DAUGHTERS OF DEVELOPMENT: THE STATE AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA

by

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B.A. University of British Columbia, 1989

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Geography)

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April 1997

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ABSTRACT

The New Order regime has crafted state machinery which shapes the construction of gender relations, and feminist politics in Indonesia. The state has adopted elements of international Women in Development (WID) theories and practice to direct the participation of women in society. Throughout Indonesian history, particularly since the rise of the independence movement at the beginning of this century, women have contributed significantly to the political, social, cultural, and economic life of the Indonesian archipelago.

This thesis begins with an examination of international Women in Development perspectives, theories and critiques that have contributed to the approach adopted by the state in Indonesia. The history of women’s activism is examined, with particular attention to the revisionist accounts of women’s contributions to Indonesian history manufactured by the state. Javanese notions of power and familial ideology have been imposed through state actions in an attempt to confine women to familial roles and household space. The progression of the formulation of ideology, policies, programs, and organizational structures which constitute the state machinery concerning women in development are traced. Some feminist political strategies adopted by women in these conditions are outlined. Sources included government of Indonesia publications and regulations; personal notes and correspondence; reports from interviews and meetings; Indonesian newspaper and magazine articles; notes from participant observation; statistics from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics and field studies.

The impact of the New Order state machinery on feminist politics, resistance, and activism is examined through the presentation of several case-studies of women in non-governmental organizations; labour and regional nationalist movements, women working in the state bureaucracy, and rural women resisting or participating in state-sponsored programs. The thesis concludes that the New Order regime has severely confined the boundaries of feminist
political space through revising or suppressing the contributions of women to Indonesian history; silencing, containing and co-opting feminist political activists; and instilling fear in women through violent action and threats of violence from the state military and surveillance apparatus.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My father James Lindsay, was only able to complete seven years of elementary education, because at the age of 12, he had to go work in the family bakery after his father died. He told me to never be afraid to ask questions, as it is the only way to learn. For this wisdom, I am grateful. My mother Thelma Ina Lindsay, went to a school of commerce to learn secretarial skills, in order get a job and help support her widowed mother. She insisted that I learn to type in high school, and told me not to mention this skill in a job interview, or I would risk always being considered only a secretary. I am indebted to my mother for my skills and speed on the computer keyboard and her long standing belief in my intelligence.

For guidance from my elders in Indonesia: Achie Luhulima, Syamsiah Achmad, Saparina Madli, Sulaskin Murpratomo, Yang Matalib, Moelyarto Djokrowinoto, Rin Munte, Yati Sunarto, Adiati Sugiaro, Chamsiah Djamal, Sudarti Subakti, I offer many thanks. I am indebted to my Indonesian sisters, for their generosity and patience, and for sharing their insights, tenacity, tolerance and joy: Minah, Chandra Kirana, Nori Andriyani, Tati Krishnawati, Henny Buthiem, Willyani, Julia Elly Basri, Yang Suwan, and Julia Suryakusuma among many others. The generosity of all of the ibu ibu in many villages has touched me deeply.

For intellectual challenges, resources, friendship and support I owe much to Melody Kemp, Sean Foley, Tim Babcock and Noeleen Heyzer. For their good company and encouragement I thank Gillian Barber, Nancy Spence, Greg Rooney, Mary Alarie, Bruce Bailey, Caroline McRae, Roneen Marcoux, Mae Burrows, Marilyn Porter, Kate Doyle, Ann Dieters, Robert Kingham, Carole Doucet and Randy King.

I am grateful to Terry McGee for intellectual inspiration and for sharing his keen interest in Southeast Asia. His patience and assistance with the university administration gave me the time to complete the manuscript. Gerry Pratt brought me to feminist theory and postmodernism which continue to challenge me intellectually.

Tia Smith and Maureen Strasdine at Capilano College Child Care Centre took excellent care of my daughter while I was in front of the computer. Above all, my partner David Lane contributed domestic work and moral support which kept our family in tact, while I worked. My infant daughter Morgen taught me anew some lessons about persistence and perseverance which provided the motivation to the complete the manuscript.
PREFACE

I first went to Indonesia in 1981. I worked for a Canadian international non-governmental organization, and with our Indonesian counterparts, we worked in rural villages on community development projects, on the Island of Sumatra. After assignments that took me to India and Africa, I returned to Indonesia from 1986 to 1988, and worked in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java in rural villages on community development projects with non-governmental organizations. The women of these villages were strong, skilled, economically astute, brilliant managers, very well organized, and with very simple technology and the strength of their bodies provided for their families, educated their children, cared for the sick and elderly, and contributed to vibrant and lively communities.

When we would arrive in a village, we first had to "knock on the door" of the Kepala Desa (the head of the village). He would call members of the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or LKMD (Council for Village Resilience) to attend. We would always be warmly received, shake hands and be seated. The eldest or most senior person among us would politely introduce each of us, and our purpose in visiting the village. Without a word food and drinks would be silently and delicately placed before each of us, by barefoot women with clean and weathered hands. No one would touch the refreshments until we were invited to drink or eat by the Kepala Desa.

If we asked to meet the women of the village, after an explanation of our purpose, they would occasionally be invited to join the meeting. The first woman notified would be the Ibu Kepala Desa (the wife of the head of the village). She would disappear toward the back of the house, and reappear a few minutes later. Usually all the chairs would be occupied, so the women would be seated on the floor among and between the chairs. Amid the smoke of the
men's kretek cigarettes, and the strong black scent, sweet from cloves, the same spokesperson for the visitors would then explain our purpose to the Ibu Kepala Desa, who would usually nod politely, and then agree to arrange for the meeting we requested.

Even after we had worked on rural development projects in villages for several months, this protocol would continue. Village women would know that we were coming, and we would still have to "knock on the door" of the Kepala Desa, before we went to another house or meeting place filled with waiting women. Always we would be received first by the Kepala Desa, then the Ibu Kepala Desa, even if she were not involved in our activities. Before we left the village we would always "knock on the door" of the Kepala Desa, and thank him for his welcome, and lapor (report on) our activities.

At first, in my fascination with the newness of Indonesian cultural rituals, I thought I was witnessing welcoming polite behaviour. I was after all in Indonesia. The tourist books and cultural guides all said Indonesians were very polite and hospitable people. Then I found these ceremonies irritating and a waste of time: we had work to do. Later still, I realized that I was seeing and participating in very ordered forms of surveillance, social control, and political containment. I was learning how to pass through social gate posts constructed by the state and guarded by men, into the confined physical and political spaces of rural Indonesian women. These steps through entrances and exits gradually became commonplace. I followed my co-worker's lead. I learned to speak Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) using very polite terminology, always beginning each question to the Kepala Desa with the verb boleh (may), always asking permission, as a dutiful daughter would of a father. Almost without exception that permission was granted.

In 1981, we went to set up some projects in a village on a small island off the coast of
Sumatra which was designated a poor "fishing village" by people in the district level government offices. We entered a village where houses were in good condition, children were barefoot but healthy. Before we left the house of the *Kepala Desa* to meet with the women, he asked us to wait a moment. He unrolled a *tikar* (a hand woven mat made by women), which he used to cover a portion of the floor. From a cardboard box, he began to take wrist watches, calculators, shoes, even televisions, and carefully arrange them all on the *tikar*. He then asked us to purchase some of the goods, assuring us very cheap prices. We all knew that these goods were illegally smuggled from Malaysia and Singapore, although it was left unsaid. We each purchased a small item, indicating our consent to participate in the illegal venture, and ensuring our collusion, our silence on these matters with any authorities we might encounter. We all discussed how the villagers maintained the illusion of an impoverished fishing village with government officials, and discovered that most families had second homes in Malaysia. Laughter followed these discoveries.

In 1987, I went with co-workers for the first time to a *Dyak* village in Kalimantan. The *Dyak* are the indigenous people of the island of Borneo, historically known as head hunters in the accounts of British and Dutch colonial writers. It took days to travel to this remote village from the provincial capital city. We travelled by motor boat, up a large river. Then we went by *sampan* (canoe), along small overgrown channels through mangrove swamps, then walked kilometres on foot. We were accompanied by a *Pegawai Negri* (officer) from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Village Development (*BANGDES*). When we arrived in the village, we asked some children to show us the house of the *Kepala Desa*. We followed the children to the house, where the door was closed, and waited outside. Dogs and pigs roamed freely among the houses. There were no women around. No smoke from cooking fires. There
was a horrible sour stench from the huge slabs of white rubber latex lying on stones in the sunlight. A few men and boys tended to the rubber.

Finally the Kepala Desa came to meet us, he opened the door of his small house, children scurried and brought chairs from other distant small houses. After a few tense and frantic minutes we were all seated on chairs in front of the home of the Kepala Desa. The Pegawai Negri was very authoritative, he spoke quickly. He asked one of my co-workers and I to explain about our organization and the project we would like to develop with the village community. Our "companion" from BANGDES was getting very irritated. He refused to stay seated. He refused the invitations from the Kepala Desa to drink the juice of young coconuts and eat fruit, which the children had brought and placed on a very small table before us. Finally, he insisted that we all had to leave the village immediately, or we would not make it back to the nearest town before nightfall. The Kepala Desa asked us to stay the night in the village. Firmly but politely the Pegawai Negri refused the invitation, and arranged to get a passing villager to give him a ride back to the river on his cargo bicycle. We stayed the night.

The women came back to the village from the ladang (rain fed agricultural fields) in the late afternoon. I sat with some of the women of the village in a kitchen area behind a small house, and spoke to them while they made an evening meal by the light of small kerosene lamps. They explained that they always try to leave the village before the Pegawai Negri comes to the village, because pejabat (government officials) always come to collect money or goods from the villagers. The women and children also let all of their pigs and dogs out of the pens as they head off to the fields, because they know that the Moslem officials are forbidden to touch these animals, and seeing piglets and dogs running around the village makes them so uncomfortable that they leave the village as soon as possible.
The women asked me my age. They asked how many children I had. When I said I had none, they asked "How do you do that?" Most of them had between six and nine children. There was no school in the village, no family planning, no community health clinic, no immunization. Yet they knew that a transmigration village of Javanese people only sixteen kilometres away in the next valley, had a school, and some kind of health care. We began a community development program in this village. When I returned to this visit my friends in this village in 1988, they had a school, a healthy baby clinic once a month, and access to family planning.

Even these remote rural villages were attached to the long arms of the Indonesian state. In our work over the years with women in rural areas, we were constantly constrained by the organizations, structures, programs, definitions of the roles of women in community development and the officers of the Indonesian government. I was constantly challenged and frustrated. We struggled to organize people in groups that did not follow state defined structures, without formal title or record, in order to not put the people of these communities at risk with local authorities. We helped people define the resources they wanted, and left aside the resources and programs the state defined as their "needs." We practised self-censorship, under-reported and wrote fiction in our reports to government declaring all of our work triumphantly successful. In 1988, I returned to Canada.

In 1991, I went back to Indonesia, to work on a Women in Development project funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. This project was focused on addressing Indonesian state policies and programs concerning Women in Development, at the central level of government through the Ministry of State for the Role of Women. State ideology and structures imposed by policies and programs of the New Order government had been evident even in remote rural villages. I had become interested in how these policies had been
formulated, and the influence of international debates and theories about Women in Development (WID) in Indonesia. Some of my activist friends and colleagues believed that international pressure was beginning to create more political space for popular movements in the late 1980s. In 1991, before I returned as a migrant worker in the international development machine, I had a long discussion about this with a long time friend from Central Java, who has been involved in women’s non-governmental organizations. She was in Canada doing solidarity work on environmental toxins in water systems, and the effects on human health. Her view was that Indonesians do not really need money from countries overseas, as much as they need relationships with people abroad, who have been involved in social movements. In her view, the more foreigners know Indonesia, and are involved with Indonesian peoples struggles and can witness the actions of the state against people and against the Indonesian environment, the greater will be the political space for women. In her case she said that she feels stronger when she is interrogated by the military, because they know that she has regular communication and relationships with people overseas. She is one of the younger generation of feminists who believes that in the silence and political stillness after the crushing of the GERWANI women’s movement and the Communist Party of Indonesia, her generation did not have access to people with the skills to analyze their own political situation, or to have the skills to organize and develop a social movement. What she valued most about her work in Canada was not so much the technical information, but the discussions about how coalitions function, evolve and organize in the environmental movement in British Columbia. Other Indonesian women have since expressed to me their appreciation for the relationships that they have with people overseas who care about women, about the labour movement and the environment in Indonesia. They believe that these international relationships and communications help to protect political space for women in Indonesia, and put another external form of pressure on their national government.
In Memory of Yohannes Yan Pius

mitra kerja
teman tercinta
terus menurus tertawa
INTRODUCTION

Remi Rikken of the National Commission for the Role of Filipino Women once said in a workshop, that "[w]omen have to light the fire from the bottom and from the top."¹ This thesis is based on reflection on my work with women in Indonesia. I have worked with women in rural areas, senior officials in central government posts. The centralization of decision making under the New Order regime, among a very few actors in national leadership in Jakarta, shapes feminist politics and feminist political strategies in Indonesia. The national policies and programs of the state have structured gender relations in Indonesian society, even at the local level.

As Chandra Mohanty has articulated:
"Any discussion of the intellectual and political construction of "third world feminisms" must address itself to two simultaneous projects: the internal critique of hegemonic "western" feminisms, and the formulation of autonomous, geographically, historically and culturally grounded feminist concerns and strategies. The first project is one of deconstructing and dismantling; the second, one of building and constructing. While these projects appear to be contradictory, the one working negatively and the other positively, unless these two tasks are addressed simultaneously, "third world" feminisms run the risk of marginalization or ghettoization from both mainstream (right and left) and Western feminist discourses."²

This thesis will employ both these methods. Initially, I will examine Women in Development as an "international" discourse concerning development practice, and the critiques of these perspectives as they have been introduced through donor agencies to developing countries. Some of the features of the history, culture and political context of women in


Indonesia will be outlined. I will then examine the history of state policies and programs concerning women in Indonesian development, and identify how they have been implemented, drawing from my experience. Some specific case studies of the experiences and strategies of Indonesian women working for social change are presented. The influence of national state ideology, policies and programs on the construction women’s participation in Indonesian national development and gender relations are discussed.

The significant rises, ruptures and continuities of the Indonesian women’s movement have been recorded since the beginning of the independence movement. Trading and colonial relationships among the islands of the archipelago, and with other Asian and European states are features of Indonesian history. The development of a strong national identity, including language, social and political organizations, and military action have been critical elements in the strategies to create the nation state of Indonesia. Women of the Indonesian islands have contributed significantly to the development of Indonesia, and are acknowledged as active contributors to nation building.

Since independence in 1945, the government of Indonesia has made national and international commitments to women’s equality. Indonesian women have legal and political equality under the constitution, and Indonesia has ratified international conventions such as the convention for Political Equality for Women (1952) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1984). However, questions remain as to the achievement of the implementation of these policies, and the benefits to Indonesian women of these national and international commitments. Activist and academic women continue to challenge the government of Indonesia to effectively apply these commitments and ensure that Indonesian women achieve these goals. The Indonesian women’s movement continues the struggle.
Since 1965, under the leadership of President Suharto, the New Order regime has constructed the role of women in national development through policy, programs and ceremonial spectacle. These conditions in turn, have shaped the definition and strategies of feminist politics in contemporary Indonesia. The New Order ideological commitments to Women in Development have been accompanied by the creation of a women’s national government ministry, provincial WID management teams, women’s organizations with compulsory membership, state-defined roles for women in national development, and positions on women’s issues in international fora.

I lived in Indonesia during each of the three most recent general elections campaigns in 1982, 1987 and 1992. I have seen the evolution of Indonesian society in different regions - Sumatra, Kalimantan, Java, Sulawesi, and Jakarta. The changes socially, politically and economically in Indonesia have created an amalgam of gender relations across these different regional and cultural boundaries, and have fostered a cross section of contemporary Indonesian feminist voices, organizations, strategies, and publications within, around and beneath the layers of New Order government ideology, programs, institutions, policies, corruption, and claims of accomplishment in the advancement of Indonesian women.

Indonesia is increasingly becoming tangled in the webs of globalization and interdependence. My experience of Indonesia is that of a foreign woman, working with Indonesians, in various ways over the past sixteen years. I persistently question how international solidarity, or cooperation, or co-optation, or exploitation or neocolonialism function between women. I have also been immersed in the internal workings of the Indonesian state apparatus as it mediates among women and between women and men. Indonesian state policy and ideology have even interceded in my own consciousness of my identity, after years of adaptation to live and work in that political, social and cultural environment.
In writing this thesis, I have drawn from government of Indonesia publications and regulations; my personal notes and correspondence; reports from interviews and meetings; Indonesian newspaper and magazine articles; and notes from participant observation. I include statistics from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics and field studies. Other sources include academic publications, donor agency documents and women's studies research.

As a Canadian, a "Western" person, presenting information from Indonesia creates tension, conflict and ambiguity. Academic documents, media accounts, even fiction in Indonesia are often shrouded in layers of censorship. This results in such dense coding in language, form and structure that to those with little or no experience in Indonesia accounts seem convoluted and incomprehensible. Where possible I will use official government of Indonesia translations of documents. When citing quotations from working documents or notes from meetings or workshops, I will identify unofficial translations. In some cases, translations of text, phrases and quotations are mine, based on my understanding of Indonesian language. I am not a native speaker, and have learned to speak Indonesian through my work experiences and with language tutors. Although I have no formal educational training or qualifications in Indonesian language, I have been asked to provide simultaneous language interpretation for my colleagues in non-governmental organizations, and Indonesian and Canadian government officers.

As a student of Indonesian language, I have always found official Indonesian government translations of state documents interesting and at times perplexing and confusing. No matter how familiar I am with the text in Indonesian language, I often find something in the English language version awkward, strange, inaccurate or what seems to me - wrong. The interpretation from Indonesian to English never quite matches my understanding of the text. While I worked with the Ministry of State for the Role of Women, I found that the unofficial translations of documents that my colleagues prepared, would differ from the official versions presented in the
official bound documents that were finally sanctioned and published by the Ministry of Information or other government publication office. The English language materials are always for "foreign" consumption, and often by analysts, scholars, and donor agency consultants. The translations are prepared for this audience, not for Indonesian citizens.

I have chosen to present official English language translations of state documents wherever possible, and then make comment or explanation of variations with my understanding of the Indonesian meaning. This ambiguity is a feature of inter-cultural and inter-national relations. Knowledge of each other is always partial, and imprecise. Frequent misunderstandings become commonplace. One learns to appreciate these intellectual disruptions, and cope with persistent frustrations.

Indonesian feminists operate under veils of censorship, some self-imposed, others required by the state, society and/or family. Indonesian feminists do not yet enjoy personal safety. I face the risk of losing admission to the country by what I write for the public record, posted in the library of the University of British Columbia. My friends and former colleagues, could face more severe sanctions.

I therefore will refuse at times to reveal sources, changing names, locations, timing, in order to conceal the identity of the women and men who have trusted me. My knowledge has come through working together, over long periods of time with trusted colleagues. I did not request or receive a research permit from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences as required by the government of Indonesia for foreign researchers. Most of the notes and documents I have collected were records of events without a particular intended research purpose, although I hoped that my experiences as a participant with Indonesians would inform this thesis. Consequently, in some cases I have had to work from fractured notes, from memory and then contact former colleagues for confirmation that my recollections are accurate. Any errors or omissions
however, rest with this author.

In this effort, I write as an outsider, a foreigner, who has lived several years in Indonesia, as a development worker. My various employment positions have intersected with the hierarchies of Indonesian society, as a project manager, trainer, advisor, or consultant. In each set of circumstances, I transgressed boundaries, and identities. Most development workers in Indonesia are foreign men of considerable privilege. They interact as the equals of the people in the upper echelons of Indonesian society, usually men. As a foreign woman, I was often assumed to be the spouse of a foreign development worker, not a development worker in my own right, by Indonesian and foreign residents alike.

In reflecting on my experiences of being a resident in Indonesia, and a migrant worker in the international development machinery, the perpetual disruption of various identities -- a "Canadian" woman, a feminist, a "boss," a foreign "expert," a person with access to foreign development assistance funds, a woman of middle age without children, a wealthy foreigner -- make it very difficult to write about Indonesian feminism in one consistent voice, from one position. To try and claim the voice of one inside Indonesia, after only a few years there, would be impossible, as those of us from outside can produce at best only partial knowledge of our particular context. Yet, many Indonesians, especially Indonesian women, have been shocked when they are outside their country to find that records of social and political movements, and even current events within Indonesia, are more readily accessible and more accurate than sources within the country itself.

I engage in this exercise as an outsider, not to more firmly ground my position as a "foreign" expert, but to examine how national interests and identities for Indonesian women have been constructed. As Sandra Harding, Uma Narayan and others have advocated, feminist coalition politics can benefit from the construction of feminist knowledge which includes the
perspectives of both those inside an oppressive system, and those outside with knowledge of how that system operates. As Uma Narayan explains:

"... the claim of epistemic privilege for the oppressed need not imply that the oppressed have a clearer or better knowledge of the causes of their oppression. Since oppression is often partly constituted by the oppressed being denied access to education and hence to the means of theory production, (which would include detailed knowledge of the history of their oppression, conceptual tools with which to analyze its mechanisms, etc.) the oppressed may not have a detailed causal/structural analysis of how their specific form of oppression originated, how it has been maintained and of all the systemic purposes it serves.\(^3\)"

Narayan points out the need to develop feminist research methods and practices that respect the voice and the feelings of the people involved, and of developing relationships, of working together from different positions and perspectives.

"Having members of the oppressed group as friends, sharing in aspects of their life-style, fighting alongside them on issues that concern them, sustaining a continuous dialogue with them, etc. can all help non-members develop a more sophisticated understanding of what a form of oppression involves ... This is distinguished from outsiders who have "an abstract sort of goodwill toward members of the oppressed group, [who are] unlikely to have much of a clear or detailed awareness of the forms in which that oppression is experienced. ... outsiders must see it as their responsibility to seek out this knowledge, not the responsibility of the insiders to bring it to them.\(^4\)"

As I have made some commitments by legal contract not to reveal information from internal classified documents of various government and non-governmental agencies, I will draw whenever possible from documents released for public distribution, and meeting/interview notes from public meetings.

The role of the state in Indonesia, and how that structured my experience of that place

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as a woman and a feminist, is the most prominent and unique feature of my sense of this geographical space. My knowledge of Indonesia did not begin with reading literature, and the study of maps. It has not been constructed by study, but more by the experience of living... breathing... working... waiting... being... in Indonesia. Seldom did I find in text, in words on a page written by Indonesians or foreigners in descriptions, facts or analysis that resonate with my experience. In Indonesia, face to face oral communication, what is "said" above all else is valued, reliable, true. My experience frequently contradicts government of Indonesia official statements and social scientific accounts of "knowledge" about Indonesia. The only way I could present this is by disrupting the written quotations with presentations of what I experienced of what I know to be "true" about Indonesia, and letting the contrast stand in the text. This is the only way I could find to be true to the Indonesian women that I know, who have shared part of their time, their lives with me, and the only way I could write this manuscript respectfully acknowledging their trust.
CHAPTER 1  PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

The publication of initial studies of women and men in rural Asia, Africa and Latin America by Danish economist Esther Boserup in 1970 brought attention to women’s productive work, particularly in agriculture and petty trading, which had largely been neglected or overlooked in the field of international development.\(^1\) Women in development (WID) as a field of study, practice, and activism grew throughout the 1970s, among development assistance agencies, non-governmental organizations and development studies. Evaluation of achievements following the first two United Nations Development Decades in the 1950s and 1960s found that women had been largely overlooked and ignored by international development planners and projects.

The rise of the second wave of feminism in developing and developed countries brought increasing international connections among women. The demands made by women of national governments brought women’s issues to national attention. Women dissatisfied with the response of national governments brought women’s issues to the United Nations, and international conferences on women, created an international awareness of women’s issues and put additional pressure on national governments to address women’s issues. The events during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975 to 1985) had a particularly significant effect on the policies and programs concerning women in many countries.

Alongside these developments academics were examining women and development issues nationally and internationally. Women in Development theory was constructed initially by academics and consultants from industrialized countries, under contract to donor agencies.

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Women's contributions to development were not recognized or valued. Men were the targets of development projects, women were excluded from development, and therefore not the beneficiaries of international development assistance. Feminist perspectives from women working in the bureaucracies of aid agencies, and academics employed as consultants in industrialized countries identified women's participation as the issue and ensuring that women benefit as the corrective strategy for development projects.

Development policy makers included Women in Development (WID) policy directives as the key to addressing these problems and ensuring greater project success. In 1973 in the United States, the Percy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was introduced, requiring the integration of women into all development programs supported by the United States government. The Canadian International Development Agency adopted initial Women in Development policy guidelines in 1976. This strategy was informed by the liberal feminist view, that increasing opportunities for women's participation would lead to greater equity.

Donor agencies formulated WID policies anchored in development models of economic growth which remained largely unquestioned. Women and men mostly from northern countries with experience addressing employment equity in government bureaucracies, and social scientists with theories of social gender roles became WID experts, the technical resource people who

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would integrate women into donor agencies international development programs and projects. The low participation rates of women employed in the modernizing economy were attributed to lower levels of productivity among women workers. Women could be equipped to participate through better family planning, nutrition, education and health. Improved social welfare would make a more productive female work force, equipped to participate in formal and informal sector employment, contributing to national development and improved household income levels.

As Women in Development policies, models, and projects were implemented, both of the categories "women" and "development" were challenged. The supremacy of systems and methods of economic development were criticized by socialist feminists from Southern and Northern countries. The sexual division of labour became a key analytical tool in critical thinking about development. The social, cultural and political boundaries of occupational and spatial segregation in rural and urban economies were exposed as barriers to women's participation in development. The gender dimensions of the dualism of subsistence and cash economies came to light as the female subsistence economy and the male cash economy. Women were largely employed in the informal economy of subsistence agriculture, petty trading, domestic reproductive work, and men worked in the formal economy of cash crop trading, transportation, industry, manufacturing and government services.

In the 1980's the challenges to Women in Development policies and practice from researchers and activists in developing countries became more widely known through international conferences, fora and events sponsored by the United Nations. The benefits expected to accrue to women from their participation in capitalist development projects in developing countries were not forthcoming. Longstanding women's movements in Latin America, Asia and Africa which had grown alongside nationalist and anti-colonial struggles came to the forefront through international media, often in coalitions with labour activists,
environmentalists and farmers, in opposition to donor countries' development practices. The staggering weight of debt to international financial institutions which restricted access to social programs, health, and education became the issue which united women from many countries in opposition to donor agencies, and the developed countries that they represent.

As Jessie Barnard outlines, a global perspective on women's issues emerged, bringing together views from across gender, class and national boundaries. As she describes:

"The issue of the relationship between the two worlds [male and female] emerged from a complex bundle of forces, few more important than the growing awareness by more and more women in more and more places of their own gender identity, of their common concerns, of their potential autonomy vis-a-vis the male world. As women from all over have come into contact with one another, discovered commonalities, the costs as well as the rewards of separation have come under scrutiny. A kind of global female consciousness was emerging. Women were getting to know the nature of their oppressions. And something new was being added. They were beginning to be heard, though not necessarily understood in an international forum, the United Nations."5

Feminist political struggles of women were becoming rigorous in developing countries, as well as in developed countries. The assumptions and categories of economic "scientific" analysis were challenged. Donor countries and development assistance agencies had attempted to measure development benefits to women through demonstrated increases in employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors - labour participation rates and increases in income. Feminist scholars and activists identified that the value assigned to the work of women and men were the issues in the inequitable distribution income from development, not labour participation rates. Women were shown to be vastly overworked, with both productive and reproductive work, in developed and developing countries.

The assumption that all income ascribed to a household was equally distributed among

members was proven erroneous. Economists continued to apply development models and economic theories where economic growth is seen to be the catalyst which would increase employment opportunities for the large populations of developing countries. The "advancement" claimed by the Newly Industrialized Economies of Asia, have become the evidence that neoclassical economics, focused on economic growth, foreign investment, "free" trade and deregulated markets is the model for all developing countries to follow. The benefits of development will eventually accrue to workers in the modern, industrializing economy through their employment in expanded labour markets. 

It is assumed that compensation for women's productive work in growing economies would be allocated according to labour market forces. Increases in women's participation, would mean increasing benefits for women. The assumptions and structures of capitalist development: productivity gains in agriculture; increased industrialization; less regulation leading to increases in international trade; increased foreign investment, etc. would be the signs of increasing economic growth. Foreign investment in export oriented manufacturing would lead to increased employment, a rise in labour force participation rates for women, and subsequent increases in household income levels.

Yet, throughout the United Nation Decade for Women, empirical studies increasingly demonstrated that the economic, social and political positions of women in developing countries were not improving, despite millions of dollars spent on development assistance, and the implementation of Women in Development policies, programs, strategies and projects. In 1985, at the end of the United Nations Decade for Women, at the Third United Nations World Conference on Women, evaluations and reports found that women were in fact worse off than

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they had been ten years earlier. The focus on women’s role in development shifted. The issue was no longer women’s participation: women were overworked already. The goal was no longer employment equity between women and men, but shifted instead to poverty alleviation.

At the close of the UN Decade for Women, in the mid-1980’s a network of activists, scholars and policy makers from North and South, formed a group called DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era), with the purpose of addressing the issues of Women and Development (WAD) practice. They challenged the gender and class issues for women, and the crises in development which women struggle to overcome. They examined explicitly the colonial experience of women in developing countries, the structural causes of crises in the provision of food, water, and fuel, for women and men in developing countries. They identified the barriers and constraints created for women, by international debt and militarism. They proposed a view of women and development informed by feminist politics based on the material, cultural and political conditions of women in Southern countries. Rather than taking one ideological position, they advocated a view from the perspective of poor women and their organizations, rather than the perspective of benevolent donors.

