VOTING WITH CARE:
WOMEN, MEN AND MORAL REASONING - DOES THE DIFFERENCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

by

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ABSTRACT

The following thesis provides a theoretical and empirical treatment of the argument proposed in 1982 by psychologist, Carol Gilligan, that women and men employ different orientations in their moral reasoning. Gilligan says men see moral conflict as a struggle between competing rights, while women see moral conflict as a struggle between competing responsibilities. Where the perspective associated with men arises out of a valuing of individual achievement and sees fairness as equality, women value relational connections and see fairness as a response to need. Males prioritize universal principles; females prioritize attention to context.

Beyond its assertion of difference, Gilligan's argument challenges the privilege given to notions of justice espoused by liberal theorists such as John Rawls and John Stuart Mill, and reflected in Lawrence Kohlberg's stage sequence model of moral development. While Gilligan does not deny the value of this justice orientation, she argues that it was formed in the absence of women and that as it stands, it lacks the necessary, and equal, elements of compassion and connection that reflect an ethic of care.

The argument has sparked philosophical and empirical debate across several academic fields. This thesis pays attention to that debate as well as contributing an empirical test of the hypothesis that women are more caring than men, in the context of voting behaviour. One hundred and ninety-one students at the University of British Columbia took part in an experimental survey in which the hypothesis was tested in two conditions: 1) subjects were asked to base a vote for either Candidate X or Y in the absence of defining criteria other than electoral poll popularity ratings, and 2) with the addition of candidate issue positions on social welfare policy. The expectation was that while both males and females were subject to the social influence provided by the opinion poll results, women, motivated by a care orientation, would be more likely to choose the underdog candidate than men. This
did not prove to be the case. Not only did more women bandwagon than men in condition 1, but in condition 2 where candidates were clearly associated with care versus rights positions, no sex differences emerged. Discussion of these findings addresses the impact of the political venue on moral orientation, while the conclusion focuses on the implications of moral difference for women's political behaviour and modern society.
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Introduction

"I had this naive view that the first woman leader was going to be more virtuous and more caring, the fantasy of the perfect mother. In the real world, it doesn't play out like that." (Wallace et al. 1993, 19)

Such were the sentiments expressed by Toronto novelist Susan Swan, in a Maclean's article about then Prime Minister Kim Campbell. The sentences contain three pieces of information which have enormous relevance in the study of women's political behaviour: 1) Canada has had its first female prime minister, 2) because of their maternal role in society, different moral values are expected from women than are expected from men, and 3) the latter expectation may be more myth than reality. While the first fact may be significant, it is the latter two that hold the attention of this thesis. Myth or not, we do generally think of women as more nurturing than men and we expect that their political decisions will reflect this sentiment. But is this the case? Kim Campbell aside, are women any more caring in their approaches to political decision-making than men?

Those who study political behaviour refer to this difference between men and women as a "gender gap," and they claim evidence of this gap exists in voting studies undertaken since the late 1970s. While by no means a homogeneous group, female respondents in these surveys reflect an overall humanitarian ethos known as "agape" - a virtue associated with charity, nurturance, love, and sense of community (Kopinak, 1987:26; Kohlberg, 1984:227). Women are more supportive than men of government efforts on behalf of disadvantaged groups, of tougher environmental protection legislation, of more generous foreign aid policies, and especially of strong peace initiatives.1 Economically speaking, they are "sociotropic"--motivated more by

1 In a previous analysis of sex differences, using data from the 1988 National Election Survey, I compared male and female responses to the question, "All things considered, do you support or oppose buying nuclear submarines?" Coding responses to reflect either "oppose" or "support" I found that where 55.4% of males were opposed to such a purchase, 67.6% of female respondents indicated opposition, a 12.2% difference. (Reference from Bancroft, W. "Tracking the Gap: Women, Men and the Conservative Vote in 1988" Unpublished essay).
considerations of social good rather than personal gain. (Wearing and Wearing, 1991; Norris, 1988; Burt, 1986; Kopinak, 1987; Miller, 1988). Men, on the other hand, tend to give more support to deficit reduction initiatives, to free enterprise policies, and to "tougher" foreign policy stances. Canadian political scientist, Thelma McCormack, suggests that perhaps men and women belong to different political cultures, and like any subculture, "the political culture of women has its own way of understanding the world" (1975, 25). In some cases, even when the moral judgment of men and women appears the same, the reasoning that led to the decision can be quite different, as the following case illustrates.

Stimulated by McCormack's ideas and by their own interest in the peace movement, Froese and Nielsen carried out a study in 1984 in which undergraduate students were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the peace movement and why they held this belief. While they found no sex differences in support for the peace movement and nuclear disarmament--the majority of men and women agreed with the peace movement and disagreed with nuclear arms proliferation--their reasons for doing so differed. Women's reasons tended to be couched in "moral or ethical" terms such as the loss of human life; men tended to emphasize the "pragmatic issues surrounding the disarmament process" for instance, that disarmament be bilateral and verifiable (132). When asked if they thought gender was related to political belief, most respondents thought it was not, but those who did offered reasons that reflected the sex stereotypes previously mentioned. One man said "I think that while men and women share a will for a common political end, women sometimes fail to appreciate or understand the mechanics of politics, while men are sometimes obsessed with those mechanics" (133).

According to psychologist, Carol Gilligan, what we see here is evidence that when men and women think about moral issues they way they think about and respond to these issues is quite different. While, for instance, both sexes may be
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aware of the actual process and implications of disarmament, women see that process in terms of lives saved; men emphasize the relative positions of the players involved. In Gilligan's terminology, an "ethic of care," resulting from a strong sense of connection to others, informs the moral judgments of women, while an "ethic of rights" reflecting a notion of justice as equality informs the moral judgment of men (1982).

In one respect, Gilligan is not saying anything new. Rather, she appears to reinforce long held behavioural stereotypes: women are nurturers, men are achievers. However, Gilligan is not only saying differences exist, she is challenging notions of moral development which reflect western philosophical values which subordinate women's perspective, relegating it as appropriate only to the private, domestic and personal sphere, while prioritizing the male perspective as the ideal, and the one most appropriate for the public world of business and politics.

For those who study women's political behaviour, the question of whether men and women use different moral reasoning when making their political decisions is highly significant, particularly when one considers that the liberal democratic paradigm on which our political system is based is the product of male philosophers with male experiences and male values. If a fundamental part of the way women think about the world is not reflected in the processes, policies, and institutions that constitute our political system, therein may lay much of the explanation for the fact that women continue to lag behind men in political interest, knowledge, and efficacy (Vickers and Brodie 1981; Kay et al. 1987).

While the focus of this paper is political behaviour, interest in Gilligan's argument extends far beyond political science into the disciplines of law, psychology, biology, sociology and philosophy. In all of these disciplines, the notion of women's cognitive-moral exclusion has ignited debates--most of it theoretical and philosophical in nature. However, in the field of social psychology, the debate
carried on by Gilligan's proponents and opponents has centred on empirical challenges, many of which will be presented in this paper.

This paper is a journey through many of the ideas and evidence that both inform and challenge Gilligan's thesis, a journey that ends with our own empirical test of the argument. Chapter one lays out not only Gilligan's thesis, but the theoretical positions of the major players in this particular moral dilemma--in particular the moral developmental models and theories of those Gilligan is challenging--Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget, and Sigmund Freud--as well as the ideas which inform Gilligan's argument, in particular Nancy Chowdorow's views on the impact of the mother/child relationship on male/female perceptions of separation and connection. Chapter two takes us into the empirical debate mentioned earlier, including not only studies which investigate the existence of sex difference per se, but those which focus specifically on manifestations of justice and care moral orientations. Chapter three is devoted to a treatment of the study undertaken for this thesis, and which tests the hypothesis that women are more caring than men, and does so in the political context of voting behaviour. Following a discussion of the results of this study, the thesis concludes in chapter four with an exploration not only of what an exclusion of this perspective in formal politics means for women's political behaviour, but of the possible benefits for society should the voice be included.

One final word before our journey begins. One evening, several months ago, my seven year old daughter and I were laying in bed reading together--she, a children's book; I, some research material for this thesis. At one point my daughter asked me, "What is that you are reading?" So, I said, "Well, it's for my thesis. This person is talking about an argument made by a woman named Carol Gilligan that men and women think differently when they make decisions about some things." And I went on to explain, in what I thought was very clear language, what my thesis
was about. At the end of my explanation I said, "So, did that make sense?" My daughter said "no." So, I made another attempt and this time really tried to make the meaning clear. At the end of this explanation I asked again, "Now, does it make sense?" My daughter said, "no." So I thought I'd better find out just how much she *did* understand before attempting this again. I said, "Well, what do you think I said? She said, "Blah blah blah blah blah Gilligan, blah blah blah blah blah...." I sincerely hope that the reader is more informed by this thesis than was my daughter.
Chapter 1: The Ethic of Care

"I deny that any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another. If men had ever been found in society without women, or women without men, or if there had been a society of men and women in which the women were not under the control of the men, something might have been positively known about the mental and moral differences which may be inherent in the nature of each." (Mill, J.S. 1869. "The Subjection of Women.")

Over a century after Mill framed these sentiments, developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan expressed the same frustration. However, unlike Mill, whose opinions were framed in a time when psychological inquiry occurred in a mostly ad hoc fashion, Gilligan was reacting to an extensive body of psychological study offered by the twentieth century's three most renowned developmental theorists: Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. All three had presented models of human cognitive and moral development in which women were found lacking, and all based their studies on exclusively male subjects. In the early 1970s, Gilligan had even co-authored one of these studies with Lawrence Kohlberg.2 However, as she wrote in 1982:

Over the past ten years, I have been listening to people talking about morality and about themselves. Halfway through that time, I began to hear a distinction in these voices, two ways of speaking about moral problems, two modes of describing the relationship between self and other (1).

Gilligan challenged accepted paradigms of moral reasoning, especially that of Lawrence Kohlberg, and began her own investigations into moral thought, this time focussing her attention on women. In Gilligan's words, "Only when life-cycle theorists divide their attention and begin to live with women as they have lived with men will their vision encompass the experience of both sexes and their theories

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2 In 1971, Gilligan and Kohlberg jointly published findings on a study of "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Post-conventional World." Daedalus 100, 1051-1086.
become correspondingly more fertile" (1982:23). Her research has led her to argue that because of differing developmental experiences, males and females develop different moral orientations. When it comes to moral decision-making, women see morality in terms of care and connection to others, where men see morality as a question of fairness, or competing rights. While the male orientation forms the core of the dominant moral paradigm in western society, women's moral orientation has been historically relegated to the personal sphere.

The masculine emphasis in current developmental theory found its origins in the theories of psychosexual development proposed by Freud in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, written in 1905. Freud theorized that the crucial divergence in personality development between males and females occurred at puberty, the time at which boys, because of castration fear, repress their libidinal attraction to their mother and transfer their identification to their father (1905, 93). This process, this mastering of what Freud referred to as the "Oedipus complex," was mandatory for personal development. In a footnote added in 1920, Freud wrote: "Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis" (92). Girls did not suffer castration anxiety and therefore, they never mastered this complex, and because of this, they did not develop the "superego," or conscience, necessary for moral development. Nor did they experience the necessary "detachment from parental authority" that young men experienced.

At every stage in the course of development through which all human beings ought by rights to pass, a certain number are held back; so there are some who have never got over their parents' authority and have withdrawn their affection from them either very incompletely or not at all. They are mostly girls... " (93).

In fact, Freud himself admitted he had very little understanding of female behaviour; in 1926 he still referred to women's sexual development as a "dark
continent" (Williams, 1987:34). Nevertheless, his belief in the link between castration fear and the development of the superego caused him to conclude in 1925 that women "show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility" (Gilligan, 1982, 7).

One might expect that as women's lives have evolved to a more independent status, and as some of Freud's other ideas have diminished in efficacy, women's moral status might enjoy a more elevated position within moral paradigms. However, while women are no longer thought to be ruled by their biological "shortcomings," their moral reasoning is still seen to be generally inferior to that of men.

When Jean Piaget pursued the theme of justice in children's play in 1932, he took no notice of biological factors in personality development beyond noticing that girls and boys played different games, and that that made a difference in their moral development. Believing that morality displayed by children throws light on understanding adult morality, and further that "all morality consists in a system of rules," Piaget believed that he could gain insight into an understanding of moral development by studying the thinking and behaviour of children playing marbles—a game involving an intricate set of rules. After watching many games played by boys of varying age groups, and talking with the players to determine their attitudes toward the imposition and interpretation of the rules of the game, Piaget developed a dynamic model of moral development based on rule practice. According to Piaget, progress in moral development is marked by an individual's movement through four stages of rule orientation beginning from a position of egocentrism, where obedience is based on either fear of punishment or unquestioning acceptance of rules as authority, and ultimately moving to an autonomous approach to rules where laws become viewed as the product of mutual consent, and to be changed
only through mutual consent. Piaget believes that the greater the knowledge of the rules involved, the more the respect for those rules becomes based on rational considerations rather than mystical acceptance (1965:28). At the highest stage of moral development, the code has been mastered, juridical discussions of principle and procedure become pleasurable in themselves, and the individual is able to "apply them to any case whatsoever, including purely hypothetical cases ..." (47). At this level, cooperation and reciprocity are assured by a rational subordination of the individual to universally agreed upon laws.

Girls do not play marble games and do not figure in Piaget's moral development schema. He felt that girls' games, such as hopscotch, never involved the complex codifications, nor complicated jurisprudence one sees in boy's collective games, and because of this, girls did not attach the same importance to rules as did boys (77-80). For Piaget, this was a serious developmental constraint, causing him to conclude that "the most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys" (77).

When, in the 1970s, Lawrence Kohlberg offered his ideas about morality and justice, the discourse shifted from rules to principles. Kohlberg offers a prescriptive paradigm of moral/cognitive development based, not only on his own extensive research, but on Piagetian notions of moral justice and stage sequence of development, and on the political philosophies of justice offered by J.S. Mill and especially by John Rawls. Employing a self-described "neo-Kantian" definition of morality based on a "categorical obligation to act" in a way that is "universalizable, a point of view which any human being could or should adopt in reaction to the dilemma" (1984a, 224), Kohlberg retains justice as the central tenet of moral development, but incorporates notions of justice beyond rule codification and jurisprudence. Like Piaget, Kohlberg also viewed moral progress as a stage sequence, but Kohlberg saw this progress as an evolution toward a cognitive and
behavioural ideal in which the morally autonomous individual at the highest level comprehends not only legal complexity, but seeks a Platonic type of ultimate truth. In Kohlberg's paradigm, notions of justice as fairness come from Rawls; notions of autonomous development are influenced by Mill:

If, with equal virtue, one is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence -- or if, with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue -- the opinion, the judgment, of the higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of the inferior (Mill 1861, 307).

In Kohlberg's model there are three major levels of moral reasoning: the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional (see Figure 1 and Appendix A). At the preconventional level, the person bases his or her moral judgment on egocentric considerations of fairness--"what is right for me," and exhibits morally right behaviour primarily as a response to externally imposed sanctions. At the conventional level, the person looks beyond self to the needs of society. What is fair is what society deems to be fair; doing the morally right thing at this level is motivated by a desire to be seen to be good by others, and out of genuine concern for the welfare of others, often putting that welfare before ones own. At the postconventional level, the person once again considers what is morally right from his or her own perspective, but this time fairness is determined by principles of equality and reciprocity, and are grounded in a notion of what constitutes a just society (Kohlberg, 1976:32-36). Within each of these three levels are two stages of moral reasoning, with the second stage being a more advanced form of the perspective taken in the first. As in Piaget's model, the individual moves from egocentric considerations to ones that consider the social good, but in Kohlberg's stage sequence, the emphasis shifts from rationally based cooperation to an awareness of rights and universal principles, seen in its most developed and morally
autonomous interpretation at stage 6, the highest stage of moral reasoning (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Kohlberg's Six Stage Moral Developmental Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>POSTCONVENTIONAL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no rights considered beyond own</td>
<td>others have rights but they are relative</td>
<td>interpersonal perspective—primacy of others over self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>societal needs take precedence over any one person's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>objective rights take precedence over social attachments and contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>universal ethical principles: equality of rights, respect for individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, Kohlberg has not found empirical support for the existence of stage 6; it is an ideal, a moral "ought." Here we find J.S. Mill's "being of higher faculties," a product of education, reflection and taste whose moral principles reflect a personal orientation where "the good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence (Mill 1861-3, 9,33). Here we also find the person able to make moral judgments framed within a "veil of ignorance," the device proposed by John Rawls to ensure that moral decisions are taken in a spirit of universalizability, not conditioned by personal circumstances or interest (Rawls 1985, 237).

