.
developments, seems likely to continue as the empty lots in existing subdivisions are filled and new developments are constructed.

Figure 10 shows the age-sex structure of the barrio's surveyed population in 1995, and provides a contrast to the relatively balanced population structure of Bunga.

Figure 10 - Age and Sex Structure of Mulawin, 1995

The diagram indicates three prominent features of the village's socioeconomy. Firstly, the preponderance of women in the 16-25 age groups emphasizes the importance of employment at CEPZ for local residents, many of whom are migrants to Mulawin. Secondly, the number of men and women in their late twenties, coupled with the very large number of infants aged 0-5 years highlights the number of young families who have moved into the area to take advantage of employment opportunities and new housing. Thirdly, the discrepancy between male and female numbers in almost all adult age categories highlights the fact that employment opportunities for
men often involve leaving the barrio, and in many cases finding work overseas. These features are corroborated by data on the employment structure of the village.

8.2.2 *Mulawin's Economy*

Tables 26 and 27 provide a detailed listing of the occupational structure of Mulawin's household economy.
Table 26 - Primary Household Occupation by Gender, Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Occupation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural/Resource Based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Farmer or Farmer with land TF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Tenant Farmer XF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/helper on a relative's land FR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer attached to other's land FO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Labourer FL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Seller VS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig Rearing PG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay Dealer PD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catching Fish FS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factory Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker at CEPZ EZ</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker elsewhere FW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Employee GE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces or Police, military/civilian PN/NP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and Related Sectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter CP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker CW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draftsman DF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician/Mechanic/Welder EL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer ER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason MS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painter PT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Worker MW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retail/Distribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson SL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari-Sari storekeeper SS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snack Vendor SV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper DH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaker/Home Sewer DM+SW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (Car/Jeep/Taxi) DV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry/Labandera LB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastor PS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle Driver TD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agent RE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental Income RI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman SE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial/Office Employee SR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe Repair SH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Programmer CM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Mulawin, 1995
Table 27 - Secondary Household Occupations by Gender, Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Occupation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural/Resource based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Farmer or Farmer w/ land TF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Tenant Farmer XF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable planter on other's land VG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay Dealer PD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piggery PG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shellfish cultivation SF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable vendor in market VS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factory Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker at CEPZ EZ</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker elsewhere FW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces, military/civilian PN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Employee GE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Government Official GO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher TC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and Related Sectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker CW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter CP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer ER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Worker MW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retail/Distribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import-Export Business IE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sari-Sari storekeeper SS</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson SL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snack Vendor SV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle Driver TD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper DH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaker/Home Sewer DM+SW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver DV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainer EN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labandera / Laundry LB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical/Dental Assistant MA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicurista MC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental Income RI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant waiter/dishwasher RS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman SE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary SR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Producer TV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Mulawin, 1995
Before commenting on the overall nature of the village's economy, it is necessary to add that unlike Bunga, Mulawin's population does not consist solely of nuclear family/household units, but also includes a number of residents who live in shared rental accommodation, as independent tenants rather than households. Known locally as 'bedspacers', and providing a source of rental income for some local households, these individuals are overwhelmingly employed at the export processing zone, as shown in table 28.

Table 28 - Independent Residents' Occupations, Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker at CEPZ</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live-In Domestic Helper</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial/Office Employee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle Driver</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, 1995

If these independent residents are added to the primary and secondary livelihoods of other households, then an overall picture of the village's occupational structure can be drawn, as provided in table 29 and figure 11.
### Table 29 - Total Occupational Structure of Mulawin, by Sector, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of working population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural/Resources</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction &amp; Related Sectors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail/Distribution</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Services</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live-In Domestic Helper</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Working Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>386</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>576</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, Mulawin, 1995

### Figure 11 - Occupational Structure of Working Population in Mulawin, 1995

![Pie chart showing the occupational structure of the working population in Mulawin, 1995.](source)

Source: Household Surveys, Mulawin, 1995
Two caveats should be noted with regard to these employment data. Firstly, they are constrained by the nature of the survey instrument used, which allowed for only one occupation to be listed for each household member.\textsuperscript{96} In reality, this misrepresents the diversity of livelihood activities, or 'sidelines' as they are known locally, that many individuals undertake. One important omission is the widespread practice of renting land from tenant farmers in order to plant vegetable crops after the rainy season rice harvest in the period between October and March. In-depth interviews suggested that approximately 15-20 individuals are engaged in agricultural activities in this way, many of them farmers who have sold their tenancy rights but continue to apply their skill on land rented or borrowed for individualcroppings.

A second caveat concerns systematic exclusions from the survey's coverage. Logistical reasons limited the survey to 208 households and, as indicated on map 5, these are located in the core of the village where the original settlement was located. The survey thus covered the old sitio of Mulawin, an established subdivision (Maria Cecilia), a new subdivision (Monteverde) and several areas of fields where some farming households live. Two established subdivisions (Santa Cecilia and Retirees I) were excluded together with a concentration of houses squatting on land to the West of the village proper. The latter area contains a large number of migrant workers who are employed in a variety of agricultural activities such as farm helpers and rice mill attendants. Thus it is very likely that the tables above under-represent those engaged in farming on the margins of the agricultural economy.

What does emerge clearly in table 29, however, is the predominance of manufacturing employment in the village's economy. More than one third of the workforce is employed in factories, and all but a handful of those are located in the export processing zone in Rosario. It has been such employment opportunities that have driven the process of land conversion in Mulawin and other barrios in Tanza and that have attracted migrants to the area from other parts

\textsuperscript{96} It should also be noted that the division into primary and secondary household occupations usually reflects the assumptions made according to gender roles by respondents to the survey (both male and female) rather than necessarily prioritising occupations according to the income that they yield. Thus men are predominant in primary occupations, and women in the secondary income sources.
of the country. A second major source of local livelihoods, for young men in particular, is the local construction industry. Land conversion and the development of new residential estates has also provided employment in ancillary sectors, such as carpentry, painting, and masonry.

8.2.3 In-migration to Mulawin

The employment opportunities described above have attracted migrants to Mulawin, and as table 30 indicates, the years 1990-1995 in particular have seen a major influx of new arrivals. Data from my 1995 survey shows that 31 per cent of the population at that time were born outside Cavite and approximately 23 per cent of the population had arrived within the last five years. The main sources of migrants are other provinces in the Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon regions (i.e. the national core region to the north and south of Manila), and out-migrants from Manila itself. Visayans are also strongly represented.

Table 30 - Birthplace and Arrival Date of non-Cavitenos in Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Year</th>
<th>S.Tagalog</th>
<th>Metro Manila</th>
<th>Northern Luzon</th>
<th>Visayas</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-89</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-95</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Household Survey’s, 1995

This data represents approximately one-third of the 1995 village population, but it is likely that it cannot be extrapolated in a linear fashion for the entire population. The survey sampling scheme was not random and, as explained earlier, systematically excluded several areas of the village for logistical reasons: Santa Cecilia Subdivision, Retirees I and the 'Squatter Settlement' indicated on Map 5. The 'Squatter Settlement' in particular is a recent addition to the village and therefore probably contains a high proportion of migrants. It is therefore likely that the proportion of migrants in the village's population as a whole is even higher than the estimates provided here.
Table 31 confirms that a major source of employment for such migrants has been in local factories.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Birthplace and Occupation of non-Cavitenos in Mulawin, 1995}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Occupational Sector} & \textbf{Region of Origin} & S. Tagalog & Metro Manila & Northern Luzon & Visayas & Mindanao & Europe \\
\hline
Agricultural/ Resource based & & 4 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
Factory Work & & 35 & 11 & 3 & 16 & 8 & 1 \\
Government Sector & & 1 & 3 & 0 & 4 & 2 & 0 \\
Construction and related sectors & & 8 & 11 & 0 & 10 & 1 & 0 \\
Retail and distribution & & 3 & 3 & 1 & 3 & 1 & 0 \\
Transport and Services & & 13 & 12 & 2 & 8 & 0 & 0 \\
None & & 38 & 68 & 14 & 28 & 10 & 1 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & & 102 & 110 & 20 & 70 & 22 & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Source: Author's Household Survey, 1995

Another important component of the village economy is temporary migration for overseas employment (see tables 32 and 33). Of the surveyed working age population (15 years and above) of 740, 39 people were currently working abroad and a further 44 had done so in the past. These individuals represent 72 households from a survey of 208 (34.6 per cent), who have at some time benefited from an income remitted from abroad.

One feature of the data in tables 32 and 33 that is worth noting is the predominance of men among overseas workers. Perhaps because of the visibility of Filipina domestic helpers and

\textsuperscript{98} Table 8.6 must, however, be interpreted with the caveats mentioned earlier in mind. The exclusion of the 'Squatter Settlement' together with a number of other houses scattered among rice fields means that the results probably underestimate the absolute numbers engaged in agricultural activities among new migrants to Mulawin.
nannies in the West and entertainers across Asia, and the recent political controversies over their
treatment, there is a popular perception that Filipino overseas migration is a largely female
phenomenon. In Mulawin, however, it is men who are most likely to find work abroad, usually
in occupations such as construction workers and seamen (in the Middle East and at sea).

Table 32 - Overseas Workers, by Occupation and Gender, Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Type</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction and related</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Helper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician/Engineer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office/secretarial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant worker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Household Surveys, 1995
Table 33 - Overseas Workers, by Workplace and Gender, Mulawin, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Work</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Household Surveys, 1995

8.2.4 Social and Economic Change in Mulawin

Mulawin's economy, then, is tied closely to global flows of several varieties. In terms of capital, industrial investment at CEPZ provides a substantial proportion of local employment. Flows of people, in the form of overseas migration and inter-regional migration contribute significantly to the nature of the village's economic and social life. And in both of these dimensions, Mulawin is even more deeply embroiled in globalized development than Bunga.

But the data presented in the preceding tables do not give a complete picture of the qualitative differences between Bunga and Mulawin. Even to a naive outsider, the contrast between the two barrios was evident, as the following entry from my field diary suggests:

Mulawin is a very different place from Bunga, and not just in its lack of agriculture. The roar of the jeepneys passing along the main road, the houses closed off by walls and gates, and the suspicion with which some people initially greet us, all emphasize how much more 'urban' Mulawin is than Bunga. In Bunga, one could pick three or four surnames and their extended clans would represent the entire village; in Mulawin, when I tried to interview a household in the new residential subdivision [Monteverde], their neighbours didn't even know who lived there and three men in the driveway (at least one of whom had a pistol tucked into his pants) were too 'busy' to talk to me. (Field Diary, July, 1995)
The feelings of longstanding residents also confirmed the sense in which the village had changed. Noting, in particular, the significant in-migration to the village, those who were born in Mulawin (ang mga tagarito) spoke of the breakdown of formerly tight social networks and a growing feeling of anomie and 'urbanness':

Q. Are there big differences from when you were growing up in Mulawin?  
A. Big ones! Of course it's not the same as before, the camaraderie is different. Those who are really from here are different. Everybody was like a relative. Unlike now, when the trend is for those people from other provinces [to come here], it's as if it's every man for himself. Not like before, when if someone was sick you would visit them because they are relatives and friends. It's like Manila now. Manila lifestyle. (Mulawin Resident, 1995)


Others too talked of changing interpersonal relations (pakikisama) and a growing unease with the anonymity of their social milieu. Evidently, the tightly woven social fabric that has been the norm in the rural Philippines - and remains largely intact in Bunga, for example - is becoming unravelled. The sheer number of new people in the village means that they cannot be absorbed into existing social networks. This personalized system, through which relationships ranging from personal disputes to business arrangements were structured, has been broken down by the influx of newcomers. Inevitably, tensions and suspicions result:

When subdivisions were constructed it became disordered, with lots of different kinds of people here. It's difficult to get along with different people, and that's why it's become very difficult since we've had these subdivisions. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

Noong magkasubdivision, gumulo ng gumulo, maraming iba't-ibang klase ng tao ang naandiyan. Saka mahirap iyong iba't-ibang tao ang pakikisamahan mo, kaya napakahirap noong magkasubdivision.

The Visayans are different in their way of thinking. They're not like us Tagalogs. For almost all of them, their attitude when they do something wrong is to think, 'anyway I'll
leave this place and they won't see me anymore'. Not like us Tagalogs - our interest is long-term. (Mulawin resident, 1995)


The last quotation comes from a farmer who has sold his tenancy rights and lives on business interests established after receiving compensation from the landowner for his eviction. His land currently lies idle and awaits development. The sentiments he expresses are common to many of the long-standing residents in the village who see a way of life, what Raymond Williams would call a 'structure of feeling', slipping away.

The same sentiments towards newcomers were also evident even in Bunga, where migrants represent a much smaller proportion of the population. While many expressed tolerance towards their new barrio-mates, and several migrants said that they had experienced no problems integrating with the local community, one Visayan woman had the following to say about the reception she had received in Bunga:

They belittle [or look down upon] us Visayans. Because they don't like... what I mean is, they really did it to me. When I was very new here. They really belittle us Visayans, here in Bunga. But it's only here in Bunga that I've experienced it. In other places like Manila, Visayans are respected, in other places too such as Olongapo. It's only here in Bunga that they belittle us. They look at us [as if we're] so small. They will say, oh, they're just Visayans. (1995)


The survey and interview data presented thus far have provided a picture of the economic and social changes which have occurred in Mulawin due to the village's incorporation into a
globalized form of development. The most striking aspect of change in Mulawin is, however, found in the physical landscape, as farm land gives way to residential estates. This process of land conversion represents both a symptom and a cause of these other changes. The rest of this chapter will explore the social, political and environmental context of this process.

8.3 New Landscapes

The residential areas that have replaced Mulawin's farmland vary considerably both in the quality of housing they provide and in the stage of development they have reached. Many former rice fields just lie idle if the existing landlord or new owners have paid compensation to the sitting tenant farmer to remove him/her from the land. In some cases they are awaiting development approvals, but in most instances they are simply biding their time until the demand for residential land increases still further. Occasionally cattle graze on the grassed fields.

On purely economic grounds, it is clearly irrational to leave the land in this way, but political and legal circumstances dictate otherwise. There are several reasons why it makes sense for owners to remove farmers. Firstly, if a farmer remains on the land and cultivates rice, the area could not be zoned by the municipality as non-agricultural, thereby precluding its conversion to other uses. A common tactic in applying for a land conversion permit is to destroy irrigation canals and dikes in order to claim that the land is unfit for cultivation. Secondly, a farmer who still works the land could conceivably claim rights to the land under agrarian reform programmes which legislate the redistribution of land from owners to tenant farmers. Finally, the longer the tenant is left while land prices increase, the higher compensation packages are inflated. This extra compensation would likely far outweigh any rental payments the owner might receive from the tenant if cultivation continued for a few extra years. There are then, economic and legal reasons why landowners are keen to remove their tenant farmers as soon as possible, and these explain the common sight of former rice land sitting idle, occupied only by grazing cattle.
When development of the land occurs, there are several different types of subdivisions that might be constructed. A 'first class' subdivision includes houselots and full service provision - septic tanks for household sewage, concreted roads, pavements, rudimentary basketball courts, and, in one case, even a chapel. In such a subdivision, house lots are sold to buyers who then construct their own homes on the site. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the 'low-cost' subdivision in which one-room, one-storey terraced units are constructed to a standardized design when a purchaser is found. These subdivisions are designed as 'social' housing and most are purchased through contributions to the Government Service Insurance Scheme or national savings schemes such as Pag-Ibig. Such units cost around 160,000 pesos (approximately C$8,000) payable over 25 years (although interest charges often double the cost by the end of this period). Whatever the style of subdivision, house lots remain empty until a buyer is found or until the new owner decides to construct a house on the lot. The result is often a bleak landscape of occupied houses interspersed with vacant units or empty lots strewn with garbage.

The developers of such subdivisions are mostly of two types. One category consists of wealthy local landowners who have paid off their tenant farmers and have enough capital to construct the basic infrastructure needed for a subdivision, such as roads and drains. The developer would not build any houses, but would instead simply sell off house lots on which others will build homes or keep as speculative investments. In 1991, the Amore and Monteverde subdivisions in Mulawin were selling lots for 350 and 500 pesos per square metre respectively. By 1995, those prices had increased to 1,200 and 2,000 pesos respectively. ‘Social’ housing, on the other hand, is usually built by large property development companies, with sales offices in Manila. Since restrictions still apply to foreign ownership of land in the Philippines, these companies tend to be predominantly Filipino owned and managed.

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99 Social housing units elsewhere in Tanza have been bought by the national government and are to be occupied by resettled victims of the Pinatubo eruption and subsequent lahar damage in Central Luzon.

100 One example is the Carissa low-cost housing subdivision in Tanza, build by Villar Homes, a company owned by Congresssman M.B.Villar.
The residents of subdivisions in Mulawin are a mixture of young families related to longstanding villagers and migrants from outside the barrio. For one subdivision, Monteverde, table 34 indicates that approximately two-thirds of the residents are from outside Tanza, and over half are from outside Cavite.

