THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN PAKISTAN:
A CASE STUDY OF THE JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI

by

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February, 1997

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ABSTRACT

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the contemporary moral, political and economic challenges facing the Muslim world. This thesis examines the interaction of religion and politics and analyzes the social and political impact of fundamentalism in Pakistan.

A number of conditions have encouraged the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan since the country was created five decades ago. The perceived failure of Western developmental models -- accompanied by rapid industrialization, uncontrolled urbanization, economic insecurity and international vulnerability -- has encouraged many Pakistanis to look for an alternative with an Islamic agenda. A major force in promoting fundamentalism in Pakistan has been the Jamaat-i-Islami political party.

The strength of the Jamaat-i-Islami as a social force is examined, and also its limitations in the political arena, where it has influenced politics but failed to control them. Survival as a political party over the past fifty years has demanded organizational compromise and accommodation. Although it has not achieved significant legislative power, the Jamaat-i-Islami as the articulator of fundamentalist values has played an important watchdog role and shaped the social, economic and political nature of the country.

The Jamaat’s political involvement is important and likely to continue, since the organization has proved effective in mobilization and in the role of moral guardian. However, its real contribution has been its ability to influence the scope of Islamization in Pakistan. The emergence and growth of the Jamaat’s ideology and organization provide a
useful case study of fundamentalism in modern Islam where goals have gravitated from revolution to reform.
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GLOSSARY

Ahi-e-Hadith - (People who follow the Hadith); militant Islamic group funded by Saudi Arabia.

Ahmadiyya - A Mahdist sect founded in 1882 that believed the Prophet reappeared early in the 20th century.

Amir - Military commander or leader; in the context of this paper it means director or president.


Barelvi - School of thought where the ulama believe in miracles and saints.

caliphate - Successor to Muhammad’s temporal, but not spiritual, authority over the Muslim community; the caliphate no longer exists.

COP - Combined Opposition Parties; political alliance put together to oppose Ayub Khan in 1964.

Deobandi - School of thought where the ulama believe in rituals and tradition.

Hadith - The sayings of Prophet Muhammad.

Hamas - Islamic resistance movement in Israeli-occupied territories.

Harkat-ul-Ansar - (Movement of Helpers); militant Wahabi group funded by Saudi Arabia.

hudud - Punishments for crimes clearly defined in the Koran and Sunnah.

IJI - Islamic Democratic Alliance coalition party led by Nawaz Sharif’s party.

ijma - Consensus, or agreement of the community, which is the source of Islamic Law

ijtihad - Independent reasoning; the tradition of Islamic scholarship constantly reinterpreting the faith according to the needs of a contemporary society.

IJT - Islami Jamaat Talaba (Islamic Party of Students); the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami.

imam - Spiritual leader of the community.
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<tr>
<td>jihad</td>
<td>Holy war or crusade to defend Islam; by analogy, any kind of religious striving or sacrifice.</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam); fundamentalist party in Pakistan founded in 1947.</td>
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<td>JUI</td>
<td>Jamaat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam (Ulama Party of Islam); party of Deobandi ulama who believe in rituals and tradition.</td>
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<td>JUP</td>
<td>Jamaat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan (Ulama Party of Pakistan); party of Barelvi ulama which represents a populist Islam.</td>
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<td>kafir</td>
<td>Non-believer in Islamic revelation; infidel.</td>
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<td>Koran</td>
<td>The holy book of Islam; a transcript of God’s word as revealed to Muhammad.</td>
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<td>Nizam-i-Mustafa</td>
<td>Order of the Prophet.</td>
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<td>madrassa</td>
<td>Religious school where boys of high school age study the Koran, Islamic law and some secular subjects.</td>
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<td>Majlis-e-Shura</td>
<td>Federal council, consultative assembly.</td>
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<td>Milli Yakjehti Council</td>
<td>(Unity Council of Believers); alliance of religious parties.</td>
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<td>MRD</td>
<td>Movement for the Restoration of Democracy; collection of eleven parties to oppose Zia ul-Haq in 1981.</td>
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<td>muhajir</td>
<td>Refugee migrants who moved from India to Pakistan.</td>
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<td>mosque</td>
<td>A building or enclosed courtyard where Muslims gather for prayer.</td>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (Muhajir National Front); political party of Urdu speaking immigrants to Karachi after partition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>mujahideen</td>
<td>Islamic guerrilla fighters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Indonesia’s secular nationalist ideology.</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Partai Islam Se-Malaysia; the Islamic opposition party in Malaysia.</td>
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<td>Pasban</td>
<td>(Protectors); youth group sponsored by the Jamaat-i-Islami which has recently broken away from the parent group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<td>pir</td>
<td>Sufi master; holy man from a holy lineage; leader of a dervish order.</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Pakistan National Alliance; nine party coalition opposing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977.</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party; a party with a Socialist agenda started by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to contest the 1970 election.</td>
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<td>riba</td>
<td>Interest derived from money-lending or usury, forbidden in Islam.</td>
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<td>Shabab-e-Milli</td>
<td>(Flame of Faith); youth group currently under the sponsorship of the Jamaat-i-Islami.</td>
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<td>Sharia</td>
<td>The Law of Islam; code of laws governing the life and behaviour of Muslims.</td>
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<td>Shia</td>
<td>A branch of Islam comprising approximately 15 per cent of all Muslims. Shias accept the spiritual authority of a divinely inspired Imam descended directly from Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. They are parallel to the Sunnis but separate from them with distinctive beliefs, practices and styles of leadership.</td>
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<td>Sipah-e-Mohammad</td>
<td>(Soldiers of Mohammad); extremist element in the Shia TJP.</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Soldiers of Companions of the Prophet); militant off-shoot of the JUP funded by Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<td>Sufism</td>
<td>Islamic mysticism.</td>
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<td>Sunnah</td>
<td>Tradition; following the example of Prophet Muhammad in conducting one’s life.</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
<td>The Sunnis comprise approximately 85 per cent of all Muslims. Sunnis, unlike Shias, recognize no divinely guided heir to Muhammad’s spiritual authority. Historically, the Sunnis have accepted the temporal authority of the caliphs.</td>
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<td>Sunni Tehrik</td>
<td>(Sunni Movement); Sunni extremist group founded by Barelvi madrassa students.</td>
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<td>taliban</td>
<td>Religious student.</td>
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<td>Tanzeem-e-Da’wa</td>
<td>(Organization of Claimants); Militant Wahabi group funded by Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<td>Tehreek-i-Insaal</td>
<td>(Justice Movement); Imran Khan’s political party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>TJP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Jafria-e-Pakistan (Jafria Movement of Pakistan); Shia militant group funded by Iran.</td>
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<td>ulama</td>
<td>Those educated in Islamic law and capable of issuing opinions on religious matters.</td>
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<td>ummah</td>
<td>Community of Muslims, world-wide brotherhood.</td>
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<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malays National Organization; the ruling party in Malaysia.</td>
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<td>Wahabism</td>
<td>A back to basics reform movement within Sunni Islam which is characterized by strict application of Koranic rules. It is named for its originator Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and is the prevalent form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>The “alms” tax which all Muslims must pay.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The growth of religious fundamentalism around the world is a twentieth century phenomenon responding to contemporary moral, political and economic challenges. Social scientists in the 1950's and 1960's argued that secularization was an inevitable corollary to modernization, however, just the opposite has happened to varying degree in a number of countries. Over the last two decades, fundamentalism has become a strong force responding to a modern need for alternative ideals and principles. "Failed modernization and ideological dead ends make people view sympathetically the purveyors of religious dogma and their messages of salvation" (Haynes, 1993:10). Today, the term “fundamentalism” is applied pejoratively to movements as diverse as Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the Confucian revival in industrial East Asia, the Sikhs’ struggle for independence from India and the Christian Coalition in the United States. However, the most vitriolic condemnation is reserved for Islamic fundamentalism, probably because in the West there is a widespread popular feeling that political Islam may be the successor to Communism as a threat to civilization and modernization.

The phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism has been described as a renewal, resurgence or revival of Islamic faith and the words "fundamentalist", "political Islam", “militant Islam” and "Islamist" are used interchangeably. Whatever the terminology, Western analysis is often based on a monolithic perception of Islam when referring to diverse and unrelated movements. Although Ayatollah Khomeini’s successful 1979 revolution in Iran gave the world reason to believe the rise of religio-political fundamentalism was imminent in Muslim countries, Islamic political movements have gone through their own evolution (Hadden, 1986:xiii). Indeed,
political Islam has manifested itself differently and has been accommodated to varying degrees throughout the Muslim world. Iran is a theocracy, while Algeria is experiencing a bloody civil war over Islamic principles. Egypt has banned fundamentalists from the political arena while Jordan has given them key cabinet positions. The majority party in Malaysia, UMNO, promotes Islamization and tries to protect itself from being outbid by PAS, the Islamic Party. Indonesia has driven the fundamentalist movement underground and imposed *pancasila*, a syncretic ideology, on all of those active in politics. A military dictatorship, in the name of Islam, has been imposed on the Sudan, while Colonel Muammar el-Qaddifi's Libya continues be a safe haven for Islamic terrorists. Iraq's secular government called on the Muslim world to join it in a *jihad* (holy war) during the 1991 crisis in the Gulf. Most recently, Turkey's pro-Islamic Welfare Party won more seats than the two leading parties (Motherland and True Path) in a democratic election after more than seventy years of secular rule. Meanwhile, the Islamic fundamentalist group, *Hamas*, has made a number of violent attempts to derail the peace process between Palestine and Israel. Islam has become a significant political force around the world as one billion Muslims form a majority in more than forty-eight countries and a rapidly growing minority in Europe and America (Esposito, 1987:19).

Although most Muslims are not Islamic fundamentalists, the movement in its various forms is highly visible and perceived to be a potential threat to secular regimes. Since most Muslim countries in the Third World do not have institutions capable of fulfilling the human needs created by modernization and its socio-economic effects, many of their citizens feel deprived in both a material and spiritual sense. The perceived failures of secularization and Westernization, accompanied by rapid industrialization, economic insecurity, uncontrolled urbanization and
international vulnerability have encouraged many Muslims to look for an alternative. In this transitional environment, fundamentalism claims to define, restore and reinforce a communal identity in the name of Islam. The issues and concerns which accompany the attempt to implement Islam vary, but the fact remains that fundamentalism is a reality which every Muslim country has to deal with in its search to cure political, economic and social ills. To understand this phenomenon it is necessary not only to consider the common causes that account for the religious resurgence, but also to look at the different responses the movement has evoked from both state and society.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the interaction of religion and politics in Pakistan and to analyse the impact of fundamentalism in this South Asian country where 99 per cent of the population is Muslim. The Jamaat-i-Islami, founded in 1941, is one of the oldest and most influential parties promoting Islamic renewal. There are a number of conditions that have made fundamentalism appealing in Pakistan as it has moved from a feudal, agrarian economy to an industrial one competing in the global market. Over five decades the Jamaat itself has changed dramatically as each new leader has taken the party in a different philosophical direction and the organization has accommodated his particular style. Although the movement began with a small group of like-minded people, it has grown to become a sophisticated party with ideological factions and cleavages. Moreover, government response to fundamentalism has been a major factor in shaping the movement over the years as the Jamaat has devised strategies and tactics to support or oppose the regime in power. While the Jamaat has helped mold Pakistan's history and contributed to the Islamization of the country, it has never captured significant political power. Today, it remains a social force which has influenced politics, but failed to control them. A close look at this fundamentalist movement in Pakistan indicates that the elements which explain the beginnings of
Islamic revivalism are different from those that sustain it. Given the renewed interest in Islamization across the Muslim world, it is important to understand what happens to fundamentalist movements over time. Fundamentalist politics in Pakistan provides an excellent case study not only in itself, but also for the lessons that can be learned about this global phenomenon.
CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

The factors that account for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism are different from those which shape the movement over time. After fifty years in the political process, the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan has found a niche. It is no longer a revolutionary force expecting to take over the reins of government, but rather has become institutionalized in the role of moral guardian. An examination of universal theories on social movements and fundamentalism helps to explain why the Jamaat is attractive as a movement and powerful as a social force, but has only a minimal political presence as a party in Pakistan today.

Social Movements:

"A social movement can be defined as a collective enterprise to establish a new order of life" (Blumer, 1946:8). Consequently, there are always political implications. According to McLaughlin (1969:4) a social movement usually manifests a shared value system, sense of community, norms for action, organizational structure, definite goals and the will to reorder society. However, over time these factors are moderated as the momentum of the movement ebbs and flows. A social movement may not achieve all its goals, but if parts are accepted and incorporated into the mainstream there may be a change in the dominant public opinion and participation in the political process. When these two functions are achieved, the movement is often modified and, by becoming part of the process, it becomes an institution (Sills, 1968:44). One must examine what
causes collective behaviour to result in a social movement before the organizational structure and
the pattern the movement follows can be evaluated.

In 1946, Herbert Blumer provided criteria by which to study collective behaviour
with an approach that was both individual-oriented and social psychological. His symbolic
interactionism thesis examined why routines of normal, institutionalized behaviour get disrupted
and collective behaviour becomes a social movement (Blumer, 1946:167-219). Talcott Parsons
took another approach in 1949 when he looked at structure-oriented functionalism and explained
social movements in terms of the strains in modern society (Parsons, 1949). Following the lead of
these two early pioneers on the subject, later theorists have expanded on both personal discontent
and structural breakdown to explain what causes collective behaviour. The social psychological
school claims economic inequality, inadequate political participation and relative deprivation may
all be reasons why people organize to change the status quo. The structuralists focus on the precise
conditions of state organization, claiming a lack of shared values will cause instability. Therefore,
elite conflict, fiscal pressures, a backward economy or international pressures can threaten the
established order and be catalysts for collective action.

