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Abstract

In 1949 the newly created Federal Republic of Germany lacked freedom of action. The country was under Western Allied occupation, its new Government under supervision by the Allied High Commission. After coming to office in September 1949, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was determined to achieve West Germany's firm anchoring in the Western community, sovereignty, political, economic, and military security, and Western European integration. However, his later success should not obscure the fact that his policy was risky. In 1949-50 his course was complicated by the Saar issue, sparse Allied granting of sovereign rights, the rearmament question, and the problem of German unity. Meanwhile, the Opposition Social Democrats under Kurt Schumacher criticized the concessions to the Allies and, as Western integration assumed a quicker pace, stressed the primacy of German unity. Even members of the Bonn Cabinet started to doubt a policy that seemed likely to solidify German division.

The West German press mirrored and judged the domestic fight over foreign policy. Four of the five leading publicists examined in this study tended to support economic and political integration in Western Europe. While not prepared to cede to French interests and to renounce German claims on the Saar, they did support the Petersberg Agreement on dismantling, accession to the Council of Europe, and involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations. The issue of German unity played a limited role in their editorials. Two pundits, Paul Sethe and Hans Baumgarten, never mentioned it, while two others, Richard Tüngel and Ernst Friedlaender, believed that Western integration offered perspectives to regain East Germany in the future. Moreover, Schumacher's opposition found little positive echo. Only Rudolf Augstein and Sethe at times backed similar policies to that of the SPD. Although the broad tenets of Adenauer's course
were accepted, there was consistent criticism of his diplomatic methods. In fact, in the spring of 1950 three commentators called on the Chancellor to surrender diplomatic affairs to someone else.

Amongst the editorialists examined, only Augstein advocated a neutralist policy, hoping it would facilitate German unification. However, he did not sufficiently discuss the great risks associated with German neutrality. Augstein was also the only commentator to oppose West German rearmament categorically. Although none of the commentators supported outright rearmament, the pundits backed a para-military federal police against the perceived East German threat. The question of direct remilitarization was ignored or made dependent on Allied concessions.
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Introduction

The German Reunification of 1990 has given Konrad Adenauer's remarkable diplomacy a posthumous triumph. In 1949-63 the Chancellor led the Federal Republic from the position of an international pariah to one of a respected power with considerable political and economic influence. Now some of his former critics, who in the past had condemned Adenauer for not actively pursuing German unification, concede that the Chancellor's policy of anchoring West Germany in the West has been vindicated.¹

Opposition to Adenauer's foreign policy came from the Social Democrats, political splinter groups, certain circles in the Protestant Church, but also from the ranks of West Germany's foremost publicists. Until 1990, when he cautiously labelled Adenauer's diplomacy as "justified,"² Rudolf Augstein, publisher of the news magazine Der Spiegel, was one of the most forceful critics of Adenauer. Another consistent critic of the Chancellor's agenda was Paul Sethe, a commentator with the daily Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Both acquired special prominence in 1952, when they, along with a few other West German publicists, opposed Adenauer's handling of the Stalin Notes. The editorialists considered Stalin's offer of an armed, neutral, and united Germany a possible opportunity for unification and were disappointed by Adenauer's failure to endorse a Four Power Conference to discuss the Soviet proposal. The exact positions of the German commentators in that controversy have been well documented by Knud Dittmann, Peter März, Hermann Graml, and Markus Kiefer.³

So far studies on the diplomatic perspectives of West German publicists have focused primarily on a) Paul Sethe and b) the years 1945-49 and 1952.⁴ This study presents and analyzes the perspectives on Konrad Adenauer's diplomacy of five leading West German publicists in 1949-50, the
first year of his chancellorship. No research has yet established in a comprehensive way to what degree Germany's political commentators in 1949-50 supported Adenauer or were able to provide alternatives to his diplomacy. If the pundits did not back the Chancellor, did they instead support his opposition, the Social Democrats under Kurt Schumacher? Or did the editorialists advocate German neutrality, a policy eschewed by Adenauer and considered by Schumacher in 1949-50 only as military neutrality, not as a political option?

In the early years of the Federal Republic a deep division existed between Government and Opposition over foreign policy. Schumacher, although in principle supportive of a Western orientation, conducted a nationalistic opposition against Adenauer's compromises with the Allies, which Schumacher thought underestimated West Germany's diplomatic strength. Adenauer's achievements of 1949-55 were not a foregone conclusion. His policies were vulnerable in 1949-50, the important first year, when he needed immediate success and did not yet have the extraordinary charisma of the later years. The German question was always in the background, the Saar question caused considerable friction in Franco-German relations and trouble for the European unification process, and the Western Allies were generally not prepared to give the Federal Republic instant concessions. Moreover, beginning in the summer of 1950, when the Korean war caused grave concern over European security against the Soviet threat, the rearmament issue led to difficulties both in the domestic and international arena.

The press, at the time the dominant form of media, mirrored and judged the political fight and West Germany's diplomatic advancement. Since Adenauer adhered strictly to the basic tenets of what would now be called his "vision," the impact of the commentators on his thinking was probably very limited. There is no evidence to show that the pundits reflected or
affected other politicians. To what degree they reflected and/or were able to mould public opinion is also difficult to say. The influence of the press on Adenauer's political fortunes, in either a positive or negative way, was certainly never decisive, barring perhaps his last years as Chancellor.

Adenauer, equipped with a machiavellian sense for power, was naturally interested in having the support of the publicists. At times he tried to use his influence to pressure dissenting journalists into adopting a more favourable line. But it would not seem that he depended on the support of the press. His success created its own support, especially after 1952. It rested largely on the results of his diplomatic efforts and on his ability to convince the West German public, anti-communist and eager to achieve political, military, and economic security, of the necessity of his approach with his clear and simple arguments.

Despite these qualifications, the analysis of the perspectives of the German editorialists is of interest. It makes it possible to appreciate better the scope of the domestic debate over Germany's diplomatic aims, constraints, and methods. The analysis of the press commentaries provides insight into the early positions of Augstein, Sethe, and others. It also gives contemporary impressions of Germany's embryonic predicament in 1949-50, when the foundations of the Federal Republic and indeed of Western Europe were built. Other related aspects will also be clarified. For instance, how did the press commentators perceive Western Allied policies? How seriously did the commentators take the Soviet threat? Did they reconcile European integration with the goal of German unification, or did they regard them as conflicting aims? And how did they see the controversial issue of German rearmament?

The examined commentators wrote in the daily Die Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, and the weeklies Die Zeit and Der Spiegel, all of which were and still are today leaders of Germany's supra-regional press. Other national publications, like the dailies Die Welt or Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, could have been included. However, the microfilms of their editions of 1949-50 were not available in North America. This study focuses entirely on the independent bourgeois press. The party press, regional publications, and tabloids were not examined.

The selected editorialists are politically well balanced. Rudolf Augstein of Spiegel, whose commentaries on Adenauer's diplomacy did not commence until the spring of 1950, and Paul Sethe of Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) followed a liberal orientation and tended to be critical of Adenauer. Augstein was born 1923 into a middle-class Catholic family in Hanover. After serving and being injured on the Eastern front, he worked as a journalist in his hometown in 1945-46 and in 1947, at age 23, started Der Spiegel as a driving force with two other co-licencees. The magazine became a phenomenal success, indeed an institution of German life, and Augstein a millionaire. In 1952 he regarded the Soviet notes as an acceptable basis for negotiations but did entertain doubts about Soviet intentions. He was confident that an armed and neutral Germany would not drift into the Soviet sphere, although the Kremlin would certainly attempt to bring Germany under Soviet influence. Augstein, an amateur historian, has written several studies on German history and prominent Germans, for instance, Adenauer, Bismarck, and Frederick the Great. Augstein turned 70 in November 1993, still a very influential figure in the Federal Republic of Germany and still commenting on the nation's political affairs."

Paul Sethe (1901-1967) was born in Bochum and worked as a journalist since 1923. From 1934-43 he worked in the political section of Die Frankfurter Zeitung. He obtained a degree in history (Dr. phil.) from the
University of Bonn in 1932. From 1949-55 Sethe was one of the five co-editors in the publishing collegium of the FAZ. Sethe had a national-liberal orientation and, beginning in 1951, after Adenauer's rejection of an East German offer for free German elections, started to stress reunification as the supreme goal of German foreign policy. In 1952, though uncertain of Stalin's intentions, Sethe argued for negotiations over the Soviet notes. He accepted Soviet security concerns and maintained that raison d'état was more important than ideological crusading. As an ideal solution he envisaged a free, united Germany which would be part of a medium-sized European army, strong enough for defence, but incapable of aggression. Due to his continued criticism of Adenauer's diplomacy, the chasm between Sethe and two other co-editors, Ernst Dombrowski and Hans Baumgarten, became unbridgeable. In 1955 he resigned and joined Die Welt. From 1963 onwards he wrote for Die Zeit and Stern. 7

Richard Tüngel of Die Zeit and Hans Baumgarten of the FAZ adopted a conservative approach supportive of the Chancellor. Ernst Friedlaender of Die Zeit, while not exactly conservative, also fitted into this group. Tüngel (1893-1970), an anti-Socialist with a strong patriotic inclination, initially worked as an architect and government surveyor in Hamburg. In 1933, after the Nazi seizure of power, he was removed, and he then worked as a feuilleton writer for various newspapers. From 1946-55 he was chief editor of Die Zeit. In 1952 Tüngel was first sceptical about the Stalin Notes, then rejected them completely as an attempt to disrupt West Germany's Western integration. He deemed the notes a product of Soviet cunning, not as a genuine effort to achieve freedom in Germany. 8

Hans Baumgarten (1900-1968) was born in Berlin and studied law and economics there. He received his doctorate (Dr. jur.) in 1923. In the 1930s he was chief editor of Der Berliner Börsen Courier and of Der Deutsche
Volkswirt. Since 1949 he was part of the publisher collegium of the FAZ. By 1951 Baumgarten was a steady defender of Adenauer's diplomacy. In 1952 he was principally in agreement with the Western Allied responses to the Soviet notes. He believed that Moscow did not want to surrender East Germany and rather intended to "bolshevize" all of Germany."

Ernst Friedlaender (1895-1973) was born in Wiesbaden. After serving in the First World War, Friedlaender studied philosophy in Bonn and, a year later, took a banking apprenticeship in Berlin. As currency expert, he worked for the Agfa company until 1931. The son of a Jewish doctor, he and his family lived in Liechtenstein from 1934-46. During that time he wrote two political treatises: "Germany after Hitler" and "Vom Wesen des Friedens." Although a novice in journalistic matters, Friedlaender started writing for Die Zeit in the autumn of 1946 and soon was the weekly's chief editorialist next to Tüngel. Friedlaender was strongly committed to Western European integration and was a member, and later president, of the German Council of the European Movement. His time at Die Zeit came to an end in May 1950 when he resigned over personal and political differences with Tüngel. Friedlaender then became a columnist and contributor to various dailies and to the North German Radio Network (NWDR). From 1955 onwards he became increasingly critical of what he perceived to be Adenauer's tight hold onto power and a resulting paralysis in domestic and foreign policy. He retired in 1960.10

The thesis contains five main chapters. The first chapter outlines Germany's diplomatic position in 1949 and reviews Adenauer's foreign policy agenda. Each of the following chapters is divided into one section presenting the relevant political and diplomatic developments, and a second analyzing the corresponding press commentaries.

The second chapter deals with the Petersberg Agreements of November 1949
whereby the Allies and Germany resolved the dismantling issue and agreed to integrate Germany into the European community. The third chapter covers the Saar issue from January-March 1950, and in particular the uproar over the Saar Conventions signed by France and the Saar Government on 3 March 1950. The fourth chapter examines the German decisions of May 1950 to accede to the Council of Europe and to enter negotiations on the French proposal of a European Coal and Steel Community. It also treats the question of German unity. The fifth chapter explores the rearmament issue of the summer of 1950.
Chapter I: West Germany's Diplomatic Position and Adenauer's Agenda

The Federal Republic of Germany had its origins in the defeat of Nazi Germany and in the Cold War. The collapse of Hitler's Reich led to Germany's partition, the Cold War hardened it.¹ In May 1945 Germany surrendered unconditionally and was occupied by the Four Powers, which assumed supreme authority. Under the Potsdam Agreements of July 1945 the War Allies retained their collective rights over Germany as a whole but divided her into four Occupation Zones. The territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line were put under Soviet and Polish administration, and Berlin was divided into one Soviet and three Western sectors. By establishing the Allied Control Council the Four Powers hoped to preserve at least the economic unity of the Zones.

However, by 1948 it had become clear that the conflict between the superpowers, marked by Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and Iran as well as by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, prevented any workable arrangement on Germany. As the Cold War intensified, Western Allied policy towards Western Germany became increasingly motivated by the desire to secure its potential for the recovery and integration of Western Europe, which in 1948-49 was undertaking first steps towards cooperation by creating institutions like the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and the Western European Union.² In the London Recommendations of June 1948 the Three Powers decided to establish the three Western Zones as a state and authorized German politicians to form a "Parliamentary Council" to draft a constitution, the Grundgesetz.

Shortly before its promulgation on 23 May 1949, the founding date of the Federal Republic, the Western Allies defined their policy towards the new state in the Occupation Statute and the accompanying Communiqué of 8 April 1949.³ In the Communiqué the Three Powers declared their intention to
integrate West Germany closely into the framework of Western European association, expecting her to join the OEEC and to negotiate a bilateral Economic Cooperation Administration agreement with the United States concerning membership of the FRG in the European Recovery Plan. The Western Zones had already individually belonged to the OEEC and had received Marshall Plan aid in 1948-49. * The continuation of these political and economic links showed how deeply West Germany was involved in the American-led attempts to integrate and stabilize the Western community. The realities of the Cold War and of West Germany’s dependence on the will and support of the Western Allies made a policy other than Western integration, namely neutrality, on either a national or European basis, perhaps buttressed by a German-Soviet understanding, more and more theoretical.

These renewed memberships also symbolized partial statehood, but the Federal Republic was not at all a sovereign state. The Western Allies were not willing to relinquish control soon and applied severe strictures on their new creation, leaving it in a distinctly inferior position. The details of tripartite supervision were drawn up in the Occupation Statute which took effect after the establishment of the Federal Government, on 21 September 1949. The Statute replaced Allied Military Government and was in reality West Germany’s highest law, in practice ranking above the Grundgesetz.

Under the terms of the Statute, scheduled for revision within twelve to eighteen months, supreme authority continued to rest with the United States, Great Britain, and France, which also maintained their Occupation Zones. They conferred legislative, executive, and legal powers, in short democratic self-government, on the Federal and the Länder Governments. However, the Allies retained extensive rights and controls, enforced by the Allied High Commission (AHC), the representation of the Allied Governments
and officially situated on the Petersberg overlooking Bonn. The High Commission towered literally and figuratively over the German Government. The AHC could revoke all conferred powers, and all laws passed by the Bundestag or the Länder Parliaments required Allied approval. The Statute reaffirmed Allied rights as regards disarmament and demilitarization. West Germany's foreign affairs were reserved for the High Commission. There could be no foreign ministry, not even consulates or commercial representations. Foreign trade and exchange were also under Allied control. Other restrictions limited or altogether forbade German activities in industry, communications, and scientific research.

The Allies also reserved the right to control and restructure Germany's coal and steel industries in the Ruhr region. They and the Benelux countries had created the International Authority on the Ruhr on 20 April 1949. The Authority, which offered West Germany only observer status until her formal accession, regulated the production and the domestic and export distribution and pricing of German steel, coke, and coal, making mainly France a beneficiary of cheap German coke. Moreover, in 1949-50 the AHC was preparing a new Allied law to end the cartelization and concentration which had characterized Germany's heavy industries until 1945.

Neither the Occupation Statute nor the Grundgesetz applied in the Saar, which France had removed from her Occupation Zone in 1945, supported by tacit approval from the United States and Britain. Since 1948 the Saar, where one million Germans lived, was included in a customs and currency union with France. The Quai d'Orsay intended to transform the Saar into an internationally recognized, autonomous state, independent of Germany but with close political and economic links to France. As another step in that direction, the French Government announced on 3 May 1949 its intention to
seek Saar membership in the Council of Europe."

During the Federal Elections campaign in the summer of 1949 the French Saar policy and Allied dismantling of German factories, a practice begun in 1946 to cover reparations, caused all parties to protest against the Allied treatment." Nevertheless, the two biggest parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union, supported a Western orientation, despite differences over its form, pace, and methods. Both advocated European integration, and both denounced the idea of German neutrality." What differentiated the parties in this bitterly contested election was the question how West Germany's economy should be run.

Despite the Marshall Plan aid, the economy was only slowly recovering from wartime destruction and dislocation. Growth was hampered by Allied dismantling, which either demolished or removed industrial equipment, by insufficient investment, and by trade restrictions. At the end of 1949 production was slumping. In February 1950 the unemployment rate stood at 13.5%. The trade deficit for 1950 amounted to more than three billion German Marks (DM) and included a severe dollar gap, made worse by the near collapse in trade with Eastern Europe. Trade with the East in 1949 hovered around 5%, for import and export respectively. In 1936 16.6% of the Reich's imports and 16% of its export trade had been with East Europe. The Federal Republic also had serious social problems, such as a constant influx of refugees from the Eastern Zone and food and housing shortages. In 1950 there were 9.5 million refugees and expellees amongst a population of 49 million."10

The electorate backed Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union and especially its economic visionary, Ludwig Erhard, the force behind the "social market economy," which embraced free market principles and had shown signs of success since the currency reform of June 1948. The CDU and
its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), emerged with 31% of the vote and joined two smaller middle-right parties, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party (DP), in a liberal-conservative coalition. The SPD, the stalwart of nationalization, especially of heavy industry, scored 29.2%, and its leader, a devastated Kurt Schumacher, had to accept the role of the Opposition. Adenauer was elected Chancellor in the Bundestag on 15 September.

When forming his Cabinet, Adenauer himself assumed the all-important role of German spokesman and negotiator with the High Commission. By monopolizing access to the Allies, the locus of real power, through the creation of an Allied-German liaison bureau in his Chancellor's Office, he assured his personal control over West German diplomacy from the very beginning. The fact was that although the Occupation Statute reserved German diplomacy for the AHC, West Germany nevertheless had a de facto foreign policy, albeit a very small one. It lay in her relations with the Western Allies. Of course, the German room for manoeuvre was slim. It was very difficult for the German Government to initiate policy other than that approved by the Allies. West Germany's nascent diplomacy was further hampered by the Allies' policy of excluding Adenauer from their political and military planning, done in part to obstruct possible German attempts at playing off the Western Powers against each other. For information on Allied policy motives and directions he had to rely on Allied briefings and, literally, on newspapers.

Already 73 years old in 1949, Adenauer was a Catholic Rhinelander with deep roots in his religion and native region. He had served as former Lord Mayor of Cologne and during the Weimar years was a deciding voice of the Zentrum Party and President of the Prussian State Council, the second chamber of the Prussian Landtag. He held decidedly conservative-bourgeois
and anti-Communist values and was imbued with a strong dislike of Prussia's influence on Germany's historical development. Since 1919 he had been advocating Franco-German reconciliation and closer integration between Germany and her Western European neighbours. During 1933-45 he was passively anti-Nazi and imprisoned at the beginning and end of Hitler's regime, losing his wife to the effects of Gestapo detention in 1948.13

Adenauer's conception in 1945-49 was an amalgam of general convictions and pragmatic-opportunistic flexibility. In this early period his methods, envisaged allies, goals, and tactics tended to change slightly according to the situation. He relied rather on actual political constellations than on fixed policy details. His two fundamental diplomatic goals were the attainment of West Germany's sovereignty and her integration in the West. He wanted to achieve West Germany's freedom of action as quickly as possible so that Germany would no longer be an object of Allied policy, defenceless against Four-Power decisions such as those concluded in Potsdam. His Western orientation meant cooperation with the three Allies, support for Western European integration, and an interest in joining NATO. The advantages of his Western policy were apparent. It was the shortest route to military security, sovereignty, and economic recovery. As partner of the Western Powers and through compromise and the trustworthy, predictable conduct of diplomacy, Adenauer hoped soon to gain a position of equality.14

He realized that West Germany's domestic and foreign policy were intertwined: success in Western alignment would bring success for his domestic goals. In the domestic realm, he endeavoured to shift the centre of Germany's political gravity to the South-West, away from Prussian influence, which he blamed for Germany's historical mistakes, such as militarism, nationalism, and socialism. Essentially he was determined to
establish the bourgeois norms of Western European constitutional and socio-economic organization in the Federal Republic.  

Adenauer was not mystified by the appeal of German unity. The Prussian and Protestant spirit of North-Eastern Germany was foreign to him. At a very early point, in October 1945, when postwar development was still in flux, he concluded that the American-Soviet war alliance would soon collapse and lead to a divided Europe and Germany. By accepting this bipolar tendency, he in effect coolly wrote off the Eastern Zone as a Communist appendage for the foreseeable future. He considered unity a long-term goal, achievable only within the context of Germany's anchoring in the West. To him West Germany was the core state and guardian of all-German interests, and he backed the establishment of the Federal Republic, hoping that at some point in the future the Eastern Zone would throw off its Communist yoke and join.

Adenauer considered neutrality only for a short time at the end of 1946 and then never again. He opposed any notion of a "synthesis between East and West," disavowing the concept of his party rival, Jakob Kaiser, who from 1945-47 tried to maintain the unity of the Reich and believed in Germany's role as mediator between East and West.

Adenauer's diplomacy was to a large extent driven by pessimism, mistrust, and certain particular fears. The Chancellor especially feared Soviet aggression. Towards the USSR he followed a defensive and uncompromising course since he mistrusted Soviet intentions and was greatly worried about the Soviet military threat and Communist Fifth Column activities. He considered the Soviet Union a predatory power which would attempt to draw Germany into its orbit, undermine Western European democracies, and, after a possible American withdrawal, dominate the continent.
Another fear, though never mentioned in public, was his distrust of the German people and their political maturity. Adenauer admired German resilience, hard work, and dynamism. However, he feared that without Western alignment Germany might one day slide back into her faults of aggression, instability, and excess. Neutrality was to him the shortest road to disaster since it might bring revived nationalism and revanchism, a new German-Soviet understanding, renewed French-German antagonism, and an end to European integration.\(^{19}\)

Adenauer attached great importance to France because French-German cooperation was essential to achieve Western European integration. He was willing to allay French security concerns by integrating the French, German, and Benelux economies. His opinion of the United States was at first unsure. He expected that the USA would sooner or later become disinterested in Europe. Therefore, it was even more important to build a Western European union, which would act as a democratic, prosperous bulwark against Bolshevism. At this early stage he was willing to include Great Britain in the European unification process. Although critical of British occupation policy, he appreciated London's attempts to keep the USA in Europe and considered both Anglo-Saxon powers as the global opponents of the Soviet Union.

The events of 1948-49 vindicated Adenauer's approach.\(^{19}\) Germany's division had hardened. The Cold War and the desire to stabilize and integrate Western Europe determined Western Allied policy. He was the man of the hour who had correctly predicted the postwar development. With the official establishment of his Government on 20 September 1949 Adenauer was in the position to translate his principles into actual policy.
Chapter II: The Petersberg Agreement of 22 November 1949

Section A: The Diplomacy

The crucial issue of the first two months of Adenauer’s diplomacy dealt with Allied dismantling. Although Germans of all political stripes were fearful that dismantling would cause more hardship and political unrest, the Allied Foreign Ministers, meeting in Washington on 15 September 1949, persisted in their dismantling programme as set out in the Washington Agreements of 8 April 1949, thereby removing many factories of Germany’s heavy industry. Nonetheless, after assuming office, Adenauer attempted to come to a new agreement with the Allies over this question. It was a first test of his ability to defend German interests, while failure had the potential to discredit Western orientation.

At issue for his Government was also its position towards German membership in the International Authority on the Ruhr (IAR) and in the Council of Europe. Adenauer’s diplomacy, however, was complicated by French support for Saar representation in the Assembly of the Council because this threatened to compromise West Germany’s accession and provoked firm opposition from the Social Democrats.

Differences between Adenauer and Schumacher over the proper diplomatic approach became apparent in the Bundestag debates of 20–23 September. While the Chancellor stressed his will to cooperate with the West, the Leader of the Opposition accentuated national interest. Adenauer noted that cooperation with the Allies was the only chance to achieve freedom and sovereignty. Germany belonged culturally and ideologically to Western Europe, and he intended to bring her soon into the Council of Europe. He stressed the need to overcome the enmity between France and Germany, hoping that the Saar would not become an obstacle. Adenauer recognized French
economic interests, but added that Germany had both economic and national interests in the Saar.

Furthermore, the Three Powers must reconsider their dismantling policy, as it was causing economic distress and severe dissatisfaction among the German people. While accepting dismantling of military industries, he opposed the destruction of plants of vital economic importance and pointed to the psychological damage such actions produced among the German people who could not understand a policy which negated the positive effects of Allied economic aid.

The coalition parties supported Adenauer's pro-Western approach, showing their readiness to join efforts to build a European community. Günter Henle (CDU), an influential manager of the Klöckner steel concern, even stated that the Ruhr Authority should not be rejected per se and was ready to participate if the Authority would become the basis for broader European industrial cooperation.  

On the other hand, Kurt Schumacher warned against the risks of compromise. He noted that the German people wished that the Saar remain German. The establishment of an autonomous Saar state and its membership in the Council would severely impede European cooperation and create a fait accompli difficult to remove later. His party desired Europe, but a Europe where equal rights applied to all her members. He considered Franco-German understanding vital, but warned against giving France carte blanche. Germany should not accept developments which set precedents and prejudged the peace treaty. Compromises on Saar autonomy would mean losing the political fight over the Oder-Neisse Line.

He strongly objected to Allied dismantling. Germany should maintain a steel capacity of 14.5 million tons annually, the level of 1929-30, long before Hitler's expansion of the military industry. He advocated a
transformation of the Ruhr Authority to include trade union rights and participation and to make nationalization of the Ruhr industries possible. Compromises could be reached, but Germany could not renounce essential political and economic elements.

The debate clearly indicated that the Government was under pressure to succeed. From October to November Adenauer sought a compromise in meetings with the Allied High Commission, without however involving the Bundestag in any notable way. His initial proposals tried to satisfy the perceived Allied desire for reparations. He offered goods from current production and French and US investment in Germany's heavy industry but then shifted to the political ground when Sir Brian Robertson, the British High Commissioner, hinted that dismantling should be seen as a security question. In his proposals of 1 and 7 November the Chancellor indicated that he was prepared to participate in any organization which served to control Germany's war potential, including her steel production capacity.

The Chancellor also used interviews with the press to present his policy of integration to the German public and to audiences abroad, particularly in France. One such interview was with Ernst Friedlaender of Die Zeit, published on 3 November. It was not revealed that the "interview," marked by a desire for compromise, was in reality a dialogue of eleven questions and answers written entirely by Friedlaender and later signed by Adenauer. In it the Chancellor identified Franco-German relations as the cardinal point of his diplomacy. French security concerns were the crucial element in reconciliation, and to alleviate them he favoured German membership in the IAR. Although unhappy with the connection between the Saar question and the Council of Europe, Adenauer noted that Saar membership would not rule out Germany's entry. If Germany was invited to
the Council, his Government would undoubtedly accept.

