A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH'S

MARCELLUS

By

EDWARD DALE CLARK

B.A., The University of Washington, 1983
M.A., The University of Washington, 1984

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Classics)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

August 1991

© Edward Dale Clark, 1991
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Classics

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date Dec. 10, 1991
A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH'S MARCELLUS

ABSTRACT

M. Claudius Marcellus won military renown during Rome's wars with the Gauls and the Carthaginians in the latter half of the third century B.C. As consul in 222 B.C. he earned the rare honor of the *spolia opima* by slaying in single combat the opposing Gallic chieftain. In the dark days following the disaster at Cannae in 216 B.C., he showed himself to be the only Roman commander capable of standing up to, if not actually defeating, Hannibal in Italy; for this he gained the title of 'The Sword of Rome.'

Plutarch, writing at the turn of the second century A.D., came near the end of the development of the historical tradition about this famous general. When he came to write this biography, he had available to him a wide range of sources, both favorable and hostile to Marcellus. The purpose of this study is to provide a commentary on his account and to assess the accuracy of the portrait offered.

Plutarch's text has been compared with all the evidence that has survived. Its similarities to and divergences from other versions have been examined, although the investigation is hampered by the loss of much of the source material that had been available to Plutarch. Through this analysis it is hoped that a more accurate picture of Marcellus and of the events in which he was involved have emerged.
Plutarch set out to prove that Marcellus was not only a brave and energetic warrior but also a humanitarian and an admirer of Greek culture. This study concludes that he is only partially convincing. Although there is no doubt about Marcellus' military prowess, his humanitarianism and love of Greek culture are open to serious questions. As the record shows Marcellus adopted measures that were both harsh and cruel, while the extent to which some of his actions appear humane is due in large part to practical necessity. In addition, his admiration of Greek culture seems to have been only superficial. Plutarch in presenting this portrait appears motivated by his notion of virtuous ideals rather than by historical reality.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT AND ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutarch’s Life</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>Parallel Lives</em> and Plutarch’s aim</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutarch’s Methods</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutarch’s Sources</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eight</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Nine</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eleven</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Twelve</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Thirteen</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Fourteen</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Fifteen</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Sixteen</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Professors W. J. Dusing and A. A. Barrett for their cooperation and supervision without which this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor P. E. Harding for his timely efforts and helpful suggestions. To my family I shall always be indebted for the patience shown me and the support given during my many years of study.

E.D.C.
The edition of Plutarch’s text used is that of K. Ziegler (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1968).

**ABBREVIATIONS**

Standard abbreviations are used for citing ancient authors and texts. Abbreviations used for many modern works of scholarship can be found in *L’année philologique* or *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. In other cases shortened titles or the following abbreviations may be employed (full citations for modern works can be found in the Bibliography):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hesselbarth HKUDDL</td>
<td>Hesselbarth, H. <em>Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur dritten</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Ed. A. Pauly et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiel SHRSPRT</td>
<td>Thiel, J. H. Studies on the History viii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times. Amsterdam, 1946.

Walde-Hofmann


References to the commentary begin with "Chapter..." (with a capital C), otherwise the word chapter refers to the text of the Marcellus.
INTRODUCTION

Plutarch’s Life

Plutarch was born in the fourth decade after Christ of a well-to-do family resident in the Greek city of Chaeronea. His family had resided there for generations. It was evidently well-off, since his father, Autobulus, kept the finest horses and engaged in hunting.

Plutarch undoubtedly had a very good education. The chronology for his studies is uncertain, but it is known that he was a student of the philosopher Ammonius in A.D. 66/7 and after going through a period of intense interest in mathematics, joined the Academy in Athens. However, before joining he must have received a thorough training in rhetoric. This is evident

1RE 21.1 [1951], "Plutarchos," no. 2: 636-962; a more precise date for his birth is difficult to determine since it is based on Plutarch’s writings from which we learn that he was a student of Ammonius during Nero’s stay in Greece and about ready to join the Academy (A.D. 66/7; Mor. 385b, 387f, 391e).
2Plutarch (Ant. 68.7-8) reports that his great-grandfather Nicarchus used to tell how all the citizens of Chaeronea were pressed into service by Antony’s agents to transport grain down to the Corinthian gulf at Anticyra in the year of Actium.
3Mor. 642a, 959b; Plutarch never tells us his father’s name, but it has been inferred from Moralia 964d (see Barrow PT 15 and Ziegler RE 21.1 [1951]: 643-644).
4Mor. 385b, 391e; it is reported that Ammonius came from Egypt and held the position of strategos at Athens three times (Eunap. VS p. 454 Olearius: ἐν οἷς Ἀμμώνιός τε ἢν ὁ Ἐξ Αἰγύπτου, Πλουτάρχου τοῦ θειοτάτου γεγονώς διδάσκαλος; Plut. Mor. 720c; see Jones HSPh 71 [1966]: 205-213). Mor. 387f: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τηνικαῦτα προσεκέμπην τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμπαθώς, τἀχα δὴ μέλλων εἰς πάντα τιμῆσειν τὸ ‘μηθὲν ἄγαν’ ἐν Ἂκαδημείᾳ γενόμενος.
in some of his early works. His later mistrust of rhetoric was probably derived from his stay at the Academy.

As a young man Plutarch went on travels. It may be assumed that he toured widely throughout Greece. But he also went on more distant journeys, going to the province of Asia, most likely visiting the city of Smyrna, and travelling to Egypt, visiting Alexandria.

He married young, taking Timoxena, the daughter of Alexion, as his wife. The marriage, which appears to have been a happy one, produced at least five children.

While still a young man, he was chosen as part of a two-man delegation to go to the proconsul of Achaea, probably in order to represent the interests of Chaeronea. This was the beginning of his official contact with the Roman governing class, among whom he was to make many friends.

During his life Plutarch made several trips to Italy and Rome, where he not only performed political duties as an ambassador of Greece, but also was in high demand for

---

5 E.g., the two speeches De fortuna Alexandri.
6 Jones PR 14, Hamilton PAC xiv, xxii-xxiii; see Krauss Die rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im plutarchischen Schriftenkorpus.
7 Mor. 501e-f; Jones PR 14-15; cf. Barrow PT 36, who believes that Plutarch delivered a lecture at either Sardes or Ephesus. That Plutarch was a young man when he went to Egypt is indicated by the presence of his grandfather Lamprias at the party given for him on his return (Mor. 678c-e; Jones PR 15).
8 Mor. 608c, 611d, 701d.
9 Mor. 608c; cf. Hamilton PAC xiii-xiv.
10 Mor. 816d; Jones PR 15.
philosophical lectures and discussions.\textsuperscript{11} The earliest datable trip to Rome appears to have been during the later years of Vespasian's reign (A.D. 69-79).\textsuperscript{12} Also datable to this reign may be his trip to northern Italy with the consular Mestrius Florus. There he visited Ravenna, Otho's tomb at Brixillum, and the battlefield at Bedriacum.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, there are indications that he may have been in Rome during Domitian's reign, in the winter of A.D. 88/9, and later in the years A.D. 92-93.\textsuperscript{14} However, with advancing age he seems to have curtailed his trips to Italy and to have remained in Greece, usually in his native city of Chaeronea or at Delphi.\textsuperscript{15}

During his trips to Italy, Plutarch became acquainted and made friends with many important Romans. He was on good terms with L. Mestrius Florus, who received a suffect consulship from Vespasian (ca. A.D. 75) and the proconsulship of Asia some 15 years later (A.D. 82/3 or perhaps 89/90).\textsuperscript{16} It was through Mestrius' intercession that Plutarch obtained Roman citizenship, possibly from Vespasian.\textsuperscript{17} On account of this favor, Plutarch

\textsuperscript{11} Dem. 2.2: ἐν δὲ Ἦρωμα καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν διατριβαίς οὐ σχολῆς οὔσης...ὑπὸ χρείαν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοσοφίαν πλησιάζόντων; see Moralia 522d-e where Plutarch mentions an incident which occurred during one of his lectures at Rome; cf. Jones PR 20-21.

\textsuperscript{12} Mor. 973e-974a.

\textsuperscript{13} Mar. 2.1, Otho 18.1-2, 14.2; Jones PR 22.

\textsuperscript{14} For winter of A.D. 88/89 see Aemilius 25.5-7; Jones PR 22; for years A.D. 92-93 see Moralia 522d-e, 632a, and Publicola 15.5; Jones PR 22-23.

\textsuperscript{15} Mor. 384e, 727b, Dem. 2.1-2; cf. Jones PR 28.

\textsuperscript{16} PIR\textsuperscript{2} Μ, no. 531; Otho 14.2; Jones PR 49.

\textsuperscript{17} Syll. 3, 829A = Smallwood Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian, no. 487; Jones PR 22.
appears to have adopted Mestrius' name as well as to have passed it on to his sons.\(^\text{18}\)

Another one of his Roman friends was Q. Sosius Senecio, to whom Plutarch dedicated his *Parallel Lives*.\(^\text{19}\) Sosius was a quaestor in Greece in the late 80's where they may have first met. In origin he may have been from the Greek East. He was also perhaps as much as 20 years younger than Plutarch.\(^\text{20}\) Upon Domitian's assassination he was promoted to the governorship of Gallia Belgica. In A.D. 99 he received the ordinary consulship and later held high commands in the Dacian Wars. Possibly on account of his services in these wars he received from Trajan the distinction of a second ordinary consulship for A.D. 107.\(^\text{21}\) It may be due to Sosius that Plutarch received the *ornamenta consularia* from Trajan.\(^\text{22}\)

Among Plutarch's other important Roman friends and acquaintances were Avidius Nigrinus and Avidius Quietus, Arulenus Rusticus, Julius Secundus, L. Herennius Saturninus, and C. Minicius Fundanus.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{18}\) Plutarch does not mention his adopted name in his writings, but it has been found on an inscription (Syll. 3, 829A; Barrow *PT* 12-13). Of Plutarch's sons, one was evidently named L. Mestrius Autobulus and the other L. Mestrius Soclerus (Syll. 3, 844A; IG, IX, 1, 61.41-42; Jones *PR* 22).

\(^{19}\) *RE* 3a.1 [1927], no. 11: 1180-1193; see *Theseus* 1.1, *Demosthenes* 1.1, 31.7, and *Dion* 1.1 for mentions of Sosius' name in the *Parallel Lives*.

\(^{20}\) Jones *PR* 55.

\(^{21}\) Jones *PR* 55-56.

\(^{22}\) *Suda*, s.v. Πλούταρχος, Χαιρωνεύς: μεταδόεις δὲ αὐτῷ Τραιανὸς τῆς τῶν ὑπάτων ἀξίως προσέταξε μηδένα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα ἄρχοντον παρέξ τῆς αὐτοῦ γνώμης τι διαπράττεσθαι; Jones *PR* 29.

\(^{23}\) *PIR*² A, nos. 1407, 1410; *Mor.* 478b, 548a; *PIR*² I/J, no. 730;
His trips to Italy and Rome and the number and importance of his Roman friends provide an obvious solution for the means by which Plutarch gathered material on the Romans portrayed in his *Parallel Lives*. Not only would he have had access to the libraries of these Romans, but also he would have been able to collect anecdotal material from his friends either orally or through correspondence.

For most of his later life, the period to which belongs the bulk of his writings, Plutarch was content to reside in his native city of Chaeronea, having put aside those duties requiring extensive travel, but still engaging in local politics. Also, he spent time at nearby Delphi, where he was one of the two permanent priests of Apollo for many years.

Plutarch lived on into the reign of Hadrian, who honored him by making him procurator of Greece (A.D. 119/20), but this position he probably only held in a nominal capacity. Also during the early part of this reign, Plutarch was the executive officer of the Amphictyonic council, the 'Επιμελητής, and as such supervised the setting up of a statue to Hadrian. However by A.D. 125 Plutarch was probably dead. It has been pointed out that he, in all likelihood, had dedicated the statue by virtue

---

24 Dem. 2.1-2, Mor. 811b-c.
25 Mor. 384e, 792f.
27 Syll. 3, 829A.
of his position as the senior priest at Delphi, and when a similar statue was set up in A.D. 125, the dedicator was a certain T. Flavius Aristotimus.\textsuperscript{28} If the Amphictyonic council had not changed its practice in the meantime, then Plutarch had died, and Flavius had succeeded him as senior priest.\textsuperscript{29} Plutarch at the time of his death was probably less than 80 years old, as his absence from the list of Ps.-Lucian's \textit{Macrobioi} suggests.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28}Syll. 3, 835B.

\textsuperscript{29}Jones \textit{JRS} 56 (1966): 66; see Ziegler \textit{RE} 21.1 (1951): 641 for references to scholars who would place Plutarch's death after A.D. 125.

\textsuperscript{30}Hamilton \textit{PAC} xvi; see Ziegler \textit{RE} 21.1 (1951): 640-641.
The "Parallel Lives" and Plutarch's Aim

The *Marcellus* forms part of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, a work consisting of a series of biographies in which a famous Greek is paired with a well-known Roman.\(^1\) The people selected were especially noted as either politicians or generals, and Plutarch attempted to show the virtuous qualities of their personalities through their actions.\(^2\) The original series consisted of 23 pairs of which all survive except the first pair, Epaminondas/Scipio. Appended to 19 of these pairs is a short comparison (*σύγκρισις*). Whether the other pairs had similar comparisons is not known; it is generally assumed that they were written, but have become lost.\(^3\)

It is not known when Plutarch began writing the *Parallel Lives*, but from internal evidence it appears probable that the whole series was begun after A.D. 96.\(^4\) He dedicated this work to his friend Q. Sosius Senecio.\(^5\) Jones suggests that Sosius' consulship of A.D. 99 might have furnished the occasion for

---

\(^1\) Although usually each pair consists of two persons, there is one exception in which a pair consists of two sets of persons (Agis/Cleomenes coupled with Tib./C. Gracchus).

\(^2\) This is the case for all of the lives except those of Demetrius and Antony whom Plutarch chose as examples of personalities which, despite having certain good traits, turned out bad.

\(^3\) See Hamilton *PAC* xxxiv.

\(^4\) Jones *JRS* 56 (1966): 68-70.

\(^5\) This is conjectured from Plutarch's address to his friend in several of the lives (*Thes.* 1.1, *Dem.* 1.1, 31.7, *Dion.* 1.1.). The actual dedication would have been in the first pair, Epaminondas/Scipio, which has not survived.
This.

Plutarch says that the inspiration for undertaking the composition of these lives came from others, but that his own continuation of the work was due to himself. This suggests that he had not originally planned such a series, but that after writing one or more pairs he was inspired to continue. This would explain the apparently haphazard arrangement seen by some scholars in this work.

What was Plutarch's aim in writing the Parallel Lives? Some scholars maintain that he wrote to show the Greeks that the Romans were not barbarians, and conversely, to show the Romans that the Greeks were not contemptible Graeculi. However, he does not state such a purpose for his work. In the preface to the Aemilius/Timoleon pair, he reveals that his research was aimed at his own moral improvement. He asserts that he is attempting to fashion his life according to the virtues of those about whom he is writing. The theme of moral improvement is also found in his Pericles, where Plutarch maintains that the

---

6 Jones JRS 56 (1966): 70.
7 *Aem./Tim.*, pref. 1: Ἐμοὶ δὲ τὴν βίων ἡμαθίαν μὲν γραφὴς συνέβη δι’ ἑτέρους, ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἢδη καὶ δίκαιον.
8 Barrow PT 52.
9 See Jones PR 104 and Palm Rom, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit 42; see Theseus 1.4-5 and Demetrius 1.5 for examples of haphazard arrangement.
10 This view is put forward by Ziegler RE 21.1 (1951): 897; see Jones PR 103 for bibliography on this problem.
11.5.
12 *Aem./Tim.*, pref. 1: Ὕσπερ ἐν ἔσοπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειράματον ἄμως γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἄφομοισθούν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τῶν βιῶν.
appreciation of works of virtue impels one to emulate the doer of such deeds. This suggests that the aim of moral improvement was meant not only for himself, but even for his readers.

But who were his intended readers? First, it must be noted that throughout the work there are indications that Plutarch had in mind a Greek audience. In the particular case of the Marcellus, he explains for the benefit of his readers the Roman spolia opima, triumph, ovation, and attitude towards religion. These explanations would have been unnecessary for a Roman audience. Further, he did not have in mind all Greeks, but only a select group, those knowledgeable enough not to share in the erroneous views of the many. These were Greeks who had sufficient wealth and leisure to spend time studying philosophy, and would be in a position to participate in politics, inspired by the examples of virtuous action presented in these biographies.

13 1-2, but note especially 2.2: ἀλλά ὡς ἡ ἄρετή ταῖς πράξεσιν εὐθύς οὕτω διηπίθησιν, ἀμφότεροι δεικνύονται τὰ ἔργα καὶ ζηλοῦσαν τοὺς εἰργασμένους, and 2.4: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἔφη αὐτὸ πρακτικῆς κίνει καὶ πρακτικῆς εὐθὺς ὁρμήν ἐντίθησιν, ἢθοποιοῦν ὑ τῇ μιμήσει τὸν θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου τὴν προσέρεσιν παρεχόμενον.

14 8.1-10, 22.1-8, 3.6, 4.7-5.7, 6.11-12; Plutarch also translates Marcellus' name giving the Greek equivalent (Marc. 1.1) as he does for several other Roman names (Cic. 1.4, Publ. 10.9, Cat. Mai. 1.3, Fab. Max. 1.2), but he never does this in reverse, giving the Latin equivalent of a Greek name.

15 This is not to deny that Plutarch knew Romans would read his work and actually desired it, but nonetheless, the work was composed with a Greek audience in mind.

16 Cras. 27.6, Cor. 21.1-2.

17 Plutarch often refers to philosophical ideas which he expects his readership to comprehend (e.g., Ages. 5.5, Lys. 25.5, Lyc. 29.1, Agis 2.1-6). See Wardman Plutarch's Lives 37-48 for discussion on Plutarch's intended readership.
The Marcellus was paired with the Pelopidas. In the Pelopidas Plutarch explains his reasons for linking these two lives together. Both men fought against formidable adversaries, Marcellus against Hannibal, Pelopidas against the Spartans, but more importantly both rashly threw away their lives in battle when it was most important for them to stay alive. This pair also has a comparison appended to it in which not only the similarities, but also the differences between the two men are pointed out.

The Pelopidas/Marcellus pair is among the first few sets of biographies written by Plutarch for his Parallel Lives. The Marcellus is already cited in the Fabius Maximus, which formed the Roman half of the tenth pair (Pericles/Fabius Maximus). Since the pairs which occupy the first position and positions 6-9 appear certain, the Pelopidas/Marcellus pair must fall within positions 2-4.

This early positioning of the Pelopidas/Marcellus pair helps to explain some of the digressions and excursuses which are found in the Marcellus. Plutarch in his Marcellus makes a

\[\text{\(^{18}\)} \text{1-2, more specifically 2.9-12: Ταύτα δὲ μοι παρέστη προαναφωνήσαι γράφοντι τὸν Πελοπίδου βίον καὶ τὸν Μαρκέλλου, μεγάλων ἄνδρῶν παραλόγως πεσόντων. καὶ γὰρ χειρὶ χρήσαται μαχιμώτατοι γενόμενοι, καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις κοσμήσαντος ἀμφότεροι τὰς πατρίδας, ἔτι δὲ τῶν βαρυτάτων ἀνταγωνιστῶν, ὃ μὲν Ἰωάννης ἀπειτησεν ὅντα πρῶτος ὡς ἔλεγεται τρεψάμενος, ὃ δὲ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχοντας ἰακεδαϊμονίως ἐκ παρατάξεως νικήσας, ἡμείδησαν ἐαυτῶν σὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ, προέμενοι τὸν βίον ὑπηρκά μάλιστα τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλως ἦν ἄνδρῶν σφαζομένων καὶ ἄρχοντων. διὸ ἤμείς ἐπόμενοι ταῖς ὁμοιότητι παραλλήλους ἀνεγράψαμεν αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους.\]

\[\text{\(^{19}\)} 19.2, 22.8.\]

\[\text{\(^{20}\)} Jones JRS 56 (1966): 67-68.\]
point of explaining Roman customs, which give the impression that his Greek audience was unfamiliar with them and required instruction. Inclusions of these remarks would be easily understandable in the earliest lives written, since these would be the first occasions when elaboration would be needed, unlike later lives when it could be expected that his readers were now familiar with these things.

21 See, for example, 3.6, 4.7-5.7, 6.11-12, 8.1-10, and 22.1-8.
Plutarch’s Method

Plutarch attempted to portray the virtues (more rarely, the vices) of his subjects’ personalities in the Parallel Lives. He believed that an individual’s character manifested itself in action, and it was this belief that guided him in the selection of material for his portraits.  

Plutarch at the beginning of the Alexander gives his clearest description of what he is doing. He states that he is writing biographies, not histories, and virtue or vice is not always evident in the most conspicuous actions, but often a trivial thing like a phrase or a jest will make more manifest one’s character than bloody fights, great battle-lines, and sieges of cities. Therefore, just as painters who in their portraits derive likenesses from the face and the shape of the eyes, in which character is revealed, but take little account of the remaining features, so he must be allowed to concentrate on the signs of the soul in fashioning the life of each, and to leave to others the narration of great actions and struggles.

Although the distinction he makes here between biography

52 This belief corresponded to the Peripatetic view of character (see Hamilton PAC xxxiii-xxxiv).

53 1.2-3: οὐ τε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὕτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεις πάντως ἐνεστὶ δῆλωσις ἄρετης ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ρήμα καὶ παιδία τις ἐμφασιν ἡσυχος ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολλορκία πόλεων. ὦσπερ οὖν οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὁμιλοῦσαν σιῶν ἐμφάνισαι τὸ ἡθος ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν μερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἢμῖν δοτέοι εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύσθαι, καὶ διὰ τούτων εὐθυμοι εἰς τὸν ἐκάστου βίον, ἑσάσαντες ἐτέρους τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας.
and history is an attempt on his part to justify his decision not to narrate in full the events of Alexander's life, for which he had too much material, still it indicates his criteria for selection: he chose incidents which showed character. But as other lives reveal, this did not necessarily mean that he avoided large events. Great incidents could also contribute to the portrayal of character. The individuals whom he was writing about played a prominent part in the major happenings of the day, and since action revealed character it would be only natural for him to use these.

In the particular case of his Marcellus, unlike his Alexander, he appears to have had a difficult time finding sufficient material, and to leave out large events would have been impossible. Therefore, to supplement this lack he adds numerous digressions which have nothing directly to do with Marcellus.³

He derived the basic frame-work and facts for his lives from the historians and with additional information acquired elsewhere, tried to elucidate the characters of his subjects. He investigated the events of the past in a manner similar to the historians, and his biographies have been called an offshoot of ancient historiography.⁴ Conversely, the historians themselves did not avoid character-study. But although there is much similarity between Plutarch and the historians, the overall

³Cf. Scardigli Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs 38.
⁴At Nicias 1.5 he labels his work a ἰστορίας; see Wardman Plutarch's Lives 1.
aims of each were different. Plutarch’s purpose was much narrower; he attempted to portray character and judged the importance of an event mainly by its ability to do so. The historians, on the other hand, took a more comprehensive view and recorded events which were memorable for any one of a variety of reasons. ⁵

Plutarch offers a further refinement on the nature of his biography in his Cimon. Here he compares the biographer to the portrait painters, who, he says, believe it proper, if they find some small annoying thing in their subject, not to leave it out entirely, but also not to render it too exact, since in the first case it would not be true to life, while in the second the appearance would be disgraceful. In the same way, the biographer, having a proper regard for human nature (knowing that no life is free of blame), ought to choose out the good qualities to form his portrait, while it is certainly not necessary to concentrate on the bad aspects. ⁶

These particular remarks in his Cimon are used to justify the portrait which he will produce of Lucullus, the Roman half

⁵See Wardman Plutarch’s Lives 2-10 for a comparison between Plutarch’s biography and character-study in the historians.

⁶2.3-5: ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὴν ἔχοντα χάριν εἶδη ξογγαφοῦντας, ἂν προσῇ τι μικρὸν αὐτοῖς δυσχερές, ἀξιοῦμεν μὴ παραλιπεῖν τοῦτο τελέῳ μῆτ' ἐξακριβοῦν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὰν, τὸ δ' ἀνομοῖαν παρέχεται τὴν ὄψιν· οὕτως ἐπεὶ χαλεπὸν ἔστι, μᾶλλον δ' ἵνα ἀμήχανον, ἀμεμφῆ καὶ καθαρὸν ἄνδρὸς ἐπιδείξατι βίον, ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ἀναπληρωτέον ὅσπερ ὁμοιότητα τὴν ἀλήθειαν. τάς δ' ἐκ πάθους τινὸς ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνάγκη ἐπιτρεχούσας ταῖς πράξεις ἁμαρτίας καὶ κήρας ἐλλείμματα μᾶλλον ἄρετὴς τίνος ἡ κάκιας πονηρεύσματα νομίζοντας ὅσο δεῖ πάντως ἐναποστημαίνειν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ καὶ περιττῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αἱ δομένους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, εἰ καλὸν οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδ' ἀναμφισβήτητον εἰς ἄρετὴν ἴθος γεγονὸς ἀποδίδωσιν.
of the pair, whose life, he knew, contained much that was disreputable. But this comment also has relevance for the Marcellus, since Plutarch deliberately leaves out actions and events in this life, where he is able to do so without greatly affecting the narrative, which show the harsh, cruel or treacherous side of Marcellus’ personality.  

Plutarch generally arranged his material in chronological order, starting with his subject’s early life and progressing from there to his death, unlike, for example, Suetonius who tends to arrange his material topologically. However, his concern for portraying character can induce him to disregard chronology when it suits his purpose. A clear example of this is found in his Solon when he deals with Solon’s meeting with Croesus. He rejects the notion that a story which is so well-known and so apt to Solon’s character should be disregarded on account of any chronological canons, which have yet to be agreed upon. Although he knows how to use his sources to fix dates, he often displays a lack of interest in chronology and at times falls into error. Gomme, after analyzing several

For example, Plutarch does not report Marcellus’ execution of 70 condemned traitors at Nola in 216 B.C. (Liv. 23.17.1-3), his treacherous attack on the enemy given leave by Fabius Maximus to depart from Casilinum (Liv. 24.19.8-10), and his acquiescence to the slaughter of the inhabitants of Henna by one of his subordinate officers (Liv. 24.37.1-39.9).

For example, at Aristides 5 the archon list is used to prove
instances of chronological difficulties in Plutarch’s Greek lives, cautions that one must be careful in deducing any chronological inferences from him.  

Plutarch cites no fewer than 151 authors in his writings. This vast number has led some scholars to question whether he had consulted them directly or had acquired his information through an intermediary. But Gomme, by pointing out Plutarch’s wide reading and statements on whom he had read, has shown persuasively that Plutarch must have been familiar with the large majority of those cited.

Among the writers cited, 40 wrote in Latin. In the Demosthenes Plutarch relates how he came to learn the Latin language. He says that he began his study of Latin late in life, and it was his knowledge of affairs which helped him to recognize the words and not vice versa. However, he did not have the time to devote himself to acquire an appreciation of Latin style.

that Aristides was archon in 489/8 B.C., at Cimon 17.8-18 and Pericles 10 Plutarch shows a disregard for what Cimon was doing between 457-450 B.C., and at Lysander 14-15 Plutarch mistakenly puts the surrender of Samos before that of Athens.

10 Thucydides 1: 56-69; see Chapter 13.3. τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ... concerning a possible chronological error in the Marcellus.


12 See Meyer Forschungen zur alten Geschichte, the most extreme supporter of this view.

13 See Gomme Thucydides 1: 54-84, especially 54-56 and 78-80 and Hamilton PAC xliii-xlvi, who agrees with Gomme’s assessment.

14 2.2-4: ἐν δὲ Ἡρώη καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν διατριβαῖς οὐ σχολῆς οὔσης γυμνάζεσθαι περὶ τὴν Ἡρωαίκην διάλεκτον ὑπὸ χρείᾳν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοσοφίαν πλησιαζόντων, ὅπερ ποτε καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἦλικίας ἡρξάμεθα Ἡρωαίκοις συντάγμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν, καὶ πράγμα θαυμαστὸν μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἄλληθές ἐπάσχομεν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως
This passage has been taken as indicating that Plutarch, although knowing many Latin words, lacked fluency in the language. He, no doubt, picked up the language as he pursued his research (this would explain the mistakes which he makes with the language). However, Plutarch’s statement was made in order to justify his failure to compare the speeches of Cicero to those of Demosthenes in their pair of lives. He is not declaring that he could not read Latin, but that he is not an expert in Latin style. His comment on the beauty, quickness, metaphors, harmonies, and other aspects of the language strongly suggests that his knowledge of it was sufficient for his purposes.

Besides published works, Plutarch also mentions other...
sources of information. In the *Nicías* he refers to the use of dedicatory inscriptions and public decrees. Elsewhere he mentions oral sources.

How did he go about composing the *Parallel Lives*? In the beginning of his *Demosthenes* he sets out what a research writer needs in order to produce a work which is not deficient. The essential requirement is that the writer should live in a famous and populous city which esteems the arts, for there he will find an abundance of books and will be able to learn additional facts from conversation. But Plutarch confesses that he lives in a small town, and he does so in order that it may not become smaller still. This admission suggests that he may have run into difficulties in composing his work while at Chaeronea, and here he is offering an apology for any defects which it may contain due to incompleteness. However, it should not be doubted that he owned a reasonable sized library at Chaeronea, containing not only the so-called classics, but also a number of less common books, which he had picked up during his travels or

18.5: Ίνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἄμελης δοκῶ καὶ ἄργος εἶναι, τὰ διαφέροντα τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡς ἑτέρων δὲ εἰρήμενα οποράδην ἡ πρὸς ἀναθήμασιν ἢ ψηφίσμασιν εὑρήμενα παλαιοῖς πεπείραμαι συναγαγεῖν, οὐ τὴν ἄχρηστον ἀθροίζων ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατανόησιν ἥθους καὶ τρόπου παραδίδοις.

19. He mentions the importance of oral sources at *Demosthenes* 2.1; an example of his use of an oral source is found at *Numa* 8.20.

20. *Dem. 2.1*: Τῷ μέντοι σύνταξιν ὑποβεβλημένῳ καὶ ἱστορίαν, ἐξ οὗ προχείρων οὐδὲ σκέψεων, ἀλλὰ ἐξέχον τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ διεσπαρμένων ἐν ἑτέροις συνιόσαν ἀναγνωσμάτων, τῷ ὧντι ἵππην πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν καὶ μάλιστα 'τὰν πόλιν εὐθόκισμον' καὶ φιλόκαλον καὶ πολιονθρόπον, ὡς βιβλίων τε παντοδαπῶν ἄφθονίαν ἔχων, καὶ ὅσα τοὺς γραφοντας διαφυγόντα σωτηρία μνήμης ἐπιφανεστέραν εἵληψε πίπτον, ὑπολαμβάνων ἁκοῆ καὶ διαπυνθανόμενος, μηδὲνδὲ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐνθείες ἀποδιδοइ τὸ ἔργον. Ἦμειξις δὲ μικρὰν μὲν οἰκούντες πόλιν, καὶ ἴνα μὴ μικρότερα γένηται φιλοχωροῦντες.
had been given to him by his distant friends. In addition, he doubtless read a great number of books which he found while on his travels and had made extracts or taken notes from them.\textsuperscript{21}

All of this material he would have had at hand in composing his work. But the precise way in which he gathered and organized his information is unknown. He probably read through the relevant material for a particular life first, then sat down to write, relying to a great extent on his own memory to recall the basic facts.\textsuperscript{22} This would not have been difficult for him, since the ancients depended to a much greater extent on memory than we do today, and their schooling emphasized its use.\textsuperscript{23} It has even been suggested that he relied almost solely on his memory, but this assumption is hardly necessary.\textsuperscript{24} Plutarch certainly depended heavily on his memory, but he could and likely did refer to his books, extracts, and notes during the process of composition.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21}In the \textit{Moralia} he mentions the use of such material which he had collected for himself (464e-f: μὴτε δὲ χρόνον ἔχων, ὡς προηγούμενη, γενέσαι πρὸς οἷς ἐβούλου μὴθ' ὑπομένων κεναῖς παντάπασι τῶν ἄνδρα χερσὶν ὄφθηναί σοι παρ' ἡμῶν ἄφιγμένον, ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὡν ἐμαυτῷ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον).

\textsuperscript{22}In the \textit{Pericles} Plutarch refers to his memory specifically as the source for the material presented (24.12: ταύτα μὲν ἐπελθόντα τῇ μνήμῃ κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν).

\textsuperscript{23}See Seneca the Elder \textit{Controv.} 1.1-5 where he discusses his ability to remember.

\textsuperscript{24}See Zimmermann \textit{RhM} 79 (1930): 61-62.

\textsuperscript{25}See Gomme \textit{Thucydidies} 1: 84, Hamilton \textit{PAC} xliv, xlvi, and Wartmann \textit{Leben des Cato von Utica} 39.
Plutarch's Sources

In the Marcellus and the accompanying Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli, Plutarch cites seven different authors as sources.\(^1\) In addition, there are indications which suggest that Plutarch utilized other authorities whom he does not mention. All of this has attracted the attention of source-critics from the middle of the nineteenth century to shortly before the Second World War.\(^2\) But despite the work done, the results have produced little consensus among scholars on what sources Plutarch used. This is due not only to the various presuppositions about Plutarch's working method and what the citations in the life imply, but also to the loss of much of the ancient evidence.\(^3\) Therefore, no definitive answer to this

\(^{1}\)Posidonius (Marc. 1.1, 9.7, 20.11, 30.7), Livy (Marc. 11.8, 24.5, 30.5, Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8), Cornelius Nepos (Marc. 30.5, Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8), Valerius Maximus (Marc. 30.5), Augustus (Marc. 30.5, Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8), Polybius (Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.7), and Juba (Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8).


\(^{3}\)In regard to the citations, for example, opinions differ over whether Plutarch had read all the authors he cites, or whether he derived some of the names from an intermediate source.
problem has been put forth in this commentary. What follows is an assessment of the literary sources.

1. Posidonius was a Stoic philosopher originally from Apamea on the Orontes in Syria. He was a student of Panaetius at Athens, but later resided at Rhodes and became a citizen. Jacoby dates his residence at Rhodes from 90 B.C., at the latest, to at least 60 B.C. We know that Posidonius was an ambassador at Rome in 87/6 B.C., and the notice in the Suda of his coming to Rome in the consulship of a M. Claudius Marcellus is generally dated to the year 51 B.C., at which time Rhodes reaffirmed her treaty with Rome, an event with which Posidonius may have been involved. He died soon after this at the age of

Not all possible sources used by Plutarch which have been postulated by scholars have been listed here, but only those which are still maintained by the most recent research (in particular, an assessment of Coelius Antipater has been left out, concerning whom see Zimmermann RhM 79 [1930]: 55 and De Sanctis SR 3.2: 371).

Although no definitive answer is proposed, the views of De Sanctis (SR 3.2: 366-373) appear to offer the most plausible hypothesis. De Sanctis proposes that Plutarch used a brief biography of Marcellus written by Cornelius Nepos for the outline of his own work, and then fleshed out this outline with material drawn mainly from the works of Livy, but also adding smaller portions derived from Polybius, Posidonius, Valerius Maximus, Juba, and a biographical work on Archimedes.

In the main body of the commentary points of disagreement between source critics are discussed when they have particular relevance, but no attempt has been made to be exhaustive.

RE 22.1 (1953), no. 3: 558-826; Jacoby FGrH, no. 87.

Panaetius died ca. 110 B.C. (Cic. De Or. 1.45); Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος; Strab. 16.2.13.

FGrH 2 C: 154.

Plut. Mar. 45.7; Suda s.v. Ποσειδώνιος; e.g. for date of Posidonius' arrival, Jacoby FGrH 2 C: 154; Cic. Fam. 12.15.2.; see Kidd Posidonius 2: 4.
Among his philosophical and scientific works Posidonius is known to have written a universal history in 52 books, starting with the year 145/4 B.C., which was to be a continuation of Polybius' work. According to Jacoby it was largely finished before 60 B.C., but its termination date is uncertain. The weight of evidence points to the mid-eighties B.C. for the conclusion of this history.

The four citations of Posidonius in the Marcellus and the brief notice in the Suda have induced some scholars to postulate that Posidonius had close ties with the Marcelli and wrote a special work for the family.

Münzer believes that Posidonius, near the end of his studies at Athens (ca. 110 B.C.), developed a personal relationship with a M. Claudius Marcellus, who was eagerly pursuing philosophical studies there. This Marcellus made available his family archives to Posidonius (just as he did for Coelius Antipater, an acquaintance through their common friend the orator Licinius Crassus), and induced him to take up a

---

10 Ps.-Lucian Macr. 20; see Jacoby FGrH 2 C: 154-155.
11 Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος; see Edelstein-Kidd Posidonius: The Fragments, vol. 1, Theller Poseidonios: Die Fragmente, or Jacoby FGrH 2 A, no. 87 for remains of this work.
12 Cic. Att. 2.1.2; FGrH 2 C: 155.
13 See Kidd Posidonius 2: 277-280 for the most recent discussion on this problem.
14 Marc. 1.1, 9.7, 20.11, 30.7; Suda s.v. Ποσειδώνιος: ἤλθε δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἑρώμην ἐπὶ Μάρκου Μαρκέλλου.
15 RE 3.2 (1899), no. 227: 2760; Cic. De Or. 1.45, 57.
defense of his family against the defamations of Polybius. Münzer bases this conjecture on Polybius' bias against our Marcellus during the Gallic War of 225-222 B.C. in favor of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus, his critical comments about our Marcellus' death, and his bias against the consul of 152 B.C., who was probably the grandfather of the Marcellus whom Posidonius met in Athens.

Several scholars besides Münzer have proposed that Posidonius undertook to compose a work for the Marcelli. The major discussion among these scholars is over what form this composition took. The suggestions have ranged from a monograph about our Marcellus to a wide ranging excursus appended to his history. However, some scholars have called into question the existence of such a work. First, there is nowhere mentioned a composition by Posidonius for the Marcelli. Second, in the examination of the citations of Posidonius in the Marcellus there is no indication of such a work. In the citation at 1.1, nothing more can be inferred than the provenance for the explanation of the name Marcellus (= 'Αρχιλός), since Bauer has

Livy (27.27.13) mentions a laudatio given by the son of our Marcellus which Coelius Antipater had come upon.


shown that Plutarch owed this citation to a long discussion on Roman names which Posidonius had given in the introduction to his historical work.\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, the citation at 9.7, which refers to Fabius being called 'The Shield' and Marcellus 'The Sword of Rome,' appears to be merely an insertion by Plutarch of one of his many gleanings gathered from his research.\textsuperscript{21} As for the citation at 20.11, Posidonius is credited with the story of Nicias of Engyion, but as the story is presented, Marcellus plays an insignificant role.\textsuperscript{22} Also, it is placed after the conclusion of the Sicilian events as an appendix, indicating that it was separate from the preceding events.\textsuperscript{23} It is therefore difficult to see how this story would have been derived from a work dealing with Marcellus. The last citation, found at 30.7, deals with an inscription on the base of a statue of Marcellus found at Lindos on the island of Rhodes. But it is not possible to establish why Posidonius had quoted the epigram on the statue, and the comment on it (it is supposed that the editorial remark of Plutarch was derived from Posidonius) does not show a very accurate knowledge of Marcellus' life. The epigram says that Marcellus held consular power seven times, and Plutarch comments that the composer of this epigram added the proconsular office, which Marcellus held twice, to his five

\textsuperscript{20}Philologus 47 (1889): 242-273; see Plutarch Marius 1 where in a discussion on Roman names the addition of Posidonius' comments makes it clear that he had dealt with this topic at length.

\textsuperscript{21}Klotz RhM 83 (1934): 292.

\textsuperscript{22}Kidd Posidonius 2: 346.

\textsuperscript{23}Klotz RhM 83 (1934): 293.
consulships to obtain this number. We know, however, that at least two more proconsulships must be counted, and one could hardly credit Posidonius with this editorial statement if he had a very close acquaintance with the Marcelli. Finally, in regard to the notice in the Suda, nothing about a written composition should be inferred from it. Although it has been suggested that Posidonius dedicated a work to the Marcellus mentioned in it, the consul of 51 B.C., Klotz says this ignores doubts which make the notice in the Suda suspect. Even Münzer admits that the notice is an awkward abridgment of its source and all attempts to rectify it remain uncertain.

Consequently, there is no solid evidence that can link Posidonius to the Marcelli or to a composition of a work for them. Although this makes it questionable to claim that Posidonius was the main source, Plutarch was certainly familiar with him, but he is cited only for extracts which are clearly detached from the main narrative.

2. Titus Livius was born at Patavium (mod. Padua) in northern Italy. Jerome puts Livy's birth in 59 B.C. and his

---

24 RE 13.1 (1926), no. 9: 816-852; Quint. 1.5.56; Asc. Corn. 68; Mart. 1.61.3.
25 Cf. Kotz RhM 83 (1934) 292-293.
26 RhM 83 (1934): 292.
28 See Mühl Klass. Phil. Stud. 4 (1925): 5-35, who is the most recent proponent of the hypothesis that Posidonius was Plutarch’s main source for the Marcellus.
death in A.D. 17.\textsuperscript{30} But these dates are apparently too high, and Livy's life-span should be from from 64 B.C. to A.D. 12.\textsuperscript{31}

Livy spent time in Rome enjoying the acquaintance of Augustus and even encouraging the youthful Claudius to undertake the writing of history.\textsuperscript{32} He probably lived most of his adult life in the imperial city, but retired in his old age to his home town of Patavium where he died.\textsuperscript{33}

It is said that Livy wrote philosophical dialogues, but he is best known for his monumental history of Rome, \textit{Ab urbe condita}, in 142 books.\textsuperscript{34} While there is no indication that this project was undertaken before 29 B.C., he appears to have completed the first five books between 27 and 25 B.C.\textsuperscript{35}

Plutarch cites Livy three times in the \textit{Marcellus} and once in the \textit{Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli}.\textsuperscript{36} These citations along with the close contacts found between Livy's work and the \textit{Marcellus} have led several scholars to postulate that he was one of Plutarch's main sources.\textsuperscript{37}

3. Cornelius Nepos was born in Transpadane Gaul.\textsuperscript{38} He

\textsuperscript{30}Ab Abr. 1958.
\textsuperscript{31}See Ogilvie Livy 1.
\textsuperscript{32}Tac. Ann. 4.34; Suet. Claud. 41.1.
\textsuperscript{33}Walsh Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods 18-19.
\textsuperscript{34}Sen. Ep. 100.9.
\textsuperscript{35}Ogilvie Livy 2.
\textsuperscript{36}Marc. 11.8, 24.5, 30.5; Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.18.
\textsuperscript{37}See, for example, Hesselbarth HKUDDL 533-541, Kahrs\text{\"{e}}d Holz Geschichte der Karthager 3: 140-362, De Sanctis SR 32.2: 366-373, and Zimmermann RhM 79 (1930): 55-64.
\textsuperscript{38}RE 4.1 (1900), no. 275: 1408-1417; Peter HRR 2: xxxx-lvi, 25-40; Plin. Ep. 4.28.1; Plin. NH 3.127; Aus. Ecl. 1.9.
appears to have spent the greater part of his life in Rome, but to have avoided public life, devoting his time largely to literary pursuits.\(^{39}\) He was on intimate terms with Atticus and exchanged letters with Cicero.\(^{40}\) His dates are not certain, but he appears to have lived a long life and to have died during the early years of Augustus' rule (ca. 99-ca. 24 B.C.).\(^{41}\)

He is known to have composed a biographical work in at least 16 books entitled *De viris illustribus.*\(^{42}\) Of this work, only the book on great foreign generals, *De excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium,* survives. This book was paired with a corresponding book, now lost, on Roman generals.\(^{43}\)

The citations of Cornelius Nepos at *Marcellus* 30.5 and at *Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli* 1.8 suggest that one of the lives of the Roman generals in Nepos' work was that of Marcellus.\(^{44}\) The presence of the life of Pelopidas in the *De excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium* and Nepos' statement that he intended to compare the foreign generals with Roman commanders strengthen this hypothesis, since Plutarch himself links these two men together as a pair and may even have been

\(^{39}\) See, for example, Hieronymus *Adv. Iovinian.* 12 Hierosol, Pliny Ep. 5.3.6, and Fronto Ep. ad M. Caes. 1.7.

\(^{40}\) Nep. *Att.* 13.7; Cic. *Att.* 16.5.5; Macrob. Sat. 2.1.14; Suet. Iul. 55.

\(^{41}\) Rolfe *Oxford Classical Dictionary*\(^2\) 728.

\(^{42}\) Char. *Gramm.* 1.141.13 Keil: Cornelius Nepos inlustrium virorum libro XVI...

\(^{43}\) Nep. *Hann.* 13.4: Sed nos tempus est huius libri facere finem et Romanorum explicare imperatores, quo facilius collatis utrorumque factis, qui viri praeferendi sint, possit iudicari.

induced to compose their biographies from Nepos’ example.

The length of such a biography by Nepos is difficult to estimate, but judging from the length of those lives which do survive, one would guess that the composition ranged anywhere from a tenth to a quarter of the length of Plutarch’s own work on Marcellus. As for Nepos’ source, it may well have been a work written by his intimate friend Atticus on the history of the Marcelli.45

Plutarch’s use of Nepos in his Marcellus has been dismissed by some source-critics, but maintained by others.46 The major argument used by those who believe that he did not consult Nepos directly is that the citations of sources at Marcellus 30.5 and at Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli 1.7-8 contain inaccuracies. The specific instance which directly affects Nepos is in the Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli. Here Plutarch indicates that Nepos was one of those who reported that Hannibal suffered defeats and reverses at Marcellus’ hands, while Nepos reports in

45 Nep. Att. 18.1-4: Moris etiam maiorum summus imitator fuit antiquitatisque amator, quam adeo diligenter habuit cognitam, ut eam totam in eo volumine exposuerit, quo magistratus ordinavit. nulla enim lex neque pax neque bellum neque res illustri est populi Romani, quae non in eo suo tempore sit notata, et, quod difficillimum fuit, sic familiarum originem subtexuit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines possimus cognoscere. fecit hoc idem separatim in aliis libris, ut M. Bruti rogatu Iuniam familiam a stirpe ad hanc aetatem ordine enumeraverit, notans, qui a quo ortus quos honores quibusque temporibus cepisset: pari modo Marcelli Claudii de Marcellorum, Scipionis Cornelli et Fabii Maximis Fabiorum et Aemiliorum. quibus libris nihil potest esse dulcius iis, qui aliquam cupiditatem habent notitiae clarorum virorum.

46 For example, Peter (Die Quellen Plutarchs 75-76) and Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 289) believe Plutarch did not use him as a source, while Zimmermann (RhM 79 [1930]: 58) and De Sanctis (SR 32: 366-368) believe that he did.
his Hannibal that as long as Hannibal remained in Italy, no one opposed him in battle or placed their camp opposite his after the battle of Cannae.\textsuperscript{47} But whether the citation of Nepos is an inaccuracy can not be proven, since his life of Marcellus has not survived, while the possibility that Nepos contradicted himself is something to be seriously considered given what is known about his scholarship.\textsuperscript{48} Also, if the \textit{De viris illustribus} attributed erroneously to Aurelius Victor can be shown to have been derived from Nepos' work, then the citations of Nepos can be affirmed as correct.\textsuperscript{49}

4. Valerius Maximus composed a handbook of examples for orators, \textit{Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX}, which he dedicated to the emperor Tiberius.\textsuperscript{50} The dates of his birth and death are unknown, but his work was probably published after the fall of Sejanus in 31 A.D.\textsuperscript{51}

Although Plutarch cites Valerius Maximus concerning Marcellus' death and funeral, some source-critics deny that he consulted him directly concerning these events or that he even

\textsuperscript{47}Plut. Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8: ἡμεῖς δὲ Λιβύς <καὶ> Καίσαρι καὶ Νέπωτι καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Ἰόβᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ πιστεύομεν ἡπτας τινὰς καὶ τρεῖς ὑπὸ Μαρκέλλου τῶν συν Ἀννίβας γενέσθαι; Nep. 5.4: quamdiu in Italia fuit, nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum post Cannensem pugnam in campo castra posuit.

\textsuperscript{48}Cf. De Sanctis \textit{SR} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2: 367.

\textsuperscript{49}See De Sanctis \textit{SR} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2: 367 and Zimmermann \textit{RhM} 79 (1930): 58; see, also, Wissowa \textit{RE} 4.1 (1900): 1416 for references to modern works dealing with the source(s) of the \textit{De viris illustribus} attributed erroneously to Aurelius Victor.

\textsuperscript{50}RE 8a.1 (1955), no. 239: 90-116; Val. Max. 1, pref., 5.5.3.

\textsuperscript{51}Val. Max. 9.11, ext. 4; cf. Helm \textit{RE} 8a.1 (1955): 90-93.
used him at all. Their position rests on the argument that the
citation is incorrect since Valerius Maximus only says, hannibal
M. Marcellum in agro Bruttio, dum conatus Poenorum cupidius quam
consideratius speculator, interemptum legitimo funere extulit
punicoque sagulo et corona donatum aurea rogo inposuit, while
Plutarch’s account is much longer. But it cannot be denied
that Valerius Maximus’ description agrees in general with
Plutarch’s, and to deny the use of him because he does not have
all the details contained in Plutarch’s version is unsound.

5. Augustus, the first emperor of Rome, was born in 63
B.C. and obtained the supreme mastery of the Roman world in 31
B.C. with his victory at Actium. In 27 B.C. the Principate was
established, and he was given the title ‘Augustus.’ He ruled
until his death in A.D. 14.

Plutarch cites Augustus at Marcellus 30.5, concerning the
death and burial of Marcellus, and at Comparatio Pelopidae et
Marcelli 1.8, concerning Marcellus’ successes against hannibal.
It is known that Augustus gave the funeral speech for his nephew
and son-in-law, M. Claudius Marcellus, who died in 23 B.C. This
speech has not survived, but it likely contained the
exploits of our Marcellus, since he was the most illustrious of

52 Marc. 30.5; see Peter Die Quellen Plutarchs 75-76 and Klotz RhM
83 (1934): 289; Klotz (op. cit. 317) even suggests that Plutarch
may have made a mistake here and should have written ‘Valerius
Antias’ instead.

53 Val. Max. 5.1, ext. 6.

54 Cf. Zimmermann RhM 79 (1930): 58; see, also, Chapter 5. for a
discussion of Plutarch’s possible use of Valerius Maximus there.

55 Dio 53.30.5; Serv. Aen. 1.712; Cons. ad Liv. 441-442; see Peter
Geschichtliche Literatur über die römische Kaiserzeit 1: 456.
Augustus' nephew's ancestors. It would be this work for which Plutarch cites Augustus.

6. Polybius was born near the end of the third century B.C. at Megalopolis. Lycortas, his father, was active in Achaean politics, being a follower of Philopoemen. Polybius followed in his father footsteps, and in 182 B.C. he had the honor of bearing the ashes of Philopoemen for burial. In 180 B.C. he was appointed an envoy to Egypt, although he never went, and in 170/69 B.C. he served as a hipparch of the Achaean Confederation. After the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C., he was deported to Rome with 1,000 other distinguished Achaeans for investigation and detained without trial in Italy. Here he made the acquaintance of Scipio Aemilianus, and as a close friend he accompanied Scipio on his political assignments, witnessing, for example, the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. After the sack of Corinth he was involved in helping to settle Greek affairs. He died sometime after 118 B.C., allegedly due to a fall from a horse.

Polybius wrote a history of Rome in 40 books which narrated Rome's rise to power during the third and second centuries B.C.

57 Polyb. 22.3.6.
58 Plut. Philop. 21.5.
59 Polyb. 24.6.5, 28.6.9.
60 Polyb. 30.13, 32.1-12; Paus. 7.10.11; Liv. 45.31.9.
62 Polyb. 39.5; Paus. 8.30.9.
63 Ps-Lucian Macr. 22; see Walbank Polybius 1:1-6.
The first books of this work, describing events up to the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C., were written before 146 B.C., but the date of their publication is uncertain.¹

Plutarch cites Polybius in the Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli for his view that Hannibal was never conquered in battle until he faced Scipio Africanus.² But except possibly for events in Sicily, Plutarch does not appear to have made extensive use of him in his Marcellus.³ There are indications which suggest Polybius was biased against Marcellus, and this may have contributed to Plutarch's failure to use him to any great extent.⁴ Also, Polybius' opinion that Hannibal remained unconquered while in Italy may have induced Plutarch to prefer other versions which asserted that Marcellus had some success against the Carthaginian commander.⁵

7. Juba II, king of Mauretania, was the son of Juba I of Numidia.⁶ In 46 B.C., while still an infant or young child, he was led in Caesar's triumph.⁷ Brought up in Italy, he became an

²1.7: Ἀννίβαν δὲ Μάρκελλος, ὥς μὲν οἱ περὶ Πολύβιου λέγουσιν, οὐδ' ὑπαξ ἐνίκησεν, ἄλλ' ἄρπτητος ἀνήρ δοκεῖ διαγενέσθαι μέχρι Σκιπίωνος.
³For example, in comparing the accounts of the Gallic War of 225-222 B.C. by Plutarch (Marc. 3-8) and Polybius (2.21-35), only two minor cases of Polybius' direct influence on Plutarch can be found (see Chapters 3.5. ἔδηλου... and 7.8. τὰς δ' ἄλλας...).
⁴See Chapter 8.1. Ψηφισμένης...
⁵See Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli 1.8.
⁷Plut. Caes. 55; App. BCiv. 2.418; Suda, s.v. Ἰόβας.
associate of Octavian, from whom he received Roman citizenship.³ Juba was restored to his father's kingdom, Numidia, but later in 25 B.C. when it was turned into a Roman province, he received Mauretania as compensation.⁹ He married Cleopatra Selene, the daughter of Cleopatra and Mark Antony.¹⁰ Juba's rule lasted until his death, most likely in the year A.D. 23.¹¹

According to Pliny, Juba was memorable more for his literary pursuits than for his kingship.¹² He wrote much, and the specific works which may have been used in this life are the Ἱστορία (or perhaps called the Ἱστορία τῆς Ἱστορίας), in two books, and the Ὀμοιότητες (or perhaps called Περὶ Ὀμοιότητων), in at least 15 books, which compared the similarities of customs and institutions between, for the most part, the Greeks and Romans.¹³

While Juba is cited at Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli 1.8, concerning whether Hannibal was ever defeated by Marcellus, he is not cited in the Marcellus, although there are some indications that he was used.¹⁴ However, considering the size of the Ἱστορία and the subject matter of the Ὀμοιότητες,

³Dio 51.15.6; Avien. Or. mar. 279; see PIR² I/J, no. 65 concerning Roman citizenship.
¹⁰Plut. Ant. 87.2; Dio 51.15.6.
¹¹See PIR² I/J, no. 65 concerning the extent of reign and year of death.
¹²NH 5.16: studiorum claritate memorabilior etiam quam regno.
¹³Steph. Byz., s.v. Ἀφοριγίνες, Ὀστία, Νομαντία; Ath. 4.170e; Hesych., s.v. κάρτης; Jacoby RE 9.2 (1916): 2394.
¹⁴See, for example, Chapter 22.9-10.
it seems improbable that Juba was used to any considerable extent.\textsuperscript{15}

Besides the authors whom Plutarch cites by name, there are indications that he made use of other writers. These other possible sources are mentioned below.

8. Various source critics have postulated that Plutarch used a lost biography of Archimedes for those sections of the \textit{Marcellus} dealing with the great scientist.\textsuperscript{16} We know that a biography of Archimedes was written by a Heracleides.\textsuperscript{17} This Heracleides may well have been Heracleides of Tarentum, an acquaintance of Archimedes and accredited with the invention of the \textit{sambucae} used by Marcellus against Syracuse.\textsuperscript{18} It would not be unreasonable to suppose that Plutarch utilized this particular biography.\textsuperscript{19}

9. M. Terentius Varro was born in 116 B.C. probably at Reate in Sabine country.\textsuperscript{20} He was the student of L. Aelius

\textsuperscript{15}Cf. Jacoby \textit{RE} 9.2 (1916): 2393.
\textsuperscript{17}Eutoc. in Archim. 3\textsuperscript{2}: 228 Heiberg: \(\dot{\alpha}l\lambda\)\(\dot{}\) \(\dot{e}\)στι μὲν τούτο τὸ \(\beta\)ιβλίον, ὡς φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ἐν τῷ Ἀρχιμήδους βίῳ, πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου χρείας ἄναγκαιον.
\textsuperscript{18}\textit{RE} 8.1 (1912), no. 63: 497-498; Archimedes names Heracleides as the deliverer of correspondence from himself to Dositheus (2\textsuperscript{2}:2 Heiberg: \(\tau\)ῶν ποτὶ \(\Κόνωνα\) ἀποσταλέντων θεωρημάτων, ὑπὲρ ὅν αἱ \(\alpha\)ιεὶ τὰς ἀπόδειξις ἐπιστέλλεις μοι γράψαι, τῶν μὲν πλείστων ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ Ἡρακλείδα κομισθέντεσσιν ἔχεις γεγραμμένας, 4 Heiberg); see Chapter 17.1. τοὺς σὺν ἐαυτῷ... concerning the attribution to Heracleides of the invention of the \textit{sambucae}.
\textsuperscript{19}See Chapters 17.2. and 19.11. for indications which support this hypothesis.
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{RE}, supp. 6 (1935), no. 84, pp. 1172-1277; Peter \textit{HRR} 2: xxxii-xxxx, 9-25; Hieron. \textit{Ab Abr.} 1902; Symm. \textit{Ep.} 1.2; cf.
Stilo, a great Roman scholar, and of Antiochus of Ascalon, a
philosopher of the Academy.\textsuperscript{21} He rose to the rank of praetor and
was a follower of Pompey during the civil wars.\textsuperscript{22} Pardoned by
Caesar he was given the task of organizing a library.\textsuperscript{23} Although
proscribed by Mark Antony, he escaped death and following the
civil wars devoted himself to literary studies.\textsuperscript{24} Varro wrote on
nearly every subject of science and history, but of his many
works only two have survived in any substantial form.\textsuperscript{25} He is
reported to have died in 27 B.C. while writing.\textsuperscript{26}

10. Dionysius of Halicarnassus came to Rome in 30 B.C. and
remained there for at least 22 years.\textsuperscript{27} Little else is known
about his life. Plutarch probably used Dionysius' \textit{'Ρωμαϊκὴ
ἀρχαιολογία}, which began to appear in 7 B.C.\textsuperscript{28} Consisting of 20
books, it traced Rome's origins and history down to the start of
the First Punic War.\textsuperscript{29}

August. \textit{De civ. D.} 1.4, who perhaps wrongly places his birth at
Rome (cf. Dahlmann \textit{RE}, supp. 6 [1935], p. 1173).
\textsuperscript{21} Cic. Brut. 205; Aul. Gell. 16.8.2; Cic. Acad. Post. 1.12;
\textsuperscript{22} Themist. p. 453 Dind.; App. \textit{BCiv.} 4.47; the date of his
praetorship is uncertain, but was probably soon after 76 B.C.
(Broughton \textit{MRR} 2: 466); Caes. \textit{BCiv.} 1.38, 2.17-18; Cic. Div.
1.68, 2.114.
\textsuperscript{23} Suet. \textit{Iul.} 44; Isid. \textit{Etym.} 6.5.1.
\textsuperscript{24} App. \textit{BCiv.} 4.47; Cic. Phil. 2.103-105; Aul. Gell. 3.10.17.
\textsuperscript{25} These are the \textit{De lingua latina} and the \textit{Rerum rusticarum libri
iii.}
\textsuperscript{26} Val. Max. 7.3; Hieron. \textit{Ab Abr.} 1990; see Chapters 8.7.10. and
8.7. ἀπὸ τοῦ... for indications of Plutarch's use of Varro.
\textsuperscript{27} RE 5.1 (1903), no. 113: 934-971; Dion. Hal. 1.7.2.
\textsuperscript{28} Dion. Hal. 1.3.4.
\textsuperscript{29} See Chapters 8.8. and 24.12-13. for indications of Plutarch's
use of Dionysius.
11. Valerius Antias was a Roman historian of the post-Sullan period. Little is known about his life. He wrote a history of Rome in at least 75 books, which was used by Livy as one of his main sources, but nothing of it survives beyond brief fragments.

Although Plutarch cites Antias in other lives, he does not do so here. However, Klotz, who has done the most recent work on the sources of the Marcellus, believes that Antias was the main source. Despite the fact that Livy is cited by Plutarch in this life and that large tracts of it closely resemble Livy’s history, Klotz maintains that where the texts are similar, it is due to the use of a common source, which is Antias. This belief is based on the fact that, although large portions of the text of the Marcellus resemble Livy, there are still small discrepancies. But Klotz’s argument is too narrow in its focus, there are other, easier, ways of explaining the discrepancies without bringing in Antias, of whose use there is no direct indication in the text. He has failed to take into consideration what role Plutarch’s memory may have played in these variations from Livy, and he has overlooked the possibility that Plutarch may have added information gathered from elsewhere.

30 RE 7a.2 (1948), no. 98: 2313-2340; Peter HRR 1: cccv-cccxxxiii, 238-275; Vell. Pat. 2.9.4; see Ogilvie Livy 12-13 concerning his floruit.
31 Aul. Gell. 6.9.17.
32 E.g., Rom. 14.7, Num. 22.6, Flam. 18.8
33 RhM 83 (1934): 289-318.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Μᾶρκος δὲ Κλαύδιος τῶν πεντάκις ὑπατεύσαντα Ῥωμαίων: Μ. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 220: 2738-2755) held the consulship five times, in the years 222, 215, 214, 210, and 208 B.C.; this total is mentioned numerous times in the ancient sources (Liv. 27.22.1; Plut. Fab. Max. 19.5, Flam. 18.1, Marc. 28.6, 30.6, Comp. Pel. et Marc. 3.4; Val. Max. 1.1.8; App. Hann. 50; De vir. ill. 45.7; Nep. Hann. 5.3; Cic. Div. 2.77; Chron. 354; Idat.; Chron. Pasch.; Cassiod.; Asc. Pis. p. 11 Kiessling-Schoell; Marcellus is designated as having been consul five times on the coins of P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus: Marcellus cos. quinq. [Sydenham The Coinage of the Roman Republic, no. 1147; Crawford Roman Republican Coinage, vol. 1, no. 439.1]). The holding of this many consulships was rare in the Republican period. Marcellus’ contemporary Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus also attained this total, and it was not surpassed until the time of C. Marius, who held seven consulships (the first in 107 B.C.). The Romans were both suspicious and jealous of anyone who held an office more than once, especially consecutively. A plebiscite passed in 342 B.C. required a ten year interval between tenures of the same magistracy (Liv. 7.42.2, 10.13.5-13; although cf. Mommsen Str. 13: 519, who suggests this may have happened in 330 B.C.). During the Second Punic War, however, following the disaster at Lake Trasimene in 217 B.C., a law was passed that allowed the people the right for the duration of the war in Italy to
re-elect as consuls whom they pleased and as often as they pleased from among those who had been consuls (Liv. 27.6.7; See Mommsen Str. 1\textsuperscript{3}: 519-521 and Kübler RE 4.1 [1900], "Consul": 1117). Rome had need of experienced generals for this conflict, and Marcellus was one of the chief beneficiaries of this law.

1.1. **Μάρκου μὲν υἱὸν γενέσθαι λέγουσι:** Nothing is known of Marcellus' father except that his praenomen was Marcus. Besides Plutarch here, Marcellus is named M. f. on a tessera hospitalis (CIL, I\textsuperscript{2}, 611 = X, 6231; if the person named here is indeed our Marcellus and not one of his descendants) and M. f. M. n. by the Fasti Capitolini and the Acta Triumphorum for 222 B.C.

His grandfather was M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 219: 2738), consul with C. Nautius Rutilus in 287 B.C. (Chron. 354; Idat.; Chron. Pasch.; Cassiod.; Fast. Hyd.).

His great-grandfather was M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 218: 2737-2738), consul with C. Valerius Potitus in 331 B.C. (Liv. 8.18.1; Diod. 17.74.1; Oros. 3.10.1; Fast. Cap.; Chron. 354; Idat.; Chron. Pasch.; Cassiod.; Fast. Hyd.). This ancestor was appointed dictator for the holding of elections in 327 B.C., but his appointment was declared invalid (Liv. 8.23.14-17). Münzer (RE 3.2 [1899]: 2737-2738) suggests that the account of this dictatorship may imitate that of Marcellus' second consulship in 215 B.C., from which he, like his ancestor, was forced to resign. In both instances their plebeian status was alleged as the real reason for their forced abdications (see Livy 23.31.12-14 and Chapter 12.1. ἐκκαλεῖ...
et seqq. for our Marcellus' consulship of 215 B.C.). Marcellus' great-grandfather was the first of the Claudii Marcelli to obtain the consulship.

1.1. κληθήναι δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς οίκιας πρώτον Μάρκελλον, ὥπερ ἔστιν Ἀρηίον: The cognomen Marcellus does not start with our Marcellus, but it appears already a hundred years earlier in the Fasti. Also, the etymology of the name is not to be connected with Ἀρηίον = Martius, but rather with the praenomen Marcus (cf. Fest. p. 112 Lindsay: Marculus deminutivum a marco). The praenomen Marcus is foreign to the patrician Claudii in historical times (cf. RE 3.2 [1899], "M. Claudius," nos. 24 and 25: 2670), but is used so frequently by the Marcelli that at times the individual Marci Marcelli are hard to distinguish. Aside from Marcus, the praenomen Gaius is also used by the Marcelli. They were a plebeian family (Asc. Scaur. 22; Liv. 8.23.16, 23.31.13), who were probably originally connected with the patrician Claudii (Cic. De Or. 1.176: inter Marcellos et Claudios patricios centumviri iudicarunt, cum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe, Claudii patricii eiusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se redisse dicerent; see Mommsen Str. 3\textsuperscript{3}: 74-75). They belonged to the tribe Arnensis (SC de Oropiis; Syll.\textsuperscript{3}, 747.6: νίὸς Ἀρνήσεως Μαύρκελλος). After the time of our Marcellus, the family was hardly inferior to the patrician Claudii in fame and reputation (Suet. Tib. 1), and Atticus, Cicero's friend, investigated and wrote their history (Nep. Att. 18.4; RE 3.2 [1899], "Claudii Marcelli": 2731-2732).
1.1. ος φησι Ποσειδώνιος: See Introduction, pp. 21-25, concerning Plutarch's use of Posidonius as a source.

The only thing that can be firmly attributed to Posidonius in this chapter is the explanation for the name Marcellus (= Ἀρήνος). Bauer (Philologus 47 [1889]: 242-243) has pointed out that Plutarch derived this citation from a long discussion on Roman names which Posidonius had given in the introduction to his historical work (in Plutarch's Marius 1 there is a discussion on Roman names in which Posidonius is cited for his comments. These comments make it obvious that Posidonius had dealt with this topic at length).

Mühl (Klass. Phil. Stud. 4 [1925]: 6-8) would attribute not only the citation for the provenance of Marcellus' name, but all of this chapter except perhaps the words τὸν πεντάκις ὑπατεύοντα Ῥωμαίων Μάρκου μὲν ύιὸν γενέσθαι λέγοντι to Posidonius. He bases his argument on Posidonius' own affinity for the personal characteristics of Marcellus and Marcellus' contemporaries which are enumerated here. But Münzer (Gnomon 1 [1925]: 96) has pointed out that nothing can be inferred about Plutarch's use of Posidonius from the characterization of Marcellus and even less from the characterization of his contemporaries. For instance, concerning the phrase κατ᾽ εὐγένειαν καὶ ἄρετήν at Marcellus 1.5, which Mühl would attribute to Posidonius, Münzer points out that such characteristics are attributed so often to Roman nobility that Plutarch, for example, in his biography of the Gracchi repeats
them, although with slightly different wording, no less than four times (Ti. et C. Gracch. 1.7, 10.6, 29.5, 40.4).