Table 34 - Residents of Monteverde Subdivision, by Birthplace, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulawin</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other barrios in Tanza</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other towns in Cavite</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Tagalog and C.Luzon</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Manila</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Luzon</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, 1995

Table 35 demonstrates the importance of local factory work in attracting people to the new subdivisions. Over half of Monteverde's working population is employed at local factories, and the CEPZ accounts for the vast majority of this number.

Table 35 - Residents of Monteverde Subdivision by Occupation, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Sector</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Working Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Resource Based</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Work</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction &amp; related</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail/Distribution</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Services</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed or at school</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household Surveys, 1995
8.4 The Social Context of Land Conversion

The chain of events that leads to the construction of such subdivisions starts with the market demand, or speculated demand, for new residential space. A series of legal clearances must be obtained to convert land from agricultural use, but as chapter 6 explained, many find ways of circumventing these regulations and others simply ignore them altogether. The start of the process for the farmer comes when the landowner approaches with the suggestion that he/she might wish to sell the land, and tries to evaluate the tenant's likely demands for compensation:

What they will do is they will approach us. Naturally we first talk about farming. [Then they say] "If perhaps I were to sell this land, would you be agreeable to my suggestion". And the tenant says, "If you can grant our rights, we could reach an agreement". Two or three times they'll approach you. Of course, he is the one who is more eager to sell. In our case, since what we want is to avoid a problem, then we agree. That is how the system works. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

Negotiations inevitably vary according to the individuals involved, but the social relationship between landlord and tenant, going beyond their economic arrangements, means that farmers often feel 'ashamed' or 'embarrassed' to negotiate as strongly as they might. Farmers feel unable to go beyond certain culturally prescribed bounds:

It is inappropriate for you to act superior to the owner of the land. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

For us, we just go along with the agreement, because it's theirs, and it's inappropriate for us to say we don't want to. It will appear that we are becoming greedy over it. (Mulawin resident, 1995)
Basta kami, sumusunod kami alinsunod doon sa aming kasunduan, e, sige, dahil kanila iyong alangan namang sabihin naming ayaw namin. Lalabas nagiging namang kami ay para baga sa palagay ay nagiging sakim.

The settlement that is eventually reached between landlord and tenant will usually provide both a cash payment and a small parcel of land on which the tenants can build houses for themselves and for their children. Cash payments have escalated in recent years but individual settlements vary according to the location of the land involved and the negotiating skills of the tenant. In 1995, a typical compensation package amounted to approximately ₱500,000 for each hectare of farmland (or 50 pesos per square metre) and a house lot of 1,000-2,000 square metres. The selling price of land to a developer, meanwhile, might be many times greater. One price being quoted by a landowner in Mulawin in 1995 was 350 pesos per square metre (3.5 million pesos per hectare).

Various legal structures, described in chapter 6, regulate the conversion of agricultural land to other uses. But like elsewhere in Cavite, many of these regulations have been circumvented if not technically breached in Mulawin. Despite clear legal regulations against converting land that is either eligible for redistribution under agrarian reform or is irrigated, land that falls into both categories has been converted, or has been taken out of production, in Mulawin. The reasons for this can be identified in the social and political context of the land market.

Firstly, farmers themselves are usually poorly informed of their legal rights. Cases exist, for example, of farmers who are de facto tenants on a piece of land, but are not legally registered as official tenants. In other instances, registered tenants with Certificates of Land Transfer under agrarian reform programmes have seen their transfers cancelled for no official reason (although usually due to the intervention of the landowner with agrarian reform officials). In all such cases, a system of verbal agreements and unwritten understandings conflicts with a legal system of documentation and regulation. In such circumstances, it is invariably the educated landlord, with high social status, sufficient resources to bribe officials, and access to legal counsel, whom the
situation will favour. But it should also be added that many potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries would rather enjoy a lucrative cash settlement than continue farming with the added
burden of amortization payments to the Land Bank. Thus all land is effectively negotiable if the
two parties can reach an agreement. In one case in Mulawin, a farmer sold his rights to two of
the three hectares he farmed and received a cash settlement and the remaining hectare under
agrarian reform. He was, legally, entitled to all three hectares under agrarian reform but could
not then have converted the land for a minimum of five years. In another case, a farmer said that
he had 'surrendered' his right to agrarian reform, even though legally there is no provision for
doing so. But as a barangay official who was also present at the interview noted, "With every
law there is an exception, if two persons agree with each other".

A landowner's ability to circumvent regulations in this way is, however, a product of
more than just access to political and judicial systems. As noted earlier, a farmer's association
with the owner is more than just a legalistic, landlord-tenant relationship. The bond between the
families may date back several generations, and the landlord might, for example, be a godparent
to the tenant's children. Consequently, tenants are reluctant to try forcing their legal rights and
souring personal relationships:

That's it, that's their proposal. Of course, you're ashamed because we've been together
for a long time. We don't want them to say we were greedy when the law [agrarian
reform] came, doing everything by the letter of the law. We don't want that, so I just
accepted it. Even though what is happening is painful, there's nothing we can do about
the situation. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

Iyon nga eh, mungkahi nga kuwan. Syempre napapahiya ka rin naman komo
napakatagal naman ng pinagsamahan n'yo, eh. Masasabi namang napaka-sobrang
suwapang naman tayo noong dumating ang batas, inilagay nating lahat sa batas. Eh,
kami naman ayaw namin ng ganoon, tinanggap ko na rin. Komo masakit man sa aking
damdamin ang pangyayaring iyon, ay wala na tayong magagawa.

The final circumstance in Mulawin which effectively removes any remaining obstacles to
land conversion is the compliant political environment in which developers find themselves. The
key regulatory role that municipal officials perform is in ensuring that land proposed for
development falls within the area zoned for that purpose and does not merit protection under any of the provisions described in chapter 6. When asked why irrigated land has been converted even though the law states that it is protected, one barangay official replied:

Perhaps not, because with our current system [of government] it passes through. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

Siguro hindi, dahil nakakalusot sa ating pamahalaan.

Another government official noted the vested interest which a municipality has in approving land conversion, which often includes skimming off a percentage of the sale price of the land. In some cases, however, developers also ensure political goodwill by making personal payments or gifts of houselots to local officials. One farmer in Bunga commented:

I don't know why [it happens], but I really don't like it. We cannot do anything about it. For example, it's our leaders who let it happen. They [developers] pay them so that it will be built. There's nothing that can be done. (1995)


This was a practice that was evident not just in the hearsay of villagers, but also in the experiences of land developers whom I interviewed. Thus, where political officials, landowners and farmers themselves all have substantial vested interests in seeing the land converted to non-agricultural uses, there are no parties left with a legal interest in the transaction to protest. And, as one Mulawin resident noted, "...even if you protest, the person to whom you take your grievance will have something to do with the project".

The local politics of individual enrichment and bureaucratic corruption cannot, however, be divorced from the wider politics of development that lie behind the changes occurring in Cavite. In broad terms this refers to the political agenda described in chapter 5 - in short, a globalized form of development. But more practically this strategy translates into the priorities set for government agencies. In the case of irrigation authorities, for example, some farmers
complain that the irrigation system, while constructed with substantial loans from the World Bank for the Second Laguna de Bay Irrigation Project, is in fact neglected on the ground, with dike maintenance and water supply inadequate for their needs: "It's because of the interest of many government officials. That is a very big question for us." Many also question the priorities of the national government concerning food security, as so much rice-producing land is converted. Some believe that the kickbacks involved in rice importation mean that officials actually favour food imports over local production. According to this body of opinion, not even the National Food Administration has the best interests of farmers at heart.

There are, therefore, two forces working against the proper functioning of these government services. One is the priorities set by the administration in terms of development strategies, and particularly the relative importance given to agricultural versus industrial development. Thus appeals against land conversion fall on deaf ears at both provincial and national scales. The other is the susceptibility of regulatory frameworks to influence through bribes or personal favours. One land developer talked frankly about using high-level government contacts in Manila to secure a land conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Three factors, therefore - farmers' legal ignorance, the social relationships between landlords and tenants, and a context of political compliance - all contribute to a situation in which the legalities of land conversion can be sidestepped. These social and political relations, locally embedded but with connections at other scales, create an environment in which land conversion driven by globalized development can rapidly proceed.

8.5 The Environmental Context of Land Conversion

Despite the abandonment of agriculture across large areas of Mulawin, some farmers still attempt to cultivate crops, particularly in areas set back from the national road. My household
survey, combined with interviews, revealed 12 households for whom farming as tenants represented their primary income. The land area they farmed totalled approximately 32 hectares.

The juxtaposition of agricultural and non-agricultural land uses is not, however, unproblematic. Just as labour market changes have put farming in Bunga under considerable strain, so the physical transformation of Mulawin's landscape presents difficulties for residual farmlands. Even before construction begins, problems can start for farmers adjacent to abandoned fields. If, as is commonly the case, the idle land is grassed-over and grazed by untethered cattle, farmers find their crops being eaten or trampled by straying animals. Farmers may also find their fields waterlogged in the rainy season if the dikes (pilapil) on adjacent land have not been maintained, thereby destroying the water management system and causing excess runoff. Once construction begins, vegetation and any remaining pilapil are removed and the problems of excess runoff during the rainy season are exacerbated. For one farmer, whose land borders on a subdivision currently under construction, rain and soil washing onto his land have severely reduced yields:

When it rains, their soil mixes with water and engulfs my crops. It's like lahar.101
(Mulawin resident, 1995)

*Pag-umulan, yung lupa nila ay nadadala ng tubig, natatabunanang aking mga tanim.
Para bang lahar.*

The decline in yield for the farmer in question has been from 90-95 cavans per hectare in 1992, to 35-45 cavans in 1995.

Even after construction, farmers face water management problems during the rainy season as runoff is further increased by the concrete roads and drainage systems that, in many cases, flows directly into irrigation channels for adjacent fields. In another case, subdivision and house construction on a social housing project left a farmer unable to plant any crops in a five

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101 *Lahar* is the mixture of ash and water that originates in volcanic deposits. Large areas of farmland in Central Luzon are still being devastated by *lahar* flows from the Pinatubo eruption of 1991 - it is to this image that the farmer is alluding.
metre strip adjacent to the development. During the completion of the houses, workers had discarded glass and steel fragments onto the field rendering it too dangerous for rice cultivation, which involves bare-footed wading in the soft mud of the paddy field.

After the completion of subdivisions, neighbouring farmers face further conflicts with residential land use:

The effect [of the subdivisions] is to pollute the surroundings. For example, the housing close to that field. All the waste from that place will go into the field. It will be polluted. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

*Ang epekto niyan magiging marumi and kapaligiran. Kung halimbawa katulad ng housing na iyan, ito naman ay bukid. Ang lahat ng dumi na naandiyan na naano uuwi lahat diyan sa bukid. Magiging marumi.*

Solid waste disposal and household sewage are particularly problematic for nearby farmers. Septic tanks, which are prone to leakage, rather than centralized sewage treatment, are used in most subdivisions, and when leakages or overflow occurs, the waste drains directly into local irrigation channels. A more immediate problem, however, is the system for solid waste disposal. Garbage removal occurs once a week, but residents often leave their garbage bags beside the main road or simply dispose of them in nearby irrigation canals. This has caused problems of flooding during heavy rain storms in Mulawin and has restricted water flows to local farms.

As the issues of drainage and waste disposal suggest, a major source of conflict between urban and agricultural land uses is water management, and particularly the supply of irrigation water. Some farmers believe that irrigation systems have been deliberately neglected by those who see financial opportunities in land conversion, but water supply also suffers from the environmental externalities of conversion. Irrigation canals clogged with garbage are the most visible indications of these externalities, but in some cases the construction of subdivisions has completely cut off irrigation supplies to particular pieces of land. Problems also arise during the construction process. The change to the water management system and the erosion of top soil into irrigation channels leads to the gradual accumulation of sediment. This is particularly acute
at the furthest reaches of the irrigation system where water comes to a stop and deposits sediment. In these areas the shallowing of the channel and the reduced gradient mean that it is almost impossible to draw irrigation water. Even in July of 1995, when the rains had already started, large areas of residual farmland in the western portion of Mulawin were left unplanted as farmers waited for irrigation water to be supplied. Many farmers ascribe the neglect of the irrigation system in this way to a lack of political motivation and vested interests in seeing land converted.

In addition to all of these problems, farmers in Mulawin must cope with the same labour shortages as their counterparts in Bunga. Just one household in Mulawin relies on agricultural labour as its primary source of livelihood, meaning that farmers must seek out harvesting teams from further afield, particularly those visiting from Batangas. Rice planters are also difficult to recruit locally, leaving most farmers to seek assistance in neighbouring barrios:

If it were not for the problems in harvesting and planting, and if we did not succumb to what is being offered to us, then the subdivisions could not be built. We often think that the time will come when you can no longer plant or harvest. In the past, the problem of farmers was just water; harvesters and planters were plentiful. It is ironic for the farmer now - while the farmland is getting smaller, and the population is getting larger, why is there such a shortage? Now there's no one to harvest, no one to plant. (Mulawin resident, 1995)

For minor tasks other than harvesting and planting, most farmers in Mulawin rely on a pool of migrant labourers, many from the Visayas, living in small huts in the rice fields. These men work for the farmer whose land they live upon when called to do so and are paid only for the days they work. At other times these workers, many of whom have come to live in Mulawin
permanently, will harvest for other farmers, weed crops, cut grass, mend dikes and perhaps plant vegetables on borrowed land on their own account. It is these workers, at the economic, social and geographical margins of the village that have the most to lose in the land conversion process, being deprived of their source of livelihood, but receiving no compensation in the land conversion transaction.

8.6 Farming on the Urban Fringe

Despite the variety of pressures described above, the farming in Mulawin that still existed in 1995 showed signs of intensification and diversification into new crops. Successful operations in pig-raising, freshwater aquaculture and melon cultivation all suggest that with adequate inputs of capital, labour and technical knowledge, the agricultural sector can be viable in an urbanizing environment.

One farmer's experiment with aquaculture has proved to be particularly successful. Together with a financial backer from another barrio in Tanza, the farmer has converted approximately one third of a hectare from rice land to ten freshwater fish ponds. The start-up costs for the enterprise were substantial: 50,000 pesos for manual labour to excavate the ponds; 30,000 pesos to construct a deep well and water pump to supply the ponds with fresh water; 50,000 pesos to stock the ponds with fingerlings of African Catfish; and around 200,000 pesos to provide daily feed to each of the ten ponds over the course of one harvest cycle lasting around 3 months. The returns on this investment are, however, impressive. Excluding the capital costs involved in establishing the operation, each pond generates a profit of 10-20,000 pesos at each harvest, with up to three harvests per year. Thus over a single year, the fishpond operation can generate an income of approximately 500,000 pesos. Furthermore, freshwater fish farming provides a complementary land use for rice cultivation, as the water drained from the pond after a harvest is rich in digestive by-products which fertilize the agricultural land.
The lack of sufficient capital, an appropriate site and technical knowledge all prevent other farmers from embarking on a similar initiative, but many have, nevertheless, intensified their production and diversified the range of crops grown. In particular, the cultivation of muskmelons has become an important part of the land use cycle for farmers in Mulawin since the mid-1980s. During the dry season, when there is seldom enough water to plant rice, farmers devote a large part of their land to the crop. An individual farmer might be capable of cultivating around 3,000 melon plants (or approximately 0.5 hectares), but for a larger area extra help is needed. Hence farmers enter into a variety of arrangements with others to cultivate melons. In some cases the farmer will simply employ helpers to assist on his land in the melon cropping, in others the farmer will act as a financier and share the harvest with someone who will provide the labour input in caring for a patch of melons as their own. Alternatively the farmer will simply lease, or even lend without charge, a part of his/her land to someone else for a period of 3-5 months. The rental charge in such an arrangement ranged in 1995 between 2,500 and 4,000 pesos per hectare depending on the distance of the land from the road and the relationship between the two parties. Particularly active in this enterprise are 15-20 farmers who have sold their own tenancy rights to property developers and who are using their compensation money as capital to establish melon-planting operations on land sub-rented to them by remaining tenant farmers. In this way, intensification in the form of melon cultivation allows farmers who have sold out their tenancy rights to continue farming on an ad hoc basis. Others too, including migrants to the area from other regions, are renting land to grow melons.

The returns from melon cultivation are substantial, yielding up to 100,000 pesos per hectare in gross income before labour and input expenses are included. The net income will depend on the amount of family labour that is available, but since there are not the major periods of intensive labour usage at planting and harvesting time as with rice, the expenses are lower. A farmer might make around 70,000 pesos from a one hectare melon cropping, and two suchcroppings are possible in the dry season between October and April. Furthermore, since rent to the landlord is paid in the form of cavans of rice from the rainy season harvest, the income from a
dry season melon crop is free from any deduction. Melon cultivation, then, provides a stark contrast to the economics of rice cultivation described in chapter 7. Limitations to its spread are provided only by the need for initial capital, sufficient labour inputs, occasionally water shortages, and the need for specialized knowledge of cultivation techniques. The accumulation of technical knowledge over the last ten years in Mulawin has made it, and Tanza generally, a major centre for melon cultivation in Cavite. This has in turn brought buyers from the wholesale market at Divisoria in Manila to the area which has made the marketing of the crop easier.\textsuperscript{102} The only further limitation on cultivation is the rapid conversion of the land base to other uses.

