GREAT BRITAIN AND THE RUHR OCCUPATION

by

CLAYTON HONDO ARENDT

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Department of History

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date April 27/92
Abstract

France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr Valley in Germany in January 1923. Germany responded with passive resistance. For the following nine months these three countries remained locked in a powerful struggle of wills.

Britain was not directly involved in the conflict but she was certainly affected by it. Britain believed that the occupation would destroy Germany's ability to pay reparations. However, Britain decided to pursue a policy of neutrality; she did not oppose the occupation, nor did she support it.

Historians have tried to determine why Britain chose the policy of neutrality. If Britain believed that the occupation was unwise, why didn't she try to end the Ruhr struggle? Most historians concluded that Britain did not actively oppose France for one of three reasons. Some believe Britain could not act because of the clear strategic advantages which France held. Others believe that Britain did try to oppose France but that her efforts ultimately failed. These first two groups of historians have accepted the central idea that Britain wanted to oppose France. However, a third group of historians rejects this thesis, claiming instead that Britain did not oppose France because she had no desire to do so.

This paper attempts to discover general British attitudes toward the Ruhr occupation. It tries to determine whether the British wanted to oppose France in 1923. A variety of materials were used
to try to discover what attitudes and beliefs determined British foreign policy during the Ruhr occupation. The main source used was the British press. This paper makes use of a number of British newspapers from that period. A variety of first hand accounts, general histories, and government documents were also used. Together these sources provided a clear picture of general British opinions of the occupation.

This paper demonstrates that Britain could not contemplate opposing France in 1923. The popular attitudes and beliefs of the time precluded any such action. Britain remained neutral not only because France was in a better strategic position than she, but also because she did not want to oppose the occupation. The evidence which has previously been used by historians to demonstrate pro-German sympathies has been entirely misinterpreted. There is nothing in British statements, actions, or beliefs which would suggest that Britain had any desire to oppose France actively in 1923.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Background

During the first nine months of 1923 the French, Belgians, and Germans were locked in a profound struggle of wills. At the start of the year, the Ruhr Valley was occupied by French and Belgian troops. The reason given for this invasion was that Germany was resisting paying reparations established by the London Agreement of May 1921. The original plan was to send a contingent of engineers and a small force of troops for protection to help reorganize the administration in this important industrial district and to ensure prompt delivery of reparations. The response in Germany, as predicted by both the British Government and the British press, was passive resistance. The Germans refused to cooperate, which brought the industry in the Ruhr Valley and in much of the Rhineland to a standstill. The Belgians and French responded by steadily increasing the pressures. Troops poured into the region as curfews, arrests, and expulsions became the order of the day. Furthermore, any unusually significant act of resistance was generally followed by an increase in the amount of territory occupied. By late Spring, the whole Ruhr was cut off from the rest of Germany by a customs barrier.
During this struggle, much attention was focused on Great Britain as the world wondered what her response would be. Britain had made it quite clear during the London Conference of December 1922, and again at the Paris Conference of 2-4 January 1923, that she would not support the proposed Franco-Belgian operation. The British Government had also made it quite clear that it would not oppose the occupation, were it to occur, but would instead choose a policy of "benevolent neutrality."

As the year progressed and as the situation in the Ruhr steadily worsened, people in all the nations concerned continued to monitor British feelings. The United Kingdom appeared to be in a paradoxical situation. She disagreed with the avowed French policy, yet at the same time, Britain was determined not to oppose the occupation. Germany expected that the British would intervene and would use their influence to support the German cause. In France some of the population feared this possibility, while others waited with barely controlled patience for the British to see the wisdom of the French policy.

As it turned out Britain managed to remain mostly aloof from the imbroglio in the Ruhr. For the first two months of the struggle the British Government maintained its silence on the issue and was satisfied simply to observe how events would unfold. By March, certain pressures increased on Britain to change its position. The debates in parliament began to focus more and more on the Ruhr struggle. The Labour Party in particular wanted the Government to take some action. At the same time, the German Government was agitating for British support. Two different delegations were sent to
lobby for possible aid, and the German ambassador Sthamer became very active. On 20 April Lord Curzon gave a speech in the House of Lords inviting Germany to make a reparations proposition which would include a statement of her "willingness and intention to pay, and to have the amount fixed by authorities properly charged with the duty." On 2 May the Germans sent a note to the Allies making a tentative reparations offer. This note proved greatly disappointing. The French and Belgians responded immediately, attacking the note as wholly unproductive. The British and Italians responded shortly thereafter, also expressing their unhappiness with the German offer. On 7 June the Germans sent a second, much more satisfying note to the Allies. This initiated two months of Allied efforts to agree on a response to this offer. Britain and Belgium especially wanted to send a joint Allied reply to Germany. On 13 June Britain asked France to clarify its position by defining a "cessation of passive resistance," and to explain the change contemplated in the administration of the occupied areas should resistance end. It wasn't until 6 July that France responded, dating the reply 14 June. The delay was explained by the forced resignation of the Belgian cabinet in late June, due entirely to an internal issue regarding "the Flamandisation of the French University of Ghent," and the difficulties of its subsequent reformation.

On 12 July Stanley Baldwin (who had taken over as Prime Minister from Bonar Law in May) and Lord Curzon gave speeches affirming British sympathy with France but attacking the ill effects of the Ruhr occupation. Eight days later the British Government issued a note which contained a proposed joint reply to Germany.
This was coolly received in both France and Belgium. Several more weeks of secret diplomacy resulted in no further progress. On 11 August, Lord Curzon denounced the occupation as illegal, politely attacking the French and Belgian positions. Meanwhile, in Germany the Cuno government had lost the confidence of the Reichstag and was replaced by Stresemann's "Great Coalition."

The last few weeks of August featured high level bickering between France and Britain without concrete results. This air of seeming animosity dissipated in September as the world's attention was drawn to other events, such as the dispute between Italy and Greece and the earthquake in Japan. On 19 September Baldwin and Poincaré met for the first time. They conferred for several hours and released a press statement which included the famous remark that Baldwin and Poincaré "were happy to discover that on no question is there any difference of purpose or divergence of principle which might impair the co-operation of the two countries."

A week later passive resistance was abandoned and the struggle took on a whole new direction.

This mixture of expectations, results, and the seeming paradox of the British situation has led to a wide variety of interpretations of British actions during 1923, both by contemporaries and by historians.
B. Thesis Statement and Contrasting Viewpoints

In the first nine months of 1923 there was no hope of the United Kingdom intervening in the Ruhr dispute on behalf of Germany in any significant way. Germany's hope of intervention was based on entirely false assumptions. Not only was Great Britain unable to help Germany, but she was also unwilling. While there were obviously a variety of different viewpoints exhibited in Britain, the mass of opinion combined with the situation at hand would not have allowed any dramatic intervention in Germany's favour by Britain. In the last three months of 1923 conditions within both Britain and Germany as well as on the international stage changed enough to create an entirely new situation. However, it is impossible to believe that Britain could have made any noticeable contribution to the German cause before those changes.

* * *

Historians hold a variety of views regarding Britain and the Ruhr occupation. Many historians believe that the Britain wanted to help Germany during the Ruhr occupation. The problem that these historians face is explaining why Britain chose a policy of "benevolent neutrality" during 1923. Some historians argue that Britain did not oppose France because she could not. They believe that France held the upper hand in the struggle and that there was nothing Britain could do. Others give no answer to this question yet remain firm in their belief that Britain's sympathies lay with Germany. Still other historians believe that Britain really did try to
take the side of Germany in this dispute but that her efforts ultimately failed.

Gordon Craig and Erich Eyck claim that Britain desired to help Germany but simply couldn't due to the larger strategic situation. Eyck believes that, "England had maneuvered herself into a position where she could do much to sharpen the quarrel but nothing to settle or shorten it." Likewise, Craig argues that Britain was helpless "to restrain Poincaré, because they were dependent upon French cooperation to protect their middle Eastern interests in the difficult negotiations that were currently taking place at Lausanne." Many historians conclude that Britain wanted to help Germany or oppose France but was in some way unable to do so.

Not all historians make clear why they believe Britain failed to act in the first nine months of 1923. However, they still subscribe to the view that Britain had a significant degree of hostility for France. Anne Orde believes that, despite the fact that Britain remained calm in the Spring of 1923, by August she was "deploring" French actions. Martin Gilbert, while trying to find the long term causes of Britain's later appeasement policy, states that during the Ruhr occupation "British public opinion began to move firmly against France." This "irritation with France" led to increasing "sympathy with Germany." Paul Hayes claims that Britain grew distinctly anti-French at this time. He states that "hostility to France was scarcely less vehement in Britain" than in Germany. Although these historians do not always explain why Britain declined to act on this supposed anger with the Ruhr occupation, they agree that Britain was fundamentally
opposed to it, and that she truly desired to side with Germany at this time.

Other historians also believe that Britain not only wanted to help Germany but that despite Britain's difficult situation she made significant attempts to do so. John Hiden states that Britain did make the effort but that it "was not enough to stop Poincaré from testing his thesis that Germany could pay but would not." Hermann Rupieper recognizes that "the French knew perfectly well that there was no British force which could prevent their doing what they pleased in Germany," but devotes much of his book, The Cuno Government and Reparations 1922-1923, to describing the efforts that Britain did make in attempting to help Germany.

The common theme amongst these historians is the opinion that Britain desired to help Germany. They believe not that it was just a few well placed people in the government or certain sections of the population who felt that Germany needed and deserved British help, but rather that this feeling was widespread. These historians usually state that the lack of British action during 1923 was due to the difficult situation which Britain was in and not due to lack of desire. Some, such as Rupieper, have even argued that Britain was dynamically active and that her apparent neutrality was simply a result of failing to achieve success.