"Social movements are the result of an interactional process which centres around
the articulation of a collective identity" (Eyerman, 1991:4). However, individuals act differently
when formed into groups, so a new school of theory moved away from the causes of collective
behaviour to analyze the organization. Focusing on "resource mobilization", various scholars have
looked at how people, material and ideas are used to mobilize support within an organization, not
why one would join. Success is evaluated by how fully the defined goals are achieved by effective
use of resources. In From Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly combines motivation with
organizational analysis when he describes social movements as "moving from organization to mobilization of resources around shared interests and finally to the realization of effective action in specific opportunity structures" (Tilly, 1978:7). He sees mobilization as rational, purposeful, proactive and political; therefore, vast resources can be demanded from members of a social movement in the right conditions. However, the degree of mobilization depends on the actual or perceived costs and benefits of common interests; the shared values and identities within the organization; the normative, coercive and utilitarian resources; power in relation to other groups; the opportunity to interact with other groups; and the cost of this interaction. Tilly argues three fundamental points. First, the form of action will differ over time. Second, participants are innovative about what they will protest about and how. Third, the decision to march, boycott, petition or assemble is shaped by the response of the authorities over time (Tilly, 1978).

In this approach, social movements are manifested by organizations. Therefore, organizational growth, change and decay must be examined. The environment is not static, so organizations adapt and respond to internal and external pressures. Hence, social movements have careers that usually follow a pattern as they mature (Blumer, 1946:203-214). They commonly begin with a small group of like-minded people who form a vanguard party to restructure society but end up as part of the establishment when the momentum for change dies down.

As a social movement grows, modification is inevitable. Since there must be a payout for supporters, there must be a reasonable chance for goals to be met or at least power gained as a prerequisite to attaining one's objectives. Therefore, over time, goals are transformed and become more diffuse. Moreover, the social movement relates to society with the tactics it uses; consequently, it must choose those that will gain public sympathy. "The choice of tactics is a
function of a number of social forces impinging on the social movement, among the most important
of which are the action of the opposition, the moral constraints implicit in the ideology and the
prevailing social attitudes toward social protest" (Wilson, 1973:256). The movement employs
various "politics of disorder" tactics when it marches, strikes, boycotts, or obstructs. As a rule it
does, not have access to the legislature, courts or mass media to achieve its goals but even if it does,
these tactics are often faster and can get the message across more effectively.

In time, there are structural changes as organizational maintenance leads to greater
formalization and rationality. The need to seek more money, more members and a greater
discipline develops specialized departments for different functions. Thus, with more reliance on
rules and regulations the developing bureaucracy tends to spend more time on administration than
on achieving goals (Zald and McCarty, 1979:333). Consequently, an oligarchy develops and
officials have a vested interest in keeping their positions: power becomes concentrated in a few
hands. As Max Weber claims, "where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely
carried through a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable" (quoted in
Eisenstadt, 1968:75). Over and above the growth pattern, there are a number of other factors to
consider. Organizational change may be caused by ideological differences, leadership styles,
factionalization and radical splits within the movement as well as by interaction with other
organizations as they co-operate, merge or join together in coalitions.

Although a social movement is dynamic at its inception, it cannot keep up the
momentum indefinitely. Hence, this often results in a becalmed movement that has neither
succeeded nor failed, but found a niche. As the Weberian model predicts, by the time the social
movement has established an economic and social base, replaced its original leadership, and
developed a bureaucratic structure, it will have generally accommodated itself to society (Zald and Ash, 1970:527). It is at this point that the movement becomes institutionalized and changes its identity to either a welfare organization, an interest group or a political party. Resource mobilization cannot be kept apart from organizational change, growth and decay.

John Walton is representative of the fourth generation in social movement theory; he argues that structure cannot be separated from ideology. In Reluctant Rebels, he discusses the context of uneven development, conditions of protest mobilization, the modernization crisis and the role of the state in a number of contemporary situations and concludes that "cultural nationalism was the key contributor to every revolt" (Walton, 1984:155). Previously, ideology was often credited with the outcome of movement activity but not sufficiently examined as the vision that mobilized collective action in the first place.

An ideological worldview provides "a set of assumptions and ideas about social behaviour and social systems...Thus a political ideology can be defined as doctrinal assumptions and ideas about past, present and future states of affairs in political systems" (Evans, 1990:166). "It is through the construction of ideology, schematic images of social order, that man makes himself for better or worse a political animal" (Geertz, 1964:63). Because ideologies are comprehensive belief systems integrated around one ideal (for example, equality, liberty, or salvation), they are action-oriented and require absolute subservience from their adherents. Beliefs of great moral significance demand a passionate approach. "The collective organization believes it alone can provide a cognitive and moral map of the world" (Shils, 1968:69).

Ideologies develop in response to existing circumstances as "socio-political thought does not grow out of disembodied reflection but is always bound up with the existing life situation
of the thinker" (Geertz, 1964:47). Hence, there are two ways to study the social determinants of ideology. One focuses on "interest" and regards ideology as a "mask and a weapon" in the struggle to gain advantage. The other focuses on "strain" and treats ideology as "a symptom and a remedy" in efforts to correct societal anxiety. Any number of stresses can give impetus to a new ideology (Geertz, 1964:52). Since ideologies are developed by intellectuals, the erudite and scholarly doctrine appeals to other intellectuals. However, unless the ideology has popular appeal, the ideological movement will not succeed, so emotional slogans, symbols and stereotypes are created.

Ideologies are usually concerned with authority and aimed at undermining the existing regime. They have a political agenda with "a set of values, a set of convictions, a set of criticisms, a set of arguments, and a set of defences" (McLaughlin, 1969:19). Ideally, the exponents of these schools of thought believe they should dominate society and that all wrongs can be put right with a transfer of power. However, in reality, if they cannot replace the prevailing political perspective totally, they often precipitate a partial reorientation of central institutions. Existing regimes adapt to the challenge by assimilating some of the articles of faith from the new movement.

In summary, this brief review of the origins of social movements indicates that a combination of the four schools of thought can be beneficial to analysis. Psychological factors and structural breakdown are important, but discontent and instability are not sufficient to cause protest activity until it is focused on specifics that can be changed. Resources can be mobilized; however, only action that is unified and lasting will produce a strong sense of solidarity and purpose. If people are motivated to follow a cause, leadership and organization can channel discontent effectively, but it is a distinctive ideology that provides direction and self justification. When all
these factors are present, social movements become dynamic. But they do change, grow and decay over time. Hence, this process must be examined to evaluate the long-term impact on society and to discover whether or not the movement finds its niche.

Fundamentalism:

Today, fundamentalist movements have become a twentieth century phenomenon promising utopia through a return to basic values. Indeed, this challenge to the contemporary moral, political and economic status quo has inspired some of the most important conflicts of our time. "Fundamentalism can be described as a world view that highlights specific, essential truths of traditional faiths and applies them with earnestness and fervour to twentieth century realities. This particular mindset is only of consequence when it becomes politically potent, altering what has been considered the normal and predictable parameters of a country's political life" (Kaplan, 1992:5). If there is no political activism, the movement is better defined as traditional or conservative. Moreover, without the essential political proselytizing element, it becomes simply another social initiative.

Political scientists have attempted to explain the rise of fundamentalism in the twentieth century. *Fundamentalisms Observed*, published by the University of Chicago, 1991, claims that all fundamentalist movements have "family resemblances". First, they are reactive forces which fight back if they perceive a threat to their identity. Second, they fight for a particular world view using selective scriptures from an authoritative source. Third, they fight against the "other," whether it be secular, modern or Western. Fourth, they fight under God, claiming to be
carrying out His will (Marty, 1991a:ix-x). In short, fundamentalism often evokes the threat of militant religious zeal.

Some analysts look at the movement as a form of politicized social activism. John Esposito (1983:10-11) believes the impetus for fundamentalist movements in the Third World comes from an identity crisis. As a result of disillusionment with Western models of government that have failed to respond to society's political and economic needs, alternate ideologies become empowered. Hence, Westernization has often been the catalyst for fundamentalist movements. James Piscatori (1985:4-5) claims that fundamentalists tailor religious doctrine to challenge the status quo. He theorizes that an ideology must be politicized to meet the masses' intermittent desire for change.

A complementary body of theory concentrates on the appeal of fundamentalism in today's world. Dilip Hiro (1989:274) maintains that Islamic fundamentalist movements in particular rally the alienated and underprivileged by presenting Islam as a just and equitable religion. Fundamentalism attracts the disenfranchised as it always draws on traditions that stress the redistribution of resources. Loyalty comes from marginalized, out-of-power groups searching for meaning from the past that can be translated into an uncertain future. Similarly, James Bjorkman (1988:2) proposes that since the lower middle classes are often disillusioned with ruling elites, fundamentalism provides a basis for identity and solidarity. He claims, "Fundamentalists replace questions with answers, doubts with certitudes, rootlessness with stability". Other theorists concentrate on the idea of a perfect religion embracing a complete ideology. Donald Eugene Smith (1966:16) postulates that fundamentalists feel they have a responsibility to guide history toward an inevitable and glorious future. Leonard Binder (1963:70) sees the movement as a way of
romanticizing a remarkable past. In any event, all these rationales promise a better life for their followers.

Another school of thought explores the relationship between fundamentalism and modernization. Bruce Lawrence (1989:2-17) asserts that fundamentalism is both a psychological mindset and an historical movement which develops when traditional relationships, values and authority patterns are changed. Fundamentalists are persuasive because they provide answers to how to cope with dislocation and feelings of insecurity. They claim that strict adherence to religious principles found in the scriptures will promote development and progress. In practice, although fundamentalist movements espouse a world view that appears anti-modern, upholding ideals from the past, they do not hesitate to use modern technology and contemporary aids such as computers, television, or video tapes to further their particular cause. As Lawrence argues, they are moderns but not modernists.

Lawrence Kaplan's oppositional model illustrates the nature of the fundamentalist-modernist link in a three phase dialectical process. First, there is a rejection of the existing authority. Second, the old is adapted to the new and a liberal position emerges. Third, the fundamentalists react and seek to re-establish tradition. "Modernism, and the strategies developed to guard against its effects and implications is the focal problem to be addressed in any consideration of fundamentalism" (1992:9). Kaplan suggests that without modernism, there would be no fundamentalism.

Finally, Martin Marty (1991a:820-825) summarizes the "fundamentals of fundamentalism," listing a number of common themes. He theorizes that all movements are based
on a traditional culture with an ancestral past. This culture, it seems, is threatened by other forces. Fundamentalist leaders can always name "the enemy", and the "we" against "them" mentality is what makes these groups potentially aggressive. Moreover, fundamentalists are selective about their retrieval from past sources, but all seek authority from traditional scriptures.

While all fundamentalist movements appear to have similar characteristics, it is Islamic fundamentalism which is potentially the most powerful, transnational force in the modern world. Over the last two decades, Islamic fundamentalism has become a viable political reality responding to the modern need for alternative ideals and principles in the Muslim world. Hence, Islam must be understood as a cultural system which penetrates, informs, motivates and shapes Muslim responses to fundamentalism. Throughout history, Islamic civilization has been inspired by a religious ideal which continues to motivate Muslims and dictate their ethical and social activity. This activating and unifying force bridges the gap between the past and the future.

The Muslim brotherhood believes “Islam is a world religion that cuts across tribal, regional, ethnic and national boundaries” (Esposito, 1987:11). The concept of the ummah (world-wide Muslim community) promotes a pan-Islam that stresses religious and moral values. Indeed, all Muslims share a number of beliefs and practices. The five pillars of faith include the act of witness, prayer, charity, fasting and pilgrimage. The Sharia is the law of Islam, developed from three basic sources; the Koran which Muslims believe to be the final and literal revelations from God; the Hadith, which contains Muhammad’s words, and the Sunnah which presents the living example of the Prophet himself. Together, this Islamic vision articulates regulations for marriage, inheritance, business contracts, conduct of war, as well as guidelines for worship. Ideally, there is no separation between the secular and the religious.
Islamic ideology provides a blueprint for society by offering comprehensive political, economic and social views. Consequently, for fundamentalists, the current instability in the Muslim world can be blamed on a departure from the "true faith". Since there is no philosophical distinction between Church and State, fundamentalists believe that the Sharia (Islamic law) should guide the believer in both his public and private life. Hence, "politics are not merely an indiscriminant part of Islam but, in many ways, its raison d'être" (Piscatori, 1983:4).

In practice, religion and politics have much in common. "Both are concerned with power and set down rules for a social order. Both appeal to principles that claim to transcend the trivia of the mundane world. Both can be frighteningly dogmatic, demanding, and imperious in compelling conformity. Even the principles and symbols of authority may overlap: divine kings and politically active religious movements are familiar across the ages and the world" (Nagata, 1984: xiv). Islamic fundamentalism is a 20th century response to contemporary challenges. Indeed, "It is not that the Middle Ages are invading our modern world, but rather that modernity itself produces its own forms of protest" (Roy, 1994:1).

