AUGUSTINE'S WAR THOUGHT -
A CRITICAL REINTERPRETATION

BY

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ABSTRACT.

Augustine's views on war have deeply influenced subsequent war thought, and scholars have agreed that his purported definition of a "just war" ethic was basic to mediaeval and later just war traditions in the West. Drawing on selected passages in the Augustinian corpus, historians and theologians have often argued that Augustine was among the first to espouse a cogent just war "doctrine," which can be reconstructed by a simple process of induction. Many have seen this as part of a more general position that he consistently advocated over more than 40 years of philosophical and theological writing.

However, relevant primary source materials do not justify such conclusions. In fact, a close examination of key texts shows that Augustine never fully expounded his war thought in a single systematic statement, but that it emerged in a variety of settings which helped shape its form and content over time. There is clear evidence that he changed his views on war, as he moved from more private, abstract, and militaristic persuasions to more public, concrete, but pacific concerns between 388 and 429 AD. Thus a more flexible, organic interpretation of Augustine's war thought, which makes greater allowance for contextual considerations, should replace previous "doctrinal" understandings.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION.

If Augustine of Hippo (354-430) had never written anything about war, his historical reputation would not have suffered significantly. Quite apart from his "practical" achievements as a leading North African bishop and church politician at a time of major historical change (395-430), Augustine's contributions in such areas as the theology of the Trinity, soteriology, ecclesiology, spirituality and church/state relations have been seminal and in many ways foundational to Judaeo-Christian thought. Notwithstanding the quality and quantity of his work, a major reason for the scale and impact of Augustine's legacy was his direct influence on later mediaeval thinkers, for whom he was more authoritative than any other patristic theologian. On their own merits, his radically innovative and self-disclosing autobiography of conversion, the *Confessions* (*Confessiones*), and his massive theology of history, *City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*), subsequently earned a place among the Western "canon" of literary, as well as religious "classics." His theological stature remains such that he is hailed by Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox traditions alike.¹

In such a context, Augustine's "just war" thinking does not normally loom large in considerations of his overall achievement.² However, inasmuch as it lies at the heart of mediaeval ideas on the subject, and thus of many later
theological, ethical and legal determinations of the conditions and circumstances deemed necessary to justify military action, Augustine's work in this area is more significant than might seem obvious in light of its place within the Augustinian corpus. And although they frequently receive secondary or even negligible reference in summary treatments of Augustine's work, his general views on war continue to command study and debate as an important topic in their own right, both among Augustinian specialists and those whose primary interest lies in the intellectual and religious dimensions of attitudes to war.

Drawing on selected passages in Augustine, interpreters have argued that he was among the first to espouse a cogent "just war doctrine," which can be reconstructed by a simple process of induction. Many have seen this as part of a more general position that was consistently advocated throughout his works.

However, in a critical review of major secondary accounts of Augustine's war thought, Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis will show that scholars have often developed potentially misleading syntheses of his ideas because of basic methodological shortcomings. In particular, they have frequently divorced the study of relevant texts from significant contextual factors, especially literary and
historical considerations. As a result, they have tended to construct more or less abstract doctrinal accounts of Augustine's war thought which bear little relation to the settings and circumstances in which he lived and worked.6

Chapters 4 and 5 attempt to remedy associated problems by conducting a systematic exposition and analysis of key primary sources within a chronological framework stretching over more than 40 years. They reveal that:

a), Augustine developed his views on war gradually and sometimes sporadically between at least 388 and 429 AD, and he never presented them systematically in one place.

b), His war thought appeared in a variety of literary, intellectual and historical contexts, all of which affected its content, as well as presentation.

c), His writings on war reflect clear shifts from more private to more public concerns, from more abstract to more concrete preoccupations, and from more militaristic to more pacific emphases over time.7

In Chapter 6, the thesis concludes that although it remains possible to assemble "doctrines" of war or "just war" by piecing together different passages from Augustine's works, the hermeneutical and historical validity of such constructions is highly questionable. A more authentic
interpretation, which takes greater account of the various forms and contexts in which Augustine expounded his views, reveals, as above, that while he regularly advocated certain principles concerning war, his war thought more closely resembles a developing, organic cluster of ideas, which was remarkably flexible, and owed much, in the presentations of different aspects of it, to immediate contextual considerations. The changing emphases of Augustine's war thought which have already been noted are thus central to its proper understanding, and could prove even more illuminating on further exploration.
CHAPTER 2 - PAST INTERPRETATIONS I - SHORTER STUDIES.

1. OPENING PARAMETERS.

This chapter provides an historiographical overview and review of significant 20th century studies of Augustine's war thought in general and his just war theory in particular. Drawing on sources spanning over 80 years, it outlines major avenues of approach to the topic, and analyses individual treatments and general trends. The focus is entirely on secondary, rather than primary sources, which have been reserved for later consideration. Among the former, two major monographic studies will be examined separately following this opening review of leading articles and other shorter accounts.

After a brief outline of a respected formulation of Augustine's just war "doctrine" by Bainton, there will be an analysis of how different authors have approached the definition and context of Augustine's war thought in light of available sources. The conclusion is that while scholars have reached a broad consensus on key elements of Augustine's just war thinking, none has provided a complete and thoroughly convincing exposition of his views on war as a whole. Basic questions of literary, theological and historical contextualisation have been insufficiently treated to allow a rounded and fully balanced interpretation.
of why Augustine wrote what he did. Those issues thus require attention to achieve such an understanding.

2. MATTERS OF DEFINITION.

Perhaps the simplest and most straightforward exposition of Augustine's thought on just war has been offered by Roland Bainton in his widely respected monograph, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace. According to Bainton, who based his account on references to passages in 10 works in the Augustinian corpus, Augustine's "code of war" included the following six conditions:

1), A war should be "just as to its intent." In other words, a just war should be principally waged "to restore peace."

2), "An object of the just war" was "to vindicate justice," primarily in the form of "avenging injuries" such as invasion, failure to make amends for past damages, or refusal to grant rights of territorial passage.

3), The proper "disposition" of a just war should be Christian love - an inherently inward quality that did not preclude acts of violence to "avenge injuries."

4), A war should be "just as to its auspices," and therefore only waged under the authority of recognised rulers.
5), The war's "conduct" should be just. There should be proper respect for treaties, alliances and other international agreements. Wanton acts of violence, "vengeance, atrocities, and reprisals" were to be avoided, although some forms of deception were permitted.

6), Participation in a just war should be limited, from a Christian perspective, to those in positions of public authority. All "religious," including clergy and monastics, were to be excluded.2

Bainton's account of Augustine's thought on war extends beyond these points to more general considerations, including Augustine's views on peace, bloodshed and church-state relations, for example.3 But the above is a systematic presentation of key points which have been echoed throughout other secondary literature. Although they have not always been stated directly, and there have been minor differences of interpretation on some of them, all six have been affirmed in different ways by a large majority of the main sources considered in this chapter. In that sense, they may be said to constitute the "core" of modern analyses of Augustine's just war theory, and are a useful starting point for further discussion.4

However, there have been significant differences about how Augustine's thought on war should be presented. And although
the majority of sources have more or less explicitly accepted Bainton's six key points, scholars have chosen to frame their treatments somewhat differently - sometimes for methodological reasons.

Thus Swift, who has offered one of the fullest recent analyses, stressed the unsystematic and often polemical nature of relevant Augustinian writings, which arose out of a number of different contexts over a period of more than 30 years.5 "There is little in his writing on war which springs from theoretical musings or from a dispassionate examination of the question," Swift argued. In light of this, as well as the scattered nature of primary sources, he thought it safer to write of Augustine's "attitudes and his approach to the issue rather than his 'doctrine' of the just war."6 As a result, Swift started by establishing a series of general principles and propositions concerning Augustine's thought on war, before developing "principles governing justifiable violence," rather than Bainton's more formal "code of war."7 The latter effectively cover all Bainton's main points, and extend to include the areas of non-combatant immunity and religious coercion. But Swift's presentation, although supported by liberal quotations from Augustine's writings, lacks Bainton's clarity and conciseness.8

Other writers to stress the scattered and occasional nature
of Augustine's treatments of war have included Monceaux, for whom "this Augustinian doctrine...had neither the systematic rigour, nor the breadth, nor the minute precision which his disciples have subsequently attributed to it." In a relatively thorough and thought-provoking account, he accordingly focused on the development of Augustine's war thought over time, summarising his findings in concluding sections on a "philosophy" and a "code" of war, which included all the main points listed by Bainton.9 Like Monceaux, Combès was prepared to write of Augustine's "doctrine of the use of military force," but he stressed that it was developed "gradually and in fragments, in the course of delicate polemics."10 Arquillière and Lenihan made a similar point. Arquillière stressed the hortatory and polemical, rather than didactic character of Augustine's political works in general.11 "Augustine...presented his ecclesiastical teachings often in a polemical context in response to heresy and opposing positions," wrote Lenihan. "The just war in the work of Augustine is not a unified theory at all...Augustine never took up the problem directly and presented a unified, internally consistent position."12

Like Swift, but retaining the notion of doctrine which he had rejected, Combès proceeded to offer both a general treatment of Augustine's war thought, and an outline of more specific just war principles, which largely affirms
Sainton's six-point outline, although in a somewhat different format. Lenihan was consistent with his presuppositional and methodological critique of interpreting Augustine's views in a "doctrinal" format, when he simply expounded eight Augustinian textual loci and sought to develop key principles from them. His exposition supported conclusions critical of other interpretations, not least for their "doctrinal" emphases.

The expository practices of other scholars such as Regout have tended to resemble Lenihan's, centring on the development of general accounts of Augustine's war thought, presented largely unsystematically from primary sources. But they have often included "war code" elements. Thus Markus, who was more concerned with the context than the substance of Augustine's views, offered a very brief "just war" summary, as, more indirectly, did Deane, whose aims were more substantive. Writers whose topical or ideological focus has been more diverse, including Quinn and TeSelle, have offered similar summaries.

Such considerations may seem somewhat marginal to any profound critique of Augustinian scholarship, but they raise important questions and have potentially significant ramifications. Not least are the issues of whether Augustine can really be said to have developed anything like a formal
just war "doctrine" at all, and if so, how it is best presented. An account like Bainton's can certainly encourage the view that he did, but the qualifications about sources and contextualisation which Swift and others have mentioned seem important. Moreover, if it is accepted, with Swift, that there is no clearly developed Augustinian "doctrine" of just war, it seems preferable to expound Augustine's views on a more "occasional" basis, more closely related to the immediate historical and theological contexts of the relevant source documents. Such a process need not necessarily preclude subsequent systematisation, but only after full allowance has been made for the diversity of relevant materials.

A related question is the extent to which it is right to separate Augustine's thought on the conditions for just war from his views on war in general. With the notable exceptions of Langan, Lenihan, Ramsey and Russell, most of the main sources considered have attempted some form of specific "just war summary."\(^{17}\) The wisdom of this has to be queried, however, especially if the existence of a "just war doctrine" is questioned. Such a statement may do injustice to Augustine's own apparent intentions in his writings, and encourage an unbalanced interpretation of Augustine's thought as a whole.\(^{18}\)
3. USE OF SOURCES.

Inasmuch as it is obviously a major determining factor for subsequent interpretation, the range of primary sources deployed is crucial to such questions. It would therefore seem significant to note that there has been far from scholarly conformity in such deployment.

The traditional Augustinian textual loci for exposition of his just war theory have been listed by Lenihan as The Problem of Free Choice (De Libero Arbitrio) I, Reply to Faustus the Manichean (Contra Faustum Manichaeum) 22, Letters (Epistolae) 138, 189 and 229, Questions on the Heptateuch (Quaestiones in Heptateuchum) VI, Sermon (Sermo) 302 and City of God XIX. 19 However, while there has been a measure of agreement among scholars as to the centrality of most of these, there have been considerable divergences both in the use and emphasis they have given to different passages and in the extent to which they have called on additional sources.

Among those who have been more expansive, Bainton, for example, drew on materials from one other Letter (47), additional sections of City of God, and two further collections simply in order to expound his basic just war outline. Despite the relative brevity of his treatment, he also cited a range of other sources to develop related
themes in Augustine's war thought. Swift was even more searching, citing materials from no less than eight separate works in addition to Lenihan's basic list, as well as a wealth of further materials from *City of God, Letters* and *Sermons*. Although not as wide-ranging, Deane, Monceaux and Russell have also been among the most inclusive in their references, Russell citing five additional works and Deane being particularly thorough in his use of *City of God*.

By contrast, others have been much more restrictive in their range of sources. Langan, for example, who sought to expound a novel, thematic treatment of Augustine's war thought and stressed the "interiority" of Augustine's ethics, mainly focused on a few passages from *City of God, Letters 138 and 189, Reply to Faustus the Manichean* and *The Problem of Free Choice I*. Likewise, in his efforts to contextualise Augustine's just war theory within the author's theological development as a whole, Markus concentrated largely on standard passages from *City of God, Reply to Faustus the Manichean* and *The Problem of Free Choice*, expanding his frame of reference only to include treatment of material from *Letter 47* and passing references to a limited range of additional works.

Allowance should be made here and elsewhere for the fact that none of the sources considered for this chapter seems
intended to constitute an exhaustive, thoroughly detailed account of Augustine's war thought. However, expositions such as those of Swift, Deane and Russell clearly indicate that while certain passages in the Augustinian corpus may have more interpretative significance, a balanced and comprehensive analysis should include other materials. Consideration of scholars' use of sources also highlights the obvious need for particular caution, when novel interpretations are developed from a restricted source-base.

Langan's account seems vulnerable to such a critical qualification, while Markus' attempt at contextualisation is plainly not as thorough as might first appear. But the clearest example of a lack of inclusive treatment of sources is Ramsey's interpretation of "The Just War According To St. Augustine," which draws entirely on City of God XIX, supplemented by two references to Confessions VIII. Like Langan, Ramsey developed a thought-provoking account of the psychological focus of Augustine's ethics and its impact on his war thought, but he did not ground his interpretation very deeply in Augustine's own writings.

4. QUESTIONS OF CONTEXT.

Above and beyond the nature and extent of sources used, questions concerning understanding of the literary, theological, philosophical and historical contexts of...
Augustine's war thought further affect its exposition and interpretation. And here particular problems arise in light of the largely "summary" nature of the accounts considered for this thesis, which seems to preclude the sort of deeper treatment necessary for full contextualisation and exposition.

i), Literary Contextualisation.
The scattered, often polemical and largely occasional nature of Augustine's war writings has already been noted. However, even scholars such as Combès, Lenihan and Swift, who have actively stressed it, have paid relatively scant attention to the differing contexts in which Augustine's thought on war emerged. Others, like Bainton, Deane, Ramsey, Regout and Russell, have made virtually no effort to outline the literary settings of relevant arguments and citations. Instead, they have constructed what amount to largely abstract doctrinal definitions, drawing support from a range of different materials, cited, or even quoted, without substantial reference to either the literary forms or specific historical circumstances in which they were written.28

Thus works which range in dating from 388 (The Problem of Free Choice) to 427 AD (City of God XXII) - from the time when Augustine was a newly converted philosopher-layman to
the period when he was a leading bishop and theologian - have often been treated as objectively similar in origin and orientation. Likewise, compositions which vary in literary form from occasional pastoral letters written to Christian imperial officials (e.g., *Letters* 138, 189 and 229), to polemical treatises designed to combat particular "heresies" (e.g., *Reply to Faustus the Manichean*), to sermons delivered on special occasions (e.g., *Sermon* 302) and theological treatises addressing specific problems (e.g., *City of God* and *The Problem of Free Choice*) have been "mined" for relevant materials without detailed reference to their peculiar forms, settings or purposes.29

This is not a universal problem among secondary sources, as the examples of Lenihan, Markus and Monceaux make clear. But even Combes and Langan, who offered some literary contextualisation for the documents they considered, contented themselves with a few brief introductory details.30 Likewise, Swift, who noted problems of context and quoted amply from Augustine, generally gave only brief indications of the origins of different documents, and sometimes none at all.31

ii), Theological and Philosophical Contextualisation.

Questions of theological and philosophical contextualisation have generally been handled more adequately than literary
issues, although here too, analysis has tended to be general and sometimes ambiguous and scholars have frequently raised more problems than they have resolved. At the level of Augustine's own sources for his war thought, the influence of Cicero, Ambrose, other classical and patristic authors and Old and New Testament writings have all been argued by different authors. But except for introductory summaries and brief observations in the course of exposition, none has sought to show in any detail how Augustine drew on prior materials to develop his own ideas.

Such questions seem particularly pressing, however, to determine how much of Augustine's war thought was genuinely "original," and how much it was shaped by biblical and/or classical precedent. Nor is there a shortage of relevant scholarship in these areas. Augustine's connections with Cicero, in particular, have been amply documented in major studies, his general relationship with classical antiquity has received significant treatment, and there is a wide range of work on biblical and early church attitudes to war.

The connections between Augustine's war thought and other aspects of his theology and ethics have received fuller treatment, although there have been clear divergences in what scholars have deemed significant related issues. For
Bainton, Augustine's ecclesiology, interior ethical focus and general anti-perfectionism were crucial background to understanding his reluctant realism about war, especially when seen against the historical context of a Christian Roman Empire that was threatened by "Barbarian" invaders. Markus, on the other hand, chose to stress Augustine's personal theological journey from a new convert seeking to explain the presence of good and evil in light of an inherently "neo-Platonic" conception of a rational and moral "world order" (in The Problem of Free Choice), to a seasoned bishop, whose faith in such an order had long given way to a dramatic realisation of the radical discontinuity of divine grace and human sinfulness in a divided world where the "City of God" and the "earthly city" co-existed nonetheless (in City of God).

Although limited in its use of sources, as has been seen, Markus' analysis thus combined elements of philosophical and theological contextualisation with the sort of attention to literary setting which others have frequently ignored. Lenihan, who showed similar concerns, stressed, by contrast, the inherent "pacifism" underlying much of Augustine's war thought, which was strengthened, he thought, by Augustine's moral understanding of evil as an inherently "subjective" quality, which depended on "the interior attitude of the soul, rather than the ethical status of individual
Ramsey similarly contextualised Augustine's just war theory, emphasising his focus on defining ultimate moral virtue in terms of "ends" and intentions and his "radical critique of such justice as characterizes, has characterized, or ever will characterize, the Kingdoms of this world." In that context, war emerged as a painful necessity and "it is a lively sense of man's common plight in wrongdoing and of the judgement of God that overarches the justified war." Conversely, Russell stressed the "vindicatory" and "disciplinary" aspects of Augustine's views, linking the latter with his tough stance on religious coercion. Augustine's radical equation of justice with moral righteousness and his strong sense of the need to preserve a balanced "moral order" in the world entailed that any violation of such an order "could be seen as an injustice warranting unlimited violent punishment." Regout ultimately took a similar stance. "The three conditions required for waging war," which were "the authority of the prince, just cause and right intention" rested on Augustine's convictions that war had "not only the aim of avenging the moral order, but also of defending, maintaining and balancing the objective status quo, and more specifically of protecting and restoring particular rights [that had been] threatened or violated."
For Langan, who sought to outline Augustine's war thought thematically, it was best understood "in primarily spiritual and attitudinal terms," and war emerged, among other things, as "an element in religious pedagogy and an exercise of divine power and judgement." However, Augustine clearly recognised "the priority of peace to war in the order of final causes or goals." So his views on war should also be connected with his understanding of peace and its relationship with justice. Deane grounded his account in the context of Augustine's "discussion of punishment and earthly justice within the state" and of his doctrine of divine providence. In that light, Deane argued, although the "discipline" of war represented "a grim and horrible necessity," it could contribute to divine purposes for "the punishment of the wicked and the testing and the training of the good." Monceaux, who distinguished clearly between a more general "philosophy" and a more practically oriented and specific "code of war" which was based on it, conceived the former as "inspired almost entirely by the Old Testament" and linked "strictly to the conception of Providence." As such, "one must undoubtedly deplore the excesses of war; but one cannot condemn it in principle, since it has often been commanded by God." Moreover, "Christ's teaching does not forbid all war, since it does not proscribe military service." Augustine's theory of the
legitimacy of warfare could be summarised as one in which, "war is legitimate in principle, but excepting divine mandates, which are indisputable, it is only permitted, if necessary, and only necessary, if just." 43

Like Langan, De la Brière emphasised the priority of peace for Augustine. "Peace," he argued, "is always the supreme end, the tranquillity of order. The ideal would be to be able to achieve peace by peaceful rather than military means." 44 By contrast, Swift stressed an Augustinian theological framework, within which the doctrine of original sin was central, God willed "the civil order as a means of punishing wrongdoers and restraining evil" and obedience to those in authority was crucial. War emerged as both a necessary result and a providential remedy for sin and evil. As such, it could be a form of "benign severity" and divine discipline. Like Russell, Swift also linked Augustine's war thought with his views on religious coercion. 45

The diversity of philosophical and theological contexts within which authors have approached Augustine's views on war is yet further evidence of the complexity of issues involved. There have clearly been common themes, such as the prevalence of sin, the need for peace and obedience to authority, the priority of ethical interiority and the overarching significance of divine providence and justice.
But as has been seen, there have been important differences in the degrees of emphasis scholars have assigned to various strands of Augustine's thought, and further analysis might usefully address the tensions among these and other aspects of his theology.

iii), Historical Contextualisation.
When it comes to matters of more general historical contextualisation, the lack of all but the most basic treatment indicates a need for even more foundational work. In part, questions of general historical context are obviously related to issues already discussed under "literary contextualisation" and "sources." As such, they concern the immediate personal circumstances in which Augustine wrote what he did, the theological and philosophical influences and precedents for his thought, as well as the different literary "forms" in which he chose to express himself. However, more general historical questions are also relevant to a full interpretation of his war writings.

As Brown has shown persuasively with reference to Augustine's views on society and religious coercion, for example, his theology cannot be isolated from general trends and events in fourth and fifth century North Africa.46 Yet expositions of Augustine's war thought frequently give the
impression that the author was scarcely affected by the world around him, except perhaps by the most major of historical developments like "Barbarian" invasions in the Roman Empire.

Thus Bainton contented himself with a few general observations about the sack of Rome in 410 AD, the impact of the Emperor Constantine's conversion and "imperial Christianity," and about Rome's history and its wars, while Monceaux largely confined his historical commentary to issues generated by a few key texts. But even such limited treatment is more detailed than that offered by Combès, Deane, De la Brière, Lenihan or Markus, and Langan, Ramsey, Regout, Russell and Swift were generally silent on such issues. The result is that questions such as the relationship between the church and the Roman military establishment, the extent of Christian military participation and the various pressures Augustine may have been under to address the topic of war have not been mentioned at all. At the same time, the progress and perceived threats of "Barbarian" invasions have not been addressed in any detail; nor have other local socio-economic, political and religious circumstances in North Africa.

Of course, some of these areas may admit of more detailed
coverage than others, but there is no shortage of general background materials that could be deployed to help elucidate the situations in which Augustine lived and worked. Moreover, to attempt to interpret what Augustine wrote about war without reference to general and local historical developments would appear quite inappropriate. How else might letters to Christian imperial officials, for example (e.g., Letters 138, 189 and 229), or a theological treatise designed partly to explain Rome's demise (*City of God*), ever be properly contextualised?

5. CONCLUDING PROBLEMS.

Such problems of historical, theological, philosophical and literary contextualisation combine with issues surrounding use of sources and critical methodology to underline the complexities involved in developing a balanced and comprehensive interpretation of Augustine's war thought, which takes proper account of its origins and how it relates to his views on other issues. Certainly, none of the accounts considered here has dealt with anything approaching the full range of such issues, or achieved a synthesis that does justice to an area of Augustine's theology that has been highly influential on subsequent thinkers.

