

CULTURAL AUTONOMY, DEPENDENCY AND UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS  
IN CANADA

by

STEVEN M. CAMPBELL

B.P.E., The University of British Columbia, 1980

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
(School of Physical Education and Recreation)

We accept this thesis as conforming  
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April 1987

© Copyright Steven M. Campbell, 1987

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Physical Education and Recreation

The University of British Columbia  
1956 Main Mall  
Vancouver, Canada  
V6T 1Y3

Date April 30 1987

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the issue of Canadian economic and cultural dependence upon the United States by focussing on the origins of the Simon Fraser University athletic program in the mid 1960's. Simon Fraser was chosen for this study because of the abrupt shift its athletic policy took from the traditional Canadian model of university athletics (no athletic scholarships, less commercialization) towards the dominant American model featuring athletic scholarships and professionalized coaching.

The thesis examines the historical, economic and cultural context in which the university was situated and provides an overview of Canadian-American sporting relations in the commercial and non-commercial spheres. With regard to the Simon Fraser case study, a detailed outline of the development of athletics at the University of British Columbia, British Columbia's oldest and dominant university, will provide necessary background. As well, research centers upon how the SFU athletic program was initially created and who the key personnel were in its founding. The concluding chapter evaluates the implications of the Simon Fraser policy move in light of developments in government spending over the past two decades.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v

Chapter

1	INTRODUCTION.....	1
	The Problem.....	1
	Method and Organization.....	4
	Notes.....	5
2	BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS: CANADIAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEPENDENCY ON THE UNITED STATES.....	6
	The Issue of Canadian Economic and Cultural Dependency.....	6
	Foreign Ownership and Economic Dependency.....	9
	Regional Economics and Dependency.....	13
	Dependency, Culture and Entrepreneurial Activity..	17
	U.S. Foreign Direct Investment and Canadian Universities.....	21
	Dependency, the Media and Canadian Culture.....	26
	Notes.....	38
3	THE INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN SPORT.....	42
	Background to Institutional and Economic Development.....	42
	From Commodification to Cartel: The Case of the National Hockey League.....	52
	Economic Development of the Canadian Football league.....	63
	Hockey, Football and Dependency: An Overview.....	89
	Notes.....	92



	<u>Page</u>
4 A COMPARISON BETWEEN AMERICAN AND CANADIAN UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS.....	99
American University Athletics.....	101
Canadian University Athletics.....	109
A Summary of Developmental Tendencies.....	130
Notes.....	136
5 THE SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY CASE.....	141
Development of Athletics at the University of British Columbia.....	144
The Development of Simon Fraser University and Its Sports Program.....	160
Simon Fraser and the Dependency Trap.....	186
Notes.....	190
6 CONCLUSIONS.....	201
REFERENCES.....	228

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my gratitude to all of those who have assisted me in my academic career.

My thesis committee members, Dr. Morford and Dr. Guppy, have each provided me with guidance, support and the interest that a project of this size demands. To each of them I am pleased to offer my sincere thanks and appreciation.

My thesis committee chairman, Dr. Rick Gruneau, has spent a considerable amount of time with me on the subtleties of the topic. His conciseness and precision of language and his patience and support were of great assistance to me in accomplishing this study. My gratitude and debt to him are beyond words.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to my family who have offered their unconditional support throughout my academic career.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Problem:

It has been over twenty years since the publication of George Grant's Lament for a Nation initiated the beginnings of a national debate on the Canadian-American relationship. Canadian nationalists have been able to take some comfort in the fact that the most dire of Grant's predictions concerning the future of Canada have not come true, at least in the short term. Yet, it is also clear that the American economic and cultural penetration of Canada has continued and broadened in the last two decades. As demonstrated in recent struggles over free trade policy, Canada's position as an adjunct to the U.S. has never been more obvious.

The current debate on free trade has focussed attention primarily on Canada-United States relations in economic matters. Lumber and automobile production are just two of the items on the agenda for discussion in the free trade negotiations recently initiated by the Canadian federal government. Inevitably, however, the issue has spilled over into the cultural sphere, for the question looms as to whether the Americans will demand and receive an expansion of the agenda to include Canada's national cultural industries. Thus, for Canadians the problem of "free trade" has extended once more into the broader issues of national

identity, culture, the arts, and the sense of who Canadians are. Within this debate it is important to note that rarely has the question been raised of sport's place in Canadian culture and the national discussion. Despite the fact that the development of Canadian sport has been highly influenced by American sport it is as if Canadian sport exists in a kind of continentalist dreamland. Detailed analysis rarely intrudes into this area of culture.

The most notable attempts to analyze sport in the context of Canada's cultural dependency can be found in the work of Bruce Kidd and Richard Gruneau.(1) However, both these authors have covered the issue only in a very general way which has rarely involved any detailed case studies. Yet, in my view, the topic of sport and Canadian cultural dependency is an important one that deserves more in-depth study. What is needed is an examination of a case study that specifically illuminates the dependency problem as it relates to the development of sport and Canadian culture.

In this thesis I shall argue that the world of Canadian university athletics provides a glimpse into the processes whereby dependent cultural relations in Canada are generated, flourish and continue to reproduce themselves. With this general argument in mind the thesis focusses upon the well publicized decision to orient the new Simon Fraser University athletics program [in 1965] towards an American model of intercollegiate athletics featuring financial payments to athletes, a

commercialization of the sports program, and professionalization of coaching. Simon Fraser was chosen for this study because of the abrupt shift its initial athletic policy took from the "traditional" Canadian model of less emphasis on athletics (no athletic scholarships, less commercialization) towards an Americanized version.

Obviously, the formation of athletic policy does not occur in a vacuum but, instead, occurs in the context of broader social pressures and tendencies that were present before the policy debate began. It seems likely that the SFU case bears some relationship to the overall Canadian dependency on the American economy and culture but few facts are available to outline the constellation of cultural influences and pressures that accumulated in British Columbia during the course of the 20th century and which set the context for the birth of the SFU athletic program in 1965.

In conducting research on the Simon Fraser case I have been guided by the following questions designed to situate the analysis in the context of the broader issue of cultural dependency. These questions are:

- 1) What was the historic, economic, and cultural context of the Simon Fraser decision?
- 2) How did that context influence the decisions made by key actors in the creation of Simon Fraser's sports programs?
- 3) Why were the proponents of an American style athletic program successful at Simon Fraser at a time when no other Canadian

university had such a program?

4) How do answers to these questions square with the public reasons given by university officials for orienting SFU's athletic program towards the American model?

5) What implications for Canadian sport might be drawn from the SFU case?

#### Method and Organization:

The analysis is organized to flow from the general to the specific. The second chapter outlines the broad "problem" of economic dependency and the economic and cultural development of Canada. The third chapter provides a brief overview of the historical development of Canadian sport as a social institution with specific reference to the issue of dependency. Following this the discussion moves to consider the historical development of university sport in Canada. This sets the stage for the final chapter where the Simon Fraser case is analyzed in detail. Research material generated in response to the organizing questions noted above has come from secondary sources, archival research and personal interviews. Secondary sources are relied upon primarily to examine the broad political, economic and cultural context of the mid-1960s and the related development of Canadian sport. Interviews and archival materials are brought into play in the more specific discussion of university athletics in Canada and British Columbia.

Notes

1. See Bruce Kidd and John Macfarlane, The Death of Hockey (Toronto, new press, 1972); Bruce Kidd "Sport, Dependency, and the Canadian State" in Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau (eds.), Sport, Culture and the Modern State. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982); and Richard Gruneau, Class, Sports and Social Development (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).

## CHAPTER 2

### BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS:

#### CANADIAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEPENDENCY ON THE UNITED STATES

This chapter traces the history of Canadian economic and cultural dependency on the United States up to the 1960's, the period when Simon Fraser University was founded and the decision made by its administration to pursue an American "style" athletics program. Discussion of the development of economic and cultural dependency provides necessary background for the case study outlined later in the thesis. The chapter begins by discussing the development of the North American continental economy during the 20th century and pays particular attention to the issues of foreign ownership, the regionalization of the Canadian economy, and the role of the entrepreneur within Canadian society.

It then moves on to a discussion of the development of the Canadian university system within the overall setting and finishes with an examination of the role the media play with respect to the reproduction and transformation of Canadian culture.

#### The Issue of Canadian Economic and Cultural Dependency

Concern over a dependence on other societies has been a major theme throughout Canadian history. The French, the



British, and Americans have all exerted major influences over Canada's economic and cultural landscape. The French colonial period, lasting until the mid-eighteenth century, began Canada's social development. This was followed by the incorporation of Canada into the British Empire in the late eighteenth century and the beginnings of the struggle for national recognition which culminated in the British North America Act in 1867. American power and influence grew in Canada during this time, especially beginning in the late nineteenth century as American foreign direct investment in Canada expanded. Since that time, as American economic influence has grown, American cultural influence on Canadian society has expanded accordingly.

During the twentieth century one can readily observe the historical shift from British to American economic influence in Canada by examining the history of Canada's foreign accounts. There, the decline of British fortune worldwide during the first World War and the 1920's can be perceived in the parallel withdrawal of British finance capital from overseas markets. British portfolio investment(1) in Canada peaked in 1913 with a total of \$2.82 billion--a total that was not to be exceeded until 1960 when British investment during the post-World War II global economic boom reached \$3.35 billion.

Changes in longterm British investment during Canada's existence as a nation state are noted by Levitt in her book Silent Surrender. From 1867-1900 British investment flows into Canada totalled \$880 million while for a shorter time period of

thirteen years (1900-1913)--during the Canadian wheat economy boom--British investment in Canada doubled to a total of \$1.75 billion. This accounted for almost 78% of all foreign investment in Canada during that time frame.(2) At that point, World War I intervened and inflicted serious damage on Great Britain's economy. Capital flows from the imperial centre reversed during the 1920s as the need for funds to rebuild the war-torn industrial base resulted in a repatriation of British capital to the English economy.

Levitt notes how from 1913-1926 there was a net outflow of financial investment in Canada to Britain of \$181 million, and that process continued into the breakdown of the world economy from 1926-1939 (-\$161 million). The economic disaster of the second World War added to Britain's financial problems. During the six war years, over \$800 million of British investment in Canada was dissolved and returned to Britain to maintain the war effort. In the second World War the undamaged Canadian economy was a net exporter of portfolio capital (losing \$265 million) while direct capital investment from external sources continued on a slower but still increasing pace adding a total of \$530 million.(3)

The process of British disinvestment was paralleled by a rise of interest in the Canadian economy by American capitalists. For the United States, the limits to her internal markets were reached around the turn of the century and the scramble by her business interests for foreign markets began. Canada was

increasingly perceived by her southern neighbours as a stable market for foreign investment while also providing an important ancillary market for profitable American surplus production. United States foreign accounts show the incredible expansion into foreign markets which the American corporations initiated soon after 1900. For Canada, as the nearest external market, this meant a dramatic upsurge in foreign investment (both direct and portfolio) that has few modern historical parallels. Levitt notes, for example, that in 1867, just after the American Civil War, U.S. investment in its northern neighbour totalled just \$15 million. Within 33 years, that total increased to \$205 million and for the next twenty five years, investment in Canada continued to expand geometrically to a total of \$3.20 billion by 1926.(4) At this point the United States held over 53% of all foreign investment and was clearly the dominant foreign supplier of capital for the Canadian economy. In a cultural sense, Canadian society was still very much a colony of Britain but there is little doubt that by the mid 1920's the North American continental economy was already a reality in terms of the diverse industrial and financial linkages between the two countries.

#### Foreign Ownership and Economic Dependency

The issue of foreign ownership in the Canadian economy has been the focus of much attention throughout Canadian history. Over the past 150 years public opinion in Canada has tended to be divided on the benefits of American direct foreign investment.

Early on, the politics of foreign investment were evident in the strategies of the political parties in their election campaigns. Michael Bliss notes that the Conservative protectionist election platform of 1911 took aim to maintain Canadian tariffs and increase the number of branch plants and Canadian jobs the American corporations established behind the tariff wall:

By 1911, there were already enough American branch plants in Canada to arouse concern when Canadians considered tariff policy. That concern, though, was not to limit what had already been called an American "invasion" of Canada (5), but rather to sustain and encourage the branch plant phenomenon. Branch plants were obviously a creation of the tariff, and it was equally obvious that tariff reductions under reciprocity (which was a Liberal election plank) might lead to an American withdrawal across the border.(6)

In fact, the ruling Liberal government under Wilfrid Laurier was already considering the possible loss of Canadian jobs that might occur under free trade. The Financial Post reported on the government's stance:

Now our ministers at Ottawa have not the slightest desire to do anything, or to agree to anything, that will have any tendency whatever to check the movement of United States manufacturers to establish large plants in this country. These American establishments operate importantly to build our population and trade, and to build up a good market for the produce of our farms. And it seems that the existence of our moderate tariff against United States manufactured goods has been instrumental in many cases in bringing us these industries. Hence a strong argument exists for not meddling overmuch with the duties.(7)

Support, however, for the tariff goes back further in time, to the 1880's and 1890's, when Canadian newspaper accounts of American branch plant investment in the Canadian economy hailed

them as more successes for the 1879 National Policy formulated by John A. MacDonald.(8) Back issues of the Canadian Manufacturer contain many references to the establishment of branch plants or ongoing negotiations towards the establishment of branch plants. The advantages of the protective tariff of Macdonald's National Policy would always receive full credit with comments such as "Score another for the N.P.", "the N.P. does it again" and "another monument to the glory and success of our National Policy."(9) At least one section of the Canadian dominant class clearly supported American direct foreign investment in Canada and the evidence lends support to the conclusion that a tradition of reliance within the Canadian economy on foreign investment capital had been building since before the turn of the century.

The beachhead of American investment throughout the Canadian economy continued its expansion from the 1920's through to the 1960's. From an overall total of \$3.2 billion in 1926, through the economic slowdown in the world economy to 1939 (total American investment \$4.15 billion--up \$965 million) U.S. dollars poured in, despite the collapse of both the U.S. and Canadian economies during the Great Depression (1929-1939).(10) Through World War II, American corporations added another \$1 billion to their investment portfolios in Canada, with the share of direct versus finance investment being about 50/50.(11) An analysis of Canadian foreign investment accounts in the immediate post-World War II era outline the stunning fact that American corporations

and individuals held a total of 84% of all direct investment in the Canadian economy while their accounts held 70% of all financial investment. Despite this seemingly overwhelming dominance throughout many sectors of the Canadian economy American capital investment north of the border was set to begin its biggest period of expansionary growth.

Starting with the post-World War II global economic boom, American investment in Canada skyrocketed. Levitt notes a doubling of direct investment in just six years from 1946 to 1952 to \$4.53 billion and then another doubling again to 1960 to a total of \$10.55 billion. At that point corporations from the United States held 82% of all direct and 75% of total foreign investment in Canada. By 1964, that total foreign investment had increased to \$21.44 billion (\$12.90 billion of which was direct) and equalled a total of over 80% of all foreign investment in Canada. Given that economists consider the Canadian economy to be a moderately sized market, it is also worth noting that almost one third (31%) of all U.S. direct investment abroad was concentrated in Canada--more than in either Europe or Latin America.

By 1963, American corporations were controlling most of the Canadian economy from head offices located in the United States. Almost one half of all manufacturing done in Canada was controlled by American corporations while U.S. interests controlled 62% of the petroleum and natural gas industries. They also owned 52% of all mining and smelting companies in Canada.

By contrast, only two and four per cent of railways and other utilities respectively were controlled by American interests.

These are only a sampling of data outlining the scale of American economic influence throughout the markets of the Canadian economy. However, they do show graphically the economic dependence that has been a keynote feature of Canadian-American relations throughout the twentieth century. And they provide an important background towards gaining an understanding as to how the development and re-creation of Canadian culture in the period between 1900 and the 1970's was influenced by the multitude of economic linkages between the two nations. Generally, these linkages weakened the Canadian east-west economy and political culture through encouraging the expansion of north-south economic and cultural relations between neighbouring Canadian and American regions.

#### Regional Economics and Dependency

The huge increase of American direct foreign investment in Canada during the 20th century initiated and increased a north-south network of trade and cultural ties as the markets for goods and resources have expanded between the various Canadian regions and their American counterparts. But this expansion in the number of north-south ties also acted to reinforce and speed up the disintegration of the Canadian east-west political economy by presenting regional economic leaders with American alternatives to Canadian markets. Certainly, the regional

economic disparities set in place by the National Policy since 1879 have done little to maintain regional political loyalties to a Canadian economic and political system historically weighted in favour of high priced central Canadian manufacturing based in Ontario.

In the west, a north-south pull in the regional economy first became apparent in the Red River settlement and in British Columbia.(12) On the Pacific coast, B.C.'s dominant industry, forestry, became tied to the expansion of the American residential housing market. As well, a number of B.C. resource industries, including hydroelectricity, coal, and metals and minerals found rising prices and abundant markets in the post-World War II global boom. Despite a lack of secondary manufacturing industry, and helped by the expansion of provincial regional economic relations with the American Pacific Coast states, British Columbians experienced large real gains in per capita income.

Politically, the economic growth experienced through the regional sale of resources gave provincial politicians some electoral advantage: as their political power and provincial economies expanded, they sought to encourage the expansion of job creating American (and other) foreign investment in their economies. As former B.C. Premier W.A.C. Bennett commented, "We had an empire to build. There were various projects to the south, more to the north...We're not going to sit by and watch potential development in B.C. held back by any source."(13) The



provincial political elites became, in effect, agents for the extension of American investment into the provinces, attempting by their policies to attract foreign investment dollars into their provincial economies. By coincidence or not, on the Pacific coast these efforts have been rewarded as since 1926 B.C. has consistently scored first or second in terms of per capita income among Canadian provinces.(14)

British Columbia, however, is far from the most exploited region in Canada as its resource based economy has left it comparatively wealthy. While the province depends less on foreign direct investment than any other region in Canada, outside groups (either in central Canada or the United States) still have controlled much of the finance and mining sectors and some of the forestry industry.(15)

The demand in a resource starved United States for plentiful and cheap western Canadian lumber, metals and minerals augmented the decline of the power of the Canadian federal state to influence the course of the nation's economic development pattern. The gradual decline in federal power left the provinces increasingly to forge their own arrangements with American corporations for the exchange of their economic resources. Heavily dependent on foreign markets and capital, the provinces developed parochial outlooks and policy makers gradually became preoccupied with a primary concern of maintaining their own province's economic growth rather than with participating in any federal national strategy for the development of the overall

Canadian economy. As sub-regions of a Canadian hinterland economy, and forced to deal with large foreign corporations, the provinces had even less bargaining power than the national government and, as independent economic agents, were susceptible to the bargaining pressures of competing with each other for American investment dollars.

The result of these interlocking developments has been to reinforce the overall theme of the development of the Canadian economy during the 20th century. Put simply, this theme has been the disintegration of the power of the Canadian national government to influence the direction of the development of the Canadian economy in the face of expanding American direct investment. Since the return of non-renewal resources to provincial jurisdiction in 1930, the provinces have encouraged foreign investors to invest in their province and exploit the abundant natural resources of Canada. The result has been an active political encouragement of the influx of foreign, principally American, capital. The baggage of American business and cultural values, and a consequent stifling of the growth of any indigenous Canadian business culture, has accompanied this national dependency on imports of foreign investment capital.

The regional economic disparities initiated with the adoption of The National Policy as official federal government policy in the 19th century have helped foreign investment interests to augment the development of north-south economic links and the exploitation of the Canadian resource economy

through American direct investment. In the next section I will outline how the overwhelming domination of the Canadian economy by American investment interests and American business culture may well have acted to suppress the growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial spirit crucial to the development of a national economy and culture.

### Dependency, Culture and Entrepreneurial Activity

At this point of the analysis it is useful to consider the impact of foreign investment on a nation's business culture. Conventional economic theory dictates that 'underdeveloped' nations benefit from external infusions of capital investment because they cannot generate enough development capital on an internal basis. This reasoning is often applied to the Canadian situation. Typically, an infusion of foreign investment is expected to act to prime the local economy by spurring the indices of economic growth. There are two types of foreign investment: financial, in the form of bonds and loans of capital to local entrepreneurs who are developing a business, and direct, which occurs when foreign entrepreneurs decide to utilize their capital to locate their own plants and factories in the host country. Each type of capital import has its own set of effects on the host country and, as we are considering the development of a national economy that is dominated by both types, it is of crucial importance to differentiate between the two.

During the last century when Canada was part of the British

Empire, most of the foreign investment in Canada was British. Much of that investment was in the form of financial portfolio instruments (ie. commercial paper and government bonds) which were utilized both by Canadian entrepreneurs and the national government to build the Canadian Pacific Railway and other capital intensive development projects for the growing east-west Canadian economy. A key point to note about the financial variety of capital import is that, in Kari Levitt's words, "The (foreign) investor was assured a safe rate of return in solid pounds sterling while the risk--and the control--remained with the borrowing entrepreneur and the government of the hinterland."(16)

An example of the limits of foreign finance capital investment to influence the Canadian decision making structure can be seen in the Great Depression during the 1930's, when a disastrous drop in Canadian export earnings from a decline in the price of wheat multiplied throughout the entire economy. The interest burden of Canada's external foreign debt rose to 6 1/2 % of G.N.P. (almost 25% of the nation's foreign exchange earnings), which is an extremely high amount.(17) But, due to the financial variety of the foreign investment pattern then prevalent in the Canadian economy, Canadian entrepreneurs remained firmly in control of the economy despite the burden of interest payments to foreigners.

The case of direct foreign investment offers a different set of implications. With the foreign corporation directly

establishing a branch plant in the host country, the foreign investor/entrepreneur gains a foothold in the Canadian market. He or she, as the principal owner of the factory, makes the crucial allocative decisions which determine which markets the business will address within the national and international economy. As a result, his or her local employees are reduced, for the most part, to the role of managerial assistants who at best will perform advisory roles in the decisions of the entrepreneurs. Levitt argues that as foreign direct investment has expanded during the 20th century, through a reduction in the availability of indigenous investment opportunities, Canada's entrepreneurial class has been slowly squeezed away from experiencing many of the crucial decision making processes that provide important learning situations for the nation's entrepreneurs.(18) As well, in the long run, the tradition of initiative and drive within the nation's culture that characterizes the personality profile of the entrepreneur has been underdeveloped.

According to Levitt, a nation with little indigenous but much foreign entrepreneurial activity and characterized by high income growth, is as economically underdeveloped as are many third world countries today. During the early 1970's many political economists (Levitt 1970, Gonick 1974, Clement 1975 to name a few) argued that Canada is one such nation. In Silent Surrender Levitt outlined the condition of Canada's economic, cultural and social development by exploring the differences

between entrepreneurs and managers within the nation's business culture. While every nation by necessity has both entrepreneurs and managers a lack of entrepreneurial opportunities in its society will have a dramatic effect on national development and on national self image.

Levitt concludes that the foreign direct investment--and its subsequent lack of entrepreneurial opportunity within the Canadian economy--has been disastrous for indigenous entrepreneurs. Put simply, control of the majority of entrepreneurial opportunities and markets in Canada by foreign interests means that talented Canadians with limited accessibility to capital must compete with each other for the few business and cultural opportunities that remain. In the end, they are "increasingly confronted with an organizational and institutional complex which presents them with a choice either of joining their resources with those of the international corporation as a salaried employee or contenting themselves with a very limited role." (19) In the final analysis, the domination of Canada's economy by foreign interests means that, generally, Canadians have had fewer opportunities to express their creative spirit and by doing so develop the economy in the successful fashion envisioned by Levitt. Most must settle for a managerial role somewhere in society as the development of Canada's economy continues to be influenced by groups located outside of the national boundaries. The net result of this situation is that a social, political and economic landscape crucial to the

development of indigenous Canadian initiatives in society during the 20th century has been lacking.

Whatever one makes of Levitt's argument about the underdevelopment of entrepreneurial initiative there can be no denying that American control over large sectors of the economy has important implications for Canadian culture (e.g. in education, the arts, media, and sports). In the next section of this chapter I examine the Canadian university system in view of the huge post-war expansion of American foreign direct investment in Canada and the continuing influence of Canada's dependent economy on the direction and development of Canadian universities during the 20th century.

#### U.S. Foreign Direct Investment and Canadian Universities

The post-war expansion in American direct investment in Canada coincided with an expansionary phase in the development of the Canadian university system. A dramatic increase in per capita incomes combined with the baby boom (and a subsequent increase in the number of university age students)(20) provided the political impetus to provincial and federal governments to greatly expand the number of universities and university students throughout Canada. The available evidence suggests that during this post-war period of growth the Canadian university system was not "developed" enough to handle the challenge of producing the graduates and PhDs required by the growing demands of the university system for academics in all subject areas. Some scholars attribute this lack of preparation to the historical

development of the resource economy and the low needs of extraction industries for university graduates in the economy. (21)

John B. Macdonald's comments in his 1962 book Higher Education in British Columbia were prophetic when he noted the underdeveloped nature of the graduate education programs of the Canadian universities in response to the needs of society for an expansion of the university system:

The most crucial problem facing us as a result of this enormous increase [of students] will be that of producing and finding staff and facilities for our colleges and universities. In British Columbia alone, for example, the number of additional full-time staff members required to maintain the current staff-student ratio will be more than 1,000; that is, about 125 members of staff must be added each year. The alarming fact, however, is that the whole of Canada is graduating annually only about 280 PhDs. (26)

However, his call for an expansion in graduate schools and in the number of PhDs developed in Canada came much too late: the large number of academic positions in Canadian universities that became available during the 1960's were filled principally by foreign born scholars, most of whom were from the United States. The following facts outline the process of the Americanization of the faculty within the Canadian university system and focus on a situation that left Canadian faculty as minorities within some of their own universities.

By 1968, the number of foreign university scholars immigrating to Canada had increased from 539 in 1963 to 1,986, a number that equalled 12% of the entire group of university



teachers in Canada that year. American academics filled 857 of those positions.(23) Steele and Mathews estimate that of the 2,642 new faculty employed by Canadian universities in 1968 only 362 Canadians were hired. The rest were non-Canadians, a group that included a total of 1,013 from the United States. Overall, it is estimated that the proportion of Canadians to non-Canadians in the faculties throughout the Canadian university system declined by about 25% between 1961 and 1968.(24) The trend was less apparent in the faculties of the older, established Canadian universities but much more prevalent in the universities founded during the 1960s. At Simon Fraser University a survey conducted two years after its 1965 establishment showed that 68 per cent of faculty were non-Canadians. At the University of Alberta the percentage of Canadians declined from 60.8% in 1961-62 to 47.2% by 1968-69 while at the University of Waterloo the numbers were similar: the percentage of Canadians on faculty declined from 68 per cent in 1964 to 57 per cent in 1968.(25)

Of crucial importance concerning the large numbers of foreign born faculty at Canadian universities has been their power and influence on the development of each school's academic traditions and program offerings. This influence extends right down to the type of courses offered and the books listed for required reading in those courses. A reduction in the number of courses dealing with Canadian subjects and in the use of American (as opposed to Canadian) textbooks in the courses appears to be the most graphic example of this situation. At Waterloo in 1969,

Steele and Mathews found that in the Faculty of Arts eight departments were chaired by U.S. citizens and that about 50% of all full professors were U.S. citizens. The situation in the Sociology department was particularly interesting:

with about six Canadians among the twenty members, sixty two undergraduate and graduate courses are offered. None is described in the calendar as dealing with Canadian problems. In the Department of English only two courses in Canadian literature are listed among the ninety or so undergraduate courses offered.(36)

Steele and Mathews go on to speculate that:

What, for example, is the interest in Canadian particularities of the Psychology Department at Simon Fraser University, which on January 1, 1969 had fifteen members, thirteen of whom were non-Canadian, ten of whom were U.S. citizens?(27)

While the addition of foreign born university teachers to Canadian university staffs during the 1960's influenced developments in the national system, the concomitant diminishment of academic and research opportunities for Canadian graduate students and scholars also provided evidence of what the Gray Report on Foreign Direct Investment in Canada termed the "colonial mentality" in the university system whereby qualified Canadians were perceived to be inferior to non-Canadians in many areas of Canadian life.(28) The evidence suggests that, as in the business system that has been dominated by the foreign direct investment of the American corporations, too few Canadians received the opportunity to continue their educations, be

considered for academic positions at universities and gradually assume the influential decision making roles existing throughout the Canadian university system. Instead, non-Canadians assumed these positions.

During the 1960's this issue was particularly acute as the Canadian universities struggled to increase their production of trained Canadian PhDs. While the universities can hardly be blamed for the shortfall and the almost crisis situation that developed, the situation showed graphically the lack of foresight in Canada during the 1960's towards setting aside for Canadian citizens the majority of the educational opportunities in Canadian universities. It is hard to imagine that other countries would allow their universities to be dominated by foreign scholars to the extent that occurred in Canada during the 1960's. Set against the large overcapacity of the graduate schools of the metropolitan American university system,(29) the Canadian education situation exhibits how economic dependency upon the United States has indirectly spawned dependent structures within Canadian social institutions.

This process of the Americanization of Canadian education also manifested itself in the educational opportunities available at the time. In fact, the influx of foreign born scholars during the 1960s simply reduced the chances that indigenous Canadian problems, perspectives, and procedures would later become dominant in the Canadian universities. As Steele and Mathews have noted, once established in Canada, the large population of

American faculty acted in countless ways, some minute, others more direct, to influence local culture towards American perspectives, styles and problems. The resulting new university culture would then reproduce itself and act to reinforce the trend towards Americanization in other areas of Canadian society. In this way, Canadian education and culture have been continually influenced by the presence of the United States, its social institutions, and intellectual traditions, as a role model.

While Americans educators have played an important role in influencing the development of Canadian universities another important institution of society acting to make American values and traditions much more available to Canadians has been the Canadian media industry. In the next section I will outline the historical development of American economic domination in the production of the Canadian media up to the 1970's and present some of the avenues whereby American cultural norms and values have been extended to Canada through press, radio and television. As in the university system, each of these areas has acted to reinforce the overall trend among Canadians and their institutions towards a growing dependency upon American culture.

#### Dependency, the Media and Canadian Culture

An examination of the media industry in Canada shows the same kind of American penetration and types of influences as described above in the business and educational spheres. A number of royal commissions (Massey, 1951; O'Leary, 1961) have

outlined the extent of American domination in magazines, local newspapers and major newspapers and separately each recommended that Canadians should begin to consider the media to be one of the most central institutions in the maintenance of the nation and the national identity.

The Massey Report noted that "communications were essential to promoting national life"(30) while the O'Leary Report commented that:

communications are the thread which bind together the fibres of a nation. They can protect a nation's values and encourage their practice....The communications of a nation are as vital to its life as its defences, and should receive at least as great a measure of national protection.(31)

Yet, despite these warnings about the crucial importance of the media to the support of the nation, an examination of some of the available evidence shows that much of the written material in the Canadian print media has originated from within the United States. The O'Leary Report noted that in 1959 over three quarters of all magazines sold in Canada were American while 41% of total Canadian magazine advertising revenues in 1959 went to just two American based publications, Time and Reader's Digest. Ten years later in 1969, Time and Reader's Digest's combined market share was well over 50%.

The advantages of those two magazines have been well known. As mass circulation magazines based in the huge markets of the United States, their large production runs in that country enabled them to eliminate the costs of overhead with which

Canadian based magazines had to contend. When Time had its Canadian content insert for the Canadian issue, the only additional bills it dealt with were the insert's overhead costs. On the other hand, Maclean's, Time's Canadian competitor, was faced with complete production costs to cover before it could break even. The difference in advertising rates was staggering: Time was able to charge just \$2700 for a full page ad in Canada while Maclean's required \$4600 for an equivalent ad in order to cover costs. Certainly, the domination of Time in Canadian magazine publishing was such that Macleans' change to the same page size of Time (with the same advertising format as Time) in the late 1960s was essential for the Canadian publication if it was to convince Time advertisers to change their affiliation.(32)

Few Canadians were aware of the extent to which much of the written material in Canadian-based publications was written in the United States and simply spilled over into Canada. For 75% of daily newspapers in Canada during the 1960's, the Canadian Press wire services were the only source of news from the rest of Canada and from foreign countries.(33) Basically a news cooperative among Canadian newspapers, the Canadian Press is primarily a clearing house. They are paid according to how much is printed and, as a result, aim their stories to appeal to as many publishers as possible and are reluctant to present any unorthodox viewpoints which may not be printed.

In British Columbia, the regional importance of business and cultural dealings with the U.S. Pacific states of Washington,

Oregon and California led to the Canadian Press writing general interest articles and making available to its B.C affiliates news stories and features about events in those western states. British Columbia's close geographic proximity to the western United States naturally led to common interests in a variety of areas, and it was in the business interest of Canadian Press to emphasize articles on those states to fit the needs of its British Columbia newspaper subscribers. Economic ties lead naturally to media ties and a gradual tightening of cultural linkages within the greater region. John Warnock has argued that the postwar expansion in Canada's trade with the United States led straight to an increase in media and cultural ties.(34)

With regard to the coverage of international news in Canada, most of the foreign copy was written by non-Canadians with much of that coming from American sources. According to Warnock (writing about the late 1960's), there is "very little direct news gathering by Canadians. This is true even of Canadian Press...whose foreign copy originates from the New York office, where a small group of editors rewrite the news releases they receive from Associated Press (U.S.) and Reuters (Britain)".(35) Where CP did not rewrite the story, local readers of newspapers did not even benefit from the Canadian slant that Canadian Press would impart to the story. And "it is quite clear that the American wire services carry their own particular biases. They cater specifically to the preferences of the local American publishers who buy their services."(36) In short, the economics

of producing the news was (and still is) such that the Canadian media using American sources have left Canada wide open to the importation of American cultural values and traditions via news stories, sports and other features that are common media fare.

