WORK-FAMILY BALANCE: 
RETHINKING THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CANADIAN SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

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ABSTRACT

The work of T.H. Marshall teaches that citizenship is inadequately theorized if only its formal legal dimension is appreciated. Equality before the law does not guarantee all persons the ability to benefit from legal entitlements since unequal social and economic conditions limit for some the opportunities to exercise their civil and political liberties. Full citizenship status therefore rests critically on what Marshall termed citizenship’s “social element,” which is concerned with the socio-economic resources and opportunities that are preconditions for dignified inclusion.

The development of the social element of citizenship in Canada following World War II is the subject of this dissertation. I argue that the central problem in fulfilling the promise of social citizenship is the failure of the welfare state to integrate adequately in institutional form citizenry aspirations and obligations associated with unpaid caregiving. The remedy to this problem rests on incorporating care into the meaning of citizenship by enhancing public commitments to facilitate work-family balance for citizens regardless of sex, race, class and other differences. New commitments to work-family balance would institutionalize an understanding of social inclusion that values the provision of care in one’s network of domestic relations on par with participation in the marketplace and political arena. The necessary institutional reordering would ensure that public policy no longer distorts how unpaid caregiving is a civic virtue on which the sustainability of market and state practices relies by systemically disobligeing men to care. Nor would policy continue to obfuscate the barriers to full community membership that the patriarchal division of care labour presents for diverse groups of women.

The dissertation defends four key policy changes: (i) a revised parental leave system that would reserve some benefits exclusively for fathers; (ii) universal child care; (iii) revised employment standards that would enforce shorter full-time paid work norms; and (iv) a restructured Caregiver tax credit to replace the current Spousal credit. I argue that these changes can mitigate key sources of gender inequality, as well as partially address declining real male wages and the resultant rising poverty among families with young children, earnings inequality and persistent levels of high un(der)employment.
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DEDICATION

For my grandmothers.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Citizenship articulates the terms of belonging in a society. It distinguishes who is and who is not a full member of the community and defines the entitlements and obligations that accompany membership. Major social institutions such as the constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements in a society engender and enforce citizenry rights and responsibilities that regulate individual participation in domestic, market, civic and political spheres while also setting constraints on state power (Jenson 1997, 628; Marshall 1964, 71-72; Rawls 1971, 7).

The work of T.H. Marshall (1964, 65-122) following World War II teaches that citizenship is inadequately theorized if only its formal legal dimension is appreciated. The capacity to participate fully in society and to affect its political decisions is not simply a question of the range of political and civil rights that empower members. Equality before the law does not guarantee all persons the practical ability to invoke and benefit from legal entitlements since unequal social and economic conditions limit for some the opportunities to exercise their civil and political liberties (ibid., 88).\(^1\) Full community membership therefore also rests critically on what Marshall (ibid., 72) termed the “social element” of citizenship that is concerned with the social and economic resources and opportunities that are preconditions for dignified inclusion and the pursuit of self-selected commitments. Recognition of the social dimension of citizenship implies that extension of full membership status to historically excluded groups is a socio-

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\(^1\) For instance, Marshall (1964, 88) argues that:

civil rights... confer [only] the legal capacity to strive for things one would like to possess but do not guarantee the possession of any of them. A property right is not a right to possess property, but a right to acquire it, if you can, and to protect it, if you can get it. But, if you... explain to a pauper that his property rights are the same as those of a millionaire, he will probably accuse you of quibbling. Similarly, the right to freedom of speech has little real substance, if from lack of education, you have nothing to say that is worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it. But these blatant inequalities are not due to defects in civil rights, but to lack of social rights.
economic process in addition to a political-legal one. The state contributes to this socio-economic process by exercising public authority to shape market, family and other community practices to mediate the distribution of opportunities and resources (ibid.; Rawls 1971, 7).

The years immediately following the Second World War witnessed substantial strengthening of the commitment to the social dimension of citizenship demonstrated by Western nation-states. Internationally, the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*\(^2\) recognized economic, social and cultural rights. For instance, Article 22 establishes that everyone

\[
\text{as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his [sic] dignity and the free development of his [sic] personality.}
\]

Schabas (2000, 190) summarizes the five Articles that follow in the *Declaration*, which identify in greater detail:

\[
\text{the rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration, to other means of social protection, to form and to join trade unions, to rest and leisure, to reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, to an adequate standard of living including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood, to free and compulsory education, and to participation in the cultural life of the community and to enjoyment of the arts.}
\]

This international effort to acknowledge and protect citizenship’s social element was consistent with domestic trends throughout Western capitalist nations, which saw the introduction and expansion of state institutions predominantly concerned to foster and redistribute social well-being. These developments built upon the work of Marshall and other contemporaries such as Beveridge (1942) in Britain and Marsh (1975/1943) in Canada who defended the position that citizenship must entail social as well as civil and political rights. In this dissertation I focus on the development of Canada’s commitment to social citizenship following World War II, although the analysis is also germane to other liberal welfare regimes.

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identified by Esping-Anderson (1990, 26-27) including the United States, Australia and Great Britain.

The principal thesis of the dissertation is that the central problem in fulfilling the promise of social citizenship since the Second World War is the failure of the welfare state to integrate adequately in institutional form citizenry aspirations and obligations associated with informal, unpaid caregiving. While the problem was first constructed by social policy in the three decades immediately following World War II, the dissertation is primarily concerned with the contemporary welfare state and engages with factors that contributed to state restructuring in Canada since 1980 to guide its investigations. In the current context, the remedy to the central problem addressed in this dissertation rests on incorporating care into the meaning of citizenship by enhancing public commitments to facilitate work-family balance for all citizens regardless of sex, race, class and other differences. New commitments to work-family balance would institutionalize an understanding of dignified social inclusion that values the provision and receipt of care in one’s network of domestic relations on par with participation in the marketplace and political arena, reorganizing arrangements between the state, market and family accordingly. The necessary institutional reordering would ensure that policy in Canada no longer overlooks how care performed in the domestic sphere can express a commitment to relationships that form the basis for any sense of family and community belonging. Nor would the welfare state continue to distort how unpaid caregiving is a civic virtue on which the sustainability of market and public policy relies by systemically disobliging men to care, while obfuscating the barriers to full social membership that the patriarchal division of care labour presents for diverse groups of women.
The analytical approach in this dissertation is interdisciplinary, an approach that is suggested by the nature of social citizenship. Institutionalization of this dimension of citizenship in the early post-war era represented the political appropriation of insights from moral theory. I therefore draw on the works of moral philosophers and political and social theorists to discern some of the motivations underlying post-war social citizenship commitments, and I return to their work when developing the theoretical underpinnings of an alternative citizenship framework that integrates care into its meaning. As the embodiment of theory, social citizenship practices are constituted in part by the ideological, social, economic and political realities of the day, rendering research by economists, political scientists, sociologists and others relevant for interpreting the cultural deployment of moral theory in public institutions in the decades following World War II. Insofar as social citizenship entitlements are instantiated by a broad range of policies, the social element of citizenship is also the domain of legal scholars and policy analysts across academic disciplines. For this reason, I rely on the expertise of legal and policy scholars who employ a range of intellectual frameworks to explore some of the labour market, family, social service and taxation policy consequences implied by the alternative blueprint for social citizenship that I develop.

Capitalizing on this interdisciplinary approach, I defend the central thesis of the dissertation by advancing three arguments. First, the early post-war era created a new model of citizenship across the country, organizing major social institutions around a stronger, but still limited, appreciation for the social and economic preconditions of full community membership. The post-war citizenship regime was inadequate due to its androcentrism and its failure to acknowledge fully the welfare potential of the domestic sphere and labour market. These inadequacies were exacerbated over time by post-industrial and post-traditional structural shifts.
Second, neoconservative restructuring since roughly 1980 has generated a new citizenship regime. This regime offers a number of important insights into social citizenship, but it is ultimately an impoverished alternative to the post-war model for several reasons, including that it re-institutionalizes an androcentric policy orientation. Third, select points of convergence between some feminist and neoconservative critiques of the post-war welfare state suggest that work-family balance is a sufficiently broad analytic concept on which to develop an alternative framework for social citizenship better suited to the particular needs of the present post-industrial, post-traditional social and economic context. The alternative would capitalize on the strengths of the post-war and neoconservative models while also addressing aspects of social security, equality and community membership that these models neglect. The most critical change implied by a work-family balance framework would be a heightened appreciation for the importance of caregiving for social citizenship to supplement and counterbalance the renewed concern for the welfare potential of market participation emphasized by economic conservatism.

1. The Post-War Model of Social Citizenship

Canada had little formal poverty relief before the First World War. Baker (1995, 82) reports that a cultural commitment to the ‘protestant work ethic’ meant citizens were generally expected to be self-reliant and “protected from poverty by their own thrift and hard work, [or] by other family members.” Prior to the 1920s, impoverished individuals with no familial relations

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3 The multiplicity of identities and differences among women has produced a range of feminist literature that develops various distinct analytical frameworks. This diversity means extensive use of the term ‘feminism’ as an analytical category risks wrongly suggesting that there is one unified ‘feminist’ agenda. A similar problem arises for the term ‘neoconservatism’ given that stark differences divide some social conservatives and economic conservatives (or neoliberals). This dissertation by no means intends to imply unity where it does not exist as I endeavour to put in dialogue feminist and neoconservative positions. While the language of ‘feminism’ and ‘neoconservatism’ is retained throughout the thesis for the purpose of making broad distinctions, it is supplemented by careful attention to different intra-group positions. In particular, I examine distinctions between feminists that reflect class and ethnic differences, particularly as they manifest in three strands of feminist literature associated with the works of Gilligan (1982), Pateman (1988) and Collins (1990; 1994) respectively. In terms of my analysis of neoconservatism, I retain the now common distinction between economic and social conservatives, highlighting where relevant the political ascendancy of the former over the latter.
on which to fall back could approach their municipalities for financial aid, which in turn
typically directed claimants to charitable and religious organizations. Application for this
municipal assistance was often demeaning, socially portrayed as an admission of personal failure
(Baker and Phipps 1997, 155).

Following the First World War, the growing voice of labour accompanied religious and
charitable groups in lobbying for new social assistance programs in response to the experiences
of disability, widowhood and unemployment. The intense levels of poverty endured during the
Depression further cemented demands for reform (Baker 1995, 83). Federal and provincial
governments responded in the 1920s and 30s by drafting a collection of piecemeal legislation
that retained elements of the English Poor Laws of 1834 by providing means-tested cash benefits
for individuals that distinguished between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor (Baker and
Phipps 1997, 155; Beajot 2000, 219; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 47-48). This
classification system disqualified many able-bodied citizens as eligible assistance recipients on
the grounds that market-based solutions were attainable to them. Esping-Anderson (1990, 42)
explains that the distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ reflected the concern that
extending social rights to guarantee a moderate income for all would foster, rather than combat,
unemployment and poverty by undermining labour market incentives. Policy makers also feared
that overly generous social protection would generate “moral corruption, thriftlessness, idleness
and drunkenness” (ibid.), as well as disempower families that were perceived as the most adept
source of social security. Accordingly, state intervention in the inter-war years was reserved for
situations in which families could no longer cope, providing a social safety net of last resort.

By the end of the Second World War, the stage was set in Canada for a new, more robust,
paradigm of social welfare. The Depression posed a profound crisis for laissez faire liberalism,
undermining faith in the tenet that a relatively unregulated market could provide employment to all who sought paid work. The wartime effort in turn laid the foundation for an alternative direction in welfare state development both in Canada and internationally. The state’s role in organizing the economic activity that financed military victory was perceived as further refutation of classical economic doctrines that downplayed the need for, and ability of, governments to macro-manage national economies (McBride and Shields 1997, 35). The unprecedented levels of public expenditure and taxation required by the Second World War effort also helped to create a new “popular fiscal tolerance for the post-war decades,” while wage controls implemented by governments moved businesses to offer more generous fringe benefit packages that set in motion revised expectations among unions in years to follow (Esping-Anderson 1990, 100).

These wartime experiences facilitated the re-conceptualization of state welfare along two axes. Rather than charity, welfare programming was increasingly sanctioned by popular and elite opinion as economic stabilizers and as citizenship entitlements. On one hand, the research of Keynes advocated social spending to function as counter-cyclical fiscal measures to sustain stable levels of aggregate demand during downturns in the business cycle and to complement wage constraint initiatives designed to defend against low corporate profitability and high inflation (Baker 1995, 128; Baker and Phipps 1997, 145; Esping-Anderson 1990s, 173-188; McBride and Shields 1997, 37; Pateman 1989, 198; Ursel 1992, 195). On the other hand, the classical liberal concern with individual freedom was supplemented by a ‘new liberal’ appreciation for the social circumstances that condition individual choices – the social element of citizenship. Poverty, particularly among the elderly, was increasingly seen as an outcome of social and economic processes, as opposed to the result of personal failure alone. The social
policy paradigm characterized by the deterrent factor of the Poor Laws tradition was therefore demoted in favour of a new paradigm articulated by Marsh (1975/1943) that reflected the position that citizenship rights should not only guarantee negative freedoms, but also a set of opportunities that facilitate social inclusion. The evolution of the concept of positive rights lent credence to the position that equal citizenship demands the institutionalization of public social protections to enhance citizens' civil and political status when poverty would otherwise leave them bereft of the resources necessary for social, cultural and political integration (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 50). The need to guarantee various social protections was reinforced by wartime studies reporting that only 44 percent of families of wage earners (other than those who earned a living from agriculture) had sufficient income to secure a nutritionally adequate diet during the booming economy with full employment (Stroik and Jenson 1999, 66).

The post-war paradigm shift in social welfare unfolded during a twenty-five year period of rapid economic growth and rising wages (Stroik and Jenson 1999, 66). Bolstered by a sense that the country could afford to expand its public sphere strategically, the state introduced a number of policy innovations to supplement its existing residual social assistance services. Much of the new programming was universal, rendering it less stigmatizing than pre-war state intervention. In 1941, following a Constitutional amendment granting the federal government jurisdiction, Ottawa implemented the Unemployment Insurance Act (S.C. 1940, c. 44). In 1944, the federal government introduced The Family Allowances Act (1944, S.C. 1944, c. 40). By 1951, the formerly targeted Old Age Pension Act of 1927 was replaced by an enriched and universal Old Age Security Act (S.C. 1951, c.18; hereafter OAS). In the mid-1960s, the federal government implemented a national Medical Care Act (S.C. 1966-67, c. 64) and a new earnings-related public pension plan, the Canada Pension Plan (S.C. 1964-65, c. 51; hereafter CPP).
The universality of the new family allowance, OAS and Medicare systems marked a dramatic departure from the stigmatized social interventions of the pre-war era, as did the contributory character of unemployment benefits and CPP that distinguished them from targeted ‘relief’ or ‘charity’. While these pan-Canadian programs never perfectly delivered on post-war promises of economic security for all citizens, they nonetheless signaled the emergence of a tacit national consensus to expand citizenship entitlements to include social rights that individuals hold by virtue of their common legal position as citizens, rather than their class, region or status. Principal among new post-war entitlements was a citizen’s right to draw upon state services and resources for the purpose of satisfying basic personal needs, especially when private mechanisms failed (Brodie 1995, 39).

The institutional entrenchment of social citizenship in the Canadian welfare state marked a significant breakthrough in the pursuit of equality domestically, particularly in terms of mitigating the effects of income inequality for social inclusion. But the new policy framework was also limited on several fronts. As I discuss below, neoconservatives criticize that post-war welfarism overemphasizes rights at the expense of obligations, as well as the capacity for the state to foster well-being at the expense of the welfare potential of the labour market and private households. In addition, feminists such as Ursel (1992) Leira (1992) Orloff (1993a) and Pateman (1989, 179-209) reveal that the post-war welfare model failed to integrate and value caregiving as it institutionalized a new commitment to social citizenship. Although the centrality of caregiving to welfare provision renders this inadequacy somewhat ironic, the failure reflects the cultural context of the times. Patriarchal expectations of public and private work inclined early theorists of citizenship and post-war policy makers to prioritize inclusion in democratic processes and the labour force as principal criteria for full membership in society, while drafting
policy that presumed white, economically advantaged men would be the primary actors in these public domains. This construction of social integration obscured and reinforced the gender, race and class systems of social power that distribute the majority of day-to-day care labour to diverse groups of women in private households for no or little pay. As a result, much of the daily caregiving on which citizens draw to secure their welfare was bracketed from the purview of the social citizenship paradigm that emerged following the Second World War. The consequences for women’s status and inclusion as citizens have been diverse and deleterious, materializing differently for disparate groups of care providers according to racial and class distinctions. These costs are examined in detail throughout the dissertation.

Two structural social changes now exacerbate the initial limitations of the post-war welfare model in Canada. The shift from a labour intensive industrial economy to a post-industrial, high technology, high labour productivity market has proven incapable of sustaining full employment. Revised labour usage strategies have contributed to the polarization of paid work hours between core and peripheral employees. This polarization has fomented increased earnings inequality (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 36-41) and marginalized rising numbers of citizens as the underemployed. The finances of many Canadians have therefore been strained for much of the 1980s and 90s, particularly among recent male entrants into the marketplace for whom real wages have been consistently dropping since the 1970s (Beaudry and Green 2000). One consequence is that the monetary costs associated with caregiving in the private domestic sphere are increasingly difficult for many Canadians to meet, a trend that is manifest in the shift in poverty to families with young children (National Council of Welfare 1998, 10-15).

Simultaneously, economic pressures and ideological changes have prompted a transition from the so-called ‘traditional’ patriarchal division of labour within households to a post-
traditional cultural order in which most women work for pay outside of the home, including the majority of mothers with young children (Statistics Canada 2000, 100). As a result, dual-earner households have become the norm (ibid., 110) and the share of families headed by single parents has increased (ibid., 29-34). Many households therefore have considerably less time to perform much of the daily caregiving work that the post-war welfare regime took for granted. Moreover, far more market participants are shouldering substantial caregiving responsibilities in addition to their role as wage-earners than was ever envisioned by early post-war policy makers.

2. Neoconservative Restructuring Dismantled and Replaced the Post-War Welfare Regime

The significant, although insufficient, breakthrough in the pursuit of social citizenship powered by the development of Canada’s welfare state following World War II has been the subject of political challenge over the past two decades, moderately in the 1980s and more fervently during the 1990s. Structural change factored prominently in motivating this challenge. The rapid economic growth of the 1950s and 60s dissipated by the 1970s, giving way to a severe recession characterized by rising inflation and unemployment. This stagflation re-ignited concerns about the state’s capacity to macro-manage national economies and rapidly limited the revenue available for public expenditures (McBride and Shields 1997, 47-51). The resulting government deficits that ballooned in the 1980s to mid-90s generated a debt ‘crisis’ in Canada during which citizens were asked by their political representatives to re-evaluate the social entitlements they can legitimately expect from their governments, as well as the obligations they must incur in return. Amidst a political climate preoccupied with the ‘debt tinderbox’, the ‘voracious compound interest treadmill’ and our ‘massive addiction’ to borrowing, Canadian federal and provincial governments initiated a dramatic project of state restructuring in which the
very terrain of political struggle continues to be renegotiated (Workman 1996). The scope, status, and nature of social citizenship in Canada is at the heart of this project.

The term ‘restructuring’ does not simply refer to expenditure reductions. While more dramatic in size since the 1980s, the quantitative cutbacks of resources for social services during the past two decades are not new. Citing work by Banting (1982), McBride and Shields (1997, 22-23) observe that the social benefits institutionalized under the welfare regime after World War II were “in constant flux, expanding in some periods and contracting in others.” What is new about the more recent round of expenditure reductions is their qualitative departure from the post-war commitment to welfare services. McBride and Shields (ibid.) report that “[i]n the past... cuts were carried out with the intention that they were ‘temporary’ and would be restored with the economic recovery.” But no such intention accompanies the spending cuts of the late 1980s and 90s. Instead, federal and provincial governments identify smaller public budgets for services as a critical element of a new social policy course in Canada that diverges sharply from that of the early post-war welfare era.

With the intention of capturing the qualitative departure between post-war welfarism and the present social citizenship regime, I follow Brodie (1995, 15) in understanding the term ‘restructuring’ to describe

a prolonged and conflict-ridden political process during which old assumptions and shared understandings are challenged and are eventually either rejected or transformed while social forces struggle to achieve a new consensus—a new vision of the future to fill the vacuum created by the erosion of the old. The concept of restructuring represents the simultaneous ‘combination of falling apart and building up again’ of an entire political-cultural order.

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4 For instance, the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1995 represented initially a $6-billion reduction in federal transfers to the provinces for health care, education and social services (Phillips 1995).

5 The commitment to reduce social spending as a central plank of a new social policy platform is particularly evident at the federal level. The Government of Canada (2000b, chapter 3) lists the achievement of a 50 year low in federal program spending as a share of GDP (at 11.7% in 1999-2000) as a key component of federal efforts to restore public fiscal health.
Integral to this definition is the notion of a “paradigm shift” whereby the state restructures to institutionalize “a new way of thinking... about governing practices” (Brodie 1996, 127). In order to distinguish one way of thinking from another, Brodie (1997, 227) uses the concept of a “meso-narrative” to explore the “governing philosophy underlying a particular state form.” This concept illuminates key metaphors, assumptions and values that provide the foundation for the practices and policies of specific state paradigms. Brodie (ibid.) explains that:

At any point, the various policy sectors, which comprise the state, may share a broad overarching consensus about what constitutes rationality or progress or equality, and so on but, at the same time, when these broad ideals are implemented into specific policies and regulations, they may and often do take on the appearance of incoherence. The concept meso-narrative points to the threads of continuity among the appearance of erratic and contradictory state practices.

Brodie’s (1997, 27) identification of restructuring with a “periodic rewriting” of the meso-narrative that informs state practices is supported by the research of Jenson (1997), Jenson and Phillips (1996), and Jenson and Sineau (2001) who also link restructuring with a redefinition of the ideas and interests that inform major social institutions. Jenson and her co-authors employ the term “citizenship regime” to refer not only to the “institutional arrangements” and “rules” that “guide and shape state policy;” but also the “understandings” and “problem definition employed by states and citizens,” as well as “the range of claims recognized as legitimate” (Jenson 1997, 631). “A citizenship regime,” Jenson (ibid., 632) explains

encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the ‘nation’ as well as the ‘model citizen,’ the ‘second-class citizen’ and the ‘non-citizen’. It also encodes representations of the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories. It locates the borders of ‘public’ and ‘private’. It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition of politics by organizing the boundaries of political debate (ibid., 632).

Thus, similar to Brodie, Jenson, Phillips and Sineau understand restructuring to reflect the renegotiation of cultural assumptions and political conventions that “re-open[s] for discussion” “the division of labour between state and market, between public and ‘private,’ and between civil society and the state” (Jenson and Phillips 1996, 113).
In this dissertation, I follow Brodie, Jenson, Phillips, Sineau, McBride and Shields in exploring and evaluating the most recent round of Canadian state restructuring largely in terms of qualitative changes in cultural ideas and assumptions about citizenship and the terrain of political struggle. I pay particular attention to ideological changes that convey evolving societal understandings of the appropriate relationships between state, market and family spaces.

An extensive body of literature that examines restructuring in Canada since 1980 identifies the dismantling state processes with the rising tide of neoconservatism domestically and internationally. I employ the term neoconservatism to capture two closely related, but still distinct, schools of thought. The first is regularly referred to as either economic conservatism or neoliberalism; the second is social conservatism. The former prioritizes reducing the role of the state in social welfare provision, while enhancing the role of the market. Brodie (1997, 235) and Jenson (1997, 633) characterize neoliberalism as a political philosophy that elevates ‘the market over the state’ by restating many laissez faire liberal principles of freedom, self-reliance, market individualism and limited social spending (see also O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 52; Teghtsoonian 1997, 121). Social conservatism, by contrast, is principally concerned with social traditionalism, emphasizing “the popular values of morality, the work ethic, law and order, the preservation of the family and church, and the denunciation of feminism, homosexuality, sexual permissiveness, and drugs” (McBride and Shields 1997, 31).

Giddens (1994, 40) reminds us that there is significant tension between the two conservative camps. By promoting less fettered market practices and an aggressive individualism, the enthusiasm that economic conservatives demonstrate for capitalism stimulates

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6 In addition to the work of McBride and Shields, Brodie, Jenson and her co-authors, Brooks (1993), Laycock (2002) and anthologies edited by Bakker (1996), Boyd (1997) and Evans and Wekerle (1997) also document the ascendancy of neoconservatism.
some of the structural changes affecting the family and other areas of social life outside of the labour market that worry social conservatives. While this tension manifests itself in internal struggles between social and economic conservatives,⁷ Laycock (2002, 9) remarks that the neoconservative “political tent generally remains standing because all the political subgroups within it share a desire to undermine their common enemy that is far more passionate than any desire to undermine one another.” The common enemy is the post-war welfare state.