From social science, another perspective emerged from collaboration between researchers and scholars in North and South in the mid-1980’s, Gender and Development (GAD). The roles, positions and status of women were structured by social gender relations, and so in order to address women’s participation in development it was necessary to examine the socially specific construction of gender relations. This focused on the factors which influenced the subordinate position of women in the shared conditions of development in particular societies.

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The introduction of a "gender" perspective in development was also contested. Some feminists argued that by losing the term women, and legitimizing the term gender, the focus of development decision makers on women would legitimately be shifted from women, to men where, in gender neutral development economics, it had always been. For other women, and particularly feminists in Indonesia, the introduction of the concept of "gender" into development discourse, theory and practice, presented an opportunity to introduce a discussion about power relations between women and men, without importing "Western" feminist theory, goals and strategies. Gender relations was a much more politically palatable topic for discussion in Indonesia, where feminism was frequently dismissed as an imported "Western" notion, which was contrary to Indonesian culture, and therefore had no validity. An examination of gender relations could include attention to both women and men, and was seen to be much less critical, threatening and confrontational than feminism to Indonesian men, particularly in the Indonesian government.

One approach to introducing gender and development was defined by the Harvard Institute of International Development and was specifically focused on gender roles in development projects. At the invitation of the World Bank, in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a team developed a framework for understanding gender roles in development projects. The tools of analysis were twofold:

1) a profile of productive and reproductive activities, the gender division of labour by age and gender;

2) a profile of access and control, identifying who (male or female) has access to which resources, and benefits from these resources (male and female).

Employing a case study method, they developed a training program which would teach
participants the skills of applying tools of gender analysis to development projects. Case studies included family planning, nutrition, education, rural credit and micro-enterprise projects. This system of analysis was designed for implementors of development "projects" and marketed to donor agencies as a training package for development project officers. USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Asian Institute of Management among others were purchasers of these training methods. The structure of the training materials on development projects examined gender relations in a particular community where a project would take place. It thus eliminated analysis of the power and gender dimensions of donor agency - recipient country relations. This approach shifted attention from the contribution of international and national capitalist development models. These could not be critically challenged by either donor agencies or recipient country development experts. In other words, the Harvard Institute developed a model of Gender Training, that would reinforce the hegemony of developed countries over the developed world. Gender issues would be addressed only through the implementation of techniques at the level of local communities in development projects. Gender issues were defined as local and technical rather than political and international issues.

This technical approach to gender and development requires extensive field study to gather all the information required to complete the various profiles. Gathering all of this information empowers outsiders - the experts (usually social scientists) to have all of the gender information about a community where a development project will be implemented. The analytical tools focused on very traditional sectors of interest to donors where women would likely be the "target group," such as projects with a social welfare orientation, women's work in informal sector enterprises, or family planning, nutritional gardening, etc. But the analytical categories used to identify the specific gender roles, and access to and control over resources were often irrelevant to the Indonesian communities. The profile of activities, a complex matrix
that is designed to identify who does what in a particular community, could be painstakingly completed. Yet the responses to these questions could vary day to day, season by season, year by year, due to circulatory rural-urban migration, or the proportion of women to men of adult age, illness or health, the number of children in a family or kinship group, or changes in family income sources. The categories of access and control applied to resources are very difficult to distinguish, and often irrelevant. For example, a family may have access to a school for their daughter, and the opportunity to participate in school management through a community committee, but may require her assistance with domestic work in order to enable the survival of the family. This prevents her from attending school.

A second approach to gender and development (GAD) was developed at the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex University. In the 1970's IDS scholars were the main proponents of the "Basic Needs" approach to development. Building on the relations with scholars in the Southern developing countries that had been forged through research and practice with the basic needs approaches, they shifted the analysis from gender roles to gender relations. Rather than assuming that there are static and prescribed gender roles, this approach focused on gender relations between women and men in any given society or situation. Gender relations are assumed to be asymmetrical, men being dominant and women subordinate, and these relations are social constructed and change over time with the specific social, cultural, historical and political conditions of a community or society.

The methodology of a GAD approach drew on Maxine Molyneux’s distinction between the practical needs and strategic interests of women. Development with a social welfare orientation focused on meeting practical needs which women and men could define for themselves, the needs for food, housing, safe and stable water supply, education, family planning, etc. The strategic interests of women are defined by their position in society. Women
and men may share the same conditions of housing, water supply, or political repression, but from different social positions. Gender relations are usually asymmetrical in a given community or society, with women subordinate to men. The specific cultural, political, social and economic features of that society define the specific positions of women and men, even though conditions may be the same. To meet the strategic interests of women, women need to be empowered through their access to economic, social, or political resources. Unequal power relations between women and men became the central issue, and empowering women became the strategy to overcome this. The theory and practice of development were seen to contribute to the creation and reinforcement of unequal power relations between women and men, and therefore development theory and practice, including Northern-developed-country donor agencies, including non-governmental organizations, needed to be challenged to change. Development needed to be redefined from a gender perspective.

The notion of practical needs and strategic interests has been given a great deal of attention by the international development scholars. To begin with an approach that assumes that women have needs, be they practical or otherwise, frames women as lacking in the first instance. The approach of strategic interests begins with the capacity of women who are seen as competent, able and self-reliant. The issue of needs is thus an area of feminist debate. Practical needs of women can be met through a variety of means, charity, the market, development projects, cooperatives or community self help groups. Addressing the strategic interests of women requires that women themselves define their specific political situation, their capacity, the conditions of their subordination, and select how and if they want to change or develop themselves or their society. It is often assumed in development circles that practical needs can be defined for women; experts know what women and men need, and how to deliver it to them. Equally this approach assumes knowledge of how women should be trained,
employed or organized in order to meet those needs. Defining women's strategic interests is seen as an approach which involves raising women's consciousness of their own circumstances, community and all of the social, political and economic forces which are shaping the conditions in which they live.

In Indonesia the practical needs of women are defined by the state. Development planners decide how women will be targeted for development activities on the basis of national development goals. The state identifies women's problems, such as too many children, and then prescribes the solution through a state sponsored program, such as family planning. Indicators of success in meeting these needs are measured through statistical indicators such as the rates of labour force participation or declines in maternal mortality. On the other hand, women's community groups and non-governmental organization in Indonesia define their work as activism. They use tools with women to define their own circumstances, such as community education. They often work with women with low levels of formal education, and use methods such as role playing, mapping, and collecting oral history to raise women's consciousness of their position in their community.

The notion most recently applied in the field of feminist criticism of development has been the notion of Mainstreaming Women in Development. This approach has both radical and neoclassical economic proponents. The United Nations agency for women's issues (UNIFEM) uses the term Engendering Development Planning, The World Bank and USAID the term Mainstreaming. This approach largely involves the implementation of technical tools in

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development planning, implementation, evaluation and accounting. Through feminist criticism of economics, there has been increasing recognition that women’s contributions to development through the unpaid economy and their reproductive work has not been recognized or valued in development planning, national accounting or in measuring the impacts and benefits of development. Approaches and technical tools are being developed to improve national statistical instruments and data sets in order provide better gender disaggregated statistics in order to measure more accurately the contributions of women and men to development, and the benefits or costs of development to the people of developing and developed countries.

The benefit to women of the implementation of these approaches remains contested. Women’s community groups, trade unions, Women’s Studies faculties in universities, and women’s bureaus in governments have all received significant financial and technical support from donor agencies. Yet significant evidence of gains in the status of women remain elusive. As the 1990s draw to a close, yet another decade of international development assistance, there are few cases which demonstrate that applying any of these perspectives can actually produced a formula for success.

The struggle for equality and increasing the status of women cannot be solved through development planning and projects. Changing the structure and conditions of gender relations in national and local societies is still inherently political. In some cases, political pressure on the state is the only legitimate means by which women benefit from economic growth and development. Women and men are unequal in most societies in the world today, although each national delegation at the United Nations Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995 presented their achievements. Modernization - industrialization - development continue to be implemented in every country in the world as the bulldozer of globalization weaves more societies into the webs of economic interdependence. The Asian Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) model is
promoted as the ideal solution for developing countries, but as Guy Standing argues, not one of these economies made the acclaimed economic achievements through export oriented manufacturing without a large young female work force.⁹

Women in Development in Indonesia

In the case of Indonesia, the application of Women in Development policies, programs and approaches lead many to question how development benefits women. In the 1990s ensuring the participation of women in development has been the justification for planned migration of women workers. Young women from rural villages go to live and work in manufacturing complexes in poor living conditions, for very low wages. Poor health and safety standards which are only rarely enforced, result in poor health, frequent injury and accidents. Women pay with their bodies for development, and it is never calculated as a cost of production. Their work is undervalued and underpaid, simply because it is classified as women's work. Rural women are also recruited as domestic workers in the rapidly growing cities in Indonesia, or to go abroad. Wage remittances from women working abroad are channelled through Indonesian banks and provide foreign currency, to assist with the balance of payments. Women's participation in economic development in Indonesia is not an unintended consequence, but a deliberate part of national development planning.

The organizational structure and requirements of donor agencies and international financial institutions create strict limitations for women in developing countries. In the case of

Indonesia, as in other countries of the South, donor-financed development projects and interventions, have significantly structured and even skewed the rise of feminist politics in the 1990s. Infusions of financial assistance for development in Indonesia are strictly regulated. Contributions to support community-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are carefully monitored, particularly those receiving support from abroad. The government has justified increased surveillance of financial flows to Indonesian NGOs since the early 1980s, as necessary to maintain the security of the nation by preventing the financing of fundamentalist Islamic activity from the Middle East, particularly Iran. In the 1990s however, the same monitoring systems have been used to prevent the flow of funds from the Netherlands to Indonesian NGO's which supported movements for democracy and human rights, and the advancement of women. These same systems also monitor support for labour movements, particularly financial support from sources in the United States.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1992, the Indonesian government halted all development assistance projects or funds from the Netherlands, and gave all projects one month to close. Press reports quoted government officials who stated that all development assistance from the Netherlands would be replaced by funds from domestic sources or other donors.\textsuperscript{11} The Netherlands funded many women's organizations, and assisted Women's Studies centres. These were all closed. To date, new funds have not been allocated from domestic or foreign sources to enable these projects to continue.

Donor agencies of the United Nations, and industrialized countries, are particularly limited in their capacity to support women in Indonesia. The majority of financial support from

\textsuperscript{10} From notes from a confidential source within the Ministry of Labour, 1994.

\textsuperscript{11} "CGI Pledges $5.11 in New Aid," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, July 1, 1993, pages 1-2.
donor agencies, including the Canadian International Development Agency, to Indonesia is in the form of government to government, or bilateral aid. These funds must be channelled to a partner agency of the Indonesian government, with approval from the Cabinet Secretariat. These restrictions severely limit the ability of donor agencies to provide financial resources to women in Indonesia. Most of the programs of the government of Indonesia for women are welfare oriented and designed to capture the labour of women without remuneration. The majority of staff in Indonesian government agencies are men. Of 3,771,285 civil servants in Indonesia, only 32.5 percent are women. This total figure includes 1,654,290 people employed in education where women are 46.2 percent of employees, as it includes teachers in public education. As a result, the figure of 32.5 percent women in civil service is skewed toward a higher rate of participation than is actually found in most government departments.\(^2\)

Indonesia has one central government agency for women, the Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women or MRW (Kantor Mentri Urusan Peranan Wanita or UPW). Like other state ministries in Indonesia for environment and youth it has responsibility for co-ordination of all women’s programs in agencies of government. With this mandate, at the central level of government, the Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women has no capacity to implement programs for women. Much like Status of Women Canada, the agency must influence other agencies of government to provide programs for women. As will be outlined in chapters 5 and 6, this mandate to influence without the staff or budget to create programs for women severely limits the capacity of this agency to deliver the policy objectives of the national and international agreements of the government of Indonesia to women’s equality.

Liberal feminists argue that bureaucratic systems can be reformed, to increase

opportunities for women in the interests of gender equity. Kathleen Staudt describes the process of implementation:

"The realization of policy responsiveness to women or to equity policy hinges on successful bureaucratic politics and leveraging, the burden for which falls upon structural units within the bureaucracy and constituency pressure from outside. Such seemingly mundane matters as developing procedures, penetrating training and budgetary processes, monitoring, and collecting data, or what some disparagingly refer to as "paper pushing" are critical to putting policy into practice. Were women's program units to control significant resources, build useful alliances, and create appropriate incentives, other parts of the bureaucracy would be more likely to respond to policy mandates on sex equity."  

However, the resources assigned to the office of the minister do not match the mandate given. MRW in 1991 had only 72 staff, making it the smallest office of a minister in the country. It has a small operating budget (approximately US$ 900,000 per year) and no funds for women's programs.  

The responsibility for assigning the financial resources for women's programs rests with the ministers responsible for sectoral or line ministries, such as health, education, public works, population, forestry, industry, labour, trade, and so on. Yet, accountability to elected members of the house of representatives for the government's response to addressing women's issues rests with the Minister of State for the Role of Women. Given this structure and mandate the Minister of State for the Role of Women can be influential. This has been particularly the case when there is a strong leader in the post, with the skills, and information necessary to influence other cabinet ministers and the President on women's issues.

In 1991, I worked on a CIDA funded technical assistance project, to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of State for the Role of Women to fulfil this mandate. My decision to work on this project with a government agency in Indonesia was based on what I had learned

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from years of working with Canadian and Indonesian non-governmental organizations. I had
experienced considerable frustration in my work with Indonesians on community development
projects due to the confining structures of Indonesian government ideology and policies
concerning women. Staff of the CIDA WID Directorate and CIDA’s Indonesian partners saw
potential for change under the leadership of Ms. Sulaskin Murpratomo, who was appointed
Minister of State for the Role of Women in 1987. Detailed information about Women in
Development policy and programs under her tenure as Minister are included in Chapter 6.

Women in Indonesia are participants in the interdependent global economy, whether or
not they have been explicitly identified in policies and programs of the government. They
participate in productive and reproductive activities and as consumers in the global economy.
Household strategies for the generation and distribution of income including; micro-enterprise;
subsistence agriculture; petty trading; inter-provincial and international labour migration; which
women have adopted for their family and their own survival have all been co-opted and
consolidated into national level development plans. These household strategies have informed
national state programs for poverty alleviation, setting minimum wage rates, commodity prices
and strategies to address the balance of payments. Majid Rahnema describes participation in
development in The Development Dictionary.

"[P]lanned macro-changes are more the indirect result of millions of individual micro-
changes, than of voluntarist programmes and strategies from above. In fact, they often
represent a co-option of the unplanned micro-changes produced by others and elsewhere.
When these reach a critical mass, and appear as a threat to the dominant
knowledge/power centres at the top, they are co-opted and used by their professionals
as an input for the planned changes, aimed at turning the potential threat posed to the top
into a possible asset for it. Hence, major projects of change from above generally
represent an attempt by those very forces under threat, to contain and redirect change,
with a view to adapting it to their own interests, whenever possible, with the victims’
participation. This is how the real authors of most revolutions are, sooner or later,
robbed of the changes they have provoked, and ultimately victimized by the professional ideologues and agitators acting on their behalf. This is how the pioneering participatory mendicants of the early development years were also robbed of their participatory ideal, as the latter was transmogrified into the present-day manipulative construct of participatory development.¹⁵

In the following chapters of this thesis, I will examine the state defined programs and strategies for Indonesian women in development, and the how the state has "robbed" Indonesian women of the changes that they have sought and struggled for, for generations, under the guises and constructs of women in development.

CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF THE INDONESIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

The history of the Indonesian women's movement is important to a discussion of the construction and deployment of Women in Development in Indonesia for several reasons. One of the most obvious reasons, is to aid in understanding the specific historical, cultural and political context in which Women in Development policies have been developed. A second is because of the issue of censorship in Indonesia. The state, to a large extent, defines what is commonly known in Indonesia of the nation's history. The two main tools in creating and revising history are the authority of Ministry of Information to ban and censor publications, and the Ministry of Education and Culture monopoly over revisionist school textbooks and curricula. The account which follows presents an alternative to the official historical record.

The history of women in Indonesia and women's contributions to Indonesian development, and the creation of historical knowledge in Indonesia are issues of considerable debate for Indonesian feminists. In 1993, at the Fourth Women in Asia Conference at the University of Melbourne, Indonesian women who had attended were outraged to find that scholars from Europe and Australia had more access to information concerning the political participation of Indonesian women in the 1950's and 1960's than they did from within their own country.¹ Indonesian women who have attempted to apprehend women's history directly from original documents or archival material have great difficulty. Within Indonesia many literature collections and libraries are inadequately stocked or materials are in disarray. The best collections are in the Netherlands which few Indonesian scholars have the resources to access. Most academics from abroad who do research in Indonesia do not work in collaboration with Indonesian scholars. As colonizers of the information age, they descend from their aircraft,

¹. Meeting notes, Ministry of State for the Role of Women, November 1993.
gather information and return to Europe, Australia or North America to publish their results and make conference presentations in European languages, distributing their materials anywhere but Indonesia.

One of the debates in contemporary Indonesian feminist circles is the construction of women leaders of the independence movement as *Pahlawan Nasional* (National Heros) by the Indonesian state. Although school children are required to learn the names of each of the nine women *Pahlawan*, and the regions of Indonesia from which they came, their specific contributions to national development and the independence struggle are not taught nor widely known. Since the time of Sukarno, leaders of women's organizations, particularly those concerned with feminist issues, have been dismissed, discounted and criticized for the import of what Sukarno and others have called "Western" ideas about women. Any claim by women for improved conditions (social, political, cultural or economic) continue to be dismissed as "Western" even today.

In 1994, in a workshop sponsored by the State Ministry for the Role of Women concerning the analysis of the differential impact of development on women and men in Indonesia, this issue was again raised. One of the male participants from a government department queried why this analysis was necessary, as Indonesian women were already respected. Any analytical tools that examined gender relations and development were imported


"Western" ideas that had no place in Indonesia, in his view. One of the Assistant Ministers who was moderating the session, asked a prominent academic, involved in Women's Studies in Indonesia to respond to this concern.

She was selected to respond to this question, because of her affiliation through marriage to a prominent and trusted associate of the President. Her husband is a former Minister of Finance, among other portfolios. Her response, paraphrased was this:

"Why is it that when my husband is asked by economists and/or journalists about whether or not Indonesia has or will achieve economic "take off" the topic is not dismissed as irrelevant and "Western?" After all, is not Rostow's theory of the stages of economic development "Western?" As Indonesian women, our concerns are worthy of equal consideration."\(^4\)

Contrary to the opinion of the person who posed the question, Indonesian women have long fought for emancipation. Some have worked in solidarity with women in other countries of Asia and Europe. Others have taken up the struggle in their own communities, or organized on a national level.

Women in The Netherlands East Indies

Women of the Indonesian islands have contributed significantly to the development of the nation. Even pre-colonial historical accounts note the leadership of some women of the elite ruling families. These women usually were connected to traditional male rulers through kinship or marriage, particularly those in the regions of Sumatra, Sulawesi, Java, Kalimantan and Bali

\(^4\). From meeting notes with Syamsiah Achmad, formerly Assistant Minister of State for the Role of Women, Responsible for Education and Training July, 20, 1994.
"Women of the ruling classes enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and power. Just as in many other countries, women came to the throne when it was a question of preserving power within a dynastic group."

Trading relations between Europeans and the people of the Indonesian archipelago began in the late 1500's with the Portuguese. Dutch colonial occupation lasted for three hundred years, with the exception of a brief period when the British became the dominant trading partner. Historical accounts of the colonial period identify Indonesian women as concubines, domestic workers, peasant farm labourers and manufacturers of hand crafts. However, most historical literature presents the Dutch colonial administration and their domination of trade in collusion with indigenous male ruling elites. Accounts also tell of the conflicts among Dutch administrators, other European traders, Chinese local traders and the subordinate local peasant population. The indigenous people of the Indonesian island provided the labour for the production of spices, sugar, rice, rubber and other agricultural exports. Unlike some other European colonizers, the Dutch provided very little education to the local population. Only the children of the local elites that worked in the Dutch colonial administration were offered education, and most frequently only the male children. As one Indonesian elderly woman explained the situation:

"At the time of Japanese occupation, and then independence even the street car conductors in Surabaya were Dutch. They were responsible for collecting fares, and had to be trusted with money, so they had to be Dutch. Local Javanese were not to be trusted."


Some writers of colonial history from outside Indonesia claim that Indonesian women enjoyed greater status than other women in Asia (Guinness, Vreede-de Steurs). The active participation of women in the traditional rural productive economy, particularly rice growing, petty trading and management of household finances were sighted as indications of women’s access to and control over resources. As Vreede-de Steurs concludes from her review of Dutch colonial records, in 1960:

"In a country where the principal sources of revenue are the products of manual agriculture in which more than 80 percent of the population is occupied, the peasant woman plays an active role in the economic organization. Despite the fact that the agricultural systems are varied in type owing to the geophysical differences of the various islands, Indonesia shows a unity of social structure that is due not solely to the existence of one and the same colonial administration or to that of one predominant religion. The position of the woman in the whole social life was regulated by tradition; her duties and her rights were in no way inferior to those of man. This immemorial custom, which is still in force, has been attested to by many observers. 'It is the wife who has to take care of the paddy which she has planted, harvested, dried, and will husk. It is she who prepares the rice and the spices... buys the household utensils... sells the products of her fields... dyes the clothes which she sells'".7

This account from her book, entitled "The Indonesian Woman", obliterates the differences between regional and ethnic identities, and claims consistent social equality for men and women throughout the archipelago, based on evidence of women’s work in rice production. But the sole example of a woman (termed "the wife") working in rice production does not allow for variations in systems of agricultural production (particularly plantations, dry land agriculture or tree crops) throughout the islands nor the differences in the gender division of labour in these

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rural economies. This analysis is based on the rather simplistic assumption that if women are visible in the public economic sphere, they somehow have achieved a level of equality with men. There also is a cultural bias in perception at work in this view. Over the past century, the image of women working in a rice field has been portrayed as picturesque, and is never defined as back-breaking physical labour in the hot sun and the mud. These women were providers of hard physical labour, and had very low life expectancy.

Vreede-de Steurs in fact glorifies the role of Indonesian women as wives and mothers in their communities, without seeing the family or the community as a site of contest or conflict for women and men. She states further:

"It is the wife’s importance as an active element in rural economy that has determined her importance as a member of the community, where every action is guided by tradition and where everyone fulfils a function fixed with regard to the economy of the group. Her other function, wife and mother, essential to the survival of the group and correlative to the first, determines her position in public and private affairs. ... All evidence supports the conclusion that the woman’s positions in traditional Indonesian communities has always been very elevated."  

One of my colleagues at the State Ministry for the Role of Women in Indonesia objected to this deterministic categorization of working Indonesian women as "elevated." As Mr. Supardan stated,

"You can increase women’s role in all kinds of work: at home, at the school, in the factory, in the office, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that you are going to increase women’s status."  

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10. From meeting notes with Mr. Supardan, Assistant Minister Responsible for Women in Social Welfare, Ministry of State for the Role of Women, October 8, 1992.
Other analysts argue that despite the participation of women in the traditional rural economy and small scale trade, women of the islands of Indonesia did not enjoy equality with men in "traditional" societies of the archipelago, nor during Dutch colonial administration (Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, Doran, Geertz, Jayawardena, Pluvier). Pluvier claims that from the time the Dutch colonial administration introduced a capitalist economy in 1870, there was tremendous conflict and social upheaval in the Netherlands East Indies. He explains:

"Since people were no longer exclusively depending on the village for their means of subsistence, a change in outlook occurred, first of course among those who chose to leave, but also among those who stayed behind. Thus the village lost its protective social function partly as a result of such new attitudes, partly because feelings of togetherness and solidarity proved insufficiently strong to defend both the community and the individual against the consequences of a monetary economy. The decay of the village community, primarily due to economic factors, was in many cases accompanied by the weakening of the political role of the village as well as of the larger units which constituted the framework of indigenous society."\(^{11}\)

These conditions led to the rise of the anti-colonial movement in the Netherlands East Indies. A composite culture of the Dutch bourgeois colonial administrators and the dominant Javanese majority was constructed and imposed throughout the archipelago.\(^{12}\) In many cases, the Dutch appointed a local "traditional" ruler, providing administrative, financial and even military support to their chosen allies. The local systems of economic, social and political relations which were usually feudal and patrimonial, were disrupted and reconstructed by these colonial impositions. Village communities were fractured through forced alliances with the Dutch appointed rulers.

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\(^{11}\) J.M. Pluvier, "Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies," in Indonesian Politics: A Reader, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, James Cook University of Northern Queensland, Townsville, 1987, page 42.

Although Pluvier does not address the gender dimensions of these changing economic and social conditions, there can be little doubt that gender relations were contested and reconfigured throughout the colonial occupation. Village social life was disrupted by the imposed capitalist colonial economy including a shift from subsistence agriculture to the imposition of plantations of cash crops for export and subsequent forced labour migration to other regions of the archipelago and urban processing and shipping areas. The gender division of labour changed in the rural village economy as women's productive and trading activities were absorbed into a capitalist monetary economy. The circulation of resources and wealth within the household economy changed as rural women lost their autonomy over the management of rice production and product distribution.

In the late 19th Century, demands in the Netherlands for the rights of citizens, workers, and women arose, and, consequently, the policies of the government in the Netherlands East Indies were challenged by citizens in the Netherlands, colonial administrators, and the indigenous people of the colony. Recorded struggles for the emancipation of women in Indonesia began in response to the imposition of capitalism in the archipelago. As plantations were imposed on land in rural areas, and manufacturing set up in towns and cities, displaced peasant farmers were drawn into waged labour. Education was set up for the sons and daughters of Dutch colonial officers and the sons of Indonesian regents in order to train an administrative work force, although there was no broad based public education.

Accounts of the history of the struggles for emancipation of women in Indonesia begin at the end of the 19th Century, and the rise of anti-colonial actions, with Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879-1904) (H.Geertz, Doran, Vreede-de Stuers, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia). The daughter of a Dutch appointed Javanese regent, she was befriended by Dutch colonial administrators and their wives. Her letters to her friends and supporters in the
Netherlands are one of the main sources of information about the conditions for women in colonial Netherlands East Indies written by a Javanese woman.

Since her death shortly after childbirth in 1904, Kartini has been constructed as an Indonesian "national" hero by the government of Indonesia through state publications and her declaration as one of nine women "Pahlawan Nasional" (National Heros). She is the most well known of these women, as her image is printed on one of the notes of Indonesian currency, and a national holiday is celebrated on her birthday, April 21. Jean Stewart Taylor observes that through the publication of various editions of her letters by Indonesians and Europeans, Kartini has been portrayed by scholars and Europeans as a princess, a "modern" girl, and the "eternal feminine", and within Indonesia she is ubiquitously known as Ibu (mother) Kartini. Taylor and Cote’s more recent translations of Kartini’s original letters reveal the inaccuracy of any one of these identities.

Kartini and her two sisters were raised as most other female children in traditional Javanese regents’ families. They were educated at primary school, along side the Dutch daughters of colonial administrators. At the age of 12, Kartini returned to the cloistered environment of the kabupaten (the regent’s domestic home and land) to await the arrangement of her marriage. She was the daughter of her father’s second wife, but always referred to his first wife as her mother in her letters. She was frustrated and unhappy with her seclusion, and longed to be educated, to become a doctor, a midwife or a teacher. She found the accepted

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13. In Indonesian language women are addressed by the title Ibu as in English a woman would be addressed as Ms. Ibu literally translated means mother, more particularly married mother. This term indicates respect for older women, or women of higher social status, even though they may not be married or mothers. As Taylor points out, applying this title to Kartini, contradicts the opinion expressed in her letters that a woman should have the right to choose to be married or not.
Javanese custom of polygyny abhorrent, and expressed envy of her Dutch sisters who were educated, could travel, and have choice over whether to marry, and who they would marry. She refused to accept gestures or displays of subservience from her younger siblings and other members of her household, as she found this behaviour demeaning.

A Dutch colonial official J. H. Abendanon, Director of Education, Religion and Industry, published a number of her letters in 1911, several years after her death. Appended to the letters, was a copy of a report she sent to the government of the Netherlands in 1903 on colonial reform entitled "Educate the Javanese." She called for education of indigenous Javanese people, particularly women, advocating the moral obligation to equip women to contribute to solving social and economic problems in Java. As she stated:

"Can anyone deny that the woman has a great role to play in shaping society morally? ... She is precisely the person for it ... Never will the uplifting and development of the Javanese people proceed vigorously so long as the woman is left behind with no role to play." 15

Although living in confinement, Kartini had an active role in trading and the household economy. Through her abilities with Dutch language, and her acquaintance with her father's Dutch colonial officer colleagues, she set up her own trade in the export of Javanese wood carvings. She and her sisters were skilled at the Javanese craft of batik, and made their own clothing. Her letters indicate not only her involvement in the household economy, but concern about poverty among peasant farmers in Java, and the expansion of Dutch taxation through the monetary economy.

"Why is it that the Javanese are poor, they ask? And at the same time, they are thinking


how they will be able to get more money out of him. Who will that money come from? Naturally from the little man for whose woe and weal we express such extreme concern that a whole commission is named to inquire into the cause of his retrogression; "What makes the Javanese so poor?": when grass cutters who earn 10 or 12 cents a day are made to pay a trade tax. Every time a goat or a sheep is butchered a tax of twenty cents is paid. A sate merchant who butchers two every day must pay this tax, which amounts to one hundred and forty florins in the course of a year. What is left for his profit? Barely enough to live on."16

Not only was Kartini aware of the economic constraints faced by Javanese peasants, she advocated economic independence for women. She realized that economic dependence on men, was a key factor in women having to endure intolerable conditions as second or third wives. She wrote:

"The only road open to the Javanese girl, especially the high-born girl is marriage... Raise the Javanese women. Teach them a trade so they be no longer defenceless prey."17

Kartini was critical of the Dutch colonial administration in Java. Her notoriety through the publication and distributions of her correspondence with people in the Netherlands, did make her a leadership figure in the anti-colonial struggle after her death. However, the notion of the unity of the archipelago of the Netherlands East Indies into one national structure called Indonesia did not occur until 1918, when the Pemuda Indonesia Youth of Indonesia Association was formed. The growing anti-colonial movement was still focused at more local levels, particularly strong in Central Java, Sumatra, Ambon, and Sulawesi until the 1920's when


Indonesian national organizations were federated from the regional groups.\textsuperscript{18}

The construction of Kartini's identity as a "national" anti-colonial heroic figure is erroneous in two ways. First, her letters calling for the education of girls and women, were addressed to the Dutch colonial administration. The strategy behind the moral position from which she argued the issue, was targeted to the government of the Netherlands, and Dutch allies sympathetic to her cause. She sought reforms to colonial administrative practices through her friends in the Netherlands, and advocated Javanese autonomy. Her strategy was anti-colonial, but did not call for a federated Indonesian nationalist movement. Her understanding of the colonial administration and political forces for more liberal colonial policies in the Netherlands, informed her strategy of advocating for change in the Netherlands, rather than with the local leaders such as her father, to whom she would have had greater access.

