THE STRUCTURAL LIMITS OF CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP INTERVENTION INTO DEFENSE POLICY-MAKING AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN THE PRC: FROM MAO TO JIANG

by

CHRISTIAN DINWOODIE


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Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

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Abstract

This thesis argues that domestic institutions have been causal in determining degrees of both foreign and defense policy non-integration and the consistency of military action with these policies in the PRC under Jiang Zemin and Mao Zedong at his peak of power. I will first examine alternative explanations of state behaviour illuminating their strengths and weaknesses in solving the puzzle of periods of policy integration and non-integration. Then I will argue that institutions have been causal in selecting out leaders and restricting leaders' choices in both cases. The two cases examined, one of policy integration under Mao Zedong in 1965 and the other of policy non-integration under Jiang Zemin from 1990-1995, each reflect a clearly distinct set of domestic institutions that has been causal in determining policy integration and consistent military action with stated policy goals. Mao was able to integrate policy and military action under conditions of directive leadership in the Politburo, hierarchical authority and pervasive politics. On the other hand Jiang has been faced with balanced leadership in the Politburo, reciprocal accountability among the top leadership, and a loosely coupled system of political military relations.

This thesis will conclude with an examination of how the current conditions of non-integrated policy can be changed with the development of new institutional rules and structures. These changes include the development of civilian military expertise, effective monitoring bodies, and policy integrating bodies. Increasing transnational relations, the cross over of the civilian and military scientific comminutes and the growing policy influence of non-military policy experts are mutually reinforcing in giving civilian leaders in China policy handles that can diminish the militaries monopoly
of expertise. These developments should help overcome the policy non-integration problems of the current political-military structure under Jiang.
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<tr>
<td>BISS</td>
<td>Beijing Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<td>COSTIND</td>
<td>Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense</td>
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<td>FALSG</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group</td>
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<td>GLD</td>
<td>General Logistics Department</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>General Office</td>
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<td>GPD</td>
<td>General Political Department</td>
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<td>GSD</td>
<td>General Staff Department</td>
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<td>IIS</td>
<td>Institute for International Studies</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>(U.S.) Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People's Congress</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>(U.S.) National Security Council</td>
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<td>OFA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>SIIS</td>
<td>Shanghai Institute for International Studies</td>
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Since the death of Mao Zedong and the implementation of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the late 1970's, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has begun to integrate into the world community by increasing its contacts with other states through trade, diplomacy and military contact. However, a disturbing trend has started to appear. Incidents of non-integrated PRC defense and foreign policies and inconsistencies in defense policies and People's Liberation Army (PLA) actions have become quite salient in several sensitive policy areas including: the South China Sea disputes, PRC-Taiwan relations, weapons exports, nuclear testing, and illegal acts of the PLA abroad. PRC foreign and defense policies and actions can be considered non-integrated in two important ways: the first is when stated policy goals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Central Military Commission (CMC), the supreme executive body of the PLA, are contradictory; and second when PLA services act in a way that is inconsistent with the polices of the MFA or the CMC. This non-integration of foreign and defense policies and inconsistency between either policy and military action is seen by many to reduce the predictability of China's state behaviour and is thus a potential source of greater instability and conflict, especially with China's neighbors.¹

I will argue that the recent non-integration of China's foreign and defense policies and PLA-Navy (PLA-N) behaviour in the South China Sea has been largely attributable to the development of three post-Mao institutions: reciprocal accountability between groups of military and civilian party elites; coalitional or balanced leadership structure in the Politburo; and loosely coupled CCP-PLA relations in which the PLA has developed a monopoly on military strategy development.² These institutional developments have been causal in determining the

¹Jervis (1978) has demonstrated the destabilizing effects of non-integrated defense and foreign policy.

²Here, I take institutions to be rules that "prescribe behavioural roles and relationships among these roles" (Roeder: 1993: 8). This analysis thus subscribes to the positive theory of institutions where the emergence of institutions such as the PRC constitution (written and unwritten) from the choices of self-interested political actors and the consequences of institutions for political choice (Roeder, 1993).
non-integration of PRC foreign and defense policy as well as inconsistencies in defense policy and military action. They have been causal by affecting civilian decision makers' incentives and ability to intervene in the creation of military strategy, they have shifted the control of strategic policy option formation away from civilian decision makers, and they have reduced civilian decision makers' ability to monitor military strategy development.

With these institutions in mind, this paper hopes to answer the following questions: which political military institutions might inhibit (or facilitate) civilian policy makers from intervening in defense strategy formation in order to coordinate it with broader foreign policy goals? How have these institutions developed in China since the end of Mao's leadership? Under which institutional conditions can foreign and defense strategies be more integrated and under which institutions can military policy and action be more integrated?

Alternative models used to explain the PRC's state behaviour and international outcomes have failed to ask these important questions, ignoring the explanatory power of domestic political military structures and processes. The bureaucratic interest model assumes that foreign ministries and defense ministries ignore international systemic imperatives and instead act to satisfy their corporate and programmatic interests. This model predicts relatively non-integrated foreign and defense policies, but it cannot explain cases of integrated foreign and defense policies. Alternatively, the structural realist model assumes that states are unitary actors, thereby negating the importance of policy making and non-integrated policies. Even realist models that account for decision-makers' responses to the international system maintain the assumption that states will act rationally based on their relative capabilities in the international system. However, when cases of relatively integrated
and non-integrated policy and behaviour both appear the limitations of these models become apparent.

An interesting puzzle develops when one compares the relative integration of foreign and defense policy under Mao Zedong at the peak of his power with the relative non-integration of these policies under succeeding leaders. In order to see the puzzle more clearly it will be helpful to choose two significant instances of decision making that have had major foreign and defense policy implications; the first case is the strategic debates of 1965 under Mao and the second is the South China Sea dispute under Jiang Zemin from 1990-1995. The question arises, how was Mao able to maintain relatively integrated foreign and defense polices and military action consistent with those policies while succeeding leaders have not been able to match his performance?

These two cases are interesting to compare because their policy outcomes are clearly different; the strategic debates case under Mao is an example of successful policy integration while the South China Sea case is an example of failed integration. Moreover, both cases are centered around the problem of the limits of civilian intervention in defense and foreign policy integration, and both cases also involve some relatively open disagreement between civilian leadership and the military bureaucracy over policy. One important constant is the nominal civilian control of the military in both cases. The most important differences are that each case is representative of a distinct set of leadership structures and political-military relations; the earlier period under Mao is representative of a more directive and hierarchical

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3George (1979) has explained the value of controlled comparison for theory development. This paper attempts to combine existing theories of party-army (civil-military) relations and leadership structure in order to first test the hypothesis that structures have been causal in the non-integration of foreign and defense policy as well as the inconsistency of defense policy (or foreign policy) and military action. This paper will then attempt to refine and elaborate these existing theories to accommodate the findings of the two cases.
leadership while the later period under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin is representative of a more balanced or diffused leadership.

In order to attempt to solve this puzzle, I will first lay out the important features of both the relatively integrated case under Mao Zedong and the relatively non-integrated case under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Second, I will examine the strengths and limitations of the alternative models mentioned above in explaining cases of relatively integrated and non-integrated policy outcomes. Finally, I will present a model of state behaviour that emphasizes the causal influence of institutional structures and processes (instead of interests) that can explain both cases of defense and foreign policy integration and non-integration.

This neoinstitutional model will be used to first discuss and explain changes in leadership authority structure and the structure of the Politburo that occurred primarily as a result of the leadership's recognition of the debilitating effects of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969)(Appendix 1). The current institutionalization of mature reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership are unlikely to change in the near term.\(^4\) I will then examine the final institutional development, loose coupling, where military strategy and policy making have been largely depoliticized. This final institutional change has resulted from both the conscious culling of Maoist political philosophy from Chinese military doctrine and strategy and the increased demands of technology. Unlike the two aforementioned institutions, the current loosely coupled civilian control system of political military relations is more subject to near term change. The problematic consequences of this final institution and some recent developments that might mitigate these problems will be discussed in the final two sections of this paper.

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\(^4\)Unless otherwise noted the word institution in this paper refers to formal (e.g. written) or informal rules (e.g. unwritten) and relationships that govern leadership and bureaucratic behaviour and define relationships within a polity. Thus institutions are not limited to governing 'bodies.' Institutions will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
The Strategic Debates of 1965-1966: Integrated Foreign and Defense Policy

With the preceding in mind, it is interesting to briefly compare the relative defense and foreign policy integration under Mao at the peak of his personal power with that of the relatively non-integrated policies of the post-Mao leaders, particularly Jiang Zemin. The strategic debates of 1965 centered around two fundamental issues; the first was one of choosing an appropriate defense posture in the face of potential U.S. and Soviet aggression; and the other involved choosing an appropriate foreign policy in light of Mao's domestic struggle against "bourgeoisie rightists" and "revisionists."  

First, the major defense policy debate of 1965 centered around whether the Chinese military should maintain a defensive 'people's war' strategy or switch to a more conventional posture. This forward posture would have likely taken China into direct confrontation with the United States on Vietnamese territory as had occurred in the Korean war. Second, the major foreign policy question facing the PRC leadership was whether it should remain non-aligned; the alternatives would have been an alliance with either the U.S. or the USSR. In both cases Mao preferred the former position against opposition within the military and among the civilian CCP elite (Harding and Gurtov, 1971; Ra'anana, 1968; Zagoria, 1968).

Mao succeeded in getting his way on both the foreign and defense policy issues, and the result was relatively integrated foreign and defense policy. Mao was able to maintain China's defensive posture against military bureaucratic pressures (led

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5The strategic debates should be seen in the broader context of the 'red vs. expert debate' which focused on the degree to which the PLA should engage in military training over political training or non-traditional military activities. This debate increased in salience after the PLA's experience in the Korean War brought officers into contact with more conventional weapons and strategies. Military 'professionals' such as Marshal Peng Dehuai pushed for a more regularized army including the establishment of ranks and promotion procedures based on military competence. Joffe (1965, 1987) and Jencks (1981) give comprehensive and detailed analysis of the debate.

6Mao accused the 'bourgeois capitalists' or 'capitalist roaders' of wanting to abandon socialist reforms and move towards a capitalist system of development. The 'leftist revisionists,' in Mao's view, were sympathetic to the changes in Soviet socialism brought about by Kruschev. See Harding and Gurtov (1980) for an excellent account of these positions.
by Chief of the General Staff Luo Ruiqing [1959-1965]) for an offensive force posture against the U.S. in Vietnam. Mao thus kept China out of an entanglement with the United States that could not have been sustained without Russian military and financial assistance, both of which Mao was loath to accept (Ra'anana, 1968; Zagoria, 1968; Parish, 1973).

Mao's choice of a defensive 'people's war' doctrine as the PRC's defense policy supported his desire for an independent or non-aligned foreign policy under which China could focus on self-sufficient development and be less affected by superpower influence. Mao also needed to maintain an anti-Soviet foreign policy demonstrating his resolve against "social imperialism" so that he had recourse against PRC leaders who were sympathetic to applying Soviet methods to solve many of China's domestic problems. Mao purged the civilian and military leaders who openly called for an alliance with the Soviets or a conventional force posture that might put China in another costly war with the United States (Yahuda, 1973; Ra'anana, 1968; Zagoria, 1968).


In contrast to the Maoist case, recent developments in the South China Sea can be seen as an example of relatively non-integrated foreign and defense policy. Chinese activities in the South China Sea have become increasingly destabilizing to the region since 1988 when it fought a limited war with Vietnam over some disputed islands in the Spratlys. Since that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the PLA Navy (PLA-N) have been sending conflicting messages about Chinese intentions in

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7 This was the line Mao pursued until improved relations with the United States became a more desirable after the Soviet threat to China culminated in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict.

8 Deng Xiaoping was one of the many CCP leaders who wanted to reform the PRC's economic polices with the assistance of Soviet technology and methods. (See Deng Xiaoping's speech to the Ninth Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party, July 30, 1965 cited in Ra'anana, 1968)

9 The Spratlys are a chain of islands, reefs and shoals in the South China Sea whose sovereignty is currently disputed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.
the area culminating in the PRC's first direct confrontation with an ASEAN neighbor over the Philippine claimed Mischief Reef in 1995.\footnote{No combat took place at Mischief Reef but Philippine fishermen were detained and then removed from the reef while the PLA-N set up permanent structures. Philippine and international media personnel were initially blocked from the reef by PLA-N but later were allowed passage with a stern warning from the PLA-N that force would be used in the future.}

In fact, Chinese decision makers seem to have been torn by two non-complimentary policy goals. The first is a foreign policy, most often promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), promoting economic development and trade. This goal requires a long term peaceful international environment which includes good relations with Southeast Asian neighbors who have become increasingly important as trading partners (Gallagher, 1994; You, 1995: 389). \footnote{Beijing can also be seen to want to avoid conflict with these neighbors because of the weight of its Tibetan and Xinjiang problems. Moreover, the PRC needs Southeast Asian cooperation in a united front against the U.S. human rights pressures especially in the wake of international ostracism resulting from the Tiananmen massacre (Chen, 1994: 898)\footnote{Deng put the modernization of agriculture, industry, and science and technology above military modernization in 1978. The military has also clearly recognized the importance of economic development before military modernization. The military bureaucracy has traditionally supported Deng's 'opening' China to the world especially its encouragement of technology transfer.}.\footnote{The PLA stated its policy clearly after its clash with Vietnam in the Spratlys in 1988 claiming: "China's sacred territory tolerates no aggression. We advise the Vietnamese authorities to abandon their ambition swallowing up China's sacred territory, to withdraw from the islands... they are occupying illegally, and to stop all their activities aimed at occupying China's Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their reefs..." (Jiefangjun bao, 30 April 1988, in FBIS-CHI, 19 May 1988, pp. 12-13).} This policy can be seen to have developed out of the priority Deng gave economic development over military development in the 'four modernizations.'\footnote{The PLA stated its policy clearly after its clash with Vietnam in the Spratlys in 1988 claiming: "China's sacred territory tolerates no aggression. We advise the Vietnamese authorities to abandon their ambition swallowing up China's sacred territory, to withdraw from the islands... they are occupying illegally, and to stop all their activities aimed at occupying China's Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their reefs..." (Jiefangjun bao, 30 April 1988, in FBIS-CHI, 19 May 1988, pp. 12-13).} It involves the recognition of the importance of a comprehensive security strategy that combines political, cultural, and economic means, not just military power, and the belief that China faces no pressing external threat (Swaine, 1996: 20). The 'economy firsters' put a higher value on a more peaceful resolution to the Spratlys dispute.

The other major policy goal, often espoused by the PLA in the military newspaper, \textit{Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao)}, is that of defending every inch of China's claimed sovereign territory.\footnote{The PLA stated its policy clearly after its clash with Vietnam in the Spratlys in 1988 claiming: "China's sacred territory tolerates no aggression. We advise the Vietnamese authorities to abandon their ambition swallowing up China's sacred territory, to withdraw from the islands... they are occupying illegally, and to stop all their activities aimed at occupying China's Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their reefs..." (Jiefangjun bao, 30 April 1988, in FBIS-CHI, 19 May 1988, pp. 12-13).} The PLA would carry out this goal under the
guidance of limited high-tech peripheral war (Li, 1996; Godwin, 1996). In particular, the PLA-N is planning a naval strike force capable of achieving victory against China's Southeast Asian neighbors. This goal would require near term assertive (military) action against other claimants to the Spratly Islands (Munro, 1994). Clearly the PLA's new peripheral war doctrine predicts Southeast Asia will be a more likely area of conflict than an early and major war with either the U.S. or the CIS (Munro, 1994).

If China adheres to its "economy in command" foreign policy and accepts the benefits of an interdependent world, it has only one policy choice in the South China Sea: a settlement of the Spratlys dispute through peaceful means. Achieving this goal would require a change in PLA defense policy that would incorporate a greater concern for confidence building. Concretely, this would mean an improved commitment from the PLA-N for increased transparency of its activities in the South China Sea. Assuming the military will continue to pursue its short-term programmatic and corporate interests and its strong sovereignty stance in the Spratlys, it will be necessary for the central leadership to guide bureaucracies towards more integrated foreign and defense policies and PLA actions in line with those policies. If the central leadership succeeds in integrating the polices and actions of the two bureaucracies the result should be improved predictability of China's intentions in the South China Sea for its ASEAN neighbors.