This idea is by no means limited to historians. Many people subscribed to the same view at the time of the Ruhr occupation. The belief that Britain was Germany's best hope was a particularly popular view within Germany itself. The German press, as well as many of the members of the Reichstag, believed that Britain was
sympathetic to the German cause, and desired to help. The Times reported on 4 August 1923 that there was a "legend, strangely prevalent [in Berlin], that Britain had made it her business to protect German interests against France." This "legend" primarily originated with the German Government. Professor Quessel lamented in the Sozialistische Monatshefte that "one of the illusions which the Cuno Government raised was hope of England's intervention." The result was that Germany spent much of its time looking to Britain for potential help. One can see why the French, in their response to the British note of 20 July, made the blunt statement that they were "convinced that if Germany had not been able to count upon a division between the Allies she would have rapidly given way."

* * *

Such then has been the response of many historians and contemporaries to the situation which faced the United Kingdom in 1923. Unfortunately the belief that Britain wanted to assist Germany is a false interpretation of British attitudes during the Ruhr struggle.

The British did not help Germany because of the situation within Britain. The British people continued to feel sympathy for France and animosity for Germany. This, combined with various other internal forces, meant that Britain could choose no policy except neutrality in 1923. Some historians have recognized this fact. Alfred E. Cornebise states that "British public opinion would not at that time countenance any act which might endanger the Entente." Likewise, W. N. Medlicott recognized that Britain had no desire to break with France, despite the Ruhr occupation. A pro-French, anti-German
attitude alongside a dislike for French policy, translated into a British policy of neutrality.

C. Sources and Justification

Since it is easy to be misled it is important for the historian to look at a wide variety of materials when studying British intentions in 1923. Too often historians have been led astray by looking at a few key pronouncements by particularly prominent members of the public. Likewise, British actions can be interpreted in a variety of ways. One must approach the problem from several different angles, and avoid taking statements or actions at face value.

The sources available to study this period are plentiful. A number of British newspapers published during 1923 (see below) reveal the attitudes and popular views that could have affected foreign policy. Other primary sources, such as writings by prominent politicians, reveal how these people felt about the events. The feelings of these statesmen are not always apparent in their public statements. Their works, combined with some of the volumes of primary documents, particularly Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, give a fairly clear view of the attitudes of the government. Few historians have dedicated themselves to this topic, but the broader area of British inter-war relations has been well traversed.

The most useful sources are the newspapers. A sampling of newspapers can reflect attitudes across the political spectrum in
British society: the far left (The Communist, which in February 1923 became The Worker's Weekly), Labour (The Daily Herald), Liberal (The Manchester Guardian Daily and Guardian Weekly, The Daily Chronicle), and Conservative (The Times Daily and Times Weekly, Daily Express, Daily Telegraph, Spectator). These, combined with newspapers which assumed a relatively independent line (The Observer, Illustrated London News, The Economist), give one a representative view of British society.

As well, the Rothermere Press (Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, The Evening News, Sunday Dispatch, and many others) can't be ignored when studying this period. The entirely pro-French views of this segment were readily apparent and their positions were frequently the topic of discussion in other newspapers.

By choosing newspapers from various other angles one can ensure that ideas which may have only been expressed in certain segments of the population will not be overlooked. One must include examples of popular newspapers (Daily Express, Illustrated London News) and serious ones (The Observer, Manchester Guardian). One should also include papers that were widely read (Daily Express), and those with lower circulation (Spectator).

One could argue that if the historian simply covered the spectrum of newspaper possibilities, much could be overlooked. This may be, but other sources fill the gap, and one should not underestimate the value of the press. This is particularly true when considering the significance of the press in Britain in 1923.

Unlike today, in 1923 there were no opinion polls. It was commonly accepted that the best way to judge public opinion was to
survey the views of the newspapers. Individual newspapers' opinions were considered representative of the segments of the population with which they were affiliated. This is evidenced by the fact that when newspapers tried to describe public opinion, either at home or abroad, they would usually do it by presenting a selection of quotations from various other newspapers.

As well, newspapers in Britain in 1923 were politically conscious and were used for debating the issues of the day. Editorials and letters to the editor played prominent roles. The Spectator was made up almost entirely of these two features. In addition, the day-to-day reporting was often heavily inundated with political discussion and opinion. A report of the day's news often quickly turned into a description of the reporter's views of the overall situation. To enhance this atmosphere of political awareness, it was common for the press to commit large amounts of space to the printing of speeches, official documents, parliamentary debates and the like. This was by no means limited to the 'serious' papers such as the Guardian or the Times; even the more popular newspapers such as the Daily Express had substantial political content. The awareness of political issues which the press in 1923 displayed, combined with its accepted role as a mouthpiece of public opinion, makes newspapers the best source for discerning British attitudes which were prevalent at this time.

Some historians may claim that the press was not an accurate gauge of public opinion because it was managed by, and reflected the views of, a small number of controlling interests. While this may be true of some newspapers (J.L. Garvin certainly appears to have
personally controlled the contents of the Observer while the Harmsworth Press clearly and consistently expounded the views of Lord Rothermere) it is not true of all. Some (such as the Guardian) had very diffuse power structures and/or employed a large number of writers who had considerable independence; others clearly represented larger group interests (such as the Daily Herald which prided itself as being the vehicle of opinion for Labour). Even those papers that were under control of a single person, or a small group of people, can't be discounted as valueless resources. While their use as a reflection of larger public opinion may be in doubt, they still participated in the debates of the time and the prevalent attitudes and views of the time did colour their contents. In addition, these newspapers were powerful as forces which could alter and direct public opinion. Just as it is today, the press in 1923 was both a reflection of what existed and a dynamic force in establishing what would be. The press barons who used their newspapers to try to sway public opinion had considerable power. Lord Beaverbrook (who controlled several newspapers including the Daily Express) was accustomed to having Prime Ministers, including Bonar Law, come to him for advice.20 Indeed, it was Beaverbrook who talked Bonar Law into going to the Carlton Club meeting (which resulted in Bonar Law leading the Conservative Party out of the Coalition).21 Lord Rothermere also considered himself to be extremely influential. Rothermere wrote to Beaverbrook on 26 April 1923 that, "If Bonar places himself in my hand I will hand him down to posterity at the end of three years as one of the most successful Prime Ministers in history, and if there is a general election I will get him returned
again."22 Lloyd George wrote a letter about a weekend that he had spent in the company of Lord Rothermere expressing the hope that "his friendship will last [because] it may produce a more friendly atmosphere in his papers." This despite the fact that Lloyd George and Lord Rothermere had distinctly different views about the situation in the Ruhr.23 Evidently the politicians of the time recognized the importance of the controllers of Fleet Street. The role the newspapers could play in affecting both public opinion and government policy, combined with their position as a reflection of existing public opinion makes the press an apt source for studying the undercurrents of British opinion.

If one did not use newspapers, and instead looked only at Britain's actions or the proclamations of its leaders, one could stray into error when analyzing the British potential for action during the Ruhr crisis. In fact, as the newspapers indicate, the general feeling in the United Kingdom was unreadiness and unwillingness to extend a helping hand to Germany.
Chapter 2: Interpretations of Britain's Response to the Occupation

One could build an argument demonstrating that Britain was close to throwing her weight against the French and Belgian cause in 1923. There were many proclamations denouncing the occupation. These attacks continued throughout 1923 and were joined by British reactions both to French diplomatic maneuvers and to the build up of French armaments. The opposition parties clamored for Britain to change her policy of "benevolent neutrality." Asquith dubbed this policy "benevolent impotence." Throughout the occupation the German Government was reaching out for British aid. There is ample evidence that Britain could have helped Germany.

It is not, therefore, surprising that, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, many people have accepted the hypothesis that Britain desired to aid Germany. However, interpreting events in this manner ignores certain realities of the situation. First, the evidence which would indicate a 'pro-German' feeling inside Britain can be explained as misrepresentative of the general public mood. Similarly, British actions often only had the appearance of being anti-French; in reality they had a very different character. Secondly, these interpretations contradict actions which demonstrate that Britain was moving in an entirely different direction (for example, Britain's insistence on reparations payments). The Daily Telegraph wrote 11 December 1922 that even though there was dissention
between Britain and France, "it does not follow that there must be quarrel and rupture."\textsuperscript{25}

A. Reflections of Britain's Opinion

Probably the most important factor in the assumption of Britain's readiness to help Germany is the acceptance of certain public statements as being representative of Britain's attitude. Some Members of Parliament, particularly those from the Labour party, were outspoken in their condemnation of the Ruhr occupation. The \textit{Daily Herald}, as the newspaper of the Labour Party, was equally strong in its attacks of the occupation. Even members of the governing circles regularly denounced the occupation, some seeming to lean towards involving Britain in support of Germany. Statements made by Lord Curzon, the Foreign Minister, Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador to Germany, and John Bradbury, the British representative on the Reparations Commission, are often used by historians to demonstrate that Britain was ready to help Germany. Cornebise writes, "Berlin exhibited perennial hopes that the British would intervene of which there were frequent tantalizing indications from Curzon, D'Abernon and others."\textsuperscript{26} To find quotations emanating from London condemning the occupation or even suggesting that Britain should aid Germany is no hard task.

However, it is an equally simple task to find quotations which would suggest that Britain leaned in the opposite direction. Some Members of Parliament openly advocated joining France in the Ruhr
occupation. The Rothermere Press maintained its campaign of "Hats Off to France" throughout 1923. All this proves is that both extremes were represented.

Anti-French statements made by Lord Curzon after April 1923 are often used by historians to demonstrate that the British Government was beginning to change its view of the situation. This does not, however, demonstrate an actual change of view in the government. Lord Curzon had maintained relative silence to this point not because he initially supported France, but because he had been busy at Lausanne with the details surrounding the Middle East peace settlements. One should also remember that Lord Curzon had a strong personal dislike of Poincaré because of a dramatic fight between the two in October 1922. Curzon's entry into the Ruhr debate simply brought a particularly vocal, noticeable and active individual to the fore. L. S. Amery wrote, "Curzon excelled himself in argumentative dispatches which his colleagues did their best to tone down." Clearly, Curzon's view can not be equated with the British view.