Kohlberg based his model on a longitudinal study of 84 male subjects asked to decide the morally right solution to a number of hypothetical dilemmas, with the Heinz Dilemma being the example most commonly referenced:

"In Europe, a woman was near death from a rare disease. There was one drug the doctors thought might save her. It was a drug that a druggist in the town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, and the druggist was charging ten times what the drug had cost him to make. He paid $200 for the materials and was charging
$2,000 for the prescription. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which was half of what he needed. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or to let him pay later. But the druggist said, 'No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it'" (Belenky et al. 1986, 236).

Kohlberg, and others who have used his stage sequence and scoring system, rate responses according to where they fall within his six stage sequence. The morally "best" responses are those which attempt to resolve a conflict of principles, in this case the right to property in conflict with the right to life.

Those who have tested women as well as men have found that women do not fare well when it comes to their placement in Kohlberg's moral continuum. Women look at this dilemma and want more contextual information, and their resolutions aim for a harmony of interests rather than a prioritization of principles. Most women end up with a stage 3 scoring, defined as a stage which emphasizes "mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity" (Kohlberg 1976, 34-35).

Gilligan (1982) does not deny that women find these values important; what she challenges is the inferior placement they receive in Kohlberg's model, and she blames this on research that has excluded women. Her own conclusions reflect the findings of in-depth interviews carried out with both mixed and all-female samples in three major studies: the college student study, involving 25 randomly selected students; the abortion decision study in which 29 women were interviewed about the moral conflict they experienced and the decisions they reached when facing an abortion; and the rights and responsibilities study, involving 144 males and females matched for a variety of demographic factors including age and education. The comments she heard have led her to conclude that what women's responses reveal is not a lesser morality, but a different one.
When one begins with the study of women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, the outline of a moral conception different from that described by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to emerge and informs a different description of development. In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract (19).

Gilligan distinguishes the two orientations as an "ethic of care" based on a "responsibility to discern and alleviate the 'real and recognizable trouble' of this world, and an "ethic of justice" based on "an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment" (100). While the first is seen most by women, the latter by men, Gilligan is unwilling to attribute this to an actual gender difference, and notes that her association is based on empirical observation. She also states the scope of her conclusions as making no claim to the origins of this difference, nor to its "distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time." However, as she points out, these differences exist "in a social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females and the relations between the sexes" (2). Central to her thinking is the notion that justice and care perspectives arise out of differing experiences of inequality and attachment. As children we all experience inequality in our relations with our parents, which diminishes as we develop our own self-identity. Attachment and separation are also universally shared experiences. However, girls do not experience the same level of separation that boys do; their experiences become grounded in their sense of connection to others. Boys experience higher levels of separation in the process of identity formation, and then in their relationships with their father, a greater sense of inequality. These experiences shape our awareness of ourselves and others: inequality leading to a perspective of
justice which privileges equality and fairness considerations, and attachment leading to a moral perspective which privileges connection (1988, 114).

Gilligan's insights are heavily influenced by Nancy Chowdorow; Chowdorow's insights by Freud. However, unlike Freud, Chowdorow finds differences emerging between boys and girls during the preoedipal experience. According to Chowdorow (1974), mothers treat their sons and daughters in a different manner from birth. Knowing that at some point a process of separation must occur between themselves and their son if their son is to develop his own masculine identity, Chowdorow says mothers encourage their sons to see themselves as different and separate from them much more than they do with their daughters. Boys not only experience greater differentiation but, forced to look to their father as a model of masculine identity, they then find a father often physically and psychologically distant. Therefore, says Chowdorow, the boy's male gender identification becomes "positional" rather than "personal," their masculinity defined by imagined criteria rather than by modelling through contact. Male identity becomes defined by what is not feminine—a negatively defined identity based on devaluing feminine characteristics. This is in contrast to the more "personal" and continuous identification girls have with the female role, a process which allows them to grow up feeling more connected to others, but less able to see themselves as individuals in their own right. Citing a duality proposed by David Bakan in 1966,3 Chowdorow suggests that these differing mother-child experiences lead to sex differentiated world views in which males are preoccupied with "agency," females with "communion." Agency sees the organism as an individual and manifests itself in "self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion. Communion sees the individual as part of a larger organism and manifests itself "in the sense of being at

one with other organisms" (55-6). While Chowdorow sees that, to some degree, these differences occur as a result of the differential treatment accorded to sons and daughters by their mothers, she suggests that in western society, the differences have been exacerbated by the process of industrialization. The economic reorganization of the family, which saw the family income dependent on wages earned primarily by men outside the home, meant boys spent far less time with their fathers. As Chowdorow says, we are not simply "taught" our male and female identities, but assimilate them through certain features of the social structure, supported by cultural beliefs, values and perceptions.

Nowhere is this more dramatically illustrated than by Margaret Mead's seminal study of three primitive societies in New Guinea. Between 1931 and 1933, Mead and her colleague, Dr. Fortune, lived with and studied the social behaviour of the Arapesh, Mundugumor and Tchambuli tribes, an experience she credits with opening her eyes to the role of social conditioning in human behaviour (1963, 279-282). Mead observed that in each tribe, while roles were organized around the fact of biological sex difference, the social organization and expected sex-linked temperaments showed enormous variation. In the Arapesh, for instance, while women carried out the everyday tasks of food production: the weeding, carrying, preparation, etc., and men oversaw ceremonial preparations, and the killing of pigs and growing of yams, both men and women were expected to care for the children. And, it is this latter occupation that is considered the tribes most important activity. As Mead describes it:

Arapesh life is organized about this central plot of the way men and women, physiologically different and possessed of differing potencies, unite in a common adventure that is primarily maternal, cherishing, and oriented away from the self towards the needs of the next generation. (15).
Children are socialized to associate security and happiness with their tribal membership, and no games are played that encourage aggressiveness and competition (57-62).

The other two tribes, the Mundugumour and the Tchambuli, produced very different behavioural norms. Where Arapesh personalities, male and female, were standardized to conform with what could be called maternal values, the Mundugumour encouraged opposite behaviour. Males and females were socialized to exhibit proud, harsh and violent behaviour—more typically described as masculine. Here, children were brutally weaned, pushed from their mothers with "blows and cross words" (198). Children's play, while unorganized, was highly competitive, as were interpersonal relations overall. Again, there were instances of differential treatment accorded males and females, but according to Mead:

... behind this difference in the treatment of boys and girls lies no theory that women differ temperamentally from men. They are believed to be just as violent, just as aggressive, just as jealous. They simply are not quite as strong physically, although often a woman can put up a very good fight, and a husband who wishes to beat his wife takes care to arm himself with a crocodile-jaw and to be sure that she is not armed (210).

In the Tchambuli, the characteristics we associate with males and females were reversed. Here the women took charge of all domestic and business affairs, while the men concerned themselves with aesthetic activities of both a vain and artistic nature.

But, while the level of sex difference varied as a correlate of cultural norms, certain patterns appear familiar to Gilligan's (and Chowdorow's) argument. For instance, in the Arapesh, a society which values nonviolence and nurturance, while the young boy experiences separation when his father must leave him to go hunting, it is not an experience analogous to males in western society because first of all, the
Arapesh boy is not expected to develop a specific masculine identity that requires a strong contrast with the female identity and second, as soon as the boy is old enough to go hunting, he regains the close contact previously enjoyed with his father. Because fathers and mothers are equally and positively involved in childrearing, both boys and girls grow up with a sense of connection. In Gilligan's terms, both males and females in the Arapesh would likely make moral judgments that reflect an ethic of care.

While much of Gilligan's own research emphasizes in-depth interviews with women about real-life moral dilemmas, she has also studied groups involving subjects of both sexes and of varying ages, in which she has administered Kolberg's hypothetical dilemmas and used his scoring system. From this, she offers contrasting perspectives on the Heinz Dilemma given by Amy and Jake, two eleven year olds in one of her studies. After being presented with the dilemma, Amy and Jake are presented with the moral question, "Should Heinz steal the drug?" Jake's solution, scored at a level falling between stages 3 and 4 is typical of a "justice' oriented response. For Jake the conflict is between the values of property and life; the dilemma for him is to choose between those two rights: the right of the druggist to sell his product at his chosen price vs the value of a human life. In Jake's words, "For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist only makes $1,000, he is still going to live, but if Heinz doesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die". His approach to moral reasoning is to look at the dilemma as "sort of like a math problem with humans," a problem capable of solving as long as you use the right logic (26). Amy totally misses this concept of logic. Not only does she not see this problem as a conflict of rights, her attention becomes focused on coming up with alternative solutions to the dilemma. She worries, for instance, about the impact that Heinz's theft might have on the ongoing relationship between him and his wife:
If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good. So they should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money (28).

In the end, Amy decides the best solution is to make the druggist understand the possible dire consequences of his refusal to sell the drug and, failing that, to have Heinz appeal to others not in the original dilemma, who might be in a better financial position to help him. It is a very pragmatic solution which tries to find the most universally harmonious way out of the dilemma, but which ignores any principles at stake.

We see in Amy's response a concern for the 'real' situation, and a desire for information obviously missing from this hypothetical description. This frustration was a common reaction from women working through Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas and because of this, Gilligan felt that discovering the true discourse of women's moral thought would require providing opportunities for women to speak of ways in which they had resolved real-life dilemmas. In the Abortion Decision Study, she interviewed twenty-nine women, ranging in age from fifteen to thirty-three, and coming from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. While their dilemmas were of a personal nature, the choices they made affected not only themselves but others, and contained consequences that could influence whether they thought of themselves as a morally right or wrong person. Three moral perspectives emerged from these interviews, and provide the stages for Gilligan's prescriptive model of moral development, centred on an orientation of care, that defines women.

Survival, responsibility and interconnection mark the three levels of women's moral development. An initial concern for self in order to survive passes through a transition phase when the woman begins to see this self-absorption as selfish, and
begins to see herself more in connection with others in a relation of responsibility. At this stage, being good is synonymous with taking care of others - only through selfless giving can self worth be attained. This is the stage where many women remain. While they may do things for themselves, such actions provoke feelings of guilt that are only assuaged if the action can be seen to be also benefiting others. Gilligan sees this as a crippling stage, unhealthy for the woman and for the others in her life. As Jean Baker Miller points out:

As wives, mothers, daughters, lovers, or workers, women often feel that other people are demanding too much of them; and they resent it. Frequently they cannot even allow themselves to admit that they resent these excess pressures. They have come to believe that they should want to respond at all times and in all ways. Consequently, they cannot let themselves openly call a halt to the demands or even take small steps to limit them. The hesitation to do this, to resist control of their own lives in even ordinary ways, can result in many psychological complications or even somatic symptoms (1976, 50).

Gilligan would have these women move beyond seeing self-fulfillment as selfishness to a point where they can view their relationships with others as opportunities for mutual give and take, where the interests of self are also considered legitimate. This involves another transitional stage wherein goodness begins to translate into "truth" as the woman realizes that being morally good involves care of self as well as others. From here it is only a short cognitive leap to Gilligan's third moral development stage, premised on a morality of nonviolence between self and other: "A moral equality between self and other is achieved by equally applying an injunction against hurting" (Brabeck 1993, 36). At this third, postconventional, moral level, we see some of the characteristics of Kohlberg's autonomous reasoner, approaching moral judgment from the perspective of self but in full knowledge of the position of others. It is the thinking manifested by Belenky et al.'s "constructivist woman."
Belenky et al. were interested in discovering whether women not only employed a different moral orientation from men, but whether their ways of learning were similarly different. Using questions employed in assigning William Perry's learning development positions, as well as standard questions developed by Gilligan and Kohlberg, they carried out intensive in-depth interviews with 135 women. From these responses, they were able to outline five epistemological categories, and we are able to see parallels between learning stage and moral reasoning employed. For instance, "received knowers" do not question authorities, be it husband or professor. Having no faith in their own intellectual abilities, they believe others must be more informed than they. Their moral judgments are also based on what others consider right. As Belenky et al. write, a persistent theme of these women is that "they should devote themselves to the care and empowerment of others while remaining 'selfless,'" (1986, 46) a characteristic of women in Gilligan's second, "responsibility" stage of moral development. This contrasts with Belenky et al.'s "constructivist woman" who approaches moral conflict from an informed but compassionate position.

Generally well educated, constructivists are aware of objective truths and forms of logical reasoning, but they also see that "all knowledge is a construction and that truth is a matter of the context in which it is embedded." Kohlberg would argue there is very little difference between this realization and his own higher stage reasoning where the person is aware "that most values and rules are relative to your group" (1976, 34-35). Kohlberg has, in fact, argued that at higher education and occupational levels, differences between men and women disappear, an argument that will be explored in the next chapter. But, Belenky et al. and Gilligan would argue that differences persist even at the level of higher order moral reasoning. For instance, Kohlberg's stage 5 reasoner may recognize relative truth, but moral judgment is based on rules arising out of an assumed social contract among equals,
and moral conflict is seen as existing between abstract principles that can be objectively solved. This contrasts with the approaches taken by the women in Gilligan and Belenky et al.'s studies who tend to place much more emphasis on the context of the situation; and on the need to resolve inequitous relationships, and on a recognition of differences in need. While Belenky et al.'s "constructivists" are capable of objective truth, their moral reasoning contains strong elements of a sense of connection to the players involved, resisting "premature generalization about what they would do or what should be done, particularly about matters of right and wrong" (149). Asked whether Heinz should steal the medicine, these women wanted to know: "What does Heinz wish?" "What is the condition of Mrs. Heinz's life?" "Why is the druggist behaving so?" "Does Heinz have children dependent on him for care?" "Who would care for the children if Heinz went to jail?" (149). Like Kohlberg's higher order moral reasoners, women in Gilligan's highest level of moral development also incorporate a notion of rights into their moral judgment, but it is a notion tempered by an awareness of the complexity of most moral dilemmas, and by an awareness that in many cases, the players are not equal.

In 1984, Kohlberg revised his scoring system to include a care perspective at every stage of reasoning, admitting that his concept of justice "does not fully reflect all that is recognized as being part of the moral domain" (1984, 227). However, Kohlberg sees "care" and "justice" perspectives as two moral orientations with two domains of application:

From our point of view there are two senses of the word moral, and two types of dilemmas, each corresponding to these differing meanings of the word... The 'moral point of view' stresses attributes of impartiality, universalizability, and the effort and willingness to come to agreement or consensus with other human beings in general about what is right. It is this notion of a 'moral point of view' which is most clearly embodied psychologically in the Kohlberg stage model of justice reasoning.
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There is a second sense of the word moral, which is captured by Gilligan's (1982) focus upon the elements of caring and responsibility, most vividly evident in relations of special obligation to family and friends.

The difference...is captured by the distinctions that many Americans make between the sphere of personal moral dilemmas and choices and the sphere of moral choice that is not considered personal, that is, the sphere captured by our justice dilemmas (230).

Kohlberg has assigned morality as care to the personal, private sphere and morality as rights to the public sphere.

Gilligan says he is wrong, that women employ moral judgments that prioritize a care perspective in their considerations of "public" moral dilemmas as well as in considerations of dilemmas closer to home. It is a debate that has stimulated a response from academics in law, psychology, sociology, biology, philosophy and political science. While some have joined Gilligan in challenging Kohlberg's paradigm, others point to the lack of empirical support existing for Gilligan's claim of male/female difference in moral orientation. To some extent, the debate also hinges on the necessity of social scientific experimentation to prove what seems obvious to our eyes. For instance, in a review of In a Different Voice, offered by psychologists Anne Colby and William Damon (1987), these authors criticize Gilligan for relying on anecdotal evidence, for failing to present empirical data to support her interview studies, and for failing to provide comparative data on males to match the data on females from her abortion study. Nevertheless, these same authors allow that there is an intuitive appeal to Gilligan's claim, and that certainly the stereotypes which present males as more independent and objective, and females as more nurturing and acquiescing, remain strongly embedded in our consciousness.
We are left with the question—*is* there a moral difference between men and women? Are women more caring in their moral response than are men? The debate on this question forms the substance of our next chapter.
Chapter 2: The Difference Debate

In his now classic study of gender identity, Robert Stoller\textsuperscript{4} tells us that regardless of the combination of forces that influence our sense of gender identity—be they biological or cultural—by the time we are three years old, that identity has developed (1964, 220). By this early age, we are aware that we are male or female—a fact which colours not only the way we look at the world, but what the world expects from us, and how the world treats us. Gilligan argues that these different experiences lead to different ways of thinking and she offers strong anecdotal evidence to support her case, but her critics say this evidence is insufficient. This chapter looks at evidence—both challenging and supportive—that has emerged from studies on moral difference conducted since 1982. While some of these studies involve Gilligan herself, she has argued that social scientific research may be inadequate for a full appreciation of the nuanced differences between male and female moral reasoning. Accordingly, before departing to the laboratory, we will spend some time in the field.

