THE NORMAN WELLS PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE:
AN EVALUATION

BY
JENNIFER SHARON WILSON

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1982

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

© JENNIFER SHARON WILSON, 1992
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.

Department of School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date Oct. 7, 1992
ABSTRACT

On July 31, 1981 the federal cabinet approved the Norman Wells Pipeline and Expansion Project (NW Project). The project consisted of a tenfold expansion to the existing oilfield at Norman Wells, N.W.T., and the construction of an 870 km pipeline to Zama, Alberta.

The approval was subject to a formal delay to allow "time for effective and meaningful planning" for the implementation of special management measures and benefit packages. Construction commenced January 1983 and the project became operational in April 1985.

Although the project did not represent a major undertaking by industry standards, it was significant for the north because it was the first major hydrocarbon production and transportation project to be completed in the Northwest Territories. In addition, the project involved a number of unique impact management structures in order to coordinate government and industry's activities and incorporate native concerns. The approach, if successfully implemented, would represent an important step towards recognizing native concerns in project management.

As a result of the new impact management structures, the NW Project has been referred to by the federal government and industry as a "model" for future northern development projects. On the other hand, native organizations viewed the project as a 'test case' that failed since all the conditions to their approval
were not fully met. This inconsistency highlights the importance of clarifying which structures were successful for future northern megaprojects.

This thesis focuses on one of the management structures unique to the NW Project, the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC). The PCC was established "to provide a forum for formal project update, reporting, communication and coordination of activities". The Committee had representatives from the federal government, the two proponents, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Dene Nation, and the Metis Association.

The specific purpose of this thesis is to assess the performance of the PCC using criteria derived from the literature on Planning Process and Citizen Participation, Group Dynamics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution.

The results of this evaluation showed that the committee failed to satisfy all the performance criteria. However, at the root of the problem were the politics associated with the approval of the project, and in particular, the fact that the native land claims issue had not been resolved.

Even in the absence of negotiated powers, the Dene and Metis had expected to actively participate in the regulation and management of the NW Project. When these powers were divorced from the processes the Dene and Metis were to be involved in, the Dene and Metis boycotted them.

In addition to politics, there were also fundamental structural and operational deficiencies with the PCC which were detrimental to its performance. On the basis of this analysis, an improved committee framework for future projects is proposed.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- **ABSTRACT** ......................................................................................................................... ii
- **TABLE OF CONTENTS** .......................................................................................................... iv
- **LIST OF FIGURES** ................................................................................................................ vi
- **ACKNOWLEDGMENT** ........................................................................................................... vii

**CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION** .......................................................... 1
  1.1 Context of Case Study ...................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Research Objectives ......................................................................................................... 8
  1.3 Premises ........................................................................................................................... 9
  1.4 Thesis Rationale .............................................................................................................. 10
  1.5 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 10

**CHAPTER TWO: NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT** .............. 12
  2.1 The NW Project Proponents .......................................................................................... 13
    2.1.1 Traditional Role in Northern Development ......................................................... 13
    2.1.2 Perspective on Northern Development ................................................................ 15
    2.1.3 Role in N.W. Project ............................................................................................. 17
  2.2 The Federal Government ............................................................................................... 19
    2.2.1 Historic Role in Northern Development ............................................................... 19
    2.2.2 Perspectives on Northern Development ............................................................... 23
    2.2.3 Role in N.W. Project ............................................................................................. 25
  2.3 Government of the Northwest Territories ....................................................................... 28
    2.3.1 Traditional Role in Northern Development ......................................................... 28
    2.3.2 Perspective on Northern Development and Role in N.W. Project ..................... 28
  2.4 The Native Organizations ............................................................................................... 30
    2.4.1 Traditional Role in Northern Development ......................................................... 30
    2.4.2 Perspectives on Northern Development ............................................................. 32
  2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER THREE: TERMS OF REFERENCE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE PCC ................................................................. 35
3.1 Reasons for the PCC .................................................................. 35
3.2 Terms of Reference, Structure, and Operation ............................ 36

CHAPTER FOUR: CRITERIA FOR A FAIR & EFFECTIVE PCC .......... 39
4.1 Appropriate Membership .......................................................... 41
4.2 Motivated Membership ............................................................. 42
4.3 Agreed Upon Time Frame and Frequency ................................. 43
4.4 Equal Access to Quality Information for All Participants ......... 44
4.5 Clearly Stated & Mutually Agreed Upon Committee Goals/Objectives ................................................................. 45
4.6 Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weaknesses and Opportunities ................................................................. 46
4.7 Identifying Committee Tasks .................................................... 47
4.8 Monitor Task Results ............................................................... 49

CHAPTER FIVE: EVALUATION AND RESULTS ................................. 50
5.1 Questionnaire Design ............................................................... 51
5.2 Sample .................................................................................. 55
5.3 Survey Method ....................................................................... 56
5.4 Method of Analysis .................................................................. 57
5.5 Results and Comparative Analysis ........................................... 58
5.5.2 Clearly Stated and Mutually Agreed Upon Committee Goals/Objectives ................................................................. 58
5.5.3 Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weaknesses, and Opportunities ................................................................. 62
5.5.4 Appropriate Membership ..................................................... 63
5.5.5 Motivated Membership ......................................................... 65
5.5.6 Time Frame and Frequency .................................................. 66
5.5.7 Equal Access To Quality Information .................................. 68
5.5.8 Identification of Committee Tasks ........................................ 70
5.5.9 Monitor Task Results ........................................................... 71
5.6 General Conclusions ............................................................... 71
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Location of Norman Wells .................................................. 2

FIGURE 2: Norman Wells Expansion and Pipeline Project ..................... 3

FIGURE 3: Norman Wells Project Management Committees .................... 7

FIGURE 4: Role of DIAND in the N.W. Project .................................... 27
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank Professor Peter Boothroyd and Dr. Alan Artibise for assisting me with the pursuit of what turned out to be a most interesting topic and one that has tremendous application for the work I am involved in. I would also like to thank my family Nancy, Odd, Brad, and John, and my special friend Cherie Enns, for their continual encouragement.

I would like to express my heart felt thanks to my husband, Dave, whose special talents and emotional support has enabled me to attain, not only my academic goals, but my career and personal aspirations as well.

Finally, I would like to give special recognition to my mother, Nancy, who has also been a professional inspiration to me. Her ingenuity, perseverance, affect, and commitment to excellence has had a tremendous influence on my goals and standards.
Chapter One:
INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONTEXT OF CASE STUDY

In July 1981, The Honourable John Munro, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) announced the federal cabinet’s decision to approve the Norman Wells Expansion and Pipeline Project (NW Project) (See Figure 1). The NW Project, though not a mega project by industry standards, was significant to the north because it represented the first major hydrocarbon and transportation project to be completed in the Northwest Territories (NWT). It was completed on April 1985.

The project had two components. One was the expansion of the long established oilfield at Norman Wells which increased oil productivity tenfold (475 to 4,800 cubic metres of oil per day) (DIAND 1984b). This component required production and waterflood injection wells to be drilled on the mainland, Goose Island and Bear Island (See Figure 2). The expansion component was constructed by Esso Resources Ltd. (Esso).

The second component included a pipeline gathering system, approximately 40 km in length, and the Norman Wells Pipeline, 870 km long. The pipeline has the capacity to pump 5,000 cubic metres of oil per day from Norman Wells to Zama, Alberta where it is transported to southern markets via the Rainbow Pipeline (See Figure 2). The pipeline component was constructed
FIGURE 1

LOCATION OF NORMAN WELLS

(EARP, 1981)
FIGURE 2

NORMAN WELLS EXPANSION AND PIPELINE PROJECT

Oilfield Expansion Component

Pipeline Component

NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

Norman Wells

Fort Norman

Wrigley

Fort Simpson

Zama

Artificial Islands

1983-84 Construction

1984-85 Construction

(EARP, 1981)
by Interprovincial Pipeline Ltd. (IPL). The construction of the project began in January 1983, and in April 1985, oil production and transportation commenced. On May 15, 1985 the NW Project was officially opened.

Stated considerations in the decision to approve the project were the perceived lack of economic development and the need for employment in the MacKenzie Valley region. But, perhaps more important, were the "substantial benefits to the south" (DIAND 1981). The oil produced from the project would replace approximately 7% of the crude oil being imported at a cost savings in interest charges of $1 million per day and foreign exchange rates of $2 million per day (at 1981 world prices). In addition, 90% of the skilled labour and capital required for the project (total value $1 billion) would be provided by Canadian markets. Finally, the project was argued to contribute to the 1980 National Energy Program's goals for energy self-sufficiency (DIAND 1981).

Native northerners strongly opposed the project. Throughout the 1970's, native northerners (specifically the Dene Nation and the Metis Association) opposed any major development prior to a land claims settlement. They believed that such a settlement would ensure greater local input into project planning and implementation, and sensitivity to traditional lifestyles and resource uses (Dene Nation 1984).

Consequently, when this project was given federal approval, the Dene Nation made "a reluctant decision to give conditional approval to the NW Project and to use it as a test case to see whether or not large scale development could in fact bring benefits to northern natives without the native people having negotiated control" (Dene Nation 1984). The Dene were persuaded by the Minister to give their approval because he said "in return for a 2 year delay in construction, the Dene set conditions which would allow the (Dene) the time and resources needed to prepare for the project and enable (the Dene) to get some
benefits and reduce the potential negative impacts on (their communities)” (Dene Nation 1985b). As a result of the Minister's statements, the Dene resolved that “the lessons learned from this project would provide direction for Dene negotiation on involvement in regulatory proceedings and monitoring on future projects and ... would determine whether to support future large scale developments before (their) rights were fully entrenched in a negotiated aboriginal rights settlement” (Dene Nation 1984).

The conditions to their approval included:

1. a 2 year delay in construction
2. funding to Dene/Metis to deal with impacts
3. jobs and training for northerners
4. a percentage of the ownership of Norman Wells oil
5. Dene Monitoring Agency (Dene Nation 1984)

Except for condition #2, none of these conditions were fully met to the Dene’s satisfaction (Dene Nation 1985b).

Cabinet’s decision to approve the project also challenged the recommendations of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Enquiry (1977) that no pipeline be built in the valley for 10 years to allow enough time for the resolution of the native land claim issue (Berger 1977).

Prior to the approval, the project was referred to three formal public reviews: The Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP), The National Energy Board (NEB), and the Northwest Territory Waterboard hearings. Ironically, through the course of the EARP and NEB hearings, the same types of concerns expressed in the Berger Enquiry were voiced by native organizations, the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and other interest groups. Despite the review panel’s uncertainties with both the proponents plans and preparedness (Dembicki 1983), both EARP and NEB
approved the NW Project subject to numerous environmental and social terms and conditions (EARP 1981, NEB 1981).

Cabinet's approval was conditional upon a two year delay for the expansion component and a two and one half year delay for the pipeline. In the Minister's announcement of the approval, very specific reasons for imposing the delay were cited:

"... to allow for effective and meaningful planning so that special measures and benefits packages are in effect during the construction phase of the $1 billion project..."

"... to work toward meeting the concerns of the Dene and Metis regarding adequate time for negotiating their land claim ...

"... to ensure that the training objectives, job and business opportunities which we have insisted be part of the project are real and meaningful..." (DIAND 1981a).

Cabinet approval also included delegating to the Norman Wells Project Coordinating Office (NWPCO) the role of coordinating the various aspects of the project and providing a focus for local input. Under the NWPCO two unique management structures were established to fulfill this mandate, the Project Coordinating Committee and the Project Management Committee. (see Figure Three).

This thesis focuses on one of the impact management structures, the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC). The PCC was established to "provide a forum for project update, reporting, communication and coordination of activities" (PCC 1983b). It had representatives from Esso, IPL, Dene Nation,
FIGURE 3

NORMAN WELLS PROJECT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

Minister DIAND

Project Coordinator

Community Advisory Committee

Coordinating Committee Management Committee

Esso
IPL
Dene Nation
Metis Association
GNWT
NEB
DIAND - COGLA
CEIC
DIAND - NAP
DIAND - I & IA
DIAND - PCO

DIAND
DIAND
DIAND
DIAND
DIAND

DIAND
DIAND
DIAND
DIAND
DIAND

GNWT
Esso
IPL

Fort Franklin
Fort Norman
Fort Simpson
Fort Liard
Hay River
Fort Smith
Fort Providence
Fort Good Hope
Wrigley

(Norman Wells Project Coordination Office, 1984)
Metis Association, Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT), and Northern Affairs (DIAND), and was chaired by the Project Coordinator (NWPCO/DIAND). In addition to the members, an observer status membership was also established. Observer status members included representatives from Indian and Inuit Affairs Program (DIAND), Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC), Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA), Energy Mines and Resources (EMR), National Energy Board, (NEB), Environmental Protection Service (EPS), and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Observer status meant not having the power to vote, however, in only one instance was a vote ever taken.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the performance of the PCC. It is hoped that this research will contribute to the literature on northern project management and the establishment of better institutions and procedures for northern development projects.

This thesis has three specific research objectives. The first is to document the key PCC participants' perceptions on the purpose, structure, and operation of the PCC and its ability to affect the project.

The second objective is to evaluate the committee based on its ability to fulfill a set of performance criteria developed from the literature on Planning Process and Citizen Participation, Group Dynamics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution. Elements derived from these sources were then adapted by myself to apply to the design and operation of a PCC type Committee.
The third objective is to provide a framework for a future PCC. This framework represents an improved structural and operation design, and incorporates solutions to the deficiencies identified in the evaluation process.