The irony in the current state of scholarship, as it is reflected in different accounts, is that there has been a
fairly strong measure of agreement about Augustine's views on just war - as stated, for example, in Bainton's outline. Yet it is obvious that the present consensus rests on weak foundations. Already, in fact, there are indications in works considered for this chapter that scholars have begun to query established "verities." Thus in questioning the morality of Augustine's alleged lack of provision for non-combatant immunity in war and of his purported insistence on total obedience from combatants, Hartigan suggested that Augustine was more "militaristic" and less comprehensive in his war ethic than was generally held. His article drew a strong and detailed response from Swift, who sought to undermine Hartigan's first two points and thus discredit the last.

More radically, Lenihan has recently argued that scholars have been misinterpreting the evidence for centuries by failing to ask what Augustine really meant by "war" and by "justice," by insufficiently stressing his negative and subjective conceptions of the evil of war, and by treating his just war thought as "a unified theory," rather than a diverse and scattered series of relevant statements. Lenihan's critique seems open to basic objections, but it undoubtedly raises important issues, which underline apparent weaknesses in recent scholarship, not least in the areas of sources, definitions and historical
A reconsideration of Augustine's war thought should clearly address a full and appropriate range of sources. But it should also consider the historical and literary contexts of those materials, and how they affected what Augustine wrote. Only then could it be determined what Augustine really thought about war, how it connected with his views on significant related issues, and how it should therefore be understood in relation to prior and contemporary ideas. It might also be decided whether Augustine held anything amounting to a "doctrine" of war/just war, or whether it is better to speak of a range of "views on" or "attitudes to" war.

Such issues may seem basic, and they obviously represent nothing like an exhaustive agenda, but they are generated by the weaknesses of the literature reviewed thus far - particularly on issues of sources and contextualisation, where fundamental questions seem to have been ignored or excluded, despite the availability of relevant evidence. Moreover, even where research exists, as it obviously does in some areas, the fact that it has not been reflected in the admittedly "summary" work of such respected scholars as Bainton, Deane, Russell and Swift, strongly suggests that key findings have simply not been absorbed into the main
body of Augustinian war thought scholarship. That too argues for a fundamental re-examination of the whole question.
1. QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW.

In view of the importance and influence of Augustine's war thought, it is surprising that the topic has so rarely received the more detailed and expansive treatment available in a monographic format. Beyond articles and shorter studies such as those reviewed in Chapter 2, two recent monographs specifically address Augustine's views on war. Both are decidedly theological in orientation, and they often seem to have been ignored by scholars. But they are clearly important by virtue of their breadth and scope.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore to review Hugh T. McElwain, *St. Augustine's Doctrine on War in Relation to Earlier Ecclesiastical Writers: A Comparative Analysis* (Chicago, IL: 1972) and William R. Stevenson, Jr., *Christian Love and Just War: Moral Paradox and Political Life in St. Augustine and His Modern Interpreters* (Macon, GA: 1987), to assess what these works have contributed to a deeper understanding of Augustine's war thought. In the process, particular attention will be addressed to the extent to which they can be said to have remedied some of the perceived deficiencies of other studies. Critical objectives will thus focus on reviewing such matters as use of sources and broader contextualisation. The authors' main
arguments will also be expounded, although they will not be critiqued in depth.

It will be concluded that neither McElwain nor Stevenson has offered the kind of chronological and progressive analysis of Augustine's war thought that seems appropriate to its proper exposition. As such, although both have made helpful contributions, neither has completed the research agenda outlined at the close of Chapter 2.5

2. HUGH T. MCELWAIN, ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE ON WAR IN RELATION TO EARLIER ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.

The stated purpose of McElwain's study, which is a published and updated version of his doctoral thesis prepared for the Catholic Theological Faculty "Marianum" in Rome, was "to research carefully Augustine's position on war and peace with the intent of discovering what - if any - may have been the sources in earlier tradition on which Augustine depended (if he did) for his doctrine on war, a doctrine that has been so influential in Christian tradition." 6 He pursued his brief in a highly systematic manner, producing a three-part work, of which the first addresses "The Question of War in the Early Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers," the second, "The Doctrine of War According to Augustine," and the third, "Comparisons between
St. Augustine and the Earlier Church Writers.  

Among his "general conclusions" was that Augustine's treatment of war was more general and more probing than that of earlier writers, although there were common elements. "Predominantly characteristic" Augustinian emphases were his views on "the relations between war and Divine Providence and the idea of peace as the final cause of war."  

Historical events, including the advent of the Constantinian Roman Empire and the support of church councils for Christian military participation, had made the issue of war both more acceptable and more pressing in Augustine's day. He had responded by adopting "what might be termed a pragmatic stance," although peace was actually "the pervading element in his entire doctrine on war."  

Such conclusions seem well supported by McElwain's analysis and exposition of primary source materials, as developed in the main body of his work, although his examination of key historical developments is somewhat cursory, and his exegetical approach to Augustine's writings is problematic, as will be seen. McElwain's treatment of "earlier ecclesiastical writers," in which he chronicled the growing significance of the question of war over the first 350 years of church history and a significant relaxation in Christian attitudes following Constantine's Edict of Milan in 313 AD,
is well presented. Dividing the pre-Augustinian era into three key periods, "from the beginnings of Christianity until 180," "from 180 to the Edict of toleration of 313," and "immediately preceding St. Augustine," McElwain argued that virtual neutrality and relative silence on the issue of Christian military participation before 180 AD yielded to mixed, although largely pacifist sentiments and statements in the third century. After 313, however, "the whole tenor of the discussion changed," as authors such as Athanasius, Basil and Ambrose of Milan worked to define appropriate principles for warfare in what had now become a Christian empire.

McElwain's exposition of pre-Augustinian writings is systematic, chronologically developed, and relatively clear and concise. Some of his conclusions seem rather simplistic compared with those of other scholars, and his range of sources is not as thorough as that of Swift in The Early Fathers on War and Military Service, for example. But overall, the author succeeded in providing a useful overview of relevant materials, which serves as a helpful platform from which to examine Augustine's war thought.

That examination itself, which is really the central focus of McElwain's study, has both strengths and weaknesses, and the latter mitigate the former. McElwain's modus operandi is
clear. His major sources are cited as City of God I, IV, XII and XIX, Letters 138, 189 and 229, Questions on the Heptateuch IV.44 and VI.10, Reply to Faustus the Manichean 22.70-78, Sermon 302, and The Problem of Free Choice I, although he also drew on a few additional passages in the course of his exposition.

McElwain described his expository methodology as "logical," rather than "chronological." In fact, he denied "development in Augustine's ideas of such proportions as to affect his doctrine to any great extent," favouring instead an inclusive approach which allowed him to analyse different strands of thought and their inter-relationships using composite collections of primary source materials. The result is a five-part account of Augustine's war thought, including separate chapters on "War According to Sacred Scripture," "Divine Providence and War," "The Causes of War," "Obligations of Soldiers," and "The Goal or Finality of War."

In the first of these chapters, McElwain drew on a variety of sources to analyse Augustine's understanding of war in the Old and New Testaments. His main conclusions were that Augustine "insisted on the permissive action of Divine Providence in the wars of the Old Law," while also identifying "the elements of justice which pervaded the
actions of Moses."\textsuperscript{18} Such arguments were strengthened by his observation from the New Testament that war was not to be considered radically evil, and more detailed examination of Augustine's views on "war and divine providence" showed that the former was clearly part of the latter's "designs."\textsuperscript{19}

McElwain summarised his findings as follows:

It [war] serves, in effect, as a trial for the just, for whom simultaneously it can be a source of merit; for the unjust, however, it is to be a chastisement, according as they have thwarted the designs of Divine Providence expressed through the natural order of things. The natural order, in fact, is ordained and accommodated to peace, a peace which once lost, paradoxically, can often be gained precisely and only through war.\textsuperscript{20}

McElwain's third chapter, on "The Causes of War," is among his most original and illuminating, not least because of its organisation, which treats causes for "unjust wars," as well as "just wars," and divides the latter into two types of war, "defensive" and "offensive."\textsuperscript{21} His findings as to the causes of "just wars" are fairly standard, centring on God's command, self-defence, and "avenging injuries." But his account also highlights two main causes for "unjust wars," "an inordinate desire for temporal goods and the mania for conquest."\textsuperscript{22} In all this, the "Obligations of the Soldier"
are said to come down to two principal ones, "to follow up the military commands of legitimate authority" and to meet "the other concomitant obligations which virtue imposes on the military figure." For Augustine, this generally involved total obedience to appointed leaders, McElwain contended, although where orders were clearly perceived as unjust, such a duty might be suspended. Finally, in his fifth chapter, on "The Finality of War," McElwain stressed "peace as the final cause of war." Since this was "the dominant theme in Augustine's entire doctrine on war," the achievement of peace was also war's ultimate justification.

Comparing McElwain's account with others considered earlier, it can be seen that there are several common elements. Emphases such as those on peace as the ultimate aim of war, the need for "just causes" and "just auspices" for war, and the duties of Christian military obedience all feature prominently, as they do elsewhere. McElwain eschewed the compilation of any kind of "just war code," detailing clear conditions for just war, and he omitted some aspects of Bainton's basic outline in this regard. But he retained a "doctrinal" label for Augustine's war thought, and his innovative approach to its definition allowed him to expound materials on such topics as causes for "unjust wars" which others have neglected. As such, McElwain's is a useful
study, especially in light of its clear, systematic
development and its comparative materials and conclusions on
the links between Augustine's views and those of earlier
writers.

Unfortunately, the book's major weaknesses seriously
undermine its strengths. As has been seen, his use of
sources is quite limited, and his exclusion of materials
from such works as *Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount* not only
seems to have affected his general exposition, but may have
contributed to his neglect of aspects of Augustine's thought
which others have deemed significant - on the need for "just
disposition" and "just conduct" in warfare, for example.29
McElwain's historical analysis, although helpful, is also
limited, and largely confined to events in the fourth
century which significantly pre-dated Augustine's
writings.30 Last but not least, because he adopted a
deliberately "logical" approach to expounding relevant
materials, McElwain made no attempt to contextualise
individual texts by showing their aims and circumstances of
composition or by grounding them in deeper historical or
theological contexts.

The result, as with other studies, is that McElwain's
exposition of Augustine's war thought, while often
internally satisfying and coherent in light of its stated
aims and objectives, emerges as a decidedly abstract doctrinal work, which reflects little of the various life and literary settings in which Augustine developed his views. Moreover, the author's denial that there was any significant development over time is unconvincing given the lack of evidence adduced for such a claim. McElwain may have succeeded in expounding significant elements of what Augustine wrote, but because he pursued a thematic approach and drew on compilations of texts related to different themes, his monograph fails to respond to the sort of research agenda sketched in the previous chapter, or to provide many answers to questions raised there.

3. WILLIAM R. STEVENSON, JR., CHRISTIAN LOVE AND JUST WAR: MORAL PARADOX AND POLITICAL LIFE IN ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS MODERN INTERPRETERS.

Stevenson's monograph was also based on a doctoral dissertation - for the University of Virginia in 1984 - and its goals likewise extended beyond simple exposition of Augustine's war thought to include comparison with the work of other authors. His focus was much more broadly philosophical and theological than that of McElwain, however, and the other writers he treated, the 20th Century American thinkers, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey, were both analysed as "modern interpreters" of Augustine, to be
judged according to their fidelity to his example. The main objectives of *Christian Love and Just War* were: a), to give an authentic and credible account of Augustine's views on "just war," and b), to examine the extent to which either Niebuhr or Ramsey could be said to have followed Augustine in their own war thought. Generally stated, Stevenson's conclusion was that "the just war theory Ramsey derives from Augustinian principles fails to account fully for the many paradoxes that Augustine recognised in the human condition," whereas "Niebuhr...became a true son of Augustine almost in spite of himself."34

Like McElwain's, Stevenson's study is carefully organised. After a brief "Introduction," the first three chapters address key aspects of Augustine's views on just war, including "Earthly Justice and the Two Cities: When Is War Appropriate?," "Human Sin and Political Authority: Who May Wage War?," and "The Grace of Right Love: How May War Be Waged?." His last chapter is then a comparative analysis of "Paul Ramsey and Reinhold Niebuhr: War, Love, and Prudence," before Stevenson's "Conclusion" considers the relevance of Augustine's thought for today.35 The first three chapters seem particularly carefully thought out, designed, as they were, to address central aspects of traditional Augustinian just war "doctrine" - "just cause," "just auspices," and "just intention" and "conduct."36
Especially striking features of Stevenson's monograph, compared with other studies, are the range of primary sources he considered and the depth of contextual, philosophical and theological analysis he undertook. In terms of sources, this is by far the most thorough work reviewed in this thesis. Stevenson covered all the standard loci for Augustine's war thought and much more besides. In fact, as well as citing from *City of God* (20 Books), *Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount* (3 Books), *Questions on the Heptateuch* (3 Books), *Reply to Faustus the Manichean* (3 Books), *The Problem of Free Choice* (3 Books), Augustine's *Letters* (36 altogether), *Sermons* (16) and *Expositions on the Book of Psalms* (11), Stevenson also drew on no less than 23 other works to expound his argument. A major reason for such a wide use of primary materials was undoubtedly the breadth of his analysis of related aspects of Augustine's thought, which extends to include such topics as justice, sin, political authority, grace, free will and love.

In his first chapter, Stevenson addressed the tensions surrounding the issue of "just cause" between Augustine's emphasis on peace as the only ultimately valid reason for going to war and his contention that war was not "a positive good," but "the last resort of a prudent people." Expounding Augustine's teaching on the "two cities," the
"City of God" and "the earthly city," Stevenson argued that their members were "in this life...inextricably intertwined," and they could not, therefore, be identified with existing "immanent institutions." By contrast, Augustine saw "the saeculum," or "the world of space and time," as a place where strife and misery were unavoidable, because "historical existence brings with it inevitable tensions, tensions that can only be resolved by God and only beyond history." As a result, "true justice," which consisted, for Augustine, of "that ordered harmony of the parts rendering to each its due," and primarily of "rendering to God God's due" in a relationship of "rightly ordered love," was ultimately impossible in the "saeculum." The problem was not "that individuals and regimes can not fulfill their obligations and so be rightly ordered, but that they can not be both rightly ordered and conscious of it."

However, "temporal peace," defined as "tranquillity of order," was realistically achievable in the world of space and time. In fact, for Augustine, whereas peace was "the great good in the saeculum," because it spared man from "the horrors of war" and allowed "contemplation and preparation for the life to come," war was "a great evil." As such, although war was inevitable, its only proper motivation or intention was for peace. For Augustine, therefore, war was
"the last resort," "always to be regretted," although sometimes justly motivated by needs to "avenge injuries," engage in appropriate self-defense or obey God's direct command. Augustine offered no "detailed tenets of 'just cause,'" he "specifically denied the possibility of translating the transcendent justice of God into any particular course of action within the saeculum," and he "repeatedly condemned the sin of self-righteousness, of facile confidence that one is in the right in a specific situation." But confronting the inevitable tensions between the transcendent demands of divine justice, the desirability of peace, the horrors of war, and the general strife and uncertainty of a fallen "saeculum," he did allow that warfare could be justly undertaken in certain circumstances. Although he never intended "to detail a doctrine," Augustine's just war ideas were thus a theologically defined, but essentially pragmatic response to the realities of life as he saw them.

In considering the role of "just auspices," or legitimate authority, to determine justice in warfare, Stevenson's second chapter is equally broad in its theological purview. Its particular concerns centre on the issues of "Human Nature, Human Perversion," "Paradox and Authority" and "Providence and War." Examining Augustine's views on humanity as "both naturally free and universally enslaved by
sin," Stevenson concluded that such a "divided and discontinuous humankind" lay "at the base of Augustine's understanding of political authority." "As natural beings - and they remain natural beings...they ought not to be coerced; they possess absolute dignity and worth. Yet as sinful, corrupted beings they have to be coerced." In this light, "political authority...is both a remedy and a punishment for sin; its purposes are both rehabilitative and retributive."

In essence, Stevenson argued, Augustine saw two different aspects of divine providence affecting humanity. From the standpoint of nature, the ordo naturalis, or "natural order," by which Augustine meant "the order of God's original creation," was a function of his providentia naturalis, or "natural providence" displayed in "the inherent workings of nature." From an historical standpoint, the lex aeterna, or "eternal law," which Augustine saw as "the historical and political order...God ordained as ruler of the 'saeculum,'" reflected the divine providentia voluntaria, or "voluntary providence," which represented "God's will as active in the world." Both were "intimately related," because, as Stevenson argued, quoting Markus, "'the eternal law...ordains the preservation of the natural order and prohibits its transgression.'"
The impact of such a twofold understanding of providence was thus vital to determining when war could be waged on legitimate authority, since "for rulers, the dualism means, on the one hand, unbridled discretion within history, and on the other, a requirement of full and direct obedience to God." Under providentia voluntaria, God consistently achieved "an active incorporation of evil will" into his plans and purposes, so that "whatever the ruler may do during his reign God had already foreseen and either rewarded or neutralised" and "if he wages war, the war will serve a purpose ultimately good." However, under providentia naturalis, "no human power is in and of itself authoritative," because for Augustine, control of others was always ultimately "unnatural." As a result, in the final analysis, "a ruler's authority derives only from his personal (individual) self-directing of will toward God," and "rulers can gain genuine authority only by attuning themselves to God's natural order." It was therefore possible, although rare, that subjects of a particular regime might justifiably disobey the orders of a ruler who held legitimate authority under providentia voluntaria, but acted illegitimately in light of providentia naturalis, by failing to meet the demands of the ordo naturalis.

For Stevenson, Augustine accordingly denied absolute discretion to rulers in waging just wars, although he
stressed the need for "just auspices." "Inevitably, the
deciding factor in the particular determination is the
setting, the particular circumstances," and "humankind's
duty is thus to listen for God's will in the particular
situation, and then obey God." As on the question of "just
cause," Stevenson thus ended by stressing the inherently
pragmatic nature of Augustine's teaching on "just auspices."

Turning to the issue of "just intention" in his third
chapter, Stevenson started with the contention that for
Augustine, "war was justifiable only as an action arising
out of right love. War's methods, therefore, ought only to
be love's methods." Considering the nature of Augustinian
love, Stevenson defined it as a "psychological attachment"
that was "intimately connected with will" as "the central
human characteristic." "Everything a person does...even
evil," was "ultimately the result of love," and God was "the
natural direction and home for human love." At the same
time, as with true justice, "humankind's obligation and
humankind's innate freedom make right love a possibility,
but humankind's corruption and pride at the very core of
one's being make it an impossible possibility." In fact,
for Augustine, only God's intervention as "the source of
right love," as of "all good," made it a realistic
expectation.
Such intervention came in the form of grace, which was "an infusion of right love into individuals who are, of themselves, wholly incapable of such love." Yet Augustine saw continuing tension and paradox in the human condition, because human pride was a consistent obstacle to God's grace, meaning that its influence both was and was not "a historical possibility." Love and grace connected with war in that "right love," as "both forgiveness of one's neighbour and an active concern for the neighbour's eternal welfare," might entail rebuke, punishment and physical coercion in a spirit of "benign severity." Moreover, "war and its consequent physical death and injury may result from right love, for Augustine, because love is primarily a matter of inward disposition, not one's outward action."

There was a further problem, however, in that although right motivations might justify warfare from a subjective standpoint, leaders were often called to make judgements about the actions of others on the basis of deeds alone. Again, therefore, Stevenson concluded by arguing that Augustine's approach to both "just intention/disposition" and "conduct" in war was ultimately pragmatic. "One should give the rules [of just war] the benefit of the doubt but continue always to listen for God's will in the particular situation." So when it came to the specific issue of *ius in bello*, or "right conduct," "the proper means of waging
war...rest firmly on the conscience of the statesperson who initiates it and the soldier who fights it."\textsuperscript{73}

Stevenson's analysis of the views of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey in his fourth chapter, which argues, as noted, that Niebuhr ultimately followed Augustine more closely, rests heavily on such paradoxical and/or pragmatic elements in Augustine's war thought to demonstrate elements of continuity between the two thinkers.\textsuperscript{74} "One can fully appreciate Augustine's contribution to human thinking about war," Stevenson wrote in conclusion, "only if one considers his sense of paradox, his acute awareness of the inherent contradictions involved in human social existence."\textsuperscript{75}

The general effect of Stevenson's account of Augustine is therefore to provide a theological context for aspects of his war thought that have traditionally been deemed important parts of his "just war doctrine" in such a way as to show that "Augustine's value...lies not in his 'doctrine'....For Augustine's theory is filled with paradoxes."\textsuperscript{76} Such standard just war tenets as "just cause," "just auspices," "just intention/disposition" and "just conduct" are thus effectively deconstructed by Stevenson's practice of placing each of them within a broader intellectual framework based on perceived paradoxes elsewhere in Augustine's theology.\textsuperscript{77} For example, the issue
of "just cause," which Stevenson linked with the object of peace, is shown to be severely complicated by the problems of achieving "true justice" or accurate self-knowledge in the "saeculum." The question of determining "just auspices" is rendered highly problematic in light of Stevenson's presentations of Augustine's views on human nature, sin and divine providence. Finally, simple definitions of "just disposition" and "just conduct" are weakened when robbed of normative force by Stevenson's complex interpretations of Augustine's understandings of love and grace. In fact, on such a basis, it is arguable that only such an obviously paradoxical thinker as Reinhold Niebuhr could have hoped to follow in Augustine's footsteps, and so to be designated a worthy successor by Stevenson, in due fulfilment of his research agenda!

However, while Stevenson seems to have provided valuable theological background for understanding some of the broader implications of Augustine's war thought - especially his views on justice and providence, for example, which will be considered in a later chapter - the author's methodology raises serious questions as to the overall reliability and plausibility of his findings. Particularly problematic are his consistent practices of:

a), treating Augustine's theology in isolation from
contemporary events or the views of previous thinkers; b), making no effort to trace any development in Augustine's thought; c), supporting his conclusions from a wide range of primary sources without contextualising them historically.

The net effect of these and other strategies, not least Stevenson's eclectic choice of related theological issues within which to interpret Augustine's war thought, is to leave his account open to obvious objections which he has done nothing to answer. If it could be shown, for example, as it will be argued in this thesis, that Augustine's war thought developed significantly over time and that it reflected the various historical and literary settings in which it emerged, Stevenson's cumulative interpretation of key emphases becomes open to a rival process of deconstruction itself. At the same time, his exegesis of key sources, however thorough and innovative, may ultimately emerge as historically invalid, because ahistorically expounded.80

This is not to deny the obvious merits of Stevenson's study, especially as what McElwain might have described as a "logical" presentation of Augustine's war thought.81 His use of sources, although arguably misconceived, is exceptionally thorough, and his theological analysis is consistently
insightful and thought-provoking. In the process, he has highlighted a number of key related areas for further study in connection with Augustine's views, and done much to raise serious questions of previous "doctrinal" interpretations of Augustinian war thought. However, like most of the other secondary works reviewed thus far, Stevenson's is vulnerable to such basic methodological critique that its conclusions, however innovative, clearly require systematic testing in light of the more inductive, developmental, research agenda advocated in the previous chapter.