8.7 Conclusion

As the example of melon cultivation demonstrates, farming can be profitable in Mulawin, and by extension the urban periphery of Manila more generally. The marketing advantages of being close to such a major centre mean that orthodox predictions of agricultural intensification around a large city could hold true. But globalized development is driving a process of urban expansion involving the widespread construction of residential subdivisions on agricultural land. This process is, however, closely related to the social, political, and environmental context of Mulawin. The result is that instead of coexisting profitably with 'globalized' development, agriculture is being 'squeezed out'.

Social relations between landlords and tenants mean that those working on the land, and potentially profiting from cultivating crops like melons, are not the actors who principally decide upon the fate of the land as a commodity. This tenancy structure combines with a relationship of personal power and influence in which farmers are unable or unwilling to assert their legal rights to continue working the land. Political structures in the form of pervasive bureaucratic

\textsuperscript{102} Department of Agriculture technicians reported that other towns in Cavite have developed similar concentrations on particular crops that have become tied in to a marketing chain with buyers from Manila, for example, \textit{ampalaya} in Dasmarinas and bell peppers in Kawit.
corruption create a context in which a powerful logic of rent-seeking capitalism can operate freely. Finally, environmental conflicts between agriculture and urban land uses create tensions that reduce the productivity of rice farming.

But these locally embedded social relationships are also connected to policy priorities set at higher levels, and other scales, of politics. In a context where development strategies favour industrial expansion over support to the agricultural sector, it becomes easier for the needs of farmers - irrigation, inputs, marketing etc. - to be neglected. In many ways, the bureaucratic corruption that also inserts itself into these institutions is less a cause than a symptom of the low priority they are given. There is, then, a complex web of relationships that link the broader discourses of globalization and the priorities it sets and the local context in which the processes it establishes plays itself out. But what is clear from the evidence in this chapter is that the process of globalization can only be understood in the context of local political, social, economic, and environmental conditions.
CHAPTER NINE
GLOBALIZING CULTURE AND REFASHIONED IDENTITIES

9.1 Introduction

Previous chapters have shown some of the ways in which the material processes of globalization become embedded in the local economic and social fabric of communities in Tanzania. Evidently, the 'global' is both constructed and experienced in the 'local' in place-specific ways. While the case studies so far have emphasized the economic effects of globalization at a local scale, a dimension of recent change that cannot be neglected is the reworking of cultural identities as individuals come to terms with new horizons of possibilities and new discursive resources with which to construct their subjectivities. This dimension of change presents a fundamental part of my argument, because it is in the context of existing identities that socioeconomic change is experienced locally, while these identities are simultaneously reworked in the process. What makes the cultural dimension so important is firstly that discourses of globalization are constructed and made persuasive there, and it may also be there that globalized development finds its most emancipatory moment. But secondly, the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization are closely entwined, and so any account of economic globalization (which has been the primary focus to this point) would be inadequate without a consideration of its relationship with cultural identities. In this chapter, therefore, I will outline some of the ways in which cultural identity affects, and is affected by, globalization as a locally materialized process.

In the first section, I locate my approach within the substantial literature on globalization and identity, and particularly the work of Featherstone, Watts, Giddens and Hall. The second section briefly reiterates some of the ways in which cultural identity operates to determine access to globalization - what Doreen Massey refers to as the 'power geometries' of globalization. The
remaining sections of the chapter examine three axes of identity construction - gender roles, youth culture, and attitudes to work - and the changes that have occurred in each.

9.2 Theorizing Global Culture

Popular, and some scholarly, interpretations of globalization see its cultural dimension as a 'disembedding' of symbols and a 'hollowing out of meaning' leading to homogenizing tendencies in the global cultural economy (Featherstone and Lash, 1995: 2; Giddens, 1990). Most writers now recognize, however, that cultural globalization cannot be seen as simply a sequence of changes between stages of tradition, modernity and universalized post-modernity, but must be considered as a geographical process in which different places and people construct their own modernities (Pred and Watts, 1992; Featherstone, 1995). Thus to the extent that there are global flows of cultural signs and meanings, they are everywhere domesticated, indigenized and adapted in specific local circumstances to create unique articulations. Globalization, then, is perhaps better represented as global hybridization, meaning a process "in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices" (Pieterse, 1995).

Culture is, of course, a notoriously slippery and difficult concept (Williams, 1976). In this instance, I will use culture not as a "superorganic" entity that defines a singular model of social relations, for example in the sense that there is a coherent Filipino culture. As Gupta and Ferguson (1992) point out, the conflation of place with culture is untenable, now more than ever. Nor will I use culture simply in the sense of the material objects - food, clothing, music etc. - which pervade the globe. Instead, I will interpret culture as "a field of material and symbolic struggle" (Pred and Watts, 1992, 45) in which meaning, interpretation and representation are at stake and are open to contestation. In particular, I use culture to refer to the construction of individual identities using socially provided discourses. Thus culture is the way in which
individuals reflexively represent themselves and their place in society. It is the intersection of these personal constructions with globalizing processes which is of particular interest. As Anthony Giddens points out, modernity has both extensional (globalizing) and intentional (self identity) aspects. Thus, according to Giddens, new mechanisms of self identity are shaped by, yet also shape, the institutions of modernity:

in forging their self-identities, no matter how local their specific contexts of action, individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are global in their consequences and implications (Giddens, 1991, 2)

In thinking through the influence of globalization on self-identity, it is worth noting the influence of post-colonial theory (Featherstone, 1995). The work of Homi Bhabha and others provides a vocabulary for thinking about a condition in which boundaries are transgressed and places are no longer characterized by a foundational identity. They are instead sites of 'in-betweeness':

The move away from the singularities of 'class' or 'gender' as primary conceptual and organizational categories, has resulted in an awareness of the subject positions - of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical locale, sexual orientation - that inhabit any claim to identity in the modern world. What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These 'in-between' spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood - singular or communal - that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself (Bhabha, 1994, 1-2)

Post-colonialism, however, and especially Bhabha's work, tends to come from a post-modern conception of identity and subjectivity (Hall, 1992). The post-modern subject is seen as "having no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a 'moveable feast': formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us" (Hall, 1992: 277). Hall contrasts this post-modern conception of subjectivity with two other perspectives. The Enlightenment subject is a unified, consistent,
coherent individual, endowed with reason, rationality and consciousness. This is the sort of universal subject assumed by modernization theories of development, wherein the same principles of social interaction apply to all individuals and societies, regardless of historical and geographical diversity (Sachs, 1992; Pieterse, 1995). The sociological subject, on the other hand, while having an inner core of selfhood, is not autonomous, but is formed in his/her relations with others. Identity, in this sense, is formed in interaction between self and society (Hall, 1992).

In addressing the issue of identity in this chapter, my conception of subjectivity is certainly not one of a non-transformable essentialized Enlightenment subject, but lies somewhere between the sociological and postmodern positions. While accepting from the latter that there is dynamism and multiplicity possible in identity construction, I would also argue that there is some fixity, some foundation on which it shifts. This fixity is derived from an existing set of relations between self and society of the sort found in the sociological conception of the subject.

What is of particular interest in the work of postmodern theorists such as Homi Bhabha is the conception of subjectivities of 'in-betweenness', emphasizing the ways in which new practices, signs, models etc., provided through the localized process of globalization, rework existing cultural identities. In this sense, globalization is an expanded horizon of possibilities - or imagination - for identity construction (Lash and Urry, 1994; Appadurai, 1990). Thus, "globalization is the framework for the amplification and diversification of 'sources of the self'" (Pieterse, 1995: 53). This is the sense in which I wish to approach the issues of globalization and cultural identity.

The work of geographer Michael Watts provides an exemplar of this approach. Watts talks of a "dialectical tacking" between the 'outside' and the 'inside', focusing on how "society as a constitutive process is expressed powerfully in political, economic and cultural formations" and simultaneously internalized in the individual (Pred and Watts, 1992: 2).

Globality and locality are inextricably linked, but through complex mediations and reconfigurations of "traditional" society; the nonlocal processes driving capital mobility are always experienced, constituted, and mediated locally. An industrial and distinctively gendered working class is made; yet, through its own use of cultural and symbolic resources,
it makes itself. In our language, a working and reworking of modernity (Pred and Watts, 1992: 6)

Globalization, then, is constructed and experienced differently in different places. And within places, existing identities go a long way to explaining how exactly this experience differs. Individuals distinguished according to gender, age, education, political allegiance etc. are all placed differentially with respect to globalization. Here Doreen Massey's reference to the "power geometry" of time-space compression is particularly appropriate (1994: 149).

9.3 The 'Power Geometry' of Globalization in Tanza

Previous chapters have shown that various axes of distinction operating within local social relations in Tanza have shaped an uneven pattern of access to, and control over, the benefits of globalized development. They will not be elaborated again in detail here, but some principal axes can be summarized.

Age and gender form fundamental filters to employment opportunities in local factories, as recruiters seek out young (age 16-25), single women. Masculinity is constructed as being too prone to insubordination and laxity in the workplace, while older men and women would also resist factory discipline and require a more 'liveable' wage. Formal educational attainment too effectively excludes many of the older generation, as employers demand high school graduation. Nevertheless, these 'identity barriers' are breached in many cases. In numerous instances, falsified birth certificates and high school diplomas and concealed marriage and motherhood have allowed women to gain employment in otherwise unlikely circumstances. In general, however, the filters in the recruitment process serve to limit employment to those favoured by factory managers. A consequence of this selective access to industrial employment is the reworking of cultural attitudes towards gender, youth and work, which will be discussed in more detail below.
Other axes of identity also play a major role in determining an individual's experience of globalized development. Most importantly, it is on the basis of economic class distinctions, particularly with respect to land ownership and access, that the benefits of land conversion are distributed. Land owners take the lion's share of the value added in conversion, while tenant farmers can also negotiate a substantial compensation package. The conversion process is, however, closely tied in with political connections, both locally and nationally, and so affiliations based on factional allegiance and kinship ties determine access to such channels. The most disenfranchised group in the municipality, with respect to both class status and political connections are new migrants, many of whom work as agricultural labourers. They live without legal access to land (and therefore the benefits of its conversion), without kinship and political networks through which opportunities arise, and in some cases face discrimination and defamation.

These, then, are some of the major axes of identity along which access to globalized development is distinguished. But, as the earlier theoretical discussion pointed out, cultural identities do not operate in a simple, static way; identity and subjectivity are not solely created from locally constituted and immutable categories onto which the dynamism of globalization is superimposed. These categories enter into a reflexive relationship with processes whose provenance is beyond the scale of the village, town or country. In other words, at the same time as various axes of cultural identity are active as 'filters' in the subjective experience of globalization, the metaphor of the 'filter' is unsatisfactory because these categories themselves are reworked in the very process they help to shape.

9.4 Subjectivity and Global Flows

Identities are reworked in the manner suggested because as Pieterse notes, globalization provides a "framework for the amplification and diversification of sources of the self" (1995,
Thus new opportunities, new spaces of selfhood, provide different contexts and discursive resources on which individuals can draw in constructing self identities. This is not to suggest that cultural meanings are a simple reflection of political economic processes, as in the classical marxist formulation of 'base' and 'superstructure'. Instead, as Watts argues, "...identity is produced and reproduced within a field of power relations rooted in interconnected spaces linked by political and economic relations" (1991, 14). In this section, I will describe three axes of cultural identity, based on gender, age, and work, to illustrate with reference to Tanza how they are being reformulated in the context of globalized development.

9.4.1 Mister, Missus and Modernity: New Gender Identities

Women are favoured in the CEPZ factories precisely because the dominant construction of gender roles places women's formal work at the margins of the economy. Female wage labour is represented as a secondary form of livelihood, even where it may yield a higher income for the household. This denigration of female labour provides the commonly noted paradox found in Filipino gender relations: while women have access to nearly all spheres of economic and political life, their role in these spheres never completely removes the expectation that they conform to models of the caring mother, dedicated wife and obedient daughter. Participation in the workforce is usually a supplement to these duties rather than a substitute. According to the dominant construction of femininity, women are not expected to be the primary bread-winners of the household. Instead their role is within the household. This model owes its basis at least in part to the models of femininity that Spanish colonialism brought to the country, as described in chapter 4.103

Such a construction of femininity intersects with the political economy of globalized development to form a feminized workforce and gender-based strategies of labour regulation in

103 Eviota (1992) and Blanc-Szanton (1990) provide detailed accounts of the reworking of models of feminine identity over time in the Philippines.
the workplace. In a study of female workers in the Mactan Export Processing Zone in Cebu, Chant and McIlwaine note that:

The fact that women tend to be found in lower paid and less prestigious jobs than their male counterparts relates very much to the practical constraints imposed by household divisions of labour, as well as the fact that, at a normative level, employers tend to regard women as secondary workers who are merely supplementing their husbands' wages. (1995, 9)

Many analysts therefore argue that the feminized workforce represents the further marginalization and exploitation of women. The workforce of young single women in industrial estates like the CEPZ is seen as representing the formation of a pool of second class workers, earning second class wages - inadequate to support a family, but not intended to be otherwise. With reference to export manufacturing in the Philippines in general, Elizabeth Eviota writes:

While employment in export factories may have expanded the range of women's productive work, it is work that has led to their subordination to a global market and a male-dominated hierarchy of management which has single-mindedly reaffirmed sexual stereotypes and communicated sexuality as a labour-control strategy. (1992, 123)

While the universality of this sort of 'female marginalization' thesis has been cogently criticized by Alison MacEwen Scott (1986) and Linda Lim (1990), the gendered, and inequitable, nature of labour markets in Philippine export industries is widely acknowledged (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995; Guerrero, 1987; Eviota, 1992; Zosa-Feranil, 1984; Pineda-Ofreneo, 1988). Chant and McIlwaine (1995, 166-169), for example, list a series of negative consequences that result from the feminization of the manufacturing workforce:

1. Reinforcement of dubious physiological and psychological stereotypes of femininity, to which women must conform.

2. Hindering women's horizontal and vertical mobility in the workforce, by consigning them to labour intensive, but not skill-intensive, tasks.

3. Little training or skill development is provided for young women.

4. Exhausting and sometimes dangerous working conditions.
The central argument made by these authors - that employment opportunities do not represent any fundamental shift in the status of women - does find some resonance in opinions expressed in Tanza. It is clear that work at any given factory at CEPZ is relatively unstable and workers may be laid off during periods of low production. It is also true that transfer of skills and opportunities for career advancement are very limited. More generally, despite widespread female involvement in the workforce, there persists the notion that a woman's primary 'place' is in the home. One man in Mulawin, for example, spoke of having to act as a 'mother' for his children when they were growing up because his wife was working full time at a cigarette factory in the southern suburbs of Manila. He described the difficulty he experienced in fulfilling this role - there was no question that raising his children was a mother's role - and lamented his wife's daily absence from the household: "The house seemed incomplete" (Para hindi ba completo ang bahay).

Several farmers in Tanza spoke of the benefits from having their wives help them in farm work, but it was generally referred to as a bonus, rather than the fulfillment of an obligation. The principal locus of female work was still in the home:

To me, if you sum it up, farming is just for men. But you can't say that women are not helping, even at home. When we are working and we return home we will just eat. They are the ones cooking for us, they are working, taking care of our children and washing our clothes. (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)


This model was borne out by table 17 which showed, on the basis of household surveys in Bunga, that responsibility for domestic chores rested predominantly with women. In the formal economy, meanwhile, tables 18 and 19 and tables 26 and 27, indicated that men are predominantly identified as earning the primary household income, while women's occupations are generally secondary. Both sets of data, on household chores and occupations, also suggest,
however, that there are enough reversals of these generalizations that there is cultural space for men to be actively engaged in housework and for women to be a household's primary participants in the formal economy. Notwithstanding the flexibility of this structure, gender roles are still, however, clearly prescribed.

Many women too subscribed to this construction of femininity. One woman in Mulawin described her view of a wife's role in a farming household:

You will fulfill your duties. For example, firstly as the wife of a farmer you'll feed him, and you'll really take care of him, because it's really difficult to farm. Food, clothes... I'm really obliged. (Woman in Mulawin, 1995).

Gagampanam mo... Halimbawa, kaunaunahanna bilang ang asawa mo ay magsasaka papakainin mo siya, talagang aalagaan mo siya, napakahirap talagang magsaka. Pagkain, 'yang damit... basta't talaga obligado ako.