1.2-3. The characteristics listed here form the basis of Plutarch's own assessment of Marcellus' personality, and around these he constructs the biography. However, these particular characteristics were not first deduced by Plutarch, but were the result of a long tradition. For example, Cicero describes Marcellus as acer et pugnax (Rep. 5.10), but also moderate (temperavit [Verr. 2.2.4]) towards his enemies, showing mercy (misericordiam [Verr. 2.2.4]) to those conquered. Nevertheless, the listed characteristics represent Plutarch's own selection, since several examples of actions which reveal Marcellus' unpleasant traits which can be found in Livy (23.17.1-3, 24.19.8-10, 35.2, 37.1-39.9), who appears to have been used as one of the main sources, form little or no part of the biography proper.

1.3. σώφρων, φιλάνθρωπος: Mühl (Klass. Phil. Stud. [1925]: 6) sees definite Stoic coloring in the characterization of Marcellus in this chapter, especially in σώφρων and φιλάνθρωπος, which he terms the most important goals of Stoic ethics (see Babut Plutarque el le Stoicîsme concerning Stoic influences in Plutarch).

1.3. 'Ελληνικῆς παιδείας καὶ λόγων...ἐραστῆς...: Plutarch gives two incidents which reveal this aspect of Marcellus'
character. At Marcellus 19.8-12 it is reported that Marcellus was greatly affected by the death of Archimedes, who was killed by a Roman soldier during the final assault on Syracuse. Plutarch relates that Marcellus sought out the relatives of Archimedes and honored them. Archimedes would be one of the κατορθούντας admired by him. In this respect, we learn from Cicero (Rep. 1.21) that out of all the booty taken from Syracuse the only item kept by Marcellus himself was a celestial sphere, which delineated the motions of the heavenly bodies, constructed by Archimedes. This item was probably kept as a memento of the great scientist. The other incident is found at Marcellus 21 where it is reported that Marcellus spoke with pride about the art treasures brought back from Syracuse with which he decorated Rome, declaring that he had taught the ignorant Romans to honor and admire the beautiful and wonderful things of Greece.

It is doubtful whether these cases prove that Marcellus was a true lover (ἐρωτής) of Greek culture. His admiration of Archimedes was probably due to that scientist’s mechanical ingenuity in thwarting the Roman assaults on Syracuse, while his boastful pride in embellishing Rome with the art works taken from Syracuse may have been a reaction to the censure he received from his enemies at Rome over its importation.

1.4. ὅπερ Ἡμηρος εἰρηκέν...: This is taken from the Iliad (14.86-87).

1.5. τοῖς τότε πρωτεύουσι Ἡρωιῶν: Among these Romans would
be Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (RE, no. 116; cos. 233, 228, 215, 214, 209, dict. 217 B.C.), about whom Plutarch wrote a separate biography. Plutarch sees in Fabius and Marcellus a close connection, reiterating (Marc. 9, Fab. Max. 19) the tradition, which he found in Posidonius, that called Fabius 'The Shield' and Marcellus 'The Sword of Rome.'

Also included among these Romans should be men such as Q. Fulvius Flaccus (RE, no. 59; cos. 237, 224, 212, 209, procos. 211, 210, 208, 207, pr. 215, 214 B.C.), T. Manlius Torquatus (RE, no. 82; cos. 235, 224, propr. 215 B.C.), P. Furius Philus (RE, no. 80; cos. 223, pr. 216 B.C.), C. Flaminius (RE, no. 2; cos. 223, 217, pr. 227 B.C.), and T. Otacilius Crassus (RE, no. 12; pr. 217, 215, 214, propr. 216, promag. [propr.?] 213, 212, 211 B.C.). See Broughton MRR, vol. 1 for references.

1.5. περὶ Σικελίαν Καρχηδονίων: This is the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.).

1.5. Γαλάταις ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς Ἰταλίας: This happened in the Gallic War of 225-222 B.C.

1.5. Ἁννίβα πάλιν συνείχοντο καὶ Καρχηδονίων: This refers to the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.).
CHAPTER TWO

2. This chapter covers Marcellus' life up to, but not including, his first consulship in 222 B.C. Plutarch's portrayal of the early life is both scanty in events and brief due most likely to a lack of information. The numerous excursuses and discussions in this life (e.g., all of Marc. 5) suggest that he sought outside material to fill up this biography in order to make it of suitable length (cf. Scardigli Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs 38). If this is so, then it would seem likely that he would have included more details about Marcellus' earlier life and career if they had been available to him.

2.1. Μάρκελλος δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν μὲν ἡν μάχης εἰδος...: Plutarch starts off his narrative proper with a general and vague statement. The only form of fighting specified is single combat, but no examples are given here. Later, however, in chapter seven he does relate the duel between Marcellus and Britomatus, king of the Gaesati. If he deduced from this incident alone that Marcellus engaged in multiple duels, he is going beyond his evidence. But if he derived his information from elsewhere, his source may have been just as vague. It is unlikely that Plutarch would have left out details which would have supported this assertion.

2.2. ἐν δὲ Σικελίᾳ τῶν ἁδελφῶν Ὀτακίλλου κινδυνεύοντα
StéocDOEv: This is probably T. Otacilius Crassus (RE 18.2 [1942], no. 12: 1862-1865). He is likely the son of the consul of 261 B.C. T. Otacilius Crassus (RE, no. 11). If these two assumptions are correct, then he would have been the half-brother of Marcellus. Marcellus himself was born ca. 269 B.C. (see Chapter 28.6. ὑπὲρ γὰρ ἔξηκοντα...), and his father apparently died young since he held no high office, which one would expect from consideration of the careers of his forebears (see Chapter 1.1. Μᾶρκου μὲν...). Marcellus’ mother will then have married again, this time to T. Otacilius Crassus (RE, no. 11). Otacilius, the son, was likely born before his father’s consulship (261 B.C.), since both brothers were serving in Sicily during the last years of the First Punic War, perhaps under the command of Otacilius’ uncle, M. Otacilius Crassus (RE, no. 10), who was holding his second consulship in 246 B.C. (see Zonaras 8.16 for Otacilius’ uncle’s command in Sicily; cf. Münzer RE 18.2 [1942]: 1862).

Otacilius became both an augur and pontiff (Liv. 26.23.8, 27.6.15; see Broughton MRR 1: 284, n. 6 concerning possibility that Otacilius did not, in fact, hold both priesthoods) and married a niece of Q. Fabius Maximus (Liv. 24.8.11).

During the Second Punic War, Otacilius was stationed in Sicily in command of a fleet from 217-210 B.C. with his headquarters at Lilybaeum (pr. 217, 215, 214, propr. 216 B.C., promag. [propr.?] 213, 212, 211; see Broughton MRR, vol. 1 for references).

Otacilius ran for the consulship of 214 B.C., but he lost
due to the intervention of Q. Fabius Maximus, who managed to have himself elected with Marcellus as his colleague (see Chapter 13.1. 'O δὲ Μάρκελλος... concerning these elections).

In 211 B.C. Otacilius sent a large quantity of grain, which he had captured on a raid to Africa, to Marcellus at Syracuse, which had been recently captured by the Romans, but where a famine was raging both among the victors and vanquished (see Chapter 19.7. καὶ γὰρ τὴν...).

According to Livy (26.22.2-15) Otacilius ran for the consulship of 210 B.C. The elections were similar in many ways to the ones in 214 B.C. except that it was T. Manlius Torquatus, not Q. Fabius Maximus who intervened in the voting in which Marcellus and M. Valerius Laevinus were elected. But Otacilius apparently died before these elections, which has led some scholars to suspect Livy's account of them (see Chapter 23.1. Τοῦ δὲ Μάρκέλλου... concerning these elections).

2.3. στέφανοι: These στέφανοι are coronae civicae. Made of oak leaves, they were awarded to soldiers who had saved the life of a fellow citizen (Plin. NH 16.7-14).

2.3. γέρα παρὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν: These are dona militaria, which consisted of awards such as torques, armillae, phalerae, hastae, coronae aureae, murales, and obsidionales (see Polybius 6.39 for a discussion of military awards; for an example of a soldier winning such awards, see Valerius Maximus 3.2.24, Pliny NH 7.102, 22.9, and Aulus Gellius 2.11.2, who list the awards won.
by a L. Siccius Dentatus, tribune of the plebs in 454 B.C.).

2.3. ἀγορανόμον...τῆς ἐπιφανεστέρας τάξεως: Broughton (MRR 1: 229) gives 226 B.C. as the latest possible date for Marcellus to hold this office of curule aedile if Marcellus was also to hold his first praetorship (this would have to have been in 224 B.C. [see Broughton MRR 1: 231]) before his consulship of 222 B.C.

2.3. οἱ δ ἱερεῖς αὔγουρα: Marcellus was co-opted into the college of augurs. Broughton (MRR 1: 230, 283) believes that Marcellus became an augur about the time of his aedileship (226 B.C.). He held this office until his death in 208 B.C. (Liv. 27.36.5).

Cicero (Div. 2.77) calls him augur optumus and reports that he wholly ignored military omens ex acuminibus (e.g., electrical discharges from the points of spears). He recounts that Marcellus used to say he was accustomed to travel in a closed litter if ever he wanted to do something and did not want to be interfered with by omens (Div. 2.77: nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est, iam M. Marcellus ille quinquens consul totum omisit, idem imperator, idem augur optumus...et quidem ille dicebat, si quando rem agere vellet, ne impediretur auspiciis, lectica operta facere iter se solere).

2.4. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἱερωσύνης...: This explanation of the priesthood of augurs is for the benefit of his largely Greek audience (see Introduction, p. 9, concerning Plutarch's intended
readership).

2.5. ἢν γὰρ αὐτῷ παῖς ὀμόνυμος...ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν: This is M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 222: 2755-2757). The affair involving C. Scantinius Capitolinus is the earliest event known about this Marcellus' life (cf. Val. Max. 6.1.7).

If Silius Italicus' mention of him at the siege of Syracuse (15.356-358) is discounted on the grounds of poetical licence, then he is next heard of as a military tribune in 208 B.C. accompanying his father, who was pursuing Hannibal in southern Italy between the towns of Bantia and Venusia (Marc. 29.1). He was wounded in the ambush which claimed his father's life, but managed to escape (Marc. 29.11, 16; Polyb. 10.32.6; Liv. 27.26.12, 27.7, 10; Sil. Ital. 15.353-376). Hannibal, after celebrating our Marcellus' funeral, sent the ashes to his son (Marc. 30.2; App. Hann. 50; see Chapter 29. et seqq. concerning these events). Coelius Antipater reports the existence in his time of a laudatio which the son presumably gave at his father's memorial service in Rome (Liv. 27.27.13).

In 205 B.C. he carried out the dedication of the temple of Virtus vowed by his father (Liv. 29.11.13; see Chapter 28.2. concerning this temple).

Like his father, he went on to have a distinguished career. He became a plebeian tribune in 204, curule aedile in 200, praetor in 198, and consul in 196 B.C. During his year as consul he won a triumph for his exploits against the Gauls in northern Italy and was made a pontiff. Finally, he became
censor with T. Quinctius Flamininus as his colleague in 189 B.C. (see Broughton MRR, vol. 1 for references). He died in 177 B.C. (Liv. 41.13.4).

2.5. Καπετωλίνος ὁ τοῦ Μαρκέλλου συνάρχων: This is C. Scantinius Capitolinus (RE 2a.1 [1921], no. 3: 352), who is elsewhere mentioned only by Valerius Maximus, who relates the same incident (6.1.7). Plutarch simply calls him a fellow magistrate (συνάρχων) of Marcellus, while Valerius Maximus labels him a plebeian tribune (tribuno pl.). Plutarch's designation of Capitolinus as a συνάρχων has led to the assertion that Valerius Maximus is probably wrong in calling him a plebeian tribune, because if συνάρχων is equivalent to the Latin term collega, which is defined as a colleague holding the same magistracy, then Capitolinus could not have been a plebeian tribune, since Marcellus was a curule aedile. Also, it has been pointed out that Capitolinus' appeal to the plebeian tribunes (Marc. 2.7: τοὺς δημάρχους ἐπικαλούμενος; Val. Max. 6.1.7: et ob id tribunicium auxilium inplorante) shows that he could not have been one of them, since they were not liable to prosecution during their tenure of office due to their personal inviolability (sacrosanctitas). However, Capitolinus does seem to have some sort of personal inviolability to prosecution since he makes use of it (Marc. 2.7: παραγραφὰς ἐμπαχανάτο; Val. Max. 6.1.7: quia sacrosanctam potestatem haberet). For this reason Mommsen postulates that Capitolinus was one of the plebeian aediles, since they had a type of sacrosanctitas (Fest. p. 422
Lindsay; Liv. 3.55.6-10), and that Valerius Maximus had confused the little known sacrosanctitas of the plebeian aediles with the well-known sacrosanctitas of the plebeian tribunes (see Römisches Staatsrecht 13: 706, n. 6, 289, n. 2, 23: 472, n. 2, 493, n. 4).

Mommsen's solution appears to resolve the crux of Capitolinus being a συνάρχων of Marcellus, but at the same time possessing a type of sacrosanctitas. But this solution is doubtful, since for one thing the use of the term συνάρχων here has no bearing on the determination of Capitolinus' office. Plutarch's use of συνάρχων cannot always be equated with the Latin collega. For example in his Antonius, Plutarch calls both a praetor and a plebeian tribune συνάρχοντας of a consul (15.5: καὶ τάλα ὁ ἑπεραττεν αὐτοκρατορικῶς ὁ Ἀντώνιος, αὐτὸς μὲν ὑπατεύων, τοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἔχων συνάρχοντας, Γάιον μὲν στρατηγόν, Λεύκιον δὲ δήμαρχον). But it might be supposed that in the present chapter συνάρχων is used as the equivalent of collega in the restricted constitutional sense. However, if this were the case, then Capitolinus should have been a curule aedile. Even Mommsen admits that a plebeian aedile is not a colleague of a curule aedile, since they do not belong to the same collegium (Str. 23: 486), and Plutarch was certainly aware of the distinction between the two offices (Marc. 2.3: ἀγορανόμον...τῆς ἐπιφανεστέρας τάξεως). Consequently, how the term συνάρχων was intended to be used here is unknown, and it cannot help in determining Capitolinus' office (see also Marcellus 28.5 where it is apparent that the term is used in a
broad sense). The only argument left to support Mommsen’s hypothesis is that Capitolinus made an appeal to the plebeian tribunes, which he believes would have been unnecessary, if Capitolinus was in fact a plebeian tribune. But this case may be an exception to the rule. Although we know of only one other instance of a tribune being prosecuted, that of L. Cotta in a civil suit with his creditors (this too is found in Valerius Maximus [6.5.4]), the reason why these two incidents were recorded in the first place may have been because they were unprecedented. In the case of Capitolinus, the nature of the crime itself probably brought about a suspension of a tribune’s normal immunity by common consent (the Romans seem to have been especially prudish in their early days [see, for example, Cato Maior 20.7-8] and therefore intolerant towards anyone suspected of pederasty). Therefore, it appears reasonable to suggest that Plutarch found Capitolinus identified as a plebeian tribune in his source.

Although Valerius Maximus recounts this episode (6.1.7) and it is known that Plutarch made use of him (see Introduction, pp. 29-30), whether he is the source here has been questioned. Peter (Die Quellen Plutarchs 75) thinks it very unlikely because of the discrepancy between the two accounts in regards to what office Scantinius held and because Plutarch adds a concluding detail which is lacking in Valerius Maximus’ version: the imposition of a fine and the dedication of silver bowls to the gods. However, Zimmermann (RhM 79 [1930]: 58-59) believes that Plutarch did use him, although inexactely, and that the detail
missing from Valerius Maximus' account was added by Plutarch
from elsewhere.

2.5. ἕρων λόγους προσήνεγκε: This is one of the few references
to pederasty which occurred during the time of the Republic
(Mommsen Strafr. 703, n. 3). A Lex Scantinia against pederasty
is mentioned by Cicero in 50 B.C. (Fam. 8.12.3, 14.4; cf. Suet.
Dom. 8.3, Juv. 2.44). Münzer (RE 2a.1 [1921], "Scantinius," no.
1: 352) maintains that this law would not have been named after
C. Scantinius Capitolinus, the one convicted of pederasty, but
rather after the proposer of the law, who belonged to a later
period. There is some evidence to suggest that this law was
[.........]am tulit in stupro deprehensi..; although cf. Münzer
loc. cit., Broughton MRR 1: 460).

That both the person convicted of pederasty and the
proposer of the law against it would have the same name is
suspicious because the name Scantinius or Scantius is rare
(besides those already mentioned, there is only a P. Scantinius,
a pontiff, who died in 216 B.C. [Liv. 23.21.7; RE 2a.1 [1921],
no. 2: 352] and a M. Scantius, a plebeian tribune of 293 B.C.
[Liv. 10.46.16; RE 2a.1 [1921], no. 1: 352-353]; cf. Münzer loc.
cit.). Perhaps the person named C. Scantinius Capitolinus by
Valerius Maximus (6.1.7) and simply Κατετωλίνος by Plutarch was
only identified by his cognomen in the original version of the
story, but later acquired the nomen, Scantinius, due to an
ancient author's erroneous belief that the Lex Scantinia
received its title from the person accused in this incident. Upon finding the accused named simply C. Capitolinus in his source, this author conjectured that the nomen must have been Scantinius and consequently added it to his own version of the story.

If the Lex Scantinia was only passed after this incident involving Capitolinus, under what law was he accused by Marcellus? There are recorded earlier known incidents of pederasty which were brought to trial (e.g., Liv. 8.28; Val. Max. 6.1.3; Dion. Hal. 16.4-5.), but there is no indication that these were done under any specific law (lex). Whether these incidents are true or not, a law against pederasty may not have been necessary, since it was probably considered an offense in itself and the case would have been heard before the people (before the establishment of quaeestiones perpetuae, beginning in the mid-second century B.C., few offenses were covered by specific leges [see Jolowicz Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 329]).

2.6. ο Μάρκελλος προσήγειλε τῇ βουλῇ τὸν ἄνθρωπον: The use of the term βουλῇ here and at Marcellus 2.7 causes difficulties. The term βουλῇ is frequently applied by Greek writers to the Roman senate, and the trial of Capitolinus in Plutarch’s portrayal appears to take place before this body. But the senate did not act as a jury in criminal cases during the Republic, and the corresponding passage in Valerius Maximus correctly places the trial before the people, as was the usual
procedure (6.1.7: M. Claudius Marcellus aedilis curulis C. Scantinio Capitolino tribuno pl. diem ad populum dixit; see Mommsen Str. 3\textsuperscript{3}: 354-358 concerning trial procedures).

It does not seem probable that Plutarch intended to use \(\text{ποὺλη} \) to signify the Roman people in assembly (either as a \textit{comitia} or \textit{consilium plebis}), since appropriate terms were available (e.g., \(\text{ἀρχαιρέσων, ἐκκλησίων} \)). And although he applies another term, \(\text{σύγκλητος} \), to the senate elsewhere in this life (e.g., 4.4), this is only an abbreviation of \(\text{σύγκλητος ποὺλη} \) (see \textit{Moralia} 313d for an example of Plutarch's use of this extended form; see Mason \textit{Greek Terms for Roman Institutions} 121-123 for discussion of \(\text{ποὺλη} \) and \(\text{σύγκλητος} \)). It appears then that Plutarch intended to use \(\text{ποὺλη} \) here as a term for the senate because that is where he believed the trial took place. But the trial would not have taken place here which suggests that Plutarch had misread his source. Although the senate did not try cases, it did pass resolutions calling for prosecution and punishment, and this may have caused Plutarch to assume incorrectly that the trial had taken place before this body. (e.g., Liv. 29.19.3-20.10, 39.8.1-19.7; see Jolowicz \textit{Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law} 322-331 and Mommsen Str. 3\textsuperscript{3}: 1063-1070).

2.7. \textit{παράγραφῳ ἐμπιστευα:} A \textit{παράγραφῃ} is an exception taken by the defendant to the admissibility of a suit (LSJ). The corresponding passage in Valerius Maximus is \textit{eoque asseverante se cogi non posse ut adesset, quia sacrosanctam potestatem
haberet (6.1.7). Capitolinus is claiming his freedom from prosecution because of his office as plebeian tribune (see Mommsen Str. 1\(^3\): 705-708 on the rights of magistrates against prosecution; the specific case here may be an exception to the rule [see discussion at Chapter 2.4. Καπετωλίνος...]).

2.7. τοὺς δημάρχους ἐπικαλούμενος: See discussion at Chapter 2.5. Καπετωλίνος...

2.8. ἐξ ὑν ὁ Μάρκελλος ἀργυρὰ λοιβεία ποιησάμενος τοῖς θεοῖς καθιέρωσεν: ἀργυρὰ λοιβεία is an emendation of ἀργυραμοιβίαν (see Ziegler’s apparatus criticus). The only other use of λοιβείων is in Plutarch’s Aemilius (31.2: λοιβεία), but this is an emendation of λοιβία (see Ziegler’s apparatus criticus for Aemilius 31.2). A λοιβείων is a cup for pouring libations (LSJ).
CHAPTER THREE

3. With this chapter begins the narrative of the Gallic War (225-222 B.C.), which continues to chapter eight. Aside from the digressions, most notably the discussion on the Romans' scrupulous observance of religious practices in chapter five and on Jupiter Feretrius and the _spolia opima_ in chapter eight, the details of the war appear to have been derived from a continuous historical narrative. This would exclude the possibility that Plutarch utilized in any significant way a monograph on Marcellus for this section, as it has been argued, since many of the events narrated have nothing at all to do with Marcellus (e.g., the campaign of 223 B.C.), and it is difficult to imagine how they would have been incorporated into such a monograph (cf. Klotz _RhM_ 83 [1934]: 295; see Mühl _Klass. Phil. Stud._ 4 [1925]: 5-35, who argues that a monograph on Marcellus by Posidonius was the main source for this life; see Introduction, pp. 21-25, concerning Plutarch's use of Posidonius as a source).

The most extensive surviving account of this war is found in Polybius (2.21-35). But although Plutarch had read Polybius (he cites him at _Comp. Pel. et Marc._ 1.7), he made little, if any, use of him for the narrative of this war (see Chapters 3.5. ἐδήλου... and 7.8. τὰς δ' ἀλλας... concerning possible influences by Polybius).

Since Livy's work (excepting the _Periocha_) is missing for these years, the annalistic tradition of this war is most fully preserved for us in the condensed versions of Zonaras (8.20.1-9)
and Orosius (4.13.3-15). Plutarch’s own narrative of this conflict has much in common with this annalistic tradition, which suggests that Plutarch derived most of his material from this source, possibly using Livy or another annalistic historian (see, for example, Chapters 4.2. ὅφη... on the portents and 4.5. ταύτα... on the letter, details which are found in the annalistic tradition but not in Polybius).

3.1. τῶν Καρχηδονίων πολέμων: These are the three wars fought between Rome and Carthage (264-241, 218-201, 149-146 B.C.).

3.1. ἔτει δεύτερῳ καὶ εἰκοστῷ: The First Punic War began in the late summer of 264 B.C., when the consul Ap. Claudius Caudex crossed the straits separating Italy from Sicily with a Roman army in order to relieve the city of Messana from the besieging armies of the Carthaginians and Syracusans. It ended in 241 B.C. after 23 years and some months with the ratification of the peace treaty by the Roman assembly following C. Lutatius Catulus’ naval victory over the Carthaginians near the Aegates islands in the same year (see Eutropius 2.27.3 for the date of this battle). The oldest preserved testimonies, that of Cato (fr. 84 Peter: bellum, quod quattor et viginti annos fuit) and that of Polybius (1.63.4: ἔτη πολεμηθεὶς εἰκοσι καὶ τέταρτα συνεχῶς), are in agreement in calculating the duration of the war at 24 years (likewise Diodorus Siculus 24.14, 25.2, Appian Sic. 2.5, and Livy 9.19.12, 21.10.7). Zonaras says that the war ended in the 24th year (8.17.7: ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος τοῖς
Karχηδονίων πόλεμος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις εἰς τοῦτο κατέληξε τετάρτῳ έτει καὶ εἴκοσιτῶ), and other late authors calculate 23 years (Eutr. 3.1: Finito igitur Punico bello, quod per XXIII annos tractum est; Oros. 4.11.4: bellum per annos tres et viginti gestum). But no writer apart from Plutarch here attests to the war ending in the 22nd year, and it has been suggested that δευτέρος is a corruption in the manuscripts. The scribe apparently misunderstood δ', the alphabetic symbol for τετάρτῳ, as an abbreviation for δευτέρος (see De Sanctis SR 32.1: 244 for suggestion and 243-246 for the dating of the beginning and for the calculation of the duration of the First Punic War).

3.1. Ἀρχαῖ πάλιν Γαλατικῶν ἄγώνων διεδέχοντο τῇ Ῥώμῃ: According to Polybius (2.21) the first incident after the First Punic War occurred in 237 B.C. when an advance to Ariminum by Transalpine Gauls summoned by the chiefs of the Boii ended because of inter-tribal fighting. The Romans had dispatched an army, but it turned back upon learning of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses (see Walbank Polybius 1: 191-192 for chronology). The annalistic tradition (Zon. 8.18.2-6; Oros. 4.12.1), in opposition to Polybius, reports a three year war with the Gauls beginning in 238 B.C., in which year P. Valerius Falto gained an astonishing victory after a serious defeat.

Two scholars, Lippold (Consules 122-123) and Harris (War and Imperialism 193-194), accept the main outline of the annalistic version of events and maintain that Rome was the aggressor, discounting Polybius’ portrayal of the Gauls as the
ones initiating hostilities. Their claim is largely based on what Zonaras says concerning the outbreak of hostilities (8.18.2: μετὰ δὲ τούτο ἐπολέμησαν αὐτῆς πολέμους πρὸς τε Βουούιος καὶ πρὸς Γαλάτας ἐκείνος πλησιοχώρους καὶ πρὸς Διγύων τινάς). In addition, Lippold (Consules 123) believes that the election of L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus to the consulship of 237 B.C. was not by chance, since they were both men from gentes which favored aggressive policies, and Harris (War and Imperialism 194) maintains that it was probably the Romans who began the war since it occurred "at a singularly convenient moment" for them.

Eckstein (SG 8) has shown the weakness of these arguments. He states that it is highly questionable to prefer a late and rather minor source over Polybius. Also, he points out that Zonaras' statement (8.18.2) does not attribute the responsibility for the outbreak of the war to Rome, but merely states that the Romans fought against the Gauls, and if a later statement by Zonaras is considered (8.18.4: ἐπὶ τούς Ἐρώμαιον αὐτῆς ἐχώρησαν), it would appear that the Gauls were the aggressors; Zonaras would then agree with Polybius on this point (Orosius' statement on the events of 238 B.C. can fit in well with this view [4.12.1: eodem anno Galli Cisalpini novi exstitere hostes]). In addition, Eckstein argues that attributing aggressive policies to an entire gens is questionable (why should distinct families within the same gens have similar aims?) and doubts whether 238 B.C. could possibly be "a singularly convenient moment" for the Romans, when their
attention was directed towards problems in Liguria (see Zonaras 8.18) and a crisis with Sardinia may have been at hand.

Eckstein (SG 8-9) claims that the most important argument in favor of the Gauls being the aggressors "is the basic pattern of the fighting" (p. 9). There is no indication of the undertaking of a grand campaign of conquest deep inside Gallic territory by the Romans; instead, the main event of the war was the Gauls' attempted siege on the Latin colony of Ariminum in 236 B.C. The implication of this, as Eckstein sees it, is that the war was essentially undertaken by the Gauls "to overthrow the long-existing status quo on the frontier" (p. 9) by destroying Ariminum, and this is exactly what Polybius says (2.21.3).

Plutarch makes no direct reference to these events, but begins his narrative proper of the conflict in the third year of the Gallic War which began in 225 B.C. (see Chapter 4.1. Οἱ μὲν οὖν...).

3.1. οἱ δὲ τὴν ὑπαλλείαν νεμόμενοι τῆς Ἰταλίας Ἰνσομβρέως...καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες δυνάμει: The Celtic tribe of the Insubres (RE 9.2 [1916]: 1589-1593) dwelt south of the Alps and north of the Po river, with their territory largely consisting of the area between the Ticinus and Addua rivers. They had their capital at Mediolanum (mod. Milan; Marc. 7.6-7; Polyb. 2.34.10). Polybius calls them the largest of the Celtic tribes in the Po valley (2.17.4: ὁ μέγιστος ἔθνος ἦν αὐτῶν). This is their first known involvement with the Romans where they are
designated specifically as 'Insubres,' although it is possible they had contact with Rome during earlier incidents, where only 'Celts' or 'Gauls' are mentioned without any specification as to tribe.

3.1. Γαλατῶν τούς μισθοῦ στρατευομένους, οἳ Γαισάται καλοῦνται: This reference to the Gaesati (RE 7.1 [1910]: 462-463) fighting for pay is also found in Polybius (2.22.1-2: Γαλάτας, προσαγορευομένους δὲ διὰ τὸ μισθοῦ στρατεύειν Γαισάτους· ἢ γὰρ λέξις αὕτη τούτῳ σημαίνει κυρίως, 2.34.2: αὕτης ὠρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀρδανὸν Γαισάτων Γαλατῶν εἰς τρισμυρίους) and likewise in Orosius (4.13.5: maxime Gaesatorum, quod nomen non gentis sed mercennario rum Gallorum est). The source of the information is attributed to Fabius Pictor (Walbank Polybius 1: 194; Heuberger Klio 31 [1938]: 65-66; Peter HRR 1: 36), who is said to have written on the war (Eutr. 3.5: traditumque est a Fabio historico, qui ei bello interfuit; Oros. 4.13.6: sicut Fabius historicus, qui eidem bello interfuit, scripsit).

The word Γαισάται (Lat. Gaesati) appears to be an adjective derived from the noun γαῖος (Lat. gaesum), a word of Celtic origin for a particular type of throwing spear used by the Gauls (on etymology see Holder Altceltischer Sprachschatz 1: 1517-1519 and Much Germistische Forschungen 26).

These Gaesati according to Polybius lived in the Alps and Rhone valley (2.22.1: τούς κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ περὶ τὸν Ἀρδανὸν ποταμὸν κατοικοῦντας Γαλάτας, 28.3, 34.2). Strabo
lists the Gaesati as living in the Po valley, but he is probably mistaken; all other sources report them as dwelling across the Alps (Plut. Marc. 6.3: τὰς Ἀλπεῖς ὑπερβαλόντες; Zon. 8.20.1: ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς ὀμοφύλων; Oros. 4.13.5: ex ulteriore Gallia). That the gaesum was used in these regions is indicated by Vergil, who in speaking of the Gauls attacking the Capitoline hill says, duo quisque Alpina coruscant / gaesa manu (Aen. 8.661-662), and by Caesar (BGall. 3.4.1), who uses the word gaesa to describe the spears used by the Seduni and Veragri who inhabited the Valais (Upper Rhone valley). But it cannot be inferred from these two references that this spear was peculiar to these peoples. The gaesum was a national weapon of the Gauls (Serv. Aen. 7.664: pilum proprie est hasta Romana, ut gaesa Gallorum), and derivatives of the word in the form of proper names appear everywhere in the Celtic world (e.g., Gaesatorix, Gaizatorix, Gaizatodiastos, Gaesatius; Heuberger Klio 31 [1938]: 64-65).

The statement in Livy about semi-Germanic people occupying the Valais (Lat. Vallis Poenina; 21.38.8: utique quae ad Poeninum ferunt obsaepata gentibus semigermanis fuissent) and the mention of Germans in the Acta Triumphorum of 222 B.C. for Marcellus' triumph over the Insubres and Gaesati (de Galleis Insubribus et Germ[an].) have led some scholars to argue that the Gaesati were Germans (Much Germistische Forschungen 26-61 among others; see Heuberger Klio 31 [1938]: 60). But the Germani of the Acta Triumphorum may be incorrect, having been introduced during the time of Augustus as a result of historical
speculation of those re-editing the Fasti. However, if it was present originally, it may still not refer to the German people but to a particular tribe of Gauls who happened to be named *Germani* (Mommsen *Römische Geschichte* 12: 555, n. 1; see Walbank *Polybius* 1: 194). In regard to Livy’s reference to Germans in the Valais, this may be an anachronism, since the term *Germani* was not used extensively before the first century A.D. (Stähelin *Die Schweiz in römischer Zeit* 33, n. 1; see Walbank *Polybius* 1: 194). Heuberger dismisses Livy’s reference by asserting that the Gaesati did not come from this valley in the first place (Klio 31 [1938]: 61, 76-80).

It is generally assumed that the term *Gaesati* came to mean ‘Celtic mercenaries’ (e.g., Walbank *Polybius* 1: 194), but this has been called into question by Heuberger (Klio 31 [1938]: 65-72, 80) who believes that it rather ought to mean ‘heroes’ (*Helden*) or ‘warriors’ (*Kriegers*). However, it seems more probable that some Celtic tribes dwelling in the Alps and Rhone valley acquired the designation *Gaesati* (spear-warriors), in place of an ethnic name, because of their habit of joining themselves to expeditions for plunder. This designation would not have been used generally for Celtic mercenaries, but only in the case of these people (see Walbank *Polybius* 1: 195 for further bibliography).

3.2. θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἑδόκει...προκαλεῖσθαι σχολὴν ἄγοντας: Polybius records that the Gauls remained at peace with Rome for 45 years after having endured a number of defeats (2.21.1: 63
In contrast to Plutarch’s simplistic view of the Gauls as third party contestants patiently awaiting their turn to do battle, Polybius states his own view that peace lasted only until a new generation of Gauls had grown up who were unfamiliar with the past suffering and peril and became exasperated with the Romans on the smallest pretext (2.21.2-3: ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶται γεγονότες τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξεχώρησαν διὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἐπεγένοντο δὲ νέοι, θυμοῦ μὲν ἀλογίστου πλήρεις, ἀπειροὶ δὲ καὶ ἄδρατοι παντὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, αὕτεις ἤρξαντο τὰ καθεστώτα κινεῖν, δ’ φύσιν ἔχει γίνεσθαι καὶ τραχύνεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πρὸς Ῥωμαίους).

De Sanctis (SR 3.1: 278) considers Polybius’ explanation why the Gauls remained inactive insufficient. He says that although the memory of recent disasters could account for the Gauls keeping quiet during Rome’s conflict with Pyrrhus, it would carry less weight during the First Punic War, especially when the defeat of Regulus’ army in Africa, Rome’s subsequent naval disasters, and her constant employment of considerable numbers of troops in Sicily substantially reduced the forces which Rome could deploy in central Italy. Also, the suppositions that this news only reached the Gauls with difficulty and that they were unable to appreciate its
significance are insufficient. De Sanctis suggests that Carthage neither undertook nor was able to re-ignite the Gauls' hatred against Rome, while Rome in the meantime followed a policy of appeasement with the Gauls.

Eckstein (SG 7) gives more credit to Polybius' explanation than De Sanctis. He says that the wars the Romans fought against the Gauls (especially the Boii) in the 280's B.C. certainly weakened the Gauls in both numbers and morale. As well, the founding of the Latin colony of Ariminum in 268 B.C. probably acted as a restraint (this is seen in the fact that when the Gauls in 225 B.C., and later Hannibal, attempted to cross the Apennines, they avoided the route guarded by Ariminum and used the more difficult passes to the west).

3.3-4. ὀὖ μὴν ἄλλα μέγαν ἦ τε χώρα παρείχε <φόβον>...τὴν πόλιν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβαλόντες: Polybius also reports the Romans' fear of the Gauls (2.23.7: οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πάντες περιδεεῖς ἦσαν, μέγαν καὶ φοβερὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐπιφέρεσθαι κίνδυνον. ἔπασχον δὲ τούτ' εἰκότως, ἐτι περὶ Γαλατῶν ἐγκαθημένου ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν τοῦ παλαιοῦ φόβου). This fear originated from the capture of Rome by the Gauls in 387/6 B.C. (trad. date 390 B.C.; see Ogilvie Livy 629 for dating), and it appears to have remained unabated up to this point due to subsequent encounters with these tribes. Polybius says that the Romans were unable to know or expect anything more terrifying than what had been done to them by the Gauls (2.20.8: τοῦ γὰρ κατακόπτεσθαι συνήθειαν ἐσχηκότες ὑπὸ Γαλατῶν οὐδὲν ἦδύναντο δεινότερον ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ
3.4. ἡς ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ θέμενοι νόμον...: The date would be 387/6 B.C. (trad. date 390 B.C.). This law is also mentioned by Plutarch in his life of Camillus (41.7: οὔτω δ’ οὖν ὁ φόβος ἦν ἰσχυρός, ὡσε θέσαν νόμον ἀφείσθαι τοὺς ἱερεῖς στρατεύας, χωρὶς ἤν μὴ Γαλατικὸς ἢ πόλεμος). It appears that Roman priests were regularly exempted from military service (Cic. Luc. 121: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos), and this was apparently due to their sacrosanctity (see Mommsen Str. 33: 241-243). This immunity from military service, however, did not prevent some priests from serving voluntarily (e.g., Marcellus was an augur [see Chapter 2.3: ο’ δ’ ἱερεῖς...], his son, M. Claudius Marcellus, was a pontiff [see Chapter 2.5. ἦν γὰρ αὐτῷ...], and his half-brother, T. Otacilius Crassus, was both an augur and pontiff [see Chapter 2.2. ἐν δὲ Σικελίᾳ...]

3.5. ἐδήλου δὲ καὶ τὸν φόβον αὐτῶν ἦ τε παρασκευή...: Polybius also comments on the preparations which the Romans made under the influence of this fear (2.22.7-8: εἰς φόβους ἐνέπιπτον συνεχεῖς καὶ ταραχὰς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, ὡσε τοτὲ μὲν στρατόπεδα καταγράφειν καὶ σίτου καὶ τῶν ἔπιτηθειῶν ποιεῖσθαι παρασκευάς, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξάγειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρους, ὡς ἦδη παρόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν πολεμίων, οὐδέπω κεκινηκότων ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας τῶν Κελτῶν).

According to Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 295) the statement
μυριάδες γὰρ ἐν ὀπλοῖς ἡμα τοσαῦτα, Ῥωμαῖων οὕτε πρῶτου αὖθ᾽ ὕστερον γενέσθαι λέγονται is apparently a misunderstanding on Plutarch’s part of a military census ordered by the Senate in 225 B.C. which he found in his sources (see Polybius 2.23.9, 24.1-16 [see Walbank Polybius 1: 196-198 for his comments on Polybius’ account of this census], Livy Per. 20, Orosius 4.13.6, and Eutropius 3.5; Fabius Pictor is the ultimate source for this census [Oros. 4.13.6; Eutr. 3.5]).

It may be possible that Polybius’ estimation of this Gallic War may have influenced Plutarch’s comment here (2.35.2: κατὰ τὰς μάχας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀπολλυμένων καὶ παραταττομένων οὐδὲνός καταδεστερας τῶν ἀστοριμένων).

3.5. τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ νοτομούμενα: This could refer either to sacrifices which had to be renewed because they had been improperly performed (e.g., Liv. 41.16.1-2) or to the retaking of the auspices until favorable omens were obtained in order that the business at hand could proceed (e.g., Marc. 29.8-10).

3.6. Plutarch is pointing out to his Greek audience that the Romans were very similar to them in regards to religious practices. He then gives an instance when the Romans performed a barbaric rite that had been forced upon them (Ἠναγκάσθησαν; see Introduction, p. 9, concerning Plutarch’s intended readership).
But how alien was human sacrifice to Roman religion? Although certain other religious rites may have originally involved human sacrifice which in historical times substituted other victims for humans (e.g., on the 15th of May straw mannequins, called Argei, were thrown into the Tiber as a purificatory sacrifice [Varro LL 7.44]), the live burial of Greek and Gallic couples was certainly a rite of human sacrifice practiced by the Romans in historical times. However, it appears to have been performed for the first time only in 228 B.C. and then, later, on only two other occasions during the Republic (in 216 and 114/3 B.C.). The late date of the first occurrence, the infrequency, and its origin from the Sibyline books (see Chapter 3.6. εἰςαντες...) may have occasioned the comments of Plutarch and Livy on the foreignness of human sacrifice to the Romans. But an analogous act of live burial was the customary punishment of Vestal Virgins for breaking their vows of chastity. This form of punishment was commonly employed during the time of the Republic and appears to have
been thoroughly incorporated into Roman practice. Excavations near the so-called Equus Domitiani in the Roman Forum have uncovered the remains of three human skeletons, one of a woman about 14-15 years old, another of a three month old baby, and a third of a man about 25-30 years old. From the position of the arm-bones it appears that man had been bound, while the position of the woman's skeleton also seemed unnatural (Gjerstad Early Rome 1: 49-52). Coarelli believes that these could be the remains of a live burial, perhaps of a Vestal Virgin and her paramour which would explain the presence of the baby. These remains are dated between 800-600 B.C. (Il foro romano: periodo arcaico 294-295) and help to affirm the antiquity of live burial among the Romans. This suggests that the comments of Plutarch and Livy are a result of defensiveness on their parts.

3.6. εἰς ἄντες λογίων τοίς ἐκ τῶν Σιβύλλειῶν: These were the Sibylline books, a collection of oracles acquired, according to tradition, by Tarquinius Superbus from the Sibyl of the Euboan colony of Cumae (e.g., Dion. Hal. 4.62; Aul. Gell. 1.19; Zon. 7.11.1-4; Tzetzes in Lycophr. Alex. 1279). They were kept in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus and consulted in times of crisis by the decemviri sacris faciundis (at this time period) on the instruction of the senate for ascertaining by what steps the gods might be appeased (e.g., Liv. 36.37.4). From the nature of some of the things suggested by them, the oracles appear to have been mainly of Greek origin (e.g., the institution of the cult of Liber, Libera, and Ceres, [Dion. Hal.
6.17; Liv. 2.41.10], the foundation of a temple of Apollo [Liv. 4.25.3]; this is the opinion of Ogilvie [Livy 654–655]; see Wissowa RK 534–543 for further information).

3.6. οὼ μὲν Ἕλληνας, ἀνδρὰ καὶ γυναῖκα, δύο δὲ Γαλάτας ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ βοῶν ἄγορα κατορύζαι ζῶντας: In Zonaras it is recorded that this was done in response to an oracle, which said that Greeks and Gauls would seize the city, in order that by this means destiny might appear to have been fulfilled (8.19.9: ἔθεν δὲ ποτὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐλθόντος καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ Γαλάτας τὸ ἀστυ καταλήψεσθαι, Γαλάται δύο καὶ Ἕλληνες ἔτεροι ἐκ τε τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θῆλεος γένους ζῶντες ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾳ κατωρύγησαν, ἵνα οὕτως ἐπιτελέσῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον γενέσθαι δοκῇ, καὶ τι κατέχειν τῆς πόλεως κατορφυμένοι νομίζονται). A scholion of Tzetzes in Lycophron's Alexandra places this event in the time of Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (603: Ἐπὶ Φαβίου γὰρ Μαξίμου Βεροκόσσου ἦτοι ἀκροχορδονώθως Ῥωμαίοι τοῦτο ἐποίησαν, Ἕλληνικὸν καὶ Γαλατικὸν ἀνδρόγυνον κρύπαντες ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἄγορᾳ, ἐκ χρησιμοῦ τινὸς δειματωθέντες, λέγοντος Ἕλληνα καὶ Γαλάτην καταλήψεσθαι τὸ ἁστυ). This would be in 228 B.C. during Fabius' second consulship as a passage in Orosius suggests (4.13.2–3: Sequenti anno...Fulvio Postumioque consulibus [i.e. 229 B.C.] ...Tertio deinceps anno [i.e. 228 B.C.] miseram civitatem sacrilegis sacrificiis male potentes funestavere pontifices; namque decemviri consuetudinem prisciæ superstitionis egressi Gallum virum et Gallam feminam cum muliere simul Graeca in foro boario vivos defoderunt; see Broughton MRR 1: 228 for references to the
consulships of Fabius, Fulvius, and Postumius). Schwenn (MGR 148-150), relying on what Plutarch says (3.6: τότε τοῦ πολέμου συμπεσόντος ἦναγκάσθησαν), dates this event to 226 B.C., but this is probably due to his desire to place it right before the Gallic War of 225-222 B.C. Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 295), Cichorius (Römische Studien 15-16), Latte (RR 256), and most recently Eckstein (AJAH 7.1 [1982]: 69-70) all concur in dating the event to 228 B.C.

A second known instance of the live burial of a Gallic and a Greek couple occurred in 216 B.C. after the Roman defeat at Cannae (Liv. 22.57.6: Interim ex fatalibus libris sacrificia aliquot extraordinaria facta, inter quae Gallus et Galla, Graecus et Graeca in foro bovario sub terram vivi demissi sunt in locum saxo consaeptum, iam ante hostiis humanis, minime Romano sacro, imbutum). The instructions for this sacrifice according to Livy came from the fatalibus libris (22.57.6) which are to be equated with the Sibylline books (see Livy 22.9.8-9). It is interesting to note that these oracular works were consulted the previous year after the disaster at Lake Trasimene (217 B.C.) under the direction of Q. Fabius Maximus who was dictator at the time (Liv. 22.9.7-11). Although the instigator in this particular instance is not known, Fabius would be the most likely candidate. Livy (22.55) portrays him as being prominent at the first meeting of the senate after Cannae, while Plutarch says he persuaded the senate to meet and was himself the mainstay of the state (Fab. Max. 17.7: βουλήν τε συνελθεῖν ἐπεισε καὶ παρεθάρουνε τὰς άρχας, αὐτὸς δὲν καὶ ρώμη καὶ δύναμις
Fabius would most likely have followed the same policy which he had advocated after Trasimene, that of enquiring of the gods themselves how they might be appeased (Liv. 22.9.7: quaeque piacula irae deum essent ipsos deos consulendos esse). This suggests that, if Fabius was involved with the instigation of the human sacrifices in 216 B.C., he was probably also involved with the human sacrifices of 228 B.C., the year of his second consulship.

A third instance of this rite is reported by Plutarch in his Quaestiones Romanae (Mor. 283f-284c). This occurrence has been dated by Cichorius (Römische Studien 7-12) to 114/3 B.C.

Finally, Pliny states that this rite had occurred even in his own days (NH 28.12: boario vero in foro Graecum Graecamque defossos aut aliarum gentium, cum quibus tum res esset, etiam nostra aetas vidit). This performance Cichorius (Römische Studien 13-14) would place either in the reign of Caligula (A.D. 39-41) or Nero (A.D. 54-68). He believes that a trace of this incident may even survive in Suetonius’ Caligula (29.2: Gallis Graecisque aliquot uno tempore condemnatis gloriabatur Gallograeciam se subegisse).

Plutarch places the site of the burial of 228 B.C. in the Forum Boarium (ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ βοαιν ἄγορᾳ), and Orosius confirms this (4.13.3: in foro boario). Although Zonaras (8.19.9: ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾳ) and Tzetzes (in Lycophr. Alex. 603: ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἄγορᾳ) only specify ‘forum’ this ought to refer to the Forum Boarium and not to the Forum Romanum. From Livy’s notice of a similar burial which appears to have happened in the same spot, we read
that the area was enclosed with stone (22.57.6: in locum saxo consaepptum). But so far no archaeological remains have yet been discovered which can be definitely linked to this structure.

The meaning of the rite has been the subject of much debate. From a passage in Pliny (NH 28.12: boario vero in foro Graecum Graecamque defossos aut aliarum gentium, cum quibus tum res esset, etiam nostra aetas vidit), it has been assumed that it was a war-sacrifice, the magical destruction of one's opponents carried out on their representatives (see Latte RR 256 and Cichorius Römische Studien 13). But it has been pointed out that in none of the three known instances which occurred during the Republic was Rome at war simultaneously with the Greeks and the Gauls (Cichorius Römische Studien 14-16). Therefore, it has been suggested that the rite was taken over without change from the Etruscans, who had suffered from Gallic attacks in the north and Greek attacks in the south (Latte RR 257; see Cichorius Römische Studien 19-20), or that it was an autonomous creation of the Romans in the fourth century B.C. at a time when Rome faced dangers from both the Greeks (i.e. Dionysius I of Syracuse) and Gauls simultaneously (Fraschetti Le délit religieux dans la cité antique 78-115; see, also, De Sanctis SR 22.1: 320 for a further suggestion along this line).

Cichorius has pointed out that the performances of the rite in 216 B.C. and in 114/3 B.C. are linked in our sources to the discovery and punishment of Vestal Virgins for breaking their vows of chastity in such a way as to suggest that the offense of the Vestal Virgins was the cause for the consultation of the
Sibylline books which demanded the ritual (Liv. 22.57.2-6: tum quod duae Vestales eo anno, Opimia atque Floronia, stupri compertae et altera sub tera, uti mos est, ad portam Collinam necata fuerat...Hoc nefas cum inter tot, ut fit, clades in prodigium versum esset, decemviri libros adire iussi sunt...; Plut. Mor. 284b-c: ἐμῆνυσε Βάρρου τινὸς ἱππικοῦ θεράπων τρεῖς παρθένους τῶν ἐστιάδων, Ἀιμιλίαν καὶ Δικινίαν καὶ Μαρκίαν, ὑπὸ ταύτῳ διεφθορμένας καὶ συνούσας πολὺν χρόνον ἀνδράσιν...ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν ἐκκολάσθησαν ἐξελεγχθεῖσαι, τῆς δὲ πράξεως δεινῆς φανείσθης ἔδοξεν ἀνερέσθαι τὰ Σιβύλλεια τοὺς ἱερεῖς...). In regard to the performance of the rite in 228 B.C., Cichorius would link the notice of a condemned Vestal Virgin in Livy Periocha 20 to this event (Tuccia, virgo Vestalis, incesti damnata est). Therefore, because of these connections and the similarity of the two types of events (i.e. both involving live burial), he believes that they may have been expiatory sacrifices to atone for the death of the priestesses (Römische Studien 16-18; it is interesting to note, in this connection, that following the discovery and punishment of the Vestal Virgins in 228 [or 230/29 as suggested below] and 216 B.C. the next case known is that of 114/3 B.C.).

Eckstein (AJAH 7.1 [1982]: 75-77), in rebutting Cichorius' arguments, has pointed out that the matter concerning the Vestal Virgin reported in Livy Periocha 20 occurred in 230/29 B.C., at least a year and a half before the burial of the Greek and Gallic couples in 228 B.C., and therefore any linkage between the two events would be highly suspect. Also, in the other two
instances, he sees no connection because the Vestal scandals were "merely...great prodigia which, in combination with other portents, led the Senate to order a consultation of the Sibylline Books" (pp. 81-82), and it was that which was reported in the oracular writings which led to the live burial of the Greek and Gallic couples. But even admitting this he does not see the live burial as a simple war sacrifice, since the victims did not correspond to the peoples with whom Rome was at war at those particular times and because the purpose of the sacrifice was not to ward off the current enemy, but to prevent some future military disaster. However, he does concede that, in a way, the rite can be viewed as a war-sacrifice with the victims representing in a symbolic manner external threats to the Roman state (p. 82; see Briquel REL 59 [1982]: 30 for further bibliography).

Whatever the meaning of the live burial of Greek and Gallic couples, the proximity of the Vestal scandals and the resulting punishment of live burial, despite the objections of Eckstein, still suggest some connection. Our lack of knowledge concerning how the Sibylline books were consulted and interpreted by the decemviri sacris faciundis leaves room for conjecture. Might not Q. Fabius Maximus in 228 B.C., who was known for his concern for religious matters, inspired by the punishment of a Vestal Virgin in 230/29 B.C., have suggested to the Romans, who were in a high state of alarm, the re-introduction of a defunct archaic religious ritual at this time and later, also, in 216 B.C.?
3.7. <ἐφ'> οἴς ἔτι καὶ νῦν...: Similarly Plutarch, in a discussion on the live burial of Vestal Virgins, mentions that even in his own days priests made offerings to the dead at the place where Vestal Virgins guilty of unchastity were buried (Mor. 287a: ἀλλὰ μέχρι νῦν ἐναγίζουσιν οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐκεῖ βαδίζοντες ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον). Both of these ceremonies were probably meant as expiatory sacrifices to atone for the deaths of those buried alive. However, the two ceremonies did not take place in the same spot since the Greek and Gallic couples were buried in the Forum Boarium (see Chapter 3.6. δόσο μὲν...), while the Vestal Virgins were usually buried near the Colline gate (Liv. 22.57.2: sub terra, uti mos est, ad portam Collinam necata fuerat).

The Romans in 97 B.C. passed a decree forbidding human sacrifice (Plin. NH 30.12: DCLVII demum anno urbis Cn. Cornelio Lentulo P. Licinio Crasso cos. senatusconsultum factum est, ne homo immolaretur, palamque fit, in tempus illut sacra prodigiosa celebrata; the rites mentioned here by Pliny may be atonement sacrifices [Latte RR 257]).
4. Plutarch begins the narrative proper of the Gallic War with the year 223 B.C. But this chapter, which deals with the actions of the consuls C. Flaminius and P. Furius, has no connection with Marcellus. Plutarch could just as easily have left out these events, as he had the events of the first two years of the war (i.e. 225 and 224 B.C.), with no discernible affect on his portrayal of Marcellus. However, the reporting of Flaminius’ contempt for the auguries (4.6: ἐνύβρις καὶ κατεφρόνησις) gives him the opportunity to add an excursus on the Romans’ attitude towards the gods. This topic forms the end of this chapter and takes up all of chapter five before the narrative of the war resumes at chapter six (see Marcellus 3.5-7, 6.10-12, 28.2-3, and 29.8-10 for other examples on this theme).

4.1. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶτοι τῶν ἀγώνων...ἐνέγκαντες: This is a transitional statement which allows Plutarch to bypass the earlier events of the war in order to deal with the struggle in 223 and 222 B.C. However, this transitional statement is a distortion of preceding events.

According to Polybius (2.23.1-31.6) in 225 B.C. the Insubres and Boii, accompanied by the Gaesati who had crossed over the Alps, advanced with their forces (50,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry and chariots) into Etruria. Before departing they stationed a guard in their territories as a
protection against the Cenomani and Veneti, who had allied themselves to Rome. The Romans, in the meantime, had sent the consul L. Aemilius Papus with his army to Ariminum to await there the attack of the enemy, while a praetor was sent to cover Etruria (the other consul, C. Atilius Regulus, had already gone to Sardinia with his army). The Gauls crossed over into Etruria and advanced as far south as Clusium before they met the Roman praetor with his forces. The Gauls withdrew northwards and attacked the pursuing forces of the praetor near Faesulae. A battle ensued, in which not fewer than 6,000 Romans were killed, while the rest took flight and found refuge on a naturally strong hill where they held out.

L. Aemilius Papus, who had headed out on hearing of the Gallic invasion of Etruria, arrived on the scene in time to rescue the surviving Romans. The Gauls, on Aemilius' approach, decided to retire. They did not go back along their original tracks, but by a route along the sea-coast through Etruria. Just at this time the other consul, Atilius, landed at Pisa with his army from Sardinia. Near a place called Telamon the Gauls' retreat was blocked by Atilius' forces, while Aemilius' army was in pursuit from behind. In the ensuing battle the Gauls were wiped out, with up to 40,000 killed and not less than 10,000 captured. However, the success for the Romans was marred by the death of Atilius. Aemilius, the surviving consul, after this battle crossed through Liguria into the territory of the Boii, which he ravaged before returning to Rome. The spoils and prisoners acquired in this campaign he used for the adornment of

Polybius (2.31.7-10) says that this success induced the Romans to hope for the entire expulsion of the Celts from the Po region. Consequently, in 224 B.C. the consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus and T. Manlius Torquatus with a large force invaded the territory of the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the remainder of their campaign had no further success due to heavy rains and an epidemic which broke out among their forces.

4.1. εἰς οὗδὲν ἐτελεύτησαν πέρας βέβαιον: The events of the war so far can hardly be called indecisive as Plutarch states, and there may have been a part of the senate which thought the war sufficiently successful to consider ending it. This is indicated by the recall of Flaminius and Furius to Rome when they were on the point of attacking the Insubres (cf. Cassola *GPR* 220-224; see Chapters 4.4. εὐθύς... and 6.2. ἐλέχθη...).

4.2. Φλαμινίου: This is C. Flaminius (*RE* 6.2 [1909], no. 2: 2496-2502) consul for 223 B.C.. As plebeian tribune in 232 B.C., he managed to pass a law in the teeth of senatorial opposition to distribute in individual allotments (viritim) the land which had formerly belonged to the Senones (Polyb. 2.21.7-8; Val. Max. 5.4.5; Cato fr. 43 Peter; Cic. *Sen.* 11, *Inv.* 2.52, *Acad.* 2.13, *Brut.* 57, *Leg.* 3.20; Liv. 21.63.2; Flaminius' tribuneship is dated to 232 B.C. by Polybius [2.21.7-8], but to 228 B.C. by Cicero [*Sen.* 11]. Cicero is in error; see Broughton
Polybius (2.21.7-9) declares that this policy of Flaminius was the cause of the Gallic War, since many of the Gauls, especially the Boii, who bordered on Roman territory, now believed that the Romans made war against them not for supremacy and sovereignty, but for their total expulsion and extermination (2.21.9: νομίσαντες οὖ ύπερ ἡγεμονίας έτι καὶ δυναστείας Ῥωμαίους τόν πρός αὑτούς ποιήσασθαι πόλεμον, ἀλλ' ύπερ δολοσχερούς ἐξαναστάσεως καὶ καταφθορᾶς). But is Polybius correct in his interpretation of Gallic belief? The Romans had held the territory which they were settling as far back as 283 B.C., when they had inflicted a serious defeat on the Senones and had driven the rest from their country (Polyb. 2.19.10-11). Also, in 268 B.C. Rome had founded the colony of Ariminum to oppose the Boii (Vel. Pat. 1.14.7). Likewise, the Gauls had already attempted an attack in 236 B.C., which ended because of internal fighting (Polyb. 2.21.1-6). The viritane distributions, on the other hand, occurred 51 years after the conquest of this territory and were located south of Ariminum (Cato fr. 43 Peter: cis Ariminum). It has been suggested that the migration of large numbers of Romans to settle in this area may have caused some alarm among the Gauls (Cassola GPR 212). But placing all the blame for the resulting war on Flaminius’ land bill is a distortion. As Eckstein points out, it was all "part of a process of escalating tensions that had, in fact,
begun about 238" (SG 12). Polybius was writing in a tradition which was hostile to Flaminius, and the view given by him was probably derived from that of Flaminius' opponents and therefore must be regarded with suspicion (see Walbank Polybius 1: 192-193 concerning hostile attitude towards Flaminius and for bibliography. Modern scholars are divided on the validity of Polybius' accusation; see Cassola GPR 212, n. 8, for bibliography; see, also, Eckstein SG 12-13, Harris War and Imperialism 197-198, and Scullard A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BC 188).

The effects of Flaminius' land bill may have exacerbated tensions, but who were the aggressors in this war? In respect to the events before 235 B.C., it appears that the Gauls were the aggressors (see Chapter 3.1. ἀρχαὶ...). As for the events leading up to the war in 225 B.C., Roman actions can be interpreted as being due to an intense fear of a possible Gallic invasion (this was how the ancients themselves interpreted the situation. For example, according to Zonaras [8.19.2] the Romans around 230 B.C. prohibited trading in silver and gold with the Celts fearing that these precious metals might be used against them, and Polybius [2.22.7-8] states that the Romans were in a constant state of alarm, sometimes enrolling forces and gathering supplies and at other times moving troops up to the borders as if the enemy had already crossed over into their territory, although, in fact, the Celts had not yet even moved from their own country). The Gauls, on the other hand, actually initiated hostilities in 225 B.C. by their crossing of the
Apennines and their penetration into central Italy (cf. Eckstein SG 11-13, who believes that Roman policy was primarily defensive, while Harris [War and Imperialism 197-199] states that the war was due in part to Roman aggression).

What were the Roman war-aims in northern Italy, especially after the successful campaign of 225 B.C.? Polybius says that this success induced the Romans to hope for the entire expulsion of the Celts from the Po region (2.31.8: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος τοῦτου κατελπίσαντες ἡρωαῖοι δυνῆσθαι τοὺς Κέλτους ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον ὀλοσχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν; see Harris War and Imperialism 111, who largely accepts Polybius' statement). However, even if this was the original intention of the Romans, the course of the war and their subsequent activities do not indicate that they carried out this policy. In fact, after the campaign of 224 B.C., in which the Boii surrendered, but the Celts north of the Po were still left intact, there were many senators who felt that the results of the war up to this point were sufficient (see Chapter 4.4. εὐθὺς...). Also, after the successful campaign of 223 B.C., peace proposals from the Insubres were taken seriously (see Chapter 6.2. ἐλέχθη...). Even at the end of the war in 222 B.C., the Insubres obtained a moderate peace with the Romans, which left them in possession of most of their territory (see Chapter 7.8. τῶς δ´... et seq.). After the war, in 219 B.C. Rome did decide to establish two colonies in the region, Placentia and Cremona, on opposite sides of the Po near the confluence of the Addua river, but their purpose appears to have
been mainly defensive in nature: to control communications and movements between the Boii and the Insubres (see Asconius *Pis.* p. 3 Kiessling-Schoell concerning Placentia and Tacitus *Hist.* 3.34 concerning Cremona). Lastly, even after the fighting in the 190's B.C. when Cisalpine Gaul finally came under complete Roman domination, the Celts of this region retained possession of much of their land with the exception of the Boii. So, Roman aims appear to have been more limited than Polybius claimed. Although there may have been a group at Rome who favored the conquest of the region, Roman policy appears to have been basically defensive. Many in the senate were concerned to ensure that the Gauls would not be a threat in view of the upcoming conflict with Carthage (cf. Cassola *GPR* 219-228, Dyson *The Creation of the Roman Frontier* 30-41, 51-54, Eckstein *SG* 14-23).

4.2. Φουρίου: This is P. Furius Philus (*RE* 7.1 [1910], no. 80: 361) Flaminius' colleague in the consuls'hip of 223 B.C. Both Scullard (*RP* 54) and Cassola (*GPR* 296-297, 378-379) believe that Furius was not in the same political group as Flaminius. Scullard places him in the Aemilian group, while Cassola (*GPR* 378-379) suggests that he may have belonged to the Scipionic circle.

4.2. μεγάλας ἐκστρατευσάντων δυνάμειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἰνσομβραί: Polybius (2.32.1-8) reports that the consuls, after having procured an alliance with the Anares, crossed into Insubrian
territory at the junction of the Po and Addua rivers. However, after sustaining losses the Romans made a truce and withdrew. The consuls then, taking a circuitous route, marched for several days and crossed the Clusius river into the territory of the Cenomani. Accompanied by the Cenomani, who were their allies, the Romans again invaded Insubrian territory from the districts at the foot of the Alps and began to ravage the countryside. The Insubres, deciding to undertake a decisive battle, collected all their forces (up to 50,000) and took up a threatening position opposite the Romans. The Romans, however, excluding their Gallic allies, whom they mistrusted, were much fewer in numbers than their opponents.

Polybius gives the number of combatants in the consular armies as they existed before the beginning of the Gallic War (2.24.3-4: μετὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξεληλύθει τέταρτα στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαῖκά, πεντάκις μὲν χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους πεζοὺς, ἵππεὺς δὲ τριακοσίους ἔχον ἐκαστὸν. σύμμαχοι δὲ μεθ’ ἐκατέρων ἦσαν οἱ συνάμφω πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισεκάτου ὀκτὼ ἵππεῖς). From Polybius’ report one can assume that the totals for the combined consular armies in this year may have been as high as 20,800 Roman infantry and 1,200 Roman cavalry in four legions accompanied by 30,000 allied foot and 2,000 allied horse. But this would be the upper limit (the normal size for a Roman legion at this time was 4,000-4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry; see Walbank Polybius 1: 199-200). If Polybius (2.32.7-8) is correct in stating that the Roman forces with their Gallic allies excluded were much fewer in number than their opponents
(32.7: οφάς ἐλάττους ὄντες παρὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων), then it appears that Rome’s Gallic allies made up a significant part of the normal allied complement accompanying the legions at this time.

4.2. Ἰνσομβρας: See Chapter 3.1. οἱ δὲ τὴν ὑπαλλείαν... concerning these Gauls.

4.2. ὡφθη μὲν αἴματι ἰέων...: Orosius and Zonaras also report the portents for this year (Oros. 4.13.12: namque in Piceno flumen sanguine effluxit et apud Tuscos caelum ardere visum est et Arimini nocte multa lucem claram obfulsisse ac tres lunas distantibus caeli regionibus exortas apparuisse; Zon. 8.20.4: ποταμὸς τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πικηνῷ αἷματόδης ἐρρύη κἂν τῇ Τυρσηνίδι καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πολὺ ἔδοξε, καὶ ἐν τῷ 'Αριμίνῳ φῶς νύκτωρ ἡμέρα προσεικός ἔλαμψε, καὶ πολλαχότι τῆς 'Ιταλίας τρεῖς σελήναι νυκτὸς ἐφαντάσθησαν, κἂν τῇ ἄγορᾷ γύψ ἐφ' ἡμέρας πλείονας ἐνιδρύθη). It is clear that the reports of Plutarch, Orosius, and Zonaras are all based on the same material. The variations found in Plutarch and his misplacing of the last portent to Ariminum are due to his carelessness in abridging his source (Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 296). Klotz assumes that Orosius drew upon Livy and that Zonaras’ account may have been derived from Valerius Antias transmitted through Dio. If this is correct, then Livy, rather than Valerius Antias, would be the more likely source for the material here, since Plutarch includes both the first and the last portents reported by
Orosius (see Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 295-296, who maintains, however, that a decision on the source is not to be forced here).

4.2. ὁ διὰ τῆς Πικενίδος χώρας ποταμός: The territory of Picenum as defined under Augustus (Plin. NH 3.46) extended along the Adriatic coast from the Aeternus river north to the city of Ancona reaching inland to the Apennine mountains (Plin. NH 3.110-112; Strab. 5.240-241). Originally it may have extended as far north as Ariminum encompassing the region once occupied by the Senones (Polyb. 2.21.7: κατεκληρούχησαν ἐν Γαλατίᾳ Ῥωμαίοι τῆς Πικενίδης προσαγορευμένην χώραν, ἐξ ἡς νικήσαντες ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Σήνωνας προσαγορευμένους Γαλάτας; Liv. Per. 15: coloniae deductae Ariminum in Piceno). The river mentioned here could be any one of several which flow in the region.

4.2. Ἀρίμινον: Ariminum (mod. Rimini) located on the Adriatic coast halfway between Ancona and Ravenna was founded as a Latin colony in 268 B.C. (Vel. Pat. 1.14.7) to be a strong-point against the Gauls of the Po valley (cf. PECS 93-94).

4.3. οἱ δὲ...ἐρεῖς...τὰς τῶν ὑπάτων ἀναγορεύσεις: These priests formed the college of augurs (collegium augurium) who were nine in number at this time (Liv. 10.6.6, 9.2). They were responsible for determining whether a course of action was approved of by the gods by watching for signs (auguria) either
directly sought (*impetrativa*) or accidentally met with (*oblativa*). In elections chickens (called merely οἶωνοὺς by Plutarch) were used for the purpose of obtaining signs. Whether and how the birds ate determined the favorability of the *augurium*. The best sign (*tripudium solistimum*) was when they ate so greedily that some of the food fell from their beaks to the ground. To ensure this result they would be starved beforehand (Cic. *Div.* 1.27-28, 2.72-73; see Wissowa *RK* 523-534 concerning augurs).