The rise of neoconservatism within Canada initiated a rapid reduction of the public sphere and post-war welfare state on the assumptions that the private marketplace and household are more efficient in the delivery of public goods and services and that high tax rates have harmful consequences for economic growth. Political actors and lobbyists used the size of public deficits and debts to justify social spending cuts, a retreat from universality in favour of targeted social services, tax reform, and widespread public sector layoffs. The political decisions that permitted Canada’s fiscal situation to deteriorate were in turn used to defend renewed reliance on market providers to regulate, manage and respond to the welfare needs of Canadians. Neoconservative governments launched an agenda of privatization through which crown corporations were transformed into market-based companies, while public services were either restructured or eliminated in order to permit markets, volunteers and/or families to assume additional responsibilities for health, education and welfare. Simultaneously, governments expanded the domain of markets through support for international free trade, deregulation and the introduction of revised labour relations. (For a review of neoconservative policies, see Bakker 1996; Boyd 1997a; Brodie 1995; Brooks 1993; Cohen 1997; Evans and Wekerle 1997; McBride and Shields 1997; and Richards 1997).

As the fiscal situations of federal and provincial governments improved in Canada by the mid- and late-1990s, the deficit and debt agenda was replaced by a new tax cut agenda to reinforce the neoconservative preference for smaller government in the area of social welfare. Alberta and Ontario led the way at the provincial level, introducing dramatic tax reduction plans in the mid- and late-1990s, followed in 2001 by the 25 percent personal income tax cuts for all income brackets introduced by the provincial Liberals of BC. The Government of Alberta (2001) tax reduction strategy is particularly significant because it institutionalized Canada’s first ‘flat tax’ that largely eliminates progressivity from the provincial income tax system.

Federally, the most significant tax cuts were announced in 2000, when the federal government twice restructured the federal income tax in the months before the election of that year. The dramatic size of the tax reduction initiatives departed significantly from the Liberal “50-50” promise to allocate half of the rising surpluses to new spending and half to tax and debt reduction. By consuming the majority of the projected $100 billion ‘fiscal dividend’ for the years between 2000 and 2005, the federal tax cut agenda belied commitments made in the 1999 throne speech that implied Ottawa would utilize renewed public wealth to reinvest in Canada’s public services as part of a ‘Children’s Budget’.

The ascendancy of neoconservatism over the past two decades rests not only on the influence of structural change, but also in part on social scientific research findings that emerged from mainstream economic analysis. For instance, Blinder (1987, 1-11) reports “a broad consensus” among economists “that cut across” the lines of partisan politics regarding the economic distortions and efficiency costs associated with high marginal tax rates and prolonged

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9 Governor-General, Adrienne Clarkson (1994, 4), claimed that “No commitment [the federal government] make[s] today will be more important for the long-term prosperity and well-being of our society than the commitment to invest our efforts in very young children.”
government deficits, as well as the economic efficiencies of free trade. Courchene (1994b, 87) also observes widespread concern among analysts "about the nature of the incentives within programs such as UI and welfare and their likely impact on labour market re-entry, regional economic adjustment and the inevitable drift towards… 'transfer dependency'."

Social science findings about policy incentives that induce reliance on state income assistance and insurance have factored importantly in motivating renewed interest among theorists and policy analysts about citizenship responsibilities and the obligations implied by receipt of public welfare. Mead's (1986) book Beyond Entitlement is indicative of how neoconservatives in the United States responded particularly quickly to this issue by arguing that American welfare needed to be reconfigured to oblige citizens to perform their citizenship duties, including the duty to participate in the paid labour market. Accordingly, the shift from welfare to workfare became a key policy recommendation in economic conservative circles. Researchers such as Courchene (1994a) and Richards (1997) articulate similar support for workfare in the Canadian context and have been important intellectual architects of the neoconservative policy regime in Canada, although their classification as conservatives is somewhat more tenuous as I discuss in chapter 4.

Rising concern about citizenship responsibilities is not simply a trend on the political right, however. In their review of recent literature on citizenship, Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 361) note that "there is increasing recognition that citizenship responsibilities should be incorporated more explicitly into left-wing theory" (ibid., 361). This trend is particularly evident in the 'Third Way' that Giddens (2000, 52) articulates for social democrats following the collapse of communism in Russia. Giddens' Third Way, now associated with the new Labour
Government of Tony Blair in Great Britain, explicitly “[p]roposes to construct a new social contract, based on the theorem ‘no rights without responsibilities’.”

The emerging cross-partisan support for the tenet that citizenship rights imply citizenship duties provides reason to regard the success of neoconservatism in refocusing attention on this element of social citizenship as a valuable development in Canadian welfarism. I return to this theme throughout the dissertation, while also identifying value in the new regime’s success in directing attention to the welfare potential of the labour market and domestic sphere. However, the neoconservative paradigm undermines the significance of these insights into citizenship’s social element by repeating mistakes made by early post-war policy-makers and theorists and by failing to appreciate fully the extent of the challenges posed by post-industrial and post-traditional structural shifts.

Like the early post-war framework, the neoconservative regime fails to integrate and value caregiving work appropriately, although the problems today differ from those encountered three decades ago. Despite the preferences of their social conservative counterparts, neoliberals who have enjoyed more political power in Canada have rejected some post-war ideas about women’s citizenship. In particular, policy frameworks organized around a male breadwinner model have been reorganized in response to rising numbers of women in the paid workplace. But, as I discuss throughout the dissertation, the female, privatized caregiver model remains dominant within economic as well as social conservative circles. Despite expecting diverse groups of women to function in the labour market on the terms established by white, middle-class men, economic conservatism rarely assesses critically the persistent patriarchal division of domestic work. It also provides little additional assistance to help women or men shoulder the unpaid care responsibilities that families continue to incur amidst the rise of dual-earner and
lone-parent households. One important consequence is that the ongoing gender division of caregiving responsibility impedes the inclusion of women in the public spaces of market and political arena, unless women can afford (or are required by workfare schemes accompanied by child care subsidies) to re-allocate their care work to others. Where this re-allocation takes place, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999, 106-107) observe that it often tracks ethnic, class and immigration distinctions, reinforcing systems of oppression indexed to these differences while failing to challenge patriarchal assumptions about the feminization of caring.

3. Feminist, Neoconservative and Other Literature on Social Citizenship

3a. Dominant approaches to theorizing citizenship neglect the subject of caregiving

Since restructuring redefines citizen-state relations, the dismantling of the post-war welfare state explains in part the “explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among political theorists” in the 1990s observed by Kymlicka and Norman (1994 352; 2000, 5). Citing Macedo (1996, 240), their analysis of this literature reveals renewed understanding in Anglo-American political thought of how “the health of the liberal public order depends on our ability to constitute not only political institutions... but appropriate patterns of social life and citizen character” (in Kymlicka and Norman forthcoming , 1). This renewed interest powered a growing academic literature intent on delineating “more concretely the sorts of civic virtues required for a flourishing democracy” as well as the opportunities for state and non-state institutions to promote them (Kymlicka and Norman 2000, 7).10

10 Kymlicka and Norman (2000, 7) report that Putnam’s (1993) work on social capital has been particularly influential in motivating a new body of research that focuses on the civic virtues and practices that sustain and enrich democratic governance.
Kymlicka and Norman (2000, 7) find that Galston’s account of responsible citizenship “captures a core set of concerns in the citizenship literature.” Galston (1991, 220-227) identifies four categories of civic virtues, which Kymlicka and Norman (ibid.) summarize as follows:

(i) general virtues: courage, law-abidingness; loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence; openness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic; capacity to delay self-gratification; adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others; willingness to demand only what can be paid for; ability to evaluate the performance of those in office; willingness to engage in public discourse.

Specifying the qualities associated with responsible citizenship is the relatively easy task confronting theorists of citizenship, Kymlicka and Norman (2000, 7) suggest: “The hard questions arise when we ask what exactly governments can or should do to promote these virtues.” However, the apparent ease with which citizen virtues are identified is belied by the conspicuous absence of ‘caregiving’ from the summary of Galston’s four categories\textsuperscript{11} – a citizenship practice that is central to much feminist literature, as I discuss below.

The relative inattention to caregiving in Galston’s work that Kymlicka and Norman describe as representative of the research about civic virtues is also evident in the important literature on social citizenship and welfare states motivated by Esping-Anderson (1990, 3). His claim that “[t]he outstanding criterion for social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces” reinforced a literature in which it is common to describe the welfare state as an institution primarily concerned to

\textsuperscript{11} I include the account of Galston’s work provided by Kymlicka and Norman since they identify their summary as being representative of the literature on civic virtues more generally. It is worth noting, however, that Galston’s (1991, 222) discussion of the virtue of “independence” includes the recognition that “the family is the critical arena in which independence and a host of other virtues must be engendered” and the concern that “[t]he weakening of families is... fraught with danger for liberal societies.” Thus, Galston’s analysis of civic virtues acknowledges “the virtues of family solidarity” in which he includes “fidelity” and “a concern for children,” although Kymlicka and Norman do not report this in their summary. While one could interpret “the virtues of family solidarity” to include the provision of care in multiple contexts, Galston does not develop this theme in his discussion of “liberal virtues” (ibid., chapter 10). Nor does he raise the theme when moving “from theory to practice” to examine the state’s role in fostering civic virtues among the citizenry (ibid., Part IV). The fact that “the virtues of family solidarity” receive only minimal attention from Galston beyond their brief mention in his discussion of the virtue of “independence” likely explains why Kymlicka and Norman do not reference them in their summary of Galston’s typology of virtues.
decommodify citizens from the discipline of the market (see also Barbalet (1988); King and Waldron (1988); Roche (1992); and Twine (1994). The focus on market discipline leads to analyses of social citizenship in which "men's experience [is] the norm" and the topic of caregiving is often marginalized (Jenson and Sineau 2001, 6).

There is an important place for contemporary efforts to defend decommodification as a critical element of social citizenship, particularly in light of recent welfare state restructuring that has unravelled many elements of the social safety net. I discuss this importance in chapters five and seven in the context of the post-industrial shift that has rendered it increasingly difficult for many citizens to secure their economic well-being through participation in the modern labour market. However, the preoccupation with decommodification implicit in what remains the dominant approach to social citizenship prioritizes a class analysis that is informed by traditional liberal assumptions about the public and private that prioritize the former and identify it with the practices of white, economically advantaged men. One result is that some of this research diverts attention away from the intersections of racism and sexism with classism, obscuring many of the relationships between domesticity and market and political practices. The dominant approach therefore fails to explore adequately the extent to which 'care' factors into the category of rights and duties of citizenship that are concerned with people's welfare. As I argue in Parts I and II of the dissertation, this inattention distorts the lived realities of many women from diverse ethnic and class backgrounds, as well as the caregiving commitments and interests that some men demonstrate. In addition, this inattention renders the dominant paradigm inadequate to address some of the most pressing challenges yielded by the structural shifts of the past two decades, including declining real male wages, increased female labour force participation, and the rise of dual-earner and single parent families.
The failure of much literature to identify caregiving specifically as a vital civic virtue is not surprising on one hand. The inattention to care is symptomatic of both the post-war and neoconservatives social citizenship regimes. The failure is surprising, however, given the now extensive feminist commentary about the contributions of women’s unpaid care work to the success and sustainability of the labour market and welfare state. Three strands of feminist debate are particularly relevant: one initiated by the work of Gilligan (1982); a second prompted by the work of Pateman (1989); and a third captured by the work of Collins (1990; 1994).

3b. Gilligan on the ethic of care

Carol Gilligan’s empirical work in moral development challenges dominant traditions in psychology, political theory, ethics and law. According to Gilligan (1995, 121) each of these disciplines traditionally prioritize a single moral orientation that focuses on questions of justice in a context of liberal individualism: “The voice that set the dominant key” in these fields was attuned to “the separate self, the individual acting alone, the possessor of natural rights, the autonomous moral agent.” By conveying a sense of separation as foundational, Gilligan (1982) argues that the dominant liberal approach to theorizing moral development distorts the role of relationships in moral, legal and political practices: it fails to hear, or account for, connection other than as potential impediments to autonomy and independence or instances of self-sacrifice.

One result, Gilligan (1987, 24) suggests, is that the dominant liberal approach ignores a second moral perspective that focuses on care, contextual variation, and connections that imply responsibilities to respond to need.12 Care, as a framework for moral decision making,

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12The centrality of the language of ‘responsibility’ in Gilligan’s research, as well as the literature it prompted, renders it particularly surprising that the subject of caregiving is absent from much of the recent work exploring the civic virtues that are required by a thriving liberal democracy and welfare state. Gilligan’s attention to responsibility clearly dovetails with the finding of Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 353) that “most writers believe than an adequate theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues” than was acknowledged during the first post-war decades.
is grounded in the assumption that self and other are interdependent, an assumption reflected in a view of action as responsive... Seen as responsive, the self is by definition connected to others, responding to perceptions, interpreting events, and governed by the organizing tendencies of human interaction and human language. Within this framework, detachment, whether from self or from others, is morally problematic, since it breeds moral blindness or indifference—a failure to discern or respond to need. The question of what responses constitute care and what responses lead to hurt draws attention to the fact that one's own terms may differ from those of others. Justice in this context becomes understood as respect for people in their own terms (ibid.).

Gilligan's (1987, 25) empirical work indicates that a majority of North Americans invoke this care perspective when deliberating about moral issues in addition to employing the justice considerations on which research traditionally focused. She maintains that the two perspectives are more complementary than sequential or opposed: they “focus attention on different dimensions of moral situations, creating a sense of ambiguity around the question of what is the problem to be solved.” This finding, Gilligan (ibid., 20) suggests, reflects that:

Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions—one of justice and one of care—recur in human experience. The moral injunctions, not to act unfairly toward others, and not to turn away from someone in need, capture these different concerns.

Gilligan's identification of the care framework initiated considerable feminist interest in determining more fully what is implied by an ethic of care for moral and political theory and practices, as well as how the care ethic differs from the alternative justice orientation (see for example Noddings 1984; Tronto 1993a; 1993b). Reflecting on the literature generated by this line of inquiry, Held (1995, 128) reports that

Feminist understandings of justice and care have by now made clear, in my view, that these are different values, reflecting different ways of interpreting moral problems and of expressing moral concern. And feminist discussion has also made clear that neither can be dispensed with: both are

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13 While Gilligan's empirical research suggests that a majority North Americans raise both care and justice considerations during moral deliberation, two-thirds of men and women tend to focus predominantly on the issues that are particularly salient from one of the two perspectives. Her studies revealed significant sex differences in the frequency with which individuals focused on either the care or justice orientation (1987, 25). Invariably, men who focus are found to prioritize justice considerations, while women who focus divide roughly equally between the care and justice perspectives. The finding that a care focus is almost exclusively a female phenomenon prompted a broader cultural trend that equated Gilligan's identification of the care ethic with 'women's morality', despite the fact that her research indicates this focus is by no means characteristic of all women. This broader cultural appropriation of Gilligan's work is subject to concerns about essentialism and risks reinforcing role specialization along gender lines on the assumption that women are 'naturally' better suited to care, nurture and respond to the needs of others.
highly important for morality. Not all feminists agree, by any means, but this is how I see the
debates of the last decades on these issues.

What remains to be worked out... is how justice and care and their related concerns fit together.
How does the framework that structures justice, equality, rights and liberty mesh with the network
that delineates care, relatedness, and trust?

Held’s characterization of what remains to be worked out in the literature is supported by
a number of feminist theorists who attempt to integrate care and justice perspectives into broader
moral or political theories (see Card 1988; Dillon 1992; Friedman 1993; Gilligan 1995; Okin
1989; Narayan 1995; Tronto 1993b). My concern to incorporate care into the meaning of
Canadian social citizenship is consistent with this literature. I propose that the institutional
embodiment of assumptions about agency offers an especially important area where the two
moral orientations can and should be merged. Attention to agency is recommended by Gilligan’s
research (1987, 23, 31), which notices that the justice and care frameworks lead to different ways
of imagining the self as a moral agent, generating and reflecting disparate views of the human
condition. Epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code (1987), have since defended the position that
assumptions about agency influence beliefs about what kinds of problems merit moral concern,
as well as the adequacy of proposed solutions. One result is that such assumptions inevitably
inform the development of political practices and institutions (Sandel 1984, 81).

In keeping with Gilligan’s finding that dominant traditions in psychology, philosophy,
law and political theory reflect a preoccupation with separation, this dissertation reveals that the
individualism of the traditional justice orientation also permeates Canada’s social citizenship
institutions. In Part III of the dissertation, I argue that attention to relationships and
interdependence implicit in the ethic of care illuminates how the traditional liberal concern with
personal autonomy can be retained, without subscribing to other liberal atomistic presumptions.
The ethic of care indicates that persons experience connection to others not solely as a barrier to
autonomy or an instance of self-sacrifice, but also as a source of comfort and pleasure, protection from isolation, and the precondition for personal autonomy (Baier 1985, 84-86). I rely on a richer appreciation for what Gilligan (1987, 32) terms “[t]his essential ambivalence of human connection” to illuminate an analytical approach that would enable theorists and policy makers to capitalize on the insights of both the care and justice moral orientations. In particular, I argue that care and justice considerations can be merged in institutional structures by rearranging relationships between state, market, and private households to shift from the neoliberal preoccupation with the welfare potential of the marketplace to a policy framework concerned to facilitate greater work-family balance.

3c. Pateman on Wollstonecraft’s dilemma

Carole Pateman’s “The Patriarchal Welfare State” (1989, 179-209) initiated a second feminist debate that reveals caregiving is a critical factor in social citizenship. Her (ibid., 197) discussion of ‘Wollstonecraft’s dilemma’ examines women’s struggles “with the task of trying to become citizens within an ideal and practice that have gained universal meaning through their exclusion.” She reports that:

On one hand, [women] have demanded that the ideal of citizenship be extended to them, and the liberal-feminist agenda for a ‘gender-neutral’ social world is the logical conclusion of one form of this demand. On the other hand, women have also insisted, often simultaneously, as did Mary Wollstonecraft, that as women they have specific capacities, talents, needs and concerns, so that the expression of their citizenship will be differentiated from that of men. Their unpaid work providing welfare could be seen, as Wollstonecraft saw women’s tasks as mothers, as women’s work as citizens, just as their husbands’ paid work is central to men’s citizenship.

The patriarchal understanding of citizenship means that the two demands are incompatible because it allows two alternatives only: either women become (like) men, and so full citizens; or they continue at women’s work, which is of no value for citizenship. Moreover, within a patriarchal welfare state neither demand can be met. To demand that citizenship, as it now exists, should be fully extended to women accepts the patriarchal meaning of ‘citizen’, which is constructed from men’s attributes, capacities and activities. Women cannot be full citizens in the present meaning of the term; at best, citizenship can be extended to women only as lesser men. At the same time, within the patriarchal welfare state, to demand proper social recognition and support for women’s responsibilities is to condemn women to less than full citizenship and to continued incorporation into public life as ‘women’, that is, as members of another sphere who cannot, therefore, earn the respect of fellow (male) citizens.
Pateman's analysis prompted two related lines of query in feminist research: first, whether the citizenship concept originally predicated on women's exclusion can be reformulated to include women fully and satisfactorily, rather than simply append them; and second, whether women should associate full citizenship status with either equality or difference, where equality means treating women exactly like men, and where difference means ascribing women a differential, but valued, citizenship status insofar as they differ from men.

In response to these questions, I draw on the work of Orloff (1993a), O'Connor (1993), Fraser (1994), Lister (1997) and Brodie (1995; 1996; 1997), all of whom identify citizenship as a potentially valuable theoretical concept for the analysis of women's subordination, as well as a powerful strategic tool in the struggle against it. Lister (1997, 12) explains that appropriation of citizenship as an effective feminist concept involves number of steps: "The first is to expose how, hidden under the cloak of false universalism,... exclusion has been not accidental but integral to... historical traditions of citizenship." Providing this exposure is one objective of Part I of this dissertation.

Further steps to employ the concept of citizenship, Lister suggests (ibid., 12-13), require that feminists reconcile their concern with women's distinctiveness from men, as well as the significance of differences between women, with the broader universalist project that underpins the emancipatory potential of citizenship: "Without the promise of the universal, against which the denial of full and genuine citizenship to women and minority groups can be measured and claims for inclusion can be directed, the concept of citizenship loses its political force." To foster this reconciliation, Lister encourages researchers to abandon the equality/difference dualism that so far has shaped much feminist theorizing about citizenship.
The work of Fraser (1994, 594-595) has been particularly helpful in moving feminist inquiry beyond this dualism. She reports that:

Theorists have debated the relative merits of [the equality and difference] approaches as if they represented two antithetical poles of an absolute dichotomy. These arguments have generally ended in stalemate. Proponents of difference have successfully shown that equality strategies typically presuppose “the male as norm,” thereby disadvantaging women and imposing a distorted standard on everyone. Egalitarians have argued just as cogently, however, that difference approaches typically rely on essentialist notions of femininity, thereby reinforcing existing stereotypes and confining women within existing gender divisions. Neither equality nor difference, then, is a workable conception of gender equity.

Rather than assume that equal citizenship for women should be identified with any single value or norm, be it equality, difference or something else, Fraser (1994, 595) urges that we should understand gender equity “as a complex notion comprising a plurality of distinct normative principles.” The plurality would include some notions associated with the equality side of the debate, some indexed to the difference approach, and still other considerations to which neither side has given due attention. Fraser (ibid., 596-600) proposes five distinct clusters of normative principles that constitute a feminist commitment to gender equity. Four clusters include proscriptions against (i) poverty, (ii) exploitation, (iii) marginalization from key social spaces, and (iv) androcentrism that portrays men’s current life patterns as the human norm to which women ought to assimilate. A fifth normative category includes equality principles committed to promoting greater income equality, leisure-time equality, and equality of respect.

Consistent with the literature triggered by Gilligan which points to the value of reorganizing social institutions around new norms of agency by merging insights from stereotypically ‘feminine’ care and ‘masculine’ justice moral orientations, Fraser’s proscription of androcentrism guides the analyses in subsequent chapters. I follow Fraser in rejecting the assumption that modern citizenship institutions should be premised on assumptions that reflect traditionally white, middle-class male citizenry practices (on this point, see also Brodie 1997, 237). Part III of the dissertation aims to de-centre the masculinist norms that currently define
Canada’s social citizenship paradigm, “in part by revaluing practices and traits that are currently undervalued because they are associated with women” (Fraser 1997, 600). This commitment to antiandrocentrism reflects a concern to ask men along with women to change their citizenship practices, with the intention of redefining ‘Wollstonecraft’s dilemma’ by introducing a third option: rather than expect women to approximate male standards, or re-institutionalize their differential citizenship status, the third option would ask men and women alike to internalize the best of both models. Since the post-war and neoliberal welfare paradigms predominantly reflect traditionally privileged male patterns of citizenry activity, the most pressing innovation requires the reorganization of social policy to induce far more men to modify their behaviour and attitudes to become more like most women today – people who shoulder considerable primary care work in addition to other citizenry obligations and ambitions (ibid., 611).

In Part III of the dissertation, I discuss some of the key policy changes that this third option implies, giving more sustained attention to specific elements of policy design as they influence systemic incentives than is typical of the literature to date. I argue that a new social policy blueprint organized around the concept of work-family balance has the potential to facilitate the redistribution of care work between diverse groups of women and men called for by this third alternative. In addition, since gender equality does not obviously capture the political will of policy makers in the present climate, I also defend the policy reforms in terms of their resources to address some of the more pressing social and economic challenges presented by the post-industrial and post-traditional shifts, including rising poverty among families with young children associated with declining real male wages, earnings inequality and persistent levels of high un(der)employment. This alternative strategy to defend the recommended policy changes points to a secondary theme that runs throughout the dissertation, namely that the analytical
boundaries associated with the concept of work-family balance should be broadened to capture a more diverse range of policy issues.

The policy analysis in Part III responds specifically to "the timidity with which authors apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy" that Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 368) describe as "a striking feature of the current debate" about citizenship. Many authors, they report, "focus more on describing desirable qualities of citizens, and less on what policies should be adopted to encourage or compel citizens to adopt these desirable virtues and practices" (Kymlicka and Norman 2000, 7). Thus, Kymlicka and Norman (forthcoming, 8) find that "all too often in the citizenship literature" the work reduces to the "platitude" that society would function better "if people in it were nicer and more considerate" (Kymlicka and Norman forthcoming, 8). In contrast to this platitude, I examine in detail the incentive structures associated with existing policies and alternatives with the intention of boldly addressing the question of what the state should do to encourage men to assume a just share of unpaid care labour from women in recognition that provision of this care is an important civic virtue and obligation of citizenship.