1.3 PREMISES

There are assumptions inherent in any evaluative process which can determine the method and outcome of the evaluation. Often they are difficult to identify because they are not made explicit. Presented below are the premises on which this thesis is based:

1. The various actors in the PCC had different interests in the north, and, therefore, different priorities and objectives for participating in the PCC. Consequently, the criteria for their own subsequent evaluations of the PCC also varied.

2. A PCC type committee should be designed to operate fairly, have appropriate membership. It should endeavor to accomplish specific tasks within the parameters of its mandate.

3. A PCC must incorporate specific structural and functional elements in order to be efficient, effective, responsible, and fair (in the sense of not systematically favouring or impairing any legitimate interest group).

4. If a committee is properly designed and implemented its participants will perceive the committee as legitimate and its outcomes fair even if each participant does not accomplish exactly what he/she intended.
1.4 Thesis Rationale

An evaluation of the PCC is of potential value since the NW Project's management approach set a precedent for future development in the north. The project was viewed as a "model" by government and industry and as a "test case" by native organizations. Therefore, this project must be treated as an opportunity to examine which structures were truly successful, and which, if any, require modification.

While the PCC represents a significant and innovative step towards cooperative implementation, monitoring and management of major resource extraction projects, an evaluation of its operations may reveal areas for improvement which ought to be incorporated into the planning process of future projects.

It is important that such evaluations be undertaken as a much larger gas pipeline project from the MacKenzie Delta and an oil pipeline up the entire valley will likely be constructed within the next decade. With the inevitability of future large projects, it is critical that effective, responsible and responsive institutions be identified and incorporated into the government's management model.

1.5 Methods

This study employs the following methods:

1. A documentary analysis:
   (a) The NW Project from the time the proponents made their application to the Federal Government until the project's completion.
(b) The approaches to northern development and interests in the north of the principle actors in the NW Project.

(c) The terms of reference, operation and structure of the PCC.

2. A literature review to identify a specific set of criteria for an effective PCC type Committee against which the PCC can be evaluated.

3. An evaluation of the PCC’s performance based on:
   (a) the set of eight performance criteria derived from the literature, and;
   (b) the members’ perception of the effectiveness of the PCC and degree to which the PCC fulfilled each criterion.

4. A telephone questionnaire to nine of the eleven PCC members which regularly attended meetings. (Only representatives from Esso and the NEB did not respond to my invitation to be interviewed. The EPS and DFO did not regularly attend). The questionnaire identified the participants’ perceptions on the extent to which the PCC met the requirements of a good PCC Committee. The questions asked corresponded directly to performance criteria.

5. Based on the results of the evaluation, a structure for establishing a future PCC is proposed.
Chapter Two:  
THE NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

During the course of the Berger Enquiry (1977) the disparity between the world views of principle interest groups in northern development was emphasized. The following observations made by Mr. Justice Thomas Berger summarize these different perceptions:

We all have different ideas of progress and our own definitions of the national interest. It is commonplace for people in Southern Canada to dismiss the notion that a few thousand native people have a right to stand in the way of industrial imperatives.

It is not just a question of a seismic trail being cleared across their hunting grounds, or of a drilling rig outside their village that troubles the native people. It is the knowledge that they could be overwhelmed by economic and political strength, and that the resources of their land indeed the land itself - could be taken from them.

[Natives] do not wish to set themselves up as a living folk museum, nor do they wish to be the objects of mere sentimentality. Rather, with the guarantees that can be provided only by a settlement of their claims, and with the strengthening of their own economy, they wish to ensure that their cultures can continue to grow and change - in directions they choose for themselves.

It will be shown in this chapter that the inherent conflicts Justice Berger emphasized in 1977 (a result of development initiatives superimposed upon
unresolved land claims) still existed at the time the NW Project began construction. This discussion has been included to give the reader an appreciation for the complexity of issues surrounding the project and its institutions. It will also provide the reader with important insight into the basis for each members' participation in the PCC, their values and expectations for the PCC, and the reasons behind their appraisal of it.

For clarity, this chapter deals with each interest group in a separate section. For each interest group the following information is presented:

1. Traditional role in northern development;

2. Respective interest in the north, their views on how the north ought to progress, and the perceived costs and benefits to northern development and;

3. Specific role in the NW Project.

2.1 THE NW PROJECT PROONENTS

2.1.1 Traditional Role In Northern Development

Since the 1960's, the Federal Government has used mechanisms such as the Taxation System, Super Depletion Allowance, Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP), Advisory Committee for Northern Development (ACND), etc., to entice industry to invest in the north. Without these incentives the economics of
northern development would have inhibited industry from locating there until the market conditions improved substantially. In response to these government programs, industry proposed a number of oil and gas projects in the north. However, the government at that time lacked a comprehensive policy framework (i.e. an integrated approach which included environmental, social and economic considerations) to evaluate development applications. Instead:

Canadian Government "policies" in the North [were] formulated only when they were currently needed [as] there was seldom a policy in place prior to new developments or demands by particular interest groups. As a result, the most audible interest group, that is business, usually won the day (Stabler and Olfert, 1981).

Fenge (1984) states that in the absence of well thought out pro-active policies private proposals were approved, not because they represented the best use of public resources but the alternate uses were never evaluated.

Others believe that the significant influence of these companies on development was not only due to the emphasis of federal policy but was also fostered by their huge financial and technological resources, marketing and management expertise, access to information, funding resources and the political influence. The Federal Government, on the other hand, does not have access to the same level of resources. Dacks (1981) explains:

Ottawa comes to rely on [industry] as the vehicle for northern development [which] it is eager to see take place . . . and their expertise enables them to act as initiator of the policy process and to force government into the role of reacting (page 15).
In other words, the level of investment, information and expertise associated with northern mega projects necessitates the government's reliance upon large resource development companies which are directed from outside the north. Alternative uses, implementation strategies and programs which reflect a sensitivity to real northern values and needs are not considered by the federal government.

The common underlying thread in both Fenge's and Dacks's perceptions is that industry's approach to development has dominated northern development and this situation has precluded other important considerations from being evaluated in the approval process. Therefore, northern development has proceeded to the detriment of the northern inhabitants and their homeland.

2.1.2 Perspective On Northern Development

The Norman Wells Project was viewed by its proponents as an opportunity for very high financial rewards (Pearse 1974). At the time of construction, the NW Project was the major project IPL was involved in. IPL's 1984 Annual Report states:

The successful completion of the Norman Wells Pipeline places the company in an excellent strategic position to participate in any future transportation system from the Beaufort Sea when crude oil discoveries are sufficient to meet threshold volumes.


These same goals for northern development were shared by Esso Resources Ltd. Esso, a wholly owned subsidiary of Imperial Oil, was at that time Canada's largest energy company and producer of crude oil, natural gas,
and oil. To Esso, the N.W. Project was "one of the company's largest investments ever". According to their annual report, the company's goal was "to achieve growth in earnings and satisfactory return on invested capital". In 1984, Esso showed a profit of $533 M and the main source of growth was the expansion of oil and natural gas resources (Imperial Oil Annual Report 1984).

This information emphasizes that industry's first priority for development projects is profit. Therefore, benefits are perceived in terms of dollar profits and the costs in terms of capital expenditures, design modification, regulation, and costs resulting from delays, corrective, mitigation and competition (Lee 1984).

Consistent with this priority, industry sees progress in the north as being dependent upon the resolution of the native lands claims issue. Currently, there is a great deal of uncertainty over how the royalties, managers, priorities and incentives will change when a settlement is reached. The desired direction of change from industry's perspective is a settlement that is restricted to surface rights and does not include subsurface rights, resource extraction rights, pricing rights, nor royalty rights (Dacks, 1981).

Progress from this viewpoint is also dependent upon the formulation of a federal energy strategy which provides a single coherent and coordinative approach to deal with all energy matters. A senior representative of the Canadian Petroleum Association states:

An energy strategy is absolutely critical to provide a sense of security to energy proponents and manufacturers alike. In the past the oil and gas industry has witnessed too many flip-flops. With each new technology or promising field of activity the emphasis has shifted to the almost total (Beale 1980).

Finally, there appears to be a real need from industry's perspective for Ottawa to evaluate the range of future energy supplies, to specify the
proportion of the total energy mix each type represents, and to develop a long range investment timetable (Beale 1980). Only through the articulation of these government priorities does industry believes it would finally get a sense of continuity to plan effectively for the future.

Social and environmental impacts of a project are dealt with by project design (which is balanced between environmental conscience and the associated costs), mitigation or compensation. This approach is not modified by government. When a proposal is referred to the EARP and NEB, the assessment component is based on industry's definition and subsequent self-appraisal of the project's costs and benefits. As a result, there is a great deal of controversy over the legitimacy of the assessments since they are prepared from the proponent's perspective, and cannot consider the importance of the "no go" scenario based on the social and environmental costs from the northerners' perspective.

2.1.3 Role in N.W. Project

In addition to the construction and operation of the project, the proponents were involved in other activities including several formal reviews prior to cabinet approval. Upon IPL's application for a Right of Way in March 1980, DIAND referred the project to FEARO (Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office which would administrate the EARP process) in 1980. Esso and IPL then filed a joint environmental impact statement with EARP in April 1980. The recommendation of the panel was issued in January 1981. The findings were that:
The project could be built within acceptable environmental and social impact limits [provided] that important deficiencies in the Proponent's planning and in the preparedness of government could be rectified (EARP 1981).

IPL was also required to file for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the NEB concurrently with its application to DIAND. The NEB held its public hearing for IPL's application in 1980. In 1981, the NEB issued the Certificate subject to Government In Council approval, and conditional upon technical, engineering, environmental, socio-economic and routing conditions (NEB 1981). Throughout the construction phase IPL interacted with the NEB's Project Coordinator on all matters that related to the conditions precedent to the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.

At the same time both IPL and Esso sought water licenses from the Northwest Territories Water Board in 1980 and 1981 respectively. The Water Board hearings were held in 1981.

Environmental matters were for the most part regulated by existing Acts, territorial ordinances and their regulations. Industry's compliance to existing regulations were evaluated weekly by the appropriate regulatory agencies and through regular status reports from the proponents. Esso and IPL had their own environmental inspectors which worked closely with government teams to resolve day-to-day problems.

The social and economic issues the federal government believed were not adequately covered by existing federal or territorial legislation were addressed by special agreements. These agreements were between DIAND and each of the proponents in the areas of training, employment and project participation by local businesses. The NW Management Committee periodically reviewed industry's compliance with the terms and conditions of the Special Agreements.
2.2 THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

2.2.1 Historic Role In Northern Developments

During the late 1960's public interest became focused on the north and private development in the north accelerated with the discovery of massive supplies of oil on the North Slope of Alaska. Unfortunately, this interest and activity was accompanied by administrative chaos. Despite the existence of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) and the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DNANR, now DIAND), the federal administration was caught unprepared (Dosman 1975).

Interestingly, both ACND and DNANR could have improved the development process. The ACND had the potential to coordinate an overall integrated approach for the north, however, "its nightmarish administrative jungle" precluded its effectiveness (Dosman 1975).

The DNANR, established to develop federal policy and to ensure orderly development, was also extremely ineffective. Dosman (1975) summarizes this situation the following way:

The first level of failure in the north . . . lay in (DNANR's) inability to lead and coordinate policy. Both in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon, (DNANR) exercised provincial type jurisdiction from Ottawa, but some sixty federal departments and agencies operated along side of each other without central direction and often at cross purposes.

Consequently, the situation was such that myriad federal activities and services had grown without an explicit framework or underlying rationale.

In 1968 Humble Oil's (a U.S. company) decided to gather scientific information on northern ice conditions in the Northwest Passage. This action
reflected the U.S. State Department's refusal to acknowledge Canada's jurisdiction in Arctic waters. This incident reaffirmed to the federal government that it had to show a greater presence in the north and to assert its jurisdiction in the north. The vehicle for doing so was resource development projects.

This incident lead to the formation of a Task Force on Northern Oil Development in December of 1968. The purpose was to speed up the Cabinet recommendation and approval process of northern development projects. Between 1968 and 1972, the Task Force was the central body for determining northern resource policy and, in fact, the Task Force became a "transmission belt" for industry's initiatives which required timely cabinet approval. As such, approvals were made which favored private enterprises' goals and did not give those being affected nor public interest groups access to the approval process. For example, Dosman (1975) states that the Task Force "was purely and entirely development oriented . . . [and] gave the most development minded officials in DIAND unfettered opportunity to 'open the north'". This situation, within a context of governmental unpreparedness and crisis, precluded a thoughtful, responsive, coordinated or long term northern resource policy.

Parallel to the government's reliance upon industry to develop the north there has been a lack of commitment to the protection or management of the northern environment. Between 1918 and 1948 most of the Arctic region had been designated as public game reserves to "preserve wildlife for the almost exclusive use of natives in the NWT" (Hunt 1976). In actuality this policy was another unobtrusive mechanism to assert Canada's sovereignty (Pimlot 1974). By the late 1960's the existing programs that focused on the environment were virtually dismantled. Pimlot (1974) characterizes situation during this period the following way:
In the 1960's the government spent millions of dollars on geological research to set the stage for northern development . . . but ecological research reduced to a trickle and virtually nothing was done to develop legislation to protect the environment. By 1969 it became evident that the Federal Government was completely unprepared to meet the needs of environmental protection north of 60.