Usually for normal administrative business one augur was selected to observe the signs, and there would be no appeal to his colleagues against his decision (Cassola *GPR* 338). However, the ancient sources make reference to group decisions (e.g., Marc. 4.3, 12.2, Liv. 22.31.13: *vocati augures vitio creatum videri pronuntiaverunt*), which implies that the augur in charge consulted the other members of the college before rendering his decision (cf. Staveley *JRS* 53 [1963]: 186).

During the last decades of third century B.C., the augural procedures were often employed in the political struggles for personal ends (Cassola *GPR* 336). In these struggles a political faction could dominated the augural college since membership was by co-option. If this happened, then it appears reasonable that the dominant group would ensure that an augur favorable to its views would be appointed for important situations (cf. Staveley *JRS* 53 [1963]: 186).

The composition of the augural college at this time is not fully known. The only certain member is Q. Fabius Maximus
Verrucosus, augur since 265 B.C. and, as its senior member, probably the head of the dominant political faction in the college. However, it can be reasonably assumed that M. Claudius Marcellus had been a member since 226 B.C. The other possible members are T. Otacilius Crassus (RE, no. 12), M. Aemilius Lepidus (RE, no. 66), P. Furius Philus (RE, no. 80), C. Atilius Serranus (RE, no. 62), Sp. Carvilius Maximus (Ruga; RE, no. 10), M. Pomponius Matho (RE, no. 18), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (RE, no. 176), and Q. Mamilius Turrinus (RE, no. 12) or C. Mamilius Turrinus (RE, no. 11; see Broughton MRR 1: 202, 210, 230, 245, 252, 266, 276, and 283 for references; see, also, Szemler The Priests of the Roman Republic 64-100 and 139-141).

There is good reason to believe that the negative signs observed here for the public proclamation of the consuls (μοχθηρας καὶ δυσόρνης...τὰς τῶν ὑπάτων ἀναγωρεύσεις) were politically motivated. The augur assigned to the election can not be determined, but he appears to have had a change of mind after the completion of the elections when the consuls were on the point of invading Insubrian territory for only then were the auguries judged invalid (see Chapter 4.4: εὐθὺς... concerning possible political motivations; however cf. Develin RhM 122 [1979]: 274, who believes that there were real religious issues involved here).

4.4. εὐθὺς οὖν ἐπεμψεν ἢ σύγκλητος ἐπὶ στρατόπεδον γράμματα...: The election of Flaminius and Furius, which at first did not seem to have encountered any opposition, was judged irregular
when the two consuls were on the point of invading Insubrian territory.

This use of the augural procedures may have been an attempt by the senatorial majority to stop the war, the continuation of which they opposed. The successes obtained up to this point may have seemed sufficient to many senators, especially to those interested in confronting Carthage in the Western Mediterranean, but to go further meant not only the tying down of Rome's military forces in a campaign thought superfluous, but also the re-direction of Rome's economic strength and political policy towards a program of colonization which would require many years to complete. Consequently, the senatorial majority may have convinced the augur in charge to change his mind in order to obstruct the consuls' activities (cf. Cassola GPR 223).

It is also possible that Marcellus, an augur himself, on seeing that the consuls were on the point of ending the Gallic War by a decisive victory which he desired for himself, convinced the augur in charge, if it was not originally himself, to declare the electoral auguries invalid (see Chapter 6.2. ó Μάρκελλος...).

4.5. ταύτα δεξάμενος τὰ γράμματα Φλαμίνιος οὗ πρώτερον ἔλυσεν: Flaminius, being well aware of the hostility in the senate (Fab. Max. 2.3; Liv. 22.3.4, 13) and suspecting the contents of the letter, did not open it until after the battle was fought, possibly in order to plead ignorance (Zon. 8.20.5: μετὰ δὲ τῆς μάχης ἀναγνωσθείσης τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ὁ μὲν Φούριος ἐτοίμως
Plutarch seems to indicate that the letter was opened and read only after the campaign had been completed, but the annalistic tradition represented by Zonaras (8.20.5-7), that the letter was read right after the battle and before further campaigning, is to be preferred. Plutarch has misrepresented the sequence of events by his condensation of the subject matter. Polybius does not include the letter in his narrative, but Livy in his books on the Second Punic War does make references to it (22.63.12, 23.3.13).

4.5. μάχην συνάψας τρέψασθαι τοῦς βάρβαρους: Polybius in his account of the fighting asserts that Flaminius had mismanaged the battle (2.33.7: δὲ γὰρ στρατηγὸς Φλαμίνιος οὐκ ὁρθῶς δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι τῷ προειρημένῳ κινδύνῳ), but victory was obtained through the foresight of the military tribunes and the bravery of the soldiers (2.33.1: Δοκοῦσι δὲ ἐμφρόνως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ μάχῃ ταὐτῇ Ῥωμαίοι, 6: διέφθειραν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν παραταξαμένων διὰ τὴν τῶν χιλιάρχων πρόνοιαν, 9: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε πολλῷ νικήσαντες ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς).

In Polybius’ account (2.32.8-33.9) the Romans, distrusting their Gallic allies, sent them across the river, which was in their rear, and demolished the bridges. Flaminius then deployed the Roman forces, which were inferior in numbers to their opponents, alongside the river bank, but did not leave room to
allow the maniples to perform their customary withdrawal during battle (2.33.7: παρ’ αὐτὴν γὰρ τὴν ὀφρὺν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἑκταξίαν διέφθειρε τὸ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς μάχης ἔδιον, οὐχ ὑπολειπόμενος τόπον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ πόδα ταῖς σπείραις ἀναχώρησιν). For this Polybius censures Flaminius since, if the Romans had been even slightly pushed back in the fighting, they would have had to throw themselves into the river. The military tribunes in the meantime had equipped the front ranks with the spears of the triarii and had ordered the men to use their swords only after the spears had done their work (Walbank [Polybius 1: 208] says that this innovation appears to have been invented to contrast with Flaminius' incompetence [see De Sanctis SR 3.2.1: 306 concerning this innovation and Walbank Polybius 1: 192-193 concerning hostile tradition against Flaminius]).

Orosius records that 9,000 Gauls were killed and 17,000 captured during the war in that year (4.13.14: eodem anno Flaminius consul contemptis auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, adversum Gallos conflixit et vicit. in quo bello novem milia Gallorum caesa, decem et septem milia capta sunt).

4.5. τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐπιδραμεῖν: Polybius makes no mention of further campaigning. However, according to Zonaras (8.20.5-7), after the battle the letter sent by the senate was read. Furius was for obeying promptly, while Flaminius was anxious to remain. In the end Furius stayed with Flaminius, but took no active part, persuaded to remain by those who were going to be left
behind with Flaminius who feared that they might suffer some disaster at the hands of the enemy if left alone. Flaminius proceeded to ravage enemy territory and to reduce some strongholds before returning home (8.20.7: Φλαμίνιος δὲ περινοστῶν τὴν χώραν ἔτεμνε καὶ ἐρύματα τινὰ κατεστρέψατο).

4.6. μετὰ πολλῶν λαφύρων: Polybius mentions that the Romans returned to Rome with much booty and many arms taken as spoils (2.33.9: πολλῷ νικήσαντες ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς...καὶ παμπληθοῦς μὲν λείας, οὐκ ὀλίγον δὲ σκύλων κρατήσαντες ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν Ἐφώμην). The arms would come in handy during the Second Punic War. After the defeat at Cannae in 216 B.C Rome outfitted a force of 6,000 men with these spoils (Liv. 23.14.4: Ea sex milia hominum Gallicis spoliis, quae triumpho C. Flamini tralata erant, armavit). Also, it is recorded that Flaminius erected a golden trophy to Jupiter from the booty (Flor. 1.20.4: de torquibus eorum aureum tropaeum Iovi Flaminio erexit).

4.6. οὐκ ἀπήντησεν ὁ δῆμος: Cassola (GPR 224, n. 39) suggests that this does not refer to the attitude of the common people but to the official greeting which the authorities were accustomed to give accompanied by the people. Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes such a welcome on Romulus' return to Rome after a successful campaign (2.34.2: οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπήντων αὐτοῖς ὕμα γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τέκνοις παρ' ἄμφω τὰ μέρη τῆς οðού τῇ τε νίκη συνηδόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπασαν ἐνδεικνύμενοι φιλοφροσύνην).
4.6. Τὸν θρίαμβον: From Zonaras (8.20.7) and Livy (21.63.2) it appears that the senate denied Flaminius the honor of a triumph, but that it was given to him by a resolution of the people, perhaps by a plebiscite (Cassola GPR 224; cf. Niccolini I fasti dei tribuni della plebe 89). Cassola proposes (GPR 224, n. 39) that Plutarch’s account of the granting of the triumph is inexact perhaps because it is very condensed (Acta Tr. for Flaminius: C. Flaminius C. f. L. n. cos. anno DXXX / de Galleis VI Idus Mart., for Furius: P. Furius Sp. f. M. n. Philus cos. anno DXXX / de Galleis et Liguribus IIII Idus Mar[t].; it is not known what activity Furius undertook against the Ligures for them to be included here).

4.6. ἐξομόσσωσαί τὴν ὑπατείαν μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος: The abdications of both C. Flaminius and P. Furius are not mentioned in the Fasti Capitolini, but Livy does refer back to Flaminius’ abdication in his first book on the Second Punic War (21.63.2).

4.7. οὕτω πάντα τὰ πράγματα Ῥωμαίοις εἰς τὸν θεόν ἀνήγετο...: See the discussion at the beginning of this Chapter.
5. This chapter is completely made up of examples of the Romans' scrupulous observance of religious practices, a subject that has been introduced by Plutarch's closing statement in chapter four (see discussion at Chapter 4.).

This chapter, which interrupts the narrative of the Gallic War (225-222 B.C.), is an insertion by Plutarch taken from a source different from the one used for the surrounding events. The surrounding events appear to have come from a continuous historical account of the war in the annalistic tradition (see Chapter 3.). The first example given here would have had no place in that source since it is chronologically too late (162 B.C.), and it would be difficult to understand why a Roman annalist would have added it here for the benefit of a Roman audience. But this difficulty would not apply to Plutarch if he was writing for a largely Greek audience (see Introduction, p. 9), and it would be reasonable to suppose that he has turned to another source for this example, and as it will be seen, for the following ones as well.

The probable source of these examples is Valerius Maximus, whom we know Plutarch made use of since he is cited at Marcellus 30.5 concerning Marcellus' death and burial. Not only do the four examples of scrupulous religious behavior occur in Valerius Maximus (1.1.3-5), but also they occur in the same order of presentation (De Sanctis SR 2.2: 368). The presence in Valerius Maximus of the account of Marcellus' difficulties in
constructing the temples of Honos and Virtus (1.1.8) immediately following the examples of scrupulous religious behavior suggest that Plutarch noticed these examples during his search for material on Marcellus.

The annalistic source used by Plutarch for this war may have recorded the two examples involving M. Cornelius and Q. Sulpicius (Marc. 5.5), placing them in the year 223 B.C. Although we can not firmly establish this date, it is suggested by what is known of M. Cornelius' career (see Chapter 5.5. Κορνήλιος...) and by Plutarch's phrase at Marcellus 5.5 (περὶ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνους χρόνους). Besides the affair involving Flaminius' disobedience (see Chapters 4.4. εὑρέτης..., 4.5. ταύτα..., and 4.5. τὴν χώραν...), the discovery of these two cases (plus possibly, later on, the last case [Marc. 5.6], involving Flaminius) in his historical source, may have inspired Plutarch to turn to Valerius Maximus as his main authority for this chapter. Some scholars (Zimmermann RhM 79 [1930]: 55; Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 297-298) have denied Plutarch's use of Valerius Maximus here basing their arguments primarily on the differences between the two accounts (see the appropriate sections for explanations of differences).

5.1. Τιβέριος γοῦν Σεμπρόνιος...: This is Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (RE 2a.2 [1923], no. 53: 1403-1409). The incident which he is involved in here occurred shortly after his second consulship in 163 B.C. with M'. Iuventius Thalna as colleague. Valerius Maximus also reports this incident (1.1.3: a Tiberio
enim Graccho ad collegium augurum litteris ex provincia missis, quibus significabat se, cum libris ad sacra populi pertinentes legeret, animadvertisse vitio tabernaculum captum comitiis consularibus, quae ipse fecisset, eaque re ab auguribus ad senatum relata iussu eius C. Figulus e Gallia, Scipio Nasica e Corsica Romam redierunt et se consulatu abdicaverunt. This appears to have been a well-known event among those dealing with Roman religious practices (Cic. Nat. D. 2.10-11, Div. 1.33, 2.74-75; see Astin Scipio Aemilianus 36 concerning this incident).

5.1. Σκιπιώνα Νασικάν: P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (Corculum; RE 4.1 [1900], no. 353: 1497-1501) was elected consul for 162 B.C. with C. Marcius Figulus as colleague.

5.1. Γάιέον Μάρκιον: C. Marcius Figulus (RE 14.2 [1930], no. 61: 1557-1559) was elected consul for 162 B.C with P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica as colleague. He is identified only as C. Figulus in Valerius Maximus (1.1.3). If Plutarch used Valerius Maximus as his primary source here, one has to ask where he found the nomen, Marcius, for him. He may have found Figulus' nomen from Cornelius Nepos, who had written a series of biographies on famous Romans and was used by Plutarch in this life (see Introduction, pp. 26-29). In the De viris illustribus falsely attributed to Aurelius Victor, which is thought to have been derived from Nepos' own work of the same name (see Introduction, p. 29, n. 125), the biography of Marcellus immediately follows
that of Scipio Nasica, Figulus' colleague as consul in 162 B.C. (chapters 44 and 45 respectively). It is reasonable to assume that these biographies followed the same order of presentation as those of Nepos' more extensive work. Also, since Scipio's biography in the De viris illustribus includes his abdication from the consulship (44.2: Is cum adversum auspicia consulem se a Graccho nominatum comperisset, magistratu se abdicavit), it is likely that Nepos' more extensive biography would have identified by name Scipio's colleague, who had also abdicated. If these two factors are taken into consideration, then one could postulate that Plutarch came across Figulus' nomen, Marcius, in his reading of Nepos' work. However, this is not the only possibility. He may have picked it up elsewhere in his research, since the event described here was well-known in discussions on Roman religious practices (see Chapter 5.1. Τιβέριος...).

5.1. Ἡδὴ δὲ ἔχοντων αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας: Scipio had already gone to his province of Corsica, while Figulus had gone to his province of Gaul (Val. Max. 1.1.3).

5.1. μαντείκοις ὑπομνήμασιν: If this emendation is correct, then these works would correspond to the libros ad sacra populi pertinentes in Valerius Maximus (1.1.3). They are probably to be identified with the commentarii Servi Tulli, manuals of procedure giving instructions for the proper holding of elections (see Ogilvie Livy 231-232, Voigt Ueber die Leges
Regiae, and Rohde Die Kultsatzungen der römischen Pontifices 62-64).

5.2. ὅταν ἄρχων ἐπ' ὄρνισι καθεκόμενος ἐξω πόλεως...: This may be an elaboration by Plutarch of his probable source, Valerius Maximus, who has only vitio tabernaculum captum (1.1.3). De Sanctis (SR 32.2: 368) maintains that Plutarch was not a mere copyist and that although Valerius Maximus’s account would be quite clear to a Roman, some explanation would be required to make it comprehensible to his Greek audience, and therefore he was constrained to have recourse to other authorities.

5.3. ἀνήνεγκε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον: Plutarch may have misrepresented the sequence of events through his abridgement of his source. According to Valerius Maximus (1.1.3) Ti. Sempronius informed the college of augurs and not the senate and then it was the college of augurs which referred the matter to the senate.

5.5. Κορνήλιος μὲν Κέθηγος...: This is M. Cornelius Cethegus (RE 4.1 [1900], no. 92: 1279-1280). Valerius Maximus also records this incident (1.1.4: Consimili ratione P. Cloelius Siculus, M. Cornelius Cethegus, C. Claudius propter exta parum curiose admota [deorum inmortalium aris variis temporibus bellisque diversis] flaminio abire iussi sunt coactique etiam). Broughton (MRR 1: 232) tentatively dates this incident to ca. 223 B.C. and suggests that Cethegus may have been a Flamen
Dialis like C. Claudius (Liv. 26.23.8; see Chapter 23.1. or ἐξορισθέντες... concerning Cethegus' relationship with Marcellus).

5.5. Κοῦντος δὲ Σουλπίκιος...: This is Q. Sulpicius (RE 4a.1 [1931], no. 16: 736). Valerius Maximus also records this incident (1.1.5: At Q. Sulpicio inter sacrificandum e capite apex prolapsus idem sacerdotium abstulit). Broughton (MRR 1: 232) tentatively dates this incident to ca. 223 B.C. Münzer (RE 4a.1 [1931]: 736) suggests that Sulpicius may have been a Flamen Dialis and that the real grounds for his dismissal were political: he may have wanted to extract himself from the constraints of this priesthood in order to pursue a political career (see Marquardt Römische Staatsverwaltung 3²: 328-330 concerning prohibitions for priests).

5.5. πίλον, δὲν οἱ καλούμενοι φλαμίνιου φοροῦσι: This is an explanation by Plutarch for the Latin apex. This word is also used by Valerius Maximus in his description of this same incident (1.1.5; see Chapter 5.2. ὅταν... concerning Plutarch's elaboration of his source).

5.6. Μινικίου δὲ δικτάτορος ἱππαρχον ἀποδείξαντος Γάιον Φλαμίνιον...: These are M. Minucius Rufus (RE 15.2 [1932], no. 52: 1957-1962) and C. Flaminius (RE 6.2 [1909], no. 2: 2496-2502). This incident ought to fall between 221-219 B.C. for which the Fasti are missing. Since Flaminius was censor from 220-219 B.C., this incident would be best placed in 221 or
the early part of 220 B.C. (Broughton MRR 1: 235, n. 3; see Cassola GPR 262 for references to modern opinion on the dating and Mommsen Str. 13: 513-515 concerning the possibility of holding offices concurrently). Neither the reason for the appointment of a dictator nor the designating consul is reported in the sources (Scullard [RP 274] states that the dictatorship would have been comitiorum habendorum caussa).

This incident is also reported by Valerius Maximus except that instead of Minucius, Fabius Maximus is named as dictator (1.1.5: occentusque soricis auditus Fabio Maximo dictaturam, C. Flaminio magisterium equitum deponendi causam praebuit). The orthodox view maintains that Valerius Maximus is in error here and that Plutarch's version is to be preferred primarily on the basis that Fabius Maximus and Flaminius are thought to have been political enemies (e.g., Zimmermann RhM 79 [1930]: 55-56, Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 297). However, Cassola (GPR 261-268) argues for accepting Valerius Maximus' version. First, it is more likely that a Greek rather than a Roman writer would have had a mental lapse concerning Roman names. The names of Fabius Maximus and Minucius Rufus were closely linked together in the historical tradition, and Plutarch may have gotten confused when recalling this incident from memory. Second, it is improbable that one of the names was corrupted through a copyist's error. Not only the corruption of Μαξίμου into Μινουκίου (in Plutarch's text), but also the corruption of Minucius into Fabius Maximus (in Valerius Maximus' text) is unlikely. Third, an inscription dealing with Fabius Maximus (CIL, I2, elogium 13 = Inscr. It., XIII, 3, 80)
attributes two dictatorships to him, and his famous dictatorship of 217 B.C. is stated to have been his second by both the Fasti Capitolini and Livy (22.9.7), while no dictatorship is documented for Minucius Rufus before the one of 217 B.C. Cassola, also, maintains that even the inscription dealing with Minucius Rufus (CIL, I², 607: Hercolei / sacrom / M. Minuci(us) C. f. / dictator vovit) cannot be used as proof for Minucius in this incident because there would have been no time for a dedication to Hercules, since the dictator under discussion appears to have abdicated immediately after appointing his Master of Horse. Therefore the inscription belongs elsewhere. The dedication would most likely have been for some military incident which would fit in well with the events of 217 B.C. (concerning the difficulties surrounding this inscription, especially in regard to whether Minucius was really dictator or merely held power equal to that of a dictator in 217 B.C. and in regard to the lapse of time before the abdication, see Dorey JRS 45 [1955]: 92-96, whose views are opposed to Cassola’s, and Develin RhM 122 [1979]: 270-273, who favors Cassola’s views).

Staveley in a review of Cassola’s book (JRS 53 [1963]: 182-187) has not been convinced by these arguments. He maintains that a strong possibility that Minucius was dictator before 217 B.C. is "suggested...by the fact that dictator is a far more natural restoration than consul in the lacuna at Livy XXII,49,16 (Livy must be supposed not to be repeating himself but to be offering new information in his parenthesis)." Given this possibility, he believes that Dorey’s solution is still the
best (p. 186; see Chapter 5.6. αὐθικ... for Dorey's solution).

Although Scullard (RP 274) accepts Valerius Maximus' version, he merely says, "a curious pair," but does not draw any important conclusions from this relationship. But the right of the dictator in choosing his subordinate offers a unique opportunity to be able to confirm that the choice was done according to his will (Cassola GPR 264; see Mommsen Str. 2\(^3\): 174-175). Therefore, if Valerius Maximus' statement is accepted, then the possibility that Fabius Maximus and Flaminius were political allies has to be taken seriously and their relationship re-assessed, since the prevailing view has been that these two were political adversaries (e.g., Münzer RE 6.2 [1909], 2496, Scullard RP 54; see Develin RhM 122 [1979]: 268-277 for a re-assessment).

5.6. τρισμὸς ἤκοψθη μυὸς ὁν σόρικα καλοῦσιν: This is an explanation for the Latin sorex. This word is also found in Valerius Maximus' version of the incident (1.1.5; see Chapter 5.2. ὅταν... concerning Plutarch's elaboration of his source). The inauspicious squeak of a sorex was one of those items commonly reported by the Roman annalists (Plin. NH 8.223: nam sauricium occentu dirimi auspicia annales refertos habemus).

5.6. αὐθικ ἐτέρους κατέστησαν: Those who replaced M. Minucius (or perhaps Fabius Maximus) and C. Flaminius are unknown.

It has been suggested that the dictator who was forced to resign was Minucius, but that his place was then given to
Fabius. This would make Plutarch’s version correct, while Valerius Maximus’ account (1.1.5) would be the result of confusion over the two sets of magistrates (see Zimmermann RhM. 79 [1930]: 56 and Dorey JRS 45 [1955] 93, who gives a possible political explanation of the motives behind this whole incident).
6.1. ἐξωμόσαντο...οἱ περὶ τῶν Φλαμίνιον: This refers to C. Flaminius himself and to P. Furius Philus (see Chapter 4.3. οἱ 8'... et seqq.).

6.1. διὰ τῶν...μεσοβασιλέων ὑπάτος ἀποδείκνυται Μάρκελλος: If there was no magistrate who could hold the elections, the senate appointed an interrex who selected two candidates and submitted their names to the comitia centuriata for ratification. If these names were rejected, the interrex or his successors, since each interrex held office for only five days, continued to submit names until the candidate(s) were accepted (see Ogilvie Livy 409-410). In this instance only one candidate, Marcellus, received enough votes to be elected.

6.1. παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχήν ἀποδείκνυσιν...Γναῖον Κορνήλιον: Marcellus and Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (RE 4.1 [1900], no. 345: 1491-1492) were elected consuls for 222 B.C., both for the first time. Livy (22.33.9-35.4) records similar elections for the consulship of 216 B.C. In these C. Terentius Varro was elected first and then he held the election for his colleague, L. Aemilius Paullus.

It has been suggested that the new consuls entered office on the Ides of March (i.e. the 15th), which remained the regular date of entry until 153 B.C., rather than on the former date of May 1. This is based on the fact that the Fasti for 223 B.C.
record no consules suffecti to replace the consuls who had abdicated before the entrance into office of Marcellus and Scipio, and that according to Livy (22.1.4) by 217 B.C. the consuls were entering office on the Ides of March (see Mommsen Römische Chronologie 102, n. 180, Str. 1³: 599, Broughton MRR 2: 638, and De Sanctis SR 3².1: 307, n. 122). However, there is a problem with this suggestion. Even if the consuls, C. Flaminius and P. Furius, resigned immediately after their triumphs (March 10 and 12; see Acta Triumphorum for 223 B.C.), there could have been only one interrex before the fifteenth (see Chapter 6.1. διὰ τῶν...), but according to Mommsen (Str. 1³: 658, n. 4) there was always at least two interreges, since the first interrex could not hold the final election. If one follows this view, it does not seem possible to have two interreges here in the interval between the abdication of the old consuls and the entry of the new into office on March 15. It might be supposed that an interrex was appointed immediately after Flaminius' triumph and abdication (one would have to assume, of course, that Flaminius resigned on the same day as his triumph and not later in conjunction with his colleague). This would allow enough time to have two interreges, but then the problem arises of having a consul, Furius, and an interrex holding office simultaneously. Accordingly, the view of Errington (Latomus 29 [1970]: 54) seems attractive. He suggests 218 B.C. for the change to the new date of entry brought about by the crisis with Carthage. Even if this is so, the date when Marcellus and his colleague entered office may not necessarily have been the former one of May 1,
since Plutarch’s account seems to indicate that Marcellus upon
his election immediately took office and then proceeded to hold
the election for a colleague (this could have occurred at any
time, not necessarily on May 1).

6.2. Ἐλέξθη μὲν οὖν...τῆς βουλῆς εἰρηναία βουλευομένης: The
peace proposals of the Insubres may not have been genuine (see
Chapter 6.3. ἀνακαινίσα...), but Plutarch’s account implies
that many of the senators were willing to negotiate for peace.
These senators would probably have been those who wanted to
prepare for the forthcoming conflict with Carthage (cf. Cassola
GPR 223-224, Harris War and Imperialism 199).

6.2. ὁ Μάρκελλος ἔξετράχυνε τὸν δήμον ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον: Plutarch portrays Marcellus as the main proponent for continuing
the war, while Polybius says that both consuls urged that peace
should not be granted (2.34.1: ἔσπευσαν οἱ κατασταθέντες ὑπ' ὁποί
Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ Γνάτος Κορνήλιος τοῦ μὴ συγχωρηθήναι τὴν
εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς). However, Polybius’ statement appears to be an
attempt on his part to increase the role Cn. Scipio played in
the campaign at the expense of Marcellus (Cassola GPR 224, n.
41; see Chapter 8.1. Ψηφιοσαμένης...). Also, if Cassola (GPR
227) is correct in assuming that the Cornelii Scipiones,
including Marcellus’ colleague, Cn. Scipio, were opposed to the
Gallic War, then Polybius’ remark is all the more suspect.

Although Marcellus may have been the principal instigator
this year for continuing the war, whether because he was a
member of a political group in favor of conquering the region (see Cassola GPR 222-223) or possibly out of a desire to win military glory, Eckstein (SG 17) believes that senatorial suspicions concerning the extent of pacification in the Po valley helped. But these may not have been necessary since the Insubres may have been intent on war anyway (see Chapter 6.3. ἀνακαίνισαι...).

6.3. κἂν γενομένης εἰρήνης: Ziegler emends the καὶ of the manuscripts to κἂν. This emendation would bring the text into accord with Polybius (2.34.2) and Zonaras (8.20.8) who say that peace was refused.

6.3. ἀνακαίνισαι τὸν πόλεμον οἱ Γασαται δοκοῦσι...: In Polybius’ account these Gaesati did not arrive fortuitously, but on the summons of the Insubres. Polybius says that the Gauls, failing to obtain peace and judging their last hopes to be dashed, hastened to hire the Gaesati (2.34.2: οἱ δ’ ἀποτυχόντες καὶ κρίναντες ἔξελέγξαι τὰς τελευταῖας ἐλπίδας, αὕτις ὄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄρδανῶν Γασατῶν Γαλατῶν εἰς τρισμυρίους; see Chapters 3.1. Γαλατῶν... concerning the Gaesati and 3.1. οἱ δὲ τὴν... concerning the Insubres).

The hiring of large numbers of mercenary Gauls (Marc. 6.4: τρισμύριοι γὰρ ὄντες) from across the Alps would have required time and strenuous effort. This suggests that if the Insubres really did summon the Gaesati, it probably occurred before the peace proposals were rejected. If this is the case, then their
overtures to Rome were used merely as a ploy to gain time (cf. Eckstein SG 17).

6.4. τρισμύριοι γὰρ ὄντες: This number is also reported by Polybius (2.34.2; see Chapter 7.6. Κτείνας... concerning Orosius' figure of 30,000 Gaesati slain at Clastidium). Although Heuberger (Klio 31 [1938]: 69) believes that this number is exaggerated, nevertheless the forces of the Gaesati must still have been significant.

6.4. εὐθὺς ἐπ’ Ἀκέρρας ὤρμησαν: Polybius says that the Celts kept the Gaesati in readiness and awaited the Roman attack (2.34.2: οὖς παραλαβόντες εἶχον ἐν ἔτοιμῳ καὶ προσεδόκων τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐφοδον).

6.4. Ἀκέρρας...πόλιν ὑπὲρ ποταμοῦ Πάδου συνυφκισμένην: According to the Tabula Peutingeriana, Acerrae was situated 22 miles from Laus Pompeii (mod. Lodi Vecchio) and 13 miles from Cremona. It was situated on the banks of the Addua river slightly north of its confluence with the Po (Walbank Polybius 1: 210; see Nissen It. Land. 2: 192). Here, at the confluence, the Romans had attempted in the previous year to invade Insubrian territory, but were unsuccessful (Polyb. 2.32.2; see Chapter 4.2. μεγάλαις...).

6.4. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ μυρίους τῶν Γασιατῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς...ἀναλαβὼν τὴν περὶ Πάδου χώραν ἐπόρθει: This was done in order to draw the
Romans away from Acerrae as Polybius' account (2.34.3-5) makes clear. The Romans had laid siege to the town, which was in Insubrian territory, and the Insubres, unable to come to its rescue, as the Romans had seized all the advantageous positions, attempted to draw the Romans off by a diversion. They crossed the Po with part of their forces, entered the territory of the Anares, who were allied to the Romans (Polyb. 2.32.2), and laid siege to a town there called Clastidium.

6.4. Βριτόματος: In his Romulus (16.7) Plutarch uses the form Βριτομάρτος. The name in Latin has come down to us in several forms of which the most common are Virdomarus or Viridomarus (Liv. Per. 20: Vertomaro; Prop. 4.10.41: Virdomari [or] Virtomane; Oros. 4.13.15: Virdomarum; Eutr. 3.6.1: Virdomarum; Serv. Aen. 6.855: Viridomarum; De vir. ill. 45.1: Viridomarum; Flor. 1.20.5: Viridomaro; Ampel. 21: Viridomaro; Fest. p. 204 Lindsay: Viridomaro; Acta Tr. for 222 B.C.: Vir[dumaro], concerning which see CIL, I², p. 47). A closely related name, Βριτόμαρτις, is used by Appian (Sam. 6, Gall. 11) of one of the Senones (cf. Flor. 1.20.3: Brittomaro). De Sanctis (SR 3².2: 367) believes that the forms Viriomatus, Briomatus, and Briomacus which are found in the various manuscripts of De viris illustribus (45.1) may reflect the form of the name used by Plutarch. Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 299) suggests that the form may have been the result of Plutarch approximating the Latin version to Βριτόμαρτις, the name of a Cretan nymph.
According to the Periocha 20 of Livy, Britomatus was the leader (i.e. king) of the Insubres (M. Claudius Marcellus cos. occiso Gallorum Insubrium duce, Vertomaro, opima spolia rettulit). Likewise, in Florus (1.20.1-5) he is considered the king of the Insubres. However, it seems more probable that Britomatus was the king of the Gaesati. This is indicated by the fact that he led a contingent of the Gaesati to Clastidium (Marc. 6.4), and when the remaining Gaesati received news of his death, they left the Insubres (Marc. 7.8). Also, Propertius considered him the king of a Transalpine tribe, but the Insubres dwelt in Cisalpine Gaul (4.10.39-41: Claudius at Rheno traiectos arcuit hostes, / Belgica cum vasti parma relata ducis / Virdomari). Although Orosius' text seems to indicate that he was king of the Gaesati, it is, nevertheless, ambiguous (4.13.15: Post hoc Claudius consul Gaesatorum triginta milia delevit, ubi etiam ipse Virdomarum regem in primam aciem progressus occidit: et inter multa Insubrium, quos ad deditionem coegerat, oppida Mediolanum quoque urbem florentissimam cepit).

Most ancient writers appear to have been unsure over which people Britomatus ruled since most designate him as merely king of the Gauls (Marc. 7.1: ὁ τῶν Γαλατῶν βασιλεὺς, Rom. 16.7: Γαλατῶν βασιλέως; Val. Max. 3.2.5: Gallorum regem; De vir. ill. 45.1: Gallorum ducem; Serv. Æn. 6.855: Gallorum ducem; Eutr. 3.6.1: regem Gallorum; Ampel. 21: rege Gallorum).

6.5. Μάρκελλος...τὸν μὲν συνάρχοντα πρὸς Ἄκέρραις ἀπέλιπε:
Only now does Plutarch indicate where the Romans are, but we are not told when the Romans got there and what they are doing. This suggests that he has given us a condensed and confused rendition of his source (see Chapter 6.4. ἐκεῖθεν...).

6.5-6. τῶν ἱππέων μέρος τρίτον...τοῦς λοιποὺς ἵππεῖς ἀναλαβὼν: Polybius says that Marcellus took the cavalry without any indication that he left any part of it with Cn. Scipio (2.34.6: ἀναλαβῶν τοὺς ἵππεῖς Μάρκος Κλαύδιος).

Since the consuls probably had their full complement of forces (four legions plus allies), Marcellus would have taken with him a little more than 2,000 cavalry based on Plutarch’s account, and at most 3,200 based on Polybius’ (these figures would be the upper limits; see Chapter 4.2. μεγάλας... concerning the size of Roman forces at this time).

6.6. τοὺς ἐλαφροτάτους τῶν ὀπλιτῶν περὶ ἐξακοσίους: Polybius gives no exact figure, saying only that Marcellus took with him some infantry (2.34.6: τινάς τῶν πεζικῶν). It appears that Marcellus set off with a force of slightly more than 2,600 (2,000 horse and 600 foot) to at most 3,800 (3,200 horse and 600 foot) combatants to confront a Gallic force of 10,000 (Marc. 6.4).

6.6. οὖθ᾽ ἡμέρας οὔτε νικῶς ἀνιεῖς τὸν δρόμον...: Part of Marcellus’ haste was to relieve those besieged at Clastidium, who were Roman allies (see Chapter 6.6. Κλαστίδιον...), but it
may also have been because it was one of the Roman supply bases for this campaign (Victumulae was another [Liv. 21.57.9-10: ad Victumulas oppugnandas ire pergit. Id emporium Romanis Gallico bello fuerat]; Victumulae may be a corruption of Vicus Tannetis = Tannetum [Dyson The Creation of the Roman Frontier 33]; cf. Frank CAH 7: 814 concerning Clastidium; it is known that in 218 B.C. Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal before the battle of Trebia, and the grain which the Romans had gathered there was used to feed his army [Liv. 21.48.8-10; Polyb. 3.69.1-4]). Nevertheless, the speed of his march and the unexpectedness of his arrival would be key factors in enabling Marcellus to overcome an enemy force vastly superior in numbers.

6.6. έώς ἐπέβαλε τοῖς μυρίοις Γαλισάταις...: According to Zonaras, Marcellus first came upon the Gauls as they were fleeing from allied territory (8.20.9: καὶ Μάρκελλος μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ληξομένους τὴν σύμμαχον διὰ ταχέων ἔλθὼν οὗ κατέλαβε σφᾶς ἔκει, φεύγοντας δὲ ἐπεδίῳκε καὶ ὑποστάντας ἐνίκησε; see Chapter 7.6. Ἐτείνας... concerning the site of the forthcoming battle).

6.6. Κλαστίδιον...: Clastidium (mod. Casteggio; PECS 226-227), situated in the territory of the Anares (Polyb. 2. 17.7, 32.1-2), is located south of Milan bordering on the northern foothills of the Apennine mountains and about 8 miles from the Po river. It controlled the route across the Po north to Ticinum (mod. Pavia; Nissen It. Land. 2: 271). It had recently become an ally of the Romans during the campaigns of C.
Flaminius and P. Furius in the preceding year (Polyb. 2.32.2). It is roughly 33 miles west of Acerrae, and Marcellus could have reached it in a day and night travelling lightly, even if we take into consideration that the Po had to be crossed on the way.

6.8. κράτιστοι γὰρ ὄντες ἵππομαχεῖν: Strabo says that the Gauls were better as cavalry than as infantry, and that they formed the best part of the Roman cavalry in his day (4.4.2: κρείττους δ᾽ ἰππόται ἢ πεζοί, καὶ ἔστι Ῥωμαίοις τῆς ἵππείας ἢ ἀρίστη παρὰ τούτων; see RE 7.1 [1910], "Galli": 634-635).

6.8. εὐθὺς οὖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν...ἐφέροντο: The recklessness of the Gauls in attacking Marcellus’ outnumbered force is not evident in Polybius’ account of the battle. He reports that the Gauls broke off the siege, went forth to meet the Romans, and formed up for battle (2.34.7: οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ πυθόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαντες τὴν πολλορκίαν ὑπῆντων καὶ παρετάξαντο). It appears that the site of the battle should be located near the banks of the Po rather then near the walls of Clastidium (see Chapter 7.6. Κτείνας...).

6.9. ὁ δὲ Μάρκελλος, ὡς μὴ φθαῖεν...: Polybius’ account differs greatly in its portrayal from Plutarch’s account, primarily in leaving out Marcellus’ exploits (2.34.8-9: τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἱππεύοιν εξ ἐφόδου τολμηρῶς σφίσι προσπεσόντων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀντείχον· μετὰ δὲ ταύτα
perieistaménwv kai kata nótoú kai kata kéras, diuschrístouménoi tē μάχη télos ettrápphsan υπ' autōn tōn ἵππων. Kai polloi mēn eis tōn potamōn émpeásontes υπὸ toú deúmatos diephárrhsan, oĩ de pleíous υπὸ tōn polemíōn katekópphsan). Marcellus' tactic of extending his line to prevent his outnumbered forces from being surrounded, as described by Plutarch, appears in Polybios' account to be one of the major reasons for the Roman victory.

6.10-11. This incident is also related by Frontinus (Str. 4.5.4: Claudius Marcellus, cum in manus Gallorum imprudens incidisset, circumspiciendae regionis qua evaderet causa equum in orbem flexit; deinde cum omnia esse infesta vidisset, precatus deos in medios hostis inrupit; quibus inopinata audacia perculsis, ducem quoque eorum trucidavit atque, ubi spes salutis vix superfuerat, inde opima rettulit spolia). The source from which Frontinus derived his version is unknown, but Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 299) believes that Plutarch's version is the earlier, since it stresses the religious factor ("Jedenfalls macht die plutarchische Fassung den ursprünglicheren Eindruck, weil sie das religiöse Moment hervorhebt"). According to him it is easier to understand how this factor was exchanged for a commonplace one rather than the reverse.

6.11. ἐκ δεισιδαιμονίας: One of Plutarch's secondary aims in this life is to point out the Romans' attitude towards the gods, and therefore if he had read several versions of this episode, he would probably have opted for the one with the religious
motive (see Chapter 4. concerning Plutarch’s emphasis on the religious element).

6.11. τὸν ἥλιον...προσεκύνησεν: The Romans believed that they had worshipped the sun from very early times. The legendary Titus Tatius, co-regent with Romulus, is said to have vowed an altar to the sun (Varro LL 5.74; Dion. Hal. 2.50.3; August. De civ. D. 4.23). However, Wissowa (RK 315-317) believes that the actual personification of the sun was introduced much later. The first indications he finds are tentatively dated to around the time of the Second Punic War.

6.12. οὕτω γὰρ ἔθος ἔστι Ἱερωμαίοις προσκυνεῖν τοῦ τοῦ θεούς περιστρεφομένους: Plutarch in his Camillus also mentions the Roman custom of turning around (5.9: καθάπερ ἔστι Ἱερωμαίοις ἔθος ἐπευξαμένοις καὶ προσκυνήσαιν ἔτη δεξιὰ ἐξελίττειν), while in his Numa (14.7-9) three possible explanations for this custom are presented. The first is that the turning around was an imitation of the rotary motion of the universe (14.8: ἀπομίμησις εἶναι τῆς τοῦ κόσμου περιφορᾶς), the second is that since temples faced east towards the rising sun, the worshipper, who entered a temple with his back towards the sun, turned around to link the fulfillment of the prayer through both gods (i.e. the one worshipped in the temple and the sun; 14.8: κύκλον ποιῶν καὶ συνάπτων τῆν ἐπιτελεῖσαιν τῆς εὐχῆς δι’ ἀμφοῖν), and the third is that it hinted at and taught the instability of human affairs (14.9: ὡς οὐδενὸς ἑστῶτος τῶν
Plutarch himself favors the second explanation (see Appel De Romanorum Precationibus 212ff.).

6.12. προσεύξασθαι...καθερώσεσιν: Elsewhere it is learned that Marcellus had vowed a temple to Honos and Virtus during this Gallic War (Liv. 27.25.7, 29.11.13; Val. Max. 1.1.8; see Chapter 28.2.).

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. This chapter begins with the only example of Marcellus fighting in single combat (7.1-4), which Plutarch (Marc. 2.1) declares was the form of fighting at which Marcellus was best.

7.1-4. The striking scene portrayed here of Marcellus' encounter with and victory over the Gallic king fits in well with other vivid elements of this episode: the hastening of Marcellus to relieve Clastidium (6.5-6), the sudden reckless attack of the Gauls against the vastly outnumbered Roman force (6.7-8), Marcellus' turning of his horse and worshipping of the sun (6.10-11), his vow in the thick of battle (6.12), and his triumphal procession to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (8.1-4). These features taken as a whole possess a dramatic quality which may reflect the influence of Naevius' play Clastidium sive Marcellus on the presentation of this battle in Plutarch's sources (see Marmorale Naevius poeta for what is known about this play and Varro LL 7.107, 9.78 for two remaining fragments of this work).

7.1. ὁ τῶν Γαλατῶν βασιλεὺς: This would be Britomatus, king of the Gaesati (see Chapter 6.4. Βριτόματος concerning over which tribe he was king).

7.1. ἀνὴρ μεγέθει τε σώματος...στιλβούσῃ: Livy in his account of the famous duel between T. Manlius Torquatus and a Gaul of
enormous size in 361 B.C. describes the Roman opponent in very similar terms (7.10.7: Corpus alteri magnitudine eximium, versicolori veste pictisque et auro caelatis refulgens armis). This similarity suggests that Plutarch's description, if it was not derived from Livy, came from the annalistic tradition in which Livy was working.

7.4. τρίτος ἀρχων...κτείνας: Marcellus was the third and last Roman commander, after Romulus (according to legend) and A. Cornelius Cossus, to kill with his own hands the opposing enemy general in combat and thereby win the honor of the spolia opima (i.e. the right of dedicating the arms of the enemy commander to Jupiter Feretrius; see Chapters 8.6. πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ... and 8.10. ὡς ἐκεῖνων...).

7.5. ἐκ τούτου συνέμισον: Marcellus' victory over the Gallic king must have greatly increased the morale of his numerically inferior force and, conversely, greatly disheartened his opponents.

7.5 ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πεζοὺς ὅμοιο προσφερομένους μαχόμενοι: Polybius, in his version of the engagement, gives no role to the Roman infantry (2.34.7-9). According to him it was only the Roman cavalry which routed the Gauls (2.34.8: τέλος ἐτράπησαν ύπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἰππέων). Plutarch also seems to believe that the Roman infantry took no part, and the infantry mentioned here (τοὺς πεζούς) refers only to Gauls, since he later states that
the Roman cavalry (leaving out any mention of Roman infantry) conquered both the Gallic cavalry and infantry (7.5: ἵππεῖς γὰρ ἱππέας καὶ πεζοῦς ἀμα...νικήσαι λέγονται).

7.5. ἵππεῖς γὰρ ἱππέας καὶ πεζοῦς ἀμα τοσοῦτοι...: The ratio would have been approximately 1:4 or 1:3 Romans against Gauls (see Chapter 6.6. τοὺς λοιποὺς... et seq. concerning sizes of the forces involved).

7.6. Κτείνας δὲ τοὺς πλείστους: The only ancient author who records the number of Gauls slain at Clastidium is Orosius, who reports the figure of 30,000 (4.13.15: Post hoc Claudius consul Gaesatorum triginta milia delevit), but this is clearly a confusion with the total number of Gaesati who had joined the Insubres in this year’s fighting (Marc. 6.4: τρισμύριοι γὰρ ὄντες; Polyb. 2.34.2: Γαισάτων Γαλατῶν εἰς τρισμυρίους). Plutarch reports that only 10,000 Gaesati went on this diversionary expedition across the Po (6.4: μυρίους τῶν Γαισατῶν).

Polybius adds a detail, lacking in Plutarch, that many of the Gauls fell into a river and perished, but the identity of this river is not clear (2.34.9: καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ δείματος διεφθάρησαν; see Walbank Polybius 1: 210). In Zonaras’ account (8.20.9; see Chapter 6.6. ἦσι ἐπέβαλε...) Marcellus came upon the Gauls as they were fleeing and when they offered battle defeated them. It is reasonable to suppose, if Zonaras is followed, that the Gauls would have gone
northward from Clastidium towards the Po, and this river ought to be the one mentioned by Polybius. Valerius Maximus in his report of the battle mentions that it occurred by the Po (3.2.5: *ut apud Padum Gallorum regem ingenti exercitu stipatum cum paucis equitibus invaderet*), but his designation *apud Padum* may mean only that it occurred somewhere in the vicinity, which could include the site of Clastidium itself. However, the only river of sufficient size in the region to have caused a large number of Gallic combatants to perish in its currents is the Po. Placing the site of the battle near this river makes sense, since the Gauls' object in invading the territory of the Anares was to draw the Romans away from Acerrae, and if they had learned that a Roman force was approaching, they probably would have set out to meet it. Therefore, the Gauls were not fleeing as reported by Zonaras (8.20.9), but had deliberately set out to meet Marcellus, and Polybius' account fits this scenario, if sufficient latitude is given to the interpretation of ὑπῆντων in the passage οἱ δὲ Κέλται πυθόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαντες τὴν πολιορκίαν ὑπῆντων καὶ παρετάξαντο (2.34.7).

7.6. ἐπανῆλθε πρὸς τὸν συνάρχοντα...: In Polybius' version (2.34.10-35.1), after taking Acerrae, the Romans advanced to Mediolanum (mod. Milan), but no further mention is made of Marcellus; instead, Cn. Cornelius Scipio takes the limelight, portrayed as the conqueror of the Gauls.

Plutarch does not mention the taking of Acerrae. However, Zonaras reports that Scipio captured it and made it a base for
the war since it was favorably placed and well walled (8.20.9: Σκιπίων δὲ κατὰ χώραν μείνας Ἀκέρας ἐπολιόρκει, καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὰς ὀρμητήριον τοῦ πολέμου πεποίηκεν, οὕσας ἐπικαίρους καὶ εὐερκεῖς). Polybius adds the detail that the Romans found it well stocked with grain (2.34.10: ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰς Ἀχέρρας οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι σίτου γεμοῦσας).

7.6-7. μυχθηρῶς πολεμοῦντα Κελτοῖς...Ἀντεπολιόρκουν τὸν Κορνήλιον: Scipio, advancing upon Mediolanum without his colleague, found himself in difficulties when the Gauls sallied forth and attacked him. His predicament was probably due to a lack of sufficient cavalry, since Marcellus had taken at least two-thirds of the Roman cavalry to Clastidium. If this is correct, then Scipio’s advance was premature and reckless, and Polybius’ account of this incident is an attempt by that historian to cover up Scipio’s rashness. Polybius states that Scipio, after he had vigorously pursued the Gauls to Mediolanum, and when he was now returning to Acerrae since the Gauls within the city did not come out to meet him, was suddenly attacked from the rear. Then after having suffered heavy losses and with a portion of his forces actually in retreat, Scipio managed to rally his men and force the Gauls to retire (2.34.11-15: οἷς ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπακολουθήσαντος τοῦ Γναίου καὶ προσβαλόντος ἄφω πρὸς τὸ Μεδιόλανον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἢρχίαν ἔσχον· ἀπολυμένου δ’ αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὰς Ἀχέρρας, ἐπεξελθόντες καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἁψάμενοι θρασέως πολλοὺς μὲν νεκροὺς ἐποίησαν, μέρος δὲ τι καὶ φυγεῖν αὐτῶν ἢνάγκασαν, ἐὼς ὁ Γνάιος ἀνακαλεσάμενος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
7.6-7. πόλιν μεγίστην...τῶν Γαλατικῶν. Μεδιόλανον...νομίζουσιν: Mediolanum (mod. Milan) was the Insubrian capital (Polyb. 2.34.10: τὸ Μεδιόλανον τῶν Γαλατῶν, δόσερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατος τόπος τῆς τῶν Ἰνομβρῶν χώρας), which was located on or near the site of the Etruscan town of Melpum, which was said to have been destroyed by the Gauls in 396 B.C. (Plin. NH 3.125; RE 15.1 [1931], "Mediolanum," no. 1: 91-95; see Nissen It. Land. 2: 180-182).

7.8. ἐπελθόντος δὲ τοῦ Μαρκέλλου...: Despite what Polybius (2.34.11-15) says, it was only with the arrival of Marcellus and the departure of the Gaesati that success inclined towards the Romans around Mediolanum (see Chapter 7.6-7. μοχθηρῶς...).

7.8. τὸ μὲν Μεδιόλανον ἀλίσκεται: Polybius mentions only Scipio at the taking of Mediolanum (2.34.15: ὁ δὲ Γνάτως ἐπακολουθήσας τὴν τε χώραν ἐπόρθη καὶ τὸ Μεδιόλανον εἶλε κατὰ κράτος), but his account is suspect since he seems to favor
Scipio at Marcellus’ expense (see Chapter 8.1. Ψηφισμενης... concerning Polybius’ bias against Marcellus). Zonaras indicates that both Marcellus and Scipio were involved in the taking of this city (8.20.9: καντειθεν δρμωμενοι το τε Μεδιδαλανον και κωμοπολιν έτεραν έχειρωσαντο). Orosius (4.13.15) and Eutropius (3.6.2) mention only Marcellus, but this is probably due to their abridgement of their sources.

Zonaras adds that another town (8.20.9: κωμοπολιν έτεραν) was taken, a fact that is not reported either by Plutarch or by Polybius, although Polybius does add the detail that Scipio laid waste the surrounding countryside (2.34.15: την τε χώραν επορθει). Münzer (RE 3.2 [1899]: 2739) suggests that this town was modern Como.

7.8. τας δ' άλλας πόλεις...: Zonaras reports that the Insubres came to terms, giving the Romans money and a portion of land (8.20.9: οι λαοποι Ινσουβροι όμολόγησαν αυτοις, χρήματα και μέρος της γής δόντες). Polybius reports that the Insubres turned over everything to the Romans, using phrasing which almost exactly parallels Plutarch's (compare Polybius 2.35.1: πάντα τα καθ' αυτοις επέτρεψαν τοις 'Ρωμαιοίς, to Plutarch's: τα καθ' εαυτοις ἐπιτρέποντι πάντα 'Ρωμαιοίς). This strongly suggests that he was used by Plutarch here.

7.8. τουτοις μὲν ήν εἰρήνη μετρίων τυχοῦσι: Although Plutarch says that the terms of the treaty were moderate, this did not prevent the Insubres from revolting and going over to Hannibal.
later during the Second Punic War (Liv. 21.25.2, 39.1; Polyb. 3.40.6-8, 60.8-11).
CHAPTER EIGHT

8.1. Ψηφισαμένης δὲ τῆς συγκλήτου μόνο τοῦ Μαρκέλλου Θόριαμβον: Plutarch's statement that only Marcellus gained the honor of a triumph is confirmed by the Acta Triumphorum for 222 B.C., since Cn. Scipio's name does not appear there (M. Claudius M. f. M. n. Marcellus an. DXX[xi] / cos. de Galleis Insubribus et Germ[an]. / K. Mart. isque spolia op[ima] rettu[lit / d]uce hostium Vir[dumaro ad Cl]astid[ium / interfecto]). It has been suggested that Scipio did not receive this honor because of severe losses he had sustained before Mediolanum (Eckstein SG 18, n. 60; see, for example, Orosius 4.12.1 for mention of a Roman commander not being given a triumph because of his losses; see Chapters 7.6-7. μοχθηρῶς... concerning events before Mediolanum and 3.1. Γαλατῶν... concerning the Germani recorded in the Acta Triumphorum).

Polybius makes no mention of Marcellus' triumph, just as earlier he had made no mention of his duel with the Gallic king or of his winning of the spolia opima in his account of this Gallic War (2.21-35). After reporting the submission of the Insubres, he concludes the narrative portion of his account simply with 'Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Κελτοὺς πόλεμος τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος (2.35.2). It is strange that Polybius does not include Marcellus' triumph since it marked not only a brilliant victory but also the end of the war, especially since he (2.31.6) does think it worthy to mention L. Aemilius Papus' triumph for his victory at Telamon in 225 B.C.
Polybius' silence about Marcellus' exploits when contrasted with his simultaneous enhancement of the role of Cn. Scipio, especially his attribution to him of sole responsibility for the capture of Mediolanum (2.34.15; see Chapters 6.2. ὁ Μάρκελλος..., 7.6. ἐπανῆλθε... et seqq.), suggests that Polybius was biased against Marcellus in favor of the family of the Cornelii Scipiones, who were his benefactors. Likewise, later on in his work (10.32), Polybius singles out Marcellus for especially harsh criticism for falling into an ambush and being killed. While other sources also censure Marcellus for imprudence for falling into a trap, only Polybius charges that the cause was military incompetence. Even Polybius' own account does not entirely justify this charge (cf. Cassola GPR 327; see Chapter 29. et seqq.). Consequently, his account must be held suspect where it differs from other versions regarding the joint activities of Marcellus and Cn. Scipio (cf. Cassola GPR 224-226, Münzer RE 3.2 [1899]: 2738, Klotz NClio 5 [1953]: 247; see Bung Q. Fabius Pictor, der erste römische Annalist 158, who would like to attribute Polybius' neglect of Marcellus to his source, and Lippold Consules 56-57, who maintains that he can find no deliberate neglect of Marcellus in Polybius' account of the Gallic War).

In his analysis of the Gallic War, Polybius (2.35.2-3) says that in respect to the desperation and daring of the combatants, the battles, and the numbers who took part and perished, it was inferior to no war in history, but it was contemptible in respect to the strategic plans and the want of judgment in their
execution: not most things, but everything was decided on by the Gauls in the heat of passion rather than with calculation. Cassola (GPR 225-226) believes that Polybius, although he attempted to give an honorable role to Cn. Scipio, preferred to deny the importance of this war.

8.1. Θρίαμβον, εἰσῆλθαν: The Romans believed that the triumph was of Etruscan origin (Strab. 5.220; Flor. 1.1.5.6; App. Pun. 66; although cf. Serv. Aen. 4.37). The Latin word for this ceremony, triumphus, formed from the shout 'io triumpe' of the soldiers accompanying their victorious general, is thought to have come from Etruria, although its original derivation may be from the Greek word θρίαμβε or an even earlier pre-Greek form (Varro LL 6.68; see Versnel Triumphus 11-55). The triumph was considered the highest honor which the state could bestow on an individual (Liv. 30.15.12: neque magnificentius quicquam triumpho apud Romanos...esse) and was greatly sought after. The ceremony basically consisted of a procession (pompa) to the Capitoline hill by the triumphator accompanied by his army where he made a sacrifice to Jupiter Optimus Maximus (see Ogilvie Livy 272-273, Versnel Triumphus, and Ehlers RE 7a.1 [1939], "Triumphus," no. 1: 493-511).

8.2-4. Plutarch in his life of Romulus (16.4-5) describes the trophy and the procession of Romulus in similar terms.

8.2. δρυός γάρ εὐκτεάνου πρέμνον...: The Roman trophy was a
borrowing from the Greeks as is indicated by the Latin word *tropæum* itself, since it is simply a transliteration of τρόπαιον (Picard *TR* 103). Although the dedication to the gods of arms taken as booty was a rite common to many peoples, the trophy, consisting of arms arranged on a cross-shaped frame in such a way as to resemble a human and erected on the field of battle by the victorious army, was of Greek origin (Picard *TR* 16-17; see Picard *TR* and Lammert *RE* 7a.1 [1939], "τρόπαιον," no. 1: 663-673).

8.5. τὸν νεὼν τοῦ Φερετρίου Διός: Unlike the normal triumph in which the procession ended at the Capitoline temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the goal of this procession was the diminutive temple of Jupiter Feretrius nearby. Some scholars have seen in this particular ceremony an older form of the triumph which existed before the establishment of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus by the Tarquins (see Versnel *Triumphus* 312 and Picard *TR* 133). It has been suggested that Livy's account of Romulus dedicating the arms of Acron, king of the Caeninenses, may contain traces of this earlier ceremony (1.10.5: spolia ducis hostium caesi suspensa fabricato ad id apte ferculo gerens in Capitolium escendit; ibique ea cum ad quercum pastoribus sacram deposuisset; Fowler *CR* 30 [1916]: 153).

According to Livy (1.10.3-7) this was the first temple consecrated at Rome, established by Romulus on the Capitoline hill when he dedicated the arms of the king of the Caeninenses, whom he had killed in combat. Although it was said to have been
enlarged by Ancus Marcius (Liv. 1.33.9), it was very small in size, not measuring more than 15 feet on its longest side (Dion. Hal. 2.34.4). A denarius minted by P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus around 44 B.C. (Sydenham The Coinage of the Roman Republic, no. 1147 = Crawford Roman Republican Coinage, vol. 1, no. 439.1) apparently shows this temple. On the coin Marcellus is shown, with the spolia opima in his hand, standing on the high stylobate of a rectangular tetrastyle temple possessing a plain pediment (Planter-Ashby 293). There is no mention of a statue in this temple, but it did contained a scepter and silex (Fest. p. 81 Lindsay: ex cuius templo sumebant sceptrum, per quod iurarent, et lapidem silicem, quo foedus ferirent). The scepter was symbolic of military success, while the silex, evidently a meteorite, was probably an old neolithic celt venerated for its antiquity and sacred function which came to be regarded as a thunderbolt sent by Jupiter (Ogilvie Livy 70, 112; Liv. 1.24.3-9; Plin. NH 37.135; see Cook CR 18 [1904]: 365 and Rose JRS 3 [1913]: 238). Propertius (4.10.48) mentions the existence of an altar, but Platner and Ashby (294) suggest that this is merely a reference to indicate the original shrine (see Platner-Ashby 293-294).

8.6. πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ἀνήνεγκε...βασιλέως Γαλατῶν: The story of Romulus winning the spolia opima is narrated by Livy (1.10), Plutarch (Rom. 16), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.33-34) and mentioned numerous times by ancient authors (e.g., Ampel. 21, Fest. p. 204 Lindsay, Serv. Aen. 6.859, Prop. 4.10).

Marcellus’ winning of the *spolia opima* is recorded numerous times in the ancient sources (*Rom.* 16.7; *Acta Tr.* for 222 B.C.; *Liv.* *Per.* 20; *Prop.* 4.10; *De vir. ill.* 45.1-2; *Val.* *Max.* 3.2.5; *Frontin.* *Str.* 4.5.4; *Flor.* 1.20.5; *Ampel.* 21; *Fest.* p. 204 Lindsay; *Verg.* *Aen.* 6.855-859; *Serv.* *Aen.* 6.855, 859; *Manil.* 1.787-788; *Sil. Ital.* 1.132-133, 3.587, 12.278-280).

8.6. μετὰ δὲ Μάρκελλον οὐδ’ εἰς: Plutarch obviously discounts M. Licinius Crassus’ claim, if he was at all aware of it, to the *spolia opima* in 29 B.C. Crassus, as proconsul of Macedonia, had defeated the Bastarnae and killed their chief, Deldo, in battle (*Dio* 51.24.3-4; see Chapter 8.10. ὡς ἐκεῖνων μόνων... for the reason used by Octavian to refuse Crassus’ claim).

8.7-10. Plutarch in his *Romulus* (16.5-6) has a similar discussion on *Feretrius* and *opima* in which M. Terentius Varro is named as one of his sources (16.6: ὁπίμα δὲ τὰ σκῦλα, φησὶ Βάρρων, καθότι καὶ τὴν περιουσίαν ὅπεμ λέγουσι).  

8.7. ἀπὸ τοῦ φερετρευμένου τροπαίου...Λατίνων: This explanation of *Feretrius* may have comes from Varro (*LL* 5.166: *Lectus mortui* <quod> fertur, dicebant feretrum nostri, Graeci φέρετρον). Silius Italicus believed that a bier (feretrum) was
used in the ceremony of the spolia opima (5.167-168: quis opima volenti / dona Iovi portet feretro suspensa cruento). Modern scholars are of the opinion that the title Feretrius cannot be from feretrum, which is a borrowing of the Greek word φέρετρον and that this explanation given by Plutarch is merely the ancients’ folk-etymology of the word (see Ogilvie Livy 70, Walde-Hofmann, and Wissowa RK 119).

8.7. Διός...κεραυνοβολούντος: In the temple was kept a silex (Fest. p. 81 Lindsay) which was probably a meteorite revered as a thunderbolt sent by Jupiter (Ogilvie Livy 70, 112; see Chapter 8.5. τὸν νεῖβ... concerning silex).

8.8. ἄλλοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πολεμίου πληγὴν...: Plutarch in his Romulus says that the title Feretrius came from ferire and that Romulus vowed to strike and overthrow his man (16.6: τὸ δὲ τρόπαιον ἀνάθημα Φερετρίου Διός ἐπωνομάσθη—τὸ γὰρ πλήξαι φερίρε Ἀρωμαίοι καλοῦσιν, εὐξεῖτο δὲ πλήξαι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ καταβαλεῖν).

Besides deriving Feretrius from ferire the ancients also thought it might have come from ferre (Fest. p. 81 Lindsay: Feretrius Juppiter dictus a ferendo, quod pacem ferre putaretur; Prop. 4.10.46-48: omne quod certo dux ferit ense ducem; / seu, quia victa suis umeris haec arma ferebant, / hinc Feretri dicta est ara superba Iovis). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.34.4) states that other titles were thought appropriate for Jupiter Feretrius, such as "Bearer of Trophies" (τροπαιοῦχον), "Bearer of Spoils," (οκυλοφόρον), or "Supreme One" (ὑπερφερέτην). All
these titles indicate that Dionysius was deriving Feretrius from ferre (Cary, trans., The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1 [Loeb]: 411, n. 1). Plutarch must have been aware of this passage of Dionysius since he cites him at Romulus 16.7 for his statement (2.34.20) that Romulus used a chariot in his triumph and this immediately precedes his discussion on the various titles of Jupiter Feretrius.

Modern scholars are in disagreement over whether Feretrius was derived from ferire or ferre (see Ogilvie Livy 70, Walde-Hofmann, Ernout-Meillet, and Wissowa RK 119, n. 6).

8.9. τὰ δὲ σκῦλα...οπίμια ταῦτα καλοῦσι: Plutarch in his Romulus discusses the derivation of opima which he believed was more likely from opus than from opes, as Varro claimed (16.6: ὁπίμια δὲ τὰ σκῦλα, ὡςὶ Βάρρων, καθότι καὶ τὴν περιουσίαν ὅπεμ λέγουσι. πιθανώτερον δὲ ἂν τις εἴποι διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν· ὅπους γὰρ ὄνομάζεται τὸ ἔργον). But besides Varro, Festus also derives opima from opes, saying that spolia opima is derived from Opes, the wife of Saturn (Fest. p. 202 Lindsay: Opima spolia dicuntur originem quidem trahentia ab Ope Saturni uxor).

Modern speculation on opima has produced differing opinions on its derivation. Walde and Hofmann derive opima from *opi-pimus = "Fülle-strotzend" (2^4: 212), but Versnel (Triumphus 311-312) believes that the word should be derived from ops = energy, and that consequently spolia are opima, 'full of power,' and not to be touched by anyone except the victor since they are taboo (see Ernout-Meillet and Stehouwer Étude sur Ops et Consus.
8.9. έν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι Νομάν Πομπίλιον...μνημονεύειν: These would be the *commentarii pontificum*, manuals of procedure giving instructions for the proper performance of religious rites and ceremonies (see Ogilvie Livy 231-232, Voigt *Ueber die Leges Regiae*, and Rohde *Die Kultsatzungen der römischen Pontifices* 62-64). Works containing religious instructions were commonly attributed to Numa. For example, a number of books ascribed to Numa and dealing with pontifical law were allegedly found buried in a field near the Janiculum in 181 B.C., but were subsequently burned on the recommendation of a praetor because of their contents (*Numa* 22.2-8; Liv. 40.29.3-14; Val. Max. 1.1.12; Plin. *NH* 13.84-87; August. *De civ. D.* 7.35).

8.9. τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ληφθέντα...τὸν δὲ τρίτον ἑκατόν: These specifications enumerated by the pontifical manuals (*commentarii pontificum*) are also reported by Festus (p. 204 Lindsay) and Servius (*Aen.* 6.859). Although Servius links the three classifications to the three historical occurrences of the winning of the *spolia opima* (secundum legem Numae hunc locum accipere, qui praecipit prima opima spolia Iovi Feretrio debere suspendi, quod iam Romulus fecerat; secunda Marti, quod Cossus fecit; tertia Quirino, quod fecit Marcellus), they are instead to be considered distinctions between varying grades of *spolia* (*Versnel Triumphus* 307-309; Ogilvie *Livy* 71).

*Versnel* (*Triumphus* 310, n. 5), relying upon Festus (p. 204
Lindsay: C qui ceperit ex aere dato), but admitting that the text is corrupt, suggests that the 300, 200, and 100 asses, which Plutarch assumes were to be given to the winner of the spolia opima, are, in fact, a kind of fine (multa) which the winner had to pay, as in CIL, I², 366 = XI, 4766: Honce loucom / nequ[i]s violatod /.../ sequis scies / violasit dolo malo, / Iovei bovid piaclum / datod et a(sses) CCC / moltai suntod (Let no one damage this place...if anyone knowingly damages with malice aforethought, let him give an ox to Jupiter as atonement and let there be 300 asses as a fine).

8.10. ὃς ἐκεῖνων μόνων ὀπισθῶν ὄντων...: By the time of the late Republic, it was held that only a general with full imperium could win the spolia opima, and this was the technicality used by Octavian to deny this honor to M. Licinius Crassus, proconsul of Macedonia in 29 B.C., after he had slain in battle Deldo, king of the Bastarnae (Dio 51.24.4: καὶ τὸν γε βασιλέα αὐτῶν Δέλδωνα αὐτὸς ὁ Κράσσος ἀπέκτεινε. καὶ τὰ σκῦλα αὐτοῦ τῷ Φερετρίῳ Διί ὃς καὶ ὀπίσθα ἀνέθηκεν, εἴπερ αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγὸς ἐγεγόνει; see Chapter 8.6. μετὰ δὲ...). Octavian may have done this because he believed that the granting of the spolia opima to Crassus would have threatened his own political position (see Ogilvie Livy 72-73, Dessau Hermes 41 [1906]: 142-144, and Syme HSPh 64 [1959]: 44-47). But the requirement that a commander had to have full imperium is not uniformly maintained in the ancient tradition (see Ogilvie Livy 563-564 on the office held by A. Cornelius Cossus when he won the spolia
8.11. During the final assault on Veii (trad. date 396 B.C.) Camillus had promised a tenth of the spoils to Pythian Apollo. For the fulfillment of this vow, the Romans dedicated a golden bowl to Apollo at Delphi (Liv. 5.21.2, 23.8-11, 25.4-10, 28.1-5; Val. Max. 5.6.8). The use of χαριστήριον here indicates that the Romans were discharging a similar vow made during this Gallic War. The person who had made this is unknown, but it was probably not Marcellus since he had vowed a temple to Virtus and Honos during this conflict, and if he had made another to Pythian Apollo, it should have been reported alongside with this one in the ancient sources (Liv. 27.25.7, 29.11.13; Val. Max. 1.1.8).

