NATURALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MORAL MATURITY

by

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B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1992

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Department of Psychology

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December 1996

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Abstract

By examining folk conceptions of moral maturity, this project sought a more comprehensive understanding of moral excellence than Kohlberg's emphasis on principled justice reasoning. Study 1 and 2 involved different samples of 120 adults (17-25, 35-55, and 65+ years). Study 3 involved a sample of 180 undergraduates. In Study 1, a free-listing procedure was used to generate the attributes of a "highly moral person," as well as those for two related person-concepts. In Study 2, a rating procedure for these attributes was used to generate a prototype of a highly moral person. In Study 3, a similarity-sorting task was used to uncover laypeople's implicit typology of moral maturity. The findings suggest that naturalistic notions of moral excellence not only contain themes of principled reasoning, but also reference aspects of moral character and virtue that enlarge our understanding of the psychological functioning of the mature moral agent.

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Acknowledgements

Rare are people who so bless our lives with kindness and care that our deepest responses become similarly fashioned. On this account it is nearly impossible to fully acknowledge all that my friend and mentor, Larry Walker, has given to me. Among other things, he has stuck with me in times of illness and despair, he has shared with me his home and family, and has demonstrated a depth and scientific rigor nonpareil. If I manage to do a measure of these things with my own students, I hope it will be seen as much Larry's legacy as my own.

In a similar way, I want to acknowledge my parents' support and love. It ain't easy to have a graduate school son.

Michael Chandler, too, deserves thanks for his mentorship. He has shown me that psychological science can be used to pursue fundamental problems in the human condition. Also, as a member of my thesis committee, Jim Russell, provided many helpful suggestions in this endeavor.

To my friends, Karl, Chris, Andrew, and Kyle - without your support I wouldn't have made it. An old professor of mine once stated that the three most important things in life are friendship, benevolence, and love; you have shown me that friendship is of the highest value.

This research was facilitated by a research grant to Lawrence J. Walker from the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada (410-94-1105) whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

Introduction

Riding piggyback on the shoulders of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1984), contemporary moral development researchers see moral excellence primarily as the ability to use a principled form of justice reasoning to resolve hypothetical moral dilemmas. Kohlberg's commitments to the "formalist" tradition within philosophy (which is essentially concerned with the regulation of conflicting claims among persons over matters of what is right, fair, or obligatory) and the "structuralist" tradition within psychology (which is primarily concerned with the stage-like development of cognitive abilities) led him and indeed the field to focus on the study of moral reasoning development through what was hypothesized to be an invariant and hierarchical series of six structural stages, in which individuals could be stage-typed according to their reasoned resolution of a moral quandary.

The highest stage of moral reasoning entails dilemma-busting principles of justice wherein individuals assume the "original position" or the "veil of ignorance," proposed by Kantians as an ideal reciprocal role-taking stance which "involves temporarily separating the actual identities of persons from their claims and interests in order to assess what would be the relative merits of those claims and interests from the point of view of any person implicated in the dilemma" (Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990, p. 167). If this formalist description of moral excellence seems otherworldly, it may be. Data from probed interviews yielded at best flimsy and suggestive evidence for Stage 6, but this only heightened the "mystery and majesty" of the moral summit (Puka, 1990), rather than providing a clear and convincing account of moral maturity.

That Kohlberg's model cannot provide a fully detailed and compelling description of moral excellence is becoming evident, but to expose this flaw in Kohlberg's project is, in some ways, to miss its core dimensions and heritage. Kohlberg (1981) did have a deep appreciation and respect for the lives of those he cherished as heroes of moral action (Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Abraham Lincoln, Socrates, and the lesser known Janusz Korczak), but his conceptual emphasis on their justice reasoning leaves an impoverished understanding of these

moral exemplars and how their morality was embodied in everyday life.

Even though most have praised Kohlberg for single-handedly dismissing what was the philosophical naivete in earlier psychological studies of morality, some (Blasi, 1990; Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Flanagan, 1991; Oser, 1996) now claim that his embrace of one preferred philosophical program (or another) has led to negative consequences including: (a) a restrictive philosophical emphasis on the moral concepts of justice and fairness; (b) a narrow conception of the moral agent that emphasizes cognition and ignores affect, behavior, and character; and (c) a failure to adequately take a phenomenological perspective on individuals' subjective experiences of morality. Thus, Blasi (1990, p. 45) claimed that "psychologists may risk missing a large portion of ... people's moral life when they are rigidly guided by definitions constructed within specific philosophical theories." Some researchers have attempted to broaden the psychological study of morality and build a better paradigm by focusing on the moral self (Blasi, 1983, 1984, 1993; Wren & Noam, 1993) or the moral personality (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Flanagan, 1991; Walker & Hennig, in press). This broadening interest represents a challenge to the "content phobia" of the Kohlbergian tradition (Noam, 1990, p. 377). For so long moral development researchers feared to elevate notions of "self" or similar "soft" processes alongside the "hard" structures of moral judgment because any such talk was all too easily scorned as a "character-based" view of morality - a line of research Kohlberg excoriated as a "bag-of-virtues" approach. But when psychologists or philosophers abstract too heavily from the hurly-burly of people's lives and conceive of morality in narrow formalist terms, they ignore "the fact that in many cultures, including our own, what we call morality also sets out a conception of a good person, of mature individual personality, and of a good life" (Flanagan, 1991, p. 17).

Thus, research bounded by a priori definitions of morality has restricted our understanding of moral functioning and so, not surprisingly, there have been increasingly frequent calls for a return to a definition of morality that includes a "common language understanding of what's morally relevant" (Blasi, 1990, p. 40). At a time when moral psychology finds itself between paradigms, it seems particularly appropriate to examine what

laypeople think constitutes moral excellence without imposing philosophical constraints. It is anticipated that the psychological analysis of folk theories of moral maturity - notions embedded in common understandings and ordinary language - can provide a broad survey of those ideas of moral excellence operating in everyday life but absent in contemporary moral development theory and research. This is the primary purpose of the present research.

There has been only limited research on the psychological functioning of people deemed to display lives of moral excellence. For example, psychobiographies of the lives of moral heroes such as Gandhi (Erikson, 1969) and St. Ignatius Loyola (Meissner, 1992) have provided some insights. More empirically, Oliner and Oliner (1988) attempted to construct a psychological profile of those who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. Extensive interviews and self-report measures revealed a number of striking patterns. Although moral principles did prove a catalyst for action in a minority of cases, the portrait of a moral exemplar was more typically of one fully engaged within a community of caring relationships and with a strong sense of attachment to others outside of one's immediate circle. Another relevant study was reported by Hart and Fegley (1995) who explored the self-concepts of a sample of adolescents displaying exceptional levels of prosocial behavior. They found that these "caring" adolescents, in comparison to a matched group, displayed greater continuity in their self-concepts, their actual selves were more likely to incorporate their ideal selves, and their self-attributions were more likely to include moral personality traits and goals. Strikingly, the two groups of adolescents did not differ in terms of stage of moral reasoning.

Likewise, Colby and Damon's (1992) recent study of moral excellence showed that their moral exemplars were not particularly distinguished in terms of principled moral reasoning: half of the sample evidenced reasoning on Kohlberg's dilemma-based measure that was clearly at the conventional level (Stages 3 and 4). In their landmark study, a small sample of people were identified as leading lives of extraordinary moral commitment and action based on the nominations of a panel of ethical experts who had formulated a set of criteria for moral excellence. Colby and Damon's case-study analysis revealed that these moral exemplars shared

a number of characteristics (beyond the ordinariness of their moral reasoning): (a) an active receptiveness to progressive social influence and a continuing capacity for change throughout their life; (b) considerable certainty about moral values and principles, combined with persistent truth-seeking and open-mindedness; (c) great positivity, humility, love for all people, and an underlying faith; and (d) a uniting of self and morality (reflecting the exemplars' identity) - a fusion between the personal and moral aspects of life. Colby and Damon's study reveals that people's reflections on hypothetical moral dilemmas do not capture the dynamic fullness of moral excellence, and this shortcoming challenges researchers to devise new ways to assess moral functioning and character. Despite the insights yielded by this study, it should be recognized that these exemplars were selected because they fit experts' criteria for moral excellence (again imposing some a priori biases); and indeed, there is some evidence that experts define a domain more narrowly than do laypeople (Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981).

Finally, Walker, Pitts, Hennig, and Matsuba (1995) reported a study in which participants were asked to nominate highly moral people (without any restrictions on these nominations) and to justify their choices. Although exemplars in the predictable categories of humanitarians and social activists were found, the most frequent categories were family members and friends. Many participants expressed distrust of the public persona of visible or historical figures, preferring to identify people whose moral character and actions they could more easily and directly judge. A content analysis of the characteristics used to justify these nominations indicated that the exemplars were identified more for their character, virtues, and behavior than for their sophisticated moral judgment ability.

Despite such suggestive findings, it needs to be recognized, however, that experts such as moral philosophers have had limited success in providing a compelling portrait of the moral ideal. The absence of such a single, definitive picture of moral excellence might be a result of the antagonism between the different canons of moral thought. Kantians, for example, favor the purity of inner motivation and principled reasoning; Aristotelians emphasize character and

virtue; and Utilitarians, while elevating the importance of inner motivational states, more directly use the calculus of the greatest good to determine moral excellence (Blum, 1988; Frankena, 1973). Each of these strands only hint at what a full-bodied portrait of the morally ideal life might look. Worse still, when the highest value of each tradition is made to take on flesh and blood, some philosophers say the result is unattractive (Wolf, 1982), uninspiring (Anscombe, 1958; Blum, 1988), bizarre (Flanagan, 1991), or far too thin to describe a real person living an exemplary moral life (MacIntyre, 1981). What unites such in-house critics is this: the conviction that ethical theory in one form or another has isolated itself from common everyday experience and even remote standards of psychological possibility in constructing ethical ideals.