In the early 1970's, the conservation movement began to attract a great deal of support. As a result, a number of federal actions gave the impression of a renewed commitment to the northern environment. The Northern Inland Waters Act, Artic Waters Act, Pollution Prevention Act, and the Territorial Lands Act were adopted and the Department of the Environment was established. During the same period the Federal Task on Environmental Policy and Procedure released a policy and procedure paper. This document led to the creation of the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) which appeared to be established to review projects from an environmental and social perspective and as an integral component of the approval (or rejection) process. In 1972, the official policy for northern development was announced. It too gave the appearance of a shift in government priorities from defense to social programs and from resource development to ecological initiatives (Canada 1972).

Perhaps most significant from an environmental and social perspective was the Berger Enquiry. For the first time a review process emphasized environmental and social impacts of a project, and recommended that no pipeline be built prior to a land claims settlement. As a result of the enquiry a ten year moratorium was placed on development to permit the time necessary to resolve the land claim issue.

Despite the appearances, the reality was that the construction of portions of the MacKenzie Highway and Beaufort Sea off-shore drilling, occurred without
resolving social, environmental and land claims issues. These decisions highlighted the contradictions between the appearance of a federal environmental and social commitment and subsequent development actions.

The 1980's were a continuation of the government's emphasis on development in the north. In October 1980 the Federal Government approved the National Energy Program (1980)(no longer in effect). An express objective of the NEP, and specifically under the Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP), was to "help promote drilling activity" (COGLA 1984). Page (1982) states that this was a move to maximize oil production on federal lands. In addition, the PIP Program in which 80% of exploration costs were paid by taxpayers served to enable more firms to participate in northern development.

The decision making process which led to the approval of the N.W. Project further illustrates the continuation of the government's development emphasis. Between the time of the release of Berger's report and the approval of the N.W. Project there was virtually no progress made towards a native land claims settlement. Indeed, both the EARP and NEB recommendations challenged Berger's 10 year moratorium. In fact, neither review even dealt with the native land claim issue.

Finally, Cabinet's conditional approval of the NW Project with a two year/two and a half year delay still permitted development without mechanisms or agreements in place that resolved northerners' concerns. In his announcement of Cabinet's decision The Honourable John Munro, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development stated:
I can't emphasize too much the importance we are attaching to the resolution of land claims. The decision we've taken to delay this $1 Billion project was not made lightly. I firmly believe the timetable now in place allows for reasonable time to achieve basic agreements regarding the MacKenzie Valley Land Claim.

Notwithstanding the 2 year delay to reach a land claim settlement, the project was given final approval without the land claim issue being resolved.

In conclusion, Ottawa has historically relied upon industry for development initiatives and has not addressed native and environmental concerns to the satisfaction of local interest groups. Consequently its traditional role has been limited to providing incentives, regulation and mitigation (Fenge 1984).

2.2.2 Perspectives on Northern Development

The Federal government's interest in the north stems from the opportunities for increasing energy self-sufficiency, national revenue, and employment and business opportunities, and reinforcing Artic sovereignty (DIAND 1981, Dacks 1981). As mentioned previously, this interest in large scale development is said to have Ottawa "running interference for industry" (Dacks 1981).

Ottawa perceives the cost to northern development in terms of the enormous tax incentives, grants, funding packages and administrative costs borne by the federal government.

The federal government sees the north as a great opportunity to pursue industrial development. Fenge 1984 and Rees 1984 state that this approach is
plagued with problems as past lessons learned from similar projects are not incorporated into an approval and planning process, cumulative impacts of projects are not dealt with and the approval and implementation of projects is not sensitive to northern concerns. The federal government views future change in terms of meeting the national interest rather than the regional or local interests (MacLachlin 1984). This has serious implications for the number and extent of the rights that may be transferred to the native organizations. In terms of the native economy, Ottawa perceives that it is only a matter of time until natives make a transition from a subsistence economy to a wage economy (MacLachlin 1984).

It was previously noted that the federal government has implemented a number of mechanisms (numerous significant Acts and regulations and 2 formal review processes (EARP & NEB)) that appear to have the ability to minimize environmental and social impacts (Rees 1981, Dembicki 1984). However, the implementation of these instruments are characterized by a lack of coordination and efficiency (Rees 1981).

EARP is only advisory, has no legislative power, and is plagued with structural and operational deficiencies (CEAC 1981, Rees 1980, Dembicki 1984). Rees (1981) makes the following comment on the EARP and NEB processes:

"both tools . . . have come under severe attack by various authors because of their weaknesses in identifying and protecting the various 'public interests' associated with development.

Second, in the absence of a comprehensive planning process for northern development, environmental and social impacts are not treated by the government as factors to be considered when a project is being considered for
approval. Instead, these impacts are dealt with through mitigation and compensation at the implementation stage (Dosman 1975, Dacks 1981).

This was the case in the Norman Wells, where both EARP and NEB approvals were given even though there were fundamental problems with the proponents' plans and programs. The larger issue of native claims was not addressed (Dembicki 1984). Instead, impact funding packages in the amount of $21M were set up by the federal government to deal with the impacts the federal government deemed significant. (The allocation of these funds was not done in a timely manner which was detrimental to the native groups' ability to minimize project impacts (Dene Nation 1985, Rees and Kerr 1987)).

2.2.3 Role in N.W. Project

The construction of the NW Project involved myriad government agencies who were responsible for administrating the regulatory requirements and managing the socio-economic and environmental concerns identified in the special agreements.

The key federal regulatory groups were NEB, Canadian Oil and Gas Administration, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Department of Environment, Department of Transportation, the Treasury Board of Canada and Canada Employment and Immigration.

The central coordinating department for northern development was DIAND. Dacks (1981) explains the challenge this department faced in the following way:
coherent and anticipatory policies and processes of
decision-making and regulation could not be created
because the debates within the department could not
be resolved, particularly because cabinet persistently
avoided giving DIAND clear policy directives it
needed to deal in other than an ad hoc level with
specific projects.

In accordance with its traditional responsibilities DIAND regulated the
project in terms of native welfare, land management, environmental protection,
economic development and promotion, energy development and local
employment development. Specifically, DIAND had to administer the
Department of Indian Affairs & Northern Development Act, Territorial Lands
Act, the Northern Inland Waters Act, Canada Oil and Gas Production and
Conservation Act, and the Environmental Assessment and Review Process. The
regulatory activities for oil and gas fell under the Canadian Oil and Gas Lands
Administration on behalf of DIAND and Energy, Mines and Resources.

Cabinet's conditional approval of the NW Project included the delegation
of special responsibilities to DIAND for coordinating inter-and intra-
governmental regulation of the project and the incremental government
programming related to the project (See Figure 4). Under these powers the
Norman Wells Project Coordination Office (NWPCO) and subsequently the PCC,
the Norman Wells Advisory Committee, and the Project Management
Committee were established. Together, these mechanisms were to provide a
forum for information exchange and a focus for coordination of activities
between government, industry and interest groups.
ROLE OF DIAND IN THE NW PROJECT

Minister
DIAND

Key Regulatory Departments & Agencies <-> Project Coordination Office <-> Other Regulatory Departments & Agencies

NEB
GNWT
DIAND: NAP
COGLA
NWT Water Board

Transportation
Communications
Fisheries & Oceans
Energy, Mines & Resources
Regional Economic Expansion
Industrial Expansion
CBIC
Health & Welfare
DIAND: I & IA
Alberta
Government of NWT
2.3 GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

2.3.1 Traditional Role in Northern Development

At the time the NW Project was being implemented, the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) consisted of both an elected Legislation Assembly and an Executive Council or "Cabinet". The Territories were headed by a commissioner who was appointed by the Minister of DIAND and reported to DIAND.

The Government was characterized by Dacks 1981 as colonial in nature because of "[its] apparent dependence on a distant and often apparently uncaring government". While substantial progress toward the devolution of authority is continually being made, the Assembly has limited resources to assist in ameliorating the impacts of northern development. The challenge (and frustration) is summarized by The Honourable Richard Nerysoo, Minister of Renewable Resouces, GNWT:

Resources and revenues from resource development are controlled federally, but the responsibility for meeting the social and economic needs of the North rests with the territorial government. The GNWT has no direct access to revenues that result from the development of northern resources, yet it must ensure that effective program are in place to cope with the changes brought about by development.

2.3.2 Perspective on Northern Development And Role in the NW Project

The NW Project was perceived by the GNWT as an opportunity to pursue a large role for itself in northern development in contrast to past assessment and management structures that were based in Ottawa. In addition, the GNWT
sought larger financial gains from mega projects in order to support its struggle for additional power and autonomy (Dacks 1981).

The GNWT supported the Dene Nation's concerns and proposed a two year delay to provide sufficient time to settle land claims (Dacks 1981). Although the GNWT believed that 2 years was sufficient time to reach a claims settlement, the recommendation did not bind the approval of the pipeline to the claims settlement because of the settlement delays that have occurred in the past. Specifically, the GNWT recommended the following:

1) A joint territorial federal northern based mechanism be developed to manage the construction and operation of the project.
2) Joint territorial federal planning [of nonrenewable resources in the MacKenzie Valley and Delta and the Beaufort Sea].
3) Guaranteed supply of refined products.
4) Resource revenue sharing to meet our needs and to build for the future (News/North October 31, 1980).

Upon the announcement of Cabinet's decision to approve the project, none of the GNWT's conditions were met. However, the GNWT was allocated impact funding in the amount of $3.546 Million over three years for operation and maintenance of governmental departments which needed to be embellished as a result of the project. But, it was not until late 1983 that the first installment of $1.25 Million was received from the Treasury Board (GNWT 1983).

A Territorial Coordinator position was created specifically to ensure the GNWT had a consistent and continual presence in the implementation of the project. His responsibilities included advising the Executive Council on project matters of interest and to be a focal point for territorial government contact with federal agencies, the proponents, and special interest groups. The Territorial Coordinator was Darryl Bohnet, who also acted as deputy chairman of the PCC.
2.4  THE NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

2.4.1 Traditional Role in Northern Development

The Native People represent the majority of people in the north. There are three native organizations which have traditionally represented native concerns in development issues. In general, the Dene Nation Association and the Metis Association represent status and non-status Indians respectively in the MacKenzie Valley Region (Dacks 1981).

The native organizations had a limited role in establishing the terms for project approval. Consequently, they feel that the consideration given to environmental protection, business and employment opportunities, and socio-economic impact resolution in the project approval process was inadequate. The EARP and NEB hearings are the only formal consultative channels that have been made available for native input into the decision making on the project. (The limitations to these processes have been noted previously.)

The type of role the Dene and Metis believe they should have is exemplified by the Management Structure they proposed for the NW Project. They proposed a joint committee comprised of senior representatives from the federal and territorial governments, Dene Nation and Metis Association, and community representatives. The proposed membership structure comprised 2 members from the Federal Government, 3 members from the Territorial Government (Economic Development and Tourism, Inuvik Region, and Energy and Resource Development Secretariat), and 5 members from the Native Associations / Community Representatives (Dene Nation 1981).
The proposed terms of reference focused on providing a coordinated direction on Project Management issues and the resolving inter-jurisdictional conflicts. A Project Coordinator was to be appointed to act as a senior liaison officer between the various regulatory agencies. The Dene had suggested that his office would be responsible for coordinating various parties by receiving and disseminating information, facilitating input into day to day management issues, providing a focus for project information and conducting any research required by the Committee. The Committee would deal with the major management issues (Dene Nation 1981).

When management structures were implemented that were divorced native participation, this action was perceived as a continuation of their token involvement and their inability to have concerns adequately addressed (Dene Nation 1984).

2.4.2 Perspectives on Northern Development

Northern development is perceived quite differently by the native organizations as compared to the other interest groups. They have occupied the north for thousands of years. And, their land use continues to focus on renewable resources such as cariboo, moose, fur bearers, fish and birds. Consequently, environmental impacts of industry directly affect the native livelihood not to mention the long established cultural ties with the land and its wildlife.

Past experience has led natives to associate northern development with native exploitation. Net gains accrued from pipeline development for native northerners are not proportional to the net gains accrued to Canadians as a
whole (Pearse 1974). Most often benefits such as jobs and contracts to supply material go to southerners and monies from land grants and annual incomes from rents, royalties and taxes also filter southward. In the NW Project case, perceived benefits were limited due to untimely funding approval, absence of a claims settlement, unresolved resource ownership agreements, the lack of an environmental priority, the absence of monitoring agency and management structure with native representation, and inflated expectations over employment opportunities (Information Pipeline June 1985).

A disproportionate share of the social and environmental costs of development are suffered by northerners. Pearse (1974) states that the continual undermining of the native culture, religion and economy translates into social and psychological strain, hardship, further passiveness and dependence. From the natives' perspective the vehicle for meaningful change is a land claim settlement. They advocate that "no major development projects be approved before a land claim settlement" so that "aboriginal people [can] exert some control over development if such projects [are] to provide benefits to northerners; to be handled in such a way that they [do] not interfere with the peoples, traditional use of the land and its resources; and to prevent massive cultural erosion by an influx of non-Dene workers." (Dene Nation 1984). The Dene envision a settlement which would also include managing environmental and wildlife protection. Also, the Dene would like a greater emphasis in northern development on renewable resources so that boom bust cycles are not as devastating (Information Pipeline June 1985). They believe these changes would enable native northerners to attain political and economic self-sufficiency, to preserve their culture based on a mixed economy, to ensure meaningful involvement in the resource development process, and to direct social change and not be directed by it.
The Dene Nation and Metis Association opposed the N.W. Project prior to a land claims settlement. It was believed that a settlement would ensure greater involvement of native organizations in the decision to approve megaprojects and the conditions to approvals.