The result of these developments has been that Canadian newspapers in the twentieth century gradually came to be, for the most part, barely distinguishable from those in the United States. As noted earlier, newspapers must be considered as a crucial medium of communication in society and the available evidence lends credence to an inescapable conclusion: American oriented news stories, and cultural features centered on events and personalities in the United States with their concomittant promotion of American traditions and biases, have been distributed much more often in Canada than have been Canadian news stories throughout the United States.

By the 1960's, the cumulative effect of this situation was staggering: the predominance of U.S. newspaper material in the Canadian press had greatly reduced the possibility that made-in-Canada stories about Canadian events would be published in Canadian papers. As a side effect, Canadian writers have had less creative opportunities in Canadian newspapers and it has been increasingly argued that less Canadian material and more imported stories has acted to influence the ongoing course of development of Canadian culture towards American cultural traditions and folklore. A parallel argument is that this process also acted to reinforce and speed up the penetration of



American capital in the Canadian economy as Canadians acquired American tastes, and markets were developed (by American business!) to satisfy those wants.

To complement newspapers as a medium of communication throughout Canada, the powerful medium of television came to the forefront in the 1950s to the point where it rivalled the press as a generator and formulator of ideas. The question of "who decides" in Canadian media became a central issue. Crucial to this question was the financial backing of the media. For, if a station or a newspaper is a commercial business that is profit oriented, it becomes imperative for the station management to employ whatever cost cutting measures that will ultimately result in larger profits to the station's owner. Proximity to the United States, with its greater economy of scale in the entertainment industry, has meant that the history of Canadian commercial television production has been largely a history of stations purchasing cheaper American shows rather than producing their own more expensive Canadian versions. Frank Peers has argued that ultimately, the import of relatively inexpensive American programs results in increased profits for the Canadian media but, again, results as well in decreased opportunities for Canadians in the national entertainment industry.(37) This situation has provided a key theme in the historical development of the Canadian media and has been countered only by attempts to regulate the broadcast industries through the organization of a public monopoly, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

An important landmark in early efforts to exert control over the broadcast media was the creation of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) by Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in 1932. In a speech to Parliament the Prime Minister asserted the importance of the broadcast media to the national development efforts of the federal government:

The use of the air...that lies over the soil or land of Canada is a natural resource over which we have complete jurisdiction under the recent decision of the privy council...I cannot think that any government would be warranted in leaving the air to private exploitation and not reserving it for development for the use of the people. (38)

The Aird Commission Report of 1929 on Public Broadcasting had already recommended complete nationalization along the British model while the Canadian Radio League (whose opinion ultimately prevailed) was for public regulation and control of the system rather than a complete takeover of all the private stations. Later, in 1936, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was created to oversee and regulate a broadcasting industry that observers expected to be composed of a large public network and many private low power stations. However, the ongoing development of private broadcast interests combined with the potent profitability of the new industry gave rise to an intense lobbying effort to reduce the power of the CBC and open up the broadcast industry for exploitation by private companies.

This situation remained essentially unchanged until September, 1957 when the Diefenbaker government (which historians

have characterized as being essentially nationalist in focus), responded to the private business interests and proclaimed a new broadcast act which separated the CBC from its regulatory functions and gave them to a new Bureau of Broadcast Governors. In 1961, it was the BBG which licensed the first private network in Canada, the Canadian Television Network (CTV). In 1962, CTV's Toronto flagship station CFTO-TV outbid the CBC for broadcast rights to the Grey Cup football game, an incident which, viewed from perspective today, symbolized the gradual weakening of the CBC's and the federal government's power over the Canadian broadcast industry.

U.S. radio programs were first added to the CBC's schedules in 1936, primarily due to their popularity from exposure via U.S. radio spillover north of the border in central Canada, the Maritimes, the prairies and in British Columbia. In British Columbia, Vancouver was not receiving broadcast signals from the Canadian stations. The geographic and economic factors which had acted to isolate British Columbia from the rest of Canada throughout Canadian history applied also to the broadcast media. It was much easier for B.C. to be reached by American stations across the border than by the CBC in central Canada. At that time, the CBC's main competition in Vancouver was not private Canadian stations but American stations based down the Pacific Coast in Seattle and San Francisco.

As well, the spillover from the U.S. commercial radio stations gave American advertisers with expanding branch plants

in Canada a free advertising advantage over the advertising efforts of their local Canadian competition. To undermine the extra advertising revenues gained by the stations south of the border the CBC initiated a policy of importing the popular American programs in order to keep Canadian audiences tuned to Canadian stations. In the long term, this strategy failed. In preference to the idea of creating Canadian shows, the CBC unwittingly provided a long-term precedent to the strategy of private stations importing American programs for the Canadian market. Following the CBC's precedent, the stage was set for Canadian private station program directors to also import ready made U.S. programs instead of producing their own. The net result of those developments was that cheaper U.S. programs were able to drive out more expensive Canadian shows. The economies of scale allowed American broadcasters to reap the benefits of Canada's developing consumer markets in the broadcast industry. The resulting loss of creative outlets for Canadian artists, producers and writers within the Canadian national entertainment culture once again echos and reinforces the common theme outlined in this chapter of a general ongoing lack of opportunities for Canadians in business, education, the media and many other aspects of society.

Originally, when private television stations were licensed to broadcast in Canada, their main aim was to act as a 'co-operative of Canadian production' but that objective was quickly sidetracked as the stations imported cheaper, popular

American shows to provide the majority of the viewing fare which at the same time also acted to increase revenues and profits. During the 1950's and 1960's made in Canada programming was almost non-existent. As Peers notes, in 1968-69 at CFTO television in Toronto, (CTV's number one station in Canada), a typical viewing week consisted of 5 1/2 hours of Canadian programming between the hours of 7:30 pm and 11:30 pm. That was about 22% of the total. In breaking down that 5 1/2 hour total, 2 1/2 were devoted to NHL hockey, 1 1/2 to variety and 1 1/2 to public affairs. The rest were American variety, drama, and comedy shows, and movies, none of which were made in Canada. Also worth noting is that in 1967 British Columbia's CHAN-TV spent, along with the seven other private stations in the province, exactly \$4,446 on local talent fees for the whole year.(39) The economic imperative of maintaining a profitable business and the advantages of using cheaper U.S. television shows had proved irresistible to the entrepreneurs controlling Canadian broadcasting and served to shape the dependent development of the Canadian entertainment and television industries during the post-World War II era.

As the Committee On Broadcasting (1965) noted:

It seems clear that the advent of private television in Canada, instead of widening the scope of programs (whether American or Canadian) available to Canadian viewers, has merely increased the broadcasting of popular entertainment, mainly of American origin...Private stations import about twice as many American programs as the CBC. This seems to be the most important factor in the consumption of American programs by Canadians. (40)

Much the same situation came to exist with regard to television news shows in Canada. In the television industry, the economics of broadcasting led to the use of less costly already produced American shows even in news production. Canadian stations frequently came to use cheaper American news features and stories. As Peers notes,(41) due to the large costs of maintaining their own foreign news bureaus Canadian television and radio stations were also forced to utilize the correspondents of the American networks to report on foreign developments. They, of course, reported to American audiences with an American slant and simply presented reports that raised the already large awareness in Canada of American foreign policy interests. The smaller Canadian broadcasters simply did not have the resources to send reporters all over the globe in search of stories and had to rely heavily on the better capitalized American media. In the final analysis, in keeping with the limited resources available in the industry, it is simply easier and cheaper for Canadian news producers to use American stories.

The cultural implications of the American domination of the Canadian media are staggering. As Peers concludes: "The American [news] media will reflect their own national concerns and national interests and that these will not always coincide with Canadian needs and interests."(42) The result in the historical development of the political economy of the Canadian media is principally that, due to the economics of media production, American cultural practices (e.g. narrative themes, production

styles) and traditions have quickly extended a pipeline into Canadian culture and have provided an encompassing context for the development of Canadian society during the 20th century.

In summary, throughout the twentieth century, the process of economic dependency appears to have had an accumulated effect. The metropolitan culture of the United States has been extended into all profitable areas of the Canadian nation. The social institution of Canadian sport has been one of these profitable markets. In the next chapter I will examine in much closer detail the development of the institution of Canadian sport first as a colonial dependent of Britain during the 19th century and, later, during the 20th century as a dependent of American business and culture. As in the case of the media (the two are quite closely linked), the development of sport in Canada was reinforced both by the Americanization of other institutions and by the extension of the capitalist market process into the previously unexploited markets of organized physical recreation and sporting spectacle.

Notes

1. Portfolio investment consists of financial securities, i.e. stocks or bonds in a particular industry which pay dividends to the holder. Owning the security permits the holder no real input into how the industrial concern is managed but simply entitles him or her to a return on the funds invested.
2. Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canadian Balance of International Payments, 1963, 1964 and 1965 and International Investment Position, p.126, and Quarterly Estimates of the Canadian Balance of Payments, Third Quarter 1968, p.17 as quoted by Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1970), p. 66-67.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Financial Post 11 June 1910 as quoted by Michael Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business," in Close the 49th parallel etc The Americanization of Canada, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p.29.
6. Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business", p.29.
7. Financial Post 4 June 1910 as quoted by Bliss, p.29.
8. The basic intent of the National Policy was to provide an economic development strategy for Canada. The three policies were: a) the institution of protectionist tariff barriers to provide jobs in Canadian-based industry and to provide jobs in the Canadian market; b) build a transcontinental railway to tie the Canadian economy together along an east-west axis; and c) promote an immigration policy designed to augment the Canadian populaion in the hinterlands (specifically in the area of the Northwest Territories--what is now the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta) in order to provide a large captive market for capital investment in central Canadian manufacturing.
9. Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business", p.31. These quotes are from various issues of the Canadian Manufacturer published between 1882 and 1896. The Canadian Manufacturer was the first official publication of the Canadian Manufacturer's Association.
10. Levitt, Silent Surrender, p.60-61. It is estimated that the Canadian economy's gross national product declined by 42% between 1929 and 1933.
11. The terms direct vs financial investment will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. A financial investment in a



company means the foreign owners could remain at arms length from the business; their main concern is not with how the company is run but only with profits. A large share in direct investment means that the foreign investor can begin to exert control over the entrepreneurial decisions that determine exactly how the profit will be made. The difference between the two types of investment is, as we shall see later, substantial. For a discussion of these differences please see Levitt, p.59.

12. Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975) p.68.

13. Roger Kane and David Humphreys, eds. Conversations with W.A.C. Bennett (1980) p.96, p.116.

14. Philip Resnick, "B.C. Capitalism and the Empire of the Pacific" B.C. Studies No. 67 Autumn 1985, p.33.

15. Patricia Marchak, "Sources of Social Conflict in B.C.", B.C. Studies No. 27 Autumn 1975.

16. Levitt, Silent Surrender, p.52.

17. Ibid. p.52-53.

18. Ibid. p.27.

19. Levitt, p. 104.

20. In his book, Higher Education in British Columbia and a Plan for the Future (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1962) p.8-10 (hereafter referred to as The Macdonald Report ), UBC President John B. Macdonald estimated that the number of students registered at the universities and colleges in British Columbia would expand from 14,710 in 1961-62 to 37,000 in 1970-71.

21. See Ian Lumsden, "Imperialism and Canadian Intellectuals", in Close the 49th Parallel and S. Crean, Who's Araid of Canadian Culture? (Don Mills: General Publishing Company Limited, 1976). Also see R. Cole Harris, "Locating the University of British Columbia" B.C. Studies No.32 Winter 1976-77 for the debate concerning the needs of the provincial resource extraction economy for technical expertise and the subsequent development of the University of B.C. in the early part of the twentieth century.

22. Macdonald, The Macdonald Report, p.15.

23. James Steele and Robin Mathews, "The universities: takeover of the mind," in Close the 49th parallel etc The Americanization

of Canada, ed. Ian Lumsden, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) p. 170.

24. Ibid. p. 171.

25. Ibid. p. 171.

26. Ibid. p. 172.

27. As well, when the University was close to opening, the Department of History received much publicity concerning its inability to find a scholar to teach Canadian history. See "They Can Teach You About Any Place Except Canada" The Vancouver Province 29 May 1965.

28. Herb Gray, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) p. 296.

29. For an illuminating table on graduate students as a percentage of total enrolment at selected Canadian and American universities see The Macdonald Report, p. 14. For example, in 1961-62 UBC had 12,602 students and 6.3% graduate students while in 1958-59 the University of Washington in nearby Seattle had 16,202 students but 22.9% graduate students. The table indicates the underdeveloped state of the major Canadian universities during the early 1960s.

30. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, Vincent Massey chairman (Ottawa: 1951) p. 4 as quoted by John Warnock "All the News It Pays to Print," in Lumsden ed., Close the 49th Parallel, p.123.

31. Royal Commission on Publications, Gratton O'Leary chairman (Ottawa: 1961) p.4 as quoted by Warnock, p. 123.

32. Gary Dunford, "Why Are This Magazine's Measurements Now 8 1/4 X 11 1/4?", Toronto Star, 11 January 1969, p. 31 as cited by Warnock, p. 124.

33. John Dauphine, "The Canadian Press ..." Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1967, p.40 as cited by Warnock, p. 124.

34. See John Warnock, "All the News It Pays to Print", in Lumsden, ed., Close the 49th Parallel.

35. Warnock, p. 124.

36. Warnock, p. 124.

37. Frank Peers, "Oh Say, Can You See?" in Lumsden, Close the 49th Parallel.

38. Crean, p. 34.

39. Peers, p. 145.

40. Report of the Committee on Broadcasting (Ottawa:1965) p. 30  
as cited by Peers, p. 145.

41. Peers, p. 142.

42. Peers, p. 153-54.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN SPORT

In the preceding chapter it was argued that the two most important themes affecting the development of the Canadian economy and its cultural institutions during the twentieth century have been: (a) the gradual replacement of Britain by the United States as the metropolitan influence on Canada, and (b) the incorporation of new and profitable areas of cultural life (e.g. media productions) into the marketplace as a Canadian consumer culture developed. In this chapter, using mainly secondary source material, I shall use the examples of hockey and football to argue that these two themes are reflected in a scale of commodification in Canadian sport over the last hundred years and the general movement away from certain British middle class values in sport and toward American "mass" cultural standards.

#### Background to Institutional and Economic Development

The institutional development of Canadian sport began during the 19th century.(1) Changes in the social structure of Canadian society brought about the antecedent conditions necessary for the institutionalization of sport. Principal among these factors were the development of wage labour, the separation of work and leisure, the growth of a professional and managerial middle class, and the accumulation of surplus capital which provided the

discretionary funds necessary for a consumer and leisure-oriented society.(2)

Against this background a number of sociologists and historians have argued that the dominant sport form in Canada during the late nineteenth century was the British Victorian ideal of the gentleman-amateur.(3) This situation reflected the hold of the British metropolitan culture upon Canadian colonial culture and the constant rejuvenation of certain British values via immigration. It is widely understood that amateurism in this period developed 'dialectically' in opposition to a wide variety of commercial sport forms. Gruneau argues, for example, that the expansion of the capitalist industrial economy and the spread of liberal values had created conditions for a more meritocratic class structure that undermined the ascriptive dominance of the upper classes. Growing class insecurities and the needs to discipline a disorderly labour force created pressures for more orderly and "civilized" games. The amateur code was a part of such initiatives.(4)

A somewhat similar argument is developed by Dunning and Sheard (5) in their analysis of the modernization of rugby football in England. They note that prior to industrialization, the dominant classes in England were secure in their positions. The power of social ascription in society was such that dominant groups did not feel threatened by competing in sports activities with the working classes: they were competing for "fun" and could easily rationalize the class interaction inherent in sport during

that era as having little meaning in the determination of social standing within pre-industrial society. In an ascriptive society the identities and statuses of dominant groups were not at stake in any type of athletic contest, and, as Gruneau suggests, "it is unlikely that they would have been very concerned about the symbolic consequences of losing to 'inferiors'." (6) For this reason the dominant classes in pre-industrial western societies were little concerned about the presence of professional players in sports of the era.

Cricket is a prime example here. In that sport's early years in Great Britain professionals competed with upper class amateurs in sports competition with few problematic consequences. Cricket's social structure, as historians have outlined, evolved and was institutionalized before the separation of professional and amateur competition occurred in the latter half of the 19th century. (7) During that early developmental period, the dominant classes exercised hegemony in society as a whole and had the power to control the consequences of any potentially oppositional cultural form. They had little to fear from the presence in their midst of better skilled paid cricket players from the lower classes. In fact, during a time when class mobility was severely restricted in society, the presence of professionals was accepted in the social traditions of the sport.

It has been argued, however, that with the changes in class relations and the rise of a meritocratic value structure that arose out of the industrializing process, the upper classes began

to feel more threatened by inter-class competition in sport and the symbolic consequences of losing to their social inferiors. Many analysts agree that social exclusion became especially important for certain fragments of the dominant class. Gruneau suggests two possible responses of the upper classes to changes imposed upon them in western society's class relations:

(1) withdraw completely from the world of competitive sports and establish social clubs which could be easily defended against the forces of democratization; or (2) set up formal organizations designed to structure play in a way which ensured that the "nobility of play" would remain uncontaminated by either "crass commercialism" or unrestricted meritocratic principle.(8)

In Canada both tactics were utilized. Exclusive "hunt and tandem" clubs emphasized a policy of restricted accessibility and maintained a social and recreational focus solely for the upper classes. Other clubs were less exclusive but attempted to protect the 'nobility of play' through promoting the cult of the 'amateur' in opposition to the often more commercialized sport forms of the lower and middle classes.(9) It was the adoption of the British amateur sports model in Canada, as part of a whole set of cultural institutions erected by British immigrants (and those Canadians who used Britain as a reference group) within the developing Canadian society, which became the nation's dominant sport form and acted to shape the direction of Canadian sport until well into the 20th century.

These exclusionary tactics were primarily developed in response to changes in the capitalist labour process which had

developed throughout the western industrializing societies in the nineteenth century. The extension of the industrial process throughout society continued to create social conditions in sport which simply could not be controlled by the dominant classes as the guardians of the amateur ethos. Most significant here is what Harry Braverman calls the "universal market" tendency of capitalist enterprise.(10) In the capitalist process, capital is set in constant motion by entrepreneurs as they seek out and develop new areas for potential profit. The development of the institution of sport in the latter half of the 19th century presented a number of important new markets for entrepreneurial activity. As Bruce Kidd notes, the consolidation of the capitalist labour market during the industrializing process acted as a wedge in many areas of society to open up other channels for potential profit. Sport was one of these dynamic areas:

The whole process is reinforced by the decline of individual competence and the alienating nature of work--a consequence of capitalism's relentless division and redivision of labour--and the decline of the sense of family and community, as more and more of their functions are assumed by the market. These very conditions have accelerated the penetration of capitalism into sport.(11)

How did sport fit into a developing industrial capitalist society? As the rationalization of social life continued to occur, the formalized concepts of work and leisure developed. Modern organized sport evolved as an institutionalized response to new class relations, the increase in leisure time, and rising disposable incomes available in the dynamic industrializing



society. As well, the crystallization of sport extended the political economy of capitalism in a number of ways that benefited entrepreneurs. First, as a spectator event during leisure hours, it presented profit potential in the sale of transportation to and from the event, betting on the outcome(12), gate receipts, concession sales, souvenirs and payments to the athletes themselves. Of central importance, remuneration to the athletes was an ongoing issue in the developing sports markets as the extension of labour markets throughout the economy educated working class athletes to the fact that their leisure sports skills were available to be purchased in a number of potential markets in society. As in the rest of the Canadian economy, those worker athletes who were mobile gravitated to those sports which presented the best opportunity for individuals to make a living. Most analysts agree that it was the development of the industrial capitalist economy with its division of labour which made possible the commercialization of sport and the professionalization of its athletes.(13)

The first entrepreneurs to take advantage of the commercial potential of sport were either athletes themselves, ex-athletes, or businessmen who recognized the market potential of sport. They formed teams, sponsored 'challenge' matches, went on barnstorming tours and generally sought to make money wherever possible.(14) But, increasingly, as the profit potential for sport became apparent to entrepreneurs throughout society, a larger number of them began competing for the limited available

markets that were available and initiated a style of open, uninhibited competition that is usually found in the early stages of the economic development of all capitalist markets. This process continued for a number of years as the fortunes of sports teams and owners rose and fell generally with the expansion and contraction of the economy.(15)

As the sports markets developed in response to the needs of the leisure based consumer culture and its industrial society, the promoters, owners and, to a certain extent the athletes, gradually adapted their knowledge and experiences to the economic realization that open competition with other entrepreneurs both in the sports spectator market and, especially, in the player labour market, was resulting in less than optimal return of profits over the long run. The more prescient of these individuals foresaw a need to reduce competition with each other in order to more regularize sports activities and present a better product to their consumers. Gruneau(16) argues that the pressures during this time of maintaining these systematic market relations between groups resulted in a need to formally incorporate clubs and sports businesses and a need to 'regulate "economic competition" between teams and protect the developing labour and product markets in sport.'(17) These were the important first steps towards the development of corporate sport in Canada and they occurred initially in those sports which attracted the best spectator response and presented the best opportunities for entrepreneurs to make money.

Hockey was the first Canadian sport to organize and coalesce into the corporate orientation noted above. Yet, possibly in response to the entrenchment of the amateur model in Canada, the first openly professional team (the Portage Lakes) was a United States based team which was created in 1903 in Houghton, Michigan by a Canadian dentist named J.L. Gibson. For his team he hired some Canadian players he had played with in Kitchener.(18) That Kitchener team had been expelled from the Ontario Hockey Association in 1898 for professionalism and provides some evidence for Bruce Kidd's assertion that in spite of the dominance of the amateur model in some areas of society "players had been secretly paid well before 1903." (19)

Thereafter, despite the opposition of amateur organizers and players, open play between professional and amateur teams gradually became commonplace throughout both Canada and the United States. Leagues proliferated in North America but mainly on a regional basis. This was due principally to the high travel costs associated with the large geographic distances between cities. Other factors affecting the early profitability of commercial sport included the presence of a state of chaos in the early player labour markets which made it very difficult for team owners to develop spectator loyalty to their teams. The early professional players often jumped leagues or were being traded or sold as teams' individual fortunes rose and fell. Indeed, when the National Hockey Association (the forerunner of the National Hockey League) was formed in 1909, the team owners bought many of

their players away from other leagues across Canada. Contracts purchased included Cyclone Taylor from the Canadian Hockey Association's Ottawa Senators for \$5250 and Lester and Frank Patrick from British Columbia for \$3000 apiece. Later, the Patricks formed another league, the Pacific Coast League, in British Columbia and began a salary war that escalated payments to players and lasted ten years.(20) Later, the owners, in seeking to reduce labour costs and maximize profits, would organize to end the salary battles and return pay scales to their previous low levels. The owners were gradually learning the unique rules of business in professional sport. As Bruce Kidd noted:

The new breed of hockey entrepreneur was quick to discover the cardinal principle of commercial sport: the teams in a league may be competitors on the ice but they are partners in business. So when there were commercial struggles, they were not so much between team and team but league and league.(21)

The owners understood that intra-league commercial rivalry creates lasting and sometimes fatal economic damage. As an example, in 1909 the Montreal Wanderers were dropped from the Eastern Canadian Hockey League when that league was in the process of becoming the basis for the Canadian Hockey Association. That move backfired on the new league, however, when the Wanderers' owner, P.J. Doran, helped form the National Hockey Association which later put the CHA out of business. Later on, in 1917, the NHA would reconstitute itself as the National Hockey League to exclude Eddie Livingston, the owner of

the Toronto franchise, because, according to Ottawa owner Tommy Gorman, he "was always arguing. Without him we can get down to the business of making money."(22)

The competition characteristic of the early development of capitalist markets had gradually reduced the number of owners who could seriously compete financially to the point where consideration could be given to forming an economic enterprise that had the possibility of becoming the dominant firm in hockey.(23) This process in sport was in keeping with the general trend throughout the continental economy as a whole towards the consolidation of and capitalization of large firms out of the many smaller businesses then existing. Access to the capital available in the major U.S. markets was an important factor in determining which firms would survive. It appears that the availability of capital to control markets was a principal factor in the rise of the NHL to dominate all of North American hockey.

It is useful at this point to outline how the NHL developed its economic control over hockey in Canada and the United States as an example of how the preceeding chapter's analysis of American economic penetration of Canada during the 20th century was paralleled by a similar process in sport. In the case of the NHL, the most important act in its corporate history was its move during the 1920s to establish its power base in the capital-rich northeastern United States. From there, it pursued policies which would harness the Canadian hockey system as a talent feeder

system to American markets.

### From Commodification to Cartel: The Case of the National Hockey League

Since the inception of the league in 1917 NHL owners have promoted league policies that would act to reinforce the ongoing commodification of Canadian hockey while at the same time acting to open up new areas for profit. The two processes were intertwined. Owners developed new areas (such as broadcasting games on radio which began during the 1920s) which acted to reproduce and extend the commodified nature of hockey in Canadian society while at the same time increasing profits. This pursuit of profits led inevitably to a continental rather than purely Canadian approach to league development. Of crucial importance, the opportunities for capital accumulation from the sale of hockey in the dominating northeastern region of the United States were more numerous and profitable than they were in Canada. The markets of the United States presented such a rich potential for profit that franchise expansion would have to occur within this region if the league and its member teams were to develop their position as the dominant firm in North American hockey. In his classic analysis of "The Economics of the National Hockey League" J.C.H. Jones emphasized the integral importance of the drive for profits throughout the league's history. Despite team owners' protests to the contrary, Jones demonstrates how the primary interest in hockey has not been based on the "love of the game"

so much as the best way to make money.(29) Hockey was the first sport in Canada whose development was first influenced by the lessons of monopoly capitalism. As such, it provides a rich source of material on the development of sports markets and the history of Canadian business enterprise.

Examining these developments, some scholars have speculated that the transformation of the National Hockey Association in 1917 from a league composed of individualistic entrepreneurial firms to an association (the NHL) dominated by a unitary corporate outlook represents an important evolutionary step in Canadian commercial sport.(30) Its member firms had begun the process of adhering to the basic "modern" principles of professional sport. An early example of the league's corporate behavior occurred during the 1920 season when there was a wide discrepancy in the competitive levels of the teams within the league. That year the NHL broke up the league dominating Ottawa Senators and dispersed its players to the other teams to improve the competitive structure and provide a better product for the spectators. With its most important concern that the league maintain its profit levels, the NHL's move was also good for Ottawa. As the runaway leader in the league its attendance totals were suffering due to the predictability of winning. However, despite Ottawa's early success in the league, by the end of the 1930s the franchise had collapsed, possibly due to the small size of the Ottawa hockey market and the effects of the Great Depression.

While there was a developing measure of corporate solidarity within the NHL, there was considerable inter-league commercial rivalry for players and spectator markets during this time. In their continuous attempts to upgrade their player talent, various teams in the NHL raided other commercial and community leagues for players. Conn Smythe of the Toronto Maple Leafs decimated the Allan Cup champion Port Arthur Bear Cats when he signed goalie Lorne Chabot and Danny Cox to pro contracts with the Maple Leafs in the middle twenties. The loss of the Bentley brothers, Max, Doug and Reg, to the professional league hurt the Drumheller Miners in the late thirties.(31) As well, competition with the Western Hockey League continued until the WHL's disbanding in 1926.

In summary, the growing commodification of the player labour markets (and the willingness of hockey labourers to sell their skills) led gradually to a domination of the labour market by the NHL, the firm with the greatest market capitalization. Other factors supporting the NHL's rise to dominance in professional hockey included the process of urbanization (which led to a disintegration of rural communities and the spectator support base for the NHL's rival community sports teams), and the economic dislocations of the 1930s which acted to bankrupt the least profitable hockey teams in the NHL and its competitor leagues as well.

Despite its own sometimes precarious short-term economic existence, the NHL, as a business with a long term corporate



perspective, took aim at maximizing profits over the long run. An important first step for this corporate organization was to extend its dominance as the top professional hockey league in North America by seeking out profitable locations for franchises in the United States. This policy would have the twin effects of increasing the NHL's share of the hockey spectator market while at the same time heading off any attempts by rival leagues to place competing teams in the best markets. The NHL's early expansionary policy took aim to monopolize the continental hockey markets by harnessing the Canadian hockey development system to the potential for capital accumulation in the lucrative northeastern United States sports spectator market.

The 1920's were boom years for the continental economy and sport entered what many called 'The Golden Age of Sport'. American businessmen with surplus capital available from the economic boom were willing to purchase NHL franchises. Franchises were sold to Boston (1924; \$15,000), to Pittsburgh (1925; \$15,000), to New York (in 1925 the entire first place Hamilton team to Tex Rickard for \$75,000), to New York (1926; \$15,000), Chicago (1926; \$50,000) and Detroit (1926; \$50,000).(32) The only franchise sold in Canada during this period came in 1924 when a second Montreal franchise was sold for \$15,000 to local businessmen. Two years later, Conn Smythe prevented the sale of the Toronto St. Pats to a Philadelphia group by calling on the civic pride of the owners to keep the franchise in Canada. He bought the franchise for \$40,000 less

than the American group was willing to pay and renamed it the Toronto Maple Leafs.

Expansion of the NHL in the eastern part of the continent had repercussions for its regional rivals in the west. The high demand for quality players to stock these new NHL franchises was too much for Lester Patrick and his regionally based Western Hockey League. On the less developed west coast the WHL simply could not compete for players with the greater financial resources available to the American based NHL so Patrick disbanded the league in 1926. All the players were sold to the NHL for \$272,000.(33) The demise of the WHL provides evidence of the growing economic power of the NHL. As it developed into the dominant firm in North American hockey, it was able to utilize its economic power in the rich urban markets of the United States to provide it with the resources to exert a measure of control over the actions of its competitors in other cities scattered throughout the continent.

Similarly, the league moved to establish a continental talent feeder system which would allow it to develop and control the best hockey talent as it came available. At the same time, these policies would act to undermine the attempts of other entrepreneurs to form rival leagues by taking the best talent. In 1927, five new North American regional professional leagues were formed as farm systems of the NHL. All had working agreements with the NHL that gave its teams sole rights to the best players in the new leagues. The five new leagues: The

Canadian Professional League (based primarily in Ontario), The Canadian-American League (based in the eastern U.S. and including Quebec City), The American Hockey Association (based in the mid-west and including Winnipeg), The Prairie League (centered on the Canadian prairies), and the California League (with four teams based in Los Angeles) were all integrated into a talent feeder system that effectively locked up the labour markets during the league's vulnerable formative years. It may possibly have been those policies designed to eliminate competition which enabled the NHL to survive the economic disaster of the 1930s.

Nonetheless, the NHL's expansionary policies were undermined by the onset of the Great Depression in the early thirties. Instead, league owners were forced to enact policies to consolidate their power and influence during an era of declining economic activity and a disastrous drop in consumer disposable income. The five new professional leagues went bankrupt while four of the NHL's franchises (including the once powerful Ottawa Senators) collapsed. Interestingly, as Kidd and Macfarlane argue, low cost community hockey thrived during this time of economic upheaval and it was apparent that it was these leagues and teams (with their modest scale of payments to players) that provided the largest amount of opposition to the NHL's domination of Canadian hockey.(34)

It is important to point out that by the fourth decade of the 20th century the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association was primarily amateur in name only. While the amateur tradition was

being continuously upheld and reproduced in the Canadian universities (a group of McGill students had developed the first set of rules for hockey in 1880), in the private clubs and within the military by the middle and upper class people that identified with the British tradition, the rapid commodification of hockey across the country during the early part of the twentieth century had resulted in a form of commercialization in the community leagues and teams that provided for some form of payment to the players. As Bruce Kidd notes: 'by 1920 many amateur teams had begun to pay their players--and not in the form of complimentary tickets, either.'(35)

The practice of paying players even among the amateur teams became so widespread and accepted by the 1930's that eventually the CAHA was forced to legitimize it in 1935 by permitting its member players to sign legally binding contracts and to accept compensation for time lost from work playing hockey. In 1937, the CAHA withdrew from the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada in further acknowledgement of the disintegration of the amateur tradition in senior hockey played across Canada. But, despite the presence of community hockey as an alternative to the corporate hockey approach of the NHL, an important point to note during this period is that the policy of paying senior players, even small amounts on an irregular basis, acted as a support to the NHL's aim of commodifying the sport and its labour markets. The payment of amateur players had the side effect of legitimizing the practice of selling labour skills in hockey. It

was this gradual trend, as part of the general process of the extension of capitalist labour markets into sport and many other areas of society during the 20th century, that led slowly but inexorably to the post World War II harnessing of the CAHA and its hockey system as a rationalized talent feeder network to the American dominated National Hockey League.

