

Bhā-viveka (A.D. c. 490-570)'s *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*, *Tattvajñānaiṣanā*, verses 137-266
An English translation and Explanation

by
CHIKAFUMI WATANABE

B.A. Ryukoku University, 1990

M.A. Ryukoku University, 1992

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Asian Studies

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September 1994

© Chikafumi Watanabe, 1994

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

(Signature)

Department of Asian Studies

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date Oct. 15, 1994

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter, *Tattvajñānaīṣanā*, (vv. 137-266) of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (MHK) of Bhāviveka (A.D. c. 490-570). Bhāviveka was one of the commentators of *Madhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika, and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. MHK is one of Bhāviveka's most important works. In the MHK, Bhāviveka gives a his own philosophy in chapters 1-3, and thereafter, presents and criticizes Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems opposing Madhyamaka philosophy in chapters 4-9.

The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. Shotaro Iida, also, published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-tarkajvālā* (TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation.

The main subject of verses 137-256 is “the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint.

Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Mādhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha's teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible. Therefore, I have decided to translate and explain in this thesis Bhā-viveka's views on “non-production of entities.”

Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti used *prasaṅga-anumāna* in order to clarify the philosophy of emptiness. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent's opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of emptiness. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other schools.

Bhāviveka, on the other hand, was not satisfied with *prasaṅga-anumāna*, and tried to clarify the philosophy of emptiness by means of independent syllogism (*svatantra-anumāna*), including the three modifications: (1) adding of the word *paramārthataḥ* (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to propositions in syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in syllogisms should be understood as *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (the negation of a proposition or the simple negation of a

proposition) and (3) the condition that no counter-example (*vipakṣa*) is to be given. In other words, he positively demonstrated the philosophy of emptiness by using independent syllogism.

Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Tables	vi
Acknowledgement	viii
Chapter One.	
Introduction.....	1
Basic Standpoint of Mādhyamika Thought	
The thought of 'emptiness' (<i>śūnyatā</i>)	
"Dependent origination" (<i>pratītya-samutpāda</i>)	
"Own-being" of "intrinsic nature" (<i>sva-bhāva</i>)	
Bhā-viveka	
The works of Bhāviveka	
Bhāviveka's logic	
Adding the restriction <i>paramārthataḥ</i> to the proposition	
The negation in the proposition should be understood as <i>prasajya-pratiṣedha</i>	
Fallacy of proposition	
Negation in the ultimate reality	
No counter-example (<i>vipakṣa</i>) is available	
Chapter Two.	
Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, <i>Tattva-jñānaiṣaṇā</i> , verses 137-256 An English translation and Explanation.....	26
Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas	
Non-production from itself	
Non-production from others	
The criticism of the four <i>pratyayas</i> or conditions	
The criticism of the <i>hetu-pratyaya</i> or the primary or material causal factor	
The criticism of the <i>ālambana-pratyaya</i> or the objective causal factor	
The criticism of the <i>samanantara-pratyaya</i> or the sequential causal factor	
The criticism of the <i>adhipati-pratyaya</i> or the dominant causal factor	

The problem of the *pratyakṣa* and *pratīti*
 The criticism of the theory of the Sāṃkhya system
 Non-production from itself and others
 Non-production from *ahetu* or without cause
 Non-production from without (the criticism of *Lokāyatas*)
 The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.
dṛṣṭi "view"
duḥkha "suffering"
 The examination of the Buddha
 Seeing *pratītyasamutpāda* and seeing the Buddha
 Conclusion

Chapter Three.

Conclusion.....87

Appendix.....97

Bibliography.....102

List of Tables

ALB	Adyar Library Bulletin
BS	Bukkyōgaku Seminā (Biddhist Seminar, Kyoto: Ōtani University)
IATS	International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vol. 1 Buddhist Philosophy and Literature, ed. by Shōren Ihara and Zuihō Yamaguchi, Naritasan Shishōji, 1992
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, University of Tokyo)
IJ	Indo-Iranian Journal
JA	Journal Asiatique
JBORS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JOR	Journal of Oriental Research
KDBKN	Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū Nenpō (Tokyo: Komazawa University)
KDKKK	Kinki Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kenkyū Kiyō (Osaka: Kinki University)
KDR	Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō (Wakayama: Kōyasan University)
MB	Mikkyō Bunka
MCB	Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques
NBKR	Nagoya (Daigaku) Bungakubu Kenkyū Ronshū (Aichi: Nagoya University)
NIBK	Nagoya (Daigaku) Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyūkai
OKDK	Ōsaka Kyōiku Daigaku Kiyō (Osaka: Ōsaka Kyōiku University)
ON	Ōtani Nenpō (Kyoto: Ōtani University)
OsG	Ōsaki Gakuhō (Tokyo: Risshō University)
Ota.	The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition - kept in the Library of the Ōtani University, Kyoto - Catalogue and Index), Suzuki Research Foundation, 1962.
OtG	Ōtani Gakuhō (Kyoto: Ōtani University)
PTS	Pali Text Society
RDDKK	Ryūkoku Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyū Kiyō (Kyoto: Ryūkoku University)
RDDN	Risshō Daigaku Daigakuin Nenpō (Tokyo: Risshō University)
TD	Taishō Daizōkyō (Chinese Tripiṭaka)
TDK	Tsurumi Daigaku Kiyō (Kanagawa: Tsurumi University)

TDT	Tsukuba Daigaku Tetsugaku (S)hisōkei (R)onshū (Chiba: Tsukuba University)
TDTK	Tsurumi Daigaku Tankidaigakubu Kiyō
TJDTK	Tsurumi Jyoshi Daigaku Tanki (Daigakubu) Kiyō
Toh.	A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur), ed. by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T. Tada). Tohoku University Indogaku Kenkyūkai, 1953.
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens

Abbreviations and signs in the translation chapter

Ms	Manuscript of MHK
[]	The syllables are not clear but ligible.
()	The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed.
..	Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.
+	The space for one syllable is damaged.
=	The syllable is divided, e.g. 'tasy=āsti' in ms.
°	The syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted.
SG	The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sāṅkrtyāyana.
k.	kārika or kārikā = verse(s) of the main text
v.	verse
vv.	verses
K	The Kārikā text
KS	The Kārikā text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima.
KT	The Kārikā text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima.
TJ	Tarka-jvālā

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to Professor A. N. Aklujkar, my major professor, who introduced me to Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā. As a graduate student of the University of British Columbia, I was much influenced by Professor A. N. Aklujkar's lectures on Indian Linguistics, philosophy and literature. Here I wish to express my deepest obligations to Professor A. N. Aklujkar for critically reading my thesis and tirelessly making suggestions. The suggestions were invaluable.

I also would like to thank Dr. Karin Preisendanz, now of Hamburg University, who was my supervisor when I was a first year in the master's student at the University of British Columbia. I was given much useful information and helpful advice in her classes and in private consultations.

Thanks are also due to Professor Kenneth Bryant for allowing me to use his computer font and for helpful advice in private consultations.

I would like to acknowledge the generous advice and help of thesis committee, Professor Daniel L. Overmyer, Professor Jerry Schmidt and Professor Laurence Preston in shaping my thesis into more presentable form.

I am deeply grateful to both Professor Yuichi Kajiyama and Mr. Yusho Wakahara for their invaluable suggestions.

Nowadays, I realize the significance of the words *kalyāṇamitra*. Mr. Tsunenori Ito who gave me much useful information and materials has been my *kalyāṇamitra*.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my mother for her constant encouragement. I believe that my late father has been protecting me with blessings of the Triple Gem these years.

C. Watanabe

Chapter One.

Introduction

The Mahāyāna movement originated in India around the first century B.C. and developed gradually over the succeeding few centuries. Mahāyāna Buddhism is represented by the two great schools, namely, the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda). The founder of the Mādhyamika is Nāgārjuna (A.D. c. 150-250), who developed and established the thought of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) that is an important aspect of Buddhist thought. The Mādhyamika may be divided into three stages, early, middle and late.

The early stage in the Mādhyamika is marked by two great figures, the founder Nāgārjuna and Ārya-deva (A.D. c. 170-270). In the middle stage various commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (hereafter, MK) were written by many scholars. In this stage, moreover, two sub-schools arose. One of them is the Prāsaṅgika (known for its *reductio ad absurdum* method), and the other is the Svātantrika (known for its acceptance of independent syllogism). The late stage is characterized by the writings of two great figures, Śānta-rakṣita (A.D. c. 725-784) and his disciple Jñāna-garbha (eighth century).

According to Tibetan tradition¹, eight Indian scholars wrote commentaries on Nāgārjuna's MK: Nāgārjuna himself (*Akutobhayā*, exists only in Tibetan translation), Buddha-pālita (A.D. c. 470-540; *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti*, exists only in variant Tibetan translations), Candra-kīrti (A.D. c. 600-650; *Prasanna-padā*, exists in Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations), Deva-śarman (fifth to sixth centuries; *Dkar-po ḥchar-ba*, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Guṇa-śrī (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known), Guṇa-mati (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Sthira-mati (A.D. c. 510-570; *Ta-Sheng Chung-Kuan Shih-lun*, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and Bhāviveka

¹ Avalokita-vrata, a commentator of Bhāviveka's *Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti*, enumerates eight commentators of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā* in his *Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-ṭīkā*. (*Prajñāpradīpa*, 85a8.)

(A.D. c. 490-570)² (*Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti* (hereafter, PP), exists in variant Tibetan and Chinese translations).

The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter: vv. 137-256 of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (hereafter, MHK) of Bhā-viveka. Bhā-viveka was one of the commentators of MK and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. In this thesis, Bhā-viveka's idea of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) is focused on through an English translation of the third chapter of his MHK. The MHK is probably Bhā-viveka's most important work. In this decade some of its chapters have been edited and published by various scholars (see Appendix). The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima.³ Shotaro Iida also published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-tarkajvālā* (hereafter, TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation. Verses 137-256 which I have selected for translation in this thesis have not been translated into English before. My English translation is based upon the Sanskrit text edited by Ejima.

The main subject of verses 137-256 is "the non-production of all dharmas." This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint.

Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Mādhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha's teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible. Therefore, I will translate and explain in this thesis Bhā-viveka's views on "non-production."

² Kajiyama has investigated the relation of Bhāviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, and as a result, calculated the date of Bhāviveka given here. For details see Kajiyama 1968/1969: 193-203; Kajiyama 1989: 177-187

³ Ejima 1980: 259-361

Basic Standpoint of Mādhyamika Thought

As mentioned above, Bhā-viveka was a Mādhyamika philosopher. I will base my discussion of the background of his thought on the Nāgārjuna's MK.

'emptiness'

The intention of the Mahāyāna Buddhists can be said to be the rediscovery of the truth realized by Gautama Buddha. Therefore, they sought to point out the contradictions of Hīnayāna Buddhism and return to what they claimed was the Buddha's teaching.

As far as we know now, it was Nāgārjuna who established and formulated the thought of "emptiness" upon the basis of the *Prajñā-pāramitā* sūtra, the *Daśa-bhūmika Sūtra*, the *Kāśyapa-parivarta*⁴ etc. The thought of emptiness, however, can be said to be found even in early Buddhist sūtras such as the *Cūḷa-suññata-sutta*, the *Mahā-suññata-sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya*, no. 121, 122) etc.⁵ Nāgārjuna claimed just to revive the true teaching of the Buddha. His philosophy of emptiness was also a criticism against Indian realism, as presented by systems such as the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, and other Buddhist schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika etc.

The Sanskrit word "*śūnya*" literally means "empty," "hollow," absent."⁶ Indian mathematicians called zero "*śūnya*," but "*śūnya*" in their usages did not mean solely the non-being of entities.

Nāgārjuna also did not mean that emptiness indicates the non-being or non-existence of entities, but rather that everything is void of *sva-bhāva* ("own-being," "intrinsic nature"). All things in our world are neither substantially existent nor non-existent absolutely: they are just like images in a dream or an illusion. We assume that all things in our world are substantially existent. According to Buddhist thought, however, they are just 'dependently co-arisen.'

⁴ See Kajiyama 1982: 6

⁵ "Seyyathāpi ayaṃ Migāramātu pāsādo suñño hatthi-gavāssa-vaḷavena, suñño jātarūpa-rajatena, suññaṃ itthi-purisa-sannipātena; atthi c'ev' idaṃ asuññataṃ yad idaṃ bhikkhu-saṅghaṃ paṭicca ekattaṃ....." (PTS, *Majjhima-Nikāya*, vol. 3, *Cūḷa-suññata-suttaṃ*. 1960). Thus the idea of *śūnyatā* is already found in the Nikāyas. See Fujita 1983

⁶ Monier-Williams 1899: 1085

They are empty of inherent existence. In other words, all entities have no intrinsic nature (*sva-bhāva*). The negation of a self-dependent substance is thus derived from the traditional Buddhist idea of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), the idea that whatever exists arises and exists dependent on other things. Nāgārjuna declares that it is dependent origination that we call emptiness." (MK, 24•18ab, *Prasannapadā* p. 503: *yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe*/). That is to say, something in existence has no intrinsic nature (*sva-bhāva*), which means entities originate in dependence on others. In other words, something which is 'dependent co-arisen' is emptiness.

"Dependent origination"

Nāgārjuna claims as follows in his MK:⁷

" He who taught dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), [which is]
 without cessation, without origination,
 Without annihilation, without permanence, without coming, without
 going,
 Not something manifold, not one thing, the quiescence of conceptual
 proliferation, tranquil (*śiva*),
 [Is] the perfect Buddha (*sambuddha*). I pay homage to that best of
 speakers. " (Tr. by William 1993: 214)

The above eightfold negation, according to Nāgārjuna, is the truth that the Buddha realized. In other words, having recognized that the most important idea in Buddhism is dependent origination, Nāgārjuna transmitted it. His idea was not formulated in a vacuum.

Basically, the idea of "dependent origination," for Nāgārjuna, means aloofness from existence and non-existence. That is, it demands transcendence of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism.

⁷ anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam//
 yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaṁ prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam/
 deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṁ vande vadatāṁ varam// (Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, p. 11.)

The word "*pratītyasamutpāda*" is a compound of the Sanskrit words "*pratītya*" and "*samutpāda*." The gerund "*pratītya*" derives from the root √i which means "to go" or "to walk."⁸ The prefix "*prati*" means "towards" or "near to."⁹ The root √pad with the prefix "*sam-ut*" means "to arise," "to appear," "to occur" etc.¹⁰ Consequently, the word "*pratītyasamutpāda*" means the arising of entities after having reached toward an antecedent, a cause, a basis. In other words, it means that everything which exists depends completely on causal relations.¹¹

Nāgārjuna declares that dependent origination, emptiness, and the middle path (*madhyamā-pratipad*), are all synonymous.¹² It is, however, true that the Buddha's statement of the middle path itself did not expressly include dependent origination or emptiness. Yet, as far as we know, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path in order to deny eternalism and nihilism. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the middle path and dependent origination or emptiness. Rather, as Nāgārjuna declares, the idea of the middle path and that of dependent origination are identical and both are a means to lead the ignorant person to absolute truth, that is, *Nirvāṇa*.

"Own-being" or "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*)

According to the Mādhyamikas, "own-being" or "intrinsic nature" is not to be found in our world where everything that exists is based on other things and where everything is in a constant flux.

⁸ Monier-Williams 1899: 163

⁹ Monier-Williams 1899: 661

¹⁰ Monier-Williams 1899: 1166

¹¹ This interpretation of the word *pratītyasamutpāda* is based on Candrakīrti's interpretation who is later than Bhāviveka. See appendix of Stcherbatsky 1927.

¹² sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā // 24-18cd // (*Prasannapadā*, p. 503.)

Nāgārjuna states as follows in his MK.¹³

It is not proper to hold that own-being (*sva-bhāva*) is originated by conditions and causes. [If] own-being is originated by causes and conditions, [own-being] would be what is made.//15•1//

And, how could own-being be what is made? For, own-being is not what is made; it does not depend on others (*nirpekṣaḥ paratra*).//15•2//

If there is existence as essence (*prakṛti=sva-bhāva*), this would never be non-existence. For, it is never possible that the essence (*prakṛti=sva-bhāva*) changes.//15•8//

If there is no own-being, what would the changing (*anyathā-bhāva*) be in. And if there is own-being, even then what would the changing be in.//15•9// (my translation)

From the above verses, own-being (*svabhāva*), in Nāgārjuna's understanding, can be seen as (1) an independent, (2) eternal and (3) unchanging substance.

That everything is emptiness can be easily recognized. Emptiness, however, does not mean the negation of our world. Our real world is conceptualized through the use of words. In this world, that is, on the conventional level, conception through words is the only reality that has "own-being" or "intrinsic nature." The conception through words is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. For example, even if we burned down a chair, or even if we died, the word "chair" would still exist. The conception which the word "chair" indicates is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. A "word," however, does not point out the essence of a thing. What a word indicates and the entity itself are essentially different from each other.

¹³ na sambhavaḥ sva-bhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyaya-hetubhiḥ/
 hetu-pratyaya-sambhūtaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet//15-1//
 svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham/
 akṛtrimāḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca//15-2//
 yady astitvaṁ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā/
 prakṛter anyathā-bhāvo na hi jātūpadyate//15-8//
 prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvaṁ bhaviṣyati/
 prakṛtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvaṁ bhaviṣyati//15-9// (*Prasannapadā*, pp. 259-272.). de Jong reads *vā satyam*. I adopt *vā satyām*.

Consequently, we must not become attached to the "conceptions" produced through language or words. At the same time, language or words are, of course, very important for us. It would be difficult to live in this world without language. After all, Nāgārjuna composed MK and elucidated *śūnyatā* using language. In other words, everything exists in our ordinary world but everything is "*śūnyatā*" in the world which is beyond our ordinary world - the highest reality.

Bhā-viveka

As mentioned in the preceding section, Bhā-viveka was one of the eight known commentators of Nāgārjuna's MK and one of the most prominent figures in the Madhyamaka school. He is known as the author of the PP, MHK "*Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng lun*," etc. His name, however, is a subject of debate due to the various forms found in different texts.¹⁴ The names "Bhāva-viveka," "Bhā-viveka," "Bhagavad-viveka," "Bhavya-viveka," "Bhā-vivikta," "Bhavya," "Bhavyaka," "Bhavya-kāra" and "Bhāvin" are assumed based upon Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan materials. In Chinese materials the names "Fen-pieh-ming," "Ch'ing-p'ieh," "Ming-pien," "Yuch'ing-fen," "P'o-p'i-fei-chia" appear. In Tibetan materials "Legs ldan hbyed," "Legs ldan," "Skla ldan, Snañ bral," "Bhavya" etc. are used. The names Bhā-viveka and Bhāva-viveka, however, appear in Chandrakīrti's *Prasanna-padā*¹⁵ (hereafter, *Pras.*), and the name "Bhāvin" appears in *Madhyamaka-śāstra-stuti*.¹⁶ The name Bhagavad-viveka is also used in the manuscript of MHK¹⁷. Nowadays the names Bhāva-viveka, Bhā-viveka or Bhavya are commonly used by scholars. Ejima, however, after examining the manuscripts of *Pras.*, and the Tibetan and Chinese sources, suggests that the name of the author of MHK, PP and "*Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng lun*" should be Bhā-viveka.¹⁸ His collected evidence may be summarized as follows:

¹⁴ For details of this matter, see Poussin 1933: 60-61. Teramoto and Hiramatsu 1935: 5-7. Yamaguchi 1941: 49-51. Gokhale 1958: 166.

¹⁵ *Prasannapadā*, p. 36.

¹⁶ de Jong 1962: 47-56. de Jong 1979: 541-550.

¹⁷ Gokhale 1958: 166

¹⁸ Ejima 1990: 846-838.

(1) The names “Bhāva-viveka” and “Bhā-viveka” appear four times in the manuscripts of Pras.. The name “Bhavya” never appears in these manuscripts.

(2) The transliteration “ 婆毘吠伽/迦 (b’uâ-b’ji-b’jwai -ka=P’o-p’i-fei-chia)” and the Chinese translation “Ching-p’ieh” appear in the Chinese materials. The former “ 婆毘吠伽/迦 ” refers to Bhā-viveka, not Bhāva-viveka or Bhavya-viveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of MHK, TJ, PP etc. was translated as “ 清弁 ” and was identified with Bhā-viveka by Hsüan-tsang (A.D. 600-664). Further, there is no indication in Chinese materials of the names “Bhāva-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka” or “Bhavya” which are assumed based upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of MHK, etc.

(3) The name of the author of MHK is “sNañ bral” or “sKal ldan” in the Tibetan translation of *Madhyamakālamkāra-ṭīkā* (P. No. 5286: D. No. 3886).¹⁹ The original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sNañ bral” should be “Bhā-viveka” or “Bhā-vivikta.” On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sKal ldan” can be assumed to be “Bhavya.”²⁰

The name of the author of PP is given as “Legs ldan byed” or “Legs ldan ḥbyed” in the Tibetan translation of PP and *Prajñā-pradīpa-ṭīkā*, the sub-commentary of PP by Jñāna-garbha (Kluḥi rgyal mtshan). However, “Legs ldan byed” is probably the Tibetan translator’s error. It should be corrected to “Legs ldan ḥbyed.” The original sanskrit word of the latter would be “Bhavyaviveka” corroborating the part “viveka.”

(4) Atīśa (Dīpaṅkara-śrījñāna. A.D. 982-1054) calls the author of MHK and PP “Bhavya” or “Bhavya sNañ bral (Bhavya-Bhāviveka)” in his *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa-pañjikā* (P. No. 5344: D. No. 3948.), the autocommentary of *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*.²¹ Besides his own treatise, Atīśa translated *Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa* (hereafter, MRP), MHK, *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā* (hereafter, TJ), *Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna* (hereafter, NBVV) and *Madhyamakārtha-saṁgraha* (hereafter, MAS) into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translator Tshul khrims rgyal ba. He calls the author of MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV “Bhavya,” and Tshul thrims rgyal ba calls him “Legs ldan ḥbyed (Bhavya-viveka)” in MAS.

¹⁹ P. Sa.126b-4, 136b-6: D. Sa. 119b-6, 128a-2.

²⁰ Mayā-vyutpatti 1916, no. 3495.

²¹ Cf. P. Ki. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2: D. Khi. 280a6, 285a1, 280b4, 280b6.

Assuming the correctness of Ejima's investigation, I adopt the name "Bhā-viveka" in this thesis.

The Works of Bhā-viveka

According to Tibetan tradition, the following works are ascribed to Bhā-viveka.²²

Pradīpa-uddiyotana-nāma-ṭīkā
Pañca-krama-pañjikā
Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti
Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa
Madhyamakārtha-saṃgraha
Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna
Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā
Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā

Besides the above treatises, *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun* is ascribed to Bhā-viveka in the Chinese Tripiṭaka.

P. L. Vaidya (1923:51-52) ascribes *Madhyamaka-pratītya-samutpāda* to Bhā-viveka. In the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, however, this treatise is attributed to Kṛṣṇa. Accordingly, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhā-viveka (see Yamaguchi, 1941:57-58).

Pradīpa-uddiyotana-nāma-ṭīkā and *Pañca-krama-pañjikā* are also not attributed to Bhā-viveka in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Therefore, scholars do not at present consider them to be Bhā-viveka's works.

Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa (=MRP)

Tibetan title: *Dbu ma rin po chehi sgron ma śes bya ba*.

²² Tāranātha 1970: 401.

The *Sde dge* edition; No. 3854
The Peking edition; No. 5254

This treatise consists of nine chapters, in which Madhyamaka thought, especially the theory of the two truths, is well summarized. This treatise is attributed to Bhā-viveka in Tibet, but there must have been considerable doubt as to whether it should really be ascribed to him. As a result of his investigation, S. Yamaguchi concluded that the author of **MRP** is not Bhā-viveka, and that the text was written around 700 A.D.²³ He points out that, firstly, there are some places where the author salutes three ācāryas, namely Nāgārjuna (A.D. c. 150-250), Āryadeva (A.D. c. 170-270) and Candrakīrti (A.D. c. 600-650). Candrakīrti was a founder of the Prāsaṅgika school (Tib. *Thal ḥgyur pa*) and was in a position of opposition to Bhā-viveka. It is thus hardly probable that Bhā-viveka saluted Candrakīrti. Secondly, a statement by Dharma-kīrti is quoted in **MRP**. Dharma-kīrti lived around 600-660 A.D. Therefore, it is impossible that Bhā-viveka knew Dharma-kīrti's works. For these reasons, nowadays **MRP** is no longer ascribed to Bhā-viveka.²⁴

***Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (=MAS)**

Tibetan title: *Dbu maḥi don bsdus pa*.

The *Sde dge* edition; No.3857
The Peking edition; No.5258.

This treatise consists of thirteen kārikās. As the title shows, it is a summary of Madhyamaka thought. The main subject of this treatise is the theory of two truths. According to the Tibetan translation, its author is Bhā-viveka. As a result of his investigation, however, Ejima pointed out: (1) the statement regarding the theory of the two truths in **MAS** does not fit the statement regarding the same theory in **MHK**, **PP** and **TJ**. (2) In order to solve the differences between **MAS** and **MHK**, **PP** and **TJ**, a mediation of the theory of

²³ Yamaguchi 1941: 54-57.