Secondly, she was firmly committed to her Javanese culture and identity. Kartini gave up a scholarship and the opportunity to go and study in the Netherlands to stay in Java, partly because of her affinity for Javanese mysticism, and partly to behave in accordance with her father's wishes. She did not call for education or changes to polygyny from an "Indonesian" nationalist identity. She was an early feminist among the women of the archipelago.

Kartini was harshly critical of the Javanese custom of men taking more than one wife, and the acceptability of this practice through Islamic law. Her letters reveal her to be opposed to Dutch colonial administration and, in solidarity with her Dutch allies, strongly in favour of the rights and emancipation of women. Yet, Kartini is not portrayed in Indonesia today as a feminist, or a champion of women's rights, or a Javanese nationalist.

The New Order regime presents \textit{Ibu Kartini} as an ardent Indonesian nationalist who was

\textsuperscript{18} Cora Vreede-de Stuers, \textit{The Indonesian Woman}, Mouton and Co. Gravenhage, 1960, p.66
concerned about women’s access to education. Most accounts of her contribution to Indonesia claim that her concerns have been addressed in the independent Republic of Indonesia. By the constitution of the Republic of 1945, women’s equality is guaranteed.

The term "Indonesia" was coined by the federation of youth and student movements for independence from the Dutch in the 1920's. Kartini and other women who were part of the pre-independence ruling elite were in fact national heroes of their own smaller sultanates or kingdoms. Tjut Nja Dien, who led men into battle, is still today frequently heralded as a symbol of Indonesian women’s achievements in social status, bravery and valiant nationalism, although in reality she fought for the independence of Aceh, a nation of a particular ethnic group, and their territory, with their own language, culture, history and aspirations. Military actions continue today in Aceh against the Indonesian army for national independence. Dewi Sartika (1884-1847) is known as a pioneer of the women’s movement as she established the first school for girls in West Java, as is Maria Walanda Maramis (1827-1924) of North Sulawesi, and Sadah Alim from West Sumatra.

The conflation of Kartini’s self-proclaimed ethnic or "national" identity as Javanese, and her subsequent portrayal as a leader in the Indonesian nationalist movement, is indicative of the construction of the "Indonesian" national identity by the state, particularly under the administration of the New Order regime. Kartini is certainly the best known and celebrated of the early feminists of the archipelago. In recent years, feminist journalists have written articles around the time of her birthday, a national holiday, originally established to honour the struggle

19. Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, The Women of Indonesia, 1985, p.18

for women's emancipation and call for a return to the quest for educational and economic equality. In contrast, the state-sponsored official ceremonies on Kartini Day which are broadcast on live television feature profiles of educated urban elite women or women in the military, and a national contest seeking the young woman who bears the most physical resemblance to *Ibu* Kartini.21

Contemporary feminist scholars debate why she is the best known and celebrated of the nine *Pahlawan Nasional*. Julia Suryakusuma argues that Kartini's selection by the New Order regime is because of her Javanese "princess" identity. Her portrayal as a dutiful daughter, mother and wife who gave up her opportunities to become an educated emancipated woman in order to be a loyal wife and mother fit the ideal notion of the Indonesian woman, which the New Order regime wants to perpetuate. She suggests that the celebration of Kartini Day, as it is now structured and scripted, should be abolished.22

The Indonesian Women's Movement During the Independence Struggle (1912-1945)

Along with the establishment of Indonesian nationalist organizations and nationalist political parties (*Sarekat Islam (SI)*, the *Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)*, and the *Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)*), in the 1920s, women formed organizations to address their national and


political concerns. Most of the leadership of these women’s organizations came from skilled educated urban women, who formed affiliations as students or through ethnic or religious alliances (Pikat, Aisyah), professional status (Pekerja Perempuan Indonesia) or in connection with nationalist or political parties (Istri Sedar, Mardi Wanita). Issues of the day were the anti-colonial struggles against the Dutch, establishing schools and access to higher education for girls and the abolition of polygynous marriage.

The first national congresses of the PNI and the PKI addressed women’s issues. However, the PNI did not take into account the range of feminist political issues that the PKI discussed. As Colin Brown outlines:

“At that [PNI] congress, party members adopted a platform which called, [sic] amongst other things, for improvements to be made in the status of women through the elimination of polygamy, forced marriage and child marriage. However, there does not seem to have been any consideration given to the role women might play in areas other than those which had traditionally been regarded as the female preserve: marriage and the family. Certainly, the party was not as advanced in its thinking as the PKI had been when it had devoted one full day’s debate at its 1924 conference to consideration of the importance of involving women in the work of the communist movement.”

In the 1920s, Sukarno was already a rising leader of the nationalist movement. He identified two types of women’s organizations emerging, those concerned with social welfare (pregnancy, child birth, cooking, etc.) and those concerned with the emancipation of women - feminist politics.


"He emphasized that in demanding equality with men, feminists had neglected the fact that Indonesian men themselves were enslaved under colonial rule. Only in an independent Indonesia would women find true freedom. The nationalist struggle he likened to a bird, with males and females as its two wings; it was therefore essential that women take their part in the nationalist movement."  

Women’s organizations faced issues of diversity and a lack of unity among women of the archipelago, at the first Indonesian Women’s Congress, convened in Yogyakarta in 1928. Despite his leadership and his urging, Sukarno’s view that feminist goals should be subsumed under the nationalist banner was not adopted. Many conflicts erupted, particularly between representatives of Moslem women’s groups and secular and Christian groups. Moslem women’s organizations were not in favour of reforming marriage laws or coeducation. According to Brown:

"In a bid to prevent these issues from splitting the congress apart, its leaders steered debate around them. As a result it failed to face squarely any of the larger political problems to which Sukarno had drawn attention."

As the nationalist movement gained strength and momentum, many women’s organizations did join in the struggle against the Dutch colonial forces.

"By the time it held its second congress in 1932, it had adopted a much more radical political stance, and was openly and freely attacking the colonial government policies. It now took as its goal the achievement of equality of status and respect between men and women in order to hasten the arrival of Indonesian independence."


Women continued to work for changes to marriage law, improved working conditions for women workers, and for women’s right to vote, which brought women’s organizations into direct conflict with the Dutch administration. In 1941, women finally won the right to vote.

This accomplishment was short lived. With the Japanese occupation of 1942, all organizations were disbanded. The Japanese permitted only one women’s organization, the *Fujinkai*, with membership composed of the wives of Indonesian administrators. The leadership was dominated by the Japanese, and was given the mandate of providing voluntary labour in support of their occupation. The main work of the *Fujinkai* women was to provide literacy training, public kitchens, Red Cross first aid, and manage land cultivation for military use. The membership within the organization was compulsory, and individuals took their position or rank from their husband’s position within the administration. This structure for mobilizing voluntary women’s labour through the wives of civil servants for social welfare purposes foreshadowed what was later adopted by the Republic of Indonesia.

Women in Indonesia Since Independence 1945 to the 1990s

Women’s contribution to the nationalist struggle, officially and underground as freedom fighters, and through support to the troops during the war for independence from the Dutch was rewarded. Women were granted equality before the law and the same political rights as men under the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945. Women’s organizations were quickly re-established during the armed independence struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949, to again take up many of the same issues. Education, workers rights, and marriage reforms became their immediate demands within the new independent state. In 1945, a women’s

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congress was held in Klaten, Central Java, and a federation of all women's organizations in support of the liberation of Indonesia was revived, KOWANI (Kongres Wanita Indonesia, the Indonesian Women's Congress).

Following the Japanese occupation in 1945, an armed struggle for the liberation of the archipelago ensued. Some women are known to have participated in the armed conflict. Other women provided food and shelter while coping with violence and being forced to flee to safety. The survival of the population, including the occupying soldiers, rested with women who remained in the villages producing food. With the occupation of some regions forcing people to migrate, agricultural production was reduced mostly to subsistence and petty trading. Some women still walked kilometres to markets with their goods. Occupying soldiers from both sides would often appropriate any food products such as eggs, rice or vegetables from women in villages. For those involved in petty trading, selling their fruit, vegetables and cooked food was a gamble, as the Japanese currency had been burned and made worthless in 1945 and the value of Dutch and Republic of Indonesia currency fluctuated daily with the changes in boundaries of the occupying forces.\(^{30}\)

After liberation in the 1950s women's organizations again rose up. Some established links with the various political parties. Wives of civil servants and the military who had been part of Fujinkai formed organizations to continue the social welfare activities they had conducted during the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence.

There are different views among Indonesian women scholars and activists as to how organizations of wives became so prevalent in the Republic of Indonesia. According to one women's studies scholar:

\(^{30}\) Notes from a conversation in Yogyakarta, 1987.
"It was during this time [the 1950’s] that women’s organizations and wives’ associations began to be harnessed to government activities. Various government policies including those on foreign affairs were supported by the women’s movement and a female volunteer force for the front [of the disputed territorial frontier with Malaysia] was set up. Eventually, the national development drive became one of the main programmes of women’s organizations. The focus was also on new women’s organizations which were created in government departments and the Armed Forces. Their membership consisted of official’s wives and female employees. It became evident at this time that the status of the organizations was changing and becoming semi-official. Whereas in the past membership had been voluntary, it was now automatic and membership subscriptions were introduced."\(^{31}\)

Throughout the 1950’s political and economic tensions between the army, Moslem groups and the communist party (PKI) came to the fore. A leftist women’s organization GERWANI (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia) the Indonesian Women’s Movement became the largest and most influential women’s organization in the country. Membership grew from 500 in 1950, to 700,000 in 1960, to 1,750,000 in December 1963 (Harian Rakyat, as cited in Fallick 1983:5-7). They were affiliated with the PKI, and allied with the party alongside President Sukarno.

Although initially founded by well-educated and urban women, the movement quickly expanded to include peasant farm women, plantation workers, and women working in factories. As economic pressures forced consumer prices to rise, GERWANI organized housewives to demonstrate against price fixing and increases. Members of GERWANI launched a literacy campaign in 1955, and many dedicated teachers went to rural villages to educate peasant women. They made "efforts to procure changes to marriage law, demanded heavy penalties in cases of rape or abduction, began kindergartens to free women to work in productive remunerated labour, fought prostitution, child marriage, and traffic in women (Wieringa 1988:79). Members supported trade unionists in the fight for the rights of women workers including equal wages, the push for effective labour law, and protection from sexual harassment. GERWANI had

\(^{31}\) Noerhadi, 1989, page 183.
voluntary membership, and was financed largely through members paying dues. They produced periodicals for women, one called *Api Kartini*, the fire of Kartini, and fought the expansion of American cultural imperialism, particularly imported movies (Fallick 1983, Wieringa 1988).

As a result of *GERWANI* militant action on land reforms for peasant farmers, and opposition to the labour and land policies of Moslem and military plantation owners, members came into direct conflict with the land-owning elite. Through their efforts to improve the working conditions of women working in factories, they confronted the managers and owners of factories, who were increasingly members of the Indonesian military. Their campaigns against polygyny and Islamic marriage law, brought them into conflict with *Alsyia*, one of the established Moslem women’s organizations, although eventually they became less strident on this issue in support of President Sukarno, who at the time had five wives.

The economic hardship of the early 1960s took a large toll on Indonesian women and men, who were not part of the wealthy elite. Indonesia’s alliance with China, and the fear of communist expansion in Vietnam, along with the period of Confrontation with Malaysia, left Indonesia increasingly isolated internationally. Political tensions between President Sukarno, various factions in the Army, the large Moslem population and the President’s allies in the *PKI* continued to rise.

In the early hours of October 1, 1965, six generals of the Indonesian army were forcibly removed from their homes, and subsequently murdered. Their bodies were deposited in a disused well at Lubang Buaya at Halim Air Force Base in Jakarta. On the base at that time, young members of *GERWANI* and *Pemuda Rakyat* (the People’s Youth) were in training to participate in the nationalist confrontation with Malaysia over disputed territories on the island of Borneo.
In the days following the murders of the generals, a faction of the armed forces seized control of radio, and newspapers. They controlled the information circulated about the incidents in Jakarta, throughout the islands of Indonesia. As part of the military propaganda campaign against the PKI, following the incident, GERWANI members were accused of committing violent acts of butchery and sexual perversion which contributed to the murders of the generals.

"The presence at Lubang Buaya of GERWANI and Pemuda Rakyat members was one of a number of pieces of evidence put forward to implicate the PKI. Over the ensuing days gruesome allegations appeared in the Army-controlled press, including assertions that the Lubang Buaya victims had been tortured and mutilated, specifically that their eyes had been gouged out and their genitals severed. It seems however that these horrible details were not enough grist for the propaganda mill. Further purported details of the General's deaths began to appear usually first in the Army's Angkatan Bersendjata. In a new twist to the propaganda theme it was alleged that the atrocities had actually been carried out by GERWANI members.

Thus on 9 October it was reported that the GERWANI women had mocked the Generals before they killed them by "playing with and fondling the genitals of the victims while at the same time displaying their own."32

"A few days later it was reported that Lt. Tandean (the kidnapped aide) was made into an "obscene plaything by the GERWANI mothers of evil" before they used him for target practice."33

"Antara, another military new publication reported on December 13 an account of a confession by one member of GERWANI, which claimed that for six and a half months members had "indulged in delirious sexual orgies which ancient Romans under Nero would have been jealous of."34 Twice a day she and the other 200 (increased from earlier accounts of 100) GERWANI women performed the Tarian Bunga Harum (Dance of the Fragrant Flowers) described by the government news agency ANTARA as "a shockingly obscene show"... "performed by totally unclad females with a view to

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tempting the approximately 400 male GESTAPU members into various obscenities. "After each twice-daily show a mass sex orgy was supposed to have ensued, in which every woman had to serve three to four men, and frequently injected with drugs to sustain their libidos they became overcome with an irresistible desire to indulge in all kinds of immoral acts." 35

"Documents alleged to have been captured from the underground PKI were used to support the claim that the PKI planned to utilize "beautiful women to destroy opposing parties on the premise that these PKI women would weaken the spirit of the nationalist and Moslem youth that they seduced." 36

The incidents which are alleged to have taken place at Lubang Buaya, and their subsequent re-creation in the press, are significant to the construction of gender relations by the New Order regime. The specific elements of the actions taken by the military following the murder of the generals, are still the mode of operation by the state against citizens groups and the women's movement today. The first was the apprehension of several women from the GERWANI contingent that were at the base. They were tortured into making confessions, which were subsequently published and broadcast by the military controlled and operated press throughout the country. As there were/are no other sources of information about these incidents, they become the historical record. These women were never brought to trial for their alleged crimes, nor were the confessions proven true by the autopsy reports which were later published in the United States in the 1970s.

The accounts of the incidents released in the press construct a particular set of gender relations among the PKI and GERWANI members. These ideological constructions are resilient features of the state apparatus of the New Order regime. The accounts above illustrate the portrayal of communist women as single, childless, sexually promiscuous, drug induced violent

murderers with no respect for men or the military. The communist men inject women with drugs, and give orders which the drugged and sexualized monster women carry out, without remorse. They demonstrate no respect for Islam or any kind of religious morality. Quotations from the confessions of two of the accused deliberately associate these violent butcherous acts with the notion of equality between women and men actually being a principle of making women become the same as men.

"When Saina was asked how she could have had the heart to carry out murders she explained that she had been indoctrinated by Aidit (the leader of the PKI) to believe that 'women should be as brave as men.' Similarly Sujati explained that she was indoctrinated to believe 'that in the communist world there is no difference between men and women.'

In the subsequent confusion after the murder of the generals, a faction of the military seized power, and General Suharto assumed leadership. A massacre ensued throughout Indonesia, where many civilians and the military fought, apprehended and killed members and alleged supporters of the PKI. Estimates are that between 250,000 and one million people died in the subsequent killing, which continued for months afterward.

Saskia Wieringa claims that most Western academic historians have perpetuated the myth that GERWANI women were involved in the murders of the generals. In her account she states:

"Up until the present day, the stories of the atrocities said to have been committed by the communist women at Lubang Buaya are still widely believed in Indonesia. Even such renowned scholars as Anderson and McVey mirror the army view when they write: 'He (General Tandean) was first badly beaten up and then as he lay on the ground (possibly already dead) GERWANI girls lined up, and were each told to take their turn at have a slash'. Although they suggest that this whole scenario was designed as a 'blooding of the ignorant wretches' and that the motive for drawing in the GERWANI was to incriminate and compromise the PKI, they do not question the truth of the confession of these girls who were arrested and badly tortured. None of the women, was ever brought before a

37. Kompas 8/12/65 and 30/11/65 as cited by Drakeley pages 9 and 10.
Again, in the account of the Western scholars, the same idea of the structure of gender relations among GERWANI "girls" and by inference the PKI male leaders is presented. The men are commanding, and the women "take turns" in an orderly fashion following orders from men to carry out brutal acts of violence.

The murder of the generals, and the propaganda campaign which informed the citizens of Indonesia about these incidents were the beginning of the total discrediting of GERWANI as an organization, and the crushing of the PKI. Estimates are that during the months following the coup, 750,000 people were arrested. This series of events is kept vividly alive in contemporary Indonesia, where in 1986, nine people accused of PKI involvement in 1966 were publicly executed. Almost thirty years later, a bold headline on the national news page of the January 12, 1995 edition of the English language newspaper The Jakarta Post quotes Suhardiman, a retired Army office, and the Vice Chairman of the President's Supreme Advisory Council as warning "Watch out for the emergence of new communism."

Just as Kartini is now portrayed as a "nationalist" by New Order revisionist historians, the history of GERWANI and the events of September 30 - October 1, 1965 have also been rewritten. The gender dimensions of these revisionist accounts are of particular significance, especially for the contemporary Indonesian women's movement, as will be illustrated in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 3  JAVANESE CULTURE AND THE NEW ORDER REGIME

Since the time of independence, the Indonesian state has been dominated by leaders from Java; both presidents, most of the military generals, and key figures in the bureaucracy are of Javanese descent. In order to account for the construction of gender relations under the New Order regime, it therefore is necessary to examine the Javanese definition of power relations, and how they have been deployed in contemporary Indonesian society. The Indonesian national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is translated as Unity in Diversity in English, has been used to homogenize ethnic, regional and religious difference by the state, and to support a preoccupation with stability. After seizing power in 1966, after so much turmoil in late-1965, the New Order government has prized social stability as the prerequisite for nation building, modernization and development. The state has defined the Indonesian national identity, often disguising the predominance of the Javanese people, customs and notions of power which operate among the elite leadership of the New Order in Indonesia.

In a discussion of Independence Day addresses of the President, Virginia Matheson Hooker identifies the terminology of the "Field of Discourse" of the New Order regime.

"By 1980, the New Order was able to list its achievement and consolidate its vocabulary - which continued to be used throughout the 1980s. Indonesia's welfare, the speeches argue, depends on continuing loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; development, 'pembangunan' is the only way "to bring about progress and welfare." In order to implement development, dynamic national stability (stabilitas nasional yang dinamis) must be fostered by everyone. The words 'tertib' (orderly) and 'kukuh' (strong) are regularly used to indicate the type of life being aimed for."¹

In order to appreciate the political context in contemporary Indonesia, it is useful to identify some of the features of Indonesian language. *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian language) was constructed over the course of the 20th Century, first by the nationalist anti-colonial movement, and then by the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Most Indonesians learn this language in school, and it is spoken and written as a second language. The language was compiled with a combination of Malay trading language, which included some Portuguese and Dutch terms, and adaptations of terms from Arabic, English, Javanese and other regional languages of the archipelago. These conditions make the study of this language a challenge, as there are many debates among Indonesians as to correct terminology, pronunciation, etymology and meaning of words and concepts in Indonesian language. Many colloquial and/or slang expressions, have slight regional variations in meaning. Language, meaning and communications in Indonesia are contested, and inherently political.

Javanese domination of the military, the bureaucracy and the state has made Javanese language, values, beliefs, culture and behaviour the acceptable norms in the government offices, and institutions of the New Order government. When I first made the transition from working with non-governmental organizations in regions outside of Java, to working in Java, there were many new terms in *Bahasa Indonesia* which I had to learn. When I went to my *Kamus Lengkap Indonesia - Inggeris* (Complete Indonesian - English Dictionary) many of these terms were not included. They were in fact Javanese terms, which were part of colloquial "Indonesian" language. When I then made the transition to working in a central government office, and dealing on a regular basis with a cabinet minister, I had to learn new language, customs and rules of comportment which were in fact from Javanese *priyayi* (ruling or elite class) culture, rather than a ubiquitous Indonesian set of behaviours. In fact, I had first learned the term
*priyayi* as *priayi* when I lived in Sumatra, as meaning snobby or spoiled, and had not understood the term's connection to Javanese royalty. Along with the imposition of Javanese *priyayi* culture came a tradition of gender relations in which women were cloistered, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of Kartini. Women were subordinate to the men in Javanese royalty. According to an Indonesian anthropologist, Kartini Sjahrir in a review of anthropological literature on women in Indonesia:

"[The] women from *priyayi* circles were portrayed as subordinate to their husbands, occupying a secondary position, while rural women (without discussing the problem of class stratification more directly) were depicted as dominant in family matters related to the kitchen, the harvest, and the sale of the harvest produce. The domination of women in household affairs, ceremonies, economic activities, despite a patriarchal like of kinship is also found in Balinese society."

The vocabularies of Javanese, Indonesian and English languages signal significant differences in Western and Javanese thought. Two heavily weighted terms in English language and important concepts in Eurocentric politics "privacy" and "power" have no equivalent terms in Javanese. As an "outsider," and a native English speaker trying to analyze gender relations in Indonesia, understanding the limitation of language is a challenge which illustrates the differences in our values, and our views of the world. Concepts such as "gender," "equality" or "private," have no precise equivalent word or term when translated into Javanese or Indonesian languages.

Although the Javanese were the largest ethnic group by population during the anti-

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3. Kartini discussed the limitations of Dutch language in translating Javanese poetry, stories and legends in a letter to her friend Stella Zeehadeelaar, August 15, 1902, as cited in Geertz, 1964 pages 178-179.
colonial struggle, to promote unity among disparate ethnic groups throughout the archipelago and prevent Javanese domination of the national language, terms were borrowed from other languages with minor changes in spelling or pronunciation. This practice continues today, with terms like komputer for computer, and memodernasasi for modernize. Many of the terms that have been chosen or created for use are slight variations of English terms. The term for "privacy" in Indonesian language pribadi, has been created from the English word with minor changes to the consonants as has nasional from national.

As Benedict Anderson describes in his analysis of power in Javanese society:

"It is important to bring out from the start an inherent linguistic and conceptual problem in the analysis that I am about to develop. Because this essay is written in English by a native English speaker, primarily for native English speakers, and also because my own intellectual perspective is irremediably Western, I see no choice but to use words and concepts like power, which are drawn from a Western analytical framework, in dealing with the problem of contrasting that framework with the Javanese. There is clearly a fundamental bias in such a method of work. But without a superordinate language and conceptual framework in which to place both Western and Javanese terms and concepts, all that one can do is recognize and remain constantly aware of this bias. When I say that the Javanese have a radically different idea of power from that which obtains in the contemporary West, properly speaking, this statement is meaningless, since the Javanese have no equivalent word or concept." 4

In order to identify Javanese and western notions of power, and power relations, I refer to Javanese Power with a large case letter, to make a distinction in terms. Having lived daily with the ceremonies, spectacles and demonstrations of Power displayed by actors of state institutions in Indonesia, it is difficult to make an accurate interpretation of the distinction in the meanings of the terms power and Power when there is no common terminology. As I struggle with this exercise, I become more aware of how the control of the construction of Indonesian national language, and the assignment of meaning to new terminology borrowed from

other languages is a politically constraining form of intellectual censorship. In Catherine MacKinnon’s discussion concerning pornography, violence against women and the law, she describes the effects of the lack of terminology for these crimes in feminist politics.

"Putting to one side what [the] progression from life to law does to one’s sense of reality, personal security and place in the community, not to mention faith in the legal system, consider what it does to one’s relationship to expression: to language, speech, the world of thought and communication. You learn that language does not belong to you, that you cannot use it to say what you know, that knowledge is not what you learn from your life, that information is not made out of your experience. You learn that thinking about what happened to you is does not count as "thinking," but doing it apparently does. You learn that your reality subsists somewhere beneath the socially real—totally exposed but invisible, screaming yet inaudible, through about incessantly yet unthinkable, "expression" yet inexpressible, beyond words.\(^5\)

A second caveat in searching for sources of information on Javanese notions of power, is that there is very little analysis of the construction of gender in Javanese Power relations, or how the Javanese notion of the Power contributes to the status of women in Javanese society. This is in part due to the patriarchal bias in Indonesian documentation, which contains accounts of the great male leaders of Java and Indonesia, their wisdom and benevolence. It is also due to the masculinist Western view of power, which influences most analysts’ gaze on Indonesia. I would also argue that this view is informed by the experiences of foreign scholars and experts who interact with people in the highest echelons of society in Indonesia. Foreign men seek other male leaders in power. Through the highly centralized system of government under the New Order regime, they can quickly identify the very few actors with access to the inner circle near the President. Content with categorizing the political system in Indonesia as patrimonial, they often only seek access to the grand male patron and his entourage.

Nonetheless, as a foreign feminist seeking to understand how patriarchal power operates

in Indonesia, there is little analytical satisfaction analyzing the system of power relations as patrimonial. It does not explain why male Javanese leaders predominate in the New Order regime and the subtle ways in which all are required to exhibit Javanese behaviour when meeting with Indonesian government officers. An analysis of the patrimonial system of government does not explain why the New Order regime has developed such comprehensive Women in Development policies and programs, and their effect on the construction of gender relations in Indonesian society.

According to Benedict Anderson, there are sharp distinctions between Western and Javanese notions of power. In Java, Power is concrete and can be possessed by one over others. Power comes through aesthetic practices, such as; fasting, meditation, sexual abstinence, etc. and is exhibited by the ruler through wahyu (divine radiance). Power is associated with halus (refined, polite, cultured, pure) behaviour.

"The connection between halus-ness and Power is readily evident; Power is the essential link between natural man, and the halus satria (refined knight) of wayang (Javanese legend of shadow theatre performance) mythology and Javanese priyayi (upper class) etiquette. In the minds of traditional Javanese, being halus is in itself a sign of Power since halus-ness is achieved only by the concentration of energy." 6

Those who are halus, who have wahyu are distinguished from others in society who are described by the term pamrih, meaning seeking profit or reward. History is seen by the Javanese, as a series of cycles. Those with divine radiance possess Power, and can consolidate unity among those people who seek their own rewards until such time as the ruler’s radiance fades, and a new leader will emerge through aesthetic devotion, who will again consolidate and concentrate Power. Benedict Anderson explains:

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"The critical point is that the Javanese view of history was one of cosmological oscillation between periods of concentration of Power and periods of its diffusion. The historical necessity of diffusion is not less compelling than that of concentration, since Power is immensely hard to retain and has perpetually to be struggled for. The slightest slackness or lack of vigilance may begin the process of disintegration, which, once it sets in, is irreversible. (The loosening of cosmological tautness stems from *pamrih*, which essentially means the use of Power for personal indulgence, or the wasting of the concentrated Power on the satisfaction of personal passions.)"

In order to analyze Javanese Power relations then, one’s focus is on the ruler with divine radiance and his/her ability to consolidate and contain any forces that may arise to diffuse this concentration. A sign of the ruler’s *wahyu* is the ability to command loyalty from subordinates, in return offering protection and freedom from fear. The ruler must have the means of surveillance in order to be alert to threats to the dissolution of the consolidation of Power. Although Anderson applies the notions of these cycles of Power concentration and diffusion to the Sukarno leadership in Indonesia, they are also useful analytical tools in examining the New Order regime, since 1965.

Javanese Notions of Power and the New Order Regime

Since Suharto seized power in the 1960’s, and was elected President of Indonesia, he has successfully quashed criticism of or threats to his leadership. The student, labour and women’s movements, and even dissent through the formally recognized political parties, have been

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quelled. The state apparatus; the military, the media, and the judicial system have all been deployed against citizens. Elaborate displays of loyalty to the President are demonstrated through nationally-televised events and ceremonies.

The Javanese view of Power concentrated in the ruler who contains and diffuses dissent is operational in the policies and practice of the New Order government. Mackie and Maclntyre point out that despite substantial economic gains, increased education and urbanization, the influence of people's organizations and political parties have been significantly diminished since the New Order regime seized office. Those who advocate greater political participation by people's organizations, and those who are critical of the President and the few ministers and generals in his confidence, are severely restrained by the machinery of the state.

