

WHAT DOES CANADA WANT ?
Reactions to the Allaire Report In and Out
of Quebec as Expressed in the Written Press

By

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ABSTRACT

The theoretical framework of this thesis bases itself essentially upon the respective works of Arendt Lijphart and Karl Deutsch, who have studied how societal cleavages and social communication interact with each other. The present thesis's main focus is the Quebec/English Canadian duality. It uses quantitative analysis to study and compare pan-Canadian reactions to the Allaire Report that was issued by the Quebec Liberal Party in early 1991. The purpose is to try and find out whether the Allaire Report and the proposals it contains have had a divisive effect on Canadian society, and if so, to what extent.

The data consists of all issues of the following newspapers over a period of time of exactly one month, from the 22nd of January and the 22nd of February, 1991 : the Calgary Herald, the Chronicle Herald, the Globe and Mail, Le Devoir, the Montreal Gazette, the Vancouver Sun and the Winnipeg Free Press. The analysis bases itself upon (1) the space that each newspaper devotes to the issue (2) the tone and content of the headlines and (3) the frequencies of appearance of certain selected words.

Quantitative analysis shows that the gap between Quebec and English Canada is becoming wider. Quebec clearly overestimates English Canada's fragile degree of homogeneity, while English Canada, by increasingly identifying itself to the so-called "rest of Canada", paradoxically acts as if Quebec were the glue that holds the whole country together.

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Introduction.

Canada is an exception among developed countries : for several decades now, the most important driving force behind Canadian politics seems to have been an uncertainty, unsolved to this day, as to whether or not there should be such a thing as Canadian politics at all - in other words, whether or not the continued existence of a Canadian state as organized by the 1867 BNA Act is a desirable thing. For compelling historical reasons, Canada is a country which, oddly enough (and this is said without scorn or contempt), does not seem to have reached its definitive shape. It is involved in a permanent process of examining and recreating itself, as opposed to other "new countries" such as Australia or the United States, which may experience internal tensions too, but whose existence as unified sovereign states is taken as a matter of course, domestically and externally. In Canada, that tension has been powerful enough to threaten the existence of the state. Current developments strongly suggest that the question remains open-ended. Canada has been involved in a complicated and long process of soul-searching whose definite answer remains to be formulated. Quite logically, uncertainties about the Canadian identity have shaped the national political and constitutional debate, and constitutional crisis seems to have become the staple diet of Canadian politicians and public, as well as their media's bread-and-butter. Since the 1960s especially, the national political pendulum has been swinging back and

forth between unity and breakup, this second option becoming a bit more probable each time. There is now widespread concern that the crisis which is currently unfolding may well spell the end of Canadian unity. Disintegrative forces seem to be gaining ground at the expense of unifying ones.

The Allaire report comes as a prime example of this trend. When that report was released by Quebec's Liberal Party in late January 1991, it drew attention from the media in Quebec and outside. There seems to be a consensus on the fact that Allaire constitutes a milestone in the traditionally federalist Quebec Liberals' strategy. Much was written about Allaire, for as well as against it, and it should be interesting to compare the respective reactions from Quebec and the "rest of Canada", as expressed in the written press. It should give us an idea of where the chief misunderstandings lie. The uproar Allaire caused in English Canada shows that the tone and content of that document struck a sensible chord in the public opinion. Since it puts Canada's unity into question, each and every Canadian citizen feels entitled to react to it. Reactions have been all the more passionate since (as we shall see later on) Allaire explicitly threatens Canadian unity in the short term. The more outspoken the threat, the more urgent the preservation of unity looks. Thus, the variety of reactions reflects the many existing conceptions of Canada as a nation and as a state. Therefore one can reasonably assume that the various ways Allaire was perceived inside and outside Quebec follow some of the most relevant cleavages in Canadian society.

When we think of Canadian society, two characteristics come to mind almost as a matter of course : French-English duality, and multiplicity of provinces, each of which has its own social personality (and likes very much to think so). In order to keep Canada one, the political sphere is bound to accommodate the potentially centrifugal forces of dualism and provincialism as best it can. Hence the importance of communication : in a country as sparsely and diversely populated as Canada, intergroup communication is at the same time more necessary and more difficult than elsewhere .

Arendt Lijphart (1977) and Karl Deutsch (1953) analyse the problem of coexistence of differentiated social groups. Each group is delineated by a subtle border between "we" and "they" (see also Grosser (1972) "Chaque groupe oriente ses comportements à partir de l'idée qu'il se fait de lui-même et des autres groupes dont il veut se différencier ou auxquels il veut ressembler"). The we-they system contains a varying degree of partnership and antagonism. For partnership to prevail over antagonism, communication between groups must reach a sufficient level and have a positive effect both on the sender and on the receiver. This thesis will , seek to explore whether the variety of reactions to the Allaire report reflects deeper cleavages of Canadian society. Were these cleavages reinforced or weakened ? In the case of Allaire, has communication had a positive/integrative effect or a negative/divisive effect on Canadian society ?

CHAPTER I - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS.

I - CAN A PLURAL SOCIETY BE STABLE ?

A - Definitions and conditions

In order to understand social forces and their respective weight, one can use Arendt Lijphart' theoretical framework as a useful starting point¹. Lijphart develops an optimistic argument : he argues that it may be difficult but not impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society. It is something Canadians feel has been missing lately : stability is no longer here, obviously, the federal government is quite unpopular, and some of its practices have been criticized and called undemocratic (it was said, for instance, that the way the Meech Lake Accord was drafted and signed left a lot to be desired, and this factor was not irrelevant to the eventual death of the Accord itself).

1 - Definition of plurality.

At this point, one cannot help wondering whether Canada has become, quite simply, too "plural" to be governed any longer. A plural society, as defined by Lijphart (here quoting Harry Eckstein), is a society which is divided by segmental cleavages (Lijphart, 1977). Societal cleavages exist

"where political divisions follow very closely and especially concern lines of objective social differentiation".

Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature. Political parties, interest groups, media, schools and voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages.

2 - Conditions for stability.

Political stability combines system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness. According to Lijphart, the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that : 1. there is cooperation between elites, and 2. groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations. Overlapping memberships are characteristic of a homogeneous political culture, in which parties and groups do perform their aggregative function. The more cross-cutting the various cleavages are, the more stable the system can potentially be, since overarching loyalties (nationalism, sub-cultures, party affiliation...) have a mutually countervailing effect. When the cleavages begin superposing themselves, overall stability becomes more precarious, and chances of internal strife and even separatism increase. It becomes especially true when party cleavages are involved.

"A stable democracy requires a situation in which all the major parties include supporters from many segments of the population. A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut as to rule out compromise".

At such a point, separation, pure and simple, sometimes become the most desirable option. Lijphart points with reason to the bias that generally exists against political divorce : no community likes to see its foundations shaken, its territorial basis diminished (viz. *"If Quebec breaks up this country it will be an enemy and one does not associate with enemies"*)². This reluctance is supported by the traditional notion in international relations that the root cause of conflict among states is the absence of a common government. Still, Lijphart argues, the dangers of a plurality of sovereign states

"must be reckoned against those inherent in the attempt to contain disparate communities within the framework of a single government".

That dilemma is quite relevant in today's Canada.

3 - Lijphart's argument as applied to Canada.

It is interesting to see how Lijphart addresses the question of federalism. He views political federalism as a special form of segmental autonomy, one that can be used only if society itself follows a federalist

pattern. In that ideal case, segmental cleavages coincide with regional ones. But even then, a federal structure is not easy to manage, for two reasons : first, it comprises several equally legitimate levels of government ; second, in a federal state, the question of identity (individual and collective) is more difficult to address than it is in a unitary nation-state. Two conditions follow for the smooth functioning of any federal system : first, there must be a clear, accurate and mutually agreed-on division of powers between the different levels of government ; second, there must be a number of common points and shared values that play the role of the glue that holds the system together.

The fulfilling of these conditions may prove more difficult in a democratic federation which is, by definition, supposed to accommodate mutual differences as much as possible. In other words, not enough democracy turns a federation into a de facto centralized system, one in which the federal structure becomes some kind of alibi, little more than political window-dressing (which used to be the case of the pre-Gorbachev USSR) ; too much democracy turns a federation into a clumsy, inefficient, ; and unstable giant, a balkanized collection of increasingly self-confident entities (which might become the case of Canada in the long run, if divisive forces keep on gaining ground).

B - Nationalism and social communication.

At this point it is necessary to ask ourselves what it is that makes one particular level of identity more attractive or more repulsive than another. Depending on the time and on the place, nationalist (or regionalist) ideas will either strike a chord and elicit a positive response from society, or meet only benign neglect or even distrust. Nationalist ideas and their appeal are anything but static phenomena, and communication plays a key role in their development.

1 - Introduction to Deutsch's argument.

The question was addressed by Karl Deutsch in Nationalism And Social Communication (1953). What is it, Deutsch asks, that holds different social groups together and turns them into a nation ? He reviews several conceptions of nationalism and nationhood. As far as the biological theory of nation is concerned, Deutsch rejects it out of hand. It is clear that he considers nationalism as a potentially dangerous phenomenon. He also criticizes the more widespread idea of a nation as a common culture, incrementally built by experiences shared over the centuries. To him, to define a nation as the outcome of shared experiences presupposes an already-existing and persistent capacity to share experience. And that is precisely what cannot be taken for granted. The cultural conception of nation is a qualitative one. What Deutsch puts forth is a quantitative conception that bases itself upon mass communication within and between

groups. The assumption is that if communication has a positive effect, it will perform an integrative function. Conversely, if its effect is negative, communication will be a desintegrative factor.

2 - Communication as a condition.

Communication happens within and between societies and communities, a community being defined here as a society which develops patterns of communication that go beyond the simple exchange of goods and services. The complex interaction between society and community lies at the root of a great number of nationality problems. In Bohemia for instance, Czechs and Germans used to constitute two quite distinct communities within one society (in that case, to go back to Lijphart's analysis, segmental cleavages are much more likely to be superposed than cross-cutting ones). What plays a key role in a community's stability is not so much the presence or the absence of a particular factor (language, history..., though they may help) as the existence of enough communication to maintain global unity (of which Switzerland is a classic example). Therefore, a functional definition of nationality supposes some social communication ; processes that are very compatible with one another. Instruments of power are used to set up and reinforce the social channels of communication, patterns of behavior, preferences, political and sometimes economic affiliations which are, in the end, the basic components of nationality. Nationality gives birth to a nation when it acquires the power with which it can sustain its own aspirations. The building of a nation-state is the

logical outcome of that process.

3 - Communication as a social process.

Since nationality supposes a complementarity of communication, it is possible to measure communication in order to assess the degrees of individual and collective allegiance to a nation, in terms of assimilation or, conversely, of differentiation. However, as is mentioned by Deutsch, the whole process of social learning remains a highly unpredictable phenomenon, since all the information that a person or a population receives can be - and actually is - modified, altered by the effects of the information that was previously received. Therefore, one particular piece of information has to make its way through three levels before it is eventually integrated into the social experience : level 1 is the brute information, the message itself ; level 2 is its reception by the collective psyche ; level 3 is its feedback effect on social action. It thus appears that there are three factors influencing any social organization :

1. the capacities and limits of that organization's "sensorial cells" (human beings or institutions) whose task it is to receive and transmit information ;
2. the social psyche and its feedback effect on collective action ;
3. the organization's degree of openness on the outside world.