The MFA has consciously been taking this "economy in command" approach. First, in 1990, in the wake of the deleterious effects of the Tiananmen massacre on Chinese foreign policy, Premier Li Peng stated that China would put the sovereignty question aside and discuss joint development of the disputed areas. This gave the PRC

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14Over the past ten years the PLA has shifted its war fighting doctrine from 'people's war under modern conditions' to 'limited local warfare under high-technology.' The new doctrine emphasizes the likelihood of quick war on China's periphery with limited political objectives is more likely than an early and major war with the U.S. or Russia. It is interesting to note that every war in which the PRC has been engaged since 1949 has been limited and local.
some bargaining space from which it could engage the other claimants and discuss joint development. The MFA has followed up on this approach by sending representatives to multilateral discussions for joint development of the disputed Spratlys for mutual economic benefit through exploiting sea bed and maritime resources.

The policy disagreements between the PLA and MFA over the level of PLA-N assertiveness in the South China Sea defines the two essentially conflicting policies that China might be taking, one driven by nationalist sentiment and goals of sovereignty while the other is driven by a realistic appraisal of current PLA capabilities and the deleterious effects of PLA-N aggressiveness on economic integration with China neighbors. These disagreements have created an atmosphere of unpredictability for China's neighbors.

To summarize, since 1988 the Spratly Islands can be seen as a case of relatively non-integrated foreign and defense policies replete with disagreements between the MFA and PLA-N over degrees of assertiveness and primary state objectives. In contrast, Mao's choice of a defensive people's war doctrine and restraint from sending full units into Vietnam as he had done in Korea was consistent with his desired foreign policy of independence and rejection of Soviet 'revisionism.'

Alternative Explanations of the Dissimilar Outcomes

Two of the key questions that this paper is concerned with are how and under what conditions military policy and actions can be changed or controlled to ensure their integration with a state's overall foreign policy. This integration would allow for more predictable PRC state behaviour; a situation clearly desired by other actors. There are two major alternative approaches that have attempted to predict state behaviour: the bureaucratic interest model (Allison, 1971; Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984) and the structural realist unitary actor model (Waltz, 1979). The first model emphasizes the different interests of soldiers and statesmen and suggests that
militaries tend to resist innovation out of bureaucratic inertia, even if the result is poorly integrated policy. Thus, foreign and defense policies tend not to be integrated.

Alternatively, the structural realist model implies that only the systemic level of analysis is important. In this model, states will automatically react to shifts in relative power by power balancing or bandwagoning (Waltz, 1979). The bureaucratic interest model seems to explain the relative non-integration of foreign and defense polices in the South China Sea. At the same time, the structural realist model seems to explain relative integration of policies during the strategic debate about whether or not to enter the Vietnam War against the U.S. in 1965-1966. Neither of the two models alone can explain both periods of integration and non-integration.

The Bureaucratic Interest Model

The bureaucratic interest model assumes that states are not unified actors because they consist of bureaucracies competing for policy influence (Allison, 1971, Model III; Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984). According to this model, members of military organizations are likely to be concerned with the resources and prestige of their organization. Military organizations will act to protect their interests in increased budget share, improved morale or increased autonomy. An improved budget share allows the services to procure and maintain the forces necessary to carry out essential core missions; high morale is important for carrying out any function effectively; and autonomy makes it easier to protect essential core plans and procedures. These conditions often prevent military organizations from responding adequately to their state's security goals.

According to the bureaucratic interest model, the behaviour of the Chinese military derives from its primary interest in defending its organizational interests.16

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15 Realists such as Posen (1984) explain that civilians will be able to intervene in defense policy to integrate it with broader foreign policy. Since this model arrives at the same outcome as the structural realist model based on the assumption of omniscient and effective policy makers I will address it together with the structural realist model.

16 Harding (1987) has an excellent description of general PLA interests including corporate, political, leadership, personal, and programmatic.
Most significantly for our purposes, this model suggests that the PLA Navy, Air Force, and PLA ground forces are concerned with protecting their "essential core" interests or their most valued missions and plans and forces for carrying out those missions. The core mission of the Chinese Navy has become the development of a blue water navy which would entail pushing for larger, more complex missions in the South China Sea and possibly acquiring an aircraft carrier battle group for these missions.

Bureaucratic interest models have been used to explain the relative non-integration of foreign and defense policies in the South China Sea. Wu and Bueno deMosquita (1994) You, (1995) You and You (1991), and Garver (1992) have all examined the PLA Navy's bureaucratic interests in its push through the South China Sea. They have also detailed the PLA-N's aspirations for developing a blue water navy capability. This model explains that the PLA-N is competing against the other services and bureaucracies for budgetary resources to complete what it feels is its mission in the South China Sea, the protection of China's sovereign territory and resources (Wu and Bueno deMosquita, 1994).

Preparation for conflict in the Spratlys has led the PLA-N to demand a larger allocation of budget funds and high technology weapons including an aircraft carrier (You, 1995: 380). The PLA-N has largely been successful in these demands because it has successfully tied its corporate and programmatic interests in developing blue water naval capacity to broader Chinese national interests which have included sovereignty rights in the South China Sea, as well as the right to living space, oil, fishing, and other resources (Garver, 1992). The PLA-N has also been an advocate of expanding the 'strategic boundaries' that define China's national interests to the blue water and into space (Cai, et al., 1987; Shambaugh, 1994).18

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17 The essential core of an organization is defined as the plans, procedures, and capabilities that are part of both the "organizational essence" and the "technical core" (Halperin, 1974).

18 One Jiefangjun bao commentator has explained China's new strategic border situation this way: "In view of the real threats and the potential threats that the nation faces, as well as the new trends of..."
The bureaucratic politics model usefully identifies interests of the individual organizations competing for scarce resources. Yet this model can not explain why or how those self-interested institutions might be forced to make sacrifices in order to integrate foreign and defense policies (as in the case of the strategic debates of 1965). On the one hand, the bureaucratic interest model helps to explain PLA-N motivations in the South China Sea that have led to frequent relatively non-integrated defense and foreign policies. On the other hand, this model can not explain cases of defense policy and military action inconsistency nor can it explain the integrated policies evident in the strategic debates of the 1960s. Moreover, even though bureaucratic politics models highlight interests, they do not explain the conditions internal and external to the state under which civilians successfully intervene to integrate foreign and defense policy. Most significantly, this model leaves unanswered how obstacles to policy integration can be overcome.

**Structural Realism-and Posen's Adapted Realist Model**

Two other ways of predicting state behaviour come from structural realism and Posen's adapted model of realism. A structural realist model explains that states (major powers), are unitary actors that will balance one another in the international system. What happens within the state is unimportant. In essence the structural realist model assumes away any importance of domestic structures or processes; the state becomes a black box. Waltz's model is interesting because it predicts state behaviour, but what is left unanswered is what occurred in the black box and whether the development in the world's oceans and in space, only by pushing the national gateway to the 3 million square kilometer zone of ocean jurisdiction, by maintaining the same geographic borders on land, and by entering a higher frontier in space is it possible to gain the needed total space to ensure the country's security and development" (Xu Guang Yu, 1987).

19 This realist grouping would also include proponents of realpolitic strategic culture such as Alastair Johnston (1995a, 1996). Johnston also assumes away the importance of divergent foreign and defense policies anticipating that China's strategic culture has predetermined decision makers thinking resulting in consistent realpolitic behaviour. However Johnston does leave room for the possibility of 'policy learning' and 'idealpolitic' behaviour through exposure to transnational relations. The potential for this change in China will be discussed in the final section of this paper.
contents of the box matter in understanding state behaviour. By definition the unitary actor model predicts an integrated foreign and defense policy.

Barry Posen's modified realist model predicts that states will respond to the international system the same way Waltz's model does (bandwagoning or power balancing based on relative capabilities), but he goes a step further in explaining the contents of the black box. Posen's modified realist model explains how military policy is affected by the civilian leadership's decisions. This model assumes that the civilian leadership will pay attention to the security interests of the country in the international system and induce changes in military doctrine when sufficient external military threat exists (Allison, 1971, Model 1; Morgenthau, 1978; Posen, 1984). Posen's model would thus allow for the same outcomes that the structural realist model would predict. Under cases of high external military threat, such as China was under at the time of the strategic debates, civilians will intervene to integrate foreign and domestic policy. However, under conditions of low or unclear military threat, such as has occurred in the Spratlys under Jiang Zemin, Posen's model does not suggest definite civilian intervention to integrate policy while the rational actor model would. Thus Posen's model can accommodate China's non-integrated foreign and defense policies in the South China Sea.

Posen might thus argue that the non-threatening context of the post-cold war era explains the difference between the policy outcomes of the two cases. However, Posen's model is not able to accommodate the effects of other systemic threats to national security such as economic threats and threats of internal instability. In this sense, Posen's model only accommodates the variances in external military threats.

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20 Posen's starting point is that one way states can balance against external threats is by increasing their own power. For example, states can do this by improving strategy (Waltz, 1979: 118). Therefore, Posen's model suggests that when states face serious external threats (or when they are contemplating aggression), they tend to adjust their military policy to make sure their foreign and defense policies are integrated and effective (Posen, 1984, fn.4, 74-75). Posen explains that although bureaucratic interest models are right about how organizations generally perform in peacetime, when a threat arises civilian leaders will intervene to force a rational updating of military doctrine in accordance with the demands of national security goals (Posen, 1984).
that would influence civilian intervention to integrate polices, but it does not accommodate the potential counterbalancing influence of economic threats from the system nor does it accommodate internal security threats that would influence civilians to intervene in military policy. Economic threats have increasingly become an important consideration in Chinese national security policy including the threat of economic retaliation for aggressive polices in the South China Sea.

There are numerous examples of Chinese foreign policy watchers who have explained Chinese behaviour as unitary and rational (Johnston 1993, 1995, 1996; Hyer, 1995; Shambaugh, 1994; Van Ness, 1971; Segal, 1985). The realist models seem to predict the relative integration of foreign and defense policy under Mao during the period of the strategic debate in 1965-1966. The Soviet Union was seen as a major threat on China's northern border and entering a war with the United States in Vietnam would have left China vulnerable to Soviet threats. According to the structural realist model China balanced against both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. by joining the group of non-aligned third world states against the superpowers. According to the Posen model Mao (or his group) saw a potential threat and was able to effectively intervene in military policy- stopping a damaging engagement with the United States to integrate it with the foreign policy goals of self-reliant development. However,

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21Elizabeth Kier (1992, 1995, 1996) has convincingly argued that defense policy decision makers will not only consider external threats but will also consider the domestic implications of alternative military policies (e.g. offensive vs. defensive) based on the existence of competing or unified political military sub-cultures. The results for civilian intervention are similar to those Avant explains in her divided vs. unified leadership (Avant, 1993).

22Some structural realists might argue that China, at this time, was not a great power and consequently its reaction to the redistribution of power in the international system was not important. However, it is clear that China could shift the balance in U.S.-Soviet conflict and did exactly this in its rapprochement with the U.S. in the early 1970's.

23The question of how leaders can change military policy generates another debate. Posen suggests that when the balance of power model applies (when a state is under serious threat or when it is contemplating aggression) civilian leaders intervene in military policy to force the military to discontinue obsolete strategies and develop new and better ones that are well integrated with a states overall foreign policy. A major competing view suggested by Stephen Peter Rosen holds that civilian intervention alone cannot cause real innovation in military strategy. If a military service is to implement a "new way of war," the service or branch chief must first alter the service's organizational structure to create career incentives for his subordinates to carry out the innovation (Rosen, 1991). Without such a change, Rosen suggests, civilian intervention cannot be effective. Thus one of the
the realist models overlook the causal influence of important domestic structures and alternative modes of international threat.

Thus, the realist models (including Posen's modified version) seem to be able to predict the relatively integrated PRC foreign and defense polices of the strategic debates. The bureaucratic interest model seems to predict the PLA-Navy's motivations and their effect on relatively non-integrated policies in the South China Sea case. However, a more robust model of defense and foreign policy making should be able to explain both instances of relative integration and non-integration. A neoinstitutional model emphasizing the importance of institutions seems to provide just this.

The Neoinstitutionalist Model with Chinese (Communist) Characteristics.

Institutions have been described as rules that prescribe behavioural roles and the relationships among those roles (North, 1990: 3; Keohane, 1988: 383-394; Young, 1986: 107). In this sense institutions have causal significance because they can shape or form decision makers' choices and the consequences of choices. More specifically, rules of politics, or constitutions, shape political behaviour by empowering specific political actors, shaping the choices available to political actors, and attaching benefits or liabilities to strategies (Roeder, 1993). Institutions are also selection mechanisms in that decision makers who fail to move successfully among these rules and relationships will be "selected out" of positions of influence (Roeder, 1993: 8). Institutions can thus be seen as causal in as much as they can constrain the choices of political actors and select who will be successful and who will fail in the pursuit of political interest.

short-comings of Posen's integrated policy model is that it does not make an important distinction between longer term policy intervention through personnel and education reforms and more immediate intervention (or micro managing) that involves direct intervention in strategy development.

24 Here, constitutions are the accepted rules of politics within a state; not necessarily formal or written rules.
Thus neoinstitutional arguments seek to discover the source of the regularities or patterns in human behaviour in the rules that constrain individual choices. Actors' policy stances can be predicted by observing their rule-defined responsibilities and the limitations of their role. Institutions may be formal or informal, but it is important that actors recognize them as constraints on their actions. Actors recognize institutions as constraints by weighing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action (Roeder, 1993).

The two causal elements of institutions mentioned above, selecting out unsuitable actors and constraining choices of decision makers, will be helpful in understanding the military's growing control over defense policy in the PRC. In the post-Mao era new domestic institutions have limited the central leaders' potential to intervene in defense policy development and integrate it with broader foreign policy. More specifically, institutions have constrained decision makers' behaviour by establishing rewards and punishments and selected out those who do not obey the rules.

Since Mao's death, three important institutions have developed in the Chinese political-military system shaping military policy making: reciprocal accountability; balanced or coalitional leadership within the Politburo; and the military's monopolization of the technical aspects of defense policy or loose coupling. The institutionalization of these new structures and processes have limited the power of civilian leaders to intervene in military policy formation and prevented them from exercising effective monitoring over the military's behaviour. This is because these institutions have been able to select out leaders unacceptable to the military and create consequences for leaders who oppose military interests in the Politburo and Central Committee. These institutions have thus helped to increase the military's influence on

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25 Institutionalization can be seen as a process where actors expectations converge and become mutually reinforcing (Roeder, 1993).
national security policy without developing integrating or monitoring mechanisms to reconcile foreign and defense policies. 26

In order to demonstrate the causality of institutions in explaining degrees of integrated and non-integrated PRC defense and foreign policy, I will first discuss how the structure and process of leadership accountability within the Chinese polity and the leadership structure and process in the Politburo have evolved from hierarchical accountability and directive leadership under Mao to reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership under post-Mao leaders (Appendix 2). The Cultural Revolution's destabilizing effects within the government will be examined as a primary catalyst for these two structural changes. I will then examine the third institutional change, the shift from pervasive politics under Mao to the loosely coupled control of military policy making under post-Mao leaderships. I will then examine the consequences of the military's monopolization of defense policy in the loose coupling system. This final institutionalization and its consequences are examined in greater detail than the first two because it is more subject to change in ways that would give civilians greater policy control to integrate foreign and defense policies and monitor military actions.

The first two important institutional changes developed from the top leadership's reaction to the excesses of Mao's directive leadership during the Cultural Revolution. 27 The first development was the movement from a dominant hierarchical authority structure under Mao from 1949 until the Cultural Revolution. During this time top leaders in the Politburo were not clearly accountable to subordinate leaders and Mao seemed unaccountable to any other leader. After the Cultural Revolution and

26 Neo-institutionalist models do not ignore the importance of the international systems influence on state behaviour. In fact, this model gives a clear explanation of how states will respond differently to similar external conditions because of domestic structures. For example, in situations of divided leadership leaders will be less responsive to systemic influences. In contrast, under conditions of unified leadership a state will be more responsive to the same international conditions. As systemic conditions change unified leadership structures will allow more flexibility for leaders to respond.