Along these lines, an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Quinn, Houts, & Graesser, 1994; Walker et al., 1995) and moral philosophy (Flanagan, 1991; Thomas, 1989) attempts to constrain ethical theories by an empirically informed account of not only how people themselves understand the moral domain, but also the psychological processes involved in moral functioning. Called *psychological realism* by Flanagan (1991), this program endeavors to move between an ethics that is too realistic - too much contingent upon the vagaries of psychological research or leaving no room for ideals - and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to the psychological functioning of people caught in the demands of everyday life. This to-and-fro is the is-ought hopscotch, and every psychologist and philosopher working in the area of ethics must learn the jig. Psychological realism in ethics demands a consideration of moral excellence that is rooted in psychological or perceived possibility. To flesh out the moral ideals "possible" or "perceived to be possible for creatures like us" (Flanagan, 1991, p. 32), moral psychology can pursue different lines of inquiry. One approach, as discussed above, is to subject those identified as moral exemplars to a battery of tests, interviews, and the like to provide a fuller description of the actual psychological factors involved in moral excellence (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995). A complementary approach, and the one pursued here, is to examine naturalistic notions of moral excellence embedded in everyday language and common

understandings, what could be called a lay theory of moral maturity. Not only does a psychological analysis of laypeople's notions of moral excellence dovetail with the recent philosophical push for a greater psychological realism in ethics and the growing resistance in moral psychology to a priori starting-points, but also such an examination fits with a significant trend in psychology which sees implicit psychological theories as important in their own right and as needed complements to explicit theories.

The importance of lay theories can be seen in the psychological study of intellectual functioning. Like morality, intelligence is an elusive concept, and few other domains have been characterized in as many different ways (Neisser et al., 1996). The dominant psychometric approach has emphasized the assessment of academic and spatial abilities. Lately, however, researchers examining lay theories of intellectual functioning (Sternberg et al., 1981) have found a greater emphasis on some everyday but previously understudied aspects of intelligence, what could be called common sense and social competence; and research on the psychological underpinnings of practical intelligence has since flourished (Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995). In similar research in a related domain, Holliday and Chandler (1986) found that laypeople's notions of wisdom not only provided a needed counterweight to the prevailing Piagetian notion that intellectual development reaches its zenith in formal operations, but also showed that wisdom can be seen as a mature marker of adult intellectual competency which involves broader components than a narrow ability to perform sophisticated forms of scientific reasoning.

Not only in the areas of intelligence and wisdom have lay theories served an important role in further understanding complex psychological constructs, but also in the domains of love and commitment (Fehr, 1988), intimate relationships (Fletcher & Thomas, 1996), and delinquency (Furnham & Henderson, 1983). Likewise, an implicit theory of moral maturity is important in its own right because: (a) Moral language terms are frequently used in everyday discourse and it would be useful to know what people mean when they use such terms. (b) On a regular basis, people make moral evaluations of self and others, and it is worthwhile to know the

psychological basis on which these evaluation are made. (c) It is informative to know how a particular folk theory compares with measures derived from explicit psychological theories. (d) And implicit theories may point to aspects of moral functioning that theories of moral development should incorporate. Since moral psychology does not have an adequate understanding or survey of moral excellence, this study will provide a base of consensual knowledge about the everyday understanding of what it means to be a highly moral person.

In the present research, the notion of laypeople's implicit theory of moral excellence is meant to refer to (a) the descriptions that are employed to identify the range of abilities, attitudes, interests, traits and values perceived as characteristic of a highly moral person, and (b) the beliefs that are held concerning how these descriptions represent a typology of moral excellence. As in most research on "lay" understandings of psychological constructs, a lay theory of moral excellence is inferred from spontaneous descriptions and expectations laypeople hold about what it means to be a highly moral person. The first step usually involves collecting a broad survey of domain-specific descriptor items, and subsequent studies attempt to uncover in various ways how laypeople use such a large, motley collection of items to make sense of a particular psychological construct.

In this study, conceptions of moral excellence will be compared with conceptions of religious and spiritual excellence. Kohlberg paid scant attention to notions of religion and spirituality because of the perceived need to establish the legitimacy of his enterprise and because of the American requirement of an areligious moral education program. However, despite claiming that morality is independent of other domains, like religion and spirituality, Kohlberg (1981; Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990) did posit a "soft" Stage 7 that was meant to answer existential questions such as "Why be moral?" by moving beyond Stage 6 justice notions to "meaning found in metaethical, metaphysical, and religious epistemologies" (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, p. 41). More recently, however, the possibility of some meaningful connection between moral maturity and matters of faith was suggested by Colby and Damon's (1992) serendipitous finding that most (80%) of the moral exemplars in their study attributed their core

value commitments to their religious faith - which was particularly surprising given that the experts' nominating criteria did not mention anything in this regard. Likewise, in Walker et al.'s (1995) study in which participants nominated moral exemplars, a sizable number of religious founders and religious leaders were identified, and these nominations of highly moral people were frequently justified by religious and spiritual attributes. In another part of this study, participants were interviewed about a series of real-life moral conflicts from their own experience, and many expressed reliance on notions of religion, faith, and spirituality in handling such everyday conflicts. For these people, morality and spirituality were not separate and independent domains, rather all aspects of morality (values, lifestyle, relationships) were governed by their religious experience and belief. Thus, it seems appropriate to compare laypeople's understanding of the relations across these domains.

This study will further examine whether the notions of moral, religious, and spiritual excellence change across the adult life-span. There is evidence that implicit theories of intelligence (Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Cornelius, 1984) and wisdom (Clayton & Birren, 1980) change over the life-span. In light of these empirical findings and the intuition that moral excellence requires nuanced social understandings derived from lived experience, this research will include samples of young, middle-aged, and older adults in an attempt to detect developmental or cohort differences. Also, in view of the recent controversy over gender differences in moral reasoning and the claimed indifference of Kohlberg's model to certain themes females put forward as morally salient (Flanagan, 1991; Gilligan, 1982; Walker, 1995), this research will attempt to give voice to both male and female perspectives.

Thus, the general purpose of this research was to examine laypeople's conceptions of moral, religious, and spiritual excellence. This was accomplished through a sequence of three studies. Study 1 was intended to provide a broad survey of those characteristics and attributes which laypeople see as descriptive of a "highly moral" person, a "highly religious" person, and a "highly spiritual" person, using a free-listing procedure in which participants generated descriptors of these person-concepts. These characteristics and attributes were then distilled,

using an established set of judgment rules, into descriptors lists for each person-concept to be used in the second study.

The purpose of Study 2 was to determine whether laypeople construe such a constellation of descriptors as a prototype-organized concept. Participants in this study rated the prototypicality of the set of descriptors for each person-concept. The prediction is that the concept of "highly moral" person can be structured as a prototype-organized construct, just as other person-concepts like "intelligent" person (Sternberg et al., 1981), "wise" person (Holliday & Chandler, 1986), and "extroverted" person (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). This means that the concept "highly moral" person will be constituted by a series of characteristic behavior and feature descriptors which vary in terms of typicality, high prototypicality ratings designating that laypeople see the features as highly characteristic and low prototypicality indicating the opposite. Research on social concept prototypes not only reveal a way of understanding the dynamics of how social concept prototypes serve to guide people's informal everyday assessment of others (Smith & Zarate, 1990), but also how they provide a window into people's rich informal theories on complex psychological constructs in the social world. While Kohlberg's paradigm elevates the role of principled reasoning in moral excellence, the prototype of a "highly moral" person will reveal those characteristics that laypeople think are the most central features of the character of a highly moral person. As noted above, this research will examine the relations among the concepts of moral, religious, and spiritual excellence. Presuming that laypeople will generate some attributes that are unique to each person-concept, as well as some attributes that are shared across person-concepts, prototype theory (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981) holds that the pattern of prototypicality ratings for such unique and shared attributes can illuminate the relations among these domains. (Specific predictions in this regard will be presented in a later section.)

Study 3 was built upon the findings of the previous two studies that revealed the prototypes for these three concepts. The purpose of Study 3 was to uncover the not-directly-observable typology laypeople use to categorize the characteristics of highly moral, religious,

and spiritual people. In this study, a similarity-sorting procedure was used in which participants grouped sets of descriptors for each target person-concept, and then these sorts were subjected to data reduction techniques which should reveal the dimensions and clusters used in categorization. These findings should provide a parsimonious typology by which we can better understand commonly held conceptions of moral excellence.

Study 1: Free Listing

The purpose of this study was to generate descriptors for three person-concepts: a highly moral, a highly religious, and a highly spiritual person, without imposing any constraints. This free-listing procedure was meant to serve as a counterweight to the trend in moral psychology where researchers have examined moral thought using philosophical standards without showing that such standards represent laypeople's notions.

Participants

A relatively large sample of 120 people participated in this study in an attempt to generate extensive lists of descriptors for each person-concept. These participants were drawn in equal numbers from three age groups (early, middle, and later adulthood), with each group balanced for gender. These participants were primarily recruited through university classes (including non-credit courses for retired people), although some cells were filled through personal contacts. No compensation was given for participation.

The younger adults ranged from 17 to 24 years of age ($M = 20.3$, $SD = 1.6$), the middle-aged adults were between 35 and 55 years ($M = 43.1$, $SD = 4.8$), and the older adults ranged from 65 to 91 years ($M = 74.4$, $SD = 6.5$). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was predominantly Caucasian (88%), with the remainder Oriental (10%), and East Indian (2%). In terms of formal religious affiliation, the sample was predominantly Christian (78%), although representing 10 different denominations. The remainder either had no religious affiliation (19%) or were Buddhists (2%) or Sikhs (2%). These participants were generally well-educated: only 2% had high school or less, 44% had some college or university education, 23% had completed a

bachelor's degree, 17% a master's degree, and 14% a doctorate. The *Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale* (SIOPS; Treiman, 1977) was used to assess participants' socioeconomic status. The mean SIOPS score was 53.6, representing occupations such as librarian and commercial artist ($SD = 13.0$; range = 33 - 78).

Procedure

Individuals completed a questionnaire that first asked for demographic information, and then prompted them to "write down the characteristics and attributes of a highly moral [or religious or spiritual] person," with a full page provided for their responses for each person-concept. Participants were asked to generate attributes for all three person-concepts, and the order of presentation of these was randomized for each participant. This questionnaire typically took 15-30 mins to complete.