According to Deutsch, self-determination becomes no longer possible when one of these three factors disappears. All three are tainted by national consciousness, which infuses them with a second degree of perception ("information about information"). National consciousness integrates the information process into a specific paradigm, a particular framework of symbols. "National symbols" do not exist as such. They are labels that are applied to real objects and actions.

II - NATION AND COMMUNICATION IN THE CASE OF CANADA

For a federal system to succeed, its citizens should have positive feelings about both the federal and the provincial level of government. This is not at all incompatible :

"Canada is a vast land covering diverse geographic and ethnic regions.

Some regionalism must therefore be accommodated. However, the same factors suggest a need for a strong central government"³.

Elkins finds that the rich variety of perceptions among Canadians follow the lines of provincial and linguistic cleavages, and reflect little patterning along other socio-economic dimensions⁴. These powerful provincial loyalties are less anti-Canadian than part and parcel of what it means to be Canadian - an unusual sort of nationalism, more cosmopolitan than parochial or localistic. Elkins stresses that the constitutional debate must accommodate many complex and subtle forces, and that therefore

it is not a black-and-white competition between provincial power and federal dominance, or between centralism and decentralization. Elkins views the constitutional debate more as the outcome of the interplay of three simultaneous forces : province-, country- and nation-building. He considers that the perpetuation of Canada as a single political entity depends on whether its citizens may or may not be put in the situation of feeling that they have to choose between their different political allegiances.

Each competing definition of the Canadian nation is actually a self-contained paradigm, which roots itself in specific cultural and philosophical interpretations of the Canadian federal situation⁵. One of them sees the Canadian federation as the outcome of a "compact" between equal provinces. In another - the Dual Alliance - the Canadian duality is interpreted as a pact between two different cultures, each equal in stature and guarded against cultural intrusions by the other. The major problem of this theory, though, is that it is hardly applicable to English Canada. As opposed to the French cultural tradition, cultural allegiance is not the primary consideration for arranging political institutions, according to the historical English viewpoint. The country was simply not , designed as an alliance of two nations (viz. "Quebec sees itself as 1/2, Canada sees it as 1/10")⁶. Writes Christian Dufour in his excellent book A Canadian Challenge : "Quebecers are still very much affected by the aftermath of the abandonment/conquest they experienced in the eighteenth century, which remains buried in their collective subconscious" (18, 1990).

A - The French-English duality.

1 - The linguistic cleavage in figures

(Source : Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, 1990)

As early as 1907 Andre Siegfried viewed the presence of two "races", the Protestant English and the Catholic French, as the most distinctive feature of Canada⁷. Siegfried wrote that all Canadian differences and divisions sprang from religious questions. In any case the language cleavage is still very much alive.

In the 1986 census, of 25.3 M Canadians, 15.7 M claimed English as their mother tongue, and 6.4 M claimed French. Another 3.2 M listed a mother tongue other than English or French. Over 4 M Canadians speak both. Among all these, 1.6 M live in a province where their official language is in the minority. But the whole picture is complicated by the fact that while French Canadians are a minority at the federal level (25.1 %), they are a majority in Quebec (81.4 %). Conversely, while Anglophones represent less than 10 % of the population of Quebec, they are the majority in Canada - and in North America at large. The source of the Canadian problem can therefore be found in the geographical concentration of French-speaking people nationally and their relative importance within Quebec. Of all French-speaking Canadians, 90 % live in Quebec⁸. Quebec is an exception, to the extent that linguistic minorities over the world generally live on the fringes of their countries⁹. Very seldom do they occupy a relatively central location as Quebec does, surrounded as it is by overwhelmingly

English-speaking regions. That unusual geographical location bears some serious consequences :

. Quebec society has always been marked by two opposites whose merger does not come easily : internally, there is a need to organize a French society, whereas, externally, there is a need to participate in the whole of Canada and North America (Dufour, 19).

. If Quebec goes for sovereignty, Canada will be broken up in two. Whether Quebecers like it or not, their province is a hinge that holds Canada together from an ocean to the other.

. Since French-speaking Québécois are the majority in their own province, it can become difficult to say who is a minority and who is not, depending on one's level of perception, and this ambiguity is loaded with political implications.

2 - The policy of official bilingualism and its efforts to accommodate duality.

a. The pros and cons of bilingualism.

P.E.Trudeau's policy rested upon a specific rationale :

"First, make sure that Quebec would not leave Canada through separatism ; second, make sure that Canada would not shove Quebec out of narrow-mindedness" ¹⁰.

Adds Andrew Cohen :

"Trudeau was Canada's constitutional compass. For two decades, his philosophy on the role of the state, on the rights of people, on the future of Quebec, on the powers of the provinces and on the meaning of language had become conventional wisdom. His idea of Canada - a pluralist, egalitarian society endowed with a bilingual government - became known as the "Trudeau vision". Although it was not his alone, his endurance and eloquence allowed him to claim paternity" ¹¹.

This vision is based on a conviction that Canada can survive only if all citizens regard every part of the country as their own, as opposed to a progressive withdrawal of each linguistic community into either Quebec or the other nine provinces. The objective is to prevent as much as possible the linguistic and the territorial cleavage from superposing themselves.

The policy of federal bilingualism as put forward by the B & B Commission (Laurendeau-Dunton) and later by the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity expresses a dual vision of the Canadian nation. The policy of bilingualism was reaffirmed in the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which makes English and French the official languages of Canada, and in the 1988 Official Languages Act. Most of the federal expenditures on official languages support three major objectives : the provision of services to Canadians in the official language of their choice, the teaching of English and French at the elementary and secondary levels, and the promotion of the official languages.

Our purpose is not to dig and delve into the ins and outs of the policy of bilingualism. Yet since we are interested in delineating the most relevant cleavages in Canadian society, we must ask ourselves whether or not that policy has had an integrative effect or a divisive one. In other words, we must try and assess to what extent bilingualism has narrowed the very gap it was supposed to bridge, or, paradoxically, created new ones.

The policy of official bilingualism has brought a great deal of linguistic training of federal civil servants, since one of the objectives was to enable every Canadian citizen, be he or she French- or English-speaking, to communicate with the federal administration in his or her mother language. Therefore, a number of linguistic requirements have been introduced where there used to be none before. Bilingual persons have access to certain jobs that unilingual persons do not. At the same time, financial incentives have been used to make these jobs attractive in spite of their additional linguistic requirements (as early as 1966, for instance, the federal government agreed to a 7% pay differential for secretaries working in both French and English at least 10% of the time). The policy of bilingualism has also been going from the federal level of government down to the provincial one. The results vary greatly from one province to the other. In 1969 the Official Languages of New Brunswick Act gave equal status to French and English for all matters under the authority of the legislature, thereby making New Brunswick (the population of which is 33.6% Francophone) the first officially bilingual province. Ontario (5.5% of Francophones) has also begun providing services in French (Bill 8) though not to the same degree as New Brunswick, and has thus far refrained

from taking the step of full official bilingualism.

The other English provinces have generally resisted providing service in French, with Manitoba (5.1% of Francophones) as a relative exception. After over a century of unilingualism, Manitoba became officially bilingual again, when a 1980 Supreme Court decision ruled that certain dispositions of the 1870 Manitoba Law were still in force. Therefore both languages may be used in the province's parliament, and laws must be translated. Public signs in French are still extremely rare though. At the extremity of legal linguistic passivity stand Newfoundland and British Columbia, with tiny Francophone populations and no provincial laws or regulations on minority language rights so far, thereby making English the only *de facto* official language (certain municipalities, however, have passed English-only motions - eg. Esquimalt, BC).

Bilingualism has also translated itself into educational policies, through the teaching of English and French as second languages, and through the entrenchment of the right to be taught in one's mother tongue where one belongs to the official language minority (English in Quebec, French elsewhere). The need for positive action has been most evident in this field. In signing the Charter, the provinces were presumably aware of this fact. They had finally broken new ground by guaranteeing the right of official language minorities to schooling in their language and appropriate control of their schools "where numbers warrant" (section 23 of the Charter). But at the same time, education is a provincial responsibility. As a consequence, though the above-mentioned right exists in and of itself

everywhere in Canada, its implementation is left to a great extent to the discretion of the provinces.

Be it in the civil service or in educational matters, bilingualism has left its mark. At the same time it has come under strong attack since its inception. Most of the criticism has been aimed at either the cost of bilingualism or at its alleged lack of legitimacy.

Arguments as to the cost of bilingualism are often inconsistent since raw figures are very easy to manipulate for political purposes, and as a consequence nobody seems to agree on them (*"The 4 billion - 5 billion figure per year cascaded into the so-called bilingual program is a monstrous affront to the people of this country."... "Bilingualism is costing Canadians 10 billion a year and the money is being wasted"*)¹². On the other hand, official figures say that the cost of all official language programs represents less than six tenths of 1% of the total federal expenditure¹³.

Still in the economic range, there is a widespread contention that language requirements unduly favour French-Canadians at the expense of English-Canadians, a smaller proportion of whom are bilingual. So, it is argued, when a person from one given official language community happens to compete over a bilingual government job (or any job) with a person from the other official language community, it is statistically probable that the person whose mother tongue is French will carry the day. However, such raw statistics do not accurately reflect reality. They fail to take the following facts into account. First, in 1988, no more than 29.1% (61000) of

public service positions were designated bilingual. Most of these (87%) are either in Quebec or in the National Capital Region. In the English provinces, only 1% to 5% of the positions are bilingual. Secondly, these figures refer to positions that are officially bilingual. Many of them are, in fact, held by people whose practical bilingualism is imperfect to say the least.

"The language of work in the Public Service is still, to an overwhelming extent, English, even in institutions with a critical mass of Francophone employees in the 20% to the 25% range"¹⁴.

Arguments as to the illegitimacy of bilingualism run deeper. But they do not all base their denials on the same approaches (even so, they are still perfectly compatible).

Ron Leitch, the president of the Association for the Preservation of English in Canada, views the whole effort of bilingualism as illegitimate because it is new, or at least relatively recent, and rests upon rights that allegedly had never existed before :

"All these are created rights. They have never existed before in this country, and the people resent the creation of new rights."

From a historical point of view, this is false. Canada's linguistic duality was recognized in the Quebec Act as early as 1774. From a legalistic point of view, this is dubious. If we follow the logic of Leitch's rationale, the simple fact that certain rights were acknowledged and entrenched at a certain point in history is enough to make these rights illegitimate. Then the only legitimate rights would be those that were never put on paper.

True, this may also reflect an Anglo-Saxon notion of common law, as opposed to the more codified vision associated with Roman law. But in any case it is hard to know exactly which rights Leitch is talking about and such an argument is shaky at best. What it shows, at least, is that bilingualism has put an end to the comfortable yet misleading vision of a unilingual and homogeneous country.