Allied policy on this complex of issues was not unanimous. The Allies were agreed on German accession to the IAR and the Council. However, they at first were divided on dismantling. In the autumn of 1949 many American officials, in particular US High Commissioner John McCloy and ECA Director Paul Hoffman, but also a considerable number of US Congressmen, wanted to end dismantling, which undermined the goals of US aid money.\textsuperscript{13} Congress feared that the American taxpayer would be presented with the costs for these contradictory policies. Moreover, the US State Department, guided by the goal of European integration, argued that "a prosperous Europe requires the economic contribution from a productive Germany."\textsuperscript{14} The Department and McCloy, who also wanted to strengthen the image of the Bonn Government, even considered transforming the Ruhr Authority into a regulatory body, based on free-market principles, for all Western European heavy industry.\textsuperscript{15}

The creation of the German Democratic Republic on 7 October and Moscow's ostensible generosity in granting her considerable self-government put additional pressure on the Allies. Dean Acheson became apprehensive about an intensification of Soviet appeals to German nationalism and advocated a more rapid pace in West German integration.\textsuperscript{16} But he was unwilling to pressure the French and British on the dismantling issue.\textsuperscript{17} They saw it as an issue of security and of national commercial interest in the coal and steel sector and were reluctant to give Germany concessions. Yet the Foreign Office had prepared the outlines of a settlement, which involved German accession to the IAR and the Military Security Board (MSB) in return for a review of dismantling, as early as September,\textsuperscript{18} and in October Ernest Bevin adopted this quid pro quo. He anticipated riots in the Rhine-Ruhr area, an erosion of the AHC's and Adenauer's moral authority,
and pressure from Parliament and his own Labour Party against the dismantling policy of the Attlee Government. On 28 October he suggested a tripartite meeting in Paris in November to review Allied policy.19

Robert Schuman was in accord "since conditions had changed since the Washington discussions."20 He based his policy on the assumption that close association between France and Germany was essential for Europe's economic rehabilitation and for French security interests. However, his room to manoeuvre was limited by his Cabinet, the Assemblé Nationale, and the French public, all of which were more inclined to treat Germany like a conquered nation and were extremely concerned about her revival.21

In the weeks before the Paris Conference, the French Saar policy made headway. On 31 October the Saar Government applied for membership in the Council of Europe. On 3 November the Ministerial Committee of the Council, in which the members' foreign ministers were represented, considered the issue and recommended "in principle" that Germany and the Saar should be admitted as "associate members" in the spring of 1950.22

During the Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers on 9-10 November the Allies agreed on new policy guidelines and authorized the High Commission to negotiate an agreement with the Chancellor.23 On 22 November, after three rounds of negotiation, the Petersberg Agreement was concluded.24 The Allies agreed to revise their dismantling programme. Although the new list still included some of Germany's biggest steel plants, eighteen important steel, and synthetic rubber and oil plants were saved. All dismantling in Berlin was stopped. The Allies also agreed to reduce certain limitations on German shipbuilding. Furthermore, Germany was allowed to open consulates and commercial representations in approved countries. In return, the Federal Republic agreed to join the IAR and to cooperate with the MSB. She also pledged cooperation with Allied decartellization of the
Ruhr industries. Moreover, it was agreed that she should be integrated in Western Europe and be admitted to the Council of Europe as an associate member. Although Bonn had wished a higher steel production quota of 13.2 million tons annually, it remained at 11.1 million tons. The other German request, a termination of the state of war, was deferred.25

For Adenauer this was a personal success and demonstrated the fruitfulness of his policy. For the first time the German side had been able to negotiate with the Allies, thereby gaining a degree of equality. However, his diplomacy encountered opposition from the Social Democrats. Schumacher criticized the chancellor for making diplomatic offers in his interviews while denying the Parliament information about his "secret diplomacy," which would in effect decide Germany's future.26 Adenauer, he charged, underestimated Germany's diplomatic position and had prejudiced her position prior to the Paris Conference. The "complete capitulations" in the questions of the Ruhr Authority and of the Saar would bring only a partial end to dismantling. He had not achieved a revision of the Ruhr Statute nor shown any "constructive compromises," for example, including a Saar representative in the German delegation to Strasbourg. Separate Saar membership, however, would weaken Germany's moral and political claims on the Saar and the Eastern territories.

Schumacher claimed that Adenauer's proposals favoured the interests of the French and German industrialists and would establish French continental hegemony. Adenauer's goal was to prevent nationalization of the heavy industries. Schumacher stressed that the SPD stood for a Western orientation and for European integration. However, these goals would not be reached by merely supporting special interests.

The confrontation between Government and Opposition, heightened by Adenauer's refusal to let the Parliament approve of the Agreement, came to
a climax during its session of 24/25 November. The Chancellor reminded the
Bundestag that Germany must not forget the misery and suffering the Nazis
had inflicted on the world. Due to the collapse, Germany was presently
without power, while the world was still reeling from the consequences of
the war. Therefore, Germany must observe certain basic facts in her attempt
to gain more power from the Allies:

So unwürdig und falsch es sein würde, wenn wir eine Politik
sklavischer Unterwürfigkeit verfolgen würden, eine dumme, unkluge und
aussichtslose Politik wäre es, wenn wir etwa auftrumpfen wollten...Die
Methode der deutschen Aussenpolitik muss sein, langsam und stückweise
weiterzukommen. Sie muss vor allem psychologisch sein und muss
versehen, das Vertrauen wiederzuerwerben...

The Agreement was a big success. Germany had gained equal status and access
to the international forum. She could advance only through cooperation with
the Allies. The Protocols provided for that goal.

While the coalition rallied around Adenauer, the SPD argued that the
Petersberg Agreement, due to Germany’s accession to the Ruhr Authority,
constituted an international treaty and hence required approval of the
Bundestag. The Agreement’s "meagre results" had to be "bought" by
unreservedly joining the Ruhr Authority, a deal as unnecessary as it was
painful for the German people. The Agreement was a piece of horse-trading,
in which Germany exchanged one sort of "nonsense" for achieving mitigation
of another: Germany consented to accede to the IAR while the Allies agreed
partially to stop the harmful dismantlings. The Authority was an instrument
to suppress Germany's industry and would not increase European security.
The session ended in turmoil in the early morning hours when Schumacher,
rattled by Adenauer's skillful handling of the opposition attacks,
denounced him as "Chancellor of the Allies."
Chapter II, Section B: The Commentators

In the early autumn of 1949 the editorialists of Die Zeit did not foresee such a violent domestic clash over foreign policy. Their commentaries called for European integration and careful conduct of German diplomacy. Both Ernst Friedlaender and Richard Tüngel hoped that these aims would find bipartisan support. However, the weekly's immediate attention was focused on dismantling.

Friedlaender regarded the issue as so urgent that he pleaded for Allied-German negotiations weeks before the German Government was constituted. Germans, he noted on 1 September, were becoming embittered, fighting for their belief in reason and justice, and in a peaceful European community. Dismantling could create a new nationalism, tarnish Western values, and make Germans receptive to the arguments of the East. While nobody minded dismantling of military plants, Germany's most advanced factories were being dismantled, without an advantage accruing to anyone.

Friedlaender refuted the Allied claim that security concerns were an adequate justification for dismantling because "Sicherheit haben die Sieger durch die Besatzung selbst und deren Statut, durch Ruhrbehörde und Sicherheitsbehörde in Bülle und Fülle." Allied interests would be best served by integrating Germany into a federal Europe, not by alienating her. The Allies were unwilling to change the Washington Agreements because acquiescence to German demands would diminish their prestige and encourage further demands. He offered a way out of this dilemma by outlining an alternative. In his win-win scenario the Allies would decide on true peace rather than false prestige and would spare twelve essential plants. It would not imperil Allied security, but boost the German and European economies. In return, Germany would end her dismantling protests. The quickest route to such an agreement would be direct negotiations between
the American High Commissioner and the director of the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, Fritz Baade (who was also an SPD-deputy in the newly elected Bundestag).

Clearly, the article was an attempt to avert industrial crippling and political isolation. The curious choice of naming Baade as German negotiator was explained by the need to act urgently when Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the Bundestag only on 15 September. But from then on Germany had an official if at first limited voice in international affairs, and Friedlaender wasted no time in trying to influence the new Parliament. That day he outlined his ideas on the tasks and methods of Germany's future foreign policy, stressing a pan-European direction. He hoped for a dialogue between Government and Opposition since "an occupied and only half-sovereign country must be anxious to have a broad basis for its foreign policy." Aware of Germany's weak position, he expected the primacy of foreign policy to last a long time.

One of the first tasks lay in considering Germany's position regarding the Ruhr Authority. He recommended Germany's entry to increase her influence and warned the Opposition not to make accession a question of national prestige. In a thinly veiled criticism of Schumacher's election speeches he stated that "Aussenpolitik darf nicht mehr ein Tummelplatz für Dilettanten und Elefanten im Porzellanladen sein." The road to Europe must be free from domestic obstacles. Germany's great goal was to attain partial sovereignty in the framework of a supranational European community. At the same time, the Government must strive to achieve unity. West Germany should become a social and political model for the East. Given all these immense challenges, he considered it unfortunate that a grand coalition had not been formed.

Friedlaender's advocacy of IAR membership, before any politician did so,
showed his commitment to work with the West. Much like Adenauer, he acknowledged Germany’s weakened position, hoping that cooperation would in time bring rewards. Schumacher’s agitation, based on a supposed equality between Germany and the Allies, was simply anathema to him. It could only impede her integration. His plea, aimed at both Government and Opposition, for a bipartisanship was probably motivated by the hope that it might control Schumacher’s destructive potential. The other idea, that of a grand coalition, enjoyed some support, even within the CDU/CSU and the FDP, probably because the tasks before the new government appeared so overwhelming and dangerous to their political fortunes and because a united domestic front against the Allies promised greater German leverage.

Friedlaender likely agreed with such arguments and probably also thought that the young republic was too delicate to endure for long a permanent split between Government and Opposition over such crucial issues, especially when one considered the tragic fate of the Weimar Republic.

Another noteworthy element in the article was the treatment of the unity issue. Although he postulated an obligation to work for unification, practical solutions remained scarce. All that was suggested was another version of Schumacher’s “magnet theory,” which would achieve unity through creating a politically and socially superior state whose attraction would draw in the Eastern Zone. But this could only have been a long-term approach. Despite all the lip service, the unity question was at best a secondary issue, lagging behind the clearly formulated goal of European integration. The latent contradictions in pursuing these two aims were not even addressed, although he must have wondered if Western integration would not divide further the two Germanies, at least for the foreseeable future.

Friedlaender tried to resolve the difficulty of yoking Western integration with the aim of unification, but his article of 20 October
chiefly stressed his convictions about a unified Europe with German participation. He stated that the Second World War had condemned the traditional nation states to death and demanded unification of Europe’s political, economic, and cultural elements in an indissoluble federation. The most important expression of European federalism was the Assembly of the Council of Europe; however, efforts to include the Saar in the Assembly were an attempt to disrupt European unification. The fate of the Saar could only be decided by a peace treaty. France and Germany should move the Saar question to the level of bilateral discussions, away from the European issue.

Friedlaender continued: "Es besteht.. keinerlei Grund, uns in einen Europa-Schmollwinkel zurückzuziehen...Wir können uns nicht einmal nur abwartend verhalten." It would be irresponsible not to indicate Germany's determination to join the integration process. The Government and the Bundestag ought to show that Germany would accept an invitation to accede to the Council. This willingness must not be qualified by attaching conditions. Germany had only this one choice. "Langst ist Deutschland jenseits aller Möglichkeiten einer Neutralität zwischen Ost und West oder eines machiavellistischen Ausspielens des einen gegen den anderen. Wir gehören zum Abendlande, ohne Vorbehalte und ohne Bedingungen." While Germany would have equal rights in the Assembly, she could not join the Council's Committee since she did not have a foreign minister. However, this sort of old and dying sovereignty should not be Germany’s goal. Instead, she should exchange the Occupation Statute for a "European Statute." He then made a connection between European integration and the unity issue:

Das ganze Deutschland gehört dazu, und wenn das Gebiet östlich der Elbe zur Zeit keine eigene Stimme hat, so heisst das nicht, dass wir westlich der Elbe stumm bleiben müssten. Jede unmittelbare Stärkung des deutschen Westens - sei es in einem deutschen oder in einem europäischen
Bund - wird den deutschen Osten mittelbar stärker machen, die Einheit Deutschlands um einen Schritt näher bringen.

Friedlaender's article was indeed a manifesto of the idea of European integration and a powerful attempt to sway the political class in Bonn. Neutrality or a policy of balancing East against West were simply ruled out and not even discussed. At the same time, he defended enthusiasm for Europe against possible charges that it might endanger German unity. Although his desire for unity was certainly genuine, his remedy remained vague; he failed to point out how or when the Eastern Zone would benefit. The question of German unity was left in abeyance. The first task, according to his agenda, was to consolidate Europe. Perhaps the Saar question and German unity could then be solved in the context of European federalism. Europe appeared as a sort of panacea for Germany's woes. Of course, it was also convenient to isolate the "side issues" in order to advance the bigger and more urgent cause. Be it the Saar or German unity, Friedlaender was prepared to put an issue on hold to further European integration.

His strong statements were followed two weeks later by the remarkable "interview" with the Chancellor, in which he himself prepared the clear commitment that he had demanded in the previous article. In his personal recollections, which illustrate his motivation in 1949-50, Friedlaender wrote in the autumn of 1967 that Bonn had faced two policy options in 1949, of which he had favoured the latter:

Vom nationalen Prestige her hätte man sagen können: Deutschland muss wieder ein souveräner und gleichberechtigter Staat werden. Es darf daher international nichts unternehmen, sofern dabei von der Gleichberechtigung abgewichen wird. Das wäre im internationalen Felde so etwas wie ein nationaler Sitzstreik gewesen, eine Politik des "alles oder nichts." Oder aber man konnte...von etwas ganz anderem ausgehen, von dem Glauben an die europäische Zukunft. Dann musste man "vorleisten," dann musste man Prestigeopfer in Kauf nehmen in dem sicheren Vertrauen, dass jedem ersten Schritt ein zweiter und dritter folgen würde und dass dies alles sich umso schneller und besser entwickeln müsste, je europäischer die Bundesregierung sich verhielt.
Friedlaender used "eine ganz seltene publizistische und zugleich hochpolitische Gelegenheit." "Da sass ich also an Adenauers Schreibtisch und hatte reichlich Zeit, um die Frankreich- und Europapolitik des deutschen Bundeskanzlers darzustellen und in gewissem Sinne zu erfinden."

Dies war das geschlagene Deutschland, das Nach-Hitler-Deutschland. Da es nicht auf Vertrauen rechnen konnte, hatte es Vertrauen erst zu gewinnen, musste es also vertrauenswürdig sein. Dies war das oberste Gesetz einer deutschen ausseren Strategie, mit der im europäischen wie im deutschen Interesse die Bundesrepublik der freien Welt des Westens anzunähern und Schritt für Schritt einzubinden war. Frankreich aber, unter unseren von Hitlers Invasion hart getroffenen Nachbarn im Westen der mächtigste und am schwersten zu überzeugende, war das Eingangstor zu dieser Welt.33

The similarity to Adenauer's own explanations was striking, and he endorsed Friedlaender's final product without much hesitation, but in the Bundestag's first foreign policy debate the SPD used the interview as a springboard for attacking the Government. Schumacher thereby denounced a diplomatic overture in which Friedlaender had secretly played an important and proud part, and the journalist responded with a stinging attack against him on 17 November. The commentary was provocatively titled "Schumachers nationaler Sozialismus" and pilloried his dogmatism.34 He denounced the disparaging comments against the Chancellor and stated that it was a critical improvement that Germany was now involved as a negotiating party. The opposition attacks were reminiscent of the ordeal Stresemann had endured at the hands of the conservatives and extreme right. "Im Vokabular fehlt da nur ein Wort: Erfüllungspolitik."

Friedlaender smugly pointed out that Schumacher's view was not shared by Wilhelm Kaisen, the SPD's popular Premier of the State of Bremen.35 He claimed that many more Social Democrats privately harboured similar feelings and were fed up with Schumacher's "Masslosigkeit...[und] zerschlagenes ausserenpolitisches Porzellan." The SPD acted on the "primacy of domestic policy," seduced by its socialist outlook, and now faced some
tough questions:

Bist du für eine deutsch-französische Verständigung, falls sie damit erkauft werden müsste, dass die Sozialisierung der deutschen Schwerindustrie unmöglich wird? ... Wenn du die Wahl hast zwischen einem Deutschland innerhalb eines nichtsozialistischen Europas und einem sozialistischem Deutschland ausserhalb Europas, was wählst du dann? ... Was ist dir wichtiger, Europa oder der Sozialismus?

Friedlaender gave the answer: "Die... SPD hat durch ihre Reaktion auf die Frankreichpolitik des Bundeskanzlers ihre eigene Parole deutlich gemacht. Sie heisst: Sozialismus, nationaler Sozialismus über alles!" The SPD must drop the the antiquated notion that socialism equals nationalization and rethink its opposition to French investments in Germany’s heavy industry. It was possible to conduct a good foreign policy and good social policy at the same time.

Friedlaender continued the attack on Schumacher on 8 December because he believed that his policies imperiled progress in Franco-German affairs. French mistrust against Germany, he wrote, was considerable and could only be alleviated by actions. A good relationship between the two states was imperative since European federalism depended on it. He commended Adenauer for his Zeit-interview of 3 November but considered Schumacher’s perspective as wrong and damaging.

Aber diese Opposition hat nun wieder genügt, um die französische öffentliche Meinung tief zu beunruhigen, ja geradezu zu erschüttern. Bis tief in die Reihen der französischen Sozialisten hinein lässt die Kritik an der Führung der deutschen SPD an Deutlichkeit nichts zu wünschen übrig... Bei der geringen Mehrheit unser Regierungsparteien findet die Haltung der Oppositionspartei, die immerhin in vier Jahren Regierungspartei werden könnte, in Frankreich stärkste Beachtung.

Friedlaender did not expect that the SPD would change its position and feared for the prospects of French-German reconciliation. Therefore, he hoped that the French Government would reply to Adenauer’s interview, continuing the good will and positive signals. This might also loosen "die etwas erstarrte Front zwischen deutscher Regierung und deutscher Opposition."
Shortly afterwards he again took matters into his own hand, arranging an interview with Robert Schuman, published just before Christmas. With so much commitment to Franco-German understanding and European federalism the vehemence of Friedlaender's criticism of Schumacher was hardly surprising. His nationalistic, dogmatic diplomacy was the complete opposite of what he had in mind. His articles were a firm attempt to stop the SPD from wreaking more havoc. It seemed odd that Friedlaender did not endorse the Chancellor's course more openly when they shared such an outlook. Throughout this period he gave Adenauer only tacit approval, perhaps fearing that more explicit praise would undermine his journalistic independence, influence, and reputation.

The editor-in-chief of Die Zeit, Richard Tüngel, was not nearly so enthusiastic about European cooperation but equally scathing in his attacks on Schumacher. In his article of 8 September, reacting to the election, he denounced the lack of constructive, factual policy in light of Germany's weak position and criticized Schumacher's excessive nationalism. He stated that Germany would probably have to wait a long time before sovereignty and freedom were granted. Abroad she was watched with suspicion and dislike. The other nations wanted to keep her as weak as possible. Regardless of this predicament, the leaders of the two big parties, but especially Schumacher, had caused unnecessary damage with their recent campaign utterances. Why, Tüngel asked, did the SPD steer such a nationalistic course? In the Saar question, for instance, Schumacher had viewed the Saar's entry into the Council of Europe as a "severe conflict." Tüngel maintained that Germany's position could be preserved by stating at the time of Germany's accession that membership did not prejudice the peace treaty. Keeping away from the Council would not be approved by the West. He charged that Schumacher was determined to conduct an uncompromising
opposition policy although Germany required constructive bipartisan diplomacy.

Two and a half months later the Petersberg Agreement was concluded. Tüngel hailed the achievement, calling it the "New Deal für Deutschland," and ridiculed the Opposition in his editorial of 24 November. He ironically juxtaposed the SPD's predictions of Adenauer's failure with the actual results. The only true German concession was the recognition of the Ruhr Statute. He reduced the SPD's attacks on German membership in the Ruhr Authority to a willing acceptance of continued dismantling and castigated Schumacher for claiming that acceptance of Saar membership in the Council of Europe meant surrendering the Eastern territories. "Wie ist es möglich, dass der Führer einer grossen deutschen Partei sich so hemmungslos der Demagogie hingibt ohne jede Rücksicht auf die ernsthaftesten Interessen des deutschen Volkes?...Weil dieser masslose Mann in Deutschland nicht die ganze Macht haben kann, will er wenigstens die ganze Opposition haben."

However, Tüngel also regretted that Adenauer had treated the Parliament in such a "rough manner." But Germany should be thankful for the Agreement, especially since the Nazi horror had not been forgotten abroad. Germany had received important and generous concessions, and for the first time negotiations had replaced dictates. Furthermore, "es ist ein Anfang gemacht worden, Deutschland wieder in Europa aufzunehmen."

Tüngel's point about Schumacher's position concerning the Eastern Territories was extreme and a reflection of his strong dislike of Socialism. Schumacher's argument was not in the least far-fetched, and the Government was quietly aware of it. As it was, the weekly's support for the Petersberg Protocol gave Adenauer important backing on the controversial issues concerning the IAR and the Saar. Schumacher, however, was severely taken to task. Die Zeit was aware that there was much distrust
and animosity against Germany abroad. Like Adenauer, the weekly knew that this was a cardinal element in post-war diplomacy and that Schumacher's strident nationalism was inappropriate and hardly helpful for German policy. Tüngel and Friedlaender only differed in analyzing the causes for Schumacher's vehement attacks. The former saw it in the embitterment over a lost election, the latter in Schumacher's dogmatic nationalism.

While Die Zeit stressed the precariousness of West Germany's position, Paul Sethe, the principal editorialist of the daily Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, maintained in his commentaries of November that the German status was improving. The Occupation Statute, Sethe argued, was in fact lagging behind the diplomatic reality. Adenauer's initiative showed that Germany was de facto conducting foreign policy. Her position should not be underestimated:


Not unlike Schumacher, Sethe was unabashed in stating Germany's growing value, and he expected the Allies to acknowledge it. The sooner they made a generous gesture and granted Germany equality and freedom, the more she would be buoyed and bound to Western ideals. If the Allies could not make such a gesture, then there might be in the end "eine verzweifelte oder gleichgültige Nation in der Mitte Europas...Glaubt man im Ernst, dass eine Nation, die sich immer zurückgeworfen fühlt, auf die Dauer auch in der geistigen Haltung ein Bollwerk Europas sein könnte?" And: "Wir wollen keine Kommunisten und keine Nationalsozialisten werden," but without Allied generosity Germans will wonder "ob es sich überhaupt lohne, für die westliche Welt einzutreten." Therefore: "Warum...tut man das doch
Sethe urged in particular the French Government to show a more constructive policy. Recent French policies had left many supporters of Franco-German understanding disappointed and discouraged. French intransigence, and resulting European disunity and German bitterness, carried the threat of an eventual American withdrawal from Europe. Without American help, Sethe asserted, Europe would be lost. Therefore: "Für uns alle, die wir den Rest europäischer Kultur und...wirtschaft verteidigen möchten, hängt Unendliches davon ab, ob der Ruf der Geschichte vom Quai d'Orsay vernommen wird."

One of Sethe's targets was the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. He labelled him a man who could not suppress his animosity toward Germany. To him Bevin represented the sort of policy that was the opposite of what he advocated. He reacted very negatively when Bevin declared that Germany would not be granted new powers until September 1950 and then only if in the meantime she had given further evidence of her democratic and pacific will. Bevin could not "leave yesterday behind," and behind his formulation Sethe saw the unwillingness to give in to German demands."

In his assessment of German policy he gave Adenauer qualified support. Sethe described his initiative as an attempt to satisfy French security concerns and to move Germany ahead. The proposals were very significant, yet German membership in the International Authority on the Ruhr represented a big sacrifice.

...Die Ruhrbehörde wird vier Jahre nach dem Ende der Feindseligkeiten errichtet, und sie soll dauern. Sie kann praktisch den Umfang und die Erzeugung der deutschen Industrie bestimmen. Sie ist in entscheidenden Dingen mächtiger als die Bundesregierung. Die Mitarbeit bei ihr jetzt zu beginnen, bedeutet die feierliche Zustimmung dazu, dass vom Ausland her
Sethe saw the French desire to admit the Saar simultaneously with Germany to the Council of Europe as another considerable concession. "Unsere Zustimmung zu seiner selbständigen Aufnahme in die Strassburger Versammlung könnte leicht so ausgelegt werden, als erklärten wir uns mit seiner Abtrennung einverstanden. Es ist also ausserordentlich viel, was die Bundesregierung...den Westmächten anbietet." In return, he assumed, Adenauer hoped to achieve a "common European law" which would lead to the eventual transformation of the IAR into a regulatory body for the Western European heavy industry and to a solution of the Saar question.

Sethe noted that the recent weeks had shown that Germany's diplomacy was firmly in the hand of the Chancellor, whom he expected to become his own foreign minister. At the same time he regretted both Schumacher's "shrill cacaphony" and the fact that Germany's first diplomatic step were undertaken against the "bitter enmity" of the SPD. It was partly Adenauer's fault that the political atmosphere was reminiscent of the Weimar years. He hoped that this situation could soon be removed in favour of "the ideal kind of diplomacy:" "eine Aussenpolitik, die als Realpolitik von allen politischen Kreisen gleichermassen getragen wird.""45"

Yet the division between Adenauer and Schumacher deepened. Sethe stated on 18 November that the personal animosity between the two leaders had escalated to a level which boded ill for the development of German politics. "Die Atmosphäre ist stellenweise mit so viel unversöhnlicher Feindschaft, ja mit Hass geschwängert, dass der Beobachter davor erschrickt." He grieved that Schumacher's remarkable qualities were spoiled by his recklessness, his lack of moderation, and his penchant for excessively aggressive and unjust formulations. Wilhelm Kaisen's support
for Adenauer’s initiative indicated "dass eben die Hemmungslosigkeit in der politischen Auseinandersetzung, die ebenso zum politischen Charakterbilde Schumacher’s gehört wie Energie und Einfallskraft, in seiner Partei nicht ohne Widerspruch geblieben ist." Sethe argued that Adenauer’s insufficient information and confusing interviews had contributed to Schumacher’s irritation. He prophesied: "Die Deutschen müssen...sich damit vertraut...machen, dass zwischen Regierung und Opposition in den nächsten Jahren nicht nur politischer Kampf, sondern bitterer Krieg und persönliche Feindschaft herrschen werden."**

Schumacher’s scandalous denunciation of Adenauer in the Bundestag underscored these premonitions. Sethe wrote that Adenauer had outmaneuvered him like a "master tactician." The illusion of a grand coalition had burst like a bubble. It was inconceivable to imagine them belonging to the same cabinet. The root of the disagreement lay in the fact that Schumacher considered the price Adenauer paid in the Agreement as too high and his diplomacy as not clever enough.

Er hat an ein stärkeres Interesse der Westmächte an der Befriedigung Deutschlands geglaubt, als es der skeptischere Kanzler annimmt. Er hat sich vorgestellt, dass, wenn man die drei Außenminister mit Vorschlägen an Deutschland herankommen lasse, man ihnen nicht so viel zu bieten brauchte, wie es der Kanzler von vorneheren getan hat; dass man im Abtasten der Stimmung und der Lage hätte feststellen können, bis wieweit man hätte gehen müssen, und dass man zum mindesten einige Verbesserungen im Ruhrstatut hätte herausschöpfen können.

Schumachers’s real defeat was his losing the support of the trade unions and of the Hanseatic leaders. "Viele Arbeiter...weigerten sich, eine Bahn mitzugehen, an deren Ende sie das Gespenst der Arbeitslosigkeit erblickten...Draussen im Lande ist Kühe entstanden zwischen dem Parteiführer und den Gefolgsleuten." He doubted whether Schumacher could ever appeal to the masses, although as leader of the SPD he needed their support. "Dafür hat er zu viele intellektuelle Züge, vielleicht auch zu
sehr preußische Züge." Fearing that Schumacher was a tragic figure, he predicted: "Vielleicht werden schon die kommenden Jahre, mit unlösbarem Verkettung von Verdienst und Schuld in Schumachers Schicksal, dieses Gefühl bestätigen."

The editorials showed that Sethe wanted to join the West as an equal member and defend Europe, presumably against the threats of Communism and political and economic instability, but his desire for European integration appeared more muted than that of Friedlaender. His support for Adenauer was equally reserved and diminished by his criticism of the Chancellor's methods, which had provoked so much hostility and for Sethe conjured up the sinister ghost of Weimar. He adamantly stressed German interests and was cognizant of Germany's surging power, not unlike Schumacher, for whom he seemed to harbour sympathy, and conceivably thought that Adenauer could have done better. The concessions made him uncomfortable, which indicated how risky Adenauer's policy was. Sethe correctly pointed to the purported powers of the IAR. What he and Bonn did not know was that these powers actually lay with the AHC, a fact which the Allies tried to hide from the Germans.

Since the Allies did not desire immediately to grant Bonn equal status, Sethe was always eager to raise the spectre of German bitterness, and he appeared to hold resentments against the Western Powers, most certainly born out of hurt national pride. Yet he had little understanding of the feelings towards Germany abroad, again resembling Schumacher who also insisted on instant equality. Sethe was too quick to assume that the Nazi horrors could be easily forgotten. With the international trend on Germany's side all powers should heed the logic of Realpolitik. But could Realpolitik, unemotional foreign policy purely based on national interest, unreservedly guide the conduct of the West when for years Germany had
brutalized its nations? To ignore deep-seated emotions, like anti-German feelings in the Western world in 1949-50, was dangerously naive, to say the least. Sethe was perhaps too keen to leave the German past behind, whereas Adenauer was wiser and equipped with a finer psychological understanding.

However, Sethe was right to point to Adenauer's crafty manipulation of Schumacher in the Bundestag. It was certainly in the Chancellor's interest to exaggerate differences with the SPD because in the long run this strengthened his own position: in his Coalition and with the Allies. Already in the first two months he had shown flashes of his political genius, striking a crucial agreement with the West and laying to rest speculations about a grand coalition.

