United States-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1954:
The Conditions and Causes for a Military Alliance

by

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Abstract

This discussion argues that the United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954 emerged because American strategic concerns for the Middle East, arising in the aftermath of the Korean War and based upon a recognition of Britain's declining ability to defend the region, coincided with Pakistan's strategic needs as a newly-independent nation. The United States believed that Pakistan—a moderate Islamic nation, situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East, and ideologically inclined toward the West—could assist Western efforts to protect the Middle East from Soviet influence, penetration, or attack. This discussion further argues that the United States only brought Pakistan into the Western strategic network when a series of events made it seem that Asia would be the next battleground for the Cold War and after it was clear that if containment were to be extended to South Asia, Pakistan was the only choice available. Pakistan's persistent and sophisticated courtship of the United States differed greatly from India's efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. And this discussion argues that the alliance was consistent with the broader policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that it stemmed not from American interests in South Asia but from Washington's global strategic efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States-Pakistan alliance was not the result of American attempts to "contain" or dominate India, of Anglo-American competition over the subcontinent and the Middle East, or of American efforts to establish economic hegemony over South Asia. Indeed, as the United States' fears for Middle Eastern security subsided, so did its commitment to the alliance with Pakistan.
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Wade Larson
Introduction
The 1954 United States-Pakistan alliance was a product of the Cold War. Pakistan received $1.8 billion in American military and economic aid between 1948 and 1966,\(^1\) entered four separate strategic arrangements with the United States between 1954 and 1959, and, dubbed America's "most allied ally," was Washington's bulwark against Communism in the subcontinent. Because Pakistan did occupy a moderately important place in American global policy, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance offers some unique angles for studying the United States' Cold War policies and their impact on the periphery of the global struggle. And yet the alliance was as important for how it was distinctive from, rather than representative of, other unequal relationships during the Cold War. For it is significant that Pakistan, situated in a region in which the United States had no economic interests, in which no American soldiers ever fought, and in which there were no indigenous communist threats, came to figure so prominently in American policy.

Although the historiography of American diplomatic activity among Southeast and East Asian nations is broad and rich, South Asia has been largely neglected. There is little historical scholarship on the United States' South Asian policies or on the place of South Asia within broader American policy and the Cold War generally.\(^2\) Pakistan has been particularly neglected in the historiography, despite its status during the 1950's as the U.S.'s "most allied ally", and during the 1980's as America's "frontline state".

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\(^1\) The exact figure was $1,844,100,000. Pakistan received more American aid than Greece ($1,061,000,000), Taiwan ($1,372,700,000), and Turkey ($1,741,000,000) during the same period. It did not, however, receive as much as Korea ($2,647,100,000) or Vietnam ($2,668,900,000).

This shortage of scholarship on U.S.-Pakistan relations has resulted in the extension to South Asia of explanations and accounts of the Cold War derived from elsewhere. Most do not fit. This is because the region so rarely figured at all in the construction of those larger explanations, because it was governed by a different set of events and priorities, and because South Asian geopolitics shifted and changed so frequently. Fortunately, much of the previously unavailable documentary evidence has been declassified during the past two decades. The new evidence makes the task of reconstructing American motivations much simpler, while also making it easier to avoid the highly divisive postures which characterized the historiography in the past.

Of the several frameworks have been advanced to explain the origins of the American-Pakistani alliance of the 1950's, the first argues that the alliance was principally an American attempt to contain and dominate India and was only secondarily concerned with the Soviet Union. This argument neglects to mention that the United States would have preferred an alliance with India and turned to Pakistan only when India refused the United States' overtures. Moreover, the argument neglects the wealth of material which shows that many of those responsible for the formation of the United States' South Asian policies agonized over the question of how to respond to Pakistani courting without upsetting the regional balance, rebuffing Pakistan, or alienating India. And finally, depicting the U.S.-Pakistan alliance as an effort to dominate India greatly exaggerates the

See, for example, Beldev Raj Nayar's *American Geopolitics and India* New Delhi: Manohar, 1976. Nayar argues that the US-Pakistan relationship was primarily established vis-a-vis India. While the United States never decided to "contain" India, this necessary consequence "flowed from the very logic of the encounter between a global power and a middle power". He suggests that the United States' goals in South Asia, both of them directed against India, were to frustrate India's efforts to establish itself as an "independent centre of power" and to maintain a regional balance to ensure American "access" to resources and markets (pp. 32,67). Kilaru Ram Chandra Rao, in *India, United States and Pakistan: A Triangular Relationship*, Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 1985, argues--representative of much of Indian opinion—that US military aid to Pakistan was never enough to allow Pakistan to defend itself against either the Soviet Union or China. Consequently, American military support for Pakistan only served to undermine American economic aid to India and whatever economic development India would otherwise have been capable of achieving (p. 238).
interest the United States had in South Asia. American aspirations were global and American policy makers were principally concerned with fighting the Cold War; India and South Asia did not, on their own, figure prominently in American interests.

A second framework locates the U.S.-Pakistan alliance in Anglo-American competition for strategic hegemony over the Middle East and South Asia. According to one proponent of this view, the United States and Britain did not forge a common Middle Eastern and South Asian strategy out of a shared commitment to containing Chinese and Soviet Communism. Rather, the "US-inspired Baghdad Pact" was an attempt on the part of the United States to "undercut [its] principal ally": "[n]o amount of equivocation can obfuscate the reality of Anglo-American rivalry when it came to defining the West's relations with the post-colonial world."4

The argument may be guilty of reading backwards from the Suez Crisis of 1956. More importantly, it fails to explain why the United States waited until 1954 to form strategic links in the region and why Britain joined the Baghdad Pact (which the U.S. did not join) if it was really nothing more than an American ploy to secure hegemony. While the author concedes that the United States had no interests in South Asia until the Korean War, she fails to identify which events in the early fifties so changed the nature of the Anglo-American "special relationship" as to encourage the United States to secure its own position at the expense of that of its closest ally. It would make more sense to argue that the United States' interest in

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4 Ayesha Jalal, “Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955.” The International History Review, XI, 3, August 1989, pp. 409-433. A less strident expression of this thesis is advanced in Anita Inder Singh's The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993. Singh's emphasis on the ways in which the US-Pakistan alliance ("unintendedly", p. 156) undercut Britain's dominance in South Asia leads her, in my view, to exaggerate the extent to which the British were surprised by the accord. She neglects to mention anywhere in her narrative a number of meetings between British and American strategists in 1950-1952 in which the role of Pakistan in the defence of the Middle East was discussed at length (See below.). Moreover, in a glaring omission, she mentions the Baghdad Pact (of which Britain and Pakistan were both signatories) only once in the entire book, and that only in passing.
a military relationship with Pakistan did indeed have "roots" in the Middle East in the early 1950's, as she argues, but that that interest was the product both of larger events in the Cold War (the fall of China, NSC-68, and the Korean War) and concern about the United Kingdom's ability to maintain stability in a region in which it was no longer welcome.

A third framework locates the American-Pakistani alliance in the United States' efforts to establish global economic hegemony. Though perhaps a compelling and coherent framework for interpreting some of U.S.-Third World relations, the economic argument has not been successful when applied to South Asia. Different versions of the argument have been advanced by Gabriel Kolko and Thomas McCormick. Kolko's contention that the "economic component remains the single most important," if "far from sufficient", explanation for American conduct in the Third World leads him to argue that the United States and Britain competed for Pakistan out of a general competition for Third World resources and markets. Thus, he argues that Britain unilaterally instigated the Baghdad Pact, an action that "extremely irritated" John Foster Dulles, was calculated to bolster British interests in the region, and which the United States "adamantly refused" to do anything more than observe. In fact, it was the United States which led the way on the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, often in spite of London's expressed concerns. And, on the whole, there was

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5 Jalal, p. 420.
7 Selig Harrison's argument that the strategic importance of Pakistan to Western powers was inspired by Sir Olaf Caroe is, as Syed Adil Husain notes, "misleading." In highlighting the intellectual framework Caroe supplied for a Pakistani alliance as well as his use of words that probably anticipated and influenced the phrases "Baghdad Pact" and "Northern Tier", Harrison overstates Caroe's importance to the process (see Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961.). (Husain, "Politics of Alliance and Aid: A Case Study of Pakistan, 1954-1966." Horizon, Nos. 1 and 2, 1979, p. 17.) Voices urging the inclusion of Pakistan within the western strategic aegis emerged from many different sources, some quite early on. See Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South-Western Asia, a Regional and Global Study. London: MacMillan and Co., 1951, pp.186-192.
considerably more cooperation between the United States and Britain over Pakistan's place in the Middle East than Kolko's argument allows. One of the United States' principal objectives was to bolster Britain's economy, and hence, its economic links with its colonies and former colonies. Furthermore, until 1952 Washington insisted that South Asia and the Middle East be areas of British control and responsibility. While the United States undoubtedly had economic aims in the Middle East, those aims did not reflect economic competition with Britain. And Anglo-American economic competition does not explain the American interest in Pakistan.

The other version of the economic argument holds that the fundamental aim of American foreign policy was to "integrate" regions like South Asia into the United States' economic net. American foreign policy was simply a continuation of capitalism's five-hundred-year effort to sustain and expand itself. Thomas McCormick argues that the Baghdad Pact and SEATO were part of the larger American attempt to establish a global economic system in which the underdeveloped "periphery" would serve the developed "core." While an interesting argument, it is highly problematic with respect to South Asia. The United States extended military assistance to South Asian states out of a strategic effort to contain Communism. Moreover, American economic and technical aid was not calculated to make Pakistan an economic partner, dependent or otherwise, of the United States. Like aid to non-aligned India, American non-military aid to Pakistan was given to in order to promote economic stability and alleviate hardship, not to ensure that Pakistan would produce the goods that

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Americans or Britons needed. As numerous intelligence estimates made clear, the United States depended on the subcontinent for virtually no economically or strategically important goods.\(^{10}\)

A fourth framework would extend to South Asia a model used to explain the United States’ rapid expansion in Europe following the Second World War. Geir Lundestad argues that the United States created an empire greater in size and scope than that created by the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1952, but that the American empire was “invited” and “welcomed” by the majority of Europeans and their governments.\(^{11}\) There is some basis for extending the model to U.S.-Pakistan relations: Pakistan persistently and patiently courted the United States from 1947 until 1954. Nevertheless, the notion of “empire by invitation” has limited applicability in South Asia.\(^{12}\) Clearly, Pakistan’s goals and ambitions vis-a-vis India shaped all of its foreign policy, and its rapid move toward China in the early 1960’s demonstrates that its ideological commitment to the West would always be outweighed by its security needs. The similarities between Pakistan and Britain or between the Baghdad Pact and NATO are limited.

As these explanatory frameworks are problematic when applied to South Asia, much of what I consider the most significant scholarship is suggestive

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\(^{12}\) To be fair, Lundestad does not extend the concept to South Asia and I am not aware of anyone else who does either. In saying that the notion of empire by invitation has limited applicability to South Asia does not in anyway diminish its explanatory power with respect to Europe anymore than denying the applicability of economic frameworks to South Asia diminish their explanatory power with respect to Central America.
of a loose "post-revisionist" framework. The following are among the most important and contentious questions: Why did the United States get involved in South Asia? When was that decision made? Was the American decision to align itself with Pakistan for most of the Cold War era an effective and prudent way to pursue its goals and interests? How significant was the subcontinent in the American Cold War effort? How much did American involvement influence the course of events in the subcontinent? And what similarities and differences were there between the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of the 1950's and their relationship of the 1980's?

The first of two approaches to these questions argues retrospectively that the American decision to ally with Pakistan was a grave and costly mistake. Critical of American policy and activity in the subcontinent, authors who take this approach argue that the United States should have maintained a "scrupulous detachment" from the Indian-Pakistani rivalry. They argue that Dulles' inclusion of Pakistan in containment was doomed from the beginning, resulting in the alienation of both India and Pakistan. And they highlight the injustices to which different administrations subjected South Asian peoples, the ways in which American policy was self-defeating, and the failure of American policy makers to understand and woo India. In my view, this approach often exaggerates the

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13 That is to say, it fits neither Traditionalist nor Revisionist characterizations of the United States' Cold War activities. Traditionalists and Realists argued that the U.S. acted appropriately and defensively in resisting Soviet aggression, that Washington fostered democracy, free enterprise, and peace, and that American leaders supported and encouraged Asian nationalism. Starting in the 1960's, Revisionists argued that it was the United States which extended the Cold War to Asia. The United States, they argued, suppressed Asian nationalism, antagonized the Soviet Union, and sought to establish global economic hegemony. Post-revisionists, who began writing in the 1970's, have borrowed elements of each paradigm. They have not been as concerned with assigning blame to either the Soviet Union or the United States. They are more likely to emphasize the ideological nature of the Cold War. And while they concede that Washington had economic objectives in Asia, they believe that its political and strategic objectives preceded its economic goals.

14 Some of the most prominent historians who take this tack are Selig Harrison, Stanley Wolpert, M.S. Venkataramani, Beldev Raj Nayar, Norman Palmer, and Kilaru Ram Chandra Rao. See Bibliography.

15 Selig Harrison. "Fanning the Flames in South Asia". *Foreign Policy*, 45 Winter 81-82, pg. 95.
negative results of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance and attributes to the United States more options and more influence than it had, thus relegating the local actors to only supporting roles.

A second approach differs not so much in terms of conclusions as in tone and emphasis; there are, after all, very few who applaud the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of the 1950's. But this approach is more likely to highlight the ways in which both Pakistan and the United States (and India, too, despite its vocal protestations) recognized the realistic limits within which any American support for Pakistan operated. Authors in this camp argue that American policy was generally calculated to assuage all of the regional egos and that the United States, despite rhetoric and appearances, carefully sustained relationships with as many players as possible. While not prone to whitewash American policy or its effects in South Asia, this group of scholars is generally less pessimistic about both.

The most useful explanatory accounts of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance emphasize the ideological origins of the United States' global effort to resist Communism through a series of American-led strategic alliances. Moreover, they resist the tendency among scholars to exaggerate the options American policy makers had. And finally, they do not ignore or downplay the importance of regional actors in the determination of American policy. The inclination to discuss U.S.-South Asian relations without reference to the actions or beliefs of South Asians is motivated in large part by a desire to attribute to the United States as much blame as possible. But it is not to absolve the United States of responsibility to acknowledge that Washington's choices were severely limited by the things done and said in Karachi and Delhi. Indeed, it is more accurate to characterize American policy as a response to the actions and pressures of the independent regional actors; India and Pakistan did as much to shape American South Asian

16 Some of the more prominent authors in this vein are Robert J. McMahon, Gary Hess, H.W. Brands, Syed Adil Husain, Leo Rose and perhaps Dennis Merrill. See Bibliography.
policy as the United States did.

These are the considerations that informed my attempt to reconstruct the interests which propelled the United States-Pakistan alliance and the broader regional and global contexts in which it was formed. I shall argue that the alliance emerged because American strategic concerns for the Middle East, arising in the aftermath of the Korean War and based upon a recognition of Britain's declining ability to defend the region, coincided with Pakistan's strategic needs as a newly-independent nation. The United States believed that Pakistan--a moderate Islamic nation, situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East, and ideologically inclined toward the West--could assist Western efforts to protect the Middle East from Soviet influence, penetration, or attack. I shall argue that Pakistan was only brought into the Western strategic network when a series of events made it seem that Asia would be the next battleground for the Cold War and after it was clear that if containment were to be extended to South Asia, Pakistan was the only choice available. Pakistan's persistent and sophisticated courtship of the United States differed greatly from India's efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. And I shall argue that the alliance was consistent with the broader policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that it stemmed not from American interests in South Asia but from Washington's global strategic efforts to contain the Soviet Union. This means that the United States-Pakistan alliance was not the result of American attempts to "contain" or dominate India, of Anglo-American competition over the subcontinent and the Middle East, or of American efforts to establish economic hegemony over South Asia. Indeed, as the United States' fears for Middle Eastern security subsided, so did its commitment to the alliance with Pakistan.