For example, in June 1994, three news publications had their licences revoked by the Ministry of Information, for publishing articles concerning a dispute over the purchase of former East German navy vessels between the Minister of Science and the Minister of Defense. This was the first occasion under the New Order where there was any report or discussion of a difference of opinion between cabinet ministers. The President himself claimed responsibility for the decision for the purchase, which has been widely reported in the media, and then the issue was not mentioned again. As one Indonesian advocate for citizens' organizations describes the situation, "for Indonesia, a large part of political culture is marked by the government's attempts to handle cultural politics."9

To ensure the appearance of the consolidation of the President's power over the heterogeneous Indonesian population, a unified diverse Indonesian culture and identity has been

crafted. Regional or nationalist aspirations have been put down by military force, as in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, and censored from media reports within Indonesia. The New Order state publications of the history of the rise of the nationalist movement and the anti-colonial struggle in Indonesia claim all leaders of regional and ethnic groups as Indonesian nationalists, even though many are known to have had strong ethnic identities and aspirations of greater autonomy from the Dutch for the people of their region. These ethnic and regional identities have been subsumed within the compulsory unity of diversity within the nation state of Indonesia. According to Anderson:

"The core of the traditional polity has always been the ruler, who personifies the unity of society. This unity is in itself a central symbol of Power, and it is this fact as much as the overt goals of statist ideologies that helps to account for the obsessive concern with oneness that suffuses the political thinking of many contemporary Javanese. ... The urge to oneness, so central to Javanese political attitudes, helps to explain the deep psychological power of the idea of nationalism in Java. Far more than a political credo, nationalism expresses a fundamental drive to solidarity and unity in the face of the disintegration of traditional society under colonial capitalism, and other powerful external forces, from the late nineteenth century on. Nationalism of this type is something far stronger than patriotism; it is an attempt to reconquer primordial oneness."\footnote{Anderson, 1990, pages 36-37.}

This "united" Indonesian national identity is challenged in contemporary Indonesia by the tensions between the ideological notions of peaceful, stable and harmonious Indonesian society, and the continued disruptions to social and economic life from the thrusts of a modern industrializing economy, globalization and development.

Consistent with Anderson's analysis of how Power operates in Javanese society, is the role of the President Suharto in ensuring his influence over foreign and domestic capital in the economy. He is known as \textit{Bapak Pembangunan}, the Father of Development. This cultural construct of a benevolent paternal guide, portrays President Suharto as provider of the wisdom,
which has led Indonesia to achieve peaceful stability, economic growth, and modernization since 1965. Development was redefined in Indonesia, and repackaged as nation building. This definition was announced by President Suharto to the nation. As one Indonesian scholar explains it:

"[T]he conceptual extension of the notion of 'development' as stipulated in the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) has had some consequences. Development is no longer limited to economic development, rather it has been expanded to the individual development of a person in his entirety and to the development of the whole society. Therefore, whatever could be thought of as cultural sectors (economics, education, religion, law, art, and morality) are co-opted by the government to be the sectors of development. On the one hand, the conceptual extension of the notion of 'development' is well accepted, for national development is no longer oriented to the escalation of production only. On the other hand, all non-economic and non-political sectors start to undergo a more direct official supervision, and the government is provided with more rights and more reasons to put cultural development under control, and to align cultural development with national stability and production-centred economic development."\(^\text{11}\)

Since 1965, through investment of state funds in government cultural institutions, the media and education, as well as the publications and censorship of the Ministry of Information, the Indonesian national identity continues to be fabricated. As Barbara Hatley concludes:

"The new national media of press, literature, film, radio, and television in the national language, Indonesian, continue to extend their reach, with profound effects on the perceptions and tastes of their audiences. Regional popular entertainment forms struggle to compete, but in many cases are dead or dying, no longer sufficiently engaging or relevant to attract their traditional constituency. At the same time, constructions of regional cultures have in their turn shaped national media such as Indonesian literature and theatre in complex and varying ways reflecting on questions of identity and cultural politics. .... Commercial interests and the activities of the state profoundly shape this picture. The all determining power of big business in the modern mass media had been amply documented, including its frequent discouragement of local creativity. State activities focus on traditional, regional performing arts, seeking political control and legitimacy through creation of "cultural identity". In this context, modern artists, particularly in the regions frequently feel ignored and stifled. Factors of political control plus difficulties of finance make autonomous cultivation of local, community cultural

\(^\text{11}\). Kleden, 1985, page 155.
forms a rather rare occurrence."  

Just as the aspirations of regional cultural identities in Indonesia have been quashed by the power of the state and so have the rising waves of the women’s movement. Just as pre-independence feminists and prominent regional women leaders have been subsumed into the network of national monuments, so have continuing struggles of women for emancipation.

The Ministry of Information produced a document which outlines the history of the women’s movement in Indonesia. The preparation and publication of The Women of Indonesia, in English language, coincided with International Women’s Year in 1985. This document was circulated as a report for foreigners, to explain women’s participation in Indonesian development. The chronology of pre-independence events in Indonesia tells of a series of organizations, publications and meetings, which occurred. It does not identify any of the substantive issues that these women’s organizations or meetings identified or addressed. According to the Ministry of Information:

"At the beginning of the 20th Century the organization of the Indonesian Women’s Movement was brought in line with the nationalist movement of the people in their struggle for independence. ... Women were to be found at the front line and in the battlefield, doing intelligence work, becoming couriers, preparing food for the guerilla fighters and rendering first aid to the victims of war and the wounded, giving information, etc. ... Fostering a strong unity during the physical struggle and in the socio-political field was the main goal of the women’s movement in the early days of the Revolution."

The Ministry neglects to mention how or why the Women’s Movement was "brought in line,"

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masking any possibility of resistance to nationalist goals, and obliterates from the record any aspirations that women may have identified for themselves, subsumed in the goal of "fostering a strong unity." Women are portrayed in "helping" roles offering assistance in battle, with the wounded, etc., but not in determining the demands or the strategies of a united national movement. There is no statement in this Indonesian government record of the demands for women's right to the vote, education, and inheritance or the struggles for change in marriage customs and law.

The Ministry of Information makes no mention of the contributions of GERWANI, to the struggle for changes in marriage law, creches and kindergartens for working mothers, rural women's literacy, women's membership in and protection by trade unions, and women's participation in politics. The Ministry only states the organization was deleted from the roster of membership organizations in the Indonesian Women's Congress, after the attempted coup in 1965.14

Other sources, published outside Indonesia, report that women in Indonesia persistently identified their own aspirations and issues in regional and national women's organizations throughout the 20th Century: women's emancipation, polygyny, education, health, and the participation of women in determining political party policies (Brown, Doran, Jayawardena, Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis).

If for the sake of argument, we accept the Ministry of Information portrayal of the Indonesian women's movement as nation builders, and analyze this view against Anderson's paradigm of Javanese Power relations, how are gender relations constructed? Men who possess Power are endowed in some mystical way with wahyu, the divine light, which can only be

achieved through aesthetic practices. This requires time to remove oneself from day to day production, and maintenance of material requirements for life, and the management of the household economy, which we have seen from the accounts of the roles of women in traditional Javanese society to be the domain of women. According to the Javanese view of Power relations, in a monetary economy, earning money or seeking profit is considered keras (harsh, forceful) and not the indicator of concentrated Power. As women work to produce and maintain themselves and society, Power cannot be attained by women. As Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis explains it:

"In short, the style of Javanese government is to give the impression of a minimum of effort. According to the Javanese idea of the woman's role, she is more bound to her social and material context and consequently less suited for asceticism, which after all means distancing oneself from one's social environment. Only in very exceptional cases can women muster sufficient kekuwatan batin (mental strength) to acquire Power. In general however, they have the mind of a salesman and are therefore pamrih (having personal motive), and a threat to power."  

The threat to Javanese Power of a women's movement, especially a united yet diverse Indonesian women's movement, is therefore a potential dissolving force for the ruler's concentration of power. "[T]he ability to contain opposites and to absorb his adversaries are important elements in a leader's claim to have power."  

In order to maintain the male rulers capacity to contain women, in the quest for development as nation building, then there needs to be a prescription from the ruler which keeps women confined in the day to day work of the material realm, and leaves the aesthetic practices and wisdom for men. Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis argues that women have now been


called upon to be the generators of income for their families, and that women’s roles were defined by the state as mothers, as providers for their families, and that this role eliminated their opportunities for power. She calls this ideology *Ibuism*, which is taken from the Indonesian word *ibu*, meaning mother, and the term of address for all women who are married, or are of child bearing age, thus denoting the expectation that all women will be mothers.

"[T]he new Indonesian society called upon the 'kaum Ibu'\(^{17}\) to put their shoulders to the task of building a new national state; and more than the men, they were expected to do this disinterestedly. The honour they could gain was that of being a good *ibu*. Power and prestige remained the privilege of men. Thus an ideology developed in which late 19th and early 20th Century Dutch values and traditional Javanese ones were linked to the 'mother' concept. This ideology, which sanctions any action provided it is taken as a mother who is looking after her family, a group, a class, a company or the state, without demanding power or prestige in return, I shall call *Ibuism.*\(^{18}\)

Women are to gain honour through maternal actions, and men gain honour or tribute through the demonstration of the concentration of their Power in Javanese society, by contrast then the appropriate behaviour of the *bapak*, the father. The performance of state ceremonies, have been a venue for the presentation of this ideology in the President’s own family. His wife and daughters are successful in business. His wife has created huge national monuments such as *Taman Mini Indonesia*, an Indonesian theme park with displays of houses, dance and food from various regions of Indonesia. The toll roads which link Jakarta with the national highways system, were built and are owned and operated by his daughter’s company. There are almost daily reports of the President’s participation in the opening ceremonies of another national monument to development, all with large audiences in attendance and media coverage, to reinforce the perception and the image of the Power of the President as *Bapak Pembangunan*.

"The social signs of the concentration of power were fertility, prosperity, stability, and glory. .... The two fundamental ideas behind these conventional images are creativity (fertility-prosperity) and harmony (tranquility-order) expressed in the age old motto so often on the lips of the contemporary elite: *tata tentrum kara raharja* (order, peace, prosperity, good fortune)."\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) This is a term in Indonesian language coined by Djjadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis literally meaning the 'mother class' of Indonesian society.

\(^{18}\) Djjadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, 1987, pages 43-44.

\(^{19}\) Anderson 1990:32-32.
In 1992, as strikes of women factory workers escalated to include demonstrations outside the Ministry of Labour and the House of Representatives, state television news broadcasts showed the President visiting a successful healthy baby clinic staffed by good *Ibu* volunteers, the wives of government officials.

This remarkable contrast in the actions of Indonesian women, from well-organized groups making demands of the state, to the cadres of volunteers obediently delivering state programs requires explanation. The New Order regime has crafted state machinery to harness women’s bodies, time, and labour; to contain any semblance of a women’s movement; and to ensure that women contribute to the orderly, peaceful prosperous nation of Indonesia according to state-prescribed behaviour. They are the dutiful daughters as the President is father, of Indonesian national development.
CHAPTER 4  GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 1966 to 1982

Under the New Order regime, national development planning follows long term twenty-five year plans. These are subsequently adjusted and made more detailed in five year cycles. The five year plans or REPELITA follow the Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) which are debated and approved by the MPR (the People’s Consultative Assembly) the upper house of representative government, and submitted to the President. The GBHN are announced by the President to the nation, and on the basis of these policy guidelines, state priorities, targets, strategies and programs are developed by planners and formulated into a five-year development plan or REPELITA. This plan is presented by the President to the DPR, the House of Representatives, and the selected members of the Cabinet responsible for implementing the plan. These plans determine the programs and projects will be funded through foreign development assistance loans and grants, national and regional budgets. The first plan was launched in 1968, and subsequent plans every five years thereafter.

Each set of the GBHN and the REPELITA which follows, are not seen as discrete sets of goals and finite plans that must necessarily be completed in each five year period. Rather each set of policy guidelines is more refined than the previous ones. They reinforce and add to the continuous efforts to achieve the goals and targets of national development in Indonesia.

REPELITA I 1968-1973

The main focus of the first five-year development plan was to improve agricultural production. The role of women in agricultural production was not implicitly or explicitly a part
of this plan. However, the detrimental effects of agricultural intensification on women’s participation in the production of rice, and their subsequent loss of incomes were documented in studies conducting in the 1970s.¹

During the implementation of REPELITA I, there were two significant actions of the government which focused on women, and marked the approach of the New Order regime to women’s participation in development. The first was the establishment of a National Commission on the Status of Women. The second was the implementation of the Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning program), which continues to influence the construction of gender relations in contemporary Indonesian society.

Komisi Nasional Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian National Commission on the Status of Women)

In 1963, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations passed a resolution recommending that member countries establish national level commissions on the status of women, to provide advice to national governments, and participate in the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. In 1968, President Suharto appointed the Komisi Nasional Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian National Commission on the Status of Women) or KNKWI to "advance the status and position of the Indonesian woman in the family as well as in society",² within the guidelines of the Constitution and the state ideology Pancasila. The mandate of the commission was to provide the government with the results of research and

¹. These included the changes in rice milling in Timmer’s study (1976) and Collier on the rice harvest payment systems (1979) as cited by Sjahrir, 1985, pages 15-16.

². Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia The Women of Indonesia, 1985, p.35.
monitoring concerning the status of women in Indonesia. The commission was composed of 20 women from women’s organizations, and 10 people from government departments, and came under the authority of the Ministry for Social Welfare.

Until a cabinet minister for women was appointed in 1978, KNKWI did commission some surveys concerning the status of women in collaboration with universities and government departments. Funding from the government of Indonesia was very limited, so most collaborative research was funded by United Nations agencies, such as UNICEF.

The KNKWI continues today, but they are seen as a group of women selected by government with no representative function or accountability to women’s organizations, and no research capacity. They are still equipped with a nominal budget and the representative function performed by the KNKWI in Indonesia country delegations to United Nations Commission on the Status of Women meetings and United Nations conferences is largely ornamental.³

Program Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning Program)

A major shift in policy from the Sukarno regime was announced by President Suharto which resulted in the first major New Order state initiative that deliberately targeted Indonesian women. In a Presidential address on Indonesian Independence day August 17, 1967, Suharto announced that Indonesia would abandon the pro-natal policy of Sukarno, and "that the country should pay serious attention to birth control."⁴ With the first five-year development plan, a government agency responsible for family planning was established.

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³ Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, The Women of Indonesia, 1985, pages 34 to 35.

The initial family planning program was implemented in Java and Bali, by trained field workers, in paid employment. When the program was expanded to include other regions of Indonesia, it was deemed to be too costly to be implemented by paid staff, so cadres of local volunteers were recruited to encourage acceptors of family planning. This program was the first state initiative which began to structure women’s participation in national development in Indonesia. As the official history of women in Indonesia of the Ministry of Information states:

"As the national family planning programme passed through its very early years of infancy, people’s awareness grew into general acceptance of modern methods of fertility control, which could not be pursued merely as a health matter, or as the sole responsibility of the Department of Health. This was all the more so as it became obvious that acceptance was based on factors beyond "family planning" such as an overall improvement of various other aspects of the individual’s life, his economic, social, spiritual as well as physical well being. Consequently, family planning came to be viewed more as a general development issue."5

The Ministry of Information account states the conclusions of the report on the implementation of the program during the first five-year plan as follow:

a. The women in family planning groups are generally young and belong to the 15 to 49 age group. This age compositions requires better educated group leaders of a similar age group who should be more perceptive and have a better understanding of their specific problems.
b. The participation of women in family planning groups indicates their desire for progress and to be part of modern life, by adhering to the small family pattern.
c. Family planning groups and the National Family Planning Board are linked by a chain which as an internal communications network could be utilized for the benefit of other development programmes.
d. In many villages family planning groups have become the nucleus of local women’s organizations."6

President Suharto signed the United Nations Declaration on Population in 1967, and the Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, or BKKBN National Family Planning Coordination Council was established in 1970. Family planning was no longer considered a health program provided through the Ministry of Health. The BKKBN is directly accountable to the President.\(^7\)

Several principles of the New Order state ideology which influence gender relations can be identified in the account from the Ministry of Information above. The first is subsuming the right of the individual to be educated and make an informed choice, as part of her, or as they state above, his health care. To ensure acceptance, the economic, social and spiritual conditions surrounding the individual, the community and the nation need to be improved, or developed. A second is the assumption that those of better educational achievements, or class position are required to educate people in villages, there are no learner centred or popular education techniques applied. A third is the conflation of participation in family planning as an indicator of willingness to be part of "modern life." There is no evidence that village women might enjoy their rural life and traditions, and want a smaller family, or the option of controlling their own fertility. A fourth principle which unfortunately became a cornerstone of Women in Development programs in Indonesia was the notion of family planning groups providing a web of communication to the village level. This account did not note the advantage of that network being composed of volunteers, who were not paid for their participation in these groups, but provided an organizational structure which could be "utilized" for other development activities. Note their consent to being used is not considered here. The last significant point is that the

groups, formed at the request or requirement of the state, in order to receive family planning information and resources, are legitimized by state sanction. They are not formed by free association or "voluntary" membership.

On the surface, access to contraception is often perceived to be of benefit to women, giving them reproductive choices. In Indonesia, the focus of the *Keluarga Berencana*, (Family Planning) or *KB* program has been challenged by women in this regard. The program is structured by nationally set targets for fertility rates, not by educational goals for women and men concerning their reproductive health and options. The *KB* program is implemented by "volunteers," with no pre-requisite health training or professional standards. State policy forbids that family planning information or contraceptives be given to unmarried women, although condoms are quite openly sold at most pharmacies. Abortion is illegal, though available under a range of conditions, depending on the price one can afford to pay. Indonesia was one of the countries where contraceptive implants, Norplant were tested, before wide distribution. Some Indonesian women health activists argue that poor quality contraceptives are dumped and tested on human subjects in Indonesia.

Despite these concerns, the Indonesian Family Planning Program has been supported by international donors, and is seen as a huge success by international standards. The accepters of the program have also become laden with other responsibilities for development. In 1986, a briefing paper to the Asian Development Bank reported that:

"[t]he *BKKBN* is implementing integrated programmes at the grass-roots level in which income generating activities for women are introduced as an incentive to the acceptance of family planning. An integrated package of activities has recently been developed by the Board. One of these projects is a revolving credit scheme accessible only to family planning accepters with seed capital being given to and managed by accepter groups. Initial funding was provided by UNFPA, with additional funds provided through the national development budget, regional development budgets, and by USAID and the
World Bank. In 1989, the annual budget for the KB program was US$100 million.

President Suharto was given a United Nations Fund for Population award in 1989, for the successful achievements of the program and the decline in fertility rates, over twenty years. In 1994, UNFPA invited officers from the Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, or BKKBN (National Family Planning Coordination Board) to share their secrets of success in Vietnam. Yet, the impact of the KB program on status of Indonesian women has not been one of the criteria with which the program’s success has been judged. As one of several researchers Ines Smyth, concluded:

"In the early period of the programme, the promotion of mothers’ and children’s health was included in the aims of the programme, though for purely strategic purposes. Now, however, this has completely disappeared from the stated aims of the programme: the protection and improvement of women’s health is not counted among its concern, either in principle or in practice. … [T]he priorities of the programme, its method of operation and delivery of services, follow international trends which leave no room for providing women with the means to autonomously regulate their fertility, through access to freely chosen contraceptive and related services."

Participation in family planning is only one of the ways that Indonesian women are paying with their bodies, their time and their labour to achieve "development" goals.

The view of the KB program from the top, from Jakarta, by the knowledgable experts, who analyze statistics, set targets, measure the number of accepters, is that it is a triumphant success. Consider the view from the bottom, from the level working women, of limited means.

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As part of a ceremony to give certificates for the completion of an adult basic literacy program, an official from the Ministry of Education and Culture in Jakarta came to visit several villages where I was working on community development projects. He is an officer of the military, who has been assigned a civilian post, a common practice in the Indonesian government. He was invited to make a speech, the first speech of the day, as he was the most senior government officer present on this occasion, and the most senior government officer ever to have visited this village.

He asked the people to look around at themselves, and their village. He pointed out their economic poverty, the lack of paint or glass windows in their houses, the poor road and bridge, leading to the village. He then asked them how many children they had, and most families did have several children. He then gave them his "guidance," stating that if they just follow the family planning program, and have smaller families they will be prosperous, as he has been in his life. He closed his speech by shouting the KB slogan "Dua anak cukup, laki atau perempuan sama saja!" (Two children are enough, boys or girls its just the same).

As it happened, I was seated behind this official during the ceremony, while other people from the village spoke in response, and wrote on a make shift black board to demonstrate their literacy skills. After he sat down, I could not help but overhear the laughter he shared with one of his aides seated next to him. As they were walking out of the village, I asked the aide what was so humorous. He said that the officer's wife was at home, eight months pregnant with his fifth child. They had been sharing the common joke about the KB program in Indonesia, that the government officials and their wives who "volunteer" to deliver the KB program follow
another KB program, that of *Keluarga Besar* (Big Families). Due to their privilege, they can have large families, but must motivate the poor families to accept the program.

Kalimantan, 1988

While I was visiting an Indonesian woman friend in a small town in Kalimantan, a young woman arrived. She was very emotional, tearful and seemed frightened. I took my leave.

A few days later, my friend sent a note to me, asking if I would meet her later that day, it was *penting sekali* (very important). I met her that afternoon, and she asked me if I could loan her some money, a great deal of money, such a large amount that she felt *malu* (shy, embarrassed) to ask. Finally, she named a figure of *satu juta rupiah* (one million rupiah, approximately $600 Canadian). She explained that the young woman who had arrived at her house while I was there, had gone to a money lender in the market, to borrow the money which she had needed to pay for an illegal abortion. She had originally borrowed six hundred and fifty thousand rupiah, which she was to have paid back weekly at the rate of Rp.25,000 per week, for one year. The man in her life had promised to help make the payments. About two months after she had the pregnancy terminated, his family had arranged a marriage for him. He had married and moved to another city, and could not longer help her make the payments. At her job in a fabric stall at the market, her monthly wage was about Rp. 50,000. A man had come to the shop demanding one million rupiah. He had threatened to steal some expensive batik fabric from the shop, if she did not pay.

Jakarta, 1992

Siti, a domestic worker in my neighbourhood often complained of feeling dizzy, sick and very tired after she had gone home to her village for several months. She had changed
employers, and went to the village between jobs as she wanted to spend some time with her family, particularly her two sons and her husband. She comes from East Java, the most densely populated province in Indonesia. Through a series of conversations with her, over the course of several weeks, I learned about the causes of her illness.

While she was home in her village, the military came for **ABRI Masuk Desa** (Indonesian army enters the village) day. This is a common practice in certain parts of Indonesia, and members of the armed forces will assist with road construction, or repairs to irrigation canals, or rebuilding facilities after a storm, volcanic eruption or earthquake. As part of the day’s activities, all the women with two children or more were invited to come to the **balai desa** (the community hall).

The wife of the senior military commander gave a speech about how important it was for all Indonesian **ibu-ibu** mothers to follow the family planning program "Dua anak cukup, laki ataupun perempuan sama saja." Then the women were asked to queue at the table at the front of the hall, and meet with the woman in the white lab coat. Siti waited her turn with her two boys. When she met the woman in the white coat, she was asked to roll up her sleeve, and she had what Siti described as a kind of "injection," with a patch of tiny sticks put under her skin, which she was told would prevent pregnancy for six months. The site of the "injection" was sore for several days.

About two weeks later, she began to feel ill. She had an irregular menstrual period, and she felt dizzy, nauseated, and had headaches. When her mother went to a nearby town to market her eggs, Siti accompanied her, and went to the **Puskesmas** (the community health clinic). She explained that she had been feeling ill since her **KB** injection, and asked if they could remove the patch under her skin. The nurse on duty told her that no one at the clinic
knew how to remove the patch.

A few days after I learned of this story, Siti visited a medical clinic in Jakarta, and a doctor removed the patch from under her skin. After a week or so, her dizziness, nausea and headaches stopped.

Jakarta, 1994

Yusuf, a driver who worked at my office, did not report for work one morning. Late that afternoon, he arrived at the office. One of the staff came and told me that he had been at the hospital with his wife since the previous evening. She had very bad abdominal pain, and was bleeding heavily. He needed money to pay for x-rays, and perhaps surgery as well.

A few days later, Yusuf came to the office. He was very sad. He explained that the doctor had to perform a hysterectomy, because her intrauterine contraceptive device had broken into 3 pieces, and severely damaged her uterus. She was 24 years old, an elementary school teacher, and would no longer be able to bear children.

REPELITA II 1973-1978

The second five-year development plan continued the emphasis on agricultural reform in food production and emphasised increasing production through modernization and industrialization. REPELITA II explicitly established some of the structures and programs which would form the foundation of Women in Development policy in Indonesia.

As mentioned above, the KB family planning program was expanded to include all regions of Indonesia, staffed by trained "volunteers." Other specific initiatives which still

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greatly influence gender relations, and the structure, form and practice of the Indonesian women’s movement in contemporary Indonesia were introduced. These include:

1. state authorization of **Kongres Wanita Indonesia, or KOWANI** (the Indonesian Women’s Congress),

2. the establishment of state sponsored wives organizations, the **Dharma Wanita** (Dutiful Women) and **Dharma Pertiwi** (Duty to the Homeland),

3. changes to marriage laws, and

4. the introduction of **Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga**, the Family Welfare Movement.

**Kongres Wanita Indonesia KOWANI (Indonesian Women’s Congress)**

Since 1974, all women’s organizations in Indonesia are required to become members of **KOWANI**, an umbrella group of women's organizations which had held their first national congress in 1928. **KOWANI** became the representative of women’s organizations in the amalgam of **golongan karya**, the functional groups, which compose **Golkar**, the ruling political party of the New Order regime.

"**KOWANI** was initially formed as a federation of women’s organisations which were non-governmental in nature, but since 1974, it has received financial subsidies for its programmes, like the semi-official wives’ organizations."\(^{12}\)

According to the Ministry of information, the purpose of KOWANI is:

"1. to motivate the members to contribute to the development of their respective communities, thus to the development of the nation and their country; and
2. to give guidance to large numbers of women toward the achievement of certain social, economic or political objectives for their personal benefit, and that of the general public.

... The Government has given due recognition to KOWANI by acknowledging this federation as the only national machinery for the integration of women in development in the N.G.O. sector.  

Many women's organisations and groups remain informal and unregistered to avoid affiliation with KOWANI and government surveillance. It is a national level umbrella organization, which is composed of representatives of other groups. Members and leaders of KOWANI are mostly senior, urban and elite women. Few have any direct association with grassroots women's organisations in urban or rural areas.

Dharma Wanita (Dutiful Women) and Dharma Pertiwi (Duty to the Homeland)

Following a tradition established during the Japanese occupation, wives of staff of many Indonesian government agencies and departments formed associations for social welfare activities under the New Order regime. In 1974, all such associations were required to amalgamate into one organization called Dharma Wanita. All wives of civil servants were required to join. A similar unifying organization called Dharma Pertiwi was established for the wives of all military personnel.

Dharma Wanita is the parallel of Korpri, the association of Indonesian civil servants, which has a largely male membership. Each member of Dharma Wanita takes her position in the organization according to the position her husband occupies in government service, regardless of her occupation or social status. Some members of the organization state that they have largely social activities, some for charity others for social or family welfare.

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The ideological principles which guide the *Dharma Wanita*, are structured in accordance to five principles, in the same format as the Republic of Indonesia State ideology. The Pancasila Dharma Wanita are:

1. To be a loyal backstop and supporter of her husband,
2. To be a caretaker of the household,
3. To be the producer of future generations,
4. To be the family's primary socializer, and
5. To be a good Indonesian citizen.\(^\text{14}\)

Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi units actually participate in forms of surveillance on the activities of other women, ensuring that state defined activities are enacted. Through contests, and regional competitions, women earn recognition for their voluntary service, from which their husbands are awarded favour from their superiors. Whenever more senior officials visit another province, region or village, the appropriate Dharma Wanita unit prepares food, decorations, welcome ceremonies, accommodation, and all personal requirements of the visiting dignitaries.

Although Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi are considered social organizations, they do play a role in political activities related to general elections, though usually disguised as the activities of housewives for family welfare. With all wives organizations consolidated under the leadership of the First Lady, a pre-election network of women, who could get out the vote for the 1977 elections was established.

"Dharma Wanita’s main activities are concentrated on the improvement of women’s life within the family. It helps to organize cooperatives, charity events, lectures on family planning, women's and children's health, basic home economics courses, and other women-related skills courses to improve the economy of low income families. Its main constituents are the wives of civil servants, especially lower-level civil servants. It also

organizes activities beyond its constituents, for instance in organizing donations for the victims of natural disasters. Beyond the activities to fulfil the practical interests of the civil servants’ wives, the Dharma Wanita have also played an important role in supporting the passage of the Government Regulation No. 10 (PP No. 10) which severely limits the possibility of a civil servant to enter a polygamous marriage. “\(^{15}\)

Sumatra, 1987

I was staying at a government owned guest house in a small town in West Sumatra. The period of campaigning for the upcoming general election was under way. I was invited by a group of women who had arrived to stay at the guest house for a few days, to join them the next weekend to visit some remote villages. I explained that unfortunately I would not be able to accompany them.

The next day dressed in their pink Dharma Wanita uniforms they went to a meeting at the regional government office, for briefings on the upcoming election. The following Friday morning they set off at 2:00 AM for the villages wearing bright yellow Golkar T-shirts and jeans, with truck loads of boxes in the convoy behind them.

They arrived back in the very early morning hours Saturday. They were full of stories: how the trucks got stuck in the mud on the mountain roads; how hard it was to walk the kilometres between villages, to make sure that they arrived at each place just before one of the five scheduled Moslem prayer times; how the people in some of the villages recited their prayers in Arabic language in a very uneducated way. They offered me some of the things that they had distributed in the village, prayer carpets and fashionable jilbab (Moslem women’s veils) imprinted with Golkar logo. They had been campaigning, in a region where people were very devout Moslems.

Jakarta, 1992

A young woman that I worked with, an accountant, was very irritated by persistent phone calls that she was called from meetings to receive. At the end of the day, she seemed very distressed. I asked her if she wanted to tell me what was wrong.

She burst into tears. She told me that her husband was a civil servant, and she had been receiving phone calls all day from members of her Dharma Wanita unit. She was assigned the position of treasurer by her husband’s boss, because of her accounting skills.