In that sense, McElwain's and Stevenson's monographs are open to similar major objections. For while both have drawn on an expansive range of sources, especially Stevenson, and both have sought to expound Augustine's war thought within a wider context than other scholars - McElwain from the standpoint of previous authors and Stevenson within a broadly established framework of Augustine's views on related issues - neither has really addressed the more immediate settings in which Augustine wrote what he did. Thus while both have made significant contributions to a better understanding of Augustine, neither has substantively broached major issues to emerge in Chapter 2. Armed with their findings, this thesis now turns to an attempted resolution of such problems.
CHAPTER 4 - EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SOURCES I.

1. AIMS AND METHODS.

It has been argued that Augustine's war thought has received inadequate treatment in that scholars have often divorced the study of relevant passages from significant contextual considerations. They have tended to ignore questions of literary and historical setting and to construct more or less abstract, doctrinal definitions of Augustine's views on war and/or "just war." However, given the significance traditionally attached to Augustine's views on "just war," the location of a full and appropriate range of primary sources, the elucidation of relevant contexts and the definition of what Augustine really wrote about war remain important. Only by addressing these and related questions can the validity of various secondary, "doctrinal" syntheses be properly tested.

Chapters 4 and 5 will begin responding to such a research agenda with a summary exposition of Augustine's war thought, based on the major textual loci identified as significant by scholars. In light of an examination of such materials in situ, passages from key works will be treated and expounded in chronological order to determine the main themes emerging from them, and how they relate to each other. Although such themes will be synthesised, where especially appropriate,
the main objective will be to define them, as they originated and were developed over 41 years of relevant writings.

Particular attention will be paid to the literary contexts of Augustine's works, centering on such matters as dating, format, avowed purposes and main arguments. Questions of immediate historical background will also be addressed, where they are obviously relevant to proper comprehension. Broader historical issues will be raised where necessary, although background detail will generally be restricted. Consideration of secondary literature and debate, which predominated in the previous chapters, will likewise be confined to matters of particular assistance or relevance to the understanding of primary materials.

Following the examination of primary sources, a developmental understanding of Augustine's war thought, which is periodically expounded over the course of that analysis, will be summarised in Chapter 6. It will be concluded that there is clear evidence of a developing, organic cluster, or nexus of ideas in Augustine's war thought, which shows strong elements of consistency. Because this emerged in various literary contexts and with different emphases relating to them, it will be seen as a remarkably flexible intellectual construct. It will also be linked with
specific historical factors that appear to have influenced Augustine's thinking, especially increasing socio-political tensions from 410 AD onwards.

2. POST-CONVERSION AND PRIESTHOOD WRITINGS: 386-395 AD.

i). The Problem of Free Choice

[De Libero Arbitrio], Book I - 388 AD.

With the notable exception of Combes, earlier expositors of Augustine's war thought tended to ignore Book I of The Problem of Free Choice, but more recent commentators have emphasised the significance and relevance of this source material. Written just two years after Augustine's formal conversion to Christianity in a style which clearly reflects his background and interests as a philosopher-layman, The Problem of Free Choice I provides valuable insights into Augustine's views on war-related issues at an early stage in his theological development.

The Problem of Free Choice comprises three books, of which the last two were not completed until 395. Its main focus, as the title makes clear, was the theological and philosophical question of free will — especially, as Pontifex, echoing Augustine's own explanation, elucidated, "the Manichaean objection to Christianity that, since the presence of evil is undeniable, it is inconceivable that God can be both almighty and infinitely good." Against that
contention, Augustine, who was himself a former Manichee, wrote to defend the view that "God was the source of everything outside Himself, that evil had no independent existence and yet that evil was not caused by God." Central to Augustine's "theodicy" was the process by which "he traced evil to sin, and sin to free will, and therefore stressed the individual responsibility which free will implied." 7

In *The Problem of Free Choice I*, Augustine's main concerns were the origin of evil and responsibility for sin (I.1.1-2.4), the definition and source of sin (I.2.5-4.10), the nature of "temporal law" and "eternal law" (I.5.11-6.15), free will in wrongdoing (I.7.16-11.23), justice in punishment (I.12.24-14.30), and a closing discussion of sin as "the neglect of eternal things" (I.15.31-16.35). 8 The general thrust of the book was to urge that the ultimate source of evil was human wrongdoing, which resulted from a free choice to give way to unworthy desires and to neglect "eternal" values in favour of "temporal" ones. 9 Within this context, Markus argued, Augustine assumed "a world order" where "rationality and morality" coincided and "wickedness" was "to breach the divine order in the world, goodness to follow it." 10 Such an order required that "temporal law, if it is to be just, must in some way derive from an eternal law," 11 and Augustine treated the morality
of killing as an example of this principle, as well as an exploratory illustration of the nature of motivation in wrongdoing.

From a literary standpoint, *The Problem of Free Choice* was written in the form of a philosophical dialogue, not a systematic theological treatise. Its arguments emerge in the interplay of questions, answers and statements between Augustine and Evodius, a member of Augustine's circle who later became a North African bishop. Augustine made it clear in his *Retractions* ([Retractiones]) that the work was originally based on genuine discussions between the two men, although studied and formal in style. Compared to many of Augustine's later works, *The Problem of Free Choice* was also remarkably undogmatic. Despite its overarching thematic framework of divine authority and "eternal law," this was essentially an appeal to reason, not revelation. In many ways, it is precisely the kind of work that might have been expected from a sophisticated young rhetorician and philosopher, who remained heavily influenced by the classical culture in which he had been educated.

The key sections from *The Problem of Free Choice* I, which have attracted attention from scholars of Augustine's war thought, occur in 1.4.9-5.13, where Augustine and Evodius discussed the morality of killing within the context of the
origin of sin and the nature of law. In I.4.9, a clear
distinction was made between murder and lawful or accidental
homicide. "When a soldier kills the enemy, when a judge or
an executioner kills the criminal, or when a weapon flies
from a man's hand inadvertently and by accident, I do not
think they sin by killing a man," observed Evodius. Augustine
agreed and in I.5.10, the two then concluded that
"blameworthy desire...which we call passion," and which
constituted "the principal element in this whole matter of
wrongdoing" (I.3.8), was "love of those things which each of
us can lose against his will" (I.5.10).

This definition provoked a related discussion as to "whether
an open enemy or a secret assassin can be killed without any
passion in defence of life, liberty, or honour" (I.5.11). The
obvious implication of Augustine and Evodius' under¬
stANDING of "passion" as the source of wrongful action
was that any killing which involved it was immoral, and
Augustine drew this inference. "The law is not just which
authorises a traveller to kill a robber in self-protection," he
observed, "or any man or woman to kill an assailant, if
possible before the violence has been carried out (I.5.11)."
The assumption was that such actions would normally entail
"passion," since they would be designed to conserve goods —
primarily life and liberty — which could always be lost and
were therefore of passing value in the ultimate scheme of
Evodius made a further distinction, however, between killings and acts of violence which the law simply allowed, as in the case of private citizens defending themselves, and those which the law effectively ordained, when recognised authorities, especially soldiers, were required to meet "force...with force." In the former instances, Evodius argued, although "a law which gives its subjects permission to commit lesser crimes in order to prevent greater ones, has a good defence...., the law does not force them [private citizens acting in self-defence] to kill, but leaves it to their own discretion, and so they are free not to kill anyone in defence of those things which they can lose against their will (1.5.12)." Officials, on the other hand, were simply law-enforcers and therefore free to act without wrongful self-interest. "When a soldier kills the enemy," said Evodius, "he is enforcing the law, and so has no difficulty in carrying out his duty without passion (1.5.12)." 17

Thus according to the ideal criteria which Augustine and Evodius established, soldiers and others under orders could commit acts of violence and even homicide "without blame," whereas private citizens could not, even in self-defence. Since Evodius allowed that the law permitted people to act
violently in self-defence, however - "no law may find them guilty, if we speak of those laws which are familiar to us and which are made by men (I.5.13)" - and since he accepted the value of such a dispensation, he proceeded to distinguish between the demands of human, or "temporal" law, and those of divine, or "eternal" law. Whereas "that law which is issued for the government of a people rightly allows these acts [of private self-defence]," he argued, "Divine Providence punishes them (I.5.13)." Augustine "thoroughly" approved this distinction, and the two then continued with a discussion of the respective demands of "temporal" and "eternal" law (I.6.14ff.).

With the exception of Markus, who was most concerned with questions of theological/philosophical context, and McElwain and Stevenson, war-thought scholars have not considered the argument of this dialogue in any detail. In fact, they have generally contented themselves with extracting or confirming two key principles from The Problem of Free Choice I, which they have deployed within an outline of Augustine's general views on war. These principles are: a), the argument that private self-defence is ultimately illegitimate; and, b), the contention that only legitimate authorities, especially soldiers, can rightfully kill others.
As has been seen, however, these points emerged in a complex intellectual and stylistic setting, where neither was without explicit qualification. Although private self-defence was viewed as illegitimate (I.5.13), it was pragmatically allowed under the provisions of what was later defined as "temporal" law (I.5.12). On the other hand, while the legitimacy of acts of violence committed by soldiers and other officials was affirmed, even there the spectre of potentially invalidating "passion" was raised, when Augustine cited the possible influence of fear of punishment by "the military authorities" (I.5.11). In light of such factors, as well as the fact that relevant passages were ultimately concerned with much broader issues, it would seem unwise to be over-dogmatic in drawing conclusions from The Problem of Free Choice about Augustine's war thought. Related issues were clearly discussed, but they were treated in both a manner and a context that are not conducive to the unqualified isolation of major principles which has emerged in most discussions of this work.

The most pivotal argument to emerge from The Problem of Free Choice centred on the importance of internal disposition to the legitimacy of acts of violence. For it was essentially the presence or absence of "passion" which was claimed to be morally determinative - both for private citizens and for soldiers and others in positions of authority.
So it is interesting to note that this theme continued in the next source for Augustinian war thought, although scholars have failed to note such continuity.

Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, which was completed in 394 AD, three years after Augustine was ordained priest and just a year before he entered the episcopate, was quite different in both style and character from *The Problem of Free Choice*. Unlike the earlier dialogue, with its philosophical and inherently non-dogmatic format and content, this was essentially an expository treatise, in which Augustine's concern was to expound the Matthaean version of the biblical Sermon on the Mount as faithfully as possible, and thus to unveil "a perfect standard of the Christian life" and "the precepts by which the Christian life is moulded" (I.1.1). As such, Augustine had no specific polemical agenda and his argument depended closely on his text. His exegesis was highly allegorical in places, which gave him greater expository freedom than a more straightforward, *historico-grammatical* account. But the demands of Matthew 5:1-7:29 were ultimately decisive, and the materials that have drawn the attention of war-thought scholars have done so because they address relevant Matthaean passages.23
Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount is a two-part work, of which Book I is devoted to Matthew 5, and Book II to Matthew 6 and 7. Key passages have been gleaned by scholars from:

i), I.19.59 and I.20.63, which Russell cited to support the view that Augustine held that "hatred was to be overcome by a love for one's enemies that did not preclude a benevolent severity;"24

ii), I.20.63-4, to which Bainton referred to illustrate Augustine's belief that Christian love was not incompatible with acts of violence, and Swift to stress the inward emphasis of Augustine's interpretation of Christian ethics;25

iii), I.20.70, which was cited by Bainton in a similar connection.26

In fact, Book I contains further materials relevant to Augustine's war thought. In I.2.9, for example, he defined "the perfection of peace" as a state where "nothing offers opposition." In I.9.21, he admitted the possibility that killers would go to heaven. In I.11.31, Augustine argued that although "we are enjoined to live peaceably with all men, as far as lieth in us," even murderers could secure divine forgiveness. In I.15.41, he stated that "a good Christian....loves his enemy, not in as far as he is an
enemy, but in as far as he is a man." In I.19.56ff., Augustine conducted a quite detailed discussion of revenge and generosity, centering on Matthew 5:38-42, in which he argued that "not only are you not to pay back what may have been inflicted on you [by an enemy], but you are not even to resist other inflictions (I.19.57)." 27

Key passages are found in I.20.63, where Augustine contended that Christian love did not abrogate the need to inflict "such punishment as avails for correction," and that "no one is fit for inflicting this punishment except the man who, by the greatness of his love, has overcome that hatred wherewith those are wont to be inflamed who wish to avenge themselves." But Augustine's emphasis on the ideal inward disposition of the punished - "happy by means of correction" and enduring injuries "with equanimity" (I.20.63), and his approval of capital punishment (I.20.64) are also noteworthy. 28

Of further significance are his arguments against Manichean non-violence (I.20.65), in which Augustine cited the examples of the apostles Paul and Thomas; his definition of "love of an enemy" as "the perfection of mercy" (I.21.69), "benevolence and kindness" (I.21.70); and his interpretation of Old Testament imprecatory passages as predictive, rather than intercessory in character (I.21.71-2). Last but not
least, Augustine clearly advanced a model of divine justice, on which human punishment was to be based. "God...is not a malevolent Torturer, but a most righteous Disposer," he argued (I.22.77).29

In the above passages, Augustine was not specifically addressing the issues of war and related ethics. His emphasis was on individual, inter-relational Christian conduct. However, Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount I clearly treated matters of broader relevance. Not least was Augustine's apparently paradoxical emphasis on a love for one's "enemies" that precluded acts of revenge and demanded mercy in face of attack (I.19.56-7), while still requiring the punishment of offenders for their own good, as well as in the interests of justice (I.20.63-4). At the heart of such an ethos was the kind of stress on the primacy of inward disposition in ethical behaviour, which emerged in his discussion of legitimate violence in The Problem of Free Choice, and which he addressed in I.20.63-4.30

Although war-thought scholars have not previously adverted to the fact, at this early stage in his career, it seems clear that Augustine primarily raised the internal ethical dimensions of violence, rather than their practical or political impact. His main argument was that violent action, including warfare, could be justified where not engendered
by wrongful "passion" (*The Freedom of Choice* I.3.8-5.13), or, more positively, where motivated by Christian love (*Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount* I.20.63-4). On such a basis, he could approve killing by soldiers, capital and other forms of punishment, assuming they were free of "passion" and/or worked for the good of those involved. Moreover, that good, for which Christian love should be concerned, included notions of moral correction that reflected a model of beneficial and benevolent discipline which Augustine observed in the nature and actions of God himself (I.22.77).

3. EARLY EPISCOPATE WRITINGS: 396-411 AD.

   i). *Reply to Faustus the Manichean*

   [*Contra Faustum Manichaeum*] - 397-8 AD.

   Such themes were developed and continued in the next major source for Augustine's war thought. The *Reply to Faustus the Manichean*, an anti-Manichean polemical treatise frequently mentioned in the secondary literature, treated war-related issues in Book 22 - especially in Chapters 70-9, where Augustine sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Old Testament wars of Moses against Faustus' pacifist, Manichean objections. This work was completed in 397-8, during the earliest years of Augustine's episcopate, and represented his first major, published treatment of the morality of war beyond more individual, ethical considerations.
Apart from *City of God*, war-thought scholars have probably paid more attention to *Reply to Faustus the Manichean* than to any other work in the Augustinian corpus. Bainton quoted from 22.70 and 75 and from 22.76 and 79 to support two key elements of his six-point, Augustinian "code of war."31 In addition to McElwain and Stevenson, writers to make particularly heavy use of 22.70-9 have included Combès (seven citations from 22.74-6), Langan (eight from 22.74-8), and Swift (seven from 22.74-9). Monceaux depended particularly heavily on relevant materials, with no less than 20 references to 22.73-8.32 The range of Augustinian argument drawn from such citations has also been quite broad.

Bainton's two central observations that for Augustine, war must be "just in its disposition," "Christian love" (from 22.76,79),33 and "just as to its auspices", "to be waged only under the authority of the ruler"(from 22.70, 75),34 have been echoed elsewhere.35 But many others have been supported from 22.71-9. It is possible to isolate at least 20 perceived elements of Augustinian thought in the accounts of scholars from *Reply to Faustus the Manichean*. Major arguments noted beyond Bainton's points include the following:

a), that just as love for one's enemies did not preclude
severity, while maintaining an inward disposition of benevolence, the real evils of war lay in the motivations and intentions of participants, rather than in their outward actions (22.74-6, 79);36

b), that war could serve as punishment/chastisement for sin and as educational discipline for Christians (22.74-5);37
c), that the primary wartime duty of soldiers was to obey orders, even from unjust rulers, and that such a duty of obedience ensured their moral innocence, even where orders were unjust (22.75);38
d), that God's sovereign providence was decisive in all matters of war. It was he who ultimately decided the incidence and outcome of wars (22.72, 74-5, 78);39
e), that any war conducted at God's command, like those of Moses in the Old Testament, was morally legitimate by definition (22.71-2, 74-5, 78).40

Such primary themes were joined by related ideas, such as the concept of an "eternal law," like that expounded in The Problem of Free Choice, which required primary allegiance to "eternal," rather than "temporal" values in the interests of a "natural," moral "order" (22.27, 73-4, 78).41 Biblical examples from the New Testament, as well as the Old, supported Christian military service and violent action
There was also the observation that not only the "authority," but also "the causes for which men undertake wars" were significant to deciding their legitimacy (22.75).

Augustine observed that physical death was less important than moral virtue (22.76), praised "Christian emperors, who have put all their confidence in Christ" (22.76), defined the "just" man as he who "seeks to use things [including war] only for the end for which God appointed them" (22.78), and argued that sinful actions represented disruptions of "universal nature"/"natural order" which required compensatory divine judgement and control (22.78). Last but not least, he was sceptical about human ability to judge the morality of different actions at all. Since God's judgements, people's motivations and the impact of circumstances would always retain elements of mystery, Augustine asked, "who can tell whether it may be good or bad in any particular case - in time of peace, to reign or to serve, or to be at ease or to die - or in time of war, to command or to fight, or to conquer or to be killed? (22.78)"

Given the complexities of Augustine's argument in Reply to Faustus the Manichean 22, as well as the range of ideas which he introduced, a comprehensive outline or synthesis is
not appropriate here; nor has any of the relevant secondary sources attempted one. However, certain considerations seem significant and even necessary to establish a working framework within which novel contributions to his war thought can be properly assessed.45

First, Augustine's main concern in 22.71-9 was not to develop a detailed and systematic account of his views on war in general, or on "just war" in particular.46 He was writing a polemical treatise against a Manichee leader, whom he knew from long and bitter experience, and defending Christian basics, such as Christ's incarnation and virgin birth and the morality and teachings of Old Testament patriarchs and prophets, against aggressive attack.47 Augustine's priority was to uphold the integrity of his faith, in this case concerning the morality of Moses' wars, by any legitimate means possible. So he marshalled a range of arguments that were often designed to answer specific points of debate, rather than to develop a balanced account of his own beliefs, deploying considerable polemical and controversial skills in the process.48

Second, since Augustine's focus was to defend Moses' wars, all his arguments in 22.71-9 were ultimately related to that end. Moreover, his key contention, to which other points were therefore subsidiary, supporting or even tangential,
was the one with which he began his concluding summary in 22.78. "It is mere groundless calumny to charge Moses with making war," he told Faustus, "for there would have been less harm in making war of his own accord, than in not doing it when God commanded him." Augustine's ultimate justification of Moses was that God ordered him to fight. A direct emphasis on such divine sovereignty was thus central to his argument, and represented the major new departure in Augustine's war thought in *Reply to Faustus the Manichean*.49

Clearly related to this argument that any war which God commanded was morally legitimate by definition (22.71-2, 74-5, 78) were Augustine's treatment of divine providence as decisive in war (22.72, 74-5, 78), and his familiar claim that war could serve ultimate moral purposes (22.74-5). Moreover, this last notion obviously connected with Augustine's assumption of an "eternal law" informing a "natural order," of which sinful disruptions required retribution and remedy, that might come in the form of war (22.27, 73-4, 78).50 Faced with Faustus' challenge against the legitimacy of wars which God commanded, Augustine drew on such ideas to outline a moral universe, in which war became a divine instrument to punish wrongdoing, educate believers and balance the natural, moral scheme of things. He thus expounded a virtual *theology* of war, centering on his understanding of providence and ultimate values,
although in keeping with the polemical context in which he did so, he presented this in scattered concepts, rather than in a more formal thesis.\textsuperscript{51}

At the same time, Augustine repeated and expanded upon ideas which he had outlined earlier. Thus he reiterated the primacy of motivations and intentions in determining the evils of war (22.74-5). He reaffirmed the moral legitimacy of military service and action for Christian soldiers (22.75), and he renewed his emphasis on "inward disposition" in showing love for enemies (22.75-6). Although he now linked this with a providential and punitive conception of war, his moral framework of "eternal law" was similarly drawn from earlier ideas (22.27, 73-4, 78), as has been seen. Finally, he urged a familiar duty of obedience for soldiers (22.75), and strengthened it to recommend total loyalty, even to unjust rulers.\textsuperscript{52} All in all, Augustine proposed significant extensions to his war thought in \textit{Reply to Faustus the Manichean}, while retaining key elements from earlier works.

\textit{ii), Letter 47 [Epistola XLVII] - 398 AD.}

Areas of continuity are equally apparent in \textit{Letter 47}, a pastoral letter which Augustine wrote in reply to the questions of a young correspondent, Publicola, in about 398.\textsuperscript{53} This letter, which has been used quite widely by
secondary sources, is essentially a teaching epistle, in which Augustine specifically addressed ethical issues previously raised by Publicola. He wrote, he said, in an attempt to remove the latter's "perplexities" (47.1), of which he directly responded to four in particular: 54

a), whether a Christian could rightfully employ "the services of a man who had guaranteed his fidelity by swearing by his false gods" (47.2);

b), whether a Christian was morally blameworthy if he knowingly allowed his produce "to be offered to false gods" (47.3);

c), whether a Christian should eat "meats offered to idols" (47.4, 6);

d), whether one might kill others "in order to defend one's own life" (47.5). 55

It was in the context of the last of these questions that Augustine directly broached war-related subjects, and he started by simply reiterating the principle he first outlined in The Problem of Free Choice (1.5.12). 56 "I do not approve of this [killing in self-defence]," he stated, "unless one happen to be a soldier or public functionary acting, not for himself, but in defence of others or of the city in which he resides, if he act according to the
commission lawfully given him, and in the manner becoming his office (47.5)." As in The Problem of Free Choice, the main reason for Augustine's distinction seems to have lain in the area of inner motivations. "The precept, 'Resist not evil,' was given to prevent us from taking pleasure in revenge, in which the mind is gratified by the sufferings of others," he argued (47.5). But this was now supplemented by notions of responsibility in connection with others' wrongdoings, which emerged in Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount (I.20.63) and in Reply to Faustus the Manichean (22.74-5).57

Here, however, the emphasis was not on punishment as a means of moral correction after the fact, but on the benefits of forestalling immorality. "When...men are prevented, by being alarmed, from doing wrong, it may be said that a real service is done to themselves," Augustine urged. In fact, Christians had a positive "duty of restraining men from sin" (47.5). He continued to make the related point that they could not be held responsible for accidental deaths resulting from "things done by us or found in our possession, which are in themselves good and lawful" (47.5).58

Apart from the direct re-affirmation of the moral legitimacy of killing in military service, this letter was primarily
concerned with private, rather than public morality, and with conduct in peace, rather than war. It is interesting to note, however, that Augustine argued from consistent assumptions concerning the primacy of inward disposition to moral action and the duties of responsibility towards others. Scholars appear justified in having drawn on these materials in exposition and elucidation of Augustine's war thought. A significant new element also emerged in the stated Christian duty to prevent, as well as correct wrongdoing.5\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{iii), Letters 87, 93 and 100}

[\textit{Epistolae LXXXVII, XCIII, C}] - 405-9 AD:
Questions of applicability further arise in Letters 87, 93 and 100, which were all written between 405-9 in connection with the Donatist controversy which preoccupied much of Augustine's attention during the early to middle years of his episcopate.6\textsuperscript{0} These letters were primarily concerned with issues surrounding the religious coercion of Donatists, a topic that has commanded separate scholarly attention, but which was related to Augustine's war thought, as Russell and Swift have shown, in that it centred on similar questions of authority, justice, motivation and punishment.6\textsuperscript{1}

Scholars have convincingly chronicled a progressive hardening of Augustine's attitudes towards the schismatic,
North African sect from about 400 onwards, as he came to accept and then actively propound the use of civil force to coerce Donatists back into the Catholic Church and to destroy their existing institutions.\textsuperscript{62} Key evidence for such attitudes emerges in his letters, where he tackled such issues directly in correspondence with Catholic, Donatist and Roman imperial figures. The three in question here were addressed to the Donatist sectarian, Emeritus (\textit{Letter 87 - 405 AD}), to the Donatist bishop, Vincentius (\textit{Letter 93 - 408 AD}) and to the Roman proconsul, Donatus (\textit{Letter 100 - 409 AD}). They all contain arguments of relevance to his war thought.