American policy toward Pakistan emerged primarily out of strategic considerations during the heightened ideological Cold War climate of the late
forties and early fifties, in response to the actions of India and Pakistan, and as a consequence of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' fears for the security of the Middle East. It emerged in three steps: During the first, from mid-1947 to 1950, the United States followed the British lead and remained neutral in the Indian-Pakistani rivalry, though some officials were beginning to view Pakistani courtship favourably. During the second, from 1951 to 1953, the Truman administration assumed responsibility for defense of the region from Britain and began leaning toward Pakistan. And during the third, following the Eisenhower election, the United States brought Pakistan firmly within the embrace of containment while attempting to minimize the negative effects of the alliance on American-Indian relations.
Chapter One

U.S.-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1950

Since 1947 the central feature of South Asia's geopolitical landscape has been enmity between India and Pakistan. They have waged three separate wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971. The first two were fought over the disputed territory of Kashmir and the third began as a civil war between West Pakistan and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), with India intervening on the side of the East. Each nation has joined the nuclear age out of competition with the other: India acquired nuclear capability in the 1970's; Pakistan did a decade later. They have extended their enmity to international organizations: Pakistan to the Islamic world, India to the Non-aligned Movement, and both to the United Nations. And both nations have succeeded in gaining the assistance of the world's most powerful states. India had, starting in the 1950's, a longstanding economic and military "friendship" with the Soviet Union. And Pakistan has had strong diplomatic and strategic ties with China, and two separate periods of military cooperation with the United States, from 1954 to the mid-sixties and from 1979 to the mid-eighties.

In 1947, at the time of decolonization, the United States had virtually no economic or security interests in South Asia. But by 1954 it had come to view the region as an area of vital strategic importance in the global struggle against Communism, had signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan, and had replaced Britain as the dominant foreign power in the region. Thus, in the course of only seven years the United States came to sign a military pact with a people with which it had no historical ties and no shared interests, taking responsibility for the security of a region it had previously regarded as a sphere of British influence.¹ A consideration of the events and developments which precipitated this shift in American South Asian policy should augment our

¹ Anita Inder Singh, p. 111.
understanding of changes during the late forties and early fifties in America's posture in the Cold War.

South Asia was only important to American strategic interests as part of the larger effort to contain Communism; the region was of "peripheral and derivative interest" to the United States.² The region was not significant for its resources, markets, trade, or as a destination for American investment. Quite simply, were it not for the policy of containment, the subcontinent would have been unimportant to the United States. And Pakistan's importance within containment reasoning stemmed principally from its location; it bordered the Soviet Union, China, the Indian Ocean, and the eastern flank of Middle East, with which it shared strong religious and cultural ties. It was Pakistan's potential as a strategic shield to the Persian Gulf and as a base of operations against the Soviet Union which attracted American strategists.

While events elsewhere in Asia initially made South Asia seem strategically unimportant by comparison, those same events would quickly make the region appear increasingly important. Colonialism was being challenged by revolutionary forces in French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia and British Malaya. At the same time, social and political revolution threatened stability in the independent nations of the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma. And in China the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek seemed imminent.³

South Asia had indigenous forms of Communism. There was an active Communist Party of India which, while not a serious threat, made even Jawaharlal Nehru wary. The CPI successfully orchestrated a number of labour strikes and anti-government marches in the months after India gained independence.


prompting Nehru, in early 1948, to outlaw it, imprison its leadership, and seize its presses. Nehru was convinced that the Soviet Union was sponsoring and supplying the CPI, a conviction strengthened by the depth and severity of Soviet criticisms of Indian efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. Nehru's actions prompted Soviet officials, in meeting with India's ambassador to Moscow (who happened to be Nehru's sister), to demand angrily that India openly declare the side to which it felt primary allegiance. And Indian requests for American economic assistance in 1948, ultimately rejected, were carefully crafted to express concerns over Soviet support for the CPI.4 It seemed that the Soviets, or at least Communism, was making inroads in Asia.

Despite these developments and despite a tendency to see Communism and Soviet influence behind turmoil of all kinds, the Truman administration was determined, at least through the forties, to stay out of South Asian affairs. Its priorities and objectives in the subcontinent were simple: the establishment and maintenance of independent, stable and peaceful states, friendly toward the West and capable of withstanding Communist threats, whether internal or external. The United States would work to develop long-term peace, stability and economic growth in the region, and would endeavor to maintain friendly relations with all states.5 These policies were advanced in numerous reports by the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, with more agreement than was commonly the case. And while some reports did note the potential strategic importance of the region, the United States' interests were primarily in Europe and East Asia and it was to those regions that most of its resources and policies were oriented. Consequently, "every major American policy formulation" emphasized the importance of following London's lead in South Asia, which

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Washington recognized to be a sphere of British influence. American priorities were elsewhere and Washington’s interest in South Asia was minimal.

It was not that Pakistan’s leaders failed to declare their allegiances; they were desperate for an American alliance. Indeed, there may well have been no fully independent Third World nation throughout the Cold War era that was as unequivocal in its support for the United States and as persistent in its requests for American aid and an American alliance as Pakistan was in the late forties and early fifties. In May 1947, some months before it even became a nation, Pakistan’s founder and soon to be first President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, arranged a meeting with two of the most senior American diplomats in the subcontinent in order to impress upon them Pakistan’s Western orientation. Pakistan, he argued, would promote American interests as an Islamic nation committed to facing the dual threats of “Russian aggression” and “Hindu imperialism.” And to those ends Pakistan would naturally look to the United States for assistance. Less than three weeks after the birth of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Pakistan’s finance minister relayed a message to Secretary of State Marshall through the American Charge d’Affaires in Karachi that Pakistan stood ready, with 95,000 men, to resist Soviet moves into the subcontinent. Muslim Pakistan, he maintained, “had little in common with Russian ideology.”

And while Pakistan’s leaders worked to establish friendly relations with the United States they were cool toward the Soviet Union. They viewed with suspicion Nehru’s appointment of his sister as India’s ambassador to Moscow. They felt offended by the slowness by which the Soviet Union recognized Pakistan as a

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6 Ibid., p. 815.
nation. And they were particularly troubled by Moscow's pro-India response to the dispute over Kashmir. While all the western members of the Security Council sought to resolve the dispute fairly, the Soviet Union remained neutral, signalling its contentment with the status quo; the status quo favored India.9 While it is certainly true that Pakistan's fear of India has shaped all of its foreign policy, including its relations with Moscow, it would be unfair to reduce its foreign policy to such. The Pakistani view of the Soviet Union did contain an ideological element which, informed by Islam, abhorred Communist atheism and was suspicious of Moscow's ambitions toward its southern neighbors.

Pakistan's orientation toward the West stemmed from a variety of complex sources and was always more than simply the result of a cold appraisal of its strategic interests. A Pakistani scholar highlights the following reasons for his nation's Western orientation in the 1940's. The vast majority of Pakistan's political, military and business elite were educated in the West and were sympathetic to Western culture. Pakistan's economy, due to the legacy of colonialism, was integrated with the West. Pakistan's leaders expected the United States and Britain, the dominant powers in the United Nations, to adjudicate fairly Pakistan's territorial disputes with India, the most important of which was Kashmir. Pakistanis recognized that the United States was by far the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world following the Second World War. And finally, Pakistan was fearful of Soviet intentions in the subcontinent and was offended by what it perceived to be Soviet coolness toward an Islamic and recently-decolonized nation.10

In October, when the new nation was just two months old, the Government of Pakistan issued to the U.S. State Department a formal request for military and

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economic assistance. Pakistan requested a loan for the audacious sum of two billion dollars. Not only did the memorandum reiterate Pakistan's and the subcontinent's vulnerability to Soviet attack, but it implicitly took issue with Washington's policy of following London in South Asian affairs by arguing that Pakistan viewed the United States, not Britain, as its best hope for military and economic assistance:¹¹

...It has been broadly assessed that to enable Pakistan to hold a proper place in the community of nations and to allow her to make a fair contribution to the stability of world peace, the Government of Pakistan would need a loan of approximately two billion dollars from the U.S.A. Government spread over a period of about five years. The country would also need the assistance of the large American oil interests to develop and exploit its immense oil resources. She would require help of the experienced technical experts for establishment and development of certain specified industries and would need also a certain amount of preferential treatment in earlier supplies of capital goods. For the purposes of defence, she would need American supplies of armaments, ammunition, naval and air crafts and facilities to train its personnel in their use...

In its external and defence policy..., the proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia, is the most dominant factor... If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility. If Pakistan is to become strong enough to defend itself, even with the generous assistance of and close collaboration with Great Britain and the United States of America, it will first need to be economically developed and extensively improved, the existing air and military bases modernized and expanded, and new ones established, the production of essential arms and ammunitions enlarged... With advancement of education, improved health conditions and a little better standard of life, and their traditional sense of pride and self-defence revived and stimulated, it is certain that the inhabitants of Pakistan will rise up to any occasion when the occasion does come. What is needed is finance, and more than that, a regular source of finance.¹²

The request was forwarded by Mir Laik Ali, Jinnah's special emissary to

¹¹ Venkataramani notes that Pakistan's leaders believed that their standing with Britain diminished significantly with Labour's post-war election victory. "The Labour Party," wrote Ghulam Mohammed, "has a background of attitudes not altogether favourable to Pakistan...Many of them were close personal friends of the Congress and were influenced...by Congress propaganda [to believe]...that the idea to partition India was retrograde." Qtd. in M.S. Venkataramani, pp. 10-11.

Washington, appointed specifically to request and negotiate American assistance. Ali broke down the $2 billion figure into $700 million for industrial development, $700 million for agricultural development, and $510 million for defence.\textsuperscript{13}

The Pakistani request for American assistance, while clearly overly optimistic and ambitious, combined persistence with sophistication. An extraordinarily persistent man who had difficulty taking no for an answer, Ali made the somewhat unusual move in 1947 of hiring the Chase National Bank to represent and lobby for Pakistani interests with the State Department. And at the end of the meeting during which Ali was informed of the American decision not to loan Pakistan the two billion dollars, he surprized the Americans by requesting $45 million to buy blankets for Pakistan’s 3 million refugees. He noted that he had already learned that the blankets could be purchased through commercial means, and he suggested that the United States might view the immediate loan of $45 million as a “an advance against the larger loan”--which had already been refused.\textsuperscript{14} The United States eventually reluctantly agreed to loan Pakistan $10 million dollars, which the Pakistanis insisted be viewed as a down payment on the $45 million dollar loan--which had also already been refused. They were persistent.

The Truman administration tried to diffuse Pakistani attempts to seek American assistance. American officials attempted to channel any future requests to sources other than the State Department, particularly the American Export-Import Bank, private investment sources and the International Bank. They noted that “the United States will give sympathetic consideration to a request from Pakistan for an emergency loan of reasonable proportions.”\textsuperscript{15} But Pakistani requests for aid and military assistance continued, pushing State Department

\textsuperscript{13} Venkataramani, pp. 16-20.
\textsuperscript{14} Qtd. in \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{15} Letter by State Dept. officials to Pakistan, October 1947, in Arif, ed., p. 6.
officials to what one scholar calls the "point of exasperation", until finally they unambiguously informed Pakistan's ambassador that the Department would not be recommending Congressional approval of aid to Pakistan "at this time", urging Pakistan again to consider other sources of funding. And in March, 1948, during heightened tensions in Kashmir, Truman approved Secretary of State Marshall's recommendation of an "informal" embargo on the sale of military equipment to Pakistan and India. The United States, wrote Marshall, "has emphasized that the dispute between the parties should be settled by pacific means."

While the first round of Pakistan's courtship of the United States did not produce the desired results, it was by no means, as has been argued, a "total fiasco." In May, only two months after imposing its informal embargo on military assistance to the nations of South Asia, the United States "after considerable deliberation" approved a Pakistani request for 30 military training planes and spare parts for its tanks. (American officials did, however, refuse a British request for the United States to transfer to Pakistan over 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition from Britain's lend-lease stores.) Even more importantly, the tide of official American opinion was beginning to change, albeit far from the public eye. Some key officials, particularly in the military and intelligence branches, were beginning to reconsider the United States' policies in South Asia. The American military attache in Karachi, Nathaniel Hoskot, recommended in April, 1948, that the U.S. extend military assistance to the young nation in view of its "strategic worldwide importance." Hoskot argued that Pakistan's border with the Soviet Union and its

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16 Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 26.
17 Memorandum of Secretary of State Marshall to President Truman, March 11, 1948, in Arif, ed., p. 9.
18 This is what Venkataramani suggests, p. 28.
proximity to the Persian gulf made it particularly useful to Washington.\textsuperscript{20} A report on “Military Aid Priorities” in August included Pakistan in a list alongside Iran, Saudi Arabia and India, of countries that “based on their capacities for self-help and...strategic location, should be extended...assistance...to resist Soviet aggression.”\textsuperscript{21} And another report noted that the American refusal to offer military assistance to nations which wanted it, specifically India and Pakistan, threatened to drive these countries to the Soviet Union for such materials, on top of creating “ill will” toward the United States. It noted that “recent reports” suggested that these countries, including Pakistan, were already “considering accepting” Czechoslovakian military assistance.\textsuperscript{22} American neutrality could produce the very outcome it was calculated to avoid.

Even more significant was an assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March, 1949, of American strategic interests in South Asia. The JCS concluded that only Pakistan, of all the South Asian states, was “from a military point of view” of “value” to the United States. The “Karachi-Lahore” area, it noted, might become strategically important and “might be required as a base for air operations against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.” This appears to be the beginning of a tendency to view Pakistan as part of the Middle East, a tendency that would increase through the next several years and make Pakistan much more valuable to American strategic interests in the process. The JCS outlined the following “strategic objectives” in South Asia:

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
\item a. Prevent Soviet encroachment or domination;
\item b. Prevent the USSR from obtaining military support or assistance from
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{20} Nathaniel R. Hoskot to Department of the Army, April 24, 1948, Qtd. in McMahon, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia", p. 818.
\textsuperscript{21} "Military Aid Priorities", Report by the SANACC Subcommittee on Rearmament, August 18, 1948, in \textit{Ibid}, p. 12.
these nations either directly or through the use of their facilities; c. Develop, without commitment to military action on our part, a cooperative attitude in these countries which would facilitate obtaining the use of areas or facilities which might be required by the Western democracies for military operations against the USSR in the event of war; and d. With reference to Pakistan, endeavor to make commercial arrangements which would, in emergency, facilitate development for operational use of base facilities in the Karachi-Lahore area.  

But while some officials were increasingly inclined to view Pakistan as a potential strategic asset, the Truman administration did not, by 1949 at least, make any moves toward giving Pakistan military assistance. This was because Washington continued to follow London's lead in South Asia, which meant favouring neither Pakistan nor India, and it continued to view the subcontinent as having limited importance in American global strategy. And when American officials did contemplate acquiring an ally in the region they generally favoured India, not Pakistan. India's size and location made it a much bigger prize and a much more effective bulwark against Asian Communism than Pakistan. And India would serve as a much better counterweight to Communist China than the much smaller Pakistan.  

But it was India, and Nehru in particular, who removed that option, prompting a British official sometime later to characterize aptly American attitudes toward India as those of a "rejected suitor." Nehru's foreign policy simply precluded an American alliance, as he noted:  

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.  

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23 Memorandum of Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 24, 1949, in Arif, ed., p. 15.  
25 Qtd. in Ibid., p. 820.  
And speaking at the Asian Relations Conference in March, 1947, he made it clear that, given its recent past, neither India nor Asia could take sides in the Cold War:

The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs....We propose to stand on our own legs....We do not intend to be the playthings of others.27

The most basic disagreement between the Indian and American governments concerned the causes of Asian Communism and nature of the threat its various forms posed. Washington interpreted events in Asia as being directed from Moscow, and held that questions of independence should be secondary to the exigencies of the Cold War.28 Framing India’s foreign policy in terms of “Asianism” or “Regionalism”, Nehru, on the other hand, believed that the colonial legacy and the West’s economic dominance were the chief causes of unrest in Asia. He felt that Asian Communism was at root Asian nationalism. Consequently, European colonialism was far more dangerous than Asian Communism to the stability and security of Asian peoples. He accurately predicted that any Communist government which emerged in China would not be subservient to Moscow, but would be highly nationalistic.29 The American policy of limited engagement in most of Asia following the war, a result of the priority Washington placed on Europe, appeared to Nehru and other Asian nationalists to demonstrate either disinterest in their independence struggles or outright support for European colonialism.