There has been dynamic change in the Muslim world in the last 50 years as the ideologies of liberalism, communism, socialism and nationalism have been tried with varying degrees of success. Today, political Islam is offering an alternative to these Western concepts. Although modern science and technology, individual freedom, initiative and opportunity are appealing, many Muslims believe that blind imitation of the West has led to loss of identity, moral decline, breakdown of family and spiritual malaise. Consequently, "the emphasis has shifted from modernizing Islam to the Islamization of the modern experience" (Voll, 1991:24). When discussing the crisis of modernity in Islam it is helpful to use a political continuum. The contest today is
among the reformers, fundamentalists and conservatives, all of whom use Islam to legitimize their bid for political power.

The three definitive positions evolved as participants in the Islamic resurgence debated which principles should be used to deal with 20th century realities. The founders of the reform school, Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Sir Muhammad Iqbal, advocated a mixture of Eastern and Western thought (Rahman, 1979:220). Ever since, reformers have wanted to use Islamic values and borrow from other political and cultural systems, if appropriate to Muslim society, to develop an indigenous model. For them, the concepts of democracy, freedom, equality and social justice are all fundamentally Islamic. The Koran and Hadith are converted into moral principles and reinterpreted so as not to conflict with contemporary views. Reformers want to reconstruct the nation state, not replace it. In contrast, conservatives believe sixth century Islam provides the perfect system. The ulama (clergy) are the most representative of this category; as guardians of Islamic doctrine they refuse to integrate modern ideas with traditional culture and accept the scriptures without question.

Fundamentalists fall somewhere between these two positions. The founders of this school of thought, Hassan al Banna and Maulana Maududi, promoted Islamic self sufficiency. Today, their activist organizations advocate a return to the pristine fundamentals of the faith and claim their convictions explain and justify everything in life. Fundamentalists put emphasis on the distinctiveness of Islam as a legitimate guide to both social action and policy legislation and interpret the Sharia quite literally to enforce Islamic law in every aspect of public and private life. Fundamentalists want to impose moral and social order on society. However, because they are flexible in dealing with the modern world they believe in ijtihad (independent reasoning) and are
selective about what doctrines they retrieve from the past. Although fundamentalists are avowedly anti-Western they will use modern science and technology to achieve their objectives as they combine tradition and modernity (Esposito, 1991:38). Through social and political activism they attempt to capture political power to establish their vision of the model Islamic state.

The Questions:

Islamic fundamentalism is a paradigm for political renewal in the Muslim world. As a social movement it strives to bring about changes in the social order through a collective attempt to reach a visualized goal. Its definitive ideology presumes the wrongs of the past can be put right with a transfer of power and return to basic ideals as it provides an objective, an enemy, a justification and a strategy (Green, 1974:51-58). Personal discontent and structural breakdown in Islam have made fundamentalism appealing to those who strive for change. However, the mobilization of resources has differed from country to country and the degree to which fundamentalism has been accommodated, repressed or co-opted by political elites has varied around the world.

To move from the general to the specific, the political and social influence of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan will now be analyzed. Chapter Two explores the conditions that encouraged fundamentalism in Pakistan and show why it has appeal. Chapter Three studies the social and political impact of the Jamaat-i-Islami over fifty years and traces how it has become part of the mainstream of Pakistani politics. Chapter Four, using the foregoing theory on social movements, ideology and fundamentalism to analyze Islamic revivalism in Pakistan, considers the following questions:
1. Why did the conditions in Pakistan promote the growth of a fundamentalist movement?  
   • What conditions were necessary for such an Islamic movement to get started?

2. What factors account for the strength of fundamentalism's appeal in Pakistan?  
   • To whom does it appeal, and why?

3. What are the limitations of the Jamaat-i-Islami as a political force?  
   • What constitutes political success or failure for a fundamentalist movement in the Pakistani context?

4. Is the Jamaat's Islamic ideology viable as a blueprint for shaping Pakistani society?  
   • What are its limitations and how are they to be explained?

5. How has the government responded to fundamentalism in Pakistan?  
   • Does government response shape the movement, and if so, how?

6. What role does the Jamaat-i-Islami play in Pakistan today?  
   • Has fundamentalism found a niche?

This thesis uses fundamentalist and social movement theory to analyse the strength of fundamentalism as a significant social force as well as its limitations in the political arena, where
it has influenced politics, but failed to control them. The central hypothesis is that the Jamaat-i-Islami as the vehicle for fundamentalism in Pakistan has gravitated from revolution to reform because it has been allowed to participate in the political process. It will be argued that survival as a political party over the past 50 years has demanded organizational compromise and accommodation as the Jamaat’s radical ideology has given way to pragmatic politics.
CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICS OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN PAKISTAN

History and Development of the Jamaat-i-Islami:

Pakistan is the only Muslim country established in the name of religion and over the years "the symbiosis between Islam and the state has strengthened" (Nasr, 1995a:145). From the beginning, fundamentalism has contributed to politics in terms of ideology and action. Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami, one of the oldest and most influential parties in the Muslim world today, is crucial to any examination of the complex political and religious relationships which underpin life in Pakistan.

A study of the origins of fundamentalism in Pakistan finds that Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami are inseparable. Maududi has been called "the most systematic thinker of modern Islam" because he responded to the situation of Muslims in contemporary times and offered an authentic, indigenous, cultural identity (Bahadur, 1977:198). Before partition, Maududi was a prolific writer on the political problems of Muslims in India. His opposition to the Indian National Congress' move to end colonialism was based on the belief that the vast Hindu majority would crush the Muslim community when the British left. As editor of the newspaper for the Jamaat-i-Ulama-i-Hind (Party of Indian ulama) in Delhi, he began to develop his own ideology. Not surprisingly, many of his ideas were shaped by events taking place around him. For example, he believed the Khilafat movement led by Indian Muslims after World War I to preserve the Muslim caliphate in Turkey failed because it was badly organized. Although he was not interested in the ideals of Communism and Fascism, he admired the organizational strategies of
their adherents. In these tumultuous times his ideas continued to develop and in 1938 as head of a religious, educational project in East Punjab, Maududi devised the ideal of a model Islamic community (Nasr, 1995b:73). He decided the best way to transform society was with a small, disciplined group which would lead the masses by example. Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami was founded in Pathankot, Punjab, on August 26, 1941. The original membership was composed of seventy-five young ulama and Muslim literati who pledged themselves to act as a vanguard (Nasr, 1995a:356). From its inception, this ideological movement promised a utopian future for a group of dedicated idealists. To this day, Maududi's ideology is the core of fundamentalism in Pakistan.

As a scholar, Maududi was originally opposed to the proposal for a separate state of Pakistan put forward by the Muslim League because he believed in the concept of the ummah. He expressed his reservations about the idea that Islam, a universal ideology, should be used as the ideological underpinning of a nation-state. Maududi argued that nationalism, a Western phenomenon, was the antithesis of Islam as it set nationhood above God. After the Lahore Resolution in 1940 committed the League to creating a separate Muslim state, Maududi bowed to the inevitable, but challenged the concept of the Pakistan movement. He did not believe the secular, Westernized leadership of Muhammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League was capable of building a truly Islamic state. Maududi considered the appeals to religion used to mobilize the masses for the creation of Pakistan -- the claim of "Islam is in danger" -- to be Islamic jingoism. In fact, the Pakistani movement was "a movement of Muslims rather than of Islam: a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests were allied in pursuit of quite material objectives" (Halliday, 1988:67). The goal of the modern, secular Western-educated elite was to create a nation-state, not a theocracy. Eventually, it
was the challenge to transform the new Muslim homeland into an ideal society that compelled Maududi to move the headquarters of the Jamaat to Lahore in 1947 with the majority of his followers. Since partition, the Jamaat-i-Islami has institutionalized political action in the name of religion, making it an integral part of the Islamization of Pakistan. Maududi believed that the Islamic character of the state should be the central issue of Pakistan's politics, while the ruling elite were more concerned with problems relating to survival and the consolidation of a viable political and economic unit. However, because the fundamentalists have had a considerable impact, "the ideological and political history of Pakistan has been marked by a continuous debate on the nature of the Islamic political system and its concrete manifestation in constitutional structure and socio-economic policies" (Ahmad, 1995:289).

Although Maududi agreed with the ulama (clergy) on the literal translation of the holy scriptures, the Jamaat's activist ideology differed from that of the traditionalists, who simply concerned themselves with arcane arguments and could not separate the fundamentals of Islam from the details of its application. However, Maududi was not a reformer either, as he felt they strayed from the commands of God and compromised their values in the name of progress. The basic premise of Maududi's thought proclaimed that Islam was entirely self-sufficient, perfect and just in giving answers for every human and social problem. He proposed that faith must manifest itself in social, economic and political domains, and he did not acknowledge any separation between Church and State. For him, Islam presented a code of conduct for all spheres of human existence and could not be reduced to just the five key duties or pillars of Islamic theology. Hence, it was more than simply professing one's faith; praying five times a day; fasting for one month of the year; paying
alms; and making a pilgrimage. Maududi wrote, "The final purpose of all the blessed Apostles of God was to set up the rule of God so that they could implement the entire system of life in the manner ordained by God" (Maududi, 1972:102). This *deen* (holistic concept) encompassed all cultural, political, economic, legal and personal views.

In his attempt to develop an ideological alternative to Western liberalism and Soviet Marxism, he coined phrases such as "Islamic system of life", "Islamic movement", "Islamic politics", "Islamic constitution", "economic system of Islam", and so forth, thereby providing Islam with a new political language (Ahmad, 1991:464). Maududi's thoughts on political Islam are summarized by Charles J. Adams (1966:391-3) as follows: (1) the sovereignty of Allah should be recognized as the basic law of the land; (2) the state should be ruled by a man "whose tenure of office and power are limited only by his faithfulness to the ideology of the state"; (3) the ruler should be assisted by a council "of men with educational qualifications to make valid applications of the fundamental law of the *Koran* and *Sunnah*"; (4) non-Muslims may live in the Islamic state but not hold policy-making positions; (5) minorities should vote as separate electorates. The other particular issues he campaigned for included the abolition of *riba* (interest), an obligatory alms tax; Islamic penal and family law; a strict socio-moral code; prohibition of birth control and the suppression of heretical groups opposed to Islamic orthodoxy. In summary, Maududi claimed the Islamic principles of economic justice, social harmony and political equality could be achieved by giving the state the right to regulate and oversee all aspects of life. To create a perfect society there must be an Islamic state and this could only be achieved if the leaders were truly Islamic and ruled by example. Hence, Maududi believed the Jamaat-i-Islami could formulate "a complete blueprint of practical solutions for contemporary socio-economic problems in accordance with Islamic
principles" (Ahmad, 1991:487). By setting the example as a "holy community", the vanguard would attract the masses
and in this way achieve peaceful revolutionary change over time. The revolution was to take place within the existing state structure and education was the keystone. The idea was to reform and the emphasis was on quality not quantity. Maududi claimed that, "an Islamic revolution can be successfully launched only when a socio-political movement based on Qur'anic principles and the prophetic model is first able to change the entire intellectual, moral, psychological, and cultural bases of social life" (Maududi, 1981:9). Thus Maududi's goals were more reformist than revolutionary.

Maududi's ideal "theodemocracy" would have a government elected by the people, but conforming to the principles of Islam. Sharia law enforced by the ruler and legislative council would establish an authoritative socio-religious system to oversee all aspects of life. Maududi was against the excesses of Western capitalism but he did promote economic freedom. Ideologically, he recognized the right to private property, but emphasized equal opportunity and a fair distribution of land to ensure all sections of society were provided for. He wanted to create a welfare state that would supply the necessities of life through a system of zakat (mandatory taxes) and abolish riba to ensure more equality.

After partition, Maududi promoted the idea that the Jamaat-i-Islami should use constitutional and legal methods to achieve its goals. He realized that the transformation of society would come only through political power, so he began to expand his political base by sending lay preachers into Pakistan's rural areas. In competition with the Muslim League he tried to mold public opinion with posters, pamphlets, and demonstrations. At this point the Jamaat-i-Islami's
popularity was aided by social problems created by the influx of refugees from India, and it quickly set up reading rooms and extended branches of its organization to get its message out. It was during these early years that the Jamaat moved from the ideal of a holy community to a party that would protect Islamic religious, cultural and political interests.

The Early Years: Failure to Create the Islamic State

Although the Jamaat started its activities in the newly-created state of Pakistan with relief work among the refugees, it quickly moved to political activism and campaigned for an Islamic constitution. Maududi felt the basic ideas justifying the establishment of a truly Islamic homeland were ignored by the first prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan and later by the first president, General Iskander Mirza. He claimed Muslim League leaders were behaving as if religion was of no concern, despite their trite use of slogans to unite the country. Indeed, it was the Jamaat which forced the pace in demanding that the new constitution would emphasize (1) the supreme sovereignty of God; (2) the *Sharia* as the basic law of the land; (3) laws that conflicted with the *Sharia* would be repealed as the state would not transgress the laws imposed by Islam (Binder, 1963:103). This Jamaat challenge was directly responsible for the Objectives Resolution adopted in 1949 that has survived the successive constitutions.