Hans Baumgarten, Sethe's colleague in the FAZ, pleaded more forcefully than he for German participation in European integration, emphasizing economic as well as political reasons. He called for an energetic Europe which utilized America's "great and historic contribution," the Marshall Plan, to achieve fast reconstruction. Baumgarten listed an entire array of economic arrangements and establishments that he deemed necessary to create a European economic union: liberalized trade, free currency convertibility, and a European branch of the World Bank. He regretted the inability of the British Labour Government to choose between the Commonwealth and a European community. Therefore, he endorsed quick steps towards a continental tariff union, for which German membership was an essential prerequisite. West Germany should be given sovereignty and/or be quickly integrated with equal rights in a European union, regardless of the slow pace of European integration. Europe must realize: "In Deutschland herrscht der Wille zur Freiheit, weil die Deutschen ein europäisches Volk sind und weil sie diese Freiheit...in einem friedlichen und vereinigten Europa verankern wollen."
Baumgarten, writing on 9 November, hoped that the Paris Conference would give Europe a much needed impetus because "Europa steckt im Dreck." But he warned that despite Allied expectations Germany could not give much in terms of security. She was already divided, demilitarized, and under occupation. "Man kann nicht gut in den Bund, um ihm die Kraft zu geben, ein neues Mitglied aufnehmen, es aber vorher kastrieren." French and British attempts to limit German economic competition also harmed the efforts to build a European union, which required two preliminary steps: Western Europe must first be organized in a stable political system; and a European common market must then be formed. All other economic and political aspects could be addressed afterwards. The Europeans should not lose sight of what Baumgarten saw as the main goal: "Eine freie europäische Gemeinschaft zu bilden, deren Selbstvertrauen und eigene wirtschaftliche Kraftballung es gestatten, vorurteilslos nach allen Seiten zu schauen und mit allen friedlich ihre Güter zu tauschen." This seemingly innocuous phrase was remarkable since it probably meant to advocate German trade with Eastern Europe, albeit in a "politically correct" construct, namely that of the European union. Certain industrial circles in West Germany had been advocating such a trade expansion; now Baumgarten supported their call while trying to avoid the possible political ramifications of commercial ties with the Communist bloc. At the same time, Baumgarten, in some ways the spokesman of German business and economic interests, provided entrepreneurs with another good reason for supporting European integration.

He endorsed Adenauer's initiative which he hailed as "echte Realpolitik." The German people, he wrote, supported the Chancellor in accepting the French security needs and in attempting to remove the French-German antagonism once and for all. However, he thought that Adenauer should have given a clearer and more comprehensive vision of
European unity, rather than functionalizing these issues to solve immediate problems. He rejected Schumacher's chief arguments and described his agitation as a sign of weakness since he had been unable to offer any alternatives to Adenauer's course.

However, Baumgarten did agree with Schumacher in minor points and expressed irritation at Adenauer's diplomatic methods. Why was it, he asked, that Adenauer's confusing interviews offered more in concessions than his notes to the High Commission? Moreover, Adenauer had not addressed all the dangerous articles in the Ruhr Statute, and the diplomatic possibilities in the Saar question had not been explored fully. He dryly noted that the Chancellor might require a foreign minister. Yet despite the doubts about Adenauer's approach, Baumgarten welcomed the end result, namely the rapprochement between the Allies and Germany.

Hence Baumgarten gave cautious approval to the Agreement. Germany, he said, was still in a state of limbo: the Allies had begun to normalize relations with Germany, but continued to stress that Germany was still an occupied country without a peace settlement. At least the Agreement had granted Germany greater economic leverage. It was a substantial success for Adenauer, who, however, had not been without blame in the recent domestic embarrassments. Baumgarten, like the previous commentators showing uneasiness over the bitterness in the political discourse, hoped that the Chancellor would use his diplomatic principles in the domestic realm as well: "...nämlich die Grundsätze des Willens zur Vereinbarung, zur Verständigung und zur Konzilianz."

The perspectives of Baumgarten resembled those of the other pundits. There was general agreement that Germany could not remain in its current isolation and deprived status. On the whole, all agreed on the need to integrate Germany in Europe, seen as a way to attain equal status; as a
result the commentators implored the Western Allies to show farsightedness and generosity. The commentators rightly felt that Germany's position was on the mend. Europe and the West needed Germany as much as vice versa. Despite criticism of his style and methods, Adenauer's course was encouraged, Schumacher's principles were not. So far the pundits were willing to follow Adenauer's diplomacy.
Chapter III: The Saar Issue

Section A: The Diplomacy

The Petersberg Agreement provided Adenauer with a promising diplomatic start. However, German optimism about more progress was doused by further developments in the Saar issue. In December 1949 Bonn received reports that France planned conventions with the Saar to settle ownership and working rights of the Saar coal mines, obligations of the Franco-Saar economic union, aspects of Saar autonomy, and the role of the French High Commissioner in the Saar.¹ They were confirmed when just prior to Schuman's official visit to Bonn of 13-15 January the Quai announced negotiations with the Saar in February to settle "details of mutual economic cooperation."²

French decision-makers realized that the Saar's separation from Germany, created by unilateral actions in 1945-48, would have no legal foundation until the peace treaty.³ They decided that France should act while she was strong. The envisaged treaties would increase Saar autonomy and still guarantee French control over the territory.⁴

During Schuman's visit the respective attitudes of the two Governments on the Saar could not be harmonized. Schuman stated that France would continue her economic links with the Saar, for which Germany was not responsible. She could not participate in the matter or protest against it.⁵ He received support from Dean Acheson who stated that the US fully backed the French position that the Saar should be politically detached from Germany and economically integrated with France. The final determination of the degree of Saar autonomy would be set in the peace settlement.⁶

Adenauer declared that any unilateral change in the status of the Saar
would adversely affect those forces in Germany which sought an understanding with France and German participation in the European community. The Potsdam decision to reserve the question of Germany's frontiers for the peace treaty must not be contradicted. A lease of the Saar mines, legally the property of the Federal Republic, would deprive the Saar of independent economic activity. Schumacher also denounced the Franco-Sarrois negotiations, using much the same arguments. Opposition to French policy in fact seemed to unite the German parties. Germany, he said, could not tolerate unilateral acts of power politics before the peace treaty. Saar autonomy would not mean greater independence from France, but separation from Germany. The French actions devalued Franco-German understanding and could not be recognized. He again warned that acceptance of Saar membership in the Council of Europe would imply recognition of its special status and constitute a renunciation of the territory.

Even Adenauer's Cabinet, which usually left diplomacy to him, manifested its anger. The Minister of Justice, Thomas Dehler (FDP), gave a speech criticizing French diplomacy of the previous three decades. France, he charged, bore as much responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War as Germany. Moreover, the rise of Hitler should be blamed in part on the Treaty of Versailles and on French attempts to keep Germany weak and divided. Jakob Kaiser (CDU), Minister for All-German Affairs, leaked his Cabinet memorandum on the Saar to the press. It stated that Germany could not renounce the Saar without also losing the Eastern territories since a solution in either question prejudiced the outcome of the other. Germany should oppose attempts at establishing faits accomplis and demand a plebiscite in the Saar concerning its political status.

French policy clearly collided with German interests, and the ensuing friction cast doubts on Adenauer's goal of integration. Partially to
downplay negative effects of German indignation, he modified his approach. His Government stated that the Saar question should not disturb a promising European development. Bonn would strictly adhere to a policy of cooperation with the Western Allies by creating Franco-German understanding and promoting European union. Everything possible should be done to convince the German people that the future of their country was identical with that of Western Europe.

These suggestions surely were also meant to alert the Allies to the dangers of the Saar issue, which, however, became more troublesome. On 3 March, much earlier than Schuman had led Adenauer to believe, the Saar Conventions were signed. The General Convention laid down that the Saar possessed autonomy in legislative, administrative, and juridical matters but also granted the French representative in the Saar wide-ranging powers which largely curtailed self-rule. The Economic Convention specified that the Saar and France would not discriminate against each other's products. The Convention on the Saar Coal Mines stated that France would exploit the mines and that this arrangement would not prejudice the peace treaty. France undertook to support the Saar's claim to ownership of the mines in the peace settlement. If the treaty upheld Saar ownership, the Convention would be continued until its duration reached fifty years.

Adenauer's initial reaction was harsh, and he condemned the Conventions the following day. He stressed Germany's legal position and warned that the agreements imperiled Franco-German relations and violated the Potsdam principles. The idea of European unity had been gravely menaced by the French action, which would encourage nationalistic tendencies in Germany. He appealed to the US and UK to take up a definitive position on the Saar problem.

Over the next days, however, he again shifted and tested the ground for
compromise. His Government published a White Book on the Saar question which condemned the French policy of "disguised annexation" but also proposed an International Saar Authority, a customs arrangement which would join Lorraine and Southern Germany economically to the Saar. Bonn was willing to endow the Saar with a measure of economic autonomy if France returned the Saar officially to her Occupation Zone, thereby confirming Germany's territorial claim. Subject to a Saar plebiscite, such a scheme would satisfy French economic aims while political separation of the Saar from Germany would be avoided. 17

Adenauer also used interviews to accentuate the issues of French-German understanding and European cooperation and to overcome the Allied-German tensions. He suggested that Franco-German antagonism be ended through the creation of a union between the two countries. It might be widened by embracing other European countries and would make a reality of European unity. Later he redefined this concept, calling for the establishment of a Franco-German customs union and of a joint parliamentary economic council, again open for others to join. He stressed that Europe was faced with the Communist danger and with the possibility of further Russian encroachments or even conquest. The temptation for the USSR to make war was greater than was generally supposed. The increasing tension in Europe caused him deep anxiety, and he affirmed that bold steps were necessary. 18

At the end of March Adenauer addressed the question of German membership in the Council of Europe, which had clearly lost appeal because of the Saar developments. Searching for face-saving concessions, the Chancellor asked that the Allies confirm by written invitation that they held Germany's accession desirable. They were also asked to give formal assurances that Saar membership and her political status were only provisional, to be examined at the peace conference. 19 The AHC agreed. On 1 April, the
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers decided to invite Germany and the Saar as associate members. The formal invitations were presented to the German Government by the High Commissioners on 2 April.20

Despite this small success, the Chancellor felt diplomatically isolated. His relations with the High Commission worsened. On 14 and 20 April the AHC vetoed two important pieces of domestic legislation.21 During a political rally in Berlin on 18 April Adenauer attacked the Western Allies for their hesitant attitude towards German integration, demanding equal treatment and revision of the Occupation Statute by autumn.22 At the same time, his handling of foreign affairs provoked criticism even among the coalition parties. The Bundestag adopted an SPD resolution, supported by votes of the coalition parties, calling for the establishment of a ministry for foreign affairs with its own undersecretary. This motion, in effect a call for a quasi-foreign minister other than Adenauer, indicated that dissatisfaction with his diplomatic methods, especially his interviews, had spread into the ranks of the Government.23

April passed without major diplomatic activity. On 9 May the German Cabinet deliberated on the issue of membership in the Council and agreed to recommend accession. However, Jakob Kaiser and the Minister of the Interior, Gustav Heinemann (CDU), voiced strong objections, backing the rest of the Cabinet only after a long debate. They feared that Germany’s membership would deepen the German division. Heinemann also worried that it would eventually lead to her accession to NATO, thereby increasing global tensions. The two ministers, however, remained isolated. The overwhelming majorities in the Cabinet and among the coalition parties agreed with Adenauer’s perspective that Germany must choose Europe.24
Ernst Friedlaender shared this European commitment, and he reacted with caution to the news of the Conventions, at first clearly wishing to calm matters. The situation was serious, he wrote on 12 January. "De facto the Saar was separated from Germany, albeit without support of an international treaty. Given all the annexations in East and West, one had the impression that the Allies wanted to dismember Germany. Naturally, Germans opposed this policy and tried to stop it in the Saar where there was still flux.

Germany should refrain from nationalistic agitation and rely on international law against the French faits accomplis. She must stress the provisional status and have it upheld by the US and the UK. When the Parliament would vote on entry into the Council, it should restate that the status of the Saar could only be decided by the peace treaty. A "no" to Strasbourg must not be considered since then Germany would exclude herself from Europe.

French policy of creating a Saar buffer state was based on the economic ties between the Saar and Lorraine and on fear of Germany. These motives would be irrelevant in a federal Europe, "denn dieses Europa wird weder die wirtschaftspolitischen Grenzen noch die nationalpolitischen Gefahren der Vergangenheit kennen." It would be myopic to confront French nationalistic policy with a German one. "Die europäische Antwort ist die richtige, auch für Deutschland, auch für die Saar." It would strengthen Germany's position, and time was on her side.

Later he stressed the positive aspects of Schuman's visit. "He had come to inform and to be informed, Friedlaender wrote on 19 January. Certainly, the announcement of the Conventions had caused disquiet. There had existed a danger that Franco-German reconciliation would be equated
with a solution in the Saar question, that mutual relations would harden. But Adenauer and Schuman had shown coolness and had not forgotten to stress common interests.

Schuman now knew that Germany could not accept a separation of the Saar or formal economic union with France. He had also recognized that Adenauer had a difficult domestic position which threatened to compromise his goals. "Frankreich steht deshalb tatsächlich vor der Frage, ob ihm eine unnachgiebige Saarpolitik...wichtiger ist, als die Anwesenheit Deutschlands in Strassburg." Neither side should force the issue since there was for the moment no solution in the offing. Instead, progress should be made on European issues and on other aspects of French-German relations.

The Saar Conventions, however, demolished hopes that the question could be shelved. On 9 March Friedlaender criticized the French position, yet still maintained that Germany must continue to work for European federalism. The Conventions, he noted, were a reason to mourn. Nobody could ask Germany to accept them quietly. Bonn rightly felt responsible for developments within the borders of 1937, the legal status until a peace settlement. It was hypocrisy on the part of the Allies to expect Bonn to denounce developments in the Eastern Zone and the Eastern territories, while asking Germany to acquiesce into French faits accomplis. The Saar regime was a spurious democracy, based on suppression of basic human rights and differing little from East German rule. What was required was a free plebiscite in the Saar. The Conventions undermined basic democratic rights by not allowing pro-German parties, by increasing the supreme powers of the French High Commissioner, and by making it impossible to endorse unification with Germany publicly. Although the peace settlement was not legally prejudiced, the Conventions were an attempt to create political facts: to turn the Saar into a "Luxembourg," to make the facto provisorium
This policy of territorial annexation was anachronistic and damaging to European unity. France could not fear both the Soviet Union and Germany. And Germany could not be both a foe and partner of Europe. Indeed, Europe was unthinkable without German partnership. Therefore, it was imperative that Germany not lose her determination to build Europe. And her right could best be expressed and asserted in the Council. "Unsere Parole bleibt: Strassburg."

Again Friedlaender's European resolve remained steadfast. Despite strongly defending German interests in the Saar, he presented European integration and Franco-German understanding as the remedy. This argumentation supported Adenauer's course but on 6 April he attacked the Chancellor for his diplomatic conduct in the preceding weeks.**" He began by outlining the aims of German foreign policy.


These aims required tact, endurance, and psychological understanding. He continued by supporting the Bundestag's call for an independent foreign affairs ministry, without which Germany could not join international diplomacy. There lately had been displeasure, widespread even among the coalition parties, about the "diplomatic improvisations" of the Chancellor: "Weder in der Saarfrage noch in der Europafrage war jenes Mass von Überlegener Sicherheit, von Detailkenntnis, von Zielklarheit zu verzeichnen, das nun einmal zu einer erfolgreichen Außenpolitik gehört."
And:

Der...an Frankreich gerichtete Vorschlag zu einer deutsch-französischen Union, der in Paris nur den Karolingern De Gaulle begeisterte, hat dem Ansehen weder des Kanzlers noch Deutschlands genützt. Das deutsch-französische Verhältnis lässt sich heute nicht mehr isolieren und gleichsam "an Strassburg vorbei" in Ordnung bringen.

The Chancellor should surrender the task of foreign affairs to someone else.

Eine Aussenpolitik, bei der allein der Bundeskanzler zu Wort kommt, muss, gerade in unserer Lage, unelastisch werden...Er hat die Richtlinien der Politik zu bestimmen, nach aussen wie nach innen. Dieser Aufgabe wird er auf die Dauer nicht gewachsen bleiben, wenn er das Ressort Aussenpolitik als sein eigener Aussenminister bearbeiten will...

These were strong and surprising words since he shared the same principles as Adenauer, principles that Friedlaender did not want changed under a new minister. This was one reason for mentioning the Chancellor’s *Richtlinienkompetenz*. But the sudden call for a new man indicated that Adenauer’s unorthodox interviews and deficient diplomatic skills had created a bad impression. He was also worried that the Chancellor might begin a policy which ignored the Council. Hence his opposition to French-German union. However, he could not suggest a possible candidate to replace Adenauer in the diplomatic realm.

Rudolf Augstein, the publisher of the *Spiegel*, shared the criticism of Adenauer’s methods but also developed a conception of foreign policy that refuted the goals espoused by both the Chancellor and Friedlaender. Using the pseudonym of "Jens Daniel," he began his periodic editorials on German diplomacy in the spring of 1950. Adenauer’s interviews, Augstein stated on 30 March, were a dilettantish attempt to "chum up" to France. It was frightening to see how nebulous his ideas were. The Soviet danger was immense, but a French-German union could not alleviate it. "Wie erst wenn die blinden Franzosen die gelähmten Deutschen führen sollten!...Wenn die sicherheitslüsternen Franzosen in ständiger

He accused Adenauer of unprincipled maneuvering and blundering. Moreover, the Chancellor acted too independently. "Es [ist] wohl Zeit, nach einem kühlen Strategen Ausschau zu halten," although he suspected that Adenauer wanted to rule alone. "Einen instinktsicheren Politiker zum Aussenminister machen, das heisst, mit ihm und gegen ihn in die Arena steigen. Furchtet sich der imponierende alte Indianer von Rhöndorf?"

While this article failed to mention the Saar issue, it reflected doubts about the desirability of close Franco-German ties in Augstein’s thinking. The following week he revealed his foreign policy principles. He noted on 6 April that concerning the Council Germany had no choice but to accept the invitation.32


He was not inclined to hurry Western integration or any German diplomatic activity:

Zwar ist es bestimmt ein Fehler, Deutschland - aus der törichten Angst, es könnte zum Kreml pilgern - an einen Ratstisch zu holen, an dem die Deutschen noch nicht gleichberechtigt sind und an dem die übrigen Partner sich noch nicht über die Spielregeln geeinigt haben...Warum... sollen denn die Deutschen im internationalen Konzert gleich wieder mitspielen, wenn ihnen noch ständig bescheinigt wird, sie verstünden die Noten nicht?

Unless German troops were required in the future, the West did not need Germany. Adenauer’s only role should be to ensure that Germany would become
economically and politically stable. Against Adenauer’s orientation, he
developed the alternative of neutrality:

Die [Amerikaner sind] von der Erkenntnis nicht mehr weit entfernt, dass
Westdeutschland keine bessere Bastion in ihrer Front sein kann, als wenn
es neutral und wirtschaftlich gesund ist: ein durch Wasserstoffbomben
garantieter Puffer-Staat, der Aussicht hat, mit Ostdeutschland
vereinigt zu werden, und der den westlichen Absatzmarkt durch Export
nach Osten entlastet. Niemand kann sagen, ob die Russen einem neutralen,
abgerüsteten Westdeutschland irgendwann die Ostzone zurückgeben würden.
Aber dass Konrad Adenauer diese Möglichkeit durch seine Politik
ausschaltet, lässt sich mit Sicherheit sagen.

Augstein regretted that the German press and the Bundestag had failed to
discuss the European question in an "open way." It was time to think beyond
the slogans of the two party leaders and to anticipate the consequences of
their policies.

Die Europa-Ekstase mag... hierzulande aufrichtig und glühend sein...aber
sie wird in einer erbärmlichen Enttäuschung versanden, wenn die Firma
Hoffman zumacht, bevor den europäischen Nationalwirtschaften der letzte
Zahn gezogen ist. Wenn England und Frankreich, unter sich schon uneins,
nicht bereit sind, sich gemeinsam an der deutschen Nachkriegs-Misere zu
beteiligen, ist die Europa-Idee witzlos.
Der Stolpergang nach Strassburg, so verkehrt er sein mag, bedeutet
keinen Beinbruch. Aber dahinter droht der Atlantik-Pakt. Es ist wohl
angebracht, die Leute, denen wir uns für vier Jahre ausliefern mussten,
jetzt schon zu ersuchen, sich über Deutschlands internationale Position
eine Vorstellung zu machen, die über das Übliche Fabulieren von der
Einheit der abendländischen Kultur oder von der Heilslehre des Karl Marx
hinausgeht.

Here was an alternative to Adenauer’s policy. Augstein’s
"Euro-scepticism" and his longing for unity culminated in the concept of a
neutral Germany, which he claimed would even benefit the West. Augstein
introduced a new argument into what he perceived to be a shallow, if not
dishonest political discourse. Like Heinemann, Augstein suspected that
Adenauer’s foreign policy opened the way for military integration while
closing the door on unity. This was the apparent price for Western
alignment, and now doubts began to emerge.

Augstein did not want to conduct diplomacy. He was determined to avoid
any commitments to the West and content with a place between the two ideological camps, Germany's economic survival guaranteed by trade with both sides. This idea was not new. Even Adenauer and Schumacher, in 1949-50 ardent proponents of Western orientation, had a few years earlier played with the thought. But was neutrality now a viable policy? Would a majority of West Germans have wanted it, and would the Western Powers have tolerated such a course? The first part had to be answered with a no. Opinion polls in 1949 to early 1951 suggested that, depending on how the question was posed, neutrality was approved by 25-45% of West Germans, but among those few saw it as a real possibility. The West German population seemed too concerned with political, military, and economic security. It was also too anti-Communist to dare the risk of neutrality with the dangers of a Communist overthrow or attack. And it appeared unlikely that the Three Powers would have retreated from their policy of integrating West Germany. The ghosts of Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet pact dictated that the road to a possible German-Soviet understanding ought to be avoided. In 1949-50 none of the Three Powers contemplated German neutrality. Augstein's assertion that the US was leaning towards it was simply wrong. Concrete moves on German neutrality occurred only in 1952-53. In 1952 Stalin offered an armed and neutral Germany, and in 1953-54 Winston Churchill, then British Prime Minister and eager to achieve détente, seriously considered the neutralization of Germany, without, however, convincing any of the Western leaders of this conception, least of all Adenauer.

Paul Sethe also toyed with neutralist sentiments at this time, but they were based on the notion of an armed and neutral Europe. For the moment, however, efforts should be concentrated on the creation of a united Europe. This idea guided his assessment of the Saar issue. In January he warned against French attempts to separate the Saar from Germany and
hoped that European unity would advance in spite of the French-German deadlock. France and Germany must not forget that they depended on each other. It had been necessary to state the German position since French-Saar negotiations would cut deep into German rights. Europe had better realize that cooperation was necessary in the light of the danger that she faced.  

The Allies should consider what effects an annexation of the Saar might have on Germany's attitude towards the West. Their Saar policy threatened to breed cynicism and anger while "Stalin was no doubt watching gleefully." Charges of German nationalism were misplaced as was blame for Adenauer who had been mistaken about the degree to which the West was willing to cooperate. Nonetheless, he should continue to aim for European cooperation. Sethe supported his economic proposals since Germany did not oppose French economic interests in the Saar. She was prepared to make sacrifices, except for territorial ones. The idea of internationalization was useful because it would give France access to Saar coal without any territorial changes.  

Despite this backing, in February Sethe urged Adenauer twice to appoint a secretary of state for foreign affairs who could work independently. His handling of some aspects of the Saar issue had been unclear and confusing. The comments by Dehler and Kaiser were inopportune, but Adenauer should have better instructed his Cabinet about the profundity of the situation. Chancellor and Cabinet needed an experienced state secretary, but Sethe wondered whether Adenauer would give him enough latitude. He admired his energy and stamina; however, Adenauer already carried too many burdens and should share his immense responsibilities.  

Sethe adhered to his pro-European line even after the Conventions. They were a sign, he charged, that French political circles were unfit to guide
Europe into a new era. Bonn must take the high road and ignore Allied foolishness. The Conventions exposed the lack of understanding between Allies and Germany. The Allies could not comprehend German disappointment. Adenauer had tried to to cooperate with France but was let down. The result was that:

Deutschland hat eine Niederlage erlitten, und diese Niederlage liegt nicht nur darin begründet, dass es ohnmächtig ist. Es hat auch die geistige Verfassung der französischen Politik falsch eingeschätzt. Aber die Zukunft wird lehren, ob diese Niederlage nicht rühmlicher war für uns als der diplomatische Sieg für diejenigen, die Vorstellungen verflossener Jahrhunderte in eine neue Zeit hinübertragen.

Though the natural leader in Europe, France had failed to seize a golden opportunity to advance the European cause. After the conclusion of the Conventions Sethe doubted whether France had the "inner strength" for the role.

As consequences of the French action, Sethe saw two dangers arising. First, the Western ideal of freedom would become increasingly hollow. For years the Western Powers had insisted that a new era was in the making. But: "Wer, keineswegs in Deutschland allein, soll denn nun wirklich glauben, dass eine neue Zeit angefangen habe?" Second, the likelihood of a new German nationalism would rise, fuelled by disappointment over the Western attitude. However, Germans must not succumb to the temptation to which France so unwisely ceded. "Nationalismus ist nämlich immer eine Dummheit, bei Siegern nicht weniger als bei Besiegten." Instead, Germany must stress the larger issues:


Adenauer's offer of a French-German union, which in effect proposed to
bypass Strasbourg, prompted Sethe to argue that the road from the Council to a true European federation would be "long and thorny." It was doubtful whether "...dieser alte, von innen und aussen bedrohte Erdteil es sich noch leisten kann, so lange zu warten bis aus dem Strassburger Rat eine europäische Regierung geworden ist." It was an advantage of the proposal that it touched directly on the crucial problem of European unity, namely Franco-German cooperation, and promised to bring it to a quick realization.

However, he regretted that Adenauer's interview of 7 March was once again marred by mistakes and confusion. "The usual mishaps and denials." He was angered by his tendency to act alone. It was not the first time that he had surprised the Parliament and the public with a sudden turn in his diplomacy. His policies would be more effective if the Bundestag, or at least its majority, stood behind him. He hoped that the soon to be nominated Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs would bring a change. Again he pondered whether Adenauer would let him work independently."

Sethe hesitated on the issue of German entry into the Council. "Die junge Bundesrepublik [steht] vor einer der schwierigsten Entscheidungen ihres Daseins. Der endgültige Entschluss wird für viele nicht aus dem Handgelenk zu lösen sein; er bedarf der strengsten und sorgsamsten Prüfung. Selten ist eine Frage so sehr in das ringende politische Gewissen gestellt gewesen."

He presented the reasoning behind the conflicting opinions, without indicating his preference. The Conventions violated principles which were supposed to govern the "new Europe." The question was whether Germany should now sanction these violations by joining at the same time as the Saar. Without assertive action the same thing might happen again. "Bedarf der Einspruch des zunächst Betroffenen gegen die offensichtliche Verkehrung aller Grundsätze des Neuen nicht einer tatkräftigeren Form als nur der
Reden und Leitartikel?" Many proponents of German entry drew an analogy to Stresemann's joining of the League of Nations. But he had done so after Locarno when French-German understanding was at a high. Nobody could claim with certainty that he would have done the same thing if Franco-German relations had just suffered a heavy blow.

The other argument maintained that accession to the Council gave Germany greater influence and a bigger forum to articulate her interests. Moreover, "Deutschland würde eine Weigerung in den Europa-Rat zu gehen, mit gefährlicher weltpolitischer Verstimmung teuer bezahlen müssen; Europa aber selber hätte den schwersten Schaden davon -- dieses Europa, das ohne uns nicht leben kann, ohne das wir aber auch nicht leben können." Sethe assumed that the second argument was gaining support but that a strong opposition to that course would remain. He regretted this division yet: "Wie könnte das zu ändern sein? In Deutschland ist viel Vertrauen zerstört worden. Darunter werden wir alle noch lange zu leiden haben." 43

In April Sethe described Adenauer as a shaken politician whose policy foundered on the Allied lack of political acumen and generosity. "Die Flitterwochen der jungen Bundesrepublik mit den Allierten sind vorbei." "Expressions of impatience and criticism" about Germany were increasingly heard abroad. Conversely, the recent events had caused Adenauer "tiefe Niedergeschlagenheit." He was "the most disappointed man in Europe." "Wie sehr war er bereit, Deutschland schnell und auch unter Opfern in die westliche Gemeinschaft zu führen! Wie sicher hat er darauf vertraut, dass nun auch der Westen seine Bereitschaft zeige, Westdeutschland als seinesgleichen anzusehen!" Now he doubted whether the Allies wanted to construct a united Europe with Germany as an equal partner. Within half a year Allied diplomacy had turned him into a bitter and inflexible doubter. "Diplomatische Meisterleistungen sehen anders aus."
The result of his disenchantment was the speech in Berlin, his most impressive and important in months. He was now forced to make demands for more powers which he had expected in November to reap easily and naturally. However, the Allies showed little psychological understanding. They listened to his demands with annoyance and did not consider his weakened domestic position.