27The third institutional development, the military's monopoly on defense policy influence and implementation, can be seen to be shaped by the increasing technological sophistication of defense doctrine and PLA capabilities and the culling of Maoist politics from military science (here meaning strategy, tactics and force posture). This development will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Mao's death this structure changed to reciprocal accountability between Politburo leaders and their subordinates in the Central Committee (Appendix 2).

The second institutional development, intertwined with the first, was the shift from a directive leadership within the Politburo where the paramount leader's opinions were not challenged as a rule to one of a balanced leadership in the Politburo where competing opinions could exist openly and the paramount leader could be challenged by other leaders of "equal" stature (Appendix 2). Under Mao, hierarchical authority and directive leadership allowed him tremendous influence in integrating foreign and defense policy and even contributed to his control over military science (strategy, tactics, and force postures). However, these institutions later developed into reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership. Under these new conditions the authority of the top party leadership (or at times the authority of the Party General Secretary) was limited as was their capability to intervene in operational level bureaucratic affairs and, in particular, the technical aspects of military policy.

Hierarchical Authority and Directive Leadership

The hierarchical leadership structure of authority under Mao at his pinnacle of power (1959-1966) can be contrasted with the more reciprocal leadership structures that characterized the original PRC constitution and the actual conditions of the post-Mao leadership (Appendix 2). A hierarchical relationship involves unilateral delegation in which the right of all agents is conditional but the ultimate principal's right is definitive (Roeder, 1993: 27). In this sense, hierarchy, accurately described both intra leadership relations between the Politburo and the Central Committee as well as relationships in the PRC polity during the peak of Mao's power (Goldstein, 28

28 This might include revolutionary stature or military experience, career performance, length, of party membership etc.

29 Unless otherwise noted 'military science' in this paper refers to the development of military strategy tactics and force postures, not the chemistry, engineering, mathematics, or physics research directed at the development or improvement of weapons or military support equipment.
This leadership structure and control of the polity helps to explain Mao's ability to integrate defense and foreign policies in the 1965-1966 strategic debates.

The hierarchical system of accountability under Mao consisted of a group of approximately eight hundred leaders whose positions were very secure in the new regime (Teiwes, 1984). This group had shared common ideas, revolutionary experience, and many economic and political successes early on in the regime. Even though the leaders might have performed poorly at times their established positions of authority were secure unless they opposed the directive leader Mao (Teiwes, 1984). In fact, despite the failures of the Great Leap Forward, there were only two significant purges from the politburo from 1949-1964: Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, both of whom opposed Mao.

The hierarchical leadership accountability structure reflected Mao's privileged position as the 'first among equals' in the Politburo. Mao's definitive position in this hierarchy was reinforced by leadership 'rules' that developed early in the regime. Leaders under Mao followed two types of rules: normative and prudential (Teiwes, 1984). Three of these normative rules - Leninist discipline, a ban on factions, and civilian control of the military - contributed to the maintenance of the hierarchical structure with Mao at the top. These norms fostered a clear top down authority structure in which no one under Mao wanted to 'rock the boat.' Mao broke these rules in several instances; two salient transgressions were his unilateral decisions to purge Politburo leaders and his attempts to designate his own successor, Lin Biao.

Top leaders reacted to Mao's transgressions of these normative rules with the development of "prudential rules," or the types of behaviour top leaders will follow that are likely to result in political success. These rules included not alienating the

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30 Normative rules, or the official guidelines of the original PRC constitution, included the norms of collective leadership, minority rights, Leninist discipline, a ban on factions, and civilian control of the military (Teiwes, 1984).

31 Institutions are infrequently static. Converged expectations can change through an aggregation of individual choices that challenge the prevailing rule(s). New rules are defined by new expectations rather than by static formal (written) rules (Roeder, 1993: 9).
leader, maintaining broad alliances, 'delivering the goods,' protecting institutional interests, maintaining guanxi networks, developing patron client ties, and maintaining army support (Teiwes, 1984). However, these rules also contributed to Mao's unquestioned hierarchical authority and other leaders' subservience to Mao, especially the rules of not alienating the leader and maintaining patron client ties.

Another reason why Mao remained virtually uncontested at the top position of the leadership hierarchy (with little accountability) was his individual aura or cult of personality that was inextricably intertwined with the identity of the new regime. Mao was seen as a founding father, a great tactical general, and a philosopher by many inside and outside the regime. Even though those within the regime leadership might have considered themselves equal to Mao in many respects, they also realized that the Chinese people as a whole and many leaders and bureaucrats looked at Mao as infallible, often revering him as an emperor-like figure. It became increasingly difficult for top leaders to challenge Mao's policies, as any challenge from within or from outside the leadership to Mao's legitimacy was a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime itself (Teiwes, 1984). Consequently top leaders began to adapt the prudential rule of not challenging the leader.

Moreover, top leaders were also influenced to obey Mao by both fear and career interest. It became clear very early that confronting Mao directly would likely result in being purged from top leadership position- as in the cases of Gao Gang (1954), Peng Dehuai (1959), and Luo Ruiqing (1965) (Teiwes, 1984). At the same time the apparent uniformity of leadership can also be explained by opportunistic leaders bandwagoning behind Mao when he attacked other top leaders (Goldstein, 1991).32 These leaders would recognize that supporting Mao against other Politburo leaders would result in opportunities for political advancement or at least the chance

32In fact, Goldstein has argued that from 1949 to 1966 the PRC exhibited all the salient characteristics of a bandwagon polity: tight hierarchy, unified central leadership, undifferentiated structures of power, and obsequious subordinates eager to demonstrate their loyalty to superiors (Goldstein, 1991).
to maintain their current positions. Thus, at the time of the strategic debates in 1965, the Maoist hierarchical accountability structure was causal in influencing top leaders to rally behind Mao rather than build coalitions against him. Converging expectations of the benefits that could result from obeying the rules and punishments that would result from ignoring the rules resulted in a situation of strong individual leadership.

The hierarchical leadership authority that developed under Mao was intimately tied to the development of Mao's directive leadership in the Politburo. Directive leadership (one person leadership) is one form of authoritarian rulership (the other being collective) that assigns policy making to a single leader such as a President or General Secretary. The normative rule for the top leadership body in the new CCP regime in 1949 was collective leadership (Teiwes: 1984). This meant the creation of a decision-making body, the Politburo, in which leaders could be balanced to represent leaders in the second tier. Yet the policy making prerogatives of this body were threatened by the changing configuration of power in the top tier of leadership.

By 1959, Mao had effectively consolidated directive rule in the Politburo by acquiring an apex role that consisted of the accumulation of multiple leadership posts and the dispersal of policy making from the politburo to the separate organs chaired by these posts. Mao not only held all three of the most important leadership positions (leader of the army, CCP, and state), but his power was also multiplied in these positions by his personality cult and role as founding father. Thus, because of the special circumstances of Mao's rulership the degree of directive power held by Mao is unlikely to be replicated by post-Mao leaders even if they manage to consolidate the triple crown of party, state and military leaderships.

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33For new institutionalism this is one of the most fundamental distinctions among situations involving choice. The differences between individual choice and collective choice are basic. The movement from the former to the latter introduces a legion of complexities associated with games, including collective action problems, voting paradoxes, and the design of strategies (Roeder, 1993:24).

34Consolidation is a process by which a politician establishes power and authority in various policy realms. It can be measured by the extent to which a politician can direct policy in an issue area and the number of areas which the same politician directs. Consolidation by the General Secretary is essential for attaining a directive leadership (Roeder, 1993:80).
More important for understanding the integrated policy outcome of the strategic debates of 1965-1966 is that when a General Secretary consolidates power within the politburo, or has uncontested power as Mao did, he is better able to enforce his will on military policy (Roeder, 1993). This suggests that the autonomy of military elites in the articulation of military policy depends in part upon disunity and competition within the Politburo leadership. At the time of the strategic debates in 1965-1966, Mao had consolidated a directive leadership (leadership of the CCP, army, and state) and his decisions were thus subject to a more controllable group of revolutionary leaders within the Politburo. In fact, the hierarchical and directive leadership system under Mao with top down accountability pervaded the Chinese polity, especially in hierarchical organizations such as the military. The consequences of the institutionalization of hierarchical accountability and directive leadership on civilian control of military policy were first, that the leadership under Mao exerted powerful control over defense and foreign policy making, and second that Mao could also control the consistency of defense policy and military action.

The primary example of Mao exercising his directive power in influencing military policy and operations was through the implementation of his 'people's war doctrine.' Mao's defense policy influenced military thought and action in two important ways; it emphasized the importance of 'people and politics' over weapons and non-political soldiers. First, Mao and his obsequious Defense Minister Lin Biao actively promoted the idea of 'people over weapons' in order to establish and then maintain the defensive people's war doctrine as the only acceptable defense policy option throughout the strategic debates of 1965 (Lin: 1965).

35At the time of the strategic debate in 1965 Mao exerted his control over acceptable military thought and operations through the Political Commissar System (PCS) and Party Committee System throughout the military. These two organizations made up the Party Political Work System (PPWS). (The Discipline Inspection Commission appeared in Chinese press reports after 1984 but is integral to the PPWS today).

36Some might see Mao's choice of the defensive people's war doctrine as making a virtue of necessity, but it was clearly a choice of not accepting military and financial aid from the Soviets and a choice to
policy priority was given to motivated men over all types of weapons, including nuclear arms. A writer in *Jiefangjun bao* has explained that wars are finally won by politically conscious and courageous men who are 'not afraid of death' (*Peking Review*, No. 48, November 24, 1967: 13). Thus, the Maoists argued that expertness in military techniques was not enough; politically conscious men were clearly more important.\(^{37}\)

Related to the idea of people over weapons was Mao's call for the prominence of politics in all realms of human affairs especially military affairs. Mao felt that apolitical military professionalism in the Huntingtonian sense was an anathema (Huntington, 1957). Instead he felt it was necessary that the PLA maintain the close ties to society that it had developed during the Chinese communist revolution by keeping its functions as a work force, a production force, and an education force. Here, Mao clearly represented the 'red' side of the 'red vs. expert' debate in that he emphasized political training and loyalty while limiting specific military training (Powell, 1967: 258). Mao also limited official training indirectly by expecting the military to maintain its non-combat functions. Mao's defense policy making power thereby made an offensive-positional warfare stance against the U.S. in Vietnam highly unlikely.

The fundamentally defensive stance of the people's war doctrine can be seen in sharp contrast to the opposing view in the strategic debates most often attributed to Chief of the General Staff General Luo Ruiqing and his followers. The opposing line consisted of a more conventional war doctrine based on the Soviet model with a forward defense posture (Luo, 1965). Essentially, Luo wanted to protect China's developing urban areas by bringing the war to the enemy with the protection of a

\(^{37}\)See for example "Treading the Path of Giving Prominence to Politics- Wang Taoming's Steel Eighth Squad Advances in Struggle," in (Peking: *New China News Agency*(NCNA), January 14, 1966.) where it is claimed that China's "superiority in men and politics" constitutes a "moral atomic bomb" that is more powerful and useful than material weapons.
Soviet nuclear umbrella rather than fighting a protracted war on Chinese territory. However, this forward posture would have required Soviet military and or financial assistance.\textsuperscript{38} These agreements with the Soviets would have clearly undermined Mao's domestically driven foreign policy of shunning Soviet revisionism.

Mao's directive power over his subordinates clearly contributed to his ability to integrate PRC foreign and defense policy in the face of domestic leadership opposition during the strategic debate. Mao moved military policy in his desired direction by replacing the confrontational Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai with the more pliant and politically acceptable Lin Biao.\textsuperscript{39} Marshal Lin not only developed policies that were agreeable to Mao but he also put into words and operation Mao's views on the correct military doctrine for China, the people's war doctrine (Lin, 1965). Mao was impressed with the success of Lin's ability to reinvigorate the flailing Political Commissar System (PCS) (discussed later in this paper) and re-exert party control over the a military that had become increasingly professionalized under Peng Dehuai.\textsuperscript{40} Mao also wanted to use Lin's successful strategies in order to militarize the population in the 'everyone is a soldier campaign' (1961-1964).

An example of Mao's more overt demonstrations of support for leaders obsequious to him was his defense of Lin Biao against the confrontational Chief of Staff General Luo Ruiqing in the strategic debates of 1965-1966. The Maoists accused Luo of being concerned only with military matters (i.e. a professional in Huntingtonian terms) explaining that Luo did not pay sufficient attention to political

\textsuperscript{38} The Soviets had actually offered military assistance to the Chinese for the purpose of resisting the U.S. in Vietnam in 1964 (Zagoria, 1968). Mao refused the assistance.

\textsuperscript{39} Peng Dehuai was regarded by many as a military 'professional' holding a military 'standpoint.' His opinions of conventional war had been shaped by China's losses to the Americans in the Korean War and their subsequent success using Soviet conventional weapons and techniques. Although never denying the paramountcy of the CCP, Peng was purged by Mao at the Lushan conference in 1959 and then discredited as a proponent of 'bourgeoisie' military policies.

\textsuperscript{40} Soviet style ranks and service laws had been implemented under Peng. By the late 1950's military officers were being accused of aloofness in ways counter to Communist egalitarian goals. Lin responded by implementing an officer to the ranks system (xiafang) where officers had to live as enlisted men for a month and eventually dissolved the system of ranks in 1965.
training and the non-combat functions of the armed forces. The structure of the hierarchical system and directive leadership of Mao fostered a bandwagon effect that brought other leaders who might have sympathized with Luo behind Mao and Lin against Luo (Ra'an, 1968; Zagoria, 1968).

It appears that the institution of hierarchical accountability and directive leadership were causal under Mao in that even in the face of opposition from the military and powerful Politburo members (Peng Dehuai and Luo Ruiqing) Mao was still able to push through his desired foreign and defense policy. There was a convergence of leadership expectations around the normative and prudential rules that reinforced Mao's directive power. The consequence of Mao's centralization of power and direct influence on military strategy was relatively integrated defense and foreign policy throughout the strategic debates of 1965-66. Mao was able to dictate the defensive people's war doctrine to the military 'modernizers' resulting in a non-aggressive force posture directed at the United States in Vietnam in 1965-1966. The bandwagoning effect of the hierarchical system also quieted those who might have supported Luo against the Mao-Lin group.

Cultural Revolution and Institutional Development

As mentioned above, institutions are seldom static. The institutions of directive leadership within the Politburo and hierarchical leadership structure were challenged by the leadership excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao had unleashed the red guards on the CCP in an attempt to rectify 'bourgeois' and 'social imperialist' tendencies within the party. The result was the destruction of the CCP organization itself and the recognition of surviving leaders that directive

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leadership was dangerous. Leadership expectations that formerly defined the early and mid-Maoist rules of the game began to diverge weakening existing institutions.

The PRC's political system began to change during the socialist education campaign in the mid 1960's, when Mao sought to promote ideological struggle and political consciousness-raising as antidotes to the "modern revisionism" fomented by Krushchev (Goldstein, 1991). Despite the intensity in which Mao launched his assault on "capitalist tendencies" in China and abroad, he lacked an organized and coherent plan of attack. His directives were vague, his speeches were abstract and enigmatic. Even loyal supporters such as Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaqi could not readily translate Mao's words into concrete policies and programs. By 1965, "neither Mao nor anyone else knew concretely how to address the problem of revisionism in China," with the result that "political cues as to the importance of class struggle and preventing revisionism could...elicit no obvious practical response from subordinates" (Goldstein, 1991: 150). Under these circumstances, the traditional bandwagon effect failed to materialize, as even the most ardent Maoists faced a formidable task in trying to understand (let alone satisfy) Mao.

In the emerging chaos of the Cultural Revolution, political actors could no longer rely on traditional, unambiguous cues from above to orient their behaviour. Factionalism was running rampant and multiple power centers emerged to compete for influence and authority. Though Mao continued intervene to set the terms of political and ideological debates his words became devoid of meaningful behavioural guidelines. Anarchy reigned as political actors at all levels were left to fend for themselves as best they could.