²⁴ Kajiyama 1983: 13. Ruegg 1981: 66. Lindner asserts in his article (1982: 167-194) that **MRP** should be attributed to Bhāvaviveka.

the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka, such as the theory of Jñāna-garbha, a later century, is necessary. (3) It is difficult to understand the theory of MAS without first assuming knowledge of the theory of Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna. (4) Avalokita-vrata, commentator of PP, does not mention MAS as Bhā-viveka's work. (5) Kamalaśīla, also, does not mention MAS as Bhā-viveka's work. In his *Madhyamakālamkāra-pañjikā*, Kamalaśīla's statement with regards to the theory of the two truths depends on MHK, not MAS. On the basis of these considerations, Ejima does not attribute MAS to Bhā-viveka.²⁵

Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun

Sanskrit title: *Kara-tala-ratna?

Chinese title: *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun* tr. by Hsüan-tsang
TD. No. 1578.

The Sanskrit manuscript of this treatise is not extant and a Tibetan translation of it does not exist.

The treatise has the same organization as the third chapter of MHK according to its abstract: it divides all entities into two categories, the conditioned (*samskr̥ta*) and the unconditioned (*asamskr̥ta*) and discusses the emptiness of these categories. Moreover, the logic and the theory of the two truths in it fit with the logic and theory of the two truths in Bhā-viveka's other works. Further, the detailed argument found in it against Yogācāra theory depends on MHK.²⁶ Therefore, nowadays it is attributed to Bhā-viveka.

From the fact that content of *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun* is relatively simple, but still fits with that of MHK, Ejima assumes that this treatise was written after MHK in order to explain in a more concise form the content of the latter (see Ejima, 1980: 15-16).

²⁵ Ejima 1980: 18-32. Ejima suggests that MAS was written before Atīśa (Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna) or Tshul khrims rgyul ba, Tibetan translator of MAS. That is, MAS was completed some time between the latter half of eighth century and the beginning of the eleventh century.

²⁶ Cf. TD.30.272a, 275a.

Prajñāpradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti (=PP)

Tibetan title: *Dbu maḥi rtsa baḥi ḥgrel pa śes rab sgron ma*

The *Sde dge* edition; No. 3853

The Peking edition; No. 5253

Chinese title: *Pan-jo-teng-lun*. tr. by Po-lo-p'o-chia-lo-mi-tiu-li

(*Prabhākara-mitra). Taishō No. 1566.

This treatise is a commentary on Nāgārjuna's MK. Bhā-viveka criticizes Buddha-pālita in this commentary with the observation that Buddha-pālita's argument in *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* is a mere *prasaṅga*, lacking both a true probans (i.e., minor premise) and an example (i.e., major premise). Bhā-viveka used *Svatantra-anumāna* (independent inference), by which he tried to explain Nāgārjuna's MK. Tibetan and Chinese translations of this treatise are extant, but only Sanskrit fragments can be found in Candrakīrti's *Pras*. There is a sub-commentary on PP, which exists only in Tibetan translation, titled *Ses rab sgron ma rgya cher ḥgrel pa* (restored Skt. title would be *Prajñā-pradīpa-ṭīkā*) by Avalokitavrata (seventh century).²⁷ Some of the chapters of the Tibetan text of PP have been edited by Max Walleser (1914) and Christian Lindtner (1984).

Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna

Tib. title: *Sde pa tha dad par byed pa dan rnam par bsad pa*.

The *Sde dge* edition; No. 4139

The Peking edition; No. 5640

This treatise is only a portion of TJ and MHK, chapter 4 v.8 (Dsa161-3--169a5). Because the authorship of TJ has not been resolved, the authorship of this treatise is also open to debate.

²⁷ Toh. No. 3859, Ota. No. 5259.

Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā (=TJ)

Tibetan title: *Dbu maḥi sñiñ pohi ḡgrel pa rtog ge ḡbar ba.*

The Sde-dge edition; No. 3856

The Peking edition; No. 5256.

It has long been accepted that TJ is Bhā-viveka's autocommentary (*sva-vṛtti*) on MHK. There is, however, sufficient reason to doubt whether or not the surviving Tibetan translation has preserved the original form of this autocommentary. This is because, after one kārikā, it is written "thus says the ācārya" in what should be a reference to Bhā-viveka, the author of the kārikās. Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kārikās, the expression "this is the intention of the ācārya" is used.²⁸ That is to say, if TJ was composed by Bhā-viveka himself, would he be calling himself ācārya in his own treatise? Ācārya usually means 'senior teacher' or 'great teacher.' There is, however, another example of an author calling himself "ācārya."²⁹ It is, moreover, possible that the surviving Tibetan translation includes additions to the text that were made during the translation from Sanskrit. There is also another piece which conflicts with Bhā-viveka's authorship of the TJ. In the commentary of the 291st verse of the third chapter, there is a quotation from "rañ gi bstan bcos (*sva-śāstra*)."³⁰ There is, however, no indication of what the "rañ gi bstan bcos (*sva-śāstra*)" is. It might indicate the author of MHK and TJ. This quotation is not, however, found in any of Bhā-viveka's works such as MHK, PP, TJ or "*Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*." It is found as a quotation accompanied by the comment "*ācārya-pāda* says as follows" in MRP which is not ascribed to Bhā-viveka³¹. It is safe to assume that both TJ and MRP are referring to the same person, and that this person is

²⁸ TJ Dsa 50a-5; 75a-1; 86a-2; 107a-2; 112b-6; 224b-4; 246b-5; 274b-6; 321a-5, etc.

²⁹ Vasubandhu calls himself "ācārya" in his *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, p. 2•17.

"kimartham punar abhidharmopadeśaḥ kena cāyaṁ prathamata upadiṣṭo yata ācārya 'bhidharmakośaṁ vaktum ādriyata iti/ āha/" Yaśomitra says ;"ācāryaḥ śāstrakāraḥ" cf. [*Sphuṭārthā*], p. 10•23.

³⁰ TJ Dsa 140b6-141a7. "... sku gsum rnam par bshag pa ñid kyāñ slob dpon gyis rañ gi bstan bcos kyi skabs su ḡdi skad bsad do/..." (English tras: With regard to Buddha's three bodies (dharma-body, rejoyment-body and accommodative body) also, ācārya says the following in *sva-śāstra*).

³¹ MR Tsa 360a5-b7. "... sku gsum rnam par bshag pa yañ/ slob dpon ñid shal śñas (ācārya-pāda) / ji skad du..."

not the author of TJ and MRP. It remains, then, a mystery as to how this “*ācārya*” figure is connected with Bhā-viveka, the author of MHK. Presumably, “*ācārya*” is an addition by Atīśa (A.D. 952-1054), a Tibetan translator of TJ, as Bhā-viveka was considered the author of MRP in the period of Atīśa. In any case, it is not prudent to assume that the author of the surviving TJ is definitely the same as Bhā-viveka, the author of MHK, PP and *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*.

It is possible that TJ was translated into Tibetan at least once before Atīśa (Dīpaṅkara-śrī-jñāna), Tshul khriṃs rgyal ba etc., because “*Dbu maḥi sñiṃ po rtog ge ḥbar rtsa ba daṅ/ ḥgrel par bsad pa gñis (Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-Tarkjvālā-ṭikā) / /*” is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the *Dkar chag Ldan dkar ma* (the catalogue of the *Ldan dkar ma*), completed in 788 A. D.³²

Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (=MHK)

Tibetan title: *Dbu maḥi sñiṃ poḥi tshig leḥur byas pa*

The *sde dge* edition; No. 3855, Dsa 3b5-17a4.

The Peking edition; No. 5255, Dsa 4a5-19-7.

The *Narthatang* edition³³; No. 3246, Dsa 5a2-17a4.

It can be said that this treatise is Bhā-viveka’s major work because it is his independent work and in it the Madhyamaka philosophy is well organized. The only known manuscript of MHK was discovered and hand copied by Rāhula Sāṃkrṭyāyana at the Śha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied the Sanskrit manuscript there, he registered his copy as ‘VII Śhalu Monastary, XXX VII, 1. 311. *Tarkjvālā (Madhyamakahṛdaya)*’ in his handlist. Later on, he gave the copy to V. V. Gokhale.

On the other hand, while traveling in India, Nepal and Tibet, G. Tucci succeeded in taking photographs of the manuscript of MHK at the Śha lu monastery.

When visiting Japan in 1971, V. V. Gokhale allowed several scholars to copy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research to them.

³² Lalou 1953: 337.

³³ The catalogue numbers of the Narthatang edition given here are in accordance with those of *A Comparative List of Tibetan Tripiṭaka of Narthatang Edition (Bstan-Hgyur Division) with the Sde-dge Edition*, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.

In 1972, when V. V. Gokhale visited Rome, he found the photographs of the manuscript of MHK in G. Tucci's collection, and was given the chance to edit them. Since then, a number of chapters of MHK have been edited and published based on the photograph from Tucci's collection and Gokhale's notes.

In 1991, a photocopy of the manuscript of MHK was published in China.³⁴

MHK consists of roughly 927 *anuṣṭubha*-verses and is divided into eleven chapters. The third chapter, *Tattva-jñānaiṣaṇā*, is the most important chapter among the eleven because the Mādhyamika thought is primarily presented in this chapter whereas the other chapters express the Mādhyamika thought through the criticism of other systems and schools. According to Gokhale (1985:78), Bhā-viveka originally composed the first three chapters under the title *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*, forming the core of MHK, and other chapters were added later. As the following note of the contents of the third chapter show, this chapter has a close relationship with MK and PP. It is in order to clarify this close relationship, as well as to provide context for the verses I will translate, that an abstract of the third chapter is given here:

Contents of the third chapter

Introduction	
1-1 The meaning and aim of the knowledge of the highest truth	vv. 1-13
1-2 <i>samādhi</i> 'concentration'	vv. 14-23ab
Introduction to Examinations	
2-1 <i>saṃskṛta-dharmas</i> 'conditioned dharmas'	vv. 23cd-24
(A) <i>skandhas</i> 'aggregates'	
(A)-1 <i>rūpa-skandha</i>	v. 25
(A)-2 <i>mahā-bhūtas</i> 'great elements'	vv. 26-39
(A)-3 <i>rūpa</i> , etc.	vv. 40-44
(A)-4 <i>indriya</i> 'sense organs'	vv. 45-65
(B) <i>vedanā-skandha</i>	vv. 66-68ab

³⁴ *Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday*, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qing and Qian Wenzhong, 1991, p. 511-523.

(C)	<i>saṃjñā</i> and <i>saṃskāra skandhas</i>	vv. 68cd-69
(D)	<i>viññāna-skandha</i>	v. 70
2-1-1	<i>dhātus</i> 'realms'	v. 71ab
2-1-2	<i>āyatana</i> 'sense-fields'	v. 71cd
2-1-3	<i>lakṣaṇa</i> 'characteristics'	v. 72-76
2-1-4	<i>gati</i> 'going'	vv. 77-85ab
2-1-5	<i>mokṣa</i> 'emancipation' and <i>bandhana</i> 'bondage'	vv. 85cd-89
(A)	<i>pudgala</i> 'person'	vv. 90-92
(B)	<i>ātman</i>	vv. 93-99ab
2-1-6	<i>rāga</i> 'attachment' and <i>rakta</i> the 'affected'	vv. 99cd-108
2-1-7	<i>nirvāṇa</i>	vv. 109-116
2-1-8	<i>viparyāsa</i> 'perversion'	vv. 117-118
2-1-9	<i>dveṣa</i> 'hate' and <i>moha</i> 'delusion'	v. 119
2-1-10	<i>sva-bhāva</i> 'intrinsic nature'	vv. 120-128
2-1-11	Conclusion	vv. 129ab
2-2	<i>asaṃskṛta</i> 'unconditioned'	vv. 129cd-136

Introduction to the Non-production of all dharmas

		vv. 137-138
3-1	Non-production from itself	vv. 139-146
3-2	Non-production from others	vv. 147-158
3-2-1	The criticism of the four <i>pratyayas</i> or conditions	v. 159
(A)	<i>hetu-pratyaya</i>	vv. 160-162
(B)	<i>ālambana-pratyaya</i>	vv. 163-166
(C)	<i>samanantara-pratyaya</i>	vv. 167-169
(D)	<i>adhipati-pratyaya</i>	vv. 170-175
3-2-2	The problem of opposition by <i>pratyakṣa</i> and <i>pratīti</i>	vv. 176-181
3-2-3	The criticism of the theory of the Sāṃkhya school	vv. 182-191
3-3	Non-production from itself and others	vv. 192-193
3-4	Non-production from <i>ahetu</i> or 'without cause'	vv. 194-213
3-5	The criticism of Lokāyatas	vv. 194-214
3-6	The criticism of <i>īśvara</i>	vv. 215-223

3-7	<i>dṛṣṭi</i> 'view'	vv. 224-229
3-8	<i>duḥkha</i> 'suffering'	vv. 230-233
3-9	<i>buddha</i>	vv. 234-239
3-10	Seeing <i>pratītyasamutpāda</i> and seeing <i>Buddha</i>	vv. 240-246
3-11	Conclusion	vv. 247-256
4.	<i>niḥsvabhāvatā</i> and <i>śūnyatā</i>	vv. 257-266
5.	The <i>Buddhas</i> and the <i>bodhisattvas</i>	vv. 267-360

It follows from what has been said above that Bhā-viveka's works are PP, MHK, probably TJ (including *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*) and "*Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun.*"

According to the relationship of quotations in the above treatises, Ejima decides the chronological order of these works as: first, MHK (possibly including TJ), second, the "*Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*" and finally, PP.

Bhā-viveka's logic

Bhā-viveka was influenced by Dignāga (c. 400-480 A.D.).³⁵ Accordingly, it was his view that the Mādhyamikas had to employ syllogisms to prove the truth of their philosophy. Hence, Bhā-viveka used syllogism (*svatantra-anumāna*) in MHK, PP and "*Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun.*" In employing syllogisms, Bhā-viveka included three modifications: (1) adding of the word "*paramārthataḥ*" ("from the standpoint of the highest truth") to propositions in his syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be understood as *prasajya-pratiṣedha* ("the negation of a proposition," as opposed to *paryudāsa*, "the negation of a term or word"), and (3) the condition that no counter-example (*vipakṣa*) is to be given.

³⁵ Erich Frauwallner 1961: 125-48 established the dates of important Buddhist philosophers. As a result of his investigation, he suggested that the life-time of Dignāga was to be 480-540 A.D. The fact that Bhāviveka was influenced by Dignāga was investigated by Ejima 1980: 61-82.

Bhā-viveka tried to clarify the philosophy of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) by means of syllogisms, including the three modifications. Here I will translate verse 26 in the third chapter, one of the typical syllogisms of Bhā-viveka in his MHK, and its commentary TJ in order to clarify the point made just now and the matters which surround his syllogisms (i.e. fallacy of proposition and negation in the ultimate reality). Then, I will explain the meaning of the verse. In order to clarify the context of the topic, I will divide the following translation into some sections, and will put an explanation after each section of translation, if necessary. My translation is based upon the Tibetan text ed. and English tr. by Iida, 1980: 81-90.

“Here,
(proposition) from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārthataḥ*) the
earth, etc. do not have the gross elements as their own-beings,
(reason1) because they are things which are made, or
(reason2) because they are things which have cause, etc.,
(instance) just like knowledge (*jñāna*).” //3-26//³⁶

Adding the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" to the proposition.

[Translation of TJ]

In [the word] *paramārtha*, *artha* is what is to be obtained (*pratipattavya*) and what is to be understood (*adhigantavya*) because *artha* is the object to be known (*jñātavya*). *Paramārtha* which means “the most excellent.” The compound *parama-artha* [can be interpreted in three ways].

(1) It means “the most excellent object” because it is the object and the most excellent (*karmadhārya* compound)

³⁶ *tatra bhūta-sva-bhāvān hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ/*

kṛtakatvād yathā jñānaṁ hetumattvādito 'pi vā//3-26// (Ejima 1980; 274.)

In MHK the above verse is the first syllogism. In addition, Bhāvaviveka explains his syllogism in his PP and *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*. For further details of his syllogism in TJ, see Iida 1980: 81-90. On his syllogism in PP, see Kajiyama 1963/1964. On his syllogism in *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*, see Poussin 1932-1933: 68-138.

(2) Or, it is the object of the most excellent. That is, because it is the object of the most excellent knowledge that is beyond discrimination (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*), it means the object of the most excellent (*tatpuruṣa* compound)

(3) Or, it is "conformable to *paramārtha*" (*paramārthānukūla*). That is, since there is that *paramārtha* in wisdom (*prajñā*) which is conformable to obtaining of *paramārtha*, it means "one which is in conformity with *paramārthaḥ*" (*bahuvrīhi* compound)

Paramārthataḥ [in syllogisms] is taken as the third type of compound (the *bahuvrīhi* compound), i.e., *paramārthataḥ*, in the ultimate reality.

[An explanation]

As is well known, the highest truth (*paramārtha*) is contrasted with *saṃvṛti* (the conventional truth) in many schools of philosophy but particularly in Mādhyamika. Bhā-viveka included this word "the highest truth" in his syllogisms. He interpretes the word *paramārthataḥ* in three ways, i.e., *karmadhārya*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrīhi* compound.³⁷ Among these three interpretations, Bhā-viveka adopts the third restriction *paramārthataḥ* in his proposition. That is to say, the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" in Bhā-viveka's proposition does not mean 'the highest truth' itself, but that which is in conformity with the highest truth itself. In other words, the third interpretation means *prajñā*, which is in conformity with the highest truth.³⁸

Assuming the first interpretation (*karmadhārya* compound) and the second (*tatpuruṣa* compound), the third interpretation is realized. The first and second "*paramārtha*" are beyond conceptions. Truth itself cannot be understood by means of concepts and language. On the other hand, the third *paramārtha* has concepts and language. However, it is *prajñā* and is approaching truth itself. That is to say, even though it is verbal usage, as long as the word *paramārtha* directs to the highest truth itself, Bhāviveka's syllogism, including the restriction *paramārthataḥ* is truth.

³⁷ In PP Bhāviveka interprets the word *paramārtha* in the same way. See, Uryūzu 1971: 34. Avalokitavrata in his PPT gives us grammatical explanations of these three interpretations of the word *paramārtha*, that is, (1) *karmadhārya* compound, (2) *tatpuruṣa* compound and (3) *bahuvrīhi* compound respectively.

³⁸ This idea can be found in the commentary on v. 8 of PP XXIV. See, Uryūzu 1971: 33-34.

The negation in the proposition should be understood as *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

[Translation of TJ]

Here, the negation 'na (not)' means *prasajya-pratiṣedha* ("the negation of a proposition"), and does not mean *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* ("the negation of a term"). One might ask: What is the difference between *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*? *Paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* affirms the other entity (*vastu*) which is similar to this entity due to the negation of the nature of this entity. For instance, by the negation "he is not a Brahman," one might affirm that [he] looks like a Brahman but he is a non-Brahman, he differs from [a brahman], that is [he] belongs to a lower class (*śūdra*) because of lacking mortification (*tapas*) and learning (*śruta*) etc. The *prasajya-pratiṣedha* negates only the nature of the entity, it does not affirm another entity which is similar but not identical. For instance, [the expression] "Brahmans must not drink liquor" denies only [the very action] itself, and does not mean "do drink something other than liquor" or "do not drink something other than liquor." Therefore, here, "from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārthataḥ*) the earth etc. which are imagined by people in the world do not have [corresponding] gross elements as their own-being" is only the negation of ["having gross elements as their own-being"]. It does not affirm "having another as own-being" or "having non-existence as own-being."

[An explanation]

The negative particle in Bhā-viveka's proposition is related to the verb, not to a nominal as a *prasajya-pratiṣedha*. For instance, "whatever exists is not produced from itself" does not mean "whatever exists is not produced from another." It just means that "whatever exists is never produced from itself."³⁹

³⁹ We come across the details of Bhāviveka regarding *prasajya-pratiṣedha* in PP and its commentary PPT. In PP Bhāviveka says: "here one should specify that entities do not [- - -] originate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate from themselves [- - -]; rather they originate from another." Likewise one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate just (*eva*) from themselves; rather they originate from themselves and another." Therefore, that also is not accepted, because it is distinct from [our] doctrine. (Tr. William 1993: 221.) According to William, addition in brackets[] is based upon PPT.

For detailed information regarding *paryudāsa* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, see Kajiyama: 1963: 423-438, 1973: 161-175.

Fallacy of proposition

[Translation of TJ]

Here, the opponents object as follows:

(i) There are the following statements in the saying of your teacher (*śāstrī-vacana* =the Buddha).

"Oh Brahman! everything consists of the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements."

And,

"The characteristic of form (*rūpa*) is change and destruction, etc".

You also accepted those [ideas, i.e., "the everything has the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements as its own-being" and "the characteristic of form is change and destruction, etc"], but if you negate those very things, your thesis (*pratijñā*) is damaged by the very ideas you accept (*abhyupagata*).

(ii) Likewise, it is well known (*prasiddha*) that the function of particular objects (*pratiniyata-viśaya*) is known through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) of the sense organs (*indriya*). And, there is no other superior proper cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*) than seeing (*dṛṣṭa*). Nevertheless, having seen the shape (*saṁsthāna*) and colour (*varṇa*) of the four elements (i.e., fire, water, wind and earth) by means of your own eyes, you still search for the own-being of the earth element, e.g., smooth touch. It is, however, understood by everybody in the world that the earth element has the nature of firmness, etc. Therefore, the negation of it means negation of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

(iii) Also, the form (*rūpa*), etc. and nature of earth, i.e., solidity (*khakkhaṭva*), wetness (*dravatva*), heat (*uṣṇatva*) and mobility (*samudīraṇatva*), etc. are well known even to the *śabara* and *mātariṅga* tribes. Thus, the negation of the own-being of entities which are well known to everybody in the world means the negation of what is well known (*prasiddha*).

To these objections we reply as follows:

Because of the restriction *paramārthataḥ* in our proposition (*pratijñā*), our proposition would not be a contradiction of the theory we accept, or of direct perception or of what is generally known. This is due to the following reasons:

(i) The Bhagavat proclaimed the theory of two truths (*satya-dvaya*), i.e., *saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārtha-satya*. Among these two truths, as for the *saṃvṛti-*

satya, he established own-beings and characteristics of entities (*dharma*). Likewise, as for the *paramārtha-satya*, he proclaimed non-own-being [of entities]. That is, [the following was stated by the Bhagavat].

"Kauśika! all entities are empty in their own-being. [The statement] "all entities are empty in their own-being" means the non-existence of entities. And the non-existence is "*prajñāpāramitā*."

According to this statement, entities do not exist. Because of this, how can they possess own-beings? Accordingly, contradiction with what we accepted does not occur.

(ii) The contradiction with *pratyakṣa* does not occur. The reason is: the objects [of cognition] are untrue and the ability of seeing, etc. does not exist because the sense-organs are [actually] senseless. Therefore, to consider that the object is what is directly perceived is improper, just as in the case of one who has an eye-disease who sees a hair, mosquito or horsefly in his eyes, or in the case of one who perceives an echo as coming from a particular place, which is improper. Accordingly, what can be *pratyakṣa* for whom, and how can there be the contradiction with that (*pratyakṣa*)?

(iii) Also, the contradiction by what is well accepted does not occur, because the ordinary person is blind due to an eye-disease: "ignorance." When it comes to analyzing something from the standpoint of the highest truth, then just as in the example of a blind person who cannot examine a jewel, the ordinary person does not understand that analyzing from the standpoint of the highest truth. Accordingly, contradiction with the well known does not occur.

[An explanation]

The opponents object to Bhā-viveka's proposition from three points of view: (i) conflict with what we accepted, (ii) objection by direct perception and (iii) objection by the well-known. That is,

(i) The Buddha proclaimed the own-being of entities. Therefore, for Buddhists, a negation of the Buddha's statement would be a fallacy of contradiction.

(ii) It is widely accepted that *pratyakṣa* of sense organs holds for specific objects. Therefore, the negation of what is actually experienced would be a fallacy.

(iii) That the own-beings of the gross element of earth are solidity, wetness, heat and mobility etc. is generally known by all ordinary people.

Therefore, negation of what is generally known by all ordinary people would be a fallacy.

To these objections Bhā-viveka replies:

Because we have the restriction *paramārthataḥ* in our proposition (*pratijñā*), our proposition would not be a fallacy on account of *abyupagata*, *pratyakṣa* and *prasiddhabādha*. That is:

(i) The Buddha taught two truths, namely *saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārtha-satya*. The own-beings and characteristics of entities are established in *saṃvṛti-satya*, that is, the own-beings and characteristics of entities are acceptable as conventional truth. The Buddha, however, taught the non-own-beingness of entities from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārtha*).

(ii) From the standpoint of the highest truth the objects of sense organs are untrue. For example, from the standpoint of the highest truth the ability of seeing does not exist. Nevertheless, in the eye of one who has an eye disease, unreal hair, etc. is seen as real. It is, however, not correct from the standpoint of the ultimate truth.