The second World War radically altered the structure of Canadian hockey for the post-war era. The loss of players to the war effort weakened many of community teams while the war industries accelerated the urbanization process that hurt the smaller rural communities. In 1940, in the first of a series of agreements with the cash poor CAHA, the NHL agreed to pay it a rights fee for every player signed by an NHL team. The aim of the agreement was to provide a cash subsidy to Canadian amateur hockey operations but a crucial side effect of the arrangement was to encourage the CAHA to become closely involved in the development and identification of player talent for the NHL's labour market. The CAHA and its member organizations became, in effect, scouts and advance guards for the NHL.(36)

Once the war ended, the NHL's most significant labour agreement was signed by the CAHA in 1947. It was the sponsorship system which allowed teams in the professional league to sponsor two junior hockey teams and hold the playing rights to the team members as well. As well, the agreement stipulated that:

No contract or agreement other than simple registration as a player, made between a player and any member club of the CAHA

shall be binding upon or have any effect whatsoever upon the NHL or its duly affiliated or associated minor leagues. (37)

The agreement formalized the establishment of a classical monopsonistic position with regard to the NHL and its labour markets. With the new arrangement, the NHL, a corporate organization composed mainly of American firms, became the sole determinant of the careers of every Canadian hockey player and achieved total domination over the CAHA and its member teams.

The development of the NHL as the dominant firm in North American hockey was aided by the close relationship professional sport established with the media. The regularity of NHL competition and thus its availability to routinized profitable coverage by newspapers, television and radio, the thrill of NHL teams paying players for playing hockey, its constant promotion in the media through advertising and public relations enabled it to gain the favour of many of the sports media. As well, at a time when newspaper reporters were not well paid, the advantages of writing the right kinds of stories were not to be passed up. For the reporter who tended to report critically on the team's activities and the game, being barred from entering the team's dressing room for interviews after the game was not uncommon. (38)

From a marketing standpoint, media outlets in major Canadian and American urban markets found the daily exploits of the professional sports teams to be excellent material to increase their listening or viewing audiences. A winning team sold more

papers and drew more listeners to a play by play broadcast than did a losing team. For the broadcast's advertising sponsors, more listeners and viewers meant larger sales of their products and increased profits while the originating stations also increased their revenues from advertising and from the increased audience.

Media dependence has played a significant role in determining the direction of the NHL's development. Evidence of media influence in determining the position of the NHL in Canada's hockey culture can be seen in the gradual development of the Toronto Maple Leafs into English Canada's representative team with its domination of the Hockey Night in Canada radio broadcasts from the 1920's to the 1950's. As well, it is well known that Vancouver was denied an NHL franchise in the mid 1960's because the League was determined to locate franchises in those American cities which would give it a chance at a lucrative national American television contract with all of its attendant profit potential. A third Canadian franchise located in Vancouver would not help in the quest for an American TV contract and, instead, would only serve to slice into the monopoly profits of the Toronto and Montreal franchises over the CBC Hockey Night in Canada telecasts. Due strictly to the NHL's desire to increase overall corporate profits, the franchise was awarded to Oakland, an underdeveloped hockey market where poor spectator response quickly let the team fall into bankruptcy.

The development of the National Hockey League from its

Canadian base into an American dominated continental league was a direct result of the development and extension of a capitalist labour market to Canadian sport and throughout the Canadian economy. The rise of, first, community based hockey teams, then loosely based regional professional leagues and associations and, finally, a continental league, followed historical developments throughout the Canadian political economy as a whole. The shaping of Canadian hockey was influenced first by the British, with their amateur ethos, and later by the Americans as their economic power began to dominate Canadian commerce. The dynamic achievement-oriented economic and cultural values of American society gradually came to displace and dominate the older values of the British ascriptive model. In hockey, the search for new areas of profit making potential led the National Hockey League into the rich markets of the northeast United States during the 1920's where the potential for capital accumulation was much greater than in Canada. Its development as a continental league led to policies (in labour relations, especially) which had as their primary aim to increase the profits of the NHL through its continual domination of Canadian hockey.

The historical development of the NHL as a commercialized form of sport has also provided a leading influence on the commodification of all Canadian sport during the past seventy years and typifies the cultural influence that American economic penetration has engendered throughout Canadian society. The next section of this chapter will deal with the sport of football



where, historically, supporters of the amateur tradition in sport were able to delay the rise to dominance of the commercializing forces for a longer period of time. However, once supporters of those British traditions were overwhelmed by the commercializing forces, the consolidation of Canadian corporate football could proceed to the point where the Canadian Football League is now dominant in its sport in Canada. However, in comparison with the NHL's development, the association of the CFL with the continental economy and American culture has occurred in a different fashion.

#### Economic Development of the Canadian Football League

Despite its continental base, the National Hockey League is the predominant professional sports league in Canada. The sport of football, led by the Canadian Football League which is now clearly dominant in its sport, has differed from hockey in its commercial development. Regional interests, rivalries and comparatively small regional markets for certain franchises have greatly influenced the direction and extent of football's development.(39) Viewed alongside the historical development of the NHL, the CFL's lack of penetration into the major U.S. markets must stand as a important factor for Canadian professional football's lack of capital accumulation. The entrenchment and control of the amateur model and its supporters in university and club rugby football during the formative years of the sport also appears to have been an important force acting to delay the imposition of a professional structure upon the

game.(40) Another factor may have been the regional rivalries between western and eastern football interests. The eastern rugby football establishment's tendency to ignore pressures from western football interests to change the game's structures towards a more commercialized setup must stand as an important sub-theme within the game's overall historical development.(41) Overcoming the fractionalizing tendencies of these rivalries was the primary organizational focus of Canadian professional football during much of the 20th century.

It is widely noted that the first game of rugby football in Canada took place in Montreal in 1865 between "a team of officers from English regiments garrisoned in Montreal and a team of civilians mostly from McGill University."(42) After a national union was formed in 1882 (which subsequently failed in 1886 due to rule differences among the various unions), the Canadian Rugby Union was reconstituted in 1891 with representatives of the Quebec and Ontario unions present. An interesting point to note in this early period is that this 'national' body was national in name only, no representatives from outside central Canada were present at its founding.(43) In fairness to central Canadian organizers the economic and demographic development of the western region had only just begun but the lack of national representatives in this early organization (especially from the more developed Atlantic region) is an early indication of the regional rivalries that were prevalent in Canadian economic and social institutions during the 20th century.

In 1897, the Canadian Intercollegiate Rugby Football Union (CIRFU) was organized in response to amateur football's rise to prominence in the universities in central Canada. Behind the move towards an intercollegiate union was the perceived need for a governing structure to check the rise of professionalism in football and to allow university officials a mechanism to control the development of the game. Again this organization was national in name only as it was focussed primarily on the central Canadian universities. After the CIRFU was accepted into the Canadian Rugby Union, the University of Toronto entered the national playdowns but lost. Shortly thereafter, feeling "unfairly challenged by near professionals"(44), the amateur Intercollegiate Union resigned from the CRU and did not return until 1905. It is important to note, however, in fairness to the other clubs in the CRU, that universities themselves were not unanimously considered as pure amateurs. During the 1890's, Canadian universities were the target (like their American counterparts) of accusations that their teams were allowing ringers and professionals to compete for them.(45)

Meanwhile, the organizational conflicts that dominated the early years of central Canadian football continued as various sets of rules were promoted and used by the Unions. The struggles that occurred were a result of the confluence of public interest in the popular but brutal American collegiate game to the south, the landed Canadian game, and the influence of British immigrants who saw little reason to tamper with the successful

rugby game imported from Britain. At one point in 1905, the rules in the Ontario union and the Quebec union were so dissimilar as to make playoff competition nearly impossible. With the return of the Intercollegiate Union to the fold that year, the possibility arose of three sets of rules with which to contend. As Frank Cosentino points out, "It thus became necessary to have two referees for each match in which two different styles were played." (46) It was not until 1909 that a uniform code of rules was eventually adopted by the CRU for all championship games.

Within the national organization, however, the sanctity of the CRU's amateur code was unanimously agreed upon by all the Unions. The CRU's stringent eligibility rules also provided a large measure of protection against the club teams instituting a process of recruiting players from other towns by ensuring that each team's players must be residents of the city in which they played. The universities, however, held an advantage. In their case, they needed only to prove that their players were certified students and had been successful in the previous year's examinations. Thus, their players could come from any town. This early rule gave the universities a decided advantage for their football programs and was an important reason for their success during the first quarter of the century. (47)

The residency requirement provided reinforcement to an already surging community spectator interest in the various teams. With the emphasis on the representative nature of the

various cities' football teams (a pride of place, community feeling), their local newspapers were not above the occasional jibe at their town's rivals. The Ottawa Journal noted the early lack of success of the Toronto Argonauts football team in this comment from a 1909 editorial:

it is strange that with all the football material there is training around Toronto, the Argonauts cannot develop a winning team.(48)

In fact, due to the liberal eligibility requirements at the universities, it was the University of Toronto which became the strongest team in Toronto and which also became the first ever winner of the Grey Cup Trophy before large crowds in Toronto in 1909. The commercial potential of football was already evident during those early days as the Varsity Blues and the Ottawa Rough Riders each gained \$3100 in gate receipts for their part in the semi-final game.(49) The University of Toronto went on to win two consecutive Grey Cups.

During this era, the universities were the principal innovators of the game, probably in conjunction and interaction with proponents of the popular American university game south of the border. In 1912, McGill University hired the first professional coach in Canadian amateur football when Frank "Shag" Shaughnessy, a Notre Dame alumnus and former coach at Clemson, arrived to take over the program. It was Shaughnessy who added such American innovations as the training table and early departure for road games to prevent train-lag. He also was the

first to demand complete control of the team and solidified an administrative structure which placed the coach in position as the dominant power in the program.

Yet, as powerful as Shaughnessy appears to have been, even he could not influence his amateur players at McGill to overcome the educational mores of their British influenced sports culture. Sports were certainly not more important than academic studies. In his first year, McGill's team members issued a notice that, despite winning the intercollegiate championship, they did not want to participate in the playoffs in "an already lengthened football season, which has cost us considerable sacrifice in respect to our academic work." (50) The very next year the team repeated this move. Despite Shaughnessy's "rationalized" (51) modern tactics, McGill's athletic outlook was still very much in the style of the 19th century British amateur tradition. For the 1914 season came this announcement came from Montreal:

The club wishes to have as little to do with the Interprovincial Union as possible. In addition to the difference in playing rules, the players of the Big Four have not always been free from the taint of professionalism and naturally the University players do not want to run the risk of being held up by the C.A.A.U. [Canadian Amateur Athletic Union] for playing against professionals. (52)

But along similar lines, the professionalized coaching methods of Shaughnessy were coming under increasing scrutiny from the central Canadian sports community. His techniques of evading the letter of the rules rather than considering the spirit was both criticized and acclaimed by observers. "Shaughnessy has

done nothing not permitted by the rules...Unquestionably, the game has been improved by the astute Montreal coach," editorialized the Toronto Globe (53) but "If Shaughnessy has played fast and loose with the rules, as is contended by some of his critics, he should be checked up now."(54)

The Shaughnessy issue appears to mark a noteworthy incident in the cultural struggle for dominance in football between the British influence and its amateur orientation in sport and the more rationalized approach to sport adopted from south of the border. Shaughnessy, an American and Notre Dame football alumnus, clearly represents the latter set of values rather than the former. Historical accounts present an interesting compromise in amateur McGill's acquiescence in Shaughnessy's rationalized search for methods to win games within the rules. It appears that McGill athletic officials ignored the moral traditions of amateurism in allowing him to implement his tactics in the McGill football program. Also worth noting is that the success of his early efforts also publicized to central Canadians how 'advanced' American university football expertise was and acted to promote its availability to the Canadian football community. Shaughnessy's presence in Canada foreshadowed the important role American coaches and players would assume in the development of Canadian football. And it was in the west that the Americanization of football would proceed at its quickest pace.

Although the Manitoba Union was first admitted as an

honourary member in the CRU in 1892, the first formal structure in the West was the Western Canada Rugby Football Union, established in 1912. Its application for entry into the CRU to compete for the Grey Cup was denied but it was accorded honorary status. But, regardless of the status of the west within the national organization, the trend towards a rise of American influences in Canadian football was pronounced in western Canada in the pre-World War I era where a large number of Americans were already playing on the teams in Edmonton, Saskatoon and Regina.(55) Regional economic and cultural relations on the Canadian and American prairies had led to the recruiting of northern U.S. collegiate football players to come north to play on the football teams. This interaction led to an Americanization of the western game and also led to western efforts to implement changes in the national Canadian rule book. Generally, however, these attempts were sidetracked and delayed by the conservative East and led to friction between both groups. The development of a game in the west more closely resembling American football would act to inflame sports relations between the western and central Canadian regions for the next four decades.(56)

After World War I, a renewal of the professional coach issue within university athletic circles occurred in 1921 when Queen's University hired a coach, George Awrey, and built a new stadium to accomodate the large crowds that it's football team was drawing. The very next season, Queen's came under fire amid charges that the team was composed of paid 'ringers'. The furor



was such that the Principal of Queen's was forced to deny all allegations in a public statement:

There have been no pecuniary or material allowances, direct or indirect, made to any man on the grounds of athletics. There has been no such kind of arrangement entered into by the University or by the Athletic Board of Control. (57)

This statement, of course, did not preclude the possibility of a group outside the University providing money to the players, an accusation which would become commonplace in athletic relations between the central Canadian universities during the ensuing decades.

Further evidence of the growing commercialization of university football came the next year when Queen's pressured its opponents who had larger stadiums to share the gate receipts when Queen's visited. The usual practice in all the leagues was for the home team to keep all receipts but, because of their larger stadiums, the football revenues of McGill and Toronto far exceeded those of Queen's. As a result, the Queen's athletic department began a campaign for the rights of the visiting team to receive one third of the receipts in all league games.

The development of club football during the 1920s shows a more pronounced pattern of commercialization than did the universities. The gradual implementation in Canadian sport (especially the NHL) of a more clearly articulated achievement-oriented value system led observers increasingly to promote the use of professional coaches and the value of 'expert

instruction' in enhancing the quality of performance. But the Toronto Globe noted the problems that tended to accompany professional coaching:

The question of employment of professional coaches is a moot one, not because of the desirability of having the expert instruction but because of the abuses which very often follow the pro system...If it can be shown that the abuses, which seem to be a concomitant of pro coaching, cannot be eliminated, the argument against the professional instructor will be greatly strengthened.(58)

Yet, once implemented, it was difficult to eliminate the concept of the paid coach as being essential to the process of maintaining the quality of the team's performance. The rationalization of coaching in the early Canadian football programs can be perceived as an important signpost of the commercialization of the sport.

Constant pressures to eliminate the non-instrumental traditions of 'pure' amateurism and sportsmanship in the social system of Canadian football continued during the 1920's. In 1926 Queen's again came under fire for scouting Toronto and McGill in their three team Intercollegiate league. This contravened a league regulation that classified the tactic of advance scouting of opponents as being within the realm of unsportsmanlike behavior. But of more concern, outside the universities, the amateur code was coming under increasing strain with the growing commercialization of club football and, of course, the precedent setting model of the commercialized continental hockey league. Football in central Canada, like the case of the NHL years

earlier, was gradually evolving relatively stable market relations that enabled the teams and leagues to budget for expected revenue at the gate. In the context of this commercialization, again with the precedent of professional hockey, players soon came to expect to gain some benefit from their football ability. More often, it was only the prospect of landing a well paying job in the team's city rather than straight cash payments that provided the incentive as former Hamilton Tiger Bruce Inksetter noted in an interview many years later:

If a player made a regular place on the team and looked like a good prospect, he would be offered a job in local industry or on the City payroll. Thus we had Ernie Cox, Bert Gibb, French and Languay on the fire department. Sprague was a policeman, Seymore Wilson and Fred Veale in the City Hall. Brian Timmis had the best job of all as a foreman with Piggot Construction Company.  
(59)

Intercollegiate football continued to grow and expand throughout Canada. In 1927, universities in the western provinces formed the Western Intercollegiate Union. The University of Alberta had started playing football in 1919 and the University of British Columbia established the first football program in rugby-dominated British Columbia by adding a team in time for the 1924 season while the University of Saskatchewan had began play in 1921. Overall, a total of 14 club and intercollegiate teams were competing in the West while 16 were active in the East.(60)

The advent of the forward pass in the early thirties heralded a major development in the impact of American football

on Canada. While by 1931 most Unions were in broad agreement to implement the rule changes necessary to bring the American forward pass to Canada few people realized the wide ranging impact it would eventually have on the development of the game. Frank Shaughnessy, the McGill coach, felt that in the long run, having the option of the forward pass "is sufficient to open up the game as a whole and to bear down on the mass formations that we have had in the past." (61) Another important effect, though, was that the implementation of this American tactic would also act to move the Canadian game even closer towards a tradition of testing and implementing American football techniques and tactics.

The strategy involving the pass was not that complex but its advent gave a decided advantage to the American import who had more training with it. It was Warren Stevens, an American graduate student at McGill and future athletic director at the University of Toronto, who exposed Canadian football to the real uses of the pass and revolutionized the game. (62) Stevens joined the Montreal Winged Wheelers and led them through an undefeated six game schedule. The offensive potential of the new rules led the University of Toronto to import an American passing coach to build up their offensive system.

Some observers accurately predicted that the implementation of the American passing rule in Canadian football would act as a carrier of "American sporting values" into Canadian society and increase the desire of team managers to import skilled Americans

to play a sport that was already resembling American football. The Hamilton Herald noted these points in an editorial that concerned the prospect of the passing rule helping to Americanize Canadian football:

When the Canadian Rugby Football Union turned Yankee and accepted the forward pass into the Canadian game, it was the intention of that governing body that the pass be learned by Canadians and developed in this country without the aid of exponents of it from across the border. (63)

Similarly, the Toronto Globe predicted that the passing rule would lead to the importation of more Americans who were familiar with the technical aspects of the pass. But that prophecy was already a reality in the West to the extent that American players were present in numbers large enough to enable the Winnipeg Free Press to report after one football game that "post-game discussion...was that the Regina amateurs were better than the Winnipeg amateurs and the Regina Americans were better than the Winnipeg Americans." (64)

The move towards open professionalism in amateur club football in Canada received a boost in 1932 when Lionel Conacher created the first professional team in Canada, the Cross and Blackwell Chiefs. Afterwards he stated, in reference to the development of the professional National Football League in the United States that, "Professional football is going ahead by leaps and bounds in the United States and we intend to have a shot at it." (65) Conacher may possibly have been affected by the success of the commercialized NHL in central Canada. The next

year there was a noticeable increase in the number of Americans playing and coaching in Canada, a situation which prompted an editorial by the Toronto Globe:

Believe it or not, football was once the most amateur of all sports in the Dominion and the finger of suspicion was seldom pointed in its direction. Cupidity, the desire to win at any cost and the coming of the forward pass have, however, made a vast difference. The Big Four clubs have become the main offenders in ignoring the rules. Are they to be allowed to do as they please? The Montreal and Ottawa clubs are chiefly to blame and they were the advocates of the introduction of the forward pass and all because they couldn't win titles under the Canadian code. Had the pass been adopted and the United States players barred, the obnoxious conditions that exist at the present time, would not have been possible. The abuses now are many and they are bound to increase. (66)

Meanwhile, pressure within the Canadian Rugby Union to Americanize the football rules continued to emanate from western clubs which wanted to make better use of their American players and coaches. But the east was still firmly in control of the councils of the CRU and enacted policies that only inflamed regional conflict. The decision of the CRU to hold the Grey Cup game in in the West in 1934 was later reversed at a special meeting called by the executive, an action which enraged the Western teams. Later that same year, the West voted to implement rule changes oriented towards the American game (including the 'pro' pass) for the 1935 season whether or not the CRU adopted them. Only one of the changes was approved later by the national body. A few months later, the Winnipeg team made a much publicized recruiting trip south of the border and brought back seven Americans to add to the two that they already had. All

were paid for the season and promised jobs in Winnipeg, actions that, according to the rules of the CRU as they were then constituted, would violate the player's amateur status and that of anyone they played against.

In the east, meanwhile, the limits of the amateur rule were tested constantly by the commercializing football clubs. The Ottawa Rough Riders were found to have paid an American to play for the 1935 season. The local branch of the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada suspended every man who played in the Interprovincial Union that season and also every player who participated in exhibition games against Ottawa. While the suspensions were eventually lifted through the intervention of the President of the A.A.U. of C., the issue exhibited the fact that the threat of the loss of amateur playing status still presented a very powerful and real threat in central Canadian sport during the 1930's. The entrenched power of the amateur tradition in Canadian football prevented the implementation of any radical changes in the eligibility regulations that would allow professionals to compete in football alongside amateurs.

The threat of sanctions carried less weight in the west. There, football organizers were beginning to feel more allegiance to their neighbours south of the border than to the "family compact" (67) in central Canada. Winnipeg, the western champion, travelled east to compete in the 1935 Grey Cup. They arrived three weeks early to scout the opposition and Frank Cosentino noted the animosity of Winnipeg general manager Joe Ryan towards

the eastern football interests:

if Winnipeg did not win the Grey Cup game, it would be the last time a team from Winnipeg would compete for the Canadian title. His [Ryan's] reasons, printed in the Winnipeg Free Press, December 4, 1935, were based on the fact that: "The West is moving ahead rapidly with its football. We're swinging more to the American code each year and the customers are with us. Our season is much shorter than in the East and we're just about fed up with efforts to keep pace with the authority flaunted over us by the Canadian Rugby Union." (68)

Winnipeg did manage to win the Grey Cup with an 18-12 win over the Hamilton Tigers to gain the West's first ever victory in the 26 year history of the Grey Cup playdowns. The title added further impetus to community efforts to promote football in the western region with the result that a new Union, the Western Interprovincial Football Union, was formed for the 1936 season. Teams from Calgary, Winnipeg and Regina were the first entrants.

In 1936, the trend towards the increased use of non-amateur players was temporarily halted as the CRU approved stringent new regulations which made illegal the use of many of the Americans imports playing for Canadian teams. Yet, paradoxically, during the same meeting, modifications in the playing rules towards the American game gave still further advantage to the imports remaining and had the effect of increasing the value of the already established imports to their clubs. Specifically, the allowing of pass protection in the backfield, a rule that was copied from American football, gave an advantage to the imports who were well experienced in those blocking techniques. In effect, the traditional use of Americans in the backfield that



became so common in the Canadian game was again reinforced by the implementation of this rule in 1936. That year, in defiance of the national body, the western teams continued using ineligible players but did not challenge for the Grey Cup. But that year's CRU annual general meeting was also marked by conciliatory relations between the regions and also showed some promise that nationally consolidating forces were at work within the game. The 1936 meeting marked the official end of unequal representation between the east and west in the executive committees of the Canadian Rugby Union. Previously, the west had always been outvoted by the east and, in administrative matters, it appeared frequently that the east was bullying the west. Feelings on the matter in the West were such that had the request for equal votes been turned down, the Western clubs would have resigned from the CRU.(69)

The rising influence of American foreign direct investment in Canada, described in the previous chapter, was paralleled by the Americanization of Canadian sport. The west became the first region in the country to legitimize the use of American players by instituting a rule restricting the number of imports allowed to play. Beginning in 1937, a maximum of eight Americans per team would be allowed.(70) As well, the Western Interprovincial Football Union brought back the 1935 rules which the CRU had overruled. The standardization of the rules across Canada continued to be a major point of contention between the reformers (the west) and the traditionalists (the east) and the two

regional factions were finding it difficult to reach common ground. It was not to be until 1941 that the CRU would finally agree to accept the western changes in the national rule book.

American football players were in even greater demand in Canada at the beginning of World War II. The declaration of war by Canada in 1939 increased the need for football players as many Canadian players enlisted in the armed forces. That year the West also expanded to a twelve game schedule and played games at night and as often as possible in order to reduce team costs. As in the development of hockey, World War II became a significant factor in effecting change in the sport of football and the people involved in its national administration.

Essentially, the war appears to have aided in the removal of some of the traditions and individuals that kept Canadian football focussed on its British heritage. Canadian ties with Great Britain weakened further after the global conflict while those with the United States increased as the two North American cultures and economies moved closer together through the growing media based consumer culture. In this context the British values of amateurism in Canadian football were continuously undermined by the professionalizing values espoused in American football and the presence in Canada of the professional National Hockey League and its affiliations. During the post-war era, the clubs chose simply to ignore the amateur code in the period before it was officially removed. Later, there was little opposition to the code's elimination.

The commercialization of Canadian football led to dramatic changes in the immediate post-war years. The CRU approved rule changes promoted by the West that were designed to enhance the marketing and promotion of the game while legitimizing and institutionalizing the recruitment of players from the U.S. Schedules in the east were doubled to twelve games (as they had been in the West) and teams began to take serious aim at winning the Grey Cup. The increasing popularity of the national championship game meant increased profits for the two clubs that made the final. These rule changes resulted in increased attendance at games held throughout the country in 1946.(71)

Also, other rule changes were implemented to move the Canadian game closer to the American version in order to make better use of the skilled imported American players. The reverse side of this development was that the rule changes would also make the continued use of the best available American players much more crucial to the commercial success of the various teams. By this time, however, the sport's primary need for highly skilled Americans was already acknowledged and conceded by the team managements. Consumer markets and spectator appeal were too important to the commercial success of the teams for general managers to ignore the abundant supply of talented players right across the border. Thus, the Canadian professional football talent feeder system began to extend south of the border.

With the increase in the number of Americans in the game, American football terminology increasingly began to displace

Canadian. This may have been due partially to the media. Interviews with American coaches and players likely picked up and transmitted their expressions to the Canadian audience and readership. As well, though, the growing U.S. media dominance of Canada was resulting in an influx of sports publications that circulated American football slang and expressions to the Canadian public, including the media. An article in Maclean's magazine stated:

The process [of Americanizing Canadian football expressions] has been hastened by the steady stream of American reading material which glorifies the U.S. gridiron hero. I think our own radio commentators are unwittingly strengthening the trend by the use of American football terminology.(72)

The teams also further rationalized their recruiting practices south of the border by taking aim at recruiting seasoned American professional stars. This was a step up from the former practice of limiting the scouting of Americans to college football graduates from northern U.S. universities. The Calgary Stampeders began the process by recruiting American pros from the National Football League as did the Hamilton Tigers who signed Frank Filchok, a New York Giant who had been banned for one year for failing to report a bribe offer. The lure of the Grey Cup and the possibilities of increased gate revenues brought an urgency to recruiters designed to acquire the best talent available in the U.S. market, even though sometimes it meant direct confrontation with the much more powerful National Football League in the bidding for American stars.(73)

Reinforcing the demand for American players was the publicity given to American college and professional football stars in the U.S. sports media. Increasingly, a Canadian team's connections in the American player market in college and professional football was perceived as an important factor in the successful identification and signing of import players. Coaches' networks of contacts in football south of the border were crucial in this regard and played a vital role in establishing the hiring practices of the coaching staffs. In fact, most coaches and general managers in Canadian football were American and it was their coaching experiences and contacts south of the border that helped them get and keep their jobs and maintain successful programs for the various Canadian clubs.(74)

Commercialization of the game meant increasingly larger budgets for the various clubs and it became more difficult to deny the professional nature of the teams. Managers admitted that, despite their club's official amateur status, they were paying players.(75) Cosentino notes an article in Canadian Business which asserted that over fifty per cent (an estimated \$35,000 to \$50,000) of the 1948 Montreal Alouettes' budget of \$75,000 was composed of player salaries.(76)

As well, the amount of financial resources invested by the clubs meant that the managers gradually came to perceive that a certain degree of rationalization of their operations would be needed to stabilize club relationships with their players and with the other teams. Initially, free agency among the players

kept labour costs rising as teams bid up the salaries of the best players. In 1950, to reduce the financial costs associated with the free movement of players in 1950 the CRU instructed all clubs to insert a reserve clause in their player contracts.(77)

Essentially, the reserve clause restricted the players' right to bargain and dramatically curtailed their freedom to change teams. It also gave the weaker teams a measure of protection against raiding from the high powered teams from the richer markets. To provide backing for the reserve clause, the CRU agreed to fine clubs \$1000 if they were caught tampering with the active players of another team. The imposition of the reserve clause in all player contracts and many of the post-war commercializing developments indicated that the CRU was gradually becoming cartelized, a process that had occurred in the NHL almost thirty years previous.

The 1950's and 1960's were a period of consolidation for the corporate entity of Canadian professional football. Led by the West, the conditions for maintaining a professional league were gradually put into place. In 1953, at the CRU annual meetings the Western delegates moved that the name of the CRU be changed to the the Canadian Football Union "because we're not playing rugby but football."(78) The Western Union also moved that G. Sydney Halter be named as the first league commissioner. In response to the eastern college draft the West also instituted a "negotiation" list to disperse the talent from the western Canadin universities and junior clubs. Edmonton was the first

team to have a full time general manager in 1952 while the long awaited B.C. Lions franchise began play in Vancouver in 1954 with full-time staff present. Calgary, Regina and Winnipeg all followed suit by the mid fifties. In the East, the new management style was slower to be adopted but the success of the Montreal Alouettes on the gridiron as they won Grey Cups in 1954, 1955, and 1956 was attributed partly to their corporate structure.

The increased value placed on the new corporate style of management during the 1950's and 1960's was evident in the approach to management techniques that general managers were promoting to their colleagues. Hamilton Tiger Cat President (and future CFL commissioner) Jake Gaudaur articulated this management perspective in a 1955 quote from the Financial Post:

The time has come when the league should be set up profit making corporations. We need owners who have a large enough capital investment in their team and their league that they will be ready to look after their interests as they would any other business.  
(79)

In 1956, in an effort to further rationalize their corporate development the western and eastern professional leagues re-formed themselves under the Canadian Football Council as a type of loose federation guiding common interests within the Canadian Rugby Union. Another example of the Americanization of the game came at that year's annual meeting when the professional leagues pushed through a change in the value of a touchdown to the American six points outmoding the traditional Canadian five.

There was little opposition to the move.(80) In 1958, the renaming of the Council to the present Canadian Football League as a means to organize the two professional leagues under one corporate identity outlined the measure of national unity within football that was fast becoming apparent.

At the same time, the broadcast media were also becoming interested in the league's availability as cheap, live Canadian production and its potential for increasing audiences and profits. In 1952 CBLT-TV of Toronto paid \$7500 to televise the Grey Cup game live in the first ever broadcast of the Grey Cup. The first television contract for Canadian football was signed in 1954 when the Big Four received a total of \$350,000 from the CBC and NBC (American) networks for the rights to televise their league games.(81) Because the Grey Cup was becoming a Canadian symbol of national unity there was growing pressure for national coverage of the game. In 1957 the first Grey Cup game was televised coast to coast with the CBC making technical arrangements with U.S. television and cable companies to carry the game through American transmission cables in order to get the broadcast signal to the Canadian Atlantic and Pacific coasts. A total of thirty one stations carried the game live across Canada.(82)

In 1961, the new, privately owned Canadian Television network became a competitor to the monopoly on CFL television rights that the CBC had developed through the 1950s. By 1962 they successfully bid for the rights to both the Eastern and the



Western Conference league games. John Bassett's CFTO-TV station in Toronto, the flagship of the nine station CTV network, caused a national furor when it outbid the CBC for the 1962 Grey Cup telecast rights. CFTO signed a number of sponsors and the telecast appeared to be extremely profitable for them but their low number of stations meant that the Grey Cup, as a national institution, would not be seen by five million other Canadian viewers out of CTV's range across Canada. To alleviate the problem, CTV offered to let the CBC carry the signal free of charge. However, the CBC, suspecting that it had been used to help sell the sponsor's rights, declined while outlining a counter offer of a re-telecast without the CTV commercials.

Public opinion was divided on the issue of private versus public television. CTV's Pierre Berton declared: "I've never been prouder of the CBC" while CFCN's Chairman Gordon Love (of the CTV affiliate in Calgary) stated that the controversy showed the CBC was a "monster riddled with communist-type thinking." (83) Eventually, the CBC agreed to carry the broadcast signal but the competition for the national game exhibited the profit potential of the league and the increasing economic power of television within professional sport.

The Grey Cup telecast was also a success in the United States where ABC broadcast it on its Wide World of Sports program. As well, the popularity of the televised football games gained an added boost later in the 1960's when, as the Canadian content broadcasting regulations were introduced, the

availability of already cheaply produced football games helped the networks fulfill the content regulations at lower cost than if they had to produce complete shows from scratch.

At that point, the dominant commercialized model of Canadian football was virtually complete. Included in its history have been many of the issues and events which were signposts of the Americanization of the sport. It was the sport of football rather than hockey which most influenced the direction of the Canadian university athletic system by, on the one hand, following the lead of the universities in the initial commercial development of the sport and, later, on the other hand, providing a commercialized and professionalized role model for the universities to emulate.

The history of the development of the Canadian Football League can be presented as the institutionalization of a sport influenced by the dominant economic themes of the 20th century. The search for new sources of profit in the developing post-World War II consumer culture took hold of football despite the game's longstanding 'amateur' traditions and acted to influence its development as a spectator sport. Just as hockey, decades earlier, had become commodified and cartelized, so too did football gradually enter the world of corporate capitalism. However, football's powerful amateur tradition and the regional conflicts between eastern and western football acted to reduce the potential for capital accumulation with the result that the sport's "progress" towards assuming a commercial model occurred

at a much slower pace than occurred in hockey. In this respect, hockey's lack of competition for capital accumulation in the northeastern United States enabled it to become the dominant commercialized sport in Canada.

### Hockey, Football and Dependency: An Overview

The institutionalization and economic development of Canadian sport occurred in tandem with the rise of the United States to replace Britain as the economic metropole for Canada. The Americanization of the Canadian economy during the 20th century led to an increasing American influence in all aspects of Canadian society. In this chapter I have argued that the commercialization of Canadian sport was greatly influenced (although not fully determined) by the precedents set within cultural institutions south of the border.