The second way of denying the legitimacy of bilingualism is to present it as a threat - a threat from the minority to the majority, where the minority would make an excessive use of their rights at the expense of the majority. Such is the rationale of Alberta's Premier Don Getty, for instance :

"We are protecting the rights of the Francophones in every way possible on a balanced basis, but we are not going to pursue that in such a way that the majority ends up losing their rights, and I think that is the risk we are facing when we have things imposed by law on us in areas like language".¹⁵

The majority referred to by Getty is, obviously, English-speaking Albertans. How they would actually end up "losing their rights" to the benefit of their 2.7% of Francophones if their province implemented the official minority language provisions in the Charter, Getty does not bother to say. Nor will he even mention precisely what rights he has in mind. He says "their rights" without qualifying it, letting people implicitly believe he means all of them. What we have here is a prime example of how the policy of bilingualism can be distorted in public discourse. That Getty actually believes what he says is not even relevant in that case. The

important thing here is that this kind of convenient, self-justifying language is quite appealing to a number of people. It proceeds from, and reinforces a manichean vision of "us and them" (and even "us against them") which is precisely what the Trudeau vision tried to run counter to.

A third way of viewing bilingualism as illegitimate is to consider it discriminatory, to the extent that it appears to be creating a "special status" for French Canadians, as opposed to the mass of people who raise no objection to being assimilated into the English-speaking majority. To them, English has become the *lingua franca* as well as a sign of their becoming "real Canadians". This argument carries a particular weight in Western Canada, where French communities are often smaller than Germanic, Slavic or Asian ones. If French is given official status, then why not German or Ukrainian ? This same argument is reinforced by demography : official language minorities are dwindling in Canada (in %, that is), through either assimilation or migration. Proportionally, there are less and less Francophones outside of Quebec and Anglophones within Quebec. Therefore some people are tempted to think that official bilingualism is incrementally losing its own *raison d'être*. But others will argue that the language provisions of the Charter become even more legitimate, since their implementation now acquires the character of an emergency.

b. The successes and limits of official bilingualism.

i - All that criticism should not obliterate the fact that many Canadians have accepted the dual character of their country, one that makes it markedly different from the United States - something which did not go as a matter of course even twenty years ago. The "French fact" may cause recriminations here and there when it appears on corn-flakes boxes, but it also means that immersion classes enjoy growing popularity, for instance. Most Canadians (74%) say that children living in their province should learn the other official language. Only 23% disagree. True, Francophones are more likely to say that children should learn English (90%) than Anglophones are to say children should learn French (69%). But it is a majority opinion even in Western Canada (from 61% in Manitoba to 55% in British Columbia)⁶.

Even some relatively reluctant provincial governments had to give in. In 1988, Alberta passed a severe language law which left only a few scraps to the Francophones. However, in *Mahe v. Alberta*, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed in detail for the first time the minority language educational rights guaranteed in section 23 of the Charter. This case was important since it laid down the foundation of the law under section 23. In *Mahe*, the appellants were parents who wanted their children to have school instruction in French in Alberta. They sought a school which was administered by a French school board, in which instruction was entirely in French and which reflected French linguistic culture. The Alberta courts did not grant the appellants what they sought. The Supreme Court examined

both the English and French texts of section 23, and found that they supported the conclusion that section 23 offers minority language groups, where numbers warrant, a measure of management and control over minority language instruction and facilities. The Court also found that

"the remedial nature of section 23 [ie. against demographic erosion] suggests that pedagogical considerations will have more weight than financial requirements in determining whether numbers warrant".

Dickinson C.J.C, who authored the judgement of the Court, stated that

"language is more than a mere means of communication, it is part and parcel of the identity and culture of the people speaking it. It is the means by which individuals understand themselves and the world around them".

The *Mahe* decision was greeted by all the Francophones of Western Canada as a major breakthrough.

ii - Of course, the members of the majority have no less of a right to education. Still, in 1987 in Vancouver, nine parents, eight of whom were Anglophones, wrote a petition asking that a particular schoolboard offer French immersion programs. Such programs are not the same thing as the entirely French programs the Edmonton parents were seeking in *Mahe*. Immersion programs are chiefly intended for Anglophone school children and their content is specific to them. So it was logical for these Anglophone parents to ask for this particular sort of program. However, the Supreme

Court of British Columbia rejected their petition (september 1987). It based its decision on the letter of section 23, and more precisely on the letter of its title, which reads *Minority Language Educational Rights*. Since the petitioners belonged to the official language majority of British Columbia, they could not, so it was argued, base their request on a section of the Charter that was clearly and specifically aimed at the official language minorities. This decision certainly makes sense from the point of view of the strict letter of the Charter. However, the question may be asked whether this decision is perfectly consistent with the spirit of the Charter, to the extent that it clearly increases the gap between the country's two official language communities - in this case, at the expense of people of goodwill. This case can be taken as a prime example of how some implications of bilingualism can eventually go against its own logic.

iii - One of the most important traits of Canadian bilingualism is that it has been perceived by English Canadians - not without reason - as an effort to accommodate the French fact in the country. Therefore, when Quebec began passing language laws that seemed to go against the logic of reciprocal accommodation, and to give decisive prominence to French at the expense of English, resentment in English Canada ran high. While English Canada was busy going bilingual (or, at least, no longer completely unilingual), Quebec gave the impression that it rejected that concession out of hand.

"The proponents of the Canadian nation saw a majority and a minority, both Canadian. Common sense in English Canada suggested the recognition of legitimate rights of the minority with regard to its own language in the federal public service and access to services in its own language in areas where it was numerically strong enough. However, a unilingual French province was a heretical notion. No distinction could be made between Anglophones living in different provinces, and those who happened to live in Quebec had exactly the same rights as all the others since they belonged to the Canadian majority".¹⁷

In the seventies, in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, it was found that educational development did not result in an increase in the number of French Canadians in managerial positions because English was still the language of business. Further, tension was caused by the preference of immigrants for English rather than French. Language became a political issue as it came to be identified with the essential nature of the French culture and the chances for its survival¹⁸.

Bill 22 was introduced in July 1974. Its objectives were, first, to make French the sole official language of Quebec (outside the Courts and the National Assembly, whose bilingual character was entrenched in the Canadian constitution), second, to restrict immigrants' access to English-language schools, third, to give more prominence to the French character, the *"visage public"* of Quebec. The outcry against Bill 22 was

strong, even though it placed Quebec theoretically in line with the English provinces (*"From today's perspective, this first language law with teeth - in Quebec - seems rather innocuous"*)¹⁹.

Bill 101 expanded on Bill 22's logic in tougher terms. It declared French to be the official language of Quebec and contains a declaration of fundamental language rights, and provisions relating to the language of the legislature and Courts, the civil administration, commerce and businesses, elections, as well as the "francization of business firms"²⁰. It also contained several provisions on minorities. Bilingual or multilingual signs would be allowed within public or commercial buildings. Moreover, unilingualism other than French was allowed in messages with a religious, political, humanitarian or ideological character. The law has been enforced with a certain degree of tolerance. English-language commercial signs have always been common in Montreal, especially on West Island. One could also find non-conforming signs in the regions of Quebec City, in the Outaouais and in the Estrie. In several municipalities, a number of businesses still advertise in English only, more than ten years after the law was passed.²¹

Nevertheless, Bill 101 has been a very contested piece of legislation. For the Francophone majority, it seemed a necessary breakwater in a sea of English. For many Anglophones, it represented an assault on their long-established language rights. The law was challenged on the grounds that it denied freedom of expression, a right protected in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which had been added in the Canadian constitution in 1982. While holding that the Quebec law was a legitimate attempt to protect the Francophone community, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it went

further than necessary in its limitation on freedom of expression. The government of Quebec could either accept the decision or invoke the notwithstanding clause in the Charter of Rights to maintain the existing ban. After some hesitation, it chose the second option, but sought to soften the blow by allowing the use of languages other than French inside businesses with fewer than fifty employees, on condition that French be more prominent. That is the essence of Bill 178, which was passed in December 1988 : a half-hearted compromise that does not really satisfy anybody. The issue soon became a matter of principle for many Anglophones. While opposition to Bill 178 seems to arise from a conception of Canada as a dual nation, which should emphasize a balance between both linguistic communities, opponents apparently failed to take into account the fact that the Quebec Anglophones benefit from privileges which Francophones outside of Quebec are far from enjoying. The idea of a unilingual French province is widely viewed as unacceptable, even if Quebec is no more "French" than Ontario or Alberta are "English". While apparently reflecting a belief in official bilingualism, the outcry against Bill 178 eventually ends up expressing the egalitarianism which is inherent to the vision of Canada as a collection of provinces, none of which should enjoy legal privileges over the others. The ambiguity of the anti-Bill 178 discourse expresses perfectly what Charles Taylor calls "our great historic misunderstanding" :

"Each side would require the other to be something which it is not in order to fit the formula within which it can itself be comfortable. Ideally for French Canadians, "English" Canadians should be a nation, in the sense of a constituent entity of a binational state. For the rest of Canada, the problem would be solved if only French Canadians would see their French identity as another ethnic identity, enriching but not undercutting an unconditional Canadian allegiance" ²².

3 - Some ambiguous uses of official bilingualism.

a. Mass-level manipulation.

The questioning of the official linguistic duality became evident over the last three-four years in political parties such as the Reform Party in Western Canada and the Confederation of Regions Party in the Maritimes. They have their counterparts in Quebec among those who believe that official bilingualism is a Trojan horse designed to overcome the French language and destroy Quebec's identity. The issue became a burning one with the Ontario municipalities' crisis in the winter of 1989-1990. By March 1990, 64 of the 839 Ontario municipalities had declared themselves unilingual, in reaction to Ontario's French Language Services Act and as a result of the campaign organized by the Alliance for the Preservation of English in Canada. APEC succeeded in convincing certain local politicians that the Act would require them to provide bilingual municipal services (The Act is actually designed to ensure that provincial agencies provide

services in French in designated areas. The provincial cabinet may designate any areas where 10% or more of the population is French-speaking, or a city or region where the French-speaking population numbers 5000 or more. The law does allow municipalities to provide services in French, but the decision clearly remains a local choice). The decisions to go unilingual received large-scale media coverage, especially in the cases of large communities like Thunder Bay and Sault Sainte Marie. On the other hand, many other Ontario municipalities quickly and publicly condemned these resolutions. Yet, "the story of Ontario's unilingual resolutions is also a cautionary tale (...) For a brief moment the mask of civility that we Canadians wear so successfully slipped, revealing the dark side of our national character (...) Long after, we will have to live with the memory that the French language could be likened to the AIDS virus to the cheers of people not so very different from those on mainstreet in any Canadian town. That is part of the bitter legacy which stands between us and our illusions of tolerance" (Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report 1990, 17).

b. Elite cooperation.

As far as language-related policies are concerned, an important practice has been a kind of gentleman's agreement between Quebec and the Western Provinces. Such an informal alliance seems to run against common sense. First, it does not seem exaggerated to state that a fair amount of mutual ignorance lingers on.

"When Quebecers think of the West at all, they are likely to visualize a vast rural hinterland of Ontario stretching in infinite boredom to the sea (...). Westerners still see Quebecers as a land of happy-go-lucky café-dwellers who love to sing and dance".²³

Second, die-hard clichés shape political visions and practices. For instance,

"When William Vander Zalm came to power," Andrew Cohen writes, "national conciliation would have to contemplate a Premier who had called Rene Levesque a frog, railed about French on cornflakes boxes and referred to Quebecers as "the French". He meant no harm, but that was the man himself".²⁴

Third, the image grew much more negative in recent years - due not least to Bill 178.

"By early 1990, Westerners were angrier at Quebec than they had been since the conscription crisis of the Second World War. Anti-Quebec outbursts were no longer limited to the so-called rednecks who have always resented and mistrusted Quebec (...). Bilingualism was discredited even among those Westerners who once supported the idea of two official languages".²⁵

However, beneath that more or less widespread resentment lies a political entente which is usually unnoticed by the national media. The roots of the mutual understanding between Quebec and the West are their common belief in provincial rights, a shared dread of bilingualism at the provincial level, and multiple endeavours to weaken Ontario's and Ottawa's influence.

The attitude of Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa is a case in point. He came to the West in 1988, shortly after Alberta and Saskatchewan had passed language laws (Bill 2 and Bill 60) leaving the unilingual character of these two provinces virtually intact. The Franco-Albertains and the Fransaskois were hoping that he would speak out for their rights, but they were strongly disappointed. Bourassa was actually buying Western silence for his own impending language legislation. Likewise, in the above-mentioned *Mahe* case, in which the Alberta government tried to prevent the Francophones from getting their own school boards, Quebec sided with Alberta. The pattern was clear : like all other provinces, Quebec first and foremost protects its own interests. True, it would be exaggerated to think that the Western Francophones had very high expectations. They *"never expected more than moral support, but that moral support has been sadly lacking"* ²⁶. As a result, the entente between Quebec and the West has generated a sellout of the linguistic rights of the Western Francophones by the Premiers of Quebec, Alberta, and Saskatchewan (with British Columbia as a bystander not inclined to complain too much). And if Quebec eventually separates, the Francophones who are not currently living in that province will have to face the choice of either migrating there or staying where they are, at the risk of having to put up with an ever less secure linguistic environment. The fact that whatever little effective linguistic rights Western Francophones currently enjoy had to be wrestled from provincial governments through the courts leaves little doubt as to the shallowness of these governments' commitment to bilingualism.

Granted, too much should not be made of this "alliance" between Quebec and the West. The latter has never seriously considered leaving Canada. Quite the opposite : as made clear by the slogan "The West wants in", Westerners want to have more say in federal policy-making. Most of them are in favour of a reasonably strong central government, in which their provinces would be more fairly represented than is now the case. The central government is viewed as a safeguard against provincial politicians' ambitions, as well as a warrant of Canadian identity. To them, the federal government is unquestionably the national government. This equation applies to a much lesser extent to Quebec. Moreover, while Quebec nationalism since the 1960s has been expressed mostly (but not exclusively) by center or left-of-center political currents, Western regionalism is clearly more right-wing (though the West also harbours strong social-democratic currents).

However, the examples of the Quebec - Western entente and of the Ontario municipalities' crisis deserve mention for they strongly suggest the following : though bilingualism is now entrenched in law, and though the courts have reaffirmed its legitimacy as a principle, the political debate over it tends to make the line between linguistic dualism and linguistic discrimination extremely foggy and variable, depending on the political interests that can be met through its manipulation. It is almost impossible to say for sure who wants what. The manipulation of official bilingualism has become a symbol and a factor of Canada's trend toward decentralization - something which comes into opposition with that policy's original integrative objective.

of the provinces, general spending power, and the existence of "grey areas" in the constitution. Ottawa has also used phenomena such as urban development or social welfare to enhance its powers, coupled with morally compelling allegations that "Canadians want" this or that.

In Quebec, every government since 1960 has resisted this constant overlapping of jurisdictions. All the constitutional projects developed in Quebec since the 1955 Tremblay Report have aimed, as a minimum, at restoring the spirit prevailing at Confederation in 1867 : federal withdrawal from the areas of provincial jurisdiction occupied over the years, and a clear division of powers between the two levels of government. At the same time, Morin argues, a Quebec government officially rejecting the option of sovereignty would put itself in a weak position, since its partners would know in advance that it would never go as far as to seriously challenge the political system as such.

Dissecting all the proposals, formulae and compromises that have been figured out, put forward, examined and eventually accepted or rejected by either side would reach well beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important here is that three interrelated dimensions of conflict cut across the debates :

- . The weaker provinces' hostility toward Central Canada (Ontario + Quebec) ;
- . The central provinces' (and incrementally the Western ones') rivalry with the federal government
- . The linguistic division between Quebec and the other provinces.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Quebec was finding itself in a very weak position. The PQ government was in complete disarray after the victory of the "no" side in the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association. The constitution had been repatriated and imposed on Quebec without its government's consent. It had been presented with a *fait accompli*.

"While Quebec remained in legal terms entirely subject to the new constitution, it nevertheless remained politically outside it. This was, to say the least, an uncomfortable anomaly" ²⁹.

In the 1984 election campaign, Brian Mulroney promised reconciliation with Quebec in the framework of cooperative federalism. With his eventual victory, followed by that of Robert Bourassa's Liberals on December 2, 1985 in Quebec, the way was open for a serious renewal of constitutional discussions with Quebec. The Meech Lake Accord met Quebec's five minimal conditions : its explicit recognition as a distinct society ; the provision for a Quebec government role in the appointment of Supreme Court justices from Quebec ; the granting of a veto over future institutional changes ; the right to opt out of federal shared-costs programs ; the guarantee of additional powers in the area of immigration.

The "distinct society" clause turned out to be the one which stirred up the most criticism. At the same time, Meech Lake fell short of fully meeting Quebec nationalist demands : originally, the draft statement of principles referred to the existence of a French-speaking Canada, centred in but not limited to Quebec, and of an English-speaking Canada, concentrated outside Quebec but also present in Quebec. But

"such language appeared to hark back to the old two-nation theory

(...) and carried the disturbing implication that Canada consisted of two unilingual collectivities, rather than suggesting a single federal country, officially bilingual, with rights for multicultural communities and aboriginals ³⁰.

As a result, the explicit notion of two Canadas was obliterated when the words "French-speaking Canada" and "English-speaking Canada" were changed to read "French-speaking Canadians" and "English-speaking Canadians" : individuals, not communities. Obviously, the drafters of Meech Lake had hoped to balance the acceptance of Quebec as a distinct society with a compensating clause that recognized the presence of French- and English-speaking Canadians as a "fundamental characteristic of Canada".

The contradiction between the successive federal strategies is blatant. In 1981, the federalist case used the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as its centrepiece in order to entrench the vision of a bilingual "one Canada". Six years later, the vision of a special status espoused by the moderate nationalists of Quebec was officially endorsed. This contradiction exploded in the public debate over Meech Lake, and led to the eventual failure of the Accord. Since the death of Meech Lake, the Canadian public debate has been criss-crossed by an accumulation of misunderstandings, frustrations, semi-successes and semifailures. One can already put forth a number of observations, from which subsequent hypothesis will be drawn.

1. A cool-headed debate over bilingualism is very difficult today. On the one hand, bilingualism has not worked well enough to erase conflicting perceptions and to bridge the gap between the two language communities. On the other hand, it has worked well enough to conjure up passionate reactions and to give rise to conflicting attitudes. "The zealots of bilingualism tried to convince Quebecers that the country was realizing Henri Bourassa's old dream of a binational Canada. In the West, become totally anglophone, the cosmetics were too superficial to cover the fact that that battle had really been lost more than a century before" (Dufour, 69). In other parts of Canada too, as the Ontario crisis or Bill 101 show, official bilingualism may well be "too little too late". In Lijphartian terms, it can be said that the language cleavage is still very relevant.

2. Quebec is the only province in which Francophones have political power. It has become increasingly self-assertive. "French power" has been traded for Quebec power. This is not without consequence for Francophones who live elsewhere. Writes a Franco-Ontarian woman :

"The trouble with being French in this country, particularly if you live in an English province, is that you are held personally responsible for any action taken on behalf of French language and culture. When legislation is passed in Quebec (where I do not even reside), or the Prime Minister and ten provincial Premiers sign an Accord at Meech Lake recognizing Quebec as a distinct society, or the Supreme Court decides for or against a province on a question of minority language rights, [I am] expected to defend it . It is, of

course, assumed that I agree with the legislation/accord/decision in question" ³¹.

On the other hand, Bill 101 has given Quebecers a kind of "psychological cocoon" which enabled them to develop their French side. The flip side of this is that *"Quebec society's need to see itself as solely French leads to the denial of a part of the Quebec identity by the Francophones themselves (...) The difficulty for the Quebec identity of recognizing its English component is the perfect parallel of Canada's refusal to politically recognize the Quebec specificity from which it draws sustenance"* ³².

Therefore, it seems that the language cleavage strongly influences the politico-territorial one. While "French Canada" exists no less in Saint-Boniface, Eastern Ontario and Acadia than in Quebec, and therefore has no strictly defined geographical borders, Quebec does have some. Quebec is the only part of Canada that can claim to be, at the same time, a province, a region and a nation. The dual allegiance (provincial and federal) Elkins views as the condition for a federation to succeed cannot be addressed in Quebec the way it is elsewhere in Canada.

3. Many Canadians believed that the Meech Lake Accord, by confirming the distinct character of Quebec, would consolidate its sense of belonging in Canada as a whole. At the same time, many considered that this recognition amounted to granting Quebec some special privileges which it should not deserve any more than any other province. As a result, the issue of recognition of the Quebec identity in the constitution remains fully unresolved up to this day. It is complicated further by two facts : first,

the failure of the Accord has been seen in Quebec as a gut rejection of this province's specificity by English Canada. No Quebec government can politically afford to settle for less than Meech Lake in future constitutional negotiations. Second, English Canadians will tend to reject any proposal that smacks of a special (that is, privileged) status for Quebec. The weakening of certain constituent elements of the Canadian identity, such as CBC or the transcontinental railway, makes people all the more sensitive to anything that could become a threat to the unity of the country. The long-standing question "What does Quebec want ?" is incrementally giving way to the idea that keeping Quebec in Canada, while a valuable goal, is nevertheless not worth such far-reaching concessions that would eventually turn federal power into an empty shell. According to that rationale, better let Quebec go and try reinforce the cohesion of "the rest of Canada", which ought to be easier once the country is rid of its troublesome French province.

4 - From these observations one can infer that the most politically relevant cleavage in today's Canadian society is the one that exists between Francophone Quebecers and Anglophone Canadians (whether or not they live in Quebec). Communication between the French- and English-speaking populations is low, and so is the integrative effect it can have according to Deutsch. The well-known notion of "two solitudes" still seems to be relevant today, to the extent that "it is not via Quebec that English Canadians have access to "universal" values, to use a much-abused word. The converse is also true". A 1989 survey found that of all the regional

stories in the previous years on CBC, 2/3 came from Ontario ; less than 5% came from Quebec. For the Globe and Mail, more than half came from Ontario, and less than 5% from Quebec. Radio-Canada is watched by 70% of French-speakers in Quebec but only 5% of audiences outside. Therefore, most of what English Canadians learn about Quebec and of what Quebecois learn about English Canada is very likely to come from media in their own respective language. Thus, as is emphasized by Deutsch, information is perceived through the already-existing frameworks of references and ideas which are respectively specific to each community. In turn, new information is added to all the other and reinforces that pattern. To the extent that newspapers simultaneously express and shape their readers' opinions, it is likely that they will reflect and even reinforce the above-mentioned English Canada - Quebec cleavage. If this is true, then English-language newspapers should have more in common with each other, both in tone and content, than with French-language ones. Language should be the factor that determines the way current issues are perceived and dealt with. So our hypothesis can be formulated as follows : if the cleavage between English Canada and Quebec is really the most relevant one in Canadian society, then any newspaper from English Canada should bear more similarity to any other English Canadian newspaper than to any Quebec newspaper, and vice-versa. Similarities and divergences can be assessed through press content analysis covering a strictly delineated period of time. In order to make comparisons, one has to limit oneself to a particular issue of common interest, that is, an issue all the newspapers in question have dealt with at length. Strictly local news would be of little interest for our purpose.

This is the reason why the debate over the Allaire report is an interesting field : reaction to the report was nationwide, and it was passionate, since the Allaire proposals, were they actually implemented, would radically change the face of the country as a whole, in the sense of a significantly greater decentralization. No wonder it was actively debated all over Canada, especially if one bears in mind that the idea of a strong central government is deeply rooted in the English Canadian identity.

CHAPTER II - PRESS CONTENT ANALYSIS.

Introduction : a brief summary of the Allaire Report

Both in its tone and content, the 74-page long Allaire Report shows a strong commitment to the notion of an autonomous, if not fully independent Quebec. It is divided into five chapters (my translation) :

1. What does Quebec want ?
2. Current federalism in a dead-end.
3. The objectives of the new political and economic order.
4. A new Quebec/Canada structure
5. The process.

The bottom-line is simple : federalism in its current form is no longer satisfying from a political, economic and social point of view, especially for Quebec. There is a need to set up a new federal structure.

Politically, Canada is in a crisis, due not least to the rising forces of regionalism and to the differences in perspectives ("As opposed to what generally exists in the rest of the country, the Quebec population sees the

Quebec government as better suited to ensure its development, whereas it is the government of Canada which is chosen elsewhere in Canada" p.11). The authors refer to the bitterness of the Quebec population after the failure of Meech Lake.

Socially, Canadian federalism has never been able to soften the country's cultural contradictions. The policy of official bilingualism has never been successfully carried out ("The very notion of the founding peoples' duality is rejected by English Canada" p.24), and multiculturalism "plays against the Francophone population", which it marginalizes and turns into "a cultural community among so many others" (p.25). The truth according to Allaire is that "Quebec is a distinct and free society, able to shoulder its own fate"(p.69).

From an economic viewpoint, federalism has proved unable to decrease blatant disparities between have and have-not regions.

In order to get the country out of that triple crisis, the Quebec Liberal Party offers a new Quebec/Canada structure. It proposes that "Quebec has full sovereignty in its already exclusive areas, in certain areas that are still shared, and in all areas that are not specifically mentioned in the current Canadian Constitution. The Allaire Report suggests the following division of powers :

1. Full Quebec sovereignty areas (as already in the Constitution).

Social questions, urban questions, culture, education, housing, leisure and sports, family policy, manpower policy, natural resources, health, tourism.

2. Full Quebec sovereignty areas (currently shared, unmentioned or federal)

Agriculture, unemployment insurance, communication, regional development, energy, environment, industry and commerce, language, research and development, social security.

3. Exclusive federal competence

Defence, tariffs and customs, common debt, currency, adjustment.

4. Shared areas

Native affairs, taxes and income, immigration, financial institutions, justice, fisheries, foreign policy, postal services, transport.

The Allaire Reports also puts forth some in-depth constitutional rearrangements, which include the abolition of the Senate and a new amending formula (with a veto for Quebec). The Quebec Liberal Party promises to organize a referendum on these reforms before the end of the fall of 1992. If there can be no agreement on that matter between Quebec and Canada, then the Quebec Liberal Party in power will propose that Quebec become a sovereign state.

This quick overview makes it easier to understand why the Allaire Report could not go unnoticed. Such proposals go further than many Canadians are willing to accept, for they tend to reduce the federal state

to an almost empty shell. Were the authors aware of that, or did they really believe that English Canadians harbour such unlimited goodwill ? To what extent is the Allaire Report a tactical move vis-à-vis the Parti Québécois, or the central government, or English Canadians ? To what extent does it go beyond that ? Interesting as the answer must be, trying to find it would outreach the scope of this thesis. It would take us too far into party politics and political psychology, and such is not my purpose. Mine is to describe the reactions to these hard-line proposals, inside and outside Quebec.

There are three reasons why I have chosen a press content approach to the Allaire Report. The first one has to do with the fairly - though not totally - satisfying availability of sources. Secondly, the media tend to emphasize confrontation rather than agreement. Editorials sometimes distort the presentation of an issue and impress a biased opinion on the everyday reader, without his/her being fully aware of that. A systematic approach over a definite period of time should allow us to go beyond that. Finally, the systematic approach becomes all the more interesting when it is comparative. The written press is very well suited for a study that uses different-language sources (French and English in the present case).

My array of choice was somewhat constrained by the degree of availability of the various sources. The English-language newspapers I selected are the following : The Vancouver Sun, The Calgary Herald, The Winnipeg Free Press, The Globe And Mail, The Montreal Gazette, The Chronicle Herald (Halifax). Obviously, data from Saskatchewan,

Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island (not to mention the Territories) is missing. However the above-mentioned provinces are not very populated. The sample comes from provinces with 87% of the population of Canada outside Quebec, so it can be considered reasonably representative. From French-speaking Quebec I analyzed *Le Devoir*. Unfortunately, *La Presse* turned out to be unavailable everywhere I searched - at least, not the back issues I was interested in. The newspapers I scanned cover a time span of exactly one month, from the 22nd of January, 1991, to the 22nd of February. My sample begins a few days before the Allaire report was released, so as to get an idea of what the "climate" was like at that time, and it goes until the opinion poll that was published by the *Calgary Herald*, which revealed that a significant majority of Albertans (about two-thirds) had never heard either of the Belanger-Campeau Commission or of the Spicer Commission, or of the constitutional hearings organized by their own provincial government...

I - STAGE I : SPACE

The comparison of the space which is respectively devoted to the debate over Allaire by the different newspapers provides an interesting first insight into the data. The average number of lines/article over the issue varies greatly. It ranges from a minimum of 79.36 lines per article in the *Chronicle Herald* to 170.04 lines in *Le Devoir*. The intermediate

stages are 95.76 lines (Calgary Herald), 112.53 lines (Vancouver Sun), 116.23 lines (Montreal Gazette), 132.07 lines (Winnipeg Free Press) and 143.55 lines (Globe And Mail). The total number of lines also varies greatly. It goes from 873 lines (Chronicle Herald) to 1463 (Vancouver Sun), 2394 (Calgary Herald), 2441 (Montreal Gazette), 2584 (Globe and Mail), 3434 (Winnipeg Free Press) and 3911 (Le Devoir). The English Canadian average is 2198 lines.

That Le Devoir devotes the greatest space to the issue hardly comes as a surprise, since Allaire concerns Quebec first and foremost, and is a product of French Quebec. If we set Le Devoir aside, it appears that the Globe And Mail comes first. There again, this result is fairly understandable, since the Globe is supposed to be Canada's only nationwide newspaper. But one could have expected the Montreal Gazette to devote more space to the issue, since the Quebec Anglophones stand on the front line. Likewise, what is most surprising here is the minimal space the issue covers in the Chronicle Herald, if one bears in mind first, that Quebec is fairly close to Nova Scotia by Canadian standards, second, that the Maritimes have a very high stake in Quebec remaining part of Canada : come independence, they would be abruptly cut off from the Canadian mainland. Therefore one would reasonably expect that the question of Quebec's sovereignist drift would stir up more active debate in the Maritimes than these first findings suggest.

Table 1 - Space devoted to the issue of Allaire.

	# of articles	lines/art.	# of lines
Chr.H	11	79.36	873
Van.S	13	112.53	1463
Cal.H	25	95.76	2394
Mon.G	21	116.23	2441
G&M	18	143.55	2584
Win.FP	26	132.07	3434
Devoir	23	170.04	3911

II - STAGE II - THE TITLES (see detail in appendix)

Before we start digging and delving into the content of the articles themselves, it is interesting to pay some attention to their headlines, since they are what attracts the reader's eye first and give him/her a hint of the tone and content of the whole article itself. Headlines are a very important part of the overall impression one derives from a newspaper.

Headlines over Allaire can be classified into five categories. There are a number of headlines that do not convey any particular feeling - be it indignation, praise, irony, mistrust or any kind of "moral" judgment. All in all, such headlines amount to a cold statement of tangible facts. It is difficult to say that they are biased in one way or the other. Sometimes

they are also far too ambiguous to say what kind of feeling they express, if any. They constitute the "N" (for "neutral") category.

The other four categories include the headlines that are not "neutral". Obviously, they were intentionally formulated so as to communicate a particular kind of judgment over the issue the article deals with. A title such as "Quebec embarks on impossible dream" (Calgary Herald, 2.1) was clearly not designated to convey a positive impression of the Allaire report nor even of Quebec itself. Headlines can also be worded in a relatively more subtle way. For instance, in "Bourassa certifies separatist reality" (Calgary Herald, 28.1), the choice of the word "separatist" instead of "sovereignist" is anything but innocent : while "sovereignty" is a clear, respectable objective, "separatism" conjures up more or less conscious images of violence and internal strife and turmoil.

Two of the "non-neutral" categories comprise those titles in which Quebec appears as the active element, the dynamic force (for instance, "Bourassa prêt à la souveraineté" - Le Devoir, 1.31). The other two categories include the titles that grant the dynamic role to Canada (for instance, "Curry the ailments - With or without Quebec" - Globe and Mail, 1.31).

Be it Quebec's or Canada's, the dynamic role can be portrayed as either a "positive" or a "negative" one, in the sense of either acceptance or rejection of the other side. For example, in "PM issues blunt warning" (Chronicle Herald, 2.14), the dynamic role is attributed to Canada as embodied by the Prime Minister, and Canada's attitude here is clearly one of rejection, of criticism. This is what I will call a "negative" headline.

That certain readers of the Globe and Mail may think that this rejection is in itself a good thing is another question. What I will try to assess is what the titles express, not how they may be received by different readers, which would introduce too much uncertainty. In the above-mentioned example, what we have is the expression of a negative attitude from the Canadian viewpoint. Therefore this particular title belongs in the category I call "Canada -". Conversely, the category "Canada +" comprises articles that convey the impression of a positive attitude/reaction from Canada (example : "Canada really can work" - Winnipeg Free Press, 2.10), or articles that ask for something else than mere rejection by considering that Allaire should be taken as an incentive to actively debate the future of the country (examples - "Who speaks for rural Canada ?" or "Opportunity for federalism" - Winnipeg Free Press, 1.29 and 2.4).

Likewise, category "Quebec -" includes titles that implicitly or explicitly present Quebec's initiatives in a negative light (ex : "Quebec dictating debate tempo" - Globe and Mail, 2.18), and "Quebec +" comprises titles that view Quebec's actions positively (ex : "Bourassa fera appel au peuple sur l'avenir constitutionnel du Quebec" - Le Devoir, 1.23).

So, as a whole, the selected categories are : N, "Quebec +", "Quebec -", "Canada +" and "Canada -", with the exception of the Montreal Gazette, which represents a particular case : given that Anglophone Quebecers are at the same time part of Quebec and of English Canada, their newspaper's position is ambiguous. Thus, headlines from the Montreal Gazette are classified into three categories instead of five for the other newspapers : Neutral, Positive and Negative. Two articles from the Winnipeg Free Press

(designed *) fit into two categories, due to their ambivalence.

Table 2 - The tone and content of the headlines.

5 categories

	N	Q+	Q-	C+	C-	tot#
Cal.H	12	4	40	20	24	25
Chr.H	18	9	18	36	18	11
G&M	38	5	22	11	22	18
Van.S	31	0	38	15	15	13
Win.FP	27	8	11	46	16	26
Devoir	22	44	4	4	26	23

(N stands for "Neutral")

3 categories

	N	%	Pos	%	Neg	%
Cal.H	3	12	6	24	16	64
Chr.H	2	18.18	5	45.45	4	36.36
G&M	7	38.88	3	16.66	8	44.44
Mon.G	5	23.8	3	14.3	13	61.9
Van.S	4	30.76	2	15.38	7	53.84
Win.FP	7	26.92	14	53.84	7	26.92

Average	Engl.Can	25.09	28.27		47.91	

Devoir	5	21.7	11	47.83	7	30.43

(N stands for "Neutral")

The classification of the articles' headlines can be analyzed through a number of hypotheses.

Hypothesis # 1 :

The English-language headlines will be more often negative than positive.

This hypothesis is verified, though not as unequivocally as one would expect. True, an average of 47.91% of headlines (almost half of them) convey a negative message, while little more than a quarter of them (28.27%) sound positively. Among the English-language press there is a visible tendency not to present Quebec's initiatives in a positive way. However that does not mean that all titles are equally critical. The Calgary Herald is by far the most likely to portray Quebec in a negative light, while other newspapers usually show more restraint. As a whole, English newspapers vary greatly in the way they suggest Canada's possible response to Allaire. The Winnipeg Free Press asks the most vocally for a serious countrywide debate, and is even some kind of exception to the rule (along with, to a lesser extent, the Chronicle Herald) since its headlines are clearly more often positive (53.84%) than negative (26.92%).

Hypothesis # 2 :

The Allaire Report comes at a time when the notion of Quebec sovereignty enjoys growing popularity among the Québécois population. Allaire does not go against the tide. Therefore, one can assume that, of all the newspapers we compare, Le Devoir will have the greater proportion of positive headlines.

The division between the English press and the Quebec French press appears most visibly as far as mutual perceptions are concerned. True, the WFP has the most positive headlines. But things change if we concentrate on positive headlines involving Quebec. While all but one English newspaper present Quebec's initiative only once in a positive fashion, Le Devoir does so ten times. Conversely, Le Devoir has only one title that suggests a positive feedback from Canada, while the Winnipeg Free Press has twelve.

Moreover, Le Devoir has more positive headlines (47.8%) than the average of English-language newspapers (28.2%).

Hypothesis # 3 :

Due to their specific situation, Quebec Anglophones think they have a lot to lose if Quebec becomes a sovereign state. They would no longer benefit from the "Canadian connection" which links them to the pan-Canadian English-speaking majority, and which alleviates the inconvenience of being a minority in Quebec. This worrying prospect is made even worse by a certain bitterness : those who made the effort to learn French and actively

and sincerely supported Quebec's Quiet Revolution cannot help but feel disgruntled by measures such as Bill 101 or Bill 178. They feel that all their goodwill was somehow betrayed by Francophone selfishness. In a nutshell, Quebec is their home, but Québécois are not their people. It must be added that the Allaire report deals with them in a vague manner ("Le nouvel ordre politique devra (...) assurer aux Québécois anglophones leurs droits historiques reconnus et, en particulier, le droit de s'exprimer à travers leurs propres institutions culturelles et sociales." p6). Therefore it seems almost preordained to assume that the Montreal Gazette contains the greatest proportion of headlines in the "-" category.

By a narrow margin, but a margin nonetheless, the hypothesis is not verified. The Montreal Gazette ranks only second best (61.9% of negative headlines) behind the Calgary Herald (64%). However, if we leave aside the "neutral" headlines, whose category represents 23.8% for the former title and 12% for the latter, the Montreal Gazette is clearly the most negative-sounding item on the list. The trend is reinforced by the fact that no more than 14% of its headlines are in the "+" category (the lowest figure in the sample).

Hypothesis #4 :

The Globe and Mail is Canada's national daily. As opposed to explicitly provincial newspapers, the Globe and Mail wants to speak for the whole of Canada. One could almost say that what Ottawa is to, for instance, Victoria or Edmonton, the Globe is to the Vancouver Sun or the Calgary

Herald. At the same time, the Globe is Ontario-based and belongs unmistakably to "the center" in the eyes of people from other provinces. Whether the Globe is more "Canadian" or more "Ontarian" is impossible to say. What remains clear, however, is that any press organ wishing to speak for all of Canada is bound to cultivate the difficult art of compromise to the highest possible point - just like the Federal government is. Therefore the Globe must make a particular effort to balance the pro and con in matters of national unity. As a consequence it is probable that the Globe and Mail will have the greatest proportion of headlines in the "neutral" category.

The hypothesis is verified unequivocally : as many as 38.88% of the Globe's headline are classified as "neutral", which makes it by far the most balanced and cool-headed newspaper - at least as far as headlines are concerned. It is the only item on the list that has more than one-third of "neutral" headlines. The Vancouver Sun comes second, with 30.76%. Conversely, the least "neutral" newspaper is by far the Calgary Herald, only 12% of whose headlines belong to that particular category.

III - Stage III : the articles.

The quantitative method I used in order to analyse the data is simple. It is based upon the calculation of frequency of appearance of certain selected words. The calculation of frequencies on a per word basis is done from an average of 6 words per line. For example, I will say that "in this newspaper, the word "Quebec" appears every X words as an average".

The selected words are classified into three broad categories, each of which refers to a particular sort of designation and perception. Actually these categories are reminiscent of the three elements that are traditionally listed as necessary constituents of a state : a territory (geographical cleavage), a population (human cleavage) and a government (political cleavage). The first category (I) refers to territorial definitions. It includes the words "Canada", "Quebec", "Rest of Canada/Reste du Canada" [or "Rest of the country/Reste du pays"], "English Canada/Canada Anglais" and "French Canada/Canada Francais". Category II refers to human beings. It includes "Canadians/Canadiens", "English Canadians/Canadiens Anglais", "French Canadians/Canadiens Francais", "Quebecers/Quebecois" and "Quebecois" in Englishlanguage newspapers. Category III includes "Nation" and "Province(s)" applied respectively to Quebec and to Canada.

Category I

. Sub-category A

1. "Canada"
2. "Quebec"

Our starting point and first hypothesis for the analysis of this particular category is quite simple and can be formulated this way : the closer the identification to Quebec (or Canada), the more often the word Quebec (or Canada) will be used. Several hypotheses can be derived from that contention.

Hypothesis #1 :

Le Devoir uses "Quebec" more often than any other newspaper does.

Actually, the reverse is true : Le Devoir uses "Quebec" much less often than any other newspaper does (once every 192 words). It can be explained by the simple fact that journalists from Le Devoir need not remind their readers that they live in a place called Quebec, while English-language newspapers from outside the province need to underline what they are talking about to the Kingston or Moose Jaw reader. The ones will write "le parti Libéral" while the others have to mention "Quebec Liberal party".

However, the same reasoning fails to explain why it is the Montreal Gazette that makes use of "Quebec" the most often , with the Chronicle Herald a close second (It is interesting, by the way, to see that both extremes in the frequency of use of the word "Quebec" originate from Quebec itself). Either the Gazette points a vengeful finger at Quebec's ruling party and at its linguistic majority, or it stresses the Quebec

Anglophones' identification to their province. The Gazette is the only newspaper in our sample that does not necessarily mention "Quebec" as such, without qualification. The expressions "French Quebec" and "English Quebec" are used four times each (out of a total of 235).

Hypothesis #2 :

Le Devoir uses "Canada" less often than any other newspaper does.

The hypothesis is strongly verified. The gap in the respective frequencies of use of the simple word "Canada" in Quebec and in English Canada is even striking. "Canada" appears only once every 309 words in Le Devoir, whereas no English-language newspaper uses it less often than once every 219 words (Vancouver Sun). Both the Winnipeg Free Press and the Calgary Herald use it almost exactly as often. The Chronicle Herald uses "Canada" the most often - by a wide margin (once every 109 words). This seems to suggest that the identification of the Maritimes with united Canada is particularly strong. Surprisingly enough, though, the Montreal Gazette is not as keen on the use of "Canada". It does so less often than 4 of the 5 other English-language newspapers.

Hypothesis #3 :

The Globe and Mail is the most balanced newspaper in its use of "Quebec" and "Canada" .

The hypothesis is verified. True, all newspapers use "Quebec" more often than "Canada". But the Globe and Mail is the most balanced one in that respect (1.56 times more often) and the Montreal Gazette the least so (3.27 times more often). The Globe and Mail obviously tries to live up to its ambition to represent all of Canada in a fairly coolheaded fashion, while the Quebec Anglophones feel they stand at the front line if Quebec eventually separates, as we saw above, and thus their reactions are understandably more passionate than those of Toronto journalists. It is also interesting to see that Le Devoir is almost as balanced as the Globe and Mail in its use of "Quebec" and "Canada". Does this suggest that Quebec journalists perceive both as partners of equal weight ? That attitude is perfectly consistent with the whole rationale of the Allaire Report. It is also one more sign that the authors of the report are in tune with the general trend of the public opinion in Quebec.

. Subcategory B :

1. "Rest of Canada/Reste du Canada" [or "Rest of the country/Reste du pays"]
2. "English Canada/Canada Anglais"
3. "French Canada/Canada Français"

Observations

1. The Globe and Mail is the keenest newspaper on the use of "Rest of Canada", once every 388 words, whereas all other papers but the Calgary Herald carry frequencies below the 1/500 words mark. All things considered, the expression "Rest of Canada" seems to be a Central Canadian and even Ontarian creation.

The most reluctant by far is the Chronicle Herald, in which "Rest of Canada" appears only every 1309 words...including once as in "Quebec, the Maritimes and the rest of Canada" : if there is a "Rest of Canada" at all, Maritimers clearly feel they do not belong to it, but to the English part of a single country called Canada. The Chronicle Herald is actually the only newspaper in our sample that makes use of "English Canada" more often than of "Rest of Canada". In all the other newspapers, the proportion between both expressions goes the other way round. It culminates in the Vancouver Sun, in which "Rest of Canada" turns out five times as often as "English Canada". Does that suggest that BC's degree of identification to

an "English" Canada is comparatively weak ?

2. However, no matter how popular the notion of the "rest of Canada" seems to have become, "English Canada" is used quite often as well. The expression appears the most often in the Calgary Herald (once every 1026 words), and the least often in the Vancouver Sun (once every 4389 words). Such a gap between two neighbouring provinces might be related to two facts : first, given that BC is very diverse ethnically speaking and that multiculturalism seems to be one of this provinces' most distinctive features, identification to a specifically "English" Canada may be more questionable - at least in terms of ethnicity rather than language, since BC is overwhelmingly English-speaking. Second, bilingualism-related issues have been more contentious, more at the forefront in Alberta than in BC, creating more potential anti-French resentment in Alberta and, in reaction, a stronger identification to "English" Canada.

3. As far as the third item on this list is concerned, the diagnosis is as simple as it is blatant : nobody speaks of a French Canada anymore. In a total of 137 articles, the expression "French Canada" appears only once...and only to be denied (by Clyde Wells, who claims he prefers the vision of Canada as a collection of ten equally-endowed provinces). The Winnipeg Free Press curiously refers once to Quebec as "New France", in a highly critical article (2.3).

Conclusions

1. The expression "Rest of Canada" is now very widely used, in spite of the negative sort of definition it supposes - a trend which makes the definition of a specifically Canadian identity even more problematic : it implicitly turns Canada into a country where nine out of ten Provinces constitute "the rest", that is, something non essential, a vague entity bereft of any specific quality, something of little value indeed. One cannot help relating it to Clemenceau's ironic remark about the post-1918 Austria, once the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain-en-Laye were signed : "Austria ? It is what's left !". Still worse : to say that the nine English provinces are "the rest" implies that the "essential" part of Canada - the "real" Canada - is Quebec. From a historical point of view, that is not entirely wrong - only incomplete. From a more contemporary viewpoint, though, and considering that the identification to Quebec is stronger than the identification to Canada among Quebecers, the equation Canada = Quebec is clearly false. All in all, the expression "Rest of Canada" is not only misleading, it is also pernicious, because of all that it logically implies. ;

2. In all the newspapers we have been using, "English Canada" is not paralleled to "French Canada", but to Quebec (and even to "le Québec français", as Le Devoir wrote once). More important still, they are opposed to each other. Antagonism appears more often than partnership. The fulfillment of Trudeau's ambitions (containing Quebec's self-assertion and

turning the whole of Canada as a home for all her inhabitants regardless of language) looks quite problematic in such a context.

Category II

1. "Canadians/Canadiens"
2. "English Canadians/Canadiens Anglais"
3. "French Canadians/ Canadiens Français"
4. "Quebecers/Québécois"
5. "Québécois" in the English press

While it seems reasonable to suppose that Quebec Anglophones think of themselves as Canadians first, their newspaper is the one that makes the least use of this word (once every 1127 words). Conversely, while Alberta has been the hotbed of Western regionalism, the Calgary Herald is the one that uses "Canadians" the most often, with the Chronicle Herald a close second and the Globe and Mail in third position. It is interesting to see that the issue of Western regionalism comes up as such in only 5 out of 26 articles in the Winnipeg Free Press - including one which explicitly condemns Western regionalism and equates it to Quebec nationalism.

The Montreal Gazette is not keen on using "English Canadians" very much either (once every 7323 words), but it is the Vancouver Sun that uses the expression the least often - if we exclude the Chronicle Herald, which does not use it at all. Conversely, the Globe and Mail makes the most generous use of "English Canadians".

Just like "French Canada" is now virtually unheard of, "French Canadians" are rare birds indeed, at least in Canadian newspapers. Still, Le Devoir is the only one that makes no mention "Canadiens Français" at

all. Obviously, the identification French = Quebec runs deep in Quebec too. In English-language newspapers, the expression surfaces from time to time but remains a very rare occurrence, especially in the Montreal Gazette (once every 7323 words). Maybe the journalists from the Gazette think they have little interest in reminding their readers of the existence of their "symmetrical" minority, by comparison to whom their lot is still fairly privileged. Over our whole sample of articles, the Gazette mentions French Canadians only twice, including once in order to denounce "a hateful French Canadian nationalist ideology" (William Johnson). It should be mentioned as well that the only time the Chronicle Herald talks about French Canadians, it is not in a reference to a group, but only in order to stress the difference between P.E.Trudeau (who is one) and Brian Mulroney (who is not). Comparatively, the keenest two on the use of "French Canadians" are the Globe and Mail (once every 3876 words) and the Vancouver Sun (once every 2926 words). Once again, the Globe and Mail wants to speak for all Canadians, and can hardly forget that about 500 000 Francophones live in Ontario. It must be added, though, that half of the "French Canadians" appear in articles written by one of them (namely Lysiane Gagnon). As regards the relative ease with which the Vancouver Sun refers to French Canadians, maybe it can be related to the comparative smoothness of language issues in BC. People there do not feel threatened by French hordes.

All English-language newspapers without exception make an extensive use of "Quebecers". But the Calgary Herald is the only one that uses "Quebecers" less often than "Canadians". The Chronicle Herald makes by far

the greatest use of "Quebecers". While it could be argued that the geographical proximity makes it easier for Maritimers to see Quebec not as an abstraction but as a society of real human beings, the same reasoning cannot explain why it is the Ontario-based Globe and Mail that mentions "Quebecers" the least often. It is interesting to see that the Montreal Gazette often draws the distinction between "English Quebecers" or "English-speaking Quebecers" (quoted 8 times out of 39) and "French Quebecers" or "French-speaking Quebecers" (6 times). Very seldom do the other English-language newspapers qualify "Quebecers". Christian Dufour sees in the "widespread circulation of the "Québécois" label one of the most notable successes of Quebec nationalism. This label internationally broadcasts the existence of a precise, although not always flattering, cultural content" (p93). However, on our sample, the success is not that obvious. English-language newspapers do not use "Québécois" often. The Gazette even refrains obstinately from doing so, and so does the Globe and Mail. For obvious reasons, Le Devoir never uses "Quebecers". The main difference here lies between "les Québécois" and "les Anglo-Québécois" or even, quite often, "les Anglos".

Category III

1. "Nation"

2. "Province(s)"

respectively applied to Canada and to Quebec.

Our hypothesis for this particular category is almost obvious : Le Devoir will be more likely than other newspapers to call Quebec a nation, while English-language newspapers will be more likely than Le Devoir to apply that label to Canada.

The results are overwhelming. Actually, Le Devoir is the only newspaper from our sample that never refers to Canada as a nation, and never describes Quebec as a province. But it does write about "la patrie québécoise" and "le nationalisme québécois". The gap between the two language communities appears very clearly here.

For their part, English newspapers very seldom refer to Quebec as a nation, or not at all. When they do, it is in an indirect fashion. For instance, the Winnipeg Free Press writes about "Quebec patriotism" (2.7), or Quebec as a "new nation" (2.9), or the necessity to "create two nations" (2.10). Sometimes "nation" seems to be used to mean "state". Most of the time though, Quebec is referred to as a province, on an equal basis with the other provinces with which it constitutes Canada.

As far as the perception of Canada is concerned, English-language newspapers themselves are not without divisions. The Chronicle Herald is far above all the rest when it comes to qualifying Canada as a nation (once every 174.6 lines). Quite surprisingly, the Montreal Gazette does so the least often.

Table 3 - Frequencies of appearance of "Canada" and "Quebec".

Category I

Subcategory A

	Canada #	Frequency	Quebec #	Freq.	Que/Can
Cal.H	82	299	135	106	1.646
Chr.H	48	109	80	65	1.666
G & M	107	145	167	92	1.56
Mon.G	72	203	235	62	3.263
Van.S	40	219	86	102	2.15
Win.FP	118	175	197	105	2.516

Average EC		192		89	

Devoir	76	308	122	192	1.605

NB - All frequency figures in all the charts are the average # of words between two same selected words.

Table 4 - Mutual proportions of "English Canada", "French Canada" and "Rest of Canada";

Subcategory B

	a	b	c	d	e	f
Cal.H	32	2.56	14	5.86	2.285	0
Chr.H	4	12	5	9.6	0.8	0
Devoir	30	2.53	11	6.9	2.72	0
G&M	40	2.675	9	11.88	4.43	1
Mon.G	19	3.79	10	7.2	1.9	0
Van.S	10	4	2	20	5	0
Win.FP	29	4.07	16	7.37	1.8	0

a - # of times "Rest of Canada" appears

b - Canada / Rest of Canada

c - # of times "English Canada" appears

d - Canada / English Canada

e - Rest of Canada / English Canada

f - # of times "French Canada" appears

Table 5 - Frequencies of appearance of "English Canada" and "Rest of Canada"

	Rest of Canada	English Canada
Cal.H	449	1026
Chr.H	1309	1048
G&M	388	1723
Mon.G	771	1465
Van.S	878	4389
Win.FP	710	1288

Average EC	751	1823

Devoir	782	2133

Category II

Table 6 - Frequency of appearance of (a)"Canadians", (b)"English Canadians", (c)"French Canadians", (d)"Quebecers", (e)"Québécois", and (f)Proportion Quebecers/Québécois

	a	b	c	d	e	f
Cal.H	368	2052	7182	4104	4788	11.66
Chr.H	524	0	5238	276	5238	19
G&M	620	1723	3876	596	0	0
Mon.G	1127	7323	7323	376	0	0
Van.S	975	4389	2926	488	8778	18
Win.FP	665	6868	10302	459	20604	45

Average EC	713	3726	6141	1049	6568	

Devoir	1020	0	0	0	1117	0

Category III

Table 7 - Frequencies of appearance of "nation" and "province" respectively applied to Canada and to Quebec.

	a	b	c	d
Cal.H	2873	898	14364	653
Chr.H	1048	1746	0	1309
G&M	7752	708	15504	2584
Mon.G	14646	976	0	2440
Van.S	8778	1755	0	1463
Win.FP	4120	1084	6868	1212

Ave.EC	6536	1194	6122	1610

Le Devoir	0	5866	11733	0

a - Frequency of "nation" as applied to Canada

b - Frequency of "provinces" as applied to Canada

c - Frequency of "nation" as applied to Quebec

d - Frequency of "province" as applied to Quebec

Conclusion.

Not only is the gap between Quebec and the "rest of Canada" the main cleavage in Canadian society : it seems to become always deeper. Quebec society and English-Canadian society are clearly not on the same wavelength. Their respective press organs have a part of responsibility in that situation, for they overlook the viewpoints from the "other side" instead of explaining them again and again to their readership. They tend to concentrate on the viewpoints from their own side (as was shown, for instance, by the overall negative tone of the reactions to the Allaire report in the English-language press). There are too many William Johnsons for one Jeffrey Simpson...Both sides seem to be increasingly drawing apart from each other. In most categories, the Quebec newspaper stands at an extreme, be it by the space it devotes to the issue of Allaire, the positive tone and content of its headlines and in the selected terms'frequencies of use. By comparison, the general consensus on the use of "Rest of Canada" appears all the more striking. It shows the extent to which Quebec-related issues have succeeded in dominating the forefront, to such a point that Quebec paradoxically seems to have become the glue which ; holds Canada together, the unmistakable mark of her identity. All cleavages seem to be subordinated to the Quebec-English Canada one, that is, the linguistic one, which in turn has serious political consequences. According to Lijphart, this would be a potentially disintegrative situation. Karl Deutsch would observe that, in the case of Canada, intragroup communication dramatically needs to be balanced by intergroup communication

: intragroup communication does exist, and in the English-speaking part of the country it somehow makes up (incompletely though) for the national identity's weakness. It has kept the country together so far, against the rising forces of regionalism. But it tends to be too self-centered and defend only its own viewpoints. As such it cannot make up for the weakness of intergroup communication nor have a positive, integrative effect at the pan-Canadian level.

As a consequence, there is an urgent need for a real, clear and tolerant English Canadian nationalism to assert itself in order to balance that of Quebec - maybe with the help of a number of specific institutions that remain to be created ? Whatever English Canadian nationalism exists at the present time still contains too many elements of what can be called an outward-looking Canadianism. It is characterized by orientations against rather than for something (be it Quebec..or the USA). True, it is easier to unite against than for something. One can even argue that English Canada's difficulty in existing is the exact opposite of Quebec's dependency on its French image. But the effort needs to be made. It implies a drastic change in attitudes vis-a-vis Quebec. Writes Dufour : "Quebec within Canada can only have a particular status, in fact if not in law. This evidence has ; become the taboo par excellence in Canadian politics. Simply pronouncing the words "unique status" (which smells of regressive favouritism) would be suicide for any English-Canadian politician. This says a great deal about the Canadian problem"(p137). English Canada's refusal to recognize the political consequences of Quebec specificity can only increase provincialism, a phenomenon which serves no one in the long run.(For

instance, major differences in the three Western newspapers reflect the West's inability to unite. Western Canada often expresses a common distrust of Central Canada, but Western provincialisms represent the limit of Western regionalism. Paradoxically, the West continues to view Central Canada as a whole, at a time when Quebec is increasingly drifting away from it, as is shown by the differences between the Globe and Mail and Le Devoir. Quebec is assertive, and lots of Anglo-Montreal power has flown to Toronto. Central Canada is more and more restricted to Ontario - something the Maritimes seem to have understood better than the West).

In such a context, nothing refrains Quebecers from overestimating the English Canadian's degree of goodwill toward them. The overall impression is that Quebec tries to modify Canada so as to suit itself, while at the same time warning that whatever agreement may be reached has great chances of being only a temporary expedient to full-fledged sovereignty. That is not, to say the least, a healthy situation for a state striving toward nationhood - which supposes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts..even if one of them is Quebec. Efforts have to be made from both sides if Canada as it exists today is to avoid disintegration along its many axes - first and foremost the linguistic cleavage, that is, the most ,
passional and existential one of all. In case of success though, Canada may become the fascinating example of a phenomenon still unknown : a state going beyond the historical, typically European stage of the nation-state without even having really reached it first.

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Chronicle Herald

Globe and Mail

Le Devoir

Montreal Gazette

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26 - CHAMPAGNE, 1990.

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29 - MILNE, 1989, 176.

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31 - CHAMPAGNE, 13.

32 - DUFOUR, 1989, 95.

33 - MILNE.

APPENDIX

Classification of headlines

Calgary Herald

. Neutral : 3 articles.

Quebec Liberals to release report on political future(28.1).

Moment of truth near - Bourassa (2.3).

Meech strategy may be coming again (2.16).

. Quebec + : 1 article.

Bourassa optimistic - solutions emerging (2.6).

. Quebec - : 10 articles.

High price put on one Canada (1.30).

Quebec wants it all (1.31).

Quebec wants the best of both worlds (1.31).

Bourassa certifies separatist reality (2.1).

Quebec embarks on impossible dream (2.1).

Quebec stands alone (2.1).

Quebecers being fed a diet of fiction (2.4).

Quebec may have to leave (2.5).

It is tough to figure out Bourassa's game (2.7).

Quebec separation costs (2.19).

. Canada + : 5 articles.

Canada's two solitudes can co-exist (1.29).

Is Quebec throwing us a curve ? (2.2).

Report may hold less than meets the eye (2.3).

Who gets to keep the name Canada ? (2.4).

Panic won't solve crisis (2.20).

. Canada - : 6 articles.

Quebec cannot vote itself out - Wells (1.26).

Alberta opposes Quebec report (1.31).

Reaction leaning to fatalistic (2.10).

PM warns divorce is expensive (2.13).

PM warns Quebec of false visions (2.14).

Albertans give unity shrug and a ho-hum (2.22).

Chronicle Herald

. Neutral : 2 articles.

Quebec Liberals brace themselves for release of constitutional report ;
(1.29).

Sovereignty referendum listed as option in Quebec Liberal report (1.30).

. Quebec + : 1 article.

Quebec separation could benefit region (2.15).

. Quebec - : 2 articles.

Bourassa's ultimatum : new deal or secession (2.9).

Quebec Premier Hoover (2.13).

. Canada + : 4 articles.

Some leadership, please (2.4).

Constitutional leadership needs to emerge (2.9).

Call to reason none too soon (2.14).

Finally, the case for Canada (2.18).

. Canada - : 2 articles.

Manning critical of Liberals (2.1).

PM issues blunt warning (2.14).

Globe and Mail

. Neutral : 7 articles.

Vote on sovereignty may be held in 1992 (1.24).

Quebec grits call for major changes (1.29).

Quebec Liberals giving Canada one more chance (1.30).

Many hope for more than Meech, less than Allaire (2.2).

The weak link in our chain (2.12).

Proposals split Quebec panel (2.21).

Bourassa rejects 1991 referendum (2.22).

. Quebec + : 1 article.

Not economics but emotion links Quebec to Canada (2.16).

. Quebec - : 4 articles.

Federalism attacked in confidential report (1.23).

Independence movements ruled by limo separatists (2.16).

Quebec dictating debate tempo (2.18).

Why Quebec will wait no longer (2.18).

. Canada + : 2 articles.

Curry the ailments - with or without Quebec (1.31).

All the redesigning of Canada needs is a decent blueprint (2.14).

. Canada - : 4 articles.

PM discounts Bouchard's remarks (1.26)

Anglophones sharply divided (2.1).

Wells rejects Quebec plan (2.4).

All the formulas and proposals in the world won't keep Quebec in Canada
(2.7).

Montreal Gazette

. Neutral : 5 articles.

"Internal sovereignty" rallies Liberals of all stripes (1.25).

Panel split on Anglos'role in constitutional row (1.26).

Quebec's new deal (1.26).

Who speaks for ordinary people ? (2.7).

On being English in Quebec (2.9).

. Positive : 3 articles.

Quebec can help West get what it wants. Manning says (2.1).

Gut rejections don't help (2.1).

"Reconfederation " is now upon us (2.3).

. Negative : 13 articles.

Parts of Quebec may want to stay in Canada (1.22).

Don't yield power to keep Quebec (1.24).

Quebec wants Ottawa to give up any power on cultural affairs (1.25)

Parizeau casts Anglophones as pariahs (1.29).

"Remake Canada or Quebec leaves" (1.30).

Bourassa constitutional line grabs ambiguity with both hands (1.30).

Liberals' plan far from founders' vision (1.30).

We won't stay mum while Quebec, Ottawa talk (1.31).

Fears confirmed about distinct society (2.1).

What Bourassa wants is now crystal clear (2.1).

Anglos divide into factions under strain of Allaire report (2.4).

If Quebec wants to go, let them go, is now common cry in Canada (2.9).

Vancouver Sun

. Neutral : 4 articles.

Bourassa confident of consensus (1.23).

Liberals' policy hurts separatists, Parizeau claims (1.28).

Quebec : the choice (1.29).

Quebec's constitutional plan sets up Bourassa's chessboard.

. Quebec + : none.

. Quebec - : 5 articles.

PQ sovereignty plan doomed to fail, professor says (1.28).

Trouble on the horizon : Bourassa has plan for Quebec (1.29).

Working-class Quebecers' lunch : sovereignty, hold the details (2.7).

Bourassa accused of using forked tongue (2.8).

Bourassa - underestimate him at your own peril (2.11).

. Canada + : 2 articles.

Quebec report fails to upset PM, Chretien (1.30).

Who will speak for Western Canada ? (2.7).

. Canada - : 2 articles.

Ottawa in no rush to respond to Quebec report (1.31).

PM appeal for federalism double-edged (2.14).

Winnipeg Free Press

. Neutral : 7 articles.

War against Iraq almost distracts Quebec from local concerns (1.24).

Quebec independence inevitable, Senator says (1.26).

Bouchard gives Quebec round 1 (1.26).

PQ sovereignty vote official (1.28).

Visible anger from Quebec (1.31).

Stage set for rerun of Meech (2.3).

Quebec demands remain the same (2.12).

. Quebec + : 2 articles.

Allaire report is worth thinking about (2.4).*

Quebec's new course provides opportunity for a new Canada (2.5).*

. Quebec - : 3 articles.

Rewrite law or we leave, Quebec says (1.30).

Bourassa buys time, but final price may be very expensive (2.6).

Quebec sovereignty called threat to Francophones (2.9).

. Canada + : 12 articles.

Who speaks for rural Canada ? (1.29).

Quebec challenges Canada (1.31).

No one speaking out against dismantling of nation (2.2).

Opportunity for federalism (2.4).

Allaire report is worth thinking about (2.4).

Canada should present its own list to Quebec (2.4).

Ill-prepared for a grave crisis (2.5).

Quebec's new course provides opportunity for a new Canada (2.5).

A spiritual loss to all Canadians (2.7).

Who can speak for Canada ? (2.9).

Canada really can work (2.10).

Keeping Canada together (2.15).

. Canada - : 4 articles.

Let Quebec go, provincial task force said (2.2).

Let Quebec depart with dignity (2.10).

Quebec cannot be "part-time province". (2.14).

Biculturalism may be on its last legs (2.19).

Le Devoir

. Neutral : 5 articles.

Partir et rester I (2.1).

" " " II (2.2).

" " " III (2.4).

Le douloureux passage de la majorité à la minorité (2.15).

Les dits de Toronto et de Québec (2.15).

. Quebec + : 10 articles.

Bourassa fera appel au peuple sur l'avenir constitutionnel du Québec (1.23).

Les états d'âme du Canada anglais n'influenceront pas la position souverainiste des jeunes Libéraux (1.24).

Un Etat pour chacun des deux peuples (1.25).

B.Bouchard veut secouer le Canada anglais (1.26).

Bourassa prêt à la souveraineté (1.30).

Faire table rase de la Constitution actuelle (1.30).

Pour que l'indépendance ne rate pas I (2.5).

" " " II (2.6).

Le rapport Allaire n'est pas un "catéchisme" (2.7).

Les Québécois prêts à donner une dernière chance au Canada (2.18).

. Quebec - : 1 article.

Méfiance et déception chez les nationalistes (1.30).

. Canada + : 1 article

Mulroney pourrait en appeler au peuple avant Bourassa (2.2).

. Canada - : 6 articles.

Ottawa fait la grimace (1.30).

Le rapport Allaire sème le désarroi dans le reste du Canada (1.31).

A l'insulte québécoise, la riposte canadienne (2.4).

Mulroney s'apprête à fixer une limite aux demandes du Québec (2.8).

Pas de Québec à peu près autonome, avertit Mulroney (2.13).

Des reliquats de racisme (2.15).