Those quotations and individuals chosen by historians to represent Britain's opposition of the occupation are often misinterpreted. Even those who were most vocal in their opposition rarely advocated active intervention. Sir John Bradbury indicated well in advance of the occupation that although he "expressed skepticism as to the success of the Ruhr occupation," he didn't think "England would [or should] undertake measures to prevent it." Throughout the Ruhr struggle he maintained that the French and Belgian actions were wrong but that Britain should remain aloof.
The fact that these people also advocated neutrality, as even Lord Curzon did for much of 1923, often goes unnoticed; it is their displeasure with French attitudes that is remembered.

B. Opposition to the Government

Public proclamations and the debates in parliament can be misinterpreted as examples of London's readiness to support Germany. In the House of Commons, it often appeared that the struggle was very close and that Britain could have at any time abandoned neutrality for a more active, pro-German role. The Labour Party and both wings of the Liberal Party frequently attacked the Government's Ruhr policy. Historians and contemporaries have emphasized the fact that in March 1923 a vote in support of the Government's policy of neutrality passed by only 48. Later in March the Government lost a vote regarding a housing issue. To some people, this demonstrates how weak the Government's position was. The press also frequently expressed views that "for all concerned a change in policy" was needed and that it was Britain's "right and duty to exert [herself] to shape the course of events and to help towards a settlement." On the surface it appears that pressure on the government was significant and that it could easily have produced a profound shift in the British position.

What is not so commonly expressed is that the opposition rarely advocated a position far distant from the one that the Government held. There was even a tendency to oppose the government's policy
without actually advocating any position. The Daily Chronicle, which primarily represented the Lloyd George wing of the Liberals, frequently blasted the government's stance in its editorials; however, for the first months of the occupation it made no suggestions as to what general policy should be pursued. Even when a policy was championed it was seldom radical. Liberals considered Britain's most severe policy option to be the removal of the British troops from Cologne. It is hard to imagine how this policy could have hindered the French policy in any way. France simply would have had more freedom in the Rhineland to pursue whatever policies she wished. Yet withdrawal was considered to be Britain's "most potent form of protest" available and one which could only be considered after "the most careful deliberation." The Liberals rarely openly advocated withdrawal; they argued only that it should be kept as a policy option.

The other major policy suggestion made by the Liberals was that the whole issue should be submitted to some international body. They sometimes advocated lobbying for U. S. intervention or for submitting the whole matter to the International Court at The Hague, but their most common suggestion was to involve the League of Nations. Beginning on 19 February the Liberals, with Labour support, regularly suggested this option. Again, this policy was unlikely to produce any effect in the Ruhr. It was well recognized that France dominated the League of Nations. Miles Lampson, from the British Foreign Office, commented that "neither the admission to the League of Nations nor the submission to the International Court in The Hague would help. The inquiry was completely unrealistic,
since both steps would be prevented by France." As well, it was common knowledge that Lord Cecil, the man who was most associated with the League in Britain and who best knew its inner workings, didn't think that the League was a viable option. Lord Cecil believed that the occupation was perfectly legal and that Britain should not intervene. The Liberal's suggestions were clearly designed for public consumption. The Liberal party wanted to appear active while the Conservatives chose non-action. However, the reality was that the Liberal policies could not have changed the situation in the Ruhr. It is likely that, had the Liberals been in power, they would not have bothered to make these unproductive suggestions.

Like the Liberals, the Labour Party advocated policies which would not have helped Germany. The Labour Party often made suggestions of a significantly undramatic nature. On 25 January Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Party leader, suggested that the British Government demand a clear statement from France about her aims in the Ruhr. He also suggested that the British representative from the Reparations Commission be withdrawn and that the British policy be made clear (including the intention of Britain to continue to trade with Germany). In March, the Labour Party suggested that a joint English, Belgian and French committee meet to "discuss" the situation. By Mid-April the Labour Party was even suggesting that "an appeal should be made to the French and German Governments to submit their proposals in regard to reparations and security." Clearly none of these policies could seriously have been
expected to break the impasse in the Ruhr or counter the French position.

Even the more radical suggestions made by the Labour Party could not have been helpful to Germany. The Labour Party called for the cancellation of war debts and reparations, and the scrapping of the Treaty of Versailles. However, the fact that these suggestions were more commonly made in the Labour newspaper the Daily Herald than in parliament indicates that they were intended mostly to impress the electorate. Significantly, in the summer of 1923, when it became apparent that negotiations were beginning again, the Daily Herald began to reassert that reparations were sorely needed. This indicates that even the more radical policies of the Labour Party were largely for show.

The suggestions made by the opposition parties in Britain would not have aided Germany. Most of their ideas were designed to convince the electorate that the opposition parties were pregnant with ideas while the Conservatives were impotent. The suggestions were invariably either simply cosmetic or unrealistic. Indeed, not all of the radical suggestions of the opposition parties were designed to favour Germany. In February four Labour Members of Parliament suggested internationalizing the Ruhr in order to ensure output of reparations in kind. It is interesting that Lloyd George also suggested a policy of internationalizing the whole Rhineland. Clearly, the opposition did not really support Germany.
C. Britain: Interactions in Western Europe

Britain's interactions with France and Germany, particularly in the Rhineland, demonstrate that Britain was not ready to cooperate with Germany. Britain continued to work with the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission and the Reparations Council despite misgivings about the occupation. On the international stage France and Britain cooperated as partners against Germany in a variety of ways. Around Cologne the British even gave a certain amount of tactical support to the actual occupation. At the same time, Britain completely rebuffed any German attempts to forge more cordial relations.

Britain's refusal to vote in favour of motions finding Germany in default of deliveries of reparations in kind is often held up as an example of how she stood up for Germany. In fact, Britain's actions within the Reparations Council and the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission do not suggest that Britain was actively opposing the Ruhr occupation. Britain did not refuse to vote to support Germany; she was simply demonstrating her faith in her own economic assessments and in her own reparations plan of January 1923. She used the Reparations Council and the Rhineland Commission to protest the occupation and to state her own case. Furthermore, Britain did not withdraw from these organizations. She might have abstained from the decision making process, but once the occupation had begun she did not fight it. The British representatives in Cologne continued to work closely with the Rhineland High Commission and continued to show support. D'Abernon admitted on
3 September 1923 that Britain was "constantly pressing the German Government to pay the Rhineland Commission or some other Inter-Allied body" and that Britain "continued to exact payment under the Reparation's Recovery Act."48 The British representative on the Rhineland Commission, Lord Kilmarnock, wrote to Lord Curzon in mid-January wondering whether "Britain can afford to let [the French] be defeated." He also suggested how Britain could "help France without definitely associating [herself] with their action."49 Although Britain sometimes used the Reparations Council and the Rhineland Commission to express her opinions, her actions showed no desire to interfere with France.

Britain's activity in her relations with Germany also gave no indication that she was willing to offer support. It is certain that Germany expected aid from Britain. This is proven by the number of attempts that the Germans made to forge some sort of contact with Britain. Germany looked to the United Kingdom for guidance and for help, however, Britain firmly refused these overtures throughout 1923. The Times accurately predicted that "the German delegation that is reputed to be coming to England to seek intervention will receive no satisfaction here."50 Despite repeated efforts, Germany could establish no high-level contacts. A letter sent by Cuno to Bonar Law was refused on the grounds that accepting it was pointless because "neither Britain nor anybody could help."51 After Curzon's speech of 20 April, Lord D'Abernon contacted Lord Curzon with the message that the German Minister of Foreign Affairs "is anxious to get an exact indication of an offer which you consider it advisable for Germany to make." Curzon's response three days later contained no
message for the German government; Curzon simply told D'Abernon that, "It is politically important that Your Excellency should carefully avoid being drawn into any form of collaboration with the German Government as to the terms of their offer to France."\textsuperscript{52} In his diary, Lord D'Abernon claims that he in fact "kept entirely clear." He also lamented that "the French papers are constantly asserting that Cuno is directed by me," and that the feeling that England's voice was supreme in Germany "was quite an erroneous view."\textsuperscript{53}

These repeated rebuffs failed to dispel the notion that Britain was willing to help Germany. The suspicion that these supposed private negotiations would lead to some agreement was prevalent in France as well.\textsuperscript{54} This fear was only enhanced when German actions seemed to respond to British proclamations. Assuredly, the German note of 2 May was in response to Lord Curzon's speech of 20 April, but this cause and effect 'relationship' came solely from the German attitude. The error that the French made, an error that historians of today sometimes replicate, was assuming that Germany was encouraged by Britain. In fact, Britain steadfastly refused to counsel or negotiate with Germany all through the first nine months of the Ruhr occupation.

In Germany, it wasn't really until August that Britain's lack of response to the German thrusts began to register. During the cabinet crisis of early August Cuno finally admitted that Germany could no longer try to gain British support and must learn to stand alone.\textsuperscript{55} As well, Dr. Mueller, the SPD ex-chancellor, said that "it was the opinion of his party that Great Britain would not separate from France and that Germany must not rely on Britain."\textsuperscript{56} Even in
October, when Stresemann made roughly the same argument, it "caused a stir of amazement in the Reichstag part of which still believed that England was backing Germany." Relief was evident in Britain when this legend was finally "disposed of by the German Chancellor himself." Although the myth proved to be hard to dispel, it was never more than a myth. There is no evidence of secret background negotiations between Britain and Germany. German expectations and French suspicions were entirely unjustified.

In truth, the only time British actions could have been considered supportive of Germany was when Britain declared herself in favour of policies which Germany also favoured. The best example of this was Britain's desire to grant Germany a moratorium. However, even this 'support' was entirely based on selfish motives. Britain desired to grant Germany a moratorium simply to maximize the final amount of reparations which Germany could pay. Furthermore, whenever Britain called for a moratorium she also invariably called for Allied control of the German financial system in order ensure that the moratorium would guarantee greater reparations payments. This demand for control was supported by all of the British political parties. Asquith stated "that financial control in Germany must form part of any settlement" because of the "widespread feeling in this country that a reparation settlement would, in fact, not be carried our without strong supervision in Germany." The Daily Telegraph noted that Britain was "as determined to make Germany pay to the limit of her capacity as France." In the press it was even suggested that Britain offer to guarantee support of the Ruhr at a later date should Germany continue to fail to pay reparations after a
Even when Britain seemed to support Germany, her motives were self-centered.

Evidence for actual British support of Germany during 1923 is almost non-existent. In 1922, it appeared that Britain and Germany were moving closer together. The first commercial air service between the two states began. Britain openly supported Germany's entry into the League of Nations. In September British banks promised to guarantee the financing of part of that year's reparations to Belgium. However, once the occupation had begun Britain withdrew. The idea of German admission to the League of Nations was put on hold, and there was no talk of British help for German finances (except to leave the option open for British businesses to make a loan to Germany). Britain claimed to be following a line of strict neutrality, but if she did waver it was to show modest support for the occupation and not for Germany.

In fact, Britain took a number of actions which lent at least tactical support to the French occupation. This was primarily done in the British zone of occupation near Cologne. From the beginning of the occupation, Britain made it quite clear through Lord Kilmarnock that they would not object to the French collecting custom's duties in the British zone. Near the end of January the British Chamber of Commerce in Cologne offered the French the service of ten British engineers. Britain also allowed French troop trains to pass through the area. Britain even lent soldiers to act as guards for these trains, and to garrison key bridges and terminals, to prevent possible sabotage. Britain relinquished two parcels of her occupied area to French control in February. First she turned over the town of
Baumber, and even helped the French to occupy it.\textsuperscript{64} Later, Britain allowed the French to take over a small area in the Cologne zone because it contained a key rail line that the French wanted to use. Britain also allowed the French to bring any coal or coke which she could extract from the Ruhr through the Cologne area. It was agreed that the number of trains run through the area by the French was not to exceed the average daily rate of the months before the occupation. The fact that the French often did exceed this average seemed to provoke no objection. Britain would not allow members of the German Reichstag to visit the British area, and would sometimes deny certain Germans entrance into Britain itself.\textsuperscript{65} Furthermore, in March, Britain didn't permit the International Workers' Conference to meet in Cologne. This particular action caused the \textit{Worker's Weekly} to accuse the British Government of "Acting as a tool of Poincaré."\textsuperscript{66} However, Britain did allow Rhenish separatists to use Cologne as their headquarters, at least for the first few months of the occupation.\textsuperscript{67} In addition, Britain supported France when France put pressure on Germany. In July Britain stopped issuing passports and passes for travel between the Cologne area and the rest of Germany. This was done in conjunction with France and Belgium in response to a bombing of a troop train by German saboteurs.\textsuperscript{68}

Britain continued to cooperate with France in most other areas in 1923. She worked with the Military Control Commission to pressure Germany to complete its disarmament. As well, Britain joined with France and Belgium in calling for an end to passive resistance. In June, the \textit{Times} stated that, "Nothing would now bring France out of the Ruhr until she considers that she has won. Therefore there is no
reason why the game should not be regarded as lost by Germany and
the useless weapon of so-called passive resistance be put aside."

By July the British Government was also openly calling for an end to
this resistance. Although Britain never openly supported the
occupation, her actions helped the French cause and demonstrated
her desire to further French efforts.

* * *

During the first nine months of 1923 Britain pursued a policy of
neutrality with regard to the Ruhr occupation. The fact that Britain
expressed her displeasure with the occupation, and with certain
other French policies, has sometimes been misinterpreted as
demonstrating support for Germany. Likewise, certain British
actions during the year have been given the same meaning.

In truth, Britain did not assist Germany, nor did she demonstrate
any desire to do so. British politicians, inside or outside of the
government, did not contemplate an active anti-French stance,
regardless of their attacks on the wisdom of the occupation. Britain's
readiness to continue its partnership with France was demonstrated
by her actions in 1923. Britain continued to cooperate with France in
a variety of ways. She even lent a degree of support to the actual
occupation. At the same time Britain held herself completely aloof
from the German overtures. Britain's actions demonstrate that if she
wavered from strict neutrality in 1923 it was always in favour of
France over Germany.
Chapter 3: Attitudes and Opinions

The last chapter showed how the British actions in the first nine months of 1923 indicated that she did not want to help Germany. Britain did not fail in her efforts to help Germany, because Britain did not make, or ever desire to make, any such efforts. Within Britain a set of attitudes precluded any real intervention on behalf of Germany. The most significant factor was that within Britain love for France - and bitterness towards Germany - still lingered from the Great War. Britain could not be altruistic towards Germany. Another factor in Britain's rejection of Germany was that the British public believed reparation payments were needed. If Britain showed Germany favour this might eliminate all chance of Britain receiving her due. These factors combined with a fear of isolation resulted in strong feeling of helplessness. The only possible policy was neutrality.

A. British Loyalties

The most powerful popular feeling was the continued affection of the British people for France. Indeed one could argue that much of Britain was entirely pro-French. The Rothermere Press, as mentioned before, was wholly supportive of the Ruhr occupation. It was also widely recognized that a substantial portion of the ruling
Conservative party wanted Britain to join France in this occupation. The *Observer* sarcastically described the attitude of these two groups by saying the "British Die-hards fall in ecstatic prostration before their political pontiff, the French Premier and Lord Rothermere kisses his toe twice a day, morning and evening."  

Despite such jabs these two groups were actually quite influential. It is not absolutely certain how many Conservatives favoured a policy of joining France in the Ruhr, but the *Economist* estimated that it was over fifty Members of Parliament. The Rothermere Press was very widely read, and if the public didn't agree with Lord Rothermere's policies they certainly didn't show it by ceasing their consumption of his proclamations. The *Daily Mail* continued to be by far the most popular newspaper in Britain and even substantially increased its circulation during the Ruhr occupation. This is in sharp contrast with the Labour newspaper, the *Daily Herald*, which was the most 'anti-occupation' of all the British newspapers and which was almost closed down in August 1923 because of low and declining circulation. In that month, Lord Rothermere began to put advertisements for his newspapers in the *Daily Herald*; perhaps he recognized that a portion of the Herald's readers had become disenchanted with the views expressed by the Herald. Even in newspapers other than those of the Rothermere Press the suggestion of complete support for the French was often seen in the letters to the editors. Sentiments such as, "What a pity [the occupation] was not tried long ago" were common in the Independent, Liberal and Conservative Press.
Even the general public, which did not agree with Rothermere's attitude of total support for the occupation, certainly wanted Britain and France to remain on good terms. The press constantly asserted that Britain was still friends with France. The Spectator pointed out that Britain had a "natural love of France and it is not small" and that it was Bonar Law's job to "prevent the Germans from thinking that they could permanently separate us from France." The Conservative Press as a whole continued to express affection for France throughout 1923. Since the Conservatives had a firm grip on power, this part of the press should be considered the most accurate reflection of the Government's outlook, and therefore of what its potential for action could have been.

The Entente was considered to be "the sole barrier between Europe and chaos." Whenever it seemed that France and Britain were moving closer together, it was celebrated as a 'good thing'. The "Entente Cordiale so gloriously instituted on the battlefield" was mentioned in an entirely positive light. If ever relations between France and Britain soured, the situation was invariably painted as sad and unfortunate. During one downturn in relations the Guardian observed that, "here there is no sign of pleasure or even indifference to the threatened rupture." The press did what it could to support the Entente. In October and November 1922, the Observer regularly published French writers describing how relations could be improved.

Despite the fact that there was constantly talk of rupture, closeness with France was always considered of greatest importance. This is supported by the fact that the term "Allies" continued to be
widely used and accepted without question. The Alliance continued
to exist in the minds of the British people. It was a closeness forged
during four years of war and it was a cornerstone of the
international situation. Britain could not contemplate opposing
France because to the mass of British people France was still a friend
and an ally. While differences existed in opinion, it was commonly
accepted that the "deepest feeling in the minds of both peoples was
the desire to remain in unison."82

The average British citizen held no such feelings of warmth for
Germany. In fact a deep feeling of animosity remained. If France
continued to be the friend during the Ruhr occupation, Germany
remained an enemy. Sthamer observed that "anti-German sentiment
lay just beneath the surface" in Britain.83 The Economist stated that,
"The present Government is not in the least likely to err on the side
of being unduly friendly to our late enemies or helping them to find
a way out of meeting their obligations."84 When discussing possible
rapprochement with Germany, the Daily Express decided that, "Such
a conception would be intolerable, and the Government which
attempted to carry it into effect would fall from power instantly."85
When considering whether or not Germany had friends in Britain, the
Daily Telegraph concluded that "in this country she has and can have
none."86 The Times simply stated that, "There is no tendency here
[London] to ignore the crimes and evasion of Germany in the past"87
and that "the feeling here is not pro-German."88

France was the country for vacations. Despite the friction
between Britain and France, the Daily Telegraph observed that, "Not
since the war have there been so many visitors in Paris [from
Britain] as at the present moment." Many people (including Curzon and Bonar Law) went to France for medical attention. In the world of sports it was common for French and British athletes to compete. Newspapers regularly ran columns about life in France. Germany, on the other hand, was perhaps seen as a country to do business with, but nothing more.

Residual war attitudes definitely limited what Britain could or could not do. It is popular to portray the diplomatic maneuvers which took place before the Great War as based on self-interest rather than on loyalty. Countries joined and broke with each other, wrestling for advantage. After the war no such simple breaking or allying could have taken place. Too many people had been involved in the war and the strength of residual loyalties would not have allowed Britain to assume a pro-German stance.

The closeness that the British people felt for France was not destroyed by the disagreements which Britain had with France during 1923. Britain was not growing apart from France despite high level friction. The Times observed that "those who died in Flanders have created an entente more real and more abiding than any political contract." It is true that the British people condemned the occupation, but they did not condemn France. The press, even when it was attacking French policy, always made it clear that that it still cared for and sympathized with France. No newspaper, whatever its political background, desired to give the appearance of being anti-French. In January 1923 the Spectator stated that even though they had displayed "in appearance a pro-German and anti-
French attitude, we had not forgotten the harm done by Germany to France, to ourselves and to the world at large.\textsuperscript{92} The \textit{Daily Chronicle}, which was known for its frequent denunciations of French policy, stated, "Our memories are not so short that we have forgotten how deeply [France] has been wronged . . . British policy is not pro-German."\textsuperscript{93} This affection for France did not waver as the occupation progressed; some felt that it even grew stronger. In mid-April the \textit{Daily Chronicle} announced that it agreed with Poincaré's observation\textsuperscript{94} that British public opinion was changing in France's favour.\textsuperscript{95}

Even when the British Press suspected that France was really in the Ruhr for security reasons, and not for reparations at all, there was no anger. Common was the attitude presented by the \textit{Observer} when it stated, "We may deplore France's action, but we can at any rate comprehend her emotions. She needs reparations and she is entitled to them. She needs security and she is entitled to it."\textsuperscript{96}

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Certain other attitudes also made Britain more patient with France's activity in the Ruhr. Euphemisms such as the "rupture cordiale" and "the agreement to disagree" show that Britain and France were still close. Not only did the British believe that French and British policies were in accord except regarding the occupation, but they also believed that even this difference was a difference in manner, not in aim. Both Britain and France wanted the maximum reparations which could be had from Germany. Britain favoured a moratorium and a new repayment schedule, while France and Belgium felt that the occupation was the best method available.
Again, this difference did not produce anger. The *Daily Telegraph* stated, "It is not lack of sympathy with France, but an excess of sympathy which prompts us to hesitate to adopt her policy towards Germany." 97 Britain felt France would soon learn that the United Kingdom's view was correct. They expected that the occupation would prove unprofitable and that once again Britain and France would be in total accord.98 However, it was also acknowledged that the French and Belgian position could prove to be correct. This possibility was treated more with hope than with scorn. The common view was "we hope that you are right but fear that you are not."99

Another popular view which prevented Britain from opposing the French was the belief that Germany did not deserve help. This was partly due to the widespread belief that Germany had deliberately avoided paying reparations. It was also felt that Germany had exerted no efforts to help her own economy, and perhaps had even sabotaged it. Miles Lampson pointed out to Sthamer in January 1923, "The general opinion here was not that of sympathy with Germany; not at all. The average man no doubt thought that Germany had brought [the occupation] on herself by not fulfilling the treaty."100 This belief was also widely expressed in the press. The *Times* said, "Germany has never made an adequate or honest effort to fulfill even a reasonable amount of the obligations which she assumed by her signature of the Treaty of Versailles."101

Another reason for Britain's lack of sympathy for the German situation was the depiction of the German economy in the British press. Germany was alternately presented as extremely wealthy or
in total economic chaos. British newspapers often reported that Germany had wiped out its internal debt and had almost no income tax as well as total employment. Germany had also embarked on numerous lavish construction projects and had heavily subsidized its industries. It appeared that, "There had been money in Germany for anything and everything except for reparations."102 The British public continued to be bombarded with rosy pictures of the German financial state during the occupation. This roused particular jealousy as Britain was suffering from high unemployment, high taxes and an unprecedented burden of debt. On the other hand, it was also quite common to depict Germany on the edge of economic ruin. However, the purpose of this was usually to demonstrate the wisdom of British plans regarding reparations, and not to raise sympathy for Germany. The British public were unsure about the economy of Germany. Part of their consciousness believed that France was right about the German reserves of wealth. Even that part of the population that believed Germany was financially ruined did not have sympathy for Germany. The British people firmly fixed the blame for Germany's financial problems on Germany itself. They believed as well that financial distress in Germany did not mean that Britain should come to Germany's aid; it meant only that the Allies should pursue an alternative method for maximizing reparations.
B. Desire for Reparations

Another aspect of public opinion in Britain in 1923 that limited her interest in action was the public's sincere desire for reparations. One of the main reasons why the Germans looked to Britain for support was because they hoped that Britain would forgive Germany's debt. Likewise, Britain's allies hoped that she might forgive the inter-Allied debts due to her. This would have helped Germany because if Belgium and France were free of debts, they might be less harsh with Germany.

In the Balfour note of 1 August 1922, Britain offered to reduce the debts due to her down to the amount which she owed the United States. To some this demonstrated that Britain was ready to forgive claims in order to try and reestablish the stability of the economy of Europe. However, America thought that the Balfour note was an attempt to force the United States to forgive Britain's debts. At the same time, Britain's other allies believed that the Balfour note was Britain's way of announcing that she expected to be paid. Regardless, it is clear that Britain was not willing to contemplate any forgiveness of debts beyond the Balfour note. She might have been ready to renounce certain debts if the United States had been willing to reduce its claim on Britain, but there was no possibility of that happening in early 1923. The United States had reacted strongly to the Balfour note and had resisted giving any significant consolations when Baldwin went to Washington in January 1923 to discuss British debt funding to the United States. All the newspapers expressed
their concern with what was felt to be the poor state of the British economy. Resentment was shown at the high taxes which the British subjects had to face, and as mentioned above, it was commonplace to point out how much less the average Frenchman or German had to pay.\textsuperscript{103} Once Britain was locked into an agreement to repay her debt to the United States, the concern over the necessity of receiving reparations only increased.

It was evident that Britain could go no further in renouncing her claims. The press argued that "there is not the faintest desire here to let Germany off"\textsuperscript{104} and that Britain wanted "to be paid as much as France."\textsuperscript{105} The \textit{Times} pointed out that, "British opinion looks to the Government for an emphatic and detailed presentment of that irrefutable British claim."\textsuperscript{106} This did not change as the Ruhr occupation progressed. In July the \textit{Times} stated that, "Any attempt that may be made to profit by exploiting differences between the Allies is based on misapprehension. This country is as firm as ever in its demand that Germany shall pay reparations up to the limit of her capacity to pay."\textsuperscript{107} Since Britain would not consider any action which appeared to be attacking France, Germany's best hope was that Britain might be convinced to forgive debts due to her. However, the British public would not contemplate this eventuality.

C. Fear of Isolation

Another factor which made it impossible for British intervention on behalf of Germany was a common feeling that Britain could not
act alone, or with limited international support. Britain felt that only by acting in concert with other nations could she oppose French policy. Historians often portray the Ruhr occupation as an example of the French "going it alone". At the time, however, it was Britain that felt isolated. She was in dispute with Turkey and Russia. Belgium was participating in the occupation. France had forged close links with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. As well, the United States refused to criticize French policy. Only Italy held a position close to Britain's. To the British this was not enough. The majority in Britain felt that no action could be taken without either the support of the European community in general or of the United States. As long as this support failed to materialize, and there was no indication that it would materialize, Britain could not contemplate any sort of dramatic intervention.

D. Support for Neutrality

The British Government had decided long in advance that it would neither help nor hinder the Ruhr occupation. This attitude was supported by the majority in Britain. It has been shown that Britain sympathized with France while remaining somewhat hostile to Germany. This combined with the public desire for reparations and the fear of isolation meant that Britain did not have many options open to her when choosing the direction her foreign policy would take. Although there was a definite feeling that the government should "do something", this was merely an expression of the desire
not to appear useless. In general, the policy of neutrality was strongly supported by the British public.

Lloyd George's Coalition Government had been swept aside; this is partly because the public was tired of adventure and conflict. The Chanak crisis is often cited as the reason why the Coalition split and the Conservatives returned to power. This is a simplification of events but is also partially true. It is clear that Bonar Law and the Conservatives campaigned partly on the platform of "no more war, no more conflict." Bonar Law had said, "The time when Britain should act alone as the policeman of the world has come to an end."108 William McElwee observed that the "adventurous foreign policy" of the Lloyd George era had "inspired the deepest mistrust [in] public opinion."109 L. C. B. Seaman agreed when he wrote, "When Bonar Law announced in 1922 that his aim would be 'tranquility and freedom from adventures and commitments both at home and abroad' he summed up the desires of the whole nation."110 Therefore, it is not surprising that Britain's neutrality had strong support in the United Kingdom throughout the first nine months of 1923. Even before the occupation had begun, parts of the press advised Britain to stay out of the conflict.111 Just prior to the actual entry into the Ruhr by France and Belgium, the Times advised that "the position of Great Britain must be one of calm restraint."112 The Observer, as well, stated "Britain can only stand aside."113 A few days later the Times added that "No action can or should be taken at the present moment by the British Government."114 Even the Daily Herald advised that active intervention should not be contemplated as it may lead to military involvement.115 This idea did not lose
credence as the occupation continued. On 19 April 1923 the Times said, "The Government has a policy, in our opinion a sound policy and one which has the support of the majority of the nation. [It is] to adopt an attitude of watchful waiting and to adhere to it." Throughout 1923, the Daily Express supported the idea of bringing the British troops back from Cologne, not as an expression of protest, but to demonstrate Britain's neutrality and to ensure that this neutrality continued. Despite the fact that Britain's policy of non-action was sometimes ridiculed, the idea that Britain remain neutral had widespread support.

Enhancing the feeling that Britain should remain neutral was the commonly held view that any sort of active policy would not have "the slightest chance of success." The press recognized that Britain's strategic position was weak and that France held the trump cards (see chapter four). This was not simply the viewpoint of government officials who knew all the details of the situation, but also of the general public. In 1922 the Guardian observed, "It is commonly assumed that, since we have now lost most of what little power we had to influence French policy, there is nothing to do but wait and see what use the French make of their freedom." By the time the occupation had begun this feeling of helplessness was clearly developed. The longer France and Belgium remained in the Ruhr, the less likely it seemed that the British could effectively oppose them. "No settlement at all is possible until France of her own free will chooses to make it so." Since Britain had "no physical means of intervention" the only possible policy was to "entrench in a sound position and wait."
E. Persistence of British Attitudes

Another interesting point regarding British public opinion is that it was remarkably constant. Those parts of the population which supported France continued to do so no less strongly in 1923 than they had in 1922. Likewise, opposition to France came from the same sources which had opposed France in the previous year. Statements from politicians such as Lord Curzon and Lloyd George, which supposedly demonstrate British opposition to the occupation, did not come solely as a reaction to the struggle in the Ruhr. Those politicians had been equally critical of French policies in 1922. The press showed a similar kind of constancy. One might have expected a strong British reaction against France at the beginning of 1923, immediately after France rejected the British reparations plan at the Paris Conference and pressed ahead with her own policies in the Ruhr. But there was no sudden outcry. The press maintained its generally supportive and sympathetic attitude towards France. On January 11, the day the occupation began, the Daily Telegraph argued:

Nothing is farther from the thoughts of the British Government, or of any of us in this country than the taking of steps which might be interpreted as showing a friendly spirit towards Germany. There has never been any hint of such a thing in our language throughout the recent controversy, and there must be none in our actions. It is well that this should be plainly stated, if only for the reason that some areas of opinion in Germany are tending to encourage the idea that Great Britain has been taking the side of that country in offering opposition to the policy of France.
There was no sudden outburst against French actions at the beginning of the occupation, and none occurred as the year progressed. After four months of occupation, the Daily Chronicle decided that "the great mass of the English people still think of the people of France as they thought of them during the war." Only two newspapers, the Spectator and the Observer changed their tone during 1923. Both moved from a policy of supporting strict neutrality to urging the government to take a more active, perhaps somewhat anti-French role. Neither of these newspapers went very far in their demands, but they did show some shift. Both were largely dependent on single individuals (J.L. Garvin of the Observer and J. St. Loe Strachey of the Spectator), which may partly explain why these newspapers showed some drift while general British opinion remained consistent. It was well known that "Old Garvin followed his own logic" and that the Observer often took sudden unexpected views. As well, it is significant that when the Spectator came out with an editorial suggesting a more anti-French stand in early January 1923, a flood of letters attacked the Spectator's position. It wasn't until 24 February that the Spectator was able to print a single 'letter to the editor' which expressed the same views as the Spectator itself. Interestingly, this letter was signed with the pseudonym "Iota Subscript," perhaps indicating that it was actually written by Strachey. It seems clear that the Spectator, nominally a Conservative paper, was not expressing the views of the majority of its readers.

* * *
Britain was never close to throwing her influence in favour of Germany during the first nine months of 1923 for several reasons. In the first place, most people in Britain still felt loyal towards France and still expressed animosity towards Germany. This feeling would not have allowed the British Government to adopt a policy harmful to France. As the Guardian mentioned, any expectation on Germany's part of "active intervention by England [was] almost certainly mistaken." Secondly, Britain could go no further towards forgiving debts because the public felt that she had gone as far as she could go on this issue. These two factors combined with the generally accepted feeling Britain could not act in isolation and the view that France was in a position of strength made Britain feel that she could take no helpful active role. It also produced a profound feeling of support for the policy of neutrality.

Chapter three discussed some of the popular views which were prevalent in Britain in 1923 and which limited the scope of action available to the British Government. These attitudes bound the government not only because it was not possible for the government to pursue a policy counter to the desire of the general population, but also because these attitudes were actually held just as strongly by the officials and members of Britain's Government.

Certain views which were not frequently expressed by the general public, but were widely held in the political hierarchy of Britain, also played a role in hindering Britain from actively opposing France. Chapter four describes how the political situation within Britain itself made it difficult to contemplate any sort of aggressive intervention.
Chapter 4: The Situation in Britain and Abroad

A. The British Government

The British Members of Parliament were no less susceptible to the attitude trends of 1923 than were the average British citizens. Just as the British public still favoured France over Germany, so did British politicians. In January Ronald McNeill, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, said that Britain had "no love for" Germany and that even though Britain and France disagreed about the Ruhr occupation, "the whole disagreement [was] simply one as to the best method of obtaining our common end." A month later Baldwin described the "need for continuing our clear partnership with France." On 13 February the King himself stated, "My Government will in no way increase the difficulties of the allies." Gustav Stresemann felt that with regard to the British and French, "the tremendous common effort made by these people during four years of war has created such powerful imponderable forces, that so long, at least, as there are statesmen from those years still at the head of their Governments, they will not be responsible for digging the grave of the Entente."

British politicians also agreed both with public desire for reparations and with the fear of acting in isolation. On 15 December 1922 Lord D'Abernon recorded, "Bonar Law thinks that unless America comes in it is hopeless to stop Poincaré and the
Four months later this attitude was still prevalent in the government. On 1 March the *Times Weekly* printed a letter from nine Unionist Members of Parliament which stated that "the essential condition of any settlement [is] an assurance of the active co-operation of the United States." Prevailing attitudes and views in 1923 meant that the British public would not accept a policy hostile to France; the politicians in the Government of Britain were constrained by the same shackles of opinion.

Some views seemed to be even stronger in government circles than in the population at large. This is due to the fact that the government had access to information not available to the general public. For example, government documents show how much interest France had in Britain's attitude at the time. In the popular press, France was often depicted as having no interest whatsoever in British opinions. In fact, as people in the government knew, France was very sensitive about British attitudes. Another area in which politicians had an edge over the average British citizen was knowledge of the conditions in Germany. The press presented a confused and constantly changing view on how long passive resistance could be maintained. A newspaper was likely to say one day that Germany was on the brink of collapse, and the next that resistance could go on for years.

The fact that the Government was in a better position to understand this situation affected it in three ways. First, the government continually showed sensitivity towards the French. While the press was openly critical of the wisdom of the French policy in the Ruhr, the British Government held its tongue for many
months. Its actions out of the public light were always performed in such a way as to least offend the French. Lord Curzon wrote that, "His Majesty's Government is anxious to minimize as far as possible adverse effect on Anglo-French relations of French independent action." In fact, it was mid-May before the Government publicly expressed dissatisfaction with French actions "for the first time." By showing this kind of restraint, even on minor points, Britain indicated that she would not suddenly oppose the French and Belgian occupation.

Secondly, the government laid the blame for the collapse of Rhineland trade on Germany. On 12 March Kilmarnock informed Curzon that the French and Belgians had done everything they could to aid British commerce in the Rhineland and the Ruhr, and that the "trouble we are now experiencing comes from the German side."

Finally, once summer began and the Government realized that German resistance was coming to an end, Britain began to reassert her claim to reparations. This will be discussed in detail in chapter five.

* * *

The actions of the British Government demonstrated that it was not likely to champion the German cause. The political situation in Britain in 1923 made this even less likely. Although the Conservative party had a strong position in the House of Commons, it had certain internal problems. The break with the Coalition in the previous year had been messy. Many of the most important leaders of this party, such as Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Balfour and Horne, refused to abandon Lloyd George at the Carlton Club meeting. The
result was that Bonar Law was forced to construct an administration with some of the less experienced members of the Conservative Party. Churchill spoke of "a government of the second eleven"; Birkenhead called them "second-class intellects." Another difficulty which the Government faced was the general rift between the "Die-hards" (the group associated with whole-hearted support of France) and the rest of the Conservatives.

The fact that the Conservative Party faced internal problems worked against the German hopes for British help. The inexperience of the administration meant that the Government was unlikely to choose any sort of dramatic policy. Time was needed for 'learning the ropes'. With the political situation still in a state of flux after the breakup of the Coalition Party, the Conservatives were unlikely to choose a direction which might lead to further chaos or realignment. The Conservative Party needed to consolidate and to reestablish itself as an independent entity. The Conservatives were not likely to take any action that would provide members with an excuse for abandoning the party in favour either of the Coalition or some other group. Both Bonar Law and Baldwin expressed a need for party stability. They demonstrated this in their dealings with the "Die-hards." Neither Law nor Baldwin wished to alienate this important wing of the Conservative Party. This is partly because the "Die-hards" had considerable grass roots support in the party. On 10 August the Guardian reported that the Government was paralyzed "by its own dissensions and the unmistakable proofs of Francophilism reported from Conservative organisations in the constituencies." The strength of the "Die-hards" was shown when Mr. McKenna, Baldwin's
choice for the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, was passed over in favour of a candidate from this faction.\textsuperscript{138} Two important "Die-hards" were Lord Derby and H. S. Amery, and both were valuable allies to the Prime Minister. In August Lord Derby threatened to resign because the changes that he and Amery had requested in the reply to the French note had not been made. Lord Derby felt that the Prime Minister and the cabinet "had been rushed by Curzon" into making an anti-French reply. Lord Derby's diary reveals that Baldwin appeased him by pleading with him not to resign and by expressing the opinion that, "Curzon's four years as Foreign Minister had been more harmful to this country than any previous Foreign Secretary." Derby also mentioned in his diary that, regarding Curzon's threat to the French of British separate action, Baldwin said "there was no doubt that [Curzon] had no thought-out plan when [he] put that [in the] note and it was a bluff which if the French called . . . would have exposed us to ridicule."\textsuperscript{139} Clearly, Baldwin was unwilling to take any action which would have seriously alienated the "Die-hard" wing of the Conservative party.

The Liberal and Labour Parties were also facing problems and this made any challenge of the Government's policy of neutrality unlikely. This was primarily due to the fact that the Conservatives had a comfortable majority in Parliament. This majority was in no danger of eroding. The Conservatives continued to win a significant percentage of by-elections throughout 1923, partly due to the public confidence in the Government after its success at the Lausanne negotiations.\textsuperscript{140} Another problem the Liberal Party faced was that it had two deep internal divisions. Liberal Opposition was divided
between the Lloyd George and the Asquith wings of the party. These two groups showed very little desire to cooperate until near the end of 1923. A further division occurred within the National Liberals. This 'liberal' party still contained many Conservative members who stood by Lloyd George after the collapse of the Coalition. In 1923 some of these Conservatives actually drifted back to the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{141} By March, former top-ranking Conservatives including Chamberlain and Birkenhead were affiliated more and more with the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{142} Others remained with the Liberals but supported the Conservative outlook of "benevolent neutrality".

This dissention in the Liberal Party meant that the Labour Party had no effective ally with which it could oppose the Government. All the Labour Party could do was speak out against the Government and, as Stresemann recognized, "the policy of Lord Curzon and Lord Derby [would not] be influenced to any considerable extent by the speeches of the Labour Opposition in England."\textsuperscript{143}

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The situation within the British government made it unlikely that Britain would choose an anti-French policy in 1923. British politicians adopted the same set of beliefs that had led the British public to conclude that it was impossible to take the German side in the Ruhr conflict. This attitude was only reinforced by the greater amount of information available to British politicians. As well, the rifts in the Conservative and Liberal Parties made it unlikely that Britain would choose an active policy.
B. The Strategic Situation

Britain was in a very weak position compared to France in 1923. The international situation made it difficult for Britain to act. Many historians have argued that it was this difficulty which prevented Britain from helping Germany in 1923. It has been shown in previous chapters that this was not the case. Britain did not desire to act in favour of Germany. However, it is true that Britain would have found it difficult to help Germany, had she wanted to, because of the strategic situation.

Britain had little room to maneuver because of her position with regard to France. France was dominant militarily and strategically. "The French knew perfectly well that there was no British force which could prevent their doing what they pleased in Germany." The French had a much larger army than the British and ten times as many military aircraft in Europe. Furthermore, the British Army was not motivated to oppose France. The British General Staff continued to see the French as their main allies and the Germans as their main threat. This is demonstrated by the fact that in October 1922 it became compulsory for members of the British Navy to learn French. The Guardian stated that the British and French Armies looked ahead to "when they might go again to meet the German foe."

In addition, France was almost entirely self reliant regarding foodstuffs and other important materials. The Times recognized that "France can easily bear for an indefinite period any sacrifices which the Ruhr occupation may impose." There was "nothing that
[Britain] could threaten her with, even if she wanted to."  

Furthermore, once France and Belgium were entrenched in the Ruhr, it is hard to imagine a physical act that could have removed them without significantly damaging British interests. It is easy to see why Lord D'Abernon concluded, "If England uninvited, takes the initiative of intervention, it will be resented and will lead to nothing." 

Britain's inferior position was evident in at least one other way. Throughout the last months of 1922 and during the first six months of 1923 Britain was in dispute with Turkey. Britain had supported Greece during the war between Turkey and Greece in 1922. At the end of 1922 it appeared that armed conflict between Turkey and the Allies (or perhaps just between Turkey and Britain) might erupt at any time. The peace talks at Lausanne dragged on until June of 1923. Every time an agreement was reached, something happened to upset the situation. It became evident that whenever it appeared France would not support the British position, the Turks made bolder demands. Britain certainly did not want war in the Middle East but she did not want to give up her many strategic holdings in the region either. Britain wanted to maintain the neutrality of the Straits and did not wish to relinquish Iraq (particularly the oil fields around Mosul) or any of her other Middle Eastern possessions. The result was that Britain was very anxious for French support in negotiations with Turkey. In January the Guardian reported that Bonar Law had "been at pains to prevent the rupture from prejudicing the negotiations at Lausanne."  

If Britain had chosen a policy which
aggravated France, it is quite possible that the United Kingdom would not have had any support in her negotiations with Turkey.

* * *

Other aspects of the international situation also discouraged Britain from choosing a policy counter to French desires. During 1923 both Italy and the United States proved that they would be difficult partners in any joint policy. The United States had moved towards a policy of isolation at the end of World War One. She quickly washed her hands of the entire Ruhr situation by pulling her troops out of Coblenz in early January. Communication from the United States indicated that America was unlikely to take part in even a discussion about the occupation. In February Britain was informed by the American Secretary of State that, "Public opinion [in the United States] is tending more and more to support France in her dealing with Germany." Cornebise believes that all during 1923 "American opinion was still strongly pro-French." Another negative factor was residual hostility towards Britain for putting pressure on America via the Balfour note and in subsequent debt funding negotiations. Britain hoped that the United States would forgive some or all of her debts, and was unwilling to pressure America for any further concessions.

Italy on the other hand, usually projected an appearance of generally agreeing with British policies. However, Mussolini came to power in Italy shortly before the Ruhr occupation began, and the direction the Fascists would take was still unclear. Britain remained doubtful about the success of any British-Italian cooperation. This hesitation proved wise: Italy's conflict with Greece in September,
and later with Yugoslavia, revealed Mussolini's true character. Britain's isolation, combined with the British feeling that she could not act alone, made a dramatic policy initiative difficult to contemplate.

Other aspects of British foreign relations also made an active policy in the Ruhr struggle unlikely. Britain was involved in difficult negotiations not only with Turkey in 1923, but also with the Soviet Union. Britain was heavily involved in India as well. On the home front, Ireland had recently received its independence and was in a state of civil war. All these areas of controversy attracted public attention and distracted Britain from events in the Ruhr. Furthermore, these matters occupied a significant number of the Foreign Affairs' officials. One author explains that Lord Curzon stopped being a thorn in the side of France in September when he went on vacation to write a book about India.157 Further distractions, also in September, were the civil unrest in Spain, and the earthquake in Japan. To many people the Ruhr conflict was just one of many 'issues of the day' and though it warranted special attention, Britain could not neglect her other interests.

C. The British Economy

The economic situation in Britain also led to diminished interest in opposing France. The most prevalent argument against the wisdom of France's occupation of the Ruhr was that it could be economically devastating for all of Europe. The common belief was that the Ruhr
occupation would hamper trade and would destroy international business confidence. This belief prevailed in Britain throughout the Ruhr crisis. Surprisingly, "to the British economy [the occupation] brought great, if temporary, gains; with the Ruhr coal-mines at a standstill Britain's coal exports were recovered to a high and lucrative volume, and unemployment was diminished." This economic boom was evident in Britain from the beginning of the occupation. On 27 January the *Economist* stated that "the net effect [of the Ruhr occupation] may be favourable for British trade." Two months later the *Economist* said, "So far as the economic reaction on Great Britain is concerned, it appears that up to the present the favourable effect considerably outweighs any opposite influences." In April the *Daily Express* also pointed out "how the Ruhr situation [was] benefitting British trade [and] had a distinctly beneficial effect on British industry and employment." Even after more than six months of the occupation the *Economist* (which had predicted that the occupation would be catastrophic for the British economy) had to admit, "It is true that the volume of production here is much larger than a year ago, and the figures of trade in June . . . compare quite favourably with last year, and indeed with the figures for the beginning of 1923." This upturn in the British economy certainly undermined the arguments of those who spoke out against the Ruhr occupation from an economic point of view.

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The economic situation within Britain combined with Britain's international involvement and her strategic limitations made implementation of any aggressive anti-French policies unlikely.
Britain was isolated and weak compared to France. She could not have dislodged France from its position. Distractions from within and from without Britain made it even less likely that she would adopt an aggressive interventionist policy.

These are not, however, the only reasons for Britain's inaction during 1923. Britain's difficult situation is only one factor. It is also significant that Britain did not desire to help Germany any more than she desired to oppose France. Britain's desires, beliefs, and position combined to make it impossible for her to contemplate aiding Germany in the first nine months of 1923.
Chapter 5: The Closing Stages

A. Summer

The Summer of 1923 is often considered a unique time in Franco-British relations. Until then, the British Government remained almost completely silent about events in the Ruhr. Beginning on 13 June, when Britain sent its questionnaire to Belgium and France, a period of negotiation set in. By mid-July British foreign policy took on an even more aggressive nature as she issued her suggested joint reply to Germany. On 12 July both Baldwin and Curzon gave speeches which reiterated the British position and demanded that Britain not be ignored in any final settlement. By August, notes were passing between the Allies on a regular basis and politicians on both sides of the Channel gave speeches with increasingly unpleasant tones. The British note of 11 August boldly stated, "His Majesty's Government have at no time contemplated, and don't now contemplate, that Germany shall be relieved from all reparation payments. They are determined that Germany shall pay up to the maximum of her capacity, the reparation to which Great Britain, equally with the other Allied Powers, is entitled, and which is needed to make good the losses sustained by this country in common with her Allies." The note also argued that Britain had not forgiven her inter-Allied debts and that British losses in trade and shipping during the First World War were just as significant as Belgian and French material losses.163
The press joined the Government in emphasizing how important it was that Britain not be excluded from any settlement during the summer of 1923. As the *Guardian* pointed out on 10 August, the press commonly believed that it "was now too late to save Germany."\(^{164}\) Parts of the press thought that it was time to "make [Britain's] position unmistakably clear."\(^{165}\) The *Times* stated, "This country is as firm as ever in its demand that Germany shall pay reparations up to the limit of her capacity to pay. The suspicion sometimes expressed in France that we are ready in the supposed interests of our trade to forgive Germany her debt is wholly unfounded."\(^{166}\) The *Guardian* emphatically insisted, "We shall receive, either from Germany, or from France, or from both together, the full equivalent of our debt to America [because] the British Government will never consent to pay reparations out of British pockets."\(^{167}\) In August the *Daily Express* said, "Whatsoever may happen we must hold fast to our claim against Germany. We may wait for years before we can squeeze the German pips until they squeak, they may never squeak 2, 600, 000, 000 pounds, but whatever they squeak, let us make sure of our share of the squeak."\(^{168}\) In late September, after Stresemann had called an end to passive resistance, the *Spectator* declared that "France has won in the Ruhr" and that Britain and France must now deal with "the real problem, which is how to extract money from Germany."\(^{169}\)

Parts of the press even began to suggest that the Government disavow the Balfour note. The *Daily Chronicle* argued that the Government should no longer consider reducing debts due to Britain as low as the amount she owed to America.\(^{170}\) It claimed that, unlike
Britain, both Germany and France were "rich and prosperous." Britain should therefore claim the right to collect the full amount of reparations and debts due her. It was thought that this would finally give the British Government a useful tool for leverage in any negotiations.