In hockey, commercialization occurred with little opposition and its subsumption to American capital during the 1920's reflected the economic power of the American metropolis. Harnessed to the American economy, the NHL proceeded to enact policies that would enable it to dominate and control the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association in its quest for a reliable talent feeder system.

The story in football was different. Unable to expand into the United States as the NHL had done, Canadian professional football imported coaches, players, techniques, tactics and rules from American football in order to develop the game in a more

marketable fashion. Gradually, the game evolved to become roughly similar to American football. The primary aim of this evolutionary process was to harness the spectator appeal of the American game to the growth of Canadian consumer culture. While American capital did not play a central role in the development of the CFL, the process of Americanization occurred through the use of American rules and tactics imported to Canada by surplus American coaches, players and managers.

To sum up, the evidence suggests that the process of Canadian dependence upon American sport can be exhibited in a multitude of ways given the cultural, economic, and institutional history of the sport. In hockey, the players, coaches and general managers have been Canadian but the capital is American and control occurs within an American business setting. In short, the Canadians have adapted their hockey culture to the American setting within which the sport must market itself. But in football, the capital and cultural context has been Canadian but the American managers, coaches and players constantly have adapted the game to fit the dominant American football culture from which they came. In both cases, Canadians have witnessed a common homogenizing tendency towards enhancing the commodified nature of the sport, its overall rationalization, and its incorporation into the worlds of mass marketing and mass entertainment. In Canada, this has led naturally to dependence upon American capital and markets and upon cultural styles generated in the American sport and entertainment industries.

Sports in Canadian universities have not been immune from these kinds of pressures. But, as upper class institutions supported by infusions of government capital, Canadian universities have not been fully susceptible to the emerging commercial pressures in sport. However, the close proximity of the professionalized American university sports programs combined with the rationalizing tendencies in Canadian sport led generally to a process of commercialization within the university athletic system. It is in order to gain an idea of the historical background of the Simon Fraser University decision to implement an American style university athletic program that we now turn to an outline of the historical differences between the development of the Canadian and American university athletic systems.

## Notes

1. For an account of the history of games and sports in Canada see Howell and Howell, Sports and Games in Canadian Life, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969).
2. Richard S. Gruneau, Class, Sports, and Social Development, (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).
3. See John Mallea, "The Victorian Sporting Legacy," McGill Journal of Education (10:2) 1975; Richard S. Gruneau, "Sport, Social Differentiation and Social Inequality," in Sport and Social Order, edited by D. Ball and J.W. Loy, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975; and S.F. Wise, "Sport and Class Values in Old Ontario and Quebec" in His Own Man: Essays in Honour of A.R.M. Lower edited by W.H. Heick and R. Graham, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1974).
4. Gruneau, 1975, 1983.
5. Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players, (New York: New York University Press, 1979) p.176-182.
6. Gruneau, Class, Sports, and Social Development, p. 108.
7. Dunning and Sheard, p. 176-82.
8. Gruneau, p. 109.
9. Ibid., p. 109. For an excellent discussion on the British cultural impact on the development of Canadian sport see John Mallea, "The Victorian Sporting Legacy," McGill Journal of Education (10:2) 1975:p. 184-96.
10. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) p. 278-279 as quoted by Bruce Kidd, The Political Economy of Sport (Ottawa: Canadian Association of Health, Physical Education and Recreation Sociology of Sport Series, 1979) p. 30-31.
11. Kidd, Political Economy of Sport, p.30-31.
12. Ibid., p. 31. Kidd notes that 'something like \$100,000' was wagered on the outcome of a rowing race between Ned Hanlon and Charles Courtney on the Potomac River in 1880.
13. Also worth noting in any examination of the central relationship of sport in the political economy of capitalism must the symbolic value of sport as an area of life where the rising meritocratic values of liberal democratic life could reinforce the adoption of those values by the various social classes and

the immigrants arriving constantly into Canada.

14. For an informative account of the early days of hockey see Bruce Kidd and John Macfarlane, The Death of Hockey (Toronto: new press, 1972).

15. Ibid., p. 102-113.

16. Gruneau, Class, Sports, and Social Development. p.119.

17. Ibid., p. 119.

18. Howell and Howell, p. 206.

19. Kidd and Macfarlane, p.103.

20. Ibid., p. 107.

21. Ibid., p. 108.

22. Brian McFarlane, 50 Years of Hockey, A History of the National Hockey League. As cited by Kidd and Macfarlane p. 99-100.

23. There are five economic conditions which must be realized if professional sport is to become a viable business. These are:

#### Cartelization

As Noll (Governments and the Sports Business) and Jones ("The Economics of the National Hockey League") note cartelization is a process whereby the individual team owners realize that the basic unit of operating profit is the league not the team. To maximize team profits, entrepreneurs must first maximize joint profits within the league.

Cartelization developed because before two teams compete on the field they must agree, off the field, on the conditions of competition. Revenues can be enhanced if competitors can agree to work together to develop and maximize the necessary conditions for profitable exchange. The example of leaving Eddie Livingstone and his Toronto team out of the newly formed National Hockey League is one that demonstrates the advantages of a cartel: it enables the members to coordinate their efforts for the common good of the group.

#### Monopoly

Many different factors affect the profitability of a commercial sports team but none more so than the presence or absence of competition. Monopoly is the total lack of competition within a particular market and means that a team can charge as much as possible for as many seats as it can sell. Monopoly also:

causes revenues from national broadcasting rights to be

divided among fewer teams; allows the market price of both existing and expansion franchises to be higher; preserves a few potentially lucrative franchise sites so that an existing team that begins to fail financially has an attractive alternative site; and, because of the threat of moving, gives a team additional bargaining power when negotiating stadium agreements or local broadcasting rights.(24)

Commercial sports teams and leagues want to monopolize their market niches for the same reason as do all businesses: the arbitrary setting of prices due to lack of competition results in windfall profits.

#### Monopsony

As a monopoly purchaser of labour, a monopsonistic sports league creates an agreement within its cartel to drive down salaries (its largest expense) and determine working conditions unilaterally. The advantages of being in a monopsonistic position can be seen in the following excerpt from Bruce Kidd:

When the NHA challenged the Canadian Hockey Association in 1909, it paid \$5,250 for a single player (Cyclone Taylor) and average player salaries jumped to \$1500. When the CHA folded a year later, the NHA successfully limited total salaries to \$5,000 per club and average salaries fell to \$500.(25)

As the single labour buyer, the sports league will attempt to control entry, playing and exit conditions for all players in such a way as to maintain profit levels at their highest possible level.

#### Media Dependence

When commercial sports leagues developed their characteristic emphasis on profitability they were forced into having to market their particular product. In order to do this these leagues developed a close association with the media. As an artificial entity created for the purpose of marketing a particular product, the commercial sports league requires constant support and attention from the media and two important points are worth noting. First, support for the sports leagues by the media should not be surprising for, as Clements notes:

The economic and media elites are simply two sides of the same upper class; between them they hold two of the key sources of power in Canadian society.(26)

Secondly, this media support has the effect of presenting the developing sports league as the essence of modern sport thus enabling it to establish a strong position in the marketplace while allowing the league time to upgrade and develop its



product.

### Public Subsidy

Public subsidies are an integral part of the success of all commercial sport. From the provision of facilities built with public moneys to athletes produced by the state supported educational systems at universities, colleges and high schools and to the enforcement of monopoly through the system of law, the cash flow of commercial sports leagues are augmented by the public. These subsidies are generally regressive as Okner notes:

In general, the benefits from publicly owned sports facilities probably accrue disproportionately to the moderate-income or well-to-do citizens in the community at the expense of the poor.(27)

Noll argues that "it is reasonable to conclude that many teams are financially viable only because of the subsidies they receive."(28) Baseball is an interesting example of a professional sport where a special exemption from the United States anti-trust laws granted by Congress helps to maintain its profitability (or reduce its losses). Canada's Combines Investigation Act is considered too weak to have any effect in controlling the activities of monopolizing sports leagues.

The framework for this discussion has been taken from Kidd, The Political Economy of Sport, p.40-44.

24. Roger G. Noll, "Alternatives in Sports Policy" in Governments and the Sports Business, Ed. Roger G. Noll, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974) p.412.

25. Kidd, The Political Economy of Sport, p.42.

26. Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite, p.325.

27. Benjamin A. Okner "Subsides of Stadiums and Arenas" in Governments and the Sports Business, p.347.

28. Roger G. Noll "Alternatives in Sports Policy" in Governments and the Sports Business, p.413.

29. J.C.H. Jones, "The Economics of the National Hockey League" in Canadian Journal of Economics, February 1969. See also J.C.H. Jones "The Economics of the NHL Revisited: A postscript on Structural Change, Behavior and Government Policy" in Richard S. Gruneau and John G. Albinson ed. Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspectives (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Canada, 1976).

30. See the argument presented by Richard S. Gruneau in Class,

Sports, and Social Development, p. 118-120.

31. Kidd and Macfarlane, The Death of Hockey, p.109.

32. Ibid., p.110.

33. Ibid., p.111.

34. Ibid., p.116.

35. Ibid., p.104-105.

36. Ibid., p.119.

37. Ibid., p. 118.

38. For an interesting anecdotal account of the politics of hockey sportswriting see 'The Cheerleaders' in The Death of Hockey, p. 133-160.

39. See note 105 in Class, Sports, and Social Development, p. 188.

40. In the rest of this chapter the term football will refer to Canadian football as it is presently played and to all its precursor forms leading back to its separation from rugby during the 19th century; the term rugby will refer to the British and landed game in Canada from which football made its split; and American football will refer to the American variety of football.

41. The history of the evolution of Canadian football is, in large, part a reflection of the history of regional conflict throughout Canada.

42. Howell and Howell, p.75.

43. Frank Cosentino, Canadian Football, (Toronto: The Musson Book Company, 1969) p. 13-14.

44. Ibid., p. 16.

45. R.J. Moriarty, The Organizational History of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union Central (CIAUC) 1906-1955, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University 1971, p. 42.

46. Cosentino, p. 17.

47. Ibid., p.19.

48. Ottawa Journal, 21 October 1909 as quoted by Cosentino p.

27.

49. Toronto Globe, 30 November 1909 as quoted by Cosentino p. 28

50. Toronto Globe, 19 November 1912 as quoted by Cosentino p. 38.

51. A definition of rationalization by Max Weber is "the process by which explicit, abstract, intellectually calculable procedures are increasingly substituted for sentiment, tradition, and rule of thumb in all spheres of activity: it leads to the displacement of religion by specialized science as the major source of intellectual authority; the substitution of the trained expert for the cultivated man of letters; the ousting of the skilled handworker by machine technology; the replacement of traditional judicial wisdom by abstract, systematic statutory codes. It demystifies and instrumentalizes life, implying that in principle one can master all things by calculations."

52. Cosentino, p. 41.

53. Toronto Globe, 30 October 1920 as quoted by Cosentino p. 44.

54. Toronto Globe, 17 November 1919 as quoted by Cosentino p. 44.

55. Cosentino, p. 48.

56. Cosentino, p. 49,50.

57. Toronto Globe, 23 October 1922 as quoted by Cosentino p. 55.

58. Toronto Globe, 7 November 1923 as quoted by Cosentino p. 61-62.

59. Bruce Inksetter personal letter to Frank Cosentino 12 December 1968 as quoted by Cosentino p. 45.

60. Cosentino, p. 94.

61. Cosentino, p. 94.

62. Cosentino, p. 94.

63. Hamilton Herald, 3 November 1931 as quoted by Cosentino p. 95.

64. Winnipeg Free Press, 9 November 1932 as quoted by

Cosentino p. 97.

65. Winnipeg Free Press, 10 December 1932 as quoted by Cosentino p. 98.

66. Toronto Globe, 7 September 1933 as quoted by Cosentino p. 99.

67. Statement by Joe Ryan in personal interview with Frank Cosentino April 1, 1968 as quoted by Cosentino p. 102.

68. Winnipeg Free Press, 4 December 1935 as quoted by Cosentino p. 107.

69. Minutes of the 1936 Western Canadian Rugby Union Annual General Meeting as quoted by Cosentino p. 111.

70. Cosentino p. 112.

71. Cosentino p. 128.

72. Maclean's, 15 September 1949 as quoted by Cosentino p. 135.

73. Cosentino p.133, 139-140.

74. Cosentino Chapter 6 "Post-War Professionalism 1945-1968".

75. See article in the Toronto Globe and Mail (8 September 1947) advising the Toronto Argonauts to openly acknowledge the fact that they were operating a professional football team as quoted by Cosentino p. 130.

76. Andy O'Brien, "Football Financing" Canadian Business November 1948 as quoted by Cosentino p. 134-135.

77. "Those Rugby Ruinations" Saturday Night 16 May 1950 as quoted by Cosentino p. 138.

78. Minutes of Canadian Rugby Union Annual General Meeting 1953 as quoted by Cosentino p. 147.

79. J. Gaudaur and J. Kieran "Is this Answer to Big Four Muddle?" Financial Post 5 November 1955 p. 21.

80. Cosentino p. 154.

81. Ibid., p.150.

82. Ibid., p.159.

83. Time Magazine 30 Nov. 1962 as quoted by Cosentino p.174.

## CHAPTER 4

### A COMPARISON BETWEEN AMERICAN AND CANADIAN UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS

Any attempt to present a comparison between the American and Canadian university athletic systems would necessarily require elaboration of philosophical and historical differences detailing not only the situation of athletics within the universities but also the changing place of the universities within the historical setting of the two societies in general. Such a detailed comparison is beyond the scope of the project at hand. However this chapter will present a brief overview of some of the key themes that have acted throughout the history of both nations to lead to a differentiation of the development patterns of the two national university athletic systems. In the American case, the evidence appears to suggest that a model of high-level commercialized athletics became entrenched throughout the major universities before an all-encompassing philosophy concerning the place of intercollegiate athletics within the American university setting could be fully articulated. In the United States, as the dynamic centre of a capitalist process that gradually extended its influence into most aspects of society--a process which reinforced the rising meritocratic values that today provide a galvanizing symbol for American culture--there were few factors to affect the commodification of university sport during the late nineteenth century.

For Canada, as a dependent nation whose development was influenced first by Great Britain and later by the United States, the development of university athletics occurred during an era when the cultural values and mores of the British upper class model of the gentleman amateur held the dominant position in national sporting activities. The development of Canadian university athletics occurred within an upper class milieu that idealized the British concept of the gentleman-amateur as the dominant sport form in society. Essentially conservative in nature, that philosophy re-affirmed the 'nobility of play' and acted to maintain its separateness from the dynamic commercial sphere of life.(1) Its entrenchment in the Canadian universities (primarily upper class institutions all) delayed the professionalization of university sport until such time as the faculty and staff within the universities could better perceive the benefits and detriments of the more commercialized American system. Faculty and staff in Canadian universities articulated a philosophy of university athletics that would be consistent with the role that the dominating British culture assigned to universities in 19th century Canadian society.

Since that time, however, the growing dominance of American economic and cultural institutions over Canada during the twentieth century has been reflected in a gradual disintegration of British-oriented cultural institutions and values in all walks of life. In university athletics, this process can be seen in the gradual acceptance of key elements of the American university

athletic system as models for the Canadian universities to emulate. It is to a provision of an outline of the basic similarities and differences between the two systems that we now turn with the intent of gaining a better understanding of the historical context within which the Simon Fraser University decision makers found themselves in the middle 1960's.

### American University Athletics

The rise of athletics at the American universities did not precede that of Canadian university athletics by very many years. But it is clear from the available evidence that in the United States an intensification of interest in collegiate athletics occurred very rapidly in the years leading up to 1870.(2) In that year the first American collegiate football game was played between Rutgers and Princeton. Competition in soccer, baseball, and rowing soon followed with the formation of the Rowing Association of American Colleges that same year. However, the spirit of competition between the universities was soon marred by an outbreak of poor sportsmanship between the competitors and the spectators at the games.(3) Concerning this historical period, in 1929, The Carnegie Report on American Collegiate Athletics noted:

The long standing rivalry between Harvard and Yale disrupted the membership of the Association. Feelings ran high and contests among the spectators were not infrequently more bitter than those between the crews...Thus the conditions engendered and fostered by intercollegiate competition led to the formation of associations to that end and that teams and crews might meet each

other in athletic competition on a uniform and accepted basis. At the same time, the rivalries which grew out of one such association in the course of years proved to be its undoing, for partisanship replaced sportmanship, and organization broke under the stress of rivalry.(4)

Harvard and Yale later withdrew from the Association in 1876.

Prior to the 1880's, the sporting traditions of the American universities loosely resembled the practices of universities in England. In the United States, volunteer coaches were the norm with the administrative controllers being, in the main, student managers. Absent were the conspicuous training tables and other signs of professionalized sport that would appear on university campuses within a very few years. While the university faculty and administrations did, on occasion, exert their power to influence the direction and development of university sport (in 1871, for instance, the Harvard and Yale faculties banned soccer matches), generally, it seems that they had little foresight of the commodification of athletics that was about to occur. As The Carnegie Report noted, these groups suffered "a general lack of comprehension respecting the implications of college sport and a complete failure to foresee the development that it was destined to undergo."(5)

After 1880, the attention paid to sports increased dramatically at many universities. Athletic programs at universities throughout the United States went through a period of expansion that led to large athletic budgets and increased complexity for the student managers. The production of commercial athletic programs involved a process of



rationalization that acted to revolutionize the sports offerings. Volunteer coaches became professional as the demand for winning teams increased, while the growing complexity of the programs led to the replacement of the student managers of athletics with full-time athletic directors. The college alumni became involved financially--this was very important for the young universities' struggle with financial problems during a period of expansion and growth--and attempted to gain influence in the athletic activities of the school.(6)

Observers agree that most alumni involved in the athletic programs were responding to a sense of loyalty to their alma mater. They were also attracted by the influential power and social prominence gained by being involved with a successful university athletic program. As well, the concept of service to youth was important for some while other rationales supported the moral, physical, and educational benefits to be gained by students from participation in campus sports.(7) But the intense alumni interest combined with a faculty attitude of hands off, 'study of the lamp, rather than with the affairs of college life', led to the assumption of graduate control of university athletics with little opposition from the administration or faculty. The increased complexity of a highly rationalized athletic program reduced the scope of student control of the situation; with faculty interest in the program almost non-existent, there was little concerted opposition to the alumni gaining control.(8) Thus, the transition of control from the

students to the alumni passed very quickly as the Carnegie Report concluded almost 40 years later:

In consequence, there was scarcely a struggle for the control of college athletics: the alumni, or such of them as concerned themselves actively with the matter, achieved dominion almost by default. (9)

At a time featuring great debate about the mission of American universities, it seems ironic that university sports programs were not shielded from the effects of commercialization.(10) However, at the turn of the century laissez faire capitalism was at its height in the United States, and the amateur tradition was not nearly as powerful as it was in neighbouring Canada. In this context, the marketing and public relations potential of university sports teams proved irresistible to alumni entrepreneurs. Lack of faculty leadership in controlling the development of a professionalized model of athletics led to an uncontrolled commodification of university sports initially under the management of the students and later under the influence of the alumni.

Of crucial importance, during an expansionary period of academic development the universities had a heavy reliance on capital infusions from alumni and community boosters. Curbing the professionalization and success of the athletic program could have led to a corresponding drop in alumni support for athletics specifically,(11) and the university in general. Ultimately, administration efforts to recruit a nationally recognized faculty

and develop prestigious academic programs could be affected quite severely. Clearly, the public relations value of a successful athletic program was perceived by many American university administrators during the late nineteenth century. In turn, the commercial basis of those benefits also acted to reinforce the commodification of university athletics and possibly played a role in preventing any concerted opposition to the commercial approach.(12)

Some evidence of the problems in the American university sports programs first became apparent during the 1880's when publicized reports of rampant recruiting of 'tramp' athletes and 'ringers' for the high profile college football teams became public.(13) Football uniforms easily concealed imposters who were recruited strictly for the purpose of winning games and increasing gate receipts. As an offshoot of the desire to win and financial need to have large gate receipts, the value of talented athletes to the team's success rose and the issue of paying players to play for the university came to the fore. The practice of subsidizing college athletes became widespread and gradually extended down the talent feeder system to the high schools where historical reports note that high school senior athletes 'shopped around' for the best bid from a university.(14) Also, of central importance to the universities' scholarly reputations, athletes who had no academic qualifications were entered into university ostensibly to play sports and, among other tactics, received complimentary tickets as payment.

Coaches were pressured to make winning the number one priority for their teams and this, in turn, led to greater pressure on the athletes to develop their skills within the program.(15)

As a result of this professionalization, team practices became more frequent and longer and led to reductions in the amount of time available in the students' timetable for their academic work. The scouting of opponents, long considered an unsportsmanlike practice, became accepted as the rationalizing process overturned many traditions that were becoming outmoded in the face of the rising instrumental values of American culture.(16) The professionalism of athletes also became more overt throughout university athletics as athletes accepted jobs or under-the-table payments from alumni to attend their university and play for its sports teams. It is also clear that the pressures to win led to an increasing brutalization of football with deaths and many injuries occurring every season. In summary, the evidence is clear that the social problems in existence in American university athletics in the late twentieth century were largely in place by the end of the nineteenth century. In effect, the commercialization and consolidation of the dominant model of American college athletics was virtually complete before university administrations were able to control the situation.

Harvard University's President Eliot described the entire issue when he wrote in his 1892-93 annual report of the disadvantages of the 'wanton exaggeration' of the university

athletic sports programs. The Carnegie Report also provided comment on the issue from a historical perspective:

The accusations against athletics current in the last decade of the century might easily have served as a sourcebook for their later opponents. They included charges of over-exaggeration, demoralization of the college and of academic work, dishonesty, betting and gambling, professionalism, recruiting and subsidization, the employment and payment of the wrong kind of men as coaches, the evil effects of college athletics upon [high] school athletics, the roughness and brutality of football, extravagant expenditures of money, and the general corruption of youth by the monster of athleticism.(17)

The anarchy of American university athletics at the turn of the century was apparent in the football crisis of 1905 when observers noted alarming increases in the numbers of injuries and deaths at games during the fall season. After evidence appeared to suggest that the universities were unable to effectively police the sport, many institutions dropped the game and the possibility loomed of a nationwide banning of the sport. Only intervention by American President Theodore Roosevelt led to the necessary reforms in the sport's technical structure being made and the college game "saved".(18)

One development of the crisis was the notion that university faculties had to take greater control of athletics. This proposal was reformulated and institutionalized in the university system and led directly to the formation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910. It was this organization that had as its broad mandate to exert greater control over the development of American university athletics.

In retrospect, however, the organization of control established by the early NCAA appears to have been too little, too late. University athletic programs were already deeply embedded in the web of commercializing forces that were present in American society.

With regard to the adoption of the British concept of the amateur athlete as the dominant sport form within the American universities, it appears that the traditional cultural underpinnings of the British amateur model were simply modified and incorporated into dynamic meritocratic principles that were so central in the development of American society. The dominance of liberalism within the United States combined with a:

legalistic, rationalizing attitude of mind ... contributed to evasions of the convention. There can be little doubt that the multiplicity of rules against professionalism has bred in many athletes, present and past, a strong predilection to satisfy the letter of the amateur rule while knowing full well that even in the act of satisfaction they were contravening its spirit.(19)

Yet, it is important to note, however, that despite the evidence suggesting that the American athletic programs were heavily commercialized, their development at that time was still, according to the standards of later eras, quite crude and unrefined. The area of recruitment, for instance, before 1917 was still largely defined by the efforts of the undergraduate manager or the athletes themselves. It was not until the immediate post-World War I era that recruiting and subsidization

was taken out of the hands of the students and the idea of developing a rationalized, efficient talent feeder system utilizing coaches, alumni and athletic directors became widespread throughout the American university system.

Following this period, the development of a commodified model of university athletics in the United States was virtually complete, save its ongoing refinement and extension as new techniques, concepts and sports were discovered and developed. In the United States, the early extension of the capitalist market into the sporting sphere in search of new profit opportunities faced little opposition in the universities and the interweaving of the athletic programs with the market process continued throughout the twentieth century. From the studies surveyed there appears to be little doubt that the forty years between 1870 and 1910 were seminal in the formation of a commercially oriented model of athletics at most of the major American universities.

#### Canadian University Athletics

Canadian university sports also have their origins in the 19th century when, as the number of students increased at the central Canadian universities (the University of Toronto, Queen's University and McGill University), many of the athletically gifted began to participate in sports activities. There are reports of track and field competitions in the early 1800's while there are records of athletic activities at Queen's, Toronto, and

Montreal in the 1850's and 1860's.(20) Rugby was being played at Dalhousie in 1860 and it was McGill which introduced the Canadian variety of rugby to the United States in May 1874 when they played two games against Harvard at Cambridge, Massachusetts.(21) As a result of this and other international competitions, some changes were instituted in the rules of rugby which were adopted throughout Canada. In this sense, Canadian university teams played a key role in the cultural diffusion of the game. Due to their leadership in rule making and game innovations, the university teams became very successful in the newly formed Canadian Rugby Union in 1892 and won six championships in a row before seceding in 1898.(22)

It is said that a group of McGill students also developed and publicized the first set of rules for hockey and it was in the form of an upper class amateur sport that it initially spread rapidly throughout Canada. Moriarty argues that the new sport of hockey was a significant contributing force in the development of Canadian university athletics.(23) During the early period, as bastions for the middle and upper class sporting ethic, the universities and their students played key roles in the organization of Canadian amateur leagues in a variety of sports and were also closely involved in international competition.

It is in this fashion that Canadian university athletics evolved as a result of student initiative during the late 1800's. It was only when the issue arose of questionable practices in the area of recruiting athletes, combined with rising popularity of



Canadian football, that the faculties of the Canadian schools became involved with and assumed control of the athletic programs. It appears that a tradition of faculty influence in athletics at the British universities and public schools played an important role in influencing Canadian university staff to become closely involved in the control of the university representative sports teams.(24) Moriarty outlined the process of transfer of control in the Canadian universities:

The gradual transfer of sports jurisdiction from student clubs to the student-faculty athletic association was typical....It was a gradual process which saw a predominantly student controlled committee exercising loose control over the sports clubs on campus, give way by the turn of the century to a joint student-faculty athletic committee exercising tight control over all campus athletic activity.(25)

Further attempts at extending administrative control over university athletics in Canada on an inter-university basis led to the formation of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union in central Canada (1906), the Maritime Intercollegiate Athletic Union (1910), and the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union (1920) in the early part of the twentieth century. Separate and independent organizations, these unions were primarily regional in focus and served to outline the underdeveloped state of Canadian university sports relations in a regionalized nation. A truly national organization was not to be formed until the re-organization of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union in 1961.(26)

Football has always been the most important sport in Canadian universities, as has been the case in the United States, and developments south of the border were observed with great interest by Canadian university athletic policy makers.(27) The American university football crisis of 1905 was given considerable coverage in the Canadian press. One representative of McGill actually attended the December, 1905 conference in New York which led to the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Conference (later to be renamed as the National Collegiate Athletic Association).(28) On the field, competition with the American schools initially provided an important opportunity for the discussion of rule changes. For example, the Michigan-Harvard "open play system" became very popular with the Canadian universities and is considered to have been an integral factor separating the Canadian game from English rugby. The decision of Canadians not to implement the American forward pass until the 1930's was also crucial to the development of a uniquely Canadian game. Even during the early years of the twentieth century many Canadians were already well aware of the impact of their geographic proximity to the United States on the evolution of their sports. Moriarty notes the comments of some early football players:

many football players deplored what they called "Americanization of rugby by the introduction of new rules and plays." One who may have been prophetic went so far as to predict that these changes in the game's character would "unhappily tend to professionalism rather than sport."(29)

Indeed, as the popularity of the Canadian game rose, it became more commercialized and presented problems for the amateur tradition of university athletics.

Revenues from football games were important to the universities. Funds were needed to support their non-revenue athletic programs and, to maximize revenues, large stadiums were constructed at several universities.(30) Molson Stadium was built at McGill University in 1919 (capacity 20,000), Richardson Stadium at Queen's in 1921 (capacity 10,000), Little Stadium at Western Ontario in London in 1929 (capacity 6,000) and Varsity Stadium in Toronto was expanded to 20,000 seats in 1930. Later, Varsity would reach 27,000 seats and become the site of some of the most important professional and university playoff games in Canadian football.

The revenue from playing host to lucrative football games every fall became a steady source of income that the three major central Canadian university athletic programs came to budget for and expect. With the proceeds from the games, stadiums were maintained, coaches and support staff salaries paid and other sports budgets augmented. The gradual expansion of university sports programs over the first few decades of the twentieth century led to the development of Big Three football (and later Big Four--Queen's, McGill, Toronto and, in 1928, Western Ontario) as an intercollegiate football monopoly which financially conservative athletic business managers and faculty advisors could ill afford to upset.(31) The overriding organizational

imperative of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union during this era appears from the evidence to have been chiefly to maintain the control of the Big Three "active" members (Toronto, Queen's, and McGill) in the all-powerful Board of Reference. It was the Board of Reference which exercised autocratic control over the affairs of the revenue generating intercollegiate football league and the interests of the "associate" members (the rest of the smaller universities and colleges).(32) Their policies consolidated and reinforced the flow of football profits to the intercollegiate football powers and augmented their control in the organizational structure of the CIAU.(33) It was also the cornerstone for future regional conflicts over power, status and finances within Canadian university athletics.

The 'have-nots' among the central Canadian universities were very interested in joining the 'haves', especially in football as the memoirs of Sherwood Fox, who assumed the Presidency of the University of Western Ontario in 1928, explain:

By their football fruits ye shall know them; seems to sum up the common thinking of the fans...As far as the general public was concerned...only those universities that had teams competing in the senior intercollegiate league were known even to exist...Probably the most expeditious way for Western to make herself widely known was to put forth a great deal of effort to advance her football team as soon as possible from the unknown and unglamorous intermediate collegiate ranks to the senior ranks...In the autumn of 1928, Western won the championship of the Intermediate Intercollegiate series. The time was ripe for action. Application for admission to the senior series was made without delay...it was accepted, the four teams rendering much easier the preparation of a season's schedule of games.(34)

Western Ontario's membership increased the size of the Big Three

to a more adaptable four team league. Later, in 1948, the London university also became the fourth member of the Board of Reference.(35)

Also included among the have-nots wishing to gain entry to the inner circle of Canadian university athletics were the regional universities located on the periphery of Canadian university sport.(36) The members of the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union made several attempts to join the CIAU during the years 1920 to 1955 but all of these efforts were rebuffed. The first attempt to extend the CIAU outside of central Canada occurred in 1921 when the University of Manitoba asked for membership in the track and field playing union. The idea of including all universities throughout Canada in the CIAU led to discussion at the CIAU annual general meeting that year but the membership agreed that the move would not be successful in view of the problems of geography.(37)

In 1928, the National Federation of Canadian University Students became active in the issue and suggested the formation of a cross-Canada intercollegiate union embracing the east and west as either branches or divisions.(38) Once again there was considerable support for the idea within the CIAU but in the end the proposal did not gain enough support and was rejected. In 1931, the CIAU received a letter from the University of Saskatchewan asking it to support the university's bid to bypass the provincial basketball club championships in favour of joining in with the national intercollegiate playoff structure. The CIAU

supported this request in a letter to the Canadian Amateur Basketball Association but wrote the secretary of the WCIAU pointing out that such a playoff setup would mean that "the east could never enter the Canadian play downs on account of the time at which they were held." (39) On these occasions, the CIAU showed little official interest in forming a truly national association that would encompass universities from both the western and eastern regions. As Moriarty notes, "This was curious in an era marked by so much openness and involvement in national and international athletics." (40) But, in view of the intra-regional rivalries in central Canadian university sports and the economic foundations of intercollegiate football, the CIAU had little reason to chance a potential upset of the status quo by including universities from outside central Canada.

It appears from the evidence that the internal issues of power and control dominated CIAU meetings to such an extent that external concerns such as forming a truly national union were of secondary importance. Chief among these internal issues in the eastern Canadian university system were the problems associated with athletic subsidization, the recruiting of athletes, and the commercialization of university football. While adherence to amateurism was espoused for public consumption, evidence suggests that the leading central Canadian universities were innovators in the importation of American-style recruiting and subsidization practices for Canadian university football. (41) For example, the importing of American football people (Frank Shaughnessy at

McGill, George Awrey at Queen's, and Warren Stevens at Toronto) to direct their athletic programs appears to have been a product of the need to ensure large revenues from gate receipts through the focus of a winning football program. Winning teams, of course, required talented players who, as it was often alleged by many observers, were recruited and subsidized to play at the major central Canadian universities. As Bill Orban, the athletic director at Loyola College has noted:

In terms of amateurism it was somewhat hypocritical, for everyone knew that there was help for athletes at Queen's, McGill and Western Ontario...If the CIAU was amateur, it was in everything except football.(42)

On the same point, J. Kirkpatrick of McGill has suggested that:

Everyone suspected everybody else of subsidizing athletes and proclaimed his own innocence. I am sure that a certain amount of subsidization of athletes was practiced in football in the major universities from funds outside the control of the universities.(43)

In addition to this issue, the larger Canadian universities faced potential recruiting competition for the best Canadian athletes from American universities which had already institutionalized their policies of providing financial compensation to university athletes through athletic scholarships and other means. Given the possibility of such competition for the best skilled athletes, it was inevitable that the Canadian universities would have to compete financially with American recruiters for some of the best central Canadian athletes.