Descriptor Judging Process

The responses given as descriptors for each concept were formed into non-redundant category descriptor lists in a three-stage process of transcribing participants' responses, grouping synonymous or thematically related descriptors, and eliminating idiosyncratic and low frequency responses. Once the responses for each concept were transcribed verbatim, an established set of judgment rules (adapted from Fehr, 1988, and Holliday, 1983) was used to distill descriptor lists. These rules involved: (a) Compound phrases were divided into separate descriptors if each could stand alone (e.g., "fair and tolerant" was split into "fair" and "tolerant"). (b) Modifiers were dropped (e.g., "very loving" became "loving"). (c) Nouns were converted to adjective forms if possible (e.g., "pride" became "proud"). (d) Words or phrases that were judged to be synonymous in meaning were collapsed. The strategy here was to be conservative in maintaining possibly subtle distinctions, but not to treat words or phrases that were clearly redundant as separate attributes. Consensus among three judges was required for the collapsing of descriptors into single attributes. (e) The less frequent descriptor in direct antonym pairs was eliminated (e.g., if both "tolerant" and "intolerant" were provided as responses, the one less frequently generated was eliminated). This was only done for grammatically direct antonyms

and not for indirect ones (e.g., "fair" and "biased"). (f) Idiosyncratic responses, ones that could not be collapsed with some other thematically related descriptor, were dropped from the final descriptor list for each concept, as were those occurring with low frequency (defined as ≤ 3).

Results

The total number of attributes yielded by the 120 participants' free listing was 1249 for the target "highly moral" person, 1234 for "highly religious" person, and 1440 for "highly spiritual" person (i.e., averaging 10.4, 10.3, and 12.0 responses per participant for each of these person-concepts, respectively). In order to analyze the relation of age and gender to the number of attributes produced, as well as differences across these person-concepts, a 3 (age group) $\times$ 2 (gender) $\times$ 3 (person-concept) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis revealed a main effect for age, $F(2,114) = 4.36$, $p < .05$, and a main effect for person-concept, $F(2,228) = 7.58$, $p < .001$. Subsequent Scheffé multiple comparison tests (with $\alpha = .05$) indicated that older adults produced fewer descriptors on average than the middle-aged group ($M_s = 8.9$ vs. 12.4), whereas the younger adults ($M = 11.4$) did not differ from either group. A similar post hoc analysis indicated that more descriptors were produced for the spiritual target than either the moral or religious ones ($M_s = 12.0$ vs. 10.4 and 10.3, respectively).

The descriptor judging process, described above, yielded lists with approximately the same number of descriptors across the three person-concepts: 91 descriptors for the target "highly moral" person, and 110 descriptors for each of the other two targets. These descriptors and their frequencies can be found in the Appendix.

As anticipated, some of the descriptors were unique to each of the person-concepts, and others were shared (incidentally in relatively balanced numbers): there were 42 unique descriptors for the moral target (e.g., "just"), 50 for the religious target (e.g., "traditional"), and 55 for the spiritual target (e.g., "peaceful"); 37 descriptors were shared between the moral and religious targets (e.g., "hard-working"), 32 were shared between the moral and spiritual targets (e.g., "truthful"), and 43 were shared between the religious and spiritual targets (e.g., "devout");

and 20 were common to all three targets (e.g., "caring").

Discussion

This study reveals that all three person-concepts are salient in people's everyday experience: the total number of attributes extracted from the participants' free listings for these targets greatly exceeds the attribute listings generated using similar procedures in studies examining lay concepts of love and commitment (Fehr, 1988) and wisdom (Holliday & Chandler, 1986), for example. Furthermore, these free listings of attributes were distilled using coding procedures previously detailed, and this process again yielded many more attributes in the present study than in previous ones (cited above) using similar procedures and coding instructions.

The free-listing procedure for the highly moral person-concept was meant to serve as a counterweight to the recent trend in moral psychology where researchers have bounded moral thought with a priori philosophical standards without showing that such standards represent laypeople's notions. Unlike Kohlberg's focus on issues of justice drawn from the liberal philosophy of Rawls, Quinn et al. (1994), in a study of naturalistic conceptions of morality, found that when people were asked the open-ended question, "What does morality mean?" the five most frequent answers reflected not moral principles or maxims, but qualities of persons. In the common-language understanding of the moral domain, moral character seems to play an important role, and Study 1 provides a detailed description of those features central in laypeople's understanding of moral excellence.

The final person-concept descriptor lists deserve comment. In the descriptor list for the moral person-concept, "honest" appears as most frequently generated by laypeople ($N = 61$). This result is similar to previous findings (Walker et al., 1995) which have shown that honesty is a frequently listed characteristic of moral exemplars. Also, descriptors of care (e.g., "caring," "kind") are prominent, as in Walker et al.'s study which found that the most common feature laypeople attributed to moral exemplars was "compassionate/caring." Negative descriptors (e.g. "judgmental," "boring," "rigid") appear, but less frequently. Amid the competing claims of

moral affairs, perhaps it is all too easy for one person's moral exemplar to be another's moral stickler. Also, in the other two person-concept descriptor lists, the most striking theme suggests that while people detail their concept of a "highly spiritual" person with positive descriptors, they attach with some frequency negative descriptors (e.g., "rigid," "self-righteous," "dogmatic") to their concept of a "highly religious" person. The meaning of these descriptors will be explored in further detail once data from the other studies have been presented.

Study 1 answers the question, "What attributes come to mind when laypeople are asked about these person-concepts?" It does not directly answer the question, "How central or important are these attributes to laypeople's concepts of these type of people?" Neither does it explicate the relations laypeople perceive among these person-concepts.

Study 2: Prototypicality Rating

The purpose of this study was to discover the prototype structure of laypeople's conceptions of a "highly moral" person, "highly religious" person, and "highly spiritual" person, and also to uncover the perceived relations among these person-concepts.

Participants

Another sample of 120 people participated in this second study. Again they were drawn in equal numbers from three age groups (early, middle, and later adulthood), with each group balanced for gender. The young adults and some of the middle-aged adults were recruited through university undergraduate classes. However, most of the middle-aged adults and the older adults were recruited through the personal contacts of university students. Course credit was given to university students for their participation and their recruitment of other participants; otherwise, there was no compensation.

The younger adults ranged from 18 to 25 years of age ($M = 22.3$, $SD = 1.8$), the middle-aged adults were between 35 and 55 years ($M = 46.2$, $SD = 6.3$), and the older adults ranged from 65 to 94 years ($M = 70.4$, $SD = 5.9$). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was predominantly Caucasian (68%), with the remainder Oriental (27%), East Indian (4%), Black (1%), and Arabic

(1%). In terms of formal religious affiliation, the sample was predominantly Christian (57%), although representing at least 10 different denominations. The remainder either had no religious affiliation (31%), or were Jews (4%), Buddhists (3%), Sikhs (3%), Hindus (2%), or Muslims (1%). These participants were somewhat less educated than the sample in Study 1: 25% had high school or less, 42% had some college or university education, 23% had completed a bachelor's degree, 8% a master's degree, and 3% a doctorate. The *Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale* (SIOPS; Treiman, 1977) was again used to assess participants' socioeconomic status. The mean SIOPS score was 47.5, similar to Study 1, and representing occupations such as preschool teacher and bank teller ($SD = 11.6$; range = 22 - 78).

Procedure

Individuals completed a questionnaire that first asked for demographic information, and then asked them to provide prototypicality ratings for the descriptors of the three person-concepts, using the descriptor lists derived from Study 1. Each descriptor list was presented on a separate page, with the order of the descriptors randomized for each participant and the order of the target descriptor lists randomized as well. Participants were asked to "rate how characteristic the following descriptors are of a highly moral [or religious or spiritual] person" using a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 (*almost never true*) to 7 (*almost always true*). Participants could also indicate if they were unsure of the meaning of the descriptor. This questionnaire typically took 30-45 mins to complete.

Results

The mean prototypicality ratings (on the 7-point scale) for all descriptors relating to each person-concept are provided in the Appendix (in order of descending prototypicality), as well as the percentage of participants who were unsure of the meaning of particular descriptors. Only two descriptors were problematic in terms of their unfamiliarity (exceeding the criterion of 25%): "proselytizing" and "pharisaic," both terms with low prototypicality ratings for the religious person-concept.

In order to assess the strength of age group and gender differences, a 3 (age group) x 2

(gender) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted over the prototypicality ratings within each of the three descriptor lists. These MANOVAs revealed no main effects for, nor interactions with, the age-group factor; and so this variable was omitted from further analyses. The MANOVA for the moral person-concept revealed an effect for gender, $F(91,24) = 2.45, p < .01$; however, the MANOVAs for the other two person-concepts revealed no gender effects. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs of the descriptors for the moral person-concept revealed that there were significant gender differences on 22 of the 91 descriptors, with females consistently providing higher prototypicality ratings on these descriptors (with the exception of the two negative descriptors, "judgmental" and "stubborn"). Thus, it seems that women depict a "highly moral" person in a more positive light than do men, rather than that they view different attributes as being particularly characteristic of the person-concept. The minimal nature of the gender differences is indicated by the extremely strong correlations between men's and women's prototypicality ratings: $r = .87$ across descriptors for the moral target, $.92$ for the religious target, and $.89$ for the spiritual target. Nevertheless, gender was retained as a variable in subsequent analyses because of the significant multivariate effect for the moral person-concept.

The next set of analyses were used to explore the relation among laypeople's concepts of a "highly moral" person, "highly religious" person, and "highly spiritual" person. Obviously these concepts are not identical since they do not involve the same set of attributes; indeed, each has a sizable number of unique attributes. These concepts are not completely independent since they do share a sizable number of attributes as well. Neither is any concept simply a component of or subsumed by another since in that case one concept's attributes would simply be a subset of the other's. Thus, it seems that the relation among these concepts is that they are overlapping but not synonymous, since there are some unique and some shared features for each. Recall that according to prototype theory (Fehr, 1988; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981), it is possible that although people use several of the same attributes to describe the target person-concepts, they still could see the relation among these concepts in different ways: (a) If the concepts are largely independent, then unique features of a concept should be considered as

central (i.e., prototypical) and shared features with other person-concepts should be seen as peripheral (i.e., less prototypical). (b) If the concepts are moderately independent, then there should not be no real differences in prototypicality ratings between unique and shared features of the person-concepts. (c) And if the person-concepts are partially independent (i.e., more overlapping than independent), then the unique features should be seen as less central to each concept than the shared features; also the correlation of the prototypicality rating (especially for shared features) should be at least of moderate strength.