In \textit{Letter 87}, where he set out a case against ecclesiastical schism and urged Emeritus to debate him on the issue, Augustine strongly emphasised the power of civil authorities. In light of a citation from Romans 13:2ff., he argued that civil disobedience could only be legitimate "for righteousness' sake" (87.7). He also urged a powerful, biblical conception of Christian emperors as "ministers of God to execute wrath upon those that do evil" (87.8; cf. Romans 13:4). This clearly echoed his understanding of soldiers as law-enforcers in \textit{The Problem of Free Choice} (I.5.12), as well as his notion of the moral value of violent punishment (\textit{Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount} I.20.63-4; \textit{Reply to Faustus the Manichean} 22.74-5). "They
bear not the sword in vain," Augustine said of emperors, directly quoting from Romans 13:4.63

Similar ideas on the role of civil authorities are found in passages cited by Russell and Swift from Letter 93, a lengthy letter-treatise on the morality of contemporary dealings with Donatist schismatics. In 93.3.9-10, Augustine commended the role of Christian emperors in punishing heretics to the Donatist bishop Vincentius.64 In 93.5.16-17, he explained the educational value of religious coercion. The emperors' role was to help the church, also in legislation, he continued - "let the kings of the earth serve Christ by making laws for Him and for His cause (93.5.19)." Even enforced church membership was biblically warranted (93.2.5), because "in acting harshly against dissidents the Church...is not repaying evil for evil. She is applying a beneficial discipline by driving out the evil of iniquity (93.2.6)."65

Such conceptions of public officials as divine instruments in imposing moral and spiritual discipline clearly echo prominent themes in Augustine's war thought. Like Christian soldiers in battle, emperors legislating for religious coercion could promote beneficial obedience and even correction among their subjects. A similar idea is found in Letter 100, where Augustine wrote to the Roman proconsul,
Donatus. He was actually requesting official leniency in not executing Donatists. The object of punishment should not be "revenge," he stated, because "we 'love our enemies,' and we 'pray for them' (100.1)." Nevertheless, he continued, "it is...their deliverance from error, that we seek to accomplish by the help of the terror of judges and of laws...we do not wish either to see the exercise of discipline towards them neglected, or, on the other hand, to see them subjected to...severer punishments." 66

The coercive emphases of these letters were obviously related to the pressures of contemporary events, but they also mirror patterns of thought evident in Reply to Faustus the Manichean as many as 12 years earlier. The virtual theology of war to emerge from the latter - whereby it became a divinely ordained instrument to balance a "natural order" (22.71-8) - not only reflected earlier Augustinian understandings of a rational, moral universe, as in The Problem of Free Choice (I.5-6.15). It drew on similar, punitive conceptions as Augustine's later advocacy of religious coercion as compulsion to good. 67

Clearly there are strong elements of thematic consistency throughout the war-related materials of Augustine's early episcopate. Major new developments centred on his legitimisation of wars commanded by God, his emphasis on
the role of divine providence in war, and his more detailed outline of related moral implications (*Reply to Faustus the Manichean* 22.71-5, 78). But he also expanded on the moral acceptability and duties of obedience of Christian soldiers (22.75; *Letter* 47.5), the benefits of restraining people from wrongful actions, and innocence in cases of accidental death (*Letter* 47.5). Themes apparent in earlier writings, including the primacy of "inward disposition" in determining the moral value of actions (*Reply to Faustus the Manichean* 22.75-6; *Letter* 47.5), continued to feature strongly. Yet as Augustine started to treat the public, as well as individual, ethical dimensions of war, and as the demands of his work led him in that direction, his war thought acquired broader, providential, theological underpinnings and implications.
CHAPTER 5 - EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SOURCES II.

1. LATER EPISCOPATE WRITINGS: 412-427 AD.

The 15 years covered by Augustine's "later episcopate" were by far the most prolific in terms of war-related writings. Materials are difficult to order strictly chronologically, however, inasmuch as the major work of the period, City of God, was written over at least 14 years (413-427 AD), although it represents a single literary entity and will be treated as such. In order to allow for a parallel and orderly treatment of other works, these will first be addressed in date-order before City of God. This group of materials is comprised entirely of letters, with the exception of one exegetical work, Questions on the Heptateuch.

Although Augustine's war writings will not be related to their broader historical context in great detail, it is significant that it was only in the following works, particularly City of God, that outside events, notably the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 AD, and imperial problems generally, obviously impinged on the literary contexts of Augustine's war thought in any major way. Hitherto, as has been seen, Augustine had primarily been writing about war and related issues in the markedly theoretical settings of theological debate, controversy and
questioning (e.g., The Problem of Free Choice I, Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount I, Reply to Faustus the Manichean 22, Letter 47). He had developed related principles in letters concerning the practical demands of the Donatist controversy, but it was from about 412 AD onwards that war as an historical phenomenon became a prominent feature.

Such was the apparent impact, at least in part, of the obvious threats to the integrity of the Roman Empire which Augustine and his readers could now see. But it is also worth noting that while North Africa remained comparatively sheltered from the material impact of some imperial problems, such as the sack of Rome, it also suffered violent, local difficulties during this period. In 413, "the relative security and prosperity of the area," which had prevailed, with only two significant exceptions, for more than a century, was seriously disrupted by the bloody revolt of Count Heraclian. This powerful uprising was eventually defeated in Italy. Intensified, anti-Donatist measures were a major local preoccupation from 410 onwards, but a number of wealthy Roman refugees also arrived in Africa at about this time, bringing more cosmopolitan concerns with them. As shall be seen, the peace of North Africa was not militarily disrupted by serious "Barbarian" incursions until the late 420s, but there is clear evidence of a generally more unsettled environment at least 15 years
Letter 138 certainly addressed a central issue for any thoughtful, public-spirited Christian of the day. Augustine was replying to the Roman imperial commissioner and leading layman, Marcellinus, who had requested advice and counsel for a high-ranking pagan, Volusianus, a young man who had questions about the incarnation and about the compatibility of Christian ethics with "the duties and rights of citizens" (Letter 138.2). Augustine had already directly answered some of Volusianus' more technical theological problems in Letter 137. Now he wrote mainly to address ethical issues, but he did so in a lengthy epistle to Marcellinus, which was designed for wider circulation, where appropriate.

As Monceaux has argued, Augustine's main concern in Letter 138 was to show that "there was no incompatibility between Christianity and the military duty of citizens." In particular, he confronted competing interpretations of key verses in the New Testament (Matthew 5:39-41; Romans 12:17), "which are affirmed to be contrary to the duties and rights of citizens; for who would submit to have anything taken from him by an enemy, or forbear from retaliating the evils of war upon an invader who ravaged a Roman province? (138.2.9)." In reply, Augustine urged his inward,
motivational interpretation of biblical injunctions of non-violence.⁴

"What is 'not rendering evil for evil'," he asked, "but refraining from the passion of revenge? (138.2.9)." "A righteous and pious man ought to be prepared to endure with patience injury from those whom he desires to make good," he argued, with reference to Matthew 5:39 (138.2.12). All in all, "these precepts [of non-violence] pertain rather to the inward disposition of the heart than to the actions which are done in the sight of men, requiring us, in the inmost heart, to cherish patience along with benevolence, but in the outward action to do that which seems most likely to benefit those whose good we ought to seek (138.2.13)."⁵

There could, therefore, be no compelling argument against Christians continuing in military service, Augustine contended (138.2.15). On the contrary, "let those who say that the doctrine of Christ is incompatible with the State's well-being, give us an army such as the doctrine of Christ requires them to be...and then let them dare to say that it is adverse to the State's well-being (138.2.15)." Moreover, in light of the fact that "many things must be done in correcting with a certain benevolent severity, even against their wishes, men whose welfare rather than their wishes it is our duty to consult (138.2.14)," military action and
participation might actually become a moral duty. Nothing could be worse than "that good fortune of offenders, by which pernicious impunity is maintained" (138.2.14). Indeed, in a Christian "commonwealth," like the Roman Empire, "even its wars themselves will not be carried on without the benevolent design that, after the resisting nations have been conquered, provision may be more easily made for enjoying in peace the mutual bond of piety and justice (138.2.14)." 

This last idea of war for peace was an advance on previous punitive conceptions of war, but there would generally seem little new in the above arguments. Augustine's benevolent severity understanding of violence and warfare had been something of a commonplace since Reply to Faustus the Manichean. His inward interpretation of biblical injunctions of non-violence had been present at least since Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, while his commendation of Christian military service had been obvious since The Problem of Free Choice. Where Augustine ventured into more uncharted war-thought territory, however, was in his open discussion of military matters of state (e.g., 138.2.14), and in his overt application of basic principles to the surrounding political environment.

This trend became even clearer in 138.2.9, for example,
where he discussed the morality of the Roman Republic (also
characterised by leniency), and in 138.3.16ff., where he
sought to answer the charge that "many calamities have
befallen the Roman Empire through some Christian emperors."
His responses to such allegations contributed little to his
war ethic. Instead, he pointed to the corrupting influence
of past prosperity (138.2.16) and to the redeeming impact of
Christianity in general (138.2.17; cf. 138.2.14). But the
mere fact that Augustine was now addressing such issues
appears indicative of the more turbulent times in which he
was writing. Now that it had become an increasingly pressing
reality in practical terms, war was also less abstract in
its theological treatment.8

ii), Letters 153, 173 and 185 [Epistolae
CLIII, CLXXIII, CLXXXV] - 414-417 AD:
Further materials reflecting the demands of the time,
although not all war-related, are found in three letters
published in the mid-teens of the fifth century, which have
not been widely quoted by war-thought scholars, although
they clearly contain relevant subject-matter.9 Letter 153,
written in 414 to the public official, Macedonius, treated
general questions of crime, punishment and the duties of
leniency. Letter 173, written in 416 to the Donatist priest,
Donatus, was a more personal communication on the Donatist
controversy. Letter 185, also known as De Correctione Donatistarum, a c.417 letter-treatise to the Roman military leader, Boniface, addressed similar issues.

Answering Macedonius' objections to leniency in the punishment of offenders in Letter 153, Augustine developed his familiar argument in favour of benevolent severity in punishment. "Bad men are to be loved," he argued, "so that they may not continue to be bad, just as sick men are to be loved so that they may not remain sick, but may be cured (153.5.14)." Standard institutions of public authority, including military force, "all...have their methods, their causes, their reasons, their practical benefits. While these are feared, the wicked are kept within bounds and the good live more peacefully among the wicked (153.6.16)." Indeed, according to such a conception of moral order, "just as it is sometimes mercy to punish, so it may be cruelty to pardon (153.6.17)." Yet Augustine urged leniency, where possible, not least because it could be notoriously difficult to decide the guilty party, even in cases of homicide. He concluded by citing a familiar biblical text in support of civil powers (Romans 13:1-8; cf. Letter 87.7-8), and by reaffirming that inward motivations ultimately determined the moral legitimacy of actions. "Let nothing be done through desire of hurting," he urged, "but all through love of helping, and nothing will be done cruelly, inhumanly
In the final analysis, "the obligation of charity is fulfilled by the good through their intention and upright conscience which God beholds."\(^{10}\)

The moral duty of correction/coercion emerged strongly in the familiar context of the Donatist controversy in Letter 173.\(^{11}\) Writing to the schismatic priest, Donatus, who had been arrested, tried and imprisoned for his alleged heresies (173.1), Augustine laid down the law without equivocation. "It does not follow...that those who are loved should be cruelly left to yield themselves with impunity to their bad will," he argued, "but in so far as power is given, they ought to be both prevented from evil and compelled to good (173.2.)." There were clear biblical examples of such an approach (173.3), and now that the official Catholic Church "wields greater power...she may not only invite, but even compel men to embrace what is good (173.10)."\(^{12}\)

Similar themes emerge in Letter 185, to Boniface, where Augustine implicitly underlined the clear connections between his attitudes to war and to religious coercion by referring to the Donatists as in "a kind of civil war" against the Catholic Church (185.10.46), and by writing of the costs of "war" against heresy (185.8.32). In such a situation, he argued, "great mercy is shown towards them [the Donatists], when by the force of...imperial laws they
are in the first instance rescued against their will from that sect (185.3.13)." Thus "kings" served "the Lord with fear," when they prevented and chastised immoral actions (185.5.19) and heretical beliefs (185.7.28), or when they enforced allegiance to Catholicism (185.3.13; 6.24; 10.46). Augustine also commended Boniface for his interest in such questions, which was clearly indicative that Boniface's "military valour" was positively strengthened by his faith (185.1.1).13

iii), Letter 189 [Epistola CLXXXIX] - 418 AD:
The possible tensions between Christian faith and military service emerged more clearly in a later letter to Boniface, Letter 189, where Augustine was writing with the pastoral intention "to build you up unto the eternal salvation of which you have hope in Christ Jesus our Lord" (189.1). Boniface was a career soldier, who became a general and eventually de facto Count of Africa by 423. He was a key participant in the later crises of Vandal invasions, and with Darius, whom Augustine addressed in Letter 229, one of the most important military leaders to figure in extant Augustinian correspondence.14

Scholars have widely drawn on Letter 189 to expound Augustine's war thought, and the following main points have been elucidated:
a), that it was biblically possible "to please God" while engaged in active military service, according to both Old and New Testament precedents (189.4);

b), that peace should be the ultimate aim of war (189.6);

c), that "war should be waged only as a necessity" (189.6);

d), that faith should be kept, even with enemies, in war (189.6).15

In addition to these arguments, Augustine also wrote of the value of prayer and spiritual warfare (189.5). He reminded Boniface that "even your bodily strength is a gift of God (189.6)." He urged "the spirit of a peacemaker" in war - "let necessity...and not your will, slay the enemy who fights against you (189.6)." He affirmed the "temporal" value of "peace among men," and the higher standing of "peace with God which procures for men the eternal felicity of the angels" (189.6). He recommended "mercy...to the vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared" (189.6). Finally, he advocated moral virtue in Boniface's private dealings and equanimity amid his successes and failures (189.7).16

The central theme of Letter 189 was Boniface's duty as a
Christian soldier to conduct himself in a Christian manner, even in warfare. In the process of outlining the implications of this, however, Augustine developed earlier emphases of his war thought and gave them greater prominence. He specifically urged peace, rather than moral retribution or correction, as the ideal aim of war (189.6; cf. 138.2.14). In this light, he also stressed that war should only be waged as a last resort and that mercy and even fidelity should be shown to enemies (189.6). What had hitherto been a somewhat austere war ethic thus acquired an increasingly peace-oriented emphasis, as Augustine offered practical advice to a Roman officer on the front line of relevant moral dilemmas.17

iv), Questions on the Heptateuch

[Quaestiones in Heptateuchum] - 419 AD:

With the exception of one obvious reference in the lengthy letter-treatise, Letter 199 [Epistola CIC], to the Catholic bishop Hesychius, where Augustine simply asserted the historical regularity of wars (199.10.35), the next major locus for war-thought scholars has been Augustine's exegetical study, Questions on the Heptateuch, which also dates from 419.18 This study, which investigated a long list of exegetical problems from the first seven books of the Old Testament, is apparently one of the least studied of
Augustine's works - it is yet to appear in full English translation - but two key passages have been regularly cited in connection with Augustine's views on war.

In Book IV.44, Augustine commented on Numbers 21:21-31, which describes Israel's killing of King Sihon of the Amorites and her capture and occupation of Amorite lands and cities, following Sihon's aggressive refusal of Israel's request of right of passage through his lands on her way, under Moses' leadership, to Canaan. Augustine's apparent concern in his brief remarks on the Numbers passage was to explain the basis for Israel's action, and he focused on the observation that "harmless passage, a right which ought to have been granted according to the most reasonable standards governing human society, was denied." Thus, "to fulfil his promises, God assisted the Israelites on this occasion since the land of the Amorites was to be given to them (IV.44)." 19

Augustine proceeded to contrast the case of the Amorites with that of the Edomites, who also denied Israel right of passage, according to Numbers 20:14-21. "For when Edom likewise refused them passage, the Israelites did not fight with their own people - the descendants of Jacob with those of Esau, his twin brother - because God had not promised that land to the Israelites. But they turned away from them." 20 Israel's response was correct in both cases,
although different, Augustine argued. It was the Amorites' refusal of a legitimate right, combined with God's promise of their lands to Israel, which justified warfare and made this an example of "how just wars were waged." Although the Edomites also acted wrongly, the fact that they were kinsfolk occupying lands that had not been promised to Israel made Israelite discretion the better part of valour. Again, God's providential command and promise were decisive in determining the legitimacy of warfare, even where refusal to grant right of passage was a grievance per se.21

The second passage from Questions on the Heptateuch VI.10 offered a more detailed discussion of the definition of "just wars" - in fact the first really to emerge in the works considered thus far.22 Commenting on morality and conduct in warfare, according to the eighth chapter of the Old Testament Book of Joshua, Augustine made a number of points that have subsequently been seen as significant parts of his "just war" thinking as a whole.

He started by arguing that on biblical precedent, "ambushes" and similar forms of trickery were "legitimate for those who are engaged in a just war." It was much more important to ensure that a war be just in the first place, and a key consideration in that determination was that "the just war is waged by someone who has the right to do so, because not
all men have that right." In other words, a just war needed to be waged on legitimate authority. Moreover, "as a rule, just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries." Examples of appropriate scenarios were where "a nation or state against whom one is waging war has neglected to punish a wrong committed by its citizens, or to return something that was wrongfully taken."23

Such practical grievances were not the only grounds which made a war "just," however. Any war that God himself ordained was "undoubtedly just."24 Indeed, "in such a war the leader of the army or the people itself should not be judged so much the author of war, as its minister."25 There thus emerged two main categories of "just war," according to this passage - those which God had specifically commanded and were therefore just by definition, like many of the Old Testament wars, and those which had legitimate grounds because they were waged to "avenge injuries," like unpunished crimes or failures to make due restitution.

The terms of Augustine's argument in Questions on the Heptateuch VI.10 are not so clear-cut that they do not raise questions, but they represented a clear advance on earlier works. Not only was "just war" described as a major topic in its own right. Augustine offered his first direct observations on individual "just causes" for warfare. The
justification of divine command was central, but he had now moved beyond general notions of moral correction/retribution to list specific "injuries" to be avenged. At the same time, further attention was given to the topic of justice or right behaviour in warfare, which featured in Letter 189. "It does not matter at all," Augustine urged, whether the prosecutor of a just war "wins victory in open combat or through ruses." The key was that he was entering combat for the right reasons.26

Summarising new developments in these works of Augustine's later episcopate, it may be seen that there are a number of significant trends. Familiar themes such as the compatibility of Christianity and military service (Letter 138.2.15; Letter 189.4), the moral value of war (Letter 138.2.14), and the centrality of God's providence in war (Questions on the Heptateuch IV.44, VI.10) were repeated. But Augustine developed a notion of war for peace (Letter 138.2.14), which had not previously been prominent, and gave it major stress in Letter 189, where it was linked with other more pacific emphases, such as the need to keep war as a last resort (Letter 189.6). Letters 153, 173 and 185 clearly indicated that Augustine had not forsworn his views on coercion in general (cf. Letter 138.2.14), but in Letter 189 and in Questions on the Heptateuch, in particular, he seemed more concerned with practical issues of justice in
war than he had been hitherto.

Not only did he expound the need for keeping faith with and showing mercy to enemies (Letter 189.6), but in his treatment of "just war" issues in Questions on the Heptateuch - provoked, as it was, by specific biblical passages - Augustine offered guidelines for determining justice in war (IV.44, VI.10). The question of legitimate causes for war also came into prominence. At the same time, it is difficult to escape the sense in these writings that Augustine was facing, and thus addressing the practicalities of war much more directly. He now wrote openly of contemporary and historical affairs of state (Letter 138.2.9, 16-17), and his pastoral duties included counselling a serving officer, for example (Letter 189). Yet while his thoughts on the Donatist controversy seem consistently tough in their main principles (Letters 173 and 185; cf. Letters 87, 93 and 100), there is evidence of a softening of both tone and emphasis in connection with war. Some of this may have been due to more immediate contextual questions (in Letter 189 and Questions on the Heptateuch, for example), but it is also arguable that the realities of war were now impinging on Augustine and his contacts in such a way that he was led to expound more pacific ideas.27
2. CITY OF GOD [DE CIVITATE DEI] - 413-427 AD.

i), Contextual Considerations.

The impact of contemporary events became even more obvious in *City of God*, Augustine's *magnum opus et arduum*, that has commonly been hailed as one of his greatest and most influential works. The range of war-related materials in *City of God* is extensive, although scholars have drawn on it to different degrees. Among those considered for this thesis, Deane and Swift cited passages from no less than 11 of *City of God*’s 22 Books, for example, while others contented themselves with citations from no more than two or three. Passages treated by war thought scholars have been located in a total of 20 Books altogether.28

The origins and purposes of *City of God* have been widely debated in complex arguments. At a basic level, and taking Augustine at his word, it is clear that he originally intended the work, which was written and published over at least a 14-year period, as a defense of "the glorious City of God against those who prefer their own gods..." (I.Pref.). Addressed to Marcellinus, Augustine's correspondent in *Letter 138* and other letters, it was avowedly a work of Christian apologetics, in which he sought to defend the nature and progress of "the City of God," both on earth and in heaven, by contrast with earthly institutions which centred on "the city of this
world...which holds nations in enslavement" (I.Pref.).