The Pakistani view of relations between Asia and the West differed markedly from the Indian. Since “Pakistan was founded on the basis of the vital difference between groups of Asians”, it “was less tempted than certain other countries by the

27 Ibid.
28 Merrill, “Indo-American Relations”, pp. 210-211.
29 Ibid.
concept of Asian (or non-White) solidarity.\textsuperscript{30} Pakistan's leaders had little sympathy for Nehru's efforts to construct a collective Asian response to western hegemony. They viewed with suspicion his proclamations concerning the threat of colonialism to Asian peoples, for clearly, colonialism was waning in Asia. The chief threat Pakistan faced was from its very large and potentially belligerent neighbor, India. This meant that Pakistanis would never share Nehru's view that Europeans posed the greatest threat to the stability and security of Asian peoples. Nor would they share Nehru's view that Asia should collectively remain neutral in the Cold War. The world was dividing into two blocs, said Pakistan's Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1949: there were those who favored and those who opposed Communism. The Muslim world, from "Cairo to Karachi", fit into the latter camp.\textsuperscript{31} As Pakistan's Foreign Minister remarked in 1954, "To me neutralism seems suspiciously like 'fencemanship'--the art of sitting on the fence between two worlds hoping that each will help for fear of losing the sitter to the other. History has witnessed the swift and tragic end of such feats of balancing when they are put to the test."\textsuperscript{32} Thus, Pakistan's interests vis-a-vis India made imperative the formation of an alliance with a nation stronger than India. The fact that the most powerful nation available for such an alliance was Western was unimportant.

But given India's recent colonial experience with a Western power, Nehru was sensitive to anything which even remotely resembled colonialism. He openly criticized American actions in East Asia some time before the U.S. came looking for allies in his own region. In late 1948 and early 1949 the United States and India clashed publicly over Dutch actions in Indonesia. Breaking a United Nations sponsored peace, Dutch forces crossed the cease-fire line and arrested much of the Indonesian Republican Army's leadership. Many Asian nationalists were

\textsuperscript{31} Qtd. in Burke, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{32} Qtd. in Callard, p. 321.
outraged, but Nehru was the most vocal. Not content to limit his criticisms to the Netherlands, whom he accused of attempting to "revive a dying imperialism and colonialism" and using "armed force to suppress a people and [its] government," Nehru implicated the United States in the Dutch action. He accused Washington of standing by with "tacit approval and acceptance of this aggression." As one scholar notes, American officials were "taken aback by Nehru's confrontational stance," for not only had the United States been quietly attempting to broker a peace, but Indonesia was one instance where the U.S. was genuinely attempting to end colonialism. They were mystified by Nehru's "'animosity'" toward them.

Nehru was capable of rhetorical moderation toward the United States, as he demonstrated at the New Delhi Conference in January 1949. He did not pursue sanctions against the Netherlands, publicly criticize the United States or propose the creation of an Asian bloc. And the Conference proclaimed itself committed to the UN and the Security Council negotiations. The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was pleased that the Conference avoided "precipitous action such as [the] establishment [of an] anti-Western bloc." Events in 1949 were forcing the Truman administration to focus increasingly on Asia and this implied forming closer ties with India, the world's largest democracy. The United States would need a counterbalance to China. As Senator Hubert Humphrey noted, American policy in Asia "is so messed up right now that we simply have to look for a new start...[F]rom every point of view--economically, politically, and for purposes of defense--India is the logical choice."

Expectations were high, therefore, for Nehru's visit to the United States in October 1949. He was invited to speak to a joint session of Congress, to meet

33 Qtd. in Merrill, "Indo-American Relations," p. 212.
34 Ibid.
35 Qtd. in Ibid., pp. 212-213.
36 Qtd. in Ibid., p. 215.
numerous key officials in the administration, including Truman and Acheson, and
to take a tour of the nation, meeting business leaders and ordinary citizens. It
would provide both sides with opportunities to make clear their policies and to set
their relations on a more friendly course.

But the visit was a disaster and was full of gaffes and disagreements. The
Americans found Nehru to be "formal and aloof,"\textsuperscript{37} and "like a student who had not
done his homework," and Acheson was later to write that the Indian leader, for all
his importance to American objectives and to India's survival, was "one of the most
difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal."\textsuperscript{38} Nehru had believed Americans
to be uncultured and boorish, and found nothing in his trip to convince him
otherwise. A CIA informant close to the Prime Minister reported that Nehru thought
Truman to be a "mediocre man" placed in circumstances "far superior to his
capacities," Acheson "equally mediocre," and other officials "uncertain, confused,
superficial...pretentious and arrogant." Moreover, he found the American people to
be "elementary and material," without "cultural drives," and desiring only to "eat
and drink and to live comfortably." But most importantly, Nehru openly called into
question the entire American foreign policy project of resisting the Soviets with
force. Since the United States could not match the Soviets' "name-calling,
deprecation and verbal belligerency," it shouldn't try. The U.S. should rather let the
Soviet Union dig its own grave, cooperate with Moscow at every turn, and forfeit to
the Soviets the fruits of belligerence and rejection.\textsuperscript{39}

The visit probably played a role in the administration's decision not to give
India aid. Just one week after Nehru's departure, the State Department informed
its ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, that it was declining his requested five-

\textsuperscript{37} Qtd. in \textit{ibid.}, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{38} Dean Acheson, \textit{Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department}, New York: Norton and
\textsuperscript{39} Qtd. in Brands, \textit{The Cold Peace}, pp. 50-51.
year, $500 million assistance program to India.40

But too much can be made out of Nehru's trip. Ultimately, the differences that emerged between the United States and India were the consequence of competing ideological visions and cannot be simply reduced to the accumulation of diplomatic blunders and missteps. There is an inclination among American scholars who are critical of Washington's South Asian policies to argue that the United States bore sole responsibility for the geopolitical shape South Asia took in the Cold War and that Nehru's eventual orientation toward Moscow was entirely Washington's doing. And while they will sometimes concede that Nehru said very confrontational and contradictory things, they often suggest that it was just a case of his bark being worse than his bite. They suggest patronizingly that American policy makers should have realized that his rhetoric was more radical than his actions41 or that Nehru spoke extemporaneously.42

Not only did Nehru often talk as if there were no differences between the United States and Soviet Union, but he was instinctively anti-American. "Despite great admiration for many US accomplishments and appreciation of the value of the US as a friend," a CIA report noted, "a strong suspicion exists in India that the US possesses the rapacious tendencies attributed to the British, and that in its foreign policy the US merely substitutes economic imperialism for the political imperialism practiced by the British."43 The American ambassador Loy Henderson was later to recall that "Nehru had developed a dislike bordering on contempt for American institutions, the American way of life, and Americans in general." "In my opinion," he said, "[Nehru] feared the spread of Americanism much more than he

40 Merrill, "Indo-American Relations," p. 222.
41 Ibid., p. 212.
did that of Communism."\textsuperscript{44} And Americans, for their part, were frustrated by Nehru's inability to recognize that the Cold War was about values and morals, and not just power. He was naive about the nature of Soviet Communism.\textsuperscript{45}

Furthermore, it is simplistic to blame the rifts in American-Indian relations solely on Washington's inability to appreciate and tolerate Nehru's neutral position.\textsuperscript{46} For one thing, the Truman administration was much more inclined to appreciate and tolerate India's non-aligned stance, at least until the Korean war, than is often recognized. When John Foster Dulles, as delegate to the 1946 United Nations' General Assembly, announced to Indian reporters that "Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim government [of India]," prompting Indian outrage, Marshall informed Nehru that "we...have been favorably impressed by India's avowed intention to pursue an independent but cooperative [foreign] policy based on [the] U.N. Charter." And Truman, answering an overly anxious Ambassador Grady who expressed concern over India's criticism of the United States and Britain, noted that such "is to be expected and all we can do is try to live it down."\textsuperscript{47}

Moreover, Nehru may not have been as pacifistic and neutral as he professed himself to be. First, there were inconsistencies between Nehru's advice to others and the policies of his own government. For while he regarded American policy as belligerent and militaristic and said India's government sought to follow Gandhian principles of non-violence, he noted that non-violent principles did not apply to the Indian government's actions in Hyderabad and Kashmir. He "nimbly" quoted Gandhi as saying that "people should 'resist aggression to the point of

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{46} Selig Harrison and many Indian scholars take this view.
\textsuperscript{47} Qtd. in Merrill, "Indo-American Relations," p. 207.
death."

By 1950 Pakistan's predictions about India's hegemonic aims in the region were being confirmed. In addition to seeking leadership of a neutral bloc of Middle Eastern and South Asian states, Nehru had gained control of Bhutan's foreign policy and Sikkim's foreign and defence policies, had signed a defence treaty with Nepal, and had aroused Tibetan fears of annexation by India (though Nehru eventually "decided to sacrifice the future of Tibet in the hope of winning Chinese friendship.")

Second, American officials might be forgiven for believing that Nehru's public condemnations of the United States for not forcefully restraining the Dutch in Indonesia, and his refusal to offer any public comment whatsoever on the Soviet actions in Hungary, hardly amounted to a fair and balanced neutrality.

The ideological divide between Delhi and Washington was simply too great to allow for a U.S.-India alliance. South Asian scholars are often more attuned than their Western counterparts to the fundamental nature of the differences between the United States and India before the U.S. and Pakistan entered an alliance. They tend to see the United States-India relationship as "deeply troubled" before the 1954 alliance of Pakistan and the United States. Indians perceived American courting as an attempt to replace British colonialism with American economic hegemony. Consequently, the American-Pakistani accord was only the "final parting" rather than the cause of the rift between Washington and Delhi.

American policy toward South Asia "crystallized" in December of 1949, when the National Security Council completed Paper 48/1. The report noted

48 Burke, p. 122.
49 Jalal, p. 419.
50 Burke, pp. 105-106.
that in the event of global war South Asia would be important to either side. It argued that India and Pakistan were, besides Japan, "the only major Asian power centers remaining outside the Soviet orbit." "Should India and Pakistan fall to Communism, the United States and its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian mainland." But, the report also noted, given South Asia's instability and its "reluctance to align itself overtly with any 'bloc power,'" that it would be unwise for us to regard South Asia, more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of Communist control in Asia."54

NSC-48 also called for the establishment of a number of American military bases to contain Communism in Asia. The "first line of defense would be American bases in Japan and the Philippines. The "second line of defense" would be countries facing immediate internal or external Communist threats. And just one month after NSC-48 was completed, events in Southeast Asia made clear where that second line of defense was going to be; in January 1950 both China and the Soviet Union officially recognized Ho Chi Minh as leader of the Peoples Republic of Vietnam. This confirmed the Truman administration's belief that Moscow sought to extend its influence to the region, and it promptly recognized the French sponsored governments in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In March, Acheson recommended an emergency military aid program of $15 million to be sent to French Indochina. And soon thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that military assistance be provided to Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and French Indochina. Southeast Asia, the JCS concluded, had become the "vital segment in the line of containment of Communism stretching from Japan southward and around the Indian peninsula."55 If India did not want to join the United States, Washington would find more willing allies. The door was opening to

Pakistan.

Meanwhile, tensions in Pakistani-Soviet relations reinforced the good relations that were developing between Washington and Karachi. Nehru's invitation to Washington in May, 1949, had led the Kremlin, less than a month later, to invite Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's Prime Minister, to Moscow. The idea was that Nehru's October trip to Washington would coincide with Liaquat's visit to the Soviet Union. But though he initially accepted the invitation, Liaquat never went to Moscow. The result was two-fold: it alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union, which complained about the snub for years; and it "succeeded in shaking the United States out of a posture of comparative indifference towards Pakistan."56 In December, 1949, it was announced that Liaquat would visit Washington the following May.

But in 1950 American South Asian policy still sought to remain neutral in the rivalry between Pakistan and India:

Our policy is to remain impartial in all Pakistan-India disputes, and to emphasize to both countries our conviction that they must work together if the problems of the subcontinent are to be solved. With regard to the Kashmir dispute, we shall continue to lose no opportunity to impress upon both Governments the importance of an early and peaceful solution to this problem.57

Washington was still inclined to view South Asia as an area of British influence and responsibility:

Because of the heavy commitments of the US in other parts of the world, and because we believe that Pakistan is more likely to remain closely associated with us the other western democracies if it remains a member of the Commonwealth, we want Pakistan-UK close and friendly, and we therefore avoid any actions which might weaken these.58

58 Ibid., p. 1496.
And American planners still recognized that the threats posed by indigenous Communism and the Soviet Union to South Asia were minimal:

In the short term, the communal tensions and the numerous political and economic disputes between India and Pakistan constitute the greatest danger to the stability of South Asia. Communism does not immediately threaten the governments of South Asia. The USSR is not exerting in this region the direct pressure evident in Iran and Indochina.  

Nevertheless, there are hints in the State Department's documentary record of 1950 of the direction the United States' South Asian policy would take. Reports contrasted Indians' growing "dislike" and "resentment" of the United States with Pakistanis' "desire to associate themselves closely with the US in long-range defense planning." Even though the State Department's policy was to maintain "an impartial position between the several countries of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan," it acknowledged that India believed that the U.S. favoured "Pakistan in [the] Kashmir dispute and [was] using its influence behind the scenes to help Pakistan obtain Kashmir." And a letter by the ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, said that the State Department "may be somewhat shocked to learn [the] depth of resentment towards America and [the] width of [the] gap that divides" Indian and American opinion.

The differences in American "objectives" in India and Pakistan in 1950 were subtle, but they demonstrate that some differences were beginning to develop between Washington's policies toward India and Pakistan:

We desire in India the continuance in power of the present non-communist government and would like it to pursue, with wide popular support, a policy of friendship and cooperation with the United States and like-minded countries in opposing communism. In the Indian

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59 "Regional Policy Statement: South Asia", in Ibid., p. 246.
60 "Relations of the United States with India: The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State", in Ibid., p. 1461.
61 "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan", in Ibid., p. 1491.
62 "Regional Policy Statement: South Asia", in Ibid., p. 249.
63 "Relations of the United States with India: The Ambassador in India", in Ibid., pp. 1461-1462.
64 Ibid., p. 1463.
domestic sphere our fundamental objectives are political stability and economic progress, the latter based on increased food production and expanded industrial capacity which would contribute to a rise in the standard of living and improve India's ability to defend itself against attack....Our relations should be such that India would be amenable to voluntarily allowing us the use of its facilities in the event of war.65

Washington's objectives in Pakistan were more ambitious:

Our principal objective in our relations with Pakistan is the orientation of its government and people toward the US and other western democracies and away from the USSR. We desire further development as a politically and economically healthy state adhering to democratic principles. In the international sphere, we seek to encourage peaceful, cooperative relations between Pakistan and its neighbors, and the informed and voluntary association of the Government of Pakistan with our international objectives.66

Moreover, the documentary record of 1950 contains the beginnings of the kind of strategic thinking that would later drive the United States' policy toward Pakistan. The United States recognized that if it rejected Pakistan's requests for military assistance and an American alliance, Pakistan would turn to the Eastern bloc, perhaps Czechoslovakia, as it had threatened to do before.67 And the U.S. was beginning to consider Pakistan and its strategic value in relation to the Middle East and a possible Muslim bloc rather than South Asia:

With regard to Pakistan's endeavor to assume leadership of a Middle East Muslim bloc, it may become desirable critically to review our concept that Pakistan's destiny is or should be bound with India. There is increasing evidence that Pakistan is a viable state...There is reason to question whether solidarity with India will ever be achieved... [A] strong Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan, and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia.68

Thus, the documentary record of 1950 shows the changes American South Asian policy was undergoing at the time. The State Department continued the

65 "Relations of the United States with India: Department of State Policy Statement", in Ibid., p. 1476.
66 "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan", in Ibid., p. 1490.
67 Ibid., p.1491.
68 Ibid., pp. 1498-99.
policies of the late 1940's to remain impartial in the Indian-Pakistani rivalry, to view the area as a sphere of British influence, and to recognize the limited threat the region faced from Communism. But one also sees in the reports and policy statements the beginnings of the American policy to favor Pakistan over India out of a recognition of the Indian dislike for the United States, a concern about what refusing Pakistani requests for assistance might lead to, and an inclination to view Pakistan as part of the Islamic Middle East.

Once American planners accepted the logic of containment, and once events in Asia called for extending containment to South Asia, the idea of some sort of alliance with Pakistan followed. Within that scheme the United States had very few options. For Pakistan was predisposed from its birth in 1947, as India was not, toward a bilateral relationship with the United States. That predisposition stemmed largely, to be sure, from Pakistan's fears and ambitions vis-a-vis India. But its leaders also leaned ideologically toward the West and they actively courted the Americans some time before the United States sought to create a system of anti-Communist alliances in the region or had even looked seriously at South Asia as a market for allies. Acheson complained of the Pakistanis that he was constantly "holding them off." The United States only turned to Pakistan when it was evident that India was unwilling to form an alliance. Depicting the American decision to favour Pakistan over India as simply one choice among many available, as some authors do, is not only inconsistent with events as they unfolded but exaggerates the degree of choice that American policy makers had within a program of extending containment to South Asia. For extending containment to

69 Harrison, The Widening Gulf, p. 266.
70 Thakur, for instance, takes this position, arguing that the US decision to establish cooperative ties with Pakistan was as simply a poor one. He correctly locates the need for regional allies in containment reasoning, but he exaggerates the options the United States had within that framework. Ramesh Thakur, "American Policy in South Asia: Regional Fallout of a Global Strategy," Political Science, December 1984, p. 150.
South Asia implied an alliance with Pakistan. And the Pakistanis, desperate for an alliance, were enormously successful in shaping American policy.
Chapter Two

NSC-68 and the Korean War: Changes in Relations, 1951-1953

During 1950 and 1951 the Truman administration's policy in South Asia changed from a position of noninvolvement to one of marked leaning toward Pakistan. This shift in policy was a consequence not only of the differences between Pakistan's and India's attitudes toward Washington and its Cold War effort, but also reflected broader changes in Truman's foreign policy that were the consequence of National Security Council Paper 68 and the outbreak in 1950 of the Korean War. Current Cold War historiography is largely agreed that the comprehensive policy statement and the Asian war radically altered the United States' stance in the Cold War, particularly in Asia. But much of the historiography of U.S.-South Asian affairs has failed to note parallel shifts in American policy toward the subcontinent.