Observations in the Field

We need only look to the way children play to see differences in male and female behaviour. As Greenstein said in his seminal study of child socialization, "When sex differences emerge early in life it is likely that these differences reflect deep-seated cultural themes" (1965, 112). Greenstein argues that the cultural assumptions learned in this period are particularly potent because it is a time when the child learns uncritically, is not conscious of alternatives, and lacks any standards for judging received information. And, because it is also a time when the child's personality is forming, what is learned during this period become unconscious, internalized values and provide a filter for future information (79). How the child's

\textsuperscript{4} At the time, Stoller was Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California School of Medicine, Los Angeles, California.
parents behave—individually and toward each other—what the child views on television, reads in books, or learns in school or in church—all have an impact on that child's sense of self and relation to the world. If, for instance, the television advertising that accompanies children's programming shows little girls quietly playing with dolls or being nurses, and little boys aggressively playing with guns—as much of it does—those images send a clear message to children of culturally ascribed roles.

Janet Lever, following Piaget's lead, felt that differences observed in play reflected not only early childhood socialization, but that play itself was a form of socialization. In 1974, Lever carried out an intensive study of 110 ten and eleven year old boys and girls from one suburban, and two city schools in Connecticut, using a variety of research methods including observation, interviews, and questionnaires. Children's play was documented both at school and in their hours away from school. Lever's study led her to a number of conclusions such as: boys play in larger groups, girls in small; girls are more likely to take part in boys' games than boys are to take part in girls'; boys play more competitive games, girls play more cooperatively, with no explicit goal or winner; and, boys play tends to be more age heterogeneous. When girls play with younger children, their play reflects mothering. Lever also agrees with Piaget that there are fewer moral lessons in girls' play. Games like jump-rope and hop-scotch rely upon turn-taking in contrast with the contingent rules of strategy that accompany sport games, therefore she argues there are fewer opportunities for judicial experience (478-83).

While I was reading Lever's study, my seven year old daughter Leah, and her eight year old friend, Amanda, were playing beside me. Their presence provided an opportunity for me to see whether, nearly twenty years later, these differences in play still existed. And, because Lever's study had not focused on the question of moral difference, I was also interested to find out more about sex specific play behaviour that might shed light on this question in the context of Gilligan's argument. The girls
agreed to answer a few questions about the way girls and boys play. Not wanting to influence their response, I was careful to keep the questions general.

I began by asking the girls whether they perceived any difference between the way they and the boys they know play. It was not a question to which Leah had given much thought, but Amanda had some very strong views on the matter. She told me that for one thing, "girls don't like to kill their toys." This seemed a novel response, so I pursued the matter. Amanda told me that when boys played with "things" like dinosaurs, the dinosaurs always kill each other. "What do girls play?" I asked. "Girls play house." "Don't boys play house?" I asked. "Well yes sometimes," said Amanda but, "if boys play house, then there always has to be something like a burglar who will kill somebody in the house." I asked Amanda if burglars never appeared when only girls were playing, and she allowed as how sometimes they did. So I asked, "if there is a burglar, what do the girls do and what do the boys do?" "If there's a burglar, we get them out of the house or they become our friend, but if boys are playing and there's a burglar, they kill them."

While Amanda's comments can only be considered as ad hoc support for Gilligan's thesis, they seem a vivid illustration of sex differences, at least in terms of attitudes to violence and to solutions based on a harmony of interests rather than a clear set of rights. It would appear that where the boys see the solution in terms of the rights of those in the house, the girls can foresee a solution which includes the burglar, albeit a much nicer burglar. One could argue that by killing the intruder, the boys are also achieving harmony, this time for those who are rightfully in the house, but there seems an essential difference between a solution which achieves harmony for some and a solution which is able to envision a potential harmony for all.

I decided to take a more empirical look at current manifestations of sex differences in children's play. In August, a time when school daycares operate on a
full day basis, I spent two days observing approximately 15 six, seven and eight year olds at play at Leah and Amanda's daycare, the Jericho Kids' Club.

At this daycare, indoor play is structured into activity centres and children must sign up for the activity centre they prefer. If they wish to play outside, this is also an agreement they make with staff. My two days at the daycare led me to make a number of observations. For one thing, boys and girls still do not choose to play together, although some activities provided venues for sex mixing more than others. The art table, for instance, found boys and girls together although their conversations tended to be same sex. While organized sports activities seemed common for at least the boys children in Lever's study, I observed few organized team games at the daycare, although I know it does occur and that it normally involves boys (although sometimes girls play as well). Also, not all boys are violent and not all girls are non-competitive. There were examples of small groups of boys playing quietly, and there were aggressive girls. And, girls tended to play outside just as much as the boys and when they were outside, they seemed equally boisterous. However, Amanda was right--girls do play house, and boys play "crash" games, and if there was one feature that characterized their play, this would be it. Two groups provide examples of this behaviour.

In one case, a group of five girls were involved in designing and building a 'house' in which there were to be two rooms: one for a hampster and one for a cat. There was much conversation about the materials needed to make proper homes for these animals, a decision that seemed to call for understanding the situation from the animal's point of view. At one point, one girl said, "If you were a hampster, what would you want?" Other conversations focused on Sarah, the cat. "Close that at night so she can't get out." "But what if she gets lost in our luggage?" "She can breath under sawdust." When design inadequacies presented obstacles to easy living, alternative solutions were sought. "Lacey (the hampster) could probably go in there."
"No, I don't think Lacey can fit there." "But Vanessa, one at a time could go."
"Well, if you change this, that would be good for Sarah." When all was complete, one girl changed the dynamics of the situation by saying, "I'm going to be a dog."

In the other case, three boys were playing "dinosaurs" at the sand table. Their play was boisterous and seemed to call for various moves and positioning of the dinosaurs in the sand, followed by various crashes, death throes and verbal effects. The plot appeared to be that one of them was trying to get away from the others, and rules centred on where the search could take place. The conversation was punctuated by comments like: "My guy drowned before you caught me!" "Oh, my leg, my leg ..... aaaaah." "He's dead ..... but when you guys were sleeping I came back." "Boy, do you snore." "master, master!" "But you never found me cause I was dead."

While elements of strategy appear common to both groups, there do appear to be differences. With the girls, much of the "game" is taken up with considerations of the animals' needs; with the boys, the animals seem peripheral to the action.

Nevertheless, although the sex differences observed in children's play may alert us to potential differences in moral cognition, the challenge to Gilligan has been to produce causal evidence. Her empirical claim has, indeed, stimulated a number of studies that both support and challenge this notion of moral difference represented by "care" and "justice" positions. We find that the evidence presented clarifies the debate in some areas and leaves us confused in others. Some evidence is directly contradictory.5

Observations in the Laboratory

In 1984, Lawrence Walker used a metaanalysis procedure to produce a statistical analysis of some 79 studies using Kohlberg's stage sequence and scoring.

5 When referring to biological difference, I will use the term "sex;" when the differences are attributed to social/cultural factors, I will use the term "gender."
system to see whether Gilligan's charge of sex bias could be defended. Walker did not find evidence of sex bias. Contrary to Gilligan's claim that Kohlberg's scoring tended to disadvantage females, Walker found that the studies actually produced few sex differences in moral development, and he concludes that women and men are more similar than not in terms of cognitive moral abilities. Separating the studies into three age groupings: childhood and early adolescence, late adolescence and youth, and adulthood, Walker found that when sex differences did occur, they were more often found at the adult level than at the other two age levels. However, he contends that even these differences were not of the magnitude Gilligan has suggested, and that these results are suspect because in studies where sex differences favored men, sex and educational and occupational differences had been confounded.

One of the studies included in Walker's analysis was carried out by Diana Baumrind. Baumrind (1993) has in turn challenged Walker's findings, saying the particular metaanalysis procedure he used biased results toward the null hypothesis.\(^6\) Again, we do not intend to pursue the debate over Kohlberg's scoring system and the issue of sex bias, but Baumrind's response to Walker includes elements pertinent to the more general moral difference debate. Baumrind argues that Walker, in effect, underweighted the adult response, and since the charge is one of underrepresentation at the levels of higher order reasoning, this is the group of focus. Basing his metaanalysis on the combined age groupings tended to produce results which diminished the importance of the sex differences favoring males in the adult group. Baumrind further protests that the high correlation between educational attainment

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\(^6\) Baumrind says that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test used by Walker assumes a continuous distribution for analysis, when in fact, Kohlberg's stage sequence is based on discrete stages. Therefore, "it is more appropriate to examine differences in frequency of men and women within a stage or stages than to compare the differences between mean stage scores of men and women" (1993, 178). Walker's results would therefore not show whether women were overrepresented at a given stage.
and stage 6 scoring produced by a small elite group tested by Kohlberg, has never been demonstrated as an equally efficacious measure for women. In other words, that controlling for education may not even out the odds.

Using findings from her study not included in Walker's analysis, Baumrind reanalyzed the evidence using statistical techniques that treated Kohlberg's stages as discrete, and controlled for both education and occupation. She found that employment per se did not make a difference in female moral stage scoring—there were no significant differences between employed and unemployed women—and while educational level and stage score level was significantly correlated for men, the same was not true for women. At the lowest educational levels, women obtain higher stage scores than men; at the highest educational level, men obtain the highest level. The results are particularly interesting for those subjects who actually scored at the stage 6 level. Here, while eleven of the twelve males scoring at this level had postgraduate degrees, this was true of only one of the nine women scoring at this level. Baumrind suggests that "more men than women may require the formal cognitive training provided by university education in order to apply principled reasoning to social-cognitive dilemmas" (188).

Gilligan herself has questioned the efficacy of using Kohlberg's dilemmas as a valid measure of women's moral orientation. Not only are they hypothetical, bearing little relation to the lives experienced by most participants in the studies, but they are biased toward a justice perspective. Dilemmas, such as the Heinz Dilemma, are constructed in a way to produce a conflict between two principles, in this case life and property. As we have seen from responses cited earlier in this paper, women do not necessarily conceive of the situation in the same framework of logic, and therefore, argues Gilligan, their answers do not necessarily reflect a "justice" orientation even though they may be a postconventional reasoner in Gilligan's care
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Several researchers have attended to this argument and have employed measures designed to include a care perspective.

While Friedman, Robinson and Friedman (1987) did not eliminate Kohlberg dilemmas from their study, their scoring system included both Kohlberg and Gilligan type reasoning measures. One-hundred one undergraduate students (78 from a liberal arts college and 23 from a community college; 47 men and 54 women) were asked to rate four dilemmas, including the Heinz dilemma, according to the importance attached to each of 12 moral criteria, six items reflecting Gilligan type "care based" criteria (referred to as "G" items), and six Kohlberg type "justice based" rating items (referred to as "K" items). For instance, an example of a "G" item applied to the Heinz dilemma was "Is this likely to weaken or strengthen the relationship between Heinz and his wife?"; an example of a "K" item for the Heinz dilemma would be "Whether the druggist, in exercising his individual rights, infringes on the rights of others." Subjects were asked to consider the rating item and then say whether they would attach great, much, some, little or no importance to the criteria (see APPENDIX B for the 12 rating items).

Comparing means for the G and K scores, the authors found no significant sex differences, and looking at individual items showed only five of a possible 96 produced significant differences with three of these in the opposite direction to that predicted. However, while their results would seem to dispute Gilligan's thesis, the authors suggest there may be possible weaknesses inherent in their methodology. For instance, because there was no existing standard by which they could evaluate their choice of G items, those items may not accurately represent a care orientation. Also, scores were based on fixed ratings rather than the "spontaneous productions" upon which Gilligan bases her findings. And finally, the use of traditional hypothetical moral dilemmas may not elicit care responses in the same way as subject initiated
real-life dilemmas. Gilligan has argued that "the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas" (1982, 69). In other words, if one wants to activate a substantive moral response on the part of women, one must present a salient dilemma.

One unexpected finding in the Friedman et al. study showed that while women from both the liberal arts college and the community college produced the same mean on the G items, women from the liberal arts college scored higher on the K items. According to the authors, the latter result is likely a product of the high correlation between moral reasoning (of the Kohlbergian sort) and level of education, but they are less sure of the implications of the former finding although they suggest that these results may indicate that "this dimension may have some generality across demographic groups" (1987, 45).

Nona Plessner Lyons (1988) is credited with developing the first standardized methodology for assessing moral orientation. Using subjects' self-descriptions and self-initiated real-life dilemmas, Lyons produced a coding scheme that allowed for codings of real-life dilemmas based on whether the subject saw him or herself as connected or separate from those in the dilemma, and their respective perspective towards others based on either "response" (care) or "rights" (justice). Those classed as "rights" tended to see their relations with others in a more objective and separate manner, and tended to see moral issues as ones demanding a resolution of conflicting claims, best solved by invoking impartial principles (35). Those classed as "response" saw themselves as connected to others, and tended to consider others "in
their specific contexts and not always invoking strict equality" (34). Lyons offers as an example of a rights perspective, the self-description of a 14 year old boy when asked "How would you describe yourself to yourself?"

What I am? [pause] That's a hard one ... Well, I ski—I think I'm a pretty good skier. And basketball, I think I'm a pretty good basketball player. I'm a good runner ... and I think I'm pretty smart. My grades are good ... I get along with a lot of people and teachers. And ... I'm not too fussy, I don't think—easy to satisfy, usually, depending on what it is.

As Lyons points out, this boy tends to describe himself in terms of his abilities. She contrasts this with the self-description offered by a 14 year old girl:

I like to do a lot of things. I like to do activities and ski and stuff. I like people. I like little kids and babies. And I like older people, too, like grandparents and everything; they're real special and stuff.... I have a lot of stuff going on. I have a lot of friends in the neighborhood.

Although this girl also begins her description by recounting her abilities, she soon passes into a description of self in terms of her relation to others. Lyons goes on to show how this way of seeing self is linked to the way one sees moral conflict and relates a conflict volunteered by the boy, in which he clearly sees the issue as one of competing principles: "Well, you have to think about what would be right ... and then ... are you gonna stand up for what's right and wrong to your friends, or are you gonna let them get you into going." She contrasts this with a dilemma produced by the girl which involved a decision about which friend should be the beneficiary of a paper route job she was giving up. The girl decides in favour of the person who she feels will be most responsive to her older customers. She decides she has made the right decision because "The person that was bad for the job finally realized that the person [chosen] was going to be a good person to do it" and in the end, "everybody's happy" (25-8).

Having developed her coding scheme, Lyons then used it to analyze a study designed by Gilligan. Thirty-six people, two males and two females at each of a
number of age groups from eight to sixty-plus, all of similar levels of high intelligence, education, and social class took part in intensive, Piagetian type interviews. Structured questions led to more unstructured probings and clarifications designed to elicit the individual's own "experience of self and domain of morality" as revealed by their real-life dilemmas (37). Considerations were categorized as either Response Predominating, Rights Predominating, or as Equal Response/Rights Considerations. Following the suggestion by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) that women reaching the higher moral development stages are more likely found among those from higher education levels and engaged professionally outside the home, the study included a sample of professional women.

Overall, Lyons found that men and women employ both considerations, response and rights, but that women use response more frequently and men use rights more frequently. Statistically, 75% of the women used predominantly response, 25% used predominantly rights. No women used both considerations equally. With the men, 14% used response predominantly, 79% used rights, and 7% (1) used both. The findings were significant at p<.001, although based on a relatively small sample size. Two unexpected findings emerged from this study. First, those who characterized themselves predominantly in connected terms--be they male or female--tended to use considerations of response in constructing and resolving their dilemmas; those who characterized themselves in more separate/objective terms tended to use considerations of rights. Second, after age twenty-seven, women employed more consideration of rights in their moral judgments, reflecting perhaps either a life cycle change or the higher education/occupation level of this group.

In a study that in some ways replicated Lyon's, Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) used Lyon's coding to test whether 1) there is evidence of both orientations in people's discussions of real-life issues, 2) whether people represent both orientations
or privilege one, and 3) whether there is a relation between moral orientation and gender.

Three subject samples were tested, each sample being matched in terms of education and professional occupation. The first sample was composed of 11 women and 10 men, varying in age from 15 to 77, but otherwise similar in education and race. The second sample was racially mixed between white and minority students—19 white and 20 minority, of which 26 were men and 13 women—and the third sample varied only by gender—10 males and 10 females.

Using Lyon's basic coding system, Gilligan and Attanucci used the terms "justice" and "care" perspectives for scoring, with a justice perspective focusing on problems of inequality and oppression, and valuing reciprocity and equal respect; and with a care perspective focusing on problems of detachment or abandonment, and valuing "an ideal of attention and response to need" (73). All participants were asked the following questions (78):

1. Have you ever been in a situation of moral conflict where you have had to make a decision but weren't sure what was the right thing to do?