Defining these two cities, Augustine laid major emphasis on their affective, spiritual origins and orientations. "The two cities were created by two kinds of love:" he argued, "the earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of self. In fact, the earthly city glories in itself, the Heavenly City glories in the Lord. The former looks for glory from men, the latter finds its highest glory in God, the witness of a good conscience (XIV.28)." When he wrote to defend the "City of God," Augustine was thus assuming the mantle of apologist for a kind of true church. But this was a spiritually defined, not a visible entity, just as the "earthly city" was not identified with any particular human institution, but with the company of all who were primarily motivated by "self-love."30

But if City of God was much more than a simple defence of the contemporary Catholic Church against other institutions, it took its stand right at the heart of current political developments. It sprang from a situation that had brought the apparent credibility of Christianity and all it was said to stand for into serious question. And it was addressed, through Marcellinus, "against the Pagans," to a group of
influential non-Christian critics, who were all too ready to interpret the signs of the times in an anti-Christian manner.\textsuperscript{31}

From Book I onwards, Augustine specifically took his cue from the sack of Rome by Alaric and the Visigoths in 410 (I.2ff.), from ongoing threats and incursions to the integrity of the Roman Empire (e.g., V.23), and from resulting charges that Christianity and its God, much in religious ascendancy since the fourth century, had failed to protect the Roman world as pagan gods allegedly did (e.g., II.2). City of God's polemical approach clearly reflected such circumstances. At the same time, the demands of Augustine's sophisticated, pagan audience led him to adopt a style which O'Meara described as "in the grand manner," and approaching "very nearly to the classical ideal as seen in Cicero." Loaded with classical, as well as biblical citations and allusions, embracing large-scale treatments of philosophy, politics and history, as well as theology, the City of God is a vast and multifaceted work which belies simple categorisation.\textsuperscript{32}

Augustine divided it into five main parts. Books I-V primarily concerned Roman history and religion, arguing against "those who maintain that the worship of the gods...leads to happiness in this life." Books VI-X treated
both Roman gods (VI-VII) and the beliefs of Platonism and Neoplatonism (VIII-X), disputing the ability of relevant deities "to secure happiness in the life to come." Books XI-XIV addressed such disparate themes as creation, evil, death and sin. Books XV-XVIII focused on biblical history until the birth of Jesus Christ. Books XIX-XXII discussed general matters of eschatology, including "man's supreme good, the last judgement, heaven and hell."33

Although concentrated in Books I-V (written in 413-15), Books XV-XVII (418-20), and Books XVIII, XIX and XXII (425-7), war-related materials are located periodically throughout. Inasmuch as this remains an integrated work, however diverse, and it has not been possible to isolate marked shifts in emphasis over time, Augustine's war thought will be treated as a single entity in City of God. In the interests of clarity, major themes will be explicated without detailed attention to specific local contexts.34

ii), Analysis of Key Themes.

If a single theological theme could be said to predominate in Augustine's treatment of war in City of God, it is the primacy of divine providence in questions of both war and peace. Right from I.1, this was linked with a moral correction/punitive understanding of war, as Augustine argued that "God's providence constantly uses war to correct
and chasten the corrupt morals of mankind." Such was God's overarching concern for the affairs of humanity, that "the providence of God...is concerned with the bodies of the dead (I.13)." His judgements were inscrutable (I.28-9), and extended even to limiting demonic powers (I.23). "The kingdoms of men," including the Roman Empire, were "established by divine providence" (V.1). It was God, who "decided that a Western empire should arise" (V.13), and he who gave "the power of domination" even to the most disreputable power-seekers (V.19).35

So if "we must ascribe to the true God alone the power to grant kingdoms and empires (V.21)," even "the duration of wars....rests with the decision of God," who again from a moral standpoint, extended "just judgement and mercy either to afflict or control mankind" (V.22). As a result, "some wars come to an end more speedily, others more slowly (V.22)," all according to God's inscrutable plans (cf. VII.30). God had the power both to scatter and build up "the nations" (XVI.4), and to force them into subjection, as well as giving them conquest (XVIII.2). God was the author of peace and the controller of war (XIX.12, 13). Most specifically, in his concerns for international politics, "it was God's design to conquer the world through [Rome], to unite the world into the single community of the Roman commonwealth and the Roman laws, and so impose peace
throughout its length and breadth (XVIII.22)."  

Such a providential understanding of God in complete sovereignty over the affairs of nations, including wars, led Augustine to affirm the value of the Roman Empire, even as he vigorously condemned its excesses. Although he allowed, for example, that the Empire was ultimately God's creation (XVIII.22), and that "the Romans had a just excuse for undertaking and carrying on those great wars....by the necessity to defend their life and liberty (III.10)," he was relentless in his critiques of less excusable aspects of Roman history (e.g., III.14, 18-19; IV.3; V.12).  

As he pursued his polemical agenda to show that the Romans were worse off with pagan gods than under Christianity (e.g., II.1), Augustine took every opportunity to point to the physical evils (e.g., III.14; IV.3), as well as the wrongful motivations (III.14; V.12), of Roman wars. In the latter connection, he had particularly strong words for Roman libido dominandi ("lust for domination"), which he regarded as much more disreputable than earlier desires for "liberty," or "glory and honour" (III.14; IV.6; V.12). Augustine discussed a range of different types of Roman war, and he had tough words for all of them, but he was especially harsh on civil wars (II.17; III.14, 23-30), which he described as "a monstrous crime" (III.14). Indeed, the
theme of the evils of war is so prevalent in City of God (cf. e.g., I.7; II.23; IV.2-3; XIX.5, 7, 28; XXII.22), that one could almost be led to believe that Augustine had undergone something of a pacifist conversion.38

Although he gave major attention to the topic of peace, such a conclusion would clearly be misguided, however. For not only did Augustine's polemical agenda influence him to write so negatively of some aspects of Roman history, but he also advanced familiar arguments, beyond divine providence, to support the legitimacy of war in given circumstances. Thus his concept of the value of war for moral correction and improvement featured quite prominently (cf. also I.8-10, 28-9; V.23; XIX.15-16), and it was joined by affirmations of the role of injustice in provoking war (XVI.43; XIX.7). Wars were inevitable (XV.4), and although "it would be better to have a good neighbour and live in peace with him," to defeat the unjust might be a "stern necessity" (IV.15). Original sin corrupted all (XXI.12), and violence was only to be expected (XV.5). The key was to take care that war was only pursued when the situation called for it.39

Augustine wrote of such notions as the "law[s] of war" (I.1; II.17; III.28), "the general practice of warfare" (I.7), "the established usage of war" (II.2), or "the normal usage
of war" (IV.2), although he did not venture to define them explicitly. There are few references to "just wars" in City of God, but in these, and elsewhere, certain criteria were established to ascertain the legitimacy of acts of warfare.40

In a passage already cited, Augustine noted that the Romans had "a just excuse" for conducting empire-building wars, because they were "subjected to unprovoked attacks by their enemies" and thus faced "the necessity to defend their life and liberty" (III.10). It would have been better to pacify enemies by non-violent means, but there was "nothing to be ashamed of" in waging war (III.10). This argument was later repeated, when it was observed that "the increase of empire was assisted by the wickedness of those against whom just wars were waged (IV.15)." In such circumstances, war became a "necessity," although Augustine partly stole his own thunder by wondering, somewhat sarcastically, whether the Romans should not therefore "worship the Injustice of others as a kind of goddess" (IV.15).41

If wars were just when they arose from the needs of self-defence (cf. also XXII.6), and/or punishing unprovoked attacks and injustices (cf. also XIX.15), they should not have been a cause of celebration, however. "Surely," urged Augustine, "if he [a wise man] remembers that he is a human
being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with the necessity of waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to engage in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man (XIX.7)." Moreover, if war was a regrettable necessity, its "justice" could all too easily be sacrificed on the altar of naked self-interest. When the Romans waged war on the Sabines after raping Sabine women who had been refused them in marriage, "it was contrary to every law of peace that he [the Roman victor] seized those who had been denied him and then waged unjust war with their indignant parents." "I am sick," Augustine cried, of recalling the many acts of revolting injustice which have disturbed the city's history (II.17)."42

Such were Augustine's general comments in City of God as to the "justice" of war, but other observations on its moral legitimacy extended to include ideas beyond those already noted. Thus God not only superintended and controlled wars in his providence; there were times when his direct command legitimised them. "The commandment forbidding killing was not broken by those who have waged war on the authority of God," Augustine observed (I.21). In the particular case of soldiers, the duties of obedience to military leaders, which were clear (cf. II.19), were even stronger when the ultimate "command" to battle came "from the Creator" (I.26)."43
"Kings or princes" were also "Christ's servants," and had past leaders followed "the teachings of Christianity on justice and morality," the Roman empire would have been in much better shape (II.19). As it was, Augustine strongly commended recent Christian emperors who had shown obedience. God favoured Emperor Constantine (306-337), who "had a long reign, and was victorious, above all others, in the wars which he directed and conducted" (V.25). Likewise, Emperor Theodosius (379-395), who "kept faith" and was "a true Christian," enjoyed success and divine blessing (V.26). Obedience was obviously the key to their prosperity, both in peace and in war. They thus served as examples of the need for such dutiful conduct, as well as supporting Augustine's agenda to show that a Christian empire was both more honourable and successful than a pagan one.44

Another familiar theme to emerge in City of God was the idea that war should mainly be waged with the object of establishing peace. This was actually a fact of life, Augustine argued. "Even when men choose war, their only wish is for victory; which shows that their desire in fighting is for peace with glory....Even wars, then, are waged with peace as their object (XIX.12; cf. XV.4)." As noted, the treatment of peace commanded significant attention in City of God. It emerged not only in its "earthly" form, as a
practical good (XV.4); it was generally preferable to war (e.g., III.10; V.17), and in its "eternal," spiritual form, i.e. peace with God (XIX.14), it was "the final fulfilment of all our goods" (XIX.11). It was a universal goal of mankind and God was its ultimate author (XIX.12). It was defined by the presence of concord, or "the tranquillity of order," in which everything had its proper place (XIX.13). "Earthly" peace was inferior to "eternal" peace, but even the City of God must make use of it (XIX.17). 45

Just as peace was characterised by concord, the "harmful and destructive" nature of war lay in the "mutual opposition and conflict of the forces engaged" (XIX.28). The "disorders" of war, which essentially stemmed from "disorders of love" (XIX.5) - i.e. wrong attachments, intentions and motivations - stood in contradiction to peace, despite the fact that war might be necessary to the restoration of both it (XV.4; XIX.12) and moral order (e.g., XIX.15). Augustine wrote of "the order of peace" (XIX.15), as characterised by the due subordination of people to their human superiors (XIX.15), and of ultimate peace as that of men with God "in subjection to the everlasting [eternal] law" (XIX.14). Such a concept of peace as order, war as disorder in relation to God and his requirements, was reflected in his discussions of psycho-spiritual peace and warfare as internal phenomena within individuals (e.g., XIX.12-14, 28; XX.9). Familiar
emphasizes on love for enemies as an inherently dispositional quality (V.19), and the inwardness of war's evils (XIX.5), were thus undergirded by analysis of relevant intra-personal dynamics and by presentation of an ideal of peace as "the tranquillity of order" on such a level.46

In summary, like other war-related writings of this period, *City of God* showed strong elements of continuity with earlier works, while developing new emphases that seemed to reflect not only the immediate demands of the work's literary context, but also pressing issues raised by contemporary events. Thus the familiar themes of the primacy of God's providence (e.g., I.1ff.), the moral value of war (e.g., I.28-9), and the duties of Christian military service (e.g., II.19), all received attention - particularly the first, which played a major part in Augustine's historical/theological analysis of the Roman Empire (I-V, passim). Equally redolent of previous presentations were his focus on benevolence towards enemies (V.19), and a psychological definition of war's evils (e.g., XIX.5), although Augustine laid greater stress on the physical dimensions of the latter than he had done previously (e.g., I.7; IV.2-3).

Where he broke particularly significant new ground was in the sustained and sophisticated attention which he gave to
the topic of peace, both as a subject in its own right, and as it related to war (e.g., XIX.11f.). Moreover, this, combined with his treatment of war's material evils and of the dynamics of intra-personal peace and warfare (e.g., XIX.12-14), resulted in a much more pacific bias to City of God than might have been expected. As in other works of Augustine's later episcopate (particularly Letter 138), he commended peace and denounced war more than hitherto. And as he continued to maintain the value of war, not least in the interests of restoring peace and his familiar good of moral order, he seemed more concerned to define the specifics of what it meant to wage "just war." As in Questions on the Heptateuch, he offered no systematic outline of this concept. He was content to observe that war was "just" in defence of life and liberty, and to punish unprovoked attacks, grievances and other injustices (e.g., III.10; IV.15). He also repeated his contention that war was always legitimate at God's command (e.g., I.21). For the most part, however, war emerged as a "stern" and regrettable necessity (IV.15; XIX.7), however useful in the ultimate, providential scheme of things.

Thus here, as elsewhere in this period, Augustine's personal and literary confrontation with the practical and intellectual challenges of events in the Roman Empire seemed to elicit a more considered and reluctant acceptance
of war, as well as a greater emphasis on peace as a priority. Scholars have construed a great deal from City of God, but their general policy of treating Augustine's war thought as a constant entity throughout his works has apparently obscured such an observation.40

3. LAST WRITINGS: 427-429 AD.
By the time of Letter 220 to Boniface, the political situation had much deteriorated in Roman North Africa. Boniface, the career general, who had effectively become Count of Africa in 423, confirming his position officially three years later, had rejected a summons by Empress Placidia, on behalf of her young son Emperor Valentinian III (425-55), to return to the court in Italy. In 427 he quelled an expedition sent by the Empress to recover Africa from his control, standing in open revolt against the imperial authorities. The following year, a further task-force was sent with the object of deposing him. In the meantime, Carthage was fortified against Roman invasion, and as Augustine himself reported, the "African Barbarians" had taken the opportunity to undertake what he dramatically described as "the devastation of Africa" (220.7).49

As he wrote to Boniface, Augustine, who was now an old bishop of 73, with all of his major work behind him, was
fearful for the future. He had thought that following Boniface's appointment as Count, "the African hordes would not only be checked, but made tributaries of the Roman Empire" (220.7). He now knew this to have been a false expectation, and he was inclined to view matters in his familiar, providential fashion. His "attention" was "more engaged by higher causes," he observed, "believing that men ought to ascribe Africa's great calamities to their own sins" (220.8). And he was keen to urge Boniface not "to belong to the number of those wicked and unjust men whom God uses as instruments in inflicting temporal punishments on whom He pleases" (220.8).50

Aside from its obvious references to pressing matters of state, Letter 220 was essentially a pastoral communication, in which Augustine took the opportunity to advise the Count "in reference to God" and thus help prevent his soul's "perdition" (220.2). He was responding to the news that Boniface, with whom he had now been in contact for some 10 years, had not only revolted against Rome and failed to establish authority over the "Barbarians" in his official capacity (220.7-8); he had placed his Christian standing in jeopardy by entering a second marriage to an Arian woman, following his first wife's death, and subsequently having his daughter baptised "by these heretics" (220.4). Augustine had also heard that others in Boniface's household had been
rebaptised as Arians, and that the general had been taking "concubines." The main thrust of Augustine's response to this situation was to seek to recall Boniface to Christian standards, centering on moral reformation (220.3-6, 8, 9-10), and to remind him of his past commitment (220.3, 12). In the process, he made a number of statements considered relevant to his war thought. Scholars have generally focused on the last chapters of the letter, in which he urged Boniface to pray and to pay attention to winning spiritual victory "over hostile passions" (220.10-11); to seek "continence" with his new wife, and "to hold the faith steadfastly even in the cares of war, if you must still be engaged in them, and to seek peace" (220.12). Other themes reflected earlier emphases of Augustine's war thought.

In addition to his providential/correctional understanding of recent political and military events, which has already been noted, Augustine presented military leadership as a Christian "service" of protection for the churches, which was to be carried out with due self-denial and devotion (220.3). He stressed the importance of prayer and spiritual warfare, both in support of and prior to military action (220.3, 10-12). Finally, he repeated his call for love of enemies, including benevolent "severity," if need be
Two years later, Boniface had found reconciliation with the Roman authorities, but in general terms, the situation in Africa was even more unstable. Seeking to defend himself against an imperial expedition led by the German leader, Sigisvult, with an army of Goths, Boniface had invited Geiseric, King of the Vandals, to his aid. Geiseric was delayed in Spain until 429, but then crossed to Africa in force, only to find that Boniface had made peace with the Roman authorities and now sought to oppose him. Having arrived, Geiseric decided on conquest and occupation, a process which he duly achieved, eventually taking much of Africa by 439, when Carthage was finally captured.53

Augustine died in 430, when his home town of Hippo was besieged. In Letter 229, a year earlier, he wrote to Count Darius, an imperial agent who successfully negotiated with Boniface to reconcile him to Rome.54 He had never met Darius, but heard of him through mutual friends (229.1). In particular, he knew him to be a peacemaker, and wished to commend him for the fact. He praised fighting men "by whose labours and dangers, along with the blessing of divine protection and aid, enemies previously unsubdued are conquered, and peace obtained for the State, and the
provinces reduced to subjection" (229.2). Even so, Augustine observed, "it is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war (229.2)." Darius had the "privilege" of being a peacemaker, and Augustine sought to encourage him in that role. He closed by requesting the possibility of an ongoing correspondence, which was subsequently realised in *Letters* 230 and 231, centering on non-military matters.55

The occasional nature of these late letters to Boniface and Darius clearly raises questions as to their wider applicability in elucidating Augustine's war thought. But *Letters* 220 and 229 both recapitulated major themes developed elsewhere. War again emerged as a providential instrument of divine punishment and correction (220.8), and the value of Christian military service was explicitly affirmed (220.3; 229.2).56 So too, Augustine asserted his inward interpretation of love for enemies (220.8); he stressed the need for *spiritual warfare* (220.3, 10-12), and affirmed the priority of peace to war (229.2). As in the works of his later episcopate, Augustine's response to the increasing strife of contemporary society was to recognise the need for the violent exercise of lawful authority, even to commend it, but to praise peace as the higher good, wherever possible. In that sense, the force of these two
letters was to confirm the more pacific bias in Augustine's war thought that seems evident from about 412 onwards.
CHAPTER 6. - CONCLUSIONS.

1. THE MAJOR PROBLEM.

In light of the range of materials relevant to Augustine's war thought, their 41-year period of composition and their various literary contexts, the observation that Augustine developed different emphases over time is not surprising. Nor would it appear unusual that aspects of his thinking came to special prominence in particular literary or historical settings. In fact, it would arguably be much more unusual, perhaps even unprecedented, had Augustine consistently expounded the same arguments at all times and in all places, especially in view of his intellectual creativity and his obvious literary abilities!

Yet the clear implication of many of the secondary accounts considered in Chapters 2 and 3 was that a consistent synthesis of Augustine's war thought could be appropriately developed in virtual isolation from the immediate, contextual considerations surrounding specific texts. In conducting a systematic review of key materials, it was shown that no single scholar had offered anything like a fully detailed examination of questions surrounding the literary, historical and even philosophical/theological contexts of different writings. With few exceptions, the general tendency was to construct more or less abstract
doctrinal definitions, based on disparate sources that were often treated as uniform, undifferentiated, supporting documentation.\textsuperscript{1}

The exposition and analysis of primary sources undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 has been limited in its aims and objectives. The major focus has been on a chronological exposition of major passages traditionally construed as war-related, with reference to their immediate settings. In the process, attention has centred on the key themes to emerge in different documents, the ostensible purposes, arguments and forms of those materials, and such broader, historical considerations as are obviously relevant in light of the sources themselves.

It is clear, however, that as well as being hypothetically incongruous, the claim or implication that Augustine regularly expounded a uniform position on war is false. On the contrary, while his war thought contained remarkable elements of consistency over time, it more closely resembles a developing, almost organic cluster of ideas, which was remarkably flexible, and seems to have owed much, in the various presentations of different aspects of it, to the immediate settings and circumstances in which Augustine wrote.
Thus in his earliest years as a Christian theologian (386-395), before he was consecrated bishop, Augustine addressed war-related issues in the decidedly apolitical contexts of an anti-Manichean treatise of Christian apologetics (The Problem of Free Choice) and an extended work of biblical exposition (Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount). His concerns were primarily intellectual and inter-personal, and he focused on the internal ethical dimensions of issues of violence and warfare. He affirmed the public legitimacy of violent action by soldiers, but sought to urge the avoidance of wrongful "passion" in killing. He advocated personal love of enemies, and interpreted that to include "benevolent severity" in correction. Throughout, he treated such issues as they directly related to his polemical agenda to assert human responsibility for evil (The Problem of Free Choice), and his exegetical task of expounding key sections of Matthew's Gospel (Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount). He was not primarily concerned with questions of justice in warfare, except as they arose indirectly in such contexts.

During his early episcopate (396-411), Augustine wrote on war-related matters in more diverse settings, including another anti-Manichean treatise (Reply to Faustus the Manichean), a letter responding partly to ethical questions
concerning military service (Letter 47), and three addressing the Donatist controversy (Letters 87, 83 and 100). The last, which were all composed in 405-9, reflected tough views on religious coercion that might seem of doubtful relevance to Augustine's war thought. But their observations on the legitimacy and use of civil force for moral correction and compulsion to good clearly echoed related issues in Augustine's development of a broader, providential understanding of war in Reply to Faustus the Manichean.

In meeting Faustus' specific Manichean objections to the legitimacy of Moses' conduct in the Old Testament, Augustine espoused a virtual theology of war as a divinely ordained instrument to balance a "natural order." He stressed the legitimacy of all wars commanded by God, and argued for greater duties of obedience from Christian soldiers. In Letter 47, writing on ethics to Publicola, Augustine added to these new departures, suggesting that violence was justified to restrain people from wrongful behaviour, as well as to correct them after the fact, and reasserting moral innocence in certain cases of accidental death. Clear elements of thematic continuity carried over from earlier works, not least the importance of inward dispositions to determine the legitimacy of individual actions. But the demands of Augustine's anti-Manichean,
pro-biblical apologetics on the one hand (Reply to Faustus the Manichean 22), and the individual needs of Publicola (Letter 47) on the other, clearly influenced him to expound broader, theological conceptions of the public role of warfare and related particularities.

In the period of Augustine's later episcopate (412-27), there is evidence that the need to respond to immediate, war-related, practical and intellectual challenges in contemporary society provoked him to adopt a less austere and more pacific approach, and to seek to establish criteria for "just" and/or morally legitimate war more precisely. His strict views on coercion persisted (Letters 153, 173 and 185), and writing directly to military officials in Letters 138 and 189, Augustine again affirmed the role of Christian military service, the moral value of war, and the place of God's providence in warfare. But he also introduced emphases - immediately relevant to the letters' recipients - on peace as a justification for war and the need to keep war as a last resort.

In Questions on the Heptateuch, the exegesis of Old Testament biblical passages later encouraged Augustine to discuss "just war" as a central issue. As well as at God's direct command, wars were just, he argued, when they avenged specific "injuries." Such guidelines, combined with a
greater stress on honourable and even merciful behaviour towards enemies (Letters 138 and 189) are plainly indicative of greater concerns to define the morality of warfare during this period.

Turning to the City of God, some of the apparent historical reasons for such priorities become clearer. Not only had the local situation in North Africa become more unsettled; writing to sophisticated pagans in the wake of the general imperial turmoil following the Visigoths' sack of Rome in 410, Augustine directly confronted major issues of state to argue that the Roman Empire had been worse off when pagan religions predominated. His sustained critique of Roman history echoed the more pacific tendencies of other works of his later episcopate, with its vigorous attacks on both the material, as well as the psycho-spiritual evils of war. Augustine continued to treat familiar themes, including the moral value of war, the duties of Christian soldiers, and the legitimacy of divinely ordained wars. But he gave greater attention to the primacy of God's overarching providence in the affairs of nations, to peace as an ultimate goal, and to the intra-personal dynamics of discord and concord. As in Questions on the Heptateuch, Augustine also ventured thoughts on the criteria of "just war," both in self-defence and in response to various injustices.
By the time Augustine came to compose his last war-related writings, in 427–9, the contemporary political and military situation had deteriorated quite markedly. As has been seen, interpretation of *Letters 220* and *229* requires detail of imperial power struggles and the North African invasion of the Vandals. And although they contain nothing new on war, they show Augustine continuing the more peace-oriented bias of other later works, as he counselled the military leaders, Boniface and Darius, on their Christian duties. Familiar themes, such as Augustine's moral and providential understanding of war and his stress on inward love for enemies, continued to the last in these pastoral communications. But if one theme predominated, it was the priority of peace, both in individual life and in public affairs of state.