Diplomatic historians debate how much the policy of containment changed from its original form under the Truman Doctrine to its various forms during the latter part of the Truman presidency and into Eisenhower era. John Lewis Gaddis has argued that as originally conceived by its chief architect George F. Kennan, the strategy of containment sought only to "maintain the balance of power", "safeguard diversity", and "keep centers of industrial-military capability out of hostile hands." Containment was a limited strategy based upon a clear differentiation between vital and non-vital interests. Consequently, when implemented in 1950, National Security Council Paper 68 so systematized and enlarged the notion of American interests as to dissolve entirely any distinctions between those interests that were vital and those that were not. There was, then, a qualitative change in American foreign policy after 1950.71

Melvyn Leffler has argued more recently that NSC-68 made only

quantitative changes to American foreign policy, that all the programs it
recommended were already in "the process of being launched," and that the policy
paper only called for ever-increasing expenditures to be made toward the effort to
thwart Moscow's power. Leffler argues that the goals of reducing Soviet influence
on the periphery, liberating Eastern Europe, encouraging nationalism among
various ethnic groups within the Soviet Union, and fostering change within the
Soviet Union itself all existed prior to the implementation of NSC-68.72

However this debate is resolved, it seems clear that some areas of the
periphery did not figure prominently in American policy until NSC-68 became
policy. Pakistan, like South Asia generally, was one such case. And whether the
U.S.-Pakistan alliance was symptomatic of qualitative changes in American
strategic thinking that emerged with the new policy or only quantitative ones is not
entirely clear. It is clear, however, that the emergence of the region as vital to
American interests coincided with the drafting of NSC-68.

Generated by events in 1949, particularly the loss of China and the Soviet
Union's acquisition of atomic capability, NSC-68 was an attempt to unify and make
coherent American foreign policy in a way that the nation and the bureaucracy
could understand.73 As one scholar notes, it characterized the Soviet Union as a
"revolutionary, fanatical power, driven toward domination of the Eurasian land
mass and ultimately the world"--despite vocal protests from the State Department's
key Soviet specialists, George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, that such a
characterization was simply inaccurate. NSC-68 greatly enlarged the means with
which the United States could conduct its foreign policies: this led to massive
increases in military procurement, tighter internal security, a nation-wide effort to
create public consensus for the U.S.'s Cold War effort, and psychological warfare

72 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and
73 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 90.
and propaganda to encourage uprisings in Eastern Europe. The administration assessed the cost of the new foreign policy at $37-50 billion a year, three times more than the Pentagon originally requested in 1950. Acknowledging objections that Soviet geopolitical motives were considerably more limited than the document characterized them as being, the administration insisted that it had to exaggerate Soviet motives and capability in order to convince a fiscally cautious Congress to accept Truman's expensive foreign policy program. Acheson predicted that war would break out somewhere in East Asia in 1950. And when it did, NSC-68 became policy.\textsuperscript{74}

The most important aspect of NSC-68 for the United States' South Asian policy was that it greatly enlarged the notion of containment. As originally conceived by Kennan, the policy sought to maintain the global balance of power by safeguarding the world's key industrial-military centers, notably Western Europe and Japan. Regions on the periphery, so long as they did not possess great industrial and military capacity, could not threaten the United States.\textsuperscript{75} NSC-68 argued that the balance of power had swung so far in Moscow's favor that there no longer were peripheral regions; all countries of the world were equally important:

\ldots any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. Moreover,

the assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.\textsuperscript{76}

This had the added effect of shifting American policy from concern for the balance of power to concern for "perceptions of the balance of power," in effect dissolving

\textsuperscript{75} Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{76} NSC-68, April 14, 1950, in \textit{FRUS, 1950, Vol. 1}, pp. 234-292; qtd. in Gaddis, p.91.
the distinction between "peripheral and vital" interests.\textsuperscript{77} And this shift in policy had profound implications for the United States’ policies toward South Asia, for it made vital what was previously only peripheral.

The Korean War facilitated the “implementation” and “institutionalization” of the policies advanced in NSC-68.\textsuperscript{78} The “whole package envisioned in NSC 68...could be wrapped up and tied with a ribbon by an Asian crisis.” That crisis turned out to be the Korean War.\textsuperscript{79} Key members of the Truman administration believed that Congress and the American public would not approve the policies advanced in NSC-68 without war. Recalling the era, Acheson later noted, “Korea came along and saved us.”\textsuperscript{80} The war allowed the Truman administration to achieve politically the militarization of American foreign policy, a policy calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union, reassure American allies in Europe and Japan, 'prime the pump' (in Keynesian terms) of the domestic and foreign economies, and suppress forces of instability and revolution on the Cold War periphery.\textsuperscript{81}

The last goal greatly shaped the United States' South Asian policy, for not only was the region now considered vital to American interests and security, but key countries in Asia would be tied to the United States via strategic alliances. The goal, as elsewhere, was the integration of willing elements of the Third World periphery into the program of containment. And the purpose was strategic. The vast increases in American military expenditures that were the consequence of the war accompanied a dramatic rise in levels of American military assistance to allied states. Quite simply, Pakistan’s chances of getting such aid were, in mathematical terms alone, dramatically increased with the changes implemented after outbreak

\textsuperscript{77} Gaddis, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{78} McCormick, pp. 99, 104.
\textsuperscript{80} Qtld. in \textit{ibid.}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 103- 05.
of the Korean War. And when the militarized foreign policy was coupled with a policy that made Pakistan a region of vital strategic importance, it was only a matter of time before Pakistan and the United States would sign some sort of cooperative military agreement.

The Korean War was also important for what it showed to be the extent of the differences between the United States and India. To Americans, the outbreak of the Korean War bore striking similarities to the outbreak of World War II: Korea was Czechoslovakia; June 1950 was September 1938; and New York was Munich. Democracy's failure to resist Hitler's aggression had led to war and Americans were determined not to make the same mistake twice. The Indians, however, did not believe the Munich analogy, and though they conceded some Soviet and Chinese involvement in the crisis, they maintained that it was primarily an internal Korean affair. Indian officials argued that by treating the Korean conflict as the prelude to World War III, the United States might unwittingly spark global conflict.

Initially, India supported the UN's resolutions that called for the withdrawal of North Korean troops and the assembling of a United Nations' force to repel the aggression. However, it soon chose the path of mediation. Nehru proposed that China be given a seat on the Security Council, that the Soviet Union be allowed to return, and that all nations concerned negotiate a solution. It was not an unreasonable suggestion, but the Americans were unwilling to compromise. When the tide in the conflict changed in favor of the UN's forces, China warned India that it would intervene if the non-Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel. The message was relayed but disregarded. When the vote came to unite Korea, India abstained, even though Nehru was strongly opposed to the action. And when

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China joined the the war, in November 1950, India voted with the Soviet bloc against a resolution which stated that China had "itself engaged in aggression in Korea." The settlement eventually reached was close to what India had earlier recommended. Nehru argued repeatedly that the war occurred because China was kept from membership in the United Nations. As one scholar correctly notes, he "implicitly placed the entire blame for the Korean outbreak on America."84

American attitudes toward India, both official and popular, changed dramatically by 1951. A Congressman compared Nehru's suggestions for ending the conflict to Chamberlain's Munich Agreement. A New York Times editorial argued that Nehru was the "voice of abnegation; his criticism now turns out to have been obstructive, his policy is appeasement. Worst of all one fails to find a valid moral judgment in his attitude."85 And a Senator said India's "proposal could not have been more acceptable to Moscow if Stalin himself had made it." The same Senator later intoned: "When the first test came to the free world...the Government of India contributed not a single soldier, not a single sailor, not a single airman to aid in resisting aggression in Korea...when the chips were down India was not there."86

In contrast, Pakistan offered enthusiastic support for the UN's effort. Though India's donation of an ambulance unit to the war was perhaps more significant than Pakistan's contribution of 5,000 tons of wheat, Pakistan's public support of the United Nations' action stood in marked contrast to the policies that Nehru's government pursued. When the conflict broke out Liaquat quickly declared that his nation "will back the United Nations to the fullest." Pakistan prepared a Brigade to join the effort, but did not send troops when its attempt to barter its participation for either an American promise of assistance if Pakistan was attacked by India, or for a

84 Burke, pp. 126-135.
86 Qtd. in Burke, pp. 127-133.
resolution to the Kashmir crisis, failed. And Pakistan did exercise some restraint: it expressed deep concern over Truman's threat to use the bomb, and it abstained in the vote to name China as an aggressor. But throughout the crisis Pakistan offered enthusiastic support for the UN's political efforts. It was even a co-sponsor of the resolution authorizing American troops to move into North Korea, arguing that the 38th parallel had never been recognized by the General Assembly and that North Korea had instigated conflict.

Because of its response to the war, Pakistan rose in American opinion as India fell. The New York Times labelled Pakistan "America's one sure friend in South Asia." Dulles later acknowledged the United States' debt to Pakistan for exercising "leadership" which brought to the UN's position "a substantial number of Asian countries." And it was clear that the differences between India's and Pakistan's responses to the American Cold War effort, visible in 1948, were, by 1951, leading to the United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954.

In early 1951 the Truman administration undertook a reappraisal of Pakistan's potential as a western ally. The Korean War had increased the tendency to view the Soviet Union as aggressive and it had sparked new concerns about the susceptibility of the Middle East to Communist attack, particularly in light of Britain's declining ability to defend the region. Both British and American officials believed the defence of the Middle East would require a military commitment, though the JCS opposed any actions which would commit American troops to the region. Local forces would have to be found. In the end, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance of 1954 was the result of Pakistan's expressed willingness to participate in the defense of the Middle East, the American need for moderate Islamic partners in the region, and Washington's concerns about Middle Eastern

87 Ibid.
instability and reaction to British colonialism.

There was a flurry of meetings among British and American strategists concerning possible means to bolster defenses in the Middle East, and a consensus was emerging that Pakistan would be vital during war. There was a flurry of meetings among British and American strategists concerning possible means to bolster defenses in the Middle East, and a consensus was emerging that Pakistan would be vital during war. 90 A meeting of the United States chiefs of mission in the Middle East, held in February 1951 at Istanbul, concluded that Pakistan's military potential should be considered as "[a] factor complementing [the] Middle East Security system." A meeting later in February among State Department officials in South Asia, held in Ceylon, proposed that the "most effective military defense of this area would be provided by strong flanks which on the west would include Pakistan." Delegates to a conference among British and American officials in mid-March, held in Malta, agreed that Pakistani forces would reduce the strategic risks faced in the Middle East. Pakistani or Indian forces would offset tensions between Britain and Iran, and would help protect Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey and the Persian Gulf oil fields. There was further consensus on the military importance of Pakistan at a conference in April, held in London: George C. McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs, said Pakistan's contribution "would probably be the decisive factor ensuring defense of the area"; and British officials said the defense of the region was "probably not possible without the effective support of Pakistan." McGhee reiterated these conclusions to the Pentagon, which was already increasingly favoring a policy to strengthen Pakistan. "With Pakistan," argued McGhee, "the Middle East could be defended. Without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East." 91

But London had doubts about the practical feasibility of enlisting Pakistan in the defense of the region. 92 British officials agreed on the desirability of Pakistani

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., pp. 823-824.
92 Ibid., p. 824.
support, and they too recognized that India could not be induced to join the West; but they were wary of the impediments to, and costs of, Pakistani participation. They doubted that Pakistan would join any formal defense arrangement prior to the Kashmir issue being settled. And they were particularly worried about the prospect of alienating India, fearing Indian withdrawal from the Commonwealth. These were obstacles in American eyes as well. On June 30 the State Department told its offices in the Middle East that there was “great uncertainty” regarding the prospects of the inclusion of Pakistan in the defense of the region. Though the department would retain the policy goal of enlisting Pakistan’s support, the dangers of increased tension between Pakistan and India, and further alienation between Washington and Delhi, precluded further moves toward an American-Pakistani alliance.\textsuperscript{93}

But over the summer of 1951 it became increasingly clear that the United States and the United Kingdom were moving in different directions over South Asia. A Department of State Policy Statement on Pakistan, submitted on July 1, summarized American policy toward Pakistan as follows:

Our objectives with respect to Pakistan are to increase the orientation of its Government and people toward the United States, the UN and the West; to strengthen the stability of a non-communist government desirous of developing, in accordance with democratic principles, a healthy political and economic state capable of satisfying the growing needs of its people; to encourage Pakistan to improve its relations with its neighbors, including the Muslim nations to the West; to achieve closer consultation with Pakistan for the purpose of increasing its participation in and responsibility for the solution of problems of special interest to all Asian countries; and to develop in Pakistan an attitude which would afford the United States and its allies access to those facilities, resources and markets desired in time of peace and required in the event of war, and which would deny such facilities, resources and markets to the countries of the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{93} Qtd. in \textit{ibid.}, p. 825.

\textsuperscript{94} “Department of State Policy Statement on Pakistan,” 1 July, 1951 (Extracts), in Arif, ed., pp. 55-56.
But the Americans had not yet decided to establish a military alliance with Pakistan:

Our policy is to remain impartial in all Pakistan-India disputes...we shall continue to encourage the UK to assume leadership in attempting to devise a settlement in Kashmir. We shall also continue to consult with the UK as to the means by which our individual policies and actions towards Pakistan can be better coordinated to achieve our mutual objectives in both the security and economic fields...

Again, the impediments to an alliance were the desirability of coordinating South Asian policy with London and the danger of alienating India.

But once again, Pakistan would help remove those impediments. In the fall Pakistan began a new campaign to secure an American alliance and was always careful to craft its requests in terms that the Americans would find compelling.

Liaquat wrote Acheson on August 25. Pakistan required military assistance, he said, and was concerned about the level of its defence readiness in light of the global situation. On September 18 Mohammed Ikramullah of Pakistan's Foreign Office told the American ambassador to Karachi, Avra Warren, that Pakistan and the United States should undertake immediate discussions concerning cooperative arrangements to defend the Middle East. Some weeks later Ayub Khan, the recently appointed head of the Pakistani army, made a similar appeal to the ambassador. On October 18 Ikramullah met with Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, informing him that "he was here to get as much military equipment as he could. He was ready to receive it as a gift, under a loan arrangement, or by outright purchase...He had with him military and financial assistants who were prepared to decide on the spot about possible procurement." A memorandum

95 Ibid., p. 61.
96 Ibid., p. 68.
98 Memorandum of conversation between Assistant Secretary of State McGee and M. Ikramullah, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, 18 October 1951 (Extract), in Arif, ed., p. 68.
of a meeting between Ikramullah and Donald Kennedy, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, also held on October 18, summarized the Pakistani emissary as indicating Pakistan's willingness to participate in a "Middle East defense program." The memorandum continued:

Mr. Ikramullah replied that...The time was past for words; Pakistan wanted action...Mr. Ikramullah, with a strong show of emotion, went on as follows: you must make up your mind about Pakistan. The Kashmir problem grows worse. There are people in Pakistan who are dissatisfied with the Government's position on Kashmir. Since the establishment of the Embassy of the USSR, Russia has been encouraging dissatisfaction. The unrest in the Middle East is spreading. This is no peace from India to Morocco. If Pakistan does not get assistance from the West, the Government's position will be grave. Pakistan may turn away from the West. It is of the greatest importance to Pakistan that it get these supplies.99

The renewed pressure from Pakistan coincided with events in the Middle East which not only called for American action but which increasingly encouraged American strategists to view Pakistan as part of the Middle East and not South Asia. This was one of the most important differences in British and American views of Pakistan. To London, Pakistan was part of South Asia and any Pakistani contribution to the defense of the Middle East should take place alongside the contribution of India; both would be within the Commonwealth. To Washington, however, such hopes of a joint Indian-Pakistani effort to defend the Middle East were fanciful, whereas the prospects of a Pakistan-led Muslim bloc that was oriented toward the West were far better.100 And it was the Middle East, not South Asia, which needed defending.