Yet, in Canada, the official policy of the CIAU and its constituents was to oppose the granting of any athletic scholarship, a policy that was formally endorsed by the member universities' presidents in 1947.(44) A key theme in this argument was that American style scholarships specifically for athletic achievement were out of order. However, few administrators saw any problems with scholastically gifted athletes receiving academic awards or bursaries based along the lines of the Rhodes Scholarships. Interestingly, the Rhodes Scholarships are considered to be a crucial precedent in the legitimation of the use of athletic scholarships at many U.S. universities.(45)

However, the pressure to succeed in university athletics on both sides of the border was great and some of the athletic directors, led by the commercialized example set by their sister American colleges and universities, saw little reason not to promote their attempts to award athletic scholarships to their athletes. As the comments of former McGill University athletic director Vic Obeck to Moriarty suggest, the support in the community for such policies was evident in the active interest of the McGill alumni during the 1950's:

We started with the premise that there was no such thing as an athletic scholarship but the question of how many meals per day would come up. Then, of course, I had a group of former McGill athletes, interested McGill alumni who were concerned because we weren't getting football boys since football is nothing in Quebec. They gave some money and said, 'go get some boys.' I pointed out that the rules were against it, but I said, 'let me think about it.' Eventually, we set up the Martlett Fund whereby



a boy could borrow funds to go to school and pay it back after graduation without interest. There was nothing under the table.(46)

Moriarty went on to add that:

From these activities, Ted Reeve of the Toronto Star called the operation, 'Vic Obeck and his loan rangers'.(47)

Other individuals in the central Canadian universities were also promoting the idea of legitimizing financial aid to athletes. According to J.B. Kirkpatrick, McGill University's faculty athletic representative from 1948 to 1956, Orrin Carson of Queen's occasionally combined with McGill's Obeck to suggest that 'open assistance to athletes be permitted, in order to remove the practice or suspicion of under-the-table deals'. But the university presidents were opposed to the move and reportedly asked their athletic directors to stop any under-the-table aid to athletes.(48) Much of the pressure to legitimize and increase the subsidization and recruiting of athletes was a result of the commercialization of the Big Four football league and its monopoly over central Canadian university athletics. Also, alumni pressures similar to those encountered at the U.S. universities were also present.

Other commercializing pressures came from the intrusion of the broadcast media into university football as a potential source of profit for radio. In 1948, for instance, the radio rights for Big Four football were sold for \$5000 (\$4000 for the regular season and \$1000 for the playoffs). London Life was the

major sponsor and Ward Cornell, famous later for his work in televised hockey, was the commentator. By 1955 the dollar figure had risen to \$20,000 and was providing a substantial source of income to the Big Four university programs. Central Canadian university football had become a substantial business.(49)

The expectation of high and regular profits from football gate receipts had become institutionalized in the university athletic programs. The financial health of the universities' overall sports programs was dependent on the success of football at the gate. In this manner, the twin pressures of a university community's desire to win plus the financial need for success at the gate led to aggressive recruiting and subsidization tactics. It was this alleged "tradition" of the Canadian university practice of providing under-the-table financial aid to athletes that would lead in 1965 to Simon Fraser University officials promoting an 'honesty is the best policy' approach to their openly providing athletic scholarships to university athletes.

On top of these events, as the complexity of the programs' administration increased, the power of conservative faculty advisors to control the professionalizing activities of the athletic directors declined. Yet, from the available historical evidence, it appears likely that the entrenchment of powerful faculty representatives on athletic councils at Canadian universities was a conservative force in university sport. That situation, combined with a residual British tradition of close faculty involvement in the program, helped to slow considerably

the adoption of commercializing methods in the athletic departments. In British Columbia, for example, both alumni and athletic department administrators had long experienced extremely strong opposition from University of British Columbia faculty to any form of 'athletic scholarship'. This intransigence was also matched by a general lack of support for attempts to increase funding to the athletic program.

The opposition to athletic scholarships at UBC was particularly virulent. "We fought scholarships," commented one retired UBC faculty member who, as a Rhodes Scholarship winner, sprinted at Oxford during the 1920s, "I've never been paid...I was an amateur and feel very strongly about it...You're being, in a sense, bribed." (50) This feeling appears to have been widespread throughout Canadian universities. While the power and strength of the amateur tradition ebbed and flowed across provinces and from university to university, there is no question that in the early years of the post-World War II era it continued to represent a credible alternative to the more professionalized model of intercollegiate athletics in the United States.

Notwithstanding the ongoing influence of the amateur tradition in the Canadian universities, the growing complexity of athletic program management and the high visibility of successful American programs led to faculty advisors gradually being left behind in the development of athletics. In the east, the role of faculty representative seemed increasingly to be 'a watchdog of academics since some athletic directors wanted to make athletics

a business.'(51) The growing financial and organizational complexity of the athletic programs eventually led to the appointment of full-time athletic directors. Part-time faculty athletic representatives simply lacked the depth of understanding of the sport system necessary to influence decision making. Conflict between the two groups increased as full-time athletic directors and part-time faculty representatives struggled for control of the decision making process. As McGill's athletic director Vic Obeck summed up the relationship between the two groups:

The old school tie boys from Eton, Cambridge, and Oxford didn't really know competition...The athletic directors were realistic; the old school tie boys were like Brundage today, not living in the 20th century...Regarding our faculty representative, Kirkpatrick, our philosophies were miles apart. He was for exercise not competition.(52)

But Canadian faculty representatives, unlike their American counterparts a half century earlier, had developed and maintained their influence within university athletics from the very beginning and continued to augment that influence during the course of the 20th century. Many of them had participated in sports in their youth and were committed to the remnants of a Victorian sporting culture. They sought to maintain the framework of the 'nobility of play' throughout university sports programs. Nevertheless, they faced continued opposition in each university from a growing faction that supported policies emphasizing not only financial remuneration designed to attract

talented athletes to the universities but also the enhanced coaching and facilities needed to build competitive inter-university athletic programs.

In many cases these latter individuals looked to the example set by the major American university programs for guidance in advocating an increased emphasis on athletics. As events during the post-World War II era subsequently disclosed, some of the American universities did not rise to the challenge of leadership. Negative publicity from collegiate basketball gambling scandals during the 1950's greatly affected public perceptions of American university athletics both in the United States and in Canada.

One of the most important gambling scandals in question here occurred in 1951 when four NCAA university players were sent to jail.(53) A section of Judge Saul. S. Streit's concluding judgement in the case was widely publicized in the New York Times.(54) In British Columbia, the New York Times article was even distributed by UBC President Norman McKenzie to the members of the UBC Senate at its meeting of February 13, 1952. The revelations about the state of athletics at the American colleges were shocking and served as excellent material for those individuals wishing to prevent a professionalization of intercollegiate sport at UBC. These individuals found a number of sympathetic ears in the membership of the UBC Senate. Within a year, the Senate's disapproval of athletic scholarships--already noted in the 1949 minutes--was elaborated

upon and codified within the University regulations. As well, stringent eligibility rules were brought in to eliminate the possibility of academically unqualified people participating as students on the University's sports teams.(55) Later, the institution of these tough policies at the province's premier university would lead to a reaction in British Columbia when SFU's Chancellor Dr. Gordon Shrum announced in 1964 his policy of awarding athletic scholarships to the University's athletes.

On a national scale, the evidence accumulated against the American collegiate sports system served to coalesce the opinion of many Canadian university faculty against scholarships in particular and also acted to bolster their struggle with the athletic directors for control of the athletic program. Nonetheless, the impact of faculty representatives on university athletic programs continued to recede during the 1950's and 1960's.

While the problems of commercialization and subsidization have always been an important and contentious issue across the Canadian university athletic scene, the universities west of the Great Lakes were also beset by the problem of an ongoing lack of available university competition in the west. The Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union was formed in 1920 but, considering the great distances, regular competition among the membership was difficult to maintain and the conference encountered many problems in attempting to establish consistent sports relations between universities. In fact, it was not to be

until after World War II that the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union organized a regular slate of competition.(56)

The problem was simply that in one of the largest athletic conference in North America transportation costs (in terms of time spent away from school and money spent for travel) were extremely high. As an example, UBC rail journeys to the prairie provinces during the 1930s to compete against both Alberta and Saskatchewan for football's Hardy Cup often resulted in trips of ten days or more.(57) The advent of commercial air travel in the post-war era helped considerably to reduce the size of the conference to a more manageable structure and it was this technological revolution in air travel, more than any other single factor, which led to a routinization of conference schedules in western Canadian university sport. However, maintaining conference travel was still very costly and later provided an important rationale for Simon Fraser University officials to spurn an expensive western Canadian conference in favour of cheaper north-south regional travel to compete against American teams.

At the University of Alberta in Edmonton the lack of available university competition in football forced the athletic department to schedule games against a variety of prairie professional teams before the sport was finally dropped as an intercollegiate activity during the years 1949 to 1959. On the Pacific Coast, at UBC, the Thunderbirds competed against

universities and colleges south of the border in the U.S. Pacific Northwest during many of the post World War II years. It was only in 1959 that UBC decided to leave the American "Evergreen Conference" in order to establish conference football relations with the western Canadian universities. However, years of competing against American universities and colleges left their mark in British Columbia culture in the form of a residual loyalty to regional Pacific Northwest competition. There was scattered opposition towards the prospect of UBC joining the western Canadian schools in competition in a Canadian conference as this comment from a former UBC assistant football coach indicates:

In 1963, we [UBC] were thinking of going into Canadian competition. At that time we [football] were doing quite well against American schools...[we had] strictly an American schedule. The people who voted decided that we would go into the Western Canadian competition. I thought it was a horrendous mistake. (58)

For UBC, the two most important factors against joining in a rejuvenated Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Association were the travel costs and the continued perception of a lack of competition in football and, especially, in basketball.(59) Teams from British Columbia had long been powers in Canadian basketball winning many national championships. Along with the Thunderbirds, senior amateur teams like the Vancouver Cloverleafs and Victoria Dominoes were regular national champions and contributed individuals to the national team program and



administrative structure. At one point before World War II the competitive level of the western universities was so far behind UBC that former Thunderbird coach Maury Van Vliet felt that "I wouldn't be surprised if UBC basketball would beat Alberta or Saskatchewan by 50 or 60 points." (60)

Still, at UBC a continuing and powerful loyalty to the nation fostered a strong desire to defy the seemingly irresistible economic travel efficiencies available from north-south competition. Instead, the University established and increased its program of more expensive sporting relations with her sister Canadian institutions. The development of this Canadianization policy was articulated clearly in the 1958 Report of the UBC Senate Committee on Recreation, Athletics and Physical Education which supported the idea that:

the future of UBC's intercollegiate competition undoubtedly lies in the direction of the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Union...We look favourably, also, on the contention that a high standard of intercollegiate competition can be expected to assume a place of considerable importance in amateur competition in Canada. (61)

But, geographically isolated from the rest of Canada throughout the history of the institution, UBC had by necessity developed extensive (and less costly) sporting ties with American universities and colleges throughout the U.S. states of Washington, Oregon and California. The Senate Report also acknowledged the value of these continental sporting relations by recommending that their development continue in the future. (62)

Regardless of these policy pronouncements, there is little doubt that during much of the two decades after World War II UBC had a very nebulous sports competition tradition as it wavered between a regional and national sports strategy. This lack of a comprehensive western Canadian university athletic tradition would later play an important role in setting the context for Simon Fraser University's athletic policy decision makers in the middle 1960's.

The principal UBC policy of encouraging Canadian competition provides a strong indication of the overall feeling throughout the west that a cohesive western regional conference was a paramount step in the right direction: The ultimate aim was to form a national collegiate organization that would provide the western universities with, as Maury Van Vliet put it, "something to shoot at...the CIAU would never have existed if it weren't for the West. We almost had to have it...they [the Eastern schools] didn't need us but our own competition was pretty feeble." (63)

However, despite constant support and lobbying from the west, progress towards implementing the idea of a national organization proceeded slowly. Funding was a crucial concern but central to the issue were the politics that had dominated central Canadian university athletics (and had been a causal factor in the breakup of the original CIAU in 1955) and which also applied to dealings with the western and Atlantic regions. According to Van Vliet, the aloofness of the Big four football powers emphasized the fractionalized state of east-west sports

relations:

They wouldn't even think of speaking to us. They were the Big Four and that was it. If you talked to anybody in the East they didn't know anything happened west of the Lakehead. They knew that UBC had some basketball teams in the past. They wouldn't even think that we were anything like the calibre of the Big Four.(64)

The issue provides a graphic example of Canadian regional conflict within the national university sports setting.

However, buoyed by the prospect of future funding support by a federal government which was becoming aware of the unifying aspects of sport for a nation threatened by the pressure of the metropolitan economy, the western universities continued their initiative towards the founding of a new CIAU. Progress was made but preceding the re-formation of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union in June, 1961 there were continuing conflicts regarding the implementation of regulations governing university sport throughout the country. Uniform eligibility rules were an important concern.(65)

Despite these obstacles, the re-emergence of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union in 1961 provided a national infrastructure for university athletic competition. Suppressed for the time being were the regional rivalries and inter- and intra-conference competition that had been an enduring legacy of the landscape of Canadian university sport during the 20th century. The first priority of the new organization was to inaugurate national championships in a variety of sports.

Accordingly, due in major part to funding from the federal government, Canadian national university championships began in basketball and hockey (1963) and in football (1965) with other sports following as funding allowed. Nevertheless, the political weakness of the young CIAU organization in governing the fragmented national university athletic structure during the 1960s provided an opening for the emergence of athletic policies at Simon Fraser University which promoted a program of athletic scholarships which was antithetical to the official position established by the CIAU membership as a whole.

#### A Summary of Developmental Tendencies

The development of Canadian and American university athletics over the past 150 years have followed similar patterns but also have some important differences which have required elaboration. In the United States, the commodification of university sport after 1870 resulted in a professionalization of football, which was already becoming the universities's most important sport. The desire of alumni for control of the college sports programs was given at best only token opposition by other groups within the university community. With little opposition available to counter the trend to commercialization, the dominant form of American collegiate athletics rapidly assumed a commercial model and was fully incorporated into the market process (save for minor innovations) by the end of World War I.

In Canada, the same kinds of commercializing pressures were

also in evidence. However, the implantation within the universities of a powerful British value system in amateur athletics (a cultural legacy of the economic and cultural power the imperial centre had held over its colonies) combined with the negative publicity often received by the American system to produce athletic policies in Canadian universities that attempted to avoid the excesses of the American model. Considered most serious of these excesses was the idea of athletic scholarships or financial aid given to athletes at American universities. Numerous adherents to the amateur model were adamantly opposed to paying athletes for their services and it was this group which promoted policies preventing the institutionalization of athletic scholarships in Canada.

Canadian academics of the period were greatly influenced by a strain of athleticism which featured two important ideals: (a) amateur athletes did not receive remuneration for competing and (b) athletics, while "morally useful" in the educational process, were certainly not equal to any other academic area of the university. Participation itself was to be the most important goal in any university sports organization. It was this group of individuals, imbued with a British tradition of amateur sport, who assumed control of Canadian university athletics early in its history and used their power and influence to promote policies to fit their value structure. The presence of this powerful faction at the Canadian universities prevented a rapid duplication in Canada of the American development pattern.

However, despite the universities' amateur attitudes towards sport, a financial monopoly developed in Big Four football in central Canada that affected the structure of university athletics throughout the country. Regional tensions were exacerbated by the autocratic administrative style of the Big Four universities and their resistance to overtures from the smaller Ontario and Quebec colleges and universities and to the attempts of the hinterland universities to become involved in the national organization. Despite the best efforts of the supporters of the amateur model, the professionalization of Canadian sport spread to the university athletic system and brought with it the values and mores which forced compromises with the amateur tradition and the culture within which it was embedded.

The western universities faced internal issues as well. Huge distances separated the various schools and travel costs for regular competition were considered almost insurmountably high. As well, the athletic programs at the various schools were at different levels of development and a consistent quality of competition was lacking. At the University of British Columbia, transportation costs were the highest and the isolation of the university forced the athletic department to develop regional competitive ties with American universities and colleges throughout the Pacific Northwest. It was the western universities, especially UBC, isolated on the periphery of central Canada, that had much to gain from the formation of a

national governing body for university sport, the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union, in 1961.

The establishment of the CIAU provided national championships and gave the western universities "something to shoot for." But a continuing perceived lack of competition within the western conference and the economics of travel costs in the western region were important local issues for the University of British Columbia. Also, the lack of a consistent tradition of cross-Canada competition (as opposed to a fairly well established tradition of regional Pacific Northwest competition) affected the direction of the athletic programs at the British Columbia universities. Given the above historical circumstances, they had the potential to become the setting of a role conflict as to the nature and direction of a university athletic program in British Columbia and, indeed, in the rest of Canada. In essence, the role conflict centered around the economically inefficient idea of maintaining and fostering expensive competition with other Canadian universities as opposed to the possibility of organizing a cost-efficient athletic program in a regional Pacific Coast setup.

In a sense, the issue was the same as that which has faced Canada and Canadians since Confederation. Could an east-west national organization and national loyalties overcome the overwhelming natural north-south economic and increasingly cultural regional tendencies? Complicating the issue were the regional tensions that had developed alongside the Canadian

economy during the 20th century and with the north-south commercial linkages that had developed as American foreign investment in Canada expanded after World War II. In economics and in culture, the province of British Columbia was very similar to the states of Washington, Oregon, and California directly south. If there were weak ties in cross-Canadian university sport and geography dictated high transportation costs to maintain those ties, why not consider the institutionalization of regional competition with schools in the U.S. Northwest? A continentalist philosophy which promoted the idea that economic efficiencies should regulate public policy provided a strong argument for those individuals arguing for a regional, North-South sports competition tradition for the British Columbia universities.

Furthermore, many aspects of the American model of university athletics were highly appealing for Canadians, especially in the West. North-south regional competition with the better coached, better skilled and highly publicized teams in the United States seemed an attractive alternative to expensive competition with weaker, less publicized Canadian universities. Such views provided a focus for efforts to implement change in the Canadian university model towards a more professionalized outlook. As a result, the history of university athletics in Canada and British Columbia during the 20th century can be understood as highly contested terrain. The followers of the American-style program (representing the so-called 'modernizing'



viewpoint) were in constant conflict with partisans of the entrenched British 'amateur' model. The history of these struggles, shaped by broader and larger questions regarding the role of sport in a Canadian society influenced so greatly by American culture, provides an important context for the Simon Fraser University case discussed in the next chapter.

Notes

1. Richard S. Gruneau, Class, Sports, and Social Development (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983) p. 109.
2. See Guy Lewis "The Beginning of Organized Collegiate Sport" in American Quarterly Vol. 22:1 (September 1970), Frederic L. Paxson "The Rise of Sport" in The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol IV No. 2 (September 1917), and Howard J. Savage, American College Athletics (New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1929)
3. American College Athletics, p. 20.
4. Ibid., p. 20-21.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 22-23.
7. Ibid., p. 22-23.
8. Ibid., p. 23-24. The importance of alumni activities to the development of U.S. colleges and their athletic programs at the turn of the century cannot be stressed enough. "With Americans a passive college loyalty is not enough. True loyalty to a university must actuate to pride, and pride to activity. Nor must that activity be merely nominal. It must not stop with polite unessentials. It must dominate and control. Once the seeming necessity to control emerges, the conflict of the interests begin." American College Athletics, p. 81.
9. Ibid., p. 23-24.
10. For a discussion of the issues concerning the place of American university athletics in American educational ideology see Hal Lawson and Alan Ingham "Conflicting Ideologies Concerning the University and Intercollegiate Athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-1940" Journal of Sport History Vol. 7 No.7 (Winter 1980).
11. "The reputation of a college came to be regarded as uncomfortably low unless its teams won more than a fair share of victories." American College Athletics, p. 24.
12. See Lawson and Ingham, op. cit. for University of Chicago President William Rainey Harper's pronouncements on the value of athletics to a university's reputation.
13. American College Athletics, p. 28-29.

14. Ibid., p. 67-71.
15. Ibid., "The Coach in College Athletics", p. 161-189.
16. Ibid., p. 180-82.
17. Ibid., p. 24-25.
18. See Ronald A. Smith "Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 1905-06 Football Crisis", Journal of Sport History Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1980) and John. S. Watterson III "The Football Crisis of 1909-10: The Response of the Eastern Big Three", Journal of Sport History Vol.8 No.1 (Spring 1981). As well, Guy Lewis, "Theodore Roosevelt's Role in the 1905 Football Controversy," Research Quarterly, 40 (December 1969) provides a good account of the crisis.
19. American College Athletics, p. 50-51.
20. For a historical overview of the development of sports and games in Canadian life see Nancy Howell and Maxwell Howell, Sports and Games in Canadian Life: 1700 to the Present, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969).
21. R.J. Moriarty, The Organizational History of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union Central (CIAUC) 1906-1955, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1971, p. 37.
22. Ibid., p. 41.
23. Ibid., p.44-46.
24. See Howard J. Savage, Games and Sports in British Schools and Universities, (New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1926) for information on the development of athletics in the British universities.
25. R.J. Moriarty, p.56.
26. J.P. Loosemore, "Intercollegiate Athletics in Canada: Its Organization and Development" CAHPER XXVIII December 1961--January 1962.
27. Ibid., p.78.
28. Ibid., p.78.
29. T.A. Reed, The History of the University of Trinity College, Toronto, 1852-1952 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1952) p. 273 as cited by R.J. Moriarty, p.39.
30. R.J. Moriarty, p. 132-33.

31. R.J. Moriarty, p. 184, 193-94. Also see "McMaster Football Fiasco" the account of how the inclusion of McMaster University to Big Four football negatively affected gate receipts and the subsequent successful dumping of McMaster from the league by the original Big Four members.
32. Ibid., p. 177.
33. Ibid., p. 216.
34. Sherwood Fox Sherwood of Western (Toronto: Burns and McEachern, 1964) p. 159-163 as quoted by Moriarty, p. 181.
35. R.J. Moriarty, p. 227.
36. Ibid., p. 168-70.
37. Ibid., p. 168.
38. Ibid., p. 168-69.
39. CIAU Minutes 28 November 1931 Vol II p.89 as quoted by Moriarty, p.164.
40. CIAU Minutes 31 March 1951 Vol III p. 152 as quoted by Moriarty, p.170.  
The CIAU representatives volted that the proposal of forming a Canada wide national intercollegiate organization "be tabled indefinitely." See Moriarty p. 258-260 for discussion of this issue.
41. See Frank Cosentino Canadian Football (Don Mills: Musson Book Company Ltd. 1969) and Moriarty, op. cit., for accounts of the commercialized development of Canadian university football.
42. Statement by W. Orban to R.J. Moriarty 3 June 1971 as quoted by Moriarty p. 224.
43. Letter from J. Kirkpatrick to R.J. Moriarty 9 September 1971 as quoted by Moriarty p. 224.
44. Minutes of the CIAU March 29, 1947 Vol. III p.38.
45. The Carnegie Report on American College Athletics noted that 'No single factor has contributed more directly to the use of athletic scholarships in American colleges and universities than the second qualification set by the will of Cecil Rhodes for recipients of the Oxford scholarships that bear his name.' p. 253-54. The second of four criteria for the scholarship winner was 'his fondness for and success in manly outdoor sports, such as cricket, football, and the like...'

46. Statement by Vic Obeck to R.J. Moriarty 9 July 1971 as quoted by Moriarty p. 222-223.
47. Moriarty, p. 223.
48. Statements by D. McLarty 8 October 1970, J.P. Metras 1 September 1971 to R.J. Moriarty as quoted by Moriarty p. 224.
49. Moriarty, p.272.
50. Statement by Dr. Harry Warren to Steve Campbell in personal interview, 11 August 1985.
51. Letter from J. Kirkpatrick to R.J. Moriarty 9 September 1971 as quoted by Moriarty p. 225.
52. Statement by Vic Obeck to R.J. Moriarty 8 July 1971 as quoted by Moriarty p. 225.
53. For an account of the 1951 NCAA scandal see Stanley Cohen's The Game They Played , (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd 1977).
54. UBC Senate Minutes November 20, 1951.
55. See UBC Senate Minutes February 13, 1952 and May 13, 1952.
56. Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.
57. Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.
58. Statement by Lorne Davies to Steve Campbell in personal interview 14 August 1985.
59. An annual report of the UBC Men's Athletic Directorate (undated circa 1945-1950) on competition with smaller colleges noted that Canadian university competition was not possible 'with lack of adequate competition and long distances for travel.' p.2.
60. Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.
61. Report of the UBC Senate Committee on Recreation, Athletics and Physical Education May 14, 1958.
62. Ibid.
63. Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.

64. Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.

65. As Maury Van Vliet noted later, "It was the West's pressure that created the CIAU. If you were Toronto or Queen's you didn't want to deal with these country bumpkins. It took us a great many years to get them to agree. We had tremendous discussions dealing with eligibility and, believe me, Toronto and Queen's resisted that like mad. Queen's always had a very strong alumni medical group and they liked to have some of their medical boys playing football. They weren't giving up their eligibility rules to satisfy the West." Statement by Maury Van Vliet to Steve Campbell in personal interview 22 September 1985.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY CASE

Any examination of policy formation must delve deeply into the social and organizational context of decision makers. In the case of Simon Fraser University, discussion of the formulation of an initial athletic policy orientation during 1964-65 which emulated a "professionalized" American model of university athletics must take into account the following factors: (a) the educational philosophies of the key decision makers, (b) important historical events and trends that may have affected their personal outlooks on university sport, (c) the examples set by relevant model institutions and (d) the influence of community groups and individuals on the policy setting.(1)

This chapter explores the impact of these factors on the development of Simon Fraser's athletic program in the mid 1960's. Central issues discussed in the chapter include an examination of relationships between the formation of athletic policy at Simon Fraser and the athletic program at the University of British Columbia, and the key role played by the first Chancellor and Chairman of the Board of Governors, Dr. Gordon Shrum.(2) Shrum's influence cannot be overestimated. Personally selected to build the university by then B.C. Premier, W.A.C. Bennett, for whom he had been a very successful provincial administrator during his 60's,(3) Shrum selected the first President, a friend and former

student of his (and 1936 Rhodes Scholarship winner at UBC), Patrick McTaggart-Cowan.(4) He also influenced the various appointments of the members of the Board of Governors.(5)

It was the Board of Governors which discussed, elaborated, and implemented many of Shrum's ideas of what a new university in British Columbia should be. While Shrum was an important actor in the development of the university, other members of the Board of Governors had their own agendas regarding the development of the university and were able to exert influence on the subsequent course of events.(6) Nonetheless, the impact of Shrum's charismatic leadership on Simon Fraser University's policy making apparatus was striking. An examination of his educational philosophy and experiences collected during his tenure as a campus power broker in physical education and athletics at the University of British Columbia (1925-61) will provide many insights into subsequent developments at Simon Fraser University (1963-1971).

Dr. Gordon Shrum has also been widely acknowledged as one of the most powerful men at the University of British Columbia during his time there as a member of the Science faculty.(7) From the time he arrived on campus in 1925 from the University of Toronto, until he retired from the UBC faculty in 1961, Shrum's power and influence as an expediter, organizer and administrator par excellence grew with the reputation and growth of the University. Legends of his prowess 'for getting things done' at the Point Grey campus abound and made his reputation. During the



course of his university career he assumed many administrative positions and responsibility for a number of campus departments. Among them, Shrum became the head of the Department of Physics (where his reputation as a recruiter of faculty was well known in universities throughout Canada and the United States), the head of the Department of Extension (off-campus courses), the head of Graduate Studies, chairman of the influential Building and Grounds Committee (which oversaw all campus buildings, the athletic practice fields and the campus Stadium), and the head of the University contingent of the Canadian Officer's Training Corps during World War II. Most important for the chapter at hand was his role as a behind-the-scenes power broker in the initiation, direction and development of the University's physical education and athletic program.(8) In particular, his interest in and support of the University's football teams during his 36 year UBC career was well known.(9) I shall argue that an examination of the available evidence supports the argument that it was Shrum's experiences in the campus politics of educational committee meetings and athletic board room sessions at the University of British Columbia which tempered his thinking on university education and set the stage for his formation and subsequent adoption of American-style athletic policies at Simon Fraser University. It is to an examination of the historical development of athletics at the University of British Columbia and Gordon Shrum's role in that history that we now turn.

### Development of Athletics at the University of British Columbia

There have been athletic teams at the University of British Columbia since the inception of the University at its original Fairview site in 1915.(10) During those early years, the athletic program followed the early development patterns of most North American university athletic programs. Most notably it was primarily student initiated and organized, and was financed from the budget of the student organization, the Alma Mater Society (A.M.S.). Organization was provided through the Men's and Women's Athletic Associations which were subsidiary organizations of the A.M.S. From the earliest days, as student activities the athletic teams were extremely successful as devices for the student body to focus on as a source of campus unity and pride at a young, growing university. Front page coverage in the student newspaper, the Ubyyssey, was typical for UBC's representative teams and coverage from the Vancouver press was also considerable.

Gordon Shrum became involved in the University intercollegiate athletic program very early in his academic career as a self acknowledged helper to Dr. Gordon Burke, one of UBC's earliest coaches.(11) Initiated in 1924, the UBC program was the first football program in the province of British Columbia. While evidence from the pre-World War II era is sparse, interviews with people involved in the athletic program during the time suggest that Dr. Shrum became involved with and influenced the completion of the University's sports stadium in

1937(12) (situated at the site of the present Student Union Building). He is also said to have selected an American, Maury Van Vliet, as the University's first full-time men's physical training instructor (and later coach of many of the athletic teams on campus).(13) In addition, Shrum apparently played a key role in the formation of the Department of Physical Education at the end of World War II as an organizational structure to house the University athletic program's teams and coaches.(14) He can also be considered primarily responsible for the hiring of Robert F. Osborne as the first member of faculty to oversee the development of the Department of Physical Education and its athletic program.(15) Osborne, with the tacit approval of Shrum, later hired the University's first members of the physical education faculty in 1946. All of this suggests the scope of Shrum's influence at the University in general and in physical education and athletics specifically. Harry Franklin, a former Thunderbird basketball player and former Director of the UBC Alumni Association noted Shrum's power at UBC:

In those days Gordon Shrum was on several committees and you just wouldn't do anything without involving Gordon Shrum. He was very powerful, particularly in the late thirties and early forties.(16)

The post-World War II anomaly of student organization and financing of the athletic program through its Men's and Women's Athletic Directorates while the University hired the coaches through the Department of Physical Education was not lost on the

campus community. The increasing complexity of administering the athletic teams in the post-war era was beginning to weigh heavily on the graduate student managers of the program. As well, the rising popularity of the university's sports teams (especially football) as a source of entertainment for the university and the city of Vancouver meant that gate receipts allowed student planners some latitude in expanding the program.(17) The need for a full-time Athletic Director or Coordinator became apparent in the students' promotion of the Ostrom Plan (named after its student chairman, Brock Ostrom) which, when it was accepted by the A.M.S. in November, 1950, recommended that the University take responsibility to hire a full-time Athletic Director and that this person report to a committee composed of students and faculty which would be responsible for setting athletic policy.(18) The University administration subsequently endorsed the proposal and in 1951, Dr. Shrum and Professor Osborne hired an American, Bob Robinette, as the University's first director of athletics.(19)

The selection of Robinette was not the first time the University had hired Americans to staff its athletic program. It is readily apparent to most Vancouver sports observers that there has always been a large supply of skilled American athletic coaches and sports personnel available in the states of Washington, Oregon, and California only a few hours drive south from Vancouver. The interview and selection during the 1930's of Maury Van Vliet--an American college football star from

Oregon--as the University's physical training instructor had raised a storm of protest in the community.(20) But by the 1950's enough precedent had been set at UBC and in other universities across Canada (more specifically at the leading University of Toronto where an American, Warren Stevens, had been athletic director since 1933) that opposition to the move was fairly limited.

Robinette's agenda as UBC's first athletic director appears to have been fairly straight forward.(21) His idea was to move the University into the realm of big time university sport, especially in football, where UBC already had a dominant presence in the Vancouver community football spectator market with large attendances at Thunderbird home games.(22) Community, university and personal pride were also at stake. The post-war years saw, despite excellent attendance figures, UBC beaten repeatedly at American football by much smaller colleges and universities in Washington and Oregon. At one point during the post-war era, UBC won only two games in four seasons, and it was the implicit aim of some of the athletic department policy makers and their supporters to lift the Thunderbird football team to the sports pre-eminence that many people felt a university the size of UBC deserved. Such a football program would have to compete with other universities (American as well as Canadian) for the skilled football players that would be essential to a successful program.(23) Viewed from perspective, the issue of utilizing some form of remuneration to recruit outstanding athletes to play

sports for the Thunderbirds seemed inevitable.

In the 1940's, single cases of University alumni-sponsored athletic bursaries could be found at UBC. These were modelled along the lines of the Rhodes Scholarship where academic standing was the predominant consideration with athletic participation an important factor as well.(24) One such official award at UBC was the Flying Officer Reverend George Robert Pringle Memorial Bursary which was allowed by the UBC Senate because it honoured the memory of a highly respected member of the University community who had participated in Thunderbird athletics.(25) Generally, however, despite these singular cases, during the university's early years the administrative structure successfully rebuffed all efforts to establish any University policies supporting and allowing the concept of "scholarships" or financial awards that were based on the prime consideration that students participate on a University team.