As a consequence, the Dene Nation made a reluctant decision to use this project as a "test case" to identify the types of regulatory and monitoring powers the Dene would require on future projects and to determine if land claims settlement would have to be a condition precedent to future projects.

A number of factors outside the nature of the approval process limited the native organizations' participation in the project. One was the problems with the timing of delivery of funding packages. Specifically, there were critical delays in the authorization process. Since the funding encompassed training, business, joint ventures, monitoring, and community/social development programs, the delays were detrimental to these groups' ability to participate effectively in the project (DIAND 1984). This was perceived as a serious breach of the conditional approval (Dene Nation 1985b) as the funding packages were to minimize "social disruption", "enhance opportunities" and "permit the native communities to be involved in planning and programming activities" (DIAND & EMR 1981).

The second limitation was a result of the federal government's rejection of the Dene's proposed Management Structure. When the Dene were not consulted on the structure and membership of alternative committees, the native organizations boycotted these structures until November 1983. It was only upon the urging of the Federal land claims negotiator, David Osborne, the native groups returned to the PCC when attempts to establish an environmental monitoring role through the lands claims process could not be accomplished. His suggestion was for the Dene/Metis to go through the PCC and submit applications for impact assessment funding. Yet, most of the substantive
construction decisions had already been made and the Dene’s involvement was limited to day to day issues.

2.5 CONCLUSION

In providing a background to the NW Project from each major participants' perspective, the disparity between agendas is apparent. At one end of the spectrum, Industry sees northern development as a vehicle for financial rewards. At the same end, the federal government has encouraged development and placed less importance on the associated environmental and social costs. At the other end of the spectrum, the native organizations emphasize the environmental and social impacts of northern development. They seek a land settlement to ensure they are integrally involved in the approval and monitoring processes so the benefits are accrued to native northerns and the impacts they perceive as negative are ameliorated. This discussion emphasizes the inherent political challenge for the PCC to be successful.
Chapter Three:

**TERMS OF REFERENCE, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

This chapter focuses on the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC). It provides a description of the types of issues encountered in past projects which stressed the need for a PCC type mechanism in the project development process. It also outlines the terms of reference, structure, and operation of the PCC. This information, combined with the members' perception of the PCC, will be used as the basis for evaluating of PCC.

3.1 **REASONS FOR THE PCC**

The PCC represented one component of the innovative impact management structures that were being advocated by the federal government and industry as the prototype for future projects of this type.

The need to establish a consultative mechanism for the Norman Wells Project was first articulated in the Norman Wells Environmental Assessment Panel’s recommendations:
The Panel recommends that an on-going consultative program be established and maintained at the initiative of the GNWT and include such agencies as required. The purpose of this program would be to predict, identify and deal with opportunities and issues raised by the project and requiring cooperative action by government and the proponents.

The translation of the above stated purpose into more specific terms could not be found in the NW Project documentation. However, the documentation from the Beaufort Sea EARP (BSEARP 1983) included a discussion of the PCC by the NWPCO's in more specific details:

1. To more accurately anticipate the problems that may arise on complex project such as the N.W. Project.
2. To incorporate a process which is always accessible to a variety of interest groups.
3. To improve the coordination of the appropriate regulatory agencies to avoid duplication and over-regulation.
4. To ensure there would be a continuing dialogue between the proponents, government, local groups and the public at large.
5. To facilitate the resolution of issues (BSEARP 1983).

3.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION

The revised terms of reference for the PCC was to "provide a forum for formal update, reporting, and communication of activities" (PCC 1983(a)). The original terms of reference included resolving project issues. However, it was subsequently decided by the PCC (upon the advice of the Project Coordinator) to
remove this objective. The stated reason for this change was that the committee's function was to solely act as a "clearinghouse for information". At the same meeting the name of the PCC was changed from Project Management Committee. The stated reason for this modification was to ensure that the name did not give the impression that the committee's function was to manage (PCC 1983(a)).

Other than the statement noted above, no specific direction or performance criteria were formally given to the members to provide clear guidance.

The PCC had representation from industry (IPL, ESSO), the native associations (Dene Nation, Metis Association), and key regulatory departments of government (PCO, DIAND; Northern Affairs, DIAND; Indian and Inuit Affairs, DIAND; GNWT; Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA); Canadian Immigration and Employment Commission (CEIC); and the National Energy Board (NEB).

Despite the NWEARP's recommendation that the GNWT establish the PCC, the Norman Wells Project Coordination Office (established under DIAND) acted as the secretariat for the PCC and the Committee Chairman was John Mar, NWPCO. The Deputy Chairman was the Territorial Coordinator (GNWT), Darryl Bohnet. The Chairman's function was to ensure that the meetings were conducted in an orderly fashion, that discussions and submissions were relevant to the group's mandate, and that requests for information were followed through by the responsible member. As the minister's representative, he also reported on the coordinative process and ensured due process was followed. The Committee met quarterly.

A core group of six members within the general membership was established. The power to vote was restricted to this group yet in only one
instance was this option exercised. The group’s membership was weighted evenly in terms of numbers between government (PCO, GNWT), Industry (IPL, Esso), and native associations (Dene and Metis). However, based on the discussion in the previous chapter, the PCC was not evenly weighted in terms of priorities for northern development (i.e. industry and government were closely aligned). The representation on the PCC was further skewed in the first year because the Dene and Metis refused to participate. Their decision to boycott the committee was a result of the federal government’s creation of a consultative mechanism that did not resemble the Dene/Metis proposal and without input from the native organizations. Further, the Dene and Metis believe that the way the PCC was set up confirms Ottawa’s lack of commitment to a consultation process with native groups (Dene Nation 1985b).

The approach adopted by the Project Coordinator was an ‘open door’ approach which allowed any interest group to attend, participate or present at the Committee meetings. At one meeting 70 people attended.

The Committee’s first meeting was held December 1, 1982, just a month before project construction began. The last meeting was held in the fall of 1985.
Chapter Four:
CRITERIA FOR A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PCC

The discussion of northern development in Chapter Two emphasized the different world views held by respective PCC members on northern development. This suggests the actors in the project had different reasons for participating in the PCC and different criteria for its success. In a situation that involves disparate groups, it is imperative that institutions requiring the participation and cooperation of such members operate fairly and effectively and have meaning for each participant. Such institutions may not ensure that the participants are happy with the outcomes. However, they will be satisfied that the outcomes are legitimately arrived at and do not systematically favour or impair certain members.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the factors that affect a committee's performance. Since these factors determine its success, they will be used as evaluation criteria in the succeeding chapter to assess the PCC.

The criteria for a successful committee are based on social and environmental impact principles and my experience with group decision-making and problem solving. In addition, there are at least three fields of literature supporting these criteria: One field is the Planning Process and Citizen Participation field. For example, Boothroyd (1977) identifies thirty-eight common planning process mistakes which limit the effectiveness of the process. Another field which focuses on the group entity is "Group Dynamics" within the Social Psychology discipline. Both the Planning Process and Group Dynamics
fields evaluate the operation, process and performance of groups in a situation where a specific short term task has been given to the group.

The third field is the Environmental Dispute Resolution discipline. This approach attempts to outline steps to improve a group's effectiveness where the group has different interests and levels of power and the method to resolve conflict is not initially known nor agreed upon.

Based on these sources, I propose eight critical elements for an efficient, effective, responsible and fair committee process. These are:

1. Appropriate Membership
2. Motivated Membership
3. Agreed Upon Time Frame and Frequency of Meetings
4. Equal Access to Quality Information for All Participants
5. Clearly Stated and Mutually Agreed -Upon Committee Goals and Objectives.
6. Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weakness, and Opportunities
7. Identification of Committee Tasks
8. Monitor Task Results

The terms of reference, structure and operation of a committee must be based on these elements if the committee is going to operate fairly, efficiently, and effectively. The following discussion details the meaning of each of these elements and highlights the importance each has on the performance of a committee.
4.1 APPROPRIATE MEMBERSHIP

Those groups with a significant stake in the outcome must participate. (Susskind 1978, Van de Ven 1980, Delbecq et al 1975).

It is important for significantly impacted groups to be on the committee in a participatory rather than an consultative basis. Their participation is critical because the goals for the committee, criteria for a satisfactory outcome, and means for attaining them are likely to be different among groups. The associated benefit is that the members are more likely to feel a sense of ownership for the committee because they were involved early and the defined actions are the result of their input.

Fulfilling this component requires identifying who should participate. Susskind (1978) stresses that interests should be categorized rather than having representatives from every interest group. Categorizing interests avoids having too many people involved and enables a more productive dialogue. It also diffuses strong representation from like groups that could bias the decisions to favour the strongest interests, i.e., the common interests that cut across the greatest number of interest groups would be favoured as opposed to having equal representation from each type of interest.

An example that highlights the importance of categorizing interests is the PCC. The PCC had equal representation in terms of numbers between industry, government and native organizations. However, Chapter Two showed the federal government and industry were closely aligned in their priorities for northern development. This raises the question as to whether or not the balance
which favoured northern development interests may have impacted the way the
PCC functioned.

Rather than having all possible interests participating through the life of
the committee (and jeopardizing the workability of the committee), appropriate
membership is also assured by periodically reviewing the membership. As part
of the committee's housekeeping duties, a review of the membership should be
conducted on a regular basis so that the committee can draw in additional
interests as the tasks evolve and relieve those whose expertise is no longer
needed.

In cases where there are many interest groups, an appropriate
modification would be to hold a public information meeting to permit
representatives to speak on specific issues. This alternative ensures outside
perspectives are solicited where applicable. To ensure the Committee meets its
regular agenda, the public information meetings should be divorced from the
actual Committee meetings. In this way the purpose of the regular meetings is
not compromised by the length of the hearing, the emotions of the hearing, and
the different natures of the respective meetings.

4.2 MOTIVATED MEMBERSHIP

Each member must actively participate (Susskind
1978, Practical Concepts 1984, Van de Ven 1980,

The participation of diverse members incorporates different points of
view and types of information into the process. Susskind (1978) states that it is
important to avoid a situation where a member will remain aloof at the initial
stages only to undermine consensus building later on.
Fulfilling this criterion requires a Chairman who is an effective facilitator. He/she must solicit input from members who are not contributing, highlight the merits of each member’s input, massage the group to reach a consensus, effectively synthesize the group’s thoughts and create an atmosphere of enthusiasm for what the group is trying to do.

A frustrating situation is to operate a meeting with absent members. Trying to recapture missed meetings to these members will require a great deal of time and energy. Even so, being updated on past decisions will never have the impact of being involved in the decisions first hand. Perhaps the most detrimental result of absent members is having the once resolved “cans of worms” being reopened by those who remain dissatisfied in the hope absent members can sway the decision back to their favour.

To motivate members to attend and to emphasize the importance of input and commitment the committee should implement a policy to replace members who do not attend a predefined number of meetings. By stating this policy at the earliest stages, every member is aware of their responsibilities and can assign an alternate member if time conflicts exist.

4.3 AGREE UPON TIME FRAME AND FREQUENCY

Establish and terminate the Committee at a time appropriate to the task. Hold meetings on a timely basis (Susskind, 1978).

The effectiveness of a committee also depends on when it is formed, how often it meets, and how long it remains in existence.

Setting meeting dates is a balancing act. Meetings must be held often enough so important issues are not missed, but not too often that meetings are without purpose or that members resent the time they must commit. It is
important to ensure meeting dates are realistic and motivated by the attainment of the committee's goals and objectives. This ensures the committee continues to move forward. On the other hand, meeting dates should not drive the process.

As the scope and tasks of the committee become better understood, the committee must determine how long it is necessary to remain active. The group must continually review the outcomes to ensure they are having the desired results. It is important to conduct an overall review of the Committee's performance before it disbands. The group or an outside consultant can perform the review. The purpose of the review is to identify the deficiencies and accomplishments of the group to provide important information for the establishment of subsequent groups.

4.4 **EQUAL ACCESS TO QUALITY INFORMATION FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS**

Quality information from a variety of sources must be available to each participant on a timely basis (Susskind, 1978).

The Committee must seek information from different literature sources, interest groups, agencies, etc., to attain a comprehensive understanding of the issues and their impacts. This requirement reduces the likelihood of overlooking important considerations and misrepresenting or missing less popular ideas. Where gaps in information exist, it is important to set aside reasonable resources (time, money) for additional research or consultation.

Disagreements over the validity of information or contradictions between sources may occur when different kinds of information are accumulated. This is further complicated by the fact that some types of information are not known and, therefore, have no precise answers (i.e., the probability of an oil spill).
Despite this difficulty the group must decide how to assess the submitted information. Then the members must assess the information and reach a consensus as to its validity. This criterion is important as it is this information that forms the basis for any subsequent actions or recommendations.

4.5 **CLEARLY STATED & MUTUALLY AGREED UPON COMMITTEE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

The goals and objectives for the committee are defined and supported by its membership (Van de Ven 1980, Rand 1964, Delbecq et al 1975, Boothroyd 1985, Boothroyd 1977, Practical Concepts 1974).