3d. Collins on organizing feminist theorizing around the experiences of women of colour

The search for a new citizenry model that integrates the practices stereotypically associated with men's breadwinning in the labour market with women's unpaid caregiving in the private domestic sphere complements the work of Collins (1994, 46) who recommends "[p]lacing the experiences of women of color in the center of feminist theorizing." "Since work and family have rarely functioned as dichotomous spheres for women of color," Collins (ibid.) remarks that "examining racial ethnic women's experiences reveals how these two spheres actually are interwoven." Thus, helpful examples of social groups that already engage the
challenge of integrating earning and caring are found in the lived realities of some women of colour, as well as many immigrant women and poor women, for whom specialization in unpaid domestic work within their own homes has not been economically viable historically.

Feminist research that focuses on less privileged groups of women is particularly successful at illuminating that caregiving is both a site of satisfaction and discrimination (see Arat-Koc 1997; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a; 1997b; Boris 1994; Glenn 1994; Roberts 1995; and Segura 1994). In contrast to second-wave feminism represented by Friedan (1963), the literature captured by Collins does not simply portray the domestic sphere as a space that women must overcome on the path towards greater gender equality, while it nonetheless remains mindful of the costs for women associated with a societal framework that reinforces male domination. I draw on this approach to theorizing domesticity throughout the dissertation, paying particular attention to discussions that reveal many less privileged women have historically been socially constructed as ‘workers’ before ‘mothers’; the resultant challenges that many ethnic minority, immigrant and poor women face in terms of fostering the security of their own families and communities through provision of unpaid care; and the associated insight that the home is an important site of refuge and fulfillment, rather than simply a site of exploitation for women.

3e. The value of engaging feminist and neoconservative critiques of post-war welfarism

The three strands of feminist research identified above provide strong support for integrating in institutional form citizenry ambitions and obligations associated with caregiving. This integration demands further reordering of the arrangements between state, market and family, effectively dismantling the now dominant neoconservative citizenship regime. However, the political success enjoyed over the past two decades by neoconservatives makes it imperative to examine their ideological framework for insights about an institutional context that can
achieve a more robust notion of social citizenship in Canada than was realized under the post-war regime, as well as one better suited to the present social and economic context. Electoral victories achieved by governments that have recently reorganized Canada’s commitment to social security and inclusion suggest that at least part of the conservative vision is ‘ringing true’ for a large share of the population. This dissertation is organized to filter from neoconservatism what may be attractive to much of the Canadian electorate, while discarding some elements of its vision that remain inconsistent with efforts to reinforce and advance the country’s commitment to the social dimension of citizenship. In this sense, my work follows in the tradition established recently by Giddens (1999; 2000) who defends “a third way in politics” that is distinct, but receptive to teachings, from both the post-war welfare and neoconservative paradigms.

To filter from neoconservatism what is compelling to much of the citizenry, I engage views expressed by the three strands of feminism identified above with the perspectives of diverse social and economic conservatives. This dialogue is impeded in the political sphere because the rise of neoconservatism has fostered a climate that is hostile to political movements that can be construed as ‘special interests’ (Laycock 2002, 56-61; Jenson and Phillips 1996, 121-129). However, there is rich potential in reconstructing the dialogue from the literature, which reveals several important commonalities. For instance, the attention to responsibilities explicit in the feminist literature motivated by Gilligan (1982) converges with the heightened emphasis on work duties that pervades neoliberal research by Mead (1986) and Courchene (1994a), as well as family duties that are implicit in the work of social conservatives such as Gilder (1987) and Berger and Berger (1983). By focussing on the harmful consequences of transfer dependency, Mead and Courchene in turn illuminate the welfare potential of labour market participation. This theme dovetails not only with the work of second-phase feminists such as Friedan (1963) who
present labour market participation as a key source of greater economic and personal security for women, but also with the more nuanced work of Fraser (1994) and others who acknowledge the importance of women's employment while rejecting androcentric labour market norms. Similarly, social conservatives such as Smith (2001) and Gairdner (1992) emphasize the important welfare contributions that women make in the private sphere and also identify the home as a sanctuary from the pressures of modernity, themes that resemble discussions prominent in the feminist literature represented by Collins (1994). Finally, social conservatives such as Berger and Berger (1982) offer insights about agency that closely parallel some elements of feminist work by Baier (1985) and Code (1987) who advance research initiated by Gilligan.

Given the fundamental issues that divide feminism from neoconservatism, these few points of convergence are theoretically interesting insofar as the distinctly different analytical frameworks employed by the two schools of thought corroborate one another in (i) singling out particular post-war state practices that merit redress; and (ii) recommending new requirements for dignified social inclusion in the contemporary context. I argue in the dissertation that the points of intersection suggest the need to reorganize state welfare practices around a strengthened commitment to work-family balance to facilitate full community membership for all citizens, while they also offer insights into what this shift in state design will resemble.

Strategically, the shared insights are politically important because they identify starting points for what Gramsci (1971) terms a 'counterhegemony.' According to Gramsci (ibid., 12), 'hegemony' is the set of processes that generate "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great mass of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group." On this view, hegemony involves "the production, reproduction, and mobilization of popular consent" to secure the "leadership" and privilege of those who are
already dominant (A. Hunt 1993, 229). A. Hunt (ibid.) observes that "[o]ne of the most important corollaries of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is that for a hegemonic project to be dominant it must address and incorporate, if only partially, some aspects of the aspirations, interests and ideology of the subordinate groups."

The points of convergence between neoconservatism and feminism that I identify in this dissertation illuminate some of what is appealing about the now dominant citizenship discourse to social groups whose less privileged status it reinforces. Once recognized, points of intersection provide openings to refashion constitutive elements of the prevailing hegemony by revealing issues on which the dominant discourse is "silent," as well as by introducing new dimensions that effectively "transcend" the discourse (A. Hunt 1993, 233). Thus, the path to replacing the neoconservative paradigm does not lie so much in negating its vision which resonates with much of the citizenry, but in reconstructing it to reprioritize what is currently missing and therefore relocate or "exhaust" elements that are presently dominant (ibid.). At the very least, the points of convergence identified in this thesis lay the groundwork for a new framework for social citizenship about which individuals with diverging ideological viewpoints can identify areas of agreement that make possible the sorts of compromises that are necessary for alternative political movements to succeed.

By engaging both neoconservative and feminist perspectives to develop a revised framework for social citizenship, I follow Giddens (1994) in rejecting the left-right political spectrum as the best analytical tool by which to capture trends in political thinking in recent decades. Giddens observes that the relationship between political radicalism and the left no longer holds as strongly as it did for much of the past century. The fall of the Soviet Union has positioned many left-leaning researchers to concentrate their efforts on protecting the post-war
welfare state from the strains to which it has become subject. This defensive position marks the new conservatism of (what remains of) the left, whereby socialists have acceded their position in the ‘vanguard of history’ in favour of the more modest task of preserving existing welfare institutions. By contrast, Giddens remarks that the conservatism of contemporary Europe and North America has now embraced the very forces it used to repudiate – capitalism and the far-reaching processes of change that unfettered market forces typically advance. One notable consequence is that many conservatives today, particularly of the economic variety, are now radically positioned relative to the very traditions conservatism formerly worked to preserve. In this respect, Giddens (ibid., 2) concludes that “[c]onservatism become radical” now confronts socialism that has “become conservative.”

In light of the declining relevance of the left-right spectrum, my decision to engage neoconservative and feminist critiques of post-war welfare reflects a number of factors. First, as revealed by the discussions above, feminism represents a series of alternative social movements that make available a set of distinct vantage points from which to critique both the post-war and neoconservative frameworks of social citizenship. Feminist literature therefore avoids the pitfalls of the left’s more modest project of defending former institutions, which signals a “nostalgic welfarism reading” of neoliberal restructuring that ignores critiques that, with good reason, charged the post-war paradigm of being patriarchal, classist, racist and environmentally unsustainable (Brodie 1995, 22). Second, although neoconservatism represents the ideological

14 Feminists are not alone, however, in offering alternative ‘progressive’ movements to socialism. Environmental groups are also an active option that has captured the attention of persons who might have formerly identified themselves with the left in Canada; and the green movement has substantial resources to contribute to any rearticulation of social citizenship both locally and globally. For instance, environmentalists urge that we acknowledge the importance of human duties, and sometimes assert their primacy over human rights. They require us to rethink what welfare means by illuminating environmental factors and values. And they ask us to expand our understanding of who counts when measuring the welfare effects of policy decisions, directing attention to future generations and the non-human (Roche 1992, 53).
challenge to the post-war citizenship regime that has enjoyed the most success in Canada, diverse strands of feminist thought have also exerted an “enormous” influence on “modernity’s capacity to imagine alternative futures for human life and society” (Roche 1992, 48; italics in original). In part because of robust intra-group debates, feminist scholars have been especially successful in moving research about equality and emancipation beyond a classic socialist analysis of class to assess the interlocking character of class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and other systems of oppression. Third, the centrality of caregiving to welfare provision provides reason to prioritize feminist scholarship because of its particular expertise about domains that have been traditionally associated with the needs, interests and work of diverse groups of women. Fourth, and finally, feminist research is well-positioned to evaluate one of the critical structural social changes with which any new framework for social citizenship must contend – the post-traditional shift which witnessed rapidly rising levels of labour force participation among married women for both financial and ideological reasons.

4. The Scope of the Dissertation

The scope of the dissertation is limited in three important ways. First, any effort to integrate care into the meaning of citizenship in Canada must be attuned to the diverging needs and experiences of care provision and care receipt that depend on whether the care recipient is a child, person with a physical or mental disability, senior citizen, or able-bodied, psychologically healthy adult. In order to contain the analysis in this dissertation, I employ child care as the primary model for exploration, particularly when assessing existing policies and proposing alternatives. Despite its focus on child care, much of the analysis that I develop also addresses some issues associated with other care contexts, particularly elder care, but the policy implications are generally left unexplored.
The choice to examine child care closely responds to the political reality that children are one of few social groups to be condoned as 'legitimate dependents' within the neoconservative paradigm (Brodie 1996, 135). The paradigm's preoccupation with self-reliance has meant that most other dependency on the state is viewed somewhat suspiciously as an indication of personal failure. The demarcation of children from adults under the guise of legitimate dependency has contributed to a neoconservative preference for targeting income-maintenance programs to children, particularly in an effort to combat child poverty. One result of this policy orientation is that it risks theoretically removing children's well-being from the circumstances of their parents or other guardians. I defend against this risk in the dissertation by focusing on children and child care in the context of the social citizenship needs of adults.

Second, the dissertation gives considerable attention to federal policy decisions in order to paint a broad overview of the ideological underpinnings of Canada's policy arena, despite the fact that child care falls under provincial jurisdiction. This methodological decision reflects practical and theoretical factors. Practically, the synthesis of policy platforms in ten provinces and two territories poses a challenge when summarizing the political mood of the country's political decision-makers. Theoretically, fiscal federal relations mean that decisions in Ottawa affect provincial governments in a qualitatively different manner than provincial decisions affect federal governments. Federal purse strings permit Ottawa to exercise considerable influence over the nature and size of provincial welfare programming. Some provinces, most notably Alberta, may have initially moved further and faster than the federal government to implement a neoconservative agenda. But federal decisions to cap spending under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), and later replace it with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST),

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significantly drained provincial coffers. As a result, provincial governments were constrained to rethink and reduce their approach to social welfare regardless of their ideological predisposition.

Some provincial variation is noted throughout the dissertation, including when provinces surpass the federal commitments to neoconservative policies. But attention is also paid to provincial policy trends that mark an alternative to neoconservatism. In particular, some Québec programming is examined specifically because the province’s approach to family policy diverges sharply from that implemented elsewhere in Canada.

Third, the dominant class-based approach to theorizing social citizenship has meant that related policy discussions typically focus on income-support programming. Considerable attention has been given to policy options that include a citizen’s income, negative income tax, minimum wage policy, earned income supplements, child tax benefits, workfare, and alternative regulations for unemployment insurance (see for example, Courchene 1994a, 317-356; Goldberg and Green 1999; Richards 1997, 268-277; Roche 1992, 178-190; Twine 1994, 163-169).

While the design of income-support programs is clearly critical to the success of any adequate framework for social citizenship, the claim that such a framework must also integrate care into its meaning suggests that theorists must also be concerned with a much broader range of programming. In particular, the inclusion of caregiving into the purview of citizenship requires policies that will support citizens to fulfil their care aspirations and needs, while also assisting individuals to balance their care commitments with other citizenship practices. To date, this broader range of programming has received less attention in the social citizenship literature. Therefore, when exploring the dissertation’s policy implications in chapters eight and nine, I focus exclusively on the kinds of policy mechanisms and changes that are required to institutionalize caregiving as part of Canada’s commitment to citizenship, rather than engage in
debates about how best to design income-support measures. The policy envelopes that I explore include labour standards regulating hours of employment, child care, parental leave, and the tax treatment of caregiving and dependency. I discuss each policy domain in terms of its capacity to support citizens achieve greater work-family balance by supplementing income-assistance mechanisms, providing access to employment, and enabling citizens to find time to care, work and play within their spheres of personal relationships.

5. Dissertation Overview

The dissertation is organized into three Parts. Part I develops the concept of social citizenship and examines its ideological deployment both in the first-post-war decades and since 1980. I initiate the analysis in chapter two by examining in more detail what the term ‘social citizenship’ means by reviewing the works of two scholars who contributed critically to the development of the concept, T.H. Marshall (1964) and John Rawls (1971). By returning to early post-war texts, chapter two also describes the citizen-state regime that was ‘torn down’ by the latest round of state restructuring in Canada in so far as it reveals some of the social and political values represented by key policy trajectories of the period. This examination provides the context within which to interpret, analyze and evaluate the retrenchment and redefinition of the Canadian welfare state over the past two decades, which is the primary focus of the dissertation.

I identify four issues that are specific to the early post-war construction of social citizenship that inform the analysis in the remaining chapters: the paradigm’s (i) assumptions about agency; (ii) approach to ‘difference’; (iii) emphasis on state welfare; and (iv) preoccupation with rights.

Chapters three and four review critiques of the early post-war paradigm with the intention of describing and explaining the current policy regime in Canada that has emerged from the state restructuring since 1980. The chapters pay particular attention to critiques that target one or
more of the four issues specific to the dominant post-war construction of social citizenship listed above. Chapter three focuses on feminist criticisms, discussing the extent to which the state has been reorganized in accordance with feminist views. Chapter four engages with neoconservative concerns, summarizing the broad scope of conservative changes to the post-war welfare state that dominated the political arena during the past two decades.

In Part II, chapters five and six examine respectively the post-industrial and post-traditional transitions in Canada, describing how these shifts exacerbated problems already present in the dominant post-war welfare regime and pose difficult challenges for any new social citizenship framework. The success of the neoconservative paradigm in responding to these shifts is also explored. The state restructuring of the past two decades is evaluated in terms of its consistency in addressing neoconservative critiques of early post-war welfarism and in regards to its continued vulnerability to feminist challenges.

Part III advances a new framework for social citizenship that integrates care into its meaning without reinforcing patriarchal divisions of labour and duty. Chapter seven recommends organizing social citizenship around a commitment to work-family balance, articulating theoretical shifts that are needed to support and facilitate this policy agenda. Chapters eight and nine explore some of the key policy implications of the proposed theoretical framework, describing policies that would lay the groundwork for a new 'politics of time'.

A new politics of time would illuminate and redress the intersections between various inequalities linked to the division of caregiving and worrisome labour market trends that have emerged in the last three decades, including increased earnings inequality, polarization in the paid hours that people work, and declining incomes for young employees. Given the importance of fostering a market environment in which demand for labour is strong, the proposed new
politics is careful to locate policy responses within a context that is committed to maintaining the profitability of the Canadian business sector, giving particular attention to employers’ interests in containing wage growth.
PART I

SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP: THE IDEOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF MORAL THEORY
CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP – THE DOMINANT POST-WAR PARADIGM

[T]here developed, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a growing interest in equality as a principle of social justice and an appreciation of the fact that the formal recognition of an equal capacity for rights was not enough.

The “explosion of interest” in citizenship observed by Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 352; 2000, 5) produced a still burgeoning literature that examines the implications of the concept’s social dimension (for example, see Adriaansens 1994; Barbalet 1988; Evans 1997; Fraser and Gordon 1992; King and Waldron 1988; Mead 1997; Orloff 1993a; Rees 1995; Roche 1992; Twine 1994). One striking feature of this literature, as noted by Barbalet (1988, 59), is that relatively little effort is made to define the terms ‘social citizenship’ or ‘social rights’ other than by identifying these concepts with the welfare state (for example, see Adriaansens 1994, 66; Evans 1997, 93-95; Fraser and Gordon 1992, 45-46; Roche 1992, 3-4). Rees (1995, 314) exemplifies this trend especially well. His work assumes that the “notion of a specifically ‘social’ citizenship... has a relatively precise and uncontroversial meaning if it is taken to refer to access to, and utilisation of, the bundle of public services conventionally held to make up the modern welfare state.”

While its connections to state welfarism in the contemporary era are intimate, social citizenship refers in part to a political ideal that is conceptually distinct from the institutional practices that give it de facto power. This distinction is important given that more than two decades of state restructuring in Canada and elsewhere raise concerns that the neoconservative citizen-state regime now institutionalizes weaker commitments to social citizenship compared to the post-war paradigm it replaced (for instance, see Brodie 1997; McBride and Shields 1997). In addition, the tendency to equivocate citizenship’s social element with the welfare state aligns the former predominantly with the goal of income and social security that Esping-Anderson (1990) documents as a primary focus of post-war welfare states. This alignment risks neglecting other
aspects of social citizenship’s emancipatory potential which policy makers were less able or
willing to institutionalize in the first decades following World War II.

In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for analyzing the evolution of social citizenship
policies and practices in Canada by returning to texts written by two leading twentieth century
theorists who fundamentally shaped post-war scholarship about the subject: T. H. Marshall’s
essay “Citizenship and Social Class,” first delivered as a speech in Cambridge in 1949;¹ and John
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice published in 1971.² The texts are analyzed with the intention of
illuminating the political vision initially associated with citizenship’s social dimension to help
assess the consequences of recent state restructuring and guide the development of an alternative
social citizenship framework in Part III. This analysis reveals that the social element of
citizenship articulates an ideal of universal citizenry entitlements to social security expressed as
part of broader commitments to equality of opportunity and dignified social inclusion.

Although the development of social citizenship in Anglo-capitalist welfare states owes
considerable debt to many thinkers such as Keynes, Beveridge, Titmuss and Marsh, the texts by
Marshall and Rawls offer particularly rich starting points for defining more precisely the
concept’s meaning. As Kymlicka and Norman (forthcoming, 4) observe, Marshall’s essay has
become a central reference point for the academic investigations of citizenship that have
dominated normative political theorizing in recent years. In addition, Marshall’s work informs
the research of Esping-Anderson (1990, 21) whose concern with ‘decommodification’ has
become the most common approach to examining citizen-welfare state regimes in the 1990s

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all references to Marshall in this chapter refer to his 1949 speech published in: Marshall,

² Unless otherwise noted, all references to Rawls in this chapter refer to: Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
(Jenson and Sineau 2001, 6). In section one below, I rely on Marshall's essay in particular for its typology of the three elements of citizenship, as well as his identification of social rights with legitimated citizenry expectations. The latter discussion sets the stage for a central theme of the dissertation: namely, that the neoconservative policy agenda since 1980 has been largely about redefining what citizens can reasonably expect of governments in terms of social welfare.

Kymlicka and Norman (forthcoming, 4) also report that the emergent focus on Marshall's essay in Anglo-American political philosophy signals the diminution of the "principal debates" of the 1970s and 1980s, which "involved the defence or critique of liberal theories of justice, with participants explaining what they agreed or disagreed with in Rawls's A Theory of Justice." While the debates for and against Rawlsian liberal theories may have become "increasingly... stale" for many academics (ibid.), the relatively limited attention to the definition of citizenship's 'social dimension' in the new literature provides strong reason to reintegrate Rawls's work with recent theoretical debates about citizenship. The development of the post-war welfare state partly represented the institutional embodiment of insights from moral and political philosophy associated with the welfare liberalism that Rawls develops and defends in A Theory of Justice. Therefore, it is helpful to re-read Rawls's work in light of Marshall's essay to elucidate the distinct set of moral and political precepts that motivated post-war policy makers to extend the social safety net well beyond the laissez faire norm accepted prior to World War II.

The value of re-reading Rawls in light of Marshall is suggested by Hindess (1993, 24), and discussed more thoroughly by King and Waldron (1988, 439) who "believe that Rawls's work can be understood as a discussion of what it is to be a citizen or member of a given society." The latter argue that Rawls's thought experiment of the original position reveals a distinction between being merely a 'subject' versus a full 'member' of a community (King and
Waldron 1988, 439-442). In section two below, I use this insight from King and Waldron as a starting point to re-examine Rawls's conclusions about the principles of justice selected in the original position. This examination reveals mutual support between Rawls and Marshall for regarding collective commitments to social security, substantive equality and dignified inclusion as prerequisites for the effective exercise of political and civil liberties.

By focussing only on the early texts of Marshall and Rawls (setting aside Rawls's later work in *Political Liberalism* (1993)), the analysis in this chapter also identifies specific assumptions that underpin and limit the paradigmatic post-war approach to theorizing social citizenship. As I discuss in successive chapters, post-war welfare practices were significantly influenced by assumptions about (a) agency, (b) objectivity, (c) the primacy of state welfare; and (d) the priority of rights over responsibilities, each of which is present either in the work of Marshall and/or Rawls. Discussion of these assumptions in section three below anticipates feminist and neoconservative critiques of the post-war regime, as well as challenges to the post-war paradigm posed by ideological and structural social transitions.

Finally, Marshall and Rawls also represent helpful starting points from which to launch an analysis of social citizenship because their notoriety extends well beyond the disciplinary boundaries within which they write — Marshall as a sociologist and Rawls as a philosopher. Their works have been assessed, lauded and critiqued by scholars from diverse academic backgrounds, becoming foundational pieces for theorists with varied intellectual pursuits. The resulting 'common commodity' status of the texts across academic divides marks an accessible starting point from which to initiate a study of citizenship that builds upon, and puts in dialogue, the insights of political scientists, sociologists, economists, legal theorists and philosophers.
1. Marshall on the Social Rights of Citizenship

1a. The politics of equal dignity

According to Marshall (84), citizenship is both an ideal "against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed," as well as an actual uniform status granted full members of a community. All who possess the de facto status are equal in terms of the rights and duties with which it is associated. Although the content of this status differs across societies, Marshall suggests that the path towards the ideal of citizenship, wherever it holds, is concerned to achieve a "fuller measure of equality" by ascribing members of formerly excluded social groups the status of 'citizens', as well as enriching the content of this status with additional rights.

Marshall (87-88) argues that the development of this modern notion of Western citizenship was facilitated by the shift away from societal practices premised on the differential "status" or honour "associated with class, function and family" towards practices that presumed contracts "between men who are free and equal in status." Taylor (1994) has since developed this theme, identifying the social transition with the emergence of the modern notion of 'dignity'. Since 'honour' offers a primary societal organizing principle that is incompatible with the onset of democracy, Taylor (1994, 27) observes that the politics of honour was inevitably superseded by the politics of "equal dignity" or "equal citizenship." He explains that we use the term dignity today "in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent 'dignity of human beings,' or of citizen dignity" (ibid.).

The politics of equal dignity is premised on the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect because of a universally shared potential. Taylor (1994, 41) and others credit the philosopher Kant with being one of the first to articulate this idea. For Kant (1993/1785,
434-435), we all possess dignity, and should be treated with respect as intrinsically valuable ‘ends’ in ourselves, rather than as ‘means’ to some end, in virtue of our common status as rational agents who have the potential to direct our lives in reference to moral principles. Although its “detailed definition... may have changed,” Taylor (1994, 41) remarks that something like Kant’s evocation of the concept of dignity has become the basis for our intuitions about equal citizenship. Most notably, the politics of dignity continues to direct our attention to some universal potential or capacity that all humans share regardless of our differences.