After the top CCP leadership had begun to recognize the debilitating effects of Mao's directive leadership and the Cultural Revolution on the CCP the first and second tier leaders responded by attempting to reinvigorate the normative rules (or norms) designated in the original PRC constitution, especially the norm of a
balanced leadership (i.e. strong politburo) and a more accountable leadership. These changes brought a clear shift from what Goldstein has described as a political system characterized by bandwagoning to one characterized by power balancing. This switch to power balancing meant the re-establishment of the norms of more reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership among the top leadership. These changes resulted from the recognition of many in the first and second tiers that their positions were jeopardized. Many of these leaders had lost their privileged positions in the massive upheaval of the Cultural Revolution massive shakeup of the CCP hierarchy. In order to prevent this in the future the first and second tier leaders have exhibited a preference for more balanced leadership institutionalizing their roles as selectors (Goldstein, 1991). These new leadership expectations began to converge and solidify the rules that would come to define post-Mao leadership relations.

**The Institutionalization of Reciprocal Accountability and Balanced Leadership**

In the post-Mao era, China's leadership structures have evolved to include relationships of "reciprocal accountability" between groups that are both principals and agents (Shirk, 1993; Roeder, 1993). Members of the Politburo, China's highest ranking decision making body, are now chosen by an elite "selectorate" consisting of the members of the CCP Central Committee, the revolutionary elders, and top military leaders (Shirk, 1993). The selectorate is probably less than five hundred people in total (Shirk, 1993). Party, government, and military officials in the selectorate are appointed by top CCP leaders but also have the authority to choose top CCP leaders, creating a relationship of "reciprocal accountability" (Shirk, 1993).

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42 Selectors may be in the Politburo or Central Committee. The important unifying feature is that these selectors shape succession and coalition politics because they are currently the only enfranchised participants in Chinese politics.


44 Although there have been several criticisms of Susan Shirk's use of the 'selectorate' concept in explaining Chinese centre-periphery economic relations (see Dali Yang (1996) for example), I feel this concept and its corollary 'reciprocal accountability' are particularly useful in explaining the
Since Mao's death reciprocal accountability has become an increasingly important feature of coalition politics in the PRC. It has created what Roeder has described as a "distinctive two tier structure of authoritarianism" in political constitutions based on Leninist principals of centralized structure. Actors perform dual roles in each tier: actors in the first tier are politicians and governors. Those in the second tier are selectors and bureaucrats. Leaders who act as politicians need to win or maintain office; leaders who act as governors need to make policy. Bureaucrats serve as the executors of leader's policies; in addition, however, many, but not all, bureaucrats as selectors have been the constituents whose support a leader had to gain in order to win or maintain office (Roeder, 1993: 67; Shirk, 1993)(Appendix 2).

Politburo decision makers in the first tier engage in a power struggle. Bureaucratized interests in the second tier engage in a contest for scarce resources. Leaders need support in the Politburo and Central Committee to promote their careers and maintain their positions; bureaucrats need patrons in the Central Committee or Politburo to maintain their posts and to carry out their missions successfully. Politics centres on a coalitional process within and across these two tiers (Roeder, 1993: 67).

In periods of elite conflict over leadership succession, the political dependence of party leaders on the selectorate becomes more prevalent, and the ability of members in the selectorate to extract resources is enhanced (Shirk, 1993). When the leadership is unified, as it was under Mao during the strategic debates, the Central Committee will usually simply ratify the leadership's decisions; but when leaders are competing with one another, as in the succession politics of Jiang's tenure, the Central Committee, full of various bureaucratic interests, becomes the arena for resolving policy disputes. (Chang, 1990: 184). Therefore, during power struggles policy makers become more responsive to the demands or aspirations of subordinate officials expanding influence of the military members in the selectorate on PRC defense policy in the post-Mao era. Even in the face of declining military representation in central party and state organs since the Cultural Revolution (Appendix 3) this selectorate group has used the rules of reciprocal accountability to exert more and more influence over defense and national security policy making.
because the support of these officials can significantly affect the outcome (Shirk, 1993: 88).

The military has been one of the major groups consistently represented in China's central governing organs since the founding of the PRC. Since its origins, the Chinese Communist Party has needed the military's support to maintain political power. The party and army developed together, sharing governing responsibilities at various points in PRC history. As a result of the early intertwining of the party and army during the revolutionary struggle a dual role elite emerged where many officers in the PLA were also top party members and vice versa. These two bureaucratic bodies developed a symbiotic relationship whereby each depended on the other in a relationship of mutual dependence based on a division of labor (Perlmutter and Leogrande, 1982).

The PLA's historical representation in central governing bodies such as the Central Committee and the Politburo has offered them ex officio influence in central leadership decision making bodies. However, in the Post-Mao period, as in Shirk's description of party leaders in the Politburo playing to the provinces, central leaders in the Politburo must also play to the military representatives in the selectorate (Shirk, 1993). Reciprocal accountability thus represents one of the most important developments in party army relations since Mao. Even though many military bureaucrats have enjoyed a privileged position in these central governing organs since 1949, they had not enjoyed the full political power of these positions until the establishment of mature reciprocal accountability. Unlike the hierarchical top down authority relationship between the first and second tier leaders under the bandwagon politics of Mao, reciprocal accountability has made the top leadership subject to the military selectors in the second tier giving a broader range of military selectors policy influence.  

45 The PLA has been described as having both 'king making' power in a succession struggle and a veto against prospective leaders to the CMC Chairmanship post. Yet at the same time the CCP has reserved
These military selectors have traditionally sought budgetary support for organizational modernization as well as support for expanding programs and missions such as blue water naval capability and expanding missions for the PLA-N in the South China Sea. Beyond these corporate and programmatic interests the military has also demonstrated political and personal interests such as greater representation and improved wages and living conditions (Harding, 1987). The central leadership's provision of these demands has meant greater autonomy, increased resources, and increased representation for the military in government bodies. Jiang's political behaviour has clearly been affected by his attempts to cater to as many of these military concerns as possible in order to build a base of support in the selectorate. Some have even described Jiang's playing to the military selectors concerns as 'pork barrel politics with Chinese characteristics' (Shambaugh, 1996).

Thus, it will become clear that institutions, as in the Maoist case, have been causal in determining both the extent of defense and foreign policy integration and the ability of civilian leaders to control military actions under Jiang. In the post-Mao era new rules and structures have limited choices and selected out leaders that haven't been able to meet the requirements of the rules of the political game. In fact, Jiang's successful coalition building with the military selectors has demonstrated his keen sense of the current rules of the game in Chinese selectoral politics. At the same time Jiang's actions in this system have clarified that top leaders, including a General Secretary with semi-consolidated power, are limited in policy creation and implementation by political structures.

First, Jiang has been limited in his policy choices by the development of the rules of reciprocal accountability. Jiang has had to be everything to everyone in the selectorate since his inauspicious beginnings as General Secretary of the Party and Chairman of the Central Commission (Shambaugh, 1996). Particularly after the

the right of personnel appointment and CCP discipline, both of which can be used to shape military interests over the long term. (Wilson and You, 1989; Dreyer, 1993b: 346).
Tiananmen massacre, Jiang had to be certain of military support within his group. He has markedly increased the PLA budget and improved officer housing, living conditions, and pay. Jiang has satisfied many of the military’s political interests by bringing a larger number of military representatives into the selectorate organs such as the Central Committee and Politburo in 1992. He has also satisfied PLA programmatic and corporate interests by increasing military budgets and the missions of each service. More importantly, he has skillfully used the power of personnel appointment to place nineteen new generals in a position to support his cause while shuffling and retiring many who might oppose his cause. All of these moves by Jiang have kept the military selectorate more supportive of his positions (Shambaugh, 1996; Dreyer, 1996c).

It is clear that Jiang’s concern for developing the support of the military for his coalition building has not only caused him to ‘distribute pork’ to the military but it has also caused him to be sensitive about intervening in areas the services would consider their "turf." Unlike Mao, Jiang has not attempted to intervene in military policy making. In particular, he has not attempted to challenge the PLA-N’s relatively expensive programmatic quest for blue water naval capability in the face of the expanding military expenditures this type of posturing would entail. In fact, it is quite clear that his appointment of Admiral Liu Huaqing as both CMC vice-Chairman and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo was not only intended to strengthen Jiang’s own coalition base with the popular admiral but also to allow a

46One of the most salient examples of playing to the military was the significant budget increases and general living improvements for officers and men after a display of party loyalty in the Tiananmen massacre.

47Currently military representation in the Politburo and Central Committee is around 20%. However, new election laws now give the PLA the right to elect 264 deputies out of a total 2,978 members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) (Dreyer, 1993b: 345).

48It is interesting to note that it is the State Council and National People’s Congress rather than the Party Central Military Commission that decide on the acquisition of large foreign procurements such as the PLA’s purchase of Russian Su-27’s. This has allowed the CMC (and Chairman Jiang of the CMC) to avoid responsibility for saying, "no," to the Navy’s desire to purchase an aircraft carrier abroad.
military 'insider' to make tough policy decisions necessary for the implementation of
the PLA's new high tech-limited warfare doctrine.\textsuperscript{49} Jiang has clearly obeyed the rules
of reciprocal accountability and deferred military policy making in the CMC to Liu
and other insiders especially in permitting the Navy's aggressive training programs in
the South China Sea and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{50}

Moreover, it would clearly be political suicide vis à vis the military selectorate
for any civilian leader to be seen as taking a soft stance in the South China Sea
(Whiting, 1996). The PLA-N has successfully tied their programmatic interests in
the South China Sea to the issue of sovereign territory, evoking a nationalistic fervor
both among policy makers in the selectorate and the general population (Garver,
1992). In fact, Jiang and other civilian leaders have had very little policy leeway in
dealing with Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Spratlys and pressure from the U.S. because the
military has been successful in defining the parameters of policy options on these
'sovereignty' issues (Shambaugh, 1996c). This issue linkage has diminished Jiang's
desire to act in a decisive way in the South China Sea that might be seen as
unacceptable by a broad range of the military selectorate as well as potentially
offending non-military selectorate. \textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49}Jiang has not only been openly supportive of the limited high-tech warfare for local wars doctrine he
has also been attributed with coining the name of the doctrine in a speech soon after the Gulf War.
Obviously the doctrine was developed by military theorists but the norm of 'civilian' (party) leadership
rule over the military requires that Jiang be attributed with development of the doctrine (and that
changes in the doctrine appear to be extensions of Maoist and Dengist military thought). Clearly the
doctrine is popular with the Navy as it is supports the PLA-N's organizational drive to act
independently and develop its blue water capabilities.

\textsuperscript{50}It is interesting to note that Jiang did not make a speech to the military for a year after his
appointment as CMC Chairman explaining that he was not worthy to do and did not have the
ideological preparation to take on the responsibility of the CMC Chairmanship (Shambaugh 1996:
216). This verified for the military selectors that unlike the Mao's directive leadership the CMC vice-
Chairman-first General Yang Shangkun and the later Liu Huaqing would be the dominant policy
makers in the CMC.

\textsuperscript{51}In fact, Jiang and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen were both forced to make a self-criticisms to the
Central Military Commission after their 'softness' on Taiwan in 1995 (Shambaugh, 1996c).
Balanced leadership under Jiang has also been causal in limiting Jiang's choices of military policy. Unlike Mao's directive leadership Jiang has had to share policy making power with other members in the Politburo. Li Peng, for example, is the powerful leader of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) which effectively controls PRC foreign policy making. Qiao Shi, a third generation leader like Jiang, controls the increasingly powerful National Peoples Congress (NPC). Both of these leaders have extensive autonomy in their own policy making realms and consequently limit Jiang's power in those important areas even when the issue is tied to military policy (Swaine, 1996; Shambaugh, 1996c).

More directly Jiang has been dependent on 'unofficial' Politburo members, such as the retired generals, in making important personnel decisions. For example, these retired generals were instrumental in assisting Jiang to remove the powerful Yangs, Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, from the CMC vice-Chairmanship and Chief of the General Political Department respectively at the 14th Party Congress in 1992. The old generals had accused the Yangs of usurping too much personal power and influence in the military. Thus, a combined interest between the military elders and Jiang was required for Jiang to carry out this important personnel decision.

Political military institutions have also 'selected out' leaders who could not survive the new rules of the political game. For example, reciprocal accountability has given the military selectorate a 'veto power' over the selection of CMC Chairmen. Thus, unlike the strictly hierarchical system under Mao during the strategic debates,

52Even powerful leaders such as Deng Xiaoping were restrained by other elders in the Politburo. Chen Yun, Nie Rongjen and other elders restricted Deng's power and forced him to bargain in many cases to get his desired policy. Deng's southern tour (Nan Xun) in 1992 to restart economic reforms was designed to gain support for his polices against the more conservative policies of Chen Yun.

53Kevin O'Brien has given an excellent account of the National People's Congress move to become more than a 'rubber stamp' body (O'Brien, 1990). This is clearly the case in its promulgation of the controversial Law on Chinese Territorial Waters in 1992.

54Qiao Shi for example oversaw the promulgation of the controversial Draft Law on China's Sovereignty in the South China Sea and it was quite out of Jiang's control. Similarly, Li Peng's decision to 'put aside' the sovereignty issue in the Spratlys in 1990 can also be seen to limit Jiang's policy choices.
Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin have all been subject to military approval in the succession competition struggle for consolidated power.\(^{55}\) Apparently, Hu and Zhao were deemed unfit candidates for the CMC Chairmanship by the military selectorate and were selected out of the game (You and Wilson, 1989: 20-21; Dreyer, 1993b: 243). Thus, in succession politics, the military selectorate has often been given the title of 'king maker.' Under conditions of reciprocal accountability, General Secretaries need the support of the military in order to consolidate power.

Thus, structural conditions since Mao have created political consequences for leaders who do not recognize their coalition support groups in the selectorate or are deemed unacceptable to those important groups.\(^{56}\) If the leadership's policies are unacceptable to a broad group of selectors (e.g. military selectors) then the consequence will be similar to a vote of no confidence in the next CCP Congress when the leaders are to be "re-selected." In this sense leaders and policies can be selected out. Consequently, coalition building leaders such as Jiang Zemin might not have the political space to intervene to reconcile foreign and defense policies. Thus unlike the directive and hierarchical leadership structure under Mao the current structure of mature reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership causes coalition building leaders to "choose" certain acceptable policies, i.e. playing to groups in the selectorate.

Leaderships since Mao have at times moved along the continuum between weak balanced leadership based on coalitions to the other extreme of more consolidated directive leadership (Appendix 1). As described above, the timing of doctrinal interventions by the civilian leadership to attempt to integrate defense and

\(^{55}\) Deng Xiaoping already held the office of CMC Chairman but needed to pass this important responsibility on to the chosen successor.

\(^{56}\) Even Deng Xiaoping can be seen to have made some concessions to the Military in the reforms of the early eighties. Some groups of officers in the military were strongly opposed to retirement and having to update their education (Johnston, 1984). Deng also had to defer to the old Marshals such as Ye Jianying, Su Yu, and Nie Rongzhen who guarded military bureaucrat's (military expert's) right to decisions of military tactics, posture and force structure.
foreign policies has been constrained by the leadership consolidation process. A new General Secretary such as Jiang, who began his coalition building with the military as an initial supporter, would have little incentive to seek to intervene in military activities without an invitation. For example, Jiang would have little incentive to go against the strong nationalist sentiment of the military and its call for an assertive stance in the Spratlys even if this stance clearly contradicts an 'economy first' position. Throughout the Spratlys negotiations Jiang's decisions have clearly been constrained by his weakened coalition building position. Clearly under conditions of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership General Secretaries are more likely to press for military policy interventions when the military is a less significant source of support within that leader's coalition (Roeder, 1993:177-178).

Thus, the consequences of a balanced leadership for civilian intervention in military planning and policy integration are an extension of and intertwined with those that result from reciprocal accountability. Balanced leadership limits what the General Secretary can do vis a vis competing interests in the Politburo. A General Secretary's power to integrate foreign and defense policy might be limited by leaders of equivalent power who desire an opposing policy.