Der Kanzler würde es heute gegenüber der Opposition schwerer haben als im November. Der wichtigste Grund dafür wäre, dass er kaum noch mit der Überzeugungskraft und Eindringlichkeit sprechen könnte wie damals. Er hat zuviele Rückschläge erlitten, er hat zuviel von dem eigenen Vertrauen eingebüsxt, das ihn damals noch bewegte; er wäre im Gefecht mit Schumacher vermutlich vor dem Parlament und vor der Nation nur ein matter Sprecher.

He and the Federal Republic needed a diplomatic success and Allied support. The German demands were just and sensible. And:

Dieses Staatswesen ist nicht ohne Mithilfe der Allierten aus der Taufe gehoben worden. Wenn sie es mit Rückschlägen füttern wollen, aus Gründen, die nun einmal in Deutschland kein Mensch versteht, so muss man einige Besorgnis um die Zukunft des Bonner Systems empfinden.

The Allies knew quite well that they had to give Germany greater freedoms sooner or later because "die westliche Welt kann es sich auf die Dauer nicht leisten, dass eines ihrer Glieder mit den übrigen in so heftigem Widerstreit und in ständig wachsendem Misstrauen lebt." But he questioned whether the Allies possessed enough vision to make the concessions in time to secure their positive impact and confidence in Western ideals.*

Sethe agreed with Adenauer's concern over the Soviet threat and believed that his fears were real and not motivated by tactics. Adenauer was exasperated: "Sind die anderen denn eigentlich blind? -- dies ist seit Wochen die Grundfrage des Kanzlers."

However, Sethe again felt "doubts and uneasiness" about one of Adenauer's "sudden diplomatic turns," made at a speech in Mainz on 21 April. He had implied that he would go to Strasbourg only if the Occupation
Statute was revised. Sethe was amazed about the connection between two points which heretofore had been separate. He was curious to know whether this latest turn-about had been cleared with the Cabinet or whether it was another example of Adenauer's "berühmte einsame Beschlüsse." Once more he asked the Chancellor to employ the advice of an experienced secretary of state.**

Adenauer's inconsistency and independent action had thus led another commentator to ask for his replacement as Germany's quasi foreign minister. The editorials clearly reflect the difficulty that he encountered in this period. He needed success, but it was elusive in these first four months of 1950. Nonetheless, Sethe was basically in line with his general course, especially when the Chancellor criticized the Allied reluctance to grant Germany more rights, an argument that Sethe had used for the past six months. Sethe's support for European cooperation and Franco-German understanding was now much more explicit than in the past. Yet at the same time he wavered on the issue of Council membership and advanced an argument similiar to those of Schumacher.

Hans Baumgarten did not join the criticism of Adenauer but was desperate for an Allied impetus and identified the UK as a restraining force against further European integration. He urged France to take the initiative in the European unification process, i.e., in the economic or cultural field, regardless of the reluctant attitude of the British Government. "Deutschland ist bereit." He regretted the constant mutual suspicions among Europe's three big countries yet refused to see any significance in them because: "Die europäischen Völker haben eine einzelstaatliche Isolierung nach altem Schema satt. Sie sehnen sich nach friedlicher Sicherheit, nach wirtschaftlichen Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten in einem vergrößerten Markt und nach einer gemeinsamen sozialen Entwicklung in ihrer überkommenen
gemeinsamen Kultur." Due to the proximity of the East and the economic and social devastation of the war, Germany was most eager to build a European federation. France hesitated since she was afraid of entering a "societas leonina" with Germany. Great Britain remained indecisive because of her ties to the Commonwealth.

Progress should not be halted by the fear of excluding a reluctant Great Britain. A French-German union, for instance, would never be directed against England, but would aim to include her in the future. Waiting for England was wrong:

Wenn man jedoch verlangt, dass alles auf einmal geschieht, dass also eine engere Zusammenfassung des westlichen Kontinents sofort die britische Insel einschliesst, dann bedeutet das nichts anderes, als dass man die europäische Verschmelzung von dem Willen desjenigen abhängig macht, der im Augenblick noch am wenigsten dahin drängt, an einer Herausschiebung des Zeitpunktes am meisten interessiert ist. Andererseits liegt es so, dass französische Initiative wohl oder übel die Engländer mitreissene würde.

Baumgarten was dismayed that progress was so difficult although both Schuman and Adenauer had the same goals: Franco-German reconciliation to build a united Europe. He deplored the effect of mutual distrust and the resulting boost for "radical elements" in both countries. Each must learn to consider the partner's domestic situation. A European perspective was needed, not a limited national viewpoint."

Clearly, the publicists were divided in their reaction to the developments of January to April. Friedlaender and Sethe avidly emphasized Germany's territorial claim on the Saar. Still they and Baumgarten persevered in their European ideal which they considered the solution for postwar problems. Then there was Augstein. He developed the only alternative to Adenauer's agenda and expressed it without reserve. Augstein, by raising the argument of unification through neutrality, proved an addition to the journalistic landscape and a danger to Adenauer whose
image, on account of his inexperience, autocracy, and unconventional interviews, had suffered considerably in the German press during these months. The pundits witnessed in discomfort the manifestations of what was later termed "Kanzlerdemokratie." It was clear, then, that Adenauer's position was in some jeopardy, although not so much on the basis of his policy. However, in May came a sudden boost in the form of a new French initiative, the type for which Baumgarten had been pleading so urgently.
Section A: The Diplomacy

On 9 May 1950, in a surprise announcement, Robert Schuman suggested a plan to pool the German and French steel and coal industries under a common authority within an organization that would be open to other European countries. He noted that the plan had been devised to preserve the peace in Europe, to overcome French-German hostility, and to create common bases for economic development as a first stage for a European federation.

Negotiations should be conducted on the basis of certain principles. The supranational joint high authority would make binding decisions with the aim of increasing production and productivity, fusing the European market under equal economic factors, and increasing the standard of living. The plan would not create an international cartel but form a single, unified market, without barriers to competition.¹

The Schuman Plan, as it was soon called, was spectacular news in the US. Truman praised the "constructive statesmanship," and Acheson termed the plan a "major contribution toward the resolution of the pressing political and economic problems of Europe."² However, the British Labour Government under Clement Attlee remained cool. It was reluctant to expose Britain's internal position to external forces and worried that the plan might compromise its commitments to a planned economy and full employment. Moreover, the success of the Commonwealth's Colombo Conference in January had contributed to British doubts about closer European ties, while Bevin also worried that such links would hamper the "special relationship" with the US. Whitehall attempted to modify the conditions for the negotiations on the Schuman Plan in a month-long series of memoranda and discussions with Paris. But the UK did not accept the French principles and decided not
to participate.\(^3\)

Adenauer, who, like Acheson, had been informed of the plan in advance, endorsed it wholeheartedly, stating that the French decision was a magnanimous step toward Europe and Germany. He appreciated the concrete nature of the proposals and the provision that other European countries could join. The production of the Saar would fall under the plan and thus an essential element of estrangement between France and Germany would be removed.\(^4\) Schumacher declared that he could neither support nor reject the plan. It ought to be examined realistically, and the SPD was open for discussions. But the Ruhr Statute and the IAR must disappear first. Moreover, the significance of the Saar question had not been altered in any way. The plan should also assure German equality, as well as foster German unity.\(^5\)

The Cabinet's decision to join the Council of Europe and the French proposal had come on the eve of the London Tripartite Conference of 11-13 May. The Allies reaffirmed that Germany should be integrated progressively into the European community. When that process was complete, she would be liberated from Allied controls and given her sovereignty to a maximum degree compatible with the basis of the occupation regime, which was to be retained until "the international situation had been modified." Integration and sovereignty were dependent on German cooperation and willingness for peace and friendly association with the Allies.\(^6\)

In June Adenauer gained legislative approval for accession to the Council. On 25 May the Bundesrat, Germany's upper house, voted for entry into the Council.\(^7\) On 13-15 June the Bundestag debated and voted on the issue. Adenauer argued that failure to join the Council would be interpreted by the outside world as a rejection of the Schuman Plan. Furthermore, a rejection of the Council was against the feelings of the
German people, who desired to end all psychological inhibitions between France and Germany. Both the Schuman Plan and the Council were linked by the common aim of European cooperation and world peace through the creation of a federated Europe. The Saar must not be allowed to disturb the reconstruction of Europe. The issue had been deprived of its significance and tension by the Schuman Plan. A vote against the Council would be a vote cast against the West."

Schumacher argued against accession. He urged that Germany not throw away her "last trump card" and listed several reasons for his party's opposition: the continuation of the occupation regime; the fact that the formal state of war with the principal members of the Council had not yet been terminated; and the separate invitation for the "Saar police state," which offended against the Council's own statutes. In addition, he stated that a divided Germany joining as a "second rate member" would inevitably be drawn into NATO and forced to rearm. Accession to the Council would imply the continuance of German division. Germany should refuse to join as long as her unity had not been restored. The Council was not working for Germany's unity, and "a number of foreign powers in Strasbourg" actively profited from her division. Moreover, accession might lead to a sort of resignation, making West Germans desperate enough to accept the division of their country."

On 15 June the Bundestag supported the bill accepting membership, against the votes of the Social Democrats. Five days later, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux opened negotiations on the Schuman Plan in Paris. Adenauer's policy of integration was established.10

These steps, however, heightened concerns over German unity, as Schumacher's remarks made plain. The SPD rarely missed an opportunity to stress the goal of German unity. In 1949 Schumacher stated that every
action of the Federal Government had to be guided by the task of German unity. The German question could not be removed from the political agenda as it was implicit in every political consideration about Germany. Whoever opposed unity on a democratic basis could not be regarded as a friend of the German people. In May 1950 Schumacher warned that Europe must not be built by excluding the Eastern Zone and the Eastern territories. Ideally, German unity should come first, to be followed by the integration of all-Germany into Europe.

In 1949-50, however, the SPD did not develop a unification plan, restricting itself to criticism of the Government's policy of integration. At times Schumacher regarded chances for unification as small. In early 1950 he said that all Germany could do was to keep open the idea of unification. Concrete steps, however, would have to be undertaken by the Allies. He added that only the US would truly work for German unity. Shortly thereafter he noted that free elections were the only means to attain unity but cautioned that it was unlikely that they would take place.

In 1949-50 the Bonn Government did little about unity, and Adenauer seemed uninterested in the issue. When assuming office, he had expressed sorrow at the German division and the fate of Germans living under Communist rule. But unity was not one of the policy goals he stressed. He merely pointed out that it might come one day when superpower tension had ended.

Two weeks after the founding of the German Democratic Republic, Adenauer outlined the fundamental elements of Bonn's German policy, essentially defensive and uncompromising in nature. The "new organization in the Eastern Zone," he said, had been created on Soviet command, without holding free elections, whereas the founding of West Germany had been approved by
the German people. The Federal Republic was the only legitimate German state, and it alone had the right to speak for the German people. The East German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line could not be tolerated.\(^{16}\) As regards the city of Berlin, "Vorposten und Bollwerk des demokratischen Westeuropas," its situation was now even more threatened. The city belonged de facto to the FRG but could not be legally incorporated because of international tensions. Article 23 of the Grundgesetz, which provided for Berlin's status as West Germany's twelfth Land, was thus "temporarily" suspended.

The issue of German unity was not raised again until 28 February 1950 when John McCloy proposed a plan for free elections in all of Germany in reaction to increased East German agitation for unity. The Pankow regime had established the "National Front" in the autumn of 1949. It was a seemingly pluralistic movement to spread the message of "democratic unity" in West Germany. All East German mass organizations and the so-called Bloc Parties, especially the East German CDU and the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPD), belonged, without in any way threatening the power of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). US and British policy-makers feared that Eastern propaganda might have an effect on West Germans. They were worried that West Germans would not become firm members of an integrated Western Europe unless convinced that Europe was interested in unification and that integration did not mean writing off the East.\(^{17}\) On 22 March 1950 Adenauer, in response to the US plan, outlined a free election initiative for a constituent assembly under the control of the Four Powers or the United Nations.\(^{18}\)

Then followed a series of proposals and counter offers between the West and the USSR. On 21 April the Western Commandants in Berlin issued a declaration on free elections in the city. The Soviets answered with a plan
of their own on 8 May. The Allies, however, rejected it. On 26 May 1950 the AHC sent a plan for German unity to the Soviet Control Commission in the GDR. The Three Powers stated that free elections to a constituent assembly were a necessary first step on the road to unification. They were willing to frame an electoral law for all-German elections and proposed discussions on this issue. Moscow did not reply, and this interchange, which seemed little more than a propaganda exercise, stopped. Only in November 1950 was there a new undertaking, this time in the form of an East German offer.15

An intra-German approach to the problem of unity, however, was ruled out by the anti-Communism of Bonn’s main political parties. Neither Schumacher nor Adenauer regarded the East German regime as a legitimate partner. Contact with Pankow implied its acceptance, and the two leaders were not willing to pay this price. The one concession that Schumacher was prepared to give Moscow to preserve chances for unification was West Germany’s military neutrality. In April 1949, when the creation of NATO raised the question of West German rearmament and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty, Schumacher had argued for military neutrality, which kept open the possibility of creating a West German army for defensive purposes. At the end of 1949 the SPD went one step further and categorically ruled out rearmament.20

By proposing even a form of neutrality, the SPD was treading on dangerous terrain. It called into question political and economic affiliations with the West. Indeed, the SPD’s negative attitude towards Adenauer’s compromises with the West cast some doubts on the party’s belief in Western orientation. In addition, neutrality carried the stigma of having to compromise with the Soviet Union and the SED-regime. Despite this handicap, there were groups and individuals actively working for neutrality and unification. These included the Gesellschaft fur die Wiedervereinigung
Deutschlands under Andreas Hermes, a co-founder of the CDU and leader of the German Federation of Farmers, and Rudolf Nadolny, a former German ambassador to the USSR. There was also the Nauheimer Kreis of the historian and CDU-member Ulrich Noack, as well as the prominent Pastor and Nazi opponent Martin Niemöller. They began speaking out in 1949/1950, but their arguments did not fall on fertile soil.21
the offer, the Bonn Government should hold a referendum in West Germany on its election plan. This, Tüngel asserted, would harden the resistance in the Soviet Zone.

One month later Tüngel's criticism of Ulrich Noack's unsuccessful attempts to woo the SED showed how little room there was for intra-German discussions. He compared the leader of the Nauheimer Kreis to a hurt and rejected lover whose dialogue with the National Front had ended in disappointment. Noack's programme, he charged, was filled with vagueness and vanity and undeserving of support since his views confused German youth. "Er ist ein ganz schlechter Politiker, er gehört zu jenen, die messerscharf schliessen, dass nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf."

Tüngel's commentaries showed that contact with the East German Communists, however well meant, could easily amount to political suicide. His assessment of the SED as a party of Soviet toadies implied that the only acceptable way to deal with the East was to send proposals from the elevated moral platform of democratic rights. His plea for a West German election programme was duly fulfilled by the Government less than a fortnight later. But it was little more than a propaganda ploy, and Tüngel even saw it as such. How this would harden East Germans, who knew exactly the realities of SED-regime, was difficult to see.

At the end of April Tüngel, a lover of Berlin, where he had spent "verwegene Jahre" during the Third Reich, pointed to the lack of concrete action on Germany unity and the status of Berlin. The debate over membership in the Council ignored the consequences this question would have for Berlin. German politicians should have recognized the importance of this aspect some time ago.

Nicht sosehr die Frage des Saargebiets hätte man zu einem Verhandlungspunkt für den Beitritt zum Europarat machen sollen - das dortige Quislingsystem wird eines Tages von selbst zusammenbrechen. Man
hatte vielmehr vorschlagen sollen, vor dem Eintritt Bonns in den Europarat Berlin in die Bundesrepublik aufzunehmen und es damit politisch zu einem Teil Europas zu machen.

Such an action would have been a test for the newly emerging European spirit. Europe could only succeed if she defended the ideals of justice against the "onslaught of barbarism." Entry into the Council made sense only if Europe accepted the task of freeing East Germany from slavery. The first step should be the inclusion of Berlin in the Council.

Tüngel's emotional concern for Berlin, in many ways a reminder of the unity of the German Reich, but also a symbol of German resilience and of Allied support for Germany, was understandable. The city was still in a dismal condition, economically lagging behind the FRG, politically isolated, and since the Blockade threatened by further Communist action. Nonetheless, formal inclusion of Berlin as West Germany's twelfth Land had the potential for doing more harm than good. Adenauer had blocked such a move in 1949 because he did not want to surrender Western Allied responsibility, and therefore protection, for the city.27

Of course, Tüngel's commitment to Berlin was also an indicator of his dissatisfaction with Germany's division, an issue that Adenauer's policy did not attack. If anything, Western integration hardened Germany's separation for the foreseeable future. Tüngel's apparent hope that the West, or even Adenauer, would be interested in actively reconquering German lands or rolling back Communism was misplaced. Adenauer focused only on Western alignment, and Europe had no interest in German unity. Tüngel's attempt to instrumentalize European unification also indicated that his pro-European bias was motivated in part, if not principally, by strong national feelings. At the same time, such qualifications amounted to a latent warning for Adenauer that his policy better bring results on German unity.
However, Tüngel’s sentiment for unification in no way interfered with his opinion about the Schuman Plan, which he described as “audacious and modern.” The French offer meant “den Anfang zu einer Wirtschaftsunion zu machen und damit den Kristallisierungspunkt für ein föderiertes Europa zu schaffen.” The French initiative and Bonn’s decision to accede to the Council were “eine schöne Krönung der gradlinigen Politik, die mit jenem Interview des Bundeskanzlers mit Ernst Friedlaender begann.” The credit to his colleague acknowledged Friedlaender’s departure from the weekly on the day this column appeared.

Tüngel appreciated the independent, supranational character of the High Authority. This requirement implied that neither parties, business representatives, nor unionists might belong. “Der französische Vorschlag geht dahin, von allen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bindungen unabhängige Persönlichkeiten auszuwählen nach dem Massstab des Sachverstandes und nicht der Leidenschaft.” For this reason European Socialists opposed the plan. They had always fought against the assumption that there was a third way, besides capitalism and socialism. Socialists tended to be “extremely nationalistic” since their goal of full employment could be reached only through protectionism. The High Authority, however, would not allow such special interests to interfere with the plan’s goal of Franco-German understanding.

After firing this convenient broadside against the Socialists, when perhaps he should have anticipated that the special interests of German and French industrialists would soon lead them to direct their criticism against the plan, Tüngel discussed the crucial question whether European integration prevented German unity. Germans in East and West, he observed, were worried that German division might deepen, that Germany was moving closer to NATO, and that Stalin might see this as a threat and start
a preventive war. Tüngel defended the roles of the Council, NATO, and the Schuman Plan, praising them for laying to rest the catchword of French-German "Erbfeindschaft." None of these organizations, he explained, contained aggressive intentions against the USSR, and fear of the Soviet Union should not weaken Germany's and Europe's political will and creativity. "Man kann nicht einfach die Hände in den Schoss legen, nur um den Kreml nicht zu reizen." It was necessary to withstand the constantly growing Soviet pressure. The decisions to enter the Council and the Schuman Plan negotiations were only belated answers to the forced inclusion of the Eastern Zone into the Soviet bloc.

Tüngel even suggested that West German rearmament might be an inevitable consequence of the Soviet build-up of the GDR's armed police, which he thought was being created to conduct civil war against the Federal Republic. West Germany, however, need not surrender the Eastern Zone to save herself from Soviet domination. He believed unity could be achieved, pinning his hopes on Berlin, "unser wichtigstes politisches Aktivum," "ein Bollwerk mitten in der Sowjetzone." As long as the West was able to defend and prop up Berlin, the Eastern Zone would not be lost either. It was a positive sign that the West was beginning to realize the danger posed by the KVP. What was more, the AHC had prepared a proposal for free all-German elections to "unmask" Soviet policy. West German assistance for the West did not mean deepening the German division. It meant stopping the Soviet advance on Europe, "und nur darauf ganz allein kommt es an."

After the legislative approval for German accession to the Council, Tüngel argued for a more energetic "Ostpolitik" in light of the Soviet danger. The decision on Council membership, he stated, would determine German diplomacy towards the West for the foreseeable future. It was "eine eindeutige Option für den Westen." In their policy towards the East,
however, both the Western Powers and Germany lacked forcefulness and coherence. The West needed an "offensive strategy," a "constructive plan" to break the Communist reign in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.

In the meantime, the USSR held the initiative in the propaganda war and tried to undermine West Germany by employing "agents and fellow travellers," whose sabotage must not be underestimated. Yet nobody in Europe or Germany opposed this threat. Europe was becoming accustomed to US help, without accepting responsibility herself. "Freiheit ist aber nicht etwas was man unbeschwert geniessen kann, sondern ein Besitz, um den man ständiglich kämpfen muss." Bonn must adopt a firm policy towards the East and wage a "spiritual and legal war" against Communist activities in the West.

Tüngel did not directly answer the central question concerning Adenauer's Western policy, namely whether integration prevented German unification. Instead of accepting that German unity was becoming unlikely, Tüngel evaded this conclusion and pointed to the Soviet threat, which now began to colour more and more his commentaries. He gave Adenauer's policy tacit approval and defended integration as constructive as well as defensive steps, necessary priorities to rebuild Europe and to deter Soviet aggression. However, he still clung to the illusion that they did not signify surrendering East Germany, although his unity policy was solely based on vague hopes and defending the status quo against Communist encroachment. A constructive policy towards the USSR implied making a deal with Moscow. It meant giving concessions to free the eighteen million East Germans. Tüngel was nowhere close to such a position, held back perhaps by firm anti-Communism and a genuine belief in the Soviet danger. Maybe he was repulsed by the thought of having to pay the Communists a price for the natural right of self-determination. His self-delusion about unity almost appeared to be a psychological suppression of an unwanted reality. The
tenacity of his hope indicated how deeply committed he was to unity and how painful renunciation of Eastern Germany would be for his conscience. It was inconceivable that people like Tüngel, so sensitive to the notion of a German nation, would not feel guilt at the continuation, and later the perpetuation, of the German division.

On the other hand, nobody was able to foretell how Germany's future would unfold. It was probable that his hopes for unity were sincere. Perhaps implicit in Tüngel's thinking was a faint expectation that Western force and determination, or a change in Soviet leadership, would lead the USSR to a conciliatory attitude. Perhaps he thought that the East Germans might rebel against Communist rule, as they would do in 1953 and 1989. If indeed he had such assumptions, they were not explicitly stated.

The issue that would virtually clinch Germany's separation was already on the horizon. The more dangerous the Soviets appeared, the stronger became the calls for German rearmament. Tüngel, too, was sounding the alarm bell. Rudolf Augstein, however, saw it differently. Writing on 18 May in an assessment of the Schuman Plan, he stated that behind the proposal loomed German rearmament and an end to any chances to unite Germany. Again he advocated a neutralist policy. French diplomacy had achieved a remarkable triumph, he noted, although France was the weakest member in the front against the Soviets: "Englands Foreign Office windet sich in Eiertänzen...Amerika begrüsst Frankreichs Vorschläge und...Frankreich...steht als Vorreiter der europäischen Einheit da." While Adenauer supported the Plan, Schumacher was reserved about the "unorthodox" plan and had reproduced the "antiquated" arguments about the Saar. His qualms were understandable:

Einleuchtend, dass die Industriellen nur zustimmen, wenn der neue Verband nicht nach sozialistischen Doktrinen arbeitet und nicht nach den Grundsätzen des Labour-Wohlfahrtsstaates. Einleuchtend, dass die
Amerikaner dieses Kind nur dann mit Beihilfen legitimieren, wenn es nicht sozialistisch ist.

These were justifiable concerns for the SPD, but "es brauchen nicht die Bedenken der beiden Völker zu sein." However, Augstein did harbour doubts about the consequences of Schuman's "grandiose" scheme and Adenauer's warm embrace of it. Clearly, its purpose was to control Germany through industrial linkage and to bind her to the West. France might also intend to slow down German growth. But if the US was to continue financial aid for Europe, then American pressure would push the industrial union towards a "Rüstungsallianz." This possibility would not be opposed by German industry, and perhaps not by Adenauer either.

The US might want to help build a European defence, and if so, Germany would be unable to object because she did not have the freedom to decide for herself. Germany was dependent on America and obliged to her because of the magnitude of her aid. In spite of this, Germany's goal lay elsewhere. "Unsere Aufgabe für den Weltfrieden ist, die deutsche Einheit in Freiheit wiederherzustellen. Wir werden sie bestimmt nicht lösen, wenn wir Waffen für den Westen schmieden." In contrast, it was America's task to arm to be able to defend "jedes Land, das jetzt noch mit Gewaltmitteln annektiert werden soll. Das mag ihnen [Amerika] passen oder es mag ihnen zuwider sein, es ist nicht anders."

Since Germany had already waged two world wars, Augstein considered it possible that divided Germany might undertake a third world war, "bei dem es diesmal nicht um die Knechtung, sondern um die Befreiung der Welt ginge." However, war in the nuclear age had ceased to be a political means. Germany was of more use to the world if she remained unarmed and served as "buffer-zone of détente and peace" separating Soviets and Americans. Seeing hints that France might want to join such a buffer-zone with Germany "unter
dem Patronat Amerikas," he judged it "ein Projekt, das unsere freimütigste Aufgeschlossenheit verdient." Yet he cautioned that Adenauer and the French showed more enthusiasm for the union of the Ruhr and Lorraine than for German unity.

Clearly, Augstein had a very discerning mind. He correctly recognized that the Schuman Plan was in part designed to control Germany, a fact which the other commentators chose to ignore. He alone openly suspected that Adenauer had no interest in pursuing unification. None of the other pundits ventured such a claim. Moreover, Augstein was farsighted enough to anticipate that Western alignment, in particular due to Germany's pending military integration (which for the moment he could only see in the field of war industry), would close the door on unity. Augstein's arguments were similar to those of Kaiser, Heinemann, and Schumacher. Indeed, the concept of a "zone of détente" was reminiscent of the idea of military neutrality espoused by the SPD. Yet despite this proximity to the position of the SPD, Augstein did not support Schumacher directly, instead ridiculing him to some degree. One could safely surmise that this must have greatly upset the SPD. Even in 1956, Fritz Erler, then one of the SPD's outstanding members in the Bundestag, noted in a private letter that Augstein attacked Adenauer while "bashfully" concealing "dass die Sozialdemokraten die gleichen Ansichten wie [Augstein] hätten." "Die Feigheit sollte man anprangern."* Augstein preferred non-involvement in the superpower conflict, without, however, doing away with US military protection. This was a case of a German "Sonderweg" and of conveniently trying to get the best of both worlds. It was a curious fact, though, that he minimized Germany's freedom of action because of dependence on America, while still believing that Bonn would be able to pursue a neutralist policy. It was also surprising that he contemplated a form of Franco-German neutrality only a month after
attacking Adenauer's concept of French-German union and mocking French
security concerns. The fact was that neither the French nor the American
Governments exhibited a great interest in German neutrality and unity.
Paris was still gripped by the fear of Germany and was therefore probably
not inclined to join Bonn in a neutral zone that might one day include even
a united Germany. The overriding aim of the Western Allies' German policy
was the integration of the Federal Republic in the Western
European-Atlanticist camp.

Furthermore, Augstein completely failed to discuss the many serious
risks associated with German neutrality. He failed to address the question
how a neutral, united Germany would regain sovereignty without allowing the
USSR a primary say in determining her politico-military development.
Augstein probably envisaged a scenario like the relatively successful
Allied Treaty on Austria of 1955, whereby Austria was united and
neutralized but maintained a Western political system. However, Germany was
not Austria, but a country of enormous resources and of cardinal
geostrategical importance. Would the Kremlin give Germany freedom without
asserting Soviet influence, without perhaps laying the groundwork for
furthering Soviet control? Certainly, a "Finlandization" of a neutral
Germany was a possibility.

If Augstein's policy of neutralism had indeed resulted in a united,
neutral, and democratic Germany and a Four-Power peace treaty, there would
have been another concern. As the Soviet notes of the spring of 1952 made
clear, Moscow wanted German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line. Yet such an
arrangement would have left the former German territories in the East, now
almost empty of their German population, under Soviet and Polish rule. The
renunciation of German land, however, could have created resentment by the
German expellees and their support for anti-democratic forces. Germany's
second republic would have been burdened with Weimar-like problems. Claims on the Eastern territories would not have subsided and could have led to a severe German-Polish antagonism, which the Kremlin might then have manipulated to its advantage.

Since the USSR had benefitted greatly from the Potsdam decisions on the Eastern territories, a Soviet-German alliance against Warsaw was improbable. Nevertheless, there remained the question whether neutrality might not lead to a Soviet-German understanding. Augstein seemed confident that the German people would resist anti-democratic forces and the Soviet temptation. However, a Russian-German alliance had a long tradition in German-Prussian history, and even the mutual atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in 1941-45 might have become irrelevant once the exigencies of Realpolitik had beckoned.