2. Could you describe the situation?

3. What were the conflicts for you in that situation?

4. What did you do?

5. Do you think it was the right thing to do?

6. How do you know?

The following dilemma is offered as an example of a justice perspective:

The conflict was that by all rights she should have been turned into the honor board for violation of the alcohol policy... I liked her very much.... She is extremely embarrassed and upset. She was contrite. She wished she had never done it. She had all the proper levels of
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contriteness and guilt.... I was supposed to turn her in and didn't.

In this dilemma, the subject clearly believes the violator should be turned in, and justifies not doing so on the basis that the friend was already being punished by her own feelings of guilt. The situation is seen in terms of the rightness or wrongness of observing the rules accompanying the no drinking regulation. This contrasts with the following care perspective, in which the subject decides whether or not to turn a proctor in who appears to have a drinking problem.

It might just be his business if he wants to get drunk every week or it might be something that is really a problem and that should be dealt with professionally.... Maybe there was just no problem there.... I guess in something like a personal relationship with a proctor you don't want to just go right out there and antagonize people because that person will go away and if you destroy any relationship you have, I think you have lost any chance of doing anything for a person.

In this case, the subject focuses on trying to understand the situation from the proctor's point of view, and worries about losing an opportunity to help the person by severing the relationship. Dilemmas were categorized according to whether considerations employed one or other perspective exclusively, predominantly, or a combination of the two, resulting in five categories of response: Care Only, Care Focus, Care-Justice, Justice Focus, and Justice Only. Overall results, based on the total population of all three samples, revealed that:

1) the majority of people used both moral orientations (69%) compared to those who used exclusively one or the other (31%)

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7 A dilemma where 75% or more of the reasoning used either justice or care was labelled either a Care Focus or Justice Focus. Where both orientations were present, but neither accounted for more than 75% of the reasoning, the reasoning was labelled Care-Justice.
2) two-thirds of the results favoured one or other orientation (only one-third was in the Care-Justice category)

3) where men's orientations fall either into a justice or care-justice orientation (n=15 and n=30 respectively, with only 1 male subject classed as Care Focus), women's orientations tend to be spread fairly evenly across the three perspectives: Care Focus (n=12), Care-Justice (n=12), and Justice (n=10).

Gilligan and Attanucci conclude that while most of us include both perspectives in our moral reasoning, most of us also privilege either justice or care, and that women favor the Care Focus, while men favor the Justice Focus. They also point out that if women were not included in this study, the Care Focus perspective would virtually disappear.

Finally, there is a group of studies which offer mixed support for Gilligan's thesis, but which also suggest a number of intriguing corollaries.

In 1988, Pratt et al. tested care and justice orientations in the context of a number of factors which have been suggested as affecting orientation usage: dilemma type (e.g. whether it is considered personal or not), person's age or life stage, and whether the moral reasoning of males and females tends to converge as their educational and occupational level advances. An earlier study by the authors8 had shown that contrary to both Gilligan and Kohlberg, men and women may "move toward more distinctive orientations in hypothetical moral reasoning with advanced development and education" (1988, 376). In the two studies undertaken by the authors in 1988, they were interested in seeing whether this same pattern existed for real-life dilemmas.

Study 1 tested three hypotheses: whether sex differences in moral orientation would be more apparent during 1) middle adulthood for both hypothetical and real-

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life dilemmas, 2) for those reasoning at higher Kolbergian stages for both types of dilemmas, and 3) when real-life dilemmas were further classified as either presenting a justice or care type of dilemma. The participants were 12 men and 12 women at each of three age levels: 18-24, 30-45, and 60-75. Education was generally high, overall 62% had a university degree, although in the 18-24 group this percentage fell to 25%. Two Kolberg dilemmas constituted the hypothetical dilemmas, and subjects volunteered their own personal moral dilemmas. Personal dilemmas were scored using Lyon's coding scheme. Pratt et al. offer as an example of a justice dilemma, a decision about fairness in deciding the punishment for a child who has stolen something; and for a care dilemma, a man's decision whether to counsel a former girlfriend, now pregnant with someone else's baby. All dilemmas were also scored "relational" if the subject considered some aspect of an ongoing personal relationship as part of the dilemma, and "nonrelational," if the dilemma existed independent of an ongoing relationship (e.g. filling out a tax form).9

Results indicated that hypothetical dilemmas produced no significant sex differences, a finding that held true when controlled for age and education. However, differences did appear in real-life dilemmas, where men were significantly more likely to exhibit justice-oriented responses than were women (p=.01). And, sex differences here were most marked for the middle-adulthood group (10 justice vs 0 care for men; 1 justice vs 6 care for women). There was very little difference in the 18-24 age group. Sex also made a difference in the type of real-life (personal) dilemma offered, with 39% of men (12 out of 31) presenting non-relational dilemmas versus only 7% of women (2 out of 27). While overall, relational dilemmas evoked

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9 While Kohlberg has argued for the priority of his justice type dilemmas as being ones which call for a truly moral point of view, these authors argue that this is an empirical question, and suggest that relational moral issues may also exemplify moral reasoning, a challenge supported by others, such as Flanagan and Jackson (1987), who suggest "there are many moral problems which have nothing to do with justice (83).}
care orientations more than non-relational dilemmas, it would appear that women tend to classify relational dilemmas as "moral" more than do men. Finally, it would appear that women who give evidence of higher order reasoning (using Kolberg stage scoring), tend to use care reasoning in real-life dilemmas whereas men do not. The authors conclude that this evidence, combined with their 1984 study which also saw divergence at this level, in orientation used to solve hypothetical dilemmas, indicates that "for both real-life and hypothetical dilemmas ..., the sexes tend toward somewhat different orientations with advanced development" (1988, 382).

Study 2 looked at the association between parental status, self-concept, and personal moral orientation. Based on research offered by D. Gutmann in 1985, which suggested that sex roles become more differentiated with the advent of parenthood, and using Lyon's coding scheme to determine "connected" and "individuated" self-concepts for justice and care orientations, Pratt et al. tested a sample of married part-time university students: 10 male and 10 female parents; and 10 male and 10 female nonparents. Each subject was asked to offer two personal dilemmas. They predicted that parents would show greater differentiation of self-concept and moral orientation than would nonparents. Results showed that indeed, there were significant sex differences among the parents, with women less justice-oriented than men, but no such differences occurred in the nonparent sample. And, in this study also, males produced more nonrelational dilemmas than did women (45% versus 22%), but when dilemma content score was used as a covariate against sex and parental status, it was found that while not significantly related to being a parent, it was related to being male or female. With nonparents, dilemma content did make a difference in moral orientation used, with no sex difference noted.

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Overall, these authors conclude that while sex differences do appear in moral reasoning, they are not as pervasive as Gilligan would suggest, their presence varying with a number of factors: life cycle, self-concept, type of dilemma, and stage of Kolbergian moral reasoning. However, the authors conclude that parenthood appears to be a strong factor in increased gender differentiation (385), a conclusion supported by an observation made by Belenky and her colleagues that there is a perceptual difference between being a mother, and just having a mother. (1986, 177)

Crown and Heatherington (1989) shifted the question of moral orientation to a specific venue: competitive sports. A decision taken as to whether or not to sacrifice personal achievement in order to give assistance to a friend in the competition suggests whether the subject's desired outcome is centred in personal achievement—a characteristic of an individuated sense of self and other (associated with a morality of rights), or affiliation—a characteristic of a connected sense of self and other (associated with a morality of care).

Two studies were carried out. In the first, 20 males and 20 females from an introductory psychology class were given a script in which two friends, either two men or two women, find themselves in a competitive situation in a basketball game. While the dilemma is not subject initiated, the authors argue that the situation is one common to participants and therefore can be considered a "real-life" dilemma. Also, subjects were scored according to "production" methods, whereby participants supplied their own reasoning in their own words, thereby avoiding the possible distortions of rating systems.

According to the authors, these two friends "are paired in a drill that will affect who starts in the first game of the season" The better athlete of the two must make a decision whether to adopt "an achievement orientation and beat the other friend, a medium affiliation orientation and allow the friend to partially succeed, or a
Voting with Care

total affiliation orientation and allow the friend to win" (282). Using Lyon's coding, the considerations used in reaching these moral decisions were coded as justice, care or justice-care. Results showed that 79.5% of the subjects chose an achievement orientation, the remainder choosing the medium achievement orientation. None chose the total affiliation orientation. There was an interaction between respondent gender and decision taken by protagonist only when the protagonist was female. In this case, 60% (6) of the males felt "Jane" should follow an achievement oriented course of action; 40% felt she should make a medium-affiliation decision, contrasting with virtually all of the females reasoning that "Jane's" behaviour should be motivated exclusively by achievement (283-4). Evaluations of the justice/care perspectives found 45% of the respondents using a justice predominant reasoning; 40% using a care-predominant reasoning, and 15% using an equal justice-care reasoning. No significant sex differences were recorded.

In the second study, 92 male and 92 female undergraduates read the same script, only this time the protagonist had already decided on which of the three moral decisions he/she would make. Where the first script ended with the protagonist being uncertain about which course of action to take, in this script, the protagonist decides to either "go all out and beat" their friend, to "hold back" and allow their friend to regain some momentum, or to "hold back considerably" ultimately allowing their friend to "steal the ball" (284-5). Participants in the study were asked to rate the decision taken for its correctness, its difficulty, whether it was a moral decision, and relational considerations both on the team and away from the sports context.

Crown and Heatherington found that in terms of correctness, subjects found the achievement decision most correct, followed by the medium affiliation and then the total affiliation. The situation itself was perceived as having a more negative effect in terms of relationship on the team for female athletes than male, and when women rated female athletes, the medium affiliation decision was seen as most
problematic between friends, but when they rated males, it was seen as being the least so. Female relationships, outside of sports, were also seen to be most negatively affected by the situation, and again when considering the medium affiliation decision, the friendship of women was seen to suffer more than that of males (285-6).

The authors conclude that while support does not exist for sex differentiated moral orientations in a competitive sports venue, there does seem some suggestion that women see relational dilemmas as moral where men do not, indicated by women answering "probably yes," the decision was moral; men answering "probably no" (287). There also seem indications that women expect to act in a competitive way in a sports venue--that this behaviour is right and appropriate to the activity--but that this behaviour will hurt their friendships with other women more than similar behaviour will affect male friendships.

Several of the studies so far have presented evidence which shows that males and females, while incorporating elements of both care and justice orientations in their reasoning, tend to spontaneously prioritize one or the other. The conclusion has been that the perspective prioritized is the modal behaviour for that sex. D. Kay Johnston (1988) challenges this assumption, suggesting instead that when prompted, males and females may be equally capable of using either orientation, depending on the content of the dilemma. Johnston used fables as a context for eliciting rights and response orientations. Although the argument has been made that only real-life dilemmas offer an appropriate context for the care orientation, Johnston defends her measure on the basis that they offer a specific and consistent context for comparison, and because they are not as personal as real-life dilemmas, she does not feel constrained in challenging the respondent's use of a particular orientation in solving the dilemma. Also, unlike Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas, subjects were asked
not only to provide a solution to the dilemma implicit in the fable, but to construct just what that dilemma was.

Sixty adolescents recruited from schools in a community north of Boston became the subjects for this study, equally divided between boys and girls age 11 and 15. These students were given two fables to read: "The Dog in the Manger," and "The Porcupine and the Moles." After each fable was read, the children were interviewed, with the interviewer using the Piagetian "clinical examination" previously described. The children were ultimately asked to produce two solutions: a "spontaneous" and a "best" solution. Lyon's coding scheme was used to determine whether constructions and solutions were best categorized as exhibiting a response orientation, or a rights orientation. Without knowing the fables, it is difficult to understand the moral reasoning employed by the participants and Johnston's interpretation of that reasoning, therefore I include the fables here.

The Porcupine and the Moles

It was growing cold, and a porcupine was looking for a home. He found a most desirable cave but saw it was occupied by a family of moles.

"Would you mind if I shared your home for the winter?" the porcupine asked the moles.

The generous moles consented and the porcupine moved in. But the cave was small and every time the moles moved around they were scratched by the porcupine's sharp quills. The moles endured this discomfort as long as they could. Then at last they gathered courage to approach their visitor. "Pray leave," they said, "and let us have our cave to ourselves once again."

"Oh no!" said the porcupine. "This place suits me very well."

The Dog in the Manger

A dog, looking for a comfortable place to nap, came upon the empty stall of an ox. There it was quiet and cool and the hay was soft.
The dog, who was very tired, curled up on the hay and was soon fast asleep.

A few hours later the ox lumbered in from the fields. He had worked hard and was looking forward to his dinner of hay. His heavy steps woke the dog who jumped up in a great temper. As the ox came near the stall the dog snapped angrily, as if to bite him. Again and again the ox tried to reach his food but each time he tried the dog stopped him.  

For the Porcupine and Mole dilemma, Johnston used a rights coding for responses such as: "The porcupine has to go definitely. It's the mole's house." She coded the solution as a response orientation for such suggestions as: "Wrap the porcupine in a towel" or "The both of them should try to get together and make the hole bigger." Solutions like, "They (moles) should help the porcupine find a new house" were coded as indicating both orientations were used.

As the interview proceeded, students were asked whether they could think of another way to solve the problem, a technique employed to test the interviewee's ability to switch orientations. An alternative solution instigated a repeat questioning process. If the subject was unable spontaneously to produce the alternative solution, they were questioned in a way that suggested the appropriate alternative. For instance, if a subject was unable to provide an alternate response orientation, they were asked, "Is there a way to solve the dilemma so that all of the animals will be satisfied?" and so on. Finally, interviewees were asked which, of all solutions discussed, they considered to be the best.

Results indicated that while the moral orientation for spontaneous solutions differed by sex for both fables, only in the Dog in the Manger Fable were those differences significant and in the expected direction. Furthermore, response variation between the two fables occur most in the female population. While girls favoured a response orientation in the Dog in the Manger Fable, they favoured a rights

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11 The fables appear in the Appendix section of Johnston's study and are adapted from *Aesop's Fables*, retold by A. McGovern, (Scholastic Book Company, 1963).
orientation in the Porcupine and Moles Fable. In the Dog in the Manger "best" solutions, males became split between rights and response, while females clearly favoured response. In the Porcupine and Moles "best" solutions, females remained more oriented to response, with males clearly favouring a rights orientation. In other words, thinking about the "best" solution, females responded in the expected direction, but males were much more influenced by dilemma content (the Porcupine and Moles Fable could more easily be construed as a conflict of rights). And, Johnston adds, "In both fables if there is a change from the moral orientation used spontaneously to that used for the best solution, it tends to be from the rights to the response orientation or to a solution using both orientations" (62). Johnston concludes that this suggests that when forced to reappraise a situation, a more inclusive perspective is activated. This is so especially in the dog fable which, in contrast to the porcupine dilemma where differences appear untenable, lends itself much more to compromise (62-63).

Overall, Johnston suggests that rather than different orientations, it may be that males and females perceive different strategies for conflict resolution. In her study, boys tended to invoke a response orientation only when they saw the possibility of an ongoing relationship, and this could only occur when differences moved to the background. For instance, where boys see the differences between the porcupine and the moles as being so great as to minimize possible ongoing solutions, girls tend to assume that the relationship exists and can continue. So, says Johnston, "In contrast to a simplistic representation of the theory which holds that the importance of relationships is more salient to females than to males, is the idea that males and females tend to negotiate conflict in relationship in different ways" (65).

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12 In the Dog in the Manger Fable, 50% of the girls used the response orientation; 40% used a rights orientation. In the Porcupine and the Moles Fable, 50% favoured a rights orientation; 30% a response orientation.
Girls talk first, and then if talking fails, invoke rules. Boys invoke rules first, and then when presented with the notion that rules might not be the best solution, their choice centers on whether to invoke power, or whether to begin to talk and address specific needs.

And finally, Mary Brabeck, reviewing literature on sex differences in moral judgment, presents evidence that shows little significant sex differences occurring in manifestations of altruism and empathy—the attributes most commonly associated with caring behaviour. According to Brabeck, while the females of this society have a reputation for being helpful and caring, studies on children have shown girls to be only slightly more altruistic than boys, and studies of altruism in adults are confounded by the use of stereotypic measures. Males, for instance, are found to be more altruistic in responding to a situation where a woman's car has broken down (1993, 43-4). Studies on empathy also tend to reveal more similarities than differences. Males, it appears, are equally as capable of understanding the reactions and needs of others as are females. However, citing Hoffman's research on sex differences in empathy, Brabeck suggests there may be a distinction between "cognitive empathy" in which one has an awareness of another's feelings, and "affective empathy" in which one is able to feel the emotions being experienced by the other: "I feel what you feel" rather than "I know what you experience." Studies of affective empathy do produce significant sex differences, with girls obtaining higher "vicarious arousal scores" than boys (44). Otherwise, says Brabeck, studies which focus purely on perspective taking and ability to recognize affect in others, do not yield such consistent results.