While such a model of the wife and mother might remain the 'ideal', parents were nevertheless flexible in allowing their daughters to work in the export processing zone. Those interviewed were universally pleased with the opportunity for waged employment that the CEPZ offered their daughters, not least because of the expectation that wages would contribute to the household as a whole. Daughters’ wages are, it seems, especially susceptible to such expectations. The comment from a farmer in Bunga, quoted in chapter 7, that daughters were 'better' than sons because they contribute their wages more willingly to household expenses undoubtedly says more about the expectations and socialization of young women that it does about the inherent generosity of either sex. Women, whether daughters or wives, are expected to play a key role in the household and these expectations have been supplemented with a financial component, rather than reduced, by factory employment. In fact, familial conflict may result in some cases where income is not shared:

Because what if, for example, a mother, parents, are poor; that's why parents let you work, because you have nothing, so somehow you can help them, but if on the contrary you will not give anything to them, it's there that conflicts arise with your parents. The parents are hoping. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995).
Dahil paano nga kung medyo, halimbawa, ang isang ina, isang magulang ay wala rin, kung kaya ka lang pinahintulutan ay dahil sa inyong kawalan, na kahit papaano ikaw ay makatulong, bagkus, hindi ka magbibigay, eh doon magakaroon din ng kaunting kuwan ang iyong magulang. Merong naasa ring magulang.

In most cases, however, daughters appear willing to assist their parents and siblings by sharing their income, and almost all CEPZ workers living with their families handed half or even more of their income over to their parents. In the case of 'bedspacers' living in rental accommodation, the amount remitted to their family would be considerably less, given the additional expenses involved in living independently.

Evidently, then, the argument made by Eviota (1992) and others that women in export manufacturing face a largely exploitative situation that persists even with their involvement in the workforce appears to hold true, although the 'exploitation' is rather more conscious and accepted than such writers usually acknowledge. At the same time, however, the sort of political-economic argument that Eviota makes, concerning the oppressive nature of manufacturing employment and reinforcement of gender stereotypes, is ultimately a rather narrow view of the foundations of power in gender relations. The empowerment that derives from waged employment is not simply economic, but represents the expansion of the culturally prescribed space for women in society. It can also involve a broadening of the roles which women in marriages or daughters living with parents can adopt for themselves. There are signs in Tanza that the increased participation of women in the waged workforce is indeed bringing changes in the social construction of femininity and the expectations attached to it. Even while traditional roles retain their currency, and economic relationships might be exploitative, women in the workforce nevertheless benefit from enhanced status.

Where daughters are paying for their siblings' education, saving for their own further education, contributing to the household budget or assisting in covering the capital outlay involved in farming, they accrue both respect and a debt of gratitude (utang na loob) from their

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104 Torres (1988) identifies a similar sense of obligation to kin, known as pakikipagkapwa, in her study of the social psychology of industrialization in the Philippines.
families. This is the reason that many young women commented that they were pleased to be helping. For the same reason, in the survey of High School pupils in Tanza, 75 per cent of graduating students aspired to working abroad, and of these, over half cited helping their families (parents and siblings) as their main motivation for doing so (see table 39).

The intangible benefits of added familial respect and status for young factory employees also translates into additional influence over decision-making within the household and often exemption from household chores. Furthermore, waged employment improves the quality of young womens' leisure time, allowing for greater indulgence in activities such as 'malling' in Manila, purchasing clothes, and going to movies. In these ways, then, waged employment can be seen as an enhancement of the social position of women by expanding the cultural space in which their self-identity and familial relationships are constructed.

While this enhancement of women's positions in social power relations is not necessarily a 'zero sum' situation, there is clearly some readjustment necessary on the part of men. A young man in Bunga commented, somewhat wistfully, that:

It is now usual, among young married people, for the man to stay at home, and for the woman to work. (1995)

Karaniwan ngayon sa kabataan, pagnag-aasawa lalake ang sa bahay, ang babae ang nagtatrabaho.

In fact, this statement is far from accurate, and most women working at CEPZ are unmarried and still living with their parents, but it does belie a sense that gender roles are changing. To some extent the same is true in agricultural work, and some male farmers noted the increased participation of female labour in farming:

Here in our place I can see a man's work also being done by a woman.
(Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

Dito sa amin meron akong nakikita kung ano ang trabaho ng lalake rin ng babae.
The participation of women in harvesting, for example, is common in Bunga. Yet harvesting teams coming from the town of Lemery in Batangas to harvest in Tanza commented on their surprise at finding women working in the fields. In their own villages, harvesting was an exclusively male preserve. While this evidence is anecdotal, it points to the manner in which gender roles can vary geographically depending on labour market conditions, and suggests that shifts over time are a response to changing circumstances.

9.4.2 Barkada and Big Macs: Refashioning Youth Culture

An important consequence of changing social and economic times in Tanza is a reshaping of youth culture. Parents repeatedly lamented the attitudes of young people 'these days', and youths themselves also recognized the very different context into which they are growing up compared with their parents. It is a context in which religiosity, familial discipline and contributions of labour to the household (particularly farming households) are receding, while the imperatives of educational attainment, the attractions of youth consumer culture, and the appeal of non-agricultural work are all ascendant. Leaving aside the question of changing attitudes towards work, which will be discussed in the next section, here I will focus on some of the changes occurring in youth subculture.

In interviews with parents and young adults, several elements of change in youth culture emerged consistently. The growing prevalence of *barkadas* (gangs or peer groups), a decline in religious observance, changing attitudes towards sexual relationships, and the use of drugs, all contributed to a sense that the social world of young people now is very different from their parents and ancestors. Moreover, many of these changes are associated with the 'globalized' development that Tanza has experienced over recent years.

The phenomenon of the *barkada* is worth exploring in detail because in parents' minds it was closely associated with other manifestations of social and cultural 'malaise'. In general
usage, the word *barkada* refers to a peer group of friends and can relate to men or women of any age. In one of the few explicit considerations of the phenomenon, Jean-Paul Dumont (1993) defines the male *barkadas* he encountered in the following way:

... males, first as boys, then as men and well into their old age, belong to and participate actively in such informal, but class-bound and long-lasting gendered groups of coevals.... In the process, not only were long-lasting bonds created between these males but male stereotypes were thoroughly reinforced. (1993, 402-3).

The literal translation of *'barkada'* as a group of passengers together on a boat, implies something of its figurative meaning - a group of peers, usually from adolescence, embarking on parallel journeys through life. But, as Dumont points out, the adoption of the word in Tagalog only emerged in the 1950s and came with a connotation of rebellion or mischief. Now, the concept retains that anti-establishment sense, as an egalitarian grouping of men, women, or classmates of both sexes who share a bond of common experiences and among whom social etiquette and inhibitions might be dispensed with or at least lowered. The *barkada* therefore represents a social context in which behaviour can stretch conventional norms - a crucible for redefining the aspirations and identities of youth, and a controlled rebellion against the overbearing institutions of family, lawfulness and hard work. The element of control is found in the conservative aspects of the *barkada*. The group can, Dumont argues, apply peer pressure to subtly foster social and moral conformity among its members and discourage originality and initiative. Nevertheless, for many young people, the *barkada* serves as:

...an egalitarian refuge where they could feel less restricted than usual in their actions, less guarded in expressing their feelings and altogether freer than anywhere else. In a way, this was conducive to some exploratory behaviour that co-members of their *barkada*, ever solicitous with each other, both tolerated and chided on an acceptably reciprocal basis. (Dumont, 1993, 429)

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105 The original use of the word was with reference to groups of criminals shipped to Manila for imprisonment. The closest equivalent in English would probably be 'gang' or 'fraternity'.

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While barkadas exist for men and, to a lesser extent women, of all ages, it is among adolescents and young adults that they are most formative and influential. It is in the context of the barkada that youth subcultures develop and new attitudes and identities are forged.

The youthful barkada is widely seen as an unproductive influence on young people by their parents. One farmer in Bunga described how his son would help him with farm work until he was 15 years old. From then onwards his attention was always elsewhere:

"It was different when he formed his barkada, now [he does] nothing, he's becoming lazy. (1995)"

*Iba na ngayon 'pagnapabarkada, wala na talagang tinatamad.*

Another farmer in Bunga spoke of 'attitude' among young people more generally, and the 'vices' they were developing:

"It's difficult for me to [understand]... you know people tend to get hooked on vices, and there are vices coming to affect young people, many vices are emerging now. If you're not aware, there are those who are discreetly grouping themselves, like a fraternity. It's very different now, nothing good will come of it. Sometimes they're smoking up, smoking weed. That's what they usually do. That's why they establish such a grouping. There are many lazy people here, really many. There are really very many lazy young people in our place, and sometimes even if their house is falling apart, they won't help their parents. (1995)"


Other parents, and administrators at Tanza's high school, also noted this trend in the behaviour of adolescents. To them, the principal manifestations of modernity among the younger generation were non-participation in household chores or livelihood activities; religious
non-observance; disobedience and 'answering back' to parents; and the development of 'vices' such as alcohol and substance abuse. One high school administrator posited a direct correlation between globalization, modernity and the malaise of youth: "[A]nswering back is a sign of advancement and modernization... parents resist but it's the mode of society today, the offshoot of the media". Other older residents of Tanza commented on the growing liberalism of people under the influence of the media, leading to changes in traditional attitudes to issues such as sex before marriage, courtship, abortion, marital separation, and religious observances such as family prayer:

Yes, the times have changed. Everything has changed. Now teenagers never follow any of our customs[/traditions]. (Parent in Bunga, 1995)

Oo, bago na ang panahon. Bago na ang lahat. Lahat ng mga kaugalian natin, hindi na sinusunod ng mga kabataan ngayon

But if the liberal, and many would suggest 'Americanized', barkada culture offends the sensibilities of older residents, it might equally be seen as liberating for the youths concerned. As an avenue for release from overbearing cultural expectations of dedication to church and family, the identities forged within the barkada are emancipatory.

There's a young woman here working at EPZA, yet the parents cannot control her. They group themselves. Like a fraternity, they tattoo themselves. Even when her mother beats her, she'll say that they don't have any business knowing what she's doing. And then the father slapped her on the face and she stopped. (Woman in Bunga, 1995)


The specific forms of this liberation draw upon the new horizons opened by globalization in Tanza. New migrants into the area, for example from Manila, bring different attitudes and

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106 The interviewee here was the high school's disciplinary officer. Although barkadas, as indicated earlier, date back in name at least to the 1950s (probably well beyond), he estimated that barkadas or fraternities started to appear in the high school in 1991 - thus coinciding (though obviously not necessarily correlating) with many of the other economic and cultural changes described in this thesis.
practices to rural areas. Several local people attributed the origins of the barkada phenomenon to the encroachment of urban, 'Manila', lifestyles. One farmer in Mulawin made a direct connection between new migrants, barkada formation, and the disinterest of young people in farming:

They're just roaming around... and not helping their parents to harvest the palay. many of them have their barkada here, the immigrants influence these children. Immigrants who are not used to working in the field. Their [local childrens'] lifestyles are influenced by their barkada. Before they helped. (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)

Palagala... and not helping their parents to harvest palay. Marami na silang barkada riyan, mga dayuhan naimpluwensiya iyong ibang, mga bata. Mga dayuhan ditong hindi sanay sa bukid. Naiingganyo ang buhay... kabarkada. Dati katulong...

Other connections with globalized development include the opportunities to migrate out of Tanza for employment in Manila or overseas - the immediate locale is seldom now seen by young people as a place where they can attain their aspirations. Global media flows that bring new images, role models and consumption patterns represent an important influence on young people. Finally, and most importantly, local employment opportunities that allow young women in particular to participate in waged work on their own account for the first time also allow them to make consumption decisions that reflect the adoption of a different, locally hybridized 'global' culture. This is seen inscribed in the dress and appearance of young people - earrings, clothing styles, tattooing, and the use of skin-lightening soaps to achieve a paler, more 'western' appearance. The 'beauty myth' to which young people, and especially girls, aspired might not be completely Caucasian, but is certainly that of the hybridized mestiza. 'Global' style is also found in the leisure activities that young people engage in: listening to contemporary pop and rap music, 'mailing' (maggala - literally 'wandering') in Manila, and watching movies with friends.

It is, of course, important not to over-emphasize the positive aspects of these trends.

While some young women in their barkada may find new freedoms and means of cultural self-

107 Living in a pharmacy allowed me to see first hand some of the consumption decisions made by women working at CEPZ. Every two weeks the pharmacy would reach a fever pitch of activity as women arrived from the end of their shift on pay day to spend some of their earnings. Popular items included baby foods and milk formula, being purchased for younger siblings. Also popular were the soaps with brand names such as "Block'n'White" which contained sunscreen and bleaching agents to make the skin paler.
expression that they would otherwise have missed out on, there are also those for whom such activities create tensions within the family, and a set of associated problems that are far from liberating. The *barkada* youth culture itself also has less positive dimensions. As mentioned earlier, the *barkada* is just as frequently the refuge of unemployed youths and a site for the development of social 'vices' such as drug and alcohol addiction, gambling and occasional inter-*barkada* violence. It was usually this dimension that parents immediately associated with their sons' or daughters' involvement with a *barkada*. Thus in addition to being a site of liberation, the *barkada* can also be a manifestation of social despair - especially among young men for whom employment is harder to find and often episodic in nature (for example in the construction industry):

Our young people then [when I was growing up] were obedient to parents. Before, we harvested and planted, but now they don't do much work. They just keep on laughing, because they say that life is just the same, even when you work hard or not. (Woman in Bunga, 1995)

*Ang mga kabataan namin noon masunurin sa magulang. Noon, kami ay nag-aani, nagtatanim, ngayon hingi gaano ang mga kabataan, nagtatawanan lamang, dahil pareho din daw ang buhay, magsipag at hindi.*

Nevertheless, for young people who find themselves growing up in a very different context of opportunities and influences, the *barkada* represents an arena in which they can come to terms with these changes and cultural experimentation can occur.

**9.4.3 The Meaning of Work**

The consequences of changing youth subculture for attitudes towards work have already been suggested by some of the quotes from local residents included above. Reformulating the meanings imbued in work is, however, a significant issue in its own right because such attitudes...
relate directly to the labour market changes described in chapter 7. These relationships serve to demonstrate the important connections that exist between cultural constructions and the material political economy of globalization. Several related dimensions of work culture are pertinent to this study: the changing attitudes of farmers towards their profession, from self-respect to self-denigration; the changing attitudes of young people towards agricultural work, which directly affects the pool of labour available at harvesting and planting times; and, the changing aspirations of young people more generally, away from agrarian occupations and towards the opportunities presented by factory work, city work and overseas employment.

Low morale in the farming sector was, unsurprisingly, most evident in Mulawin, where the very existence of farming is threatened by the encroachment of urban land uses. Several farmers expressed the sense of low self-esteem to which their profession had sunk:

They belittle themselves, that's how they feel about themselves, they pity themselves when they are farming
(Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)
Minamaliit nila ang tingin nila sa kanilang sarili kaawa-awa sila pagsila ay nagbubukid.

People look down on farming (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)
Mababa ang tingin pagnagtatrabaho sa bukid.

The reason for this low morale is found, to a large extent, in the attitudes of young people towards farming as a livelihood. As other opportunities have presented themselves, young people have shifted their aspirations (or at least their realistic expectations) away from a rural life and towards other forms of work. As farming has become less appealing, its place is being taken by the greater economic and cultural capital to be accumulated from factory work, and even more so from office/retail jobs in Manila or overseas work:

Now, only a few young people like farming, really just a few.
(Youth leader, Bunga, 1995)

Sa ngayon, bihira na ang mga kabataan mahilig sa agriculture, bihira na talaga.
The same youth leader also noted that even where young adults don't have the sort of work to which they aspire - for example if they are waiting for a posting as a seaman - they will often still prefer not to help in agricultural tasks. The labour shortages experienced by farmers are not, therefore, purely the result of potential workers being employed elsewhere, but also reflect a change in 'attitude' (ugali) towards the type of work that is desirable. This is, of course, in combination with the other employment opportunities which make such work unnecessary.

A farmer in Mulawin also commented on the peer pressure, for example through a *barkada*, that can reinforce such a 'modern' attitude through mockery:

Modern times is a very strong influence, For example, your son is doing something, like hoeing, and a group will pass by, and they'll call to him...'that's not the real life'.
(Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)

Modern times is a very strong influence. *Halimbawa, iyong anak mo may gagawin, pinag-aasarol, yung grupo daraan, kakantsangan...* 'that's not the real life'

A farmer in Bunga made a similar point, but implied more about the changing cultural proclivities of the younger generation:

There is a great change among the youth of today compared with before. It's because now the young people are too social. Now the young people are becoming more elegant than before. Because in those days [when I was growing up] you won't believe it, I never experienced wearing long pants. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

*Ang malaking ipinagbago ng mga kabataan ngayon kaysa noon. Dahil kasi ngayon ang mga kabataan ay masyado silang mga sosyal. Magagara ngayon ang mga kabataan kaysa noong una. Kasi noong araw, hindi ka maniniwala, hindi ako nakadamas makapagsuot ng pantalon.*

Two key words in this quote warrant some elaboration. Literally, *sosyal* translates as 'social', but in this context it is being used in a more pejorative manner. The implied meaning is behaviour in an elite or aloof manner, or with an attitude ('to take on airs' might be an appropriate English equivalent). The implication is that younger people have become socialized into a higher way of life and consider themselves too 'precious' to be involved in farm work. A similar implication is
inferred by the verb *magagara*, whose root, *gara*, literally translates as elegant. A more accurate rendition might, however, be pompous, extravagant, fancy or dressy.\(^{108}\)

One farmer in Mulawin related these changing attitudes to the influence of the media (ironically, his comments were delivered in hybridized 'Taglish'):

> Because the new generation and the TV program, they show about the different standard of living of some people. I mean, they never study the effect of us copying things from other countries shown on the TV programs. Young people are thinking that this is the better way of life than... So that's why some people dream of the new lifestyles... So they hate farming. (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)

The reorientation of young people away from farming and towards non-agricultural types of work begins even before leaving high school. Interviews at the Tanza National Comprehensive High School revealed that parts of the school’s curriculum are geared closely to the skills needed by firms at the CEPZ. The development of CEPZ in the 1990s has brought a greater focus on short technical courses designed for factory labour, such as electronics, dressmaking and computing.\(^{109}\) The design of these courses is the result of close collaboration between the school and factory managers. At the beginning of each school year the high school Principal and Department Heads for subjects which come under the rubric of Technology and Home Economics (THE) visit the CEPZ to consult on required skills to be incorporated into the curriculum. A significant proportion of the high school’s graduates enter employment at the CEPZ on the conclusion of their studies. Although precise figures are not available, the school’s Principal estimated that 60 per cent of graduates proceed to further education or training of some

\(^{108}\) Literal translations are from the Tagalog-English dictionary, compiled by Leo James English (1986) and published by the National Bookstore in Manila. The contextual meanings were derived from discussions with my research assistant, Ms Berna Javier.