The Jamaat abandoned its missionary objectives when it moved from the ideal of a "holy community" to contest the Punjab elections in 1951. Although it gained some visibility at this point, Maududi reached the peak of his popularity during the anti-*Ahmadiyya* movement when political/religious tension was at its height a few years later. In 1953, the Jamaat joined the traditional *ulama* in an effort to declare the *Ahmadiyya* non-Muslim. This sect was a cohesive,
politically upwardly mobile group that believed the Prophet had reappeared in the 20th Century. Its heresy threatened the traditional teaching of the Koran and soon united rival parties on this particular matter. Riots and demonstrations became so violent that many of the religious leaders were jailed in an effort to regain the peace. Hence, religious issues were at the forefront in 1956 when the first Pakistani constitution incorporated the "Objectives Resolution" in its preamble. The Basic Directive Principles created a parliamentary democracy with non-justiciable Islamic guiding principles and the provision that no laws would be passed that contradicted the Koran and Sunnah. Surprisingly, although the new constitution changed little of substance, Maududi felt it transformed Pakistan into an Islamic society, giving his party legitimacy. The Jamaat endorsed it enthusiastically. However, from this point on, the public's interest in the nature of the Islamic state and how to achieve it largely dissipated, and other concerns came to the forefront. Support for the fundamentalist cause waned as economic priorities outweighed constitutional concerns.

The imposition of martial law in 1958 by General Ayub Khan was a disappointment to the Jamaat-i-Islami. The fundamentalist party had just achieved great success in the Karachi municipal elections and the abrogation of the constitution dashed its hopes for the anticipated 1959 national election campaign. Ayub moved away from the idea of why Pakistan was created to where it was headed as he pushed for modernization, industrialization and secularization. In fact, he actively promoted religious modernism to separate the sacred and the secular. The two particular issues which inflamed both the fundamentalists and the ulama were: (1) the reformed Muslim Family Laws that restricted polygamy, regulated divorce procedures and improved maintenance for women; and (2) the government take-over of religious endowments to establish education and research facilities that would present a liberal, progressive approach to Islam. Moreover, to repress
any political opposition, Ayub introduced the "Basic Democracy" scheme to provide representation at the district level and he officially banned all political parties. However, the Jamaat continued to operate under the guise of promoting religion, education, and social welfare so its organization was intact when political activity was resumed in 1962. By this time, the Jamaat was so opposed to Ayub's government that, disregarding its earlier opposition to women in public office, it joined the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) which ran Fatima Jinnah as a candidate for President in 1964.

Despite the Jamaat's willingness to accommodate other parties, in the late 1960's new forces emerged. Religious matters were ignored and issues such as regional autonomy and socio-economic justice came to the fore in the anti-Ayub movement. The issues around Islamic identity were usurped by the more immediate concerns of war and economic survival. There was a growing disparity between rich and poor. "In 1968 twenty-two families controlled two-thirds of Pakistan's industrial assets; 80 per cent of banking; 70 per cent of insurance" (Nasr, 1994:163). East Pakistan was agitating for more provincial autonomy while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto campaigned for more economic and social equality. Mujib-ur-Rahman's six-point program and Bhutto's "Islamic socialism" appealed to the divergent political moods of the two wings of the country. At this point there was little interest in reviving a religious debate as the Awami League and the Pakistani People's Party (PPP) were the real forces with which the government had to contend.

When General Yahya Khan took over in 1969 he declared that the constitution would be rewritten and elections were called for 1970. A major collision was inevitable as East and West Pakistan overwhelmingly voted for the Awami League and the PPP, respectively. Bhutto boycotted constitutional negotiations that would accept the Awami League majority in the National Assembly and make Mujib the prime minister. In response, Mujib laid down new conditions for
East Pakistan's participation in terms which fell just short of secession. However, negotiations failed, and Mujib was arrested. Yahya committed Pakistan to a costly civil war and a disastrous conflict with India which ensued in 1971. The Jamaat-i-Islami, which made a dismal showing in the 1970 elections, once again regrouped. It compromised its professed ideals for political expediency and made an official alliance with the military by championing nationalism and joining the army's counter-insurgency campaign. In fact, the Jamaat's student wing, Islami Jamaat Talaba (Islamic Party of Students - IJT), formed two paramilitary units in a futile effort to fight the Bengali guerrillas and prevent East Pakistan from seceding. During the war between East and West Pakistan, 2,000 Jamaat and IJT members, affiliates and sympathizers who joined the military were killed and 12,000 were held in prison camps in what became Bangladesh (Nasr, 1994:169).

**Bhutto's Islamic Socialism**

In anticipation of the 1970 elections, the Jamaat-i-Islami had joined a right-wing coalition backed by the Karachi business community and campaigned against the socialist platform, arguing that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was a Marxist front waiting to set up a communist regime. It was at this point that the Jamaat-i-Islami evolved into a force that was not averse to using the coercive power of the masses to promote its Islamic program, as its right-wing worker, student and labour wings confronted their PPP left-wing counterparts. However, when Bhutto promised to address many of the issues the fundamentalists campaigned for, their popularity receded. Bhutto claimed he would resolve the economic inequalities, open up the political system, and improve Pakistan's international image all in the name of Islam. When Pakistan held its first truly democratic election, public concern ignored religious sentiments and
focused on the social and economic issues directly relevant to everyday living. Consequently, the 1970 elections were a disaster for the Jamaat, which won only four seats in the National Assembly (Nasr, 1994: 65).

After twenty years of advocating democracy, it was as if the party's prophecy had failed when the belief that a majority would vote for Islam proved to be untrue. Even Maududi's leadership was questioned along with the party's reliance on Islamic symbols. Consequently, the Jamaat changed its strategy, putting more emphasis on practical issues, not just the constitution. There was a new dependence on street power, rather than on seats in the legislature, as the belief in democracy faded and the Jamaat eventually sought influence and power by collaborating with the military. Ironically, at the same time that the Jamaat-i-Islami was defeated in the national elections, the student wing, IJT, swept student union elections on all major campuses, restoring a sense of confidence and legitimacy within the Jamaat-i-Islami. It was at this point that radicalism grew, as the IJT called for an Islamic revolution while its parent party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, became more cautious. However, "the transformation of the student body into a militant political machine had progressed too far to be easily reversed" (Nasr, 1994:70).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto defined religion in terms of personal piety, not as a guide to social and political life. His secular, socialist stance afforded little tolerance for traditional religious practices that would get in the way of national development. Even though he called his party platform "Islamic Socialism", in the early 1970's the PPP agenda concentrated on economic issues, on nationalizing industry and initiating land reforms. As there was no abundance of natural resources in Pakistan, foreign aid became an important factor keeping the economy afloat, and Bhutto became more dependent on international forces. When Bhutto's promises did not
materialize, religion intruded and the Jamaat-i-Islami was once again at the forefront of an anti-
Ahmadiyya movement in 1975. Street power became its main threat as Jamaat leaders addressed
8,777 public meetings and led 47 processions. These demonstrated the Jamaat's ability to
destabilize the government and forced Bhutto to declare the Ahmadiyya sect non-Muslim (Ahmad,

During the Bhutto regime the Jamaat moved more and more into the role of strident
political activism that was to be its trademark, using strikes, marches, boycotts and demonstrations
to oppose the government. As the years went by and the PPP's socialist regime became
increasingly corrupt and ineffective, the call to return to a strict adherence of Islamic principles
could not be ignored. Consequently, when the nine party coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA) was established to oppose Bhutto in the 1977 elections, it incorporated Islamic rhetoric in its
slogans. Once again, this proved to be an effective rallying cry with which to mobilize opposition
against an incumbent government. The alliance adopted a religious platform calling for a return to
Nizam-i-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet). Eventually, Islamic issues became so politicized that in
order to legitimize his regime Bhutto was forced to introduce new laws to prohibit alcohol, night
clubs, gambling and horse racing. Throughout his rule Bhutto moved away from his socialist
rhetoric and became more attentive to the demands from the Islamic parties. But it was too little,
too late, as Bhutto's promised redistribution of economic goods gave way to under-the-table deals
in a repressive environment. Moreover, by trying to appease his opponents and balance the
demands of various interest groups Bhutto ignored his own supporters. Old economic grievances,
fuelled by inflation and religious agitation, developed into a virtual civil war. When Bhutto
announced his intention to hold general elections on January 7, 1977, the opposition marshalled its
forces and coalesced into a cohesive organization. The PNA's nine party coalition campaigned hard and expected to gain a significant position in the national and provincial assemblies. Although the PNA was not expected to capture a majority in the election, it was a surprise when the coalition won only 36 seats out of the 192 contested (Burki, 1991:65). When the opposition cried foul, the army intervened and Bhutto was taken into custody.

Zia's Islamization

General Zia ul Haq stepped in to restore law and order on July 5, 1977, following widespread rioting triggered by the PNA's charges of rigged elections. He soon began to use martial law to establish and sustain an Islamic state after the nation's disastrous experience with Bhutto's socialism. For Zia, Islam had a higher priority than democracy and his strong personal beliefs blended with the idea that Pakistan was an ideological state. To take Islam out of Pakistan would make it collapse. In an effort to give his regime legitimacy, the General claimed he was charged with the task of creating an Islamic society and returning to Nizam-i-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet). Thus, with a radical change in leadership and political direction, Islam became the cornerstone of his military dictatorship. In the beginning, Zia identified with Maududi's ideas and cultivated the Jamaat with promises to institute an Islamic order. In a Provisional Constitutional Order signed by Zia on March 24, 1981 a Majlis-e-Shura (Federal Council) with hand-picked delegates was set up to advise him (Burki, 1991:71). As Zia appeared to be a pious leader, the Jamaat gave him wholehearted support. In return, fundamentalists were appointed to four significant cabinet posts (production and industry, petroleum and minerals, water and power, information and broadcasting) as well as a number of council and court positions (Nasr, 1994:191).
Moreover, Zia appointed fifty-three committees and commissions, each with a number of Jamaat members to advise on Islamic reform (Ahmad, 1995b:291). After thirty years of political activism, the Jamaat was finally part of the ruling establishment.

Zia's Islamization program was introduced in a broad but scattered fashion on the Prophet's birthday in 1979. He created new political structures, such as Sharia law courts to review legislation; agencies to collect and distribute zakat and boards and commissions to study the implementation of Islam into society (Ruthven, 1984:323). His Islamization program renamed streets, universities and public places, revised text books, and made Urdu the national language. Perhaps his most controversial act was the introduction of the hudud ordinances, an Islamic penal code which legitimizes amputation for theft, whipping for false accusations of sexual offences and stoning for adultery. In fact, these changes were mainly symbolic as few punishments were implemented in spite of the rhetoric. Zia was running a capitalist economy and, therefore, many of his Islamic economic changes were cosmetic. He did try to eliminate the charging of riba, but his scheme to have banks buy their customers' goods and simultaneously resell them back at a higher price had little effect. For the first few years, the Jamaat supported most of Zia's policies. However, Jamaat cabinet members eventually resigned from his government in 1983 to protest the postponement of elections and the suspension of political parties after the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The former Prime Minister was hanged in April 1979 on a disputed conviction for conspiring to commit a political murder. Over time, the relationship between the Jamaat and Zia deteriorated. Originally believing the Jamaat could provide a blueprint for his Islamization program, Zia became disillusioned with the impracticality of the Jamaat's ideas and its people's lack of follow-through in ministerial positions. Consequently, he began to forge closer ties with the
other Islamic parties in a "divide and rule" campaign to manipulate Pakistani politics so as to shore up his own position.

Although the Jamaat refused to join the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), it did agitate with other groups in 1983 for an end to martial law and the transfer of power to the people. In fact, it was these actions which forced Zia to hold a state-wide referendum to ask voters if they agreed with his Islamization program. Despite the affirmative response, the military regime continued to feel threatened by political opposition. Consequently, Zia banned all student unions and organizations, obviously targeting the powerful IJT in an effort to undermine its mobilizing abilities. Although the military had initially needed IJT support, over time this well-organized, independent, street-wise force became a potential political threat. Zia's ban on political parties did, indeed, have a weakening effect on the opposition in the 1985 elections. Although voter turnout was impressive, no opposition party did well. In fact, the Jamaat won only eight of two hundred seats in this legislature (Burki, 1991:77).

After these elections, Zia lifted martial law and made amendments to the constitution, giving ultimate power to the position of President. Although he revived the political party system, Zia continued to exercise certain restrictions over his political rivals and he replaced the Jamaat with the Muslim League as the cornerstone of his regime. Nevertheless, he was obviously still concerned about the Jamaat's influence as he continued to undermine the party. Despite its dismal showing at the national level, the Jamaat-i-Islami did very well in the Karachi municipal elections in 1986, but Zia forced the province of Sind to dismiss the elected government and remove all Jamaat members from city administration. In the new elections that were subsequently called, the Mohajir's (migrants to Sind after partition) own political party Muhajir
Qaumi Mahaz (Muhajir National Front - MQM) came into power, further reducing the Jamaat support. Zia also banned labour unions in state-run organizations where the Jamaat was in control, greatly reducing its influence and political clout. By the end of Zia's rule, the relationship that had started with so much in common had dissolved into bitter antipathy. In fact, just before Zia's death, the Jamaat-i-Islami announced it had reached an agreement with Benazir Bhutto's PPP (Esposito, 1983:70).