Events throughout the Middle East and North Africa suggested the necessity of establishing the Middle East Command (MECOM) or sometimes called the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), a regional equivalent to NATO. As

99 Memorandum of conversation between M. Ikramullah, and Donald M. Kennedy, Director, and T. Eliot Weil, Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA), 18 October 1951 (Extract), in *Ibid.* p. 69.
100 Anita Inder Singh, pp. 115-119.
originally conceived, the new military pact would tie the defense of the Middle East to that of Europe, would pivot around the contributions of Turkey and Egypt, and would be headed by a British appointee. Both Turkey and Egypt, however, were strongly opposed to British leadership, and relations between Britain and Egypt were becoming increasingly hostile. While American planners were sympathetic to Egyptian complaints, they believed that until an alternative was found, British involvement would have to remain: the Suez Canal was vital. Given the erosion of British relations with Egypt and Iran, however, Acheson feared that the Middle East was fast becoming a powder keg. He tried to convince Eden to change the MEDO concept for something more acceptable to the Egyptians. Washington was beginning to feel that Britain could not be relied upon for continued leadership in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{101}

Washington was also beginning to recognize that not only must the West avoid further radicalizing Middle Eastern and South Asian politics, but it must find and strengthen those states and political forces which were ideologically moderate and sympathetic toward the West. Sometimes the arguments for Pakistan's ideological suitability were highly dubious, as that advanced by a State Department Consul-General to Lahore: Though Muslims were "retrograde, uniformed, venal...[and given to] arrogance", they were far more acceptable than the "tortuous Hindu who despises as he grovels before, or politely infuriates by obfuscation the unclean European."\textsuperscript{102} But the more reasonable recognition was that Pakistan was more moderate and far more inclined toward the West than many of the radical forces in ascendancy in Iran and Egypt; it was, as a State Department paper had noted in 1950, "more Western than Eastern-minded."\textsuperscript{103}

The contrast with Iran, for instance, was stark. Iran was headed by the

\textsuperscript{101} Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 476-478.
\textsuperscript{102} Qtd. in Jalal, p. 415.
\textsuperscript{103} Qtd. in Anita Inder Singh, p. 116.
highly nationalistic Mohammed Mossedeq. And he faced enormous pressure from right-wing fundamentalists and the left-wing Tudeh party, both of which were ardently opposed to the West. In Iran, as in the Muslim world generally, the West had few friends. American planners acknowledged in NSC-129/1 that the “danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attract as from acute instability, anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism that could lead to disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union could come to power.”

As one scholar notes, the Truman administration recognized that “internal disintegration” was the chief threat to Western interests in the region; “[a]s that disintegration continued apace, Pakistan’s strategic stock soared.”

It is significant that for so long the United States’ official policy was to view the Middle East as an area of British influence and concern. As late as December, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that “The United States considers that the defense of the over-all area of the Middle East is a British strategic responsibility.”

The combined pressures of the Korean War and the growing conflicts between Egypt and Britain and Iran and Britain, however, forced American planners to reassess that policy. As Paul Nitze argued in May, 1952: British resources were “wholly inadequate” to the task of defending the Middle East. The fact the Americans came so late to the Middle East and were so reluctant to take responsibility for the region’s defense is evidence enough that their Middle Eastern and South Asian policies were not part of a relentless imperialism nor of a state-sponsored economic competition with Britain. In January, 1952, a U.S. briefing paper for talks with Churchill and Eden prioritized Washington’s policies in Iran:

105 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, p. 146.
“Our primary objective is the maintenance of Iran as an independent country aligned with the free world. A secondary objective is to assure access of the Western world to Iran's petroleum, and as a corollary to deny access to the Soviet bloc.” The United States' Middle Eastern policies were motivated primarily by strategic concerns arising from the Cold War.

By the Spring of 1952 American planners were becoming increasingly convinced of the need to separate American Middle Eastern policies from those of Britain and France. A British massacre of more than fifty Egyptians in January sparked rioting throughout the country and toppled the Egyptian government. Meanwhile, the French suppression of a nationalist movement in Tunisia threatened to spill over into Morocco, where the United States was building bases. By associating with the colonial powers and appearing complicit in the suppression of nationalist movements, the United States was seriously jeopardizing its prestige and influence in the region. The goal, according to the NSC, was “to guide, if possible, political developments in the area in ways which will involve the least danger to Western interests and maximum assurance of stable non-communist governments.” Noted Acheson, “somehow or other we must assume the leadership and manage to bring the British and French along with us on the road to a solution.”

A possible solution, it appeared, was to abandon the MEDO concept in favor of something which would rely less heavily on British leadership, allow the United States to deploy military advisory teams and aid to the various regional players, and focus regional defense less on the Suez and more on the region's oil fields. To this end, the scheme's chief proponent Paul Nitze argued, the United States should establish a “northern tier” defensive shield based upon the contributions of

108 Qtd. in Leffler, p. 481.
Turkey and Pakistan. There might still be room for an arrangement that would include Arab states, but it would make American policy considerably less dependent on the British presence in Egypt. Eventually, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would form a defensive shield over the Middle East. And best of all, by relying on indigenous forces and American air power, the United States would not have to commit any troops to the region.  

The Truman administration tried throughout late 1951 and early 1952 to convince Churchill’s government to join a defensive arrangement involving Pakistan; Eden complained to the Prime Minister that Washington is “pressing us hard.” The Americans, he wrote, “take the view that we are inclined to sacrifice the advantages to be obtained from a Pakistani contribution to the defense of the Middle East for fear of antagonising India.” This was indeed the American position: events in the Middle East were deteriorating so quickly that Pakistani defenses would have to be bolstered as soon as possible; India’s insistence on remaining neutral could not be allowed to deter the West from defending the Middle East.

Throughout 1952 the combination of continued Pakistani pressure and ongoing unrest in the Middle East worked to increase Pakistan’s attractiveness. And Pakistani pressure did continue: In a July meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, Mir Lake Ali, Pakistan’s special defense advisor, requested $200 million in military supplies for the army and air force. He insisted that the arms were not needed against India but against Communism. The Pakistani public was so alarmed about Soviet intentions, he said, that he feared a “psychological surrender” if American assistance was not offered soon; Pakistan desired an “active and positive” alliance with the United States against Soviet Communism.

109 Ibid., pp. 481-485.
110 Qtd. in McMahon, “United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia,” p. 826.
The Pakistani request was made attractive by instability in the Middle East. That instability, as one memo noted, was being fuelled by "rising Arab nationalism, the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, the Israeli-Arab conflict, Mossedeq, the preoccupation of Pakistan with Kashmir, the declining prestige of the U.K., France, and the U.S. in the area, and plenty of other things."  

Pakistan's growing importance in the United States' Middle Eastern policy paralleled broader developments in American foreign policy. In 1952 the Truman administration initiated a comprehensive review of NSC-68 and its place in American strategy. The result was NSC-135/3. It reaffirmed the objectives outlined in NSC-68 and declared them well within American economic means. And it argued that the free world's ability to maintain its position would depend upon:

(a) its capacity to stand firm against Soviet political warfare, which may be intensified by the increasing Soviet atomic capabilities, (b) a greater capability and greater willingness than have been demonstrated to commit appropriate forces and material for limited objectives, and (c) its ability to develop greater stability in peripheral or other unstable areas."  

When Eisenhower won the November election, the Truman administration refined NSC-135/3, recommended specific actions, and crafted NSC-141 specifically for the new administration. NSC-141 was the "most uncompromising expression yet of the interlocking logic of expandable means and symmetrical response." It proposed that American friends in the Middle East and Far East be strengthened. And it suggested that Europe, Asia, and North America were all equally important within American interests and to American security. All were threatened; all would have to be secured.  

On the Truman administration's final day in office the Secretaries of State

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112 Qtd. in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 124.
113 Ibid.
and Defence and the Director for Mutual Security submitted a report to the NSC entitled "Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security." The Report argued that the United States would suffer "substantial cold war losses" in the Middle East and South Asia in the near future unless new initiatives were launched, unless the U.S. made it interests in the region "more explicit", and unless the United States assumed "increasing responsibility" for the region's defence:

The U.S. should continue in its effort to achieve a Middle East Defense Organization, initially as a means of gaining the political cooperation of certain of the states of the area. The initial effort in this direction should be concentrated on Egypt. At a later date the U.S. should consider undertaking more formal commitments to support those Middle East and South Asian countries which give convincing demonstration of their determination to defend themselves and their willingness to cooperate with the West.

The U.S. should be prepared to extend grant military aid to a number of Middle Eastern countries in addition to Greece, Turkey and Iran....It is believed that Pakistan's active cooperation in defense of the Middle East might be obtained without involving unmanageable problems with India. The strengthening of Pakistan on the Eastern flank of Iran, in conjunction with Turkish strength on the Northwest, might add to Iranian self-confidence and would exercise a stabilizing influence in the area.... The first instalments of substantial military aid to Pakistan should be supplied at an early date, provided this can be done in a manner which does not involve unmanageable problems with India.  

Thus, American perceptions of Pakistan had reversed completely by the beginning of 1953. Driven by NSC-68, the Korean War, and growing instability and unrest in the Middle East, the Truman administration had become convinced that the Middle East was threatened. It was further convinced that the United States required local allies to protect Western interests in the region. And in contrast to neutral India and the radical forces in ascendancy in the Middle East, Pakistan was pro-West and moderate.

It is tempting is to argue, as one scholar does, that the American decision to establish a military partnership with Pakistan was "driven by a remarkably

114 Qtd. in Venkataramani, pp. 200-201.
imprecise and inchoate formulation of the nation's strategic needs." American strategists "came to view Pakistan as a key to the defence of the Middle East, but they were never sure exactly how it would contribute to that larger objective, nor were they certain about the exact nature of the threat Moscow posed to that troubled region."

Although that assessment is probably correct, it is made retrospectively and is not entirely fair. The Middle East was in convulsion, the Soviet Union was beginning to direct its attention toward the Third World, and radical forces were in ascendancy throughout Asia and the Middle East. American planners did not know if the region would collapse internally, giving either the radical left or the fundamentalist right the opportunity to seize control and establish order, or fall to external Communist influence or attack. They recognized that a defensive arrangement involving Egypt would not work. They recognized that the region's problems vastly outstripped Britain's ability to defend it. And they also recognized that the defense of the region would require regional allies. Thus, American planners constructed the notion of the Northern Tier: the United States would enlist the willing support of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and perhaps Iran in a defensive shield over the Middle East. In peace, these states would serve as a deterrent to anti-Western or Communist forces; in war, these states would assist Western forces in the defense of the Middle East. Given the complexity of all the variables with which Western strategists had to work, the scheme appeared both reasonable and workable. Truman's successor would have to implement it.

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Chapter Three

Relations Under Eisenhower and Dulles, 1953-1954

In 1953 there were numerous manifestations of not only the growth of Communism, but of the instability and crises that Moscow might be able to exploit. Anti-American riots erupted in Central America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Moscow exploded its first thermonuclear weapons the year that Eisenhower took office. Britain and Egypt were on the brink of war over the Suez. Iran's Communist Tudeh party was growing stronger and stronger. And turmoil throughout Asia called for the establishment of a system of stable, military alliances with those nations still friendly to the West. The Chinese Revolution, the Korean War, events in the Suez, and the assassination of Mosseedaq made South Asia seem susceptible to Communism.116

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was gaining ground in key technological and economic areas.117 Its economy was growing by an astounding six percent annually, twice the rate of American economic growth. Soviet engineers developed the World's first radar for high altitude flying. They led in the production of hydrogen bombs and rocket propulsion systems. And they would shock the West by developing long-range bombers much more quickly than expected, becoming the first nation to enter outer space, put an animal into orbit, and circle the moon. By 1957 the Soviet economy would be second in size and output only to the American, and it supported a military establishment "roughly equal in strength" to that of the United States.118

Furthermore, despite Stalin's death in early 1953, Moscow's foreign policy remained aggressive and consistent with Lenin's instructions that the Revolution

118 Ibid.
be exported.\footnote{Ibid., p. 18.} The Soviets extended generous credits and loans to a select group of countries, specifically targeted for their strategic importance: Egypt, Syria, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Over the course of the 1950's, Moscow extended $100 million to Afghanistan. It gave India a giant steel mill and $378 million for its first Five Year Plan. It shipped arms to Arab nations, broadcast throughout Africa, and poured $1.5 billion into China. Burma was so impressed with Soviet aid that it requested the withdrawal of the American aid mission. By the mid-fifties Soviet bloc technicians were working in more than a dozen Asian and Middle Eastern states, extending Moscow's reach and influence. The Soviet Union even supplied Egypt with atomic energy research facilities and proposed to do the same in Syria and Lebanon. At the same time time, China's economy was growing by 8 percent a year, fuelling its own aggressive foreign policy. Between 1954 and 1957, Peking extended an estimated $1 billion to North Korea, $22 million to Cambodia, $16 million to Ceylon, and $20 million to Yemen.\footnote{Ibid.}

Eisenhower campaigned by playing on Americans' fears of Communism. He promised to go one step further than containment, to "liberate" those who were enslaved under Communism. His foreign policy would be more internationalist than Truman's. And he would undo the "Asia-last" policy of the previous administration.\footnote{Qtd. in Ambrose, pp. 132-133.} But despite the rhetoric, Eisenhower actually pursued a more cautious and conciliatory foreign policy than Truman had. He promised to "live peacefully and permanently" with Communism, to end the war in Korea, and to reduce the size of the armed forces. He was unwilling to commit American soldiers to combat. And he promised to balance the budget by making significant reductions to defense expenditures. For although the New Look rejected the premise of NSC-68 that the United States could afford to spend up to twenty
percent of its GNP on defense, it "was based in large part on the success of the
NSC-68 program." The New Look acknowledged that the United States had an
overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It came into effect at a
time of lessened tension in the Cold War, after the Korean War was over and Stalin
had died.122 His election promises notwithstanding, Eisenhower continued the
policy of containment. Indeed, "there was no basic difference" between the foreign
policies of Eisenhower and Dulles and those of Truman and Acheson.123

Upon assuming office the Eisenhower administration moved quickly to
establish a U.S.-Pakistan alliance. Dulles himself visited Pakistan in May, 1953,
and received Pakistani leaders in Washington later that same year. In May, 1954,
Pakistan and the United States signed the Mutual Defence Agreement Pact which
committed the United States to military and economic support for Pakistan. In
September, 1954, Pakistan joined the South East Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO), which also included the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. And in 1955, Pakistan
joined the Baghdad Pact (later to became the Central Treaty Organization, or
CENTO); it consisted of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Thus, within
two years of the Eisenhower election, Pakistan had signed on to three separate
military pacts with western powers.

In opposition to the view that the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was the "brainwave
of John Foster Dulles,"124 or that Dulles' 1953 trip to South Asia "produced a basic
shift in America's Asia policy,"125 the best scholars agree that it was evident by

122 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
123 Ibid., p. 134.
124 George Lerski, qtd. in G.W.Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers:
125 H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third
1952 that the defence of the Middle East would involve Pakistani participation. As one prominent scholar argues, there was a "remarkable degree of continuity" between the South Asian policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that only "the quirks of the American electoral calendar prevented the Truman administration from going forward with the initiative. It had...established an impressive, if not always persuasive, rationale for an American-Pakistani military relationship, one that the Eisenhower administration would inherit and ultimately act on."

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration's South Asian policies do deserve special consideration, if only because the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was established during its term. But there were important differences in the ways the Truman and Eisenhower administrations approached the region. Dulles' State Department, for example, seemed more willing than Acheson's to tie America's South Asian policy to strategic alliances. This was in accordance with Eisenhower's election promise to reduce the excessive military expenditures which had characterized Truman's foreign policy; strategic alliances with like-minded Asian states would be a much more cost effective means of defending American security. Thus, the South East Asian Treaty Organization, the Baghdad Pact, and the Central Treaty Organization were all Dulles' creations and all, significantly, involved Pakistan. In 1956 Acheson criticized his successor's reliance on such alliances in South Asia. They have not produced "strength and unity", he said; "they have produced division and weakness." And while it is true that, contrary

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126 Choudhury, p. 81; Anita Inder Singh, p. 128.
to charges of "pactomania", Eisenhower and Dulles signed only four new nations to formal strategic alliances with the United States, and that all the rest were signed by Truman. Eisenhower's pacts were in South Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East. Needless to say, these regions did not have Western Europe's cultural, ethnic, and ideological links with the United States; SEATO could never equal NATO.

