POSTMODERN SELVES AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-IDENTITY

by

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ABSTRACT

This research sought to operationalize some of the central psychological elements of emergent contemporary selves, herein broadly dubbed, *postmodern*. These elements involve both the multiplicity of the self-concept (as measured by Linville's self-sorting task) and the accounts that people employ to justify their self-identity (obtained by semi-structured interview and scored using Chandler's developmental taxonomy). Participants also responded to six measures of well-being and adaptiveness: perceived stress, locus of control, behavioral flexibility, self-concept confusion, self-esteem, and self-focused attention. It was hypothesized that the combination of high self-multiplicity with more dynamic, or functional, accounts of self-identity, termed *multiplicitous functionalism*, will contribute to well-being. Participants were 64 female and male undergraduates in the 18- to 24-year age group - a point in the lifespan when self-identity is undergoing considerable flux. Results indicated that, as expected, higher levels of self-identity were associated with greater self-multiplicity. The various measures of well-being were meaningfully correlated. The locus of control construct was used to make a number of important distinctions. For example, those low in perceived stress and those high in behavioral flexibility, self-esteem, and self-clarity reported greater internality. Consistent with the central thrust of this research, multiplicitous functionalism (high in both self-multiplicity and self-identity) was associated with overall psychological adaptiveness and well-being, as evidenced by greater behavioral flexibility and reflection, and less rumination and perceived stress. This thesis has sought to buttress the argument for a developmental consideration of selfhood, contending that recent talk of protean, polyphonic selves do suggest themselves as adaptive, particularly in a culture where instability and fragmentation seem often the case.
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God speaks to us through our lives,
we often easily say.
Something speaks anyway,
speaks out some sort of godly
or godforsaken meaning to us
through the alphabet of our years,
but often it takes many years
and many further spellings out
before we start to glimpse,
or think we do,
a little of what that meaning is.
(Buechner, 1982, p. 41)

I did not baptize myself into this alphabetical narrative within which I emerged as conscious, and reflexively through which I find myself in dialogical tension and delightful conversive musings. I am a part of all whom I've met, as Shakespeare said, and whatever grace can be extracted from a life it is in large part due to all that have been before. To the unknown many, I feel your presence; to those known, I thank you for your support, particularly I think of family and friends.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Current philosophical, sociological, and psychological depictions of the "self" stand like so many reflections of contemporary postmodern architecture where a collage of disparate multi-historical styles give expression to the sentiment: "Never again one voice." We too are described as a multiplicitous collection of selves reflecting the various situations, roles, audiences, internal voices, goals, and mood states we indwell as embodiments of a complex post-industrial culture. *Protean selves* (Lifton, 1993), *saturated selves* (Gergen, 1991), *mutable selves* (Zurcher, 1977), *divided selves* (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993; Laing, 1960), *empty selves* (Cushman, 1990) - the list expands rapidly - are the talk of the day, weighing in as heavily upon my bookshelf as they do my pocketbook. Each seeks to reformulate my experience of my-self. The voice of deconstructionist epistemology, dubbed postmodern, is heard echoing both within the halls of academe itself and its self, making the problem of the latter of the same piece as the former (Sampson, 1985). The "flood of publications about self and selfhood may well reflect the especially problematic status of selfhood in our time" (Smith, 1994, p. 405; italics added).

For some, the above movements represent a wrongheaded aberration - centripetal forces scattering the hard-won unities of modernity (Smith, 1994). Of this postmodern self-in-flux, words like "narrow," "flat" (Bloom, 1987), "hedonistic," "narcissistic" (Lasche, 1978), and "problematic" (Baumeister, 1986, 1987; Smith, 1994) fly fast and hard. The historical sketch Cushman (1990) provides is one of a turn from a "sexually restricted" to an "empty self," following a parallel shift from a savings to a debtor economy.

The empty self is soothed and made cohesive by becoming "filled up" with food, consumer products, and celebrities... struggling to find sense and meaning in a confusing world.... Three beneficiaries of this narcissistic dynamic are the modern state, the advertising
industry, and the self-improvement industries (including psychotherapy). (pp. 599, 606, 608)

In the same vein, Greenwald (1980) speaks of the need for a "totalitarian ego," standing at the stabilizing political center of our disparateness and the project of Enlightenment itself, as a necessary illusion - "an intrapsychic analog of genetic evolution" (p. 603). The cohesion of the self is the center of personality, the fitting together of experience which generates confidence and mastery. Indeed, current rapid changes combined with the loss of moral horizon or meta-ethical criteria (Baumeister, 1986) may be causally implicated with the rapid rise in depression and other forms of pathology since World War II (Seligman, 1990). Therapy's function is to re/discover one's inner core or essence with which one identifies - in the centralized sense of self-identity. Modernity is thus best kept alive and breathing, and "postmodernity," a term preferably constrained to architectural domains.

More optimistic and less reactive others prefer the possibility that we are in the birth pangs of a new historical consciousness increasingly populated with persons-in-flux. Solutions are not to be found in the re-establishment of old unities, either in the unity-of-the-sciences project or outworn and mistaken conceptions of unified, stable, and centered selves. And as with contemporary architecture, this new found posture is not taken as a lamentable loss. Postmodernity "frees one from the tyranny of the prevailing orthodoxy.... Technological determinism - or, indeed, any determinism - was discredited. Architecture could again be based on context, mood, culture, ornament, or almost whatever mattered to the architect and client" (Jencks, 1990, p. 3).

In psychology, and rather exemplary in this regard, Gergen (1991) finds freedom from the old essentialist fixities. Past notions of selfhood have outlived their usefulness. We are encouraged to feel at home amidst an exhilaration of moral possibilities and the dizzying perspective-taking inherent in the many
voices within us. We are challenged to adopt a new and more currently adaptive theory of a self that "vanishes fully into a stage of relatedness ... toward a new self-consciousness: the postmodern" (p. 17).

What historians, literary critics, and anthropologists agree upon is that self-conceptions are far more culturally contingent than analytically universal a concept. But can some clarity be found within the direction or order of their historical emergence? What is to be made of these recent historical turns? They need concern us no further were it not for the interest that developmental psychologists have often had in exploring the conceptual possibility that personal development might in some way be viewed as a recapitulation of those larger movements of historical thought. Discourse under the rubric of the term postmodern, is here taken as more than just frivolous scholasticism (Smith, 1994). If the slope of the historical trajectory is flat (or negative), then human development is at best mere change or adaptive Darwinian niche-packing (Blasi, 1976). Developmentalists of the Piagetian or Kohlbergian sort, however, are enthusiastic about the possibility of progressive adaptation or development in a narrower sense, with the attendant potential of eking values out of fact, ought from is (Kohlberg, 1971), within some later-is-better scheme. Indeed, the possibility that history and/or ontogeny is moving in some fruitful direction has been the faith and hope of the modernist enterprise - and developmental psychology is perhaps the most modern of all psychological enterprises (Morss, 1992).

There is, however, clearly a problem in locating current postmodernisms at the head of any proposed modernist developmental progression - as the former designation implies. "Most generally perhaps, a deconstructionist aesthetic would undermine the notion of trajectories in development" (Morss, 1992, p. 460) - indeed, regarding them as anathema. While the colorful, though by now
largely outworn term "postmodern" will remain as designator of those historical turns since World War II, this thesis follows others who prefer to regard the current stage of historical thought as high modern rather than postmodern. In this sense the term postmodern is retained largely for rhetorical purposes.

Giddens (1991) comments:

> It has become commonplace to claim that modernity fragments, dissociates. Some have even presumed that such fragmentation marks the emergence of a novel phase of social development beyond modernity - a postmodern era. Yet the unifying features of modern institutions are just as central to modernity - especially in the phase of high modernity - as the disaggregating ones. (p. 27)

Large geographical empires are being torn asunder by the dissociative forces of mini-nationalism and the attendant centrality of social identity (Tajfel, 1982). The Balkans, ex-Yugoslavia, examples can be multiplied, even here at home as Québec, the Northwest Territories, and First Nations evidence these dispersive forces. It has even been proposed that Europe will eventually break up into numerous city states. But at the same time, globalizing forces of ever larger trading blocks and unified currency-use are creating new unities of a different sort. Similarly, the course this thesis wishes to navigate lies between the two caricatured responses with which we opened. While notions of selfhood are becoming increasingly fragmented and dispersive, there are qualitatively other ways of establishing the simultaneous unity that we each take ourselves to be than positing the necessity of a centralized totalitarian ego.

The thesis, then, suggests itself that adjustment amidst a rapidly changing and "unstable" society may amount to developmentally keeping abreast of those broader historical movements - most recent of which is seeking to redefine ourselves as Protean, after Proteus the Greek sea-god of many forms (Lifton, 1993). To be left in the historical shadows is to risk being eclipsed in the dark. "The protean self emerges from the confusion, from the widespread feeling that
we are losing our psychological moorings. We feel ourselves buffeted about by unmanageable historical forces and social uncertainties" (Lifton, 1993, p. 1).

The current discussion is set within this larger discourse, dubbed postmodern, to (a) underscore the constructed nature of selfhood, and (b) indicate something of the direction which it is believed current depictions of selfhood appear to be taking. The term postmodern will, then, take on a less specific designation here, signalling two historical emergences: first, involving the already mentioned historical move to greater dispersiveness; and second, to attempt to spell out what a developmental account of unity or cohesiveness might look like. (While the term self-identity will largely be used, the expression theories of self-cohesiveness or simply self-cohesiveness is to be understood as synonymous.)

It is hypothesized that higher levels of self-identity, within the yet-to-be-proposed developmental framework, are better able to do the necessary work of maintaining self-cohesiveness within a highly dispersive and pluralistic culture that offers its members a veritable smorgasbord of often competing ideologies and responses to the reflexive question, "Who am I?" Higher levels of self-identity should free individuals up to a kind of open-ended flexibility and freedom from fixity over lower, more static, and immutable notions. By "higher," an increased formal adequacy is referred to, in addition to the currently hypothesized increased association with well-being.

This thesis explores the hypothesis that "higher" levels of self-identity are associated with greater dispersiveness (or multiplicity) within the self-structure, and that those high in both self-multiplicity and level of self-identity will be found particularly adaptive. Various constructs of well-being will be employed in this evaluative task - behavioral flexibility, perceived stress, self-concept confusion, self-esteem, self-focused attention, locus of control - in addition to examining some of the correlates among these measures themselves. The sample
of participants under study here are undergraduate university students. Early adulthood is a time when a number of crucial life tasks are being negotiated within the context of oftentimes stressful identity negotiation.

While this discussion might be resumed a good ways further downstream, it was deemed desirable to say something about the historical evolution of Western conceptions of selfhood, both to locate the current discussion within the array of broader issues, as well as to underscore the constructed nature of the current object of inquiry - the Self. This chapter concludes with a specific set of hypotheses. The centerpiece is an empirical approach to questions of self-identity proposed by Chandler and his colleagues (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Chandler, 1994a, 1994b, in press; Chandler, Boyes, Ball, & Hala, 1985) - interpreted in light of the following historical sketch whose developmental recapitulation is sought, and to which I now turn.

Historically Situating the Self:
From Hollywood Squares to Herman's Head

Both cross-cultural and historical investigations into conceptions of selfhood confront our inclination to view our own perspective of world and self as true and normative.

Just as different people entertain various beliefs about the nature of the universe, they likewise differ in their ideas about the nature of the self.... The individual's self-image and his interpretation of his own experience cannot be divorced from the concept of self that is characteristic of his society. (Hallowell, 1955, p. 76)

A thumbnail historical sketch might go as follows: Once upon a time there was ... a great medieval cosmology which held everyone and everything within a great chain of being. To the democratic eye this social structure appears as something of a sociological Hollywood Squares - a game-show whose set resembles an upright checkerboard slotted with celebrities required to stay put
until the end of the show. What you were to become, commitments, indeed who you were, were ascribed to you and there was little room for the kind of conflict choices imply. Self-esteem was not a problem - fixed in Nature according to your status, and with a vast array of others always beneath you, stable and favorable comparisons were easily arrived at (Baumeister, 1987). Fixity was the norm of the day, and self or identity was simply another given. With increasing social instability over the centuries the (collective) self retracts upon one's family and private self (Baumeister, 1987; Taylor, 1989). The Cartesian self, precariously perched atop a pair of thin individualist's legs, is found tottering under the weight of its own Cogito.

Of particular historico-cultural interest has been the Western emergence of individualism. The piece of historiography that gets told about the matter regards the pointing-to of some significant "era" in which it makes most sense to speak of the rise of the individual - either sometime during the Middle Ages around 1200 (Bloch, 1961; Huizinga, 1959; Morris, 1972), or the Renaissance/Reformation (so Macmurray, 1933; Williams, 1961). Or, if greater elaboration is required, historians might hold out for the later-Eighteenth century (i.e., late Enlightenment/early Romanticism). Whatever milestone is used, emerging in this century and on the other side of the industrial and political revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, is what is most notably described by Geertz (1979) as "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe ... set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural background" (p. 229).

An increasing number of voices are questioning the survival potential of individualistic self-conceptions in the face of current socio-historical changes. "Technologies of saturation," unleashed by advances, first in low technologies (e.g., rail, the automobile, telephone, etc.), then in high technologies (e.g.,
television, videos, computers, etc.), propel us into a pluralized global network of multiple contexts and relationships. Berger (1974) talks about the "pluralization of life worlds" and Giddens (1991), "the mediation of experience." Our range of "possible selves" (Markus & Nurius, 1986) grows exponentially (Gergen, 1991), and the "saturation" of incommensurable meaning (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988) acquired through the expansion of communicative possibilities results in the "vertigo of the valued" (Gergen, 1991). "Caught in often contradictory or incoherent activities one grows anguished over the violation of one's sense of identity" (Gergen, 1991, p. 17). An ever-expanding web of relationships leaves behind "internal voices ... vestiges of relationships both real and imagined" (p. 71). This fragmenting and inner-populating of voices - be they invisible guests (Watkins, 1986), social imagery (Klinger, 1981), social ghosts (Gergen, 1987), or imaginary audiences (Elkind, 1967) - is a condition Gergen (1991) calls the "vertigo of unlimited multiplicity," the syndrome of "multiphrenia," or the "pastiche personality."

To say, then, that current conceptions of selfhood are emerging to replace those earlier is to say that greater emphasis is being placed on flux and process, a dynamic self-as-knower (Zurcher, 1977), and less on static conceptions of self-as-known for which unities in the face of often ravaging personal and historical changes are harder to warrant.

Dissatisfaction with identity in social structure and with a self as object is increasing among many people in contemporary American society.... Self as object is not adaptive; self as process is ... [and] can generate a unique configuration of self, which will be called the Mutabile Sratioal. (Zurcher, 1977, pp. 27-28)

Baumeister (1987) speaks of persons as an aggregate of components - a broader concept than role, including name, geographical location of dwelling, etc. In the course of history, components such as job, place of dwelling, and marriage have become destabilized, and religion, name, and social rank trivialized. What
has become problematic in contemporary culture is the ephemeral nature of those components out of which we define or construct ourselves. Self-as-object has become problematic.

Harre (1984) sees the move toward multiplicity and the loss of a unified self as having taken place in two steps. The first came with the "subpersonalizing shift," positing a committee of quasi-persons contained within the boundaries of a single person: Freud's tripartite self, Jung's complexes and archetypes, the personality subregions of Lewin, the topdog/underdog of Perls, Klein's internal objects, the inner child and transaction analysis, McAdams' imagoes and the introjections of object-relations theory (Rowan, 1990). Today's therapeutic industry employs these conceptions in everything from Inner-Voice Dialogue to Psychodrama. Hermans and Kempen (1993) further break up the Jamesian I into a host of "I positions" - modules in dialogue with one another and no one to direct traffic.

With the self as author, the I can imaginatively construct a story in which the Me is the protagonist.... Like the authors in Dostoevsky's novels, the different authors, localized at different positions in the imaginal landscape, may enter into dialogical relationships with one another, agreeing or disagreeing with each other. In this highly open and dynamic conception of the self, transactional relationships between the different I positions may lead to the emergence of meanings that are not given at one of the available positions. (p. 44)

Similarly, in the recent TV sit-com Herman's Head, cameras take viewers within a subpersonalized protagonist named Herman to reveal an often tempestuous dialogue among four very distinct characters.

Harre's (1984) second step amounts to a further populating of internal (Minskian) "agents," now mechanically hierarchicalized and considerably dumber. We are all but talking modular computers is the argument: "Humunculi - demons, agents - are the coin of the realm in Artificial Intelligence,
and computer science more generally" (Dennett, 1991, p. 261; Minsky, 1986).

While talk of multiplicity, multiple selves, subpersonalities - terms expand rapidly - are busy harrowing the old unities of modernity, I contend that some theory of cohesiveness, or self-identity, is a necessary prerequisite for selfhood. New unities are historically, and if the present hypotheses be correct, developmentally emerging to accommodate societal change and dynamism. Current conceptualizations must return to the ancient theoretical struggle of the one-and-the-many, neither loosing sight of the other, and to this end the current discussion now turns.

Theoretical Issues: The-One-and-the-Many

Recent empirical investigations, which this thesis seeks to extend, have adopted new methods better suited to the parsing up of potential multiple selves-in-flux, although with no shortage of methodological and theoretical polyphony. It is hoped that this current line of investigation will provide some attempt at operationalizing so-called postmodern selves. In terms of that ancient Ionian debate of the mutual defining-ness of "the-one-and-the-many," the present underlying contention is that the current theoretical and empirical emphasis on the fragmentary and contextual many comes as: (a) a welcome corrective to earlier ethnocentric assumptions of the integrated one; but (b) at the same time has been overcorrective, losing sight of our taken-for-granted existential unity, for which the term self-identity has be reserved (following the usage of Giddens, 1991).

Multiplicity and Role Identities

Regarding the many, James (1890/1950) serves well, and is frequently cited as a sort of founding figure in the field of multiple-self research (Linville and Carlston, 1994). James' empirically investigatible self-as-known was
subdivided into material, spiritual, and social selves, with the latter undergoing further division: "A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him ... [and] as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares" (p. 294).

Most social theorists argue for some type of reciprocity between the organization of society and the organization of self. Symbolic interactionists hold that self-conceptions derive from taking the role of specific and then of generalized others (Mead, 1934). Movement across the lifespan involves, among other things, the accumulation of roles (e.g., joining the work-force, marriage, etc.) and the loss of roles (e.g., children leaving home, retirement, death of spouse, etc.). Sociological role-identity theory views society as a structured network of social roles (McCall, 1987). Roles involve expectations and prescriptions for appropriate role behavior; therefore shared relationships within a social network depend upon being a certain sort of person in any given social role, providing "purpose, meaning, direction, and guidance to one's life. The greater the number of role identities held, the stronger one's sense of meaningful, guided existence" (Thoits, 1983, p. 175). To not have any identities is to not know how to behave. Roles are also affective, carrying with them a sense of being needed by various role partners. It would follow, then, that having a greater number of identities contributes to well-being. The more role identities, the greater one's existential security in the face of failure in any one role.

Our final identity, on a sociological tack, represents the resultant set of roles peculiar to each individual, and can be thought of as involving two crossing orthogonal dimensions: (a) the number of roles occupied, and (b) the overlap between roles (or multiplexity; Thoits, 1983). Roles are not independently located in time and space. Overlap exists as social roles are often nested within one another (see Figure 1). Anything to the left of the vertical social-overlap axis
Figure 1

Locating Integration and Differentiation Along the Dimensions of Identity-Overlap and Number

reads low on the horizontal number-of-identities axis. This left half might be considered occupied by socially isolated or minimally differentiated selves (e.g., unemployed, unmarried, retired, those who live alone, etc.). Generally the greater the number of identities, moving to the right across the number of identities axis, the greater is the overlap (Thoits, 1983). Where there is considerable overlap across a large number of identities (i.e., the upper right quadrant) we speak of integration, and where there exists a large number of independent roles with little overlap we speak of differentiation (or in Linville's, 1987, terms, complexity). More pejoratively, the later might also be labelled fragmentation (Donahue et al., 1993).

When "self-descriptors," usually some set of trait terms or descriptive phrases, overlap, superordinate-subordinate relationships emerge. Stryker
(1987) speaks of a "salience hierarchy" of social roles. Hierarchical arrangement of role identities allows for the integration of many "minor" identities at the bottom while maintaining broader "major" identities at the top capable of integrating those lower (De Boeck & Rosenberg, 1988). What emerges at the top can be considered to be most largely involved in other aspects of the self. Other social relationships can be understood as being largely built on these centralized role identities. In terms of set theory, the most superordinate set represents that identity with the greatest intersect of elements (i.e., self-descriptors) across all role identities. While the same two-dimensional figure (Figure 1) can apply to both sociologist and psychologist, the psychologist is interested in a narrower intrapsychic unit of analysis - internal selves or self-aspects in addition to the sociologist's handful of major social roles.

Yet when we come to ask questions regarding what it is that marks all these particulars or self-aspects, sociologists prefer the term identities, as belonging to one-and-the-same consciousness, we quickly run aground the problem Hume (1740/1955) did - all he could find was a bundle of particular perceptions. But what or who is it that has these thoughts?

Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence. At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it, or which for shortness we may call one the Me and the other the I. (James, 1890/1950, p. 315; italics in original)

Psychology's "self-concept" corresponds with James' Me. Of the unifying and yet ever-changing I - that for which Hume sought but could not find - James pressed the "stream of consciousness" into service. He, like Heraclitus (c. 504-501 B.C.E.) before him, found in the river an appropriate metaphor for the one-and-the-many paradox. One can never step into the same river twice, yet we regard it as the same river.
Singularity and Self-Identity

By self-identity I refer to that self-same unity that each of us takes ourselves to be. This I does not here refer to the impulsive or unsocialized self that Mead (1934) spoke about, nor that of a continuous action-system (Linville & Carlston, 1994). From the vantage point of the, here proposed, final developmental stage in history's march, the I/me/you relationship is one largely constituted by language. The I is a linguistic indexical which derives its meaning from the web or network of language within which it is embedded, and whose use provides the necessary conditions for the emergence of self-awareness. All languages make use of this I/me/you pronominal form. The capacity for their use amounts to the locating of oneself within Euclidean space amidst an array of other such users (Giddens, 1991). The self is dialogical (Taylor, 1991). In Harré's terms, to be an I is to possess a life narrative.

A person's identity is not to be found in behavior, nor - important though this is - in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. (p. 54; italics in original)

Jaynes (1976) speaks about the self as a "mind space" - an analog space which the I constructs to metaphorically observe the Me traversing time and space. "Time [is] spatialized into a journey of my days and years" (Jaynes, 1976, p. 63). To keep the narrative thread going is to locate some means by which the countless episodes that make up our lives might be identified as belonging to a single spool. One method would be to locate some self-same object belonging to the self in each of the frames. I am reminded of a certain CBC-FM program that taxes listeners' knowledge of covert culture. Several brief clips are played spanning a variety of media and historical personages, from Ozzy Osborne to Hitler, and listeners are asked to identify "the one thing the unites all the people in these clips." (I am always amazed at how obscure and esoteric the answers are found to be.) But locating the identity of some permanent object able to stand
outside the ravages of time, is only one possibility - a formally rather poor one as it shall turn out to be. When one considers the radical degree of change that occurs across the lifespan - between ourselves as newborn and our eventual selves in old age - it seems surprising that the task gets pulled off at all.

Following Harré (1984), I take self-identity, what he calls "self," as ultimately a transcendental truth (i.e, not given merely by experience), yet empirically investigable - people have something to say about the matter.

In summary, there is a danger of becoming impaled on one of two horns in this one/many dilemma. On the one hand talk of ever further parsing up the Jamesian Me seems right-headed, empirically manageable, and historically welcome within a complex culture - but notions of singularity, or the Jamesian I, taken as some superordinate self-component rising to the top of the stack do not compel conviction. What is the self-concept a conception of? Current discussions seem either silent or echo too clearly older philosophical notions of "things in themselves." Our notion of the I-in-itself is also a notion, and falls prey to Putnam's (1988) cookie-cutter analogy.

The things independent of all conceptual choices are the dough; our conceptual contribution is the shape of the cookie cutter.... Take it seriously, and you are at once forced to answer the question "What are the various parts of the dough?" If you answer that (in the present case) the "atoms" of the dough are the n elementary particles and the other parts are the mereological sums ... then you simply adopt one metaphysical picture: the picture according to which mereological sums "really exist."... Talk of mereological sums is really just a façon de parler.... What the cookie-cutter metaphor tries to preserve is the naive idea that at least one Category - the ancient category of Object or Substance - has an absolute interpretation. (p. 114)

Individuals have their own theory of how the pieces fit together, and it may not be the same as that by which the researcher is laboring.
A Developmental Model of Self-Identity: 
Ontogeny Recapitulates Philosophy

Chandler and colleagues (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Chandler, 1994a, 1994b) offer a description of five soft-stages of self-continuity (i.e., identity as re-identification, or numerical identity) empirically based on interviews with more than 200 children and adolescents. They find in their research a developmental progression in the use of these stages. Successive stages are formally better able to maintain unity or self-identity in the face of change and disparity. The model makes a general two-fold distinction between two types of account: Structural and Functional theories or what might also be regarded as static versus dynamic accounts, respectively. The former fix upon a strategy of structurally ordering details of the self that stand outside the ravages of time. Three subspecies have emerged from their analysis: Simple Inclusion, Topological, and Essentialist. Functional accounts end up justifying self-sameness by the connection of time slices into a single "functional" unit. Two subspecies exist here, termed Foundational and Narrative. These levels (see Table 1), will be taken up in more detail. It is expected that participants in this study will primarily divided between Essentialist (Level 3) and Foundationalist (Level 4) accounts, with a sprinkling of Narrativist (Level 5) accounts, and so less space will be expended on earlier accounts.

The first level, Simple Inclusion accounts, sounds little more than what we have thus far been saying of psychology's notion of the "self-concept" - a summation across separate "components." Change is a matter of an add-on orsubtractive bit of calculus. The difference, however, lies in the absence here of any need to justify the part in relation to the whole. Come the self-buffeting of life, the only hope in securing oneself lies in the fingering of some subset of components that are found to have remained intact (e.g., name, fingerprints).
Table 1

A Taxonomy of Self-Identity Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conception of Self</th>
<th>Global Index of Self-Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Theories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1: Simple Inclusion Accounts</strong></td>
<td>Some &quot;sufficient&quot; number or intersecting set of self-components remains between one's former and current self.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The self is seen as a static, aggregate collection of components. Change involves the simple addition or deletion of self-components.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2: Topological Accounts</strong></td>
<td>While facets may be hidden from view or go dormant, components of the self remain fixed throughout the lifespan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The self is viewed as a multifaceted structure. Each facet of which is equated with another side of a fixed character. Change involves the mere presentation and eclipse of facets. Change is thus only apparent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 3: Essentialist Accounts</strong></td>
<td>There exists an essential unchanging core that remains throughout life. Surface change is dismissed as alternate expressions of the core, or perhaps even conventional and unauthentic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The depth metaphor becomes pressed into service with notions of a singular true self located at the core. Change is regarded as phenotypic, only involving surface attributes and not the essential core itself.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional Theories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 4: Foundational Accounts</strong></td>
<td>What connects the various frames of one's life is their causal relatedness. Descriptions of current selves make use of causal language (because, since, for the reason that) involving temporal rather than spatial depth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present self is conceived as a causal consequence of one's past. Change may be structural, involving surface as well as deeper structures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 5: Narrative Accounts</strong></td>
<td>Self-identity is conceived as an autobiographical narrative counted as continuous so long as it is coherent and plausible. Causal mechanisms supplying spatial and temporal depth may be used, but these are regarded as metaphor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The self is regarded as a theoretical construct - like the notion of a center of gravity. One's self is an autobiographical story in which one is the actor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: adapted from Ball and Chandler (1989, p. 261). Copyright 1989 by Cambridge University Press and adapted with permission.*
Topological accounts (Level 2, renamed from Chandler's Typological) lend a structural organization to the many features of the self - "the separate attributes of which are worn, much like the fixed facets of some empty polyhedronic shape" (Chandler, 1994b, p. 8). What might be taken as evidence of personal change can now be understood as a matter of presentation or "temporary eclipse of one of the self-structure's many facets" (Chandler, 1994b, p. 8). Something of this account of selfhood is represented in the film "Schindler's List" when Oscar Schindler says of notorious Nazi guard and friend(?) Amon Goethe, "The war brings out the bad aspects of people, not the good ... always the bad. He has some good aspects." Aspects may lie dormant, or internal voices, like those filling the subjective worlds of Dostoevsky's characters, may be temporarily silent. While local variations of the self can be handled by such an account, more global upheavals of the sort young persons may developmentally traverse can extend outside the range of accountability.

A move is made toward interiority in Trilling's (1971) description of 16th-century English society in its newfound fascination with deception and pretense. The dichotomy between misguiding appearances and underlying realities is also reflected in philosophy, politics, and literature. This is the time of the emerging popularity of theater in England and France. The actor wearing many masks makes for a good metaphor. There is great interest in the villainous character, recognized by the audience as evil, but who manages to escape the detection of others - at least for a time. Introspection at this point in history, while practised, has nothing of the abstract ambiguity that it will later have, when the self begins to acquire a more spacious interiority.

The third in the level sequence is what has been tagged Essentialist arguments. Here the "essence" of one's being lies in the deep inner recesses. Such arguments revolve around a genotype-phenotype distinction. Change can
be discounted as mere surface variation atop deeper hidden structures. This account is reminiscent of the 19th century, following the wake of Romanticism which bequeathed a unique and individual self to later generations. This is also the time of the Victorian habit of self-reflection and scrutiny (Baumeister, 1991).

A point comes, particularly in an individualistic culture, when it asks of its budding youth that commitments be made, and that a place be found as an individual among fellow individuals. Part of the story of emerging Western individualism is this vestigial belief, from the Romantic era, that potential, purpose, and direction are to be found within - mined out from the essentialist core. Indeed, to be true to oneself was to engage in just this introspective task of establishing inner-outer "congruence" or "authenticity." Television ads today entice us to "be ourselves." Within the root metaphor (Pepper, 1942) of the organic unfolding of authentic selves, social factors stand as only disruptive and representative of the unauthentic. Nineteenth century neo-Gothic literature is awash with selves divided and alienated from themselves (Miyoshi, 1969).

Widespread methods of therapeutic intervention were developed, most notably by Rogers (1980) and remain popular today, promising to make "self-knowers" of us all (Wicklund & Eckert, 1992). Perhaps the ontogenic recapitulation of that stage emerges during adolescence. Broughton (1981) noted a similar stage of deep inner-outer division in the adolescent self.

Secrecy is crucial: once one's unique thoughts are shared, they are no longer unique.... If one looses one's uniqueness through an act of self-disclosure or sharing, personal essence becomes absorbed into impersonal appearance.... Knowledge is conceived pictorially as an "engulfing" of the known that makes it part of the knower. (p. 22)

Carl Rogers' (1980) existential philosophy, drawn from philosopher Kierkegaard and theologian Buber, emphasizes knowledge of the "true" self. Such knowledge is imagined to be contained within the "ideal" self lying
dormant beneath the many acquired bad habits and "false" selves. Self-realization involves the emergence of the former from the latter - the arising of autonomy out of conventionality. The therapist empathically stands as the Socratic midwife to this birthing process which is part of nature's drive to perfect itself. In this way evolutionary order arises out of chaos.

The move from Structurally defined theories of self-identity to Functional approaches amounts to a shift from static conceptions of self-as-object to more dynamic conceptions of self-as-subject. What gets abandoned here is the possibility of discovering some self-particular of whatever concrete or abstract description which might possibly escape the workings of time. Rather some means is sought for conceptually splicing the various frames of one's life onto a continuous reel. Of the two subspecies, what distinguishes the Foundational from the Narrative Level has to do with the order of assembly. Where the present is conceived as the effect of which one's past acts as cause, we have a Foundational account. What I take to be different from what has gone before is the rejection of static fixities in favor of flux.

In the shadow of World War II, American literature moved away from themes of the deep alienation associated with belief in a discoverable inner entity. The 1960s were more about the construction of meaning and self rather than its discovery (Baumeister, 1987). There is a pragmatic getting-on with things within given limitations. I take Dewey's pragmatism, with its rejection of essentialist fixities, as prototypic here. His emphasis was on praxis or method, of which Dewey considered the scientific method as exemplary.

Science is not constituted by any particular body of subject-matter. It is constituted by a method, a method of changing beliefs by means of tested inquiry as well as of arriving at them. It is its glory, not its condemnation, that its subject-matter develops as the method is improved. (1934, pp. 38-39)

Change rather than fixity is now a measure of "reality."... Change is
omnipresent. The laws in which the modern man of science is
interested are laws of motion, of generation and consequence. He
speaks of law where the ancients spoke of kind and essence.... It is
only by these processes of active manipulation of things in order to
realize his purpose that he discovers what the properties of things
are ... but he never learns what the things themselves [really] are.
(1920/1954, pp. 100, 102)

The downside of viewing the present as in some way causally determined is that
it tends to be rigid and fatalistic, allowing little space for conscious decision and
change.

Finally, Narrative accounts involve a reading of the relationship to one's
past, not from the linearly causal back to front, but rather from the literary
window of, and serving the purposes of, the present - not unlike the current run
of revisionist Western movies (e.g., "Dances with Wolves"). Presentist
historiography re-edits the past in light of the present because that's all there is.

What the metaphor of narrative suggests is the constructed and fiction-
like nature of its subject matter. Dennett (1991) speaks of the self as belonging to
the same class as other theoretical concepts such as "center of gravity."
Something can be said about them, even calculations can be made using them,
but they are ultimately instrumental and fictional. What matters here is not so
much the finding of components as if they were "facts" that are either identical
with themselves in one's past, or stand in relation with other components in the
past, but rather the creation of a best story out of events. "Facts" can be variously
assembled into different systems of meaning, even challenging the dominant
texts in our lives (White & Epston, 1990).

Within the Level 5 conception there is a reorientation to, or dialogue with,
time. Rather than being conceived as a finite substance running out like so much
sand in a glass fatalistically carrying us along, time is open to be conceived more
proactively - as entitling life to be lived. Taking charge of one's life means
confronting an otherwise dizzying open array of possibilities. If therapeutically
required, complete breaks from the past are possible, and novel possible future selves entertained - possibilities not merely left open to the interplay of contingency. The form of security attained by holding firmly to past actions understood as self-constitutive, is an imprisoning and brittle theory (Epstein, 1973) easily fractured.

Developing a coherent sense of one's life history is a prime means of escaping the thrall of the past and opening oneself out to the future.... The autobiography [as a therapeutic tool] is a corrective intervention into the past, not merely a chronicle of elapsed events.... Feelings of "if only" can be got over and done with. (Giddens, 1991, p. 72)

Dutton's (1994) work with abusive husbands, for example, centrally involves the examination of identity loss. Those that fear the future are precisely those who attempt to buttress delaminating self-conceptions by securing themselves with money, property, health insurance, and relationships. In short, Narrative self-conceptions arise out of a recognition of identity as a self-reflexive project for which the individual is morally responsible (Harré, 1984). This stands in stark contrast to just "getting to know one's self/essence better" or the modernist enterprise of passive inferencing of one's behavior (e.g., Bem, 1972). This is self-actualization of a different form, regarding weighty questions of what would personally constitute the "good life." Giddens (1991) uses the term "lifestyle" to encompass such a project:

Lifestyle is not a term which has much applicability to traditional cultures, because it implies choice within a plurality of possible options, and is "adopted" rather than "handed down" ... reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile nature of self-identity. Each of the small decisions a person makes every day ... contributes to such routines.... All such choices ... are decisions not only about how to act but who to be. (p. 81)

While not of central import, a brief footnote is required regarding the post-structuralist critique - of a piece with the reality-as-text metaphor and the current final stage which it seeks to court. The prototypic person I have in mind
here is not Rorty (1991), but rather Taylor (1989). That reality is constituted by language must be given its full post-Wittgensteinian weight, but that language "goes all the way down" as Rorty would have it, ultimately involves the kind of deconstruction which ends in solipsism and a radical incommensurability of rival interpretive communities of the sort this thesis seeks to head off. Taylor (1989), like Giddens (1991), holds out the possibility of a high-modernity whose language is more asymptotic - language continues ever further down, but never right the way down. The world has something to contribute to the meaning of words - and thus not just anything can count as a good story.

We have thus far laid out a taxonomy regarding qualitatively distinct theories of self-identity based on Chandler's (1994a, 1994b) developmental model. The sequence seeks some historical representation across five levels posited to emerge developmentally. The thought that conceptions of selfhood must emerge in response to local exigencies seems plausible - so that having a 19th-century Essentialist account might be considered an ontological liability amidst the kind of tumultuous change that many find themselves living in at the turn of the 21st. We might further query as to the kinds of pathology that could emerge if the individual adoption of such increasingly adequate self-conceptions were unable to keep apace social and personal changes that are so much a part of later life-tasks. This thesis amounts to a sort of temperature-taking of the various levels of self-identity for which a number of measures have been selected that will best reflect the problems associated with lower levels and serve to highlight the adaptiveness of higher levels.

Well-Being and the Self

In the years since Holmes and Rahe (1967) devised the Schedule of Recent Events, an expanding body of empirical data has served to underscore the
relation between life events and health. Not only major life events (e.g., death of friend or spouse, divorce, etc.) but also daily hassles (e.g., involving investments, work-load, friends, pets, etc.) are causally implicated in the onset of illness in a stress-illness model. While this conception has high face validity, attempts to observe the relation have yielded low to modest correlations (Tausig, 1982). Not all people are equally affected. Stress is not a simple variable, but involves a number of processes including appraisal and coping, which mediate the frequency, intensity, duration, and form the psychological or somatic response takes. A wide range of variables have proven to have a buffering effect: effective coping strategies (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), social support (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Thoits, 1982), locus of control (Johnson & Sarason, 1978), hardiness (Kobasa, Maddi, & Kahn, 1982), and self-esteem (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988), among others.

Current discussions regarding contemporary life suggests that dispersive forces inherent in technologies of saturation (Gergen, 1991) have created a new vista of problems - as well as opportunities for those able to cope with this level of complexity. This current research might be considered an extension of health psychology in positing the mediatorial role played by higher levels of self-identity in contemporary life.

Self-Identity

To date little empirical work has been done on the question of self-identity. No research has thus far been undertaken in the querying of possible correlates to Chandler et al.'s measure of numerical identity beyond its relation to suicidal risk. Ball and Chandler (1989) found over 80% of adolescents considered high risk for suicide were unable to offer an account of their own temporal continuity, in comparison with slightly more than 10% of the low-risk
group and none from the normal control group. Research has supported the buffering effects of counter-suicidal ideation (e.g., reasons for living; Kralik & Danforth, 1992) and offered a developmental taxonomy of progressively more compelling rhetoric that might be expended on one's behalf when suicide-as-escape looms dark on the horizon. But all this falls thinly to the ground when offered in support of a "self" of whom one can not seriously consider being or becoming. This radical deconstructed and concrete presentist posture of suicide has been documented (Baumeister, 1990). If the construction of meaning amounts to the making of web-like connections among particulars, then for these hospitalized youth, present, past, and future amount to detached episodes through which no meaningful thread can be drawn.

Multiple Selves

A brief review of the sociological literature indicates mounting evidence for the beneficial effects of occupying multiple roles (Stryker, 1987). In a data set involving 720 men and women reinterviewed from an earlier random selection of members of a community health center, investigators examined the relation of "identity accumulation" (i.e., multiple social positions) and "psychological distress" measured by a 20-item list of psychological and psychosomatic symptoms. After controlling for a number of background variables, it was found that a decrease or loss of social identities from Time 1 to Time 2 resulted in a corresponding increase in distress over the same period. In contrast, an increase in total number of identities involved a decrease in psychological distress from Time 1 to Time 2. The results were particularly apparent among those with few identities (i.e., the socially isolated), who have both more to gain and more to lose (Thoits, 1983).

A similar investigation (Verbrugge, 1983) involved the question of
potential role strain accompanying women's increased involvement in multiple roles (job plus family responsibilities). The increase in responsibilities might lead to higher risks of acute and chronic health problems. Instead, investigators found a main effect between the number of roles and a number of health variables (general health status, symptoms, curative and preventive actions, and mood). Whatever strains might be apparent were found to be low and offset by large benefits. These studies are consistent with other research indicating the benefits of marriage, parenthood, and particularly employment. Work, family, and love are the main avenues individuals have in our culture for providing purpose, value, self-efficacy, and self-worth (Baumeister, 1991). To investigate the thesis regarding postmodern multiplicity and the increased inner-populating of selves, a means must be had of examining potentially finer grains of fracture - beyond the handful of visible social role-identities with which sociologists busy themselves.

Linville (1987) has developed a method well-suited for examining differentiation of the self-structure. The method involves a sorting task, modeled after Scott (1969), and is used in this research to assess self-multiplicity. (Complexity as Linville measures it, is here referred to as self-multiplicity.) Participants are given a deck of 33 1" X 3" cards. Printed on each card is a self-descriptor (e.g., quiet, affectionate, imaginative, etc.). Both positive and negative self-descriptors are included. Participants are instructed to sort the descriptors into groups or self-aspects descriptive of their various selves, social roles (e.g., lawyer, mother), activities (e.g., cyclist, writer), relationships (e.g., friend, cousin), and goals they consider self-defining, or representative of the person they are. Self-aspects are the analog to the sociologist's role-identities - each has their own set of features, propositions, and affects. Participants are free to identify as many or as few self-aspects, and use whatever descriptors they deem
necessary. Self-multiplicity (SM) represents the minimum number of independent descriptors which underlie an individual's sort. The SM value increases with the number of identities/selves sorted and the less redundancy of descriptors used in their creation. Her studies indicate, in agreement with the above sociologists, that greater self-multiplicity serves to moderate the adverse impact of stressful life events on physical and mental well-being. No main effect was found between self-multiplicity and measures of psychological adjustment (depression, physical symptoms, and perceived stress). What she did find was a buffering or interaction effect: "Greater self-complexity acts as a moderator of depression and illness when people are under high stress" (p. 671).

Her explanation is derived from a spreading activation account of memory - activation of any self-aspect, with attendant thoughts and feelings, activates interconnected others. Failure in any one role carries heavy implications for associated others. Unaffected self-aspects are left to function as buffers. The effect was mainly beneficial to those experiencing high levels of stress. In such contexts those subjects higher in self-multiplicity evidenced fewer adverse symptoms. Linville notes that high-multiplicity in the absence of stress may carry its own inner conflict, making of simple persons in a relatively unproblematic life the best of all worlds. The inability to detect low levels of conflict may be due either to its transparent chronicity or simply the inability of the life-event scales to capture it.

Having one's security embodied in only a limited range of possibilities can make failure and change that much more threatening.

Perceived Stress

It has already been mentioned that the subjective experience of stress is dependent on more than just the existence of disruptive life events, but also
involves the subjective processes of appraisal and coping. The current research
will use the *Perceived Stress Scale* (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) as
a measure of state stress. Respondents indicate the degree to which they
perceive current life events as overloading, controllable, and predictable - three
constructs shown to be of central significance in the role of stress. Higher
dynamic self-conceptions are hypothesized to mediate life stressors.

In two separate college samples, Cohen et al. (1983) report their *Perceived
Stress Scale* to have correlated as predicted with: life-event scores (*College Student
Life-Event Scale*; Levine & Perkins, 1980); depressive symptomatology (*The Center
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale*; Radloff, 1977); physical
symptomatology (*Cohen-Hoberman Inventory of Physical Symptoms*; Cohen &
Hoberman, 1983); availing of health services; social anxiety (*Social Avoidance and
Distress Scale*; Watson & Friend, 1969); and smoking-reduction maintenance over
a 4- to 12-week period after administration. In comparison with (a) a simple
count of life events and (b) the subjective experience of stressfulness regarding
specific events (*College Student Life-Event Scale*; Levine & Perkins, 1980), (c) the
PSS correlated significantly higher with physical symptomatology (*rs* = .31, .23,
and .52, respectively on Sample 1, and *rs* = .36, .32, and .65 on the second, *p* <
.001), and depressive symptomatology (*rs* = .18, .29, and .76, respectively on
Sample 1, and *rs* = .14, *ns*, and .33 and .65 on the second, *p* < .001). More
objective measures using either a simple count or a normatively weighted
derived score have longer predictive capability but lower state correlations.

A significant correlation with the following locus of control measure is
expected. Stress is experienced to the extent that individuals feel they are not in
control of their life. It is hoped that the locus of control construct will help make
some further qualitative distinctions in what follows.
Locus of Control

The *locus of control* construct historically goes back at least to Plato's "*Republic*" and his conception of the *good man* as a "*master of himself*" (lit. "*stronger than himself, kreitto autou*; 1976, p. 430). Taylor (1989) traces the development of the notion from Plato through the disengaged cogito of Descartes, Locke, and into contemporary times. A superordinate pass through the construct space discloses a generalized internal-external dimension, most notably associated with the social learning theory of Rotter (1966). He defined a belief in internal control as the extent to which an individual perceives an event as consequent rather than contingent upon one's own actions, character, abilities, or intentions. A belief in external control refers to the degree to which rewards are perceived as independently related to one's actions. For example, attributing an event as the result of "*luck, chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, or unpredictable because of the great complexity of the forces surrounding him*" (p. 1).

In addition to verifying that individual internal-external differences do exist, internality has generally been found to be more positive. Among children, externals are described as more neurotic, impulsive, and hyperactive (Linn & Hodge, 1982; Raine, Roger, & Venableš, 1982); among adults externality is associated with depression (Burger, 1984) and self-harming behaviors such as smoking, immoderate drinking, and careless driving found in a cross-cultural study involving the United States, India, and Hong Kong (Kelley, 1986). Internality is positively associated across cultures with school performance, cognitive development, and other forms of achievement (Tyler, Labarta, & Otero, 1986; Shute, Howard, & Steyaert, 1984).

Agreement, however, on the nature and number of underlying factors has been thin - ranging from 2 (Mirels, 1970) to 18 (Coan, 1974). Paulhus (1983) and
Christie (Paulhus & Christie, 1981) have proposed three theoretical factors reflecting contextual distinctions or what they refer to spheres of control (SOC). Three key spheres are specified: personal, interpersonal, and sociopolitical efficacy. Associated with each context are one's beliefs regarding the mastery of personal achievements, management of social interactions and relationships, and perceptions of control within the wider societal context, respectively. For example, the item "My major accomplishments are entirely due to my hard work and ability" reflects personal efficacy and "I have no trouble making and keeping friends" reflects the interpersonal.

Parsing up the construct in this fashion has shown decided advantages over Rotter's I-E scale. Relatively few interpersonal items exist in Rotter's measure, making the study of conformity, persuasion, and other forms of interpersonal behavior more difficult. Other perplexities have gained some clarity; for example, the apparent contradiction with the correlation between Machiavellianism and Rotter's external locus of control. It appears that the strength of the unexpected relation comes from the sociopolitical sphere where the high Machiavellian's cynicism holds sway, but in the interpersonal domain, as expected, high Machiavellians evidence high levels of perceived control.

The current research used the SOC as a means of drawing certain qualitative distinctions, in addition to extending the range of already existing correlates. The difference between reflection and rumination, reflecting different motivations for introspection, revolves around perceived control. With reflection the inward turn is undertaken out of self-initiated intellectual curiosity. Rumination, however, involves a continual turning over of the mind's sod without the capacity to cease - thoughts are affectively negative and intrusive. Similarly the difference between the above wishy-washy character or social chameleon and someone who is contextually flexible can be conceived as
involving the presence or absence of internal control.

Behavioral Flexibility

Often in the psychology literature flexibility is pointed to as central in any definition of adjustment (see Scott's, 1968, review). Leary (1957) makes the statement that maladjustment entails "the limiting of one's interpersonal apparatus and the compulsive use of certain inflexible, inappropriate interpersonal operations" (p. v). On the other end of the adjustment continuum one finds flexibility in dealing with a wide variety of situations and environmental press. Leary comments: "In the adjusted, well-functioning individual the entire repertoire of interpersonal reflexes is operating spontaneously, flexibly and appropriately - when the survival situation demands aggression, he can aggress; when it calls for tenderness, he can be tender" (p. 118). The postmodern self freed from the quest for an unambiguous central "true" immutable self is open to respond contextually, as well as not getting anxious regarding the variability that already exists. A number of constructs have sought to address these concerns: Bem's (1974) notion of androgyny, Snyder's (1974, 1979) self-monitoring, the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) Flexibility Scale (Gough, 1957), and Wiggins and Holzmuller's (1978, 1981) 16 interpersonal traits, among others. The assessment of this construct has been problematic on two fronts: empirical and theoretical.

In a brief review, Paulhus and Martin (1988) comment on a number of the above measures. Bem's (1974) measure is too narrow in scope and relies too heavily on trait ratings, assuming that people rely on this information to determine behavior. Some evidence questions this (Kaplan, 1979). It further appears the case that only the masculinity subscale predicts self-esteem, and not the combined androgyny index (Taylor & Hall, 1982). Wiggins and Holzmuller
(1978, 1981) have broadened Bem's measure using 16 interpersonal traits, but continue to give insufficient contextual consideration. Snyder's self-monitoring measure has been shown to be low in predictive validity (John & Block, 1987), in addition to convergent validity. Theoretically, it is not clear as to what differentiates an adaptive flexibility from those more maladaptive. Paulhus and Martin (1988) acknowledged that some sorts of behavioral variability are considered maladaptive: weak character (Shapiro, 1965), the social chameleon (Ring & Wallston, 1968), a dependent character (Millon, 1981), or just being wishy-washy (Block, 1961). In short, "for a variety of reasons, current measures do not adequately tap the critical components of flexibility" (p. 98). Paulhus and Martin (1988) proposed the notion of functional flexibility measured by their Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC) which forms a composite of behavioral capabilities. A number of studies have both confirmed its discriminant validity, finding that it taps a different construct from those above (Paulhus & Martin, 1988). This current research seeks to operationalize the current discussion of protean selves using this measure.

It may be that increasing multiplicity of selves and behavioral flexibility is adaptive only up to a point. Donahue et al. (1993) found that "individuals who saw themselves very differently across their roles tended to be more depressed, more neurotic, and lower in self-esteem than individuals who saw themselves as similar across roles" (pp. 837-838). She also found that individuals high in what she calls Self-Concept Differentiation (SCD) were, in addition, less interpersonally adjusted - showing a negative correlation with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness on the Big-Five personality factors, as well as socialization, self-control, and acceptance of conventional values. Donahue regards individuals high in SCD pejoratively as "fragmented selves." Similarly, Block (1961), in examining "role variability" (i.e., internal consistency), found that
subjects who were overly high in variability, what he called "interpersonally changeable," were relatively more neurotic: "an interpersonal chameleon, with no inner core of identity ... plagued by self-doubts and despairs for he has no internal reference which can affirm his continuity and self-integrity" (p. 392).

Paulhus and Martin (1988) examined 10 different measures of interpersonal variability, including those mentioned above. Factorial analysis revealed that these measures loaded onto different factors, and that the four indexes of the BIC (difficulty, avoidance, anxiety, and capability) clustered together on a unique dimension, thus outlining a distinct construct. In Study 2, the authors examined the relation between peer ratings and participants' self-reports. Peer ratings are considered a good benchmark for criterion validation because they provide an independent evaluation of behavior by people who know the participants well. Using three different peer measures (global assessment of flexibility, the short capability form of the BIC, and five global ratings of flexible behaviors), the correlations with participants' scores were significantly higher than three other measures used for comparison (all ps < .01). Respondents scoring high on the BIC measure of flexibility were rated by peers as being interpersonally flexible.

In Study 3, the BIC was examined in relation to several measures of maladjustment: the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953), Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and Block's (1965) Ego Resiliency Scale. All four indexes of the BIC correlated with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (p < .01; the difficulty index was p < .05). The other measures proved unrelated (rs -.03 to .08).

Study 4 requested two peer ratings, instead of only the one used in Study 2. In addition to the original 16 interpersonal descriptors, 10 7-point adjustment ratings were added based on items in Lanyon's (1971) General Maladjustment
Factor (e.g., grouchy, feelings are easily hurt, depressed, anxious, etc.). Peer-rating correlations with flexibility replicated Study 2. No correlation was discovered with an anxiety index (composed of Items 2, 7, and 10 from the above adjustment ratings), but correlations with peer ratings on adjustment reached the levels for self-esteem in Study 3 ($p < .05$).

The widespread belief is that flexibility is desirable and adaptive up to a point. Perhaps rather than positing a curvilinear relationship to distinguish maladaptive behavioral inconsistency (e.g., obsequiously submissive) from adaptive flexibility, it might be more accurate to consider the distinction one of quality and not of quantity. (The same is likely true of the self-multiplicity versus self-confusion distinction - as will be seen next.) The former is perhaps more representative of the experience of being overwhelmed and buffeted by life, reflective of indecisiveness, insecurity, and low self-confidence. The social chameleon is one who is knocked about by the situation, while the flexible individual chooses to adopt a mode of behavior for the situation - the difference is one of locus of control - an important construct that will be used to make a number of meaningful distinctions in what is to follow. Shapiro (1982) has claimed that rigidity is not only a consequence of a variety of psychopathologies but also an implicated cause. If the flexible individual is one who is able to surmount the strain of remaining consistent (e.g., Lecky, 1945; Swann & Read, 1981), then higher levels of personal identity should open up an individual from such pressures, particularly those of earlier levels of self-identity that insist on immutable aspects and "true" core selves.

Problems with the construct of behavioral flexibility, in part, arise out of conceptual and methodological imprecision involving the distinguishing of self-differentiation (or multiplicity) from self-confusion on the intrapsychic dimension, and being flexible rather than a social chameleon on the behavioral
Self-Concept Confusion

If a person were to say they were both extroverted and shy, would this count as an indication of a complex self-understanding or as reflecting self-confusion? Sande, Goethals, and Radloff (1988) examined the degree (i.e., not at all - very much) to which individuals regarded themselves as possessing both of a pair of trait opposites (e.g., serious - carefree). In support of the "flexibility-postmodern hypothesis," these researchers concluded that "people perceive themselves as having a richness and depth of personality that confers on them the capacity to act flexibly and appropriately. That is, people conceive of themselves as being multifaceted" (p. 14).

The difficulty lies in that similar measures are used to test both self-complexity and self-concept confusion (SCC). Self-concept confusion, in contrast, has been associated with low self-esteem (LSE) and a host of measures of maladaptiveness (Campbell, 1993). Elsewhere, the relation between self-differentiation and self-esteem are either quite low, using an integrative-differentiation measure (de Vries, 1988), or in the opposite direction (Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991). It may be that Donahue et al.'s (1993) more reactive measure, providing subjects with both self-descriptors and (five) social roles, was more accurately evaluating confusion than a more adaptive complexity. That her Self-Concept Differentiation measure correlated so highly negative with the Big-Five's Conscientiousness dimension, in light of the discussion that follows, leads one to think that self-confusion was being measured rather than differentiation. Different methods seem to produce different results.

Campbell's (1993) measure of SCC seeks to tap directly the extent to which an individual's self-beliefs are held with clarity and confidence (e.g., "My beliefs
about myself often conflict with one another. Sometimes I feel that I am not
really the person that I appear to be."). SCC is highly correlated with a number
of maladaptive scales (Campbell, 1993): Negative Affectivity (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988), Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1985), and Taylor's Manifest
Anxiety Scale (1953).

The notion of self-concept confusion, or elsewhere identity diffusion
(Marcia, 1980), also finds a number of resemblances with subscales measuring
Borderline Personality Organization (BPO; Oldham, Clarkin, Appelbaum, Carr,
Kernberg, Lotterman, & Haas, 1985). Oldham et al.'s (1985) measure of BPO has
three subscales: identity diffusion, primitive defenses, and reality testing. A
number of items, particularly the identity-diffusion subscale, are similar to SCC:
"I feel like a fake or an imposter, that others see me as quite different at times."
"I see myself in different ways at different times." "I find it hard to describe
myself." "I feel empty inside." A few of the reality testing items are also similar:
"Somehow, I never know quite how to conduct myself" and more distantly:
"People see me as rude or inconsiderate and I don't know why" and "I feel almost
as if I'm someone else like a friend or relative or even someone I don't know." Of
course it is the convergence of these particularly with more extreme items which
warrant the more serious concern.

Researchers hypothesize that individuals scoring high on both identity
diffusion and primitive defenses of the BPO scale are characteristic of a number
of clinical diagnoses: paranoia, schizoid, histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial, and
borderline disorders (Oldham et al., 1985). This is in agreement with Taylor and
Goritsas (1994) above. In an interesting line of research using the scale, Dutton
(1994) finds that physical abuse, anger, jealousy, and experienced trauma
symptoms correlated highly with all three subscales: "The core of this complex is
an unstable sense of self that requires stabilizing through the intimate other and
a tendency to project (externalize) blame for dysphoria onto the intimate other" (p. 2).

Factorial studies (Goldberg, 1990) have found five clarity-related items to load heavily onto Conscientiousness of the Big-Five: decisiveness, predictability (e.g., consistent, steady), indecisiveness, inconsistency, and aimlessness. Other investigators have found similar results (Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992; Johnson & Ostendorf, 1993). It seems most plausible that goal-directedness and inhibitive or self-control facets of Conscientiousness are implicated in the possession of stable and consistent beliefs regarding oneself. A large literature strongly supports the point (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). It is in this respect that Donahue et al.'s (1993) more reactive measure may have tapped self-confusion rather than multiplicity. She provided both sociological role-identities (e.g., student, son/daughter, friend, romantic partner, worker) and self-descriptors. That Donahue also found a strong negative correlation with self-esteem, using Rosenberg's (1965) measure, is consistent with the finding that individuals high in SCC are also low in self-esteem (Campbell, 1993).

Self-Esteem

Self-esteem is measured using items which assess one's sense of self-worth (e.g., "I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others." "I take a positive attitude toward myself." Rosenberg, 1965). Campbell (1993) suggests that low self-esteem (LSE) and high Neuroticism appear to be independent concomitants of SCC. On self-rating trait-adjective scales, LSE individuals, in contrast to those high in self-esteem (HSE), show greater conservatism and noncommitment in their self-descriptions - they stay closer to the scale's midpoint. In a publication entitled "To know oneself is to like oneself," Baumgardner (1990) found that LSE individuals lacked certainty in their self-
judgments. LSE people take longer to make self-descriptive decisions; report less subjective confidence; show less temporal stability in their ratings; less internal consistency; less congruence with situation-specific behavior (Brockner, 1984; Campbell, 1990, 1993); and show greater daily mood swing in response to life hassles (DeLongis et al., 1988). There are, in addition, the life-buffering effects of high self-esteem discussed above.

The self-confusion of LSE individuals renders their behavior more erratic and situationally determined or plastic. Self-esteem seems particularly salient in its effects regarding people's reactions to self-relevant feedback. The self-presentational style of HSE people (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) tends to discount unfavorable feedback that might throw current self-conceptions into question, whereas LSE individuals are more accepting of both negative and positive feedback (Campbell, 1993). There is here a similarity between LSE and depressive realism. Part of the explanation for this LSE plasticity would appear to be SCC. Having a strong sense of identity, defined as confidence or clarity regarding one's self-knowledge, fosters a sense of control over future outcomes, which in turn supports a stronger sense of positive affect and self-assurance. This is generally consistent with the developmental literature on identity achievement (Grotevant & Adams, 1984; Marcia, 1980) and its correlation with HSE.

The image, then, is of an individual who varies with the context and monitors situational demands. But being plastic rather than flexible means that future goals and commitments are difficult to make - one might come across a context where opinions would need to be changed and projects therefore abandoned.

One function of the self is to keep us from changing too rapidly. Each person must make some long-range plans in order to balance single purposeness against attempts to do everything at once.... We
have to find some way to constrain the changes we might later make.... If we changed our minds too recklessly, we could never know what we might want next.... We could never depend on ourselves. (Minsky, 1986, p. 42)

Minsky speaks of selves as "myth" and "masquerades" - "the chains we forge to keep ourselves from wrecking all the plans we make" (p. 42). It was in this sense that William James expressed the importance of the subjective experience of one's identity stating that a person with a divided sense of self had a "sick soul" (Gergen, 1971, p. 20). But the making of stable committable plans must be balanced in our culture with the reality that many of the vocations we now dream for our children may not be around at the time they are ready to occupy them, in addition to life's all too often tragedies. People are increasingly asked by society to re-tool and make major vocational disjunctions. Ours is a revolving-door economy. Theories that allow for a more open and disequilibrated structure may be more adaptive in this context.

Particularly interesting from this study's point of view, is the attenuated correlation between SCC and self-esteem among Japanese in comparison to North American young adults (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, in press). In Japanese culture, *omote* (face/outer) and *ura* (mind/inner) express the contradictory nature of things, and the value of attaining consistency between inner-outer and across situations is not the same as in a tradition that has believed that God sees even the hidden parts (Doi, 1986). Integrity and authenticity are just the opposite here. One is expected to change according to the demands of the situation.

This underscores the cultural embeddedness of not only our concepts of selfhood (Markus & Kitayama, 1990), but also the implication of self-theories for pathology. Fisher and Farina (1979) found that believing in a biosocial versus a social-learning perspective had implications regarding the causes and solutions to emotional problems that people held. Those whose view of selfhood was
more of a biosocial perspective versus social learning believed that less could be
done to control emotional problems, and in a 4-month follow-up found that such
individuals were more likely to use alcohol and/or drugs to assuage emotional
distress. These two perspectives might map onto Essentialist and
Foundationalist perspectives, respectively.

Self-Focused Attention

Klerman (1979) spoke of ours as the "age of melancholy." Historians and
medical anthropologists note the social construction of not only the self, but also
divergent forms of pathology (Lewis-Fernandez & Kleinman, 1994). In a
retrospective study examining the probability of depression by age cohort since
World War II, Ingram (1990) found a rising incidence and an earlier age of onset.
He points to the "waxing of the individual and the waning of the commons" (p.
2) as largely implicated. The self-focused "maximal" or "California self" emerges
amidst a recession of larger buffering and collective structures such as
nationhood, religion, and family. That depression and the inward turn or
private self-focus have several parallels has long been noted (Smith & Greenberg,
1981). Both depressed individuals and privately self-focused individuals
evidence low self-esteem, social withdrawal, and what has been called
"depressive realism" (Alloy, Albright, Abramson, & Dykman, 1990). Self-focus
and depression are positively correlated in both clinically depressed and
nonclinical samples (Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987). A number of
models of depression have accorded self-focus a central role in the development
of depression. Self-focus has been found to increase negative thinking (Ingram et
al., 1987; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987), amplify negative affect
(Gibbons, Smith, Ingram, Pearce, Brehm, & Schroeder, 1985), and exacerbate
performance deficits (Strack, Blaney, Ganelen, & Coyne, 1985).
In answering the question about why people self-focus, research has implicated both between-subjects differences and within-subjects processes. Regarding the former, Strack et al. (1985) view self-focus as a dispositional response style which tends to perpetuate distress. Nolen-Hoeksema (1987) found that women cope with sadness by becoming passive and ruminative about the causes and implications for their depressed affect. Men who evidenced a more active, distracting style were found to have weaker and shorter bouts of depression.

Persons high in negative affectivity (Watson et al., 1988), understood as a trait-like predisposition elsewhere called neuroticism, regularly report an introspective style - they are apprehensive, negativistic, and vigilant. They report a greater number of physical symptoms, and problems such as headaches, back pain, nausea, colds and so on which correlate rather poorly with more objective health-status indicators such as health-related behaviors (e.g., absenteeism, physician visits), biological markers (e.g., blood pressure levels, serum risk factors, immune system functioning), and health outcomes (e.g., diagnosis of disease, mortality rates). In contrast, trait positive affectivity is unrelated to somatic complaints (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989).

Regarding the within-subjects processes of depression, a number of different causal accounts have been given. Negative affect, like anything perceptually salient, elicits focal attention. That negative affect often follows unexpected events may make the experience that much more salient. Somewhat similarly, a general condition of increased arousal can make the self more perceptually salient (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). Apart from saliency, arousal also initiates an "epistemic search" for information to explain the arousal. Internal sensations and memories of past emotional experiences are examined, especially in cases where the cause of arousal is unclear. When physiological
arousal was induced by having subjects run in place or up a hill, these "naturalistic inducers" were found to evoke self-focus (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980).

A number of persons-as-computer models have self-focus occupying an important role in a self-regulatory negative (discrepancy-reducing) feedback loop. Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) have proposed a model building upon the control-process view of Carver and Scheier (1981). In addition to affect signalling needed self-regulation in the face of disruptive life events, affect may activate a self-regulative process whose function it is to control the affect itself. Disruptions induce a state of self-focused attention in which people compare their current state of goal achievement with a salient standard. If the standard is met or exceeded, positive affect results, the cycle is exited, and self-focus is terminated. Coping is here understood as discrepancy-reducing behavior. In most cases disengagement from the self-regulatory cycle is easily accomplished by simply abandoning or derogating the importance of the goal, and moving onto some other goal. However, when the event evokes a goal that is important to the individual's identity or sense of self-worth, people may be unable or unwilling to exit the self-regulatory cycle. Continuing to focus on an unattainable goal creates a downward spiral in which self-focus intensifies negative affect, and makes extrication that much more difficult when negative internal and stable attributions are made undermining one's sense of mastery. An inability to exit the self-regulatory cycle where self-focused attention continues to hold before one's face the reality that ideals are not being met eventually culminates in a paralytic state of depression. What serves as standards by which current behavior is compared are the self-idealisms, possible selves embodying the hopes, dreams, and fears by which people are motivated.

Wood, Saltzberg, and Goldsamt (1990) suggested that negative affect induces self-focused rumination in response to negative events, whereas positive
affect does not. Happiness was associated with an outward focus; happy people reported a greater desire for social interaction and liking for others. In Carver and Scheier's (1990) view, self-focus is considered more neutrally, serving an adaptive or maladaptive purpose depending on the expectancies that one has. High subjective expectancy promotes a problem-focused coping, whereas if the probability for success is deemed low, a more ruminatory response may follow accompanied by negative affect - continuing to mull over events in the mind, with particular focus on the negative aspects of the event and negative feelings the event elicited.

Lavallee and Campbell (1994) conducted a 2-week diary study and found that daily hassles most disruptive of one's personal goals, which subjects disclosed during a pretest, were regarded as most serious and found to produce the greatest degree of rumination (e.g., "My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop thinking about"), and self-concept confusion (e.g., "My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently"). Between-subjects analysis revealed the close association between negative affectivity, a tendency to ruminate about negative events, and greater levels of self-focused attention in describing the events. According to Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987), negative life events implicating the self or an identity goal involve greater difficulty in exiting the self-regulatory cycle even if discrepancy reduction appears impossible, otherwise calling for an interruption in the cycle. The result is what is experienced as rumination.

A further distinction between reflection and rumination turns on the already employed notion of locus of control. Rumination involves a loss of control, an inability to stop the process of self-analysis. Reflection is, as has been said, a process taken up out of a positive curiosity motive - taken up and dropped as desired. Reflection should, therefore, be positively related to
internality, and rumination should be related to externality.

There is often a decided ahistoricism in many of the above theories of self-focused attention. Levels of depression may be more characteristic of some historical epoches and some developmental periods than others, in which case there should be something more to say regarding self-idealisms than their discrepancy from the actual self (Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992; Alexander & Higgins, 1993). Some historical periods were attended by greater self-focus and depression - it is here hypothesized to be due to particularly held theories of self-identity. For when the epistemic search for meaning and meta-criteria arises in the face of life events and threats to identity, Essentialist and not Functionalist levels are theoretically more likely to take an inward turn. If the current developmental recapitulation theory of self-identity is correct, then the self-focused attention should show up at those corresponding developmental periods. This might also account for dramatic spike in attempted suicide among teens, and the already large literature regarding the increased self-consciousness of adolescents (Lapsley, Milstead, Quintana, Flannery, & Buss, 1986).

Summary and Hypotheses

Contemporary institutions, like the selves that populate them, differ from historically preceding forms of social order with regard to their tendency to dynamism and decentralized dispersiveness. Increasingly, contemporary conceptions of the self are being cast in terms of multiplicity and dubbed postmodern. A useful taxonomy of terms with which to more clearly articulate what is meant by postmodern selves can be conveniently located within the two dimensions of overlap- and number-of-identities. While the self is widely acknowledged to having become problematic in its fragmentedness, the point of contention revolves around whether a solution is to be found in the re-
establishment of old integrative unities, usually conceived in terms of hierarchicalization and overlapping roles/self-aspects, or to accept the multiplicity of differentiation. Gergen (1991) posits a radical inner-populating of selves and incommensurate perspectives that takes place in a pluralistic world, globalized via technologies of saturation.

One possible story, argued by Baumeister (1991), has it that the self is a schema, an organization of self-knowledge. Rather like the Level 1 Simple-Inclusion account of self-identity, different components of the self are added and subtracted from the total aggregate. But this is barely an account of self-identity at all. Little attention is given to self-identity understood as a coherent system. Identity is thus understood primarily with respect to the confidence and clarity with which various components making up the schema are held. The gradual breakup of the fixities of medieval and ancient interdependent cultures has left an unstable and perpetual flux, making identity problematic. Doubt regarding the self is, then, of a piece with the emergent skepticism of our age.

The interpretation I wish to put forward maintains the existence of a soft-stage sequence of qualitatively distinct accounts of self-identity that go beyond hierarchically integrative notions or simple-inclusion account. The problematic nature of selfhood is here understood as not keeping apace recent social reconceptualizations of the self that allow for greater flux. Multiplicity can be maintained, moving in the direction of Gergen’s arguments, while maintaining some necessary cohesiveness in the self structure - what has been called self-identity.

Structuralist notions of self-identity are particularly problematic amidst flux and change, resulting in increased levels of perceived stress, rumination, and lower self-esteem. Notions of immutable inner selves restrict the range of behavioral flexibility and self-multiplicity that can be considered and called upon
in times of perturbation. Levels of *perceived stress* should be higher as well. More
dynamic theories have a greater external and proactive focus, and should be
associated with less introspective *rumination*.

Thus, the purpose of the present study was to examine the following
hypotheses: (a) that higher levels of self-identity (i.e., functional theories) will be
associated with greater self-multiplicity, descriptive of what has been termed the
postmodern self; (b) that the various measures of psychological functioning and
well-being (perceived stress, locus of control, behavioral flexibility, self-concept
confusion, self-esteem, and self-focused attention) will be meaningfully
correlated; (c) that the postmodern self, composed of those individuals who are
both high in self-multiplicity and functionalist in their theory of self-identity
(hence dubbed *Multiplicitous Functionalists*) will be associated with the measures
of psychological functioning and well-being, whereas those low in self-
multiplicity and/or who are Structuralists will not; and (d) additionally, that the
correlation between low self-esteem and high self-concept confusion that has
been found in previous research will be mediated by level of self-identity (with
this relationship evident only at the lower structural levels and not the higher
functional ones).
CHAPTER 2: METHOD

Participants

Participants were 33 female and 31 male undergraduates in the 18- to 24-year age group (but for one 29-year-old), drawn from the University of British Columbia, Department of Psychology's subject pool ($M = 19.6$ years, $SD = 1.71$). Level of post-secondary education ranged from 1 to 5 years ($M = 1.50$ years, $SD = .87$). The ethnic composition of the sample was primarily Caucasian (68.8%), in addition to Oriental (26.6%), East Indian (3.1%), and Arabic (1.6%). Non-Caucasians were either Canadian-born or had been resident in Canada for 5 or more years (with the exception of three participants who had been in Canada for less than 5 years). Socioeconomically, the parents of the participants represented a middle-class composition, as assessed by Treiman's (1977) Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale ($M = 51.1$, $SD = 9.6$). All participants received course credit for their involvement.

This particular age group has a number of characteristics of interest in this study. The period of young adulthood represents a time of considerable transition - a time when extant selves are being abandoned and new selves imagined and forged. The university context can also be a highly stressful one in which direct feedback is given regarding academic progress and aptitude. School and academic life are reported by this age group as most frequently the cause of distress, followed by relationships (Joss, Lacy, & Levine, 1982). The life task here involves the consideration and making of commitments to various desired future possible selves (spouse, profession, new activity identities) and the all-too-real anxiety regarding undesired possible selves - often default positions failing the realization of certain hopes, dreams, and expectations. This is a critical population to examine for pathology and identity formation.
Research indicates that the 18- to 24-year age group is at an even higher risk for suicide than 15- to 19-year age group (Kralik & Danforth, 1992).

Procedure

Participation required a total of 60 to 90 min of students' time. The session was divided into two parts preceded by a brief paper-and-pencil demographic information form. One part involved the completion of six self-report measures completed at a computer station. These computerized self-report measures were generated in random order. The other part of the session was composed of two measures: Linville's (1987) self-complexity (i.e., self-differentiation or multiplicity) sorting task, and the self-identity interview were administered in counterbalanced order. In addition, the order of the two parts of the session were also counterbalanced, yielding four orders of completion.

The following method section begins with a description of the measures that have been employed in the operationalization of a developmental scheme of self-identity culminating in what has been called the "postmodern self" (i.e., self-differentiation and self-identity). The measures of well-being and psychological adjustment follow. Those measures that have already been discussed at length in the previous chapter will require only a brief mention here. The specific measures themselves as well as procedural directions are given in Appendix A. All multiple-item self-report measures were administered using an event-driven computer program. Respondents clicked on the appropriate Likert item (e.g., <STRONGLY DISAGREE> to <STRONGLY AGREE>) in response to the test item displayed in a text window. Clicking on the <NEXT> command button took users through the program, allowing participants to proceed at their own pace.
Measures

Self-Identity Interview (SII)

The self-identity interview is a modification and extension of procedures used by Chandler and colleagues (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Chandler, 1994a, 1994b) in their assessment of self-identity amongst children and teenagers. The original measure involved presenting participants with simplified color-illustrated cartoon versions of Charles Dicken's "A Christmas Carol" and Victor Hugo's "Les Miserables." The presentation of each narrative was followed by a structured interview, probing participants' conceptions of change and identity in the lives of the respective protagonists. Finally, they were asked how they might account for their own self-continuity.

The current research is a modification in that, given the intelligence and maturity of a sample of university undergraduate students and the familiarity of Dickens's "A Christmas Carol," it was possible to discuss the story directly with little preamble. Following that, the film "Regarding Henry" was discussed, replacing "Les Miserables," and participants' notions of true selves and afterlives were elicited - the latter amounting to a final tension test to possible failure on self-identity. Moving from A Christmas Carol, to Regarding Henry, to the afterlife dilemma amounted to a step-wise load increase on self-identity in the manner of a philosophical thought experiment - testing intuitions against the manipulation of a single variable (Wilkes, 1988). Pilot testing confirmed the helpfulness of such load increases in the determination of those identity criteria participants considered most robust in the face of personal change.

Dickens' "A Christmas Carol" is a tale quite familiar to anyone attending to even a smattering of television around Christmas time. Mr. Scrooge enters the story line as an old penny-pinching fiscally absorbed shrew without an ember of
social tenderness. On the eve of Christmas, he is confronted by the panorama of his own sorry and socially isolated life. So soul-stirring is his encounter with the ghosts of Christmas-past, -present, and -future as to compel an (apparently?) radical transformation of character. The story closes with the portrayal of a now warm and generous man who exemplifies the very Christmas spirit of giving and care. After some co-authored before-and-after description of Scrooge is settled upon, the question is asked how the Scrooge portrayed at the beginning of the tale can be understood as one-and-the-same person with that portrayed at its close.

The second dilemma is taken from the film "Regarding Henry," starring Harrison Ford - a story of a man who finds himself in the wrong place at the wrong time. The wrong place is a corner confectionary, and the wrong time involves unfortuitously walking into a petty holdup taking place there. A shot is fired, glancing off Ford's skull. When he finally awakes in the hospital, he does so with the complete loss of memory and knowledge of who he is. Typical of a Harrison Ford movie, all this takes place within the first action packed 10 minutes. The rest of the story is taken up with his struggles in learning to walk, talk, read, write, everything, all over again. The moral parallel with the Scrooge story is classic. After the shooting event he no longer behaves as the lucretiously self-centered, swindling, and maritally unfaithful president of a major corporation he (his past-related self) once was. He sets out to make (his?) past business dealings morally right, and passion kindles towards a woman he is told is his wife. Again participants were asked whether they regarded him as the same and to give some account of their answer. Is Ford to be counted as one or more, should a count of persons across this lifespan be undertaken?

Similarly, participants were asked to discuss their understanding of what people refer to when they speak of "needing to find themselves," as well as their
notions of true selves. Finally, they were prompted to give some account of their own self-identity.

Responses to the questions in the interview were transcribed verbatim and scored by considering both the global level and the match examples provided in the scoring guide (Appendix B). Participants' level of self-identity, based on the protocol as a whole, was classified as either representing a pure level (e.g., Level 3) or a transitional level (e.g., Level 2/3) when adjacent levels were both represented in their reasoning.

Interrater reliability was assessed by a second independent rater who scored a random sample of 25% of the interviews. Reliability was found to be satisfactory, with $r = .79$ and Cohen's $\kappa$ (correcting for chance agreement) = .57.

Self-Multiplicity Sorting Task (SMST)

In Chapter 1, self-differentiation, or what has here been called self-multiplicity, was suggested as part of an operationalization of what was meant by a postmodern self. Linville's (1987) self-sorting task, modeled after Scott (1969), was used in the present research to assess self-multiplicity. Participants were given a deck of 33 1" X 3" cards. Printed on each card is a self-descriptor (e.g., quiet, affectionate, imaginative, etc.) and a number associated with that descriptor. Both positive and negative self-descriptors were included. Participants were instructed to sort the descriptors into groups or self-aspects descriptive of their various social roles (e.g., lawyer, mother), activities (e.g., cyclist, writer), relationships (e.g., friend, cousin), and goals they consider self-defining or representative of the person they are. Participants were free to identify as many or as few self-aspects, and use whatever descriptors they deemed necessary. Task instructions were taken from Linville (1987) and read to participants prior to the sorting task. This particular method of assessing the
self-differentiation construct has proven optimal. P. Linville (personal correspondence, July 22, 1994) notes:

Having subjects check off traits from a list for each self-aspect led them to check lots of traits indiscriminately; having subjects fill in boxes with traits - each representing a different self-aspect - restricted their use of self-aspects and traits; having subjects first list their self-aspects was problematic because the aspects did not arise out of the traits they later sorted; having subjects first list a set number of self-aspects (e.g., 10 self-aspects) does not let the number of aspects vary naturally which is a major component of SC. (p. 1)

Self-multiplicity was scored using a measure of dispersion based on an $H$ statistic as used in information theory (Attneave, 1959; Scott, 1969). Self-multiplicity (SM) represents the minimum number of independent descriptors which underlie an individual's sort. SM is defined by:

$$SM = \log_2 n - (\Sigma n_i \cdot \log_2 n_i)/n$$

where $n$ is the total number of self-descriptors (here 33), and $n_i$ is the number of self-descriptors that are used in any particular group combination. A group combination is a self-descriptor that occurs in some subset of groups but not in others. Any particular self-descriptor could be found in all, none, or any statistical combination of possibilities. For example, if an individual formed only two groups, four possible combinations are possible. Any one descriptor could be found in none, all (1 and 2), 1, or only Group 2. Thus, the SM value increases with the number of identities/selves sorted and the less redundancy of descriptors used in their creation.

Perceived Stress Scale (PSS)

While the notion that stressful life-events are causally implicated in the onset of illness has a broad base of interest, numerous difficulties have arisen in the testing of this relationship. Objective measures, derived either from simple counts of events or a normatively derived weighting of events, have a number of advantages. Yet life-stress scores based on the subjective-ratings of life events
prove to be a better predictor of health outcomes. Rather than calculate global perceived stress levels on the basis of reactions to individual events, Cohen and his colleagues (Cohen, Kamrack, & Mermelstein, 1983) have developed a nonspecific measure of psychological distress that asks questions covering the previous month.

Since perceived stress is a state measure influenced by daily hassles, major events, and coping resources, coefficient alpha reliability is highest across short periods \((r = .85\) over 2 days\). After 6 weeks, more moderate test-retest correlations were obtained \((r = .55)\). Correlations between age and PSS were .04 and -.08 for two samples.

The *Perceived Stress Scale* (PSS) is a 14-item instrument designed to measure a global assessment of experienced stressfulness (Cohen et al., 1983). Items generally involve the degree to which the respondent's life is appraised as unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloading. These three constructs have been repeatedly found to be of considerable significance in the experience of stress (Averill, 1973; Cohen, 1978). Participants indicated their choice on a 5-point Likert scale 1 <NEVER> to 5 <VERY OFTEN>. Items 4 - 7, 9, and 13 are reverse-scored. A final PSS value was derived with a potential range from 14 to 70. High values indicate the experience of considerable subjective stress. This measure was included to test the predictive value of higher stages of self-identity.

**Spheres of Control (SOC)**

An evaluation of locus of control was undertaken using the more differentiated *spheres of control* construct (Paulhus, 1983; Paulhus & Christie, 1981). The measure distinguishes three contexts wherein the perception of internal-external control takes place: personal (SOC-PS), social (SOC-SO), and
political (SOC-PO). It was with respect to perceived control that, the otherwise similar, distinctions were made between behavioral flexibility versus wishy-washiness, and reflection versus rumination. This scale has a high internal consistency (.89; Paulhus, 1983).

Each of the three subscales contains 10 items. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 <DISAGREE> TO 7 <AGREE>, yielding a range on each subscale between 10 and 70. High values indicate a high level of perceived internal efficacy or control within that particular sphere.

Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC)

Behavioral flexibility was measured with the Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC) developed by Paulhus and Martin (1988). While the capacity to respond flexibly in a variety of situations has been widely recognized as an indicator of adjustment, its measurement has been complicated by the development of numerous instruments each correlating rather poorly with one another. Measures which tap the presence of interpersonal traits, such as the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) Flexibility Scale (Gough, 1957) and the Self Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974, 1979), do not directly measure the breadth of one's behavioral repertoire and have demonstrated poor behavioral predictive validity (e.g., the Self Monitoring Scale; John & Block, 1987): Composite measures are generally too narrow in scope. For example, Bem's measure of androgyny assesses only behavior associated with two traits associated with their respective sex roles: instrumentality/dominance and expressiveness/nurturance (Bem, 1974). The current measure seeks to remedy these shortcomings with a self-report inventory that attempts to meet Leary's (1957) two criteria for a behavioral flexibility construct: a wide behavioral repertoire and the capacity to adjust to contextual demands. Both of these are descriptive of a postmodern self and are
hypothesized to correlate with higher stages of self-identity. Factorial analysis has demonstrated that a unique and consistent construct is being tapped by this measure. Significant correlations have also been obtained when compared to peer ratings of global assessment and self-esteem (Paulhus & Martin, 1988). The long form includes the assessment of four indexes of behavioral flexibility (difficulty, avoidance, capability, and anxiety) regarding the enactment of the 16 interpersonal traits. The current study uses only the short form which asks only for the respondents' capability of enactment. This index, in particular, seems to most accurately tap the construct of interest (Paulhus & Martin, 1988).

The measure asks respondents directly about their capacity to perform a number of interpersonal attributes (e.g., "How capable are you of being warm in situations that require it?"). On 16 interpersonal items (e.g., cold, meek, trusting, etc.), participants selected their desired response on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 <NOT AT ALL> to 7 <VERY MUCH>. Items were summed to derive an overall rating of flexibility ranging from 16 to 112. High scores indicate a greater degree of behavioral flexibility.

Self-Concept Confusion Scale (SCCS)

One of the structural aspects of the self-concept is the degree of clarity and confidence with which the components of the self-identity are held. Campbell et al. (in press) have developed a 12-item self-report scale to measure this construct. The measure demonstrates good psychometric properties. Alpha reliability coefficients range from .85 to .86. The combined-sample inter-item correlation matrix demonstrates that all of the items are positively correlated, ranging from .10 to .58, with an average inter-item correlation of .34. Principal components analysis has revealed strong evidence for a single global factor. Test-retest reliability in two separate studies over a 4-month interval in the first study and a
5-month interval in the third, revealed high levels of temporal stability with correlations of .79 and .70, respectively. While the SCCS was moderately correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) Scale of Socially Desirable Responding ($rs = -.32$ in Study 1 and -.33 in Study 3), this is comparable with other measures, including self-esteem, neuroticism, conscientiousness, and agreeableness (Campbell et al., in press).

Participants entered their selection on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 <STRONGLY DISAGREE> to 5 <STRONGLY AGREE>, yielding a final SCCS value between 12 and 60. Items 7 and 11 are reverse scored. High values indicate low temporal stability, confidence, and clarity regarding one's self-beliefs*.

Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)

Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965) which is a global measure of one's sense of self-worth. General items allow the respondent to select and evaluate their own relevant content specific behaviors to form the bases for judgment (e.g., "I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others." "I take a positive attitude toward myself."). The measure is widely used and demonstrates good psychometric properties (Wylie, 1974). A test-retest reliability coefficient of .85 was obtained by Silber and Tippett (1965) using a college sample. The scale has also been found to have a high internal consistency ($\alpha = .78$; DeLongis et al., 1988).

Participants rated each of 10 statements on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 <STRONGLY AGREE> to 4 <STRONGLY DISAGREE>, yielding a range from 10 to 40. High values indicate a high level of self-esteem.

* Since the completion of this thesis research, the SCCS has been modified so that high values indicate self-concept clarity rather than self-concept confusion.
Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ)

Apparent contradictory findings in the self-focus literature imply a "self-absorption paradox" (Alloy & Abramson, 1988). While self-focused individuals are found to hold clearer and more articulate beliefs about themselves, such individuals also evidence significantly higher levels of psychological distress and pathology. This might be regarded as evidence of depressive realism (melancholic sagacity) were it not for another line of research indicating a relationship between self-concept clarity and self-esteem (Campbell, 1990). In an effort to reconcile these findings, Trapnell and Campbell (1995) have distinguished two motivational bases for self-attentiveness: reflection and rumination. Trapnell and Campbell (1995) have developed a measure with two subscales reflecting this distinction. The Reflection Scale (REF) taps an affectively positive inquisitive motive or interest in one's inner thoughts, feelings, and attitudes (e.g., "I love exploring my 'inner' self."). The Rumination Scale (RUM), in contrast, measures affectively negative intrusive thoughts regarding the self evoked by anxiety or uncertainty (e.g., "Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself"). The Reflection and Rumination Scales have been found to be independent of one another, indicating distinct forms of self-attention. While the Reflection Scale is correlated with openness on the Big-Five dimensions and unassociated with neuroticism, the reverse has been found to be true of the Rumination Scale (Trapnell & Campbell, 1995).

Self-focused attention was assessed in this research using the above Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ). Each subscale contains 12 items using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 <STRONGLY DISAGREE> to 5 <STRONGLY AGREE>. The Reflection Scale contains five reverse-coded items, and the Rumination Scale contains three. A score for each scale was determined, with a potential range from 12 to 60. High values indicate high levels of reflection and/or rumination.
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

We began this investigation by making some entrance into recent discussions seeking to take the increasing fragmentation of the self to its ultimate desolation - proclaiming the death of the author itself (Foucault, 1984). Less affrontish in claim, talk of high-modern selves are here deemed more profitably employed than deconstruction, although embeddedness within the increasing complexity of trans-global contemporary cultures will require more radical adjustments than just a larger rolodex (Gergen, 1991). The upshot is to suggest that local theories of selfhood, of which such fragmented forms represent the most recent, propose themselves as emergent and advantageous within such contexts - mutated ideation upon which sound natural selection ought to avail itself. To the empirical end that such historical shifts have their reflection along the developmental continuum, as social embeddedness entails an ever more expansive involvement within the larger global culture, this thesis has sought to operationalize what such a movement might look like. While there is increased talk of the multiplicitous nature of the self in the literature, only limited counter-punctual discussion is heard regarding how the many bits might conceivably congeal to form our taken-for-granted identity. Of the former, self-multiplicity, Linville's (1987) self-sorting task was used; and of the latter, a semi-structured self-identity interview (Chandler, 1994a, 1994b) probed questions of cohesiveness.

The hypotheses of this study rest upon a stress-diathesis outline of health. Disruptive life changes (stressors) are mediated, among other things, by one's conceptions of change and sameness. Particularly when self-definitions are in flux, as they are in the sample under current study, some account of how the rapidly proliferating parts (i.e., self-aspects, social roles, etc.) are to make up the
whole must be had. It is suggested that some accounts may be formally fitter, and that those emerge later along the developmental path. Recall that two of the ways in which this developmental progression might go awry are developmental delay and regression. In addition, there is a third variety, an extreme form of disequilibration where such self-identity justificatory practices are absent altogether (Ball & Chandler, 1989). At the close of the Introduction a number of hypothesis were laid out. Each will be taken up in turn in what follows.

The hypotheses posited a relationship between these two constructs, self-identity and self-multiplicity, and then went on to say something evaluative about higher levels of these variables. This, in particular, was thought to be true of self-identity, where a prescriptive defense of numerically higher levels is currently based only on formal adequacy and temporal emergence - formal adequacy in that higher levels are more accommodating to true change, and temporal emergence commending higher levels within a presupposed later-is-better scheme. The proposed additional level of prescriptivity entails an evaluative temperature-taking from a number of measures of psychological adjustment and well-being: behavioral flexibility, perceived stress, self-esteem, reflection, rumination, self-concept confusion, and locus of control. Higher levels of self-identity and -multiplicity were expected to be predictive of psychological adjustment and well-being. These measures of well-being were predicted to be meaningfully intercorrelated, with locus of control playing a key function. Additionally, the relation between self-concept confusion and self-esteem was hypothesized to be mediated by level of self-identity, serving to underscore the contextual nature of functionalist accounts of self-identity, similar to the role interpersonal cultures play in the evaluative role of behavioral variability. First, something needs to be said about the preliminary analyses that were undertaken.
Preliminary Analyses

Preliminary analysis were conducted on all the measures in this study including self-multiplicity and self-identity in order to examine order effects and gender differences. Recall that the study involved two counterbalanced sessions. One of the sessions took place at a computer station where students responded to items from the following measures in random order: the Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC); the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS); Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (RSES); the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ), composed of reflection (REF) and rumination (RUM) subscales; the Self-Concept Confusion Scale (SCCS); and the Spheres of Control measure (SOC), composed of personal (SOC-PS), social (SOC-SO), and political (SOC-PO) locus of control subscales. The self-multiplicity sorting task and the self-identity interview were taken up in the other session, these also in counterbalanced order. Four orders were thereby created. Analyses did not reveal any order effects on these measures. Similarly, analyses of gender differences revealed no effects with the single exception of significantly higher levels of perceived stress reported by females on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The mean PSS score for females was 42.6 and males, 39.6, t(62) = 2.24, p < .05. Given the generally nonsignificant pattern in these preliminary analyses, these variables of order and gender will not be further examined.

In subsequent analyses using directional tests, one-tailed p-values will be reported when examining the a priori predictions of the study.

Self-Identity and Self-Multiplicity:

The Vessel and its Shards

To be a shard is by definition to imply the existence, at least at some point in one's brighter past, of a functioning vessel of which one was a part.
mentioned in the Introduction, the psychological literature is burgeoning with talk of self-components, roles, goal commitments, self-aspects, and other such shards, but little mention is given to notions of coherence or ownership by which some self comes to regard the fluxional Many as adhering within itself as One. The benefits accruing from more protean and variegated selves were also emphasized in that chapter. However we spell that out, and it is here suggested that at least five levels of possibility exist, some more formal sublimity need rise out of the current hush. At this point the division between transcendental selves, over which philosophers muse, and empirical selves, the quantifiable of psychologists, reflects a faux division. People have something to say on both matters.

Self-Identity

Self-identity was assessed using three mini-narratives, designed to bring a stepwise tensile load to bear on individuals' notions of selfhood: Mr. Scrooge in "A Christmas Carol," Harrison Ford in "Regarding Henry," and beliefs about a possible afterlife. In addition, the usually less convulsive transitions of participants' own lives were quarried for conceptions of self-identity. Students not only had things to say on the matter, but many had a considerable amount to say. Most participants found this component of the study extremely interesting and some had already thought at some length on the problem - although usually in the context of other metaphysical/religious questions.

Scoring the resultant protocols placed these students within the Level 2 through Level 4 range. Most (69%) students were structuralists in their understanding of self-identity. Recall that self-identity is achieved among structural accounts by positing the existence of some temporally continuous self-defining bit(s), whether conceived as currently displayed or temporarily covered
by the debris of convention (Level 2) or laid at the hidden genotypic core (Level 3). Functionalist accounts, Levels 4 and 5, have given up such prospects in favor of emphasizing the relationship across the various time-slices in the life-span.

Self-Multiplicity

Self-multiplicity was measured using Linville's (1987) self-sorting task. Recall that students formed groups of cards reflecting their various self-aspects: roles, traits, and other self-defining components. On each card was a distinct self-descriptor. As many or as few groups of cards could be used in their sort, and from the resultant sort an $H$-statistic was calculated ($M = 3.11$, $SD = .79$).

The first hypothesis proposed an association between level of self-identity and self-multiplicity. Formally more adequate levels of self-identity should allow for a more variegated conception of one's self. The Pearson product-moment correlation between levels of self-identity and self-multiplicity yielded a moderate, but significant correlation of $.22$ ($p < .05$). This relationship between the two variables can be illustrated in two ways. First (as revealed in Figure 2), there was a general increase in the means for self-multiplicity across the three levels of self-identity (collapsing transitional levels into the major levels). Analyses confirmed a linear trend across levels of self-identity, $F(1,61) = 4.44$, $p < .05$.

Second, this relationship was examined using the structural versus functional distinction in level of self-identity (the level of investigation that will be used for all subsequent analyses except where noted). As expected, it was found that Structuralists were significantly different from Functionalists in the degree to which they regard themselves as multiplicitous ($Ms = 2.99$ and 3.37, respectively; $t(62) = 1.79$, $p < .05$).

Similarly, this relationship can be illustrated by way of a contingency table.
with two levels of self-identity (structural vs. functional) and two levels of self-multiplicity (low and high as given by a median split on the variable). As is evident in Table 2, the majority (60.0%) of those at the functional level of self-identity were above the median in self-multiplicity, whereas a slight majority (54.5%) of structuralists were below the median.

We turn then to those measures which will be used in evaluating levels of self-identity and -multiplicity. In subsequent analyses, in addition to using self-identity and self-multiplicity singularly, a composite measure of these related constructs was derived. This measure was derived from the contingency table presented above (Table 2), being premised on the view that such multiplicitous functionalists (those high on both measures) should be more adaptive than those students represented in the other three cells. Thus, this measure simply
Table 2

Dichotomous Classification of Levels of Self-Identity and Self-Multiplicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Multiplicity</th>
<th>Structuralists</th>
<th>Functionals</th>
<th>Self-Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>24 (54.5%)</td>
<td>8 (40.0%)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>20 (45.5%)</td>
<td>12 (60.0%)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

represents a dichotomy between multiplicitous functionalists and the others. The relations amongst the dependent measures will first be taken up before attending to the evaluative work.

Well-Being: Temperature-Taking

In the second hypothesis, the various measures of well-being, against which the current developmental scheme is to be evaluated, were expected to be meaningfully intercorrelated (although as previously mentioned, the political control subscale, which was included as part of the overall SOC measure, was not of any particular interest). As seen in Table 3, all but a small minority (17%, shown in italics) of the correlations among these measures were in the predicted direction. Recall that on some measures a high score represents well-being (viz., RSES, REF, SOC-PS, SOC-SO, SOC-PO), whereas on other measures a low score represents well-being (PSS, RUM, SCCS). For example, the correlation between perceived stress (PSS) and self-esteem (RSES) was expected to be negative, whereas the correlation between PSS and self-concept confusion (SCCS) was expected to be positive. Of those intercorrelations correctly predicted, the
Table 3

**Intercorrelations among the Measures of Well-Being**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Behavioral flexibility (BIC)</td>
<td>-0.28*</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perceived stress (PSS)</td>
<td>-0.42***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
<td>-0.51***</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Self-esteem (RSES)</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.42***</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reflection (REF)</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rumination (RUM)</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.25*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Self-concept confusion (SCCS)</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personal control (SOC-PS)</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Social control (SOC-SO)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Political control (SOC-PO)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Correlations that are not in the predicted direction are indicated by italics.

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001

A majority (63%) attained significance (their p-values are indicated in Table 3).

Marking the clearest path through these intercorrelations, and in light of the discussion in the Introduction, are three constructs of particular interest: behavioral flexibility, self-concept confusion, and self-focused attention. These will be taken up in turn before examining other hypotheses. The thread that will weave its way throughout is a fourth construct of importance - locus of control - in light of the key role it plays in making desirable qualitative distinctions.

**Locus of Control**

The central role of an individual's being the "master of him/herself," as
was noted in the Introduction, dates back in the literature at least to the writings of Plato. The current study further demonstrated the benefits of this construct - internality reigning over externality. Internals who reported high levels of efficacy or control in the personal and social domains also reported less perceived stress and greater levels of self-esteem, $rs = -.37$ and $-.51$, $ps < .05$ and .001, respectively.

As a locus of control measure, the benefits of the SOC in parsing up the generalized internal-external construct into distinct spheres - personal, social, and political - was demonstrated by the distinct intercorrelations found among the various measures of psychological functioning (see Table 3). While personal and social spheres were found to be moderately correlated in this sample ($r = .35$, $p < .05$), as would be expected, neither attained significance in relation to the political sphere, $rs = -.04$ and .07. These sorts of distinctions become easily washed out in using only a generalized internal-external measure.

**Behavioral Flexibility**

The difference, it was argued, between the social chameleon and the flexibly adaptive individual turned upon a locus of control distinction, with internality being deemed the above mentioned virtue. The social chameleon's situational response is passively reactive rather than actively engaging. As expected, a significant correlation was found between behavioral flexibility and level of control in the social sphere, $r = .38$, $p < .001$. Those who reported being capable of enacting a wide variety of interpersonal traits also reported being able to play important parts in group situations (item 10), make and maintain friends (item 2), smooth over disagreements (item 9), and saw themselves as capable conversationalists (item 3). That the correlation between behavioral flexibility and control in the social sphere was higher than in the personal sphere is
understandable given the BIC's focus on interpersonal traits - but it is surprising that the correlation with personal control failed to reach significance. Incidentally, a significant correlation was also found between behavioral flexibility and control in the political sphere, \( r = .33, p < .01 \).

These behaviorally flexible individuals also reported significantly lower levels of perceived stress, \( r = -.28, p < .05 \); as well as higher levels of self-esteem, consistent with the correlation reported by Paulhus and Martin (1988) in examining the behavioral flexibility construct with the BIC.

**Self-Concept Confusion**

Similarly, the locus of control distinction proved discriminating in the question of self-confusion versus self-clarity. Recall the empirical and theoretical difficulty attending an evaluation of those who describe themselves in several conflicting ways: Is complex clarity or confusion the most accurate inference here? Confirming the importance of locus of control in the distinction, the current study found that self-concept confusion (SCCS) correlated negatively with internality in both the personal and social spheres, \( rs = -.37 \) and \(-.23, ps < .05 \) and \(.001 \), respectively. Those individuals who were least likely to state that their beliefs about themselves were in conflict (item 1) or changed frequently (item 4) tended to be among those whose achievements were seen as consequent to their plans and goals (e.g., "When I make plans I am almost certain to make them work" - SOC-PS item 1). Commitment requires knowledge of the self, or at least the belief that one possesses such knowledge. Indeed, one of the functions of the self, as already stated, is to balance long-range plans with the desire to do everything at once - to keep us from wrecking all the plans we make. At that point in life when society asks of its budding youth that commitments be made and a place within the larger social network be found, confusion can be rather
traumatic.

As expected, self-concept confusion was inversely correlated with self-esteem, demonstrating the close relation between the evaluative and knowledge components of the self-structure, $r = -.39, p < .001$. The self-concept enables a number of important personal and social functions such as the presentation of a consistent, predictable self-image, and the providing of goals used to direct behavior. Self-confusion is related to a variety of social, emotional and motivational problems (Baumeister, 1986). For example, in the clinical domain one of the problems of the Borderline Personality is that the need for order is sought in its coherence around disorder and chaos itself (Mitchell, 1988). Such individuals are characterized by extreme interpersonal volatility and turbulent mood fluctuations. Participants who were scored high in self-concept confusion also reported high levels of perceived stress, $r = .32, p < .01$.

Some discussion was also made in the Introduction of the cross-cultural differences found in previous research (Campbell et al., in press) between self-esteem and self-concept confusion - underscoring the constructed nature of the self-concept. Individualism among Western cultures presupposes a bounded self capable of decontextualized description. A self-concept which fluctuates, is inconsistent and unstable, is likely to be labelled as confused - towing in its train a critical evaluation of such unauthentic behavior. In contrast, Japanese culture expects individuals to change according to the context. Here the self is contextually defined within an array of others, and the same behavioral variability is less likely to be regarded reflecting self-confusion. The correlation between self-concept confusion and self-esteem in the one culture becomes a non-issue in the other. Studies in this area "urge caution ... in interpreting SCC scores in non-Western samples" (Campbell et al., in press, p. 43). The current study would suggest that similar developmental considerations should be
entertained. Among structuralists a strong correlation was found between self-concept confusion and self-esteem ($r = -.46, p < .001$), whereas among functionalists, the relationship was nonsignificant ($r = -.25$). However, these two correlations were found not to differ significantly, $z = .84, p = .20$.

**Self-Focused Attention**

It was suggested that not all self-focused attention was equal. Two sorts of inward turn were distinguished: reflection and rumination. Reflection is characterized by a positive intellectual curiosity taken up at will, in contrast to rumination which refers to the negative intrusion of thoughts and an inability to stop analyzing things. This distinction found additional validation in the current study. That rumination is likely to attend the experience of life as uncontrollable, unpredictable, and overwhelming is demonstrated by the significant correlation between rumination and perceived stress, $r = .49, p < .001$. It is, then, understandable that rumination should also be attended by lower levels of self-esteem, $r = -.42, p < .001$. In contrast, neither perceived stress nor self-esteem were significantly related to reflection, $rs = -.02$ and -.19, respectively.

In the same manner that the contextual behavior of the social chameleon was conceptually hived off the more desirable notion of behavioral flexibility, and distinctions were made between self-clarity and confusion, so too, levels of control were expected to discriminate rumination from reflection, particularly control in the personal and social spheres. This hypothesis was not clearly supported, however, using the *Spheres of Control* measure (see Table 3). There was only a single significant correlation between either reflection or rumination and any of the three control subscales. There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of relationships here which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
It was also expected that the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire would provide further validation of the Self-Concept Confusion measure. Campbell et al.'s (in press) finding that SCCS correlated differentially with reflection versus rumination (average $r_s = .12$ vs. .52) suggests that the high levels of self-analysis exhibited by people low in clarity are not particularly motivated by intellectual curiosity about themselves, but are more likely to take the form of affectively-negative intrusive self-relevant thoughts. (p. 22, italics in original)

The current study, however, found a moderate correlation between SCCS and both reflection and rumination subscales ($r_s = .30$ and .51), although the correlation with rumination was considerably stronger. This, in part, might be explained by the moderately significant correlation between the reflection and rumination subscales in the current sample, $r = .37$, $p < .001$, whereas they were only weakly correlated in Campbell et al.'s (in press) study. The present finding need not be understood, however, as a lack of independence between the two measures, given their relatively low intercorrelation.

Composite Measure of Well-Being (CWB)

Finally, because these measures of well-being and psychological adjustment did for the most part correlate meaningfully, a composite measure based on these variables was derived for use in some subsequent analyses. This composite measure of well-being (CWB) was derived by averaging the standardized scores from the BIC, PSS, RSES, RUM, REF, SCCS, and SOC (changing the direction of the scores as appropriate). This composite measure was used, along with the more specific measures, as an additional evaluative measure, hopefully one with greater reliability.
Self-Identity and Self-Multiplicity in Relation to Well-Being

Having established a moderate correlation between level of self-identity and self-multiplicity, and drawn out some of the significant relations among the measures of well-being, it remains to be seen whether a developmental scheme that moves in this direction provides any benefits to its bearer, or whether self-identity is rather an all-or-none matter - the case of development gone awry by disequilibrated deconstruction. Whether these measures independently or in conjunction predict well-being on any of the dependent measures, including the composite well-being measure, is the question that this final section seeks to address.

Self-Multiplicity and Well-Being

Consistent with Linville (1987), although contrary to Campbell et al. (1991) who found a correlation with self-esteem, no significant relationships between self-multiplicity and any of the specific measures of psychological adjustment were found (Table 4). However, with the composite measure of well-being (CWB) as a more general reflection of psychological adjustment, a moderate correlation was revealed ($r = .22$, $p < .05$), indicating the adaptiveness of being multifaceted. This is consistent with the discussion in the first chapter and Linville's (1987) findings of the buffering effects of self-multiplicity.

Self-Identity and Well-Being

An examination of the relationship between levels of self-identity and the measures of well-being revealed similar results (Table 4). Correlations are in the anticipated direction but did not reach significance - except for the already mentioned anomaly with control in the political sphere, $r = .35$, $p < .01$. In particular, the expected correlation between behavioral flexibility and self-identity - anticipating that a functionalist theory might open up greater
Table 4

**Correlations between Self-Identity, Self-Multiplicity and Measures of Well-Being**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-multiplicity</th>
<th>Self-identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral flexibility (BIC)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived stress (PSS)</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem (RSES)</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection (REF)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumination (RUM)</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-concept confusion (SCCS)</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal control (SOC-PS)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social control (SOC-SO)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political control (SOC-PO)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite well-being (CWB)</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05     **p < .01

contextual behavior than structuralist theories - again, while in the correct
direction, did not reach significance, \( r = .16 \).

**Multiplicitous Functionalism and Well-Being**

Recall that not only was it expected that formally more satisfactory levels
of self-identity would allow greater variability or self-multiplicity within the self-
concept (which was indeed found), but also that together they should prove
most adaptive. Table 5 presents the means for the various measures of well-
being (along with significance tests) as a function of this dichotomous
classification of multiplicitous functionalists versus those low on either self-
identity or self-multiplicity.
Table 5

*Multiplicitous Functionalists and Measures of Well-Being*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Well-Being</th>
<th>Multiplicitous Functionalists</th>
<th>Low on either Self-identity or Multiplicity</th>
<th>t-value (df = 62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral flexibility (BIC)</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>1.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived stress (PSS)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem (RSES)</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection (REF)</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>1.68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumination (RUM)</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1.80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-concept confusion (SCCS)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>-.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal control (SOC-PS)</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social control (SOC-SO)</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political control (SOC-PO)</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.97*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite well-being (CWB)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>2.40**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05  **p < .01

While self-multiplicity and self-identity individually did not predict the expected association with behavioral flexibility (see Table 4), when Functional theories of self-identity are conjoined with high self-multiplicity, determined by a median split (see Table 2), members within this category (N = 12) did evidence greater behavioral flexibility. Multiplicitous functionalists reported a greater capability of enacting a wide range of interpersonal traits than students low in multiplicity (simple) or low in self-identity (Structuralists). In addition, multiplicitous functionalists also reported lower levels of perceived stress.

Similarly, the anticipated tendency of structualist theories to invite an
inward turn as the solution par excellence in matters of complexity and confusion, while not supported taking self-identity (or self-multiplicity) by themselves, the relationship did prove significant when both self-multiplicity and self-identity were considered in conjunction: Multiplicitous functionalists were less inclined to rumination and more inclined to reflection.

Finally, it was found that multiplicitous functionalists scored considerably higher on the composite measure of well-being than those who were low on either self-identity or -multiplicity. Thus, in support of the central argument of this thesis, those individuals who conceived of themselves in multifaceted ways and possessed a theory capable of mopping up the many bits into some defensible whole, were found to dwell in the best of all worlds.
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

What the [anti-representationalist] ... denies is that it is explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that item "corresponds to" or "represents" the environment in a way that some other item does not. (Rorty, 1991, p. 5)

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all". (Carroll, 1871/1965, p. 198, italics in original)

Like Alice, this thesis drops into a hole where talk of symbolism, metaphor, and appearances make jabberwocky out of our past ontological lists - where the old matter-of-factness no longer seem to hold sway. In seeking to situate the current thesis within the broader context of current discussion, for which the term "postmodern" is often all too vacuously waved about, the risk is run of similarly coming off rather pretentiously. In getting to the "empirical" business at hand, little more than a tipping-of-the-hat in that general direction was and could have been accomplished even were there infinitely smaller page margins - and, this, in a direction where radical and privileged discourse is underway. By privileged discourse I do not intend o mean that which takes place within the parallel and largely underground and fantastical world of Lewis Carroll - as if words spoken in that kingdom were dream-like and irrelevant to the lives and conversations of construction laborers or low-income housing residents.... The material effects of these discourses first impact the elite.... However, first impacts should not be mistaken as the only impacts because postmodern discourse, like theoretical discourses in the past, come to affect individuals who, by design or otherwise, are kept dangerously unaware of the concerns of the elite. (Russell & Gaubatz, 1995, p. 389)

In large agreement with these writers, this thesis has sought to regard such discourses as more than "frivolous scholasticism," seeking rather, to listen after their intimations within our own theoretical hallways.
By locating this thesis thus, it was hoped that: (a) the socially constructed nature of selfhood might be underscored; and (b) by way of the resultant brief historical cameo, one might hold out the possibility of some similar developmental silhouette. More broadly cast, we have used the term *postmodern* to signal the emergence of more protean selves, or what was to be called *Multiplicitous Functionalists*, whose investigation formed the climax of this thesis.

As noted in the Introduction, the term "postmodern" does, however, pose problems for any historical or developmental project that seeks to place such a biting-of-the-hand-that-located-it level at the top of its progressive stack. Humpty Dumpty is sure to come tumbling down. At best all that can currently be done is to here recognize that the current conception of Level 5 would not be sufficiently radical for many - the reader was asked to have some notion like that of high-modernity in mind (Giddens, 1991).

In the historical cameo it was suggested that, like the apocalyptic landscape in which MacIntyre's (1981) seminal *"After Virtue"* opens, modernity has led to an increased fragmentation of society and selfhood. Anticipated in medieval choral works, the move from monophony to polyphony and part singing was resisted because it was thought to threaten the old unities. But new unities and cohesion have emerged. It was suggested that, while study of multifaceted selves has been a psychological growth industry, the work of self-identity has been largely left in the armchairs of philosophers.

Two measures were used to reflect the developmentally conceptualized move towards a postmodern self. Of today's now interiorized polyphony it was thought that Linville's (1987) self-sorting task might represent an intuitively appropriate tool; and the work of Chandler (1994a) formed the foundation for investigating the developmental means by which individuals conceptualize self-identity. In addition to self-identity and self-multiplicity, *Multiplicitous*
Functionalists - those high in both self-multiplicity and level of self-identity, and representative of the turn towards the postmodern self - were also examined in relation to various measures of well-being.

Self-Identity and Self-Multiplicity

Regarding self-identity, it was suggested that five levels were investigatible and that these emerge to meet local exigencies in the same way that this might be said historically. Developmentally later levels of identity were said to be not only formally more adequate in their capacity to deal with personal change, but also demonstrably adaptive. A previous study (Ball & Chandler, 1989) had already demonstrated that lower levels of self-identity (Levels 1 and 2) were associated with higher suicidal risk (based on past and current expressions of suicidality across several sources and degree of professional concern) in a hospitalized sample of adolescents. The current study sought to extend this research using a number of measures of well-being and psychological adjustment: Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC), Perceived Stress Scale (PSS), Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), Self-Concept Confusion Scale (SCCS), Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ), and the Spheres of Control (SOC). In addition, a composite measure of well-being (CWB) was created from these.

The notion of multiplicity can be studied from several levels. Sociologists investigating identity accumulation (i.e., multiple social positions) have generally spoken of a positive relation between increased number of role identities and well-being. These studies are consistent with other research indicating the benefits of marriage, parenthood, and particularly employment. Investigating finer grains of fracture, however, has been a theoretical and methodological challenge.
Linville (1987) had such a level of analysis in mind when she spoke of self-aspects descriptive of not only the various social roles we indwell, but also activities, relationships, goal-commitments, and any other dimension or category along which people chose to speak of themselves - like bricks going into the earthen dwelling of which we are composed, and for which she uses the term self-complexity. High self-complexity results in a self-sort composed of a large number of self-aspects low in descriptor overlap. Her studies indicate that high self-complexity serves to moderate the adverse impact of stressful life events and physical and mental well-being.

The first hypothesis was to suggest that self-identity and self-complexity (or self-multiplicity) would be related. The increased formal capacity of higher levels of self-identity to maintain a continuous narrative, diachronic unity, in the face of change was thought to relate to an increased capacity for self-multiplicity, the synchronic component. This hypothesis was confirmed, although the correlation was not particularly strong ($r = .22$). Collapsing the levels of self-identity into two groups, Structuralist (Levels 1-3) versus Functionalist theories (Levels 4 and 5), yielded a similarly significant difference in self-multiplicity, with Functionals evidencing greater self-multiplicity than Structuralists.

The second hypothesis concerned the expected intercorrelations among the measures of well-being which were then, in the third hypothesis, used as a water-mark by which self-identity and -multiplicity were evaluated.

**Well-Being**

**Self-Concept Confusion**

The question of self-multiplicity is of a piece with a related construct, that of self-differentiation - often more pejoratively understood. Donahue et al.'s (1993) notion of self-concept differentiation (SCD) is contrasted with ego-integration, and is
found to negatively correlated with the Big-Five's Conscientiousness factor. Being the social-chameleon is deemed undesirable. On the surface, Donahue et al.'s task of ticking off a given set of self-descriptors across a set of five social roles seems not unlike Linville's measure. The equation would be: Linville's self-complexity = Donahue et al.'s self-differentiation. Yet, the one gets storied as a desirable buffer, whereas the other is more descriptive of the self-confused social-chameleon. Whether Donahue et al. achieve the results they do because their measure is a more reactive one, as I have alluded to, is open to question.

Different procedures do seem to predict different outcomes. Similarly, results of asking participants to rate themselves on the descriptiveness of opposing traits terms, can conceptually reflect self-complexity or confusion. The term *multiplicity* was here preferred to avoid such connotative bleeding.

Rather than asking about descriptive variability as determined by social roles or other lines of fracture, a more direct approach to the question is one that asks people to *evaluate* their perceived multiplicity. Campbell et al.'s (in press) measure of *self-concept confusion* asks persons of their subjective experience of conflict and confusion within their self-knowledge - both synchronic and diachronic. Interestingly, both Campbell et al.'s (in press) SCCS and Donahue et al.'s (1993) SCD significantly correlated with low-levels of Conscientiousness on the Big-Five - in part explaining the current suggestion that they were tapping similar constructs. This correlation might be explained in that decisiveness and goal-directedness are important facets of Conscientiousness. The notion of identity as goal-commitment (Erikson, 1968) is relevant here.

In response to the question regarding what people mean when they say "they need to find themselves" in the self-identity interview, most mentioned seeking social and vocational goals. When asked on what basis they might determine such decisive ends, most said something about discovering their likes
and dislikes. In a world that offers its members a veritable smorgasbord of competing opportunities for decision - in contrast to Henry Ford's Model-T coming in any color you want so long as it's black - determining what one's likes and dislikes are, can be worthy of a pilgrim's quest. Essentialists are far more inclined to go ferreting out meta-values from rabbit holes leading to the inner core. One Level 3 18-year-old female participant (#133), in response to the question, stated:

Well, this is kind of funny, because actually that's kind of what I'm going through right now. And I'm actually considering taking a year off and going into the depths of Africa, you know, just somewhere away from my family and everything. For myself, um, find myself - the old cliche that I don't really like to use, but um, I feel like I need to be away from various influences that I know sculpt the way I can sculpt the way I think, and sculpt some of my opinions and my beliefs. I want to be away from that and be in a culture or a setting or an environment that's entirely new, that I can - a clean state. And then sort of get a really pure understanding of myself, you know, without any kind of extra - like my parents are a very big influence in my life.... And just totally just sort of take a layer - like, a big, huge layer off of the outside of myself, or something, and just really look at my core to know what I believe, so that I can - when I come back then, to my parents, and come back to all my other influences that are in my life - can have more of a - like, a less of a wishy-washy kind of set of beliefs, or set of direction as well. I think that's another thing. Like, I really don't know what direction my life is going in at this moment. And for some reason, I think that if I can find myself, that I can get a better idea where I'm supposed to go, or what I'm supposed to do.

In contrast, the Functionalist is far more likely to say something constructivist like that represented by the following 18-year-old male (#154):

Well, I guess people who use that expression basically assume that there's something that they were intended to do. So, I mean, the concept of searching for yourself, um, basically means there's something you don't know about. But to find what's within you, you have to look what - you now, outside of you. That's kind of a paradox.... But personally, I think that I don't believe that there's something that we were determined to do. I could search to find myself by trying as many new things as I could. But I don't think that's predetermined, or set out for me to do beforehand.

The first participant was more passive, regressive, or contemplative in her desire to strip away what she regarded as so much social precipitate. The latter was
more active and progressive, less bound by predetermined fixity, and more a
project of current construction. She scored relatively high in self-confusion,
whereas he scored lower. The correlation between SCCS and either self-identity
or -multiplicity did not reach significance, however, in this sample.

A general qualitative distinction was made between multiplicitous
functionalists and chameleon-ists, revolving around the notion of control - a
thread that will wind its identifiable way through much of the following
discussion. Rather than perceiving oneself as the helpless victim of contextual
happenstance, the multiplicitous functionalist chooses to be, acknowledges that
he or she will be, different across contexts as it is determined suitable. There is no
single self-same core that requires buttressing against the contextual winds.
With respect to self-confusion, this hypothesis was confirmed. Participants who
regarded themselves as confused also tended to state that they experienced low
levels of control in their personal and social spheres ($rs = -.23$ and -.37).

Low Self-Esteem Plasticity

In addition to using self-esteem as a general measure of well-being, often
understood as reflecting the degree of positivity of self-components, another line
of research investigating the phenomenon of low self-esteem plasticity is relevant
here (Brockner, 1984). Research indicates that persons with low self-esteem have
more uncertain self-concepts and tend to evidence greater situation lability than
those with high self-esteem (Campbell et al., 1991). Persons low in self-esteem
tend to be conservative, less the risk-takers when stood alongside their high self-
esteeem self-presenting counterparts. In a similar manner to an individual's
deferring to the judgment of others in an ambiguous context, so too low self-
esteeem persons are plastic or chameleon in the ease with which they accept self-
relevant contextual stimuli when the state of their own self-knowledge is unclear.
As expected, self-concept confusion was inversely correlated with self-esteem ($r = -.39$). Individuals who evaluate themselves lower in self-esteem are unclear about the state of their self-knowledge and tend to experience greater conflict among self-beliefs.

In not all cultural contexts is situational variability deemed problematic. Campbell et al. (in press) have suggested that the close relation between low self-esteem and self-confusion is endemic to a particular species of self-concept - that form of bounded self that emerged in the West, in contrast to the interdependent self particularly native to Japan. Similarly, the fourth hypothesis anticipated that not all developmental levels of self-identity would evidence the high self-esteem/self-confusion relationship because structuralist accounts of self-identity presuppose a self-same bounded individual whereas functionalist accounts do not. Indeed, a difference did emerge with a significant correlation between the two variables among Structuralists but not Functionalists.

**Behavioral Flexibility**

Another measure that was explored as a means of validating the move toward an open postmodern self, was the construct of behavioral flexibility. A long tradition in psychology has sought to underscore the desirability of flexibility versus rigidity - indeed understanding psychopathology as an exaggerated reification of particular self-aspects. Those high in functional flexibility, as measured by the BIC, reported higher levels of self-worth ($r = .32$), consistent with the correlation reported by Paulhus and Martin (1988), and experienced life as less overwhelming, unpredictable, and uncontrollable as measured by the PSS ($r = -.28$). The notion of control is integral to the measure in that respondents are asked to evaluate their *capability* of enactment. Those who reported being capable of enacting a wide variety of interpersonal traits also
reported higher levels of internality. The current study offers further validation of the BIC as a measure of adjustment.

**Reflection-Rumination**

Similarly, the degree of internality was used to describe the difference between reflection and rumination. Recall that *reflection* was characterized by a positive intellectual curiosity motive, in contrast to *rumination*, referring to the negative intrusion of thoughts and an inability to cease self-analysis. That rumination, or more commonly, *worry*, was more likely to attend experiencing life as stressful, was confirmed by the significant correlations with perceived stress (PSS) and self-confusion (SCCS). Understandably rumination was correlated with low self-esteem, whereas reflection was not. Contrary to expectations no differences were found with respect to degree of control using the *spheres of control* (SOC) measure. One possible avenue of explanation could be in the lack of conceptual discrimination made between locus of control, even as parsed up among three spheres (i.e., personal, social, and political), and *self-control*.

Schlegel and Crawford (1976), in seeking to examine the number of possible factors within a generalized locus of control measure, found two main factors labelled *fatalism* and *social systems control*. They conducted a hierarchical factor analysis based on Reid and Ware's (1974) 32-item internal-external locus of control questionnaire. While both fatalism and social systems control factors loaded onto a hierarchical solution of a generalized locus of control factor, self-control items did not - leaving "doubt as to the validity of self-control as a third dimension of I-E control" (p. 385). Self-control (e.g., "People cannot always hold back their personal desires; they will behave out of impulse" - reverse coded item) refers to the sphere of *life-impulses* in contrast to personal control involving
individual life outcomes. Self-control seems to be a distinct dimension from other forms of control. The question of specificity of control is raised. Whether self-control with respect to behavioral impulses and control of thought are separate domains has yet to be determined. What the above research indicates is the asynchronicity of self-control with the more general hierarchical locus of control construct.

As the preceding sections have revealed, these measures of well-being and psychological adjustment did hang together in a meaningful package (justifying the creation of the composite measure of well-being). Now the discussion turns to these measures related to self-identity, self-multiplicity, and their intersection - the multiplicitous functionalists.

**Multiplicitous Functionalists**

For the most part, neither self-identity nor self-multiplicity correlated with any of the measures of well-being. These findings were not inconsistent with Linville's (1987) study. She found only a buffering effect using the self-sorting task. A composite measure of well-being (CWB) was triangulated upon by aggregating measures of well-being into a hopefully more reliable overall reflection. This composite measure correlated with both self-identity and self-multiplicity, although attaining significance only with the latter. Individuals who expressed greater multiplicity had higher levels of overall well-being.

The developmental direction of the postmodern self was said to be multifaceted and to be based on the more formally adequate functionalist theories of self-identity. Those high in both self-multiplicity and level of self-identity, were then hived off for special investigation. Consistent with expectations, and in contrast to either measure alone, multiplicitous functionalists reported a greater capacity to enact a wide repertoire of behaviors
when the situation demanded it. Behavioral flexibility has long been regarded as descriptive of adjustment, and it is hoped that this thesis has given some additional insight into the self-structures of such individuals. This category of persons also reported a greater capacity to see life change (stress) as predictable, controllable, and not overloading. In addition, and reflective of the two transcript excerpts included above, Multiplicitous Functionalists evinced a greater degree of reflection and significantly less rumination than did those who were Structuralists and/or who were not multifaceted.

Finally, Multiplicitous Functionalists scored significantly higher on the composite measure of well-being. It is hoped that this thesis has mustered a certain, though modest, argument for a developmental account of selfhood - and that recent talk of protean, polyphonic selves do suggest themselves as adaptive, particularly in a culture where instability and fragmentation seem often the rule.

Thoughts, Comments, and Snide Remarks

The buffering hypothesis, which underlay much of the current rhetoric, needs further testing particularly by means of a multiple regression model which would include the multiplicative interaction of stress and self-identity. A less labor-intensive tack might involve a more objective measure of stress which examines life-change units either weighted or unweighted, as a way of determining whether certain theories of cohesiveness are more adaptive in more labile contexts. The current use of a perceived stress measure did not allow any comments to be made across participants as to the comparative degree of objective stress or change they were undergoing.

When persons are asked to give some account of Scrooge's self-identity, the first clubs out of the bag were generally remarks like: he still looks the same, has the same place of birth, name, friends, face, etc. Some physicalistic bodily
criteria of the sort best identified as Level 1 were usually offered up as justification served with the observation that in life change usually happens very gradually. The Harrison Ford story served as a means of performing a survival test on these various initial offerings. Pressing harder, the question of belief in an afterlife places maximal tensile stress on the notion of self-identity - bringing it for many to the snapping point. Most philosophical discourse on self-identity usually begins with the 17th century philosopher, John Locke. But while he believed in an invisible (soul) substance, he thought it no basis upon which self-identity might be established. The question remains as to what level of survival testing ought questions of self-identity to be empirically pitched. Should the question of an afterlife be included as an expression of the highest level of reasoning? But this is not a new problem to research into the self. Much in the same way the relatively similar methodologies of Donahue and Linville yielded different results, it remains to be determined what sort of story best elicits the kind of responses reflective of their general structure of self-identity. How much change should the protagonist of the story be allowed to undergo, before the researcher asks questions?

"Good-bye, till we meet again!" she said as cheerfully as she could.
"I shouldn't know you again if we did meet," Humpty Dumpty replied in a discontented tone, giving her one of his fingers to shake: "you're so exactly like other people."
"The face is what one goes by, generally," Alice remarked in a thoughtful tone.
"That's just what I complain of," said Humpty Dumpty. "Your face is the same as everybody has - the two eyes, so - " (marking the places in the air with his thumb) "nose in the middle, mouth under. It's always the same. Now if you had two eyes on the same side of the nose.... A heavy crash shook the forest from end to end. (Carroll, 1871/1965, p. 205)
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: MEASURES

Self-Identity Interview
(adapted from Chandler, 1994a)

Instructions:

In this segment of the study I would like to use the classical story, Charles Dickens's "A Christmas Carol," as a starting-point for discussion. This particular story is not so important to me as the kinds of questions it raises. It is a story of an older man who was shown by different ghosts his past, present, and future. The experience caused him to see himself as someone he didn't like. His life became drastically changed. I am interested in the ideas individuals have about how people can change and yet they still consider themselves to be the same person after that change. We don't doubt that the main character in the beginning is the same as the one in the end - Mr. Scrooge. Indeed, I take for granted that I will be the same person tomorrow or next year as I am today. Little work has thus far been done in this area. I would imagine that a variety of opinions regarding such matters exist. There are obviously no right or wrong answers in this. I chose this particular story because I thought it would be well known - it is frequently shown on television during the Christmas season. Do you recall the story, "A Christmas Carol"? Can you generally remember the main character, Mr. Scrooge?

I have some questions that I would like to ask. They will seem like odd questions, because most of us have never had to think about such matters before. At best we can be said to have some basic intuitions about this. What I will try to do is grasp your understandings. Please feel comfortable to take whatever time you need. I realize that these are difficult questions. Feel free to ask any questions of clarification you like.

SELF-CONTINUITY

1. We've just discussed two very different descriptions of someone who has changed considerably over time. How do you understand that Mr. Scrooge regards himself to be one and the same person in the beginning and in the end? [Or, how do you understand that we are talking about the same person given the changes that have occurred?]

2. [If the sense of sameness is not grasped:] Now while we often use the phrase "I'm not the same person I used to be" or "I was a different person back then," isn't there a sense in which we still regard ourselves as the same? Is this a clear distinction?

3. [If further exploration is needed:] There is a sense in which I/we are investing in our futures - money saved in the bank, getting an education, etc. The assumption is that we expect to be these persons in the future. Why do we assume we will be the same persons in the future?

4. [If family and community are mentioned:] What if we transported this person to the heart of Africa or some very different setting? We left family
and friends behind with no communication. The person adopts a new set of values. Would you consider this person to be the same?

5. Last Christmas I flew out East. The movie on the flight was entitled "Regarding Henry," starring Harrison Ford. Have you ever seen the movie? [No matter.] It is the story of a man who finds himself at the wrong place at the wrong time. The wrong place being a corner 7-11 type store. Wrong time because he walks into the middle of an armed hold-up. A shot is fired and he catches a bullet which just glances off his skull. He almost dies. When he does regain consciousness, he doesn't know who he is or recognize his wife and family. Perhaps typical of Harrison Ford movies, this takes place within the first 5 minutes of the movie. The remainder of the show is taken up with his learning how to walk, talk, read, write - everything all over again. It is like the Scrooge story in that the person "he used to be," if I can use that expression, was very different from the post-shooting Harrison Ford. He used to be involved in crooked business dealings as a president of a major corporation and had a failing marriage. But all that gets turned around and he makes radical changes to his life - or rather he appears to be a different person. Would you say that he is the same person or has he become someone else? [Alternatively: What if you were given the task of counting the number of persons in the world, and came across Harrison Ford's life - would you count one or two persons?]

[If respond "two:" In the movie the character actually gains a few of his memories back. How would this affect your previous judgment?]

TRUE SELVES

6. Sometimes people say that they "need to find themselves." What do you think they mean? Is this a phrase you have ever or are likely to use?

7. When people talk about their true or real self, to what do you think they are referring? Would you say that you had a true or real self?

8. Is it important to know your true self? Why?

9. Would you say you knew who you were?

AUTHENTICITY/CONTEXTUAL SELF

10. What if you were to see a friend acting differently in different situations and in the company of different people. What would your take on that be?

AFTERLIFE

11. We have been discussing individuals whose lives have undergone considerable change - Mr. Scrooge and more the more drastic change of Harrison Ford losing his memory. Death might be regarded as the most abrupt change of all. People often have beliefs regarding an afterlife. Do you think it is possible that people have an afterlife?
PERSONAL

12. Would you say that you have changed a lot over the years? How would you account for your own self-sameness over time?

13. Would you say that you had a strong sense of your own uniqueness? To what extent? Can feeling unique make a person feel alone in the universe?

CHANGE

14. Do you think people can change themselves? [If "no," why? If "yes," how?] What about people like mass murderers or mentally disturbed people that say they have changed? Do you think they can change?
Self-Multiplicity Sorting Task
(from Linville, 1987)

Instructions:

In this study we are interested in how you describe yourself. In front of you are 33 cards and two recording sheets. I'll let you look through the cards when I finish giving the instructions. Each card contains the name of a trait or characteristic. Your task is to form groups of cards that go together, where each group describes a social role, relationship, activity, or goal that is self-defining or representative of some aspect of your life. You may sort the traits into groups on any meaningful basis - but remember to think about yourself while doing this. Form as many or as few groups as you desire. Continue forming groups until you feel that you have formed the important ones. I realize that this task could be endless, but we want only what you feel is meaningful to you. When you feel that you are straining to form more groups, it is probably a good time to stop.

Each group may contain as few or as many traits as you wish. You do not have to use every trait, only those that you feel are descriptive of yourself. Also, each trait may be used in more than one group; so you may keep reusing traits as many times as you like. For example, you may find that you want to use the trait relaxed in several groups. If you wish to use a trait in more than one group, you may use one of these blank cards on your desk. Simply write the trait and its number on a blank card and then proceed to use it as you would the other cards.

The sheet with the columns is your recording sheet. Use the recording sheet to indicate which traits you have put together. Each column will correspond to one of your groups. Notice the number in the corner of each card. Write only the trait's number in the column, not the name of the trait. In each column, place the numbers of the traits that form a group. A natural way to perform this task is to form one or several groups and record them, then mix up the cards and see if there are other groups that you wish to form and then record them. Repeat this procedure until you feel that you have formed the groups that are important to you. Remember to use the blank cards if you wish to use the same trait in more than one group. You have an extra recording sheet if you need it. The order in which you record the groups is not important, nor is the order of the traits within a group. We are only interested in which traits you put together. Please label each group you put together at the top of each column. Use whatever term or expression you like. Do not put your name on the recording sheet. Your responses are strictly confidential - so be as honest as you can.

As you are doing the task, I'd like you to keep a few things in mind. Remember that you are describing yourself in this task, not people in general. You do not have to use all of the traits, and you may reuse a trait in several groups. Take as much time as you like on the task. Different people will finish at different times. Do you have any questions about the task? Now look at each of the traits and let me know if you need any clarification regarding the meaning of any particular trait. When you are finished, please let me know.
Perceived Stress Scale
(from Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983)

Instructions:
There are 14 items on this scale.
You will be asked to indicate your feelings and thoughts during the last month. In each case you will be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are differences between them and you should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer each question fairly quickly. Now click <NEXT> to continue.

1. **never** | 2. **almost never** | 3. **sometimes** | 4. **fairly often** | 5. **very often**

In the last month, how often have you:

1. Been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly?
2. Felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?
3. Felt nervous and stressed?
4. Dealt successfully with irritating life hassles? (-)
5. Felt that you were effectively coping with important changes that were occurring in your life? (-)
6. Felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems? (-)
7. Felt that things were going your way? (-)
8. Found that you could cope with all the things that you had to do?
9. Been able to control irritations in your life? (-)
10. Felt that you were on top of things? (-)
11. Been angered because of things that happened that were outside of your control?
12. Found yourself thinking about things that you have to accomplish?
13. Been able to control the way you spend your time? (-)
14. Felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?
Spheres of Control Questionnaire
(from Paulhus, 1983)

Instructions:
This scale contains 30 items.
For each of the statements presented, please indicate your level of agreement or
disagreement by clicking on the appropriate option. Now click <NEXT> to
continue.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
disagree agree

Personal Control Subscale
1. When I get what I want it's usually because I worked hard for it.
2. When I make plans I am almost certain to make them work.
3. I prefer games involving some luck over games requiring pure skill.
4. I can learn almost anything if I set my mind to it.
5. My major accomplishments are entirely due to hard work and
   intelligence.
6. I usually don't make plans because I have a hard time following through
   on them.
7. Competition encourages excellence.
8. The extent of personal achievement is often determined by chance.
9. On any sort of exam or competition I like to know how well I do relative
   to everyone else.
10. Despite my best efforts I have few worthwhile accomplishments.

Social Control Subscale
11. Even when I'm feeling self-confident about most things, I still seem to lack
    the ability to control interpersonal situations.
12. I have no trouble making and keeping friends.
13. I'm not good at guiding the course of conversation with several others.
14. I can usually establish a close personal relationship with someone I find sexually attractive.

15. When being interviewed I can usually steer the interviewer toward the topics I want to talk about and away from those I wish to avoid.

16. If I need help in carrying out a plan of mine, it's usually difficult to get others to help.

17. If there's someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it.

18. I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others.

19. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement I usually make it worse.

20. I find it easy to play an important part in most group situations.

Political Control Subscale

21. By taking an active part in political and social affairs we, the people, can control world events.

22. The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions.

23. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

24. This world is run by the few people in power and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

25. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.

26. One of the major reasons we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.

27. There is very little we, as consumers, can do to keep the cost of living from going higher.

28. When I look at it carefully I realize it is impossible to have any really important influence over what politicians do.

29. I prefer to concentrate my energy on other things rather than on solving the world's problems.

30. In the long run we, the voters, are responsible for bad government on a national as well as a local level.
Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities
(adapted from Paulhus & Martin, 1988)

Instructions:

The following scale contains 16 items.

In different social situations, different behaviors are required. For example, we need to act warm at some times and cold at other times. For certain behaviors, we find ourselves easily capable of acting in the required fashion. But for other behaviors, we find ourselves incapable of acting that way even when we know the situation requires it.

You will be presented with several behaviors. Choose the scale item most like you. Click the mouse (left button) on the best option and click on <NEXT>.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
not at all somewhat very much

1. How capable are you of being gregarious (i.e., friendly, neighborly, approachable) in situations that require it?
2. How capable are you of being humble (i.e., unaggressive, modest, not vain) in situations that require it?
3. How capable are you of being aloof (i.e., impersonal, uninvolved, distant) in situations that require it?
4. How capable are you of being boastful (i.e., conceited, arrogant, cocky) in situations that require it?
5. How capable are you of being introverted (i.e., withdrawn, unsparkling, shy) in situations that require it?
6. How capable are you of being warm (i.e., tender, kind, sympathetic) in situations that require it?
7. How capable are you of being meek (i.e., timid, shy, bashful) in situations that require it?
8. How capable are you of being cold (i.e., uncharitable, hardhearted, unsympathetic) in situations that require it?
9. How capable are you of being extraverted (i.e., outgoing, lively, enthusiastic) in situations that require it?
10. How capable are you of being trusting (i.e., gullible, naive, not crafty) in situations that require it?
11. How capable are you of being self-assured (i.e., self-confident, assertive, firm) in situations that require it?

12. How capable are you of being crafty (i.e., cunning, sly, calculating) in situations that require it?

13. How capable are you of being dominant (i.e., commanding, forceful, leader-like) in situations that require it?

14. How capable are you of being agreeable (i.e., accommodating, compliant, cooperative) in situations that require it?

15. How capable are you of being submissive (i.e., forceless, yielding, weak) in situations that require it?

16. How capable are you of being quarrelsome (i.e., impolite, uncooperative, hostile) in situations that require it?
Instructions:

This scale contains 12 items.

For each of the statements presented, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by clicking on the appropriate option. Now click <NEXT> to continue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 strongly disagree</th>
<th>2 disagree</th>
<th>3 neutral</th>
<th>4 agree</th>
<th>5 strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a different opinion.
3. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one day to another day.
4. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was really like.
6. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.
7. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality.
8. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.
9. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.
10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really like.
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know what I want.
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(from Rosenberg, 1965)

Instructions:

This scale contains 10 items.

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements below, using the following scale. Now click <NEXT> to continue.

1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire

(Trapnell & Campbell, 1995)

Instructions:

This scale contains 24 items.

For each of the statements presented, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by clicking on the appropriate option. Now click <NEXT> to continue.

1  2  3  4  5
1 strongly disagree 2 disagree 3 neutral 4 agree 5 strongly agree

Reflection Subscale

1. Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn't appeal to me that much. (-)
2. I'm not really a meditative type of person. (-)
3. I love exploring my "inner" self.
4. My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me.
5. I don't really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. (-)
6. I love analyzing why I do things.
7. People often say I'm a "deep," introspective type of person.
8. I don't care much for self-analysis. (-)
9. I'm very self-inquisitive by nature.
10. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things.
11. I love to look at my life in philosophical ways.
12. Contemplating myself isn't my idea of fun. (-)

Rumination Subscale

1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop thinking about.
2. I always seem to be "re-hashing" in my mind recent things I've said or done.

3. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself.

4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep going back to what happened.

5. I tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me for a really long time afterward.

6. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with. (-)

7. Often I'm playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation.

8. I often find myself re-evaluating something I've done.

9. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long. (-)

10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. (-)

11. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with.

12. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or disappointing moments.
APPENDIX B: SELF-IDENTITY SCORING SYSTEM

Five pure levels of self-identity can generally be divided into structural and functional theories. What most easily distinguishes between the two is the presence/absence of belief in an unchanging self-entity. Structuralists regard the self as fixed and unchanging, whereas Functionalists do not. This distinction might most clearly evident in the Ford story in response to the first question whether Ford is the same person or whether he should be counted as two. Discussions of the existence of true (immutable) selves is also a good place to check for this distinction.

Scoring should consider two points: (a) does the protocol reflect a structuralist or a functionalist theory? and (b) what specific account is reflected, considering match examples. Actual scoring practice will probably reflect some recursiveness between the two steps.

I. Structural Theories

 Structural theories are alike in their belief in the self as some static thing remaining outside the ravages of time. If one's personal identity through time is conceived as a set of frames in a film, then what connects the various frames as belonging to the same spool is a self-same entity existing unchanged in each frame.

Distinctions:

Level 1, the Simple Inclusion account, is barely any proper account at all, and likely to be found only among young subjects. The distinction, then, falls between Topological and Essentialist accounts. What distinguishes the two is (a) level of abstraction and (b) accessibility to direct observation. The latter is perhaps easiest to determine. If subjects speak of themselves or their self-
attributes in a rather simplistic, dogmatic, or self-evident sense, then look at specific match items in Level 2. If the self, however, is more illusive and hidden or it is said to have various "expressions," then this more likely indicate a Level 3 account. Structuralists rely most heavily on a bodily criteria of self-identity, in contrast to the emphasized memory criteria of the Functionalists.

**Level 1 - Simple Inclusion Account**

**Conception of the Self:**

The self is seen as a static, aggregate collection of components.

**Self-Identity:**

Change involves the simple addition or deletion of self-components. Some sufficient number or intersecting set of self-components remains across one's former and current selves.

**Level 2 - Topological Account**

**Conception of the Self:**

The self is viewed as a multifaceted structure. Each facet of which is equated with another side of a fixed character. The metaphor is that of a centerless and depthless polyhedronic shape.

**Self-Identity:**

Change involves the mere presentation and eclipse of facets - thus change is only apparent and not real change. While facets may be hidden from view or go dormant, components of the self remain fixed through the lifespan. There is a skepticism regarding change and a cynicism toward those that claim they have changed.
Self-Knowledge:

Self-knowledge is not a difficult task. Self-descriptions have a rather matter-of-fact or self-evident character to them.

Examples:

Scrooge:

1. He doesn't change, he is just putting on a Mr. Niceguy. If we could follow the story a little longer we would see him revert back to his old ways.

2. Scrooge hasn't changed at all, he's just gotten superficially nice. The sameness in him is just his built-in characteristics. He can only change the way he shows them.

Ford:

1. If the movie continued, you would see he would just return to the person he was before.

2. He can present himself to other people, so they think he is different, but he is really the same person.

Personal:

1. I can be nice or I can be cold. There isn't one aspect that is really or the true me deep inside.

Change:

1. People don't change - they can only change the way they cope with or react to situations and people.

2. You will always struggle with those parts of your character - certain situations, like stress, can bring them back up to the surface.

3. Some of those characteristics will always be there in your brain somewhere.

Level 2/3 - Transitional

Score a transitional 2/3 when adjacent levels are mentioned consistently throughout the same protocol.
Level 3 - Essentialist Accounts

Conception of the Self:

*Horizontal* (periphery-core) and/or *vertical* (surface-depth) metaphors are pressed into service here. The *true* self is located in the most introspectively inaccessible regions of one's being. Three different types are distinguishable. Type 1 is static - one's core self has always been there. Type 2 represents a maturational unfolding of a personality latently present at birth. Either type could emphasize physicalistic genetic information or some more invisible soulish description. Of whichever type, a postulated inner core is the result. Little emphasis is given on the role the social domain in with respect to the true self. Indeed, one's current self may often be regarded as a *false* self - the result of cultural shaping from without rather than authentically mined out from the true inner core.

Type 3 is the most abstracted of all. Who one is reduces to a formless, descriptionless *point of view* moving through space.

Self-Identity:

Change is recognized as phenotypic, involving only surface change. The deeper self-defining characteristics never change. Behavior may represent different expressions of the same inner self.

Self-Knowledge:

Knowing one's true self can be problematic because of its hiddenness. It is not always clear what is the true versus the false self. There is often a strong quest theme in these protocols. Type 2 and Type 3 are often difficult to distinguish. Consider (a) level of abstraction, and (b) accessibility of self to direct observation. Do not confuse with the Topological account, which lacks the
hidden abstractness and introspective complexity of the Essential accounts.

Examples:

Scrooge:

1. His underlying personality will always be there. How his desire for money gets expressed is what changes.

2. I think he would change on the surface, but somewhere inside of them, his personality would be the same.

3. We're born with certain instincts of how to act and behave - heredity plays the most important part.

4. The relation of the inner to the outer, always remains the same. Who you are is the inner. That's the difference between the I and the Me. [Type 4]

Ford:

1. Ford is the same person, because he still has the same soul. The incident caused him to find his true self, which is who he is after the shooting.

2. Even though he lost his memory he would still have the same personality traits and would behave the same, only they would be expressed different.

3. Ford remains the same person even though he is not aware of it.

Afterlife:

1. I will go up to heaven and I'll look at things the way I've been looking at things through life. I'll kind of have the same essence.

2. Afterlife is possible because the soul is eternal and unchanging.

3. I don't believe in an afterlife because once you are dead, your body, who you are, is dead.

Personal:

1. Life is a gradual process of discovering the self.

2. My basic feelings, reactions, and goals stay the same. There are always those same themes.

3. My life could not have turned out other than it did.

Change:

1. Only external change is possible.
Level 3/4 - Transitional

Conception of the Self:

This transitional stage has two forms. Type 1 refers to those protocols which use the adjacent Levels 3 and Level 4. Type 2, in contrast, appears as a genuine combination of Levels 3 and 4. This second type can be understood as a crystallized personality type. These individuals emphasize the role of experience, particularly early childhood experience in creating the self, but once matured it reifies into an immutable entity describable in the same terms as the Level 3 self - as core, fixed, and immutable. The following examples are taken from this second type.

Personal-Identity:

Change is possible early in life, but not once the inner core has crystalized or matured.

Examples:

Scrooge:

1. In essence he is still the same personality deep inside.... Everything that happens to you makes you who you are.

Ford:

1. The foundation that has been laid by experience is still there, deep down inside. He still will know and behave the same even though he doesn't know it.

Change:

1. People don't change ... maybe if some major traumatic experience event happened. But I still don't think they would change deep inside.
II. Functional Theories

Level 4 - Foundational Accounts

Conception of the Self:

The present is conceived as a causal consequence of one's past. The most significant indicator marking this level is the use of memory as a criteria for establishing sameness through time. The memories of one's past all gather within the same consciousness - often conceived as a vacuous chamber or theater in which memories re/appear and are gathered. People are a stream of consciousness.

Personal-Identity:

Change can involve surface as well as deeper structures. Indeed there is little talk of deeper anything, although some notion of implicit memory or automaticity might be mentioned. Experience is what determines who one is and the sorts of change that are possible. Genetics is more a description of the hardware on which the software runs. Descriptions of current selves make use of causal language (because, since, for the reason that, etc.) involving temporal rather than spatial depth.

Self-Knowledge:

No true self is to be sought after, but rather a very pragmatic approach to self-identity. People who speak of looking for themselves are just mixed up.

Change:

(True) change is possible at any time. The distinction between true versus some other form of change is not as sharply distinguished here.
Examples:

**Scrooge:**

1. Scrooge is the same person because he remembers that he was the one that changed.
2. Scrooge sees the changes happening to him.
3. He still remember who he used to be, and where he was born.

**Ford:**

1. A person's essence is their experience and memories. Ford acquires a new essence with loss of his memories - he has to start over.
2. He would still have the same memories. That makes him one continuous person, not necessarily the same.
3. Ford would be a different person if he lost his memory.
4. Ford would be a different person. It's like turning a computer off and starting all over again.

**Afterlife:**

1. Afterlife is possible, because the body doesn't really stand for anything. It's not who you are.
2. I think the soul can change.

**Personal:**

1. My goals will change as I go through life.

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**Level 5 - Narrative Accounts**

**Conception of the Self:**

The self is regarded as a theoretical construct - like the notion of a center of gravity. One's self is an autobiographical story in which one is the actor. Causal mechanisms supplying spatial and temporal depth may be used, but these are regarded as metaphor. One's behavior can be re-storied from numerous perspectives and perhaps serving different purposes.

Similar to the Level 4, but rather there is a clear understanding that the
memory criteria is not "A having the memories of A," but rather "A having the memories of B, of whom A is believed to be temporally connected."

Change:

Involves re-storying the dominant texts that have ordered one's life and filling in. "The evolution of lives is akin to the process of reauthoring, the process of persons' entering into stories, taking them over and making them their own" (White & Epston, 1990, p. 13).

Example:

1. There is no self just beliefs that there exists a person in the past who experienced certain things which I regard myself as connected with by virtue that I currently have those memories.

2. The traumatic event caused him to interpret or see his life differently.