The Democratic Years

Pakistan had alternated between quasi-democracy and, mostly, varying degrees of authoritarianism in a number of military regimes for four decades. By 1988, there was considerable unrest as the public was not enthusiastic about the fully Islamic state envisioned by Zia and was once again pressuring for democratic changes in government policy. However, the country was thrust into a new crisis when Zia's military plane crashed on August 17, 1988, killing him and all on board (Burki, 1991:95). After Zia's untimely death, two major parties emerged to contest the surprise election called by President Ishaq Ghulam Khan. While the PPP campaigned for full restoration of democracy with greater social and economic justice, especially for women, its leader -- Benazir Bhutto -- quickly alienated the religious parties by denouncing the Islamization program, vowing to eliminate it once in office. Meanwhile, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI), a loose coalition of right-wing parties supported by the armed forces and the Intelligence Service, pledged to continue developing Islamic policies for the economy and society. The IJI leader, Nawaz Sharif, appeared to be devout and won the Jamaat's support. However, the PPP, which won the 1988
election with only 38 per cent of the popular vote and 45 per cent of the seats, managed to put together a coalition to obtain a small majority (Hyman, 1985:1).

Benazir's failure to manage the economy, charges of corruption, and ongoing hostility with the provinces led to her dismissal within twenty months. The Jamaat-i-Islami was still very much a factor during this short tenure, criticizing Benazir's secular, Westernized style despite her having done little to dismantle the Islamization program. Although it lacked any influence with the incumbent government, interest among fundamentalists proved to be still strong as the Jamaat-i-Islami held a three day conference in November 1989 attended by more than 100,000 supporters to discuss ways to make Pakistan a truly Islamic state (Ahmad, 1991:457). Not surprisingly, when the President dismissed the PPP and called for new elections in October 1990, the Jamaat joined the IJI coalition and worked hard to whip up the masses against the PPP.

The two major parties remained in the race with the same leaders and the same platforms. This time it was the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) which won with its pledge to develop the economy and end corruption. Although it only managed to win three per cent of the popular vote, the Jamaat formed an important part of the governing coalition. When the IJI promised to continue Islamization, it needed the fundamentalist endorsement to give its program legitimacy. However, the pace of Islamization and the depth of its ideological reach became a source of conflict before long. There were reports, for example, of how the fundamentalists held the Nawaz Sharif government back for months while debating the Islamic legal system. In truth, Sharif's policies showed a certain amount of ambiguity as he introduced the Sharia bill to satisfy the demand for Islamic law and economics, but at the same time abandoned Pakistan's long-standing support for the Muslim fundamentalists fighting in Afghanistan (Marty, 1991b:630).
Moreover, when the IJI wooed the Muhajir's MQM party, the Jamaat claimed it (IJI) was simply paying lip service to Islam and was more interested in using ethnic and provincial parties in its bid to gain power. It was at this point that the Jamaat started to criticize Sharif's government and call for greater Islamization. Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami opposed IJI official policy in the Gulf War and supported Iraq's position. It organized 338 public rallies and demonstrations to whip up public support against American "imperialism", claiming the Pakistani government was too involved with the U.S. (Nasr, 1994:215). Since the Gulf War popularized Islamic issues again, Sharif pushed a more comprehensive Sharia bill through parliament in an effort to appease the religious right. Through personal lobbying Sharif kept the Jamaat-i-Islami under the IJI umbrella, but there was little co-operation. During the constitutional crisis between the Prime Minister and the President in 1993, the Jamaat remained aloof. In the 1993 election, citing differences in ideology, the Jamaat joined other religious parties forming the Pakistan Islamic Front, to the dismay of the IJI. The coalition was expected to take the conservative vote, thereby helping the PPP. This did, indeed, happen and Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister. Once again, the fundamentalists did not fare well as the Jamaat and the religious parties combined managed only to win 28 out of 217 seats in the National Assembly (Economist, December 9, 1993:31).

In summary, despite a poor electoral showing for the Jamaat over the years, its presence is still felt. Experience has taught it that there are extra-parliamentary ways to pressure government. Indeed, Islamic revivalism can be gauged by the way the state reacts to it and in Pakistan every regime has made some attempt to get the Jamaat-i-Islami on side: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared the Ahmadiyya minority to be non-Muslims; Zia ul Haq introduced Islamic courts, laws and punishments; Benazir Bhutto adopted a head scarf and stopped shaking hands with men;
Nawaz Sharif passed Sharia legislation and brought in a mandatory death sentence for blasphemy. Today, Pakistan is far more Islamic than Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisioned when he campaigned for a Muslim homeland and claimed, in his famous inaugural speech, that in the course of time all citizens would be equal as Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims (Burki, 1986:46). The Objectives Resolution, Sharia law and ongoing pressure for Islamization have changed the character of the country, making Islam the tie which binds a diverse variety of citizens. The Jamaat's trademark demands for the establishment of an Islamic state and an Islamic constitution have been part of the political process since Pakistan was created. In practice, however, its politics have been moderate. "Despite some degree of militancy in its rhetoric, it has been accommodationist in its ideological orientation and evolutionist in its methodology of change" (Ahmad, 1991:500). For the most part the Jamaat-i-Islami has influenced policy as a vocal pressure group without resorting to violence, but it has played a significant role in Pakistan's political and social development.

The Current Situation

Until the 1980's there were only three religious parties in Pakistan. The Jamaat-i-Islami (Part of Islam - JI), the Jamaat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan (Ulama Party of Pakistan - JUP) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam (Ulama Party of Islam - JUI) all operated within the system. Now, however, the situation is more complex as a number of radical, militant groups which have little regard for electoral politics have mushroomed in Pakistan. A variety of splinter sects have emerged to fight over different versions of religious history. Currently, the government's Special Branch lists five that are viewed as particularly dangerous. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Soldiers of the
Companions of the Prophet - SSP), a militant offshoot of the Jamaat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) formed in 1982, claims all Shias are kafirs (non-believers) and should be eliminated. It wants a completely Sunni state and has engaged in violence, kidnapping and murder to eliminate the Shias.

The Sunni Tehrik (Sunni Movement), founded by students from Barelvi madrassas (religious schools), is reputed to be one of the most dangerous in this sectarian war. Indeed, it may be the front for a criminal network. In response to the Sunni militancy, the radical Tehrik-e-Jafria-e-Pakistan (Jafria Movement of Pakistan - TJP), a Shia group, was launched as a way to globalize the Iranian Revolution in Pakistan. Although this party was born in protest against certain aspects of Zia's Islamization laws, it has moved from a defensive posture to be the aggressor in the fight between Shias and Sunnis. The Sipah-e-Mohammed (Soldiers of Mohammad), the extremist element in the TJP, is reputed to finance its operations through gun-running. In addition to the Sunnis and the Shias, there are the Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Helpers) and the Tanzeem-e-Da'wa (Organization of Claimants), which number Arab guerrillas in their ranks. This does add another element to Pakistan's sectarian problems as their particular brand of zealotry (Wahabism) is considered radical and extreme (Herald, June 1994:35-37).

This sectarian violence has been exacerbated by the Islamic educational system. During the Zia regime widespread religious education flourished with government encouragement and largesse. In addition to providing state funding, Zia brought Islamic schools into the mainstream, giving them equal status with universities. The network of madrassas has multiplied as an alternative to the state-run educational system. Today there are an estimated 8,000 Islamic schools, colleges and academies in Pakistan that educate approximately 2.5 million to 3.5 million students (Rashid, 1996:160). It is believed that many of these institutions have become training
camps for militant extremists. In fact, the *talibs* (religious students) who are currently studying in these *madrassas* have begun to haunt the government in Islamabad. Since the *taliban* movement in Afghanistan originated in these schools, the present Pakistani regime quite rightly fears they may initiate an Islamic revolution at home. "The ideological underpinning of the *talibans* in both countries is the need for a third force outside the political mainstream that the masses can follow" (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 8, 1995:20).

Zia did his part to promote sectarianism in Pakistan when he tried to enforce his *zakat* ordinance on the 10 per cent minority Shia population. When the *Shias* rioted and insisted on a separate platform to articulate their demands, the stage was set for the two major sects to clash. Subsequently, *Sunni* versus *Shia* violence has erupted frequently, making Pakistan a battleground for foreign interests. Iran has trained and funded the TJP while Saudi Arabia has done the same for SSP and also the fanatic group Ahi-e-Hadith (People who follow the Hadith) in their bid for power behind the scenes. This is a dangerous situation because in all of these organizations there are hardened criminals who have received guerrilla training from Afghan mujahideen and who are looking for new battles to fight (*Newsline*, Sept. 1994:39). Former Western support for the Afghan war and freedom fighters has meant the various splinter groups are well armed and well funded. In fact, these Islamic radicals based in Pakistan allegedly sell their services in other countries. Many of these fundamentalist soldiers have become involved in the extremist movements in Egypt, Algeria and Jordan as well as the ongoing battle in Kashmir (*Newsline*, Sept. 1994:33).
Recently, Benazir Bhutto cracked down on all the Islamic groups, claiming they were fanning sectarian violence and international terrorism. In January 1995 she launched a campaign to disarm the militants and end the bloodbath between the *Shias* and *Sunnis*. The government banned foreign funding for political parties and exerted strict controls over religious schools. Benazir also attempted to appease international concern by waiving extradition charges against Ramzi Ahmad Yousaf, the mastermind behind the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Currently, over 1200 Islamic activists are in custody after the November 20, 1995 bombing that killed 15 people at Egypt's Islamabad embassy. However, all this may be in vain. “In Pakistan the civil administration has little chance of containing Islamic militancy since it is estimated there are five times as many Islamic militants as policemen” (*Economist*, Jan. 28, 1995:37).

In addition to the sectarian violence, ethnicity has erupted into an explosive issue in Karachi. The city is ethnically different from the surrounding *Sindhi*-dominated countryside as this was the place where one million Urdu-speaking refugees from India settled and established economic control after partition. These are the *Muhajirs* who broke away from the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1988 to work for their own interests. Originally, the *Muhajir*’s party, the MQM, simply wanted less interference from the central government; however, its platform has become more extreme over time. Now it is demanding its own province separate from Sind and even advocating a separate *Muhajir* state.

In 1992 the MQM used its elected position as a platform to criticize the national government. In response, Benazir refused to hold local elections and ignored the national census which showed an enormous shift of population from rural to urban ridings. This would drastically reduce the number of rural seats held by feudal Sindhi politicians that support the PPP. Since then,
the MQM has dominated Karachi, first by elections and now with guns. When the army was sent in, in July 1995, the MQM went underground and employed urban guerrilla tactics to bring the city to a standstill (Rashid, 1996:161). Thus far, the police and paramilitary troops have been no match for the armed forces which were unleashed. The MQM attacked police stations and government buildings with bombs and rockets. Political, religious and criminal violence has killed more than 2,100 people in Karachi to date and the death toll continues to rise. The resulting state of anarchy has serious consequences because Karachi accounts for one-third of Pakistan's GNP. For a long period, Benazir Bhutto refused to talk with the MQM before it laid down its arms. The MQM in turn said it would not comply until the government released all of its jailed members and dropped charges against its London-based leader, Altraf Hussain. To confuse the issue further, Nawaz Sharif, leader of the opposition, exploited the situation by calling for a more conciliatory policy. Even when Benazir relented in July 1995, the subsequent eleven rounds of talks did not result in any agreement. Karachi remains on the verge of civil war.

Islamic militancy within the state system is yet another issue to contend with, as evidenced by an Islamic plot to overthrow the government. On October 14, 1995, Benazir Bhutto confirmed that 36 army officers were arrested for an attempted coup (Rashid, 1996:163). Indeed, there are a number of reasons that can explain the increased Islamization of the military over the years. First, the armed forces are no longer staffed by Western-educated elites and many officers today come from the lower middle classes. Second, Zia promoted devout soldiers to high ranks and their influence is now being felt. Third, the ten-year Afghan war radicalized many of the troops resulting in a new emphasis on Islam. Fourth, the anti-American sentiments aroused by the suspension of aid, the Gulf War, and the fate of Muslims in Bosnia have produced a fiercely
nationalistic and conservative force. Therefore, taken together, it is not surprising that unrest in the army has surfaced and radical elements have emerged. "Miss Bhutto's government is in trouble with widespread corruption, a sputtering economy and a state of near anarchy in Karachi" (Economist, Oct. 21, 1995:39). Many officers are very disillusioned and favour a purer Islamic state. Only time will tell to what extent the Jamaat has been involved in the military conspiracy, but Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, has warned the government not to use this incident to purge the army of patriotic Islamic elements. Now that the coup plotters are on trial the outcome will be telling. Military support is necessary for the survival of any government in Pakistan.

Religion and politics have coalesced for the youth of modern Pakistan as they become more frustrated and disillusioned with government policy. Pasban (Protectors) was launched by the current leadership of the Jamaat in 1990, despite the old guard's conservative reservations about ideological purity. In this endeavour, less stringent membership requirements were advocated to make the Jamaat more accessible to young people. This youth wing was open to all even though it was controlled and guided by the parent organization. Pasban's modus operandi, best described as political theatre, was an ingenious way to get a message across and the video screenings, plays, laser light shows and music attracted new followers. However, the electoral defeat in 1993 gave the conservative element in the Jamaat an excuse to blame Pasban for their poor showing. In the end, it was Pasban that broke away from the Jamaat, claiming it needed to follow its own more open culture. Subsequently, the Jamaat has launched a new youth organization, Shabab-e-Milli, to attract young people into the fundamentalist fold.
Islam has once again become a rallying point in Pakistani politics as the religious parties have set aside their sectarian differences and joined together in an alliance. Diverse elements have pledged their solidarity against the government and established the Milli Yakjehti Council (Unity Council of Believers) with Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the Jamaat, as mediator. This Council was formed in 1995 when religious groups and parties found themselves victims of the government's aggressive action against them (Herald, June 1995:46). To date the Council has been successful in uniting the sects and splinter groups but it is too soon to predict whether it will be a cohesive force in the political arena.