Successful policy integration and leadership control of the military bureaucracy can be seen to move along a continuum based on political structures and rules that constitute the institutions discussed above (Appendix 1). A strong directive leadership combined with weak reciprocal accountability (i.e. a hierarchical polity) results in the potential for strong civilian-leadership control over military planning and policy integration. At the other extreme strong reciprocal accountability combined with a coalitional (shared or balanced) leadership will lead to weaker civilian control over military planning and policy integration. Under conditions of a directive leadership the General Secretary need not defer to or play to groups within the electorate.
The development of reciprocal accountability and institutionalized balanced leadership parallels a third post-Mao development, the movement from pervasive politics in military thought and training under Mao to the institutionalization of the loosely coupled political military system under post-Mao leaders. As apparent from the discussion above the institutionalization of balanced leadership and reciprocal accountability will not be subject to rapid change and will clearly not repeat the special structural circumstances that Mao's paternalistic leadership offered. However, the final institutionalization, the PLA's monopolization of military policy formation, as discussed below, is more likely than the first two institutionalizations to change in the direction of greater civilian leadership control as was the case in the former Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s (Kaufmann, 1992). The following section will discuss the Chinese military bureaucracy's increasing control over defense policy making and the negative consequences this change holds for the leadership's ability to both integrate foreign and defense policies and keep military actions consistent with defense polices.

From Mao's Pervasive Politics to Loose Coupling

The final significant post-Mao institutional development has been the shift from a set of political-military rules and relationships dominated by pervasive Maoist egalitarian political philosophy to a new set of rules and relationships characterized by an increased division of responsibilities between the military and civilian bureaucracies and a depoliticization of military science. Since the death of Mao the military has gradually monopolized defense policy expertise, information, and option generation. "Loose coupling" is the hierarchical relationship between party elites and the military bureaucracy found in communist systems (Rice, 1987). In the PRC, defense policy making operates in what organizational theorists call a "loosely coupled" system (Scott, 1981:256-257). This means that the party leadership concentrates on setting the broad outlines of policy while option formation and implementation are left to the professional core in the military. Thus, loose coupling
can be seen as the institutionalization of the division of labour for developing the military technical aspects of doctrine and the socio-political aspects of doctrine (or military doctrine vs. military science). Without proper monitoring and control of the military technical aspects of doctrine, coordination between socio-political and military technical aspects of doctrine (i.e. coordination between military policy and defense action) may suffer as well as the coordination between defense policy and foreign policy.

Loose coupling has existed in the Chinese system with different degrees of strength since 1949 when the PRC adopted many of the policies and institutions of the Soviet Army and Bolshevik Party. Generally, it meant a division of labour between the military and civilians that fostered greater specialization.\(^{57}\) This early loose coupling reached its peak under Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (1954-1959) who supported greater military distinctness and regularization by supervising the installation of ranks and the 1955 Military Service Law for the PLA.

Mao (and Mao's military thought) was opposed to this division and instead wanted the military to be a more "revolutionary" army involved in all aspects of social modernization (Jencks, 1981; Joffe, 1965, 1987). Mao's distaste for an 'expert' army lacking appropriate political indoctrination was demonstrated in his purge of the "professionalist" Defense Minister Peng Dehuai in 1959 and the appointment of Lin Biao, who was sympathetic to Mao's call for "people over weapons' and a highly political army. Mao also used mass campaigns such as the 'learn from the military' campaign of 1964, the elimination of ranks in 1965 and the officer to the ranks system (xiafang) of 1959 (where officers had to live as regular soldiers for a month each year) in order to install his egalitarian philosophy and curb the separation of the military as an institution independent of Chinese politics and society (Jencks, 1981; Joffe, 1965, 1987).

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\(^{57}\)This division was particularly salient between the civilian and military scientific communities and economies. Mao put the best scientists and resources into the military's special nuclear and missile projects. He created a 'third line' in the interior provinces where these scientists were separated from the civilian scientists.
Mao thus wanted his egalitarian political philosophy to pervade all realms of social activity in China; this included his attempts to eliminate hierarchy in the military.

Mao implemented and monitored these changes through the use of the Party Political Work System (PPWS). This system helped to push Mao's political philosophy down to every level of the armed forces through the powers of party discipline, personnel appointment and political education and indoctrination. The success of Mao's efforts to push his philosophy to all levels of the military was demonstrated by the strength of the 'red' group in the 'red vs. expert' debates. A significant consequence of Mao's pervasive politics was the blurring of the distinction between military science and military doctrine.

However, in the post-Mao period there has been a movement towards greater regularization and specialization in the military. The present leadership still maintains the ideal that the PLA is a revolutionary army with special societal functions, but there is also greater recognition of the need for military specialists, such as rapid reaction forces and more advanced military technological capabilities in the services (Ding, 1993). Thus it is clear that the civilian leaders of the CCP now generally delegate military policy making (the military technical aspects of doctrine or military science) to the functional specialists, the armed forces and service academies themselves (Li, 1996, Cheung, 1987; Swaine, 1996, Godwin, 1988).

The distinction in PRC military thought between military doctrine (junshi xueshuo) and military science (junshi kexue) is important and helps to eliminate

58 The Party Political Work System (PPWS) consists of three parts: the Political Commissar System (PCS) responsible to the General Political Department (GPD) and ultimately the CMC, The Party Committee System responsible directly to the Politburo Central Committee, and the Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) responsible to both the Central Committee and the CMC. For an excellent examination of the organization and structure of political work in the PLA see Shambaugh (1991).

59 An interesting example of Mao's distaste for separating class warfare from doctrine was his refusal to allow PRC nuclear scientists to discuss or debate nuclear strategies or the consequences of nuclear weapons (Lewis and Xue, 1993). People's war remained the official doctrine in which all military thought had to be interpreted even in the face of the development of nuclear weapons.
confusion between Chinese military doctrine and strategy.60 Within this framework, strategy belongs to military art (junshi xueshu), the most important branch of military science (Appendix 4). The importance of this distinction for the post-Mao loose coupling system of political-military relations was clarified soon after Mao's death by Defense Minister Marshall Ye Jianying in an article in the authoritative Peoples Daily (Renmin Ribao) (Ye, 1979). Ye explained that the important distinction between military doctrine and military science, or the socio-political aspects of doctrine and the military technical aspects of doctrine, is that the former are considered the realm of politicians in the party elite while the latter are considered the realm of the military bureaucracy. Thus, military science and its subset military art (the study of the development of strategy, tactics and force posture) became regarded as the realm of military (Ye, 1979, Nan Li, 1996, Chien 1982, Tan Eng Bok, 1983). This growing distinction between the more political aspects of doctrine and the scientific aspects of military art meant that Mao's political philosophy was no longer deemed an acceptable replacement for an undeveloped military and was subsequently culled from military science planning.61 Again, as with the institutionalization of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership, leadership expectations first diverged over the old Maoist rules and then began to converge on a more rational division of labour. Given the existing Bolshevik political-military structures (i.e. a centralized general staff system without civilian monitoring) these new rules helped to institutionalize 'loose coupling.'

60 This same distinction was made in Soviet military thought and has apparently resulted in confusion for many arms control negotiators who misinterpret the highly political term 'doktrina' for its less political counterpart in the west (Hamm and Pohlman, 1990).

61 Defense Minister Zhang Aiping echoed Marshal Ye's call for the need to move beyond Mao's military thinking in his valuation of the role of politics in military science explaining that political factors were important "but also correct strategy and tactics of the war's commander, the sophisticated nature of our military equipment, the quality of our personnel who use the equipment, et cetera." Zhang Aiping, "Several Questions Concerning the Modernization of Defense," Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 5 (1 March 1983); in FBIS-CHI, No. 53 (17, March 1983).
In fact, Deng's military modernization efforts helped to institutionalize the military doctrine-military science split allowing the services and service academies even greater specialization. Deng did this by creating standards of promotion based on technical ability and education levels rather than length of time in the services. Officers also became subject to mandatory retirement ages and faced a ceiling for promotion if they failed to meet new educational requirements (Dreyer, 1996). Deng was also successful in improving the regularization of the armed forces through his campaign of purging of many "Maoists" or military conservatives in the Party rectification campaigns of the mid 1980's (Johnston, 1984, 1987). These successes led to the culling of Maoist political philosophy and strategy from military planning. Consequently, under Deng and now Jiang, technical skills rather than political obedience has become the primary mode for advancement in the PLA.

**Problems of Loose Coupling (Problems of Agency)**

Since the death of Mao and the institution of Deng's military reforms several problems of agency have been exacerbated by the increasingly looser hierarchical relationship between the party leadership decision makers and the military bureaucracy. In theory, the Politburo, as the highest decision making body in the PRC, has the authority to create institutions that will allow it to maintain control of

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62 Dreyer has correctly argued that politics did not leave the PLA after Mao (Dreyer, 1993b). China's party-army relations have certainly not approached the Huntingtonian ideal of an apolitical army under Deng Xiaoping. Tiananmen has demonstrated that the PLA is still the army of the Party not the state. However, Deng's (and Jiang's) politics do not include egalitarian constraints on the military nor do they include philosophical constraints on the development of military art (strategy tactics and force postures) as was the case under Mao.

63 Deng attempted to implement this type of rationalization on all Chinese bureaucracies.

64 It is important to note the power of personnel management has remained firmly in the hands of the Party elite and can be used to reshape the officer corps. In contrast to direct intervention in tactics and strategy development, personnel control is a blunter tool of policy control that works over longer time periods. Jiang has utilized this tool in his coalition building by appointing 19 new generals early in his tenure (Shambaugh, 1996).

65 Here an agency problem is the problem of a principal to get its agent to do what it wants- i.e. the ability of the civilian leadership (often represented in the General Secretary of the CCP) to control defense policy and ideally integrate it with foreign policy.
its bureaucratic agents. However, in an environment of increasingly more sophisticated military technology and strategy, the Politburo has failed to develop alternative centers of civilian expertise, effective parallel monitoring agencies, and effective policy coordinating and integrating departments that would permit it to exercise routine, detailed direction over the General Staff, PLA-Navy and PLA-Air Force in matters of military strategy development.

An important implication of these three features of the mature Chinese loose coupling system is that the military has begun to play a much larger role in national security policy making, decision making, and implementation. In particular, as will be examined below the PLA-N has likely become the primary source of military-security policy options for the South China Sea. Moreover, this trend has combined with the development of balanced leadership and reciprocal accountability between political leaders and military leaders in the selectorate making party elite intervention into areas of military policy sporadic and their outcome uncertain. Essentially the major problem of the communist system of loosely coupled political-military relations is the strain it puts on civilian control of military science development.

**Ineffective Parallel Monitoring Institutions**

One of the problems that has become apparent in the loose coupling system is the lack of effective monitoring of the military to ensure its compliance with civilian policy directives and its integration of defense policy goals with broader national goals or foreign policy goals. For the Party Political Work System (PPWS) or any other body to be considered an effective monitoring institution it should meet the following conditions. First, a monitoring agency should treat the surveillance of the operator (the military commands) as its sole and clear task but not share operational

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66 Clearly as Clausewitz (and Mao) have explained that defense policy can sometimes be considered one facet of foreign policy. However this assumes centralized coordinating control of both policies or some level of understanding between the military and foreign affairs bureaucracies about appropriate policy. Thus, defense policy (or foreign policy) can be seen as autonomous when it sends signals to its agents that contradict desired foreign policy (or defense policy) goals.
responsibility with the operator. Officials who are extremely aggressive about detecting and reporting deviations can expect to win promotions in a monitoring agency. But if they share responsibilities with the monitored, excellent performance will take precedence over oversight or reporting deviations (Downs, 1967: 149). Also, to prevent half-heartedness in detecting and reporting deviations, the monitoring agencies should not be steeped in the norms, values, and skills of the operating organization. Lastly, when structural integration exists between the monitor (PPWS) and the monitored (military commands), effective communication should exist between the monitoring agency and external organizations (i.e. civil party organizations) of comparable or superior levels in order to facilitate the prompt transmission of information (Colton, 1979: 115-135).

Under Mao's directive leadership (1959-1966) the PPWS became an effective monitoring agency again. Lin Biao had successfully revived the Political Commissar System (PCS) after its deterioration under the 'professionalist' Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (Joffe, 1965; George, 1967). There was a clear division of labour between the commanders and commissars (George, 1967). In 1961 the "Regulations Governing PLA Management and Educational Work of Company Level" and the "Four Sets of Regulation on Political Work in Company Level Units of the PLA," were issued strengthening the hands of the political commissars relative to the military commanders and party committees (George, 1967: 205). By early 1964 Mao had deemed the political outlook of the PLA sufficiently improved to hold it up as a model to other organizations including the CCP and the state bureaucracy.67

67The measure of Lin's success in reforming the PCS between 1959 and 1964 can be seen in Mao's desire to replicate this system throughout the CCP and Chinese society in the 'Learn from the Experience of the Peoples' Liberation Army in Political and Ideological Work' campaign (1964-1965). Moreover, 'political departments' modeled on those within the PLA were established in branches and units of the economic and industrial organizations throughout the country (George, 1967: 207). Joffe (1965) and Harding and Gurtov (1971) give excellent explanations of Mao's motivations for this decision.
The reformed PPWS allowed Mao to intervene in tactical decision making through Defense Minister Lin Biao and the Political Commissar System (PCS). Lin and the PCS effectively spread Mao's idea that politics should pervade all policy issues (including those of military tactics) and that Mao's thought was infallible. The PCS enforced the dictates of Mao's military and political thoughts on the military commanders through its control over personnel appointments and promotions at all levels of the PLA. In the context of the 'red expert' debates the political commissars clearly supported the importance of political 'education' over combat training (Powell, 1967). As a result of the effectiveness of the PCS and the commissars' loyalty to Mao's thought against nascent 'professionalism' in the PLA, the PPWS was able to act as an effective monitor of the PLA's political loyalty which included loyalty to Mao's military thinking espoused in his 'people's war doctrine.'

However, since Mao's death and the onset of Deng's military reforms, it has been argued that the PLA has become self-monitoring in many of its activities (Li, 1993). As discussed above the Party Political Work System (PPWS) has traditionally acted as party watchdog over the military bureaucracies' implementation of party directives. The PCS (a subset of the PPWS) was in fact an effective monitor of political activity during the strategic debates and early Cultural Revolution under Mao. During this time, as explained above, the distinction between military science and doctrine was blurred with Mao's call for the pervasiveness of politics in all realms of human social activity. This led to Mao's frequent interventions in both matters of military doctrine and science with his opinion carrying the day. However, greater

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68 It should also be noted that at the time of the strategic debates the task of indoctrination of the military was easier than it was in the late 1940s and 1950s when the PLA was forced to use large numbers of Nationalist soldiers of questionable loyalty (The Nationalists had their own PCS. See Chen (1991)). Moreover, repeated rectification campaigns rooted out much of the "remnant bourgeois" elements. Conscription also offered the Party and opportunity to be more selective in the recruitment of soldiers with acceptable family and occupational backgrounds (Griffith, 1965).

69 One example of the extent of the disagreement between levels of political and military education in the PLA can be seen when a member of the PCS exclaimed his outrage that some Naval activists had "retrogressed to the extent that Chairman's Mao's quotations were being replaced by fire mission manuals and instructions" (Beijing: NCNA, Dec. 15, 1967).
regularization in the PLA has brought about changes in the functions of the PPWS since Mao's leadership (Li, 1993). These changes have left the PPWS unable to effectively monitor military activities.

Important changes have included: the extensive withdrawal of the PLA from its ideological and civil functions, and therefore a relative autonomy of the PPWS from party authorities; there has been a gradual reduction of PPWS activities and personnel; and an increase in the functioning of the PPWS as an administrative agency (together with the military command) but not as a surveillance agency (separate from the military command) and therefore there has been a merging of values, interests, and skills among the commanders and commissars (Li, 1993). Thus, unlike the strategic debates period under Mao the political commissars now share operational and administrative responsibilities with the military and other departments in the PLA. Second, the commissars are now steeped in the norms, values, and skills of the PLA. The PPWS has promoted these norms and values and acquired relevant administrative skills as a necessary component of its own functions. Finally, since the Cultural Revolution the PPWS has pulled out of many of its 'revolutionary' responsibilities with Chinese society while increasing its structural integration with other departments of the PLA (Li, 1993).