Thus clear shifts are evident in Augustine's war thought from more private to more predominantly public concerns, from more abstract to more concrete preoccupations, and from more militaristic to more pacific emphases over time. Moreover, such progressions seem to have been related not only to the different literary contexts in which Augustine worked, which varied from apologetic treatises to pastoral letters to exegetical works, all with their peculiar purposes, but also to the increasingly threatening environment in which he found himself.
Augustine's life was rarely trouble-free, in the sense that he was constantly embroiled in theological and political strife - particularly with the serious onset of his involvement in the Donatist controversy, for example. But as the Roman Empire, including North Africa, witnessed greater instabilities from the 410s onwards, there is clear evidence that such tensions were reflected in Augustine's works. His response was not to become more belligerent, however, but to question the legitimacy of war more carefully and to commend peace more highly.2

3. FURTHER QUESTIONS.

Whether, in the course of such developments, Augustine ever advocated a thorough-going and consistent theology or ethics of war, which now admits of scholarly induction and systematisation, is a question that remains beyond the immediate purview of this thesis. Significant areas require further investigation to establish a definitive answer - not least, the connections between Augustine's views on war and on related theological issues, and the extent to which he drew on prior sources. But certain concluding suggestions seem apposite.

First, it is clear that a number of themes appear regularly in Augustine's works, although tailored to different
settings, where appropriate. Concepts such as the providential framework and correctional value of war, the primacy of internal motivations and dispositions in determining moral legitimacy, and the compatibility of Christianity with military service, figure sufficiently consistently in various loci to support the view that they constituted, with related emphases, an Augustinian war-thought nexus which he advocated over many years.

Second, the main problems with seeking to expound such a nexus, or cluster of ideas, are that Augustine constantly refined and/or expanded it in different literary settings, and that the general bias of his war thought varied significantly over time. He did not vigorously stress the priority of peace to war until the works of his later episcopate, for example, but from then on, it had significant prominence. At the same time, any attempt to expound Augustine's war thought from just one major work - Reply to Faustus the Manichean, or City of God, for instance, is bound to yield different emphases, depending on what is chosen.

Third, although it would clearly be possible to construct some form of synthesis if one ignored such contextual considerations, the value of such a summary would have to be questioned, and this seems particularly pressing in the case
of Augustine's views on "just war." In fact, although scholars have made much of his "just war theories," as has been seen, Augustine's own references to "just war" were quite limited. It is possible to supplement them with related materials of a more general nature, as scholars have often done, but the value of that procedure would seem doubtful, if Augustine never propounded such a "just war doctrine" himself.3

Finally, a more promising way of presenting Augustine's war thought as a whole, including his ideas on "just war," seems to lie in pursuing the sort of chronological progression of clustered ideas outlined in this thesis. In this connection, greater consideration of questions of theological and historical contextualisation might help substantiate some of the above, developmental conclusions more fully, as well as enabling the presentation of a more elaborate explanatory thesis.
ENDNOTES.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION.


*City of God* is used throughout this thesis as an abbreviated form of the full English title of the work, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*.

2. There are, for example, no indexed references to Augustine's "just war" thinking in Brown or TeSelle, "Augustine the Theologian." A leading work on Augustine's philosophy, Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* (New York, 1960) has only one such reference (p.178).


A distinction is here made between Augustine's "just war doctrine" (or "ethic," or "theory") and his "war thought." The former is understood to refer to what has traditionally been construed as a more or less formal theological position, in which Augustine laid out various criteria that would morally "justify" war. The latter refers to his general thinking on war, including his just war position.

5. See especially, below, pp. 5-48, passim.

6. See ibid.

7. See ibid., pp. 49-110.

8. See ibid., pp. 111-120.
CHAPTER 2 - PAST INTERPRETATIONS I - SHORTER STUDIES.

1. The main sources selected for review in this chapter, all of which directly address Augustine's war thought, are:


Other sources are treated [and cited], where they address relevant issues. Major recent monographic treatments of Augustine's war thought are Hugh T. McElwain, St. Augustine's Doctrine on War in Relation to Earlier Ecclesiastical Writers: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago, IL:
1973); William R. Stevenson, Jr., Christian Love and Just War: Moral Paradox and Political Life in St. Augustine and His Modern Interpreters (Macon, GA: 1987). They are reviewed separately in Chapter 3 of this thesis.


3. Ibid., pp. 91-5.

4. Bainton's first point has been directly or indirectly affirmed by Combès, pp. 294-5; Deane, pp. 158-9; De la Brière, pp. 562; Langan, pp. 176, 178ff.; Lenihan, pp. 48, 52; Monceaux, pp. 7, 18, 20; Regout, p. 40; Russell, p. 16; Swift, pp. 113-4. Others to address this issue have included Richard Shelly Hartigan, "Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of the Innocent," Journal of the History of Ideas, 27 (1966), pp. 198-9; Gary J. Quinn, "Pacifism and the Just War: Are they Compatible?" Dialog, 11:4 (1972), p. 278.

Bainton's second point has also been made [at least partially] by Combès, pp. 269-70, 273; Deane, pp. 156, 159, 160-2; De la Brière, pp. 564-5; Langan, pp. 172, 174, 177; Lenihan, pp. 49, 52; Monceaux, pp. 17-19; Regout, p. 41; Russell, pp. 16-21, passim; Swift, pp. 121-2. Others to stress aspects of it have included Hartigan, p. 199, and Quinn, p. 278.


Bainton's fourth point has also been made by Combès, pp.
Aspects of Bainton's fifth point have been affirmed by Combes, p. 268; Deane, pp. 158-9, 166; Lenihan, pp. 48-9; Monceaux, pp. 10, 20; Russell, p. 23. Others to treat it have included Hartigan, p. 200, and Quinn, p. 279.

Bainton's last point has been seconded [at least in part] by Deane, p. 155; De la Brière, p. 558; Langan, p. 174; Lenihan, p. 41; Monceaux, p. 13; Russell, p. 18; Swift, p. 130. Others to comment on this issue have included Hartigan, p. 200, and TeSelle, "Toward an Augustinian Politics," p. 91.


6. Ibid., p. 111.


12. Lenihan, pp. 42, 55.

13. For Combès' "outline of specific just war principles," see pp. 284ff.

14. For Lenihan's conclusions, see pp. 52-8. See also below, pp. 18-19, 25-6.

15. Regout, pp. 39-44; Markus, p. 11. The stated aim of Markus' article, p. 1, was "to look at Augustine's thinking...in the immediate context of his own intellectual biography." Deane's "'just war' summary" amounts to little more than a couple of closely packed sentences (pp. 158-9).


18. The main dangers in constructing a summary of Augustinian "just war doctrine," in a more formal theological sense, would seem to lie in:

a), creating a false "construct" of his views, gleaned from different sources, which ends by suggesting an overall position which he never actively advocated at any one particular time;

b), thereby distracting attention from the wider range and complexity of his thought on war and thus encouraging an unbalanced interpretation of his views as a whole.

"Doctrine" is here understood as a clearly distinct and developed theological position, as opposed to a more informal set of views.


20. Bainton, pp. 95-8, formulated his just war outline on the basis of City of God I.6-7, XIX.12-13, XXII.6; Expositions on the Psalms (Ennarrationes in Psalmos) 124.7; Letters 47, 138, 189, 229; Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount (De Sermone Domini in Monte) I.XX.63, 70; Reply to Faustus the Manichean XXII.70, 75, 76, 79; Questions on the Heptateuch IV.44, VI.10; The Problem of Free Choice I.V.11, 12. Elsewhere, he drew on additional materials from this corpus, as well as other works - ibid., pp. 91-5, 98-100.

21. Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 110-149. The works cited by Swift in addition to Lenihan's basic list are: Against Gaudentius Bishop of the Donatists (Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum Episcopum), Against the Writings of Petilianus (Contra Litteras Petiliiani), Commentary on John's Gospel (Tractatus in Johannem Evangelistam), Commentary on the First Letter of John (Tractatus in Epistolam Johannis ad Parthos), Confessions, Expositions on the Psalms, Discourse on Some Questions from Romans (Expositio LXXXIV Propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos), Responses to Various
Questions from Simplicianus (Ad Simplicianum de Diversis Quaestionibus) and Retractions (Retractationes). He also cited passages from no less than 13 Letters, three Sermons and 10 books of City of God.

22. Russell, pp. 16-39, cited additional passages from Against a Letter of Parmenian (Contra Epistolam Parmeniani), Against Gaudentius Bishop of the Donatists, Against the Writings of Petilianus, Confessions and On Catechizing the Uninstructed (De Catechizandis Rudibus). Among other sources, Monceaux, pp. 1-23, drew on materials from eight letters and seven books of City of God. Deane, pp. 154-171, referenced 11 books of City of God.

23. Langan, pp. 169-189. Langan's "novel thematic approach" centred on extrapolating eight key themes/observations concerning Augustine's war thought, in light of which he sought to reflect on contemporary issues. Some of these themes reflect aspects of conventional just war interpretations - Augustine's punitive conception of war, his stress on ethical motivation ("just disposition") and his emphasis on due authorisation ("just auspices"), for example. Others are more wide-ranging - the observations, p. 174, that Augustine showed "a willingness to interpret evangelical norms in terms of inner attitudes rather than overt actions," for example, and Augustine's "assumption of general social passivity and quiescence in the decisions and moral judgments of authority."


25. This is a significant qualification, in that none of the shorter accounts here considered can really be said to constitute "a major study" of Augustine's war thought. See also note 1 of this Chapter.

26. Markus, pp. 1-13, actually only "contextualised" four main passages from Augustine.

27. Ramsey, pp. 15-33.

28. Bainton, pp. 91-100; Deane, pp. 154-171; Ramsey, pp. 15-33; Regout, pp. 39-44; Russell pp. 16-39.

29. For the dates of Augustine's works, see Appendix A, pp. 172-4, and Brown, pp. 74-7, 184-7, 282-5, 378-9. For brief
outlines of the literary contextualisation of some key passages, see Lenihan, pp. 42-52; Markus, pp. 1-13; Monceaux, pp. 2-11.


32. For the influence of Cicero and other classical authors, see Bainton, pp. 91, 95, 98; De la Brière, pp. 560-1; Markus, p. 4; Regout, p. 39; Russell, pp. 16, 18, 26. See also, Childress, p. 4.

For the influence of Ambrose and other patristic writers, see Bainton, pp. 89-91, 98; Regout, pp. 39-40; Russell, p. 16.

For the influence of Old and New Testament writings, see Bainton, p. 98; De la Brière, p. 560; Monceaux, p. 12; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 123-8.

33. Bainton, pp. 91-100, listed the most extensive references, despite the overall brevity of his account of Augustine's war thought. Like Bainton, Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 110-149, offered further contextualisation by virtue of earlier sections of his book which deal with early church attitudes to war in general, but he did little to highlight areas of continuity or discontinuity between Augustine's views and those of his predecessors. McElwain's monograph, which will be reviewed in Chapter 3, is a major study of this topic.


For biblical and early church attitudes to war, see Bainton, pp. 44-90, McElwain, pp. 17-74, and Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 32-110. See also, for example, C. John Cadoux, The Early Christian Attitude to War (London, 1940); Adolf Harnack, Militia Christi (Philadelphia, PA: 1981); Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: 1975); Jean-Michel Hornus, It Is Not Lawful For Me To Fight (Scottdale, PA: 1980); Stanley Windass,

35. Bainton, pp. 91-5.
37. Lenihan, pp. 52-8, especially p. 56. See also below, pp. 25-6.
38. Ramsey, pp. 18, 28.
40. Regout, p. 44 - author's translation.
41. Langan, pp. 172-81, especially pp. 172, 178. Augustine's thought on peace, which is not treated in depth in this thesis, has attracted scholarly attention in its own right. See, for example, Harald Fuchs, Augustin und Die Antike Friedensgedanke (Berlin, 1926), and Joachim Laufs, Die Friedensgedanke Bei Augustinus (Wiesbaden, 1973), which is a response to Fuchs. See also, Thomas Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the Augustinian Tradition, 400-1200," Augustinian Studies, 10 (1979), pp. 105-111; Zampaglione, pp. 296-309.
42. Deane, pp. 156-7.
43. Monceaux, pp. 12, 15, 17 - author's translations.
44. De la Brière, p. 563 - author's translation.
47. Bainton, pp. 93-5; Monceaux, pp. 1-11, passim.
48. For the general historical commentary of different scholars, see Combès, pp. 263-4, 277ff.; Deane, pp. 154, 168-71; De la Brière, pp. 566-8; Lenihan, pp. 50-1; Markus, pp. 8-10. See also Arquillière, pp. 542-3; Quinn, pp. 277-8.
49. Scholarship on the later Roman Empire is massive. For general social and religious trends of relevance to

For the dates of key works by Augustine and brief details of their personal and historical settings, see Appendix A, pp. 172-4.

50. For the influence of Augustine's war thought on later thinkers, which has been widely maintained, although subject to different interpretations, see above, "pp. 1-2, and Chapter 1, note 3. See also, De la Brière, pp. 570-2; Lenihan, p. 37; Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views on the 'Just War,'" p. 11; Ramsey, pp. 32-3; Russell, pp. 18, 26ff..

51. See above, pp. 6-7.

52. Hartigan, pp. 195-204.


54. Lenihan, pp. 52-8. Lenihan's queries as to the definition of "war" seem unsubstantiated, for example, inasmuch as his claim that "war," for Augustine, would have generally meant "civil war" is unsupported by cited textual evidence. However, his suggestions that Augustine had no "unified theory" of just war and that "justice" was a complex Augustinian concept have been echoed by other sources. See, for example, Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 110-11; Arquillière, pp. 545-7.

55. As has been seen, it can be all too easy to claim a theological simplicity and completeness for Augustine's war thought if one fails to treat complexities surrounding sources and contextualisation, in particular.

56. This may partly reflect the sheer range and diversity of Augustinian scholarship, but it may also be due to uncritical expository tendencies among scholars.
CHAPTER 3 - PAST INTERPRETATIONS II - MONOGRAPHIC STUDIES.

1. For "the importance and influence of Augustine's war thought," see above, pp. 1-2.

2. See Chapter 2, note 1.

3. McElwain's work is not cited in any of the other secondary studies reviewed for this thesis, for example.

4. Such "perceived deficiencies" are listed towards the close of Chapter 2. See especially above, pp. 24-7.

5. See ibid.


7. Ibid., pp. 11-74, 75-134, 135-167.

8. Ibid., pp. 165-7, 166.


10. For McElwain's "examination of key historical developments," see, for example, pp. 59-62, 71-3. For problems with this and "his exegetical approach to Augustine's writings," see below, pp. 35-6, 48.


12. Ibid., pp. 71-3, 73.

13. Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 32-110. For a summary of Swift's sources, see pp. 7-9. In addition to authors treated by McElwain, he considered the works of such writers as Athenagoras, Arnobius and Eusebius of Caesarea, as well as other documents.

McElwain's conclusions on attitudes to war in the first two centuries seem "simplistic" in comparison with those of Edward A. Ryan, "The Rejection of Military Service by the Early Christians," Theological Studies XIII (1952), pp. 1-32, for example.

14. Additional passages were cited from: City of God III, V, X, XIV-XV, XVII-XVIII and XXII; Expositions on the Book of Psalms 84.10 and 124.7; Letters 136, 139 and 231; Retractions II.69

16. Ibid., p. 83.
17. Ibid., pp. 85-95.
18. Ibid., p. 95.
20. Ibid., p. 104.
22. Ibid., pp. 120, 121.
23. Ibid., pp. 121-5, 122.
24. Ibid., p. 124.
26. Ibid., p. 132.
27. See above, pp. 6-7.
29. See above, pp. 6-7.
30. See, for example, McElwain, pp. 59-62, 71-3. He majored on the presence of Christians in the military, the 313 Edict of Milan and subsequent church conciliar approval for military service.
31. See ibid., p. 83. McElwain effectively argued that from Reply to Faustus the Manichean (397-8 AD) to City of God (413-427 AD), there was no significant "development" in Augustine's war thought, and he rebutted only one possible change in emphasis. However, as will be shown in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis, there were other significant shifts in Augustine's views over time, none of which McElwain addressed in his monograph. See below, pp. 49-120, passim.
32. See above, pp. 24-7.
33. Stevenson's doctoral dissertation was William R. Stevenson, Jr., War, Love and Paradox in the Thought of St. Augustine (University of Virginia PhD Dissertation, 1984).
34. Stevenson, "Christian Love and Just War," p. 8. All
further Stevenson references are to this work.

35. Ibid., pp. 1-10, 11-46, 47-76, 77-114, 115-48, 149-52.

36. As defined, for example, in Bainton, pp. 95-8. See above, pp. 6-7. Stevenson's third chapter, pp. 77-114, which was designed to cover the issue of "right intention" (p. 8), actually includes consideration of matters relating to "just disposition" and "just conduct" in Bainton's terms. Likewise, Chapter 1, pp. 11-46, on "just cause," treats materials addressed in the first two points of Bainton's six-point "code of war."

37. Even Swift, "The Early Fathers," which is otherwise the most thorough of all the secondary accounts reviewed in this thesis in its use of sources, is much less inclusive than Stevenson. See above, p. 13 and Chapter 2, note 21.

38. Stevenson, pp. 11-114, passim.

39. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

40. Ibid., pp. 18, 20.

41. Ibid., pp. 21, 23, 26.

42. Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

43. Ibid., p. 34. For Augustine, Stevenson argued, any human quest for justice thus ended in "contradiction." Because human consciousness was always tainted by pride and selfishness, as soon as people tried to conceive of justice, their efforts ended by subverting their own standing as "just," or "rightly ordered." The corollary of this position was that "the most just" would be those "least conscious of their own 'justice.'"

44. Ibid., p. 35.

45. Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

46. Ibid., p. 39.

47. Ibid., pp. 40, 41, 42.

48. Ibid., pp. 42, 44.

49. Ibid., p. 45.

50. Ibid., pp. 47-76.
52. Ibid., p. 51.
53. Ibid., p. 59.
54. Ibid., pp. 65-6.
56. Stevenson, p. 66.
57. Ibid., p. 68.
58. Ibid., p. 70; cf. p. 48.
59. Ibid., pp. 70, 71.
60. Ibid., pp. 71-3.
61. Ibid., pp. 74, 75.
62. Ibid., p. 77.
63. Ibid., pp. 77, 78.
64. Ibid., p. 79.
65. Ibid., p. 88.
66. Ibid., p. 89.
67. Ibid.,
68. Ibid., p. 95.
69. Ibid., pp. 98, 99-100.
70. Ibid., p. 105.
71. Ibid., p. 107.
72. Ibid., p. 109.
73. Ibid., p. 112.
74. Ibid., pp. 115-148, passim.
75. Ibid., pp. 149-52, 151.
76. Ibid., p. 150.

77. The process of "deconstruction" noted here refers to the way in which Stevenson consistently sought to demonstrate that what had traditionally been interpreted as relatively unproblematic Augustinian "just war tenets" were in fact related to and thus complicated by difficult, even irreconcilable paradoxes in Augustine's thought. The net result of Stevenson's approach is thus ostensibly, although not conclusively, to dismantle or "deconstruct" such tenets in light of his own reinterpretations of them. See also, above, note 36.

78. Ibid., pp. 11-46, 47-76, 77-114, passim. See also, above, note 36.

79. See below, especially, pp. 95-105, passim.

80. In light of the exposition of primary sources to be conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, these will emerge as serious problems with Stevenson's study, as with the majority of other secondary accounts reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. See below, pp. 111-18.

81. McElwain, pp. 82-4.

82. See above, pp. 6-11.
CHAPTER 4 - EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SOURCES I.

1. See above, pp. 24-7, 48.

2. See ibid.. Major secondary sources reviewed are listed in Chapter 2, note 1.

3. It has not been possible to read Augustine's complete works for the purposes of this thesis. The focus has therefore been restricted to sources which are obviously significant, and which can be dated with some security. Although much more extensive overall, the latter include all those listed by Lenihan, p. 42 (see above, p. 12), with the exception of the undated Sermon 302.

Lenihan extracted two main principles from Sermon 302.16ff., pp. 49-50: a), "that the Gospel did not mandate rejection of military service....it is wickedness (malitia) that is the problem and not military service (militia);" and b), "peace will come only when there is that interior change [in the military] brought about by listening to the teaching of Christ." Aspects of both are elucidated from other primary sources in this thesis. See below, passim. For the Latin text of Sermon 302, see J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Latinae, Vol. XXXVIII-XXXIX (Paris, 1844), cc. 1385-93.

For the similar expository policy pursued with reference to Augustine's writings on religious coercion, see below, note 61.

4. See, for example, Combès, pp. 265-6, 284-5. For "more recent commentators," see Bainton, pp. 95, 97-8; Deane, pp. 160-1; Hartigan, p. 196; Langan, pp. 176-7; Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views," pp. 3-4, 7; McElwain, p. 80; Ramsey, pp. 35-6; Russell, p. 18; Stevenson, passim; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 128, 133-4; Windass, pp. 24-5.

5. Peter Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," p. 74. The dates of all major works, excluding Augustine's letters, have been taken from Brown.


8. For "the neglect of eternal things," see Pontifex (transl.), p. 67.

9. For a complete summary of the argument of Book I, see ibid., pp. 16-19.


11. Ibid.

12. For further details on Evodius, see Pontifex (transl.), p. 15 and Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," passim. Where Augustine and Evodius have been italicised in the following paragraphs, they refer to the literary characters who feature in The Problem of Free Choice, as opposed to the historical figures.

13. For Augustine's commentary, see Retractions I.9.1ff.: "After I was ordained a priest at Hippo Regius, I completed, in Africa, the second and third of these books, insofar as I could at the time:" See Inez Bogan (transl.), p. 32. For the Latin text, see Almut Mutzenbecher (ed.), Retractionum Libri II, in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina [CCSL], Vol. LVII (Turnhout, Belgium: 1984), p. 23: Quorum secundum et tertium in Africa iam Hippone Regio presbyter ordinatus, sicut tunc potui, terminavi.

The literary genre of The Problem of Free Choice is ostensibly that of a Platonic dialogue.


15. For the Latin text of The Problem of Free Choice, see W. M. Green (ed.), De Libero Arbitrio Libri Tres, in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Vol. XXIX (Turnhout, Belgium: 1970), pp. 205-321. Sections of Latin citations are placed in square brackets where they are not in translation in the main text, but are included in endnotes for purposes of contextualisation.

For 1.4.9, see p. 216: Nam et miles hostem et iudex uel minister eius nocentem, et cui forte inuito atque imprudenti
telum manu fugit, non mihi uidetur peccare, cum hominem occidunt.

For I.5.10, see p. 217: [Resipisco et admodum gaudeo tam me plane cognouisse, quid sit etiam] illa culpabilis cupiditas, quae libido nominatur. [Quam esse iam apparent] earum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque inuitus amittere.

For I.3.8, see p. 215: [Clarum est enim iam nihil aliud quam] libidinem in toto malefaciendi genere dominari.

16. The further assumption here was that wrongful "passion" (I.5.10) involved "love of those things which each of us can lose against his will" (I.5.10), as above.