Moreover, Eisenhower seemed much more willing to risk alienating India than Truman had been. The Republican administration reasoned that, since India was inclined toward neutrality anyway, the United States might as well enlist a willing (and Islamic) Pakistan. As one American official recalled, "We decided Pakistan was a better bet than India." Certainly the perception in South Asia was that the new administration would lean more heavily toward Pakistan. As the Pakistani newspaper *Dawn* noted happily, "Politically...India may not be heard with so much attention from now on by America."132

Pakistan's political situation had recently changed to the U.S.'s liking, making the idea of forming military ties with Pakistan more attractive. On April 17, 1953, less than a month before Dulles' arrival in Karachi, the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed Prime Minister Kwaja Nazimuddin and replaced him with Mohammed Ali Bogra, formerly Pakistan's ambassador to Washington. The coup signalled a shift in Pakistan's leadership away from the religious right and the electorate in East Pakistan toward the civil bureaucracy and the military establishment, both of which were primarily based in West Pakistan. It was West Pakistan which had closer geographical and cultural ties with the Middle East.

130 Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 152. Gaddis counters Townsend Hoopes' famous charge of "Dullesean pactomania" (in *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* p. 241) by noting that while Truman signed formal alliances with forty-one countries from 1947-1951, the Eisenhower administration formally enlisted only four: Thailand, Pakistan, Korea, and Taiwan. It also promised military assistance to Iran, p. 152.
131 Qtd. in McMahon, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia", p. 823.
132 Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 199.
Moreover, the bureaucracy and the military were the two political power groups which were most strongly oriented toward the West, which were the most secular of Pakistan's power bases, and which most desired an American alliance. As one scholar notes, “American officials recognized immediately that the bloodless coup in Karachi created a much more positive atmosphere for the Dulles mission.” The American embassy called the development a “definite triumph of progressive elements...over religious reactionaries and those willing to give in to such reactionaries.”

Dulles arrived in Pakistan on May 22, 1953, as part of a tour of Asian and Middle Eastern states that included stops in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, and Libya. Begun just a few weeks after Eisenhower assumed office, the tour was meant to demonstrate the new administration's increased emphasis on Asia. And it provided the Secretary of State with the opportunity to, as one scholar puts it, “assess the lay of the land in the East.” But the trip did not, as has been argued, inaugurate great changes in American strategy in South Asia. It was rather an opportunity for Dulles to lay the groundwork for policies already in the works: a military aid package for Pakistan as part of the Northern Tier; and large increases in economic and technical assistance for India. The former had been proposed and rationalized by the Truman administration; the latter was a new emphasis of the Eisenhower administration.

Dulles hinted publicly that his inclination was to view Pakistan as part of the Middle East, and on that basis, as potentially eligible for an American “collective security” agreement. As he noted at a press conference in Pakistan:

> We believe in the principle of collective security through the U.N. Until that is firmly established, nations situated as we are would

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naturally be interested in measures designed to promote collective security on a regional basis. Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern and a South Asian country. We have an abiding interest in the Middle East. Likewise we should be interested in any measures likely to promote political and social stability in South and South-East Asia.\textsuperscript{136}

Still, Dulles did not make any specific promises concerning American aid and he was careful not to raise Pakistani expectations to the the point where they would be impossible to fulfil. Indeed, though there is “no indication” that he tied American aid to progress on a settlement of the Kashmir issue with India, “it appears likely” that he impressed upon his hosts the political realities of American aid: being able to demonstrate that Pakistan did desire peace with India would greatly help to get Congressional approval of an aid package for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{137}

Pakistan's leaders did their best to impress Dulles with their commitment to the West and their ability to contribute the Cold War effort. Mohammed Ali Bogra, the new Prime Minister, jokingly admitted to Dulles that such was his reputation for liking the United States that the it was widely believed that he was “controlled” by Washington. During several meetings with the Secretary of State he promised Pakistan's full support in any American effort to create a regional defensive arrangement. General Ayub Khan, powerful head of Pakistan's military, was direct about two things: Pakistan's military needs, and Pakistan's unswerving orientation in the Cold War. Pakistan's potential in manpower and bases was available to the Americans; the present government, he said, is “extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States.” And Ghulam Mohammed, Pakistan's Governor-General, also participated in the courtship: Pakistan needed a loan of $100 million dollars to survive its current economic troubles. The new government was turning back the “fanatical” Islamic fundamentalists and was turning “toward the West,

\textsuperscript{136} Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 203. 
\textsuperscript{137} ibid., pp. 204-205.
particularly the United States.”¹³⁸ Pakistan was doing all it could to impress the American Secretary of State.

And Dulles was impressed: “the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against Communism.”¹³⁹

One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendliness which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems. I am convinced that they will resist the menace of Communism as their strength permits. You know that Pakistan and the United States have commonly supported the same view in the United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese Treaty.¹⁴⁰

Pakistan’s courtship of the United States was succeeding.

Dulles’ visit to India produced very different results. Indians already held a negative view of Dulles because of a diplomatic blunder he had made in 1947 when he had announced that “Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim government.” Though his meetings with Nehru went without incident, they did not produce any agreement on global issues. Nehru and Dulles discussed tensions in Egypt, the prisoner of war dilemma in Korea, and the United States’ efforts to construct an anti-Communist pact in the Middle East. But the Secretary of State was not entirely forthcoming about American intentions in the Middle East and South Asia: it was “unlikely”, he said, that the Middle East Defense Organization would materialize “as originally projected”. And, he added, the administration had “no present plans” for an alliance with Pakistan “which could responsibly be looked upon as unneutral” with respect to India. Though both of these statements were true in the narrow sense, they shielded Dulles’ thinking. And it is unlikely that Nehru was put at ease by the Secretary of State’s disclaimers. Upon returning to Washington Dulles described Nehru as “utterly

¹³⁸ Qtd. in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 162-163.
¹³⁹ Qtd. in Burke, p. 160.
¹⁴⁰ Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 204.
impractical" on global affairs.\textsuperscript{141}

Over the next ten months there were a number of developments which continued the momentum toward an American-Pakistani alliance. In April, Pakistan’s Prime Minister had announced that Pakistan would need 1.5 million tons of wheat from foreign sources to avert famine, that shipments would have to start within three months, and that Pakistan would request the aid from the United States. On June 10 Eisenhower presented the Pakistani request to Congress, where both he and Dulles did their best to get the assistance package passed.
The Bill was passed on June 25. The episode is significant for how it differed from India’s efforts to get emergency food aid in 1949 and 1951. The aid for Pakistan was passed quickly, was strongly supported by the Eisenhower administration, and was occasioned by speeches characterizing Pakistan as “believing the same kind of things we believe” and as a “strong bulwark” against Communism. India’s request for food in 1949 had been rejected in the aftermath of Nehru’s trip to Washington. And its request in December, 1950, though supported by the Truman administration, was held up in Congress by a group of legislators until June of the following year. Unsurprisingly, the American delay to help India had allowed China and the Soviet Union to not only provide India with assistance, but to demonstrate how their actions differed from those of the politically-motivated and opportunistic Americans. But Pakistan, in the summer of 1953, encountered no such obstacles.\textsuperscript{142}

On June 3 Dulles met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and made clear the administration’s thinking concerning the Middle East. Working from a map, he explained the Northern Tier:

What I do think is possible is to develop strength along this northern area [indicating], where there is more fear of the Soviet Union. You have got a motivating force there...you find a different spirit and a

\textsuperscript{141} Brands, \textit{The Spector of Neutralism}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{142} Burke, pp. 160-162.
recognition of the danger from Soviet Russia and you have something on which to build.

Turkey...is really a strong point. They are the people that are prepared to fight. They are strong, they are valiant, they are allied with us in spirit...this is an extremely dependable area which can generate a great deal of military power at a point which is strategically important.

At the other end, here you have got Pakistan...which can be a very strong point. We have these two strong points, here and here.

...We should rely on the northern tier countries through here. We feel that if you have two strong points, here and here [Turkey and Pakistan] it is very difficult, even if Iran cannot be made strong, to go through those mountain passes.

...The trouble with Pakistan at the moment is that we do not have any program of military aid for Pakistan, because we don’t dare to do it because of the repercussions on India...143

The job of selling the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was well underway.

Also in June, the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense drafted a joint report on the question of American military assistance for Pakistan. The report acknowledged that giving weapons to Pakistan would produce “strong Indian resentment”, would strengthen Pakistan’s position in Kashmir, and would increase the Soviet Union’s interest in South Asia. The report also acknowledged that Nehru would be placated by neither American assurances that the arms would not be used against India, nor by promises of equal aid for India. But the report predicted that though an American alliance with Pakistan would sour U.S.-Indian relations, it would not turn them into enemies, for such was India’s need for American economic and technical assistance.144 Quite simply, the United States felt that the gains accrued from an American-Pakistani alliance, particularly in the Middle East, would offset the losses suffered in American-Indian relations. And though this latter point appears questionable in retrospect, the prediction that there was only so much damage that an American-Pakistani pact could do to American-

Indian relations proved to be remarkably accurate.

In July Dulles began the work of setting up the Northern Tier. He told the National Security Council that Egypt and many of the other Arab states were beset by internal problems, were unconcerned about the Soviet threat, and were unsuitable as allies in America's Cold War efforts. A Middle Eastern pact based upon the contribution of Egypt, as in the MEDO concept, "was certainly finished." Thus, the United States should encourage Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran to form a collective security agreement that would be much stronger than any which centered on Egypt. Dulles said that he had been "immensely impressed the martial and religious characteristics of the Pakistanis" and that Pakistan could become a "potential strong point for us" in the Middle East. The proposed policies were approved by the President as part of NSC-155 which proposed that the United States first encourage Pakistan and Turkey to sign a pact that would later serve as a nucleus to include Iraq and Iran.145

The success of the CIA-assisted overthrow of Mohammed Mossedeq's government in August greatly improved the prospects for including Iran in the Northern Tier.146 Iran's potential for contributing to the defense of the Middle East had been noted by the Truman administration. In June, 1952, there was a meeting of key administration officials on strategies for defending the Middle East. Working from Nitze's Northern Tier strategy, the planners assigned Iran a key role in the defense of the whole region. J. Lawton Collins, the army's Chief of Staff, argued that the defense of the region would require two "rings": an inner southern ring consisting of Egypt and other Arab states, or MEDO; and an outer northern ring that would run from Turkey and Asia Minor through the mountains of Iran and Pakistan, in essence, the Northern Tier. Iran's participation would be vital: "If we are going

145 Qtd. in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 164.
146 Ibid.
to hold Middle Eastern oil we will have to hold a line in Iran", said Collins. "If we could get a stable government in Iran, one which would talk turkey with the Turks, we might be able to do something." In August, 1953, the Shah would emerge as that stable government, and the pieces for the Northern Tier would be in place.

From Pakistan's perspective, however, things weren't moving quickly enough. Though the Americans were moving toward giving Pakistan assistance, a number of questions remained: "How realistic were the prospects for Pakistan making a meaningful military contribution to such a defense effort? How much military aid would the United States need to provide in order to enhance sufficiently the capabilities of the Pakistani armed forces, and what form should that aid take? Should arms be given only if Pakistan adhered to a regional defense pact?...How vociferous would [the Indian reaction] be? What could the United States do in advance to contain the damage to Indo-American relations certain to follow an arms deal with Pakistan." Moreover, there remained strong opposition within the U.S. government. Chester Bowles, the American ambassador to India, was among the most outspoken and he continued to argue the points he had argued under the Truman administration:

The Indian government and people...would react strongly against any program to supply modern U.S. equipment to the Pakistan Army which might be used against India.

Moreover, the Soviet Union would be presented with a tempting choice of alternatives. The Soviets would surely offer India military assistance to match our assistance to Pakistan. This might be supported by substantial Soviet economic aid to bolster the Indian Five-Year Plan...

...The proposed arms agreement with Pakistan, far from furthering our national objectives in the Middle East and South Asia, will add dangerously to the grave instability that already exists there. I am convinced that the proposed United States-Pakistan military agreement may indeed set in motion a chain of events which in the next ten years can lead to political developments in India and South Asia which will have grave implications for our future relations in this area and indeed in

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Because the Americans appeared to be moving so slowly, Pakistan intensified its diplomatic pressure on the United States. On September 30 General Ayub met with Dulles in Washington. Ayub said he came for one reason: to acquire arms for Pakistan’s military. And as the official State Department record of the meeting puts it, “The Secretary observed, smilingly, that it was none of his business but he hoped General Ayub would get what he came for.” When Ayub expressed his frustration with the slowness at which Washington was moving to give Pakistan aid, Dulles explained that presidential approval of the aid package depended upon feasibility studies by the Defense Department; he urged Ayub to be patient. Dulles closed the meeting by stressing his commitment to giving Pakistan military assistance whatever the response from India. Continuing the pressure, Ghulam Muhammad visited Washington in November as part of a several week tour that included stops in Britain, France, Egypt, and significantly, Iraq and Turkey.

Meanwhile, Pakistan began to pressure Washington by another means: the press. Acting on a shrewd and purposeful leak by the Pakistanis, the *New York Times* said in an editorial that Ghulam’s meetings with Eisenhower concerned “exploring the possibilities of a military alliance between Pakistan and the United States.”

The article sparked a flurry of public discussion, media speculation, and diplomatic activity. The State Department quickly issued a denial, saying that there

150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 *New York Times*, November 5, 1953.
was “no truth whatsoever in reports that the United States and Pakistan were negotiating a pact for provision of military aid by the former to the latter in return for bases.”\textsuperscript{153} The story was reprinted in newspapers throughout South Asia. Nehru phoned Washington in outrage, repeating his prediction that American aid would bring the Cold War to South Asia. He announced publicly that an American-Pakistani pact would “have far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and especially on India and Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{154} India’s ambassador to Washington, G.L. Mehta, met with Dulles to lodge a formal complaint. In acknowledging that American aid to Pakistan was a “calculated risk”, Dulles insisted that the arms would not be used against India and that no agreement between Pakistan and the United States would involve the establishment of American bases. And in London, Ghulam asserted that reports of American bases in Pakistan in exchange for arms were “absolutely unfounded and baseless.”\textsuperscript{155}

The Pakistanis appeared to have mastered the diplomatic game. The leaks to the media had the double effect of “raising the diplomatic stakes” of the whole process while considerably limiting the “policy options” available to the Eisenhower administration.\textsuperscript{156} The move put enormous pressure on the administration: what was previously only a matter for key officials to consider in secrecy and calm was now a diplomatic hot potato. It increased the possibility of completely reversing Pakistan’s orientation in the Cold War, should the United States decide against granting Pakistan arms. As Ghulam was later to tell Nixon, if the U.S. were to decide against giving Pakistan aid, after all the publicity, “it would be like taking a poor girl out for a walk and walking out on her, leaving her with

\textsuperscript{153} “Statement by the Spokesman of the State Department,” 11 November 1953 (Extract), Qtd. in Arif, ed., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{154} Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{156} McMahon, \textit{Cold War on the Periphery}, p. 168.
Pakistan was forcing the issue.

But Pakistan was also learning just how dangerous playing the Cold War diplomatic game could be. In November Moscow informed Karachi that it would "like an explanation" about reports concerning Pakistan's "adherence to plans for the formation of an aggressive military bloc in the Middle East." "The Soviet Union cannot be indifferent," the letter said, "to reports...of an agreement to establish American air bases on Pakistani territory...in a region so close to the borders of the U.S.S.R... [that] have a direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union." Pakistan's response to Moscow contained an outright denial that there was any "question of granting military bases" in Pakistan to the United States. And it hinted at Karachi's discomfort at the prospect of offending its powerful northern neighbor: "The Ministry has the honour to state further that the Pakistan Government does not contemplate taking any step in hostility or unfriendliness to any Government or State, with which, like the U.S.S.R., it has friendly relations." Pakistan's leaders must have recognized the dangers inherent in courting the United States as assiduously as they had. For if Washington failed to meet Pakistan's defense needs, there would be little chance of turning toward an already-offended Moscow.