Of course, the policy of no "first party" scholarships at UBC could not preclude the possibility of "third party" awards given by interested persons from without the University.(26) This was alleged to be a widespread practice in many of the institutions which had built winning teams in Canada since the late nineteenth century.(27) At UBC, the different sets of values represented on each side of the athletic scholarship issue provided a focus for a clash between educational philosophies in Canada.

Central to this long standing issue was the role sports and

athletics ought to perform in the education of university students. At the risk of considerable simplification, it is possible to identify three differing philosophies about the role of athletics in Canadian universities, all of which were important factors during 20th century development. The first view was rooted in the residues of a Methodist asceticism on Canadian university campuses. From this perspective, sport was often identified as an essentially frivolous sidelight to the more serious side of academic life. A related set of arguments identified sports as products of mass culture; forms of spectacle which had developed in conjunction with 20th century mass societies and which could be counterposed to more educationally significant forms of "high culture" such as music and the arts. In marked contrast to this position was a view which saw sport as an activity of central value to education and the "spirit" of university life. Accordingly, it was argued that sports should be promoted as much as possible. Proponents of this view found their origins in the 19th century games masters of the English public schools and the "cult" of athleticism which they engendered and diffused. The middle ground in this struggle over the place of athletics was occupied by a modified philosophy of "amateur athletics" which stressed versatility and valued the function of sport in a well-rounded life. For supporters of this viewpoint, sports were considered morally useful in education but definitely secondary to the arts and humanities as part of an overall well-rounded "versatile" education. Of some importance

to this paper, it is important to note that it was in consideration of the needs of students for this kind of "all-round" education that compulsory physical training was instituted in the schools.

Yet, the goal of versatility was plagued by increasing pressures for specialization in education. In sporting activities, this meant, on the one hand, that fully "amateur" teams could not compete fairly with the professional, specialized teams which they often opposed. As well, during this time the value of physical training to education was challenged as demand on student's time from specialized academic subjects increased. With the subsequent elimination of compulsory training came the increased availability of voluntary activity in the form of intramural participation. As well, there was an ensuing development in the quality of the representative teams and the resources at their disposal and this found its element in the pressure for excellence and the spectator support base which developed in both Canada and the United States in the late 1800's. These, then, were the major philosophies and internal pressures which guided the debate on the role of athletics in Canadian universities during the 20th century.

At UBC, during the mid 1940s, debate over these philosophies and pressures was overlapped by the high visibility of university football as a commercial spectacle at rival institutions in eastern Canada and in the United States. The apparent "successes" of these football programs led to pressures to



initiate a practice of giving financial aid to athletes in order to produce a team which would be attractive to spectators while at the same time garnering public relations benefits for the university.(28) In Canada, the process of paying athletes was extremely distasteful to practitioners of the amateur ideal and ran counter to their belief that athletes should not receive any form of extrinsic compensation for their sports skills. But the gradual development of the American major university athletic system as the dominant university model in North America during the twentieth century provided an alternative. In both Canada and the United States, supporters of this model often saw themselves as "progressive" forces at odds with more archaic models of sport organization.

Conflicts such as these were also taking place at eastern Canadian universities and, to a lesser extent, in the American colleges (where the British influence was considerably weaker). However, in British Columbia, located on the periphery of the Canadian cultural centre, the struggle was also affected by the geographic isolation of the province and its growing economic, media and cultural ties with the American Pacific Coast states of Washington, Oregon and California. British Columbian society was infused with traditional British colonial values but its cultural development during the 20th century was influenced by the imposition of values and images transmitted from the United States through the American media. As well, the immigration of Americans into the province during the 20th century brought a

constant flow of "American" ideas and practices into western Canada. It is within the context of these conflicting philosophies and value systems that the development of the University of British Columbia athletic program during the 1940's, 50's and 60's must be viewed.

The post-World War II era at UBC saw the establishment of an academic Department of Physical Education under the director Robert F. Osborne. The Department's mission was to provide a degree granting program of coursework, oversee the University's compulsory physical education program and provide an organizational framework for the University's athletic teams. The expansion of the University's athletic program, which initially was financed and controlled by the students themselves, was outgrowing the capacity of the Alma Mater Society budget. To augment the athletic budget and ensure the continued growth of the sports program, student organizers lobbied the University administration to increase its financial contribution to the athletic program, especially considering the public relations value of the Thunderbird teams.

This desire for increased spending on physical education and athletics by the University was not without its critics. Some faculty thought that the students' sports teams were an important part of the educational process but that enhanced University support for sports should not be forthcoming.(29) Other individuals in the University senate were against the institution of a degree granting program in Physical Education for people

'participating in activities and games'.(30) These comments reflected variations both of a lingering protestant suspicion of games and of the legacy of the Victorian amateur sports ethos. Physical activity and athletics was seen to be "acceptable" in Canadian education, perhaps even important, but only as in moderation and in conjunction with more "serious" academic activities. Further evidence of the power these ideas held in Canadian society throughout the 20th century can be found in the great difficulty establishing degree granting programs in physical education in universities throughout the country. It was not until 1941 that the first physical education program in Canada was instituted at the University of Toronto.

Nonetheless, the complex process of rationalization and commercialization of UBC's athletic program continued in the 1940s. Yet, without the comprehensive support of the University administration, its development floundered in comparison with the other universities in the Pacific region. In particular, the football team, with large crowds at every home game did very poorly against the smaller American Pacific Northwest schools like Western Washington. In 1950 the student body, with some alumni involvement(31) began investigating the possibility of instituting some form of scholarship or award system for athletes in order to enable the University to attract the skilled players needed to field winning football teams. Reaction by the UBC faculty and senate to these developments was slow to coalesce. Later that school year, however, the UBC senate responded to

support in the community for a stronger athletic program by forming a committee to investigate athletic scholarships with the idea of reporting back with policy recommendations for senate.(32)

However, at about the same time in the United States, the fixing of college basketball games in New York and Kentucky had become a public and well publicized scandal. This scandal provided evidence for opponents to outline the negative effects that payments to athletes and increased University expenditures on athletics might bring to the University's reputation. In the light of these developments, and with access to various reports of other North American universities' policy decisions concerning their own athletic programs, the committee recommended "that the Senate not approve of the establishment of athletic scholarships." (33) As well, it also recommended that the University tighten up the eligibility rules for first year athletes so as to prevent athletes from competing for the University for a season and subsequently dropping out of school.

Both policies were adopted by senate and served to severely constrain the professionalization of the University's athletic program. In fact, these precedent setting senate rulings appear to have been the most influential developments in the history of UBC athletics and, by deed of the University's position as the largest in the province, for athletics at all three British Columbia universities. There appears to be little doubt that

they had a great impact on supporters of athletics province-wide, including Dr. Shrum, mentor of the UBC athletic program.

Despite UBC's internal policy directions, outside influences continued to make an impact on the development and direction on the University teams, especially football. The Quarterback Club, composed of supportive alumni and community businessmen, media and interested supporters (including Dr. Gordon Shrum who rarely missed a meeting), was a lobby group for upgrading the athletic program and met almost every Friday.(34) As Harry Franklin, a former secretary of the club noted, the Quarterback Club was "the first attempt to get behind a team with an organization...1948 to 1953 were our best years and we even organized a Nanaimo branch."(35)

One particular incident in the Club's efforts on behalf of UBC football appears to have had a striking impact on Shrum(36) and his perception on the key factors in the development of a major university athletic program. This was the attempted recruiting of John Henry Johnson, a running back from California who would later go on to star in the National Football League. Robinette, the athletic director, was from California and knew of Johnson's football exploits at Saint Mary's and Arizona State University. The Quarterback Club convened and quickly raised \$6000 in order to bring the future National Football League great to Vancouver to run roughshod through the Evergreen Conference.(37) Problems apparently rose with regard to his admission to the University and Johnson never did come to UBC.

The Thunderbird football program continued in the doldrums (although it continued to supply a number of football players to the Canadian Football League during the ensuing decades). Yet, the situation provides a clue to Shrum's thinking on the topic. Some observers close to Shrum's involvement in athletics during his academic career at both UBC and SFU felt that he did not know the 'nuts and bolts' of a top notch athletic program.(38) It could very well have been his growing feeling from his experiences with the scholarship laden universities and small colleges to the south that financial aid to athletes was the principal ingredient in the mix of a powerful athletic program. Certainly, the roadblocks preventing UBC from acquiring athletic scholarships during the 1950's could easily have seemed to Shrum to be the principal factor in the poor showings of the team and may only have served to spur his desire to have them. The institution of them at Simon Fraser University would be the first athletic policy he would announce for the new university in 1964.

Through the decade of the organization of UBC's physical education and athletic program from 1945 to 1955, the issue of athletic scholarships had served as a galvanizing symbol for those individuals who wished to emphasize the entire athletic program. But it also provided a target for those individuals who, as former B.C. Lions general manager (and former UBC football star) Herb Capozzi commented, 'preferred the British concept of athletics with participation the key thing as opposed to excellence.'(39) For these individuals, remuneration to

athletes struck right at the heart of their entire belief system. Moreover, scholarships were only one important part of a whole program of a questionable increased emphasis on athletics. The available evidence is clear on the fact that, during his years at UBC, Dr. Goron Shrum was one of those individuals who avidly supported the expansion and enhancement of UBC's physical education and athletics program.(40) Why he was such a staunch advocate of these kinds of policies is not so clear.

An examination of Shrum's autobiography demonstrates that his exposure to Canada's British sporting traditions and ideals was at a minimum during his early years. Raised in rural Ontario of German ancestry, Shrum came from a protestant family and credited his grandmother for encouraging him to gain a university education. He participated little in sports and, although he 'played a little rugby'(41) he certainly did not become immersed in the dominant Canadian rugby culture and its amateur tradition as had his student compatriots at the University of Toronto. Nonetheless, upon his arrival at UBC in August, 1925 as a new faculty member he promptly became involved in promoting the fledgling UBC football program. At that time, as later during the 1940's and 50's, the teams were faring poorly within a schedule of both American and Canadian competition. In a later interview Shrum commented on how impressed he was at the time with the discipline and quality of the American teams, both on and off the field as compared with the behavior of the Canadian squads:

my observation was that the American teams were the best...These American teams came up here by bus and were well coached, they had nice uniforms, good boots and they were well disciplined...Canadian football teams from Regina and Manitoba weren't well disciplined and they were often coached by somebody in the community like Dr. Burke who was not a member of the UBC staff, who really had no control over them. After the game, some of them would go wild in town. But the Americans never did...I couldn't help but feel that American football was really the logical thing for us to play out here.(42)

During his years at UBC, Shrum became involved in other areas of the University. He became a hiring advisor to UBC's second President, Dr. Leonard Klinck (1918-44), and, as noted earlier, it was Dr. Shrum who conducted the screening process and selected Maury Van Vliet and Gertrude Moore as the University's men's and women's physical education instructors in January, 1936. At that time, there was considerable opposition within the community with regard to the hiring of an American during a time of high unemployment in Vancouver and especially considering the prospect that the UBC athletic program would be "tainted" with American professionalism.(43) Despite the opposition, the appointment was ratified and Van Vliet served the University in the physical education and athletics areas until he moved to the University of Alberta near the end of World War II.

As Chairman of the influential Buildings and Grounds Committee, Shrum played an important role in acquiring sports fields for the University. The Stadium was completed in October, 1937 and provided one of the finest football stadiums in Canada.(44) Later that same year, Shrum was announced as the new



Director of University Extension (which ensures that university courses and faculty knowledge are made available to the community surrounding the university) and in that role, less than twelve months later, he exhibited his keen interest as an advocate of physical education and athletics by establishing a summer school in athletics. The first resident instructor was a well known American, Hec Edmundson, from the University of Washington, who arrived to teach track and field and basketball coaching. A report in the Vancouver Sun newspaper quoted Shrum's rationale for the program:

The integral relationship between athletics and physical education, the continued successes of British Columbia teams in Dominion competition and the records established by men and women from this province in the Olympic and British Empire Games have attracted widespread attention to physical training work carried on in this province. The University of British Columbia hopes to make some contribution in this field.(45)

But Shrum's main interest was the sport of football and his (and others') ardent support of it drew opposition from advocates of other sports, (particularly rugby) which often competed with football for players.(46) Dr. Harry Warren, UBC's first great athlete--he ran the sprints for Canada in the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam--and later a professor of Geophysics at the University, remembers clearly the rugby vs football issue and he and Shrum's conflicts over the direction of the University's sports program:

Dr. Shrum was a great proponent of Canadian football. He was

terribly keen and he and I fought about it. I was usually on the losing side as he was a very prominent person and a bigger person in the University than I.(47)

Despite such opposition, Shrum maintained a large measure of power and influence over the development of athletics at UBC. When Van Vliet left UBC near the end of the second World War to go to Edmonton to begin an academic program of physical education at the University of Alberta, it was Shrum who appointed Robert F. Osborne, a former student of his and member of his World War II C.O.T.C. group, as director of UBC physical education.(48) It was also Shrum who promoted the hiring of another American, Bob Robinette, as athletic director in the early 1950's and it was he who was influential in ensuring that future National Football League coach Don Coryell became coach of the Thunderbirds in 1953. Later, in 1955, when Coryell resigned as coach, Shrum utilized his eastern connections with Ivor Wynne at McMaster University to interview and oversee the appointment of Frank Gnuyp as the new UBC football coach, a position which Gnuyp retained until his retirement in 1971.

#### The Development of Simon Fraser University and Its Sports Program

In order to assess Simon Fraser's rejection of the established model of Canadian university athletics, Shrum's relationship with McMaster University's Ivor Wynne is worth examining more closely. Ivor Wynne was one of Shrum's contacts in the east.(49) As head of Physics at UBC, Shrum was well known

as a 'head hunter' who recruited world class scholars to come to Vancouver to work at the University of British Columbia and the evidence suggests that he utilized the same procedure in athletics to maintain a network of contacts throughout the Canadian universities. Dick Mitchell, a former UBC assistant football coach, commented later on Shrum's network:

Gordon Shrum kept in touch with what was going on in the rest of Canada, particularly in regard to football. I'm sure he knew Warren Stevens [athletic director at the University of Toronto]...if Ivor Wynne had not told Gordon Shrum about Frank Gnuip he'd still be in a steel factory. One of the reasons Shrum went back east was to look for coaches.(50)

One can reasonably assume that with his eastern university connections Shrum was aware of the situation in central Canadian university athletics. Specifically, he had to be aware of the political situation in the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union, especially the McMaster University football problem of 1953-55--when Ivor Wynne's McMaster was admitted to the Big Four football league and then unceremoniously dropped by the CIAU--and of the rumours surrounding the recruiting and subsidization of football players in the Big Four. Given his own experiences in dealing with the issue of recruiting football players to UBC, it seems reasonable to assume that Shrum was well aware of the issue of recruiting and subsidization throughout the central Canadian university athletic system. This knowledge, combined with his long and often frustrating involvement with athletics at UBC, molded his thinking on university athletics and led to the

development of an "ideal" model based on his personal experiences with both the Canadian and American athletic models.(51) The hypocrisy that he perceived within the Canadian university setting must have had a great effect on him for, less than ten years later, as chancellor and chairman of the Board of Governors at Simon Fraser University Shrum would turn maverick and lobby for and achieve a legitimized university policy that would openly position the athletic program as a centre of importance within the university.

The rapid development of Simon Fraser University (which opened on September 1, 1965) has its origins in the dramatic increase in university age students in British Columbia during the post World War II era. The doubling of UBC's student population base from 1955 to 1962 to a total of 12,950 (52) reflected the projection that the number of students registered in British Columbia's universities and colleges would almost triple from 14,710 in 1962 to some 37,000 in 1971. With the University of British Columbia as the province's largest university, the majority of these high school students wishing to gain a post-secondary education would have to attend university at UBC.

This large bulge in the British Columbia student population base reflected a nationwide trend where the number of students throughout Canada were projected to almost triple from 114,000 in 1960 to 312,000 in 1970.(53) Undoubtedly, the strain on the available resources at UBC and at other universities across the

country would have been enormous had they been forced to take in the bulging student population. Instead, to accomodate the projected increase in student enrolments in B.C. the Macdonald Report recommended in 1962 that a new four year degree granting university be established in the western lower Fraser Valley with the aim of enrolling 2000 first year students for September, 1965.(54) That university would be Simon Fraser.

Meanwhile, upon his retirement from the UBC faculty at age 65 in 1961, Dr. Shrum was approached by the Premier of British Columbia, W.A.C. Bennett, to become co-Chairman of B.C. Electric (now B.C. Hydro) where he remained until 1972. It was Bennett who, after receiving the Macdonald Report, called upon Shrum to take charge of constructing the new university. Shrum recounts the telephone conversation he had with Bennett:

Premier Bennett said: "You know, Dr. Shrum, we've got the Macdonald Report and we've accepted it and I want you to be chancellor of the new university. Select a site and build it and get it going. I want it open in September 1965."(55)

Shrum was an obvious choice to lead the project. His academic and administrative experience at the University of B.C. and his organizational prowess at B.C. Electric gave him the confidence of the Premier and the government. He began work immediately. Time being of the essence, the construction process of SFU was a fast track project where, in the first of many controversial moves, Shrum called for tenders for the contracts for the athletic facilities (a gymnasium and swimming pool)

first. It was only the first signal of a number of surprising, unorthodox moves by the new University. After construction began Shrum encountered opposition towards his early policies from a member of the regional business elite. As he explains in his autobiography the early construction of the gymnasium and pool complex did not sit well with potential donors to the new University:

The first concrete was poured for the gymnasium in the spring of 1964 with a good deal of publicity. Some people disapproved. One prominent Vancouver businessman I met on the street one day said, "Well, Gordon, you'll never get any money out of me. I won't contribute to any university where the first building they build is a gymnasium." In fact, the gym was first only because of its simplicity compared with some of the other buildings. I did feel, however, that a gymnasium was an important facility to include in the initial phase of construction.(56)

But the new University administrator's involvement in the construction process indicated his long-time experience in dealing with the administrative politics of a university. Later, he explained the crucial importance of incorporating facilities for athletics and the arts in the initial plans for the new University because:

The University of British Columbia opened in 1915 without a gymnasium, and it did not get a proper one until after the Second World War. Before then, they had to make do with a little wooden affair built with student funds. It had taken UBC fifty years to get a theatre, and in 1963 it still did not have an indoor swimming pool. After a university is established, and someone tries to get a swimming pool or a theatre, there are always fifteen academic departments whose demands for funds seem to take priority. I included a gym, a theatre, and a swimming pool in my SFU plan because I knew from experience how difficult it was to

obtain such facilities later on.(57)

But other surprising innovations at the new university included the prospect of using the trimester system to maximize the efficient use of the University's resources, organizing the University's construction so as to provide for successive, organized phases of expansion in the decades to follow (unlike the haphazard development that had been a hallmark of the uneven growth of UBC), allowing for daycare and tutorial services and, generally, ensuring that experimentation and academic innovation would be the order of the day within Simon Fraser. However, the innovation which attracted the largest amount of publicity nationwide for the new University was Chancellor Shrum's announcement on March 13, 1964 that Simon Fraser would institute a policy of awarding athletic scholarships to athletes in its new athletic program.(58) The announcement received headlines right across Canada, something that probably didn't surprise Shrum for he was well aware of the impact his radical policy announcements generated for SFU, especially in the competition for publicity with the other new universities opening across the country. He had a positive feeling about the public relations value of his pronouncements:

This announcement [on athletic scholarships] got us a lot of publicity because it was so contrary to the current practice. Most Canadian universities, especially UBC, were opposed to athletic scholarships(59)... I was the P.R. man. SFU got more publicity in Ontario than did the five new universities opening at the same time there. SFU had the reputation as an innovator.(60)

And public image was important. As a new university competing for funding, students, faculty and public recognition, Simon Fraser needed to establish a strong position in the minds of the public. The value to the new University of promoting a high level program of athletic excellence, including scholarships was also not lost on various members of the SFU Board of Governors, who supported Shrum's policies. A member of the Board of Governors, Alan Eyre, who was also a Director of the B.C. Lions professional football team, commented later:

The athletic program was basically designed to build student loyalty and pre-eminence on a faster basis than you could get by turning out graduates. Simon Fraser, we felt, would get a quicker image through athletics than you could get through scholastic achievements. It takes a long time to produce academics.(61)

Arnold Hean, another Board of Governors member who had first met Shrum when Shrum trained him as a radar technician at UBC in 1940, adds that:

SFU was trying to be in the vanguard and we thought that sports would highlight who we were and bring us to the attention of a lot of people in academic areas.(62)

It appears that Hean was right. From the response to Shrum's announcements there is little doubt that Simon Fraser University gained valuable initial publicity about its new programs and innovative policies. Unquestionably, the publicity campaign was a step ahead of the public relations efforts of the other new



universities under construction throughout Canada. It also served to radically differentiate the new school over the older universities which had developed a reputation and image of downgrading sports and athletics. SFU had moved to fill a sports public relations void to quickly become the best known sports university in the country.

Overall, an examination of the attitudes of the individuals on the first Board of Governors at Simon Fraser University leads to the consideration that they were sympathetic to Shrum's push for athletic scholarships and the development of an athletic model styled on a modified American format at the University. It also appears that Shrum influenced their selection to the Board of Governors as a result of their support of his athletic policies and his university policies in general. Shrum characterized SFU's first President McTaggart-Cowan, an ex-officio member of the Board of Governors, "as a very strong supporter of athletics...especially football" while Fred Dietrich and Alan Eyre were "strong supporters". Eyre, a member of the B.C. Lions Board of Directors, supported Shrum's plan possibly because "it was a great deal of help to the Lions to get a few players from SFU." (63) McTaggart-Cowan noted Eyre's interest in the athletic program when he commented later that if he had to single out one person who was most supportive of Shrum's athletic policies "aside from Shrum and myself it would be Alan Eyre." (64)

Another Board of Governors member, Arnold Hean, noted that the new President was "keenly interested in sports and there were

a number of others on the board who were equally interested...Alan Eyre was very enthusiastic...no one was negative [on the emphasis on athletics] provided academic qualifications were maintained."(65) And, as already mentioned, Fred Bolton and Fred Dietrich had been, along with Shrum, members of the UBC Quarterback Club.

Of central importance to the maintenance of University athletic policy must be the role of the university President who, in Shrum's words, "is the one with the real power."(66) His selection(67) for this position was a long time friend, Patrick McTaggart-Cowan, who was a former Science student of his at UBC. McTaggart-Cowan, a 1936 Rhodes scholarship winner, had had little experience in the administration of a university but his academic and sporting experiences at Oxford University where he was involved in rowing and badminton,(68) his long term relationship with Shrum and his administrative experiences as the head of the Meteorological Service of Canada led Shrum to the opinion that, "I thought he could do the job."(69) Certainly installing as the new President a man who was inexperienced in academic administration would give Shrum, who already held two powerful positions in the administration, a decided measure of influence in the day to day duties of a third and possibly most powerful position of all.

McTaggart-Cowan consistently displayed full support of the Simon Fraser policy of offering athletic scholarships to the University's incoming athletes. From the very announcement of

his appointment as President he constantly articulated his support of the entire range of Shrum's athletic policies. His rationale focussed on the argument that Canadian universities should support the pursuit of excellence in all spheres of life, not just the central core of academic study. In a speech to the Men's Canadian Club of Vancouver he commented:

Any student who has some area of excellence--I don't care how small--and has once tasted success, will have the desire to go all the way to get it....Why shouldn't such students get scholarships for their success [in athletics] just as a student good in mathematics can get a scholarship in mathematics?(70)

Also, the new President felt that the presence of talented athletes on campus "motivates the whole student body to become involved in the athletic program." (71) In these early days, it was important for the administration to meet criticism head on and publicly dispute the notion that athletic scholarships would mean that the University's academic quality would suffer. In a speech to the Lower Mainland Parks Advisory Association McTaggart-Cowan commented that although SFU would be promoting policies aimed at emphasizing its athletic program, the advent of athletic scholarships would not necessarily mean that the university would de-emphasize its academic programs. He asserted that "We are not looking for students with the body of Goliath and the brains of a three year old." (72) And in a letter to the author, he strongly reiterated his belief that SFU's initial scholarship athletes were "above average academically." (73)

The support of the President as the link between the

policies of the Chancellor and the faculty and other community interest groups appears to be a crucial ingredient in allowing the institutionalization of Shrum's vision of an American-style university athletic model to take place at Simon Fraser with little organized opposition. The President's key role in the promotion of certain policies was to act to marshal a base of support for the administration's policies while at the same time acting to fractionalize any opposition that may have arisen. Actually, McTaggart-Cowan's full support of Shrum's athletic policies might have been expected. As a Shrum appointee with little administrative experience in university systems, generally he could be expected to support Shrum's educational policies during his learning phase on the job while at the same time deferring to the 40 years of Shrum's experience at UBC in dealing with academic matters. In a recent letter to the author, SFU's first president detailed his inexperience--and that of the first Board of Governors--when he noted that he and that group "were developing our philosophy as we went along." (74) Shrum, of course, had a decided advantage over the others in his UBC experiences and this gave him an increased measure of influence within the Board of Governors in the shaping of the University's initial educational policy and athletic policies.

What specifically was Simon Fraser's athletic policy as enunciated by Shrum in March, 1964? Essentially, he promoted a program consisting of three major thrusts. These were (1) the offering of athletic scholarships to attract talented athletes to

the school, (2) upgrading coaching to the best professional level available and (3) providing tutorials to give the athletes extra help with their academic work.(75) Elaborating on his policy in a newspaper interview Shrum declared:

We must have athletic scholarships. We cannot use our government grant [academic] funds for this but I am sure there are outside funds for this. I would not lower our academic standards but for any athlete capable of doing university work, I am in favour of scholarships and bursaries...I would be in favour of bringing in coaches from the United States until our own program supplies us with our own coaches...I would not for one moment condone the development of athletics at the expense of academics nor would I ever push a student through his exams simply because he plays football.(76)

He also went on to explain that a crucial problem in Canadian university sport was to stop the flow of the best athletes to athletic scholarship offers from American colleges and universities. He declared that Simon Fraser would compete with those American universities to keep talented Canadians at home. In a newspaper interview he noted that "we must try to keep our athletes in our country and we must give them every opportunity to receive an education."(77) During a decade of rising nationalism in Canada, this rationale struck a responsive chord in British Columbia and across the country. In Toronto, the lead paragraph in a story in the Toronto Telegram on SFU's athletic policies began, "Canada's athletes should stay in Canada, says Dr. Gordon Shrum."(78) and many newspapers emphasized this appeal to Canadian nationalism to their readership as one of the most important rationales for SFU's

unique athletic policy. American domination of Canadian institutions during the post-war era had left many Canadians feeling increasingly helpless to control the development of their society. SFU's move had popular appeal as a seemingly noble attempt to stem the 'brawn drain' to the United States.

Yet, despite the certainty of Shrum's public pronouncements on policy, his vision of a well developed athletic program could not be implemented at Simon Fraser unless it received internal support throughout the university from the faculty, senate, and the administrative apparatus. To a large extent, the need for support from these groups was circumvented as some of the policies were announced before many of the faculty and staff were appointed. Early on, the Board of Governors had signalled its approval of the new athletic setup in their formal and informal meetings while the President had also demonstrated his support of Shrum's plans in public speeches throughout the province. A major concern for the backers of an increased emphasis on athletics, however, was gaining the support of the members of faculty, some of whom were political radicals unlikely to be sympathetic to the organization and implementation of an American-style athletic program at SFU. Yet, the radical element on campus did not provide any noteworthy opposition to the new plan. This was probably due to the fact that in the mid-1960's the institution of sport had not yet become the subject of intellectual attacks as had other social institutions. In fact, few intellectuals held well thought out and critical views on the

nature of sport in the United States, Canada or elsewhere.(79) Instead, it is likely that the radicals of 'Berkeley North' perceived the University's athletic program as being trivial to their intellectual attacks on society (if they thought about it at all) and so ignored it completely.(80) This appears, generally, to have been the case in most universities throughout the United States and Canada up until the late 1960s.

As well, since a large percentage of the SFU faculty were American, a possibility exists that the adoption of an athletic program similar to the ones that the faculty experienced during their undergraduate and graduate student days may have provided a reason for them to tacitly support, by not opposing, the adoption of an athletic program styled along an American model.(81) In any case, as Shrum explained later, he faced little opposition in getting the idea of athletic scholarships approved by the senate. His administration aided the achievement of this goal by incorporating them into an innovative policy of rewarding student activities in a wide variety of areas with activity scholarships from the University's academic scholarship funding base. On this point Shrum noted:

The reason was because we also offered activity scholarships so that students who were active, not necessarily in athletics, but perhaps in the student council, music, drama or some other campus activity could win awards as well. If we had been recommending only athletic scholarships, I would never have been able to get the support of the faculty.(82)

The elevation of the SFU athletic program to a higher

position within the overall aims of the University was augmented by the development, articulation, and implementation of an educational philosophy that sought to eliminate the barriers in education between mind and body. Commenting later on this key theme as a mainstay of the athletic policies, Dr. A.R. MacKinnon, the university's first Dean of Education, noted that:

Simply, the University was conceptualized as an educational institution where mind and body were not separated...The [athletic] program was embedded directly in the education program of the University.(83)

Within this reconstituted model of earlier athleticism, sport was to bridge the traditionally distinct separation from the university's wide range of programs and enter a realm where it became just another part, albeit an important one from a financial and public relations point of view, of the University. Gone would be any tradition of separate mind and body. In place would be an ideal balancing of the two within a modern university model. McTaggart-Cowan displayed his thoughts on the matter in a letter to a 1971 athletic review board when he noted:

In the case of athletic scholarships we have had irrational and emotional opposition which dates back certainly as long as I have been alive. Why, on the one hand, one should be delighted to have a student win a music scholarship for muscular dexterity with the fiddle and yet be in violent opposition to a scholarship being given to someone who can swim faster on his back than anyone else in Canada--I just do not understand. (84)

Within the Faculty of Education setting, the development of the athletic program utilized an educational philosophy which



allowed the Department of Athletics to be placed in an innovative interdisciplinary Physical Development Centre. Education Dean MacKinnon stated later that under this strategy: "the seamless code of learning could not be divided. Thus, the University had to give as much attention in the living field situation as to study in the academic classroom." (85) The athletic teams would be expected to provide training experiences for Canadian coaches and trainers as well as the talented athletes that would enrol. In the case of the athletic department personnel each would become a member of the University faculty with complete academic standing and be accorded the full status of faculty. In a written statement, the University outlined the rationale behind the new Physical Development Centre:

It is our belief that a well organized athletic team provides more than just a place to discuss and test self-discipline and achievement theories, it furnishes a laboratory for actual practice...Athletics provide students with a unique experience which is both physically and psychologically challenging. (86)

The circle, then, was complete. Shrum's vision had been transformed into policy and from there a process of rationalization had followed, complete with a reconstituted educational philosophy that provided a *raison d'etre* for the defence of the athletic policies. In short, the athletic policy construct was finished. With this complete model, the administrative structure was in a better position to defend itself against criticism from the sports community, the provincial government or from within the national setting.

Response from the British Columbia sports community to Shrum's policy announcements came fairly quickly. At UBC, athletic program officials downplayed the value of scholarships in a successful athletic program. Robert Osborne, Director of the School of Physical Education and a key member of the policy-setting Men's Athletic Committee, commented to the Vancouver Sun that:

Scholarships and bursaries will help, but the question of total environment must be taken into account...It takes coaching, competition and even acceptance by the newspapers to make a successful program....The UBC senate is not opposed to athletic scholarships but it is against recruiting of the high pressure, market place type that has sometimes occurred in the U.S. colleges bid for outstanding athletes the way the B.C. Lions bid for their players. The inducements are very similar.(87)

In addition, the Department of Athletics quickly made public the fact that the Men's Athletic Committee had had the question of athletic scholarships under consideration for some time. Athletic Director Bus Phillips commented to the Ubyyssey student newspaper that "We are pleased that Dr. Shrum plans to implement our ideas into Simon Fraser's athletic program."(88) Clearly, though, Simon Fraser had taken the "lead" away from UBC within the provincial sports community and provoked responses from people who were unhappy with policy direction at the older, tradition bound University. It was annoying for many that the institutional forces that had prevented the University of B.C. from instituting athletic scholarships a decade earlier now appeared to be holding back the university's athletic program.

Community sports leaders were quick to express their opinions on Simon Fraser's break with Canadian and British Columbian tradition. Herb Capozzi, an alumnus of UBC and general manager of the B.C. Lions, publicly criticized the athletic effort of UBC in a speech to the meeting of the B.C. Teachers Federation noting that "By the encouragement of an athletic program, SFU will receive public acceptance that UBC has never had....Sports is the great public relations tool of a university."(89)

Yet, his support was not shared unanimously by all members of the community. In an editorial entitled "We Lost-Hooray" the Vancouver Sun took the side of the provincial taxpayer emphasizing the financial cost of an American major college style athletic program:

For the ordinary citizen on the paying end there must seem something out of kilter with Mr. Capozzi's dream.