She explained that she had sung for many years in her church choir, and that the Dharma Wanita wanted her to lead a choir, which would provide entertainment for the people after their husbands made speeches in the upcoming election campaign. She had to decline the invitation to lead a choir, explaining to the wives of her husband’s superiors that she could not lead a choir, because she worked outside the home, and spent about three hours a day commuting to and from work in Jakarta traffic, and needed the little time she had left for her children and other family responsibilities. The day in question members of her Dharma Wanita unit had been calling to ask for financial contributions from her to support their campaigning activities, in place of her contribution through voluntary work, because after all she was working for a private company and earning pentambah uang (extra money).

Manado, North Sulawesi, November 1993

I was asked by an engineer who worked for a Canadian Engineering company as the Project Manager of a CIDA funded project concerning water resource management, to come to visit their office in the Water Division of the Provincial Office of the Department of Public Works, to discuss ways women could be integrated into their project. I went with two engineers to visit a community where the Department of Public Works was expanding irrigation systems,
in order to increase rice production in the province of North Sulawesi. We spent many hours there discussing the irrigation project, and we walked through the area with some women and teenagers from the village, discussing why they did not want to have an expanded irrigation system built in the region.

I returned to the provincial capital, arriving at my guest house very late at night. I prepared for my meetings the next day with the few women engineers working on the project, who wanted to discuss their concerns about the project with me.

A shiny new jeep which the project had purchased for the Department of Public Works arrived to collect me and take me to the project office, or so I thought. Instead, I was taken to a huge meeting room in the most expensive hotel in the city, with huge windows overlooking the harbour, and introduced to about eighty members of the Dharma Wanita, Public Works Unit. I was seated on a platform at the front of the room, with the most senior members of the Dharma Wanita. As the host for the day, introduced the schedule, I learned that I was giving the Dharma Wanita lectures, morning and afternoon to this audience, on Women in Water Projects. The project training coordinator, and two of the Indonesian project engineers, men all three, were at the back of the room drinking coffee, and snickering.

I was taken from the meeting back to my guest house as the Project Office had closed for the day, because the Project Manager from Canada was getting married to a young local woman, I was told, and everyone had to prepare. I spent the evening writing a project gender implementation strategy, and I flew back to Jakarta early the next morning as planned.

Jakarta, 1997

A senior lecturer at a prominent university described the change in the autonomy of wives associations from the time:
"My father was a policeman. Even though my mother had studied enough to go to university, she could not attend because she had to return home during the Japanese occupation. After independence, she became very active in women’s organizations. Every political party had a women’s section and most government offices had a wives organization. My mother was active in the police wives association, they raised their own funds for all their activities. They were independent [from government]. My mother demonstrated for monogamy. Even the men in the military and the police had GERWANI wives. ...

Dharma Wanita ruined women’s independence. It was created by Ibu Tien (Suharto’s wife) because she had so much power. Whether you were involved in your own women’s organization or not, you had to join Dharma Wanita and take your position from your husband’s position. My mother called it regression and degradation. On the positive side, Dharma Wanita has meant that some women have become more powerful, by ordering their husband’s staff to do things, or by influencing their husband. There is now a lack of critical thinking among women. Indonesian women can not say anything about politics anymore. There are women in each of the political parties, but there is no critique from women in Golkar (Golongan Karya, the ruling party). They have to do the family welfare work, and promote income generation.¹⁶

Changes to the Marriage Law of 1974

In contrast to President Sukarno who had several wives, President Suharto had only one, until she died in 1996. Polygynous marriage, and the violations of the rights of women upon separation, divorce or abandonment had long been issues which the Indonesian women’s movement, and women’s organizations had pressed the government to change. Under Sukarno, women felt there was little opportunity for change, given the personal circumstances of the President.

Once Suharto and the New Order came to power, women’s organizations, even those sanctioned by the government called for legal changes to marriage law. With rumoured support from the First Lady, some Christian members of the House of Representatives (DPR) put forward draft changes to the marriage law. The account that follows documents the tremendous

¹⁶. From interview notes with a professor at the University of Indonesia, January 1997.
resistance these proposed changes prompted. This case also illustrates the role of the military in mediating between various factions and the *dwifungsi* or dual function of the military in Indonesian society, that is, the legitimate involvement of the military in civilian matters and the state. 17

"In August 1973, the government introduced a new bill, proposing a single marriage law for all Indonesians. The Islamic courts organized by the Department of Religious Affairs were to be given a minor legal role, compared to civil registration. On points involving inter-religious marriage, adoption, inheritance, marriageable age, polygamy, and remarriage the bill was quickly attacked as contrary to Islamic law and an encouragement to sexual licence outside marriage. Seen as an assault on the fundamentals of Islam, the issue united and aroused the Muslim community. As protests flowed in to the government, young Muslims began picketing the DPR [House of Representatives] building, on one occasion forcing their way into the chamber before being evicted by troops. ...

As the protest threatened to get out of hand, the two generals most closely concerned with security stepped in. General Sumitro, the head of the armed forces internal security command, *Kopkamtib*, and General Sutopo Yuwono, head of *Bakin* the Intelligence agency, initiated behind-the-scenes discussions with the Muslim parties in October, and reached a compromise after some weeks. This understanding was the basis for redrafting by a committee drawn from all groups in the DPR, and in December the bill passed without a vote. Although the Muslims were far from happy with the result the new bill gave continued emphasis to religious courts and the marital laws of each religion." 18

Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, The Family Welfare Movement

Many social services are delivered through the *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* or as it is commonly referred to in Indonesia the *PKK*. Literally the words in the title mean the Guidance of Family Welfare, but it is translated by the Indonesian government as the Family Welfare Movement. The term *pembinaan* or guidance is common in Indonesian government...
documents, and is applied to various social issues, which government programs address. Within the Ministry of Education and Culture for instance is a division called Pembinaan Generasi Muda, or Guidance for the Young Generation, which delivers various non-formal education programs for young people. According to independent feminist scholar and journalist Julia Suryakusuma:

"Pembinaan is roughly translated as guidance, but also implies indoctrination, construction, and management, and emphasises the mobilization of society by the state."

The PKK was designed by planners in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and began implementation in 1974 as part of REPELITA II. The structure and purpose of the "movement" was adapted from a project implemented in the province of Central Java, which is the region of the island of Java which is considered one of the main centres of the most halus or pure forms of Javanese culture. The model was the same as with the KB family planning program, to test a government initiative in Java, and then replicate the same model, structure, resource patterns, and tools to deliver the same uniform program in all regions of Indonesia, without accounting for the variations in the values, cultures or social structures of the more than 300 ethnic groups in Indonesia.

In a study which tried to measure the impact of national development in three different regions of Indonesia, conducted by social scientists from Central Java, at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta the origins of the PKK movement are outlined.

"Governor Munadi of Central Java Province launched a project that he called "village modernization" (modernisasi desa). The primary objective of his project was to accelerate the process of social modernization in his province through non-formal or out-of-school education for adults and especially for heads of families. Mrs. Munadi, the wife of the Governor, joined her husband in implementing the project by getting village women to

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lend their support to various local development activities and to participate directly in them. ... The women's component rather than the entire package of village modernization efforts was selected by the Minister of Internal Affairs for application on a nationwide basis, initially under the name "family welfare education" (*pendidikan kesejahteraan keluarga* or *PKK*).

... The government did not want to convey the impression that the work of the *PKK* was imposed on village women, and the terms "program" and "project" were therefore avoided. Instead, the *PKK* was characterized as a "movement" in which women, particularly married women were called upon to participate more actively in the development process by modernizing their homes and the lives of their families. Once the ministry established the movement in other provinces and judged the trial results to be satisfactory, the name was modified to family welfare development (*pembinaan kesejahteraan keluarga* retaining the original abbreviation, *PKK*).”

Several features of this account warrant further examination and explanation. The first is the emphasis on modernization. Following the Sukarno regimes isolationist positions on foreign affairs, particularly from the United States, the imposition of the process of *modernisasi*, was affiliated with the imposition of high yield rice technologies, family planning, the import of automobiles, television and other consumer goods. The second is that the wife of the Governor brought the message of this process to rural people through informal education, which did not require the funds for infrastructure such as schools construction, standard text books and educational materials, nor of trained educators in remunerated work. The focus is stated as on adults, "especially heads of families." The Indonesian Marriage Law of 1974 makes a significant distinction between the *kepala keluarga* (head of the family) and the *kepala rumah tangga* (head of the household). 


21. Article 34, paragraph 1 and Article 32, paragraph 3, as cited by the Office of the State Minister for the Role of Women, in *The Changing Role of Women With Special Emphasis on their Economic Role*, Jakarta, September 1989.
(the mother) is considered the head of the household, and considered responsible for the management of all of the activities and the physical space within and surrounding the home. In this case the family head, the men were to be educated, and through the assistance of the Governor's wife, the women become involved in what appears to have been a secondary consideration. Yet when the program became national the responsibility for social modernization was shifted to women, who were to give family pembinaan (guidance) not pendidikan (education). PKK is referred to as a "movement" yet the official title uses the term pembinaan rather than gerakan, the term in Indonesian language that means movement. This selection is by design to avoid any association with GERWANI, Gerakan Wanita Indonesia the women's organization affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party, which the New Order military summarily discredited in the mid-1960s.

Another account of the history of this "movement" written by Julia Suryakusuma, a Jakarta based researcher working from official government documents provides the background of the content of the PKK movement.

"PKK was founded in a seminar on Home Economics in Bogor, West Java in 1957. The seminar was conducted by the Education Section and Community Nutrition Institute of the Ministry of Health. Between 1960 and 1962, an inter-departmental committee which included the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of Religion, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a number of female figures compiled a list of educational topics which they considered appropriate for a developing society. This was how the ten programs of PKK were originally conceived.

In the mid 1960's the Governor of Central Java instructed the implementation of PKK as part of regional development efforts. PERTIWI the organization of wives of government officials were given the task of spreading the principles of PKK, Centres for PKK training were formed in all districts in Central Java, and from 1970-1971, these efforts were given financial support from the district budget. At the end of 1971, in a meeting governors from all of Indonesia, the Minister of Internal Affairs suggested that PKK be implemented throughout Indonesia."^22

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Note that in this account which draws from government publications from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the names of each government department are identified, but the names and qualifications of the "female figures" of the committee which decided what would be "appropriate" topics are not included. This account reflects that the officials of these government agencies know what is best for Indonesian women, and that the wives of civil servants are trusted and trained to deliver the message.

The two accounts also reflect the national and regional perspectives. In the first account, the governor of the province and his wife are specifically named, and the design of the program as accredited to the Governor, which was then proven so successful that the Minister of Internal Affairs decided to replicate it throughout Indonesia. In the official version, the authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the subordinate position of the governors and their wives are reflected. The program was designed by technocrats in government agencies, in this version of events, and the Governor then subsequently "instructed" that it be implemented by wives of officials.

The PKK directed women to participate in ten specific kinds of activity, defined as female spheres of interest:

1. The creation of good relations within and between families;
2. Correct child care;
3. The use of hygienic food preparation techniques and close attention to nutrition;
4. Care that clothing is suited to its proper functions - protection, morality, modesty;
5. Intelligent use of house space to meet needs of hygiene, entertainment, etc.;
6. Total family health - in physical, mental, spiritual, and moral spheres;
7. Effective household budgeting;
8. Efficient basic housekeeping, calculated to maximize order and cleanliness;
9. The preservation of emotional and physical security and a tranquil environment in the home;
10. The development of family attitudes appropriate to the modernization process - planning for the future.\(^\text{23}\)

The \textit{PKK} "movement" was imposed nationally throughout Indonesia on the eve of International Women's Year and the United Nations World Summit on Women in 1975. The Indonesian government defined women's role as clearly within the household, subordinate to men in the hierarchy of state institutions. Women's role in modernizing society, in development was established. The time and unpaid work of urban women, the wives of civil servants, was thus harnessed into welfare oriented training and education of rural and poor women. The "movement" attracts many volunteers interested in welfare activities, not only the wives of civil servants, but usually under the leadership of the wife of a local official.

The state has designed the \textit{PKK} to deliver social development programs on the basis of women's voluntary unpaid labour. Even though some training is provided, these social services are not delivered by trained professionals. As a result, the quality and consistency of these programs vary over time and by region in Indonesia. The allocation of \textit{PKK} national and regional budgets are assigned often according to the personal preferences, values, skills, religion, and ethnicity of the individual woman assigned leadership according to her husband's rank by the Ministry in which he is employed.

Indonesian feminists and representatives of women's organizations are frequently critical of \textit{PKK}, and it is largely seen by urban women as an older women's domain. In more rural

areas, many younger women, as wives of junior civil servants, are still very motivated to assist their husband’s career and their family’s upward mobility through being active contributors to PKK. It has also been argued that through the volunteer work of the PKK cadres, women develop valuable skills and experience in organization, public speaking, and leadership, which gives them confidence to participate more actively in paid work and public life. Women also gain associations with the wives of more senior government officials, which can be a powerful form of networking. The structures of Dharma Wanita, Dharma Pertiwi, and PKK influence the strategies employed by women activists in Indonesia. They frequently use instrumental approaches, and informal associations with women near men in decision making positions, to communicate their demands, requests or pleas for funding, political support, or to bring issues forward.

Jakarta 1991

An Indonesian woman I met while I lived in Indonesia, is a retired civil servant, who worked in the Ministry of Home Affairs from the mid-1960’s until she retired. The Ministry of Home Affairs is one of the most powerful agencies of the Indonesian government, as they are responsible for security and development throughout the country. Regional and urban planning, rural development and coordination of all departments implementation of national goals at regional, sub-regional and community levels come under the Ministry of Home Affairs. All governors of the provinces, and other more local appointed officials are responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs.

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The woman I met described to me the conditions in the Ministry of Home Affairs during the late 1960's and early 1970, which lead to the prescription of particular roles for women in national development. She explained that the men in the Ministry of Home Affairs were very concerned about the threat to security from "Western" feminism. She described the men as takut wanita ingin menjadi sama pria (afraid that women want to become the same as men). As she spoke, I recalled the first time I had looked in my English - Indonesian language dictionary, to find the word meaning equal. I found the word sama, which I knew meant "same".

She explained that her male colleagues were concerned that there would be no one at home to cook, to take care of the household and the children if men and women were the same. She laughed, saying that most Indonesian men did so little work in their homes, they probably did not know what work their wives did, and what was done by the pembantu (domestic worker). According to her the men in the Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs designed the PKK program to ensure that their own wives would be at home with their families.

REPELITA III 1978-1983

Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) 1978

The GBHN or Guidelines of State Policy of 1978, for the first time included a chapter on women in development. It was included in Chapter 20, Health, Social Welfare and the Role of Women. The REPELITA III cabinet included the appointment of an Associate Minister for the Role of Women. The third five-year development plan introduced an emphasis on industrialization, where the previous plans were more focused on improvements in agricultural production and infrastructure.
The chapter on Women in Development had two parts, the first outlined the principles and the second strategies to achieve these principles of state policy.

Women in Development Principles

1. Since overall development requires the maximum participation of both men and women in all fields, women have the same rights, responsibilities, and opportunities as men to fully participate in all development activities.

2. The role of women in development should increase harmoniously with their role in creating healthy and prosperous families, guiding the young generation, the youth and under fives in the context of the development of the Indonesian Man.

3. In order to accelerate women’s roles and responsibilities in development process their knowledge and skills in various fields should be developed according to their needs and capabilities.25

Women in Development Strategies

1. To improve and expand the role of women as housewives in creating healthy and prosperous families.

2. To increase and expand the role of women as members of the labour force through the expansion of work opportunities in various fields of development.

3. To speed up and expand the role of women in various fields of development through educational and skill improvements.

4. To encourage a social-cultural environment conducive to the participation of women in development.

5. To improve and expand the role of women in various fields of development to increase their contribution to building a strong foundation for the Indonesian nation. To grow and develop women’s personal strength toward the achievement of a just and prosperous society.26

As Women in Development was included in the GBHN and then the REPELITA, there was a specific national budget allocation included for the five year period. This policy and


subsequent programs, were ideologically continuous with women as housewives, and subordinate to husbands and officers of the state. It marked the first time however, that the state acknowledged women as participants in the labour force, coincident with the shift in national priority from agriculture, where women work as unpaid family labour, to industrialization, where the emphasis on manufacturing in developing countries such as Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore had already shifted to incorporating women workers. There was also the recognition that women would need education and skill training to participate in the labour force.

This yet again marked a harnessing of women's labour for the national development drive, only in this instance it was aimed at formal education, and formal sector employment, albeit and the lowest end of the development spectrum. There also was recognition in the policy, that to make these changes in the role of women, the social and cultural context would need to be addressed. This marked the state's legitimation of programs promoting the idealized gender relations in the mass media, and justification for the codification of the separate roles of women and men by law, policy and state practice.

In a review of anthropological studies on women in Indonesia, Kartini Sjahrir noted in 1985:

"From the mid 1970s up until now, the majority of written work on women has taken the theme of their weakness in the field of employment opportunity, wage levels, the hardening of the division of labour based on sex, and after that, women and family planning, etc. ... Concern at the progressively lower role and position of women, and the realization of the importance of their position in the family led to priority for the equalization of development being directed toward women in the Third Five Year Plan. It must be remembered that at the World Conference of Women in Mexico in 1975, one extremely important element put forward was Equal Rights for Women and Men .... The success of this conference had a positive effect on the Government of Indonesia, especially as the complaints about women in the development process seemed to be universal in the life of Third World States."

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The inclusion of a Women in Development chapter in the third five year plan was in response to international attention to the status of women. The state definition of women in development, including appropriate roles, and the legal status of women and men in the family and the household, were national efforts to ensure that Indonesian women did not set their own course. The appointment of minister for women’s affairs, ensured that the Indonesian government had a national government agency to participate in international fora concerning women, in future.

Associate Minister for Women’s Affairs 1978

Government publications proudly announce that Indonesia was one of the first countries in the Asia and Pacific region of the United Nations to have a full ministry dedicated to women’s affairs. Ibu Lasijah Soetanto was appointed Associate Minister for the Role of Women in the REPELITA IV cabinet. The main tasks of the Associate Minister for the Role of Women were to coordinate the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the programs of government departments. The allocation of minimal financing and staff for the Office of the Minister however indicated that this appointment was ornamental.

Program Peningkatan Peranan Wanita Keluarga Sehat Sejahtera (Program for the Enhancement of the Role of Women in Healthy and Prosperous Families)

In 1982, there were significant changes to the mandate of the PKK "movement", particularly to the focus of the activities implemented at the grassroots level. Through the Office of the Associate Minister for the Role of Women, a program coordination and monitoring mechanism was established, the Program Peningkatan Peranan Wanita Keluarga Sehat Sejahtera

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known as *P2W-KSS*, the Program for the Enhancement of the Role of Women in Healthy and Prosperous Families. This marked a shift in emphasis of the goal of the program from *kesejahteraan keluarga* or family welfare, to *keluarga sehat sejahtera* or the healthy and prosperous family. This change in terminology moved away from possible demands for a state welfare system of financial support to families, and toward a definition of improving the role of women in creating healthy and prosperous families.

By an announcement made to the nation by President Suharto, the PKK became the sole standardized vehicle for mobilizing women for any development program at the village level. This action made the delivery of Women in Development programs like a huge military operation. Decisions would be made at the central level of government, and move down the chain of command, through the governors to the province, to the district level, to the lowest level of administrative authority, the village. The wife of the *Kepala Desa*, (the head of the village), *Ibu Kepala Desa*, was appointed the head of the PKK, and the sole representative of women’s organizations on the *Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa* or LKMD (Council for Village Community Resilience).

In President Suharto’s speech to the parliamentary committee meeting announcing the new program he stated:

"The government will support PKK which we hope will be a spearhead for the development of society from below, 'motored' by women. I ask that the various activities programmed at the national level be channelled through PKK. We can have many programs for women to enhance the role of women in development. But is should not be forgotten that these programs are aimed toward and to be implemented by women in the villages, whether in rural or urban areas. If there are too many organizations, it is not in accordance with their simple desires and way of thinking, and will only serve to confuse them." 29

This statement reflects the Javanese notion of Power, as discussed by Ben Anderson. The President demonstrated his capacity to consolidate social forces under his Power, yet with the appearance of making a polite request, "asking" that programmes be channelled through PKK. He assumes a posture of the patron in his wisdom who will prevent confusion, by ensuring unity and uniformity through a hierarchical chain of command that reaches down to the most simple people in villages. It is interesting to note the shift in terminology, from social modernization, to development. This marked the first significant appropriation of the concept of Women in Development by the Indonesian state, to in turn deploy the ideal of women's participation in development against women. The state had set the stage for women to be responsible for a dual role, and a double day, at home ensuring the health of the family, and in the labour force and income generating activities to ensure family prosperity as well.

To account for this shift, it is important to note the changes that occurred in the rural agricultural economy during the 1970s. With the tremendous push in infrastructure for irrigation and changes in seed, chemical inputs and pesticides and mechanization in the rice economy, women in rural areas were displaced from employment. This put pressure on women from rural villages, with little or no education to seek other forms of employment. Some went to work in plantations, others went to urban areas to domestic work. This push into the city, led many women into very low paying jobs in the informal sector, or in labour intensive manufacturing such as hand rolling cigarettes, agricultural processing, peeling prawns, or packaging tea.

Despite the increase in government revenues from oil exports, state expenditures on social services were to be severely limited. The delivery of health, family planning, and other social services was to be the responsibility of women, as unpaid volunteers. Efforts to enhance women’s role in development were not defined on the basis of empirical evidence or women’s definition of their needs, but rather by the need of the state for the low cost delivery of social
services, in order to allocate national funds and international development assistance dollars to improvements in infrastructure for industrialization. During the five years of REPELITA III, the budget allocation for women’s programs was US$10 million.  

Several of the Ten Points of PKK family welfare guidance were also changed, as outlined in Table 5.1. Village women were to become the champion students and implementors of the state ideology Pancasila, which meant that the wives of more senior level government officers were compelled "voluntarily" to become the educators, delivering the state political rhetoric.

Women also became promoters of state structured and managed cooperatives which are mostly in agriculture and agricultural processing; contributors to gotong-royong or mutual self-help, a state requirement of providing the physical labour for maintenance of roads, water supply, irrigation canals, etc. in villages, usually unremunerated; responsible for conservation and management of the village environment; and required to participate in family planning. Through the deployment of this comprehensive Women in Development program package the Indonesian state has objectified women. There is no recognition of the capacity of village women to determine what development they want in their communities, nor what they define as the families they want to live in, nor how they want to participate in the realization of social change.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten Points of PKK 1974</th>
<th>Ten Points of PKK, 1982</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The creation of good relations within and between families;</td>
<td>1. Comprehension and practical application of the national philosophy and state ideology Pancasila;</td>
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<td>2. Correct child care;</td>
<td>2. Gotong royong, mutual self-help;</td>
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<td>3. The use of hygienic food preparation techniques and close attention to nutrition;</td>
<td>3. Hygienic food preparation and attention to nutrition;</td>
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<td>4. Care that clothing is suited to its proper functions - protection, morality, modesty;</td>
<td>4. Selection of appropriate clothing and learning sewing skills;</td>
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<td>5. Intelligent use of house space to meet needs of hygiene, entertainment, etc.;</td>
<td>5. Interior house arrangements for improved hygiene and efficient use of space;</td>
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<td>6. Total family health - in physical, mental, spiritual, and moral spheres;</td>
<td>6. Education and training in new skills;</td>
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<td>7. Effective household budgeting;</td>
<td>7. Primary and family health care;</td>
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<td>8. Efficient basic housekeeping, calculated to maximize order and cleanliness;</td>
<td>8. Promotion of cooperatives;</td>
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<td>9. The preservation of emotional and physical security and a tranquil environment in the home;</td>
<td>9. Maintaining a clean and harmonious home and village environment;</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. The development of family attitudes appropriate to the modernization process - planning for the future.</td>
<td>10. Appropriate domestic and family planning.</td>
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Sources: Department of Information 1982 and 1987.
A field study of the INCO Soroako nickel mine in South Sulawesi from the late 1970s, illustrates the impact state programs for family health, planning and welfare had on social structures and gender relations in nearby villages.

"The change from an economy based on agricultural production, to one where wage labour was the principal form of livelihood had significant effects on all areas of social life. In particular, the fact that the increasing importance of wage labour, in work which took place outside the village and outside the scope of customary social relationships, meant that in Soroako there was an increasing separation between the world of work and domestic life. These had been integrally related in the peasant economy where the members of one's household were also one's principal partners in production. Also, the fact that the mining company almost exclusively recruited men meant that the world of work was principally a male domain, while the village (which employed men left for long hours each day) became principally a female domain. ... This meant that parenting, the care and socialization of young children, increasingly became the province of women. Add to this a consideration of the fact that the older siblings were away from the home, often even the village, because of a greater commitment to education for children, and it is clear that a greater proportion of the child care was falling on women. And indeed, many did feel it a burden. Women often commented on the greater limitations on activities due to the growing demands of child care.\footnote{Kathryn Robinson, "Modernisation and Mothering," in Prisma The Indonesian Indicator, No. 37, September 1985, LP3ES, Jakarta, page 52.}

The state prescribed gender roles of modern formal sector male employee and unpaid female child care worker and house keeper were enacted through the development of the mine. It is interesting to note that child care, subsistence agriculture, and petty trading activities of the women in the villages are not considered work by the author. The notion of separate domains in the spatial divisions between "work" and "village" are not reflected in state policy and practice. The centrally defined state political and administrative structures of Kepala Desa and Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or LKMD (Council for Village Resilience) in fact gendered positions of decision making. The position of Ibu Kepala Desa (wife of the head of the village) as the Kepala PKK (Head of the Family Welfare Movement) is the only woman member of the LKMD, other positions are most often filled by men.
In the example above from the island of Sulawesi, the imposition of a Javanese elite or *priyayi* notion of gender relations through national policy is also evident. Men and older siblings had traditionally been involved in child care and socialization. With modernization and the recruitment of a male labour force women become the sole day time occupants of the village and excluded from economic activity.

Along with these changes in gender roles, relations, and gendered spaces, came the introduction of maternal and child health programs and technologies which had profound impact on women’s health, time and knowledge. The Soroako case study identifies some of these changes.

"In the pre-project village community, the birth, care and raising of children was carried out by members of the community. A number of (usually female) traditional midwives attended births which took place at home. The midwife and a number of female relatives would come to stay for a few days after the birth, and help with the practical care of the child, and give instruction in matters such as breast feeding, and bathing the child. ... In 1979, few young women were availing themselves of the opportunity to give birth in the hospital. ... Most would have called the midwife to their homes. By 1981, it was apparent that many young mothers were choosing to give birth in the company hospital. ... In such cases, the new mothers dispensed with the rituals which followed giving birth, an important source of instruction about the nurturing role of the mother. ... In addition, new ideas and practices with respect to the care of children were being promoted by the wives of company executives by way of a women’s association, formed with the aim of promoting modern ideas about women’s roles. ... Within the organization the idea of the care of children as primarily the mother’s role was stressed. For example, I heard the usual practice of the care of the weaned infant falling to older siblings, criticised as an indication of a lack of motherly feeling, a sign that the mother would reject an older child once a younger one came along. The elite women’s views were promoted in the formal activities of the association, in a 'healthy baby competition' held on *Hari Ibu* (Mother’s Day). The assumption was always that the beliefs and practices of the elite women, with respect to all aspects of women’s roles (child care, domestic management and so on) were superior to those of the village women."

By the end of the period of implementation of the third five year development plan, the organization, programs, ideology and state structures of women in development were effectively implemented throughout Indonesia. The planned development focus on increasing production in rural areas, financed by the national revenues from oil and gas exports was beginning to demonstrate improvement in income levels and a decline in fertility rates. The oil shock of 1982 and decline in world oil prices had a severe impact on the capacity of the government to continue to finance such large scale development efforts.
In the 1980s Indonesian planners shifted emphasis in national development efforts to diversify industrialization strategies. This was in part to absorb labour displaced from agriculture, but also to attract foreign investment and reduce reliance on oil and gas revenues for government financing. One analyst describes the economic interdependence and economic changes of this period:

"Fortuitously, Indonesia’s economic growth was picking up at a time neighbouring Asean economies were beginning to groan under the strain of higher labour costs and overloaded infrastructure. Institutional and commercial donors were also impressed by the way economic liberalism was being implemented in Indonesia. Many were banking on the possibilities after harnessing Indonesia’s racially tolerant, secular society to the modern age. Less openly they were also happy with a state which administered policies of economic rather than political liberalism. What they wanted to see was the development of an open competitive economy founded on private enterprise. Few cared to peer to closely at the confusing reality beneath the surface; the whiff of 'NIC-dom’ was enough. Jungle though it may be, the economic landscape was yielding a bountiful harvest for those with the temerity to venture forth."\(^1\)

Most of the investment in industrial enterprises was concentrated in Java, although diversification in timber and agricultural processing was located in other regions such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra. There were significant increases in manufacturing for export of plywood, textiles, garments and sports shoes all of which rely on a labour force composed of mostly women workers.\(^2\) The rapid expansion of these industries, particularly in East Java, and the JABOTABEK (Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi) region led to protests by local farmers


\(^2\) Meeting Notes from Ministry of Labour, July 1991.
over land grabs, and labour strikes over wages and working conditions.³

The oil crisis of 1982 caused the government to secure foreign development assistance through grants and loans to finance national development, as oil revenues declined due to the significant drop in world prices. Through a process of deregulation and easing of restrictions on foreign investment, industrial development expanded, particularly toward the end of the 1980s.