\(^{109}\) Approximately 200 students are graduated each year who have taken high speed sewing at the High School (about one quarter of the graduating class). Nearly all of these students end up working at CEPZ.
kind, while the remaining 40 per cent enter the workforce. Of that 40 per cent, approximately three-quarters find employment at the CEPZ.

From the point of view of school administrators, the advantages of the CEPZ are twofold. First, the preference of employers for high school graduates provides an incentive for students to finish their studies. Secondly, local factories provide relatively abundant employment. Equally, however, the CEPZ presents drawbacks for educators. The ease of securing employment provides a disincentive for students who might otherwise enroll in a college programme, and may even induce students to drop out of high school before graduating in order to start earning (often with the acquiescence of parents). The job prospects at CEPZ often prove irresistible to children from relatively poor families who are struggling to keep them in school. For this reason, among others, around 200 students each year drop out of Tanza's high school.

In an attempt to develop a picture of how students themselves view their prospects after high school, I conducted a survey of 136 pupils (78 females and 58 males) in the graduating class of 1995 at Tanza National Comprehensive High School.\textsuperscript{110} The results of this survey reveal some perspectives of young people on their future careers (although the sample is clearly non-representative, as students graduating from high school represent the more academically-inclined and in general come from wealthier families). One question asked about students' plans after graduation. The results are shown in table 36.

\textsuperscript{110} I did make an initial attempt at informal interviews with high school students, and the use of a more open-ended survey. It became evident, however, that student felt uncomfortable and embarrassed by this format, and far more at ease with a written questionnaire that was mostly designed with multiple-choice answers and a few open-ended questions. The survey is included in Appendix D. Students at the high school are streamed according to academic standing. In order to get a cross-section of students, I surveyed classes from the top, middle and bottom of the year group.
Table 36 - Career Plans of Students at Tanza National Comprehensive High School, 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plans After Graduation</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working in Farming</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working at CEPZ</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in Manila</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Abroad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further Study:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Administration</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering/Electronics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Communication</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing/Medical technician</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See Appendix D for the original question (number 12). Where more than one opinion or option was checked, both entries have been included. Source: Author's High School Survey, 1995.

What is clear from these data is that employment at CEPZ is an attractive option for some students, but for the majority further education or training is the preferred route. All students were clear that farming was not a goal to which they would aspire. On the contrary, the type of work that is preferred emphasizes the gulf between the world in which these young people see ahead and that of their parents. If the choices of higher education courses can be taken as an indicator, then it is fields such as computer science, engineering and business administration that represent the aspirations of young people.

Further questions in the survey sought students' opinions specifically about farming and employment at the CEPZ, and they were given a few lines in which to articulate their thoughts in either Tagalog or English. Tables 37 and 38 summarize the responses to these questions and include typical responses classified according to overall 'positive' or 'negative' feelings towards farming and factory work.
Table 37 - Students' Opinions on Farming as a Career Option, Tanza, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings about farming</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;It helps the country&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;It's good to help parents&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;It's hard work&quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;The work is boring&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;The income is low&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;I want to be a professional&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: High School Survey, 1995

Table 38 - Students' Opinions on CEPZ as a Career Option, Tanza, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings about Working at CEPZ</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;I want to help my parents&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;It's good money&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;I would be with my friends&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;I can save money to study&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;The work is enjoyable&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive - &quot;There are lots of girls&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;Hard work and tiring life&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;Need to study instead&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;Low pay&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;Boring work&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;No opportunities to advance&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - &quot;The work is unstable&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: High School Survey, 1995

Evidently farming is seen in an overwhelmingly negative manner by the students. Even those who provided positive responses appeared to be considering the option in an abstract way. "Helping the country" and "helping parents" were given as reasons why farming is a 'good thing', but did not necessarily imply that the students themselves were ready to select that option.

Working at CEPZ, meanwhile, was perceived in a rather more ambivalent manner. Clearly the
students saw benefits, but contrary to the impressions of many farmers, they did not see CEPZ as an easy option. Instead it was widely considered to be hard work.

The one option that students did show a great deal of enthusiasm for (although not necessarily immediately after graduating) was working abroad. The results of this question are provided in table 39.

Table 39 - Students' Attitudes Towards Working Abroad, Tanza, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDE</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive - Would like to work abroad in future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help family: &quot;to help my parents &amp; to give a good education to my younger brothers&quot;</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To earn a good salary: &quot;Because I want big-big salary&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To see other countries: &quot;I want to explore and experience life in other country&quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To join family already abroad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help the Philippine economy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To find a husband</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier to find work abroad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work abroad is easier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative - Would not like to work abroad in future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation from family: &quot;Because I don't want to leave my family&quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism: &quot;I don't want other country to benefit from my knowledge&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good opportunities exist in the Philippines &quot;hindi naman sa ibang bansa tayo kikita&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It's hard to work abroad: &quot;Some of factory workers treated like animal&quot;; &quot;It's hard to work abroad and you are the slave of foreigners&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No career advancement abroad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: High School Survey, 1995

Clearly, such attitudes to overseas work carry a strong economic motivation. But table 39 suggests that other factors are also influential. Firstly, the culturally prescribed loyalty and duty to the family, while challenged in some circumstance such as the barkada, is still a powerful force on young people, with a strong sense that going abroad was intended to help siblings and
parents. In addition, the leading reason for not going abroad was precisely to avoid leaving a family behind. Secondly, there is also a sense in which overseas work is seen as an adventure, allowing young people to explore different cultures and other places. This, along with the evidence presented on the educational system and attitudes to farming, highlights the new meanings and significances attached to work in Tanza. Farming is no longer seen as a desirable pursuit; instead, the opportunities of globalized development - factory work, city jobs and overseas travel are the horizons to which young people aspire.

9.5 Conclusion

Focusing on shifts in cultural identity in a context of globalization leads to several conclusions. Firstly, local constructions of identity, for example in relation to class, gender, education, and marital status, serve to create a 'power geometry' of access to the local manifestations of global flows. Factory work in particular is based on various constructions of age and gender, with a strong preference for young single women. But as the last chapter showed, the real power behind local constructions of globalization lies with the government officials and land owners who stand to benefit from land conversion. These then are some of the ways in which local constructions of cultural identity and social status directly affect the local experience of globalization. But globalization is embedded in cultural meanings in more than just a 'filtering' or 'mediating' capacity. The new horizons for identity construction that global flows provide create a complex process of hybridization. Locally constructed identities are themselves reworked by globalization, and this chapter has described this reflexivity for three dimensions of cultural identity. Gender identities are provided a new, and perhaps emancipatory, space through the opportunities to engage in waged employment and contribute to family budgets. Youth culture has been reworked to create a hybridized 'mestizo' culture that is rooted in the local institution of the barkada but challenges other cultural practices surrounding the
family and the church - and not always in a positive way. Finally, tied in to the changing aspirations of young people is a refashioning of the cultural significance of different types of work. This process is predicated on the new opportunities created by globalization, and results in the denigration and rejection of farm labour in favour of factory work and overseas employment.

Each of these cultural changes feeds back into the economic dimensions of globalized development. Thus, for example, the labour scarcity in agriculture, described in chapter 7, cannot be understood without reference to the new ways in which identity is constructed relative to occupation. Equally, a farmer's decision to relinquish his tenancy rights and allow the owner to sell the land cannot be viewed in isolation from the disdain which he sees in his children's, and perhaps his own, attitudes towards farming. Thus, just as the last two chapters have demonstrated the embeddedness of globalization in place-based social, economic, political and environmental relations, so it is equally embedded in local culture - and in the hybridized changes to local culture that it induces.
CHAPTER TEN
GLOBAL FLOWS, LOCAL RESISTANCE?

10.1 Introduction

The sorts of changes described in this thesis have elicited strong responses elsewhere in Cavite. Land conversion and the rights of factory workers have been contentious political issues in the province and have occasional erupted into violent confrontations. Popular protests against development in Cavite have included movements against the original construction of the Cavite Export Processing Zone in Rosario (1981), against an industrial estate developed by the Japanese Marubeni Corporation in Langkaan, Dasmarinas (1990), against a new dumpsite servicing Manila to be located in Carmona (1992), against a 330 megawatt power plant project in Amaya, Tanza (1993), and against numerous other residential and industrial estates.111 Some of these protests have achieved national and international exposure. The 'Langkaan Controversy', for example, led to the ousting of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in the Aquino administration after he refused to sign a land conversion permit for the development (McAndrew, 1994). The resistance to the Amaya power plant project in Tanza drew international attention as non-governmental groups publicized the struggle.

More generally, the conversion of farmland has been a point of heated debate within the Philippines, particularly among progressive groups concerned with the eviction of tenant farmers and issues of national food security.112 Labour regulation too has been a source of local protest.

Cavite's non-union and anti-strike policies under Governor Remulla (1979-1986; 1988-1995) have occasionally been a source of labour unrest in the province (Coronel, 1995).\textsuperscript{113}

There are, therefore, numerous examples of what might be seen as 'local' resistance to 'global' forces. In this chapter, however, I will argue that such a dichotomous construction of local vs. global does not faithfully represent the social, political and cultural context for experiencing globalization that has been described in this thesis. Firstly, while there are many instances in which individual opposition is expressed, particularly by farmers in Tanza, their place within local power structures is such that they cannot activate this resistance in any meaningful way. Secondly, while the manifestations of globalization are explicitly harmful for some, for others the opportunities which arise, economically and culturally, are liberating. Moreover, households and even individuals may experience both positive and negative reactions. Thus the response to globalization is unsurprisingly ambivalent. Thirdly, where resistance to globalized development is successful, it is because local social and political relationships have been transcended, or 'dislocated', in a coalition of opposition.

The chapter is structured in the following way. First, I will provide a brief overview of the broader political context for political opposition in the Philippines, particularly through the 'progressive movement'. Secondly, I will recount some examples of individual opposition to land conversion and indicate the powerless position of the farmers involved. Thirdly, I will show how the benefits of globalized development, while selective, create ambivalency in local attitudes. Finally, I will describe two instances - one a power plant project in Tanza, the other the provincial election of 1995 - in which local power structures were successfully challenged.

10.2 Perceptions of Globalization and Alternative Discourses

Resistance to globalization and other development strategies is seldom heard among the *trapos* ('traditional politicians') drawn from the land-holding elites and provincial political 'bosses' who still dominate the Philippine Congress (Gutierrez, 1993). Instead, dissenting opinions within the Philippine polity are mostly articulated by the broad-based progressive movement. These generally leftist groups of intellectuals, activists and unionists extend from the established Catholic church, which over the last few decades has engaged in 'critical collaboration' with the government, to the armed revolutionaries of the New Peoples' Army. In between is a plethora of issue-based groups, umbrella organizations and ideological movements, many with conflicting agendas and beliefs.

On the subject of globalization, various groups have provided alternative views of how the Philippines should construct its place in the world. Some are rooted in the economic nationalism of the 1950s and early 1960s, articulated then by individuals such as Jose Diokno and Claro Recto and now by figures such as Wigberto Tañada (Cullather, 1994; Tañada, 1993). Such establishment figures advocate policies of mild protectionism, the withdrawal of US forces and economic/political influence, and a 'Filipino First' regulatory framework. At the other end of the spectrum are the ideologues of the radical Maoist left who castigated the 'US-Marcos dictatorship' and hyphenate the Aquino and Ramos regimes in a similar way, while demanding the removal of foreign capital from the national territory (Goodno, 1991). In between are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) focusing on specific issues such as the plight of overseas contract workers, women involved in the sex trade, farmers impoverished by global commodity chains, and workers in foreign-owned factories. Put together, these groups have tried to synthesize local scale oppositions to the manifestations of globalized development and exploitative social practices into an alternative vision of what development should mean. In doing so they create the vocabulary, or discursive space, for different 'global imaginaries'.
Nationalist economics, and specifically nationalist industrialization, has been one of the rallying points for such groups. One organization, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement), a radical association of trade unions, has outlined the following vision of 'nationalist industrialization':

...the country is trapped in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment where we are forced to export all we can, import in order to survive, and meanwhile remaining backward and non-industrialized basically.

This situation, the KMU believes, is the root cause of unemployment and underemployment in the country. The task of the government, therefore, is not only to come up with short-term, patch up solutions to the problem but to pursue a long-term program for genuine industrialization that will essentially restructure the Philippine economy. By this, we mean the expansion of local industry, with the domestic market, not the world market, as its base. This is what the KMU basically means when we call for nationalist industrialization (KMU Position on Job Creation, n.d., reprinted in Schirmer and Shalom eds., 1987, 376)

Much of the inspiration for positions of this kind has come from nationalist intellectuals such as Alejandro Lichauco and Renato Constantino, who have authored numerous tracts on Philippine political economy, identity and history, mostly inspired by the marxian dependencia movement in development theory. Constantino, in particular, stands out, with writings that span the last 50 years and continue today through syndicated newspaper columns available on the Internet. He argues that the economic plight of the Philippines is deeply bound up with political-economic ties and cultural identity rooted in colonial power relations. He traces current thinking towards economic, political and cultural relations with the rest of the world to the political, religious and educational institutions established by Spanish and American colonialism to foster dependent development and a colonial consciousness.

The central purpose of Constantino's writing is the development of a counter-consciousness in the service of cultural decolonization. His approach is to encourage mass

114 Influential works have included 'The Lichauco Paper' (Lichauco, 1973), 'Nationalist Economics' (Lichauco, 1988), 'Dissent and Counter-Consciousness' (1970), 'Neocolonial Identity and Counterconsciousness' (Constantino, 1978).
education in the historical legacy of colonialism and thereby to encourage a critical approach to Philippine relations with the outside world.\textsuperscript{115} In this way, Constantino has tried to articulate a global imaginary in which the Philippines is not subordinated to the demands of either imperialist powers or global capital. In a booklet called 'A Filipino Vision of Development' Constantino argues for a series of measures to carefully regulate the relationship between the Philippines and foreign capital in the process of industrialization (Constantino, 1991). First, instead of attempting to attract as much foreign investment, of whatever type, as possible, Constantino argues for a planned and regulated investment program for industrialization in diverse sectors and an emphasis on local sources of capital. Secondly, Constantino contradicts the prevailing wisdom that protectionism is somehow regressive and arcane and argues that locally owned enterprises should indeed be protected from outside competition. Thirdly, rather than basing development on export manufacturing using cheap labour, Constantino insists that governments should foster strong domestic demand through higher wages and redistributive reform, particularly in the agricultural sector. Priority should also be given to national security in essential sectors such as food production. Finally, Constantino criticizes the 'race to the bottom' mentality that the global economy fosters in developing countries and deplores the competition that forces countries to compete with ever more enticing tax incentives, cheaper labour, and ownership privileges for global capital.\textsuperscript{116}

Constantino has also addressed the discourse of globalization directly. In a column entitled 'Globalization Hype', he writes:

The Philippine government is faithfully following the globalization prescriptions of international capital, seeing these as the spurns [sic] needed to push the country out of the economic doldrums, and make it forge ahead in the GNP race not too far behind its neighbors.... The now familiar name of the game, 'global competitiveness', is pushing nations to prove themselves in the economic arena by producing 'export quality' products at the cheapest

\textsuperscript{115} In many Filipino universities, Constantino's historical texts and essays on colonialism are widely used. In particular, Constantino 1974 and 1975.

possible price in order to fare well in the ultimate testing ground - the international marketplace.
Globalization is a disease which is now ravaging the lives of the more vulnerable peoples of the world.\textsuperscript{117}

Constantino's arguments can be criticized on several grounds. First, some historians have objected to his partisan and overtly political scholarship (May, 1987). Secondly, Constantino adheres closely to a class-based analysis that assigns the primary historical struggle to the 'working class' while neglecting other axes of resistance based on gender, ethnic or religious identities in the Philippines. Finally, Constantino's arguments on globalization tend to be based on a 'dependency' vocabulary which often neglects a critical analysis of how globalization is embedded in local social relations.