The mean prototypicality ratings across types of attributes for the three person-concepts are presented in Table 1. The type-of-attribute variable indicates whether the descriptors are unique to that person-concept or shared with one or the other of the two other person-concepts. For example, for the moral person-concept, there are three types of attributes: those unique to moral, those shared with religious, and those shared with spiritual; and so on for the other person-concepts. In order to uncover the relations among these person-concepts, a 2 (gender) x 3 (type of attribute) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the type-of-attribute factor and using prototypicality ratings as the dependent variable, was conducted for each person-concept separately. The ANOVA for the "highly moral" person-concept revealed a main effect for gender, $F(1,118) = 4.42, p < .05$, reflecting the significant multivariate effect for gender reported earlier, with women providing higher prototypicality ratings than men ($M_s = 4.93$ and 4.70). This ANOVA also revealed a main effect for type of attribute, $F(2,236) = 6.25, p < .002$. The ANOVA for the "highly religious" person-concept also revealed a significant effect for type of attribute, $F(2,236) = 15.56, p < .001$. Finally, the ANOVA for the "highly spiritual" person-concept similarly revealed an effect for type of attribute, $F(2,236) = 24.89, p < .001$. This analysis surprisingly also revealed an effect for gender, $F(1,118) = 7.03, p < .01$, with women providing higher prototypicality ratings overall than men ($M_s = 4.94$ and 4.55). This effect was unexpected since there was no significant effect in the group x gender MANOVA over descriptors for the spiritual person-concept reported earlier (indeed in that MANOVA the p -level for the gender effect was .30).

Follow-up analyses of the significant type-of-attribute effect found for each person-concept were conducted with Scheffé multiple comparison tests (with $\alpha = .05$). For the moral person-concept, unique features had significantly higher prototypicality ratings than those features shared with either the religious or spiritual person-concept (which did not differ from each other). According to the reasoning presented earlier, this implies that the concept of a "highly moral" person is largely independent of the other two person-concepts. On the other hand, for both the religious and the spiritual person-concepts, the shared features had significantly higher prototypicality ratings than their unique features, implying that the concepts of a "highly religious" and a "highly spiritual" person are more overlapping than independent of each other and of the concept of a "highly moral" person. Given that these concepts seem to be partially overlapping, it is not surprising that the correlations of shared descriptors between person-concepts are moderately strong: $r = .76$ for the descriptors shared between the moral and religious person-concepts, $.62$ between moral and spiritual person-concepts, and $.60$ between religious and spiritual person-concepts, all $ps < .001$.

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the relations among these person-concepts. Since the highest prototypicality ratings for the moral target are for those attributes that are unique to the concept with lower ratings for those attributes that are shared, the center of the moral "circle" does not include either of the other two targets. On the other hand, since the highest prototypicality ratings for the religious and spiritual targets are for their shared attributes, not their unique ones, the centers for these two circles are inside each other and also within the moral target. That is, the moral person-concept is largely independent of the religious and spiritual person-concepts, whereas they are only partially independent of each other and of the moral one.

Discussion

Research has indicated that prototype theory can serve to illustrate the dynamics of the formal clinical diagnosis of psychological disorders (Genero & Cantor, 1987; Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981), but also how people use prototypes to guide their informal

everyday assessment of others as intelligent (Sternberg et al., 1981), wise (Holliday & Chandler, 1986), and elderly (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981), for example. Recall that the prototype approach suggests that our confidence that a person deserves to be called, say "intelligent," "wise," or "highly moral," depends on that person's overall similarity to an internalized person-concept prototype, just as our confidence that some object is to be classified as "bird" depends on its similarity to the prototype "bird." The more a person manifests attributes matching the person-concept prototype, the more confidently and quickly that person can be identified as a member of a particular social category. As related to this project, a person who manifests many of the attributes in the prototype of a highly moral person will be more quickly and assuredly characterized as highly moral than one who manifests only a few. In this way a prototype of a highly moral person identifies those characteristics most salient in laypeople's understanding of moral excellence.

Inspection of the prototypicality ratings for the descriptors of the moral person-concept suggest some noteworthy themes. The highly prototypical descriptors "has clear values" and "has strong beliefs" resonate with Colby and Damon's finding that moral exemplars showed no evidence of intricate, tortuous cognitive process leading to moral choice, but rather demonstrated certainty amid risk. Great certainty, in moral matters, however, can all too easily be perceived as dogmatism, and laypeople acknowledge the shadowy side of moral certainty with the inclusion of such attributes as "rigid," "self-righteous," "judgmental," "critical," and "stubborn." They rate these adjectives, however, as relatively uncharacteristic of highly moral people. The high prototypicality ratings for the descriptors "self-disciplined," "self-assured," and "self-confident" reveal that laypeople portray moral exemplars as possessing a strong sense of self and personal agency, just as other studies have found (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995). The descriptor falling second in prototypicality ratings, "faithful to spouse" presents a curious finding since two of the most publicly hailed moral exemplars of the 20th century, Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi, are alleged to have failed in this regard (Flanagan, 1991; Juergensmeyer, 1987). Also, the strong evaluations of attributes such as "principled," "maintains high

standards," "has integrity," and "consistency" imply that laypeople see highly moral individuals as ones who show a disposition to act in accord with their moral ideals, principles, or intuitions. Despite appearing as the most frequently cited characteristic of moral exemplars in a previous study on laypeople's understanding of highly moral people (Walker et al., 1995), descriptors of care (e.g., "caring," "kind," "helpful," "considerate," "compassionate") are not among the most prototypic, instead falling somewhere around the median on the descriptor list. A fuller discussion of the prototype for a highly moral person is found in the concluding section of this paper.

A number of researchers have found the effort to define and distinguish between spirituality and religion to be nuanced and thorny because empirical results have shown that the two domains are so closely associated with one another in their core meaning and content (Bergin, 1991; Kelly, 1995). In agreement with this position, the findings in Study 2 revealed that the religious and spiritual person-concepts were more overlapping than independent (i.e., their shared descriptors were seen as significantly more prototypical than the unique descriptors of each concept). Even though laypeople rate "believes in a higher power" as the most central descriptor for each person-concept, they differ on how that affirmation takes shape. In the religious person-concept, the affirmation of a transcendent value is closely joined by explicit traditional Christian references and practices ("tries to know and please God," "church-going," "active in church life," "reads Bible"); whereas in the spiritual person-concept, descriptors referencing such institutional or creedal aspects of religious faith either do not appear or appear as less prototypical. Laypeople appear to distinguish between the two domains as previous researchers have done: Spirituality is seen as some kind of personal affirmation of the transcendent, whereas religion is viewed as the creedal, institutional, and ritual expression of spirituality that is associated with institutional church organizations (Bergin & Jensen, 1990; Kelly, 1995).

The findings of Study 2 revealed that laypeople across the adult life-span do not differ in their prototypicality ratings of descriptors for each person-concept. This suggests that the

conception of moral, religious, and spiritual excellence are similarly held throughout adulthood. Although it was hypothesized that developmental or cohort differences might be evidenced in these person-concepts (given some indications of societal shifts in attitudes toward morality and religion in general), none was found. In light of these findings, age-group differences will not be examined in the subsequent Study 3.

The recent controversy over gender differences in moral psychology has centered on moral reasoning ability (stages or orientations) in response to hypothetical or real-life dilemmas. As an indication of the male-biased nature of Kohlberg's stage theory, one empirical claim (Gilligan, 1982) has stated that women evidence lower stages of moral reasoning than do men. Even though Walker (1984) found no significant gender differences in response to Kohlberg's standard interview, important differences in moral functioning may still be apparent in the moral domain. The evidence of no gender differences in moral reasoning could be met with the counterclaim that Kohlberg's measure only elicits a narrow aspect of moral functioning (i.e., justice reasoning ability) and that important differences in the moral domain lie outside the scope of his endeavor. Perhaps men and women differently value the broader aspects of moral character or personality in their conception of a moral ideal. In contrast to Kohlberg's exclusive focus on moral reasoning ability, the descriptors generated in a free-response procedure in the first study provided a wide-ranging survey of what men and women have voiced as important aspects of moral excellence. Even though in Study 2 women provided higher prototypicality ratings for these descriptors than did men ($M_s = 4.93$ vs. 4.70), both men and women rank ordered the descriptors in a very similar way as evidenced by the extremely strong correlation between their prototypicality ratings ($r = .87$). It appears that both men and women order the descriptors in a like-minded fashion and thus, in many ways, share a conception of a highly moral person as much more alike than different.

Colby and Damon (1992) serendipitously discovered that most of their moral exemplars were deeply religious or spiritual. This was an unexpected finding because the Kohlbergian research tradition has since its beginning driven a wedge between the moral and religious

domains. By closely examining laypeople's understanding, this research attempted to further explicate the perceived relations between the moral, religious, and spiritual domains. The results showed that laypeople's concept of a "highly moral" person is largely independent of their concepts of a "highly religious" and "highly spiritual" person: those features which are unique to the moral person-concept were rated as significantly more prototypical than those moral descriptors shared with either of the other person-concepts. In contrast, analyses revealed that laypeople's concepts of the "highly religious" and "highly spiritual" person are only partially independent of each other and of the moral person-concept.

To uncover the dimensions of psychological constructs researchers have often asked laypeople to generate descriptors of people or domains (e.g., a wise person, a creative person, love). Because lay notions are often much broader than explicit psychological theories, researchers often compare lay notions of related domains in order to distinguish those dimensions most prominent in lay understandings of a particular construct. Love and commitment, for example, may serve as foils for each other; hence Fehr (1988) found that those concepts were partially overlapping, just as in this study lay notions of moral, religious, and spiritual people were.