This potential, rather than anything a person may have made of it, is what ensures that each person deserves respect. Indeed, our sense of the importance of potentiality reaches so far that we extend this protection even to people who through some circumstance that has befallen them are incapable of realizing their potential in the normal way—handicapped people, or those in a coma, for instance (Taylor 1994, 41-2).

1b. Three elements of citizenship

Marshall’s essay “Citizenship and Social Class” can be read as examination of the evolution of the politics of equal dignity and citizenship in Anglo-capitalist states. One of his key intellectual contributions is his analysis of the content of citizenship status, which he divides into three (potential) parts – its civil, political and social elements (71-2). The three parts refer to sets of rights that Marshall distinguishes by referencing the institutions that contribute most to their social force. The motivation for this distinction is Marshall’s recognition that rights have little meaning and influence in the absence of an institutional context capable of enforcing and protecting entitlements on behalf of citizens (Barbalet 1988, 6). The de facto content of citizenship status therefore depends on the history of a society’s institutional development, according to Marshall. As social institutions evolve, so do the de facto rights of citizenship.

On the basis of this institutional analysis, Marshall argues that civil rights, “the rights necessary for individual freedom,” are most closely associated with the court system and the rule of law. These institutions provide a basis for “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought
and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” (71).

Similarly, he observes that “the right to participate in the exercise of political power” presupposes parliamentary institutions, local councils and the democratic electoral system (72). The social element of citizenship, Marshall suggests, is most closely associated with a welfare state’s education system and social services. These institutions, he reports, have the potential to give rise to a broad series of entitlements, ranging “from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (72).

Of the three elements of citizenship, Marshall is principally concerned with the social dimension, particularly its effects vis-à-vis the tendency for laissez faire capitalist economies to produce substantial vertical stratification within societies. While he acknowledges that civil and political rights are critical to citizenship in a democratic state, he argues that their formal status may mean little to citizens who suffer either “class prejudice and partiality” or the “unequal distribution of wealth” that leaves them bereft of the resources necessary to pursue goals freely, access property and participate politically (88-91). For Marshall, the urgency of demands generated by need and the unequal status associated with poverty radically undermine the conditions necessary for successful market and political participation (Brodie 1997, 229), thereby distorting both the contribution that individuals can make and the ends they can achieve. In addition, Marshall (87) observes that the formal status of civil entitlements may render self-perpetuating the social exclusion that results from material constraints. Civil rights, he remarks, have historically been used to deny individuals social protection from the inequalities of a capitalist economy on the grounds that such rights empower citizens to engage in the competitive market equipped with the means to protect themselves.
The attention that Marshall pays to the social and economic context necessary to effectively exercise civil and political rights is in keeping with a long-standing Western tradition of theorizing citizenship. King and Waldron (1988, 425-426) observe that Aristotle, Machiavelli, Burke, de Tocqueville, Mill and, in the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt... have believed that in order to be a citizen of a polis, in order to be able to participate fully in public life, one needed to be in a certain socio-economic position... People, it was said, could not act as citizens at all, or could not be expected to act well in the political sphere and to make adequate decisions, unless some attention was paid to matters of their wealth, their well-being and their social and economic status.

Marshall diverges from many earlier historical figures in terms of the conclusion that he draws about the connection between socio-economic context and the capacity to participate in one’s community effectively. While Aristotle, Machiavelli, Burke and others used this link to ground an argument for restricting citizenship to those who occupy a ‘suitable’ social location, the shift from a politics of honour to one of dignity moves Marshall to the opposite conclusion. A society genuinely committed to the politics of dignity, he suggests (96-97), should ensure that social institutions are arranged such that everyone occupies the socio-economic position in which the dominant intellectual tradition provides good reason to believe that citizens ought to reside.

Marshall describes a two-track approach to foster the sort of social and economic context required for universal citizenship. First, he emphasizes the importance of guaranteeing citizens a right to education. A public commitment to education, Marshall (109) argues, is critical to prevent cyclical “hereditary privilege” and a cornerstone of “the right to equality of opportunity.” Second, Marshall lauds a system of social services that both creates “a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant” (96); and a “guaranteed minimum... supply of certain essential goods and services (such as medical attention and supplies, shelter and education)” (101). In Marshall’s view, such a system of social services has the potential to effectively counter the tendency for capitalist economies to commodify citizens. The “real income” on which citizens depend for their survival and well-being would no longer be
contingent on the sale of their labour power for a wage that makes little reference to their “social needs and status” as citizens (80).³

Marshall’s endorsement of a guaranteed minimum reflects a commitment to an egalitarian foundation for society. His concern is the “general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life” (102). This enrichment demands a “general reduction of risk and insecurity” premised on an equalization of social conditions “between the more and the less fortunate at all levels—between the healthy and the sick, the employed and the unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of a large family.”

However, this concern with an egalitarian foundation is by no means a commitment to absolute equality of outcomes. For Marshall (110), the right to equal opportunity is actually “an instrument of social stratification.” Public provision of education, he claims, guarantees the equal right to display and develop differences, or inequalities; the equal right to be recognized as unequal. In the early stages of the establishment of such a system the major effect is, of course, to reveal hidden equalities—to enable the poor boy to show that he is as good as the rich boy. But the final outcome is a structure of unequal status fairly apportioned to unequal abilities (109).

Thus, in Marshall’s view, social citizenship does not combat inequality per se, but illegitimate inequality. Democratic citizenship, he suggests, is entirely consistent with “status differences... provided they do not cut too deep... and provided they are not an expression of hereditary privilege” (116). Inequalities are tolerable so long as they “are not dynamic” and, thus, do not foster an institutional setting that structures opportunities which for all intents and purposes are unavailable to some because of their socio-economic starting points.

Preoccupied with the tension between social citizenship and capitalist markets, Marshall’s acknowledgement of legitimate social inequality suggests that the two social forces

³ Marshall’s interest in decommodification has since become a dominant theme in the literature on social citizenship, influencing thinking most significantly in the 1990s with Esping-Anderson’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
can co-exist: one must not inevitably succumb to the other. Despite his much quoted claim (84) that “in the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war,” Marshall’s qualification that “the phrase is rather too strong” (110) better reflects his overarching analysis of the relationship. For Marshall, citizenship “impose[s] modifications” on capitalism, but markets must still function within limits. In keeping with his contemporaries Keynes and Beveridge, the post-war social and economic strategy advocated by Marshall is one of ‘embedded liberalism’ – the combination of economic liberalization with a commitment to social protection. As Roche (1992, 22) remarks, Marshall maintains that there is a
tension between the principles and institutions of welfare and social citizenship on the one hand and those of capitalism on the other... Nonetheless, the image he conveys throughout is that of the manageability of this tension and, overall, of the reciprocity and functionality of the major sectors of the modern social system, particularly the state and capitalism.

Although he considers the tension between capitalism and social citizenship to be manageable, Marshall hints that it is not entirely reconcilable. He is well aware of the role that conflict plays in the extension of citizenship, noting that this growth “is stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won” (92). He is also conscious of the class bias that characterizes citizenship’s civil and social elements, as is reflected in his recognition, already discussed, that civil rights are sometimes used to deny social protection to persons who do not succeed in the market. Some civil rights are critical to the workings of capitalist markets and persons for whom the market is lucrative. By contrast, some social rights clearly prioritize the needs of the less secure. Thus, while Marshall (103) suggests that the commitment to universality explicit in the politics of dignity may undercut class-based stratification, Barbalet (1988, 10) observes that his analysis also demonstrates how “class conflict may possibly be about the nature and scope of citizenship rights.” So long as class stratification remains significant and pervasive, Marshall’s work suggests that the terrain
between the social element of citizenship and the civil rights that ground market practices is likely to remain contested, as witnessed with the rise of neoconservatism in Canada since 1980.

This implication of Marshall’s work is consistent with the fact that social entitlements have never been formalized to the same degree as civil and political rights. Unlike citizenship’s other dimensions, social rights “rarely are built into national political constitutions in any full, explicit and unequivocal way” (Roche 1992, 225), nor do they receive comparable protection under international covenants (Schabas 2000, 199-200). Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an apt example. While the Charter alludes to a right to equal opportunity by sanctioning affirmative action programs in section 15(2), it includes no explicit protections against material deprivations that undermine citizens’ abilities to participate fully in our cultural, political and economic spaces. Indeed, the dearth of such formal social protections prompted advocates of a ‘social charter’ to lobby (largely unsuccessfully) for the inclusion of new social rights in the Charlottetown Accord (Bakan 1997, 135).

Lacking formal expression at a constitutional level, social rights are considerably more ambiguous and intangible than are civil and political entitlements in the public eye. As a de facto status, there can be no doubt that social citizenship occupies a less secure footing compared to its civil and political counterparts. This diminished legal status likely reflects the fiscal conditionality of citizenship’s social dimension. The provision of social services and income transfers requires a level of public expenditure not associated with the civil and political rights of modern citizenship (Barbalet 1988, 70-2; Roche 1992, 34-5). Therefore, the full scope of social rights to education and health care is contingent not solely on service delivery infrastructure, but also on a state’s institutional capacity to generate revenue (Marshall, 104). Evaluating the extent of this state capacity raises questions about income redistribution between members of a
community, including the share of personal or family income that should appropriately be paid to purchase public services and fund income transfers. This line of questioning inevitably confronts concerns about individual property rights. The result is that the social dimension of citizenship exists in continual tension with citizenship’s civil element. Given the diverging class affiliations associated with civil and social rights, Marshall (87-88) implies that it is imprudent to assume the state will equally guarantee both dimensions of citizenship. If nothing else, the less formal expression of social rights ensures they are subject to recurrent political contestation, something which neoconservative advocates have capitalized on in recent decades.

1c. The legitimate expectations of citizens define the qualitative content of social rights

Bracketing the historical and fiscal factors that explain the less explicit articulation of citizenship’s social dimension in a constitutional context, one senses in Marshall’s work that this less formalized expression also appropriately reflects the character of social citizenship. Social rights that demand benefits in the form of a service “cannot be precisely defined,” Marshall (104) argues. The abstract formulation of rights that legislation typically demands will be hard pressed to capture a social right’s “qualitative element.” For instance, the full meaning of a right to education is not discernable from legislation that states all children of a certain age will attend school. Rather, its actual meaning is contingent on the educational system’s commitment to factors that impact the quality of children’s educational experience: class-room size, teacher training, and the educational materials and opportunities made available to students and instructors. Similarly, a right to health insurance may make it possible for every citizen to visit a doctor. But the full impact of that right depends on the health care system’s capacity to ensure that individuals’ ailments are properly cared for.
Although difficult to capture in legal documents, Marshall is adamant that what matters most to citizens about social rights is their qualitative element: for instance, what citizens can legitimately expect from a right to health care given their community’s socio-economic context. When the expectations that citizens hold about health care, education, or social assistance are perceived to be ‘reasonable,’ they may motivate state initiatives in these areas, and thereby create obligations on the state. As Marshall (104) observes, “[e]xpectations officially recognized as legitimate... become... details in a design for community living.”

Marshall does not provide a clear sense of the criteria by which citizenry expectations are conferred legitimacy by the state. Given his commitment to the view that social citizenship generates a right to lead a civilized life according to the standards of the day, one might surmise that official recognition is merited by expectations that support social inclusion, equality, dignity and so forth. Simultaneously, the language of legitimate expectations suggests the concept of social consensus. As more people share expectations, the state may be motivated to consider their positions more carefully. Still, the desire to identify precisely when expectations are legitimate raises questions for which definitive answers are infrequent. Broad agreement alone cannot be a sufficient criterion of legitimacy since members of patriarchal, racist or homophobic communities may widely share expectations that are entirely unjust and illegitimate. What is more, citizenry expectations (legitimate or otherwise) will change over time in response to economic growth, technological advances and ideological shifts and therefore will forever be a subject of ongoing negotiation between competing stakeholders. Indeed, this dynamic quality is what renders it difficult to formally express in a constitutional context the qualitative dimension of social rights.
Although his essay is relatively silent about the appropriate criteria by which to evaluate the reasonableness of citizenry demands, Marshall’s invocation of the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ to define the content of social rights tracks the tenor of public debate about social issues. His insight is especially evident in recent government inquiries into the status of Medicare in Canada. The federal government created the Commission on the Future of Health Care while the Alberta government commissioned the Mazankowski (2001) Report largely in response to the fact that “Canadians express concerns about waiting lists and timely access to certain medical procedures” despite rising provincial expenditures (Romanow 2002, 4). The perception that lengthening waiting periods for non-elective surgery reflect a health care system ‘in crisis’ reveals not only that citizens share expectations about how much time we should reasonably wait for medical procedures, but that the current trend towards longer waiting lists illegitimately ignores this expectation.

Following Marshall’s insights about the qualitative content of social rights, a central theme of this dissertation is that the struggle over social citizenship amounts in large part to a struggle over public attitudes. The neoconservative restructuring of the past two decades has been just as much about the state changing citizens’ expectations as it has been about changing government budgets (Kline 1997, 349; Workman 1996, 15). From a neoconservative perspective, many Canadians demonstrate too little self-reliance and personal responsibility and have lost sight of the independence attainable from a strong commitment to labour markets and their families (Richards 1997, 144-145; Courchene 1994a, 29-30). As a result, some economic conservatives are concerned that citizens increasingly fail to recognize the limits and liability of government provision. Reorienting public attention to the value of a circumscribed state therefore has become a primary neoliberal objective (Brodie 1995, 57; Philipps 1996b, 736).
The question of legitimate citizen expectations also informs the revised framework for social citizenship that I propose in Part III of the dissertation. My argument that caregiving should be built into the meaning of Canadian citizenship rests on the claim that successfully combining the aspirations and obligations associated with both caring and earning is a legitimate expectation among individual Canadians that ought to be officially recognized by the state. This theme is developed throughout the dissertation by referencing a number of social factors that confer legitimacy to the expectation, including labour market transitions, declining real male wages, shifting family organizational strategies, and the demands of social justice, security, equality and dignified community membership.

2. Rawls's on Full Membership in Society

While Rawls never intended *A Theory of Justice* to continue a dialogue initiated by Marshall's essay, there is nonetheless a marked affinity between the two works. Just as Marshall characterizes citizenship as a status possessed by full members of a society, Rawls's intention is to explore the sort of society in which equal individuals would freely contract to become full members. Rawls examines how individuals choosing from a position of equality would organize their community's foundational institutions and, thus, the civil, political and social rights and duties engendered by this organizational structure.

2a. Rawls on the social contract

As with Marshall, the politics of dignity is central to Rawls's project. The Kantian depiction of persons as 'ends in themselves' who merit equal consideration influences Rawls significantly. "Each member of society," he (28) claims, "is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice... which even the welfare of every one else cannot override." This
inviolability, he suggests, flows from a human “potentiality” (505): namely, “the capacity for a sense of justice” (511).

Rawls gives status to the inherent moral standing of persons by working within the social contract tradition. He asks us to imagine that individuals “decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society” (11). The contract idea explicitly recognizes persons as autonomous, self-defining individuals whose consent to a societal framework (even if only hypothetical) matters when considering the justness of the society. Consent, in this context, suggests that the rights and duties that are generated by the organization of social institutions are “self-imposed” (13); they reflect a set of social principles to which autonomous individuals would freely assent.

Rawls (13) has no intention of suggesting that a society could “be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense.” We are all born into some particular position in some particular society and this social location significantly affects our life prospects. Nonetheless, imagining the sort of society that equal people would consent to, Rawls suggests, provides insights and criteria with which to measure the justness and inclusiveness of existing communities. Indeed, he argues that any society satisfying “the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair” would “come as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme.”

Rawls’s concern to describe a social order to which citizens would voluntarily consent if given the choice motivates the distinction that King and Waldron (1988, 439-440) draw between a ‘subject’ and ‘full member’ or ‘citizen’ of society:

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4 In the religious systems that dominated pre-Enlightenment thought, moral obligations were typically thought to derive their social force from some larger natural or divine order. As Enlightenment thinkers questioned the foundation of these older ethical systems, theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau resorted to the concept of a social contract to justify and explain the moral force of rights and duties (Kymlicka 1993, 186).
A person is a mere subject of a regime and not a citizen, if its rules and policies will be applied to him or her whether he or she likes it or not and whether they serve his or her interests or not. They are applied without reference to his or her consent. But, since Locke, the liberal tradition has always been that we should try and think of subjects as though they were founding members of the society in which they live. Even though they cannot actually choose the regime they live under, nevertheless in our attempts to evaluate and to legitimize such a regime, we should at least ask what sort of order they would have chosen if they had had the choice. This is the tradition Rawls pursues. For Rawls, being a member of a society is not just a matter living in and being subject to a social framework, it is also a matter of how that framework is justified.

2b. Rawls on the principles of justice agreed to in the original position

The method that Rawls employs to surmise the principles of social organization to which full members of society would assent is his now renowned thought experiment of the “original position” in which representative citizens negotiate an initial agreement about society's basic structure (135-136). Rawls's original position is premised largely on the “veil of ignorance,” a mechanism meant to eliminate the biases of parties to the contract. Behind the veil of ignorance, all contractors are assumed to be self-interested, but no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism... [T]he parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong (137).

Blinded by the veil of ignorance, Rawls (18-19) believes that all contractors are equally devoid of morally irrelevant knowledge that could be used to tailor principles of social organization to benefit their own circumstances. The result, he claims, is an initial context of choice that is fair in which all negotiate from a position of equality. In addition, together with the veil of ignorance, Rawls (148) argues that the assumption of self-interest “achieves the same purpose as benevolence.” Since no one knows what position she will occupy in the society she is co-designing, asking one contractor to decide what is in her best interest is equivalent to asking her to take into consideration equally and impartially all possible alternatives. She must take on
the perspective of persons occupying every relevant social location within the proposed society because of the possibility that she may end up any one of those people.

Rawls's veil of ignorance has received a great deal of attention since its publication, much positive and some critical. In particular, many critics have challenged the epistemic plausibility of the assumption that contractors in the initial position could actually divorce themselves from the particularities of their social locations, thus raising questions about the objectivity that the veil of ignorance purports to achieve (for example, see Sandel 1984; I. Young 1989). The findings of this debate are a secondary concern of this dissertation, one on which I focus in part three below in the context of the dominant paradigm's approach to difference. At this stage, my primary interest is the principles of justice that Rawls argues would be chosen within the original position. Whatever one thinks about Rawls methodology, the principles of justice he proposes articulate a conception of citizenship that at once resembles very closely and builds upon that developed by Marshall.

Integral to the notion of citizenship that runs throughout Rawls's (4) project is his recognition that society is “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” one typically characterized by both an “identity” and “conflict” of interests. Societies reflect an identity of interests, Rawls claims, because “social cooperation” makes available to individuals “a better life” than they could achieve independently. Interests simultaneously conflict, however, because members are not indifferent about how to distribute the added benefits produced by their collaboration, since a larger share typically facilitates individual pursuits.

Attuned to this identity and conflict of interests, Rawls (7) defines the subject of social justice as “the way in which the major social institutions... determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” Major institutions include “the political constitution... competitive
markets, private property in the means of production and the monogamous family." Akin to Marshall’s focus on a society’s institutional context, Rawls observes that the interrelationships between major institutions generate various social locations within a community into which individuals are born. Some of these starting places are more favourable than others, Rawls argues, and the inequalities that result run “especially deep”:

Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply.

Some social locations are more favourable than others, Rawls (62) indicates, because they provide greater access to primary social goods, things that every person is presumed to want because they “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.” For Rawls, primary social goods include “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth” (62), as well as the conditions required for self-respect (440). These goods are ‘social’ because they are generated, distributed and regulated by the rules of the institutions that constitute society’s basic structure (92). They are ‘primary’, Rawls (93) observes, because they “are necessary means” regardless of one’s goals and commitments. The more primary social goods one possesses, the more one can be assured of success in carrying out her or his intentions, whatever the objectives may be.

Since their distribution profoundly affects individuals’ life prospects, Rawls surmises that the job of negotiators in the original position is to establish principles to organize a society’s institutional development to distribute primary social goods fairly. The justness of the social scheme they propose “depends essentially on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors of society” (7).
Confronted with this task, Rawls (43) argues that parties to the initial contract would choose two principles that they order lexically so that the first takes priority over the second. The first principle, Rawls (61) claims, defines and secures “the equal liberties of citizenship.” These liberties are, roughly speaking, those identified by Marshall as civil and political rights: “political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of the law.” Consistent with the commitment to universality that flows from the politics of dignity, Rawls (ibid.) states that these liberties must be distributed equally to all members of a society, “since citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights.” These basic rights define the terms in which members of a society are equal regardless of whatever social and economic inequalities may otherwise be sanctioned in a community.

Rawls’s second principle is concerned with the distribution of wealth and income, identifying the sorts of financial inequalities that are inimical to a genuine commitment to the equal liberties of citizenship. His second principle has two parts. The first, like Marshall, emphasizes the importance of equality of opportunity: “positions of authority and offices of command,” Rawls argues, “must be accessible to all” (61). Inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth that undermine this equal opportunity structure are therefore proscribed.

The principle’s second part, what Rawls terms the “difference principle,” offers a more precise definition of Marshall’s concept of ‘illegitimate inequalities’. According to the difference principle, inequalities of wealth and income are unjust whenever they do not benefit persons who are least advantaged in society (102-3). The intuitive idea underlying Rawls’s difference principle is that we can imagine that parties in the original position initially propose
an arrangement in which all social primary goods are distributed equally. Everyone in this case would have similar rights and duties and all income and wealth would be apportioned identically. “This state of affairs,” Rawls (62) suggests, “provides a benchmark” for judging the relative merit of alternative social arrangements. Should some inequalities of financial resources and organizational powers raise the economic and social well-being of even those least advantaged in society above the hypothetical benchmark, then all contractors would have reason to accept the inequalities. No party to the initial contract stands to lose from such unequal distributions (assuming that long-term equality of opportunity is not undermined (302-303)), even if she winds up in the least privileged social location within the society she is co-designing.

Thus, like Marshall (116-7), Rawls’s second principle acknowledges that justice does not require an absolutely equal distribution of financial resources. Instead, his difference principle (see especially 67-75) defends an egalitarian social foundation from which the principle of economic efficiency can be operationalized through capitalist markets. The incentive effects implicit in markets offer societies an opportunity to capitalize on the varied levels of ambition and natural talents among its members and thereby maximize economic growth and the value of available resources. When regulated by a social structure that does not permit inequalities to cut “too deep” or express “hereditary privilege” (Marshall, 116), the dominant post-war paradigm of social citizenship implies that economic efficiency has the potential to render “the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset” (Rawls, 179). The “more fortunate” in the lottery of natural talents and ambition prosper more within competitive markets, but they do so “in ways that help those who have lost out” (ibid.).
2c. Social citizenship entails state commitments to social security and substantive equality that enrich the formal guarantees of political and civil rights.

By defining what inequalities in income and wealth are incompatible with justice, Rawls affirms Marshall’s (88-91) finding that the social and economic conditions with which the social element of citizenship is concerned are prerequisites for the effective exercise of political and civil rights. This acknowledgment is most obvious in the lexical ordering of Rawls’s two principles, which prioritizes the first over the second. This ordering, Rawls (43) explains, “means... that the basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of wealth and authority in ways consistent with the equal liberties” of civil and political citizenship. The distribution of material resources must be so organized since some allocations are fundamentally incompatible with equal liberties and opportunities for all: “Until the basic wants of individuals can be fulfilled, the relative urgency of their interest in liberty cannot be firmly decided in advance” (543; see also 204-5). As Jackman (2000, 243) notes, “[i]t requires little imagination to question the value and meaning of a right to freedom of conscience and opinion without adequate food; to freedom of expression without adequate education; to security of the person without adequate shelter and health care.” Accordingly, Rawls concurs with Marshall that a genuine commitment to freedom and individual autonomy entails commitments to the social preconditions of freedom – commitments that make up the domain of citizenship’s social dimension. Only under “favourable circumstances” are citizens free to prioritize their “fundamental interest in determining [their] life plan” according to their personal talents, values and objectives (543).

Such favourable circumstances are ensured for all citizens, Rawls suggests, only if a society’s social structure includes two factors. The first is a strong social security system. Like Marshall, Rawls (87) lauds the concept of a guaranteed “reasonable social minimum,” one that
can be calculated in terms of the material resources of the more privileged in society so that “the advantages of the better situated improve the condition of the least favored.”

The second is a broader commitment to foster the social context necessary for substantive equality of opportunity in addition to formal legal equality. Not only should positions be “open to talents... in a formal sense,” Rawls (73) argues, citizens also “should have a fair chance to attain [those talents].” In a just society, he explains, it is essential that “[t]he expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.” Thus, just as Marshall suggests that the welfare state must impose limits on the operations of capitalism, Rawls (ibid.) concludes that “[f]ree market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity.”