Constantino does, however, articulate an alternative imagination of the Philippines' place in the world that is widely shared by others in the progressive movement. The result is a space for resistance to the dominant view of inevitability and necessity that prevails in discussions of globalization. Later in this chapter, I will describe an instance in which the broader agenda of the progressive movement was integrated with a localized oppositional movement. In the next section, however, I will examine some of the resonances that the dissenting voice of the progressive movement finds amongst farmers in Tanza.

\textbf{10.3 Resisting the Global When It's Already Local}

The opinions of intellectuals and activists in the progressive movement are also articulated by some farmers. One farmer in particular identified the need for nationalist industrialization:

\textit{We don't need to look to other countries. It's because our management here are selfish, they don't want to share. Investors are coming here, aren't they. Couldn't our own people do the same thing? Like the Ayalas, they're very rich. They could afford to build}

\textsuperscript{117} R.Constantino, 1996, syndicated column, 'Globalization Hype' reproduced on the World Wide Web: http://www.mabuhay.com/phil_reporter/...
ten factories. They could do that. And they're really sharp people. But they still want other countries, and they come in here for their own benefit.... Whatever benefits they gain would go to us if only our own people were the ones helping us. But no. ...... I heard they're even going to Australia to get foreigners to come and develop our country. (Farmer in Bunga, 1995)

Individual opposition to globalized development in Cavite is, however, most widely targeted at the process of land conversion. It is undoubtedly the case that many farmers would prefer not to see their land, and the land around them, converted to other uses. Many farmers to whom I spoke expressed an emotional attachment to the land and disappointment, frustration and anger that the conversion was proceeding so prolifically. Two lengthy but eloquent quotations capture these sentiments:

That's really a rice field, [but] they built a subdivision. They will cause great hunger among the people. They have no pity, the landowners have no pity in destroying rice fields. These have been rice fields for a long time. Those rice fields have existed since Spanish times. Even before the Spanish times they were rice fields. Now, I think people have become greedy. I don't know what it all means. If they are constructing subdivisions, we have large areas of uplands where they should build them.

If we really lack a place to build houses here [in Cavite], it should be done there in the uplands. We should do it there, not here in the rice fields. Can you imagine, these are rice fields where we have harvested, where we have grown lots of food. Now what will we eat? There's certainly not enough for us now. We will suffer a shortage....

We were pushed to the edge. Is it reasonable for them to sell it? They knew we are working on it. They should not encourage us to sell, because that's where we get food.... We should love it forever because that's where we get our existence. (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995)

Kung talagang kulang ang ating tayuan ng bahay, eh, dapat doon sa lupang kataasan, tayo kumuha, hindi dito sa lupang tubigan. Mantak mong lupang tubigan pinag-aanihan natin yan, kinukunan natin ng malaking pagkain, ngayon ano ang ating kakainin. Kapos tayo sigurado ngayon... kakapusin tayo....

Ginipit pa kami. Eh, iyon ba'y dapat ipagbili nila? Nalalaang ginagawa, ba'y hindi dapat na imungkahin ipagbili pagkat kinukunan ng pagkain iyan... Aba'y dapat mahalin natin habang panahon dahil diyan nabubuhay ang tao.

In my opinion, while there is still farmland it [conversion] should be stopped, because when it is made into housing, we poor people cannot buy the housing. We don't have any way of earning income, especially when it's all housing that is constructed and not factories; but not all members of the family can work in the factories. When you're over-age you can't work, when you're under age you also can't work. If you haven't finished high school, if you don't have a strong backer, you also won't be accepted. If these remain as farmlands, then even when you're older you can still harvest and plant crops....

Because it's like this. The usual thinking of the people here is that, even when they disapproved of it, but the mayor likes it, their wishes will not be respected. (Farmer in Mulawin, 1995).

Yong sa ganoong opinyon ko, sa pananaw ko, iyong gusto ko'y.... habang may natitira pang bukid ay matigil. Kasi kapag iyan ay natayuan na ng housing. kaming mahihirap hindi ni makakabili ng housing, wala na kaming mapagkakakitaan, pagkahousing na yan, ngayon kung isang pabrika ang itatayo, lalo na sa mga residenteng mga naandito, hindi naman lahat ng pamilya ay puwedeng makatrabaho sa pabrika, pag-overage hindi ni maaari, pagkalamang sa edad hindi rin maari, paghindi tapos ng high-school, kung wala kung malakas na backer, hindi ka rin tatanggapin samantalang kung iyan ay bukid, kahit may edad na, pude ka pa rin mag-ani magtanim ng halaman

Kasi ganito ang pangkaraniwang iniisip ng mamamayan dito, kahit tutulan mo at gusto ng Mayor, hindi makapangayari 'yon.

Several points emerge from these quotations. First, and most obviously, agricultural land provides income and livelihood for farming households. Secondly, however, farmers also feel a strong attachment to the land on which they work, and their resistance to land conversion is as much visceral as it is a valuation of their source of livelihood. Finally, this individual resistance is not simply rooted in a financial and emotional loss, but also in the subsistence economy of the
farming household that rice cultivation supports. Resistance, then, is based on three factors: the loss of a source of income in the formal economy; emotional attachment to the land; and, the removal of a subsistence food supply.

But the quotes above also indicate the reasons why such resistance has not been articulated in a collective fashion in Tanza. Except for a few cases, most instances of agricultural land conversion have passed through unopposed. Even where farmers had legal rights to block the conversion they have not done so. In part, this is clearly related to the marginal profits to be made from rice cultivation, described in chapter 7, and the substantial compensation payments that farmers receive for their eviction. But the quotes indicate that the embeddedness of these financial transactions in local social and political power relations also plays a major part in securing conversions. As chapter 8 demonstrated, the social context of land conversion places individual farmers in a position of culturally constrained behaviour towards their landlords and in politically impotent relations with local government officials. Farmers are 'ashamed' to contradict the (illegal) will of their landlords, with whom a personal, although unequal, relationship has been established over many years. Likewise, the local political machinery is all too often beholden to those with the most influence and deepest pockets, rather than functioning as an impartial regulatory framework.

The broader point to draw is that to speak of 'local' resistance to 'global' forces is to misrepresent the context of change. Instead, the experience of farmers in Tanza shows that 'local' resistance is pitted against 'local' processes of change, because it is only through local structures that 'global' processes are manifested.
10.4 Benefits and Ambivalence in Local Globalization.

A second approach to the question of globalization and resistance in Tanza is to expand on the concept of a local 'power geometry' of globalization discussed in chapter 9. The existence of such a differential experience of globalization implies that there can be no unified 'local' response to the process because it means different things, both materially and culturally, to different people.

The economic 'power geometry' produces a series of axes on which those variously located in local power structures are positioned. Local politicians, large landowners and property developers (and the three groups overlap significantly) are the prime beneficiaries of urban and industrial development, followed by tenant farmers and their families who receive compensation payments. Various groups also benefit directly, such as those with employment based on manufacturing industries or the construction sectors. Others will derive less direct benefits if, for example, they are involved in the transportation, service or retail sectors.

Entwined with this economic power geometry are cultural axes of access, exclusion and change in the local process of globalization. At a basic level, various aspects of individual identity shape access to globalization. As the second quote above made clear, employment at local factories is selective on the basis of age, gender, education and political connections. But in a more complex way, cultural identities are reworked as described in chapter 9. Gender identities and youth subculture are transformed in often liberating ways. At the same time, changing attitudes to work among young people mean that land conversion is less an issue to them than it is to their parents' generation. In this way, globalized development can open new spaces for the construction of identity, especially among younger people, and these spaces have both emancipatory and exploitative dimensions.

Thus in Tanza globalization is experienced in different ways by different people, and even in different ways by the same people, as both costs and benefits are weighed. In only a few cases can there be seen an absolute loss resulting from land conversion and industrial
development. Most clearly this is the case among older, uneducated migrants who have come to Tanza to work in agriculture. Without access to the benefits of industrial employment, without land of their own for which to be compensated, without political connections through which to secure new opportunities, and often without kinship networks to provide assistance, these people represent the poorest and most socially marginal group. For others, though, variously positioned within the power geometry and identity distinctions of globalization, ambivalence and acceptance are understandable reactions. It is for these reasons that we cannot easily talk of 'local' resistance to globalization.

10.5 Resistance in Tanza

Despite the barriers and complexities to 'local' opposition, there have, nevertheless, been instances of resistance in Tanza that have successfully challenged the local power structures through which globalization is mediated. I will now describe the circumstances surrounding two such cases. The first example revolves around a plan to construct a large power generation facility in barrio Amaya and illustrates the effective involvement of NGOs in transcending the scale at which resistance occurs. The second instance is the electoral defeat of Governor Remulla in the 1995 provincial election, again illustrating the importance of multiple scales in resisting globalization and its consequences.

10.5.1 People Power Versus the Power People: Resistance in Amaya

After the poblacion, Amaya's 22,000 inhabitants represent Tanza's largest population centre (see Map 3).\footnote{This population figure is from the 1990 Philippine Census of Population.} It was on 35 hectares of land adjacent to Amaya that municipal councillors invited an international consortium of investors to locate a 330 megawatt power
station in 1992. In a resolution dated September 28th 1992, municipal councillors urged that the plant be located in Tanza indicating that it would uplift economic conditions and encourage other foreign investors to consider the town as a place to do business. A few days later the municipal council passed an ordinance declaring the rice land in question to be officially rezoned as industrial. The project was symbolically launched at Malacañang Palace in Manila on December 12th 1992, with the enthusiastic support of President Ramos. The project would be a part of the national Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) programme that allows private investors to construct infrastructure facilities, operate them for a specific period and charge for their services, and then hand over the facility to the national government. The Amaya project received presidential backing because Ramos had, at that time, staked a great deal of political credibility on solving the country's constant power shortages (a problem that was strongly dissuading potential investors from locating in the Philippines). The Amaya plant would sell power to the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) for 25 years before transferring the facility to the government.

The plant in Amaya was to be constructed at a cost of US$275 million by a consortium of investors, both domestic and foreign, who formed the Cavite Energy Corporation (CEC). CEC was, in turn, a subsidiary of Tradeinvest Asia Inc. - itself a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based Ace Indonesia Incorporated. The local broker was a Manila-based entrepreneur, but technological inputs and some capital were apparently coming from an Australian company.

The plant was to be fueled by Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), a relatively clean form of hydrocarbon power generation, but only once a source could be secured - perhaps via a proposed submarine pipeline from Palawan to Bataan which would cross Manila Bay. Meanwhile, the operation would be based on diesel fuel, with only vague assurances that it would eventually switch to LNG.

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119 This account of the protest revolving around the power plant is derived from interviews with those involved in the struggle and press accounts.
The first that local people heard about the project was a two-page newspaper advertisement in December 1992 declaring that ground-breaking ceremonies would be performed in a few weeks' time. Yet clearance from the Department of Environment's Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) had not at that point been obtained and was conditional on technical soundness, including environmental considerations, and social acceptability. A highly simplistic environmental report had been prepared, without any reference to local conditions, and social acceptability had not been evaluated at all, yet over 100 families would have to be relocated for the project.

By the end of January 1993, local opposition was mounting as news spread of the consequences of the project. When EMB evaluators came to the municipal hall to assess social acceptability in February 1993, 7,000 Amaya residents marched from the village to demonstrate their opposition. The response from local political officials was to give assurances that the matter would be carefully evaluated, but to emphasize that the power plant was important in assisting industrialization through foreign investment. Municipal officials had declared the site as zoned for industrial use, but no maps or documents were available at the municipal hall to indicate this on an official land use plan. At the provincial level, the protesters received an even more dismissive response and experienced the wrath of Governor Remulla. A local leader of the protest movement described their encounter with the Governor:

Some of the people that were with us recorded our conversation, our dialogue with the provincial governor. We were with some nuns and we were talking about the problem. And you know he got agitated, very very agitated. I never saw him like that. He said, in Tagalog, "umuwi na kayo", just like a father telling his infant child: "go home". "I'm your governor I know what I'm going to do, you go home". He was with his bodyguards. Up in his office in Trece Martires. Several nuns were with us. There were about 300 people. This was the time we were already in the courts, a court was hearing our petition to have that [zoning] resolution nullified.

By September 1993, EMB approval had been secured by the consortium, leading to speculation that bribes had been paid at the highest levels in the Department of the Environment. It seemed
that popular protest, still inscribed on many walls in Amaya with the words "No to Power Plant", had achieved nothing.

It was in mid-1993 that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) became involved, including the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, Solidarity for Peoples' Power, The Southern Tagalog Alliance for Genuine Development Alternatives (ST-AGENDA), and the Philippine Environmental Action Network. As part of the Philippines' leftist progressive movement, these organizations viewed the proposed development in Tanza not just as a socially unacceptable imposition on local people, but also as a manifestation of the government's reliance on foreign capital and prioritization of industrial projects over agricultural development. They thus made connections between the specific project under dispute and the broader worldview which it represented.

The NGOs organized press conferences and media coverage and a corruption charge was laid against the Secretary of the Environment for issuing an environmental clearance without proper public consultation.120 NGOs experienced in public protest coached local people in appropriate strategies. The groups' leaders stayed in Amaya during the most intense periods of protest and some, from more militant groups, indicated a willingness to take drastic action, including bombing, if construction of the plant went ahead. Other strategies of protest also developed during 1993. On one occasion, opposition leaders learnt that the President would be passing over Tanza in a helicopter to attend the funeral of a murdered mayor elsewhere in Cavite. Local people were mobilized and assembled on the proposed power plant site to form, six-abreast, a giant human chain spelling the word "NO".

The NGOs also started to mobilize their international networks. Through contacts in Australia, the project's partner there was investigated and a protest was lodged with the Prime Minister's Office. A letter arrived in Tanza indicating that the Australian government would investigate the affair. Oppositional groups were also mobilized in the Netherlands and

elsewhere, and the NGOs ensured that foreign visitors, especially those from influential countries such as Japan, saw the site in Amaya.

All these pressures led to delays in the project's commencement and as a result its prospective customer, Meralco, raised the possibility of cancelling its power purchase agreement with CEC. With the withdrawal of some investors, the funding package started to collapse. The CEC looked elsewhere for money and started negotiations with Energy Initiatives Incorporated, a subsidiary of the New York based General Public Utility (GPU), a power supplier in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. But they too pulled out, and the project was left without sufficient funding.

A case is still pending in court as the opposition groups try to challenge the conversion order for the land issued by the municipality and thereby head off future plans for power plant development. In 1995, a renewed proposal for a power plant in Tanza surfaced, this time with the backing of British Gas - but its proposed site is not yet known.\(^\text{121}\)

The example provided by the Amaya power plant finds parallels elsewhere in Cavite, where local disaffection has been translated into effective resistance when activated at larger scales and with broader agendas by NGOs. The other important feature of the Amaya protest was that it was supported by a broad cross-section of the local population. Even those without farmland being affected resisted because of the plant's potential environmental consequences in their barrio. The opposition was thus supported by landless labourers, tenant farmers, landowners and professionals alike. This unity of purpose across social groups and across scales is, I would argue, a precondition for 'local' resistance to globalization. Even so, it was still 'local' power structures, in the form of municipal, provincial and national government agencies, that the oppositional movement had to tackle, rather than the global developers \textit{per se}.

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10.5.2 *The Kingpin's Usurpation - Electoral Resistance in Cavite, 1995*

A second, and quite different, moment of resistance can be identified in the electoral defeat of Governor Juanito Remulla in the provincial elections of May 1995. As discussed in chapter 6, Remulla possessed a formidable political machine in Cavite and his electoral defeat was one of the major political upsets of the 1995 local elections. The reasons for Remulla's defeat are instructive and can be identified in both his relations with the national scale of politics and with a disaffected electorate within his province. Only when these scales were united was the kingpin usurped.

Although a member of the same coalition as the President, Remulla had earned the enmity of Fidel Ramos during the 1992 presidential election, when he chose to support the candidacies of Senator Ramon Mitra and Eduardo 'Danding' Cojuangco. Remulla had orchestrated an improbable vote of zero from the party's provincial branch for the Ramos candidacy, although in the election itself, Ramos won in the province. This, along with Remulla's reputation as a 'strongman' with strident policies towards land conversion and labour laws that embarrassed the national administration, fuelled Ramos' determination to see him replaced. The President found a Caviteño of sufficient stature to oppose Remulla in the form of Epimaco Velasco, a native of Tanza, and the director of the National Bureau of Investigations. Velasco's candidacy was given glamour and popular appeal by the addition of Bong Revilla, a 27 year old action-movie star and son of a Caviteño senator. The Velasco-Revilla organization also fielded a full slate of mayoral candidates across the province, drawn from the upper classes of Cavite's towns.