Moreover, the PPWS was originally intended to monitor political loyalty - not the technical aspects of military strategy development (even though Mao had effectively used the PCS to implement his people's war doctrine). The post-Mao advancement of PLA technology levels, the requirements of greater specialization, and the switch to a limited high-tech warfare doctrine have all worked to pull Maoist politics out of the PLA's technical development. Wendy Frieman has explained "the concept of a professional rather than a political army, consistent with the broader economic goal of improving efficiency and instituting rational bureaucratic procedures, has resulted in the reassessment of the relative role of men [sic] and weapons in warfare" (Frieman, 1989: 275). Under these new conditions of improved
technology and goals of efficiency the PPWS has neither the mandate nor the capabilities to monitor the development of strategies, tactics, and force postures. Consequently, in the Jiang period, the PPWS can no longer be treated as an effective monitoring body of the PLA.

Apparently the PPWS' evolution within the PLA combined with the depoliticization of military science (strategy tactics and force postures) has virtually eliminated its potential to act as an effective monitor of PLA activities. In particular the PPWS can not be seen to act as an effective monitor of PLA-N military science (strategy, tactics and force posture) developments. The consequence of the absence of an effective monitoring body for the PLA-N in the South China Sea has been the exacerbation of the agency problem between defense policy and defense action.70

Unlike Mao's pervasive control of PLA behaviour through the PCS at the time of the strategic debates, current top civilian decision makers lack effective control over the routine training activities of the services. In particular, the Chinese command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system has been described as underdeveloped and at least one or two generations behind the U.S. system. (Li, 1996) As has been suggested by Segal (1996) and Whiting (1996) the PLA-N units in the South China Sea might be acting on their own interpretation of an ambiguous defense policy. In short, the PLA-N sees its primary goals as protecting Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea and expanding its limited high-tech warfare capabilities through extensive training missions. Poor civilian and military monitoring and control capability leave room for much discretion in PLA-N routine training activities.

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70The ineffective monitoring of military behaviour has also been evident in the pervasiveness of illegal PLA business activities and missile sales. (On Illegal PLA business activities see Cheung (1994), Ding (1993), Solomone (1995), and Joffe (1995). On missile sales see Lewis, Hua, and Xue (1991).)
The Problem of the lack of Competing Civilian Expertise

The absence of civilian experts capable of competently questioning military technical aspects of doctrine has also contributed to poor monitoring and diminished civilian control of the military technological aspects of doctrine and option formation under the Post-Mao leaderships.\(^71\) This problem of asymmetric information has become particularly salient in the PLA's recent drive towards a more high-tech military doctrine.\(^72\) The PLA-N's quest for blue water naval capability and its move from coastal defense to active offshore defense has also been advanced by the PLA-N's control over important information. However, the increasing technological demands of these new doctrines and strategies have not been paralleled by institutional developments and civilian expertise that would allow civilian leaders to maintain the same degree of control over military policy making as Mao had during the strategic debates. One significant result of this monopoly of expertise has been the PLA-N's relatively unencumbered assertive push into the South China Sea based on PLA-N corporate interests rather than clear security goals.

In fact, there have been several mutually reinforcing factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of civilian expertise that might have otherwise counterbalanced the skewing of defense policy influence towards the military bureaucracy (the military services and service academies). As mentioned above, the

\(^{71}\)This brings up the broader problem of establishment vs. non-establishment advisors in communist systems. (I will address this problem in more detail in the final section of the paper). Rice has explained that highly centralized military systems such as those of China and the former USSR, employing general staffs, do not as a rule have a parallel civilian/political apparatus for analysis and option formation (Rice, 1987). There is no reason to expect that the Chinese would, as the American system does, equate the maintenance of political authority with a civilian political apparatus for analysis and option formation. The theoretically unified communist system (unified under the Party) would not acknowledge the need for American type civil-military checks and balances. It is the American system that is unique in that a civilian chain (the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian secretaries of the services) functions parallel to those of the professional military staffs (Rice, 1987).

\(^{72}\)The PLA's new high-tech doctrine has been variously defined since the Gulf War. Basically it involves the assumption that China will more likely face a local or peripheral war rather than a major global war. In these conflicts rapid force deployment will be used to achieve limited political objectives.
first factor has been the general increase in the technological content of defense and arms control policies combined with military secrecy. The movement from 'peoples war under modern conditions' to limited high-tech warfare and the movement from a coastal defense doctrine to a blue water doctrine has created demands for new information that is not readily available to non-military organizations in China. In fact, even though all militaries observe the rules of secrecy, the Chinese military by comparison seems "excessive and even paranoid in the extent to which they go to protect the most basic information" (Shambaugh, 1987: 296).\textsuperscript{73} The increasing complexity of both weapons and doctrine combined with high levels of military secrecy and organizational autonomy have left civilians in China largely unable to challenge the PLA's military science decisions.\textsuperscript{74}

Another factor that has weakened civilian expertise has been the long time divergence in orientation between the civilian and military economies and scientific communities. These long-standing divisions lasted until the mid 1980s when Deng's reforms called for greater integration between the two scientific communities. Out of the need for secretiveness and rapid military modernization it was not until this time that military scientists were able to work outside or share information outside military industries (Wang, 1988; Frieman, 1989). This situation not only caused redundancy and diminished efficiency but it also inhibited the development of a base of civilian personnel that might be able to question (through positions in non-military establishment policy communities) the PLA's strategies, force postures and tactics. At minimum, strong civilian expertise in these areas of military affairs might give civilian decision makers alternative policies to choose from.

\textsuperscript{73}Beyond the purposes of national security, military organizations might choose to protect their information from other domestic institutions for fear of loosing their monopoly over military policy development deriving from that information.

\textsuperscript{74}Unlike the PLA missile tests around Taiwan in 1995 and other PLA exercises the PLA-N has not made a habit of announcing its training missions in the South China Sea.
The Chinese situation can be seen in contrast with the role civilian experts play in other states. For example, in the United States and other democracies civilian experts frequently testify about high technology weapons, doctrines, and strategies to civilian governing institutions such as the Congress or these experts might hold consulting positions in government. There is also greater potential for developing this kind of military expertise in democratic states where information is more readily available and there is more freedom to move between civilian and military economies. For example, the PRC has not yet produced civilian specialists such as the U.S.'s Les Aspen who has made a political career out of giving technical advice on military science. The Chinese system has not yet developed this type of conduit for policy advice. However, the Post-Mao development of China's social science policy communities is a necessary step in forming bases from which specialists can offer central leaders important expert advice on military policy, but the problem of military secrecy and tight information controls still exist. The importance of these nascent policy communities will be discussed in the final section of this paper.

The lack of relevant political-military experience among the new generation of Chinese political leaders is a third factor exacerbating asymmetric information problems created by an increasingly technological doctrine and left military policy formation in the hands of the military bureaucracy. Deng Xiaoping was the last top 'civilian' leader who had significant military experience. Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin have all lacked the seemingly essential military experience to make strong decisions in defense policy that would be carried out by the PLA forces.

75 In the U.S. for example, a general attempting to introduce a new weapons system might be challenged by a professional policy advisor such as Les Aspin. This type of civilian advisor could persuade a decision maker alter their opinion by offering policy alternatives. I would like to thank Elizabeth Speed for bringing this point to my attention.


77 According to Shambaugh (1996) Jiang has worked hard to familiarize himself with military interests and power structures, apparently visiting at least one PLA unit per month. However it will be difficult for Jiang to develop the extensive military knowledge and reputation of Deng or Mao.
Moreover, based on established norms, there seems to be little chance of a top civilian leader coming from the ranks of the PLA. This means the top leaders will continue to rely on the advice of PLA advisors for defense policy. In the absence of civilian expertise, the PLA-N's programmatic interests (such as blue water naval capability) will likely bias defense policy advice or prepared policy packages offered to civilian leaders.

In particular the PLA-N's current policy of developing blue water naval capabilities has security implications that many in the civilian bureaucracy and other military services might not be fully aware of. The PLA-N and central authorities were clearly not expecting the unsettled reaction of the Philippines and other ASEAN states to the PLA-N's activities on Mischief Reef (Segal, 1996). Even more disturbing to the Chinese might be the rapid development of Japan's navy in response to their growing perception of Chinese hegmonism in the region.

Finally, the continuing monopoly on military analytic capabilities held by the Chinese military bureaucracy has also weakened the potential for civilian expertise and skewed defense policy making towards the military bureaucracy. According to most current analysis Chinese military expertise is restricted to the realm of the military services and military academies (Swaine, 1996, Li, 1996, Cheung, 1987, Shambaugh, 1987). The PLA is primarily responsible for formulating and implementing defense policy and strategy under the supervision of the senior CCP elite responsible for formulating the national strategic objectives (Appendix 5). "Indeed, defense policy is virtually the exclusive domain of the PLA and comprises the core of its involvement in the entire national security arena" (Swaine, 1996).

78The military establishment research institutes include such organizations as the Beijing Institute for Strategic Studies (BIIS) the General Staffs G-2 and G-3 and the in-house research institutes of each of the services as well as the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and National Defense University (NDU) (Cheung, 1987; Shambaugh, 1987; Effimiaides, 1994; Swaine, 1996). Some non-military bureaucracy policy institutes that deal with broader security issues include the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and The Institute for International Studies both under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, non-establishment institutes seem to lack access to both essential military information and access to defense policy makers in the CMC.
Post-Mao era top decision makers have come to rely more and more upon finished policy analysis developed and presented by bureaucratic specialists or expert researchers (Barnett, 1985).

The PLA and its research centres have retained this monopoly of important defense related information (essential in developing policy packages for decision makers) due to the lack of civilian expertise necessary to develop competing institutions, as described above. There are four kinds of technological data that are particularly relevant to developing PRC defense policy options. First, micro technical data on PLA and foreign military technologies; second, broad systems data on PLA and foreign weaponry; third, cost data on PLA and foreign weaponry; and fourth, force balance data and "threat forecasts" (Meyer, 1985). A number of groups in the PRC have partial access to portions of this information and the competence to evaluate it: the professional military; the internal security bureau; the scientists, engineers, designers, and managers of the military industries; the military department of the State Council; the CMC; and select members of the Academy of Sciences (most of whom would be members of one of the other groups). Yet, only one group has both access to all the data and the knowledge necessary to use it in the formation of finished policy packages: the PLA.

One of the consequences of the military's monopoly of expert analysis of military affairs has been its development of decision influence in matters of military technical aspects of doctrine (Meyer, 1985). Much of the confusion over who is in control of Chinese defense policy has resulted from an overemphasis on the act of decision making itself.79 Traditionally it has been taken for granted that the person or group giving the orders has control over policy. However, orders are only the last of several steps that go into the decision making process. Before decisions are made, issues must be identified and options outlined. The final decision is a function of both

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79 The Central Military Commission, under the direction of a civilian Chairman, has the authority to make all military policy under the supervision of the Party Secretariat.
the way the problem was defined and the range of options perceived. Therefore, it is helpful to distinguish between two important aspects of decision making power: decision influence and decision authority (Meyer, 1985:39).

Decision influence connotes the degree to which the collection and processing of decision relevant data, the analysis of the data, and the preparation and structuring of options and alternatives are controlled or manipulated by a given party. Decision authority is the role of selecting the option for implementation; of having the final word on the content of the decision. For omnipotent and completely rational decision-makers this distinction is not relevant, but in the real world it is. The perceptions, images, expectations, and assessments of those with decision authority can be greatly influenced by those who are well placed to structure, if not manipulate, the flow of information. In this way those without formal decision authority may, nonetheless, ensure that those subsets of choices that they prefer appear as the most logical and obvious solutions to those with the authority to decide (Meyer, 1985: 40).

The significance of this distinction is reinforced by what we know of the structure of defense decision making in China. Historically (under Mao) the Chinese military bureaucracy has had little or no direct decision authority in areas of national strategic objectives (Swaine, 1996). This situation was reflected in Mao's dominance of military science and the effects of bandwagoning behaviour on subordiantes. Yet, it is also true that in the post-Mao era the structure of defense decision making is such that the professional military has faced little effective institutional competition for decision influence in areas of national security policy, such as military force planning, weapons acquisitions, and arms control. Thus while the Chinese military may not be able to make defense policy, it has certainly in a strong position to influence it in the

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80This next two paragraphs draw on Meyer (1985).
Post-Mao era. The PLA-N in particular has exerted decision influence over its policies in the South China Sea.\(^8\)

The PLA-N in particular has largely become the master of its own destiny in the South China Sea. First, the PLA-N has been in a position to offer finished policy packages to the CMC. The Navy retains its own research institute for the development of naval strategy (Swaine, 1996). These structures have solidified the PLA-N’s decision influence over naval policy in the South China Sea. Second, the PLA-N has control over information and can use this control of information instrumentally to push its policy interests in the South China Sea even if this means uncoordinated foreign and defense policies. For example, Admiral Liu Huaqing, The PLA-N leader throughout the 1980’s, was able to push for more assertive training missions and programs even against civilian opposition.\(^8\)

More importantly for the South China Sea case is the opinion of Naval officers expressed in the recent book *Can China Win the Next War* (Xiao Bing and Qing Bo, 1994) The consensus among officers that the PLA-N must act assertively in the South China Sea within the next few years (before the issue is internationalized) in order to protect Chinese sovereignty clearly predicts the content of the PLA-N’s decision influence on policy makers who hold decision authority. This situation seems to explain the PLA-N’s assertiveness since 1988 and in particular its decision to be assertive on Mischief Reef in 1995. Civilian leaders might have been given few options or might have been given insufficient information about the political consequences of these PLA-N actions.

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\(^8\) Admiral Liu Huaqing’s position on both the Standing Committee of the Politburo and as Vice Chairman of the CMC has also clearly helped the Navy exert decision authority. Liu and his colleague CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Zhen wrote a letter to the Central Committee in 1992 expressing their opinion that ‘defending national sovereignty and independence should take precedence over all others and over transient economic interests’ (Garver, 1996: 263).

\(^8\) One important example of the PLA-N’s independent action was Admiral Liu Huaqing’s disregard for Deng Xiaoping’s call for the guiding principle of a strictly coastal defensive force in 1979 (Lewis and Xue, 1993: 224). Instead Liu actively developed an ‘offshore defense’ strategy that would benefit his designs for a blue water naval capability for the PLA-N (Zhan, 1994: 188).
Although the CCP leadership is the final authority in matters of defense, the absence of a coherent civilian staff institution that is competent to develop military strategy and force posture options (and their consequences for foreign policy) leaves political authorities heavily dependent on the professional military bureaucracy for information, expertise, and ultimately, policy options. Thus it could be argued that the CMC's ability to make decisions regarding PLA-N force posture and strategy is as parochial as the PLA-N's itself in many respects. In terms of doctrinal paradigms the CMC receives its intelligence and strategy suggestions from the Navy. There are no civilian bodies with enough expertise to challenge the PLA-N's monopoly on naval strategy development or naval "military science."

This consolidation of military technical expertise in the hands of the military services can thus be seen as either an instrumental act to preserve information for bureaucratic power or it can be seen as a natural, evolutionary consequence of the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs (Gill, 1996). In either case the results are an ever growing number of national security policy options and alternatives confronting Chinese political leaders which revolve around scientific and technical considerations that are beyond their experience and competence and that of their advisors and staffs.