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We are left with some overriding findings and a number of new questions. It would appear that evidence does exist for two different moral orientations, but that it is not as pervasive as Gilligan has suggested. When it is observed it is more likely to occur among adults (although Johnston provides evidence of differences in younger age groups); in parents more than in nonparents; and to be affected by other variables such as dilemma content (rights or response; relational or nonrelational), and context. Higher educational level seems to produce a Kohlbergian type of higher order moral reasoning for men, but the evidence on this is conflicting for women. Walker, for instance, says sex differences disappear when controlled for higher education, while Pratt and his colleagues say that if anything, differences become more manifest at higher education levels. Finally, in the one area so closely identified with women that we might expect a clear sex difference--altruism and empathy--it appears the verdict is mixed. However, even Brabeck, the author of this last challenge to Gilligan's thesis, admits there remains strong intuitive appeal that women are the more compassionate sex.

In the following study, I offer a simple empirical contribution to this debate. While the experiment itself cannot claim the same level of justice versus care discussion offered by the preceding studies, three elements of this study are worthy of attention: it addresses the very basic question of whether women are more caring in their moral reasoning than are men; it offers an opportunity to look for this orientation in a cross-cultural sample; and finally, it provides an opportunity to test for caring behaviour in the context of voting behaviour, complicated by the potential influence of public opinion.
Chapter 3: Voting with Care--The Study

In a democracy, when elections are fairly conducted, we assume that citizens vote not only because it is their right to do so, but also because they feel their vote may have some influence on an outcome about which they care. If this is so, then a choice between candidates becomes a moral choice, especially if those candidates represent two moral points of view. Carol Gilligan has suggested that when men and women make moral choices, they may base their judgments on different criteria: where men, motivated by individualistic values, may see the issue as one involving a conflict of rights solved through the application of a universal principle; women, motivated by a sense of connection to others, may see the situation as one of conflicting needs, best solved when no-one is harmed. But what happens when men and women enter the polling booth? Does a justice type of moral reasoning influence the way men vote? Do women vote for the candidate who will make the most caring decisions? And finally, in modern election campaigns, subject to relentless electoral polling, another variable enters the picture: the impact of public opinion on voting behaviour. In what way does knowing how others think--not just our immediate acquaintances but the entire electorate--influence the way we vote?

While there has been a resurgence of attention to the potential influence of public opinion polls on voting behaviour, it is not a new issue. In British Columbia, from 1939 until 1983, electoral polls were prohibited during election campaigns precisely because of this fear. George Gallup argues that the fear is unwarranted:

Polls do have an influence on the conduct of government and the planning of political campaigns for the obvious reason that no better way exists to gauge the opinions and preferences of voters. But this impact of polls on political decisions has little or nothing to do with the fear entertained by many that the publication of poll results leads an appreciable number of persons to switch sides in an election campaign... (1976, 33).
However this is a contention disputed by others like Jean Laponce who says, "... it would be unreasonable to assume that knowing how others intend to vote would have no influence on one's vote" (1983, 2). Certainly, as long as one pays some attention to media, it is difficult not to be aware of what others are thinking. If nothing else, where poll results might once have been included as part of election news, today poll results often are the news and form the headlines and lead stories in election coverage. According to Richard Johnston, daily tracking during the 1988 national election revealed that "polls penetrated deeply into the electorate." Looking specifically at attention to polls occurring prior to the leaders' debate in that election, 70% of respondents surveyed in the 1988 National Election Survey, who indicated a vote intention, had read or heard of a poll in the seven days prior to the debate (1992, 206).

But how do polls effect us? Do they make us want to vote like everybody else--a phenomenon known as bandwagoning? Do they change our vote from our preferred party to a strategic choice based on eliminating our least preferred choice? Or, do they make us want to vote for the lower rated candidate--a phenomenon known as underdogging. Perhaps they have no effect beyond providing an interesting indicator of immediate political sentiment. Gallup would argue the latter is the most accurate scenario, that beyond the possibility of using a poll for strategic voting, and he sees no problem with this, polls neither influence a person to bandwagon or to underdog. He cites a study undertaken by his own polling company which matched party preferences of respondents in a city where there were no published polls to

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14 According to then British Columbia Liberal Party President, Floyd Sully, the event that actually launched the Liberal Party's fortunes following the leaders' debate in the 1991 provincial election, was the front page publication of a positive poll result in the Vancouver Sun, three days after the debate (Oct. 11), with the headline titled, "Massive boost launches Liberals.". According to Sully "until then, the print media had been largely ignoring the Liberals, and what they had to say wasn't particularly positive. When that headline appeared, it made people sit up and take notice." (Comment made to author in Bancroft, W. "The Debate Effect and Liberal Fortunes in the 1991 B.C. Provincial Election." Unpublished essay (April 1992) 11.
party preferences of respondents in a city where polls were published in local papers. The study found the party preferences of those polled in the two cities to be almost identical (1976, 36). However, an extensive experimental study carried out by Ceci and Kain in 1982 revealed massive shifting in response to poll information.

During the Carter/Reagan presidential election campaign in the United States, Ceci and Kain used nine classes of undergraduate psychology students to test whether dominance information contained in electoral poll results would change candidate preference. Dividing the students into three test groups, conflicting electoral polling information was given to each of the three groups in the morning, and then to a proportion randomly selected across the three groups in the evening. In the morning, one group was told that the most recent polling results put Carter in the lead; one group was told that Reagan was in the lead; and the final group was given no polling information. Each group was then "polled" for their candidate preference. In the evening, polling confederates phoned the randomly selected group, and once again gave them conflicting poll results before soliciting their current candidate preference. Ceci and Kain found "dramatic, but opposite findings" (235). Rather than using the information strategically, or siding with the winner, these respondents tended to react against whoever was cited as being dominant in the P.M. condition. And, as the authors point out, while this might at first appear as an underdog effect, the movement away from dominance did not mean a simple switching to the least favoured candidate as the underdog effect would suggest. In many cases, the respondent's earlier stated preferred candidate would be the one he or she heard as being dominant in the evening, in which case, the respondent remained with their initial preference but scored them lower. Ceci and Kain call this behaviour an "oppositional reactivity hypothesis"—the dynamic which occurs in response to dominance information which motivates "movement away from whoever was currently being touted as dominant" (240).
There is also research which suggests that groups respond differently to poll information. A study by Navazio (1977)\(^{15}\) tested the impact of poll results by looking at opinion responses of a control group (not aware of poll results) and an experimental group (made aware of poll results). It was found that when poll results provided a strong negative evaluation of Richard Nixon, while there were no differences between the two groups in terms of tendencies to bandwagon or underdog, occupational attitudinal differences emerged. Blue-collar workers were more favourable to Nixon than blue-collar workers in the control group; and clerical and white-collar workers were less favourable to Nixon than those in the control group (Ceci & Kain 1982, 229-30). As Ceci and Kain say, "The opinion poll can play a role as a reference group in itself" (230). These authors, as well as Johnston, also suggest that both the level of party commitment and level of electoral political knowledge\(^{16}\) may make a difference to how much a person is affected by polling information. According to Johnston, for respondents in the 1988 National Election Survey, poll awareness had a direct impact not only on whether they expected the party to win or lose, but also "dramatically tilted the balance toward information that was both current and in the public domain and away from information that was inside the voter's head (207). There is also some suggestion that the politically uninvolved are more susceptible to "high-profile polls." In other words, the recording of a particularly dramatic popularity rating may receive undue weighting. Instead of placing the information within a campaign dynamic of change, those who are politically naive may fixate on this information. And if that information is


\(^{16}\) I make a distinction here based on a definition of politics that extends beyond that traditionally defined as concerning the formal political institutions of government, parties and elections. I prefer a broader definition of politics, such as that offered by Harold Lasswell which defines politics as "Who gets what, when, and how".
inaccurate, and not all polls are in fact accurate 19 times out of 20, that can have serious effects for democracy.\textsuperscript{17} Christopher Hitchens, writing in Harper's Magazine, is especially critical of polls, seeing influence not just as a by-product of published results, but as the insidious intent of pollsters intent on "shaping" public opinion, especially that proportion of the public unable to analyze the information critically. According to Hitchens, "Fluidity,' is what pollsters call the chaos and ignorance that they seek to influence" (1992, 50).

If we consider women to be a separate political culture, as Thelma McCormack has suggested, and as Gilligan's thesis would support, then we may expect women and men might respond differently to information presented in polls--theoretically, we should expect women to respond to this moral decision in a manner motivated by an ethic of care. The following study tests the hypothesis that if women and men respond differently to electoral polling information, that difference will be observed in voting choices that show that women are more caring than men.

**Design**

The study is an adapted replication of an earlier study by Laponce (1966). Theorizing that if citizens see an election as no more than a game, they will vote in a way that will prolong the game--by restoring equibalance in this particular political "system" through a vote for the lower rated candidate--the underdog--Laponce constructed a voting situation of "political near-vacuum" in which no information existed about the hypothetical candidates except their names, Smith and Jones. From this no information condition, Laponce was able to insert additional candidate criteria to produce a more "war-like" election environment--one where the outcome matters

\textsuperscript{17} In March and April of 1993, polls undertaken by four polling companies: Angus Reid, Gallup, Environics and ComQuest Research predicted three scenarios regarding the possible outcome of a future federal election. The Tories under the new leadership of Kim Campbell would 1) "sweep the next election" (predicted by Gallup), or 2) "win a sizable majority" (predicted by Angus Reid and ComQuest), or 3) "lose to the liberals" (predicted by Environics) (Beltrame 1993: A4).
more than the game—a situation that should see a tendency to vote more in line with preference rather than dominance.

Beginning with the basic scenario, Laponce carried out five different experiments involving approximately 1000 undergraduate psychology students. A variety of hypotheses were tested including: whether the introduction of an issue makes a difference to the voting decision; whether the size of the gap makes a difference in the tendency to rescue the underdog; whether in a three candidate contest, the middle candidate would benefit from a combination of bandwagon and underdog effects; whether stated party preference made a difference to the outcome; and finally, whether age makes a difference in the tendency to produce equibalance.

While each experiment produced its own thematic variant, all were based on the notion of a voting decision taken in response to the overall results of a previous voting decision. For example, in the first experiment, students were given a ballot on which only the candidate names Smith and Jones appeared, one on top of the other. Students were asked to name their preferred candidate, and then the ballots were collected, counted and a fake result was announced—that Smith had received 69% of the votes; Jones, 31%. With these first ballot results now in their head, students were asked to vote again, and again the ballots were collected and counted. All in all four ballots were taken. On the third ballot, identifying candidate features such as age, sex, religion and ethnicity were included; on the fourth, students responded to information revealing that the vote on the third ballot had produced a large gap of 89% to 11% between Smith and Jones.

Experiment number two dealt specifically with the question of whether the size of the popularity gap makes a difference in the tendency to choose the underdog, while the third experiment introduced the notion of a third candidate to see whether a
middle candidate might benefit from both bandwagoning and underdog effects. The final two experiments involved the introduction of party identification as an intervening variable, and of age, measured by testing two different age levels of school children.

Results showed that overall, an issue does reduce the gaming nature of the election (although the tendency reasserted itself after several ballots); that the larger the gap, the greater the tendency to equibalance; that when one candidate clearly dominates and one candidate is clearly nondominant in a political near-vacuum, the underdog is favored; that when party preference is activated, it does influence the outcome; and that younger children are more likely to bandwagon than older age groups. While Laponce attributes most movement to the underdog as a gaming attempt to equalize the system, the party preference experiment revealed a counter intuitive result. In this case, the third ballot in a three candidate competition provided subjects with candidate party identification as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Independent)</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Democrat)</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (Independent)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Votes for these three candidates were then cross tabulated with subjects' own party identification, indicated in a follow-up questionnaire. It was expected that Republican voters, now motivated to respond in a more "war-like" fashion, would bandwagon for strategic reasons--voting for A to ensure that B did not win. While the bandwagon effect was strongest in this condition, as Laponce says, the underdog votes "were far from eliminated." Of those who had voted for B on the second ballot, when party identification was unknown, 68% moved their votes to A on the third ballot.

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18 This did not prove to be the case. Testing three conditions: a near-equality; a near-equality of the top two candidates; and a situation of clear dominance and even spread, Laponce found votes were randomly distributed in response to the first two conditions, and in the last condition, while the underdog effect was activated, only the lowest rated candidate benefitted.
ballot, but 32% went to the underdog. Laponce refers to these underdog rescuers as "floating voters" "whose function in the political system is in some respects akin to that of the Red Cross on the battlefield" (991).

In the current experiment, the focus is also on voting behaviour in response to first ballot news, however in this case, the "first ballot" is actually the results of a published electoral poll. As well as the ballot design, this experiment also begins with a political near-vacuum condition and then introduces candidate criteria, but this time the intervening variable identifies the candidates by ideological position—a difference reflecting care versus justice orientations, rather than game versus war.

As Laponce's results indicate, the effect of polls is not systematic: "In some cultures, in some years, for some types of individuals, the bandwagon tendency will dominate, while in others, at other times, it will be the underdog effect" (1983, 2). If women and men respond differently to poll information, our intuitive expectation is that women will be more likely to vote for the underdog than will men, reacting like Florence Nightingales rescuing the injured candidate/soldier in the "political Red Cross." However, in Gilligan's moral construct, a caring orientation could be manifest either by "getting on the bandwagon" or by "rescuing the underdog."

According to Gilligan, an injunction not to hurt, motivated by a sense of connection to others, can be seen not only in helping behaviour but also in apparently conforming behaviour. Some women in her studies indicated a reluctance to take controversial stands that might cause offense to some; others a need to be part of a consensus, exhibiting a reluctance to go against the status quo (1982, 65-6). Indeed, earlier work in conformity suggests that this is a trait associated with women, and more with women than with men.19 If this is the case, then we might expect that women would also bandwagon more than men, and that if there is a sex difference in polling effect, this would be it. However, more recent studies in this area,

19 Several of these studies are cited in Pugh and Wahrman (1983).
particularly those taking place within a branch of investigation known as status characteristics theory, dispute the notion that conforming behaviour is a dispositional trait in women (Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Wagner, Ford and Ford 1986; Foschi 1992; Stewart and Moore Jr. 1992). While most research involving mixed-sex groups produces results in which females often defer to their male partner's choice, while males do not defer to females, research in this field has also produced results which indicate that conformity in women is not "dispositional," or innate, but rather "situational"—a product of a) their gendered status, b) the nature of the task and c) the materials used. For example, Stewart and Moore (1992), using same-sex dyads, tested levels of deference in relation to varying wage levels in three pay conditions: high, low, and no information. In the high pay condition, subjects were told that they would be paid "on the basis of information we have received from you." They then signed a "contract" on which they could see that they would be paid $5.20 for their participation in the task while their partner would be paid $2.50. In the low pay condition, the fee schedule was reversed, and in the no information condition, subjects were not given any particular amount but simply told they would be paid at the end of the session. Results indicated no significant differences between men and women in their degree of resistance in the different conditions, and the authors conclude that the findings "support the conclusion that women are not generally more deferent than men" and that the results are consistent with previous findings that

20 Status characteristics theory is concerned with the impact of status valued difference on performance expectations and task evaluations in task oriented groups. Most gender studies in this field employ a standardized laboratory experiment involving dyads, in which subjects are asked to make a number of either/or (binary) choices about information presented on slides (usually ambiguously grouped black and white squares)—a task that they tell subjects indicates spatial ability. While subjects work in pairs, they do not meet and cannot see each other. The only information they are aware of is that their "partner" is someone of the opposite sex.

Shown the slide pattern, for example the checkered pattern referred to above, subjects are asked to indicate whether there is a greater proportion of either white or black squares. After indicating their choice by pressing a button which lights up on a console in front of them, the subject is then notified five seconds later, by another lit console button, of her/his partner's choice. The subject can then change their initial choice to agree with their partner, or stay with their own original choice.
women's more deferent behaviour in mixed-sex dyads is activated "at least in part" by
gendered status differentials rather than any innate personality differences.

In the current experiment, subjects worked alone in completing the
questionnaire, and their responses were anonymous. And, while any survey is
subject to a certain amount of response bias and therefore it could be expected that
respondents might "go along" with majority opinion, thinking this to be the desired
response, the research just outlined would suggest that this behaviour should be no
more true of women than men, especially since all respondents were aware that the
researcher was a woman. Therefore this study considers the question, "Are women
more caring in their moral reasoning than are men?" through the tendency to rescue
the underdog.

Method

An experimental questionnaire was administered to undergraduate students in
two social psychology and two political science classes at the University of British
Columbia. 191 students participated, 76 were males and 113 were females. There
were no refusals, however two incomplete responses were eliminated.21 Students
were given no information about the purpose of the questionnaire before filling it out
other than it formed an important element in a master's thesis, and that their
participation was voluntary. All classes were told that they were welcome to ask any
questions as soon as all questionnaires were completed, and debriefings were held
with all classes in which the purpose of the questionnaire was explained in the
context of the central question for the thesis.