(iii) The ordinary person is afflicted by ignorance. Accordingly, he cannot examine anything as it is.

Negation in the ultimate reality

[Translation of TJ]

One might say: the highest truth (*paramārtha*) transcends every intelligence (*buddhi*). However, the negation of the own-being of entities (*bhāva-svabhāva-pratiṣedha*) is in the object sphere of words. Therefore, the negation does not establish the absence of own-being of entities.

We (Mādhyamikas) reply: to say this is not proper. The *paramārtha* is twofold. One is *paramārtha*, which works without conception (*anabhisamskāra-pravṛtti*), which is beyond the world (*lokottara*), which is pure (*anāsrava*) and which is beyond diversification (*niṣprapañca*). The other is *paramārtha* which works with volition (*sābhisamskāra-pravṛtti*), which is conformable to the equipping of virtue and knowledge (*puṇya-jñāna-sambhāra*), which has diversification (*saprapañca*) that is called "pure worldly intelligence" (*śuddha-laukika-jñāna*). Here we adopt the latter *paramārtha* as qualification of the proposition (*pratijñā*). Therefore, there is no fallacy [in our proposition].

Similar example

[Translation of TJ]

The statement which is connected with similar examples (*sapakṣānvaya-nirdeśa*) is "no produced thing has elements (*bhūta*) as its nature (*svabhāva*), just like knowledge (*jñāna*)."

One might say: in what manner is knowledge (*jñāna*) a produced thing?

We reply: it is accomplished by logic (*tarka*) which aims at heaven (*svarga*) and nirvana (*apavarga*). Here, the negation "knowledge does not have elements as its own-being, because it is a thing which is made" is connected with the sense of *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

No counter-example (*vipakṣa*) is available in the syllogism.

[Translation of TJ]

Here, among three aspects of reason (*hetu*), due to the non-indication of the third condition, i.e., absence of a counter-example, what we intend to say is conventionally explained by using only two aspects of reason. The property of the subject (*pakṣa-dharma*) exists only in the similar example (*sapakṣa*), not in the counter-example (*vipakṣa*) because the latter, which has own-being differs from the former, which never exists. Therefore, we do not state instances (*dṛṣṭānta*) which lack counter-examples (*vipakṣa*) and reasons.

In order to indicate a convertible term (*pariyāya*), [the word] *hetumat* is used. [The abstract] noun of *hetumat* is *hetumattva*. The term "etc." in the syllogism includes other reasons, i.e., knowability and expressibility etc. In this case, the phrase "because they are things which have cause" is used as the reason (*hetu*). Whatever has cause, knowableness or expressibility etc. does not have elements as its own-being, just like knowledge. Likewise, the earth does not have gross elements as its own-being from the standpoint of the highest truth.

In this way, each term [of syllogism] is related to the others.

[An explanation]

According to Dignāga's logic, a correct syllogism is conditioned by three aspects. These are: (1) *pakṣa-dharmatva*, namely reason (*hetu*) should be the predicate of the subject of the proposition, (2) *sapakṣa-sattva*, namely reason (*hetu*) must belong to an example similar to the subject of the proposition. and (3)

vipakṣāsattva, namely, reason (*hetu*) must not belong to a counter-example of the subject of the proposition. Bhā-viveka, however, does not adopt the third aspect among the above three aspects. That is, Bhā-viveka does not adopt a counter-example in his syllogism. The reason is: Bhā-viveka upholds the emptiness of all entities in the ultimate reality. Hence, with regard to the statement "from the standpoint of the highest truth, earth, etc. do not have gross elements as their own-beings, because they are things which are made," a counter-example, i.e., "something which has gross elements as its own-being" does not exist. That is, the proposition (*pratijñā*) "from the standpoint of the highest truth, the earth etc. have no gross elements as their own-being (*svabhāva*)" is a case of *prasajyapratishedha* and means only the negation of "have gross element as their own-being." In this case, the counter-example which can be assumed is one of which "have gross as their own-being" could be said. However, as long as "have gross as their own-being" is simply negated, there is no possibility of a counter-example. The employing of *prasajyapratishedha* as the negation of the proposition (*pratijñā*) leads to non-necessity of the counter-example.

Accordingly, the above-mentioned syllogism amounts to:

- (p) If considered by *prajñā* (wisdom) which is in conformity with the highest truth, the earth etc.⁴⁰ do not have the gross elements as their own-beings,
- (h1) because they are things which are made, or,
- (h2) because they are things which have cause, knowableness (*jñeyatva*), expressibility (*vācya*) etc.
- (d) just as knowledge does not have gross elements as its own-being.

Thus, I have clarified the idea of Bhā-viveka regarding three modifications and showed how we should understand Bhā-viveka's syllogism.

In the following chapter, I shall translated MHK 3•137-256.

⁴⁰ The term "etc." includes water, fire and wind. See, Iida 1980: 82.

Chapter Two.

Bhā-viveka's *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*, Third Chapter, *Tattva-jñānaiṣanā*, verses 137-256 An English Translation and Explanation

As mentioned in the introduction, a critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of the Tibetan text of the third chapter of MHK were published and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima in 1980. Shotaro Iida published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of TJ corresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of both the verses and the TJ.

Here, I present an English translation and explanation of of MHK, 3•137-256. My translation is based upon the text edited by Y. Ejima, and my explanation is basically based upon TJ. TJ, however, does not give us detailed commentary for some verse parts. Hence, I have tried to explain verses which TJ does not explain sufficiently based upon my own understanding. Although the Tibetan translation indicates the separate components of the syllogism, like thesis, reason and example, I have combined them in a single sentence. I do not explain each verse I translate. I sum up the main points of the discussion where verses form a unit and have the same context.

Explanation of abbreviations and signs employed in this chapter:

Ms Photocopy in *Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday*, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qian Wenzhong, 1991, p. 511-522

The MHK manuscript itself is reported to have been written on 22.5 X 2 inch palm-leaves, and is said to consist of 24 folios with 5 or 6 lines on each of the obverse and reverse sides. It has the Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili script of the eleventh century. The dedication "*deya-dharmo 'yam uttarāpathika-śrāmaṇera-bandya-dharmākaraśenasya*" further indicates that the manuscript was written in Northern India.⁴¹

[] The syllables (*akṣaras*) are not clear but legible.

⁴¹ For details of this manuscript, see R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937.

- () The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed.
 .. Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.
 + The space for one syllable is damaged.
 = The syllable is divided, e.g. 'tasy=āsti' in ms.
 ° The syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted.
 SG The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sāṅkṛtyāyana.
 k. *kārika* or *kārikās* = verse of the main text
 v. verse
 vv. verses
 K The *Kārikā* text
 KS The *Kārikā* text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima.
 KT The *Kārikā* text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima.
 TJ Tarka-jvālā: Sde dge edition, No. 3856, Dsa 53b2-144b7.
 Peking edition, No. 5256, Dsa 57a-157b2.
 Narthing edition, No. 3247, Dsa 53a7-152a5

An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows:

3.	Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all <i>dharmas</i>	vv. 137-138
3-1	Non-production from itself	vv. 139-146
3-2	Non-production from others	vv. 147-158
3-2-1	The criticism of the four <i>pratyayas</i> "conditions"	v. 159
(A)	<i>hetu-pratyaya</i>	vv. 160-162
(B)	<i>ālambana-pratyaya</i>	vv. 163-166
(C)	<i>samanantara-pratyaya</i>	vv. 167-169
(D)	<i>adhipati-pratyaya</i>	vv. 170-175
3-2-2	The problem of the opposition of <i>pratipakṣa</i> and <i>pratīti</i>	vv. 176-181
3-2-3	The criticism of the theory of the Sāṅkhya system	vv. 182-191
3-3	Non-production from itself and others	vv. 192-193
3-4	Non-production from <i>ahetu</i> "without cause"	vv. 194-195
3-5	The criticism of <i>Lokāyatas</i>	vv. 196-214
3-6	The criticism of <i>īśvara</i>	vv. 215-223
3-7	<i>drṣṭi</i> "view"	vv. 224-229

3-8	<i>duḥkha</i> "suffering"	vv. 230-233
3-9	The <i>Buddha</i>	vv. 234-239
3-10	Seeing <i>pratītya-samutpāda</i> and seeing the <i>Buddha</i>	vv. 240-246
3-11	Conclusion	vv. 247-256

TRANSLATION

2. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas

अथ वा कल्पना-जाल-प्रसरो ह्य् एवमादिकः ।
जात-भावाश्रयो बालम् आकुली-कुरुते बलात् ॥१३७॥
विद्वान्⁴² विद्या-प्रदीपेन यथा-भूतं परीक्षते ।
जातेर्⁴³ निषेधात् तच्छान्तेः⁴⁴ प्रपञ्चोपशमस् तदा ॥१३८॥

Or, indeed, the expansion of a net of false constructions which has such a beginning with such things as [*dravya*, *pradhāna*, *jīva* and *ātman*], and which has for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant person through its force. //137//

By the lamp of knowledge (*vidyāpradīpa*), a knowledgeable person examines (arising of entities) as they are on [the basis] from [the view of] rejection of production. Then out of its (=production's) quenching is (i.e. comes) the cessation of the diversified world of experience. //138//

Explanatory comment:

The realists, i.e., the Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Ābhidharmika etc. among the Buddhist schools and the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika etc. among the Brahmanical schools, state that produced things actually exist in the world. The Madhyamaka school, however, asserts that produced things do not exist in ultimate reality.

The phrase *evam-ādika kalpanā-jāla-prasara* in the above verse means *dravya*, *pradhāna*, *jīva*, *ātman* etc. that other systems imagine as real existences and which are referred to in vv. 135-136.⁴⁵

An ignorant person misunderstands in that he thinks that produced things actually exist in the world and that entities are produced either from themselves,

⁴² विद्वान् ms.

⁴³ जाते ms. KT: skye bkag

⁴⁴ तच्छान्ते ms. KT: de shi bas

⁴⁵ *dravya-pradhāna-jīvādi jñeyam yat tīrthya-kalpitaṃ/
yathā-yogaṃ niṣeddhavyaṃ yukty-āgama-viśāradaih* //3•135//
*iti sva-para-siddhānta-kalpita-tāma-nirātmatām/
vidvān vibhāvya bhāvānām tattva-jñāmṛtaṃ pibet* //3•136//

from others, from both themselves and others or without a cause. A discriminating person, however, realizes non-arising of entities as the truth, attains proper wisdom, and liberates himself from the diversified world of experience.

2-1 Non-production from itself

Introduction to verses 139-140

Bhā-viveka discusses here the doctrine of 'pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state' (*Satkāryavāda*) in the Sāṃkhya school. The Sāṃkhyas claim that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is therefore self-generated. However, their statement is not acceptable to Buddhists. According to TJ, the Sāṃkhyas propose that an effect pre-exists in the cause. This amounts to saying that it produces itself from itself or that an existent is produced from itself. Bhā-viveka criticizes this opinion.

तत्र तावत् स्वतो जन्म संवृत्यापि न युज्यते ।
सात्मकत्वाद् , यथा दध्नः स्वतो जन्म न विद्यते ॥१३९॥

Here, firstly, production from itself is not proper even from the standpoint of conventional truth, because it [already] has itself, just as a curd has no birth from itself. //139//

नोत्पन्नाः स्वात्मतो भावा भावत्वात् , तद्यथा पुमान् ।
नापि चात्मास्त्य् अजातानाम् अजातत्वात् ख-पुष्पवत् ॥१४०॥

The existents do not arise out of themselves, because they are [already] in existence, just like the *puruṣa* (*pūms*) in your view.

Nor [on the other hand], do the unproduced have a self (=own-being), because they are not born, just like the sky-flower (*kha-puṣpa*). //140//

Explanatory comment:

An existent thing is not produced from itself because it is already existent, just as *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya theory is not produced from itself. Nor do the

unproduced things have themselves, because they have not been produced, just as the sky-flower.

Whatever exists in our world does not arise from itself both because such origination would be purposeless and because it entails an absurdity. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of things which are in existence already. The absurdity is this: if something exists it would not arise again and yet there would never be a time when it was not arising. For example, it is clear that curds are produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible even in our everyday world that curds are produced from curds themselves.

Further, entities are not produced from entities themselves because entities are things which already exist, just like "*puruṣa*" (one of the two substantial principles) which Sāṃkhya admits as a real, unchanging, unevolving entity.

On the other hand, what is not arisen cannot be said to exist, just like the sky-flower which is only an imaginary flower.

According to TJ, the reasons (*hetu*) "because it [already] has itself" in verse 139 and "because they are [already] existent" in the verse 140 are conventional. From the standpoint of the highest truth entities do not have own-being.

ख-पुष्पाभाव-वाच्यं हि खादि यद् अपि ते मतम् ।
न ख-पुष्पं तद् इत्य् अस्मात् पक्षेऽपि न्यूनता न नः ॥१४१॥

If you say that 'there is absence of sky-flower' means 'there is sky, etc.' still that sky, etc. is not the sky-flower. Hence, we do not have a deficiency (*nyūnatā*) even in [this] alternative (*pakṣa*). //141//

Explanatory comment:

This verse is an elaboration with regard to the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) which Bhā-viveka advanced in v. 140. According to TJ, the Sāṃkhya school points out that there are various interpretations regarding the sky-flower: i.e., "the flower in the sky," "the flower which comes from the sky" or "the flower of the sky." etc. From this standpoint, they counter that there is no proper example to support Bhā-viveka's statement. Bhā-viveka, however, clarifies that by advancing the example of "the sky-flower" which does not really exist, he refers

only to non-existence of entities . Therefore, he says that “we do not have a deficiency even in our alternative.”

कार्यस्य कारणं स्वात्मा. तस्य जन्म ततो मतम् ।
 स्वतो जन्म ततोऽभीष्टं भावानाम् इति चेन् मतम् ॥१४२॥
 स्वात्मवत् तदनन्यत्वात्⁴⁶ कारणं⁴⁷ स्याद् अकारणम् ।
 अजातत्वाच् च किं कस्य कारणं स्याद् अकारणम् ॥१४३॥

The own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) is considered to be from that (cause). Therefore, of existents [which are the effects], birth from themselves (=their ownbeing, the causes), is desired - if this were [your, i.e., the Sāṃkhya's] view, //142//
 [then,] because [the cause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self [of that effect], it would be no cause (i.e., cease to be a cause).
 And since [*puruṣa pradhāna* etc.] are unproduced, what, itself being causeless, could be the cause of what else? //143//

सत्य् आत्मनि च भावस्य⁴⁸ वृथा कारण-कल्पना⁴⁹ ।
 तस्माद् एव तद् उत्पन्नं⁵⁰ चैक्यं जनक-जन्ययोः ॥१४४॥

And, when the self of an existent [already] exists, it is useless to postulate a cause. “A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (*janaka*) and what is generated (*janya*) become identical (*ekya*). //144//

⁴⁶ तदनन्यत्वात् ms. KT: de las gshan min

⁴⁷ तोरणं ms. KT: rgyu ni

⁴⁸ Ms; sic, KT: bras bu (=kāryasya)

⁴⁹ कारणाकल्पना, KT: rgyur brtag pa ni

⁵⁰ तद् =उत्पन्नां ms. KT: de skyes na

दधि-भावेन पयसोऽवस्थानाच् चेद् अबाधकम् ।
पुत्रत्वेनानवस्थानात् पितुर् न हि नबाधकम् ⁵¹ ॥१४५॥

If [what we have said above is] undamaging [to your position] because milk exists as curd, [then what we have said is] not undamaging (i.e., is certainly damaging) because of [the fact that] a father does not exist as child.//145//

Explanatory comment:

In the above verses, Bhā-viveka points out identity of a cause and an effect. If the cause is the effect, a pot would be produced from the pot itself. Or alternatively, the pot (i.e. the effect) would pre-exist in clay (i.e. the cause). In other words, if a pot really pre-exists, there is no sense in claiming its arising a second time.

TJ gives the following explanation of v. 145: It is not seen by anyone, anywhere and in any way that “abandoning the state of a father, the father changes to the own-being of a child.” A father cannot abandon being a father and therefore cannot be a child. Even though a child and its father have a blood relationship, the father and child are not identical. Therefore, you cannot get rid of the fallacy that the generator and the generated would be identical in your view.

विपक्षासंभवाद् इष्टा नापि हेतोर् विरुद्धता ।

Because of impossibility of counter-examples (*vipakṣa*), it too would not be right to hold that the reason [in our syllogism] is contradicted. //146ab//

एवं तावत् स्वतो जन्म भावानां नोपपद्यते ॥१४६॥

Thus, there is this much that existents are not produced from themselves.//146cd//

⁵¹ न हि नै..धकं ms. KT: /gnos pa med pa ma yin no/

Explanatory comment:

The opponent may think of finding a fault like contradiction (*viruddhatā*) in Bhā-viveka's remark in order to reject his criticism. Because Bhā-viveka's syllogisms, however, do not leave room for counter-examples his critical statement cannot contain a contradiction.

2-2 Non-production from others

Introduction to verses 147-158

The argument on non-production from others takes place as a controversy between Bhā-viveka, on the one hand, and the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika-Nyāya among the Buddhist schools and the Vaiśeṣika school, on the other hand. While the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta seek to explain reality exclusively in terms of a conceptual pattern of identity and permanence, the Buddhist realists state it exclusively in terms of difference and impermanence. They assert that the cause and effect are different entities. Thus, the Buddhist realists and the Vaiśeṣika school advocate the doctrine of origination from others, i.e., that entities are produced from entities which are other to them.

स्वभावासम्भवाच् चापि कः कस्मात् पर इष्यते ।
न गो-शृङ्गाद्रि-शृङ्गत्वं⁵² वाजि-शृङ्गं परं मतम् ॥१४७॥

Moreover, since it is not possible that own-being can exist, what is desired to be different from what? It is not thought that the horn of a horse (*vāji-śṛṅga*) is different from the horn of a cow (*go-śṛṅga*) and the horn of a mountain (*adri-śṛṅga*). //147//

Explanatory comment:

If entities are produced from other things, there is a question "what is different from what? In the ultimate reality, there is no ownbeing of entities, that is, entities do not exist in the ultimate reality. Therefore, distinction of entities is not proper for Bhā-viveka. In the above verse he says: since a horn of

⁵² °त्व मस, "°त्वाद्" (bertter)

a horse does not exist, any attempt to relate it to the horns of others does not make sense.

न परे परमार्थेन प्रत्ययाश् चक्षुरादयः ।
चक्षुर्विज्ञानजनकाः परत्वाद् वीरणादिवत् ॥१४८॥

From the standpoint of the highest truth, the other causal factors (*pare pratyayā*), such as the eye, etc., do not produce visual cognition, etc., because they are different [from each other], just like the *vīraṇa* grass, etc. (*vīraṇādivat*)/ /148/ /

न विवक्षित-नेत्रादि-कारणा⁵³ रूप-धीर् मता ।
परत्वात् प्राग् असत्त्वाद्⁵⁴ वा यथा घट-पटादयः ॥१४९॥

It is not admissible that cognition of form (*rūpa*) has the intended eye etc. as its cause, because it is different [from them], or because it does not exist beforehand, just like a jar and woven cloth etc. [are not the cause of cognition of form]. / /149/ /

Explanatory comment:

If, as the Buddhist realists and Vaiśeṣika maintain, the cause and the result are different entities, and the cause produces the result, there is a deficiency. The eye produces only eye-cognition (*cakṣur-vijñāna*), but it does not produce a grass-cap, cloth or jar. A grass-cap, cloth and jar are produced from *vīraṇa* grass, yarn and clay respectively, but eye-cognition is not produced from them. An entity "X" which is different from an entity "Y" does not produce "Y" as its result. Accordingly, Bhā-viveka maintains that production from others can not be admitted.

⁵³ °कार.. मस, सघः °कारणं, KT: rgyu can

⁵⁴ सत्त्वाद् = ms

अजातस्य परत्वं च सांवृतं, न तु तत्त्वतः⁵⁵ ।
परस्माद् अपि जन्मैवम् अयुक्तम् इति गृह्यते ॥१५०॥

And, the otherness of something unproduced is a conventional truth;
[yet that otherness] is not [there] from the point of view of the highest
truth. Thus it is grasped that origination from another entity is not
proper.//150//

अनिर्देशस्य चोत्पत्तिर् उत्पन्नस्य निरर्थिका ।
नापि जातिर् अजातस्य ख-पुष्पवद् असंभवः ॥१५१॥

[If you now hypothesize the arising of something that] is produced [but]
is inexpressible, then [that] production is useless. Nor can there be arising
of what is not arisen yet, [because] it is impossible, just like the sky-flower
(*kha-puṣpavat*).//151//

जायमानस्य चोत्पत्तौ तुल्य-पर्यनुयोगिता ।
अवाच्यस्याप्य् अवाच्यत्वात् तदन्यवद् ⁵⁶ असंभवः ॥१५२॥

[Now, if someone were to say that] what is in the process of being born
arises, there would be a similar objection (*tulyaparyanuyogitā*).
There is no birth of something inexpressible also, because it is
inexpressible [as to whether it is already produced or it is not produced
yet], just as [there is no birth of] things other than it (the
unexpressible).//152//

Explanatory comment:

The above verses make four points: (1) what has already arisen does not
arise again. (2) what is not arisen yet does not arise. (3) what is in the process of
coming to exist does not arise either. (4) something inexpressible does not arise.
The points (1) and (2) are already explained in the preceding sections. Hence, I
shall explain points (3) and (4) here.

⁵⁵ तत्त्वतः ms

⁵⁶ avāc[ya]+..danyavad= ms. KT:/brjod du med phyir gshan bshin no/

(3) What is in the process of coming to exist has both a portion of what has already arisen and a portion of what is not arisen yet. As mentioned before, what has already arisen does not arise and what is not arisen yet does not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, having both that which has already arisen and that which is not arisen yet, does not arise.

(4) Something inexpressible also does not arise. Something inexpressible refers to what is in the process of coming to exist, because it is inexpressible whether it is what has already arisen or what is not arisen yet. What is in the process of coming to exist has two portions, that is, a portion which has already arisen and a portion which is not arisen yet. As mentioned above, what has already arisen and what is not arisen yet do not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, i.e., something inexpressible, does not arise.

According to TJ, a barren women's child is also included in other things inexpressible. Presumably, TJ means that the skin colour of the barren woman's child is inexpressible whether it is white or black.

विकल्पितात्मना शून्यास् तत्त्वतश्⁵⁷ चक्षुरादयः ।
कृतकत्वाद् विनाशाद् वा यथा मायामयं पयः ॥१५३॥

From the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are empty as entities consisting of conceptual construction (*vikalpita*), because they are created, because they are destroyed (*vināśa*), like illusory water (=a mirage). //153//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents maintain that entities are produced, because they are acknowledged as mentally constructed entities. Therefore, there are entities which are constructed by cognitions. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. He says: in our ordinary world it is admitted that the eye is an entity and cognizes the form or colour of entities as blue or white or black etc. The eye, however, is not a real entity in the absolute reality, because the eye is what is created or what

⁵⁷ तत्त्वतः ms. Not translated explicitly in KT.

is destroyed, just as illusory water (suggested by TJ). Therefore, the eye is not real entity.

साध्य-तुल्य-निषेधाच् च संशयो नेतरात्मना ॥१५४ab॥

Because [a non-conceptually constructed entity] is denied in the same way as the object to be proved, i.e., due to the negation of the mentally constructed entity, (*sādhya-tulya-niṣedha*), there is no doubt [about the reason (*hetu*)] by the other [non-mentally constructed] entity.//154ab//

अकल्पितो ऽपि⁵⁸ मायात्मा वितथस् तत्त्वतो⁵⁹ मतः ॥१५४cd॥
स्वात्माभिमति-हेतुत्वाद्⁶⁰ यथासौ कल्पितात्मता⁶¹ ॥१५५ab॥

Although the entity *māyā* ('ultimate illusion') is not mentally constructed (*akalpita*), it from the standpoint of the highest truth is thought to be unreal (*vitatha*), because of its being a cause of self-affirmation, just as it is false as an imagined entity.//154cd-155ab//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that for illusion there is something which we do not cognize. Bhā-viveka objects to this statement here. He maintains that the entity *māyā* is made by a magician, not mentally constructed. It is not, however, a real entity. It is seen variously by people. That is, one person sees the colour of it as blue, etc. Another person sees the colour of it as red, etc. Or, a form of it is seen variously by many people. The colour or form of illusion is different from one's validation. Therefore, such illusion is not in reality an entity. (suggested by TJ)

⁵⁸ अविकल्पितोऽपि ms

⁵⁹ तत्त्वतो ms

⁶⁰ स्वात्माभिमतहेतुत्वाद् = ms. KT:/la laḥidod chags rgyu yin phyir/

⁶¹ °आत्मना ms. KT:de ñid (tad eva, tattva)

प्रतीतांशेन तत्-सद्धेर् दृष्टान्त-न्यूनता न च⁶² ॥१५५cd॥

Because it is proved by a portion of what is experienced in the world,
there is no deficiency of analogy (*dr̥ṣṭāntanyūnatā*).//155cd//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents object again that if there is no non-imagined entity in illusion the *māyā* which Bhā-viveka adopted as an example would not be proper instance. There is, however, something material for making an illusion behind the illusion. That material can be the instance. Therefore, there is no deficiency in this instance.

