SINO-JAPANESE TRADE IN THE EARLY TOKUGAWA PERIOD: *KANGO*, COPPER, AND *SHINPAI*

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis surveys Sino-Japanese relations in the early Tokugawa period with a specific focus on transactions in the major commodity--copper--between the two countries. The main purpose of the research is to investigate the bilateral contact in the early Tokugawa, the evolution of the copper trade, the political events involved with the trade, and to reexamine the significance of *sakoku* (seclusion) policy of Japan from a Chinese perspective.

This thesis first explores the efforts of the shogunate from 1600 to 1625 towards reopening the *kango* or tally trade with China which had been suspended in the previous Muromachi period. Based on research of the archives of the Ming imperial court, this study for the first time demonstrates the Chinese response to their efforts. The thesis goes on to survey the copper problem in China, the Qing court copper policy, and the copper trade between Japan and the Qing. The discussion includes concern with China's internal economic and monetary situation and its external trade with Japan, the Kangxi Emperor's direct involvement with the copper trade, particularly from 1684 to 1715, and the control over the trade by the bakufu. Finally, the thesis presents a thorough examination of the case of *shinpai* (trade credentials) in China triggered by the "Shotoku New Regulations" issued by the bakufu in 1715, and takes the *shinpai* case and the imperial edict of the Kangxi Emperor on the case as a touchstone and clue to the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations in the whole Tokugawa period. The study concludes that the *sakoku* policy had a positive impact on Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa (Qing) period.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KNNB Nin, Kosho (Ren Hongzhang). *Kinsei Nihon to Nitchu boeki*. (The Pre-Modern Japan and Sino-Japanese Trade). Tokyo: Rokko Shuppan, 1988.

KXQ *Kangxi qijuzhu*. (The Court Record of the Kangxi Emperor's Daily Activities). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984.

MSS *Ming Shenzong Xianhuangdi shilu*. (Veritable Records of the Wanli Reign). Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1962.

NBK Kimiya, Yasuhiko. *Nikka bunka koryushi*. (The History of Sino-Japanese Cultural Communication). Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1955; rep. edn., 1987.

NSS Shinobu, Seizaburo. *Nihon seijishi*. (The History of Japanese Politics). Tokyo: Nansosha, 1976.

NTB Yamawaki, Teijiro. *Nagasaki no Tojin boeki*. (The Chinese Trade in Nagasaki). Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1964.

ZQZM Ren, Hongzhang. "Zhaotong yu Qingdai qianqi de Zhongri maoyi" (Copper Bullion and the Sino-Japanese Trade in the Early Qing Period), in Dongbei Diqu Zhongri Guanxishi Yanjiuhui, ed., *Zhongri guanxishi luncong*, vol. 1, Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1982, pp. 56-71.

NOTE

All romanization of Chinese terms is in *pinyin*. For Japanese, the Hepburn romanization system has been employed, but in the main text long vowels are not indicated by a macron; all the Japanese words with such a symbol can be found in the glossary. Most terms for units of measurement are written in accordance with Japanese pronunciation. Both Chinese and Japanese names have been expressed by family name first. Dates which are given in terms of the Chinese or Japanese lunar calendar are written in the following way: era name, era year (Western year)/month/date. For example: Keicho5(1600)/6/11, means the eleventh day of the sixth month of the fifth year of Keicho era in lunar calendar; while the year is 1600 in Western calendar. Sometimes the era name is omitted, which means that the year given is in Western calendar but the month and the date are still in lunar calendar.



Illustration 1. - *Kango* (Trade Tally)
Source: Nin Kosho (Ren Hongzhang), *Kinsei Nihon to Nitchu boeki* (Tokyo: Rokko Shuppan, 1988), 19

信牌

長崎通商照票

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Illustration 2. - *Shinpai* (Trade Credential)
Source: Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shiko kaito roku · Tojin fusetsu gaki · Wappu tomecho* (Suita: The Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies at Kansai University, 1974), Illustration 1.



Illustration 3. - Chinese Ship from Fuzhou (Fujian)
Source: Nishikawa Joken, *Zoho Ka-i tsushoko* (1708; rep. edn., in *Nihon keizai sosho* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Sosho Kankokai, 1914), 5, 243.



Illustration 4. - Chinese Ship from Nanjing (Jiangsu)
Source: Ibid., 242.



Map 1. - Japan
Source: Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Map 3.



Map 2. - Kyushu
Source: Ibid., Map 9.



Map 3. - China
Source: Lynn A. Struve, ed., and trans., *Voice from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tiger's Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 4.

SINO-JAPANESE TRADE IN THE EARLY TOKUGAWA PERIOD: *KANGO*, COPPER, AND *SHINPAI*

"Countries are situated in various directions; those which have gold and jade might lack silk and brocade while those which have millet and rice might lack implements and utensils. If those which have a surplus don't distribute and those which have shortage don't acquire, people's livelihoods will be deficient and those surplus commodities will rot. Rather than waiting for rotting, it is better for each to supply what the other needs so that each can get what they want."

Tokugawa Ieyasu[1]

[1]Suganuma Teifu, *Dai Nihon shogyoshi* (1892; rep. edn., [n. p.] 1979), preface by Tani Tateki.

INTRODUCTION

One of the profound and enduring topics in Japanese history, from high antiquity until the present time, is Japan's relationship with its continental neighbour, China. The theme is of particular significance in the Tokugawa period (1600-1867) when Japan purposely cuts off its ties with the outside world. During an era between the enforcement of a so-called "*sakoku*" or seclusion policy in 1639 and Perry's navigation to Tokyo Bay in 1853, only the Chinese, along with the Dutch, were allowed to come to the port of Nagasaki to trade.[2]

Due to historical heritage and cultural affinity, China functioned not only as a trading partner but even more as a window and a medium to the outside world. Japan's trade with China was in fact a political and diplomatic activity as well as an economic and commercial interaction. Thus, the study of the trade is undoubtedly a key to the understanding of broader themes in the history of Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa period.

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[2]Strictly speaking, there was another route of Sino-Japanese trade, besides Nagasaki, which operated during the *sakoku* period, even though the trading value was very limited. That was *Santan koeki* (Santan Trade), an annual barter trade between Santan (*Shandan*, in Chinese), the native people living in the lower Heilongjiang (Amur) River region, and Ainu of Ezo (Hokkaido). The trading centres were located at Shiranushi, a town at the south end of the Karafuto (Sakhalin) Island, and Soya, a village within the present Wakkanai city of Hokkaido. Allegedly, in 1593, Kakizaki (Matsumae) Yoshihiro, who would later become the lord of Matsumae domain, presented Tokugawa Ieyasu a Chinese coat which was purchased from the trade. Starting from about the twelfth century, the trade continued until the mid-nineteenth century. A minority group living in present China, *Santan* is also known as *Elunchun*. See Kokushi Daijiten Henshu Iinkai, ed., *Kokushi daijiten* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985), 6, 581-82; also Kondo Morishige, *Henyo bunkai zuko*, in *Kondo Seisai zenshu* (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1905), 1, 1-160 (separate pagination). For an introductory article in Chinese, see Chen Kang, "Zhongguo yu Beihaidao guanxi shihua", in Zhongwai Guanxishi Xuehui, ed., *Zhongwai guanxi shi luncong* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1987), 2, 25-47.

Sino-Japanese relations and the trade between the two countries in the Tokugawa period have been studied in Japan and China for many years with many scholars being particularly interested in the dominant form of commerce, the copper trade. Copper functioned for Japan as a major means of payment in foreign trade, more important than gold and silver in the Tokugawa period, and the productivity of copper or the sum of copper collected for export primarily decided the scale of the country's overseas trade. On the other hand, copper was the original material for currency minting in China, and her monetary stability was heavily influenced by the supply of Japanese copper. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that "all the commercial transactions between China and Japan in the Tokugawa period existed because of the existence of the copper trade."[3]

Since the end of the World War Two, Western scholars have also been attracted to the study of Sino-Japanese relations and trade in the Tokugawa period. In 1949, John W. Hall published a path-breaking article on the Sino-Japanese copper trade which explored China's dependence on the Japanese copper supply in the early part of Qing period (1644-1911).[4] Afterwards, William S. Atwell's studies[5] of currency flows in sixteenth and seventeenth

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[3]*ZQZM*, 69.

[4]John W. Hall, "Notes on the Early Ch'ing Copper Trade with Japan", in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 12 (Dec 1949), 444-61.

[5]William S. Atwell, "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy Circa 1530-1650", in *Past & Present*, 95 (May 1982), 68-90; and "Some Observations on the Seventeenth Century Crisis in China and Japan", in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 45:2 (Feb 1986), 223-244.

century East Asia, indicated the significance of Japanese overseas trade to an even greater extent.

Important works which examined the issues of *wako* (Japanese pirates) and the Chinese seaborne piracy related to Sino-Japanese relations, and which provided distinctive historical setting for Sino-Japanese trade in the previous Ming dynasty (1368-1644), were Wang I-t'ung's book, *Official Relations between China and Japan, 1368-1549*,[6] So Kwan-wai's book, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the Sixteenth Century*,[7] and John E. Wills, Jr.'s works, including his article, "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang", and his book, *Pepper, Guns, and Parleys; the Dutch East India Company and China, 1622-1681*.[8] These authors clarified the historical background and demonstrated that both the form and the participants of the Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period would be different from those of any other time.

In 1970 and 1980 respectively, Aloysius Chang[9] and Robert LeRoy Innes[10] presented their dissertations on the trade in this

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[6]Wang I-t'ung: *Official Relations between China and Japan, 1368-1549* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[7]So Kwan-wai, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the Sixteenth Century* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975).

[8]John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History", in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills Jr., eds., *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); and *Pepper, Guns, and Parleys; the Dutch East India Company and China, 1622-1681* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

[9]Aloysius Chang, *The Chinese Community of Nagasaki in the First Century of the Nagasaki Period, 1603-1688* [Ph.D. dissertation] (Brooklyn: Saint John's University, 1970).

[10]Robert LeRoy Innes, *The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century* [Ph.D. dissertation] (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).

historical period. Innes' work, *The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century*, is the first systematic study of Japanese foreign trade in the seventeenth century and still remains even today as the only significant research on the trade itself. In this way, it is suitable to refer Innes' work as the "most relevant research" to the present study.

A well-known study was added to the literature by Ronald P. Toby in 1984;[11] his book *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* cast brilliant light on major aspects of Japanese relations with China and Korea in the early Tokugawa years. In fact, most of the themes of the current thesis are triggered by or related to Toby's book. In 1992, Marius B. Jansen, one of the pioneers in the study of Sino-Japanese relations, contributed another book, *China in the Tokugawa World*[12] to the field, a work which has functioned as a valuable guidebook to anyone wishing to approach the study of Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa and the Meiji era.

Another group of scholars whose works are relevant to Sino-Japanese relations are those who have studied Dutch-Japanese

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[11]Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Toby also has another major article: "Contesting the Centre: International Sources of Japanese National Identity", in *International History Review*, 7:3 (Aug 1985), 347-63.

[12]Marius B. Jansen, *China in the Tokugawa World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

relations.[13] Their works, which centre on events contemporaneous with the Sino-Japanese trade, can also serve as background for those studying this trade. They can be particularly helpful in presenting a wider context in which the trade of copper and other precious metals took place between Japan and China.

Finally, the works of authors who write about Arai Hakuseki,[14] one of the major shogunal policy initiators in the early Tokugawa period, also produced useful research for the study of Sino-Japanese relations.

Although some Western scholars have already stressed the importance of studying Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa period, generally speaking, works in English on the subject are

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[13]Two "index" books for the theme are: John Landwehr, *VOC: A Bibliography of Publications relating to the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1800* (Utrecht: HES, 1991) and M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz et al., eds., *Dutch Authors on Asian History: A Selection of Dutch Historiography on the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Providence: Foris Publications, 1988). Leading authors on the topic include: Charles R. Boxer, Leonard Blussé, Artur Attman, Kristof Glamann, John E. Wills, Jr., William S. Atwell, etc. It is difficult to list "major" works, but the following are particularly related to the copper trade: Charles R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (New York: Knopf, 1965), *Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia: 1602-1795* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), and *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555-1640* (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Históricos ultramarinos, 1963); Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Riverton: Foris Publications, 1986); Artur Attman, *Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550-1800* [trans. by Eva and Allan Green] (Goteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhallet, 1983), and *The Bullion Flow between Europe and the East, 1000-1750* [trans. by Eva and Allan Green] (Goteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhallet, 1981); and Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen: Danish Science Press, 1958), especially, Chapter IX, "Japanese Copper".

[14]Major works include: Joyce Ackroyd, trans., *Told round a Brushwood Fire: The Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki* (Tokyo: Princeton University Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1979), and Kate Nakai, *Shogunal Politics: Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of Tokugawa Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

"surprisingly few"[15], and many crucial questions about the relationship and trade between the two countries in this period have remained unanswered: when and how, for example, did Tokugawa Ieyasu start his efforts to restore trading relations with China, what measures did the shogunate take to continue these efforts, how were the Japanese affairs treated in the imperial court of the Ming and Qing dynasty, and on what basis did China form her policy towards Japan?

Even in Japanese historiography, some unsolved problems remain. For instance, in an effort to obtain *kango* (trade tally i.e. permission to trade) from China, the shogunate elaborately prepared and entrusted letters to Chinese local authorities. However, unfortunately, there was no Japanese source which recorded the responses to those letters. It therefore remained enigmatic as to whether the Chinese ever received these letters, and whether they ever responded. Another area in which questions have lingered is the subject of *sakoku* (seclusion). Although the discussion about *sakoku* has always played a significant role in the whole of Japanese historiography, the theme has never been approached from a Chinese perspective: how did China perceive *sakoku*, and how did the policy influence the relationship between Japan and China?

As early as the 1950s, a Japanese scholar had already

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[15]Marius Jansen, *China in the Tokugawa World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), Bibliographical Note.

suggested that the issues of Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period should be approached in the context of the political and economic background of China,[16] while another expert commented recently that the research on the foreign relations of early-modern Japan has been nearly stagnant (in Japan) in the postwar period, and that existing studies have concentrated solely on the research of trading value based on Dutch and Japanese "account books".[17]

Based on existing scholarship, this thesis surveys Sino-Japanese relations in the early Tokugawa period with a specific focus on transactions in the major trade commodity--copper--between the two countries. The main purpose of the research is to investigate, through the narration of the bilateral contact in the early Tokugawa, the evolution of the copper trade, the political events involved with the trade, and the relations between Japan and China, and to reexamine the significance of *sakoku* policy for those relations from a Chinese perspective. The thesis aims to answer the following questions: what was the connection between China's internal economic and monetary situation and its external trade with Japan; how much distinction is there between Tokugawa's trading relation with China in the Ming and that in the Qing dynasty; what was the basis for the formation of Qing policy towards Japan; and finally, how are all

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[16]Saeki Tomi, "Koki Yosei jidai ni okeru Nisshin boeki", in Toyoshi Kenkyukai, ed., *Yosei jidai no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Dohosha, 1986), 244.

[17]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko* (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1990), Summary, 1; and Preface, v.

these factors related to *sakoku*?

To reach the above goals, the thesis makes an effort to give a textual study of original Chinese materials, along with Japanese sources, especially the imperial court archives in the Ming and the Qing dynasty, some of which were only released to the public in recent years. It also discusses, in a broader sense, the basis for the Qing policy towards Japan. Through a study of original documents, this study will verify some major events recorded in Japanese materials with Chinese documents which some earlier studies did not even think existed.[18] Most original Japanese and Chinese sources quoted in the paper, appear here in English for the first time.

The term "Sino-Japanese trade" in the Tokugawa period refers to the commercial transactions between Japan and all Chinese ships coming to Japanese ports, regardless of their status and original harbour. The trade can be roughly divided into three stages: first, from 1600 to 1683; second, from 1684 to 1715; and third, from 1715 to the end of the Tokugawa period. In the first stage, 1600 to 1683, the leading figures are the Zheng family, that is a family of five generations with the Seaborne Lord Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) at the centre. In the second and third stages, most ships were sent by or related to the Qing court. With an emphasis on the most active period of the trade from 1685 to 1715, this paper will chiefly survey the trade in the first and second stages, while general features of the trade in the

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[18]Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 57.

whole Tokugawa period are also presented.

The thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines the efforts of the shogunate in reopening trade with China and the basic features of the Sino-Japanese trade in the first stage (1600 to 1683). From 1600 to 1625, the shogunate had done its utmost to obtain *kango* (trade tally) or restore trading relations with China through various routes. Those efforts, which included the dispatch of letters to Chinese local officials asking for trade, as well the repatriation of Chinese captives, have been studied by many Japanese scholars based on the Japanese materials, and the prevailing conclusion is that the letters perhaps did not ultimately reach their addressees.[19] However the present study for the first time demonstrates the response to Japan's expectation from the Chinese side and gives a clear answer to the fate of those letters based on research of the archives of the Ming imperial court. In this way, this thesis is a study which has never been carried out in any language before.

The second chapter deals with the copper problem in China, the Qing court copper policy, and the copper trade between Japan and the Qing from 1684 to 1715. Beginning with an analysis of the reason for the copper scarcity in China, the study develops a detailed survey on the evolution of the copper trading policy of China. After that, the Kangxi Emperor's direct involvement with the copper trade and the control over the trade by the bakufu are the major concerns.

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[19]*NBK*, 637.

The third chapter will give a thorough examination of the case of *shinpai*[20] (trade credentials) in China triggered by the "Shotoku New Regulations" issued by the bakufu in 1715. The author will answer the questions initiated by Ronald P. Toby in his studies: what was the original text of the imperial edict of the Kangxi emperor on the case and why did the emperor issue such a "lenient" edict in the case? The thesis also takes the *shinpai* case and the imperial edict on it as a touchstone and clue to the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations in the whole Tokugawa period.

In the conclusion of the thesis, the difference between Chinese policy towards Japan in the Ming and the Qing dynasty and the impact of *sakoku* on Sino-Japanese relations will be discussed.

In a survey of both the direct trade between Japan and various Chinese traders as well as indirect trade with China through Ryukyu, the major emphasis of the study is the commercial transaction managed by the shogunate and the Qing imperial courts.

In the interest of brevity, the author will seek to avoid repeating the basic facts and narration of the trade which have already appeared in previous English studies, such as the organization of the Japanese merchants and the evolution of the

[20]The Romanization of this term has been done according to the modified Hepburn system; in traditional way, though, it was spelled as "*shimpai*".

Japanese trading system in the Nagasaki trade.[21]

Beginning with the general features of tributary trade, between China and peripheral countries, and Sino-Japanese relations in the previous Muromachi period (1338-1573), the story of trade between the Tokugawa Japan and the two dynasties, the Ming and the Qing, of China will be narrated in the following three chapters.

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[21]Cf. Robert Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 244-375.

CHAPTER ONE: The Sino-Japanese Contact in the Early Tokugawa Years

This chapter examines the Sino-Japanese trade in the first stage of the Tokugawa period, from 1600 to 1683. The major concern in this chapter is Japan's efforts to restore "official" or *kango* (tally) trade with China, which was discontinued in 1549, and the operation of the "actual" trade from 1600 to 1683. From 1600 to 1625, through various routes, the shogunate actively promoted the reopening of tally trade (the form trade had taken in the previous Muromachi period), but failed. Ironically, at the same time, various Chinese private traders enthusiastically sailed to Japan for trade. And finally in 1635, the shogunate assigned the port of Nagasaki as the only harbour to facilitate the Sino-Japanese trade.

To understand the background, it is necessary, first, for this chapter to trace the bilateral relations up to the previous Muromachi period. Japan's relationship with China in the Muromachi period was a so-called tributary relationship derived from the Chinese principle of treating surrounding countries, a principle known as *ka-i* (*huayi*, in Chinese) order. The ancient Chinese, isolated from other great centres of civilization, developed a belief in themselves as the only civilized community in the world and had an attitude of superiority towards their neighbours on the Asian continent and overseas. The Chinese felt that the neighbouring "barbarians" should show their allegiance to China, the unique civilized land, in at least three ways: (1)

by calling themselves vassals of the Chinese emperor, (2) by sending to China occasional envoys bringing tributary offerings of goods, and (3) by accepting Chinese "*nianhao*" (*nengo* in Japanese, i.e. era or reign names)[22] and using them in memorials presented to China. Foreign states which carefully and diligently observed these obligations were assured of lasting peace with China and were treated with generosity by the Chinese.[23]

In the practice of tribute, China set up the time and the frequency for the sending and receiving of the tributary embassies. After the tributary embassies presented their tributary goods to the Chinese imperial court, Chinese emperors would also award them commodities as "returning bestowal". The value of those "bestowals" always exceeded greatly that of the tributary commodities brought to China by the embassy.[24] Meanwhile, the tributary embassies were accompanied by merchants who carried commodities, other than tributary goods, and were allowed to trade in China. Such trade was much more important for the tributary country than for China; it was a "fundamental means" for the tributary country to strengthen itself under the umbrella of *ka-i* order.[25] Above all, the tributary passage was a

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[22]For the explanation of "reign names", see Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 90, and Mary C. Wright, "What's in a Reign Name: The Use of History and Philology", in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 18:1 (November, 1958), 103-6.

[23]Wang I-t'ung, *Official Relations between China and Japan: 1368-1549* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 1.

[24]*NSS*, 8.

[25]Ibid., 9.

lucrative business.

In the Muromachi period, the third shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu sent a tributary embassy to China in 1401 and accepted the title of "*Nihon Kokuo*" (King of Japan) from the Ming emperor. The main reason why the Muromachi bakufu paid tribute to the Ming dynasty was that it wanted to trade with the Chinese. There was no way to trade with the Chinese except by paying tribute. Thus paying tribute for the commercial advantage of the Chinese trade was completely distinct from the Japanese tribute in ancient times which was aimed at taking the social and political model from China. This was the eminent feature of the Japanese tributary embassies in the Muromachi period.[26]

To manage the tributary trade and prevent piracy or illegal trade, in 1383, the Ming court initiated the *kango boeki*: tally trade (system).[27] The *kango* or tally was actually a licence for paying tribute to China. It was first issued to Thailand; then in 1404, the Ming sent the embassy of Zhao Juren to Japan and issued *kango* to the Muromachi Bakufu. From then on, when Japanese ships came, the Chinese officials would check the *kango* they carried with the corresponding tally or bound record kept in China; only those ships which brought an authentic tally were permitted to trade.[28] Thus, Japan's trade with China in the Muromachi period was called *kango boeki* or *kango* (tally) trade.

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[26]Ibid., 11.

[27]*NBK*, 554.

[28]Ibid.

However communication and trade between Japan and China in the Muromachi had been retarded by *wako* (*wo*[29] *kou* in Chinese, i.e. Japanese pirates) who ruthlessly harassed the Chinese coastal area.[30] From the middle of the fourteenth century, serious Japanese piracy appeared along the coastal provinces of China, but in the early Muromachi period, the *wako* was not a threat to China's security. However in 1523, the fight over the privilege to trade with China, or the authenticity of their *kango*, between the Ouchi and the Hosogawa families in Ningbo caused the most brutal *wako* assault ever to occur in China. The Ming court was frightened and withdrew its trading organ *shibosi* (*shihakushi* in Japanese, the Office of Merchant Ships) in Ningbo and rejected all Japanese ships paying tribute.[31] But the rejection of Japanese tribute only made the *wako* activities more grave; Japanese pirates, in collusion with Chinese coastal residents who were "illegally" trading with Japan, frequently assaulted the coastal area of South China. The military warfare against *wako* became a major problem for the Ming court. Finally, in 1549, Ming-Japanese official relations were virtually

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[29]"wo" was a derogatory term, used then by Chinese and Korean, which referred to "Japan" or "Japanese". The term "wozi" (Japanese) and "wowang" (Lord of Japan), which would appear in the later quotations, also had the same implication. Nevertheless, the term "wo" or "wa" (pronounced as "Yamato") was the name of the country in the high antiquity. The discussion on the meaning of the term is beyond the scope of the thesis.