"The technocrats made enormous efforts to shape a new economic landscape, but were unable to alter fundamentally the socio-political context governing the environment. In private discussions, they would admit they were up against a bureaucracy unwilling to accept change, vested interests who demanded impossible quid pro quos, and ultimately an uncertain political future. What they created was an impressive facade. The foremost obstacle to fundamental change was the New Order's firm resistance to far-reaching institutional reform. The collapse of oil prices in 1982 convinced Suharto of the need to adapt, but not fundamentally alter, the structure of the state. The fact that foreign donors were willing at the same time to provide a cushion of aid meant the financial autonomy of the regime was never threatened. Development spending was sustained. Socio-economic conditions, far from deteriorating in the early 1980s, actually improved through the course of the oil crisis."⁴

Many such claims of improved social and economic welfare for Indonesian citizens are reported through the 1980s and early 1990s based largely on aggregated national data concerning labour force participation rates, rising income per capita, and increases in levels of formal education enrollment and completions. The success of family planning acceptance and decline in the birth rate are also credited with improving living standards.

REPELITA IV 1983-1988

Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) 1983

The Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) 1983


remained almost the same as under REPELITA III, with the exception of the addition of the following clause:

In order to promote the participation of women in development it is necessary to further increase the activities of women for the improvement of family welfare through the programmes of the Family Welfare Movement (*Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* or *PKK*).\(^5\)

The strong emphasis on women as homemakers, and in unremunerated voluntary community work was reinforced. The "state guideline" promoted yet another increase in welfare oriented activities for women.

**Women in Development Chapter of REPELITA IV**

The five-year development plan included specific objectives to enhance the role of women in development as follow:

1. To improve the basic education and skills of women in rural areas, primarily through non-formal education.
2. To improve qualitatively and quantitatively the Family Welfare Programme.
3. To conduct appropriate information and guidance through modern and traditional mass media to change the image of women and public attitudes toward women.
4. To increase women's knowledge and participation in the fields of health, health education for mothers and children, sanitation and nutrition for the family.
5. To increase opportunities for women to participate in training courses, workshops, seminars, conferences, institutions and teams in all fields, and at all levels at home and abroad.\(^6\)

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The Minister for the Role of Women had been able to create an awareness that women’s participation in formal education should be given greater emphasis and that women should be more visible in national and international events. This was no doubt in preparation for the United Nations World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985, which would mark the close of the UN Decade for Women. The inclusion of women’s participation in international conferences in the REPELITA chapter on Women in Development would ensure that state financial resources would be made available to send national delegations to the government and non-governmental conferences in Nairobi.

3. Office of the State Minister for the Role of Women

In the REPELITA IV cabinet, the Associate Minister for the Role Women was upgraded to the level of Minister of State. The Office of the State Minister for the Role of Women or MRW (Kantor Mentri Urusan Peranan Wanita or UPW) became a central government agency responsible for all government affairs concerning women. Like other state ministries, (such as: environment, or youth) it was made responsible for the co-ordination of other ministries and agencies of government, with respect to women’s programs. MRW has several functions:

1. coordination of other agencies of government programmes for women;
2. monitoring and evaluation of government programmes for women;
3. advocacy for women with agencies of government; and
4. reporting on the situation of women to the House of Representatives and the President.

The Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women has no mandate, resources or capacity to implement programs for women. Much like Status of Women Canada, the agency
is responsible to influence other agencies of government to generate policies and programs concerning women.

The Indonesian state is structured and operates in a very military style. There is very highly centralized decision making and policy formulation is in the hands of a very few trusted ministers and officers in Jakarta, whose decisions are in turn implemented through a long chain of command, which reaches down to the smallest village, and to groups of twenty-five households. Government officers down the line, ensure that Presidential and Ministerial decrees, and government policies and programs are implemented. One analyst described the situation:

"Knowledge of the precise nature of any aspect of policy-making under the New Order is at best patchy. Suharto is not a leader prone to allowing his ministers and advisers to take credit for a particular policy. If there is wisdom in the guidance of the state, it flows from him. If mistakes are made, they are the fault of its servants."\(^7\)

The delivery of services and programs for women at the village level have been claimed to be effective. The PKK program in particular has been given international awards by UNICEF for the effectiveness of maternal and child health, nutrition and informal education.\(^8\) As these state sponsored initiatives are national development programs, and designed at the central level of government, they often do not offer the flexibility to respond to the variations in regional differences throughout the country. The financial resources allocated to the delivery of government projects and programs are usually offered to communities through a system of patrimony, involving local government officials. These conditions result in variation according

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to social affiliation with government officers, and ability of provincial or district level governments to generate revenue for development programs. In many cases, the development budgets for specific national programs are allocated through the *Inpres* (Presidential Instruction) mechanism. Financing for building elementary schools, community health centres, etc. have been allocated through the *Inpres* system. This reinforces the authority of the President, and ensures that those loyal citizens who support the President will see national resources allocated to work in their communities.

**Imposition of a Singular State Ideology**

Popular political participation throughout the 1980s was curbed by state interventions into political parties and citizens organisations and associations, by Presidential decree.

"In 1984, Soeharto decreed that all social-political organisations including the civilian political parties, must declare *Pancasila* as their sole ideology, or *asas tunggal*... As the 1980s unfolded, the main story on the political front was the ever-increasing stature of Soeharto and the fading away of potential opposition to him, either from the civilian arena or from within the army. Critical officers were removed and replaced with loyalists. Organizations of all kinds existed under the constant threat of being accused of anti-Pancasila activities. The obligation of swearing allegiance to Pancasila was extended to non-governmental organisations and other social groups."

This included women’s organizations, both formal and informal groups. Course outlines in women’s studies which included Foucault on the reading list were deleted from university curricula on the grounds that his work was against the state ideology. The mandate of PKK

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9. This term refers to the five principles of ideology of the state of Indonesia: Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Representative Government, and Social Justice.


11. Meeting notes, University of Indonesia, 1993.
"motivators" to provide education on *Pancasila* ideology (as introduced in the changes of 1982) ensured that the women's political participation would be enclosed within state defined boundaries preventing educated elite women from challenging the policies and programs which targeted rural women, or women workers.

The imposition of this one ideology on all Indonesians gave the state the authority to define the boundaries of political debate, which has had an impact on feminist politics in Indonesia, as well as other popular movements. According to Adam Schwarz:

"Frequent and ominous warnings about the ever-present threats to national unity—from, among others, communists, radical Muslims, and Westernized liberals—are meant to ward off moves for political changes. In a society which is culturally comfortable with strong rule and deeply concerned with national unity, these warnings act as powerful disincentives to political reformation. The political choice available to Indonesia, Soeharto argues, is not between authoritarianism and democracy; it is between 'Pancasila democracy'—that is, the status quo—and chaos."  

This New Order regime continues to present only these two political options for women as well. The demonization of *GERWANI* women as sexualized, lacking in morals or religion continues. Their demise as part of the violent attacks on the communists in the mid 1960s, at a time that many Indonesians remember as chaotic, reinforces the notion that only the New Order can provide the order and stability required for development. The morality of the preservation of national unity has in turn been extended to be associated with "Western" women in general, and "feminists" in particular. European and foreign women are permitted by censors at the Ministry of Information to be seen in films and advertising images in Indonesia, as sexually promiscuous, without religion. Indonesian women are not permitted to be portrayed in these kinds of roles.

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The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

In 1980, Indonesia sent their first Ministerial delegation to a United Nations Conference on Women in Copenhagen. The Assistant Minister for the Role of Women signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. In 1984 the Indonesian House of Representatives ratified this UN Convention (Act No. 7/1984). This action was in significant contrast to those taken toward popular citizens movements in Indonesia during the same period of time.

This is one example of how international pressure can be exerted on national governments to make change for women. With the ratification of this convention in place, women in Indonesia can press the government to enact this commitment. In 1994, a group of women academics established the Convention Watch Working Group within the Graduate Program in Women’s Studies at the University of Indonesia, which brings together activists, academics, legislators and policy makers. Members of Convention Watch conduct research and field studies to monitor the implementation of the convention in particular areas of law, and then present the results to appropriate government bodies to press for change. They are funded by the Asia Foundation and the United States Agency for International Development. While the convention is a complex legal document, and out of the range of accessibility of many Indonesian women, by working with the existing commitment of the Indonesian government for reform, women can press for change without threats to their personal safety. The university program in Women’s Studies effectively creates a bridge between women in the community, activists and the government, and provides a political space for the study and discussion of feminist politics.

The compulsory membership of women's organizations in KOWANI, severely limits women in participation in society, politics and development, as mentioned earlier. The new law introduced to govern organizations in Indonesia, Number 8/1985, gives the government the power "to abolish any organization that has been found to engage in activities that cause public disorder, receive foreign financial support without consent of the government, provide help to foreign interests that are in direct opposition to the interests of the nation as a whole."¹⁴

Clearly it is the officers of the government who determine which activities are deemed as causing public disorder, or in opposition to the interests of the nation. Feminist organizations have come under much more severe scrutiny by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the police and the military since this law came into effect. They have had publications seized and banned, meetings and seminars closed, and arrests and apprehensions for "interviews" have become commonplace among women activists. Peaceful public demonstrations are disrupted by the police who are not a civilian force, but part of the military. The threat and practice of state violence against women activists is a very real condition for Indonesian feminists.

This statute also authorized surveillance of the transfers of funds from any source, personal, institutional, governmental or charitable, particularly those from international sources. This has caused Indonesian women's organizations to become much more bureaucratized in order learn how to manage, censor and disclose funding sources, including the masking of funding relationships that are perceived to be in violation of state policy. Organizations must have the capacity to manage funds according to accounting standards that enable the presentation

of financial statements to government, or face closure. Indonesian government officials defend the necessity of this broad range of state authority over citizens associations, on the basis of the fear of terrorism and violence that could possibly be financially supported by fundamentalist Moslem groups or countries in the Middle East. Funds from Europe and North America that support trade unions and the labour movement are also closely monitored.

World Summit on Women in Nairobi in 1985

Indonesia sent a government delegation to the Nairobi United Nations Conference on Women, and adopted the Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement for Women: Equality, Development and Peace upon the conclusion of the meetings. A large delegation of women from KOWANI were supported financially by the government to attend the non-governmental forum as well. The exposure of Indonesian government officials, and para-state representatives to women from other developing countries was significant. In the drive to ensure that donor agency funding was secured for development assistance in Indonesia, their Women in Development requirements were given attention.

Women’s Participation in the Labour Force

In the 1980’s women’s participation in the Indonesian labour force increased significantly. Two particular labour markets are worthy of note. The manufacturing industries which relocated from other Asian countries, sought young female workers, particularly garments, sports shoes, textiles and electronics. State policies which supported migrant workers to go abroad to improve foreign exchange earnings through remittances had particular impact on women. While the
target set for the Fourth Five Year Plan was 250,000 migrant workers, official sources reported that 465,972 Indonesian migrant workers were processed by the Department of Manpower to be sent abroad, during that period, remitting US$ 552 million. In 1983, 41.5 percent of migrant workers were women, by 1988 women accounted for 77.5 percent of migrant workers, mainly going abroad to domestic work.

REPELITA V 1988-1993

The Women in Development chapter of REPELITA V appears in the section titled "Kesejahteraan Sosial dan Peranan Wanita" Social Welfare and the Role of Women. The heading of the chapter was altered from Peranan Wanita or the Role of Women in previous REPELITA documents, to Peranan Wanita dalam Pembangunan Bangsa, or the Role of Women in National Development. This signified a shift in the state rhetoric, rather than women being the delivery vehicle for social and family welfare, they became human resources for national development. The adjective bangsa in this case means national in the sense of a people, not the more administrative term which would have been the Indonesian term nasional.

Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) 1988

"1. Women as citizens and as potential human resources in development, have the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities in all aspects of the nation's life and development activities. Therefore her status in the community and her role in


development should be continuously accelerated and directed toward facilitating maximum contribution to national building in accordance with *nature, self esteem and dignity as women.* [my emphasis]

2. The role of women in development should increase harmoniously with the development of their responsibilities and role in creating health and prosperous families, including the development of youth, children, and adolescents, particularly health and nutrition, education, including religious and spiritual education and rights.

3. In order to enhance the role and responsibilities of women, their capacities should be further promoted by increasing knowledge and skills, in order to increase their employment opportunities. In this context, the development of the social-cultural environment should be made more conducive to women's participation in development.

4. In order to promote the participation of women in development, the welfare of the family should be enhanced, among others through the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) as a social mobilization growing from the grass-roots level with women as motivators. 17

The phrase used at the end of the first guideline of state policy "in accordance with nature, self esteem and dignity as women" has become a focus of considerable debate in Indonesia among women, feminists, government officials at the Ministry of State for the Role of Women, in the House of Representatives, and in the mass media.

In Indonesian language, the phrase reads:

"*pembangunan bangsa sesuai dengan kodrat, harkat dan martabatnya sebagia wanita.*" [my emphasis] 18

The term at the centre of debate and contest is *kodrat.* I first learned this term in a national workshop sponsored by the Ministry of State for the Role of Women in August, 1991. The workshop was concerned with developing a situational analysis of women in Indonesia, using


statistical evidence. Approximately two hundred participants were representatives from various sectoral departments, the twenty-seven provinces of Indonesia, women’s studies centres, para-statal organizations and community based non-governmental organizations.

In the orderly manner of Indonesian government consultations with the public, the meeting was officially opened by the Minister, then there were a series of lectures. Then participants were given the opportunity to make comments or ask questions. People spoke one by one, using microphones, as the hall was so large, and speaking with a soft voice is one of the signs of polite (halus) and respectful behaviour.

There was a great deal of whispering among participants, it seemed mostly from the men, and what seemed to me some very inappropriate laughter. I turned to my very senior and experienced colleague seated next to me, and asked what the term kodrat meant, and what all the noise was about. She said kodrat had to do with biology, the reproductive organs that a woman had. She said that when this issue is discussed men make jokes among themselves, but we (women) just ignore them. I was confused, but got the signal that I should not pursue the issue further at that time.

Some months later, I discussed the meaning of the term kodrat with an Indonesian friend, a graduate of the Faculty of English Literature, who works with women’s organizations but earns her income from translation and interpretation. This woman is a Christian, the daughter of an high ranking Javanese officer in the military, who is Moslem. She grew up in a small city in Central Java in a very traditional Javanese family.

She told me that the word kodrat came from Arabic language, and meant the physical manifestation of the will of Allah. So for instance, she explained that because women have a uterus and breasts, it is the will of Allah that they must bear children and breast feed, meaning
that they are responsible for the care of children.

On another occasion in 1993, I was involved in a big debate, in three languages at dinner at a friend’s house, where everyone disagreed about the meaning of *kodrat*. One woman was a technical consultant, working with the International Labour Organization and the Ministry of Labour, to establish a set of guidelines for the occupational health and safety of women workers. She was exceedingly frustrated, because one of the men in the Ministry of Labour claimed that women should be forbidden to work at night because of *kodrat*, they should be home with their children. The consultant argued that the decision should be the choice of the woman.

Some young educated Indonesian woman insisted that until women had passed child bearing age, around 40, they should be prevented from exposure to dangerous work, toxic chemicals and night work, in order to preserve their reproductive health. The ILO technical specialist argued that all workers should be protected from toxic chemicals and dangerous work, according to the variations of the impact of those on women and men, due not only to their biological health, but also to the gendered division of labour. Young women of child bearing age should be prevented from working with leaded gasoline, was her example.

In early 1997, I discussed the use of the term *kodrat* in state Women in Development policy with a prominent Indonesian woman psychologist. She had yet another perspective on this issue.

"I hate the word *kodrat* in the GBHN, I have asked both Ministers [of State for the Role of Women, Ibu Sulaskin Murpratomo and Ibu Mien Sugandhi] "why don’t we throw it out?" and even Ibu xxxx [a prominent woman lawyer] said we cannot throw it out. *Kodrat* means a person’s potential, but it has been given a very negative interpretation, implying limitations. A woman does not have to breast feed just because she has a baby. A woman can express her milk, and the baby can be fed with a bottle. Or another woman can feed the baby. In Europe they had wet nurses. The term comes from Javanese language not Arabic. *Fitra* is the term in the Islam religion, which refers to your own potential. As long as we cannot get rid of that word *kodrat*, we will not be able to get rid of that kind of thinking, that kodrat only applies
to women, and women are limited to the care of children. If the term has to be in state policy, then it should be *kodrati*, which applies to both men and women. The strategies of women [working for change] in Indonesia have to consider the words of the President."^{19}

In a needs assessment report commissioned by USAID, an expert panel of women was convened to identify solutions and strategies for the promotion of Indonesian women in politics. The panel concluded that new perspectives on the division of labour between men and women should be developed, including:

"...[an] alternate definition of women's *kodrat*. Indonesians acknowledge the term "*kodrat" to determine the "nature vs nurture" debate on women's position in the society. Traditionally, "*kodrat" consists not only of the biological aspects of women being: maternity (giving birth and breast-feeding) and menstrual cycles, but also the socialization of roles deemed as proper for women: as homemakers. A new definition of *kodrat* would only stipulate the biological needs of women. The role of homemaker can also be performed by men."^{20}

In the state policy, the term *kodrat* is invoked to limit women to the role of mother, child care worker and homemaker, based on the assumption of biological capacity to bear children. Regardless of the etymology of the word, whether from Java or Islam, the state draws on the term to invoke an Indonesian and non-western claim to maintaining women in the role of mother and homemaker in national development.

Women in Development Chapter of REPELITA V

The strategies for the enhancement of the role of women in development presented in

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^{19}. Notes from meeting with a professor in Jakarta, January 21, 1997.

REPELITA V, are the following:

1. To raise and enhance the status and role of women in society according to their nature as women, attention will primarily be paid to improving the welfare of poor women in urban as well as rural areas, and secondly to those aged 15 to 29 years.

2. To develop healthy and prosperous and happy families, women should not only be objects but also implementers and beneficiaries in various fields of development. For this purpose the P2W-KSS (Peningkatan Peranan Wanita Menuju Keluarga Sehat dan Sejahtera) or Enhancing the Role of Women Toward Healthy and Prosperous Families Program has to be strengthened and better coordinated.

3. With regard to education and skills, the policies are directed at:
   a) eliminating illiteracy, and ignorance of Bahasa Indonesia and deficiency in basic education;
   b) encouraging, especially poor women to gain access to secondary education;
   c) promoting a more conducive social environment for women to gain equal access to formal and informal employment as well as various positions in society;
   d) encouraging greater participation among women in the development and utilization of technology; and
   e) enhancing knowledge and skills of women for raising their children.

4. Efforts to improve family welfare will increasingly be based on active social participation in various activities. In this regard the role of non-governmental organizations especially the Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga or PKK or Family Welfare Movement will be further developed in order to enable them to actively participate in all aspects of development in all areas.

5. To enhance the role and responsibility of women in development, greater opportunities will be given to women to become decision makers, policy makers, planners and beneficiaries of development.21

These Women in Development strategies marked several significant shifts in state policy from previous development plans. The first was to raise the status of women in society, not just increase activities, and the acknowledgement that there were poor women in rural and urban areas. The influence of international concepts of Women in Development theory were adopted in the second strategy, which aims for women to be beneficiaries, not just objects and implementers of development, as women had been identified in previous state plans. In the third

strategy, specific skills in national language, formal educational achievements and access to technology, to equip women for employment and positions in society are identified. This marked a shift in the recognition that women were employed in both formal and informal sector employment, and participated in economic development, not only family and social welfare. The PKK however remains the focus of delivery of development at the grassroots level. In the fifth strategy, opportunities for women to participate in decision and policy making and development planning are identified. This was the first Women in Development statement that acknowledged women’s participation in the political and state mechanisms of development planning and decision making. These strategies were announced as part of REPELITA V, and therefore provided the opportunity for women to seek state financial and human resources to match these statements of principle in programs.

Minister of State for the Role of Women

Sulaskin Murpratomo had been appointed State Minister for the Role of Women in 1987, after the death of the previous minister. She was then reinstated with the Fifth Development Cabinet. Her approach to the position was similar to those in cabinet that were technocrats. She took her leadership role within government very seriously, and her view of improving the status of women in the economy, politics, the government and science is reflected in the marked changes in government strategy of REPELITA V.

Ibu Murpratomo came to the position of minister after her tenure as head of KOWANI, the Indonesian Women’s Congress. She had been a long standing member of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) since 1982, for the ruling Golkar faction. From 1958 until 1983, Ibu Murpratomo had been employed by UNICEF as a Project Officer, and had been exposed through United Nations development assistance projects to Women in Development as a critique
of development models. She attended the United Nations Conference for Women in Nairobi in 1985, as the head of KOWANI, and was familiar with non-governmental organizations criticisms of the relationships between donor agencies and recipient countries through this and other international fora.

The Minister came to her appointment with knowledge of Indonesian government systems from the national policy and political systems, to village level project implementation. She knew women and men in non-governmental organizations, universities, and donor agencies.

*Ibu* Murpratomo had a clear vision of what she wanted the Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women to accomplish during her tenure. She brought new *Staf Ahli*, (technical advisory staff) and Assistant Ministers from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*LIPI*) and respected social scientists from prominent universities to her office. She described these key staff as "thinkers" necessary to influence policy formulation and program planning in other agencies of government. Her view was that the office of the state minister for women's affairs would be staffed by officers with the intellectual capacity to influence others to change government systems and programs to benefit women. In her view, development planning in Indonesia had to become more gender responsive, based on empirical evidence of the situation, conditions and status of women and men in various regions of Indonesia. Her staff needed the capacity to provide facts and analysis about the situation of women, which would frame government resource allocations and programs.

The Office of the Minister for the Role of Women was structured with four divisions that mirrored the strategies mentioned above:

1. Women in Health and Welfare
2. Women Workers
3. Education and Training of Women and

An Assistant Minister was placed in charge of each of these divisions, and made responsible for the coordination of women's participation in government programs in each of these areas through the establishment of working groups with representatives of the planning bureaus of other government ministries and agencies. The *P2W-KSS (Peningkatan Peranan Wanita Menuju Keluarga Sehat dan Sejahtera)* or Enhancing the Role of Women Toward Healthy and Prosperous Families program was restructured. The program was titled *P2W (Peningkatan Peranan Wanita)* Enhancing the Role of Women, and was expanded in collaboration with fourteen ministries, that then were responsible to account to the Minister for the Role of Women on the participation of and benefit to women in development programs of other departments such as: Public Works, Religious Affairs, Agriculture, Education and Culture, Tourism, Industry, Labour, Trade, etc.

Ensuring that women benefit from development was not just a matter of developing a bureaucratic system, and pressuring decision makers to allocate financial resources to women. State and para-statal structures did draw the participation of some Indonesian women, in some sectoral programs, but usually they involved women of the older generation in Dharma Wanita or PKK activities that had a welfare orientation, even though sponsored by the Department of Public Works, or Agriculture. The case can be made that a coordination mechanism with the Office of the Minister for the Role of Women, could not adequately ensure programs that would meet the needs and aspirations of women in a rapidly industrializing society. Containment of student demonstrations, labour disruptions and strikes of women factory workers prompted military intervention during *Ibu* Murpratomo's leadership, which remained outside the sphere of influence of the coordinating mandate of the Minister for the Role of Women.
Many young people who are high school and university graduates apply their skills to work in private sector companies, or non-governmental organizations or community groups that are beyond the reach of government departmental programs. Foreign investment has expanded private sector employment freeing young women working in factories and offices from civil service employee based organizations. Women who are highly skilled professionals can now get better working conditions and benefits from employment with private firms than in government offices or universities. As a consequence of working for a private firm, women are no longer required to demonstrate their loyalty to state institutions and policies, as they are freed from compulsory membership in state and para-statal organizations. However, women working in private sector employment with husbands in the civil service, are still required to participate in government family welfare programs and to campaign for the ruling GOLKAR party during election campaigns, to ensure the security of their husbands position.

*Ibu* Murpratomo had been to villages and seen first hand in the delivery of UNICEF programs and through women's organizations including the *PKK* the problems with the variation of resources and quality in the delivery programs for women in rural and urban areas. She was well aware of the shifts in women's employment to formal and informal sector enterprises, and the effects particularly on the status of young women in factories. During her tenure there were several significant increases in financial resources to women's programs in all regions of Indonesia.

She held annual meetings with representatives of donor agencies, where each agency was asked to report their expenditures for women’s programs over the past year, and funding requests for the following year were presented. In an autocratic and polite manner of a Javanese ruler, she would ask each participant to increase their support for women, often asking her staff to quote from donor agency Women in Development policy documents.
Ibu Murpratomo was able to work with the President to prepare a Presidential decree which was announced in April of 1991. By this decree each province was required to establish a Women in Development Management Team which was chaired by the Vice-Governor, and responsible to report the Minister of State for the Role of Women and the Minister of Home Affairs twice a year on the allocation of provincial budgets to women’s programs in their province, including the PKK. This mechanism and reporting format of public accountability before superiors, alongside peers among the Vice-Governors was very effective in increasing the financial allocations for women’s programs.

By the same Presidential decree, each government university and Islamic institute was required to establish a Women’s Studies Centre, which would provide analytical resources and research capacity on the situation of women in each province to the Women in Development Management Teams. The implementation of these decisions did meet with resistance in some regions. Some academics appointed to Women’s Studies Centres were pleased to have the opportunity to do research, and be released from heavy teaching loads. Others had no interest in research projects which were tools for state planners, and preferred to remain more distant from government officers and state sponsored women’s programs. In some regions Women’s Studies Centres were able to get considerable financial resources for research on women in their provinces from provincial government budgets. The establishment of Women’s Studies Centres by the authority of the President provided legitimacy to research concerning women with the Rectors of universities, and the Directorate of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education and Culture. Financial resources to fund the centres was not part of the Presidential decree, but the sanction of the President made the struggles for funding within institutions more legitimate, as part of national development.
Indonesia Women’s Programs on the International Stage

In the 1988, UNICEF and the World Health Organization presented international awards to the PKK for achievements in community development and health care. President Suharto also received an award for the Family Planning program as mention in Chapter 5. With the rise in income levels reported since the New Order regime had taken power in Indonesia, opportunities arose for Indonesia to take leadership internationally, and achievements regarding women in development was one area that the state wished to promote. In September 1991, Indonesia hosted the summit of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and in parallel held a ministers conference on women in development, in which ministers and officers from other developing countries were able to visit projects in villages and urban areas of Indonesia. At the close of the Summit, Indonesia’s President Suharto was chosen leader of the non-aligned movement for a two year term.

REPELITA VI 1993-1998

During the closing years of Ibu Murpratomo’s tenure as Minister of State for the Role of Women, considerable effort was made to influence the policy development process for the 1993 Broad Guidelines of State Policy or GBHN and REPELITA VI. The Minister wanted not only a Women in Development chapter in the guidelines and the plan, but a statement of policy and a commitment to the participation of women in each sectoral chapter of the plan. Despite considerable effort and financial resources to train government planners in gender responsive

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development planning with technical and financial resources from several international agencies and donors, this goal was not realized.

Minister Murpratomo encountered considerable opposition to the introduction of the term gender in Indonesia. In her view, and the approach of her advisors, a gender approach would be more acceptable to Indonesian decision makers, and the technocrats who formulate state policy, because it clearing included men and women, and would not be dismissed as "Western" feminism. Taking the elements of social justice from the state ideology Pancasila and the principles of equality from the 1945 Constitution and the Indonesian ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the technical staff of the Ministry and their colleagues in the Central Bureau of Statistics, Women’s Studies Centres and BAPPENAS the National Development Planning Agency, they developed detailed analyses in policy papers and plans for Women in Development in REPELITA VI.

When these were presented to officers of Planning Bureaus in government departments, and members of the People’s Consultative Assembly, they encountered hostility, resistance and dismissal. Michael Vatikiotis describes international efforts to encourage political change in Indonesia.

"In late 1989 Indonesia’s major donors moved to address the issue of human rights, popular participation and a broadening of the political base.... Flexible when it came to preserving the financial integrity of Indonesia, Suharto could not be convinced that any aspect of the political system need changing. He was fond of telling visiting dignitaries that Indonesia’s stability was ensured by the democratic process developed by the New Order. If there were short comings in the legal and bureaucratic area, these were because of Indonesia’s developing country status. ... The argument was apparently convincing. Mindful of investment opportunities the aid poured in."

The Minister’s technical staff and advisors encountered the same kind of rigidity among

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the officers of the bureaucracy and elected and appointed members of the People's Consultative Assembly, who were for the most part men. Convincing them that government planning should provide for women to participate in decision making, proved impossible at that time. The Minister herself said that she encountered most difficulty from the people in her own political party, particularly those from Moslem organizations and regions of the country. Gender responsive development was proven to be a political struggle, not merely a technical exercise.

Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN (State Policy Broad Guidelines) 1993

After considerable debate, and many revisions the following policy guidelines for women in development were announced by the President in 1993, for REPELITA VI.

1. Women as citizens and human resources for development shall have the rights, obligations and opportunities equal to those of men in development in all fields. The development of women's role as equal partners of men shall be directed towards improving their active participation in development activities including the effort to nurture healthy prosperous and happy families, as well as the growth and development of children, young people and youth, in the framework of building up the Indonesian man in his entirety. The position of women in the family and the society as well as their role in development shall be maintained and further enhanced to be able to contribute their utmost to national development with due respect to the quality, dignity and position of women. [kodrat]

2. Women's capabilities need to be developed by promoting their mastery of science and technology, skills and mental and spiritual resilience, to be able to better utilize the opportunity play an effective role in all aspects of national life and in all activities of development including the process of decision making and capable of facing all kinds of changes within society and the international world. The social and cultural climate shall be developed to be more supportive towards the effort of improving the quality and dignity of women to enable them to play an active role in society life and in the circles of families in a harmonious and synchronized way.

3. The efforts to bring about family welfare shall be further promoted among others by upgrading the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) as a community development movement through which shall grow from the bottom up through the movement of the small, happy and prosperous family in which women are the motivators. Improvement of women's role in family welfare shall be made simultaneously with the improvement of the awareness of parents of their role and responsibility in the education of children and young people by relying on values of religion and national culture.
4. The role of women in community development in the urban as well as rural areas shall continue to be promoted particularly in addressing the various social and economic issues, directed towards an even distribution of the results of development, promotion of quality human resources, and preservation of the environment.