स्व-भाव-शून्या⁶³ ह्य् अथ वा तत्त्वतश्⁶⁴ चक्षुरादयः ।
कृतकत्वाद् विनाशाद् वा मार-निर्मित-बुद्धवत् ॥१५६॥

Or, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are devoid of own-being, because they are created, or because they are destroyed, just like the Buddha made by evil (*māra*).//156//

यश् च स्व-भावो भावानां स्व-भावो ऽसौ न तत्त्वतः⁶⁵ ।
कृतकत्वाद् यथोष्णत्वम् अम्भसः स्थिरतापि वा ॥१५७॥

The own-being of entities is not own-being from [the standpoint of the highest] truth, because it is created, just like the hotness or hardness of water.//157//

Explanatory comment:

Here Bhā-viveka discusses the own-being of entities. What is assumed as the essence of entities in our world is not the essence of entities from the

⁶² न [च] ms

⁶³ ..भावशून्या ms. KT: dños ñid ston

⁶⁴ तत्त्व° ms

⁶⁵ तत्त्वतः ms

perspective of the highest truth. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the essence of entities, i.e., the own-being of entities (*svabhāva*), of an independent, eternal and unchanging substance, is not admitted by the Mādhyamika school. Here Bhā-viveka does not define the own-being of entities, but it comes to mean the non-existence of entities. What is made or what disappears does not have own-being because such a thing changes in substance and hence is non-eternal. For example, to follow TJ, when water is boiled, it becomes hot water; when frozen, water has solidity, i.e., becomes ice etc. Likewise, when water is cooled, it becomes cold water; at room temperature, it has softness, i.e., it is water itself. Therefore, water does not have an own-being; it is not an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. Thus, the essence of entities accepted in our everyday world is denied from the standpoint of the highest truth.

स्वात्मनैव⁶⁶ हि भावानां उत्पादो नोपपद्यते ।
पर-भावेन⁶⁷ चोत्पादो न दृष्टो गोः खरात्मना ॥१५८॥

It is not logically proper that entities arise by themselves (i.e. by their own-being). And it is not seen that [entities] arise through the state of another (i.e. as something else). Just as the arising of a cow in the form of a donkey is not seen. //158//

Explanatory comment:

TJ: The cow which has dewlap, tail, hoof and horn etc. as its essential features does not arise as the donkey which has single hoofs and long ears etc. as its essential features. Moreover, a cow is not produced from the cow itself. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of a cow which is in existence already. Therefore, origination from an entity itself is not acceptable. Origination as other entities is not acceptable either.

⁶⁶ स्वात्मन् = एवं ms

⁶⁷ पराभावेन ms. KT: gshan gyi dños por

2-2-A. The criticism of the four *pratyayas* or conditions

Introduction to verses 159-175

The Buddhist Realist, Vaibhāṣika and Ābhidharmika advocates the doctrine of origination from others. In these verses, Bhā-viveka refutes the four causal factors which appear to have been drawn from Hīnayāna philosophy. According to Bhā-viveka, the Buddha taught that the existent does not appear out of the four conditions for people whose wisdom is covered by nihilistic or non-nihilistic views (suggested by TJ). For this reason, he recognized and proclaimed the four conditions only for the purpose of establishing the truth of verbal usage.⁶⁸ The Vaibhāṣika, however, adopted this theory as the real truth which the Buddha realised, and they maintained that entities are produced from others, i.e., four causal factors. The four conditions are: (1) primary or material causal factor (*hetu-pratyaya*), (2) objective causal factor (*ālambana-pratyaya*), (3) sequential causal factor (*samanantara-pratyaya*), and (4) dominant causal factor (*adhipati-pratyaya*).⁶⁹

हेत्वादि-प्रत्ययेभ्यश् च परेभ्यो जन्म⁷⁰ सांवृतम् ।

नातोऽभ्युपेत-बाधोऽस्ति⁷¹ तत्त्वतो⁷² हि न ते⁷³ यतः ॥१५९॥

The production from others such as causal-conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) is conventional. Accordingly, there is no contradiction with the theory we have accepted. For they (the four *pratyayas*) do not truly exist from the standpoint of the highest truth. //159//

Explanatory comment:

The four causal factors are in general admitted by all the schools of Buddhist Realists. Bhā-viveka admits the four causal factors only from the

⁶⁸ *Praññāpradīpa*, p. 27.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 2•61c-63.

⁷⁰ pa[re].-[nma] ms. KT: gshan las/ /skye ba

⁷¹ °बाधारस् = ms. Ejima puts नातोऽभ्युपेतबाधितास् . However, this is metrically unacceptable. KT: gnod pa med/

⁷² तत्त्वतो ms

⁷³ तो ms. KT: de dag

standpoint of conventional truth. Bhā-viveka refutes each of the causal factors in the following verses.

2-2-1-(A). The criticism of the *hetu-pratyaya* or the primary causal factor

Introduction to verses 160-162

Hetu refers to 'primary cause' or might refer to simply 'primary' or 'root.' As the mind is a complex of a number of mental factors inseparably associated with one another, a *hetu* is only one of the factors constituting the mind just as a root of a tree is only one causal factor of the constituents of a tree. The *hetu-pratyaya* refers to the appropriate object of the mental process. When something is said to be the primary cause of another, that thing is said to be the *hetu-pratyaya*.⁷⁴

न सतो नासतो युक्तः प्रत्ययः सदसत्त्वतः⁷⁵ ।
तदन्यवद्.⁷⁶ अजातेर् वा प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययः कुतः⁷⁷ ॥१६०॥

It is not proper either that what exists or what does not exist has a causal condition, because of being in existence and not being in existence [respectively], just like things which are different from them [, i.e., which are not effects].

Alternatively, how can the causal condition of something which does not arise [really] be a causal condition? //160//

⁷⁴ See, S. Chaudhri 1976: 113.

⁷⁵ °सत्त्वतः ms

⁷⁶ तदन्यवद् ms. KT: de las gshan bshin

⁷⁷ =अजातेर् =वा प्रत्ययो प्रत्ययः कुतः ms, which requires to be read "...प्रत्ययोऽप्रत्ययः कुतः", KT: rkyen ma skyes/ /rkyen rnams su ni ji ltar ḡgyur/

न हेतुः कार्य-जनकः तच्छून्यत्वात्, तदन्यवत् ।
नापि तज्-जन्मतोत्पित्सोः⁷⁸ प्राग् असत्त्वात्⁷⁹ तदन्यवत् ॥१६१॥

The cause is not what produces the result, because it is void of that (the result), just like things which are different from them.

Nor is what is about to arise produced from that (the cause), because it does not exist beforehand, just like things which are different from them.//161//

नाजातं जायमानं वा जातं वा⁸⁰ जनयत्य् अयम् ।
उक्त-दोषाद् अजातेश् च⁸¹ तस्माद्धेतुर् न तत्त्वतः⁸² ॥१६२॥

This (the cause) does not produce what is not produced, what is in the process of being produced or what is already produced, because of the logical faults already stated⁸³ and because [entities] do not arise.

Therefore, there is truly no *hetu* [*pratyaya*].//162//

Explanatory comment:

Here, Bhā-viveka poses the question whether the four conditions are for the result which exists or for the result which does not exist? There cannot be conditions for the result which does exist, because it already exists. For example, there is no clay seen causing a completed pot. Then, with regard to the result which does not exist, Bhā-viveka asserts that there are no causal conditions, because the result does not exist. For example, there is no seed or water as cause for the sky-flower. Accordingly, the primary or material condition (*hetu-pratyaya*) does not exist.

⁷⁸ KT:/skye bar ḥdod paḥaṇ des bskyed min/ (nāpi tajjanmatotpitsuh)

⁷⁹ °सत्त्वात् =ms

⁸⁰ जायमानम् =वा जातम् वा ms

⁸¹ ajā..ś ms. KT: ma skyes phyir

⁸² धेतू न तत्त्वतः ms

⁸³ See, vv. 151-152.

2-2-1-(B). The criticism of the *ālambana-pratyaya* or objective causal factor.

Introduction to verses 163-166

Ālambana refers to an 'object of cognition.' The *ālambana-pratyaya* is the objective sub-cause of the relation between the object and the subject of perception. All the conditioned (*samskr̥ta*) and the unconditioned (*asamskr̥ta*) function as the *ālambana-pratyaya* of the mind and mental states (*citta-caitta*).⁸⁴ For example, a weak man can neither get up nor stand without the help of a stick. The mind and the mental states can neither arise nor continue without an object of cognition. As stick is a support of the weak man, an object is the support of the mental function.

जातस्यालम्बनायोगो⁸⁵ जाते जातिर् वृथा यतः ।
अजातस्याप्य् अजातत्वाद् यथानुत्पत्ति-धर्मिणः ॥१६३॥

What is already arisen does not attach itself to a supporting cause for,
[then] the arising of what is already arisen would be in vain.
What is not arisen yet also [does not attach itself to the supporting cause],
because it is not produced yet, just like what has non-arising as its
nature. //163//

Explanatory comment:

The supporting object is the object of the mind and mental functions. That is, when what is going to be the object of the mind and mental functions becomes the cause, the result, "mind and mental functions" arise. Therefore, Bhā-viveka says that what is already arisen does not attach itself to the object, because for what is already arisen such a cause would be again vain. In other words, cognizing the object, mind or consciousness does not cognize the same object again. For example, cognizing a desk, the mind or consciousness does not need to cognize a desk again as a desk.

⁸⁴ See, S. Chaudhuri 1976:114.

⁸⁵ = ārambaṇa° ms. KT: dmigs

Moreover, what is not arisen yet does not attach itself to an object because it is not produced yet. For example, the eye of the barren woman's child does not attach to an object. (TJ available)

जायमानस्य योगः स्यात् . स च नालम्बनं⁸⁶ विना ।
जनि-क्रिया-समावेशो⁸⁷ विकलाङ्गस्य⁸⁸ नेष्यते ॥१६४॥

[If one says that] what is in the process of coming to exist would attach itself to [the supporting cause], that [attaching] does not exist without support (*ālambana*). The inclusion of the action of being born in that which lacks some parts is not desired.//164//

Explanatory comment:

What is in the process of coming to exist does not attach itself to an object, because it has the nature of both what is already arisen and what is not yet to arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming into existence does not have the function of cognition of objects.

अथ वा चित्त-चैतानां नैवालम्बनम्⁸⁹ इष्यते ।
तत्त्वतो⁹⁰ जायमानत्वाद् ग्राह्यत्वाद् वापि रूपवत् ॥१६५॥

Alternatively, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that there is support for the mind and mental functions (*citta-caitta*) is not acceptable, because it is something in the process of coming into existence, or because it is something to be perceived (*grāhya*), just like a form (*rūpa*).//165//

⁸⁶ = āramvaṇaṁ ms. KT: dmigs pa

⁸⁷ °yā° added under the line in ms.

⁸⁸ °āṅgasya, ms

⁸⁹ = āramvaṇam= ms. KT: dmigs pa

⁹⁰ तत्त्वतो ms

Explanatory comment:

From the standpoint of the highest truth there is no object in the mind and mental functions because this mind and these mental functions themselves are what is to be perceived, just as form, color etc. are what are to be perceived. In other words, they are identical from the viewpoint that both are in the process of coming into existence, that is, they are not completed yet as themselves. Therefore mind and mental functions do not have an objective sub-cause (*ālambanapratyaya*).

किं च, सालम्बनस्य⁹¹ स्यात् कालाभेदात्⁹² स चाप्य् असन्⁹³
एवम् आलम्बनाभावात्⁹⁴ किं कस्यालम्बनं⁹⁵ भवेत् ॥१६६॥

Moreover, [if one were to say that] what has a support (*sālambana*) would [attach to the object], it would not be proper because of the absence of difference of time (*kālābheda*). Thus, since the object does not exist, what could be the object of what? //166//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents maintain that what has a support, i.e., mind and mental functions, attach to the object. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this statement. I do not fully understand what Bhā-viveka says in this verse. His objection probably means: just as the right and left horns of a cow come out at the same time, 'the mind and mental function' and the object arise at the same time. Therefore, discrimination of what is grasped, i.e., the object, and what grasps, i.e., the mind and mental function, is not proper. In other words, what arises at the same time cannot be either what grasps or what is grasped. Accordingly, there is no object, so anything cannot be the object of anything. (suggested by TJ)

⁹¹ आरम्बण[स्य] ms. KT: dmigs bcas pa

⁹² कालभेदात् ms. KT: dus gcig phyir na

⁹³ स चाप्य् अयं ms. KT: de mi ruñ

⁹⁴ =अरम्बणा° ms

⁹⁵ =अरम्बणं ms

2-2-1-(C). The criticism of the *samanantara-pratyaya* or the sequential causal factor

Introduction to verses 167-169

Bhā-viveka criticizes the idea of the sequential condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*). The sequential condition appears to pertain primarily to the production of mental events. It may be taken to refer to the extinction of the immediately preceding moment of consciousness which engenders the succeeding mental state. In other words, the sequential condition may refer to the immediately preceding extinction of a cause, like a seed, which allows for the emergence of the effect, like the sprout.

नाजातस्य निरोधोऽस्ति ख-पुष्पवद् अजातितः ।
न निरुद्धे निरोधोऽपि निरुद्धत्वाद् यथा मृते ॥१६७॥

What is not arisen yet is not blocked, because it has not arisen, just like the sky-flower. What has already disappeared is not blocked, because it has already disappeared, just as in the case of a dead person. //167//

Explanatory comment:

The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what is not arisen yet. What is not arisen yet has no disappearance, because it has had no arisen state, just as the sky-flower does not disappear.

Moreover, the sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has already disappeared. What has already disappeared has no disappearance, because it has already disappeared, just as a dead person does not die.

नानिरुद्धेऽनिरुद्धत्वाद् १६ वर्तमान-प्रदीपवत् ।
निरुध्यमाने नापीष्टः पूर्वोक्त-प्रतिषेधतः ॥१६८॥

What has not disappeared yet is not [blocked], because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp (*pradīpa*) that is existing.

That what is in the process of disappearing disappears is not desired, because of the refutation already stated. //168//

१६ निरुद्धत्वाद् = ms

Explanatory comment:

The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has not disappeared yet. What has not disappeared yet has no disappearance, because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp which is still existing. That is, what has not disappeared yet refers to what is existing. Something existing does not need a condition of arising.

तुल्य-कालस् तथापि स्याद् भिन्न-कालो ऽपि वा भवेत् ।
युक्तो⁹⁷ निरुध्यमानत्वान् नार्हच्-चरम-चित्तवत् ॥१६९॥⁹⁸

Even then (*tathāpi*), [what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming to exist] would be simultaneous (*tulyakāla*) or temporally separate (*bhinnakāla*). [In any case,] it is not, like the final mind of an Arhat (*arhaccarama-cittavat*), justified because of its being in the process of disappearing. //169//

Explanatory comment:

In the case of what is in the process of disappearing the condition is denied in the same way. The opponents, according to TJ, maintain that what is in the process of disappearing supports the arising of that which is in the process of coming to exist. Accordingly, what is in the process of disappearing is the sequential condition. To this assertion Bhā-viveka objects that the sequential condition, i.e., what is in the process of disappearing, is not a sequential condition of what is in the process of coming into existence, because what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming into existence would be simultaneous. Or, even if they are not simultaneous, a sequential condition defined as what is in the process of disappearing is not a condition. In other words, that which is in the process of disappearing cannot be the condition of the

⁹⁷ [यु]क्तो ms

⁹⁸ Ms puts here another half verse: सालम्बनत्वाद् अथ वा प्रत्ययः समनन्तरः/ Ejima suggests that it is left out in the Tibetan K and does not appear in V even in prose form. It might be omitted here for the same reasons; it seems to be misplaced and hardly interpretable when we pay attention to the context (k. 163-166: *ālambana-pratyaya*, k. 167-169: *samanantara-pratyaya*), and the writer of Ms writes the word “ālambana” in “āramvaṇa” in the preceding k. 163-166 while he writes it only here rightly, what leads us to suppose that this half verse was inseted at a certain occasion. It might be, however, copyist’s peculiarity, and may not come from Bhāviveka himself.

next arising, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. The final mind of an Arhat means that when an Arhat is destroyed, after the next existence (*punarbhava*) and transmigration (*saṃtāna*) he reaches Nirvāṇa. Therefore, his mind does not produce the next mind (=next life).

2-2-1-(D). The criticism of the *adhipati-pratyaya* or the dominant causal factor.

Introduction to verses 170-175

Bhā-viveka refutes the dominant causal factor (*adhipati-pratyaya*). The dominant causal factor assists the other in respect of the origination of entities, just as the three legs of a tripod assist one another, without disturbing the arising of entities. Accordingly, everything can be a dominant causal factor (indirect cause). For example, water, earth, sun and warmth can be the dominant causal factors for the growing of seeds.

तत्त्वतो⁹⁹ जात्यसद्-भावाद् भाव-सत्ता न युज्यते ।
वन्ध्या-तनय-सत्तावद्¹⁰⁰ अतो नाधिपतिर् मतः ॥१७०॥

The being of entities is not logically proper, because the arising of [entities] does not exist from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, just like the existence of the barren woman's child. Therefore, the dominant causal factor is not accepted. //170//

कार्येण शून्योऽशून्यो वा प्रत्ययोऽधिपतिर् भवेत् ।
न शून्यस् तेन शून्यत्वाच्छब्द-बुद्धेर् यथेक्षणम् ॥१७१॥

[If one were to accept:] the dominant causal factor would be either with the effect or without the effect.

[The condition that] lacks [the effect] is not [the dominant causal factor], because it lacks that (the effect), just like the eye[sense] for cognition of words. //171//

⁹⁹ तत्त्वतो ms

¹⁰⁰ °सत्तावद् = ms

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka says: the condition without the effect is not the dominant causal factor, because it is without the effect, just as the eye-organ is not the dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. According to Ābhidharmika, Vaibhāṣika, etc. everything can be a dominant causal factor. The eye organ, however, cannot be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. Instead, auditory consciousness can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. On the other hand, the eye organ can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of the eye. Thus, the eye organ and cognition of words do not have interdependence. Moreover, the eye organ without eye-cognition cannot be the dominant causal factor of eye-cognition, because when there is no result there is no causal factor. Therefore, the condition without result cannot be the dominant causal factor. (suggested by TJ)

संवृत्यापि न चाशून्यः¹⁰¹ प्रतीतिर् बाधिका¹⁰² यतः¹⁰³ ।
कार्ये¹⁰⁴ च न भवेत् कार्यम् असत् कार्यं च ते भवेत् ॥१७२॥

That which is not empty [of effect, i.e., which is coupled with an effect] is not [the dominant causal factor] even on the conventional level.

For such a situation is opposed (*bādhikā*) to actual experience (*pratīti*).

Moreover, there would be no effect in the such a effect. And what does not exist for you would become the effect. //172//

Explanatory comment:

Something which is coupled with an effect cannot be the dominant causal factor, because it already has an effect. Something which already has an result cannot be a causal factor. Moreover, if something which already has an effect

¹⁰¹ चाशून्याः (*m, pl*) ms

¹⁰² Ms *sic*

¹⁰³ KT: /sbyañ la sogs na gnas pa yi/ /rgyu tsam yod pa ñi tshes la/ (KD, NP, VDNP, *sic*) In V it is preceded by the following sentence : /mig stoñ pa shes bya ba la kun rdsob tu yañ grags pañi gnod par hgyur te/ /gañ gi phyir she na/ /sbyañ la....(VD, Dsa 98b5-6; N, 102b3; P, 106a5), which, though not being a versified rendering of it, is connected with the pāda ab in KS if we can rectify "mi stoñ pa" (*aśūnya*).

¹⁰⁴ =(k)[ā]rye ms. KT: hbras bu

associated with it, this could not be considered as the effect. It would pre-exist, or something else that is not an effect would be the effect.

कार्य-शक्तिर् हि कार्यं चेत् किम् अन्यत् कारणं ततः ।
आधाराधेय-भावो हि तदनन्यस्य नेष्यते ॥१७३॥

If one were to say that the [latent] capability of the result (*kāryaśkti*) is the result, how can there be a cause other than that (latent capability of the result)? A relation of the recipient and the thing to be received (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) is not desired in the case of anything else [other than cause and effect].//173//

कार्य-पर्याय-मात्रं वा व्योम्नि व्योम-स्थितौ¹⁰⁵ यथा ।
यदासौ¹⁰⁶ कारणं किं¹⁰⁷ तद् येनाशून्यं तद् इष्यते ॥१७४॥

If this [latent capability of the result] is just a synonym for the result, just as in the usage “there is a space in the space,” what could be admissible as that (cause) with which that (result) is seen as associated.//174//

Explanatory comment:

The opponent maintains that the latent capability of effect is the effect and that latent capability exists in the cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka asks: If that is so, how can there be a cause other than the latent capability of the effect. That is, if the latent capability exists in the cause, the cause would be unnecessary.

Bhā-viveka continues, moreover, by asking: if this latent capability of the effect is just a synonym for the effect as in the usage “there is a space in the space.” That is, if the latent capability of the effect is a synonym for the effect, the cause and the effect would be indetical. There is, however, no relationship of place and what is to be placed. In other words, the usage “there is a space in

¹⁰⁵ व्योम्निर् =व्यो° ms

¹⁰⁶ यथासौ ms. KT: gal te de ñid

¹⁰⁷ किं ms

the space” does not make sense. Therefore, the idea that “the latent capability is a synonym for the effect” is not admitted.

सतश् च संभवाभावात्¹⁰⁸ कः कस्याधिपतिर् मतः ।

असतः प्रत्ययाभावात् कः कस्याधिपतिर्¹⁰⁹ मतः ॥१७५॥

Because there is no arising of what is existing, what is taken as the dominant[causal factor] for what? On the other hand, because what is not existing does not have a cause, what is taken as the dominant [causal factor] of what? //175//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that the latent capability of an effect is what pre-exists in the cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka responds: if the cause is the latent capability of the effect, what is the effect which the cause has? He, moreover, states that because there is no repeated arising in what already exists, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z? Likewise, because there is no condition in what is not existing, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z?

Thus, Bhā-viveka refutes the idea of the dominant causal factor even from the standpoint of conventional truth as well as from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-2-2 The problem of the *pratyakṣa* and *pratīti*.

जाता घटादयो दृष्टा. दृष्टे¹¹⁰ हेतुर् निरर्थकः ।

दृष्ट-प्रतीति-बाधैवं¹¹¹ बाधिका भवतीति चेत् ॥१७६॥

दृष्टं जन्म घटादीनां बाल-सामान्यया धिया ।

¹⁰⁸ सद्भावा° ms. KT: skye ba (sambhava)

¹⁰⁹ आ[धि]पतिर् ms

¹¹⁰ नष्टे ms

¹¹¹ दृष्टः प्रतीतिर् बाधैवं ms. KT:/mñon sum dañ ni grags pa yi/ /gnod pas

प्रतिषेधस् तथा नायं¹¹² नातो दोषो यथोदितः ॥१७७॥

A possible objection (*cet*): An earthen pitcher, etc. are seen as produced. Reasoning (*hetu*) has no role to play in the case of what is perceived. [If you use *hetu*,] the invalidation of what is actually seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) and actual experience (*pratīti*) becomes something that invalidates it.//176//

By a knowledge which is similar to that of the ignorant person (*bālasāmānya*), the arising of the pitcher, etc. is perceived. We do not deny such [an opinion]. Therefore, there is no deficiency (*doṣa*) pointed out.//177//

न रूपालम्बना¹¹³ बुद्धिः स्व-संवेद्यास्ति तत्त्वतः¹¹⁴ ।
यतो नो न हि तद्-बाधा¹¹⁵ बाधिका तदजातितः ॥१७८॥

In the ultimate analysis, a cognition which has form as its object (*ālambana*) [and] is self-conscious does not exist. Hence, for us the “invalidation” by that (direct perception) would not be an invalidation because that (direct perception) does not arise [in the ultimate reality].//178//

नैव प्रत्यक्ष-धीर्¹¹⁶ युक्ता यथार्था परमार्थतः ।
बाल-बुद्ध्यविशिष्टत्वाद् अलात इव चक्र-धीः ॥१७९॥

From the standpoint of the highest truth, it is not logical that a cognition of direct perception which is in accordance with the object should exist, because it is not distinguished (i.e. it does not really differ) from the knowledge of an ignorant person, just like the cognition of the circle for a fire-brand.//179//

112 KT:/gañ phyir de ni mi ḥgog pas/ (=pratiṣiddham yato nedam?)

113 °आलम्बना ms

114 तत्त्वतः ms

115 तद् बोधा ms. KT: de yi gnod pa

116 pra....dhī ms. KT:mñon sum blo ni

नापि तद्-गोचरं वस्तु संस्कृतत्वाद् यथात्म-धीः ।
अद्रव्यत्वाच् च रूपादेः प्रत्यक्षं नो न बाधकं ॥१८०॥

[The direct perception which has] that (form, etc.) as the object-sphere is not a really existing substance, because it is what is created, just like the cognition of ātman. And, direct perception would not be a refutation for us because form, etc. are not really existing substances.//180//

विद्वन्-नीति-विचारं च न प्रतीतिः प्रबाधते ।
नाविद्यापटलान्धानां तत्त्वेऽधिक्रियते¹¹⁷ वचः ॥१८१॥

Actual experience does not invalidate the thought coming from the wisdom of wise men. The word of people who are blind is not considered eligible with respect to truth because of their covering of ignorance.//181//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents claim that Bhā-viveka's reason (*hetu*) in his syllogism is not valid because his reason would be opposed by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and actual experience (*pratīti*). In the syllogism, for example, "from the standpoint of the highest truth, a pot has no real existence, because it is what is produced (or made), just like a cloth," the thesis and example are reasonable. The reason, however, is not sound. For it is, by direct perception, seen and understood that a pot is a thing which is produced or made from clay, water, a lathe, potter etc. Thus, for Bhā-viveka's opponents the reason in the syllogism is invalidated by direct perception and actual experience.