Ironically, Nehru may have strengthened the resolve of both the United States and Pakistan to complete a military agreement. As a contemporary observed,

The very violence of Indian opposition put the United States in a corner as far as international prestige was concerned. Prime Minister Nehru's unqualified denunciation, while quite consistent with his own ideology, left the United States no 'out.' It had to bow to Indian pressure and drop all consideration of military aid to Pakistan or force it through in spite of

157 Ibid.
Indian objections. As was quickly pointed out, rejection of Pakistani overtures would mean a death blow to American hopes for other Asian countries to join in defense measures with the West.\footnote{160}

Nehru strengthened Pakistani resolve as well. For such was his opposition to the American-Pakistani accord that he persuaded some Pakistani nationalists who were originally opposed to aligning with the West to approve of the alliance.\footnote{161}

In December Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Karachi and eventually became one of the administration's strongest advocates of a military aid package. Nixon was immensely impressed by Pakistan's military potential, its commitment to the Cold War effort, and its leadership, particularly General Ayub Khan. He was later write that Ayub, "unlike most of his countrymen...was not obsessed by the Pakistan-India problem." He was "more anti-communist than anti-Indian", "was seriously concerned about the communist threat", "and was strongly pro-American." Nixon noted that Ayub was particularly concerned that the Soviet Union might use India as a "cat's-paw for establishing a presence in South Asia."\footnote{162} Throng of Pakistanis hailed the Vice-President with shouts of "America Zindabad" and "Nixon Zindabad".\footnote{163} And a security guard assigned to Nixon for his stay exclaimed to American reporters, "Sahib likes us."\footnote{164}

In early January, 1954, Dulles submitted his final recommendations to Eisenhower for military aid to Pakistan. He said Turkey and Pakistan were willing to sign a mutual defense pact if the United States gave Pakistan the arms it required. And he acknowledged that "we must expect quite a storm from India if we go ahead with a military program for Pakistan." Nevertheless, maintained Dulles, "we can ride out the storm without fatal effect on U.S.-Indian relations." "We can

\footnote{161 Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. London: Pall Mall Press. 1968, p. 126.}
\footnote{163 "Long live America", and "Long live Nixon".}
\footnote{164 Qtd. in Venkataramani, p. 234.}
gain a great deal by going ahead.” On the other hand,

failure to do so at this juncture would be disastrous both to our relations
with Pakistan and to the position of the present pro-American Pakistani
Government. It would probably also be disastrous to our standing with
the other countries of Asia, who would assume we had backed down in
the face of Indian threats.\footnote{165}

Eisenhower gave the proposed military assistance package his final approval on
January 14.

After that events moved quickly. On February 19 Pakistan and Turkey
announced their intention to seek closer political, economic, and cultural ties, and
to find ways of “strengthening peace and security”. Pakistan’s Prime Minister
called the announcement “the first concrete major step towards strengthening the
Muslim world.”\footnote{166} On February 22 Bogra told a press conference in Karachi that
the Government of Pakistan had requested American arms under the Mutual
Security Act. On February 24 Eisenhower had the American ambassador to India
personally deliver a message to Nehru. The ambassador stressed the two most
important points in the letter: Eisenhower would ensure that Pakistan would not
use the weapons against India; and a “request by India for military aid would
receive most sympathetic consideration.”\footnote{167} The next day, on February 25, 1954,
the United States’ Government publicly announced its intention to supply Pakistan
with military assistance. On April 2 Pakistan and Turkey signed an Agreement for
Friendly Cooperation that committed them to cooperating in defense, arms
production, and technology. And on May 19 Pakistan and the United States
signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.

Apart from the Baghdad Pact, which Washington arranged but did not sign,
the United States signed seven additional pacts and agreements with Pakistan

\footnote{165} Qtd. in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, p. 171.
\footnote{166} Qtd. in Burke, pp. 163-164.
\footnote{167} Telegram: The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: Vol.
over the next fifteen months. In September, 1954, Pakistan was a signatory, with the United States, to the South East Asia Treaty Organization. In January, 1955, the two nations signed a Mutual Security Agreement, an agreement to supply Pakistan with Surplus Agricultural Commodities, and an agreement for Technical Cooperation. In February the United States extended Pakistan further Relief Assistance. In May the United States and Pakistan signed a Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement. And in August Pakistan signed an agreement to receive American technical assistance to develop atomic energy for civil uses. Pakistan was beginning to reap the rewards of alignment with the West; it would face the costs of that alignment later.

Notwithstanding the number of formal agreements between Pakistan and the U.S. that followed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the actual provisions of the MDAA were modest. It committed the two nations to cooperating on “arrangements for individual and collective self-defense”. It expressed a common commitment to working within United Nations defense arrangements. And as might be expected, the Agreement imposed far more limits on Pakistan than it placed on the United States. Only part one of Article I committed the U.S. to action, that of providing Pakistan with the “equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize.” The rest of Article I and Articles II through VI prohibited Pakistan from certain actions and committed it to others. Pakistan was prohibited from using American arms for “purposes other” than maintaining its “internal security” and “legitimate self-defense”, participating in “the defense of the area”, and assisting in UN actions. Pakistan was expressly forbidden from undertaking any act of aggression against other nations, transferring the arms to any other nation or organization, or compromising classified American material. Pakistan was committed to providing the United States with any “potential” resources in which the U.S. was deficient.
and "taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the
maintenance of world peace."\(^{168}\)

It bears repeating that the United States extended military assistance to
Pakistan for strategic reasons. First, the threat of war weaves its way throughout
the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, so much so that it is
impossible to understand American motives in establishing the alliance without
reference to strategic matters. The MDAA explicitly committed Pakistan to making,
"consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by
its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the
development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive
strength of the free world."\(^{169}\)

Second, on February 19, 1954, a week before Washington announced its
intention to establish formal military ties with Pakistan, the National Security
Council made clear its thinking concerning South Asia. NSC-5409, entitled
"United States Policy Toward South Asia", is saturated with strategic concerns.
"The United States", noted the report, "is profoundly concerned with the future of
South Asia because of its strategic location, manpower, natural resources, and
growing influence in world affairs." Part of the strategic value of the region was
"psychological and political", and concerned the competition between democratic
and authoritarian frameworks in the race to develop impoverished nations. But a
greater part of the region's strategic importance was of a military nature and
concerned the threat of war:

South Asia forms a great land bridge between the countries of
Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It has several thousand miles of
common frontier with the Soviet Union and Communist China. It is in
close proximity to the Communist-controlled areas of Central Asia with
which it is culturally and ethnically related, a factor which might be of

\(^{168}\) "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, Signed by the United States and Pakistan at Karachi,
May 19, 1954", in Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954. New York:
\(^{169}\) ibid., Italics added.
future advantage to the United States. It has seaports and naval bases from which control could be exercised over shipping passing through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, they of Bengal and the Indian Ocean; bases and communications facilities for insuring uninterrupted communications between Europe and Southeast Asia; and some air bases of value as post-strike facilities in strategic air attacks against the USSR. In case of a protracted war, the area contains many potential sites for additional military installations of allied power could be directed against the Soviet Union. 170

The question of bases is significant. Although there is little indication that American delegates pressed for bases during the negotiations of the MDAA, they clearly hoped to keep open the possibility of acquiring them later on. The report by the JCS in 1949 had noted that the United States would require bases in West Pakistan in the event of war. NSC-5409 is even clearer in expressing that desire. And a secret report prepared for the United States Air Force in April, 1954, entitled Selection and Use of Strategic Bases, indicated that the U.S. would require airbases to the south of the Soviet Union, where there was greater "kill potential" and where Soviet defenses were weakest.171 In 1956 the CIA awarded the Lockheed Corporation with a contract to develop the high altitude U-2 surveillance plane. In 1960 the Soviets succeeded in shooting down a U-2 spy plane that had taken off from the American base in Peshawar, Pakistan.

And third, the alliance permitted the United States to defend more of the world with diminishing resources. This was consistent with the Eisenhower administration's fiscally conservative policies. As Eisenhower noted, while "it cost $3,515 to maintain an American soldier each year, for a Pakistani the price was $485."172 Again, the alliance was created out of strategic concerns: the United States could not contain Communism and defend the world on its own.

171 Venkataramani, pp. 299-301.
172 Qtd. in Ambrose, p. 137.
It is on this point that so much of the historiography is mistaken. The United States did not extend military assistance to Pakistan out of a desire to dominate or contain India, to construct another outpost in its global empire, or to establish economic dominion over the Third World. Rather, it was motivated by strategic concerns for the security of the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, South Asia. Those concerns arose out of its belief that the region, unstable and volatile, was threatened by Communism. Whether those strategic concerns were misguided, unjustified, or simplistic is another question altogether.
Chapter Four

Eisenhower and Dulles: Pakistan in a Broader Context

Recent historiography has overturned the view that the Eisenhower administration’s Middle Eastern and South Asian policy was a failure. One of Dulles’ early biographers argued that the administration’s policies were characterized by “sham” and “semifraud”, that they were “ad hoc” and “chronically fitful and episodic”, and that they reflected “short-term considerations and little or no long-range planning.”\textsuperscript{173} However, revisionists of Eisenhower’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{174} have been more generous: Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ foreign policy record, while clearly “mixed”, was restrained, balanced and flexible.\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, they argue, Eisenhower’s policies must be considered in the context of a confrontational foreign policy framework inherited from Truman, domestic and partisan pressures from the likes of McCarthy, the rapid economic and military growth of the Soviet Union, and for the first time, the threat of thermonuclear war.\textsuperscript{176}

The Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy is difficult to appraise because of discrepancies between its rhetoric and its actions. Rhetorically, the administration was confrontational and inflexible. Dulles argued that Truman’s open-ended and “immoral” policy of containment would bankrupt the United States.\textsuperscript{177} The U.S. should structure its foreign policy around the concepts of “liberation” and the threat of nuclear “retaliation” rather than the containment of

\textsuperscript{174} These “revisionists” of Eisenhower’s foreign policy record are not to be confused with Revisionists proper, otherwise known as Corporatists. Revisionists of Dulles’ and Eisenhower’s foreign policies are probably closer to being post-revisionists in the broader historiographical debate, and their reassessments of the Dulles-Eisenhower record are often intended to overturn Corporatist assessments of the 1950’s.
\textsuperscript{177} Divine, p. 14.
Communism through conventional military means. The United States, wrote Dulles, must develop the will and the means to "to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing."\textsuperscript{178} Much has also been made of Dulles' characterizations of the United States in explicitly moral and religious terms, as the defender of Judeo-Christian civilization. And though not prone to the same excesses, Eisenhower was also capable of sweeping rhetoric. In statements that seemed calculated to undermine the primacy of Europe in American policy and treat all regions of the world as equally important, Eisenhower intoned: "...we hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable"; and "[as] there is no weapon too small, no arena too remote, to be ignored, there is no free nation too humble to be forgotten."\textsuperscript{179}

In practice and in private, however, Eisenhower and Dulles were considerably more flexible and realistic than their public pronouncements concerning the ideological origins of Soviet policy would suggest.\textsuperscript{180} "These Communists are not early Christian martyrs," wrote Eisenhower. "I cannot see them starting a war merely for the opportunity that such conflict might offer their successors to spread their doctrine." National Security Council study 5501 concluded that while the Soviet Union would "seek constantly...to extend Communist power and to weaken...U.S. power and influence," it would not be so rash as to pursue its "long-term goals in ways which jeopardize the security of the regime...or the Communist bloc." In a list of Moscow's six strategic objectives, in order of importance, the report listed the objective of spreading "communism

\textsuperscript{179} Qtd. in Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment}, pp. 129-130. He made both statements in 1953.
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 141-143.
The explanation for the conflict between the Eisenhower administration's rhetoric and its actions lies in politics, in the pressures that the pragmatic and centrist Republican administration faced from the right wing of the party, and in the administration's skill at using the Secretary of State as a foil for the Republican right. For when Dulles spoke publicly "he did so with an eye to Congress, and so his words were geared to the shaping of public opinion" rather than to an expression of either his own beliefs or the administration's policies. He purposefully overstated and oversimplified his points "for effect" in order to secure public and Congressional support for the administration's foreign policy programs. In so doing, however, Dulles left for his political opponents and later historians a persona that is "something of a straw man." And the result has been to complicate greatly the task for historians of making coherent the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy.\(^{182}\)

Perhaps the most glaring example of the gap between what the Eisenhower administration said in public and what it believed in private concerned the nature of Communism and the threat it posed. In public, Dulles characterized Communism as a cohesive and rational ideology that sought to "extend its system throughout the world and establish its 'one world' of state socialism." International Communism was an indivisible monolith that stretched from "Berlin to Kamchatka".\(^{183}\) This had obvious implications for American foreign policy: it fostered a 'zero-sum' view of the world, like that advanced in NSC-68, in which any victory for Communism was a loss for the United States. But in practice Dulles and Eisenhower demonstrated much more sophistication and subtlety. The National Security Council under their leadership listed "the basic objective of our national

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\(^{182}\) Marks, pp. 7-8.

\(^{183}\) Qtd. in *Ibid.*, p. 137.
security policies [as] maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions.” And this implied a distinction between interests and threats; the United States would counter only those threats in which genuine American interests were at stake.\textsuperscript{184}

In private the administration also acknowledged that international Communism was not a cohesive entity; nationalism shaped Communist ideology.\textsuperscript{185} The administration learned from Tito that “[i]nsistance upon absolute conformity to a pattern made in Russia does not work in areas where the economic and social problems are different...and where there are deep-seated national and cultural loyalties.” It suspected that a Sino-Soviet split might occur and that the United States would have opportunities to “promote division” between the Soviet Union and Communist China. And Dulles noted frankly that it wasn’t the Communist nature of the Soviet Union which concerned the United States:

> The basic change we need to look forward to isn’t necessarily a change from communism to another form of government. The question is whether you can have communism in one country or whether it has to be for the world. If the Soviets had national communism we could do business with their government.”\textsuperscript{186}

It was Soviet expansionism, and not Soviet Communism \emph{per se}, which had to be countered.

The administration’s attitude toward neutrality is particularly significant. In rhetoric Dulles had universalized the Cold War, arguing in \emph{War or Peace} that the next phase would involve “ending neutrality.” Neutrality would be the correct response to just another “typical ‘great power’ struggle.” But the Cold War was fundamentally a moral struggle, and it consisted of a struggle between

\textsuperscript{184} Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment}, pp. 136-137.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 142.
\textsuperscript{186} Qtd. in \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 142, 143, 143.
diametrically opposed value systems. In this Dulles appeared far less tolerant of India's non-aligned position than Truman and Acheson had been: "India's foreign policy," he said, "is not one which measures up to what we think are the best standards."

But by many measures the Eisenhower administration was tolerant of neutrality, treating non-aligned India almost as well as it treated allied Pakistan. Between 1955 and 1960 Pakistan received $750,000,000 in economic and technical assistance from the United States, more, but not substantially more, than the $717,000,000 that India received during the same period. And while Pakistan certainly received more per capita than India did, the difference was more than offset by the enormous differences in credits and grants from the Soviet bloc nations: between 1955 and 1960 Pakistan received $3,000,000 to India's $930,000,000. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, by contrast, India received almost twice as much as Pakistan did. Aid figures during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were far more reflective of India's "higher-policy" value than aid figures during the Eisenhower era were of Pakistan's special status, when Pakistan was the U.S.'s "most allied ally" and when India's foreign policy did not measure up to the "best standards." In this sense the United States' South Asian policies during the fifties mirrored the gap that existed generally in American foreign policy between the Eisenhower administrations' inflexible rhetoric and its pragmatic policies.

188 Qtd. in Brodkin, "United States Aid to India and Pakistan," p. 665.
189 Qtd. in Ibid., p. 665.
191 Ibid., p. 30.
Overall, despite the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, the United States and India had good relations during the 1950's, due largely to the efforts of Eisenhower himself. Recognizing that Nehru would never enter a military alliance with the United States, Eisenhower believed that economic and technical aid was Washington's best means of ensuring Indian stability and independence from Moscow. His policy toward India was threefold: he successfully established a genuine friendship with Nehru; he and his administration understood and repeatedly emphasized India's strategic importance; and he structured his efforts to keep India from falling under the aegis of Communism through an extensive program of economic aid, often in the face of considerable political opposition. In fact, Eisenhower respected Nehru's policies of non-alignment and socialism, and on occasion defended both. Knowing that India could not be brought into a Western alliance, he argued that a neutral India was preferable to an India that was a Soviet ally. Given Nehru's suspicions of the West and India's proximity to the Soviet Union, Eisenhower knew that closer alignment with India was impossible, even without the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. He worked hard, within that knowledge, to ensure that U.S.-Indian relations were as good as they could be. Indeed, by 1956, the damage to Indian-American relations created by the U.S.-Pakistan alliance had "receded sufficiently" to allow the Eisenhower administration to "recover at least some of its lost footing" with Delhi.

Thus, the Eisenhower administration developed, in concert, "two types" of containment in South Asia: the first supplied arms to Pakistan and sought to bring it into the strategic effort to defend the Middle East; and the second worked to "balance the adverse effects" of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance on U.S.-Indian relations.