Goals are visionary statements. A goal statement communicates the aspirations of what the Committee ought to achieve, how the Committee process should work, and what the desired outcome(s) is. In the case of a PCC type committee, the goal statements must be consistent with the legislated mandate or terms of reference for the committee.

A successful Committee has explicitly stated goals that are understood and supported by its members. Otherwise the committee can not be successful for the following reasons:

a) Members may have inappropriate expectations that the committee can not or should not try to accomplish. Against these expectations the committee will be perceived as a failure.

b) Members may continually try to re-define what it is they are trying to accomplish rather than using their resources to achieve the committee's tasks.

c) Members may try to achieve unrealistic or inappropriate goals with respect to their jurisdiction, resources and constraints.
d) Accomplishments will not be recognized because the goals were never articulated.

Since goal statements often represent a number of aspirations across various time frames or topics, it is necessary to break each goal statement into its specific components. These components are called objectives. Once broken down into objectives, specific tasks can be then be identified to fulfill the objectives. Section 4.7 explains this process in more detail.

4.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COMMITTEE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

Identify the inherent strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities associated with the committee (Boothroyd 1977, Susskind 1978) prior to formulating goal statements.

Before defining the committee's goals, the committee must carefully review its strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities. Only upon a comprehensive investigation of their committee's circumstance will the members have a good understanding of the committee, its resources, its potential, and therefore in a position to define its goals.

Strengths and weaknesses relate to negative and positive factors that currently exist. Strengths for a PCC type committee could be, for example, the variety of interests represented, the ability to have a more comprehensive understanding of the issues, access to different types of information, provision of an expedient forum for resolving issues, etc. Constraints, for example, could be in terms of time commitments, lack of money to implement certain tasks, the absence of legislative power, the desire to use the committee as away to resolve issues not being resolved elsewhere, etc.
Opportunities differ from strengths as they are visionary and describe what ought to be. An example of an opportunity for the PCC was that it was the first committee of its kind would set a positive precedent for future committees.

Going through this exercise is a very powerful tool. It serves to heighten every participant's awareness of what can realistically be achieved and what factors challenge their realization. It also helps to replace individual differences in priorities, values, etc., with a "committee consciousness." If done successfully, this process can not only generate comprehensive goal statements that are pragmatic and thoughtful, but can also generate a great deal of enthusiasm for what the committee can accomplish.

4.7 IDENTIFYING COMMITTEE TASKS

Goals and objectives are achieved through the implementation of tasks.

Once articulated, a goal is broken down into operational statements or specific components called objectives. Then a task or series of tasks are identified which will accomplish each objective and may address different time frames (short, medium, or long term). Through a fine-tuning process, a series of tasks is selected based on its ability to meet each objective given the associated opportunities and constraints.

The following diagram explains the relationship between goals, objectives, and tasks:
To summarize goals are broken down into specific component parts called objectives. Then one or a number of tasks are defined to achieve each objective. Each task, the person responsible for implementing the task, and the time frame to initiate and complete each task is recorded and circulated. By clearly stating the Committee's expectations in this way, those members who have been delegated tasks are made accountable. Identifying reasonable initiation and completion dates (and of course meeting them) ensures the process continues to move forward.

It should be noted that time frames must be viewed with some flexibility. Some actions will be implemented more efficiently while others may be not. Delays can be due to unforeseen circumstances, by issues that arise which are
controlled from outside the group, or resources not being made available in a
timely manner.

If modifications (time, responsibility, opportunities and constraints, actual
goals, strategies and objectives, assumptions) to action plans are necessary,
record and communicate these modifications to the appropriate people.

4.8  MONITOR TASK RESULTS

To ensure goals are achieved, the committee must
have the task results monitored. (Van de Ven 1980,
Practical Concepts, 1984, Boothroyd 1985, Boothroyd
1977, Practical Concepts, 1984)

Completing all defined tasks is the way to accomplish the committee’s
goals and objectives. As tasks are assured of being relevant only at the time they
are identified, some tasks may have to be modified as new concerns,
information, conditions or priorities occur. Therefore, to ensure that the desired
outcomes occur and are responsive, and that undesired effects are avoided, the
implementation phase must be monitored.

An example of a specific committee task could be to hold monthly
meetings in order to fulfill the objective to communicate information in a timely
fashion. Upon review it may be that holding monthly meetings does not permit
enough time for members to respond to specific committee duties.
Consequently, members come to meeting unprepared, frustrated and defensive.
A modification to the task could be to move the meeting to every month and a
half thereby giving people adequate time to respond, ensuring a more
productive meeting, and improving the meeting atmosphere.
Chapter Five: 
EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Chapter Five presents the evaluation component of this thesis. The evaluation is based upon the parameters of the PCC presented in Chapter Three, the ideal criteria for a fair and effective committee presented in Chapter Four, and the membership's perception of the effectiveness of the PCC presented in this Chapter. This information will be compiled in an evaluation matrix to provide a systematic assessment of the success of the PCC.

Diverse sources of information for this evaluation (the terms of reference, structure, and operation, the ideal committee criteria, and the members' perception of the committee) provide a comprehensive assessment of how the committee was set up to operate, how it actually operated, and how it was perceived to have contributed to project development.

The perceptions of the members were derived from a telephone questionnaire administered to the PCC membership. The first section of this chapter will outline the questionnaire design and method of administration. Each question or series of questions correspond to the specific performance criteria outlined in the previous chapter.

The second section presents my assessment of the PCC bringing together the parameters of the PCC, ideal committee criteria, and the membership's perception of the effectiveness of the PCC. The assessment will include a discussion of each criterion as it relates directly to the PCC. It will also include an evaluation matrix to summarize the PCC's performance on each criteria.
5.1 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The purpose of the questionnaire was to identify the members' perceptions of success of the PCC based on the ideal committee criteria. Consequently, the questions asked of the members relate to the eight ideal committee criteria presented in the preceding chapter.

In this section, each question is explained below in terms of its importance and its relationship to the ideal committee criteria. The actual questionnaire is presented in Appendix III.

5.1.1 Questions:  What was the agreed upon purpose of the PCC?
What did (your group) want the PCC to accomplish?

Criteria:  Clearly Stated and Mutually Agreed Upon Committee Goals/Objectives
Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weakness, and Opportunities

These questions were designed to identify what the respective members had wanted the Committee to accomplish, what they perceived it was set up to accomplish and what project issues were deemed the most important to be addressed in this forum.

The purpose was to show if there was a consensus on the goals and objectives for the PCC and if the members expectations resembled the PCC's mandate. It also provided the context for the answers each respondent gave to the other questions.
5.1.2 Questions: Would you change the terms of reference for a future PCC?
Of the types of issues dealt with, what type of issue was of greatest importance to your group?
Were they satisfactorily dealt with?
Were any issues not satisfactorily dealt with?

Criteria: Clearly Stated and Mutually Agreed Upon Committee Goals and Objectives
Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weakness, and Opportunities

The respondents were asked if they agreed with terms of reference for the PCC and if they felt the terms of reference for such a mechanism in project development should be modified.

This series of questions was important because it showed if there was support for the PCC's mandate, if the mandate was sufficient or deficient, and if there was a realistic understanding of what a PCC type mechanism could accomplish given its mandate, resources and membership.

5.1.3 Questions: A core group was established, yet rarely were meetings limited to this group. Did you agree with this decision?
Did you agree with the members selected for the core group?
Should the membership have included other groups or should it have been more restrictive?
Would you have modified the committee structure in any way?

Criterion: Appropriate Membership

As with any group, the membership of the PCC was an important determinant of its performance. Therefore, the members were asked if they
agreed with the division between core/non core group members and the fact that this division was not enforced. Members were also asked if they agreed with the range of members and weighting between interests.

Together, these questions showed if the PCC's membership was perceived as appropriate.

5.1.4 Questions: Did your group rely on the Committee to provide a certain type of information? If so, what type of information was sought?
Was this information easily available?
Did any discrepancies or gaps exist in different sources of information? If so, how was this resolved?
Were any modifications required to improve this process?

Criteria: Equal Accessibility to Quality Information For All Participants
Motivated Membership
Identify Committee Tasks
Monitor Task Results

In any committee the availability of quality information is critical to the success of the process. This series of questions provided insight into the Committee's responsiveness to the "information accessibility" criterion. In the PCC case this element was even more important because it was the reason the PCC was established. And therefore, this question directly related to the motivation of the membership since this was to have been the fundamental reason members were to attend. If members were designated tasks relating to supplying information and resolving discrepancies between sources, these
questions also relate to "identify committee tasks" and "monitor task results" criteria.

5.1.5 Questions: Was the Committee established at an appropriate time?
Was the termination date appropriate?
Did you agree with having the meetings every three-four months?

Criteria: Agreed Upon Time Frame and Frequency of Meetings
Motivated Membership

Participants were asked if the start-up and completion dates were appropriate for the issues the Committee was to deal with. Since the time frame affected the issues that could be addressed by the respective agencies, this criteria is important as it provides insight into the effectiveness of the PCC.

Second, the frequency that meetings can impact the motivation of the members. A committee that functions well will have timely meeting dates and will have members wanting to attend. If meetings are redundant or unjustified then the motivation to attend would be low.

5.1.6 Questions: Would you rate the PCC's ability to affect the Project as poor, satisfactory, good, or excellent?
Do you feel such a committee has a role to play in project development?
Are there advantages to having a PCC?
Are there disadvantages or problems with a PCC as part of the management structure?
Are there changes to the Committee which would improve its performance?
Criteria: All

The purpose of these questions was to establish whether or not this forum was perceived to have a positive effect on the project by (1) allowing more people access to a wide range of information, (2) improving the quality of information, (3) streamlining the dissemination of information, and (4) incorporating concerns into actions. The information derived from this question provides insight into the adequacy of the Committee's Terms of Reference (Committee Goal - synonymous with Accessibility to Information; Appropriate Membership; Frequency of Meetings) and the effectiveness of the strategies to accomplish the mandate (Identification of Committee Tasks/Monitor Task Results).

These questions also gave an indication of whether or not expectations for the committee were realistic (Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weakness, etc.).

And finally, the first four questions give us another reading into the motivation of the members in the Committee on the basis of whether or not it was a forum for providing timely information or making a positive contribution to the management of the project (Motivated Membership).

5.2 SAMPLE

The telephone questionnaire was administered to nine of the eleven PCC membership agencies/organizations/departments. Five core members, three non core members and one member from the Project Coordination Office responded. Representatives from Esso and NEB did not respond.

Specifically, the sample consisted of the following people:
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

Jim Wallace, Project Coordinator's Office, DIAND
Darryl Bonnet, Territorial Coordinator, GNWT
Bill Stephens, Regional Director, NAP, DIAND
Conrad Pilon, Regional Director, I&IA, DIAND
Maurice Thomas, COGLA and CEIC

PROPOSENTS:

Bill Pearce, Project Manager, IPL

NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS:

Kate Irving and Margaret Gorman, Dene Nation
Larry Tourangeau, Metis Association

5.3 SURVEY METHOD

This study employed the telephone questionnaire method. This method was chosen because of the nature of the research and the fact that both the response time involved, the printing costs for mail surveys, and the travel time costs for face to face interviews would be excessive in this circumstance. Aside from reduced time requirements, the advantage of the telephone survey is better quality information can be solicited because of this method's suitability to open ended questions.

The Total Design Method (TDM) (Dillman's 1978) was fundamental to the survey design. It emphasizes that each aspect of the survey process affects the quality and quantity of responses. This method includes understanding why
people do or do not respond to questionnaires, which translates into sensitivity to question type, order, wording, and implementation. Most important to telephone surveys is that they must read well, sound interesting and maintain the respondents concentration as they are solely dependent upon verbal communication. Recent development on the construction and implementation of telephone surveys such as the TDM has made this method very successful as well as time efficient.

Prior to the administration of the survey, advance letters were sent out to each representative. The purpose was to introduce the research and its importance, set out the time expectation, emphasize the utility, and ensure the interview time was convenient (See Appendix 1).

5.4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The information derived from the questionnaire was compiled into an evaluation matrix to summarize the analysis and highlight the findings. The eight ideal committee criteria are listed in the left column. The performance of the committee is rated from "Performed Well" to "Performed Poorly". Within the cells, the degree of consensus or variance among answers given is indicated by "√" for consensus or an "X" for variance. A positive performance with consistency between responses would result in a "√" in the "Well" performance column. A poor performance with a variety of reasons given would appear as an "X" in the far right column.
5.5 RESULTS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

5.5.1. Evaluation Matrix

**Author's Performance Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Criterion</th>
<th>Performed Well</th>
<th>Performed Poorly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly Stated Committee Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgment of Opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivated Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed Upon Time Frame/Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Quality Information</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of Committee Tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Task Results</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \checkmark = \) Consensus on reasons   \( X = \) Variance on reasons   for Performance Rating

5.5.2 Clearly Stated and Mutually Agreed Upon Committee Goals/Objectives

**General Observations**

The diverse interests in northern development were reflected in the members' objectives for participating in the PCC. Most members had very different goals for the PCC and the differences were both in terms of the scale and substance of issues which they had wanted the PCC to address. Prior to discussing the members' goals and objectives it is useful to review the different members' reasons for attending the meetings.