To complicate the situation further, the ex-cricketer, Imran Khan, is being hailed as the new populist idol and possible saviour for Pakistan. He is an excellent crowd puller with great charisma. As a born-again Muslim, he claims the West is "immoral, depraved, hypocritical and imperialistic while the ruling elite is heartless and corrupt" (Economist, Jan. 7, 1995:26). His political rhetoric to date is based on class struggle, as Khan claims the political system inherited from the British has created a class of "brown sahibs". Most commentators feel Khan, along with his Tehreek-i-Insal (Justice Party), will be a major player in the next election. His message has appeal for many Pakistanis who are discontented with the existing leadership and disillusioned with the West. He has declared that "Islam offers a moral alternative to godless government, and a vocabulary that allows people to express their frustration at their government's failure to deliver" (Economist, Mar. 4, 1995:35). His ties to the fundamentalists are rumoured but not substantiated. Indeed, Benazir's government has clearly been worried about Khan's popularity. There was much speculation about how her administration blocked Khan's participation in the 1996 World Cricket
Cup, refused to support his charitable campaign, and may have been involved in the bombing of his hospital in Lahore (Economist, April 2, 1996:29).

Benazir Bhutto had good reason to be concerned since her second regime has been a disappointment to many Pakistanis. Unemployment is high; inflation is over 20 per cent; economic growth has remained below six per cent in the last three years and corruption is endemic throughout the system. Benazir did not reform the judiciary, bureaucracy or the police despite her promises. In fact, she has moved to the far right in her attempts to support the status quo. Consequently, her administration has become more and more authoritarian. According to Rashid (1996:159), the gap between rich and poor is greater than ever. Benazir Bhutto’s regime perpetuated rule by a small coterie of perhaps 300 families. “Through blood ties, marriage, and business they have dominated the military, the bureaucracy, and politics. Some 80 per cent of the 247 members of the National Assembly are drawn from the feudal land owning class; they pay no income tax but benefit enormously from state patronage in the form of favours, licenses, bank loans and graft”.

Clearly, Pakistan is in a state of disarray and the political climate is volatile. There are secessionist demands in three out of four provinces and anarchy reigns in Karachi. The economic recession caused by strikes, debt and falling revenues has once again created an ideological crisis. Not surprisingly, the debate over whether the state should be secular or Islamic has intensified as yet another government has failed to give its citizens a decent living standard. This time "Pakistan's Islamic movement is being driven more by poor social conditions and a breakdown of law and order than by pure ideology" (Rashid, 1996:160).

To the outside world, Benazir tried to portray Pakistan as a moderate Muslim country, but growing extremism is an ongoing problem. Internally, there is a pro-Islam, anti-West
mood since the U.S. cut economic and military aid when Pakistan refused to abandon its nuclear program. Although the Brown Amendment in January 1995 was to permit delivery of $368 million in embargoed arms and spare parts, it has been delayed by a new controversy over the supply of 5000 ring magnets to Pakistan from China (Rashid, 1996:163). Moreover, Pakistani Islamists feel outraged by the lack of Western support for Muslims in Kashmir and Bosnia.

In this climate of international distrust and suspicion, regional, ethnic and sectarian divisions are pulling Pakistan apart and once again the fundamentalists have been the catalyst in an explosive situation. In October, 1996, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami resigned from the Senate and called for nation-wide strikes and demonstrations to protest against government corruption and economic mismanagement. On November 5, 1996 President Farooq Leghari used his constitutional power to dismiss Benazir Bhutto’s government and three provincial legislatures. He has issued a nine point charge sheet against Benazir that includes accusations of corruption, nepotism, misrule, undermining the judiciary, bringing the army and presidency into disrepute and letting security forces kill thousands of people in Karachi. In the interim President Leghari has named Merag Khalid, former parliamentary speaker, as Prime Minister pending general elections set for February 3, 1997 (Economist, Nov. 9, 1996:37). At this point the Jamaat-i-Islami is waiting in the wings and it is unclear whether it will perform a unifying role to consolidate support for any one party or give impetus to a coalition of oppositional elements. After forty years as a player in the political process, the Jamaat is nowhere near achieving legislative power on its own, but is a powerful ally. Throughout Pakistan’s history the Jamaat has had a significant impact on the social, economic and political fabric of the country.
CHAPTER THREE

ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI

Structure

After partition, the Jamaat-i-Islami soon developed into a "highly structured, hierarchically organized, bureaucratic-type organization that has established a clear line of authority and a huge network of functional departments and nation-wide branches" (Ahmad, 1991:459). Today it is geographically distributed throughout Pakistan's four provinces. With aspirations to use Islamic principles to restructure the state and reorder society, the Jamaat-i-Islami has tried to maintain unified thought and action in an organization that consists of three levels: members, associates and sympathizers. A full member is trained to internalize Maududi's interpretation of Islam and total ideological commitment is mandatory. However, it is the associate members, who favour an Islamic order but are not committed to the complete participation demanded of full members, who are the backbone of the Jamaat. They do not aspire to leadership positions, but have a great impact at the local level. Supporters, committed to the Islamic cause, vote in elections and contribute resources and time although they have no influence in the internal structure. In 1992 there were 7,861 full members; 34,156 associates and 357,229 registered supporters (Nasr 1994:96). Internally, the Jamaat-i-Islami is a cadre organization that consists of an elected amir (leader), deputy, secretary general and Majlis-e-Shura (consultative council). The pattern is repeated at the provincial, division, district, town and village levels in a series of concentric circles. This allows the organization to be decentralized yet closely knit. The amir is the source of supreme authority and oversees all the administrative and budgetary matters. The Shura meets once or twice
a year to interpret doctrine, oversee the implementation of ideology and advise on future party policy. However, the day-to-day activity is carried on by the secretariat. This bureaucracy runs training camps for workers, controls publications, raises funds and carries out party policy. The Secretary-General is like a party boss who directs the administrative machinery. In fact, the last two leaders have previously held the post of Secretary-General. In the fifty years since the Jamaat’s inception, this bureaucracy has greatly increased in size and complexity, becoming formalized and entrenched. Many full-time workers who have vested interests of their own are more concerned today with organizational control than with expanding popular support.

Although the Jamaat-i-Islami has tried to make inroads in Pakistani villages through its welfare work, medical clinics and publications, its elitist membership rules and regulations have limited its populist appeal. The party requirement of total commitment to its objectives and decisions is too rigid for most peasants. Through the years there have been moves within the party to relax the membership rules and broaden the Jamaat’s base of support, but tension remains between the ideologues, who emphasize religious philosophy, and the pragmatists who are politically motivated.

There is ongoing debate within the organization about the Jamaat’s proper role. The source of contention is between the idea of an exemplary spiritual community and the practical needs of a political party striving to capture power. Although leadership was passed on peacefully from Maulana Maududi to Mian Tufayl Muhammad in 1972, and then to Qazi Husain Ahmed in 1987, their individual styles reflected this dispute. Throughout the history of the Jamaat there have been periods of upheaval and redirection as leadership changes have reoriented the party. Indeed, purges have become the way to deal with dissenting members if they do not share the vision of the
Maududi was a visionary with a distinctive ideology and activist agenda. He claimed that "revolution is not a means of articulating popular demands but of defining a political struggle against the secular state" (Nasr, 1994:221). Maududi envisioned the Jamaat as the vanguard of the coming Islamic revolution. Socio-political change would be a top-down process as Pakistanis would follow the example of the political elite. In this way a "holy community" would develop. Therefore, under Maududi "Islamic revolution in the Jamaat's rhetoric was not the battle cry of the masses but an elitist crusade aimed at appropriating the state" (Nasr, 1994:221).

Next came Mian Tufayl Muhammad who was an administrator, not a politician. He focused solely on the Sharia, as opposed to Maududi who placed emphasis on the procedural as well as the substantive parts of the Islamization process. Mian Tufayl felt that "politicalization had become a consuming passion that drowned out ethical considerations, intellectual vitality, pious works and worship" (Nasr, 1994:54). During his time in office, authority became more decentralized which encouraged independent power plays and affected the cohesion of the party. As the Jamaat became increasingly marginalized politically in the 1980's internal dissension increased and the pragmatists overwhelmed the ideologues. At this point the Jamaat began to show more interest in governing how Muslims lived than in their individual souls. Hence, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, a populist who had a good rapport with young and politically active elements, was elected in 1987 and again in 1992. Under his leadership the Jamaat has opened up and become more politically active.

The Jamaat-i-Islami has a number of affiliate institutions that propagate its views and consolidate its power. Professionals are represented by the Pakistan Medical Association, Muslim Lawyers' Federation, Pakistan Teachers' Association, and Merchants' Organization.
Labourers have the National Labour Federation and peasants are supported by the Peasants' Board (Nasr, 1994:62). However, the most important Jamaat-sponsored Union is the student organization Islami-Jamaat Talaba (IJT). One of the oldest movements of its kind, the IJT started on university campuses to check the left wing and spread religious propaganda. It is through the IJT that the Jamaat-i-Islami has managed to control many of the educational institutions in Pakistan, successfully organize anti-government movements and intimidate its political opponents. The IJT has certainly demonstrated the potency of student power. Although this group modelled itself on the Jamaat, it has been transformed into a political organization faster than its parent. Ideology alone has not been able to check the activist element regardless of what the Jamaat leadership deemed proper. In fact, the Jamaat has maintained a tenuous hold on IJT activity since "the IJT's power and zeal, especially in terms of manpower needed to wage demonstrations, agitate, and conduct electoral campaigns, were too valuable for the Jama'at to forego" (Nasr, 1994:67). The IJT's ability to mobilize the masses around religious issues has done much to contribute to the Jamaat-i-Islami's ongoing political presence in Pakistan.

One third of the Jamaat current leaders began as IJT members, and close organizational bonds and camaraderie have been formed by years of student activism. These former IJT members, who were mainly educated in the modern sciences and are attuned to politics, have had a significant impact on the Jamaat. Moreover, the IJT has left its mark on a great number of students who have gone on to be important Pakistani leaders, intellectuals and bureaucrats. Maududi's idea of cultural engineering is applicable here. His doctrine of Islamizing the state from within and above, and creating revolution through education and conversion rather than coercion, is played out in the IJT (Nasr, 1995a:359).
Since partition the Jamaat has managed to penetrate the educational system, the media, and the administrative and coercive wings of the state apparatus. Its infiltration of the army, police and intelligence services has been a source of concern for the moderates as criticism can be considered anti-Islamic. Although the Jamaat-i-Islami is not a mass party "it relies for its strength on its organizational structure and the degree to which it can control the government machinery by vertical and lateral penetration in the key departments of state" (Khan, 1985:142). In addition, to gain control over the religious sector the Jamaat has established its own madrassas and these schools have proliferated in the last decade. In fact, during the Afghan war, the Jamaat operated religious educational facilities for 3.5 million Afghan refugees in the NWFP and Baluchistan. It is these institutions that produced the talibans who advanced on the incumbent government in Kabul in 1995 and 1996. Moreover, in the last few years the Jamaat expanded its network to include a new group of semi-autonomous affiliates, the Pasban, who believed in the goals of the party, but were not bound by its membership discipline. The aim, obviously, was to organize those who sympathized with the Jamaat, even if their support was limited to politics. However, this endorsement by the more populist elements in the Jamaat created opposition and cleavages within the organization as some of the leadership claimed these new affiliate members were simply political opportunists. Recently, Pasban removed itself from Jamaat sponsorship, citing differences in ideology, strategy and tactical approach. This was so serious a loss that in response, the Jamaat has established a new group, Shabab-e-Milli (Flame of Faith), to attract a more youthful following. The party is, indeed, changing as it tries to balance its ideological orientation and political goals.
Social Base

The fundamentalist ideology of the Jamaat-i-Islami appeals to those who are searching for identity in a transitional society. Fundamentalists distrust Western ideologies such as socialism, capitalism and communism, claiming Western civilization is beset with moral decay. Since secularism, liberalism and nationalism appear to have failed in Pakistan, Maududi's vision presents its own indigenous model to reform society. Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami has attracted the urban middle class who are "psychologically alienated, socially declining, relatively well-off economically, but insecure and politically ineffective. They are reacting against social deprivation at the hands of the upper social classes and government bureaucrats, on the one hand, and against the increasing militancy of the lower classes, on the other" (Ahmad, 1991:496). The urban middle class is not against capitalism or the state, but wants to reform big business and purify the corrupt bureaucracy. Moreover, it wants to be part of the political process. "Religious parties - the Jamaat is the most notable case in point - have since 1947 provided the only gateway for the middle and lower middle classes, urban as well as rural, into the forbidding structure of Pakistani politics. Dominated by the landed gentry and the propertied elite through the intricate patronage system, political offices have generally remained closed to the lower classes" (Nasr, 1994:74). Fundamentalists promise to change the balance of power and structure of social relations. Consequently, over the years there has been identifiable support for the Jamaat from this segment of the population.

Students are also frequently attracted to fundamentalist ideology. In Pakistan access to education and chronic unemployment have left many young people feeling frustrated and let
down by the system. Schools often do not equip students with the skills (e.g. computer science, English) required to compete in the job market and those who do compete find that most of the opportunities are only available to those with elite connections. Given the inherent inequality in the country, fundamentalism has appealed to this aspiring group as it calls for a more equal and fair system open to everyone.