21 In a number of cases, respondents refused to answer question #1—the hypothetical condition. While these
cases were eliminated from any analysis involving that particular condition, their usefulness in evaluating
other dimensions of analysis precluded their ultimate rejection from the study.
In the questionnaire, students were asked to consider two voting situations referred to herein as condition 1 and condition 2. In condition 1, a situation of "political near-vacuum," respondents were asked to imagine this scenario:

You are about to make a voting choice between two candidates, let's call them X and Y, to whom you feel equally committed. As you stand in the polling booth pondering your choice, you remember that just before you left your home, you heard a radio news broadcast reporting the results of a public opinion poll in which X and Y were given the following popularity ratings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate X</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Y</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who will you vote for, X or Y? _________

After answering this question, students then moved on to Condition 2, in which information about the candidate's positions on appropriate social welfare policy was added:

Now let's try another scenario. You're once again in the polling booth about to make a choice between Candidate X and Candidate Y, and again, you're aware that the most recent poll results have given X the greatest share of the popular vote. However, this time you are aware that X and Y take significantly different stands on the following issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>(Believes the poor get too many handouts, and must learn to be more self-reliant. X suggests the government should endeavor to cut back on welfare costs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate X</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>(believes the government should do more to help the poor even if it means higher taxes.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Y</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who will you vote for, X or Y? _________
The gap size of 47:35 was chosen with the intention of having a large enough gap to activate an underdog response and yet not so large that it becomes pure gaming. A pre-test of the questionnaire had shown this gap to be effective.22

The first, hypothetical, condition of political near-vacuum was chosen with the intent of activating a care response based only on considerations of dominance and subordination. As Johnston says, "the less access a voter has to external information, the more he or she resorts to introspection" (1992, 204). With no other information to go on except the candidates' standings in popular opinion, the person in the polling booth is forced to vote on internally generated reasons that may or may not be in response to others' opinions. The expectation here is that the internally generated response for women will be to rescue the underdog; for men, the more achievement oriented response of siding with a winner. The questionnaire included opportunities for respondents to provide open-ended "spontaneous" reasons for their choice of X or Y in Condition 1, and to express any frustration they may have felt with being forced to make a choice in such a hypothetical situation.

While the venue of the polling booth remains in the second condition, this time Candidate X and Candidate Y represent ideologically different positions: Candidate X prioritizes self-reliance; Candidate Y prioritizes helping the poor even at the cost of personal sacrifice. While the first condition is purely hypothetical—in real life, no one would ever be asked to vote in the absence of any attendant information about the candidates—this is not case in Condition 2. Gilligan has argued that only real-life dilemmas activate a care response, that women are very frustrated by the absence of information in hypothetical dilemmas (1982, 69). Condition 2 presents a

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22 Two gaps had actually been tested: 47:42 and 47:35. The smaller gap tended not to produce more than random choices. The pre-test also resulted in a rewording of the conditions to reflect greater clarity.
real-life dilemma many of these subjects had faced before and, as they were all old enough to vote, were likely about to face again in an upcoming federal election.\textsuperscript{23}

Condition 2 lends itself to an application of Lyon's coding scheme. Candidate X values self-reliance—a principled position based on individual effort. Candidate Y advocates altruism and self-sacrifice in a program of social welfare geared to the community. Therefore, in condition 2, those choosing Candidate X will be seen as manifesting a justice orientation; those choosing Candidate Y will be seen as manifesting a care orientation.

Beyond the questions directly related to the two conditions specified were several soliciting demographic information such as age, sex, parent's ethnic identity and personal ethnic identity. Students were also asked to state their academic major, their party preference, and a short scale of questions measuring levels of political efficacy, defined by Kornberg and Clarke (1992) as "a citizen's belief that he or she can influence the political process" (93)\textsuperscript{24} (see APPENDIX C for complete questionnaire). All open-ended questions were "blind coded"—in other words, care was taken to ensure that no demographic characteristics of the respondent, such as sex or ethnic identity, were known when coding spontaneous responses.

The questions on ethnic identity were included with an awareness that UBC has an ethnically diverse population and that this was a variable that should be considered in order not to make cross-cultural assumptions. As it turned out, a large proportion of the students taking part in the survey were Chinese, a fact that provided an opportunity to test the hypothesis in two population groups: an overall, ethnically

\textsuperscript{23} The experimental survey was conducted in August, 1993. A Canadian federal election was held the following October.

\textsuperscript{24} A post-manipulation question was also included in which respondents were asked if they could identify the information being sought in the questionnaire. While the majority of responses made reference to the possible influence of polling, and a number suggested that it had something to do with the factors affecting voting decisions, not one student correctly surmised that the variables of interest would be sex and moral reasoning.
mixed population; and a sample which compared those who identified as European with those who identified as Chinese.

Total Sample Findings

Condition 1: Political Near-Vacuum

An overall frequency distribution of responses to the question for condition 1 revealed that of the 189 respondents, 63% voted for X, 28% voted for Y, and 9% refused to answer the question. After assigning refusals as missing values, the vote for X or Y was cross tabulated with sex. These results, along with the overall recoded distribution, appear in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Vote for X or Y in condition 1, by sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>% Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2=5.30 \ p=.02 \]

In condition 1, over 76% of the females voted for X, the top-rated candidate, compared to just over 58% of the male respondents who did so, an actual difference of 18%. In contrast, almost 42% of the males voted for Y, the underdog, compared to just under 24% of the females. While the results of the crosstabulation are significant at \( p=.02 \), the trend is in the opposite direction to that which is expected. In this political near-vacuum condition, it would appear that while both males and females are more likely to bandwagon than to underdog, men are proportionately more likely to vote for the underdog than are women.
Voting with Care

Since the purpose of the experiment was to gain an insight into potential sex differences in motivational forces influencing voting behaviour, the questionnaire afforded subjects an opportunity to state their reasons for voting for either X or Y in this condition. An analysis of the open-ended responses to this question allows us gain an insight into why this apparent anomaly exists.

When asked why they voted for X, those who did so (63% of the total sample) provided answers that fell into two clear categories: "conforming" if the subject voted for X because he or she deferred to majority opinion, and "achievement oriented" if the subject voted for X because they thought X would be a winner. Typical comments in the "conforming" category were "If most people were voting for the candidate, then he must be doing something right," "If I like both candidates equally, I would then vote for the more popular one," "Since both candidates were equally committed and the majority or more people prefer Candidate X, Candidate X seemed to be more reliable." Typical comments in the "achievement oriented" category were "He was leading and I wanted to be associated with a winning candidate since I knew no other facts about them," and "If I voted for Y, X would still be more popular, but not necessarily win. If vote for X, X may have greater chance to win." Together these two categories accounted for 107 of the 120 respondents voting for X, 89% of the total. Seven respondents refused to answer (6%) and the remainder of the comments (5%) suggested no clear coding, typified by comments like "It was a random choice," and "I liked the higher number." These were coded as "other." After assigning refusals and "other" as missing values, "Why vote for X" measured by "conforming" and "achievement oriented" were cross tabulated with sex.
Voting with Care

Table 2: Condition 1--Why Vote for X, by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>% Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforming</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement Oriented</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ²=4.38  p=.04

From the table, it would appear that while a vote for X, the top-rated candidate, is motivated by conforming behaviour in both males and females, this tendency is most clearly demonstrated by females, a difference that is significant at .04.

Returning to Table 1, 53 respondents voted for Y in condition 1 (28% of the total sample). As expected, the most common reason indicated for voting for Y was support or identification with the underdog, typified by such comments as "Help the underdog," "Always go for the underdog," and "Because I feel sorry for the guy." (25 out of 53, or 47%). All other responses were categorized as "other." Reasons in the "other" category tended to fall into two camps: 1) those who chose Y because of a wish to be nonconforming (9 of 53, or 17%), typified by comments like,"I believe others are ignorant about real information and that a majority of people would vote without knowing really what they are voting for," and 2) those motivated by gaming (11 out of 53, or 21%). Typical of the latter group are comments like "To even the odds," or "To make the race more interesting." The remainder of the "other" category consists of a number of unrelated comments that did not fall easily into the other assignments (9 out of 53, or 17%). These responses included comments like, "I don't
believe in being surveyed by public opinion polls. After assigning those who refused to answer (3 out of 53, or 6%) as missing values, "Why vote for Y," measured by "rescue underdog" and "other" was cross tabulated with sex, with the results as follows.

Table 3: Condition 1— Why vote for Y, by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Male (27)</th>
<th>% Female (25)</th>
<th>% Total Sample (52)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Underdog</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the information in the table illustrates, in a political near-vacuum condition, of those who vote for the underdog, the driving motivation for both males and females appears to be a need to "rescue."26

Condition 2: Social Welfare Issue Position Added

However, what happens when candidates become identified with an issue position, particularly when the position deals with social welfare, a concern associated with the ethic of care. If the lower-rated candidate takes a position that reflects an attitude of responsibility and connection to the community, will we now see a clear movement of women toward the underdog? And, will we find more underdog supporters among women than among men? Table 4 below provides

---

25 The decision to keep these "odd" comments in the sample, and to group nonconforming and gaming comments together in the "other" category was made primarily on the basis of providing a large enough sample for statistically reliable results. Also, the category of interest here is the "rescue" category.

26 And, since 6 of the 11 respondents who underdogged to keep the game going were women, it also appears that women are just as motivated by gaming as men.
results of the vote for X or Y in condition 2, cross tabulated by sex (refusals in condition 1 assigned as missing values).

Table 4: Vote for X or Y in Condition 2, by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Male (76)</th>
<th>% Female (110)</th>
<th>% Total Sample (186)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p=ns

While X remains the favored candidate by both men and women in condition 2, there has been a clear movement toward Y by women. In contrast, men have tended to move away from Y in this condition and toward X, the top-rated candidate, producing a pattern where slightly more women now favour Y, the underdog, than do men, although the difference is not statistically significant. Using Lyon's coding scheme, we would say that when given a clear choice between policies reflecting justice and care positions, 36.4% of the women in this sample have responded with a care orientation in their voting decision, compared to 32.9% of men. However overall, both men and women favour a justice orientation. The following chart provides a diagram which allows us to see the actual pattern of vote switching.
Figure 2: The Movement of Votes from Condition 1 to Condition 2, by Sex

Looking at the chart we see that while the same trend is manifested by male and female Y supporters in condition 1—with just slightly more male Y supporters staying with Y in condition 2—an opposite movement is manifested by condition 1 male and female X supporters. Here we see that male X supporters in condition 1, the "no information" condition, become much more strongly attracted to candidate X in condition 2, when X's welfare policy position is known. In contrast, female X supporters in condition 1 become much less attracted to X when they become aware of X's policy position.

Cross-Cultural Findings

Two open-ended questions in the survey dealt with ethnic identity. In one question respondents were asked with what ethnic group their family identified, while the other question asked with which ethnic group they personally identified. In the second question respondents either repeated their family identity or offered their own
as "Canadian" or hyphenated their family identity with "Canadian."27 Reasoning that there may be a qualitative difference in cultural values between those Chinese who self identify as Canadian or Chinese-Canadian--suggesting a possible internalization of western values--and those who see not only their family's but their own personal identity as Chinese, the Chinese sample was formed by choosing only the latter respondents. Those Chinese who had cited their own ethnic identity as Canadian, or Chinese-Canadian, were eliminated from the sample. However, in the belief that there might not be quite such a difference between overseas European values and Canadian European values, and because otherwise the sample might have been too small to be usable, the "European" sample was formed from those who indicated either "British" or another European country as their family ethnic identity.28 No attempt was made to ensure that their personal ethnic identity was identical to their parents. While the European and Chinese male and female sample sizes do not allow for subsample comparisons, we are at least able to see how these ethnic sex groupings compare to each other and to the larger sample in their overall reaction to the two conditions in the experiment.

**Condition 1: Political Near-Vacuum (Cross-Cultural)**

Again, assigning refusals in condition 1 as missing values, the European and Chinese groups were each cross tabulated with the vote for X or Y. Two interesting patterns emerge here. While in both European and Chinese populations, the male-female pattern follows the overall pattern established by the larger sample, the differences between males and females is larger in the Chinese sample than in the European sample.

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27 Besides the ethnic groups identified in this experiment, a variety of other ethnic identities were cited including: Japanese, Iranian, Korean, Malaysian Chinese, African, Indian, Japanese, and Jamaican.

28 These included those who cited their family ethnic identity as: Polish-British, Irish, German, and Austrian. Those who simply stated their family identity as Canadian were not included.
Table 5: Vote for X or Y in Condition 1 - Cross Cultural Comparison, by Sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Male (16)</td>
<td>% Female (21)</td>
<td>% Male (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p=ns x²=3.83 p=.05

In the Chinese sample there is a 22.4% difference between men and women in support for the candidates in condition 1, a difference that is significant at .05. However, in the European sample this difference narrows to 10.4% and produces no statistical significance (although significance is likely affected by the small sample size). Again, it would appear that while the bandwagon effect is strongest in both European and Chinese populations, it is more evident with women than with men and this is especially so in the Chinese population. Next, we look at the voting choices of these two sample populations when the candidates more clearly reflect justice and care policy positions.

Condition 2: Social Welfare Policy Position Added (Cross-Cultural)

Table 6: Voting for X or Y in Condition 2 - Cross Cultural Comparison, by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Male (17)</td>
<td>% Female (20)</td>
<td>% Male (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p=ns p=ns
Here we see that the sex differences observed in condition 1 have been virtually eliminated in both European and Chinese sample groups, with the levelling out being created primarily by the movement of women toward Y. This is the same pattern observed in the large sample, except that there is less movement away from Y in the European male sample. The most striking cross-cultural difference observed occurs in the differing male-female gap sizes.

Summary of Results

Overall, the bandwagon effect dominates in condition 1 and condition 2 for the entire sample, and for both cross-cultural subsamples.29 While this effect holds true for both males and females, it is more dominant for females, especially in condition 1. In condition 1, over three-quarters of the females voted for X compared to less than 60% of the males. However, the introduction of the candidates' social welfare positions in condition 2 produces differential movements for males and females. In the large sample, proportionately more males voted for X, the "justice candidate" in condition 2 than did in condition 1, while proportionately more females voted for Y, the "care candidate" than did in condition 1. When the context moved from a contentless, hypothetical situation to a real-life moral dilemma with a choice between justice and care perspectives, women moved to the care perspective. However, while large and significant sex differences occurred in the political near-vacuum condition, in a direction opposite to that expected, in the care versus justice dilemma of condition 2, sex differences virtually disappeared, a finding that held true across both European and Chinese subsamples. It would appear that in a voting

29 The fact that most respondents believed that the experiment was testing polling influence did not seem to deter this tendency, although some went to great pains to rationalize their decision as the following comment indicates: "Candidates were equal except for popularity, therefore there must have been something about the more popular candidate to make him more popular, such as style or charisma or a certain stand on an issue that would influence my vote"
context, subject to the possible influence of public opinion, there is not support for the hypothesis that women are more caring than men.

Discussion

Two major questions emerge from these results: 1) when the voting situation is one where no information is known about the candidates other than majority opinion, why are women more conforming than men; and 2) why are there no significant sex differences when the voting situation changes to present a choice between a justice and care orientation? The first question leads us into an area that touches on the broader issue of women and politics, so we will save that discussion for last. However, the latter question has direct relevance for the empirical debate on moral difference.

The lack of sex difference observed in the care/justice condition in this experiment is consistent with many other studies in this area—both those which have directly addressed Gilligan's argument of moral difference, and those which have looked at the impact of public opinion polling. Laponce's 1966 study did not find sex differences either.30

It may be that sex differences did exist in the current study but went undetected because the condition did not provide salient justice and care perspectives. Greeno and Macoby have suggested that while there is no clear evidence supporting the argument that women are more altruistic in behaviour than men, this may be because tests have not employed situations which activate this kind of behaviour in women, that it may more likely be manifest in behaviour toward

30 The only condition in Laponce's study which produced any significant difference between males and females occurred when information on the candidate's sex was introduced. In that case, while only 9% of the males transferred to the lower rated candidate, who was identified as a woman, 20% of the females transferred to this candidate. However, Laponce adds that 42% of the female subjects also left the woman candidate upon learning her sex which he offers as confirming proof of the saying that "women have, as candidates, a limited appeal to their own sex" (1966, 992).
friends and intimates, not strangers (1993). However, this contention would be disputed by survey research which shows women more supportive of social welfare initiatives than men (Kopinak 1987; Carroll 1988; Miller 1988) which, while not conclusive proof, certainly suggests that women extend care beyond immediate horizons. Among the latter group of researchers, Susan Carroll has suggested that a gender gap on this issue may reflect not only nurturing sentiments on the part of women, but also socio-economic vulnerability. In this argument, those who would respond most to policies advocating greater distribution would be those who can identify with the need for these policies and who would most benefit by them. So, not only because they are motivated to care for others, but because 65% of all welfare recipients are women (Kemp 1985, 143) it would be expected that women, more than men, would support more generous welfare policies. However, the subjects in this experiment were university students and it can be assumed that they feel little socio-economic identification with welfare recipients. It might be that peace and environmental concerns would have been more accessible issues.