Mr. Wallace (PCO) had wanted the Committee to provide a forum to resolve misunderstandings. He felt his presence allowed him to clarify a situation thereby avoiding its escalation to an issue. Similarly, Mr. Pearce (IPL) participated so that his company was fairly represented on the committee. He felt it was important in a situation such as this that IPL be a participant so that if
any issues were raised they could be there to address them from their perspective.

Mr. Stephens (NAP) saw the Committee as an opportunity to reconcile the way natives view development and the way developers view native organizations. He also saw the committee as a vehicle for a fair and complete review of all aspects of the projects and concluded it was "very positive and should be used as a model." No other member shared this view.

The GNWT looked to the Committee as another way to meet with the proponents to resolve specific issues that arose in the construction phase. The Metis Association came to the Committee to try to increase the number of Metis meaningfully participating in business and employment opportunities. The Dene Nation joined the PCC specifically to establish a role for themselves in Environmental Monitoring. I & IA came in support of these same issues and in particular, to ensure that northern benefits were reaching northerners.

COGLA/CEIC attended meetings to keep informed of the progress of the project and to report on their various activities.

**Appropriateness of PCC Goal (Terms of Reference)**

Resulting from the varied interests in the PCC, considerable disagreement existed over the appropriateness of the goal for the Committee or in this case the terms of reference. Out of the nine members interviewed, five members agreed with them. Bill Stephens (NAP) and Maurice Thomas (COGLA and CEIC) felt the Committee represented an important response to a key problem in the construction of past projects. Past projects, they believe, did not make important project information available to those who required it and limited the participation of northerners. They felt this was detrimental to the northerners' ability to take advantage of the benefits.
Jim Wallace (PCO) also supported the terms of reference. He also felt the Committee was also useful in its ability to persuade the proponents to cooperate on certain issues. This was important because the committee had no power to force the proponents to respond to their requests. Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Wallace added he would like to have seen a management type committee with members given the power to make decisions at the meetings and the authority to direct the proponents.

Bill Pearce (GPL) felt the terms of reference were satisfactory because provided a visible access point for communities who did not understand or have patience with the bureaucratic process. He cautioned that this forum also "attracted trouble " as it also became an opportunity for people to air their frustrations for issues beyond the scope of the Committee's jurisdiction. Another observation made by Mr. Pearce was that the PCC's effectiveness was limited to issues which could not be resolved through other channels. Therefore, the Committee was "utilized by exception".

Four members did not support the terms of reference. Both Mr. Pilon (I & IA) and Darryl Bohnet (GNWT) were critical of the Committee because it was not a vehicle for resolving issues or making decisions. Mr. Pilon felt the fact emotions ran high, too many people were allowed to attend, and the Committee's lacked any real authority. These factors, he concluded, precluded the success of the Committee. Mr. Bohnet was critical of the terms of reference because he felt the key decisions had already been made by the proponents, therefore, the meetings were a forum for informing (as opposed to discussing with) the members.

The Dene Nation did not approve of the Committee because it was established without any input from them on the terms of reference. They felt the mandate should have focused on management issues and resolving inter
jurisdictional conflict. Similarly, the Metis Association had wanted the Committee to have more powers to direct the proponents. Larry Tourangeau said that meaningful participation in the project approval process was not possible because the development requirements were set out in the special agreements. As a result of this situation he felt there should have been a better understanding of what the Committee was to accomplish.

**Conclusions**

Based on the responses given, there was a significant disparity between the desired terms of reference and the actual terms of reference. In addition, there was no attempt to resolve the member's dissatisfaction either by attempting to modify the goal (given the constraints) or by convincing the membership of the importance of the PCC as it was established. The interviews indicated most members (PCO, I&IA, GNWT, Dene and Metis) felt the Committee should have had the power to direct the proponents performance and to deal with project construction issues.

The interviews also highlighted a number of prescriptions for improvement. The PCO stated "a committee with a bit more authenticity would have been more effective,... the PCC could only persuade not direct, ... [and] if the proponents had chosen not to conform, the PCC could not force them to."

I&IA stated similar concerns. The GNWT felt the "PCC should have been more targeted towards issue resolution". Both native organizations felt the PCC should have been a management committee and therefore "could have accomplished something given the inherent problems with the project".

Only those representatives that saw the importance of having a mechanism for the exchange of project information (PCO, CEIC, COGLA, NAP) saw the PCC as a useful mechanism.
Larry Tourangeau summarized the PCC's performance on this criterion when he said "there should have been a better understanding of what the role of the Committee was".

5.5.3 Acknowledgment of Committee Strengths, Weaknesses and Opportunities

General Observations

The responses to the interview questions (especially, those relating to terms of reference) suggest that the members did not acknowledge the inherent strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of the PCC's legislated mandate, structure and operation. Nor did they understand the limitation to their own desired parameters for the PCC. In other words, several members wanted the PCC to have the power to direct the proponents, yet, these members did not have the power within their own jurisdictions to make decisions at the meetings.

The failure to identify what could realistically be accomplished (or what could not) lead to misaligned or inflated expectations and subsequent harsh criticisms of the PCC when the it did not meet these expectations. In other words, this criterion is a fundamental building block of a "good committee". Not building this criterion into the setup of a committee creates unrealistic expectations for the committee but also impairs the committee's perceived performance on other criteria as well.

Conclusions

The process for establishing a PCC mechanism in the future should include an orientation process which has the members as a group systematically list on the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of a PCC type committee. In this way members will identify and internalize realistic expectations for what
the PCC should accomplish given its characteristics, jurisdiction, resources and membership.

Secondly, this type of exercise helps to replace individual agendas with a "committee consciousness". And, by emphasizing the opportunities, this process can generate a great deal of enthusiasm for what the committee can accomplish.

This common base of understanding sets the stage for prescribing how the committee should operate (succeeding criteria) and will be consistent with its abilities and resources.

5.5.4 Appropriate Membership

General Observations

In Chapter Four, the discussion on the "appropriate membership" criterion stressed the importance of having affected interest groups participate on the committee. The PCC membership consisted of core members and non core members. In addition to these participants, there was an open door policy which permitted virtually any person to speak who felt his/her interests were being affected. The criticism voiced against the PCC's structure emphasizes the challenge to find a balance between ensuring the necessary interest groups participate and limiting the membership so that the group is manageable. Most members (PCO, I&IA, GNWT, IPL, Dene, and Metis) did not agree with the membership of the PCC.

Although some members felt the core membership should have been enforced because the meetings were unwieldy, most stated that enforcing core membership was not the critical issue. In fact, it was the composition of the core group that was viewed as inappropriate.

It is not surprising that the way various members would have changed the PCC membership related to their objectives for participating. Several
members felt that industry should not have been included (Dene, Metis, and I & IA) and that government was over represented (Dene, Metis, GNWT, and I & A). The native organizations believed the committee should have had 50% representation from native organizations and from government. The latter is consistent with the management committee mandate the native organizations had originally proposed.

Mr. Pilon (I&IA) suggested that a future structure should be restricted to the territorial government, key federal department(s), and native organizations. Other federal departments and industry should be participating at the subcommittee level.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Pilon (I & IA ) felt that the Committee's effectiveness was restricted because the Project Coordinator and chairman of the Committee was a federal representative. He believed this impaired the responsiveness and accountability of the chairman to the public because he could not lobby the minister for decisions. Being a federal representative lead to the perception that he misdirected the Committee away from addressing such issues as land claims, revenue sharing, etc., which Mr. Pilon felt to be integral to many project issues. He proposed a future chairman should be from an independent organization jointly selected by industry, government and native associations.

As mentioned before, Bill Pearce did not support the Committee structure. He felt the meetings became very emotional because broader issues such as land claims settlement were not resolved prior to project approval. He stated the process was frustrating and "the democratic process goes mad when everyone is an expert, [and] often there was no consensus within groups let alone between them". Further, he did not agree with the proposition for more Committee powers. He felt this would make the Committee redundant because
projects were already regulated and monitored effectively by the 51 agreements with the federal department and the NEB.

Lastly, the committee's performance on the appropriate membership criteria was severely compromised by the native organizations' decision to boycott the PCC until November 1983.

Conclusions

Based on the responses given, the PCC structure did not meet the "appropriate membership" criterion. Specifically it was suggested that the core group have representatives from GNWT, federal government, and native organizations only. Proponents or other agencies should be solicited for information on an "as required" or "task force" basis. This setup does not necessitate membership in order to have concerns incorporated into the process.

Mr. Pilon's comment on the inappropriateness of the chairman, also stresses that the "appropriate membership" criterion should include the careful selection of a chairman. In a future PCC type committee a chairman should be someone who is mutually agreed upon by the committee, and would most likely be appointed from an outside agency or organization.

5.5.5 Motivated Membership

General Observations

The membership's motivation to actively participate in the Committee was ascertained largely from the responses to the "meeting frequency" question. The membership as a whole was not committed to this committee process. Conrad Pilon (I & IA) stated he found the whole process very frustrating so he did not attend regularly. Bill Pearce (IPL) said he did not care when the PCC met as he found the process "painful". Kate Irving (Dene Nation) said the Committee was not established early enough in the project development process.
and was therefore ineffectual. She also felt their token involvement meant many construction issues were not dealt with properly. Larry Tourangeau (Metis) stated that they saw the PCC as an ineffective mechanism when contracts continued to be given to southern workers. The fact that both the Dene and Metis boycotted the PCC for the first year also indicated their low commitment to the PCC.

Many members also noted that the level of commitment was lower because most members were involved with so many other committees or meetings.

**Conclusions**

The members' desire to participate on the PCC was very low and therefore the "motivated membership" criterion for the PCC was not met. The lack of enthusiasm was a result of a poor foundation, structure and operation. Had there been support for the PCC's mandate and a more appropriate structure, the PCC would have been more effective, and the membership would have been more committed.

Finally, it is important to note that organizations can not continually send the same representatives to act on similar committees and expect these people to be able to contribute to each enthusiastically. Agencies should vary the people they designate with the view to having these people contribute fully and energetically.

**5.5.6 Time Frame and Frequency**

**General Observations**

Most members felt the PCC should have been established earlier. Since it was not, the PCC did not provide a much needed forum to discuss construction plans.
All members agreed with the committee disbanding upon the completion of the project. The responsibility for monitoring the project was regulated by the various government agencies.

There was no agreement over the appropriateness of the frequency of meetings. Generally, the interest groups whose priorities for the Committee were consistent with its mandate felt the frequency of meetings was appropriate. The three month interval gave these members the time to react to the various requests. These members believed more frequent meetings would have let to the same issues being dealt with from meeting to meeting.

Conversely, the Dene Nation, who felt the Committee should have been a management committee, were critical of the fact that the meetings were not held frequently enough. They felt that things happened so quickly during the construction phase that issues were missed. The Dene stated that if the meetings been held more often, project issues could have been made more clear and dealt with more depth.

The Metis Association felt that the frequency of the meetings was irrelevant because the Committee was not effectual.

**Conclusion**

Based on the responses given it appears that there was a discrepancy in the members' assessment of the PCC fulfilling "time frame and frequency" criterion. Those members with expectations consistent with the terms of reference felt the frequency of meetings was appropriate. Those with expectations outside the committee's mandate felt the frequency of meetings was inadequate.

There was agreement that the PCC was established too late in the process so that construction planning issues could not be discussed by the committee. Therefore, a future PCC should be established immediately after the project is
given approval. All members agreed with the PCC being disbanded after the project was completed.

5.5.7 Equal Access to Quality Information for All Participants

General Observations

This criterion is fundamental requirement of a PCC type committee. It was established as a solution to past northern mega projects problems in which important project information was not reaching the appropriate interest groups at all or in a timely matter. This deficiency has historically restricted these groups from participating in the project planning process or taking advantage of various opportunities including employment or business related. The questionnaire results indicate that the PCC did have the potential to bring together a wide source of information. However, there were still problems with the type of information made available, the timeliness of submissions and the perceived accuracy of information submitted, despite the goal being effective and efficient information exchange.

Some members saw benefits to this forum. Mr. Stephens explained that the information provided through the Committee forum offered "a general perspective on the project... in contrast to the detailed scientific information which was available from within the department... [and] it was an important opportunity to take a step back and understand how the things fit the whole project."

A second benefit stated by NAP, I & IA and GNWT was that the PCC provided a direct link to the proponents on a regular basis (every 3-4 months). Unfortunately, Mr. Pilon noted that industry always provided a "positive and cheery picture" of native contracts and employment. When discrepancies were
apparent, the Committee was not a good forum for challenging or resolving the discrepancies because emotions ran so high.

Several groups felt the focus on the day-to-day construction issues was detrimental to the PCC's usefulness. The more substantive issues which were important to I&IA, GNWT, Dene, and Metis were not discussed because they were not directly related to construction matters (Dene Nation, 1985). The Dene stated important issues, i.e. environmental, special skills training, construction planning issues, were "shoved under the rug" or passed on to side committees which the Dene were either not involved in, not invited to, or had boycotted previously. They believed most of the decisions had taken place prior to the Committee's existence or at higher levels, the information exchanged was simply "window dressing".

Another criticism was expressed by Mr. Thomas who felt those that emphasized job-related information made his information reports less significant unless he was reporting on the new native job opportunities.

The distribution of information distribution was also problematic. The Dene Nation stated they were not able to get the additional information they had requested on at least two occasions.