The Muhajirs are another group of people who have historically supported the Jamaat's platform. These Urdu-speaking refugees from India, who mainly settled in Sind after partition, migrated to be in an Islamic Pakistan. Until the mid-1980's, they supported the idea of a strong central government which would create a homeland for all Muslims, not separate, ethnically-oriented political groups. Consequently, the recent rise of the Muhajir's own political party, Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), with its call for quota systems and regional autonomy, has been a great setback for the Jamaat.

Although urbanization and industrialization have helped the Jamaat's cause in the cities, the party has failed to make significant inroads into the countryside, where two-thirds of the population live. Its message is directed to the intellectual in Urdu, therefore, it is incomprehensible to most Pakistanis. The overall literacy rate in Pakistan is 28 per cent and only 3.4 per cent claim to be Urdu speakers, so the Jamaat's constituency is very small (Nasr, 1994:82). In the rural areas it is the Sufi pirs and traditional ulama who are important in the religious life of the peasantry. Land-owning pirs fill a significant political role in rural Pakistan as they mediate for the peasants and dispense government patronage while the ulama command respect in the madrassas and mosques. The Barelvi ulama who represent a populist Islam with a belief in miracles and the power of the saints, have established their own political party called Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) while the
Deobandi ulama, with their vigorous belief in rituals and tradition, belong to the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). The Jamaat-i-Islami discounts the pirs' "popular" Islam, claiming it is misleading, superstitious and vulgar and ridicules the ulama's atavistic approach and refusal to accept ijtihad (independent reasoning). However, both the JUP and JUI have a rural following. Overall, the Jamaat's elitist attitude has hurt it politically, particularly when the limited Islamic vote block in the countryside is split with the other religious parties. Moreover, no religious party does well in rural areas when it is competing with the feudal landowners' patronage system (e.g. Sind, Punjab).

Even in the cities the Jamaat-i-Islami has limited appeal among the lower classes -- "the landless peasants, the urban proletariat, the uprooted migrants from rural areas struggling for two square meals in the slums of the big urban centers" (Ahmad, 1991:496). These marginalized groups have turned to the traditional ulama in the mosques for spiritual and financial support. To date, the Jamaat-i-Islami has all but ignored the socio-economic concerns of the lower classes in its quest to convert the intellectuals, develop a "holy community" and Islamize the state's constitution. This elitist doctrine in a country plagued with poverty and extreme economic inequality has limited the Jamaat-i-Islami's electoral appeal. Nevertheless, in spite of its shortcomings as a mass party, there has been enough support for the Jamaat through its various affiliations to make it a force to be reckoned with. Over the years, the Jamaat-i-Islami has become the religious conscience of the country forcing each regime to institutionalize Islam to varying degrees to legitimize its rule. Fundamentalism has indeed relocated the ideological center of gravity in Pakistan.
CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN PAKISTAN

This chapter will explore the causes of fundamentalism and examine its significance as a social movement in Pakistan. It will evaluate the Jamaat’s ideological limitations and discuss the role Islamic revivalism plays after being part of the political process for five decades. Theories on social movements and fundamentalism will be employed to provide an analysis and to answer the questions posed earlier.

A) The conditions

Why did the conditions in Pakistan promote the growth of a fundamentalist movement?

• What conditions were necessary for such an Islamic movement to get started?

Historically, Pakistan had a feudal, agrarian economy with little industry. When the first Muslim trading families from India migrated, they developed strong links with the Western style bureaucracy set up to administer the country at partition. Over time, an uneven pattern of development emerged as feudal dominated areas existed alongside capitalist activity. However, this did not do much to sustain most of the population since there was little “trickle down” to the masses. Today, much of the country is still socially and economically deprived and Pakistan’s current statistics are not encouraging. With a “population growth of over three per cent a year, Pakistan ranks among the countries with the poorest levels of social development. Given its high birth rate, by the year 2050 Pakistan will be the third largest country in the world
after India and China" (World Bank Annual Report, 1991:280). It is estimated that 64 per cent of the population does not have access to safe drinking water and the literacy rate is only 28 per cent. Urbanization is expected to double in the next 10 years and complicate the already existing overcrowded conditions in the cities. In 1993, in over 80 per cent of housing units, seven people crowded into an average of just over one room. Undoubtedly the conditions are worse today (Hussain, 1993:6).

Although Pakistan has been incorporated into the international capitalist system both politically and economically, the majority of its citizens have not prospered. The administration has limited resources for social programs owing to its narrow tax base, which exempts many large landowners and politicians. Debt servicing is a major burden, and when the demands for restructuring made by the World Bank and IMF are enforced the burden falls on low and middle income wage earners. Although the political elites in Pakistan have experimented with various constitutions and political structures, they have failed to build a representative democracy where the will of the people and democratic institutions are operable.

Not surprisingly, all of these conditions have contributed to the rise of fundamentalism as a potent social force in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis have good reason to feel personally discontented. The prospects for the ordinary person are not encouraging as the standard of living remains low in comparison with much of the world. Psychologically, feelings of relative deprivation are enhanced by better global communications and out-of-country workers who send money and information back to their families in Pakistan. Moreover, the middle class is frustrated because it pays disproportionally high taxes and has little opportunity to voice its political concerns. The elites and feudal elements continue to control the political system
through patron-client networks or outright vote buying. Economic inequality persists and corruption is rampant throughout society. The promises made by each new administration have not materialized and, whatever party is elected, it appears to make little difference to the life of most Pakistanis.

The social structural outlook is equally pessimistic since Pakistan is polarized along religious, ethnic and regional lines. The anarchy that reigns in Karachi; the ongoing sectarian violence between the Shias and Sunnis; the increasing militancy in splinter groups; and regional demands for autonomy in three of four states do not bode well for the future. At the national level there is a financial crisis and the fiscal pressures are tremendous. The US has withdrawn its aid program and the IMF has suspended a $600 million loan until structural changes are made and debts are repaid. However, the government continues to increase spending on defense to maintain its place in international military competition, particularly with India. In addition, the elite conflict between the two leading parties, IJI and PPP, has all the characteristics of a personal vendetta rather than democratic competition. Consequently, both psychological and structural conditions have created an environment where fundamentalism can flourish in Pakistan. As McLaughlin (1969:4) stipulates in his definition of social movements, it [fundamentalism] has a shared value system, sense of community, norms for action, organizational structure, definite goals and the will to change the social structure.

B) The appeal

What factors account for the strength of fundamentalism’s appeal in Pakistan?

- To whom does it appeal, and why?
Historically, Pakistan's troubled origins, ethnic and geographic diversity and vulnerable international position have often made its very survival uncertain. However, most Pakistanis believe the Islamic framework justifies the country's existence. Consequently, a "passionate attachment to a Muslim identity has been a constant in Pakistan's self-image and in the rhetoric of its politicians" (Metcalf, 1983:187). However, there are a number of other factors which account for the appeal of fundamentalism.

Islamic fundamentalism is a sociopolitical movement born out of the protest and frustration of those who have not been politically or socially integrated. John L. Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs, explains the influence of the Jamaat-i-Islami by suggesting that fundamentalism is politicized social activism reacting to the social and economic crises that have occurred throughout Pakistan's history (Esposito, 1983:10-11). Other theorists concentrate on how fundamentalism appeals to the disenfranchised, remembering Islam's "perfect past" (Binder, 1963:70), and projecting a glorious future (Smith, 1966:16). Since Pakistan was established as a Muslim homeland on the basis of the slogan "Islam in danger", the fundamentalists have targeted foreign models and ideologies over the years to explain the country's identity crisis. Western liberalism, Soviet Marxism, pluralism, secularism, and modernity have all come under attack as threats to Islam when the role of religion in the state is questioned. In Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami presents Islam as an indigenous political force. Fundamentalist ideology claims Islam to be not simply a faith but a way of life. It promises to introduce a more egalitarian socio-economic order and to regulate the political system in accordance with Islamic prescriptions in the Koran.
Lawrence Kaplan, editor of *Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective* (1992:7) claims the inevitable societal dislocation caused by industrialization and urban growth “leaves rootless people with problems of identity, nostalgia for past associations, and susceptible to simplistic alternatives”. Therefore, when the Jamaat offers a more assertive Islamic identity in a time of transition and change, it appeals to those who feel powerless.

For many fundamentalists, modernity has become the symbol of moral decline and spiritual malaise. Hence, a return to fundamentals is often an attractive solution for those threatened by the uncertain nature of the contemporary world. In Pakistan, where social upheaval, economic strains, inflation, unemployment and shortage of housing are the norm, the Jamaat’s desire to return to traditional values has great appeal. Bruce Lawrence (1989:2-17) theorizes that Islamic revivalism can be linked to a fight for a threatened culture and a challenge to the forces of modernity in a transitional society.

As Martin Marty summarizes, Islamic fundamentalists are reactive and fight back when they perceive a threat to their identity. They put their particular world view forward using selective scriptures from the *Koran* and *Sunnah*. God and Mohammed are their authoritative sources. They fight secular and Western influences in the ongoing battle with “the other”. (Marty, 1991a:ix-x). Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami’s fundamentalist alternative presents a blueprint for life itself.

In Pakistan, fundamentalism is urban-based. As a rule it attracts lower middle-class people, especially university students and young professionals who are frustrated because they cannot find the positions or political power that correspond to their expectations. Education is an important part of fundamentalist ideology and through its control of the *madrassa* system,
the Jamaat has built a network of contacts and influence for those that pass through it. The Jamaat has also made some inroads with the marginalized urban poor who crowd the cities in growing numbers by establishing clinics, legal services and family assistance programs to help them survive. Pakistan’s high inflation rate, urban poverty, low productivity and stagnant economy are a breeding ground for fundamentalist ideology. Disillusioned with the political elites’ hegemony and Westernized government style, the Jamaat is presenting a complete agenda to re-establish an Islamic identity and way of life. Fundamentalism offers a justification for frustration, and a degraded self-image becomes a source of dignity. The promise of more socioeconomic and political equality in Pakistan’s class-ridden society has great appeal. This is clearly evident in the recent endorsement Imran Khan’s Justice Movement has received and the support for the Jamaat’s tax protest demonstrations in Rawalpindi. The fundamentalist alternative provides a route for certain segments of the population.

C) Success or failure

What are the limitations of the Jamaat-i-Islami as a political force?

- What constitutes political success or failure for a fundamentalist movement in the Pakistani context?

If legislative power is the criterion of success, the Jamaat has not succeeded; however, the situation is more complex than this measure would indicate. At first glance one would say it has failed to deliver on its initial promise of revolution, because revolutions happen quickly, not as part of the orderly political process. The Jamaat’s tactics have varied from peaceful demonstrations to political intimidation, but for the most part the party has operated
within the country’s legal framework. There is no doubt that Pakistan has become increasingly Islamized, due in most part to Jamaat-i-Islami efforts. Despite its poor showing at the polls, it has managed to infiltrate the state apparatus, motivate youth groups and make its presence felt in every administration. However, before discussing the fundamentalist impact on Pakistani society, it is necessary to examine the Jamaat’s limitations.

Charles Tilly’s resource mobilization model is useful in the analysis of the Jamaat’s effectiveness as an organization. If mobilization depends on shared costs and benefits of common interests, fundamentalism has failed to achieve any kind of significant consensus in the population. Although Islam may be the link that binds Pakistanis, it does not always compensate for major ethnic, communal and regional cleavages. The Jamaat’s erudite political campaign has limited appeal for the peasants, and therefore, it has shallow roots in rural Pakistan. Outside the cities, the Jamaat is seen as a party only concerned with religion, hence, it lacks credibility on day-to-day economic issues. In a country where the question of survival is foremost, the Jamaat’s intellectual ideology appears to be too elitist. It is geared to the academics, not the masses. Moreover, the party’s membership requirements and strict discipline have little to do with the everyday life of the worker struggling to make a minimal living.

The Jamaat’s cooperation with other groups has varied over time as various coalitions have been formed to oppose incumbent governments. However, alliances with other Islamic parties have floundered since philosophical differences have inevitably arisen. The Jamaat continues to undermine both the Barelvi and Deobandi schools of thought as it believes it alone has the correct ideological plan for life. Not surprisingly, the religious vote is split a number of ways. When it was to their advantage to make other political alliances, the Jamaat
cooperated with different groups. The party joined oppositional coalitions to defeat the incumbent Ayub and Bhutto governments, and cooperated with Zia and Sharif to further its own aims, but the relationships were never lasting. The Jamaat's fixation on religious issues tends to sooner or later alienate its allies. The MQM is a case in point, when ethnicity became more important than the ideology that had brought the Muhajirs to Pakistan. Even when the Jamaat has been part of the ruling coalition, it has antagonized its partners. Zia ultimately withdrew his support and actively undermined the Jamaat while Sharif simply ignored it until his government was threatened.