193 Ibid.
194 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, p. 190.
The latter policy, though not as formal or as public as the former, recognized and respected India's position of non-alignment and sought to cooperate with the Asian giant by providing it with considerable economic and technical assistance. America's South Asian policies were realistic and were based upon a pragmatic recognition of India's size and importance. They attempted to limit Soviet influence in India by securing Nehru's friendship and by offering India assistance.195

It has even been argued that the Eisenhower administration's South Asian policies were more successful than the Kennedy administration's at reducing Soviet influence with India and keeping U.S.-Indian relations friendly, even though Kennedy significantly increased American aid to India and sought openly to undo his predecessor's tilt toward Pakistan. Kennedy's "bold promises" of American support disillusioned India when it became obvious that he was unwilling to support Nehru's positions in Goa and Kashmir, to upset the regional military balance in favor of India, or to further antagonize Pakistan.196 Of course, the Eisenhower administration's generous policies toward non-aligned India, over time, had much the same effect on Pakistan.

Thus, the Eisenhower administration imposed realistic limits on the U.S.-Pakistan alliance; and its decision to bring Pakistan within the Western strategic effort appears pragmatic and consistent with reasonable efforts to contain the Soviet Union. The administration forged strategic links with Pakistan out of a genuine fear for the security of the Middle East. It believed that Pakistan could, in times of peace, assist Western efforts to deter a Soviet attack on the Middle East; in times of war, Pakistan could contribute to the defense of the region. The administration apparently also believed that the U.S.-Pakistan alliance met certain rhetorical and symbolic criteria that the Cold War imposed on Washington. At the

196 Ibid., pp. 267-268.
same, however, it recognized what the costs of the alliance were. Within that recognition, the Eisenhower administration endeavored to undo the negative consequences of the alliance. It attempted to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan’s enemies and to ensure that the rhetorical and symbolic functions of the alliance did not excessively jeopardize Washington’s position in the region.

The United States did not enter a military partnership with Pakistan out of ignorance or naivete. On July 10, 1954, the American Ambassador to Karachi, H.A. Hildreth, sent a five-page report to the State Department. He listed the political, economic, and military obstacles that Pakistan faced in becoming a “politically stable” and “economically sound” partner of the West. He noted that the MDAA had “increased the expectations of the Government of Pakistan and produced a feeling akin to one of dependence on the United States.” He urged Washington to develop a clearer picture of what Pakistan’s participation in the defense of the Middle East would entail. And he proposed that the State Department and National Security Council scrutinize “with unrelenting care” the American investment in Pakistan.

But the noteworthy aspect of Hildreth’s report isn’t that he had concerns about the alliance with Pakistan. Rather, it is noteworthy is that at the end of a report intended to highlight the risks in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, Hildreth concluded that he saw “no reason to alter [the] judgment” that Pakistan would survive and develop as a “firm member of the free world.” “The Embassy,” said the Ambassador, “believes Pakistan to be a tolerable risk.” Hildreth’s cable captures perfectly the complex nature of American thinking regarding Pakistan.

197 FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XI. pp. 1851-1855. McMahon uses Hildreth’s “cable” to say the opposite of what I say here (Cold War on the Periphery, pp.187-188). He suggests that the cautionary tone of the report should have served as a “portent” of things to come, thus setting up his narrative of events after 1954. But McMahon inverts the order of Hildreth’s remarks, using the ambassador’s conclusion that the alliance was a “tolerable risk” as the context for his concerns and words of caution. In fact, most of the report is devoted, as one would expect a report to be, to discussing potential hitches in current policy. It is significant that, in the context of a report on the potential problems in current policy, Hildreth expressed his belief that the policy was correct.
The Eisenhower administration entered the alliance with Pakistan fully aware of the risks it posed. But it believed, as the Truman administration had, that the benefits of the alliance would outweigh the risks.
Conclusion

The Alliance and its Aftermath

The United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954 was the product of a genuine mutuality of interests between the two nations. Both nations entered the alliance for primarily strategic reasons. Pakistan sought a military agreement with the United States because it believed itself to be threatened by India, because it viewed American attempts to create the Northern Tier as an opportunity to strengthen its relations with the Islamic world, and because its leaders leaned ideologically toward the West. The United States believed that Communism, whether internal or external, threatened Western interests in the Middle East. The alliance with Pakistan was, from the American point of view, an attempt to deter a Soviet attack on the Middle East, to gain the regional allies required in the event of a Middle Eastern War, to ensure that Western forces would have a foothold in southern Eurasia, to create a pan-Islamic bloc friendly toward the West, and to prevent Pakistan from turning to Moscow for its security needs. The alliance served both nations' interests.

But the mutuality of interests was short lived and both nations soon believed the alliance to have been a mistake. Indeed, from its inception the seeds of its undoing and of developments that were detrimental to long-term American interests were latent in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. These include Pakistan's disillusionment with the alliance based on its unrealistic expectations for what the alliance would yield; the impetus to drive India toward the Soviet Union (though there were limits to how far India would go); and the entanglement of the United States in regional conflicts.

First, it soon became clear that Pakistan's status as the United States' "most allied ally" exaggerated whatever ideological compatibility the two nations shared. In the end, Pakistan's relations with India were the most important factor in its
foreign policy. When war between Pakistan and India broke out in 1965 and the U.S. not only proved unwilling to assist its ally, but hindered it from waging war, Pakistan abandoned the alliance, improved its relations with the Soviet Union, and pursued an alliance with China. And over the course of the fifties and sixties Pakistan became convinced that in choosing sides in the Cold War it had failed to gain the strategic and material advantages which non-aligned Third World nations had gained. Egypt and India, for instance, had played the superpowers off of each other and made enormous gains in the process. Pakistanis were greatly disillusioned with the United States.¹⁹⁸

Second, the conditions which generated the alliance changed. The United States-Pakistan alliance was in some ways an historical accident: it was the coincidence of American fears for the security of the Middle East, following the Korean War, occurring just when the young and insecure South Asian nation most desperately wanted protection from its large neighbor. It was not to last. Washington discovered that in choosing some allies in the region (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan), it alienated other nations and delivered them to Moscow (Egypt, Syria, and India). And throughout the fifties and sixties the China-Pakistan and United States-India relationships grew stronger as the United States-Pakistan alliance became weaker.

Third, and most importantly, the contingency for which the United States-Pakistan alliance was created never arose. This was probably due less to the success of the Northern Tier in averting a Soviet attack on the Middle East than to the emergence of developments which enormously changed the region’s geopolitical landscape. Over the course of the 1950’s the insecurity and instability which had followed the Korean War gave way to stability and detente. And the

¹⁹⁸ Shaheen Irshad, Rejection Alliance: A Case Study of U.S.-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1967. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1972. Irshad says that Pakistan’s expectations were far too high. And Pakistan’s “disillusionment was all the greater because it dramatically focussed on [the] emotionally charged and symbolic problem...[of] Kashmir,” p. 120.
The notion of Mutually Assured Destruction greatly diminished the chances of a large conventional war occurring anywhere, let alone in the Middle East. Consequently, the U.S.'s need for the alliance with Pakistan diminished as well.

Following the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, officials with both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations feared that the next theater for Cold War conflict might be in western Asia and the Middle East. They believed that an alliance with Pakistan, as part of a defensive shield of the Middle East, would best protect the region. They were impressed by the sincerity, persistence and consistency of Pakistan's efforts to join the West; by 1954, Pakistan had courted the United States for seven years, through two administrations, and three Secretaries of State. But no war against Communism broke out in western Asia. Instead, Communist wars broke out in South Asia, between India and China, and South East Asia, between France and the Vietminh. Once American officials recognized that the Northern Tier was based upon an errant calculation of threats to Western interests, and may actually have created more problems than it solved, they began to search for ways to extricate the United States from the more problematic agreements which formed the Northern Tier. The Pakistani alliance was among the first to be reconsidered. By mid-1956 some officials in Washington had concluded that the alliance was ill-considered. And Eisenhower himself, in a moment of rare candor, called the alliance a "terrible mistake."

But in 1954, in the aftermath of the Korean War, the alliance made sense. As a contemporary academic noted, "The choice forced on the United States was obvious." "From the American viewpoint," he said, "the 'tying-in' of Pakistan with the world-wide defense scheme is perfectly consistent with established policy....The United States in the future will promote the development of leaders in

199 Qtd. in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, p. 212.
200 In 1954 James W. Spain was a professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
the Middle East and support regional efforts at indigenous groupings...rather than attempt to make separate bilateral arrangements with each country concerned." Moreover, he added, "the need for defense preparations, particularly in the eastern part of the area, is made all the more acute by the almost certain existence of a growing source of hostile strength beyond the mountains to the north." It seemed that the United States had finally "assumed responsibility for the organization of the defense efforts in the Middle East."201 The alliance with Pakistan was consistent with those efforts.

201 Spain, pp. 748-751.
The United States and Pakistan had two eras of cooperative military relations during the Cold War: the first lasted from 1954 to the mid-sixties, and the second lasted from 1979 to the mid-eighties. In some respects the relationship of the 1980's mirrored the rhetoric, strategies and policies which had characterized and generated the alliance of the 1950's. Events during Carter's administration created the conditions which permitted the Reagan administration, in what were sometimes rhetorical and theatrical ways, to resurrect the policy of containment. This was in part because the contingency against which the U.S.-Pakistan alliance had been established in 1954 finally arrived in 1979. And what is most fascinating about the region in the 1980's is the extent to which it fit the Cold War's familiar patterns, albeit with new twists: 'non-aligned' India did not condemn Moscow for the invasion of Afghanistan; the U.S. and U.S.S.R. largely waged war by proxy; and the United States was forced to support and strengthen a dictatorial strongman, even one who was developing nuclear weapons, as the last pro-American and anti-Communist holdout in the region.

In other respects, however, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship during the 1980's was fundamentally different than it had been during the 1950's. No longer an alliance, it was a cautious relationship informed by thirty years of experience, deemed necessary because of an actual shared threat, and constructed in what was no longer a bipolar world. Each nation entered the new relationship despite its reservations about the other. Pakistan buried its memories of American

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202 There was also a brief collaborative arrangement between Nixon and Yahya Khan in the early seventies, but it was short-lived, expedient, and did not reflect any serious policy shifts towards South Asia.

duplicity and opportunism, images of Vietnam, and reservations about American secularism under the new exigencies. Despite misgivings about Pakistan's nuclear program and military leadership, concerns about alienating India, and doubts about the wisdom of a partnership with a volatile nation aspiring to theocracy, the United States considered the Soviet presence in Afghanistan so serious as to outweigh all other considerations. Moreover, the global and regional equations of the fifties had disappeared and the world and region were no longer on a bipolar axis: China had emerged as its own center of power; Pakistan was firmly anchored within an independent and increasingly powerful Islamic bloc and was no longer militarily or economically dependent on the United States; the United States' global power and prestige had declined considerably; and India, heading the non-aligned movement, was pursuing rapprochement with Pakistan and closer ties with the West. Thus, the expedient U.S.-Pakistan relationship of the Reagan years and the backdrop against which it emerged were fundamentally different than the alliance of the fifties and the conditions which had generated it.

These two points of comparison, the actual pragmatic relationship and the rhetoric employed to depict it, dovetail in the changes that accompanied the Carter-Reagan transition. There was a sudden and marked increase in arms and rhetoric. While the events which made some sort of renewed relationship with Pakistan strategically necessary and politically viable occurred during Carter's term, the containment formulae of the fifties were not reconfigured until Reagan's term. That these changes were largely rhetorical can be seen in the clear limits within which even Reagan's support for Pakistan operated. The United States finally had a Communist presence in South Asia to counter, but global events from Johnson to Carter had led inexorably towards a diminution of American overseas involvement and the confidence upon which globe-spanning strategies and efforts depended. Although Afghanistan justified a renewed Cold War, the United States (its rhetoric
notwithstanding) acknowledged its limitations. Thus, it would be inaccurate to
describe the relationship after the invasion of Afghanistan, even during the Reagan
years, as simply a return to the fifties. The United States responded to the
Afghanistan invasion by applying containment rhetoric to a post-containment
situation.

Just as the initial American-Pakistani alliance was proposed by a
Democratic President and created by a Republican one, so the second period of
U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation was proposed by Carter’s administration and
created by Reagan’s. It was Carter who halted SALT II, who boycotted the
Olympics, and who proposed overlooking Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear
capability. In August, 1978, and in April, 1979, the State Department had
announced that it would halt all aid to Pakistan under the 1976 Symington
Amendment which prohibited the United States from giving military and economic
aid to nations developing nuclear weapons. Within days of the Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan, however, Carter declared his administration’s intention
to supply Pakistan, a “frontline state”, with military and economic aid. He did not,
however, propose to renew the military alliance of 1954, but to shore up Pakistani
defences in the face of a Soviet threat. To that end, Carter offered Pakistan $400
million, to be divided equally between economic and military assistance, and to be
spread over two years. In his famous response, President Zia rejected the offer
and described the amount as “peanuts”.204

Although it was the Carter administration which proposed a second era of
military aid for Pakistan, it was the Reagan administration which proposed to do so
within a reconfigured policy of containment. Within two days of Reagan’s
inauguration, the United States’ ambassador in Islamabad affirmed American

204 Zubeida Mustafa, “Pakistan-US Relations: The Latest Phase,” The World Today, December
support for Pakistan's territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{205} Speaking to the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary of State Buckley called Pakistan the "'Eastern Anchor' of our potential Defensive Arc against the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{206} A significant difference between Carter's and Reagan's approaches to the question of military assistance for Pakistan was the historic agreement to which each appealed. Whereas Carter had invoked the 1959 Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, which simply pledged the United States to defend Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, the Reagan administration invoked the spirit and language of the 1954 alliance. Furthermore, the Reagan administration proposed not $400 million in assistance, but $3.2 billion, including the controversial sale of forty F-16 fighter planes. As the State Department's Press Relations Office noted, this was an effort to make Pakistan "capable of withstanding Soviet pressure."\textsuperscript{207} It was also a return to containment.

Nevertheless, South Asia and the world had changed since the 1950's. By any measure the crisis in Afghanistan provided a far better example of Communist aggression than the crises in Korea or Indochina, but there was no chance that even Reagan was going to go to war over Afghanistan. America would fight only by proxy. The American government worked differently, too, as post-Vietnam foreign policy was no longer the exclusive property of a handful of men in the White House. Reagan had to secure Congressional support for his package. Moreover, international reaction to the Soviet invasion showed how global geopolitics was no longer strictly bipolar. The Islamic countries, many of whom were not particularly partial to the United States, unanimously condemned Moscow. And India, which initially justified the Soviet action, soon voiced its concerns about the invasion and expressed its desire for an independent and sovereign Pakistan. Nehru's

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Ibid.}, pg. 473.
daughter, Indira Gandhi, noted that India's concerns about a return to the fifties had been "allayed". 208

That the U.S.-Pakistan relationship under Reagan was driven by a specific set of events and was confined within new regional realities can be seen in how long it lasted. The United States' military support for Pakistan and its willingness to overlook Pakistan's nuclear program diminished with the Mujahadin's successes on the battlefield and with the lessening of Cold War tensions that began with Gorbachev. And it was only a few years before Washington again began to pressure Pakistan to halt its nuclear weapons development program.

Thus, the United States-Pakistan alliance of the 1950's grafted the Cold War onto South Asia in a way that anticipated and partly determined the geopolitical shape the region would take later. It was not until that bipolar framework had dissolved that an actual Soviet threat emerged in South Asia. The Soviet presence again grafted the Cold War onto the region. In other words, superpower conflict and global concerns were imposed upon South Asia during both the fifties and the eighties, though each for very different reasons. And each era of American-Pakistani relations had the elements which would have given the other the sort of 'legitimacy' it demanded. The alliance of 1954 mirrored the bipolar division of the world and the mutual good will of both parties, but it lacked both a Soviet threat and a long-term mutuality of interests. It forced the region into a bipolar framework in anticipation of a Communist threat. When that threat never materialized, the alliance dissolved. Conversely, the military relationship of the 1980's involved real threats and, at least potentially, a long-term mutuality of interests, but its Cold War rhetoric and tactics greatly simplified the multipolar geopolitical realities of the day. Between 1954 and 1981 the bipolar framework within which nations made alliances, defined themselves ideologically, and

208 Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy after Afghanistan", in Cohen, pp. 65, 72.
accrued material benefits, in other words the Cold War, become increasingly irrelevant in South Asia. And it was only after the bipolar division of the region had broken down and the global struggle had been eclipsed by local events that an actual Soviet threat finally arrived.
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