8.11. In this Gallic War, alongside Rome’s older allies, the Cenomani, the Veneti, and the Anares, recent allies of Rome in the Po region (Polyb. 2.23.2, 32.2), may have been recipients of this booty.

8.11. Hiero II (RE 8.2 [1913], no. 13: 1503-1511), king of Syracuse from 270-215 B.C., had been a faithful ally of Rome since 263 B.C. after initially opposing her in the early stages of the First Punic War. From Plutarch’s notice here it
must be assumed that Hiero had helped the Romans in this war. Livy (22.37.1-8) reports that, after the Roman defeat at Lake Trasimene in 217 B.C., Hiero, of his own accord, sent to the Romans not only a gold statue of Victory weighing 200 pounds but also 300,000 measures of wheat, 200,000 of barley, and a contingent of bowmen and slingers numbering 1,000. Hiero may have supplied Rome with similar material during this war.
CHAPTER NINE

9. In this chapter Plutarch introduces us to the Second Punic
War, which will continue to be the arena of action for Marcellus
for the remainder of this life.

9.1. "Αννίβου δ' ἐμβαλόντος εἰς 'Ιταλίαν: Hannibal crossed the
Alps into Italy in either late September or late October of 218
B.C. (Polyb. 3.54.1; Liv. 21.35.6; Walbank Polybius 1: 390).

9.1. ἐπέμφθη μὲν ὁ Μάρκελλος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν στόλον ἀγὼν:
Marcellus was elected praetor (his second time) for 216 B.C. and
assigned to Sicily (Liv. 22.35.6). This is the first we hear of
him since his consulship of 222 B.C. All of the ancient sources
are silent about his activities during the six previous years.
Although it is not recorded that he participated in any of the
major battles of this Punic War which had occurred up to this
point, Livy's remark that all of the magistrates elected for 216
B.C. were absent from Rome suggests that Marcellus was serving
in some official capacity (22.35.7: Omnes absentes creati
sunt).

Marcellus' absence from the historical record from 222-216
B.C. suggests that after his consulship he receded into the
background of political life. What may have caused this is
unknown. Having gained the consulship, and having won the rare
honor of the spolia opima, he may have decided to rest on his
laurels and not to take a leading role in subsequent political
struggles. However, the misfortunes of Rome in the early years of the Second Punic War created a need for him since Rome required experienced men (cf. Liv. 22.35.7), and he was thrust back into the forefront.

9.2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἦ περὶ Κάννας ἀτυχία συνέπεσε: According to ancient tradition the battle took place on 2 August 216 B.C. (Aul. Gel. 5.17.5; Macrobr. 1.16.26). However, the Roman calendar at that time was ahead of the solar year, and with an adjustment made for this, the date of the battle would be put back into June or July (De Sanctis SR 3.2: 130).

9.2. Ἦ' Ρωμαίων οὐκ ὀλίγαι μυριάδες...διεφθάρησαν: Plutarch in his Fabius Maximus records that 50,000 Romans perished in this battle, while at least 14,000 were captured either during the fighting or shortly thereafter (16.9: λέγονται δὲ πεσεῖν μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ Ἦ' Ρωμαίων πεντακισμύριοι, ζῶντες δ' ἀλῶναι τετρακισχίλιοι, καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην οἱ ληφθέντες ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς στρατοπέδοις μυρίων οὐκ ἐλάττουσι; see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 126-130 for discussion on figures and Walbank Polybius 1: 439-441 for discussion and bibliography).

9.2. ὀλίγοι δὲ σωθέντες εἰς Κανύσιον συνεπεφεύγεσαν: According to Livy’s text (22.50.4-12, 52.4) it appears that up to 4,000 infantry and 200 cavalry escaped during the night from the two Roman camps (of which 600 were from the smaller camp) and made their way to Canusium. Later the consul Varro transferred the
forces which had collected at Venusia, about 4,500 men, to Canusium and in a letter sent to the Roman senate reported that he had about 10,000 men (Liv. 22.54.6, 49.14, 54.1, 56.1-2). In Appian’s account (Hann. 26.113) about 10,000 men from the larger camp made their way to Canusium, and Livy in at least one place appears to accept this figure (22.54.4; cf. Liv. 60.19-20, Val. Max. 4.8.2). Although this has caused some scholars to postulate that there were 14,500 men at Canusium, the figure reported by Appian may have been the result of confusion over the total number of those who eventually made their way to this town (see Cornelius Klio, supp. 26 [1932], 51-63 and Hallward CAH 8: 55 who accept the lower figure and De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 128-129, Klotz Philologus 88 [1933]: 62, n. 43, and Walbank Polybius 1: 440 who accept the higher).

Canusium, an important town in ancient Apulia, is located on the right bank of the Aufidus river (mod. Ofanto) approximately 24 kilometers from its mouth. It came under Roman control in 318 B.C. (Liv. 9.20.4) and remained loyal to Rome during the Second Punic War (Liv. 27.12.8: see PECS 192-193).

9.2. ἂν δὲ προσδοκία...ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην ἔλαυν: According to Livy (22.55.1-2) the senate was summoned to discuss the security of the city because of this expectation that Hannibal would march on Rome. There is an anecdote (Fab. Max. 17.1-2; Liv. 22.51.1-4) that Hannibal was urged to march immediately upon the city. When he hesitated, he was told that he knew how to gain a victory, but did not know how to use it (Fab. Max. 17.2: 'σὺ
vitān oĭdatos, νίκη δὲ χρῆσθαι οὖκ οἶδας'; Liv. 22.51.4: 'Non omnia nimirum eidem di dedere. Vincere scis, Hannibal; victoria uti nescis'). This delay was thought by the ancients to have been Rome's salvation (Liv. 22.51.4: Mora eius diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio). But Hannibal was well aware that an attack on Rome would be futile without the necessary siege equipment and hazardous while the Latin allies remained loyal to Rome.

9.3. πρῶτον μὲν ὁ Μάρκελλος...δεξάμενος: Marcellus was still at Ostia preparing a naval expedition to Sicily when the news of the disaster at Cannae reached Rome. In Livy's version of events, the decree of the senate (22.57.1: censuere patres> M. Claudium, qui classi ad Ostiam stanti praeesset, Canusium ad exercitum mittendum scribendumque consuli ut, cum praetori exercitum tradidisset...) preceded Marcellus' dispatch of troops to Rome (Liv. 22.57.7: M. Claudius Marcellus ab Ostia mille et quingentos milites quos in classem scriptos habebat Romam, ut urbi praesidio essent, mittit).

9.3. εἰς Κανύσιον παρῆλθε: Marcellus had sent on ahead to Teanum Sidicinum the legion with its military tribunes which had been assigned to his naval expedition, and a few days later, after turning over the naval command to his colleague P. Furius Philo, he hurried to Canusium by forced marches (Liv. 22.57.8: ipse legione classica—ea legio tertia erat--cum tribunis militum Teanum Sidicinum praemissa, classe tradita P. Furio
Philo collegae paucos post dies Canusium magnis itineribus contendit; Livy in this passage calls the naval legion the 'Third,' but at 22.53.2 the 'Third Legion' was one of those which had fought at Cannae. While Brunt [Italian Manpower 648] does not consider the numbering credible, Foster [trans., Livy 5 {Loeb}: 387, n. 2] suggests that either the naval legions were numbered separately or, more probably, the legions had now been renumbered; cf. Klotz Philologus 88 [1933]: 65; see RE 12.1 [1924], "Legio," no. 1: 1204-1205 concerning the numbering of legions).

According to Appian, Marcellus, having gathered a force of up to 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry composed of citizens, allies, and manumitted slaves, marched to Teanum where he watched to see what Hannibal would do next (Hann. 27: αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς δούλους ἄγων καὶ ὅσους ἄλλους ἐδύνατο τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ συμμάχων, γενομένους ἀπαντάς ἐς μυρίους πεζοὺς καὶ δισχιλίους ἱππέας, ἐς τὸ Τεανὸν παρῆλθε καὶ, ὃ τι πράξειν ὁ Ἀννίβας μέλλοι, παρεφύλασσεν). But Appian seems to have confused the activities of Marcellus with those of the dictator M. Iunius Pera. According to Livy (22.57.11, 23.14.2-4, 32.1) the armed force of 8,000 manumitted slaves composed part of Pera's army which was stationed at Teanum. The accounts of Plutarch and Livy are preferable to Appian's, since at this time of crisis there would have been insufficient time to raise and properly train a force of manumitted slaves; it would have been imprudent to send such an unreliable force with Marcellus as front line troops, when other forces, although meager, were available (see
Brunt *Italian Manpower* 648-651 concerning disposition of forces after Cannae).

9.3. τούς ἐκεῖ συνειλεγμένους παραλαβὼν: In a dispatch to the senate C. Terentius Varro, the surviving consul, reported that he had up to 10,000 men at Canusium (Liv. 22.56.1-2; see Chapter 9.2. ὁλίγοι...).

9.3. ἐξήγαγε τῶν ἐρυμάτων...τὴν χώραν: Upon taking over the Roman forces at Canusium, Marcellus must have pulled them back at the first opportune moment to Casilinum, where envoys from Nola found him with his army (Liv. 23.14.10). At this time Marcellus’ naval legion may have been transferred to the consul C. Terentius Varro (Liv. 23.22.11; cf. Brunt *Italian Manpower* 649; Livy [23.38.9] records that in 214 B.C. Varro’s forces were assigned to M. Valerius Laevinus who was now in command of a fleet of 50 ships. This is reasonable, if Varro’s forces were, in fact, soldiers trained to be marines; see Chapter 12.4. διαδοῦς...for further speculation on this naval legion).

Plutarch’s statement ὡς οὖ προηρομένος τὴν χώραν is an exaggeration, since Marcellus would have been in no position to assert control over the surrounding territory with the troops at his disposal. Even in his subsequent march to Nola, he avoided the Campanian plain in which Hannibal’s forces were operating and took a circuitous route through the foothills to the east (Liv. 23.14.13). Plutarch here is trying to emphasize the daring and vigorous nature of Marcellus’ personality and
strategy as an introduction to the comparison between Marcellus and Fabius Maximus that follows.

9.4-7. Plutarch in his *Fabius Maximus* (19.1-6) has a similar comparison between the personalities and strategies of Marcellus and Fabius Maximus. It had been thought that they were political rivals (Münzer *RE* 3.2 [1899]: 2740), but the general view now, based largely on the results of the electoral proceedings of 215 and 214 B.C., is that they were political allies (see Chapters 12.2. ἐμφανῶς... and 13.1. Ὅ δὲ Μάρκελλος... for the interpretation of the results of these elections). Although doubts are still raised concerning their relationship (for example, Eckstein [*SG* 157, n. 3] believes that there is insufficient information available to enable one to determine who Marcellus' friends were), the conjecture that they were political partners is still tenable (see Chapters 10.9. τὰῦτα..., 24.2, 25.3. Συνθέμενος..., and 28.2. for further indications of Marcellus' and Fabius' relationship).

9.4. τῶν ἤγεμονικῶν καὶ δυνατῶν ἀνδρῶν: Aside from C. Flaminius (cos. 223, 217, pr. 227), who was killed at Lake Trasimene in 217 B.C., most of the Romans referred to here would have perished at Cannae in 216 B.C. Along with the consul L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 219, 216), two quaestors of 216 B.C. and 29 military tribunes perished, some being of consular, praetorian, and aedilician rank, among whom were Cn. Servilius Geminus (cos. 217) and M. Minucius Rufus (cos. 221, mag. eq.
217, dict. 217?); in addition, 80 men either of senatorial rank or eligible to enter that order having held a qualifying magistracy, who had volunteered to serve as soldiers in the ranks, had also died (Liv. 22.49.15-17, 56.2).

9.4. Ψαβίου δὲ Μαξίμου: This is Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (RE 6.2 [1909], no. 116: 1814-1830), nicknamed Cunctator, 'The Delayer.' Plutarch wrote a separate life on him, composed after this life of Marcellus (Fab. Max. 19.2: ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ [sc. Μαρκέλλου] γεγραμμένοις εἰρηται; 22.8).

9.6. τὸ θαρραλέον αὐτοῦ καὶ δραστήριον: In his Fabius Maximus Plutarch mentions that he had discussed these characteristics of Marcellus' personality (19.2: οὐ μὲν γάρ, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένοις εἰρηται, περιλαμβανόμενο τὸ δραστήριον ἔχων καὶ γαῦρον, ἢ ηὗ καὶ κατὰ χείρα πλήκτης ἀνήρ καὶ φύσει τοιοῦτος ὃν οἶκος ὁμηρὸς μάλιστα καλεῖ φιλοπολέμους καὶ ἀγερχόμενος, ἐν τῷ παραβόλῳ καὶ ἱταμέν καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα τολμηρόν τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀντιτιμῶντι [τῷ] τρόπῳ πολέμου συνίστατο τοὺς πρώτους ἀγῶνας; compare with Marcellus 1.2).

9.6. ποτὲ μὲν ἀμφότεροις ἀμα χειροτονοῦντες ὑπότους: This occurred in 214 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 258-259).

9.6. ποτὲ δ' ἐν μέρει, τὸν μὲν ὑπατον τὸν δ' ἀνθύπατον ἐξέπεμπον: This occurred in 215 and 209 B.C. when Marcellus was proconsul and Fabius Maximus consul (see Broughton MRR 1:
9.7. ο δὲ Ποσειδώνιός φησι τὸν μὲν Φάβιον θυρεόν καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον ξίφος: This characterization is repeated in Plutarch’s Fabius Maximus (19.4: διὸ τοῦτον [sc. Φάβιον] μὲν ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησι θυρεόν, τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον ξίφος ὑπὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καλεῖσθαι, κινημένην δὲ τὴν Φαβίου βεβαιότητα καὶ ἀσφάλειαν τῇ Μαρκέλλου συντονίᾳ σωτηρίων γενέσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις), and it appears to have been a well-known metaphor (e.g., Flor. 1.22.27: Hinc illi cognomen novum et rei publicae salutare Cunctator; hinc illud ex populo, ut imperii scutum vocaretur).

The citation of Posidonius here appears to be an insertion by Plutarch of one of his many gleanings gathered from his research (Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 292; see Introduction, pp. 21-25, concerning Plutarch’s use of Posidonius).

9.7. αὐτὸς δ’ ὁ Ἀννίβας ἐλεγε...: Plutarch in his Fabius Maximus has a variant of this supposed saying which has been altered to a description of the affect Marcellus and Fabius had on Hannibal (19.5: ὁ δ’ Ἀννίβας τῷ μὲν ὡς ῥέοντι σφόδρα ποταμῷ πολλάκις ἀπαντών, ἔσείτο καὶ παρερρηγνύετο τὴν δύναμιν, ὥς οὖ δ’ ἀφοφητί καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ὑπορρέοντος καὶ παρεμπίπτοντος ἐνδελεχῶς ὑπερειπόμενος καὶ δαπανώμενος ἐλάνθανε, καὶ τελευτῶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατεστή τοσαύτην, ὥστε Μαρκέλλῳ μὲν ἀποκαμείν μαχόμενον, Φάβιον δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μαχόμενον).
10.1. Livy does not report any such activities on the part of either Hannibal’s soldiers or Marcellus. According to him (23.1.1-10.13, 14.5-10) Hannibal was engaged in winning over the cities of Campania, while Marcellus was stationed at Casilinum. This report is to be preferred to that of Plutarch, who is at pains to emphasize the daring and vigorous nature of Marcellus’ personality and strategy (see, for example, Chapter 9.3. ἐξήγαγε... concerning this emphasis of Plutarch).

10.2. Νεαπολίταις μὲν ἐπέρρωσεν: Livy makes no mention of Marcellus helping Neapolis, but later he reports that the Neapolitans themselves had summoned M. Junius Silanus to their aid (23.15.2: ceterum postquam Neapolim a praefecto Romano teneri accepit [sc. Hannibal]—M. Iunius Silanus erat, ab ipsis Neapolitanis accitus—Neapoli quoque, sicut Nola, omissa petit Nuceriam). It is possible that Silanus was sent to Neapolis by Marcellus at the request of the Neapolitans at the time of his advance to Nola. But whether or not this is true, Plutarch’s statement here was probably derived from a source other than Livy.

10.2. εἰς δὲ Νῶλαν εἰσελθὼν στάσιν εὑρε...: According to Livy (23.14.5-13) Hannibal moved into Nolan territory, but refrained from attacking the city, since he still had hopes that it would be surrendered to him voluntarily. Meanwhile the Nolan senate
sent envoys to Marcellus, who was at Casilinum with his army, to inform him that they were making a pretense of favoring Hannibal in order to slow down the commons' defection to him and that the city needed help. Marcellus instructed the Nolan senate to maintain the pretense. He then set off from Casilinum for Nola.

He took a circuitous route to reach Nola, staying in the hill-country east of the Campanian plain, presumably to avoid Hannibal's army (Liv. 23.14.13: Ipse a Casilino Caiatiam petit atque inde Volturno amni traiecto per agrum Saticulanum Trebianumque super Suessulam per montes Nolam pervenit).

Livy (23.15.1) reports that on Marcellus' arrival Hannibal withdrew from the Nolan countryside and headed for Neapolis. In his account Hannibal had made two earlier unsuccessful attempts to seize this town, because he wanted to obtain a sea-port as a base for ships arriving from Africa (23.1.5: oppugnaturus Neapolim, ut urbem maritimam haberet; 15.1: cupidus maritimi oppidi potiundi, quo cursus navibus tutus ex Africa esset). His first attempt was soon after the battle of Cannae, but the defenses of the city deterred him from assaulting it (Liv. 23.1.5-10). The second attempt was after his taking of Capua and right before his advance into Nolan territory (Liv. 23.14.5). On his third attempt he was deterred by finding the city defended by the Roman prefect M. Junius Silanus. So he bypassed it and headed for Nuceria (Liv. 23.15.1-2; Silanus must have arrived while Hannibal was before the walls of Nola, probably sent there by Marcellus; see Chapter 10.2. Νεαπολίτας...).
10.3-11.1. This episode about Lucius Bantius is also related by Livy (23.15.7-16.1), Frontinus (Str. 3.16.1), and Dio Cassius (fr. 57.32). Plutarch's version most closely resembles Livy's, and De Sanctis (SR 3.2: 370) believes that the differences can be attributed to Plutarch's freedom in adapting Livy. However, Plutarch may have gotten the incident from elsewhere. In his Fabius Maximus (20.2-3) he describes a similar episode involving Fabius' favorable treatment of a Marsian soldier which is not found in Livy, but is found in the De viris illustribus. If the De viris illustribus was derived from Cornelius Nepos, as has been proposed (see Introduction, p. 29, n. 125), then it is possible that Plutarch derived both incidents from Nepos and not Livy (see Introduction, pp. 26-29, concerning Plutarch's use of Nepos).

10.3. Livy says, Erat iuvenis acer et sociorum ea tempestate prope nobilissimus eques (23.15.8).

10.4. Livy says, Seminecem eum ad Cannas in acervo caesorum corporum inventum curatumque benigne, etiam cum donis Hannibal domum remiserat (23.15.8).

10.5. ἁμειβόμενος οὖν ταύτην τὴν χάριν...προθύμως: Livy says, Ob eius gratiam meriti rem Nolanam in ius dicionemque dare voluerat Poeno (23.15.9).
10.5. τὸν δῆμον ἵσχυν ἐξήγαγε πρὸς ἀπόστασιν: Livy says, quem conscientia temptatae defecptionis...stimulabat (23.15.7).

What this action may have entailed is not specified by our sources, but it probably involved secret negotiations with Hannibal, and it may have been due to these that the Nolan senate sent envoys to Marcellus for help (see Chapter 10.2. εἰς δὲ Νῶλαν...).

10.6. ὁ δὲ Μάρκελλος...οὐχ ὁσιον ἤγειτο: Livy says, Ceterum cum aut poena cohibendus esset aut beneficio conciliandus, sibi adsumpsisse quam hosti ademisse fortem ac strenuum maluit socium (23.15.10).

10.6. πρὸς δὲ τῷ φύσει φιλανθρώπῳ: Plutarch is emphasizing here one of the main characteristics of Marcellus, which he outlined at Marcellus 1.3.

10.6. πιθανῶς οὖν ὅμιλίᾳ [καὶ] προσάγεσθαι φιλότιμον ἥθος: If these traits were not mentioned in his source, Plutarch may have deduced them from the way the episode was presented in that source.

10.6. ἀσπασάμενόν ποτε...: This is the first important deviation on Plutarch’s part from the way the episode is presented by Livy (23.15.10: accitumque ad se benigne appellat).
10.7-8. The dialogue which takes place here is remarkably different from that given by Livy, especially the remark on Bantius' defense of Aemilius Paullus at the battle of Cannae, which is lacking in Livy. Livy has:

multos eum invidos inter populares habere inde existimatu facile esse quod nemo civis Nolanus sibi indicaverit quam multa eius egregia facinora militaria essent; sed qui in Romanis militaverit castris, non posse obscuram eius virtutem esse. multos sibi qui cum eo stipendia fecerint, referre qui vir esset ille quaque et quotiens pericula pro salute ac dignitate populi Romani adisset, utique Cannensi proelio non prius pugna abstiterit quam prope exsanguis ruina superincidentium viorum equorum armorumque sit oppressus. 'Itaque macte virtute esto' inquit. 'Apud me tibi omnis honos atque omne praemium erit et, quo frequentior mecum fueris, senties eam rem tibi dignitati atque emolumento esse' (23.15.11-14).

The detail given by Plutarch of Bantius defending Aemilius (10.7: ὃς μόνον Παῦλον Αἰμίλιον...καὶ ἀναδεξημένου) is more vivid than Livy's generalities about Bantius' exploits. Plutarch's departure from Livy here (if, indeed, Livy is his source) may be a product of his own imagination as De Sanctis (SR 3.2: 370) believes, but it is still possible that he had found this variant elsewhere (see Chapter 10.3-11.1.).

10.9. ταῦτα φιλομορφονθεῖς...: With this statement Plutarch comes back into agreement with Livy (23.15.15: Laetoque iuveni promissis equum eximium dono dat bigatosque quingentos quaestorem numerare iubet; the δραχμὰς ἀργυρίον are the bigatos in Livy).

Livy adds that Bantius was given permission to approach Marcellus whenever he desired, a privilege not mentioned by
Plutarch (Liv. 23.15.15: lictoribus imperat ut eum se adire quotiens velit patiantur).

Marcellus’ policy of treating allies leniently when it was possible to win over their loyalty to Rome was one also followed by Fabius Maximus (Fab. Max. 20.1; see Dio fr. 57.31 and Plutarch Fab. Max. 20.4 concerning Marcellus’ and Fabius’ treatment of the men under their commands). Plutarch ascribes to Fabius a very similar incident (Fab. Max. 20.2-3: λέγεται γάρ ὅτι στρατιώτην ἄνδρα Μάρσουν, ἄνδρείς καὶ γένει τῶν συμμάχων πρῶτον, αἰσθόμενος διειλεγμένον τισὶ τῶν ἐν στρατοπέδῳ περὶ ἀποστάσεως οὐ διηρέθησεν, ἀλλ’ ὀμολογήσας ἠμελήσθαι παρ’ ἄξιαν αὐτόν, νῦν μὲν ἔφη τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αἰτιάσθαι πρὸς χάριν μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰς τιμὰς νέμοντας, ὕστερον δ’ ἐκείνον αἰτιάσεσθαι μὴ φράζοντα μηδ’ ἐντυγχάνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴ τοι δέοιτο. καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν ἵππον τε πολέμισθην ἐδωρήσατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀριστεῖοις ἐκόσμησεν, ὥσπερ πιστότατον ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ προθυμότατον εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα; this incident is also found in Frontinus Str. 4.7.36 and De viris illustribus 43.5). Not surprisingly this similarity in policy led to confusion in our sources over who was responsible for the treatment in the various episodes of this type. For example, Valerius Maximus (7.3.7) links Fabius, not Marcellus, to the episode concerning Bantius. Also, while Dio Cassius (fr. 57.33) names Marcellus in an episode concerning the favorable treatment of a Lucanian soldier, Plutarch (Fab. Max. 20.5-9), the De viris illustribus (43.5), Valerius Maximus (7.3.7), and Frontinus (Str. 4.7.36) assign it to Fabius.
The similarity between Marcellus and Fabius in their treatment of Roman allies suggests that they may have been political associates (see Chapter 9.4-7.).
CHAPTER ELEVEN

11.1. Ἐκ τούτου βεβαιότατος...: Livy reports a similar assessment of Bantius (23.16.1: Hac comitate Marcelli ferocis iuvenes animus adeo est mollitus ut nemo inde sociorum rem Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuverit), but he does not portray him as the most feared (δεινότατος) informer and accuser of the conspirators, as Plutarch does. This further picture of Bantius by Plutarch fits in well not only with the disclosure of a plot to Marcellus before the first battle at Nola (Marc. 11.2-3; Liv. 23.16.5-7), but also with the subsequent events there when Marcellus rounded up and executed over 70 conspirators (Plutarch leaves out this incident, which Livy reports at 23.17.1-3). However, it is probably not a conjecture by Plutarch deduced from Livy (if Livy was his main source), but a portrayal he found elsewhere (see Chapter 10.3-11.1 concerning possible sources use by Plutarch for the Bantius episode).

11.2. Ἡσαν δὲ πολλοί: Livy reports that over 70 conspirators were executed by Marcellus after the first battle at Nola (23.17.2: Supra septuaginta damnatos proditionis securi percussit; see Chapter 12. concerning why Plutarch omits mention of these executions).

11.2. διενοούντο τῶν Ῥωμαίων...: Plutarch’s portrayal of the conspiracy is much abbreviated. According to Livy (23.16.5-6) the leading men of Nola informed Marcellus that the commons were
holding nocturnal conferences with Hannibal, and not only was it
planned to plunder the Roman baggage, but also to receive
Hannibal himself into the city. Livy (23.16.2-5) reports that
before this revelation Marcellus had withdrawn into the city on
Hannibal’s approach, not out of fear, but to prevent any
betrayal of the city to the enemy. In this situation both sides
formed up daily for battle, the Romans before the walls of Nola
and Hannibal in front of his camp, but a general engagement was
avoided and only light skirmishes took place.

11.3. διὸ συντάξας...τὴν δύναμιν ἑντός: Unlike Plutarch, Livy
(23.16.8) gives a detailed description of the disposition of the
Roman forces. The army was divided into three divisions, one
for each of the three gates which faced the enemy. The main
body, consisting of the Roman legions and the Roman cavalry, was
stationed behind the central gate; the recruits, light infantry,
and allied cavalry were posted behind the two flanking gates;
while the camp followers, soldiers’ servants, and unfit soldiers
were appointed to defend the ramparts.

Marcellus’ forces at this time probably consisted of only
the survivors of the Cannae army, since it is likely that his
naval legion, which he had sent earlier to Teanum Sidicinum from
Ostia, had now been either transferred to the consul C.
Terentius Varro or returned to its ships (cf. Brunt Italian
Manpower 649, Toynbee Hannibal’s Legacy 2: 527-528; see Chapters
9.3. Κανύσιον... and 9.3. ἔξηγαγε...; see, also, Chapter 9.2.
δλίγοι... concerning numbers).
11.3. παρὰ τὰς πύλας ἔστησε τὰ σκευοφόρα: Livy reports a slightly different arrangement for the baggage (23.16.8: impedimenta subsequi iussit [sc. Marcellus]; 16.9: subsidiaque destinata impedimentis data, ne occupatis proelio legionibus in ea impetus fieret).

11.4. ἦν οὖν ὕπλων ἔρημα...: According to Livy, when Hannibal saw the absence of Roman troops, he supposed that his conferences with the conspirators had been betrayed, but believed that if he pressed the attack, the commons would bring about an uprising. For this assault he sent part of his soldiers back to camp in order to bring up into the front line the necessary equipment for attacking the city (23.16.10-11). This activity explains Plutarch’s comment that Hannibal advanced in a somewhat disorderly manner (προσάγειν ἀτακτότερον; Livy has in sua quisque ministeria discursu trepidat ad prima signa [23.16.12]).

11.5. τῶν ἱπποτῶν τοῦς λαμπροτάτους: Plutarch makes no mention of the Roman infantry stationed at this gate and portrays Marcellus as at first rushing out to the attack with only the cavalry. Livy reports that Marcellus ordered first the infantry, then the cavalry to charge from this gate (23.16.12: patefacta repente porta Marcellus signa canere clamoremque tolli ac pedites primum, deinde equites, quanto maximo possent impetu in hostem erumpere iubet).
11.6. μετ' ὀλίγον δ' οἱ πεζοὶ...: Plutarch makes the two divisions of the Roman army, positioned at the flanking gates, attack in succession, while Livy makes them attack simultaneously. Livy, also, names the commanders of these two divisions, P. Valerius Flaccus and C. Aurelius (23.16.13: Satis terroris tumultusque in aciem medium intulerant, cum duabus circa portis P. Valerius Flaccus et C. Aurelius legati in cornua hostium erupere; see Broughton MRR 1: 251 concerning legates).

Livy (23.16.14) adds that the shouting of the camp followers, the soldiers' servants, and those detailed to guard the baggage created the appearance of a large army to Hannibal's men who were contemptuous of the smallness of the Roman forces (cf. Frontin. Str. 2.4.8).

Two ancient sources give slight additional details about the battle which are not found in the accounts of Plutarch, Livy, and Frontinus. Ampelius says, Marcellus qui primus Hannibali aput Nolam restitit et inclinata<em> m> eius aciem penitus trucidavit (46.6), while the De viris illustribus says, Hannibalem apud Nolam locorum angustia adiutus vinci docuit (45.4; what angustia adiutus refers to is unclear). But more important than these details is that both authors report that Marcellus taught his forces how to withdraw from battle in an orderly fashion (Amp. 18.10: Claudius Marcellus qui Hannibalem primus in Campania proelio vicit; idemque docuit in bello quomodo equites sine fuga cederent; De vir. ill. 45.3: Primus docuit, quomodo milites cederent nec terga praebarent). The
close proximity of these remarks to notices on the battle at Nola suggest that Marcellus instructed his forces in this maneuver before this battle. Although we hear no more about this tactic, it may have been the reason why Marcellus was able to engage Hannibal on numerous occasions throughout this war without a serious defeat. After Cannae the Romans avoided all-out set-piece battles with Hannibal, preferring instead to wear him out with smaller actions. This new strategy would on occasion produce indecisive engagements, and being able to withdraw from these in an orderly manner would be vital, since Hannibal’s possession of a superior cavalry force would have enabled him to annihilate an opponent who did not do so. The Romans with their new strategy could not hope to confront Hannibal successfully without such a capability (see Chapter 12.4. δισοδος... for the possibility of another tactical innovation by Marcellus. Vegetius’ Epitoma rei militaris appears to contain traces of still a third [1.15: et Claudius pluribus iaculatoribus institutis atque perdoctis hostem, cui prius inpar fuerat, superavit]).

11.7. κανταυθα πρωτον οι συν Ἀννίβα Ρωμαίοις ἐνέδωκαν: Besides Plutarch several other ancient writers report Marcellus’ victory over Hannibal’s forces at Nola (Cic. Brut. 12; Liv. 23.16.15-16; Val. Max. 1.6.9; Flor. 1.22.29; Ampel. 18.10, 46.6; Oros. 4.16.12; De vir. ill. 45.4; Zon. 9.2.12; possibly Vergil Aen. 6.857-858 and De viris illustribus 42.6 also refer to this event; see Chapter 11.8. κλεός δὲ... concerning the importance
of this battle).

In the *Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli* (1.7) Plutarch reports Polybius’ claim that Hannibal remained undefeated until he faced Scipio. This tradition is also echoed by Cornelius Nepos (*Hann*. 5.4: *quamdiu in Italia fuit, nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum post Cannensem pugnam in campo castra posuit*). Plutarch, however, follows the tradition that Hannibal’s forces suffered some losses and reverses at the hands of Marcellus, although he admits that Marcellus was never able to inflict a decisive defeat on Hannibal (*Comp. Pel. et Marc.* 1.8-9: ἡμεῖς δὲ Λιβίῳ <καὶ> Καίσαρι καὶ Νέπωτι καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Ἰόβα τῷ βασιλεί πιστεύομεν ἡττας τινὰς καὶ τροπὰς ὑπὸ Μαρκέλλου τῶν σὺν Ἁννίβῳ γενέσθαι: μεγάλην δ’ αὐται ῥοπῆν οὐδεμίαν ἐποίησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ προεπτὸν ἕνεκάς τι γενέσθαι περὶ τὸν Λίβυν ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς ἑκείναις).

Modern assessments of this battle maintain that the details as reported in the ancient sources are unreliable and the victory of Marcellus was small. They concede as certain nothing beyond Marcellus’ success in preventing the capture of Nola by Hannibal’s forces (see Münzer *RE* 3.2 [1899]: 2740-2741, De Sanctis *SR* 3.2.2: 225, n. 47, and Lippold *Consules* 57-58, 169-170).

11.7. ὑπὲρ πεντακισχιλίως ἀποθανεῖν: Livy (23.16.15) gives the figure of 2,800 of the enemy killed, and he even hesitates to affirm this. The divergence between Plutarch’s and Livy’s figures has been used as an argument against Plutarch’s use of
Livy as the main source for this battle (e.g., Klotz *RhM* 83 [1934]: 301-302, Peter *Die Quellen Plutarchs* 77-78), but Plutarch's figure of 5,000 may be a confusion on his part with the number of enemy killed at the second battle at Nola (*Marc. 12.5*: νεκροὺς μὲν γενομένους πεντακισχίλιους; Liv. 23.46.4: Hostium plus quinque milia caesa eo die; De Sanctis SR 3.2: 368-369). The casualty figures given by the ancient sources for this battle are, in all likelihood, unreliable.

11.8. ὁ δὲ Λύγιος οὕτω μὲν οὐ διαβεβαιοῦται...: Plutarch's citation of Livy here, along with his own rendition of Livy's assessment of the effect of this battle makes it obvious that Plutarch had read this section of Livy (23.16.15-16: Vix equidem ausim adfirmare, quod quidam auctores sunt, duo milia et octingentos hostium caesos non plus quingentis Romanorum amissis; sed, sive tanta sive minor victoria fuit, ingens eo die res ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibale [vincentibus] difficilius fuit quam postea vincere).

Although the idea that Livy was Plutarch's main source for this battle has been denied (e.g., Klotz *RhM* 83 [1934]: 301-302, Peter *Die Quellen Plutarchs* 77-78), the similarity in structure between the two narratives makes it clear that Plutarch was certainly familiar with Livy. His description of the battle, which he could have derived completely from Livy with no outside help, is immediately followed by a version of the assessment of the battle that appears right after the description of the battle in Livy (cf. De Sanctis SR 3.2: 368-369).
11.8. κλέος δὲ μέγα Μαρκέλλω...: Although Marcellus' victory at Nola was undoubtedly small, nevertheless, the ancient sources stressed its psychological importance (Liv. 23.16.15-16; Cic. Brut. 12: atque ut post Cannensem illam calamitatem primum Marcelli ad Nolam proelio populus se Romanus erexit; Oros. 4.16.12: primusque post tantas reipublicae ruinas spem fecit Hannibalem posse superari; De vir. ill. 45.4: Hannibalem apud Nolam locorum angustia adiutus vinci docuit). That the victory of Marcellus had real psychological significance is proven by his successes at the consular elections for 215 and 214 B.C. (see Chapters 12.1. ἐκάλει... et seqq. and 13.1. 'Ο δὲ Μάρκελλος... concerning consular elections).
12. After the narration of the battle at Nola in chapter 11 Plutarch immediately proceeds to the consular election held to replace one of the consul designates of 215 B.C., who had died before entering office. In doing so Plutarch leaves out the subsequent actions of Marcellus at Nola, which are reported by Livy.

In Livy’s account, after the battle Hannibal moved off towards Acerrae, while Marcellus conducted an investigation into those who had held secret negotiations with the enemy. He executed over 70 conspirators and confiscated their property. Then he led his army to a camp positioned above Suessula (Liv. 23.17.1-3: Hannibal spe potiundae Nolae adempta cum Acerras recessisset, Marcellus extemplo clausis portis custodibusque dispositis ne quis egrederetur quaestionem in foro de iis qui clam in conloquiis hostium fuerant habuit. Supra septuaginta damnatos proditionis securi percussit bonaque eorum iussit publica populi Romani esse et summa rerum senatui tradita cum exercitu omni prefectus supra Suessulam castris positis consedit). Plutarch’s citation of Livy at Marcellus 11.8 for his comments on the first battle at Nola makes it highly probable that he was also familiar with this section of Livy’s work. We have to conclude, therefore, that although he appears to have been hard pressed for information on Marcellus (cf. Scardigli Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs 38), he chose to exclude this incident from his work because it conflicted with
his attempt to portray Marcellus as a humanitarian (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος). Although he was too honest to deny the cruelty of some of Marcellus' actions, which he admits in the Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli (1.3: Μάρκελλος μὲν ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὑποχειρίως γενομέναις σφαγὰς ἐποίησεν), he purposely left out of the main body of the biography any description or mention of them if he thought that it was possible to do so without harm to his narrative.

12.1. Θατέρου τῶν ὑπάτων ἀποθανόντος: L. Postumius Albinus and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus had been elected consuls for 215 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 253-254 for references). But before they could enter office, Postumius along with his army were ambushed and wiped out by the Boii in Cisalpine Gaul (Liv. 23.24.6-13; Zon. 9.3.3).

12.1. ἐκάλεσεν Μάρκελλον ὁ δῆμος...: Marcellus wintered with his army in camp above Suessula (216/5 B.C.; Liv. 23.17.3, 19.1-4). He was summoned to Rome near the end of winter to report to the senate (Liv. 23.24.1-2, 25.5), after which he was ordered to lead a new army into camp above Suessula, while the army already there was to be transported to Sicily (Liv. 23.31.3-6).

According to Livy, when men saw that Marcellus, whom they greatly desired to elect as consul because of the outstanding way he had handled affairs as praetor, had been sent away, as if on purpose, discontent sprang up in the senate. The new consul of 215 B.C., Ti. Sempronius, put off the elections until his
Taciti primo expectaverant homines uti consul comitia collegae creando haberet; deinde ubi ablegatum velut de industria M. Marcellum viderunt, quem maxime consulem in eum annum ob egregie in praetura res gestas creari volebant, fremitus in curia ortus. Quod ubi sensit consul, 'utrumque' inquit 'e re publica fuit, patres conscripti, et M. Claudium ad permutandos exercitus in Campaniam proficisci et comitia non prius edici quam is inde confecto quod mandatum est negotio revertisset, ut vos consulem, quem tempus rei publicae postularet, quem maxime voltis, haberetis.' Ita de comitiis donec rediit Marcellus silentium fuit). If discontent arose in the senate as Livy says (23.31.7: fremitus in curia ortus), it certainly was not from the senatorial majority that would have been running affairs. What may have happened was that the senatorial majority appeared to many of the commons sufficiently hostile towards Marcellus to inspire them to rise up in his support, since they especially desired him as consul as the subsequent election showed (Marc. 12.2; Liv. 23.31.13; Marcellus had enjoyed the support of the commons on an earlier occasion, at the time of his first consulship, when he won over the people to his side for the continuance of the Gallic War of 225-222 B.C; see Chapter 6.2. ὁ Μάρκελλος...). As for Sempronius, his delaying of the consular election until Marcellus' return indicates that he may have been on the side of the commons against the senatorial majority (cf. Cassola GPR 405).

12.2. πάσαις μὲν ἀπεδείχθη...τὸ σημεῖον: Livy's report concurs
with Plutarch's account of the voting and of the augurs' interpretation of the thunder (23.31.13: Creatur ingenti consensu Marcellus qui extemplo magistratum occiperet. Cui ineunti consulatum cum tonuisset, vocati augures vitio creatum videri pronuntiaverunt).

12.2. ἐμφανῶς δὲ κωλύειν ὁκνούντων...: Livy makes no mention of this hesitation or fear of the augurs, but instead reports that the senators were spreading a rumor that it was displeasing to the gods that for the first time two plebeians had been made consuls (23.31.13: volgoque patres ita fama ferebant, quod tum primum duo plebeii consules facti essent, id dei cordi non esse).

It was not until 43 years later that the first pair of plebeians became consuls (C. Popillius Laenas and P. Aelius Ligus were elected consuls for 172 B.C.; Fasti Capitolini for 172 B.C.: C. Popillius P. f. P. n. Laenas, P. Ailius P. f. P. n. Ligus / Ambo primi de plebe; see Broughton MRR 1: 410-411 for references). After Marcellus' abdication, Q. Fabius Maximus was elected as suffect consul for 215 B.C. (Liv. 23.31.14; see Broughton MRR 1: 254 for references).

It has been proposed that the negative interpretation of the auguries was politically motivated. Münzer (Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien 74) suggests that this was done to prevent the consulship from going to two plebeians, and it was brought about by Fabius Maximus, who had the most to gain from it. Lippold (Consules 170-171), concurring with Münzer, believes that Fabius
used his influence as augur and the aversion among the senatorial nobility to both consulships going to plebeians to prevent Marcellus' consulship and to make way for himself, since the continuation of his own strategy would hardly have been guaranteed with Marcellus as consul (cf. Crake Phoenix 17.2 [1963]: 125: "more probably it was a conflict between the conservatism of Fabius and the impulsiveness of Marcellus").

It is possible that this incident was politically motivated, since the senatorial majority may have been against Marcellus (see Chapter 12.1. ἐκάλει...), and the manipulation of the auguries for political ends was not unknown for this period (see Chapter 4.3. οἱ ὀ...). However, it is not certain that Fabius Maximus was the prime instigator behind the political maneuvering. It would only make sense if Fabius and Marcellus were political opponents (as Münzer [RE 3.2 {1899}: 2741] believes). Scullard (RP 57-58) would go so far as to maintain that Fabius was the augur involved, even though Marcellus was his political ally. But to justify this assertion, he has to postulate that the whole affair was staged by Fabius and Marcellus "in order to moderate the ambitions of the People" (p. 58). But a farce of this type seems unlikely.

If the incident was politically motivated, what can be reasonably conjectured is that after Marcellus' abdication, which had been forced on him by his opponents, Fabius was elected to replace him since he was his political ally. It is not likely that the commons in the state of mind they were in at the time would have turned around and elected a candidate
hostile to Marcellus (Cassola GPR 316-318, who believes that even if other proof is lacking, this incident would be sufficient to prove the political ties between Marcellus and Fabius; cf. Lippold Consules 171, 383; see Chapter 9.4-7. concerning the relationship between Marcellus and Fabius Maximus).

The political interpretation, however, is not the only possibility; the incident may have been due to real religious considerations. On the one hand, the uproar caused by the dispatching of Marcellus to Campania before the elections for a suffect consul may have caught many senators by surprise. The assignment was perfectly reasonable to them because Marcellus was a plebeian and would not normally have been considered a candidate since the surviving consul himself was plebeian. On the other hand, Marcellus, due to his popularity, may have been sent away deliberately to avoid the possibility of there being two plebeian consuls, something which may not have been desired either for political or religious reasons (see Chapter 12.1. ἐκάλετ...). However, later, when thunder was heard upon his entry into the consulship, it would have been fairly easy for this negative sign to be interpreted as the gods' displeasure at there being two plebeian consuls, since it was an innovation which had not occurred before (cf. Müller-Seidel RhM 96 [1953]: 245-246, Crake Phoenix 17.2 [1963]: 124-125).

12.3. Οὐ μέντοι τὴν στρατείαν...ἀνθώπατος ἀναγορευθείς...στρατόπεδον: In Livy's text the grant of proconsular power
had been given to Marcellus by a resolution of the people for the way he conducted affairs in 216 B.C. (23.30.19: M. Marcello pro consule imperium esse populus iussit, quod post Cannensem cladem unus Romanorum imperatorum in Italia prospere rem gessisset). This occurred before his departure to lead a new army into camp above Suessula and the holding of elections for a suffect consul (see Chapter 12.1. ἐκάλει...). Scullard (RP 57, n. 3) questions whether proconsular power was not granted to him after his abdication of the consulship as a consolation prize. Apart from this, Livy's version agrees with Plutarch's (Liv. 23.32.2: M. Claudius pro consule ad eum exercitum qui supra Suessulam Nolae praesideret missus).

Although Marcellus holds the title pro consule at Livy 23.30.19 and 32.2 and is called proconsul at 48.2, he is called propraetor at 39.8 and 42.10 and praetor at 43.12. Since there are no other indications that a change of source has occurred, this inconsistency may be due to either confusion or carelessness on either the part of Livy or his source(s) (cf. Klotz Livius und seine Vorgänger 157-158; see Mommsen Str. 23: 647-650).

12.3. κακῶς ἐποίει τοὺς ἡρμήνευσ τῇ τοῦ Φοίνικος: In Livy these would be the Hirpini and the Caudine Samnites, into whose territories Marcellus made frequent raids (23.41.13-14: Eadem aestate Marcellus ab Nola quam praesidio obtinebat crebras excursiones in agrum Hirpinum et Samnites Caudinos fecit adeoque omnia ferro atque igni vastavit ut antiquarum cladium Samnio
memoriam renovaret).

12.4. ὁς δὲ ὄξεῖαν... ἦκε: According to Livy (23.41.13-43.5) Hannibal left Tifata, where he was stationed, and advanced against Marcellus at Nola at the request of the envoys sent by the Hirpini and the Caudine Samnites. At the same time Hanno came from Bruttium with reinforcements and elephants brought in from Carthage.

The envoys had portrayed Marcellus' excursions into their territories as the incautious raids of brigands (23.42.10: nunc propraetoris unius et parvi ad tuendam Nolam praesidii praedae sumus; iam ne manipulatim quidem sed latronum modo percursant totis finibus nostris neglegentius quam si in Romano vagarentur agro), but on his arrival Hannibal found the situation much different (23.43.7: Nihil enim Marcellus ita egerat ut aut fortunae aut temere hosti commissum dici posset. Explorato cum firmisque praesidiis tuto receptu praedatum ierat omniaque velut adversus praesentem Hannibalem cauta provisaque fuerunt).

According to Livy's account (23.43.8-44.3), on Hannibal's arrival Marcellus held his forces within the walls of Nola and ordered the Nolan senators to walk up and down the wall and to observe the activities of the enemy. Hannibal attempted to persuade these senators to hand over the city, but he was unsuccessful.

12.4. προκαλομένω...οὐκ ἤβουλήθη διαγωνίσασθαι: Livy (23.44.3-6) does not report any hesitancy to fight on Marcellus'
part. Instead, on Hannibal's approach to the walls, his forces burst forth and attacked. The battle was only broken off due to a heavy rain storm. Hannibal lost not more than 30 men, the Romans 50 (Liv. 23.44.5: tamen Poenorum prima eruptione perculsi ceciderunt haud plus quam triginta, Romani quinquaginta). It has been suggested that the small number of Carthaginians killed is due to an error of the copyists (see Moore, trans., Livy 6 [Loeb]: 152, n. 1, and Walters' and Conway's apparatus criticus). This supposition seems to be based on the idea that the sudden attack by the Romans should have produced more Carthaginian than Roman casualties.

Marcellus' command at this time consisted of two urban legions which had replaced the survivors of Cannae. The Cannae forces had fought at Nola in the previous year, but had now been transported to Sicily (Liv. 23.31.3-6).

12.4. τρέψαντι...καὶ μηκέτι προσδεχομένῳ μάχην ἐπεξήλθε: Livy (23.44.6-7) reports that on the third day after the initial encounter, Hannibal sent out a part of his force to ravage Nolan territory. Learning of this, Marcellus led out his forces and Hannibal did the same.

12.4. διαδοὺς δόρατα τῶν ναυμάχων μεγάλα: The source of these spears may have been from the naval legion which Marcellus had commanded in 216 B.C. at Ostia, and which he had sent to Teanum Sidicinum shortly after the Roman defeat at Cannae (Liv. 22.57.8). This legion, which appears to have been stationed now
in Apulia or possibly amalgamated with the garrison force at Tarentum (cf. Brunt *Italian Manpower* 649, 651, and Chapter 9.3. ἔξηγα...; although cf. Toynbee *Hannibal’s Legacy* 2: 527-528), may have exchanged their weapons in Campania and left the naval spears there before departing for their new assignment. These spears, then, could possibly be the ones which Marcellus now made use of. The use of these arms may not be due to a tactical innovation on Marcellus’ part but to a shortage of weapons, which may still have existed since the Roman defeat at Cannae in the previous year [Liv. 22.57.10, 23.14.4]).

This notice on the distribution of naval spears is lacking in Livy’s account of the battle (23.44.6-46.4). Klotz (*RhM* 83 [1934]: 302-303) believes that this notice is not likely to be an embellishment by Plutarch, and that nothing indicates that it has been taken from other contexts and inserted here. Therefore, he concludes, Plutarch must have been using Livy’s own source, Valerius Antias. De Sanctis (*SR* 3.2: 370-371), on the other hand, believes that this notice is an insertion by Plutarch into a Livian context derived possibly from either Cornelius Nepos or Polybius.

12.5. ὅκοντι τότε δεῖξαι τὰ νῆτα Ρωμαῖοις: Livy describes the battle as occurring around the walls of Nola on all sides (23.44.3: *Itaque corona oppidum circumdedit ut simul ab omni parte moenia adgrederetur, 44.7: Mille fere passuum inter urbem erant castraque; eo spatio--et sunt omnia campi circa Nolam--concurrerint). He reports (23.44.8) that the noise of
the battle brought back the nearest of Hannibal's men who were out plundering. Also, he (23.44.9) adds that the Nolans made up part of Marcellus' force, serving as reserves.

According to Livy (23.46.2-3) Hannibal's forces were driven back to their camp, and although the Roman forces were desirous of attacking it, Marcellus led them back into the city.

The phrase ὁκοῦσα τὸ τε ἰδὼν τὰ νῶτα appears to be a translation of the Latin terga Poeni dederunt (De Sanctis SR 3.2: 370; see Livy 23.46.2).

12.5. ἀποβαλόντες ἐξ ἑαυτῶν...: Plutarch's figures on casualties are a shortened version of Livy's. Livy reports that more than 5,000 of the enemy were killed, 600 captured (the conjecture αἰχμαλώτους δ' ἐξακοσίους is based on Livy; see Ziegler's apparatus criticus), 19 military standards and 2 elephants taken, and 4 elephants killed in battle, while the Romans lost less than a 1,000 men (23.46.4: Hostium plus quinque milia caesa eo die, vivi capti sescenti et signa militarara undeviginti et duo elephanti; quattuor in acie occisi; Romanorum minus mille interfecit).

Like the first battle at Nola (see Chapter 11.7. καντακομ...), the victory of the Romans over Hannibal's forces is exaggerated. Münzer (RE 3.2 [1899]: 2742) believes that out of this whole episode one can only reasonably conjecture that Marcellus retained Nola, the Romans made some plundering raids, and they perhaps had a successful engagement against small parts of Hannibal's army (cf. De Sanctis SR 3.2: 244, n. 104, Lippold
Livy (23.46.5) reports that on the first day after the battle both sides buried their dead and Marcellus burned the spoils of the enemy as a votive offering to Volcan.

Livy agrees with Plutarch that some of the Numidian and Spanish cavalry deserted to the Romans, but his text gives the figure of 272 men (23.46.6: Tertio post die ob iram, credo, aliquam aut spem liberalioris militiae ducenti septuaginta duo equites, mixti Numidae <et> Hispani, ad Marcellum transfugerunt). It has been conjectured, based on Plutarch's report, that CCCXXII (322) should be read in the manuscripts of Livy at this point (see Walters' and Conway's apparatus criticus).

The phrase ιπτείς Ἰβήρων καὶ Νομάδων μιγάδες appears to be a translation of the Latin equites mixti Numidae et Hispani (De Sanctis SR 3.2: 370; see Livy 23.46.6).

12.6. οὐπω πρότερον Ἀννίβα τούτο παθόντος: Unlike Livy, Zonaras' report of these operations does contain a similar observation (9.3.6: πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ Ἰβηρες, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν Λιβύων ἐγκατέληπον αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ηὐτομόλησαν, ὃ οὐπω πρόφην ἐπαθεῖ). Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 303) believes that since this statement is not found in Livy, but is found in Zonaras, Plutarch owes it to Zonaras' source, Valerius Antias (see Klotz
RhM 83 [1934]: 296 concerning Zonaras' source). This is not the only possibility. Plutarch may have found it in another source, possibly Cornelius Nepos, whose material could ultimately have been derived from Valerius Antias or even older annalistic historians.

12.6. ἀλλ' ἐκ ποικίλων καὶ πολυτρόπων...: This comment by Plutarch is not found in Livy. It is closely tied to the previous statement, οὕπω πρῶτερον Ἀννίβα τούτο παθόντος, and therefore it may have come from the same source as that statement, or it could be Plutarch's own reflection on it.

12.7. οὗτοι...πιστοὶ παρέμειναν...: Livy reports similarly and adds that after the war land was given to them for their heroism (23.46.6-7: Eorum forti fidelique opera in eo bello usi sunt saepe Romani. Ager Hispanis in Hispania et Numidis in Africa post bellum virtutis causa datus est).

After this battle Hannibal sent Hanno back to Bruttium with the forces which he had brought, while he himself sought winter quarters in Apulia near Arpi (Liv. 23.46.8).

Near the end of this year, Marcellus was ordered by the consul Fabius Maximus to dismiss his troops after an adequate garrison had been left at Nola for safeguarding the city, lest they be either a burden for the allies or an expense for the state (Liv. 23.48.2).
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

13.1. Ο δὲ Μάρκελλος ἀποδείχθείς ὑπατος τὸ τρίτον: The elections for 214 B.C. were held by Q. Fabius Maximus at which he was re-elected consul for the fourth time, while Marcellus was elected for the third time, in absentia, as his colleague (see Broughton MRR 1: 258 for references). According to Livy (24.7.11-9.3) the lot for voting first had fallen to the junior century of the tribe Aniensis, and while they were voting for T. Otacilius Crassus and M. Aemilius Regillus, Fabius stopped the proceedings, objecting to the qualifications of these two candidates, to Aemilius, because he was a flamen, and to Otacilius, although related to him by marriage (he had married a niece of Fabius), because he lacked sufficient military experience. Over Otacilius' strong objections, the praerogativa centuria voted again and chose Fabius and Marcellus, which selection the remaining centuries followed without deviation.

It is well-known that the centuries tended to follow the lead of the praerogativa centuria, and if Fabius wanted to change the outcome of the voting, he had to convince it to alter its vote (Cic. Planc. 49, Mur. 38, Div. 1.103, 2.83; see Taylor Party Politics in the Age of Caesar 56).

The annulling of a vote already cast is otherwise known for certain only for the consular elections of 210 B.C. (cf. Liv. 10.22), which has similarities to this incident, especially in that Otacilius was the loser on both occasions (see Chapter 23.1. Τοῦ δὲ Μαρκέλλου... concerning this election and Broughton
MRR 1: 278 for references).

Scullard (RP 59) believes that Marcellus' election to the consulship was a repayment by Fabius for Marcellus' exclusion from that office in the previous year, and that Otacilius received a second praetorship as a consolation prize for being denied this same position (see Chapter 12.1. ἐκάλε... et seqq. concerning elections for 215 B.C. and Scullard RP 57-58 for his view of what happened).

Cassola (GPR 320) believes that this incident shows the hostility of both Fabius and Marcellus towards Otacilius, although Fabius was related to him by marriage and Marcellus was his half-brother. He suggests that the hostility may have been due to a desire on Otacilius' part to enlarge the strategic objectives of the war by a landing in Africa which both Fabius and Marcellus were against.

Whatever may have been the behind the scene maneuverings which took place among the various political factions, one of the consulships of 214 B.C. could hardly have been given to anyone other than Marcellus if one considers the popular support he had for the consulship of 215 B.C. from which he had to resign (see Chapter 12.1. ἐκάλε... et seqq., Münzer Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien 74, Taylor Roman Voting Assemblies 93-94, and Staveley JRS 53 [1963]: 186). It is interesting to note that the century which voted first was composed of those from the tribe Aniensis, which was Marcellus' own (SC de Oropiis; Syll.3, 747.6).

Plutarch leaves out entirely the events of Marcellus'
consulship of 214 B.C. before his departure for Sicily. According to Livy (23.46.8, 24.12.3-5, 13.8-11) Hannibal set out from Arpi where he had wintered and returned to Campania. While he was ravaging the territory of Neapolis, envoys from the Nolan commons summoned him with a promise of surrendering the city, but Marcellus summoned by the leading men of Nola anticipated this undertaking. In one day he marched from Cales to Suessula and that same night sent 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry into Nola as a garrison.

Livy (24.17) says that when Marcellus learned of Hannibal's approach to Nola, he summoned the propraetor Pomponius with the army which was in camp above Suessula, and prepared to meet the enemy without delay. He sent C. Claudius Nero with the best part of the cavalry out of Nola at night with orders to circle around the enemy unseen and to fall on their rear when he saw that the battle had begun. In the battle, although the Romans had the upper hand, the cavalry failed to appear, and Marcellus, not daring to pursue the retreating enemy, recalled his troops. More than 2,000 of the enemy but fewer than 400 Romans are said to have fallen that day. Near sunset Nero returned with the cavalry, having failed to make contact with the enemy, and was sternly rebuked by the consul. On the following day the Romans formed up for battle, but the enemy remained in camp. On the third day, in the dead of night, Hannibal set off for Tarentum.

Doubts have been raised over the authenticity of this third battle at Nola, which is reported nowhere else in the historical sources except in Livy. At Livy 23.48.2 it is reported that
Marcellus was ordered to dismiss his army except for a garrison of sufficient size to defend Nola (this would be near the end of 215 B.C.), but the existence of this garrison is completely forgotten in the narrative of Marcellus' actions in 214 B.C., and the situation at Nola appears similar to that in 216 B.C. Also, the Pomponius mentioned by Livy (24.17.2) here should be the propraetor M. Pomponius whom Livy (24.10.3) mentioned earlier as being in command of Gaul (see Münzer RE 3.2 [1899]: 2742-2743 for a more detailed exposition of the arguments against the authenticity of this battle).

According to Livy (24.19.1-7), while Marcellus was at Nola, Fabius, his colleague, who was in camp near Casilinum, summoned him. Leaving behind a garrison of 2,000, Marcellus duly brought the rest of his forces up to Casilinum. Upon his arrival both consuls undertook the siege of the town, which was being held by a garrison of 2,000 Campanians and 700 of Hannibal's soldiers. After an unsuccessful attempt on the town, during which the Romans suffered many casualties, Fabius wanted to raise the siege, but Marcellus convinced him to carry it through. Later, while the Romans were bringing up siege equipment, the Campanians begged Fabius that they be permitted to leave safely for Capua. But after a few of the Campanians had gone out, Marcellus seized the gate through which they were departing, and a general massacre ensued around this area; then after the Romans had broken into the town, it began there also. About 50 of the Campanians who had managed to leave Casilinum fled to Fabius, who gave them safe escort to Capua. Meanwhile the town
was captured, and the enemy prisoners consisting of both Campanians and Hannibal's soldiers were sent to Rome for captivity, while the inhabitants of the town were distributed among the neighboring peoples for internment. After the capture of Casilinum, Marcellus returned to Nola, but engaged in no further activities there because of illness (Liv. 24.20.3: Marcellus retro unde venerat Nolam rediit, 7: Marcellum ab gerundis rebus valetudo adversa Nolae tenuit).

Why did Plutarch skip over Marcellus' activities as consul in 214 B.C. in Campania and immediately proceed to his activities in Sicily? The account of the siege of Casilinum by Livy (24.19; it is assumed that Plutarch was familiar with Livy) portrays Marcellus in a poor light. Marcellus took advantage of Fabius' assurance of safe conduct to the Campanians to seize the town; consequently, only about 50 of the Campanians reached Capua safely under an escort provided by Fabius himself (24.19.8-10: Campanique Fabium orarent ut abire Capuam tuto liceret, paucis egressis Marcellus portam qua egrediebantur occupavit caedesque promiscue omnium circa portam primo, deinde inruptione facta etiam in urbe fieri coepta est. Quinquaginta fere primo egressi Campanorum, cum ad Fabium confugissent, praesidio eius Capuam pervenerunt). Plutarch chose to exclude this incident of Marcellus' treachery from his work because it conflicted with his attempt to portray him as a humanitarian (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος). Also, Plutarch may have chosen to exclude the third battle at Nola (found at Livy 24.17) because it was very similar to the two previous ones, and it added
nothing positive to his portrayal of Marcellus' character. In fact, Marcellus' berating of his subordinate would hardly have fit into Plutarch's conception of him (Liv. 24.17.7: Solis fere occasu Nero diem noctemque nequiquam fatigatis equis hominibusque, ne viso quidem hoste rediens, adeo graviter est ab consule increpitus ut per eum stetisse diceretur quo minus accepta ad Cannas redderetur hosti clades). However, the possibility that he excluded this battle on sound historical grounds, judging that it never took place, can not be excluded, but this is unlikely. If one takes these two incidents into consideration, then it seems reasonable to suggest that Plutarch, although he appears to have been hard pressed for material on Marcellus (cf. Scardigli Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs 38), found it more to his purpose to leave out Marcellus' activities in Campania in 214 B.C. and to proceed immediately to his actions in Sicily.

13.1. εἰς Σικελίαν ἔπλεσεν: Marcellus arrived in Sicily either late in 214 or early in 213 B.C. while he was still consul, presumably after recovering his health at Nola (Liv. 24.20.7, 21.1; Polyb. 8.1.7; Sil. Ital. 14.110-113; see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 317-322 and Eckstein SG 345-349 concerning chronology of Marcellus' activities in Sicily; Marchetti [BIBR 42 {1972}: 20-21] would like to place Marcellus' arrival much later, after the fall of Leontini and the arrival of the Romans before Syracuse, but see Eckstein SG 139, n. 20 who points out the improbability of this view; see, also, Lippold Consules
258-259 and Eckstein SG 144-145 for the reason why Marcellus was sent rather than his colleague Fabius Maximus).

13.2. \(a\iota\ \gamma\alpha\rho\varepsilon\) 'Aννίβου...\(\tau\eta\varsigma\ \nu\iota\rho\sigma\ou\): According to Polybius’ account (7.2-5; the account in Livy [24.4-6] is derived from Polybius [see Walbank Polybius 2: 31]) the initiative which induced the Carthaginians to conduct military operations in Sicily came from Hieronymus, the new ruler of Syracuse, who had succeeded Hiero II in 215 B.C., and was persuaded by Zoippus and Adranodorus, sons-in-law of Hiero, to send envoys to Hannibal. The Carthaginians would have been only too happy to deprive Rome of a valuable ally, to gain back their former possessions in Sicily, which they had lost in the First Punic War, and to have an easier access for supplying Hannibal in Italy (see Eckstein SG 135, n. 2, Hoffmann Hermes 89 [1961]: 481, and Marchetti BIBR 42 [1972]: 5 concerning strategic importance of Sicily for sending reinforcements to Hannibal from Africa).

13.2. \(\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \tau\varepsilon\tau\omega\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\epsilon\nu\omega\nu\)\ldots: After Hiero’s death in 215 B.C., his grandson Hieronymus, a boy of only 15, succeeded to the kingdom of Syracuse (Liv. 24.4.1, 5). According to Livy (24.4.1-7.9) the three advisors of Hieronymus were Adranodorus, Zoippus, sons-in-law of Hiero and pro-Carthaginian, and Thraso, who was pro-Roman. After Thraso was eliminated, Hieronymus was persuaded to send envoys to Hannibal in Italy. Hannibal sent to Syracuse Hippocrates and his brother Epicydes, who were born at Carthage, but were Syracusan in origin. With these two men an
alliance was concluded. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the governor of the Roman province of Sicily, learning of this immediately sent envoys to Hieronymus in order to renew the alliance which the Romans had had with his grandfather, but they were dismissed by the king. Hieronymus then sent ambassadors to Carthage to make a treaty according to the alliance made with Hannibal. After sending Hippocrates and Epicydes in advance with 2,000 men to attack those cities held by Roman garrisons, Hieronymus went himself to Leontini with up to 15,000 infantry and cavalry. Here he was assassinated by a conspiracy which had been formed against him. Appius, in the meantime, informed the senate of what was happening in Sicily and concentrated all his forces on the border facing Syracusan territory (Polybius in his account of these events [7.2-8] reports two Roman embassies sent to Hieronymus).

Livy (24.7.1-7) reports Hieronymus’ assassination at Leontini under the year 215 B.C., but according to Polybius’ account (7.7.3) Hieronymus lived some 13 months after his accession, and since Hiero seems to have lived into the consular year of 215 B.C. (Liv. 23.38.12-13), Hieronymus must have been assassinated in 214 B.C. (see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 317-318).

13.3. διὸ...προαπεσταλμένη δύναμις καὶ στρατηγὸς Ἄππιος: Ap. Claudius Pulcher, praetor for 215 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 254 for references), had gone to his province of Sicily in 215 B.C., (Liv. 23.32.2) and despite Livy’s incorrect chronology, this occurred before Hieronymus’ assassination (Liv. 24.7.1-9).
According to Livy, Appius' military force consisted of the survivors of Cannae, along with some worthless soldiers culled from the legions of the dictator of 216 B.C., M. Iunius Pera (23.25.7-8). But Livy does not indicate that the dispatch of Appius and these troops was due to Rome's alarm over Syracuse's loyalty, instead he believes it was Appius himself who first advised Rome of the alarming situation developing there (24.7.8-9), and the forces sent under his command were merely to replace troops already stationed on the island (23.25.10, 31.4; see Eckstein SG 136-144 concerning Appius' handling of affairs with Syracuse).

13.3. ταύτην παραλαμβάνοντι τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ: Although Marcellus as consul would be the supreme commander of the Roman forces in Sicily, he did not replace any Roman commander already assigned there. There are indications (see Chapters 18.1 Τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας... and 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...) that he brought over from Italy only one of the two legions which he had commanded in Campania earlier in the year (Liv. 24.11.2). This is reasonable, given that the situation in Sicily, although precarious, had not deteriorated to the point of armed conflict (see Chapter 14.1 ἄδικηθεις...), while military forces were probably still needed in Campania (cf. De Sanctis SR 32.2: 268). Later, however, after the situation had worsened, Marcellus had need of more men, and therefore summoned his other legion from Campania (Liv. 24.36.4; Brunt [Italian Manpower 654] suggests that the delayed arrival of Marcellus' second legion may have
been due to a shortage of transports).

The composition of the Roman military forces on the island at the time of Marcellus' arrival and during his subsequent activities there is not clearly revealed in the ancient sources. There were, of course, the exiled survivors of the Cannae army who were serving under P. Cornelius Lentulus governor of the Roman province of Sicily during 214-212 B.C. (Liv. 24.10.5, 12.7, 25.5.10, 26.1.9). Also, T. Otacilius Crassus was in command of the Roman fleet stationed at Lilybaeum in 214 B.C. (Liv. 24.10.5, 12.7), which command he continued to hold until his death in 211 B.C. (Liv. 24.44.5, 25.3.6, 26.1.12). Livy (24.10.3) states that all the commands of 215 B.C. were extended for 214 B.C.