**Inadequate Policy Coordinating Institutions**

Loose coupling has also been characterized by the inadequacy of coordinating institutions both within the military and between the military and foreign affairs bureaucracies.\(^3\) The weak coordinating capability of PRC foreign and defense policy making organizations and intra-service coordinating organizations (within the PLA) has contributed to the non-integration of foreign and defense policies and the

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\(^3\)Barnett (1985) has given an excellent description of poor coordination between military and foreign affairs bureaucracies explaining that many of the officials that he interviewed felt these coordinating mechanisms were not necessary for China (in 1985) because it didn't have global responsibilities on par with the U.S. or the Soviet Union (Barnett, 1985:93-109). Hamrin (1992) has expanded on Barnett's work emphasizing the importance of policy leading groups as coordinating bodies for major or complex issues that could not be settled at lower levels (Hamrin, 1992: 103).
inconsistency of defense policy and PLA action. The PRC does not have foreign and defense policy coordinating institutions comparable to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) or the Office of International Security Affairs (OISA) in the US Department of Defense; nor does it have intraservice policy coordinating institutions comparable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Appropriate intraservice coordinating institutions would ensure service goals and planning are integrated for a clear national defense policy. Similarly, effective foreign and defense policy coordinating institutions should allow important policy information to flow between defense and foreign policy decision making bodies through overlapping personnel or integrating bodies. These structural conditions suggest that the non-integration of foreign and defense policies in South China Sea case might have been a result of poor coordination both between bureaucracies and between military policy makers and military actors.

The lack of an effective supervisory body to coordinate PLA, PLA-N, and PLA-AF strategies and activities in the PRC has led to greater intra-service rivalry over larger questions of budget allocations and the determination of the PRC's most urgent defense problems. The PLA has no organization equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that might effectively coordinate service policies and demands. In theory, the Central Military Commission (CMC) authorizes and coordinates all policies relevant to the military. In practice, however, the commission has no policy group assigned to this task and the staff of the CMC General Office (GO) (bangongting), led by Liu Kai and Li Lijun, does not have enough personnel to carry out this task (Lewis and Xue, 1991:90; Li, 1994).

84 Apparently inter-service rivalries have been exacerbated as the PLA-N has shifted the focus of Chinese defense policy away from the Asian continent to the South China Sea (Munro, 1994).

85 In China every bureaucracy is directed by a leadership squad (lingdao banzi) composed of only a few leaders, but every leadership squad is served and assisted by a large mishu squad or General Office (GO)(bangongting/bangongshi). A general office should function as a counter bureaucracy in the sense that it contains counterpart subunits to virtually all the bureaucratic departments under the leadership squad, thus providing the leaders with a countervailing base of expertise and information and necessary organizational capacity to attempt effective control over the bureaucracy. Moreover, all
the CMC Chairmanship and because the CMC's chairmen speak infrequently, the staff of the CMC General Office (GO) and the leaders of the six main organizations under the CMC have worked out a de facto system of controls for themselves, relying on their own network connections.\footnote{These six organizations include the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Political Department (GPD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), COSTIND, The Academy of Military Sciences and NDU, and the Second Artillery.} Apparently defense specialists at lower levels of the military bureaucracy work out certain parts of military policy because there is no one overseeing the whole (Lewis and Xue, 1991: 91).

This diffused structure of authority has contributed to substantial uncoordinated policy between the PLA-N, PLA-Air Force, and PLA ground forces each often pursuing the development of its own war fighting strategies and development (Li, 1996; Chen, 1994). Nominally, the General Staff Department (GSD) should act to integrate the various PLA services, but in reality the PLA-N and PLA-Air Force often act independently, frequently bypassing the GSD and dealing directly with the CMC (Swaine, 1996). In general, GSD defense policy interests centre on promoting and implementing the strategic and tactical-operational goals of the PLA leadership giving "preferences to interests of the PLA ground forces, which have historically dominated the military command system" (Swaine, 1996).\footnote{The GSD also performs the headquarters function of China's infantry forces and hence most GSD officers have extensive backgrounds in the ground forces. This service preference leads many GSD strategic analysts and senior officers to emphasize defense against potential threats from the Asian mainland rather than sea launched threats to China's coastal provinces.} Moreover there has been a conspicuous absence of PLA-N representation in the GSD leadership. In fact, since 1949 there has been only one PLA-N representative in the GSD leadership.

Consequently, the PLA-N, possessing its own logistics and intelligence network, often acts on its own reporting directly to military regions or the Central GO's are organizationally unified into a subsystem running vertically from the top to the bottom and cutting horizontally across various hierarchies of the Chinese bureaucratic structure, thus serving as a crucial integrative mechanism (Li, 1994: 1).
Military Commission rather than the GSD.\textsuperscript{88} Recently the PLA-N in particular has been increasingly behaving as a quasi-independent bureaucratic actor formulating critical elements of China's defense policy. In recent years, it has pushed for greater recognition of its institutional viewpoint in the senior levels of the PLA leadership with significant success (Swaine 1996a: 47). Thus, the GSD does not seem to be an adequate service integrating-coordinating body since the PLA-N often circumvents its authority. With the increasing number and complexity of PLA-N missions the absence of an effective intraservice integrating body will be reflected in increased policy non-integration and unpredictable defense action (e.g. this might have been part of the problem in the Mischief Reef incident).

Not surprisingly the PLA-N has also taken the lead in arguing for a defense strategy key to China's growing maritime strategic interests and therefore places a high priority on naval development (Munro, 1994). Specifically the PLA-N leadership has been the major, but by no means sole, proponent of the creation of a technologically sophisticated, operationally versatile blue water force, centered on significantly increased numbers of principal surface combatants with greater operational range, fire power, and air defense capabilities, a greatly improved nuclear powered submarine force, a stronger naval air arm, and possibly one or more carrier battle groups (Swaine, 1996a).

The quest for the development of this capability has made the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea an important testing ground for new Naval technology and tactics (Zhan, 1994; You, 1995). In order to achieve blue water capability the PLA-N must develop personnel skills, strategies, and tactics through first hand experience in broader and more complex naval exercises that increasingly take the PLA-N out of its previous role of coastal defense into blue water exercises (Chen, 1988 : 48).

\textsuperscript{88}According to Garver, the Guangzhou Military Region and Hainan Province (the island province closest to the disputed Spratly Islands) are both active supporters assertive PLA-N policy in the South China Sea in the PRC's legislative bodies (Garver, 1996: 258). Both the Military Region and the Province stand to gain from more assertive PLA-N activities.
Moreover, as described above, the PLA-N has successfully utilized changing domestic concerns to push its own programmatic and corporate interests in the South China Sea (Garver, 1992). The PLA-N has argued that possession of the Spratlys is an intergal part of China's security and this gives them a reason to develop greater offshore capability.  

The second problem of coordination exists between defense and foreign policy making bureaucracies. The CMC and the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) lack effective defense and foreign policy coordinating capabilities. Ideally, these bodies should have significant representation from both foreign policy and defense policy sub arenas to allow for relative integration between defense and foreign policies. This would resemble an integrated institution such as the NSC in the United States system. However, the CMC is basically a military body with token civilian leadership and no MFA representation (Swaine, 1996a). Most of the important work and important decisions in the CMC have been carried out by vice-Chairmen such as recently retired General Yang Shangkun and the current Vice-Chairmen Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen.

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90 The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group led by Premier Li Peng is the most important group under the Party Secretariat that deals with foreign policy making in the PRC. It has decision making power and decision influence (Swaine, 1996a:24).

91 For a detailed discussion of the U.S. NSC and the NSC staff, see Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Shoemaker (1989).

92 Jiang Zemin, as Chairman of the CMC, is the only 'civilian' representative on that body. At the same time there has been little or no military representation on the FALSG during Jiang's tenure.
In contrast with the CMC, the FALSG, is predominantly civilian with at times no high ranking military expert representation (Swaine, 1996a). Premier, Li Peng has been the leader of this group giving very little decision making responsibility to Jiang Zemin. This situation seems counterproductive for improved defense and foreign policy integration because Jiang, as Chairman of the CMC, has access to that body but Li does not. Moreover, these two policy arenas seldom overlap because the leaders of the national strategic objectives sub-arena meet infrequently and there is no real coordination mechanism between these two bodies. Consequently, there is no reason to expect high levels of defense and foreign policy integration under conditions of a balanced leadership in the Politburo.

The State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA) has been compared in function and membership to the U.S. NSC (Swaine, 1996a: 26). This comparison has been made largely because of OFA's recent expanded responsibilities under Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu who has been compared in power and authority with a National Security Advisor (Swaine, 1996a: 26).93 These responsibilities have included a variety of critical administrative, secretarial and even policy making functions within the FALSG; it has essentially served as a supra GO under the FALSG. However, there are some important differences between the two bodies that inhibit the OFA from performing proper defense and foreign policy coordination. While the NSC staff serves as the supreme executive leader of the U.S. government, (i.e. the President) the OFA primarily serves the Chinese Premier Li Peng and not the President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin. Moreover unlike the U.S. NSC whose membership includes the top civilian and military figures of the U.S. national security apparatus, the OFA's duties and membership are limited to the civilian foreign policy realm (Swaine, 1996: 26).94

93 This impression was reinforced when Liu Huaqiu met for eight hours with his U.S. 'counterpart' NSC advisor Anthony Lake for eight hours during the Taiwan missile exercises in Spring of 1996.
94 The OFA and the NSC staff also differ in size: The former contains less than twenty full-time members, but the latter has at times included more than fifty professionals (Swaine, 1996: 27 fn.17).
Similar to the foreign affairs establishment's lack of coordinating institutions, the PRC defense establishment has no office comparable to the Office of International Security Affairs in the US Department of Defense specifically responsible for relating military policy to foreign policy (Barnett, 1985: 100). Moreover, not very much is known about what kinds of research and analysis on military strategic and political military issues relevant to foreign policy are done by working level professional analysts within the defense establishment to provide a basis for top military leaders, and top party and government leaders as well, to make judgments on foreign policy issues that take military factors into account (Barnett, 1985: 100). 95

The consequences of these poor coordination mechanisms combined with the conflicting policy goals of the two bureaucracies, can be seen in the recent appearance of policy disagreements between the MFA and PLA including such issues as weapons sales, nuclear testing, assertiveness in the South China Sea, response to U.S. trade and diplomacy. (Garver, 1992, 1996, Lewis and Xue, 1991, 1993, Whiting, 1996) Most importantly poor policy coordination has exacerbated military and foreign affairs bureaucracy's disagreements over degrees of assertiveness in the South China Sea. The only way to rectify this policy conflict has been to take it to a higher authority, such as a leadership small group, for decision making. However, as discussed above, that higher authority has been constrained at times in its decision making by reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership.

The policy disagreements between the two bureaucracies were played out in the debates over the 1992 Draft Law on Chinese Territorial Waters. Sharp divisions in policy position developed between the MFA and PLA, with the MFA taking the position that the law should not specify the Diaoyutai (Sengaku) Islands since to do so would inevitably cause tension with Japan. Instead the MFA reportedly favored a

95 Tai Ming Cheung (1987), David Shambaugh (1987), Nicholas Eftiamedies (1994) and Michael Swaine (1996a & 1996b) have worked to remedy this gap in Chinese defense policy literature, but information is still limited.
vaguer reference to 'Taiwan and other affiliated islands.' The MFA rationale for this stance was that it felt that it was not in the PRC's interest to raise this issue creating a conflict with Japan (Garver, 1996).

The MFA was also reportedly opposed to specific, detailed enumeration of the islands in the South China Sea claimed by China. The MFA noted that China had only recently committed itself (in August 1991) to shelving the sovereignty issue regarding those islands while pursuing their joint development. The MFA expressed its feelings that now was not the time to raise the issue. The MFA also reportedly opposed the draft law's explicit assertion of China's right to use military force against foreign activities in its 'territorial waters' in the South China Sea and the Sengaku area. The MFA was reportedly opposed on these issues by the PLA General Headquarters (GSD), the PLA-Navy, and the Guangzhou Military Region as well as by conservatives from Shanxi and Hainan provinces. Military representatives argued that specification of China's ownership of these islands and explicit statement of its willingness to use military force to uphold its claims would strengthen its legal and negotiating position. Japan could not be trusted, the military argued, and the fact that it was presently dominating Chinese territory (Diaoyutai) could not be overlooked. Moreover, the military representatives felt that Chinese military forces had to be legally empowered to remove by force any foreign incursion into China's maritime territories (Kyodo, in FBIS, DRC, 27 February 1992, pp. 115-116-quoted in Garver, 1996). The tougher version of the law favored by the PLA was approved by the NPC and promulgated by China's President Jiang Zemin shortly afterwards.

This policy disagreement quickly moved from the domestic arena to the international arena in the form of PLA-N action. Later in 1992, the MFA responded to Indonesia's initiative for resolving conflicts in the South China Sea by sending four representatives to Jogjakarta to further diplomatic initiatives and build confidence with ASEAN states. This clearly was tied with the MFA's desire to maintain good relations with its southeast Asian trading partners. The Indonesian workshop on
managing conflict in the South China Sea went from June 29 to July 3, 1992. The day after the workshop, PLA-N forces landed on Ba Lac Reef at the expense of the previous claimant Vietnam (Hamzah, 1992: 22). This action clearly contradicted MFA moves for a more peaceful resolution to the disputes.

One explanation for this non-integration of foreign policy and military action that has gained acceptance amongst scholars is that the PLA-N was not acting against MFA efforts but instead there was an absence of coordination between the two bureaucracies. Professor Ji Guoxing of the Shanghai Institute for International Relations explains the 1992 PLA-N landings on La Bac Reef in this way (Ji Guoxing, April 7, 1993.- quoted in Jencks, 1994). According to Ji, the PLA-N action really was a "failure of coordination." The PLAN was uninformed about the diplomatic initiative in Jogjakarta. Ji denies that the PLA-N is consciously pursuing its own aggressive policy in opposition to the Foreign Ministry's. Rather, in the absence of coordinated guidance from Beijing, the Navy is "literally and assertively interpreting the official policy that the islands are sovereign territory..."(Jencks, 1994: 95-96).

The MFA continued its conciliatory policy of offering to shelve the sovereignty issue and focus on joint development. They agreed to the principle of the non-use of force to settle the disputes in the ASEAN declaration of 1992 (FEER, 13 AUG, 1992: 17). In 1993, Philippines President Ramos and Jiang Zemin agreed in principle to explore and develop the disputed territory jointly and shelve the issue of sovereignty (Chen, 1994: 899). In 1993 even Defense minister Qian Qiqian expressed his support for a peaceful resolution to the dispute (Whiting, 1996).

At the same time, the PLA-N had decided that the South China Sea was the most appropriate place for it to flex its muscle around China's borders. Can China Win the Next War (Xiao Bing and Qing Bi, 1993), a book determined to be written by mid level Chinese Naval officers in 1993, explained that in order to avoid the consequences of the "internationalization" of the Spratlys issue the PLA-N must act quickly, within the next ten years or the chances of ever recovering the Islands will
diminish considerably. These officers determined that the use of modern rapid high technology methods could bring victory. This plan included: suddenness, focused attack, integrated operations, strengthening supplies and fast but steady operation with strict control (Munro, 1994: 371).

Uncoordinated policy and military action between the two state agencies reached its peak in 1995 when the PLA-N took Philippine claimed Mischief Reef. This action broke what was considered conventional wisdom that China would not forcibly claim territory disputed with an ASEAN member (to that point PLAN only entered conflicts with Vietnam). The PLA-N forcibly detained and then removed Philippine fisherman from the Philippine claimed Mischief Reef and then set up their own structures on the reef. As mentioned above, if the salience of the issue was important enough it would have reached the FALSG or CMC level for arbitration and coordination. Yet, even if the plan to take Mischief Reef did make it to these higher decision making bodies top leaders would still have been constrained by the decision influence of the PLA-N and the restricting influences of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership.

Thus it seems that the poor quality of the existing PRC military and foreign policy coordinating institutions has clearly contributed to the non-integration of foreign and defense policies in the South China Sea. Although the actual process of decision-making that took place determining the actions of the PLA-N in the area from 1990-1995 must remain speculative (due to the lack of transparency in the civilian and military bureaucracies), the three post-Mao institutional developments described above have clearly limited decision makers' ability and interest in opposing the PLA-N's more assertive policy in the Spratlys.