5. To meet the increasing demands for skilled manpower in development, women personnel shall be much required in the various fields of employment. Special attention should be paid to increased skills, productivity, welfare and protection of women workers including those working overseas especially in relation to occupational health and safety, career development and assurance of social services for them and their families with due regard to the quality, status and dignity of women. [kodrat] 25

In the first guideline, the notion of women and men being "equal partners" in development is introduced. Women are still first and foremost associated with their role in the family, and the masculinist terminology of the "Indonesian man" is clearly stated in the English language translation. In Indonesian language the term mitra sejajar actually means parallel partners, although Indonesian government official translations, and government officers always refer to this term as meaning equal partners. By selecting this term for use in state policy it has become part of the jargon of Women in Development practice of the New Order regime, over the past few years. The application of this term to gender relations in Indonesian society is still contested by Indonesian women and men who are working for social change. As one government officer pointed out:

"The use of sejajar or parallel, does not challenge the traditionally ascribed roles and relations between women and men within the family, or in society. The wives of those in the military are required to follow their husbands, to move to which ever the location their husband’s posting. In name, the government claims that this is equality, but the hierarchy of men over women is not challenged. Women remain parallel, but subordinate."26


26. Meeting notes from group discussions during a Gender Training Workshop with CARE community field workers in December 1993, in South Sulawesi.
In the second clause of state policy, women's capability in science and technology is addressed, and the role of women in decision making not only in society and internationally is articulated. This reflects the effort of the women officers of the government agencies to ensure that Indonesian women are part of international fora. Many Indonesian women believe that international attention on women's issues in Indonesia creates and protects at least some degree of political space for women's issues.

Several members of the Minister’s advisory team fought to include the notion of parental responsibility for children and young people which is in the third guideline. This statement is seen as a step toward eliminating women from sole responsibility for child care, justified by kodrat. In the next guideline women’s roles in social and economic issues is identified, and for the first time their role in environmental conservation stated. This inclusion was in response to the participation of Indonesian women from government and non-governmental organizations in the UN sponsored Rio Earth Summit in 1992.

The attention to women workers in the fifth policy statement clearly marked a shift in acknowledgement by the state that women are part of the labour force, and efforts should be made to address their access to opportunities and working conditions.

It is difficult to assess the value of these changes in the wording of state policy. During the evaluation of a gender training workshop for community development workers in eastern Indonesia in 1993, when I asked participants what was the most valuable tool they had to take back to their work in rural villages, they said it was the official copy of the Women in Development chapter of the GBHN. They believed that having an official document from the MPR, the People’s Consultative Assembly with the authority of the President, which stated that

translation by this author.
women were to be participating equally with men in decision making, would assist them in making community organizing more open to women participants.

Nonetheless, the majority of financial and human resources directed to development in Indonesia, are still delivered by men, to men. Without any system of impact assessment, it is difficult to measure whether these policy changes really have any impact on the conditions of women's lives, and their status and position in Indonesian society. Many women activists claim that the only women who benefit from the efforts of the women's ministry, and the women who are senior officers in the government, who get more opportunities for international travel, and more power within the state bureaucracy, and there is little or no effect on ordinary working women.

Minister of State for the Role of Women

In the Sixth Development Cabinet, and a new Minister of State for the Role of Women was appointed, Ibu R.A. Aminah Sugandhi. The widow of a former general, she came to the post from being the head of KOWANI. She was well known as a good orator and campaigner for Golkar, the ruling faction in the House of Representatives, and the People's Consultative Assembly. She had been active in many national social organizations, affiliated with Golkar, but had no experience with government development programs before she was appointed minister.

The significance of the change in leadership of the ministry cannot be explained only through the performance of the previous minister, and her staff team. Her appointment to the post from her position has the head of KOWANI marked a continuity with Ibu Murpratomo.
There were many changes in the appointment of ministers to the major economic portfolios in the Sixth Development Cabinet, attributed to the rise of Islamic groups within Golkar and the opposition PPP party, which criticized the domination of key economic posts by Christian technocrats. Dissent and posturing among senior military officials brought changes to senior posts in the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. Ibu Sugandhi was known to be very loyal to the President and his family.

Regardless of the reason for her appointment as minister by the President, her leadership brought a marked change in the approach, staff and goals of the ministry. The senior advisors and assistant minister were quickly retired from service or replaced, largely by people with administrative government experience, not policy analysts. Meeting with donors and Vice-Governors became ceremonial, rather than technically focused opportunities to call government planners and officers to be accountable for women’s participation in development. A national year of Women in Development was declared for 1994, but much of the state national budget allocated to the office of the minister, was diverted to the costs of hosting the Asia-Pacific preparatory technical and ministerial conferences in July 1994, in Jakarta in preparation for the United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing the following year. Issues of women’s welfare were brought again to the fore and mass women’s organizations sponsored by the state were again celebrated and lauded. The themes of women in decision making, policy formulation and economic development faded by comparison.

Harmonious Partnership

A particular element of the text of the GBHN was selected by the staff of the Minister for the Role of Women in the Sixth Development Cabinet, to become a major theme of women
in development policy and state ideology. The end of the third policy guideline states:

"The social and cultural climate shall be developed to be more supportive towards the effort of improving the quality and dignity of women to enable them to play an active role in society life and in the circles of families in a harmonious and synchronized way." 27

The President had announced this among other policy guidelines at the close of the heated debates in the People's Consultative Assembly over the Women in Development issues to be address in REPELITA VI. At that time labour strikes were increasing in Indonesia, and women workers were frequently staging protest demonstrations at the Ministry of Labour, and the House of Representatives, demanding that labour legislation for women workers, particularly the minimum wage and maternity benefits be enforced by the government. In order to contain this appearance of conflict, the notion of women's role being in "harmony" with men, became the theme promoted by the Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women.

This theme of harmony in society and the family was again underscored by a Presidential announcement on Hari Ibu (Mother's Day) December 22, 1995, when Suharto said:

"Dengan kemitrasejajar pria dan wanita yang harmonis, kita bangun bangsa Indonesia yang maju dan sejatera lahir dan batin." 28 (With the parallel partnership of men and women which is harmonious, we will develop the Indonesian nation advanced and prosperous materially and spiritually.)

This statement was printed, signed by the President, framed in gold, and is now mounted on the walls of Women's Studies Centres in universities, the meeting rooms of women's organizations and government offices. The themes of harmonious partnership between women and men in


28. Noted from a signed original print in the meeting room of the Graduate Program in Women's Studies, University of Indonesia, January, 1997.
national development has become the hallmark of the Indonesian ministry nationally, and in international events, such as the United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. The President can claim that criticism from women has been contained and consolidated under his leadership into harmonious partnerships for national development, even though social action throughout Indonesia proves otherwise.

REPELITA VI

One of the major themes of the Sixth Indonesian Development Plan was the alleviation of poverty. Following the success of models such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the National Development Planning Board brought Professor Dr. Mubyarto from Gadyah Mada University to head a program to alleviate poverty in the poorest villages of Indonesia. The program would provide low interest loans to groups of families, who would determine their own priorities and plans for development funded by these revolving credit schemes. A program of Presidential Instruction, it was implemented directly to people in the villages through Bank Rakyat Indonesia through their branches as the local level, not through government departments. Despite the efforts of the staff of the Ministry of State for the Role of Women and their development planning colleagues, the equal partnership of women and men was not included as an element of the design of this program, and the benefits of the program to women are questionable.

Activism in the labour movement continues, despite efforts to contain strikes, demonstrations and protests. The dual function of the military in civilian matters, such as labour strikes, many of which involve women, continues to be contested. The ability of the state to protect Indonesian women migrant workers overseas has also been a contentious issue, as hundreds of thousands of workers go abroad to domestic work. Military intervention was
required to quell protests in July 1996, over state interference in the selection of the leadership of the opposition *PDI* (Democratic Party of Indonesia). In this case, Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was democratically elected leader of the party in 1994, was ousted in a state sponsored counter conference of the *PDI*.

The achievement of harmonious partnership between women and men in national development and prosperity in Indonesia is yet to be realized.
CHAPTER 6   INDONESIAN WOMEN IN THE 1990s

Many women are working for social and political change for women in urban and rural areas throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The deployment of Women in Development policies and programs by the New Order regime has shaped the form, issues and strategies of the contemporary Indonesian women's movement. But policies and programs are not the only state mechanisms of the New Order which influence the women's movement and gender relations in Indonesia. A generation of feminists were effectively silenced by the military's demonization of the members of GERWANI who were at Lubang Buaya at the time of the killing of the Generals in 1965. The fear of violence from the military and the police keeps many women from challenging the status quo.

Many women with whom I have worked in Indonesia refuse to refer to themselves as feminists. The term is commonly called the "F" word in women's circles. Many prominent women in academia, the government and social and political organizations that speak out on women's issues and press for change are of the generation that came to power in the late 1960s. These women are usually of the "older" generation women, aged approximately 55 to 70 years. There are younger women, who came of age after the 1965 coup attempt, and were not as influenced by the murders and military propaganda of that time. They are the daughters who have come of age under the New Order regime, with promises of modernization, development and prosperity. For many of these younger women who have not had access to the benefits of development, there is considerable discontent and frustration. Usually it is younger women between the ages of 20 to 35 years in Indonesia who tend to be more radical. They are often dismissed by those of the older generation as impatient, too critical, and demanding changes that
are unacceptable to Indonesian society.¹

The women's movement in Indonesia is fractured. As in many other countries it operates in very loose coalitions, which form and change quickly, depending on the issues which are addressed. Many efforts are made to unify across class boundaries, ethnic and religious differences, and regional identities. Some efforts focus on resistance to oppression and "malestream" social change, others are constructive, building organizations founded on feminist visions. These efforts wax and wane, resulting in a fragmented coalescence of women who know each other, who know of the work of others, but work from their different locations in society with different strategies to affect change in the social and political conditions in Indonesia.

When I was involved in a project with the Graduate Program in Women's Studies at the University of Indonesia in 1997, some of the academic staff explained the difficulty that they had with gaining acceptance for using feminist qualitative research methods. They explained that the term "feminist" was dismissed as Western, and told that it had no place in Indonesian research. They decided to call their work research from the perspective of Indonesian women. This was met with much less resistance, and was noted as an addition to the construction of knowledge in Indonesia.

In this chapter, I will present profiles of some of the women who are part of the contemporary Indonesian women's movement, fractured and fragmented as it is. These case studies illustrate how the apparatus and mechanisms of the state affect women in Indonesia. As far as possible, I will present the work and the efforts they make from the perspective of Indonesia women, as they have shared their lives with me.

¹ Personal notes from a meeting with graduate students in Women's Studies at the University of Indonesia, January, 1997.
International connections are a common feature of many of the individuals, organizations, and institutions involved in social and political change for women, the merits and constraints of which are contested and debated by many. My work in Indonesia with women, has caused me to take various stands on these issues at different times. In some cases, Indonesian women have asked me to be with them, to witness their work, to listen to them, and learn about their lives and experiences, because they believe that having foreign witnesses, observers and communications can strengthen their demands for feminist political space within Indonesia. Some Indonesian women see feminist efforts to bring women’s issues into the United Nations assemblies and agencies as the only effective way to put pressure on their national government. The national social policies, programs and structures of make of women within the country problematic. Other believe that international connections have diverted Indonesian women away from working with women within the country and produced a network of international conference attendants, who seek to appropriate the experience of Indonesian women activists as fodder for information consumers overseas.

The role of international donor agencies, both government and non-government and the structure of their relationships with women in developing countries such as Indonesia, are questionable. Support directed through bilateral and multilateral agencies to the government can actually reinforce the strength of the state instruments which work to suppress activism and oppress women in Indonesia.

The international non-governmental organizations that can and do support women’s groups and organizations in developing countries often have administrative and reporting requirements to satisfy standards set in developed countries. These procedures are usually unfamiliar to women in developing countries. In order to access development assistance women in Indonesia must divert efforts from their activism, education, advocacy or research to training
in bureaucratic administration and management. In most cases knowledge of European languages and "Western" cultural values are required. Consider the experience of one Indonesian women's organization, Yayasan Perempuan Mardika.

A Portrait of Disappointment

When I first met Nori Andriyani in 1992, she was pregnant with her first child, and doing popular theatre workshops with women factory workers. She was a founding member of an organization called Yayasan Perempuan Mardika or YPM (the Foundation for Women's Liberation). The organization was established by a group of middle class young women who had met as university students, and been active in the student movement in the 1980's.

"[V]arious students' discussion groups held small lectures, inviting the few remaining radical scholars and introduced radical social and political theories unthinkable at the university. ... Soon we 'took to the streets'. It was the disputes over intensifying land grabbing in the rural areas that initiated large scale (by the standard of that period) student support for the masses in the late 1980's. Students rallied with peasants... ... the protest experience had a big impact on my life. The feeling of being one with the people, the powerful feeling of being together and exhilarated at the strength that we found to fight against injustice. ... The whole experience turned my mind upside down. I no longer wanted to be merely a wife and career woman but wanted to ensure that my life would be dedicated to something more, like serving the people and fighting for justice, freedom, and democracy.

... We developed a long term plan, agreeing to focus our work on industrial women workers because their number was increasing and they are as a group, heavily exploited. We believed that aside from the economic perspective, a feminist perspective was needed within the labour movement. ... We were lucky because women's issues were high in the funding agencies agenda... hence it was a good time to get funding... We designed and delivered adult education programs for workers on various topics, including labour law, political economy and gender issues. We aimed at supporting the workers to organize themselves. We wanted to see more women worker activists in the labour movement. We dreamed of setting up a small comprehensive documentation, research and campaign centre on labour issues. We wanted to generate public support by various campaigns. We certainly aimed to do a lot. Probably too much.

Looking back I realize that we were crazy. Although there were five foundation members, only two were willing to work full time,... The ideal YPM staffer was a progressively political feminist, who was willing to work in a new NGO. She must be prepared to have an uncertain future and no career path, and be happy to receive a small
wage. She would have to move from her comfortable surroundings at home to live with the workers. In short, we looked for women who were prepared to commit class suicide - something that we as founders could not even fully achieve.

Meanwhile the funding agencies were on our backs. They naturally wanted regular reports. One donor even wanted sophisticated financial reports. ... Besides the planned programs that we promised in our proposal to the donors to deliver, we also had to deal with the unplanned activities, such as assisting workers in disputes, getting legal aid, assisting sick workers, and meeting the military’s pressures (including attending their summon for 'interviews'), etc."²

In November, 1995 YPM as an organization, folded. In January of 1997, I met with Nori in Jakarta. She was pregnant with her second child. Her husband has left his work as a legal aid lawyer and he now works 12 to 16 hours a day in a private law firm. She has had a difficult pregnancy and is working part time teaching Women’s Studies at a university. If she were able to work full time, her wages would be 350,000 Rupiah per month or $205.00 Canadian. She felt emotionally shattered, and her feminist idealism seemed crushed. Just before we parted, she said:

"Regarding our sexuality women have to make very careful choices. I expect that I will be mostly a housewife until my eldest child is eight years old. I have to train domestic helpers enough that they will stay with our family. I am managing an industry of our own, the house renovations, the human resources, the limited financial resources. We have to survive, and create quality in the education of our children. There is no quality in state schools. We have to create the stimulation and guidance at home to give our children education. People in Jakarta spend too much time in traffic and just earning enough for their families to survive."³

The Femocrats⁴

International development assistance relationships are structured by colonial history.


Significant transfers of resources, financial and technical are channelled through international development assistance agencies to Indonesia. For example, donors pledged US$ 5.11 billion in aid to Indonesia for the fiscal year 1993-1994. Women working as civil servants in government agencies in Indonesia, want to ensure that these resources do not only benefit men in Indonesia. If only men get access to the employment, education, technology and infrastructure that this aid brings, the dominance of men and subordination of women in Indonesia is reinforced and exacerbated. In turn, if women in government agencies can access some of these resources for women either through specific women's programs, or by ensuring the integration of women in programs and projects, there is greater likelihood that at least some women will be equipped to take equal positions with men in their society.

Shortly after I first began working with the staff of the Office of the State Minister for the Role of Women, I discussed their strategies with some of my colleagues. I asked one of the most senior Assistant Ministers, a lawyer by profession, why the strategy of the Ministry was to focus so much of their efforts on influencing the preparation of the GBHN and REPELITA VI, instead of legal reform. At the time many women's non-governmental organizations were pressing for legal changes to the rape and sexual assault laws. She explained that in Indonesia very few women have access to the justice system, because of low levels of education and limited financial resources. If the minister and her staff could strengthen the requirements of all government agencies to involve women in all development policies and plans, far more women could benefit than through legal reform. Their strategy was to ensure that women got their fair share of national and regional budgets and international development assistance loans and grants. Their strategy was to integrate women into all sectors of development, particularly

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the economic sectors where income could be generated through paid employment. Women’s voluntary work in social welfare activities of the state, and the state definition of development remained unchallenged.

Violence Against Women

Threats to personal safety, and the safety of family members are a feature of working for change in Indonesia, be that for women, workers, human rights violations, etc. Some wives and members of the elite, with derivative power that comes from connection to the central authorities of the state therefore feel a responsibility to raise issues and speak out about women’s issues using the personal affiliations of marriage or kinship as protection. For others, harassment and the threat of violence becomes too much to bear. The "interviews" and apprehensions by the military cause activists to succumb to pressure from spouses and family to be silent, and stop political activities, in order to protect the safety of others, particularly children. The case of a leader of a women’s organization working for environmental conservation in Central Java illustrates the role of the military and gender relations in the family on activists in the women’s movement.

This is a portrait of a woman from a village in Central Java. She was born a member of one the royal family of her village, and was given the name of a famous Javanese princess. I will call her Dewi. In the mid-1970s high yield rice technology was introduced in Java. Dewi recalls the day when the green revolution came to her village, because it was literally a green revolution, army green. She was a young girl the day the soldiers came to her village to supervise the planting of the new rice. No farmers were permitted to plant their own seedlings. The soldiers watched over all of the fields and all of the farmers, and made sure that the new varieties of rice were planted. They required much more water than traditional rice, as well as
fertilizers and pesticides. Over the next few years Dewi and her family realized that there were less wild birds in their village, because there were fewer pests to eat. They could no longer keep small fish in the flooded rice fields, because they could not survive in the water with fertilizers and pesticides. Dewi’s father had fewer ducks, because there were no longer so many insects to be eaten in the flooded fields.

Dewi was fortunate, and when she finished high school she went to Yogyakarta to study at university. Most of her village school friends went to nearby towns to domestic work. Some went to work in a biscuit factory, others to the cigarette factory. Some she later discovered ended up working in the sex trade. She studied psychology, and met a fellow student from Jakarta, who later became her husband. He told her he loved her because she was such a good Javanese woman. After she graduated, Dewi went to work with a non-governmental organization that provided community health education in Central Java. It was through her work educating village people about health care, that she became more and more convinced of the detrimental health effects of the environmental degradation in Central Java. After a few years, she and some friends founded an environmental organization, and received funding from the Netherlands.

They began to work with farmers in remote highland areas that had not been targeted for high yield rice varieties and found that in many cases women knew more about traditional seeds than men did. The organization Dewi had founded went through some dramatic changes in the mid 1980s. The young women became more and more disillusioned with the men in their group, and eventually broke away and formed the leadership of their own organization. Even though they lived in one of the smaller cities in Central Java, they were determined to work with the rural farmers, women and men, and to educate children about their environment, so they accepted small salaries, and lived simply. They launched campaigns against a World Bank
funded dam, the use of toxic pesticides, the loss of biodiversity in food crops, and publicized the results of their research through newsletters and magazines.

Dewi and her friends became interested in traditional Javanese agriculture, and organic farming. As she had good English language skills, she wrote to groups overseas and was invited to conferences and training courses overseas. After she went abroad for four weeks leaving her infant daughter at home, she vowed she would only go overseas again if she could take her children with her. She was invited to study for several months in Europe, and the people sponsoring her would be able to accommodate her children. She was torn, she did not want to go and leave her husband behind. After all, he came from a patriarchal culture and his friends were already teasing him about this wife who travelled the world, while he sat at home alone with his daughters. Dewi explained the situation to her European friends and they found a suitable training program for him concerning organic farming. He lived in a European farming community where men and women worked together, and he saw for the first time a different distribution of domestic labour between women and men. He learned to cook and did his own laundry with some of the other men.

When Dewi and her family returned to Central Java, her husband came to work in her organization. They launched a campaign to create public awareness about the pollution of an important river in Central Java. They decided that they would travel the villages on the banks of the river and collect stories from the people in the villages about what the village meant to them. They wanted to develop some cultural performances about the value of the river and eventually publish a book about their project. Through publications, Dewi kept getting more and more well known. They began monitoring night emissions from factories in Central Java, and interviewed villagers nearby to enquire about the health impacts, particularly respiratory diseases from air pollution.
When I visited Dewi and her family in 1991, she had just returned home after being apprehended by the local military. I asked her how the interrogation had been. She explained that it was not nearly as bad as the last time, because they only took her and she knew her husband was with the children. She said that they had reviewed her organizations' publications with her page by page, and had asked her about criticism of the various industries polluting the river. They asked about her whereabouts on many of the nights, that she and others from their organization had been collecting samples, and interviewing villagers on their air pollution campaign. It had been rumoured by some villagers, that a particularly bad polluting factory was owned by a member of the President's family. Fortunately she said, the local military officers were not too well educated so they could not question her further if she responded with technical terminology, and numerical measure of particular chemicals.

Increasingly, Dewi was called upon to present the results of her group's research at various conferences and seminars. She and some friends established a gender study network of women who worked in community groups that were interested in learning more about gender relations and working with women. After she had been away on a trip collecting some samples with other women from the organization, she returned home to find her husband very angry. Other men in the non-governmental organization community in their region said that they pitied him, having such an outspoken feminist wife. They asked him what had happened to the Javanese princess that he married. Their relationship deteriorated, he spent more time away from home, rarely explaining his absence.

One night she faced her husband's anger and violence. She took her daughters and left. She filed for a divorce, which was granted on the basis of her husband no providing financially for the family. She did however have to assume his debts, which leave her responsible for a monthly payment of approximately US $500, per month. In order to make this payment, she
had to leave her work with her environmental organization, they just could raise enough funds to pay her a high salary.

Two years later, she has moved to a much larger city, and is working for an international organization. She has custody and full financial responsibility for her three children. The environmental organization she founded continues to work with women and farmers in Central Java, but has less funding because of the financial difficulties they experienced, and the women working there keep a much lower profile in the community than they did previously.

Violence Against Women in the Labour Movement

In Indonesia, I have seen the vacant and sad eyes of women who have been beaten and tortured by the military. The Indonesia Country Report to the United Nations on the Implementation of the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies only devotes two short paragraphs of text to violence against women. References are made only to violence against women in the family and the workplace, stating that there is anecdotal evidence reported in the media, and the subject needs to be researched. The violence of the military, and the threat of violence which is well known through oral reports and people's experiences are not included in written records. Generally people are too frightened of the police and the military to report any incidents of violence in their communities.

One case of violence against a woman in Indonesia, with direct ties to the military, was widely reported. It caused challenges to the dwifungsi of the military, particularly in labour disputes. It is the case of a young woman factory worker in Surabaya, Marsinah.


Marsinah, a 23 year old worker in a Swiss - Indonesian joint venture factory that makes wrist watch components, died on May 8, 1993. There are many different accounts of the story of her life, and her struggles as an activist in the factory where she worked. I was trusted with a document that recounts her life story, from the words and stories of people who knew her well. This is a factual account of a murder.

Marsinah was born in the village of Nglundo, in the region of Nganjuk, in East Java. Her mother, Sumini and her father Astin, had three children. Marsinah was the second daughter of three children: Marsini, the eldest a sister, and Widji, a younger brother. When Marsinah was three years old, her mother died. She was raised by her Grandmother Paroi, and lived with her aunt Sini and uncle Suraji. Marsinah finished elementary, junior and senior secondary school. She was known in high school as a bright student who always read books and newspapers. Even though she was eager to go to university, because of economic reasons she had to be satisfied with her high school education. To increase her knowledge and skills, she attended computer and English language courses. Besides her work in the Production Division at PT Catur Putra Surya, or PT CPS Marsinah also sold various necessities to workers. If her friends needed materials for clothes, she provided it and they would pay for it by instalments. She was known as a quiet naive, friendly, sociable, helpful, and loyal young woman. In addition, she was also brave. Her bravery was seen when there was a strike at the factory. When all the demonstrators were chased away from the factory by security guards, Marsinah was the only one who refused to leave the factory. It was her bravery that caused her to see God.

In April 1993, workers at PT CPS became agitated and dissatisfied because of the news of the required raise in wages for factory workers from the Governor of East Java, which had been circulated publicly. The governor’s letter asked the employers to raise workers

7. The standards for minimum wage rates are tied to regional conditions, and set as a proportion of the minimum physical needs index. This minimum wage level is still below subsistence requirements, or the minimum living needs index. The minimum wage in 1995 was set at 94 percent of the cost of minimum physical needs, and 79 percent of minimum living needs, as estimated by the Department of Manpower.
wages by 20 percent. Over a few weeks, the PT CPS labour union had a meeting with each division to discuss the increase in accordance with the Governor’s letter. On May 3, it was agreed that all workers of PT CPS would not go to work. That afternoon, nine workers were summoned by letter to the local Koramil (Military Command office). According to a worker, the Director of the company Yudi Astono had asked the local government and military command for assistance.

At 7:00 AM, workers demonstrated at the factory, making 12 demands. The security guards tried to only allow the workers required for the first shift into the factory. They swayed their sticks at the workers, and tore down the banners and posters raised by the workers. One of the security guards called all of the workers PKI, the banned Communist Party of Indonesia. The military and the police also assisted the security guards in preventing workers from entering the factory.

Marsinah was the only demonstrator to speak up against the security forces. "Its all right if our friends cannot enter the premises, it is up to you, now we want to negotiate with the company...." she said.

Then the Director, Yudi Astono met the demonstrators on the grounds outside the factory. "Let’s get to work, as usual!" he said. There was no response from the crowd. Marsinah stepped forward and shouted, "Please don’t! Please don’t! We do not have to work. Let Pak Astono work by himself!"

Then the Head of the Personnel Division, Mutiari said "Lets get back to work!" "No! NO! Friends, you do not have to work." said Marsinah. "It is okay if you do not want to work, I cannot force your friends if you do not want to work. It is all right for me. I do not like you!" said Mutiari, as she left.

At 10:30, officials from the Department of Labour and the PT CPS Union came to negotiate with the demonstrators. Participants in the meeting were fifteen demonstrators including Marsinah, nine members of the SPSI trade union, three people from the company, and officials from the Department of Labour, two officials from the SPSI union and two officials from local government and the police.

The negotiations were tough. Marsinah was very vocal during negotiations. She demanded the workers receive wages and daily allowances for food and transport according to Ministry of Labour Decree No.50/1992. Officials from the Department of Labour intervened, and they reached an agreement.

On May 5, 1993 workers return to work at the factory at the usual time. Sixteen workers were summoned by letter to Kodim, the office the local Military command. At 9:00 AM, 13 workers arrived at the Kodim office. At about 1:00 PM, Marsinah went to look for a friend, another worker who had been involved in the demonstration. She went to the Personnel Office to find her. Mutiari, the Head of Personnel was difficult with her. Marsinah was interrogated. She told Mutiari that the situation was urgent. "What kind of urgent situation? Is someone dead?" asked Mutiari.

"No, no one is dead." said Marsinah, "Our problems were solved yesterday, but now there is a problem with Kodim!"

Marsinah finally got permission to go to the Kodim office. She explained that if she has to provide answers to Kodim, that one of their representatives T----, would have the answer.

After Marsinah left the room, Mutiari told a staff member that she did not like Marsinah’s manner.
Marsinah went to look for her friends that afternoon, but none of them were home yet. She asked other friends to go to the Kodim office with her to look for them. When they arrived, the 13 workers had already left.

Marsinah went home to her boarding house. Wearing a white T shirt, she told her landlady and house mates that she was going out to a friend's house. She went to a worker's house, and met one of the workers who had been summoned to Kodim, but had not attended. She asked to see the letter of summons. Marsinah said that if possible, she would like to take the person responsible for the letter to court. She meets two other friends outside, and asks them if they would like to go and get some food at Tugu Kuning. They did not want to go, and go back to their boarding houses. That was the last time Marsinah was seen alive.

For five days, workers at PT CPS and friends worried. No one had seen Marsinah, they could not locate her. Some of Marsinah's friends go to her relatives house in Surabaya to look for her.

On May 12, workers at PT CPS hear that Marsinah is dead. The news came from her relatives in Surabaya. Her four closest friends go to her village in Nganjuk to check. The news is true. Marsinah died, in a very unnatural way.

On May 13, workers at PT CPS go to work as usual. At the security gate, one of the security guards cynically says "Your friend is dead! Marsinah is dead! Aren't you going to pay your respects to her family?" Feeling very hurt, several workers immediately turned and left.

During the second shift on May 15, about 20:30 some workers were called by name over the public address system, and told to go to the security gate immediately. When they arrived, they were met by an Intel (government intelligence agency) officer from Nganjuk, who asked for information about Marsinah. The workers went with the officer to Nganjuk. One by one they were asked to give information about Marsinah all night, until the next morning. At 10:00 AM the next day they were allowed to leave. They were finally told, that Marsinah was found dead on May 8, 1993, at about 20:30.

The official autopsy report stated that Marsinah had serious abdominal injuries, and her hymen was torn. A 15 to 20 cm long blunt instrument had repeatedly been forced into her vagina. She died in a sitting position, wearing a black T shirt, her ring and earrings on May 8, 1993.

A guard at the gate near where Marsinah's body was found saw a white van with Surabaya police registration plates enter in the middle of the night. When the guard asked the driver his destination, he got a curt snap reply. Since he was afraid, he asked no more.\(^8\)

Marsinah's murder became the focus of national and international attention. A coalition of non-governmental organizations called upon the government to launch an investigation. Due to the limits of this thesis, the details of the subsequent events will have to be omitted. I do

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\(^8\) Transcript of interviews from a confidential source.
however want to note the some of the gender dimensions of the spectacle that the trial became.