[30]Details in So Kwan-wai, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the Sixteenth Century*.

[31]Chen Shuifeng, "Jinshi chuqi zhongri maoyi guanxi", in *Bainian lai Zhongri guanxi lunwenji* (Taipei: [n.p.], 1968), 782.

terminated.[32]

The termination of the supply of Chinese commodities inconvenienced Japan. Traditionally, Japanese people had a liking for Chinese goods, especially silk, silk yarn, medicine, books and other products; the consumption of Chinese commodities had already become a part of Japanese daily life. To meet such a need, the Portuguese merchants in Macao worked as *entrepôt* traders. They shipped Japanese silver to Macao and sold it to the Chinese; then they transported Chinese silk yarn to Japan. From this monopoly of Sino-Japanese transit, the Portuguese made enormous profits.[33]

Even though the promotion of trade with China had been listed as one of the priorities in Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi's agenda, the war with China in Korea (1592-1598) which was caused by Hideyoshi's invasion, made all their efforts to reopen trade with the Ming, including suppressing Japanese piracy to win the favour of the Chinese, meaningless and void. To protect China from *wako* and the hostilities of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the Ming issued a stricter ban on the Chinese coastal area to prohibit any commercial activities with Japan in 1593. Severe punitive measures were declared for anyone who violated the rule. However, soon after, China fell into the whirlpool of civil war and the Ming dynasty was nearly overthrown.

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[32]Wang I-t'ung, *Official Relations between China and Japan: 1368-1549*, 80.

[33]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankei shi no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1984), 32.

Earliest Contact through Ryukyu

From the beginning of the seventeenth century, Sino-Japanese trade had been promoted by Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa bakufu, and his successors. When Tokugawa Ieyasu reunified Japan in 1600, the dominant topic in his diplomatic agenda was to rebuild Japan's normal relations with the Ming.[34] Ieyasu was more eager to trade with other countries than Toyotomi Hideyoshi. To prepare for the battle of Osaka,[35] it was necessary to import military logistics such as lead, deer leather and, most importantly, silk yarn. Silk yarn was used to make armour, to wrap up the handles of swords and to make the covers for weapons. Other than military issues, silk, Chinese medicine, books, sugar, and dye were also badly needed. Besides, Ieyasu himself had a strong preference for the use of imported materials in his daily life.[36]

First of all, Ieyasu's aspiration was to restore *kango* trade with China; he started his effort immediately, even before his crowning as the *Sei i dai shogun* (The Barbarian-Quelling Generalissimo).[37] Since there was no direct link with China, Ieyasu tried three routes to reach his goal; besides repatriating Chinese captives back to China, he took Ryukyu, Taiwan and Korea

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[34]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankei shi no kenkyu*, 31-2.

[35]The battle (1614-15) was between Tokugawa Ieyasu and the adherents of the Toyotomi family; it resulted in strengthening supreme power for Ieyasu.

[36]*NSS*, 5-6.

[37]*NBK*, 632. Ieyasu was crowned as "*Sei i dai shogun*" in 1603.

as mediators.[38] This study will survey all his efforts except the Korean route.

At the very beginning, Ieyasu decided to utilize Ryukyu as the mediator. Since the early fifteenth century, Ryukyu had been actively participating in trade activity in the arena of Eastern and Southeast Asia. Paying tribute to China, Ryukyu was doing *entrepôt* trade as well. Ryukyuan ships exported sulphur and horses to Southeastern Asia, then from there transported sappanwood[39] and pepper home for sale to China, Japan and Korea. Next, Ryukyuan merchants bought silk and porcelain from China and swords and gold from Japan and traded them to other ports. Ryukyu reached the peak of its commercial activities around the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century and declined after that time. Some of the reasons for this were the harassment by the *wako*, the invasion of the Portuguese and the increased activities of the Chinese merchants from coastal Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southeastern China. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Ryukyu had to stop its activities in Southeastern Asia and concentrate only on trading with the Chinese and the Japanese.[40]

According to Japanese sources, in Keicho5(1600)/1, *Gotairo* (the Five Elders or Five Ruling Seniors headed by Ieyasu)

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[38]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankei shi no kenkyu*, 32.

[39]With the name of *suo* in Japanese and *sufang* in Chinese, *sapang* is an East Indian tree from which a red dye can be obtained.

[40]*NSS*, 14-5

entrusted the Shimazu family in Satsuma domain[41] with repatriating the Ming general Mao Guoke, who was taken to Japan as hostage when Japan fought with China in Korea. Shimazu Iehisa, the Lord of Satsuma, and Terazawa Masanari, the Lord of Shima domain,[42] signed a letter for Mao's brother Mao Guoqi who was also an army official in Beijing, the Ming capital.[43]

The Shimazu family had had deep connections with the Ming for a long time, and this was a mission they had anticipated. Shimazu Yoshihiro assigned his vassal Torihara Kiuemon as the envoy and meanwhile ordered him to manage the reopening of trade with the Ming. Kiuemon was skilful in navigation and maritime trade and had been to Ryukyu several times. He quickly prepared his ship named "*Tenshin Maru*" and left Bonotsu for Fuzhou of Fujian Province in Keicho5(1600)/8. From Fuzhou, he went on to Beijing and was well received there.[44]

At the end of the same year, Kiuemon safely returned to Bonotsu. When he started his journey home, the Ming permitted the Shimazu to dispatch two ships from Fuzhou to trade with Satsuma the following year. The long-time dream of resuming trade with China was finally about to be realized; Satsuma was joyfully and

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[41]Satsuma domain is southern part of present Kagoshima Prefecture.

[42]Shima domain is a part of present Mie Prefecture.

[43]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankei shi no kenkyu*, 32-3.

[44]Kiuemon's fabrication (explanation to follow) went too far; he even boasted that the Ming Shenzong (Wanli) emperor himself hosted an imperial banquet for him. See Kawashima Motojiro, *Nangoku shiwa* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1926), 289. As a historian, nevertheless, when Kimiya Yasuhiko quoted the story, he omitted the story of the "imperial banquet"; see *NBK*, 632.

eagerly waiting for the ships from the Ming. But unfortunately, until the Autumn of 1601, no Chinese ships came to Satsuma.[45]

In fact, in 1601 the Chinese did send two ships from Fuzhou to Satsuma as promised. However on the way to Satsuma, the ships were attacked by Itamiya Sukeshiro, a Sakai merchant who was a trusted merchant of the Shimazu family. He and his followers slew all crew members and looted the ship's cargo. The incident was exposed soon after and Itamiya Sukeshiro was executed, but the efforts of the Shimazus in reopening Chinese trade were shattered.[46]

On the other hand, the Ming worried about the fate of the two ships which had gone to Japan years ago to which there had been no response. In Keicho10 (1605), the Ming asked its *sakuhoshi* (investiture envoy) to Ryukyu, Xia Ziyang and Wang Shizhen, to collect information about the two ships. Therefore, in 1606, utilizing the occasion of congratulating Shimazu Iehisa on his inheritance of the domain, the King of Ryukyu, Sho Nei, dispatched a Buddhist monk from the Sugenji temple to Satsuma to probe for news. To learn more about the case, the Ryukyuan in Satsuma also invited Kiuemon to Ryukyu.[47]

To continue their efforts, Satsuma withheld the truth of the looting incident. In 1606/9, Shimazu Iehisa entrusted to Kiuemon a letter to the Ming Investiture Envoy to Ryukyu. Meanwhile

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[45]*NBK*, 632.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid., 632-33.

Yoshihisa, Iehisa's uncle and ruling noble of the Shimazu domain, wrote a letter to Sho Nei, the King of Ryukyu.[48] Both letters were drafted by Nanpo Bunshi, a Buddhist monk.[49] In his letter, Iehisa expressed the hope that the Ming ships could sail to Satsuma to trade every year. The gist of Yoshihisa's letter was as follows:

> The commerce between *Chuka* (China) and Japan has been terminated for more than thirty years. At present, our Shogun (Tokugawa Ieyasu) is concerned about the situation; moreover the Shogun wants Iehisa to negotiate with your country in order to make our trading ships navigate to your country every year. Meanwhile the Great Ming could exchange merchandise with Japanese merchants; each supplies what the other needs.[50]

In his letter, Yoshihisa also expressed the hope that Satsuma could send ships to Ryukyu every year and meet with the Ming ships to trade with each other. He also suggested that Ryukyu could benefit from this as well. Obviously, the Shimazu was expecting to trade with the Ming ships directly to Satsuma, and Yoshihisa sincerely hoped the King of Ryukyu could mediate between China and Japan.[51]

"Probably, after getting to Ryukyu, Kiuemon canvassed Xia Ziyang" to send more ships to Japan; the next year (1607), Xu Lihuan, a Chinese merchant from Quanzhou of Fujian, came to

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[48]Ibid., 633.

[49]Kodama Tachio, "Shimazu han no Chugoku boeki to sakoku", in Yanai Kenji, ed., *Sakoku Nihon to kokusai koryu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1988), 1, 297.

[50]Ibid., 636. For the text of the whole letter, see Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, 8, 55.

[51]Ibid., 633.

Satsuma for trade and stayed for one year. In 1608, Xu Lihuan left Satsuma for China. On this occasion, Shimazu Yoshihisa wrote a letter to Xu Lihuan earnestly asking him to return the next year. The letter said that: "The oath of our alliance is as firm as gold and stone or gum and lacquer so that nothing can split them."[52] Yoshihisa also suggested that even if Xu's ship was blown to some other island, he could wait there until Satsuma sent an official to go there to trade. He promised that Satsuma would not pay even one *rin* (penny) less on Chinese cargo than others might offer.[53]

However, the Chinese documents told the above story in a different way. First, Mao Guoke himself had actually been sent to the capital of China and in accordance with the *Ming Shenzong xianhuangdi shilu*[54] (Veritable Records of the Wanli Reign), the case had been presented to the Emperor.

In the *Ming shilu*, in 1600/6,[55] Liu Yuanlin, the Governor of Zhejiang Province, reported to the imperial court that:

> "(Your Majesty:) Our forward post captured a foreign ship with officials, servants, Chinese and barbarians aboard. Upon interrogation, we found a (Chinese) military official Mao Guoke among them. Originally sent by his brother Mao Guoqi who was a military commander, he went to the Japanese camp to induce the enemy to capitulate.

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[52]Ibid.

[53]Kodama Tachio, "Shimazu han no Chugoku boeki to sakoku", 1, 299.

[54]*Ming Shenzong Xianhuangdi shilu* (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1962), 596 vols. It has been henceforth abbreviated to *Ming shilu*. The Wanli reign is from 1573 through 1619.

[55]This date is different from the Japanese source quoted above in which Mao left in 1600/8.

> At present, the ruler of Japan,[56] (Tokugawa) Ieyasu ordered a Japanese commander to manage a ship to repatriate him and other (Chinese) people who were plundered (to Japan) years ago".[57]

Due to the state of war between Japan and China, Japanese affairs in the Ming court were managed by *bingbu* (the Board of War or the Ministry of Defence). Six months later, in Wanli28 (1600)/12/5,[58] The Board of War presented a memorial to the court about Mao's case again:

> "(Your Majesty:) The Board jointly interrogated Mao Guoke who had been escorted (to this office) by the Governor's Office of Fujian. He confessed that originally he went to the Japanese camp with an official denunciation of the enemy, and currently he returned to China with a letter of a Japanese general . . . However the so-called official denunciation he carried was only a written copy without either seal or date; who could believe his words? But the Japanese letter lured (us) with peace and wanted direct trade; this was a very cunning plot. . ."[59]

Apparently, the story of repatriating envoys, which was "well received in Beijing" according to Japanese sources, was a forgery by Satsuma to show off their effectiveness in negotiating with the Chinese.[60] By contrast, in such circumstances, no Japanese

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[56]The original text is "Zhizheng Jiakang" in Chinese, and "Shissei Ieyasu" in Japanese.

[57]*MSS*, v. 348.

[58]This date was January 8th, 1601 in Western calendar.

[59]*MSS*, v. 354.

[60]The same type of forgery was also practised by Tsushima domain when they were entrusted to contact Korea in restoring the relations between Japan and Korea. Details in Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 25-44. These were, I think, due to the lack of shogunal control over foreign affairs and the autonomy which the powerful domains and lords, especially those in Southwest Japan, enjoyed over foreign trade primarily before 1639. The heritage of such an autonomy proved to be a vital threat to the shogunate in the *bakumatsu* era. For the relationship between the bakufu and the southwest domains, cf. Fujino Tamotsu, *Bakusei to hansei* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1979), particularly, 44-50.

mission could expect to be welcomed in China. The Ming officials simply interpreted the Japanese petition of "peace" and "direct trade" as "a very cunning plot".

In accordance with the latter part of the Satsuma story, the Chinese side manifested equal eagerness and enthusiasm for trade with Japan. In 1601, the Chinese did send two ships loaded with Chinese commodities from Fuzhou to Satsuma. Was this possible at a time when the Ming carried out the harshest ban on maritime trade with Japan, and when the violaters of such a ban were faced with the death penalty? The answer could be found in the memoirs of Xia Ziyang, the Investiture Envoy of the Ming to Ryukyu.

For conferring with the King of Ryukyu Sho Nei, the Ming court appoint Xia Ziyang, a military officer from the Board of War, as the Investiture Envoy to Ryukyu in 1602;[61] however Xia Ziyang did not actually sail to Ryukyu until 1606. The following records are from his memorial to the Emperor:

> "(In waiting for the departure) . . . this imperial subject is concerned that some officers and their followers are harbouring evil intentions and secretly collaborating (with the Japanese). For instance, Xu Yu, the Commander of Monitoring Japanese of the Governor's Military Office (in Fuzhou), is outwardly monitoring the Japanese but inwardly collaborating with the Japanese. . . . In the sixth month of last year (1603), Xu Yu bribed Wang Liwei, the barbarian (Ryukyuan) officer, and secretly boarded his nephew Xu Mei, who often goes to Japan to trade, and loaded illegal cargoes on Wang Liwei's ship and left for Japan. We have evidence to prove that Xu Mei is currently in Japan . . . ."[62]

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[61]*MSS*, v. 376.

[62]Xia Ziyang and Wang Shizhen, *Shi Liuqiu lu* (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1969), 76-7.

The whole truth had come out. Even though the Ming court issued strict restrictions against maritime trade, the local officials could still smuggle cargo to Japan. The two ships from Fuzhou had to be sent by Xu Yu or other officials like him. In fact the reason for their audacity in violating the rule was quite simple: money. Due to the termination of Sino-Japanese trade, the price of Chinese commodities in the Japanese market soared to the sky. Silk, silk yarn, silk wadding, thread, even needles, all sold at least ten times as high as the price in China.[63] Among the Chinese products, Chinese medicines were needed most urgently and their price was much higher.[64] Thus, some greedy local officials, especially those military officials like Xu Yu, were "outwardly monitoring the Japanese but inwardly collaborating with the Japanese" and actively organizing smuggling to Japan. These officials, along with other Chinese coastal residents, were in league with Japanese pirates, and helped them to smuggle from China, even looting Chinese coastal areas. Thus, the Ming official documents concluded that (in the seventeenth century) "the *zhenwo* (real Japanese pirates) are about three out of ten",[65] all other "*wako*" were in fact

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[63]Dai Yixuan, *Mingshi · Folangji zhuan Jianzheng* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1984), 37.

[64]Ibid.

[65]See *Mingshi · Riben zhuan*; also Zheng Liangsheng, *Mingdai Zhongri guanxi yanjiu* (Taipei: The Liberal Arts Press, 1985), 277.

Chinese.[66] They were of course eager to trade with the Japanese.

The last part of the Satsuma story was the meeting between the Japanese mission, led by Torihara Kiuemon, and the Ming Investiture Envoy Xia Ziyang; allegedly the former "canvassed" Xia to send more ships to Japan.[67] The real story could also be found in Xia Ziyang's memoirs:[68]

> "In the ninth month (of 1606), the barbarian (Ryukyuan) officer suddenly reported that the Japanese were coming to harass (the island). . . . Several Japanese ships entered the harbour and actually they were coming to congratulate the King on the conferring of power and for trade . . . At the time when the Japanese heard that we were about to leave,[69] they requested the honour of an audience. All my colleagues said that the Japanese were carrying swords and their temper was like that of dogs and goats, and they said that I should not meet them. I answered that . . . with the dignity of our Celestial Empire, if I refused their request would that be Consistent with our formidable prestige? Thus I ordered our soldiers to arrange themselves in rows and ordered the gate opened while I sat to meet them. When the head of the Japanese group saw me, he was frightened and knelt on the ground. After kowtowing several times, he retreated . . ."[70]

Based on the above quotation, this paper speculates that

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[66]A Chinese scholar suggested that another form of evidence which revealed the true identity of the *wako* was the ships they used. Accordingly, Japan could not build large ships at this time while China was able to build ships which could carry as many as two thousand people; see Hu Qiuyuan, "Bixu lianri yixu fangri", in *Bainian lai zhongri guanxi lunwenji* (Taipei: [n.p.], 1968), 265. Also Oba Osamu, "Scroll Paintings of Chinese Junks which sailed to Nagasaki in the 18th Century and their Equipment", in *The Marine Mirror*, vol. 60, (1974), PP. 351-62.

[67]*NBK*, 633.

[68]Xia Ziyang et al., *Shi Liuqiu lu*, 109. Xia arrived in Ryukyu in Wanli34(1606)/5.

[69]Xia left on 1606/10/21. Xu Yuhu, *Mingdai Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi yanjiu* (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1982), 75.

[70]Xia Ziyang et al., *Shi Liuqiu lu*, 110.

Kiuemon might have met Xia Ziyang in Ryukyu in 1606, but it was impossible for Xia, the imperial representative of the Ming court, to promise trade. That would have been appropriate with neither the Ming policy nor his status. Xu Lihuan, the Chinese merchant from Quanzhou who went to Satsuma for trade in 1607, was apparently an "illegal" merchant who sailed to Japan without official permission.

However, from the above story, there is one point which should be noticed: as one of the major efforts in reopening Chinese trade, the shogunate actively organized the Chinese captives to be repatriated to China, and tried to utilize such a chance to send a letter to the Chinese officials. Besides the case of Mao Guoke, these kinds of repatriations frequently appeared on the Ming official archives. These were sincere expressions in hope of reopening direct trade.

In accordance with the *Ming shilu* dated Wanli30 (1602)/4/12,

> "The *wowang* (Lord of Japan) (Kato) Kiyomasa[71] repatriated the captured Wang Yinxing and others totalling eighty-seven people; they were given ships and supplied with rice and peas, and entrusted with two Japanese letters. With the translator Wang Tianyou, they together sailed back to China. ...the calligraphy of the letters is similar to that of the Chinese. Are those letters really from (Kato) Kiyomasa? All unknown . . ."[72]

Besides repatriating Chinese captives, the Japanese sometimes sent back the Chinese pirates as well. This aimed at earning favour from the Chinese officialdom. On

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[71]Kato Kiyomasa was in fact one of the major military commanders who fought with the Chinese in Korea.

[72]*MSS*, v. 371.

Wanli30(1602)/6/18, the *Ming shilu* recorded that:

> "The island barbarians (i.e. Japanese) sent back the captives and furthermore repatriated four Southern China pirates; their performance looks timid, but the barbarian character is most shrewd. (They) often pretend to give in pursuit of taking, so who will ever know that today's contact is not for tomorrow's covert conspiracy? (We) should well prepare for sudden danger. . . . "[73]

Unfortunately, the repatriation was not as successful as the bakufu anticipated; nor did the letters receive positive response from the Ming. It was obvious that the repatriated Chinese captives could neither prove the authenticity of those Japanese letters nor persuade the Chinese officials to believe that Japan was sincerely seeking a good relationship with China.

In sum, no matter how poorly or deliberately the Satsuma people fabricated their story of trading with the Chinese, as the practitioner of the shogunal policy of reopening trade with China, Satsuma signalled to the Chinese their desire for "peace" and "direct trade"; from this point, Satsuma was successful. Therefore, after Xu Lihuan's visit to Satsuma in 1607, probably due to the commitment of Shimazu Yoshihisa, or the spreading rumour of that commitment in China, more and more Chinese ships came to Japan.

In 1609, ten Ming Ships came to Satsuma and anchored in the ports of Kagoshima and Bonotsu.[74] All the ships submitted their cargo list to the Shimazu, and the Shimazu transferred them to Sunpu where Tokugawa Ieyasu lived. Ieyasu felt it hard to read

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[73]Ibid., v. 373.

[74]*NBK*, 633.

the lists. He ordered Honda Masazumi to assign the Zen monk Ishin Suden, a foreign affairs advisor of the bakufu, to put *kana* (Japanese alphabet) beside each item. According to the lists, most of the items were silk products, others included cloth, Chinese medicine, stationery, sugar, ginseng, etc.[75]

On the other hand, Ryukyu ignored the Satsuma requirement for mediating the direct trade between Japan and China; finally in 1609, the arbitrary Satsuma domain carried out a military campaign and conquered Ryukyu and took its King Sho Nei as prisoner to Japan. After that, even though Ryukyu was still a vassal state of the Ming, it was simultaneously forced to be the vassal state of Satsuma. Ironically, the bakufu and Satsuma domain were clearly aware that Ryukyu was the vassal state of the Ming, but they did not demand the king of Ryukyu to terminate his subject relationship with the Ming, but, in contrast, requested Ryukyu to continue to pay tribute to the Ming, because Japan wanted to continue to use Ryukyu as the mediator in reopening direct trade with China and Japan wanted to utilize Ryukyu's tribute to China to carry on Sino-Japanese trade itself.[76]

To prevent disturbing Ryukyu from smoothly continuing to pay tribute to China, Satsuma made all its efforts to conceal the real status of its relationship with Ryukyu from the Ming. Except

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[75]Ibid., 633-34.

[76]*NSS*, 15. For a chronology of Ryukyu-Chinese relations from 1612 to 1694, see Robert Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 203-5; also Robert Sakai, "The Ryukyu (Liu-ch'iu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma", in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1968, 112-34.

for a few, Japanese people were not allowed to voyage to Ryukyu. While they were in Ryukyu they were banned from speaking Japanese, keeping Japanese hair styles, and even dressing in a Japanese way. Ryukyuans were prohibited from having Japanese names too. When foreigners sailed to Ryukyu, all the Japanese had to hide away.[77]

The Ryukyu incident was reported to the Ming imperial court first in 1612/6/; in his memorial, the General Commander of Zhejiang, Yang Chongye, reported to the court that "We discovered that Japan sent three thousand people to Ryukyu, and took the King of Chuzan as prisoner. . . "[78] This report was verified soon after.

In Wanli40(1612)/7, the Viceroy of Fujian, Ding Jisi, reported to the emperor that :

> "The barbarian embassy of Ryukyu country, Bai Shou, Chen Hua, carrying their country's statement, petitioned that since the King has returned (from Japan), he specially sends an embassy with tribute. This imperial subject contemplates that . . . even though their King was released home, it is apparent they can not be independent any longer. . . . This year is not a tributary year, . . . why suddenly have they landed without previous notice? . . . why suddenly are many Japanese products mixed in the tributary goods? . . . why has the size of the entourage increased by more than one hundred? All these situations are not honest like before, moreover the Japanese are controlling them . . . "[79]

It seemed that Satsuma was anxious to go to China to trade so that they coerced the Ryukyuan to pay tribute at a time when they

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[77]*NSS*, 15-6.

[78]*MSS*, v. 496.