If, however, Lentulus was assigned the Roman province of Sicily, one has to ask what happened to the former governor, Appius (Liv. 23.31.4, 32.2), from whom Lentulus took over the command of the exiled Cannae legions. Livy gives no indication, but Polybius (8.3.1) calls him an ἀντιστράτηγον (i.e. propraetor; see Broughton MRR 1: 260-262), and (8.1.7) says he was in command of 100 ships. Livy (24.11.4-9) reports that Otacilius, who had been in Rome for the consular elections, was ordered to escort 100 new ships to Sicily, and since he was already in command of a sizable fleet there (Liv. 22.31.5-6, 37.13), these new ships must have been meant for Appius. But there are also indications that Appius was in charge of infantry forces as well. Appius sent out garrisons to protect the fields of the Roman allies soon after Marcellus' arrival in Sicily in
late 214 B.C. (Liv. 24.29.4-5), and when Marcellus attacked Leontini with his whole army in late 214 or early 213 B.C., he summoned Appius to make an attack from the other side (Liv. 24.30.1: Marcellus cum omni exercitu profectus in Leontinos Appio quoque accito ut altera parte adgrederetur). Also, when the Romans attacked Syracuse there appear to have been three Roman legions involved, and since Marcellus had brought over only one, the other two must have been supplied by Appius (see Chapters 18.1. Τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας... and 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...).

Finally, near the end of 213 B.C. after Marcellus released Appius from his command in order to allow him to go to Rome to seek the consulship, we learn that he appointed T. Quinctius Crispinus to take over the command of the fleet and the old Roman camp at the Olympieion near Syracuse, while he established a winter camp for his own forces north of Syracuse (Liv. 24.39.12-13).

These notices indicate that Appius in addition to the fleet also commanded infantry forces. These forces have been identified as the exiled survivors of the Cannae army and this is the orthodox view (see, for example, De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 270, 288, 371, Hallward CAH 8: 64, Toynbee Hannibal's Legacy 2: 650-651, and Brunt Italian Manpower 652-655). But there are serious reasons to doubt this. First, the exiled Cannae army is always reported as being under the command of the governor of the Roman province of Sicily (Liv. 23.30.18, 31.4, 6, 24.10.5, 12.7, 25.5.10-6.1, 26.1.7-10, 28.11, 27.7.12, etc.). Second, the men from this force were not employed in the siege of
Syracuse until the winter of 213/2 B.C. (see Chapter 13.3. τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ... concerning chronology). Third, the sources indicate that these men were only used to replace losses in the units on active service (see Chapter 13.9. λόγῳ...), while the infantry forces under Appius appear to have constituted two whole legions (see Chapters 18.1. Τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας... and 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...).

If Appius did not have the Cannae army, what infantry forces did he command? A strong case can be made that he commanded not only a fleet of 100 ships, but also an infantry force of two legions serving on board these ships as marines. These legions would have been enrolled in 214 B.C. and would have accompanied Otacilius when he escorted 100 new ships to Sicily for Appius.

Livy (24.11.1-6) reports under 214 B.C. the number of Roman legions and their assignments, indicating that six new legions were enrolled that year (see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 306-316, Gelzer Kleine Schriften 3: 269-300, and Brunt Italian Manpower 643-660 concerning authenticity of these lists in Livy). De Sanctis in his table listing these assignments (3.2: 614-615) gives two of the new legions to Gaul, two to Rome, and one each to Picenum and Macedonia. But the assignments of a new legion to Picenum and to Macedonia are dubious. Livy reports under 215 B.C. that C. Terentius Varro was given the task of holding a levy in Picenum for the defence of that region (23.32.19: C. Terentio proconsuli negotium datum ut in Piceno agro conquisitionem militum haberet locisque iis praesidio esset). This force ought
to be the legion assigned to this region by Livy (24.11.3) and not one of the new ones. Likewise, Livy reports under 215 B.C. that P. Valerius Flaccus was ordered to protect the Italian coastline and to investigate the war in Macedonia with 55 ships, on which had been embarked the soldiers who had originally been under Varro’s command (23.38.9: iussusque P. Valerius militibus Varronianis, quibus L. Apustius legatus Tarenti praerat, in naves impositis quinquaginta quinque navium classe non tueri modo Italiae oram sed explorare de Macedonico bello; 32.16). This force also ought to be the legion assigned by Livy (23.11.3) to the fleet of M. Valerius Laevinus in 214 B.C. and not one of the new ones (De Sanctis [SR 3.2: 615] lists this under Macedonia).

If a new legion is not to be assigned either to Picenum or Macedonia, where are these two new legions to be placed? In Livy’s distributions of legions (24.11.2-3), two are assigned to Sardinia, but neither one of these is likely to be a new legion (see Livy 23.34.10-15, 40.1-2, and 41.7. At 23.41.7 Livy reports that T. Manlius Torquatus brought back to Rome in 215 B.C. the soldiers which he had taken with him to Sardinia [consisting of one legion {23.34.13}]. But the notice at 24.11.2 of two legions stationed there in 214 B.C. suggests that either these soldiers were re-assigned to the island or Livy is wrong about the soldiers returning to Rome). Also, two legions are assigned to Apulia, but these were old legions from Sicily (Liv. 23.32.2). To each of the consuls of 214 B.C. were allotted two legions; those of Fabius Maximus were the same as
those which he had commanded the year before (Liv. 23.32.1, 24.11.2, 12.5); however, the two legions of Marcellus are more problematic. Livy reports that near the end of 215 B.C. Marcellus was ordered to dismiss his soldiers to Rome after leaving a sufficient garrison at Nola (23.48.2: M. Claudio proconsuli imperavit [sc. Fabius Maximus], ut retento Nolae necessario ad tuendam urbem praesidio ceteros milites dimitteret Romam ne oneri sociis et sumptui rei publicae essent). This force was composed of the two City legions which he had received for that year (Liv. 23.31.3, 5). These forces may have been permanently disbanded at this time, but this possibility is not likely. First, they had only been in existence a short while, no more than a year and a half (Liv. 23.25.9-10, 31.3). Second, Livy (23.48.2) makes it clear that the soldiers were sent to Rome for economic reasons during the winter of 215/4 B.C. Both of these things point to the soldiers being placed on furlough for the winter rather than being discharged. Therefore, it is reasonable that Marcellus' forces for 214 B.C. were his former soldiers summoned back to their units, and this recall was not part of the new enrollment of six legions.

If these assignments are accepted, then the only possible placement for the two remaining new legions would be to Sicily under the command of Appius. But this causes difficulties. Livy (24.11.2) assigns two legions to Sicily, but De Sanctis (SR 32.2: 614-615), among others, has interpreted Livy's statement as referring to the Cannae army exiled there for punishment. Consequently, he does not allot any new legions there since he
believes that this would disagree with Livy's total of two legions for the island. However, there is another possible explanation. We know that Livy's allotment of commands and placement of legions are incomplete (e.g., the legions and commanders in Spain are wanting in the lists for the years 215-210 B.C.). In regard to the two legions assigned to Sicily in 214 B.C. as reported by Livy (24.11.2), it is not indicated whether they were two of the newly raised legions or the survivors of the Cannae army. Livy himself may not have known. It is possible that he found this assignment in his source without any identification attached to it and assumed that it referred to the Cannae army when, in reality, it referred to two of the newly raised legions. Consequently, he wrote up his account under this false impression that the Cannae army was the only legionary force assigned to the island. In support of this hypothesis, it can be argued that Livy makes no mention of Appius' position in 214 B.C. when he should have been a propraetor or even in 213 B.C. when he was either a propraetor again or a legate of Marcellus.

If Appius' position is not given by Livy, then it would be only natural that he would also not list the forces which Appius commanded (this is definitely the case for the fleet of 100 ships). In addition, although Livy (24.39.12) reports that Marcellus gave Appius' command to T. Quinctius Crispinus which would be in late 213 B.C., Crispinus and the forces which he should have commanded are not given in the list of assignments Livy provides for the following year. But these forces
commanded first by Appius then by Crispinus finally do seem to appear in the list for 211 B.C. under the command of Otacilius. Livy states, *T. Otacilio et M. Valerio Siciliae Graeciaeque orae cum legionibus classibusque quibus praerant decretae; quinquaginta Graecia cum legione una, centum Sicilia cum duabus legionibus habebat naves* (26.1.12). One might argue that *Sicilia* is used in this context to refer to the old Roman province of Sicily, therefore the two legions ought to be the Cannae army which were now under the command of the governor C. Sulpicius (Liv. 26.1.9). However, besides the fact that the forces assigned to C. Sulpicius have already been mentioned earlier (Liv. 26.1.9), such an interpretation destroys the parallel correspondence of the sentence. It appears best to interpret *Sicilia* as a geographical region just as *Graecia* is to be interpreted, and that the two legions and 100 ships of Sicily are those commanded by Otacilius, just as the one legion and 50 ships of Greece are those commanded by Valerius (26.1.12 must have been taken over by Livy from his source since it does not seem to have occurred to him that in the list for 211 B.C. he has now assigned four instead of the usual two legions to Sicily, placing two under C. Sulpicius, and two under Otacilius). The only difficulties are when did Otacilius take control of these forces, and what happened to the fleet which he had originally commanded. But these problems are not insoluble. Therefore, it can be concluded that two of the newly enrolled legions of 214 B.C. were assigned first to Ap. Claudius Pulcher for Sicily, then to T. Quinctius Crispinus in late 213 B.C., and
finally to T. Otacilius Crassus by 211 B.C. The men of these legions appear to have served as marines aboard the 100 ships commissioned in 214 B.C. (it is interesting to note that these two legions would have served on board 100 ships which corresponds to Valerius' one legion which served on board 50 ships [Liv 23.38.7-9, 24.11.3]).

Livy does not tell us what happened to these two legions after the death of Otacilius in 211 B.C., but it appears likely that these legions and probably also the fleet fell under the jurisdiction of the governor of the Roman province of Sicily, C. Sulpicius (Liv. 25.41.13). In the following year (i.e. 210 B.C.) the new consul M. Valerius Laevinus received Otacilius' fleet (Liv. 26.28.3) but not his two legions. Instead he received two other legions from Etruria for Sicily (Liv. 26.28.4-5, 27.7.9), while the praetor L. Cincius took over the command of the Cannae soldiers from C. Sulpicius (Liv. 26.1.9, 28.11). At the same time M. Cornelius Cethegus was given the task of discharging Marcellus' army, which had been placed under his care on Marcellus' departure in 211 B.C. (Liv. 26.21.16-17, 28.10). Given these arrangements, one might assume, since Livy does not tell us, that the two legions under discussion here were also discharged along with Marcellus' army. Livy has a notice under the year 210 B.C. which reads, P. Sulpicius collega eius omnem exercitum praeter socios navales iussus dimittere est (26.28.9). But he records in the following year (i.e. 209) that P. Sulpicius still retained this legion (27.7.15: P. Sulpicio eadem legione eademque classe Macedoniam obtinere iusso
prorogatum in annum imperium). From this it appears that the Sulpicius mentioned at 26.28.9 should not refer to the proconsul of 210 B.C., P. Sulpicius, but to the former governor of Sicily, C. Sulpicius, and that Livy has confused the two because both were in command of fleets. If this is so, then Livy’s notice at 26.28.9 refers to the discharge in 210 B.C. of the two legions under discussion here.

Although Livy normally does not mention the allied units assigned to the legions, it would be reasonable to suppose that those legions sent to Sicily were accompanied by their allied contingents (cf. Brunt *Italian Manpower* 654; from Livy’s account of 12 Latin colonies refusing to supply their required quota of troops in 209 B.C., it is learned that allied soldiers were among those in the exiled Cannae army [27.9.4-5]). In the case of the two legions accompanying the fleet assigned to Appius in 214 B.C., their allied contingents probably formed the rowing complement (see Thiel *SHRSPRT* 195-196).

13.3. τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ προσπίπτουσι Ῥωμαίοι: From Livy’s text (25.5.10-7.4, 24.39.13) it is apparent that these were the leading men from the exiled Cannae army who, with the permission of the governor of the Roman province of Sicily, P. Cornelius Lentulus, met Marcellus at his winter camp near Syracuse in 213/2 B.C. (even with Livy’s amalgamation of the events of 214 and 213 B.C. into one year, it is obvious that this incident occurred at the end of the second year; see De Sanctis *SR* 3.2: 317-322 and Eckstein *SG* 345-349 concerning chronology).
Plutarch has placed this meeting out of chronological order. Marcellus had just arrived in Sicily (late 214 or early 213 B.C.) with only one of his two legions, and there were still prospects of a peaceful settlement of the crisis with Syracuse (see Chapter 13.3. ταύτην...). A need for extra troops, especially from the Cannae army, would not be anticipated at this time. It would appear more reasonable to place this meeting in the winter of 213/2 B.C., after the unsuccessful assault against Syracuse when the need for extra troops became apparent (Marcellus' second legion reached him after this first attack [see Chapters 18.1. Τῆς δὲ πολιωρκίως... and 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...]). Also, it would be more natural for the representatives of the Cannae army to go to Marcellus after he had conducted military operations in Sicily in which the survivors of the Cannae army saw themselves excluded rather than at the time of his arrival when the role they were to play was more uncertain.

De Sanctis (SR 3.2: 371), on the other hand, asserts that Plutarch's chronology of this episode is correct. He believes that the opening words of the speech which Livy puts into the mouth of one of the delegates from the Cannae legions (25.6.2: consulem te, M. Marcellae, in Italia adissemus...) proves that Marcellus must have been consul at the time (i.e. 214 B.C.). But this is unconvincing. Although De Sanctis does not explain why this section of Livy proves his assertion, he must believe that the delegate is addressing Marcellus as consul, but this does not appear to be the case. Besides, the two other ancient
notices of this event fit better with the dating of the winter of 213/2 B.C. (Val. Max. 2.7.15; Frontin. Str. 4.1.44; Frontinus even names the consuls of 212 B.C., Q. Fulvius and Ap. Claudius, under whom the discussion in the senate took place; cf. Livy 25.7.2 concerning consuls; cf., also, Münzer RE 3.2 [1899]: 2746, who accepts the date 213/2 B.C.).

Plutarch may have deliberately shifted this episode out of its chronological position for narrative reasons. Once he begins the account of the siege of Syracuse (chapters 14-19), although he inserts major digressions on Archimedes, he avoids as much as possible incidents occurring in Sicily which are not directly connected with the siege by summarizing them in a brief note at Marcellus 18.2. Since Plutarch was writing biography, not history, he probably did not feel compelled to keep to a strict chronological order, and although the incident with the Cannae army was too important as an indicator of Marcellus’ humanitarianism (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος) to omit, he may have thought that its insertion in chapter 18 would have been too much of an interruption of the narrative at that point. Thus he considered it best to move it forward and insert it here in chapter 13 at the beginning of his account of Marcellus’ Sicilian affairs (see Introduction, pp. 15-16, concerning Plutarch’s attitude towards and accuracy with chronology).

13.5. τοῖς δ’ ἔρα τοσοῦτον...λαβεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀποψηφίσασθαι: The Roman senate, although many of the senators had relatives among the prisoners, voted against paying the ransom. The
consideration which carried the most weight, in addition to the traditional lack of indulgence towards Romans who had surrendered, was that the senate neither wanted to exhaust the treasury nor to furnish Hannibal with money, of which it was rumored he stood in need (Liv. 22.61.1-2).

13.5. ἐπὶ μικροῖς λύτροις ἀποδιδόντος Ἀννίβου: The Roman forces which were left in camp at Cannae surrendered to Hannibal after terms were reached. It was agreed that the ransom for a Roman citizen would be 300 denarii, for an ally 200, and for a slave 100 (Liv. 22.52.2). Later Hannibal set the ransom for a Roman cavalryman at 500 denarii (Liv. 22.58.4).

13.5. τοὺς δὲ πραθέντας ἐξω τῆς Ἰταλίας: Many of these prisoners were sold as slaves to the Greek states. Later in 194 B.C., at the request of T. Quinctius Flamininus, the Greek states purchased and released those Romans who had been sold by Hannibal in the Second Punic War. The number of these was large, with 1,200 alone being found in Achaea (Liv. 34.50.3-7).

13.6. These soldiers were the same ones whom Marcellus took over from the consul Varro at Canusium in 216 B.C. (Liv. 22.57.1, 8). Later they formed Marcellus' force which fought in the first battle at Nola in 216 B.C., where Hannibal suffered his first military setback since his arrival in Italy (see Chapter 11.3. διὸ συντάξας... et seqq.). But despite this Roman success, the senate in the early part of 215 B.C. voted to
relegate these soldiers to Sicily for the duration of the war in Italy (Liv. 23.25.8). Organized into two legions (Liv. 28.10.13; see Chapter 9.2. ὀλίγοι... concerning numbers), they were entrusted to Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the new praetor of Sicily (Liv. 23.31.4).

Although the common soldiers who survived Cannae were punished with exile for their part in the Roman defeat, the surviving Roman officers were not only left unpunished, but even enjoyed further military appointments and political office during this war (e.g., C. Terentius Varro, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, and Q. Fabius Maximus, son of the Cunctator). The prolonged (from 215-201 B.C.) and visible punishment of these common soldiers may have been due to the senate’s attempt to shift the blame for the disaster at Cannae away from the commanders, and by implication the senate’s own strategy, and to place it on the common soldiers’ flight from battle, thus giving warning to other units what they might expect from surviving defeat.

13.7. In Livy’s account (25.5.10-7.4) one of these men gives a speech, at the close of which they all fall down at Marcellus’ knees.

13.8. οἰκτίρας οὖν αὐτοὺς ὁ Μάρκελλος ἔγραψε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον: According to Livy, Marcellus said that it was not within his competence to grant their request, but that he would write to the senate and carry out everything according to its
will (25.7.1: Marcellus id nec iuris nec potestatis suae esse dixit; senatui scripturum se omniaque de sententia patrum facturum esse).

13.9. The resolution of the senate as reported by Livy is similar (25.7.2-4: Eae litterae ad novos consules allatae ac per eos in senatu recitatae sunt; consultusque de iis litteris ita decrevit senatus: militibus, qui ad Cannas commilitones suos pugnantes deseruissent, senatum nihil videre cur res publica committenda esset. si M. Claudio proconsuli aliter videretur, faceret quod e re publica fideque sua duceret, dum ne quis eorum munere vacaret neu dono militari virtutis ergo donaretur neu in Italiam reportaretur donec hostis in terra Italia esset; cf. Liv. 26.1.6-8, 10). But the resolution as reported by Frontinus is even closer to Livy’s (Str. 4.1.44: Ille senatum consuluit; senatus negavit sibi placere committi his rempublicam, qui eam deseruissent; Marcello tamen permisit facere, quod videretur, dum ne quis eorum munere vacaret neve donaretur neve quod praemium ferret aut in Italian reportaretur, dum Poeni in ea fuissent). See also the notice in Valerius Maximus 2.7.15.

13.10. The reaction of Marcellus to the senate’s decision is not recorded outside of this remark by Plutarch. This is possibly a conjecture on Plutarch’s part stemming from his view of Marcellus’ humanitarianism (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος).
14.1. ἀδικηθεὶς ὡρ’ Ἰπποκράτους στρατηγοῦ Συρακοσίων: From Livy’s account (24.21-28) it appears that after the assassination of Hieronymus the political situation at Syracuse was on the point of civil war. Adranodorus was slain for a suspected plot to seize power, the members of the royal family were massacred, and Hippocrates and his brother Epicydes managed to have themselves elected magistrates against the opposition of the conspirators, who themselves had been elected magistrates earlier. However at the time of Marcellus’ arrival (late in 214 or early in 213 B.C.; see Chapter 13.1. εἰς... concerning chronology) the pro-Roman party still held the upper hand, and it was decided to send ambassadors to the Romans for the renewal of the old treaty. When Marcellus heard the terms they were offering, he believed that agreement could be reached and dispatched envoys to Syracuse to renew the treaty (see Eckstein SG 145-147, who discusses the moderate terms of this treaty and points out Marcellus’ restraint, flexibility, and statesmanlike manner in dealing with the Syracusans).

Soon after this envoys from Leontini arrived at Syracuse requesting a garrison for the protection of their territory. Hippocrates was ordered to lead the deserters there (these men would have come primarily from the Roman fleet [Liv. 24.23.10: nunc apud transfugas, quorum maxima pars ex navalibus sociis Romanorum erat]). In addition, many from the mercenary auxiliaries followed, which created a force of 4,000 men. This
event pleased both sides at Syracuse; the senders rid themselves of the dregs of the city, and those sent acquired an opportunity for revolution (Liv. 24.29.1-3).

With this force Hippocrates began to make furtive raids on the lands bordering the Roman province. Then after Appius sent troops to protect Rome’s allies, Hippocrates attacked and overwhelmed a Roman outpost (Liv. 24.29.4: Hippocrates enim finitima provinciae Romanae primo furtivis excursionibus vastare coepit; deinde, cum ad tuendos sociorum agros missum ab Appio praesidium esset, omnibus copiis impetum in oppositam stationem cum caede multorum fecit).

14.1. ὂς Καρχηδονίοις χαριζόμενος...πρὸς Λεοντίνοις: Hippocrates along with his brother Epicydes (RE 8.2 [1913], no. 10, "Hippokrates": 1779-1780) were born at Carthage. Although Carthaginian on their mother’s side, they were of Syracusan origin, since their grandfather was an exile from the Sicilian city because he was suspected of having assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles (Liv. 24.6.2; Polyb. 7.2.4). They were sent to Syracuse by Hannibal in 215 B.C. to form an alliance with Hieronymus, and after his assassination stayed in Syracuse, stirring up opposition against the pro-Roman faction (Liv. 24.6.2, 23.5-24.1, 27.1-4; Polyb. 7.2.3, 8.3.1). See Chapter 14.1. ἄδικηθείς... concerning Hippocrates’ massacre of Romans near Leontini.

14.2. εἶλε τὴν τῶν Λεοντίνων πόλιν κατὰ κράτος: Leontini was a
Greek colony in Sicily located at the southern end of the Campi Leontini (mod. Piana di Catania). Although earlier the site had been inhabited by Sicels, the Greek colony was established by Chalcidians from the island of Naxos (ca. 729 B.C.; Thuc. 6.3.3). Although largely autonomous in its earlier period, in 422 B.C. it came under Syracusan control (Thuc. 5.4.2-5) and remained in this state throughout most of the fourth and third centuries B.C. It was conquered by Marcellus in 214 B.C. and in the time of Cicero it had the status of a civitas decumana (Cic. Verr. 2.3.104; see RE 12.2 [1925] 2042-2047 and PECS 497-498).

After Marcellus was informed of Hippocrates' attack on the Roman outpost, he at once sent envoys to Syracuse to declare that the peace was broken and that an excuse for war was not lacking unless Hippocrates and Epicydes were sent away from Sicily (Liv. 24.29.5: Quae cum essent nuntiata Marcello, legatos extemplo Syracusas misit, qui pacis fidem ruptam esse dicerent nec belli defuturam unquam causam, nisi Hippocrates atque Epicydes non ab Syracusis modo sed tota procul Sicilia ablegarentur).

According to Livy (24.29.6-12) the Syracusans sent envoys to Leontini, where both Hippocrates and Epicydes were holding out. These envoys attempted to order the two men to leave Sicily, but the people of Leontini had been sufficiently aroused against Syracuse that this attempt failed. The people of Leontini asserted that they had not instructed Syracuse to make peace for them and were not bound by any such measures. The Syracusans reported this to the Romans and stated that the
treaty would not be broken if the Romans made war upon Leontini, and they would even help if it was guaranteed that the town would be placed under their authority after its subjugation just as it had been agreed upon in the treaty.

Marcellus proceeded to attack Leontini with his whole army and summoned Appius to attack from the other side. The city was taken during the first assault (Liv. 24.30.1: Marcellus cum omni exercitu profectus in Leontinos Appio quoque accito ut altera parte adgrederetur, tanto ardore militum est usus ab ira inter condiciones pacis interfectae stationis ut primo impetu urbem expugnarent). According to Livy’s account (24.30.2-3) Hippocrates and Epicydes, when they saw the walls being taken and the gates broken in, retired into the citadel, but managed to escape secretly that night. Meanwhile, a force of 8,000 troops which had been dispatched by Syracuse was at the river Mylas when the news of the capture of Leontini reached them.

14.2. Δεοντύνους μὲν οὐκ ἡδίκησα...: Plutarch agrees with Livy, who says that none of the people of Leontini or soldiers except for the Roman deserters were harmed after the capture of the city, and all property was restored except that which had been lost during the confusion caused by the capture of the city. As for the deserters, up to 2,000 were scourged and beheaded (Liv. 24.30.6-7). This was normal Roman practice (see Marquardt Römische Staatsverwaltung 22: 573), but the consequences of it were detrimental to the Roman cause in Sicily. From a consideration of the characteristics which
Plutarch was trying to ascribe to Marcellus (Marc. 1.3), one can assume that Plutarch would have liked to have left out this episode, but it played too crucial a role in the events which followed for him to do so.

14.3. τού δ’ Ἰπποκράτους πρῶτον...ἀποσφάτει Μάρκελλος: According to Livy (24.30.2-31.15) Hippocrates and Epicydes, having escaped from Leontini, made their way to the Syracusan army, which had been moved to Megara Hyblaea. The soldiers were in a state of mutiny, because they had received a false report that a general massacre of soldiers and citizens and a plundering of Leontini had taken place [many of the foreign mercenaries in the army would have been fellow soldiers with those at Leontini]. In this disturbed state the army was won over by Hippocrates and Epicydes through a ruse, which worked on the fears of the foreign mercenaries. Meanwhile the generals who had been in command, Sosis and Dinomenes (they had been fellow conspirators in the assassination of Hieronymus [Liv. 24.7.4, 21.4]), rode away in alarm to Syracuse. Once they had gained control of the army, Hippocrates and Epicydes dispatched a messenger to Syracuse to bear a false report about Leontini similar to the one which the army at the Mylas river had received.

14.3. ἐπεί τα δὲ τεταραγμένοις...καταλαβόντες: Livy reports (24.32) that upon receiving a false report of the events at Leontini sent by Hippocrates and Epicydes, Syracuse was thrown
into confusion. In this situation Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had the support of the soldiers and the commons, managed to enter Syracuse with their army, while the magistrates took refuge in Achradina. Achradina was then taken by assault, and all the magistrates were slain, except those who had managed to escape in the confusion. Hippocrates and Epicydes were then elected magistrates by their supporters.

14.4. καταστρατοπεδεύσας πλησίον: According to Livy the Roman army encamped at the Olympieion (24.33.3: cum Romanus exercitus ad Olympium--Iovis id templum est--mille et quingentos passus ab urbe castra posuit). This temple, dedicated to Zeus, was located west of the Great Harbor, a little over two kilometers south of Syracuse (see Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 221 and 280-281).

14.4. εἰσέπεμψε μὲν πρέσβεις...οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰπποκράτην: Livy records an earlier Roman embassy sent by sea in which one ship was captured as it entered the harbor, while the envoys escaped with difficulty (24.33.2: Et ab Appio legati per portum missi forte in quinqueremi erant. Praemissa quadriremis cum intrasset fauces portus, capitur; legati aegre effugerunt).

According to Livy (24.33.4-8) the present embassy was met by Hippocrates and Epicydes with their attendants outside one of the gates of the city in order to prevent the Roman envoys from entering. The Romans demanded that those who had fled to them for refuge should be restored safely to their native city, those
responsible for the slaughter should be surrendered, and the Syracusans should be given back their freedom and laws. These demands were refused (according to Eckstein [SG 151-154] Marcellus' march up to the walls of Syracuse and ultimatum may have been an attempt on his part to overawe the populace in order to destabilize the positions of Hippocrates and Epicydes before their power became firmly established).

14.5. προσβολάς ἐποίεῖτο...: The major accounts on the siege of Syracuse are found here (14.5-7, 15.1-17.4, 18.1-19.12), in Polybius (8.3-7), Livy (24.33.9-34.16, 25.23-31), Zonaras (9.4.6-9, 5.3-5), Tzetzes (Chil. 2.109-128, 136-149 Kiessling), and Silius Italicus (14.178-683).

The siege of Syracuse began at the beginning of the spring of 213 B.C. We know that in the fall of 213 B.C. Ap. Claudius Pulcher was given leave by Marcellus to go to Rome to stand for the consulship of 212 B.C., and in his place Marcellus appointed T. Quinctius Crispinus to command the fleet and the old camp before Syracuse, while he built a winter camp at Leon, just north of Syracuse, for himself (Liv. 24.39.12-13: Inde Ap. Claudio Romam ad consulatum petendum misso T. Quintium Crispinum in eius locum classi castrisque praeficit veteribus; ipse hibernacula quinque milia passuum <ab> Hexapylo--Leonta vocant locum--communiit aedificavitque. Haec in Sicilia usque ad principium hiemis gesta). From a remark of Polybius that Appius' forces sat before Syracuse for eight months without attempting another assault after the failure of the first one,
it has been assumed that this period refers to the time before Appius gave up his command of the besieging forces in order to go to Rome to stand for the consulship of 212 B.C. (8.7.5-6: τὸ δὲ πέρας, ἀναχωρήσατες εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν καὶ συνεδρεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀππιον, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐβουλεύσαντο πάσης ἔλπίδος πείραν λαμβάνειν πλὴν τοῦ διὰ πολιορκίας ἔλειν τὰς Συρακούσας, ὡς καὶ τέλος εποίησαν· ὅκτω γὰρ μῆνας τῇ πόλει προσκαθεξόμενοι τῶν μὲν ἄλλων στρατηγημάτων ἢ τολμημάτων οὐδενὸς ἀπέστησαν, τοῦ δὲ πολιορκείν οὐδέποτε πείραν ἔτι λαβεῖν ἐθάρρησαν; De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 319).

The attack on land by the Roman forces was against a section of wall in the neighbourhood of the Hexapylon gate (Liv. 24.33.9; Polyb. 8.3.2). This gate (mod. Scala Graeca) was located in the wall built by Dionysius I (reigned 405-367 B.C.) along the northern edge of Epipolae, the plateau overlooking the inhabited areas of Syracuse to the south. Polybius locates the attack east of the Hexapylon gate where the wall makes a turn to the north (8.3.6: πλὴν δὲ μὲν Ἀππιος ἔχων γέφρα καὶ κλίμακας ἐνεχείρει προσφέρειν ταῦτα τῷ συνάπτοντι τείχει τοῖς Ἐξαπύλοις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν; cf. Walbank Polybius 2: 70-71).

The attack from the sea by the Roman fleet was against that region of Syracuse known as Achradina (Liv. 24.33.9; Polyb. 8.4.1). Polybius locates it at the Stoa Scytice in Achradina (8.3.2: τῇ δὲ ναυτικῇ τῆς Ἀχραδίνης κατὰ τὴν Σκυτικήν προσαγορευομένην στοάν, καθ’ ἣν ἐπ’ αὐτῆς κεῖται τῆς κρηπίδος τὸ τείχος παρὰ θάλατταν). The Stoa Scytice is not otherwise known, but the fortified area of Achradina was situated just north of
the Little Harbor, and the attack must have been aimed here (Walbank Polybius 2: 70).

The Romans' main point of attack appears to have been by sea against Achradina, while the attack by land was to be a diversion. Marcellus led the attack by sea with the fleet, which was originally under Appius' command, while Appius took over the ground troops. The Roman forces before Syracuse probably consisted of the legion and its allied contingent which Marcellus had brought over from Campania and a fleet of 100 ships which had two legions serving on board. It can be reasonably assumed that not all of these forces took part in the attack. For example, it is reported that only 60 ships were used (Marc. 14.5; Polyb. 8.4.1; Liv. 24.34.4). Desertions among Rome's naval allies may explain why more ships did not take part (see Livy 24.23.10), while garrison duty and other assignments necessitated the dispatch of ground troops elsewhere (see Chapter 13.3. ταύτην... concerning composition of Roman forces in Sicily).

14.6. ὑπὲρ δὲ μεγάλου ξεύγματος...ἀρας: Plutarch has misinterpreted his source here in describing the arrangement of the ships which carried the so-called sambucae (see Chapter 15.5. concerning name). In Polybius' detailed description of these siege ladders (8.4.2-11), the eight ships were bound to each other in pairs with the inner oars of each pair removed (8.4.2: ἀμα δὲ τούτοις ὁκτὼ πεντήρεσι, παραλειμέναις τοὺς ταρσοὺς, ταὶς μὲν τοὺς δεξιοὺς, ταῖς δὲ τοὺς εὐωνύμους, καὶ
The confidence of Marcellus reported here corresponds to the optimism felt by the whole Roman force in Polybius’ and Livy’ accounts (Polyb. 8.3.3: ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν ἠλπίσαν καταταχθεῖν τῇ παρασκευῇ τοὺς...
Liv. 24.33.9: et quia, sicut Leontinos terroe ac primo impetu ceperant, non diffidebant vastam disiectamque spatio urbem parte aliqua se invasuros, omnem apparatum oppugnandarum urbium muris ad moverunt).

14.7. ἢς ἄρα λόγος οὐδείς ἦν Ἀρχιμήδει καὶ τοῖς Ἀρχιμήδους μηχανήμασιν: All major sources on this attack attribute the successful resistance of the Syracusans to the genius of Archimedes (Polyb. 8.3.3, 7.8-9; Liv. 24.34.1-2; Zon. 9.4.7; Tzet. Chil. 2.128 Kiessling; Sil. Ital. 14.338-340).

14.8-15. This section of chapter 14 is probably in large part derived from a lost biography of Archimedes (see Introduction, p. 34, concerning the probable author of this work).

Archimedes, the most renowned scientist of antiquity, was the son of the astronomer Phidias of Syracuse. Born around 287 B.C. he spent some time in Alexandria where he came into contact with the flourishing school left by Euclid; he was acquainted with both Conon of Samos and Eratosthenes of Cyrene. Residing for the greater part of his life in his native city of Syracuse, he put his services at the disposal of Hiero II for whom he devised the defences of the city, which were to play a vital role in preventing the Romans from taking the city by direct assault (see RE 2.1 [1895], no. 3: 507-539; ancient references to Archimedes’ life have been collected in Heiberg’s Quaestiones Archimedeae).

The digressions on Archimedes found in the Marcellus
provide one of the primary sources for Archimedes' life (see Dijksterhuis *Archimedes* concerning his life and works and Heath *HGM* 2: 16-104 or *Archimedes* concerning his mathematics).

14.8. It has been suggested that Plutarch's portrayal of Archimedes' attitude towards the applied sciences has been influenced by Platonic thought (see Peters *The Harvest of Hellenism* 216, n. 35 and Chapter 17.6.).

Aside from the anecdote at 14.12-14, the most famous of Archimedes' practical applications of his theoretical studies undertaken at the prompting of Hiero was the investigation of a gold crown suspected of having been adulterated with silver. The solution to the problem occurred to Archimedes while he was at the baths. Upon immersing himself into a tub, he noticed the overflow of water. At this he realized the solution to the problem, and leaping out of the water, he ran home naked shouting, ἐὑρηκα, ἐὑρηκα. Archimedes' insight was that one could calculate the volume of the crown by measuring the amount of water it displaced. Knowing that an equal weight of gold had less volume than an equal weight of silver, Archimedes compared the volume of the crown to the volume of a mass of gold equal in weight to the crown and discovered that the crown had more volume. He deduced from this that the crown had been adulterated (Vitr. 9, pref. 10-12).

14.9-10. Eudoxus of Cnidos (RE 6.1 [1907]), no. 8: 930-950) was
a mathematician who lived from about 408-355 B.C. He is said to have attended lectures given by Plato at Athens and to have learned geometry under Archytas. He was the first to propose a system of concentric spheres to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies (see Heath *HGM* 1: 322-334).

Archytas of Tarentum (*RE* 2.1 [1895], no. 3: 600-602) was a mathematician who flourished in the first half of the fourth century B.C. and was an acquaintance of Plato. He is credited with being the first to treat mechanics according to mathematical principles (Diog. Laert. 8.83: ὁ τῷ μηχανικῇ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς προσχρησάμενος ἀρχαῖς μεθόδευσε; cf. Vitr. 1.1.17, 7, pref. 14). There is also attributed to him a mechanical dove which could fly (see Heath *HGM* 1: 213-216).

Although Archytas and Eudoxus may have depended on mechanical devices (14.9: δι' αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὀργανικῶν παραδειγμάτων ὑπερεύδοντες) to demonstrate to others their solutions to problems, in particular the problem concerning the mean proportionals (14.10: τὸ περὶ δύο μέσας ἀνὰ λόγον πρόβλημα), they clearly did not use these devices in rigorous mathematical proofs. The solution by Archytas for the problem of the mean proportionals which has come down to us is purely theoretical, consisting of a geometrical proof in three dimensions in which there are three surfaces of revolution: a right cone, a cylinder, and a tore (i.e. anchor-ring; Eutoc. in Archim. 3^2^: 84-88 Heiberg; see Heath *HGM* 1: 244-270 for the history and the various solutions of this problem). Likewise, in the supposed letter of Eratosthenes to Ptolemy Euergetes
preserved for us by Eutocius, it is stated that Archytas and Eudoxus could only come up with theoretical solutions to this problem but no practical construction for ordinary use (Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 90 Heiberg: τῶν δὲ φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ διδάσκοντος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ζητοῦντων δύο τῶν δοθεισῶν δύο μέσας λαβεῖν 'Αρχύτας μὲν ὁ Ταραντῖνος λέγεται διὰ τῶν ἡμικυλίνδρων εὑρηκέναι, Εὐδοξὸς δὲ διὰ τῶν καλουμένων καμπύλων γραμμῶν· συμβέβηκε δὲ πάσιν αὐτοῖς ἀποδεικτικῶς γεγραφέναι, χειρουργήσατι δὲ καὶ εἰς χρείαν πεσεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι πλὴν ἐπὶ βραχὺ τι τὸν Μέναιχμον καὶ ταῦτα δυσχερῶς; cf. Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 96 Heiberg, Vitr. 9, pref. 14: Itaque Archytas cylindrorum descriptionibus, Eratosthenes organica mesolabi ratione idem explicaverunt, Diog. Laert. 8.83: πρῶτος [sc. Ἀρχύτας] κίνησιν ὀργανικὴν διαγράμματι γεωμετρικῶς προσῆγε, διὰ τῆς τομῆς τοῦ ἡμικυλίνδρου δύο μέσας ἀνὰ λόγον λαβεῖν ζητῶν εἰς τὸν τοῦ κύβου διπλασιασμόν).

The problem of the mean proportionals arose as a result of the Greeks taking up the question of how to double the volume of a cube (Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 88–90 Heiberg; Plut. Mor. 718e–f, 386e, 579a–e; Vitr. 9, pref. 13). Hippocrates of Chios discovered that if two mean proportionals in continued proportion between two straight lines, the greater of which is twice as long as the lesser, could be found, then the cube will be doubled (Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 90 Heiberg). If a and b are two straight lines with b twice the length of a, and x and y are the two mean proportionals (i.e. \(a:x = x:y = y:b\)), then x is the length of the side of a cube which has twice the volume of a cube which has a as the length of its side.
The first mechanical device that could calculate mean proportions is described for us in the supposed letter of Eratosthenes (Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 92-94 Heiberg). This instrument was called a mesolabe (Gr. μεσολάβος or -ον, Lat. mesolabus; Papp. p. 54.31 Hultsch; Vitr. 9, pref. 14).

The calculation of mean proportions was of particular importance for military science in the construction of torsion-spring artillery (Eutoc. in Archim. 3²: 90 Heiberg: χρήσιμον δὲ έσται τό ἐπινόημα καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπαύξειν καταπαλτικὰ καὶ λιθοβόλα ὀργάνα. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἀπαντα αὐξηθῆναι καὶ τὰ πάχη καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰς κατατρήσεις καὶ τὰς χοινικίδας καὶ τὰ ἐμβαλλόμενα νεῦρα, εἰ μέλλει καὶ ἡ βολὴ ἀνάλογον ἐπαύξηθηναι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι ἄνευ τῆς τῶν μέσων εὑρέσεως).

In these machines the crucial dimension was the size of the sinew bundles which provided the energy for propelling the missile. The standard torsion-spring artillery piece had two vertical bundles into each of which was thrust an arm able to swing horizontally; attached to these two arms would be the bowstring. A sinew bundle was regarded, in practice, as a cylinder of set proportions whose crucial dimension was the diameter. Ancient military engineers in order to obtain the maximum effective range for a specific size or weight of projectile developed two formulas for determining the size of the sinew bundles. For a machine shooting bolts (i.e. catapult) the diameter of the sinew bundle was 1/9th the length of the bolt which was of a standard diameter and weight for a specific
length. For a machine shooting stones (i.e. ballista) the
diameter equalled 1.1 times the cube root of the product of the
weight of the stone multiplied by 100 (the diameter was measured
in dactyli \([1 \text{ dactylus} = 19.3 \text{ mm.}]\) and the weight in Attic minae
\([1 \text{ mina} = 436 \text{ g.}]\)). The first formula does not provide any
difficulties, but the second involves the extraction of a cube
root. If the weight of a stone happens to be 10 minae, for
example, it is quite easy to use the formula since the cube root
of 1,000 (10 \(\times\) 100) is 10, and so the diameter would be 11
dactyli. However, for most other weights the cube root would be
more difficult to extract. One of the ways ancient military
engineers solved this problem, if they did not happen to have a
table of cube roots handy, was to find the mean proportionals
between two lines the lengths of which were proportional to the
weight of the stone of a ballista of known dimensions and the
weight of the stone of a ballista of unknown dimensions. If we
use the mean proportional formula, \(a:x = x:y = y:b\), where \(a\) is
the weight of the stone of a ballista of known dimensions and \(b\)
is the weight of the stone of a ballista of unknown dimensions,
then \(x/a\) times the diameter of the sinew bundle of the ballista
of known dimensions will give us the diameter of the sinew
bundle of the ballista of unknown dimensions. The ancients
found mean proportionals geometrically, at times employing a
device known as the mesolabe (see Landels EAW 120-122, Marsden
in Archim. \(3^2\): 54-107 Heiberg).
14.11. ἐπεὶ δὲ Πλάτων ἡγανάκτησε...φορτικὴς βαναυσουργίας δεομένοις: The censure of Plato against Eudoxus and Archytas is found only here and in Plutarch’s *Moralia* (718e-f), but in the *Moralia* Plutarch also adds the name of Menaechmus (see Diels *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 16: 427-428 concerning possible origin for Plutarch’s statement). It is interesting to note that in the supposed letter of Eratosthenes, Eudoxus, Archytas, and Menaechmus are listed together as having attempted to find a practical (i.e. by mechanical means) solution to the problem of the mean proportionals, but only Menaechmus was partially successful (Eutoc. in Archim. 32: 90 Heiberg).

14.11. οὖτω διεκρίθη γεωμετρίας...: This tendency of separating the theoretical from the practical does not seem to have prevailed completely among ancient mathematicians (e.g., Eratosthenes devised a *mesolabe* for calculating cube roots [Eutoc. in Archim. 32: 92-94 Heiberg; Vitr. 9, pref. 14]; Archimedes used mechanical means for investigating certain mathematical problems [see Chapter 17.6.] and for determining the angular diameter of the sun [see Chapter 19.11. τῶν μαθηματικῶν...]). There are also indications that the science of mechanics was held in high esteem not only among mathematicians but also among philosophers themselves (Papp. 8, pref. 1, p. 1022 Hultsch: Ἡ μηχανικὴ θεωρία...πρὸς πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρήσιμος ὑπάρχουσα πλείστης εἰκότως ἀποδοχῆς ἦξισται πρὸς τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περισσοῦδαστὸς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ σχεδὸν πρώτη τῆς περὶ τὴν
The discussion on mechanics (14.9-11) embedded in the discussion on Archimedes must have been inspired by the source used by Plutarch for Archimedes' life. Undoubtedly this source discussed the problem of the mean proportionals, since Archimedes in constructing the defences of Syracuse had to deal with this problem in the design of his artillery pieces (see Introduction, p. 34, concerning Plutarch's source). Especially in the construction of his short-range machines, Archimedes would probably have been forced to depart from the normal specifications for their design (Soedel-Foley Scientific American 240.3 [1979]: 157-158). These specifications were concerned with obtaining the maximum effective range for a specific size or weight of missile (see Chapter 15.8. τοῦς γὰρ...). Archimedes likely devised specifications for machines which were to be used for ranges shorter than the maximum (see Chapter 15.9. διαδοχὰς...).

14.12. Ἀρχιμήδης, Ἰέρων τῷ βασιλεῖ συγγενῆς ὡν: It is not known what family connection existed between Archimedes and Hiero II.

14.12. ἔγραψεν ώς τῇ δοθείσῃ...: According to Pappus Archimedes uttered the remark δὸς μοι, φησί, ποῦ στῶ, καὶ κινῶ τὴν γῆν in connexion with his discovery of the solution to the problem of how to move a given weight by a given force (Papp. in Archim. 22: 548 Heiberg = Papp. 8.19, p. 1060.2 Hultsch; cf.
14.13. Athenaeus (5.206d-209e) describes the construction, launching, and furnishing of the Syracusia, an enormous three-masted wheat transport of Hiero's fleet. This must be the same ship as the one mentioned here by Plutarch. In Athenaeus' account, after half of the ship had been completed, the order was given to launch the hull into the sea so that the remaining work could be finished there. After considerable searching was done for a method of launching, Archimedes alone devised a way to drag the hull down to water; he did this by means of a windlass (207b: 'Αρχιμήδης ὁ μηχανικός μόνος αὐτὸ κατήγαγε δι' ὀλίγων σωμάτων. κατασκευάσας γὰρ ἐλικα τὸ τηλικοῦτον σκάφος εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν κατήγαγε. πρῶτος δ' Αρχιμήδης εὗρε τὴν τῆς ἐλικος κατασκευὴν; cf. Tzet. Chil. 2.107-8 Kiessling, Simpl. in phys. 7.250a19, p. 1110.2 Diels, Procl. in Euc. p. 63.19 Friedlein).

The particular device used by Archimedes to move the ship is called a πολύσπαστον (compound pulley) by Plutarch here, but Athenaeus (207b) refers to it as a ἐλιξ (helix). Heath believes the ἐλιξ was similar to the κοχλίας described by Pappus (pp. 1066, 1108-1109 Hultsch) "in which a cog-wheel with oblique teeth moves on a cylindrical helix turned by a handle" (Archimedes xx). According to Galen (18: 747 Kühn) the πολύσπαστον was invented by Archimedes, while Oribasius (49.23.1, 4: 407 Bussemaker) attributes to Archimedes and Apellis a device called the τρίσπαστον ὀργανὸν (triple pulley)
which was used for the drawing down of ships. The τρίσπαστον is also mentioned twice by Tzetzes, once concerning Archimedes’ boast about moving the earth (Chil. 3.61-62 Kiessling: ὦ γῆν ἀνασπῶν μηχανὴ τῆς τρισπάστω, / βοῶν, ὧν, καὶ σαλεύσω την χθόνα;), and again in reference to the launching of the Syracusia (Chil. 2.107-8 Kiessling: ἐκ τῆς τρισπάστω μηχανῆς χειρὶ λαῖδι καὶ μόνῃ / Πεντεμυριστέμιμον καθείλκυον ὀλκάδα). Heath suggests that Archimedes used a πολύσπαστον or a τρίσπαστον to pull the ship once he had got it moving with a device similar to the κοχλίας (loc. cit.).
15.1. According to Polybius the Roman forces, having readied wicker-works, missiles, and other materials for a siege, had hopes of outstripping their opponents in siege operations in five days due to their superiority in numbers (8.3.3: ἐτοιμασάμενοι δὲ γέρρα καὶ βέλη καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν ἤλπισαν καταταξήσειν τῇ παρασκευῇ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους). Livy also portrays the Romans as having this sentiment (24.33.9: et quia, sicut Leontinos terrore ac primo impetu ceperant, non diffidebant vastam disiectamque spatio urbem parte aliqua se invasuros, omnem apparatum oppugnandarum urbium muris admovebant).

15.3. ταῖς δὲ ναυοῖς: From Livy’s account it appears that only the ships which were yoked together approached the wall, while the remaining ships remained at a distance and provided covering fire from archers, slingers, and javelin throwers (24.34.5-7: Ex ceteris navibus sagittarii funditoresque et velites etiam, quorum telum ad remittendum inhabile imperitis est, vix quemquam sine volnere consistere in muro patiebantur; hi, quia spatio missilibus opus est, procul muro tenebant naves; iunctae aliae binae quinqueremes...turreas contabulatas machinamentaque alia quotiendis muris portabant). In Livy (24.34.5) those shooting from the decks of the ships were successful in accomplishing their objective in this first attack, but Polybius (8.5.2-4) reports that the ships were driven off by artillery fire from
the wall, so that Marcellus had to resort to a night attack.

15.3. τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ βρίθους...κατέδυον εἰς βυθὸν: According to Polybius (8.5.8-11) some of these cranes carried stones weighing up to ten-talents [258.6 kg., based on Attic-Euboic standard of 1 talent = 25.86 kg.], while others carried lead weights that were dropped onto the sambucae while they were being raised.

The projecting arms of these cranes appear to have been mounted on universal joints not far from their mid-points. This permitted a crane to be swung not only from side to side but also up and down, allowing the crane operator to position a projectile directly over a ship (Polyb. 8.5.10: τότε περιαγόμεναι καρχησίῳ πρὸς τὸ δέον αἱ κεραίαι, 6.2: κατηγέ τὴν πτέρναν τῆς μηχανῆς ἐντός τοῦ τείχους; cf. Landels EAW 95-96).

15.3. τὰς δὲ χειρὶ σιδηραῖς...ἐπὶ πρόμυναν [ἀν]έβαπτιζον: These iron grappling-hooks were affixed to chains which the crane operators let down onto the enemy ships in an attempt to grasp their prows. After a crane operator had gotten a firm hold onto a prow and had made secure the chain, he would press down the butt-end of the projecting arm and thereby lift up the prow of the ship. Then after making fast this end so that it would not move, the crane operator would release the chain and grappling-hook and allow the prow of the enemy ship to drop (Polyb. 8.6.2-3: ἀμα δὲ καὶ καθίει χειρὰ σιδηρὰν ἐξ ἀλύσεως δεδεμένην, ὃ δραχάμενος ὁ τὴν κεραίαν οἰκίζων ὀθεν ἐπιλάβοιτο τῆς πρόφρας, κατηγέ τὴν πτέρναν τῆς μηχανῆς ἐντός τοῦ τείχους.
In order for the rear of the projecting arm to be lowered when a ship was attached to the chain at the other end, it has been suggested that a block-and-tackle was fastened between the rear of this beam and the base of the crane, and that a tug-of-war team then pulled on the cable to lower the butt-end (see Landels EAW 97-98). However, in Livy’s description of the operation of these cranes, it appears that a counter-weight was used to raise up the prow of a ship (24.34.10: in eas tollenone super murum eminente ferrea manus firmae catenae inligata cum iniecta prorae esset gravique libramento plumbum recelleret ad solum, suspensa prora navem in puppim statuebat). If Livy’s description has any basis in fact, one might ask how a counter-weight was used. In one possible scenario, after the prow of a ship had been grasped by the grappling hook, the other end of the chain to which the grappling hook was connected would be fastened to a counter-weight suspended near the top of the crane under the point where the projecting arm was mounted onto the supporting structure. When the counter-weight was allowed to drop straight down, its force would raise the prow of the ship attached to the other end of the chain. If further lift was needed, the chain could be made fast to the projecting arm, and then a block-and-tackle could be used to pull down the butt-end of this beam (cf. Walters’ and Conway’s apparatus).
15.3. η δι' ἀντιτόνων ἐνδον ἐπιστρεφομένων...: It is not clear what these devices are. Plutarch may be referring to a system of cables attached to the head of the projecting arm of a crane to help swing it over the wall, or to a block-and-tackle used to lower the butt-end of this beam, both of which could be used to drag ships, once they had been grappled, closer to the overhanging cliffs and projecting rocks at the base of the city wall against which they would founder.

15.4. This is clearly an exaggeration on Plutarch’s part. It is not necessary for the ships to be completely hoisted from the water. According to Landels (EAW 96-97) a ship would only have to be lifted up by the bow until the stern shipped water, and then the action of the water filling the hull would make it stand on end with only a few feet of the bow remaining above the surface once the buoyancy of the hull had found equilibrium. He adds, however, that if the bow was lifted higher and then released, the downward plunge of the hull would be quite violent, and even if the ship managed to remain upright, it would be awash and quite useless.

Both Polybius and Livy give more credible accounts of the effects which this violent plunge produced (Polyb. 8.6.4: οὗ γινομένου τινὰ μὲν τῶν πλοίων πλάγια κατέπιπτε, τινὰ δὲ καὶ κατεστρέφετο, τὰ δὲ πλείστα τῆς πρόφρας ἄφ’ ὑψους ριφθείσης βαπτιζόμενα πλήρῃ θαλάττης ἐγίνετο καὶ ταραχῆς; Liv. 24.34.11:...
15.5. Polybius gives the same explanation for the name of this siege ladder (8.4.11: εἰκότως δὲ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῆς προσηγορίας τέτευχε ταύτης· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐξαρθῇ, γίνεται τὸ σχῆμα τῆς νεῶς ταύτης καὶ τῆς κλίμακος ἐνοποιηθέν παραπλάσιον σαμβύκη; cf. Athen. 14.634a who reports an identical explanation given by Andreas of Panormus, who was probably copying from Polybius [Walbank Polybius 2: 73]). The musical instrument called the *sambuca* has not been identified for certain, but was likely a triangular shaped harp with many strings (see Walbank Polybius 2: 72 and Landels JHS 86 [1966]: 69-77). From Polybius' statement it would appear that the deck of the ship and the ladder represent the two sides of the musical instrument, while the props used to support the ladder (8.4.6: ἐξερειδοντες ταῖς ἀντιπρόσωποι) suggest the strings (Walbank 2: 73). Other possible suggestions are given by Landels (op. cit.), but a close analogy is not to be expected from a military nickname (Walbank Polybius 2: 74; Vegetius [4.21] compares a *sambuca* to a *cithara*; see Chapters 14.6. ὑπὲρ... concerning *sambucae* and 17.1. τοὺς σὺν ἐαυτῷ... concerning the inventor of the Roman *sambucae*).

15.6. Plutarch is mistaken here about ten-talent stones (258.6 kg., based on Attic-Euboic standard of 1 talent = 25.86 kg.) being hurled at the *sambuca* while it was still far from the
The largest stone thrower attested to have been devised by Archimedes was one built for Hiero's gigantic ship the Syracusia. It could hurl a three-talent stone one stadium (i.e. 600 ft.; Athen. 208c). The largest ballista stone mentioned by Vitruvius (10.11.3) is one of 360 Roman pounds, which is still far short of ten talents. Polybius' account (8.5.8-10) makes it clear that the ten-talent stones were dropped, not hurled, upon the sambucae by cranes projecting over the walls. However, it is still likely that the sambucae were shot at while still far from the wall by ballistae shooting stones of lesser weight. Plutarch's error may have been the result of his compressing together the actions of the ballistae and the cranes (cf. Tzetzes Chil. 2.114-117 Kiessling: Μαρκέλλου δ' ἀποστήσαντος μικρόν τι τὰς ὀλκάδας, / 'Ο γέρων πάλιν ἀπάντας ποιεῖ Συρακουσίους / Μετεωρίζειν δύνασθαι λίθους ἀμαξιαίους, / Καὶ τὸν καθένα πέμποντα βυθίζειν τὰς ὀλκάδας).

15.7. Ὡστε τὸν Μάρκελλον ἀπορούμενον...: Livy in his account of this attack has the land assault continue after the withdrawal of the fleet and implies that reinforcements from the fleet were added (24.34.12: Ita maritima oppugnatio est elusa omnisque spes eo versa ut totis viribus terra adgrederentur). Although Polybius (8.3-7) describes the land assault right after his account of the attack by sea, he does not indicate that the land assault continued after the sea attack was called off.

15.8. Βουλευομένοις δ' ἔδοξεν...ἐτι νυκτὸς...τοῖς τείχεσι:
Polybius (8.5.4) indicates that Marcellus attempted to bring the ships near the wall at night, but says nothing about whether the land forces did the same. Livy in his account (24.33.9-34.16) has no mention of a night attack.

15.8. τοὺς γὰρ τόνους...: Ancient artillerymen almost always tried to attain the maximum propulsive force possible from their machines since they desired the impact of the projectile to be as powerful as possible. This meant that they did not consider it efficient to vary (i.e. to lessen) the tension on the torsion springs (i.e. sinew bundles) or to draw back the throwing arms to varying degrees in order to alter the range. The only other possible way of altering the range was to change the angle of projection, but it appears that ancient artillery could not shoot at angles of depression of more than four degrees below the horizontal because of the way the spring-frames were mounted onto the bases (Marsden GRAHD 91-92, 118).

It has been estimated that arrow-shooting and stone-throwing machines had a normal maximum range of approximately 400 yards, although the most powerful ones could shoot up to 500 yards (Marsden GRAHD 91; the angle of projection for these machines would be set at 45 degrees in this case). When placed on a wall or in a tower this range would be increased, but a space would be left in front of the wall which they could not cover since the angle of fire for these machines could not be depressed sufficiently. For example, a machine raised 27 feet above ground level, situated on a wall, firing at
the horizontal with maximum propulsive force would shoot a
missile 63 yards, and if this machine could be depressed up to
four degrees below the horizontal the distance would only be
some ten yards closer. This would leave a gap of approximately
50 yards within which a besieger would be safe from the fire of
a machine directly in front of him (see Marsden GRAHD 117-118).

15.9. ὁ δὲ ἦν...ὅργανων τε συμμέτρους πρὸς πᾶν διάστημα
κινήσεις καὶ βέλη βραχέα: It appears from this statement, when
combined with the previous one, that Plutarch supposed that the
Romans decided on a night attack because they believed the space
within which one of Archimedes' artillery pieces could not be
brought to bear was quite large. Polybius, on the other hand,
states that Marcellus undertook a night attack exactly because
Archimedes' machines could hit his forces over an extensive
interval with the shorter range machines taking over from the
longer range ones as the Roman forces approached nearer
(8.5.2-4: ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἄνὴρ, παρεσκευασμένος ὄργανα πρὸς
ἄπαν ἐμβελές διάστημα, πόρρωθεν μὲν ἐπιπλέοντας τοῖς
ἐυτονωτέροις καὶ μείζοσι λιθοβόλοις καὶ βέλεσι τιτρώσκων εἰς
ἀπορίαν ἐνέβαλε καὶ δυσχρηστῶν, ὅτε δὲ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπερπετὴ γίνοιτο,
τοῖς ἐλάττωσι κατὰ λόγον ἂεὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀπόστημα χρώμενος εἰς
τοιαύτην ἦγαγε διατροπὴν ἵστε καθόλου κωλύειν αὐτῶν τὴν ὅρμην
καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν, ἦως ὁ Μάρκος δυσθετούμενος ἡμαγκάσθη λάθρα
νυκτὸς ἐτὶ ποιήσασθαι τὴν παραμγὴν). It appears then, in the
light of Polybius' account, that Marcellus thought it might be
possible to avoid the effects of this artillery by slipping his
ships at night into the small gap near the walls where these machines could not be brought to bear.

Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy all mention the employment of artillery of various sizes or ranges (Plut. 15.9; Polyb. 8.5.2-3; Liv. 24.34.8: Adversus hunc navalem apparatum Archimedes variae magnitudinis tormenta in muris disposuit. In eas quae procul erant naves saxa ingenti pondere emittebat; propiores levioribus eoque magis crebris petebat telis). The distance which these machines could reach with their projectiles would vary according to the various settings and characteristics of the machines and the sizes of the projectiles used, but it would not be necessarily true that the smaller machines had shorter ranges than the larger ones (see Marsden GRAHD 86-92).

The most important factor for range would be the angle of projection. With stone-throwers the angle of projection is relatively unimportant for its effectiveness, but with arrow-shooters to be effective the angle needs to be much nearer the horizontal (Marsden GRAHD 88-90). Consequently stone-throwers had the greatest maximum effective range (see Marsden GRAHD 90) and would be employed first firing at a 45 degree angle of projection. Arrow-shooters would only be brought into play when the targets came within their maximum effective range, while the stone-throwers would still be employed but with a decreased angle of projection. In addition, artillery could be pivoted from side to side on its base, providing a field of fire (in the form of an arc) which would overlap with the field of fire of adjacent machines (of course
the area overlapped would be closer to the firing line than the maximum range of these machines). These factors would produce a greater rate of fire from the walls as the targets approached nearer. Livy had a vague notion of this (24.34.8: propiores levioribus eoque magis crebris petebat telis).

15.9. διαδοχας ου μεγαλων...: This placement of apertures in the wall is also reported by Polybius and Livy (Polyb. 8.5.6: έως άνδρομικους ύψους κατεπύκνωσε τρήμασι το τείχος ως παλαιστιαίως το μέγεθος κατά την έκτος ἐπιφάνειαν· οίς τοξόταις καὶ σκορπίδια παραστήρας ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους, καὶ βάλλων διὰ τούτων, ἄχρηστους ἐποίει τοὺς ἐπιβάτας; Liv. 24.34.9: murum ab imo ad summum crebris cubitalibus fere cavis aperuit, per quae cava pars sagittis, pars scorpionibus modicis ex occulto petebant hostem). These apertures according to Polybius were approximately five or six feet high but only about three or four inches wide on the outside. Livy’s mention of cubit sized openings may be a mistranslation, but it is possible that the apertures were a cubit (18 in.) wide on the inside. This type of design for a loophole would give the archers, who are mentioned by Polybius and Livy, but not by Plutarch, a high degree of protection, while allowing them at the same time to shoot over a large vertical field of fire, even though the horizontal field of fire would still be quite restricted (cf. Walbank Polybius 2: 75).

The placing of apertures in the wall, of which many would be set fairly low (Liv. 24.34.9: murum ab imo ad summum), was
Archimedes' solution to the problem of covering that space immediately in front of the wall which could not be covered by the artillery placed on top. This solution was fully appreciated by Polybius (8.5.5: γενομένων δ' αὐτῶν ἐντὸς βέλους πρὸς τῇ γῇ, πάλιν ἔτεραν ἕτοιμακε παρασκευῆν πρὸς τοὺς ἄπομαχομένους ἐκ τῶν πλοίων).

All three ancient authors mention the use of small scorpions behind these apertures (Plut. 15.9: σκορπίοι βραχύτονοι; Polyb. 8.5.6: σκορπίδια; Liv. 24.34.9: scorpionibus modicis). These would be small torsion catapults shooting arrows of approximately one cubit (18 in.) in length (Marsden GRAHD 79).

Plutarch specifies the scorpions used as having short torsion springs (βραχύτονοι). This has been interpreted by Soedel and Foley (Scientific American 240.3 [1979]: 157, 159) as an indication that Archimedes in his design of these machines departed from the normal optimum cylindrical configuration for torsion springs (see Chapter 14.9-10.). If this is correct, Archimedes may have discovered that either there was a different optimum cylindrical configuration for the torsion springs of very small machines, or more probably, certain changes in the cylindrical configuration (specifically the height of a sinew-bundle) did not greatly affect the performance of such machines. These machines were designed to cover the space in front of the wall which could not be covered by the artillery positioned on top (a distance of probably less than 100 yards). In this case trying to obtain the greatest possible range from
the scorpions was not important, and some sacrifice in range would be acceptable for corresponding benefits elsewhere. The use of short torsion springs provide two major benefits. First, these springs would reduce the overall size of the frames holding them thereby making the machine much lighter and more maneuverable. Second, less sinew cord would be required for the springs and less material (primarily wood) for the construction of the frame which would result in a lower cost per machine and more machines constructed from the same amount of material.

Both Walbank and Marsden, in commenting on the use of these short torsion springs, err in interpreting their performance. They believe that these short springs imparted a more powerful impact or blow to a projectile than normally configured springs, but at the same time the range of this missile was shortened (Walbank Polybius 2: 75: "they had special short cords which gave a poor range but a powerful impact"; Marsden GRAHD 92: "Archimedes...made some of his scorpions with unusually short springs (βραχύτονοι) to secure a more powerful blow.² The range was reduced in consequence"). The impact (or blow) of a missile is determined by its velocity and mass, while the distance traveled is determined by its velocity and angle of projection at which it is fired (we are neglecting the shape of the missile and air-resistance for the sake of simplicity, but this does not affect the basic conclusions). If one assumes both the mass of the missile and the angle of projection as fixed, then a change in velocity will result in a change both in the impact and range. If the velocity is reduced, then there is a
corresponding reduction in the impact as well as in the range, while if the velocity is increased, then there is a corresponding increase in the impact as well as in the range. Consequently, if the short torsion springs could deliver a more powerful impact, then the range of the projectile would be longer, not shorter.

It is reasonable to assume that, if χρακτόνα refer to torsion springs which deviated from the optimum cylindrical configuration, then the machines employing such springs had a shorter range and lesser impact (but not so much as to make their performance ineffective), but that the benefits gained (more maneuverability and lower cost per machine) outweighed these disadvantages.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

16.1. 'Ως οὖν προσέμειξαν οίδμενοι λανθάνειν: The objective of the Romans was to try to avoid, under the cover of darkness, the fire of the Syracusan artillery mounted on the walls and to reach that space right in front of the walls which they supposed was safe from its fire (see Chapter 15.8. τούς γὰρ...).

16.1. πετρῶν μὲν ἐκ κεφαλῆς...πρὸς κάθετον: Polybius in his account of the Roman land attack mentions the dropping not only of stones, but also of beams upon the assailants (8.7.3: οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν γέρρων βιαζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν κατὰ κορυφὴν λίθων καὶ δοκῶν ἐμβολαῖς διεφθαρμένοι). Polybius also reports that the cranes employing grappling-hooks which were used against the ships (Polyb. 8.6.2-4) were directed against personnel too. Men were lifted up armor and all and then dropped (8.7.4: οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ταῖς ἐκ τῶν μηχανῶν ἐκακοποίουν, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴπα· σὺν αὐτοῖς γὰρ τοῖς ὀπλῶις τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἐξαιροῦντες ἑρρίπτουν; cf. Zon. 9.4.7). It is doubtful whether the besieged would go through the trouble of employing these cranes against individual enemy soldiers. This anecdote sounds like an exaggerated soldier's story expressing fear of these devices (see Chapter 15.3. τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ... et seq. concerning these cranes).

16.1. τοῦ <δὲ> τείχους τοξεύματα πανταχόθεν ἀναπέμποντος: These missiles would be fired from the numerous loopholes which
had been placed in the wall by Archimedes to cover that area which was not accessible to the artillery placed on top of the wall (see Chapter 15.9. διαδοχάς...).

16.2. κανταύθα πάλιν αύτών εἰς μήκος ἐκτεταμένων...ἀπίόντας: In falling back the Roman forces now came under fire from the artillery situated on the wall.

16.2. ἔγινετο πολὺς μὲν αύτων φθόρος: No casualty figures are given by the ancient sources for this siege.

16.2. πολὺς δὲ τῶν νεῶν συγκρουσμός: Polybius (8.5.4) reports an attack at night by the Roman fleet, but does not indicate that a corresponding attack was also undertaken by the land forces. Plutarch in his account of the assault does not make it clear whether or not a land attack was attempted. But it is only reasonable to assume that the night attack was undertaken both by land and sea for the same reason it was done during daylight (see Chapter 14.5. προσβολάς...).

16.3. τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν ὀργάνων ὑπὸ τὸ τεῖχος ἐσκευοποιήτο...: Marsden (GRAHD 109) interprets this passage as possibly implying that the majority of the artillery was situated in front and at the base of the wall (ὑπὸ τὸ τεῖχος) among outworks, which is a position recommended by Philo (Par. 82.6-14).

This interpretation, however, does not seem reasonable for Syracuse. The positioning of artillery in front of a wall was
done in order to cover the space right in front of it that the artillery positioned on top could not reach, but this problem had been solved by Archimedes with the placement of loopholes in the wall itself (see Chapter 15.9. διαδοχὰς...). If artillery was positioned in front, then it would require extensive outworks to protect it in this vulnerable position. However, remains of extensive outworks at Syracuse have only been found at the Euryalus fort. It has been reasonably conjectured that artillery was placed in front of the main wall here, but the area guarded by the fort is exceptional since it afforded a very easy approach to the plateau of Epipolae. Artillery was placed in front of the main wall in this sector to give added supporting fire to the artillery placed on that wall and in the adjoining towers (see Marsden GRAHD 119-121 and Lawrence JHS 64 [1948]: 99-107).