2d. Social citizenship entails state commitments to a robust understanding of ‘full community membership’ premised on dignified inclusion, as opposed to treatment of suffering

In addition to affirming Marshall’s commitments to security and substantive equality, Rawls’s second principle of justice, and particularly its difference principle component, suggests an interpretation of Marshall’s view that citizenship is a status conferred on full members of society (King and Waldron 1988, 439-442). The contention that everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could lead a satisfactory life moves Rawls (15) to conclude that the division of advantages produced by society should draw forth the willing cooperation of every participant, including those less well situated. This position implies that individuals are self-respecting full members of a community if and only if it can reasonably

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5 I use the term “substantive” to qualify the theme of equality of opportunity that runs throughout the work of Marshall and Rawls because both wish to maximize equality of opportunity within a institutional context that imposes limits on the level of inequality of outcome that is tolerated, particularly over generations. By recommending that a political and legal institutional framework should regulate overall economic and social trends, Marshall and Rawls signal their concern that equality of opportunity can produce inequalities in income and wealth that constrain opportunities for members of subsequent generations.
be expected that they would voluntarily "collaborate with" those "better endowed, or more fortunate in their social circumstances" (103). Rawls difference principle in turn suggests terms under which it is reasonable to expect such participation would be forthcoming: namely, when persons can be assured that society's basic institutional structure is designed to reflect appropriate concern for their needs and interests in addition to those of other members (King and Waldron 1988, 440). Appropriate concern is demonstrated, the difference principle implies, when a community endeavours to ensure that no individual 'loses out' while subject to the social order; that inequalities in wealth and income benefit even those who are least advantaged in the community. According to Rawls (87), the social institutions presently responsible for redistributing wealth and income "are riddled with grave injustices" and, therefore, require reorganization so that their design ensures "the difference principle is satisfied consistent with the demands of liberty and fair equality of opportunity."

While the appropriate concern that full members merit under Rawls scheme may appear to place a stringent demand on the state in terms of the institutional reordering it requires, the public duties generated by the difference principle parallel closely state duties that Marshall identifies with the social element of citizenship. As already discussed, Marshall's (72) initial definition of social rights references a range of entitlements intended to guarantee that citizens lead a civilized life according to the standards of the day. Unlike Rawls, there is nothing in Marshall's work to suggest that a guaranteed standard of 'civilization' premised on the tastes and technologies of the time would permit inequalities in wealth and income if and only if they benefit individuals occupying the least privileged positions in society. Nevertheless, Marshall's reference to a standard of civilization complements Rawls by proposing a strict constraint on what inequalities are permissible. At the very least, this standard rules out inequalities that
exceed a point where the *relative* material deprivation that some suffer renders them uncivilized by the standards of their more privileged peers.

In addition, the standard of civilization criterion defends against what Bakan (1997, 141) describes as a “radically incomplete vision of citizenship” that is content merely to organize basic institutional arrangements to treat the suffering of the less fortunate. He argues that one does not lead a civilized life because the state will treat one’s poverty with potentially stigmatized income assistance or one’s illness with medical services if the state simultaneously “supports and enforces social relations largely responsible for causing that suffering, for making people poor and making them sick.” Instead, the right to live a civilized life suggests a state duty to ensure that the institutional order does not relegate the “political and economic causes of poverty and illness... to the so-called private and depoliticised world of biology, individual choice and ability, family and the market” where they “become invisible and irrelevant.” Thus, like Rawls’s difference principle, Marshall’s standard of civilization criterion demands the reorganization of social institutions that are complicit in reinforcing social relations that sustain individual marginalization and therefore impede some community members from accessing the means to achieve personal projects in a socially respected way.

3. The Dominant Post-War Construction of Social Citizenship

The preceding sections engaged with the works of Marshall and Rawls for insight into the vision initially associated with the concept of ‘social citizenship’. This last section revisits their texts to discern characteristics about the post-war approach to institutionalizing citizenship’s social element in the welfare state of the day, searching for fundamental assumptions that incline post-war theorists and policy-makers to emphasize some elements of social welfare over others. The section illuminates four themes with which I engage throughout the dissertation: the
dominant post-war paradigm's (a) assumptions about agency; (b) approach to 'difference'; (c) emphasis on state welfare; and (d) preoccupation with rights. All four themes identify elements of the post-war welfare regime targeted by both neoconservative and feminist critiques.

3a. *The dominant post-war paradigm aligns autonomy with individualism*

The textual analysis above found that Marshall and Rawls both understand citizenship's social element to represent state commitments to social security, substantive equality, and a robust understanding of full community membership for all citizens. One theme that unites these commitments is a concern for the social preconditions of liberty and the free expression of human agency. Sen (1999, 19) defines an agent "as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well." In keeping with this definition, Rawls and Marshall articulate visions of social citizenship that would secure for individuals a socio-economic context in which individuals can reasonably act and bring about change in keeping with self-selected values. Public commitments to a reasonable social minimum of income and access to social services, an egalitarian institutional foundation, and social norms and practices that facilitate genuine inclusion throughout important areas of social life all help to secure for citizens the substantive freedom to do the things they have reason to value.

The concern with agency implicit in Marshall’s and Rawls’s discussion of social citizenship reflects a number of dominant cultural assumptions about autonomy. Following Code (1987, 357), I argue throughout the dissertation that such assumptions influence decisions about what kinds of problems merit public attention and guide judgments about the adequacy of proposed solutions. The work of Rawls is a particularly apt example of the model of agency that guides early post-war welfare practices, as well as liberal political theories more generally.
By inviting his readers to consider the principles of justice we would choose to govern our society if we were deciding in advance, before we knew our place in the community, class or social status, intelligence or physical abilities, or interests, goals or system of values, Rawls’s original position presupposes a certain picture of personhood, one that Sandel (1984) refers to as the “unencumbered self.” Sandel (1984, 86) observes that the original position presumes “there is always a distinction between the values I have and the person I am.” To be capable of choice behind the veil of ignorance, I must stand to my circumstances always at a certain distance. There must be a subject ‘me’ that is prior to and independent of any ambitions or desires. Regardless of what values or goals I hold, I must be capable of detaching myself to assume an allegedly neutral, unbiased perspective suitable for debating questions of justice.6

Implicit in the distinction that Rawls draws between the people we are and the ambitions or values that we hold is an ideal of human agency. Sandel’s (1984, 86) analysis suggests that if we take Rawls’s thought experiment seriously, what appears “most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them.” This prioritization of the human capacity to choose reflects the significance of autonomy and independence to our understanding of human agency. Only if my identity is not tied to the aims and interests that I have at any particular moment can I be considered free and capable of genuine choice. Only if I stand at some distance to my circumstances can I regard myself as the subject as well as the object of experience. It is the capacity to transcend my values and pursuits that ensures I am an initiator of action, rather than an instrument of the purposes for which I strive.

6 Rawls’s presumption about agency raises important ontological questions. Most notably, Sandel (86) remarks that the original position implies that “[n]o role or commitment could define me so completely that I could not understand myself without it. No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am.” Although beyond the scope of my dissertation, this ontological implication merits careful scrutiny, something Sandel pursues in “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” (1984). See Kymlicka (1989) for an alternative perspective.
The unencumbered self advances a "liberating vision," one that is often conceived as a model of what is best in human nature (Sandel 1984, 87). Our allegedly essential capacity to choose our values and life-defining projects suggests that at some fundamental level we are unfettered by the dictates of nature and the constraints of social expectations. The distinction between the persons we are and the values we hold portrays human beings as sovereign agents, capable of adopting, and perhaps more importantly resisting, custom, tradition or inherited status. The capacity to engage with and resist social sanctions enjoys the status of a character ideal in contemporary Western society. Code (1987, 359) observes that the unencumbered self's "mode of being" as a self-originating agent, a self-defining and self-realizing subject "is considered worthy of admiration and emulation."

However, the typically liberal ideal of the autonomous, self-defining agent rarely ends with recognition of the alleged distance between the persons we are and the values and pursuits that we adopt. The result, I argue throughout the dissertation, is that the liberating element of the vision falls subject to a descriptively inaccurate and deleterious model of human agency. Beyond the encumbrances of custom, tradition and inherited status, the ideal of autonomy associated with the unencumbered self often includes a range of additional characteristics that ostensibly secure our capacities to choose. In particular, Gilligan (1987, 29) observes that liberal theory often "align[s] the self and morality with separation and autonomy—the ability to be self-governing," thereby associating personal relations or caring commitments with "self-sacrifice" or restraints one's ability to pursue self-selected interests. Similarly, Kymlicka (2002, 419) remarks that much liberal theory "not only presupposes that we are autonomous adults, it seems to presuppose that we are adults who are not care-givers for dependents" (italics in original).
In the original position, this atomistic tendency is most obvious in Rawls's (13, 127) insistence that initial contractors are “mutually disinterested.” Contractors are assumed to be occupied first and foremost with the advancement of their own concerns and “take no interest in one another’s interests” except insofar as the pursuit of personal goals requires it. Agents who demonstrate this mutual disinterest have no relations premised (at least in part) on affection or other sentiments that may motivate individuals to prioritize satisfaction of the pursuits of others on par, if not above, their own.

Relationships are not entirely absent from Rawls’s (128) original position. He describes parties to the initial contract “as heads of families, and therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest descendants.” But when describing the original position, Rawls does not engage carefully with the patriarchal assumptions implicit in imagining initial contractors as ‘heads of families’ (Okin 1989, chapter 5), a point to which I return below. Nor does his original position carefully consider what genuine concern for one’s closest descendants entails on a daily basis, or the potential for that concern to encumber individuals either temporally or psychologically with varied obligations that impede their flexibility to pursue diverse goals. Instead, the depiction of initial contractors as representatives of continuing hereditary lines serves the more limited role for Rawls of explicitly including in the original position concern for intergenerational equality.

Similarly, Rawls’s (129) commitment to mutual disinterestedness in the original position is not intended to rule out the possibility “that once the veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have ties of sentiment and affection.” Foremost among these ties, we can assume, are close family members and other intimate relations whose interests and ends we wish to advance. Nevertheless, Rawls excludes motivational factors indexed to feelings of affection for
others from initial contract deliberations for methodological reasons. “At the basis of theory,” Rawls explains, “one tries to assume as little as possible.” The original position is therefore constructed “to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions” that do not depend on contentious assumptions. Included in the set of assumptions that are subject to controversy, Rawls indicates, is the presupposition that a conception of justice rests on extensive ties of natural sentiment between individuals.

By entrenching a commitment to mutual disinterestedness in the original position, Rawls permits a gradual alignment of autonomy with individualism. There is no interdependence recognized in the original position. Indeed, the point of the original position is to establish the terms of future collaboration. Initial contractors at the bargaining table are depicted as self-sufficient individuals willing to concede, if not welcome, a series of new interdependencies to capitalize on the social cooperation that makes possible a better life for all than any one could live by his or her own efforts alone (Rawls, 4). Thus, the starting point for Rawls’s thought experiment is a set of autonomous, self-reliant agents who cautiously approach interdependence as an afterthought through the protected mechanism of a contract. The contract establishes a set of rights to protect parties’ highly valued independence from the undue intrusion of other (potentially self-serving) individuals who are intent on achieving their own personal goals.

In chapter eight of A Theory of Justice, Rawls (462-512) explores in some detail the evolution of moral agency. This discussion illuminates some problems with aligning autonomy with individualism, despite the fact that the insights do not shape Rawls’s description of the original position. Persons only acquire a sense of justice, Rawls recognizes, in response to relationships, initially with family members or other primary caregivers (463), and eventually with broader societal associations (467-472). “In the absence of affection, example and
guidance," Rawls (466) suggests, a child will not be engaged in the processes through which a sense of justice is achieved. He identifies parental concern for basic wants and needs, together with their love, support and encouragement, as necessary to affirm a child’s sense of self-worth, establish early role models, and eventually represent norms in response to which children may or may not rebel (464-465). Rawls (467-468) further acknowledges the approval or disapproval of persons in social positions of authority as critical means through which additional moral standards are impressed upon young persons; and he characterizes social interactions more generally as engendering within individuals the intellectual skills required to view social situations from diverse viewpoints. For Rawls (474), the pinnacle of moral development is the emergence of a robust sense of respect for principles of justice that extends beyond concern for (dis)approval of authority figures and associates. However, he maintains that this pinnacle achievement is unattainable without “the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feeling and mutual confidence” that welcome children into the full scope of societal relations and spaces (473-474). Ideally, these attitudes foster “the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution.”

Rawls’s depiction of how individuals acquire a sense of justice illuminates the critical role that a context of interdependence plays in the development of moral agency and individual autonomy. But despite this appreciation for interdependence, Rawls ignores the issue when constructing the original position, focusing instead on a moment in the human life course when individuals appear particularly self-sufficient and independent, distant from other relationships.

7 Moral agency is central to Rawls’s (515) understanding of autonomy, which he defines as persons “acting from principles [of justice] that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings” (i.e. in the original position). The careful account of how individuals ultimately achieve respect for principles in chapter eight of A Theory of Justice therefore indicates Rawls’s appreciation for the essential contribution of interdependence to the development of personal autonomy.
This focus has significant consequences. One is that Rawls under-theorizes the family, largely discounting questions of patriarchy and discrimination within private households despite including the family in his list of “major social institutions” that he describes as the primary subject of justice (7). As Okin (1989, 94) notes, by the time Rawls (303) announces that his “sketch of the system of institutions that satisfies the two principles of justice is now complete,” he has examined all of the major institutions that he initially listed under this heading except the family. The focus on market and political institutions at the expense of private households is consciously or unconsciously connected with Rawls's depiction of contractors in the original position as private, isolated individuals who are mutually disinterested in one another's projects. Rawls initial characterization of human agency appears more plausible by abstracting from the domestic sphere and leaving the family almost completely out of the institutional analysis. I examine below some of the implications of Rawls's inattention to justice within families.

I also return to the appreciation for interdependence that Rawls demonstrates in chapter eight of *A Theory of Justice* when proposing a revised framework for social citizenship. The objective is to engage more carefully with the insights of this chapter than Rawls did when developing his thought experiment. I argue that his acknowledgement that relationships critically support the evolution of moral agency suggests a way to resist the temptation of thinking that there is some affinity between autonomy and detachment, while retaining much of the liberating vision of the unencumbered self. Rawls's analysis of the role that other persons play in the formation of moral character rules out the presumption that we grow naturally or independently to autonomous self-sufficiency. But his overarching commitment to the distinction between the people we are and the values we hold implies that interdependency is not inconsistent with the character ideal of individuals as self-realizing agents capable of some
substantial degree of self-definition through which we resist or accept customs and traditions. If we take seriously Rawls's discussion of the acquisition of a sense of justice, a revised framework for social citizenship could reorganize social institutions around the recognition that the genesis of personal autonomy is not monological, something we each achieve on our own, but "dialogical" (Taylor 1994, 32). Feminists and social conservatives alike recognize this phenomenon, as I discuss in chapter seven.

3b. The politics of difference

The politics of dignity, we have seen, is central to the work of Marshall and Rawls. The fundamental intuition of the politics directs attention to "what is the same in all" and asks that we treat people "in a difference-blind fashion" (Taylor 1994, 43). What differentiates people, the politics of dignity implies, is generally arbitrary when the justness of a social order is at issue.

This difference-blind commitment factors prominently throughout A Theory of Justice. Rawls's acclaimed veil of ignorance is an archetypal example of the liberal desire to develop an evaluative perspective devoid of "those aspects of the social world that seem arbitrary from a moral point of view" (Rawls, 15). For Rawls, the veil of ignorance is not simply a thought experiment, but also a guide for citizens to follow when evaluating existing social institutions. "[A]s far as possible," he argues, "the basic structure [of society] should be appraised from the position of equal citizenship... [which] defines a general point of view" (97). Consistent with the veil of ignorance, this perspective is allegedly available to any citizen if she transcends her particular self-interested life and her pursuit of private interests. Once positioned in a political sphere that is neutral with respect to people's private ends, Rawls (ibid.) suggests that citizens achieve an impartial viewpoint from which they can agree about what is in the common good. This neutral viewpoint permits institutions to be ranked in terms of "how effectively they
guarantee the conditions necessary for all equally to further their aims, or by how efficiently they advance shared ends that will similarly benefit everyone.”

Taylor (1994) observes that the liberal commitment to an ‘allegedly’ difference-blind evaluative perspective has come under challenge in recent decades on the grounds that it is ill-equipped to discern accurately when social institutions equally affect, or similarly benefit, individuals belonging to diverse social groups. The concern, he explains, “is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture” (ibid., 43). The ‘general’ perspective that Rawls advocates is charged with reflecting the interests of the privileged, particularly by prioritizing what subject matter merits public debate. On this view, the assumption that individuals must divorce themselves from their affiliations and experiences to assume a purportedly neutral viewpoint poses significant epistemic challenges and potentially harmful consequences for members of minority and disadvantaged social groups. Only they “are being forced to take alien form” in the political sphere, which ignores, glosses over or assimilates “to a dominant or majority identity” key factors that differentiate their social location from that of persons more favourably positioned (ibid. 38). The result is that various needs indexed to precisely the distinctive characteristics and circumstances obscured by the so-called ‘neutral’ point of view go unattended in the political sphere for reasons that may be “subtle and unconscious” (ibid. 43). This neglect, critics maintain, renders the supposedly fair, difference-blind approach to moral and political deliberation “highly discriminatory” (ibid.), marginalizing, if not silencing, the voices of those who are less advantaged (see also I. Young 1989, 257).

The reproach of the difference-blind strategy motivates a new ‘politics of difference’ among critics premised on an alternative methodological commitment to “recognize and even
foster particularity” when evaluating social institutions (Taylor 1994, 43). This commitment is not meant to downplay the importance of impartiality to deliberative processes. Rather, Taylor (1994, 39) remarks that “a principle of universal equality” underlies the new politics just as it does the politics of dignity. The politics of difference, he observes, “is full of denunciations of discrimination and refusals of second-class citizenship.” By focussing on what distinguishes individuals and groups, the politics of difference is not so much a rejection of moral objectivity as a suggested means to better approximate it (see also Code 1991).

While the two politics share a commitment to universal equality, their respective methodologies remain difficult to reconcile. As Taylor (1994, 39) notes, the desire to show all citizens equal respect gives the politics of difference an entry point into its elder cousin. “But once inside... its demands are hard to assimilate to [the politics of dignity].” In pursuit of universal equality, the politics of difference “asks that we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared.” Its commitment to universality actually “powers an acknowledgement of specificity.” Where the politics of dignity prioritizes approaches to nondiscrimination that are “quite ‘blind’” to factors that distinguish citizens, “the politics of difference often redefines nondiscrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment.”

It is worth noting that Rawls’s original position and his invocation of a ‘general point of view’ associated with equal citizenship are subject to critique from the politics of difference despite the fact that he is not entirely unsympathetic to the methodological insight advanced by its proponents. Although he posits the position of equal citizenship as the preferred viewpoint for evaluating society’s basic institutional structure wherever possible, Rawls’s difference principle clearly recognizes that viewpoints which illuminate some relevant distinctions are also
critical. He suggests that “for the most part each person holds two relevant positions” when judging the justness of a social system: “that of equal citizenship and that defined by his place in the distribution of income and wealth” (96). The latter specifically requires a class-based analysis of social institutions, their distribution of liberties and duties, and their opportunity structures. What is more, Rawls’s attention to particularities moves him to further acknowledge that, “sometimes,” positions other than those of equal citizenship and social class “may need to be taken into account,” including “[d]istinctions based on sex… race and culture” (99).

What Rawls does not do, however, is act on this latter recognition. Beyond the sophisticated class-based analysis that grounds the difference principle, Rawls offers no examination of social institutions from perspectives that illuminate gender, ethnicity or other identity-related differences. This failure explains in part why Rawls (7) recognizes the “monogamous family” as the appropriate subject of social justice, but does not explore or offer any appraisal of whether this institution is actually just in either its patriarchal form or some other (Okin 1989, 94). One result, as I discuss in detail in chapter three, is that political theory and public policy consistent with Rawls’s work risks completely overlooking the full range of obstacles facing diverse groups of women that arise out of the patriarchal division of labour – a risk that the politics of difference minimizes by paying greater attention to distinctiveness. Therefore, just as this thesis builds on Rawls’s appreciation for (but under-theorization of) interdependence, so it develops his (albeit limited) recognition of the politics of difference implicit in his claim that positions other than those of equal citizenship and class may need to be taken into account when evaluating social institutions (99).

Feminist scholarship has been especially strong in developing the politics of difference, evaluating institutional arrangements from viewpoints indexed to, among others, ethnicity, class,
gender, sexuality, and ability (Arneil 1999, 192; Code 1993; 1991; Harding 1993). The methodological appeal to perspectival orientations endeavours to move beyond the recognition of separate trajectories of discrimination to consider multiple and divergent instantiations of sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, and so on where they intersect in individuals’ identities. While discussion of institutional arrangements for ‘Blacks’ and ‘women’ may alert readers to the force of racism and sexism, it does not obviously capture the lived experiences of ‘Black women’. We cannot assume that experiences of racism and sexism by women of colour are equivalent to some linear function of the discrimination endured by men of colour and Caucasian women. As Razack (1998, 12) argues,

we do not come any closer to describing relations of domination and subordination when we... 
[adopt] an additive model of oppression (racism plus sexism produces a doubly oppressed woman). It tells us nothing, for example, about how systems of oppression work, how they sustain one another and how they come into existence in and through one another, to conclude that a white woman is always better off than a Black woman. Developing the picture further, by filling out details so that we have a poor white woman and a rich Black one, still keeps us in the abstract realm of multiplying essences. Instead, it is vitally important to explore in a historical and site-specific way the meaning of race, economic status, class, disability, sexuality, and gender as they come together to structure women in different and shifting positions of power and privilege.

The multiple and contextually-specific barriers that obstruct efforts to balance the roles of breadwinner and unpaid caregiver represent both the kind of site-specific subject of exploration that Razack proposes and a unique organizing theme around which to chart the historical development of institutions that contribute critically to Canadian social citizenship. The division of responsibility for care provision crosses not only institutional borders, but systems of oppression indexed to ethnicity, class and sex. By tracing the history of the distribution of care labour, it is possible to discern how the welfare state, marketplace and domestic sphere evolved in response to multiple patterns of stratification and subordination. This history illuminates some of the complex ways in which diverse systems of oppression help to secure one another by segregating women and men into positions that exist symbiotically and hierarchically.
3c. *The dominant post-war paradigm prioritizes state welfare*

The dominant post-war welfare paradigm develops a predominantly class-based analysis of social citizenship. This point of focus is obvious in Rawls’ s difference principle, as already discussed, as well as the title of Marshall’s text, “Citizenship and Social Class.” The post-war paradigm assesses class-stratification primarily for its effects on two fronts: equality of opportunity (Marshall, 109; Rawls, 61) and citizens’ access to a reasonable social minimum (Marshall, 101; Rawls, 87). Many analysts of social citizenship have since deemed the latter particularly important, identifying the provision of a guaranteed social minimum as a critical decommodifying measure by which to de-link the well-being of citizens from the moral arbitrariness of market machinations (see for example Esping-Anderson 1990; King and Waldron 1998; Roche 1992; Twine 1994).

The post-war paradigm’s focus on class has important ramifications for its treatment of the state, market and households as potential sources of welfare. In particular, Roche (1992, 16, 43) observes that this focal point renders the paradigm susceptible to overemphasizing the social security made available by state services and obscuring the contributions of non-state sources of welfare. This risk arises for two related reasons.

First, class-based analyses have the potential to divert attention from the welfare contributions made predominantly by women within the sphere of private homes. A man of his time, Marshall’s primary concern with class takes for granted a patriarchal division of labour and perpetuates a public/private dichotomy that rejects the latter realm as an appropriate subject of theorizing and political evaluation. Consequently, Marshall tends to see women as homemakers and mothers rather than as workers and political actors, despite the extensive war-time evidence to the contrary. This is particularly evident, Roche (1992, 33) reports, in Marshall’s formulation
of the broad complex of social systems that constitute the modern context of welfare – what Marshall (1981, 123-136) refers to as the “hyphenated society.” In his list of systems, Marshall includes the welfare state, democracy and capitalism, but not families. While Roche (1992, 33) notes that Marshall on occasion is sensitive to the important role that families play as “‘the original and basic’ welfare service,” the fact that a key organizing framework for much of his analysis of social citizenship does not reference families speaks volumes.