Diana Baumrind has argued that educational level does not merely assess academic skills or knowledge of subject matter, but is also "the best single index of social niche, indicating at its higher levels acculturation into the dominant values of the intelligentsia in Western society" (1993, 188). This would suggest that not only may a response to the poor lack salience for these women through lack of class identification, but also that women at this educational level and age may reflect status quo thinking more than their own.31 Belenky and her colleagues (1986) describe women at this level as "procedural thinkers." Having learned the intellectual rights and wrongs—the frameworks for analysis—they have yet to pass to a stage where their own ideas and intuitions become merely informed by known knowledge, not driven by it. While the scope of any study is limited by the sample base used, David Sears

31 Over 88% of the population was 25 and under.
(1988) has expressed strong reservations about the ecological validity of results obtained from experiments using college and university students, a population he believes are in no way representative of the more general population. Not only are their own opinions still unformed, relying on the reference group for authority, but they are also more oriented to self than to others, and are dominated by cognitive rather than affective processes. In the current study, it is possible that all three factors might militate against a pure care response: the women may not have reached a stage where their care encompassed others, they may not yet have formulated their own value priorities, and in a setting that emphasizes cognition over affection, humanitarian concerns may not have the salience for this group that they might for some. Both the findings and the limitations of this study suggest that further research of this sort would benefit from using a broader cross-section of the population, and testing for more variables.

While Laponce found no sex differences, he did find that, except in the experiments involving an issue and where children were tested, the underdog effect was much stronger than the bandwagon effect. In the current experiment, it is the bandwagon effect which predominates for both males and females, and especially for the females in condition 1. In the face of the larger societal opinion, subjects in this experiment have generally moved toward that opinion, not away from it. Because there was no control group, in which voting decisions would have occurred in the absence of knowledge of public opinion, we cannot say for sure that the bandwagon effect seen here is purely a result of the influence of published poll results. But certainly, since the main difference between this and the Laponce study is that in his study, subjects are reacting to their classmate's opinion and in this study subjects are

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32 Sears carried out a content analysis of articles published during 1980 in the three major journals of sociopsychological research, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. According to Sears' analysis, 75% of the articles in these journals relied solely on undergraduate subjects (1988, 315).
reacting to majority opinion generated by the greater society, it would appear that this kind of polling information has a stronger bandwagon effect. It may also be, as Ceci and Kain have suggested, that in an experimental situation, "poll reports may take on a greater salience and influence than they do in a natural context" (1982, 241). If this is the case in the current experiment, this may have exaggerated the actual bandwagon effect, but would not account for the difference between males and females in this regard. We are left with the question, are males more caring or are females more conforming?

It would appear from the findings in condition 1, that not only do males have a stronger tendency to support the underdog than females, but that when Y supporters cited their reasons for choosing this candidate, both sexes were primarily and equally motivated by a desire to rescue the underdog. It may well be that in a hypothetical voting situation, males respond to the underdog with more care than females, but there may also be a weakness in the coding interpretation for this variable. A number of the responses which simply said "I tend to vote for the underdog" might have been more properly coded as gaming or nonconformity rather than as rescuing. In that case, more of those responses might have been cited by males than females. It may also be that while my own sex might not have activated deference in female subjects, it might have prompted greater nonconformity in male subjects. In other words, males in the study might have chosen Y to show me, a woman, that they were not going to abide by my expectations, in a way that they might not have done had the researcher been male. Finally, support for the contention that, in condition 1, males were not as motivated to vote for Y out of care as the data would suggest is provided by the movement of males away from Y in condition 2 (see Figure 1).

And what of the differences observed between the Chinese men and women, and the European men and women. Why was the gap between European men and women so much less than the gap observed between Chinese men and women? A
possible answer is suggested by Williams and Best's (1990) cross-cultural examination of sex differences in fourteen countries. These authors found that "in countries where the women are relatively 'liberated,' the affective meaning differences in the self-perceptions and ideal self-perceptions of men and women were less [i.e. women and men perceived themselves in a more similar fashion]" (163). While we really have no idea whether the Chinese women in our sample are less 'liberated' than the European women, if they are, this may account for some of the larger gap size in the Chinese subsample. Another factor may have to do with relative differences in self-esteem. For instance, where no great sex differences in self-esteem were found in the authors' American sample, large differences were found between Japanese males and females, with Japanese males exhibiting much higher self-esteem than Japanese females (110-11).33 However, as Williams and Best caution, one must be very careful in interpreting cross-cultural differences, as observed differences may be merely the product of methodological flaws. For instance, in the present study, the European and Chinese codings are based solely on responses to a question on ethnic identity and therefore cannot be taken as indicative of held cultural values.

And finally, there is the question of the greater conformity exhibited by females in condition 1. Anticipating that condition 1 might not activate a moral consideration among female subjects because of its highly hypothetical nature, two questions in the experimental survey were designed to address this eventuality. First, those subjects who experienced frustration with the condition were asked to cite the nature of their frustration. A second question asked them to rate the level of their frustration on a Likert scale from one to five. We would expect that females would be more likely than males to cite lack of contextual information as the source of

33 The greater support for X by Chinese students in both conditions is intriguing but beyond the scope of this study to investigate. However, for further reading on this topic, I would suggest H.K. Ma's "The Chinese Perspectives on Moral Judgment Development" in the International Journal of Psychology 23 (1988) 201-227.
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frustration, and to express higher levels of frustration than males. However, contrary to expectations, results showed that of those indicating frustration with this condition (29%), not only was the hypothetical nature of the situation cited equally by men and women, but of this group, men were far more frustrated by the lack of information than were women! It would appear that it is not the hypothetical nature of the situation that is driving the higher conformity levels in women.

If we accept the evidence that women are no more dispositionally deferential than men, then perhaps this apparent conforming behaviour may reflect not consensus arising out of deference to majority opinion, but a greater sense of connection to the community. In which case, more women vote for X in condition 1 because, having nothing else to go on except what the majority of people in society think, they respond to the message of this great "other" by agreeing with their choice. However, this logic is disputed by the results of condition 2 in which proportionately less women abide by public opinion than men. If community connection is driving a bandwagon response, why are women not bandwagoning in larger proportions than men in condition 2?

I would argue that the conformity observed in condition 1 is, indeed, deference and not the product of connection, and I would argue further that the reason we see it more in condition 1 than condition 2 is because there is no issue to mitigate the impact of the abstract notion of politics. Let me be clear. Attributing this manifestation of conformity to deference in no way implies that deference is an innate behavioural trait for women, rather this draws upon research suggested earlier that when women exhibit more deferential behaviour than men, it is the result of situational factors such as a gendered status differential or the nature of the task at

34 Having coded the 1-5 Likert rating into those who indicated lower ratings (1 - 3) and those who indicated higher ratings (3 - 5), this variable was then crosstabulated with sex. Of the 55 respondents falling in this group, 63.6% of the males fell into the higher category, while 60.6% of the women fell into the lower level category. The results were not significant (p=.14) but this may be a factor of sample size.
hand. In this case, both factors are operant. Women are being asked to vote—a political act—and they are being asked to do so in an information vacuum. All they know is what others have decided. And, when women think of others in a political context, those "others" are men.

Since Aristotle first established public and private spheres of influence, and put men in charge of both, decreeing that "as between male and female the former is by nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject" (325-323 B.C, 68), there has been a virtual exclusion of women from the world of formal politics. When Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke proposed their social contracts, they were contracts that could not include women because women were not considered citizens. Both Hobbes and Locke declared that family interests would be adequately represented by the husband.35 Even Rousseau, who valued compassion and decried social and political inequality, saw no contradiction when he declared that "the man should be strong and active; the woman should be weak and passive; the one must have both the power and the will; it is enough that the other should offer little resistance" (Rousseau 1762, 322).

In Canada, women became federally enfranchised in 1918. In 1921, there was one woman, Agnes MacPhail, in the House of Commons; in 1929, women became legally considered as "persons." Even with these "dramatic" advances, politics remained a man's world as witnessed by the images portrayed in the 1972 movie, The Candidate, starring Robert Redford as a street front activist who becomes lured into running for political office. In this movie—a dramatic portrayal of backroom politics—women appear only as wives, secretaries and as political 'groupies'. All candidates and all main political players are male.

35 As Brodie points out (1991, 12-13), the franchise was limited to male property owners. While this also left a good proportion of men disenfranchised, it eliminated women. Theorists reasoned that by virtue of their biologically determined attributes and roles, women were unsuited for public life and therefore should not be citizens. Not only were women the major theorists of classical liberalism,
In the year that The Candidate was released, only 2% of the seats in the House of Commons were occupied by women. Since this time, there has been some improvement. In 1984, the percentage of women in the House of Commons jumped to 9.6%; in 1988 to 13.9% and in the 1993 federal election, the proportion of women in the House soared to 17.9%, with 14% of the new Liberal government cabinet positions given to women. While the increases do speak of dramatic improvement, the continued underrepresentation of women has prompted Janine Brodie to say that "Women remain governed rather than governors, legislated rather than legislators" (1991, 9). And, although it would appear that Canadians find the inclusion of women in political elites to be an increasingly palatable notion, we have a way to go before the word "politician" conjures up images of women and men with equal frequency. Finally, should there be any doubt that certain assumptions about the sex-linked nature of this arena persist, I offer the evidence of the spontaneous comments presented by the students in this study. Any reference to Candidate X or Candidate Y that identified the candidate by sex, assumed that sex was male.

People are generally more susceptible to social influence when they are uncertain about how to behave; if women are more deferential in a political venue, it is because it is a venue where they do not yet feel they can claim ownership. And, just as the women in Crown and Heatherington's competitive sports venue felt less secure about acting on their own intuitive reasoning in that "masculine" venue, so do most women feel the same lack of security in pressing their views in a political venue, where a "caring" orientation is not necessarily considered appropriate. As Pugh and Wahrman state, "Women are socialized to defer to the judgment of men in certain kinds of situations" (1983, 748). The political world is one of those situations.

Examples of this deference to the assumed greater political knowledge of "others" are included in the reasons given by a number of women for voting for X.
One woman said, "At my age and limited knowledge of politics and the factors or issues for which we choose a politician it has been so far easy or safe to go with the majority." Another offered this reason for choosing X: "... having less knowledge about politics, I guess the 'majority knows'."

When people have a low sense of political self-worth they are said to possess low levels of political efficacy. In this experiment, four questions measured political efficacy: two measured external efficacy; two measured internal efficacy. While internal efficacy may be defined as the belief that one has the personal capacity to influence political decisions, external efficacy refers to the person's belief that the political system itself will be responsive to their needs. A crosstabulation of subject's sex with their responses to the efficacy measures appears below.

Figure 3: Men, Women and Political Efficacy

\[\text{Figure 3: Men, Women and Political Efficacy} \]

\[\text{n=188} \quad (p=\text{ns for internal efficacy}; \ p=.05 \text{ for external efficacy}) \]

36 As the highest conformity ratings came from Chinese women, it may be that this group feels especially unempowered in this system.
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(Internal efficacy was measured by the questions: "Sometimes, politics and government in Ottawa seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" and "People like me don't have any say about what the federal government does." The external efficacy questions were: "Generally, those elected to parliament in Ottawa soon lose touch with the people" and "I don't think that the federal government cares much what people like me think." The response categories were strongly agree, somewhat agree, don't know, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree. The internal efficacy questions and external efficacy questions were regrouped into new variables and recoded to reflect the categories agree, disagree, and both/don't know.)

These results are consistent with similar analyses of political efficacy undertaken since 1965 (Black and McGlen 1979; Kay et al. 1988; Brodie 1991). In all studies, while both males and females exhibit high levels of distrust toward political actors and the political system, women have less confidence in their sense of political self-worth than do men. For some reason women, even highly educated women, do not have as strong a sense of connection to the political system as men. While the evidence of this study does not offer proof that men and women live in different political cultures, the scope is after all limited to undergraduate university students attending the University of British Columbia. We cannot rule out the possibility that Gilligan may be right about moral orientations, and that the exclusion of women's moral perspective from the formal arena of politics remains a barrier to women's political knowledge, interest and efficacy. In the next chapter, we discuss the implications of this continued exclusion, not only for women's political behaviour but for society as a whole.)
Chapter 4: Adding Care to the Moral Discourse—Implications for Women and Society

There is nothing, of course, in the form of liberal democratic theory that calls for an exclusion of women's political voice. Quite the contrary. It was expected that once women had the franchise and began to vote in the same numbers as men, they would also become proportionately represented, and sex-linked barriers to involvement would disappear. That this has not occurred has been a source of consternation and inquiry for those who study women's political behaviour. Of special concern has been women's continued lag in terms of political interest, knowledge and efficacy.

Various factors, structural and cultural, are often cited as contributing to this situation. For instance, those who focus on the impact of labour force participation cite the fact that most working women are grouped in low-paying and non-unionized "pink-collar"ghettos\textsuperscript{34} which offer few opportunities to gain political knowledge (Black and McGlen 1979; Burt 1986); others that women who work must also perform the dual role of wage work and home work (Vickers and Brodie 1982). Those who focus on cultural impediments emphasize the impact of socializing messages which distance women from seeing their place in the formal world of politics (Vickers and Brodie 1982; Lovenduski and Hills 1981; Vicky Randall 1987). However, a recurring theme underlays much of this discourse—that the arena of government, parties, politicians, and bureaucratic policy has little salience for most women.

Gilligan's theory suggests that the arena may have little salience because it does not reflect the behaviour or values that represent women's moral perspective.

\textsuperscript{34} This description refers to an occupational segregation that sees 77\% of working women grouped into five occupational groups: clerical, service, sales, medicine and health, and teaching. (1985 Statistics Canada information, cited in S.J. Wilson, "Gender Inequality", in Understanding Canadian Society (Canada: McGraw-Hill, 1988) 537.)
Rather than emphasizing cooperation, politics is highly competitive. Rather than responding to need, politicians respond to power. And, rather than recognizing the concerns that women have as important, the political world as we know it designates these concerns as less important, as the 'soft' issues. As Martha Ackelsberg has written "If what matters most to me is considered not to be appropriate to 'politics,' I will tend not to participate in [electoral] political activity (1988, 289). And, of course, if I can find little connection between my so-called "private" interests and the "public" world of politics, I will have "little incentive to acquire political information, develop a continuing interest in politics and public affairs" or to "try to influence either the content or implementation of public policy in the interim between elections" (Kornberg and Clarke 1992, 26).

Liberal theory is presented as being gender neutral, but as Frazer and her colleagues argue, it presents an ideal which is more representative of men:

It is typical of male life-histories that one makes, or anyway dreams of making, one's way in the world in accordance with one's own choice of career; that one develops an autonomous capacity for business and politics; that one founds one's own dynasty, however humble and suburban; that one regards the outlay of money and work as an investment on which a return is to be expected (1992, 4).

These authors point out that while these ambitions and values can also be present in women's lives, they are not typical, they are "not the stuff on which a 'normal' ... woman draws in constructing a sense of her own identity" (ibid). For instance, Ackelsberg argues that women are alienated by liberal democratic values that emphasize individuality instead of community, an outlook that misses the reality of the concerns that occupy most women, working or domestic, on a daily basis:

Women in industrial societies bear primary responsibility for the nurturance of both children and adult males within their households. But that responsibility means that women must be active in the urban arena considerably beyond the boundaries of the so-called domestic
sphere. They are the ones who negotiate with landlords, markets, welfare officers, health-care providers, and the like. They are the ones who must make the adjustment when wages, prices, or rents fluctuate (1988, 302).

As Ackelsberg argues, contrary to liberal notions of community, premised on the combined voice of individuals, women often enter the public arena as members of social networks. For many women, the political "problem" is not one of linking self to the greater community, it is finding a way "to link the concerns, visions, and perspectives they share with their neighbors and coworkers to the 'political system' that stands apart from them and seems to control their lives" (302-3). Denying the political validity of their concerns denies the political nature of their acts and, for many women, acting on behalf of this "private sphere" requires very political acts: from the Filipino women who have become part of the armed resistance of that country, to the "eco-feminists" who led this past summer's environmental protests on Vancouver Island (Bell, B1) to the women in the End Legislated Poverty coalition who protested as part of the Solidarity Movement in 1983. While a common thread in these protests may be community connection, they are further linked by the fact that they all take place outside of the formal political arena. If Gilligan is right, this will remain the venue for women's political involvement until the present system acknowledges the worth of this other political culture--an acknowledgment that must go beyond mere quantitative representation to a blurring of the distinction between private and public.