On the other hand, for Bhā-viveka, direct perception and actual experience cannot refute his view. The arising of a pot, etc. is perceived by the means of knowledge accessible to an ignorant (=ordinary) person. Direct perception can be admitted in terms of conventional truth yet not from the standpoint of the highest truth. The knowledge derived from direct perception, from the standpoint of the highest truth, does not correspond to its object. For example,

¹¹⁷ तत्त्वे ms

seeing the revolving fire brand, an ordinary person cognizes it as a circle, which it is not.

Likewise, actual experience cannot refute Bhā-viveka's syllogism either. The word of people blinded by ignorance cannot be admitted as truth. That is, since people are affected by ignorance, their so called actual experiences are not acceptable as superior means of knowing from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-2-3. The criticism of the theory of the Sāṃkhya system

Introduction to verses 182-191.

According to TJ, in these verses Bhā-viveka discusses the doctrine of "pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state" (*satkāryavāda*). He, however, has already criticized this doctrine in verses 139-146 (the section of "non-production from itself"). Instead, it seems Bhā-viveka is actually referring to the *pradhāna* (primary matter) and *puruṣa* (pure consciousness) which the Sāṃkhya system advances as the cause of all phenomenon. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, these two are independent existences and ungenerated existences. Bhā-viveka criticizes this idea.

सतो ऽपि जन्म नाभीष्टं. सतः किं जन्मना भवेत् 118।

स्थौल्यं चेन् न च सत् कार्यं, स्थौल्यस्यासंभवात् 119 पुरा ॥१८२॥

It is not acceptable that there is arising of what already exists. What is the point of the arising of what already exists?

If one answers: there is grossness (*sthaulya*) [as new element when an effect comes about, we reply that then] the effect does not exist [in the cause] because of the impossibility of grossness (*sthaulya*) in the previous [cause] state. //182//

118 KT:/yod pa ci phyir skye bar hgyur/ (Eng. tr. Why does what already exists arise?)

119 sth[au](lya)syā° ms

किं च, यच् चक्षुषः स्थौल्यं न तत् तत्-प्रत्ययैः कृतम् ।
प्राग् असत्त्वाद् ¹²⁰ यथा कुण्डं ज्ञेयत्वाद् वापि भोक्तृवत् ॥१८३॥

Moreover, what [we consider] the grossness of the eye is not created by its causal conditions (=causes), because it (grossness) does not exist beforehand, just like a pot, or just like the *puruṣa*, because it (grossness) is what is to be known (*jñeya*). //183//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that there is grossness of an effect in a cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects: Because there is no effect in the cause, there is no grossness in the previous cause state. For example, there are no thick trunk or rank twigs etc. in a seed of a fig tree. (TJ available) Bhā-viveka continues his objection. The grossness of something is not created by its causes. For example, a pot is not made by grossness of the pot. The grossness of the pot does not exist beforehand. The pot is made by clay, water etc.

सामान्येन च संवृत्या भोक्त्राद्य् अभिमतं हि नः¹²¹ ।
नातो दृष्टान्त-दोषोऽपि क्वचिद् अत्रोपपद्यते ॥१८४॥

In the conventional [truth] we (also) generally accept the experiencer, etc. (*bhoktrādi*). Hence, the deficiency (*doṣa*) of the analogy (*dṛṣṭānta*) does not occur any where here (i.e. in the preceding statement). //184//

Explanatory comment:

The Sāṃkhya system claims that you cannot use the 'experiencer' as an analogy when you do not accept the existence of an experiencer. Bhā-viveka, however, admits the existence of an experiencer as a general convention. Therefore, there is no deficiency of the analogy in Bhā-viveka's statement.

¹²⁰ °सत्त्वाद् ms

¹²¹ हि तः ms

अभिव्यक्तेर् अदोषश् चेत् किं केन व्यज्यते यथा॥
 यथा घटः प्रदीपेन नाभिव्यक्तिः सतो यतः ॥१८५॥
 संवृत्यापि प्रदीपेन¹²² प्रकाशसहितो घटः ।
 क्रियते तन्मतिर् वापि प्रतिपक्षोदयो ऽपि वा ॥१८६॥

If [the Sāṃkhya] were to say: “there is no deficiency [in our claim] because of manifestation (*abhivyakti*) (i.e. what we are speaking about is really manifestation of the effect, not new physical creation),” [we ask:] for instance what is manifested by what? [If the Sāṃkhya replies that] “for example, by means of [the light of] a lamp, a pot [is manifested],” [we say] no. For this is manifestation of what exists already.//185//
 Even on the conventional level, [it is obvious that] by means of a lamp, a pot is joined with the light, or the perception of that (i.e. pot) is created, or the arising of something opposite [to light, i.e. darkness] is created.//186//

Explanatory comment:

The Sāṃkhyas maintain that the existent does not arise, but simply becomes manifest. To this statement Bhā-viveka asks what is manifested by what? If a pot is manifested by means of the light of a lamp, it is not proper, because a pot is what is already arisen. Therefore it is not admissible that what is already arisen manifests itself. Only the features of a pot are seen by means of the light of a lamp. A pot itself has been existent before the light is turned on. Therefore, the unmanifest, i.e., pot, etc., does not become manifest.

व्यज्यते नानाभिव्यक्तम् अव्यक्तत्वात् ख-पुष्पवत् ।
 स्व-नीत्या वा यथा भोक्ता प्रधानं चेति निर्दिशेत् ॥१८७॥

The unmanifested (*abhivyakta*) is not manifested, because it is non-manifested (i.e. is a non-manifested) principle, just like the sky-flower. Or, from the standpoint of [the Sāṃkhya] himself, [we] could point out [the following disproving analogy]: just like the experiencer and the primary material cause (*pradhāna*).//187//

¹²² saṃvṛty=ā..i...dīpena ms. KT:/kun rdsob tu yañ mar mes ni

न वा सर्व-गतो भोक्ता नाहेतुश् चेतनो न च ।
यदि तस्याप्य् अभिव्यक्तिर् अव्यक्तत्वं च¹²³ हीयते ॥१८८॥

[Further objection against the Sāṅkhya:] If that [experiencer] also is manifested, the experiencer would be neither omnipresent (*sarvagata*), causeless (*ahetu*), or sentient (*cetana*), and its unmanifestness (*avyaktatva*) would be lost.//188//

कार्यं परिणतं यच् च प्रधानं वः प्रसज्यते ।
व्यक्तिकं तत् स्वरूपेण¹²⁴ कार्यत्वेऽविकृतिः कथम् ॥१८९॥¹²⁵

[If you were to admit the above, then] your *pradhāna* would become something transformed and a result. By nature it (*pradhāna*) would be an individual [effect]. [But], how can it have unchangeableness (*avikṛti*) when [it, *pradhāna*] is a result?//189//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka maintains that what does not exist does not become manifest. The sky-flower, for example, is not manifested, because it does not exist. Then Bhā-viveka refers to *pradhāna* and *puruṣa* considered as always (i.e. already) existing. Considering that both a pot and *pradhāna* or *puruṣa* are what already exist, he objects that the unmanifested does not become manifest, because it is not manifested (i.e. is an unchanging existent). If what already exists, i.e., *puruṣa*, becomes manifest, it would not be *puruṣa* which has characteristic of omnipresence, etc. and its unmanifestness would be lost. Bhā-viveka, moreover, maintains that if *pradhāna* becomes manifest, its omnipresence, etc. would be lost that is, *pradhāna* would be the manifestor of itself. Therefore, the unmanifestness of both *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* would be lost.

¹²³ =avyaktatvañ=ca ms. KT: mi gsal ba yan (avyaktatvañ ca)

¹²⁴ vyakti+++peṇa ms. SG: vyakti+++rūpeṇa. The restoration above is Ejima's provisional. KT does not translated 'svarūpeṇa.' I translated this verse based upon my understanding.

¹²⁵ The Tibetan editions are based on a Sanskrit text slightly different from our ms. KT says: If *pradhāna* is manifested, your *pradhāna* which is an effect and which is changed would be manifestation. This [idea] is not accepted.)

व्यञ्जका यस्य ये चेष्टा न ते तद्व्यञ्जका मताः¹²⁶ ।
कारणत्वादिहेतुभ्यो दध्नस् तन्त्वादयो यथा ॥१९०॥

It is thought that "X1," "X2," "X3" etc. are the manifestors of "Y," but they are not admitted [by us] as manifestors of "Y," because of the reasons 'being of the cause' (*kāraṇatva*), etc., just as thread, etc. [are not manifestors of] yogurt. //190//

तन्त्वादेर् अपि तच्छक्तेर् दृष्टान्त-न्यूनतेति चेत् ।
तन् न तन्त्वादि-भावेन न ते तद्व्यञ्जका¹²⁷ यतः¹²⁸ ॥१९१॥

If [the Sāṃkhya] were to say that "because the thread, etc. have a latent capability (*śakti*) for [producing of] that (yogurt), your example is deficient," [we reply that] that is not [so]. For they (the thread, etc.) are not the manifestors of that (yogurt) as thread, etc. //191//

Explanatory comment:

The Sāṃkhyas think that X1, X2, X3 etc. are the manifestor of something Y. Bhā-viveka, however, does not accept this idea. I do not fully understand what Bhā-viveka says here. Bhā-viveka probably means: for example, yogurt is not made by thread, etc. Yogurt is made by milk. Therefore, thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt. In other words, thread, etc. are not manifestors of yogurt. Even if the thread, etc. have a latent capability of producing yogurt, they cannot be the cause of yogurt, because the thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt as the thread, etc. themselves. (suggested by TJ)

¹²⁶ तद्व्यञ्जकमता मता ms. KT:/de dag de gsal byed mi ḥdod/, cf. K. 191cd.

¹²⁷ तद्व्यञ्जनका ms

¹²⁸ In ms follows a verse:

संवृत्यापि न कार्यस्य प्रत्ययैर् =न्यक्तित् =इष्यते/

तद्वेदानुविधायित्वाद् =घटस्येव मृदादिभिः//

Ejima suggests that it is the same with what appears once more as k. 193. This may be a misplacement in comparison with the Tibetan versions of K and V.

2-3. Non-production from itself and others.

Introduction to verses 192-193.

There are those who, like Jains, maintain that cause and effect are both identical and different. That is, they claim that entities are produced both from themselves and others. For example, in the case of the production of a gold ring, cause and result are both identical and different. Inasmuch as the gold ring is produced from gold, it is produced from itself, i.e., cause and effect are identical. Nevertheless, inasmuch as causes like an artisan and heat are also required for the production of the effect, however, the gold ring is produced from others. That is, the cause and effect are different. Therefore, the causal relation is one of both identity and difference.

स्व-परस्मान् न जन्मेष्टं¹²⁹ न च सदसदात्मनः¹³⁰ ।
यतो नोभय-वादोऽस्ति युक्तितः प्राक् परीक्षितः ॥१९२॥

Production from neither itself nor from something else is acceptable. Nor is the [production of] an entity which exists and which does not exist acceptable, because a statement speaking of both [possibilities as the one referred to just now] which has already been examined in the proper way, [and rejected] is inexistent [cannot be entertained].//192//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka claims that the idea of “production from both itself and something else” should be negated by the aforesaid two syllogisms, i.e., the syllogism about non-production from itself and the syllogism about non-production from others, because here “self and others” is nothing but a combination of “self” and “others.”

¹²⁹ svaparasyān=na=[nm]=eṣṭaṁ ms. KT:/bdag dañ gshan las skye ba dañ//.....mi ḥdod/

¹³⁰ c=āsadasadātmanah ms. KT: bdag ŋid yod dañ med

संवृत्यापि न कार्यस्य¹³¹ प्रत्ययैर् व्यक्तिर् इष्यते ।
तद्-भेदानुविधायित्वाद् घटस्येव मृदादिभिः ॥१९३॥¹³²

Even on the standpoint of conventional level it is not desired that the effect is manifested by its conditions, because an effect follows the changes of that (cause) , just as [manifestation of] a pot through soil, etc.
(*mṛd*).//193//

Explanatory comment:

Clay, for example, is a cause of a pot. In other words, a pot is an effect of soil. The pot, however, is not manifested by soil, because when the pot produced, soil itself has been destroyed. Accordingly, the effect, i.e., the pot, is not manifested by its cause, i.e., soil.

2-4. Non-production from *ahetu* “without cause”

Introduction to verses 194-195

Some thinkers, like nihilists, proclaim that entities are produced without cause. In the following verses Bhā-viveka criticizes their view.

संवृत्यापि हि नाकस्माज्¹³³ जातं चक्षुर् इतीष्यते ।
सामान्येन¹³⁴ च तद्-योगाद् विशेषेण च कुण्डवत् ॥१९४॥

Even from the standpoint of conventional [truth], it is not desired that the eye is produced from nothing, because it comes to be associated with universality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*), just as in the case of pot.
(*kuṇḍa*).//194//

¹³¹ Ms here reads “kāmasya” instead of “kārasya” in verse misplaced after k. 191. See. the footnote 140.

¹³² This verse is the same with the superfluous one that is misplaced just after k. 191.

¹³³ =आकर्माज् = ms. KT: glo bur

¹³⁴ सामान्ये ms

कार्यत्वात् क्रम-जन्मत्वाद्¹³⁵ विनाशात् परिणामतः ।
हेतु-प्रत्यय-नैयम्याज्¹³⁶ जातितो चेति लक्षयेत् ॥१९५॥

Moreover, because it is a result, because it is produced in a [specific] sequence, because it can be destroyed [later], because it can change, because there is regularity of cause and causal conditions, and because it comes into existence -- this is what one should notice.//195//

Explanatory comment:

The assertion of a production without cause means that it is no longer held that the result is produced from a cause which is itself or that the effect is produced from a cause other than itself. In other words, the effect is produced by chance. Those who assert that entities are produced without causes admit only perception, and ignore the causality. For example, a pot possesses both universal features (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and specific features (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). That is to say, a pot has hardness, etc. Hardness, etc. are generally known as the features of the pot. The pot also has colour, design, shape etc., which are specific features. As long as a pot has universal features and specific features, it has causality, that is, it is produced from causes. Besides the two features, Bhā-viveka mentions other features of entities in verse 195. (my own understanding)

Here, the qualification, i.e., from the standpoint of the highest truth, is not added to Bhā-viveka's syllogism refuting the opponent's assertion. Probably, the intention of this section is that causality should be examined. Therefore, it might be pointless to discuss the production without cause from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-5. The criticism of *Lokāyatas*

Introduction to verses 196-214

Those who, like the *Lokāyatas* and *ājīvikas*, do not concede the existence of a next life, and deny the result of an action, consequently negate the necessary

¹³⁵ कार्यत्वात् = कर्मजन्मत्वाद् = ms. KT:/ ḥbras bu yin phyir rim skyehi phyir/

¹³⁶ हेतुप्रत्यय+....म्याज् = ms. SG: hetupratya(ya)naiyamyāj=, KT:/rgyu rkyen ñes paḥi phyir dañ ni/

causal ground for the existent, and assert the production of entities without cause. In the following, Bhā-viveka attacks them.

जात्यन्तर-निरुद्धो हि नोत्पन्नः¹³⁷ शिवको¹³⁸ मतः ।
 नाशित्वात् तद् यथा कुण्डं¹³⁹ कार्यत्वाद् वेति चेन् मतम् ॥१९६॥
 न कुण्डं कुण्ड-रूपेण निरुद्धं जायते यथा ।
 तथा चेच्छिवकोऽभीष्ट इष्टम् एव प्रसाध्यते ॥१९७॥

One might say: it is not thought that a clay ball (*śivaka*)¹⁴⁰ which has disappeared due to another's arising is produced [again], because it is already destroyed, or because it is a result, just like a pot (*kuṇḍa*). //196//
 Just as a pot which has disappeared as a pot is not produced, a clay ball is not produced, if this is what you mean (*abhīṣṭa*), then [by this statement of yours] nothing but something desired [by us] is proved. //197//

Explanatory comment:

Here, Bhā-viveka points out the opponent's contrariety of syllogism. Bhā-viveka says that the statement of the opponent proves what he (Bhā-viveka) wishes to prove. That is to say, the statement of the opponent 'it is not thought that a clay ball which has disappeared due to another's arising (=arising of a pot) is produced again' cannot be the objection for Bhā-viveka's idea.

अथ निरुद्ध-हेतुत्वं हेतोर् एवं विरुद्धता ।
 संतत्या चेद् अनष्टस्य स्याद् एवं व्यभिचारिता ॥१९८॥

¹³⁷ नोत्पन्न ms

¹³⁸ KT: ḥjim goṇ (the Sanskrit equivalent of which would be mṛt-piṇḍa).

¹³⁹ कुण्ड ms

¹⁴⁰ According to M. Monier-Williams 1899, this word means (1) an idol or image of Śiva (2) a pillar or post to which cows are tied (to be milked or for rubbing against). According to St. Petersburg Wörterbuch, the word means (1) ein Idol Çiva's (2) ein Pfal, an den eine Kuh gebunden wird oder an den sie sich kratzt. Thus, according to the dictionaries consulted the word does not have the meaning "soil." However, the Tibetan translator uses the word "ḥjin goṇ." From the context, his gloss should be taken as meaning "soil."

Now, if [your reason “because it is already destroyed” in v. 196 means: ‘because its] cause has already been blocked,’ there would be contrariety of reason (i.e. you would be giving a reason opposite to what you wish to prove). Or, if your reason means: ‘[because] what has not been destroyed yet [disappears] as a continuous existence,’ your reason would be inconclusive (i.e. you will not be able to point out a definite, specific cause).//198//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents explain the meaning of reason (*hetu*) in verse 196. However, even they try to explain or to interpretate the reason ‘because it is already destroyed’ in various ways, they cannot prove their opinion. It is the fact that what is already destroyed is never produced again, therefore, the reason which the opponents advanced does not make sense.

अस्ति गर्भादि-बुद्धेः प्राग् अनन्तर-निरुद्ध-धीः¹⁴¹ ।
ज्ञेय-भेदेन तद्-भेदाद् धीत्वाद् वापि तदूर्ध्ववत् ॥१९९॥

The cognition (*buddhi*) which has just been blocked exists in the cognition that begins within the womb (*garbha*), because it becomes different with the distinction of what is to be known (i.e. of the object), or, because it is a cognition (*dhīva*), just like the cognition later than that (i.e. just like a subsequence cognition).//199//

चैत्रस्य शब्द-बुद्धिर् या रूप-बुद्धिश् च जायते ।
ज्ञेय-भेदात्¹⁴² तयोर् ऐक्यं भिन्न-संतानयोर्¹⁴³ यथा ॥२००॥

Because of the difference of object, the identity of ‘X’s cognition of an expression and cognition of a form is like the identity of two persons with different continua (i.e. such an identity does not exist).//200//

¹⁴¹ अस्ति गर्भादिबुद्धिस् = तु पराग् = अ+.... निरुद्धधीः ms. SG:.....prāg = a+ntaraniruddhadhīḥ.
KT:/mñal gnas sñon rol blo la ni//mdun rol kho nar ḥgags blo yod/

¹⁴² KT: gshan phyir, “jñeya-” is not translated in KT.

¹⁴³ °सन्तानयोर् = ms

दृष्टान्तासंभवस् तस्मान्. नैकत्वं जायते धियः¹⁴⁴ ।
धीत्वान्¹⁴⁵ नापि तदेकत्वं, व्यभिचाराद्¹⁴⁶ धियान्यया ॥२०१॥

Therefore, there is an impossibility of an analogy [in verse 199]. Oneness (*ekatva*) of cognition does not arise. Nor does oneness of them [on account of the reason] “because it is cognition” arise, because [the reason] would be vitiated (*vyabhicāra*) by another [person’s] cognition. //201//

Explanatory comment:

I do not fully understand what these verses say. Probably this verse means: The Lokāyatas do not admit the transmigration. The Buddhists, however, admit the transmigration on the conventional level. After a person dies, the next cognition of the person begins within the womb. It is not the same cognition with the cognition which the person had before his or her death. This process continues as long as a person is in the conventional world. Therefore, in verse 199 Bhā-viveka advances the analogy ‘just like the cognition later than that, that is, just like a subsequent cognition. Moreover, oneness of previous cognition and later cognition does not arise, because, as mentioned above, the cognition of previous life and the cognition of later life are different from each other, just as the cognitions of two persons are different from each other.

बालस्य च्युति-चित्तं चेत् साध्यतेऽप्रतिसंधिकम्¹⁴⁷ ।
नास्तिकैश् च्युति-चित्तत्वाद् अर्हच्-चरमचित्तवत् ॥२०२॥
स्याद् अनैकान्तिको हेतुर् अतीत-च्युति-चेतसा ।
जाति-स्मरादि-सद्-भावाद् उक्त-नीत्यापि तत् च सत् ॥२०३॥

The non-believers [in the Buddhist’s message] (*nāstika*) may say as follows:

144 दृष्टान्तासंभवस् = तस्यान् = नैकत्वाज् = जायते धियः ms. KT: /de phyir pha rol phyir yañ ni/ /dpe med par ni mi hgyur te/ which differs from the reading in ms.

145 धीत्वान् = नाम पि ms

146 व्यभिचारा ms. KT: hkhrol par hgyur phyir ro/

147 प्रतिसन्धिक ms. KT: mtshams sbyor med/

The mind of an ignorant person at the time of death does not attain re-birth (*apratisaṃdhika*), because it is a mind at the time of death (*cyuticitta*), just like the final mind of an Arhat (*arhaccaramacittavat*). //202//
 [In response, we say your] reason would be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) because of the mind at the time of death in the past (*atītaccyuticeta*). And since recollection of a previous existence remains, that [mind at the time of death] exists also on account of the reasoning [already] given (*uktanīti*). //203//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents do not admit the next life. From this viewpoint, they state that when a person dies, his or her mind does not attain re-birth, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not attain re-birth. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. On the conventional level, it is admitted that a person has recollection of a previous life. Therefore, the mind at the time of death in which recollection of previous existence remains.

च्युति-चित्तं च जनकं भवत्य् एवान्य-चेतसः ।
 साविद्यत्वाद्¹⁴⁸ अनार्यस्य चित्तं तज्-जनकं यथा ॥२०४॥

The mind at the time of death becomes a generator (*janaka*) of another mind, because it has ignorance (*sāvidyā*), just as the mind of a dishonourable person (*anārya*) generates that (another mind). //204//

Explanatory comment:

As mentioned above, the opponents state that a mind at the time of death does not produce the next mind, just as a mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects: an ordinary person has ignorance, therefore, a mind at the time of death produces the next mind. That is, as long as one who has ignorance, his or her mind is produced every time of death, i.e., there is transmigration.

¹⁴⁸ s(ā)..[dya]tvād= ms. KT:/ma rig pa dañ bcas paḥi phyir/

स्व-कर्म-जनिता नेष्टाः शरीरेन्द्रिय-बुद्धयः¹⁴⁹ ।
विनाशित्वाद्¹⁵⁰ यथा कुण्डं पर-लोकोऽस्त्य् अतो न चेत् ॥२०५॥

[The non-believers might state as follows:] it is not desired that body, sense organs and cognition (*śarīrendriya-buddhi*) are produced by their own action, because they are perishable, just like a pot. Therefore, the next world does not exist. //205//

तेनैव तस्याकरणाद्¹⁵¹ अथान्येनापि¹⁵² चाकृतेः ।
नान्य-स्व-कर्म-जनितो देह इत्यत्र किं हि नः¹⁵³ ॥२०६॥

[However, what do we Mādhyamikas have to do with the view that] since "A" is generated neither by the same "A" nor by another, the body (*deha*) is not produced either by one's own action or by that of another. Either way we have nothing to lose. //206//

अकर्म-जनितत्वे च विद्यते न निदर्शनम् ।
(/śiñ la sogs pa dus skye ba //sems can las kyi dbaṅ gis te/)¹⁵⁴ ॥२०७॥

[If one were to say: body, etc are] not produced by the action [of human beings], there is no supporting instance (*nidarśana*) of your statement. [If one were to say: the tree (Tib.: *śiñ*, Skt.: *vrkṣa*), etc are not produced by the action of human beings], the tree, etc. are produced by the power of the action of human beings (*akarmajanita*). //207//

(/sems dmyal gnas dañ mtshon dañ dpag bdam śiñ skye
bshin/)¹⁵⁵ //208ab//

¹⁴⁹ n=eṣṭāś=śa° ms

¹⁵⁰ विनाशित्वा ms. KT: shig phyir

¹⁵¹ तस्य करणाद् = ms. KT: de ma byas/

¹⁵² अन्येनापि ms. One akṣara should be added for the sake of the metre.