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96 The idea of distinguishing ASEAN claims from those of non-ASEAN members (i.e. Vietnam) was solidified in the 1992 ASEAN agreement that force would not be used to solve the sovereignty claims in the Spratlys.
Recent Developments: The Second Part of the Puzzle

The preceding sections have answered the first question I proposed; what post-Mao institutions have been causal in determining non-integrated foreign and defense policy and the inconsistency of defense policy and military action. As mentioned above the first two institutions, reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership, seem to be unchangeable in the near future; it is unlikely that any future leader will be able to recreate the conditions that gave Mao directive power and the coordinating effect that power had on policy making and military action. However, the third institution, loose coupling, can be seen to be subject to change in the near term in several important ways. Thus this leaves room for attempting to answer the second part of the puzzle; how can foreign and defense policy be better integrated and military action be made more consistent with defense policy. The answer to the second question seems to include the nascent development of three post-Mao institutions: the leadership's expanding use of social science policy communities for policy advice, leadership plans to establish policy coordinating bodies, and the crossover of information and personnel between the civilian and military scientific and economic bureaucracies.97 These three developments seem to change the institutional rules of loose coupling and thus have the potential to ameliorate the problems of civilian control that a strong loosely coupled system creates.

First, since Zhao Ziyang's tenure as Premier top leaders have begun to rely more on specialist policy advice in making important economic, foreign policy, and national security decisions (Halpern, 1988; Swaine, 1996; Shambaugh, 1987; Glasser and Garret, 1986). In particular, policy communities (made up of research institutes, university scholars and expert bureaucrats) have become important in defining the

97 As Nina Halpern (1988) has explained post-Mao leaders have responded to the problems of policy integration with attempts at structural rather than motivational change. Halpern explains that "instead of using campaigns [as Mao did] to address these problems, Deng reorganized the advisory system by creating new bodies to supplement bureaucratic sources of advice and, more important, to structure that advice so as to overcome bureaucratic deficiencies" (Halpern: 1988: 160).
parameters of defense and foreign policy decision making. Since the death of Mao, many scientific and social scientific policy groups have been revived and many new ones created (Shambaugh and Wang, 1984). These policy groups write reports, hold conferences, and organize ad hoc groups to attempt to answer questions the government has put to them. These expert groups have also developed their own policy packages for presentation to decision makers.

In the Post-Mao era of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership, civilian leaders will not want to battle against their generals unless they have both political support and a sufficient bureaucratic tools. Policy communities or expert advice givers can act as bureaucratic policy tools or 'policy handles' when questions of appropriate military science arise. Civilian leaders can use expert advice to challenge the military's monopoly on expertise and reduce the military's decision influence in defense policy making. Civilian leaders can thus achieve more integrated defense and foreign policies and military action if they can control the military bureaucracy through the enhanced monitoring and policy coordinating capabilities the policy handle would afford.

However, in order to develop policy communities into effective policy handles over military doctrine and military science developments several conditions need to be met. First, expert advisors need access to relevant military data. As discussed above this is still a difficult question in the PRC where information has traditionally been seen as a form of personal and bureaucratic power. However, the situation is improving with greater crossover between the civilian and military scientific communities and an increased demand from the foreign affairs and State Council bureaucracies for information relevant to national security decision making. Second, civilian expert policy advisors need access to military policy decision makers. This

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98 Kauffman has explained that a policy handle is a way to redefine the nature of a policy decision and force change on a subordinate organization by moving the policy decision from the organization's exclusive area of expertise (Kauffman, 1992).
might prove more difficult than the first caveat. Currently the CMC (the top military policy decision making organization) receives expert advice from within the military bureaucracy; the G-2 and G-3 of the General Staff report to the CMC and they have been very protective of their turf (Swaine, 1996a). A third problem for developing effective expert military advice has been the almost dichotomous civilian and military scientific communities until the recent Deng reforms. Under Mao there had been very little crossover between the two communities resulting, even to this day, in a shortage of civilians with the ability to give expert military advice.

One example of a growing expert policy community in China is the nascent civilian arms control community (Johnston, 1986; 1996). China's increasing participation in international multilateral arms control agreements has drawn China to the negotiating table and exposed PRC scientists and policy makers alike to alternative ways of thinking about arms control (including developing strategies and doctrines different from those held by the PLA or generated by its in-house strategists.) Thus, growing policy communities, independent of the military bureaucracy, are developing expertise that can be used to develop policy options that may lie outside the realm of choices offered by the military bureaucracy and consequently challenge the military's monopoly on military policy influence.

If an issue is sufficiently transnationalized, such as arms control, this might give the leadership a form of policy handle or at least an international gage by which it can confidently respond to the military bureaucracy's policy demands with alternative proposals based on the experiences of other states.

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99 The military 'establishment' policy research institutes such as AMS, NDU and BIIS bring up the question of bias in policy creation and policy parochialness. As members of the military establishment these organizations might not be able to see the breadth of defense policy permutations that non-military establishment policy groups might.

100 According to Kauffman (1992) this is exactly what happened in the Soviet Union in the early 1970's when the civilian government went against military advice and decided to sign an ABM treaty with the United States.
A second recent development that the leadership might use to ameliorate the adverse effects of the loose coupling system has been the possibility of creating new institutions to help coordinate military and defense policy. Many among the Chinese leadership and defense and foreign policy strategists have called for the creation of a policy coordination institution similar to but stronger than the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) to deal with the increasing problem of foreign and defense policy non-integration (Swaine, 1996: 79). Much of the discussion has focused on building up the responsibilities of State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA). There are plans to bring together political and bureaucratic leaders from the foreign, defense, and national strategic objectives policy realms to concentrate control over the National Security apparatus at the top. Such an organization would "clarify vertical and horizontal lines of authority, facilitate communication and interaction throughout the national security policy bureaucracy, and thereby provide better coordination among and control over the different components of national security policy, both civilian and military" (Swaine, 1996a: 79).

One caveat in the future development of policy coordinating institutions is that the creation of new coordinating institutions seems to rely on the strength of individual leaders resolve and connections. For example, the development of the OFA in recent years has been greatly the result of the personal power of Li Peng (Politburo Standing Committee Member, Premier, and FALSG leader) and his protege Liu Huaqiu (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and director of the OFA). These two leaders have been able to give the OFA real power but this power may fade when the powerful figures pass on.\footnote{This seems to have been the case when the burgeoning web of international relations policy groups disintegrated when their powerful nexus Huan Xiang passed away in 1989.}

There has also been discussion of improved Command Control Communication and Intelligence (C\textsuperscript{3}I) that would ameliorate the problem of
inconsistent defense policy and military action. Improved C3I would involve restructuring the GSD to better accommodate the PLA-Air Force and PLA-Navy in both policy planning and joint exercises. These conditions might be brought about more rapidly with the declining relative power of the ground forces in the GSD.

A third important dynamic that might help resolve loose couplings problems of agency has been the changing relationship between the civilian and military scientific communities and economies. As mentioned above, these economies and the scientists that worked within them were effectively separated until the mid 1980's (Wang, 1988). However, economic reforms and the post-Mao leadership's drive for efficiency have pushed the two communities to increase linkages and exchanges of personnel and technology. The military has clearly realized the benefits of sharing information and technology with the civilian sector, and the civilian sector has clearly benefited from military technology spin-offs (Wang, 1988). The CCP has also permitted many of the highly qualified military scientists to move to the civilian economy where they might find higher financial rewards (Wang, 1988). As Wendy Frieman has explained "the military sector might still have some of the best, but no longer has all of the best, of China's scientists" (Frieman, 1993, 60).

One significant result of the military's increased sharing of information, technology, and personnel with the civilian sector might be the development of some civilian expertise outside of the military establishment. This pool of civilian experts is essential for both developing effective military science monitoring bodies and for the coordination of military and foreign affairs bureaucracies. Former military scientists might be employed in non-military establishment think tanks or in newly established

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102 Feng Yujun et al. "Xuqiu qiayin, quanju gaohuo." have assessed the doctrine-driven impact on command control, force structure, combined arms training, and equipment standardization. According to Li (1996) Feng's article, which is based on an evaluation of a combined arms campaign exercise in the Jinan Military Region conducted in 1994, has allegedly "aroused a strong response" from various PLA units. For a selection of articles as evidence of this response on doctrine guided training, simulation, technical and logistical maintenance and sustainment, C3I development, and army building in general, and on further doctrinal innovation with an eye to "fighting and winning the next war," see Jiefangjun bao, 21 March 1995, p. 6 (Li, 1996: 449).
bureaucratic coordinating bodies offering policy advice to leaders that might contradict the military bureaucracy's proposals. These changes would create an effective policy handle which the civilian leadership could use along with non-military selectorate support to overrule the military's preferred policies. Similar results might occur if the PLA makes public more of its important statistics (the U.S. military posts information on the internet, for example.) In this sense expert policy communities would be able to monitor and check military demands for new missions and technologies. This development would add sophistication to existing policy handles such as civilian control over the military's budget which weeds out military plans based on economic priorities.

One civilian institution that has begun to develop a capacity for offering leaders alternative or non-military establishment policy advice is the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). This body is under the jurisdiction of both the CMC and the State Council and acts as a defense research and development and production centre. It seems to be becoming an effective monitor of PLA procurement policy. COSTIND won an important debate with the PLA over the efficacy of buying arms from Russia in 1993. The Navy and Air Force apparently argued for substantial purchases of off the shelf systems from Moscow, while COSTIND argued for upgrading China's defense industrial base (with the help of Russian scientists and technicians) and not becoming overly dependent on foreign suppliers (Shambaugh, 1994: 18). COSTIND's position prevailed demonstrating the efficacy of a competing institution in integrating military procurement policy with the broader economic policy goal of developing China's industrial base against military opposition.

With some caveats there seems to be a growing potential for these three nascent institutional developments to counteract the problems loose coupling has presented for policy integration and military action consistent with that policy. Nascent expert advisory bodies and policy communities, evolving policy integrating
institutions, and the increasing cross over of civilian and military scientific communities have potential to improve the problems of monitoring military action, improving coordinating institutions and developing civilian expertise in military affairs. These developments are all in part consequences of Deng's choice of improving coordination and discipline through the use of institutional structures rather than through political motivation as was the case under Mao. However, the problems of insufficient access to military policy decision makers and the strength and importance of the military in the selectorate vis a vis the civilian leaders means that the policy influence of new expert communities and their ideas still face the formidable task of persuading the military that it is in their interest (or in the states interest) to incorporate the new ideas of security.

Conclusion

This paper began by proposing to solve a puzzle: What are the causal elements in China's relatively non-integrated defense and foreign policies and under what conditions can there be greater integration? Clearly institutions have been causal. The post-Mao institutionalization of reciprocal accountability, balanced leadership, and the military's monopoly of defense policy making have all worked to limit the civilian leadership's capability to intervene in defense policy making and its attempts to integrate it with changing foreign policy needs. Policy choices have been selected out and leaders have based their choices on their own political survival given existing institutional rules and structures.

The relatively integrated foreign and defense policies and the consistency of military actions with defense policy that occurred during the strategic debates of 1964-1965 was clearly a result of Mao's hierarchical authority, directive leadership and an effective monitoring system. Mao was able to overcome resistance within the military bureaucracy and Politburo to integrate China's foreign and domestic policies. An effective monitoring body, the PCS, worked to ensure military action was consistent with defense and foreign policy.
Conflicting Chinese defense and foreign policy and inconsistent military policy and actions in the South China Sea have clearly resulted from the loss of civilian control of the military. This loss of control can be attributed to the development of reciprocal accountability, balanced leadership, and the monopolization of defense policy options by the military bureaucracy.

However, the implications of reciprocal accountability, balanced leadership and loose coupling do not preclude a change in the structures and processes that make up these institutions. In particular, loose coupling seems the most likely to change and in some respects has already begun to change. The development of competing civilian expertise, policy communities and stronger coordinating institutions might overcome much of the policy non-integrating effects of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership.

This paper concludes that institutions have been causal in determining Chinese civil-military relations and the relative integration and non-integration of defense and foreign policies and military actions. The PLA has become a much stronger player in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy under conditions of reciprocal accountability and balanced leadership. Loose coupling has further contributed to the military's monopoly of defense influence and the development and parameters of choices for national security. These three institutions have reinforced each other in shifting the balance of control of military affairs from the civilian leadership to the military bureaucracy.

If the Chinese civilian government cannot control the PLA or parts of the PLA in their policy development and military action, then the civilian leadership's goal of a peaceful environment for China to develop its economic potential might easily be discredited. Assertive PLA-N action in Southeast Asia and in the East China Sea has already caused China's neighbors to be on guard. These neighbors desire predictability in Chinese actions; non-integrated defense and foreign policy and independent
military action only exacerbates the distrust of China's good intentions that has already begun to develop in the region.

In fact, one could argue that the future of China's economic reforms may well depend on the civilian government's ability to establish firm civilian control over the development of military strategy and operations. The Chinese leadership's increasing dependence on trade with foreign states to keep the Chinese economy growing exposes them to the influence of trade wars and unequal economic treatment. Clearly economic considerations are now factored into any consideration of Chinese national security and the civilian leaders would best know the costs of military action. Policy coordination would thus benefit from the leaders of the military understanding that civilian leaders are in a better position to protect China under these new conditions of national security.

Thus domestic rules and structures also have significance in any consideration of a 'China threat' or the policy of 'constrainment.' Clearly power is fragmented in China. It seems a redistribution of that power in favour of civilian leaders would be desirable to all. Using the structures discussed above as a framework for interpreting the potential for Chinese aggressiveness it seems that any aggression is more likely to develop out of policy confusion and the weakness of the central leadership than any organized plan of the CCP for regional hegemony. As long as the military maintains its privileged position within the Party's central governing organs a form of domestic Party control exists. At the same time, the danger of unintentional belligerence looms larger as a result of the military's privileged positions in these bodies.

The answers seem to lie in what Chinese leaders can do to change the existing structures of the political military system to promote more genuine and thorough civilian control. They can do this through policy handles, bureaucratic integration under civilian guidance and institutional control, and improved monitoring of military science. Anything that China's well wishers can do to promote these three nascent institutions will also contribute to enhanced civilian control of the military. Engaging
China in trade, cultural, and military ties and exchanges helps to free up important information in the economy and bureaucracy that will help develop more effective expert policy groups giving military advice from outside the military establishment. This also encourages the sharing of experiences of success and failure in the respective systems.

China has responsibilities that come along with its great power aspirations; in order to be a responsible great power China will need to develop foreign and defense policy integrating institutions equal in capability with its rapidly developing force projection capabilities. The failure of the Soviet Union to achieve its integrated grand strategy goals can be partially attributed to its failure to develop institutions that would allow innovation and integration in the defense and foreign policy realms. China's experience certainly need not replicate that of the former USSR.
Bibliography


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Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Mao 1959-1967</th>
<th>Post-Mao</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization of Military Science</td>
<td>Pervasive Politics</td>
<td>Loose Coupling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuum of civilian ability to intervene and coordinate foreign and defense policies and defense policy and military action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>low civilian control</th>
<th>high civilian control</th>
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<td>reciprocal accountability</td>
<td>hierarchical authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>balanced leadership</td>
<td>directive leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>loose coupling</td>
<td>pervasive politics</td>
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Appendix 2

Appendix 2 is borrowed from Roeder (1993).

Figure 2.1. Accountability in an Authoritarian Polity
Appendix 3

Appendix 3 is borrowed from Swaine (1995).

Political-Military Leadership Trends


Figure 2.1—The Percentage of Military Cadres in the CCP’s Politburo, Central Committee, and Provincial Committee
Appendix 4

Appendix four is borrowed from Tan Eng Bok (1983).

FIGURE 1.1 Hierarchical relations among the Chinese military concepts

- direct
- derived

relation

MILITARY DOCTRINE
(Milutul Xunfa)

MILITARY SCIENCE
(Milutul Xueshu)

MILITARY ART
(Milutul Xunfa)

THEORY OF WAR
AND STRATEGY
(Zhenyou ha zhanlifa de gudui)

STRATEGY
(Zhanlifa)

OPERATIONS
(Zhanlifa)

TACTICS
(Zhanlifa)
Appendix 5

Appendix 5 is borrowed from (Swaine, 1996a).

Figure 1: China's National Security Policy Arena