Furthermore, there would have been legitimate doubts about the ability of the American military umbrella to deter the Soviets. Stalin's aggression and lack of scruples had been amply demonstrated by the Blockade of Berlin in 1948, as well as by his subjugation of most of Eastern Europe and by the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. In the summer of 1950 the Korean war further tarnished Moscow's already bad image. Such manifestations of power politics made neutrality a great risk. Nobody could guarantee that Stalin would not try to attack or incorporate a neutral Germany into his orbit. The glaring example was the Communist coup in Prague in 1948. Unless the US maintained adequate forces in Western European countries, a US guarantee for a neutral Germany ran the risk of having to liberate an already invaded Germany and Western Europe. Although the Soviets would have been able to use the conquered resources, the US could have succeeded in freeing the continent. But by then Europe would have been crippled by the ravages of conventional and nuclear war. Augstein seemed to trust that nuclear deterrence would
prevent any Soviet gambles. However, there was no assurance that the US would resort to atomic weapons, especially since the rapid development of missile technology soon threatened the North American continent. These were weighty arguments against neutrality, yet Augstein simply ignored them.

While Augstein searched for ways to preserve chances for unity, Hans Baumgarten did not even bring up the issue. His focus was entirely on the Schuman Plan, which he hailed as the kind of initiative that the FAZ had advocated for so long. The significance of the proposal, he remarked, could hardly be overestimated. Schuman's initiative "detoxicated" French-German relations. It was diplomacy of the "highest order," one of the "totally new methods" now tried in foreign policy. Whereas all previous attempts at Franco-German understanding had failed, this one seemed about to achieve it.

The plan took account of two crucial concerns: French fear of the possible abuse of German economic power and German demands for equality in European cooperation. It envisaged the mutual supervision and management of the French and German steel and coal production. War between France and Germany would become impossible. "Die Offenlegung betrifft nämlich nicht nur die Kohle- und Eisenwirtschaft, sondern die gesamte Wirtschaft der beiden Länder, weil jeder Wirtschaftszweig eng mit der Schwerindustrie zusammen- und von ihr abhängt." He expected that Italy and the Benelux countries would join but was less optimistic about the UK. The important thing was that France had finally taken the initiative and was not waiting for British participation from the outset.

Baumgarten then addressed possible objections to the plan. Regarding the impact of the plan on the Soviet Union, neither France nor Germany wanted to be drawn into military adventures by assuming a hostile, aggressive stance. Therefore, Schuman proposed that a United Nations representative
supervise the new organization to ensure adherence to the provisions of the UN Charter. It was the express intention of the plan to create a "Kristallisationspunkt" for Europe, so that her economic, political, and cultural power grew. This was not a threat, but rather a contribution to stabilize and calm the world. Furthermore, the plan would not lead to a cartel. On the contrary, production was to be increased and other areas, such as North Africa, might be developed. It was a bold, daring offer, and other problems associated with Germany's heavy industry, such as the steel quota, the question of ownership of the industries, and the export price for coal, might now be solved more easily. At the same time, the question whether Germany's industry would be nationalized in the future was not prejudged.  

Hans Baumgarten's endorsement of the Schuman Plan was absolute. He highlighted the economic and political advantages and defended the plan against almost every conceivable objection. It promised to lead to the policy goals which the FAZ had advocated for so long, namely Franco-German reconciliation, European cooperation, and a revival of German industry. What is noteworthy is Baumgarten's adamant insistence that the plan had nothing to do with a cartel. This, of course, was the big American fear. Other criticism came from the CDU. The Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, later opposed the plan because he saw it as a needless limitation of the German economy. It would seem that Baumgarten's commentaries, known to correspond roughly to the economic and political tenets prevalent among Christian Democrats, intended to shore up early support for the plan. Social Democratic opposition was likely; therefore, it was essential to rally the potential supporters before the plan assumed a negative image. Paul Sethe also approved of Schuman's initiative and, like Baumgarten, did not connect the issue with German unity. Sethe lauded Schuman's courage
and energetic action, but agonized over the UK's reluctant attitude. France had gained the initiative in Europe and reduced the tension of the spring. It was an economic project of great scope, which recognized German equality and built French-German cooperation, promising to "push aside the past" and lead Europe into the future. However, British diplomacy stood in "bizarre contrast" to that of the Quai. Whitehall's policy was neither bold nor progressive, but tended to hesitate because Great Britain confronted difficult choices. There was the question whether greater ties with Continental Europe would compromise British links with the Commonwealth. Moreover, British industry was reluctant to adhere to decisions made by a supranational body, while the British Government was loath to introduce its nationalized industries into an authority where private industries would prevail. On the other hand, there was the danger of a greater European trading bloc from which England would be excluded.\(^3\)

When Britain refused to join the Schuman Plan negotiations, Sethe was relieved that the other European countries showed no signs of resignation. He hoped that the UK would join at a later date when Downing Street was again ruled by the "spirit of bold decisions." It remained to be seen whether Britain would realize that it was not only a part of the Commonwealth but also of Europe.\(^3\)

Sethe could not foresee that British reluctance to join the European unification process would last not years, but decades. His position seemed to betray pro-British sympathy. Perhaps he regarded British involvement in Europe as a balance against possible French predominance. It was clear though that the FAZ strongly supported the Schuman Plan and the aims it pursued. For Baumgarten and Sethe the issue of German unity appeared to be secondary. At least they ignored the criticism of Augstein and the SPD. This was a surprising fact because only half a year later, and again in
1952, Sethe reacted so positively to the Eastern offers. Then he suddenly showed his desire for unity, a goal that had remained unmentioned the previous twelve months.

But in the spring of 1950 Sethe, and Baumgarten, were behind Adenauer. Like the Chancellor, they avidly welcomed the French proposal. This was also true of Tüngel. Only Augstein put forward a clear alternative to the policies of Adenauer. But the idea of neutrality was limited in its appeal by the risks associated with it. The big factor working against neutrality was fear of Soviet aggression, a topic to which the commentators gave considerable attention. This fear was on the rise and, as Tüngel's warning indicated, led to the question whether Germany should rearm.
Chapter V: West German Rearmament

Section A: The Diplomacy

Despite the Allied commitment to establishing a demilitarized Germany, Western military leaders considered German rearmament since 1947. From the spring of 1948 onwards the issue was periodically discussed in the international press. After the fall of China to Communism and the successful explosion of a Soviet nuclear bomb in August 1949, it arose again. The discussion was motivated by the enormous Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, a danger made worse by the prospect of a nuclear stalemate between the superpowers.

The secret US war plan "Offtackle," proposed at the end of 1948 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, painted a bleak scenario of Western defence, making a mockery of plans of NATO and the WEU to hold the Rhine as a first line of defence. In case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the Americans expected the West to retreat to a position on the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula. Continental Europe would have to be reconquered at the end of the second war year. Western European defence therefore hinged only on the American nuclear deterrent and military potential.

Adenauer had followed the security issue since 1948 and noted in March 1949 that West Germany should seek membership in NATO. In two interviews in November and December he stated that he would be prepared to consider the question of a German contingent in the framework of a European army. These comments produced domestic controversy. All parties in the Bundestag opposed creation of an army, and Allied opinion polls indicated that Germans were not eager to rearm and seemed to have become anti-militaristic. The SPD maintained at the end of 1949 that to repel the Soviets effectively along the zonal border, West Germany would have to
rearm "like Hitler." However, Moscow would then embark on a preventive war. In addition, the West would at the moment not accept such a drastic measure and its inherent political consequences. Therefore, Germany must commit to "radical disarmament." Her only contribution to strengthen the West and to check the spread of Communism could be the rapid development of democracy and Socialism in Germany, thereby attracting the Eastern European states currently under Soviet thraldom to the West."

Adenauer probably already made the connection between rearmament and political leverage toward the West, but he also had genuine concern for the security of the FRG, which indeed was his task as Chancellor. He expected a Soviet or East German attack on West Germany in the short or medium term. Allied talk of the Rhine defence line was unacceptable to him since this would turn almost all of Germany into a battlefield. Instead, he demanded that Western defence commence at the Elbe.

He pointed to the moral and legal duty of the Western Powers to guarantee West German security, making public requests for an explicit Allied security guarantee in the first half of 1950. The Allies, aware that this was impossible given their lack of adequate forces, maintained that NATO inherently protected West Germany and Berlin. Adenauer also proposed to establish a West German federal police force, arguing that Bonn needed an instrument to uphold internal security against Communist activities and a counterpart to the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP), the East German para-military force, which the Soviets had been building since 1948. He feared that in case of an East German attack the Allies would be reluctant to intervene lest a conflict with the USSR erupted. Then the Bonn Government, deserted in such a "civil war," would be easily toppled by the KVP. The comparison to the KVP indicated that the proposed "police force" could have a military character, and indeed it was Adenauer's
intention to use the police as a possible basis for covert rearmament.\textsuperscript{16}

Adenauer’s request was secretly inspired by the British High Commission.\textsuperscript{17} Since the spring of 1950 Robertson considered a federal police force a suitable and inconspicuous instrument to offset the KVP and to begin covert rearmament.\textsuperscript{18} However, McCloy and François-Poncet stressed very careful handling of the police issue, and at the London Tripartite Conference the Allies determined that the matter required “further study.”\textsuperscript{19}

Reluctance to rearm Germany demonstrated how deep the mistrust of Germany still ran. France feared that the police might become the nucleus of a new German army. Schuman probably regarded German rearmament as unavoidable. Through Germany’s gradual integration into Western Europe he attempted to lay the psychological and political foundations for it. Yet hostility to a rearmed Germany prevailed in French public opinion and among influential Government members.\textsuperscript{20}

The US also rejected German remilitarization in the spring of 1950. Sharing the fear of covert militarization, Acheson was adamant that the police and the rearmament issues be kept apart. Furthermore, the US feared for the development of liberal-democratic forces in Germany and worried about the negative effects that remilitarization would have on French-German understanding and the European unification process. Moreover, there was the concern, shared by British policy makers, that Germany, once armed, might strike an alliance with the USSR or embark on an irredentist course. In addition, US officials thought that the matter of German rearmament was not too urgent due to US nuclear superiority.\textsuperscript{21}

In the meantime, Allied calls for German rearmament continued. In March Winston Churchill, the British Opposition leader, stated that Western Europe could not be defended without “the active aid of Western
Neutrality was a familiar policy for Richard Tüngel. He had advocated UN-supervised neutrality for Germany in 1947-48. Since then he had dropped this conception.\(^{22}\) His desire for unity, however, remained strong. He backed the US proposal for free elections of March 1950, but was surprised by the reaction of the German parties. Writing on 9 March, Tüngel noted the "remarkable coolness" with which German politicians had received McCloy's plan.\(^{23}\) He registered a "mixture of distrust, fear, instinctive rejection, and perplexity" in Bonn's political circles and suspected that they welcomed the timing of the Saar Conventions, so that the proposal might conveniently be forgotten.

The plan, he continued, represented an abrupt turn in Allied policy. For the first time Germany was asked to undertake steps to achieve unity. However, the Government had rejected this opportunity by claiming that the issue belonged to the Four Powers and should be dealt with in the Allied Control Council. Yet this statement contradicted the Four Powers who backed inter-German negotiations on free elections. "Es ist undenkbar oder müsste zumindestens undenkbar sein, dass man in Bonn ein solches Angebot einfach ausschlägt."

He did not know whether intra-German discussions could succeed. But Bonn's refusal was spurious. "Der Grund dafür sollte nur sein, dass man mit der Sowjetzonenregierung zwar Handel treibt, aber sie keineswegs soweit anerkennen will, dass man ihr ein Angebot macht, freie, unbeeinflusste, gemeinsame Wahlen unter internationaler Aufsicht zu veranstalten?" It would be better if the Government unmasked the "crooks" and "servile agents of the Cominform" who had founded the National Front. The Government and the parties ought to present a detailed programme for free elections, to be unveiled symbolically in Berlin. If, as was to be expected, Pankow declined
Germany." The British Chiefs of Staff postulated at the end of March that Western Europe was "indefensible without German manpower." The US Chiefs of Staff decided in April 1950 that German rearmament was of "fundamental importance."

But for the moment there was no substantial Allied action on German rearmament, even when Adenauer suggested on 6-8 June separately and in secret to each High Commissioner that a German-French "International Legion" be trained in France. The idea, which represented Adenauer's first and unconditional offer of rearmament, was ignored.

The North Korean attack of 25 June 1950 on South Korea changed the situation drastically. The Communist assault came as a complete surprise to the West and within days forced involvement of American forces, seriously weakening the defence in Europe. Americans and Europeans drew parallels between events in Korea and the situation in Germany despite some obvious dissimilarities: Germany was occupied by Allied forces, and she was of crucial geostrategic importance. The West was convinced that the Kremlin had instigated the aggression, and the question was whether the USSR planned the same for Europe or even a global confrontation. The US accepted the Korean challenge, despite the risk of direct Soviet intervention and a Third World War. The UK and France supported the Americans and were keen to engage the US in Europe as a military presence, also providing military assistance.

The Korean attack provoked serious fears in the AHC about possible Soviet and/or East German attacks against Berlin or West Germany. Yet when the AHC settled the police question on 28 July, it refused a centralized police, only approving a barricaded Länder police force of 10,000 men, with certain federal executive powers.

Washington, however, was already secretly planning far beyond police
units, mainly due to pressure from the Pentagon, which now adopted the doctrine of directly defending the European continent. The fundamental question for the US was how Germany could resume her legitimate position in the European state system, maintain her security, and be a source of strength and stability without endangering her neighbours. After prolonged bargaining between the Pentagon and the State Department over the form of rearmament, a "package proposal," drafted in time for the New York Tripartite Conference of 12-14 September, resulted. It demanded NATO acceptance of the immediate creation of 10-12 German divisions in return for the stationing of American troops in Europe, the creation of a NATO defence system, and the appointment of a US Supreme Commander. Integration of the European forces would be minimal. To maintain control over German units, they would not be equipped with certain heavy weaponry and their officers would be barred from the international command staff. Moreover, Germany would have no air or naval forces.

Meanwhile, Adenauer embarked on an offer of German troops in a European army, without, however, dropping the police option. Two events had contributed to his resolve. Speaking to the Council of Europe on 11 August, Churchill called for the creation of a European army with German participation. Then Adenauer received a memorandum on German security, prepared by former Wehrmacht generals. It stated that Germany was in the worst politico-military situation of her history. The Three Powers were unable to provide for her security: there was no security guarantee, and Allied forces in the FRG were weak. The US nuclear superiority would last only until 1952. By then German forces, optimally numbering 15 divisions, would have to be in place, organized in army corps as part of an Atlanticist-European army.

Armed with this information, Adenauer went into the AHC-meeting of 17
August and requested permission to build a "defence force" of 150,000
volunteers, adequate to meet the KVP. Again he attached no conditions to
this offer. Adenauer, when asked by McCloy, endorsed Churchill's concept
and stated his readiness to work for a German contribution. 32

Publicly, Adenauer ventilated both the police option and German
participation in a European army. 33 He used the concepts of "internal and
external security," with which he created a great deal of confusion,
thereby containing possible domestic opposition, while also avoiding the
disavowal of Allied plans. As regards internal security, which meant
security against the KVP, he declared that the GDR was seeking to overthrow
the Bonn Government and systematically undermining West Germany. Internal
security must be taken over by Bonn through the formation of a federal
police as strong as the KVP.

Concerning Germany's external security, which signified security against
the USSR, he called for a strengthening of US forces and favoured the
creation of a European army, adding that Germany, if called upon to provide
a contingent, would, under certain conditions, make "sacrifices for her own
and Europe's fate." He deprecated the idea of forming a new Wehrmacht, a
notion which was far from the thoughts of the Government and the
Bundestag. 34

Schumacher rejected Adenauer's plans. The Social Democratic objections
to rearmament now suddenly gave way to an offensive politico-military
strategy through which Schumacher hoped to achieve unity. He developed this
concept of Western strength, which he thought might force the Soviets to
redraw peacefully global spheres of influence in favour of the West, during
the later part of 1950, but the essential ideas were revealed at the end of
August. Schumacher dismissed Adenauer's "Rüstungssurrogate" and instead
pleaded for "konsequente Lösungen." The KVP could march only in
conjunction with Red Army aggression against the West. In that case, a West German police would be almost useless. If Germany was to contribute militarily to Western defence, the US must first display "monumental power" in Europe to deter Soviet preventive strikes. Only an offensive strategy was acceptable if Europe was to be defended. Then West Germany would not become a battlefield, East Germany and Berlin could be liberated, and the final decision could be sought "east of the Vistula." This would be the only condition under which Germany could be expected to contribute, apart from the "obvious preconditions," namely "die deutsche rechtliche und tatsächliche Handlungsfreiheit unter gleichzeitiger Aufrechterhaltung der Besatzung." He accused Adenauer of committing a "decisive mistake" by unconditionally offering rearmament without obtaining further recognition of German rights.\(^3\)

Adenauer's official offer came at the end of the month in the form of two memoranda for the AHC.\(^3^6\) The first memo stated that the Chancellor was prepared to contribute a German contingent if an international European army was formed. It also recommended a federal police to deal with covert and overt action by the KVP "if the Allies were unwilling for whatever reason to employ their forces."\(^3^7\) The second memo constituted the "price" for the military offer. It was essentially a plea for German political equality and partnership with the Allies. It suggested the transformation of the purpose of occupation to one of protection against external danger and demanded that Allied-German relations be replaced by a system of contractual agreements.\(^3^8\)

Adenauer wanted the memos discussed in New York, where he suspected that rearmament would be one of the main points of the agenda. The German public, however, was for the moment not informed of the initiative.\(^3^9\) Apart from possible domestic opposition, the other obstacle lay in the
French attitude. Schuman was only prepared to accept an increase in the Länder police. He stated that Germany's external security remained the concern of the Allies. The means were too limited to arm both the Allies and Germany, and priority must be given to the rearmament of the Allies.⁴⁰

Great Britain favoured a centralized federal police of 100,000 men. Bevin saw it as an unconditional German offer which did not entail immediate Allied concessions. Moreover, he feared an East German attack within "the next few months" against Berlin and the FRG. He was also concerned that latent defeatism might drive Germans into Soviet hands. It was imperative to show Western resolve to boost the "shaky and crumbling" German spirit. He did not favour a creation of a German army due to French susceptibilities and the belief that the German public would not accept more than a police. The British Chiefs of Staff made more drastic demands and proposed gradual German rearmament, recommending an army of 20 divisions, with local naval forces and a considerable air force. Yet Bevin regarded these plans as "impractical" for the time being. He did consider the possibility of a Soviet preventive strike, but argued that this danger better be met now rather than later, when the balance would have tipped even more in favour of the East.⁴¹

At the New York Conference the US failed to get the breakthrough that it had wanted. French resistance to German rearmament could not be overcome.⁴² But US pressure continued, and on 24 October the French Government announced a plan for the creation of a European army, later called the "European Defence Community." The EDC treaty and the treaty on German-Allied relations were signed in 1952, but the French National Assembly never passed them. It was only in 1955 that Germany became sovereign and a member of NATO.
Chapter V, Section B: The Commentators

It was clear from the very beginning that rearmament was a promising instrument for gaining sovereignty." Equally obvious were its implications for German division. Richard Tüngel touched on this aspect in perhaps his most direct treatment of the issue of remilitarization. Writing on 15 December 1949, he examined Adenauer's suggestion of a German contingent in a European army.* For Tüngel it was a dangerous question where one wrong decision could bring uncontrollable consequences. Given Soviet military superiority, a German contribution would hardly provide more security. At present the Allies could not even stop the Soviets along the Rhine. Besides, who would equip a German army? America was barely able to provide the minimum of war material to Western Europe, while Germany could certainly not afford military efforts.

Moreover: "[Es] wäre für eine absehbare Zukunft kaum noch eine Möglichkeit vorhanden, eine Einigung Deutschlands herbeizuführen," since the USSR would in return integrate East German forces into its military system. He did worry that Moscow might let the SED begin a civil war once the Kremlin had succeeded in the withdrawal of all occupation troops. But should the European army become embroiled in such a confrontation, global war would ensue. "Vernunft...[spricht] dagegen, heute eine Aufrüstung Westdeutschlands zu erwägen oder gar zu erörtern." He handed the military burden to the US. "Je stärker die militärische Macht der Vereinigten Staaten wird, je bessere Waffen sie an die Mächte des Atlantikpaktes abgeben können, desto grösser wird die Sicherheit Westdeutschlands sein, desto eher wird auch ganz Deutschland zu einem Frieden kommen."

Already Tüngel shared Adenauer's assessment of Communist aggressiveness. Still rearmament was an unacceptable option for him. The argument about its consequences for German unity was perhaps his ultimate motivation. The
other reasons seemed at least debatable. For instance, why should the repulse of East German forces by a European army lead to a third world war? He may well have feared that a European army could lead to the disengagement of the US on the continent, thereby making Europe vulnerable to Communist attack. His solution to the German and European security question was certainly simple. Let the US shoulder the costs of deterrence.

In the summer of 1950 his fear of East German aggression became more acute. In June he warned that Soviet build-up of the "Bürgerkriegsarmee der Sowjetzone" would have "consequences" for West Germany. "Man kann...auf die Dauer nicht untätig zusehen, wie in der Sowjetzone gerüstet wird für einen Bürgerkrieg, der ganz Deutschland nach dem Willen der Sowjets dem Kreml ausliefern soll." What exactly he meant remained unclear, but this passage could be construed as acceptance of a counterpart to the KVP.

In the weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War he stated that he did not expect the USSR to start a global war because Soviet industrial potential was insufficient and Soviet power in the satellite states had not yet been consolidated. The Kremlin preferred civil war, and Germany and Japan would be the next targets of Moscow's "permanent aggression," perhaps along with South-East Asia, Persia, and Southern Europe. It was a bitter fact that despite the establishment of the KVP the Western Allies did not permit West Germany "eine entsprechende Polizeitruppe."

Adenauer's requests for a federal police force had become public at the beginning of June. Now Tüngel clearly supported this idea, inherently accepting the quasi-military character of such a force. For him an equivalent to the KVP seemed a self-evident move, so convinced was he of the East's hostile designs.

Tüngel avoided discussing direct rearmament, perhaps fearing the consequences of military integration for German unity. At one point he
merely stated that the West must respond with military preparedness. Furthermore, "man [sollte] den Vorschlag, den Walter Lippmann...gemacht hat, beachten..., dass nämlich auch besiegte Völker wie Japan an der Verteidigung der Freiheit teilnehmen müssen." Tüngel knew that it implied a form of German contribution. But he was content with merely hinting at this possibility, without elaborating on its details or ramifications.

Instead, the police option continued to be stressed in July. He still believed that the Korean events could be repeated in Germany, pointing out that the KVP was equipped with heavy weaponry and, according to Pankow, was to be increased in size by one fifth. He demanded that the West German population be assured "dass sie die Bürgerkriegsarmee der deutschen Sowjetregierung ohne fremde Hilfe schlagen könnte."

He claimed that the SED, like the USSR, was "im Studium der vorbereitenden Mobilmachung...für den Bürgerkrieg." Moreover, Pankow planned "National Front" organizations in the FRG to appeal to nationalists and former Nazis. Its aim was to foment agitation against the Allies. Pankow also envisioned sabotage troops in West Germany to target industrial and logistical installations. The Bolsheviks wanted to achieve "eine allgemeine Infiltrierung Westdeutschlands, das man auf diese Weise mehr und mehr erobern will." To fight back, he entreated the West German population to show moral strength and resist the Eastern temptation. Meanwhile, Bonn must fight Communist activities with tough legal measures, maybe even depriving the KPD of its democratic rights.

On 17 August Tüngel commented on the reluctant attitude of the German population towards rearmament. Western countries, he stated, were amazed at the German hesitancy. This pacifism was in part the result of excessive Allied reeducation, designed to eradicate militarism. He praised the
speeches of the German delegates in Strasbourg, which, given the mood of the population, were "mutig und einsichtsvoll." They all agreed in principle with the need to include German contingents in a European army, although the SPD insisted, "in Fragen der Europapolitik merkwürdig starr und doktrinar," on the creation of a European Government prior to building an integrated army. The attitude of the delegates should, however, not give the impression that German approval to participation in European rearmament was a foregone conclusion. The European enthusiasm in Strasbourg was "all very nice," but: "Wir liegen heute im Vorfeld von Europa, wir gehören ihm ja sichtbar vollberechtigt noch nicht an, und für uns gilt manches, was für das übrige Europa nicht gilt."

While all of Western Europe might face war in the short or long term, Germany alone was threatened by civil war. It was wrong to assume that the Allied presence would stop the KVP from attacking the FRG. Communist propaganda asserted that an invasion would come within six months. And: "Warum soll man nicht schnelle Einfälle durchführen...mit gleichzeitigen Aufständen der...kommunistischen Sabotage-Kaders in der Bundesrepublik?" Allied forces were too weak to guard effectively the zonal border. "Andererseits könnten sie an der Grenze in Kämpfe verwickelt werden, die zu weitgehenden politischen Komplikationen führen müssen." Moreover, fighting between East Germans and Allies "...würde auf viele Deutsche keinen guten Eindruck machen." Bonn required a police force of at least 100,000 men, motorized and armed with modern weapons. This could also serve as first contribution to European defence.

Tüngel's last article on rearmament before the New York Conference aimed to dispel the fear that in his mind seemed to grip many Germans. They were worried about impending war, he wrote on 31 August. It was a case of mass neurosis, and this situation threatened to spawn cowardice. In
response to Korea, the US was undertaking rearmaments, which in a few years would result in military superiority. However, now Germans feared that the Soviets would start a preventive war, with Germany the probable target.

He pointed out that a Soviet attack on the FRG or on Berlin would immediately lead to a third world war. In its course, the Soviets could overrun Western Europe, but in the end the USSR, which was aware of its long term inferiority in a global war, would suffer the military fate of Nazi Germany. The real danger was civil war, supported by the Kremlin without direct Soviet involvement. At the moment Moscow could with impunity "play with fire." Fear was the Soviets' best ally in such a game since "Angst lähmt...ganze Völker und macht sie in ihrem Widerstand unsicher." It gave the Communists greater influence and more inspiration to attempt "open revolt." Therefore, Germans should fight "unreasonable fears" and concentrate on the "positive goals:" the creation of a unified, federal European state; and the reconquest of the European countries, including the Soviet zone, presently under Soviet tyranny.

Tüngel avoided a clear position on rearmament in the summer of 1950, although the question of German participation in a European army was raised publicly by both Adenauer and Churchill since the middle of August. Tüngel probably shared the reluctance of the majority of the German people, possibly for fear of irreversible consequences for the question of unity. Perhaps he also expected that Germany should first receive equal status in Europe, as his article of 17 August seemed to indicate. In that respect he was in accordance with the SPD, which he mocked for demanding a European Government prior to rearmament. But Schumacher's demand probably disguised his desire first to achieve political equality with the rest of Western Europe.

Tüngel's assessments of the threats facing the FRG, which gradually grew
in urgency, were striking in that he was so convinced that the Communists planned civil war in Germany, even with Allied troops present. His scenarios certainly appeared vivid and compelling. The danger might seem improbable in hindsight, but Adenauer and the High Commissioners also believed in this threat. This indicated that even Tüngel was infected by the fear that he diagnosed in the German people. He took seriously the SED-rhetoric, which agreed with his belief in the aggressive nature of Communism. Yet he clearly ruled out the threat of global war, believing strongly that Moscow would not dare challenge the US War potential. For now he seemed content with a strongly armed federal police.

The last sentences in his article of 31 August pointed to a crucial point. He mentioned the positive goals of European federalism and of freeing Eastern Europe, and especially the GDR, of Soviet tyranny. But his last article appeared to contain in between the lines the tacit and painful realization that unity was out of the question for the foreseeable future. What was left was the European policy and the hope that Western strength and unity would in time bring German unification and the victory over Communism.

While Tüngel remained mute on rearmament, Rudolf Augstein mounted serious arguments against it. In March 1950, reacting to Adenauer's denial of reports that he had sought advice from a questionable organization of former Wehrmacht generals, Augstein noted that he was right to seek advice on security because the AHC was neither willing nor capable of discussing the matter in a serious fashion. The changeability of US policy and its refusal to guarantee the Elbe against "Eastern encroachments" further justified concerns how Bonn, in case of Allied withdrawal, could repel East German attacks.

"Deutsche 'Streitkräfte'" should be used only for defence against the
KVP. "Dass man ihnen die Verteidigung Europas zumute, ist die eigentliche Gefahr." He reminded Adenauer that nobody had empowered him to make an offer of German contingents to a European army. The Chancellor should appoint a foreign minister, who realized "dass im augenblicklichen Kräftefeld noch kein Spielraum für eine deutsche Außenpolitik ist." He continued:

Denn was kann eine deutsche Außenpolitik weiter sein als die Beherzigung des einen Grundsatzes: Eine ausenpolitische und militärische Frontstellung gegen Sowjetrußland ist für Deutschland nicht diskutabel, solange: 1) Westeuropas Rüstung in einem so bejammernswerten Missverhältnis zu der des Ostblocks steht. Es ist besser kampflos als kämpfend überrannt zu werden; [und] 2) die westliche Welt den deutschen Export nicht annähernd aufsaugen kann.