Even though Kohlberg repeatedly voiced strong claims for the independence of the moral domain, his writings on Stage 7 suggest an intimate connection between the moral, religious, and spiritual domains: This quasi-mystical, religious stage was held to justify the moral principles embedded within Stage 6; and among those chosen by Kohlberg for their moral excellence were those who were also acclaimed for their religious and spiritual achievements. Laypeople, too, see the concepts of moral, religious, and spiritual excellence as related but asymmetrical. Their notions imply that to be a "highly moral" person one does not need to manifest characteristics central to a "highly religious" person or "highly spiritual" person. Laypeople see moral virtues as relatively independent of religious or spiritual ones. The reverse, however, is not true. To be a "highly religious" person or a "highly spiritual" person, one does need to show many of the characteristics of a "highly moral" person. It seems that a core characteristic of what it means to

be a "highly religious" person and "highly spiritual" person is to manifest moral character. This finding reflects the fact that moral guidelines for conduct have always been a central component of religious teachings, where to be a religious or spiritual exemplar usually involves following the ethical requirements woven into a particular faith tradition.

Study 3: Similarity Sorting

Even though Study 2 revealed those descriptors which laypeople see as most central to the given person-concepts, its methodology cannot reveal how laypeople group the multifarious collection into a manageable typology. Study 3 attempts to uncover laypeople's implicit typology of moral, religious, and spiritual descriptors by using a similarity-sorting task in which participants freely group the descriptors which they believe belong together. Data reduction techniques, namely hierarchical cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling were then used to discern the latent structure of laypeople's implicit typologies. Because of the consistent absence of developmental/cohort effects in Study 2, only a single age group was recruited to participated in this third study.

Participants

A sample of 180 undergraduate students participated in this study, none of whom had participated in the previous studies. Unlike the previous two studies, this involved a between-subjects design in which different groups of students did the similarity-sort task for each of the three sets of person-concept descriptors, with each group of 60 students balanced for gender. Most students received course credit for their participation.

These participants averaged 21.3 years of age ($SD = 4.5$, range = 17-46). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was primarily Oriental (52%) and Caucasian (43%), with the remainder East Indian (5%) and Canadian Indian (1%). About half of the sample (51%) had no formal religious affiliation; the majority of the remainder were Christian (39%), representing nine different denominations. Other religions represented in the sample were: Buddhist (5%), Sikh (2%), and Muslim, Hindu, and Bahai (each 1%).

Procedure

The descriptor lists generated by the free-listing task in Study 1 and used in the prototypicality-rating task of Study 2 involved between 91 and 110 attributes. To use these numbers of attributes in a similarity sort would represent quite a formidable task. In order to avoid subject-fatigue effects, it was decided to use the 50 most prototypic attributes within each list for the similarity-sorting task. This is a somewhat arbitrary number, but more than adequate for the statistical techniques employed here and certainly one that includes the most representative descriptors for each person-concept.

The 50 descriptors for each person-concept were printed on small (approximately 4 x 7 cm) cards. After providing demographic information, participants were asked "to sort these cards into categories representing your best judgments about which characteristics are similar to each other and which are different from each other." Further instructions clarified that they could make as few or as many categories as they saw fit, and putting as few or as many cards in each group. This task typically took 15-20 mins to complete. Recall that this was a between-subjects design, with different participants doing the similarity sort for each person-concept.

Results

For each participant's similarity sort, a 50 x 50 co-occurrence matrix was constructed, with 1 indicating that two attributes were placed in the same category and 0 indicating that they were not. These matrices were then summed across participants for use in data analyses. Two somewhat complementary data reduction techniques were used here, both with the same set of co-occurrence matrices: hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) and multidimensional scaling (MDS). HCA is an agglomerative statistical technique that generates clusters of attributes based on the pattern of association among terms in the co-occurrence matrix derived from participants' similarity-sort groupings. MDS is a statistical technique that generates a map of the location of attributes relative to each other, based on an appropriate number of dimensions, as a function of their dissimilarity as given by the co-occurrence matrix. Note that the HCA procedure does not readily provide an examination of gender differences in the similarity-sort; however, certain

MDS procedures do allow for a description of the differential weighting by men and women of the dimensions derived to represent the data.

Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). The co-occurrence matrix for each of the three person-concepts was submitted to cluster analysis, using the between-group average-linkage clustering method based on squared Euclidean distances. No standard interpretive procedure exists for deciding how many clusters to retain from the agglomerative clustering procedure. A balance, however, must be struck between maximizing the solution's interpretability and minimizing the distance between adjacent cluster solutions in the agglomerative clustering process. A six-cluster solution for the characteristics of a "highly moral" person seemed to do both: this constellation of clusters is interpretable, and a large distance coefficient increase occurs between the six- and the five-cluster solution.

The attributes comprising each of the six clusters for the moral person-concept are presented in Table 2, along with a summary label for each cluster. The typology of attributes for a highly moral person is: (a) principled/idealistic, (b) dependable, (c) has integrity, (d) caring, (e) fair, and (f) confident. These labels, of course, represent our attempts to capture the essence of the attributes comprising each cluster.

Similarly, a six-cluster solution for the characteristics of a highly religious person was derived; and the attributes comprising each of these clusters are presented in Table 3, along with a summary label for each cluster. The typology of attributes for a highly religious person is: (a) active in church life, (b) committed/ethical, (c) traditional, (d) caring, (e) steadfast, and (f) dogmatic.

Finally, the clustering procedure yielded a six-cluster solution for the characteristics of a highly spiritual person; and the attributes comprising each of these clusters are presented in Table 4, along with a summary label for each cluster. The typology of attributes for a highly spiritual person is: (a) devout, (b) committed, (c) meditative, (d) contented, (e) trustworthy, and (f) caring.

In order to determine the relative importance laypeople attach to each cluster in their

person-concept typologies, the prototypicality ratings (generated in Study 2) for all the attributes within a cluster were averaged. These mean prototypicality ratings for each cluster are also presented in Tables 2-4. A 2 (gender) x 6 (cluster) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted for each of the three person-concepts, with repeated measures on the cluster factor, and using prototypicality ratings as the dependent variable. The analysis for the moral person-concept revealed a main effect for cluster, $F(5,590) = 16.18, p < .001$; indicating that these clusters of attributes are differentially central in people's conception of a highly moral person. A Scheffé multiple-comparison test (with $\alpha = .05$) revealed the significant differences across these clusters (see Table 2). Thus, the most prototypic clusters of attributes for a highly moral person are the principled/idealistic and dependable ones.

The ANOVA for the religious person-concept also revealed a main effect of cluster, $F(5,590) = 30.13, p < .001$; as well as an interaction between gender and cluster, $F(5,590) = 3.07, p < .01$. The locus of this interaction was determined by analyses of the simple main effect of gender for each of the six clusters. Only one significant gender difference was revealed; women had higher prototypicality ratings on the committed/ethical cluster than did men ($M_s = 5.57$ and 5.17), $F(1,118) = 5.51, p < .05$. A Scheffé multiple-comparison test was used to examine the main effect for the cluster factor in this analysis (the significant differences across clusters are reported in Table 3). Thus, the most prototypic clusters of attributes for a highly religious person are: active in church life, committed/ethical, and traditional.

Finally, the ANOVA for the spiritual person-concept revealed main effects for both gender, $F(1,118) = 7.11, p < .01$; and for cluster, $F(5,590) = 3.39, p < .005$. As was found in an earlier analysis of prototypicality ratings (Study 2), women regarded a highly spiritual person in more positive terms than did men ($M_s = 5.30$ and 4.90). A Scheffé multiple-comparison test was used to examine the main effect for the cluster factor; however, no significant differences across the prototypicality ratings for the spiritual person-concept were found. Thus, these clusters should be regarded as equally descriptive of a highly spiritual person. Note that the range of prototypicality ratings for this person-concept (Table 4) is much smaller than for the other two.

Multidimensional scaling (MDS). For each person-concept, a MDS procedure was employed to analyze the similarity-sort data. This technique arranges points representing attributes along orthogonal axes such that the distance between any two points reflects the frequency with which the items co-occur. Interpretation of the MDS person-concept maps involves informed conjecture about the possible structure participants imposed on the descriptor items in their sorting. The interpretive process attempts to identify implicit dimensional axes around which points may be configured.

Given the suggestion of gender differences that was evidenced in the prototypicality ratings of Study 2, a nonmetric individual differences scaling model (INDSCAL) was adopted as the MDS procedure in order to describe differences between men and women in their dimensional depiction of the attributes of these person-concepts. (Note that gender differences cannot be statistically examined with the previous HCA procedure.) This MDS procedure was applied to the dissimilarity matrices of men and women for each of the three person-concepts. An examination of the Kruskal stress values for successive dimensional solutions indicated that a two-dimensional solution provided a good fit to the data in each case; with relatively low stress values of .14, .13, and .17 for the moral, religious, and spiritual person-concepts, respectively, and with final R^2 values (which indicate the proportion of variance accounted for in the two-dimensional solution) of .91, .92, and .90.

The MDS-derived two-dimensional solution of the similarity-sort data for the concept of a "highly moral" person yielded dimensional coordinates for the various attributes which are presented in Table 2, grouped according to the clusters derived by the HCA procedure. Examination of these coordinates suggests that these attributes are organized along the two dimensions of a self/other orientation and an external/internal orientation. The first dimension is anchored at the "self" end by attributes such as "self-assured," "self-confident," and "self-disciplined," reflecting personal agency; and is anchored at the "other" end by attributes such as "caring," "thoughtful," and "sincere," reflecting a focus on care for others. The second dimension is anchored at the "external" end by attributes such as "tries to obey the Ten

Commandments" and "law-abiding," reflecting an orientation to maintenance of external moral standards; whereas the "internal" end of the dimension is anchored by attributes such as "confident," "dependable," and "conscientious." The self/other dimension was of substantially greater importance than the external/internal dimension in representing people's sorts of these attributes (.72 for the first dimension vs. .19 for the second). In terms of gender differences, women weighted the self/other dimension somewhat more heavily than men (.94 vs. .75), whereas men weighted the external/internal dimension more heavily than women (.59 vs. .16). (Note that there is no inferential statistic available to test the significance of this gender difference.)