The expression ὑπὸ τὸ τεῖχος should mean "under the protection of the wall" (i.e. "behind it"; LSJ, s.v. ὑπό, has the example: κατακρυπτεῖν τινὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν θύρην [Hdt. 1.12]). It would not be reasonable to have most of the artillery (τὰ...πλείστα) in front of the wall, since not only would it be more vulnerable, but placing the artillery in a lower position sacrifices the increase in range it would have, if situated on top of the wall. Also, the missiles sent against the Romans are described as coming from concealed positions (μυρίων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἐξ ἀφανοὺς ἐπιχεομενῶν). This would better describe missiles coming from loopholes and from artillery placed on top of the wall protected by battlements rather than
from forward projecting and exposed outworks.
17.1. Τοὺς σὺν ἐαυτῷ σκόπτων τεχνίτας καὶ μηχανοποιοῦσι: One of these engineers was probably Heracleides of Tarentum, who is said to have been the inventor of the sambucae used by the Romans (Athen. 14.634a-b: καὶ Ἀνδρέας ὁ Πανορμίτης ἐν τῷ τριακοστῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Σικελικῶν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν, ὡς ἀπὸ δύο νεῶν προσάγοιτο τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων τείχεσι. καλείσθαι τε σαμβύκην, ἐπειδὴ ὅταν ἔξαρθῇ γίνεται σχῆμα νεῶς καὶ κλίμακος ἐνοποιούμενων, ὅμοιον δὲ τί ἔστιν καὶ τὸ τῆς σαμβύκης. Μόσχος δὲ ἐν πρώτῳ Μηχανικῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν εἶναι λέγει τὸ μηχάνημα καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Ταραντίνου εὑρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὸ εἴδος; see Introduction, p. 34, concerning Heracleides as one of Plutarch's sources; see, also, Walbank Polybius 1: 72).

17.2. Plutarch probably found this supposed saying of Marcellus in a lost biography of Archimedes (see Introduction, p. 34) and not in Polybius. For, even though the latter has the anecdote, it is in a shorter form, in which the mythological references are left out (8.6.6: ὥμως δὲ ἐπισκόπτων τὰς αὐτοῦ πράξεις ἔφη ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν αὐτοῦ κυαθίζειν ἐκ θαλάττης Ἀρχιμήθη, τὰς δὲ σαμβύκας ῥαπιζομένας ὅσπερ ἐκσπόνδους μετ' αἰσχύνης ἐκπεπτωκέναι; Athenaeus [14.634b] reproduces Polybius' rendition of Marcellus' joke, but instead of ὅσπερ ἐκσπόνδους he has ὅσπερ ἐκ πότου).

Landels (EAW 96) suggests that this saying of Marcellus may be authentic: "Marcellus was trying to save face, and justify
his action in abandoning a direct attack and turning instead to a prolonged blockade."

If the Heracleides who is said to have been the inventor of the Roman *sambucae* is the same as the biographer of Archimedes (see Introduction, p. 34), then it is possible that the joke made by Marcellus is factual and not an invention, since Heracleides could have heard Marcellus himself say it and have included it in his biography of Archimedes.

17.2. πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικὸν τοῦτον Βριάρεων: Archimedes is likened to Briareus (*RE* 3.1 [1897], "Briareos": 833-835), a hundred-handed giant of mythology.

17.3. One of Archimedes' inventions allegedly used at this siege, but of which no mention is made by either Plutarch, Polybius, or Livy, is an arrangement of mirrors which could concentrate the rays of the sun on a ship and set it afire at a distance of a bow-shot (*Tzet. Chil.* 2.118-127 Kiessling: 'Ος Μάρκελλος δ' ἀπέστησε βολὴν ἐκείνας [sc. ὀλκάδας] τὸξου, / 'Εξάγωνόν τι κάτοπτρον ἐτέκτηνεν ὁ γέρων. / Απὸ δὲ διαστήματος συμμέτρου τοῦ κατόπτρου / Μικρὰ τοιαῦτα κάτοπτρα θείς τετραπλά / γωνίας / Κινούμενα λεπίσι τε καὶ τισι γιγαλμίοις, / Μέσον / ἐκεῖνο τέθεικεν ἀκτίνων τῶν ἡλίου, / Μεσομβρινῆς καὶ θερινῆς καὶ / χειμεριωτάτης. / Ἀνακλωμένων δὲ λοιπὸν εἰς τοῦτο τῶν ἀκτίνων / "Εξαψις ᾨδῆ φοβερὰ πυρώδης ταῖς ὀλκάσι, / Καὶ ταύτας ἀπετέφρωσεν ἐκ μήκους τοξοβόλου). It is known that Archimedes wrote a work on mirrors (*Kατοπτρικά; Theon Synt. 1: 29 Halma*),
and therefore may have conducted experiments with them. But the earliest mention of the story of the mirror used at the siege of Syracuse is not found until Lucians' *Hippias* (2: τὸν δὲ [sc. Ἀρχιμήδη] τὰς τῶν πολεμίων τριήρεις καταφλέξαντα τῇ τέχνῃ; cf. Gal. *Mixt.* 3.2 Helmreich, *Zon.* 9.4.8), and since neither Plutarch, Polybius, or Livy mention the alleged device, it must be seriously doubted whether it was used. The story may have arisen from an ancient author who upon reading Archimedes' work on mirrors assumed that an experimental device described in it (i.e. an arrangement of mirrors for setting fire to objects at a distance) was used at this siege.

17.4. According to Polybius at a council called after this unsuccessful attack it was resolved to try any other means of capturing the city except by direct assault (8.7.5: τὸ δὲ πέρας, ἀναχωρήσαντες εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν καὶ συνεδρεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀππίον, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐβουλεύσαντο πάσης ἐλπίδος πείραν λαμβάνειν πλὴν τοῦ διὰ πολιορκίας ἑλεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας, ὡς καὶ τέλος ἔποιήσαν). It was thought best to blockade the city in order to reduce it by famine (Polyb. 8.7.10: οὐ μὴν ἄλλα νομίσαντες μάλιστ' ἀν ύπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τούς ἔνδον ὑποχειρίους φίσει γενέσθαι, ταύτης ἀντεἰχοντο τῆς ἐλπίδος· καὶ ταῖς μὲν νυσί τὰς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπικουρίας αὐτῶν ἐκώλυν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι τὰς κατὰ γῆν; *Zon.* 9.4.8). But the Romans were only partially successful in bringing about a scarcity of food supplies (Polyb. 8.37.2; Liv. 25.23.14), since the Carthaginian fleet was able,
despite Roman efforts, to sail into and out of Syracuse on several occasions (Liv. 24.36.3, 7, 25.25.11-13). Even Livy admits that the Romans were unable to prevent provisions from reaching Syracuse (25.23.3: quamquam nec vi capi videbat [sc. Marcellus] posse inexpugnabilem terrestri ac maritimo situ urbem nec fame, ut quam prope liberi a Carthagine commenatus alerent).

17.5-12. This section of chapter 17 is probably in large part derived from a lost biography of Archimedes (see Introduction, p. 34).

17.5. The fourth century A.D. mathematician Pappus of Alexandria reports that Carpus of Antioch stated that Archimedes wrote only one book on mechanics, that dealing with the celestial sphere, but did not think it worthwhile to write about other mechanical subjects (8.3, p. 1026.9 Hultsch = in Archim. 2: 551 Heiberg: Κάρπος δέ πού φησιν ὁ Ἀντίοχεὺς Ἀρχιμήδη τόν Συρακόσιον ἐν μόνον βιβλίον συντεταχέναι μηχανικόν το κατὰ τὴν σφαιροποιίαν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐξισοκέναι συντάξαι). Although Archimedes may not have left any writings on his mechanical inventions except the one on the sphere, he did write on theoretical mechanics (e.g., Περὶ ᾿Ωγῶν [On Balances or Levers], Κεντροβαρικά [Problems on the Centers of Gravity], Κατοπτρικά [Properties of Mirrors], Περὶ ὀχυμένων [On Floating Bodies]; see Heath HGM 2: 22-25 or Archimedes xxxi-xxxviii).

17.6. Plutarch’s portrayal of Archimedes’ attitude towards the
applied sciences may have been influenced by Platonic thought, since we know that Archimedes did not despise mechanics (cf. Peters *The Harvest of Hellenism* 216, n. 35, Soedel-Foley *Scientific American* 240.3 [1979]: 154). In his work *The Method* (Περὶ τῶν μηχανικῶν θεωρημάτων... Ἐφοδος) Archimedes comments positively on the usefulness of mechanical means for investigating certain mathematical problems (Archim. 2: 428 Heiberg: ἐνικμασα γράψαι σοι καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ βιβλίον ἐξορίσαι τρόπου τινὸς ἱδιότητα, καθ’ ὅν σοι παρεχόμενον ἔσται λαμβάνειν ἀφορμᾶς εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι τίνα τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι θεωρεῖν διὰ τῶν μηχανικῶν. τοῦτο δὲ πέπεισμαι χρήσιμον εἶναι οὕδὲν ἔσον καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῶν τῶν θεωρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τίνα τῶν πρῶτον μοι φανέντων μηχανικῶς ὑστερον γεωμετρικῶς ἀπεδείχθη διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως εἶναι τὴν διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ τρόπου θεωρίαν).

17.8-10. Heath, a modern authority on ancient Greek mathematics, says this on the character of Archimedes’ works:

The treatises are, without exception, monuments of mathematical exposition; the gradual revelation of the plan of attack, the masterly ordering of the propositions, the stern elimination of everything not immediately relevant to the purpose, the finish of the whole, are so impressive in their perfection as to create a feeling akin to awe in the mind of the reader (*HGM* 2: 20).

Although Archimedes clearly did not arrive at his results by the steps set out in the proofs, something of his method of investigation is revealed to us in his work *The Method* (Archim. 2: 423-507 Heiberg) where he describes how he discovered
certain theorems by the use of mechanics. But he makes it clear that this did not constitute scientific proof of them and that it was still necessary to give a rigorous demonstration using orthodox geometrical methods (Heath *HGM* 2: 21).

17.12. Livy mentions that Marcellus himself took responsibility for his burial (25.31.10: aegre id Marcellum tulisse sepulturaeque curam habitam; cf. Tzet. *Chil.* 2.145-148 Kiessling), and therefore he may also be responsible for setting up the marker.

Cicero (*Tusc.* 5.64-66), as quaestor in Sicily in 75 B.C. under Sex. P educaeus (see Broughton *MRR* 2: 98 for references), sought out the tomb of Archimedes. He found it among the graves at Syracuse's Agrigentine gate neglected and overgrown with thickets. It consisted of a small column on which was the figure of a sphere and cylinder but with only about half the inscription still readable (5.65-66: ego autem cum omnia conlustrarem oculis—est enim ad portas Agragantinas magna frequentia sepulcrorum—, animum adverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in qua inerat sphaerae figura et cylindri...apparebat epigramma exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum dimidiatum fere).

From this request of Archimedes it can be inferred that he regarded the discovery of the ratio which the cylinder bears to the sphere as his greatest achievement (Heath *HGM* 2: 19).
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

18.1. Τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας...τῶν Σικελιωτῶν: Since the Roman commanders did not wish to waste time in besieging Syracuse while accomplishing nothing else (Polyb. 8.7.11), they divided their troops, and while Appius remained with two-thirds of their forces, Marcellus with the other third set off to recover those cities which had defected to the Carthaginians (Polyb. 8.7.11-12: διείλον οἱ στρατηγοὶ σφᾶς αὐτῶς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὡσε τὸν μὲν Ἄππιον ἔχοντα δύο μέρη προσκαθῆθαι τοίς ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀναλαβόντα Μάρκον ἐπιπορεύεσθαι τοὺς τὰ Καρχηδονίων αἱρουμένους κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν; Liv. 24.35.1: Interim Marcellus cum tertia fere parte exercitus ad recuperandas urbes profectus quae in motu rerum ad Carthaginienses defecerant).

The Romans had three legions around Syracuse at this time. This is indicated by the notice of the Romans dividing their forces (Polyb. 8.7.11-12, Liv. 24.35.1) and by the manner in which Marcellus employed his third. Marcellus found himself vastly outnumbered with his small force when he confronted the Carthaginian army of 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 12 elephants at Agrigentum. When, however, in his subsequent withdrawal back to Syracuse, he unexpectedly came upon a Syracusan force of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry at Acrillae, he overwhelmed it (see 18.2. εἴλε... concerning these events). This suggests that Marcellus had a force of one legion with its allied contingent. Besides, a total of three legions at this
time fits in well with a notice in Livy (24.36.4) of a legion arriving in Sicily near the end 213 B.C. after the battle at Acrillae. This newly arrived legion, which was probably the one which Marcellus had left behind in Campania when he crossed over to Sicily (see Chapters 13.3. ταύτην... and 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...), would raise the Roman force to a total of four legions, giving each commander the control of two legions, which was the usual maximum legionary force for one commander (see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 274, 307-308, Gelzer Kleine Schriften 3: 239, Brunt Italian Manpower 654-655, and Walbank Polybius 2: 77-78 concerning the presence of three legions at Syracuse; the main objective of recent scholarship has been to oppose the small numbers allotted to the Roman force at Syracuse by Kahrstedt [Geschichte der Karthager 3: 469] who proposed a total of only 10,000-12,000 men). It is reasonable to suppose that each legion was accompanied by its allied contingent, although no direct mention of this is made by the ancient sources (see Chapter 13.3. ταύτην...).

According to Livy, Marcellus recovered the cities of Helorum and Herbesum, which gave themselves up voluntarily, while he took Megara by force and sacked it in order to terrify other defectors, especially the Syracusans (24.35.1-2: Helorum atque Herbesum dedentibus ipsis recipit, Megara vi capta diruit ac diripuit ad reliquorum ac maxime Syracusanorum terrorem).

Megara Hyblaea was located 20 kilometers north of Syracuse on the east coast of Sicily. The city was founded according to the literary tradition by the Megarians in 728 B.C. (Thuc. 6.4),
but recent discoveries would date it to ca. 750 B.C. (see PECS 565-566).

Helorus was a small city located south of Syracuse on the left bank of the Helorus river (mod. Tellaro). It was connected to Syracuse by the Helorian Road (see PECS 382-383).

Herbesus was located north of Syracuse near the cities of Megara Hyblaea and Leontini. It was this city that Hippocrates and Epicydes escaped to during the capture of Leontini by the Romans (Liv. 24.30.2, 10-11; see RE 8.1 [1912], "Herbessos," no. 2: 530-531).

Plutarch in his account here of the taking of Megara says nothing about Marcellus’ sacking of the town, since he wants to underplay Marcellus’ harshness and cruelty whenever possible. But he was too honest to deny it completely, and he mentions the incident at Megara in a later context (Marc. 20.2), where he attempts to justify it. He probably also had the example of Megara in mind in the Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli (1.3), where he admits that Marcellus had committed massacres in many captured cities.

18.2. εἰλε δὲ τὸ Ἰπποκράτους...χάρακα βαλλομένους: The Carthaginian commander Himilco had landed a force of 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 12 elephants at Heraclea Minoa during Marcellus’ foray in Sicily to recover rebel cities (Liv. 24.35.3).

Carthage, it appears, had now resolved to recover her lost possessions in Sicily, which she had given up in the First Punic
War (Liv. 24.35.4-5), following Hannibal's new strategy of opening up new theaters of war in order to produce the encirclement of Italy (cf. Hallward CAH 8: 61).

Marcellus had hastened to Agrigentum in order to arrive there before the Carthaginians, who were coming from the opposite direction, but he was too late. Since he was in no position with his small force to confront the Carthaginians, he marched back towards Syracuse. During this march Marcellus kept his forces arrayed to meet any emergency, because he was afraid of the numerically superior Carthaginian forces which were following him. In this formation Marcellus unexpectedly came upon a Syracusan army at Acrillae. This force, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under the command of Hippocrates, had been dispatched by the Syracusans, in the belief that their city could be adequately defended by a part of their forces. It was to join Himilco in order to help him carry on the war against Marcellus. Hippocrates had managed to slip his force out of Syracuse by night through places unguarded by the Romans, and was pitching camp at Acrillae when Marcellus' army fell upon him. The Syracusan infantry was overwhelmed, but Hippocrates with the cavalry managed to escape to Acrae (Liv. 24.35.6-36.1).

Livy in his account of the battle (24.36.1) gives no definite number of casualties, but Plutarch gives the figure of 8,000 enemy killed. Obviously Plutarch acquired this figure from a source other than Livy.

The site of Acrillae is unknown, but it must have been
situated on the line of march from Agrigentum to Syracuse not far from Acrae (Smith Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography 1: 22).

Acrae was a colony of Syracuse founded in 664 B.C. (Thuc. 5.5.3) and located to the west of the modern center of Palazzuolo Acreide on the summit of a hill between the valleys of the Anapus (mod. Anapo) and Helorus (mod. Tellaro) rivers (see PECS 26-27).

According to Livy (24.36.2), Marcellus returned to Syracuse after this battle since it restrained those Sicilians inclined to revolt from the Romans.

18.2. ἐπέδραμε δὲ πολλὴν τῆς Σικέλιας...: Plutarch has briefly summarized Marcellus' actions away from Syracuse in order to return quickly to the narration of the siege. But this summary exaggerates the extent of Marcellus' activities since he confined himself largely to the western half of Sicily.

Livy (24.36.2-7) reports that after Marcellus' return to Syracuse, Himilco, joined by Hippocrates, pitched camp about eight miles from Syracuse by the Anapus river. Meanwhile a Carthaginian fleet of 55 ships under the command of Bomilcar sailed into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, but it did not tarry long since Bomilcar, being outnumbered by the Roman fleet and seeing that his stay only further depleted the supplies of the allies, decided to put to sea, and the fleet crossed over to Africa (see Hallward CAH 8: 67-68 and Chapter 19.7. καὶ γὰρ τὴν... concerning possible doublet of Bomilcar's actions by
Livy; although cf. Thiel SHRSPRT 82, n. 144).

Around this time Roman reinforcements arrived from Italy, landing at Panormus (mod. Palermo). This force consisted of the legion (Liv. 24.36.4; its allied complement probably accompanied it) which was assigned to Marcellus in 214 B.C., but had been left behind by him in Campania when he first crossed over to Sicily. This is indicated by the fact that we do not hear of this legion being re-assigned while it was in Campania. The bringing over of only one legion at first and a second one only later accords well with what we know of the situation at the time of Marcellus' arrival (see Chapter 13.3. τῶντην...) and with the number of legions at Syracuse (see Chapter 18.1. Τῆς δὲ πολιορκίως...). These reinforcements marched along the coast, escorted by their transport fleet of 30 ships, in order to avoid Himilco who had advanced inland to intercept it. It was met by Appius at Pelorum, who had advanced with a part of his forces to meet it (Liv. 24.36.4-6; see Moore, trans., Livy 6 [Loeb]: 291, n. 3, for Pelorum instead of Pachynum, Livy's reading, as the meeting place of Appius and the Roman reinforcements).

After Himilco had failed to intercept the Roman reinforcements, and realized that there was no opportunity of attacking the Romans around Syracuse, he undertook to bring up his army to any point where there was hope of a revolt from the Romans and by his presence to give encouragement. He was first successful at Murgantia where the inhabitants betrayed the Roman garrison (Liv. 24.36.5, 8-10). Here the Romans had gathered a
large store of grain and supplies of every kind (Liv. 24.36.10: Murgantiam primum prodito ab ipsis praesidio Romano recipit, ubi frumenti magna vis commeatusque omnis generis convecti erant Romanis).

Murgantia (or more commonly Morgantina) was located five kilometers east of modern Aidone on the Serra Orlando ridge. The city held a strategic position controlling roads leading to Gela in the south, Messina in the northeast, and Katane in the east (see PECS 594-595). It is listed by Silius Italicus as an ally of Carthage (14.265: non frondosis Morgentia campis abstinuit Marte infido). According to Livy (26.21.14, 17), after Marcellus departed from Sicily in 211 B.C., it once more defected to the Carthaginians, but was subdued by Marcellus' successor, M. Cornelius Cethegus, and assigned to some of Rome's Spanish allies (although Livy does not report it, Murgantia must have been retaken by the Romans near the time of the fall of Syracuse).

According to Livy, due to the defection of Murgantia, other cities began to overthrow their Roman garrisons (24.37.1: Ad hanc defectionem erecti sunt et aliarum civitatum animi, praesidiaque Romana aut pellebantur arcibus aut prodita per fraudem opprimebantur). But at Henna, a town commanding a site in central Sicily on a rocky plateau 950 meters above sea level (see PECS 304-305), the Roman garrison, under the command of L. Pinarius, anticipated its betrayal by massacring the inhabitants (Liv. 24.37.2-39.6; Frontin. Str. 4.7.22; Polyaen. 8.21). Livy comments that this deed was either evil or necessary, depending
upon how one looked at it (24.39.7: Ita Henna aut malo aut necessario facinore retenta). But it seems certain that the Roman garrison there was in immediate peril, since Himilco and Hippocrates were nearby, having been summoned by the intended betrayers. But after the massacre of the inhabitants, they departed, Hippocrates to Murgantia and Himilco to Agrigentum (Liv. 24.39.10: Hippocrates inde Murgantiam, Himilco Agrigentum sese recepit, cum acciti a proditoribus nequiquam ad Hennam exercitum admovissent).

Marcellus, who probably arrived at Henna just after the massacre, ceded the booty from here to the soldiers. Livy, describing Marcellus' feelings, states that although Marcellus did not approve of the deed, nevertheless he thought that this incident would restrain the Sicilians from betraying their Roman garrisons (24.39.7: Marcellus nec factum improbavit et praedam Hennensium militibus concessit, ratus timore fore deterritos proditionibus praesidiorum Siculos). However, Livy (24.39.8-9) reports that it had the opposite effect: all those who were wavering in their loyalty now went over to the Carthaginians.

Whether Livy is correct in stating that Marcellus did not approve of the act is questionable, but the actions of the Roman garrison do not seem out of line with the policy which Marcellus was pursuing in Sicily of being harsh when necessary (see, for example, Marcellus 14.2 and Livy 24.30.6 on the execution of Roman deserters, Marcellus 20.2 and Livy 24.35.2 on the capture and sacking of Megara, Marcellus 20.11 on Marcellus' intention of punishing Engyion, and Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli 1.3
on Plutarch’s admission that Marcellus committed massacres in many captured cities). Also, from an inscription found in Rome, it is known that Marcellus made a display of the booty taken from Henna, which he would not have done if he had believed that the action taken there was discreditable (CIL, I², 608 = ILS, 12: M. Claudius M. f. / consol / Hinnad cepit; since the inscription identifies Marcellus as consul, and we know that the massacre at Henna occurred in 213 B.C. when he was not consul [see De Sanctis SR 3².2: 317-322 for chronology], the inscription must refer to the year when it was set up, probably in his next consulship [i.e. 210 B.C.]; the year 211 B.C. has also been suggested [see CIL, I², pp. 499-500]). Even Livy’s report (24.39.7) that Marcellus ceded the booty from Henna to the soldiers points to his having approved of his subordinates’ actions.

From Henna Marcellus went to Leontini where he gathered together grain and supplies (probably to replace those lost at Murgantia [Liv. 24.36.10]), and after leaving a garrison there, he returned to Syracuse (Liv. 24.39.11: Marcellus retro in Leontinos redit frumentoque et commeatibus aliis in castra convictis, praesidio modico ibi relictō, ad Syracusas obsidendas venit; the phrase retro in Leontinos redit implies that he had originally proceeded to Henna from Leontini). After he arrived at Syracuse, Appius was discharged so that he could go to Rome to stand for the consulship of 212 B.C., and in his place Marcellus appointed T. Quinctius Crispinus, who took over the command of the fleet and the old Roman camp at Syracuse, which
was located west of Syracuse near the Olympieion. Marcellus
built a winter camp for his own forces north of Syracuse at a
place which Livy calls Leon (24.33.3, 39.12-13). Livy locates
this place five miles from the Hexapylon gate (24.39.13: ipse
hibernacula quinque milia passuum <ab> Hexapylo--Leonta vocant
locum--communiit aedificavitque), but it is known that the place
called Leon was only one and a half kilometers from the
Hexapylon (see Drögemüller Syrakus 101 and 147). Drögemüller
has suggested that Livy has given the correct distance, but the
wrong name. A distance of five miles would locate the winter
camp on the Thapsus peninsula (mod. Magnisi), a much more
suitable place for such a camp than the strategically unsafe
position at Leon. According to Drögemüller (Syrakus 147-148)
Livy had learned elsewhere than from his main source, Polybius,
that the Romans had built a camp north of Syracuse at a place
called Leon (this camp would have been the one used in the
spring of 213 B.C. when the Romans launched a land attack
against a section of wall east of the Hexapylon gate [mod. Scala
Graeca]). But since Polybius did not identify the camps by name
in his account, Livy erroneously attributed the name Leon to the
winter camp of 213/2 B.C.

18.3-19.5. Polyaenus (8.11) reproduces this section of Plutarch
in his work. But although he obviously drew directly from
Plutarch as the phrasing and word order show, there are
significant enough discrepancies to indicate that he was not
making a direct transcription, but must have been relying on
notes or his own memory.

18.3. Χρόνῳ δὲ προίόντι Δάμιππόν...κομίσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα: The following events occurred in the spring of 212 B.C. (Liv. 25.23.2: intio veris; see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 317-322 for chronology).

According to Livy the Spartan Damippus (RE 4.2 [1901], no. 1: 2056) had been sent on a mission to Philip of Macedonia. Marcellus was willing to negotiate for his ransom because the Romans at this time were trying to obtain an alliance with the Aetolians who were allies of the Spartans (25.23.8-9: Damippus quidam Lacedaemonius, missus ab Syracusis ad Philippum regem, captus ab Romanis navibus erat. Huius utique redimendi et Epicydae cura erat ingens, nec abnuit Marcellus iam tum Aetolorum, quibus socii Lacedaemonii erant, amicitiam adfectantibus Romanis; it should be noted that during the reign of Hieronymus, Damippus, who served as a member of the king’s council, had advised that Syracuse should abide by its treaty with Rome [Polyb. 7.5.1-3]).

18.3. πύργον τινὰ κατεσκέψατο...: This tower was called Galeagra (Liv. 25.23.10; Zon. 9.5.3). Livy locates it near the Portus Trogilorum (25.23.10: Ad conloquium de redemptione eius missis medius maxime atque utrisque opportunus locus ad portum Trogilorum proper turrim, quam vocant Galeagram, est visus). Livy’s linking together of the tower and the Portus Trogilorum has resulted in the tower being located to the east of the
Hexapylon gate (mod. Scala Graeca; see, for example, Parke JHS 64 [1944]: 100-102 who locates the tower near the modern port of S. Pangia; this location is accepted by Walbank Polybius 2: 112). However, Drögemüller (Syrakus 139-147) has shown that it must have been located west of the Hexapylon gate in the vicinity of the modern Torre della Targetta and Livy’s topographical placement of it near the Portus Trogilorum is incorrect due to his confused handling of his sources.

Plutarch reports that this tower was carelessly guarded (φυλαττόμενον μὲν ἄμελδως), but Livy says the opposite (25.23.13: sed cum adiri locus, quia ob id ipsum intentius custodiebatur, non posset, occasio quaerebatur).

18.4. ως οὖν τὸ θ’ ὑψος…εἰκάσθη καλῶς: One of the Romans on the delegation, counting the number of courses in the wall in this sector from close up and estimating the thickness of a course, realized that the wall was lower than earlier estimates and even reachable with moderate sized scaling ladders. He reported this to Marcellus (Liv. 25.23.11-12; Polyb. 8.37.1).

18.4. κλίμακες παρεσκευάσθησαν: According to Polybius (8.37.3) two scaling ladders were constructed to match the height of this wall. Livy (25.23.16-24.1) makes no mention of these, but reports that after the first group of soldiers had mounted the wall with ladders, more ladders were brought up for the use of the remaining groups.
18.4. ἐορτὴν Ἀρτέμιδι...παραφυλάξας: While Marcellus was awaiting an opportune moment to attack here, a deserter from Syracuse, named Sosistratus by Frontinus, reported to Marcellus that the Syracusans were celebrating a three day festival in honor of Artemis, and although food was scarce, plenty of wine had been offered by Epicydes. Marcellus, surmising that the guards would likely be drunk, resolved to undertake the scaling of the wall (Livy. 25.23.14; Polyb. 8.37.2; Frontin. Str. 3.3.2; Polybius' text also reports that the Syracusans themselves donated wine [πολὺν μὲν Ἐπικύδους δεδωκότος πολὺν δὲ Συρακουσίων], while Livy reports that the wine was offered by Epicydes and distributed by the Syracusan leaders [vino...ab Epicyde praebito universae plebei et per tribus a principibus diviso]; Walbank [Polybius 2: 113] suggests that the transmission of Polybius' text here is faulty).

What festival of Artemis is referred to here is unknown. Artemis was worshiped at Syracuse under several cult titles, two of which are Lyaia and Ortygia (RE 2.1 [1895], no. 2: 1407-1408). To Artemis Lyaia there was a great spring purification festival (Walbank Polybius 2: 113), while the cult title Ortygia refers to the quail, the bird of spring (Münzer RE 3.2 [1899]: 2746). Since Livy (25.23.1) dates the events here to the beginning of spring, either of these two festivals could have been the one concerned.

18.4-5. ἔλαθεν οὐ μόνον...ὡς οὐδενὸς μέρους ἀναλῶτοι μένοντος: Marcellus, having selected a picked body of approximately 1,000
men, sent them during the night with scaling ladders to mount the wall in the sector of the Galeagra tower. Marcellus himself waited a short time and then proceeded with the rest of his army towards the Hexapylon gate. The scaling party managed to mount the wall unobserved and proceeding along the wall found no sentries at their posts, but fell upon the drunken enemy soldiers who had gathered together in the towers to celebrate the festival and slew them. Upon reaching the Hexapylon gate they burst open a postern door and at the same time gave a signal by trumpet to Marcellus and his troops who were approaching. General fighting now broke out, but the enemy guards, uncertain as to what was happening, were quickly put to flight (Livy 25.23.15-24.5; Polyb. 8.37.2-11; see Walbank Polybius 2: 112 concerning postern door).

Meanwhile Epicydes, roused to action by the disturbance, advanced from the Island (Ortygia) through Achradina with reinforcements towards the Hexapylon gate. But when he realized that the plateau of Epipolae was occupied by enemy forces, he marched back into Achradina without having put up much resistance. Livy (25.24.8-10) reports that Epicydes feared more being shut out from Achradina and the Island through some treachery than an attack from the Romans.

18.6. The three regions of Syracuse mentioned here, Achradina, Neapolis, and Tyche, were situated southeast of Epipolae. These three regions along with the Island (Ortygia) were the inhabited quarters of the city, while the plateau area of Epipolae, even
during Syracuse’s most expansive periods, was for the most part uninhabited (Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 222). Nevertheless, this plateau had been incorporated within the city’s defenses, by Dionysius I in 401 B.C., because its dominating position over the inhabited regions made it too valuable to allow it to fall into enemy hands (Diod. 14.18.2-8; see Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 270).

The region of the city called Achradina was situated immediately north of the Island (Ortygia), oriented in a northeast/southwest direction (Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 224). As indicated by Plutarch here, it possessed its own fortifications, which made it necessary for Marcellus to undertake a second siege (see Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 226).

The regions of Neapolis and Tyche were situated outside Achradina’s fortifications to the north. Neapolis was located west of Tyche and just north of Achradina, and according to Cicero (Verr. 2.4.119) the theater was located in this region. The location of Tyche, whose name according to Cicero (Verr. 2.4.119) was due to a temple of Tyche located there, is more uncertain, but it appears to have been situated somewhere north of Achradina and east of Neapolis (see Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 225-227). Between Neapolis and Tyche there appears to have been an area free of construction (Liv. 25.25.5; Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 226). Unlike Achradina these quarters were evidently not protected by their own defensive walls (Liv. 25.25.5-9; Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 226; see Fabricius Klio, supp. 28 [1932], Drögemüller Syракus, and Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia
209-306 concerning the topography of Syracuse).
CHAPTER NINETEEN

19.1. Livy (25.24.7-10) reports that Epicydes advanced against the Roman forces only after daybreak when Marcellus had already entered Epipolae with his whole army, but it is more reasonable to believe that he did this when the Romans were actually storming the Hexapylon gate.

19.2. The melodramatic scene of Marcellus shedding tears over the fate of Syracuse is also described by Livy (25.24.11-13) and Silius Italicus (14.665-671), and mentioned by Augustine (De civ. D. 1.6, 3.14). Appian (Pun. 132) and Diodorus (32.24), drawing from Polybius (38.22), report that Scipio Aemilianus, likewise, shed tears at the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. (cf. Polyb. 38.21; see Astin Scipio Aemilianus 282-287).

It is questionable whether the incident of Marcellus shedding tears took place. Although Scipio Aemilianus may well have shed tears at the fall of Carthage, since Polybius himself was present at Carthage's capture and is said to have reported the actual words of Scipio, the incident reported here had no such eyewitness. In fact, the scene itself makes little sense since Syracuse was far from being captured. Both Achradina and the Island, the most important sectors of Syracuse, still held out, and Marcellus had to undertake a second siege, which was to last into the early part of 211 B.C. (see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 317-322 for chronology), and at the same time guard against becoming trapped within the city-walls by an enemy force.
approaching from the outside. The shedding of tears by Marcellus over the fate of Syracuse may be a dramatic addition of later historians inspired by the example of Scipio Aemilianus at the destruction of Carthage.

In Livy’s account (25.24.14-25.1) this incident inspired Marcellus to send forward the Syracusan refugees who were in his camp to entice the enemy to surrender the city, but the Roman deserters, who were the primary force holding the walls of Achradina and had no hope of pardon, did not allow them to approach.

Livy (25.23.4-7) had reported an earlier attempt by Marcellus, before the capture of Epipolae, to employ the Syracusan refugees in the Roman camp to bring about the capture of the city by betrayal. In this attempt a slave belonging to the exiles pretended he was a deserter and gained admission into Syracuse where he made contact with those in sympathy with the exiles outside. These sympathizers managed to hold discussions with the exiles by slipping out of Syracuse hidden under the nets of a fishing vessel and sailing around to the Roman camp. This means of contact was repeatedly employed, and the number of conspirators within the city reached up to 80 before they were betrayed to Epicydes and executed under torture.

Drögemüller (Syrakus 139-147) believes that this incident is the same one as that mentioned later by Livy (25.24.14-25.1) and that Livy’s doubling of the incident was due to his confused handling of his sources. According to Drögemüller this incident took place after Marcellus’ capture of Epipolae, and the
conspirators sailed to Piccolo Seno, a small cove only three kilometers by sea and out of sight from the walls of Achradina, to meet with the exiles from the Roman camp which was now within the outer walls of Syracuse. This is more plausible than a trip by boat to the earlier Roman camp north of the Hexapylon gate. The route would have been in full view from the walls of Epipolae by day and have involved travelling a distance of at least nine kilometers by night (in his arguments Drögemüller identifies Piccolo Seno as the Portus Trogilorum; see Chapter 18.3 πύργον...).

Soon after his entrance into Epipolae, Marcellus attempted to induce the garrison holding the Euryalus fort to surrender. This fort, occupying the highest point of the Epipolae plateau, anchored the extreme western sector of Syracuse's defensive fortifications and commanded an easy approach to the plateau from the interior of Sicily (Liv. 25.25.1-2). Its elaborate design, at least in its later stages, was the work of Archimedes (see Lawrence JHS 46 [1946]: 99-107) and is considered to have been one of the strongest of Greek fortifications (Moore, trans., Livy 6 [Loeb]: 437, n. 3; cf. Liv. 25.25.5: Marcellus, ut Euryalum neque tradi neque capi vidit posse).

The maintenance of this fort by the Syracusans posed a serious threat to the Romans since it could easily admit a relieving force which could then, in turn, blockade the Romans encamped within Syracuse's outer walls (Liv. 25.26.1). According to Livy (25.25.2-4) Marcellus sent Sosis, one of the slayers of Hieronymus, to negotiate with its commander,
Philodemus of Argos, for the fort’s surrender, but he was put off by Philodemus who was awaiting a relief army under Hippocrates and Hmilo.

19.3-6. According to Livy, Marcellus pitched camp in a vacant area between the regions of the city named Neapolis and Tyche (see Chapter 18.6.), fearing that, if he should enter the densely inhabited quarters, he would not be able to restrain his soldiers from scattering in their eagerness for booty (25.25.5: inter Neapolim et Tycham—nomina ea partium urbis et instar urbium sunt—posuit castra, timens ne, si frequentia intrasset loca, contineri ab discursu miles avidus praedae non posset).

Livy (25.25.6-9) reports that representatives from Neapolis and Tyche came to this camp begging that they be spared from bloodshed and fire. Marcellus held a meeting to discuss these requests and from a consensus of those present, proclaimed that free persons were not to be violated, while everything else was permitted to be seized as booty (25.25.7: De quorum precibus quam postulatis magis consilio habito Marcellus ex omnium sententia edixit militibus ne quis liberum corpus violaret: cetera praedae futura). Then, after he had stationed guards at the entrances to the camp to protect against any attack, Marcellus allowed the soldiers to disperse. Although they refrained from bloodshed, the plundering was extensive.

Marcellus’ unwillingness to plunder Syracuse (19.4: μάλα δ' ἄκων ψαρεύεις) and his sympathy for its plight (19.6: οἰκτρὰ πάσχειν ἤγείτο τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τὸ συμπαθοῦν καὶ τὸ συναλγοῦν ὃμως

259
Livy's narrative. They are probably Plutarch's own inventions resulting from his attempt to emphasize Marcellus' humanitarianism (1.3: φιλάνθρωπος). This is indicated by their absence from Livy, who does describe the scene of Marcellus shedding tears over Syracuse's fate and therefore could be expected to have added similar things to his account. If these things are not present in Livy's work, then it is unlikely that Plutarch would have found them elsewhere.

Livy reports (25.25.10, 26.1) that around the time of the Roman plundering of Neapolis and Tyche, negotiations with Philodemus came to an end. Having despaired of receiving outside assistance and on obtaining assurances of safe conduct, he surrendered the Euryalus fort. Possession of this fort by Marcellus relieved him of the fear of being hemmed in.

19.7. λέγεται γὰρ οὐκ...πλούτον γενέσθαι: Livy has a similar comparison, but in his version the amount of booty carried away from Syracuse is compared to that which could have been carried away from Carthage if it had been captured at this time (25.31.11: in quibus [sc. Syracusis] praedae tantum fuit, quantum vix capta Carthagine tum fuisset cum qua viribus aequis certabatur). Neither of these comparisons is probably correct, because Syracuse, despite extensive looting, was left intact with many of its treasures still remaining (see Chapter 21.1. πλεῖστα...), and it appears that the Romans found little money left in the royal treasury (see Chapter 19.7. πλὴν...).
Plutarch has shortened the sequence of events in order to arrive quickly at the scene of Archimedes' death, which he thought important for revealing Marcellus' humanitarianism (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος) and love of Greek culture (Marc. 1.3: Ἑλληνικὴς παιδείας... ἔραστής). The fall of Achradina and the Island occurred in the spring of 211 B.C., approximately one year after the capture of Epipolae in 212 B.C. (see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 317-322 for chronology; Livy reports a speech of Marcellus' in which he says he had been besieging Syracuse for three years [25.31.5: se quidem tertium annum circumsedere Syracusas]; this would be from late 214 to early 211 B.C.).

According to Livy (25.25.11-13), during this time of crisis for the Syracusans, with part of their city taken, Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral at Syracuse, managed to slip out at night during rough weather with 35 ships, when the Roman fleet could not ride at anchor in open water. Having informed the Carthaginians of the situation at Syracuse, he returned with a fleet of 100 ships; whereupon, it was rumored, he was presented with many gifts by Epicydes from the royal treasury of Hiero (Livy [24.36.7] previously reported that Bomilcar had earlier sailed for Africa, but no mention is made of his return; see Chapter 18.2. ἐπέδραμε... concerning the possibility of this incident being a doublet).

Livy reports (25.26.1-2) that after Marcellus had gained possession of the Euryalus fort, he proceeded to lay siege to
Achradina, establishing three camps in suitable positions around it with the intention of reducing it by preventing any supplies from reaching it from outside. If Livy is correct in interpreting Marcellus' intentions, the Roman strategy was bound to fail as long as the Syracusans were able to bring in supplies by sea, and up to this point, the Romans had been unable to prevent them from doing so (see Chapter 17.4.).

While the Romans were engaged in besieging Achradina, Hippocrates and Himilco finally arrived with their forces, but too late to prevent the surrender of the Euryalus fort. Having fortified a camp by the Great Harbor, they set about attacking the old Roman camp at the Olympieion, which was under the command of Crispinus. At the same time Epicydes made a sortie from Achradina against the Roman lines, and the Carthaginian fleet put into shore between the city and the Roman camp to prevent any Roman relief force sent by Marcellus from reaching Crispinus (Liv. 25.26.3-4). According to Livy this action was more of a disturbance than a true battle, and the Carthaginians and Syracusans were routed by the Romans (25.26.5: Tumultum tamen maiorem hostes praebuerunt quam certamen; nam et Crispinus Hippocraten non repulsit tantum munimentis sed insecutus etiam est trepide fugientem, et Epicyden Marcellus in urbem compulit).

After this engagement the army which had come to the relief of Syracuse caused no further problems to the Romans due to a plague which broke out among both parties (Liv. 25.26.7). Livy reports that the plague was due to the time of the year and to unhealthy places (25.26.7: Nam tempore autumni et locis natura
gravibus, multo tamen magis extra urbem quam in urbe, intoleranda vis aestus per utraque castra omnium ferme corpora movit). This would be in the autumn of 212 B.C., and the places referred to must be the marshy ground near the outflow of the Anapus river into the Great Harbor (Münzer [RE 3.2 (1899): 2747] suggests that the disease was malaria; see Brunt Italian Manpower 611-624 concerning effects of malaria in antiquity). Marcellus transferred the soldiers of the old camp at the Olympieion into the city when the plague began to be serious. This transfer offered some relief, but, nevertheless, many of the Romans were carried off by the disease. The Syracusan relief army suffered horribly encamped, in all likelihood, near the marshy ground here. Both Hippocrates and Himilco perished as well as most of their soldiers except the Sicilians, who had scattered to their own homes when they saw the spread of the disease (Liv. 25.26.3-4; Appian [Sic. 4] records that the Sicilians numbered 20,000 foot and 5,000 horse).

But even after the plague and destruction of the relief army, the opponents of the Romans still had hopes of rescuing Syracuse. The Sicilians who had formerly composed Hippocrates' army were gathering together not far from Syracuse, bringing in supplies and summoning reinforcements from their native cities. Meanwhile Bomilcar sailed again for Carthage and prevailed upon his government to provide him with additional supplies and ships. Thus with 130 warships and 700 transports, Bomilcar set sail from Carthage to Sicily with favorable winds (Liv. 25.27.1-4).
According to Livy (25.27.4-13) the same easterly winds which facilitated his crossing to Sicily prevented Bomilcar from rounding Cape Pachynum. Epicydes, fearing that the Carthaginian fleet would make for Africa if delayed much longer by the winds, handed over the control of Syracuse to the commanders of the mercenaries and sailed out to meet Bomilcar. Marcellus with his fleet also headed south to Cape Pachynum in order to engage the Carthaginian fleet and to prevent it from reaching Syracuse, even though he had fewer ships. However, a battle never took place. After the east wind dropped, Bomilcar put to sea first, but when he saw the approach of the Roman ships, he steered towards the open water and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, bereft of hope, did not return to Syracuse to be captured along with the city, but sailed to Agrigentum, while the transports which were stationed at Heraclea returned to Africa.

When the Sicilians who were encamped near Syracuse heard of these events, they discussed terms for the surrender of Syracuse with Marcellus (these terms as presented by Livy were quite generous [25.28.3: Cum haud ferme discreparet, quin quae ubique regum fuissent Romanorum essent, Siculis cetera cum libertate ac legibus suis servarentur]). They then sent envoys into the city who aroused their sympathizers to slay Epicydes' appointees, Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes surnamed Sindon, and after the populace had been called to assembly, new magistrates were appointed who dispatched representatives to Marcellus. While these representatives were away, the deserters, fearing that they would be handed over to the Romans, aroused the mercenary
soldiers with the same fear. Seizing arms they engaged in a massacre in which the new magistrates were slain. Taking control of the city, they appointed their own leaders to replace the slain magistrates, three to take charge of Achradina and three to take charge of the Island (Liv. 25.28-29). However, it soon dawned upon the mercenaries that their situation was different from that of the deserters, and the returning representatives pointed out that the Romans had no reason for punishing them (Liv. 25.29.10-30.1).

Among the retinue of the representatives, Marcellus had sent on purpose a Spanish auxiliary. This soldier made contact with one of the mercenaries' leaders, the Spaniard Moericus, and convinced him to throw in his lot with the Romans. Moericus commanded the section of the wall extending from the Fountain of Arethusa to the entrance of the Great Harbor (Liv. 25.30.2-6; this would be on the Island; see Strabo 6.2.4 and Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 235 concerning the fountain of Arethusa). Livy's account (25.30.7-12) is confused, but it appears that Moericus admitted a Roman contingent, which had come by boat, into the Island, while Marcellus undertook a full-scale attack against the walls of Achradina. The Island was easily captured, having been deserted by the guards who rushed to defend the walls of Achradina. When the defenders realized this, their resistance broke down, especially among the deserters, who now endeavored to escape capture. Marcellus, when he perceived that the Island had been taken and most of Achradina captured, ordered a withdrawal. According to Livy
(25.30.12) this was to prevent the royal treasury from being
looted, but it also allowed time for the deserters to escape in
order to prevent a fierce and desperate struggle to the end
(Liv. 25.31.1).

After the deserters had been given time to make their
escape, the Syracusans opened up the gates of Achradina and sent
envoys to Marcellus to beg only that their lives be spared.
Marcellus sent a quaestor to receive and guard the royal
treasury, while the city was given over to the soldiers to be
plundered, after guards had been assigned to protect the houses
of the exiles who had earlier fled to the Roman side (Liv.
25.31.1-8).

According to Livy (25.31.12-15) a few days before the
capture of Syracuse, Otacilius crossed to Utica from Lilybaeum
with 80 quinqueremes, and there he captured 130 cargo ships
loaded with grain. Returning with these ships on the third day
after having setting out, Otacilius immediately dispatched the
grain to Syracuse, and this arrived just in time to avert a
famine among both the conquered and the conquerors (cf. Diod.
26.20.2; it seems probable that the merchant ships Otacilius
captured had made up part of the Carthaginian relief force for
Syracuse which had returned home from Heraclea with its mission
unaccomplished [Liv. 25.27.12]; cf. Thiel SHRSPRT 86-87).

19.7. ἔβισαντο διαρρήσαι: In Livy (25.31.3-7) Marcellus
delivers a speech in which he attempts to justify the subsequent
plundering of Syracuse (specifically at 25.31.6-7: quid
potuerint Syracusani facere, exemplo vel eos esse Syracusanorum qui intra praesidia Romana fuerint vel Hispanum ducem Moericum qui praesidium tradiderit vel ipsorum Syracusanorum postremo serum quidem, sed forte consilium. sibi omnium laborum periculorumque circa moenia Syracusana terra marique tam diu exhaustorum nequaquam tantum fructum esse quod capere <sibi contigerit, quantum se servare> Syracusas potuisset).

Plutarch, on the other hand, is deliberately trying to portray Marcellus as a reluctant conqueror, by relieving him of the responsibility for the plundering. This typifies all of chapter 19 in which Plutarch takes pains to obviate any notion that Marcellus sanctioned any of the atrocities which occurred in the capture and sack of this famous Greek city. Plutarch probably thought that not to have done so would have worked against his attempt to portray Marcellus not only as a humanitarian (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος), but also as a lover of Greek culture (Marc. 1.3: Ἑλληνικής παιδείας...έραστής).

19.7. πλὴν τῶν βασιλικῶν χρημάτων: Livy (25.30.12, 31.8) records that Marcellus sounded the recall before the complete capture of the city to prevent the royal wealth from being plundered, and before he allowed his soldiers to plunder the city he put a quaestor in charge of the royal treasury.

The amount of wealth derived by the Roman government from the royal treasury and the booty which went into the public purse does not appear to have been very great. In the year following the capture of Syracuse, during Marcellus’ fourth
consulship (i.e. 210 B.C.), the Roman state fell into a serious financial crisis due to a lack of funds in the public treasury and to the citizens’ reluctance to pay more taxes (Livy 26.35-36). This would not have been the case if the wealth derived by the Roman government from Syracuse in ready cash was at all great. Although many artworks were carted off to Rome, these appear to have been used as decorations for monuments and not to have been sold at auction (see Chapter 21.1. πλείστα...). Also, Livy himself reports that the wealth in the royal treasury was rumored to be greater than it actually was (25.30.12: regiae opes, quarum fama maior quam res erat). Much of it may have been taken away by Epicydes and the Carthaginians in the closing days of the siege (Livy 25.25.13: multis, ut fama est, donis ex Hieronis gaza ab Epicyde donatus [sc. Bomilcar]).

19.8. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ Ἀρχιμήδους πάθος ἤνίασε Μάρκελλον: Marcellus had given orders that Archimedes was to be spared and grieved upon learning of his death (Cic. Verr. 4.131; Val. Max. 8.7, ext. 7; Plin. NH 7.125; Sil. Ital. 14.676-678; see Marcellus 19.12.).

19.8-11. ἔτυχε μὲν γὰρ αὐτός...: Plutarch gives three versions of the account of Archimedes’ death. The first two versions are closely related, portraying Archimedes as being absorbed in working out a solution to some mathematical problem at the time of his death. The third version, however, is markedly
different; it describes him as carrying a box of scientific instruments to Marcellus when he was killed. This version is unique since all other ancient accounts of Archimedes' death are variations related to the first two versions given by Plutarch (Livy. 25.31.9; Cic. Fin. 5.50; Val. Max. 8.7, ext. 7; Sil. Ital. 14.676-678; Zon. 9.5.5; Tzet. Chil. 2.136-149 Kiessling).

Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 304) believes that the first version is derived from Polybius, while doubting whether the other two versions were mentioned by him. Klotz suggests that it is more likely the last two were derived from the lost biography of Archimedes used by Plutarch (see Introduction, p. 34, concerning biography of Archimedes).

19.8-10. ἔτυχε μὲν γὰρ αὐτός...: We possess an account of Archimedes' death from both Livy and Valerius Maximus, two authors mentioned by Plutarch as sources for this life (Livy [Marc. 11.8, 24.5, 30.5, Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8], Valerius Maximus [Marc. 30.5]). Although these accounts are similar to the first two versions of Plutarch, neither one agrees in all details with either one of his versions (Livy 25.31.9: Cum multa irae, multa avaritiae foeda exempla ederentur, Archimeden memoriae proditum est in tanto tumultu, quantum captae urbis in <viis> discursus diripientium militum ciere poterat, intentum formis quas in pulvere descripsrerat ab ignaro milite quis esset interfectum; Val. Max. 8.7, ext. 7: at is, dum animo et oculis in terra defixis formas describit, militi, qui praedandi gratia domum inruperat strictoque super caput gladio quisnam esset
interrogabat, propter nimiam cupiditatem investigandi quod requirebat nomen suum indicare non potuit, sed protecto manibus pulvere 'noli' inquit, 'obsecro, istum disturbare,' ac perinde quasi neglegens imperii victoris obtruncatus sanguine suo artis suae liniamenta confudit). These two accounts may have been derived from a common source, possibly Valerius Antias, since both mention the ignorance of the soldier, a detail that Plutarch does not include.

Two other accounts which have come down to us, although similar to the first two versions of Plutarch, are more closely related to each other, deriving their similarities from Dio Cassius (i.e. Zon. 9.5.5: διάγραμμα γάρ τι διαγράφων, καὶ ἀκούσας τοὺς πολεμίους ἐφίστασθαι, "πάρ κεφαλάν" ἔφη "καὶ μὴ παρὰ γραμμάν." ἔπιστάντος δὲ αὐτῷ πολεμίου βραχὺ τε ἐφρόντισε καὶ εἰπὼν "ἀπόστησθι, ἄνθρωπε, ἀπὸ τῆς γραμμῆς" παρώξυνε τε αὐτὸν καὶ κατεκόπη, Tzet. Chil. 2.136-144, 149 Kiessling: Ἡν κεκυφώς, διάγραμμα μηχανικόν τι γράφων, / Τίς δὲ Ὀρμαῖος ἐπιστὰς εἶλκεν αἰχμαλωτίζων. / 'Ο δὲ τοῦ διαγράμματος ὅλος ὑπάρχων τότε, / Τίς ὁ καθέλκων οὐκ εἰδὼς, ἔλεγε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. / Ἀπόστησθι, ὃ ἄνθρωπε, τοῦ διαγράμματος μοι. / 'Ως δὲ εἰλκε τούτων συστραφεῖς καὶ γνοὺς Ὀρμαῖον εἶναι, / 'Εβδα, τί μηχανήμα τίς τῶν ἐμῶν μοι δότω. / 'Ο δὲ Ὀρμαῖος πτωθεῖς εὖθὺς ἐκεῖνον κτείνει, / Ἀνδρα σαθρὰν καὶ γέροντα, δαιμόνιον τοῖς ἐργοῖς. / ... / Ὅ Δίων καὶ Διόδωρος γράφει τὴν ἱστορίαν).
Plutarch’s source for this version is unknown, it must have originated from an author who was intimately familiar with Archimedes’ scientific investigations since the scientific instruments listed here, especially the γωνίαι, have particular relevance for them (see Chapter 19.11. τῶν μαθηματικῶν...). This would fit in well with what we know about Heracleides, the author of a biography on Archimedes (see Introduction, p. 34).

19.11. τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὁργάνων...πρὸς τὴν ὀψιν: Of the three types of scientific instruments listed here, only Archimedes’ work on on sundials (σκιόθηρα) is otherwise unknown.

Archimedes is known to have constructed celestial spheres (σφαίραι) which duplicated the motions of the heavenly bodies. Cicero (Rep. 1.21-22, Tusc. 1.63) describes those spheres of Archimedes which Marcellus had brought back to Rome as part of the booty from Syracuse (see Heath Archimedes xxi for further references).

The instruments called γωνίαι (lit. angles) by Plutarch refer to a device which could measure the angular diameter of the sun (i.e. the diameter of the sun as a section of arc of the circumference of the circle described by the orbit of the sun around the earth). Archimedes in his work Arenarius (12-16, 2²: 222-226 Heiberg) describes the construction and employment of this device used in his attempt to measure the angular diameter of the sun. It consisted of a long straight rod on which was mounted at right angles a small disk which could be moved along it. Positioning an eye at one end of the rod, Archimedes
observed the sun immediately after its rising, taking two readings by adjusting the disk along the rod until it just covered and just failed to cover the orb of the sun. In his experiments using this device, Archimedes found that the diameter of the sun was not less than 1/656 and not more than 1/800 of the arc of its orbit.

Plutarch’s wording γωνίας, αἵς ἐναρμόττει τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου μέγεθος πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν has similarities to Archimedes’ statement regarding what he attempted to do in his experiment (Aren. 1.10, 222 Heiberg: αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπισκεψάμενος τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐπειράθην ὀργανικῶς λαβεῖν τὰν γωνίαν, εἰς ἃν ὁ ἄλλος ἐναρμόζει τὰν κορυφὰν ἔχουσαν ποτὲ τῇ ὄψει). These similarities when taken in conjunction with the certainty that the device use by Archimedes was uncommon, otherwise he would not have taken the trouble to explain its construction and employment, and Plutarch would not have bothered to explain its function, suggest that Plutarch’s wording was ultimately derived from Archimedes’ work. However, Plutarch probably did not use this work directly, but acquired the information from a lost biography of Archimedes by Heracleides who would have been the author most likely to be intimately familiar with Archimedes’ scientific investigations (see Chapter 19.11.).

19.12. Livy reports a similar sentiment towards Archimedes’ death and treatment of his relatives on Marcellus’ part, but leaves out Marcellus’ reaction towards the slayer (25.31.10: aegre id Marcellum tulisse sepulturaeque curam habitam, et
propinquis etiam inquisitis honoris praesidioque nomen ac memoriam eius fuisse).

Tzetzes in his account gives his opinion that Marcellus killed Archimedes' slayer with an ax (Chil. 2.145-149 Kiessling: Ἐθρήνησε δὲ Μάρκελλος τούτο μαθὼν εὐθέως / Λαμπρᾶς τε τοῦτον ἔκρυψεν ἐν τάφοις τοῖς πατρώοις / Σὺν τοῖς ἀρίστοις πολιτῶν καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις πᾶσι· / Τὸν δὲ φονέα τού ἀνδρός οἶμαι πελέκει κτείνει. / Ὅ Δίων καὶ Διόδωρος γράφει τὴν ἱστορίαν).

It is surprising that Plutarch makes no direct reference to Marcellus taking care of Archimedes' burial, which is mentioned by both Livy (25.31.10) and Tzetzes (Chil. 2.146-148 Kiessling), since it would have been in line with the portrait Plutarch was attempting to draw of Marcellus as a humanitarian (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος) and a lover of Greek culture (Marc. 1.3: Ελληνικῆς παιδείας...ἔραστής).

Another possible indication of Marcellus' admiration for Archimedes is that from all the booty taken back to Rome by Marcellus the only item he kept for himself was one of Archimedes' celestial spheres (Cic. Rep. 1.21; see Chapter 1.3. Ελληνικῆς... concerning possible reason for Marcellus' admiration of Archimedes).
20.1. This statement about Marcellus appearing to have been the first to show the just side of the Roman character may be Plutarch's own assessment. But the possibility still remains that he acquired this assessment elsewhere. Klotz has suggested that Posidonius, who is the source for the following account of Nicias of Engyion (Marc. 20.3-11), may have spoken of Marcellus' behavior towards the Greeks (RhM 83 [1934]: 293-294). If Posidonius spoke of this behavior, then it is possible that the assessment given here by Plutarch may have been derived from him.

20.2. οὕτω γὰρ ἐχρητο...[number] ἐνεργέτησεν: Livy, along similar lines, says, Marcellus captis Syracusis, cum cetera in Sicilia tanta fide atque integritate composuisset ut non modo suam gloriam sed etiam maiestatem populi Romani augeret (25.40.1).

After Marcellus had captured Syracuse, embassies from nearly all of the Sicilian states came to him (Liv. 25.40.4). Livy says that the terms these states received from him varied according to their status before the taking of Syracuse. Those who had remained loyal to Rome, or although they had revolted, returned into friendly relations with her before the sack of Syracuse, were treated as faithful allies, while those who had surrendered out of fear after the taking of Syracuse were treated as having been conquered (25.40.4: Qui ante captas...
Syracusas aut non desciverant aut redierant in amicitiam ut socii fideles accepti cultique; quos metus post captas Syracusas dediderat ut victi a victore leges acceperunt; see Eckstein SG 166-169).

There is some indication that Marcellus by his actions in Sicily before the capture of Syracuse engendered a sense of mistrust in those cities which were loyal to Rome (App. Sic. 5: ὃτι διαβεβλημένων τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ οὐκ ἐπίστευον χωρίς ὑπόκου. διὸ καὶ Ταυρομενίων προσχωροῦντων οἱ συνέθετο καὶ ὄμοσε μήτε φρουρήσειν τὴν πόλιν μήτε στρατολογήσειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς).

20.2. ὡστε εἰ τι περὶ Ἐνναν ἡ Μεγαρεῖς ἡ Συρακοσίους...: The town of Henna, whose inhabitants had been massacred by its Roman garrison in 213 B.C. when they came under suspicion of being about to defect to the Carthaginians (see Chapter 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...), had the status of a civitas decumana within the Roman province of Sicily in the time of Cicero (Cic. Verr. 2.3.100).

The town of Megara Hyblaea, which had revolted from the Romans, was taken by force and sacked by Marcellus in 213 B.C. According to Livy (25.35.2) Marcellus did this in order to inspire terror in other defectors (see Chapter 18.1. Τῇς δὲ πολιορκίας...). After this time it led a wretched existence (RE 15.1 [1931]: 211) and by the time of Strabo no longer existed (Strab. 5.267).

Syracuse, following its capture and sack, lost its independence (although cf. RE 4a.2 [1932]: 1533-1534) and became
the residence of the governor of the Roman province of Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.5.29-30, 80).

In order for Plutarch to prove his assertion at Marcellus 20.1, he has to justify the measures Marcellus undertook against these three cities. It is interesting to note that although he has reported Marcellus’ activities against Syracuse (passim) and mentioned his capture of Megara (Marc. 18.2), he has failed to discuss what happened at Henna. This is due, no doubt, to the impossibility of reconciling what happened there with his portrayal of Marcellus as a humanitarian (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος).

20.3. μνημοθήσομαι δ’ ἐνός ἀπὸ πολλῶν: It has been alleged that the less than abundant material on Marcellus led Plutarch to include items of marginal relevance in order to fill out this biography (see Scardigli Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs 38). If this is true, then Plutarch’s statement is puzzling, since it would have been to his advantage to add more than one example, both to fill out the work and to reinforce his portrait of Marcellus. This creates the suspicion that Plutarch had, in fact, few examples at hand. His assertion may be a deduction on his part from a statement of one of his sources, but one which lacked particular examples (e.g., Liv. 25.40.1). Even the story which he presents suggests that he had few examples available, since it is a poor one to use to illustrate Marcellus’ humanitarianism (Marc. 1.3: φιλάνθρωπος). Marcellus is on the point of punishing the people of Engyion before he gives in to
the pleading of Nicias (Marc. 20.11). His release of the people of Engyion is done as a favor to Nicias, his supporter, rather than out of any concern for those whom he was about to punish. This incident shows not Marcellus' but Nicias' humanitarianism towards his enemies.

20.3-11. πόλις γὰρ ἐστὶ...: Mühl (Klass. Phil. Stud. 4 [1925]: 8-9) has argued that chapter 20, at least from this point on, is a literal transcription by Plutarch from Posidonius (see Marcellus 20.11 for Plutarch's naming of Posidonius as his source). He bases his conclusion on a comparison of the style of this passage to a long citation of Posidonius quoted by Athenaeus (5.211e-215b) concerning the activities of Athenion at Athens around the time of the First Mithridatic War (87-86 B.C.). Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 293-294) rightly dismisses this conclusion, stating that one can only go so far as to say that perhaps the style of Posidonius colors Plutarch's narrative.

20.3. πόλις γὰρ ἐστι τῆς Σικελίας Ἑγγύιον...: Engyion (or more commonly Engyon; RE 5.2 [1905], "Engyon": 2568) located somewhere in central Sicily is probably to be identified with Gangi, although Nicosia and Troina have also been suggested (PECS, "Gangi," 344, "Troina," 936). Diodorus (4.80.5) reports that the town was 100 stades from Agyrion. He (4.79.1-5) also says that it was founded by Cretans shortly after the death of their king Minos in Sicily, and they named the place after a spring which flowed in the town. In the time of Cicero it
possessed the status of a *civitas decumana* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.103).

20.3. διὰ θεῶν ἐπιφάνειαν ἔνδοξος ἄ καλοῦσι Ματέρας: The town was famous for its cult of the goddesses called 'Mothers,' who were originally female deities indigenous to the native Sicilian population. These goddesses became identified with *Magna Mater* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.97, 5.186; Coarelli-Torelli *Sicilia* 161) or with the *Curetes*, who nurtured Zeus in his infancy near Mount Ida on Crete (Diod. 4.79.7-80.2).

20.4. Ἰδρυμα λέγεται Κρητῶν γενέσθαι τὸ ἱερόν: Diodorus (4.79.7, 80.5) reports that the cult of the 'Mothers' was brought over from Crete and a large and expensive temple was built for them.

20.4. λόγχας τινάς ἐδείκνυσαν...: Meriones (*RE* 15.1 [1931], no. 1: 1031-1035) was a Cretan hero who fought on the side of the Greeks at Troy. Diodorus (4.79.6) reports that at some point after the fall of that city, Meriones landed in Sicily, and the Cretans with him were welcomed by the Engyionians because of their kinship and given citizenship.

Odysseus' wanderings were located by the ancients in Italy, Sicily, and Iberia (Strab. 1.2.11, 2.14, 2.17, 3.2.13). Besides the spears and helmets here at Engyion, other objects associated with Odysseus are known. These were either memorials to commemorate his wanderings or actual objects claimed as belonging to him. At Odysseia in Iberia shields and ship-beaks
were put up in the temple of Athena in his honor (Strab. 3.4.3), while at Circaeum in Italy a bowl was shown which allegedly belonged to him (Strab. 5.3.6). Even sanctuaries were alleged to have been founded by him (e.g., Strab. 5.4.8 concerning the sanctuary of Athena on Cape Sorrento).

The variation of Odysseus' name given here, Οὐλίξου, may be the Greek form from which the Latin Vlixes was derived (Wüst RE 17.2 [1937]: 1907).

20.10. διεσώθησαν μὲν οὖτως εἶς Συρακούσας πρὸς Μάρκελλον: Nicias arrived at Marcellus' camp probably no earlier than the later part of 213 B.C. after the Roman massacre at Henna (see Chapter 18.2. ἐπεδραμε... concerning Henna). According to Livy (24.39.8-9) this massacre caused those cities wavering in their loyalty to Rome to go over to the Carthaginian side. The city of Engyion was likely one of those cities (Silius Italicus [14.237, 248-249] lists both Henna and Engyion as still being allies of Rome before the first assault against Syracuse).

20.11. ἐπεί δὲ πολλὰ τούς 'Εγγυῖνους...ἀφετέρως πολλὰς ἤθωκε: Marcellus must have retaken Engyion in 211 B.C. after his subjection of Syracuse. His treatment of the Engyionians appears not as an act of humanitarianism (the view Plutarch advocates) but as a favor to Rome's loyal supporter Nicias.

20.11. ταύτα μὲν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἱστορήσε: The story of Nicias of Engyion which Plutarch derived from
Posidonius is mentioned by no other ancient author. It is an appendage added by Plutarch to his main narrative of Marcellus' Sicilian affairs for which he used other sources (Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 293, 303-304; although cf. Mühl Klass. Phil. Stud. 4 [1925]: 5-35 for a different interpretation). For Plutarch's use of Posidonius as a source in this life see Introduction, pp. 21-25.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

21.1. Τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον...ἐπανερχόμενος: After the fall of Syracuse in the early part of 211 B.C., and the settling of affairs with many of the Sicilian communities, Marcellus still had to deal with the Carthaginian forces at Agrigentum. These forces were under Hanno, Epicydes, and a new commander sent by Hannibal in the place of Hippocrates. This new leader, named Muttines, who had been trained in the arts of war by Hannibal himself, took over the command of the Numidian auxiliaries and began to overrun the Sicilian countryside. This activity emboldened the other two commanders to go outside the walls of Agrigentum and to take up a position at the Himera river with Muttines. When Marcellus heard of this, he marched against the enemy forces and encamped nearby (Liv. 25.40.5-9). According to Livy (25.40.10-41.7), in an engagement with the Romans, Muttines had driven them back inside their fortifications, but in the meantime a mutiny of the Numidians had broken out within the Carthaginian ranks which resulted in 300 of them retiring to Heraclea Minoa. Muttines went on a mission to pacify and recall these men and warned Hanno and Epicydes not to attack while he was gone. However, these two commanders, feeling indignant at him, decided to attack during his absence. In the resulting battle the Numidians who were still with the Carthaginian army made it known to Marcellus that they would remain inactive. Consequently, the engagement was short and the Carthaginians fled back to Agrigentum, while the Numidians scattered to the
neighboring towns.