While we are seeing more women represented in Ottawa, the political agenda remains focused on traditional areas and approached in traditional ways. Many women who suggested a caring ethic before gaining office seem to lose sight of this once in office, where they become caught up in the world of competitive politics (Gray 1991). In 1985, Penny Kome wrote "In the political context of the 1980s, feminism's main impact may be that there's more room for individual women to
succeed in the corporate and political worlds, as long as they conform to the current standards of those worlds" (1985, 192). If we recall the evidence from Crown and Heatherington's study of affiliation versus achievement orientations in a competitive sports setting, this behaviour is not surprising. In this arena, traditionally associated with men and competition, women accepted competition as normal and right--an acceptance that became easier with experience. In politics, while many players may seek an ideal of cooperation, confrontation and competition remain the norm, and women, like their male counterparts, feel they must act in the appropriate competitive manner. Many also feel that to "play the game" they must demonstrate an emphasis on the "hard" issues in order to maintain power; that the important thing now, as former Tory adviser, Jocelyne Cote-O'Hara said in 1989, is "to have a seat at the table of the mighty" (Gray 1989). However, if the concerns that reflect a care orientation are considered superfluous to the "real" issues, as defined by those sitting at the table, substantive change is unlikely--a reality graphically illustrated in the following comment by Liberal MP (and current Deputy Prime Minister), Sheila Copps:

Picture, if you can, the traditional caucus meeting. There we would be, 33 men and me, seated at a long, oblong table, arguing the issues of the day. Little wonder that tile drainage problems got much higher priority on our agenda than daycare or family violence (Copps 1986, 28).

Some suggest that change will come when women represent a critical mass in parliament, and in caucus. However, it is unlikely that numbers alone will make the difference, nor will simple assertions that women's voice should be included. A case must be made that the political discourse will be improved by the inclusion of a moral orientation which emphasizes responsibility and connection to others, and which demands a contextual rather than an abstract understanding of the moral
dilemma. Three such arguments come to mind. The first has to do with the notion of community implicit in a morality of care.

Gilligan argues that the women in her studies present an overarching notion of the collective community. As one woman put it:

By yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the sound of one hand clapping, the sound of one man or one woman, there is something lacking. It is the collective that is important to me, and that collective is based on certain guiding principles, one of which is that everybody belongs to it and that you all come from it (1982, 160).

Gilligan says that although the world described by men also includes relationships and attachments, "no particular person or relationship is mentioned, nor is the activity of relationship portrayed in the context of self-description" (160-1). Males think of empowerment as individuals, and when autonomy is defined as individual autonomy, and individual achievement is presented as an ideal, concern with relationships weakens.

While not employing the same conceptual framework as Gilligan, Ralph Dahrendorf (1979) also describes the modern liberal society as one which has emphasized individual opportunity at the sacrifice of connection. Dahrendorf talks about the tension between options and ligatures, and argues that in the liberal quest for expanding options, modern society has lost many of the ligatures, or bonds, that formerly provided guidance and gave meaning to life. According to Dahrendorf, without ligatures to provide meaning in the growing awareness that expanding opportunity is a myth, western liberal societies will see a crisis of political legitimacy. We are seeing that crisis now. We see it in the election of nontraditional parties, and we see it in external efficacy measures, such as the one cited in this paper's care study, which show a lack of trust in political authorities and in the system. And, we hear it in populist demands to put the people back into politics and
to decentralize political decision-making to communities. There seems a felt need for a moral orientation that emphasizes community and connection.

Just as a morality of care may have something to add to a mending of the malaise of modern liberal society, so it may contribute to a liberal discourse of universal justice. Gilligan argues for a morality of care as a counterweight to a morality of rights, because she sees an implicit failing in a notion of justice based on impartiality. Impartiality, in Gilligan's view, fails to take into account differences in need. It is a theme also addressed by feminist writers like Iris Marion Young and Seyla Benhabib who argue that equal opportunity and equal treatment are not necessarily fair.

Young criticizes Rawl's "veil of ignorance" which would remove any differentiating characteristics from those in the original position. While Rawls argues that doing so would ensure an impartial treatment of others, Young suggests that the other side to this coin is that a mutually disinterested position also "precludes any of the participants from listening to others' expressions of their desires and interests and being influenced by them" (1990, 101). Young says the entire notion of impartiality is a myth, that it is impossible to adopt an unsituated moral point of view. You cannot escape who you are and what your experiences have been. Without substantive understanding of what has also taken place for others, a designated universal principle can only represent the values of those who framed it in the first place. Therefore, the "ideal of impartiality" serves the ideological function of masking the way in which the particular perspective of the dominant group is perpetuated (97). As Young argues:

Where social group differences exist, and some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, this propensity to universalize the particular reinforces that oppression. The standpoint of the privileged, their
particular experience and standards, is constructed as normal and neutral (116).35

She sees women's demand for the particulars of the context, and their desire to find solutions that attempt to satisfy all needs as a positive input into our current justice paradigm. We are reminded of Johnston's fable study in which the girls exhausted attempts to negotiate difference between the porcupine and the moles before invoking rules, while the boys immediately resorted to principles because they saw so much difference it seemed to preclude the possibility of talk.

Seyla Benhabib describes the view of others prescribed by universal notions of justice as that of the "generalized other." In this view, every individual is seen "as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves" and justice requires that we accord this person equality and reciprocity with ourselves. But, like Young, Benhabib argues that this is a blinkered view of justice in a plural society. This Rawlsian notion demands a consideration based on putting oneself in the other's shoes and imagining what you would want but, says Benhabib, without knowledge of the particular history of the other, this can only be a "definitional" understanding, an abstraction of needs. What is required, according to Benhabib, is a perspective that takes the standpoint of the "concrete other" wherein we view "each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affects-emotional constitution" (281). Benhabib says women are able to see the "concrete other" and, challenging Kohlberg's relegation of a morality of care to the realm of personal moral dilemmas, she argues that an inclusion of the morality of care as essential to a "moral point of view" will lead to a more mature moral paradigm.

35 And, as Benhabib argues, "liberal theory uses as its paradigmatic case, the experiences of a specific group who are invariably white, male adults, who are propertied or at least professional" (1992, 274). In a diverse population like Canada's, this description omits a considerable portion of the population.
Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) have referred to this as an "empathetic justice," one which incorporates a sense of "co-feeling" for others. They say co-feeling "implies an awareness of oneself as capable of knowing and living with the feelings of others, as able to affect others and to be affected by them." In chapter two of this essay, Brabeck spoke of the distinction between cognitive and affective empathy with the difference described as the difference between "I feel what you feel" and "I 'know' what you feel" (1993, 45). In this case, one might conclude that what the Rawlsian justice model suggests is a moral consideration based on cognitive empathy, in contrast to the affective empathy found in women's moral orientation. Gilligan and Wiggins argue that with this shift in conception of self to others, moral questions change, leading to "a perspective that turns on questions of inclusion and exclusion, rather than respect for others while inequality persists (119). These authors also challenge Kolberg's contention that a morality of care is more appropriate to the personal realm of moral conflict. They say "moral outrage can be provoked not only by oppression and injustice but also by abandonment or loss of attachment or the failure of others to respond" (120). In this view, one might support higher levels of social welfare assistance not because all children have a right to be fed and clothed in our society (although one might also agree with that principle), but because these children must not be abandoned, and because one can feel the pain of the mother or father who must see their child suffer.

Some feminists see a danger in any theory which reinforces stereotypes that they see as being the product of oppression. In this view, women are more nurturing and empathetic because, as part of a subordinated group, they are better able to identify with others' pain and need. Catherine Mackinnon objects to the very discourse of difference as one which perpetuates inequality. "Differences" she says, "are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact. They are its outcome presented as its origin, the damage that is pointed to as the justification for doing the
damage after the damage has been done" (1990, 213). In this thinking, any time a difference exists there is the likelihood that a status value will be attached. It is a strong argument and one that is supported by other research, but Mackinnon's argument is based on the notion that discussions of legal equality within a difference perspective assume a male norm. The issue is not whether differences exist between men and women, but rather how that difference is valued. This is, of course, the issue, and the question remaining is how to remove the status values that now are attached to rights and to care, and how to solve the tension between the two.

Resolving this tension will not be easy. While, as the studies point out, many issues can be viewed from either a "care" or "justice" perspective, the view itself can lead to quite different consequences and can indicate quite different priorities. As Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) point out:

...detachment, which is the mark of mature moral judgment in the justice perspective, becomes the moral problem in the care perspective--the failure to attend to need. Conversely, attention to the particular needs and circumstances of individuals, the mark of mature moral judgment in the care perspective, becomes the moral problem in the justice perspective--failure to treat others fairly, as equals (82).

Gilligan and her colleagues argue that both perspectives are necessary for mature moral decisions, and that "the capacity for love and the appreciation of justice is not limited to either sex" (Gilligan and Wiggins 1988, 137). That not all females are nurturing and not all males are competitive can be seen in children's play, and

36 This argument would certainly be supported by much of the research that has been undertaken in a branch of expectation states theory known as status characteristics theory. Laboratory experiments, such as that described earlier in this paper, have shown that evidence of difference, especially what are known as diffuse status values such as gender, class, or race become the basis of performance expectations in task oriented groups (Berger et al. 1977).

37 While "crash" games dominated boys' play at the daycare, there were boys who certainly did not "kill" their toys. One boy, in a different dinosaur group than the one described earlier, asked his dinosaur, "Oh hi, dinosaur, what are you doing?" I am also reminded that when my son was small, he would play with G.I. Joe war toys, but he would spend an hour setting up the base, then there would be five minutes of battle, then the soldiers would all have coffee after which he would put them to bed with blankets I had made for them. Definitely two orientations here.
Gilligan suggests that if we wish to encourage an integrated moral orientation, this is the age at which we should begin. Certainly as Flanagan and Jackson point out, and as Margaret Mead's study would support, "there is nothing necessary (although there may be biological and social pressures in a certain direction) about the way we arrange nurturance, or about the particular ways parents treat their male and female children, and thus the story is not required to turn out exactly the way it does now" (1993, 77). The trick, of course, is having all members of society—males and females—agree that the proposed orientation is desired.

In their study of sex differences in fourteen countries, Williams and Best found evidence that when it comes to sex roles, women in most countries tended to be more "egalitarian" in their views about sex-role relationships than men, who tended to be more traditional. The authors suggest that "this is not a surprising finding in light of the fact that the traditional ideology, which assigns greater importance and/or power to men, would naturally be viewed as being more agreeable to men than to women" (1990, 157). This same pattern, in which males appear more resistant to status change than females, emerges in some of the research on status characteristics theory earlier cited (see pages 54, 55). It would appear that while women may be ready to see themselves as equal, men have not quite reached that point. Understandably, there is resistance to adjusting the current paradigms that guide our societies as long as those paradigms maintain the status quo of those for whom they serve.

There is also, of course, a reluctance by some to alter a norm which appears to have societal consent. Kohlberg, who has continued to prioritize a rights perspective as being the only truly "moral point of view", defends his position on the basis that the moral philosophical paradigm that informs his theory is, in fact, representative of society (1984). However, Kohlberg points out that moral decision-making takes place within the context of the group, and that changes in that structure can affect the
content of moral choice. Our society has changed from the time when the current paradigm was framed. The "public sphere" is now one increasingly populated by women, and by other groups who are also demanding a voice; the private sphere increasingly shared by men. And more and more, there is a demand for doing away with the distinction entirely. Flanagan and Jackson (1987) suggest not only that the moral voices argued by Gilligan and Kohlberg need further refinement, but that even these two voices may not adequately fill an existing moral philosophical gap. It may be that the value of Gilligan's argument lays as much in exposing the shortcomings of the current discourse on moral ethics as it does in raising the issue of whether women's particular voice is included in the discourse.
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APPENDIX A: KOHLBERG'S SIX STAGE MODEL

PRECONVENTIONAL
1. Heteronomous Morality
An egocentric point of view, not considering the interests of others or recognizing that those interests might be different from their own.

2. Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange
An awareness of rights beyond your own that might be conflicting. Rights are relative.

CONVENTIONAL
3. Mutual Interpersonal Expectations
Relationships, and interpersonal Conformity
A perspective based on shared relationships. Feelings, agreements, expectations of others take primacy over individual interests. Personal not generalized in orientation.

4. Social System and conscience
Sees the societal point of view over interpersonal agreements or motives.

POSTCONVENTIONAL
5. Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights
A "prior to society" perspective - values and rights take precedence over social attachments and contracts. Considers moral and legal points of view in a context of objective impartiality.

6. Universal Ethical Principles
A moral point of view. Belief in the validity of universal moral principles of justice based on equality of rights and respect for individuals.
G ITEMS (Gilligan)

Is Heinz likely to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?

Is this likely to weaken or strengthen the relationship between Heinz and his wife?

How old are Heinz and his wife, and do they have children who could help them raise money?

Heinz's willingness to substitute himself for his wife and bear the brunt of society's laws.

Does Heinz have a responsibility to care for his wife?

Which outcome will cause the least hurt for all of the people involved?

K ITEMS (Kohlberg)

Whether there is a moral code to which all individuals should adhere.

What values are going to be the consistent basis for governing how people act towards each other?

The relative weights of life and property.

Whether the value of life and the equality of human rights are prior to law.

Whether the druggist, in exercising his individual rights, infringes on the rights of others.

Whether Heinz has a right to make a decision based on his own system of values.
APPENDIX C: THE QUESTIONNAIRE

In the following questionnaire we are interested in the political choices people make. We would ask you to answer each question before going on to the next, and please be assured there are no right or wrong answers and your responses are absolutely confidential. May we thank you in advance for your cooperation in completing the questionnaire.

#1
You are about to make a voting choice between two candidates, let's call them X and Y, to whom you feel equally committed. As you stand in the polling booth pondering your choice, you remember that just before you left your home, you heard a radio news broadcast reporting the results of a public opinion poll in which X and Y were given the following popularity ratings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate X</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Y</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who will you vote for, X or Y? _____

#2
Now let's try another scenario. You're once again in the polling booth about to make a choice between Candidate X and Candidate Y, and again, you're aware that the most recent poll results have given X the greatest share of a popular vote. However, this time you are aware that X and Y take significantly different stands on the following issue:

Candidate X 47% (believes the poor get too many handouts, and must learn to be more self-reliant. X suggests the government should endeavor to cut back on welfare costs.)

Candidate Y 35% (believes the government should do more to help the poor even if it means higher taxes)

Who will you vote for, X or Y? _____
We are also interested in how you feel about our current political system and your place in it. In general, how would you respond to the following statements?

#3 Generally, those elected to parliament in Ottawa soon lose touch with the people.

- strongly agree
- somewhat agree
- don't know
- somewhat disagree
- strongly disagree

#4 I don't think that the federal government cares much what people like me think.

- strongly agree
- somewhat agree
- don't know
- somewhat disagree
- strongly disagree

#5 Sometimes, politics and government in Ottawa seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

- strongly disagree
- somewhat disagree
- don't know
- somewhat agree
- strongly agree

#6 People like me don't have any say about what the federal government does.

- strongly agree
- somewhat agree
- don't know
- somewhat disagree
- strongly disagree
Before we finish, we need to know a little bit about your background,

#7  This class is (political science, social psychology, sociology, etc.)

__________________________________________________________

#8  Your major is

__________________________________________________________

#9  You are  male   female

#10  Your age is

#11  With what ethnic group does your family identify? (e.g. Italian, Greek, Indian, First Nations, Chinese, British, Polish)

__________________________________________________________

#12  With what ethnic group do you identify?

__________________________________________________________

#13  Which federal political party do you prefer?

  Liberal   ______

  Conservative ______

  N.D.P. ______

  Reform ______

  Other ______

  None ______

  Don't Know ______
And finally, we'd like to know what you thought of, and remember about, the questions and your answers.

#14 (Do not look back at the first page when answering this question). In question #1, what were the poll results for

the top rated candidate
the lower rated candidate

#15 If you voted for the top rated candidate on question #1, can you remember why you did so? It is your very first reaction that we are interested in. (you may look back at question #1). Please state your reason.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

#16 If you voted for the lower rated candidate on question #1, would you state your reason for doing so.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

#17 What, would you say, is the information we are seeking in this questionnaire?

________________________________________________________________________

#18 Some people have expressed difficulty in answering question #1. In the interest of improving our questionnaire, we would like to know if you share this experience. If you had difficulty answering #1, would you please state what that difficulty was?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

#19 On a scale where 1 represents "not at all difficult" and 5 represents "very difficult," how would you rate your level of difficulty with question #1? (please circle the appropriate number)

1 2 3 4 5