We have also seen that Rawls largely ignores the household sphere. He fails to examine the family despite acknowledging it to be the appropriate subject for questions of justice (7), as well as referencing the need to consider issues of gender and ethnicity (99). Like Marshall, Rawls’s disinterest in the domestic sphere likely reflects the influence of the public/private dichotomy and the patriarchal division of labour. This influence is evident in Rawls’s claim (128) that “[w]e may think of the parties in the original position as heads of families” and his description of the family “as a small association, normally characterized by a definite hierarchy, in which each member has certain rights and duties” (467). The assumption that negotiators of the initial contract occupy a traditionally male role implies that the status quo within families and the distribution of labour between the sexes is taken for granted. In keeping with this implication, Rawls’s (490) “first law” of moral psychology presumes that “family institutions are just.” This presumption, Okin (1989, 94) remarks, suggests that “families… must become just in some different way (unspecified by [Rawls]) from other institutions, for it is impossible to see how the viewpoint of their less advantaged members gets to be heard” in the original position.

I discuss in later chapters that some feminists and social conservatives take issue with the post-war tendency to obscure the welfare contributions of the domestic sphere. Some feminists who build on the work of Pateman (1988), for instance, argue that a preoccupation with
government administered social security overlooks the opportunity costs of domestic labour for women’s participation in the political arena and marketplace (Armstrong and Armstrong 1994; Evans 1998; Orloff 1993a). Other feminists working in the tradition of Collins (1994) who is concerned with the experiences of women of colour and immigrant women contend that the post-war paradigm’s emphasis on government welfare disregards the numerous obstacles that prevent some women from being able to provide welfare to their own family members (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a; 1997b). Many social conservatives echo this latter concern, typically citing women’s caregiving as a key source of citizens’ moral and civic development (Berger and Berger 1983; Gilder 1987).

In addition to downplaying the welfare contributions of diverse groups of women in private households, the dominant post-war paradigm’s class-based focus generates a sense of ambivalence towards competitive markets, reserving considerable theoretical room to prioritize state fostered social security. A class-infused lens is especially likely to portrays capitalism as “a system, not of equality, but of inequality” (Marshall, 84). When so characterized, competitive markets are viewed primarily as forces to dampen, contain and tame. In response, the dominant paradigm invokes the state to soften the edges of capitalist markets through various redistributive practices (Rawls 73), including a public social security system (Rawls, 87; Marshall, 101). The resulting emphasis on state delivered welfare risks discounting the positive contributions of the wage-system to the well-being and personal security of paid workers and their dependents.

Roche (1992, 41-2) argues that this risk is exacerbated because the post-war regime takes for granted full-employment. It acknowledges that a public social security system depends on a successful industrial economy that is highly mechanized and labour intensive. Such an economy not only relieves the state of financial responsibility for potentially unemployed individuals, it
also provides the tax base for income security programs and other public spending. But in keeping with Keynesianism and a commitment to counter-cyclical macro-economic measures, the post-war paradigm assumes that the labour market is politically manipulable. Thus, even in contexts when the dominant paradigm acknowledges the welfare contributions of markets, it elevates the position of the state by assuming that governments can realistically manage and sustain through full employment policy the economic conditions required to produce a tax-base for substantial state welfare spending.

Some feminists and economic conservatives share the concern that the post-war prioritization of state social security risks underemphasizing the importance of the marketplace as a source of welfare. As I discuss in later chapters, a number of feminists cognizant of Wollstonecraft’s dilemma maintain that the dominant paradigm of social citizenship ignores the degree to which paid employment fosters personal independence and economic security for diverse groups of women (Evans 1997; Orloff 1993a). Economic conservatives share the latter feminist sentiment, regularly drawing attention to the welfare capacity of markets and welcoming women into the labour force (though often as low-cost labourers) (Teghtsoonian 1997, 120-22). By focussing on state welfare, economic conservatives such as Courchene (1994a, 29-30), Mead (1986), and Murray (1987) charge that the dominant paradigm overlooks the extent to which social security seduces dependency among the poor and public institutions fail to achieve allocative efficiency (Roche 1992, 82-6).

3d. The dominant paradigm prioritizes rights over duties

Citizenship rights imply citizenship responsibilities. In return for the benefits that individuals derive from collectively enforced rights, citizens must nurture a social context
capable of preserving their entitlements. This recognition is present in the dominant post-war paradigm. Marshall (112) observes that

If citizenship is invoked in the defence of rights, the corresponding duties of citizenship cannot be ignored. These do not require a man to sacrifice his individual liberty or to submit without question to every demand made by government. But they do require that his acts should be inspired by a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the community.

Marshall alludes to number of citizenship obligations. Most notably, he (117-119) argues that in order for the welfare state to be paid for by a prosperous and growing economy, it must be ‘paid for’ morally and politically by citizens who put their hearts into their jobs and “work hard” (on this point, see also Roche 1992, 20). In addition, Marshall cites a “duty to improve and civilize oneself... because the social health of a society depends upon the civilization of its members” (82); “the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions” (118); and the duty for organized labour to exercise industrial discipline so as not to disrupt through frequent strikes the success of the economy on which the welfare state depends (112). While not referenced explicitly, the patriarchal assumptions that pervade the dominant paradigm suggest a further duty for women to shoulder substantial daily care and welfare responsibilities in the domestic sphere for no, or little, pay.

While the post-war commitment to the position that rights entail obligations cannot be denied, Roche (1992, 31; italics in original) advances a helpful analysis of the paradigm which reveals that “it has tended to institutionalize a conception of the social citizen as mainly a rights-claimer.” The various duties to which the paradigm alludes “are typically either unspoken, relatively muted or underemphasized in relation to its emphasis on the new social rights of individuals in the postwar welfare state” (ibid., 30; italics in original). Roche’s position is well

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8 The Kantian influence that underpins A Theory of Justice ensures that moral duties play a central role in Rawls’s work. Kant (1785/1993) argued against utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories of morality that define what is morally ‘right’ as a function of what maximizes good states of affairs. Instead, Kant defends the deontological view that an action is morally ‘right’ if it is done for the sake of a ‘moral law’ or duty.
supported by the analysis of social citizenship advanced by Marshall and Rawls. Both are concerned to ensure that citizens can take full advantage of their civil and political rights by guaranteeing the right to equal opportunity (Marshall, 109; Rawls, 83-9), the right to education (Marshall, 109; Rawls, 87), the right to a guaranteed minimum (Marshall, 104; Rawls, 87), the right to share fully in the social heritage of a community (Marshall, 72), and the right to live the life of a civilized person according to the standards of the day (Marshall, 72; Rawls, see his discussion of the difference principle). Roche's analysis also receives support from Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 354) who argue that "the view of citizenship... implicit in much postwar political theory... is defined almost entirely in terms of rights," and they cite Marshall as the "most influential exposition of this postwar conception of citizenship-as-rights."

The post-war preoccupation with citizen entitlements is unsurprising given the dominant paradigm's tendency to focus on state welfare. Citizenship rights typically take the form of legitimate claims on the state: they are the duties (negative or positive) that the state owes its individual members. Thus, when analysis centres around state action, it can be expected that talk of citizenship rights (i.e. state duties) is likely to predominate over discussion of the duties that citizens owe one another as individuals or as a collectivity.

The dominant paradigm's preoccupation with citizenship rights, rather than duties, also reflects the historical context within which the modern Western concept of citizenship evolved. As Marshall (84) indicates, the development of the politics of dignity was premised on the equalization of rights and entitlements between individuals, as well as the enrichment of citizenship status with new types of rights (see also Taylor 1994, 37). By the beginning of the post-war era, the advent of new rights had become a priority among political actors and the general public. There emerged a sense that the citizenry was owed repayment for the discharge
of its "national duties of suffering and sacrifices during the Great Depression and the Second World War" (Roche 1992, 31). The state was in turn deemed capable of managing the expansion of the public sphere to protect a series of new social rights to security and well-being given its performance organizing the military effort and regulating the war-time economy. New found prosperity in the 1950s and 60s also provided the state the additional fiscal capacity to deliver the welfare services increasingly demanded by citizens. The post-war welfare consensus was the result. There arose a widely accepted belief among the public that an activist state could resolve the pressing problems of modern society by assuming increased responsibility for welfare-related needs formerly identified as the appropriate domain of private individuals and families (Brooks 1993, 143; Brodie 1995, 14-15; Evans and Wekerle 1997, 5).

Just as the three other characteristics of the post-war approach to social citizenship highlighted above are primary points of concern for both neoconservatives and feminists, so is the post-war paradigm's treatment of citizenship obligations. Economic conservatives such as Mead (1986, 238) express concern for the construction of citizens as 'rights-claimers.' He advances the view that equality demands not only equal rights, but equal obligations. A system of social entitlements, he maintains, is only sustainable if the members of a community perform their personal duties of self-care, self-reliance, self-development, accountability to others for one's actions and, following Marshall, the duty to attain employment. Similarly, social conservatives like Berger and Berger (1983) often articulate a further set of family duties that oblige "husbands and wives," "parents and young children," "mature children and elder parents to respect and care for each other, ideally for life" (Roche 1992, 115). Parents in particular are called on to assume the profound duties they owe to their children, regardless of their marital
status. Family policy more generally is expected to encourage and facilitate family members to carry out their respective responsibilities to one another.

Among feminists, Gilligan's (1982) identification of the ethic of care prompted increased attention to the role of duties in feminist theory and women's equality. Some of the resultant analyses focus on the degree to which the current institutional relationships between state, market, and family impose significantly more caregiving and domestic responsibilities on women than men and illuminate the diverse costs for that women that accompany this division of obligations (Baines, Evans and Neysmith 1998). Accordingly, feminists such as Eichler (1997, 83) and Neysmith (1998, 239) argue that women can only achieve equality of opportunity when, among other things, men amend their behaviour on numerous fronts, including in the household where they must assume additional responsibility for the daily care of children and dependents.

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined the theoretical foundations for post-war social citizenship commitments in the three decades following World War II. This examination provides the backdrop against which to interpret and evaluate state restructuring since 1980, which is the principal concern of the dissertation. The remaining chapters in Parts I and II identify and engage with theoretical and structural challenges that confronted the dominant post-war welfare paradigm starting in the 1970s. As I will demonstrate, these challenges motivate two general conclusions. First, the four characteristics of the post-war approach to theorizing social citizenship discussed above represent reasonable targets of feminist and neoconservative critiques. Second, the post-war citizenship regime developed during the first three decades following World War II was ill-equipped to address challenges presented by more recent structural changes to the social and economic context.
These limitations of post-war social citizenship merit careful scrutiny in the present context. They do not, however, diminish the value of the general vision of social citizenship that Marshall and Rawls articulate. I argue throughout the dissertation that there remain strong reasons to retain public commitments to make available a reasonable social minimum of income assistance and social security, as well as to reorder institutional arrangements to foster and preserve the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity and dignified social inclusion.

The subject of a social safety net has received a great deal of attention in the literature about social citizenship, particularly from Esping-Anderson (1990) and the research influenced by his work. In response, I grant greater attention to the subjects of equality of opportunity and social inclusion in this dissertation. My examination departs from class-based analyses to examine how the intersection of sexism, racism and classism affects (i) the distribution of caregiving work that impedes diverse groups of women from participating in the labour market; and (ii) the state and labour market practices that constrain the opportunities available to some citizens to care for loved-ones and friends in their own private spheres. Dignified social inclusion, I argue, demands that citizens can enjoy the rewards of participation across key community spaces such as the labour force and their private network of personal relations, while also having the time to perform the civic duties that preserve the institutional superstructure that facilitates citizenry access to important areas of social life. Therefore I recommend in Part III of the dissertation that Rawls’s and Marshall’s interests in reordering major social institutions to redistribute income and wealth should be extended so that critical attention is also given to the role of institutional arrangements in distributing responsibility for caregiving and facilitating citizens’ achievement of their care-related aspirations.
CHAPTER 3
FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF THE POST-WAR WELFARE REGIME

I myself have never been able to figure out precisely what feminism is: I only know that people call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat.

-- Rebecca West, The Clarion (1913).

Feminism remains difficult to define nearly a century after Rebecca West indicated her own uncertainty. Feminism is a dynamic concept and refers to numerous schools of thought with diverging views. Arneil (1999, 3-4) suggests “a preliminary definition of feminism might be:”

The recognition that, virtually across time and place, men and women are unequal in the power they have, either in society or over their own lives, and the corollary belief that men and women should be equal; the belief that knowledge has been written about, by and for men, and the corollary belief that all schools of knowledge must be re-examined and understood to reveal the extent to which they ignore or distort gender.

Many contemporary feminist circles approach ‘gender’ as multifarious rather than monolithic, organizing research around notions of identity, distinctiveness and particularity. Women of colour and lesbian theorists have been especially effective at demonstrating that the “phrase ‘as a woman’ is the Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism” (Spelman 1988, 13). The quest for commonality is charged with distorting differences among women by portraying as universal a privileged female viewpoint that prioritizes the concerns of white, economically secure, straight, and mentally and physically healthy women. In an effort to avoid such distortion, Arneil (1999, 206) observes that three concepts now inform most feminist analyses of identity: “one is fluidity rather than fixed identity; the second is multiple rather than singular identity; the third is contradiction.” These concepts acknowledge what Razack (1998, 35) describes as “a collective reality of oppression in which [women’s] individual choices are seriously constrained in [diverging] ways related to race, class, sexuality, and disability.”

Attention to difference also unveils how male privilege is not experienced equally by all men (Arneil 1999, 62-63; Segura 1994, 227; Spelman 1988, 89-95). The systematic exclusion of some men of colour from trade unions, the labour market and/or voting rights indicates that sex-role relationships amidst families of colour are inadequately explained by reference only to the differential participation of men and women in household and market spheres.
The concern with identity and distinctiveness typical of much contemporary feminist research informs the organization of this chapter. In the first three sections below, I draw on and integrate two streams of literature related to the work of Pateman (1988, 179-209) and Collins (1990; 1994) to examine class, ethnic and immigration status differences among women. Using this literature, I demonstrate that the post-war welfare regime developed a fragmented model of social citizenship and a tiered system of social benefits. The model reflects a vision of social inclusion that partitions the full range of human needs and aspirations, particularly those associated with caring, earning and governance. White, economically secure men and women are included in the sphere of citizenship on markedly different terms that prioritize male participation in public spaces. Considerably less public support is given to facilitate social inclusion for persons disadvantaged by racist and classist social forces that buttress white, male privilege. In section four, I conclude by briefly examining the post-war regime's limited response to the critiques of state welfarism articulated by the two streams of feminist literature.

The chapter is organized to reveal how welfare state expansion in the post-war era gave institutional form to the problematic assumptions about agency and the preoccupation with rights and state delivered welfare that were identified in the works of Rawls and Marshall. My analysis employs the concept of 'decommodification' that underpins Esping-Anderson's (1990) influential typology of welfare-state regimes. Esping-Anderson describes post-war institutionalization of the social element of citizenship primarily in terms of the development of new social policies designed to diminish citizens' status as market 'commodities'. Policy initiatives successfully 'decommodify' citizens whenever they enable "people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces" (ibid., 3).
The central claim of this chapter is that the post-war decommodification project was inadequate as a strategy to institutionalize the social dimension of citizenship for two reasons. First, post-war welfarism developed new social security measures primarily to mediate the commodity-logic of market forces that confront members of the dominant social group defined along racial, class and gender lines. The history of immigration and domestic work reveal that Canadian governments were eager to augment, rather than mitigate, the commodity-status of many men and women of colour, immigrants and the poor (Arat-Koc 1999; Dua 1999). The result is that the post-war model of social citizenship was inadequate even on its own terms.

Second, the post-war state’s preoccupation with decommodification reflected an incomplete vision of social citizenship that failed to fully appreciate the welfare potential of the labour market and domestic sphere. The post-war social context ideologically constructed and systemically influenced white women in economically secure households to care for no pay as wives, daughters (in law) and members of families (Pateman 1998, 179-209; Orloff 1993a; Evans 1997, 102). One consequence is that the post-war regime overlooked the welfare potential implicit in labour market participation through which such women could potentially enhance their personal security and economic independence. By contrast, many women of colour, poor women and immigrant women were ideologically envisioned and publicly recruited to serve as workers before mothers who would supplement for limited pay the care work of more privileged white wives. For such women, the post-war regime disorganized the welfare potential implicit in their private domestic work (Dua 1999), discounting how unpaid caregiving contributes significantly to personal and community survival and empowerment, as well as the development of individual and collective identity (Collins 1994).
The post-war welfare regime advanced an incomplete vision of social citizenship in large part because it institutionalized an inadequate understanding of autonomy that retains the cultural alignment of agency with individualism implicit in Rawls's original position. This assumption about agency, together with racist, classist, and sexist social forces, motivated post-war state and market practices designed specifically to extend new social entitlements to economically privileged men, while absolving them of primary responsibility for the caregiving on which the sustainability of the welfare state relies. The resultant distribution of care work that tracked gender, ethnic and class lines better positioned white, male breadwinners to pursue the cultural ideal of a self-realizing agent who is free of relational obligations and sentiments of affection that may limit either temporally or psychologically his opportunity to pursue self-selected ends.

1. The Dominant Post-War Ideology of 'Citizen-Mothers'

1a. The post-war welfare state presupposes that economically advantaged women will care

The post-war welfare regime in Canada marked a national breakthrough for social citizenship as envisioned by the dominant paradigm. State programming evolved in a direction consistent with the guaranteed minimum proposed by Marshall (1964, 101) and Rawls (1971, 87) by introducing a series of enriched social services. New national benefits included unemployment insurance, the universal family allowance system, a universal old age security system, and universal Medicare. While the new welfare regime only approximated the vision advanced by Marshall and Rawls,² the universality of post-war programming nonetheless signalled a burgeoning national consensus in favour of social entitlements to protect citizens

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² Post-war welfare programming retained classical liberal concerns about the inefficiency of inducing workers to opt for welfare. For instance, UI initially covered just 42 percent of the paid labour force in Canada (McBride and Shields 1997, 42); payments were purposefully designed to be less valuable than minimum wage; and "[c]laimants had to be capable and available for work but unable to find 'suitable' employment" (Baker 1995, 88) Similarly, the family allowance system initially provided a couple with two children just $5.95 per month, or roughly 5% of an average family’s monthly income (Jenson and Stroik 1999, 66).
from becoming undeserved exiles from society due to poverty (Brodie 1995, 14-15; Brooks 1993, 143; Evan and Wekerle 1997, 5).

However, the effects of post-war welfare programming diverged sharply for Canadians, tracking gender, race and class differences, as well as immigration status. Feminist scholarship that builds on Pateman’s (1988, 179-209) analysis of the citizenship options available to women reveals that post-war welfare policies that protected white men from total dependence on the market for their survival simultaneously promoted economic dependence on husbands for many white and class-advantaged women. For instance, Pateman (1989, 184) charges that the post-war welfare commitment to foster high and stable levels of employment was directed specifically to able-bodied men and never engaged the employment needs or aspirations of women (see also Esping-Anderson 1990, 148). Stroik and Jenson (1999, 66) observe that the universal family allowance system represented a federal commitment to supplement men’s market earnings to assist with the costs of maintaining financially dependent wives and children. Orloff (1993a, 318) concludes that unemployment insurance and pension plans secured men’s positions as household breadwinners when they were unable to support their families economically as a result of job-loss or diminished wage-earning capacities. Evans (1997, 102) documents how the formally gender-neutral unemployment insurance system did not envision married women as appropriate recipients. Between 1950-57, the system imposed stringent eligibility conditions on new wives to “prevent them from claiming benefits too easily when, it was thought, they were really withdrawing from the labour force [by choice].” Finally, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999, 129) remark that the forty year period of contributions required for a full C/QPP benefit was premised on male labour force participation and was difficult to meet for women with intermittent work careers due to child rearing obligations.
Just as new post-war welfare programming reinforced economically privileged women's status as homemakers, the decision to withdraw federal wartime funding for child care further buttressed systemic barriers obstructing women's access to the labour market. The war-effort required the labour of women to fill positions left vacant by men who joined the armed forces. In response, Prime Minister King introduced the Dominion-Provincial Wartime Day Nurseries Agreements.\(^3\) The Agreements committed the federal government to share with provinces the costs of creating day care centres for mothers working in war-related industries and later extended this benefit to working mothers more generally. While only Québec and Ontario made use of the federal funding (Baker 1995, 199), the Agreements facilitated a significant transfer of responsibility for child-rearing between family and state during the war years. However, the federal government's assumption of increased responsibility was short-lived. As industry's need for the supplementary labour of women subsided following the war, Ottawa withdrew its financial support for child care and many of the centres created in Ontario and Québec were closed (Baker 1995, 199; CRRU 2000, 35, 44).

Despite women's important contributions to industry during the war years, the elimination of federal child care funding signalled the dominant societal expectation that the 'good' mother would remain outside of the paid labour market, particularly during her children's formative years (Glenn 1994, 3). She would prioritize her children's interests (and typically also their fathers') above her own non-maternal goals (Boyd 1997b, 256; Glenn 1994, 3); and she would be entirely self-sufficient in her domestic role, managing full responsibility for her children at all times without asking for public assistance (Kline 1995, 120). The dominant cultural ideal assumed that the 'good' mother would welcome exclusive, privatized female

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\(^3\) Order in Council authorizing agreements with provinces for the care of children whose mothers or foster mothers are employed in war industries in Canada, P.C. 1942-6242.
domesticity, and the economic dependency it entails, because this social location provided her the time and flexibility to tend adequately to her children’s needs (M. Nelson 1994, 183; Luxton and Reiter 1997, 200). Research on maternal bonding and deprivation in the 1950s supported this assumption by purporting to show that married biological mothers were best suited to care for pre-school children and that non-familial care arrangements should only be measures of last resort (Baker 1995, 190). 4

The post-war ideal of motherhood remained just that for many women following World War II. Despite state and employer rhetoric about a family wage, only the most powerful unions were generally successful in achieving levels of remuneration sufficient to maintain an entire family in the first post-war decades (Luxton and Reiter 1997, 200). Many working-class wives and children therefore played a critical economic role making up the difference between a man’s so-called ‘principal’ wage and the cost of household survival, often through paid work in the informal economy such as “taking in laundry, sewing, or boarders, peddling household products such as eggs, or running small business or stores out of the house” (ibid.). More generally, the ideology of motherhood and femininity remained fluid in response to the changing needs of industry and the state, just as it had during the war years (Armstrong and Armstrong 1990, 81; Boris 1994, 167). Brand (1999, 85) observes that when industry required a cheap and extended

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4 The post-war ideology of motherhood departed significantly from pre-industrial practices. Prior to the nineteenth century, most family members, women and men alike, worked in the domestic economy and participated in child care (Beaujot 2000, 65; Pateman 1989, 187; Slaughter 1995, 78). Women were typically involved in all aspects of feudal agricultural economies, including labour that involved great physical strength and endurance. But industrialism relocated the principal site of economic production outside of individual households. This shift laid the foundation for the ideological separation of home from market and work from child rearing along gender lines. The ideology of separate spheres soon filtered into policy. For instance, Ursel (1986) analyzes labour legislation in Ontario between 1884 and 1913, documenting how state and market practices increasingly limited the places, hours and kinds of work in which women were permitted employment in Canada. While the legal restrictions were often described as necessary to protect women’s physical well-being and moral sensitivity, they clearly reinforced men’s positions in the market. Pateman (1989, 187) similarly reports that British and Australian census classifications initially considered women’s unpaid domestic labour as productive work, but eventually redefined the domestic role in opposition to the economically active population by the turn of the twentieth century.
labour force to supplement or replace male workers, women were increasingly viewed as capable employees – "good at detailed or boring work." Conversely, when there was less demand for labour, the "ultra-feminine, helpless female" stereotype ascended in popular thinking.

While the post-war ideology of motherhood never accurately portrayed the lives of many women, rapid real wage growth of the 1950s and 60s allowed unprecedented numbers of families to live on the earnings of one male breadwinner. The newfound wealth operationalized to a degree formerly unseen in Canada idealized notions of womanhood and motherhood that constructed the latter in opposition to paid work. Throughout the first post-war decades, motherhood was viewed not only as the proper career for married women (Baker 1995, 199), but also a criterion of maturity, balance and fulfillment for women more generally (Kline 1995, 119; Lupton and Barclay 1997, 57).