The dimensional coordinates for the various attributes of the religious person-concept are presented in Table 3, again grouped according to the clusters derived by the previous HCA procedure. Examination of these coordinates suggests that these attributes are organized along the two dimensions of a divine/other orientation and a devout/authoritarian orientation. The first dimension is anchored at the "divine" end by attributes such as "dependent on God," "active in church life," and "worshipful," reflecting a focus on the divine; and is anchored at the "other" end by attributes such as "caring," "loving," and "helpful," reflecting a focus on care for others. The second dimension is anchored at the devout end by attributes such as "prayerful" and "worshipful," reflecting an orientation to personal spirituality; whereas the "authoritarian" end of the dimension is anchored by attributes such as "strict," "opinionated," and "rule-bound." The divine/other dimension was of greater importance than the devout/authoritarian dimension in representing people's sorts of these attributes (.69 vs. .23). Gender differences here were relatively small with women weighting the divine/other dimension slightly more heavily than men (.87 vs. .80), whereas men weighted the devout/authoritarian dimension slightly more heavily than women (.55 vs. .41).

The dimensional coordinates for the various attributes of the spiritual person-concept are presented in Table 4, again grouped according to the clusters derived by the previous HCA procedure. Examination of these coordinates suggests that these attributes are organized along a

divine/inner orientation and a divine/other orientation (similar to the first dimension for the religious person-concept). The first dimension is anchored at the "divine" end by attributes such as "trusts in God," "close to God," and "God-centered," reflecting a focus on the divine; and is anchored at the "inner" end by attributes such as "introspective," "deep," and "reflective," emphasizing an inner awareness. The second dimension is anchored at the "divine" end by attributes such as "has a relationship with God," "God-centered," and "worshipful;" whereas the "other" end of the dimension is anchored by attributes such as "kind," "sympathetic," and "helpful." The divine/inner dimension was of greater importance than the divine/other dimension in representing people's sorts of these attributes (.58 vs. .32). In terms of gender differences, men weighted the divine/inner dimension somewhat more heavily than women (.86 vs. .64), whereas women weighted the divine/other dimension more heavily than men (.70 vs. .40).

In this exploratory concept-mapping approach, the pairing of the MDS and HCA procedures can be a powerful heuristic, where the dimensional solution provided by MDS can serve as a foundation on which to display the clusters provided by HCA (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 58). One would assume that these analyses would yield convergent findings representing laypeople's implicit typologies regarding the attributes of these person-concepts. More specifically, the attributes within each of the various clusters (derived by the HCA procedure) should have relatively similar dimensional coordinates (derived by the MDS procedure). Figure 2 illustrates the conjoining of the results of these two procedures for the moral person-concept. As predicted, it shows that each of the six clusters are well-defined in terms of dimensional space and are discrete from the each other. For example, the "caring" cluster of attributes is located at the "other" pole of the self/other dimension (reflecting a concern for others) and tending toward the "internal" pole of the external/internal dimension (referencing an orientation toward inner values rather than external norms). Likewise, the "confident" cluster is located at the "self" pole of the self/other dimension and the "internal" pole of the external/internal dimension; and so on for the other clusters.

Figures 3 and 4 similarly illustrate the conjoining of the results of the MDS and HCA procedures for the religious and spiritual person-concepts, respectively. Again, these figures illustrate the relative convergence between the two procedures in uncovering laypeople's typologies regarding religious and spiritual excellence.

Discussion

As the most prototypical cluster of attributes of a highly moral person, the Principled/Idealistic cluster signals the importance of strongly held values and principles in the lives of moral exemplars. When this group of descriptors is paired with the Fair cluster, they together pose themes which resonate with Kohlberg's work. Just as Oliner and Oliner's (1988) and Walker et al.'s (1995) findings suggested that the distinguishing feature of moral exemplars was their compassion and care along with their ability to sustain and nurture a complex web of familial and community relationships, the Dependable, Has Integrity and Caring clusters illustrate that laypeople regard interpersonal sensitivity and warmth as important aspects of moral excellence. In light of the often-posed polarity between orientations of justice and care in moral reasoning (Gilligan, 1982; cf. Walker, 1991), it is important to note that as evidenced in these clusters laypeople see both themes as central in their conception of moral excellence. This finding resonates with Walker, de Vries, and Trevethan's (1987) finding that justice and care reasoning tend to be integrated at high levels of moral maturity. In addition, the Confident cluster demonstrates the perceived agentic qualities of the moral exemplar, those attributes that laypeople, psychologists (Colby & Damon, 1992), and philosophers (Pincoffs, 1986) alike see as important for moral exemplars to possess in their successful pursuit of moral goals and social activism in demanding circumstances. In general, laypeople's typology provides a rich portrait of the moral exemplar that not only resonates with suggestions in previous psychological research on moral excellence but also yields a much broader statement than is found in contemporary moral psychology.

In comparing the clustering solutions for each person-concept, a number of similarities appear. Each person-concept includes a highly prototypical cluster of attributes which

designates strong commitment: to moral matters (designated by the Principled/Idealistic cluster in the moral person-concept), to religious values and affairs (signaled by the Active in Church Life and Committed/Ethical cluster in the religious person-concept solution); and to a relationship with the divine (as suggested by the Devout and Committed clusters in the spiritual person-concept solution). In addition, in all three person-concepts there appears a cluster of attributes demonstrating qualities of caring.

Researchers have commonly used MDS to reveal the dimensions underlying individuals' perceptions of other people (Shikiar & Coates, 1978; Rosenberg & Jones, 1972). Even though the MDS procedure does not provide an inferential statistic to test differences between men and women, it does reveal how salient each dimension of the final MDS solution was in each of the gender's group space. For the moral person-concept, women used the self/other dimension as the primary heuristic in their grouping solutions, whereas men weighed both the self/other and external/internal dimensions more equally. In general, the MDS procedure revealed gender differences of a much smaller magnitude in the religious and spiritual person-concepts than in the moral one.

The dimensions of the MDS solution for the moral person-concept need further elaboration. Themes of agency and communion have been proposed as fundamental themes in the understanding and measurement of interpersonal behavior (Wiggins, 1991), and the self/other dimension of the moral person-concept solution seems to incorporate some of those dynamics. As found in other surveys of the moral domain (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), this tension between personal drives and needs and one's commitments to others seems to underlie a basic naturalistic understanding of morality. In addition the external/internal dimension manifests the tension between reference to external moral standards, such as the Ten Commandments and the laws of society, and reliance on personal strength and conscience. This tension has been given similar shape in Quinn et al.'s (1994) project to map naturalistic concepts of the moral domain. In their research they proposed that a social/individual dimension described one aspect of laypeople's cognitive map of morality.

General Discussion

In response to an impoverished understanding of moral maturity in contemporary moral psychology, this project in a series of three empirical studies attempted to illuminate a full-bodied conception of the moral exemplar as embedded in common language and everyday understanding. This research sought to uncover laypeople's implicit personality theory of the moral agent and, by extension, their understanding of the central components of moral excellence. As part of his formalist legacy, Kohlberg explicitly focussed on the development of justice reasoning and saw such broad psychological concerns of self or personality as tangential at best to the primary importance of reasoning in moral functioning. In response to critics who have charged that his model leaves the moral agent disembodied, Kohlberg countered, at least as much as his adherence to a strict cognitive-developmental model allowed, by attempting to flesh out his moral agent to include an engaged respect for persons and active sympathy and by stressing the importance of the moral self and attachment to others in the development of justice reasoning (Kohlberg et al., 1990 Kohlberg & Diessner, 1991). Others, too, have tried to round out the account of Kohlberg's moral agent by embedding moral reasoning in the larger framework of character (Emler, 1983) and by showing how moral aspects of character (e.g., open-mindedness, a sense of irony, respect for others) can be derived from the "cardinal" virtues of benevolence and justice congruent with the formal description of Kohlberg's highest stage (Boyd, 1989). Despite these patch-work attempts to include a greater account of the moral agent, even those previously championing Kohlberg's model have stated that "the restrictiveness of that paradigm is now increasingly obvious, even to those ... who have contributed most to it" (Wren & Noam, 1993, p. vii). As a result, some call the current zeitgeist in moral psychology "post-Kohlbergian" (Lapsley, 1991; Punzo, 1996), and now researchers are attempting to incorporate a broader understanding of moral character, dismissed by the Kohlbergian program.

Recently, a vanguard has attempted to rehabilitate these disparaged processes in the study of morality under the rubric of moral self (Noam & Wren, 1993; Punzo, 1996) or moral personality (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Flanagan, 1991; Walker & Hennig, in press). In

general, these attempts try to enrich our understanding of the moral agent. Nowhere is this broadening of moral psychology needed than in the study of moral excellence. As recent research has demonstrated (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995), the justice reasoning ability of exemplars does not set them apart. Other psychological processes, like the role of identity, self-concept, faith commitments, and various psychological dynamics other than moral reasoning, seem to have an important place in extraordinary moral commitment. Those pushing for a greater psychological realism in our understanding of moral ideals demand that such findings be given full consideration in moral psychology. Likewise, people's subjective conceptions of moral excellence must be included as important. This position militates the Kohlbergian program, where moral relevance was strictly determined by philosophical principles - a maneuver that some now decry as a negative narrowing of the domain (Blasi, 1990; Campbell & Christopher, 1996). In psychological circles there is a call to include those things that "according to common understanding and ordinary language, many ... consider to be moral or morally relevant" (Blasi, 1990, p. 40). Into this context, this research provides a taxonomic description of moral character that laypeople see as morally relevant.