**Conclusions**

The PCC failed to fulfill the "equal access to quality information" criterion. Although dealt with in the succeeding section, it is important to reiterate that a future PCC should ensure the responsible agencies are held accountable for meeting their tasks in a timely manner. In addition, the committee should be dedicated to resolving discrepancies between different information sources. A successfully operated PCC would acknowledge that inconsistencies may occur and identify a process and resources to resolve discrepancies.
5.5.8 Identification of Committee Tasks

General Observations

With the committee's mandate being to provide a forum for information exchange, the committee tasks criteria is synonymous with the committee goal. The method for doing so was to have each member report on the activities of the group he/she represented and provide the necessary support documentation.

When a specific issue arose, the task for bringing relevant information to the Committee was delegated to the appropriate member. A list outlining issues that were to be dealt with and the name of responsible member was distributed with the minutes to ensure the responsibilities were met.

A third committee task was to provide a forum which allowed any interest group to participate. As mentioned previously, this practice was cumbersome and the type of issues raised were often outside the jurisdiction of the PCC.

Conclusions

The above strategies brought up to date information from a number of sources to the Committee. Recording responsibilities ensured accountability, deadlines were met and documentation was provided. However, there were a number of problems. Disagreements occurred over the type of information presented. As mentioned previously the start date of the committee precluded the discussion of construction planning issues. And, discrepancies over the accuracy of information sometimes arose. Conrad Pilon stated disputes often arose because IPL provided a "positive and cheery picture" of business development figures. In this situation, as problems arose, the problems should have been evaluated and resolved.
This type of forum for exchanging information should not be continued by a future PCC. An open door policy should be replaced by one that invites representatives of different groups to speak to the members about issues that fall within the committee's mandate. This would ensure the best use of everyone's time and encourage a productive dialogue.

5.5.9 Monitor Task Results

The committee partially fulfilled this task. A good technique to monitor task completion is to record in the minutes tasks, the person responsible, and the agreed upon completion date. The minutes of the PCC reflected this was done. However, the monitoring component should have, in this case, also been sensitive to discrepancies in information being provided. If information was called into question this should have discussed and a strategy to resolve the discrepancy should have been formulated. Therefore, good monitoring not only assumes the tasks are done but that the results are acceptable.

5.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The PCC did not satisfy any of the eight criterion for an ideal committee. The fundamental flaw appears to be the failure to have the membership's support of the PCC's mandate. This was a direct result of some members' frustration with the conditions (or absence of conditions) of the federal government's approval of the project and subsequently with the lack of powers delegated to the institutions they had access to. Therefore they inappropriately
looked to the PCC as the mechanism to solve problems that were not perceived as being adequately dealt with elsewhere.

The second conclusion is that all criteria are interdependent. The lack of support for the PCC's mandate translated into harsh criticism across all criteria.

Consequently, a future PCC must be have the land claims issue resolved and be designed to meet all eight criteria if it is going to be perceived as responsible, efficient, effective and fair.
Chapter Six:

CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATE STRUCTURE FOR A PCC

The results of this study indicate the PCC failed to satisfy all performance criteria of an ideal PCC. The fundamental flaw was a lack of support for the PCC mandate.

The native organizations perceived the PCC as a failure because of the politics associated with the approval of the project, and in particular, that the land claims issue was still not resolved at the time the project began construction. Without negotiated powers, the native organizations reluctantly agreed to use this project as a test case with the expectation of participating in the management and regulation of the project. However, institutions that had native involvement such as the PCC were divorced from any decision making powers.

Similar concerns were mentioned by Indian Affairs and the GNWT. Both agencies did not support the PCC structure because they felt the PCC should have been a decision making body and therefore should not have included industry in its membership.

The lack of support for the terms of reference meant these groups envisioned a totally different kind of committee, and this translated into a lack of support for the PCC’s membership, time frame/frequency of meetings, operation and contribution to the project. This situation severely impacted the spirit of the meetings so that virtually all the members felt the PCC was flawed.
Therefore a true model for northern development necessitates the resolution of the land claims issue first, as well as implementing mechanisms such as the PCC which are properly designed and managed.

Since the land claims issue is outside the study focus, the remainder of this chapter will focus on presenting an improved committee framework for a future PCC. The proposed structure is based on principles derived from the literature, my experience with committees, and the structural and operational deficiencies of the PCC.

6.1 FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE PCC

Based on the criteria for an ideal committee and the subsequent evaluation of the PCC, the following framework has been developed as a guide for a future PCC mechanism. A number of assumptions have been made. First, with the land claims issue settled and the management process resolved, a PCC that is responsible for disseminating information will be perceived an important component of the project. Second, the PCC is intended to operate fairly, efficiently, effectively, and responsibly. Third, very disparate interests exist and the process will be challenging because of the membership and the context of the committee. Each member must acknowledge this and believe they can respond to the challenge.

Establishing A PCC

Since northern development projects are characterized by disparate stakeholders, the most effective way to establish a PCC is through a participatory process. An approach where one particular interest group prescribes the parameters for such a committee is flawed.
The process for establishing the PCC must occur at the time the project is given approval. One of the criticism of the NW PCC was the committee was established after the construction planning stage therefore the types of issues the committee could discuss was severely limited.

The process for identifying the parameters for the PCC should include the participation of the interest groups who have a legitimate stake in the project. It begins by organizing a workshop and by inviting the key participants. The workshop should be facilitated by a professional trained in managing group processes, able to quickly synthesize information and message consensus, and not be one of the stakeholders.

The importance of having the people coordinating important project processes such as the PCC, who are non-stakeholders, can not be understated. This lesson was learned from the NW PCC experience where the NW PCC Chairman was a federal representative. In the interviews one member noted that his effectiveness was perceived to have been impaired because he steered the committee away from certain issues and could not lobby the minister for decisions. While the Chairman’s actions may be justified the perception was that he was acting according to his line responsibilities and not the committee’s. Since the workshop facilitator is a non-stakeholder, will have group facilitating expertise, and will have been integrally involved in setting the foundation for the committee, this person should be considered for the role of the Chairman as well.

The purpose of the workshop is to review the desired goals and objectives for the committee (i.e. what do the participants want the PCC to accomplish and what type of activities should the committee engage in given opportunities and constraints in terms of characteristics, resources, jurisdictions, and stakeholders),
the scope of the committee (i.e. types of issues to be addressed), and principal requirements (membership and operational time).

The committee achieves the above through 3 tasks. Prior to the workshop a background document on the proposed PCC and a questionnaire should be distributed to the key participants who have indicated they will attend or to those who can not but would like input. The questionnaire is intended to solicit the individual participant's views, and prepare and sensitize them for the workshop. The questionnaire will ask for responses on the following items:

1. The importance of a PCC type mechanism
2. Tasks PCC should endeavor to accomplish
3. Who should be involved and in what capacity.
4. The scope of issues that PCC should deal with
5. The principal determinants of a successful PCC
6. What elements are detrimental to the success of the PCC
7. The strengths, weaknesses and opportunities are associated with a PCC type mechanism.

To assist in the consensus reaching process tables should have wide representation to that other view points are shared and understood.

After this exercise is completed at the individual group level, a discussion including all groups is held to highlight commonalities and disparities, and to attempt to reach a consensus on each item within the scope of the mandate. The results of the discussions and questionnaire should be compiled by the facilitator and at a follow-up meeting presented, rationalized and discussed with the participants.

The workshop format is beneficial for a number of reasons. It provides a forum to highlight the importance of a PCC, incorporate input from a wide variety of groups, define the committee parameters from this diverse
perspective, create an understanding of the goals and their rationale, acknowledge the real constraints to the committee, foster greater support for the PCC due to the participation at the initial stages, promote a sense of working together on a common goal, reflect a commitment to have different sources of input throughout the committee process and help create a sense of ownership for the committee.

At the conclusion of the workshop process the following elements of a successful PCC will likely have been achieved.

Performance Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Criterion</th>
<th>Performed Well</th>
<th>Performed Poorly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly Stated Committee Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgment of Opportunities/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivated Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed Upon Time Frame</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Quality Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of Committee Tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Task Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

√ = Consensus     X = Variance for Performance Rating

Operational Considerations

Once the PCC has been established, the operation of the committee must be fine-tuned and the tasks must be implemented effectively.

The committee members should be responsible for setting the committee's meetings dates as they are dependent upon the type of tasks they will be undertaking. By having the members set the dates they will ensure the committee continues to move forward with purpose and without undue
hardship for the members. As the scope and tasks of the committee are fine-tuned, the committee can determine how long it is necessary to remain active.

The members should also establish a policy to replace members who miss a predefined number of meetings. Defining this policy early in the process ensures every member is aware of their responsibility and that considerable time is not devoted when absent members return to recapturing meetings or rehashing issues that were once resolved.

The PCC must continually identify their tasks and implement them effectively. Due to the nature of a PCC much of its tasks will be related to identifying a variety of mechanisms for assembling, evaluating, and communicating project information. One mechanism the NW PCC employed was the PCO's newsletter. An improved variation would be to have each member write articles in the newsletter on a rotating basis. This technique ensures issues relevant to each stakeholder are covered, communicated and deemed credible. All articles should be reviewed by the committee prior to being published. This technique would contribute to a greater awareness of the PCC, broaden the PCC’s constituency, increase accountability, and be a mechanism for soliciting untapped resources and new ideas. Another option is for the PCC to host various presentations on aspects of the project.

While identifying tasks is critical to the success of the committee, the implementation of these tasks is equally important. This can best be achieved by ensuring detailed and accurate minutes are taken.

By documenting the meetings the committee is forced to articulate and agree on exactly what the tasks are, what steps or actions are required to resolve the tasks, who is responsible, what the initiation and completion dates and when each task is completed. It should be noted that the tasks may require the
assistance of outside groups or individuals. If this is so, the groups to be contacted and the member responsible for contacting the group must be noted.

Formally noting responsibilities and time frames ensures the committee's tasks are accomplished and the process continues to move forward. Since unforeseen circumstances can arise which may delay completion, time frames should be somewhat flexible. All revisions to the schedule must be recorded in the minutes.

The success of a meeting is as much determined by how it is conducted as by the attention given to the preparation of the agenda. The agenda should have a limited number of tasks, a limited number of delegations, and an interest item scheduled at the end of the meeting.

The tasks of a PCC should include 1) a review of the minutes to ensure they are accurate and have everyone's approval, 2) a review of the status and results of scheduled tasks, 3) the resolution of unanticipated problems 4) a confirmation that the action plans are having the desired results and 5) the reformulation of action plans that are not having the anticipated results.

Encouraging delegations is one option to broaden the PCC's information base and thereby reducing the likelihood of overlooking important issues or misrepresenting or missing less popular ideas. Delegations should appear first on the agenda. Their numbers and the length of their presentation must be agreed to prior to the committee's start-up and should be adhered to by the Chairperson. Any discrepancies in information provided should be flagged for follow-up and shared with impacted groups.

Adding an item of interest on the agenda is important so that the members remain motivated. In a PCC situation a visual presentation on various aspects of the project or its results could be arranged. Items of interest should be placed last on the agenda to keep people's interest to the end of the meeting.
and ensure the meeting ends on a positive note. The Chairman should conclude the meeting with a summary of the accomplishments made at the meeting. This again reaffirms the positive contributions being made by the committee and the importance of its existence.

A PCC that operates in the manner described above will likely fulfill the remaining criteria for a successful PCC.

**Performance Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Criterion</th>
<th>Performed Well</th>
<th>Performed Poorly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly Stated Committee Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgment of Opportunities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate Membership</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivated Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed Upon Time Frame/Frequency</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Quality Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of Committee Tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Task Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ = Consensus     X = Variance for Performance Rating

**Conclusion**

It is believed that a true "model" for northern development must respond to lessons learned from past experiences. Based on this assessment of one component of the NW Project - the PCC - a future PCC could be structured to operate fairly, be perceived as appropriate, have the support of its members, accomplish realistic tasks, and have a positive impact on northern development projects.

From this discussion on the requirements for a future PCC, one can see that an effective PCC can play several critical roles in the project development: recorder, facilitator, coordinator, communicator and motivator. Providing the
land claims issue is resolved, a PCC can have a positive impact not only through its direct goal - dissemination of information - but by fostering a mutual respect and trust for disparate interests, by ensuring key stakeholders effectively communicate with each other, and by providing an example of how working together can resolve challenges. A successful PCC will not only serve as a model for other committee processes but as a model of cooperation for northern development.
September 15, 1985.

Organization's Name and Address.

Attention: Representative's Name

Dear Representative's Name:

I am a student in the Masters Program in Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia. For my thesis requirement I am studying the Norman Wells Expansion and Pipeline Project. Specifically, I am interested in investigating the effectiveness of the Norman Wells Project Coordinating Committee as an effective mechanism in project management.

A review of the minutes and other relevant documents indicates that you have been an active member in this Committee. As a result, I would appreciate the opportunity to talk with you to find out your views on the Committee. The success of this study depends on your participation.

I will be phoning you within the next two weeks. I anticipate the interview will not take any longer than 15 minutes. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me by phone at (604) 278-1798 or (604) 228-4409.

Your participation in this study would be most appreciated.

Yours truly,

Jennifer Wilson.
Hello, this is Jennifer Wilson from the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia. I had sent a letter to you explaining that I would be calling you regarding the success of the Project Coordinating committee. Do you have a few minutes to talk with me now? The questions should only take about 15 minutes.