These are some of the external reasons why the Jamaat has not been able to translate general sociopolitical discontent and structural breakdown into a revolution but, equally important, explanations lie within the internal workings of the organization. If resource mobilization depends on the shared values and identities within the organization, the Jamaat's internal frictions have jeopardized its effective performance as a rational, purposeful, proactive, political force. After partition, when religion was used to build morale in the face of unprecedented physical and economic dislocation, the Jamaat's power peaked. However, over time its pure ideological orientation has become compromised with politics as it oscillated between reform and revolution. The Jamaat has moved from being a group of like-minded ideologues acting as a movement vanguard to a group of pragmatists running a political party. Within the hierarchy a complex and entrenched bureaucracy has developed with specialized departments that have a vested interest in maintaining the established structure and protecting their positions. Internally there is no agreement on ideology or strategy as the religious and political factions debate and vie for control. Organizational change has been caused by
ideological differences, factionalization and leadership styles. Consequently there has been a lack of cohesion, and splinter groups have broken off from the Jamaat-i-Islami to follow different policies because there has not been enough payout for its supporters. For example, the Pasban left the Jamaat fold recently because the ideologues blamed the pragmatists for their dismal showing in the last election and curtailed their activities. As Blumer claims, organizations do indeed have a career path (Blumer, 1946:203-214): the Jamaat has grown, changed and refocused over time.

E) Limitations in Maududi’s Ideology

Is the Jamaat’s ideology viable as a blueprint for shaping Pakistani society?

- What are its limitations and how are they to be explained?

From the beginning, Maududi’s fundamentalist ideology has presented a comprehensive belief package. Islam for Maududi was “a well-ordered system, a consistent whole, resting on a definite set of clear-cut postulates” (Bahadur, 1977:160). Because there is no separation in Islam between the sacred and the secular, he definitely had a political agenda with “a set of values, a set of convictions, a set of criticisms, a set of arguments, and a set of defenses” (McLaughlin, 1969:19). Maududi believed his “blueprint for life” was the remedy that would solve all of Pakistan’s problems. But, as a workable ideological system, it had to be contingent on the social support system and on its ability to change meanings and political character in different circumstances. As discussed in previous sections, internal friction and the inability to interact with other groups put limits on the Jamaat’s political effectiveness.
On close examination, many of Maududi’s ideas are questionable and his approach was too elitist and inflexible to be accepted by the common man. Although Maududi claimed to translate literally from the Koran, he was very selective and there are a number of contradictions in his theory.

- First and foremost, Maududi’s ideological model of a “holy community” was a response to an existing situation before partition when there were numerous stresses on the Muslim community in India. However, after becoming a political party in Pakistan in 1947, the viability of his Islamic solution to reorder society was not very appropriate for the existing conditions where survival was the prime concern for the nascent state. Even in theory Maududi’s idea of a “holy community” was contradictory because if everyone was virtuous, the hegemony of the Jamaat as vanguard would be unnecessary.

- Second, the Jamaat-i-Islami, Maududi’s party, expects to be elected democratically but it does not believe in representative democracy. Maududi claimed people should not elect their own representatives because they did not understand what was in their best interests. For him, a comprehensive understanding of Islam was a prerequisite for leadership. “According to Maududi’s calculations, among those who claim to be Muslim, the percentage with any knowledge of Islam is not more than .001 per cent” (Ahmed, 1985:100).

- Third, although Maududi superficially endorsed the democratic process, the old adage “one man, one vote, one time” would probably be enforced if the Jamaat were elected because, in Maududi’s ideology, the people cannot be sovereign as it would conflict with the sovereignty of God. Therefore, elections would be unnecessary because the Jamaat-i-Islami was
God's party. Maududi believed change would not come from mobilizing the masses to topple the existing order, but from taking over the centers of power.

- Fourth, since Maududi's pivotal point is the sovereignty of God over the universe and the infallibility of the Koran, he emphatically used this to justify the ruler's position as the vice-regent of God. However, when it came to implementing the law, he contradicted the Koran when he claimed that *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) by the *ulama* (men of learning) took precedence over *ijtihad* by the *ijma* (consensus of the community).

- Fifth, contrary to Verse 109.1 in the Koran that claims there should be no compulsion in religion (Dawood, 1990:433), Maududi envisioned a state with coercive powers to enforce his ideological blueprint on society and oversee every aspect of public and private life.

- Sixth, Maududi excluded all non-Sunni sects (*Ahmadiyya, Shia, Ishmaili*) and non-Muslims (Christians, Hindus, Buddhists) from participating in politics in spite of the fact that Mohammad preached inclusiveness and acceptance. He proposed separate electorates for the minorities, who would be restricted from policy-making positions.

- Seventh, despite his democratic rhetoric, Maududi saw no place for differences of opinion or political parties, because, for him, the members of the Jamaat were the only custodians of true knowledge. His "theodemocracy" would, in fact, be an authoritarian regime.

It is hardly surprising that, given its various limitations and contradictions, Maududi's ideology has not gained mass support. Nevertheless, his message was compelling enough to particular segments of the population to ensure that every regime has assimilated some of the articles of faith from the fundamentalist movement.
F) Government response

How has the government responded to fundamentalism in Pakistan?

- Does government response shape the movement, and if so, how?

The Geertz model that emphasizes the social determinants of ideology is particularly applicable to Pakistan as successive governments have focused on “interest” and used ideology as a “mask and a weapon” to gain political advantage. Meanwhile, the Jamaat has focused on the “strain” in society and used its ideology as a “symptom and a remedy” to correct all the country’s woes (Geertz, 1964:52). Politics in Pakistan have often revolved around religion since every government has accepted Islam as the official ideology, albeit with their own particular interpretations. The Jamaat has been shaped by government activity because it has needed to respond to each administration’s manipulations. For those in power, Islam has been a valuable tool in the political process throughout Pakistan’s history. Jinnah’s claim of “Islam in danger” motivated the mass exodus from India. Bhutto used Islam to quiet groups calling for separate ethnic and regional identity, claiming this was unpatriotic and against the ideal of Islamic brotherhood. Zia called for a return to the Nizam-i-Mustafa to give himself legitimacy and an ideological framework, while Sharif used Islamic rhetoric to form a winning coalition. Although the ruling elites have become adept at symbol selection, their commitment to Islamic ideology has become increasingly suspect. Every leader has used Islam when it suited his or her purposes.
Governments in Pakistan have had one of three responses to fundamentalism: repression, accommodation, or co-optation. Ayub used repression when he banned political parties and jailed some of the Jamaat leaders. However, the party survived as a religious and educational organization and quietly infiltrated the state power structures. Other regimes have accommodated the fundamentalists when the Jamaat was an important factor in their electoral success or failure. Bhutto denounced the Ahmadiyya; Zia gave the Jamaat important cabinet posts and Sharif introduced a new Sharia law to satisfy its religious demands. At times the incumbents have simply co-opted Jamaat policies to legitimize their administration. The constitutional preamble, Zia’s Islamization program, Islamic law courts and stricter laws on women’s testimony were all borrowed from the fundamentalists’ platform.

Over the last fifty years, the Jamaat has responded to government actions by employing a variety of tactics and strategies. At times the fundamentalists have compromised their ideology and cooperated with secular and left-wing groups for reasons of political expediency. In its attempts to build coalitions to oppose an incumbent government, the Jamaat-i-Islami has tried to shape a cultural consensus through common history, current destiny and glorified heritage. The Jamaat’s activism since partition has provided an alternative to the Western models of socialism and liberalism, and has kept the issue of Islam front and center. It has used the Koran to attack social injustice and abuse of power, becoming a legitimate mainstream movement with strong support in certain sectors. Although the Jamaat membership is only 600,000 in a population of 122 million, fundamentalists have played an important role in political debates and events (Ahmad, 1991:492). Over the years, the Jamaat has used boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and outright intimidation to demand change. It is interesting to note that
it was the Jamaat that led the recent protest march in Rawalpindi against Benazir Bhutto’s harsh tax reform in June 1996. Ironically, it was a similar demonstration in the same city that brought down her father’s government in 1977. In October 1996 the Jamaat once again demonstrated its “street power” when thousands of Islamic fundamentalist demonstrators tried to storm the capital, Islamabad, demanding Benezir Bhutto’s resignation. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, accused her of corruption and mismanagement of the economy (Vancouver Sun, October 28, 1996:A6). The Jamaat succeeded in driving home the fact that regardless of its electoral standing, it is a force to reckon with as it brought every day life in major cities to a standstill with nation-wide strikes.

G) The role of fundamentalism in Pakistan

What role does the Jamaati-i-Islami play in Pakistan today?

• Has fundamentalism found a niche?

The idea of revolution in Pakistan may be fading, but Islamic symbols have increasingly penetrated society and politics over time. Islam is not disappearing but becoming integrated as the authorities issue their own Islamic ordinances and the public focuses more and more on the ethics of its leaders. As Weber’s model predicts, once a social movement has established an economic and social base, developed a bureaucracy and changed its leadership, it will be accommodated to society (Zald and Ash, 1970:327-340). In Pakistan the Jamaat-i-Islami is synonymous with fundamentalism. Maududi’s ideas are durable and the movement has continued to be a viable organization after his death. Today it remains a legitimate part of the
political process. Although the Jamaat functions more successfully as a pressure group than a political party, its influence and power should not be underestimated. It has played an important watchdog role and impacted the social, economic and political fabric of the country. Many of Pakistan's institutions have become Islamized because the Jamaat has worked at lateral and vertical penetration of the state apparatus and has infiltrated the educational system, the media, the police and the military. The Jamaat has kept the issue of Islam alive for fifty years despite its many changed stances on issues and shifts in political support. Although the fundamentalists may not have achieved all their goals and the momentum of the movement has ebbed and flowed, they are still a force with which to be reckoned. After long term involvement in the political process, the Jamaat-i-Islami itself has become institutionalized and accepted into the mainstream of Pakistani life. It has found a niche. "Short of revolution the Islamic network will persist in its characteristically nebulous way to influence how the people react to the formal sources of power" (Piscatori, 1983:6). In many ways it has become the religious conscience of the country.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

"Religious revivalism has run counter to many of the presuppositions of Western liberal secularism and development theory, among them the belief that modernisation means inexorable or progressive secularisation and Westernization of society" (Esposito, 1987:24). Although there are many forms of fundamentalism, Islam is perceived to be the most threatening to the West. This is of consequence because in the 1990s there is a fear that militant Islam will become the next political force in the aftermath of the cold war.

Islamic governments in power may vary, but fundamentalists are a reality in the political calculations of every Muslim regime. Political elites have dealt with this Islamic revival in a number of ways. President Assad of Syria murdered 30,000 Islamists in a 1982 massacre, and Col. Qaddafi in Libya has savagely repressed any revival message which conflicts with his own. In contrast, other Muslim countries have successfully absorbed dissident fundamentalist movements into the mainstream political body as evidenced by the number of elected Muslim Brotherhood members in the Jordanian parliament and the recent majority vote for the Islamic Welfare Party in Turkey. Meanwhile, the governments in Egypt and Malaysia have co-opted Islamic policy to try to outbid the fundamentalist opposition. "In many Muslim societies religion remains a pervasive, though at times diffuse, social force, and popular political culture is far less secular than is often presumed" (Esposito, 1992:212).

Among many Western observers there is a tendency to understand Islamic revivalism as simply extremism and terrorism. Indeed, this fear of fundamentalism is fed by
commentators who claim Islam and the West are on a collision course. Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard professor, forecasts a "clash of civilizations" between "The West and the rest". Willie Claes, former Secretary-General of NATO claims that "Islamic fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism". Even Newt Gingrich, speaker of the House of Representatives, urges the US to establish "a coherent strategy for fighting Islamic totalitarianism" (Economist, March 5, 1995:35). Author Benjamin Barber argues in Jihad versus McWorld (1995) that the main conflicts now and in the future will be between [Islamic] cultural values and a world of [Western] technology and consumerism. As Edward W. Said, a distinguished Muslim critic has claimed, "today Islam is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and this tension establishes a framework radically limiting knowledge of Islam" (Said, 1981:155).

Since fundamentalism is thriving in the late 20th Century it must be acknowledged and addressed. This trend may be a challenge to the modern, liberal, secular ideas of the West, but it presents a viable alternative in many parts of the Muslim world. Political Islam is here to stay and the West must come to terms with it. Although fundamentalism may vary from country to country, Pakistan is an excellent case study with which to assess the actual impact of religion on society and politics over time. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that fundamentalist goals will gravitate from revolution to reform if their exponents are allowed to participate in the political process. This thesis' examination of the Jamaat-i-Islami's fifty years of participation in Pakistan's political process largely corroborates this explanation. Throughout Pakistan's history, the Jamaat's ideology has infiltrated civil society and enriched political debate. A demographic explosion, economic inequality, lack of national identity, failure of western political models and the inability of elites to produce a strong, prosperous society have all contributed to the significant social impact
fundamentalism has had in Pakistani society. However, the factors that promote fundamentalism are not those which sustain it.

As an organization, the Jamaat has grown and changed over time. It is a prime example of the fundamentalist trend in contemporary Islam. Over fifty years the Jamaat has influenced politics in Pakistan, but has failed to control them. The public has become immunized to fundamentalist revolutionary rhetoric as the Jamaat has moved from a purely ideological orientation to the compromise and accommodation involved in party politics. Although Islam has rooted itself deeply and pervasively in Pakistani society, the fundamentalists have never achieved electoral success. Nevertheless, the Jamaat’s political involvement is important and likely to continue since the organization has proved effective in mobilization and in the role of moral guardian. Its real contribution has been its ability to influence the nature of Islamization in Pakistan. The emergence, growth, ideology and organization of the Jamaat provide excellent illustrations of how fundamentalism can change in modern Islam when goals gravitate from revolution to reform. As Donald Eugene Smith (1990:44) claims, “oppositional politics is the forte of religion and the arena in which it has its greatest successes”. In Pakistan, fundamentalism has become part of the mainstream because it has been allowed to be part of the political process.
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