So much had been taken away from Germany that she was forced to export, and it would not be in the interest of the US to have an economically ruined country in its front against the USSR. Americans should be content that Germany was eliminating the Communist appeal within her own borders.

As regards security, a US guarantee would better protect Germany than a German army. Indeed, the US must protect her lest the German potential should fall into Russian hands. If the US provided a guarantee and if the West became so economically strong that it could absorb German exports and supply the FRG with the necessary military hardware, then Germans, as a matter of self-interest and mutual expediency, would agree to contribute to Western military security. "In dieser Branche sind sie fit."

This perspective was later augmented by Augstein’s fears that as part of the Schuman Plan Germany could become part of the Western "Rüstungsallianz." "Die heutigen Deutschen," he wrote on 18 May, "nützen der Welt mehr, wenn sie nicht gerüstet sind." He then developed a vision of a neutral Germany as part of a buffer-zone between the superpowers but protected by an American guarantee."

It was noteworthy that Augstein supported a West German "defence force"
against the KVP at a relatively early point. It was also interesting that he used the export question as a reason to oppose rearmament, which he feared would solidify Europe's division. The West German economy was struggling in 1950. The seemingly lucrative Eastern markets therefore had a certain attraction. Augstein was not alone in making this argument. German industry and the Economics Ministry under Erhard were also interested in expanding the trade with the East. Of course, the export issue also gave Augstein's vision of neutrality an economic underpinning. His conception was based on the belief that it would be possible to get the best from the West and from the East. The Americans would provide military security, and the Soviets might one day release the Eastern Zone. In the meantime, West Germany could maintain commercial ties with both, thereby perhaps becoming independent of the crucial Marshall Plan aid.

When Augstein touched on the reactions after the Korean war, he considered it "halbwegs spassig" that Adenauer demanded security guarantees while the Allies "sich in das Problem vernarri haben, wie man die Sicherheit Westeuropas durch Vermehrung der deutschen Polizei-Tschakos lösen könnte." A guarantee would only state the self-evident, and a "Polizei-Heer" would be too weak "in any case." What was really required were concrete plans for evacuations and retreats. "Die Welt ist vermutlich vom Weltkrieg so weit entfernt wie nur irgendwann seit 1945." But as long as war was possible, evacuation plans for those who did not want to become Russian "Kriegspotential" had to be made.

He deemed Korea another example of the "gigantic political miscalculations" of the US. Nonetheless, "die Verkennung der Triebkräfte des Kreml ist noch nicht irreparabel." The American reluctance to assume the mantle of the "Weltfriedensgaranten" had its parallel in the Roman Empire shortly before Caesar. "Auch die Römer liessen sich nur mühsam
herbei, der asiatischen Grausamkeit des Antiochos von Syrien und des Mithridates von Pontos Schach zu halten." If the Korean experience "bumped the US onto the path of global imperialism," then Germany's security would be assured. US decisiveness in Korea "könnte [uns] dazu dienen, der Unmenschlichkeit der asiatischen Stalinisten kühl, klarer und entschlossener zu begegnen."

This column indicated clearly that Augstein judged the USSR a dangerous power. It also showed that he accepted without any reservations the global role of the United States. Compared to his earlier commentary, Augstein now seemed to dismiss the usefulness of a US guarantee and creation of a federal police. He also gave the impression of being rather fatalistic. He appeared to imply that West German defence efforts would be meaningless and that only the US, the "global policeman," could deter the Soviets. In his editorial of 31 August Augstein suddenly completely rejected Adenauer's plans of a federal police, presumably suspecting that the Chancellor might use it as a springboard for rearmament and German military integration."

A federal police would endanger Germany, he stated, and "sie ist auch nicht geeignet, den USA, der Schutzmacht der Freiheit, Hilfe zu leisten." He noted that Adenauer's proposal opened him up to charges of dishonesty. He knew full well that the force would soon expand above the present estimates. In the meantime, Schumacher, in the past limited to the "unproductive obstinacy of the party tactician," was now the representative of a genuine political trend. He had produced "einige Wahrheiten, die dem Kanzler guttäten."

Unfortunately, Schumacher's argumentation was marred by one false point: his acceptance of rearmament if an offensive Western army was positioned along the Elbe. This was "ein gedanklicher Kurzschluss." At best Germany could be rearmed as the last Western state, and then only under the
protective umbrella of totally mobilized US forces. However, it would be certain “dass eine allierte Offensiv-Armee an der Elbe plus deutsche Aufrüstung die Russen zu einem verzweifelten Präventivkrieg geradezu herausfordern würde.” Schumacher deserved credit for shelving the SPD’s “illusionary pacifism,” “der oftmals aus dem Jahre 1910 zu stammen schien.” But by supporting rearmament he was as wrong as Adenauer.

Augstein continued: “Es ist Zeit, wenn überhaupt noch Zeit ist, zu erkennen, warum und wie lange eine deutsche Aufrüstung für die westliche Welt nutzlos, für uns Deutsche aber unannehmbar sein wird.” If the Russians planned to attack, then West Germany ought to be armed like “Grossdeutschland unter Hitler.” An army which could not guarantee that Germans could serve as officers was a monstrosity, and “eine Europa-Armee, in der die Deutschen die Minderheit sind, hält die Russen nicht auf.”

There were two options. The US, supported by France and the UK, could undertake to defend Europe. “Das hiesse das Risiko eines Weltkrieges herunterschrauben und den Deutschen den Bruderkrieg ersparen.” Or Germany, supported by the US, could assume the task of defending Europe. Then Germany, even in a federal Europe, would become Europe’s predominant power. “Dies zuzulassen sind selbst die Amerikaner nicht bereit.” Augstein concluded: “Bleibt...die unangenehme Erkenntnis, dass die Deutschen ihre Aufrüstung nicht akzeptieren dürfen und dass die Amerikaner auch an der Elbe das Opfer bringen müssen, dass die 'Pax Americana' auf dem Erdball von ihnen fordert.”

Augstein’s argumentation was fundamentally identical to the policy of the SPD before Schumacher’s sudden reversal at the end of August. Obviously, Augstein wanted to prevent a blind rush towards rearmament whose negative consequences for his policy he realized. He saw exactly that it would be very difficult to stem the tide when the leaders of Germany’s two
main parties were already behind rearmament. Yet his argumentation was not very convincing. Although he tried to give his reasons the force of logic, it appeared artificial. His analysis missed the middle ground that was eventually adopted in the following years. Germany was integrated in NATO, without wanting or being able to assume a predominant position. He did regard the KVP and the USSR as a potential threat. But his concept of the US as guarantor of peace needed much more examination and detail. It appeared that the US already had so many global military obligations that dependence on the Americans might not inspire a great deal of confidence. And it seemed fundamentally wrong to rely on another power for national defence, which was a self-evident right and a mark of sovereignty. Without it, Germany would have been a dependent second-class state, at the mercy of the will of the superpowers. She would not have been master of her own fortunes.

Sethe's position on rearmament seemed beset by inner doubts and uncertainty. Rejection of the idea was buttressed by lucid, forceful argumentation. Strangely, he did not list concerns over German unity as reasons against rearmament. However, at times there appeared hints that he could maybe accept a German contribution to Western defence. When the issue arose in November 1949, Sethe regretted that Allied leaders seemed to assume that it constituted a "gift." "Die Wirklichkeit aber ist, dass die Worte von der Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland eine tiefe Angst bei Millionen von Müttern und einen leidenschaftlichen Widerwillen bei Millionen von jungen Männern hervorrufen." The Allies should recognize that remilitarization would be a big sacrifice, if Germany ever accepted it.

He emphatically rejected creating a German mercenary army, which would have little military value. Germany was not a supplier of "cannon fodder." Nevertheless, he implied that a regular German army was a possibility: "Wir
But he then criticized Adenauer's interviews, which he asserted could not change opposition to rearmament. He doubted whether it was Adenauer's task to endorse such military plans. Given the uncertainty abroad about German rearmament, Germans should stay out of the debate. The Allies had caused too much confusion by first denigrating Germany's military tradition, then asking for her to contribute to Western defence."

Sethe's position was contradictory. Although impressed by the population's rejection of remilitarization, he appeared to argue then for, then against rearmament. In the spring of 1950 Sethe tended to shove the issue away, while he also stressed his standard demand. "Deutschland," he wrote in March, "hat innerhalb der westlichen Gemeinschaft vor allem politische, wirtschaftliche und ideelle Aufgaben zu lösen." Excitement about Churchill's remarks must not detract from his demand for "geistige Eingliederung Deutschlands in den Westen." According to Sethe, Churchill regarded the treatment of Germany as "contradictory, foolish, and fraught with psychological dangers," which might result in encouraging Communist and neo-fascist tendencies in Germany. Sethe again raised the dark spectre of German indifference, caused by maladroit Allied policy. "Irgendeine Rolle wird es schon einmal in der Weltpolitik spielen, ob fünfzig Millionen Menschen in der Mitte Europas an den Westen glauben oder ob ihre Herzen taub bleiben, wenn sie von dorther angerufen werden.""
eines Tages aufgefordert werden wird, 'einen Beitrag zu ihrer und zur
europäischen Verteidigung zu stellen.'" In spite of this apparent consensus,
he hoped that Germans would remain "bei dem klaren, ruhigen und
wohlüberlegten Nein, das die meisten Deutschen seit Jahren in dieser Frage
ausgesprochen haben."

He described a German contribution as useless. Defence of Western Europe
relied mostly on assistance from the US, and "diese wird auf viele Jahre
kaum ausreichen, die westeuropäische Siegerstaaten ausreichend zu
bewaffnen." Diverting US assistance bound for France or the UK to Germany
would not improve Europe's "materielle Wehrkraft." In addition: "In keinem
Lande der Welt [ist] das Waffentragen so wenig volkstümlich wie in
Deutschland. Das was man den deutschen militaristischen Geist nennt, ist
geschichtlich sehr jungen Datums." The horrific sacrifice and destruction
of the last war, as well as Allied denazification, had removed the military
spirit without which rearmament would be of questionable value. Moreover,
its benefits would be negated by Allied unwillingness to grant equal
status. How effective would German units be when "man nur zum Kanonenfutter
bestimmt sei, dazu ausersehen... ausgebrannt zu werden." It was false to
assume that "das Standhalten des deutschen Soldaten aus dem letzten Kriege
sich einfach wiederholen [liesse], wenn man ihm nur wieder Waffen in die
Hand gebe."

What was more, the idea of a European defence was plagued by the
non-existence of a united Europe. "Schaffen wir doch erst einmal das
vereinigte Europa, dann können wir uns auch über seine Verteidigung
unterhalten." It would be a long process, and he hoped that "die Russen uns
noch so lange Zeit [lassen], bis es geschaffen ist." In this context he
alluded to the issue of European neutrality. "Wir halten sehr viel von den
Gedanken unserer Kollegen vom Pariser Monde, die dieses Europa 'bewaffnet'

und 'neutral' machen wollen. Darin liegt wahrscheinlich eine hohe Gewähr für eine politisch glückliche Zukunft."

In May he backed the Allied protest against the KVP since it unmasked the militaristic tendencies of Bolshevism and the true source of global tensions. However, he maintained that German remilitarization would be an excessive response to the East German build-up. He conceded that the KVP would expand beyond 50,000 men and constituted a serious threat. Nonetheless, it was not an army per se. In response, it sufficed to establish a federal police with similar weaponry. Rearmament, on the other hand, would invite immediate action by the Soviet Union.

Those who "attempted to soften up Western Europe's public opinion for German rearment," were confounding two types of threats: the KVP and the Red Army, which constituted a much greater danger. Against Soviet military might 15-20 German divisions would hardly help, given the extent of European vulnerability.

It showed ignorance of the true nature of Bolshevism if one thought that the "paper sword" of 20 German divisions might counter the "immense peril from the East." What was needed was a progressive, vital, and powerful ideal, such as the "Bild eines neuen Europa..., das alle seine Glieder als gleich wertvolle Gemeinschaften anerkennt, dem die Idee der Freiheit und der Gerechtigkeit voranleuchtet und das auch noch dem Ärmsten den sozialen Aufstieg sichert." Then the East German threat would lose its potency, and then measures against the Soviet menace might be discussed."

At this point his reluctance to rearm Germany was supported with plausible, persuasive arguments. His approach was rather like that of Schumacher: Germany had tasks in other fields, and first the Allies must free Germany of the occupation regime, then one could talk about a defence contribution. Sethe's talk of a "united Europe" of course assumed an
integrated and equal Germany. What was remarkable in Sethe’s articles was the willingness to run the risk of a delay in improving Western Europe’s defence. The Soviet threat was clearly stated, yet Sethe seemed convinced that Germany could do little to help militarily. His thinking toyed, ever so fleetingly, with the idea of neutrality. Yet it was not taken up whole-heartedly, at least not in 1949-50. Thus at the end of May he appeared to have certain doubts about Adenauer’s course.

The North Korean attack prompted Sethe to make comparisons to Germany’s situation.\(^3\)

Unnötig zu sagen, dass kein...Volk gegenwärtig mit solcher Spannung nach Korea blicken kann wie das deutsche. Das liegt nicht nur daran, dass Deutschland der unmittelbare Nachbar jener gewaltigen östlichen Welt ist, deren äußerste Vorposten gegenwärtig in Korea zum Angriff übergegangen sind. Stärker noch ist der Eindruck einer unheimlichen Gleichformigkeit des russischen Vorgehens in Korea und bei uns.

However, he drew no immediate conclusions from the event. In July Sethe noted that the US intervention deserved even more admiration than US commitments under the Marshall Plan. Only resolution and steadfastness could impress Moscow. Weakness would encourage the Soviet desire to expand. Sethe then pointed out the lesson of the Korean experience. The war showed that the weak, rotten conditions in the Far East provided little resistance to Communism. "Zur Aufrüstung und zur vorbereitenden Verteidigung gegenüber dem mächtigen Bolschewismus gehört immer eine lebendige, fortzeugende und mitreissende Idee." In the Western world, to which he counted Asian states, the ideals of freedom and justice must be fulfilled. Only then would it make sense to arm.\(^4\)

The war in Korea had also made apparent the contradictory nature of Allied treatment of Germany. Germany belonged theoretically to the West. Yet the Allies had not incorporated her fully into their community. How much longer should Germany wait? While Korea was in flames, the West displayed immaturity and inner division.
Bonn had wisely avoided making demands following the North Korean invasion. Unfortunately, there were still Allied politicians who gladly denied Germany, "einem Staate von fünfzig Millionen in der Mitte eines schwerbedrohten Erdteils," proper diplomatic rights. "Solche Starre [muss] Kopfschütteln erregen." In addition, the Allies were still not willing to lift industrial limitations on Germany. It seemed that powerful circles in the West preferred hampering Germany's economic recovery for fear of competition, to building a united world. In the spring Adenauer had demonstrated more perspicaciousness than his Allies in assessing the true extent of the Eastern danger. It was time to dispose of the distinction between victors and vanquished.

After the middle of July Sethe's position began to waver and appeared confused at times. While he still preferred to hand the military responsibility to the Allies, he continued to establish political conditions for a German defence contribution. He noted that the thought of German rearmament was spreading "like an oilspill" in the Western world. Nevertheless, there could be no rearmament without an end to German discrimination. Only free states with equal rights could be asked to carry weapons. Allied ideas about rearmament were muddled. It would take five years, at least, to form 25 German divisions. The Russians, in the meantime, might intervene while time was still on their side. In any case, German armed forces would not make a difference. Perhaps they would resist Soviet superiority for days, even weeks. In the end they would be destroyed; the Soviet advance would continue. Nothing would stop the Red Army because Western defence was a sham.

The Allies had two responsibilities: a united Europe and sufficient rearmament to hold the Soviets until the arrival of US reinforcements. After fulfillment of these conditions, German remilitarization could be
discussed. The US ought to realize that a stronger military presence in Europe was required. Washington had to accept the consequences of the mistakes committed after 1945, when both Japan and Germany were completely demilitarized. "[Das] war ein weltpolitischer Fehler ersten Ranges... Nun müssen sie die Lasten auf sich nehmen, die ein verteidigungsstarkes Deutschland und...Japan ihnen erspart hätten." He added: "Das Schicksal lässt sich nicht betrügen; auch nicht dadurch, dass man den Deutschen erlaubt, wieder einen Stahlhelm zu tragen, worum sie gar nicht gebeten haben." The US must assume the burden of substantial rearmament and be militarily prepared even in peace time. America's former two "Festlandsdegen," France and Britain, were not able to play that role again. They had not even accepted their share in the defence efforts. The military power of the UK and France was not commensurate with their greatness and inner strength.

After Churchill's speech in Strasbourg Sethe doubted whether the creation of a European army was enough to build a unified Europe. Europe's energies must first be directed towards achieving unity, not towards military aims. Unity would then improve combat effectiveness and solve the problem of German integration with the least amount of friction. Furthermore, unity would show "moral force." It would indicate that the West was governed by "elementare Triebkräfte zur Formung einer neuen Welt." "Eine solche Bekundung [würde] den Angriffswillen der Sowjets auf das äusserste dämpfen." In addition, European unity was perhaps the only way to soothe the bewilderment of the German people at the Allied desire to rearm them. The hasty call for rearmament seemed as unreflected as the "dilettantism" of 1945 when the Central European defence capability was destroyed. This thoughtlessness could not be redeemed by abruptly rebuilding a German army. The Western Powers alone would have to assume the
task of defending Europe.\textsuperscript{67}

This seemed like a clear statement, but only a few days later he identified one of the obstacles which the Allies ought to remove before Germans could agree to remilitarization: the imprisonment of Germans unjustly convicted of war crimes, a cause that was also championed by Adenauer's coalition partner, the FDP. Sethe conceded that it was a touchy subject, and he emphasized that he did not mean those cases where cruelty and breach of law had been proved. "Aber in Landsberg und anderswo sitzen zahlreiche Soldaten, bei denen die Fälle keineswegs so liegen." The professional soldiers had never accepted these verdicts, and because of their sense of honour would not serve in a new German army while their comrades sat in prison. The injustices had not been limited to soldiers. Many industrials and high-ranking civil servants had been tarnished as criminals merely to hurt the leading classes and the self-esteem of the German people. It was "eine Art verfeinerter Morgenthau-Politik." This was the reason why men like Krupp and von Weizsäcker, "ein an Wahnsinn grenzender Fall," had been condemned.\textsuperscript{68}

Sethe lacked coherence in his stance on rearmament. Furthermore, he, like Tüngel, did not react to the developments in late August when Adenauer and Schumacher supported German rearmament. What was clear was that Sethe wanted extensive Allied concessions. The German demands were understandable and in the end fulfilled during the next five years. Sethe's criticism of Allied disarmament policy in 1945 completely ignored Allied sacrifice in the fight against the Third Reich. After 1939-45, it was natural that the world felt inclined to eradicate for ever German military might. An Allied reader might have considered Sethe's blunt words crass and offensive. On the other hand, the Western Allies certainly did underestimate the threat posed by the Soviets after the Second World War. The conventional imbalance
Hans Baumgarten wrote on rearmament only after the Korean invasion and started with very cautious perspectives. In July he stated that the task for Germany lay in helping to secure Western Europe. "Das beste augenblickliche Mittel dazu scheint die Verwirklichung des Schuman-Plans zu sein."

Later he added that Germany's anti-Communist attitude was an important contribution to the preservation of peace. The continuance of anti-Communism was "die Aufgabe der deutschen Politik." This included finding solutions to social and economic problems to prevent political radicalization. Schumacher was right when he stated that "eine maximale soziale Leistung" constituted "den einzig möglichen effektiven Beitrag Deutschlands für den Schutz Europas vor dem Bolschewismus."

In the middle of August Baumgarten stressed that Bonn must continue to work for a vibrant and peaceful united Europe, but also enunciated the need for direct German defensive action. But decisions on European unification were of such importance that Germany must be able to express her will as a free state. It was impossible that such crucial decisions could be made "auf Anweisung aussenstehender Kräfte oder auch nur unter dem Schein [dessen]." Germany's subordinate status must cease. The AHC should be dropped, and the occupation be transformed into the stationing of Allied troops for defence purposes.

At present "Militärmudigkeit" was widespread among Germans. Yet if Germans had something worth defending, such as the "Lebenswerte einer ehrenhaften, materiellen und geistigen Freiheit" of a united Europe, then surely Germans would be willing "die Wirklichkeit zu erhalten und zu vertiefen." Europe faced two risks: those of military aggression and Bolshevik subversion. As a first step, every state required "eine wirklich schlagkräftige Polizei."

"Die Abwehr brutaler Vergewaltigung beginnt zu Hause. Ist sie gesichert,
kann man kraftvoll an die äussere Verteidigung denken."

In September Baumgarten stated with relief that US determination to fight Communist aggression had finally stimulated the British and French "Widerstandsgeist." The new Allied military élan would calm West Germans because Germany did not want to become "die schwache Stelle in der militärischen Front der politischen Gegner." He regarded Adenauer’s comments on German rearmament merely as the desire to build a federal police. It was "nur ein Beitrag zur Innenpolitik, zur Sicherung Westdeutschlands vor inneren Gewalttätigkeiten, wozu allerdings auch auf die sowjetzonale Volkspolizei verwiesen werden muss." Creation of a federal police was supported by Baumgarten as "zweckmässig." External security, however, should be handled by the Allies. Certainly, a "Bundespolizei" implied that Bonn should be accorded "volle innenpolitische Souveränität" after New York. The limiting of Germany’s defence duties to internal security would eliminate international distrust of a renewed German militarism. At the same time, European unification would not be slowed down. He hoped soon to see in Europe "das vertrauensvolle Zusammenwirken Gleichberechtigter auf allen Ebenen."

The commentators provided four different opinions, and there was no clear approval of rearmament. Baumgarten completely ignored the issue whether Germany should join an integrated European army. At the same time, he brought forward substantial demands for the creation of a federal police. Augstein in the end categorically rejected such a police, probably because he feared Adenauer would abuse it for covert rearmament. Sethe and Tüngel, in turn, saw no objections to a federal police. They seemed willing to consider remilitarization if the right "price" could be found. However, except for Augstein, nobody in the late summer of 1950 seemed to think explicitly about what rearmament might do to Germany’s division.
Conclusion

The commitment to West German rearmament nearly propelled Adenauer to sovereignty and Western integration on a contractual basis after only two and a half years in office. Ultimately, he had to wait until May 1955 to achieve his two cherished goals. Yet it is a tribute to Adenauer's diplomatic skill that already in 1952 the Federal Republic was on the verge of becoming sovereign. A great part of the foundation for this success was built in his first year when he used the opportunities given to him by Allied policy and the Korean war. From the outset Adenauer assumed personal control of foreign policy, and only two months after coming to office he reached the Petersberg Agreement, which accepted West Germany as a negotiating party and greatly reduced Allied dismantling, a source of Allied-German friction. It also provided the first, though limited, revisions of the Occupation Statute. In the spring of 1950 the Chancellor weathered the Franco-German fracas over the Saar issue and, by continuously stressing his desire for Western European integration and Franco-German understanding, at times with rather unorthodox proposals, helped to create a fruitful environment for the initiation of the Schuman plan, which gave his foreign policy such a timely impetus. The plan supplied Adenauer with a crucial argument to secure accession to the Council of Europe since integration of the main sector of Western European industry promised to flesh out the idea of European federalism. The North Korean aggression then provided a stimulus for military integration. It raised the threats of East German and Soviet attack, increased Western solidarity, and furnished powerful arguments for West Germany's rearmament. Adenauer shrewdly and disingenuously avoided an open discussion on remilitarization, thereby for the moment containing opposition to it.

Thus in September 1950 Adenauer had prepared the ground for West
Germany's political, economic, and military integration in the Western community. This provided the Federal Republic with strong allies, security, and stability. The disadvantage of Adenauer's policy of Western integration was the hardening of German division. East Germans were left to their fate without Bonn making a genuine attempt to overcome separation. Because it was improbable that Moscow would accept the Western integration of all-Germany, neutrality was the one policy that could perhaps avoid the solidification of German division. Neutrality, however, was the antithesis to Adenauer's agenda. He rejected it because he did not trust Soviet intentions or the maturity of the German people. He feared that neutrality might lead to a Soviet-German understanding, and therefore an end to Western European integration and French-German understanding. In a worst case scenario, he worried that neutrality would ultimately bring the outright Bolshevization of Germany.

Even if he had wanted to probe Soviet willingness to grant German unification, he still would have had to contend with the restrictions on his diplomatic latitude. The High Commission controlled German diplomacy and by opting for an active German policy Adenauer would have undermined the very Allied trust that he was at pains to cultivate. There would have been a genuine danger of "falling between two stools." Moreover, Adenauer's reluctance to force the unity issue was certainly made easier by the lack of a Soviet proposal on unification in 1949-50.

Adenauer's opposition, the SPD, was unable to exploit the shortcomings in Adenauer's policy. Kurt Schumacher, although toying with the idea of military neutrality until the summer of 1950, strongly opposed political neutrality. The leader of the SPD was convinced of the necessity of a Western orientation, and he disparaged Jakob Kaiser's idea of Germany as a "bridge" between East and West. Schumacher's fervent anti-Communism did not
allow for a dialogue with the SED and ruled out a deal with the USSR. The result was that Schumacher could gain a profile only through criticism of Adenauer's methods and by appealing, with rather vague exhortations, to the primacy of German unity. Schumacher wanted the Government and the West to act "offensively" towards the goal of unity. The opposition, however, remained ineffectual because the SPD could not develop a real alternative, one that was not limited to mere rejection of Adenauer's course.

Schumacher's only "plan" for achieving unity came in August 1950 when he reversed completely his earlier position on rearmament. While he had advocated unarmed military neutrality in 1949-50, he now developed a conception based on the assumption that Western military and political strength would force the Soviets peacefully to redraw global spheres of interest. In the wake of this realignment East Germany and Eastern Europe would be surrendered by Moscow. If the West accepted this premise, gave Bonn sovereignty, and agreed to a massive military build-up along the Elbe, then Schumacher was prepared to rearm West Germany. The problems with this conception were the Allied disinterest in achieving unity, the already vast US global military commitments, and the possibility that Moscow might begin a preventive war before Western strength had been amassed along the zonal border. Schumacher himself moved away from this radical variant of a policy of strength in the autumn of 1951, and after its leader was more or less incapacitated by a stroke late that year the SPD began outlining elements of German neutrality without, however, having the courage to advocate neutrality openly. In these early years of the Federal Republic the SPD never found its true identity. The dilemma between having to choose between Western integration and German unity while wanting both made the party inconsistent and caused internal disagreement. Perhaps without Schumacher's strong leadership the SPD might have drifted into a neutralist position
much earlier.

Rudolf Augstein had no qualms about pressing for a neutral policy. His chief goal was to preserve chances for unification. He realized correctly that Western integration would make unity impossible for the foreseeable future and instead suggested neutrality for the Federal Republic. This begged the question how West Germany could achieve political, military, and economic security. Clearly, one of the problems with a neutralist policy was the uncertain future it seemed to hold. Augstein, however, failed to discuss properly the many political and military risks inherent in neutrality. Moreover, the Three Powers had no interest in German unification and neutrality. The Western Allies' cardinal aim was to control and integrate West Germany in the Western camp. If a majority of West Germans had favoured neutrality, then the Three Powers perhaps could have been forced to support it as well. However, there was no such strong movement in 1949-50. The few groups and individuals in favour of neutrality teetered along the sidelines in German politics.

Paul Sethe once alluded to neutrality on a European basis. He was sympathetic to it but regarded it only as a possible step following Western European unification. His immediate goal was for West Germany to become a sovereign and equal member of the Western community. Although indecisive about accession to the Council of Europe due to the Saar issue, he supported Western European integration. His main reason seemed to be the realization that Europe was in a fragile state. He differed from Adenauer mainly in the forcefulness with which he demanded German equality. Adenauer was more cautious in this respect, except during the month of April. Sethe, on the other hand, sounded much like Schumacher, who too wanted immediate recognition by the Allies of Germany's equal status.

Since the middle of spring Sethe consistently argued for a state
secretary to assume foreign affairs. He was critical of Adenauer’s handling of the Saar question and of his interviews. It was possible that Sethe had personal reservations against the energetic, purposeful Chancellor and his close control of foreign affairs. Despite these indications of opposition to Adenauer, Sethe did not openly contradict his policies. He hedged on accession to the Council and on rearmament, at times using the arguments of the SPD, but Sethe did not disavow Adenauer.

Sethe’s apparent indifference to the issue of German unity was striking. In 1952 he was strongly motivated by the desire to unify Germany. The same desire must have been there in 1949-50; however, the lack of any realistic perspectives probably led him to focus instead on Western integration.

Hans Baumgarten’s support for European integration was constant and strongly motivated by economic reasons. He gave the Petersberg Agreement qualified support and then, after exhorting France to provide a stimulus for Franco-German understanding, enthusiastically backed the Schuman Plan. On the whole, Baumgarten supported Adenauer’s policy. Schumacher’s policies found little positive echo in his commentaries. Indeed, Schumacher did not receive substantial support from any of the pundits.