1b. The post-war fragmented model of citizenship

The cultural ideal of exclusive female domesticity marked a cornerstone of post-war social citizenship that partitioned the full range of human needs and aspirations, especially those related to reproduction and nurturing, economic success and civic participation. The post-war paradigm simply did not ideologically depict that any one individual citizen should care, earn and contribute to governance. Rather, it promoted role specialization within white, economically secure households, rigidly dividing responsibilities between spouses. The division of labour saw racially and economically privileged women and men integrated as citizens on very different terms. These terms overlooked the classism and racism that buttress white patriarchy, obscuring the still different and deleterious manner in which some persons of colour and immigrants were incorporated as citizens more for their inexpensive labour than as prospective contributors to, and full members of, society. The diverging gender roles among economically privileged
families are the subject of this sub-section. The commodification of less privileged individuals by the Canadian state is explored in section two below.

Pateman (1989) concludes that the post-war welfare regime incorporated privileged women as subordinate, encumbered citizens who were ideologically distanced from the roles of income-earner and governor. Their prescribed citizen domain was “the family, a sphere separate from (or in social exile from) civil society and the state” (ibid., 192). The principal citizenship-contribution expected of privileged women was the fulfillment of familial care obligations for no pay. Heartfelt commitment to the domestic sphere offered many white, middle-class women the opportunity to earn moral commendation from the public as ‘mothers of the nation’, as well as financial security contingent on the benevolence of their husbands. Some wives and mothers received additional support for their care work from poorly paid domestic help.

As ‘mothers of the nation,’ the care labour performed by wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters (as well as that provided by domestic help) did not simply raise the next generation of citizens. It also absolved many men, the state and the marketplace of the largest share of daily welfare provision, making possible a dramatically different and elevated citizenship status for racially and economically privileged males. Unencumbered by many relational obligations of care and nurturing, financially secure men were positioned to approximate the liberating vision implicit in Rawls’s unencumbered self – the ideal of a self-defining, self-realizing, and self-governing agent in the public spheres. The key to this privileged male ideal of citizenship was employment (Evans 1997, 107; Leira 1992, 25; Pateman 1989, 186). Paid labour force participation would in principle provide men the funds to support the dependent wife and other domestic help who afforded them the time and flexibility to pursue self-selected economic and political ends. Employment also offered the financial resources to permit a substantial degree of
self-reliance for male citizens as protector, provider and head of their own private household, giving many the means for self-respect and the means to demand from fellow male citizens recognition of their equal worth.

1c. The welfare state as a mechanism of stratification

The centrality of employment for integrating privileged males as breadwinners and active citizens meant that the tendency for capitalist markets to leave some individuals without the resources necessary for dignified democratic participation evolved as the primary concern of the post-war welfare regime (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993a). Family allowances, workers’ compensation, employment insurance, pensions and health care further shielded the autonomy of male breadwinners from unfettered capitalist forces, reinforcing their opportunity to approximate the character ideal implicit in Rawls’s unencumbered self. This post-war welfare orientation was financially and practically facilitated by the care work of diverse groups of women. Since women in private homes were expected (for no or little pay) to accommodate most of the vital day-to-day needs of children, the elderly, the sick and persons with disabilities, the welfare state granted little attention to this aspect of citizenry well-being when assuming increased responsibility for welfare (Leira 1992, 2; Pateman 1989, 192). Roche (1992, 33) observes that “[o]ne of the most notable features” of the post-war paradigm is the degree to which it appears “to take for granted what is probably the biggest and most pervasive welfare sector of any kind, state or non-state, namely the caring role of women and the institution of the family.”

While the state has an interest in both economic production and demographic reproduction, the post-war tendency to take for granted the care work of diverse groups of women corresponded with a trend that saw the welfare state devalue the fragmented female citizenry role vis-à-vis its male counterpart. The diverging valuation was most evident in the
tiered system of access to social benefits institutionalized by the post-war regime. This system provided weaker social protections for citizen-mothers than for citizen-wage-workers by indexing social rights and benefits more to earning than caring (Leira 1992, 26; O'Connor 1993, 505; Orloff 1993a, 315). In her cross-national evaluation of post-war welfare states, Leira (1992, 171) observes that “[w]hat matters when access to social rights is the issue is the formal contract of employment and the form of remuneration given. Caring, when carried out informally or unpaid, is not integrated in the welfare state entitlement system on par with employment.”

The stronger connection between social benefits and the wage-earner role emerged on two fronts. First, entitlement to some of the most significant post-war protections from poverty, such as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, presupposed successful paid labour force participation and was inaccessible to exclusive caregivers and persons relegated to the margins of the market by poverty, ethnicity, immigration status and/or gender. Second, the burgeoning middle-class of the 1950s and 60s spawned expectations about social security that surpassed the new provisions made available by universal welfare state programming (Esping-Anderson 1990, 25). Rather than furnish rising middle-class standards, the Canadian welfare state opted to supplement its modest universal entitlements with new targeted programs for low-income Canadians, leaving the market to supply the superior welfare demanded by the growing social strata through private insurance or ‘fringe’ employment benefits.

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5 Esping-Anderson (1990, 25) explains that

The solidarity of flat-rate universalism presumes a historically peculiar class structure, one in which the vast majority of the population are the ‘little people’ for whom a modest, albeit egalitarian, benefit may be considered adequate. Where this no longer obtains, as occurs with growing working-class prosperity and the rise of the new middle classes, flat-rate universalism inadvertently promotes dualism because the better-off turn to private insurance and to fringe-benefit bargaining to supplement modest equality with what they have decided are accustomed standards of welfare. Where this process unfolds (as in Canada or Great Britain), the result is that the wonderfully egalitarian spirit of universalism turns into a dualism similar to that of the social-assistance state: the poor rely on the state, and the remainder on the market.
For instance, public concerns about income security among seniors in the mid-1960s
induced the state to implement the earnings-related C/QPP and An Act to amend Old Age
Security (S.C. 1966-67, c. 65), which introduced the income-tested Guaranteed Income
Supplement (GIS). In the same period, the federal government introduced the Canada
Assistance Plan (S.C. 1966-67, c.45; hereafter CAP), which directed benefits to low-income
earners as part of a cost-sharing program with the provinces.

The targeted benefits of CAP and GIS, and the moderate benefit levels of the C/QPP, left
room for companies to implement welfare measures and collectively bargained social benefits as
wage-supplements. As a result, fringe employee benefits emerged as a key means to access
enriched medical insurance plans, dental coverage, and pension entitlements, benefits that
typically could be extended to an employee’s spouse (including survivor rights in some cases)
and children. Where company-based schemes proved insufficient (or unavailable to some,
including the self-employed), the state increasingly used tax expenditures to subsidize the
purchase of so-called ‘private’ insurance and retirement savings plans (Esping-Anderson 1990,
26-27; C. Young 1994, 565).6 This turn to private insurance and fringe-benefit bargaining by the
better-off marked the emergence of a new welfare state stratification. The equality promoted by
the modest universal programs of the 1940s and 50s ultimately fostered a new class dualism as
the more fortunate relied increasingly on the market to secure enhanced levels of welfare.

The class dualism intersected the fragmented model of post-war social citizenship. This
intersection generated a stratified access-system to social benefits that buttressed gender, race
and class systems of oppression for many, while simultaneously mitigating income-inequality

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6 In addition to being a revenue-raising mechanism, the work of Surrey (1973) reveals that the tax system is also a
central tool by which the state spends money. His research has since motivated tax expenditure analysis which
recognizes income exclusions, tax deductions, credits, deferrals and other departures from the normative tax system
as public ‘tax expenditures’ that are functionally equivalent to government grants delivered directly to citizens.
among others, especially racially privileged men and their families (Esping-Anderson 1990, 64-5; O’Connor 1993, 504; Orloff 1993a, 315; Leira 1992, 26). The most honourable point of access to social benefits prioritized claims founded on employment success. A privileged group of male breadwinners could typically earn adequate wages from the market, gain entitlement to UI and workers’ compensation in response to diminished wage-earning opportunities, and bargain for fringe benefits or purchase private insurance plans. The welfare state depicted such men as entitled to social protections and benefits by virtue of their self-reliant participation in the paid labour force or any misfortune this participation may have produced.

Persons outside or at the fringes of the market, by contrast, were only positioned to make two very different claims for social benefits, one more respected than the other (Leira 1992, 171; O’Connor 1993, 504; Orloff 1993a, 315). First, spouses or widows of breadwinners with sufficient contributions to social insurance plans were typically treated as ‘rights-bearers by association’: their marital tie to an insured worker entitled them to the same standardized treatment given their partners, although regularly at lower benefit levels. Second, the post-war state institutionalized a moderate safety net that delivered more stigmatized welfare benefits on the basis of need rather than merit. This bottom tier was especially important to persons in families maintained by women who were not in the paid labour force, or by women who worked at its margins with or without a partner.

O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999, 188) observe that the tiered system by which citizens could access post-war social benefits illuminates how welfare state policies may be just as much “mechanisms of stratification” as programs that “mitigate patterns of stratification” (see also Pateman 1989, 184). This insight is echoed in research of various theoretical hues other than feminism, including that of Esping-Anderson. He (1990, 23) remarks that “the welfare state
is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations.” This finding suggests the need to rethink an important insight about citizenship highlighted by the work of Marshall and Rawls. Just as they observe that formal political and civil citizenship status does not always parallel a person’s actual status because of economic inequalities, so may formal social citizenship entitlements not imply full social membership. Rather, O’Connor (1993, 505) comments that social rights also fall into the category of entitlements that “have a class bias in practice.” But the biases do not cease with class prejudices. O’Connor concludes that “a gender and/or race bias may exist singly, or in interaction with one another, or with a class bias, in relation to all elements of citizenship” – civil, political and social.

Id. The marketplace institutionalized the fragmented model of post-war citizenship

Post-war employment practices institutionalized the unencumbered status that the welfare regime prescribed for white men in the market and political arena. The dominant ideology of motherhood spawned a corollary norm of the ideal worker (Slaughter 1995). The care work of wives and domestic help permitted businesses to expect and demand that family responsibilities would rarely compete for an ideal worker’s time or distract his attention from the job. Businesses preferred employees with limited domestic responsibilities so that they could labour to whatever extent was required by the market. In return for unencumbered labour force participation, market rhetoric echoed the state concern to secure for ideal breadwinners a family wage that was sufficient to provide for their dependent wives and children (Orloff 1993a, 319; Pateman 1989, 189; Slaughter 1995, 78).
Although the family wage was a myth for many men, employers’ decisions about remuneration and career advancement were still influenced by the breadwinner/caregiver dualism, resulting in the systemic devaluation of work-experiences that diverged from the ideal worker norm. For instance, part-time, temporary and other non-standard employment was (and remains) typically lower-paying than full-time employment, enjoyed less labour legislation and union protection, and often provided workers with few, if any, benefits (Jenson 1996, 94-96). Similarly, requests for increased flexibility to balance paid work and unpaid caregiving generally were (and continue to be) perceived as indications of limited career aspirations and therefore undermined opportunities for promotion (Duffy 1997, 176).

The juxtaposition of the ideal worker norm and the ideology of motherhood imposed additional systemic barriers to equal labour market participation for women, since the hegemony of the female caregiver model ideologically disqualified many women from the class of preferred workers. For instance, some employers assumed that female job candidates were, or would become, encumbered by child rearing duties, regardless of applicants’ actual caregiving aspirations (Conway 1997, 136-7; Fineman 1995, 207; Segura 1994, 214). Many employers and unions also presumed that women who entered the labour market did so as ‘secondary’ earners who did not require a ‘living wage’ given their access to a ‘principal’ male income (Slaughter 1995, 82). The pervasiveness of such assumptions in the labour market meant many women endured gender wage discrimination and employment segregation that intersected with other labour market obstacles indexed to class and racial prejudice (Armstrong 1997, 45-7; Evans 1998, 53; Jacobsen 1994, chapter 6, Phillips and Phillips 1993, 2, 45, 53-4).

The diminished income-earning opportunities available for many women further circumscribed decisions about the division of labour within middle-class homes, reinforcing
many economically privileged women's status as homemakers. Citing research by Becker (1991), Slaughter (1995, 83) aligns discriminatory labour market practices premised on the ideal worker norm with a cycle of economic dependency and domesticity for many married women. She explains that “[w]hen women make less than men—and they usually do—it is ‘rational’ that they be the ones to cut back or drop out of the labor market... to rear the children and to provide domestic services,” assuming that the spousal unit will want to maximize family income.

Until the benefits that the wife could gain from the labor market outweigh the benefits of domestic production, she will invest in the household economy by bearing and raising children and developing the husband’s career. As long as the husband gains more than the wife loses, it is best for the family that the lower earning wife be the childrearer.

This is the origin of the cycle of dependency. Once they start devoting their energies to childrearing, Mothers fall behind in developing market skills and in maintaining their place in waged labor. This makes them the appropriate candidates for assuming the childrearing duties but at the same time it drives them further into economic marginalization and dependency on the Breadwinner.

The cycle to which Slaughter refers is propelled by the fact that employment marketability of many women depreciates during extensive periods outside of the paid workforce as their previous job experience and training become less relevant in a dynamic market economy. This depreciation in turn renders it more difficult for at-home mothers regardless of their marital status to re-enter the labour market and to earn a life-sustaining wage should they be so motivated by renewed employment aspirations, economic need, divorce or, increasingly, the eligibility requirements of social assistance. Future earnings are minimized further by the fact that years dedicated to unpaid caregiving mean that full-time mothers forgo possible wage raises, career advancement, and training or education opportunities, all of which increase employees' earning capacities (Jacobsen 1994, chapters 7 - 9).

One resulting irony of this cycle is that the post-war ideology of motherhood asks women to sacrifice their personal independence for the purpose of nurturing the independence of their children, partners and other relatives. The costs of this concession are well documented (see for
example Armstrong and Armstrong 1994; and Phillips and Phillips 1993) and include considerably higher rates of poverty for divorced and elderly women that traditionally reflect their biographies as caregivers and homemakers (Eichler 1997, 36). Although the risks inherent in forfeiting one’s economic independence may appear palatable (and even economically ‘rational’ from the standpoint of a couple) so long as one is part of a spousal unit, the risks often actualize for women when a marriage ends or a partner dies.

2. The Race and Class Underpinnings of Post-War Motherhood Ideology

2a. The post-war regime socially constructed some women as workers – before mothers

Racial and classist social forces circumscribed the post-war commitment to exclusive motherhood, limiting the prescription of separate spheres for men and women primarily to white families. The ideology of female privatized domesticity not only advanced a stylized image of the ‘good’ mother, but simultaneously disqualified certain social locations amidst relations of class, race, marital status and sexuality as less suited for motherhood (Kline 1995, 121). In particular, the dominant norm ideologically distanced single and working class women of all ethnic backgrounds from the path to citizenship integration available to women in more financially advantaged households (Boris 1994, 176). Economic need meant many such women were confronted by a context of choice that precluded the option of remaining home full-time. Unable to rely solely on a man’s earning power, such women were economically required to balance the ‘double day’ of paid work and unpaid domestic labour long before the term became popularized in contemporary thinking.

When paid work proved insufficient to shield their families from economic deprivation, poor mothers could approach the welfare state as ‘clients’ of social assistance, eligible for the least generous and most stigmatized social benefits (O’Connor 1993, 504; Orloff 1993a, 315). In
many cases, poor mothers were (and continue to be) subjected to social and legal scrutiny, including regulation by child welfare law through which the dominant ideology of motherhood yields considerable power to discipline women. Kline (1995) reports that during child welfare and other regulatory proceedings the acts or omissions of poor mothers that diverge from the dominant norm are routinely decontextualized from the realities of racism, colonialism, immigration status, violence and classism. Yet it is often these factors that generate the poverty that precludes poor women’s conformity with middle-class expectations about devotion to child-rearing and the closely associated norms of maternal stability, self-sufficiency and cleanliness.

Although ideologically disqualified from the category of ‘good’ mothers, many poor and working class women were welcomed, and even recruited, for low-paid work as caregivers in white, economically privileged homes (Glenn 1994, 8, 20; Roberts 1995, 230; Teghtsoonian 1996, 121). Low-paying caregiving positions have been the only jobs open to many women for much of Canada’s history. Between 1871 and 1941, Fudge (1997, 121) reports that domestic employees constituted the single largest category of paid female workers in Canada. This labour market participation by some women contributed critically to the well-being of children and relatives in more privileged homes, as well as the time and flexibility to pursue self-selected goals enjoyed by many white males.

Work in private households has been an especially important source of employment for women of colour (Dua in 1999, 246). Arat-Koc (1997, 73) observes that:

Beginning with black slaves who provided domestic service for nuns and other employers in New France, women of colour in Canada have been a source of domestic workers during most of Canadian history, largely because they have been barred from exercising other labour market options. Long after the abolition of slavery at the end of the eighteenth century, black women in Canada remained in domestic work. They did find industrial employment at a time of labour shortage during World War Two, but were subsequently the first group to be laid off. At the turn of the century, Micmac women in Nova Scotia were also excluded from industrial employment and considered suited only for domestic work. In the postwar period, when Canada was considering immigration of domestics from among European refugees, Canadian employers also utilized the cheap labour of ‘Canada’s own displaced persons,’ the Japanese Canadians.
The racial and class underpinnings of the post-war welfare project are particularly evident in the history of Canadian immigration. British colonial settlement strategies and later Canadian immigration policies were informed by the overarching goal of creating a white settler nation (Arat-Koc 1997, 74; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997b, 33). When tolerated before the 1960s, men and women of colour were permitted to migrate to Canada predominantly in response to capitalist demands for low-cost labourers. The demand for cheap labour first increased considerably in the late 19th century as the Canadian economy moved unevenly towards industrialization. Finding it difficult to attract British and European immigrants to supply Canadian employers, the government was compelled to permit migration from China, India and Japan. Dua (1999, 244) observes that “in the context of a white, settler policy and the politics of racial purity, Asian migrants were defined as temporary workers rather than potential citizens of Canada.” Governments imposed a differential residency and citizenship status on Asians, denying them the right to vote, naturalization, ownership of certain kinds of property, access to certain occupations, and, until 1947, equal opportunity to sponsor spouses and children. As a result, the majority of Asian migrants were men, many of whom were forced to leave behind their wives and offspring (ibid., 245). In response to such restrictive immigration practices, “the demand for a ‘family’ became a central issue” in Asian and other minority ethnic communities (ibid.).

The limited opportunities permitted men of colour to sponsor their wives meant that foreign domestic recruitment schemes accounted for one of the few ways women of colour could gain immigration status in Canada before the 1960s. This proved true despite the fact that the

7 Dua (1999, 243-244) also observes that “an examination of the institution of the family in First Nations communities demonstrates that colonial and Canadian state policies have often denied First Nations people the right to live in a family context and the right to have the ‘family’ form of their choice.” French missionaries “undertook an active campaign” to replace traditional gender, sexual and familial relations in First Nations communities “with an alternate set of relationships organized around monogamy [and] patriarchy,” while residential schools and child welfare policies “forcibly separated [children] from biological parents and First Nations communities.”
recruitment of women of colour as foreign domestics was largely restricted until the supply of domestics declined from more ‘desirable’ source countries in the United Kingdom and Europe. Although research indicates that Caucasian domestics also “suffered class subordination and middle-class paternalism,” Arat-Koc (1999, 215-6) reports that they were nevertheless preferred by the Canadian state because of their potential to become “mothers of the nation.” In contrast, women of colour were seen as “threats to [Canada’s] racial and cultural purity” because of their capacity to reproduce a non-white population (Arat-Koc 1999, 208; see also Dua 1999, 254-5).

By the 1950s and 60s, British and European sources for domestic workers were dwindling. The federal government responded by recruiting women of colour more regularly to meet the ongoing demand for domestic workers. Consistent with racist concerns about Canada’s ‘cultural purity’, state immigration policy simultaneously restricted the residency and citizenship status of foreign domestics (Arat-Koc 1997, 54, 74; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997b, 33-6; Daenzer 1997, 81). Whereas earlier British and European domestics were granted permanent residency and encouraged to marry white men upon completing their domestic terms, the decision to target women of colour recruits in 1955 eventually led to policy changes in the 1960s that denied foreign domestics this permanent status. The new criteria responded to political discontent about the number of requests to sponsor relatives initiated by women of colour domestics, as well as their mobility rate out of domestic service despite labour market discrimination. The result has been that foreign domestic applicants since the late 1960s (predominantly women of colour) have generally not been able to qualify for entry into Canada as landed (permanent) immigrants.
Instead, they are welcomed primarily as ‘migrants’ for their labour in affluent Canadian homes, rather than as immigrants and potential contributors to Canadian communities.\(^8\)

This commodification of women of colour by state immigration policy in the 1960s stands in stark contrast to the ideal of exclusive motherhood prescribed to white middle-class women that reached its peak in social influence at about the same period. The tenor of immigration legislation signals how the post-war welfare state had little interest in integrating many women of colour, immigrant women and poor women as citizens on the same terms prescribed for white women in financially secure households. The state was primarily interested in the low wage labour of the former groups of women, more so than their mothering. The resulting differential citizenship-expectations exacerbated the experiences of gender oppression endured by some less privileged women. By prioritizing their poorly remunerated work over mothering, the post-war welfare state effectively withheld public recognition of an important element of their self-understanding as women. Iyer (1997, 178) remarks that “[i]n a deeply sexist society, in which the ultimate in feminine achievement is motherhood, a refusal to recognize some women as mothers is to relegate them to the margins of their gender” (see also Roberts 1995, 229).

The welfare state’s commodification of women disadvantaged by racism and classism was also entirely inconsistent with the concern to decommodify labour that emerged as a central tenet of the post-war paradigm of social citizenship for white, male breadwinners. One result is that many single, poor, immigrant and minority ethnic women had relatively little time to nurture privately their own children or dependent relatives (Collins 1994, 51). The post-war policy

\(^8\) The construction of some women of colour as workers before mothers under foreign domestic recruitment schemes in the 1960s is tempered by the fact future decades saw greater numbers of women of colour acquire landed immigrant status in Canada by being sponsored as ‘family class’ immigrants (Arat-Koc 1999, 210).
regime premised on a model of exclusive female domesticity compounded challenges posed by this lack of time since it meant that the welfare state did not institutionalize social services to provide affordable supplementary care for children and other dependents. Therefore, many families that were already financially disadvantaged also had fewer resources to meet their care-related needs because they did not have the luxury of a full-time at-home spouse. In response, Roberts (1995, 35) reports that many women of colour had either to “entrust their children to the care of a neighbor, relative, or older sibling, or leave them to wander in the neighborhood.”

2b. Recognizing domesticity as a site of refuge against discrimination

The separation from children and family imposed by financial need moves many less privileged women to envision domesticity very differently from some white, middle-class married women. The struggle for the former is not to escape the constraints of the nuclear family, but to acquire more time to participate in a family context (Dua 1999, 242). Therefore, in a society infused with race and class subordination, the domestic sphere is inadequately theorized if it is only depicted as a site of gender oppression. For many single, poor, immigrant and minority ethnic women, the domestic sphere is just as importantly a site of solace and resistance against discrimination in which “women and their families engage in collective effort to create and maintain family life in the face of forces that undermine family integrity” (Collins 1994, 47; see also Roberts 1995, 236; Dua 1999, 242; Spelman 1988, 132).

Collins (1994) reveals that unpaid domestic work can be viewed as a form of resistance to oppression on multiple levels. For instance, the care performed by some poor and minority ethnic women represents “mothers fighting for the physical survival both of their own biological

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9 Since the extended family structure mitigated some of the challenges of maternal separation imposed by employment responsibilities, Collins (1994, 51-52) observes that grandmothers are often “highly revered in Black communities... because [they] function as primary caretakers of their daughters' and daughter-in-laws' children.”
children and those of the larger... community” (Collins 1994, 50), as well as the right to retain custody of wanted children amidst a child welfare system that imposes culturally biased standards (ibid. 53-54; Kline 1995; Roberts 1995, 231). Care work is also a source of empowerment for some women. Collins (1994, 55-56) explains that “[m]any Black women receive respect and recognition within their local communities for innovative and practical approaches” to mothering their own children, as well as to nurturing the children in their extended family networks and in the community more generally. Finally, caregiving by women in minority ethnic groups also contributes significantly to the development of their children’s sense of self. The failure of schools, the media and other public institutions to validate the identities of racialized ethnic groups requires mothers to compensate by cultivating “a meaningful racial identity in children within a society that denigrates people of color” (Collins 1994, 57). Minority ethnic mothers must teach their children “to survive in systems that oppress them,” while ensuring that this survival does “not come at the expense of self-esteem” (ibid.).