1. What was the purpose of the PCC?
2. What did your (group) want to the PCC to accomplish?
3. Would you change the terms of reference for a future PCC?
4. Of the types of issues dealt with, what type of issue was of greatest importance to your group?
5. Were they satisfactorily dealt with?
6. Were any issues not satisfactorily dealt with?
7. A core group was established, yet rarely enforced. Did you agree with this decision?
8. Did you agree with the members selected for the core group?
9. Should the membership have included other groups or should it have been more restrictive?
10. Would you have modified the committee structure in any way?
11. Did your group rely on the committee to provide a certain type of information? If so, what type of information was sought?
12. Was this information easily available?
13. Did any discrepancies or gaps exist in different sources of information? If so, how was this resolved?
14. Were any modifications required to improve this process?
15. Was the committee established at an appropriate time?
16. Was the termination date appropriate?
17. Did you agree with having the meetings every three-four months?
18. Would you rate the PCC’s ability to affect the Project as poor, satisfactory, good, or excellent?
19. Do you feel such a committee has a role to play in project development?
20. Are there advantages?
21. Are there disadvantages or problems?
22. Are there changes to the committee which would improve its performance?

This completes my questions. I appreciate your cooperation and time. Are there any questions you would like to ask of me?

Thank you.
## APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW NOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>PROJECT COORDINATION OFFICE: JIM WALLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TERMS OF REFERENCE</strong></td>
<td>Although PCC's membership was limited to 11, often many additional people came to meetings. Therefore, the type of information exchanged was widespread. A committee with a bit more authenticity would have been more effective. PCC could only persuade, not direct. If the proponents had chosen not to conform, the PCC could not force them to. PCC useful in terms of mandate but more so in its ability to persuade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td>Members could not make any decisions right there. PCC should have been active earlier in the Project. Should have been a management type committee with power to direct the proponents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</strong></td>
<td>Wide range of information was accessible ranging from news media to researchers to the general public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL TIME</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient as will be monitored regularly by DIAND and IPL on weekly basis. But not initiated early enough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEETING FREQUENCY</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient as will be monitored regularly by DIAND and IPL on weekly basis. But not initiated early enough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVES FOR PCC</strong></td>
<td>Appropriate as gave members time to prepare and react to requests for reports or information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIGNIFICANT ISSUES</strong></td>
<td>The socio-economic issues were the most important. But these were expected to be resolved. Unfortunately there was a high degree of expectation because IPL and Esso did not fully explain the fine points about the benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABILITY TO AFFECT</strong></td>
<td>It was a useful mechanism in terms of its mandate but more so because of its ability to persuade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUE</td>
<td>INFORMATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS OF REFERENCE</td>
<td>This process was in response to a key problem encountered in the past projects in the north in which the access to information was not good which in turn limited the impacted groups to effectively participate in the project. Therefore, this mechanism was very positive and should be used as a model. In addition there was a real need to have communication between competing groups and different power relationships. Communication between parties was generally very good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>The membership was adequate. More importantly, the meetings were held in such a way that any legitimate group could participate in the meetings. The tradeoff was that the meetings were time consuming, long, and if the subject was not of interest to you, could be boring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</td>
<td>The information that was obtained was useful. Since the PCC had a broad scope it served to give a general sense of the project. This was in contrast to the detailed scientific information that was available within the department. In essence, the PCC offered an important opportunity to take a step back and understand how the things fit together in the whole project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL TIME</td>
<td>The operational time was appropriate as the project was over and monitoring is still going on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING FREQUENCY</td>
<td>The frequency of meetings was appropriate because if the meetings had been more frequent, the PCC would have been addressing the same issues from meeting to meeting. It would have also been much more expensive. And if the meetings were held less than quarterly the issues would have fallen through the cracks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES FOR PCC</td>
<td>To be fair and complete review of all aspects of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNIFICANT ISSUES</td>
<td>Reconciling the way native groups view development versus the way developers view native organizations. Both have considerable merit to bring to the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABILITY TO AFFECT</td>
<td>The ability to affect the project was considerable. The project was completed on time, had meaningful participation of the impacted communities, and promoted a dialogue between very different groups. It was visible point of contact.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The terms of reference was beneficial in that the Committee was a good information diffuser. Unfortunately, the committee was not effective in terms of exchanging views and making decisions because there was no power to do so, the sheer numbers of people involved and the lack of understanding of the issues that the committee should have been addressing.

The committee should not have included industry and government was overrepresented. These agencies should have been on sub-committees. The Project Coordinator should not have been the chairman as he could not lobby the minister for decisions and was restricted in his ability to speak on certain issues such as land claims, revenue sharing, and land use planning. A more appropriate chairman should have been an independent appointed by the minister and the relevant political and judicial authorities. This would certainly have improved the responsiveness and accountability of the committee to public pressure.

Other sources were used more than the committee forum. Industry would always provided a positive picture of the number of native contracts, and business and employment figures. The community side of the picture was provided by the media, band, band councils and commerce office. The disadvantage was that when discrepancies occurred they could not be challenged because emotions ran so high.

To ensure that environmental and socio-economic benefits were being taken advantage of by the northerners and that impacts were avoided.

Environmental protection - and this was simply not dealt with at any meeting. Northern benefits - there should be a strategy formulated with long term benefits which amortizes over time. It was a miracle that no negative impacts were encountered.

The committee was not effective because it did not deal with the substantive issues such as environmental protection and northern benefits with any depth. And due to the process, different points of view were not exchanged.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES: DARRYL BOHNET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERMS OF REFERENCE</td>
<td>The PCC should have been more targeted towards issue resolution. The option to vote should have been utilized for this reason. As it was, the committee resolved an issue only once through a vote and this format should have been used at each meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>Key decisions fell on the shoulders of the proponents therefore the meetings were really sessions to inform and tell the members. Consequently, the PCC was really just a formalized forum for reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</td>
<td>Did not agree with the numbers of members nor the weighting. The PCC should have had equal representation from government, natives and proponents. The core group should have been enforced. Finally, too many people were allowed to attend the meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL TIME</td>
<td>Other sources of information were relied upon other than the meetings. And because the PCC only addressed the 'hot issues' at the time of the meetings, the depth of information was severely limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING FREQUENCY</td>
<td>The operational time was satisfactory as too many committees tend to last too long. The specific requirement of the PCC was to work through the project's construction phase. Since the project is now operational there is no need for the PCC to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES FOR PCC</td>
<td>Was appropriate and divided things into neat quarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABILITY TO AFFECT</td>
<td>To interface the proponents for the resolution of concerns that arose in the construction phase of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The committee improved the effectiveness of the project as it kept the public informed and promoted the though, issues were dealt with on a day to day basis outside the committee. If an issue arose that required action, the PCC would not be waited for. The committee was really a forum for discussing the 'hot issues' at that particular time. Finally, the effectiveness of the committee was severely limited by the number of people that attended the meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>INTERPROVINCIAL PIPELINE (NW) LTD.: BILL PEARCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS OF REFERENCE</td>
<td>The mandate was satisfactory as it was. The PCC should not have been given more power to direct industry as it would have made the PCC and the federal regulatory agencies redundant. At present federal agencies and the National Energy Board regulate and monitor industry very effectively through 51 agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>This structure was not appropriate in the northern context. Things are so political here because the broader issues have not been resolved. In addition, the democratic process goes mad everyone is his own expert. Often there was no consensus within groups let alone between them. There was not one area of agreement, too broad of issues were being addressed and groups often took the smallest issues and made them political. The open door policy made meetings too unwieldy at times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</td>
<td>Provided everyone information from a wide range of perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL TIME</td>
<td>N/A as the process was so painful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING FREQUENCY</td>
<td>N/A as the process was so painful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE FOR PCC</td>
<td>To make sure that IPL's position was represented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNIFICANT ISSUES</td>
<td>PCC was good only in cases where issues could not be solved through the appropriate channels. It was utilized &quot;by exception&quot;. Jobs, training and business opportunities were important issues. And although not everyone got a job, the bottom line was that the project was completed successfully in that industry met its commitments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABILITY TO AFFECT</td>
<td>The committee was good in that it was a visible access point for communities who did not understand or have patience for the bureaucratic process. But it could also attract trouble. The committee's effectiveness was limited because it was trying to upstage and prove that the respective departments were not doing their job. IPL was totally dissatisfied with the process as it was a no win situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISSUES</strong></td>
<td><strong>Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration, Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission: Maurice Thomas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terms of Reference</strong></td>
<td>The terms of reference were satisfactory as the committee represented a good forum for information exchange and everyone as pushed up the learning curve. Mostly socio-economic information was dealt with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committee Structure</strong></td>
<td>Agreed with the membership as everyone who had a hand in the project was represented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to Information</strong></td>
<td>The information exchanged in this forum and the kind of information my agency could offer was not really applicable. Main sources of information came from in house. And, the committee did not see the information presented as significant unless it represented job opportunities for natives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Time</strong></td>
<td>The committee was slow getting started but the length of time that it operated for was in appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meeting Frequency</strong></td>
<td>Agreed with the frequency of meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives for PCC</strong></td>
<td>Did not come to the meetings until late 1983. Decided to participate to learn what was going on and to report on COGLA’s activities i.e. drilling, construction of islands, spills, seismic activities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Issues</strong></td>
<td>Socio-economic aspects of the project were focused on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to Affect</strong></td>
<td>Was effective in that the committee did modify regulatory procedures that would have been different if PCC did not exist. In addition, it got people to discuss the contentious issues of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>DENE NATION: KATE IRVING, REPRESENTATIVE: MARGARET GORMAN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS OF REFERENCE</td>
<td>The mandate was very limited in that it never regulated unless a dispute arose. What was needed was Northern Agency which had the power and scope to make sure procedures were properly followed. The regulatory powers should have been transferred to this agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dene Nation was not involved in the setting of the terms of reference or committee structure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry did live up to commitments as per agreements but the problem was that the standards were not high enough. If a management committee had been established instead, the forum could have accomplished something given the inherent problems with the project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>The committee should have been 50% native representation and 50% government representation with actual regulatory powers at a Monitoring agency level. The management committee would have input into the project management issues and resolving inter-jurisdictional conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</td>
<td>Not a tremendous amount of information was exchanged through this forum. Important issues were shoved under the rug or addressed by side committees which the Dene were not apart of. Since many of the decisions had already been made prior to the Dene's involvement the information exchanged was really “window dressing”. When reports or additional information was required the delay in receiving them was untimely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL TIME</td>
<td>The operational time was fine because the PCC on its own was not effective therefore this predisposed it being missed. The committee should have been established much sooner than a month before construction began.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING FREQUENCY</td>
<td>Meetings did not take place frequently enough. Things happened so quickly in the construction phase that issues fell through the cracks. There were daily reports, minor spills etc., that were not dealt with. Therefore, issues were not dealt with any depth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES FOR PCC</td>
<td>The objectives for the committee was to establish a Dene role in Environmental Monitoring as this could not be done through the Claims negotiating forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNIFICANT ISSUES</td>
<td>The primary issue was environmental issues. Other issues were training issues, and business and employment issues. The Dene had wanted the project to provide higher level skills to northerners as well as labour intensive opportunities. However, this could not be addressed because it did not relate to the N.W. project specifically. Construction issues could not be addressed because the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PCC was set up late in the process. Therefore, these issues were approached in an ad hoc manner.

The effectiveness of the committee was limited as Dene needs were not addressed adequately. In addition, the Dene's role was that of token involvement. If the committee was to accomplish something it should have been a management committee.

As it was, it was a forum for superficial discussion of issues, with no real attempt to identify solutions and virtually no follow up.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>METIS ASSOCIATION: LARRY TOURANGEAU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERMS OF REFERENCE</td>
<td>Would like to have seen more powers to direct IPL. Since the initial agreements had already set the terms which IPL was obligated to there was not meaningful participation in the project through this forum. There should have been a better understanding of what the role of the committee was.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>Agreed that the key participants should be involved in the committee but that the voting power should be split 50/50 between native organization and government agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO INFORMATION</td>
<td>There was no real substance to the information exchanged. Since the main purpose was to ensure Metis took advantage of the business and employment opportunities, the source of the information was the communities themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION TIME</td>
<td>N/A The fact that the situation was so frustrating and the Metis had numerous other meetings to attend, the PCC meetings were not that important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING FREQUENCY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE FOR PCC</td>
<td>To ensure that the Metis took advantage of the business, training and employment opportunities in the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNIFICANT ISSUES</td>
<td>There were none since the job/business issues were never dealt with with any influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABILITY TO AFFECT</td>
<td>Very limited effectiveness as there was no meaningful participation on the line. The Metis lost interest in the PCC after a while as could not get anywhere as contracts continued to go south; union procedures, definition of northerner, etc. remained problematic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


COGLA (Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration), 1985. Telephone Interview with Maurice Thomas. October 18, 1985.


Dene Nation, 1985(c). Telephone Interview with Kate Irving and Margaret Gorman, October 1, 1985 and October 4, 1985.
Delbecq et al, 1975.

DIAND (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 1981. "Norman Wells Pipeline Approved with a Further One Year Delay". Communique and Backgrounder, July 30, 1981.


MacLachlan, L., 1984. "Did the BEARP Panel Listen to Northerners?" in Northern Perspectives Volume 13


Van De Ven, 1980