Remulla's powerful alliances within Ramos' Lakas-Laban coalition meant that the President could not openly endorse Velasco's candidacy or campaign for him, but voters were left in no doubt as to the President's feelings. His initials - FVR - were used in the names of both Velasco's *ad hoc* political party, 'Forward with Vitality and Reform', and in their declared

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funding source, 'Friends of Velasco and Revilla'. Powerful backing was also evident in Velasco's well-organized, well-funded, and well-armed campaign. Most important, however, were the issues on which Velasco chose to base his campaign - putting a stop to the conversion of irrigated agricultural land, and asserting the rights of factory workers. Velasco argued that the provincial government had gone too far in allowing the wholesale conversion of valuable agricultural land and had not focused land conversion on upland areas of less importance. He also denounced the repression of labour rights in the denial of minimum wages and union organization, particularly in the Cavite Export Processing Zone.¹²⁴

Election day, May 8th, saw Velasco finishing with 78,163 votes and Remulla with 55,638; Revilla also won by a similar margin.¹²⁵ Two features stand out as quite startling in this result. The first is that Remulla's political machinery could let him down in such a way. The governor had a reputation for being able to deliver votes (through his many patron-client relationships across the province, or simply through direct bribes and intimidation), which had earned him many powerful allies in the Senate and Congress. And yet, when his political career depended on it, he was unable to deliver votes for himself. Two factors seem to be responsible for his usurpation. The first is the formidable array of resources available to the President's candidate. As a former director of the NBI, Velasco had access to sufficient 'gun and goon' power to neutralize any threat from Remulla of strong arm tactics.¹²⁶ In effect, therefore, the election was contested on the basis of the issues which Velasco laid out in his campaign - a rarity in Philippine local politics.¹²⁷

The second factor is highlighted in the geography of the election result. Remulla, a native of Imus in the north of the province, won only by the narrowest of margins in his own home town.

¹²⁵ 'Remulla bows to Velasco; Bong in, too', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10th, 1995.
¹²⁶ 'Remulla, Velasco vow no bloodshed', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7th 1995; 'Remulla bows to Velasco; Bong in, too', Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10th, 1995. The election was relatively free from violent incidents, exceptions being the discovery of unexploded homemade bombs at the Tanza National High School and in Dasmarinas, and a shooting in Cavite City. See 'Cavite bombing attempts foiled: voting relatively peaceful in hot spot' Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9th 1995.
and lost in most of the other lowland towns where his 'revolution' of industrialization and urbanization had been most effective. In these areas, it seems, the electorate was dissatisfied with the opportunities of employment stemming from global capital investment. Rather than respond positively to Remulla's development strategy, the electorate reacted against the anti-union policies that he had consistently and openly held. In short, the 1995 election result suggests that widespread opposition did exist to Remulla's policies, but it was suppressed until a candidate emerged who could neutralize the electoral tactics usually employed.\footnote{The election was not completely trouble-free. The entire province was placed under the security control of the national Commission on Elections which had to deal with various cases if illegal bearing of arms. In addition, on election day a crude bomb was found and successfully defused at Tanza's high school which was serving as a polling station.}

While acknowledging this fact, Remulla remained unrepentant. A few days after the election he commented in the press: "I really find it ironical that those who benefited from my administration's industrial peace policy were the ones who caused my downfall".\footnote{‘Loss due to no union policy: Remulla admits failure’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15th, 1995; see also ‘The very best for Cavite’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 22nd 1995.} It would appear that the governor still maintained that his political practices were legitimate given the need to attract foreign capital and industrial investment to the province.

Whether or not Velasco's victory leads to widespread changes in Cavite remains to be seen. Early indications certainly suggested a change in the administration's tone: a billboard erected by Remulla's government on the highway into Cavite from Manila announced the province's 'Second Revolution' of industrial development and its 'Peace and Productivity Zone'; a few weeks after Velasco was elected, the sign was painted over and replaced with the slogan "Touch the Lives of the Less Fortunate: Pay your Taxes". At the same time, the possibility of significant change in Cavite's political economy would seem to be unlikely given the election of 19 out of 23 mayors, three congressmen, and many provincial board members who stood as Remulla's candidates.

Two conclusions can, however, be drawn from this electoral saga of successful resistance to land conversion and labour repression. Firstly, it was a coalition of powerful candidates...
together with disaffected farmers and factory workers that succeeded in toppling the figurehead of Cavite's globalized development. As in the case of the Amaya power plant, it took an alliance such as this, that cut across social and economic groups, to form an effective opposition.

Secondly, it was the combination of different scales within this opposition - from the national scale of presidential support to the barangay scale of Velasco and Revilla's political campaign - that permitted 'local' opposition to overcome those political leaders who had derived their power from mediating the relationship between 'local' and global' scales.

10.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed some of the possibilities for local resistance to the process of globalization. What emerges is the conclusion that speaking of 'local' resistance to the 'global' is an overly simplistic representation. The relationship of individuals to global flows is complex and ambivalent and doesn't necessarily create the grounds for grassroots opposition. Furthermore, where there is opposition, and the long quotes provided earlier indicated that it does exist quite passionately, it comes up against social barriers to protest and local power structures that have a vested interest in globalized development.

There have, however, been moments of successful resistance, exemplified by the Amaya case and the 1995 elections. These examples seem to point towards certain preconditions for successful oppositional movements. Firstly, diverse and fractured local experiences of globalized development must be united. Only when local structures of social and political power are transcended can the opposition that is contained by them become activated. Secondly, this transcendence of social groups must be matched by a transcendence of multiple scales of opposition. Whether this is brought about by the involvement of NGOs or a disgruntled President, it is a crucial part of resisting the power of those who promote and benefit from globalized development.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

This thesis began with the promotion of globalization by various politicians and business gurus, but ended in the last chapter with instances of resistance to globalized development in Cavite. To connect these two contrasting interpretations it is necessary to return to the research question that I presented in chapter 1 and then reiterated throughout the dissertation. That is, how do social processes (economic, political, cultural and environmental), embedded in place, mediate and construct a particular experience of globalization? This conclusion will provide an overview of the evidence presented in the thesis as it relates directly to that question.

Part II of the thesis started with an account of the ways in which 'local-global' relations in the Philippines have been constructed over time. This historical account traced the emergence of a complex political economy in the Philippines that incorporated distinctions of ethnicity, class, family ties and social status. I described how, over the course of colonial and post-colonial history, the vested interests of diverse domestic constituencies made the relationship between the Philippines and the growing world economy an arena of contestation. By the late 1960s, however, a strong orientation towards foreign-investment driven, and export-oriented, development had emerged. The Philippines' 'place in the world' had become firmly constructed as a node in a global space of flows and by the 1990s an explicit rhetoric of globalization had emerged to legitimize this position. Nevertheless, chapter 4 demonstrated that such a construction must be seen as a contingent reflection of the interests of powerful groups within and outside the country.

The subsequent discussion in chapter 5 of industrialization in the Philippines showed how the discourse of globalization has become translated into development policies. But just as the adoption of a globalized strategy had been contested within the national political economy, so too was its application. The ambivalence of export-oriented strategies in the 1970s and early 1980s,
coupled with a personalistic regulatory environment, meant that little was achieved in terms of attracting foreign investment flows to locate in the country. Changing domestic circumstances in the 1990s, however, transformed the country's relationship to global flows and indicators of foreign investment, exports, and economic 'openness' have taken a sharp upward turn in recent years. One consequence of this strategy has been the continued heavy concentration of investment in the national core region - the area most intensively 'connected' to global transactional space.

It is, however, at a sub-national scale that the 'local' mediation or embeddedness of globalization is most apparent. At a provincial and municipal scale, chapter 6 showed that experiences of globalization in Cavite were shaped by a system of political-economic power relations deeply rooted in its colonial history. The processes of labour market transformation and agricultural land conversion in particular were shown to be driven by globalized development but moulded by powerful local figures. Industrial investment has thus been incorporated into the local political economy on terms dictated by, and beneficial towards, those in command. This mediation of global flows by local social relations both reflects and reinforces power.

Part III of the thesis brought the scale of analysis down further still, but the influence of local social processes remained central. In the villages of Bunga and Mulawin, the local manifestation of globalization was found principally in the processes of labour market transformation and land use conversion from agricultural to urban activities. But in each case these processes cannot be understood solely as globalization writ locally. Both represented the integration of globalized development, manifested in the nearby export processing zone, with local social relations. The scarcity of labour experienced in agriculture, for example, is not just a result of massive increases in employment at the factories in the zone. It also reflects: the labour needs and divisions of labour inherent in the human ecology of rice cultivation; the social relations of tenancy; the cultural significance of rice; and changing attitudes to farm work. All of these locally constituted factors determined the ways in which globalization was experienced, and responded to, in a village such as Bunga.
Local social relations are also critical in understanding the loss of agricultural land in Mulawin. The nature of tenancy arrangements, the legal and political context of land use regulations, and the environmental conflicts between rice ecology and urban development, all contributed to the conversion of agricultural land even where it is destined to simply lie idle. To leave land vacant in this way cannot be rationalized on purely economic grounds; it is only in the light of these social, political and environmental relationships that it can be explained.

As these instances implied, the experience of globalization is not simply a process of economic change. Cultural identities are also reworked, but once again in ways that incorporate elements of both the 'local' and the 'global'. This process is captured through ideas such as 'hybridization' and 'in-betweenness'. Chapter 9 explored the cultural embeddedness of globalization in two ways. First, it pointed to the ways in which globalized development incorporates what Massey (1994) calls a "power geometry" of differential access based on various axes of identity. But when used in this sense culture simply acts as a 'filter' or 'mediator' of globalization. Discussions of gender, youth and work-based identities showed that cultural forms are in fact reworked in the process of globalization. Moreover, these hybridized forms connect directly with the economic dimensions of globalized development.

In all chapters, then, the embeddedness of globalization in local social relations was apparent. But implicit in this discussion was the argument that the 'local' is no more meaningful as a spatial category that the 'global'. While the impersonal and disembodied global logics that were reviewed in chapter 2 have been shown to be rather more localized and 'embodied' than many writers allow, this localization occurs at multiple scales. In other words, the 'places' in which globalization is embedded are simultaneously national, provincial, municipal, village, household and individual. Social processes which activate globalization operate at, and between, each of these scales. Thus, for example, chapter 6 showed that the political power brokers of Cavite could not exert such influence over the globalizing labour process and the land market without ties to both national level authorities and municipal and village level agents. Similarly, chapter 4 illustrated the way in which defining development policy in the national arena has been
a process of brokering vested interests at that scale with the broader context of colonial powers and latterly international creditors. The process of globalization, then, is activated and experienced in social relations operating at multiple and connected scales.

A corollary of this argument is that scales cannot be hierarchically arranged, with social processes at larger scales determinative over those at smaller scales. And yet this is exactly the construction of scale that is embodied in the discourse of globalization. It incorporates a notion of the global scale as a privileged domain of analysis. By representing places as nodes in a global space of flows, alternative political options - most notably some form of economic nationalism - are deferred to the determining inevitability of processes at a global scale, for which no one can be held accountable. But the embeddedness of globalization in multiple places suggests that this construction of scale must be not be viewed as neutral and apolitical. The discourse of globalization, found most explicitly in the place-marketing strategies described in chapters 5 and 6, is politicized in two ways. Firstly, there is the political definition of 'national interest'. As chapter 4 showed, the pursuit of globalized development represented the outcome of political contestation among domestic constituencies to elide their best interests with the national interest. Secondly, however, there are a number of ways in which globalized development incorporates political choices. The spatial inequity of economic growth described in chapter 5 results from a development strategy that places the attraction of foreign investment above all other social goals. The labour practices described in chapter 6 are legitimized through a discourse of globalization and the need for 'competitiveness'. Finally, the prioritization of industrial development over improving agrarian productivity is a consequence of pursuing global industrial capital in Cavite.

But the use of globalization to justify each of these political practices must be seen in the light of the embeddedness of global flows discussed earlier. If the argument is accepted that globalized development is activated at multiple scales, then the use of globalization to legitimize political practices represents a discursive invocation rather than a material determination. Political choices are deferred to a constructed global scale which is represented as apolitical and
unavoidable. This thesis argues instead that the social relations operating at multiple levels of the 'local' are where the experience of globalization is created. This, I believe, explains why the frustrations of the farmers expressed at the beginning of chapter 10 have only occasionally found an effective voice. It is not because they are powerless against the impersonal forces of globalization, but rather because they are disempowered within the context of local social power relations. It is those wielding power who can construct globalization to legitimize their actions and further their interests. Thus it is only when these local power relations are transcended or dislocated, for example through the involvement of NGOs in the Amaya dispute, or the intercession of Presidential influence in the 1995 gubernatorial election, that disempowered voices are heard.

At this point it is possible to return to some of the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 2. This thesis has shown that the dominant discourse of globalization is flawed. The "logics" of globalization, that are widely promulgated by both the political left and right, imply that the privileged scale of theoretical understanding must be a globalized one. In turn, this constructs an inevitability around the material processes - economic and cultural - of globalization. The corollary has been a consensus around the policy prescriptions of neoliberal development theory. The neoliberal orthodoxy can be critiqued on various empirical grounds. As chapter 5 indicated, the foreign-investment driven and export-oriented nature of its policy formulations have led to spatial inequity, and other authors have identified the minimal domestic linkages and multiplier effects that export processing zones contribute (Warr, 1984, 1985). This thesis, however, has also drawn attention to the assumptions that underpin the neoliberal orthodoxy - in particular, the production and politics of spatial scale. In doing so, the approach might be seen as rooted in two other strands of contemporary development theory. From 'post-marxist' writings, I have drawn an emphasis on the particularities of place and the inadequacy of universalized frameworks for understanding social change. In addition, non-essentialist post-marxist approaches incorporate axes of social power relations beyond those based on production
and class. In this thesis that has meant examining the embeddedness of globalization in, for example, gender identities, political power structures and environmental relations. What this produces is a perspective on the material processes of globalization that views them as embedded, mediated, negotiated and resisted in places at multiple scales. This refutes arguments that imply the 'end of geography' brought on by a global space of flows. The processes of globalization are not inexorable logics, but are received, interpreted, accommodated and adapted in particular ways in different places. Such a sensitivity to place implies a process of 'hybridization' and 'in-betweenness' - concepts that are well developed in the cultural studies literature. The evidence drawn together in this thesis suggests that economic theories of globalization must develop a similar sensitivity.

From post-structuralist perspectives I have applied the concept of discourse and examined the ways in which globalization might be viewed as a politically charged discursive legitimation for a particular brand of development. Four techniques of discursive deconstruction were identified in chapter 2: finding implicit meanings in 'texts'; tracing the history of such 'texts' to demonstrate their contingency; analyzing the power relations and interest groups that define and benefit from a particular discourse; and, identifying alternative forms of knowledge and other ways of seeing the world. Each of these strategies has been useful: the 'texts' of promotional literature indicate the underlying assumptions of foreign-investment driven development; an interpretive history of the Philippines reveals something of the contingency of such approaches; power relations at various scales were shown to have strong vested interests in the dominant discourse of globalization; and, finally, alternative visions of the Philippines' 'place in the world' were found from within the progressive movement. The role of social movements, a preoccupation with many post-structural development theorists, was also shown to be important in the assistance provided by Philippine NGOs in transcending scales and locally embedded power relations in the case of the Amaya dispute.

Where, then, does this leave the study of globalization and social change in places like Tanza, Cavite, and the Philippines? I would argue, firstly, that it should be situated in, and
between, each of these multiple places, because it is precisely there that the material processes of globalization are embedded in local power relations. Secondly, however, a broadly materialist post-Marxist approach to development should not neglect the discursive constructions of globalization that are not just rooted in material processes but also legitimize and foster particular experiences of globalization.

*
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APPENDIX A

OFFICES AND INSTITUTIONS VISITED FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES
i) National Government Agencies

- National Statistics Office
- Board of Investments
- Department of Trade and Industry, Region IV (Southern Tagalog)
- National Economic and Development Authority, Region IV (Southern Tagalog)
- Export Processing Zones Authority
- Cavite Export Processing Zone Authority
- Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
- Department of Agrarian Reform
- Metro Manila Development Authority
- Calabarzon Coordinating Council

ii) Academic

- University of the Philippines, Diliman (various Departments and individuals)
- Ateneo de Manila University (Institute of Philippine Culture)
- University of the Philippines, Los Banos
- International Rice Research Institute
- Philippine Social Science Centre

iii) Non-Governmental Organisations

- National Network of Agrarian Reform Advocates
- Philippine Peasant Institute
- Rural Missionaries of the Philippines
- Southern Tagalog Alliance for Genuine Development Alternatives
- Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Central Luzon)
- Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper

iv) Provincial Government Offices

- Office of the Governor
- Provincial Planning and Development Office
- Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
- Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
v) Local Government Offices

- Office of the Municipal Mayor, Tanza
- Tanza Municipal Planning and Development Office
- Tanza Municipal Agricultural Office
- Tanza Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
- Office of the Municipal Assessor, Tanza
- Office of the Municipal Engineer, Tanza
- Tanza National Comprehensive High School
- Parish of the Holy Cross, Tanza
- Second Laguna de Bay Irrigation Project, Tanza

vi) Commercial

- Rural Bank of Tanza
- International Packaging Corporation (Primepak) Ltd., Tanza
- Transnational Paper Mills, Tanza
APPENDIX B

HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
**HOUSEHOLD SURVEY**

**PANGALAN:** ___________________________  Household #:____

1. Kailan po itinayo ang inyong bahay? 19_

2. Ilan po ang anak ninyo? _____

3. Sino-sino po ang nakatira dito sa inyong bahay?
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pangalan</th>
<th>Kasarian</th>
<th>Relasyon</th>
<th>Kailan/Saan po ipinanganak?</th>
<th>Ano po ang pinakamataas naabot ninyo sa pag-aaral?</th>
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4. Nasaan po ang iba ninyong anak?
   