Nine men and one woman were charged with the pre-meditated murder of Marsinah. All were employees of *PT CPS*, with the exception of one captain from the *Koramil*, the local military command unit. The lone woman accused, Mutiari the Head of Personnel mentioned above, was 26 years old at the time of the trial in 1994. She had gone to university and graduated from the law faculty. The men accused were aged between 33 and 57, with the exception of one 22 year old security guard at the factory. Mutiari and two domestic workers at the home of Yudi Susanto the Indonesian owner of the factory were the among the most important witnesses called to testify about what they had overheard concerning the plans for Marsinah’s death.

The judicial proceedings included dramatic re-enactments of the meetings when the murder was planned at Yudi Susanto’s home, and the brutal interrogation and murder of Marsinah in the actual hut in the forest where her body was found. These spectacles were photographed and recorded for publication and broadcast in the mass media. This national attention did cause the role of the military in industrial disputes to be examined, and eventually in 1996 changed. However, the trial and the reenactments from the perspective of Indonesian women who witnessed these public events reveal the dimensions of the impact of the state judicial apparatus, socially and politically.

At the time of Marsinah’s trial, I remember discussing the re-enactments with the domestic workers in my neighbourhood one afternoon. They all said that they would be terrified to ever hear people in a place where they worked plan a crime. One woman said she would immediately run away from her employer and not go back to her village where they might look for her. She said she would be afraid that she could never get a job again if her employer knew she had heard something like that. She would be afraid she would be punished if she stayed.
Another woman said that she could never have the courage to speak up and testify in a court. She speculated that the only reason the domestic workers could testify was because they were so young, only 18 and 22 years of age respectively. In her view, they were probably too young to have had children, so they would not have to worry about their children being hurt or humiliated. They all felt most sorry for the young woman who was the Personnel Manager. They had heard on the radio that she had lost 10 kilograms of body weight from the stress of the trial. She had a university education. They had heard her mother was praying for her daughter. They pitied her family who would be so embarrassed.

Although I did not have the occasion to speak to factory workers at the time of the trial, about one year later, when I was in factories meeting women workers in July and August of 1995, I did discuss Marsinah’s death. The women workers in a plywood factory in Lampung in the southern part of Sumatra stated that they listen to the radio for announcements of increases in the minimum wage. They told me that they always get the increase in minimum wage within one month of announced changes. They thought Marsinah was very brave, but said they would never have the courage to speak up to the Director of their factory the way she did.

Women Challenging Indonesian Nationalism

Regional armed conflicts continue in Indonesia in the 1990s in regions such as Irian Jaya, East Timor and Aceh. The imposition of national unity in these regions includes the implementation of Women in Development programs and policies. Women support these movements against Indonesian occupation of these regions. Their experience and perspectives are usually omitted from the accounts of these conflicts.

On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops opened fire on demonstrators in Dili, the
capital city of Timor Leste.\(^9\) Five hundred and twenty-eight people died or "disappeared" that day.\(^10\) A woman who was present that day, came to Jakarta through a network of safe houses, to have shrapnel removed from her body by a qualified surgeon in a private clinic. She stayed for several weeks with friends in Jakarta. I will call her Margarita.

Margarita is soft spoken, deliberate in her selection of words. She told us of the fear and the confusion that day in November, the day of the Dili Massacre. She ran when she heard gunfire, was wounded, and taken into an army truck with other men and women. They watched as young men were shot, and then the soldiers dipped bread in the blood of the men, and forced it into the mouths of the women who had witnessed their execution.

She described the conditions for women in Timor Leste under the Indonesian occupation. "In the villages it is terrible for women. The Army men always want women for sex. In 1993, they came to a house at night, and said that the Kepala Desa wanted the woman to come to his house. So she went with the soldier, he had a gun. The soldier took her to a place where his friend was waiting. The Army men raped her. She was a virgin. Then they brought her clothes to her father, and showed him the blood. She could not go home, so she must go with the soldiers. This happens often in Timor Leste.

When I went back to my village after I finished school, the women in the village said we are only here to do what the Army wants us to do.

It is more difficult for women than men in Timor Leste. If men are arrested, they go to jail, they can forget. But a woman who is raped never forgets. Many women are in the villages in Timor Leste because their husbands are in the forests and the mountains with FRETELIN (the armed liberation fighters). So, the Army can force women to come to the city. They can do what they want with the women, because the men in their families are in the mountains or arrested. The most beautiful women are always arrested.

In one village, Los Polos, the Army came after they had already fought FRETELIN in the mountains. The people in the village were farmers. The military gathered all the people together. They collected all the young men and women. The women were

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9. This is the Portuguese name that residents of East Timor, or Timor Timor, use for their homeland.

forced to take off all of their clothes, then the men. The women and men must sit naked side by side, and the soldiers threw stones at the men and women’s genitals. Then they raped the women.\footnote{11}

Margarita was interrogated, many times. She was forced to watch while other women were interrogated. Indonesian military men would place two chairs facing each other. A woman was forced to sit in one, with her hands tied behind her back. The interrogator would place the two front feet of the chair on top of the insteps of the woman’s feet, then he would be seated on the chair, with his trousers open. Some of the women arrested in Dili that day in November 1991 were forced into prostitution, or selected to become the companion of Indonesian military men. Margarita does not know where any of the members of her family are. She dreams of leaving Indonesia, but said she does not sleep well at night.

Poverty Alleviation: Some Women’s Perspectives

The \textit{Program Inpres Desa Tertinggal} (IDT), was implemented by Presidential Instruction in November of 1993 as a major initiative of the Government of Indonesia poverty alleviation strategy. This programme was designed to provide working capital in the form of interest free loans to the poorest families in rural villages throughout Indonesia. Loans are provided interest free, by the local branch of Bank Rakyat Indonesia to groups of rural residents for income generating activities selected by the group based on their knowledge of local conditions. Preparatory selection, organization and training were implemented in 1994, and funds dispersed to village groups beginning in January, 1995.

\footnote{11. From notes transcribed and translated from an interview with Margarita in 1993.}
The Village of Piongan in Tanah Toraja, South Sulawesi

Piongan is a highland village in the northern part of the province of South Sulawesi. Some of the best coffee in Indonesia is grown in this area, known as Tanah Toraja. This province has also been designated as a region with potential for increased wet land rice production. The farmers in the village of Piongan grow coffee and rice, but are unable to grow enough rice for subsistence throughout the year. They cultivate cassava to supplement their diet. The Torajan people are largely Christians, and well known for the carved effigies mounted on platforms on the limestone cliffs surrounding their villages.

In this village two IDT program groups were selected, each composed of 25 members. A family is considered a group member, represented by the designated head of the family, the father. The two groups in Piongan village decided to use the capital funds provided by the program to raise pigs, to sell in the market for meat.

Each household in the group received a capital loan of 40,000 Indonesian Rupiah (US $18.00) from the program. The price of a piglet in the market is Rp.60,000 (US $27.00). In order to purchase a piglet, each family had to generate an additional Rp.20,00 (US $9.00). The main cash crop for this village is coffee. As the price of coffee had recently fallen from Rp.8,000 per kilo to Rp.2500 per kilogram, members had to find other sources of additional capital. In order to purchase the piglets, the women of the village made hand woven traditional mats (tikar), which were sold in the market.

The tikar are woven from tuyu leaves, which some of the people in the village grow on their own land. For those who must purchase the leaves as inputs for making a mat, the price of the material for one mat, is Rp. 3000 (US $1.35) to Rp. 4000 (US $1.80). The price that a completed tikar will fetch is between Rp.10,000 (US $4.52) and Rp. 16,000 (US $7.23).
the people in the village can afford the time, and the cost of transport to the market (Rp. 400), which is approximately 12 kilometres away, they can sell the tikar for Rp.12,000 (US $5.42) to Rp. 16,000 (US$ 7.23), depending on the size and quality. Usually the women cannot afford to go to the market, so they sell the mats to a trader who comes to the village, and buys all the tikar that are completed for Rp.10,000 each.

Two or three women will work together to make one tikar. They weave when they can find time between their other productive and domestic work responsibilities. It takes about one week to complete weaving one mat. The weaving team of two or three women can complete a mat in just four days, if they have the money to buy kerosene for their lamps, which enables them to weave in the evenings. For the purchase of a piglet, each family had to produce at least two tikar to cover additional funds required for the purchase price, and transport to and from the market for the purchaser, and the piglet.

The women described a typical day in their lives now that they have become involved in raising pigs, as well as their other responsibilities. A woman wakes in the morning, and walks approximately two kilometres to the spring, to bring water for her family and the piglet. Then, she cooks the fodder for the piglet, which is composed of leaves, corn and water. She feeds the piglet, and then cooks breakfast for her family.

After the family has eaten breakfast, and her children are sent off to school, she will do laundry, clean the house, cooking and eating utensils, and sweep the surrounding land. She then sorts her coffee or rice and sets it out in the sun to dry, before walking five kilometres to fetch firewood. Sometimes, collecting firewood will take most of the morning, as it is not always easy to cut, and the wood can be very heavy, which makes the journey home slower and longer. Upon her return from collecting firewood, she fetches water and vegetables, to prepare a mid-day meal for her family. If there is still time left in the morning, she will accompany her
husband to their fields and assist with weeding, planting or harvesting of coffee, rice or cassava.

After the mid-day meal, she will weave *tikar*, or sort, dry and prepare coffee for market, and then go again to work in the fields. Usually on her way home, she collects fodder for her piglet. Then again, she fetches water for the family and cooks the fodder and feeds the piglet. She will then prepare an evening meal for her family.

There was considerable disagreement between women on how long it will take to raise a pig to marketable age. The suggested time frames were from eight months to two years. It was hard to tell if this variation was based on experiential knowledge of having raised piglets before, or guess work. The women expected that a healthy adult pig would sell for between 200,000 and 250,000 Rupiah (US $ 90.41 and US $113.00), at market. Most of the women had not raised pigs before, and spoke with hopeful anticipation about selling their animal when it was older, returning their interest free loan, and then being able to purchase another piglet. There was no mention of planning or learning how to breed their own stock in the village.

The women of Piongan were clearly dissatisfied with how this programme has increased their work loads. They not only had to weave more *tikar* in order to purchase the piglets to begin with, but daily they must now carry more wood and water for the animals, and cook their feed twice a day. The women explained that the men of their families will take the pigs to market when they are of age and size to fetch a reasonable price. Women stay in the village to take care of domestic and farm work, and children. It was unclear how much access the women could expect to have to the cash produced when the animals finally went to market. One woman suggested she could not trust that her husband would not lose all the money gambling on the cock fights in town, near the market, and return home with nothing.

From the accounts of the women, it can be estimated that they spend on average an additional three hours per day to tend to the raising of their pigs, seven days a week, aside from
the labour in the production of tikar, required for the purchase of stock. If a piglet were ready to go to market after eight months, the women would have contributed approximately 672 hours of labour to their production.

If a pig were to fetch the price of Rp. 200,000 at market, with deductions for the cost of transportation for the pig and seller (Rp. 5000), and working capital to be returned to the group (Rp. 40,000), they would get a return for their labour equal to Rp. 230 (US $0.10) per hour. This would be the equivalent of a daily wage of Rp. 1845 (US$ 0.83), which is higher than the agricultural wage of Rp.1600 (US $0.72), and 59 percent of the daily provincial minimum wage for formal employment in the manufacturing sector of Rp.3,100 (US$ 1.40). The minimum wage in 1995 was set at 94 percent of the cost of minimum physical needs, and 79 percent of minimum living needs, as estimated by the Department of Manpower.

If a pig were to fetch the price of Rp. 250,000 at market, and take 2 years to raise to market standard, then the returns to the women’s labour will look quite different. At three hours per day, over two years, the labour inputs would be 2184 hours, or 273 working days based on the 8 hour day in formal sector employment. The hourly wage would be Rp. 94 (US $ 0.04) or a daily wage of Rp. 776 (US $ 0.35), only 47 percent of the agricultural wage of Rp.200 per hour, or Rp.1600 (US $ 0.72) per day. This return to labour is only 25 percent of the provincial minimum wage in the formal sector. As they have only had their stock for three or four months, no actual time frames, prices or real returns could be calculated.

The village women of Piongan were very willing to explain their circumstances, but shy and embarrassed about their appearance with visitors. One woman said,

"It is a pity, you are here at the time of day to see our children coming home from school in their uniforms, but they have no sandals or shoes to wear. I have holes in my clothes, and no time to mend them."

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They explained further, that primary school fees are Rp. 6,000 (US $ 2.71) and uniforms cost Rp. 10,000 (US $ 4.52). The price of sandals is Rp. 1,500 (US $ 0.67) and shoes approximately Rp. 7,000 (US $ 3.16). In order to purchase sandals or shoes for their children they have to weave and sell more tikar which is difficult, given their current time constraints.

The Village of Parang Banoa in South Sulawesi

Parang Banoa is a village located 18 kilometres from the provincial capital city of Ujung Pandang. The farmers in this area rely on rain fed agriculture, although the region is much drier than the highlands in the interior of the province. They grow one crop of rice per year, and green vegetables, mung beans, peanuts, coconuts, bananas and papaya. These crops are for subsistence and sale in the local market when there is a surplus.

The land in this region is not very fertile, and particularly in the dry season, the men of the village will work in construction as brick layers or carpenters. They go by bicycle to Ujung Pandang and return to the village daily. Their wage is Rp. 4000 (US $ 1.80) per day, which is 29 percent above the provincial minimum wage of Rp. 3100 (US $ 1.40).

Parang Banoa has two groups involved in the IDT programme. One group of women are weavers, of traditional silk sarongs, and the other group of men, are involved in wood work and cabinet making. The women’s group has twenty seven members. To begin with, 20 of the members received loans of Rp. 100,000 (US $45.20) each. Each member is responsible to repay Rp. 15,000 (US $6.78) per month, interest free to the group. As the village does not produce its own silk, the weavers must purchase their raw materials in a shop in Ujung Pandang. They purchase thread which is already spun, dyed and polished, ready to weave. The price of silk thread is Rp. 60,000 (US $27.20) per kilogram, which is usually enough thread for four sarongs. The sarongs sell for Rp. 50,000 to Rp. 60,000 (US $ 22.61 to US $ 27.12) depending on the
quality.

It takes about two weeks time for a woman to complete the weaving of a sarong, given her other domestic work, and her work in the fields, or drying and processing agricultural products such as nuts and beans. A sarong which can raise the price of Rp.50,000 (US $22.61) in the market, requires a capital repayment cost of Rp.7500 (US $3.39) and the price of materials Rp.15,000 (US $6.78), which will net the weaver Rp.27,500 (US $12.43). Allowing for some flexibility for the costs of transport to purchase thread and sell sarongs, the return to the weaver for her labour is approximately Rp.2000 (US $0.90) per day.

At the time of our visit to the village, the women were having no delays in selling their sarongs in Ujung Pandang, or meeting their repayment targets. The total funds returned to the group were reported to be accumulated to an amount that will enable the seven remaining group members to borrow their initial start up capital, within the next month. Even though this indicates a successful program in terms of credit circulation, which is designed to meet the practical "needs" of poor rural women, the return to their labour is half the wages men make in the city, and still lower than subsistence level.

A Village Near Bandar Lampung, in South Western Sumatra

In this village, there were 20 members of the IDT group, and the members use their working capital from the program for a range of income generating activities. Five member families used the capital to assist them with small trading activities, selling vegetables in the local market. Ten member families used the funds for starting to grow peanuts as a cash crop. Five women members of the remaining families in the group decided to make emping, small crackers made from melinjo, a small nut which is roasted and then pounded flat, and fried.

The five women in the group received training in producing emping from an already
existing Department of Manpower training program. The implementation the IDT program requires that activities be coordinated with existing programs available locally. After the training, the women used the capital they received of Rp.200,000 (US $ 90.00) as a group, to buy kerosene stoves, and fuel, tools and the melinjo nuts, which are their raw materials for production of crackers.

The price of melinjo in the market is Rp. 2000 (US $ 0.90) per kilogram. It takes two kilograms of nuts to produce one kilogram of emping, which will fetch a price of Rp.7000 (US $3.16) in the market. Unfortunately, melinjo do not grow in their village, so they must purchase the nuts in the market. The women work together to produce the crackers, one roasts the nuts, another peels them once they are roasted, two will pound the nuts flat, and the other lays them out to dry. If they work together, they can make about one half a kilogram of emping in one hour. In a day, as team, they can make about two kilograms of emping, as this work must fit between the other responsibilities they have for work in vegetable gardens, and the household.

They found after a few weeks that they no longer use the kerosene stove to roast the nuts, as the fuel does not burn hot enough. They can speed up their production time, if they roast the nuts over their traditional wood fires used for cooking. The local market is five kilometres away, two times per week, so they try to produce enough emping to send one group member to the sell their products each market day.

The returns to the women's labour for emping production, are lower than other wage rates in the region. Agricultural wages are Rp.3,000 (US $ 1.35) per day, which is 85 percent of the formal sector minimum wage of Rp.3500 (US $ 1.58) per day. The agricultural wage per hour is Rp. 375 (US $ 0.16). If the five women working together for one hour produce one half a kilogram of emping, they would fetch at market Rp.3500 (US $ 1.58) for that product. The
costs of the inputs are: Rp.2,000 (US $ 0.90) for the melinjo nuts; transport to and from the market of Rp. 400 (US $ 0.18), the costs of packaging and time spent in the market. The maximum possible return for their labour would be Rp.1500 (US $ 0.67), divided among 5 women, is Rp.300 (US $ 0.13) per hour, not accounting for transport or time spent selling in the market.

Their initial plan was to make return payments of their interest free loan to the group over a 10 month period, which would require a monthly payment of Rp. 20,000 (US $ 9.04). They said that after five months they had only been able to return about 25 percent of their repayment target. Their slower repayment rate was due to conditions in the market, as they found that they cannot always sell all of the crackers that they produce, as quickly as they would like. The people in the village have experienced significant declines in household incomes from the drop in the price of cloves in the past few years, due to the establishment of a monopoly agency owned by one of the sons of the President, to whom they must sell their product. so most farmers have stopped producing cloves. As a result, they welcome the opportunity to try other activities and products for income generation.

The main source of income for the people of this village comes from remittances from young people who leave the village to go to work in the nearby city of Bandar Lampung as domestic or factory workers. In Bandar Lampung the villagers reported that the factory workers receive wages of Rp. 3500 (US $ 1.58), the provincial minimum wage, and about 60 percent of their young migrant workers are there. They also knew the minimum wage in the Jakarta - West Java area for factory workers was Rp.4600 (US $2.08), and stated team that 40 percent of young people from their village were working in that region, as proximity to Jakarta makes the transport costs from the village relatively low, about Rp. 7500 (US $ 3.39) each way. The women in the group want to get their loan paid off, and then send their emping to market in
Jakarta with their nieces and daughters, where they will fetch a higher price.

Women Resisting National Development Goals: Who wants to work in the rice fields?

In 1992, I went to visit a village in North Sulawesi which had been selected by regional government development planners for increased rice production. The loss of agricultural land to industry in Java has put pressure on other regions of Indonesia to increase food production, particularly rice, in order to maintain self-sufficiency and reduce dependence on imports. Project engineers in the Irrigation Division of the Department of Public Works were charged with responsibility for upgrading irrigation systems in this region in order to bring a particular number of hectares of land into wet land rice production.

Every irrigation project in Indonesia is required by Ministerial Decree to have a Water Users Association, that must build and manage the secondary canals, and manage a system of fee collection in order to ensure that there is a pool of funds available for maintenance and repairs. In this particular village the engineers had met with the Kepala Desa and the LKMD several times, but they had not been able to establish a Water User’s Association. They invited me to assist them and see if there was a way to "get the community organized" as they put it.

I went to the village late in the afternoon and met with women behind their houses as they returned from the fields. When I asked them if they had heard about the new irrigation project, they explained that the men had told them all about this new scheme. They had posters and maps in the Kantor Kepala Desa (the office of the head of the village), with colours and numbers and pins stuck in certain places. They deliberately avoided community meetings about this irrigations business and wanted nothing to do with it. My first thoughts were the engineers had probably designed the canals in such a way that these women would not get as much water
as the men in the group of decision makers, or perhaps there was some problem with land ownership and compensation that had been overlooked.

I asked the women to tell me how they had learned about the project. Their response was a common one in Indonesia. Their husbands had been called to a meeting at the Balai Desa (the community hall) and the Kepala Desa and some guests, government officials from the city had told them about the project. The women had heard about it from their husbands. I asked if they had a water user’s association in the village. They assured me that there was an association, and that the men had all their names on the membership list in the Kantor Kepala Desa. They had work family work groups to do the maintenance, but the women handled all the money. Amid much laughter, a woman explained that if the men had the money it would all have been burned in cigarettes. When I asked about land ownership, the women said they owned the land jointly with their husbands, and were members of the village co-op for seed, fertilizer and pesticides, etc. I asked if the new canals would mean that people will lose their land, or their priority for the water. They didn’t really know.

Finally, I just asked why they did not go to the meetings about the new irrigation canals. They all began speaking at once.

"Why should we go to those meetings?" they asked. "The men will want us to sign up in front of all the officials from the city. Then, all the men will work on building new canals and get wages. They will go buy new motorcycle parts or chainsaws or beer or whisky."

"Who will work in these new rice fields?" they asked.
One woman said, "Look at my hands, I have too much work now, I am almost old. My daughter dreams all day of going to the city and becoming a domestic worker for a family that has a car. My son plays the guitar all day so he can go play music in a restaurant, or on television. We are not Javanese you know. We don’t like working in the rice fields. I am happy with my small coconut tree plantation. I can get my sons up the trees every few weeks, and at least we have carts to carry the coconuts along the pathways to the road, where the truck can collect them and take them to the factory. We grow enough rice to eat, and we earn enough from money from selling coconuts. We
don't want any more rice fields."\textsuperscript{12}

The explicit Women in Development policies, programs and machinery of the state are not the only forces shaping the women's movement in Indonesia in the 1990s. The accounts included here demonstrate that women are not merely the objects of development directed by the state, but agents of development in their own communities. Despite the claims of the benefits of Indonesian development at a national level, these accounts indicate that there is considerable variation in how much women benefit, by region, by class position, by occupation and employment status and age. Women's participation in development is not an indication that women benefit from or support state defined national development in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{12} From field notes, North Sulawesi, November 1993.
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

One of the significant features of Indonesian as a country, a geographic space, is the role of the state in social, cultural, and political life. Gender relations under the New Order regime are influenced by state machinery, policy and programs. These elements of the state apparatus situate Indonesian women, and have influenced the Indonesian women’s movement by the definition of the political space of feminist politics. Maila Stivens argues that, "[a] would-be Southeast Asian feminism operates under a double burden of male and western hegemony of thought".¹ I have argued that international notions and critiques about women in development have been borrowed and adopted by the Indonesian state, in order to accommodate growing international attention to the status and roles of women in development countries.

In Indonesia through state definition of ideology, and law, appropriate roles in the family and organizational structures for women, Javanese notions of power have been uniformly applied throughout the archipelago. The Javanese elite or priyayi definition of Power contributes to the present social structure of gender relations in contemporary Indonesia by confining women to the day to day management of the provision of physical needs for their families. By contrast, men are constructed as gifted with the wisdom that entitles them to be the decision makers. Women are confined to the roles of mothers within the family, and managers of the provisions of material, educational and spiritual resources to the household.

One account written by a British woman in the 1950s quotes Dr. Hurustiati Subandrio, wife of the first Indonesian Ambassador to England, who identified significant differences in women’s activities in and status Javanese society at that time.

¹ Maila Stivens "Thinking About Gender and the State in Indonesia", in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Arief Budiman, ed. Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Australia, 1990, page 109.
"In Indonesia an ideal wife is considered to be someone who is a good friend in life to her husband. Married women in our country share full responsibility in the tasks and duties of matrimonial life with their husbands. This can be said of nearly all classes of the community, with perhaps the exception of the princesses of the court, who are kept in a world of luxury and seclusion, far from the realities of life. Particularly the peasant and working classes give equal partnership to women and men. The harder the living conditions, the higher the status for women. ... It is not what the most capable of our women has achieved that matters so much, but rather how the majority live and work." ²

Under the New Order the distinctions in gender relations between classes and various ethnic groups have been obliterated. One national uniform view of women has instead been formed from the priyayi cultural notion of the ideal women who supports her husband, cares for children and manages all of the day to day affairs. Through the decisions, decrees, announcements and instructions of the President, women are defined through ties to husband and children, responsible for the welfare and prosperity of their family.

The New Order government has not acted in isolation to develop policy and programs to structure the participation of women in society and in development. The influence of international relationships and the movement of women's demands for equality at an international level are evident in Indonesian state policy. The New Order government has presented their national achievements regarding women's participation in family planning and social welfare on the international stage, through such fora as the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. International pressure to improve the status of women has resulted in the appointments of a government commission and a minister of the cabinet for women's affairs, with such meagre resources that little more than the appearance of attention to women's issues can be expected. Explicit policies and programs of the government target women and have significant impact on

the participation of women in social and economic activities. The design and formulation these programs and policies are not assigned to one agency of government although the Minister for the Role of Women is responsible to coordinate these efforts.

The history of Indonesian women has been revised, suppressed and obliterated by state agencies such as the Ministry of Information. The demonization of women involved in the social movements and the Communist Party of Indonesia, as immoral sexual predators, under the command of evil men, has effectively silenced a generation of women in Indonesia. Grand state ceremonies celebrated annually to signify the importance of women in Indonesia, are little more than women’s pageants and mother’s parades. Women’s actual contributions to the development of Indonesian society are undervalued and understated. The history of women defining and organizing grassroots movements have been obliterated from state accounts. Indonesian women activists have been accused of associations with communism and "Western" feminism in order to dismiss their for equality as threatening to the nation.

The imposition of compulsory membership for women in state sponsored women’s organizations has appropriated women’s time for government directed programs and activities. Many state sponsored social institutions and programs require that women participate as wives and mothers, confirming their familial identities. Women’s labour has been appropriated for family planning, health, environmental conservation, village beautification and social welfare activities, without remuneration. These demands on women’s time and labour prevent women from having access to the most critical resource - time- necessary for participation in grassroots citizen organizations and movements. In January 1997, I had a discussed the state of the Indonesian women’s movement with an Indonesian friend, Yang Suwan. She told me of a struggle she was involved in trying to get legal assistance for women who are the second wives of Moslem men. They were not receiving the financial support to which they are entitled by
Moslem and state law, and had effectively been abandoned by their husbands. Several women lawyers had refused to take any of the cases. They had all had represented women in other kinds of disputes on other occasions. Suwan later thought to ask the women lawyers about their marital status. She found that they were all first wives. She stated further:

"This is the success of this regime. Women are so tied to husbands and children - their position or their husband’s position, that there is no possibility of solidarity among women."

Women who work in state agencies claim that they can more effectively change conditions for women than women’s non-governmental organizations because they are closer to the ministers, the decision makers and the President. They take pride in their professional abilities. They identify women’s access to state resources as the issue, and contributing to improved Women in Development policies and programs as the strategy. There is no requirement that they make any changes in their personal lives unlike the workers in non-governmental organizations who believe that they must commit "class suicide" in order to be in solidarity with factory workers. The New Order priorities of order, security and development are not challenged. State violence and threats to women’s personal and family safety are not counted, not acknowledged, so they do not exist.

The New Order strives to create the appearance of stability, a state prescribed prerequisite for development. The illusion of social peace is maintained by a constant threat of state violence, reinforced by systems of surveillance and state controlled information. Complex systems of state defined ideals and expectations of women participation in development, which are widely known throughout the country, even in remote areas, contribute to the monitoring of the actions of women’s organizations by state official and their wives. The publications, seminars and workshops, financial transfers and interprovincial and international travel of
women's organizations are carefully watched by officers of the state. Elaborate state ceremonies are frequently convened, command performances of citizens including women, demonstrating their loyalty and creating the appearance of harmonious relationships between men and women, and among Indonesian citizens.

Leaving Jakarta in 1994, I recall saying to two Indonesian women friends that I had a terrible sense of foreboding. In July, 1997 the army was sent to put down the protest and occupation by demonstrators of the Democratic Party of Indonesia office. There is a very fragile appearance of order, and underneath a social volcano including women, which is ready to erupt.
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APPENDIX 1 ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES CONTACTED DURING RESEARCH

1. Government Agencies
   Canadian International Development Agency
   Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta, Indonesia
   Department of Education and Culture, Republic of Indonesia
   Department of Home Affairs, Republic of Indonesia
   Department of Labour, Republic of Indonesia
   Department of Public Works, Republic of Indonesia
   Office of the State Minister for the Role of Women, Republic of Indonesia
   National Development Planning Board, Republic of Indonesia

2. International Agencies
   Canadian Cooperatives Association, Indonesia Cooperative Development Assistance Project
   CARE Canada, Indonesia Project Offices
   CUSO, Indonesia Program
   Canada World Youth, Indonesia Program
   Save the Children, Indonesia Program
   United Nations Development Fund for Women, Asia Pacific Regional Office, Bangkok
   USC Canada, Indonesia Program
   The World Bank, Resident Representative Office, Jakarta, Indonesia

3. Non-Governmental Organizations
   Bina Desa
   Gita Pertiwi
   Kalyanamitra
   Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Indonesia
   Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial
   MAWADDAH Foundation
   Muslimat NU
   Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia
   Pusat Pengembangan Sumberdaya Wanita
   Rifka Annisa
   Solidaritas Perempuan
   YASANTI
   Yayasan Dian Desa
   Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia
   Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera
   Yayasan Pengembangan Kerajinan Rakyat Indonesia
   Yayasan Prakarsa
   Yayasan Perempuan Mardika
4. Universities

Atma Jaya University, Jakarta
University of Indonesia, Jakarta
Women’s Studies Centre, Hasanuddin University
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta