BORDERING ON THE NEW FRONTIER:
Modernism and the Military Industrial Complex in the United States and Canada, 1957 - 1965

By
DAVID BRIAN HOWARD
B.A., University of British Columbia, 1978
B.F.A., University of British Columbia, 1982
M.A., University of British Columbia, 1986

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Fine Arts)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April, 1993
© David Brian Howard, 1993
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

(Signature)

Department of Fine Arts
The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date March 2, 1993
In 1964 Clement Greenberg suffered his greatest setback as the critical arbiter of modern painting. The "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition he had helped to organize at the Los Angeles Museum of Art was critically demolished, definitively shattering the myth of invincibility surrounding Greenberg's modernism, an aesthetic which had been a powerful influence in the United States and Canada in the post-war period. For many contemporary critics, the early to mid-1960s is the period in which a stultified and institutionalized modernism was finally usurped by an approach to culture that was less elitist and more socially engaged.

The new cultural model that was taking shape within the Kennedy Administration's vision of the New Frontier sought to remotivate a sense of "national purpose" within the United States to counter the nation's preoccupation with consumerism and affluence. The pragmatic liberal concept of culture sought to rework the relationship between work and play in order to promote a new relationship between individualism and civic virtue. The impetus to re-shape the boundaries between art and society under the New Frontier was a direct response to the political and military challenge posed by the Soviet Union in the late-1950s, especially after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, and the
inability of the Eisenhower Administration to respond to the anxieties generated by the intense superpower rivalry.

This international environment also exacerbated the ongoing tensions between Canada and the United States, culminating in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker delayed in responding to the U.S. alarm over the presence of Soviet medium range nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the political firestorm that followed this delay highlighted the frictions that had developed in the unequal bilateral relationship between the United States and Canada after World War Two.

While the Cold War was approaching its ultimate showdown, Greenberg was proceeding to a geographical margin of North America -- Saskatchewan -- to participate in the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops. Ironically, while Greenberg was extolling the virtues of Canadian abstract painters such as Art McKay and Kenneth Lochhead, going so far as to argue that the Saskatchewan abstract painters were New York's only competition, Los Angeles was asserting itself as New York's cultural rival. As a consequence of the phenomenal post-war growth of the military-industrial complex in the American Southwest, a fierce rivalry was developing with the traditional bases of power in the Northeast. The Southwest, and Los Angeles in particular, was the major beneficiary of the accelerated defense spending resulting from the heightened tensions of the Cold War in the 1950s.
Partially in response to a regional dispute over military appropriations, the economic and cultural elites of Southern California sought to counter the pragmatic liberal agenda of the Kennedy Administration by promoting Los Angeles as the Second City of American Art. Greenberg's "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition was intended to draw attention to the Los Angeles cultural renaissance and the maturing of the city's independent cultural identity.

Thus, Greenberg's sojourn to Saskatchewan at the height of the Cold War and during a crucial period of his formulation of his theory of modernist painting after abstract expressionism provides the focus for an examination of the status of modernism in the early 1960s, especially in the context of U.S.-Canadian relations and interregional rivalry between the Northeast and the Southwest. This thesis seeks to explain the complex cultural and political dynamic of modernist painting in the United States in the Cold War years of 1957 to 1965 and the effect of this dynamic on the development of Canadian modernist painting.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ......................................................... ii
List of Figures ................................................. vi
Acknowledgement ............................................... xiv

Introduction: Living on Border Lands:
   New York - Emma Lake - Los Angeles .................. 1

Chapter One: From the Missile Gap to the Culture Gap. . . . 24

Chapter Two: Between Chesed and Binah:
   Modernism on the Margins ................................. 127

Chapter Three: The Golden Age as Catastrophe:
   The Los Angeles Cultural Renaissance and the
   "Post Painterly Abstraction" Exhibition. .............. 224

Conclusion: Borderline Syndrome:
   Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Identities. ................. 323

Figures .......................................................... 345

Bibliography .................................................... 409
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cover photograph, <em>Life</em> magazine, October 21, 1957: American scientists plotting the orbit of Sputnik 1</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Photograph, <em>Life</em> magazine, October 21, 1957: Orbits made by Sputnik in its first 24 hours of flight</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Photograph, <em>Life</em> magazine, October 21, 1957: President Eisenhower with space toys and space fashions</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. The Rocket Thrower (1964) by Donald de Lue
Bronze statue, 45 feet

12. "The City: Places and People": exterior of the New York State Pavilion
[Source: Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.156]

13. Two Curves: Blue Red (1964) by Ellsworth Kelly
Painted aluminum, 18 feet by 18 feet.
Collection of the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
[Source: Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.163]

14. Prometheus (1964) by Alexander Liberman
Painted aluminum, 20 feet by 20 feet.
Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.

15. World's Fair Mural (1964) by Roy Lichtenstein
Oil on plywood, 20 feet by 16 feet.
Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.
[Source: Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.159]

16. World's Fair Mural (1964) by James Rosenquist
Oil on masonite, 20 feet by 20 feet.
Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.
[Source: Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.159]
17. **Thirteen Most Wanted Men** (1964) by Andy Warhol  
(covers in black cloth) Silkscreen on canvas,  
20 feet by 20 feet.  
[Source: *Remembering the Future*, Exhibition  
Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli,  
1989), p.157]  

18. **Robert Moses** (1964) by Andy Warhol  
Silkscreen on canvas.  
[Source: *Remembering the Future*, Exhibition  
Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli,  
1989), p.157]  

Chapter Two  

[Source: *Atlas and Gazetteer of Canada* (Ottawa:  
Queen’s Printers, 1969), p. 13]  

20. Augustus Kenderdine, first director of Murray  
Point Summer School of Art, ca. 1937  
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape*.  
Ed. John O’Brien. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel  
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.20].  

21. Photograph of Emma Lake, Saskatchewan  
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape*.  
Ed. John O’Brien. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel  
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.152]  

22. Ken Lochhead, Roy Kiyooka, and Art McKay at  
the Regina College of Art, 1957  
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape*.  
Ed. John O’Brien. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel  
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.12]  

23. **Return to Humanity** (1955) by Ken Lochhead  
Oil on canvas, 40.6 by 76.8 cm.  
Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.  
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape*.  
Ed. John O’Brien. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel  
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.95]  

24. **Of Birds and Grass, No. 2** (1953) by J. Shadbolt  
Ink and casein on paper, 50.5 by 64.5 cm.  
Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto.  
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape*.  
Ed. John O’Brien. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel  
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.78]  


25. **The Edge of the Forest** (1957) by Art McKay
Watercolour on paper, 43.3 by 58.5 cm.
Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape.*
Ed. John O'Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.77] . . .369

26. Photograph of Barnett Newman at Emma Lake, 1959
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape.*
Ed. John O'Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.28] . . .370

27. **Image of Clarity** (1961) by Art McKay
Enamel on masonite, 182 by 121.7 cm.
Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape.*

28. **The Way One** (1951) by Barnett Newman
Oil on canvas, 101.6 by 76.2 cm.
Collection of the National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape.*
Ed. John O'Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.81] . . .372

29. **Woman I** (1952) by Willem de Kooning
Oil on canvas, 75 7/8 by 58 in.
Collection of the Museum of Modern Art, New York

30. **The Red Stairway** (1944) by Ben Shahn
Tempera on masonite, 16 by 23 5/16 in.
Collection of the St. Louis Art Museum.

31. **Winged Hue** by Morris Louis
Oil on canvas, 102 by 105 in.
Courtesy of French and Company.

32. **Crystal** by Kenneth Noland
Oil on canvas, 94 by 94 in.
Courtesy of French and Company.
[Source: Clement Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," *Art International* 4 (1960), p.29] . . . . . . . . . .376
33. Greenberg's 1962 route through Prairie Canada
[Source: Clement Greenberg, "Painting and Sculpture in Prairie Canada Today," Canadian Art 20 (March-April 1963), p.91] . . . . . . . . . . . .377

34. Clement Greenberg at Emma Lake, 1962

35. Dark Green Centre (1963) by Ken Lochhead
Acrylic on canvas, 208.3 by 203.2 cm.
Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto.

36. Enigma (1963) by Art McKay
Enamel on board, 48 by 72 in.
Collection of the Vancouver Art Gallery.
[Source: Post Painterly Abstraction. Exhibition Catalogue, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1964, n.p.]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..380

[Source: Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990)] . . . .381


Chapter Three

39. Cross (1957) by Wallace Berman
Wood, photograph, chain.
40. **Untitled (1958)** by Craig Kauffman  
Oil on canvas, 62 by 50 in.  
Private collection.  

41. **Untitled (Trip Series) (1959)** by John Altoon  
Oil on canvas, 53 5/8 by 48 in.  
Collection of the Pasadena Art Museum (The Norton Simon Art Museum).  

42. Photograph of the Ferus Gallery Group:  
Edward Kienholz, John Altoon, Billy Al Bengston,  
Craig Kauffman (upside down), Robert Irwin,  
Edward Moses (reclining), and Allen Lynch,  
ca. 1959-60  

43. **Blue, Green (1958)** by Karl Benjamin  
Oil on canvas, 44 by 66 in.  

44. **Magical Space Forms (1951)** by Lorser Feitelson  
Oil on canvas.  
[Source: Jules Langsner, "Permanence and Change in the Art of Lorser Feitelson," *Art International*, (1963), p.76]. . . . . . . . . . . . 388

45. **Dichotomic Organization (1959)** by Lorser Feitelson  
Oil on canvas, 60 by 60 in.  

46. **Like Unlike (1959)** by Frederick Hammersley  
Oil on canvas, 60 by 40 in.  

47. **No. 8 (1959)** by John McLaughlin  
Oil on canvas, 60 by 40 in.  

48. Photograph of the Contemporary Arts Council of the Los Angeles Museum  
49. **Troy** (1962) by Billy Al Bengsten
Oil and oil lacquer on masonite, 60 by 60 in.
Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Factor,
Beverly Hills.
[Source: *Six More*. Exhibition Catalogue,
Los Angeles Museum, 1963, p.7] . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

50. **Happy Birthday** (1962) by Joe Goode
Oil on canvas and milk bottle, 76 by 66.5 in.
Collection of Rolf Nelson Gallery, Los Angeles.
[Source: *Six More*. Exhibition Catalogue,

51. **Sinking George** (1962) by Phillip Hefferton
Oil on canvas, 90 by 67.5 in.
Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Monte Factor,
Los Angeles.
[Source: *Six More*. Exhibition Catalogue,

52. **Annie** (1962) by Edward Ruscha
Oil on canvas, 71 by 66.5 in.
Collection of L.M. Asher Family, Los Angeles
[Source: *Six More*. Exhibition Catalogue,
Los Angeles Museum, 1963, p.9] . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

53. **Crime Buster** (1962) by Mel Ramos
Oil on canvas, 30 by 26 in.
Collection of Abrams Family, New York.
[Source: *Six More*. Exhibition Catalogue,
Los Angeles Museum, 1963, p.5] . . . . . . . . . . . . 397

54. **Statement of a Paradox** (1963) by Art McKay
Enamel on masonite, 121.9 by 182.9 cm.
Collection of the Norman Mackenzie Art Gallery,
Regina, Saskatchewan.
[Source: *The Flat Side of the Landscape.*
Ed. John O’Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel
Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p.42] . . . 398

55. **Red Mask** (1963) by David Simpson
Oil on canvas, .72 by 41 in.
Collection of David Stuart Galleries, Los Angeles.
[Source: *Post Painterly Abstraction*. Exhibition
Catalogue, Los Angeles Museum, 1964, p.80] . . . 399
56. **Peppermint Lounge** (1962) by Emerson Woelffer
   Oil on canvas, 72 by 57 in.
   Collection of David Stuart Galleries, Los Angeles

57. **Blue Balls** (1962) by Sam Francis
   Oil on canvas, 80.75 by 80.5 in.
   Collection of Martha Jackson Gallery, New York.

58. **Dynasts** (1961-2) by Ralph Ducasse
   Oil on canvas, 60 by 84 in.
   Collection of the artist.

59. **Pasco-Blue** (1963) by Frank Hamilton
   Oil on canvas, 54 by 60 in.
   Collection of the artist.

60. **Acropolis** (1963) by Mason Wells
   Liquitex on canvas, 60 by 50 in.
   Collection of the artist.

61. **Untitled** (1961-2) by Robert Irwin
   Oil on canvas, 60 by 60 in.
   Private collection.

62. **Title page, Post Painterly Abstraction Catalogue**

63. **Untitled** (1962) by John Ferren
   Oil on canvas, 54 by 54 in.
   Collection of Rose Fried Gallery, New York.

64. **Photograph of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1965.** William Pereira, Architect
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Give me back the Berlin Wall
give me Stalin and St. Paul
I've seen the future, brother:
it is murder.

Leonard Cohen
"The Future"

This dissertation is the culmination of not only six years of doctoral studies but of more than a decade of pre-occupations, both as an artist and as an art historian, with the impact of European and American culture on Canada. I would particularly like to thank my supervisors, John O'Brian and Serge Guilbaut, for their intellectual support and diligent criticism as well as their encouragement while I was pursuing this obsession. Their combined influence and scholarly guidance have helped me direct my energies in completing this undertaking. I would also like to acknowledge my friends and colleagues at the University of British Columbia for their invaluable support and encouragement over the years: Alex Alberro, Mary Jane Cowan, Sandra Gillespie, Steven Harris, K. Dian Kriz, Maureen Lunn, Ann Morrison, Lora Rempel, Professor Maureen Ryan, Professor Rose Marie San Juan, Victor Semerjian, Colleen Skidmore, Linda Smeins, Shep Steiner, and Andrea Thomsett.

My thanks also go to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing funding support during my doctoral studies. In addition, I would like to thank the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design for granting me the time necessary to realize the completion of this project.

This project would not have been possible without the support of my families, especially Florence Howard and Neil and Beryl Galbraith. In particular, I have to thank Jeffrey Lee Stevenson for his unintended contribution to this project. A special appreciation is reserved for Vivian Galbraith Howard for her astute critical observations, steadfast companionship, and unlimited patience throughout my many years of graduate studies.
And that means pessimism all along the line. Absolutely. Mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: between classes, between nations, between individuals. And unlimited trust only in I.G. Farben and the peaceful perfection of the air force. But what now, what next?

Walter Benjamin

No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism; but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.

Theodor Adorno

All such writing is an assault on the frontiers.

Franz Kafka
Introduction:

I deconcentrate and it is the secondary, eccentric, lateral, marginal, parasitic, borderline cases which are 'important' to me and are a source of many things, such as pleasure, but also insight into the general functioning of a textual system.

Jacques Derrida

Yet this is the point at which I must remind the reader of the obvious; namely, that this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as thoughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death and terror.

Frederic Jameson

In August 1962, in response to an invitation from the Canadian painter Kenneth Lochhead, the noted American art critic Clement Greenberg made a ten-day journey in his mother-in-law's 1956 Dodge, covering over three thousand kilometers, through the northeast and midwest United States and across Canada.¹ His destination was a small collection of wooden huts on the shores of a remote lake in north central Saskatchewan: Emma Lake, the site

¹. The specific details of Clement Greenberg's journey to Emma Lake, Saskatchewan, are taken from the Clement Greenberg correspondence, 1962/63, Archives of American Art (AAA) and the Kenneth Lochhead correspondence of the same period, University of Regina Archives (URA).
of a small summer art camp. Long a center of artistic activity in the province of Saskatchewan, the art camp had, since 1955, played a major role in maintaining a dialogue between artists in Saskatchewan and the art community across North America, and with New York City in particular. For Greenberg, the trip was, in his terms, a sort of "safari" for which he was to receive a modest honorarium of $800.00.

After a little over a week on the road, Greenberg crossed the world's longest undefended border between two sovereign states to begin the journey across the vast expanse of the Canadian prairies. The absence of barbed wire, armed guards or a heavily defended boundary between the United States and Canada belied the extraordinary events that were unfolding that summer and later that fall, as Greenberg's journey finally came to an end. Coinciding with Greenberg's journey to Saskatchewan in August 1962, forty-two Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles were also in transit, on their way to a secret installation in Cuba. In effect, the world was poised on the edge of a potential nuclear abyss that would come to be known as the Cuban Missile Crisis: in Canada, the political fallout of this event would inaugurate, in the words of the Canadian philosopher George Grant, "the strongest stand against satellite status that any
Canadian government ever attempted.\textsuperscript{2} Even while the Canadian government prepared to challenge the alleged imperial authority of its neighbour to the south, the gravitational pull of the Cold War should have ensured that Canada would follow the standard neo-colonial orbit. At such a tumultuous moment in North American and international affairs, the presence of the leading modernist art critic of the United States on the symbolic margin of North America raises compelling questions about the role of modernism within John F. Kennedy's policies of the "New Frontier."

Greenberg's "safari" to the wilds of central Saskatchewan\textsuperscript{3} was more than a pleasant holiday, as his two-week stay at Emma Lake was supplemented by studio visits criss-crossing the width and breadth of the Canadian prairies. Greenberg was commissioned by the journal Canadian Art to write a report on his journey of cultural discovery in western Canada for the magazine. In addition, Greenberg himself inquired about the possibility of teaching in Regina for a year, a proposal which collapsed when the University of Saskatchewan failed to procure the funding required for such a visiting lectureship. This was a very strange gesture on the


\textsuperscript{3} The area around Emma Lake is actually home to numerous private recreational cottages and summer camps.
part of a critic supposedly at the height of his power, particularly since, at this same time, intellectuals were migrating from the margins of influence to occupy positions of authority at the symbolic center of state power -- Washington, D.C. Yet Greenberg, an exemplar of the culturally dominant center, desired to relocate himself, momentarily at least, on the margins.

The significance of the trip to the development of Greenberg's own conception of art after abstract expressionism is revealed in a letter to Lochhead, the founder of the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops. In this letter, dated March 10, 1963, Greenberg enthuses:

> You have no idea of how much I'm betting on Saskatchewan as N.Y.'s only competitor. When I tell that to people around here [New York City] there's general amazement -- as you might expect -- but there's also a willingness to allow for me being right -- which is even more amazing to me . . . . All of which means I have something of a stake in Saskatchewan.  

This remarkable statement gives the impression of a critic wishing to challenge the cultural dominance of New York City, a city he had been instrumental in establishing as the centre of modern art production in the post-war period. The quotation is astonishing in its assertion of Saskatchewan as a potential competitor for New York, especially in the light of Saskatchewan's status as one of the most under-populated,

---

4. Letter from Clement Greenberg to Kenneth Lochhead, 10 March 1963, URA.
over-exploited economic hinterlands of the booming post-war North American economy, part of the next-to-invisible buffer-zone between the superpowers of the Cold War, and, furthermore, a province which harboured North America's first, and up to then, only socialist government! The fact that this "competition" occurred only a decade after New York had successfully "stolen" the idea of modern art from Paris is arguably a dialectical inversion of comic proportions. After all, if Greenberg wanted to shake up New York's complacency over its domination of the post-war art world, surely the burgeoning art scene in Los Angeles made that city a more likely contender than the hinterlands of Saskatchewan.

Perhaps even more surprising than Greenberg's claim regarding Saskatchewan's role as New York's only competitor was the hesitancy and the self-doubt he expressed in the letter to Lochhead. His shock at being affirmed in his opinions by a segment of the artistic community of Saskatchewan and the personal stake he placed in the province occurred during the waning moments of his domination of the post-war art scene, a time when the autonomy of modernism was collapsing. The trip to Saskatchewan emerges as a possible tactical retreat during which Greenberg could regroup before reclaiming his former pre-eminent role in art criticism.

Greenberg's advocacy of the abstract painters of Saskatchewan extended to include the art public of the province as well. In 1963, his enthusiasm for Saskatchewan as
a receptive environment for the latest developments in modern painting was reflected in his suggestion to hold an exhibition entitled "Three New American Painters: Louis, Noland, Olitski" in the provincial capital of Regina. This exhibition, comprised of ten paintings by Jules Olitski, Kenneth Noland and Morris Louis, brought together the three most important painters for Greenberg's concept of art after abstract expressionism. In the eyes of Gerald E. Finley, acting director of the Norman Mackenzie Art Gallery in Regina, the exhibition would establish Saskatchewan's pre-eminence in Canada for "the showing of contemporary American painting."  

Thus, not only was the traditional hierarchy of center and periphery being inverted between Canada and the United States but, within Canada itself, the traditional role of Saskatchewan as a subservient colonial hinterland to the cultural domination of Central Canada was also being inverted. The question immediately arises, however, as to whether this was a post-colonial moment of self-realization or simply another episode in the evolution of colonialism, with the margin being flattered by the fleeting attention paid to it by a representative of the center.

The tentative nature of Greenberg's description of his own influence in his letter of March 10, 1963 could be

dismissed simply as false modesty on his part. Likewise the pandering to his ego by marginal Canadian artists starved for critical attention from New York could have led Greenberg to an insincere assertion of the relative importance of these artists to his theorization of modern art. Yet one month after his startling letter to Lochhead, Greenberg backed up his claims for the significance of the modernist painting being produced in Saskatchewan by inviting both Lochhead and fellow Saskatchewan painter Arthur McKay to participate in a major exhibition of painting being organized by him and James Elliott, a curator at the Los Angeles Museum, for the spring of 1964.

The exhibition, ultimately entitled "Post Painterly Abstraction," was to be the unveiling of the next advance in the teleology of Greenbergian modernism, marking a transition from painterly to linear modes of representation within modernist painting. Thirty-one artists were drawn from a variety of cities and regions across North America, including, in addition to the Saskatchewan representatives, painters from Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington D.C., Toronto, and New York. In contrast to Greenberg's original vision, in which Saskatchewan was to be equal to other regions included in the exhibit, Museum Curator James Elliott increased the number of Californian contributors, thus diluting the significance of the Saskatchewan contingent within the overall scope of the exhibition. As a result, the impression of an East Coast-West
Coast dialogue was created, marginalizing the critical contributions of other regions.

An analysis of Greenberg’s visit to Saskatchewan and the presence of Saskatchewan artists in the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition will help to unravel some of the mystery surrounding Greenberg’s modernist position in the early 1960s. Greenberg’s western Canadian sojourn provides key insights into understanding the status of modernism as the hegemonic cultural production of the early sixties. If Greenberg’s modernist position was unequivocably the cultural dominant of this period, then the issue of the role of modernism as an instrument of imperial domination of the colonial periphery becomes a central concern of any cultural analysis of Greenberg’s presence on the margins.

One interpretation of Greenberg’s influence is offered by Barry Lord in his 1974 book *The History of Painting in Canada*, which presents Greenberg as an agent of imperial domination. For Lord, Greenberg’s modernism becomes an example of the "classic" phase of American expansionism under John F. Kennedy between 1960 and 1963, following in the footsteps of the utilization of abstract expressionism for similar colonizing purposes under Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Within Lord’s Marxist schema, the model of colonial subordination is provided by the social democratic government of Saskatchewan. Despite the Saskatchewan government’s attention to social welfare issues, the
provincial government also provided a point of entry for the "left-liberal, continentalist outlook" of a variety of American liberal and social democrats on the run from McCarthyism. But it was the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan that was, according to Lord, "the real centre of the U.S. invasion," and he named McKay and Lochhead as the colonial handmaidens of this latest foreign adventure by the United States. While Lord's construction of the period is overly simplified, his targeting of left-liberals on the run from McCarthyism in Saskatchewan is curious. In the early sixties, Greenberg was hardly on the run from McCarthyism; in fact, at the height of his influence in the fifties, he was an outspoken anti-Communist and acquiesced to the goals of McCarthyism. The displacement of Greenberg from the center in the 1960s would have required more than than right-wing scare tactics.

6. Barry Lord, The History of Painting in Canada (Toronto: New Canada Publications, 1977), p.209. While I am critical of Barry Lord's reductionist Marxism with its simplified base-superstructure scaffolding, he at least draws attention to the colonial relationship and its impact on culture within Canada. Furthermore, he attempts to analyze the role of Emma Lake within a broader historical analysis, unlike the usual treatment of the subject in Canadian art history wherein Emma Lake is briefly mentioned but not analyzed to any degree (e.g. David Burnett and Marilyn Schiff, Contemporary Canadian Art (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1983), pp. 126-140). The lack of critical attention towards Emma Lake has changed recently with the exhibition and catalogue on Emma Lake, curated and edited by John O'Brian, which is the most extensive work yet published on the subject. See The Flat Side of the Landscape: The Emma Lake Artists' Workshops (Exhibition Catalogue, Saskatoon: Mendel Art Gallery, 1989).
The complexity of Greenberg's position in the early sixties forces a re-examination of the cultural and political dynamic of that period. The possibility of Greenberg's "de-centering" in the early sixties has not been of much interest to many postmodernists who tend to portray the period between the publication of Greenberg's classic text *Art and Culture* in 1961 and the republication of the essay "Modernist Painting" in 1965 as indicative of the domination of Greenberg's theories of modernism within cultural institutions of the center. Rarely do postmodern critics note that the text for "Modernist Painting" had been first broadcast and published by the Voice of America five years earlier in 1960. Thus, as early as 1960, Greenberg was responding to the de-centering of his modernist position by firmly redrawing the boundary line between modernism and mass culture. The desire of postmodernist critics to read the period between 1961 and 1965 as a continuation of Greenberg's earlier influence is a simplification of the early sixties as a historical moment. Such an interpretation does not exceed, by very much, the conclusion drawn by Barry Lord (that is, that Greenberg was an imperial agent) and does little to elevate the dialogue on the complex interplay between modernism and politics in this period. Andreas Huyssen, for example, links the institutional domination of this particular mode of Greenbergian modernism with the liberal-conservative consensus of the 1950s as providing the rationale behind the rejection of modernism in
the 1960s:

The modernism against which artists rebelled was no longer felt to be an adversary culture. It no longer opposed a dominant class and its world view, nor had it maintained its programmatic purity from contamination by the culture industry. In other words, the revolt sprang precisely from the success of modernism, from the fact that in the United States, as in West Germany and France, for that matter, modernism had been perverted into a form of affirmative culture.

While Huyssen's observations regarding the transformation of modernism into a form of affirmative culture are important, Greenberg was, as well, an exemplar of the alliance of modernism with a liberal-conservative consensus in the fifties. Is this the same consensus Lord referred to as "left-liberal"? Was modernism the only contemporary art practice that functioned as affirmative culture? If not, how does this complicate the theorization of decenteredness and the preservation of utopian hopes within mass culture (as a strategy for transforming everyday life) that Huyssen advocates as an oppositional position to the culture industry and modernism?

I wish to propose that the either/or position of Huyssen and Lord could be replaced by the tripartite structure advocated by Raymond Williams. Williams theorizes culture as being composed of a set of dynamic interrelations between the overlapping of dominant, residual and emergent cultures. If

this approach is applied to the period between 1961 and 1965, then the interpretation of modernism as the cultural dominant within a liberal-conservative or liberal-left consensus begins to erode. If Greenberg and his theory of modernism were so tightly ensconced at the center of power, then his appearance on the margins in Saskatchewan in 1962 and the launching of the flagship exhibition of "Post Painterly Abstraction" from Los Angeles in 1964 could point to his de-centering and transformation into a residual cultural moment. By replacing Greenberg's dominant voice with a more marginalized one, an uncertainty about the cultural hegemony of the period is created. This de-centering looms as an important historical problem for establishing the precise cultural dominant, if

8. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Williams discusses the differences between dominant, residual, and emergent cultures in Chapter Two, pp. 121-129. Some of Williams' more helpful comments that I have adapted in my reformulation of Greenbergen modernism in the early sixties include his argument that a residual cultural moment will exist, "usually at some distance from the effective dominant culture, but some part of it, some version of it . . . will in most cases have had to be incorporated if the effective dominant culture is to make sense." (p.122) Referring to 'emergent' culture, Williams argues, "... it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture . . . and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict sense, rather than novel. Since we are always considering relations within a cultural process, definitions of the emergent, as of the residual, can be made only in relation to a full sense of the dominant" (p.123). This dissertation contextualizes Post Painterly Abstraction within Williams' construction of the "full sense of the dominant" by mapping Clement Greenberg's concept of modernist painting within the triangulation of New York - Emma Lake - Los Angeles.
any, of the liberal-conservative consensus against which the counter-culture of the sixties rebelled.

The ease with which Greenberg's theories have been dissected by postmodernist critics for their teleological essentializing, hierarchialized oppositions, outmoded epistemology and other forms of logocentrism masks the need for a more thorough critical and historical understanding of the way modernism and postmodernism can both be centered and de-centered at particular historical junctures. This dissertation should not be misunderstood as an effort to redeem Greenberg's interpretation of modernism, on the one hand, nor to downplay the legitimacy of the questions being posed by postmodernist and poststructuralist critics alike, on the other. Yet too many questions remain unanswered about the role of modernism in the period of the early 1960s for me to be comfortable with the historical constructions currently available. The lengthy colonial history of Canadian culture, and in particular the role of Greenberg's theory of modernist painting after abstract expressionism as a possible instrument of cultural hegemony, cannot be adduced without some effort at confronting the potential of the neo-colonizing moment within American postmodernism as well. The urgent need to reassess

9. As Gayatri Spivak argues, if the objective of territorial acquisition is no longer the dominant imperative of imperialism, then "it is no longer necessary to cultivate a locally-resident community of cultured ideologues who will disseminate cultural imperialism." Under neo-colonialism, the objective of imperial control is waged through much more sophisticated, mediated and internalized forms of surveillance
the period and raise these questions is demonstrated by the authors of a recent text on post-colonial literature, entitled *The Empire Writes Back*, who have cogently observed that even if one accepts the description of the present as a postmodern era, "little genuine decolonization is yet in sight."10 Indeed, recent events in Canadian history, such as the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and the joining of the Organization of American States, would tend to confirm the opposite: an acceleration of the post-war neo-colonizing process and the reduction of Canada to the role of a disciplined imperial auxiliary firmly within the grasp of the United States. This is a familiar and common experience for a society that had previously witnessed the historical ebb and flow of the French and British Empires.

By analyzing the historical trajectory of Greenberg’s interpretation of modernist theory during the period between 1957 and 1965 as Greenberg crossed and recrossed the frontier between the United States and Canada and then by enlarging the discussion to include the tension generated by the internal regional conflict between New York and California leading up to the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, the fluid


nature of the terms modernism and postmodernism will become more apparent. As geographer David Harvey writes:

We then get to see the categories of both modernism and postmodernism as static reifications imposed upon the fluid interpenetration of dynamic oppositions. Within this matrix of internal relations, there is never one fixed configuration, but a swaying back and forth between centralization and decentralization, between authority and deconstruction, between hierarchy and anarchy, between permanence and flexibility, between the detail and the social division of labor (to list but a few of the many oppositions that can be identified). The sharp categorical distinction between modernism and postmodernism disappears, to be replaced by an examination of the flux of internal relations within capitalism as a whole.11

11. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), pp.339-340. Susan Buck-Morss, in her insightful analysis of Walter Benjamin, notes that Benjamin's Passagen-Werk alludes to the same point, namely, . . . that it makes no sense to divide the era of capitalism into formalist "modernism" and historically eclectic "postmodernism," as these tendencies have been there from the start of industrial culture. . . . Modernism and postmodernism are not chronological eras, but political positions in the century-long struggle between art and technology. If modernism expresses utopian longing by anticipating the reconciliation of social function and aesthetic form, postmodernism acknowledges their nonidentity and keeps fantasy alive. Each position thus represents a partial truth; each will recur "anew," so long as the contradictions of commodity society are not overcome.

Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), p.359. While this argument contradicts Frederic Jameson's periodization of postmodernism as the cultural expression of Late Capitalism, I still find Jameson's attempt at theorizing the sixties, with the benefit of Ernest Mandel's tripartite division of the history of capitalist development in Late Capitalism (London: Verso Books, 1987), and his usage of the cultural theory of Raymond Williams, very helpful. Mandel's suggestive analysis of the impact of the "permanent arms economy" upon the post-war development of capitalism enables Jameson to supplement earlier theories of
The intimate relationship of Canada with the politics of flux emanating from the United States places Canada at a strategic point in the discussion of American postmodernism. As the Canadian cultural theorist Arthur Kroker has noted, it is precisely the location of Canada at the intersection of these various imperial moments throughout history that makes such a colonial frontier country as Canada "a barometer of civilizational discourse, old and new."\(^{12}\)

In the post-World War Two period, Canada faced a "space-oriented" American society. Because of its particular geographical and ideological proximity, Canada becomes a case study in the transformation of a great perceptual shift in western society: the ascendancy of "monopolies of knowledge, specializing in the domination of space over time."\(^{13}\) The proximity of Canada to the United States and the dynamic of United States-Canadian relations at that time are important factors in an analysis of the consequences of the domination of the politics of space over the politics of time.

The literal take-off point for the conquest of space was the launch of the first Soviet ICBM in the summer of 1957, soon followed by the launch of the world's first orbital


\(^{13}\) Kroker, pp.120-21.
satellite, Sputnik 1, in October of 1957. The shock to the United States of the advanced state of Soviet technology accelerated the compression of time and accentuated the priority of space in theorizing the ramifications of this technological advance.\textsuperscript{14} For the first time in the post-war period, the technological pre-eminence of the United States in the politics of spatial control and surveillance was called into question. Furthermore, the priority of Canadian territory as a buffer-zone between the Soviet Union and the United States turned up the heat on the Canadian government to acquiesce to the security demands of the U.S. politicians and the U.S. military.

Between 1957 and 1963, the prerogatives of spatial control and the securing of the airspace of the United States against the threat of Soviet surveillance and nuclear attack witnessed an ongoing struggle between the Canadian government of John G. Diefenbaker, elected in 1957, and the requirements of the military-industrial complex within the United States. By 1962, relations between the Canadian and the United States governments had reached their lowest ebb. Diefenbaker's

\textsuperscript{14} Much of my own analysis of the shift from the politics of time to the politics of space is derived from Edward Soja, who in his book \textit{Postmodern Geographies} (London: Verso Books, 1989) argues for a reassessment of the role of space in critical social theory, in part, to help explain the longevity and success of the evolutionary transformation of capitalism in the twentieth century. Drawing upon the insights of such theorists of space as the French social philosopher Henri Lefebvre, Soja see Los Angeles and Southern California as emblematic of the transformation of capitalist spatialization.
disagreement with the U.S. interpretation of events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, the sole national leader in the Western Hemisphere to take issue with the United States, compounded the irritation of the Kennedy Administration with the Canadian leadership.

However, in protecting the northern boundaries of the United States against the threat of long-range bombers, the thorny issue of Canadian sovereignty over the control of its geography and airspace could not be overlooked. The decision of Canadian Air Force commanders to respond to the American mobilization of continental defenses in the Cuban Missile Crisis, against the express wish of the Canadian government to wait for further information, was symbolic of the pressures that could be placed on the sovereignty of a junior member in a bilateral defense arrangement.15

Yet long before the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949, the securing of Canadian airspace against a Soviet bomber threat had been the subject of an ongoing discussion between the commanders of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force. As General Charles

15. Kennedy declared the heightened state of military alert, called Defensive Condition (Defcon) 3, in a speech delivered on October 22, 1962. Diefenbaker refused to authorize DefCon 3 for the Canadian military, subsequently stating "We were not a satellite state at the beck and call of an imperial master." As Nash observes, the Canadian military were infuriated by Diefenbaker's decision and disobeyed his instructions, putting the Canadian military on full alert. Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p.191.
Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1957, wrote:

There were no boundaries upstairs, and the most direct air routes to the U.S. major targets were through Canada. Therefore, air defence was to be a joint effort from the start.16

The absence of boundaries "upstairs" (i.e. in airspace) signalled both a threat and an opportunity. Initially the American government needed to detect and intercept Soviet bombers over Canada to secure the defense of the continental United States. This meant that Canada was an unsuspecting accomplice in the development of new techniques of surveillance and spatial control. With the development of satellite technology, the impediment of opaque national boundaries girding secure national frontiers and identities was easily bypassed by the installation of a series of transparent membranes, arrays of radar and other surveillance equipment stretching across thousands of square miles of Canadian territory, a working model of the projection of neo-colonial space around the globe. The world's longest undefended border between two sovereign nation states concealed layers of sophisticated early warning radars that signalled only too well to Canadian nationalist intellectuals the implications of the invisible politics of spatial control. The transparent boundaries of continental defense concealed a

U.S.-controlled military establishment of 170,000 personnel in over four hundred bases in Canada.\textsuperscript{17}

As the transparent web of Fortress America spanned the North American continent, propelled by the increasing militarization of the economy of the United States, New York City and the Northeast began to be challenged by Los Angeles and Southern California for the role as the center of what the geographer Anne Markusen has termed the "Defense Perimeter." A huge amount of national wealth was transferred to the development of the aerospace industry in Southern California.\textsuperscript{18} The surprising emergence of the 'sunbelt' --

\textsuperscript{17} Nash, p.73.


The relationship between regionalism, militarism and the politics of space has received a considerable amount of critical attention over the last five years. Anthony Giddens, in the second of his three volume critique of historical materialism, has updated the discussion of the relationship between capitalism, militarism and surveillance. See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987). An insightful analysis of the ramifications of Giddens' argument is presented by Martin Shaw in the essay, "War and the nation-state in social theory," in David Held and John B. Thompson [Editors], Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp.129-146. Shaw argues:

The transformation of modern warfare clearly has major implications for the relationship of war and society. Nuclear militarism clearly requires general ideological mobilization, in the context of Cold War rivalry, and this can give the impression of societies which are still highly militarized. At the same time there is a need for specialized
dominated by Los Angeles -- as a regional challenge to the hegemony of New York City in the sixties was propelled by the technologies of transparency including the massive aerospace, missile and electronic industries that were locating in Southern California in the forties and fifties. The rivalry between the East and West coasts of the United States forms a complicated aspect of changing relations between older forms of colonial domination based on universalism and objectivity and the newer subjectivism and regional dynamic characteristic of neo-colonial strategies in the Cold War, aimed internally within the continental United States as well as externally in the Third World. Frederic Jameson refers to this changed political and spatial dynamic as the "latest mutation in space" -- postmodern hyperspace -- which has "finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body, to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world." The subsequent erasure of the older hierarchical boundaries demarcating center and periphery, subject and object, and avant-garde and mass

military industries of a high order of technological sophistication, which lie behind the concept of a 'military-industrial complex.' Indeed, these two characteristics, taken together, have led E.P. Thompson to assert that societies in the Cold War 'do not have military-industrial complexes; they are military-industrial complexes.' (pp.144-145)

culture within postmodern hyperspace was exploited by the United States as a necessary transitional phase towards the development of a new politics of spatial control. This phase led to the projection of a decentered capitalist totality (a nascent "new world order") that, according to John F. Kennedy, would aid in America's anti-communist mission and, "in effect, reshape the world in our [America's] image."20

Within the parameters of the regional conflict between the Northeast and Southwest, Greenberg's attempt to re-enter the dialogue on contemporary art with a reworked concept of abstract painting that relied on maintaining the borderlines between the avant-garde and the growing middle-class consumer culture was particularly appealing to a small group of Canadian painters who, like many Canadian intellectuals, associated mass consumer culture with the worst aspects of the technology and industry flowing from the society south of the Canadian border. The efforts to maintain a difference of approach, even one that drew upon the questionable legacies of the European philosophical tradition and the "triumph of American painting," became conceivable as a counter-discursive strategy; the postmodern universe was unravelling to reveal its complicity with the "reshaping of the world." The breakdown of the rigid modernism/postmodernism dichotomy reflected the paradoxical peripheralization of resistance

within capitalist development even as fragmentation and heterogeneity increased.

However, the particular relationship between Greenberg and the painters of Emma Lake in the early sixties provides a case study in the complex and contradictory history of cosmopolitan modernist painting. Caught between the decline of New York-based modernism and the rise of Los Angeles as the "second city of American art," Saskatchewan artists found themselves once again on the margins, between the dissolution of cultural and historical boundaries and the disappearance of national boundaries "upstairs."
Chapter One: From the Missile Gap to the Culture Gap

A painful notion: that beyond a certain precise point in time history ceased to be real. As if, without being aware of it, the whole human species had suddenly taken off from reality, but without our knowing it. Now our task and our duty must be to single out that moment and, until we have done so, we are forced to persevere in the present destruction.

Elias Canetti

To every civilization, at some moment in its existence, the mortal challenge comes. Now Red Russia's dictatorship has thrust such a challenge upon the West. The challenge is not simply military; it is total -- intellectual, spiritual, and material. To survive, the free world, led by the United States, must respond in kind. Amid a clamor of alarm and self criticism, America is preparing to shoulder this burden of great historical responsibilities. Technical problems which were long ago the province of isolated specialists have become the concern of a whole citizenry.

Newsweek
January 20, 1958

On Friday, October 4, 1957, the stunned populace of the United States reeled under the news of the successful launch of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik 1. The launch of this satellite, officially baptized "Artificial
"Traveller Around the Earth," recalled the nightmarish period of national insecurity that followed the successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Sputnik symbolized a new level of technological and scientific achievement, not to mention an unsurpassed potential power of surveillance, all achievements that the United States had previously considered marks of its own unchallenged technological leadership. The government now faced a period of intense public scrutiny seeking to answer the question: "How could the United States have forfeited its leadership in scientific expertise and jeopardized the security of the Free World?"

Furthermore, with the visible potential of Soviet technology to breech Fortress America, many U.S. citizens believed nuclear Armageddon was only minutes away.

A period of intense national self-examination queried the direction and goals of both the domestic and foreign policy of the United States. No sphere of life was exempt from this critical re-evaluation. Not surprisingly, this re-evaluation was to have significant implications for the role of high culture and, specifically, for the relationship between Clement Greenberg's particular interpretation of modernist painting and the evolution of this new phase of the Cold War. Was it conceivable that the culture gap between
modernist painting and mass culture so essential to Greenberg's understanding of modernism was not an indication of the triumph of American painting but, rather, a reflection of the United States' decadence and inability to triumph in the Cold War? From 1957 to the 1960 presidential campaign, concerns over the Soviet technological lead in ballistic missiles, nicknamed the "Missile Gap," led both Democratic and Republican politicians to question the nation's willingness to focus on specific objectives and national goals. Had an overall preoccupation with affluence and consumerism in the 1950s somehow robbed the nation of its will to meet the Soviet challenge? Was the triumph of abstract expressionism in demonstrating the United States' cultural leadership of the West a hollow victory if it was achieved at the price of moral decay? For many American politicians, the solution to winning the Cold War internally and externally meant closing both the missile gap and the culture gap.

In analysing the relationship between the missile gap and the culture gap, I will explore in some depth the history and politics of the arms race in the Cold War between 1957 and 1964, not simply because it provides an interesting background but because it is integral to a fuller understanding of the development of contemporary
art in the United States. The threat implied by the missile gap was symptomatic of the psychological crisis in American society which led to a recasting of national and regional identities as the state mobilized itself for the Cold War. I believe that a key aspect of this recasting of identities was the rehabilitation of the nineteenth century concept of the frontier, a concept which had been crucial in the westward expansion of the United States. In 1893, the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner declared the continental frontier "closed," stimulating the overseas military and economic expansionism of the United States. In the Cold War era, with the expansion of the conflict with the Soviet Union to the Third World, Kennedy's continual invocation of the New Frontier throughout his speeches in the 1960 presidential campaign and into his presidency signalled a new relationship between the government and the arts based on the need to mobilize the American population to meet the Soviet threat both at home and abroad. I feel that a detailed examination of the evolution of the concept of the frontier, from the nineteenth century to the early 1960s, provides the link between pragmatism and culture that was forged by pragmatic liberals as a vital component of their Cold War strategy.

Following the launch of Sputnik 1, public anxiety
was quickly exploited by critics of the Eisenhower Administration and was further heightened through the mass media. Three days after the launch of Sputnik 1, the *New York Times* editorial column raised the spectre of a world in which the Soviet Union held the lead in weapons technology:

> Is the world faced with a radical change in the military balance of power at that time, presumably to be measured in months or a small number of years, when the Soviet Union has enough such missiles to place every major United States city and base under threat of annihilation?

> Is the policy of putting domestic budgetary and political considerations ahead of security considerations in allocating funds for defense still a tenable policy in the present situation?

> Are we making a maximum effort at the present time . . . to assure that we too have intercontinental ballistic missiles at the earliest possible time?

> If not, should we not increase our effort so that it is the maximum possible, utilizing all the rich resources of our science, technology, and industry?¹

This editorial expressed a criticism of the Eisenhower Administration which had been commonplace even before the launch of Sputnik, but which now assumed a new urgency and political significance. Critics of the Eisenhower Administration exploited citizens' anxieties, some using

these fears to further their own political goals. The pragmatic liberals, in particular, called for a union of scientific specialization with industry to counter the Soviet threat.

The October 21, 1957 issue of Life magazine also used Sputnik to criticize the Eisenhower Administration. The cover photograph displayed the planet Earth with three U.S. scientists plotting the orbital trajectory of Sputnik. (figure 1) The scientific specialists appear at a loss, two of them painstakingly examining a large crumpled sheet of mathematical calculations while their colleague maps out the orbit of the satellite. A single orbit is indicated moving around the globe on a North-South axis, sweeping over the two most populous nations of the Earth: linking together the successful communist revolution in the People's Republic of China with the potential communist subversion of the Third World, at that time becoming an increasing focus of the Cold War. Even more ominously, the orbit of Sputnik leads directly to North America. The Soviets had successfully launched their first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) only two months before the launch of Sputnik, while scientific specialists in the United States had failed to preserve national security and had jeopardized the freedom of the West.

The same issue of Life magazine included a
representation of the number of orbits made by Sputnik in its first twenty-four hours of flight. (figure 2)

Beneath the headline "The Orbit Weaves A Web As Whole World Watches," the Earth is shown encased in a dense weave of red lines, but this time the image focuses on the direct relationship between Sputnik's orbital web and the immediate threat Sputnik posed to the United States. As one veteran of the U.S. Vanguard rocket project stated on the October 21st editorial page: "I think this is the first step toward the unification of the peoples of the world, whether they know it or not". This editorial attributed blame for the calamity to those in the Pentagon who "confuse scientific progress with freezer and lipstick output." Ultimate responsibility fell on the shoulders of President Eisenhower whose photograph within the same issue of Life showed a weary president next to a series of photographs representing the latest in space toys and space fashion. (figure 3) This juxtaposition provided an implicit critique of the Eisenhower Administration, tying the scientific inadequacy of the United States' space effort to the debilitating influence of consumerism and mass culture.

Now the Soviet Union was ahead in waging "technological imperialism" against humanity. The issue of the resolve and national purpose of the United States to meet this challenge became a key element of the political maneuvering from the launch of Sputnik to the 1960 election. Initially the political attack came from the Democrats, in particular Democratic Senators Lyndon Johnson and Stuart Symington, and from elements in the Air Force eager to secure the necessary funding for their missile program[^4]. In quick succession, the attack was joined by John F. Kennedy, who had been informally campaigning for the 1960 presidential election since 1956, and a host of Republicans representing the liberal establishment of the Northeastern wing of the Republican party including Senator Jacob K. Javits and Nelson Rockefeller Jr.[^5] With Eisenhower a lame duck president, the political opportunity to take advantage of, and even promote, public anxiety arising from the missile gap was inviting. For both Republican and Democratic politicians as well as elements within the defense bureaucracy known as the Iron Triangle (the three Armed Services of the United States), Eisenhower's vulnerability offered an


[^5]: In 1956 Nelson Rockefeller resigned as Special Assistant to the President. One reason for his resignation was the lack of funding for the military.
opportunity to wrench society in a very different
direction.

Following the launch of Sputnik, the Eisenhower
Administration continued to pursue a defense strategy
known as the "long pull," a euphemism for an approach
that attempted to limit excessive defence spending rather
than diverting resources from the private sector
especially as the economy was entering its most severe
recession since World War Two. In fact, the
Administration attempted to lower the defence budget for
the fiscal year after Sputnik. This meant that the U.S.
military doctrine was limited in 1957/8 to strategic
"sufficiency," which in nuclear terms was a rejection of
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' strategic doctrine
of "massive retaliation." Rather than straining national
resources to achieve nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union, long pull strategic doctrine opted for equivalency
with Soviet military capabilities, including a ceiling of
two hundred missiles on the U.S. ICBM program. Such
fiscal restraint on issues of national defence alienated
all three branches of the Armed Services and in very
short order split the Iron Triangle into two main
competing factions: the Army and the Navy on one side
with the Air Force on the other. 6

6. The Army and Navy both supported the concept of
nuclear sufficiency but advocated further defence
appropriations for limited war capabilities and the
Both factions' positions represented opposing strategic doctrines but even within these two large segments of the military were smaller factionalized positions. Within the Air Force, for example, some factions organized around a strategic doctrine based on heavy bombers while others pushed the new ICBM technology. Divisions within the military also coalesced around particular geographical regions, with the increasingly powerful Air Force centred in the Southwest, especially in the Los Angeles area. Consequently, the changing technological demands of the Cold War meant that the Air Force, and therefore the Southwest, played a growing role in national politics at the expense of the northeastern manufacturing base.

Thus, Eisenhower's definition of a middle way between the requirements of the national economy and national security was jeopardized by the exploitation of the public's fear of the missile gap by fellow Republicans, Democrats, and the Iron Triangle. However, shifting of resources away from the Air Force. See Aliano, p.272.

7. Eisenhower's adherence to the defence doctrine of the "long pull" was based on the strategic rationale that long-term defence needs would be more efficiently and effectively met by a defence policy which did not respond to each particular military crisis but aimed to eliminate extreme oscillations within defence budgets over the long term. This strategy was consistent with Eisenhower's conception of liberty and freedom within America and how they could be most adequately defended and nurtured. Liberty and freedom were jeopardized either by the
after Sputnik, a pragmatic consensus began to coalesce between Republicans such as Nelson Rockefeller Jr. and Jacob Javits and Democrats such as John F. Kennedy, a consensus with a strong connection to one arm of the Iron Triangle: the Air Force.

For three years prior to the launch of Sputnik, the Air Force had successfully used the threat of a manned bomber attack on North America to press for increasing autonomy within the defence bureaucracy, supplanting its previous role of supporting the Army. The rapidly increasing impact of the Air Force on defence doctrine and military appropriations combined with the extensive economic and political impact of the aerospace industry on political constituencies within the United States resulted in the formation of an alliance between the Air Force and the Democrats in Congress by 1956. For many Democrats, the electoral failure of Adlai Stevenson in 1956 meant that a new strategy had to be adopted by the party to secure any hope of success in 1960. By supporting the Air Force, conservative Democrats were allying themselves with what Cold War theorist Walt Rostow termed the New Air Romanticism: "reliance on air power [which] fitted other elements in the national style military superiority of a foreign power or by turning America into a garrison state dominated by the military-industrial complex. Eisenhower believed that the "long pull" was the middle way between the two threats.
and tradition." Specifically, Rostow pointed to the broad national appeal of this New Air Romanticism:

The substitution of capital and machinery for manpower . . . fitted the nation's industrial character; and the image of American security firmly in the hands of an American Air Force and American weapons suited the national temper, appealing strongly to residual isolationist elements.°

Democrats and liberal Republicans were positioning themselves for an assault on the "long pull" strategy of Eisenhower by emphasizing the need for strategic superiority in ICBMs which, they argued, could be most efficiently pursued by giving the Air Force a clear mandate and adequate funds. The political dividends to the Air Force and to the Democrats were enormous as an economic recession took hold of the country during the same year as the launch of Sputnik.

Since World War Two, the aerospace industry had


Airpower romanticism was a natural successor to the naval romanticism which had sprung up half a century or so earlier; its advocates were in the direct line of the Mahanist proponents of the big navy of the first decade of the century. A preponderant Strategic Air Command -- like the Great White Fleet -- appeared a device for performing as a world power without getting too deeply enmeshed in the complex, dangerous, interior of Eurasia. (p.224)

The relationship between militarism, the frontier and pragmatism will be discussed later in Chapter 1.
dramatically influenced the urban-suburban relationship of America. Large aerospace plants and support companies were often located outside of major cities or in regions remote from the Northeast, where land and labour costs were much lower. The rapid growth of Air Force appropriations, first in response to the bomber gap and then the missile gap, resulted in the arming of suburbia in the mid to late 1950s, as Geoffrey Rossano observes: "Almost despite itself, suburbia U.S.A. became the home of attack bombers, production lines and giant factories. Suburbia armed was suburbia transformed."^9 Democrats were strategically positioned to exploit both the impact of an economic recession within the suburbs as well as the Cold War anxieties caused by Sputnik by allying with the Air Force to push Congress for greater aerospace appropriations.

Giving further credibility to the Eisenhower Administration’s political rivals, statistical estimates of the Soviet Union’s lead in the missile gap were published in the mass media by the summer of 1958. According to these figures, beginning in 1959, the Soviet Union’s lead in ICBMs would be 100 to 0. Projecting this rate of development, even taking into account concerted

---

American efforts to close the gap, the United States in 1963 would still be considerably behind, with 130 weapons as compared to 2,000 for the Soviet Union. By 1958, Air Force officers and Democratic and liberal Republican congressmen were advocating a missile force in the thousands. Yet civilian and military planners had not previously considered the importance of space as propaganda. Nor had they previously considered the significance of scientific achievement in terms of its political consequences both domestically and internationally. In the period following Sputnik, when

10. By 1959 the Russian superiority was being downgraded. CIA estimates at this time put the United States and the Soviet Union force levels at par, approximately ten missiles per side. However, in order to keep fuelling the American defense build-up, estimates for the early 1960s show the persistence of a distinct numerical superiority on the Soviet side: in 1960 approximately 100 missiles to the American 30; and by 1962 500 missiles to the American estimate of 1-300. For a further discussion of the politics of missile numbers see Ball, pp.3-40 and Roy E. Licklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy" in Political Science Quarterly 85 (December 1970), 600-15.


11. Ball, p.44.

12. Aliano, p.47.
the propaganda effects of space were only too apparent, a strategy that combined both civilian and military objectives seemed the most expedient way of pursuing American objectives in the Cold War. Rostow, a leading Cold War adviser to both Rockefeller and Kennedy, suggested the term "New Frontier" to describe the new pragmatic liberal strategy forged for the 1960 election. Rostow also conceptualized the new space and weapons technology as strategic elements in the Cold War conflict:

Three forces are conspiring to create in the second half of the twentieth century a world arena in which the affairs of nations are more intimately interacting than in the past and, simultaneously, one within which power is progressively diffused. Those forces are the accelerated technological revolution in communications, the revolution in weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, and the revolutionary movement toward modernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.¹³

Through an alliance with the Air Force between 1958 and 1961, pragmatic liberals seized the Cold War agenda away from the Eisenhower Administration by promoting a mobilization of American resources to meet the Soviet threat in the three areas which Rostow deemed strategic: communications, weapons technology, and Third World modernization. Exploiting these new factors became a goal of Cold War planners and an important concern within

¹³. Rostow, p.411.
the re-theorizing of pragmatism under the concept of the New Frontier.

Of the multitude of published critiques of the Eisenhower Administration's waging of the Cold War, the two most significant in terms of creating a pragmatic consensus were the Gaither Committee Report and the Rockefeller Brothers' Report, entitled "International Security: The Military Aspect." Together, these two reports galvanized a pragmatic liberal response to Sputnik that would provide the ammunition to undermine the Eisenhower legacy prior to 1960. Both Kennedy and Nelson Rockefeller Jr. derived crucial aspects of their political platforms from these reports attacking Eisenhower and his legacy as embodied by Republican presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon.

Ironically, the Gaither Committee14 (named after the Chairman H. Rowan Gaither, Chairman of the Rand Corporation's Board of Trustees) was formed by Eisenhower himself seven months before the launch of Sputnik to consider the merit of constructing $40 billion worth of nuclear blast shelters in America. The release of the Committee's report, entitled "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age," one week after the launch of Sputnik

14. The Committee's formal designation was the "Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Council to the FCDA."
added fuel to the critics of the Eisenhower Administration. The report emphasized the vulnerability of the United States' strategic deterrent to a surprise Soviet attack and advocated reinforcing Strategic Air Command's defenses against such a possible surprise assault. The report also recommended a rapid increase in production and deployment of medium and long-range nuclear missiles far exceeding the numerical projections of Eisenhower's strategy of the "long pull." Allusions to American vulnerability therefore combined in the mass media with images of another Pearl Harbour as symbolized by Sputnik. The Eisenhower Administration was easily depicted as weak and vacillating on questions of national security. Eisenhower, however, exacerbated this criticism by ignoring the recommendations of the Gaither Committee Report and even tried to reduce the defence budget for the next fiscal year.

The Rockefeller Brothers' Committee was also formed prior to the launch of Sputnik, in November 1956, under the direction of Henry Kissinger and the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund chairman Laurence Rockefeller. The Committee dealt as well with national security issues but served as a more public forum than the Gaither Committee for discussing these issues. The final Report of the Committee, ("International Security: The National
Aspect"), pointed towards the increasing vulnerability of the United States to maintain military superiority over the Soviet Union given the present priorities of the national economy. As with the Gaither Committee Report, the Rockefeller Brothers' Report advocated a re-orientation of national defence priorities towards the greater production of nuclear missiles, both medium and long range, which undermined Eisenhower's "long pull" strategy. With the Report's release on November 6, 1958, the Eisenhower Administration was buffeted by critiques of its failure to defend America by panels of experts from within the Administration and the Republican Party. The two reports were often mentioned together, serving as key documents in the months leading up to the 1960 election.

The similarity of views shared by Kennedy and Rockefeller on national defence served to buttress the formation of a pragmatic liberal consensus on defense issues with subsequent influence on the structuring of the domestic economy and on the waging of the Cold War. From the ranks of the Gaither and Rockefeller Committees were drawn many of Kennedy's future political advisers including Jerome Wiesner, staff director on the Gaither Committee who became his major science adviser; Paul Nitze, special adviser to the Gaither Committee and future national security adviser to Kennedy; as well as
Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk, and Chester Bowles among over a dozen other members of these Committees who ultimately worked for Kennedy either during the 1960 election or in his Administration. Both committees were also linked with the Council on Foreign Relations, a liberal think-tank on foreign affairs, in which David Rockefeller was a vice-president. Thus, while these two Committees were formed prior to the launching of Sputnik 1, this unexpected event coalesced the political opposition to the Eisenhower Administration, primarily by liberal Republicans and Democrats, who sought to manipulate and take advantage of the missile gap anxiety generated by Sputnik. As Henry Kissinger noted in 1960, "For all the heat of the controversy, it is important to note that there is no dispute about the missile gap as such. It is generally admitted that from 1961 until at least the end of 1964 the Soviet Union will possess more missiles than the United States."

In addition, the launch of Sputnik provided

15. The content and politics of the Gaither Committee and the Rockefeller Brothers Reports are discussed in Chapter One of Ball, especially pp. 15-58.

16. Of the twenty-four men serving on the Gaither Committee, twelve were members of the Council on Foreign Relations; including John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Board of the Council. Of the thirty-three members of the Rockefeller Brothers Report Committee, twenty-one were members of the Council.

17. Licklider, 610.
Rockefeller and Kennedy with the means to secure the political support of the Air Force and its constituencies in the suburban areas of the economy dependent on military appropriations based on new aerospace and missile technologies. Communities in the Northeast\textsuperscript{18}, but particularly areas of the country experiencing the greatest suburban growth, such as Los Angeles and other major cities of the South and West, were particularly well situated to take advantage of the new high technology in weapons and communications advocated by the pragmatic liberals.

However, because the economic infrastructure of Los Angeles and Southern California was already so well attuned to the needs of aerospace and high technology service industries, the Northeast was in danger of receiving fewer aerospace and military appropriations. This regional imbalance in the distribution of military spending was the Achilles heel of the pragmatic liberal defense and economic program: achieving the rate of military build-up required by the Air Force to close the missile gap potentially meant an unintentional privileging of some regions of the country over others. Between the Korean War and 1961, the Northeast saw its

\textsuperscript{18} In New York State, for example, between 1950 and 1960 the population of Nassau county more than doubled, from 660,000 to 1.3 million, largely as a result of the economic impetus provided by the aerospace industry.
overall percentage of prime military contracts decline from 27.4 percent to 11.8 percent; the Northeast fell from being number one, the prime regional beneficiary of military contracts, to number three in terms of overall percentage, while during the same period the Pacific region's share of defense contracts rose from 17.9 to 26.9 percent, going from the third highest level to number one within eight years. The unequal regional distribution of the defense budget was an unforeseen consequence of the tremendous lead Southern California had already achieved in aircraft production since World War Two. Thus while the push to close the missile gap could benefit liberals of both parties, the economic infrastructure of aerospace manufacturing, centered in California, was inadvertently weakening the the economy of the Northeast.

In 1959 two members of the New York congressional delegation who were also allies of New York Governor Rockefeller, Senators Jacob K. Javits and Kenneth B. Keating, attempted to redress the regional imbalance in defence spending, before increased defence expenditures had been permanently siphoned to other regions of the country. "Today, with U.S. defense expenditures of $45

billion representing over half of the federal budget, defense contract awards and procurement policies have a profound impact on the economic well-being of almost every major industrial region in the country," Senator Javits told a meeting of a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It is for this reason that every member of New York's congressional delegation is vitally concerned with the declining percentage of defense dollars spent in New York as compared with other states, particularly California." In May 1959, Javits and Keating introduced the Armed Services Competitive Procurement Act, an attempt to open up defence contracting to a more competitive bidding procedure which would theoretically steer a larger share of the defence budget towards New York. The New York Times noted that this dispute, primarily between New York and California, was threatening to erupt into a domestic cold war. The economic dislocation resulting from the strategy of


21. "State Maps Fight for Arms Orders," in the New York Times, March 8, 1959, p.1. The consequences of the cold war between New York State and California over defence spending extend beyond the military realm and has a considerable influence on cultural spending and patronage in the state of California. The relationship between the arms industry and cultural patronage and institutions in California will be explored in detail in Chapter 3.
overcoming the missile gap exacerbated old and new fissures within American society, producing gaps not only in regional politics on a national level but ultimately extending throughout the society from international relations to the family unit: gaps which pragmatic liberalism under Rockefeller and Kennedy sought to exploit prior to the 1960 election and to contain thereafter.

The pragmatic liberal opponents of the Eisenhower Administration succeeded in exploiting the public's perception of the missile gap. Their criticism of Eisenhower was linked to a critique of mass culture as the domestic equivalent of the missile gap. The apparent unwillingness or inability of the Administration to mobilize the populace to face the new challenges of the Cold War was traced to the lack of national purpose which the United States had never previously experienced until the era of rampant consumerism had undermined the "family system". The relationship between the domestic sphere and foreign policy was highlighted in a 1960 Ford Foundation study in which two Harvard sociologists examined family life to ascertain the key to domestic success:

Early in January, 1957, Russia exploded an atomic bomb, and American scientists monitored its fallout of fission products. Non-stop simulated bomber flights in the upper atmosphere were now reported by the U.S. as
traveling around the world in about forty-five hours. Troubles arose in the Middle East. Hungary broke into revolution. Then came Sputnik, space vehicles, ICBM's and crash programs for training more scientists. The world is like a volcano that breaks out repeatedly... The world approaches this critical period with a grave disruption of the family system... The new age demands a stronger, more resolute and better equipped individual... To produce such persons will demand a reorganization of the present family system and the building of one that is stronger emotionally and morally.

Thus, the Eisenhower Administration's failure to address the missile gap became associated with the failure of family life: the securing of national boundaries became equated with a secure family life and with clearly identified gender roles. This failure of the Eisenhower Administration in both domestic and military realms is succinctly captured in the following 1959 statement by foreign policy specialist George Kennan:

If you ask me... whether a country in the state this country is in today: with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great urban areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient

social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions -- if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, good chances of competing with a purposeful, serious, and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is 'no.'

Ironically, the suburban middle-class lifestyle was now targeted as a source of weakness. This privileged lifestyle was seen to be undermining the disciplined societal infrastructure that had triumphed over fascism, resulting in a self-indulgent population ill-equipped to counter the disciplined will of the Soviet Union. However, in the suburbs (an outgrowth of the rapid expansion in high technology and manufacturing associated with the military) the missile gap and the culture gap overlapped to reinforce the equation that military weakness and undisciplined consumerism were cumulatively sapping the nation's will to resist.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., author of the 1949 liberal text *The Vital Center*, and strategic spokesman for the pragmatic cultural policy of the new liberalism, traced the decline of the United States in the 1950s to the collapse of individual identity in the suburbs with the attending consequence of undermining masculinity. In a 1958 essay entitled "The Crisis of American Masculinity," Schlesinger cites the homogenizing influence of mass

media and its ability to undermine individual spontaneity as a key to understanding the weakened influence of the United States abroad and the emasculation of the American male at home. What was needed, according Schlesinger, foreshadowing Kennedy's call for a New Frontier, was a reclamation of the "American male identity" exemplified by the frontiersman.24 The invoking of the mythological figure of the frontiersman could, as Richard Slotkin observes, "embody the negative potential of economic development and the attendant social change, as well as its progressive and positive aspects. The dangerous or dubious form of the bourgeois could be made to disappear into the mystique of the buckskin pioneer. It is for this reason that the Frontiersman became a viable center for a 'myth of concern' that sought to explain and justify the processes and exigencies of capitalist development."25 Such a recovery of male identity could be initiated by three "techniques of liberation", including satire, art and politics:

How can masculinity, femininity, or anything else survive in a homogenized world, which seeks steadily and benignly to eradicate all differences between the individuals who compose it? If we want to have men again in our theatres and our films and our novels -- we


must first have a society which encourages each of its members to have a distinct identity. 26

The assumption that national security, both domestically and externally, relied on a secure definition of masculine identity was an effective strategy to wield against an Administration that appeared sexually impotent in the light of Sputnik and that undermined secure gender identities by promoting the unrestricted expansion of mass leisure, as essayist Herbert Gold noted in 1962: "The consumer culture -- in which leisure is a menace to be met by anxious and continual consuming -- devours both the masculinity of men and the femininity of women." 27 The image of the frontiersman led to the renewal of secure gender boundaries and national boundaries by tapping the renewing vigor of the frontier myth as a bridge to overcoming the missile gap, the culture gap and the crisis of American masculinity.

In addition to Sputnik, two other major events after 1957 questioned the Republican strategy in the Cold War and reinforced the party's image as being too reliant on promoting effete images of consumerism to counter the potent Soviet combination of national purpose and


increasing technical ability. The first was the colossal failure of the American display at the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958. The second was the triumph of Richard Nixon over Nikita Khruschev in the famous "kitchen debate" held at the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow in an exhibition promoting the "American way of life."

Attended by over forty-one million people, the Brussels Exhibition was the first Class One World’s Fair to be held in Europe since the war. It provided a classic Cold War confrontation between rival conceptions of the good life and the key to societal modernization, a prime consideration of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. The Soviet pavilion primarily presented displays of heavy machinery within a structure that was short on style but very effective as a promotion of the Soviet path to modernity:

The building was big, crass and vulgar, of semi-monumental design. Inside, were symbols of giantism. Everything was larger than life size, from the huge statue of Lenin to the huge cut away model of the Tupolev plane. All this was dominated by models of Sputnik.²⁸

The American pavilion, on the other hand, drew criticism from the business community, the American media, and the Director of the United States Information

Agency because it displayed signs of "decadence and effete ness"\textsuperscript{29} that undermined efforts to promote the superiority of the American way of life. A three-and-a-half-page letter written by an irate businessman to President Eisenhower complained that the American exhibition contained an image of a naked woman, several examples of Grandma Moses-era folk art, and a female fashion show "that [did] not compare favorably with what I have seen put on by a department store in Park Forest, Illinois."\textsuperscript{30} The juxtaposition of scenes and images from folk and popular culture with examples of abstract expressionist art emphasized the gap between the American people and the nation's cultural elites. The U.S. journalist David Brinkley, in his review of the Fair, agreed that too many abstractionist paintings were on display in the U.S. pavilion which, along with "milk shakes inexpertly served and grossly overpriced. . . [fail] to present any clear idea of just what it is we are trying to say. It is perhaps too soft a sell."\textsuperscript{31} The Soviets, by effectively demonstrating "symbols of their rapid growth and power,"\textsuperscript{32} conveyed a sense of

\textsuperscript{29} Joyce, p.9.


\textsuperscript{31} Brinkley, p.8.
national purpose that was particularly appealing for newly independent developing countries.

The 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow was an opportunity for both the Soviets and the Americans to contrast their respective approaches to the good life. Vice-President Richard Nixon extolled the virtues of the suburban lifestyle in America which the exhibit presented in an idealized fashion. (figure 4) This lifestyle was characterized by the greatest range of consumer items possible, as Nixon stated:

To us, diversity, the right to choose. . . is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision made at the top by one government official. . . . We have many different manufacturers and many different kinds of washing machines so that the housewives have a choice . . . Would it not be better to compete in the relative merits of washing machines than in the strength of rockets?\(^{33}\)

As Elaine Tyler May notes, the exhibit presented an image of American superiority by demonstrating "the 'model home' with a male breadwinner and a full-time female homemaker, adorned with a wide array of consumer goods."\(^{34}\) Nixon's strategy was an attempt, just prior to the 1960 election, to turn the missile gap from a liability into an asset. By emphasizing the quality of


34. May, p.16.
life in the suburbs along with well-defined gender roles, each safely contained in its own sphere of expertise, Nixon struggled to redeem the Eisenhower Administration's "long pull" strategy by defusing the anxiety about affluence which the liberal establishment was trying to exploit. In demonstrating that American male potency was enhanced by suburban living while female sexuality was safely contained in the domestic sphere, Nixon hoped to bypass the critique of Republican Strategic Doctrine made by the Rockefeller Brothers' Report and the Gaither Committee. Yet as Barbara Ehrenreich observes, "[The Soviets'] very lack of consumer goods was also disquieting. It raised the suspicion that Americans had been treacherously softened by affluence while the Russians were still strong enough to cope with deprivation on a daily basis."36 Neither could Nixon shake the anxiety about the missile gap, with two out of three Americans still listing nuclear war as

35. American cultural superiority was also on display in Moscow with an exhibition of abstract expressionist paintings, including works by Pollock, Motherwell, Guston, Rothko, and de Kooning as well as non-abstract painters such as Grant Wood, John Curry and Peter Blum. Again the emphasis was on pluralism, presenting the Soviet audience with a selection of American artistic styles that reflected that pluralism of the domestic sphere.

36. Ehrenreich, p.33.
the greatest problem facing society.\footnote{May, p.23.} (A reminder of the Soviet technical ability in rocketry came with the collapse of the proposed superpower summit that was to be held in the United States after the Moscow Exhibition because of the shooting down of the U2 flight of Francis Gary Powers by an advanced Soviet air defence missile.)

In the spring of 1960, \textit{Life} magazine took direct aim at the Eisenhower Administration strategy by publishing a series of ten essays on "The National Purpose" which highlighted the "excessive materialism, complacency, flabbiness, selfishness, apathetic and aimless affluence, and moral confusion [that needed to be addressed] because they impaired America's global performance and reputation."\footnote{Jeffries, p.457.} The Republican claims of material well-being as the basis of national security both in domestic and foreign policy were severely shaken, and the Republican philosophy that had dominated the 1950s was criticized for its complacency in the face of obvious threats to freedom that included communist successes in the Third World, internal moral decay bred by complacency and material success, and the resulting inability to close the gap between new historical realities and old political solutions. What was needed at home and abroad was, as historian John W. Jeffries noted, an ability to
"transcend affluence and revitalize the American will and spirit, and so turn domestic into global success." 39

John F. Kennedy's New Frontier was a strategy designed to prod and cajole Americans from their materialist malaise by means of a complex renegotiating of the traditions of pragmatism, progressivism, and liberalism that retained some characteristics of the post-war liberal "vital center" tradition of Arthur Schlesinger, reworked to capitalize on the political opportunities of the late 1950s. Schlesinger's call for a return to the spirit of the frontiersman in the modern age was exploited, in the Kennedy campaign, to promote a new individualism that would transcend the shortsighted materialism of the Eisenhower era and provide an activist-oriented philosophy that would tackle the gaps

The ten contributors to the volume included John K. Jessup, chief editorial writer for Life; Adlai E. Stevenson, twice the democratic presidential nominee who ran against Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956; Archibald MacLeish, poet; David Sarnoff, board chairman of the Radio Corporation of America; Billy Graham, evangelist; John Gardener, president of the Carnegie Corporation; Clinton Rossiter, Professor of Government at Cornell University; Albert Wohlstetter, associate director of projects at the Rand Corporation; James Reston, Washington correspondent of the Times; Walter Lippmann, liberal social critic and writer for the New York Herald Tribune. Albert Wohlstetter is a prime example of the missile gap advocate working at the juncture between the aerospace industry, the Air Force and the Rand Corporation which formed a key component of both Rockefeller's and Kennedy's critique of Republican defense policy.

in American society while avoiding a complete levelling of cultural values that the short-sighted Republican defense of the suburbs arguably promoted. By emphasizing the qualitative aspects of an engaged civic life as opposed to the quantitative emphasis of the Eisenhower regime, or of the legacy of the New Deal, liberal intellectuals sought to redefine the parameters of a new vital center for liberalism in the late 1950s.

Schlesinger's focus on the centrality of art, satire, and politics as the key "techniques of liberation" for liberal society was adapted to the Kennedy election strategy after Schlesinger had abandoned the Stevenson presidential campaign. Responding to Kennedy's desire for a distinct political identity for the 1960 campaign, Schlesinger and Thomas K. Finletter circulated a memo entitled "The Shape of National Politics to Come," which located the historical precedents for the liberalism of the 1960s in the Progressive politics of the turn of the century. The depiction of the Progressive period as the historical precedent for the New Frontier was a clever solution to the problem of defining a political center for liberals, a solution that avoided the excesses of both Republican laissez-faire consumer capitalism and the materialism and

reliance on large-scale state interventionism of the New Deal 1930s. However, the equation of art, satire and politics in the 1960s with the concept of the frontier and the contradictory history of the Progressive period in American politics required a creative reworking of liberal and progressive doctrine to bring together the elements of the Republican and Democratic parties interested in pragmatic liberalism -- all under the banner of the New Frontier.

The concept of the frontier has ever been one of the most persistent national myths extending from the colonial origins of the United States to the present, displaying a remarkable ability to adapt to rapidly changing social and technological spheres. The frontier is also the foundation of the myth of national exceptionalism, of a group of colonists, "physically removed from the Metropolis, [who], although they were 'modern' people like the citizens of the Metropolis, [were forced by emigration] to accept a temporary regression in conditions of life and work, which were necessarily more primitive in the colonies."²¹ An examination of the historical development of the concept of the frontier in the United States provides a necessary linkage between the aggressive expansionism of the late

---

41. Slotkin, p.34.
nineteenth century and the neo-pragmatism of Kennedy's New Frontier. In my opinion the legacy of the frontier concept in the history of the United States, especially from 1893 up to the New Frontier, is crucial to an investigation of the ideological underpinnings of the domestic and foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration.

Mediating between the Metropolis and the Wilderness⁴², the myth of the frontier provided the colonial settlers with a belief system that could rationalize their precarious toehold on the North American continent as a positive new development in civilization. The two poles of experience, the metropolitan and the wilderness, were transformed, with the tension of the historical situation of the colonist becoming a productive ideology for the formation of a new identity. This new identity became the basis for the colonial struggle against the British Empire and provided the colonists with a nascent post-colonial identity: "The completed American was therefore one who remade his fortune and his character by an emigration, a setting forth for newer and richer lands; by isolation and regression to a more primitive manner of life; and by establishing his political position in opposition to both

⁴². Slotkin, p.34.
the Indian and the European, the New World savage and the Old World aristocracy. The frontier myth thus effectively bridged the gap between the center and the periphery by creating a hybrid identity out of the colonial situation. The marginality of the colonies was transformed into an effective model for constructing a workable language of self-identity that would become a paradigm for colonial struggles in the future. Adapted to the context of the Cold War, this language of self-identity provided the United States with an effective instrument for appealing to the newly emerging societies of the so-called Third World seeking their own models of post-colonial development.

The meaning of the frontier was encoded from the beginning with an effective combination of two contradictory impulses: first, the desire for a post-colonial identity with an in-built hostility to imperial designs; second, a rationalization for the expansive

43. Slotkin, p.34.


45. My usage of the term "post-colonial" is derived from that of Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, who use the term "to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day." (p.2) Using this definition, the authors see the United States as being paradigmatic of post-colonial literatures everywhere because "[the United States and other post-colonial cultures] emerged in their present
designs of the settler population in the New World. This contradictory message provides a clue to the longevity of "American exceptionalism" and to the appeal of the myth of "America" on developing societies attempting to establish their own identities, mediating between their former imperial masters and their new relationship to the centers of the capitalist economic order.

The contradictory message of the frontier and its ability to oscillate between the two poles of resistance and domination enabled the myth to mutate its message in different geographical and historical contexts. This flexibility provided an invaluable instrument for projecting the myth of "America" across the continent and ultimately in forging an imperial ideology applicable to the Third World in the post-colonial context of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In the decade between 1890 and 1900, the frontier myth was reformed: from the logic underlying the conquest of the continental United States to the application of the frontier myth beyond national boundaries, the myth now served to rationalize imperial expansion. In this decade, Progressivism in the United States, to which Schlesinger turned as a model for the neo-liberalism of

---

form out of the experience of colonization and asserted themselves by foregrounding the tension with the imperial power, and by emphasizing their differences from the assumptions of the imperial center." (p.2)
the New Frontier, began to develop alongside the actual closing of the frontier in the continental United States. The possible end of the frontier myth as a motivating force in the United States coincided with the development of pragmatism and progressivism as overlapping phenomena at an important transition point in its history: the interior imperial expansion of the frontier within the continental United States was coming to an end just as systematic overseas expansion was beginning.

Thus, the frontier was not only the guardian of civilization mediating between the metropolis and its periphery, but also the guarantor of class harmony, be displacing class conflict onto economic and territorial expansion. The closing of the westward expansion of the frontier symbolized expulsion from the material and spiritual Eden of the frontier myth and deposited the United States in a strife-ridden present that jeopardized individualism and freedom with class warfare.

In 1893 the United States hosted a major World’s Fair in Chicago that presented part of the solution to the crisis of the frontierless society, as Robert Rydell notes: "The fair . . . served as an exercise in educating the nation on the concept of progress as a willed national activity toward a determined, utopian goal."46

The concept of Progress promoted at the Exposition was intended to harness the advances of science and technology into an educational apparatus which would contain the fissures ripping open the social fabric of the United States. G. Brown Goode, the Smithsonian Institute representative appointed to organize the Exposition's educational function, noted the educational imperative in his "First Draft of a System of Classification for the World's Columbian Exposition," stating: "The exhibition of the future will be an exhibition of ideas rather than of objects, and nothing will be deemed worthy of admission to its halls which has not some living, inspiring thought behind it, and which is not capable of teaching some valuable lesson." The valuable lesson, in this instance, was "to formulate the Modern."  

Integral to Goode's conception of the Exposition was the centrality of the visual arts. According to Goode, museums in the nineteenth century United States were too few and their purpose was too ill-defined yet "[the museum was] . . . the most powerful and useful auxiliary of all systems of teaching by means of object lessons."  

47. Quoted in Rydell, p.45.
48. Rydell, p.47.
49. Rydell, pp.44-45.
Furthermore, Rydell notes:

The Museum of the past must be set aside, reconstructed, transformed from a cemetery of bric-a-brac into a nursery of living thoughts. The museum of the future must stand side by side with the library and the laboratory, as part of the teaching equipment of the college and university, and in the great cities cooperate with the public library as one of the principal agencies for the enlightenment of people.\(^5^0\)

Thus, education, science, culture, and literacy were to secure a path by which the gaps within society could be traversed.

This early formulation of the role of middlebrow culture as an instrument of social adjustment, education, and the instilling of civic virtue occurred at a time in the history of the United States when the gap between highbrow and lowbrow culture had become an immediate concern. The Columbian Exposition proposed a resolution to the conflict between high and low culture by splitting the Fair's exhibits into two distinct zones: the high cultural zone of the White City and the popular cultural zone of the midway. The elite loathing of popular culture, apparent at the 1876 Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, gave way to mere ambivalence in Chicago.\(^5^1\)

\(^5^0\) Consequently, the museums of the future must be "adapted to the needs of the mechanic, the factory operator, the day laborer, the salesman, and the clerk, as much as to those of the professional man and the man of leisure." (Rydell, p.45)

\(^5^1\) Rydell, p.237.
The creation of a separate zone for popular culture was a specific strategy to contain and educate the social class threatening the stability of the established order:

[The development of popular culture zones] into components of the expositions reflected the growing efforts by the upper classes, threatened by class conflict at every turn, to influence the content of popular culture. [The centrality of these zones] to American culture and to the efforts by American elites to establish their cultural hegemony is certain. World's fairs midways constituted "living proof" for the imperial calculations by exposition sponsors.52

Thus science, education, and culture were adapted by liberal elites to turn the concept of the frontier outward, to rationalize what had originally been an anti-imperial discourse into a new imperial worldview, and to contain the stresses building within by expanding outwards.

The relationship between the concept of the frontier and the containment of social contradictions within the United States was made unmistakably clear in a famous talk given by progressive historian Frederick Jackson Turner to a meeting of the American Historical Association held in conjunction with the 1893 Chicago Fair. The talk, entitled "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," alarmed the historians present in the audience with its claim that the frontier

52. Rydell, p.236.
had now drawn to a close with potentially disastrous consequences for the future. According to Turner, democracy and individualism were dependent on the frontier which, if they were to be preserved, required the continual expansion of the United States: "So long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power secures political power. But the democracy born of free land, strong in selfishness and individualism, intolerant of administrative experience and education, and pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds, has its dangers as well as its benefits." 53 The reactivation of the frontier myth by Schlesinger and Kennedy during the Cold War served a similar function. In the 1960s as in the 1890s, the United States required a powerful unifying myth to overcome internal social contradictions and rationalize


overseas expansion in the name of liberty and progress. In the 1964 New York World’s Fair as in the 1893 Chicago Exposition, liberty, progress and a middlebrow culture were mobilized in the form of the frontier myth to counter both real and imagined enemies.

In the 1890s, "American exceptionalism" required a renewal of frontier mythology. This renewal was available by overseas expansion. Naval theorist Alfred Mahan rationalized this extension of the frontier when he advocated the production of a Great White Fleet capable of transporting the utopian dreams of the White City at the Columbian Exposition around the world. New Frontier theorist Rostow noted that naval power was decisive to continuing the expansion of the frontier in the 1890s, thus providing a complex historical model for the relationship between new weapons technology and overseas domination. The Kennedy Administration successfully exploited a similar relationship in its alliance with the Air Force between 1958 and 1961 as well as in its promotion of the conquest of outer space as a metaphor for the New Frontier.54

54. The classic principles of naval strategy that Mahan developed in his geopolitical theory are summarized as follows:

(1) The balance of the world’s power lies in the landmass of Eurasia; and it is subject to unending competitive struggle among nation states.
(2) Although the balance of world power hinges
The progressive period of 1890 to 1920 to which Schlesinger referred provided the intellectual foundations for his re-evaluation of pragmatism and

on control of Eurasian land, the control over the sea approaches to Eurasia has been and can be a decisive factor, as the history of many nations, most notably Britain demonstrates.

(3) In the end, naval power consists in the ability to win and to hold total dominance at sea, which, in turn, requires a naval force in being capable of meeting and defeating any likely concentration of counterforce. A naval power must, therefore, maintain as a concentrated tactical unit at readiness an adequate fleet of capital ships with adequate underlying support.

(4) Support for such a force includes forward bases, coaling stations, a merchant fleet adequate for overseas supply, and, perhaps, certain territories whose friendship is assumed at a time of crisis. It follows, therefore, that a naval power should be prepared actively to develop an empire as well as substantial foreign trade and a pool of commercial shipping.

(5) The United States stood at a moment in its history and in its relation to the geography of world power when its full scale development as a naval power was urgent.

(6) The pursuit in times of peace of the prerequisites for naval power would have the following advantages: the challenge of commercial and imperial competition would maintain the vigor of the nation; acceptance of responsibility for Christianizing and modernizing the societies of native people within the empire would constitute a worthy and elevating moral exercise; and the whole enterprise would be commercially profitable. (Rostow, pp.21-22)

Mahanism, for Rostow, provided a moral, military and economic justifications for the retooling of the frontier concept so that it could successfully make the transition from internal to external domination. In 1898 the destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana harbour provided the political rationalization for the beginning of the Spanish-American War and the expansion of American power into the western Pacific and the Caribbean in the early twentieth century.
liberalism in the United States. However, the politics of Schlesinger's Vital Center derive from a selective interpretation of that period. Harmonizing the concept of the New Frontier with progressivism, liberalism, and pragmatism in the late 1950s required a sloughing off of many important concepts from the original development of pragmatic philosophy in the United States. An analysis of the legacy of the pragmatic tradition from the 1890s onwards is necessary to understand the origins of Schlesinger's very skewed construction which purged pragmatic theory of its radical elements in favour of a much more conservative interpretation.

The progressive era's shift from entrepreneurial to corporate capitalism inaugurated many efforts to negotiate a middle path between laissez-faire individualism and deterministic Marxism. Despairing of the effects of unrestricted capitalism upon the quality of life but suspicious of determinist and teleological conceptions of social progress, progressive era pragmatists developed a broad range of approaches to mediate the relationship of the individual to corporate capitalism. In general terms, however, these writers renounced social revolution for variations of democratic social reformism, deconstructed the dualistic bias of European philosophy, particularly of Kant and Hegel, and emphasized the unintended consequences of human action
which undermined utopian visions of social progress derived from Marx.

There was, however, broad disagreement among pragmatic thinkers about the extent of social progress that could realistically be expected from human actions; even individual philosophers were inconsistent in their treatment of this issue. In the 1880s, John Dewey, for example, utilized a Hegelian framework, with its attendant abstractions and teleological approach to history, that persisted in a subterranean way throughout his work, even after his repudiation of Hegel in the mid-1890s. This Hegelian residue provided him with an ongoing optimism about social progress and the potential for profound social democratic reform even while his pragmatism rejected such a teleological conception of progress. Other progressive liberals, such as Max Weber or Wilhelm Dilthey, were profoundly pessimistic about the long-term potential for social reform in the face of the increasing bureaucratization and rationalization of capitalist society.

The development of the progressive era and its attendant move away from European philosophical traditions towards a home-grown pragmatic philosophy coincided with the closing of the frontier. Dewey, for example, abandoned his reliance on Hegelian philosophical idealism one year before the Chicago Columbian
Exposition. However, while it is too easy to assume that the historical overlapping of these developments automatically indicts progressive and pragmatic approaches as variations of frontier ideology, Schlesinger's advocacy of the New Frontier as an umbrella term describing Vital Center pragmatic liberalism under Kennedy points to a purging from his thought of those aspects of the pragmatic tradition that would contradict the rationalizations by which the United States sought to justify outward expansion. The historian William Appleman Williams, however, makes the point that even if liberals and progressives such as Dewey and Charles Beard were opposed to imperialism, they were still entrapped within the conceptual framework of Turner's frontier thesis which, Williams argues, "made democracy a function of an expanding frontier."\(^{55}\) If progressives and liberals were determined to advance the spread of American democracy to the rest of the world, they were merely rationalizing the imperial implications of the frontier behind the veneer of individualism and freedom. Schlesinger made the conscious decision to adapt those elements of the progressive period that did not question the relationship of democracy with capitalism, specifically tailoring his philosophy of the Vital Center

---

within the alliance of those elements of the progressive and pragmatic traditions that were incorporated into the frontier myth. Schlesinger thus combined the remaining legacy of the progressive era into an alliance with Kennedy's conservative liberalism and the liberal Republicanism of New York State Governor Rockefeller.

In the 1962 "Introduction" to the re-publication of Vital Center, Schlesinger outlined the process of reconstruction that pragmatism, liberalism and progressivism had undergone in the intervening thirteen years. The day of monolithic Communism was definitely over:

History thus shows plainly that Communism is not the form of social organization toward which all societies are irresistibly evolving. Rather it is a phenomenon of the transition from stagnation to development, a "disease" (in Walt Rostow's phrase) of the modernization process. Democratic, regulated capitalism - the mixed economy - will be far more capable of coping with the long-term consequences of modernization.  

However, Schlesinger was also critical of the legacy of New Deal liberalism. The New Deal emphasized problems essentially "quantitative," focusing on the issues of production and consumption. Schlesinger, therefore, altered the major focus of liberalism under the New Deal and reoriented the qualitative concerns of

the earlier pragmatists to counter the rampant consumerism of the 1950s. In the early 1960s, Schlesinger thus described the change from quantitative to qualitative liberalism: "The impending shift from quantitative to qualitative liberalism emphasizes once again the hazards involved in the degeneration of liberalism into ideology. By tradition American liberalism is humane, experimental and pragmatic; it has no sense of messianic mission and no faith that all problems have final solutions." According to Schlesinger, qualitative liberalism focused on the proper balance between public and private enterprise: "The resulting improvements in opportunities in education, medical care, social welfare, community planning, culture and the arts will improve the chances for the individual to win his spiritual fulfillment." Within his conception of the New Frontier, the realization of American democracy and freedom was once again tied to the expanding frontier: an internal frontier of a qualitatively improved life under capitalism, an external frontier of Cold War conflict in the Third World and a symbolic exterior frontier in outer space. Securing these various frontiers was the objective of the New

57. Schlesinger, The Vital Center, xv.
58. Schlesinger, The Vital Center, xv.
Frontier. The external frontier was to be secured by the Air Force, NASA, and the exploitation of the missile gap. The internal frontier was to be secured through an alliance of government and corporate funding nurturing a pragmatic liberal conception of civic virtue in which the gap between elitist high culture and mass culture would be closed by the redefinition of the role of work, pleasure and leisure in the United States.

The missile gap helped to highlight the inadequacy of the Eisenhower Administration in coping with the shift to qualitative concerns. Now Schlesinger invoked the Spirit of the New Frontier, with the role of the new frontiersman being filled by the "Harvard educated Rhodes Scholars," scientists and intellectuals who were increasingly being drawn into the Kennedy Administration. The migration of these intellectuals from the periphery to the center corresponded to the enormous shift of national resources to the military industrial complex and its recruitment of scientists from the universities into massive aerospace corporations and related military industries.

59. Seymour Harris notes that of Kennedy's first two hundred appointments, nearly half came from backgrounds in government, whether politics or public service, 18% from universities and foundations and 6% from the business world; the figures for Eisenhower were 42% from business and 6% from universities and foundations. Cited in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.211.
Schlesinger unveiled the outline of his new formula for the interaction of culture, business, and government in an article entitled "Notes on a National Cultural Policy," published in the journal Daedalus in the spring of 1960. In this article, Schlesinger argued that reliance solely upon private initiative was tainted by its "impotence" to sustain the economic support necessary for a national cultural strategy. Schlesinger avoided, however, the massive government intervention of the New Deal by advocating a limited role for the Federal government in the arts with particular attention to Western European models of government support programs. Recognizing the historical opposition for such government support in the post-war period, Schlesinger recommended the formation of a Federal Advisory Council on the Arts to explore the avenues that would arrive at the delicate balance between qualitative and quantitative concerns. To repeat, pivotal to all these issues was a redefined individualism that invoked a new sense of civic virtue, an individualism whose relationship to the frontier was not dissimilar to that of the frontier mythology characteristic of "American exceptionalism" in the nineteenth century, but adapted to an urban context as opposed to a wilderness setting.

Schlesinger’s ongoing reconstruction of liberalism led to a growing convergence of liberal opinion between
Vital Center liberals and the liberal Republican establishment of Governor Rockefeller, Senator Javits, and New York Mayor John Lindsay. The growing consensus between these two groups on a variety of issues, including government support of the arts, was a result of their intense analysis of the Eisenhower Administration following the launch of Sputnik. The increasingly similar pragmatic liberal approaches to culture were formulated by intellectuals associated with the Rockefeller Brothers’ Fund and the Twentieth Century Fund, both financed by the Rockefeller family. These intellectuals developed a cultural strategy based on an increased level of public support for the arts that would supplement that of the private sector, creating a model that would usher in a new cultural renaissance.

In the immediate post-war period, government funding for the arts was only a remote possibility. Funding for cultural programs had to be arranged by private foundations or individuals: the Cold War effectively quashed hopes of a resurgence of government support for the arts as had existed in the New Deal because of the association of such support with Soviet-style state intervention in culture. On several occasions, the battle for government funding was fought by Republican representative Javits, who introduced bills advocating funding for the arts throughout the late 1940s and
1950s. In 1957, for example, he co-sponsored a bill calling for the formation of a federally funded arts foundation with grant-making ability modelled after the British and Canadian Arts Councils. In each instance, the proposed legislation was defeated, but the need for government support of the arts was perceived by Javits, John and Nelson Rockefeller, and even Henry Luce as a natural addition to the economic, scientific and military superiority of the United States in the Cold War. The launching of Sputnik provided an urgent impetus to mobilizing the cultural sector more effectively than private sources had previously been able to do. In April

61. Javits was one of Cold Warrior George Dondero’s most ardent opponents on arts issues. In 1949, in response to Dondero’s art treatise "Modern Art Shackled to Communism," he stated, "In seeking to descredit modern art by its wholesale condemnation as communistic my colleague -- I am sure unwittingly -- falls into the trap of the same propagandistic device the influence of which we have all decried in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, for it is condemnation by class and broad-scale labeling without individual evaluation and, beyond everything else, without a patient confidence in the ultimate judgement of our people and their capability for discerning the good from the evil, the artistic from the propagandistic and the true from the false." Cited in Elaine King, Pluralism in the Visual Arts in the United States 1965–1978: The National Endowment for the Arts, an Influential Force. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1986, pp.45-46.
1959, one month after introducing the Defence Appropriations Bill in Congress, Javits noted the importance of culture in waging the Cold War:

Our political institutions, our individual freedoms and our way of life serve as examples, even as an inspiration, to the peoples of the world. We have expended untold toil and countless billions to give our nation this stature to preserve it. Yet in this tremendous progress, one vital element of our national character has been left to struggle with little public effort and assistance to aid it. The cultural heritage of America -- one of the great building forces holding together and enhancing our varied national life -- has been relegated to a lesser role in the pageant of America.\(^62\)

In response to criticisms of his "long pull" strategy and his lack of legislative action on the arts, President Eisenhower organized a Presidential Commission on National Goals. However, the resulting Report on National Goals did little to alleviate the public's anxiety and was easily surpassed by the rival Rockefeller Brothers' Report Prospects for America, a liberal Republican critique of the Eisenhower Administration and its legacy in the form of presidential hopeful Nixon. Furthermore, in countering this criticism, the Eisenhower Administration was handicapped by its lack of direct experience with cultural issues. Thus, Eisenhower had little option but to appoint a knowledgeable and high

62. Quoted in King, p.51.
profile cultural adviser from Rockefeller's experienced team to lead the Presidential Commission's investigation of culture: the pragmatic liberal August Heckscher, Jr., Director of the Twentieth Century Fund and cultural adviser to Nelson Rockefeller. Not surprisingly, in his new role, Heckscher would promote the Rockefeller cultural program while indirectly critiquing the cultural policies of the Eisenhower Administration.

A vital component of the Report on National Goals was Heckscher's essay "The Quality of American Culture," a brief summary of the Vital Center critique of the Eisenhower Administration from a liberal Republican perspective. The essay opens with a comparative analysis of "Material and Cultural Progress," contrasting the wealth and leisure of the modern United States with the nation's cultural evolution. To Heckscher, the pattern was clear: while the overall material progress of the United States had prospered, culture had lagged behind. Heckscher did not question that some individual artists had been successful but he did not mention any such individual artists by name. Although both Heckscher and Rockefeller were advocates of abstract expressionism, the gap between the huge new middle class of the post-war era and the cultural productions of these few artistic
individuals had increased not decreased, giving "cause for serious uneasiness." Heckscher concluded that the United States had yet "to prove that it [could] nourish and sustain a rich cultural life...

As the incomes of the people have risen, a proportionate share has not been devoted to intellectual and artistic pursuits." In the post-Sputnik environment of national insecurity, Heckscher delivered the following critique:

As leisure has increased, so has the amount of time given to unproductive and often aimless activities. Many of these leisure-time activities may properly be called recreational; too few can be judged to hold real meaning in the lives of individuals or of the community.

Amid concern for what the citizen does under conditions of modern industrialism, there is at a deeper level concern for what he is. The general advance in well-being seems to have


At the time of the writing the report, Heckscher was the Director of the Rockefeller-funded Twentieth Century Fund as well as a member of the Art Commission of the City of New York, and Chairman of the Board of the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art. Heckscher’s father was also a close colleague of Nelson Rockefeller and a friend of the Rockefeller family in the 1930s. Both Heckscher Sr. and Rockefeller were allies against Robert Moses, the most powerful figure in the history of New York city planning and organizer of the 1939 World’s Fair in New York. This conflict, central to defining the ongoing relevance of the New Deal to the 1950s and 1960s, would culminate in the conflict between the allied families of Rockefeller and Heckscher with Robert Moses over the organization of the 1964 World’s Fair in New York City.
brought with it a lessening of moral intensity and a readiness to indulge in secondhand experience. The ethic of the contemporary economic system emphasizes consumption, with "happiness" and "comfort" as the objectives to be sought. The end product seems to be a great mass prepared to listen long hours to the worst of TV or radio and to make our newsstands -- with their diet of mediocrity -- what they are.

The state of the arts in a society may be judged, among other things, by the beauty of its public monuments, the scale and fitness and the ease of human contacts provided by the squares and streets of its cities, the pleasantness of its country landscape. A people caring about dignity and excellence in its private lives may be expected to care about the embodiment of these qualities in the public environment. The American scene today is not reassuring in this regard. 64

In such a cultural environment, Heckscher disparaged those intellectuals who were critical of mass culture while only offering in its place a reliance on a elitist defense of modernist practices. 65 Thus, in Heckscher's arguments, military preparedness and the governmental subsidy of culture were depicted as equal partners in promoting the security of the United States; the missile gap and the culture gap were now seen as interrelated. The production of America's nuclear arsenal and the backbone of national security lay in the expanding suburbs, the home of a predominantly mass culture.

64. Heckscher, "The Quality of American Culture," p.127. This text was the co-operative result of a panel of participants who included Alfred Kazin, free-lance writer and author; Leo C. Rosten, editorial adviser to Look magazine; and Aline Saarinen, art critic for the New York Times.
Schlesinger's depiction of the crisis of masculinity and its relationship to the homogenizing effects of mass culture received its most cogent expression in Heckscher's analysis. Mass culture and the undisciplined use of leisure time combined to cross the boundary between private and public life, weakening the potency of both and ultimately jeopardizing the security of the United States.

As Heckscher noted, the gap between the individual artist and society had widened intolerably, threatening the whole of society with a culture that promoted senseless play and leisure, a culture "less contemplative and more keyed to more material ends," ultimately

64. Heckscher wrote in the New York Times Magazine on the tendency of some critics to attack mass culture:

The fashion has been to decry 'mass culture.' Indeed the temptation to do so recurs almost every time we sit for any length of time before a television set or subject ourselves to the kind of vulgarity spawned by the 'gray areas' of the modern city. It is not original and authentic ugliness which is most distressing in these encounters. It is not absolute badness of taste or style, but the sense that something potentially good has been corrupted and weakened. The inevitable question arises whether excellence can be transmitted to a vast population without debasing it. From that sobering question critics of modern culture have gone on to indict nearly everything that is being done, or could be done, to develop the arts in a highly industrialized society.


undermining the will of the country to resist more
disciplined societies such as the Soviet Union. Leisure
had lost its earlier aristocratic meaning, subsumed by a
radical transformation of time under industrial
capitalism. In Heckscher's view, "[The] machine [of
industrial capitalism] sets its own rhythm and exacts its
price in terms of sensibilities blunted and energies
drained."^67

Heckscher's solution was not to rely solely on the
success of the avant-garde to keep culture moving; such a
strategy would merely marginalize those artists in much
the same way scientists had become marginalized before
the launch of Sputnik. The key was to move these
individuals from the periphery to the center of national

The spread of a debased form of leisure, the
mechanization of time, and the impulse to consume mass
culture thus combined to alter the quality of life under
capitalism:

... time in the modern world tends to
be increasingly harried and gadget-ridden.
Free time becomes the occasion, not so much for
depthly felt human relationships and the
experience of intellectual rewards, as for
efforts to escape from boredom and for a
seemingly endless pursuit of trivial
distractions. Leisure, which should be the
seed-bed of the arts, the source both of
creation and enjoyment, too often becomes a
round of activities undertaken as a result of
disguised or overt pressure and for ends which
appear to have less and less to do with
enrichment either of the individual or of
society.
concern not merely by valorizing a few individuals but by advocating the development of a culture in which the gap between work and culture was filled by a meaningful concept of leisure. For Heckscher, this meant advocating a pluralistic approach towards culture that preserved the elite role of high art while at the same time encouraging a greater interaction of high art with more popular art forms so as to raise the overall level of cultural literacy in the United States:

Valid forms attuned to the requirements, like those springing from the industrial machine, may well be evolving under the very eye of those who discount mass culture as necessarily degraded and second-rate efforts. The movies, often in their less pretentious forms, can be examples of popular art at its best; a form of expression freshly created out of fresh needs, for an audience as broad as the community itself. Whether television has evolved, or is evolving, as a comparable art form is more difficult to say. But the opportunity exists for creative innovation, as it does in popular music and the musical theatre. The very rootlessness and restlessness of American life, its changefulness and diversity, may shape a culture admittedly different from anything known before, yet like folk art in being popular without being degraded.68

Heckscher's defence of aspects of popular culture was combined with his desire to preserve the "Creative Few," those who create the culture by which a civilization achieves ultimate distinction.69 Achieving


Heckscher lists four points as essential for a society to
maintain its cultural health:

1. Art is for professionals. Its practice requires training, discipline and the most unflagging dedication. Nothing is more appealing in the United States today than the enthusiasm with which do-it-yourself culture is followed by the people. The activities of Sunday painters, amateur actors, weavers, wood-workers, musicians, etc. -- all have their value. They are part of that constructive use of leisure of which we spoke earlier. But they do not attain, except in the most professional, the level of true art. The line between the professional and the amateur, between the artist and the audience, is one which any first-rate culture must maintain.

2. Art is not self-evident nor of necessity immediately enjoyable. It requires in the spectator an effort of the spirit and of the mind, sufficient to put himself in harmony with a vision other than his own. Americans have grown accustomed to say that they know what they like. We have had dinned into us that the customer is always right. These attitudes may be adequate for the consumer of mass-produced merchandise; they have very little to do with the person capable of appreciating art in any of its subtle forms.

3. Art is not a matter of numbers. The museum in our contemporary society may find it necessary for economic reasons to cater to a wide public. They may find it tempting and attractive to engage in various educational activities. Insofar as they do these things they may be community centers or educational institutions, both of which we would be poorer without. But to the large degree that they perform such services they are not concerned with art in the sense in which we have been speaking of it. Numbers and popularity are not related to this kind of art; indeed the preservation of excellence and the setting of ultimate standards may be incompatible with efforts to broaden public appreciation.

4. Art is not self-expression. Just as art cannot be understood without effort, so it cannot be created without travail. It lives by laws of its own, laws not always easy to communicate or to understand. But the true artist in any field is bound by these laws and is responsible for keeping them by a strict inner discipline. This is as true of the most abstract or experimental art as of
such a level of "ultimate distinction" required the limited intervention of government support for the arts on the federal, state and local levels along with increasing support from the private sector. Heckscher echoed Schlesinger's call for an emphasis on the qualitative aspects of culture over the quantitative when he concluded his article: "The ultimate dedication to our way of life will be won not on the basis of economic satisfactions alone, but on the basis of an inward quality and ideal." 70

Another Research Director of the Twentieth Century Fund who worked with Heckscher to formulate a liberal arts constituency and a new role for culture in the Kennedy era was Sebastian de Grazia, whose book Of Time, Work and Leisure was published by the Fund in 1962. The book in part examines the differences in the concepts of work and play in capitalist society and analyses the consequences for leisure. De Grazia notes that as consumerist society gained momentum in the 1950s, the concepts of leisure and play became conflated while the concepts of work and play became increasingly estranged. De Grazia's text emphasizes the virtues of an elevated concept of leisure, a synthesis of work and play achieved objective and traditional art. Above all, art is its own end, and has nothing to do with therapy or emotional release. (pp.135-136)

through the combined efforts of education and government-supported culture.

De Grazia employed the historical analogy of the Spartan Empire to illustrate the dangers of the separation of work and play in the modern United States and to argue for the value of an integrated concept of leisure, making extensive use of Schlesinger's comparison of the crisis of masculinity to the state of culture. Sparta, successful at war, was a society with clearly defined gender roles: the male warrior waged war away from home while the female remained isolated in the domestic sphere with "no education in self control." Thus the Spartan female resorted to a life of "license and luxury." Echoing the concerns of Schlesinger and Heckscher, the parallels with the Eisenhower era of the 1950s are evident in De Grazia's description of the decline of the Spartan Empire as being characterized by "...the growth of luxuriousness, avarice, maldistribution of property, shortage of warriors, and a female population that in war caused more confusion than the enemy."  

Thus, according to De Grazia, the greatest challenge for an Empire was managing periods of peace so that

collapse did not result from affluence and a corresponding decadence. The task was a matter of educating citizens to remain disciplined and actively engaged in society to forestall the possible ill effects of prosperity. Leisure was the key by which work and play could be bound together and, De Grazia concluded as did Heckscher and Schlesinger, a pluralistic democratic and decentralized culture was the most effective vehicle for perpetuating the strength of the United States at home and abroad. The potentially harmful effects of massification, which to a large extent motivated the modernist avant-garde, would be overcome by raising the overall educational standards of the populace through the medium of a more disciplined, work-oriented conception of leisure. Therefore, government support of the arts as a reworked synthesis of work and play became a lynchpin for the New Frontier strategy of deploying a reoriented concept of leisure as the social glue of Imperial America.

The frustration of politicians such as Javits who advocated more active government support for the arts but who could not pass arts legislation in the American Congress led to the formation of more modest examples of state funding for the arts to bypass the political log-jam on the federal level. Upon being elected governor
of New York State in 1958, Rockefeller was able to promote the concept of government funding as a state model for an ultimate federal program, drawing upon the recommendations of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund Report and the Twentieth Century Fund.

In 1961 Rockefeller pushed through the New York legislature his proposal for a State Council of the Arts, modelled in part on the British and the Canadian Arts Councils. His intention was to promote the pragmatic liberal cultural model that emphasized a democratizing

73. In 1958 Congress approved the building of a National Cultural Center in Washington D.C., but it would have to be built with private funds. While Rockefeller and Javits felt this was a step in the right direction, without actual governmental financial aid, it was still largely a symbolic gesture.

74. The key elements of Rockefeller's pragmatic liberalism were: "the conviction that all problems can be solved, a belief that activist big government is necessary for solving societal problems, a belief that the executive branch of government has the key responsibility for leading the attack on public problems, a belief in the efficacy of joint efforts between the public and private sectors in solving societal problems, and a belief in an executive's outflanking public and legislative resistance in order to achieve what one perceives to be in the best interests of society." (James E. Underwood and William J. Daniels, Governor Rockefeller in New York: The Apex of Pragmatic Liberalism in the U.S. (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), p.252)

The idea for a state arts council was part of a proposal that originated in the 1957 gubernatorial campaign. While the original budget proposal in 1961 was quite modest, one year after the establishment of the NYSCA that budget expanded by 900% to $450,000 and by 1965 had reached $562,000. By 1976 the figure had risen to $35,653,000. For additional information on the funding of the NYCSA, see Dick Netzer, The Subsidized Muse (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.80.
of American high culture through a co-operative partnership of government and private support. The barriers between a dynamic concept of leisure for the whole society embodied by the culture gap could be overcome, as Rockefeller noted:

   The arts are not for the few -- they are for the many, for the people as a whole. This is the central fact and the essence of the strength of the arts in a democratic society. The values of art are universal. Everyone can feel the impact of cultural experiences once his eyes and ears have been opened and his mind sensitized. There is no reason why anyone in our society should be denied the opportunity for the same experiences, the spiritual exhilaration that the arts can offer.\textsuperscript{75}

Initially funded for a modest $50,000, the New York State Arts Council (NYSCA) provided a working model of a government-supported arts agency that successfully negotiated the previous hands-off approach to the arts while avoiding the kind of public support that had existed in the days of the New Deal Works Projects Administration. In order to promote the understanding of the arts throughout the state, the NYSCA also sought to distribute its funding on a geographically equitable basis. This meant an emphasis on regional centers for

the arts, with the Lincoln Center for the Arts as the model, and yet de-emphasizing New York City as a center with its culturally elitist garrison mentality.

The centerpiece of Rockefeller's cultural program was the Lincoln Center, a multi-purpose facility that demonstrated the aggressive activism of liberals in addressing the role of culture in society. (figure 5) The area of the proposed center was a run-down part of New York City formerly used as the setting for the film version of *West Side Story*, a musical based on the lives of the Puerto Rican inhabitants of the area. Constructing the center in that location symbolized the benefits of the arts to America's inner cities as well as the will of the state government in aggressively dealing with the social inequities of urban life. The architect of the United Nations building -- Wallace Harrison, a longtime friend and architect for the Rockefeller family -- was commissioned to oversee the project. Harrison had previously served on the Board of Trustees of the Museum of Modern Art as well as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Study Group, headed by Henry Kissinger. (figure 6)

The intent of the Lincoln Center was, according to its President William Schuman, to embody an idea "rooted in the belief that the role of the arts is to give more than pleasure; that music, drama and dance provide
enrichment beyond understanding -- encounters with qualities of perfection, nobility and splendor which engage the heart, the spirit, the intellect." 76 To realize this lofty intent, the Lincoln Center was conceptualized as a regional arts center, providing a new model of cultural interaction in the community outside of the older forms of art patronage. The ever-present threat of the Cold War meant that this edifice to the freedom of expression was promoted as apolitical, much as abstract expressionism had been promoted by Cold War liberals, in order to provide an effective contrast between the freedom of the artist in the United States and the heavily state-financed cultural apparatus of the Soviet Union. Of the total capital expenditures on the Center, approximately $40 million was to derive from the public sector while the remaining amount of $102 million was to be raised by the private sector. 77

The regional focus of the Lincoln Arts Center was an


77. By 1962 over $74 million had been raised from the private sector. For information on the funding of the Lincoln Center as well as its projected role in the society, see the 1962 volume of the journal Arts in Society, especially the article by Edgar B. Young, the Executive Vice-President of the Lincoln Center.
important aspect of the overall pragmatic liberal cultural agenda, as explained by Max Kaplan, Director of the Arts Center at Boston University:

Our concept of a regional arts center must grow out of perspectives from the past, analyses of the present, and hopes for the future. "Regional" suggests that we deal with history, space, time; "art" bids us to define its values and uniqueness for these conditions, and the term "center" implies a statement of function for a new kind of institution.78

The Center was projected as the performing arts extension to the New York World’s Fair: the New York State Theatre, an integral component of the Lincoln Center complex, actually opened concurrently with the Fair. Both the Lincoln Center and the World’s Fair affirmed the cultural project of the New Frontier.

In this same article, when discussing the relationship between elite and popular art, Kaplan argued that a middle path must be found between the conservative Republican Barry Goldwater’s opposition to federal funding of arts programs and the remnants of a past Golden Age of state support for the arts in the New Deal. According to Kaplan, the crucial function for a regional


arts center was:

... to affirm an aesthetic, democratic value in the right and possibility of every man emerging from what one writer calls the "waist-high culture" to the culture of the fine eye, ear, heart, spirit, and mind. It must supplement a sociological premise that every man has a history with the philosophical premise that every man has an essence. The Center must become an institution in which a synthesis even more than an accommodation is sought between excellence and affluence. By mediating between the individual and the community, the business sector and public institutions, the artist and the public, the center and the periphery, and between notions of art as pure entertainment or as elitist high culture, the Lincoln Center was the epitome of the pragmatic liberal cultural strategy. By the time construction of the Lincoln Center had finished, over sixty arts centers were being constructed across America, supplementing a growing number of arts councils that followed the example of Rockefeller's NYSCA.

John F. Kennedy's election campaign was slowly built along the lines of a New Frontier that utilized culture as a key method of neutralizing the contradictions within

society that undermined America's ability to fight the Cold War. Initially, in his campaign, the actual relationship of the arts to government support was vague, but the symbolic role of culture was integral to the use of frontier imagery as was made clear in an article written by Kennedy in 1960:

If the government must not interfere it can give a lead. There is a connection, hard to explain logically but easy to feel, between achievement in public life and progress in arts. The age of Pericles was also the age of Phidias. The age of Lorenzo de Medici was also the age of Leonardo da Vinci. The age of Elizabeth also the age of Shakespeare. And the New Frontier for which I campaign in public life, can also be a New Frontier for American Art.

For what I decree is a lift for our country: a surge of economic growth; a burst of activity in rebuilding and cleansing our cities; a breakthrough of the barriers of racial and religious discrimination; an Age of Discovery in science and space; and an openness toward what is new that will banish the suspicion and misgiving that have tarnished our prestige abroad. I foresee, in short, an America that is moving once again.

And in harmony with that creative burst, there is bound to come the New Frontier in the Arts. For we stand, I believe, on the verge of a period of sustained cultural brilliance. 80

With Kennedy's election, the change in emphasis regarding the role of culture in the New Frontier was visibly demonstrated by the presence of 155 "frontiersmen" in the arts and sciences at the

Presidential Inauguration. Writers such as Hemingway, Faulkner, and Steinbeck, playwrights such as Arthur Miller, Thornton Wilder, and Tennessee Williams, artists such as Alexander Calder, Stuart Davis, Mark Rothko and Edward Hopper, and composers such as Hindemith, Stravinsky, and Bernstein were issued written invitations which stated: "During our forthcoming Administration we hope to seek a productive relationship with our writers, artists, composers, philosophers, scientists and heads of cultural institutions."\(^81\) A new "Golden Age" was beginning, proclaimed poet Robert Frost at the inauguration. The contrast between the cultural attitudes of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations was noted by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. who stated in a speech to the American Federation of Arts in 1962 that "In the Executive Mansion, where Fred Waring and his Pennsylvanians once played, we now find Isaac Stern, Pablo Casals, Stravinsky, and the Oxford players."\(^82\)

The formative stages of Kennedy's cultural policy began in December 1961 when Heckscher was invited to Washington to formulate the cultural strategy of the New Frontier. His appointment to the White House staff was characteristic of the reliance of the Kennedy

\(^81\) Quoted in Larson, p.151.

\(^82\) Quoted in Larson, p.151.
Administration on the more pragmatic "hard intellectuals" that had worked on the Rockefeller Brothers' Reports critiquing the Eisenhower Administration.

While intellectuals were moving from the periphery of state power to positions of influence within the White House, these intellectuals were not the soft progressives of the New Deal. Idealists were shunted aside on the road to the White House in favour of hard-nosed liberals, many of whom had served on the Rockefeller Commissions. When Schlesinger and economist John Kenneth Galbraith switched their allegiances to Kennedy from Stevenson in 1960, the transition from New Deal "soft progressives" to New Frontier pragmatism was complete. The appointment of Dean Rusk, a member of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, as Secretary of State instead of Kennedy's Democratic presidential rival Adlai Stevenson was the most powerful indication of this philosophical shift within the Democratic party after 1960. In particular, Heckscher's appointment to the White House meant that the main architect for the cultural policy for the New Frontier would come from the liberal Republican camp of Rockefeller and not from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.

Between Heckscher's appointment to the White House

83. Both Galbraith and Schlesinger had supported Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956.

Heckscher's diagnosis of the ills of society followed Schlesinger's schema: Americans had over-emphasized the quantitative aspects of material life at the expense of the qualitative. The central issues of society rested not on material well-being but on the dangers of boredom, loneliness, and alienation which threatened to tear apart the fabric of post-war society. The individual citizen, according to Heckscher, was experiencing the loss of his or her own individuality, becoming "an abstraction in the midst of meaningless change and activity."84 Such a loss of individuality symbolized the loss of will to overcome the contradictions in the United States, whether in terms of the functioning of the military-industrial complex and the existence of a missile gap, a culture gap, or a gender gap, each capable of threatening national security and well-being. The spread of the suburban middle-class lifestyle and value system was, for Heckscher, the greatest challenge to the supremacy of the United States:

The danger today is that this comfortable middle realm will prevail over everything else in the social order, swallowing up the private man and the public man alike and making way for the great mass that in the end dominates all. Then everyone will have become so well adjusted to everyone else that no one can any longer be a person in the old sense. Compromise and conformity will have been so far developed that there remain no valid issues worth compromising and nothing to conform to except a vague and general standard of mass morality. Unless there are countervailing forces drawing men strongly toward privacy on the one hand, and toward a meaningful political life on the other, the social sphere comes to be taken as an end in itself. Unless there are a few antisocial people, all is lost.\(^5\)

Consensus and conformity under Eisenhower were responsible for taking the United States to the brink of the decline of the empire, but thanks to the antisocial presence of the abstract expressionists and the Beatniks, a breathing space for individualism had been preserved. But Heckscher proposed an inclusive conception of culture that promoted the contradictory aspects of individuality on the antisocial margins within the sphere of middle-class life, transcending the rigid separation of the public and private life while not collapsing both realms into one homogeneous mass. Heckscher argued that this dynamic interplay between the public and private sphere of suburban middle-class life promoted the revitalized mythology of frontier individualism for the urbanized context of postwar America: "Only then can we hope to

lift ourselves out of the yawning pit which reduces all values to communal values, and loses both the citizen and the person in the mass man."\textsuperscript{86}

Within Heckscher's schema, the arts were a key link in remotivating civic virtue and achieving public happiness. As Heckscher readily admitted, this implied an intimate link between art and politics that avoided overt propagandizing or isolation within a formalist ivory tower. High culture and popular culture were to engage in a dynamic dialogue, characteristic of the great civilizations of Greece, Rome and the Italian Renaissance, that would provide a concept of creative leisure, keeping work and play in a dynamic tension, animating the individual out of his or her boredom.

Heckscher's pragmatic liberal aesthetic emphasized a playful, ironic and detached approach to art in order to pursue the objective of a dynamic civic culture. He was sympathetic to the frontiersman approach of the modernist avant-garde, the antisocial individuals who preserve a fragment of self-expression during the darkest moments, but his civic-minded pragmatism required that an active civic culture must press beyond the defensive positions of the avant-garde and the anti-ironic position of the formalists if a cultural renaissance in the United States

\textsuperscript{86} Heckscher, \textit{Public Happiness}, p.58.
were to be achieved without diluting its complexity:

Now this style of art, though it seems at first "difficult" and is frequently obscure, is in many ways closer to the people than what is on the surface more comprehensible and familiar. Indeed I would go so far as to say, directly contradicting Ortega, [Ortega Y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher and modernist] that such art -- which is essentially "modern" art -- is popular by necessity and fate. For it is the essence of the dramatic and satirical style that it does not exclude anything; it takes in all aspects of life, not moralizing about them but setting them forth in their own light. 87

Heckscher outlined a concept of culture that was to a degree dialogical but which always remained within the limitations of enhancing the life of the citizen within the New Frontier, a defensive and offensive mechanism capable of preserving the expanding frontier of the concept of freedom and forestalling the decline of previous empires such as Rome. The pessimism of

87. Heckscher, Public Happiness, p.255. The pragmatic approach of Heckscher neatly grafts a dialogical approach to culture into a defense of the New Frontier:

The spiritual and the sensual, the serious and the ludicrous, the elevated and the base, could find themselves neighbours in Shakespeare or Donne. The language of the street and the most divine poetry went side by side, their incongruity being on the surface, while they carried the hint that in some higher judgement they could be reconciled as essential aspects of man's nature and of the world. Puns and quips played their part, for they intensified the feeling that opposites were never quite as opposed as they appeared; they suggested in unexpected ways that verbal similarities reflect a deeper harmony, even when "common sense" had decreed that they were unrelated. (p.255)
pragmatic liberals about the idealism of socialist or progressive theory was cleverly camouflaged behind the optimism of piecemeal social reform secured by the dynamism of a revitalized frontier.

Pragmatic liberal advocates of government support of the arts continued, however, to be stymied in their efforts to pass legislation authorizing the establishment of a federal arts agency. In 1962, three separate bills promoting federal involvement in the arts "[in order] to disseminate the arts to the provinces" were introduced by Hubert Humphrey, Joe Clark and Jacob Javits: each was in turn defeated by a skeptical Congress. On May 28, 1963, Heckscher's Report to the President, "The Arts And The National Government," was released, providing the foundation for a concerted implementation of a federal cultural policy originating out of the Presidential office with a consequently greater profile and enhanced chance being passed by Congress.

Heckscher's primary recommendation in the Report was to establish an Advisory Council on the Arts as a preliminary stage in establishing more far-reaching federal support. Heckscher was laying the groundwork for a nationwide arts foundation that would solidify the liberal cultural agenda of Rockefeller and Kennedy.

88. King, p.54.
Although it was never authorized by Congress, the Advisory Council indicated official presidential sanctioning of federal involvement in the arts.

Heckscher's blueprint for a federal role in arts support highlighted the contradictory nature of pragmatic liberal philosophy in the Kennedy era. Great care was taken to downplay the extent and role of the government's involvement while the private sector was still expected to carry the main burden of cultural patronage, as Heckscher clearly explained: "Although government's role in the arts must always remain peripheral, with individual creativity and private support being central, that is no reason why the things which the government can properly do in this field should not be done confidently and expertly." 89 While deemphasizing the role of the federal government, Heckscher's advocacy of a national arts foundation represented a significant shift in the structuring of American culture. By dispensing federal funds to aid in the establishment of arts councils across the United States, Washington D.C.'s National Cultural Center would become the national model "promoting

cultural diversity, innovation, and excellence."^90

The modest role of the federal government belied the sweeping changes envisaged earlier in Heckscher's report in the section entitled "Impact on the Cultural Environment," a capsule summary of the thrust of pragmatic liberal philosophy. Social contradictions were to be grasped in their totality, not approached in a piecemeal fashion, by fashioning new federal-urban alliances linking private and public participation in national problem solving. The pragmatic liberal cultural program was to become a model of profound social change that would marginalize adherents to older forms of laissez-faire capitalism or socialism:

The scale upon which modern Government acts makes it vital that this responsibility to the total environment be acknowledged. The constant tendency is to think only of the immediate task, forgetting the wider implications of governmental action. The economics of roadbuilding too often threaten to run highways across historic towns, park lands, or even across a college campus. The urgency of slum clearance often means that a wrecking crew destroys in the process a humanly scaled and intricately woven community life . . .

The Renaissance state has been referred to as "work of art." Today the whole environment, the landscape and the cityscape, should be looked on as potentially a work of art -- perhaps man's largest and most noble work. The power to destroy provided by modern organization and machinery is also, if it is wisely used, an unprecedented power to create. To create humanely in the service of man's highest needs is a supreme task of modern

---

90. Colby, p.106.
statesmanship.91

In response to Heckscher's report, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 11112 on June 12, 1963, announcing the establishment of the President's Advisory Council on the Arts.92 The President's statement (drafted by

91. Quoted in Colby, pp.98-99. Heckscher's references to the ravages of roadbuilding are in part a critique of the Baron Haussmann of New York City, Robert Moses, whose extensive promotion of freeways in and around New York City was a constant irritation to Heckscher and his father. Ironically, both the construction of the Lincoln Center and the building of the State Capital complex in Albany, promoted by Nelson Rockefeller, required the extensive demolition of slums composed of the tightly interwoven communities which pragmatic liberalism purportedly sought to benefit. In the specific case of the state capital complex, over 7,000 units of low rental housing were bulldozed.

92. Kennedy opened his statement on the Council as follows:

Establishment of an Advisory Council on the Arts has long seemed a natural step in fulfilling the Government's responsibility to the arts. I acknowledge the support of members of the Congress in both Houses for this measure. I am hopeful that the Congress will give the Council a statutory base, but, meanwhile, the setting up of the Council by Executive action seems timely and advisable.

Accordingly, I am establishing the President's Advisory on the Arts within the executive office, to be composed of heads of Federal departments and agencies concerned with the arts and thirty private citizens who have played a prominent part in the arts. Private members will be drawn from civic and cultural leaders and others who are engaged professionally in some phase of the arts such as practicing artists, museum directors, producers, managers, and union leaders. An executive order is being issued today defining the scope and structure of the Council, and I
Heckscher\textsuperscript{93} made extensive use of the arguments that had been developed by pragmatic liberal intellectuals rationalizing the strategic importance of Federal involvement in the arts. As historian Gary Larson observes, the President cited the following pragmatic arguments in support of culture:

[Culture provides] opportunities for arts training and participation of the young; emerging forms and institutions, including the growing number of state arts councils; the impact of government operations on the arts, including tax and copyright laws, public works, housing, and urban renewal; public recognition of excellence in the arts, including prizes, competitions, festivals, tours, and exhibitions; and the implications of the national cultural scene for the cultural exchange projects.\textsuperscript{94}

Unlike the earlier debates on the question of Federal funding for the arts prior to 1960, supporters of government aid for the arts could point to both

shall shortly announce the names of those private citizens I am asking to serve.

The creation of this Council means that for the first time the arts will have some formal Government body which will be specifically concerned with all aspects of the arts and to which the artist and the arts institutions can present their views and bring their problems.

Quoted in Colby, pp.106-107

For a in-depth discussion of the political skirmishing around the issue of Federal support for the arts see Fannie Taylor and Anthony L. Barresi, \textit{The Arts at a New Frontier} (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1984), especially chapter two.

\textbf{93.} Larson, p.178.

\textbf{94.} Larson, p.179.
presidential backing and the visible success of the various pilot projects in cultural funding inaugurated by Rockefeller in his term as governor of New York State since 1958. Now for the first time, backers of government funding for the arts could take advantage of the combined Democratic and Republican support for a program of Federal aid for the arts, enabling the arts bill to pass through Congress successfully. On August 20, 1964, the arts bill came before the House of Representatives and passed by a vote of 213 to 135, with many of the Republicans loyal to Rockefeller supporting the Democratic bill. Passed by the Senate the following day, the arts bill paved the way for the establishment of a National Foundation on the Arts which would finally put into place the machinery necessary to realize the cultural agenda of pragmatic liberalism.95

While the battle over the Federal role in arts

95. Representative William Ryan (Democrat-New York) noted the similarities between the role of arts legislation within Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society:

Legislation to encourage the arts and humanities is vital in working toward that improved quality of life that is the essence of the Great Society . . . We all can remember how dear this subject was to President Kennedy. As a monument to him -- and as an expression of this body's concern with the future of our national culture, we should quickly enact this bill into law.
Quoted in King, p.59
support was being fought in Congress in the early to mid-1960s, planning and construction were underway for the New York World's Fair that was set to open on May 1, 1964 in conjunction with the opening of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts. Both were cornerstones of the liberal cultural agenda essential to Democratic and liberal Republican hopes within the northeastern establishment to defeat Barry Goldwater in the 1964 federal election.

The troubled history of the 1964 World's Fair in New York is a clear indication of the fractured political environment within which the pragmatic liberalism of Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson had to function. While it was the newly emerging political force in the United States, the liberal program was still opposed by both the vestiges of a New Deal form of urban politics and by the increasing strength of a resurgent right wing. The former "new Deal" political position was embodied by Robert Moses (figure 7), who had been the powerful New York City representative in the 1939 New York World's Fair Corporation. In 1964, Moses was Director of the Lincoln Center, New York City Parks Commissioner, President of the 1964 New York World's Fair

---

96. Especially after the economic interests of California were jeopardized by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara's efforts to curtail the power of the Air Force.
Corporation, and arch-rival of New York Governor Rockefeller. Largely because of Moses' opposing vision, although it still demonstrated the influence of the New Frontier, the 1964 World's Fair failed to delineate clearly the new political and cultural values of the liberals.

Built on the site of the 1939 New York World's Fair at Flushing Meadows, New York, the 1964 fair was intended to be a showcase of the New Frontier liberalism forged in the late 50s and early 1960s. At the ground-breaking ceremonies held in 1962, Kennedy declared:

This is going to be a chance for us in 1964 to show 70 million visitors -- not only our countrymen here in the United States but people from all over the world -- what kind of people we have. What our people are like and what we have done with our people. And what has gone on in the past, and what is going on in the future . . . That is what a world's fair should be about and the theme of this world's fair -- Peace Through Understanding -- is most appropriate in these years of the 60s.97

Whereas the 1939 Fair had glorified the advent of the consumer society and the benefits of corporate capitalism by huge corporate pavilions extolling capitalist themes and values, pragmatic liberalism sought to provide the human face of capitalist modernization in 1964. The chairman of the design committee, Rockefeller's architect Wallace Harrison (figure 8), hoped to bypass

the corporate emphasis of the earlier Fair by emphasizing cohesion and unity within the Fair’s overall design. The committee, composed of five architects including Harrison, Gordon Bunshaft, Henry Dreyfuss, Emil H. Praeger, and Edward Durrell Stone, suggested a central theme and plan similar to the 1867 Paris World’s Fair that would promote capitalism as well as global unity by suppressing individual corporate and national identities. However, the proposal for a single structure housing the whole Fair was defeated by Robert Moses, who suggested the committee more closely adhere to the complete theme of the Fair, which had the awkward title of "Man’s Achievements on a Shrinking Globe in an Expanding Universe and his Desire for Peace through Understanding."98 Moses, who represented the urban politics of the New Deal, wished to maintain control over Fair planning in his ongoing power struggle with Governor Rockefeller99 and rejected the concept of one pavilion housing the Fair. Instead, he argued that the Fair should be constructed on the older exhibition strategy of 1939 with its corporate capitalist emphasis.100


99. The political battles between Rockefeller and Moses came to a head in 1962 when Rockefeller attempted to replace Moses as Chairman of the State Council of Parks with Laurence Rockefeller. See Underwood and Daniels, p.313.
Ultimately out of the two hundred pavilions on the fairgrounds, only three were designed by the Fair Corporation, including the Hall of Science pavilion designed by Harrison. The effect of this polyglot assembly of pavilions was to dilute the Fair's new liberal message to a celebration of 1930s corporate capitalism.

Despite his intention to repeat his success of 1939, Moses modified his strategy for the 1964 Fair in one important way that was to have a bearing on the role of culture at the Fair. In opposition to the conceptual and organizational parameters of the 1939 Fair, Moses wanted to promote the impression of a "de-centralized" world's fair that would give the maximum amount of leeway to the "endless variety" of culture in the United States. Moses and his coterie of planners then blended decentralization and eclecticism of exhibits with the legacy of the successful promotion of the Average American from the 1939 Fair. The result was a form of populist eclecticism hostile to the liberal pluralism of Kennedy and Rockefeller:

100. Robert A. Caro points out that the failure to develop a more united and cohesive exhibition strategy resulted in Great Britain (and three-quarters of the Commonwealth), France and Italy pulling out of the Fair, destroying any sense of international co-operation. See Caro, The Power Broker (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 1094. Caro's book is an all-encompassing biography of Robert Moses.
I get a little weary of the avant-garde critics who see in a World's Fair only an opportunity to advance their latest ideas, to establish a new school of American planning, architecture and art and place their individual seal on one grand, unified, integrated concept which will astonish the visitor from the hinterland and rock the outer world... The fair administration belongs to no architectural clique, subscribes to no esthetic creed, favours no period or school and worships no artistic shrine.  

Moses' form of cultural populism was in direct opposition to the pragmatic liberal model of culture slowly being developed under the aegis of Heckscher: in its eclecticism it ignored the ideological imperatives of education and civic virtue which liberals sought to pursue in their particular vision of the fine arts.  

Immediately after his appointment to the Presidency of the Fair Corporation, Moses intimated his hostility to certain forms of modern art by stating, "I should hope we could afford... considerable statuary... [with] no freak stabiles and mobiles in the park, I beg you."  

In October 1960, five months after his appointment, Moses gave another indication of the public support he intended

---


102. Quoted in Helen A. Harrison, "Art for the Millions or Art for the Market?" in Remembering the Future, p.142.
for art at the Fair by noting, "... as to art ... sponsored and paid for by the Fair, very little of this sort of thing is contemplated." As far as Moses was concerned, the role of art was to be of minimal interest to his overall cultural strategy, which would remain largely dependent on private patrons and public museums in the city of New York. Moses' attitude to art was a holdover of his cultural strategy at the 1939 New York World's Fair, an attitude which he expressed in a 1938 article written for the Saturday Evening Post:

There may be no public announcement of it, but the shows, the entertainments, the amusements, fun, food, drinks, and everything else that goes with it; a gigantic circus, are going to come out first ... Business will run a close second. Culture, which is somehow associated with long walks and aching feet, will be third. 103

At the 1939 Fair, class distinctions were buried under Moses' rubric of the "Average American" and "the Average American Family." This averageness, of course, corresponded to the values of the middle class, which the 1939 Fair constructed in such a manner as to appeal to all the so-called "masses." Grover A. Whalen, the Fair's President, argued that, unlike any other such exhibition, values of scientific progress were to be wedded to the life of the Average American. This union would, in turn, promote the ideals of the World of Tomorrow, especially

103. Quoted in Miller, _p.71._
since the Fair "conveyed the picture of the interdependence of man on man, class on class, nation on nation. It attempted to tell of the necessity of enlightened and harmonious co-operation to preserve and save the best of modern civilization as it was then known." ¹⁰⁴

The oblong-shaped site of the Fair was dominated by a long central axis anchored at one end by a circle of corporate pavilions surrounding the Fountain of the Planets, including IBM, Bell Telephone, and General Electric. (figure 9) The axis was defined by a long landscaped mall bordered by the Hoover and Eisenhower promenades and transversed by the Avenue of Commerce ultimately merging with two other major pedestrian arteries, the Avenue of the Americas and the Avenue of Africa. All three converged on the central symbol of the Fair, the US Steel Corporation’s Unisphere which appeared on the cover of the May 1, 1964 issue of Life magazine. (figure 10)

The Unisphere was a model of the Earth shown with three orbits of successful American space launches encircling the globe. The cover photo of the pavilion mirrored the photographs of the earth from the October 21, 1957 issue of Life symbolically revealing the

triumphant reversal of the Soviet launching of Sputnik. The illuminated orbits of three space launches encompassed the globe, navigated by the new frontiersmen: the American astronauts. The foundation of this triumphant symbol of a revitalized frontier was constructed on the old base of the Trylon and the Perisphere, the centerpiece pavilion of the 1939 World's Fair which had been melted down during World War Two to make weapons of war.

However, the victory of United States technology and corporate capitalism was promoted at the World's Fair at the expense of the message of the New Frontier. The pavilions of the United States Federal Government and of New York State, the twin institutional backers of New Frontier liberalism, were located roughly equidistant from one another on opposite sides of the Unisphere forming a cross axis with the central promenade as they converged at the Unisphere. At the apex of the cruciform layout of the major promenades extending from the conglomeration of corporate pavilions was the New York City Pavilion, the center of Moses' political power. The Fair was literally bifurcated by Moses' strong corporate message with the liberal message deflected to the opposing cross axis. Visually and ideologically at cross-purposes with one another, the rival political camps also clashed over their respective choices for the
types of visual art which would encode the message each wished the Fair to promote.

Symptomatic of the conflict over the role of art at the 1964 Fair was a competition held for the five available commissions for public sculpture to be located at strategic points around the fairgrounds. The sculpture committee was chaired by Gilmore D. Clarke, a close friend of Moses' who had helped design the layout of the 1939 Fair. The panel was composed of three members: James Rorimer of the Metropolitan Museum, Rene d'Harnoncourt of MOMA, and Thomas Buechner of the Brooklyn Museum. For Clarke, the intention of the committee was to ensure that the sculpture selected for the Fair satisfy a majority, if not necessarily all, of the fairgoers. The Committee as a whole recommended "a range of sculptures from contemporary conservative to the conservative avant-garde." However, after submitting a shortlist of possible sculptors, D'Harnoncourt, an ally of Rockefeller, Heckscher and Phillip Johnson (the designer of the New York State Pavilion) resigned from the committee in protest over the aesthetics of the sculptors being selected as well as in protest over the general aesthetics of the Fair, including his immense distaste for the US Steel Corporation's Unisphere.

The most strategic location for a sculpture, on the grand plaza between the Hoover and Eisenhower Promenades
which formed the central axis between the Unisphere and the Fountain of the Planets, went to Donald de Lue. Located on the central mall to the West of the Unisphere, the 43-foot bronze sculpture of the Rocket Thrower (figure 11), a heroic classical male figure symbolizing the mythological conquest of space, characterized the not-too-subtle influence exerted by Moses on the role of art at the Fair. John Canaday, art critic of the New York Times, characterized de Lue's sculpture as "an absurdity that might be a satire of the kind of sculpture already discredited at the time of the 1939 Fair." In a letter to Moses, De Lue responded, "The intemperance of [Canaday's] comments is an indication, I believe, of fear and frustration." De Lue further stated that it would be hard for Canaday and his "pals . . . to tout this poverty stricken and stupid abstract sculpture with the Rocket Thrower so much in evidence." Moses, eager to justify his selection of De Lue, replied to the sculptor in the following way: "Those whose opinion I respect like your contribution. It will be conspicuous long after the Canadays are forgotten." Moses was perhaps revealing his own private strategy for coping with the short term

105. Quoted in Harrison, p.146.
106. Quoted in Harrison, p.146.
107. Quoted in Harrison, p.146.
virulence of oppositional criticism to his conception of
the Fair.

A crucial aspect of Moses' approach to fine arts
included procuring an exhibit of Vatican treasures.
Thanks to Moses' lobbying efforts with Pope John XIII,
the Pieta by Michelangelo was to be exhibited for the
first time outside of Rome in nearly five hundred years
alongside a variety of other Vatican art treasures. The
Vatican treasures would be displayed in a special
pavilion directly across the Truman Promenade from the
New York State Pavilion, which was encircled by the new
liberal aesthetic in the form of an externally mounted
modern art exhibit. Thus, fairgoers lining up to view
the Vatican Treasures would be subject to the artistic
display on the outside of the New York State Pavilion
before being whisked inside the Vatican Pavilion on a
moving sidewalk. Once inside, the viewer could observe
the Pieta bathed with special lighting and listen to a
soundtrack designed to enhance the spiritual experience.
Art News noted that the statue appeared "amid Gregorian
Muzak, under flickering blue lights which turned the
creamy marble to sugary white."\(^{108}\) In the light of

\(^{108}\) Despite his ability to lobby the Pope, Moses could
not secure the Hirshorn sculpture collection because of
the lack of funding for a structure on the site. Moses
insisted that the only obligation of the Fair was to
provide the actual land for the exhibit; pavilion funding
would have to come from a private sponsor. Such an
Moses' aesthetic choices for the Fair, Thomas B. Hess, the editor of *Art News*, labelled Moses the "Art Slayer" whose Fair "combine[d] the tone of a carney shill with the spirit of a black marketeer" making a mockery of its pledge to display "the finest products of the spirit, mind, and hand of man." 109

In contrast to Moses' primary focus on amusements and the promotion of capitalism as the lynchpins of his exhibition philosophy, the New York State Pavilion provided one of the few examples of the new pragmatism of New York Governor Rockefeller. The architect, Philip Johnson, had previously been worked for the Rockefeller family as the architect of the dance theatre at the new Lincoln Center of the Performing Arts. For the Fair, attitude towards the role of art led *Art in America* to state in an editorial what Nelson Rockefeller and August Heckscher, Jr. most dreaded to hear, that the Fair "would serve to confirm the frequent criticism of our country as an entirely materialistic nation." Cited in Harrison, p.150.


While there were several further efforts to establish contemporary art exhibits at the Fair, such as the "Art 65" exhibition in the second year of the Fair, their effect was diminished by the lack of funding, poor location or the lack of publicity if they were exhibited. "Art 65", for example, was an exhibit of 59 lesser known contemporary artists who were displayed in the American Express Pavilion, a pavilion whose major attraction was a huge "Money Tree." As Dore Ashton observed, the corporate sponsorship meant that, "commercial motives of a big company inevitably intervene and dignity flies out the window."
Johnson designed a circular pavilion which highlighted, both in its interior and exterior exhibits, the centrality of the arts to the architect and the ideology of the pavilion's major patron.

The exterior art display, entitled "The City: Places and People," was one of two exhibits sponsored by the NYSCA to promote the strategic relevance of modern art to contemporary life in the United States (figure 12) and included murals and sculptures by some of the most important contemporary artists in New York, such as James Rosenquist, Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, Robert Indiana, Ellsworth Kelly, Alexander Lieberman, Peter Agostini, John Chamberlain and Robert Malloy. Works included in this display had been commissioned by Phillip Johnson specifically for this installation. The second art exhibit, located on the inside of the pavilion, was curated by Katherine Kuh, editor of Saturday Review. Entitled "The River: Places and People," in contrast to the contemporaneity of the exterior exhibition, this exhibit was an historical show of 17th to 19th century paintings focusing on the history of New York on the Hudson River. The two art displays complemented one another to a certain extent by suggesting the important legacy of the European influence on the art of the United States while demonstrating, on the outside face of the pavilion, the extent to which contemporary painting was
both sophisticated and grounded in the experiences of post-war America. Unlike the pre-war aesthetic of Moses or the increasing remoteness of Clement Greenberg's turn to the formalism of Post Painterly Abstraction, the New York State Pavilion art exhibitions sought to avoid the extremes of nationalism and internationalism in culture through populist eclecticism. In its pluralist guise, the New York State Pavilion sought to educate the fairgoing public to the relevance of higher culture -- especially in an international Fair promoting "Peace Through Understanding" in the midst of the Cold War.

"The City" art exhibition was composed of a series of immense murals and sculptures, several measuring twenty feet square. While this exhibition was dominated by Pop artists, the presence of an abstract painting such as *Two Curves: Blue Red* by Ellsworth Kelly (figure 13) or an abstract sculpture such as *Prometheus* by Alexander Liberman (figure 14) helped to emphasize the pluralism of contemporary high culture in the Pop era while signalling the diminution of the modernist paradigm to the role of a dutiful but subservient auxiliary in the cultural renaissance of the United States in the 1960s. Kelly was the only artist exhibited on the exterior of the New York State Pavilion whose paintings had also been included in Clement Greenberg's "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in Los Angeles earlier that same year. At New
York, Kelly was the exception that proved the rule: Greenbergian modernism was reduced to a marginalized accent amidst a myriad of styles, ranging from the Pieta to The Rocket Thrower to Pop. Abstract shapes and images hinted at the remoteness of modern art, but were juxtaposed with riotous colours and mass media-influenced Pop works such as the World's Fair murals by Roy Lichtenstein and James Rosenquist. (figures 15 and 16) The pluralistic mix of Pop artists and modernist accents in this exhibition undermined the hierarchical status of modernism while elevating popular culture and mass media imagery to the level of the fine arts. The cultural theorist Dick Hebdige has commented upon the implications of this interaction of cultural forms on politics:

... the politics of Pop reside in the fact that it committed the cardinal sin in art by puncturing what Bourdieu calls the "high seriousness" upon which bourgeois art depends and through which it asserts its difference from the "debased" and "ephemeral" forms of "low" and "non" art.\textsuperscript{110}

And Hebdige further states in regards to the anti-hierarchical status of Pop art:

Pop did not break down that opposition, far from it, but it did manage to smudge the line more effectively than most other modern art movements. For whereas pure taste identifies itself in the active 'refusal of the vulgar, the popular, and the sensual,' Pop reaches out to close those gaps in order to produce not 'politics' opposed to

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{110. Dick Hebdige, Hiding in the Light (New York: Routledge, 1988), p.141.}
'pleasure' but rather something new: a politics of
pleasure.\textsuperscript{111}

However, in his theorizing of the politics of Pop,
Hebdige ignores the potential similarities between the
smudging of cultural boundaries as a critical act and the
blurring of boundaries pursued by pragmatic liberals to
further a liberal Cold War agenda.

The desire of the pragmatic liberals to promote a
certain understanding of the function of culture within
capitalism in the New York State Pavilion was not totally
realized. The apparent cohesiveness of the exhibition
was disrupted by controversy over one work: Andy Warhol's
Thirteen Most Wanted Men series (figure 12) (which, much
to the chagrin of Robert Moses, earned the Fair its
nickname: "the Pop Art Fair.")\textsuperscript{112}

Installed April 17, Warhol's piece was composed of
twenty-five acrylic and silkscreened panels, including
three left blank, displaying the frontal and side
profiles of the most wanted criminals in New York
State.\textsuperscript{113} Comprised mainly of images of Mafiosi, the

\textsuperscript{111} Hebdige, p.141.

\textsuperscript{112} Newhouse, p.237. The unity and coherence desired by
the Fair planners would not be attained until three years
later at the Montreal World's Fair in 1967. At this
Fair, in the American Pavilion space exhibits and Pop Art
combined to provide a playful educational environment
that validated the original plan for the 1964 Fair
defeated by Moses.
mural was easily visible to fairgoers lining up for entry into the Vatican Treasures pavilion. Within a few days, the piece was covered by a black cloth before Warhol covered it entirely in silver paint. (figure 17) Shortly thereafter, the work was removed altogether.

Initial publicity was slight but the April 18 New York Times published a statement issued an Warhol's behalf by Phillip Johnson. This statement indicated that Warhol himself was displeased with the effect of the installed work and was contemplating having it removed from the pavilion. However, Johnson later modified his interpretation of events noting that "The names [of the subjects] got to Governor Rockefeller; [the men] were all Italian . . . Most of these 'Thirteen Wanted' were Mafiosi." Thus Johnson suggested that the potential for lawsuits from the influential New York Italian community was so overwhelming and potentially so debilitating to Governor Rockefeller that there was no


As Stuckey notes, Warhol selected the theme of his art work after rejecting the Heinz pickle as a motif based on a souvenir from the 1939 World's Fair. Stuckey also points out that the "Thirteen Most Wanted Men" piece alluded to WANTED/$2,000 REWARD, a 1923 work by Marcel Duchamp. (p.16)


other choice except to remove the mural. "Thus," concludes Helen A. Harrison, "the mural was removed for political rather than aesthetic reasons." However, it seems uncharacteristic that the Rockefeller family would have capitulated to such pressure unless they were facing an overwhelming conservative backlash.

In their efforts to understand the removal of Warhol's mural, previous analysts have overlooked the divisive internal politics of the Fair. The 1964 New York World's Fair was, in part, a reflection of the political combat that emerged in the post-Sputnik United States as the neo-liberalism of Rockefeller and Kennedy emerged as a potent political force. The temporary union of progressive Republicans and Democrats challenged the outworn representations of the United States crafted by urban planners such as Moses in the earlier part of the century and forged an up-to-date pragmatic liberal strategy on the domestic and foreign policy fronts. Given Rockefeller and Moses' opposing visions of the meaning of the Fair for American society, it seems more likely that the removal of Warhol's mural was yet another chapter in the divisive (but well-hidden) internal politics of the Fair rather than a result of either aesthetics or external political pressure alone. Warhol

himself alluded to this possible explanation with his suggestion that the removed mural be replaced by a new mural composed of the silk-screened image of a smiling Robert Moses. (figure 18) Not surprisingly, Johnson vetoed Warhol's suggestion.

Robert Moses momentarily stalled the ambitions of the pragmatic liberals to make the Fair a monolithic edifice sanctifying the New Frontier. He insisted on the relevance of an older equation of Fair ideology based on populism, amusements and the blatant promotion of capitalism. Moses believed he could eliminate the culture gap by refusing to make high art a priority at the Fair. In contrast, New Frontier liberalism felt the culture gap could be narrowed with the passing of the National Art and Cultural Development Act four months after the opening of the Fair. Within a year, two decades of political wrangling over public support for the arts and the so-called culture gap would reach an important watershed with the establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) on September 29, 1965.
Chapter Two: Between Chesed and Binah: Modernism on the Margins.

Kitsch has not been confined to the cities in which it was born, but has flowed out over the countryside, wiping out folk culture. Nor has it shown any regard for geographical and national-cultural boundaries. Another mass product of Western industrialism, it has gone on a triumphal tour of the world, crowding out and defacing native cultures in one colonial country after another, so that it is now by way of becoming a universal culture, the first universal culture ever beheld.

Clement Greenberg

The disdainful amusement I and thousands like me felt for Canadian achievement in any field, especially those of the imagination, was a direct reflection of our self-hatred and sense of inferiority. And while we dismissed American mass culture, we could only separate ourselves from it by soaking up all the elite American culture we could get at.

Dennis Lee

Between 1957 and 1965, pragmatic liberalism successfully redefined the "vital center" of U.S. politics by outmaneuvering its political opponents on the right and on the left. The course established to negotiate the treacherous shoals of both the missile gap and the culture gap contributed significantly to the success of John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign. Kennedy's liberal strategy on foreign and domestic
politics would reorient both the Cold War and cosmopolitan modernism within the United States.

Located on the margins of North American society, the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops were situated on the border-line separating work and play in central Saskatchewan (with Emma Lake's leisure activities juxtaposed to the sprawling staple economy of wheat production in southern Saskatchewan). This outpost was the last place that one would expect to find North America's leading art critic during one of the decisive periods of his career. The arrival of Clement Greenberg at Emma Lake in 1962 provides a key example of the fluctuating environment of North American culture at the moment the two superpowers were poised to annihilate one another. Canada would be the buffer-zone over which such a conflict would be waged and whose territory could be used as a shield and a decoy for incoming nuclear missiles and bombers. The symbolic dissolution of national boundaries and the decay of the boundaries that Greenberg had erected to safeguard his modernist tenets curiously overlap at this point. Emma Lake in 1962 becomes a complex case study of the interrelationship between art and politics at a time when modernism in the United States was being deposed from its earlier domination of high culture and as the world was hovering on the brink of catastrophe with the Cuban Missile
Crisis.

As the pragmatic liberalism of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier began to support a qualitative concept of civic culture that dissolved the boundaries between work, play and leisure, the intellectual scaffolding that since 1948 had united Greenberg's modernist avant-garde with the liberal causes of freedom, individualism and internationalism began to buckle. The dissolution of this informal alliance did not occur overnight but was the result of a gradual modification of U.S. Cold War strategy in the wake of Sputnik 1. With the invocation of the discourse on the frontier alongside a newly reformulated interpretation of pragmatism, however, the viability of any aesthetic that relied on the tradition of European philosophical idealism, especially that of Kant, Hegel or Marx, was in serious jeopardy. In the early 1950s, New York modernism had been adequate to establish the cultural superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union in Europe. By the early 1960s, however, the role of modernism in U.S. Cold War policy was being displaced by a neo-liberal cultural strategy cognisant of the impact of technological change and of the increasing importance of the Third World as a buffer-zone and arena of competition in the Cold War.

Paradoxically, as Greenberg's interpretation of
modernism began to lose favour with Cold War cultural planners in the United States government, his power as a critic had never been greater. Prior to Kennedy's election, Greenberg's influential essay "Modernist Painting" was published and was also broadcast by the Voice of America's international shortwave transmission network, reaching a potential audience of between thirty and fifty million listeners.¹ Then in 1961 came the publication of his collection of essays entitled Art and Culture, presenting a highly edited and selective interpretation of the last two decades of Greenberg's critical activity. This anthology also extended the reach of his influence: Saskatchewan artist Ken Lochhead suggested that the text was crucial reading material for all the participants in Greenberg's 1962 Emma Lake workshop. Greenberg's trip to Saskatchewan and his subsequent organization of the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in 1964 for the Los Angeles


The publication and broadcast information on "Modernist Painting" was drawn to my attention by Professor John O'Brian, who was the first to note that the essay was broadcast in the spring of 1960 and published a short while later in the Voice of America's Forum Lectures (Washington, D. C.: United States Information Agency, 1960). The essay was republished in Arts Yearbook 4 (1961), 101-8, and then in Art and Literature 4 (Spring 1965), 193-201. I would like to thank Professor O'Brian for making available to me his introduction to volumes three and four of his edited collection of essays and criticism of Clement Greenberg.
Museum highlight the positive responses to his influence in the early 1960s. In contrast, during this time, the influence of his version of modernism was challenged as never before, leading to a polarization between those in favour of loosening the grasp of modernism on high culture and Greenberg's own "circling of the modernist wagons."

Greenberg's "safari" to Saskatchewan in August 1962 also assumes importance in the modernist dialogue with the culture of pragmatic liberalism, as Greenberg himself noted in his 1965 article "America Takes the Lead: 1945-1965." In the article, a summing up of the triumph of American painting in the post-war period, Greenberg stated:

> In the spring of 1962 there came the sudden collapse, market-wise and publicity-wise, of abstract expressionism as a collective manifestation. The fall of that year saw the equally sudden triumph of pop art, which, though deriving its vision from the art of Rauschenberg and especially Johns, is much more markedly opposed to painterly abstraction in its handling and general design.  

Greenberg's decision to go to Saskatchewan, and then to entertain the idea of teaching at the University of Regina for one year, occurred at an important junction. Nineteen sixty-two was the midpoint between the collapse

---

of abstract expressionism and the emergence of Pop art, and between the publication of two of Greenberg's most influential texts -- "Modernist Painting" and *Art and Culture* -- and the unveiling of Greenberg's proposed next phase of modernist painting, "Post Painterly Abstraction," at an important exhibition in Los Angeles. At such a crucial moment in the shifting of cultural paradigms within the United States, Greenberg's appearance on the margins in Saskatchewan consequently make the 1962 Emma Lake Workshop and his two-month driving tour of Western and Central Canada appear as more than a leisurely excursion on the way to a remote summer camp in the bush. Rather, Emma Lake and the subsequent "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in Los Angeles reflect Greenberg's increasing disenchantment with New York. Thus, the margins and their remoteness from the center presented a counterpoint to the hub of a fading modernism and the emerging hegemony of Kennedy's New Frontier.

The development of Emma Lake as a center for the promotion of visual culture within Saskatchewan began in the darkest days of the Great Depression (figure 19). Prior to 1934, Saskatchewan had had only one degree-granting post-secondary institution: the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon. By 1934, thanks to the
financial incentive of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which provided a grant of $50,000 and thousands of library books, the University of Saskatchewan was able to take the financially troubled Regina College under its jurisdiction\(^3\), thus extending the availability of post-secondary education to the southern part of the province.

A northern extension of the post-secondary educational system seemed a logical step in the efforts of the University of Saskatchewan to co-ordinate higher education across the province, as Ann Morrison notes: "With a northern extension, the university would not only increase and strengthen this growing network of influence, but would also suggest the importance it wished to give the spread of cultural ideas through the educational system, even in the worst year to date of the Depression."\(^4\) This northern extension took the form of a summer school of fine arts.

The school's first director, British painter Augustus Kenderdine (1870-1947) (figure 20), a lecturer in Fine Arts at the University since 1928, selected


Ann Morrison’s essay for this catalogue contains the most comprehensive background on the early history of art workshops at Emma Lake prior to the formation of the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops in 1955.

\(^4\) Morrison, p.22.
Murray Point as the site for the Art School at Emma Lake. Located fifty kilometers north of Prince Albert, the site was a twenty acre parcel of land that included a five acre peninsula stretching out into Emma Lake. Enclosed by a dense forest, the future Murray Point Summer School of Art provided the perfect setting for Kenderdine's particular brand of nineteenth century landscape painting, geographically and psychologically removed from the economic and social carnage of the collapsed wheat-growing economy in the southern part of the province.

The reshaping of the provincial economy due to the collapse of the international wheat market resulted in the dislocation of over 250,000 individuals across the three prairie provinces between 1931 and 1941. Saskatchewan's population suffered the most, and statistics recorded a net loss in population for the first time since 1870. As a result of the drought and the economic failure of wheat farming, the 1936 census recorded that over 8200 farms in Saskatchewan had been abandoned. While the Great Depression embraced the

5. Kenderdine was educated at Blackpool and Manchester before a stint in the Académie Julian in Paris in 1890. As Morrison has pointed out, the more classically European woodlands of Emma Lake were particularly suitable for Kenderdine's hierarchical conception of landscape, as opposed to the vast expanse of the flat prairie grasslands of the south.
entire Canadian economy, no other region of the country suffered as significant a loss of growth and productivity as the prairie region comprised of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In a sense, capitalism was receding, leaving an economic, political and cultural vacuum that presented political opportunities for both the right and the social democratic left across the prairie provinces, resulting in the rise of the conservative Social Credit movement of William Aberhart in Alberta and the birth of the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan.

The installation of the Murray Point Art School at Emma Lake in 1936 symbolized the move north by many farm families who, after having abandoned the southern grasslands, turned to the northern parkland areas of the province that bordered the grain-producing areas of central and southern Saskatchewan. Over 15,000 families ultimately moved to the northern margins of Saskatchewan to re-establish some kind of agricultural economic base in the province. Ironically, the landscape that typified Emma Lake and geographical areas similar to it were subject to government-sponsored programs of deforestation and water drainage that threatened to draw the parkland into the same economic whirlwind that had devastated the

To appeal to potential students from the southern part of the province, the Murray Point Art School emphasized the contrast between northern and southern Saskatchewan in terms of recreation and leisure. The idyllic aspect of the location was featured in the 1936 brochure for the first summer school which stated that the site was "well timbered" with "water frontage on three sides," thus providing the students with "ample and varied material for either land or water sketching." The illusion of wilderness and the access to leisure at Emma Lake also "represent[ed] a geographical 'other' to the workshop leaders from New York such as Will Barnet, Barnett Newman, Herman Cherry, and Clement Greenberg], a place of physical and spiritual retreat, a wilderness respite from the madding crowd," an effective combination in attracting such a cosmopolitan modernist as Greenberg to the site as the psychological and physical antithesis to New York (figure 21).

Within the visual arts prior to World War Two and in the decade following the war, the legacy of European (especially British) academic landscape painting

9. John O'Brian, "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan, and Who is Emma Lake?" in The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.31.
dominated painting in Saskatchewan. The arrival of two British artists in particular -- Inglis Sheldon-Williams (1870-1940), who taught at Regina College from 1913-1917, and James Henderson (1881-1951), who worked in Regina from 1911 to 1916 -- oriented art in the province toward the British landscape tradition, an orientation that was reinforced by Kenderdine's appointment as a lecturer at the University of Saskatchewan in 1928. The legacy of that tradition extended to the late 1950s when the Saskatchewan painter Art McKay, one of the leading modernist innovators in the province, described his style as "an abstract version of English landscape painting." 10

In 1944 the political fortunes of the province took a dramatic turn that would inexorably alter the relationship of the visual arts with the public sphere. In the provincial election of 1944, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, led by T.C. "Tommy" Douglas, became the first democratically elected socialist government in North American history. The reverberations of this election were felt throughout the continent, even inspiring the establishment of an American version of the CCF in the state of Michigan that same year. American mass media was also fascinated by this phenomena of

socialism next door: the New York Times, Time magazine, and Newsweek all published articles analyzing the election of the CCF. The critical attention devoted by the mass media and intellectuals to the election of a socialist government meant, according to John O'Brian, "[that] while Saskatchewan remained geographically distanced from major economic and intellectual centers in the U.S. with the rise to power of T.C. Douglas and the CCF, it was not imaginatively distanced."  

Despite the positive role model provided by the election triumph of the CCF in Saskatchewan, the post-war political environment in the United States proved to be anathema to the establishment of a viable democratic socialist third party alternative to the Democrats and the Republicans. While two distinct third party proposals appeared on the left in the United States within two years of the end of World War Two, including the National Education Committee for a New Party that hoped to emulate social democratic movements in Europe, the disintegration of the Progressive movement and the

11. John O'Brian's research on the impact of the CCF election in the United States reveals that the New York Times published six articles on the CCF in 1944 and that Time and Newsweek published a total of ten articles between 1944 and 1948 on the CCF and Saskatchewan. See O'Brian, "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan, and Who is Emma Lake?" The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.30.

12. O'Brian, "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan, and Who is Emma Lake?" The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.31.
subsequent defeat of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party in the 1948 election sounded the death-knell for any socialist third-party alternative in the United States. From Greenberg's perspective, the lack of a socialist alternative for American society combined with the rise of the middle class, "surging toward culture under the pressure of anxiety, high taxes, and a shrinking industrial frontier ... constitute[d] a much greater threat to high culture than Kitsch itself." Greenberg identified two alternatives: "a new cultural elite ... with enough money and enough consciousness to counterbalance the pressure of the new mass market," or socialism. However, in reference to the latter option, Greenberg pessimistically concluded, "but right now who talks of socialism in America?" Despite referring to himself as early as 1948 as an "ex- or disabused Marxist," Greenberg was cognizant of the deplorable colonizing effects of American kitsch (Canada, of course, was a prime example of this cultural colonization given the geographical proximity of the two countries). The appearance of socialism in Saskatchewan, on the margins of North America, must have appeared as much of a curious

incongruity as Greenberg's own efforts to establish a viable avant-garde movement at the center in New York City.

On February 1, 1948, the socialist government of Saskatchewan initiated a policy of formal government support of the arts, the first such policy in North America. While the United States was paralyzed in its efforts to secure government support for the arts by the "red scare" and the opposition of conservative congressmen such as George Dondero, the Saskatchewan government established its mandate "to make available to the citizens of the province greater opportunities to engage in creative activities in the fields of drama, visual arts, music, literature and handicrafts, with qualified guidance and leadership, and to establish and improve the standards for such activities in the province."14 Inspired in part by the successful formation of the British Arts Council several years earlier, the Saskatchewan Arts Board (SAB) was a hybrid institution adapted to the peculiarities of a largely rural, agrarian-based staple economy, as noted in the Annual Report of the SAB in 1951:

The form . . . was tempered by Western Canadian conditions, the comparative smallness

of the cities, the thinly-spread population and the various limitations due to distances. Rather than the Old Country Plan of having panels for each of the Arts, it was considered best to have each of the Arts Board members contribute to the whole field of interest in order strengthen the Board's plans and projects. The fundamental principle of the Arts Board . . . is its ultimate faith in human creativity, the unique resources of each person, which gives meaning, distinction and direction to life.15

Despite the SAB's miniscule 1948 budget of $4,000 provided by the Department of Education, the CCF demonstrated its determination to go against the tide of the Cold War by publicly subsidizing the arts. Saskatchewan was solidifying its role in North America as Canada's "red province," a fact which had a bearing on the attractiveness of the Emma Lake Workshops for New York painters who remained sympathetic to the left.16

The more democratic orientation of the SAB contrasted sharply with the actions of the Federal Government of Canada. After World War Two, the Canadian government became increasingly alarmed by the influx of U.S. mass culture, including books, radio programmes, and shortly thereafter, television programmes. This cultural bombardment contributed to anxiety about the

15. Quoted in Riddell, p.6.

16. O'Brian cites Barnett Newman as one Workshop leader who was fully aware of the political orientation of the province. See "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan, and Who is Emma Lake?" The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.31.
status of the Canadian identity, especially given Great Britain’s weakened ability to act as a counterweight to U.S. influence. Specifically, these concerns focused on how exposure to American mass culture would influence the Canadian public towards identifying with American, as opposed to Canadian, policy both domestically and internationally. In response, the Canadian government initiated a review of post-war cultural developments, focusing on the threat of American mass culture to Canadian cultural identity.

As early as 1945, the Arts and Letters Club (a luncheon club in Toronto made famous by the membership of the central icons of Canadian painting, the Group of Seven) began lobbying the federal government for support for Canadian culture. These concerns culminated one year after the formation of the SAB, when Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent asked Vincent Massey, the former Canadian High Commissioner to London, to lead a group of eminent Canadian intellectuals to survey Canada’s cultural resources. The Massey Report, formally titled The Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, was published in 1951. This report warned of:

... the difficulty of developing Canadian culture because of the enormous influx of artists from the United States. The Commission recommended that federal financial aid be given to the universities and that a
government agency be established to encourage the arts and social sciences by awarding grants and scholarships. The St. Laurent government agreed to help the universities, but waited another six years before announcing the formation of the Canada Council. 17

Canadian historians such as W.L. Morton, Donald Creighton, and Arthur Lower felt that as a result of the pressures of foreign (particularly U.S.) influence, concrete steps could be taken to assure the formation and preservation of a distinctive cultural identity. However, the pervasiveness of American mass cultural influence within Canada caused historian Frank Underhill (one of the framers of the CCF platform in 1932), to question the ability of Canadian culture to differentiate itself from this pressure to conform to the U.S. image. He believed the Massey Commission’s labelling of American mass culture as ‘alien’ to be a fundamental distortion of the relationship of mass culture to liberal capitalism. For Underhill, mass culture was the inevitable result of the processes of modernization, not an aberration solely attributable to the United States, and to reject this culture as "unbearably vulgar and anti-intellectual" 18 was to misunderstand the relationship of contemporary culture to industrial society. The effect of such a

18. Quoted in Levitt, p.152.
misunderstanding would skew federal government policies away from coping with the implications of mass culture towards a preoccupation with high culture. However, Underhill's dissenting voice was drowned out by the majority opinion of the Massey Commission. For example, W.L. Morton, in his book *The Canadian Identity* (published one decade after the Massey Commission Report) reflects the attitude of the Commission's majority who felt that:

> [It does not] . . . greatly matter that Americans and Canadians share the same popular culture; after reading the same comic strips, and the same periodicals, Canadians remain as distinct as they ever were. What differentiates the two people are things far deeper than the mass culture of North America which both countries share and both created. 19

One of the Massey Commission's recommendations for defending Canadian cultural identity was the establishment of a nationwide arts funding agency. Between the Massey Commission and the creation of the Canada Council, the National Gallery of Canada in Ottawa initiated a series of exhibitions to bring Canadians up-to-date with the latest trends in modern painting: namely the various forms of abstract expressionism that had developed in the wake of the triumph of American painting in New York City after World War Two. The change in focus at the National Gallery from a traditional emphasis

on figurative and representational art (largely landscape) to a preoccupation with abstraction occurred within a very short amount of time. For example, the First Biennial of Canadian painting held at the National Gallery in Ottawa in 1955 was predominantly regional and representational, yet, at the Second Biennial in 1957 (the year the Canada Council was established), abstract painting counted for over sixty per cent of the total exhibition. The transition from regionalist forms of representation to cosmopolitan modernism was explained by the Associate Director of the National Gallery, Donald Buchanan, who noted at the opening of the Second Biennial:

> Canadian painting is no longer linked to Canadian geography . . . The romantic aspects of raw nature are depicted less and less frequently, for as we mature our art passes from the objective to the subjective and in it the personal, the more intimate, even the introspective take control.

[The artists in this exhibition are] are of the generation that has reacted to an unthinking nationalism in culture. Painters as well as writers have begun to doubt that we can build undisturbed any obvious or fixed Canadian pattern in this world of flux and change.20

Although delayed six years from the publication of the Massey Report, the creation of the Canada Council in

1957 symbolized resistance to the increasing pull to the south even as the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation accelerated in response to Soviet achievements in space technology. Paradoxically, Canadian resistance to American cultural influence through public support of the arts drew the interest of American pragmatic liberal intellectuals, also concerned with the issue of public support for the arts. Prior to Kennedy's election, pragmatic liberal cultural strategists from the United States were actively promoting their concept of an "arts constituency" in Canada, attempting to formulate a workable model of public and private consensus on government funding for the arts. The irony of the Canada Council's original goal -- to be an instrument of support for a Canadian cultural identity -- was apparent at the very first meeting of the Council.

The Canada Council first met on April 30 and May 1, 1957; representatives of the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, including Dean Rusk, later Kennedy's Secretary of State, were present to observe and contribute suggestions on cultural policies. From the combined energies of the Canadian and American participants in the initial meeting, a governmental role

for culture emerged, signalling a departure from the Massey Commission's earlier defence of a British model of high culture. The extent of the American influence on the formation of the Canada Council can be inferred from the emphasis placed on regional distribution of funding for the arts. This position of using state-sponsored culture to mediate between the center and the hinterlands of North America was a hallmark of American neo-liberal thinking and was designed to avoid reinforcing the strength of the already culturally advanced metropolitan areas of the United States. I believe that this legacy of American influence symbolizes the confluence of liberal thinking on both sides of the border at that time: both U.S. and Canadian liberals viewed the public support of culture as a necessary instrument of national policy. However, the regional focus of federal governmental arts policy did not actually begin in Canada until after the defeat of the John Diefenbaker Conservative government in 1963 by the pro-Kennedy Liberal party led by Lester B. Pearson.

Cultural developments in Saskatchewan, though on the margins, were not stunted in their growth thanks to the provincially supported SAB and the influx of new young painting instructors determined to be active participants in the dialogue on modern art. Following the death of Augustus Kenderdine in 1947, the shift to modernism at
the University of Saskatchewan was initiated by Gordon Snelgrove, who had originally been hired by Kenderdine in 1936 after completing his doctorate at the Courtauld Institute in London, England. Snelgrove appointed two modernists to the faculty in 1948: Nikola Bjelajac and the American painter Eli Bornstein.

The Regina College of Art was also experiencing a turnover of staff. Kenneth Lochhead, a 24-year-old painter from Ottawa\textsuperscript{22}, was appointed the new director in 1950. Two years later, Lochhead hired fellow Canadian painter Arthur McKay; both Lochhead and McKay were to be key figures in the transformation of the Murray Point Summer School of Art into the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops (figure 22). Lochhead also took steps to establish the first "A" gallery in Saskatchewan\textsuperscript{23}: the Norman Mackenzie Gallery, which opened in 1953 under the directorship of Richard Simmins, formerly of the National Gallery in Ottawa. Thus within several years, Saskatchewan was poised to develop and promote a concept of modern art fully cognisant of the developments occurring in the United States and the cultural dialogue in the nation’s foremost gallery, as Simmins stated in

\begin{footnote}
22. Lochhead received much of his advanced art training in the United States, especially at the Barnes Foundation and at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts in Philadelphia.

23. Morrison, p.25.
\end{footnote}
the catalogue for the "Ten Artists of Saskatchewan"

exhibition:

Saskatchewan up to the present period has remained outside the main stream of Canadian art. This has been due to a number of factors... At the present time, however, there are a large number of young artists in Saskatchewan, well-trained, energetic and conscious of the necessity of improving standards and competing on a national rather than regional level.24

This willingness to engage in a dialogue with the most complex cultural discourses of the period was not, however, to be filled solely by long-distance communication with cultural centers through the mass media. Rather, as Lochhead argued, "If we can’t get out, then let’s bring someone from the outside to us." In personal terms he then explained why the idea for an artists’ workshop appealed to him: "I needed this for myself in terms of the idea of getting together and exchanging ideas with people who had more experience than myself."25 The desire for self-improvement and education


25. Quoted in John D. H. King, A Documented Study of the Artist's Workshop at Emma Lake, Saskatchewan. Unpublished BFA Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1972. Ann Morrison’s research has found that discussions surrounding the original idea of the Emma Lake school were quite fractious with disagreements concerning the school’s overall philosophy, and questions concerning whether the school should emphasize only professional artists or include those individuals aiming for a teaching career. There was also considerable institutional bickering between rival educational bureaucracies. Ultimately control of the selection of
brought the mountain of modern art criticism to Saskatchewan.

In the mid-1950s, the early work of Lochhead and McKay had characterized the embryonic state of modern painting on the Prairies. While both artists had been exposed to a range of visual languages in the course of their art education, the Emma Lake Artists' Workshops accelerated both their artistic development and their dependency on New York.

Lochhead, in 1955, the year of the first Workshop, was producing works such as Return to Humanity (figure 23), a Surrealistic oil painting depicting a procession of depersonified human beings clad in academic robes passing an audience of frozen monumental automatons in a threateningly barren landscape with white doves flying into an ominously dark sky. While conversant with most aspects of modern art, Lochhead was obviously not utilizing the abstract expressionist style so popular in New York at this time. Instead, he was relying upon a Surrealist figurative style inspired in part by the work of other Canadian painters of the time including Jack Shadbolt, a Vancouver-based painter who was also the first Emma Lake Workshop Leader (figure 24). By the time of his Workshop, Shadbolt had been working within a faculty and the philosophical orientation of Emma Lake came under the jurisdiction of Regina College. Morrison, pp.26-27.
Surrealist vernacular for almost a decade.

When the first American painter, Will Barnet, was invited to be Workshop Leader in 1957, Art McKay was still evoking the English watercolour tradition on the Prairies with works such as *The Edge of the Forest* (figure 25), a watercolour sketch of a tightly compressed group of trees in a shallow pictorial space. While his watercolour technique was moving towards abstraction, references to the landscape were unmistakable and McKay did not seem overly influenced by the abstract expressionism of New York at this time.

With the facilities already in place at Murray Point and with initial financing provided by the provincial SAB, the first Emma Lake Artists' Workshop was held in 1955 and ran from August 15 to 29, with eighteen participants; Lochhead was the Workshop Co-ordinator. Following Shadbolt, another Canadian painter, Joe Plaskett, was chosen as workshop leader in 1956, but the Workshop organizers had already begun to look beyond the boundaries of Canada: not only to New York, extending an invitation to Barnet, but also to Mexico, with invitations sent to David Alfred Siquieros and Jose Gutierrez. Barnet's presence at the 1957 Workshop established direct contact between Emma Lake and New York

for the first time. Attendance increased dramatically, to thirty-one full and part-time participants. The success of the 1957 workshop in bridging the artistic centre and the margin is encapsulated by the comments of Saskatchewan artist and workshop participant Ernest Lindner in a letter written to Lochhead shortly after the conclusion of workshop:

> Mr. Barnet's understanding help has done more for me than I ever dared hope for. I believe he has helped me to a definitive breakthrough in my work and I hope, no, I am convinced that my contact with Barnet will prove a definite turning point in the quality of my work.

> The association with other artists from outside the Province, who seemed equally enthusiastic and appreciative was of course also invaluable. I felt that the whole atmosphere was electrically charged, making everybody work at top capacity.

> There is no doubt in my mind, that these workshops have passed the experimental stage and have established firmly the value and the need for such work-meetings under expert guidance. Far away as we are from the great Art Centres of the world it is one way to raise our standards of work and to keep in touch with contemporary trends.

27. Indirect contact with New York had been established through Jack Shadbolt, who had studied with Will Barnet.

28. Quoted in King, p.64.

Another letter sent to Lochhead by Marion Nicholl (a teacher at the Alberta Provincial Institute of Technology in Calgary) emphasized those qualities that made Emma Lake unique in Canada:

> The invaluable experience of studying with Will Barnet at Emma Lake persuades me to write to you of my profound gratitude. The University of Saskatchewan shows an unusually
The enthusiasm that Lindner expressed for this contact with the outside cultural community betrays no self-consciousness concerning the shift of loyalties from Great Britain to New York. Similarly, Workshop Leaders were unselfconsciously frank (and unapologetic) about their New York bias. Barnet, for example, described his view of the purpose of the Workshops as follows: "[The Workshops function as a] dissemination of ideas with the visiting artist who is usually from the center of the art world, New York City." While Barnet saw himself as a representative of the latest New York art trends, Workshop Co-ordinator Lochhead emphasized the universality of modern art, writing that "Mr. Barnet brought forth a profound insight of the universal values in art thus enabling the participants to grasp a clearer understanding of the structural order embodied in any successful work of art." In the late 1950s, it was enlightened attitude in promoting such a project. I only wish the Banff School had followed your pattern.

I doubt that there is such an opportunity for practising artists anywhere else in Canada and you are to be congratulated for conceiving and carrying through such a farsighted and future-building idea.

I hope, very much indeed, that you will continue on this path with the obviously sympathetic backing of the University of Saskatchewan.

Quoted in King, p.66.

29. Cited in King, p.250.

30. Cited in King, pp.60-1.
critically important for those artists attending the workshops to establish contact and have access to information. Dependency on the center was essential until they were fluent in the vernacular of modern art and could contribute their own voices to cosmopolitan modernism.

The tentative connection established between Emma Lake and New York by the 1957 Barnet Workshop was further validated by the 1959 Workshop led by the New York abstract painter Barnett Newman (figure 26). The arrival of Newman, a New York artistic luminary, represented, in the words of John O'Brian "a pivotal moment in the development of the Workshops." McKay described Newman's impact in the following way:

[He was] a power trick -- like king baboon knows how to wake up young baboons who are sitting on their asses not doing their thing (to put it in Desmond Morris's terms). It's ridiculous, but it's an animal reaction. There is some electrical thing that goes and says: Jesus! Like, wake up! -- Because this is important! This is a guy who knows! Newman's influence on many of the Workshop participants is best illustrated by McKay's 1961 painting

31. As King notes, the New York abstract expressionist Franz Kline declined an invitation to participate as Workshop Leader in 1959. His refusal resulted in the invitation being extended to Barnett Newman.

32. O'Brian, "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan and Who is Emma Lake?" The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.34.

33. Cited in King, p.90.
Image of Clarity (figure 27), a large format abstract image dominated by a Newman-like vertical "zip." This characteristic zip deviates slightly in its gentle curvilinear form from the strict parallelism of Newman's own work, as in The Way 1, for example (figure 28). The background of McKay's painting also deviates in the application of enamel paint to a masonite surface, resulting in a more differentiated and dynamic visual field than would be found in Newman's painted canvases. McKay attributed this variation on Newman's technique to the influence of fellow Workshop participant Ronald Bloore: "I owe to Ron Bloore the idea of glazing stove enamel over latex which I use to this day." Thus, despite the desire of the "young baboons" to follow the lead of "king baboon," they also exerted a modifying influence on one another. Nonetheless, these young Canadian painters were increasingly predisposed towards New York artists, and the Newman Workshop represented an acceleration of the influence of New York prior to Greenberg's arrival at Emma Lake in 1962.


35. Not all the participants at the Newman Workshop felt as positively about the experience as did McKay. Some participants criticized Newman because of various professional and pedagogical issues. For example, one participant, Robert Bruce, noted in a later interview that "There wasn't any workshop as far as that goes," indicating his frustration with the whole experience. Bruce added, "As far as I was concerned, he [Newman]
However, in their eagerness to be up-to-date with the centers of art, primarily New York, Saskatchewan artists embraced the inherent bias within U.S. post-war modern art of emphasizing the universal and the international over the particular and the regional. As long as cosmopolitan modernism was the hegemonic style of contemporary art during the 1950s within the United States, and increasingly around the world, the dominance of universalism and internationalism remained relatively unquestioned by many Canadian artists. However, that hegemony began to be questioned by more and more Canadian artists and politicians in the early 1960s. In the wake of this analysis, the dialogue established between Saskatchewan and New York began to seem anachronistic. The particular ideological implications of the cosmopolitan modernist discourse could no longer remain transparent in the tumultuous decade of the 1960s; thus modernist artists were reintroduced to the political realm from which they had sought, through their

contributed absolutely nothing artistically." Bruce's artistic inclinations were towards the de Kooning-inspired abstract expressionists and, in his view, the Newman-inspired modernist work at Emma Lake "didn't seem to have any meaning." (Quoted in King, p.71) Modernism became the dominant tendency at Emma Lake from 1957 until 1965, but its influence was never complete amongst all participants. However, although the focus of this study is the modernist strain at Emma Lake, it is important to remember that voices of dissent were present at every workshop.
allegiance to Greenberg's formalism, to separate themselves.

The turn in the 1950s towards internationalism was almost unavoidable for many Canadian painters given the bifurcation of the post-war New York art scene into progressive modernism and representational forms of painting. The latter, however, were perceived by most North American artists and critics as tainted by nationalism and/or regionalism. The association of nationalism with fascism had, as early as 1942, tarnished the efforts of progressive artists in the United States who, like Ben Shahn, attempted to maintain the anti-fascist message of American regionalist art. As Cecile Whiting has observed, this predisposition to associate regionalism and fascism was too hard to shake: "Neither continuing to paint regionalist imagery -- universalized or not -- nor painting figurative works documenting the international war effort succeeded in adapting regionalism to the ideological imperatives of America during the war and post-war eras." Despite the efforts of regionalists to proclaim their support of the war


37. Whiting, p.128.
effort and represent the antifascist struggle, freedom, individualism, and internationalism continued to be associated with non-regionalist art forms. Thus, regionalist sympathies in the visual arts were exiled to the margins of liberal cultural discourse. In the immediate post-war years, being up-to-date for painters in both Canada and the United States meant subsuming regional and national sympathies to the allure of universalism despite the implicit national agenda of the United States that was promoted by this very discourse.38

By 1948, Greenberg's formulation of a modernist avant-garde provided the rationale for an elite modernism that was the visual equivalent of the advanced liberal ideology that was so eloquently expressed in the original version of Arthur Schlesinger's *The Vital Center*, published in that same year. "Alienation," "freedom" and "individualism" became the catchwords of an alliance of particular strands of liberalism and avant-garde art production in the post-war period, an example of what art historian Serge Guilbaut sees as "perhaps the first reconciliation of avant-garde ideology with the ideology of individuality, risk, and the new frontier as forged by Rothko and Newman, Greenberg and Rosenberg, with the

advanced liberal ideology set forth by Schlesinger in *The Vital Center*: the politics of freedom."\(^{39}\) Mark Rothko and other New York modernists, such as Adolph Gottlieb and Barnett Newman, could not abide the association of regionalism with fascism nor its geographical rootedness and its rejection of international artistic styles.\(^{40}\) Despite the modernist aversion to regionalism and nationalism because of this association with fascism and the concomitant destruction of freedom and individualism, American modernist artists were unintentionally drawn into a defense of U.S. nationalism under the guise of internationalism, as Whiting explains: "Ironically, since democracy was most closely associated in their minds with the United States, the ideal of democratic universalism most often ended up as the propagation of American nationalism."\(^{41}\) In the early 1950s, this cloaking of

\(^{39}\) Guilbaut, p.189.

\(^{40}\) Whiting, p.195.

\(^{41}\) Whiting, p.199. After the cancellation of the 1958 Emma Lake workshop, the workshop organizers were able to attract Barnett Newman as the workshop leader in 1959. Newman's own position on regionalism and nationalism is expressed in the article "What about Isolationist Art," in which he states:

> Isolationism, we have learned by now, is Hitlerism. Both are expressions of the same intense, vicious nationalism. . . . [Both use] the 'great lie,' the intensified nationalism, false patriotism, the appeal to race, the re-emphasis of the home and homey sentiment. The art of the world, ranted [the isolationist], as focused in the Ecole de Paris, is
nationalism within internationalist aspirations was a powerful ideological instrument for the United States, as it represented itself as the bastion of cultural freedom.

Canadian artists in Saskatchewan eager to learn about the latest tendencies in modernist painting regarded the move to abandon Canadian art's preoccupation with regionalism and nationalism as progressive. The rejection of regionalism and nationalism was not that difficult for young artists such as Lochhead and McKay, given their boredom with the nationalist legacy of the landscape school of the Group of Seven which had dominated English Canadian art since World War One. With the advent of the Cold War, cosmopolitan modernism seemed a legitimate means of rejecting nationalism and of providing a means of participating in the international modernist movement, ideally not as a colonial outpost but as an equal contributor.

Emma Lake Workshop Co-ordinator Art McKay expressed the hostility of Saskatchewan modernists to nationalism in a 1961 catalogue statement, one year prior to Clement Greenberg's arrival in Saskatchewan:

There is no such thing as a distinctly Canadian art; there are only artists who happen to be Canadian. Each person makes his world which he shares with those who are interested, and people share only those things in which degenerate art, fine for Frenchmen, but not for us Americans.

Quoted in Whiting, p.195.
they have common awareness. McKay’s assertion of an anti-nationalist individualism presented the strongest indication of how smoothly and effortlessly the Saskatchewan painters were moving towards the individualism and universalism of New York modernism at a time when the relationship between Canada and the United States was under tremendous stress. However, Greenberg’s colonizing influence must be assessed in the light of the changing nature of the Cold War. If Greenberg had been successful in the early days of the Cold War, the late 1940s and early 1950s, in asserting the superiority of American painting and in providing the critical equivalent of Schlesinger’s Vital Center for the visual arts, then why did his influence in the art world not continue unabated up until the moment of his arrival in Saskatchewan? Positioning Greenberg within the evolution of the Cold War, on the borderline between his post-war success and the decline of his dominance in the early 1960s, will provide a more accurate assessment of what role, if any, his aesthetic played in the U.S. efforts to bring Canada in line with the American Cold War strategy.

Between the end of World War Two and 1955, Clement

Greenberg developed his particular variant of modernist criticism in reaction to the changing cultural context of the United States. One important aspect of the post-war social environment was the threat and the promise of the phenomenal growth of the middle class which simultaneously was "surging toward culture" as well as demanding cultural experiences that were "not too hard to consume." Whereas in his famous 1939 article "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," Greenberg had warned of the universalizing tendencies of the culture of kitsch as a by-product of Western industrial civilization, by 1946, Greenberg foresaw the effect of the gravitational pull of an expanding middle class culture on his concept of the modernist avant-garde:

This state of affairs constitutes a much greater threat to higher art than kitsch itself -- which usually keeps the distinctions clear. The demand now is that the distinctions be blurred if not entirely obliterated, that is, the vulgarization be more subtle and general.

Just as kitsch was sweeping the globe on its triumphal post-war tour, so too was kitsch smashing the boundaries of everyday life, extending the exchange principle to its ultimate conclusion: "penetrating," as Henri Levebvre

43. *Clement Greenberg* Volume 2, Ed. O'Brian, p.57. This argument was made by Greenberg in an article for *The Nation* originally published on February 23, 1946.

argues, "the details of everyday life."45

The threat of this extension of kitsch from the smallest particular to the global structuring of culture could be countered by modernist disaffirmation and negation as a means of critiquing exchange value and alienated labour. However, without the realization of socialism or the existence of a cultural elite able to counterbalance the pull of the new middle class market within the United States, the foundations for such a critical strategy were shaky at best.

One strategy for disaffirmative practice with which Greenberg was undoubtedly familiar was the criticism of the neo-Marxist philosopher Theodor Adorno.46 However, faced with the torn halves of a culture which did not add up, Greenberg chose to defend his disaffirmative aesthetics on substantially different foundations than had Adorno in the 1950s. Adorno's concept of a critical modernist practice embodied two options. Modernism could react against the universalization of kitsch and exchange value by posing as a disaffirmative practice, thereby


46. This is argued by John O. Brian, Introduction, Clement Greenberg, Volumes 3 and 4, p.9. O'Brian highlights Greenberg's fluency in German and the overlapping of many of his arguments with those of Adorno in the 1940s.
"offering itself as a 'negative knowledge' of commodity fetishism." Alternatively, modernism could capitulate to capitalism, "presenting itself -- either cognitively or in all innocence -- as that world's affirmative agent." Adorno's attempt to articulate a sophisticated Marxist position within modernism as a negative knowledge of modern liberal capitalism meant, as Martin Jay argues, stubbornly resisting, "choosing between flawed alternatives or positing a harmonious mediation between them: Negative ontology or historicism, transcendant or immanent critique, autonomous art or art in the service of the revolution, speculative theory or empirical investigation." Adorno adhered to these and other "antimonies," resisting the temptation to essentialize the identity of modernism's critique or to fall back upon the subjectivity or intersubjectivity of taste derived from Kant's Critique of Judgement. Rather than withdrawing into Kant's arguments Adorno inverts them,


48. Jay, pp. 118 and 163. Despite Adorno's well-known reputation for cultural and social pessimism, which derived from the mangled nature of the modern subject, his subject position at the intersection of contrasting antinomic relationships gave him more critical flexibility than Greenberg's later ossified modernism. This enabled Adorno to write, at the end of his life, in 1969: "The integration of consciousness and leisure is obviously not yet entirely successful. The real interests of the individual are still strong enough at the margins, to resist total control." Quoted in Jay, p.128.
performing a service similar to Marx with Hegel, keeping the materialist dimension alive.  

Rather than attempt to maintain such an antinomic structure that kept open the materialist option for Adorno's critical theory, Greenberg increasingly opted for the Kantian critique of subjective taste as the foundation for his critical modernism. This belief in the subjectivity of taste was the critical paradigm Greenberg brought with him to Emma Lake, Saskatchewan. The Kantian position had several advantages for Greenberg, as the Cold War deepened and Marxism became anathema not only to liberal intellectuals, including the 'soft progressives' villified by Schlesinger in the Vital Center, but to Greenberg himself. The Kantian turn allowed Greenberg to retain the European philosophical tradition within his criticism without appearing too soft on communism or too lax in his defence of freedom. Thus Greenberg could maintain the essentialist and foundationalist arguments of European philosophy to form


50. O'Brian notes that Greenberg refers to Kant for the first time in 1943 and continued to use Kant's philosophy in formulating his criticism. In 1950 this reliance on Kant extended to the use of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement as the key text in a seminar taught at Black Mountain College. (O'Brian, Introduction, The Flat Side of the Landscape, p.9.)
an artistic criticism that would continue to keep culture moving forward even after hope in the material transformation of the society had diminished. More importantly for Greenberg, the delicate formulation of a progressive concept of culture divorced from Marxism would allow his teleology of cultural development to coexist within the liberal political culture of the United States in the 1950s.

Greenberg's strategic choice of Kant over Marx is perhaps understandable in a culture like that of the United States, which after 1948 held out little promise for the realization of socialism and little more for the construction of a cultural elite that would support the idea of a modernist avant-garde. In addition, the increasing efforts by some liberals to distance themselves from the European philosophical legacy for the sake of the pragmatic current in American thought made the progressive teleological side of Greenberg's modernism vulnerable to liberal criticism. While Greenberg's move to Kant would resonate sympathetically with the subterranean progressive teleology of a pragmatic liberal such as the early John Dewey51, he

would have more serious problems with the anti-Kantianism of the pragmatic liberal thought of William James.\textsuperscript{52} Greenberg’s ability to maneuver between the competing strands of pragmatism and liberalism would determine the success or failure of his interpretation of modernism for Cold War liberals. As the interpretation of John Dewey and the ‘soft progressives’ was replaced by Schlesinger’s ‘hard’ pragmatic liberalism, it became imperative for Greenberg to reconcile modernism and the European philosophical tradition within an increasingly pragmatic liberal environment.

In the Cold War environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s, Greenberg’s growing advocacy of a self-reflexive modern art was a suitable complement to a

52. Despite the fact that the anti-Kantian revolution in the United States was led by William James, recent scholarship has demonstrated the existence of hidden affinities between both the dualism of Kant and the anti-dualism of James. For an analysis of Kant’s pragmatism and James’ transcendentalist presuppositions, see Thomas Bruce Carlson, \textit{The Pragmatic Individual: from Kant to James}, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1990.

The most outspoken contemporary exponent of the anti-Kantian turn in American neo-pragmatism is Richard Rorty. Since the publication of his first article on pragmatism, during the Kennedy Administration, Rorty has been the staunchest advocate within the United States of the anti-foundationalism and anti-correspondist theories of knowledge contained in the pragmatic philosophies of 1950s, including those of Willard Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, and Donald Davidson. For a discussion of the impact of the pragmatic philosophers of the 1950s on contemporary pragmatism, see C.G. Prado, \textit{The Limits of Pragmatism} (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989).
foreign policy geared to holding the Soviet Union at bay in Europe and convincing Europeans of the sophistication and superiority of American art. Domestically, Greenberg's theories of modernism were also acceptable on the basis of their anti-communism and their attractiveness to a liberal elite intent on maintaining a cultural distinctiveness from the expanding middle class and its suburban middlebrow culture.

In 1953 Greenberg published a lengthy essay entitled "The Plight of Our Culture" in two consecutive issues of the journal Commentary. The essay rates as one of his finest pieces of critical exposition but tellingly sets out the implications of a critical strategy now far removed from the Marxism of the 1939 essay which established his reputation, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch."

"The Plight of Our Culture" defined the critical niche between the traditionalists and the liberals that Greenberg had carved for himself in the preceding decade. As an alternative to both positions, Greenberg offered, within the sphere of art, a mechanism by which the contradictions of industrial society could be countered. While insufficient as political praxis to change society as a whole, Greenberg considered the modernist avant-garde sufficient to keep culture moving on its progressive course, even in a period of cultural regression.
In contemporary industrial society, Greenberg argues in this essay, the role of work is the central category of life. Leisure becomes a peripheral concern while play becomes escape. More importantly, "play as such, under industrialism, is no longer serious enough to open the way to the heart of things -- it is rather a detour or escape." For there to be authentic culture, in Greenberg's view, this way of being must be countered. Authentic culture must "lie at the center" of all things, serious and unserious, while at the same time not presenting an unreflective closure of authentic culture's possibilities. The realization of utopia is downplayed for a more sober assessment of the possibilities of overcoming the alienation of work and recovering some semblance of humanity. Unlike the role of play in American pragmatic liberalism, wherein the hierarchical structure separating the spheres of work, play and leisure is dissolved (with freedom, individualism and non-alienated labour being realizable within liberal capitalism) and unlike Jacques Derrida's later assertion of the perpetual play of difference oscillating between the unresolvable tensions of the same and other, Greenberg's theory of play remained firmly within the European idealist tradition. Greenberg posited

distinctions and boundaries that subsumed play within work until some indeterminate point in the future. Only then would society overcome the social contradictions of alienated labour that had kept play sequestered within the realm of modernist practice to protect it from the commodifying touch of late capitalism.

Greenberg's shift from the materialism of his Marxist period to his particular brand of Kantian aesthetics, however, did maintain play as a vital component of his aesthetic equation. Alternatively, had Greenberg opted for Hegel, for example, play would have been a non-issue. Had play become central, as in Derrida, Greenberg's critical concept of progress itself would have been called into question. Greenberg was attempting to mediate the terrain between play and non-play, stepping gingerly between the extremes of Hegel and pragmatism.

The essay "'American-Type' Painting," published in Partisan Review in 1955, crystallizes Greenberg's critical position at the moment when the European philosophical legacy was appropriate to promoting the American Cold War effort in Europe. Greenberg notes that abstract expressionism "is the first phenomenon in American art to draw a standing protest, and the first to be deplored seriously, and frequently, abroad. But," he adds, "it is also the first on its scale to win ...
serious attention." Greenberg's interpretation of the international success of abstract expressionism seemed to take little notice of the criticism of abstract expressionism at the Venice Biennale in 1954. Only one year previous to the publication of "'American-Type' Painting," the Rockefeller-financed American exhibition at the Biennale, organized by New York's Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), had focused on two American painters: a cosmopolitan modernist -- Willem de Kooning (figure 29) -- and a representative of the tradition of social realism and regionalism in America -- Ben Shahn (figure 30). The 27th Venice Biennale demonstrated to Greenberg the triumph of the cosmopolitan modernism of de Kooning over the regionalist legacy of Shahn. Despite the immense gulf separating the artistic sensibilities of Shahn and de Kooning, the dual-pronged exhibition strategy successfully demonstrated the necessity of exhibiting examples of the latest American modern art to sway Italian elites to the side of the West by demonstrating


55. For a discussion of the 1954 Venice Biennale, see Pohl, pp.153-172.

56. Greenberg triumphantly states, "At the Biennale in Venice this year, I saw how de Kooning's exhibition put to shame, not only that of his neighbor in the American Pavilion, Ben Shahn, but that of every other painter present in his generation or under." ("'American-Type' Painting," 196).
the United States as the leader and guarantor of individualism and freedom. However, while de Kooning may have represented the qualities of individualism and freedom which MOMA had intended, the reception of his work by the European art world was, by and large, negative. As a result, art historian Frances Pohl concludes, "[de Kooning's] art failed, therefore, to win for the United States the respect and good feeling that was in such short supply." 57

In "American'-Type Painting," however, Greenberg ignored the success of the regionalist tradition, represented by Shahn, in reaching out to the Italian middle class, an ominous oversight at the moment when culture was becoming a more important instrument of foreign policy. In contrast, pragmatic liberals anxious to promote culture beyond the realm of an elite few did not overlook the success of regionalism in its appeal to the middle class. The recognition, on the part of certain pragmatic liberals such as Nelson Rockefeller, of the importance of high culture to the Cold War effort resulted in the MOMA playing an important role in the promotion of American culture in Europe. In 1952, for example, MOMA initiated an international exhibition program which was to extend for five years at a cost of

57. Pohl, p.189.
$625,000.58 This program was designed to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of government involvement in the arts resulting from McCarthyism and assumed an almost "quasi-official character, providing the 'U.S. representation' in shows where most nations were represented by government-sponsored exhibits."59 The program was directed by Porter A. McCray, a protege of Rockefeller's architect Wallace K. Harrison. In addition to the overseas program, in 1954 MOMA purchased and proceeded to operate the U.S. pavilion at the Venice Biennale until a viable program of government support was put in place. MOMA's involvement in Venice ended in 1962, the same year that August Hecksher, Jr. began his evaluation of government funding for the arts.

For pragmatic liberals such as Nelson Rockefeller, the lesson was clear: in order to contain and discipline the suburban middle class at home or in Europe as well as to communicate freedom and individualism in the Third World and around the globe, the gaps between regionalism and internationalism, the center and periphery, as well as between high and low culture would have to be narrowed. While abstract expressionism would continue to be the backbone of modern art exhibitions sponsored by

59. Cockroft, 40.
MOMA, cultural observers were aware of the need to reach out to these other potential publics that were decisive to victory in the Cold War.

In 1955 the Rockefellers and MOMA exhibited abroad "The Family of Man" for the first time. This show was a travelling photographic display ultimately seen by nine million viewers in sixty-nine countries in eighty-five separate exhibitions. The theme of the exhibition promoted the universality of the family unit within the framework of liberal humanism. As Allan Sekula has argued, "["The Family of Man" exhibition] universalize[d] the bourgeois nuclear family, suggesting a globalized, utopian family album, a family romance imposed on every corner of the Earth." In his preview remarks on the exhibition, Nelson Rockefeller proudly stated how much the exhibition created "a sense of kinship with all mankind." Thus while abstract expressionism had achieved for the United States an assertion of individualism and freedom to which the elites of Western Europe could respond, it was not necessarily the only means upon which to secure global cultural hegemony.


Early indications of the vulnerability of Greenberg's defense of modernist painting in a Cold War environment extending beyond Europe and encompassing a broad range of cultures was revealed in a prescient letter sent to Greenberg on April 1, 1955 by the editor of Intercultural Publications Incorporated, James Loughlin. Greenberg had submitted a copy of "'American-Type' Painting" to Intercultural Publications for possible publication. Loughlin's comments to Greenberg after reading the proofs of the article reflect, as early as 1955, the potential unsuitability of Greenberg's cosmopolitan modernism to the broadening scope of the Cold War:

[The article is not] . . . a good piece to sell them [e.g. abstract expressionist paintings] to say, a Burmese who has none of the background of earlier modern art to serve as a step in his adjustment to these extremists. You say at one point that a certain picture by Jackson Pollock is a "masterpiece of clarity." Now what is the poor Burmese to think when he looks at the reproduction and then at the sentence. He's going to think we are pulling his leg . . . . To summarize all this I think that this might be an excellent piece for us to use in our French, German, and Italian editions where we have a sophisticated public to deal with -- but that would be pretty much of a total loss for

62. Sekula writes that the world portrayed in The Family of Man exhibition "... is merely a smoothly functioning international market economy, in which economic bonds have been translated into spurious sentimental ties, and in which the overt racism appropriate to earlier forms of colonial enterprise has been supplanted by the 'humanization of the other' so central to the discourse of neocolonialism." (p.143)
our English language edition which goes to the primitive countries.63

As discussed in Chapter One, by the launch of Sputnik 1 in the fall of 1957, the focus of American Cold War policy under President Eisenhower came under increasing attack, especially from a revitalized Democratic party seeking a winning formula for the next presidential election. Between 1957 and the broadcast of "Modernist Painting" in the spring of 1960, therefore, Greenberg's Kantian defense of modernism was suddenly immersed in a raging debate over his dualistic construction of modernism and kitsch. Greenberg's

63. Greenberg correspondence, Archives of American Art (AAA). An example of the anti-dualist and anti-hierarchical bias of American liberal intellectuals who were trying to define a strategy for containing the Soviet Union in the Third World would be the position of Daniel Lerner. Lerner was a key member of what Theodore White referred to as "Action Intellectuals" (intellectuals who moved to the government bureaucracy from academia following Kennedy's election in stark contrast to the preponderance of business and military leaders under the Eisenhower regime) and was a key advocate of the development of "white propaganda." Lerner argued for the extensive use of modern mass media and the clever use of truth and accuracy in broadcasting as strategies which would ensure the eventual victory of the United States over the Soviet Union in the Third World. His strategy was significant in its advocacy of a universal symbolism that would serve "democratic" development in the Third World that could not be confined solely to elites. For further reading on Lerner's arguments on this issue see "Revolutionary Elites and World Symbolism," in Harold P. Laswell [Ed.], Propaganda and Communication in World History (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1980), especially p.392.
Kantianism could not be allied with the theories of liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. as pragmatic liberalism transformed itself to exploit the vulnerability of the Eisenhower Administration and the weakening influence of the "soft" progressive wing of the Democratic party.

Schlesinger had reluctantly accepted the Dewey tradition within American liberalism after the war, but by 1956, in two essays ("Liberalism in America: A Note for Europeans" and "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American Political Thought and Life") Schlesinger demolished the Deweyan legacy while laying the philosophical groundwork for liberalism that struck at the heart of European philosophical idealism. Schlesinger's Vital Center liberalism was shifting more and more to the right, discarding many elements that had been present at the time of that book's initial publication, as Schlesinger briefly noted in his essay "Liberalism in America": "[American liberalism has] jettisoned many illusions. Its temper is realistic, even skeptical. Its objectives are limited. It is mistrustful of utopianism, perfectionism, and maximalism." Thanks to his reading


65. Schlesinger, Politics of Hope, p. 70.
of the Protestant theologian Niebuhr (a persistent critic of Dewey’s progressivism and political optimism), Schlesinger envisaged a pragmatic liberalism which recognized the tragic limitations of the human condition while opening the door to an activist liberalism that could, through the maximum application of human ingenuity, technology and science, incrementally solve various social problems. The end of teleological optimism, the introduction of pessimism, and the immense complexity and flux of contemporary society signalled a shift of emphasis within liberalism, ultimately resulting in the questioning of the determinism, elitism and dualistic emphasis within the aesthetics of Greenberg’s model of modernism.

The development of the pragmatic anti-formalist position within American liberalism went hand in hand with the development of Schlesinger’s and Kennedy’s vision of the expanding New Frontier. This relationship between pragmatism and the New Frontier bears a similarity to the coming of age of American pragmatism in the late nineteenth century which had developed in reaction to Frederick Turner’s argument concerning the closing of the frontier and had prospered in the new expansionist era of the United States after 1898. In both instances, the restricted notion of progress contained in the pessimistic tradition of pragmatism
furnished anti-formalists an alternate concept of progress in opposition to the social optimism of Dewey or the European philosophical tradition. Activist liberals who were anti-dualist and anti-formalist, (e.g. "hard" liberals and not "soft") and who equated modernism with formalism did not pose a threat to Greenberg's modernist position during the Eisenhower era until a more pluralist anti-hierarchical position was advanced by the pragmatic liberals swept into the Federal government with Kennedy's election in 1960.

In 1958, as art historian Thierry de Duve has noted, Greenberg still remained confident that his reductive modernist arguments, which rationalized the replacement of 'painterly' abstract expressionism with a 'linear' form of abstract field painting, were the answer to the


The new voices in American philosophy in the late 1950s were those of William Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Wilfred Sellars. Their promotion of ontological pluralism and philosophical anti-foundationalism are integral to the various exponents of American neo-pragmatism such as Richard Rorty. For a discussion of these issues see Cornel West, "The Politics of American New-Pragmatism" in John Rajchman and Cornel West [Eds.], Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp.252-272.
malaise of second and third generation abstract expressionist painters.67 While the political and social environment of the late 1950s was definitely shifting, the opportunity remained for Greenberg to boldly seize the high ground. He could fend off rival forms of abstract painting, such as abstract classicism in Los Angeles or the emerging new generation of painters such as Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg in New York, while keeping his Kantian dualism and subjectivity of taste intact. The price of his strategy was to emphasize only the opticality of the image and to jettison any lingering philosophical residue that tied his work to his earlier materialism, while retaining the "positivist aspect of the modernist aesthetic."68 In effect, Greenberg's solution to the plight of culture in the 1950s was to make himself the spokesman for a modernism out of touch with the model of cultural development advocated by pragmatic liberals such as Nelson Rockefeller, Jacob Javits and August Heckscher, Jr.

The election of Kennedy in 1960 set in motion a process whereby pragmatic liberal intellectuals could implement their theories concerning the role of culture

in the Cold War United States. As a consequence, the gap separating the cultural positions of Greenberg and the liberal pragmatists widened to the point of rupture. Greenberg published two articles in 1960 that codified his theoretical stance and highlighted examples of modernist painting as visible articulations of his position. "Modernist Painting," first broadcast over the Voice of America and published in 1960, clearly lays out the new ground upon which Greenberg hoped to keep modernist painting moving forward, endowed with the momentum of a Kantian moral imperative. The second article, "Louis and Noland," published in the May 25, 1960 issue of Art International, not only presents examples of the work of the Washington, D.C.-based painters Morris Louis and Kenneth Noland as examples of Greenberg’s new aesthetic but also suggests his interest in "provincial" environments as vital contexts for the production of modern art -- two years prior to his trip to Emma Lake.

In outlining his defence of a self-reflexive modern art that would break with the "Tenth Street touch" of first and second generation abstract expressionist painters, Greenberg advocated an exploration of the formal characteristics of modern painting, "not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area
of competence."69 Invoking Kant as the first modernist, Greenberg isolated the characteristics of painting according to the criteria of a pure immanent criticism ("purity" meaning, according to Greenberg, "self-definition, and the enterprise of self-criticism in the arts [has become] one of self-definition with a vengeance."70) While flatness is the term most closely associated with Greenberg's concept of purity, the boundary lines separating immanent critique from contamination with anything external to it enabled Greenberg to play with and disassemble the binary tensions integral to painting as a form of representation. Flatness was thus not an absolute and, argued Greenberg, "[there] can never be an utter flatness."71 Sculptural illusion may transgress the "heightened sensitivity of the picture plane,"72 but modernist pictorial illusions of space enable the viewer to have a new visual experience.

Greenberg's new theories of modernist painting required the viewer to engage with the paintings on their


own terms. Greenberg's concern with the paintings' attendant play with formal criteria continues ideas first expressed in his 1953 essay "The Plight of Our Culture," which was re-published in a highly edited form in the anthology Art and Culture in 1961. In "The Plight of Our Culture," Greenberg established his position in opposition to pragmatic liberalism's synthesis of work and play, a synthesis which liberals saw as a way of educating the suburban middle class to new forms of mass leisure and civic virtue. Curiously, Greenberg observed in this essay that contemporary liberals seemed more open and reasonable than they had in the past. However, pragmatic liberalism's fundamental misunderstanding of industrialism and its consequences for a life based on the qualitative principles of high culture, as opposed to the quantitative values of mass culture, rendered their proposals for overcoming the rift between work and play powerless. Worse still, their inability to understand that leisure was "both a product and a function of work" meant that the liberal concept of leisure would promote the very passivity within mass culture it was intended to overcome.

Greenberg's own formulation of the relationship

---

73. For a discussion of Greenberg's conception of the relationship between work, play, and leisure, see "Plight of Culture," pp.54-62.
between work and play was visually realized in the work of Morris Louis and Kenneth Noland. In works such as Louis’ *Winged Hue* (figure 31) and Noland’s *Crystal* (figure 32), the application of thinned oil paint onto areas of unprimed cotton duck asserts the primacy of flatness and opticality while maintaining the visual illusion of depth by the indeterminate way in which the canvas and paint bond. "The effect," states Greenberg in the essay "Louis and Noland," "conveys a sense not only of colour as somehow disembodied, and therefore more purely optical, but also of colour as a thing that opens and expands the picture plane." The resulting play of surface and depth, the soaking of the pigment into the canvas, also enabled Greenberg to theorize about the visual transcendance of the central painted image by pointing to the illusion of space projected beyond the framing conventions of painting:

The suppression of the difference between painted and unpainted surfaces causes pictorial space to leak through -- or rather to seem about to leak through the framing edges of the picture into the space beyond them.

According to Greenberg, the intertwining of paint and canvas creates a textual play in the work of Louis and Noland. The modulating of surface and depth by the

---


staining of the canvas provides a means for subtly maintaining a visually ambiguous form of facture. This facture is crucial, argued Greenberg, in order to "suppress associations with geometrical painting -- which implies, traditionally, a smooth, hard surface."\(^7^6\) Greenberg's concept of painting after abstract expressionism thus oscillates between the extremes of painterly and geometric abstraction. While maintaining a space for play within the interstices of his formal criteria, Greenberg subordinates play to his Kantian formalism, avoiding either the elimination of play within Hegel's systematic determinism or the hypostasizing of play within Derridean deconstruction.

Greenberg's promotion of the two Washington abstract painters Louis and Noland as exemplars of his neo-Kantian aesthetic also provides an interesting spatial analogy. New York, for Greenberg, had sunk to new depths of cultural depravity, as indicated in his statement, "Never before in New York has there been so much false and inflated painting and sculpture, never before so many false and inflated reputations."\(^7^7\) In Los Angeles, meanwhile, the newly emerging hard-edge style, designated Abstract Classicism by its primary critical advocate

\(^7^6.\) Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," 28.

\(^7^7.\) Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," 27.
Jules Langsner, was claiming leadership of abstract painting on the West Coast. Between the center, New York, and the pretensions of Los Angeles to be America's Second City of Art, Greenberg saw room for painters to maneuver between provincialism and the so-called cosmopolitanism of the center. Louis and Noland, by virtue of being 250 miles from the new Babylon of art in New York, had access to the cultural maelstrom of the center without being "subjected as constantly to its pressures to conform as you would be if you lived and worked in New York." In Greenberg's view, Louis and Noland's geographical "isolation" becomes, in this context, an indication of their moral integrity in the face of cultural decay. Such reasoning, however, also provided a window of opportunity for the painters of Emma Lake, Saskatchewan, who were beginning their pursuit of Greenberg as a workshop leader. It was during the period, immediately following Kennedy's election, at the time when Greenberg was refining his new strategy for abstract painting, that he visited the margins of the North American cultural universe: Emma Lake.

In January 1962, Greenberg accepted an invitation to attend the August Emma Lake Artists' Workshop.79

78. Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," 27.
Workshop organizer Ken Lochhead suggested, as a possible itinerary for the journey to Saskatchewan, flying from New York directly to Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, via Trans-Canada Airlines, then Pacific Western Airlines to Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, where Lochhead would meet Greenberg and drive him to Emma Lake: an easy ninety-minute drive to the north. By July, however, Greenberg had decided that he and his wife, Jenny, with the Canadian sculptor Robert Murray acting as an informal chauffeur, would drive the several thousand miles from New York to Emma Lake. (figure 33) Greenberg’s commitment of time and energy to a journey across half the continent to a small lake on the fringe of the broad expanse of prairie grasslands at an important juncture in the history of painting in the United States suggests that his trip was perhaps something other than a mere holiday. As Greenberg later noted in his article on prairie painting for Canadian Art, Saskatchewan was rooted in a mysterious and complex "double obscurity": it had a provincial relationship to the major cultural centers of Canada (Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa) which were, in their turn, also in a provincial relationship to Paris and New York.

79. Greenberg’s arrival on the periphery was actually preceded by the refusal by two New York painters, Phillip Guston and the 1959 workshop leader Barnett Newman, to accept the invitation to visit Emma Lake as workshop leaders.
Saskatchewan thus became a paradigm for Greenberg's theories concerning the traditional relationship of center and periphery. Destabilizing this relationship created a legitimate space for "provincial" modernist artists such as Louis and Noland and could do the same for artists in Saskatchewan. Since Saskatchewan was the "remotest," "most isolated" of the Canadian prairie provinces, its obscurity was all the more exotic. Consequently Saskatchewan was more interesting to Greenberg than "penetrating the isolation . . . of art in Los Angeles."^{80}

However, even more significant for Greenberg than the physical remoteness of the province and its artists were the psychological mechanisms developed by the inhabitants for coping with their isolation. Rather than bemoaning their peripheral status and seeking to overturn it by competing with New York (Greenberg cites the specific examples of Podunk and San Francisco in the United States as fostering this ambition), artists in Saskatchewan were insulated from the cultural depravity of the center while at the same time acknowledging "that [Saskatchewan] is in a provincial situation."^{81} Yet, as

---


Greenberg notes in the article, Saskatchewan was "far less provincial in atmosphere than I expected." Saskatchewan painters were thus in an ambiguous situation. Paradoxically these artists were simultaneously extremely isolated and provincial, yet were familiar with many of the complex issues of modernist painting thanks to the New York artists brought to Emma Lake. This situation mirrored the paradoxical status of Greenberg himself, who had become America's single-most important art critic at the moment when the liberal cultural paradigm of high culture in the United States was beginning to shift away from its brief flirtation with modernism towards the pragmatic liberal Cold War cultural agenda of pluralism and regionalism. Greenberg arrived in Saskatchewan in the summer of 1962, a crucial moment in his reaction to the newly emerging liberal cultural paradigm.

Lochhead, in comments written after Greenberg's two-week visit to Emma Lake, noted that Greenberg's reputation was responsible for drawing the highest calibre of artists that the Workshops had ever witnessed, including artists from Montreal, Vancouver, and Los Angeles. Composed of twenty-three participants, a diverse collection of abstract and representational

82. Greenberg, "Painting and Sculpture in Prairie Canada," 90.
painters had the opportunity to work closely with New York's leading critic for two weeks. Beginning at nine in the morning, Greenberg would meet with the artists for an informal hour of conversation over coffee (figure 34). Two hours of formal discussion would occur in the afternoon with several evenings devoted to marathon conversations of up to four hours. Lochhead noted the advantage of the close living quarters in a 1970 interview, in which he outlined the unique situation of the Emma Lake Workshops:

Well, artists in New York would never have a chance to have breakfast, lunch, and supper with Clement Greenberg for two weeks running in the woods; and then between sessions go and have a drink and talk, and talk off into the night. In New York, you're lucky if you see these people for an hour if you drop by at their place; they're always having something else to do. This way, they're completely captive to that environment.

Following the Workshop, Lochhead's work clearly demonstrated the hothouse effect of two weeks of close proximity to America's leading art critic. Three paintings, all completed in 1963 and all selected by Greenberg for the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in Los Angeles -- Dark Green Centre (figure 35), Pink Centre, and Yellow Centre -- exemplify Lochhead's

83. These comments on the day-to-day workings of the 1962 Workshop are from Ken Lochhead's report on the Workshop, reprinted in King, pp.114-115.

84. Quoted in King, p.123.
adherence to the critical precepts which Greenberg had evolved since the turn of the decade and which formed the basis of his Workshop. All three paintings utilize a roughly similar format: large, slightly irregular, rectangular or squarish shapes of colour which take their point of reference from the shape of the canvas itself. Acrylic paint is allowed to soak slightly into areas of unprimed canvas, creating the ambiguity of spatial effect that Greenberg advocated in "Modernist Painting." Unlike Louis and Noland, Lochhead adheres to rectangular shapes that are more restrained in their form than Louis' Winged Hue, with its organically influenced stained veils, or Noland's Crystal, with its semi-irregular radial symmetry. All three artists occupy the terrain between the dialectical opposites of the "painterly" and the "geometrical," avoiding both the rigid geometry of Mondrian (or of the Abstract Classicists in Los Angeles) and the "mannered and aggressive surfaces" of painterly abstraction. Lochhead's use of colour and concentric shapes prompted Greenberg to write in 1963, "[Lochhead] has broken through to pure flat colour stated in shapes that approach 'geometry' without really touching it." Greenberg then proceeded to single out Lochhead's work as a "new direction [which] relates to nothing else in

contemporary Canadian painting."

Similarly, Lochhead's colleague McKay revealed a strong Greenbergian influence in the works he produced in 1963, such as Enigma (figure 36), Circle, and Flux, all three of which were also included in the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition. These three works exhibit an identical technique: McKay's earlier adaptation of the Newman zip is replaced by rough geometrical shapes created by scraping enamel paint off of masonite surfaces. McKay uses a different technique than does Lochhead to achieve roughly the same end: the ambiguity of spatial effect advocated by Greenberg in "Modernist Painting." In McKay's works, the illusion of depth is maintained by the irregular patterns formed by the scraping away of the paint from the masonite rather than by allowing paint to soak into the canvas. The aggressive action of scraping away the paint is contained within geometrical forms to avoid the appearance of an overly expressionist technique. Greenberg declared McKay's originality resulted from "the curiously spacious way in which his central motifs are related to the shape of the support...[McKay's work] marks a break from the cubist 'box' as we still see it in Soulages, de Kooning, Riopelle, Guston, and many others, and embodies a new

86. Greenberg, "Painting and Sculpture in Prairie Canada," 92.
response to experience." Greenberg proudly concluded, "These new pictures of McKay's would be as new in Paris or New York as they are in Regina."^^

Lochhead, in addition to being Workshop Coordinator, was also a member of Saskatchewan's leading avant-garde painting group, the Regina Five, the five key abstract painters who had exhibited together in the National Gallery in 1961. It is interesting to note that not all members of the Regina Five were enthusiastic about Greenberg's visit or his visible influence on the evolution of their colleagues' painting. Ronald Bloore -- Regina Five member, director of the Norman Mackenzie Art Gallery in Regina, and participant in the 1959, 1960, and 1961 workshops -- was aghast at the presence of a critic at what was supposed to be a painter's workshop. He also deplored the fact that new aesthetic criteria from the outside were upsetting the delicate balance between openness to a range of other ideas and the slavish adherence to one (i.e. Greenberg's) aesthetic doctrine. In contrasting the earlier workshops with the 1962 version, Bloore blasted Greenberg's influence:

The Artists' Workshops have poisoned the integrity of that atmosphere. The workshops at Emma Lake grew, achieved maturity, faltered and finally substituted for creative exploration an imported critically secure painting theory. It

is probable that recent workshops have inhibited the rich potential in the visual arts in the provinces. 88°

Contrary to Bloore's arguments, the Saskatoon painter Ernest Lindner, who attended the 1962 Workshop, had no doubt as to the importance of Greenberg's participation:

There is no question that the artists' seminars at Emma Lake have caused the most important upsurge of creative work in those who participated. The intimate contact with contemporary New York artists, and especially with the eminent art critic Clement Greenberg, has been simply invaluable to all of us who took part in these seminars. I for one am deeply grateful for this "window" to the larger contemporary art world." 89

This "window" to the outside art world, however, provided an extremely limited view of the New York art scene. Paradoxically, Saskatchewan artists, for good or for bad, regarded Greenberg as the emissary of the center at precisely the moment when Greenberg himself was validating the margins as an alternative to the hegemony of the center. This perspective applies not only to Lochhead and McKay's enthusiasm for Greenbergian modernism but also to later workshop organizers who sought to counterbalance the modernist influence in their selection of future workshop leaders. For example, immediately after Lochhead had left Saskatchewan for a

88. Quoted in McKay, 280-281.
89. Quoted in McKay, 281.
new position at the University of Manitoba, the first attempt was made to dilute Greenberg's influence: workshop organizers invited Greenberg's arch-opponent from Los Angeles, the critic Lawrence Alloway, to be Workshop Leader in 1965. One year prior to his arrival in Saskatchewan, Alloway had played a significant role in discrediting Greenberg's flagship "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition at the Los Angeles Museum of Art, an exhibition which included paintings by Lochhead and McKay.

Two years after Greenberg's 1962 Workshop, McKay analyzed the Emma Lake Workshops and detailed the construction of the post-war art scene from a particular Canadian point of view, demonstrating the appeal of Greenberg's modernism. Acknowledging the lingering English impact on Canadian art which Greenberg helped to dispell, McKay stated: "We have been fed on a tax-supported diet of English conservatism, late and little." Consequently, "[Canadians] have not been

90. In addition to Alloway, the composer John Cage also attended the 1965 Workshop as Co-Leader, reinforcing the desire of the post-Lochhead organizers to broaden the critical focus of the Workshops.

91. Between Greenberg and Alloway, Lochhead invited the artists Kenneth Noland and Jules Olitski, two of the leading exemplars of Greenbergian aesthetics, to be Leaders at the 1963 and 1964 Workshops, respectively.

92. McKay, 281.
permitted to enjoy at home, in the original, the challenges thrown up by the U.S. 'post war experience' in art. A staunch anti-nationalist, McKay was flummoxed by the tirade of criticism directed at Greenberg and his article on Prairie art published in 1963. The hypocrisy of this selective diatribe suggested to McKay a blindness to those aspects of American society that were more pervasive and more threatening to Canada than Greenberg's theories of modernism: "Curiously enough," he stated, "we accept political coercion, economic domination, Coca-Cola, and predigested mass communications, while we resist exposure to the more humane and civilized arts from the U.S.A." In his arguments against American mass culture, McKay echoes Greenberg's similarly phrased statements against kitsch

93. McKay, 281.

94. In his catalogue statement for the exhibition Five Painters From Regina, sponsored by the National Gallery of Canada, McKay reveals the extent to which nationalism was an anathema to him:

There is no such thing as a distinctly Canadian art; there are only artists who happen to be Canadian. Each person makes his world which he shares with those who are interested, and people share only those things in which they have a common awareness.


95. McKay, 281.
in the 1940s and 1950s. However, McKay saw the intrusion into Canada of American mass culture as a colonizing influence. Thus, despite Greenberg’s status as a leading American art critic, McKay tailored Greenberg’s arguments to meet the local predicament of Canadian painters on the geographical and cultural periphery, yet still deluged by popular culture from the United States.

In opposition to the colonizing effects of kitsch, Emma Lake was an outpost of modernism. However, in the changing North American cultural environment of the early 1960s, Greenberg’s precise role in the cultural Cold War was ambiguous. Was Greenberg the cutting edge of U.S. Cold War cultural strategy or was his presence in Saskatchewan already signalling his "ex-centricity" and the reduction of his modernism to a "residual" status in North American culture, as opposed to his "dominant" status in the 1950s? Was Greenberg’s modernism still functioning in its former Cold War guise when "Modernist Painting" was broadcast over the Voice of America?

As Greenberg was trying to reinforce the boundary lines separating his formulation of modern art from mass culture, the national boundaries of Canada were transgressed in the airspace above North America. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the symbolic fall-out from that event that so dramatically influenced the politics of the United States between 1958 and 1960 had
immeasurable consequences on the relationship of Canada with its southern neighbour. In the post-World War Two period, Canada had already been exposed to the technological, economic, cultural, and military prerogatives of the United States for over ten years. As the Canadian political scientist Arthur Kroker has observed, post-war Canada was face to face with:

... [a] now fully "space oriented" society, with no inner coordinating principle and with no organic conception of lived tradition, time, succession or duration which might act as an inner check against the politics of imperialism. In the American mind, there came together a historical tilt in favour of the violence of militarism (as a truth-sayer of the sectional cleavages of domestic politics) and a cultural bias in favour of media of communication oriented to the control of space. The United States could be the lead empire of the modern age because its internal political history, and its "will" to imperialism (founded on "missionary consciousness"), predisposed it to take full advantage of the "bias of communication" towards the abolition of tradition, and the ascendancy of the politics of spatial control.96

The politics of spatial control reached their zenith with the launch of the first Soviet ICBM in the summer of 1957, followed later that year by Sputnik 1. For the first time in the post-war period, American technological pre-eminence in the politics of spatial control and surveillance was being called into question. Not only

was American security at stake but, if the United States were to contain the Soviet Union in the Third World by means of the control of space and the dissemination of information through the mass media, Sputnik 1 raised the specter of the Soviet Union beating the United States at its own game.

The precariousness of the Canadian situation following the launch of Sputnik 1 is represented by a photograph in the October 21, 1957 issue of *Life* magazine which portrays a globe of the world encircled by a menacing cellular grid of red lines representing the continuous orbits of Sputnik around the globe. (figure 2) The image focuses on North America, revealing the strategic significance of Canada to the United States.

The priority of Canadian territory as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the United States turned up the heat on Canadian politicians to acquiesce to the security demands of the American politicians and American military, in particular, the United States Air Force. Prior to Sputnik, the threat of a Soviet nuclear bombing attack on the United States had prompted the U.S. air defence commander, in 1949, to warn that air defence radars located within the United States gave a little over one hour of warning time before Soviet bombers would be incinerating the cities of the American northeast and northwest, suggesting that "our highly industrialized,
highly populated border -- which just so happens to be that border facing the threat to our national security -- is wide open and will continue to be so until we extend our presently programmed radar northward." The establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) on August 1, 1957, prior to the launch of Sputnik, represented the first relinquishing of sole Canadian control of the military defense of its own territory since the severing of colonial ties with Great Britain. A joint public statement was issued at the news conference announcing the formation of NORAD: "A further step has been taken in the integration of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States .... An integrated headquarters will be set up in Colorado Springs and joint plans and procedures will be worked out in peacetime, ready for immediate use in case of emergency." (While the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent negotiated the treaty, it was ratified by the newly elected Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker.)

Between 1957 and 1963, the prerogatives of spatial control and the securing of the airspace of Fortress America against the threat of Soviet surveillance and

97. Jockel, p.43.

nuclear attack witnessed an ongoing struggle between the Canadian government under Diefenbaker and the requirements of the U.S. military-industrial complex. This struggle was also occurring at the moment when inter-service rivalry was at its height and a regional competition was emerging between the east and west coasts of the United States over the issue of where modern weapons technologies should be developed and manufactured.

One of the first major decisions of the Diefenbaker government after its landslide electoral victory in 1958 reflected the impact on Canada of the defence debates occurring within the United States. This decision concerned the first all-weather jet fighter plane to be designed and built within Canada: the Avro Arrow. Plans for the jet were premised upon foreign sales, especially to the United States Air Force. The jet had been planned in response to the 1953 bomber gap, precursor of the 1958 missile gap controversy, with a proposed six hundred planes being manufactured at a price of $1.5 to $2 million each. However, between 1954 and 1957, the power of the USAF had expanded so greatly, with its main manufacturing centers in Southern California, that by the launch of Sputnik all efforts by the Canadian government to secure foreign sales for the Avro Arrow had collapsed; Europeans had also decided to purchase fighter aircraft
from the USAF instead of from Canada. In August 1958, Canadian Defence Minister George Pearkes made a last-ditch effort to sell the plane to the Pentagon without success, prompting Diefenbaker to quip to his colleagues, "There go the Americans again. You can’t trust them."99 One month later the Avro Arrow was cancelled, but the lingering effects of the decision would taint U.S.-Canadian relations for the next five years. (One effect of the cancellation was the exodus to the United States, en masse, of the scientists and technicians who had formed the backbone of Canadian aerospace technology, thousands of whom ended up working for NASA).

The Avro Arrow decision warrants attention because of the compromise agreed to by the Diefenbaker government in the cancellation of the program. To compensate for the cancellation of the Avro Arrow program, the United States government agreed to provide free of charge two squadrons of the U.S. Bomarc-B missiles at bases in North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, Quebec. These missiles required the installation of nuclear warheads to have a legitimate function of intercepting Soviet nuclear

bombers over the Canadian Arctic. Yet Diefenbaker and the anti-nuclear faction of the Federal Cabinet refused the placement of nuclear weapons on the missiles, opting for sandbags in lieu of warheads. The significance of nuclear warheads to continental defence became clearer, however, as Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara later remarked: "... one of the purposes of the Bomarc bases in Canada was to attract the fire of Soviet missiles which would normally be targetted at American locations."100 Diefenbaker wryly observed that American foreign and defence policy intended to make Canada "a decoy duck in a nuclear war."101

The background radiation from the Bomarc missile fiasco continued to sour U.S.-Canadian relations, with the personal rapport between Diefenbaker and Kennedy sinking to ever-lower levels: after their first meeting on February 20, 1961 (figure 37), John Kennedy stated to his brother Robert, "I don't want to see that boring son of a bitch again."102 According to Arthur Schlesinger, "Kennedy thought the Canadian [Prime Minister] insincere and did not like or trust him."103 Matters quickly

101. Quoted in Martin, p.199.
became worse after Kennedy’s state visit to Ottawa three months later, one month after the Bay of Pigs disaster. The furor was initiated by a secret briefing memorandum to the President from Kennedy’s leading countervol revolutionary theorist and director of State Department Planning, Walt W. Rostow. Found discarded in an Ottawa wastepaper basket, the memorandum, entitled "What We Want from Ottawa Trip," contained four major briefing points which, in effect, suggested broader Canadian participation in American foreign policy objectives, from pushing the Canadians to join the Organization of American States to insisting on Canadian support for America at the United Nations in Geneva on the subject of increased surveillance on the borders of Laos and Viet Nam. The memorandum inflamed Diefenbaker, providing in his mind one more piece of evidence of bullying by the senior member of the bilateral relationship.

The decisive event that brought to a climax the strained relationship of Canada with the United States was the Cuban Missile Crisis. In August of 1962, forty-two Soviet medium range ballistic missiles — carrying warheads twenty to thirty times more powerful than those detonated at Hiroshima with a range sufficient to hit most of the United States and the major eastern cities of Canada — were on their way to Cuba, in part, to compensate for the accelerated American nuclear weapons
production initiated by the launch of Sputnik. Western allies were expected to follow in lock step behind the U.S. interpretation of events occurring in Cuba, but Diefenbaker ignored the photographic evidence from U2 spy aircraft, choosing instead to await more conclusive evidence supporting the U.S. claim. Canada was the only western ally to adopt this "wait and see" strategy. In his statement to the House of Commons, Diefenbaker defended his actions in the following way:

What people all over the world want tonight and will want is a full and complete understanding of what is taking place in Cuba. . . . The determination of Canadians will be that the United Nations should be charged at the earliest moment with this serious problem . . . As late as a week ago, the USSR contended that its activities in Cuba were of an entirely defensive nature . . . The only sure way that the world can be secure of the facts would be through an independent inspection.104

Yet the implications of joint continental defence would rob the Diefenbaker government of the option of making up its own mind. As a result of the 1957 NORAD agreement, the Canadian Army and Air Force went on full alert as NORAD went to DEFCON 3, designating the high level of defense readiness of North American forces. Canadian sovereignty vanished as Canadian jet fighters took up position on air bases in the American South without authorization from Diefenbaker or the Canadian

104. Quoted in Martin, p.199.
government, which the NORAD agreement had insisted was the proper procedure. The Canadian Air Force Wing Commander responsible for issuing the order for moving fighter planes to Florida without orders from the Diefenbaker government summed up the loss of Canadian control over its armed forces by rationalizing "We moved them without authority . . . . Maybe it was wrong, but we found good reason for some training exercises in Florida. If we'd asked for political permission we would have been turned down."^105

On January 3, 1963, two months after the Cuban Missile Crisis and four months before the next Canadian federal election, elements of the Kennedy Administration intervened in domestic Canadian politics. First, American General Lauris Norstad, the senior commanding officer of NATO, arrived in Ottawa on a farewell tour prior to his retirement. At a press conference, Norstad blasted Canada's nuclear weapons policy and implied that Canada was not fulfilling its NATO treaty obligations. A Diefenbaker cabinet member, Alvin Hamilton, remarked in the aftermath of Norstad's comments, "Kennedy sent Norstad to do this hatchet job on us. It was American imperialism of the highest order. But we were not going to be pushed around."^106

The paranoia of Diefenbaker and several of his cabinet ministers resulting from the Norstad press conference was fuelled by a second gaffe by a member of the Kennedy Administration. Acting Secretary of State George Ball, in the absence of Dean Rusk, issued a press release on January 30, 1963 which was directly critical of the Diefenbaker government's handling of the nuclear weapons issue. Criticism of this press release extended beyond traditional party lines. Even NDP House Leader Tommy Douglas, an arch-rival of Diefenbaker, announced to the House of Commons, "I think the Government of the United States should know from this Parliament that they are not dealing with Guatemala... nor are they dealing with Cuba." While the intended consequences of the

106. Quoted in Nash, p.225. Nash notes that Canadian public opinion, measured by Gallup polls, was moving away from the Diefenbaker government's Cold War strategy and its recalcitrance regarding nuclear weapons. The Norstad press conference accelerated this process, and shortly thereafter, the Liberal candidate for Prime Minister in the upcoming Federal election, Lester Pearson, switched his anti-nuclear stance to a position advocating the arming of Bomarc missiles with nuclear warheads and the storing of nuclear weapons at assorted bases across Canada.

Even Pierre Trudeau, two years before going to Ottawa as a Liberal Member of Parliament, wrote in an article following the Norstad press conference and the State Department press release that the motives of the United States government were dubious at best:

Do you think that General Norstad... came to Ottawa as a tourist... Do you think it was by chance that Mr. Pearson... was able to quote the authority of General Norstad? Do you think it was inadvertent that on January 30 the State Department gave a statement to
American intervention sometimes backfired, with Diefenbaker exploiting a nationalist backlash in his campaign strategy, the clumsiness of the U.S. representatives sparked an intense debate in the next Canadian election over the fate of Canadian sovereignty.

The ensuing political firestorm determined the anti-American tenor of Diefenbaker's campaign strategy in the upcoming federal election, the result of a successful vote of non-confidence against the government's defense policies following the U.S. intervention in Canadian domestic politics. Yet Diefenbaker's nationalist campaign failed to sway the Canadian electorate; for the first time in Canadian history, an election fought on a nationalist platform succumbed to continentalist policies. On April 8, 1963, Lester Pearson and the Liberal party, whose election platform had been outspokenly pro-Kennedy, formed the new government on Parliament Hill.108

---

107. Quoted in Nash, p.249.

108. In 1965, the Canadian philosopher George Grant,
While the Canadian election represented the triumph of Pearson's Liberal internationalism, it did not translate into the triumph of Greenberg's internationalist modernism in Canadian culture. Surprisingly, almost paradoxically, Greenberg's position in Canadian culture became more tenuous after the election of the Pearson government with its close ties to the Kennedy Administration to the south. Increasingly, Greenberg was faced with a continent-wide liberalism that advocated anti-dualist, anti-hierarchical, pluralist, and regionalist cultural policies, all of which were anathema to Greenberg's intensely internationalist and elitist modernism. In the face of the increasing popularity of non-modernist modes of representation, Greenberg stubbornly continued to refine his concept of an abstract post painterly style with the Saskatchewan painters as important elements exemplifying the increasing marginalization of the modernist sensibility in liberal intellectual circles in North America.

While the bitter political events of the first four months of 1963 were unfolding in Canada, in New York Greenberg was making a determined effort to promote not reflecting on the demise of the Diefenbaker government, wrote perhaps his most famous book, Lament for a Nation. In the text, Grant outlined what he meant by his lament and its implications for Canada: "To lament is to cry out at the death or at the dying of something loved. This lament mourns the end of Canada as a sovereign state." Quoted in Kroker, p.35.
only the Saskatchewan painters who had piqued his interest but also the American painters whom he thought representative of the next phase of modern painting: Morris Louis, Ken Noland and Jules Olitski. Beginning with the exhibition "Three New American Painters," which opened at the Norman MacKenzie Gallery in Regina on January 11 and closed on February 15, and ending with the publication of his article in Canadian Art on Prairie painting and sculpture, Greenberg extolled the virtues of modernism on the prairie grasslands of Saskatchewan.

Between Greenberg's participation at Emma Lake and the "Three New American Painters" exhibition, he and Lochhead carried on a considerable correspondence that indicated Greenberg's growing interest in Saskatchewan and its small group of modern painters. In a letter to Lochhead dated October 9, 1962, Greenberg disclosed that the whole "safari" had been fun. He singled out Saskatchewan, however, because while the trip to Winnipeg and Western Ontario had been "OK" it was still an "anti-climax" after Saskatchewan: "I can't tell you how excited I got watching you all at Emma Lake -- I only realize it now. And Lord, do I miss Emma Lake and Saskatchewan in general. It was one of the great experiences of my life; I'm not exaggerating."109 One month later, Greenberg

109. Lochhead correspondence, (University of Regina Archives.) This particular letter officially confirmed
reiterated his enthusiasm for Saskatchewan, dropping a hint to Lochhead that "I'd be tempted to take a year's lectureship somewhere in the Province if it were offered to me." Greenberg's effusive praise of Saskatchewan would merely be amusing if not for the fact that his enthusiasm extended to the art and the sophistication of certain elements of the art public in Saskatchewan. Greenberg's enthusiasm for Saskatchewan would reach its peak in the first few months of 1963.

Greenberg's positive assessment of the cultural environment in Saskatchewan reached beyond the interest he held in McKay and Lochhead. In an article published in the magazine Canadian Art on the "Three New American Painters" exhibition, Greenberg elaborated his revised theory of marginality in which he celebrated isolation from the center as a positive asset. Unlike New York, with its fixation on the "Tenth street touch" or the latest trends such as Pop art, Greenberg perceived the art public for modernism in Saskatchewan "as being less set in its ways than most publics." Similarly, that Louis, Noland, and Olitiski would be the only participants in the Norman Mackenzie Gallery exhibition. Greenberg also disclosed to Lochhead that he first heard of the death of Morris Louis while in Ottawa.


111. Clement Greenberg, Three New American Painters:
Greenberg observed that the art professionals in the community, such as Lochhead and the other members of the Regina Five, were producing work more appreciative of the latest critical tendencies (his own, of course) and, paradoxically, less provincial than most work being exhibited on Tenth Street in New York. The legacy of Tenth Street and abstract expressionism and its recent commercial success in the United States, from Greenberg's perspective, inhibited the stunted New York art public from moving beyond established taste and responding more openly to the fresh wave of post painterly developments that he had begun to develop in the mid-fifties and had fleshed out in the Louis and Noland article of 1960. Greenberg felt that the challenge proffered and the response elicited by these new paintings in the cultural environment of Saskatchewan, which did not have a vested interest in abstract expressionism, would be "more exhilarating than anything else."  

Greenberg, in fact, was so confident about the Saskatchewan art public that he deliberately included in the Norman Mackenzie exhibition two Louis paintings, Gamma and Number 33, and two Nolands, New Problem and Gift, which had not been exhibited anywhere prior to the

---


exhibition in Regina. The debut of these advanced works on the distant margin of the North American continent gave Greenberg an immense and, in his words, "perhaps irrational" satisfaction.

Saskatchewan's art public, by reason of its isolation, was untainted by the commercialization of abstract expressionism in New York, and thus was capable of reacting in a fresh and open way to new visual information.

In March, Greenberg's views on Prairie painting and sculpture were published in Canadian Art. Extolling his theory of Saskatchewan's "double obscurity" and de-centering the traditional relationship between New York and the provincial margins, Greenberg elevated a handful of Saskatchewan painters, giving particular emphasis to the painters in Regina, as the pre-eminent group of modern artists on the Prairies. Saskatchewan "big attack" painters, such as the Regina Five, had avoided being victimized by New York trends in part due to their isolation, and in part to the efforts of Ronald Bloore to keep New York abstract expressionism at bay in the 1950s.

113. The works by Olitski had been previously exhibited only at Bennington College. The paintings by both Olitski and Noland were due to be exhibited in either March or April for the first time. See Greenberg's letter to Lochhead, dated November 23, 1962 (URA).

In particular, Bloore promoted the French-Canadian abstract painter Paul-Émile Borduas as an alternate model of modernism, not associated with the triumph of American painting.

In this article, Greenberg first praised McKay and then turned to Lochhead, choosing to highlight the development of Lochhead's painting since the summer of 1962, avoiding self-serving direct mention of Greenberg's own Emma Lake Workshop and its influence. Using Lochhead's painting *Left of Centre* as example, Greenberg argues that Lochhead had broken through the limitations of the monochrome, a legacy of the Bloore-Borduas period, moving towards quasi-geometric forms of "pure flat colour." The suggestion of geometry and of pure flat colour remains indeterminate within Lochhead's work according to Greenberg's precepts of isolating the intrinsic qualities of the medium of painting while allowing for a dimension of play within those stringent formal requirements. Unlike the work of Bloore and McKay, Lochhead's emphasis on free-floating rectangular forms that "approached 'geometry' without really touching

115. Greenberg's observations also highlight the key differences between McKay and Bloore: while McKay had fully adopted Greenberg's critical position, Bloore felt that Greenberg's focus was too narrow, preferring a more divergent range of influences. Bloore, unlike McKay, had not rejected the cubist box of Borduas, for example.
it" augured, in Greenberg's opinion, the possibility of an entirely new direction in Canadian painting.

Not surprisingly, the two painters from Saskatchewan chosen by Greenberg to participate in the 1964 "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in Los Angeles were Lochhead and McKay. Each was represented by three works whose formal characteristics exemplified the aesthetic tenets proposed by Greenberg at the 1962 Workshop. All six paintings were conceived and executed after Greenberg's visit to Emma Lake.

On March 10, one month before the Canadian federal election that was, in part, being waged over the future relationship of Canada with the United States, Greenberg shared his enthusiasm about and optimism for Saskatchewan by writing to Lochhead that he was betting on Saskatchewan as New York's only rival. Taking delight in the confusion such a statement would make in New York, Greenberg felt he had a definite "stake in Saskatchewan." Yet while the defeat of the nationalist election platform of John Diefenbaker on April 8 should have eliminated the traditional opposition to cosmopolitan modernism and ensured the reputation of the Regina painters in contemporary North American art circles, the cultural environment in Canada was paradoxically becoming both

more pro and more anti-American. While the Canadian public was embracing Pearson's continentalism, some English Canadian artists and intellectuals were becoming alarmed at Canada's rate of cultural assimilation with the United States and thus assumed an increasingly defensive stance towards American cultural influence. This new defensive stance included antagonism towards Greenberg as a representative of the center (New York) even while Greenberg was attempting to separate himself from the center and establish himself as the spokesman for the margins. This complex interplay of nationalist sentiments created an increasingly hostile atmosphere for Greenberg's cosmopolitan modernism whose values one might have anticipated being readily appropriated by the new Liberal administration.

Hints of the changed cultural environment in Canada appear in a letter written by Greenberg to Lochhead one month after the Canadian election. Responding to a letter from McKay, Greenberg tells Lochhead:

Art [McKay] tells me the Canada Council is putting pressure on you to lay off the New York orientation. They would have to come up with that just at this time, wouldn't they? But who would you get from England by now who wouldn't reflect NY at second hand?117

However, Greenberg criticized the indeterminacy of Lochhead's forms only one year later. In a letter dated April 29, 1964, Greenberg, for the first time in their extensive correspondence, made serious criticisms of Lochhead's work. Three days after hanging the paintings for the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition in Los
Greenberg fulminates for an extended paragraph against this anti-American prejudice, never suspecting the operation of a different cultural paradigm that had been present in its nascent form in the early days of the Canada Council.\textsuperscript{118}

In responding to Greenberg’s letter, Lochhead defiantly repudiated the growing "anti-New York" bias of the Canada Council, reassuring Greenberg that he was "not in the least concerned about it since we do not have to rely on Canada Council support for future Workshops.

\begin{quote}
Angeles, Greenberg wrote:
Your two larger paintings stood up well, but I discovered a weakness in them as well as in the smaller picture "Pink Center." The square shape of the canvas didn’t quite go with the contents in all three. Both "Dark Green" and "Pink" would have benefited from being narrower, and "Yellow Center" might have benefited from being shorter or squatter. There was too much lateral space around the central motif in both the first and second. The moral is: never take the shape of your picture or canvas for granted; in flat and abstract painting more than any other kind, it’s got to relate tensely -- though not tightly as in Cubism and Cezanne -- to what’s inside it.
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
(Lochhead correspondence, (URA)).
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
118. In concluding his letter to Lochhead, Greenberg mentions that he was planning an exhibition entitled "After Abstract Expressionism." This exhibition would be held at the Los Angeles Museum in February, and would be composed of work by thirty artists (with four from Canada and three from California). Greenberg emphasized that both Lochhead and Art McKay were definitely invited to participate.
\end{flushright}
Whatever feelings they [the Canada Council] have at the moment about this will change as I am confident that we are on the right track as any other group in the country. I feel this [i.e. the Emma Lake Workshops] is our only hope in Canadian art to keep in touch with the New York art world."119

The changing environment for public support of the arts within Canada was encapsulated in comments by the Chairman of the Canada Council, Arthur Gelber. In a speech made to an American conference on cultural funding held early in 1963 (and published in the spring issue of Arts in Society,) Gelber revealed that he was not anti-American or even anti-New York but rather in favour of the new pragmatic liberal cultural strategy rapidly emerging from the initiatives of the Kennedy Administration:

- The wide picture is, in Canada, as in the U.S.A. one of a burgeoning interest in the arts in an affluent society with leisure increasing at an almost dismaying rate!

I have not presented this paper with any sense whatsoever that we Canadians can teach you Americans how to suck eggs. On the contrary. Certainly the Canada Council of which I have spoken at considerable length, would not have flexed its muscles at all without the wise coaching of the Ford,

119. Lochhead correspondence, letter dated May 14, 1963 (URA). Lochhead concludes the letter by expressing his interest in participating in Greenberg's proposed "After Abstract Expressionism" exhibition. For Lochhead, this exhibition was equivalent to entering the "big league" of modern art.
Carnegie, Rockefeller, and others of your great foundations. After all, you have been used to the "use of riches" somewhat longer than we have.120

This admission on the part of the Canada Council Chairman of the close rapport between the Canadians and the Americans at the birth of the arts agency indicated how rapidly the influence of Great Britain, so evident in the 1951 Massey Report, had been replaced by the model of governmental aid to the arts that was emerging in the United States.

Very quickly the influence of the pragmatic liberal cultural model from the United States had gained ascendancy among a small liberal elite within Canada. However, the successful grafting of the pragmatic cultural model to the Canadian context would not be the result of foreign machinations as much as the changing political and cultural contexts of Canada which required a more dynamic and far-reaching model of governmental support for the arts such as the cultural program developing in the United States. Many social factors, such as the rapid expansion of the middle class, rampant consumerism, conflicting regional elites, and other social contradictions (resulting from the rapid acceleration of capitalism into its tertiary phase of

development that Ernest Mandel characterized as "late capitalism"\textsuperscript{121}) were shared by both Canada and the United States. At this point, the symbiosis between the two nations would seem almost inevitable.

Canada's linguistic duality, which differentiated it from the United States, was particularly suited to an inclusive cultural strategy that balanced regionalism and regional elites within a national confederation. Writing in 1964, one year before moving to Ottawa with two other prominent Quebec liberals, Jean Marchand and Gerard Pelletier, Pierre Elliott Trudeau outlined the advantages of the pragmatic liberal cultural model for the Canadian context:

One way of offsetting the appeal of separatism is by investing tremendous amounts of time, energy, and money in nationalism, at the federal level. A national image must be created that will have such an appeal as to make any image of a separatist group unattractive. Resources must be directed to such things as national flags, anthems, education, arts councils, broadcasting corporations, film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network of railways, highways, airlines; the national culture and national economy must be protected by taxes and tariffs; ownership of resources and industry by nationals must be a matter of policy. In short the whole of the citizenry must be made to feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions, and standard of living can be protected from external attack.

and internal strife. [underlining mine] 122

It is not surprising that many Canadian liberals along with Trudeau turned to the closest model of governmental aid for the arts that was at hand, especially when viewed as a solution developed by the society which was now on the cutting edge of modernity. What would form the basis of the future Canadian cultural revolution under the Liberal government's aegis had as its origin the new cultural paradigm developed in the United States.

The decentralizing and democratizing philosophy in Canadian cultural policy was highlighted at Seminar '65, a Canadian Conference of the Arts held at Ste. Adele-en-Haut, Quebec in 1965.123 The Conference objectives were to examine the present status of culture within Canada while assessing current plans underway to celebrate the Canadian centenary in 1967. The Conference's major recommendation was that the arts be given the highest priority:

But if the total culture of a country may be likened to an arch, then surely the keystone is the arts. A nation reveals itself to


123. The decision to distribute cultural power to the regions was made by a committee of cultural advisers dominated by representatives from Quebec and Ontario (who comprised 124 of the 140 assembled provincial representatives). As in the United States, regionalism was a means of maintaining the center's power while attempting to procure the loyalties of regional elites.
posterity through the arts, for the arts are the apex of culture, the crown of its total achievement. Until recently the arts in Canada were unable to assume their rightful place. The new technology of communications offers the means for a national expression but only the arts can provide the significant content by which a nation comes to know itself.\textsuperscript{124}

Seminar '65 bears all the hallmarks of the cultural strategy first outlined by the New York State Council of the Arts after 1960 and the President's Advisory Council on the Arts in 1963, both of which also provided the blueprints for the establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts in 1965. Within these new cultural institutions, regionalism was freed from its association with totalitarianism. Greenberg's cosmopolitan modernism was thus displaced by the new regionalism which grew out of the new pragmatism of continent-wide North American liberalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

While the new cultural paradigm emphasized regionalism, the Emma Lake painters were too closely associated with the pervasive American influence within Canadian culture since World War Two for their work to be recognized by the Canada Council as examples of the best contemporary Canadian painting. Their pro-New York stance was out of synch with a national Liberal leadership intent on asserting a national cultural strategy.

\textsuperscript{124} Seminar '65 Conference of the Arts, p.6.
identity.
Chapter Three: The Golden Age as Catastrophe: The Los Angeles Cultural Renaissance and the "Post Painterly Abstraction" Exhibition

I should be very much pleased if you could find me something good (meaty) on economic conditions in California . . . California is very important for me because nowhere else has the upheaval most shamelessly caused by capitalist modernization taken place with such speed.

Karl Marx

The question, at least for Southern California, is not so much whether the area was/is ripe for Pop, but whether the whole ambience -- from show business to air craft industry to the Gobi of suburbia -- is not pre-emptively Pop in itself.

Peter Plagens

Before going to Los Angeles I thought that American society was sick. After being there I feel it is nigh unto death.

Tommy Douglas

In the 1960 presidential election, John F. Kennedy and the pragmatic liberals narrowly defeated the Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon. Kennedy’s concept of the New Frontier, which drew upon the deep resonance of the frontier in American mythology, added to the overall success of his campaign throughout the United
States. In a compelling campaign speech delivered to Democrat supporters in Los Angeles in July 1960, Kennedy endeavoured to embrace California within his concept of the New Frontier:

For I stand facing west on what was once the last frontier. From the lands that stretch 3000 miles behind me, the pioneers of old gave up their safety, their comfort and sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the West. . . . [But] the problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won, and we stand today on the edge of a new frontier — the frontier of the 1960s, a frontier of unknown opportunities and paths, a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats. . . . For the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on this frontier at a turning point in history.

California, the state that represented the western extension of the nineteenth century frontier, also epitomized the tensions caused by the missile gap and the culture gap in post-war America. For while the California military-industrial manufacturing base stood to benefit from Kennedy’s exploitation of the missile gap controversy, many members of the state’s political and economic elites were conservative Republicans and therefore were Kennedy’s political opponents. These conservative Republicans mistrusted the doctrine of the New Frontier primarily because it had been developed by intellectuals from the northeast states and consequently felt that the economic benefits of the growth in military spending by the Kennedy Administration would be unfairly

distributed, with the Northeast receiving more than its appropriate share. Thus, rather than adopting the New Frontier strategy for waging the Cold War, many of the political and economic elites in California were determined to challenge the ideology of Kennedy’s liberalism with their own Cold War agenda.

After Kennedy’s election, the state’s ambitions for national political, economic, and cultural prominence inaugurated a period of intense inter-regional rivalry which accentuated the growing gap between the Northeast "Industrial Heartland" and the Southwest "Defense Perimeter" of the United States. The American historian Mike Davis characterizes this period of regional competition as the "Californization of Late Imperial America"; in other words, the Cold War tensions over both the missile gap and the culture gap gained domestic importance because of California’s rise to national prominence, challenging the leadership of the northeastern political establishment. A conflict over the regional allotment of military spending exacerbated


regional tensions that overflowed into the cultural realm. Between Kennedy's liberal New Frontier and the rise of conservative Republican forces in Southern California, New York's most important economic rival, the internal tensions of the military-industrial complex indirectly and directly influenced the debate over the culture gap.

In this chapter, I will examine this new regional rivalry within the United States of America as it altered the terms of the debate over the role of culture, using as a case study the exhibition of Clement Greenberg's conception of painting after abstract expressionism, ultimately baptized "Post Painterly Abstraction," at the Los Angeles Art Museum in 1964. While many postmodernist critics highlight the 1965 re-publication of Greenberg's essay "Modernist Painting" as the epitome of the domination of the U.S. art scene by Greenbergian modernism, it is my contention that the 1964 Los Angeles exhibition was, in fact, a watershed marking the failure of Greenberg's proposed next phase of modernist painting to reclaim the position of critical hegemony that he had formerly held in the immediate postwar period. In 1964, Greenberg found himself isolated between the new pluralist cultural paradigm of pragmatic liberalism and the conservative advocates of a short-lived Californian cultural renaissance. Greenberg's modernism could no
longer function as a viable critical model for Cold War liberalism in the changed political context of the early 1960s. Thus, his insistence on the maintenance of aesthetic boundaries separating high and mass culture was marginalized by a pragmatic blurring of these boundaries in response to the changing character of American society and the extension of the Cold War to the Third World.

Los Angeles emerged as the west coast rival to New York City following a period of frenetic economic and population growth within the city from 1870 to 1940. This sustained growth was unsurpassed by that of any other American city, including New York, in the same period. The population growth, accelerated by an influx of immigrants, pushed the population levels of Los Angeles to 1,228,000 by 1930, a quadrupling of the city's population in two decades. By 1930, Los Angeles had surpassed San Francisco and was the largest city of the west coast of North America.

From 1870 to 1940, industrial growth in Los Angeles occurred at an astonishing rate. The city was in eighteenth place in the nation in overall manufacturing by 1910, accelerating to fifth place by 1930, and was out-distanced only by New York in the late 1950s. Such a rapid rise to national economic prominence would
ultimately lead to a serious competition with New York City for the distinction of being the nation's leading urban centre.

In the post-World War Two period, the population and industrial manufacturing base in Los Angeles received a tremendous economic windfall. The advent of the Cold War with the Soviet Union fed new capital into the military manufacturing industries that had just reaped the profits from the last war. This pre-existing military industrial base facilitated the research and development of many advanced high technologies. As a result, the economic foundations were laid for the expansion and construction of numerous cultural institutions. Newly affluent patrons would fund the Californian cultural renaissance, the self-proclaimed Californian Golden Age, centered in the four counties where the bulk of the military appropriations were situated: Los Angeles County, San Diego County, Orange County, and Santa Clara County. These new benefactors helped to coalesce a very divergent range of economic, cultural, and political elites, uniting the military manufacturing sector with the culture industry.

By 1953 California had surpassed New York as the United States' prime beneficiary of military appropriations. The additional military contracts
awarded to California during the early Cold War more than
doubled the contracts awarded to any other state during
this period. In 1959, two years after the launch of
Sputnik, these military contracts totalled $5.2 billion
or 23.7 percent of all the military contracts awarded in
the United States. In that same year the amount of
defence contracts awarded to New York suffered a decline
of approximately thirty-four percent, prompting the

4. James L. Clayton, "Defense Spending: Key to
California’s Growth," Western Political Quarterly 15
(June 1962), 281. The relationship between the economic
growth of California and military spending is also
examined in Clayton, "The Impact of the Cold War on the
Economies of California and Utah, 1946-1965," Pacific
Historical Review 36 (1967), 449-473; Martin J. Schiesl,
"Airplanes to Aerospace: Defence Spending and Economic
Growth in the Los Angeles Region, 1945-1960," in Roger W.
Lotchin [Ed.], The Martial Metropolis (New York: Praeger,
1984) pp.135-150; and Robin Bloch, Studies in the
Development of the United States Aerospace Industry,
Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning, UCLA,


In World War Two, the combined amount of defense
expenditures distributed to the North, East and Central
regions of the United States was equal to 32.4% of all
defense spending in the country. At the same time the
Pacific region of the country was the recipient of
approximately 12.3% of defense spending. By the Korean
War the regional ratio had altered to 27.4% for the
former and 17.9% for the latter. After John F. Kennedy’s
election, for fiscal 1961, the ratio had been profoundly
altered, to 11.8% for the old industrial heartland, and a
dramatic 26.9% to the Pacific region.
See Joseph D. Phillips, "Economic Effects of the Cold
War," in David Horowitz [Ed.], Corporations and the Cold
p.183.

Even more significant than the percentages of
defense spending going to the different regions was the
drafting of the Javits-Keating Defense Appropriations Bill by the New York State Congressional delegation in an attempt to stop the hemorrhaging of their region's share of the military-industrial allocations.

Within California, the defense industry had taken the lead in total manufacturing, with the majority of military contracts going to firms within the Los Angeles metropolitan area. In 1959, Los Angeles was awarded sixty-one percent of the State's total defence appropriations. Mammoth increases in defence spending as a result of the Korean War were later supplemented by increased defence appropriations for missiles and electronics after the launch of Sputnik in 1957. In particular, billions of dollars were allocated to the space race and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Clearly, this economic windfall meant that for the foreseeable future, California, and Los Angeles in particular, would be the cutting edge of America's advanced scientific and technological

amount of new Research and Development funding, essential to future industrial growth, that was associated with the growth of the military-industrial complex. The bulk of new Research and Development funding in the late 1950s and early 1960s went to the Department of Defense and was primarily directed towards five major industries, with the two industries most associated with Los Angeles -- aircraft and missile production and electrical equipment and communications -- receiving 58% of Research and Development funding contained within the Department of Defense budget. Phillips, "Economic Effects of the Cold War," p.183.
community, the heart of the military-industrial complex.

The intense economic development of California in the 1950s resulted in an immense shift of regional political influence towards the Southwest, away from the traditional power base of the Northeast. During the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, especially following the post-Sputnik realigning of political forces prior to the 1960 election, the economic rivalry between Los Angeles and New York was exacerbated by the efforts of the New York congressional delegation to divert defense appropriations away from California and towards New York. The introduction of the Javits-Keating Competitive Procurement Act (S. 1875) to the Armed Services Subcommittee on May 7, 1959 was the opening salvo of New York's attempt to reclaim a significantly higher proportion of defence spending contracts which had been, within the last decade, awarded to California. It is significant that both Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating

---

6. According to Seyom Brown, a journalist writing in The Reporter, the three major points of the Javits-Keating Bill were intended to:
(a) increase the number of contracts and subcontracts allocated by competitive bidding rather than "negotiation"
(b) encourage "a fair share of purchases with small business concerns"
(c) encourage "a fair proportion to concerns located in areas of substantial labor surplus"
were pragmatic liberals, closely identified with Governor Rockefeller's efforts to institute a liberal, government-funded program for the arts. Their position thus foreshadowed the central tenets of Kennedy's New Frontier in responding to the twin threats of the missile gap and the culture gap. The diverse coalition from California formed to respond to the Javits-Keating Act naturally opposed this threat to California's economic well-being and ultimately also opposed the cultural model of government arts support being advocated by Governor Rockefeller and other pragmatic liberals in New York State.

Emotions were running high in California against the Javits-Keating Act; State Senator Thomas H. Kuchal characterized it as "a conspiracy of Easterners to raid the southern California aerospace complex." 7 Prior to the Act's introduction to Congress, the Californian congressional delegation, both Democratic and Republican, launched a pre-emptive strike on the New Yorkers by announcing a counter-resolution which accused "New York interests of trying to 'pirate' defense contracts from the west coast industry." 8 The resolution encouraged the Defense Department to continue to award defense contracts

7. Lotchin, p.144.

"on the basis of economy of production, plant capability and competence of personnel." As the New York Times noted, "It pledged a united fight against placing contracts on a political basis in New York and elsewhere."^{9}

---


Both Senators Keating and Javits responded immediately to the criticism from California with Keating claiming the charges were "preposterous," stating:

We are merely trying to arrange concerted action by the New York delegation co-operating with industry and labor in the state and with the Rockefeller Administration to alert all concerned to the opportunities for a greater share of the prime defense contracts.

Javits then added:

Actually we are only seeking to emulate California's own excellent example. If Californians choose to interpret our activities as a plunge into politics, perhaps we had better take a closer look at what California has been up to. (p.35)

Senator Javits maintained that the legislators from New York were "very properly concerned with taking every appropriate step to make sure that New York firms get their full and fair share of United States defence business." (p.35)

In response Senator Thomas K. Kuchal of California replied:

In one fell swoop, the critically important problem of providing the best assurance for perpetuating American freedom by deterring aggression would become simply a gigantic, annual, helter skelter spending spree, which would put to shame the governmental boondoggles of another generation"
In addition to this aggressive action by the Californian congressional delegation, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce also responded with a rare show of unity, organizing a task-force to launch a counter-attack. This task force was comprised of a diverse range of Californian elites, such as defence industry executives, members of the Chambers of Commerce from San Diego, San Jose, Sacramento and elsewhere in California as well as other business leaders. The task force also enlisted the services of Professor Gerhard Rostvold of Pomona College to write a report extolling the virtues of California to the nation’s defence industry.

The regional furor engendered by the Javits-Keating Act severely jeopardized the efforts of the Kennedy presidential campaign to use the missile gap as a method of securing political support in the powerful regions of the country that relied on defence spending. Kennedy could not easily negotiate between two apparently mutually exclusive priorities: support for fellow pragmatic liberals such as Javits and Keating in New York and the need to appeal to Californian voters. One example of Kennedy’s attempts to traverse the political minefield created by this regional dispute was his

announcement on September 28, 1960 in Niagara Falls, New York that his administration would offer "a fair distribution of defense contracts across the nation." This statement understandably caused a certain degree of consternation among the forces in California gathering to oppose the legislation of Senators Javits and Keating. Yet Kennedy's political opponent for the presidency, Richard Nixon, advocated Eisenhower's "long pull" strategy and therefore opposed an excessive increase in defence spending to close what he considered to be an imaginary missile gap. In the eyes of many Californians, Nixon was, consequently, an unsatisfactory alternative to

11. The statement by Kennedy was made at a Bell Corporation plant that had seen its employment figures decline between 1958 and 1960 from 15,000 to 3,000. As Ed Cray notes:

Candidate Kennedy was hinting that if elected he would return to Defense Manpower Policy No.4, one of a number of executive orders issued during the Second World War in an effort to promote local spending and to bolster areas hit by chronic unemployment. The policy provided that defense contracts be awarded to those firms able to meet the competitive price and located in areas with over 8 percent unemployment.

This restriction on Department of Defense buying was lifted in 1953, shortly after Eisenhower was inaugurated. With its cancellation, West Coast firms especially in what was then called the aircraft industry tended to receive bigger and bigger portions of the defense pie. By 1959, firms headquartered on the West Coast ranked two, three, four and seven of the top ten companies granted Department of Defense contracts.

On January 7, 1960, the threat of the Javits-Keating Act was removed as the legislation was tabled indefinitely by the Armed Services Subcommittee, ensuring Los Angeles a continued pre-eminent role in defense contract procurements. Thus economic prosperity for the near future was guaranteed with the additional spin-off benefit of a new-found unity amongst the Southern California business and political elites. This latter by-product of the intense regional rivalry with New York State would be an important factor in establishing the foundations of the Los Angeles cultural renaissance of the early 1960s as California's rivalry with New York over defense matters soon extended into rivalry in other areas, including culture, as a matter of regional pride.

The opposition to the Javits-Keating Bill in 1959 was largely centered in Los Angeles and its four surrounding counties, the prime beneficiaries of defence appropriations. However, this situation also highlighted the increasing competition between Los Angeles and San Francisco for political and economic leadership of the state of California. Prior to the tremendous growth of Los Angeles in the 1950s, San Francisco had been the center of the state's economic, political and cultural life. Yet between 1930 and 1960, overall political and economic power was reoriented, corresponding to the
growth of the aircraft and aerospace industries in and around Los Angeles and the resulting population growth of Southern California. This population growth in the south of the state, from 2.7 million in 1930 to nine million in 1960, also shifted political influence. The conservative coalition formed to combat the northeastern liberal establishment and the Javits-Keating Act further solidified an increasingly right-wing Southern California electorate, much to the chagrin of Democratic Governor Pat Brown and presidential hopeful Kennedy. The Californian voting patterns in the 1960 presidential

12. During the same period the population growth of the northern half of California was 2.7 million, or slightly less than half of the state total, to 6.3 million. While representing a significant increase in population, the regional distribution definitely favoured the south. See Michael Paul Rogin and John L. Shover, Political Change in California (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969), p.154.

Even though the Right suffered significant political losses in California during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the persistence and growth of the Right in Southern California was an important factor in the shift of the national Republican party away from the Northeast and to the Southwest, and ultimately resulted in the election of Ronald Reagan as governor in 1966. The party platform continually emphasized an anti-university, anti-obscenity, anti-welfare and anti-fair housing platform. (Rogin and Shover, p.177)

election indicated a growing rift between the liberal North, centered in San Francisco, and the conservative South, centered in Los Angeles.

While Kennedy narrowly won the 1960 election, the voting returns indicated the growing Republican influence not only in California but in the entire western United States, with Richard Nixon taking ten of the thirteen states in the region, including California, and seventy-five electoral votes. However, the overall popular margin of victory for the Republicans was quite small, with Nixon garnering 51.1% of the popular vote in the thirteen western states. Yet, as historian Totton J. Anderson noted after the election, "The 1960 election in the West brought a resurgence of Republican party strength on both the state and national levels." The increasing influence of the West in terms of population demographics, economic growth, and electoral impact on national politics highlights an increasing regional


14. Nixon's percentages were actually below those achieved by Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 while Kennedy easily surpassed Stevenson's total vote count in the same two elections. Anderson, 287.

division within the United States that Los Angeles and Southern California were particularly well situated to exploit. This regional power shift was accentuated by the reapportionment of congressional districts following the election which resulted in a net gain to California of eight seats, confirming California's status as the second most powerful state, in terms of electoral politics, in the nation.

As previously noted, as the rivalry between New York and Los Angeles intensified in the post-Sputnik era, competition in the economic and political realms extended to include competition in the realm of high culture as well. Even though Los Angeles art patrons recognized New York's cultural dominance, these patrons felt that Los Angeles should attain recognition in the cultural domain commensurate with its emerging role as New York's main rival. Many of the Southern California social elites who patronized high culture already felt that by 1957, Los Angeles was the Second City of American Art because of its unbelievably rapid growth in the 1950s. However, this rather simplistic and self-serving perception was shaken with the 1958 publication of Creighton Gilbert's article "Ratings for U.S. Art Museums," which included an assessment of the status of museum culture in Los Angeles.16 As Gilbert noted, Los Angeles in 1954 was the
third largest city in America but in terms of museum holdings in Old Masters, it rated a disappointing fifth.\textsuperscript{17} While Gilbert's assessment criteria were dubious, his article made the point that, in terms of a particular perception of culture, Los Angeles was far from rivalling New York let alone the rest of the country. In an era of such high economic and political stakes, the domain of culture could not remain untouched by the rivalry between the two major urban capitals of these competing regions.

The sense of cultural inadequacy in Los Angeles was magnified by the loss of three major collections from the city in the years between the end of World War II and

\textsuperscript{16} Creighton Gilbert, "Ratings for U.S. Art Museums," the \textit{College Art Journal} 17 (Summer 1958), 392-403. Gilbert's assessment of art museums in America was based on a book by John Morse, \textit{Old Masters in America}, published in 1955. Morse drew up a list of forty old masters and then analyzed every major art museum in America to ascertain how many works by these artists were in the museums. An analysis of Gilbert and Morse is contained in Winifred Haines Higgins, \textit{Art Collecting in the Los Angeles Area, 1910-1960}, University of California, Los Angeles, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Department of Fine Arts, 1963, pp.441-442.

\textsuperscript{17} The Los Angeles area was accredited by Morse as having eighty masterpieces, including works at the L.A. Museum and on loan to the Washington Art Gallery. Other cities in California fared much more poorly, with San Diego rating fourteenth and San Francisco seventeenth. In overall national rankings, New York was at the top of the list followed by Washington, Boston and Philadelphia. See Higgins, p.442. From Higgins' perspective, the fallacy of the Morse study was in the assumption that the works being tabulated were in fact genuine works by old masters (p.442).
1957. The loss to interests outside of Los Angeles of the Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection, the Aline Barnsdall Collection, and the Edward B. and Gladys L. Robinson Collection\(^\text{18}\) were damaging blows to the meagre holdings of the Los Angeles Art Museum and to the cultural prestige of the city.

In an effort to stem the hemorrhaging of the city's cultural heritage and to proclaim Los Angeles as a legitimate cultural rival to New York City, the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors approved a decision, on December 9, 1958, to construct a new art museum -- ultimately to be known as the Los Angeles County Museum of Art -- on a corner of Hancock Park bordering Wilshire Boulevard. The city's cultural elites had wanted to build a new art museum since the 1940s, but not until the city was in a position to take cultural leadership of the state from San Francisco and challenge New York did the

\(^{18}\) The Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection had been offered to the Museum as early as 1938. Failure to construct adequate exhibition space within Los Angeles for the collection ultimately led to its donation to the Philadelphia Art Museum. The Aline Barnsdall collection was a crucial resource on European modern art, especially for its collection of Monet, at the Los Angeles Museum between 1940 and 1946. It was sold by Knoedler and Co. Inc. in the early 1950s. The Robinson collection was sold for $3 million to Stavros Niarchos after Richard F. Brown and the patrons of the Los Angeles Art Museum had raised $2.5 million to purchase the collection. For further information on the history of these three collections in Los Angeles see Higgins, especially Chapters 7, 8, and 15.
necessary will and funding actually materialize. The new art museum was specifically calculated to augment a change of perception in America’s last frontier. As the President of the Board of Trustees, Edward Carter, noted one year before the opening of the museum in 1965, "[Los Angeles is] . . . uniquely ready to spend money on culture. It is a center of artistic and musical activity, and spending money for their development is a prideful act. Besides it tends to offset the image that the place is largely populated by kooks."

The emerging challenge to New York’s cultural hegemony overlapped the economic and political challenges to Los Angeles from the Northeastern pragmatic liberal elite, whose leaders, such as Rockefeller and Javits, were advocates of public support for the arts. By supporting culture through private patronage, individuals such as Carter could proclaim the flowering of culture under laissez-faire capitalism. Thus, from its very inception, the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art was at the center of a political rivalry between the liberal advocates of the New Frontier and the emerging New Right in Southern California.

To contextualize the evolution of the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art, in particular to clarify the role of the museum itself within the city and the role of patronage within the museum, a brief overview of the history of the old Los Angeles Museum will be helpful. The old museum was first conceived in the late nineteenth century to meet the demands of an expanding elite and a growing nouveau riche. Eventually, two

---

20. The first organized art movement in Los Angeles was formed by an alliance of several cultural clubs including the Friday Morning Club, the Ebell Club and the Ruskin Art Club, which was, as Frederic Jaher observes, "an association of upper-class women dedicated to foster the study of art, at first among its members and later throughout the city." (pp.646-7) After the completion of the Opera House in 1902, the newly formed Ruskin Art Club began to lobby for a structure that would form the basis of a permanent foundation for the collection and exhibiton of the visual arts. In tandem with the Society of Fine Arts of California, these organizations were able to secure the development of a site for the construction of a multi-purpose museum with the cornerstone being laid at the newly named Exposition Park on December 17, 1910. Two structures were to be built on the site at a price of $250,000 each: the Museum of History, Science and Art and the State Exposition Building. The completion of the two edifices did not resolve one major difficulty for the art patrons of Los Angeles. As Higgins notes, the science and history displays were very quickly established in their respective exhibition spaces but the art museum remain closed due to the lack of art objects available for public display. It was not until November 6, 1913, the day of the formal dedication of the structure, that the art wing was actually opened. Higgins, pp.8-9.
structures, the Museum of History, Science, and Art and the State Exposition Building, were built at Los Angeles’ Exposition Park. The dedication of the buildings on November 6, 1913 was part of a larger celebration of the completion of the Owen River Aqueduct, which guaranteed a secure long-term water supply for the economic growth of the city. But framed within an even larger context, the exhibition structure at Exposition Park was the Los Angeles contribution to a series of celebrations planned in San Diego and San Francisco to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal in the August of 1914 and to mark the increasing importance of California in projecting the American frontier beyond the shores of the United States into the Pacific Rim and Latin and South America.21

However, the ongoing scarcity of available old masters from Europe and the eastern United States meant that the museum was forced to rely upon the meagre resources available among local art patrons. The poverty of the museum’s art collection led former Chief of the Department of Fine Arts for the Panama Pacific Exposition, John E. D. Trask, to comment on the state of the arts in 1916:

... no great collection is there. The people of Los Angeles will have to wake-up if they

21. For example, following the 1912 Mexican Revolution, United States Marines landed in Nicaragua to protect American commercial investments.
want one -- and they do . . . A museum cannot make an art collection without . . . the people. All art museums derived their collections from the generosity of collectors, and it's up to the collectors in this part of the world to see that the art side as well as the scientific side at Exposition Park is developed. 22

The first patrons of the museum to donate their collection were Mr. and Mrs. Preston Harrison in 1918. Within their collection were a large number of works by American and French artists including one hundred drawings by artists such as Degas, Rodin, Matisse, L'Hote, Forain, Signac, Derain, Utrillo and others. 23 In 1922, the first major exhibition of modern art at the Los Angeles Museum of History, Science, and Art was organized by Stanton Macdonald-Wright and was composed of works selected from the Daniel and Stieglitz galleries of New York City.

By 1925 the first major extension to the museum was added, a more austere modern structure than the florid architecture of the original. Within the addition was a permanent space for "The Mr. and Mrs. William Preston Harrison Gallery of American Art." One year later, the

22. Quoted in Higgins, p.14. The following year, thirty-eight paintings were lent to the Los Angeles Museum from the "Exhibition of Selected Honor Paintings form the Palace of Fine Arts," Panama Pacific International Exposition, San Francisco, 1915.

23. Ironically, Mr. Harrison's father had been the Mayor of Chicago at the time of the 1893 Chicago World's Fair and was assassinated in office on the last day of the Chicago Exposition. Higgins, p.20.
Harrisons donated a further forty-eight paintings by French artists; this collection was displayed in another space, "The Mr. and Mrs. William Preston Harrison Gallery of Modern French Art." However, despite their leadership in promoting art patronage at the Los Angeles Museum, thirteen years after their initial donation, the Harrisons were still the only contributing art patrons. As a result of this lack of support, the museum's art collection remained severely limited. Works exhibited were drawn exclusively from the museum's small permanent collection, primarily featuring second-rate local landscape artists. As Winifred Higgins observes, museum visitors were usually only able to see "arroyos, deserts and scenes of the coastline frequently rendered in a banal manner."\(^{24}\)

By 1936, plans were underway to construct a separate museum exclusively for the exhibition of fine art. A resolution was introduced to the Board of Supervisors proposing a ninety-nine year lease on a parcel of land located at Hancock Park. However, due to political wrangling between arts advocates and the Water And Power Commission, plans for the proposed fine arts center, to be part of a huge $35 million civic center, collapsed.\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\) Higgins, p.14.

\(^{25}\) Higgins, p.42.
Thus, between the opening of the Los Angeles Museum of History, Science, and Art in 1913 and the mid-1950s, financial and political obstacles prevented the establishment of a separate public structure exclusively dedicated to the fine arts in Los Angeles.

In the post-war period, the major patron of the Los Angeles Museum was the newspaper and business magnate, William Randolph Hearst, an avid art collector who was entirely opposed to modern art. In 1950, for example, art critic Arthur Millier, writing in the Art Digest, noted that 277 out of the 339 works of art donated to the museum were donated by Hearst or by his corporations. However, Hearst's anti-modern tastes were indicative of the growing rift in Los Angeles between the political conservatives and modern art, complicating the Los Angeles Museum's attempts to modernize its collection and break-out of its provincial legacy.


27. The conflict between art and politics in California and the relationship of this conflict to the Cold War of the late 1940s and early 1950s was highlighted by the controversy surrounding the Rincon Post Office Annex murals in San Francisco. Completed in 1949 the mural paintings depicted the history of San Francisco from the first moments of European colonization up until the most recent event in the city's history: the signing of the U.N. charter. The murals, painted by the artist Anton Refrigier, drew extensive praise from the San
Opposition to modern art forms was vehement in Los Angeles during the early Cold War years. As Peter Plagens observes, the Los Angeles art public was bombarded by a rash of denunciations of modern art, from sources ranging from the retiring President of the California Art Club, who criticized abstract painters as degenerate, un-American subversives, to the Sanity in Art group, who claimed to have observed "maps of secret defense fortifications sequestered in abstract paintings." (Ultimately, the Los Angeles City Council resolved that the abstract artists accused by the Sanity in Art group were "unconscious tools of Kremlin propaganda.")

Francisco Art Association, which observed that his work was "among the most distinguished mural paintings executed in this country in the past generation." In contrast, conservatives such as Richard M. Nixon and fellow California Representative Hubert B. Scudder attacked the mural, characterizing it as "artistically offensive," "historically inaccurate," and "subversive." The debate was entered with equal furor by liberals in San Francisco and elsewhere, including Lloyd Goodrich of the Whitney and Julian Huxley, the former Director-General of UNESCO. Ultimately, the murals were preserved but the debate had set the stage for future debates in California over the appropriateness of socially critical contemporary art, whether modern or social realist in style, being placed in public institutions. Jane De Hart Matthews, "Art and Politics in Cold War America," American Historical Review 81 (1976), 765.


29. Plagens, p.23. Los Angeles' most visible national art writer, Jules Langsner, wrote in his monthly letter for Art News in December 1951:

For six weeks artists of Los Angeles have
Yet between 1954 and 1957, the modern art scene in California slowly began to develop, despite the absence of patronage and the persistent Cold War environment which made abstract art a target of conservative politicians, such as Congressman George Dondero, and civil servants, such as Robert Moses, not only in Los Angeles but in New York and Washington, D.C. as well. However, with the changing political environment following the launch of Sputnik, art patrons, both shuddered in a common nightmare. Reality, bordering on grotesquerie, descended on them all when the City Council put on "trial" a group of art works removed from the walls of the city’s Greek Theatre Annual Exhibition, and brought to City Hall, there to be held up to scorn and ridicule. Like a freak tornado, the benighted councilmen grasped at large for victims, and though they thought they were tilting at "modern art" a number of our most respected and conservative artists suffered the anguish of being asked to "defend themselves for creating these subversive, sacrilegious and abnormal" works.

Many motives have been suggested for this outbreak of councilmanic hysteria. Some (psychiatrically-minded) persons believe that the man who started it all, Councilman Harold A. Harby (whose son is an artist) was venting a personal grudge at his disappointment in his son's choice of profession. Others (politically experts) view the attack on "modern art" as an effort to embarrass Mayor Fletcher Bowron whose fond project has been the establishment of an effective Municipal Art Commission headed by Kenneth Ross. And, of course, one can suspect that Councilman Harby hungered for publicity and thought (correctly) that he could get some cheaply by accusing the modest exhibition at the Greek Theater of being red. Whatever the reason, art and artists were suddenly being kicked around like a political football.
liberal and conservative, began to reconsider the role of modern art within the Los Angeles Museum as a method of framing both their differences from and similarities to New York. The fate of modernism within these internal debates was partially determined by the political rivalry between the Californian advocates of the New Frontier and the nascent New Right. It is my contention that the debate over modern art and the role of modernism is encoded within the complexity of this political struggle. An analysis of the relationship of art and politics will help to resolve the contradictory role of modernism in Los Angeles between the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the opening of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in 1965. What precisely was the role of modern art within the Los Angeles Museum in the post-Sputnik period? Why was Clement Greenberg, the art critic so intrinsically associated with northeastern liberalism and with New York in particular, invited to organize the first exhibition of abstract painting ever sponsored by the museum? How did the pragmatic liberal concept of culture evolve within a museum whose Board of Trustees were adamantly opposed to the cultural policies of the Kennedy Administration?

The dominance of abstract expressionism in New York inevitably influenced the development of abstract painting within Los Angeles in the 1950s. However, as
Jules Langsner, the city's leading modern art critic in the 1950s, noted, the dominance of abstract expressionism did not negate the development of regional inflections:

If the production of abstract art in Southern California could be charted on a graph, the current season would show activity at an all time peak . . . The one thing our abstractionists have in common is a determination not to inhabit a common stylistic territory. There are lyric colorists like Benay Ventura, disciplined geometers like John McLaughlin, magic-space artists like Lorser Feitelson and scumbling Abstract Expressionists. 30

In 1957, a new privately owned art gallery, co-founded by Walter Hopps and Ed Kienholz, opened in Los Angeles: the Ferus Gallery. This gallery was to give major impetus to the development of contemporary art in Los Angeles and also played an important role in fostering art education and patronage in the city. The opening exhibition, "Objects of a New Landscape Demanding

The attacks on the murals were part of a much larger right-wing offensive fuelled by the anti-communist hysteria after the war. California, in particular, was a focus of a right-wing backlash against the legacy of New Deal liberalism. From the 1947 Hollywood Red Scare and the California Loyalty Oath, an attack on academic freedom, passed by the Regents of the University of California on March 25, 1949, to the UNESCO controversy in Los Angeles from 1951 to 1953, a conservative assault on the concept of internationalism advocated by the United Nations, a variety of issues were seized by a growing right-wing constituency that created a less-than-ideal environment for the flourishing of the contemporary arts, let alone of modern art.

of the Eye," displayed the work of Los Angeles artists, including John Altoon, Billy Al Bengston, Craig Kauffman, Edward Kienholz, and Edward Moses, as well as artists from San Francisco including Jay DeFeo, Roy DeForest, Richard Diebenkorn, Frank Lobdell, and Clyfford Still. While this exhibition introduced many of the up-and-coming artists of Los Angeles to the Southern California art public, the show was still dominated by the abstract expressionist painters based in San Francisco. Gerald Nordland, in his review of the exhibition for Frontier magazine, expressed the hope that the presence of the abstract expressionist painters from the north would prove beneficial to the Los Angeles art scene, stating: "It is hoped that the new showplace can raise the standards of unrepresented experimental painters and that future months will bring much more of American 'action' painting to its hospitable walls." Three months later, the Ferus Gallery achieved tremendous notoriety when an exhibition by the Los Angeles artist Wallace Berman of assemblage works that utilized images of male and female nudes was raided by the Los Angeles police. (figure 39) The arrest of Berman was only the latest in a string of obscenity charges laid against Los Angeles artists in the 1950s, damaging the credibility of the city's cultural

reputation in both San Francisco and New York. Charged and convicted of obscenity, Berman was so depressed by the oppressive and provincial attitudes of the Los Angeles authorities that by the end of 1957 he moved to San Francisco to join the artistic community in that city, robbing Los Angeles of one of its key assemblage artists.32

One year after the opening of the Ferus Gallery, Walter Hopps and Irving Blum, a new arrival in Los Angeles, bought out Edward Kienholz’ interest in the gallery for $100. This change in ownership also marked a turning point in the direction of the gallery, changing from a loose gathering of bohemian artists towards a more streamlined and professionalized operation. With a new location across the street and a small group of twelve artists to manage, the gallery began focusing on nurturing a new group of artists as well as patrons willing to buy contemporary art.33

The Ferus Gallery, under the direction of Hopps and

32. For a discussion of the Ferus Gallery and the arrest of Wallace Berman, see Rebecca Solnit, Secret Exhibition (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1990), pp.18-23. The book is an examination of six Californian artists including George Herms, Wally Hedrick, Bruce Conner, Jay DeFeo, and Jess Duncan.

Blum, emphasized abstract expressionist painters such as Craig Kauffman (figure 40) and John Altoon (figure 41). Robert Irwin, who was working in an Abstract Expressionist mode at the time, was recruited shortly thereafter. (figure 42) Blum thought that the gallery's collection of abstract painters from San Francisco and Los Angeles was "equivalent" to the quality of abstract painters located in New York, but rather than exalting the artists of California over the New Yorkers, Blum emphasized the need for an alliance between Southern California and New York. Blum's call for an alliance was not an acknowledgement of New York's superiority but rather a recognition that New York was the key to promoting the prominence of Los Angeles artists internationally and for creating a stable patronage environment for art in California, as he observed, "... if it isn't talked about, if it isn't supported, if it isn't nurtured, it's likely somehow to fade."34 (It is important to remember that, while the Board of Trustees at the Los Angeles Museum might have welcomed Blum's claim that Los Angeles art production was "equivalent" to that of New York, they would certainly have rejected Blum's desire to move beyond the provincial environment of Los Angeles and forge a closer association with New

Despite the Ferus Gallery’s orientation towards promoting abstract painting, Blum and Hopps did not ignore new trends in the art world. By the time Pop art was emerging as a dominant force in the United States in the early 1960s, Blum recognized the need to include within the gallery a representative sampling of Pop artists, including Andy Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein. Interestingly, Blum bypassed Claes Oldenburg because of Oldenburg’s "expressionistic" style and Blum’s desire not to overwhelm the abstract painting of the Ferus Gallery with Pop imagery. 35

The diversity of artistic production in San Francisco and Los Angeles was also reflected in the increasing number of other privately owned art galleries in both cities. As elsewhere in the United States, the growth of a new patronage class, resulting primarily from the postwar economic boom, fuelled the expansion of the private gallery system. These new art consumers added a

35. In the interview with Joann Phillips, Blum stated: "I excluded Claes because he was the most expressionistic [of the group including himself, Warhol, and Lichtenstein] and I didn’t want the gallery too heavily oriented in the Pop direction, you see." Blum, "At the Ferus Gallery," p.37.

One of Blum’s greatest disappointments with the Los Angeles art scene was the failure to secure a second generation of patrons to sustain the development of the Los Angeles art scene after the generation of the Weismans and the Phillips, for example.
new element to the forces shaping the role of modern art in Southern California as attendance at museums and galleries increased and new exhibition facilities proliferated. Thus, the older business and Hollywood patrons of the arts were joined by new consumers of high culture for whom possession of works of art was becoming a badge of cultural honour, creating a mixture of hope and anxiety concerning the role of art in the city. Hope was created by the new art patrons' stimulation of cultural development; anxiety resulted from the fear of domination by the New York liberal cultural elite unless an indigenous form of modern art could be encouraged.

Less than one year after the decision to build the new art museum at Hancock Park and two years after the opening of the Ferus Gallery, the Los Angeles Museum held an exhibition curated by Langsner entitled "Four Abstract Classicists." This exhibition was on display from September 16 to October 18, 1959 and clearly demonstrated that the museum was not interested at that time in using the artists of the Ferus Gallery as the basis for establishing a contemporary art identity for Los Angeles. In contrast to Irving Blum's desire to forge an alliance between the art communities of New York and Los Angeles, Langsner wanted the "Abstract Classicists" exhibition to promote a form of abstraction indigenous to Los Angeles, with no ties to New York. The show was comprised of
works by four veteran Los Angeles abstract painters: Karl Benjamin, Lorser Feitelson, Frederick Hammersley, and John McLaughlin. As Plagens observes, the exhibition was significant to art in Los Angeles in that it finally provided the city with "[its] first claim to international success as a modern art center." Lawrence Alloway, the art critic who organized the exhibit of this show in London, even observed that "[these] rigorous and exacting easel pictures" would finally remove the label of provincialism and would counter the "constant misrepresentations" of Los Angeles painting. Consequently, the evolution of the exhibition is significant in an analysis of the development of painting in Los Angeles after abstract expressionism and also in highlighting the cultural rivalry between New York and Los Angeles.

The painter Karl Benjamin first conceptualized the idea for an exhibition of painting after abstract expressionism and approached Peter Selz, then chairman of

36. Initially exhibited in the San Francisco Museum of Art, the show was ultimately to be exhibited at the Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA) in London where it was renamed "West Coast Hard Edge" by its English organizer, Lawrence Alloway.

37. Plagens, p.117.

the Art Department at Pomona College, about the possibility of organizing such a show. In a 1976 interview, Benjamin asserted that he was motivated by his desire to break out of the straightjacket of abstract expressionism and establish in Los Angeles a strong foundation for an indigenous form of abstraction:

... at the time everything in all the art magazines was about abstract expressionism, and that was the only thing that was given any credibility as far as contemporary art criticism was concerned. And I'd had a couple of shows, and it seemed like anybody that painted in any other way was sort of dismissed as being some kind of a dead-end offshoot of Mondrian, or a temporary resurrection from the old American abstract... [painters]."39

Selz approved of the idea for the exhibition, but the details were undeveloped when he left Pomona to assume a position at the Museum of Modern Art in New York.40 However, both Selz and Benjamin agreed that for the proposed exhibition to be successful in establishing Los Angeles as a center of original and creative painting, "[the exhibition] demanded a less provincial and more powerful initial exposure."41 Thanks to Alloway and to


the Assistant Chief Curator at the Los Angeles Museum, James Elliott, a tour was organized with the intention of establishing Los Angeles as a dynamic center of modern painting.42

The title of the exhibition, "Four Abstract Classicists," signified a shift away from the current dominance of abstract expressionism. The artists intended, in the words of Langsner, "[to fly] in the face of current fashion in art nomenclature by calling themselves Abstract Classicists."43 The invocation of classicism was a delicate maneuver, effectively encapsulating the style's marked turn from expressionism and romanticism but risking the label of sterile academicism.44

42. The exhibition in London was set up by Alloway but made possible by the sponsorship of the United States Information Service. See Lorser Feitelson, Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait, Tape transcript, UCLA: 1982, p.72. This would have been the same time period in which the Voice of America, a branch of the United States Information Agency, was broadcasting Clement Greenberg's talk "Modernist Painting."


44. The origin of the term "abstract classicism" is a matter of considerable disagreement, though not as much as the debate surrounding the origin of the term "hard-edge painting." Karl Benjamin claims not to know where the term came from even though his wife claims to have made it up in collaboration with Peter Selz. In the interview for the Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait, Benjamin does describe, in some detail, his thought process concerning the title:
For Langsner, the term classicism allied the principles of classicism with methods of scientific investigation since "both science and classical art reflect the passionate need of the Greek spirit to bring light and order to the world of man." This concept thus identified the unique ground occupied by the Los Angeles painters in 1959, both classical and, by its scientific parallel, modern. The Los Angeles painters were therefore distanced from the taint of abstract expressionist "narcissism" and its "succor of the confessional," as Langsner outlines in the following quotation:

A classical work of art aspires to balance -- thought and feeling, intelligence and intuition, reason and emotion. The rational

BENJAMIN: ... I began thinking about art in general and that there are always two poles to art. With the Greeks it was the Dionysian and the Apollonian; there was always the sort of romantic impulse in art and the classical impulse. From an historical viewpoint it always seemed to surface. David and Delacroix. At each place there seemed to be, in a given art period, at least after you had a certain perspective, both those impulses were there. So here was all this abstract expressionism, there had to be its polarity. And I just tailed in on the word that was already used, abstract expressionism, so I said there must be an abstract classicism. It was a misleading word, and from twenty years later it sounds kind of pretentious.

INTERVIEWER: So you're the one who made up the phrase?
BENJAMIN: I don't know who made it up.
(p.43.)

element in classical art runs counter to a widespread contemporary belief in the primary value of emotion and intuition in esthetic experience. Submitting the creative act to regulation (or guidance) by intelligence, it is contended, diminishes (if it does not exterminate) mood, feeling, emotion. Thus one encounters comments to the effect classical art is cold austere, impersonal, excessively disciplined, devoid of passion, what have you. These are objections difficult to overrule only if one accepts blindly the premise that the mission of art is concerned exclusively with the expression of emotional states of being, and forgetting that intelligence is every bit as human as feeling. 46

The four painters included in the exhibition -- Benjamin (figure 43), Feitelson (figure 44), Hammersley (figure 46), and McLaughlin (figure 47) -- were related stylistically by their use of distinct edges and geometric form. 47 Yet their use of form did not

46. Langsner, Four Abstract Classicists, p.9.
47. Langsner encapsulates these similarities in the following manner:

Forms are finite, flat, rimmed by a hard clean edge . . . They are autonomous shapes, sufficient unto themselves as shapes. These clean-edged forms are presented in uniform flat colors running border to border. Ordinarily color serves as a descriptive or emotive element in painting. Its relation to the viewer tends to be more visceral than cerebral. But in these paintings color is not an independent force. Color and shape are one and the same entity. Form gains its existence through color and color its being through form. Color and form here are indivisible. To deprive one of the others is to destroy both. (Langsner, Four Abstract Classicists, pp.9-10)
marginalize the role of color. According to Langsner, color and form were synthesized into one concept -- colorform. All four of the painters shared these general principles of style but also exhibited complex differences.

Feitelson, who used reduced formal means to express subjective content, was probably the most important artist of the four to Langsner, especially since he had been the key figure in Langsner's unsuccessful attempt in the 1930s to establish a modern cultural voice for Los Angeles: Post-Surrealism. Langsner and Feitelson shared a similar interest in the potential for internal dialogue within abstract painting. This partially explains why Langsner selected works for the "Abstract Classicists" exhibition from an earlier period of Feitelson's production, the Magical Space Forms of 1951 (figure 44) as opposed to his vertical stripe style of the mid-1950s (figure 45). The informal geometry of the earlier work, with its lack of precise verticals and horizontals, was more conducive to the construction of an internal dialogue which Langsner was attempting to develop within the exhibition. Feitelson himself described these works in the following terms:

The paintings I call Magical Space Forms are free from three-dimensionally described objects, tangible space, perspective or light and shade.
The enigma of reality is greatly increased by a duality of interchangeable form and space in which stark flat areas of color have ambiguous existence, being both positive and negative, in a state of continual fluctuation.

There is nothing fortuitous or 'automatic' in the creation of these Magical Space Forms, fantastic though they are. Because I am concerned with durable vitality rather than momentary frenzy, I find that my work demands full participation of both my sensibilities and my critical faculties.48

Although Langsner considered Feitelson to be the most important artist in the exhibition, Langsner's conception of abstract classicism was not limited to the formal style of any one artist. He deliberately selected artists whose work exhibited a range of styles and techniques. John McLaughlin, for example, in a work entitled No.8 used reduced formal means as did Feitelson, but for an entirely different purpose: to convey a sublimation of content, to the point of content's virtual disappearance. (figure 47) To make the exhibition cohesive, Langsner played the formal language of each artist off of the others, weaving together different intentions and some commonly held aesthetic assumptions regarding abstraction. However, this complex internal dialogue, with its intentional play of difference within a limited range of formal means, could and would be read by critics as a breakdown of the internal cohesiveness of

the exhibition rather than as a coherent dialogue between these artists.

The contradictions between individual artistic integrity and the collective expression of an artistic movement led the critic Gerald Nordland to observe in a review of the exhibition: "[The works in the exhibition] do not justify the art historical base they are built upon." In fact, he observed, the paintings had "no common program,"\(^49\) although he cited McLaughlin and Benjamin as being more classical and legitimate than Feitelson and Hammersley: "classical in the sense of exploring a formal system, or using generalized rather than specific colors, of extending the possibilities of a limited form... legitimate [in the sense of embracing] a relationship to the painterly values, closed forms, multiplicity within unity and a non-mysterious clarity."

The paintings of Feitelson and Hammersley, because of their curved naturalistic lines and shapes, their romanticism and their playful use of colour, indicated to Nordland a haphazard melding of romantic and classical principles. As a result, according to Nordland, the works of these two artists did not conform to the criteria implied by the label "abstract classicism."\(^50\)

---


Thus, "Four Abstract Classicists" was a critical failure and Langsner's efforts to provide a credible regional art movement were unsuccessful. The tremendous pressure, engendered by the on-going rivalry with New York, to establish a distinct Los Angeles voice in contemporary art was not enough to elevate abstract classicism to this role.\(^{51}\)

Interestingly enough, elements of Nordland's criticism of the 1959 "Four Abstract Classicists" exhibition would reappear five years later in 1964 in his criticism of Greenberg and the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition at the Los Angeles Museum. In both exhibitions, individual critics such as Langsner and Greenberg attempted to define a new path for abstract painting after abstract expressionism. Nordland chastised both for their unorthodox interpretation of formalism which he believed to undermine the intent of both the critics (e.g. Langsner and Greenberg) and the artists involved. Thus, both exhibitions engendered substantial negative criticism, from Nordland and others, because of a perceived lack of internal consistency and

\(^{51}\) The failure of abstract classicism to distinguish itself as the cutting-edge of modern painting in Los Angeles left the field wide open for the success of a variety of neo-Dada and Assemblage artists as well as the abstract painters associated with the Ferus Gallery, whose aesthetic was far removed from that of abstract classicism.
coherence. These two exhibitions, however, frame an historical period in which the continued relevancy of abstraction to the evolving liberal cultural strategy of the New Frontier was diminishing. They also bracket a period of intense planning and debate concerning the role of modern art at the Los Angeles Museum in the years between the decision to build a separate art museum in late 1958 and the opening of this new museum in 1965.

Following the March 18, 1958 decision to authorize the construction of a new art museum at the Hancock Park site, Chief Curator Richard F. Brown made the following optimistic statement about the status of culture in Los Angeles:

The best way to describe the interest Los Angeles has in art is to say it's vehement. More fine private collections are being made, more important galleries are being operated and more art is being shown publicly than in any other city but New York. This is clearly the No.2 art center in the U.S. today, and in 20 years or so, Los Angeles may even overtake New York.52

However, the heavy reliance on private capital to fund the flagship of the city's artistic coming-of-age immediately caused problems, including ongoing conflict between museum planners and temperamental and egotistical patrons. For instance, one of the museum's most

important patrons, Howard F. Ahmanson, would pledge $2 million to the project only if the name of the museum were changed to "The Howard F. Ahmanson Gallery of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art." Ahmanson, who had made his fortune in the Home Savings and Loan Association and who was a major power broker in the Republican Party, managed to present his ultimatum without consulting Brown, resulting in a furor of controversy from other potential major donors who did not wish to contribute funding to a museum named after an individual private patron. With the potential loss of millions of dollars in additional donations to the museum, the issue of the name of the museum was put on hold. However, as a concession to major donors, such as Ahmanson, individual exhibition spaces within the museum were named after specific patrons. The problems of coping with egotistical patrons would, nonetheless, continue and would ultimately contribute to the resignation of the new museum's first director, Richard F. Brown, in 1965.

55. The plan of the naming of the galleries was made public in the Art Fund Sketch 1 (April 1962) in which the building for the permanent collections was to be called the "Ahmanson Gallery"; the building housing the Special and Changing Exhibitions to be called the "Lytton Gallery," along with ten other exhibition spaces to be named after prominent patrons. (Higgins, p.392).
In garnering the patronage necessary for the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), the fund-raising committee was led by Sidney Brody, Mrs. Norman Chandler, Mrs. Freeman Gates, and Edward S. Carter, one of the city's most powerful business leaders. All were members of the established social elite that pre-dated the aerospace boom and the growth of the entertainment industry of Hollywood and were essential figures for the success of the fund-raising efforts. They cautiously played other elements of Los Angeles' social elites against each other in an effort to procure the requisite funds. As journalist Peter W. Bart observed in the New York Times: "The new [fund-raising] leadership was careful to balance the old California families from Pasadena and other prosperous suburbs of Eastern Los Angeles with the 'new wealth' of other western sections of Beverly Hills and Belair." However, the major funding for the new cultural edifice was largely dependent on the largesse of the "tycoons of the savings and loan industry, whose assets in California had grown from $4 billion to $24 billion in the last decade, thanks to favorable state laws and a booming real-estate market." In addition to Ahmanson, other important

57. Bart, "Art Center Symbolic."
contributors from this segment of the business community included S. Mark Taper, chairman of First Charter Financial, who contributed $100,000; and Barton Lytton, of Lytton Industries Limited, who donated $750,000.58

The generosity of these patrons was, according to Bart, stimulated by their desire to launch the museum without the assistance of the Rockefeller family. This sense of rivalry with the Rockefeller family and the northeastern liberal elite was exacerbated by the threat to the economic health of Southern California posed by the Javits-Keating Act in 1959. As previously noted, both Javits and Keating were allies of Nelson Rockefeller and key advocates of the pragmatic liberal cultural agenda, especially of public support of the arts. Large segments of the Los Angeles business community, unified in opposition to this act, supplied massive funding for the new art museum, motivated by the city’s political, economic, and cultural rivalry with New York.

In contrast to the successful fund-raising efforts for the new LACMA which were spurred by the controversy

58. In addition to their patronage to LACMA, the Lyttons also sponsored a "Lytton Center for the Visual Arts" which opened in 1962 located behind the Lytton Savings and Loan Institution. Business and culture presumably went hand-in-hand for the Lyttons, as Barton Lytton remarked: "We [Lytton Industries] have constantly rationalized and prayed that the [Lytton Center for the Visual Arts] will demonstrate itself as an aid to profit." Higgins, p.402.
surrounding the Javits-Keating Act, the failure of abstract classicism highlighted the tenuous status of contemporary art in Los Angeles. In 1959, the role of contemporary art at the old Los Angeles Museum remained contentious. Some liberal museum staff recognized that the museum needed to exhibit work by contemporary artists to demonstrate Los Angeles' new-found cultural sophistication and maturity. This re-orientation meant that the museum would have to abandon its previous strategy of exclusively valorizing Old Masters and greatly expand its contemporary art holdings. However, this seemingly logical change in policy was met with considerable resistance. The museum's conservative Board of Trustees and its major patrons were traditionally unenthusiastic about contemporary art; however, these were the very individuals most keen to establish Los Angeles as an economic, political, and cultural rival to New York, the center of contemporary art in the United States.

Clearly, this conservative ambivalence towards contemporary art was in direct conflict with the objective of competing with New York on its own terms. To achieve this objective, the conservative patrons and Board of Trustees were forced to overcome their antipathy to contemporary art, at least for a short period of time. New institutional support for the exhibit and promotion
of contemporary art was consolidated by the establishment of a Contemporary Arts Council (CAC) within the museum. However, the formation of this new council did not completely resolve the controversy over the role of contemporary art because the liberal CAC members were, in many instances, sympathetic to the very New York art world that the conservatives despised. Thus, the museum was internally split between two factions whose objectives seemed mutually exclusive. The conservative patrons and Board of Trustees, vehemently opposed to the northeastern liberal elite and its cultural program of public support for the arts, wanted the new LACMA to symbolize Los Angeles' cultural coming of age and represent the achievement of free enterprise in the arts. The CAC, on the other hand, supported the pragmatic liberal approach to culture and wanted the new LACMA to exhibit the most up-to-date works by the best contemporary artists, from New York as well as from elsewhere. Each group could only achieve its objectives if these cultural and political differences could be overcome in the interests of building the new museum and establishing its national reputation for the collection and exhibit of contemporary art. Such a tenuous rapprochement could only exist for a very brief moment.

It is my contention that an analysis of the Contemporary Arts Council's formation and functioning
within the Los Angeles Museum will highlight some of the complex reasons why Clement Greenberg was invited to organize the first exhibition of modern art ever originated by the museum itself, just one year prior to the opening of the new LACMA. The four year period between the formation of the CAC and the opening of the LACMA was a crucial time in preparing the art public and art patrons of Los Angeles for a liberal pluralist conception of contemporary art. Paradoxically, in the Cold War years of the early 1960s, Greenberg's teleology and essentialism were increasingly opposed to this very liberal pluralist conception which the CAC sought to promote. Thus, Greenberg's aesthetic would seem to have been at cross purposes with the philosophy of the CAC, prompting an essential question: If Greenberg's modernism had become anathema to pragmatic liberalism, why did Curator James Elliott and the CAC approach him with the proposal for this flagship exhibition of modern painting "after abstract expressionism"?

As previously mentioned, the CAC was formed under the auspices of the old Los Angeles Museum in order to expand the museum's mandate not only to encompass exhibitions of more recent art production but also to encourage the collecting of contemporary art and to educate new patrons about the intricacies of the new art
As the first step in the establishment of the CAC, Curator Elliott met with six wealthy couples to discuss forming such a committee to act in liaison with the museum. (figure 48) Frederick and Marcia Weisman were the leaders in the early planning stages of the CAC. Immediately, they committed themselves to a contribution of $2500 to the CAC and lobbied to make this amount the required annual membership fee. However, such enthusiasm was not as common among the other participants. Ultimately the membership fee was lowered to $500 per couple per year, a modest amount of money to fulfill the ambitious objectives of the CAC charter.

In June 1961 Elliott forwarded the proposed charter for the CAC, co-authored by CAC members Gifford Phillips, Michael Blankfort and Harry Sherwood, to the museum's Board of Trustees. The charter had two main objectives:

59. The CAC was one of at least a dozen Councils within the Museum which ranged from the Women's Auxiliary Council to the Costume Council.

60. The six couples were Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Freeman, Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Hirsh, Mr. and Mrs. John Rex, Mr. and Mrs. Harry Sherwood, Mr. and Mrs. Milton Sperling, and Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Weisman.

61. Marcia Weisman, Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait, Tape transcript, UCLA: 1982, pp. 182 and 183. At one point, the Weismans provided the museum with sufficient funds to hire a preparator (Henry Hopkins) and carry his salary for up to the first year, at $350 a month, after James Elliott's attempts to secure funding from the Board of Trustees had been unsuccessful. (p. 184)
a short-term function focusing on acquisitions, purchases, and loans at the old museum and a long-term role advising the new LACMA Board of Trustees on exhibition policy and staff hiring.  

From the perspective of the Gifford Phillips, the first elected chairman of the CAC, the Council was the most important of all the auxiliary organizations formed under the aegis of the museum. It was apparent to Phillips, however, that the Council’s support for contemporary art was not shared by the Board of Trustees, as he made explicit in a 1976 interview: "I always had the feeling the Board of Trustees regarded [contemporary art] as a kind of stepchild; they never really seemed to accept it as an important component of the museum operation. I always felt we were out in left field." When queried about the Board of Trustees’ lack of interest in contemporary art, he replied, "That’s right, no one on the board was particularly interested in contemporary art." Compounding this lack of interest

---

62. Between the drawing up of the group’s charter and its official recognition by the Los Angeles Museum, a large group of prominent collectors was asked to join the committee. These included Mr. and Mrs. William Fadiman, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Sherwood, Mr. and Mrs. Michael Levee Jr., Mr. and Mrs. Donald Factor Henry Rogers, Mr. and Mrs. Hans de Schultes, Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Alpers, Mr. and Mrs. Leonard Asher, and Dr. Leopold Tuchman.

63. Gifford Phillips, Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait, Tape transcript, UCLA: 1976, p.105. Gifford Phillips was the publisher of several journals in
was the Board's mistrust of Phillips since he was, at the
time of his election as Chairman of the CAC, also a
member of the International Council of the Museum of
Modern Art in New York, the organization upon which the
CAC was based. Moreover, Phillips was the editor of the
major liberal journal in Los Angeles, *Frontier* magazine,
and a delegate to the Democratic national conventions in
1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964. Following in the footsteps of
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Jules Langsner and other
supporters of Adlai Stevenson in the 1950s, Phillips
shifted his support to Kennedy for the 1960 election and
was an avid supporter of the New Frontier cultural
agenda.\(^6\)\(^5\) Clearly, Phillips' political and cultural

the course of his career including *Frontier* (Los Angeles,
1949-1967), and *The Nation* (New York, 1967-1963). He was
also a businessman participating as an active partner in
The Tee Vee Company in Los Angeles between 1949-1954 as
well as the Pardee-Phillips Homebuilders, Los Angeles,
1952.

64. Phillips, *Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait*,
p.105.

65. One year following his departure from the CAC, in
1964, Phillips became a trustee of the Phillips Family
Collection, Washington, D.C., and in 1966 a trustee of
the Museum of Modern Art in New York. In 1973 he became
president of the Pasadena Art Museum. Phillips' advocacy
of the New Frontier cultural policy was clearly stated at
a conference a few days after the bill establishing the
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities.
Panel participants included a large Californian
contingent: Walter Hopps, co-founder of the Ferus
Gallery; Lawrence Lipton, poet and author; Kirk Douglas,
actor; John Houseman, producer and director; Abbott
Kaplan, associate dean of the College of Fine Arts at
UCLA; Thomas W. Leavitt, director, Santa Barbara Museum
of Art; plus Roger L. Stevens, President Johnson's
loyalties were directly contrary to the values of the conservative Board of Trustees.

The museum officially recognized the Contemporary Arts Council in December 1961. Over the next several years, the Council was highly active, encouraging patrons to donate works of contemporary art and organizing a series of seven exhibitions as well as a new lecture series and a variety of vehicles to promote and develop local "New Talent" in contemporary art. The most important of these activities was the series of exhibitions, meant to educate the various art publics in Los Angeles and Southern California about the history of contemporary art. The CAC hoped that by educating the public about the value of contemporary art, fund-raising for the new museum would be facilitated and local artists would be encouraged. The Council anticipated that the cumulative effect of this educational program would be twofold: contemporary art would be promoted while satisfying the conservative Board of Trustees about the cultural and financial advantages of exhibiting contemporary art. In 1962, three CAC exhibitions were held in the museum, including shows on "Futurism" and exhibitions of works by Jean Dubuffet and Louise

Special Assistant on the Arts; and 12 other participants. Phillips’ position is published in Gifford Phillips, The Arts in a Democratic Society (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1966).
Nevelson. In 1963, CAC-sponsored exhibitions included shows by Phillip Guston and the Guggenheim-organized "Six Painters and the Object." The latter exhibit was made politically palatable by the addition of a West Coast group of artists, as well as the addition of the words "Six More" to the original exhibition title. In 1963, as well, Curator Elliott began planning the only exhibition of modern art to be conceived and organized under the auspices of the old museum. This was to be the grand finale of CAC exhibitions prior to the move to the new cultural edifice at Hancock Park. This exhibition was to display Clement Greenberg's concept of the new painting after abstract expressionism, an exhibition that came to be titled, after considerable debate, "Post Painterly Abstraction."

The CAC played an important strategic role in the definition of modern art within the context of the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art. In helping to familiarize the art publics of Los Angeles with contemporary art, the CAC also attempted to demonstrate that Los Angeles was the cultural leader of the West Coast, the Second City of American Art after New York. Art critic John Coplans noted that the CAC was particularly successful in helping to undermine the cultural leadership of San Francisco, particularly the effort in that city to establish an Ecole du Pacifique:
But the Ecole turned out to be a figment, and the prominence of San Francisco was undermined by a series of misfortunes. The dead end of San Francisco figurative painters, the failure -- with one exception -- of any commercial galleries of vitality to survive, the lack of even a single major collector of avant-garde art, all conspired to reduce the reputation of that city to its present level. As the image of San Francisco as an outpost of well-bred, cosmopolitan culture in the woolly West began to give way, so did the myth of Los Angeles as exclusively the home of vulgar money, Hollywood taste and palatial hot-dog stands.66

Thus, the CAC was instrumental in the development of the necessary network of dealers and patrons to support contemporary art in Los Angeles, as well as in the encouragement of an indigenous Los Angeles variant of contemporary art. If successful, this indigenous production would provide the distinct Los Angeles cultural identity sought by Board of Trustees while meeting the cultural agenda of the New Frontier sought by the pragmatic liberals on the CAC.

The growing influence on west coast liberals of the new cultural mood in Washington and New York was reinforced by two symposia held in Southern California analyzing the status of the arts in the United States. The first symposium, entitled "The Arts in a Technological World," was held at Pomona College on

February 21 and 22, 1963; the second, entitled "The Cultural Arts in California," was held at the University of California at Los Angeles between April 5 and 7, 1963. Both symposia attracted prominent speakers and were well attended. The keynote speaker at both events was August Heckscher, Jr., President Kennedy's Consultant on the Arts. His presence, observed CAC Chairman Gifford Phillips, "indicates a considerable if belated interest here in the White House program." Heckscher's talks promoted the White House cultural program of federal sponsorship of the arts, emphasizing the pluralistic nature of contemporary art production and the desire of the Kennedy Administration to avoid the taint of an "official" government culture by providing funding for the broad spectrum of this artistic production. Phillips agreed with Heckscher that "...aid to education and the

67. Prominent speakers at the Pomona College symposium included W. McNeil Lowry, Director of the Ford Foundation Program in the Humanities and the Arts; Dennis Flanagan, writer and editor of Scientific American; Alfred Kazin, Beckman visiting Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of California at Berkeley; and Richard Lippold, sculptor. At UCLA speakers included Lawrence Lipton, poet and author; Kenneth Rexroth, poet, critic and painter; Stanley Kramer, motion picture producer; Jack Lemmon, actor; Aldous Huxley, author; Carey McWilliams, editor of the Nation; Thomas W. Leavitt, Director of the Pasadena Art Museum; John Houseman, producer and director; Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor of UCLA; Richard J. Neutra, architect, and many others.

arts by the highest levels of government in a society with a strong democratic tradition like Britain or the United States poses less of a threat to the cultural freedom than that posed indirectly by economic attrition or directly by local pressure groups, both public and private.\textsuperscript{69}

Another important speaker at the Pomona College Symposium was W. McNeil Lowry of the Ford Foundation. Lowry's comments on the role of private philanthropy were particularly attractive to Phillips given the politically sensitive role the CAC was attempting to play within the Los Angeles Museum. As Lowry reminded his audience, private philanthropy provided many pitfalls for the artist and for the public role of culture in society. Lowry noted that private patrons "have always acted from impure motives," and listed four of these impure motives, which are summarized by Phillips as follows:

1. The local or regional status motive, which results in regional "art festivals" and often merely reinforces the provincialism which it is trying to overcome.

2. The social motive, which .... [is] typified by excessive publicity given to gowns worn by ladies at opera openings.

3. The educational motive, where the arts become submerged in academicism because it is easier to get appropriations for the arts if they fall under the heading of "education."

\textsuperscript{69} Phillips, "Art and the Artist," 22.
4. The economic motive: Is it good for business?  

According to Phillips, these impure motives meant that despite the increased funding from the private sector and the increased attendance figures at cultural institutions, "the artist today in this country seems to be more alienated than ever from society." In contrast, Heckscher's proposals offered the vanguard artists a "little cash," as historian Lawrence Lipton observed, which was all such artists needed as long as they were left alone in their creative endeavors. Phillips concurred with Heckscher that public funding of the arts was less of a threat to culture in a democratic America than the questionable motives of philanthropists, and in his journal Frontier, Phillips publicly endorsed the Kennedy Administration's proposals on federal arts funding. Phillips' declaration highlighted the political rift between the CAC and the Board of Trustees in the crucial years prior to the opening of the LACMA, a privately financed public institution.

The presence of liberals on the CAC was only one

70. Phillips, "Art and the Artist," p.22. These impure impulses definitely characterize the motivations of the Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles Museum. "Provincial boosterism" and cultural and social prestige motivated the Board of Trustees in their support for the new LACMA as a vehicle for their own self-aggrandisement.

example of the increasing influence of the cultural agenda of the New Frontier. At the state government level, this influence was made even more apparent when Governor Edmund G. Brown's Democratic Administration sponsored the California Art Commission in 1963. Echoing the policies of the Kennedy Administration, the bill introducing the Commission argued "... many of our citizens lack the opportunity to view, enjoy or participate in living theatrical performances, musical concerts, operas, dance and ballet recitals, art exhibits, examples of fine architecture, and the performing and visual arts."\(^{72}\) The legislation was intended to overcome the gap between the culturally underprivileged and the fine arts and "accord the arts their proper place in the everyday life of all citizens."\(^{73}\) As with the New Frontier, culture was at the forefront of a new educational strategy designed to raise the public's overall level of knowledge and close the gap between mass culture and high culture.

The California state cultural policy adopted a strategy similar to that of the CAC in Los Angeles in its efforts to ally the traditional patrons of art with the


\(^{73}\) Quoted in Scott, p.1.
new cultural mood of the White House. To accomplish this objective, Governor Brown attempted to integrate a national policy with the boosterism of the regional establishment, melding the political and cultural antagonists into a common front on culture, if on nothing else. As the California Art Commission Bill forthrightly stated:

In earlier times, when the arts were forced to depend almost exclusively upon the patronage of the rich, there was good reason to reward wealthy donors by giving them the fashionable image they sought. Today, when one of the chief purposes of all serious arts organizations should be to bring the middle class and the poor into partnership with creative artists and knowledgeable appreciators, it is no longer advisable to indulge the vanity of the well heeled. 74

The bill also paid homage to the cultural leadership pretensions of California, noting that the proposed Commission would help to "establish the paramount position of this state in the nation and in the world as a cultural center." 75 In the vernacular of the business climate of Southern California, the bill assured both liberals and conservatives alike that the money spent on the Commission would function as "downpayment on California's ascendency to world leadership in the arts." 76

74. Quoted in Scott, p.94.
75. Quoted in Scott, p.3.
76. Scott, p.3.
The Californian cultural legislation was based on the Rockefeller model of the NYSCA, offering public funds, initially as small grants, to encourage new artists and new cultural experimentation while breaking down the elitist image of art in society. The bill intended to strip the cultural establishment of its control over high culture by providing enough public funding to tip the balance of power within museums and galleries in favour of the New Frontier cultural policy: "gradually . . . some of the more timid or hidebound members of boards of directors might become converted to adventurous policies, or they might retire, making way for more adventuresome spirits."77 Once having released public cultural institutions from dominance by private philanthropists, pragmatic liberals could pursue their larger objectives, including "paving the way for closer alliances with the public schools, neighbourhood art programs, and art associations doing missionary work in outer suburbia."78 Thus, millions of "emotionally and intellectually underprivileged citizens"79 would benefit from public support for the arts.80

77. Quoted in Scott, p.96.
78. Scott, p.96.
79. Quoted in Scott, p.121.
80. These liberal cultural proposals challenged the power and the intentions of the Board of Trustees of the Los
The California arts legislation highlights the strategic role of culture in the New Frontier. According to Cold War liberal theorists such as Schlesinger, the dual threats of the missile gap and the culture gap could be overcome on the one hand by a massive commitment of public funds to the production of strategic ballistic missiles and, on the other hand, by the public promotion of cultural institutions and contemporary art. This bizarre juxtaposition had particular relevance for California because of its manufacturing base in aerospace technology and its desire for national cultural leadership. However, the contradictions between the competing visions of New Frontier liberals and the increasingly powerful New Right constituency in Southern California threatened to derail the California cultural renaissance.

California, in the early to mid-1960s, seemed poised for a renaissance that would establish Los Angeles as the main cultural rival to New York in the United States. This anticipated renaissance would also help to establish a tentative bridgehead for the cultural agenda of the New Frontier on the shores of the Pacific. "Provincialism," observed Langsner in a 1963 issue of Art in America, "the Angeles Museum. The resulting tensions would erupt six months after the opening of the new LACMA.
curse of so many gifted American artists, has died on the vine in Los Angeles."\(^{81}\) In addition, he asserted, "The solitary dominance of New York in American art has ended. What's wrong with that?"\(^{82}\) Yet within two years, the promising contemporary art scene within the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art had begun to unravel, the longed-for cultural renaissance stillborn within the political and social contradictions of 1965. The unexpected premature death of the Californian cultural flowering raises important questions about the role of the LACMA and of the CAC in promoting contemporary art.

While the CAC's exhibition strategy focused on educating viewers about contemporary art, two exhibitions in particular stand out because of the large public and critical response they generated. The "Six Painters and the Object" exhibition opened in March 1963 and was organized by the British critic Lawrence Alloway of New York's Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum. The overlapping "Six More" exhibition began in July of that same year and was also organized by Alloway, this time working in conjunction with the Los Angeles Museum. Both these exhibitions helped to redefine Pop art, the dominant style then emerging in the international art world, in a


82. Langsner, "America's Second Art City," 129.
Thus, as the museum was anticipating Greenberg’s exhibition of painting after abstract expressionism, it was also actively promoting Pop art as an example of the museum’s contemporaneity and of California’s cultural maturity and sophistication. While the juxtaposition of modernist painting and Pop art could merely be an indication of the museum’s pluralism prior to the opening of LACMA, I am convinced that the museum deliberately cast the two approaches in a polemical binary opposition. One strategy sought to break down the boundaries between high and popular culture to better instrumentalize this cultural synthesis in molding American opinion; the competing strategy sought to reinforce these boundaries, preserving the integrity of modern art and ensuring modernism’s forward progression. These divergent strategies would be on public display at the Los Angeles Museum in two pivotal exhibitions: "Six Painters and the Object/Six More" and "Post Painterly Abstraction."

"Six Painters and the Object," a travelling exhibit that included works by Pop artists such as Jim Dine, Jasper Johns, Roy Lichtenstein, Robert Rauschenberg, James Rosenquist and Andy Warhol, was New York-centric. The bulk of the works were loaned by New York patrons and dealers; the lone Los Angeles contributors were the Dwan Gallery and Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. Rowan. While "Six
Painters and the Object" received considerable publicity, both positive and negative, Alloway wished to broaden the exhibit to demonstrate that California was an active contributor to the contemporary Pop art scene. As a result, the "Six More" show was added to the exhibit at the Los Angeles Museum, displaying thirty-four works by four Pop artists from Los Angeles -- Billy Al Bengsten (figure 49), Joe Goode (figure 50), Phillip Hefferton (figure 51), and Edward Ruscha (figure 52) -- alongside works by two Pop artists from Sacramento: Mel Ramos (figure 53) and Wayne Thiebaud. Just as importantly, works in the exhibition were loaned by a showcase of Californian, and in particular, Los Angeles, patrons of the arts including Mr. and Mrs. Walter Hopps (of the Ferus Gallery), Phillip Hefferton, and Leopold Tuchman of Beverly Hills. 83

According to Curator James Elliott, the "Six Painters and the Object" exhibition combined with the "Six More" exhibition to provide "... a sensitive and well-reasoned survey and comparison of pop art painting on the East and West Coasts." 84 In the catalogue,

83. The "Six More" exhibition was composed of art works drawn from a previous exhibition of Pop art held at the Pasadena Art Museum in 1962. This exhibition, entitled "The New Painting of Common Objects," was organized by Walter Hopps.

84. Lawrence Alloway, foreword to Six More (Exhibition Catalogue, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1963).
Alloway carefully distinguished the object makers from the painters who were the prime focus of the exhibition. In his view, while the West Coast object makers focused on the "twin threads of American Gothic (Poe) and of social protest,"\(^{85}\) the painters avoided both the pitfalls of "nostalgia" and "anger." More specifically, these Californian Pop painters focused on "the supermarket or Pacific Ocean Park rather than the crypt or the junk shop."\(^{86}\) Thus, Alloway defended the particularly Californian vision that informed the paintings. In contrast, he criticized the legacy of European critiques of mass culture, the legacy upon which Greenberg based his criticism, characterizing these critiques, whether Marxist, Freudian or sociological, as usually negative and inhibiting for American and European intellectuals attempting to analyze mass culture. Pop artists, in comparison, drew upon images from mass media and utilized them in an "objective" way, thereby helping society to overcome social contradictions by portraying "a spirit of acceptance [that] called for originality and vigor."\(^{87}\) According to Alloway, these Pop artists were reducing the alienation of the artist from society by transmitting

\(^{85}\) Alloway, p.2.

\(^{86}\) Alloway, p.2.

\(^{87}\) Alloway, p.3.
cultural concerns to a broad pluralistic audience. Thus, these artists bridged the gap between the "fine arts" and the "popular arts" through their use of images from the mass media, images that were familiar to artist and viewer alike. This effect was achieved, in Alloway's view, "without the loss of the autonomy of the flat picture plane." Alloway concluded his catalogue essay by arguing that the painters in the "Six More" exhibition demonstrated the complexity of the "sign" environment of contemporary life:

Paradoxes of representation, the play of levels of signification, are at the heart of this kind of painting. The artist is engaged both in making legible references to external objects and in achieving satisfactory internal formality. The issue of this double impulse is signs that are problematic and complex, as subtle, for all their references to mass communications, as art that refers to more respected sources.

According to artist and critic John Coplans, who had arrived in California from England in 1961, the characteristics of Pop art identified by Alloway made it eminently suitable for a distinctly American cultural hybrid, one fully educated in the European legacy of high culture but finally achieving its own voice in a manner that abstract expressionism, with its internalization of European aesthetics and philosophical disputes, was never

89. Alloway, p.3.
89. Alloway, p.10.
capable of realizing. Coplans enunciated this argument in a review of a large Pop exhibition at the Oakland Art Museum entitled "Pop Art, USA," held in September 1963. The review was published in the October 1963 edition of the recently created Californian journal Artforum. Coplans saw this new artistic hybrid as a product of the same crisis in art which had helped to engender the abstract expressionists: "the problem of bringing forth a distinctly American painting, divorced from the stylistic influences and esthetic concerns of a tradition of European art which has lain like a frigid wife in the bed of American art since the Armory Show." 90

The simplistic and myopic caricature of abstract expressionism and the 'crisis' in American art was used to reinforce the idea that Pop Art could mediate the contradictions between high and popular culture. The devices used by the Pop painters in America were unique, Coplans argued, because "[they] derive their force from the fact that they have virtually no association with a European tradition." 91 Yet as an English artist and

The sexual analogy in this statement by Coplans clearly encapsulates the new role of culture in the United States and focuses on the gender anxieties of the pragmatic liberals in the late 1950s and early 1960s. According to these liberals, the closing of the culture gap would have the effect of raising the leisure level of suburbia and, in the process, of securing the gender roles and identities of the suburban middle class family.
critic, Coplans was fully aware of the origins of the term "Pop art," a term first coined by Alloway to include the English "Independent Group" under a label that indicated their interests in mass media, technology and popular culture. Regardless of the actual European origins of Pop, critics such as Coplans and Alloway strove to define it in terms identifiable solely with the United States even though both critics recognized that the mass media was "universal," not merely American in bias.

Jules Langsner, who had attempted to define the voice of contemporary Los Angeles art in his 1959 "Four Abstract Classicists" exhibition, was displaced by the


The British perception of America at this time was reflected in a talk given to the BBC by Lawrence Alloway, entitled "Artists as Consumers -- The Splendid Bargain" and broadcast March 11, 1960. Alloway stated "[America is] the model for any fully urban city of any industrialized society: we see in America what's happening and what's available to anybody who is living in the twentieth century. It's not an exotic. . .it's everybody's right." Quoted in Robbins, The Independent Group, p.40.
new critical and popular attention being paid to Pop. He noted in a review of "New Paintings of Common Objects" (the exhibition of Pop art held at the Pasadena Art Museum in the fall of 1962): "This critic finds himself in the unfamiliar (and vaguely uneasy) position of being cantankerously at odds with the serious effort to fashion a new mode of vision in the pictorial arts." 93

Critical reviews of "Six Painters and the Object" and "Six More" in the mass circulation newspapers of Los Angeles and the surrounding suburbs reflected the schism in the art world over the reception of Pop art. Adherents to the elitism of modern art were appalled by Pop, as reflected by critic Arthur Millier's review in the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner: "I must admit it -- I can't be objective about this 'objective' painting. . . Any sane reaction to the features of our present environment begins, I think, with a realization that it needs drastic changes to be directly livable. These images that Pop artists glorify are kid stuff." 94 In response to this negative criticism, pro-Pop critics such as Larry Palmer of the Pasadena Star News focused on the Pop's appeal for the middle class market, affirming that


the middle class public accepted the show "with words of praise." According to Palmer, the initial shock of the middle class at the childishness of the work was soon replaced, after closer examination, by enjoyment.

While the number of in-depth reviews was limited, the coverage of the exhibitions in the Los Angeles mass media was unprecedented, achieving the prominence for the Los Angeles Museum and for contemporary Californian artists that the CAC had sought. This publicity for the museum accelerated museum memberships and financial contributions for the construction of the new LACMA from the middle class as well as from those wealthy patrons who had had longstanding doubts about the role of contemporary art in the Los Angeles Museum. By 1964, the success of the CAC exhibition strategy had contributed to an increased membership in the museum. Membership surpassed ten thousand for the first time in the museum's history while the necessary funding for the new LACMA was virtually achieved, ninety-seven percent of its projected building costs having been reached in that same year.

In the spring of 1963, several months before the opening of the "Six More" show, planning began for the seventh, and last, exhibition in the CAC's series

designed to educate the Los Angeles art publics prior to the opening of the new LACMA. This exhibition was to demonstrate the latest tendencies in modern abstract painting, the first and last show of modern painting to be conceived, funded, and organized by the old Los Angeles Museum. In a series of telephone conversations with Clement Greenberg, Curator James Elliott sketched the rough outlines for an exhibition tentatively entitled "After Abstract Expressionism," the title based on the article by Greenberg that had been published in the October 1962 edition of *Art International*. This article summarized the major tendencies in American art since the 1940s from which Greenberg extrapolated the major terms of reference that would form the foundation of the "After Abstract Expressionism" exhibition, later renamed "Post Painterly Abstraction." Having rejected other current trends such as Pop and Neo-Dada, Greenberg outlined very flexible criteria for selecting an exhibition of painting after abstract expressionism, leaving a large range of painterly means for artists to explore. Out of this period of experimentation, Greenberg theorized that the next stage in the teleological development of the modernist painting project might develop.

Greenberg’s hesitation and unwillingness in the 1962 article to explicitly declare this period of experimentation as the next phase of modernist
development is reflected again in his catalogue statement for "Post Painterly Abstraction." Many Los Angeles critics of the exhibition would misunderstand Greenberg's intention because of his vagueness, a deliberate lack of precision which would prove to be the Achilles heel of Greenberg's exhibition concept. As with the criticism of Langsner's "Four Abstract Classicists" exhibition, Greenberg would be portrayed as too vague in his selection of artists and works.

However, plans for the organization of the show changed from the spring to the fall of 1963. In a letter dated September 25, 1963, Elliott suggests to Greenberg special arrangements for the selection of works from California, indicating a change of course from initial discussions in which Greenberg had been promised total curatorial control of the entire exhibition: "You [Greenberg] will select all works to be included in the exhibition with the exception of those artists working or represented in galleries or collections in Southern California."96 This alteration enabled Elliott to

96. Letter from James Elliott to Clement Greenberg dated September 25, 1963. (Clement Greenberg correspondence: Archives of American Art). This letter also outlined the funding available for the exhibition: $1000 for arranging the collection and shipping, $350 to cover incidental expenses and $200 for photographs. The exhibition would be offered to other museums across North America, each additional exhibition entailing an additional $100 for Greenberg.
increase the number of Californian artists, thus making the exhibition appear as a regional dialogue between New York and California much as the highly visible "Six Painters and the Object" and "Six More" exhibitions had done for Pop. The altered conception of the exhibition would shift the entire focus of the show. Greenberg had originally intended the exhibition to be a broad regional compilation of works from across North America, including nine works by Canadian artists: the Toronto abstract painter Jack Bush and the Saskatchewan artists Art McKay and Kenneth Lochhead were each to contribute three paintings. Although the Canadian contingent would still be included in the exhibition, their role would now be marginalized by the emphasis on the New York/Los Angeles dialogue.

The reasons behind Greenberg's rather surprising inclusion of McKay and Lochhead, both unknown in California, are easily understandable: the works of both artists closely follow the terms he set forth in his Art International article of 1962. McKay often employed rough geometric shapes of relatively pale color contrasted against dark backgrounds. In Statement of a Paradox (1963) (figure 54), the paint handling has been reduced to the scraping of oil paint over a hard masonite surface. The paradoxical subtraction of pigment to achieve an ambiguous juxtaposition of surface and depth
avoided the excess and mannerisms of painterliness in abstract expressionism. This technique placed McKay between classic abstract expressionist gesture and the stained canvases of Noland and Louis while enabling him to break with the cubist box which was the trap for so-called novelty art movements. Lochhead also avoided the early phase of painterliness by utilizing flat color with geometricized shapes, as exemplified by a work such as *Dark Green Centre* (figure 35). Both artists were lauded by Greenberg as contemporary and up-to-date. Despite their disparate means of representation, they still fit within the flexible parameters of Greenberg's tentative approach to the next phase of abstract painting.

Among the thirty-one artists originally selected to participate in the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, the two Saskatchewan artists along with three painters from California were to function as examples of regional accents in a movement rooted primarily in New York. However, because of Elliott's expansion of the Californian contingent to six painters, three other artists were removed from the show. The six Californian artists included in the exhibition were David Simpson (figure 55) and Emerson Woelffer (figure 56) of Los Angeles; Sam Francis (figure 57) of Santa Monica; and Ralph Ducasse (figure 58), Frank Hamilton (figure 59)
and Mason Wells (figure 60) of San Francisco. A crucial exception to this group was the abstract painter Robert Irwin of Los Angeles, the only Ferus Gallery painter asked to participate. (figure 61) While his work related to the broad parameters of the Post Painterly concept in terms of its formal qualities, Irwin rejected the European notion, embraced by the abstract expressionists in New York, of a school or movement. Irwin’s conception of his own role as an individual artist was a hyper-form of individualism, ill-suited to Greenberg’s conception of a modernist avant-garde movement. Irwin’s repudiation of Greenberg’s invitation endeared him to the critics of the the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, who praised him as a Californian finally independent of New York’s cultural hegemony, as well as applauding his work as a positive example of non-teleological abstract painting.

97. The omission of the Abstract Classicists from the exhibition, by either Clement Greenberg or the museum, snubbed one of the most important attempts to give Los Angeles a cultural identity in terms of abstract painting. Greenberg, who would have been familiar with the work of Karl Benjamin and the others as a result of his participation on the jury for the Los Angeles Museum’s Annual Exhibition of Artists of Los Angeles and Vicinity in 1960, should not have had any difficulty in selecting samples of their work for the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition based on formal grounds if his concept was meant to be as flexible as he initially indicated to James Elliott. If the museum was selecting the Californian contingent, then the serious question arises as to why no work from the Abstract Classicists was included?
Ongoing confusion over the artists to be selected for the exhibition resulted in the postponing of the opening from a tentative date in January or February to a new official opening date of April 22, 1964. Confusion, as well, existed about the title of the exhibition. Originally entitled "After Abstract Expressionism," reflecting the vague and still relatively unformed direction of abstract painting, the new title "Post Painterly Abstraction" was selected by Greenberg late in 1963. The new title was still unfocused enough to encompass the experimentation and diversity of the show. Elliott, however, suggested in a letter to Greenberg dated March 1964 that the show was expected to be "polemical." He pointed out that the proposed title

There is some confusion over who exactly was in charge of selecting the Californian contingent. In contradistinction to the statement made by Elliott to Greenberg are the recollections of one of the Californians invited to participate. According to Emerson Woelffer, he was directly contacted by Greenberg and asked to contribute works to the show (Greenberg probably saw Woelffer's work for the first time in the 1960 Annual Exhibition). Woelffer also indicated that at no time in his conversations with Greenberg was the concept of the exhibition discussed. Woelffer was painting in an abstract expressionist idiom at the time and was expecting to be included in another abstract expressionist exhibition, not the next phase of painting after abstract expressionism. This assumption reinforces the pragmatic and tentative nature of the exhibition that Greenberg was proposing to Elliott and the Museum in Los Angeles.

From a personal interview with Emerson Woelffer, November 1989.

was confusing and generally interpreted as "Post-Painterly Abstraction," which, as Elliott pointed out to Greenberg, was bad grammar. "Perhaps," wrote Elliott, "we could write it 'post painterly-abstraction.'"\(^{99}\) The desire to make the show more polemical by asserting a more definitive, less ambiguous title threatened to compromise Greenberg’s intent for the exhibition. An uneasy solution was reached in the catalogue by leaving out any hyphenation but printing the word "Post" in solid black letters while "Painterly Abstraction" was printed as outlines only. (figure 62) While Greenberg assented to this final compromise, his desire for the exhibition to be suggestive, rather than definitive, of the next phase of abstract painting was subsumed under Elliott’s insistence that Greenberg be portrayed as having constructed a new polemical assertion of his modernist teleology. We do not know why Greenberg acquiesced to Elliott, but the ultimate effect of using the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition to aggressively assert modernism in the context of Los Angeles in 1964 was to invite critical retaliation from the local cultural community.\(^{100}\)


100. While conducting research in the LACMA Archives, neither I nor the staff were able to locate the file containing the museum’s documentation of the "Post
In his foreword to the exhibition catalogue, Elliott noted that the two preceding exhibitions in the CAC series -- "Six Painters and the Object" and "Six More" -- had been surveys of Pop painting on the East and West Coasts. According to Elliott, the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition as well as these two preceding shows had been designed "to provide a broad view of the two developments in recent painting which have coalesced into movements."101 Elliott described Greenberg and the latest exhibition as an integral part of the CAC's mandate to educate the people of Los Angeles about the newest trends in contemporary art:

Clement Greenberg was one of the first critics to recognize, support and write about Post Painterly Abstraction, as he has called it here, and he was our choice to select the artists and works to be included in this exhibition. In his catalogue essay which follows, he articulately gives the background for the developments of the trend, and outlines

---

Elliott's foreword ignores the previous months of organizational wrangling. He mentions neither the role of the museum in selecting and expanding the Californian contingent nor Greenberg's statements that Post Painterly Abstraction was not definable as a trend or movement. Greenberg was thus left in a critically vulnerable position, defining a movement he was reluctant to acknowledge as such, appearing to be the sole organizer for a show in fact not entirely his own, in a cultural environment resentful of edicts seeming to emerge from New York. The subtle and tentative nature of Greenberg's original conception of the show was lost in Elliott's desire to emphasize the "polemical."

Greenberg's catalogue statement reiterates many of the arguments he had originally put forth in his 1962 article "After Abstract Expressionism" in *Art International*. He restates his adherence to the European dialectical history of modern painting, between painterly and linear means. He uses the same references to the Swiss art historian Heinrich Wölflin, and even repeats the term "malerische" to delineate the term "painterly."

102. Elliott, *Post Painterly Abstraction*. When I interviewed him in Los Angeles, the former Education Officer of LACMA, Henry Hopkins, maintained that Greenberg had sole responsibility, including the selection of all painters in the exhibition.
Clearly, between his 1962 article and the exhibition catalogue, Greenberg's concept of Post Painterly Abstraction remained nebulous: it was a reaction against abstract expressionism, but continued abstract expressionism's project and did not reject it out of hand. Of the painters selected by Greenberg, almost a quarter employed painterly means, with the New York artist John Ferren -- who led the Emma Lake Workshop in 1960 -- even retaining the infamous "Tenth Street Touch."103 (figure 63)

Greenberg thus clearly maintained that the range of responses to the heritage of abstract expressionism did not constitute "a school, much less a fashion," in order to differentiate his new conception of painting from the current school of Pop art. Pop functioned as an art movement in reaction to abstract expressionism. In contrast, the new abstract painters, although they could conceivably form a school one day, so far had not done so.104 Greenberg re-emphasized the nebulousness of the concept of Post Painterly Abstraction by suggesting that even works by Pop artists like Robert Indiana and the

103. In his catalogue essay, Greenberg even connects Saskatchewan artist McKay stylistically to Painterly Abstraction in France but states that the design elements of linear quality and plainness within McKay's work "fend off what might be oppressive associations." Post Painterly Abstraction, p.3.

104. Greenberg, Post Painterly Abstraction, p. 4.
"earlier" Jim Dine could fit within the parameters of the exhibition. From Ferren to Dine, from abstract expressionism to Pop, Greenberg stressed the open nature of Post Painterly Abstraction, contradicting Elliott's foreword to the catalogue with its emphasis on schools and trends and its attempt to make the exhibition a more restrictive and closed formal entity than it actually was. Elliott, on the other hand, wanted the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition to define clearly a confrontation between the rival movements of Pop and modernism.

It is hard to ascertain Elliott's motives for insisting on such a rigid binary presentation of the two movements in the space of a single year. However, I would suggest that a possible motivation can be identified in the relationship between the anti-hierarchical, anti-dualist intentions of neo-pragmatists such as Elliott and Gifford Phillips and their desire to promote art forms independent of the European philosophical tradition. The contrast between Pop and Post Painterly Abstraction would allow for a critical rejection of modernism and, coincidentally, of New York, much to the pleasure of the conservative Board of Trustees. At the same time Elliott was able to promote Pop art as the contemporary art form most suited to Los Angeles. In terms of the CAC's tentative relationship
with the museum Board of Trustees, the success of Pop art seemingly ensured the presence of contemporary art in the museum while simultaneously, the failure of Greenberg's exhibition would demonstrate California's independence from the cultural hegemony of New York. Although it is difficult to imagine that any curator would oversee an exhibition which he or she wished to be a critical failure, it is apparent that Elliott's motives and actions before, during, and after the exhibition were, at the least, questionable. It is conceivable, if not probable, that the critical failure of Greenberg's "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition enabled contemporary Pop art, and the cultural agenda of the New Frontier, to establish a bridgehead within the museum.

The official opening of the exhibition in April 1964 was preceded by a reception and preview for gallery members only. Greenberg delivered a short talk to the members entitled "How Art is Acquired," a talk which he repeated a few days later. This lecture was a straightforward explanation of art acquisition for novice patrons. Greenberg did not provide, nor was asked to provide, any clarification or defense of his premises in organizing the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, leaving the exhibition ominously vulnerable to criticism in a cultural environment that was seeking its own regional voice and understanding of contemporary art.
production distinct from that of New York.

Critical reviews in the Los Angeles and Californian press were a fraction of the number of those written about the Pop exhibitions held at the museum a year earlier, indicating an immediate lack of critical and popular interest. Most of the actual reviews refrained from passing judgement, choosing instead to make brief announcements of the date of the opening and of the overall organization of the show, usually highlighting the artists from California. Only two newspaper reviews were bold enough to analyse the exhibition in-depth. One review, "Color for Art's Sake" by Arthur Millier, was published in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner on May 10, 1964. Millier dismissed the exhibition as being "stuff for ad men and decorators." He added further, "I saw nothing in this museum show I wanted to hang in the living room. But some of these poster like works would brighten a patio party, a corporation report to the stockholders or a bookjacket." When Millier's criticism of the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition is contrasted with his acerbic dismissal of the earlier Pop art exhibition as "kid stuff," one can discern the parameters of his construction of the highbrow/middlebrow dichotomy. Post Painterly Abstraction typified elitist wallpaper, cut-off from the culture at large in the corporate boardrooms of the nation. Pop art, however,
lacked sufficient depth and gravity to be an artistic remedy to the cultural malaise of the middle class in contemporary America.

The other review, "Post Painterly Show is Outer Directed," was written by Virginia Laddy of the Long Beach Press Telegram and was published on May 3, 1964. Laddy, while persuaded by many of Greenberg's arguments in the catalogue, found the group a "mixed bag," stating: "Their collective difference from what has gone on before is not great enough in either degree or kind to communicate that this is 'new painting.'" Again the critic measured the success or failure of the show against what Greenberg himself considered to be a non-existent break with abstract expressionism. Thus Post Painterly Abstraction was faulted for failing to live up to critical standards of evaluation inapplicable to Greenberg's original conception of art after abstract expressionism. However, such dissonance between Greenberg's intent and the critical response in the press is a reflection of the conflict between Greenberg and Elliott at the heart of the planning for the exhibition.

These negative, or at best lukewarm, reviews combined with the complexity of the art itself resulted in attendance for the exhibition falling well below what had been anticipated, especially compared to the attendance for the Pop exhibitions. In order to generate
some momentum for the exhibition, the Museum Education Officer, Henry J. Hopkins, assembled a panel discussion to be held during the third week of the show. According to Hopkins, in a letter of explanation to Clement Greenberg, dated May 29, 1964, the panel was organized with the intention of gaining "diverse opinions about the exhibition, pointing out the positive features and what to them [the panelists], were negative features."\textsuperscript{105} Hopkins wrote the letter at Elliott's suggestion, to inform Greenberg that the panel discussion had already taken place. Greenberg was not invited to attend; in fact, he was not even given prior notice that the panel discussion was going to occur.

The four members of the panel assembled by Henry Hopkins were Gerald Nordland, art critic, Dean of Chouinard Art School and Associate Editor of \textit{Artforum}; John Coplans, painter, critic, and editor-at-large of \textit{Artforum}; Jules Langsner, art critic for \textit{Art News} and the curator for the 1959 "Four Abstract Classicists" exhibition\textsuperscript{106}; and Robert Irwin, painter and teacher, who


\textsuperscript{106}. Just prior to the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, Jules Langsner was still promoting the abstract classicist alternative to Greenberg, assemblage, neo-Dada and Pop art. Between March 11 and April 12, 1964, Langsner curated an exhibition at the Santa Barbara Art Museum entitled "California Hard-Edge Painting," having adapted Lawrence Alloway's terminology to describe
had withdrawn from the exhibition before it opened. All four panel members had a vested interest in deflating Greenberg's conception of Post Painterly Abstraction as it had been framed by Elliott in the exhibition catalogue. Nordland, Coplans and Langsner were enthusiastic supporters of the development of a regional cultural voice for California; all three wished Los Angeles to become the Second City of American Art. Each had promoted a particular form or style of art to fill the role of cultural beacon for the Californian renaissance and were suspicious of the continued efforts of a New York-based critic to maintain his cultural hegemony. Of course, these critics were responding to the polemical interpretation of Post Painterly Abstraction which Elliott had insisted the exhibition promote. This philosophical and aesthetic modernist construct threatened to minimize their influence as well as keep Los Angeles on the margins of contemporary American art. The artist Robert Irwin, while formally compatible to the stylistic tendencies within the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, was adamantly opposed to the traditional role of critics such as Greenberg in defining or suggesting the next school or movement in some abstract linear development of painting.

The hostility of the panel to Greenberg was revealed abstract classicism in the mid-1960s.
in Nordland's opening comments in which, to the assembled crowd of five hundred people, he accused Greenberg of refusing to participate in the panel discussion. Only at the end of the evening did Hopkins notify the panel and audience that, indeed, Greenberg knew nothing about the panel discussion. Sensitive to potential charges of plotting the critical demolition of Greenberg and the exhibition, Hopkins quickly added as his final comment, "I didn't know what the view of the panel would be," portraying a naive innocence about the potential damage the panel could cause to Greenberg's reputation. In his letter to Greenberg of May 29, however, Hopkins admitted prior knowledge of at least one panel participant's position, that of John Coplans, stating that he knew Coplans "to be more negative in his attitude."

Nonetheless, Hopkins, a high-profile member of the Los Angeles Museum, should have been fully aware of all of the panel participants' positions vis-a-vis Greenberg, the post-war New York domination of culture, and the need for Los Angeles to establish its own cultural identity. While collusion may be too strong a term, Hopkins must have known the potential damage a discussion panel composed of those specific individuals could inflict upon an overtly polemical display of another phase of Greenberg's teleology.

Coplans' comments during the panel discussion were
published in the Summer 1964 issue of Artforum, in which he summarized his criticism of the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition by arguing: "At any rate, as the exhibition currently stands, it is so full of indefensible absurdities, we can only smile at such cuckoo judgements and lose the whole purity of what is new."\textsuperscript{107} However, Irwin's withdrawal from the exhibition, on the grounds of his refusal to participate in a school or movement and his mistrust of critics, gave Coplans a role model of abstract painting not beholden to Greenberg's determinism. According to Coplans, Irwin was "essential" to the concept of Post Painterly Abstraction and his absence undermined the show and Greenberg's authority, at least in California.

The two painters from Saskatchewan included in the show, Art McKay and Ken Lochhead (whom Greenberg considered representative of a region second only to New York in the quality of its painters) were virtually ignored in the cross-fire of critical positions representing the conflict between the East and West Coasts of America. Coplans failed to mention Lochhead, let alone analyze his work. McKay was mentioned once, along with a larger group of artists composed of George

Bireline, Jack Bush, Ernest Deiringer, Ralph Ducasse, Frank Hamilton, Howard Mehring, Albert Stadler, and Mason Wells -- all of whom Coplans deemed so lacking in "esthetic finality" as not to be worthy of inclusion within a show entitled "Post Painterly Abstraction."

Coplans' indifference to the Canadians was understandable in the context of the diffuse nature of Greenberg's concept and the emphasis in the exhibition on New York and California, which marginalized the other regions represented in the show. Coplans went on to reject out of hand the work of Sam Francis, Helen Frankenthaler, John Ferren, and Emerson Woelffer as abstract expressionism. Rather than seeing Greenberg's concept as inclusive rather than exclusive, in his critical autopsy Coplans relied on the polemical emphasis given to the exhibition by Elliott, therefore penalizing Greenberg for being too nebulous and too determinist at the same time.

From the critical demise of Greenberg's exhibition, Artforum attempted to piece together some conclusions about the status of high culture in Los Angeles. Phillip Leider, Managing Editor of the magazine, juxtaposed Robert Irwin with several of the Los Angeles artists represented in the 1963 "Six More" exhibition, including the two Ferus gallery painters Edward Ruscha and Billy Al Bengsten, as the core of the current Los Angeles avant-garde, stating "[These artists] may be producing the most
interesting and significant art being produced in America today." The leadership role of the "Cool School," as Leider termed this assorted collection of painters and sculptors, in Californian culture was made possible by two major factors: firstly, by the critical demise of the polemical reading of Greenberg's "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition and secondly, by the failure of Pop art to engage the viewer sufficiently on the aesthetic level, a similar argument to that posed by critic Arthur Millier. The "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition functioned as a lightning rod for the disparate critical voices in the museum and the cultural community, who found that the difficulty in identifying a specific cultural voice for Los Angeles could be temporarily overcome by the collective mauling of New York's leading critic, who was himself becoming marginalized within the new pragmatic liberal cultural strategy of the New Frontier.

The "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition closed at the Los Angeles Museum on June 7, 1964 but the anticipated demand for further exhibitions across the United States failed to materialize. With the exception of the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis and the Toronto

Art Gallery, the expected tour later in 1964 collapsed. Exhibitions at two other cities that had expressed interest in the show, Washington, D.C. and Montreal, did not materialize. In Montreal, this failure resulted from the insistence of show organizers at the Musee des Beaux Arts that a contingent of Quebecois abstract painters be included in the show. Unlike their counterparts in Los Angeles, Montreal artists were denied participation and Musee cancelled plans for the proposed exhibition.

Despite the lack of critical success of the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, in the summer of 1964, the prospects for both the Los Angeles Museum and the CAC were optimistic. The CAC could claim to have promoted contemporary art successfully through a series of exhibitions, and the importance of contemporary art within the museum should have been assured. Furthermore, a flourishing fund-raising campaign and increased museum membership highlighted the success of the tenuous truce between the Board of Trustees and the CAC. As the new LACMA approached eighty percent completion that year, Director Richard F. Brown could proudly state in Artforum: "Our opportunity is further enhanced by what

109. The Toronto Art Gallery showed two-thirds of the exhibition with the other third exhibited at the Hart House Gallery at the University of Toronto.
may be the most effective marriage of private support and public tax financing in the United States -- a co-operative effort that is nowhere better exemplified than in the building of the Museum." Ultimately, Brown concluded,

[To complete this] unique, co-operative agreement, a self-perpetuating, non-political Board of Trustees composed of leading citizens and collectors will devote the vast amount of time, energy, and money necessary to operate the new Art Museum to assure its success as a truly great institution wherein people may not only see the accumulated art treasures of history, but also gain a deeper perception of nature, history and man through educational programs, lectures, films, tours and study.110

Clearly, in 1964, Brown foresaw that the cooperative arrangements between the CAC and the museum Board of Trustees, between private and public capital, between regional and national pride, and between the art of the past and the contemporary art of the present would continue into the future, leading the way in establishing Los Angeles as the Second City of American Art.

On March 31, 1965, the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art (figure 64) opened to tremendous fanfare, including an orchestra playing Handel's "Royal Fireworks Music." Seven years of fund-raising and public education had apparently achieved its objective: the construction of the largest art museum in the United States since the

National Gallery in Washington in 1941, a tangible demonstration of America's cultural renaissance and the centrality of Los Angeles to the realization of that cultural triumph. The President of the Board of Trustees, Edward W. Carter, in his opening speech, assured the citizens of Los Angeles and California that they were no longer considered "kooks" in the Northeast and proclaimed to the gathered assembly of the Californian cultural community: "The museum is the striking physical manifestation of our new Golden Age."111 No longer could haughty Easterners consider California a cultural backwater; as Business Week magazine observed in an article entitled "Los Angeles hoists flag of culture," culture was now "'in' out Los Angeles way."112

Despite the symbolic victory over Clement Greenberg and the legacy of New York cultural hegemony achieved by the critical demolition of the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition, the Golden Age of LACMA, forged from the fragile alliance between the pragmatic liberals on the CAC and the conservatives on the Board of Trustees, quickly began to unravel. Rather than galvanizing the new museum as the voice of a strong

regional cultural identity, the ongoing conflict within contemporary art juxtaposed with the dispute between the role of public institutions versus the interests of private philanthropy, could not be contained within institutional boundaries. The reassertion of the Board of Trustees' power to make arbitrary decisions pertaining to museum administration and to the role of contemporary art within the museum led to the demise of the alliance of the Board and the CAC, with the long-smouldering internal dispute finally erupting publicly in 1965.

The disintegration of the relationship between the Board of Trustees and the CAC became overtly public six months after the opening of LACMA with the resignation of Director Richard F. Brown as a result of these political divisions. One of the issues cited by Phillip Leider in his analysis of Brown's resignation was Brown's continuing conflict with the Board over the choice of architect for the museum. At the heart of the conflict was an unnamed member of the Board (who, in fact, was Howard Ahmanson, the member of the Board who had originally argued to have the museum named after himself.) Ahmanson had lobbied for the appointment of Millard Sheets as the architect over the museum staff's proposal of Mies van der Rohe. The compromise, William Pereira and Associates, resulted in LACMA becoming, in Leider's words, a "fountain-bedaubed spectacle on
Wilshire Boulevard (the only building ever negatively criticized by *Arts and Architecture* magazine.)

In attributing blame for the design fiasco, Brown noted in his letter of resignation, dated November 8, 1965, "It was, and still is, my firm opinion that the museum could have been substantially greater in layout and design but for the unfortunate decisions in which professional recommendations were overruled in favor of a generous but misguided donor's understandable refusal to sufficiently compromise this desire for a monument rather than build the finest community institution possible." In the aftermath of Brown's resignation, the Chief Curator James Elliott also resigned, leaving vacancies in the two most important professional posts at the museum.

After the Brown resignation, the CAC also began to be bypassed in Board decisions regarding the hiring of replacements for Brown and Elliott. The CAC and its new chairman Frederick Weisman (who had been elected to the post after Gifford Phillips' term expired at the end of 1964) fully expected to be briefed and actively involved in the hiring decisions, especially since the new curator would be responsible solely for contemporary art. However, the CAC was informed by the Board that it had

already selected a new director and a new curator of contemporary art: Ken Donahue and Maurice Tuchman, respectively. Having been bypassed in such serious personnel decisions, Weisman resigned as chairman of the CAC. Henry Hopkins, the LACMA Education Officer whose salary had been paid by the Weismans in his first year, ultimately left the museum to become the curator of the Frederick Weisman Collection. The conservative Board of Trustees had aggressively asserted its dominance and the shortlived truce that had survived between 1958 and 1964 to help build the museum's credibility in contemporary art dissolved. Their objective of building a new museum achieved, the Board asserted control over the contemporary art agenda.115

In his Artforum comments on the Brown resignation, the art critic Philip Leider blamed the Board of Trustees and singled out Howard Ahmanson without naming him directly as Brown's most implacable opponent. Leider stated:

Behind this trustee [e.g. Ahmanson], and this money, the rest of the board closed ranks. The picture that emerges, therefore, is not one of a group of high-minded elders of the community seeking, at all costs, to create the finest institution possible for the area, but of a group of self-seeking individuals making a crude spectacle of themselves in the attempt to slice the Museum pie according to their own untrained wishes.

115. The information on the politics of the CAC following the Brown resignation is derived from the Marcia Weisman transcripts, Los Angeles Art Community: Group Portrait, pp.185-188.

As a postscript to events described in this dissertation, it is important to note that LACMA failed to achieve leadership of the Los Angeles contemporary art scene. Instead, the Pasadena Art Museum emerged as the new leader in the field. After his move to Pasadena as
curator in 1960, Walter Hopps, formerly of the Ferus Gallery and a former CAC-member, had helped to establish this museum as the centre of contemporary art in Southern California. Thanks to Bob Rowan, a trustee of the Pasadena Art Museum who actively supported the Ferus Gallery by purchasing works by Irwin, Kauffman, Altoon and Bengston, as well as the patronage of Marcia Weisman and her brother Norton Simon, the Pasadena Art Museum became the new locus of institutional support for contemporary art in Southern California. The exodus of the pioneers of contemporary art from the Los Angeles Museum to Pasadena was completed with the appointment of Gifford Phillips as Museum President in 1973. Ultimately, Norton Simon would leave his substantial art collection to the Pasadena Art Museum, resulting in the name of the museum being changed to the "Norton Simon Art Museum."
Conclusion

Borderline Syndrome: Of Boundaries, Gaps and Identities

Margins of political discourse, from this perspective, designate those border-zones or crossroads where attentiveness and creative initiative intersect and where the stakes of meaning and non-meaning, order and disorder have to be continually renegotiated. Participating in the negotiation means to be a marginalist or Grenzganger, a person habituated to crossing back and forth between self and other, between home and abroad.

Fred Dallmayr

Where do "we" stand on the post or neo-colonial map? Where do we stand in global history to perceive homogenizing trends? How are our own global visions locally circumscribed? This is the hardest thing to see.

James Clifford

After ten years of continentalizing my ass, what had I accomplished? . . . I was a colonial.

Dennis Lee

This dissertation has explored a range of issues surrounding the historical trajectory of Clement Greenberg’s modernist theory during a crucial period of the Cold War, a period in which human civilization danced on the edge of the nuclear abyss. At the same time,
Canada stood directly between the two superpowers, a broad no-man's-land for the interception of nuclear bombers and missiles. In addition, Canada was caught between the two leading cities of the East and West coasts of the United States -- New York and Los Angeles -- engaged in prolonged regional rivalry over the military-industrial complex. This East coast/West coast rivalry also extended to the cultural realm, affecting the reception of both modern and contemporary art in the United States and, by extension, in Canada as well. It is within this historical constellation that the decline of Greenberg's modernism can be traced.

In the preceding chapters, I have provided some intersecting approaches to the analysis of this complex era in which Greenberg's modernism failed to renegotiate its relationship to North American culture. Rather than dominating the U.S. art scene in the early 1960s, Greenberg, while still influential, was increasingly displaced from his previous role as the arbiter of taste in modern art. I have suggested a variety of interrelated factors responsible for Greenberg's decline in status: the changing Cold War cultural strategy of the United States government in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the emergence of a revamped pragmatic liberalism in that same period, the changing regional politics and balance of power within the United States, and the
changing relationship of the center and the periphery that resulted in Greenberg's attempts to valorize the modern art of the margins while lambasting the contemporary art of the center, New York. My objective throughout has been to call into question the standard historical account of how postmodernism supplanted the hegemony of modernism. While I am certainly not an apologist for Greenberg's modernist paradigm, I hope that I have problematized the relationship between a residual modernism and an emergent postmodernism to reveal that the fetishizing of autonomy and of heterogeneity can both be implicated in the machinations of the Cold War and of Late Capitalist society.

Kennedy's New Frontier was a remotivation of the nineteenth century concept of the frontier, a concept which had rationalized the outward expansion of the United States to the west coast and beyond. Pragmatic liberalism's reworking of this concept provided Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign with an effective rhetorical ploy that hearkened back to the expansionary days of the continental United States. It also revamped the frontier concept, making it more effective in waging the Cold War at home and abroad. With this remotivated concept of the frontier in mind, I want to extrapolate from my analysis to a brief consideration of the relevance of my representation of the Cold War era to current debates.
concerning postmodernism and neo-colonialism. In the immediate post-Cold War period, with its invocation of a New World Order, the historical relationship between some elements of pragmatism and neo-colonial expansion becomes an important key to understanding the present-day efforts to mediate between Same and Other while reconceptualizing the critical traditions of modernism. I am suggesting that my analysis of the art and politics of the early 1960s can contribute to a critical assessment of the politics of much postmodernist thought in the present day.

Jane Flax, in *Thinking Fragments*, her recent book on postmodernism, defines the term "borderline syndrome" as an "illness" in which "the self is in painful and disabling fragments." Consequently, Flax observes, borderline patients lack a core self and are frustrated in their ability to mediate between Same and Other, inner and outer worlds. In opposition to a postmodernist optimism advocating such de-centered fragments, she warns: "Those who celebrate or call for a 'decentered' self seem self-deceptively naive and unaware of the basic cohesion within themselves that makes the fragmentation of experiences something other than a terrifying slide into psychosis."¹ While I do not wish to extend the

analogy too far, I think Flax’s suggestive comments are pertinent to a Late Capitalist universe that perpetuates its hegemony by incorporating into its identity the idea that it is somehow de-centered, thus enabling fragmentation to assume a positive role.

Between 1957 and 1965, the foundations securing the dominance of Greenberg’s particular interpretation of modernism slowly eroded as the processes through which the society of the United States assured its meaning and identity were not so much dismantled as recast in an altered form. This process of re-drawing internal as well as national and international boundaries as a means of securing new private and public identities for the citizens of the United States was an integral aspect of the political struggle waged between the Republicans and the Democrats in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Between the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, an all-too-real image of the abyss cast serious doubts on the integrity of the U.S. identity and its ability to triumph in the Cold War. The New Frontier strategy of recasting boundaries, whether between nations, regions, genders, or forms of cultural expression, re-opens the issue of Greenberg’s modernist paradigm and its precise relationship to this new phase of the Cold War.

During the Kennedy Administration, a new cultural
policy was formulated, advocating increased government support for the arts as a means of remotivating the American populace to wage and win the Cold War. This national policy was adapted from the successful model of New York State support for the arts devised, in part, by pragmatic liberals such as Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Jacob Javits and arts adviser August Heckscher, Jr. As a result of this re-orientation of cultural policy, art forms, such as Pop, that successfully bridged the gap between elite high culture and mass culture were favoured, and modernism, with its orientation towards European idealism, was marginalized.

In this dissertation, I have argued that the domination of New York-centered modernism and therefore of Greenberg as its leading critical voice was jeopardized by the changing cultural model promoted by pragmatic liberalism. Clearly, with the critical failure of the 1964 "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition at the Los Angeles Museum, Greenberg’s previous position of influence was undermined by the new cultural environment of the early 1960s. The failure of the museum to secure a national tour for the "Post Painterly Abstraction" show only highlighted the failure of Greenberg’s paradigm to reclaim its dominant position at the center of the art world in the United States. I contend that this critical failure in Los Angeles, juxtaposed with the virtual
absence of Greenberg’s idea of good modern art at the 1964 New York World’s Fair and the victory of the new pragmatic liberal cultural hero Robert Rauschenberg at the Venice Biennale that spring, implied that Greenberg’s discourse of modernism was displaced regionally as well as nationally and internationally. While his influence would continue (and for some critics and artists it would still be pervasive), Greenberg would henceforth only be one critical voice among a myriad of others in a pluralist cultural environment. Unlike the 1940s and 1950s, pragmatic liberals in the United States in the 1960s were a powerful national influence that could not tolerate Greenberg’s particular teleology and essentialism with its elitist bias.

The de-centering of Greenbergian modernism in 1964 was the culmination of a series of events stemming from the acceleration of the Cold War after the launch of Sputnik. Prior to and after the 1960 election which brought Kennedy to power, pragmatic liberals attacked the Cold War strategies of the former Eisenhower Administration. Instead they favoured an aggressive realignment of American Cold War strategies that would, as a consequence, regain American military and technological superiority as well as assert American cultural leadership, not only in Europe but in the new Cold War battlegrounds of the Third World. Thus both the
missile gap and the culture gap would be narrowed, perhaps even closed.

The narrowing of the culture and the missile gaps had intended and unintended consequences for advanced painting in the United States. Greenberg, whose modernist paradigm had been dominant in the New York art world for over a decade, attempted to rationalize the continued importance of modernism for America in the early 1960s, thus reinforcing the culture gap. However, Greenberg's aesthetic was inappropriate in a pragmatic era that sought to blur and redefine the boundaries separating high and low culture. Both modernists such as Greenberg and pragmatic liberals such as Heckscher and Schlesinger exploited what cultural theorist Homi K. Bhabha (extrapolating from the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan), has labelled 'the process of gap.' It is the process of gap that allows for a strategic redeployment of the relationship of the subject to the Other.\footnote{Homi K. Bhabha, "Interrogating Identity," \textit{Identity Documents}, Document Six (London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1987), p.8.} The twin discursive fictions of the missile gap and the culture gap allowed pragmatic liberal strategists to exploit the gap between meaning and existence that momentarily appeared following Sputnik. The process of gap rendered former boundaries highly flexible in reorganizing the relationship of the subject to the
Other. For pragmatic liberals such as Schlesinger and Heckscher, the opportunity emerged to secure a liberal vision that avoided the totalitarian extremes of left and right. The rise of the suburban middle class in America and the increasing importance of the Third World created an opportunity for liberals to integrate these new Others, at home and abroad, into their Cold War agenda. However, this integration necessitated a reconceptualizing of the boundaries between Same and Other. Older forms of Eurocentric universalism were inappropriate to the flexible and pragmatic liberal approach which sought to dissolve older boundaries for the sake of charting new spaces and new relationships with the Other in suburbia and the Third World.

The construction of a very narrow and specific anti-foundationalist, anti-universalist, and anti-teleological bias by pragmatists in the United States in the late fifties, when purged of its more progressive Deweyan elements from the 1930s, provided the tactical and strategic flexibility necessary for liberal politicians in the Democratic party to exploit 'the process of the gap.' Democrats could deconstruct the Cold War strategies of the Eisenhower Administration while substituting in their place a series of different binary relationships constructing new identities of race, class, and gender. These newer fictions of identity came under the aegis of
a wholly domestic brand of pragmatic liberalism and were not dependent on the older European philosophical categories. This pragmatic tradition was a form of post-colonial discourse that gave the policy planners of the United States not only an intuitive understanding of colonial struggles after World War Two but also the blueprint for the projection of that post-colonial discourse outwards as an instrument of counter-insurgency campaigns in the Third World. Of course, these new fables of identity were never imposed in a homogenous fashion but were subject to continuous interrogation and re-negotiation by the New Right in the Sunbelt states, the Civil Rights movement, Third World revolutionary movements and, as the sixties progressed, the emerging New Left. It is within the debate over the meaning of this historical legacy of dissolving boundaries and the overturning of pre-existing identities that Greenberg’s modernist gambit must be analysed. Greenberg’s complex re-working of modernism in his formulation of Post Painterly Abstraction has too often been dismissed as an archaic relic of logocentric categories. Such criticism overlooks the precarious position of modernism in the historical constellation of the early 1960s; it is crucial to understand the precise role of modernism in the cultural strategy of the pragmatic liberals in order to understand the later debates between modernism and
postmodernism.

Greenberg's sojourn on the Canadian prairie in August of 1962 occurred at the moment when the philosophical ground around modernism was shifting, which, along with Greenberg's distaste for the increasing commercialization of the New York art world and the pastiche of the second generation New York School, was gradually transforming him into an ex-centric. Thus, Greenberg scoured the margins to secure the means by which he could once again give voice to modernism as the cultural dominant, searching for art untainted by New York. Greenberg's moment of ex-centricity, however, which encouraged his travels to the margins, was perceived by Lochhead, MacKay and the other Emma Lake painters sympathetic to Greenberg, as the moment when their recognition by the center was finally materializing in the form of the famous critic's arrival at Emma Lake in 1962. For Lochhead and McKay, inclusion in the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition was further evidence of this belated recognition, of their entry into the "big leagues" of modern art. Ironically, these painters on the margins were looking toward New York as the center of the art world at the same moment Greenberg was most disenchanted with (and de-centered from) the New York art scene.

This co-mingling of center and margin in
Saskatchewan might theoretically have transformed Greenberg's relationship to Emma Lake from a colonizer/colonized or master/slave relationship into what Allon White and Peter Stallybrass refer to as a "hybrid" one,\(^3\) a situation that dissolves the binary relationship that traditionally holds the center and periphery in place, with the center always holding the upper hand. In a hybrid place, the traditional dualism is upset because neither party -- in this case, neither Greenberg nor the Emma Lake modernist painters -- is secure in its identity as centrist or marginalist. The hierarchy between centre and margin is not eliminated, but blurred or co-mingled. Because the Canadian artists encountered Greenberg as he was in the process of becoming an ex-centric, the meeting could have exemplified what Canadian literary critic Linda Hutcheon characterizes as "a mirror of Canadian marginalization [which] . . . challenges the general notion of centre and, at the same time, undoes that particular idea of the possibility of a centred, coherent subjectivity.\(^4\)

Although the 1962 Emma Lake Artists' Workshop had

---


the potential for a hybrid co-mingling of Greenberg's critical voice with that of the Saskatchewan painters, Greenberg did not in fact alter the frame of his discourse. By failing to adapt to his own growing eccentricity and to substitute his hardening formalist categories with the more nimble and malleable strategy of the Grenzganger (i.e. the marginalist capable of negotiating a new relationship "between self and other, between home and abroad,")^5 Greenberg instead chose to solidify his modernist defenses with a formalist circling of the wagons. Rather than a critical border transgression of those categories which would have allowed Greenberg to mediate between older binary models of center and periphery as well as colonizer and colonized, he opted for the traditional formula of cultural colonialism in the guise of cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{5.} Fred Dallmayr, \textit{Margins of Political Discourse} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), ix-x. See also Dallmayr's Introduction (xi-xvii) for a discussion of Platonic \textit{metaxy} or "in-between."

\textsuperscript{6.} While I am critical of Greenberg's cosmopolitan modernism because of its lack of dialogue with the margins, I agree with writers such as the literary theorist Bruce Robbins that cosmopolitanism is not a monolithic term and that, in some instances, it is a necessary corrective to hyper-nationalism. Of the present, Robbins states that ideally, internationalism could be de-nationalized so as to avoid functioning as a monologue imposed on the margins. Instead, Robbins thinks that cosmopolitanism could be the first step of an "internationalist political education" and part of a long-term process "of trans-local connecting that is both political and educational at once." See Bruce Robbins,
Thus, instead of functioning as a "hybrid place," Emma Lake was merely the same old place in which logocentric categories were imposed on the margins, an old-fashioned and rapidly outmoded model of high culture in the Cold War, bypassed and discarded by far more malleable and transparent strategies of neo-colonial intrusion as formulated by the Kennedy Administration. Greenberg had failed to adapt to the process of the gap being employed by the pragmatic liberals (in essence, applying their own version of the Grenzganger) and therefore was unable to resituate modernism as the central aesthetic discourse in the United States.

Greenberg’s static positioning as an advocate of a withering formalism made him an all-too-visible and easily targetted opponent of the liberal adherents to a non-hierarchical, non-teleological pluralism. The visibility of Greenberg’s static defense and the transparency of the neo-colonial aspirations of pragmatic liberalism meant that many opponents of modernism were now included in the cultural administration of a new pluralist universe. Greenberg and his modernist paradigm were convenient foils for the establishment of new regional and national cultural identities in the United States and Canada. In Los Angeles, for example, the

critical rejection of Greenberg and the "Post Painterly Abstraction" exhibition foregrounded a pluralist model of contemporary art that satisfied both liberals and conservatives within the Los Angeles Museum.

In Canada, on the other hand, in the aftermath of the defeat of the nationalist Conservative government of John Diefenbaker, the new Liberal government, anxious for a new cooperative relationship with the Kennedy Administration to the south, eagerly began to set in place a cultural agenda that would also reject Greenberg's modernist hegemony in favour of the pragmatic liberal pluralist model. Thus, while appearing to promote Canadian cultural identity through the rejection

7. The defeat of the Diefenbaker government in 1963 was more than the mere passing of a Conservative government for it demonstrated to the complete spectrum of Canadian society the nature of the rule of a Western Hemisphere dominated by the capitalist dynamo of the United States. As George Grant stated very eloquently in the mid-60s (a statement which retains its cogency in a contemporary era of free trade and the emergence of a New World Order):

But what lies behind the small practical question of Canadian nationalism is the larger context of the fate of western civilization. By that fate, I mean not merely the relations of our massive empire to the rest of the world, but even more the kind of existence which is becoming universal in advanced technological societies. What is worth doing in the midst of this barren twilight is the incredibly difficult question.

of American (e.g. Greenbergian) cultural domination, the Pearson government would ultimately follow the lead of the Kennedy Administration in its cultural policies. The Canadian Liberal cultural policy favoured state intervention in the arts supporting a pluralist non-hierarchical cultural program drawing from the particularities of specific regions. Ironically, at the 1967 World’s Fair held in Montreal to celebrate the Canadian centennial, this cultural strategy, selected to promote the maturing of the cultural identity of an independent Canada after hundreds of years of colonial ties, only highlighted the effective internalization of the neo-colonial strategies forged in the United States earlier in the Cold War. While trying to avoid the very real dangers of a nationalizing essentialism, Canadian Liberals fell victim to a universalism and an internationalism that was the essence of neo-colonialism during and after the period in which Cold War strategists such as Walt Rostow had shifted away from their fixation on Europe towards the control of Others at home and in the so-called Third World.

By claiming to be in disintegration through its advocacy of regionalism and pluralism, the center could

re-negotiate the terms of its own and others' identities while retaining the strategic initiative. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall noted this situation in 1978 by contending that a new series of "frontier effects" arose as the social contradictions of the sixties fragmented "the great consensus of the 50s and 60s," juxtaposing the people, unified as a counter-hegemonic bloc, against the state. However, I think that Hall's optimism concerning the confrontation of the homogeneity of the fifties with the heterogeneity of the sixties fails to account for the "frontier effects" of Kennedy's New Frontier as a flexible strategy capable of dissolving rigid hierarchies and formations of identity in favour of a more mobile and transparent liberalism.

It is my contention that a similar myopia informs many of the Canadian discussions of postmodernism. Critics fetishize pluralism and heterogeneity in

9. Steven Conner, Postmodernist Culture (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), pp.235-237. Conner makes a very valuable observation when he notes that the desire to see the center as unoccupied inadvertently "creates a Manichean universe of absolute opposites which is barely responsive to the actual complexities and overdeterminations of the situation under consideration." p.236.

opposition to Greenberg's fetishizing of artistic autonomy within a universalist and homogenizing modernism. The critical opponents of Greenberg's strategy of autonomy ignore at their peril the deployment of pluralism and heterogeneity characteristic of the neo-pragmatism of the Kennedy era. Hutcheon, for example, argues in a recent essay for a strategy of "fringe interference" building on the strengths of a historical and political position that would avoid the "neoconservatively nostalgic [and] radically revolutionary" precisely because of the self-critical awareness that this artistic and critical production has of its own compromised nature. Such a cultural strategy seems to articulate a position for a critical art that would fit comfortably into the pragmatic paradigm I have been discussing, in effect following Jane Flax's description of postmodernist culture "playing in the graveyard" at the end of history. Without adequate analysis of the social and historical context of such

11. Linda Hutcheon, "Fringe Interference: Postmodern Border Tensions" in Mark Kreiswirth and Mark A. Cheetham [Eds.] Theory Between the Disciplines (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp.101-134. I am in partial agreement with Hutcheon's call for an art of interference and de-centering; it is the optimism behind this strategy that I find debatable, given the lack of adequate historicization, and the tenuous nature of the cultural forms supposedly providing the interference.

heterogeneous cultural works, how is it possible for critics to be self-conscious about the compromised nature of their own context, let alone demonstrate how these texts would actually "interfere" with the boundaries securing the current phase of capitalist hegemony?

In contrast to Hutcheon's strategy regarding the conflict between the Same and the Other, the cultural critic Kobena Mercer argues that "the left - what's left of it - still cannot bring itself to think that its enemies are any more capable than it is when dealing with the imaginary and symbolic dimensions of hegemonic politics." Mercer goes on to assert that, as the New Frontier and the growth of the New Right demonstrate,

The problem is not the collapse of the left/right metaphor as a distinction between progressive and reactionary politics, but that the binary frontier or boundary between them is not totally closed or fixed and that it is the partial or incomplete character of any political identity that enables these appropriations to be made from either side of the oppositional divide.  

13. Mercer, "1968," p.437. Mercer, in particular, points to the success of New Right politicians such as Enoch Powell in England in seizing "hold of what the Situationists used to call 'the reversible connecting factor.' This was a term coined by Guy Debord in his theory of 'detournement' or the bricolage of bits and pieces found in the streets. Enoch Powell's bricolage of racism, nationalism, and populism was based on a similar textual strategy." See also Kobena Mercer, Powellism: Race, Politics and Discourse, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of London, Goldsmith's College, 1990.

Mercer's attentiveness to pragmatic liberalism's ability to intervene successfully in the renegotiations of logocentric binaries is a necessary corrective to the optimism that often characterizes much of the discourse of post-modernism, post-colonialism and post-marxism. Rather than retreating to Greenberg's fetishizing of his interpretation of modernism or to liberalism's celebration of postmodernism, Bhabha suggests "a social process of enunciation... [which attempts to] relocate that claim to cultural and anthropological priority (High/Low; Ours/Theirs) in the act of revising and hybridizing the settled, sententious hierarchies, the locale and the locutions of the cultural." As a result, the oppositional writer is situated in a critical space that could point "to limits and inhabit the border countries of frontiers and margins and rob discourse of a conciliatory conclusion."

In this dissertation, I have presented an historical argument that challenges many of the premises upon which the modernism/postmodernism debate is waged. I have

15. Homi K. Bhabha, "Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern Guilt" in Cultural Studies, p.57.

16. Iain Chambers, Border Dialogues (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc., 1990), p.116. Chambers tempers the enthusiasm of Hutcheon by observing that to inhabit these borderlands is to occupy a tenuous position; thus he concludes, "we have to face up to inscribing (to enrol, to write) ourselves into an altogether less guaranteed context."
argued that modernism was not the cultural dominant in the early 1960s that many postmodernist critics have characterized it to be. As early as 1962, modernism was being supplanted by a new cultural paradigm which shared many of the attributes of later postmodernism, including its anti-dualism, anti-foundationalism, anti-historicism, and anti-elitism. However, this pragmatic cultural paradigm, which formed the foundation for the later development of postmodernism in North America, was implicated from its inception in furthering the political objectives of the United States. Thus, the decline of Greenberg's modernist paradigm stands as a warning, not so much to the advocates of modernism as to a doctrinaire adherence to either modernism or postmodernism. I have tried to demonstrate some of the hazards associated with the extremes of boundaries, gaps, and identities, and alert the reader to a more critical perception of the present historical period. The narrative is meant to be cautionary. As the critic Walter Benjamin lamented over half a century ago, "But what now, what next?"
Dream and Waking life have now been blended
Longtime in the caverns of my soul --
Oft in daylight have my steps descended
Down to that Dusk Realm where all is ended,
Save remeadless [sic] dole!

James Clarence Mangan

S’io credesse che mia riposta josse
A persona che mai tornasse al mondo,
Questa fiamma staria senza piu scosse.
Ma perciocche giattami de questo fondo
Non torno vivo alcun, s’i’odo il vero,
Senza tema d’infamia ti rispondo.

(If I thought that my reply would be to one who would ever return to the world, this flame would stay without further movement; but since none has ever returned alive from this depth, if what I hear is true, I answer you without fear of infamy.)

Dante
Inferno XXVII, 61-66
Figure 1. Cover photograph, Life magazine, October 21, 1957: American scientists plotting the orbit of Sputnik 1
Figure 2. Photograph, Life magazine, October 21, 1957: Orbits made by Sputnik in its first 24 hours of flight
Figure 3. Photograph, Life magazine, October 21, 1957: President Eisenhower with space toys and space fashions.
Figure 3. Photograph, *Life* magazine, October 21, 1957: President Eisenhower with space toys and space fashions.
Figure 5. Lincoln Center of the Arts, New York City

Figure 6. Group portrait of "some of the men who made Lincoln Center"

Figure 7. Robert Moses, President of the 1964 World's Fair Commission

[Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p. 44]
Figure 8. Wallace Harrison and Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

Figure 9. Map of the 1964 World's Fair

["This is the Fair," New York Times Magazine, April 19, 1964, n.p.]
Figure 10. Cover photograph, *Life* magazine, May 1, 1964: US Steel Corporation's Unisphere
Figure 11. The Rocket Thrower (1964) by Donald de Lue. Bronze statue, 45 feet.

[Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.144]
Figure 12. "The City: Places and People": exterior of the New York State Pavilion

[Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.156]

[Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.163]
Figure 14. *Prometheus* (1964) by Alexander Liberman. Painted aluminum, 20 feet x 20 feet. Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.

([*Remembering the Future*, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.158])
Figure 15. *World's Fair Mural* (1964) by Roy Lichtenstein. Oil on plywood, 20 feet x 16 feet. Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.

[Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.159]
Figure 16. \textbf{World's Fair Mural} (1964) by James Rosenquist. Oil on masonite, 20 feet x 20 feet. Collection of the University Art Museum, University of Minnesota.

[\textit{Remembering the Future}, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.159]
Figure 17. **Thirteen Most Wanted Men** (1964) by Andy Warhol, (covered in black cloth). Silkscreen on canvas, 20 feet x 20 feet.

Figure 18.  

Robert Moses (1964) by Andy Warhol.  
Silkscreen on canvas.

([Remembering the Future, Exhibition Catalogue, Queens Museum (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), p.157])
Figure 19. Map of Saskatchewan

Figure 20. Augustus Kenderdine, first director of Murray Point Summer School of Art, ca. 1937

(The Flat Side of the Landscape. Ed. John O'Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1989, p. 20)
Figure 21. Photograph of Emma Lake, Saskatchewan

Figure 22. Ken Lochhead, Roy Kiyooka, and Art McKay at the Regina College of Art, 1957

Figure 23. Return to Humanity (1955) by Ken Lochhead. Oil on canvas, 40.6 x 76.8 cm. Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.

Figure 24. Of Birds and Grass, No. 2 (1953) by Jack Shadbolt. Ink and casein on paper, 50.5 x 64.5 cm. Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto.

Figure 25. The Edge of the Forest (1957) by Art McKay. Watercolour on paper, 43.3 x 58.5 cm. Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.

Figure 26. Photograph of Barnett Newman at Emma Lake, 1959.

Figure 27. Image of Clarity (1961) by Art McKay. Enamel on masonite, 182 x 121.7 cm. Collection of the Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon.

Figure 28. *The Way I* (1951) by Barnett Newman. Oil on canvas, 101.6 x 76.2 cm. Collection of the National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.

([The Flat Side of the Landscape. Ed. John O'Brian. Exhibition Catalogue, Mendel Art Gallery, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1989, p.81])
Figure 29.  


Figure 30. The Red Stairway (1944) by Ben Shahn. Tempera on masonite, 16 x 23 5/16 in. Collection of the St. Louis Art Museum.

Figure 31. *Winged Hue* by Morris Louis. Oil on canvas, 102 x 105 in. Courtesy of French and Company.

[Clement Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," *Art International* 4 (1960), 26]
Figure 32. *Crystal* (1959) by Kenneth Noland. Oil on canvas, 94 x 94 in. Courtesy of French and Company.

[Clement Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," *Art International* 4 (1960), 29]
Figure 33. Greenberg's 1485 mile route through the Prairie provinces of Canada in 1962

[Clement Greenberg, "Painting and Sculpture in Prairie Canada Today," Canadian Art, 20 (March-April 1963), 91]
Figure 34. Photograph of Clement Greenberg at Emma Lake, 1962.

Figure 35. Dark Green Centre (1963) by Ken Lochhead. Acrylic on canvas, 208.3 x 203.2 cm. Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto.

Figure 36. *Enigma* (1963) by Art McKay. Enamel on board, 48 x 72 in. Collection of the Vancouver Art Gallery.

Figure 37. Photograph taken at the Oval Office, Washington, D.C., February 20, 1963
Standing: U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Canadian Ambassador Arnold Heeney, U.S. Ambassador Livingston Merchant; Seated: President John F. Kennedy, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Canadian Minister for External Affairs Howard Green.

Figure 38. Installation photograph of the exhibition, "Three New American Painters: Louis, Noland, and Olitski," Norman Mackenzie Art Gallery, Regina, Saskatchewan, 1963

Figure 39. **Cross** (1957) by Wallace Berman. Wood, photograph, chain.

Figure 40.  

*Untitled* (1958) by Craig Kauffman. Oil on canvas, 62 x 50 in. Private collection.

Figure 41.  *Untitled (Trip Series) (1959)* by John Altoon. Oil on canvas, 53 5/8 x 48 in. Collection of the Pasadena Art Museum (The Norton Simon Art Museum).

Figure 42. Photograph of the Ferus Gallery Group: Edward Kienholz, John Altoon, Billy Al Bengston, Craig Kauffman (upside down), Robert Irwin, Edward Moses (reclining), and Allen Lynch, ca. 1959-60

Figure 43. *Blue, Green* (1958) by Karl Benjamin. Oil on canvas, 44 x 66 in.

[Los Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art Journal, 5 (1975), 14]
Figure 44. Magical Space Forms (1951) by Lorser Feitelson. Oil on canvas.

[Jules Langsner, "Permanence and Change in the art of Lorser Feitelson," Art International, (1963), 76]
Figure 45. *Dichotomic Organization* (1959) by Lorser Feitelson. Oil on canvas, 60 x 60 in.

*[Los Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art Journal, 5 (1975), 14]*
Figure 46.  
*Like Unlike* (1959) by Frederick Hammersley. Oil on canvas, 60 x 40 in.

[Los Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art Journal, 5 (1975), 14]
Figure 47. No. 8 (1959) by John McLaughlin. Oil on canvas, 60 x 40 in.

[Los Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art Journal, 5 (1975), 14]
(l. to r.) Dr. Leo Tuchman, Dr. Nathan Alpers, Mrs. Philip Gersh, James Elliott, presenting the First Annual Purchase Grant Award of the Contemporary Art Council to Llyn Foulkes (right).

Figure 48. Photograph of the Contemporary Arts Council of the Los Angeles Museum.

Figure 49. *Troy* (1962) by Billy Al Bengsten. Oil and oil lacquer on masonite, 60 x 60 in. Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Factor, Beverly Hills.


Figure 51. *Sinking George* (1962) by Phillip Hefferton. Oil on canvas, 90 x 67.5 in. Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Monte Factor, Los Angeles.

Figure 52.  *Annie* (1962) by Edward Ruscha. Oil on canvas, 71 x 66.5 in. Collection of L.M. Asher Family, Los Angeles.


Figure 53.

Figure 54. **Statement of a Paradox** (1963) by Art McKay. Enamel on masonite, 121.9 x 182.9 cm. Collection of the Norman Mackenzie Art Gallery, Regina.

Figure 55. **Red Mask** (1963) by David Simpson. Oil on canvas, 72 x 41 in. Collection of David Stuart Galleries, Los Angeles.

([Post Painterly Abstraction. Exhibition Catalogue, Los Angeles Museum, 1964, p.80])
Figure 56.  

Blue Balls (1962) by Sam Francis. Oil on canvas, 80.75 x 80.5 in. Collection of Martha Jackson Gallery, New York.

Figure 58. *Dynasts* (1961-2) by Ralph Ducasse. Oil on canvas, 60 x 84 in. Collection of the artist.

Figure 59. *Pasco-Blue* (1963) by Frank Hamilton. Oil on canvas, 54 x 60 in. Collection of the artist.

Figure 60. *Acropolis* (1963) by Mason Wells. Liquitex on canvas, 60 x 50 in. Collection of the artist.

Figure 61. Untitled (1961-2) by Robert Irwin. Oil on canvas, 60 x 60 in. Private collection.

An exhibition organized by the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and sponsored by the Contemporary Art Council

Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles: April 23-June 7, 1964

Walker Art Center, Minneapolis: July 13-August 16, 1964

The Art Gallery of Toronto, Toronto: November 20-December 20, 1964
Figure 63. *Untitled* (1962) by John Ferren. Oil on canvas, 54 x 54 in. Collection of Rose Fried Gallery, New York.

Figure 64. Photograph of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1965. William Pereira, Architect.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Archives


University of Regina Archives (URA). Regina, Saskatchewan. (Contains the papers of Ronald Bloore, Ted Godwin, Kenneth Lochhead, and Douglas Morton in addition to those of W.A. Riddell).

University of Saskatchewan Archives. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. (Especially the Kenderdine papers and the Emma Lake Art School scrapbooks).

_____. Benjamin, Karl. Interviewed by S. Palanker, August 9, 1976.


_____. Lundeberg, Helen. Interviewed by Fidel Danieli, June 1974.


_____. Weisman, Marcia. Interviewed by George M. Goodwin, August 1978.


3. Interviews

Hopkins, Henry. Telephone interview with David Howard in Los Angeles, November 1989.

Weisman, Marcia. Interview with David Howard, Los Angeles, November 1989.

Woelffer, Emerson. Interview with David Howard, Los Angeles, November 1989.
SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books


Kegley, Charles W. and Robert W. Bretall [Editors].  


Scott, Mel. The States and the Arts. Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California (Berkeley), 1971.


2. Journals, Magazines, and Newspapers


______. "Formal Art." Artforum, 2 (June 1964), 42.


______. "Pop Art, USA." Artforum, 1 (October 1963), 28-29.


Donovan, James, Jr. "Role of the Arts in the Department of State Cultural Relations Program." Arts in Society, 2 (Spring/Summer 1963), 40-45.


Flores, Juan and George Yudice. "Living Borders/Bascando America: Languages of Latino Self-Formation." Social Text, 24 (1990), 57-84.

Foster, Stephen C. "Clement Greenberg: Formalism in the 40s and 50s." Art Journal, 35 (Fall 1975).


"The Plight of Our Culture." *Commentary*, 16 (1953), 61.


———. "What's Next After Abstract Expressionism?" Canadian Art, 21 (September/October 1964), 282-283.


______. "The Cool School." *Artforum*, 2 (Summer 1964), 47.


______. "Pop Goes the West." Arts Magazine, 37 (February 1963), 60-62.

Noszlopy, George T. "The Embourgeoisement of Avant-Garde Art." Diogenes, 5 (Fall 1969), 65-68.


______. "Culture on the Coast." Art in America, 3 (Summer 1964), 22-23.


"West Coast Milestone, Opening of the Multimillion Dollar Los Angeles County Art Museum." Art in America, 53 (April 1965), 103.


Theory Culture and Society. Special Issue on Postmodernism. 5 (June 1988).


3. Exhibition Catalogues


Catalogue essays cited:


________. "Where the Hell is Saskatchewan and Who is Emma Lake?" pp.29-40.


Catalogue essays cited:

Dickstein, Morris. "From the Thirties to the Sixties: The World's Fair in its Own Time," pp.21-44.

Harrison, Helen A. "Art for the Millions, or Art for the Market?" pp. 137-166.


4. Unpublished Dissertations