¹⁵³ The pāda cd is different in KT: /hjiḡ rten raṅ gi las bskyed min//gshan ḥdi ṇed la ci shig gnod/

¹⁵⁴ The pāda cd is left out in ms

¹⁵⁵ The pāda ab is left out in ms

Just as the sword and the felicitous pearls arise in hell and heaven respectively.//208ab//

Explanatory comment:

According to the Lokāyatas, human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. While alive they are independent existences. After their death, they return to their conglomerations of each element respectively, i.e., the element of earth returns to the conglomeration of the element of the earth and so on. The Lokāyatas, etc. claim that the production of a body has no cause and is a matter of chance. By contrast, Buddhism does not admit the production of entities without cause. Bhā-viveka denies their statement “the body, etc. are not produced from action” because they do not give a valid example. In this case, their example should be “just as a tree is not grown by the force of action of human beings, but just consists of the elements of earth and water etc.” The growing of trees however, needs the force of action of human beings. Without it, a tree does not arise, grow or bear fruit. In some cases, it might be that just as the sword, which is a symbol of suffering, arises in hell whereas the felicitous pearls, which are a symbol of pleasure, arise in heaven. (my own understanding)

भूतेभ्यश् च कथं बुद्धिस् तदत्यन्त-विलक्षणा ॥२०८॥

How can a cognition which has completely different characteristics from those (=gross elements) (*tadanyantavilakṣaṇā*) arise from gross elements?//208//

अचेतनानां भूतानां चैतन्यं¹⁵⁶ मद-शक्तिवत् ।
सूर्य-कान्ताग्निवद् वापि जायते जातिमत्त्वतः¹⁵⁷ ॥२०९॥

[If one were to say:] consciousness (*caitanya*) seen [on the part of] unconscious gross elements is like the power to intoxicate (*madaśkti*) or

¹⁵⁶ cai+., ms. SG: cai(ta)nyam. KT: śes pa yod pa ñid.

¹⁵⁷ जातिमत्त्वतः ms

like the fire which arises out of the sun-stone (*sūryakānta*), because it has arising.//209//

मद-शक्तेर् अचैतन्याद्¹⁵⁸ दृष्टान्त-न्यूनता हि ते¹⁵⁹ ।
अतुल्य-जाति-हेतुत्वाद्धेतोश्¹⁶⁰ चापि विरुद्धता ॥२१०॥

[You] still have deficiency of analogy [in your statement] because there is no consciousness in the ability of liquor. And there would be a contrariety of reason [in your statement] because non-equivalent kinds of cause are used.//210//

नाध्यात्मिकानि भूतानि बोद्धृणीति¹⁶¹ प्रतीयते ॥
कठिनादि-स्व-भावत्वाद्¹⁶² भूतत्वाद्धि¹⁶³ तदन्यवत् ॥२११॥

That internal gross elements (*ādhyātmikāni bhūtāni*) are not cognizers (i.e. cognition) is understood, because they have firmness, etc. (*kaṭhinādi*), or because they are gross elements, just like other similar entities.//211//

Explanatory comment:

I do not understand what these verses mean. Probably these verses mean: As mentioned above, the Lokāyatas state that human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this view. The elements of earth, water etc. have firmness, and they are gross element. It is known that the firmness is an intrinsic nature of earth, not an intrinsic nature of cognizers, i.e., beings. Accordingly, earth, etc, which have firmness, etc. cannot be human beings.

¹⁵⁸ अचैतन्या ms. KT: śes yod ma yin pas.

¹⁵⁹ हेतो ms. KT: khyod kyi.

¹⁶⁰ Ms sic. All of the Tibetan versions: / rgyu rnam rigs mthun yin paḥi phyir/ (=तुल्यजातीयहेतुत्वाद्)

¹⁶¹ boddhriṇīti ms

¹⁶² KT: sa la sogs paḥi.

¹⁶³ भूतत्वा धि ms. KT: ḥbyuñ ba yin phyir.

अतो गर्भादि-विज्ञानं विज्ञानान्तर-पूर्वकम् ।
विद्वद्भिर् अवबोद्धव्यं ग्राहकत्वात् तदूर्ध्ववत् ¹⁶⁴ ॥२१२॥

Therefore, the wise man should understand that sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) which begins within a womb, etc. is preceded by another previous sense-consciousness, because it is one which cognizes, just like the [sense-consciousnesses] which comes after it. //212//

वत्सः पूर्व-कृताभ्यासाज् जातस्थाहारम् एषते ¹⁶⁵ ।
आहारार्थ ¹⁶⁶ परिस्पन्दाद् यथा परिणतेन्द्रियः ॥२१३॥

A calf seeks food after birth because of earlier practice (i.e. habit) formed in its previous [life], because it moves for the purpose of [searching for] food, just like a full-grown sense organ (*parinatendriya*). //213//

नानैकान्तिकता ¹⁶⁷ हेतोर् अयस्कान्तोपलादिभिः ¹⁶⁸ ।
तदाहाराभ्यवहतेर् दृष्टत्वान् नाप्य् असिद्धता ॥२१४॥

[Our] reason ["because it moves for the purpose of seaching food"] would not be uncertain (*anaikāntika*) due to the stone [which is moved] by a magnet. And [our reason would not be] incomplete because the eating of that (calf) is actually perceived (*tadāhārābhyavahṛti*). //214//

Explanatory comment:

When a person is born, his or her cognition is produced, but it is not a completely new production. The next cognition of the person is made immediately after his or her death. For example, a calf seeks food without learning how to obtain food. That is, a calf knows how to obtain the food because of earlier practice formed in the previous life.

¹⁶⁴ grā[ha]..+....ddhavat ms SG: grāhaka(tvā)t=tadūrddha(?rdhva)vat. KT:/ḥdsin pa yin phyir de ḥog bshin/

¹⁶⁵ Ms sic. KT:/byuñ ma thag tu zas ḥtshol byed/ (=jāstatha āhāram eṣate).

¹⁶⁶ हारार्थ ms

¹⁶⁷ नानैकान्तिकता ms

¹⁶⁸ Ms sic. KT:/ khab lon gis ni rdo bskyod pas/.

2-6. The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.

कस्यचित् प्रीति-हेतुत्वाल् लोको नेश्वर-कर्तृकः ।
विदधानो यथा प्रीतिं नेश ईश्वर-कर्तृकः ॥२१५॥

The world is not made by God, because it is the cause of pleasure for [only] some people, just as the worldly lord who gives pleasure does not have God as his creator.//215//

अहेतुत्वाद् 169 अजातेर् वा नेशो विश्वस्य कारणम् 170 ।
यथाकाशस्य कुसुमं नेष्टं विश्वस्य कारणम् ॥२१६॥

The universe is not made by God, because the universe does not have a cause, or because the universe does not arise, just as it is not desired that a sky-flower be the cause of the universe.//216//

अशेषस्यास्य जगतो 171 नेश्वरः कारणं परम् ।
चित्तवत्त्वाद् 172 यथा गोपो न जगत्-कारणं परम् ॥२१७॥

God is not the ultimate cause of the universe, because he has a mind, just as a cowherd (*gopa*) is not the ultimate cause of the universe.//217//

सामग्र्या भाव-निर्वृत्तेः 173 कश्चिद् एकोऽस्ति नेश्वरः ।
न चैक-कर्तृकः कश्चिन् . नानैकान्तिकताप्य् 174 अतः ॥२१८॥

Any individual is not the lord [of everything] because an entity is produced by the totality (*sāmagrī*) [of causes]. And, nothing has a single

169 °त्व° added in the margin in ms

170 n=eśo viśva....+ṇa[ṛn] ms. KT:/dbaṅ phyug kun gyi rgyur mi ḥdod/

171 Ms. sic. KT:/ḥgro ba ma lus ḥdi dag gi/ (aśeṣasyāśya jagat)

172 चित्तवत्त्वाद् ms

173 भावनिर्वृत्तेः ms. KT:/ dños rnams.....ḥgrub paḥi phyir/

174 नानैकान्तिकत् = आप्य् =

creator. Therefore, [the reason “because it has a mind”] is not inconclusive.//218//

सेश्वरं चक्षुरादीष्टं बहुत्वाद् यदि दासवत् ।
अजातैकेश्वरासिद्धेर् ईशो¹⁷⁵ स्यात् तद्-विपर्ययः ॥२१९॥

If [one were to say:] “that the eye, etc. have God as their creator is accepted, because they are many, just like servants,” [we reply:] because an unborn and single God has not been proved, established, *Īśvara* would be the opposite of that (i.e. of what you normally take God to be - one and uncreated).//219//

सकर्तृकम् अथाभीष्टं रचितत्वाद् घटादिवत् ।
अनिर्दिष्ट-विशेषेण¹⁷⁶ कर्ता¹⁷⁷ चेत् सिद्ध-साधनम् ॥२२०॥

Now if [you were to say:] “that [the eye, etc.] have a creator is desired by us, because they have been produced, just like a pot, etc,” [then in this case,] the ‘creator’ (*kartā*) does not have definite particularity (*anirdiṣṭaviśeṣa*), therefore, you would be proving something already proved [by us] (*siddhasādhana*).//220//

अथ नित्यैक-सूक्ष्मादि-विशेषेण न तेऽन्वयः ।
अनित्य-मूर्त-जातत्व-दोषापत्तिश्च¹⁷⁸ तस्य वः ॥२२१॥

Then, [if one were to refer to a ‘creator’] with particular [features] such as ‘eternal,’ ‘single’ and ‘minute’ etc., there would be no logical connection (*anvaya*) in your statement. Further, [if you give an example “just like a potter for a pot,”] there would be an occurrence of a deficiency (*doṣa*) i.e., that (*Īśvara*) is ‘the uneternal,’ ‘the material’ and ‘the arisen’ in your statement.//221//

175 =ईशे ms. KT bdañ phyug gcig (eko īśo)

176 Ms. sic. KT: khyad par ma bstan paḥi/ (=अनिर्दिष्टविशेषो हि?)

177 कर्ता ms

178 मूर्त° ms

सत्त्व-भाजन-संख्यात-लोक-वैचित्र्यकारणम् 179 ।
कर्मेश्वरश् चेत् संवृत्या¹⁸⁰ सिद्धम् एव प्रसाध्यते ॥२२२॥

If you were to say that as conventional truth, God is the action which causes manifoldness of the world called being and the receptacle (*sattvabhājana*), then the proved is being proved (i.e. you will prove what we have already proved. //222//

एतेन काल-पुरुष-प्रधान-परमाणवः ।
कारणं नास्य जगतो विष्णुर् वेति निषेधयेत् ॥२२३॥

Thus, with this (reasoning) one should reject [saying] that the world is made by 'time,' 'puruṣa,' 'pradhāna,' 'atoms' (*paramāṇu*) or 'Viṣṇu' .//223//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka maintains that nothing is produced not only by *Īśvara*, but also by *kāla* (time), *puruṣa*, *pradhāna* (ultimates in the Sāṃkhyas) and *paramāṇu* or by a personal God like *Viṣṇu*.. Some thinkers say that the whole world is produced by a creator such as *Īśvara* (God). To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. On the conventional level, for the Mādhyamikas entities which includes an universal world is produced from causes. They are not produced by single cause, like God. Moreover, even the opponents refer to the God (creator) with qualifications such as eternal, single, subtle etc; they cannot prove production of entities from the God (creator), because the God should be eternal, single, subtle etc. That is, qualifications to the God indicate that the God is uneternal, many etc. Therefore, the opponents cannot establish their opinion.

179 सत्त्व° ms

180 kar(m)=e+[ś]=[c](e)[t]=sa(r̄n)vṛtyā ms. KT:las//dbaṅ phyug yin na kun rdsob tuḥaṅ.

2-7. Drṣṭi “view”

Introduction to verses 224-229

The theme here is the negation of the classification of eternalism (*śāśvata-vāda*) and destructionism (*uccheda-vāda*).

दृष्ट्यन्धकार-विध्वंसो¹⁸¹ बुद्धोत्पादो¹⁸² यतस् ततः ।
तद्वद् आयतनोत्पाद इष्टश् चेद् असद् उत्तरम् ॥२२४॥

If one were to say that “since from the arising of the Buddhas comes the destruction of blinded vision. Therefore, likewise, the arising of sense organs is desired.” [We say:] this is false answer (*uttara*).//224//

अध्वाभावाद् अनुत्पादे कस्य का दृष्टिर् इष्यते ।
तद् अभूतस्य¹⁸³ बोधाय बुद्धोत्पादस्य कर्तृता ॥२२५॥

When there is non-production [of entities] because of the non-existence of the process of time (*adhvan*), which view on whose part is desired by us! (i.e. we do not propound any view for any one as real.) Therefore, the arising of the Buddhas [is considered to be] an agent (*kartṛ*) for making [people] understand what never came to be (i.e. the Buddhas come into existence in our view only to let people grasp that nothing come into existence).//225//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that because there is arising of the Buddha, there is the destruction of wrong views. It means that because there is a cause, there is the effect. Therefore, there should be arising of sense organs as the cause of grasping of objects. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this statement. Arising of the Buddha is said for those who have wrong views, i.e., production of entities, etc. That is to say, in the ultimate reality there is no arising of the Buddha. On

181 °विध्वान्सो ms. KT: sel ba.

182 बुद्धोत्पादाद् = ms

183 °sya° added under the line in ms

the conventional level, the Buddha comes into existence in our view to let people grasp that nothing has come into existence.

असुरश् चेत् सुरान् नान्यः कथम् एवम् अशाश्वतम्¹⁸⁴ ।
असुरश् चेत् सुराद् अन्योऽनुच्छेदो युज्यते कथम् ॥२२६॥

- If the non-god is not different from a god, how can there not be permanence? If the non-god is different from a god, how can absence of being cut off (=being destroyed) make sense?//226//

अवाच्यत्वे ऽपि घटवत् कथम् उच्छेद-वर्जनम् ।
सदसत्त्वे¹⁸⁵ऽपि निर्वाणे नेतरस्यास्त्य् अतिक्रमः ॥२२७॥

Even if one were to say that there is ineffability [one cannot decide whether identical or different], just like that of a pot, how could there be the abandonment of extirpation, i.e., permanence? Even if one were to say that [the identity] exists or does not exist, there is no passing over of the other in Nirvāṇa.//227//

Explanatory comment:

The classification of permanence and extirpation denotes the same result of emphasizing only one of these two in cognition, perception and inference. Therefore, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path because he was aware of these two extreme views. Here, Bhā-viveka shows the idea of the middle path in order to deny the two classifications of eternalism and nihilism. Verse 227 indicates the idea of the middle path. Bhā-viveka maintains in this verse that there is no classification of eternalism and destructionism from the standpoint of the highest truth.

184 कथं=ए[व]+शाश्वतं ms. KT:/des na ji ltar rtag mi hgyur/ We could read this as

“कथम् एव न शाश्वतं” or “कथम् एवं न शाश्वतं” as in k. 228b, but here Ejima takes into consideration the possibility of contrast between “anucchedaḥ” and “aśāśvataḥ”.

185 °सत्त्वे ms

यद्य् उत्पादो निरुद्धस्य कथम् एवं न शाश्वतम् ।
अनुत्पादे निरुद्धस्य¹⁸⁶ कथं नोच्छेद-वादिता ॥२२८॥

If it be the case that what has been blocked arises, how can there not be eternal? If it be the case that what has been blocked does not arise, how can there not be propounding of nihilism? //228//

संतानाद्रव्य-सत्त्वाच् च कस्माद् उच्छेद-शाश्वतः।
तदभावाद् अनुत्पादो युक्तोऽनुच्छेद-शाश्वतः¹⁸⁷ ॥२२९॥

Since continuity (*sarntāna*) does not really exist, how can there be extirpation and permanence? Since that (*sarntāna*) does not exist, the non-arising [of *sarntāna*] from the standpoint of non-extirpation and non-permanence (*anucchedaśāśvata*) is proper. //229//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka says that nihilism and eternalism should be denied because continuity does not exist. What does not exist, in other words, does not have either destruction or eternity because it does not have a beginning or end.

2-8. *Duḥkha* "suffering"

अनुत्पादाय दुःखस्य¹⁸⁸ बुद्धानां धर्म-देशना ।
अतस् तत्-फल-सद्-भावाद् उत्पादोऽभिमतो यदि ॥२३०॥
पूर्ववत् तदनुत्पादात् तस्याथोत्पाद इष्यते¹⁸⁹ ।
नानुत्पादः फलं तस्य तत्-परिज्ञा तु तत्-फलम् ॥२३१॥

If one were to say: "the Buddhas taught *dharma* in order to secure non-arising of suffering. Accordingly, the effect (non-arising of suffering) of

186 or "अनुत्पादान् निरुद्धस्य". अनुत्पादा निरुद्धस्य ms. KT:/hgags pa skye ba med gyur na/

187 कस् = ते नुच्छेदशाश्वतः ms. KT:/rtag chad de dag ga la yod/

188 दुः(ः)[ख]स्य ms

189 कस्यानुत्पाद इष्यत ms. KT:/gal te de ni skye ḥdod na/

that (the teaching of the Buddha) exists, arising of [suffering] is approved [by us].” //230//

[In response, we say:] as mentioned before, that (suffering) does not arise, [even if] the arising of that (suffering) is admitted, non-arising of that (suffering) is not an effect. But comprehension (*parijñā*) of that (non-arising of suffering) is an effect of that (namely, the teaching of the Buddhas). //231//

तेनैव तस्याकरणात् स्व-कृतं तन् न युज्यते ।
अन्येनान्य-क्रियायोगान्¹⁹⁰ न चान्य-कृतम् इष्यते ॥२३२॥

That [result] ought not be self-made, since a thing does not make itself. And, because X does not have contact with Y's action, it is not desired that a thing is made by an other. //232//

न स्व-संतानजं दुःखम् इष्टं¹⁹¹ सत्त्वाद्यसंभवात्¹⁹² ।
अद्रव्यत्वाद् अभेदाच्च च दुःखं तन् नापि संततेः¹⁹³ ॥२३३॥

Because of the impossibility of spiritual essence (*sattva*), etc, it is not desired that suffering be born from its own continuity (*sva-santāna*). And, because it is not a real entity and it does not have distinction (*abheda*), there is no suffering in continuity. //233//

Explanatory comment:

One critic objects that the Buddha taught the teachings (*dharma*) in order to aim at the non-arising of suffering. This means the existence of the arising of suffering. However, even if the arising of suffering is admitted, suffering does not have arising as itself (*svabhāva*). The non-arising of suffering, moreover, is not an effect of the teaching of the Buddha. Correct understanding of the non-

¹⁹⁰ अन्येनान्यक्रियायोगात् ms. °t has a virāma.

¹⁹¹ दुःखं इ° ms

¹⁹² सत्त्वाद्य° ms

¹⁹³ दुःखं त..... न्ततेः ms. SG: duḥkhaṁ tan=n=āpi santateḥ, KT:/sdug bsñal de la rgyud kyañ med/

arising of suffering based upon the teaching of the Buddha is the effect. It is a kind of effect but is at the same time transcendent.

2-9. The examination of the Buddha

Introduction to verses 234-239

Opponents analyze variously the figure of the Buddha. They consider that what the figure of the Buddha is or what the Buddha is. Hence, Bhā-viveka examines the Buddha.

उत्पादिनः प्रसाध्यन्ते संस्काराश् चक्षुरादयः ।
 सत्त्व-संज्ञाभिधेयत्वाद् ¹⁹⁴ बुद्धवद् यदि तत्त्वतः ¹⁹⁵ ॥२३४॥
 नोत्पाद-धर्मा बुद्धा नो नातस् तद्वत् तदुद्भवः ।
 आत्मवत् तदसत्त्वाद् ¹⁹⁶ वा मायावद् वास्तु संभवः ¹⁹⁷ ॥२३५॥

If [by you] are argued for, as real, the composite things (*samskāra*) the eye, etc. as undergoing production, because they are expressed by the term "*sattva*," just like the Buddhas. //234//

Then we say in response: for us (Mādhyamikas), the Buddhas do not have arising as their nature (*dharmā*). Accordingly, they (the composite things) do not have arising, just as they (Buddhas) [do not arise], or they do not exist [in the ultimate reality], just like the *ātman*, or there is a possibility [of their arising in conventional reality], just like illusions. //235//

Explanatory comment:

Humans are called *sattva*, and are beings who are made. This means something which is made has arisen. Likewise, because the Buddha has the name "Buddha," he would be a being who is made, that is, has arisen. To this view, Bhā-viveka objects by pointing out that the Buddha does not have arising

¹⁹⁴ सत्त्व° ms

¹⁹⁵ तत्त्वतः ms

¹⁹⁶ तदसत्त्वा ms.KT: de skye yod min te/

¹⁹⁷ māyovad=v=ās[t]u sambhavaḥ, SG: māyo baddhāstu sambhavaḥ, KT: sgyu ma bshin ḥbyuṅ yod/

as his nature and is not identical with *rūpa*, *skandha*, etc.. For the Mādhyamikas the real Buddha is our phenomenal world.¹⁹⁸ The Buddha does not have any own-being. This world does not have ownbeing either. The “Buddha” is just a name, and is not an independent entity. The Buddha is illustrated as a dream, illusion or figure in the mirror.¹⁹⁹ In other words, the Buddha is just the name “Buddha” in the conventional world and does not have the name “Buddha” in the absolute truth which is beyond false discrimination. Further, because the Buddha is not an independent entity, the Buddha does not arise. From this it follows that the Buddha does not exist, and similarly entities in the conventional world do not exist from the standpoint of the absolute truth. Therefore, Bhāviveka says “just like the Buddha” that is, despite the fact that the Buddha has the name “Buddha,” he does not exist, i.e., the Buddha is not real existence. In other words, even the Buddha is dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), just as entities are dependently coarisen. Therefore, the Buddha should be examined according to the theory of dependent origination.

रूपं न बुद्धो बोध्यत्वाद् उदयाद् वापि लोष्टवत्²⁰⁰ ।
पराभासात्म-भासत्वाद् विज्ञानं नेन्द्र-जालवत् ॥२३६॥

Buddha is not *rūpa* [from the standpoint of the highest truth], because it is what is to be cognized (*bodhya*), or on account of being something to be understood, or because he arises, like a clod of earth. And Buddha is not consciousness, because he illuminates others and himself, just like illusion created through magic.//236//

¹⁹⁸ tathā-gato yat-svabhāvas tat-svabhāvam idam jagat/
tathā-gato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idam jagat//22-16// (*Prasannapadā*, pp. 448-449).

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Prasannapadā*. p. 289, p. 436, p. 449. p. 540. etc.

²⁰⁰ KT:/gzugs ni yañ dag ñid du na//sañs rgyas ma yin rtog byaḥi phyir//ḥkhor los sgyur bshin....., and it might be restored as follows:
rūpaṃ na buddho bodhyatvāt tattvataś cakravartivat/

न बुद्धो रूपिणः स्कन्धाः स्कन्ध-संग्रहतो मताः²⁰¹ ।
उदय-व्यय-धर्मित्वाज् ज्ञेयत्वाद् वापि रूपवत् ॥२३७॥

The Buddha is not considered skandha, having form on account of being a conglomeration of skandha (*skandha-saṅgraha*), or because they have the nature of arising and passing away, or because they are objects of cognition, just like for. //237//

तन्-नाशे नाश-दोषाच् च स्कन्धा²⁰² बुद्धो न युज्यते ।
नान्योऽन्य-लक्षणाभावाद् . आत्मवत् स कथं च न ॥२३८॥

When they (the *skandhas*) are destroyed, there would be deficiency that [the Buddha] would disappear, it is not proper that the skandhas be Buddha. Because characteristics other than these of [skandhas] do not exist, [the Buddha] is not different [from skandhas]. And how could he be like the *ātman* for us? //238//

अवाच्योऽद्वयसन् नेष्टः पूर्ववत् तन् निराकृतेः ।
घटवद् वाप्य् ²⁰³ अवाच्यत्वात् कथं तद्-बुद्धता मता ॥२३९॥

Because it can be refuted as before, he is not acceptable as someone inexpressible and not a real entity. Or, how can his Buddhahood be acknowledged on account of being inexpressible like a pot. //239//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka negates the identity of the Buddha and skandhas. I do not, however, fully understand what Bhā-viveka says. In Buddhism, it is said that beings consist of five skandhas in order to demonstrate impermanence of existent. From this point of view, the opponents state that existent which is called the Buddha exists. If something exists, the existent consists of skandhas, i.e., *rūpa-skandha* (matter of form), *vedanā-skandha* (perception), *saṃjñā-skandha*

²⁰¹ [ma].. ms. SG: matāḥ.

²⁰² KT: sku (tanu)

²⁰³ yad=ghaṭāv=āpy= ms. °ya° and °gha° added under the line; KT: bum pa bshin du.