Livy’s notice on the casualties for this battle is incomplete. While it is reported that many thousands were killed and eight elephants captured, the figure for the number of captured men has dropped out. Madvig has suggested the figure of 6,000 (Liv. 25.41.7: Multa milia hominum caesa; capta <sex milia> et octo elephanti; see Walters’ and Conway’s apparatus criticus). This was Marcellus’ last battle in Sicily and as victor he returned to Syracuse (Liv. 25.41.7).

Marcellus went home to Rome at the end of the summer of 211 B.C. (Liv. 26.21.1), but the troops which he had commanded were left behind, having been turned over to the praetor M. Cornelius Cethegus (Liv. 26.21.16-21).

It appears that Marcellus’ troops remained in Sicily because the threat of war still existed on the island. This threat became reality soon after his departure, when a Carthaginian fleet landed 8,000 infantry and 3,000 Numidian cavalry. At this time Muttines with the Numidian auxiliaries roamed over Sicily and burned the fields of the Roman allies, while Murgantia, Ergetium, Hybla, Macella, and other cities of lesser importance went over to the Carthaginians. However, the revolting cities were reduced to submission by Cethegus (Liv. 26.21.14-15, 17).

The reason Marcellus returned to Rome is unclear. Plutarch says that he was called back by the Romans for employment in Italy (ἀνακαλομένων τῶν Ρωμαίων ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγχώριον καὶ σύνοικον πόλεμον). However, there is no mention of this in Livy, and

282
after Marcellus was elected consul for 210 B.C., he was at first assigned by lot back to Sicily (Livy. 26.29.1). He may have returned in order to celebrate a triumph, which was denied him, receiving an ovation instead (see Chapters 22.1. 'Ενισταμένων... concerning denial of triumph and 22.1. συνεχόρησεν... concerning granting of ovation), but it is more likely that he returned in order to stand for the consulship of 210 B.C. Although the wording of Livy's text indicates that Marcellus was absent from the elections (26.22.13: M. Claudium, fulgentem tum Sicilia domita, et M. Valerium absentes consules dixerunt), the account of these comes after that of his celebration of the ovation (26.21.1-13 and 22.1-15 respectively) which should indicate that he was already in Rome at the time of the elections and not still in Sicily. This suggests that the absentes in Livy's text should only refer to Valerius, and therefore it ought to be emended to absentem. But Livy's rendition of the elections (26.22) has other dubious elements that makes the whole account suspect (see Chapter 23.1. Τοῦ δὲ Μαρκέλλου... concerning elections).

21.1-2. πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα...: Livy also reports on the plunder Marcellus carried back to Rome from Syracuse (25.40.1-2: ornamenta urbis, signa tabulasque quibus abundabant Syracusae, Romam devexit, hostium quidem illa spolia et parta belli iure). This booty was paraded in the ovation he celebrated in Rome (Livy. 26.21.7-8: Cum simulacro captarum Syracusarum catapultae ballistaeque et alia omnia instrumenta belli lata et pacis
diuturnae regiaeque opulentiae ornamenta, argenti aerisque fabrefacti vis, alia supellex pretiosaque vestis et multa nobilia signa, quibus inter primas Graeciae urbes Syracusae ornatae fuerant) and was used to adorn the temples of Honos and Virtus which had been vowed by him (see Chapter 28.2.), as well as other places (Liv. 25.40.3: Visebuntur enim ab externis ad portam Capenam dedicata a M. Marcello templa propter excellentia eius generis ornamenta; Cic. Verr. 2.4.121: Romam quae adportata sunt, ad aedem Honoris et Virtutis itemque aliis in locis videmus).

There has been found at Rome outside the Porta Capena a dedicatory base which probably supported a statue taken as booty from Syracuse (CIL, I², 609 = VI, 474 = ILS, 13: Martei / M. Claudius M. f. / Consol dedit; originally vovit was inscribed, but it was later erased and replaced with dedit [CIL, I², p. 499]; since the inscription identifies Marcellus as a consul, the dedication was probably set up during his consulship of 210 B.C., although see CIL, I², pp. 499-500, which dates it to 211 B.C.).

Marcellus kept very little of the booty for himself. Cicero in his Verrines states that Marcellus retained nothing for himself (2.4.121: Nihil in aedibus, nihil in hortis posuit [sc. Marcellus], nihil in suburbano), but this is not quite right since in the De re publica Cicero says that Marcellus kept a celestial sphere, an invention of Archimedes, for himself out of all the booty from Syracuse (1.21: sphaeram quam M. Marcelli avus captis Syracusis ex urbe locupletissima atque ornatissima
sustulisset, cum aliud nihil ex tanta praeda domum deportavisset...cuius ego sphaerae cum persaepe propter Archimedi gloriam nomen audissem). Cicero (Rep. 1.21) also mentions that another celestial sphere of Archimedes had been placed in the temple of Virtus by Marcellus.

The extent of the plundering at Syracuse is difficult to determine. Polybius' view that the Romans decided to leave nothing behind is an exaggeration (9.10.2: Ἐκρίθη μὲν οὖν διὰ τούτο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ προειρημένα μετακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολλεῖν), which was perhaps due to his bias against Marcellus (see Chapter 8.1). Similarly, the complaints of the Sicilians heard in the Roman senate in 210 B.C. about the despoiling of Syracuse are exaggerated (Liv. 26.30.9: certe praeter moenia et tecta exhausta urbis ac refracta ac spoliata deum delubra dis ipsis ornamentisque eorum ablatis nihil relictum Syracusis esse). Cicero, on the other hand, in his Verrines exaggerates Marcellus' moderation in order to draw as sharp a contrast as possible between Marcellus' and Verres' actions (2.2.4: Urbem pulcherrimam Syracusas,—quae cum manu munitissima esset, tum loci natura terra ac mari clauderetur,—cum vi consilioque cepisset [sc. Marcellus], non solum incolumem passus est esse, sed ita reliquit ornatum ut esset idem monumentum victoriae, mansuetudinis, continentiae, cum homines viderent et quid expugnasset et quibus pepercisset et quae reliquisset, 2.4.120: Itaque aedificiis omnibus, publicis privatis, sacrís profanís, sic pepercit [sc. Marcellus] quasi ad ea defendenda cum
exercitu, non oppugnanda venisset. In ornatu urbis habuit victoriae rationem, habuit humanitatis; victoriae putabat esse multa Romam deportare quae ornamento urbi esse possent, humanitatis non plane exspoliare urbem, praesertim quam conservare voluisset. In hac partitione ornatus non plus victoria Marcelli populo Romano adpetivit quam humanitas Syracusanis reservavit; cf. Quint. 5.11.7). He goes on to say that Marcellus left many splendid things and did not violate any one of the gods (2.4.121: Syracusis autem permulta atque egregia reliquit; deum vero nullum violavit, nullum attigit), giving examples of items left intact at Syracuse by Marcellus but removed by Verres (e.g., artwork from temple of Minerva on the Island [Verr. 2.4.122-125], a famous statue of Jupiter Imperator [Verr. 2.4.129-131]). Both Plutarch and Livy compare favorably the amounts of booty found at Syracuse and at Carthage (Marc. 19.7; Liv. 25.31.11), but their comparisons probably exaggerate the amount of the booty taken from Syracuse (see Chapter 19.7. λέγεται...). Finally, Pliny (NH 34.13) reports the use of Syracusan bronze in the Pantheon built by M. Aggripa. From all of this, it is reasonable to conjecture that a fair amount of booty was carried back to Rome from Syracuse by Marcellus, but that the city was not stripped bare (e.g., the temples were left untouched). One of the considerations which must have induced him to be moderate in this regard was the Syracusan exiles who had remained loyal to Rome (Liv. 24.33.6, 25.23.4, 31.8, etc.; cf. Eckstein SG 162).
21.2. The booty from Syracuse was the first large scale importation of Greek art into Rome. This started a trend which would continue throughout the remaining years of the Republic as Rome extended her control over the lands bordering the Mediterranean. Although Plutarch emphasizes the grimmer adornments which had decorated the city before this time, Rome had possessed works of art. But these were mostly of Etruscan or Italian manufacture and in Plutarch’s eyes clearly lacking in refinement (οὐδὲν...κομψῶν) and unremarkable (οὐδὲν...περιπτῶν).

21.3. The three metaphors given here by Plutarch are gleanings derived from his extensive readings, which he probably recalled directly from memory.

21.3. ἀλλὰ ὅσπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδας...ἀρχήστραν: Plutarch repeats this expression, although with a slight alteration, in his Moralia (193e: καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπίαν οὕσαν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένην ‘πολέμου ἀρχήστραν’ προσηγόρευεν, ὡς μὴ δυναμένους κρατεῖν αὐτῆς, ἂν μὴ τὴν χεῖρα διὰ πόρπακος ἔχωσι).

21.3. Ξενοφῶν...ἐργαστήριον: The Spartan king Agesilaus, campaigning in Asia Minor from 396-394 B.C. against the Persians, spent the winter of 396/5 B.C. training his army at Ephesus and turning the city into a munitions factory (Xen. Hel. 3.4.17: ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ὄντως οἶσθαι πολέμου ἐργαστήριον εἶναι).
21.3. οὕτως ἂν μοι...: This quotation from Pindar Pythian 2.1, which is used as a metaphor for Rome here, originally applied to Syracuse (2.1-2: Μεγαλοπόλις ὁ Συράκοσι, βαθυπόλεμοι / τέμενος ᾿Αρεός, ἀνδρῶν ἵππων τε σιδαρχομάν δαιμόνιαι τροφοί). It seems likely that the connection of this metaphor with Syracuse in Pindar’s poem provided the impetus which brought it into Plutarch’s conscious memory for inclusion here.

21.4. Marcellus and Fabius Maximus were frequently juxtaposed by ancient authors (e.g., Marc. 9.4-7., Fab. Max. 22.8, Liv. 27.16.8). This contrast, however, is found nowhere else in the surviving ancient sources.

21.5. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκίνησε...μένειν εἶσαεν: Livy reports that the works of art at Tarentum nearly equaled those at Syracuse, but that Fabius abstained from booty of this type with a greater loftiness of spirit than Marcellus (27.16.7-8: signa tabulae prope ut Syracusarum ornamenta aequaverint. Sed maiore animo generis eius praeda abstinuit Fabius quam Marcellus).

Plutarch in his Fabius Maximus (22.8) reports that Fabius carried off a colossal statue of Heracles from Tarentum and set it up on the Capitoline hill. Pliny (NH 34.40) also reports this and adds that a forty cubit high statue of Jupiter made by Lysippus was left by Fabius because of its size and the difficulty in moving it (cf. Flor. 1.13.27).
21.5. ἔπειταν τὸ μνημονευόμενον...: Plutarch repeats this saying in his Fabius Maximus (22.7) and his Moralia (195f).

Livy’s version explains the circumstances for Fabius’ decision (27.16.8: *qui interroganti scribaet quid fieri signis vellet ingentis magnitudinis—di sunt, suo quisque habitu in modum pugnantium formati—deos iratos Tarentinis relinquui iussit; cf. August. De civ. D. 1.6).

21.6. Among the critics of Marcellus may have been M. Porcius Cato, who was a young man at this time (born 234 or 233 B.C. [Cat. Mai. 1.8]) and had served under Marcellus (probably in Campania [Cic. Sen. 10], definitely in Sicily [Nep. Cato 1.2; De vir. ill. 47.1]; see Astin Cato the Censor 6-7). While consul in 195 B.C. Cato spoke against the repeal of the Oppian law, which had been passed during the Second Punic War, barring women from owning more than half an ounce of gold, from wearing multi-colored dresses, or from riding in carriages within a mile of a town except for the celebration of religious festivals (Liv. 34.1.3). In the speech which Livy gives Cato, the same hostile attitude towards the works of art taken from Syracuse is found as seen here in Plutarch (Liv. 34.4.4: Infesta, mihi credite, signa ab Syracusis inlata sunt huic urbi. Iam nimis multitatis audio Corinthi et Athenarum ornamenta laudantes mirantesque et antefixa fictilia deorum Romanorum ridentes).

This introduction of works of Greek art by Marcellus was considered by the Romans not only as the beginning of their own appreciation of art, but also as the start of the indiscriminate
despoiling of things sacred and profane in order to acquire them (Liv. 25.40.2: ceterum inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaque hinc sacra profanaque omnia volgo spoliandi factum est). According to Livy the temple which Marcellus decorated with the spoils from Syracuse was the first to suffer this indignity (25.40.2-3: licentiaque...quae postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, vertit. Visebantur enim ab externis ad portam Capenam dedicata a M. Marcello templo propter excellentia eius generis ornamenta, quorum perexigua pars comparet; see Chapter 28.2. concerning the temple and Lippold Consules 260-265 for discussion on the plundering of Syracuse and its effects).

21.7. Plutarch obviously believed that this boast of Marcellus proved that he was a lover of Greek culture (Marc. 1.3: Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας καὶ λόγων...ἔραστής), but a more cynical observer would say that Marcellus was just trying to justify his actions against the censures of his critics.

Marcellus would have had little time for boasting to the Greeks since he met his death at the hands of Hannibal in 208 B.C., a little less than three years after his return from Sicily (see Chapter 29. et sqq. concerning his death).
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

22.1. "Ενυπαμένων δὲ τῶν...ό τρίτος θρίαμβος: The De viris illustribus records that Marcellus was denied the triumph through chicanery (45.6: Et cum per calumniam triumphus a senatu negaretur; see Chapters 6.2, 21.6, 23.1, 23.9, and 27.2 concerning what is known about Marcellus' enemies).

According to Livy (26.21.1-13) a meeting of the senate was called by the praetor C. Calpurnius at the temple of Bellona where Marcellus gave his account of affairs in Sicily and asked for the honor of a triumph. After much debate this request was refused (in the debate it is revealed that a public thanksgiving [supplicatio] had been decreed while Marcellus was still in Sicily for the successes which he had obtained there). The reason for this refusal was that Marcellus' army had not been brought back with him, but still remained in Sicily where fighting continued. This same argument was also used in 185 B.C. to refuse a triumph to L. Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus (Liv. 39.29.4-5; cf. Liv. 31.49.10; see Versnel Triumphus 167, who believes that Marcellus was turned down because of exercitus non deportatus, but that this reason only later turned into a norm).

Valerius Maximus records that Marcellus was refused the triumph because he did not hold a [regular] magistracy at the time (2.8.5: Quin etiam ius, de quo loquor, sic custoditum est, ut P. Scipioni ob recuperatas Hispanias, M. Marcello ob captas Syracusas triumphus non decerneretur, quod ad eas res gerendas
sine ullo erant missi magistratu). This argument was also used against L. Cornelius Lentulus, a proconsul, in 200 B.C. (Livy 31.20.1-5; see Mommsen Str. 1^3: 126-128)

Whatever the excuse given by the senate for turning down Marcellus' request, the efforts of his enemies to deny him this honor were probably significant. Also, the senate may have been hesitant about granting a triumph while Hannibal was still a threat in Italy. It was not until 209 B.C. that the first one of the war was awarded. This was to Fabius Maximus for his capture of Tarentum in 209 B.C. (Fab. Max. 23.1-2, Comp. Per. et Fab. 2; CIL, I^2, elogium 13 = Inscr. It., XIII, 3, 80). Although the capture of Tarentum was a much smaller military achievement than the taking of Syracuse and Hannibal was still a threat in Italy, Fabius may have gained his triumph because of his great political clout (cf. Eckstein SG 169-170).

Plutarch records here that this triumph would have been Marcellus' third (ο ότίτος θρίαμβος), while in the Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli he assigns him three triumphs (3.6: τρεῖς θρίαμβους). In these notices Plutarch must be including in his reckoning Marcellus's triumph in 222 B.C. (Marc. 8.1), his triumph on the Alban Mount, and his ovation (called a lesser triumph by Plutarch [τόν...ελαττω]) in Rome granted to him in place of a regular triumph (Marc. 22.1).

22.1. συνεχόμενον...εὶς τὴν πόλιν: According to Livy a compromise was reached in which Marcellus was granted an ovation (26.21.5: medium visum ut ovans urbem iniret). Although Livy
(26.21.6) also mentions that Marcellus celebrated a triumph on the Alban Mount the day before his ovation at Rome, he does not include this in the senatorial compromise, and in the De viris illustribus it is recorded that Marcellus celebrated this of his own accord (45.6: de sua sententia in Albano monte triumphavit).

The celebration of a triumph on the Alban Mount was a substitute ceremony for the general who was refused the real thing (Versnel Triumphus 165-166). A general could always celebrate this form of triumph on the basis of his iure imperii consularis (Liv. 33.23.3) without state authorization (Liv. 42.21.7; Versnel Triumphus 192-193). This was first done in 231 B.C. by C. Papirius Maso (Val. Max. 3.6.5; Plin. NH 15.126). It has been suggested that Papirius, who as pontiff had access to the libri pontificales, knew of an older form of the triumph which had been celebrated on this hill (Goell De triumphi Romani origine, permissu, apparatu, via 4).

The ovation (RE 18.2 [1942]: 1890-1903), as indicated here, was less prestigious than a regular triumph (cf. Dion. Hal. 5.47.2), and is referred to by the ancients as a lesser triumph (minor triumphus [Plin. NH 15.19; Serv. Aen. 4.543], ἐλάσσων θρίαμβος [Marc. 22.1; Dion. Hal. 5.47.2, 8.67.10]). It was awarded to commanders for a victory which did not warrant a triumph. Aulus Gellius lists some of the reasons for the granting of an ovation instead of a triumph (5.6.21: Ovandi ac non triumphandi causa est, cum aut bella non rite indicta neque cum iusto hoste gesta sunt aut hostium nomen humile et non
idoneum est, ut servorum piratarumque, aut deditione repente facta inpulverea, ut dici solet, incruentaque victoria obvenit; cf. Fest. p. 213 Lindsay, s.v. Ovalis corona; see Versnel Triumphus 166-168 for commentary on this passage and Mommsen Str. 1\textsuperscript{3} 133-134). According to tradition the first ovation was celebrated in 503 B.C. by P. Postumius Tubertus (Dion. Hal. 5.47.2-3; Plin. NH 15.125).

22.1. ὃν εὗάν ᾿Ελληνες, ὅβαν δὲ ῾Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσι: Ovatio is cognate with ovare which refers to a cry of exultation or rejoicing (Fest. p. 213 Lindsay: Ovantes laetantes, ab eo clamore, quem faciunt redeuntes ex pugna victores milites, geminata O littera). Ovare is probably derived from *euaio and related to the Greek εὐάξειν = to cry εὐαί (see Versnel Triumphus 166, Walde-Hofmann, Ernout-Meillet, and Rohde RE 18.2 [1942]: 1891-1892).

22.2. Like Plutarch, other ancient authors also describe the differences between the ovation and the triumph (Dion. Hal. 5.47.3: διαφέρει δὲ θατέρου πρώτον μὲν, ὅτι πεζὸς εἰσέρχεται μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς προηγούμενος ὁ τῶν υἱῶν κατάγων θρίαμβου, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔφ' ἄρματος ὄσπερ ἑκείνος: ἔπειθ' ὅτι οὐ τὴν ποικίλην καὶ χρυσόσμην ἀμφιέννυται στολῆν, ἥ κοσμεῖται ὁ ἔτερος, οὐδὲ τὸν χρυσοῦν ἔχει στέφανον, ἀλλὰ περιπόρφυρον λευκὴν περιβέβληται τήβενναν, τὸ ἐπιχώριον τῶν ὑπάτων τε καὶ στρατηγῶν φόρημα, στέφανον δ' ἑπίκειται δάφνης, μεμείωσι δὲ καὶ τοῦ σκήπτρου τῇ φορήσει παρὰ τὸν ἔτερον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ταύτα ἐχει; Suet.
Pratum 283 Reifferscheid: Ovare et triumpare hoc differt, quod triumphans quadrigia vehitur et coronatus laurea corona subsequitur pompam; qui autem ovat, aut super equum tripudiat aut mirtea corona cinctus pompam praecedit; see RE 18.2 [1942] 1899).

22.3-6. Plutarch is expressing here his own view on the criteria originally used for deciding whether an ovation or a triumph was to be awarded. He deduces these criteria from the differences in the two ceremonies.

22.4. οἱ μὲν γὰρ...καὶ φοβερὸν εἰσήγον: Valerius Maximus reports that one of the criteria necessary for a triumph was the slaying of at least 5,000 of the enemy in one battle (2.8.1: Oblevia proelia quidam imperatores triumphos sibi decerni desiderabant. quibus ut occurreretur, lege cautum est ne quis triumpharet, nisi qui V milia hostium una acie cecidisset; see Mommsen Str. 1: 126-128 for the qualifications required for a general to be awarded a triumph, of which the principal ones were the holding of imperium and auspiciium).

22.4. ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς καθαρμοῖς...: Pliny reports that laurel was placed by the Romans on the weapons of soldiers as a sign of rejoicing and victory (NH 15.133: Romanis praeceipue laetitiae victoriarumque nuntia additur litteris et militum lanceis pilisque, fasces imperatorum decorat). He was aware that laurel was used for the fumigation and purging of the blood of the
slain enemy (NH 15.135: quia suffimentum sit caedis hostium et purgatio, ut tradit Masurius), but rejects this as the reason for its use in the triumph. Instead, he believes that it was used because it was dear to Apollo, it served as a token of the freedom won for the people by Brutus, and it was never struck by lightning (NH 15.134-135).

22.5. Plutarch’s explanation of the conditions for the awarding of an ovation is incomplete and bears no relationship to why Marcellus was granted one (see Chapter 22.1. συνεχώρησεν...).

22.6. ὁ αὐλὸς εἰρήνης μέρος: Whatever the validity of this statement, the pipe was certainly used as an instrument of war among the Greeks. Polybius reports that the pipe (αὐλός) instead of the trumpet (σάλπιγξ) was employed by the Cretans and Spartans in war (Athen. 626a; cf. scholia Pindari Pyth. 2.127). On the Protocorinthian ‘Chigi vase’ in Rome, hoplites are shown marching to the sound of a pipe.

22.6. τὸ μύρτον Ἀφροδίτης φυτόν: Pliny reports that P. Postumius Tubertus, the first Roman to celebrate an ovation (503 B.C.), entered Rome crowned with the myrtle of Venus Victrix since he had won his campaign against the Sabines without bloodshed (NH 15.125: triumphansque de Sabinis P. Postumius Tubertus in consulatu, qui primus omnium ovans ingressus urbem est, quoniam rem leniter sine cruore gesserat myrto Veneris victricis coronatus incessit; cf. Fest. p. 213 Lindsay, s.v.
Ovalis corona).

22.7. Dionysius of Halicarnassus may be one of those referred to by Plutarch (ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν) since we know that he was familiar with him (see Introduction, p. 35) and Dionysius himself gives an explanation of ovatio along lines similar to those given here (Dion. Hal. 5.47.2: δὲν καλοῦσιν οὖστιν, παρεγκλίναντες τοῦνομα Ἑλληνικὸν ὑπάρχον εἰς τάσαφές. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον εὐάστής [οὔτως] ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐλέγετο, ὡς αὐτὸς τ' εἰκάζω καὶ ἐν πολλαῖς εὐρίσκω γραφαῖς ἐπιχωρίοις φερόμενον).

22.8. This etymology of the word ovatio is also found in Servius (Aen. 4.543) and in Lydus (Mens. 4.3, p. 67 Wünsch). However, modern opinion is against this derivation (see Chapter 22.1. δὲν εἴδαν...).

22.9-10. Plutarch also comments on these rites of the Spartans in his Moralia (238f: "Ὅταν στρατηγήματι τοὺς πολεμίους νικήσωσι, βοῶν τῷ Ἀρεί θύουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἐθίζοντες τοὺς ἡγουμένους οὐ μόνον πολεμικοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγικοὺς εἶναι").

His source for this section is generally considered to have been Juba's Ὄμοιότητες (See De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 368, Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 304-305, and Hesselbarth HKUDDL 535-536).
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

23.1. Τοῦ δὲ Μαρκέλλου τὸ τέταρτον ὑπατεύοντος: Livy (26.22.2-15) gives an account of the consular elections for 210 B.C. After the praerogativa centuria, which was composed of the juniors from the tribe Voturia, had given their vote for T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius Crassus, Manlius objected to his candidacy alleging poor eyesight and requested that the century vote again. The junior century consulted with its senior counterpart, which recommended three possibilities: Q. Fabius Maximus, M. Claudius Marcellus, and M. Valerius Laevinus. In the re-voting they chose Marcellus and Valerius, and this lead was followed by all the other centuries (see Broughton MRR 1: 278 for references).

The account of these elections is similar to that of the elections for 214 B.C. (see Chapter 13.1. ὅ δὲ Μάκελλος...). In both accounts Otacilius losses out in his bid for the consulship through the annulment of the vote cast by the praerogativa centuria. This is suspicious because the nullifying of a vote is known for certain only in these two cases (cf. Liv. 10.22) and it appears that Otacilius had died before the last elections took place (Liv. 26.23.2: Forte ita incidit ut comitiis perfectis nuntiaretur T. Otacilium, quem T. Manlio nisi interpellatus ordo comitiorum esset collegam absentem daturus fuisse videbatur populus, mortuum in Sicilia esse). Although it is a reasonable conjecture that Otacilius' role in the elections of 210 B.C. is a reduplication of the part
he played in 214 B.C., the reason why Manlius appears is more
difficult to resolve (see Cassola GPR 318-319, Staveley Greek
and Roman Voting and Elections 210-211, Taylor Roman Voting
Assemblies 93-94, Lazenby Hannibal's War 169 and Lippold
Consules 179-180; see also Scullard RP 64-65 for his analysis
and for further bibliography). If Marcellus was in Rome at the
time as a candidate for the consulship, as I have suggested
(Chapter 21.1. Τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον...), then Otacilius' part seems
all the more suspicious).

23.1. οἱ ἑχθροὶ τοῦ...πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον: In Livy's account
of this episode (26.26.5-9, 29.1-32.8) M. Cornelius Cethegus and
T. Manlius Torquatus are portrayed as his opponents along with
others left unnamed (26.26.6, 8, 32.1-5). Cethegus' antipathy
can be explained as resulting from a desire on his part as
Marcellus' successor in Sicily to increase his own glory at
Marcellus' expense (Liv. 26.26.8: eundem [sc. Cethegum]
litteris falsis urbem implesse bellum in Sicilia esse ut suam
[sc. Marcelli] laudem minuat). Münzer (RE 3.2 [1899]: 2750)
suggests that Cethegus belonged to the Scipionic circle and
Marcellus' adversaries should be sought there. Manlius' 
hostility towards Marcellus is more problematic since he was not
only known for his severity (e.g., Liv. 22.60.5-27: T. Manlius
Torquatus, priscæ ac nimis durae, ut plerisque videbatur,
severitatis, interrogatus sententiam ita locutus fertur:...),
but is thought to have been an adherent of the Fabian faction,
the same political group to which Marcellus belonged (Scullard
RP 32-33, 65). Scullard (RP 68) suggests that Manlius may have been antagonized by Marcellus’ success and by his own failure in the consular elections for 210 B.C. (see Chapters 6.2. ὁ Μάρκελλος..., 21.6., 22.1. ἔντομαμένων..., and 27.2. concerning Marcellus’ enemies, and 23.9. ἐπεὶ δὲ διηνέχθησαν... for further discussion on Manlius).

In Livy’s account (26.26.5-9) Marcellus, on the day he entered the consulship (i.e. March 15), held a meeting of the senate where he announced that he would not conduct any business, while his colleague was away (Laevinus was still in Greece). He addressed the senators saying that he knew there were many Sicilians near Rome in the villas of his detractors, and that he would have immediately given them a hearing in the senate, if they were not pretending some fear of speaking about him with his colleague absent. He added that M. Cornelius Cethegus had conducted almost, as it were, a levy throughout Sicily so that as many as possible might come to Rome to complain about him, and his opponent had filled Rome with letters falsely alleging that war existed in Sicily so as to diminish his own glory. Livy concludes this scene by reporting that Marcellus obtained on that day the renown for having a moderate disposition (26.26.9: Moderati animi gloriam).

During the time Marcellus was awaiting the arrival of his colleague, a fire broke out in the Roman forum that, among other things, destroyed the Atrium Regium and threatened the temple of Vesta. Since the conflagration appeared to be the work of arsonists, Marcellus, on the authority of the senate, proclaimed
a reward for information on the culprits. On the testimony of a slave, the arsonists, among whom were five young Capuan nobles, were found out and punished, while the slave was given his freedom and 20,000 asses (Liv. 26.27.1-9).

23.1. ὡς δεινὰ καὶ παράσπονδα πεπονθότας: Eckstein (SG 162, n. 27) suggests that these charges stemmed from the looting that resulted after the final capture of the city, although in earlier abortive peace talks, Marcellus had promised that Achradina would not be pillaged.

23.2-11. This episode is fully reported by Livy (26.29-32) with shortened versions surviving in Valerius Maximus (4.1.7) and Zonaras (9.6.8-9; cf. Dio fr. 57.46a).

Both Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 305-309) and De Sanctis (SR 3.2: 372) agree that, despite the close affinities this account has with Livy's, Plutarch did not use him for this section. However, they do not agree on what source Plutarch did use. Although Klotz maintains that the source is Valerius Antias, De Sanctis gives the more likely possibility. He asserts that there is not the slightest indication of Plutarch's direct use of Valerius Antias in this life and therefore suggests Cornelius Nepos or, with less probability, Juba as the source.

23.2. Marcellus' sacrifice on the Capitoline hill and Laevinus' refusal to allow the Syracusans to come before the senate until his colleague's arrival has no counterpart in Livy. Instead,
Livy's episode (26.29) begins with the consuls drawing lots for their respective provinces, in which Laevinus is assigned Italy and the war against Hannibal, while Marcellus receives Sicily. This causes consternation among the Sicilians present in Rome, who then begin to spread fearful complaints about Marcellus. Finally it is demanded of the consuls that they consult the senate concerning an exchange of provinces (26.29.5-6: Hae Siculorum querellae domos primum nobilium circumlatae celebrataeque sermonibus, quos partim misericordia Siculorum, partim invidia Marcelli excitabat, in senatum etiam pervenerunt. Postulatum a consulibus est ut de permutandis provinciis senatum consulenteret; the Syracusans in Plutarch's account are always called Sicilians in Livy's). Marcellus, stating that he would exchange his province so that no one could say that the Sicilians spoke under fear, does so voluntarily without any resolution being passed by the senate. After this exchange the Sicilians are introduced to the senate (Liv. 26.30.1).

Given what is known of Marcellus' ambitions, one can surmise that he may have been quite willing to exchange Sicily for Italy and the war against Hannibal (see Marcellus 28.4-6), and that the fearful complaints of the Sicilians provided an easy pretext for doing so.

Livy gives a prophetic meaning to this exchange (26.29.9-10: Inter ipsos consules permutatio provinciarum rapiente fato Marcellum ad Hannibalem facta est, ut ex quo primus post <adversissimas haud> adversae pugnae gloriam ceperat, in eius laudem postremus Romanorum imperatorum
It is interesting to note that, although Livy does not record Marcellus performing a sacrifice on the Capitoline hill before he is summoned to the meeting of the senate, he does have him go to the Capitoline hill after his speech to conduct a levy of troops while awaiting the decision of the senate (26.31.11: Ita dimissi Siculi et ipse in Capitolium ad dilectum discessit). The coincidence of Marcellus performing some type of act on the Capitoline hill in both Plutarch's and Livy's accounts suggests that they are referring to the same thing, but that distortions have produced what appear to be two separate activities. It may be that Marcellus' sacrifice, as reported by Plutarch, formed part of the proceedings in the holding of the levy, as reported by Livy (see Brunt Italian Manpower 625-626 concerning the holding of levies on the Capitoline hill).

23.3. The portrayal here of Marcellus' actions is dramatic but absurd. The matter before the senate was to decide the validity of his actions in Sicily, not to conduct a trial with the Syracusans as prosecutors (cf. De Sanctis SR 3.2.2: 372). It would have been considered unworthy of a consul's dignitas to submit to such a procedure (in Livy's more believable account, Marcellus say this very thing [26.31.1: 'Non adeo maiestatis' inquit 'populi Romani imperiique huius oblitus sum, patres conscripti, ut, si de meo crimine ambigeretur, consul dicturus causam accusantibus Graecis fuerim']).
23.4. Since Plutarch is not using Livy as his source here (see Chapter 23.2-11.), he must have chosen this version of the episode because it explicitly emphasized Marcellus' character, as seen here, something Livy's version does not (see Marcellus 23.8 and 10 for additional emphases on Marcellus' character).

23.5. Plutarch sums up the complaints of the Syracusans, while Livy (26.30.1-10) gives them in a speech in indirect discourse. In Livy's version the Sicilians emphasize the faithfulness of Hiero II to the Romans and their own [alleged] oppression under their subsequent leaders: Hieronymus, Hippocrates, and Epicydes. They claim that there was no end of Syracusan nobles ready to betray Syracuse if only Marcellus was willing to accept their offers. But despite these things, they assert, Marcellus instead desired to slaughter and destroy the oldest allies of the Roman people. Not only the walls and the houses of Syracuse were destroyed, but also the shrines of the gods were despoiled so that nothing was left in the city. Finally, they request that the senate order their property which still existed to be restored to them.

The account of this speech in Zonaras describes the Syracusans as not accusing Marcellus, but instead as concentrating on their own pardonable state (9.6.8: οἱ Συρακούσιοι δὲ καταστάντες εἰς λόγους οἰκονομικῶτερον τῇ διαλέξει ἔχρησαντο, οὐκ εἰς κατηγορίαν τοῦ Μαρκέλλου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἱκετείαν τραπέντες καὶ ἀπολογίαν τοῦ μὴ ἑκόντες ἀποστήναι Ἡρωάθων, καὶ συγγνώμης τυχεῖν ἀξιούντες). This version
conforms to none of the other accounts of this episode.

Valerius Maximus' version of the speech conforms to Livy's (4.1.7: querentisque de se patienter sustinuit [sc. Marcellus]). Furthermore, his account is very similar to Livy's in all other particulars (even calling the speakers Sicilians rather than Syracusans) except that it places the exchange of the provinces after this episode rather than before. Despite this difference, everything else suggests that Valerius Maximus was using either Livy or Livy's source.

23.6-7. In Livy the Sicilians, after their speech, are asked by Laevinus to leave, but Marcellus requests them to stay (26.30.11-12: Talia conquestos cum excedere ex templo ut de postulatis eorum patres consuli possent Laevinus iussisset, 'Maneant immo' inquit Marcellus...; cf. Val. Max. 4.1.7; Livy fails to name the temple referred to here, and Plutarch, along with Zonaras and Valerius Maximus, does not name the place where the senate was meeting).

Livy's rendition of Marcellus' speech (26.31.1-11) is fairly similar to Plutarch's in emphasis. In it Marcellus mentions the wrongs suffered by the Romans from the Syracusans and points out that he turned away no one who offered to betray Syracuse, while what he inflicted upon them was in accordance with the rules of war.

23.8. λεγόμενων δὲ τῶν λογῶν...τοῦ βουλευτηρίου διέτριβεν: In Livy, Marcellus does not wait by the door, but proceeds to the
Capitoline hill to conduct a levy of troops (26.31.11: Ita dimissi Siculi et ipse in Capitolium ad dilectum disc essit).

23.8. οὐτὲ φόβῳ διὰ...: This description of Marcellus' deportment is not found in Livy (see Chapter 23.4. concerning Plutarch's emphasis on Marcellus' character in this episode).

23.9. ἐπεὶ δὲ διηνέχθησαν...ἀπεδείχθη: Livy records that there was a long debate in the senate in which the majority, led by T. Manlius Torquatus, expressed dissatisfaction with Marcellus' harsh actions against the Syracusans (26.32.1-5: Ibi cum diu sententiis certatum esset et magna pars senatus, principe eius sententiae T. Manliuo Torquato...haec taliacue cum ad invidiam consulis miserationemque Siculorum dicerentur).

The role which Manlius plays in the debate has raised doubts since he was known for his severity, and it is thought that he belonged to the same political faction as Marcellus (see Chapter 23.1. οἱ ἐχθροὶ...). Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 305-306) believes that Manlius' role here and the following speech in indirect discourse (Liv. 26.32.2-4) are inventions of Livy's source (i.e. Valerius Antias) in order to create suspense, since the speech merely repeats the arguments of the Sicilians and Livy himself was aware of the conflict between this speech and the resolution of the senate (26.32.5: haec taliacue cum ad invidiam consulis miserationemque Siculorum dicerentur, mitius tamen decreeverunt patres). More recent scholarship has tended to accept Manlius' role in the senatorial debate (e.g., Scullard
RP 68, Lazenby Hannibal’s War 169, Eckstein SG 171, Lippold Consules 266-267). Lippold (loc. cit.) contends that the benefits that had been gained by Rome from the economic strength of its former ally and the future advantages that could be expected were real grounds for Manlius to support the Syracusans.

According to Livy (26.32.7) after the senate had passed its decree, two senators were sent to summon back Marcellus. Then when the Sicilians were reintroduced into the senate the decree was read.

23.9-10. προσπίπτουσιν αὐτῷ...πράττων ἀγαθὸν ἅπετέλει: This scene of the Syracusans throwing themselves at the feet of Marcellus is also described by Livy (26.32.8: legatique beneigne appellati ac dimissi ad genua se Marcelli consulis proiecerunt obsecrantes ut quae deplorandae ac levandae calamitatis causa dixissent veniam eis daret, et in fidem clientelamque se urbemque Syracusas acciperet. Potens senatus consulto consul clementer appellatos eos dimisit; cf. Val. Max. 4.1.7).

23.10. καὶ τὴν ἔλευθερίαν...: Livy reports, acta M. Marcelli quae is gerens bellum victorque egisset rata habenda esse, in reliquum curae senatui fore rem Syracusanam, mandaturosque consuli Laevinō ut quod sine iactura rei publicae fieri posset fortunis eius civitatis consuleret (26.32.6). Zonaras’ description of the senate’s resolution is more similar to Livy’s account than Plutarch’s (9.6.9: καὶ διαγνώμης γενομένης έδοξε
Although Marcellus could have, by right of conquest, ordered the destruction of Syracuse and the enslavement or extermination of its inhabitants (see Volkmann *Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner eroberter Städte in der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit* 199-204), he decided instead to preserve it. In settling Syracusan affairs, he looked after the interests of the supporters of Rome, but impoverished those whom he considered enemies (Liv. 25.31.8, 26.21.11 30.10). It was forbidden to any Syracusan to live on the Island (Ortygia; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.84), while a permanent Roman garrison was probably established there at this time. The royal lands now became ager publicus (Liv. 25.28.3, 26.21.11), and Syracuse lost all its former possessions. Finally, Marcellus may have required Syracuse to pay tribute (see Eckstein *SG* 163-165).

The τὴν ἑλευθερίαν and τοὺς νόμους mentioned here by Plutarch may have been the same as those agreed upon in the abortive peace talks before the final capture of Syracuse (Liv. 25.28.2-3: legatos de condicionibus dedendae urbis explorata prius per conloquia voluntate eorum qui obsidebantur ad Marcellum mittunt. Cum haud ferme discreparet, quin quae ubique regum fuissent Romanorum essent, Siculis cetera cum libertate ac legibus suis servarentur).

23.11. From Cicero (*Verr.* 2.2.51, 4.151) it is learned that even in his day the Syracusans celebrated a famous and sacred
festival, the *Marcellia*. This was in honor of the Marcelli and it took place on the day when Marcellus was said to have captured Syracuse. We also learn from him (*Verr.* 2.2.50) that there was standing in the *bouleuterion* at Syracuse a bronze statue of the conqueror (he [*Verr.* 2.4.86] reports that equestrian statues of the Marcelli existed in the market-places of most Sicilian towns).

This is the first genuine case known of a patron-client relationship established between a Roman commander and a foreign community (cf. Badian *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)* 157).
24.1. According to Livy, before Marcellus set out for his command, a levy was held (26.31.11, 35.1). Also, the question of raising more oarsmen was taken up. Since the public treasury did not have the necessary funds for the procurement and pay of these men, the consuls issued an edict requiring the citizens to furnish the necessary personnel with pay and rations. In response to this demand, a fierce protest arose, with the people claiming that they had nothing to give since the war had already exhausted their resources. This protest was only quelled after the senators, at the suggestion of the consul Laevinus, voluntarily contributed as a loan all the gold, silver, and coined bronze which they possessed with the exception of a small portion that they kept for their own personal use. After this the consuls set out for their provinces (Liv. 26.35-36; the lack of funds in the treasury at this time is perplexing since the ancient sources imply that Marcellus had come back from Syracuse in 211 B.C. with an immense amount of booty; see Chapter 19.7.

Marcellus’ forces this year consisted of two legions and their allied contingents (Liv. 26.28.4, 27.2.6-7). The legions are labelled the First and the Third by Livy in his description of the battle at Numistro, but in the following year (i.e. 209 B.C.), although Marcellus was re-assigned the same forces, Livy labels one of the legions the Eighteenth (27.2.6-7, 7.11, 12.14,
14.3). Brunt (Italian Manpower 647, n. 2) believes that many of the references to legionary numbers are sheer inventions (see RE 12.1 [1924], "Legio," no. 1: 1204-1205 concerning numbering of legions).

24.1. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων...: After the disaster at Cannae, the Romans avoided another all-out set-piece battle with Hannibal, and their strategy turned to one of regaining control of the cities in Italy which had revolted. Only Marcellus among the Roman leaders deliberately dared to confront Hannibal in battle, and for this he gained the title 'The Sword of Rome.' (see Chapter 9.7. ὁ δὲ Ποσείδώνιος...).

Although Cn. Fulvius Centumalus encountered Hannibal in battle at Herdonea this year (i.e. 210 B.C.), and Livy calls him Par audacia Romanus (sc. Hannibali; 27.1.7), Fulvius did not actively seek out battle with Hannibal, but was constrained to fight by Hannibal's sudden arrival (see Chapter 24.4 ἔπειτα...).

24.2. Marcellus' opinions of the strategy of Fabius Maximus, in the form they are reported here, are likely Plutarch's own supposition based on his interpretation of Marcellus' activities (see Chapter 9.4-7. concerning comparison between Marcellus and Fabius).

24.3-9. This part of chapter 24 has very close similarities with Livy (27.1-2), and the citation of Livy at 22.5 confirms
Plutarch’s probable use of him as his primary source here (see Chapter 24.5. concerning reason for citation). Klotz’s arguments (*RhM* 83 [1934]: 309-310) against the use of Livy here, except for the citation, based on some minor variations in Plutarch are unconvincing (Klotz believes that περὶ πολιν Νομίστρωνα [24.6] can not be inferred from *ad Numistronem* [Liv. 27.2.4] and τῇ...ὑπεραία [24.7] and καταβαντος Ἄννιβου [24.7] could not have come directly from Livy).

24.3. After the capture of Capua by the Romans in 211 B.C., many of Hannibal’s former allies in Italy now became estranged from him. Since Hannibal could not garrison these places without seriously reducing the strength of his field army, he embarked on a policy of devastating those areas which he could not hold, which further decreased his popularity. Marcellus, taking advantage of this, attempted to recover those places which showed signs of defecting to the Romans (Liv. 26.38.1-5).

According to Livy, Marcellus first recovered Salapia, which was located in Apulia northwest of Cannae, before retaking the Samnite towns (27.1.1; since it seems likely that Plutarch had read Livy, his failure to mention Salapia may have been due to a lapse of memory). The leading men of Salapia had arranged to hand over the city and its Punic garrison of 500 Numidian cavalry to Marcellus, but although the betrayal was unforeseen, the Numidians, nevertheless, put up a stout resistance, and not more than 50 of them were taken prisoner (Liv. 26.38.6-13; cf. Val. Max. 3.8, ext. 1, App. *Hann.* 45-47, Zon. 9.7.6-7). Livy
remarks that after this incident Hannibal was never again superior in cavalry (26.38.14: nec deinde unquam Poenus, quo longe plurimum valuerat, equitatu superior fuit; see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 444, n. 26).

The Samnite towns captured by Marcellus are named Marmoreae and Meles by Livy (27.1.1). The locations of these places are uncertain (see RE 14.2 [1930], "Maronea": 1912, 15.1 [1931], "Meles," no. 3: 494, and De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 444, n. 26). Livy (27.1.2) agrees with Plutarch in the number of Hannibal’s soldiers captured, but also reports that the booty taken from these places was handed over to the soldiers and specifies the quantity of grain found (240,000 modi of wheat and 10,000 modi of barley).

During his activity in southern Italy in 210 B.C., Marcellus is reported to have assigned ships to Dec. Quinctius (Liv. 26.39.4: Primo quinque naves, quarum maximae duae triremes, a Marcello ei [sc. Quinctio] traditae erant [habuit]: postea rem impigre saepe gerenti tres additae quinqueremes). Quinctius was anchored off Rhegium in order to ensure the safe passage of supplies from Sicily to the Roman garrison besieged at Tarentum (Liv. 26.39.1-3), but in a subsequent naval battle he was killed and his fleet, numbering twenty ships, was destroyed (Liv. 26.39.6-39.19).

24.4. ἔπειτα τοῦ Ἀννίβου...στρατιὰς τὸ πλεῖστον: Livy reports that this disaster occurred a few days after the capture of the Samnite towns by Marcellus, near the city of Herdonea (27.1.3: 313
clades intra paucos dies accepta est haud procul Herdonea urbe). Herdonea was located approximately 26 miles west of Cannae (PECS 388). According to Livy (27.1.4-15) the proconsul Cn. Fulvius Centumalus (RE 7.1 [1910]: 235-236) was situated near the city, in a camp positioned in an insufficiently safe place and unfortified with entrenchments. He had hopes of regaining the city, which had deserted the Romans after the disaster at Cannae, since he had perceived that their loyalty to Hannibal was wavering. Hannibal, on his part, concerned about retaining an ally and having the hope that he might catch the enemy unaware, made a quick march from Bruttium with an unencumbered army and attacked. In the resulting battle the Roman army was destroyed. Livy agrees with Plutarch about the death of Fulvius and the eleven military tribunes, while he also adds that the number of soldiers slain was uncertain, since one authority placed the number at 13,000 and another at not more than 7,000 (Frontinus [Str. 2.5.21] and Appian [Hann. 48] give the figure of 8,000 Roman casualties, while Orosius [4.18.3] reports 17,000). After the battle Hannibal deported the inhabitants of Herdonea to Metapontum, since he found them disloyal, and put to death the leaders whom he discovered had had conversations with Fulvius. Meanwhile the Roman survivors of the battle made their way to Marcellus who was in Samnium (see De Sanctis SR 32.2: 445, n. 28 concerning the possibility that a battle at Herdonea in 212 B.C. involving the praetor Cn. Fulvius Flaccus is a reduplication by Livy of this battle).
24.4. ἔπεμψεν εἰς Ῥώμην...: This section is very similar to what Livy reports (27.2.1-2: Marcellus nihil admodum tanta clade territus litteras Romam ad senatum de duce et exercitu ad Herdoneam amisso scribit: ceterum eundem se, qui post Cannensem pugnam ferocem victoria Hannibalem contuderit, ire adversus eum, brevem illi laetitiam qua exsultet facturum).

24.5. The specific passage which Plutarch is referring to in Livy is Et Romae quidem cum luctus ingens ex praeterito, tum timor in futurum erat (27.2.3), which corresponds to ἀναγνωσθέντα τὰ γράμματα μὴ τῆς λύπης ἀφελεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷ φόβῳ προσθεῖναι. The rest of this section, which has no counterpart in Livy, appears to be Plutarch's own elaboration of Livy's statement (cf. Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 310). Plutarch may have been prompted to cite Livy here because he thought Livy should have elaborated his statement.

24.6. Livy's narrative is very similar (27.2.4: consul ex Samnio in Lucanos transgressus ad Numistronem in conspectu Hannibalis loco plano, cum Poenus collem teneret, posuit castra).

Numistro appears to have been close to Venusia (Liv. 27.2.10), and it has been suggested that it was located in the area of Muro Lucano (see RE 17.2 [1937], "Numisto," no. 1: 1401 and De Sanctis SR 32.2: 447, n. 30).

24.7. Plutarch's summary of the battle agrees with Livy's
detailed account (27.2.5-8). Livy reports that the right flank of Hannibal’s army extended up the hill, while the Roman left flank was anchored on the city (27.2.5: Ita tamen aciem instruxerunt ut Poenus dextrum cornu in collem erigeret, Romani sinistrum ad oppidum adplicarent). At first the Roman First Legion and the Dextra Ala engaged Hannibal’s Spaniards, Balearic slingers, and elephants. When these two battle lines became wearied from fighting, both sides replaced them with fresh troops. On the Roman side the Third Legion relieved the First, and the Sinistra Ala relieved the Dextra. However, night intervened before a decision could be reached.

Frontinus, the only other ancient author to give an account of this battle, declares that Hannibal was the victor (Str. 2.2.6: Hannibal apud Numistronem contra Marcellum pugnaturus cavas et praeruptas vias obiecit a latere, ipsaque loci natura pro munimentis usus clarissimum ducem vicit). Even if Livy and Plutarch are correct in reporting that the Romans gained control of the battlefield on the following day (see Chapter 24.8-9. ἐδίσκωκεν...), Frontinus’ assessment is likely true since Hannibal was able to leave without hindrance, while it appears that the Romans suffered significant casualties (see Chapter 24.9. ἐδίσκωκεν...).

24.8-9. ἐμα δ’ ἡμέρα...θάψας τοὺς φίλους: According to Livy, on the following day, the Romans again arrayed themselves for battle, but when the enemy failed to come forth they gathered up the booty and cremated their dead (27.2.9: Postero die Romani
ab sole orto in multum diei stetere in acie; ubi nemo hostium adversus prodit, spolia per otium legere et congestos in unum locum cremavere suos).

24.9. ἀναζειχαντος δ' ἔκεινου: Livy reports that Hannibal left on the second night after the battle and moved into Apulia (27.2.10: Nocte insequenti Hannibal silentio movit castra et in Apuliam abiit). Plutarch's placing of Hannibal's departure before the gathering of the spoils and the cremation of their dead by the Romans is the only significant deviation he makes from Livy in the portrayal of this confrontation (24.3-9). Since Livy appears to be the primary source used by Plutarch for this account (see Chapter 24.3-9.), this discrepancy is probably carelessness on Plutarch's part.

24.9. ἐδίωκεν αὕτης...: In Livy (27.2.10-12) Marcellus pursued Hannibal on the second morning after the battle, after leaving a modest guard with the wounded at Numistro under the command of the military tribune L. Furius Purpurio [this may indicate heavy casualties suffered by the Romans]. He finally overtook him at Venusia where both sides engaged in skirmishing for several days, which turned out in the Romans' favor. Then Hannibal led his army through Apulia at night, seeking places to set up ambushes, while Marcellus followed in the daylight hours after first reconnoitering.

24.10. Ἀιὸ καὶ τῶν...συνηρτημένων κινεῖν: According to Livy
Marcellus sent a letter to the senate informing them that it was not in the best interest of the state for him to break off his pursuit of Hannibal. Therefore the senate thought it best to recall the consul Laevinus from Sicily. Under instructions from the senate, the city praetor L. Manlius sent a letter to Laevinus together with Marcellus' letter in order that Laevinus might know why he was being recalled instead of his colleague.

24.10. ἔλθοντα δ' ἐκέλευεν...: According to Livy (27.5.14), when Laevinus was summoned to Rome, he entrusted his province to the praetor L. Cincius Alimentus and sent the commander of the fleet in Sicily, M. Valerius Messalla, to raid Africa and gather intelligence. He himself set off to Rome with ten ships. When in Rome, he received the intelligence gathered by Messalla, which he read to the senate. The information that the Carthaginians were preparing a very large fleet for the recovery of Sicily and that Messalla believed it was about to set out persuaded the senate to decree that the consul must not wait for the elections, but after appointing a dictator for the purpose of holding elections, return immediately to Sicily.

Livy (27.5.15-17) reports that a debate arose between Laevinus and the senate. Laevinus kept saying that he would appoint Messalla dictator in Sicily, while the senators denied that a dictator could be appointed outside Italy (27.5.15: consul in Sicilia se M. Valerium Messallam qui tum classi praesesset dictatorem dicturum esse aiebat, patres extra Romanum
agrum--eum autem Italia terminari--negabant dictatorem dici posse; cf. Liv. 27.29.5). When the people's tribune M. Lucretius consulted the senate on this matter, it decreed that the consul before he left the city should ask the people whom they preferred, and if the consul refused, the praetor should ask the people, and if the praetor refused, the tribunes should bring it before the commons. When the consul refused to submit the question before the people and forbade the praetor to do so, the tribunes asked the commons, who resolved that Q. Fulvius Flaccus be appointed dictator (see RE 7.1 [1910], no. 59: 243-246 concerning Fulvius and Chapter 25.1. 'Ενει δ'... et seq. concerning outcome of dispute).

24.11. A consul could appoint a dictator on his own authority, while a praetor needed the co-operation of the comitia (see Mommsen Str. 2\(^{3}\): 146-148).

24.12-13. The two possible etymologies given for dictator as well as the comparison between the words meaning 'edict' used by the Greeks and Romans have their parallels in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.73.1; see Chapter 24.12. καὶ διά... et seqq. for Dionysius' text). Although not exact, the similarities between these two discussions suggest that Plutarch was familiar with this section of Dionysius (see Introduction, p. 36-37, concerning Dionysius as one of Plutarch's sources). Both De Sanctis (SR 3^2.2: 368) and Hesselbarth (HKUDDL 535-536) would attribute Plutarch's information to Juba, but this attribution
seems unnecessary.

24.12. καὶ δὶὰ τοῦτο...δίκερε ἩΡωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν: This explanation for dictator is also found in Cicero (Rep. 1.63: nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur quia dicitur), Varro (LL 6.61: hinc dictator magister populi, quod is a consule debet dici, 5.82: Dictator, quod a consule dicebatur, cui dicto audientes omnes essent), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.73.1: ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ τίθενται δικτάτορα...εἴτε ὡς τινες γράφουσι διὰ τὴν τότε γενομένην ἀνάρρησιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ παρὰ τοῦ δῆμου τὴν ἀρχὴν εὑρόμενος κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους ἐθισμοὺς ἔξειν ἔμελλεν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀποδειχθεὶς ἐνός). Mommsen believes this explanation is linguistically impossible (Str. 2\(^3\): 144, n. 2).

24.12. Ἔνιοι δὲ ἴσον...: This explanation for dictator is also found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.73.1: ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ τίθενται δικτάτορα, εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ κελεύειν, ὅτι θέλοι, καὶ τάττειν τὰ δίκαια τε καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἄν αὐτῷ δοκῇ) and Varro (LL 5.82: Dictator, quod a consule dicebatur, cui dicto audientes omnes essent). For a discussion on the etymology of dictator see Mommsen Str. 2\(^3\): 144, n. 2.

24.13. Dionysius of Halicarnassus has a similar comparison between the words meaning 'edict' used by the Greeks and Romans (5.73.1: τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτάγματα καὶ τὰς διαγραφὰς τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων ἡδίκτα οἱ ἩΡωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν).
CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

25.1. 'Επεί δ' ἐλθὼν...ἐβούλετο λέγειν δικτάτορα: The colleague of Marcellus, M. Valerius Laevinus, was summoned to Rome from Sicily to hold the elections, but because of the situation in Sicily was instructed by the senate to return immediately after appointing a dictator who would hold them. He wished to appoint M. Valerius Messalla, but the tribunes on instructions of the senate had asked the commons whom they wished, and they had declared for Q. Fulvius Flaccus (see Chapter 24.10. ἐλθόντα....).

Whatever political maneuverings may lie behind this episode, Laevinus may have desired to appoint Messalla dictator because they were cousins (see Scullard RP 68-69).

25.1. καὶ βιασθήναι...νυκτὸς εἰς Σικελίαν: Although the commons may have voiced their opinion on whom they wanted as dictator, the prerogative for appointing one should still have been with the consul (see Mommsen Str. 2:\(^3\): 146-148). However, the example of Q. Fabius Maximus' and M. Minucius Rufus' appointments to the dictatorship by the people in 217 B.C. may have been a decisive factor in Laevinus' decision to leave (see Broughton MRR 1: 243 for references). He disagreed with the choice of Q. Fulvius Flaccus and did not want to be forced by public opinion to appoint someone against his own wishes. He may also have thought that he could be passed over to his embarrassment while he was still present in Rome now that there
were precedents for a dictator being appointed by the people.

Livy in his account does not mention why Laevinus left (27.5.18: Sed quo die id plebis concilium futurum erat, consul clam nocte in Siciliam abiit). This indicates that if Plutarch was using him as his primary source here, which seems likely (see Chapters 24.3-9. and 25.3-10), he either inferred the reason for Laevinus' departure or derived it from another source.

25.1. οὐτως ὁ μὲν...: Since the prerogative for appointing a dictator lay with a consul (see Mommsen Str. 23: 146-148), and Laevinus refused to appoint the choice of the commons, the senate was constrained to ask Marcellus to perform this function.

This section corresponds to Livy 27.5.17: tribuni plebei rogarent, plebesque scivit ut Q. Fulvius, qui tum ad Capuam erat, dictator dicetur, and 27.5.18: destitutique patres litteras ad M. Claudium mittendas censuerunt ut desertae ab collega rei publicae subveniret diceretque quem populus iussisset dictatorem.

25.2. Since the reasons for not summoning Marcellus to Rome must still have been valid (see Chapter 24.10. Διὸ καὶ τῶν...) and Livy says only, Ita a M. Claudio consule Q. Fulvius dictator dictus (27.5.19), it should be assumed that Marcellus did not come to Rome, but remained with his army to make the appointment.
For references to Marcellus' appointment as proconsul for the year 209 B.C., see Broughton MRR 1: 287.

25.3-10. This part of chapter 25 has very close contacts with Livy 27.12.2-3 and 12.7-13.10, and despite the objections of Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 311), it appears that Livy was the main source.

25.3. Συνθέμενος δὲ πρὸς...βοηθείν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον: According to Livy, Fabius sent a letter to Marcellus instructing him to detain Hannibal with as fierce fighting as possible, while he himself attacked Tarentum (27.12.2: Fabius, qui et collegam coram obtestatus et per litteras Marcellum ut quam acerrimo bello detinerent Hannibalem dum ipse Tarentum oppugnaret; all of Tarentum except the citadel, where the Roman garrison held out, had been captured by Hannibal in 213 B.C. [Liv. 25.7.10-11.20]).

The vigorous action recommended by Fabius, as reported by Livy, opposes what Plutarch had previously said about Fabius' policy (see Marcellus 9.4 and 24.2). However, since Fabius and Marcellus are generally thought to have been political allies (see Chapter 9.4-7.), Marcellus may now have been able to persuade Fabius that it was time to adopt a more vigorous strategy, and the refusal this year of 12 Latin allies to furnish troops may have provided the catalyst for this change (Liv. 27.9). Whatever was the impetus, the content of Fabius' letter suggests that he believed the war in Italy would be over quickly once Tarentum was retaken (27.12.3: ea urbe adempta
hosti iam undique pulso, nec ubi consistaret nec quid fidum respiceret habenti, ne remorandi quidem causam in Italia fore).

25.3. ἐπέβαλε περὶ Κανύσιον: Livy reports that Marcellus left winter camp as soon as there was sufficient fodder in the fields, and came upon Hannibal at Canusium, where he was attempting to induce the city to come over to him (27.12.7: Marcellus et consulis litteris excitus et quia ita induxerat in animum neminem ducem Romanum tam parem Hannibali quam se esse, ubi primum in agris pabuli copia fuit, ex hibernis profectus ad Canusium Hannibali occurrit. Sollicitabat ad defectionem Canusinos Poenus; see Chapter 9.2. ὁλίγοι... concerning Canusium).

The troops which Marcellus commanded this year were the same as those of the previous year, consisting of two legions and their allied contingents (Liv. 27.7.11; see Chapter 24.1. Τοῦντεῦθεν...). It is not recorded where he wintered with his army, but it must have been in southern Italy, possibly at Venusia (Liv. 27.21.3, 22.2).

25.3. καὶ πολλὰς ἀλλάσσοντι...: According to Livy (27.12.8-10), on Marcellus' approach, Hannibal withdrew from before Canusium, and since the countryside was open and unsuitable for ambushes, retired into wooded areas. Marcellus pursued (27.12.9: Marcellus vestigiis instabat castraque castris conferebat) and kept offering battle, but Hannibal only engaged in skirmishing, believing a general engagement
unnecessary. However, Marcellus chanced to come upon Hannibal’s army in a level and open area while it was pitching camp, and by attacking those trying to fortify the camp, forced a major engagement (27.12.10: Nocte praegressum adsequitur locis planis ac patentibus Marcellus; castra inde ponentem [sc. Hannibalem] pugnando undique in munitores operibus prohibet. Ita signa conlata pugnatumque totis copiis).

25.4. ὁμίσαντος δὲ μάχεσθαι δεξάμενος ὑπὸ νυκτὸς διελύθη: Livy reports the same outcome for the first day’s fighting (27.12.10: et cum iam nox instaret Marte aequo discessum est. Castra exiguo distantia spatio raptim ante noctem permunita).

Besides Plutarch and Livy, Orosius also gives an account of this battle (4.18.3-4: Marcellus consul cum Hannibale triduum continuum dimicavit. primo die pari pugna discessum est, sequenti victus consul, terto victor VIII milia hostium interfecit, ipsum Hannibalem cum reliquis fugere in castra conpulit).

25.4-5. καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν...: Hannibal’s speech here corresponds to Livy 27.12.11-12: Hannibal...multis verbis adhortatus milites ut memores Trasumenni Cannarumque contunderent ferociam hostis: urgere atque instare eum; non iter quietos facere, non castra ponere pati, non respirare aut circumspicere; cottidie simul orientem solem et Romanam aciem in campis videndam esse; si uno proelio haud incruentus abeat, quietius deinde tranquilliusque eum bellaturum.
25.6-7. ἐκ τούτου συμβαλόντες...τούμπροσθεν προελθεῖν: According to Livy, two hours into the battle, the Dextra Ala and the extraordinarii of the Romans began to give way, and Marcellus seeing this brought up the Eighteenth Legion into the front line. However, while some men were withdrawing in confusion and others were sluggishly coming up in support, the whole line was thrown into confusion, and the Romans fled (27.12.14-15: Pugnatum amplius duabus horis est. Cedere inde ab Romanis dextra ala et extraordinarii coepere. Quod ubi Marcellus vidit, duodevicesimam legionem in primam aciem inducit. Dum alii trepide cedunt, alii segniter subeunt, turbata tota acies est, dein prorsus fusa, et vincente pudorem metu terga dabant; see Chapter 24.1. Τοῦντεῦθεν... concerning the numbering of the Eighteenth legion).

Livy (27.12.14-15) does not indicate whether the ordering of the Eighteenth Legion to move up into the front line was inappropriate, but only that it caused confusion. This may be why Plutarch, if he was using Livy as his source (see Chapter 25.3-10.), only suggests that Marcellus faltered in ordering this maneuver (25.6: δοκεῖ...σφαλὴναι).

25.7. ἢ δὲ μετακίνησις αὐτῆ...: Livy (27.12.16) agrees with Plutarch on the number of Roman casualties and adds that four centurions and two military tribunes, M. Licinius and M. Helvius, were also killed. In addition, Livy (27.12.17) reports that four military standards were lost by the ala which fled
first and two standards by the legion which was coming to its relief.

25.8. Marcellus’ speech in Livy occupies 27.13.2-7, of which 6 (Non equidem mihi cum exercitu meo loqui videor nec cum Romanis militibus: corpora tantum atque arma eadem sunt) corresponds to the abbreviated version of the speech given here.

25.9. αἰτομένων δὲ συγγνώμην...ἔναν δὲ νικήσωσι, δῶσειν: This section corresponds to Livy 27.13.8: Clamor inde ortus ut veniam eius diei daret: ubi vellet deinde experiretur militum suorum animos. ‘Ego vero experiar,’ inquit ‘milites, et vos crastino die in aciem educam ut victores potius quam victi veniam impetretis quam petitis.’

25.9. αὕριον δὲ μαχεῖσθαι...: This sentiment is placed by Livy in the speech of Marcellus given on the following day, before the commencement of fighting (27.13.12: edicere iam sese omnibus pugnandum ac vincendum esse et adnitendum singulis universisque ne prius hesternae fugae quam hodiernae victoriae fama Romam perveniat). If Plutarch was using Livy as his source here (see Chapter 25.3-10.), he may have shifted forward this sentiment for narrative reasons, since he does not allot Marcellus a speech before the start of battle on the third day of fighting.

25.10. διαλεξομένως δὲ ταῦτα...πυρὸν κριθὰς μετρῆσαι: Livy
(27.13.9) also mentions this punishment, but adds that the centurions of those maniples which had lost their standards were made to stand ungirded with swords drawn (27.13.9: centurionesque manipulorum quorum signa amissa fuerant dextrae gladiis discinctos destituit).

25.10. δι’ ἕ τι πολλῶν...: This sentiment of the soldiers comes before the first speech of Marcellus in Livy and is put in a slightly different way (27.13.1: contionem adeo saevam atque acerbam apud milites habuit ut proelio per diem totum infeliciter tolerato tristior iis irati ducis oratio esset).

Livy ends the narrative of the second day of fighting with this feeling among the soldiers: Ita contio dimissa fatentium iure ac merito sese increpitos neque illo die virum quemquam in acie Romana fuisse praeter unum ducem, cui aut morte satisfaciendum aut egregia victoria esset (27.13.10).
CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

26. De Sanctis (SR 3.2.2: 372-373) believes that Livy is the main source here, used either directly or mediated through Juba. Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 311-312), on the other hand, believes that although the contacts with Livy are close, the discrepancies prove that Plutarch was instead following Livy's main source (i.e. Valerius Antias). However, the loss of Antias' work makes Klotz's conclusions unverifiable, and although De Sanctis puts forward an argument for the use of Juba (see Chapter 26.8. for argument), Juba could not have provided the bulk of the material (see Introduction, pp. 32-34, concerning Juba). It is possible that the differences between this account and Livy's may be the result of Plutarch's use of Cornelius Nepos (see Chapter 23.2-11. concerning De Sanctis' belief on the use of Nepos as a source there).

26.1. "Αμα δ' ἡμέρα...μάχης ἐσομένης σύμβολον: The raising of the purple vexillum as a sign of battle is not present in Livy's account, which begins, Postero die ornati [armatique] ad editum aderant (27.13.11). It has been suggested that this notice was derived from Juba (Hesselbarth HKUDDL 535-536; De Sanctis SR 3.2.2: 372-373). Plutarch has a similar notice on the raising of the purple vexillum in his Fabius Maximus (15.1: ἀ' ἡμέρα τὸ τῆς μάχης σημεῖον ἐξέθηκεν - ἔστι δὲ χιτών κόκκινος ὑπὲρ τῆς στρατηγικῆς σκηνῆς διάτεινόμενος; see Webster The Roman Imperial Army 139-140 concerning vexillum).
26.1. αἱ δ' ἠπιμασμέναι...: Livy's account does not contain the request of the dishonored units to occupy the front line. Instead, Marcellus declares that he would place them there (27.13.11: pronuntiatque a quibus orta pridie fuga esset cohortesque quae signa amisissent se in primam aciem inducturum). Also, his account does not report that the military tribunes led the remaining forces into line.

26.2. Hannibal's speech, as rendered by Livy (27.14.1: 'Cum eo nimirum' inquit 'hoste res est qui nec bonam nec malam ferre fortunam possit. Seu vicit, ferociter instat victis: seu victus est, instaurat cum victoribus certamen'), does not contain the last sentiment given here (ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μαχησόμεθα...αἰσθάνομαι πρόφασις ἐστίν'). This sentiment may be Plutarch's own invention based on his interpretation of Marcellus' personality.