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<th>Pangalan</th>
<th>Kailan po ipinanganak?</th>
<th>Saan po sila nakatira?</th>
<th>Anong trabaho nila?</th>
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5. Ano po ang pangunahing hanapbuhay ng inyong pamilya?
   
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<th>Pangalan</th>
<th>Uri ng trabaho?</th>
<th>Saan?</th>
<th>Kailan nagsimula?</th>
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6. Mayroon po bang ibang gawaing nakakatulong sa pangkabuhayan ng inyong pamilya?
   
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19-
7. **Mayroon po ba sa kasambahay ninyo ang sa ngayon ay nagtatrabaho sa abroad?**

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<tr>
<td>Sino po?</td>
<td>(B/L)</td>
<td>Relasyon</td>
<td>Saan?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri ng trabaho?</td>
<td>Ao po ang pinakamataas nagsimula? na naabot nila sa pag-aaral?</td>
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8. **Mayroon po ba sa inyong kasambahay ang nagtatrabaho noon sa abroad?**

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<td>ii.</td>
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<td>iv.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sino po sila?</td>
<td>Uri ng trabaho</td>
<td>Saan?</td>
<td>Kailan?</td>
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9. **Sino po ang tumutulong ng mga sumusunod na gawaing bahay?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Pagluluto (Cooking)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Paglalaba (Wash Clothes)</td>
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<td>c. Paglilinis (Cleaning)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Pamamalengke (Marketing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Pag-aalaga ng bata (Childcare)</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Kumpuni ng bahay (Hh repairs)</td>
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10. **Alin sa mga sumusunod ang mayroon sa bahay ninyo?**

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<th></th>
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<th>Kailan ninyo nabili ito?</th>
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<tr>
<td>i.Radyo</td>
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<td>ii.Cassette Player</td>
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<td>iii.Bentilador</td>
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<td>iv.Telebisyon</td>
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<td>v.Betamax/VHS</td>
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<td>vi.Refrigerator</td>
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<td>vii.Sasakyon</td>
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**MARAMING SALAMAT PO**

11. **Anong uri ng materales yari ang bahay?**

a. Ang dingding ____  b. Ang bubong ____
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

NAME: ____________________________   Household #: ______

1. When was your house constructed? 19 __

2. How many children do you have? ______

3. Who lives in your house?
   i. Name  ii. Gender  iii. Relation to you  iv. Place/Date of Birth (arrival date, if not from here)  v. Highest educational attainment
   a. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   b. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   c. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   d. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   e. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   f. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______
   g. _______  ______  ______  ______  ______

4. Where are your other children?
   Name  Year of birth  Where do they live?  Occupation
   h. _______  ______  ______  ______
   i. _______  ______  ______  ______
   j. _______  ______  ______  ______

5. What is your family's main source of livelihood?
   i. Name  ii. Type of work?  iii. Where?  iv. Start Year

                      ____________________________   ____________________________
   v. Who from your family helps with this?  vi. In what way do they help?
                      ____________________________   ____________________________

6. Are there other activities contributing to your family's livelihood?
   No ______  Yes ______
                      ______  ______  ______  19-____  ______  ______
                      ______  ______  ______  19-____  ______  ______
7. Is there anyone in your household currently working abroad? No_____ Yes_____ 
   a. _____ b. _____

8. Has anyone in your household worked abroad in the past? No_____ Yes_____ >
   i. Who? ii. Type of work? iii. Where? iv. When? 
   ________________ ________________ __________ 19—19__

9. Who helps in each of the following household chores?
   Names
   a. Pagluluto (Cooking) ________________________________
   b. Paglalaba (Wash Clothes) ____________________________
   c. Paglilinis (Cleaning) ________________________________
   d. Pamamalengke (Marketing) ___________________________
   e. Pag-aalaga ng bata (Childcare) ______________________
   f. Kumpuni ng bahay (Hh repairs) _______________________

10. Which of the following do you have in your house? When did you buy them? (Check) When?
    i. Radio __________
    ii. Cassette Player __________
    iii. Electric Fan __________
    iv. Television __________
    v. VCR __________
    vi. Refrigerator __________
    vii. Vehicle __________

    THANK YOU
    ****************

11. What type of material is the house made from?
   a. The walls ________ b. The roof ________
APPENDIX C

FARMING SURVEY
PANGALAN: ___________________________   Household #: ___

1. Kayo po ba ay nagbubuwis (tenant) ___ o may-ari ___ ng lupa? Kung magbubuwis:
   i. Sino po ang may-ari ng sinasaka ninyong lupa? ______________
   ii. Saan po nakatira ang may-ari ng lupa? ______________

2. Paano po napasalin sa inyo ang lupa? ____________________________

3. Gaano pong kalaki ang lupang tinataniman ninyo ng palay?
   Nakaraang tagulan: ___ (hectares)   Nitong tag-araw: ___
   Gaano karami ang inyong ani?
   Nakaraang tagulan: ___ (cavans)   Nitong tag-araw: ___

4. Gaano pong kalaki ang lupang tinataniman ninyo ng gulay at prutas? ___ (sq.m.)

5. Anu-ano pong mga gulay at prutas ang inyong itinatanim?
   Uri: ___________   Ano po ang tanim ninyo ngayon? ___________
   Kailan nagsimulang magtanim? ___________

6. Noong nakaraang taon, alin po sa inyong pananim ang nakapagbigay sa inyo ng mas malaking tulong? ___________

7. Mayroon po ba kayo alagang hayop?
   Uri: ___________   Bilang: ___________

8. Sino po sa inyong pamilya ang tumutulong sa mga sumusunod na gawaing pambukid?
   a. Pagaararo ___________
   b. Pagtatanim ___________
   c. Paghahasik ng pataba ___________
   d. Pagdidilig ng pesticides ___________
   e. Paggagamas ___________
   f. Pagdidilig ___________
   g. Pag-aani ___________
   h. Pagbebenta ng gulay ___________
   i. Pagaalaga ng hayop ___________
   j. Pagahahatid ng pagkain sa bukid ___________
9. a. Saan kayo kumukuhan ng puhunan sa pagsasaka?
   b. Borrowed from: i. Bank  ____ ii. Individual in Bunga ____
       iii. Person not in Bunga ____ iv. Other (specify) ____

10. Noong nakaraang taon magkano po ang inyong nahiram na pera?
    i. Tagulan: _____ (pesos)  ____ ii. Tagaraw: _____ (pesos)

11. i. Kailan po kayo huling gumamit ng sabog sa pagtatanim? ___
    ii. Kailan po kayo nagsimulang gumamit ng sabog? ___

12. Kailangan pa ba ninyong bumili ng bigas? ___  Ano pong buwan? ______

13. Noong nakaraang ani sa TAG-ULAN at nitong ani sa TAG-ARAW:
    i. Saan pong bario y na ngmumula ang mga nagtatanim sa inyong sakahan?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    ii. Ilan po ang mga nagtatanim inupahan ninyo?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    iii. Magkano po ang bayad ninyo sa kanila?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw ____ (arawan)

    iv. Saan pong bario y na ngmumula ang mga nag-aani sa inyong sakahan?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    vi. Ilan po ang mga nag-aani inupahan ninyo?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    iv. Gaano po ba ang lahat na inyong nagastos?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    v. Pagkatapos pong maalis ang lahat ng ginastos sa patanim at pagkakautang, ilan na lang po ang natirang palay sa inyo?

    vi. Saan ninyo ibinebenta ang mga palay?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan _____ b. Nitong tag-araw _____

    vii. Magkano po ang bayad sa inyo sa bawat kilo ng palay?
       a. Nakaraang tag-ulan ____ (pesos/kg) b. Nitong tag-araw ____ (pesos/kg)

14. Sino po sa palagay ninyo ang magpapatuloy ng inyong pagsasaka kung kayo ay matanda na? __________________________

MARAMING SALAMAT PO
QUESTIONS FOR FARMERS

NAME: ___________________  Household #: ______

1. Are you the tenant (tenant) ___ or the owner ___ of the land? If the tenant:
   i. Who is the owner of your land? ______ ii. Where does the owner live? ______

2. What is the area of your land? __________

3. What area of the land is planted with rice?
   Last rainy season: _____ (hectares)  This dry season: _____
   What was the size of your harvest?
   Last rainy season: _____ (cavans)  This dry season: _____

4. What area of your land was planted to vegetables and fruits? _____ (sq. m.)

5. What vegetables and fruits do you plant?
   Type  Which are you now planting?  When did you start planting them?
   ______  ______  ______
   ______  ______  ______
   ______  ______  ______

6. In the last year which of your crops has contributed the most income? ______

7. Do you have any livestock?
   Type  How many?
   ______  ______
   ______  ______
   ______  ______

8. Which members of your family help with the following farming activities?
   a.Ploughing  i.Names  ii. Hired Help?
   b.Planting
   c.Fertilizing
   d.Applying pesticides
   e.Weeding
   f.Watering
   g.Harvesting
   h.Selling vegetables
   i.Looking after livestock
   j.Bringing food to fields

9. a.Where do you get the capital for farming? __________
b. Borrowed from:  
   i. Bank  ii. Individual in Bunga  
   iii. Person not in Bunga  iv. Other (specify)  

10. In the last year how much money have you borrowed? 
   i. Rainy season: ___(pesos)  ii. Dry season: ___(pesos)  

11. i. When did you last use 'sabog' for planting? ___  
   ii. When did you first use 'sabog' for planting? ___  

12. Do you ever need to buy rice? ___ During which months? ___  

13. During your last RAINY SEASON harvest and during this DRY SEASON harvest: 
   i. Which barrio did your planters come from?  
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   ii. How many planters did you hire? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   iii. How much did you pay them? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season___(per day)  
   
   iv. Which barrio did your harvesters come from? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   vi. How many harvesters did you hire? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   iv. How much were all of your farming expenses in total? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   v. After all of your farming expenses and debts were covered, how much rice was left for you? a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season___(cavans)  
   
   vi. Where did you sell the palay? 
      a. Last rainy season _____  b. This dry season _____  
   
   vii. How much were you paid for each kilo of rice?  
       a. Last rainy season _____ (pesos/kg)  b. This dry season _____ (pesos/kg)  

14. Who do you think will take over your land when you are old? ____________________  

THANK YOU VERY MUCH  
***************
APPENDIX D

SURVEY FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
Survey of TNCHS Graduating Students

This is not a test. It is a survey asking you for information about your family and your plans after you graduate from high school.
Please complete it carefully and do not miss out any questions. If there is information that you do not know, just put a '?' in the space provided.
Thank you for your cooperation.

1. Name__________________  2. Age___  3. Section_____

3. Address: Barrio ____________, Town ________________

4. Where were your parents born? Mother:_________ Father:_________

5. Please list ALL the people who currently live in your house:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to you</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Place</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E.g. Father</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2nd Year HS</td>
<td>Tenant Farmer</td>
<td>Punta</td>
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6. Do you have any family members who are NOT currently living in your house? YES ( ) NO ( ). If 'Yes', please list them below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to you</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Work Place</th>
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7. Has anyone in your family ever worked abroad, either now or in the past? YES ( ) NO ( ). If 'Yes', please list them below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to you</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Years</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
8. How do you help your parents, in household chores and in your family's income (hanapbuhay)?
   i. Household Chores: _______________________________________________________
   ii. Family Income (Hanapbuhay): ___________________________________________

9. When you selected Technology and Home Economics (THE) subjects in your second year, what were your three choices?
   1st: ____________________ 2nd: ____________________ 3rd: ____________________

10. Which subject are you now taking? ________________________________________

11. Why did you choose the subjects listed above?
    (You may check more than one answer)
    a. I wanted to be in a class with my friends ( )
    b. My parents told me which subjects to select ( )
    c. I chose ones in which I like the teacher ( )
    d. I chose the ones that would cost less in materials ( )
    e. I chose ones related to my future course in college ( )
    f. I chose ones providing training for working at EPZA ( )
    g. I chose ones providing training for work in farming ( )
    h. I chose the ones in which I got good grades ( )
    i. Other reasons (please specify) ( ) ____________________________

12. What do you plan to do next year after graduating from high school (please check)?
    a. Work in farming ( )
    b. Work at EPZA ( )
    c. Work in Manila ( )
    d. Work somewhere else (specify): ( ) ____________________________
    e. Further study (specify which course): ( ) ______________________
    f. Other (specify): ( ) _______________________________________

13. What are your feelings about working in farming?
    ________________________________________________________________

14. What are your feelings about working at EPZA?
    ________________________________________________________________

13. Would you like to work abroad in the future? YES ( ) NO ( )
    Please explain your answer:
    ________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX E

Philippine Government Incentive Packages for Foreign Investors and Exporters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Credits on imported raw materials for 5 years</th>
<th>Credits on imported new capital equipment</th>
<th>Credits for taxes and duties on raw materials and semi-manufactured products used as production inputs</th>
<th>Credits for taxes withheld on foreign loan interest payments</th>
<th>Credits for increase in revenues</th>
<th>Credits for import substitution of non-traditional products</th>
<th>Exempt from capital gains tax on sale of capital assets</th>
<th>Exempt from duty on capital equipment and parts import until 1997</th>
<th>Exempt from advance payment of customs duties</th>
<th>Exempt from wharfage dues, export taxes, duties, and expenses on exports of products and services</th>
<th>Exempt from surplus taxes duty, corporation tax on gross export earnings</th>
<th>Exempt from export income tax</th>
<th>Exempt from export withholding tax on export of products, services, and earnings on export of services</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972 (PD66) Export Processing Zone</td>
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<td>1972 (PD66)</td>
<td>Export Processing Zone</td>
<td>Incentive</td>
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<td>1981 (PD1789) Omnibus Investment Code</td>
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<td>Investment Code</td>
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<td>1994 (RA7844) Export Development Act</td>
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<td>Export Development Act</td>
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<td>1995 (RA6135) Export Incentives Act</td>
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<td>Export Incentives Act</td>
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<td>1996 (RA5186) Investment Incentives Act</td>
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<td>Investment Incentives Act</td>
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<td>1997 (RA7432) Export Processing Zonal Investment Code</td>
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<td>Export Processing Zonal Investment</td>
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<td>1998 (RA7433) Export Incentives Act</td>
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<td>Export Incentives Act</td>
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<td>2001 (RA7434) Export Processing Zonal Investment Code</td>
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<td>Export Processing Zonal Investment</td>
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<td>Foreign Exchange/Investment Incentives</td>
<td>Tax Deductions</td>
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<td>Priority in allocation of foreign exchange for import of merchandise, equipment and materials</td>
<td>Net operating costs for first ten years</td>
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<td>Repatriation of foreign investment and remittances of profits and dividends at any time in full at the prevailing exchange rate</td>
<td>Accelerated depreciation of fixed assets</td>
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<td>100% repatriation of investment for foreign investors</td>
<td>50% deduction for labour training expenses</td>
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<td>Remittance of earnings for foreign investment</td>
<td>10 year deduction for organization and pre-operating expenses</td>
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<td>Deductions for investment in pioneer enterprises</td>
<td>Net operating loss carry over or 1% tax deduction on export sales if firm uses a new brand name different from imported brands</td>
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<td>10 year deduction for organization and pre-operating expenses</td>
<td>Reduced income tax on direct labour materials used as production inputs</td>
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<td>Accelerated depreciation of fixed assets</td>
<td>Double reduced income tax if establishment is in a priority area for development</td>
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<td>Deduction on profit used for expansion of fixed assets</td>
<td>First 5 years: deduction of 50% of labour expenses from taxable income</td>
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<td>Deduction above is doubled if located in a less developed area</td>
<td>5 year reduced income tax equivalent to production inputs</td>
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<td>Deduction above is doubled if located in a less developed area</td>
<td>Deduction from expansion of fixed assets</td>
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<td>Deduction for expansion of fixed assets used for production</td>
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Conditions Include

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Export at least 70% of production</th>
<th>Export at least 60% of production</th>
<th>Export at least 50% of production</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enterprises owned by foreign investors</td>
<td>Export additional to existing export</td>
<td>Export assistance from government</td>
<td>Export assistance from government</td>
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<td>Conditions apply</td>
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<td>1. Freedom from expropriation</td>
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<td>Establishment of an Export Assistance Fund</td>
<td>Faster and simpler export procedures</td>
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<td>Export at least 70% of production</td>
<td>BOI authority not needed for companies not seeking incentives, even if company is over 40% foreign owned.</td>
<td>Export at least 50% of production</td>
<td>Incentives offered by BOI, EPZA, and Subic and Clark development authorities still apply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cunetto et al. 1987; Board of Investments; Board of Investments Act of 1991.