(conception), *saṃskāra-skandha* (volition) and *vijñāna-skandha* (consciousness). For the Buddhists, however, the Buddha is transcendent, not a being. Hence, the Buddha consists of five skandhas. For the Mādhyamikas the Buddha is also dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). He is not a real existent. He transcends existent and non-existent. Therefore, it cannot be said that something and the Buddha is identical or something and the Buddha is not identical.

2-10. Seeing *pratītyasamutpāda* and seeing the Buddha

न प्रतीत्य-समुत्पाद-दृष्टेः संबुद्ध-दर्शनात् ।
इष्ट आयतनोत्पादः पूर्ववत् तन्-निराकृतेः ॥२४०॥

Because, as mentioned before, it can be refuted, it (arising of sense organs) is not desired that because the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). //240//

न सन् नासन् 204 सदसतो न नित्यान् नाप्य् अहेतुतः ।
नाप्य् अस्मान् नाप्य् अनस्माच् च शाश्वतोच्छेद-वर्जितः 205 ॥२४१॥

What exists ,what does not exist and what either exists or does not exist do not [arise]. There is no entity transcending permanence as well as destruction which is [produced] from the permanent or without cause or from this or from that. Both permanence and extirpation are abandoned. //241//

204 न तन्नाशं ms

205 n=āpy=asmā=anasmāc=chā° ms

न सन् नासन् न सदसन् उत्पादोऽतः स कीदृशः²⁰⁶ ।
दर्शनं दर्शनात् तस्य कथं शास्तुः प्रतीयते²⁰⁷ ॥२४२॥

The arising is not what exists, what does not exist or what either exists or does not exist. Therefore, what kind of [arisa] is it? How is a vision [of truth] known from the vision [of truth] of that teacher?//242//

स्व-भाव-वादिनां वादः²⁰⁸ तस्माद्²⁰⁹ इष्ट-विघातकः ।
मायोत्पादवद् उत्पादो यस्य तस्य तु युज्यते ॥२४३॥

Therefore, for one who maintains that entities have own-being (*svabhāvavādin*), the statement [“the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination] damages what they desired. However, for one who [maintains that] the arising [of entities] is similar to the arising of illusion, [that statement “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination”] is proper.//243//

उक्त-दोष-मलापायात् सद्धर्मोल्का-प्रकाशनात्²¹⁰ ।
क्रियोपकार-रूपेण सांवृतं²¹¹ बुद्ध-दर्शनम् ॥२४४॥

Seeing the Buddha is something which belongs to lower truth (*saṃvṛti*). [It is said to come] from removing the dust of afore-mentioned deficiency [and] from lighting the torch of true dharma (*saddharmolkāśana*). But this is a conventional [expression] as an assistance towards activity (*kriyopakārarūpa*).//244//

²⁰⁶ na san=n=āsan (c. virāma) sadasann=utpādadoṣaḥ sa kīdṛśaḥ ms. KT:/skye ba yod min med ma yin//yod med ma yin de gaṇ na/

²⁰⁷ प्रदीयते ms. KT: śes par bya

²⁰⁸ वाद ms

²⁰⁹ स्वस्माद् ms. KT: de phyir (=tasmād).

²¹⁰ उक्तदोषमल्पायाश्व=[च] सद्धर्मोल्काप्रकाशनात् ms. KT:/smras paḥi ñes paḥi dri bsal bas//dam chos sgron ma rab bstan phyir/

²¹¹ संवृतं मस. खथः कुन रदसोब तु न (साम्प्रतयअ)

मायोपमस्याभूतत्वात् तत्त्वतस् तन् न दर्शनम् ²¹² ।
अप्रतर्क्यम् अविज्ञेयम् अनिरूप्यानिदर्शनम् ²¹³ ॥२४५॥

निर्निमित्तं निराभासं निर्विकल्पं निरक्षरम् ।
पश्यतो बुद्धि-बोद्धव्यं तद्-दर्शनम् ²¹⁴ अदर्शनात् ॥२४६॥

Because what is similar to illusion never takes place is not truth, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that (seeing) is not really seeing. It is beyond inference (*apratarkya*), is indiscernible (*avijñeya*), cannot be demonstrated (*anirūpya*), does not have an illustrative example (*anidarśana*), is without any mark, is devoid of any image (*nirābhāsa*), is beyond mental constructions (*nirviklpa*), is beyond words (*nirakṣara*) and is to be awakened by the mind of the viewer (*paśyato buddhiboddhavya*) and is an act of seeing from the standpoint of non-vision. //245,246//

Explanatory comment:

In Buddhism, as is well known, it is commonly said that “seeing dependent origination” refers to “seeing the Buddha,” and “seeing the Buddha” refers to “seeing dependent origination.” That is, “seeing dependent origination” and “seeing the Buddha,” are not different, but identical. With regard to this statement, however, opponents misunderstand that when the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination, the sense organs, i.e., the eye organ, etc., arise. That is, as long as the function of cognition, “seeing dependent origination” or “seeing the Buddha,” is taking place, the sense organ, i.e., the eye organ, arises. For the Mādhyamikas, however, the idea that “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination” refers to the fact that those who understand properly the theory of dependent origination cognize the real Buddha, that is, the Buddha himself is dependent origination, or again, the Buddha and the truth of “dependent origination” which the Buddha realised are identical.

²¹² तत्त्वतस् = तन् = निर्दर्शनं ms. KT:/de ni de nid mthoñ min te/

²¹³ अनिरूप्याभिदर्शनं ms. KT:/brtag bya ma yin dpe med pa/

²¹⁴ °व्यन् त° ms

2-11. Conclusion

तद् एवं परमार्थेन न स्वतः परतो न च ।

नोभयस्माद् अकस्माद्²¹⁵ वा न सद् वासन्²¹⁶ न चान्यथा ॥२४७॥

Thus, in the highest truth, nothing is produced from itself, from others, from either itself or others, from both or without cause or produced as something existing, not existing or as [existing] in other ways (*anyathā*). //247//

न केशवेश-पुरुष-प्रधानाण्वादि-कारणात्²¹⁷ ।

जायते व्यज्यते वापि भावः कश्चित् कथंचन²¹⁸ ॥२४८॥

No entity is produced or manifested in any way from a cause such as Keśava (=Vishṇu), Īśa, Puruṣa, Pradhāna or atom etc. //248//

तत्र स्वभाव-कारित्र-लक्ष्य-लक्षण-संश्रयाः ।

एकत्वान्यत्व-संकलेश-व्यवदान-क्रियाश्रयाः ॥२४९॥

There (= in the highest truth), [conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) which] depends on own-being (*svabhāva*), function (*kāritra*), what is to be characterized (*lakṣya*) and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) [does not arise]. And, [conceptual construction which] depends on identity (*ekatva*), otherness (*anyatva*) and function of either affliction (*sarīkleśa*) or purification (*vyavadāna*) [does not arise either]. //249//

215 KT: rgyu med.

216 न सत्वासन् = ms. KT: yod med ma yin.

217 °कारणाः ms. KT: rgyu las.

218 कथं च नः ms

यथाकाशे कशाघातो विचित्रं चित्र-कर्म वा²¹⁹ ।
बीजानि वा न रोहन्ति तथास्मिन् सर्व-कल्पनाः²²⁰ ॥२५०॥

All mental constructions are in it as hitting with a whip or the act of
beautiful painting or growing of seeds would be in the sky.//250//

तिमिरापगमे यद्वद् विशुद्धामल-लोचनः ।
नेक्षते केश-मशक-द्वि-चन्द्र-शिखि-चन्द्रकान्²²¹ ॥२५१॥
क्लेश-ज्ञेयावृति-तमस्-तिमिरापगमे तथा ।
न पश्यति बुधः किञ्चित् सम्यग्-ज्ञानामलेक्षणः ॥२५२॥

When the eye-disease passes away, one whose eye becomes completely
clean and pure does not see the hair (*keśa*), mosquito (*maśaka*), two moons
(*dvicandra*) and the eye in a peacock's plumage (*śikhicandraka*).//251//
Likewise, when the eye-disease of darkness which envelopes what is to
be known and defilements passes away, a wise man whose eye has
become pure by means of proper knowledge does not see
anything.//252//

यथा प्रसुप्तः पुत्र-स्त्री-विमान-भवनादिकम् ।
पश्येद् मिद्धवशात्²²² तत्र प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥२५३॥
संवृत्याधिगतांस्²²³ तद्वद् उन्मीलित-मतीक्षणः²²⁴ ।
अज्ञान-निद्रोपरमात् प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥२५४॥

Just as, one who is fallen into sleep might see a child, woman, palace,
house etc. But the same person when awakened from sleep would not
see [anything] there.//253//

219 KT:/tshon gyi ri moḥi las dañ ni/

220 सर्वकल्पना ms

221न्द्र° ms. SG:°dvicandra°, KT: zla gñis dañ.

222 पश्येत् = सिद्धवत् = ms. KT: gñid dbaṅ gis.....mthoñ gyur pa

223 संवृत्य् = आधिगता ms. KT: kun rdsob śes pa dag.

224 °मतीक्षणः ms

Similarly, one whose eye of intelligence is opened wakes up from the expiration of the sleep of ignorance does not see those which are obtained from the conventional standpoint (*sarvortyādhigata*). //254//

निशि भूतान्य् अभूतानि यथा तमसि पश्यति²²⁵ ।
 प्रोन्मीलिताक्षो यद्य् अर्क उदेति च²²⁶ न पश्यति ॥२५५॥
 न पश्यति तथा विद्वांश् चित्त-चैतस-गोचरम्²²⁷ ।
 सम्यग्-ज्ञान-रवि-ध्वस्त-समस्ताज्ञान-वासनः ॥२५६॥

Just as, one sees inexistent demons (*bhūta*) in the darkness at night. As one whose eyes are open when the sun rises, he does not see [those demons]. //255//

Likewise, one whose inclinations (*vāsanā*) of all ignorance (*samastājñāna*) are destroyed by the sun (*ravi*) of the proper knowledge does not see the object-sphere of the mind and the function of mind (*ctticaitasagocara*) //256//

Bhāviveka here concludes his theory of the “non-own-beingness” of entities.

225[प]श्यति ms. SG: tanmasi paśyati, KT: mun khrod na.

226 °क्षो न्यदि चेति इति ms. KT:/ ñi ma śar shiñ mig byeñi tshe/

227 विद्वान् (c. virāma) ci° ms

Chapter Three. Conclusion

As A. K. Warder says:²²⁸

Nāgārjuna's main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddha to set out a list of 'ultimate' principles or elements which in some metaphysical sense 'exist,' still less to define their 'own-nature,' by implication immutable.

Nāgārjuna formulated and established the philosophy of "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*) upon the basis of the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures, etc. and the followers, Buddha-pālita, Bhā-viveka, Candrar-kīrti, Deva-śarman etc. inherited his philosophy of "emptiness," and developed their own methodologies to defend it. Nāgārjuna himself used logic. He generally used *prasaṅga* as often as dilemmas and tetralemmas. A follower Buddha-pālita inherited *prasaṅga-anumāna* but analyzed it into four *prasaṅga* arguments. For example, to Nāgārjuna's statement

"Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from no cause, do any entities ever originate anywhere,"²²⁹ (tr. by Ames 1993: 233)

Buddha-pālita divided this into the following four arguments. He pointed out: (1) entities are not produced from themselves, because the origination of entities from themselves would serve no purpose and would lead to absurdity. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of what is in existence already; (2) if entities are produced from others, all things are produced from all other things; (3) if entities are produced from both themselves and others, the fault attached to the two preceding alternatives would combine in this third argument; (4) if entities are produced from causeless, all entities would be produced from all things.

Bhā-viveka, however, raised an objection against Buddha-pālita's statement. He maintained that Buddha-pālita's statement was deficient, because

²²⁸ Warder 1970: 377, ll, 11-13.

²²⁹ na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana // 1•1 // (*Prasannapadā*, p. 12.)

neither a reason (*hetu*) nor an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) had been stated. Besides, he claimed that Buddha-pālita's statement implied the acceptance of the alternative proposition, i.e., that entities are produced from others. Bhā-viveka, therefore, attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent syllogism (*sva-tantra-anumāna*) which included three unusual modifications; adding the word *paramārthataḥ* (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to the proposition in a syllogism: specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be taken as "*prasajya-pratiṣedha*" (the negation of a proposition); and the condition that no counterexample is to be given.

Candra-kīrti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argument advocated by Bhā-viveka and defended Buddha-pālita's statement against the objections put forward by Bhā-viveka. Candra-kīrti argued that Buddha-pālita's statement had no faults even though an independent reason and example had not been stated by him in his statement. Candra-kīrti's statement was that the way of *prasaṅga* was enough to refute the opponent's opinions. Therefore, the independent syllogism was not necessary.

Later on, this controversy was considered as the origin of division of two sub-schools, i.e., Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, in the Mādhyamikas in Tibet.

Sthira-mati, a prasaṅgika, and Nayāikās also criticized syllogism of Bhā-viveka. If the modification *paramārthataḥ* governs not only the proposition (*prajñā*) but also the whole syllogism, reason (*hetu*) would not be permissible, because all things would be non-existent from the standpoint of the highest truth. If, on the contrary, the modification governs only the proposition and not both reason and instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), then the subject in reason would have to be regarded as existent when considered from the standpoint of conventional level, while the same subject in the proposition would be non-existent when considered from the standpoint of the highest truth.²³⁰

Using the *svatantra* syllogism, Bhā-viveka maintained a philosophy of "emptiness." He, in other words, recognized the truth of logic which is founded on perfect wisdom (*prajñā*) of the absolute, and that perfect wisdom manifests itself by means of the conventional truth, i.e., logic.

²³⁰ See Kajiyama 1969: 152-163.

This attitude of Bhā-viveka can be seen in the following passage from his MHK:²³¹

After intelligence (*mati=prajñā*) is concentrated, one should examine by means of *prajñā* as follows: “There is own-being of dharmas, which is grasped from the point of view of verbal usage. // 3•21 // But [while] analyzing with intelligence (*dhī=prajñā*), is this [grasped] from the standpoint of the highest truth?” If it would be so, this is indeed truth (*tattva*). If not, he [still] searches for [truth]. // 3•22 //

Then, for Bhā-viveka what is the truth? As he says below, the non own-being of entities, i.e., emptiness, is truth;

स्वभावापरिनिष्पत्तेर्²³² अजातेर् वा स्वभावतः²³³ ।
मायेभवन्²³⁴ न भावानाम् ईक्षते सस्वभावताम्²³⁵ ॥२५७॥

[The wise man] does not see that state in which entities have own-being, because own-being has not come into effect, or because there is no birth through the very nature [of entities], just as he would not see an illusory elephant. // 257 //

उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्²³⁶ संवृत्या हेतुमत्त्वाद्²³⁷ अथापि वा ।
मायेभवन् न²³⁸ भावानाम् ईक्षते सस्वभावताम् ॥२५८॥

²³¹ samāhita-matiḥ paścāt prajñayaivam parīkṣayet/
yo 'yam svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ grhyeta vyavahārataḥ // 3•21 //
vicāryamāṇas tu dhiyā kim ayam paramārthataḥ/
yadi syāt tattvam evāyam ato 'nyaś cet sa mṛgyate // 3•22 // (Ejima, 1980:272)

²³² स्वभावात् = परिनिष्पत्तेर् = ms. KT: dños ñid ma grub phyir/

²³³ स्वभावत ms

²³⁴ मायेभवन् = ms. KT: /sgyu mañi glañ chen ji bshin no/. cf. k. 258c.

²³⁵ सस्वभावतां ms

²³⁶ °मत्त्वा ms

²³⁷ °मत्त्वा ms

²³⁸ °n=na° added under the line in ms

[Likewise, the wise man] does not see that state in which entities have substantial nature, because they (entities) have production, [i.e., undergo production] from the standpoint of conventional [truth], or because they (entities) have causes, just as he would not see an illusory elephant. //258//

न सन्ति भावा²³⁹ इति वा यथार्था न मतिर् मता ।
कल्पना-द्वार-निर्वृत्तेः स्थाणोः पुरुष-बुद्धिवत् ॥२५९॥

Or it is held that the cognition “entities do not exist” does not accord with things as they really are, because it (cognition) occurs by means of conceptual construction (*kalpanādvāra*), just like a cognition which perceives a tree as a human being. //259//

असद्-बुद्ध्युपलभ्यो वा भावात्मा वितथो मतः ।
कल्पना-ज्ञान-गम्यत्वान् ²⁴⁰ मरीच्युदक-बुद्धिवत् ॥२६०॥

Or, an existent which is grasped by a false cognition is considered unreal, because it (existent) is perceived by knowledge (*jñāna=prajñā*) having conceptual construction, just like the cognition in which “a filament of air is seen as water.” //260//

सदसद्-बुद्धि-बोद्धव्य-निषेधाद् एवम् एव तु ।
जायतेऽजाति-योगेन निर्विकल्पा मतिः सताम् ॥२६१॥

Thus (*evam eva tu*), through the refutation of a real as well as unreal cognition as well as object of cognition, for the wise men, cognition (*mati=prajñā*) which is beyond conceptual construction arises as a consequence of non-arising (*ajātiyogena*). /261//

239भाव ms. SG: na sa+bhāvā, KT: dños mams med.

240 °गम्यत्वा ms

शून्यत्वात् सर्व-धर्माणां तदशून्यत्वतोऽपि वा ।
न निष्कल्पा मतिर् नेष्टा²⁴¹ पराग्वत् तत्-प्रतिषेधतः ॥२६२॥

It is not accepted [by us Mādhyamikas] that a constructionless state of mind does not exist when one's mind grasps 'all dharmas are empty' or 'all dharmas are not empty.' //262//

शून्यतादि-स्वभावेन यतः शून्या हि शून्यता ।
न पश्यति ततो विद्वाञ्छून्यतेत्य् ²⁴² अपि शून्यताम् ॥२६३॥

Emptiness [on its part] lacks self in the form of emptiness, etc.
Accordingly, the wise man does not see emptiness as emptiness. //263//

निराभासोऽपि भावात्मा निष्कल्प-मति-गोचरः ।
आलम्ब्यत्वाद् ²⁴³ यथार्थो न जलेन्द्राव् इव ²⁴⁴ चन्द्रधीः ॥२६४॥

Even the existent appearanceless grasped in a constructless cognition is not reality as it is, because it (existent) is what is to be grasped, just like the cognition that the moon in water is seen as the moon. //264//

²⁴¹ +.[i]..[lpā] matir =a=eṣṭā ms. SG: (nirvi)kalpā matir=n=eṣṭā , KT:/mi rtog blo gros mi ḥdod min/

²⁴² विद्वां शू° ms

²⁴³ आलम्ब्यत्वाद् ms

²⁴⁴ जलेन्द्राव् इव ms

निर्विकल्पार्थ-विषया निर्विकल्पापि धीर् मृषा ।
अनात्मादि-स्वभावत्वात् तद् यथा सविकल्प-धीः ॥२६५॥

Cognition (*dhī=prajñā*) which is beyond conceptual construction, and which has as its object that object which is beyond conceptual construction is [considered] unreal, because it (cognition) has non-selfness, etc. (*anātmādi*) as its nature, just like a cognition having conceptual construction. //265//

ज्ञेयस्य सर्वथासिद्धेर्²⁴⁵ निर्विकल्पापि यत्र धीः ।
नोत्पद्यते तद् अतुल्यं तत्त्वं²⁴⁶ तत्त्वविदो²⁴⁷ विदुः ॥२६६॥

Because an object of cognition (*jñeya*) is not proved in any way [i.e., since no objects of cognitions exist], those who know the truth understand that where even constructless cognition (*dhī=prajñā*) does not arise is unequalled truth. //266//

As long as we recognize that cognizable entities do not exist, that entities neither exist nor do not exist, that entities do not have own-being and that everything is emptiness, all such cognitions are false discrimination. The truth is truth where even cognition which is beyond false discrimination, conceptual construction or any imaginations does not arise. That is to say, only by the extreme exclusion of any false discrimination, conceptual construction or imagination truth can be obtained.

²⁴⁵ ज्ञेय[स्य]..+.. सिद्धे ms. SG: jñeyasya sarvathāsiddhe, KT:/śes bya rnam kun ma grub phyir/

²⁴⁶ तत्त्वं ms

²⁴⁷ तत्त्व° ms

Nāgārjuna states as follows:²⁴⁸

There is emancipation (*mokṣa*) from the extinction of action and affliction (*karmakleśa*). Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). They (conceptual construction) [are produced] from diversification (*prapañca*). But, diversification is destroyed in emptiness (*śūnyatā*). (18-5)

When the object sphere of the mind (*cittagocara*) becomes extinct, [the object sphere of] the word (*abhidhātavya*) [would also] become extinct. Indeed, dharmahood (*dharmatā*) is neither what is arisen nor what is destroyed. (18-7)

This is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of truth which is known through others, which is quiescent (*śānta*), which is not diversified by diversification (*prapañca*), which is beyond conceptual construction (*nirvikalpa*), which does not have many meanings (*anānārtha*). //18-9//

From the above statement of Nāgārjuna, it is obvious that the important point is the notion of “conceptual construction” (*vikalpa*). Conceptual construction is the cause of the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptual construction is produced from diversification (*prapañca*). Diversification is destroyed by an understanding of *śūnyatā*. Bhā-viveka’s statement regarding “conceptual construction,” on the other hand, is slightly different from that of Nāgārjuna. Bhā-viveka adds a remark on it as “knowledge of conceptual construction” or “cognition which is beyond conceptual construction.” Moreover, with regard to definition of *śūnyatā*, we come across the difference between the statements of Nāgārjuna and that of Bhā-viveka. The former states that “it is dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) that we call emptiness.” (MK, 24•18ab, p. 503.: *yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ śūnyatā tāṃ pracakṣmahe*/). Bhā-viveka, on the other hand, states that “voidness (*śūnyatā*) alludes to the

²⁴⁸ *karmakleśakṣayan mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ/
te prapañcātpapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate//18-5//
nirvṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nirvṛtte cittagocare/
anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā//18-7//
aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcāir aprapañcitam/
nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam//18-9// (Prasannapadā, pp. 349-372)*

knowledge which perceives voidness without any grasping.”²⁴⁹ It is the fact that Bhā-viveka was a Mādhyamika and a follower of the Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna. In spite of this fact, Bhā-viveka’s definition of *śūnyatā* is different from Nāgārjuna’s definition. Here too Bhā-viveka refers to knowledge or wisdom (*prajñā*). Then, how does Candrakīrti, a follower of Nāgārjuna and a prasaṅgika, define *śūnyatā*? He quotes Nāgārjuna’s statement above regarding the definition of it in his *Pras*.²⁵⁰ That is to say, Candrakīrti exactly follows Nāgārjuna’s definition, and comments that “thus, the meaning of the word *pratītya-samutpāda* is the meaning of the word *śūnyatā*.”²⁵¹ Thus, we come across the difference between Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, on the one hand and Bhā-viveka, on the other hand. Here, it should be noticed, however, that there is no essential differences between them. Both Bhā-viveka and Candrakīrti are the followers of Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas. They both cognized that entities have no own-being (*sva-bhāva*), and there is only emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Their final aim was obtaining of absolute truth (*tattva*) and reaching *Nirvāṇa*. For the Mādhyamikas, “*śūnyatā*” itself is absolute truth. In other words, by understanding “*śūnyatā*,” obtaining of absolute truth is possible. To the obtaining of absolute truth, i.e., *Nirvāṇa*, Bhā-viveka just recognized the importance of knowledge or wisdom (*prajñā*).

From these points of view, I would like to assume Bhā-viveka’s intention. Bhā-viveka followed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy as a Mādhyamika and at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “*śūnyatā*,” which is declared in “*Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*,” etc.²⁵² That is to say, while Bhā-viveka followed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “*śūnyatā*.” There are over two hundreds years separating Nāgārjuna’s period and Bhā-viveka’s period. Therefore, Bhā-viveka saw the need to demonstrate the true intentions of Nāgārjuna and the philosophy of “*śūnyatā*.”

²⁴⁹ Uryuzu 1985: 33.

²⁵⁰ *Prasannapadā*, p. 491.

²⁵¹ *evam pratītya-samutpāda-śābdasya yo ’rthaḥ sa eva śūnyatā-śābdasyārthā. (Prasannapadā, p. 491)*

²⁵² Kajiyama 1979: 114-143, 1989: 89-206 examined the relationship between philosophy of *prajñā* and philosophy of emptiness.

Logic itself belongs to verbal usage, and is not absolute reality. It is, however, impossible to state the philosophy of "*śūnyatā*" without verbal usage. Therefore, Bhā-viveka added a restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" to his syllogism arguing "*śūnyatā*," in order to caution the reader about this contradiction. His kind of syllogism was rejected by Candra-kīrti. For Candra-kīrti the logical method could play a role only from the conventional standpoint and it should not be brought into speak of any phases of the highest truth. For Bhā-viveka, however, the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" is the function which leads to "absolute truth" from the "conventional world," and only on reaching the absolute truth, i.e., *Nirvāṇa*, the use of logic should be abandoned.