For I.5.11, see ibid., p. 217: [Prius enim mihi discutiendum uidetur] utrum uel hostis inruens uel insidior sicarius, siue pro uita siue pro libertate siue pro pudicitia, sine ulla interficiatur libidine....Non ergo lex iusta est, quae dat potestatem uel uiatori, ut latronem, ne ab eo ipse occidatur, occidat, uel cuipiam uiro aut feminae, ut uiolenter sibi stupratorem inruentem ante inlatum stuprum, si possit, interimat.

17. For I.5.12, see ibid., pp. 217-8:

a. Legem quidem satis uideo esse munitam contra huiuscemodi accusationem, quae in eo populo quem regit minoribus malefactis, ne maiora committerentur, dedit licentiam....non enim eos lex cogit occidere, sed relinquit in potestate. Liberum eis itaque est neminem necare pro his rebus, quas inuiti possunt amittere...

b. Iam uero miles in hoste interficiendo minister est legis; quare officium suum facile nulla libidine impleuit.

18. The terminology of the "temporal"/"eternal" law distinction was actually introduced in I.6.15, although the difference was plain before then.

For I.5.13, see ibid., p. 218: Nulla fortasse, sed earum legum, quae apparent et ab hominibus leguntur....Videtur ergo mihi et legem istam, quae populo regendo scribitur, recte ista permettere et diuinam prouidentiam uindicare.

19. See above, note 4, for relevant references.

20. For the first of these principles, see, for example, Combès, pp. 284-5; Langan, pp. 176-7; Ramsey, pp. 35-6; Stevenson, p. 112, n.98; Windass, pp. 24-5. For the second,
21. In 1.5.11, Augustine linked the example of when "the law also orders a soldier to kill the enemy, and if he refuses to do so he is punished by the military authorities," with those of people who killed in self-defence. See CCSL, Vol. XXIX, p. 217: *Nam militi etiam iubetur lege, ut hostem necet, a qua caede si temperauerit, ab imperatore poenas luit.* The clear implication was that this might also be a case of killing motivated by fear and thus subject to "potentially [morally] invalidating 'passion.'" The argument was not pursued by either Augustine or Evodius, but its possible force in undermining the legitimacy of military violence would seem clear. The key issue would be whether fear of punishment by relevant authorities constituted grounds for "passion," even in those under military orders.

22. See above, pp. 53-5.


26. Bainton, p. 96. Bainton, p. 91, also cited 1.4.12 to support his contention that Augustine once believed in a kind of Christian perfectionism, whereby perfect peace could become an earthly reality.

27. For the Latin text of *Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* see Almut Mutzenbecher (ed.), _De Sermone Domini in Monte Libri Duo,* in _Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina,* Vol. XXXV (Turnhout, Belgium: 1957).

For 1.2.9, see p. 6: *In pace perfectio est, ubi nihil repugnat...*

For 1.11.31, see p. 33: *[quamquam] iubeamur cum omnibus, quantum in nobis est, pacem habere...*
For I.15.41, see p. 45: bonus christianus...diliget inimicum, non in quantum inimicus est, sed in quantum homo est...

For I.19.57, see p. 65: [sed ait: non resistere adversus malum,] ut non solum non rependas quod tibi fuerit inrogetum, sed etiam non resistas, quo minus aliud inrogetur.

28. In favour of capital punishment, Augustine quoted the allegedly supporting biblical examples of Elijah in 1 Kings 18:40 and 2 Kings 1:10, and the apostle Peter with Ananias and Sapphira in Acts 5:1-10.

For I.20.63, see ibid., p. 72: [Neque hic] ea uindicata [prohibetur] quae ad correctionem ualet....Sed huic uindicatae referendae non est idoneus nisi qui odium, quo solent flagrare qui se uindicare desiderant, dilectionis magnitudine superauerit. See also, p. 73: [ut illum in quem uindicat non poena miserum sed] correctione beatum [uelit, paratus tamen, si opus sit,] aequo animo [plura tolerare...].

29. For I.21.69, see ibid., pp.78-9: Perfectio autem misericordiae, [qua plurimum animae laboranti consulitur, ultra dilectionem inimici porrigi non potest]....[Eius autem imperio, qui uenit legem impliere non soluere, perficiet] beniuerentiam et benignitatem, [cum eam usque ad inimici dilectionem perduxerit.]

For I.22.77, see p. 87: deus [quoque puniendo illos] non est maliuolus tortor sed iustissimus ordinator.

30. See also above, pp. 53-5.

31. Bainton, pp. 96-7. For his six-point "just war code," see ibid., pp. 95-8; above, pp. 6-7.


32. Combes, pp. 268, 270-1, 289-90, 295; Langan, pp. 170-3; McElwain, passim; Monceaux, pp. 2-3, 12-14, 16-20; Stevenson, passim; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 119-21,
123-4, 127-9, 139.

33. Bainton, p. 96.

34. Ibid., p. 97.

35. See, for example, Combès, pp. 289-90; Deane, pp. 162-3; Langan, p. 173; McElwain, p. 102; Russell, pp. 17-18; Stevenson, passim; Swift, "The Early Fathers," p. 129.

36. See, for example, Russell, p. 17; Swift, "The Early Fathers," p. 119.

37. See, for example, Combès, p. 270; Langan, p. 172; McElwain, p. 103; Russell, pp. 16-17.

38. See, for example, Combès, pp. 289-90; Langan, p. 173; McElwain, pp. 121, 123; Monceaux, p. 20; Swift, "The Early Fathers," p. 139.

39. See, for example, Combès, pp. 270-1; Langan, p. 172; McElwain, p. 104; Monceaux, p. 12.

40. See, for example, Deane, p. 161; Langan, p. 173; McElwain, pp. 102-3; Monceaux, pp. 16-17.

41. Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views," pp. 5ff., argued that in the period between The Problem of Free Choice and Reply to Faustus the Manichean, Augustine lost his belief in "a rationally ordered universe" (p. 5), and that he had a new understanding of law by the time he came to write the latter, because "the relationship between the eternal, the natural and the human law" (p. 7) had become less rigid for him. Unfortunately, although he argued persuasively from secondary sources, Markus did not demonstrate the validity of this argument from Reply to Faustus the Manichean itself, however. Yet as shall be seen, there is clear evidence of Augustine's continuing belief in a rational moral order, reflecting "eternal" values, within which war played a significant correctional role (see below, pp. 67-8 and note 50).

It would thus seem premature to argue, as Markus did, that Augustine's war thought was exclusively "now part of another closely integrated set of ideas" (p. 7), centering on war as peculiarly sanctioned in a Christian Empire (p. 9). This last emphasis may be implicit in Augustine's praise of Christian emperors, for example (22.76), and in his stress on the validity of wars that were divinely ordained (22.71-2, 4-5, 78). But it will be contended, by contrast
with Markus (pp. 9ff.), that such concerns did not clearly emerge until around 412 AD, in Letter 138 (see below, pp. 78-81).

42. Examples included the actions and teachings of Moses, the apostle Peter, John the Baptist and Jesus (22.70-1, 74).

43. This is the first reference traced to the importance of causes in determining the legitimacy of war. The latter feature prominently in modern "just war" accounts (see, for example, Bainton, p. 96), but it is interesting to note that Augustine did not really return to the subject in any detail until City of God (413-427 AD) and Questions on the Heptateuch (419 AD).

For 22.75, see Migne (ed.), c. 448: Interest enim quibus causis quibusque auctoribus homines gerenda bella suscipiant...

44. Cf. note 41. For 22.76, see Migne (ed.), c. 449: christiani quoque imperatores plenam gerentes fiduciam pietatis in Christo, [de inimicis sacrilegis, qui spem suam in sacramentis idolorum daemonumque posuerant, gloriosissimam victoriam perceperunt...]

For 22.78, see c. 451: [homo iniquus....quantum in ipso est, perturbat in se] ordinem naturalem, [quem lex aeterna conservari jubet.] Fit autem homo justus, cum ob alium non appetit rebus uti, nisi propter quod divinitus institutae sunt....[ut ea quae peccata non essent, nisi contra naturam essent, sic judicentur et ordinentur, ne] universitatis naturam [turbare vel turpare permittantur]....quis hominum novit cui pro sito aut obsit in pace regnare vel servire, vel vacare, vel mori, in bello autem vel imperare, vel pugnare, vel vincere, vel occidi?...

45. References to newness or novelty are not intended to imply here or anywhere else in such a context that Augustine introduced ideas that could be found nowhere previously in the Augustinian corpus, simply that they were unprecedented in the immediate settings of materials deemed war-related.

46. Although Augustine wrote quite a lot about war, and even attempted a definition of justice at one point (22.78), he stated that "there is no need here to enter on the long discussion of just and unjust wars (22.74)." See Migne (ed.), c. 448: Sed de justis quidem injustisque bellis nunc disputare longum est, et non necessarium. John Eppestein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (London, 1935), pp. 69-70, quoted passages in his translation of extracts
from 22.74-5, which address "justice" in warfare. But it has only been possible to trace the above specific reference to *justa bella* (22.74) in these sections.

47. Augustine had known Faustus, a Manichean "bishop," since his own years as a Manichee, when he had been disappointed by Faustus' failure to answer his growing problems with the sect. See *Confessions* 5.3.3; 5.6.10-5.7.13, in John K. Ryan (transl.), *The Confessions* (New York, 1960), pp. 114-5, 119-122. Cf. Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," pp. 58, 86, 264, 319, 370 n.4.

Inez Bogan observed in a note on her translation of Augustine's *Retractions* 2.33, p. 135:

Augustine opposes Faustus' attack on the Old and New Testaments, that is, on the Law and the Prophets, the Lord, the Incarnation of Christ, and the life of the Patriarchs. The format of this treatise compels the reader's attention: Augustine presents his arguments and those of his opponent in dialogue form as though Faustus and he were engaged in a debate. First, he cites the arguments of Faustus - thus preserving the latter's work almost entirely - and then he refutes them one by one.

As this last comment implies, Augustine was actually replying, in a work totalling 33 Books altogether, to a published attack on Christianity by Faustus, which is no longer extant per se. And as he stated himself (I.1), he was doing so at the request of others.


49. Such a focus was arguably implicit in *The Problem of Free Choice* (e.g. 1.5.13-6.14; cf. above, p. 56 and note 41), but it now became explicit.

For 22.78, see Migne (ed.), c. 450: *Calumniosa ergo imperitia Moyses reprehenditur quod bella gesserit, qui minus reprehendi debuit, si sua sponte gereret, quam si Deo jubente non gereret*...

50. In 22.78, Augustine traced some of these connections on a more individual level. When "a man loves for their own sake things which are desirable only as a means to an end," he observed, "...he disturbs in himself the natural order which the eternal law requires us to observe." See Migne (ed.), cc. 450-1: *Fit autem homo iniquus, cum propter se ipsas diligit res propter aliud assumendas....perturbat in*
Such "injustice" required correction, and God was the controller of sin, "so that sinful actions, which are sinful because they are against nature, are judged and controlled, and assigned to their proper place and condition, in order that they may not bring discord and disgrace on universal nature." See ibid., c. 451: ut ea quae peccata non essent, nisi contra naturam essent, sic judicentur et ordinentur, ne universitatis naturam turbare vel turpare permittantur...

Such passages clearly indicate Augustine's continuing belief (see above, note 41) in "a rationally ordered universe" (Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views," p. 5), where a "natural" order depended partly for its maintenance on man's allegiance to a divinely ordained "eternal law," and on judgement/retribution for human failures in that regard. Moreover, inasmuch as misdirected "love" (22.78), or wrongful motivation, lay at the heart of "love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like,...it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars (22.74)." See Migne (ed.), c. 447: Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque impiacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi. libido dominandi, et si qua similia, [haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur;] quae plerumque ut etiam jure puniantur, adversus violentiam resistentium, sive Deo, sive aliquo legitimo imperio jubente, gerenda ipsa bella suscipiuntur a bonis. War thus became "a divine instrument to punish wrongdoing, educate believers and balance the natural, moral scheme of things."

For a synthetical, although useful discussion of Augustine's views on providence, order and political authority, see Stevenson, pp. 65-72, and above, pp. 40-3.

51. Augustine frequently presented his thought in this way. Hence, at least in part, associated difficulties of interpretation. See also above, note 45.

52. The extent to which Augustine recommended total military obedience has been debated by Hartigan, pp. 195-204, and by Swift, "Saint Augustine on War and Killing: Another View," pp. 369-383, which was a response to Hartigan. The issue is not prioritised in this thesis. See also, above, pp. 33-4 and 42, on McElwain's and Stevenson's interpretations of this issue.

53. Except where otherwise noted, dates and citations of


For 47.1, see c. 184: [sed quomodo tibi auferrentur hi] aestus, [irateor, aestuavi...]

55. For 47.2, see *ibid.*, c. 184: utrum ejus fide utendum sit, qui ut eam servet per daemonia juraverit.

For 47.3, see c. 185: [Item si de area vel torculari tollatur aliquid] ad sacrificia daemoniorum [sciente christiano, peccat si fieri permittit, ubi prohibendi potestas est.]

For 47.4, see cc. 185-6: De escis [autem] idolorum nihil amplius nos debere observare, quam quod praecipit Apostolus, certus esto.

For 47.5, see c. 186: [De occidendis hominibus] ne ab eis quisque occidatur, [non mihi placet consilium...]

56. See above, pp. 53-5.

57. For 47.5, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, c. 186: non mihi placet consilium: nisi forte sit miles, aut publica functione teneatur, ut non pro se hoc faciat, sed pro aliis, vel pro civitate, ubi etiam ipse est, accepta legitima potestate, si ejus congruit personae....Hinc autem dictum est, non resistamus malo (Matth. v,39), ne nos vindicta delectet, quae alieno malo animum pascit; non ut correctionem hominum negligamus.

For 47.5, see *ibid.*, cc. 186-7: Qui vero repulluntur aliquo terrore ne male faciant, etiam ipsis aliquid fortasse praestatur....[Absit ut] ea quae propter bonum ac licitum facimus, aut habemus, [si quid per haec praeter nostram voluntatem cuigam mali acciderit, nobis imputetur.]
59. See above, note 45.


61. See Russell, pp. 23-6; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 141-9. Russell and Swift cited and/or quoted a number of texts from works not treated in this thesis, but included above in Chapter 2, notes 21-22, to illustrate Augustine's approach to religious coercion. In the interests of brevity and clarity, analysis has here been restricted to exemplary relevant materials on religious coercion from Augustine's Letters. For further discussion of the topic as it related to Augustine's thought and to contemporary trends in North Africa, see Brown, "Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine," pp. 260-78, 301-31.

62. See above, notes 60 and 61. For some relevant historical details, see also Appendix A, pp. 172-4.

63. For 87.7, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, c. 300: [Propterea providentissime Dominus non ait: Beati qui persecutionem patiuntur tantum; sed addidit,] propter justitiam (Matth. V, 10).

For 87.8, see ibid.: Non enim frustra gladium portant; Dei enim ministri sunt, vindices in iram in eos qui male agunt.


65. For 93.2.6, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, c. 324: [Quidquid ergo facit vera et legitima mater,] etiamsi asperum amarumque sentiatur, non malum pro malo reddit; sed bonum disciplinae, expellando malum iniquitatis, appenit, [non odio nocendi, sed dilectione sanandi.]

For 93.5.19, see ibid., c. 331: imo vero serviant reges terrae Christo, etiam leges ferendo pro Christo.

66. For 100.1, see ibid., c. 366: Neque enim vindictam de inimicis in hac terra requirimus...diligimus inimicos nostros et oramus pro eis. Unde ex occasione terribilium
judicum ac legum, [ne in aeterni judicii poenas incidant,] 
corrigi eos cupimus, non necari; nec disciplinam circa eos 
egligi volumus, nec suppliciis quibus digni sunt exerceri.

67. On "Augustinian understandings of a rational, moral 
See also above, notes 41 and 50.
CHAPTER 5 - EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SOURCES II.


For "the relative security and prosperity of the area," see Warmington, p. 12. See ibid., pp. 9-12, for the revolts of Firmus (372) and Gildo (395-8), the "two significant exceptions" to this. "Counts of Africa" (e.g. Count Heraclian) were Roman military chiefs - see ibid., pp. 4-5.


3. Monceaux, p. 4 - author's translation. It is worth stressing that this was probably a question of immediate relevance to much of the army in what was officially a Christian empire. And it was to become even more current after 416 AD, when pagans were legally excluded from military service. See Childress, p 12.

4. For 138.2.9, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, c. 528: Quae omnia reipublicae moribus asseruntur esse contraria: Nam quis, inquit, tolli sibi ab haste aliquid patiatur, vel Romanae provinciae depraedatoribus non mala velit belli jure reponere?

5. For 138.2.9, see ibid., c. 529: Quid est autem non reddere malum pro malo, nisi abhorrire ab ulciscendi libidine?

For 138.2.12, see c. 530: Paratus itaque debet esse homo justus et pius, patienter eorum malitiam sustinere, quos fieri bonos quaecumque, ut numerus potius crescat bonorum, non ut pari malitia se quoque numero addat malorum.

For 138.2.13, see ibid.: Denique ista praeccepta magis ad praeparationem cordis, quae intus est, pertinere, quam ad opus quod in aperto fit; ut teneatur in secreto animi patientia cum benevolentia, in manifesto autem id fiat quod eis videtur prodesse posse, quibus bene velle debemus...
6. For 138.2.15, see ibid., c. 532: Proinde qui doctrinam Christi adversam dicunt esse republcae, dent exercitum talem quales doctrina Christi esse milites jussit...et audeant eam dicere adversam esse republcae...

For 138.2.14, see ibid., c. 531: Agenda sunt autem multa, etiam cum invitis benigna quaedam asperitate plectendis, quorum potius utilitatis consulendum est quam voluntati....[Ac per hoc] si terrena ista respublica praecpta christiana custodiat, et ipsa bella sine benevolentia non gerentur, ut ad pietatis justitiaque pacatam societatem victis facilius consulatur. [Nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur;] quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccantium, qua poenalis nutritur impunitas...

7. The idea of "war for peace" is not fully developed until Letter 189 (see below, pp. 84-6) and City of God (see pp. 101-3).

8. For 138.3.16, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, c. 532: [Utquid autem ad illud respondeam quod dicunt,] per quosdam imperatores Christianas multa mala imperio accidisse Romano?

9. Authors to have cited them include Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 112 (Letter 153), 122 (Letter 173), 138 and 140 (Letter 185); Russell, pp. 24-5 (Letters 173 and 185); Stevenson, passim (Letter 153), pp. 27, 100, 102 and 104 (Letter 173).


For 153.5.14, see ibid., c. 659: Et tamen ideo diligendi sunt mali, ut non sint mali; quemadmodum, non ut permaneant, sed ut sanentur, diliguntur aegroti.

For 153.6.16, see c. 660: Habent ista omnia modos suos, causas, rationes, utilitates. Haec cum timentur, et coercentur mali, et quietius inter malii vivunt boni...

For 153.6.17, see ibid.: Sicut enim est aliquando misericordia puniens, ita et crudelitas parcens.
For 153.6.19, see c. 662: Nihil nocendi cupiditate fiat, sed omnia consulendi charitate; et nihil fiet immaniter, nihil inhumaniter....a bonis tamen intentione atque conscientia quam Deus cernit, [sive severitate, sive lenitate, nonnisi officium dilectionis impletur.]

11. See Chapter 4, notes 60-1.

12. Both Russell, pp. 23-4, and Swift, "The Early Fathers," p. 147, stressed the centrality of this compulsion to good concept to Augustine’s ideas on religious coercion.

For the Latin text of Letter 173, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, cc. 753-7.

For 173.2, see c. 754: Non tamen ideo qui diliguntur, malae suae voluntati impune et crudeler permittendi sunt; sed ubi potestas datur, et a malo prohibendi, et ad bonum cogendi.

For 173.10, see c. 757: [quod utique quanto magis impletur], tanto majore utitur [Ecclesia] potestate, ut non solum invitet, sed etiam cogat ad bonum.


For 185.10.46, see c. 813: [et tanguam] civili bello, [nostris contra nos erectis signis armisque pugnaverunt.]

For 185.3.13, see c. 798: Unde magna in eos fit misericordia, cum etiam per istas imperatorum leges, ab illa secta, [ubi per doctrinas daemoniorum mendacioquorum mala ista didicerunt,] prius eripiantur invitii...

For 185.5.19, see c. 801: Quomodo ergo reges Domino serviant in timore, [nisi ea quae contra jussa Domini fiunt, religiosa severitate prohibendo atque plectendo?]

For 185.1.1, see c. 792: [Vere hinc te apparet etiam de ipsa] virtute militari, [fidei servire quam habes in
For further details on Boniface, see Rev. J. G. Cunningham (transl.), p. 552 n.10. See also, Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," pp. 422-3, 425; Warmington, pp. 13-14, 18.

See, for example, Bainton, p. 95; Combès, pp. 291-2, 295; Deane, pp. 159, 161 n.28, 164 n.33, 166; Hartigan, p. 201; Langan, p. 175; Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views," p. 10; McElwain, pp. 81, 132, 160; Monceaux, pp. 9, 21; Regout, pp. 40-1; Stevenson, passim; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 114-15, 139. See also, Lenihan, pp. 47-8. For the Latin text of Letter 189, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, cc. 854-7.

For 189.4, see ibid., c. 855: [Noli existimare neminem] Deo placere posse, [qui in armis bellicis militat.]

For 189.6, see c. 856: [Pacem habere debet voluntas,] bellum necessitas...

For 189.6, see ibid.: [Hoc ergo primum cogita, quando armaris ad pugnam,] quia virtus tua etiam ipsa corporalis donum Dei est.... Esto ergo etiam bellando pacificus.... [Si autem pax humana tam dulcis est pro temporali salute mortalium, quarto est dulciorem] pax divina pro aeterna salute Angelorum! Itaque hostem pugnantem necessitas perimatur, non voluntas. [Sicut rebellanti et resistenti violentia redditur,] ita victo vel capto misercordia jam debetur, maxime in quo pacis perturbatio non timetur.

This is an obvious example where the immediate context of Augustine's presentation of his thought, i.e. a pastoral letter in which he sought to expound the duties of Christian love for Boniface as a military officer (138.2-3), appears to have influenced its content. There is a clear difference between such a context and the polemical demands of works like Reply to Faustus the Manichean, for example. Even so, as shall be seen in connection with City of God, Augustine did lay increasing emphasis on war for peace, as time progressed. See below, pp. 101-3.

For the reference in Letter 199 (35), see Sister Wilfrid Parsons (transl.), in Roy Joseph Deferrari et al. (eds.), The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 30 (Washington, DC, 1955), pp. 356-401: "As to wars, when has the earth not been scourged by them at different periods and places? (p. 384)."

For the Latin text of Letter 199, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, cc. 854-925. For 199.10.35, see c. 917: Bellis autem per diversa intervada temporum et locorum quando non terra
contrita est?


For IV.44, see ibid., p. 263: Innoxius enim transitus negabatur, qui iure humanae societatis aequissimo patere debat. Sed iam ut deus sua promissa completeret, adiuit hic Israelitas, quibus Amorphaeorum terram dari oportebat.

20. Author's own translation. See ibid.: Nam Edom cum similiter eis transitum denegaret, non pugnauert cum ipsa gente Israelitae, id est filii Iacob cum filiis Esau, duorum germanorum atque geminorum, quia terram illam Israelitis non promiserat; sed declinauerunt ab eis.


22. Although Augustine used the term "just wars" in Reply to Faustus the Manichean (22.74), for example, he did not venture to define it. See Chapter 4, note 46.