[79]Ibid., v. 497.

were not scheduled to do so. However, the Viceroy of Fujian suggested to the court that "to show the awe of the Celestial Empire", the Ming "should not instantly reject them"; instead it was better for the court to "give a certain amount of supplies and gifts and let them return".[80]

Due to the suspicion about Ryukyu's relation with Satsuma, in addition to domestic financial difficulty, the Ming reduced the frequency of the Ryukyuan tribute from once every two years to once every ten years. This attacked Satsuma's plan to utilize the tribute to trade with China. Satsuma then forced Ryukyu to send tributary embassies to China four times between 1612 and 1622. Upon the petition of Ryukyu, the Ming permitted Ryukyu to pay tribute once every five years starting in 1622 but later on they reinstated the frequency of once every two years as before.[81]

Each time the Ryukyuan embassy was about to depart, Satsuma participated with great enthusiasm. Half of the capital used for Ryukyuan tribute was from Satsuma; sometimes, Satsuma even borrowed money from famous merchants in Kyoto and Osaka to invest in the embassy.[82] The money Satsuma used for Ryukyuan tribute to China was called "*totogin*",[83] meaning the silver sailing to China

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[80]Ibid.

[81]For a general study of Ryukuan tributary activities to the Ming (1609-44), see Miyata Toshihiko, "Kinsei shoki no Ryumin boeki", in *Nihon Reikishi* 340 (September 1976), 1-19.

[82]*NSS*, 16.

[83]Sakihara Mitsugu, "Totogin to Satsuryuchu boeki", in *Nihon rekishi*, 323 (April, 1975), 27-47. See also Chen Daduan, *Yongqianjia shidai de Zhongliu guanxi* (Taiwan: Minghua Shuju, 1956), 80; Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei* (Tokyo: Nihon Shoseki Kabushiki Gaisha, 1976), 165.

or the money navigating to China. Satsuma always entrusted Japanese goods to the Ryukyuans to sell in Fuzhou; when Ryukyuans shipped goods back from China, the goods were sold in Nagasaki, Kyoto and Osaka through Satsuma. The Shimazu introduced strict measures to control Ryukyu's trade with China. All commodities going to and being shipped back from China were under strict monitoring and checking by Satsuma in Ryukyu. Those Ryukyuan officials who failed in their duties would be punished or even executed.[84] Even this kind of brutal rule could not stop the Ryukyuan from trading with the Chinese; when they sailed back from China, usually they secretly unloaded some cargo on small Ryukyuan islands, and then sailed to Naha--the capital of Ryukyu--to get checked by the Japanese.[85]

For Ryukyuans themselves, to invest in the tribute, besides the *totogin*, they had to borrow capital from Kagoshima merchants and return it after they came back and sold the commodities from China.[86] The Chinese official archives recorded that "The tributary ships are allowed to sell various commodities, without customs duty, on which the whole country (Ryukyu) relies. Most of their capital is from Japan, and most of the currency in their country is (Japanese) *Kan'ei* coins. Eighty or ninety percent of the commodities they ship back from tribute would be sold to

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[84]Chen Daduan, *Yongqianjia shidai de Zhongliu guanxi*, 80.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

Japan".[87]

In general, since the Ryukyu carried out the so-called "Double Subordinating Policy", they in fact became the "intermediaries in Sino-Japanese trade".[88] Afterwards, most of the commodities Ryukyuan ships brought to China were maritime products of Japan, that were almost the same as what Chinese copper trade ships brought back from Nagasaki.[89] What they bought from China was silk yarn, brocade, medicine, paper and sugar, similar to what Chinese ships carried to Japan. Meanwhile, Ryukyuan ships also brought Southeast Asian products from China for Satsuma.[90] Therefore, the Sino-Ryukyuan trade was "in fact Sino-Japanese trade in disguised form".[91]

Taiwan Route

While the efforts to reopen trade with China through Ryukyu were in process, the shogunate started to open another route: Taiwan. In Keicho14(1609), Ieyasu ordered Arima Harunobu, the lord of Bizen, to send an expeditionary team to Taiwan; the excuse was that Taiwan should pay tribute to Japan.[92] In the decree from the bakufu, the shogun required the team to find a

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[87]Ibid. See also Zhao Erxun et al., comp., *Qingshigao · Shuguo zhuan*, v. 1.

[88]Chen Daduan, *Yongqianjia shidai de Zhongliu guanxi*, 81.

[89]Ibid., 85.

[90]Ibid., 86.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankei shi no kenkyu*, 37.

good harbour for Japanese ships, prospect Taiwan's geographical situation and investigate its natural resources. However the ultimate purpose of the team was to find a go-between for opening direct trade with China; and the shogun himself actually had high expectation for the expedition.[93] Following the order of the bakufu, Arima Harunobu assigned his vassal Chijiwa Ume to head the team. But in Taiwan, the team had conflicts with the Taiwanese aborigines; the Japanese merely captured some captives and returned to Japan. The expedition failed.[94]

Nevertheless Ieyasu did not give up. For him, the desire to reopen direct trade with China was stronger than the Muromachi Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu.[95] Therefore, he took advantage of all possible opportunities. In 1610, when Zhou Xingru, a Chinese merchant from Nanjing, arrived on Goto Island, Ieyasu received him and issued a *shuin-jo* (vermilion-seal licence), encouraging him to come to trade. On his way back, *Roju* (Regent) Honda Masazumi and Hasegawa Fujihiro gave Zhou Xingru letters, both drafted by Hayashi Razan, a famous Confucian scholar at that time, to Fujian province and the Governor of Fujian, Chen Zizhen.[96] The gist of the two letters was to ask the Ming to issue *kango* (trade tally) to Japan. Unfortunately, like all other

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[93]Ibid., 38.

[94]Ibid.

[95]*NSS*, 12.

[96]The original text of the two letters are in Hayashi Razan: *Razan sensei bunshu* (Kyoto: Kyoto Shisekikai, 1920), 130-32.

letters to China, these letters never received a response and Zhou never showed himself on Japanese shores again.[97]

Anxiously waiting for several years, the bakufu was disappointed by the lack of response from the Ming to the letters carried by Zhou Xingru. Then, by coincidence, another opportunity came for the bakufu to renew their attempt to make Taiwan a go-between to promote Chinese trade.

In 1616, Nagasaki Deputy (Representative of the bakufu), Murayama Toan, offended the bakufu and was sentenced to capital punishment.[98] To atone for his crime, Murayama appealed for the conquest of Taiwan for the bakufu. With the consent of the shogunate, he sent his second son Shuan to lead a fleet on an expedition to Taiwan. The fleet consisted of thirteen vessels and two to three thousand soldiers. They left Nagasaki on 1616/3/29 for Taiwan.[99] When the fleet navigated to an area close to Ryukyu, it was split by a sudden sea storm. Only one ship reached its destination, Taiwan, and all the crew members were slain by Taiwanese aborigines. The two ships led by Akashi Michitomo drifted to Dongyong of Fujian Province on 1616/5/17.[100] After camping two days, the soldiers of Arai Michitomo captured Dong Boqi, who was a military officer of the Ming, and took him back to Nagasaki. One remaining group of vessels passed by the

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[97]*NBK*, 637.

[98]Ibid., 648.

[99]Chen Shuifeng, "Jinshi chuqi Zhongri maoyi guanxi", 792.

[100]Ibid.

Zhejiang coastal area, and another group headed by Shuan himself drifted to Vietnam. Both groups returned to Nagasaki the following year, 1617.[101]

When the Shogunate received the news of the capture of Dong Boqi, it decided to let him be the mediator in negotiating for reopening trade with China. On 1617/3/18, the bakufu dispatched Akashi Michitomo, Masaki Yajiemon, Shibata Katsuzaemon, and Chinese translator Gao Zimei as envoys to Fujian and repatriated Dong Boqi. The envoys carried Japanese local products as presents for officials in Fujian Province in hope of opening trade.[102]

The *Ming shilu*, on 1617/4/19, recorded that the Akashi Michitomo mission was detained by Chinese soldiers in the coastal areas of Fujian Province, and the Deputy Commander of Seaborne Defence, Han Zhongyong, questioned them. The following is the report of the first Sino-Japanese diplomatic talk for normalization, written by Han Zhongyong and forwarded to the throne:

> (Your Majesty:). . . this imperial subject questioned (the Japanese), asking them, "Why did you invade Keelung and Tansui (of Taiwan in the last year) . . . why did you attack the inner land (Fujian) and take Dong Boqi and return him to China again, and why did you invade Ryukyu", etc. (Akashi) answered in a good manner. This subject told them: "we never allow you to pass through Chinese territory . . . but if your ships are blown to our shores, . . . (or) if you land to fetch water (you may but) you are not allowed to stay for long." . . . Akashi and others petitioned: "As soon as we return to Japan we will request our king to investigate the criminals who last year invaded (Taiwan); if they are

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[101]Ibid.

[102]Ibid.

> Japanese merchants (who originally came overseas for trade) of a certain island, we will execute them on the Chinese coast (in front of you); if they are Chinese, we will extradite them to China, so as to express our sincerity." This subject answered: "This frontier officer is not entitled to decide the matter of sending and receiving of foreign missions; meanwhile it will take a long time for this province to report your mission to the imperial court and receive instructions, . . . if you really can act in that way, that will benefit your country." Then this subject stated: "If you want to occupy Taiwan, we will introduce strict maritime prohibitions and a trade embargo. . . . Winning and losing in commerce can be seen very easily." Akashi and others pointed to the sky and crossed their hands and said they did not dare to. . . . (Finally,) What this subject suggests is to provide some supply and repatriate them. . . .[103]

The dialogue provided a vivid picture of the negotiation. Due to long-term hostility over *wako*, the war in Korea, and Japan's conquering of Ryukyu, plus the expansion to Taiwan one year before, the Ming officials did not trust the Japanese, and in fact their rigid attitude towards the Japanese petition was justified. The shogunal method of negotiating the reopening of trade with low level Chinese officials was itself doubtful. Here the honest Chinese official admitted that he did not have the right to decide anything. An interesting phenomenon was that from all the sources quoted above, in fact all original materials this author studied, there was no Japanese letter directly addressed to the Ming imperial court; even in the example above, Akashi Michitomo did not ask for a meeting with higher ranking officials. Since the *kango* trade terminated in 1549, this was perhaps due to a shogunal unfamiliarity with the diplomatic and

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[103]*MSS*, v. 560.

administrative system of the Ming court. Or, perhaps more likely, was it because the shogunate thought that China was similar to Japan whose remote domains, such as Satsuma, had a substantial power over foreign affairs? Whatever the reason, the shogunal approach was ineffective.

Shan Fengxiang Mission to Japan

Even though the Akashi mission did not make any major breakthrough, it signalled to the Chinese side that Japan was sincerely seeking an amicable relationship with China. Thus, two years later, in 1619, the Chinese side tried to use this channel to communicate with Japanese authority, and thus came the famous Shan Fengxiang mission, the first Chinese official mission to Japan since the bilateral relations were discontinued in the mid-sixteenth century.

After the establishment of the Tokugawa Bakufu, the *wako* still acted at large in looting the Chinese coastal area. Therefore in Genwa5(1619)/4, when the Japanese piracy reappeared in the coastal area of Zhejiang, Wang Liangxiang,[104] the Military Governor of Zhejiang (and Fujian) thought about using the chance provided by the Akashi Michitomo mission, to appeal for Japanese authority to suppress piracy. Then, in 1619/6, he chose Shan Fengxiang, a military officer, as a representative and entrusted him with two letters, one addressed to Japanese shogun, and the

[104]On the text of the letter sent to Japan in 1619 (To be quoted next), there were only the Chinese sender's surname and his title; his full name (wang Liangxiang) was from *MSS*, v. 561.

other to the magistrate of Nagasaki.[105]

Shan Fengxiang, accompanied by Shen Maoren and a fifty-member entourage, sailed to Tsukushi (Kyushu) first and met with Akashi Michitomo there. Akashi then guided their tour in Japan; he led them to Kyoto, the capital where the Emperor resided. From there they wanted to go to Edo to be in audience with the shogun, but, Japanese side refused their wish. They stayed in Kyoto and submitted in their letter to the shogunate.[106]

The letter was sent to the second shogun Tokugawa Hidetada, and its content was as follows:

> From Wang, the Imperial Assigned Military Governor on the Defence Affairs in Zhejiang (and Fujian) Province
> In the interest of quelling the piracy, stabilizing the coastal area and eliminating the harassment for commerce, this governor notifies the following affairs:
> In accordance with the report from the military office of Fujian province in the year of 1617,[107] *kiho* (your respectful country) repatriated (our) military officer Dong Boqi and others. That news had already been presented to (our) throne, . . . that was immensely joyful. Therefore, the maritime prohibition was not as strict as before, and trading vessels were able to navigate. But, in the fourth month of this year, the military office of Fujian province reported to this office that the crafty gangsters of the (Chinese) coastal areas assembled in looting commercial ships and cargoes, even murdering and wounding frontier officers and soldiers. Upon the report, this office organized joint campaigns to capture the pirates. Meanwhile, this

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[105]Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, in *Kondo Seisai zenshu*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1905), 9, 57. (separate pagination)

[106]Hayashi Razan: *Razan sensei bunshu* [*Razan zenshu*, vol. 1](Kyoto: Heian Koko Gakkai, 1920), 44.

[107]On the original text, the year was expressed, in the sexagenary system, by two Chinese characters: *dingsi* (*hinoto-mi*, in Japanese) indicating the year of 1617. For a brief explanation of the sexagenary system, see Joyce Ackroyd, *Told around a Brushwood Fire*, 325.

commander deduces that after committed looting, those pirates must attempt to escape by boarding on overseas merchant ships and to sneak into *kiho* (your respectful country) to trade. . . . If those pirates cannot be annihilated, that will be a shame for anyone who holds a country.

Based on the above reasons, this commander particularly assigned a military officer (Shan Fengxiang) as envoy to submit our letter to

Shogunsama kika (The Shogun, Your Excellency), to appeal for your excellency to order all of your domains to carry out the following measures: checking every single commercial ship arrived in your harbours, and questioning all (Chinese) merchants who stayed in Japan for years or passed through other ports to Japan, especially those gamblers and hooligans who are apt to become pirates; in the case of evidences being seized, please punish them severely without mercy. . . . (If you could perform in this way,) we will believe more firmly that your previous kindness in repatriating our military officer was not a mere performance.

Humbly petition for the permission of the above measures by the *Shogunsama* (The Shogun, Your Excellency)

Wanli47(1619)/6 of the Great Ming Dynasty[108]

At that time, the *toshiyori* (senior councils) were in charge of the shogunal administration. Their primary suggestion to handle the letter was to refer the matter to Hasegawa Kenroku, the Bugyo (Magistrate) of Nagasaki, first, then consult Ishin Suden, the major foreign policy advisor of the shogun. The Shogun Hidetada privately agreed with this arrangement.[109]

So, on Genwa7(1621)/3/2, carrying the letter, Nagasaki Bugyo Hasegawa Kenroku and Hayashi Eiki, younger brother of Hayashi Razan, went to Edo to consult Ishin Suden.[110] After reading the

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[108]Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, 9, 57.

[109]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 117.

[110]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 117.

letter, Suden asserted that the format of the letter was impertinent, and the basis for the assertion was as follows.

In the first line of the letter, the first eighteen *kanji* (Chinese character), were the formal official title of the sender: *Kin sa so chin setsu choku chi ho so hei kan chu gun to toku fu sen ji* (The Imperial Assigned Military Governor on the Defence Affairs in Zhejiang (and Fujian) Province). The eighteen were tightly followed by another *kanji*: the sender's family name: *O* (*Wang* in Chinese). On the actual letter, the former eighteen *kanji* were in wood block printing, but the last one (the surname) was in hand-writing. Next to it, after a space, came another *kanji* "*yue*" ("*wei*", in Chinese; here it means "in the interest of . . ."), which was also in block printing. The whole text was in Chinese ink printing, therefore it was easy to recognize that only the family name of the sender was in hand-writing. For a letter to shogun, this kind of format was rude. Meanwhile, the three Chinese characters *sho gun sama* (The Shogun, Your Excellency) were not written properly. Moreover, the letter to the shogun and that to the magistrate of Nagasaki were identical.[111]

In the end, Suden summarized seven points of rudeness and concluded that the letter was not trustworthy. Hayashi Eiki consented with him.[112] Accordingly, Suden explained his opinion to *toshiyori* (the senor councils) and Hasegawa Kenroku, and received

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[111]Ibid.

[112]Ibid.

their agreement as well. On 1621/3/18, at a banquet, Suden had a meeting with the senior councils. Two of them, Doi Toshikatsu and Honda Masazumi, transmitted an order from Hidetada to all that the management of the letter shall be decided by Suden. At this occasion, Suden suggested that the letter could be returned.[113]

On next day (1621/3/19), Suden went to Edo Castle, the shogunal residence, and Shogun Hidetada asked him about the letter. Suden answered that the letter was rude and was like a bulletin of Japan, not trustworthy.[114] Then, Suden consulted Terazawa Masanari, the previous magistrate of Nagasaki, on the treatment of the letter. Based on his experience of communicating with Chinese, Terazawa suggested that Sino-Japanese communication should take the route of Korea and Tsushima. Suden thought this was reasonable and then made a copy of the letter and was ready to return it to the Chinese. Thus, on 5/9, Suden and Terazawa went to Edo Castle and reported their opinion to Hidetada. The shogun ratified their plan.[115]

Because after the submission of the letter, Shan Fengxiang petitioned to the shogunate that it was difficult to return home without response from Japanese authority.[116] Therefore Ishin Suden drafted a *kakitsuke* (*yudan*, in Chinese; i.e. shogunal note) to

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[113]Ibid.

[114]Ibid., 118.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, 9, 57.

Shan Fengxiang.[117] The content was as follows:

> In recent times, the communications between *Daimin* (Great Ming) and *Nihon* (Japan) were carried out through *Chosen* (Korea) to Tsushima, and Tsushima presented (it to the shogunate). Now, (you) indecently presented no reason, you should return suddenly (immediately) and afterwards appeal what you want through Korean translation office.[118]

After the Shogun Hidetada read the response, Suden, bringing the *kaketsuke*, returned from Edo to Kyoto. Finally, on 1621/6/12, Shan Fengxiang was called to the residence of Itakura Katsushige, the Lord of Iga Domain.[119] Nagasaki Bugyo Hasegawa Gonroku, one of the addressees of the Chinese letter, and Hayashi Razan met with Shan there. Hasegawa passed over the response to him. While the meeting was in progress, Itakura Katsushige and his son Itakura Shigemune, the Lord of Suo Domain,[120] and Suden were waiting at other part of the residence, but they did not come out to meet with Shan Fengxiang, because Shan's rank was not high enough. Shan and his entourage were given supply and left Japan for China.[121]

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[117]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 119. Written in a classic prosaic style, those Chinese letters drafted by Nanpo Bunshi and, particularly, Hayashi Razan were beautiful Chinese in any standard. However, Ishin Suden's Chinese was surprisingly and unbelievably poor. Because Suden used Chinese characters according to their Japanese meaning, he failed to make himself understood in several parts of the letter. For the original Chinese text of the letter, see the Appendix of the thesis. To reflect the authentic feature of Suden's Chinese writing, I translated the letter into awkward English. PLEASE TAKE NOTE.

[118]Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, 9, 58.

[119]Iga domain is the west part of present Mie Prefecture.

[120]Suo domain is the eastern part of present Yamaguchi Prefecture.

[121]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 119. Shan Fengxiang mission did not appear in *MMS*. I think this was an mission assigned by the local officials. Some scholars asserted that this was a response to the letter brought to China by Zhou Xingru, see Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 60 and Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 119. However, from the content of Shan's letter we learnt that Shan had no any relation with Zhou xingru. On the contrary, Shan

It seemed to be strange that Hidetada so easily abandoned the chance to restore trading relations with Chinese which his father Tokugawa Ieyasu made so much effort to pursue. In fact, Hidetada was known for his tyrannical temperament; he was not as considerate as his father in treating foreigners. While giving audiences with the English, Spanish and Dutch, Ieyasu spoke directly to them. However, Hidetada gave only silent audiences, even to the Dutch.[122] For Chinese, Ieyasu himself met with many ordinary Chinese merchants, but Hidetada was not so enthusiastic to perform in the same way.

Ronald Toby concluded that the shogunal rejection of the Shan Fengxiang mission was due to the insignificance of China in the interests of bakufu legitimacy.[123] His assertion was right; the Ming authority also noticed that Ieyasu tried to utilize the restoration of diplomatic relations with Korea to strengthen his legitimacy.[124]

Nagazumi Yoko suggested that the rejection was because the way of treating foreign affairs changed. In Hidetada's time, the decisions on foreign affairs were made through consulting all previous foreign affairs advisors of Ieyasu, and through the

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Fengxiang mission was not a response to any Japanese letter but initiated by the Chinese side, and was somehow related to Ashitomo mission of 1617.

[122]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, Summary, 2-3.

[123]Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 63-4.

[124]*MSS*, v. 574.

shogunal resolution.[125] While at the same time, protocols regarding foreign relations were formulated and Hidetada became very concerned about them.[126] Therefore, a diplomatic breakthrough could not be achieved based on a Chinese letter which was not able to satisfy the advisors or to meet the requirement of protocols.

However, this thesis argues that there were two other important reasons for the shogunal rejection to Shan Fengxiang mission. First, Hidetada had asked the Korean royal family to send many feelers to the Ming court explaining Japan's desire to restore relations with China. In contrast to how Japanese letters were sent to Chinese local authorities in southern China, the Ming court replied to almost all Korean letters (memorials).[127] Through Korean routes, Hidetada could receive enough feedback to realize that the Ming would not consider restoring relations with Japan. Therefore, he was somehow disappointed and no longer

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[125]Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, 120.

[126]An incident can indicate how severe the shogunate, under the third shogun Iemitsu, was about the diplomatic protocols. In 1627, the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia dispatched Pieter Nuijts as envoy to the shogun to explain the situation in Taiwan. When Nuijts arrived in Hirado, a high official of the lord of Hirado carelessly informed the shogunate that an "ambassador" from Holland had come. Then Nuijts and his entourages travelled to Edo in an unprecedentedly lavish way, at the shogun's expense. But when the Ruling Elders discovered that he was dispatched from Batavia, they questioned Nuijts many times on the purpose of the trip, his status, and his relation to the Dutch royal family. In accordance with the understanding of the Elders, an ambassador should only present a royal gift and letter to the shogun, and not demand anything or talk about trade. The lord of Hirado, thinking that his own life was at stake, took an interpreter as scapegoat and claimed that the interpreter gave all the misinformation. See Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, Summary, 3.

[127]There are many such Korean letters (in Chinese) and Chinese response in *Ming Shenzong shilu* (*MSS*). Two typical ones can be found in *MSS*, v. 562 (1617) and v. 574 (1618). The former clearly stated that "Hidetada" wanted to build up good relationship with China. But, all Japanese good will was ignored.

expecting a sudden breakthrough.

The second cause or the most dominant reason was that even though there was no any official link between Japan and China, the supply of Chinese commodities was guaranteed. Through the non-official route, or the hands of private or illegal Chinese merchants, Sino-Japanese trade had been recovered gradually. (details to be followed) By 1620s, the trade was already on a large scale. Thus, it was impossible for the shogun to accept a letter from a Chinese local official, which looked like an official poster of Japan, for the purpose of rebuilding trading relations.

The same story was repeated three years after the rejection of the Shan Fengxiang mission. In 1624, another Chinese letter was brought to the shogunate from the Governor of Fujian, and it requested punishment of Japanese piracy as before. Nagasaki Deputy Suetsugu Masanao responded, with a letter drafted by Hayashi Razan,[128] by claiming that the piracy was not related to the Japanese; and when the Japanese side asked for trade, this was refused by the Chinese side.[129]

Conclusively, from the early years of Keicho until the time of Kan'ei (1600-1625), about twenty some years, the bakufu tried with all their sincere and enduring efforts, through the Ryukyuan, Taiwanese and Korean routes, to reopen direct trade and

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[128]For the text of the letter, see Hayashi Razan: *Razan sensei bunshu*, 136.

[129]Ibid.

to rebuild official relations with China, but failed. Due to the scare of Japanese *wako* and a traditional policy of maritime prohibition enacted from the early Ming,[130] both the Chinese local and supreme rulers neither dared to nor had the ability to develop an active policy towards Japan.

Many scholars studying Sino-Japanese relations of this period had speculated that those letters deliberately prepared by the Japanese probably were not ultimately sent to the addressees, but the documents quoted here clearly demonstrated that the messages sent from Japan had reached not only the local officials but the imperial court. In 1612, the Board of War summarized the Japanese letters and envoys sent in the past several years to the emperor as "(In 1610, Japan) sent spurious envoys twice to detect our strength."[131] This paper theorized that in the above context the letters sent to China in 1610 were in fact the letters carried to China by Zhou Xingru.

Another question about the unresponsive attitude of the Ming might be whether or not the Ming court had the correct information about the current Japanese policy towards China. Did they notice that the Tokugawa bakufu carried out a new policy different to that of Toyotomi Hideyoshi? Did they always stick to the cliche about *wako*? There was evidence to prove that the Ming noticed the change in Japanese policy towards China.

In Wanli40(1612)/8, the Board of War reported to the emperor

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[130]Chen Shuifeng, "Jinshi chuqi Zhongri maoyi guanxi", 794.

[131]*MSS*, v. 498.

that "The Japanese invasion of Korea . . . happened in the time of *guanbai* (*kanpaku* in Japanese, i.e. Toyotomi Hideyoshi), however recent Japanese harassment is actually that of illegal Chinese who hired Japanese hooligans to loot coastal fortune. Without their king's instruction, the Japanese do not dare to carry out large scale battle...."[132] In fact, the court also learned that most of the *wako* (in the seventeenth century) were Chinese.

However the answer to all the Japanese letters requesting the reopening of direct trade and rebuilding of good relations could be summarized in a typical memorial from the Fujian military officer reported to the court in 1617:". . . On their petition of rebuilding good relations, in preventing further countless troubles, we would do better never to trust them."[133]

Based on the above survey of the relations of that time, the impression one can receive might be that the Japanese were eager and anxious to resume trade as well as official relations with China, but the Chinese side carried a rigid and unresponsive attitude. Why then did the Chinese side not develop a more flexible policy? The reason was domestic turmoil. The crisis China was suffering was vividly described in a memorial sent to the court in 1612: ". . . At present, the northern hordes (Manchurian rebellion) have not been suppressed, and the military situation in Sichuan (Peasant Uprising) is very urgent; adding

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[132]Ibid.

[133]Ibid., v. 560.

the Japanese alarm in the southeast, it would be catastrophic to attempt to gather military supplies and to recruit soldiers. Everywhere funds are deficient. How can we deal with it?"[134] Surrounded by those problems, the Ming court was not able to handle the Sino-Japanese relations, or capable of reacting actively to the Japanese petition; therefore it adopted a policy of refusing Japan's gestures.

The "Minkan" Trade

While pursuing the reopening of both official relations and the direct "official" trade with China, the Tokugawa shogunate actively encouraged the "*minkan*" (between-people or non-official) trade. With this, it was very successful.

In the same year (1600) that the Five Elders repatriated Mao Guoke, the first Chinese ship sailed into Nagasaki.[135] Under the encouragement of Ieyasu, Sino-Japanese trade revived and the number of Chinese ships entering Nagasaki increased annually. To facilitate the Chinese trade, the bakufu appointed Feng Liu (Hyo Roku in Japanese) as the first *Totsuji* (Chinese Interpreter) in Nagasaki in 1604.[136]

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[134]Ibid., v. 501.

[135]*NBK*, 636. According to the study done by Nishikawa Joken (1648-1724), the first Chinese ship entered the port of Nagasaki in 1562. See Saeki Tomi, "Koki Yosei jidai ni okeru Nisshin boeki", 244.

[136]*NBK*, 650.

Chinese Ships Navigated to Japan, 1600-1647

Year	No. of Ships	Year	No. of Ships
1600	anchored*	1627	many**
1601	2 (distressed)	1630	many
1605	1o	1631	60
1606	3	1632	4
1608	anchored	1633	many
1609	10	1634	36
16010	4	1635	40
1611	70	1637	64
1612	30	1639	93
1613	20?	1640	74
1614	60-70	1641	97
1617	anchored	1642	34
1618	anchored	1643	34
1620	anchored	1644	54
1623	36	1645	76
1624	38	1646	54
1625	60	1647	30
1626	2		

*, **: Number unknown.

Sources: Kodama Tachio, "Shimazu han no Chugoku boeki to sakoku", 299; and Iwao Seiichi, "Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu", in *Shigaku Zasshi*, 62:11 (Nov 1953), 991.

In the efforts to carry out a "*minkan gaiko*" (diplomacy between people) to reopen direct trade, the Shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors stood in the forefront. In the early 1610s, Ieyasu himself frequently received the Ming merchants who went to Sunpu to visit him; usually Ieyasu issued *shuin-jo* (vermillion-seal licences) to Chinese captains as rewards. Among the Chinese who visited Ieyasu, there was one person who should be mentioned here. On 1612/8/15, a Chinese merchant visited Ieyasu in Sunpu and gave him Chinese medicine and books; the visitor also talked about the current situation in the Ming with Ieyasu. He was Koxinga's grandfather Zheng Shaozu, and allegedly that was his first visit to Japan.[137] (This might mark the beginning of the development of this family's dominance of Sino-Japanese trade and their control over seaborne routes throughout the East Asian seas for roughly sixty years.) In total, between 1604 and 1624, Chinese merchants in Japan applied for and received forty-three *shuin-jo*.[138]

Under the encouragement of the bakufu, more and more Chinese ships sailed to Japan to trade. In 1610, the *Ming shilu* recorded

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[137]Zheng arrived in Nagasaki on 1612/7/25; see *NBK*, 638-39. But both Japanese and Chinese authors offered a confused account of the figure who met with Ieyasu. Those who suggested that he was Koxinga's grandfather Zheng Shaozu include Kimiya Yasuhiko as quoted above. Meanwhile others claimed that the person was Koxinga's father Zheng Zhilong, including Yamawaki Teijiro, in *NTB*, 29. Chinese scholar Lin Renchuan stated that Zheng Zhilong first arrived in Japan (Hirado) in 1623 and that he then made a living by selling shoes. See Lin Renchuan, *Mingmo Qingchu siren haishang maoyi* (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1987), 180-81. I, for no particular reason, favour the idea of "grandpa". A general introduction for various speculations on Zheng Zhilong's first arrival of Japan can be found in Wu Fengbin, "Zheng Zhilong, Zheng Chenggong fuzi qiaoju Riben kaolue", in Zhongwai Guanxishi Xuehui, ed., *Zhongwai guanxishi luncong* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1987), 2, 48.

[138]Robert Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 165.

that "Recently, illegal merchants" vied with each other in trading with the Japanese, so that "high masts and large ships always festooned the way to Japan."[139]

But on the other hand, the Ming enforced stricter rules on banning trade with Japan. Chen Zizhen, the Governor of Fujian Province to whom the Nagasaki officials sent a letter and asked for direct trade, "replied" to the Japanese appeal with a suggestion to the Ming court for tightening coastal defense in 1610. Gao Ju, the Governor of Zhejiang Province issued new regulations to ban illegal trade with Japan in 1612. Capital punishment was frequently practised.[140]

Even then, in 1612, the Ming court found that "illegal merchants see Japan as a gold net, and compete in going to the deadly land" to trade.[141] In fact, Japan was definitely a "gold net". Due to the stricter enforcement of the maritime prohibition in China, the price of Chinese goods in Japan reached another level, while the Japanese commodities for export, gold and silver, were urgently needed in China. Therefore, a Ming official pointed out that the Chinese merchants "made one hundred times profit when they arrived in Japan; and then made another one hundred times benefit when they returned to China".[142]

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[139]*MSS*, v. 476.

[140]Nakada Yasunao, *Kinsei taigai kankeishi no kenkyu*, 35.

[141]*MSS*, v. 497.

[142]Li Jinming, *Mingdai haiwai maoyishi* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), 174.

Most illegal Chinese merchants were from Fujian province. In 1612, the Board of War reported to the throne that "On maritime prohibition, nowhere else is more loose than Fujian, . . . The people who collaborate with the Japanese are all from Fujian Province, . . . a sum of tens of thousands of people, . . ."[143] Obviously, tens of thousands of Fujian people were trading illegally with Japan and the actual scale of the trade was very large. From 1611 to 1635, Chinese ships entered Japan at an average of more than 40 ships per year.[144] The Shogunate limited other foreign ships to Hirado and Nagasaki in 1616, but Chinese ships could go to any other ports, such as Satsuma (Kagoshima, Bonotsu), Hizen (Goto, Omura, Karatsu) and Hakada.[145]

The Chinese ships were warmly welcomed in Japan because what they brought in, silk yarn and other commodities, was so deficient in Japan. Besides military and luxury purposes, the silk yarn was also important for the development of the handicraft and the silk weaving industry, a booming business in the Tokugawa period. For instance, the production of *nishijin ori*, a famous silk product in western Japan, was consuming one

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[143]*MSS*, v. 498.

[144]Iwao Seiichi, "Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu", 991.

[145]The bakufu permitted Chinese ships to sail to any port in 1610. *NBK*, 637. In 1616/6, the bakufu limited Chinese ships to Nagasaki. However, for unknown reasons, only two months later, the bakufu reassured Chinese traders that their ships would be allowed voyage to any port, including Satsuma. Hayashi Fukusai, *Tsuko ichiran* (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1912-1913), 5, 228, and 8, 459. Yamawaki Teijiro suggested that this was a concession of Hidetada, the second shogun, to Satsuma. *NTB*, 10.

third of the Chinese silk imported via Nagasaki.[146] Traditionally, the supply of Chinese silk yarn had never been discontinued. Even during the harshest days of maritime prohibition in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ming ships still traded silk yarn with Japanese ships in Manila. In 1630, when the alarm of *sakoku* rang aloud in Japan, the Chinese ships imported three hundred thousand *kin* of silk yarn into Nagasaki, which "planted an unmovable root in the trade"[147] during the *sakoku* period. In Japan, it was hard to imagine a day without Chinese trade.

Following the implementation of *sakoku*, the Chinese ships lost their privilege to voyage to any port they wanted and were limited to Nagasaki alone in 1635. Beginning at that time the Nagasaki trading system was formed. The city of Nagasaki became the major international port from the beginning of the Tokugawa period and the administration of Nagasaki was fully under the bakufu control. The local officials, *bugyo* (magistrate) and *daikan* (deputy), were the representatives of the shogun and they carried out the daily administration of military and commercial affairs including Chinese trade.[148] In the time of the Nagasaki trade, the Chinese were called "*Tojin*"[149] (Men of Tang); and the

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[146]Harada Tomohiko, *Edo jidai no rekishi* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1983), 157.

[147]*NTB*, 9.

[148]*NBK*, 647-48.

[149]The definition of the term is controversial. See Oba Osamu, *Edo jidai ni okeru Tosen mochiwatashisho no kenkyu* (Osaka: Kansai Daigaku Tozai Gakujutsu Kenkyujo, 1967), 9. Also Joshua Fogel, book review for Marius Jansen's book *China in the Tokugawa World*, in *American Historical Review*, 98:2 (April 1993), 545.

Chinese ships were called "*Tosen*"[150] (ships of Tang). Both were popular names used then to refer to the Chinese. To collect overseas information from Chinese merchants, the bakufu set up a special position "*fusetsu yaku*"[151] in Nagasaki. Equivalent to "information officer" in modern terms, the *fusetsu yaku* asked the Chinese captain to report the political situation in China and Southeast Asia each time their ships entered the Nagasaki port. The records would be sent to the bakufu. However, the "Seclusion" and the limitation of the trading port to Nagasaki brought almost no negative influence on Sino-Japanese trade. After 1635, from 1637 to 1661 more than fifty-three Chinese ships entered Nagasaki annually.[152]

In the first stage of Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period, from 1600 to 1644, all ships from China were private and illegal ships. After the Qing dynasty was founded by the Manchu, in 1644, the Chinese ships could be roughly divided into two categories; first, ships with the anti-Qing colour, such as those of Koxinga and the two feudatories which launched a rebellion against the Qing;[153] and second, ships directly or indirectly sent

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[150]Another way to pronounce the word is "*karafune*".

[151]*NBK*, 650.

[152]*KNNB*, 94. also Iwao Seiichi, "Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu", 988-98.

[153]From 1673 to 1681, three feudatories in South China revolted against the Manchu Throne. Two of these, headed by Shang Kexi and Geng Zhongming, sent ships to Japan for trade. See *NTB*, 1; and Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 140-41.

by the Qing court. From 1644 to 1683, because the maritime routes were tightly controlled by Koxinga's fleet, the Qing-related ships counted only a few in number.

During the whole Tokugawa period, there was another group of Chinese ships distinct from any of the above categories: ships from Southeast Asia. These were Chinese ships managed by the Chinese merchants who resided in major ports in Southeast Asia: such as Tonkin,[154] Quinan,[155] Patani,[156] Siam and Batavia.[157] They were in fact Overseas Chinese traders, but the bakufu treated them as Chinese; through them Japan traded with Southeast Asia and other parts of the world actively during the *sakoku* period.

From 1623 to 1683, the major player in the trade was the Zheng family. Koxinga's grandfather Zheng Shaozu, his father Zheng Zhilong, Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), his son Zheng Jing, and grandson Zheng Keshuang, the five generations controlled the trade for sixty years. The Zhengs transported silk yarn and sugar and deer leather to Japan and bought copper from Japan used for minting money, making cannons and guns, and for other military purposes. To monopolize the copper trade, the Zhengs carried out a monopoly policy and did not allow other merchants to freely

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[154]This was a port in-between the present Hanoi and Haiphong of Vietnam.

[155]The original name of the port is *Konan* in Japanese pronunciation and *Guangnan* in Chinese. Quinan is present Da Nang, a port city in Vietnam.

[156]A port in North Thailand.

[157]The original three Chinese characters for the name of the port are pronounced "Karapa" in Japanese and "Yaoliuba" in Chinese. I translate it into "Batavia" which was the Western name for that city then. Batavia is the present Jakarta of Indonesia.

trade copper.[158]

From 1600 to 1683, in the first stage, Sino-Japanese trade was carried out between the Japanese shogunate and the Chinese illegal merchants, pirates and the Ming loyalists, but soon after another Chinese merchant would come to the arena and be as eager as the shogun to trade. He was none other than the Qing emperor.

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[158]Zhu Delan, "Qingchu qianjieling shi Zhongguochuan haishang maoyi zhi yanjiu", in the Editorial Committee of the book ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* (Taipei: Institute of Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, 1986), 2, 151.

CHAPTER TWO: The Evolution of Copper Trade

Succeeding the above chapter surveying the Sino-Japanese trade in the first stage of the Tokugawa period, this chapter studies the trade in the second stage: from 1684, when the maritime prohibition was lifted in China, to 1715 when a set of new rules regarding foreign trade was issued in Japan. Meanwhile, this chapter also presents a survey on the relationship between the Chinese internal monetary situation and their external copper trade as well as the Qing court policy on copper acquisition, from the founding of the Qing dynasty in 1644 to the end of Kangxi reign in 1722. Differing from the Ming rulers who were beset with difficulties both at home and abroad, the Qing monarchs were vigorous and fully confident in trading with Japan. Since the acquisition of Japanese copper was closely related to the financial and monetary situation of China, as this thesis will display in the pages to come, Sino-Japanese trade in this stage developed to a level which was unprecedented in terms of trading value and scale.

Copper Problem and the Copper Policy of China

The study of the Sino-Japanese copper trade cannot be completed without a survey of the problem of copper in China. Copper had a long history as currency in China even before the Qing dynasty, but the supply of copper had agonized many Chinese rulers. Traditionally, in case of a copper shortage there were

two solutions: limiting the use of copper and importing copper.[159] After the middle of the Ming, the central government had to increase copper imports from Japan to meet the need of the central mints and provincial mints.[160] Besides these, there were countless private or illegal mints.[161]

From the year 1644 when the Qing dynasty was formally founded and the Manchu rulers started running the central government, they encountered the copper problem. First of all, they had to pay administrative and military expenses as well as the stipends for officials and soldiers by *zhiqian* (*seisen* in Japanese; i.e. unified money or official coin).[162] Two central mints were set up in Beijing: the one belonging to *Hubu* (the Board of Revenue) was called *Baoquanju* (the Bureau of Treasure Spring) and specialized in minting coins for the stipends of soldiers. The other under the management of *Gongbu* (the Board of Works) went by the name of *Baoyuanju* (the Bureau of Treasure Fountain), and specialized in minting cash for large infrastructures and hydraulic projects.[163]

In the Qing dynasty, both copper and silver were currency,

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[159]Fu Yiling, *Mingqing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1956), 177.

[160]Ibid.

[161]Though private minting of money was prohibited by any dynasty, it was hard to implement the ban. In the Ming dynasty, for instance, the circulation of private (illegally minted) money was always at large. See Peng Xinwei, *Zhongguo huobishi* (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1958), 474.

[162]The word of *zhiqian* was used in the Ming and the Qing periods, particularly in differing *jiuqian*: money of old dynasty but still in circulation; and *siqian*: private money.

[163]*KNNB*, 224; also Yang Duanliu, *Qingdai huobi jinrong shigao* (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1962), 4.

while the former was the main currency in circulation. Generally speaking, "Copper equalled money and money equalled copper."[164] The market price was calculated on a silver base, but the exchange rate between copper cash (coin) and silver was not stable.[165] Another problem was that of private minting. Since the currency was made of copper and the original materials for minting money were so easy to obtain, it was difficult to eliminate private minting completely.[166] All these elements caused the chaotic monetary situation in the Qing dynasty.

At first, if copper cash could not be supplied sufficiently by the central government, it would increase its value during circulation; for this reason the illegal minting occurred everywhere. People melted their copper ware and minted it into coin. Certainly the quality of the illegal minted coins was poor but it could be circulated because of the scarcity of coin for circulation.[167]

To stop illegal minting, the Qing court took a simple measure: increasing the weight of every single coin.[168] In the first year of Shunzhi (1644), the cash was made one *wen* (one coin) for the weight of one *qian*; then in the next year it

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[164]Xiao Qing, *Zhongguo gudai huobi sixiang shi* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 304.

[165]Xiao Qing, *Zhongguo gudai huobishi* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 312.

[166]Ibid., 314.

[167]Yang Duanliu, *Qingdai huobi jinrong shigao,* 53-7.

[168]The Qing government took the measures of increasing or decreasing the weight of coin to control the exchange rate between copper and silver, and, eventually, to stabilize the currency. Peng Xinwei, *Zhongguo huobishi*, 521.

increased to one *qian* two *fen* for one *wen*, then to one *qian* two *fen* five *li* in 1650, and finally in 1657, a criterion of one *qian* four *fen* for one *wen* (one coin) was set.[169]

However, the reverse of this situation (illegal minting) occurred when the following three conditions were met: 1) copper supply was low; 2) the value of the coin was held constant; and 3) the weight of each single coin was increased. The result was the increased price of copper and the decreased value of cash. At such times, the illegal minting among the people turned suddenly to the illegal selling of coin for copper. In 1684, Vice Minister of *Libu* (the Board of Officials) Chen Tingjing presented a memorial to the court and reported that then "by one *ryo* of silver people can only buy about seven *kin* of copper, but if someone melts one thousand coins he can get eight *kin* and twelve *ryo* of copper".[170] This meant that copper was expensive and cash (coin) was cheap, in other words, that the same weight of copper was worth more silver than the coin, made of copper, in the same weight. Therefore people were often melting coin to make copper ware to sell.

Aiming at preventing this phenomenon from continuing, and eventually at stabilizing the exchange rate between copper and silver, the Qing court sometimes reduced the weight of coin and issued many decrees to ban the illegal selling of cash. Besides this, the Qing rulers ordered the prohibition of large copper

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[169]*ZQZM*, 58.

[170]Ibid.

ware. The Qing court issued the rule that "in local markets red copper pots and copper ware which had already been made were still allowed to be sold, but from now on, all brass[171] ware which weighs less than five *kin* can still be made and sold; however all others are banned for manufacturing. Anyone violating this, will have their copper ware confiscated and be punished."[172] The copper shortage in the Shunzhi and early Kangxi reign (1644-1670) was serious, especially after 1655 when the court issued an order of "Maritime Prohibition" in an effort to defeat the resistance force lead by Koxinga. In 1661, the Qing court issued another decree moving all coastal dwellers away from the shore thereby aiming to strengthen the blockade imposed against Koxinga. After that, the number of official ships bound for copper acquisition decreased to almost none. In 1679, Emperor Kangxi even ordered the collecting of old copper ware, such as spoons, bowls, basins, incense burners etc., for minting money.[173] Traditionally, a new dynasty would not use the money of the previous one because of the era name of the old dynasty on it. But in 1681, Kangxi refused the Governor of Fujian's suggestion for reminting the old copper money, and moreover in 1683 the court declared that all old copper money was permitted to be circulated.[174]

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[171]which was the original material for coins.

[172]*ZQZM*, 58.

[173]Ibid.

[174]Ibid., 60.

As early as in 1645, the Qing court enacted a policy to assign special officials to manage the copper acquisition at the customs of coastal areas. This was called *guan chai ban tong* (the System of Copper Acquisition by Customs Officials).[175] The selected customs official had a fixed tenure and a certain quota[176] of copper to be purchased. Meanwhile the court encouraged merchants to voyage to Japan for copper buying and ordered local governments to issue licences to merchants, and to purchase the copper they brought back from abroad. At that time, there was no limitation on overseas trade from the Qing court and ships could go to any port they wanted.[177] But, unfortunately, most maritime commercial routes in Southeast China were then controlled by anti-Qing fleets under the command of the rebellious Seaborne Lord Koxinga; therefore the navigation of ships loyal to Qing was in jeopardy and, as a result, there was never enough copper shipped home. Thus from Shunzhi8 (1651) the Qing had to issue

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[175]*KNNB*, 224.

[176]The Qing court set up an annual acquisition quota to meet the needs of the central or provincial mints. But unfortunately, the statistical data of the Qing court on the copper trade was not available. As an alternative, there is a complete list for the number of coins minted by the central mints during the Shunzhi, Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns (1644-1734). See Yang Duanliu, *Qingdai huobi jinrong shigao*, 6-9. In the actual trade, the official quota was not necessarily the amount purchased in Japan. By contrast, in most cases, the two numbers were not in agreement. This was because Chinese merchants could only purchase more copper than was required of them if there was enough copper available. For the Qing government allowed the official merchants, upon returning from Japan, and fulfilling the official quota, to "sell at their own will". Since copper in China had a good market value, the portion of self-retailing was more attractive to those merchants. All of these factors caused the merchants to make every effort to purchase more copper. *ZQZM*, 66.

[177]*KNNB*, 224.

paper currency instead of copper for ten years.[178]

In 1653, the Qing court allocated ten thousand *ryo* of duty silver to each of the six customs in Shangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and other provinces to import copper. According to the price at that time, the sixty thousand *ryo* of silver could buy one million *kin* of copper.[179]

In 1679, the court decided to allocate fifty thousand *ryo* of silver received from salt tax for purchasing copper and assigned the salt officials to manage copper acquisition for the mints in Beijing.[180] This was aimed at stimulating harder work from the customs officials but it caused a chaotic situation in the copper supply. Because of the lack of copper and the task assigned by the court to two separate groups within the same officialdom, it resulted in nothing but competition between customs officials and salt officials as well as the rise of the copper price on the market. The outcome was that copper was expensive and cash was cheap. Thus people bought coin, melted it for copper ware, and then sold it. This pattern developed especially seriously in Beijing. Two years later (1681), the Qing court gave up the idea and continued to ask the customs officials to manage copper acquisition solely.[181]

Between 1645 and 1699, the Customs Official Copper

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[178]Peng Xinwei, *Zhongguo huobishi*, 556-57.

[179]*KNNB*, 224.

[180]Ibid., 225.

[181]Ibid.

Acquisition developed from six customs ports to sixteen. Every customs port had a Copper Superintendent who was entitled to take responsibility for using the duty income to acquire a certain amount of copper. The copper supply drastically improved after the "Open Sea", the lifting of the ban on maritime trade, of 1684; from 1695, the copper trade value mounted at an unprecedented speed. However, in 1699, the Qing replaced the Custom Official Copper Acquisition System, which had operated for more than a half century, with the copper acquisition assignment of the *guanshang* (official merchant or government contractor) from *Neiwufu* (the Department of Imperial Household).[182]

The Department of Imperial Household was a part of the imperial court; its major duty was to serve the daily life of the imperial family. However the Kangxi emperor developed special relations with some staff of the Department, especially with Cao Yin[183] who was the grandfather of Cao Xueqin, the author of the *Dream of the Red Chamber*. The emperor assigned him as the Textile Magistrate of Jiangning[184] a position in charge of silk acquisition for the imperial family. But more importantly, Cao

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[182]Ibid., 226. For a general introduction about government (royal) contractors from the Department of Imperial Household, see Wu Qiyan, "Jianlun Qingqianqi Neiwufu huangshang de xingqi", in Ye Xian'en ed., *Qingdai quyu shehui jingji yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1992), 772-83. A path-breaking study on copper contractors has been published by Fu Yiling in his book *Mingqing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben*, 176-97.

[183]For the studies of Cao Yin and Kangxi, see Jonathan Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-Hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), and Preston M. Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department--A Study of Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662-1796* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

[184]Jiangning is present Nanjing.

Yin and other textile officials from the Bureau of the Imperial Household were actually assigned another duty by the emperor in person: monitoring the performance of local officials in South China.

Due to the exceptional relationship with the emperor, Cao Yin wrote to the emperor in 1697 and applied for the contract of the copper trade; and the emperor ratified his requirement.[185] Therefore, in 1699, the court ordered the copper superintendents in six customs ports (Wuhu, Hushu, Hukou, Huaian, Beixin and Yangzhou) to yield the copper acquisition quota assigned to them to Wang Gangming (Cao Yin's trade partner) and five other "government contractors" from the Department of the Imperial Household. Meanwhile, the official merchants (government contractors) could borrow capital (silver) from the Board of Revenue for the acquisition cost and this capital had to be returned after the merchants purchased copper back from Japan and sold it out in China. From that time, the two central mints in Beijing relied completely on the copper from Japan.[186]

Unfortunately, the official merchants borrowed money but could not provide enough *etong* (*gakudo*, in Japanese; i.e. the allotted quota copper) within the assigned time. By 1715, the silver used for copper acquisition owed by official merchants totalled more

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[185]Gugong Bowuyuan Mingqing Danganbu, ed., *Guanyu Jiangning Zhizao Caojia dangan shiliao* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975), 15-20.

[186]*KNNB*, 227.

than two million *ryo*.[187] By that time, the *shinpai* (trade credentials) case, which triggered a crisis in trade and will be studied later in this chapter, occurred and trade was paralysed. This situation resulted in the copper supply for the two central mints in Beijing becoming very low. However the imperial court did not understand the reason, suspecting that the merchants were not performing their duty properly. Emperor Kangxi wrote that "If the copper acquisition continued to rely on (official) merchants, it must be in debt for a long time and with no possible solution", by then "they might owe several million *ryo*"; at that time, "even it we take severe punitive measures and confiscate their households, they still can not pay back the silver owed by them".[188] Therefore, the emperor issued a decree ordering the use of the silver from the imperial treasure to pay back the silver owed to the Board of Revenue. He then decided to terminate the Imperial Household Merchants Acquisition System immediately and transfer the task to provincial officials.

In 1716, the court formally declared the end of copper buying through official merchants and ordered the governors in eight provinces (Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong) to "select honest and capable officials" to take charge of the copper acquisition. Following the decree, an annual acquisition quota of 554,400 *kin* was assigned for each province; the total amount came to 4,435,200 *kin*. Of this,

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[187]Ibid.

[188]Ibid.

2,923,384 *kin* was allotted to one of the central mints: the Bureau of Treasure Spring while 1,511,816 was allotted to another central mint: the Bureau of Treasure Fountain.[189]

Under this order, the eight provinces selected "honest and capable officials" and let them hire merchants for copper acquisition. The hired merchants would become official merchants as well, and they could not only carry the licence issued by the governor of the province but could also borrow silver from the provincial government for the cost. Upon returning from Japan, the merchants had to submit to the government the amount of copper, of a value equal to the cost of the silver they had borrowed before; after that they could sell the residual copper, if any, themselves.

Most of the hired copper merchants were from Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and their ships only berthed in the ports of these two provinces. Thus, the other six provinces had to send merchants to go to these two provinces to buy copper from the hands of Jiangsu and Zhejiang merchants. And due to an unfamiliarity with situations in the two provinces, the people from the other six provinces usually could not send the assigned amount of copper to the capital at the scheduled time. For this reason, starting in 1722 the eight-province copper acquisition was changed to a two province (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) acquisition. Besides its own assignment, Jiangsu took the quota for Anhui, Jiangxi, Fujian and Guangdong and made a total amount of

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[189]Ibid., 228.

2,772,000 *kin*. At the same time, Zhejiang took its own plus Hunan and Hubei province and made up to 1,663,200 *kin*.[190]

In fact, the malfunction of the eight-province copper acquisition was due not to domestic reasons but to the implementation of a new trading rule called the Shotoku New Regulations issued by the bakufu. These regulations limited the number of Chinese ships to thirty and the amount of copper trading value to only three million *kin*. Under these circumstances, how could the two province acquisition succeed? From 1722, Jiangsu province, which took in purchasing copper for the assigned amount of five provinces, delayed its payment every year; Zhejiang province did exactly the same.[191]

Copper Production and Copper Export in Japan

When the Qing government was eager to import copper, some unprecedented progress happened to be made in Japanese mining. After 1543, the Westerners, mainly Portuguese and Dutch, began to navigate to Japan's shore for trade. Meanwhile, from the mid-sixteenth century, gold and silver mining in Japan developed fruitfully; therefore the two noble metals, especially silver, which had a drastic increase in production, worked as the major exporting commodity in trade with Westerners and Chinese.[192] However, the production of both metals reached their climax in

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[190]Ibid.

[191]Ibid.

[192]Kobata Atsushi, *Nihon no kahei* (Tokyo: Shibundo, 1958), 133.

the fifty years with 1596 to 1623 as the middle years; after that the production declined.[193] In 1668, the bakufu banned the export of silver.[194]

During the time when gold and silver production declined, copper mining boomed: in the Tensho era (1573-1592), the Kawakami *dozan* (copper mine) in Harima domain[195] and Akazawa mine in Hitachi domain;[196] in 1596, the Gamo mine in Iwashiro domain;[197] and in 1610, the famous Ashio mine in Shimotsuke domain[198] were successively discovered. Later, in 1615, the Furokura mine was discovered in Ugo domain.[199] All those mines were immediately excavated and yielded good production.[200]

In the Kanmon era (1661-1673), copper mining developed more prosperously. The Ashio copper mine in this era greatly increased its production. From 1662 to 1666, it produced a total of 2,810,000 *kin* of copper, and its annual average was 562,000. But from 1667 to 1676, it produced 21,870,000, with the annual

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[193]Ibid.

[194]Ibid., 134. The ban on silver export was lifted thoroughly in 1672. *NTB*, 315-16.

[195]Harima domain is a part of the modern Hyogo Prefecture.

[196]Hitachi domain is within the present Ibaraki Prefecture.

[197]Iwashiro domain is a part of the present Fukushima Prefecture.

[198]Shimotsuke domain is modern Tochigi Prefecture.

[199]Ugo domain is a part of present Akitá Prefecture.

[200]Nihon Gakushi In, ed., *Meijizen Nihon kogyo gijutsu hattatsushi* (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1958), 173.

average of 2,190,000 *kin*.[201] At the same time, new copper mines were continuously discovered in various locations. In Kanmon8(1668), the number of large-scale mines reached twenty-three, and in Jokyo2(1685), it mounted to thirty-four. At this time, the national total of copper production reached nine million *kin*.[202] The number of miners was about two hundred thousand, the coke burners were around one hundred thousand; Osaka refinery alone had ten thousand workers doing foreign trade copper refinery.[203]

In the Genroku era (1688-1703), the development of copper mining presented an imbalance. The production of the Ashio mine sharply declined in 1688. The bakufu lent five thousand *ryo* of silver to save it, but it was not easy to rejuvenate. However at the same time, in Genroku3(1690), a large mine was discovered in Besshi, the Iyo domain.[204] The mining of the Besshi mine started in 1691; its production soared. In 1691, it produced 320,000 *kin*; in 1697, 2,245,000; and in 1699, 2,534,000.[205]

But, copper mining at that time failed to develop new technology. Since it depended on backward traditional mining and refinery methods, its development had limits.[206] In 1697, the

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[201]Ibid., 176.

[202]Ibid., 177.

[203]Ibid.

[204]Iyo domain is present Ehime Prefecture.

[205]Nihon Gakushi In, ed., *Meijizen Nihon kogyo gijutsu hattatsushi*, 189-91.

[206]Ibid., 192.

annual quota of copper for export was supposed to be 8,920,000 *kin*,[207] but it was impossible for all the mines to fulfil this task. Moreover, by the same year copper production had already reached its apex and one could not expect any increase in amount. Besshi, Ashio and other major mines never demonstrated such high productivity again. After that, the copper industry in Japan steadily declined.[208]

Besides serving as an export, copper was used for manufacturing utensils and for minting money.[209] Among copper traders, Izumiya Yoshijiro had been engaged in copper exporting since 1573.[210] Therefore, in 1638, when the *sakoku* policy was initiated, Izumiya Ribei and twenty-one other copper merchants were permitted to trade copper with foreigners.[211] The trade enabled the Izumiya family to earn a huge fortune; this was the origin of the Sumitomo *zaibatsu* (combine). Thus, after gold and silver, copper gradually made its debut in the arena of trade with the Dutch and Chinese.

Chinese merchants were eager to buy copper from Japan because of its good quality; especially *saodo* (copper bullion)

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[207]Ibid., 193. This number is discrepant with the actual trade statistics of the same year: 8,960,023 *kin* which the thesis will quote lately. That data was calculated by Yanai Kenji based on the original record of major copper exporter, Izumiya (Sumitomo) family. See Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei*, 175.

[208]Ibid., 193.

[209]Ibid., 175.

[210]Ibid.

[211]Ibid.

which was the best copper product for the Chinese to mint coin.[212] From the time of Jokyo(1684-1687), copper became a major commodity for trade with China. *Saodo* was also called *goyodo* (Royal copper).[213] The operation of Sino-Japanese trade solely depended on the amount of copper (*saodo*) collected in Nagasaki.[214] The copper from mines was first transported to Osaka, then from Osaka transferred to Nagasaki by ships. This was why *saodo* had another name: *Nagasaki mawarido* (the copper circulated to Nagasaki).[215]

It was understandable that the copper trade did not enjoy smooth sailing. At first, in Kan'ei14(1637), the bakufu banned the export of copper.[216] This was because in 1636, after using Chinese coins for centuries, the bakufu was taking an important measure to control its monetary situation: minting its own copper cash as currency to circulate in Japan.[217] Due to the increasing need of mintage, therefore, the export of copper had to be sacrificed.[218]

The ban made the Dutch lose business. In 1645, Nagasaki Bugyo Baba Toshiaki suggested lifting the ban. He said to the Dutch

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[212]Yamawaki Teijiro, *Nukeni* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1965), 158; also *ZQZM*, 56.

[213]*KNNB*, 218.

[214]Ibid.

[215]Ibid.

[216]Kobata Atsushi, *Nihon no kahei*, 209.

[217]Ibid.

[218]Ibid.

interpreter that since there was abundant copper in Japan why should the export to the Dutch not be allowed? Japan already had too much copper coin, so why not export it? His consultation with another Nagasaki Bugyo Yamazaki Masanobu lead to the lifting of the ban and reopening of the copper trade in 1646.[219]

Copper gradually played an influential role in the Nagasaki trade after the middle of the seventeenth century.[220] From 1664 to 1667, the copper export from Nagasaki to the Chinese ships increased at an average of one or two hundred thousand *kin* per year.[221] In 1672, the export jumped up to the stage of one million *kin*,[222] a level which it would never fall below until 1794[223] (except in 1715 and 1716, details to follow). The year of 1684, however, marked the beginning of copper export to China on a truly massive scales in terms of both the amount of copper and number of ships involved.

The Booming of Sino-Japanese Trade

In 1683, Zheng Keshuang, the grandson of Koxinga, surrendered to the Qing court. In the following year, Zheng Keshuang went to Beijing and Emperor Kangxi learned from him how beneficial

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[219]Ibid., 210.

[220]Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei*, 174.

[221]Ibid., 175.

[222]Ibid.

[223]*NTB*, 220. In contradistinction to that, after 1795, the sum of copper exported to China never surpassed one million *kin*. Ibid.

overseas trade could be. Then the emperor "opened the sea": ordered the lifting of "Maritime Prohibition". The emperor himself even sent thirteen ships to Nagasaki for trade in the same year (1684).[224]

After the "Open Sea", Chinese ships from the mainland poured into Japan and the trade boomed in the second stage of Tokugawa period. The numbers of Chinese ships entering Nagasaki, in the years immediately after the "Open Sea", were as follows: 1684: 24; 1685: 85; 1686: 102; 1687: 115; 1688: 193. In 1688, the number of Chinese people who came to Nagasaki by ship reached 9,128, almost ten thousand.[225]

Japanese Copper Export on Chinese Ships, 1664-1697

Year	Amount (*kin*)	Year	Amount (*kin*)
1664	283,800	1684	2,675,100
1665	343,700	1685	3,288,100
1666	526,400	1686	4,455,700
1667	748,200	1687	3,830,200
1672	1,158,100	1688	3,370,600
1673	1,096,650	1689	3,352,568
1674	1,032,600	1690	3,766,873
1675	1,935,400	1691	2,961,840

[224]*KNNB*, 147.

[225]Oba Osamu, *Edo jidai no Nitchu hiwa* (Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1980), 31.

1676	1,044,200	1692	2,270,250
1677	1,200,000	1693	3,312,317
1678	1,800,000	1694	3,359,100
1679	1,847,770	1695	4,445,262
1682	3,283,925	1696	7,477,502
1683	2,825,355	1697	7,139,968

Sources: Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei* (Tokyo: Nihon Shoseki Kabushiki Gaisha, 1976), 175, and Zhu Delan, "Qingchu qianjieling shi Zhongguochuan haishang maoyi zhi yanjiu", in the Editorial Committee of the book ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* (Taipei: Institute of Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, 1986), 2, 150.

Because of the prompt development of Sino-Japanese trade after 1684 and the rapid rise in the trading value, the bakufu found that the supply of noble metals, particularly silver for the Chinese, was not enough to sustain the trade. To prevent a fast drain of silver, the bakufu resolved to take serious measures to limit the scale of the trade.[226] Based on the previous experience on the foreign trade control, in Jokyo2(1685), the bakufu issued the "Jokyo Regulation" and it limited the trade value of Chinese ships to six thousand *kan* of silver,[227] by which it aimed to curb the drain of silver by exporting more copper to

[226]*NTB*, 51.

[227]Ibid., 53-5. In 1686, the Chinese ships bought 4,455,700 *kin* of copper for the silver of 3576 *kan*. Ibid., 53.

meet the need of trade value.[228] From this point, copper became a "*dai koku bashira*" (the central pillar) sustaining the Nagasaki trade.

The trade boom resulted in the huge amount of copper flowing to China. According to Yanai Kenji, from 1684 to 1700, during a period of seventeen years after the lifting of the Maritime Prohibition in China, China's transport of *saodo* from Nagasaki totalled about 69,000,000 *kin*. Annually the lowest was 2,000,000 *kin*; the highest was 7,000,000 *kin*; the annual average was four million.[229]

On the other hand, according to the "Jokyo Regulations", if the goods carried by the Chinese ships exceeded the amount of trade value set by the bakufu, the Nagasaki authority would ask the extra ships to return without trade.[230] In 1688 alone, there were as many as 77 Chinese ships forced back fully loaded; this made the Chinese merchants suffer tremendous losses.[231] But because there was no limitation on the number of ships, those ships which were compelled to return would sell their goods to Japanese residents in Japanese coastal areas illegally. To ban the *nukeni* (smuggling), in 1688, the bakufu limited the number of Chinese ships to Nagasaki to seventy vessels.[232]

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[228]*NTB*, 52.

[229]*ZQZM*, 64.

[230]*KNNB*, 145.

[231]Ibid., 153.

[232]*ZQZM*, 64.

Furthermore, in the interest of preventing direct contact between Chinese crew members and Japanese merchants, the bakufu ordered all the Chinese crew members to live in *Tojin yashiki* (Chinese Residency) from 1689.[233] Under this condition, the Chinese merchants often complained to Nagasaki local officials about the deficiency of authorized trade levels, and petitioned for trading cargoes which exceeded these limits. With the purposes of eliminating smuggling and stopping the drain of silver, from 1695, the bakufu allowed that those Chinese goods exceeding the limited amount be traded with copper. This was called *shiro mono gae* (substitutive quota or barter transaction) or *do shiro mono gae* (substitutive copper transaction).[234] This caused the copper trade between the two countries to reach its peak in Genroku10 (1697); in the same year, Japan exported 8,960,023 *kin* of copper to the Chinese and the Dutch, of which 7,139,968 *kin* was for Chinese ships.[235] In 1698, the actual trade value increased to 13,000 *kan*, of which 7,000 *kan* were accounted as *shiro mono gae;* and 5,000 *kan* of that was spent by the Japanese on importing Chinese silk.[236] Meanwhile the number of ships was increased to eighty. Also from 1698, due to the decrease in copper production, Japan used *tawara mono* (maritime

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[233]*KNNB*, 204. For a more detailed explanation of why the Chinese Residency was built, see *NTB*, 75-81.

[234]*KNNB*, 153-54.

[235]Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei*, 175.

[236]Ibid. 154.

products) and *shoshiki* (sundry goods and handicrafts) to trade for the deficient part of the trade value.[237]

Emperor Kangxi's Spy to Japan

Since the Emperor Kangxi noticed the drastic decline in the number of Chinese ships permitted to Nagasaki after 1685 when the "Jokyo Regulations" were issued, he could not understand the reason but had doubts about Japanese intentions in changing their attitude towards Chinese merchants. Thus the Emperor wanted to send a spy to Japan to collect first hand information for him. He assigned the task to his close subject: Li Xu, the Textile Magistrate of Suzhou. Along with Cao Yin, the Textile Magistrate of Jiangning and Ao Fuhe, the Textile Magistrate of Hangzhou, Li Xu was in fact one of the spies sent by Kangxi to southern China to monitor the local situation and the performance of the local officials.[238]

In the Winter of 1700, the Emperor met Li Xu in Beijing and ordered him, "Upon the consultation of three Textile Magistrates, to send one person to the Eastern Sea (Japan)",[239] to investigate the reason for Japan's changing attitude towards Chinese merchants. In the Spring of 1701, Li Xu talked about the imperial

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[237]*NTB*, 222-23.

[238]*KNNB*, 156.

[239]Gugong Bowuyuan Mingqing Danganbu, ed., *Li Xu zouzhe* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1976), 15.

message with Cao Yin and Ao Fuhe. As a result, Ulin i da[240] Mo Ersen, the Treasurer in the Hangzhou Office of the Textile Magistery, was selected. To protect his secrecy, Li Xu and the other two also decided that, "instead of (departing) from Ningbo where ships are crowded and he might be easily recognized, (he should) depart from Shanghai" which was a much less prosperous port. Li Xu reported to the Emperor about the plan.[241]

Mo Ersen left Hangzhou for Suzhou in 1701/5; then from there he went to Shanghai. On 1701/6/28, Mo Ersen disguised himself as a merchant and boarded Captain Wu Ziying's ship for Japan.[242] On 1701/7/9, the ship arrived at its destination, Nagasaki. Mo stayed in Nagasaki for more than two months. In the latter part of the ninth month, Mo boarded another ship bound for home with Li Caiguan as the captain,[243] and arrived in Ningbo on 1701/10/6. He hurried to report to the Emperor as soon as he was ashore. On 10/11, he went to Hangzhou, and four days later, he reached Suzhou. On the next day, 1701/10/16, he started his journey to the court.[244] In Beijing, he reported his findings in Japan directly to the Kangxi Emperor. Unfortunately, the original

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[240]Written in three Chinese characters, Ulin i da is a Manchurian term which means treasurer. In Romanizing the term, I followed the formula of Kanda Nobuo; see Matsuura Akira, "Koshu shokuzo Ulin i da Mo-er-sen no Nagasaki raiko to sono shokumei ni tsuite--Koki jidai no Nisshin kosho no ichi sokumen", in *Tohogaku*, 55 (January, 1978), 75. The Chinese pronunciation for the three characters is "wulinda".

[241]*Lixu zouzhe*, 16-7.

[242]*KNNB*, 157.

[243]Ibid., 158.

[244]*Lixu zouzhe*, 18-9.

record of their talk is still not accessible at this time.[245]

The Mo Ersen mission was extremely important in forming the Qing policy on Japan. Later on, the Yongzheng emperor once talked about his mission: "In the past, the Kangxi Emperor heard some rumours and then dispatched a textile official Ulin i da Mai(Mo) Ersen, disguised as a merchant, to sail to Japan to investigate. On his return, he reported to the emperor that those rumours were groundless and that the Japanese were humble and meek. By this, the emperor set his mind at rest; and the ban on overseas trade was relaxed."[246]

In the above text, there was no clue about what those rumours were, but presumably they were suspicions about Japanese intentions as they lowered the trade levels with China. After the report of Mo Ersen, the Kangxi emperor was convinced that Japan would not be of any harm to China. Then he continued his efforts to encourage Chinese merchants to trade with Japan. Significantly, the Qing policy towards Japan, initiated by Kangxi and based on Mo Ersen's report, was not changed until the middle of the nineteenth century. Thus, the Mo Ersen mission helped to develop a principle for the Qing policy towards Japan. After the incident of Jokyo Regulations in 1698, another more troublesome incident, the *shinpai* case, occurred and this time the Kangxi emperor settled the case also based on the Mo Ersen report.[247]

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[245]*KNNB*, 158.

[246]*Yongzheng zhupi yuzhi*, Memorial of Li Wei, Yongzheng6(1728)/8/8.

[247]*KNNB*, 158-60.

Arai Hakuseki and the Issuance of *Shinpai*

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Japan was no longer capable of exporting copper in as massive a scale as before because of the limited natural resources. In Genroku14(1701), concerning the situation of copper production, the bakufu enforced the control and management over copper processing and purchasing. The shogunate set up the *doza* (copper office) in Osaka to guarantee the copper supply for the Nagasaki trade. This office controlled all copper refineries in Japan and it organized them to refine the copper to be purchased by the office for the Nagasaki trade. Upon collection, the office would send the copper to Nagasaki for export.[248]

Copper export sharply declined after 1701 and the copper office could not be of any help in the circumstances. In 1703, even though this was a good year in copper "harvest", the nationwide production of *saodo* (copper bullion) was about 6,350,000 *kin*. After deducting four million *kin* for domestic needs such as minting money, there was only 2,350,000 *kin* left for export to the Dutch and the Chinese.[249] Thus the supply of copper could not meet the export demand. In 1711, Japan only exported 1,754,194 *kin* of *saodo* (copper bullion) and 43,500 *kin* of raw copper to China.[250] In the following year(1712), the bakufu

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[248]Ibid., 218.

[249]Yanai Kenji et al., eds., *Kaigai koshoshi no shiten · Dai ni kan · Kinsei*, 174.

[250]Yamawaki Teijiro, *Nagasaki no Tojin boeki*, 119.

resolved to change the overall management of the copper export. The *doza* (copper office) was dismantled and replaced by a group of seventeen merchants called *fukidoya nakama* (association of copper refinery owners). They were assigned the task of collecting five million *kin* of copper per year. But, there was no way for them to fulfil the task.[251]

The drastic drain of gold, silver and copper caused deep concern of Arai Hakuseki, the major adviser of the Shogun Tokugawa Ietsugu. He wrote to the shogunate in February 1714 that ". . . if we calculate the sum of gold and silver that has gone to foreign countries for the one hundred and seven years since the Keicho era (1596-1614) on the basis of the information given by the Nagasaki Bugyosho (Magistrate Office)and compare it with the amount of gold and silver produced in our country within the same period, we can see that we must have lost a quarter of the gold and three-quarters of the silver. . . . As for copper, what we have now is not only not enough for foreign trade, but insufficient for internal need as well."[252] Then he suggested that ". . .we must first consider the total yearly production of gold, silver, and copper that can be exported abroad, and then decide on the yearly sum that is to be used for foreign trade at Nagasaki. Next, the amount that is to be carried as freight on

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[251]Ibid., 139.

[252]Joyce Ackroyd, trans., *Told round a Brushwood Fire*, 136. Arai Hakuseki's assessment has been controversial even today. See *NTB*, 152-3. For a detailed reassessment of Hakuseki's calculation, see Miyazaki Michio, *Arai Hakuseki no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1969), 150-202.

each foreign ship is to be reckoned, and both the number of ships and the amount of freight are to be fixed."[253]

Finally, drafted by Arai Hakuseki[254] and supported by Ozuka Kiyosuke,[255] the new Nagasaki Bugyo, a series of new rules on trade called "*kaihaku goshi shinrei*" (New Regulations for Seaborne Trade) was issued by the bakufu in 1715.[256] Because 1715 (Kangxi54) was the fifth year of the *Shotoku* era, the regulations were commonly known as "*Shotoku shinrei*" (Shotoku New Regulations).[257] The Regulations limited the number of Chinese ships to thirty vessels and the trading value to six thousand *kan* of silver per year out of which three million *kin* of copper could be purchased annually. In case of copper deficiency, *tawara mono* (maritime products) and *shoshiki* (sundry goods and handicrafts) would be supplied as substitute.[258] To enforce the limitation, the shogunate issued *shinpai* (trade credentials) to Chinese ships which entitled them to trade while setting a particular trade value for each particular ship.[259]

The so-called *shinpai* was just a piece of paper written in *kanbun* (Chinese) drafted by the Chinese interpreters in Nagasaki.

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[253]Joyce Ackroyd, trans., *Told round a Brushwood Fire*, 248.

[254]*NTB*, 152.

[255]Ibid., 140.

[256]*KNNB*, 162.

[257]*NTB*, 141.

[258]*KNNB*, 162.

[259]*NTB*, 145-46.

Its text was as follows:

Trade Credential
Tally for Nagasaki Trade

Respectfully under the order of the Nagasaki *Bugyo* (Magistrate), the Nagasaki Office of the Chinese Interpreters declares that this office will select Chinese merchants to issue trade credentials in the interest of pursuing an orderly trade.

You Chinese merchants have been sailing to trade with this country for many years and have never ceased. However the merchants coming here are a variety of persons and there are a few dishonest merchants among you and they purposely disobey our rules. Due to the above reason, it is necessary from now on to limit the number of Chinese ships from your original ports and the amount of trading value as well. Here this office set up the approximate value of NINE THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED *ryo* of silver for this ship from Nanjing to come to trade. Since the captain Yang Dunhou has personally signed an agreement to honour our rules, this office hereby decided to issue this trade credential to him as a tally. When this ship comes to this port, the tally should be presented and be checked by this office. Only after that, will this ship be allowed to sell the goods carried aboard freely. But those ships without tally will be repatriated immediately. You Chinese merchants must perform in a more sensitive way and those who violate the rule will never be issued the tally again. Moreover punitive measures will be introduced.

From: The Nagasaki Office of the Chinese Interpreters
Relinquished at the time . . . requested[260]
The (date, month of the)fifth year of Shotoku[261]

To prevent forgery, the tally used Japanese indigenous paper[262] and had a red seal, besides two others, over the number of the trade value which was seen as the crucial part of the

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[260]This is the term of *shinpai* validity.

[261]The translation of the shinpai is based on the photo in Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shinko kaito roku · Tojin fusetsu gaki · Wappu tomecho* (Suita: The Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies at Kansai University, 1974), illustration 1. However, the original date on the illustration was Ansei4(1857). I "borrowed" the date of "Shotoku".

[262]*NTB*, 145.

shinpai.[263]

The most prominent feature of the *shinpai* was that instead of the Chinese era name "Kangxi", the bakufu used the Japanese era name "Shotoku" on the text. The two Chinese characters later triggered the most disturbing case on Sino-Japanese relations at the imperial court in Beijing. The case will be studied in the next chapter.

The *shinpai* could be used only once and there was a term of validity written on it. Counting from the time when they were issued, some *shinpai* were written for the permission of trade in the coming year and others were written for trade after the coming year. After receiving the *shinpai*, almost all Chinese ships came in the year assigned by the *shinpai*. Sometimes Chinese captains gave *shinpai* to others. However, the Chinese Interpreter Office in Nagasaki did not pay so much attention to the addressee of the *shinpai* but was only concerned about whether the ship was carrying a *shinpai*.[264]

The *shinpai* was not an invention of Arai Hakuseki. In practice, he imitated the seaborne trade examining system of the Yuan dynasty in China.[265] But by the implementation of the *shinpai*, Arai Hakuseki successfully shifted the bakufu to a much more favourable position in controlling trade.[266]

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[263]*KNNB*, 169.

[264]Ibid.

[265]*NBK*, 665.

[266]*KNNB*, 170.

The Shotoku New Regulations were declared to Chinese captains on 1715/3/5 by special bakufu envoys from Edo.[267] Then a total of forty-six *shinpai* were issued to Chinese captains from Nanjing and Ningbo(thirty-nine), Amoy(two), Taiwan(two) and Guangdong(one). Some of them came to Nagasaki in the previous year(1714).[268] However, later in 1715, there were thirteen more Chinese ships entering the Nagasaki port after the issuing of the *shinpai*. Among them, five were from Taiwan, two from Fujian, one from Quanzhou and others from Southeast Asia. In accordance with the Shotoku New Regulations, the annual limit for Chinese ships was thirty; those ships which exceeded the number of the annual limit were not allowed to trade in Nagasaki and had to sail back with their cargo. Of these ships the majority were from Fujian and Taiwan. Furthermore, they could not receive *shinpai* and even lost their right to come to Japan permanently. Apparently, from now on, all Japanese trade benefits would be monopolized by the Jiangsu and Zhejiang captains who had been competing in the trade with Fujian captains. The indignant Fujian captains swore revenge.[269]

Confrontation between Chinese captains trading with Nagasaki from Jiangsu, Zhejiang province and those from Fujian province

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[267]*NTB*, 140-41.

[268]*KNNB*, 171.

[269]Ibid.

had been taking place for a while.[270] During the time of "Maritime Prohibition" in both the Ming and the Qing, the coastal ports in Jiangsu and Zhejiang were monitored strictly. However this policy ran into practical difficulties in Fujian. Due to a tradition of going to Southeast Asia to gain fortune, plus the connivance of a few local officials, the Fujian people could always manage to have their commodities loaded on board and their ships pulled out of harbours for foreign destinations. Accordingly the Ming court archives recorded that in "Fujian, tens of thousands of people are going overseas illegally"; in Qing even the Kangxi Emperor heaved a sigh: "Is there any single day without smuggling?"[271] The smuggling Fujian captains monopolized Japanese trade. But after "Open Sea", both geographical access with Japan and control over the silk supply (silk being a local product of the two provinces) turned the favour of Japanese trade to the Jiangsu and Zhejiang captains.

Jealous in their rivalry and angry at their business loss, some Fujian captains who did not receive *shinpai* from Japan sought revenge from the Zhejiang captains who had the *shinpai*. The Fujian captains chose the issue of era name to attack their rivals. This manoeuvre proved to be effective in destroying the rivals' business with Japan, because the two characters meant much more for the Chinese than a name of a year.

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[270]Details in Yamawaki Teijiro, *Kinsei Nitchu boekishi no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Yashikawa Kobunkan, 1960), 23-37.

[271]*Qing shilu · Kangxi chao*, v. 116.

CHAPTER THREE: The *Shinpai* Case in China

This chapter presents a study on the *shinpai* case in China, particularly in the imperial court, and surveys the Qing policy towards Japan, and even further, by discussing the basis for the imperial edict on the case, explores the position Japan took in the whole purview of Qing foreign policy. At the same time, the copper trade in the third stage, from 1715 to the end of Tokugawa period, will be examined.

The *shinpai* case was the first significant diplomatic event between the two countries which took place after the foundation of the Manchu Throne. It was sensitive, because it related to the basic concept of the Chinese political tradition; and it was influential because it involved so many people in China, from merchants to high ranking government officials; it was also important because it was tightly connected with the monetary administration of China as well as with the security of the dynasty. The case caused the Qing court to reassess its policy towards Japan, and in fact it contributed to the formation of a trade policy which would last for more than one and a half centuries afterwards. Above all, the case was a touchstone for the relations between the two countries.

It is not difficult to understand why the issue was treated so seriously, because the plaintiffs sought a strong excuse to start. In accordance with the traditional Chinese political philosophy, or the idea of *ka-i* order, *nengo* (era names) was one of the symbols of the sovereignty of a dynasty. This was already

introduced at the beginning of the paper. In Japan, during the Muromachi period, all Japanese correspondence with the Ming court was in the Chinese calender; moreover, when the shogunate corresponded with Korea they also employed the Chinese era names.[272]

Since, in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the commercial communications in Southeast Asia were in Chinese,[273] many formal correspondences between Japan and the Western countries in the early Tokugawa period were also in Chinese. In letters to Western officials, the Japanese used the Japanese era names.[274] But the Westerners' letters to Japan often used the Chinese calendar.[275] This was probably because the people who drafted the letters were Chinese and the Westerners, mostly Spaniards and Portuguese, did not understand the significance of the calendar. Certainly, sometimes the Westerners used the Christian era names in their letters to the Japanese, but written in Chinese characters.[276]

When the Tokugawa Shogunate wrote official letters to Chinese officials, they avoided the usage of the Chinese calendar.

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[272]Zheng Liangsheng, *Mingdai Zhongri guanxi yanjiu*, 169.

[273]Fu Yiling, *Mingqing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben*, 131; see also Xu Yuhu, *Mingdai Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi yanjiu*, 269.

[274]Murakami Naojiro, *Ikoku ofuku shokanshu · Zotei·Ikoku nikki sho* (Tokyo: Yushodo, 1966), 67.(The page number is for *Zotei·Ikoku nikki sho*) All the examples about the correspondence between Japan and other countries can also be found in Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, in *Kondo Seisai zenshu* (Tokyo: Kokusho KankoKai, 1905) v. 1.

[275]Ibid., 90, 94, 97.

[276]Ibid., 104.

Instead they put two Chinese characters in the place where the era name should be; that was *saisha* (*suishe*: in Chinese) or *saiji* (suici: in Chinese), meaning "in the year of ...".[277]

Considering all the elements above, it seemed that the acceptance of a trade tally with a foreign calendar was not simply a faux pas. Thus, some of the Fujian captains who did not receive *shinpai* from Japan sued the Zhejiang captains who had the *shinpai* for betraying the Qing court by accepting the Japanese era name.

Shinpai Case in Local and Imperial Court

In 1715/5, posters accusing captains who received *shinpai* of treachery to the Qing first appeared in Ningbo.[278] In 1715/7, Fujian and Taiwan captains headed by Zhuang Yunqing and Xie Yeyun formally presented an indictment to Jinxian County of Zhejiang Province to sue forty-three Nanjing (Jiangsu), Ningbo (Zhejiang) captains headed by Hu Yunke, Dong Yiri and Guangdong captain Li Taoshi for collaborating with a foreign country and betraying the Qing court by accepting the *shinpai* with an era name in the foreign calendar.[279] The magistrate of Jinxian County thought the case was too serious to consider at his level and immediately forwarded it to the Zhejiang provincial government.[280] After

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[277]Hayashi Razan: *Razan sensei bunshu*, 131.

[278]*KNNB*, 172.

[279]Ibid.

[280]Ibid.

hearing the case, the Administrative Department of the Zhejiang province pronounced judgement that "It is not right for the forty-three captains to have covertly accepted foreign tally in order to monopolize the trade." He ruled further, however, that "Zhuang Yunqing and others lodged a false treason accusation against them which is not reasonable either."[281] Meanwhile the judgement pointed out that since every country has its own calender, it is natural for Japan to issue tally with its own era name on it.[282] At that time, the Qing officers who gave such a judgement were indeed brave.[283]

On the other hand, the defendants headed by Dong Yiri, who was from Ningbo of Zhejiang Province, refused to accept defeat and struck back to sue the plaintiffs; they also willingly handed in the *shinpai* they held to the Zhejiang Customs. To protect its own economic interest, the customs reported to the Governor of Zhejiang and suggested the return of *shinpai* to Zhejiang merchants who originally owned them. The governor finally concluded that all *shinpai* should be returned to Japan and ships should trade like before.[284] In fact, "returned to Japan" meant the *shinpai* would be returned to Japan by Zhejiang merchants.

Zhuang Yunqing and other plaintiffs refused to accept the judgement as final, and they moved the case to Jiangsu Province

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[281]Ibid., 173.

[282]Ibid.

[283]Ibid.

[284]Ibid.

and presented their case to the Jiangsu Customs. The Jiangsu Customs speculated that if they requested the plaintiffs to follow the judgement of Zhejiang Province all the Japanese trade profits would be taken solely by neighbouring Zhejiang Customs and it would only become more difficult for them to collect their own quota of duty income. Then they presented the case to Jiangsu provincial government and suggested that they forward the case to the imperial court. At the same time they accused Hu Yunke, Dong Yiri and others of secretly receiving *shinpai* while blaming the Zhejiang Customs Office for having decided to return *shinpai* to them.[285]

At this point, the case developed into a much more complicated stage. The "political principles" of the Celestial Empire, mixed with the economic interests of different local governments, caused not only controversy but also confrontation between officials in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. To avoid the accusation of treason, upon the exchange of views, the top officials in the two provinces requested Xu Yuanmeng, the Governor of Zhejiang, who had served at the imperial court before,[286] to draft a memorial to the throne.[287]

When the case was proceeding, Li Taoshi, the only captain from Guangdong province involved in the case, absconding to avoid

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[285]Ibid., 174.

[286]For a brief biography of Xu Yuanmeng, see Zhao Erxun et al., comp., *Qing shigao · Liezhuan*, 76.

[287]*KNNB*, 174.

punishment, fled to Guangdong and sailed to Nagasaki again in 1716. In Nagasaki, the Japanese officials were shocked by the news Li Taoshi brought to them. Then the bakufu ordered the Nagasaki Deputy to "stop communication (and trade) with ships from Nanjing (Jiangsu) and Ningbo (Zhejiang), and not to violate the new regulations set up last year".[288] Because Li Taoshi entered the port without the *shinpai*, he was banned from trade and ordered to leave. Following him, Dong Yiri and six other captains sailed to Nagasaki with no *shinpai*, were not allowed to trade, and were ordered to leave with all their cargo as well.

So in 1715, only two ships from Taiwan and one ship from Amoy came to Nagasaki with *shinpai* and traded in Nagasaki. Besides them, there were four other Chinese ships from Da Nang, Guangdong, Batavia and Siam which came without *shinpai* but were permitted to trade. The next year (1716), only seven Chinese ships came to Nagasaki with *shinpai* to trade; they were two from Amoy, two from Taiwan, one each from Guangdong, Quinan and Batavia. In the two years only fourteen ships came to trade and this was only twenty-three percent of the sum set up by the Shotoku New Regulations. Moreover there were no ships from Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces to trade.[289]

On the Chinese side, from 1715, the trade with Japan was stagnating. This brought a disastrous result: the cessation of the regular copper supply from Japan. In the same year (1715),

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[288]Ibid.

[289]Ibid.

the Grand Secretary Song Zhu reported to the Kangxi emperor that "At present, the copper (supply) for *Baoquanju* (the central mint of the Board of Revenue) is very low; not enough for minting."[290] The emperor assumed this was due to the inefficiency of those government contractors who contracted the copper acquisition quota, and he therefore decided to change the copper acquisition system to eight province (Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong) acquisition and ordered the governors in eight provinces to make all their efforts to buy copper. But the following year (1716), the trade stagnated, and there was no way for the eight provinces to provide copper.[291] Kangxi was impatient and hastily questioned: "The Board of Revenue had suggested that if (the court) require local officials to acquire copper there would not be a delay in duty. Why, after we have tried this for less than one year, have there been so many delays?"[292] To deal with the urgent situation, the emperor had to order the collection of copper ware from the people.

Eventually, on 1716/9/2, through Zhao Shenqiao, the Minister of Revenue, a memorial about the *shinpai* case was presented to the Kangxi Emperor in person.

The gist of the memorial was as follows:

"(Your Majesty:)Previously the (Chinese) merchants trading with the East Sea (Japan) came and went without

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[290]Ibid., 175.

[291]Ibid.

[292]Ibid.

> trouble. This year in the place of Changxi[293] (Nagasaki), the *wozi* (Japanese) suddenly set up a new rule and issued *paipiao* (credentials) only to (captain) Hu Yuanke (Yunke--Tang) and forty-one other captains who arrived there earlier. They are allowed to trade there. For other ships which do not have the credentials of their country (Japan), they (the Japanese) will force them to sail back and trade is prohibited. For us Chinese to accept the credentials of Changxi town (Nagasaki), is not only contrary to our fundamental principles, but, if let stand, will probably cause a disturbance".[294]

Thus the Board of Revenue suggested that the Chinese captains "return the credentials (to Nagasaki) and use China's credentials as a licence".[295]

After hearing the presentation, Emperor Kangxi issued his oral edict immediately:

> "This sovereign once dispatched a textile official across the sea to watch their (Japanese) trading situation. Their trade capacity was quite large at first but decreased later. The trade credentials of *wozi* (Japanese) were just tokens for trading with each other, like those tallies used by silk merchants (of China). (Another example is that) the tally given to merchants in each (Chinese) custom is for checking maritime traffic floating in their duty areas; that is not equal to an imperial edict or an official document of government. Governors (of Zhejiang and Jiangsu) reported this case as a serious issue; they are mistaken. The suggestion of the Board of Revenue is mistaken also."[296]

Then the emperor ordered the Nine Ministers of the imperial court and other relevant officials to discuss this matter and report

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[293]The word Nagasaki is written in two Chinese characters, and it is pronounced as "*changqi*" in Chinese. However, here and closely followed in the second line after, Nagasaki and the name of the chief defendant Hu Yunke were misspelled in different Chinese characters in the original text. This resulted in pronouncing the two words as, mistakenly, "Changxi" and "Hu Yuanke". The same error was not committed henceforth.

[294]*KXQ*, 2303.

[295]Ibid.

[296]Ibid.

again.[297]

The imperial edict gives one much material for meditation. The emperor had recalled the textile official Ulin i da Mo Ersen immediately; apparently, he relied on Mo's report for judgement on any case involving relations with Japan. The emperor demonstrated his familiarity with Japanese affairs and explained to the officials that the reason that the Japanese limited the Chinese ships was because "their trade capacity" "decreased". According to the emperor, the *shinpai* was nothing but a token for merchants to trade; he even criticized the local officials for raising a great fuss about trifles. Showing his leniency towards Japan he declined the proposal of the Board of Revenue and implied that the Chinese merchants could use Japanese tally to trade. Meanwhile, Kangxi did not take the problem of the calendar name, which agonized so many people, too seriously. He was full of confidence that the Japanese could not be plotting any conspiracy against the Qing. Notably, the emperor did not mention the shortage of copper.

Twenty days later, on 1716/9/24, Grand Secretary Ma Qi and other officials jointly presented another memorial about the case to the emperor. In it they suggested that "Hu Yunke and others who accepted Japanese licences should be punished and all

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[297]Ibid. The original text of the imperial verdict on the *shinpai* case was released in 1984 in *Kangxi Qijuzhu* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju) for the first time since it was given. Before that the only clue for the verdict was the Chinese captains' oral report to the Nagasaki officials in 1717 recorded in *Ka-i hentai*. Being hearsay, however, that report was discrepant with the real text. See Hayashi Shunsho et al., eds., *Ka-i hentai* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1981), 2726; also Yamawaki Teijiro, *Kinsei Nitchu boekishi no kenkyu*, 33.

commercial ships should trade as before".[298]

The emperor gave his edict the second time by repeating his first edict:

> "The credential is just a token for trading with one another, not equal to documents of local officials in our country. . . . Isn't it misleading to think of this as a vital problem? . . . If you take this as a vital problem, how can merchants trade?"[299]

Then the emperor ordered the Nine Ministers to consult again. It is likely that the emperor became somehow impatient with his subjects who stubbornly adhered to their opinions.

The case did not appear on *Kangxi Qijuzhu* (the Court Record of the Emperor Kangxi's Daily Activities) until the following year. On 1717/3/26, the Grand Secretary Ma Qi reported the result of the consultation by the Nine Ministers to the emperor. Ma said that:

> "(Your Majesty:). . . We humbly petition for the return of the credentials, which these subjects once showed to your majesty, to those merchants and that they be allowed to trade normally. However those who have credentials will be able to go frequently while those without credential will have their commodities frozen. (Since) They are all paying tax, we should order the superintendents of the coastal customs to summon all the merchants to their presence and well inform them that the credentials should be distributed among them evenly. Each ship carries the same quantity of goods, and the credentials should be passed around so that each merchant will be able to go alternately. . . ."[300]

Upon their presentation, the emperor ordered them to consult Xu Yuanmeng, former Governor of the Zhejiang Province, who first

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[298]Ibid., 2310.

[299]Ibid.

[300]Ibid., 2373.

brought the case to the court.[301] Soon after, on 1717/4/3, when Ma Qi and others reported to the emperor about the case again, the emperor gave the same edict.[302] From then on, the court officials did not ask for any further imperial perusal and it was obvious that their opinion, sharing the *shinpai* among the merchants, was ratified by the emperor.

Following the imperial edict, the *shinpai* were returned to the Zhejiang Provincial Customs in Ningbo and were kept there; all merchants had to go to Ningbo to obtain *shinpai* before they left for Nagasaki. However such a policy annoyed captains of Jiangsu province who usually went to Japan directly from Shanghai. Thus, on 1717/8/17, a memorial from Sahacha, the Superintendent of Jiangnan Provincial Customs, was presented to the emperor to petition for "the return of licences to captains" from Jiangnan province as well.[303] The emperor immediately ratified his petition[304] and from then on the *shinpai* were kept at both Zhejiang and Jiangnan Provincial Customs (Ningbo and Shanghai), and the ships could sail to Nagasaki from either port.[305]

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[301]Ibid.

[302]Ibid., 2375.

[303]Ibid., 2424.

[304]Ibid. On his memorial, actually, Sahacha petitioned the emperor to "consult the viceroy and governor of Jiangnan Province" on the matter. But, the emperor had an intimate understanding of how bureaucratic his subjects might be; therefore, he said "if this matter is assigned to the viceroy and governor to consult, it will take a long time and destroy merchants' business." Instead, the emperor ordered Xu Yuanmeng and the Board of Revenue to make a decision "promptly." *KXQ*, 2424.

[305]Zhu Delan, "Qing kaihailing hou de Zhongri Changqi maoyishang yu guonei yanan maoyi", in Zhang Yanxian ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* (Taipei: Institute of Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, 1988), 3, 407.

The lengthy *shinpai* case was finally settled. From the time when Zhuang Yunqing first sued the Zhejiang captains in Jinxian County on 1715/7 to the time of the imperial edict on Sahacha's petition of 1717/8, many people and officials were involved in the case and the Kangxi emperor issued his oral edict five times on it. In fact, this was one of the largest cases in the early Qing dynasty regarding foreign relations and the most eminent case in Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa period. During those two years, the trade between China and Japan stagnated and captains from Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Fujian all suffered immensely in various ways. When the case was ultimately settled, and the reputation of the Zhejiang captains who accepted the *shinpai* was thoroughly whitewashed, Hu Yunke, the major defendant, had already died due to continuous interrogations by government officials at different levels.[306]

After the *shinpai* case, the status of Fujian captains in the copper trade substantially declined. Meanwhile the copper trade itself also lost its vigour. On one hand, Chinese ships were limited to a very low level; and on the other hand, due to a lower production ability, Japan could not even supply the amount of copper limited by the Shotoku New Regulations.

Due to the enforcement of the Shotoku New Regulations in 1715, Chinese merchants of Jiangsu (Nanjing) and Zhejiang

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[306]Hu died in Hangzhou in 1717/5. Hayashi Shunsho et al., eds., *Ka-i hentai*, 2791.

(Ningbo) could not sail to Japan.[307] This caused the acquisition plan of both 1715 and 1716 to fail. In 1716, the Qing court assigned the sum of 4,435,200 *kin* as annual quota to acquire.[308] However, in next year, when the Chinese ships sailed to Nagasaki again, the Qing court did not change its quota in keeping with the *shinpai* incident of previous years, and, as a result, in 1719, the unfulfilled quota of copper acquisition reached to 2,728,600 *kin*.[309] From 1722, the Qing court had to reduce the quota for copper acquisition in accordance with the decline of copper production in Japan.[310]

In 1717, due to the drastic decrease in the number of ships coming to Nagasaki, the bakufu issued ten more *shinpai* for Chinese ships, and the authorized trade levels was lifted to 8,000 kan. In 1720, the number of ships was reduced to thirty again and the trade level to 4,000 kan. Afterwards the number of ships and the trade level were often reduced. Generally speaking, annual copper exporting decreased as time passed.[311] In 1795, the copper exported to Chinese ships fell for the first time beneath one million *kin* (905,640); henceforth, the exported amount never again climbed up to one million.[312]

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[307]Cf. footnote 288.

[308]*ZQZM*, 66.

[309]Ibid.

[310]Ibid.

[311]Zhu Delan, "Qing kaihailing hou de Zhongri Changqi maoyishang yu guonei yanan maoyi", 377. *NTB*, 220-21.

[312]*NTB*, 220.

China's Foreign Policy toward Japan

The traditional Chinese way of perceiving the problem of the era name has already been surveyed in the first chapter of the thesis and at the beginning of this chapter. However, the emperor's edict in the *shinpai* case was very distinct from traditional thinking. Why did the emperor give such a lenient decision? This study will quote the emperor's own words as a clue to providing a broader basis for his edict on the *shinpai* case.

On 1716/10/25, after having issued his edict twice on the *shinpai* case, the emperor briefed important imperial subjects on the foreign policy of the empire:

> "At present, coastal defence is of tremendous importance. . . there are two (major) cities overseas, Luzon[313] and Batavia. Batavia is a port for the "Red Hairs" (Dutch) to anchor ships and Luzon is a harbour for the "West Sea" (Spanish) ships; besides there are many bandits hiding there. Wishing advantages, inlanders (Chinese mainlanders) often sail ships with rice there, then they sell their ships and come back; some have even resided there. . . . It is permitted to sell rice and food to inland (mainland) Fujian and Guangdong, but if sold to overseas pirates, there will be a considerable result.[314] This sovereign holds that inland (Chinese mainland) commercial ships are allowed to go to the East Sea (Japan) but they are prohibited to sail to Nangyang (*Nanyo*: in Japanese; i.e. Southeast Asia).[315]. . . However

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[313]Present Manila of the Philippines.

[314]Besides the trade of ships, the emperor was also concerned about the selling of a special lumber named "Mesua ferrea L", which could be used to make keels, to the "South Sea" (Southeast Asia). However, study focusing on the commerce and trade of that time done by modern scholars suggests that the emperor's concern, at least over the selling of lumber, was not necessary. See Tian Rukang, "Shiqi shiji zhi shijiu shiji zhongye Zhongguo fanchuan zai Dongnan Yazhou hangyun he shangye shang de diwei", in *Zhongguo jin sanbainian shehui jingji shi lunji*, v. 5 (Hong Kong: Chongwen Shudian, 1974), 275.

[315]The ban for Chinese ships voyage to Southeast Asia was not released until Yongzheng5(1727). The measures for the implementation of the ban can be found in *Qing shilu* · Kangxi chao, v. 271 (Kangxi56(1717)/1/25). However, those measures and the procedure of imperial ratification were not recorded on *Kangxi qijuzhu*

> foreign ships are allowed to come at their will . . . There are so many (Chinese) ports allowing access overseas, which at present is not disturbing; but after hundreds of years, it will bring disaster for China".[316]

Here, the monarch stated his concern over two potential threats to the Qing and declared the maritime prohibition on Chinese navigation to Southeast Asia. According to the emperor, the two major security concerns were: the secret activities of the Ming loyalists in Southeast Asia, and the encroachment on China by the Western forces in the future.

The emperor's concern was reasonable. It was true that in the major ports of Southeast Asia, the local Chinese community did not only have a large population and strong economic power but a fresh anti-Qing colour. Because the last stages of the Ming resistance against the Manchus were carried out in the coastal provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang and Guangdong, the leaders of this resistance, Koxinga and others, also employed illegal traders and pirates of the Nanyang (Southeast Asia) to fight for their cause. Therefore, "for the first time, these Chinese (in Southeast Asia) were made to play a part in the politics of the Chinese empire."[317]

On the other hand, the brutal implementation of the maritime

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of the same date; see *KXQ*, 2350. On the other hand, even though Chinese ships were prohibited to sail to Southeast Asia, they were permitted to go to Annam (Vietnam) for copper acquisition. See *Yongzheng zhupi yuzhi*, v. 8, Memorial of Tong Jitu (Yongzheng2(1724)/9/15). For the connections between the removal of maritime prohibition in 1684 and the implementation of ban on trade with Southeast Asia in 1717, see later discussion.

[316]*KXQ*, 2324-25.

[317]Wang Gungwu, *A Short History of the Nangyang Chinese* (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 1959), 13.

prohibition (1656-1683) not only "force(d) many Chinese to join the (Ming) loyalist bands" but also let "many Chinese traders and even more Ming loyalists decide to make their homes in the Nanyang", such as "in the Philippines, in Siam and in Java".[318]

Therefore, even the surrender of Zheng Keshuang, the grandson of Koxinga, to the Qing ruler in 1683, and the removal of maritime prohibition in 1684 were not the end of the Nanyang Chinese connection with the political struggle in China. The spirit of that resistance was carried on in the form of secret societies, first founded by a resistance leader in the 1670s. "These were the groups of *T'ien-ti Hui* (*Tiandihui*) or Heaven and Earth Societies which began to dominate the lives of all the Nanyang Chinese and continued to do so for more than two centuries."[319]

Suspicious of the Chinese activities in Southeast Asia and worried about their influence, especially the organization of the secret societies, spreading to the empire through maritime trade, the emperor had to issue the maritime prohibition again in 1717.

Distinct from the Chinese "bandits" in Southeast Asia which represented an immediate menace, the Western problem would affect China in the long-term. In the time of the Kangxi reign, China had such substantial development that the word "Pax Sinica"[320] has

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[318]Ibid., 15.

[319]Ibid., 14.

[320]The word is equivalent to the "Golden Age of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns, 1662-1795", see *Concise Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chinese Edition, Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshe, 1985), 4, 646.

been retrospectively used to describe the age. The Qing signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia in 1689 and the emperor also enforced China's rule over its northwest frontier and Mongolia. However, there was another potential threat: the Westerners. From the sixteenth century, the Portuguese and the Dutch started their encroachment on Chinese coastal areas and they occupied Macao and Taiwan. During the time of the civil war between the Ming and the Manchus, both the Portuguese and the Dutch were actively involved in the war aimed at taking advantage of the Chinese rulers. The Portuguese openly fought against the Manchus in 1631 and 1647;[321] the Dutch navy participated in the battle between the Qing and Koxinga's fleet in Taiwan in 1664.[322] Kangxi understood that if the civil war in China lasted any longer, the Westerners would profit from it.

The early unpleasant encounter with the Westerners made the emperor suspicious of their intentions. Even though the emperor made the acquaintance of many Jesuit missionaries, and in 1716 when the emperor addressed the foreign policy there was no immediate threat, Kangxi's vigilance could not be lessened. Indeed, his warning was far-reaching, because it was made 77 years before the Mission of MaCartney (1793)[323] and more than one

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[321]Wang Sizhi, *Qingshi lungao* (Chengdu: Bashu Shushe, 1987), 316-19.

[322]Cf., John E. Wills, *Pepper, Guns, and Parley; the Dutch East Indian Company and China, 1622-1681* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

[323]George MaCartney was the first British Embassy who made official visit to China. Cf., George MaCartney Earl, *Embassy to China; Being the Journal kept by Lord MaCartney during his Embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1793-1794* (Hamden: Archon Brooks, 1963).

century before the Opium War which brought "disasters" for China from her ports "allowing access overseas", exactly as Kangxi emperor had predicted.

The foreign policy of the Qing mainly depended on the emperor's personal understanding of the issues; he of course put national security as the first concern over any decision-making. Undoubtedly, the *shinpai* case was treated in the same way. And from such a perspective, at the same time as when Kangxi stated the potential threats of the Ming loyalists and the Westerners, the emperor issued a lenient edict on the *shinpai* case; this was simply because Japan was not a security threat to the Qing.

The shogunate "closed" Japan in 1639, and the Qing dynasty was founded in 1644; there was no direct confrontation between the two. More impressively, Japan refused to assist the anti-Qing resistance led by the Zhengs who had had such a deep connections with Japan and sincerely requested support from Japan.[324] After 1684 when the maritime prohibition was relaxed, Japan worked as the supplier of copper. Most importantly, there were no indications showing that Japan was collaborating with the Ming loyalists in Southeast Asia. But, Kangxi did not forget about *wako*. He once intended to forbid the navigation of Japanese ships to China; however, fortunately Japan was carrying a severe *sakoku* (seclusion) policy, even though the emperor did not ban Japanese

[324]For details see *NBK*, 640-46, and Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 119-40; also Lynn A. Struve, ed. and trans., *Voice from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tiger's Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 114-21.

ships, there would not be any ship from Japan.[325] All these elements resulted in the hospitable attitudes of the Manchu rulers towards Japan.

Another decisive factor in the imperial edict was the information brought back by Mo Ersen from Nagasaki. The Japanese people, their temperament, and their attitude towards China and the Chinese must have impressed him. All of his report and other information gave the emperor the impression that Japan was trustful of Qing. Thus, the problem of *shinpai* or era name, from the view of the emperor, only carried a small weight. This led to his lenient edict that the case should not be treated as a vital matter; and also led to his policy of banning trade with Southeast Asia while keeping trade open with Japan.

Last Stage of Copper Trade

When Emperor Yongzheng inherited the throne in 1723, one of his top priorities was to send merchants to Annam (Vietnam) to buy copper.[326] In the Yongzheng reign (1723-35), the situation of copper supply was still a severe one for the Qing court. In 1726, the ban on brass ware became stricter, and the government explained this to the people in the following way: "If the nation has abundant copper production, and the benefit of mining can be sufficient and the circulation can be smooth, it will not be

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[325]Saeki Tomi, "Koki Yosei jidai ni okeru Nisshin boeki", 271.

[326]Lin Tiejun et al., eds., *Qingshi biannian · Disan juan · Kangxi chao* (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1988), 584-85.

reasonable to collect the copper common people have for minting (money). However at the present time in order to stop the destruction of currency, the court has to carry out a strict prohibition of copper ware".[327] In 1727, the court declared that people could submit copper ware for paying taxes.[328]

However, fortunately, the copper mines in Yunnan province gradually increased their productive capability.[329] To alter the situation of mere dependence on foreign copper supply for the central mints in Beijing, the Qing court had started the excavation of the Yunnan copper mines as early as 1705. Since the supply of Japanese copper deteriorated day by day, the central mints began to use Yunnan copper in 1725.[330] In the same year, the court allowed some provinces to acquire Yunnan copper, instead of Japanese copper, to submit to the central mints.[331] But the quality of Yunnan copper was not as good as Japanese copper so that the Guangdong province even bought Yunnan copper and melted it into rod shape, and then sent the rods to Beijing as if it were Japanese copper.[332] Thus, the court still encouraged merchants to buy copper from Japan. In 1730, the official quota of 2,772,000 *kin* was assigned for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui,

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[327]*ZQZM*, 58.

[328]Ibid., 59.

[329]*KNNB*, 229.

[330]Ibid., 230.

[331]Ibid., 229.

[332]Ibid., 230.

Jiangxi and Fujian province to separately recruit merchants to import.[333]

The copper production in Yunnan boomed in the years of Qianlong reign (1736-1796). At that time, "the production of Yunnan copper was about six or seven million *kin* annually; in some more productive years eight or nine million *kin*, and the highest amount could reach ten million even twelve or thirteen million *kin*".[334] The peak production, in 1766, amounted to 14,674,481 *kin*.[335]

Compared with the prosperous situation in Yunnan, the copper production in Japan continued to decline. In 1736, Japan reduced the number of Chinese ships by another five from the base level given by the Shotoku New Regulations in 1715; thus the number of Chinese ships allowed to sail to Nagasaki declined to twenty-five.[336] At the same time (1736), the Qing court reduced the weight of each single coin from one *sen* four *bun* to one *sen* two *bun* by which the central mints could save several hundred thousands *kin* of copper.[337] Thus the Qing court decided to reduce the sum of copper required to be sent to the capital from 4,430,000 *kin* to 4,000,000 *kin*.[338] Meanwhile, the court required

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[333]*ZQZM*, 67-8.

[334]*KNNB*, 230

[335]Ibid.

[336]Ibid., 231.

[337]*ZQZM*, 61.

[338]Ibid.

the purchase of the annual quota of four million *kin* for the central mints to be divided evenly between Japanese and Yunnan copper.[339]

The copper production in Yunnan mines continued in a prosperous way. Besides supplying copper for the central mints and for local use, there was still much surplus copper. On the other hand, the official merchants of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces going overseas for copper acquisition often failed to bring back enough copper. To clear the calculated amount owing, in Qianlong4(1739) the Qing court decided to stop official merchants copper acquisition, and replace it with capable merchants who could pay for the capital themselves to go to Japan to purchase copper.[340] The local government widely recruited those merchants and issued them the licence and the *shinpai* from official merchants, and let them prepare goods for Japan trade. Upon their return, they were allowed to sell half of the copper themselves and the other half was evenly sold to the government of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.[341]

The most significant decision also came out in the same year (1739 that the Qing court decided to allot all two million *kin* of Japanese copper, which originally was designated for the use of the central mints in Beijing, to local mints in Jiangsu and Zhejiang province. Meanwhile, the amount needed for the central

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[339]*KNNB*, 231

[340]*ZQZM*, 62.

[341]Ibid.

mints (four million *kin*) would all be Yunnan copper, and Yunnan province would take charge of the copper supply.[342] This meant that the central mints finished the history of dependence upon Japanese copper and instead, all its original material would be from Yunnan province. Since Japanese copper was not for central mints, it went to provincial mints. In 1744, the provincial mints which used Japanese copper spread to Zhili, Shanxi, Jiangxi and Hubei.[343] From then on, even though the Qing court did not stop the Japanese copper import, its significance was immensely reduced.[344]

In the end, following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan and China signed a bilateral relation treaty in 1871. That treaty contained some supplemental clauses regarding free trade. Then the Sino-Japanese copper trade in the Tokugawa period was permanently finished.[345]

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[342]*KNNB*, 232.

[343]*ZQZM*, 62.

[344]*KNNB*, 234.

[345]*NTB*, 314.

CONCLUSION

The Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period was carried out with two dynasties in China. At first, with the Ming, the shogunate encountered the problem of tributary trade. The so-called tribute was in fact a special type of international trade. Functionally, the tribute could be divided into two categories: for receiving Chinese culture as a state model, as Japan had done in the Heian period; and for exchanging commodities or the right to trade.[346] In the Muromachi period, the Japanese tribute belonged to the second category.

Since China only permitted tributary trade on a limited scale, it could not meet the increasing demand for commercial transactions in Japan. In this way the tributary trade thwarted the international trade. Meanwhile the aging tributary system had been challenged by two byproducts of the system itself: piracy and smuggling. Therefore, China's diplomatic policy, or commercial policy, had a decisive influence on the stability of East Asia.

The Tokugawa shogunate primarily wanted to reestablish official trading relations with the Ming; namely, to reopen direct government-to-government trade, as in the Muromachi period, with the Ming court. Through various diplomatic routes, the shoguns had appealed for the issuance of *kango*: trade tally from China, but were refused by the Ming court. All other measures in this effort including the repatriation of Chinese

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[346]*NSS*, 8-11.

captives and the utilization of Ryukyu, Taiwan and Korea routes had been ignored by China.

For the shogunal failure in reopening trading relations with China, the Chinese suspicion about Japan's sincerity and the internal turmoil of China were major reasons. Due to a lengthy harassment by *wako*, it was not easy for the Ming rulers to reconcile with Japan, even though most of the late *wako* (in the seventeenth century)were Chinese. In this way, the fragile rulers of the late Ming could not permit any Japanese to come for trade.

However on the Japanese side, the diplomacy or communication with the Ming was very poorly organized. From one direction they sent an envoy and from the other they attacked, and this pattern could not gain trust from China. It seems that the shogunate did not manage the diplomatic affairs in a solid and united way; and, at least at the earliest stage, the shogunate had a problem in controlling the remote domains. A Japanese scholar also suspected that the shogunal attempts to negotiate the reopening of trade through Chinese local officials were a mistake.[347] Ultimately, even though all the information from Japan had been passed on to the supreme rulers of China appropriately, no breakthrough was achieved. Afterwards, since the Nagasaki system had been formed and the *sakoku* initiated, there was no necessity for Japan to reconsider the formal relations with the Qing rulers.

The trade between Tokugawa Japan and Qing China was much more fruitful. Different from the Ming rulers, the Qing emperors

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[347]Kodama Tachio, "Shimazu han no Chugoku boeki to sakoku", 298.

accepted the fact that a trade relation with Japan which was not a tributary relation had already been developed by pirates and illegal traders before they unified the whole of China and controlled the Chinese coast.

This paper concludes that the Sinō-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period was a new type of trade which did not exist in any time before. The bakufu created a situation in which Japan could trade with China without the performance of tribute. The diplomacy of the bakufu, in handling this matter, was perfect and full of flexibility. Formed in new and special circumstances, the basic characteristics of the Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period might be summarized as "*minkan boeki*": non-official trade or trade without formal official link or people-to-people's trade, even though in fact it was closely controlled by both rulers. The real partners of the trade were none other than the Japanese shogun and the Chinese emperor. A policy of "*seikei bunri*" (separation of politics and economics) was carried out by the rulers in both countries.

The Tokugawa shogunate's efforts to reopen trade with China, on a non-official basis, were vigorous and successful. At a time when building up an official relationship was impossible, the drive aiming at establishing a trading route between Japan and various Chinese individuals proved to be effective. Along with a prudent diplomacy regarding direct involvement in China's internal affairs, of course accompanied by the warm reaction of Chinese illegal merchants, the bakufu succeeded in resuming trade

with China at a substantial level at a time when China was experiencing internal turmoil and external uncertainty.

The promotion of Chinese trade by the shogunate was based on both traditional and pragmatic concerns. Traditionally, China could provide commodities which Japan wanted and could not acquire elsewhere. Even during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries when the Ming carried out the harshest ban on trade with Japan, the Sino-Japanese silk trade never ceased in Southeast Asian ports, such as Manila. Pragmatically, the need for Chinese goods in the Tokugawa period meant that terminating the trade would cause a price increase for imported goods, especially silk yarn, in Japan's local market and cast a shadow on the economy.

On the other hand, the inability of both Ming and Qing rulers to clear the Chinese coast before 1683 enabled various private merchants to go to Japan for trade. In her article "*Sakoku* reexamined", Kazui Tashiro concluded that the Sino-Japanese trade in Nagasaki "was seen by Chinese as smuggling".[348] This is an ambiguous statement. In fact, Sino-Japanese trade between 1600 and 1684 was "smuggling" but after 1685 the trade was a transaction encouraged and ultimately managed by the emperor. Moreover, even during the "smuggling" years, approximately 1644 to 1656, some trade to acquire copper from Japan was also expected by the Qing ruler.

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[348]Tashiro Kazui, "Foreign Relations During the Edo Period: *Sakoku* Reexamined", in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 8:1 (Summer 1982), 288.

Unfortunately, the shogunal operation of trade with China was not as successful as reopening trade. Through the whole Tokugawa period, the bakufu's position in trading with the Chinese was comparatively passive. From gold and silver to copper, and finally to maritime products and sundry goods, the chain indicated that the Shogunate had to search desperately to find something to exchange for the Chinese goods they needed. The reason was quite simple: Japanese natural resources were exhausted faster than the trade grew and there was not enough commodity to sell. Ultimately, trade was trade. The embarrassing situation of the bakufu reflected the contradiction between the gradually widening world trade and the low level of productive capability Japan had.

It seems that the only exception to the bakufu's poor arrangement of the trade was the "reform" by Arai Hakuseki: the issuance and the manipulation of the *shinpai*. By issuing, taking back or threatening to take back the *shinpai*, the bakufu succeeded in veering the trade into their active control. Not only limiting the drain of precious metals, the *shinpai* also enticed those dishonest Chinese merchants to import goods into Japan, even including people, such as an archery coach, something which was seriously forbidden by the Qing. But the crackdown of illegal Chinese merchants in the Yongzheng reign (1723-1735) ended the good situation created by the *shinpai*. However, that

story is beyond the purview of the paper.[349]

Historically, copper had a mutual flow between China and Japan. Starting from Song dynasty (960-1279), Japan imported tremendous amount of copper coin from China through tributary trade, and then took Chinese coin as national currency to circulate nationwide. The import of Chinese coin developed to its peak in the Ming dynasty.[350] In the early years of Tokugawa period (1640-70), copper, on the Japanese side, worked as a tool to stop the drain of gold and silver. But later, the policy of limiting the scale of the copper trade caused the smuggling of Chinese commodities and the mounting of the price of imported silk products. For further study, the relationship between the imported Chinese commodities, especially silk, and the price of silk in the Japanese local market should be put into perspective. On the Chinese side, the copper provided the original source for currency minting, and this guaranteed the stability of the value of currency. This was immensely important for the Qing dynasty. However, this study argues that copper, even though very important, was not the most decisive factor in forming the imperial edict of the *shinpai* case in the Qing court. In his speech and edict, the emperor never mentioned the problem of copper.

Meanwhile, the copper shortage in China was amplified by the

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[349]For a summery of Sino-Japanese relations in the Yongzheng reign, see Saeki Tomi, "Koki Yosei jidai ni okeru Nisshin boeki", 270-76.

[350]Cf. Kobata Atsushi, *Nihon kahei ryutsushi* (Tokyo: Toko Shoin, 1969).

incorrect understanding of the monetary situation in China by the emperor Kangxi. At that time, the emperor and other monetary experts of the court did not understand modern currency theory. Kangxi thought the only solution for the situation was to increase the amount of currency or to use more copper to mint more coin, and this was a one-sided view. This idea required the net increase of the copper supply and did not solve the problem but rather made the problem worse.[351]

Like Casablanca or Teheran during the World War Two,[352] the Nagasaki port was a venue for both Japanese and Chinese rulers to collect information which formed the basis for their decisions on mutual relations. In the *shinpai* case Kangxi gave a lenient edict based on the information his personal spy collected from Japan. This was also consistent with his policy of leniency towards surrounding countries. In domestic affairs, Kangxi used spies, such as the textile officials, to monitor local officials' performance. In dealing with the problem in Japan, he used the same strategy.

The idea of "*ka-i*" order or the Chinese and barbarian relationship has been discussed by many scholars over time. Just as Shinobu Seizaburo pointed out: "From the seventeenth century to the early half of the eighteenth century, compared with Europe and Japan, China obviously prevailed in the competition of the

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[351]Song Dexuan, *Kangxi sixiang yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kezue Chubanshe, 1990), 76-7.

[352]Casablanca, a city in Morocco, and Teheran, the capital of Iran, both served as centres of spying activity for both sides in the Second World War.

counter-influence between the East and the West reflected by trade; even from the angle of culture, the odds were always in China's favour. China, at that time, was a powerful central kingdom in the centre of the *ka-i* order which China viewed as a world order, and with this China confronted the European state order."[353]

In Eastern Asia, there was then such a "world order" with China as the centre; while at the same time there was a market as well. This paper would like to suggest the concept of the East Asian Commercial or Market Order. At first, this meant that those countries who wanted to trade with China had to follow the Chinese way of doing business or at least a way which could be accepted by the Chinese. On the other hand, every country wanted to utilize the political situation to take advantage of Chinese trade. Ryukyu used Japanese money to trade between the Chinese and the Japanese, and the Portuguese used Macao to trade between China and Japan. Basically this situation did not change until the Opium War.

As is well known, modern diplomacy started with Richelieu and the Peace of Westphalia around the 1640s. At that time, the ideas of country and national sovereignty were still evolving in the western hemisphere. Only after the Opium War did those concepts first spread to East Asia. However at the present time, there seems to be a phenomenon in the study of the history of international relations that people approach the subject from a

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[353]*NSS*, 36.

modern concept which obviously did not exist when the original events happened. In the study of Sino-Japanese relations, the opinion that the Japanese use of the term "*Tojin*" (Men of Tang, i.e. Chinese) in the Tokugawa period was disparaging to the Chinese is widely accepted as an exaggeration.[354]

Finally, this present study strives to discuss the impact of *sakoku* on Sino-Japanese relations in the Tokugawa period from a Chinese perspective. The question that should be asked first is why did the tributary trade in the Muromachi (Ming) malfunction and bring so many troubles to both sides while the Seclusion policy and "*minkan boeki*" (non-official trade) work well in Tokugawa (Qing)? As this paper suggested before, under tributary trade, China only permitted trade on a limited scale; it could not, then, meet the gradually increasing demand for commercial transactions in Japan. In this way the tributary trade system partly bred Japanese piracy (*wako*) in the Muromachi (Ming).[355]

The *wako*, especially in the late Ming dynasty, was mainly a combination of Japanese pirates and a joint force of Chinese seaborne merchants, poor and rebellious coastal residents who were actively pursuing overseas trade. Recently, one Chinese scholar even argued that the Japanese pirates (*wako*) were just Chinese coastal merchant groups who pursued free trade, and if

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[354]Fogel, book review for Marius Jansen's book *China in the Tokugawa World*, in *American Historical Review*, 98:2 (April 1993), 545.

[355]This paper did certainly not deny that the major cause of *wako* was in Japan.

they had been given more freedom in overseas trade there would not have been any piracy.[356] This paper cannot thoroughly agree with this argument but favours the idea that the combined forces of Chinese coastal rebels and Japanese pirates could have been a threat to rulers in either of the two countries. Meanwhile, the pirates in the Chinese coastal areas developed accompanied by the progress of naval techniques as well as the development of the commercial activity. Since a *laisser-faire* policy on overseas trade was impossible in either of the two countries, the problem of *wako* seemed difficult to solve. This was the major reason for the malfunction of the tributary trade in the Muromachi period.

In the Qing dynasty, there was another concern for Chinese rulers over coastal piracy, namely that the illegal maritime traders, joined with overseas Chinese or foreign forces, often organized anti-government activities and triggered regular crises in Chinese society. At this point, the Manchu rulers were more vulnerable. In contrast to the Ming, the alien Qing court was more than the previous dynasty vulnerable to the threat of rebellion. It was unimaginable that the Qing ruler could resist the attack by a joint force of the *wako* from Japan, the fleets of Ming loyalists from Southeast Asia and the possible rebels of the secret societies in Southeast China; in other words, the three forces were one of the vital threats to the whole Chinese coast line and thus to the crown of the Qing emperors. Thus, the Chinese coastal area could never be calm for even one day without

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[356]Lin Renchuan, *Mingmo Qingchu siren haishang maoyi*, 382.

the harsh ban on Japanese going overseas. Here it is not difficult for one to conclude how crucial a role *sakoku* played in keeping the national security of China.

Fortunately, from a Chinese perspective, because the *sakoku* effectively and thoroughly eliminated the *wako*, it is appropriate to conclude that the *sakoku* did nothing but provide better circumstances for the two countries to trade with each other in the Tokugawa (Qing). And this was why Sino-Japanese trade in the Tokugawa period could be successful. Another advantage China took from the *sakoku* was that when a *sakoku* policy was carried out, Japan still allowed the Chinese to come to Japan for trade. This was an ideal situation for the Chinese: only trade, no *wako*. Thus, even though smuggling still existed in the Tokugawa period in Japanese waters, these Japanese smugglers never caused serious problems which could threaten the national security of Japan and China; this was simply because the *sakoku* policy was in effect.

In the Ming dynasty, there was a saying about the national danger: "*Wako* from the South and the bandits from the North", the latter meaning Manchus. Ultimately the Ming collapsed at the hands of the "bandits". But in the Qing time, such a threat of *wako* from the south did not exist. Actually in the early Qing years, from the Kangxi to Qianlong reign, the Manchu rulers carried out several large military campaigns in their border area in North and South and Southwest China; these campaigns were also carried out with the prerequisite that there was no threat from the east sea.

The positive influence of the *sakoku* has long been mentioned by historiography both in Japan and elsewhere. However this paper concludes that its success on foreign issues should also be noticed. In Ming China, Japanese affairs were treated by the Board of War (Ministry of Defence), which was concerned solely with national security; however in the Qing, the *shinpai* case was treated by the Board of Revenue (Ministry of Finance), and therefore was viewed as a problem regarding protocol. When compared with those deprecating comments on the petition to reopen trade from Japan in the Ming, and those disparaging comments on Japanese people, such as "their temper was like that of dogs and goats", the Qing imperial court had a good impression of its neighbour, and the emperor referred to the temperament of the Japanese as "meek". Apparently, not only did the *sakoku* help to avoid Western encroachment, and protect domestic cultural and economic development, but it successfully, at least in the case of China, avoided confrontation and maintained good relations with its continental neighbour for almost two and half centuries. From the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, Japan and China could enjoy a good neighbour relationship which was not possible before or after--and all this due to the effect of the *sakoku* policy of Japan. The seclusion may have forestalled the Sino-Japanese War for almost two centuries.

Another factor which should not be neglected in the context of Sino-Japanese relations was the effect of the Western forces

which tried to encroach upon Japan and China. Even though Kangxi carried out a more lenient policy towards the Christian missionaries in China, he was still concerned about the intentions of the West. In Japan, the brutal suppression of the Christian religion symbolized that Japan wanted to ward off the West. In the practise of *sakoku*, the bakufu officials in Nagasaki carefully checked every Chinese ship entering the harbour for Christian books. Thus, though at the time of Kangxi (1662-1722) China did not implement, as harshly as Japan did, the ban on Christians, when compared with the West, China was definitely a much safer partner for Japan. On the other hand, for China, a Japan without *wako* was also a friend much more trustworthy than the West. Both Japanese and Chinese rulers considered the Western invasion as the first priority in their concern about national security. The Sino-Japanese relationship in the Kangxi reign (1662-1722) was friendly; then in Yongzheng reign (1723-1735), when the emperor knew Japan used *fumie*[357] to detect the Christian believers he felt partly relieved.[358] Apparently, the common vigilance to a stronger enemy--the West--promoted Sino-Japanese relations.

At about the same time in the mid-seventeenth century, the *sakoku* or maritime prohibition policy was brought to bear in both Japan and China. The difference in seclusion policies between the

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[357]*Fumie* was a plate with a crucifix or other Christian symbol to be trodden on in order to prove oneself a non-Christian.

[358]*Yongzhen zhupi yuzhi*, Memorial of Li Wei, Yongzheng6(1728)/9/25. Also, Saeki Tomi, "Koki Yosei jidai ni okeru Nisshin boeki", 274.

two countries was that *sakoku* in Japan was caused by the foreigner or external religious problem, while in China the cause was internal rebellion. However both were based on a concern for national safety or a threat to the ruler. Classic writers have already commented on the maritime prohibition policy of Japan and China. Voltaire stated that the Japanese shogun closed the sea to prevent some terrible changes and the shogun was "correct".[359] Adam Smith concludes that the policy thwarted the development of China's trade,[360] and Karl Marx pointed out that the policy was due to the Manchu rulers' concern for their power.[361] In a time when the Westerner came to the East sea, the rulers in Japan and China put their political concern over the safety of their crown first, and the economic interest second. This is what we conclude from the study.

In closing this thesis on Sino-Japanese trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the author wants to mention Liao Chengzhi and Takazaki Tatsunosuke without any fear of being accused of an anachronism. In 1962 when formal diplomatic relations were impossible between the two countries, Liao and Takazaki, trade representatives from China and Japan, signed a

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[359]Oeuvres Completes de Voltaire, Paris: [n. p.] 1878-79.

[360]Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 2, 680-81.

[361]Karl Marx: "Revolution in China and in Europe", in Shlomo Avineri ed. *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), 68.

trade treaty to establish direct trade between Japan and China.[362] The principle of that time, "*minkan boeki* (trade without formal official link)" was exactly the same as the two nations' principle in dealing with each other three and a half centuries ago.

The policy developed under the *sakoku* by the Japanese shoguns and the Chinese emperors as well as by the pirates and the legal and illegal merchants formed a pattern of dealing with the difficulties between the two countries. That pattern of shelving political disputes in order for the two sides to supply each other with what they needed, proves to be applicable and effective in *"dakai"* (breaking through) a diplomatic impasse, even in the twentieth century.

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[362]Shinobu Seizaburo: *Nihon gaikoshi, 1853-1972* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1974), 564.

GLOSSARY

Akashi Michitomo 明石道友

Akazawa 赤沢

Akita 秋田

Amoy 厦門

Anhui 安徽

Annam 安南

Ao Fuhe 敖福合

Arai Hakuseki 新井白石

Arima Harunobu 有馬晴信

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足立義満

Ashio 足尾

Baba Toshiaki 馬場利重

Bai Shou 柏壽

bakufu 幕府

bakumatsu 幕末

Baoquanju 寶泉局

Baoyuanju 寶源局

Beijing 北京

Beixin 北新

Besshi 別子

Bingbu 兵部

Bizen 備前

Bōnotsu 坊津

bugyō 奉行

bun 文

Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹

Cao Yin 曹寅

Changxi 長溪

Chen Hua 陳華

Chen Tingjing 陳廷敬

Chen Zizhen 陳子貞

Chijiwa Ume 千千石采女

Chūka 中華

Chūzan 中山

Da Nang 峴港

dai koku bashira 大黒柱

daikan 代官

dakai 打開

Ding Jisi 丁繼嗣

dō shiromono gae 銅代物替

Doi Toshikatsu 土井利勝

Dong Boqi 董伯起

Dong Yiri 董宜日

Dongyong 東湧

dōza 銅座

dōzan 銅山

Edo 江戸

Ehime 愛媛

Elunchun 鄂倫春

etong 額銅

Ezo 蝦夷

fen 分

Feng Liu 馮六

Fujian 福建

fukidōya nakama 吹銅屋仲間

Fukushima 福島

fumie 踏絵

Furōkura 不老倉

fusetsu yaku 風説役

Fuzhou 福州

gakudō 額銅

Gamō 蒲生

Gao Ju 高舉

Gao Zimei 高子美

Geng Zhongming 耿仲明

Genroku 元禄

Gongbu 工部

Gotairō 五大老

Gotō 五島

goyōdō 御用銅

guan chai ban tong 官差辦銅

guanbai 關白

Guangdong 廣東

Guangnan 廣南

guanshang 官商

Haiphong 海防

Hakada 博多

Han Zhongyong 韓仲雍

Hangzhou 杭州

Hanoi 河内

Harima 播磨

Hasegawa Fujihiro 長谷川藤広

Hasegawa Gonroku (Fujimasa) 長谷川権六(藤正)

Hayashi Eiki 林永喜

Hayashi Razan 林羅山

Heilongjiang 黒龍江

Hirado 平戸

Hitachi 常陸

Hizen 肥前

Hokkaidō 北海道

Honda Masazumi 本多正純

Hosogawa 細川

Hu Yuanke 胡元客

Hu Yunke 胡雲客

Huaian 淮安

Huayi 華夷

Hubei 湖北

Hubu 戸部

Hukou 湖口

Hunan 湖南

Hushu 滸墅

Hyō Roku 馮六

Hyōgo 兵庫

Ibaraki 茨城

Iga 伊賀

Ishin Sūden 以心崇傳

Itamiya Sukeshirō 伊丹屋助四郎

Iwashiro 岩代

Iyo 伊予

Izumiya Ribei 泉屋理兵衛

Izumiya Yoshijirō 泉屋吉次郎

Jiangning 江寧

Jiangsu 江蘇

Jiangxi 江西

jinba ori 陣羽織

Jinxian 鄞縣

jiuqian 舊錢

Jōkyō 貞享

ka-i 華夷

Kagoshima 鹿児島

Kaihaku goshi shinrei 海舶互市新例

kakitsuke 書付

Kakizaki Yoshihiro 蠣崎慶広

kan (kamme) 貫

kana 仮名

Kan'ei 寛永

kangō 勘合

kangō bōeki 勘合貿易

Kangxi 康熙

Kanmon 寛文

kanpaku 関白

Karafuto 樺太

Karapa 唐留巴

Karatsu 唐津

Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正

Kawakami 川上

Keelung 基隆

Keichō 慶長

kihō 貴邦

kin 斤

Kin sa sō chin setsu choku chi hō sō hei kan chū gun to toku fu sen ji 欽差總鎮浙直地方總兵官中軍都督府僉事

Kōnan 広南

Kyōto 京都

li 厘

Li Caiguan 李才官

Li Taoshi 李韜士

Li Xu 李煦

Liao Chengzhi 廖承志

Libu 吏部

Liu Yuanlin 劉元霖

Liuqiu 琉球

Ma Qi 馬齊

Macao 澳門

Mao Guoke 毛國科

Mao Guoqi 毛國器

Masaki Yajiemon 正木矢次衛門

Matsumae 松前

Ming 明

Ming shilu 明實錄

Ming Shenzong 明神宗

minkan 民間

minkan bōeki 民間貿易

minkan gaikō 民間外交

Mo (Mai) Ersen 莫（麥）爾森

Murayama Tōan 村山等安

Muromachi 室町

Nagasaki 長崎

Nagasaki Bugyōsho 長崎奉行所

Nagasaki mawaridō 長崎廻銅

Naha 那覇

Nanjing 南京

Nanpo Bunshi 南浦文之

Nanyang 南洋

Nanyō 南洋

Neiwufu 內務府

nengō 年号

nianhao 年號

Nihon Kokuō 日本国王

Ningbo 寧波

nishijin ori 西陣織

nukeni 抜荷

ō 王

Oda Nobunaga 織田信長

Ōmura 大村

Ōsaka 大阪

Ōuchi 大内

Ōoka Kiyosuke 大岡清相

paipiao 牌票

Patani 大泥

qian 錢

Qing 清

Quanzhou 泉州

rin 厘

rōju 老中

ryō 両

Ryūkyū 琉球

Sahacha 薩哈喀

saiji 歳次

saisha 歳舎

Sakai 堺

sakoku 鎖国

sakuhōshi 冊封使

Santan kōeki 山丹交易

saodō 棹銅

Satsuma 薩摩

Sei i dai shōgun 征夷大将軍

seisen 制錢

Shan Fengxiang 單鳳翔

Shandan 山丹

Shandong 山東

Shang Kexi 尚可喜

Shanghai 上海

Shibata Katsuzaemon 柴田勝左衛門

shibosi 市舶司

shihakushi 市舶司

Shima 志摩

Shimazu Iehisa 島津家久

Shimazu Yoshihiro 島津義弘

Shimazu Yoshihisa 島津義久

Shimotsuke 下野

shinpai (shimpai) 信牌

Shiranushi 白主

shiromono gae 代物替

Shissei Ieyasu 執政家康

Shō Nei 尚寧

shōgun 将軍

shōgunsama kika 将軍様麾下

shoshiki 諸色

Shōtoku 正德

Shōtoku shinrei 正德新令

Shūan (Murayama) (村山)秋安

shuin-jō 朱印状

Shunzhi 順治

Sichuan 四川

siqian 私錢

Sōya 宗谷

Suetsugu Masanao (Heizō) 末次政直(平蔵)

sufang 蘇芳

Sūgenji (Sōgenji) 崇元寺

suici 歳次

suishe 歳舎

Sunpu 駿府

suō 蘇芳

Suzhou 蘇州

Taiwan 台灣

Takazaki Tatsunosuke 高崎達之助

Tansui 淡水

tawara mono 俵物

Tenshin Maru 天神丸

Tenshō 天正

Terazawa Hirotaka (Masanari) 寺沢広高(正成)

Tiandihui 天地会

Tochigi 栃木

Tōjin 唐人

Tōjin yashiki 唐人屋敷

Tokugawa 徳川

Tokugawa Hidetada 徳川秀忠

Tokugawa Iemitsu 徳川家光

Tokugawa Ietsugu 徳川家継

Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康

Tonkin 東京

Torihara Kiuemon (Shūan) 鳥原喜右衛門（宗安）

Tōsen 唐船

toshiyori 年寄

totōgin 渡唐銀

tōtsūji 唐通事

Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉

Tsukushi 筑紫

Tsushima 対馬

Ugo 羽後

Ulin i da 烏林達

Wakkanai 稚内

wakō 倭寇

Wang 王

Wang Gangming 王綱明

Wang Liwei 王立威

Wang Shizhen 王士禎

Wang Tianyou 王天佑

Wang Yinxing 王寅興

Wanli 萬歴

wen 文

wokou 倭寇

wowang 倭王

wozi 倭子

Wu Ziying 吳子英

Wuhu 蕪湖

wulinda 烏林達

Xia Ziyang 夏子陽

Xie Yeyun 謝叶運

Xu Lihuan 許麗寰

Xu Yuanmeng 徐元夢

Xu Mei 許美

Xu Yu 許豫

Yamazaki Masanobu 山崎正信

Yang Chongye 楊棠業

Yangzhou 揚州

Yaoliuba 咬嚕吧

yudan 諭單

Yunnan 雲南

zaibatsu 財閥

Zhao Juren 趙居任

Zhao Shenqiao 趙申喬

Zhejiang 浙江

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 鄭成功（國姓爺）

Zheng Jing 鄭經

Zheng Keshuang 鄭克塽

Zheng Shaozu 鄭紹祖

Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍

zhenwo 真倭

Zhili 直隸

zhiqian 製錢

Zhizheng Jiakang 執政家康

Zhou Xingru 周性如

Zhuang Yunqing 莊運卿

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APPENDIX 1

Japanese Era Names (1573-1817)

Tenshō	1573-91
Bunroku	1592-95
Keichō	1596-1614
Genna	1615-23
Kan'ei	1624-43
Shōhō	1644-47
Keian	1648-51
Jōō	1652-54
Meireki	1655-57
Manji	1658-60
Kanbun	1661-72
Enpō	1673-80
Tenwa	1681-83
Jōkyō	1684-87
Genroku	1688-1703
Hōei	1704-10
Shōtoku	1711-15
Kyōhō	1716-35
Genbun	1736-40
Kanpō	1741-43
Enkyō	1744-47
Kan'en	1748-50
Hōreki	1751-63
Meiwa	1764-71
An'ei	1772-80
Tenmei	1781-88
Kansei	1789-1800
Kyōwa	1801-03
Bunka	1804-17

APPENDIX 2

Chinese Era Names (1573-1820)

Wanli	1573-1619
Taichang	1620
Tianqi	1621-27
Chongzhen	1628-43
Shunzhi	1644-61
Kangxi	1662-1722
Yongzheng	1723-35
Qianlong	1736-95
Jiaqing	1796-1820

APPENDIX 3

Measurement Conversions

1 *kin* = 16 *ryo* = 600 gm. = 1.32 lbs.

1 *ryo* = 10 *qian* = 1 tael

1 *qian* = 10 *fen*

1 *fen* = 10 *li*

1 *kan* (*kamme*) = 3.75 kg. = 8.27 lbs.

APPENDIX 4

Coinage Units in the Qing Dynasty

1 *guan* or *diao* = 1,000 *wen*

Source: Zhang Jiaxiang: *Zhonghua bizhi shi* (Taipei: Xinjiang Chubanshe, 1925; rep. edn., 1974), 97.

APPENDIX 5

The Shogunal Note to Shan Fengxiang Drafted in Chinese
by Ishin Suden in 1621

示明人諭單

大明日本之通信、近代
自朝鮮告對馬對馬奏
上之、今猥無由執奏之、
然還邦而以朝鮮譯通
可述所求之事者也、

Source: Kondo Morishige, *Gaihan tsusho*, in *Kondo Seisai zenshu*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1905), 9, 58.

APPENDIX 6

Illustration - *Kango* (Trade Tally)

Source: Nin Kosho (Ren Hongzhang), *Kinsei Nihon to Nitchu boeki* (Tokyo: Rokko Shuppan, 1988), 19.

APPENDIX 7

Illustration - *Shinpai* (Trade Credential)

Source: Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shiko kaito roku · Tojin fusetsu gaki · Wappu tomecho* (Suita: The Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies at Kansai University, 1974), Illustration 1.

APPENDIX 8

Illustration - Chinese Ship from Fuzhou (Fujian)

Source: Nishikawa Joken, *Zoho Ka-i tsushoko* (1708; rep. edn., in *Nihon keizai sosho* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Sosho Kankokai, 1914), 5, 243.

APPENDIX 9

Illustration - Chinese Ship from Nanjing (Jiangsu)

Source: Ibid., 242.

APPENDIX 10

Map of Japan

Source: Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Map 3.

APPENDIX 11

Map of Kyushu

Source: Ibid., Map 9.

APPENDIX 12

Map of China

Source: Lynn A. Struve, ed., and trans., *Voice from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tiger's Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 4.