The issue of German unity was never far from Richard Tüngel’s mind. He did not let the German question drift out of sight but ultimately was not able to outline direct, short-term ways to attain unification. In his editorials of 1949-50 he defended the basic elements of Adenauer’s Western policy, despite questions about its implications for German unity. Tüngel’s staunch anti-Communism, fear of Soviet aggression, and refusal to engage in intra-German negotiations contributed to this position. He asserted that prospects for German unity had not been compromised, yet his German policy was little more than vague hopes and a defence of the status quo against Communist encroachment. Implicit in Tüngel’s thinking was the painful
realization that at the moment little could be done to achieve unity. His chief priority became the defence of West German and European freedom.

Ernst Friedlaender also grappled with the problem of how to resolve European integration with the desire for German unity. Of all the pundits, Friedlaender was the most committed to European unification and since September 1949 vigorously pushed for German accession to the Council. He argued that German unity did not conflict with European integration. For him the strengthening of West Germany meant an indirect improvement for the Eastern Zone. Although in agreement with the general points of Adenauer's policy, Friedlaender nonetheless demanded that Bonn's diplomacy be handed to a state secretary in April 1950. This criticism, and that by Augstein and Sethe, underscored how badly the Chancellor's interviews affected his domestic position. This fact also underlined the importance of the Schuman Plan, which gave Adenauer a timely success just as the controversial rearmament issue was beginning to unfold.

The question of rearmament could have been a stumbling block for Adenauer, given the extent of the domestic opposition to it. The publicists took various positions. Tüngel, Baumgarten, and Sethe regarded the threat posed by the KVP as justification for the creation of a federal police without, however, commenting on the possibility that Adenauer might exploit it as a foundation for remilitarization. Baumgarten tied his backing of police forces to extensive Allied concessions in the field of German domestic sovereignty, but he ignored the issue of re-creating a German army. Tüngel hinted at a price for rearmament, yet did not clarify his ultimate position. Sethe's erstwhile rejection of rearmament, which sounded very much like certain positions of the SPD, appeared to crumble as the possibility of gaining sovereign rights beckoned. Only Augstein was adamant in his rejection, correctly anticipating that rearmament would make
unification impossible. All in all, the rearmament issue was discussed with a certain lack of profundity. Adenauer's hints at the possibility of a contribution to a European army were not taken up.

The summary of the editorials of 1949-50 revealed that Adenauer's diplomacy was on the whole supported by West German publicists. Augstein's opposition only seemed to justify the rule. Western European integration enjoyed much more backing than the policy of neutrality, which was at times dismissed or not discussed. The issue of German unity had emotional appeal but could not pull Tüngel and Friedlaender away from their support for Western integration. The possibility of a conflict between integration and unification was recognized but explained away. The need to act on Western integration was greater than the fear of its consequences for unity. When the Korean war made consolidation of the West even more urgent, there was no explicit recognition that Adenauer was moving towards the remilitarization of the Federal Republic, a step that would clinch its Western integration but also the fate of East Germans for the next forty years.

Adenauer's pressure on the FAZ over the years indicated that he deemed support by the press important, especially from such a preeminent newspaper. Conversely, Augstein's backing of a neutralist policy gave those politicians who advocated neutrality probably more credibility. Yet to measure the degree to which the pundits were able to influence the public or certain policy makers would require opinion polls or testimony from the various individuals.

Modern Germany now faces the consequences of this long national division. But then every policy has its price. Whether unification could have been achieved at an acceptable compromise is impossible to determine. There were possibilities for neutrality. By 1952 the SPD was largely in
favour of it, and a compromising Soviet proposal might have led to
Four-Power agreement on a neutral or neutralized Germany. Yet the

Adenauer was wise to refrain from a neutral policy. In hindsight the
dangers seem too immense when compared with the relatively successful
development of the Federal Republic. The fact is that Adenauer’s diplomacy
attained all its goals. His achievements, ranging from unity, Franco-German
understanding, and European unification, to shaping Germany’s democracy and
economy, are monumental. Each taken by itself would be a proud success. One
hopes that the new Germany will not squander Adenauer’s legacy.
Endnotes - Introduction

1. See Rainer Zitelmann’s introduction to his book Adenauers Gegner: Streiter für die Einheit (Erlangen, 1991). He quotes the historian Arnulf Baring, an erstwhile critic of the Chancellor, on page 10: "Adenauer war der wichtigste deutsche Wegbereiter der Entwicklung, die uns jetzt die Wiedervereinigung gebracht hat." Seit dem Wandel in Osteuropa und der DDR habe Adenauers Deutschland-Politik zugleich mit seiner Westpolitik eine glänzende Rechtfertigung erfahren." Zitelmann points to the "brennende und bewegende Frage...ob vierzig Jahre Diktatur und Teilung wirklich unvermeidbar waren," but argues that historians cannot prove "scientifically" either that Adenauer’s policy was the only possible and imaginable road to German unity, or that Adenauer’s domestic opponents would have been able to achieve unification in the 1950s.

Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage (Göttingen, 1988), and Rolf Steininger, Eine vertane Chance: Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und die Wiedervereinigung. Eine Studie auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Berlin, 1985), argue that Adenauer did not want unification. Foschepoth maintains that a British document of 1955 indicates that to Adenauer “integration of Western Germany with the West was more important than the unification of Germany” because “Adenauer had no confidence in the German people. He was terrified that when he disappeared from the scene a future German Government might do a deal with Russia at the German expense.” Foschepoth, Adenauer, 289-90.

Steininger asserts that: 1) Stalin’s offer of 1952 was serious. "Dies war die Chance" [für die Wiedervereinigung]; 2) the Western Allies took seriously the Soviet proposals for Four-Power negotiations, but did not want German unification; and 3) Adenauer had committed "ein historisches Versaumnis" by not bringing the Allies to explore Soviet willingness to grant concessions. The methods and perspectives of Foschepoth and Steininger are criticized by Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutschlandpolitik Adenauers: Alte Thesen und neue Fakten (Opladen, 1991).


In the 1950s the political controversy over Adenauer’s unwillingness to discuss the Soviet offer of unification led to the "Legende der verpassten Gelegenheit." Its origins and Sethe’s and Augstein’s minor parts in forming it after 1952 are explained by Manfred Kittel, "Genesis einer Legende: Die Diskussion um die Stalin-Noten in der Bundesrepublik 1952-1958," VfZ, 41 (1993): 355-89. The chief credit for generating the "legend" belonged to Gustav Heinemann and Thomas Dehler, both former Ministers in Adenauer’s first Cabinet, who savagely settled their accounts with the Chancellor and his German policy in a famous Bundestag session in January 1958.
März, Diskussion, and Graml, *Die Legende von der verpassten Gelegenheit: Zur sowjetischen Notenkampagne des Jahres 1952,* VfZ, 29 (1981): 307-41, argue that the Stalin Note did not represent a missed opportunity. For them, as for Adenauer, the Soviet initiative was an attempt to derail Allied-German negotiations over the European Defence Community and the General Treaty. Perhaps more liberal access to the relevant Soviet files will soon shed light on Stalin’s motives.


5. For years Adenauer was displeased with Sethe’s editorials and put pressure on his co-editor, Hans Baumgarten, and on the owners and business advertisers in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.* Sethe left the newspaper in 1955, but the exact circumstances have not been clarified. The known facts were that Sethe’s co-editors Erich Welter, Ernst Dombrowski, and Baumgarten, although not Karl Korn, no longer supported his political course. As a result, Sethe resigned, although the daily’s political section, of which Sethe was the head, stood behind him. Fischer, *Zeitungen; Soell, "Problem;* and Baring, *Aussenpolitik.*


7. Ibid., 72-74; Zitelmann, *Streiter,* Noack; "Sethe;* and Soell, "Problem."


1. For Four-Power diplomacy towards Germany in the post-war years, see Josef Foschepoth, ed., Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage. Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte 1945-1952 (Göttingen, 1985).

2. For the OEEC, see endnote 4. The Council of Europe was founded on 5 May 1949. It was a consultative and largely symbolic body to further European federalism and included ten countries, but not West Germany. The members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The Council was situated in Strasbourg and was divided into the Assembly and the Ministerial Committee. The Council's statute is printed in Margaret Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs 1949-50 (London, 1953), 348-58. The WEU was the body of the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, a mutual defence pact signed by France, the UK, and the Benelux. It coexisted with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded on 4 April 1949, which in 1949-50 was impeded by its limited deterrence, lack of coordinated military planning, and loose provisions for mutual assistance. NATO included the WEU members, as well as the US, Canada, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, and Iceland.


4. The OEEC was founded on 16 April 1948 and was the organization for the Marshall Plan (European Recovery Plan), the counterpart to the ECA, which in turn was founded on 13 April 1948. The OEEC was also designed as a supranational machinery for the planning and implementation of policy. Since it lacked real authority, it instead became a mere forum for intergovernmental consultation and negotiation. John Gillingham, Coal, steel, and the rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955. The Germans and French from Ruhr conflict to economic community (Cambridge, 1991), 133-36. The Convention of the OEEC is printed in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations vol. 10 (1948): 244-50. The Western Zones received Marshall aid since April 1948, and the Bizone signed the ECA-Agreement with the USA on 14 July 1948. The Agreement is printed in Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 318-22. The Federal Republic joined the OEEC on 31 October 1949 and concluded the ECA-Agreement with the US on 15 December 1949. The text of this agreement was substantially the same as that of the ECA-Agreement with the Bizone. The three deviating articles are printed in ibid., 444-45. For the politico-economic aspects of postwar diplomacy, consult Gillingham, Rebirth; Charles S. Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany. West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991); Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958 (Munich, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, 1987); and Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1949-51 (London, 1984). Werner Bührer, Die Bundesrepublik und die Organisation für europäische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Munich, forthcoming).

5. The IAR was governed by the Ruhr Statute of 28 December 1948. Its text is printed in Dennett, Documents, 10 (1948): 118-27.
6. For an overview of Allied-German negotiations on decentralization in the heavy industries, which culminated with passage of Allied Law No. 27 in 1951, see Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany: John McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA., 1991), 185-209. It is a good account of the US High Commissioner's term in the Federal Republic from 1949-52.

7. For the Saar conflict, see Rainer Hudemann and Raymond Poidevin, eds., Die Saar 1945-1955. Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte (Munich, 1990); Robert H. Schmidt, Saarpolitik, 1945-1957, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1960); Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict, 1945-55 (New York, 1960); and Per Fischer, Die Saar zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich (Frankfurt, 1959). During the summer, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, tried to get a reluctant Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, on his side about the issue. The US was also hesitant to endorse Saar membership prior to or simultaneous with West German admission. United States, Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949 [hereafter cited as FRUS], vol. 3: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (Washington, 1974), 271-73, 478-82, 484-85, 487-89).


9. The Social Democratic Party was under the rigid leadership of Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952), a Protestant East Prussian, ardent socialist, and Nazi-opponent who was imprisoned from 1933-43 in Dachau and lost his right arm on the Russian front in 1914 and his left leg in 1948 as a late result of Nazi torture. He emphatically rejected cooperation with the East German Communists and with the USSR, which he regarded as a hegemonic power, run by a totalitarian regime. Having considered neutrality until 1947, he henceforth argued for Germany's integration in the West but with a socialistic perspective. His initial support for integration waned as the chances for economic and political transformation diminished in Europe. His reserve was also partly due to the hesitation shown by the British Labour Government, in which he at first had put much stock. While he had an ambiguous perspective of the US, he strongly opposed French policy towards Germany, and his dislike of it grew with the years. For Schumacher's diplomatic conception in 1945-49, see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Reich.

10. For a short account of West Germany's economic situation in the 1950s, consult Bracher, Geschichte, vol. 2: Die Ära Adenauer 1949-1957, by Hans-Peter Schwarz, 77-86. For a detailed analysis, see Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980 (Frankfurt, 1983).

Western European trade with the East was a contentious issue for the US, which since 1948 had practically terminated its trade with the USSR. In particular Congress and the Pentagon saw trade restrictions against the East as a Cold War weapon. The State Department and the ECA, however, were hesitant to stop Western European trade with the East because this was one way to decrease the continent's dependence on US aid. The US embargo policy, which sought to cease sales of strategic commodities to the East, was sharpened with passage of the "Battle-Act" in Congress in February 1952. The act threatened to discontinue US aid for those countries which did not follow US embargo guidelines. The US controlled Western trade with

11. The other results of the election of 14 August 1949: FDP 11.9%; Communist Party 5.7%; Bavarian Party 4.2%; DP 4.0%, Centre Party 3.1%. The other splinter parties and independents accounted for another 9.8%. Ibid., 475.


12. The liaison office (Verbindungsstelle zur Allierten Hohen Kommission) was officially formed on 20 November 1949 and headed by Ministerialdirigent Herbert Blankenhorn, a former career diplomat of the Wilhelmstrasse. His Verständnis und Verständigung: Blätter eines politischen Tagebuches, 1949-1979 (Berlin, 1980) is a good contemporary source. For Adenauer's aides in the Chancellor's Office (Bundeskanzleramt), see Baring, Aussenpolitik.


14. Schwarz, Reich, 455-58. In this work Schwarz does not directly mention Adenauer's "Potsdam complex," his fear of an Allied agreement over Germany's head and at her expense, which made West Germany's attainment of sovereignty urgent. Schwarz does develop it in "Konzept," p. 81.


16. Schwarz, Reich, 467-79.

17. For Jakob Kaiser's conception, see ibid., 299-344; and Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser. Politiker zwischen Ost und West, 1945-1949 (Stuttgart, 1969). Jakob Kaiser (1888-1961) was a member of the German Resistance and


19. However, Wilfried Loth, "Adenauers Ort in der deutschen Geschichte," in Foschepoth, Adenauer, 276, correctly states that Adenauer’s fear of Soviet aggression gave his conception an element of self-fulfilling prophesy. By opposing Kaiser’s all-German initiatives, he undermined the position of the democratic forces in the Eastern Zone and thereby contributed to the German division.

Adenauer’s diplomacy defies facile explanations. As with his contemporaries, who often saw him with a mixture of admiration and aversion, Adenauer and his achievements have divided historians. The most controversial issue is his perspective on German unity. Did he want unification? There can be little doubt that his top priorities were Western integration and gaining sovereignty, two goals that went hand in hand. It was a policy that deliberately left East Germans to their fate, at least in the short run. However, in the late fifties, when West Germany was firmly aligned, Adenauer did discuss secret plans with the Soviets to achieve at least freedom for the East Germans from Communist rule by accepting an Austrian status of the German Democratic Republic. The relevant publications on this issue are listed in Rudolf Morsey, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1969 (Munich, 1987).

I believe that Adenauer, who in his long life had witnessed the ups and downs of history, expected the weakening of the Soviet Union and greater Western leverage. Then the FRG would be able to pay the Soviets a price for the GDR without compromising his political achievements. He probably hoped for the sort of development of 1989-90, except much sooner. Without Western superiority, he was not prepared to risk his legacy, which did so much to overcome the many blunders and crimes of 1871-1945 and to establish a functioning democracy and a sensible conduct of foreign policy. Of course this was achieved while East Germans had to endure Communism. But many of them accepted and participated in the Pankow regime, thereby sustaining it.
1. In the "level-of-industry" plan of March 1946 the Allies agreed to dismantle, as reparations, war industries, such as steel and synthetic oil, rubber, and fuel, as well as industrial capacity in excess of the standards of Germany's neighbours. After the breakdown of Four-Power cooperation on this plan in 1946, the US and UK increased German industrial activity in the "Prohibited and Limited Industries" (PLI) Plan of October 1947. The number of plants to be dismantled in the Bizone was reduced from 1,500 to 859. The steel production quota was raised from 5.8 million tons to 10.7 million (to which were added 0.4 million tons from the French Zone). The list was revised at the Washington Tripartite meeting of April 1949 after the study of the ECA Industrial Advisory Committee, initiated by the ECA Administrator, Paul G. Hoffman, in the autumn of 1948. The new list of April 1949 scheduled 744 plants for dismantling. The Germans were still dissatisfied as the Allies included eight steel and chemical plants on the list although the Committee had recommended that they be spared. Furthermore, the Allies ignored the committee's advice to give the August Thyssen Steelworks a reprieve till 1952. However, the Allies did save 159 plants from dismantling, as recommended in the Committee's Report of 12 January 1949. But the eight other plants not saved comprised more than 30% of the value of the spared factories. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (hereafter cited as KCA) 1949/50, 9961-62; Schwartz, McCloy, 68-69; and Horst Lademacher and Walter Mühlenhausen, eds., Sicherheit, Kontrolle, Souveränität: Das Petersberger Abkommen vom 22. November 1949. Eine Dokumentation (Melsungen, 1985), 35-37. The reparations question is discussed by Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1992).

2. The memorandum of conversation by the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson (1893-1971), of his meeting with Robert Schuman (1886-1963), the French Foreign Minister, and Ernest Bevin (1881-1951), the British Foreign Secretary, is printed in FRUS 1949, 3:599-603.


4. Schuman again proposed admittance of the Saar at a press conference in Paris on 2 September 1949. KCA, 1949/50, 10344. In August during the first session of the Council of Europe the French delegation had brought forward the same proposal.

6. Ibid., 7. Session, 23.9.1949, 94-6. In October 1949 Henle pressed the Chancellor to join the IAR to stop dismantling. The Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, shared Henle’s view.


8. Adenauer’s consultation with his Cabinet and the Bundestag was minimal. On 4 November he informed the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, Carlo Schmid (SPD), of his proposal of 1 November. On 9 November he notified the caucus leaders of his note of 7 November. The Parliament received general information about the proposals during the session of 15 November. Adenauer told his Cabinet on 25 October that he had decided on German accession to the IAR and got his Ministers’ approval. In the same Cabinet meeting Adenauer supported German membership in the Council of Europe, even if the Saar was accepted simultaneously. He argued that Franco-German relations had to be improved, in part because US diplomacy aimed at French-German reconciliation. Adenauer maintained that the Saar issue could be solved at a later point. Federal Republic of Germany, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol. 1: 1949, eds. Ulrich Enders and Konrad Reiser (Boppard, 1982), 148-51. Hans-Peter Schwarz defends Adenauer’s conduct. “Opposition und öffentliche Meinung haben Adenauer damals wie später den Vorwurf der Geheimdiplomatie ‘am Parlament vorbei’ gemacht. Doch nach Lage der Dinge war kein anderes Verhalten möglich. Es wäre ihm auch nicht vorteilhaft erschienen. Denn er manövrierte sich dadurch innenpolitisch und auch auf europäischer Ebene in eine Schlüsselstellung hinein. Er allein hatte auf deutscher Seite den Überblick über den jeweiligen Sachverstand und konnte seine Position im Spiel der Kräfte entsprechend bestimmen.” Ara, 67.


10. The proposals are printed in Lademacher, Abkommen, 337-38, 369-73. In the middle of October Adenauer also informed the AHC verbally that he would consider accession to the IAR in return for its Europeanization. Ibid., 94. The meetings of Adenauer with the AHC from September to December 1949 are documented in ibid. The verbatim records of the meetings are also printed in Federal Republic of Germany, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 1: Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare, 1949-1951, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich, 1989).

11. The interview is printed in Lademacher, Abkommen, 339-44, and in Frei, Friedlaender, 252-56.
12. The exact circumstances are explained in ibid., 244-51 and in section B of this chapter. When Friedlaender arrived for the interview, Adenauer was suddenly called to the AHC. He told the journalist: "Bleiben Sie nur gleich hier, und setzen Sie sich an meinen Schreibtisch und schreiben Sie hin, wie Sie sich das denken. Ich komme dann wieder hierher." Adenauer gave another interview to the Baltimore Sun on 7 November, in which he roughly made the same points as in the Zeit-interview. He had been told that Truman was a regular reader of the newspaper. 


15. Ibid., 40-41. This idea, however, was too much for the Foreign Office. Ibid., 31-32, 41.


17. Acheson did not want to give the impression that the US was seeking to impose a solution on its two allies. Furthermore, since the French regarded their agreement to the establishment of the FRG as a bargain for obtaining security arrangements, "our difficulties will be intolerable if they believe we are seeking [to] withdraw from our part of the bargain." Ibid., 614-18, Acheson to McCloy, 25.10.1949.

18. Ibid., 269-71, US Charge d'affaires in the UK, Julius C. Holmes, to Acheson, 1.9.1949. The MSB was responsible for supervising demilitarization in Germany and had been founded on 16 December 1948. For the control functions and activities of the MSB, see Matthias Glaser, Das Militärische Sicherheitsamt der Westallierten von 1949-1955 (Bonn, 1992).

19. FRUS 1949, 3:618-21, Bevin to Acheson, 28.10.1949. For Bevin, see Allan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, 3 vols. (London, 1960-83), v. 3: Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary. 1945-1951; and Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin (Manchester, 1993). After receiving this request Acheson cabled Schuman, stating that the Allies must give "rapid and genuine support to those [democratic] elements now in control of Germany." He suggested to Schuman that this was "the time for French initiative and leadership of the type required to integrate the German Federal Republic promptly and decisively into Western Europe." FRUS 1949, 3:622-25. Acheson to US Embassy, 30.10.1949.

20. Ibid., 621, note 5, telegram (not printed) from US Ambassador to France, David K. E. Bruce.

21. Ibid., 626-29, Bruce to Acheson, 30.10.1949. For Schuman's foreign policy, see Rudolf Mittendorfer, Robert Schuman - Architekt des neuen
Characteristic for the Fourth Republic were its political instability and frequent changes of governments, the strength of the Communists, the drain on resources by the French involvement in Indochina, and the resulting financial dependence on the US.

22. *FRUS 1949*, 3:305-08, 478-98. The recommendation went to the Standing Committee of the Assembly which later supported it.

23. The relevant documents of the Paris conference are printed in Lademacher, *Abkommen*, 373-93. Also see *FRUS 1949*, vol. 3.

24. The verbatim records of the meetings between the Chancellor and the AHC of 15, 17, and 22 November are printed in Lademacher, *Abkommen*, 126-74; and in *Akten*.

25. The Agreement is printed in Ruhm von Oppen, *Documents*, 439-42. The August Thyssen plant in Duisburg, for instance, was saved, but the former "Hermann Göring Reichswerke" in Salzgitter and the Krupp Steelworks in Essen were not. The FRG applied for membership in the IAR on 30 November 1949. On 20 December the German member, Vice Chancellor and Minister for the Marshall Plan, Franz Blücher, participated in an IAR meeting for the first time. The state of war was not officially terminated until July 1951.


For the foreign and domestic policy of Schumacher and the SPD, see Kurt Klotzbach, *Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965* (Berlin, 1982).


28. Ibid., 477-80, 485-90. The Government argued that this did not apply since the FRG was already a member of the IAR because of her observer status. The Agreement was not a treaty because the matter fell under the occupation law. It was therefore not a matter for international law, since the FRG was not a sovereign state. The Grundgesetz articles under dispute were 24,1 and 59,2. The Grundgesetz is printed in Ingo von Münch, ed., *Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland. Quellentexte zur Rechtslage des Deutschen Reiches, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Stuttgart, 1968), 91-129.

29. *Die Zeit* was first published on 21 February 1946 in Hamburg under the press licence of the British Military Government. Its original circulation was 25,000. It increased to 81,000 by 1950, but then dropped
sharply during the next two years. In 1952 circulation stood at only
44,000. However, the weekly managed to survive, and today is still an
influential publication with a circulation of 488,000 in 1992. The
publisher of the weekly was and is Gerd Bucerius, born in 1906, a
CDU-deputy for the Bundestag from 1949-62. However, the editorial staff had
relative political independence within the confines of the newspaper's
liberal orientation. Eschenburg, Jahre, 166-67; Benn's Media Directory:
Europe 1992 (London, 1992). For the early history of Die Zeit, see Tüngel,
Deutschland. For Allied press policy in Germany in 1945-49, see Peter J.
Humphreys, Media and Media Policy in West Germany. The Press and

30. "Der Weg zum Demontagefrieden," Die Zeit (henceforth Zeit),
1.9.1949.


33. These passages are cited in Frei, Friedlaender, 245-48.


35. Kaisen said in the middle of November that Adenauer should be given
a chance to seek an understanding with the Allies. Kaisen and Brauer, as
leaders of the Hanseatic States, were interested in the lifting of the
restrictions on German shipbuilding. Akten, 18, note 3.


37. The interview and Friedlaender's background explanations are cited
in Frei, Friedlaender, 260-66.

38. In Deutschland, 414, Tüngel stated that in 1949 he had a different
perspective on European unification than Friedlaender: "Ich selber war viel
skeptischer als er. Ich stimmte in vielem mit Schumacher überein, nur aus
ganz anderen Gründen...Ich teilte nicht die Ansicht, dass die Führung in
den Europa-Fragen den Sozialisten überlassen werden sollte. Friedlaender
stimmte...der Adenauerschen Politik der Vorleistungen zu, die ich für
falsch hielt. Ich gestehe heute gern, dass er Recht gehabt hat." About
Schumacher's opposition to the IAR, Tüngel stated: "Es wäre sehr falsch,
[darin]... das Zeichen einer nationalistischen Gesinnung zu sehen.
Schumacher war nun einmal der festen Überzeugung, dass der Aufbau
Deutschlands und Europas nur unter sozialistischer Führung in demokratischem
Sinne erfolgen könne." Ibid., 417.


40. "New Deal für Deutschland," Zeit, 24.11.1949. In Deutschland,
419-24, Tüngel told how this article originated. Blankenhorn had telephoned
him on 16 November, asking him to come to Bonn. The next day he gave Tüngel
the rough agreement, so that he could write an article on it. "Mir war
sofort klar, dass es sich hier um einen entscheidenden Einschnitt in der
Besatzungspolitik handelte. Zum ersten Mal wurde nicht befohlen, sondern


42. The FAZ commenced publication on 1 November 1949 and grew out of the Allgemeine Zeitung mit Wirtschaftsblatt, published in 1946-49 in Mainz under the licence of the French Military Government. The FAZ proclaimed that its mandate was to be "eine Zeitung für Deutschland" and "eine Stimme Deutschlands in der Welt." It followed a conservative, pro-business orientation. In 1950 the FAZ had a circulation of 60,000. By 1953 it had increased to 150,000, and two years later the FAZ was Germany's biggest national paper. In 1992 circulation stood at 370,000. Fischer, Zeitungen; Soell, "Problem;" Political Handbook of the World, 1950 (Toronto, 1950).


45. "Deutschland."


Endnotes - Chapter III


2. KCA, 1949/1950, 10489-90. It was unofficially reported that France planned the leasing of the Saar mines, possibly for fifty years.

3. In 1945 France had contemplated annexation but then decided on Saar autonomy, coupled with a Franco-Sarrois economic union. The Saar was separated from the French Occupation Zone on 30 August 1945. The steel works were sequestrated on 30 June, the coal mines on 26 December 1945. France tried to get Four-Power approval, legally necessary to fix the international status of the Saar, for its political and economic Saar plans in 1946-47; however, the Soviet delegation at the Allied Conferences refused. Both the US and the UK publicly supported the French aims, subject to final settlement by a peace treaty, since the summer of 1946. In the meantime France undertook a series of unilateral steps, which London and Washington, while not pleased, did not oppose. On 22 December 1946 she established a customs border between the Saar and the French Zone, de facto removing the Saar from the authority of the Allied Control Council. On 20 November 1947 she introduced the French Franc as currency in the Saar. On 30 March 1948 France decreed the introduction of a customs union with the Saar, thereby completing the economic union. The US and UK gave de facto approval to this arrangement in the Allied Agreements of 28 January and 20 February 1948 which regulated the economic questions arising out of the Saar's status. De jure, however, the Saar was still part of the French Occupation Zone.

The Saar Government under Johannes Hoffmann, who had opposed the return of the Saar to Nazi Germany in 1935, had been elected under questionable circumstances on 5 October 1947. The Saar Diet passed the constitution, which stipulated Saar autonomy and economic union with France, on 8 November 1947. Fischer, Saar, 44-96; Schmidt, Saarpolitik, vol. 1: Entfaltung der Saarpolitik zwischen "Wirtschaftsanschluss" und "Europäisierung" 1945-1953.


6. Acheson's statement during his press conference on 18 January is printed in FRUS 1950, vol. 4: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, (Washington, 1980), 929-30. McCloy regretted the French action and feared that the leases would preclude the final settlement of the Saar status. Ibid., McCloy to Acheson, 17.1.1950, 927-928. The dispatches of the US Charge in London indicate that the Foreign Office also believed that the timing of the French action was "highly inappropriate" and that the leases would have an effect on the terms of the peace treaty. Whitehall further stated that the Saar Government had no legal right to lease the coal mines. The UK considered ownership vested in the German Reich. Consequently, the Saar could not dispose of Reich property. Ibid., Holmes to Acheson, 18.1.1950, 928-29. The British and American reservations about the conduct of the French policy, however, were not made public. In his dispatches to both McCloy and the US Ambassador in France, Acheson made it clear that the
US would unequivocally adhere, even at the time of the peace settlement, to his statement of 18 January. Ibid., cables of 20.1.1950, 930-32.