On the surface it appears that relations between France and Britain took a turn for the worst in the summer of 1923. However, this increase in friction was due only to Britain's concern for her own best interests and did not indicate a more pro-German outlook. She feared that Germany might settle separately with France and Belgium, leaving Britain out. It has already been established that Britain could not sway France from any policy about which France felt strongly. It is only natural that Britain did not want to be disregarded in any final settlement.

The reaction within Britain to the attempts by the Government and the press to reestablish Britain's international position also indicates that Britain was not becoming anti-French. The Daily Herald describes how Baldwin's speech of 12 July "was cheered by the Opposition, frequently cheered, almost continuously cheered. It was coldly received by his own side . . . and on all the Government benches there was an almost sullen refusal to applaud." The Observer also noted that there was an expectation that the Conservative Party would replace Baldwin with someone who would not be so callous toward the French. Lord Derby thought that the ideas in the speech were too extreme. He requested that further communications with France be conducted by someone less anti-French than Lord Curzon.
The note of 11 August also lacked support within Britain. It has already been mentioned that Lord Derby threatened to resign over that note. Austen Chamberlain, expected by many to be the next Prime Minister, denounced the 11 August note as unduly harmful to the Entente.\textsuperscript{175} This is despite the fact that the British note simply restated the British point of view and the British claim.

* * *

One further peculiar feature of the summer of 1923 demonstrates again that Britain was not growing pro-German at this time. It became increasingly common to view the potential collapse or fracture of Germany as insignificant. This indifference first appears in Bonar Law's statement of January 1923: "If the rest of the world were normal and Germany were to disappear under the sea, Great Britain would be better off than before, because German competition would be removed."\textsuperscript{176} However, looking at German collapse "with approval [was] a point of view which . . . had not occurred to anyone" again until July.\textsuperscript{177} As the summer wore on German collapse and German dismemberment were more frequently viewed with indifference. In September Stresemann said that he "had heard with regret that part of the English Press had expressed the view that England had really no great interest in German unity, and that the Germans had been very well content at the time when they were still Hanoverians, Saxons and Prussians."\textsuperscript{178} This idea never had the support of more than a minority of British newspapers but its growing acceptance demonstrated the lack of sympathy Britain had for German conditions in the summer of 1923.

* * *
It became clear as early as January 1923 that Britain was not going to help Germany during the Ruhr crisis. It would be ludicrous to assume that after six months of neutrality Britain would suddenly have supported Germany. The fact that the British Government became somewhat more critical of French policy in the summer of 1923 does not mean that Britain was moving closer to the German position. The British, in both the press and the government, merely began to insist on an adequate share of reparations and a right to be part of any final settlement. The British attempts to champion their own cause demonstrated no sympathy for Germany.

B. Conclusions

There was never any chance of Britain championing the cause of Germany in 1923. Neither could she have taken any actions that were overtly harmful to the French. It was not only the international situation that stopped Britain from assuming an aggressive interventionist attitude; her internal beliefs and attitudes prohibited this possibility.

Historians have often misinterpreted Britain's inaction in 1923. The fact that Britain openly criticized the wisdom of the occupation and that the press and parliament encouraged the Government to "do something" has led some to conclude that Britain wished to oppose the occupation actively. However, displeasure with the occupation did not make any of the British political parties oppose France. Britain rebuffed all German attempts to establish close contacts.
Britain lent a certain degree of tactical support to the occupation. In all of her actions Britain demonstrated that she would never support the German cause.

Britain would not consider any sort of alliance with Germany primarily because of internal factors. Affection for France and animosity towards Germany was still part of day-to-day attitudes in Britain. Newspapers across the political spectrum demonstrated that Britain still felt that the Franco-British Entente was valuable and unshakeable. This feeling was not destroyed by the British denunciation of the French action in the Ruhr. On 6 October 1923 the Spectator said, "We [the British] have run the risk of appearing to be the enemies of France and not what we are, her true friends."179 The British condemnation of the occupation also did not change the British feelings towards Germany. As the Times stated, "We may condemn the French without necessarily taking the part of Germany. . . British disapproval of the French operation in the Ruhr does not mean that the British nation is leaning to the side of Germany or that it is prepared to lend Germany aid in the conflict."180 Popular attitudes within Britain such as the desire for reparations and a fear of isolation only enhanced Britain's determination not to oppose France. Neutrality was the only option and it was widely supported both by the people and the British Government.

The Government found itself constrained by these popular views; its choices of possible action were also limited by several other factors. The Conservatives had to appease the Die-hard supporters of France in their ranks. The Liberal Party was divided and could not
offer any effective resistance to the policy of "benevolent neutrality" (even if they had wanted to).

The Government was also constrained by the larger strategic situation. Britain had no hope of getting international support against the French during the first nine months of the Ruhr struggle, except possibly from an unpredictable Italy. Britain was further distracted by events in Ireland and India and by difficult relations with the Soviet Union and Turkey. Furthermore, she needed French support to ensure her interests in the Middle East. Not only was opinion against aggressive intervention, but internal and external situations made that possibility even less appealing.

In the summer of 1923 Franco-British relations seemed to worsen. In truth, Britain was simply reasserting her own position and demanding her share of any settlement as the struggle in the Ruhr neared completion. This change should not be interpreted as a shift in British sympathies; both British public statements and the flow of opinion in Britain demonstrated that she was even less sympathetic to the German cause.

Britain had no desire to help Germany during the first nine months of 1923. She faced a barrier of opinions and attitudes which demanded that she do nothing to aid the German cause. This, combined with the difficult situation which Britain faced, precluded aggressive intervention.
Footnotes


4Manchester Guardian Weekly, 21 September 1923, p. 228.


9Ibid., p. 100.


13Ibid.

14Times Daily, 4 August 1923, p. 8.

There was one officially Communist M. P. elected in November 1922. As well, several Labour Members of Parliament were considered to be Communists running under the Labour banner.

In truth the results of these votes were due to natural fluctuations. Parliament had voluntary attendance and some votes were bound to go poorly for the Conservatives. These votes did not demonstrate a sudden shift against the government's position on the Ruhr occupation.
It wasn't until 6 March that an editorial suggested any serious policy alternative to complete neutrality.

35 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 23 February 1923, p. 141.

36 Spectator, 13 January 1923, p. 41.

37 Spectator, 24 February 1923, p. 313.


42 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 20 April 1923, p. 310.


46 Economist, 24 February 1923, p. 429.

47 Comebise, Weimar in Crisis, p. 292.


50 Times Daily, 19 January 1923, p. 11.


52 DBFP, vol. 21, pp. 222-223.

53 D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, p. 207.

54 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 27 July 1923, p. 64.

55 Times Daily, 9 August 1923, p. 9.

57 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12 October 1923, p. 289.

58 Times Weekly, 10 May 1923, p. 484.

59 Economist, 11 August 1923, p. 211.


61 Spectator, 6 January 1923, p. 5.


64 London Daily Express, 6 February, 1923, p. 5.


68 Times Daily, 7 July 1923, p. 10.

69 Times Weekly, 7 June 1923, p. 580.

70 Observer, 5 August 1923, p. 8.

71 Economist, 3 March 1923, p. 480.


74 London Daily Herald, 18 August 1923, p. 3.

75 Spectator, 20 January 1923, p. 95.

76 Times Daily, 16 February 1923, p. 11.

77 Spectator, 6 January 1923, p. 5.
78 Observer, 9 December 1922, p. 12.
79 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 28 July 1923, p. 75.
80 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 11 August 1923, p. 110.
81 Observer, 29 October 1922, p. 7.
83 Cornebise, Weimar in Crisis, p. 215.
84 Economist, 30 December 1922, p. 1207.
87 Times Daily, 27 July 1923, p. 11.
88 Times Daily, 3 July 1923, p. 15.
89 London Daily Telegraph, 1 August 1922, p. 6.
90 Observer, 14 January 1923, p. 12.
91 Times Weekly, 12 October 1922, p. 256.
92 Spectator, 6 January 1923, p. 5.
94 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 20 April 1923, p. III.
95 London Daily Chronicle, 16 April 1923, p. 2.
96 Observer, 7 March 1923, p. 7.
99 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 26 January 1923, p. 64.
100 DBFP, vol. 21, p. 54.


104 Times Weekly, 9 December 1922, p. 11.


111 Economist, 30 December 1923, p. 1207.

112 Times Daily, 5 January 1923, p. 11.

113 Observer, 7 January 1923, p. 12.

114 Times Daily, 12 January 1923, p. 9.


118 London Daily Express, 3 August 1923, p. 6.

119 Manchester Guardian Daily, 17 August 1922, p. 6.

120 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 July 1923, p. 2.

121 Observer, 5 August 1923, p. 8.


124Koss, Political Press in Britain, p. 413.

125Spectator, 24 February 1923, p. 324.


129Cornebise, Weimar in Crisis, p. 214.


131D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, p. 139


133DBFP, vol. 21, p. 25.


137Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10 August 1923, p. 104.


141Manchester Guardian Weekly, 3 August 1923, p. 85.

142Birkenhead, Earl of Birkenhead, p. 212.


146 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 October 1922, p. III.


149 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 July 1923, p. 2.

150 D'Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, p. 188.


154 DBFP, vol. 21, p. 94.

155 Cornesise, Weimar in Crisis, p. 216.

156 However the London Daily Herald reported on 7 July 1923 (p. 3) that a fascist newspaper claimed that Italy and Britain were only in agreement about the Ruhr occupation and that the two countries were in conflict in all other ways.


159 Economist, 27 January 1923, p. 131.

160 Economist, 3 March 1923, p. 479.

161 London Daily Express, 4 April 1923, p. 6.

162 Economist, 21 July 1923, p. 87.
This, as has been argued elsewhere in the essay, was not always true. Many newspapers exhibited very little knowledge about the economic situation in Germany.


Times Weekly, 19 July 1923, p. 66.


Spectator, 29 September 1923, p. 409.


Manchester Guardian Weekly, 3 August 1923, p. 82.

Ibid.

Sutton, Gustav Stresemann, p. 135.

Spectator, 6 October 1923, p. 448.

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