Most of us think a university is a place where the mind is cultivated and the understanding improved. If, as he implies, it needed stadiums, halfbacks, high jumpers and gymnastic marvels to achieve public acceptance, it would be a far, far different institution. And really not worth pinching our pennies for.(90)

Local coaches and athletes (many of whom at that time were attending American universities on athletic scholarships) also expressed qualified approval of the principle of athletic scholarships at the university level in British Columbia.(91) Many, however, were quite concerned that there were other factors besides scholarships involved in the development of a high level university athletic program. Some, like Vancouver's Harry

Jerome, who at the time was the co-holder of the World Record in the 100 yard dash, and attending the University of Oregon on a scholarship, expressed caution at the Simon Fraser developments, noting that:

I would have attended school in B.C. if the top coaching and competition had be available...I think U.S. schools sometimes stress athletics too much...As far as I am concerned my relationship with U.O. is strictly business. They're utilizing my name; in return I'm getting educated. I'd like to see a good system implemented in Canada, in which athletes would get a chance to get an education and contribute to campus spirit.(92)

The athletes felt that the Simon Fraser move would act to spur the development of high school sports within the province. The need for high calibre athletes to help make SFU competitive with U.S. universities could be accomplished by awarding a stipend to high school coaches. The feeling at the time was that athletic scholarships and the whole increased emphasis on athletics at the new university "would kill forever the vacuum of apathy that presently exists among prep athletes."(93)

Local coaches were in favour of the plan as well.

University of British Columbia assistant football coach Lorne Davies termed Shrum's proposals "a big step forward." According to the Vancouver Sun UBC head football coach Frank Gnuip supported the move while assistant coach Bob Hindmarch commented that, "I'm in favour of getting as many kids to go to university as possible...why shouldn't there be athletic scholarships?" Cal Murphy, head coach of the strong Vancouver College high school football team, who had helped his players get U.S. university

athletic scholarships, said "If a boy could get his tuition paid, which is about \$400, of course he would go to a B.C. school." A year later, however, two of Vancouver College's best football players would accept scholarships to play at Washington State instead of enrolling at the soon to open new B.C. university.(94) On a cautionary note, coaches were concerned about the other aspects of a high quality university athletic program. B.C. Lions minor football co-ordinator Denny Veitch echoed the comments of UBC's Osborne when he noted that "There are other factors involved in a first class athletic program. Scholarships are not the total answer."(95)

Simon Fraser's athletic program began in earnest the following year when on March 11, 1965, after applications had been taken for the position, Lorne Davies was announced as the first athletic director and football coach. He would take up his new position on May 1, 1965 in preparation for the September opening of the University.(96)

His first task as athletic director was to begin planning for the football season just ahead. As the University had no athletic board to control policy making, within the constraints of his appointment, the new athletic director had great latitude to develop the program as he saw fit. Publicly, his position was clear: "Our entire program will be patterned after those in the successful U.S. colleges."(97) Davies clearly expected to adopt a step ladder approach to making a planned rise to the top levels of American university football. When the school opened he

outlined those steps in a newspaper interview:

This year [1965] we'll play a five game schedule against U.S. junior colleges and university freshmen teams and minor football teams on the Pacific Coast. In 1966 we should be able to compete against some small four year schools, as well as junior colleges. By 1967 we'll be playing Evergreen Conference schools in Washington, then in 1968 the Skyline Conference... It will be 1969 or 1970 before we can tackle-literally or figuratively-teams on the Big Ten or major independent level.(98)

The process of building such a high performance university athletic program involved recruiting local and national players using scholarships either awarded by the University(99) or by private donors. The first private awards came from the B.C. Lions football club (three were available at \$300 each per year)(100) while a Board of Governors member, Fred Dietrich of Dietrich-Collins, put forward a \$500 scholarship. These were the first officially sanctioned American style athletic scholarships ever instituted at a Canadian university.

Yet, despite these optimistic financial developments, several problems threatened to sidetrack Davies' program to develop Simon Fraser University athletics into one of the "best" programs on the Pacific Coast. Interestingly, despite the professed desire of the administration to have a football team competitive enough to compete with the best west coast American university football programs, (the cost of which could reach \$1 million annually) the initial budget for operating the athletic program (excluding salaries) was just \$25,110--a sum far below the the one million dollars that Davies estimated would be needed

annually to field a top university team.(101)

Without question, the amount of university funds dedicated to the athletic program was the crucial determinant affecting the level of competition at which the SFU sports teams would eventually settle. Thus, the rationales supporting the allocation of such a small amount of money to fund the University's program of athletic excellence are well worth exploring.

The budgetary process at Simon Fraser was democratic in nature with each Dean submitting his proposed budget to a meeting of all the Deans for discussion. In this open fashion the formation of the initial athletic budget was influenced and approved by the University faculty before being submitted to the Board of Governors for approval. From the available evidence it is unclear as to whether the upper echelon of the administration could have allocated more University funds into the athletic program in order to reach its well publicized goal for the football team. Certainly, the enthusiasm among the Board of Governors for an enhanced athletic program did not extend to the point where the financing of the endeavour would never be a major concern. With regard to the prospect of the Board unilaterally increasing the budget for athletics in opposition to the faculty decisions, the opinion of Board member Arnold Hean represents the opinion of the majority. He stated that: "from my viewpoint what money there is should be spent on the correct academic programs and not on sports."(102) On the question of the Board providing

leadership by putting up the large amount of funds necessary to maintain a high level athletic program he notes that "we discussed that, but no way could we do it."(103)

SFU President McTaggart-Cowan felt that the budgetary process was a fair one and "a matter of striking a balance. The football portion was their fair share."(104) In a letter to the author, Education Dean MacKinnon thought that the initial athletic budget "was enough to get the program in operation...In fact, a larger athletic budget could very easily have created the impression that the University was now embarked on what you [the author] have referred to as an American style collegiate athletic program."(105) In summary, the Board of Governors actively supported the idea of maintaining the SFU athletic program at a high level provided that there were no negative effects financially or academically. It appears that the cost of financing an expensive Pacific Coast athletic program was too great a price for the SFU Board to pay. As Arnold Hean put it:

We were inclined to agree with Gordon [Shrum] that we wanted recognition for the university and, as long as it didn't detract from the University in any way dollarwise or academically, we wanted to push it as far as we could.(106)

Thus, the constraints on the emergence of the SFU athletic program become apparent. The University's administrative leaders were willing to support the uplifting of athletics to a more central place within the University's academic program but they also would not allow a high level athletic program to become a



significant drain on the academic funding base. Viewed from perspective, it seems unlikely that SFU's administrators would have funded an athletic program on the scale of a University of Washington or UCLA unless it was supported by outside money. Along these lines, it appears that the decision makers were expecting gate receipts to provide some of the financing to help the athletic department expand its budgets.

In view of funding and facility constraints, the University's officials decided to produce a limited program of intercollegiate sports, at least until more funding became available.(107) To make use of the newly built gymnasium and swimming pool facilities, basketball and swimming intercollegiate programs were established while the relatively more expensive football program was initiated because, according to McTaggart-Cowan, "as much as anything, it was the competition from well coached teams immediately south of the border, plus the fact that football ranked higher than rugby or soccer in the completely illogical scale of intercollegiate activities both in Canada and the United States."(108) As well, the fact that some of the Board members (Gordon Shrum, Alan Eyre, Fred Dietrich, and Fred Bolton) were avid supporters of football may have also played a role in the decision.

Also of interest concerning the initial organization of the athletic program was that there was no student input on the policy making level (i.e. on an athletic board similar to UBC's Men's Athletic Committee).(109) The University did not levy a

student athletic fee but instead paid for the entire athletic program out of general University funds. An examination of the backgrounds of the coaches in the three sports instituted in 1965 shows that they were either American trained Canadians (football: Lorne Davies; basketball: John Kootnekoff) or American citizens (swimming: Paul Savage).

Also, there was no "traditional" academic model of physical education. One reason for this was the University's central mandate which was to avoid duplicating UBC's course offerings in the same area. Additional opposition to a physical education program came from Education Dean Archie MacKinnon who perceived the traditional Canadian model of university physical education to be "an amalgam of questionable practices, which in general had a very low reputé in most university settings." (110) Within MacKinnon's overall aim to raise the academic image of athletics in the University, an important sub-concern was the status of the coaches and administrators within the University's structure. MacKinnon felt that they should be regarded as "intrinsically important members of the total faculty." and credits the President, as a former Rhodes Scholar, with supporting him completely on the educational philosophy behind the Physical Development Centre. (111)

Once Davies was selected as athletic director and head football coach, and had initiated the development of the athletic program, the vision of a powerful University athletic program had to be grounded in the reality of a university still in the

construction phase. Problems arose. The campus wasn't even available for potential athletes to view. Probably the most pressing concern in the summer of 1965 was the lack of detailed information on the University's academic programs with which coaches could recruit athletes. Compounding the problem was that the University athletic awards were not even legitimized by the Board of Governors until June 21st. These events acted to delay Davies's moves towards building a credible football program quickly. An important concern for first year athletes was the daunting prospect that they would have to wait three seasons of their four year career before Simon Fraser would begin to play four year colleges and universities. Faced with these and other obstacles, a number of talented B.C. high school football players accepted offers to attend universities south of the border (notably, Henry Grenda, Bob Fitzpatrick and Dave Golinsky accepted offers to Washington State to play football). Yet, despite these problems, thirty financial awards were accepted by first year SFU athletes and the athletic department moved into its first season.

While the football players were the first students on the new campus it was Dr. Shrum who continued in his self-appointed role as 'the University's p.r. man'. At the official opening of the University he promised the University of British Columbia that SFU would have winning teams, "even if we have to buy them." (112) The plaques for the buildings were then unveiled and, in a footnote worth recording for posterity, it was Shrum

who unveiled the plaque for the gymnasium.(113) The process of building the new University was complete save for the ongoing development of campus cultural institutions in all areas of university life.

### Simon Fraser and the Dependency "Trap"

At that point, the development of the SFU athletic program was virtually complete with all of its major features present. However, one key component that would act to mold its future development was the conference affiliation, which would determine its scheduling of competition for years to come. All Canadian universities belonged to their regional university athletic associations, membership in which entitled them to representation in the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union, the national governing body. Thus, to become a member of the CIAU and compete for the Canadian national university championships, Simon Fraser had first to apply for membership in the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Association and agree to abide by its constitution and bylaws.

There is no evidence to suggest that Simon Fraser University made any plans during its early years to become a conference member of the WCIAA. First, the key actors in the development of the SFU athletic program (Shrum, McTaggart-Cowan, and Davies) were very much opposed to the anti-scholarships policies and traditional de-emphasis of athletics espoused by the western Canadian universities. They were not willing to give up the core

concept of scholarships in order to join the conference.(114) Athletic scholarships were much too central to the whole philosophy of an athletic program that was already well publicized by Gordon Shrum and others. For President McTaggart-Cowan the issue was clear cut: "We really did not care about the CIAU because we had no intention of competing in that league." For him a perceived lack of quality competition for SFU and poor coaching among the Canadian universities were key reasons for the administration. As well, McTaggart-Cowan was influenced by the huge transportation costs associated with competing in the CIAU as opposed to the lower cost travel involved with playing in a north-south competition configuration with very competitive universities and colleges in Washington and Oregon.(115) The President gives part of the credit for his support of athletic scholarships to the financial assistance he received as a Rhodes Scholars student-athlete at Oxford during the 1930's. At SFU he also wanted to 'remove the feeling of guilt' involved in hypocritical under-the-table payments to athletes and wanted 'to make the system honest.'(116) 'I was determined that Simon Fraser would be honest and that it would be far better to take the criticism from the dishonest than to join them.'(117)

Within the athletic department, the comments of Lorne Davies as the athletic director echoed these sentiments but for him, in the summer of 1965, the question of conference affiliation was not an important concern. More important to a new athletic

department with young teams composed mainly of first year players was the need to arrange games against freshman and junior college teams during the next two years. In his first year as athletic director with a budget of only \$25,110 for three teams Davies "wasn't certain what we were going to do but we certainly weren't going to lock ourselves into an expensive conference."(118)

As well, his personal stand against the policies of the other Canadian universities was particularly strong. He alleged that their under-the-table payments were "teaching the kids to cheat."(119) He also railed against:

The hypocrisy of so many institutions saying they don't have any athletic awards yet we have had people from our campus recruited by other institutions from right off our campus. By institutions that supposedly don't have athletic scholarships.(120)

With the western universities, especially UBC, being singularly opposed to the idea of athletic scholarships both sides refused to budge on the issue. Simon Fraser was already publicly committed to a policy of 'honest' athletic scholarships and enhanced athletic excellence but for the other universities, constrained as much as anything by internal political opposition to the awarding of financial aid to athletes, there was little possibility that they could concede to the SFU position. Such a move would be tantamount to confirmation that they were hypocritical in their athletic policies.

Thus, locked into these positions, and reinforced by personal acrimony and institutional rivalries, the two groups

were unable and unwilling to come to some form of agreement whereby SFU could join the WCIAA. Despite this ongoing issue, Simon Fraser continued the development of its athletic program as an independent and, in 1968, three years after the opening of the university on September 1, 1965, the athletic department applied for, and was accepted as the second Canadian member of the United States based National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.(121) As Lorne Davies noted at the time, 'We feel that being asked to join the NAIA is another big step towards reaching our goal of being recognized as having the finest athletic program in the country.'(122)

Thus, the major portion of the construction of the athletic model that would control the development of Simon Fraser University's intercollegiate athletic program for the next few decades was complete. A product of a unique historical, political, and cultural context and of one man's personal vision, the SFU program glorified imported American techniques and tactics in intercollegiate athletics. American superiority in sport was seen to lie in their professionalized university athletic system. According to SFU planners, this superiority could be countered by a Canadian "adaptation" of those tactics in pursuit of a nobler cause than the Americans'. The SFU model took aim at reducing the 'brawn drain' to the U.S. universities and claimed to champion a Canadian national identity which was under attack in all areas of Canadian cultural life. However, the strategy employed to do this was in itself a major concession

to the professionalizing forces inherent in American culture.

Clearly, the wisdom of Canadians using the tactics and ideas of the dominant metropolitan culture threatening to subsume Canadian society in order to prevent that subsumation must be questioned. The decision makers at Simon Fraser, themselves influenced through a lifelong exposure to United States culture, perceived a fault in the Canadian university athletic system through the lens of cultural dependency. In their eyes American style athletic practices were seen to be 'modern' and 'progressive'. The traditional Canadian program by contrast was viewed as archaic and hypocritical. Cultural power subtly entered a debate about the definition of quality in athletic programs and the irony of the Simon Fraser strategy was ignored.



Notes

1. For a first person account of the birth of Simon Fraser University see Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography with Peter Stursberg, edited by CLive Cocking. (Vancouver: UBC Press 1986).
2. One of the original SFU Board of Governors, Alan Eyre, who was also involved with the B.C. Lions as a director, commented in an interview that the SFU athletic program "was a response to what we thought UBC would have been nice to have been." Statement by Alan Eyre in personal interview with Steve Campbell 31 July 1985.
3. Shrum chaired a Royal Commission on the B.C. Power Commission, accepted Bennett's offer of the B.C. Energy Board and later became head of B.C. Electric (later B.C. Hydro) from 1961-72.
4. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography, p.107. Also see statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview with Steve Campbell 23 July 1985. McTaggart-Cowan first met Shrum in 1929 in his first year as a combined honours math and physics student at UBC. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan 6 May 1986 in letter to Steve Campbell 6 May 1986.
5. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview with Steve Campbell 9 August 1983.
6. Statements by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983, Alan Eyre in personal interview, 31 July 1985.
7. Statements by Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985, Dr. Harry Warren in personal interview, 11 August 1985, Harry Franklin in personal interview, 22 July 1985.
8. Statements by Maury Van Vliet in personal interview, 22 September 1985, and Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985. As hiring advisor to UBC President Leonard S. Klinck (1918-44) Shrum interviewed and selected both Van Vliet and Osborne to become members of the university staff dealing with physical education and athletics. Osborne's mission, however, was academic in nature. He was to organize and develop UBC's first academic program in physical education.
9. Statements by Robert F. Osborne, 11 September 1985, Harry Franklin, 22 July 1985. See G.M. Shrum's letter to the editor of the Ubyyssey 14 February 1928 p.2 in which he entered the university wide debate as to whether the students should grant football the status of major sport. He noted that 'It is my personal opinion that any minor sport that attracts a squad of players for practice five times per week at 7:45 am for a period of nearly three years, and at the end of this period can turn out

a record twenty three men for an intermediate game, should be raised to a major status. The winners of the Lipton Cup this year were virtually inter-collegiate champions of Western Canada. If the students decide to make this game a major sport, then it is no strain upon my imagination to look forward and see UBC winning the Intercollegiate Championship of Canada from McGill, Queen's and Toronto Varsity.'

10. See UBC Totems (1915-66) for historical information and photographs on athletics and other student activities at the University of British Columbia. Special Collections, UBC Library. For an interesting study on the prehistory of the University of British Columbia and the role of physical activity, games and sports in the debate about where the university should be located see R. Cole Harris, "Locating the University of British Columbia" B.C. Studies No.32 Winter 1976-77.

11. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983. SFU Board of Governor Alan Eyre considered Shrum and Gordon Burke to be the two progenitors of UBC football. Statement in personal interview, 31 July 1985.

12. Statements by Maury Van Vliet in personal interview, 22 September 1985, Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985.

13. Statements by Maury Van Vliet in personal interview, 22 September 1985, Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

14. Statement by Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985.

15. Statements by Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985, Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

16. Statements by Harry Franklin in personal interview, 22 July 1985.

17. The highly successful Thunderbird basketball team of 1945-46 was used to spearhead a province-wide fundraising campaign to build the War Memorial Gymnasium at UBC. The building was completed in 1951.

18. The first meeting of the Men's Athletic Committee, as the policy making apparatus for the men's athletic program, was held on March 17, 1952.

19. Robinette subsequently resigned as athletic director and an interim director, Dick Penn, was appointed until R.J. Phillips was appointed to the permanent position in July, 1953.

20. Statements by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983, and Maury Van Vliet in personal interview, 22 September 1985. A principal concern here was that Van Vliet would taint the University's athletes with the professionalized approach of the American university system from which he emigrated.
21. Statements by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983, and Dick Mitchell in personal interview, 24 July 1985.
22. Estimates of attendances at UBC football games range from one to eight thousand fans per game. At that time the professional football B.C. Lions were not in existence and UBC dominated the Vancouver market.
23. See the comments of Robert F. Osborne, UBC head of Physical Education, on the value of athletic scholarships in competing for football players in the collegiate labour market. Don McClean "Athletic Director UBC's Crying Need", Vancouver News Herald, 31 October 1950, p. 6.
24. See note 26 in Chapter 3. The Rhodes Scholarships are considered to be the major precedent for the institution of athletic scholarships at many American universities since the Scholarships were first established by Cecil Rhodes in 1902.
25. In 1936 Pringle was the first recipient of the Bobby Gaul Trophy as UBC's outstanding male graduating athlete. See Pringle Memorial Bursary in the UBC Calendar Appendix-Awards description. There are a number of these types of awards at UBC.
26. First party awards refer to the university controlling the awarding of financial aid to the student who is the second party. Third party aid refers to the process whereby the student receives financial support from individuals or groups outside the university's financial control.
27. R.J. Moriarty, The Organizational History of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union Central (CIAUC) 1906-1955, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University 1971. Scattered throughout this dissertation are a number of events detailing the concern of various universities with regard to alleged under-the-table payments to athletes.
28. Guy Lewis, in his article 'The Beginning of Organized Collegiate Sport' American Quarterly Vol.22:1 (September 1970) credited publicity from the media as integral to the beginning of university sport in the United States. "Intercollegiate sport was in large measure the product of a favorable press during the decade following the Civil War. This publicity encouraged participation because the outcome of events was considered 'sacredly connected with the glory of Alma Mater herself.' No other factor was more important in determining the nature and

extent of organized collegiate sport." P.229.

29. Statement by Harry Warren in personal interview, 11 August 1985.

30. Statement by J.V. Clyne (member of UBC Senate). UBC Senate Minutes, 17 October 1951. The minutes read "Mr. Justice Clyne questioned the reasons for recommending a change in status in this Department [of Physical Education] and criticized the policy of giving degrees for participation in activities and games, and the emphasis given by the Department of Physical Education to American football."

31. Three members of the Quarterback Club, a community and alumni athletic support group, appeared at the contentious AMS Council Meeting of 16 October, 1950 demanding to know, "What are you going to do about football?" The incident followed on the heels of a 47-7 home loss to Western Washington and a post-game student demonstration demanding greater assistance to a team which had only won two games in four seasons. The agenda item at the meeting was the issue of financial aid for football players.

32. UBC Senate Minutes, 13 December 1950.

33. UBC Senate Minutes, 13 May 1952. One member of the committee, a UBC basketball alumnus, Mr. Harry Franklin, noted later that the committee was heavily weighted with individuals lined up on the amateur side of the issue. Statement by Harry Franklin in personal interview, 22 July 1985.

34. Statement by Harry Franklin, former secretary of the Quarterback Club, in personal interview, 22 July 1985. In fact, a membership list for the Quarterback Club dated 12 February 1949 shows two future Simon Fraser University Board of Governors, Fred Dietrich and Fred Bolton, as members. Source: Alma Mater Society Archives, The University of British Columbia.

35. Statement by Harry Franklin in personal interview, 22 July 1985.

36. A number of personal interviews have confirmed that the story was perceived by many to be a significant historical precedent in the struggle over UBC's athletic program. In an interview Shrum himself brought up the story without prompting and considered it a turning point in his own historical relationship with UBC athletics. A number of others recall basically the same story. See note 37.

37. Personal anecdotes from that meeting include the story that Robinette went to the telephone to confirm with Johnson the arrangement but just as he was dialing the number Shrum reportedly asked, with an eye towards UBC's entrance standards,

"Wait, can he speak French?" to which Robinette replied, "French? I'm not even sure he has English!" Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983. Separate personal interviews with Gordon Shrum (August 9, 1983), former assistant football coach Dick Mitchell (July 24, 1985) and Quarterback Club secretary Harry Franklin (July 22, 1985) all acknowledge the John Henry Johnson story, a story which quickly assumed almost mythical proportions as Johnson went on to star in the CFL and the NFL. He is still the eighth leading all-time rusher in the NFL.

38. Maury Van Vliet, Robert Osborne, Harry Franklin, Patrick McTaggart-Cowan and Lorne Davies.

39. Statement by Herb Capozzi in personal interview, 18 September 1985.

40. Statements by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983, Dick Mitchell in personal interview, 24 July 1985, Harry Franklin in personal interview, 22 July 1985, and Harry Warren in personal interview, 11 August 1985.

41. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography, p. 14.

42. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

43. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

44. For a history of the University of British Columbia see Tuum Est: A History of the University of British Columbia, Colonel Harry T. Logan (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1958) P. 132.

45. "UBC Will Teach Teachers in Sport" Vancouver Sun 15 June 1938. p. 14.

46. See the 1928 selection of letters to the editor, including Shrum's, in the Ubyyssey newspaper debating as to whether the students should make the growing sport of football a major sport in the university as was rugby. The vehemence of the debate indicates the depth of feeling within the university community on the issue. The Ubyyssey 14 February 1928 p.2.

47. Statement by Harry Warren in personal interview, 11 August 1985.

48. Statements by Robert F. Osborne in personal interview, 11 September 1985, Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

49. Statements by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August

1983, Dick Mitchell in personal interview, 24 July 1985.

50. Statement by Dick Mitchell in personal interview, 24 July 1985.

51. "[Dr. Shrum] had a very substantial involvement with university athletics at UBC. He had also had in the latter experience intense moments of frustration where he saw athletics being relegated to a peripheral position with the attendant results." Letter A.R. MacKinnon to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.

52. John B. Macdonald, Higher Education in British Columbia and a Plan for the Future also known as The Macdonald Report. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1962) p.8.

53. Ibid. p.14.

54. Ibid. p. 64, 75.

55. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography. p. 97.

56. Ibid., p. 105.

57. Ibid., p. 105.

58. Shrum first publicly announced his athletic policy plans during a speech at the UBC Men's Big Block Awards Banquet on March 11, 1964. An article in The Ubyyssey noted that 'He said that Simon Fraser Academy will have athletic scholarships as long as the students have the academic requirements. "I don't feel that a student should be refused an athletic scholarship or bursary if he needs the money," he said.' The Ubyyssey 15 March 1964 p.6.

59. Ibid.

60. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

61. Statement by Alan Eyre in personal interview, 31 July 1985.

62. Statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview, 23 July 1985.

63. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

64. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

65. Statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview, 23 July 1985.

66. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography, p. 97.

67. There is little doubt that Shrum selected the President and presented the appointment to the Board of Governors for ratification, a process which he considered a formality. Statement by Alan Eyre in personal interview, 31 July 1985.

68. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

69. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography, p. 107.

70. Vancouver Province March 24, 1964.

71. Canadian Weekly August 29-September 4, 1964 p.4.

72. Vancouver Sun March 20, 1964.

73. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

74. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

75. Shrum was hoping to attract Minnesota Vikings head coach Bud Grant (statement in personal interview 9 August 1983) or Russ Jackson, quarterback of the Ottawa Roughriders ( New Westminster Columbian, 28 May 1964), as the new SFU head football coach.

76. Vancouver Sun, 13 March 1964. Actually, Shrum's announcement on athletic scholarships occurred a few days earlier at the UBC Men's Big Block Awards Banquet but was only released by the media in time for March 13th.

77. Ibid.

78. Toronto Telegram, 14 March 1964.

79. See Richard S. Gruneau, John G. Albinson, Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspectives (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Canada Ltd. 1976) Preface p.xi.

80. In its early years Simon Fraser University suffered from student radicalism and faculty unrest and thus earned the media nickname 'Berkeley North'.

81. At Simon Fraser, a survey conducted in 1967 showed that 68% of its faculty were non-Canadian. The majority of these individuals were American.

82. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography, p. 108. The first athletic scholarship fund at SFU was allocated \$10,950 which was the same amount received by the activity scholarship fund. The approval

of these awards occurred on June 21, 1965.

83. A.R. MacKinnon letter to Steve Campbell, 12 May 1986.

84. Patrick McTaggart-Cowan letter to J.H. Wyman, Chairman, Intercollegiate Athletic Review Committee, Simon Fraser University, 9 December 1971.

85. A.R. MacKinnon letter to Steve Campbell, 12 May 1986.

86. Simon Fraser University Department of Athletics statement quoted in the Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 October 1965 p. 35.

87. Vancouver Sun, 17 March 1964.

88. The Ubyyssey, 26 March 1964.

89. Vancouver Sun, 3 April 1964. "Capozzi Raps UBC Over Lack of Leadership."

90. Vancouver Sun, 9 April 1964.

91. See survey comments from the sports community in Vancouver Sun, 14 March 1964 "Athletes Endorse SFU's Program", 17 March 1964 "Shrum on Right Track".

92. Vancouver Sun, 14 March 1964.

93. Vancouver Sun, 14 March 1964.

94. Vancouver Sun, 17 March 1964.

95. Vancouver Sun, 17 March 1964.

96. Davies, a special assistant coach with the B.C. Lions had also coached the Vancouver Blue Bombers to three B.C. Junior championships. He also played football at Western Washington University in Bellingham and had been an assistant coach there and also with the University of Oregon freshmen. Davies also received his university education in the United States and obtained a Master of Science degree in Physical Education from the University of Oregon. He was an assistant football coach at UBC when he accepted the SFU position.

97. Vancouver Times, 11 March 1965.

98. Trail Daily Times, 8 September 1965. The story was from the Canadian Press wire service and was entitled "Football Fever Running High at newly built Simon Fraser University".

99. The first fund for athletic awards at SFU was allocated \$10,950 by the Board of Governors for the 1965-66 school year



with the provision that each athletic award could be less than but not more than \$219. SFU Board of Governors Minutes 21 June 1965. Also passed at the same time were university academic funds for general activity awards (\$10,950), scholarships for first class students (\$10,950) and general bursaries (\$35,150). Included in the minutes was this addendum concerning the maintenance of university academic standards: "Satisfactory academic standards must be maintained at all times. If the student finds it necessary to curtail his athletic activities in order to maintain academic standards, he will not be required to relinquish any part of the award."

100. These scholarships had been offered earlier to the University of Victoria on the stipulation that Victoria hire a football coach as athletic director. As Victoria could not afford a football coach or a program the offer was turned down. The move was part of a general Lions strategy to upgrade their talent feeder system from the local provincial universities. Victoria Times, 27 March 1965.

101. Lorne Davies' story of his meeting with Chancellor Shrum subsequent to his receiving his first athletic budget of \$25,110 is illuminating in this regard.

'When I got my budget I went down to see Dr. Shrum, he was the Chairman of B.C. Hydro at that time, and I asked him if he knew what it cost to play in the Rose Bowl. So I explained to him that the Rose Bowl teams are chosen as the winner of the Big Ten and the winner of the Pac 8 and to get there you had to be a member of either of those conferences.

It would cost us roughly one million a year. I think he was quite shocked at the amount of money it would cost. He just said "Do the best you can." He wasn't against it, it was just that he didn't have the money to pump out an additional \$900,000.' Statement by Lorne Davies in personal interview, 14 August 1985.

102. Statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview, 23 July 1985.

103. Statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview, 23 July 1985.

104. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

105. Letter A.R. MacKinnon to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.

106. Statement by Arnold Hean in personal interview, 23 July 1985.

107. See Lorne Davies comments to the Board of Governors on the constraints of the facilities on the developing athletic program in the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Governors,

Simon Fraser University, 26 March 1965. Also A.R. MacKinnon letter to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.

108. Patrick McTaggart-Cowan letter to J.H. Wyman 3 December 1971.

109. Statement by Lorne Davies in personal interview, 29 April 1986.

110. A.R. MacKinnon letter to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.

111. A.R. MacKinnon letter to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.

112. New Westminster Columbian, 10 September 1965.

113. New Westminster Columbian, 10 September 1965.

114. Statement by Gordon Shrum in personal interview, 9 August 1983.

115. Patrick McTaggart-Cowan letter to Intercollegiate Athletic Review Committee at SFU 9 December 1971; Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

116. Statement by Patrick McTaggart-Cowan in letter to Steve Campbell, 6 May 1986.

117. Patrick McTaggart-Cowan letter to Intercollegiate Athletic Review Committee at SFU 9 December 1971.

118. Statement by Lorne Davies in personal interview, 29 April 1986.

119. Statement by Lorne Davies in personal interview, 29 April 1986.

120. Statement by Lorne Davies in personal interview, 29 April 1986.

121. The first Canadian university to join the NAIA was Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario which joined in 1967 and remained there until the formation of the Great Plains Athletic Conference as a prairie regional conference within the CIAU in the early 1970s.

122. Lorne Davies memorandum to Simon Fraser University Bursar Don Ross, 9 May 1968.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes material discussed throughout the thesis in order to provide answers to the five problem questions stated in the introduction.

- 1) What was the historical, economic, and cultural context of the Simon Fraser decision?
- 2) How did that context influence the decisions made by key actors in the creation of Simon Fraser's sports program?
- 3) Why were the proponents of an American style athletics program successful at Simon Fraser at a time when no other Canadian university had such a program?
- 4) How do answers to these questions square with the public reasons given by university officials for orienting SFU's athletic program towards the American model?
- 5) What implications for Canadian sport can be drawn from the SFU decision?

What was the historical, economic and cultural context of the Simon Fraser decision?

I have argued that the decision of Simon Fraser University athletic policy makers to orient their athletic program along an "American style" model occurred in the context of intensifying American domination across the spectrum of Canadian society and culture. In economics, the evidence examined in chapter one indicates clearly the dominance of American business culture during the 20th century expressed through the mechanisms of foreign direct and indirect investment. The close geographic location of Canada to the United States made it an extremely valuable market for the surplus production of American corporations and it quickly became America's largest and most important foreign market.

Pressures on Canadian business were paralleled by similar developments in the cultural realm. Mass produced magazines, newspapers, films and other cultural events in the United States spilled over north of the border as the need for additional sales led entrepreneurs to aggressively pursue Canadian markets. The Canadian media were gradually overwhelmed by cost efficient U.S. media which, with their greater economies of scale of production, came to dominate Canadian radio and television programming with cheaper American sitcoms, dramas and news coverage.

The ascendancy of American influence over the Canadian economy and culture signalled a reduction of Canadian dependency on Britain for her economic and cultural lead. While Britain was

still a powerful actor on the global scene, the financial effects of two world wars during the twentieth century acted to force the British to fall back economically and established the United States as the developing new world economic power. In Canada, American economic growth during the 20th century resulted in an expansion of American foreign direct investment to the point during the 1960's where American corporations controlled many of the markets in the Canadian economy and exerted a controlling influence on the direction and development of the national economy from outside its boundaries.

Within the cultural context, the retreat of British influence over Canadian anglophone culture occurred at a much slower pace. The legacy of British imperial culture persisted well into the 20th century and, in a residual form, continues to exist today. However, U.S. economic influence acted to ensure that American cultural practices and attitudes would be continuously offered to the Canadian population as acceptable and 'modern'. The development of a Canadian consumer culture parallel to that of the Americans has tied Canada even closer to American capitalism during the twentieth century. In this consumer culture, the capitalist market process rapidly expanded to include many untapped areas of society, including a wide range of leisure activities and, more specifically, sport.

The institutional development of Canadian sport began during the colonial period largely under the direction of an imported British middle-class sports culture. By the late nineteenth

century, the philosophy of amateurism had become the dominant element in the institutional structuring of sport. Amateurism continued to exert a residual influence on the direction and development of Canadian sport for much of the 20th century.