Explorations of folk psychology and natural language have been fruitful in other areas of psychology such as the lexical approach to personality (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). Using natural language as a source of personality attributes, researchers have identified five broad dimensions of personality description, usually called the Five-Factor Model (Goldberg, 1993; John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 1988; McCrae, Costa, & Piedmont, 1993). The primary tenet underlying the importance of such explorations is that "such factors suggest the hypothesis that the people in this language community have noticed in themselves or others a characteristic that is salient in their daily transactions and relates, in systematic ways, to social outcomes that they regard as important" (John et al., 1988, p. 198). In a similar way, the usefulness of a taxonomy of descriptors of a highly moral person bears the assumption that such clusters of semantically related descriptors reference characteristics salient in day-to-day moral functioning.

Just as lay theories of intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1981), wisdom (Holliday &

Chandler, 1986), and delinquency (Furnham & Henderson, 1983) overlap with explicit psychological theories, laypeople's understanding of moral personality not only includes themes that resonate with Kohlberg's scheme but also broader aspects of moral functioning. As discussed previously, a Kohlbergian theme of the independence of the moral domain appears: laypeople view moral excellence as relatively independent of their notions of religious and spiritual excellence. Themes of justice, fairness, and moral principles too, laypeople see as important. The importance of interpersonal sensitivity and personal agency, while these characteristics have been empirically shown to be salient in the lives of moral exemplars, remain unincorporated in contemporary moral psychology.

A number of limitations inhere in the psychological analysis of folk concepts. The primary limitation of this study is that folk theories describe people's conceptions, not necessarily those scientifically validated or true. For example, the clusters of moral descriptors reference what laypeople perceive to be importantly implicated in the character of a highly moral person. Whether these aspects of moral character really are central in mature moral functioning is a task for research involving moral exemplars themselves. It should be noted, however, that recent research (Fletcher, 1995; Funder, 1995) has demonstrated that laypeople have the ability to generate surprisingly accurate trait or attribute judgments of others. In addition, this study only explored adults' conceptions of moral maturity, not children's; and explored these conceptions only within a Western cultural context. Further research will be necessary to uncover developmental aspects of notions of moral excellence, as expressed in different cultures.

Future research can proceed in two directions. The first entails a further exploration of laypeople's notions of moral maturity by coding the Big-5 personality dimensions in the free-listed descriptions of a highly moral person generated in Study 1 (cf. Donahue, 1994; Schiller, Tellegen, & Evens, 1995). This type of analysis would help to connect and clarify the talk of "moral personality" in moral psychology by referencing those well-developed, explicit models used in personality research. The second line of research could examine in various ways the lives and moral reasoning of those identified as moral paragons.

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Appendix

Prototypicality Ratings (PR) and Unfamiliarity Ratings (UR, in %) of Descriptors (Study 2) and
Frequencies of Descriptors (Study 1) for the Three Person-Concepts

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Moral Person							
concerned about doing right	5.96	0	14	respectable	5.38	0	6
faithful to spouse	5.88	0	4	honorable	5.37	0	8
has clear values	5.87	1	6	consistent	5.33	0	10
law-abiding	5.78	2	22	trustworthy	5.33	0	20
has strong beliefs	5.77	1	5	upright	5.33	8	6
honest	5.77	1	61	loyal	5.32	0	10
able to distinguish right/wrong	5.76	1	12	conscientious	5.26	2	10
has a highly developed conscience	5.76	1	6	good	5.23	2	22
ethical	5.69	2	10	reliable	5.23	0	10
principled	5.69	3	19	sincere	5.23	0	8
maintains high standards	5.68	2	13	respectful	5.20	0	17
truthful	5.59	0	20	has convictions	5.17	3	4
self-disciplined	5.57	2	4	virtuous	5.10	8	6
has integrity	5.52	2	19	respected	5.08	1	6
responsible	5.48	1	8	fair	5.03	0	25
faithful	5.39	1	10	just	5.03	6	14
				dependable	5.00	0	10
				exemplary	4.98	10	8
				hard-working	4.98	0	7

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Moral Person (cont'd)							
genuine	4.97	2	5	cautious	4.53	2	6
caring	4.93	0	24	community-minded	4.50	2	4
self-assured	4.92	2	10	self-sacrificing	4.50	3	6
strong	4.92	7	6	unselfish	4.50	0	4
tries to obey the Ten Commandments	4.92	1	5	independent	4.49	2	7
proper	4.88	1	4	uncompromising	4.48	3	7
righteous	4.82	4	9	conservative	4.47	2	6
thoughtful	4.82	0	15	generous	4.45	1	13
self-confident	4.81	2	4	understanding	4.43	1	8
confident	4.80	0	7	forgiving	4.42	1	5
kind	4.78	0	20	intelligent	4.41	3	18
unswerving	4.77	12	6	clear-minded	4.40	3	4
helpful	4.76	1	9	empathic	4.39	10	5
rational	4.75	0	9	open	4.39	2	4
considerate	4.73	0	10	wise	4.39	1	4
aware	4.66	3	6	selfless	4.37	7	4
compassionate	4.65	1	8	non-hypocritical	4.35	5	5
serious	4.65	1	4	courageous	4.30	2	5
nice	4.61	0	4	realistic	4.30	0	4
loving	4.58	0	4	rigid	4.27	3	6
friendly	4.57	0	6	proud	4.26	1	4
logical	4.55	2	4	self-righteous	4.26	4	6
				religious	4.22	3	13

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Moral Person (cont'd)							
critical	4.21	1	4	nonconforming	3.77	4	4
judgmental	4.13	1	14	uptight	3.72	2	4
stubborn	4.03	2	6	intolerant	3.71	1	6
accepting	4.02	1	4	unbiased	3.71	1	4
is an activist	3.88	6	5	boring	3.27	3	6
open-minded	3.86	1	7				

Highly Religious Person							
believes in a higher power	6.39	0	8	knowledgeable about religion	5.53	0	5
has strong beliefs	6.17	0	8	dedicated	5.51	0	11
tries to know and please God	5.99	0	4	spiritual	5.41	0	12
church-going	5.92	0	17	rule-bound	5.39	2	8
prayerful	5.83	1	23	traditional	5.25	1	5
devoted	5.76	1	16	disciplined	5.24	1	10
active in church life	5.75	0	9	moral	5.21	0	18
worshipful	5.75	2	5	ritualistic	5.19	3	17
devout	5.73	5	14	respects authority	5.17	1	4
dependent on God	5.67	0	6	reverent	5.16	15	5
reads Bible regularly	5.58	2	4	principled	5.15	1	6
faithful	5.57	0	19	pious	5.11	21	11
committed	5.53	3	15	ethical	5.10	3	4
				law-abiding	5.07	1	4

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Religious Person (cont'd)							
honest	5.00	0	14	community-minded	4.64	2	7
is a follower	4.99	4	4	unswerving	4.63	15	4
conservative	4.96	1	13	compassionate	4.62	0	6
God-fearing	4.95	1	4	forgiving	4.61	1	4
sincere	4.93	1	5	meditative	4.61	2	6
righteous	4.90	4	4	zealous	4.60	13	6
godly	4.88	6	4	thoughtful	4.59	2	8
strict	4.86	2	5	considerate	4.57	2	5
consistent	4.82	2	7	friendly	4.56	1	11
caring	4.80	0	14	generous	4.54	0	5
certain	4.78	3	10	self-righteous	4.52	5	20
respectful	4.78	1	4	careful	4.48	2	4
charitable	4.75	2	4	goal-oriented	4.48	3	5
good	4.74	3	7	self-controlled	4.47	3	6
steadfast	4.74	10	4	self-sacrificing	4.46	1	9
helpful	4.73	1	8	contented	4.45	1	7
kind	4.72	0	11	patient	4.43	3	5
trustworthy	4.72	1	9	reflective	4.41	3	4
dogmatic	4.68	15	17	judgmental	4.39	1	21
hard-working	4.68	3	5	legalistic	4.35	13	16
opinionated	4.67	0	6	rigid	4.35	3	20
dependable	4.66	0	4	proselytizing	4.34	47	7
loving	4.64	1	11	proud	4.32	2	6

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Religious Person (cont'd)							
sensitive	4.32	2	4	humble	3.99	1	11
closed-minded	4.31	1	14	introspective	3.99	17	4
unquestioning	4.30	2	13	uptight	3.98	3	4
organized	4.27	2	5	fearful	3.91	2	4
single-minded	4.23	3	5	hypocritical	3.83	4	16
pharisaic	4.22	59	5	intolerant	3.82	3	12
inflexible	4.20	2	5	coercive	3.75	11	4
stubborn	4.20	3	8	submissive	3.75	3	5
calm	4.18	1	5	domineering	3.72	3	4
critical	4.18	1	5	self-conscious	3.72	5	4
persuasive	4.16	2	4	naive	3.61	3	4
authoritarian	4.15	3	5	annoying	3.58	3	5
externally-motivated	4.14	8	4	simple-minded	3.53	4	4
prejudiced	4.14	1	4	unreasonable	3.51	1	4
saintly	4.14	5	4	misguided	3.34	3	4
understanding	4.09	2	4	arrogant	3.29	2	4
narrow-minded	4.01	0	18	self-centered	3.26	3	4
fanatical	4.00	3	9	irrational	3.18	1	4
				ignorant	3.17	2	5

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Spiritual Person							
believes in a higher power	6.11	1	12	has a relationship with God	5.08	3	6
has strong beliefs	5.79	1	7	worshipful	5.06	1	10
has faith	5.61	1	5	kind	5.05	1	20
believing	5.48	3	4	honest	5.04	0	20
meditative	5.36	3	12	thoughtful	5.03	2	19
devoted	5.26	1	6	truthful	5.03	0	4
peace-making	5.24	1	4	compassionate	5.02	0	13
committed	5.23	0	5	close to God	5.01	3	5
peaceful	5.23	1	26	nature-loving	5.01	3	7
faithful	5.19	0	18	introspective	5.00	13	10
caring	5.18	1	30	thankful	4.98	1	5
moral	5.17	0	12	has integrity	4.97	3	9
loving	5.16	0	37	happy	4.94	2	7
trusts in God	5.16	0	4	sincere	4.93	0	9
dedicated	5.15	1	5	nonmaterialistic	4.91	3	12
reflective	5.14	0	12	prayerful	4.91	2	36
forgiving	5.13	2	16	trustworthy	4.91	1	7
deep	5.12	6	5	guided by Holy Spirit	4.90	1	5
hopeful	5.12	0	6	charitable	4.87	2	5
self-content	5.12	2	5	sympathetic	4.86	0	4
loves God	5.11	1	4	trusting	4.86	2	8
devout	5.10	8	5	contented	4.84	0	6