Nāgārjuna, Buddha-pālita and Candra-kīrti used *prasaṅga-anumāna*. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent's opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of *śūnyatā*. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other schools. Svātantrikas beginning with Bhā-viveka, on the other hand, were not satisfied with it, and positively demonstrated the philosophy of *śūnyatā* by using *svatantra-anumāna*. For them, probably, *prasaṅga-anumāna* was not enough to demonstrate the philosophy of *śūnyatā* and was not enough to refute the opinions of realists. It may be, moreover, possible that Bhā-viveka was influenced by dominant school of thought, i.e., importance of logic. From these points, it can be understood that Bhā-viveka's use of logic employed a more positive approach to *Nirvāṇa*.

I shall try to clarify Bhā-viveka's theory through a diagram which shows his idea of the process from the conventional world (*samvṛti*) to the highest truth (*paramārtha*), i.e., Nirvāṇa.

The highest truth (Nirvāṇa)

perfect wisdom

(having no diversification, "*niṣprapañca*")

↑↓

The Buddha

↑↓

The middle way (*madhyamā-pratipad*)

↑↓

Dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)

↑↓

Emptiness (*śūnyatā*)

↑↓

Non own-beingness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*)

↑

↑

↑ ⇐= logic (having the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" etc.)

wisdom

(having diversification, "*prapañca*")

The conventional world

Appendix

An outline of research on Bhā-viveka

The works of Bhā-viveka have been studied by many scholars over a long period because his philosophy is one of the most important strands in the Mādhyamika school. Therefore, numerous works have already been completed on the subject. Below only a representative bibliography of the works of Bhā-viveka is provided.

1. *Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti.*

This treatise is a commentary on Nāgārjuna's MK. Accordingly, the basic contents of it and those of MK are identical.

Chapter one.

Frauwallner, 1958: 226-232.

Nozawa, 1977: 1-7.

Kajiyama, 1963: 37-62, 1964: 100-130.

Nōnin, 1993: 45-66.

Willam, 1993: 219-259.

Chapter two.

Tachikawa, 1982: 1-26, 1983: 31-58, 1984: 111-128, 1981: 1-22, 1985: 44-55,
1985: 21-41.

Chapter Three.

Nōnin, 1987: 16-38.

Chapter Eleven.

Mochizuki, 1990: 25-49.

Chapter Twelve.

Mochizuki, 1989: 1-27.

Chapter Thirteen.

Mochizuki, 1989: 69-86.

Chapter Fifteen.

Kajiyama, 1079: 181-202.

Chapter Sixteen.

Furusaka, 1981: 1-14.

Chapter Seventeen.

Kajiyama, 1979: 305-357.

Chapter Eighteen.

Kajiyama, 1978: 287-328.

Ichigō, 1967: 1-20.

Ichigō, 1967: 250-260.

Chapter Nineteen.

Nishikawa, 1984: 7-13.

Chapter Twenty-four.

Uryūzu, 1971: 15-56.

Furusaka, 1976: 117-131.

Chapter Twenty-Five.

Malcolm, 1985: 25-75.

Yasui, 1961: 305-372.

2. *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and *Tarkajvālā*

According to the colophons of the Tibetan translation of **MHK**, the Tibetan translation of **TJ** was finalized by Atīśa (981-1054 A.D) at Lhasa and dictated to Lotsawa Jayaśīla.²⁵³ The Sanskrit original has not so far been found.

Chapter One.

Skt. title: *Bodhi-cittāparityāga*.

Tib. title: *Byari chub kyi sems mi gtan baḥi leḥu ste dan po*.

Eng. title: *Non-abandonment of the thought of enlightenment*.

Skt. text: Gokhale, and Bahulkar, 1985: 76-108. (Including an English translation).

Chapter Two.

Skt. title: *Muni-vratasamāśraya*.

Tib. title: *Thub paḥi brtul shugs la yari dag par bsten pa*.

Eng. title: *Taking the vow of an ascetic*

Skt. text: Gokhale, 1972: 40-45. (Including an English translation)

Chapter Three.

Skt. title: *Tattva-jñānaiṣaṇā*.

Tib. title: *De kho na ṅid kyi śes pa ḥtshol ba*.

Eng. title: *The quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality*.

²⁵³ See, Chattopadhyaya 1967: 475, 487.

Skt. texts (edition): Gokhale, 1962: 271-275. (vv. 275-284.)²⁵⁴

(Including an English translation)

Iida, 1980: 52-242. (vv. 1-136.) (Including an English translation).

Ejima, 1980: 259-474. (Including a Japanese translation of MHK and a portion of TJ equivalent to v. 26 of MHK).

Japanese translation: Nozawa, 1954: 53-46, 1955: 56-44, 1955: 38-26, 1956: 43-31, 1959: 105-118, 1964: 87-74, 1964: 70-58: 79-64, 1971: 96-86, 1973: 108-89. (vv.1-141 and TJ).

Chapter Four.

Skt. title: *Śrāvaka-tattvaniścayāvatāra*.

Tib. title: *Ñan thos kyi de kho na ñid hjug pa*.

Eng. title: *Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Īśvara*.

Japanese translation from Tib.: Nozawa, 1941: 45-71, 1944: 45-71.

Chapter Five.

Skt. title: *Yogācāra-tattvaviniścaya*.

Tib. title: *Rnal hbyor spyod paḥi de kho na ñid gtan la dbab pa la hjug pa*.

Eng. title: *The ascertainment of the truth of the Yogācāra*.

Japanese translation from Tib.: Yamaguchi, 1961: 1-41.

English translation from Skt.: Iida, 1966: 79-96. (An annotated translation and study of verses 1, 7, 8 & 9), Hirabayashi, and Iida, 1978: 341-360.

Chapter Six.

Skt. title: *Sāṃkhya-tattvāvatāra*.

Tib. title: *Grangs can gyi de kho na ñid la hjug pa*.

Eng. title: *Ascertainment of the truth of the Sāṃkhya*.

Skt. text: Nakada, 1973: 145-155, 1983: 1-3.

Japanese translation from Skt. and Tib. : Nakada, 1973: 156-185. 1983: 4-7. Honda, 1980: 126-166.

Chapter Seven.

Skt. title: *Vaiśeṣika-tattvaniścaya*.

Tib. title: *Bye brag paḥi de kho na ñid la hjug pa*.

Eng. title; *Ascertainment of the truth of the Vaiśeṣika*.

Japanese translation from Tib.: Miyasaka, 1958: 51-87.

²⁵⁴ According to Gokhale, the number of these verses is provisional. The verses which Gokhale proposed are equivalent to vv. 280-289 of Ejima's Skt. edition.

Chapter Eight.

Skt. title: *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya*.

Tib. title: *Rig byed kyi mthar smra baḥi de kho na ṅid la ḥjug pa*.

Eng. title: *Ascertainment of the truth of the Vedānta*.

Skt. edition: Gokhale, 1958: 165-180. (vv. 1-16).

Nakamura, 1975: 300-329. (vv. 18-96).

Qvarnström, 1989.

Chapter Nine.

Skt. title: *Mīmāṃsā-tattvanirṇayāvatāra*.

Tib. title: *Dpyod paḥi de kho na ṅid gtan la dbab pa la ḥjug pa*.

Eng. title: *Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Mīmāṃsaka*.

Skt. edition: Kawasaki, 1973: 71-86. (vv. 1-17 and a Japanese translation), 1976: 1-16. (vv. 1-17 and an English translation), 1985: 174-184. (vv. 132-138 and TJ and a Japanese translation), 1992: 407-467. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanese translation), 1992: 131-143. (Includes an English translation)

Chapter Ten.

Skt. title: *Sarvajñātāsiddhinirdeśa*.

Tib. title: *Thams cad mkhyen pa ṅid du grub par bstan pa*.

Eng. title: *Exposition of the proof of the omniscience [of the Buddha]*.

Skt. text: Kawasaki, 1992: 468-472. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanese translation), 1992: 131-143. (Includes Tibetan edition and an English translation)

Chapter Eleven.

Skt. title: *Stutilakṣananirdeśa*.

Tib. title: *Bstod pa daṅ mtshan bstan pa*.

Eng. title: *Exposition on the eulogy and the marks*.

3. *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*

Restored Skt. text: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, *Madhyamakārtha-saṃgraha of Bhāvaviveka*, 1931: 41-49.

Tib. ed. and Japanese tr.: Ejima, 1980: 18-23.

Japanese tr.: Nagasawa, 1969: 191-198.

English tr.: Lindtner, 1981: 200-201.

4. *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*

English tr.: Rockill, 1884: 181.

Japanese tr.: Watanabe, 1939.

French tr.: André Bareau, 1956: 167-200.

5. *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*

Skt. ed.: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, 1949.

Translations: Poussin, 1932-33: 1-146, Frauwallner, 1958: 232-240, Hatani, 1931: 99-138.

Bibliography

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT, PALI ETC. TEXTS

- Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Pradhan Prahlad ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. VIII, Patna, 1967.
- Ibushūrinron*, ed. by Enga Teramoto and Tomotsugu Hiramatsu, *Zō-Kan-Wa Sanyaku Taikō Ibushūrinron (A Study of the Samaya-bhedoparacanacakraśāstra— Comparative Study of Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese translations)*, Kyoto, 1935.
- Christian Lindtner, *Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter 25, *Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica*, Vol. 29/1, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoms de Körös, 1984, pp. 77-97. (Last half of chapter twenty-five).
- Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka*, P. L. Vaidya ed. Paris, 1923, pp.51-52.
- La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti*, J.W.de Jong ed. *Oriens Extremus* 9, 1962, J.W.de Jong, *Buddhist Studies*, 1979, Berkeley, California.
- Madhyamakaśāstram*, *The Madhyamakaśāstram of Māgārjuna*, Raghunath Pandeya ed., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.
- Prasannapadā*, Louis de la Vallée Poussin ed., *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*, *Bibliotheca Buddhica* 4, St-Petersbourg, repr. Osnabrück 1970, Tokyo, 1977.
- Prajñāpradīpa*, Max Walleser ed., *A commentary on the Madhyamakasūtra by Bhāvaviveka*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, work 226, nes series No. 1396, Calcutta, 1914.
- Shōtarō Iida [1980], *Reason and Emptiness, A Study in Logic and Mysticism*, The Hokuseidō Press, Tokyo, pp. 52-242.
- Sphuṭārthā*, Unrai Wogihara ed., *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, Sankibō Buddhist Book Store, Tokyo, 1989.
- The Madhyamakaśāstram of Māgārjuna*, Raghunath Pandeya ed. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.
- Yasunori Ejima [1980], *Chūkan-shisō no Tenkai - Bhāvaviveka no Kenkyū - (Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India)*, Shunjūsha, Tokyo, pp. 259-360.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Articles and Books

- Alaka, Chattopadhyaya [1967], *Atīśa and Tibet*, Calcutta.
- Bureau, André [1956], *Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques*, JA 224, pp. 167-200.
- Eckel, Malcolm David [1985], *Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the Prajñāpradīpa*, Miscelanea Buddhica, Indiske Studier V, Chr. Lindtner ed., Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, pp. 25-75.
- Edgerton, Franklin [1985], *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, Rinsen Book Co.
- Ejima, Yasunori [1985], *Chūron Sho-chūshakusho ni okeru Engi no Gogi-kaishaku* (The interpretation of "pratītyasamutpāda" in the commentaries on *Madhyamakāśāstra*), Dr. Akira Hirakawa's anniversary for his seventieth birthday, *Bukkyō Shisō no Shomondai* (The Problems of the Buddhist thought). Shunjūsha, Tokyo.
- [1990], *Bhāvaviveka/ Bhavya/ Bhāviveka*, IBK 38-2, pp. 98-106.
- Frauwallner, Erich [1958], *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin.
- [1961], Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO 5, pp. 125-148.
- Fujita Kōtatsu [1982], *Kū- suñña, suññata, suññatā*, (*Empty- suñña, suññata, suññatā*) *Bukkyō Kyōri no Kenkyū* (A Study of Buddhist doctrine), pp. 81-93.
- Furusaka Kōichi [1976], *Daijyō Bukkyō ni okeru Nitaisetsu no ichi-kōsatsu - "Hannya Tōron" 'kan-Shōtaibon wo Chūshin to shite - (An Examination of the Theory of the Two Truths in Mahāyāna Buddhism)*, OKDK 25, pp. 117-131.
- [1980/1981], "Chūron" ni okeru Rinnekan no Hitei (1) (*The Negation of saṃsāra in Madhyamakakārikā (1)*), OKDK 29-2/3, pp.171-184, (2) OKDK 30-1/2, pp. 1-14.
- Gokhale, V.V.[1958], *The Vedānta Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā*, IIJ, 2-3, 1958, p. 166.
- [1962], *Masters of Buddhism adore the Brahman through Non-adoration (Bhavya's madhyamakahṛdaya, 3)*, IIJ 5-4, pp. 271-275.
- [1972], *The Second chapter of Bhavya Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*, IIJ 14-1/2, pp. 40-45.
- Gokhale, V.V.: Bahulkar, S.S. [1985], *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Tarkajōla Chapter 1.*, Miscellanea Buddhica Indiske Studier 5, ed. by Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, pp. 76-108.

- Guenther, H.V. [1932], *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, Pelican Books A, Penguin Books Inc., 1972.
- Hatani, Ryōtai [1931], *Daijyō Shōchin ron, Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūgan-bu* 3, pp. 99-138.
- Hirabayashi, Jay: Iida, Shōtarō [1978], *Another look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence*, Edward Conze Festschrift (Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series vol. 1, pp. 341-360.
- Honda, Megumu [1980], *Sāṃkhya Tetsugaku Kenkyū Jō.*, Tokyo, Shunjūsha.
- Ichigō, Masamichi [1967-1], *Chūganha to Katsuron • Shōrigakuha tonō Tairon* (*Mādhyamika's criticism of [the ātman] of the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika*), Tohōgaku 34, pp. 1-20.
- [1967-2], *Chūganha to Sūronha tonō Tairon* (*Mādhyamika's criticism of the soul-theory of Sāṃkhya as found in Prajñāpāradīpa XVIII*), IBK15-2, pp. 250-260.
- Iida, Shōtarō [1966], *Āgama (Scripture) and Yুক্তi (reason) in Bhāvaiviveka*, Kanakura Kinenronbunshū (kanakura Festschrift), Tokyo, pp. 79-96.
- Inaba, kenshō [1966], *Shoin no Kyōron o chūshin toshita Chūkan-Hōtōron no Kōsatsu* (*Nitaishō* 1), BS 4.
- Kajiyama, Yūichi [1960], *Bhāvaiviveka and the Prāsangika school*, The Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication, vo. 1, Edited. by Satkari Mookerjee, Directed by Navanalandamahavihara, Nalanda, Navanalandamahavihara, Patna, pp. 19-331.
- [1968/69], *Bhāvaiviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla*, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie, Bd.XII-XIII, Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, pp. 193-203.
- : Ueyama, Shunpei [1969], *Bukkyō no Shisō 3 Kū no Ronri - Chūgan-* (*Thought of Buddhism 3 Logic of Emptiness - the Mādhyamika-*), Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo.
- [1978], *"Chie no Tomoshibi" (Chūron Shōven-shaku) Dai Jūhachishō 'Jiga to Taishō no Kenkyū'* (*Bhāvaiviveka's Prajñāpāradīpa - The Eighteenth Chapter - A Study of Ātman and Ālambana*), Sekai no Meicho Daijō Butten, Chūō Kōronsha, pp. 287-328.
- [1979-1], *Bhāvaiviveka no Gō Shisō - "Hannya Tōron" Dai Jūnanashō no Wayaku* (*Bhāvaiviveka's Thought of Karma, Japanese Translation of the Seventeenth Chapter of Prajñāpāradīpa*), Gō Shisō Kenkyū, pp. 305-357.

- [1979-2], *Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Philosophy of Prajñā*, Studies in Pāli and Buddhism, ed. by A. K. Narain, B. R. Publishing, Delhi.
- [1979-3], “Chie no Tomoshihi” *Dai Jūgoshō (Shiyaku)* (Japanese Translation of the Fifteenth Chapter of *Prajñāpradīpa*), Prof. Shinjyō Itō and Junshō Tanaka’s Memorial Volume, Tōhō Shuppan, pp. 181-202.
- [1983], *Chūkan Shisō no Rekishi to Bunken (History and treatises of Madhyamaka thought)*, Tokyo, Shunjūsha.
- [1989], Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (selected papers) edit. on the Occasion of his Retirement from Kyoto University by Katsumi Mimaki et al. under the Auspices of the Felicitation Committee of the Society for Buddhist Studies, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, Rinsen Book Co., Ltd, Kyoto.
- Kawasaki, Shinjyō [1973], *Bhavya no Tsutaeru Mīmāṃsā Shisō*, Nakamura Kinen Ronshū, pp. 71-86.
- [1976], *The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya- kārikā - Text and Translation - (1) Pūroa-pakṣa*, TDT.
- [1985], *Nikushoku to Bhāvivēka*, Tōhō 1, pp. 174-184.
- [1992-1], *Issai-chi shisō no Kenkyū*, Tokyo, Shunjūsha,
- [1992-2], *Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavya’s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-Tarkajvālā (the IX th and Xth Chapters)*, IATS vol. 1, pp. 131-143.
- Lalou, M [1953], *Les textes bouddhiques au temp du Roi Khri-sron-lde-bcan*, JA, CCXLI, pp. 313-353.
- Larson: Bhattacharya [1987], *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. IV, Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass.
- Lhundup, Sopa Geshe: Hopkins, J. [1976], *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, New York.
- Lindtner, Christian [1981], *Atīśa’s Introduction to the Two Truths and its Sources*, JIP 9.
- [1984], *Bhavya’s Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter 25*, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. 29/1, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoms de Körös.
- Mayāvyutpatti, ed. by Ryōzaburō Sasaki, Tokyo, repr. 1962.
- Mimaki, Katsumi [1977], *Le Grub mthaḥ rnam bshag rin chen phren ba de dkon mchog hjigs med dbari po (1728-1791)*, Texte tibétain édité, avec une introduction,

- ZINBUN: Memoirs of the Reserch Institute for Humanistic Studies. Kyoto University.
- Miyasaka, Yūshō [1958], "*Ronri no Honoo*" ni okeru *Vaiśeṣika Tetsugaku*, (*Vaiśeṣika philosophy in Tarkajvālā*) KD 1, pp. 62-107.
- Mochizuki, Kaie [1989], "*Hanña Tōron*" Dai Jūnishō Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation of the Twelveth Chapter of *Prajñāpradīpa*), Zanshin 62.
- [1989-2], "*Hannya Tōron*" Dai Jūsanshō Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation of the Thirteenth Chapter of *Prajñāpradīpa*), RDDN 7.
- [1990-1], "*Hanña Tōron*" Dai Jūichi Shō Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation of the Eleventh Chapter of *Prajñāpradīpa*), Zanshin 61.
- Monier-Williams [1899], *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.
- Murakami, Shinkan [1991], *Indo Tetsugaku Gairon* (Introduction to Indian Philosophy), Heirakuji shoten, Kyoto.
- Nagasawa, Jitsudō [1969], *Daijō Bukkyō Yugagyō Shisō no Hatten Keitai*, Tokyo, Nagasawa Jitsudō Sensei Ikō Shuppankai, 1969.
- Nakada, Naomichi [1973-1], *The Sanskrit text of the madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā (Dbu-maḥi sñiñ-poḥi tshig-lehur-byas-pa) and the Tibetan Text of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-ṅrtti-tarkajvālā (Dbu-maḥi sñiñ-poḥi ḥgrel-pa rtog-ge ḥbar-ba) ṣaṣṭhaḥ paricchedaḥ/ Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ*// (Part 1. Pūrvapakṣa)., TJDTK, 6, pp. 145-155.
- [1973-2], *Chūkanshinron no Ju Dai Roku-shō oyobi Ronri no Honoo -Indo no Nigenron no Tetsugaku [Sāṃkhyā-setsu] o Shōkai seru Bubun no Wayaku to Chū-*., TJDTK 6, pp. 156-185.
- [1983], *The Sanskrit Text of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (Dbu-maḥi sñiñ-poḥi tshig-lehur-byas-pa) and the Tibetan Text of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-ṅrtti-tarkajvālā (Dbu-maḥi sñiñ-poḥi ḥgrel pa rtog-ge ḥbar-ba)ṣaṣṭhaḥ paricchedaḥ/ Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ*// (Part 2. Uttarapakṣa, (a)vv. 5-7., TDK 20, pp. 1-3.
- [1983], *Chūkan Shinron no ju Dai Roku-shō Dai Go-Dai Nana kārikā oyobi Ronri no Honoo Wayaku sono 2 (Shōdaijōron-shaku shoshutsu no Hiseshi Nayashuma no toku Ga to Hikakushite)*., TDK 20, pp.4-7.
- Nakamura, Hajime [1975], *The Vedāntic Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdaya*, ALB 39, pp. 300-329.
- Nishikawa, Takashi [1984], *Prajñāpradīpa Dai Jūkyūshō ni okeru Sho-chūshakusho no Inyō ni tsuite - Buddhapālita Hihan wo Chūshin to Shite - (On the quotations*

- of the commentaries in the Nineteenth Chapter of *Prajñāpradīpa*), KDBKN 17, pp. 7-13.
- Nonin, Masa'aki [1987], *Shōben-cho "Hannya Tōron" Dai Sanshō no Wayaku to chuu (Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa - Annotated Japanese Translation of the Third Chapter -)*, RDDKK 8.
- [1992], *Chie no Tomoshihi Dai ichi shō no Wayaku (1) - En no Kōsatsu - (Japanese translation of the first chapter of Prajñāpradīpa (1) - the examination of pratyaya-)*, Bukkyo to Fukushima no Kenkyū, Ryukoku Daigaku
- Nozawa, Jyōshō [1941], *Daijō Hibussetsuron (Criticism of the authenticity of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India)*. OtG 22-2, pp. 45-71.
- [1944], *Shōben no Shōmon Hihan (Bhāviveka's criticism of the Śrāvaka)*, MK 88, pp.45-71.
- [1977], *Hanña Tōron-shaku "Shohō Fujishō" Ron (Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā - The Theory of Non-birth of Dharma-)*, ODBK.
- Qvarnström, Olle [1989], *Hindu Philosophy In Buddhist Perspective - The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhāvya's Madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā -*, Sweden, Lund Studies In African and Asian Religions vol 4, Lund - Plus Ultra -.
- Rockhill, W. Woodvill [1884], *The life of the Buddha*, London.
- Ruegg, David Seyfort [1981], *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz.
- Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula [1937], *Second Search for Sanskrit Palm-leaf MSS. in Tibet*. JBORS 23, Part 1, pp. 1-163.
- Sastri, N. Aiyaswami [1931], *Madhyamakārtha-saṅgraha of Bhāvaviveka*, JOR 5-1, Madras.
- [1949], *Karatalaratna of Bhāvaviveka*, translated into Sanskrit, Visvabharati Annals II, Appendix.
- Schayer, Stanislaw [1935], *Notes and Queries on Buddhism*, Rocznik Orientalistyczny 11. pp. 206-213.
- Stcherbatsky, Stanislaw [1977], *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, repr. Varanasi.
- Tachikawa, Musashi [1982-1985], *Shōben-cho "Chie no Tomoshihi," Dai Ni Shō Wayaku • Kaisetsi (I) (Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa, Annotated Japanese translation of the Second Chapter (I))*, NBKR 84, 1982, pp. 1-26, (II), NBKR 87, 1983, pp. 31-58, (III), Saṁbhāṣa (NIBK) 5, 1984, pp. 111-128, (IV-1), NBKR

- 90, 1981, pp. 1-22, (IV-2), Saṃbhāṣa (NIBK) 6, 1985, pp. 44-55, (V), NBKR 93, 1985, pp. 21-41.
- Tāranātha [1970], Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, tr. , Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, ed., *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism In India*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, second ed., 1990.
- Uryūzu, Ryūshin [1985], *Nāgāujuna Kenkyū* (A Study of Nāgārjuna), Shunjūsha, Tokyo
- Watanabe, Zuigen [1939], *Zōbun "Shōjyō Jūhachibu Buha Kaisetsu" Yakuchū* (Japanese translation of Tibetan "The explanation of the eighteen subschools in Hīnayāna Buddhism), OsG 94.
- Warder, A.K. [1970], *Indian Buddhism*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers PVT. Ltd. Delhi, Second Revised Edition, 1980, Reprinted, 1991.
- Yamaguchi, Susumu [1941], *Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U tonon Tairon* (Dialogue concerning existence and non-existence in Buddhism), Tokyo, Sankibō Busshorin.
- [1943], *Chūgan-ha ni okeru Chūgangakuhsetsu no kōyōsho* (A summary of the theory of the Mādhyamika in the Madhyamaka school.), ON 2, pp 69-152.
- Yasui, Kōsai [1961], *Chūgan-shisō no Kenkyū* (A Study of Mādhyamika philosophy), Hōzōkan, pp. 305-372.
- [1970], *Chūkan shisō no Kenkyū* (A Study of Mādhyamika philosophy), Hōzōkan Kyoto, Japan.

List of Tibetan Tripiṭaka

A Comparative List of Tibetan Tripiṭaka of Narthang Edition (Bstan-Hgyur Division) with the Sde-dge Edition, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.