Yet, the pressures of capitalist enterprise in Canada led entrepreneurs to attempt to harness sport as an area for potential profit. It was the early entrepreneurs who developed commercialized sport forms in Canada as areas for capital accumulation. In hockey, the pattern of paying players to participate first developed in the rural towns and communities of Canada before the turn of the century where the townspeople were willing to pay to watch their community teams. There, in the hard working conditions of mining towns, the upper class culture of the amateur ideal in sport held little influence on the working classes. Furthermore, when commercialized hockey presented an opportunity to skilled players to add to the meager wages of resource industry work few were in a position to turn it down in order to maintain their amateur status. The commercialization of hockey and the professionalization of its player labour market developed rapidly.

The formation of the National Hockey League in 1917 and its continentalization during the 1920's reflected the Americanization of the national economy and culture. The NHL (initially based in Canada) assumed control of the potentially lucrative hockey market in the northeastern United States during the 1920's and faced little competition in promoting the sport

there. Once the majority of the franchises were located in the United States, the NHL became controlled by American capital. Its development as the dominant hockey organization in North America led to policies which gradually extended its domination and control of the Canadian hockey labour markets in Canada and the entire institutional structure of Canadian hockey. In summary, it was the NHL, as the first corporate form of commercialized sport in Canada, which provided the leadership in the expansion and refinement of a commercialized sports culture and its attendant values.

The development of Canadian football occurred along different time lines. Dominated by the British amateur rugby tradition and by the growth and development of university football in central Canadian universities, the commodification of football occurred later than in hockey. The residual cultural strength of the amateur tradition delayed the overt professionalization of the game until after the second World War and did not allow the consolidation of professional football until well into the 1950s. As well, an important point in the development of Canadian football as a capitalist enterprise was its inability to break into the lucrative American professional football market. This stands as an important reason why professional football in Canada has failed to reach the profitability standards of the National Hockey League.

The historical development of Canadian football has also been greatly affected by regional conflicts between western and

eastern football interests. During the course of football's development, the west continually led the east in attempts to institute rule changes and professionalize the game. But the intransigence of the conservative eastern football establishment interests to many of the changes acted to delay the ratification of any new rules. While this occurred, the importing of better skilled football players and coaches from the United States led to the adoption and adaptation of techniques, slang, and tactics from south of the border.

It is well known that the Canadian universities played important roles in the development and refinement of the sports of hockey and football. As institutions which largely served the privileged classes, Canadian universities were the fountainhead of the amateur ideal. The individuals they graduated assumed roles in the national organizations which enabled them to reproduce and develop Canada's amateur sporting traditions. Canadian universities, like their American counterparts, were the dominant agents in football during its earliest periods until the 1920's when the commercialized club operations began to dominate central Canadian football. The amateur tradition was extremely powerful in Canadian university sports programs. Yet, nowhere were the contradictions of amateur sport more evident. Many university sport programs were also characterized by under-the-table "professionalism". Furthermore, a considerable number of the early professionalizing innovations in football, primarily in response to developments in the popular,



commercialized collegiate game south of the border, originated in Canadian universities. Football soon came to be dominated by the major schools, all of which gradually came to depend upon the revenues from its continued commercialization. The need to maintain gate receipts led to the imposition of an autocratic intercollegiate organization (the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union) whose policies exacerbated the inter- and intra-regional conflicts that occasionally developed in response to attempts by smaller universities to gain more power within the organization.

Accompanying these changes, American collegiate athletics continued to gain significance as a role model for people working in university sports programs. American university athletic programs became commercialized and professionalized during the nineteenth century with little effective opposition from within the schools themselves. Yet, in the Canadian universities the same development was prevented by a more effective opposition. In the United States, professional coaches, training tables, a highly rationalized system of recruiting, athletic scholarships and subsidization of athletes all became standard practices for the universities in the American system before the first World War. The weakness of the British amateur tradition in the United States and the financial needs of privately funded colleges combined with a lack of faculty control of athletics to allow a rapid professionalization of athletic programs. The extension of the American colleges' talent feeder network into Canada during

the post-World War II era greatly affected public perceptions in Canada of a "brawn drain" of athletes to the United States which resembled closely the economic relationship of Canada and the United States.

In Canadian universities, however, the entrenchment of values of versatility in university life, coupled with a romantic conception of amateurism and a strong tradition of faculty involvement and guidance in student affairs, presented a structured impediment to professionalism. In the Canadian universities, the faculty became involved in the athletic affairs of the students and enacted controls on the development of athletics which delayed and deflected the imposition of a professional structure on university athletics for much of the twentieth century. Amateur attitudes prevailed on Canadian campuses and opposed all attempts to legitimize athletic scholarships and recruiting networks as integral university techniques for attracting top athletes to attend university and play for university teams. Furthermore, as Canadian universities began to receive state funding the public relations and alumni fundraising aspects of sports programs were less significant.

On an administrative level, the autocratic behavior of the powerful central Canadian universities (Toronto, McGill, and Queen's) within the misnamed Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union--there were no members from the west or the Atlantic regions--led to hard feelings in universities and colleges. This was true both within the central Canadian region as well as in

the outer regions which, as in the case of western professional football interests, felt that they were being ignored by the central Canadian "family compact." The breakup of the CIAU in 1955 was largely a result of the unbending behavior of the major universities in the face of the growth and development of many Canadian universities and colleges in the post-war period.

In the west, the universities were faced with other important issues in their conference relations. Although originally established in 1920 the Western Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union was unable to maintain a consistent schedule due principally to two factors: travel costs and geography. The huge distances between the western universities simply could not be bridged by rail on a regular basis. The time spent away from studies and the costs associated with long journeys led to ad hoc scheduling that depended precariously on a variety of funding sources that differed from year to year. As well, the level of competition varied from university to university and it was difficult to ensure quality competition between their athletic programs. These factors plus the intractability of the CIAU in central Canada led universities in the west to explore alternative policies for their athletic development.

At UBC, in Vancouver, these problems were particularly acute because the nearest Canadian university was the University of Alberta in Edmonton. As well, the competitive situation between UBC and the prairie universities up until the late 1960's was

disparate with UBC teams considered much stronger. This situation, combined with the University's close geographic position to the state of Washington and the large number of American universities and colleges there led to the adoption of an athletic policy advocating competition against schools from the Pacific Northwest, in the absence of any regularized Canadian alternatives. The lack of consistent and predictable competition within a western Canadian conference did not really end until the late 1960's.

The importing of football coaches from the United States strengthened UBC's North-South ties. These coaches brought with them American techniques, attitudes, and ideals and attempted to implement American models of collegiate football against the opposition of individuals supporting British sports traditions. A key agent in the development of the UBC football program was a member of the UBC faculty, Dr. Gordon Shrum. He was a notable factor during his 36 year career in the importating of American sporting values into the direction and development of athletics at the University of British Columbia.

The post-war economic and baby booms resulted in two key processes relevant to the arguments put forward in earlier chapters. First, the university system in Canada expanded very rapidly with student enrollments doubling and doubling again. Second, the dramatic increase in student enrollments at the universities caught many academic planners unaware. In British Columbia, the 1962 Macdonald Report to Premier W.A.C. Bennett,

recommended an urgent, immediate planned expansion of the provincial university system, including an entirely new four year university located somewhere in the Fraser Valley. In response to the report, the Bennett government awarded the task of building the university to Dr. Gordon Shrum. After his retirement from UBC at age 65, Shrum had worked exceptionally hard for the provincial government and Premier W.A.C. Bennett on a number of government projects. Because of the perceived urgency of university construction, Shrum was given a considerable amount of autonomy to build the university as he saw fit. Evidence suggests that Shrum was the sole person in charge of the initial development phase of the university and, generally, was able to successfully manipulate the course of the university's development towards fulfilling his own ideal model of a modern university.

During the initial organization of the university Shrum held great power in the selection of the individuals who would form the upper administrative levels of the University. Generally, he appointed or recommended the appointment of people to the Board of Governors who were from outside the university system. He also chose to work with people he already knew and, in some cases, who were also sympathetic to his ideas on university athletics. These factors, combined with Shrum's domineering personality, his command over the powerful positions of Chancellor and Chairman of the Board of Governors, and his long academic and athletic experience gave him a decisive advantage in

controlling the outcome of the university decision making process. It was this broad context of economic, cultural and geographical factors which provided the setting within which Simon Fraser University made its decision to implement an American style model of university athletics.

How did that context influence the decisions made by key actors in the creation of Simon Fraser's sports program?

There are two important points to consider with regard to the effect of the historical, economic and cultural context on the decision making process at Simon Fraser. First, well worth noting is that the time period of the SFU decision during the 1960's presented a wide range of policy options for Canadian decision makers. The post-war global economic boom, and the rise of the United States and American culture to a pre-eminent role model position for Canadians throughout Canadian society had not yet been encumbered by the Vietnam War and the 1960's American student riots and race disturbances. There were dramatically few negative aspects to the public image in Canada of American culture and no obvious reason for Canadian decisionmakers to oppose forms of dependency which seemed linked to affluence and cultural innovation. Nonetheless, residual British traditions in Canadian cultural institutions continued to offer policy options for Canadian decision makers. Indeed, Canadian university policy makers appeared to have had a wider and more varied range of policy options during the 1960's than they have had at any time

since, given the constraints of nationalist feeling which grew in the decades since that time.

Second, the student masses rushing to university in the 1960's created an almost crisis situation for the provincial government. In order to deal with what was perceived as a growing political problem, a new university would have to be built urgently. In its haste, the government handed the job of organizing and developing Simon Fraser University to Gordon Shrum, whose past experience had shown them, had the credentials to complete the job on time. In a real sense, due to the nature of his appointment and the task he faced, Shrum was given almost complete control of the University through his appointment as Chancellor and chief developer of the University. It was this unprecedented control that enabled him to direct the development of the University and, central to this study, position its athletic program towards a University model that suited his educational beliefs. In the final analysis, Shrum's power and influence within the incipient University structure was the decisive factor in determining the direction to be taken by SFU's athletic program.

Another important development within the University's athletic policy was Shrum's perspicacious use of advertising and promotional techniques to position Simon Fraser University within the public eye. Early on in the University's development Shrum perceived himself as the University's public relations man and managed to utilize the ongoing development of the athletic

program to keep the University (and himself) in the public eye. At a time when a number of other universities throughout Canada were also in the process of being constructed, Shrum's pronouncements and media 'style' helped SFU to gain a handsome share of all the new schools' publicity. There is no question that his flair for promotion utilized the fact that the growing media, especially television, were expanding rapidly and developing an eye for interesting news features for their audience.

The theme of regional east-west conflict in Canadian society generally, and in university athletics specifically also played an important role in providing a range of policies and an economic and cultural milieu that favoured Simon Fraser's north-south relations in university sport. The University of B.C.'s traditional sporting relations with the Pacific Northwest universities and colleges provided a useful precedent for Simon Fraser to follow (and one of which Shrum was well aware having been involvvely so closely with UBC athletics for so many years). The idea that high cost intra-provincial university sports competition should be maintained at the expense of the more economic local regional travel was also losing its force in the face of "continentalization" in other areas of economic and cultural life.

On an individual note, there is no question that Shrum's personal experiences as an athletic power broker at the University of British Columbia during the formative years of the



athletic program played a key role in influencing the development of Simon Fraser's athletic model away from the issues that had affected Shrum at the Point Grey campus. Chief among these concerns was the conflict that centered around athletic scholarships and financial aid to athletes. It was the confluence of all of these contextual factors which provided the opening for Simon Fraser University to institute its athletic program.

Why were the proponents of an American style athletics program successful at Simon Fraser University at a time when no other Canadian university had such a program?

The proponents of an American style program were successful in installing their particular university athletic model at Simon Fraser because of the unique circumstances surrounding the building of the University--circumstances that allowed little opposition to the University's development pattern. Essentially, the speed required to build the University in time for September, 1965 gave Shrum and his appointees a large amount of power and scope in the University's construction. Within this construction phase, and as W.A.C. Bennett's personal appointment, Shrum was able to play a primary leadership role in directing the development of all facets of the academic institution.

UBC had always had strong regional ties with American universities and this fact, combined with the aloofness of the central Canadian universities prevented western athletic policy

makers from realizing a truly national university athletic organization that would ground British Columbian universities in a solid tradition of national university support. A lack of that national tradition in the British Columbia sports community gave Simon Fraser policy makers additional latitude to enable them to fashion an athletic policy that emulated the American model.

It is important to note here that, at the time of the SFU policy decision towards implementing athletic scholarships the established B.C. university athletic tradition was already strongly influenced by the American model. UBC, for instance, had played American rules football for a number of years and influenced the decision of B.C. High School officials to institute American rules football in the high schools within UBC's talent feeder network. This policy would aid in the development of athletes for UBC's football program. As well, the majority of UBC's football coaches have been either American or American trained. The conditions present at Simon Fraser during the early days of the school simply provided the opportunity for key actors to institutionalize tendencies and practices that had been given only partial expression at UBC.

The number one issue at stake in the development of the university athletic model was the concept of athletic scholarships. Prevented from seeing their implementation at UBC, Shrum wanted to legitimize athletic scholarships within the bureaucratic structure. To overcome any opposition to their adoption, it was recommended that they be included in a system of

awards called activity scholarships. Following along Simon Fraser's policies of encouraging "excellence" in a wide variety of areas within the University, not just academics, the activity scholarships were to be awarded to students serving the university in areas such as theatre, student administration, performing arts and athletics. Couched in the democratic wrapping of general activity scholarships, the inclusion of athletic awards in the new University's financial aid program for students faced little opposition from the University's faculty, the last group to possibly actively affect Shrum's policies.

How do answers to these questions square with the public reasons given by university officials for orienting SFU's athletic program towards the American model?

The main public reasons given by University officials for orienting the athletic program towards an American model were as follows:

- 1) The need for Canada to keep her university athletes at home. Shrum and McTaggart-Cowan appealed to the nationalist urgings of Canadians by noting that the adoption of American style athletic scholarships would act to keep Canada's athletes at home, for the betterment of Canada and the future development of the nation.
- 2) The right to develop athletics as a centre of excellence within the University. As McTaggart-Cowan noted in one of his public speeches, why shouldn't excellence in athletics be supported in the same way as excellence in mathematics, physics

and music?

3) A need to counter the hypocrisy of the amateurs in their opposition to athletic scholarships and financial payments to athletes. The University's policy makers appeared to want to take a leadership role in eliminating what they viewed as an "outmoded" amateur tradition in the Universities. Scholarships were represented as a necessary component in the "modernization" of Canadian university sports.

4) A desire to have the University respond to the needs of young people, in a variety of areas that weren't strictly academic in the classical sense. Shrum referred to university athletics as being "as important to young people as sex" and in his policy statements he asserted that Simon Fraser University would respond to the importance that students placed on athletics by elevating their place within the University. Eliminating some of the anomalies regarding amateurism by instituting a policy of excellence in university athletics was one of his responses.

From perspective, there are a number of salient points worth noting concerning the rationales utilized by Simon Fraser University officials while bearing in mind the possibility that self serving posturing may creep into discussions about one's own recent actions. First, the reasons offered by the Simon Fraser decision makers stem principally from their adoption of ideas on the development of education in society and on the role of sport in social life that were prevalent in the United States and in American educational institutions in the 1960's. For example,

the extension of the concept of "excellence" within the University sphere to include the area of athletics reflects to some degree the liberal notion prevalent in the United States that sport (mass culture) was equivalent to the arts and music (high culture). American universities accepted sports as a valuable educational experience while Canadian universities still perceived it as important, but secondary to academics. Finally, it also reflects the corporate perception that a market based firm requires good public relations for it to succeed in its corporate mission.

Philosophically, the key decision makers at SFU, influenced first by the desire to eliminate the alleged outmoded institutional pattern controlling the development of athletics in Canada and, second, by the public relations and financial value of a high level university athletic program to a newly founded and growing university, acted in what they perceived were the best interests of the university in establishing an American style athletic program. It appears from the available evidence that the public relations component was a very important concern for SFU. In this area, the shock value of the policy move was an unmitigated success as the University was very successful in positioning itself within the Canadian public's eyes as a predominant Canadian sports university. The policy move also cultivated the change oriented image the new University required to attract top, young scholars to its Burnaby Mountain campus.

What implications for Canadian sport can be drawn from the SFU decision?

First, the Simon Fraser University decision to orient its athletic program along the lines of an American university model provides an illuminating account of how the development of Canadian sport has proceeded according to the cultural context in which it is situated. An examination of the historical, economic and cultural context provides a glimpse of the social forces impacting on the decision and an outline of the range of decision making opportunities available within the university system. It appears that tradition and embedded philosophy significantly reduce the probability that change oriented administrative structures can be successfully implemented in social institutions. At SFU, tradition was not present in large measure during its early years. As well, the traditional Canadian university educational model and value structure was significant by its notable absence. Given the overall continentalization of the Canadian economy and culture, a much larger range of policy options was possible at this new British Columbian university.

I would argue that certain features of the Simon Fraser case provide a glimpse of the future of Canadian university sport. By this I am not suggesting that Simon Fraser's direct connection with American leagues and its in house financial awards program will necessarily be replicated at other Canadian universities. I note only that it is possible that the Canadian programs will be caught up in pressures to adopt a more professional approach in

their athletic programs (including more remuneration to their athletes and some form of a tie-in with private advertisers, and the professional leagues). These types of policies were first promulgated by Simon Fraser University during the mid 1960's.

The limiting factor in the offering of inter-university athletic programs is, of course, financial. The development of the initial SFU program was (and continues to be) severely limited by budgetary constraints and serves to outline the needs of Canadian universities for extra funds if they are to develop truly Canadian programs with expensive cross-Canada competition. This, of course, is the case for all Canadian sport, but is most especially the case in western Canada where travel costs are so high. To aid the development of national sport, which the federal government has considered an important factor in the maintenance of the national identity, Ottawa stepped in during the 1960's and 1970's to create governmental organizations which would channel federal funding to the organizations which needed additional funds.

The Canadian Interuniversity Athletic Union has been a key recipient of federal funding earmarked for travel and for supporting excellence in university athletics. Central to the rationales used by the CIAU to gain federal support for travel subsidies was the situation of the western universities' athletic teams and the travel costs that they faced in maintaining conference schedules. Also, ironically, presenting a case for CIAU travel subsidies was the situation of Simon Fraser

University, which ostensibly was forced to eliminate the initial possibility of entering into Canada West university competition due to the large travel costs it would have incurred had it joined the western organization. In keeping with a long-standing Canadian tradition of state supported culture, it has been the federal government which has provided for the maintenance of Canadian sport and which controls the funding direction of sport's development. In fact, it is fair to say that had the federal government not committed itself to financially supporting the activities of the Canadian Interuniversity Athletic Union and its national university championships, it is unlikely that this organization could have been maintained in its present form.

An important future concern for Canadian sport must be the ability of the federal government to continue allocating budget funds to university sport in the years to come. Since the rapid expansion of federal spending during the 1970's, the national government has entered into an extended period of budget deficits and financial crises. Eventually, it will have to rein in its spending. Due to these budgetary constraints, the government has notified sports groups that they must develop alternate means of funding, especially from the corporate sector. If federal budget support for university sport remains constant, the Canadian universities can maintain their broadbased pattern towards developing sports to reinforce the national identity. If, however, budgets decline and sport must turn toward the private sector for funding and sponsorship, sports organizations may not



receive as much response from the corporations as one might be led to think. The historical development of the Canadian economy as a branch plant of the American economy will well influence the dispersal of corporate discretionary income. By this statement I mean that the high percentage of foreign ownership in Canadian industry may foster corporate ownership behaviors that are not conducive towards supporting cultural endeavours in the host country and may have negative effects on efforts to raise funds for the universities' athletic programs. In any case, the "rush to market" by the universities sports programs may result in a stilted version of the American model where the "market" sports and market values predominate in the athletic program.

Ultimately, due to federal funding cutbacks, Canadian universities may have to retrench their sports programs and become the type of regionally based athletic program that was offered by Simon Fraser University when it opened. Budgetary restraints will lead to non-revenue sports being cut and coaches let go with the result that only the sports that offer some chance of bringing in revenue and/or publicity for the University will be left. Athletic scholarships would still be a possibility in those sports where community donations would fund them. Generally, with reduced funding for Canadian university sport, regional sports programs of the type predominant during the pre-1960's may well become the dominant university sports model in Canada. The Simon Fraser decision in the mid-1960's sought to resolve a Canadian regional problem with a continentalist

solution. Collapse of federal funding might well create new pressures for such an initiative elsewhere.

In terms of a national sports identity or model, the rise of a model of athletics at Simon Fraser antagonistic to the dominant Canadian athletic model acted to spur university decision makers into analysis of what the Canadian university athletic system should be and how distinct it was from the American and Simon Fraser models. Straddling between a domineering American culture and a residual, but still powerful, British set of cultural values, Canadians have had to decide just what constituted the Canadian university athletic model. But Canadians have never really had a distinctive model that was unaffected by a metropolitan sports culture. The culture of Canadian university sport has always involved a set of compromises between British amateur traditions, local market pressures, and American cultural influences. In this context Canadians have articulated what is considered to be a distinctly Canadian model of university athletics and attempted to put it into place within the CIAU. Unfortunately, this model is, in the middle term, precariously dependent on outside financing from a federal government whose economic constraints may force it to reduce its financial support for Canadian culture. And, as in the case of any compromise, there will always be dissatisfied parties and ongoing challenges to the legitimacy of the structure in place.

The Simon Fraser case also leads to a larger issue. The exodus of Canadian athletes to universities in the United States

which the institution of athletic scholarships at the new university took aim at eliminating is a result of the great emphasis on athletics within the United States. To a large extent, the capital available within the rich markets for sport within the U.S. makes possible the highest salaries for coaches and athletes and enhances the possibility that Canadians will emigrate to the United States to compete or coach. In short, as in the case of NHL hockey, and in business and education, Canada has become a second place nation in which university athletes can train or Canadians can learn to coach. Like most of the dominant features of the rest of its society, Canadian sport has developed into an attachment or resource base to the more powerful American sports culture.

It is possible that Canadians may simply decide not to accord sports the value or emphasis that they currently hold in American society. However, should Canadians want to compete with American sport for the best athletes and coaches, additional funds and programs must be committed to the effort. Since about 1960, the federal government has been contributing a measure of funds to support this effort but this money cannot be guaranteed for the future. Certainly, while the federal state can make a substantial commitment to fund activist objectives in a number of cultural areas, its ongoing financial crisis must lead analysts eventually to recommend a reduction in government support for those activities. While the importance of national sports teams in representing the national identity is crucial, the politics of

budget making are such that no one can predict if and when funds for sport will be cut. In an optimistic vein, it could very well be that sport's value to the nation is so great that even if federal budgets are cut, that part of the budget devoted to sport may receive increased funding. In the Simon Fraser case it is clear that the administrators did not anticipate federal funding support for university athletics in Canada and instituted a program based on a cost-efficient north-south regional model. In the short and middle terms this policy was successful in terms of raising the competitive levels of the university's sports teams but, financially, it prevented the university from taking part in the renewed national programs that the federal government was sponsoring. In the long term the state of continued federal funding support for university sport will be paramount in any evaluation of the Simon Fraser University decision to implement a north-south model of university athletics.

This situation is replete with the ironies of turning to the market. For Canadian university athletics, the rejection of the American model is substantial. Yet, within that rejection, the adoption and adaptation of marketing values in pursuit of "excellence" in sport had led directly back towards domination by American culture. The value of the original Simon Fraser decision to adopt American methods to stay Canadian must be questioned. Nonetheless, the onrush of history, the weeding out of economic inefficiencies, and the ongoing advance of Americanization in many Canadian cultural institutions leads to

the possibility that staying Canadian--or not becoming American--may well be impossible. The market would seem to dictate and Graham Spry's well-known observation made long ago seems true today: "It is either the State or the States."

## REFERENCES

- Bailey, Peter. Leisure and Class in Victorian England. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.
- Brohm, Jean-Marie. Sport: A Prison of Measured Time. Translated by Ian Fraser. London: Ink Links Ltd., 1978.
- Broom, Eric F; and Baka, Richard S. P. Canadian Governments and Sport. Ottawa: CAHPER Sociology of Sport Series, 1979.
- Cady, Edwin H. The Big Game. Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 1978.
- Cantelon, Hart; and Gruneau, Richard; ed. Sport, Culture and the Modern State. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.
- Capozzi, Herb. Former General Manager, B.C. Lions Football Club. Vancouver, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 18 September 1985.
- Clement, Wallace. The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975.
- Clement, Wallace. Continental Corporate Power. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
- Cohen, Stanley. The Game They Played. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1977.
- Cosentino, Frank. Canadian Football. Toronto: The Musson Book Company, 1969.
- Crean, Susan. Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture. Don Mills, Ontario: General Publishing Company Limited, 1976.
- Davies, Lorne. Director of Athletics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 14 August 1985.
- Davies, Lorne. Director of Athletics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 29 April 1986.
- Dunning, Eric; and Sheard, Kenneth. Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players. New York: New York University Press, 1979.
- Ewen, Stuart. Captains of Consciousness. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976.
- Eyre, Alan. Former member of Simon Fraser University Board of Governors, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 31 July 1985.
- Franklin, Harry. Former member of UBC Senate, Vancouver, B.C.

Interview with Steve Campbell 22 July 1985.

Grant, George. Lament For A Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965.

Gray, Herb. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972.

Gruneau, Richard. "Sport, Social Differentiation and Social Inequality." In Sport and Social Order edited by D. Ball and J.W. Loy. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Gruneau, Richard; and Albinson, John G., ed. Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspectives. Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Canada Ltd., 1976.

Gruneau, Richard. "Power and Play in Canadian Society." In Power and Change in Canada, edited by Richard J. Ossenbarg. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1980.

Gruneau, Richard. Class, Sports, and Social Development. Amherst, Mass.: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1983.

Guttmann, Allen. From Ritual to Record. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Harris, R. Cole. "Locating the University of British Columbia." B.C. Studies 32 (Winter 1976-77) : 106-125.

Hoch, Paul. Rip Off the Big Game. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972.

Howell, Nancy; and Howell, Maxwell L. Sports and Games in Canadian Life: 1700 to the Present. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969.

Hughes, Thomas. Tom Brown's School Days. New York: Airmont Publishing Company, Inc., 1968.

Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1985.

Jones, J.C.H. "The Economics of the National Hockey League," Canadian Journal of Economics, February, 1969.

Jones, J.C.H. "The Economics of the NHL Revisited: A postscript on Structural Change, Behavior and Government Policy." In Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspective, edited by Richard Gruneau and John Albinson. Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Canada, 1976.

Kefauver, Estes. In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America. London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1965.

Kidd, Bruce. "That Great American Institution-The Grey Cup." Weekend November 29, 1969.

Kidd, Bruce; and Macfarlane, John. The Death of Hockey. Toronto: new press, 1972.

Kidd, Bruce. The Political Economy of Sport. Ottawa: CAHPER Sociology of Sport Series, 1979.

Kidd, Bruce. "Sport, Dependency and the Canadian State," In Sport, Culture and the Modern State, edited by Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1982.

Kirchner, Glenn. Member of Faculty, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 9 April 1986.

Koppett, Leonard. Sports Illusion, Sports Reality. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981.

Kurtzmann, Joseph B. "A Critical Analysis of the CIAU: 1961-1966." CAHPER Journal (April-May 1969) :20-23.

Lalonde, Marc, P.C. M.P. Speech during Second Reading - Bill C-22 "Canadian Professional Football." House of Commons Debates. 18 April 1974.

Lasch, Christopher. The Culture of Narcissism. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1979.

Lawson, Hal A.; and Ingham, Alan G. "Conflicting Ideologies Concerning the University and Intercollegiate Athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-1940." Journal of Sport History. Volume 7 (Winter 1980) 37-67.

Loosemore, J.P. "Intercollegiate Athletics in Canada: Its Organization and Development." CAHPER Journal (December 1961-January 1962) p. 9-10, 40.

Levitt, Kari. Silent Surrender. Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1970.

Lewis, Guy. "Theodore Roosevelt's Role in the 1905 Football Controversy." Research Quarterly Volume 40 (December 1969).

Lewis, Guy. "The Beginning of Organized Collegiate Sport." American Quarterly. Volume 22 (September 1970) : 222-229.

Logan, Harry T. Tuum Est: A History of the University of British Columbia. Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1958.

Lumsden, Ian, ed. Close the 49th parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.



- Macdonald, John B. Higher Education in British Columbia and a Plan for the Future. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1962.
- MacKinnon, A.R. Former Dean of Education, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Letter to Steve Campbell 12 May 1986.
- Macpherson, C.B. The Real World of Democracy. Toronto: The Hunter Race Company, 1965.
- Mallea, John R. "The Victorian Sporting Legacy." McGill Journal of Education. Volume 10:2 (1975) :184-196.
- Mangan, J.A. Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Marchak, Patricia. "Class, Regional, and Institutional Sources of Social Conflict in B.C." B.C. Studies. Volume 27 (Autumn 1975) :30-49.
- Marchak, Patricia. In Whose Interests. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979.
- Marchak, Patricia. Ideological Perspectives on Canada. 2d ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1981.
- Mathews, Robin. "the Destructive Image: Canada and the Lessons of the Incas." Canadian Forum. June/July, 1985 :19-23.
- Matthews, A.W.; and Osborne, Robert F. A Brief on the subject of federal support for a national programme to stimulate interest in amateur sport and physical fitness - and the position of the universities in relation thereto. Submitted to The Honourable J. Waldo Monteith, Minister of National Health and Welfare. February, 1961.
- Matthew, A.W. Athletics in Canadian Universities. Ottawa: The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1974.
- McTaggart-Cowan, P.D. Former President of Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Letter to J.H. Wyman, Chairman, Intercollegiate Athletic Review Committee, SFU. 9 December 1971.
- McTaggart-Cowan, P.D. Former President of Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Letter to Steve Campbell 7 May 1986.
- Meggysey, Dave. Out of Their League. New York: Paperback Library, 1971.
- Michener, James A. Sports in America. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1976.

Mitchell, Dick. Former assistant football coach at UBC. Interview with Steve Campbell 24 July 1985.

Moriarty, R.J. The Organization History of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union Central (CIAUC) 1906-1955. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1971.

Morris, Willie. The Courting of Marcus Dupree. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1983.

Noll, Roger G., ed. Governments and the Sports Business. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974.

Novak, Michael. The Joy of Sports. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Okner, Benjamin A. "Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas." In Governments and the Sports Business, edited by Roger G. Noll. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974.

Osborne, Robert F. Former Director of UBC School of Physical Education and Recreation. Interview with Steve Campbell 11 September 1985.

Paxson, Frederic L. "The Rise of Sport." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Volume 4 (September 1917) : 143-168.

Panitch, Leo. "Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy." Studies in Political Economy. 6 (Autumn 1981) : 7-33.

Peters, J.E.; and Shearer, R.A. "The Structure of British Columbia's External Trade, 1939 and 1963." B.C. Studies. 8 (Winter 1970-71) : 34-46.

Rea, W. Harold; DesRuisseaux, Dr. Paul Wintle; and Greene, Nancy. Report of the Task Force on Sports for Canadians. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969.

Reisman, David and Denney, Reuel. "Football in American: A Study in Cultural Diffusion." In Sport in the Sociocultural Process, edited by M. Marie Hart. Dubuque, Iowa: WM. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972.

Resnick, Philip. The Land of Cain: Class and Nationalism in English Canada, 1945-75. Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977.

Resnick, Philip. "B.C. Capitalism and the Empire of the Pacific." B.C. Studies 67 (Autumn 1985) : 29-46.

Richards, John; and Pratt, Larry. Paririe Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979.

Rooney, John F. The Recruiting Game. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1980.

Safarian, A.E. The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970.

Savage, Howard J. Games and Sports in British Schools and Universities. New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1926.

Savage, Howard J. American College Athletics. New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1929.

Scott, Jack. The Athletic Revolution. New York: The Free Press, 1971.

Shrum, Gordon. Former Chancellor of Chairman of the Board of Governors of Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 9 August 1983.

Shrum, Gordon; and Stursberg, Peter. Gordon Shrum: An Autobiography. Edited by Clive Cocking. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986.

Simon Fraser University. Burnaby, B.C. Board of Governors, Minutes of Meetings 1963-1969.

Smith, Ronald A. "Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 1905-06 Football Crisis." Journal of Sport History. 8 (Winter 1980).

Smith, Ronald A. "The Historic Amateur-Professional Dilemma in American College Sport." The British Journal of Sport History. 2 (December 1985) : 221-231.

Suart, George. Vice-President Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 18 August 1985.

The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. UBC Senate Minutes of Meetings 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953.

The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. Report of the UBC Senate Committee on Recreation, Athletics and Physical Education. May, 1958.

Van Der Kroef, Justus M. "The U.S. and the World's Brain Drain." International Journal of Comparative Sociology. 2 (1970) 220-239.

Van Vliet, Maury. Former Dean of Physical Education, University of Alberta. Edmonton, Alberta. Interview with Steve Campbell 22 September 1985.

Vancouver Province. Clippings from 1963-1968.

Vancouver Sun. Clippings from 1963-1968.

Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Mentor Books, 1953.

Warren, Dr. Harry. Former member of UBC Senate, Vancouver, B.C. Interview with Steve Campbell 11 August 1985.

Watterson, John S. III. "The Football Crisis of 1909-10: The Response of the Eastern Big Three." Journal of Sport History. 8 (Spring 1981).

Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

Wolf, David. Foul! The Connie Hawkins Story. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1972.

Wolf, David. "The Growing Crisis in College Sports." In Sport in the Socio-Cultural Process, edited by M. Marie Hart. Dubuque, Iowa: WM. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972.