23. The translations are from Swift, p. 138. For the Latin text of VI.10, see CCSL, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 318-9: [hinc admonemur] non iniuste fieri ab his qui iustum bellum gerunt, [ut nihil homo iustus praecipue cogitare debebat in his rebus, nisi ut] iustum bellum suscipiat, cui bellare fas est; non enim omnibus fas est. Cum autem iustum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna, utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad iustitiam interest. Iusta autem bella ea definiri solent quae ulciscuntur iniurias, si qua gens uel ciuitas, quae bello petenda est, uel uindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est uel reddere quod per iniurias ablatum est. [Sed etiam hoc genus belli] sine dubitatione iustum est, [quod deus imperat, apud quem non est iniquitas et nouit quid cuique fieri debeat.] In quo bello ductor exercitus uel ipse populus non tam auctor belli quam minister iudicandus est.

24. The translation is from Eppstein, p. 74.

25. Author's own translation.

26. See note 23.

27. These conclusions will partly be tested in the next section, covering City of God, which was composed over the
same period. "Immediate contextual questions" in Letter 189 and *Questions on the Heptateuch* primarily concern Augustine's pastoral agenda for Boniface and his exegetical aims respectively.

28. See Deane, pp. 154-71, passim; Swift, "The Early Fathers," pp. 110-49, passim. Among those to cite from just one or two Books of *City of God* have been Langan and Ramsey, for example. The 20 Books, from which citations have been traced in secondary literature are I-V, VII-IX, XI-XXII. Stevenson, *passim*, cited from all 20 in his wide-ranging analysis of Augustine's thought.


29. Citations are from Henry Bettenson (transl.), *City of God* (London, 1984). For a good, general discussion of the origins and purposes of *City of God*, see John O'Meara, "Introduction," in *ibid.*, pp. vii-xxxv. For Marcellinus, who was the recipient of Letter 138 and a number of other letters, see above, note 2.

For I.Preface see CCSL, Vol. XLVII, p. 1: *Gloriosissimam citatatem Dei...*[hoc opere instituto et mea ad te promissione debito] defendere adversos eos, qui [conditori eius] deos suos praeterunt, [fili carissime Marcelline, suscepit]....[Unde etiam] de terrena cititate, [qua cum dominari adpetit,] etsi populi serviant, [ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur, non est praetereundum silentio quidquid dicere...]


It is also important to note that Augustine made regular allowance for the fact that the two cities were "interwoven and intermixed in this era, and await separation at the last judgment" (I.35). See CCSL, Vol. XLVII, p. 34: *Perplexae sunt istae duae ciuitates in hoc saeculo inuicemque permixtae, donec ultimo iudicio dirimantur.... In an immediate, practical sense, "both cities alike enjoy the good things, or are afflicted with the adversities of this temporal state (XVIII.54)." See CCSL, Vol. XLVIII, p. 656: *Ambae tamen temporalibus ueste bonis pariter utuntur ueste malis*
pariter affliguntur.... His vision of society, although dualistic, therefore, was not simplistically separatist.

For XIV:28, see ibid., p. 451: Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria.

31. For Augustine's approach to his readership, see Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," pp. 299-312, passim. "Against the Pagans" was the City of God's subtitle.


33. This version of Augustine's division of City of God is given in ibid., pp. xxxvi-xxxviii. According to a late letter cited there, p. xxxvi, from C. Lambot, "Lettre Inédite de Saint Augustin Rélative au De Civitate Dei," Revue Benedictine, 51 (1939), pp. 109-21, Augustine thematically grouped Books VI-X as "written against those who think that suchlike [pagan] deities are to be worshipped by rites and sacrifices in order to secure happiness in the life to come." He divided the last 12 Books in groups of four, "so that four should describe the origin of that City [of God], four its progress, or rather its development, and the four last the ends in store for it."

For the Latin text of this letter, see Lambot, pp. 112-13, esp. p. 112: [Si autem corpora malueris esse plura quam duo, iam quinque oportet codices facias, quorum primus continet quinque libros priores quibus adversus eos est disputatum qui felicitati uitae huius non plane deorum sed daemoniorum cultum prodesset contundunt, secundus sequentes alios quinque qui uel tales uel qualescumque plurimos deos propter uitam quae post mortem futura est per sacra et sacrificia coiendos putant. [Iam tres alii codices qui sequuntur guaternos libros habere debebunt. Sic enim a nobis pars eadem distributa est] ut quatuor ostenderent exortum illius ciuitatis totidemque procursum siue dicere maluimus excursum, quatuor uero ultimi debitos fines.

34. Dates of composition for City of God have been drawn from Brown, "Augustine of Hippo," pp. 282-4, 378.

35. For 1.1, see CCSL, Vol. XLVII, p. 2: [illī] prouidentiae divinae tribuere, quae solet corruptos hominum mores bellis emendare atque conterere...
Augustine's treatment of Rome and its history is extensive in *City of God*, especially in the first five Books. Coverage of war-related themes and associated references in this chapter is therefore selective. See also below, note 47.

38. Augustine's open treatment of different kinds of war in Roman history - "foreign," "social," "civil," and even "servile" (e.g. III.23ff.) seems decisive evidence against Lenihan, p. 53, and his contention that "to Augustine, 'War' was civil war or police action to maintain order within the empire." Lenihan's related argument that the "war," whose justice Augustine commended, was "civil war" (p. 53), because "basically an internal police action for the purpose
of maintaining the good order of society" (p. 54), is also inconsistent with Augustine's periodic condemnations of "civil war" in *City of God* (e.g. III.14).

The question of what Augustine meant by "war" is obviously significant to understanding his war thought. But the range of references in *City of God*, which extends to include even spiritual warfare (e.g. XIX.12-14), renders sharp delimitations of meaning inappropriate, except where obviously dictated by specific contexts. There certainly seem no compelling grounds for holding that Augustine only ever approved of a particular type of warfare—either "civil" or "foreign," for example—or that his understanding of the basic structure or dynamics of war was so determined by immediate historical and cultural factors as to render it incomprehensible 1,500 years later. A basic, general definition of "war," centering on public, armed conflict, is thus assumed in this thesis, although it is noted that Augustine also discussed warfare in a metaphorical, psycho-spiritual sense (see below, pp. 102-3).

For III.14, see *CCSL*, Vol. XLVII, p. 76: [*Ilio itaque uitio tantum scelus [perpetratum est socialis belli atque cognati...]*

39. For IV.15, see *ibid.*, p. 111: [*Proinde belligerare et perdomitis gentibus dilatare regnum malis uidetur felicitas, bonis] necessitas....Sed procul dubio felicitas maior est uicinum bonum habere concordem [quam uicinum malum subiugare bellantem.]

40. For the "law[s] of war," see *ibid.*, p. 2: *belli iure* (I.1); p. 48: *iure belli* (II.17). Cf. p. 35: *quod...belli iure [fieri] licuisset* (II.2), which Bettenson, p. 49, has translated as "the customary rights of war." For "the general practice of warfare," see *CCSL*, Vol. XLVII, p. 6: *consuetudo bellorum* (I.7). For "the established usage of war," see p. 35: *institutum moremque bellorum* (II.2). For "the normal usage of war," see p. 100: *bellorum morem* (IV.2). This is not intended to represent a complete listing of such references.

41. "Why should not Injustice be a goddess—at least the Injustice of foreign nations," Augustine asked, "if Panic and Pallor and Fever earned a place among Roman gods? (IV.15)." See *ibid.*, p. 111: *Cur autem et iniquitas dea non sit uel externarum gentium, si Pauor et Pallor et Febris dix Romani esse meruerunt?*

*For III.10, see above, note 37, and *ibid.*, p. 72: Decenter*
For IV.15, see also p. lll: Iniquitas enim eorum, cum quibus iusta bella gesta sunt, regnum adiuuit ut cresceret...

42. In XXII.6, Augustine noted Cicero's view that "the ideal city never takes up arms except in defence of its faith or its safety." See CCSL, Vol. XLVIII, p. 814: [Scio in libro Ciceronis tertio, nisi fallor, de re publica disputari] nullum bellum suscipi a ciuitate optima, nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. In XIX.15, he argued: "When a just war is fought...victory, even when the victory falls to the wicked, is a humiliation visited on the conquered by divine judgement, either to correct or to punish their sins." See ibid., p. 682: Nam et cum iustum geritur bellum, [pro peccato e contrario dimicatur;] et omnis victoria, cum etiam malis provenit, divino iudicio uictos humiliat uel emendans peccata uel puniens.

For XIX.7, see p. 672: [Sed sapiens, inquiunt, iusta bella gesturus est.] Quasi non, si se hominem meminit, multo magis dolebit iustorum necessitatem sibi extissse bellorum, quia nisi iusta essent, ei gerenda non essent, ac per hoc sapienti nulla bella essent.

For II.17, see CCSL, Vol. XLVII, p. 48: nullo autem iure pacis non datas rapuit et iniustum bellum cum earum parentibus iuste suscensentibus gessit....Multa commemorare iam piget foeda et iniusta, quibus agitabatur illa ciuitas...

43. For I.21, see ibid., p. 23: et ideo nequaquam contra hoc praecertum fecerunt, quo dictum est: Non occides, qui Deo auctore bella gesserunt...

For I.26, see p. 27: [Itaque unde punitur si fecit iniusus, inde punitur nisi fecerit iussus. Quod si ita est iubente imperatore, quanto magis] iubente creatore!

44. For Augustine's attitudes to the Roman Empire, see, for example, O'Meara, "Introduction," in Bettenson (transl.), pp. xxii-xxvi. For a detailed discussion of V.26, see Y. M. Duval, "L'Eloge de Théodose dans la Cité de Dieu (V, 26,1)," Recherches Augustiniennes, 4 (1966), pp. 135-179.

For II.19, see CCSL, Vol. XLVII, p. 51: Cuius praecretta de iustis proboisque moribus [si simul audirent atque curarent reges terrae et omnes populi, principes et omnes iudices terrae, iuvenes et virgines, seniores cum iunioribus, aetas omnis capax et uterque sexus, et quos baptista Iohannes
adloquitur, exactores ipsi atque milites: et terras uitae praesentis ornaret sua felicitate res publica, et uitae aeternae culmen beatissime regnatura conscenderet}....[tolerare] Christi famuli [iubentur], siue sint reges siue principes [siue iudices...etiam pessimam, si ita necesse est, flagitiosissimamque rem publicam...]

For V.25, see see p. 161: Diu imperauit...in administrandis et gerendis bellis victoriosissimius fuit...

For V.26, see ibid.: [Unde et ille non solum uiuo] servauit quam debetam fidem, [uerum etiam post eius mortem pulsum ab eius interfectore Maximo Valentinianum eius paruulum fratrem in sui partes imperii tamquam] Christianus [excepit pupillum.]

45. For Augustine's general views on peace, see Chapter 2, note 41. This is a complex aspect of Augustinian thought, of which only broad themes are outlined here.

For XIX.12, see CCSL, Vol. XLVIII, p. 675: Quando quidem et ipsi, qui bella volunt, nihil aliud quam vincere volunt; ad gloriosam ergo pacem bellando cupiunt peruenire....Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella...

For XIX.11, see ibid., p. 674: Quapropter possemus dicere fines bonorum nostrorum esse pacem...

For XIX.13, see p. 679: pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis...

46. For XIX.28, see ibid., p. 698: quid in bello noxium perniciosumque...rerum inter se adversitatem atque conflictum.

For XIX.5, see p. 669: [Quid itidem illa, quae] in amore uitia [commemorat idem Terentius, <<inuiriiae suspiciones, inimicitiae bellum, pax rursum>>: nonne res humanas impleuerunt?]

For XIX.15, see p. 682: [Hominibus autem] illo pacis ordine, [quo aliis alii subiecti sunt, sicut prodest humilitas seruentibus, ita nocet superbia dominantibus.]

For XIX.14, see p. 681: [ac per hoc omnem pacem uel corporis uel animae uel simul corporis et animae refert ad illam pacem, quae homini mortalii est cum immortalii Deo, ut ei sit ordinata in fide] sub aeterna lege oboedientia.

Augustine also wrote of psycho-spiritual peace and warfare
in his *Confessions*. See, for example, VII.21; X.28, 30, 38; XII.10-11; XIII.9, 11, 35-8.

47. See above, note 45. It is also important to note that *City of God* treats specific matters relating to conduct in warfare - from both historical and ethical perspectives - which scholars have frequently neglected. Book I contains significant discussions of questions of sanctuary (I.4-7), torture (I.10), burial (I.12-13), captivity (I.14-15), rape and suicide (I.16-28) that were provoked by the sack of Rome in 410, for example. As noted (see above, pp. 94-105, passim, and note 37), Augustine's analysis of Roman history is extensive, especially in Books I-V, and also includes moral judgements about earlier war-related trends and incidents (e.g. II.3, 17-25; III.1-31, passim; IV.3-8, 14-15, 28; V.12-26, passim). Such issues are not thoroughly addressed in this thesis, which focuses on a selection of "key themes" from *City of God* that are clearly of broader relevance to Augustine's war thought. But they would require full inclusion in any comprehensive analysis.

48. It is also arguable that the inherent dualism of the conceptual framework of *City of God* raises significant questions of the possibility of ever achieving ultimate "justice" in warfare.

Augustine defined "justice" in a distributive sense in *City of God* as "that virtue which assigns to everyone his due" (XIX.21). See *CCSL*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 688: *Iustitia porro ea uirtus est, qua sua cuique distribuit*. Examples of "just wars" included those which avenged injuries received or punished people who had themselves acted unjustly (e.g. III.10; IV.15). However, true "justice" was ultimately dependent on giving God his "due." "Justice is found," he argued, "where God, the one supreme God, rules an obedient City (XIX.23)." See *ibid.*., p. 695: *Quapropter ubi non est ista iustitia, ut secundum suam gratiam ciuitati oboedienti Deus imperet unus et summus....* Moreover, Augustine defined such a "City" in markedly spiritual terms, linking its "justice" with that of its citizens (XXIX.23).

On the other hand, he effectively denied the ultimate attribute of "justice" to pagan Rome at all. "When a man does not serve God, what amount of justice are we to suppose to exist in his being?....And if there is no justice in such a man, there can be no sort of doubt that there is no justice in a gathering [e.g. pagan Rome] which consists of such men (XIX.21; cf. II.21)." See *ibid.*., p. 689: *Quapropter ubi homo Deo non seruit, quid in eo putandum est esse iustitiae?.....Et si in homine tali non est nulla iustitia,
procul dubio nec in hominum coetu, qui ex hominibus talibus constat.

Augustine did not spell out the full implications of this position in terms of "just wars." But if true "justice" could only ever be found in a perfect Christian society - a society which he finally reserved for the after-life (cf. XV.5; XXII.29-30) - the "justice" of all "earthly," human institutions arguably became relative to the Christian devotion and obedience of its members.


49. For Boniface, see above, p. 84 and note 14. For the general historical context of Letter 220, see also Jones, p. 79. It is on the basis of such contemporary usage of "Barbarians" as is found here in Augustine, that the word is used occasionally in this thesis.

For the Latin text of Letter 220, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, cc. 992-7. For 220.7, see c. 995: [Quid autem dicam de] vastatione Africae, [quam faciunt] Afri barbari...?

50. For 220.7, see ibid., c. 995: [Qui non dicebant quandocumque tu comitavam sumeres potestatem,] Afros barbaros, non solum domitos, sed etiam tributarios futuros Romanae reipublicae?

For 220.8, see c. 995: Nam causas ego superiores potius attendo, quia ut Africa tanta mala patiatur, suis debent homines imputare peccatis. [Verumtamen nolim te] ad eorum numerum pertinere, per quos malos et iniquos Deus flagellat poenis temporalibus quos voluerit.

51. For 220.2, see ibid., c. 993: Secundum autem Deum ne pereat anima tua, [non facile tibi quisquam consulit...]

For 220.4, see c. 994: [Jamvero, si ad nos non falsa perlata sunt, quae utinam falsa sint, quod] ab ipsis haereticis [etiam ancillae Deo dicatae rebaptizatae sint...]

52. For 220.11, see c. 997: [Salus vero animae cum immortalitate corporis, virtusque justitiae, et victoria] de cupiditatibus inimicis, [et gloria et honor et pax in aeternum, non dantur nisi bonis.]
For 220.12, see c. 997: [Atque utinam posses ei persuadere] continentiam, [ut sine impedimento redderes Deo quod te debere cognoscis....] ut in ipsis bellis, si adhuc in eis te versari opus est, fideem teneas, pacem queras...

53. See Ferrill, pp. 136-7; Warmington, p. 14. Augustine also wrote of prevailing conditions elsewhere - in Letter 228, for example.


55. Letters 230 and 231 were more concerned with literary and theological matters. For the Latin text of Letter 229, see Migne (ed.), Vol. XXXIII, cc. 1019-20.

For 229.2, see c. 1020: [fidelissimi bellatores,] quorum laboribus atque periculis, Dei protegentis atque opitulantis auxilio, hostis indomitus vincitur, et quies reipublicae pacatisque provinciis comparatur: sed majoris est gloriae, ipsa bella verbo occidere, quam homines ferro; et acquirere vel obtinere pacem pace, non bello.

56. Augustine's argument in favour of military service to protect the churches (Letter 220.3), although specifically addressed to Boniface, may actually be said to constitute an expansion of his views on "Christian military service."
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS.

1. See above, pp. 24-7, 48.

2. On the pressures of contemporary events, see especially, above, pp. 76-8.

3. On scholars' definitions of an Augustinian "just war doctrine," see above, pp. 6-11. It is interesting to note, for example, that only one element of Bainton's six-point "code of war" (pp. 95-8), purportedly defining Augustine's views on "just war," is clearly supported by passages in which Augustine was specifically addressing "just war." Other citations were all to passages dealing more generally with the legitimacy of war. See also Chapter 4, note 46.

Key questions in attempting to decide the theological and historical appropriateness of following the doctrinal procedures of Bainton and others obviously centre on closely defining Augustine's understanding of justice and the extent to which he drew on other "just war" conceptions. In other words, given that his specific comments on "just war" were so limited, was his conception of justice broad enough to justify the inclusion of other materials? Furthermore, would such an inclusive approach be historically appropriate in light of what can be discovered of historical and contemporary precedents for Augustine's views?

Such questions form part of the further research deemed necessary in Chapter 2 - see above, pp. 24-7. See also Chapter 5, note 48, for a brief discussion of Augustine's definition of "justice."
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APPENDIX A - BASIC CHRONOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE'S LIFE AND WAR-RELATED WRITINGS.

A. Early Life to Conversion (354-386).1

i), Augustine's Life: 354 - born at Thagaste (Souk Arrhas, Algeria): 370 - returned home after studying rhetoric and literature at Madaura: 371 - rebelled against parental morality; to Carthage for further studies: 372/3 - father Patricius died; took a concubine; son Adeodatus born; philosophically influenced by reading of Cicero's Hortensius; converted to Manichaeism: 375 - back to Thagaste to teach rhetoric: 376-383 - taught rhetoric in Carthage; practising Manichee "hearer": 379 - abandoned astrology: 383 - to Rome to teach; embraced philosophical scepticism: 384 - appointed Professor of Rhetoric at Milan; enrolled in local church, where influenced by Ambrose's preaching; developed interest in Platonism: 385 - mother Monica joined him in Milan: 386 - converted to Christianity; retreated to Cassiacum; wrote first series of Christian dialogues.


B. Post-conversion and Priesthood (387-395).

i), Augustine's Life: 387 - back to Milan; baptised; death of mother Monica: 388 - from Ostia to Rome to Carthage to Thagaste: 390 - death of son Adeodatus: 391 - to Hippo to found monastery; ordained priest at Hippo by Bishop Valerius: 392 - public debate in Hippo with Manichee Fortunatus: 393 - attended [church] Council of Hippo, where he delivered discourse: 395 - consecrated Bishop of Hippo, as successor to Valerius.

ii), Contemporary Developments: - 386 - purge of Manichees at Carthage: 387 - Maximus invaded Italy: 391 - Theodosian edict against paganism in Empire: 392-394 - Eugenius (Emp. in the West): 393 - Donatist council at Cebarussa; Maximian went into schism with Donatist church: 394 - Donatist council at Bagai; suppression of Maximianist Schism: 395 - new Emps., Arcadius (395-408 - East) and Honorius (395-423 - West).
iii). Writings Addressing War and Related Themes: - The
Problem of Free Choice I (388); Expositions on the Book of
Psalms (392-420); Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount (394).

C. The Early Episcopate (396-411).

i). 397 - attended II and III [church] Councils of Carthage;
debated with Donatist Bishop Fortunius; began autobiography,
Confessions (397-401): 399 - attended IV Council of
Carthage; began On the Trinity (399-419): 401 - V and VI
Councils of Carthage; investigated former Maximianist
clergy: 402 - VII Council at Milevis: 403 - VIII Council of
Carthage; preached in Carthage: 404 - IX Council of
Carthage: 405 - X Council of Carthage: 407 - XI Council at
Thubursicum: 408 - XII and XIII Councils of Carthage: 409 -
XIV Council of Carthage (attendance uncertain): 410 - XV
Council of Carthage; temporarily retired due to bad health:
411 - preaching at Carthage and Cirta against the Donatists;
collatio with Donatists; affair of Pinianus at Hippo.

ii). Contemporary Developments: 395-8 - revolt of Gildo,
Count of Africa: 397 - death of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan:
398 - execution of Optatus, Donatist bishop of Timgad: 399 -
imperial agents closed pagan shrines in Africa: 401 -
election of Pope Innocent I (401-417): 402 - defeat of
Visigoths in Italy: 403 - attack by Donatists on Bishop of
Bagai: 403-410 - severe repression of Donatists in North
Africa: 405 - "Edict of Unity" against Donatists: 406 -
Vandal invasion of Gaul: 407 - usurpation of Constantine
III: 408 - accession of Theodosius II (Emp. in the East,
408-450); Alaric and Visigoths entered Italy: 409 -
Visigoths beleaguered Rome: 410 - Visigoths entered Rome;
Roman refugees fled to Africa; withdrawal of official
toleration for Donatists; "heretic" Pelagius passed through
Hippo.

iii). War-related Writings: Reply to Faustus the Manichean
(397-8); Letter 47 (398); Letters 87, 93 and 100 (405-9).

D. The Later Episcopate and Last Years (412-427).

i). Augustine's Life: 412 - Synod at Cirta; preaching at
Carthage; began anti-Pelagian writings: 413 - began City of
God (413-427): 414 - first appearance of On the Trinity: 416 -
attended church council at Milevis, which condemned
Pelagius: 418 - XVI Council of Carthage: 419 - XVII Council
of Carthage: 421 - wrote Enchiridion (421-423): 426 - wrote
On Grace and Free Will and Retractions (426-427): 430 -
death and burial.


iii). War-related Writings: Letter 138 (412); City of God (413-427); Letters 153, 173 and 185 (414-17); Letter 189 (418); Questions on the Heptateuch (419); Retractions (426-427); Letter 220 (427); Letter 229 (429).

E. ENDNOTES.


2. General historical information does not claim to be definitive. It is based on Brown and his selection of key events and developments, both in the Roman world in general and in North Africa in particular.

3. No attempt has been made to give a complete list of Emperors during Augustine's life. It should be noted that for most of the period, 354-430, there was more than one "Emperor" at any one time owing to imperial divisions.

4. The Carthage Councils, which are listed in this chronology, were an instrument of North African local church government, which Augustine, as Bishop of Hippo, attended.