26.3. ἐκ τούτου συνήσαν αἱ δυνάμεις: According to Livy's text the front line of the Romans was occupied by the Sinistra Ala and those cohorts which had lost their standards, while the right wing was held by the Eighteenth Legion (27.14.3: Sinistra ala ab Romanis et cohortes quae amiserant signa in prima acie pugnabant et legio duodevicesima ab dextro cornu instructa; there is a problem with Sinistra since at 27.12.14 it was the Dextra Ala which gave way in battle and at 27.13.11. Marcellus announced that it would be put into the front line; Conway and
Johnson [apparatus criticus for 27.14.3] suggest that both the Dextra and the Sinistra Alae were now stationed in the front line; see Chapter 24.1. Τούντευθεν... concerning the numbering of the Eighteenth Legion). The wings of the Roman army were commanded by the legates L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Nero, while Marcellus stationed himself in the center. On Hannibal’s side the front line was held by his Spanish troops (Liv. 27.14.4-5).

26.3. καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν...: This part corresponds to Livy 27.14.6: Cum anceps diu pugna esset, Hannibal elephantos in primam aciem induci iussit, si quem inicere ea res tumultum ac pavorem posset.

26.4. Livy (27.14.7-11) records that the military tribune was C. Decimius Flavus and that he seized the standard of the first maniple of the hastati and ordered it to follow him. Livy differs from Plutarch in that he does not report that Flavus struck the leading elephant with the butt-spike of the standard, but instead that he ordered the maniple to throw their pilum. The effect of this was to turn the elephants back towards their own lines, which were thrown into confusion. As a consequence, the Roman infantry pursued and routed their opponents.

26.5-6. This part corresponds to Livy 27.14.12-13: Tum in fugientes equitatum immittit Marcellus, nec ante finis sequendi est factus quam in castra pavelentes compulsi sunt. Nam super
alia quae terrem tremtationemque facerent, elephanti quoque
duo in ipsa porta corruerant, coactique erant milites per fossam
vallumque ruere in castra. Ibi maxima hostium caedes facta.

26.6. καὶ τῶν ὑπάρχων...: Livy (27.14.13) reports that two of
the elephants perished at the gate leading into the camp and
that Hannibal's soldiers had to make their way in across the
ditch and rampart. This was where the greatest slaughter of
Hannibal's soldiers took place.

26.7. Plutarch's figures for casualties agrees with Livy's
(27.14.13-14), but he has combined the figures for the number of
Roman dead and the number of allied dead, which Livy gives
separately (27.14.14: mille ferme et septingenti de duabus
legionibus et sociorum supra mille et trecentos occisi). Also,
Livy (27.14.13) adds that five elephants perished.

Plutarch's phrase τραυματίαι δ' ὀλίγον δὲίν ἀπαντες
corresponds to Livy's volnerati permulti civium sociorumque

The number of casualties on the Carthaginian side (i.e.
8,000 dead) must clearly be an exaggeration of the Roman
annalistic tradition in an effort to mitigate the seriousness of
the Roman defeat (cf. Liv. 27.20.10, 21.3; see Münzer RE 3.2
[1899]: 2752, who considers the details of this battle as
inventions of Valerius Antias).

26.8. This section corresponds to Livy 27.14.15-15.1. He
records that Hannibal was reported heading towards Bruttium (27.15.1: Speculatores qui prosequerentur agmen missi postero die rettulerunt Bruttios Hannibalem petere), but does not report that Marcellus led his army to Sinuessa in order to allow his soldiers to recuperate. Instead, later on in his work, he mentions that Marcellus had billeted his troops at Venusia (27.20.10: vagante per Italiam Hannibale media aestate Venusiam in tecta milites abduxisset; cf. Liv. 27.20.10, 12, 21.3, 22.2).

This discrepancy has convinced Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 312) that Plutarch is not following Livy but Livy’s source (i.e. Valerius Antias). Klotz also maintains that Livy is wrong when he names Venusia, since Klotz believes that Marcellus led his troops back to the Castra Claudiana, which was located near Sinuessa. However, De Sanctis (SR 3².2: 373) has shown that if Plutarch derived his information here about Sinuessa not from a Latin source but from a Greek source (i.e. Juba), then the error can be shown to lie with Plutarch and not with Livy. De Sanctis suggests that Plutarch read CYENOYCIA in his Greek source which was a corruption of an original OYENOYCIA (cf. Münzer RE 3.2 [1899]: 2752).
27.1. The extent of Hannibal's activities after the fighting at Canusium as portrayed here is exaggerated. According to Livy (27.15.1) he headed towards Bruttium, in the toe of Italy. There he received the surrender of a Roman force of 8,000 men besieging Caulonia. This force was composed of brigands transferred out of Sicily from Agathyrna and Bruttian deserters (Livy. 26.40.16-18, 27.12.4-6, 15.8, 16.9; cf. Plut. Fab. Max. 22.1 where Marcellus is named, probably incorrectly, as the one who had transferred the brigands from Sicily instead of his colleague for 210 B.C., M. Valerius Laevinus). From Caulonia Hannibal headed towards Tarentum, but on learning of its capture, he lingered nearby for five days and then withdrew to Metapontum (Livy. 27.16.10-12). Here he must have spent the winter, since in the following year (i.e. 208 B.C.) his first move was to approach Locri, which was then under siege by the consul T. Quinctius Crispinus (Livy. 27.25.11-12).

Plutarch's exaggeration of Hannibal's activities corresponds to a rumor in Livy (27.20.10: Marcellus etiam adverso rumore esse, superquam quod primo male pugnaverat, quia vagante per Italianam Hannibalem media aestate Venusiam in tecta milites abduxisset). It is possible that Plutarch found such a rumor in his source(s) and that he believed its validity since he thought Marcellus had withdrawn to Sinuessa (see Chapter 26.8.). However, Livy's report of Marcellus' army staying at Venusia (27.20.10, 12, 21.3, 22.2, 25.10) which makes better
strategic sense weakens such a rumor's credibility.

27.2. Besides C. Publicius Bibulus, the enemies of Marcellus are not named by Plutarch nor by Livy who also gives an account of this episode (27.20.11-21.4; see Chapters 6.2. Μάρκελλος..., 21.6., 22.1. Ἐντσταμένων..., 23.1. Οἱ ἔχθροι..., and 23.9. ἐπεὶ δὲ διηνέχθησαν... concerning what is known about Marcellus' enemies).

Apart from the incident here, little else is known of C. Publicius Bibulus (RE 23.2 [1959], no. 14: 1897-1898). As plebeian tribune in 209 B.C., he is credited with the Lex Publicia de cereis (Macrobi. Sat. 1.7.33; see Broughton MRR 1: 286 for references). Also, Plutarch's description of him as a clever speaker (δεινὸν εἰπεῖν ἄνδρα; this phrase although lacking in Livy could have been inferred by Plutarch from Livy's account [27.20.11]) suggests that he may be the C. Publicius mentioned by Cicero as an orator quoted by Cato (De Or. 2.271; cf. Münzer RE 23.2 [1959]: 1898).

The attack of Publicius which in Livy's account (27.20.11-21.4) extended to the nobility is thought by Scullard to point either to a "general discontent with senatorial conduct of the war or to an intrigue against Marcellus by his political opponents" (RP 70-71). Bleicken (Zetemata 13 [1955]: 61-62) believes that although the nobility was against Marcellus in the debate over his request for a triumph in the previous year, they were now on his side (cf. Lippold Consules 192).
27.3. ὃς πολλάκις συναγαγὼν...στρατηγῷ τὴν δύναμιν: This part corresponds to Livy 27.20.11: Is iam a prima pugna quae adversa fuerat adsiduis contionibus infamem invisumque plebei Claudium fecerat.

27.3. ἔπει Μάρκελλος ἔφη...: This has no counterpart in Livy. De Sanctis (SR 32.2: 372-373), who believes that Plutarch’s main source here is Livy, used directly or mediated through Juba, suggests that Plutarch made this up himself having in mind the baths at Sinuessa where he believed Marcellus’ army was stationed (Marc. 26.8).

27.4. According to Livy, when Publicius introduced a bill to abrogate Marcellus’ power, his friends/relations obtained leave for him to come to Rome to justify himself and won a postponement of the impending legislation until he arrived (27.20.12: et iam de imperio abrogando eius agebat cum tamen necessarii Claudii abtinuerunt ut relecto Venusiae legato Marcellus Romam rediret ad purganda ea quae inimici obicerent nec de imperio eius abrogando absente ipso ageretur).

It is not known who these friends/relations of Marcellus were (see Chapters 9.4-7. and 29.15. Κρισπίνος concerning Marcellus’ possible political allies).

27.5. ἐκ δὲ τῶν διαβολῶν...τῶν Φλαμίνιον ἱππόδρομον: Livy agrees with Plutarch in placing the proceedings in the Circus Flaminius (27.21.1: Actum de imperio Marcelli in circo Flaminio
The Circus Flaminius was built by C. Flaminius while censor in 221 B.C. in the southern part of the Campus Martius, and it was frequently used for public assemblies (see Platner-Ashby 111-113). Since it was situated outside the pomerium, a magistrate could conduct business in Rome without laying aside his imperium (see Taylor Roman Voting Assemblies 20-21, 31-32, 45-46).

27.5. ὥ μὲν Βίβλος ἀναβας κατηγόρησεν: Livy reports that Publicius attacked not only Marcellus but the whole nobility, accusing them of extending the war by deceit and tardiness. In his attack the tribune declared that the people were now enjoying the fruits of proroguing Marcellus’ power: the army, having been twice cut up, was spending the summer at Venusia (27.21.2-4: Accusavit tribunus plebis non Marcellum modo, sed omnem nobilitatem: fraude eorum et cunctatione fieri ut Hannibal decimum iam annum Italiam provinciam habeat, diutius ibi quam Carthagine vixerit; habere fructum imperii prorogati Marcello populum Romanum; bis caesum exercitum eius aestiva Venusiae sub tectis agere; the phrase bis caesum refers to the battles at Numistro in 210 B.C. and Canusium in 209 B.C.).

27.5-6. ὥ δὲ Μάρκελλος...: In Livy there is no mention of speeches given by prominent individuals, but it was Marcellus’ account of his deeds alone which carried the day for him (27.21.4: Hanc tribuni orationem ita obruit Marcellus...
It is interesting to note that in Livy (27.21.2) the nobility was accused by Publicius in his speech against Marcellus, but at the same time no mention is made of their pleading in Marcellus' defense, while in Plutarch the nobility pleads for Marcellus, but it is not indicated whether they were accused by Publicius. If Plutarch used Livy here as his source, then this discrepancy could be the result of his recall of this incident directly from memory without recourse to Livy's text after the initial reading.

27.6. δὲ μόνον φεύγει...: If this statement is not derived from Plutarch's source(s), then he may have inferred it from the alleged saying of Hannibal which he has recorded at Marcellus 9.7 (αὐτὸς δ' ὁ Ἁννίβας ἔλεγε, τὸν μὲν Φάβιον ὡς παιδαγωγὸν φοβεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον ὡς ἀνταγωνιστήν. ὃς' οὗ μὲν γὰρ κωλύεσθαι κακόν τι ποιεῖν, ὃς' οὗ δὲ καὶ πάσχειν).

27.7. Livy reports similarly the outcome of the proceedings, but indicates more precisely that the elections for the consulship occurred on the following day (27.21.4: Hanc tribuni orationem ita obruit Marcellus commemorazione rerum suarum ut non rogatio solum de imperio eius abrogando antiquaretur, sed postero die consulem eum ingenti consensu centuriae omnes crearent).

This whole episode seems to confirm that Marcellus never
really lost the support of the common people and the attempt by his enemies to undermine it was unsuccessful (see Chapters 12.2 εκάλει... concerning Marcellus' support).

27.7. τὸ πέμπτον ὑπατον ἀποδειχθῆναι: Scullard (RP 71) believes that Marcellus' success in these elections was "due to the desire to finish the war before the restlessness and sacrifices of the allies became too severe, since he seemed to be the only man able to face, if not to conquer, Hannibal" (see Broughton MRR 1: 289-290 for references).
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

28.1. Παραλαβὼν δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν: Marcellus undertook his fifth and last consulship in 208 B.C. with T. Quinctius Crispinus as his colleague. Both received Italy as their province, and from the two armies of the consuls of the previous year and a third army at Venusia, which Marcellus had commanded, they were to select one each, with the remaining army being given to the general who was to have the command over Tarentum and the Sallentinians (Liv. 27.22.1-2; see Broughton MRR 1: 289-290 for references).

28.1. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν...: In Livy the news of an uprising in Etruria occurred during the elections, and Marcellus had not yet entered the consulship when he was sent to quiet the situation there (27.21.6-7: Comitiorum ipsorum diebus sollicita civitas de Etruriae defectione fuit. Principium eius rei ab Arretinis fieri C. Calpurnius scripserat, qui eam provinciam pro praetore obtinebat. Itaque confestim eo missus Marcellus consul designatus, qui rem inspiceret ac, si digna videretur, exercitu accito bellum ex Apulia in Etruriam transferret). Although Livy also records that Marcellus' action checked the uprising (27.21.7: Eo metu compressi Etrusci quieverunt), the calm appears to have lasted only a short time, since further action was required by Rome against Arretium, from which the Romans took hostages (Liv. 27.24; see Harris Rome in Etruria and Umbria 135-137 and 139-140).
28.2. According to Livy, Marcellus vowed a temple to Honos and Virtus during the Gallic War at Clastidium in 222 B.C (27.25.7: quod cum bello Gallico ad Clastidium aedem Honori et Virtuti vovisset, 29.11.13), but Cicero believed that Marcellus undertook this vow during the siege of Syracuse (Verr. 2.4.123: Et Marcellus qui, si Syracusas cepisset, duo templa se Romae dedicaturum voverat). Valerius Maximus, who also reports this incident described by Plutarch, indicates that Marcellus made this vow at both Clastidium and Syracuse (1.1.8: In qua cum M. Marcellus quintum consulatum gerens templum Honori et Virtuti Clastidio prius, deinde Syracusis potitus nuncupatis debitum votis consecrare vellet). Modern scholars have assumed that Marcellus made the vow twice, first at Clastidium and then renewed it at the siege of Syracuse (see Platner-Ashby 258 and Richardson AJA 82.2 [1978]: 243). But it seems more reasonable that Marcellus made only one vow, namely, that at Clastidium. First, Cicero’s belief that the vow was made at Syracuse may be a conjecture on his part based upon his knowledge that Marcellus embellished the temples with the booty taken from there (Verr. 2.4.121, 123). Second, using Valerius Maximus’ account as proof of two vows (as Richardson does [loc. cit.]) is hazardous since he too, like Cicero, may have made an incorrect assumption. Third, in Livy’s extensive narrative of the siege at Syracuse the vow is never mentioned, which one would expect to find if Marcellus had made one there. Finally, it is difficult to imagine what additional benefit Marcellus thought he could
receive by renewing a vow which he had not yet discharged.

Marcellus attempted to discharge his vow by renovating an existing temple dedicated to Honos by a Q. Maximus (Cic. Nat. D. 2.61: Vides Virtutis templum, vides Honoris a M. Marcello renovatum quod multis ante annis erat bello Ligustico a Q. Maximo dedicatum). The Q. Maximus mentioned by Cicero is usually thought to be Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus since he is known to have celebrated a triumph over the Ligurians in 233 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 224 for references), and accordingly, it is conjectured that a non has dropped out of Cicero's text before multis ante annis (Mayor, ad loc.). However, it has been suggested by Richardson (AJA 82.2 [1978]: 244) that it was not Verrucosus but his great-grandfather Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus who had dedicated the temple. He seems to believe that the close connection made by the Romans between Verrucosus and Marcellus (e.g., Verrucosus as 'The Shield' and Marcellus as 'The Sword of Rome') produced confusion and that Cicero wrongly attributed the foundation of the temple to Verrucosus. He says, "it would be unusual, if not unthinkable, for one to rebuild a temple properly belonging to the other while the other was still alive," and adds that the attribution of the temple to Rullianus accords with the tradition that, as censor in 304 B.C., he established the transvectio equitum with the temple of Honos as the starting point (De vir. ill. 32.3). But Richardson's suggestion is probably wrong, and Verrucosus should be favored as the founder of the temple renovated by Marcellus. First, Cicero's notice (Nat. D. 2.61) links the temple with a Ligurian
war. We know that Verrucosus celebrated a triumph over the Ligurians in 233 B.C., while there is no indication that Rullianus fought against these people. It does not seem likely that the notice of the Ligurian war would have been added by Cicero because he wrongly assumed that the Q. Maximus he read in his source referred to Verrucosus. Second, the argument that Marcellus would probably not have rebuilt a temple recently constructed by his contemporary can be questioned. The term \textit{renovatum} used by Cicero (\textit{Nat. D.} 2.61) may merely mean "redecorated." Marcellus and Verrucosus are generally considered to have been political allies (see Chapter 9.4-7.) and are known to have been indirectly related (Marcellus' half-brother Otacilius had married a niece of Verrucosus; see Chapter 2.2. \(\varepsilon\nu \delta\varepsilon\ \Sigma\iota\kappa\epsilon\lambda\(\rho\); in this context, the embellishment of the temple of Honos by Marcellus with the spoils of Syracuse would be an indication of their political and domestic solidarity. Finally, Rullianus is not credited with the founding of the temple, but only with the establishment of the \textit{transvectio equitum} (\textit{De vir. ill.} 32.3).

The temples of Honos and Virtus appear to have stood just outside the Porta Capena (Liv. 25.40.3: \textit{Visebantur enim ab externis ad portam Capenam dedicata a M. Marcelllo templa, 26.32.4, 29.11.13; Mon. Anc. 2.29; Not. Reg. 1}). Coarelli (\textit{Roma} 154) locates them here, while Platner and Ashby (259) even suggest that they may have been situated north of the Via Appia in this area, but Richardson (\textit{AJA} 82.2 [1978]: 244) wants to locate them inside the Servian wall between the Porta Capena and
the spring of the Camenae. Asconius (Pis. p. 11 Kiessling-Schoell) locates the tombs of the Marcelli next to the temples of Honos and Virtus, and if this is correct, then Richardson's hypothesis seems doubtful, since it is highly unlikely that the tombs of the Marcelli would have been located inside the Servian wall.

Marcellus' troubles with the priests is also reported by Livy (27.25.7-9) and Valerius Maximus (1.1.8). According to them the pontiffs objected to one cella being dedicated to more than one god on the grounds that if it was struck by lightning or some other portent were to happen in it, the rite of expiation would be difficult. These priests explained that it would not be known to which of the two deities the sacrifice was to be made, nor was it proper to sacrifice one victim to two gods except in certain fixed cases.

As a result of the pontiffs' objection, Marcellus hastened to build a separate structure for Virtus (Liv. 27.25.9: Ita addita Virtutis aedes adproperato opere). This construction appears to have been a temple contiguous with that of Honos (Sym. Ep. 1.20.1: aedes Honori atque Virtuti gemella facie iunctim locarunt) and not just the addition of another cella (although the term aedes, which can refer to either the temple or its cella, is often used to describe the structures, the term templum is also found, which should indicate that what was built was another separate building [Cic. Verr. 2.4.123: duo templae Romae dedicaturum voverat {sc. Marcellus}; Liv. 25.40.3]). Although the addition of a second cella to the temple of Honos
to house a statue of Virtus may have been unobjectionable to Roman religious sentiment (other temples in Rome had multiple cellas for different deities, e.g., temple of Capitoline Jupiter), it may have been impractical from a constructional standpoint without major alterations to the existing structure, and if the temple of Honos was still in good condition, being only some 25 years old, it probably seemed better and easier just to build another temple right next to it.

Plutarch indicates that the religious complex was built by Marcellus out of the booty brought back from Sicily (ναὸν ἐκ τῶν Σικελικῶν λαφύρων ἄθροισμένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), while both Livy and Cicero are more specific, reporting that it was adorned with the spoils of Syracuse (Livy. 25.40.1-3, 26.32.4; Cic. Verr. 2.4.121). Among these objects was a celestial sphere made by Archimedes, which was placed in the temple of Virtus (Cic. Rep. 1.21). However, by Livy's day many of these decorations had been appropriated for use elsewhere (Livy. 25.40.2-3).

Marcellus did not survive to dedicate his work. This duty was left to his son, who performed the ceremony in 205 B.C. (Livy. 27.25.10, 29.11.13: Aedem Virtutis eo anno ad portam Capenam M. Marcellus dedicavit; it is interesting to note that Livy records only the dedication of the temple of Virtus and not that of Honos, which suggests that the latter may not have been in need of re-dedication having undergone little, if any, alteration; see Platner-Ashby 258-259 and Coarelli Roma 154-155 concerning temples of Honos and Virtus).
The portents of lightning strikes and mice gnawing the gold in a temple of Jupiter are reported by Livy for this year, but he also includes portents which Plutarch leaves out (27.23.2-3: Et ex Campania nuntiata erant Capuae duas aedes, Fortunae et Martis, et sepulcra aliquot de caelo tacta, Cumis...mures in aede Iovis aurum rosisse, Casini examen apium ingens in foro consedisse; et Ostiae murum portamque de caelo tactam, Caere volturium volasse in aedem Iovis, Volsiniis sanguine lacum manasse), while Plutarch has portents which Livy does not report here but earlier for the year 209 B.C. (27.11.4: Et Priverni satis constabat bovem locutum, 11.5: et cum elephanti capite puerum natum). If Plutarch was using Livy as his source for this chapter, which seems likely (see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 372-373), then his discrepancy with Livy may be the result of his recalling the portents from memory, but failing to recheck his source after the initial reading.

According to Livy both consuls were detained in Rome because they had difficulty in making atonement for some of the announced portents (27.23.1: consules religio tenebat quod prodigiis aliquot nuntiatis non facile litabant). He also adds that for several days sacrifices were not coming out favorably and for a long time the pax deorum was not obtained (27.23.4: Per dies aliquot hostiae maiores sine litatione caesae diuque non impetrata pax deum). He concludes by asserting that the dire consequences of these
portents fell upon the heads of the consuls while the state remained safe (27.23.4: In capita consulum re publica incolumi exitiabilis prodigiorum eventus vertit).

28.3-5. αὐτὸν ἐν Ῥώμῃ σπαργῶντα...: This characterization of Marcellus may be an embellishment by Plutarch since Livy who was probably his source here has simply Ceterum consulem Marcellum tanta cupiditas tenebat dimicandi cum Hannibale ut numquam satis castra castris conlata diceret (27.27.1). However, the possibility that Plutarch derived this from elsewhere cannot be excluded.

28.6 καὶ εἷ μὴ πολλῆς...: This evaluation of Marcellus appears to be based on the comments of Livy (27.27.11: Mors Marcelli cum aliocui miserabilis fuit, tum quod nec pro aetate—iam enim maior sexaginta annis erat—neque pro veteris prudentia ducis tam improvide se collegamque et prope totam rem publicam in praeceps dederat).

28.6. ὑπὲρ γὰρ ἐξήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη τὸ πέμπτον ὑπάτευον: Livy records this as Marcellus' age at the time of his death during his fifth consulship in 208 B.C. (27.27.11: Mors Marcelli...pro aetate—iam enim maior sexaginta annis erat).

If Livy is Plutarch's source here, which seems likely (see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 372-373), then his statement should be preferred over Plutarch's in estimating Marcellus' age. Accordingly, Marcellus turned 60 sometime before his death in
the summer of 208 B.C. This would place his birth in either 269 or 268 B.C. (although cf. Münzer RE 18.2 [1942], "O tacilius," no. 12: 1862 who places Marcellus' birth around 270 B.C. ["Marcellus ist um 484 = 270 geboren"]). But for us to accept a date of 270 B.C., would necessitate preferring Plutarch's statement over Livy's, and interpreting it as referring to Marcellus being 60 at the time of the consular elections held in 209 B.C. Additionally, one must assume that Marcellus turned 61 at some point after these elections but before the end of that same year).
29. This chapter narrates how Marcellus fell into ambush and was killed by Hannibal’s forces. The account of his death is related or mentioned by numerous sources (Comp. Pel. et Marc. 3.6, Pel. 2.9-11, Fab. Max. 19.6, Flamin. 1.5; Liv. 27.25.11-27.14; Polyb. 10.32.1-6 [see Walbank Polybius 242-244]; App. Hann. 50; Val. Max. 1.6.9; Sil. Ital. 15.343-380; Nep. Hann. 5.3; Cic. Tusc. 1.37, 89; Oros. 4.18.6, 18.8; Zon. 9.9.1; De vir. ill. 45.7; Plin. NH 11.189; Eutr. 3.16.4; see De Sanctis SR 3^2.2: 460, n. 49).

The apparent recklessness with which Marcellus threw away his life was one of the similarities which he had in common with Pelopidas that induced Plutarch to write their lives in parallel (Pel. 2.11-12: ήφειδησαν έαυτών συν οὔδενι λογισμῷ, προέμενοι τόν βίον ὅπηνικα μάλιστα τοιούτων καῦρός ήν ἀνδρῶν σφυκέμενων καὶ ἄρχόντων. διόπερ ήμεῖς ἐπόμενοι ταῖς ὁμοιότησι παραλλήλους ἀνεγράψαμεν αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους).

How the placing of blame for Marcellus’ death developed in the ancient historical tradition is thoroughly analyzed by Caltabiano (CISA 3 [1975]: 65-81). Although there was general agreement in charging Marcellus with imprudence for the ease with which he exposed himself to danger (Comp. Pel. et Marc. 3.6.: Μάρκελλος δὲ μῆτε χρείας μεγάλης ἐπικειμένης, μῆτε τοῦ παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ πολλάκις ἐξιστάντος τὸν λογισμὸν ἐνθουσιασμοῦ παρεστῶτος, ὑσάμενος ἀπερισκέπτως εἰς κίνδυνον, οὗ στρατηγοῦ πτῶμα, προδρόμου δὲ τῖνος ἡ κατασκόπου πέπτωκεν; Liv. 27.27.11: 349
neque pro veteris prudentia ducis tam impovide se collegamque et prope totam rem publicam in praeceps dederat; Val. Max. 5.1, ext. 6: dum conatus Poenorum cupidius quam consideratius speculatur, interemptum; App. Hann. 50: θυμικὸς ὃν ἐς μάχας καὶ παρακινδυνευτικὸς αἰεί; Polyb. 10.32.7-12), the reason for his death came to be explained in two different ways. One tradition, represented primarily by Polybius, attributes Marcellus' demise to military incompetence (see Chapter 29.18.). The other tradition, represented by Plutarch and Livy among others, blames Marcellus' neglect of the warnings portended in the augural sacrifices as the cause of death (see Chapters 29.8-10. and 29.11.), but at the same time lessens his culpability for the military failure by attributing the undertaking of the rash action not solely to him but to the whole Roman camp (see Chapter 29.7.). In regard to the fighting itself, this tradition faults the Etruscans accompanying Marcellus for their abandonment of the consul (see Chapters 29.14. and 29.15-16.).

29.1. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ...ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον: In Livy's account (27.25.6-7) Crispinus set out first, while Marcellus was held back by religious matters. Crispinus departed for Lucania with reinforcements to take over the command of the army there which had been under Q. Fulvius Flaccus.

Crispinus attempted to attack Locri in Bruttium because he thought that Tarentum had given great fame to Fabius (27.25.11: quia magnum famam attulisse Fabio Tarentum rebatur). All types
of artillery and military machines were summoned from Sicily, as well as ships which were to attack the city from the seaward side. However, this attack was given up when it was rumored that Hannibal had moved forces to Lacinium, and Marcellus had now led his own army from Venusia. Since Crispinus desired to join his colleague, he returned to Apulia (Liv. 27.25.11-13).

29.1. καὶ πολλὰ μεταξὺ...: In Livy the consuls encamped between Venusia and Bantia with their camps less than three miles apart (27.25.13: et inter Venusiam Bantiamque minus trium milium passuum intervallo consules binis castris consederant; Marcellus’ forces consisted of the army stationed at Venusia which he had commanded the previous year along with reinforcements brought from Rome [Liv. 27.25.10; see Chapter 25.3. ἐπέβαλε...]). Into this region Hannibal returned (27.25.14; cf. App. Hann. 50; Zonaras errs, possibly while excerpting his source, in placing Hannibal at Locri [9.9.1: ἐπιστρατεύσαντες {sc. Μάρκελλος καὶ Κρισπῖνος} γάρ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀννίβου τυγχάνοντος ἐν Λοκροῖς}; Valerius Maximus is also mistaken in locating this episode in Bruttium [1.6.9: a multitudine hostium in Bruttis circumventus {sc. Marcellus}]). There both consuls led out their forces daily and arrayed them for battle, with the expectation that the war could be ended if Hannibal engaged the two consular armies (Liv. 27.25.14: Ibi consules ambo ingenio feroces prope cottidie in aciem exire haud dubia spe, si duobus exercitibus consularibus iunctis commisisset sese hostis, debellari posse).
Appian, who must have been using a source different from either Plutarch or Livy, states that the two consuls did not dare to begin battle with Hannibal (Hann. 50: ἐνθα ἀυτῷ Κλαύδιός τε Μάρκελλος, ὁ Σικελίαν ἐλών, πέμπτον ὑπατεύων τότε, καὶ Τίτος Κρισίνος ἀντιστρατεύοντες οὐκ ἔτολμον ἀρχεῖν μάχης). This, however, does not seem correct given the character of Marcellus (which Appian himself describes shortly after the above cited passage [Hann. 50: θυμικός δὲν ἐς μάχας καὶ παρακινδυνευτικὸς ἀεὶ]) and the strategy which Rome appears to have adopted this year.

What was Rome’s strategy this year? The assignment of Italy to both consuls as their province and the consuls’ joint operation against Hannibal with the combined strength of two consular armies strongly indicate that Rome’s intention was to drive Hannibal from Italy or at least to confine him to its most southern part. There were several factors which may have induced Rome to adopt this policy to end the war now in Italy. First, the burden of the war was causing disaffection among her allies and Latin colonies (Liv. 27.9). Second, news came from Etruria that it was ready to revolt (Liv. 27.21.6-7, 24.1-9). Third, Tarentum had been captured in the previous year (Liv.27.15.9-16.9), thus freeing Rome’s efforts in that direction and permitting her to direct more attention to Hannibal himself. But the most important factor must have been Rome’s apprehension at reports of Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal’s intentions of marching to Italy (Liv. 27.5.10-12, 7.1-4).

Indications of this policy adopted now by Rome are not
wholly lacking in the ancient sources (e.g., Valerius Maximus 1.6.9: cum summo studio niteretur ut Poenorum exercitum aut in Italia prosterneret [sc. Marcellus] aut Italia pelleret).

The beneficiary of this policy was Marcellus who was elected consul for 208 B.C., since he seemed to be the only man capable of facing, if not defeating, Hannibal. Consequently with his unexpected death, the hope of ever defeating Hannibal and driving him from Italy dimmed (cf. Scullard RP 71, Hallward CAH 8: 91-92).

Venusia (mod. Venosa) is located on the Via Appia in the border region between Apulia, Lucania, and Samnium. Originally a Samnite town it was colonized by the Romans in 291 B.C. (Dion. Hal. 17/18.5.1-2; Vell. Pat. 1.14.6). After the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. it took in the consul C. Terentius Varro and other Roman survivors (Fab. Max. 16.6; Polyb. 3.116.13, 117.2; Liv. 22.49.14; see RE 8a.1 [1955], no. 1: 892-896 and PECS 966).

Bantia (mod. Banzi) is located 20 kilometers south of Venusia on the border between Apulia and Lucania. It is situated on a spur overlooking a tributary of the Bradano river. It was a flourishing settlement in the third century B.C. and became a municipium in the first half of the first century B.C. (see RE 2.2 [1896], no. 2: 2848-2849 and PECS 142).

29.2. ὁ δὲ εἰς μάχην μὲν οὐ κατέβαινεν: From Livy we learn that Hannibal did not believe himself equal in strength to the two consuls with their combined forces; consequently, he undertook to devise ambushes. But nevertheless, skirmishing
still took place between the two sides with varying fortunes (27.26.1-3: Hannibal, quia cum Marcello bis priore anno congressus vicerat victusque erat, ut cum eodem si dimicandum foret nec spem nec metum ex vano haberet, ita duobus consulibus haudquaquam sese parem futurum censebat; itaque totus in suas artes versus insidiis locum quaerebat. Levia tamen proelia inter bina castra vario eventu fiebant).

29.2. αἰσθόμενος δὲ πεμπομένην...τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους: According to Livy (27.26.3-5) the consuls believed that the year might be wasted through skirmishing, but thinking that Locri could be attacked, they wrote to L. Cincius to cross over from Sicily with the fleet to Locri, and they commanded that part of the army which was garrisoning Tarentum be led to this same town so that the walls might be attacked by land also. Hannibal, however, discovering these plans from some Thurians, sent a force to set up an ambush on the road from Tarentum (27.26.5: Ea ita futura per quosdam Thurinos comperta Hannibali cum essent, mittit ad insidendam ab Tarento viam).

29.2. κατὰ τὸν περὶ Πετηλίαν...: Plutarch does not give the number of Hannibal’s forces involved, but Livy records (27.26.5) 3,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry placed in ambush (that Hannibal still had so many cavalry with him in Italy seems to contradict what Livy had said earlier about the strength of this force in Hannibal’s army at this time; see Chapter 24.3.).

The number of casualties recorded by Plutarch differs from
Livy. In Livy’s account (27.26.6) the Romans, proceeding without reconnoitering, fell into the ambush, in which up to 2,000 of them were killed, 1,500 captured, while the others, scattered in flight, made their way back to Tarentum.

Although Livy has been suggested as Plutarch’s main source for this chapter (see De Sanctis SR 3.2: 372-373), the differences between the two accounts suggest the possibility that Plutarch may have utilized a secondary source, possibly Cornelius Nepos (see Chapter 23.2-11. for De Sanctis’ suggestion of Nepos as the source used there; although cf. Kotz RhM 83 [1934]: 314-316).

29.3. This reaction by Marcellus has no counterpart in Livy, but Livy does have a comment which may be somehow related: Ceterum consulem Marcellum tanta cupiditas tenebat dimicandi cum Hannibale ut numquam satis castra castris conlata diceret (27.27.1).

29.4. This detailed description of the hill far outdoes Livy’s depiction: Tumulus erat silvestris inter Punica et Romana castra (27.26.7). Plutarch could not have conjectured this description of the hill from Livy’s narrative, which implies that either he was using his own imagination or depended upon another source (cf. Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 314).

29.5. This has no corresponding part in Livy; instead, he reports that the Romans did not occupy the hill because they did
not know the condition of that part which was facing the enemy
(27.26.7: quia Romani qualis pars eius quae vergeret ad hostium
castra esset ignorabant).

29.6. τῷ δὲ ἀρξ...κρείττον ἐνεδρεύσατι: Livy gives the same
assessment on why Hannibal did not occupy the hill (27.26.7:
Hannibal insidiis quam castris aptiorem eum crediderat).

29.6. καὶ πρὸς τούτο...: Livy differs from Plutarch concerning
the troops used by Hannibal. He reports that the Carthaginian
commander, during the night, placed some squadrons of Numidian
cavalry in ambush (27.26.8: Itaque nocte ad id missas aliquot
Numidarum turmas medio in saltu condiderat, quorum interdiu nemo
ab statione movebatur ne aut arma aut ipsi procul
conspicerentur; cf. Sil. Ital. 15.367-370). Polybius concurs
with Livy in that Numidians were lying in ambush, but he
attributes their presence as accidental and not due to a
deliberate plan of Hannibal (10.32.3: τῶν δὲ Νομάδων εἰθισμένοι
τινὲς τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις καὶ καθὸλου προπορευομένοις ἐκ τοῦ
tῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακος ἐνέδρας ποιεῖν, ὑπεστάλκεισαν κατὰ τινα
συντυχίαν ὑπὸ τῶν λόφον; Polybius may have preferred this
version of the incident because it strengthened his view of
Marcellus' military incompetence, concerning which see Chapter
29.18.).

Appian, in his strikingly different account of this
episode, states that while Marcellus was pursuing what he
thought was a small group of Numidians carrying off plunder, he
was attacked on all sides by Africans (Hann. 50: λείαν δὲ τινα ύπο Νομάδων ἀγομένην Μάρκελλος ἴδων καὶ δόξας ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς ἄγοντας ἐπέδραμεν αὐτοῖς μετὰ τριακοσίων ἵππων σὺν καταφρονήσει καὶ πρῶτος ἤγειτο, θυμικὸς ὡν ἐς μάχας καὶ παρακινδυνευτικὸς αἰεί. ἂφω δὲ πολλῶν τῶν Λιβύων φανέντων καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτῷ προσπεσόντων).

29.7. Livy also reports a similar voicing of opinions in the Roman camp (27.26.9: Fremebant volgo in castris Romanis occupandum eum tumulum esse et castello firmandum ne, si occupatus ab Hannibale foret, velut in cervicibus haberet hostem).

29.8. ἐδοξεὶν οὖν τῷ...κατασκέψασθαι: Livy portrays this inclination of Marcellus in the form of a conversation (27.26.10: Movit ea res Marcellum, et collegae 'Quin imus’ inquit 'ipsi cum equitibus paucis exploratum? Subiecta res oculis certius dabit consilium.’; cf. Polyb. 10.32.1).

29.8-10. καὶ λαβὼν τὸν μάντιν ἐθύετο...: In addition to Plutarch, both Livy and Valerius Maximus describe this sacrifice and the interpretation given to the signs offered by the livers (Liv. 27.26.13-14: Immolasse eo die quidam prodidere memoriae consulem Marcellum et prima hostia caesa iocur sine capite inventum, in secunda omnia comparuisse quae adsolet, auctum etiam visum in capite; nec id sane haruspici placuisse quod secundum truncia et turpia exta nimis laeta apparuissent; Val.
Max. 1.6.9: sollemnique sacrificio voluntates deorum exploraret, quae prima hostia ante foculum cedidit, eius iecur sine capite inventum est, proxima caput iocinoris duplex habuit. quibus inspectis aruspex tristi vultu non placere sibi exta, quia secundum truncata laeta apparuissent, respondit).

Pliny places the second sacrifice on the following day, but this is probably inexactness on his part (NH 11.189: M. Marcello circa mortem, cum periti ab Hannibale, defuit [sc. iecor] in extis; sequenti deinde die gemenum repertum est).

Plutarch’s switch from a single haruspex (29.8: τὸν μάντιν) to several (29.10: οἱ δὲ μάντεις) is probably due to carelessness (cf. Liv. 27.26.14 and Val. Max. 1.6.9 where only one haruspex is mentioned).

29.11. ἄλλα γὰρ τὸ πεπρωμένον...κατὰ Πίνδαρον: This line, quoted by Plutarch from Pindar (fg. 232 ed. Snell), is Plutarch’s own addition, and it serves a similar function as Livy’s remark: Ceterum consulem Marcellum tanta cupiditas tenebat dimicandi cum Hannibale ut numquam satis castra castris conlata diceret (27.27.1). Both statements follow immediately after the reporting of the sacrifices, and are attempts by Plutarch and Livy to explain Marcellus’ failure in heeding the warnings portented.

29.11-12. ἔξησε τὸν τε συνάρχοντα...: In Livy’s account Marcellus on his way out ordered the soldiers to prepare to move camp in case the hill was found suitable (27.27.2: tum quoque
vallo egrediens signum dedit ut ad locum miles esset paratus, ut si collis in quem speculatum irent placuisset, vasa conligierent et sequerentur; cf. Polyb. 10.32.1).

Livy (27.26.11-12) records the same composition of the Roman forces, but in addition lists the military tribunes, M. Marcellus (Marcellus’ son) and A. Manlius, and two prefects of the allies, L. Arrenius and M’. Aulius, as also belonging to the consuls’ retinue (the addition of the last three names may be due to Livy’s discovery of them in the casualty list of the battle [27.27.8]; we also learn later from both Plutarch [29.17] and Livy [27.27.8] that the consuls were attended by their lictors).

Polybius gives a different composition of this force. He records that the consuls took two troops of cavalry (this would be 60 combatants [Polyb. 6.20.9, 25.1]), up to 30 velites, as well as their lictors with them (10.32.2: αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν ἵππεων ἀναλαβόντες ὑλας δύο καὶ γροσφομάχους μετὰ τῶν ῥαβδοφόρων εἰς τριάκοντα προῆγον).

Appian in his account (Hann. 50) merely reports that Marcellus took with him 300 cavalry.

The composition of the Roman forces as reported by Plutarch, Livy, and Polybius for this foray indicates that this was no ordinary reconnaissance mission (it would be unusual for both consuls to go on a routine scouting trip), and therefore the purpose of it as given by the ancient sources appears inadequate (e.g., Liv. 27.27.14: Ceterum ita fama variat ut tamen plerique loci speculandi causa castris egressum).
Caltabiano (CISA 3 [1975]: 73-74), reaching this conclusion, compares this episode with the account of the death of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus as reported by Livy (25.16-17), in which she finds many similarities. Sempronius, after repeated sacrifices and on being warned by the *haruspices* of the foreboding nature which they portended, nevertheless set out from the Roman fortifications with his lictors and a troop of cavalry to a spot not far from camp where a meeting had been arranged with the Lucanians to discuss their return to the Roman alliance. However, this meeting was a trap, and upon Sempronius’ arrival Punic infantry and cavalry, placed there in ambush, sprang up and massacred the small Roman force. Taking this account into consideration, Caltabiano hypothesizes that Marcellus’ retinue was more fitted for conducting a diplomatic mission than for reconnoitering a hill.

Caltabiano leaves her suggestion as merely a hypothesis since she can find no objective data with which to verify it ("Tuttavia mancando altri dati obiettivi che possano rendere questa ipotesi accettabile, mi limito a prospettarla come tale, lasciando aperti tutte le incertezze e gli interrogativi che una ipotesi inesorabilmente propone" [p. 74]). But if a likely reason for a diplomatic mission can be found, then her hypothesis becomes more viable. The ancient sources record three occasions when Numidian cavalry voluntarily defected to Marcellus, once in 215 B.C. after the second battle at Nola (Plut. *Marc.* 12.6, Liv. 23.46.6, Zon. 9.3.6), a second time in 211 B.C. during a battle with Carthaginian forces in Sicily.
(Liv. 25.41.2-4), and a third time in the same year at the Roman capture of Agrigentum (Liv. 26.40.3-8, cf. 27.5.6). Knowing this Hannibal may have devised a plan to lure the consuls into an ambush by having the Numidian cavalry make overtures to Marcellus about possible defection. This would appeal greatly to the Romans whose objective this year appears to have been to end the war in Italy (see Chapter 29.1. καὶ...). Hannibal’s strength lay chiefly in his cavalry, and if the Romans could detach this force from Hannibal, then the prospects of driving him out of Italy would be almost certain. A meeting with the Numidians may have been the objective of the Romans going to the hill, and therefore this scenario would strengthen Caltabiano’s hypothesis. But, nevertheless, it must be asked, if this is what happened, why is it not mentioned in the ancient sources, especially when we know that Marcellus’ funeral speech, delivered by his son who was an eyewitness to the affair, survived into later times and should have contained a report of the event (Liv. 27.27.13)? The simplest explanation might well be that Marcellus was in the habit of doing the most important reconnaissance himself, while his son, Crispinus, and others may well have accompanied him in order to profit from his greater experience in these matters.

29.12. πείραν ἄρετῆς καὶ...: This part has no corresponding section in Livy (see Chapter 29.2. κατὰ τὸν... concerning Cornelius Nepos as a possible secondary source).

Plutarch is probably only referring to the Fregellians, not
to the Etruscans, as the ones giving proof of their courage and loyalty, since we learn at 29.14-15 that the Etruscans fled immediately on being attacked, while the Fregellians remained and fought until Marcellus himself was killed.

The presence of the Etruscans in Marcellus’ force may be the result of Marcellus’ sojourn that year in Etruria. He may have enrolled these units at that time to ensure Etruria’s loyalty which was in doubt (see Chapter 28.1. πρῶτον...; see, also, Harris Rome in Etruria and Umbria 137-139 for his opposing view).

29.13. This section corresponds to Livy 27.27.3: Numidis speculator nequaquam in spem tantae rei positus sed si quos vagos pabuli aut lignorum causa longius a castris progressos possent excipere, signum dat ut pariter ab suis quisque latebris exorerentur. Livy also reports here the nature of the route taken by Marcellus (27.27.3: Exiguum campi ante castra erat; inde in collem aperta undique et conspecta ferebat via).

29.14. This section corresponds to Livy 27.27.4-5:

Non ante apparuere quibus obviis ab iugo ipso consurgendum erat quam circumiere qui ab tergo intercluderent viam; tum undique omnes exorti, et clamore sublato impetum fecere. Cum in ea valle consules essent ut neque evadere possent in iugum occupatum ab hoste nec receptum ab tergo circumventi haberent.

Livy adds the remark that the Romans could have resisted longer if the flight begun by the Etruscan cavalry had not frightened
those remaining (27.27.5: extrahi tamen diutius certamen potuisset ni coepta ab Etruscis fuga pavorem ceteris inieisset).

Polybius has a slightly different account of the ambush in that he locates the Numidians at the base of the hill (10.32.4: οἷς τοῦ σκοποῦ σημὰντος ὅτι παραγίνονται τινες κατ’ ἀκρον τὸν βουνὸν ὑπερδέξιοι 'κείνων, ἔξαναστάντες καὶ παρὰ πλάγια ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν ἀποτέμνοντα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ διακλείουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς).

Appian reports that the rear portion of the Roman force fled first, abandoning Marcellus, who bravely fought on in the belief that those behind him were following (Hann. 50: ἂφω δὲ πολλῶν τῶν Λιβύων φανέντων καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτῷ προσπεσόντων οἱ μὲν οὐραγοῦντες ὅμως πρῶτοι φυγῆς ἔρχον, ὁ δὲ Μάρκελλος ὥς ἐπομένων αὐτῶν ἐμάχετο γενναίως, μέχρι κατακοντισθεὶς ἀπέθανε (Hann. 50).

Valerius Maximus' version of this incident places it at night (1.6.9: ita monitus M. Marcellus ne quid temere conaretur, inequenti nocte speculandi gratia cum paucis egredi ausus, a multitudine hostium in Bruttis circumventus aeque magnum dolorem ac detrimentum patriae interitu suo attulit). The addition of this detail appears to be an attempt by either Valerius Maximus or his source to exculpate Marcellus' action.

29.15-16. Livy relates a very similar report of the fighting (27.27.6-7: Non tamen omisere pugnam deserti ab Etruscis Fregellani donec integri consules hortando ipsique ex parte
Both Livy (27.27.10) and Polybius (10.32.6) report that there was confusion in the Roman camp due to the effort to provide aid, but that the fighting was over before any help could be dispatched.
foray reported here by Plutarch, whatever its intended purpose, in order to profit from Marcellus’ greater experience.

29.15. Μάρκελλον δέ τις...ήν λαγκίαν καλούσιν: This passage of Plutarch makes it obvious that he is following a Latin source here (Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 315). Plutarch describes the lancea (λόγχη πλατεία) for the benefit of his largely Greek audience (cf. Liv. 27.27.7: Marcellum...transfixum lancea; see Introduction, p. 9, concerning Plutarch’s intended readership).

29.16. τὸν δ' υἱὸν ἀρπάσαντες...: Polybius, in an incomplete notice, also records the escape of Marcellus’ son (10.32.6: καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Κλαυδίου τραυματίαν, μόλις καὶ παραδόξως τὸν κίνδυνον διαπεφευγότα ***).

29.17. Livy’s report of casualties (27.27.8-9) is similar to Plutarch’s but more extensive and precise. Livy records that 18 cavalrymen were captured, while 43 were killed either in the fighting or during the flight; of the lictors, five were captured and the remaining were either killed or fled with Crispinus. Livy also states that the military tribune A. Manlius was killed and of the prefects of the allies, M’. Aulius was killed and L. Arrenius was captured.

29.18. ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ...πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἐπιβιώσας: According to Livy (27.28.1-3) Hannibal now moved his camp to the hill, and Crispinus, terrified by the death of his colleague and by his
own wounds, set out that night and marched to the nearest mountains where he pitched camp in a high and safe place. Then the two leaders engaged in using their wits, one in contriving and the other in avoiding trickery (27.28.3: Ibi duo duces sagaciter moti sunt, alter ad inferendam, alter ad cavendam fraudem).

Later, after his ruse against Salapia failed (see Chapter 30.2. τὸν μὲν...), Hannibal set out to raise the siege of Locri which was under attack by L. Cincius (Liv. 27.28.13). When Crispinus learned this, he ordered Marcellus’ son, who was a military tribune, to lead his father’s army to Venusia, while he himself left with his army for Capua, although he was barely able to endure the trip because of his wounds. He sent a letter to the senate informing it of the death of his colleague and of his own wounds and that he was unable to come to Rome for the elections because of his condition and also because he was concerned about Hannibal moving his forces towards Tarentum. He said that it was necessary that envoys be sent to him with whom he could speak. The senate upon obtaining this letter sent Q. Fabius Maximus, the son of Verrucosus, to take over the army at Venusia and dispatched three legates to Crispinus (Liv. 27.29.1-6).

Livy (27.33.6) reports that Crispinus died of his wounds at the end of this year after having appointed T. Manlius Torquatus dictator for the holding of elections and games. He also mentions that his authorities disagreed about whether Crispinus had died at Tarentum or in Campania.
29.18. καὶ πάθος τοῦτο...: This comment is also found in Livy (27.33.7: ita quod nullo ante bello acciderat, duo consules sine memorando proelio interfeci velut orbam rem publicam reliquerant).

Livy at the conclusion of his narrative on the death of Marcellus gives an interesting insight into his sources and summarizes what they agreed upon in respect to this incident:

Multos circa unam rem ambitus fecerim si quae de Marcelli morte variant auctores, omnia exsequi velim. Ut omittam alios, Coelius triplicem gestae rei ordinem edit, unam traditam fama, alteram scriptam in laudatione filii, qui rei gestae interfuerit, tertiam quam ipse pro inquisitam ac sibi comperta affert. Ceterum ita fama variât ut tamen plerique loci speculari causa castris egressum, omnes insidiis circumventum tradant (27.27.12-14).

From this passage one can see that Plutarch’s account of this episode followed the standard version of what happened.

Polybius blames Marcellus himself for his misfortune (10.32.7: Μάρκος μὲν οὖν ἄκακωτερον ἡ στρατηγικότερον αὐτῷ χρησάμενος τοῖς δεδηλωμένοις περιέπεσε συμπτώμασιν) and uses this incident as an opportunity for pointing out that commanders are more liable to make mistakes in this regard (i.e. exposing themselves to unnecessary danger) than in any other matter, although the error is an obvious one (10.32.8-12). However, Polybius’ negative comments on Marcellus’ military abilities may have been helped along by his bias against him (see Chapter 8.1. Ψηφισμάτων...), since it does not seem to have occurred to him that personal inspection of critical topographical features is a
necessary requirement of a competent commander in the absence of accurate maps. The real reason why the ambush was successful in the first place was not military incompetence on Marcellus’ part, as Polybius believes, but Hannibal’s keen observance of Marcellus’ habits.

Marcellus is said to have fought in 39 battles. In this he was surpassed only by C. Julius Caesar who fought 50 times (Plin. 7.92; cf. Solin. 1.107, Amm. Marc. 25.3.13 who records only 20, but De Sanctis SR 3.2: 460, n. 50 suggests that this is perhaps a copyist’s error: XX for XL).
30.1. Among the ancient sources which record the death of Marcellus, Plutarch, Appian, and Silius Italicus describe the reaction of Hannibal on viewing his body. According to Appian, Hannibal praised Marcellus as a soldier, but censured him as a general (Hann. 50: καὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ σῶματι ὁ Ἀβνίβας ἐπιστάς, ὡς εἶδε τὰ τραύματα πάντα ἐπὶ τῶν στέρνων, ἐπήνεσε μὲν ὡς στρατιώτην, ἐπέσκωψε δὲ ὡς στρατηγὸν). Klotz (RhM 83 [1934]: 316) believes that Plutarch’s and Appian’s versions go back to the same source, but that into Appian’s account has flowed a small bit of the tradition represented by Polybius (Polyb. 10.32.7: Μάρκος μὲν οὖν ἀκακώτερον ἢ στρατηγικῶτερον αὐτῷ χρησάμενος τοῖς δεδηλωμένοις περιέπεσε συμπτώμασιν). Silius Italicus has this to say:

At postquam Tyrius saeva inter proelia ductor
infixum adverso vidit sub pectore telum,
immane exclamat: "Latias, Carthago, timere
desine iam leges; iacet exitiabile nomen,
Ausonii columen regni. sed dextera nostrae
tam similis non obscursus mittatur ad umbras.
magnanima invidia virtus caret" (15.381-387).

30.2. τὸν μὲν δακτύλιον ἀφείλετο: Both Livy and Zonaras also mention Hannibal’s acquisition of Marcellus’ ring (Liv. 27.28.4; Zon. 9.9.2). Crispinus, realizing the danger which this ring posed in Hannibal’s possession, sent a message around to the neighboring towns announcing his colleague’s death and warning against believing any letters sealed with this ring. Shortly thereafter Hannibal attempted to recapture Salapia by sending a
letter there forged with Marcellus’ name, stating that he was coming that night. However, the Salapians suspecting a trick foiled Hannibal’s plans by admitting only a small portion of his arriving force, which they massacred (Liv. 27.28.4-13; Zon. 9.9.2-3).

30.2. τὸ δὲ σῶμα κοσμήσας...: The account of Marcellus’ funeral is related or mentioned by numerous sources (Comp. Pel. et Marc. 3.9-10; Cic. Sen. 75; Liv. 27.28.1; Val. Max. 5.1, ext. 6; Sil. Ital. 15.387-396; App. Hann. 50; De vir. ill. 45.7-8). Although Livy is extremely brief in his description of the funeral (27.28.1: ibi inventum Marcelli corpus sepelit [sc. Hannibal]), other surviving sources are fuller and give details which are similar to Plutarch’s (App. Hann. 50: τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔκανε λαμπρῶς καὶ τὰ ὅστα τῷ παιδὶ προσέπησεν ἐς τὸ Ρωμαιῶν στρατόπεδον; De vir. ill. 45.7-8: Quinquies consul insidiis Hannibalis deceptus et magnifice sepultus. Ossa Romam remissa a praedonibus intercepta perierunt; Val. Max. 5.1, ext. 6: Hannibal M. Marcellum in agro Bruttio, dum conatus Poenorum cupidius quam consideratius speculatur, interemptum legitimo funere extulit punicoque sagulo et corona donatum aurea rogo inposuit). But the most detailed depiction, that given by Silius Italicus, is probably due to poetical license and should not be considered historical:

alta sepulchri
protinus extruitur caeloque educitur ara.
convecentant silvis ingentia robora; credas
Sidonium cecidisse ducem. tum tura dapesque
et fasces clipeusque viri, pompa ultima, fertur.

370

30.3-4. The only other surviving source which reports the loss of Marcellus' remains is the De viris illustribus (45.8: Ossa Romam remissa a praedonibus intercepta perierunt). Although Plutarch implies that the remains were intercepted on their way to Marcellus' son who was in the Roman camp, the De viris illustribus reports that this occurred on their journey to Rome. It may be that Marcellus' remains were successfully delivered to his son in the Roman camp, but when they were dispatched from the camp to Rome, they were intercepted. If this is the case, then Plutarch's account is misleading due to his excerpting of this incident from his source(s).

Of the two versions of the funeral reported here, the first is to be preferred. The second version attributed to Livy and Augustus that Marcellus' remains were taken to his son and buried splendidly is dubious, since Livy does not report a burial at Rome and Augustus had his own reasons for desiring this outcome for Marcellus' death (see Caltabiano CISA 3 [1975] 78-79, who proposes that in promoting his nephew and son-in-law, M. Claudius Marcellus, as his successor Augustus wanted to link him with our Marcellus and his famous exploits, but at the same time wished to gloss over our Marcellus' neglect of the auspices [see Chapters 29.8-10. and 29.11. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ...], which had contributed to the spreading of the belief that he had lacked
burial). However, the first version does not preclude that a memorial ceremony was held at Rome, since Livy (27.27.13) reports that Coelius Antipater had consulted the laudatio for Marcellus given by his son.

The tomb of the Marcelli was located beside the Via Appia just outside of the Porta Capena near the temples of Virtus and Honos which our Marcellus had vowed (see Chapter 28.2.). The funeral monument was embellished by his grandson with three statues, one of himself, of his father, and of his grandfather, our Marcellus (Ascon. p. Pis. 11 Kiessling-Schoell: Idem cum statuas sibi ac patri itemque avo poneret in monumentis avi sui ad Honoris et Virtutis, decore subscripsit: III MARCELLI NOVICES COSS.; see Coarelli Roma 154-155).

30.5. οἵ περὶ Κορνήλιον Νέπωτα: See Introduction, pp. 26-29, concerning Cornelius Nepos as one of Plutarch’s sources.

30.5. Οὐαλέριον Μάχιμον: See the Introduction, pp. 29-30, concerning Valerius Maximus as one of Plutarch’s sources.

30.5. Λίβιος: The citation of Livy here appears to be incorrect since he merely says this about Marcellus’ funeral: ibi inventum Marcelli corpus sepelit (27.28.2; cf. Zimmermann RhM 79 [1930]: 59; see the Introduction, pp. 25-26, concerning Livy as one of Plutarch’s sources).

30.5. Καῖσαρ ὁ Σεβαστὸς: See the Introduction, pp 30-31,
concerning Augustus as one of Plutarch's sources.

30.6. τῶν ἐν Ῥώμη: Two inscriptions have been found in Rome which mention offerings dedicated by Marcellus, but the statues themselves have not survived (CIL, I², 608 = ILS, 12; see Chapter 18.2. ἐπέδραμε...; CIL, I², 609 = VI, 474 = ILS, 13; see Chapter 21.1-2. πλείστα...).

30.6. γυμνάσιον μὲν ἐν Κατάνη τῆς Σικελίας: Katane (mod. Catania) is located on the eastern coast of Sicily just south of Mount Etna. Founded by Chalcidians from Naxos in the second half of the eighth century B.C. (Thuc. 6.3.3; Strab. 6.2.3), it was conquered by the Romans in 263 B.C. (Eutr. 2.19.1). In the second and first centuries B.C. it was a civitas decumana (Cic. Verr. 2.3.103) and under Octavian was raised to the status of a Roman colony (Strab. 6.2.4; Plin. NH 3.89; see PECS 442-443, RE 10.2 [1919]: 2473-2477, and Coarelli-Torelli Sicilia 326-338).

Nothing more is known about the gymnasium built here by Marcellus (or one of his descendants?), but its presence suggests that Katane may have helped Marcellus during his campaigns in Sicily (214-211 B.C.).

30.6. ἄνδριάντες δὲ καὶ...οὗς Καβείρους ὀνόμαζον: Samothrace is a mountainous island in the northeast Aegean on which was located a famous sanctuary dedicated to the Great Gods (see PECS 804-806 and RE 1a.2 [1920], "Samothrace": 2224-2226).

The Great Gods, who were of pre-Greek origin, probably
semitic, included the Kabeiroi (Gr. Dioskouroi) who were demons attendant on a Great Mother (Axieros or Gr. Demeter) and her spouse (Kadmilos or Gr. Hermes; see PECS 804-805 and RE 10.2 [1919], "Kabeiros," no. 1: 1399-1450).

Why Marcellus (or one of his descendants?) made dedications to these gods is unknown, but their association with Demeter suggests that he may have made a vow to Demeter during his campaigns in Sicily (possibly at Henna from which it was thought her rites had arisen [Val. Max. 1.1.1]), and the statues and pictures from Syracuse given to this sanctuary may be in fulfillment of this vow.

30.6. περὶ Λίνδου ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς: The city of Lindos located on the east coast of the island of Rhodes existed already in Mycenaean times and is even mentioned by Homer (Il. 2.653-670). It was famous in antiquity for its shrine of Athena Lindia on the acropolis (see PECS, "Rhodes": 755-758 and RE 13.1 [1926], "Lindia": 712-713).

Why Marcellus (or one of his descendants?) dedicated spoils from Syracuse here is unknown, but the very fact of the dedication shows that the Marcelli must have had some sort of connection with Rhodes (cf. Jacoby FGrH 2 C: 189).

30.7-8. Since Plutarch refers to Posidonius as his source only for the statue of Marcellus, the other notices of dedications must come from a different source (Klotz RhM 83 [1934]: 292-293; see the Introduction, pp. 21-25, concerning Posidonius as one of
Plutarch's sources).

Since the statue referred to here is of Marcellus himself it must have been a dedication made by someone other than him, possibly by his grandson since it is known that he set up a statue of his grandfather on the family tomb near Rome (Ascon. p. Pis. 11 Kiessling-Schoell). However, the inscription on the base of this statue, as reported by Plutarch, raises difficulties, because the epigram refers to Marcellus as having held the consular power seven times, but we know that he held five consulships and was proconsul at least four times. This indicates that the one responsible for the epigram had an inaccurate knowledge of his political life, and this could hardly have been one of his descendants (see Ziegler RhM 110 [1967]: 63-64 concerning text).

30.9. Plutarch explains here how ἑπτάκι (seven) was derived for the number of times Marcellus held consular power. However, he does not appear to notice the discrepancy that Marcellus held the proconsulship not two but at least four times (see Introduction, pp. 24-25).

30.10. Γένος δ' αὐτοῦ...ἀειμείσθω διέτεινεν: The male line of Marcellus continued for six generations ending with the death of M. Claudius Marcellus the nephew of Augustus in 23 B.C. (RE 3.2 [1899], "Claudii Marcelli," nos. 214ff.: 2731-2732). The descendants of Marcellus frequently held the highest magistracies. His son, M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899],
no. 222: 2755-2757; see Chapter 2.5. ἦν γὰρ αὐτῷ...), was consul in 196 B.C. and censor in 189 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 335 and 360-361 for references). His grandson, M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 225: 2758-2760), was consul in 166, 155, and 152 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 1: 437, 448, and 453 for references). Of Marcellus' great-great-grandsons, one, C. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 214: 2733), was praetor in 80 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 2: 84 for references), and another, M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 227: 2760), was curule aedile in 91 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 2: 21 for references). Of his great-great-great-grandsons, one, M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 229: 2760-2764), was consul in 51 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 2: 240-241 for references), another, C. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 216: 2734-2736), was consul in 50 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 2: 247 for references), and a third, C. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 217: 2736-2737), was consul in 49 B.C. (see Broughton MRR 2: 256 for references). Finally, his great-great-great-great grandson, M. Claudius Marcellus (RE 3.2 [1899], no. 230: 2764-2770), was curule aedile in 23 B.C.

30.10. This Marcellus (RE, no. 230) was born in 42 B.C., the son of Octavia the sister of Augustus (RE 17.2 [1937], "Octavia," no. 96: 1859-1868), who had married C. Claudius Marcellus (RE, no. 216). At the end of 27 B.C. as military tribune, he accompanied Augustus to Spain for a war against the Cantabrians (Dio 53.26.1; cf. Suet. Aug. 26, Tib. 9), but

376
returned to Rome in 25 B.C. before Augustus to marry Augustus’ daughter, Julia (RE 10.1 [1918], "Iulia," no. 550: 896-906; Suet. Aug. 63; Mon. Anc. Lat. 4.23 = Gr. 11.12; Cons. Liv. 67-68; Sen. Cons. Marc. 2.3; Plut. Ant. 87.3; Dio 53.31.2). Upon Augustus’ return in 24 B.C., Marcellus was made a pontiff, received into the senate, and obtained the curule aedileship of 23 B.C. with the right to stand for the consulship ten years earlier than the legal limit (Tac. Ann. 1.3; Dio 53.28.3-4; Plin. NH 19.24). During his aedileship he put on exceptionally magnificent games and was considered by many to be Augustus’ successor (Dio 53.30.2, 31.2-3; Vel. Pat. 2.93.1; Sen. Cons. Marc. 2.3, Cons. Polyb. 15.3; Tac. Hist. 1.15), but he died in the later part of this year at the age of 20 at Baiae (Dio 53.30.4; Prop. 3.18; Vel. Pat. 2.93.1; Serv. Aen. 6.861). He was given a public funeral at which Augustus gave the speech (Dio 53.30.5; Serv. Aen. 1.712; Cons. Liv. 441-442), and 600 marched in the procession wearing the masks (imagines) of his ancestors (Serv. Aen. 6.861, 874). His cremated remains were placed in the mausoleum which Augustus had built for himself and his family (Dio 53.30.5; Serv. Aen. 6.861; Cons. Liv. 67-68; see RE 3.2 [1899], "M. Claudius Marcellus," no. 230: 2764-2770).

30.11. εἰς δὲ τιμὴν...τὴν βιβλιοθήκην ἀνέθηκε: This library, established by Octavia after her son’s death (Ovid Trist. 3.1.69), was located in the Porticus Octaviae. Augustus appointed C. Melissus to undertake the arrangement of this facility (Suet. Gram. 21), which contained a section for both...
Greek and Latin books (CIL, VI, 2347 = 4431, 2349 = 5192). In A.D. 80 the library burned down (Dio 66.24.1-2), but it is probable that the building and its contents were replaced by Domitian (Suet. Dom. 20; see Platner-Ashby 84-85 and Coarelli Roma 276-277).

30.11. Καῖσαρ ὁ Θέατρον...: The theater of Marcellus was located on the northwest side of the Forum Holitorium. Built by Augustus, the structure was intended as a memorial to his nephew, and it was dedicated in Marcellus’ name (Dio 43.49.2, 53.30.5-6; Mon. Anc. 4.22; Liv. Per. 138; Suet. Aug. 29). In 17 B.C. the construction was far enough advanced that part of the celebration of the Ludi Saeculares took place in it (CIL, VI, 32323.157; Eph. Epigr., VIII, 233), but it was not dedicated until 13 (Dio 54.26.1) or less probably 11 B.C. (Plin. NH 8.65; Chron. Pasch.; see Platner-Ashby 513-515 and Coarelli Roma 272 and 274).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Texts and Editions


________. De re publica. 6th ed. Ed. K. Ziegler. Leipzig:
B. G. Teubner, 1964


Inscriptions and Coins

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1862-.


Inscriptiones Graecae. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1873-.


**General**


1951-1952.


Buchholz, M. *Quibus Fontibus Plutarchus in Vitis Fabii Maximi et Marcelli Usus Sit.* Diss., Greifswald, 1865.


Cook, A. B. "Zeus, Jupiter, and the Oak (Conclusion)." *CR* 18 (1904): 360-375.


Fabrini, L. "Su una recente proposta per la identificazione di M. Claudio Marcello." *ArchClass* 13 (1961): 152-158.


Frank, T. "Rome after the Conquest of Sicily." Chap. in The


——. "Die Stellung des Silius Italicus unter den Quellen zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges." *RhM* 82 (1933): 1-34.


Lippold, A. *Consules: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des römischen Konsulates von 264 bis 201 v. Chr*. Bonn: R.
Habelt, 1963.


Much, R. "Der Eintritt der Germanen in die Weltgeschichte." Germanistische Forschungen: Festschrift anlässlich des 60


Pauly, A. et al., eds. Real-Encyclopädie der classischen


Rosenhauer, J. *Symbolae ad Quaestionem de Fontibus Libri qui Inscribitur De viris illustribus urbis Romae.* Camboduni, 1882.


Schübeler, P. *De Syracusarum Oppugnatione Quaestiones Criticae.* Geestemünde, 1910.


Sickinger, A. *De linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et Reliquis et Vestigiis.* Diss., Heidelberg, 1883.


Soltau, W. *De Fontibus Plutarchi in Secundo Bello Punico Enarrando.* Diss., Bonn, 1870.


______. *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections.* London,
Southampton: Thames and Hudson, 1972.


Volkmann, H. Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner erobeter