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Spiritual Person (cont'd)							
God-centered	4.84	0	6	is a good listener	4.69	1	4
accepting	4.83	1	8	open	4.69	3	9
friendly	4.83	2	11	self-controlled	4.69	1	7
helpful	4.83	0	6	joyful	4.68	1	19
respectful	4.82	0	4	self-sacrificing	4.68	1	6
sensitive	4.82	1	15	persevering	4.67	4	4
concerned	4.82	1	4	gentle	4.66	1	12
dependent on God	4.81	1	6	idealistic	4.66	2	4
empathic	4.81	8	6	self-assured	4.66	3	4
optimistic	4.81	1	4	patient	4.64	2	18
understanding	4.81	1	9	generous	4.63	2	10
visionary	4.81	4	5	calm	4.61	1	23
merciful	4.79	4	5	steadfast	4.59	13	4
self-aware	4.79	2	12	selfless	4.55	2	4
satisfied	4.78	0	5	godly	4.54	5	5
good	4.75	2	11	gracious	4.54	2	6
religious	4.75	1	9	humble	4.52	1	26
confident	4.72	1	12	holy	4.51	3	5
has a hunger for God	4.72	3	4	approachable	4.50	1	4
considerate	4.71	1	4	mystical	4.50	8	5
motivated	4.71	1	7	pure	4.50	2	6
serene	4.70	10	12	other-worldly	4.49	18	5
				tolerant	4.48	3	4

(cont'd)

Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.	Descriptor	PR	UR	Freq.
Highly Spiritual Person (cont'd)							
relaxed	4.43	2	7	easygoing	4.13	1	4
dependable	4.42	2	4	simple	4.04	6	4
studies Scripture	4.42	4	13	farsighted	4.03	13	4
open-minded	4.38	2	22	quiet	4.02	2	7
wise	4.38	3	8	is a leader	3.93	0	4
independent	4.36	2	5	solitary	3.82	3	7
balanced	4.31	5	6	detached	3.68	5	4
non-judgmental	4.30	1	6	eccentric	3.51	3	4
energetic	4.27	3	8	naive	3.19	2	4
questioning	4.23	1	5	irrational	2.96	3	4
other-oriented	4.17	22	6				

Table 1

Mean Prototypicality Ratings across Types of Attributes for the Three Person-Concepts

Person-Concept	Type of Attribute			
	Unique	Shared with Moral	Shared with Religious	Shared with Spiritual
Moral	4.91 _a		4.79 _b	4.80 _b
Religious	4.45 _b	4.69 _a		4.82 _a
Spiritual	4.66 _b	4.85 _a	4.87 _a	

Note. Empty cells indicate that data are not applicable. Means within each row having the same subscript are not significantly different.

Table 2

Dimensional Coordinates of Attributes for the Moral Person-Concept

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	self/ other	external/ internal		self/ other	external/ internal
Principled/idealistic cluster (PR = 5.44_a)			righteous	-.68	-1.42
concerned about doing right	-.87	-1.37	unswerving	-.94	-.24
has clear values	-.85	-1.24	Dependable cluster (PR = 5.33_{a,b})		
law-abiding	-.82	-1.60	faithful to spouse	.44	-1.01
has strong beliefs	-1.11	-1.29	dependable	.91	1.44
able to distinguish right/wrong	-.84	-1.31	responsible	.43	.87
has a highly developed conscience	-.75	-.78	faithful	.62	-.96
ethical	-.25	-1.42	respectable	.21	.77
principled	-.80	-1.45	honorable	.48	-.19
maintains high standards	-1.08	-.69	loyal	.96	-.34
self-disciplined	-1.25	-.07	reliable	.73	1.18
upright	-1.02	-.57	respectful	.64	.65
has convictions	-1.16	-.76	respected	.09	1.13
exemplary	-.70	-.14	Has integrity cluster (PR = 5.17_{b,c})		
tries to obey the Ten Commandments	-.89	-1.68	has integrity	-.30	-.53
proper	-.54	-.60	consistent	-.74	.60
			conscientious	-.07	.80
			rational	-.59	.41
			hard-working	-.63	1.07

(cont'd)

Table 2 (cont'd)

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	self/ other	external/ internal		self/ other	external/ internal
Caring cluster (PR = 5.10_{b,c})			considerate	1.57	1.07
honest	1.39	-.23	Fair cluster (PR = 5.06_{c,d})		
truthful	1.11	-.38	virtuous	.01	-.79
trustworthy	1.34	.29	fair	.61	.21
good	1.17	-.18	just	.17	-.70
sincere	1.70	.74	Confident cluster (PR = 4.85_d)		
genuine	.98	.22	strong	-.96	1.06
caring	1.86	.97	self-assured	-1.51	1.61
thoughtful	1.70	.69	self-confident	-1.42	1.75
kind	1.64	1.29	confident	-1.45	1.77
helpful	1.46	1.35			

Note. Means for the prototypicality ratings (PR) of attributes having the same subscript are not significantly different.

Table 3

Dimensional Coordinates of Attributes for the Religious Person-Concept

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	divine/ other	devout authorit'n		divine/ other	devout authorit'n
Active in church life cluster (PR = 5.57_a)			God-fearing	-1.14	-.52
believes in a higher power	-1.10	-.75	godly	-.74	-1.02
has strong beliefs	-.51	-.22	Committed/ethical cluster (PR = 5.37_{a,b})		
tries to know and please God	-1.10	-1.37	devoted	.02	-.35
church-going	-1.18	-1.52	faithful	.07	-.71
prayerful	-1.13	-1.57	committed	.26	-.12
active in church life	-1.20	-1.60	dedicated	.24	-.21
worshipful	-1.14	-1.51	moral	.61	.09
devout	-.96	-.69	ethical	.54	.67
dependent on God	-1.28	-1.33	righteous	.09	.20
reads Bible regularly	-1.25	-1.50	Traditional cluster (PR = 5.14_b)		
knowledgeable about religion	-.87	-1.12	rule-bound	-.72	1.57
spiritual	-.78	-1.07	traditional	-.58	.96
ritualistic	-1.08	-.56	disciplined	.34	.99
reverent	-.67	-.33	respects authority	-.13	1.21
pious	-.63	-.41	principled	.18	1.52
is a follower	-.99	-.85	law-abiding	-.06	1.36
			conservative	-.52	1.32
			strict	-.60	1.95

(cont'd)

Table 3 (cont'd)

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	divine/ other	devout authorit'n		divine/ other	devout authorit'n
Caring cluster (PR = 4.77_c)			dependable	1.56	.59
honest	1.65	.08	loving	1.75	-.51
sincere	1.61	.04	Steadfast cluster (PR = 4.77_c)		
caring	1.82	-.31	consistent	.59	1.23
respectful	.95	.20	steadfast	.10	1.35
charitable	1.06	-.42	hard-working	.98	.96
good	1.64	-.02	Dogmatic cluster (PR = 4.70_c)		
helpful	1.67	-.06	certain	.08	1.31
kind	1.87	-.21	dogmatic	-.68	1.16
trustworthy	1.49	.28	opinionated	-.10	1.82

Note. Means for the prototypicality ratings (PR) of attributes having the same subscript are not significantly different.

Table 4

Dimensional Coordinates of Attributes for the Spiritual Person-Concept

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	divine/ inner	divine/ other		divine/ inner	divine/ other
Devout cluster (PR = 5.23)			dedicated	.60	-.86
believes in a higher power	-1.77	-.64	Meditative cluster (PR = 5.15)		
has strong beliefs	-.71	-.69	meditative	.22	-.66
has faith	-1.29	-1.30	reflective	1.07	-.59
believing	-.66	-.35	deep	1.07	-.47
faithful	-.59	-.81	introspective	1.11	-.50
trusts in God	-2.00	-1.17	Contented cluster (PR = 5.04)		
loves God	-1.99	-1.17	peace-making	.08	.60
devout	-.56	-1.23	peaceful	.10	.46
has a relationship with God	-1.85	-1.77	hopeful	-.16	.05
worshipful	-1.33	-1.53	self-content	.84	-.35
close to God	-2.00	-.86	nature-loving	-.16	.48
prayerful	-1.54	-1.38	thankful	-.17	.17
guided by Holy Spirit	-2.00	-1.37	happy	.95	.12
God-centered	-1.86	-1.55	nonmaterialistic	.20	-.28
Committed cluster (PR = 5.22)			contented	1.14	-.33
devoted	.21	-.73	Trustworthy cluster (PR = 5.00)		
committed	.39	-.87	moral	-.32	.01
			honest	.94	.49

(cont'd)

Table 4 (cont'd)

Attributes	Coordinates		Attributes	Coordinates	
	divine/ inner	divine/ other		divine/ inner	divine/ other
truthful	.89	.28	compassionate	.85	1.34
has integrity	.71	.08	sincere	.32	1.30
trustworthy	.82	.71	charitable	.77	.72
trusting	.77	.34	sympathetic	.59	1.74
Caring cluster (PR = 4.96)			accepting	.39	.92
caring	.74	1.65	friendly	.73	.98
loving	.49	1.56	helpful	.67	1.65
forgiving	.51	1.10	respectful	.74	.38
kind	.59	1.84	sensitive	.74	1.48
thoughtful	.71	1.01			

Figure 1

Representation of the Relations among the Person-Concepts

Figure 2

Two-Dimensional Representation of the Attributes for the Moral Person-Concept

(The loops drawn on the configuration are based on the HCA of these attributes.)

Figure 3

Two-Dimensional Representation of the Attributes for the Religious Person-Concept

(The loops drawn on the configuration are based on the HCA of these attributes.)

Figure 4

Two-Dimensional Representation of the Attributes for the Spiritual Person-Concept

(The loops drawn on the configuration are based on the HCA of these attributes.)