7. KCA, 1949/50, 10489; FAZ, 17.1.1950. Adenauer, Memoirs, 232-66. Bonn’s basic legal position was that the Saar de jure belonged to the French Occupation Zone and therefore to Germany. The question of ownership of the Saar mines was a matter of some confusion. Adenauer stated to Schuman on 15 January that the mines were the property of the State of Prussia in 1918. They then passed into French ownership and were purchased by the German Reich in 1935 after the Saar plebiscite. The mines were then made part of the Reich-owned Saargruben A.G. Adenauer referred to article 134 of the Grundgesetz which stipulates that the Federal Republic assumes the property of the German Reich. Adenauer, in effect arguing that the Saar could not dispose over the mines, reminded Schuman on 15 January that France had recognized the “Basic Law.” Adenauer remarked in his Memoirs, 236, “this entire argument was new and surprising to Schuman,” since he thought property outside the FRG was not affected by that article.


11. During his visit to Bonn Schuman had left Adenauer with the impression that the negotiations on the Conventions would last at least half a year. Adenauer, Memoirs, 237.

12. Excerpts from the French text of the Conventions are printed in Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 469-82. The three main Conventions are also printed (in German) in Wilhelm Cornides, ed., Europa Archiv (hereafter cited as EA) vol. 5: 1950 (Oberursel, 1950), 2915-22. Also compare KCA, 1949-1950, 10621-23; and FAZ, 4.3.1950.

13. The General Convention, which did not include a proviso concerning the peace settlement, stated that the French representatives in the Saar enjoyed diplomatic status. He had powers to ensure the application in the Saar of French monetary and customs legislation. Moreover, he could oppose any Saar legislation or regulation which compromised the French-Saar economic and monetary union, ignored the Saar’s international obligations, or jeopardized the political independence or external security of the Saar. Furthermore, France assumed responsibility for the Saar’s foreign relations and external defence. The French High Commissioner, Gilbert Grandval, officially became the French Ambassador to the Saar on 20 February 1951.

14. The Economic Convention likewise did not contain the stipulation that it was subject to the peace settlement. This led the German Government and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag to conclude that the two
Conventions were intended by France and the Saar to be understood as independent of the coming peace treaty. Adenauer, Memoirs, 242.

In the Convention France undertook to take the Saar’s interests into consideration in any trade agreements with third parties. The Convention declared that the Saar would refrain from any measures which would give Saar producers an unfair advantage. This in effect meant that the Saar’s taxation rates, wages, social benefits, and social contributions had to be adapted to French standards.

15. In return for the mining rights, the Saar received an annual compensation of 30 French Francs per metric ton of coal. The estimated production of Saar coal for 1950 was 15.3 million tons. That would have given the Saar a compensation of 495 million French Francs, or roughly 5 million German Marks. At the time 30 Francs equaled 36 German Pfennings. FAZ, 4.3.1950. Schmidt, Saarpolitik, 1:246, deemed this compensation rather low.

16. KCA, 1949-1950, 10621. Adenauer, Memoirs, 239-48. Great Britain declared on 8 March that the Conventions were only provisional and valid only until the peace treaty. Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 482-83. A letter from the British High Commissioner of 9 March to the Chancellor reaffirmed this view. The French High Commissioner issued a statement on the same evening, declaring that all Conventions were subject to confirmation in the context of the final peace settlement. The US made no public statement on the Saar issue, other than Acheson’s comments of 18 January. Acheson did let Adenauer know through the US High Commission at the end of January that the US had no additional commitments to France and that the question of ownership of the Saar mines was an item for discussion and settlement at the time of the peace treaty. FRUS, 1950, 4:934-36. When Acheson received the draft conventions from the French Ambassador to the US, Henri Bonnet, at the end of January, he considered the French position not as alarming as expected. Ibid. The German Government issued a legal protest against the Conventions in the Bundestag on 10 March.


18. KCA, 1949-1950, 10622; FAZ, 9./22.3.1950; Adenauer, Memoirs, 244-48; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 700-02. The interviews on 7 and 21 March were made by the American journalist Joseph Kingsbury Smith. The international echo to Adenauer’s unusual offers was weak. The French Information Minister, Henri Teitgen, stated on 22 March that France need not accept improvisations or throw herself into German arms. Ibid., 703. However, General Charles de Gaulle supported Adenauer’s initiative for a Franco-German union in a speech on 15 March. KCA, 1949-1950, p. 10622-23.

19. Against the statutes of the Council, the Allies wanted Bonn to be the petitioner and apply for an invitation. The Allied-German negotiations on the invitation are documented in Adenauer, Memoirs, 248-56.

21. On 14 April the AHC issued a provisional veto against the Bonn's civil service bill from which the Americans in particular had expected more sweeping reforms. They regarded the German law as too undemocratic and authoritarian. On 20 April the AHC decreed the same veto against the new taxation law. The bill envisaged a reduction of the income tax to stimulate spending power and investment. The Allies, however, feared that the loss in revenue would increase the German deficit by 800 million to 1 billion German Marks. They were afraid that US funds would have to cover the budget deficit. Both bills eventually became law after some revisions. The tax bill was approved on 29 April 1950; the civil service bill on 17 May 1950. FAZ, 18./20. - 24.4.1950; Schwartz, McCloy, 91-92; Kabinettsprotokolle, vol. 2: 1950; and Akten. For civil service reform, see Wolfgang Benz, "Versuche zur Reform des öffentlichen Dienstes in Deutschland 1945-1952," VfZ, 29 (1981): 216-45.

22. FAZ, 19.4.1950; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 94-97. At the end of the rally Adenauer asked the audience to join in the singing of the third strophe of the controversial "Deutschlandlied," which became Germany's official anthem only in 1952. This symbolic act of defiance in the presence of the Allied Commandants was described by the Foreign Office as "tasteless." Zeit, 27.4.1950

23. FAZ, 1.4.1950. On the same day a bureau for foreign affairs (Dienststelle für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) was created in the Chancellor's Office. Its provisional head was Blankenhorn. This office became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtige Amt) on 15 March 1951, after the "little revision" of the Occupation Statute. Chancellor Adenauer also assumed the Ministry as Germany's first Foreign Minister. Walter Hallstein became the Ministry's Undersecretary on 2 April 1951. Kabinettsprotokolle, 1950, 368-71; Kosthorst, Kaiser, 124-41; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 713-14. On 9 May, the German Government published an official memorandum concerning accession to the Council. In it Adenauer explained his reasons for advocating German membership. The memo is printed in EA, 5 (1950):3127-29. For Heinemann, see Dieter Koch, "Heinemanns Kritik an Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik," in Foschepoth, Adenauer, 201-34.


29. Augstein's cryptic and idiosyncratic style make translation very difficult. Therefore, I quote him at length in the original.

30. The first issue of Der Spiegel appeared on 4 January 1947 and was the successor of the magazine Diese Woche, which had run afoot of British censorship and the Foreign Office at the end of 1946 by criticizing British policy. The original circulation was 15,000. In the middle of 1948 it stood at 60,000; two years later it reached to over 100,000 copies. In 1992
circulation was 1,100,000. The magazine was a phenomenal success due to its malicious, cynical style, its use of contemporary jargon, and its topical and people-oriented content. It has gained a special place in the German press because of its commitment to investigative journalism and success in uncovering numerous scandals. Brawand, Spiegel; Benn's 1992.


35. See Chapter V, Section B. In 1949-50 Sethe only once mentioned briefly the topic of European neutrality.

36. Sethe did not specify the "danger." Presumably he meant European disunity and the Communist threat. "Die Zeit ist noch nicht reif," FAZ, 18.1.1950. This article was only signed with the grammalogue "An," an occasional practice by Sethe. He also used "he," "tú," and apparently "pu." Hans Baumgarten used "Bgt.," "gar," "ten," and "rt." Letters from FAZ, 9./17.9.1993.


41. Ibid.

42. "Zu früh?," FAZ, 10.3.1950.


45. "Ob sie..."

Endnotes - Chapter IV

1. FAZ, 11.5.1950; Schwartz, McCloy, 90-105. The English translation of Schuman's press release is printed in Dennett, Documents, 12 (1950): 85-87. The French text is printed in Carlyle, Documents, 315-317. The "Schuman Plan" was in fact the idea of Jean Monnet (1888-1979), the Director of the French Industrial Plan. Monnet became the chief French negotiator for the Schuman Plan and later the first President of the Coal and Steel Community's High Authority. For the economics of the Schuman Plan, consult Milward, Reconstruction, 362-420; and Gillingham, Rebirth. Besides Franco-German reconciliation and European unification, France followed other aims with the Schuman Plan. She anticipated Germany's political and economic recovery and suspected that under US pressure the IAR might be abolished and the German steel quota raised. France wanted to secure lasting control of the Ruhr industry, albeit in the form of partnership. Moreover, France needed access to German coke and German steel markets, as well as equal competitive conditions to counter the strength of German heavy industry. Without the pooling of Western European coal and steel, Monnet feared a decreasing French steel production, dumping of German steel, and a return of inter-war cartels and protectionism, coupled with a possible German-Soviet economic arrangement. Schwartz, McCloy, 101-105; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 718-20.


4. KCA, 1949-1950, 10731; Adenauer, Memoirs, 256-60; FAZ, 10.5.1950. After having been informed on 8 May by a personal letter from Schuman, sent by a special messenger of the Quai d'Orsay, about the impending French announcement, Adenauer handed the messenger two replies for Schuman, one personal, one official. They are printed in Mensing, Briefe, 208-09. Mensing states that the exact circumstances of the events before 9 May 1950 have not been completely reconstructed. In his Memoirs, Adenauer mentioned two letters from Schuman, but so far this has not been confirmed. Mensing, Briefe, 510, note 236.

5. FAZ, 11./23.-24.5.1950; Klotzbach, Staatspartei, 201-05. For the perspective of the SPD on the Schuman Plan, consult ibid.; and Weber, SPD Fraktion.

6. Compare FRUS, 1950, 3:828-1107; and DBPO, ser. 2, vol. 2, The London Conferences: Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Strategy, January - June 1950, for the painstaking preparation for the Conference. The results were small in comparison to it. The text of the Allied Communiqué on Germany is printed in Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 486-88. The General Communiqué of 13 May 1950 is printed in
7. FAZ, 26.5.1950; Federal Republic of Germany, Deutscher Bundesrat, Sitzungsberichte, vol.1, 1-43. Session, September 1949-December 1950, 358-364. The Bundesrat, which represented the Länder (States), caused Adenauer considerable difficulties. The problem was that the Government Coalition in Bonn could not always count on a majority in the Bundesrat. Many Governments of the Länder were run by Social Democrats (in the spring of 1950, five of the eleven States), sometimes in coalitions with the FDP and/or the CDU/CSU. Every State election threatened Adenauer with an SPD-dominated Bundesrat.

The States of Hesse, Lower Saxony, Schleswig Holstein, and Hamburg, all governed by the Social Democrats, voted against membership in the Council. Bremen, the other Social Democratic State under Kaisen, voted with the Government. Max Brauer, the Premier of Hamburg, was also in favour of accession to the Council. But the voting regulations of the Bundesrat prevented him from voting it, since a majority of his State Cabinet supported Schumacher's stance. Earlier, at the SPD's annual convention of 21-25 May in Hamburg, Max Brauer, Paul Löbe, the former speaker of the Reichstag, and Willy Brandt, the young deputy from Berlin, had already argued for accession to the Council. Kaisen was on a tour in the US. FAZ, 23./24.5.1950; Klotzbach, Staatspartei, 201-05.


10. John Gillingham, Rebirth, 364, stated that the Schuman Plan, signed in April 1951, while not providing an adequate framework for supranational government, doing little to harmonize economic conditions, and not leading to an inexorable process of unification, did lead to Germany's Western integration, Franco-German partnership, and resulted in the creation of Europe as a political entity.


12. Hrbek, SPD, 93.
13. Ibid., 100.


16. The East German Government, whose seat was in Berlin-Pankow, was controlled by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). The Pankow regime had announced its intention to recognize the “border of peace” on 12 October 1949. The GDR officially recognized the Oder-Neisse Line in the Warsaw Declaration of 6 June 1950. The actual agreement was signed on 6 July 1950 in Zgorzelec (formerly Görlitz). In German the agreement is therefore also known as the “Görlitzer Abkommen.” The text is printed in Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 497-500. Also consult FRUS, 1950, 4:958-63. The Three Powers did not recognize the Zgorzelec Agreement. The Agreement was condemned by all parties in the Bundestag, with the exception of the KPD.

Sethe described the Warsaw Declaration as “Verrat am eigenen Lande und...an grossen Übernationalen Ideen." “Die Warschauer Unterschrift ist der glatteste und rundeste Verrat, der seit langem in Deutschland vorgekommen ist." Sethe insisted that Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia were German provinces and that Hitler’s crimes could not be set right by new injustices. "Ulbrichts Reise nach Warschau," FAZ, 9.6.1950. Tüngel stated that Ulbricht had given away the "Heimat" of ten million Germans and brought East Germany into the system of Soviet satellite states. But: “Die Geschichte wird über die SED hinweggehen.” “Die neue Volksdemokratie,” Zeit, 15.6.1950. The other commentators did not address the issue.


18. The German text is printed in Bemühungen, 9-11; the English text is printed in Carlyle, Documents, 161-62.

19. The AHC, meeting in Berlin on 20 April, approved a resolution of the West Berlin City Assembly of the same day which requested the Commandants of the four sectors to permit free elections as soon as possible in the City. The AHC welcomed the initiative and agreed that the elections should be held under quadripartite supervision. FRUS, 1950, 4:843. The Soviet declaration is printed in ibid., 4:852-54. The text of the Western Allied plan of 26 May is printed in Carlyle, Documents, 162-65.

20. Schumacher was as adamant as Adenauer in his opposition to Communism, especially since the forced union of the KPD and the SPD in East Germany in 1946, which produced the SED. For Schumacher’s hatred of the SED
and Communism, consult Klotzbach, Staatspartei; and Hrbek, SPD. For Schumacher's position on rearmament in 1949-51, see Buczylowsk, Schumacher; and Chapter V.

21. For a good discussion of the circles advocating neutrality, see Dohse, Dritte Weg. On Niemöller, see Dietmar Schmidt, Martin Niemöller: Eine Biographie (Stuttgart, 1983).

22. Schwarz, Reich, 385-89.


25. Tüngel, Deutschland, 9.


27. Schwarz, Aufstieg, 680-81.


29. From this issue on Friedlaender no longer worked for Die Zeit. Friedlaender's perspective regarding German unity was explained in Chapter I. In the spring of 1950 he did not elaborate further on this topic.


31. On 23 May 1950 the Western Allies sent the USSR a note regarding the armed East German Police, the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP). They demanded the immediate dissolution of the para-military units, comprising an estimated 50,000 men. The text of the note is printed in Ruhm von Oppen, Documents, 493-95. Also see Chapter V.


33. "Zwischen Lothringen und Rhein-Ruhr," Spiegel, 18.5.1950. At the end of this article, Augstein mentioned signs that France might join Germany in a "buffer-zone of peace." He probably referred to articles in Le Monde which discussed an armed and neutral Europe.

34. Erler's comments are cited by Soell, "Problem," 111.


37. Milward, Reconstruction, p. 413.


39. "Hoffnung."
Endnotes - Chapter V


2. In November the US Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, publicly pondered the possibility of a German army. Then Lucius Clay, the former US Military Governor in Germany, recommended the formation of a "composite military force of Western European nations to which Germany could contribute with limited forces." FRUS, 1949, 3:317-18, 340-42.

3. Allied and German estimates in 1950 calculated that the Soviets maintained some 175 infantry and tank divisions, of which 22 were stationed in the GDR, compared to 13 Allied divisions of limited military effectiveness in Western Europe. The East German Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP), a para-military force, which the Soviets had been building since 1948, was estimated at 53,000 men and growing, but had only limited weaponry and training. West German estimates expected the KVP to hit 150,000 men in 1951 and 300,000 in 1952. Wiggershaus, "Bedrohungsvorstellungen," 89-100, 104. The figures on Allied and Soviet (or East German) military estimates vary slightly in the primary and secondary literature.

Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 269-70, argues that Allied estimates exaggerated Soviet strength. He thinks Soviet industry was not able to support such a force with enough modern weaponry. He claims the Soviets maintained 30 elite divisions in Eastern Europe, with another 60 well-trained and well-equipped Soviet divisions in the reserve in the USSR. Also see Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," International Security, 7 (Winter 1982-83): 110-38.

4. The first years NATO was an empty shell. It was marked by a lack of military strength and of coordinated military planning. France and the UK wished to engage the Americans in Europe, but the US, until the autumn of 1950, wanted to leave the defence of the continent to the Europeans themselves. Under the terms of the NATO treaty, mutual assistance was defined very loosely and did not force any member state to provide military aid. There were also no provisions for an integrated military strategy. Therefore, only the UK, and perhaps Canada, knew of the "Offtackle" plans. For Allied military strategy, see Christian Greiner, "Die Allierten militärstrategischen Planungen zur Verteidigung Westeuropas 1947-1950," in Anfänge.
5. Former Wehrmacht Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger had privately written about the need for a West German contribution to Western Europe's defence since 1948 and supplied Adenauer, then President of the "Parliamentary Council," with their memoranda. Roland G. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit Westdeutschlands 1947-1950," in ibid.


7. The first interview was with Paul Baar of L'Est Republicain (Nancy) on 11 November 1949, the second with John Leacacos of the Cleveland Plain Dealer on 3 December. Baring, Aussenpolitik, 71, note 47; Adenauer, Memoirs, 267-68.

On 3 December Adenauer stated that he was against the establishment of a German national military force. He stressed that there could also be no question of Germans joining foreign armies as mercenaries. At the very outside he would be prepared to consider the question of a German contingent in the framework of a European army. He was also concerned about the expansion of the East German KVP and pointed to the moral and legal duty of the Western Powers to guarantee West German security.

8. Although Adenauer stood by his comments, all parties opposed militarization. Speaking for the coalition, Heinrich von Brentano, the CDU's caucus leader, declared that the German people opposed rearmament. Erich Ollenhauer, the Second Chairman of the SPD completely rejected militarization, stating that concern over the KVP was an inadequate reason to begin debate on rearmament, which, if carried through, would heighten international tension. BT, 24. Session, 16.12.1949, 734-36. On the SPD's perspective on rearmament, see Buczylowski, Schumacher, 62-74.

An Allied poll in November 1949 indicated that 62% of West Germans opposed creation of a German army. 26% were for it. In August 1950, depending on how the question was posed, 40-60% of West Germans favoured a German army. Merritt, Surveys, 60, 80.

9. Schwarz, Aufstieg, 736, states that Adenauer was predominantly concerned about security. I think that Adenauer was too shrewd to miss the connection between a military contribution and greater sovereignty for long, and Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," argues similarly. The Social Democrats had realized at the end of 1948 that a German defence contribution might bring sovereignty. Klotzbach, Staatspartei, 211-212. It also would have been unwise to conjoin publicly the security issue with political demands; Allied susceptibilities would quickly have been offended. Adenauer had probably harboured in his mind the link between the two points for some time.

10. Schwarz, Aufstieg, 728-29; Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," 460-61. Adenauer's concerns about the KVP had definitely arisen before the Korean War.


12. In the first half of 1950 Adenauer made such requests about every two weeks. Adenauer attached great importance to a security guarantee. He
pestered the AHC with requests concerning the guarantee until he was finally satisfied with the Allied declaration of 19 September 1950, which stated that the Allies would resist an attack on the FRG and Berlin “from any quarter.” Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 289.

13. The Allies made such a statement following the London Conference. FRUS, 1950, 3:1085-86 (Paper approved by Foreign Ministers, 22.5. 1950: Security of German Federal Republic – Reply to Dr. Adenauer's Request). It said that “the Federal Republic does not lie alone in Europe. Under Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an armed attack upon the occupation forces of the Western Allies in Germany will be considered as an armed attack against all the parties to the Treaty, and will at once bring into play the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty.” This declaration was not made public, but handed to the Chancellor by the High Commissioners. The Articles of the North Atlantic Treaty are printed in Dennett, Documents, 11 (1949): 612-15.

14. Adenauer made the police proposal on 28 April 1950. The proposal is printed in FRUS, 1950, 4:684-85 Also compare Robertson’s cable about the proposal to Bevin, 29.4.1950, in DBPO, 2:176-77. Adenauer asked for a force of 25,000 men. Due to an Allied leak to the press, the police proposal became public in the first week of June. The proposal probably contradicted the Grundgesetz. Under the Grundgesetz the Federal Government had no explicit territorial defence prerogative nor internal policing powers. Police matters belonged solely in the Länder jurisdiction. Without changing the Grundgesetz, a federal police force was therefore unconstitutional and could only have been created by the doubtful use of legal loopholes, such as an Allied directive, an administrative agreement between Bonn and the Länder, or the generous application of federal constitutional authority over border security. On the constitutional problems, see Foerster, “Innenpolitische Aspekte.” Article 91,2 of the Grundgesetz stated that in an emergency the Federal Government may assume command of the Länder police. However, this article had been suspended by the Allied Military Governors in the spring of 1949. In all other cases, according to Articles 30 and 70, competence in police matters rested with the Länder Governments. The attempts by the Federal Government to get around the terms of the Grundgesetz are also explained in Baring, Aussenpolitik, 76-81. Ultimately, Bonn resorted to its administrative authority in border control matters, as spelled out in Article 87,1, and in 1951 formed the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS), initially numbering 10,000 men.


17. This is the conclusion one has to draw from the relevant English and American documents. DBPO, 2:141, calendar note i to No. 38; FRUS, 1950, 4:688, note 1, 689-90.

18. This becomes clear in Schwartz, McCoy, 119, note 12. Robertson also advised him at the end of March to name a "security advisor." He suggested former Wehrmacht General Gerhardt Graf von Schwerin who was appointed on 24 May 1950 and ordered by Adenauer to report on questions of internal and external security. However, von Schwerin fell out of favour
soon, apparently because of suspicions that he was too closely connected with the British. There was also dissatisfaction with his choice of personnel, over methods employed in the development of his plans, and over indiscretions to the press. He was dismissed on 28 October 1950. See Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," on von Schwerin's role and difficulties.

19. For the Allied discussions in London, consult: FRUS, 1950, vols. 3 and 4; and DBPQ, vols. 1 and 2. François-Poncet stated at an AHC meeting on 4 May that French public opinion was not ready yet "to swallow the establishment of a German force of 25,000 men." Robertson, however, was surprised at the "modesty of the figure rather than by the size." DBPQ, 2:177, note 3.

20. Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 297. In particular Jules Moch, French Defence Minister since July 1950, and the French President, Vincent Auriol, were fundamentally opposed to German troops. Moch was anti-German and vehemently objected to German rearmament, not least because during the Second World War he had lost his son to torture by the Gestapo. Before becoming Minister of Defence in the summer of 1950, Moch had been Minister of the Interior, 1947-50.

21. For the American debates and policies by the Department of State and the Department of Defense (until September 1950 headed by Louis A. Johnson), consult FRUS, 1950, vols. 3 and 4. Also refer to Schwartz, McCloy; and Wettig, Entmilitarisierung; as well as Lawrence Martin, "The American Decision to Rerarm Germany." in Harold E. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham, 1963), 645-663; and Steininger, Wiederbewaffnung.

22. Churchill commented on a German defence contribution in the Commons on 16 and 28 March. FAZ, 17./30.3.1950; KCA, 1949-50, 10636, 10694-95.

23. Schwartz, McCloy, 118; FRUS, 1950, 4:686-87 (Report to the NSC by Secretary of Defense, 8.6.1950: Extracts of views by JCS on Western policy toward Germany); Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 302-03. Also see DBPQ, 2:139-41 (UK Brief of 26 April: Reestablishment of German Armed Forces).

24. The Allies did improve discipline, organization, and equipment of the so-called "Labour Service Units," uniformed and barracked German auxiliary formations, consisting of guards, drivers, and workers, to the Allied armies. Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 301,313; and Schwarz, Aufstieg, 729, quote conflicting numbers for the Arbeitsdiensteinheiten. Schwarz claims the units comprised 80,000 men, while Wettig's figures are lower. At the same time, the AHC also passed a revised, "definitive law for the prevention of German rearmament" on 8 May, prohibiting industrial production of material capable of being utilized for warlike purposes. KCA, 1949-50, 10711.


26. US policy makers now accepted the guidelines of NSC 68, a policy paper of April 1950, which stated that the Kremlin was animated by the desire to expand its revolutionary ideology over the rest of the "Free World." To thwart Soviet imperialism in this mortal conflict the US must

27. The AHC letter to Adenauer of 28 July is printed in FRUS, 1950, 4:701-702. The letter states that the AHC "...is of the opinion that the Federal Government must have assured powers to call out and control these mobile police forces for the duration of an emergency. During other periods such mobile forces will be placed under the authority of the Lander Governments."

28. For the US governmental debate on German rearmament, consult FRUS, 1950, vols. 3 and 4; as well as the authors cited in endnote 21.

29. Schwartz, McCloy, 134

30. He warned that "we are all in great danger." "The freedom and civilization of Western Europe lie under the shadow of Russian Communist aggression, supported by enormous armaments." A resolution supporting Churchill's plea was adopted by a wide margin. The SPD-delegation in Strasbourg voted against Churchill's resolution. KCA, 1949-50, 11085-86; FAZ, 12.8.1950; Carlyle, Documents, 326-31.

31. The memo, prepared by Speidel, Heusinger, and Hermann Foertsch, and read in Cabinet on 15 August, is summarized in Baring, Aussenpolitik, 82-84; and Schwarz, Aufstieg, 756-757.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid; Buczylowski, Schumacher, 75-141.

36. The two memos were given to McCloy on 30 August. Adenauer later used time pressure as an excuse for not seeking Cabinet's approval to the final text. Cabinet was informed of the memos on 31 August; however, the decisive passages in the first memo were not read to the Ministers until 17 October. Interior Minister Heinemann had insisted on 31 August on seeing the memorandum on security, because the police issue was an area of his ministerial responsibilities. After consulting the document, Heinemann confronted Adenauer, arguing that he had not informed Cabinet that he was offering German divisions. The split between Adenauer and Heinemann, who opposed rearmament for religious, military, and political reasons, could not be repaired. On 10 October 1950 Heinemann resigned from Cabinet.

37. See Baring's analysis in his Aussenpolitik, 86-90. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," claims that an attack by the KVP would surely have prompted resistance by the Allied occupation troops. In all probability this would have been the case, but Adenauer perhaps did not want to rely on the Allies. In my view this would have been a prudent and understandable concern. The appeasement of Hitler before 1939 had shown to Adenauer how weak-kneed Western democracies could be.

38. Schubert, Sicherheitspolitik, 84-85.

39. The memo on security was for a long time shrouded in mystery. Adenauer made public parts of it only on 24 November 1950. He had even skillfully denied for weeks that an offer of rearmament had been made. During the Bundestag debates of 8 February 1952 the Chancellor revealed more parts of it, but the entire memo was not publicized until 1977. The chairmen of the coalition parties were informed of the content of the memos on 22 August 1950. Schwarz, Adenauer, 761, 767. The Bundestag did not debate the security issue until 7/8 November 1950. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," 487, states that "Adenauers Informationspolitik war erschreckend spärlich und unzutreffend."

40. KCA, 1949-50, 10952. It should not be forgotten that France was involved in a war against the Vietminh in Indochina since 1946. Some 150,000 French troops were fighting in that area in the summer of 1950. Wiggershaus, "Entscheidung," 347.

41. Consult FRUS, 1950, 4:717-18 (Bevin to Acheson, 5.9.1950), 718-21 (Paper prepared in the British Foreign Office, August 1950: German association with the defence of the West); DBPO, ser. 2, vol. 3: German Rearmament (London, 1988), 9-13 (Bevin to Sir Oliver Harvey, 5.9.1950). Harvey was the British Ambassador to France. Bevin's concerns about the intentions of the East and about the low German morale and a possible loss of Germany to the Soviets resemble Adenauer's security memorandum of 29 August. Also see Steininger, Wiederbewaffnung.

42. The Allies only permitted an additional 20,000 men for the Länder police and undertook to resist any attack on the FRG and Berlin "from any quarter." For the results of the New York Tripartite Conference of September 1950, consult DBPO, vol.3; FRUS, 1950, vols. 3 and 4; EA, 5:3405-07; KCA, 1949-50, 11001. The Communiques of the North Atlantic Council Meetings of 16-26 September 1950 are printed in EA, 5:3475-76.

43. The SPD realized in 1948 that a German defence contribution might bring sovereignty.


56. Here Augstein repeated the points Schumacher made on 23 August 1950.
57. "Liegt in Deutschland die Entscheidung?," *FAZ*, 15.11.1949.
60. "Wir sollen noch warten?," *FAZ*, 22.3.1950.
64. "Nichts aus der Geschichte lernen?," 1.7.1950.
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