The struggle among some minority ethnic women to instill within their children a strong indigenous cultural awareness reveals that their “subjective experience of... motherhood is inextricably linked to the sociocultural concern of racial ethnic communities – one does not exist without the other,” Collins (1994, 47) observes. This recognition suggests that unpaid caregiving in some minority ethnic groups represents resistance to oppression that stretches well beyond the particular homes in which the work is performed because it contributes to a broader project of community development (ibid., 56-57). By working to ensure that their children cultivate a proud affiliation with their cultural history, many women of colour help foster a flourishing collective racial identity. The strength of this collective identity underpins a community’s sense
of empowerment to resist oppression and demand full inclusion for its members in key social spaces, including the marketplace and political arena.

The commitment to unpaid caregiving demonstrated by some immigrant and minority ethnic women is not without recognizable costs. While unpaid caregiving is integral to the survival of children, families and communities of colour, many women of colour presently endure a "loss of individual autonomy and... submersion of individual growth for the benefit of the group" (Collins 1994, 50). Therefore, Collins (ibid.) argues that "the question of women doing more than their fair share of [caregiving] work for individual and community development merits open debate." To date, Roberts (1995, 245) worries that this debate has yet to develop fully since some women of colour "remain silent about sexism in our communities" out of "fear that we will be charged with betraying our common interests as a people" in the struggle against racism (see also hooks 1981, 1-13).

While acknowledging the need for this debate, Dua (1999, 242) reports that "many writers" nevertheless reject "the idea that the family is the main institution that structures inequality for women of colour" (Dua 1999, 242). The theoretical depiction of domesticity simply as an obstacle that women must overcome to achieve equality rests on two problematic assumptions premised on white, middle-class experience: first, that mothers and their children enjoy "a relative degree of economic security" and, second, that women have the luxury of understanding themselves primarily as agents "in search of personal autonomy, instead of members of racial ethnic groups struggling for power" (Collins 1994, 48). Since their lived realities are incongruous with such assumptions, many immigrant and minority ethnic women report frustration that financial need impedes extensive participation in their domestic spheres that would enhance their abilities to keep their families together, tend to their children's physical
and emotional needs, and provide their children with skills to cope amidst systems of discrimination (Dua 1999, 242; Roberts 1995, 225, 236; Spelman 1988, 132).

3. The Post-War Regime Institutionalized an Inadequate Understanding of Domesticity

The two streams of feminist literature examined above reveal that the Canadian post-war welfare state institutionalized the inadequate appreciation for the workings of the domestic sphere that characterizes Rawls’s and Marshall’s theoretical examination of social citizenship. Feminist research associated with Pateman (1988, 179-209) rejects the tendency for the post-war state to discount the costs for women that arise from extensive commitments to household and care labour. This literature denounces barriers that impede women’s citizenship participation outside of the domestic realm as wage-workers and governors.

In contrast, the second avenue of feminist analysis captured by Collins (1994) illuminates the important contributions of domestic work to child, family and community well-being. The characterization of domesticity as a site of solace and resistance suggests that participation in one’s family network is an essential element of genuine social belonging that has yet to be fully appreciated by contemporary theorists of citizenship. Participation in the private life of family and close friends protects citizens from isolation. It positions citizens to cultivate what are often the most intimate and foundational relationships in their lives from which they can request, or provide, emotional and economic support in times of need. The domestic sphere is also a place where many citizens find a network of relationships that will validate their sense of self worth and, in some cases, a potential reprieve from the forces of discrimination. The validation of personal worth empowers citizens to cope with various individual challenges and broader systems of social oppression, while it simultaneously develops and strengthens the collective identities of the ethnic groups to which individuals belong. Thus, the findings of this second
stream of feminist literature suggest that obstacles to participation in one’s own domestic sphere are just as much impediments to the practices of full social membership as are barriers to inclusion in the public spaces of market and political arena.

The two schools of feminist critique point to important class, race and citizenship complexities that underpin diverging points of view about caring and nurturing responsibilities among women. Spelman (1988, 123) notices that “[t]he meaning and the oppressive nature of the ‘housewife’ role has to be understood in relation to the roles against which it is contrasted.” Unpaid domestic labour assumes a very different significance when contrasted to work that is ascribed high social value and achieves for women economic independence than when compared to labour that is degrading, economically necessary, ideologically imposed and underpaid.

The two related feminist indictments also reveal how caregiving is an important site of exploitation and satisfaction for women (Baines, Evans and Neysmith 1998, 7). This dual character of caregiving forces feminists to walk what Maroney (1985, 44) refers to as a “tightrope between offensive and defensive poles.” The feminist movement(s) seeks to validate “‘what women do’ (and have done historically) in mothering at the same time as it contests patriarchal glorification of the role at the expense of the occupant.” Maintaining this delicate balance is a difficult challenge, and some feminists concede that the movement(s) has failed on occasion. In the words of Elshtain (1981, 333):

It is the isolation and debasement of women under terms of male-dominated ideology and social structures that must be fought, not the activity, the humanizing imperative, of mothering, or of being a parent, itself. Too frequently mothering has been overassimilated to what feminists call the ‘shitwork.’ Mothers were demeaned under the guise of ‘liberating’ them.

While depictions of care labour as ‘shitwork’ repeat the very failure that many feminists indict—namely, under-theorization of caregiving—diverging schools of research that successfully walk the feminist tightrope reveal that inattention to domesticity renders the post-war welfare
commitment to social citizenship both incomplete and inadequate on its own terms. The paradigm is incomplete because its preoccupation with de-linking the welfare of citizens from the dictates of the capitalist wage system distorts an important issue: before decommodification will be significant for individuals they must first access the labour market. The point of this recognition is not to downplay the significance of policy measures designed to mitigate the commodity-logic of the market. O'Connor (1993, 513) observes that any effort to protect citizens from forced participation in the labour market “irrespective of age, health conditions, family status, [or] availability of suitable employment, is obviously of major importance to both men and women.” Rather, the point is that too much commodification is not the problem facing some women; their problem is too little commodification. In O'Connor’s words: the post-war regime “does not take into account the fact that not all demographic groups are equally commodified and that this may be a source of inequality.” The remedy, Orloff argues (1993a, 318), is to supplement post-war decommodification with a “new analytic dimension that taps into the extent to which states promote or discourage women’s paid employment – the right to be commodified.” This is a theme that I explore in the remaining chapters, particularly as it dovetails with the insights of economic conservatives.

Inattention to domesticity also undermines the post-war paradigm of social citizenship on its own terms. On one hand, the paradigm’s commitment to decommodification dissipated across race, class and gender lines, as foreign domestics of colour were recruited for their labour but permitted less formal, only temporary residency status in Canada. In this case, the paradigm showed relatively little of what Marshall (1964, 84) referred to as an “urge towards a fuller measure of equality,” remaining content to institutionalize differential access to social benefits that tracked race, class and immigration differences. On the other hand, some feminists charge
that the post-war concept of decommodification is too narrow in scope, ignoring the extent to which racism and classism operate to "(dis)organize familial... relations" (Dua 1999, 243; see also Glenn 1994, 5). One result is that the post-war regime distorts and obscures the institutional challenges that must be overcome before some citizens can find the time and flexibility to labour and care in the domestic sphere while retaining a reasonable opportunity to secure their economic well-being.

This second limitation is particularly challenging for feminists concerned to recommend policy alternatives. The most obvious remedy is to draft new decommodifying measures that provide citizens more time to care, a theme that is central to this dissertation, especially where it intersects with social conservatism. However, both streams of feminist literature examined above seek a very specific category of decommodifying measures that provide additional time to care without reinforcing women's status as primary caregivers, whether unpaid or poorly paid. From this perspective, the point is not to demean domestic work, but to redistribute some of it. Implicit in this position is the charge that the extension of new social rights to citizens in the post-war era took for granted, and reinforced, a social context premised on an indefensible distribution of civic responsibility for unpaid care. The intersection of racism, classism and sexism that sustains patriarchy enabled many fathers to abdicate care responsibilities, leaving diverse groups of women to shoulder the relinquished work and endure the associated costs.

The contention that community and family membership entail substantial responsibilities to provide care in a domestic context is an insight that many social conservatives also share, as I discuss in chapter four. But feminist research represented by both Pateman and Collins depart from conservative literature by employing the concept of citizenry obligations to illuminate the
unequal division of caregiving responsibilities between the sexes, as well as between different groups of women. Although male income-earning is important, both streams of feminist literature suggest that this role is not sufficient for modern fatherhood; and that men must acknowledge and respond to a range of social citizenship duties that many have traditionally neglected (Collins 1994, 50; Eichler 1997, 83; Pateman 1988, 135; Roberts 1995, 245). Institutional changes are therefore necessary to shift the care burden while simultaneously socializing men to recognize the value of caregiving and the satisfaction with which it is often associated. I will demonstrate in chapter six that redefining the male domestic role is critical to ensuring that some women’s pursuit of increased economic independence does not come at the expense of other, often less privileged, women who provide care in the labour market for limited remuneration (Baines, Evans and Neysmith 1998, 4, 14; Eichler 1997, 83, 107; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 106-107).

4. The Impact of Feminist Critiques on Post-War Restructuring

Neoliberal challenges to post-war welfare have had the greatest influence on state restructuring, particularly since the 1980s (Brodie 1997; McBride and Shields 1997). In the 1970s, however, the welfare state evolved more unevenly, as some feminist critiques filtered into policy. White, middle-class feminist concerns that linked paid labour force participation with increased security for women enjoyed the most attention among governments, in part because of the racial and financial privilege that such women enjoyed.

One particularly important feminist breakthrough at the federal level occurred in 1970 with the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. The Commission prescribed,

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10 Gilligan’s (1995, 112) distinction “between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care” is a further example of how some feminists employ the concepts of obligation and duty to reveal the unequal division of care responsibilities between the sexes.
among other things, equal pay for work of equal value and affirmative action policies, as well as increased public support for child care to combat the systemic factors contributing to women's economic marginalization. The momentum generated by the Royal Commission helped usher in federal equal pay for equal work legislation in the *Canada Labour (Standards) Code* in 1971 (S.C. 1970-72, c. 50, s. 14a(1)), pay equity commitments in the *Canadian Human Rights Act* in 1977 (S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, s. 11), and similar legislative changes by half of the provinces and two territories in the intervening period (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 90).

Roughly at the same time, employment equity strategies supplemented pay equity legislation. For instance, the 1977 *Canadian Human Rights Act* proscribed employment discrimination based on gender. The *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* constitutionally acknowledged the right to equality in employment and explicitly sanctioned affirmative action proposals based on sex and race. In 1986, the federal government introduced the *Employment Equity Act* to benefit women, visible minorities, disabled people and aboriginal peoples (S.C. 1986, c.31). Section 2 of the *Act* states that employment equity "means more than treating persons in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences." Beyond these legislative initiatives, the federal government has since enacted a contract compliance policy that requires employers of 100 or more workers bidding for public contracts above $200,000 to hire in accordance with the principles of employment equity (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 93).

Pay and employment equity strategies marked substantial shifts in welfare state policy. Symbolically, this type of legislation signalled a new ambivalence about the appropriate domain for women. The state no longer took for granted that economically and/or ethnically privileged

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11 This reading of section 15(1) of the *Charter* was established by the *Action Travail* case (*CNR v Canada (Human Rights Commission)* [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114).

women should be integrated as citizens first and foremost in their capacity as caregivers labouring for no pay within families. Instead, pay and employment equity strategies publicly recognized women as citizen-wage-workers. This recognition would grow increasingly important as recessions and declining male wages intersected feminist values to motivate rising numbers of middle-class women to pursue paid employment. At a practical level, employment equality measures successfully advanced the earnings and careers of some women. Strengthened labour market ties, together with social assistance, further assisted some women to achieve greater economic independence from a male wage. This added financial independence combats the poverty often endured by single mothers and divorced and widowed women, as well as provides more resources for women seeking to escape domestic violence (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 2; Pateman 1989, 195, 199).

Notwithstanding these positive consequences for women’s equality, the pay and employment equity initiatives implemented in Canada have left many of their feminist advocates disenchanted due to their limited scope. For instance, commentators observe that the complaint-based nature of many programs means they are reactive rather than proactive, placing the responsibility on individual women to prove unequal pay or employment discrimination (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 90-91). Others challenge the limited coverage of employment equality strategies. Pay equity schemes (other than that temporarily implemented in Ontario under the Rae NDP government) do not apply to the private sector where the gender wage gap is particularly large (Fudge and McDermott 1991, 8). Similarly, the Employment Equity Act of 1986 covered just 10 percent of the workforce and its replacement in 1995 (S.C. 1995, c. 44) has since improved coverage to just roughly 15 percent (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 92-4). Some feminists also find pay equity strategies wanting because of the
difficulty of avoiding gendered criteria to evaluate skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions (Phillips and Phillips 1993, 152). Employment equity strategies are further undermined because their success depends on declining unemployment rates (Jenson 2000/1998, 6; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 156), and their benefits often target women who are already in the upper echelons of the marketplace (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 225).

Beyond limitations inherent in the policies implemented to date, many feminists observe that pay and employment equity measures alone are inadequate to address the economic and political marginalization of diverse groups of women. While such initiatives challenge the male-breadwinner model by advancing the position that women are equally competent market participants, they fail to adequately problematize post-war expectations of the ideal worker established primarily by and for racially privileged, middle-class men. Pay and employment equity legislation invite women to participate in the labour market on terms that evolved in a cultural context that presumed the breadwinner/caregiver dualism. In the absence of policy and social changes that relieve women of some of the domestic workload, their capacity to approximate the unencumbered status of the ideal worker norm is significantly obstructed.\(^{12}\)

The Canadian welfare state has demonstrated relatively little concern about this obstruction. Compared to many European countries, Canada and other English-speaking welfare states have been reticent to contribute to the development of care replacement alternatives such as public child care and maternity/parental leave policies to assist women and men balance earning and caring (Baker 1995, 189-235). Ottawa provided no federal funding for child care services during the first two decades after World War II. During the same period, most provincial governments provided only minimal funding to support a limited number of nursery

\(^{12}\) In chapter five, I discuss in more detail the challenges that women encounter in approximating the ideal worker norm when examining the labour market restructuring that has been motivated by the post-industrial shift.
services. The Ontario government proved a noticeable exception by passing the *Day Nurseries Act* (S.O. 1946, c. 17). This Act provided provincial funds to cover 50 percent of operating costs of child care programs as well as a licensing and regulatory system for centres (CRRU 2000, 44).

The reluctance of most Canadian governments to assume increased public responsibility for child rearing saw child care relegated to the status of 'welfare service' when economic and attitudinal changes prompted record numbers of women to enter the paid workforce starting in the late 1960s. Under the *Canada Assistance Plan* (CAP) of 1966, the federal government agreed to cost-share 50/50 with the provinces various initiatives designed to minimize or prevent poverty and defined child care programming as a service that could contribute to this end. Although the provinces were not compelled to take advantage of CAP funding, within a decade all implemented child care initiatives that subsidized services only for 'needy' families in keeping with CAP criteria (CRRU 2000, i). For families ineligible to benefit from CAP's social assistance, the federal government amended the *Income Tax Act* in 1971 to permit a limited tax deduction for parental child care expenses (R.S.C. 1985, (5th Supp.) c. 1-5, s. 63). The result of post-war child care policy has been a dearth of regulated services in Canada. As of 1998, there were regulated spaces for just 10 percent of children age zero to twelve (CRRU 2000, 96).

The ensuing pattern of child care use among Canadian families reflects class differences. Jenson and Thompson (1999, 6) report that:

> In the mid-1990s, 35 percent of families on social assistance had children in centre based and regulated care, while only 19 percent of other families with a mother who was employed or studying did. Fully 31 percent of children in families with an income under $30,000 versus 17 percent of children in families with higher incomes were in a child care centre. In other words, middle class parents have difficulty gaining access to the form of care widely considered to be the best quality – regulated care in a child care centre with a preschool educational program.

In effect, the Canadian post-war welfare state produced a tiered system of child care in Canada. Families that can afford preschools, nannies or regulated care take advantage of tax subsidies.
Government-subsidized day care is provided for families with very low incomes. Middle-class families that cannot afford the entire cost of unsubsidized day care are forced to turn to family members, friends or other informal arrangements (Baker 1995, 207).

The Canadian welfare state’s commitment to maternity and parental leave has been equally limited compared to European countries (Baker 1995, 156-188; O’Hara 1998). In 1971, the federal government introduced wage replacement benefits for women employees absent from work due to pregnancy and childbirth by amending the *Unemployment Insurance Act* (1971, S.C. 1970-72, c. 48, s. 30). The Act was later amended in 1984 and 1990 to provide paid leave opportunities for adoptive parents and fathers (S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 14). However, the scope of leave benefits was, and remains, limited. As late as 1998, slightly less than half of all families with a new born were eligible for federal paid maternity or parental leave benefits in that year, whether by the mother’s or father’s contributions to unemployment insurance (Statistics Canada 1999c). Self-employed workers have no access to the federal system and eligibility criteria are premised on male patterns of workforce participation that deny benefits to some part-time workers. The duration of benefit payments in Canada has traditionally been moderate. Before policy changes in 2001, biological mothers were entitled to just 15 weeks of maternity benefits. An additional 10 weeks of leave were available to any adoptive or biological parent, which a mother could use to supplement her maternity leave. The six-month total benefit period stood in stark contrast to Scandinavian policy, which has historically institutionalized leave entitlements of up to one year per child (Baker 1995, 166-168; O’Hara 1998, 7-20). The value of leave benefits has also been very low in Canada, remunerating just up to 55 percent of parents’ insurable earnings, compared to over 80 percent in some European countries (ibid.).

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13 The 2001 changes to parental leave policy in Canada mean that some parents can receive benefits for up to 50 weeks per newborn. I explore recent amendments to the leave system in chapter eight.
While the limited post-war funding for child care generally benefited higher- and lower-income parents at the expense of the middle-class, funding for maternity and parental leave has typically benefited middle- and high-income families. Iyer (1997, 176) finds that the structure of the leave system contemplates a group of pregnant women who pay (un)employment insurance premiums but are disqualified from claiming the maternity benefit, either because they cannot satisfy the qualifying conditions (not worked enough hours) or because they cannot afford the drop in earning that taking the benefit entails.

Simultaneously, low wage replacement levels reinforce the hegemony of the female caregiver model. Limited benefits disincline higher earners in heterosexual couples from taking advantage of the leave period, as total family income falls further from a minimum 45 percent drop in the higher earner's income. The gender wage gap ensures that this line of thinking contributes to the feminization of parental leave benefits, since most fathers continue to earn more than mothers. 1998 statistics corroborate this trend, showing that 98 percent of parental leave claimants in that year were women (Statistics Canada 2000, 109).

Conclusion

Feminist critiques of the post-war regime enjoyed limited success in restructuring the welfare state. Pay equity and employment equity strategies signalled a reorientation in state thinking about women's relationship vis-à-vis the market. In particular, daily caregiving was no longer seen as the only appropriate role for women. This shift in thinking was consistent with schools of feminism that were particularly concerned to diminish barriers that impede women's citizenship participation in the market and political arena. However, the impact of this policy shift was constrained by the welfare state's limited commitment to child care and maternity/parental leave programming. The post-war regime continued to understand daily caregiving as the domain of private households and remained reticent to assume extra caregiving.
responsibilities from women, or to redistribute these responsibilities between the sexes. The result was the ideological extension of the male half of the breadwinner/homemaker equation to economically privileged women in the absence of any significant reorganization of state, market and household institutional arrangements. The post-war welfare state failed to introduce sufficient support to compensate families for the domestic labour that is lost when single parents or both parents work for pay, a reality with which many women of colour, poor women and immigrant women had long struggled.

The effects of limited institutional restructuring between state, market and domestic spheres differed for diverse groups of women, tracking race, class and other differences. For some women, typically members of economically secure families, privatized daily care work remained a substantial impediment to successful labour market participation. For others, financial need continued to motivate extensive paid work commitments that limited the time they could devote to caring for their families and community. The time deprivation endured by some working class women remained acute partly because feminist calls for the post-war state to reorganize its decommodification dimension to account for the workings of the domestic sphere fell largely on deaf ears.
CHAPTER 4

NEOCONSERVATIVE CRITIQUES OF POST-WAR WELFARISM

I remember back six years ago, this Western life I chose.
And every day, the news would say some factory’s going to close.
Well, I could have stayed to take the Dole, but I’m not one of those.
I take nothing free, and that makes me an idiot, I suppose…

So come all you fine young fellows who’ve been beaten to the ground.
This western life’s no paradise, but it’s better than lying down.
Oh, the streets aren’t clean, and there’s nothing green, and the hills are dirty brown,
But the government Dole will rot your soul back there in your home town.

So bid farewell to the Eastern town you never more will see.
There’s self-respect and a steady cheque in this refinery.
You will miss the green and the woods and streams, and the dust will fill your nose.
But you’ll be free, and just like me, an idiot I suppose.

While feminist critiques of post-war welfarism had only moderate influence on state restructuring, neoconservative critiques enjoyed far more success. ‘Neoconservatism’ refers to a broad political tent that is home to two important sub-camps: economic and social conservatives. Since economic conservatives are also referred to as neoliberals in the literature (for example see Brodie 1997; Jenson 1997; McBride and Shields 1997; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999), I employ the terms synonymously in this dissertation.

Contemporary economic conservatism appropriates many classical liberal principles emphasizing freedom and market individualism (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver, 52). Although neoliberals rhetorically value ‘small government’, the veracity of this rhetoric is belied by policy prescriptions that imply the need for a strong state to mitigate market-blocking institutions or incentives (Bakan 1997, 150; Brodie 1995, 15), including unions, minimum wage legislation and passive social assistance strategies that decommodify workers. Giddens (1994, 2) observes that the economic conservative commitment to free markets stimulates structural changes affecting the family and other areas of social life that radically alters its proponents’ relationship with ‘tradition’ – “that very phenomenon which [conservatives] previously held most dear.” One
result, Giddens (1999, 6) notes, is that modern economic conservatives are really ‘conservative’ in name only. They advocate a philosophy that “is libertarian on moral as well as economic issues,” offering support in “favour [of] sexual freedom” and “decriminalizing... drugs.”

In contrast, social conservatives demonstrate continued allegiance to moral ‘traditions’. They defend the church and the idealized 1950s patriarchal family, on one hand, and denounce “feminism, homosexuality, sexual permissiveness, and drugs,” on the other (McBride and Shields 1997, 31). Similar to neoliberals, social conservatives employ rhetorical flourishes that laud small government. But this rhetoric obscures their eagerness to legislate moral issues, provided that governments institutionalize ‘traditional’, typically Christian, values that, among other things, are anti-gay and anti-abortion (Teghtsoonian 1993, 102-103).

Despite the obvious tension between the two neoconservative schools, the broader political tent remains standing because both sub-groups “share a desire to undermine their common enemy that is far more passionate than any desire to undermine one another” (Laycock 2002, 8). The common target of critical analysis is post-war welfarism. In the first section of this chapter, I summarize briefly the restructuring of the welfare state for which neoconservatives have been responsible over the past two decades. In section two I examine social conservative challenges to post-war welfare that motivated this restructuring, while in sections three and four I engage in more detail with economic conservative critiques.

The investigation in this chapter reveals interesting points of convergence between economic and social conservatism and the strands of feminist literature explored in the previous chapter. Notwithstanding many significant disagreements, some neoconservatives and feminists concur (although often for different reasons) that the post-war paradigm (i) disproportionally focuses on citizenship entitlements without adequately obliging citizens to fulfil social duties;
and (ii) overemphasizes the welfare potential of state services at the expense of market and domestic contributions to individual well-being. These select points of convergence guide the development of an alternative social citizenship framework in Part III of the dissertation.

My analysis below prioritizes neoconservative critiques of the post-war welfare paradigm that are articulated in the Canadian context. Since neoconservatism in Canada has strong ties to political thinking in the United States where concerns about 'big government' bureaucracy and spending have resonated in American culture, I draw on important American texts to explore neoconservative indictments of post-war welfarism, especially works by Mead (1986; 1997). But Canada’s distinct political and institutional culture has meant that some elements of American neoconservatism factor less prominently in domestic political debates. In particular, the concern that an expansive state sphere has the potential to undermine the democratic foundations of society by imposing ‘unity of thought’ or ‘government control’ is less salient in Canadian political debates than it is south of the border (Teghtsoonian 1993). While this concern is not entirely absent in Canadian neoconservative work, rhetoric about state-imposed conformity tends to enjoy a more prominent place only in research that is less carefully argued.¹

Among Canadian neoconservatives, I engage primarily with the works of Courchene (1994a) and Richards (1997) who advance two of the most cogent and comprehensive neoconservative critiques of the Canadian welfare state. Both have been important intellectual architects for Canadian social policy in the past decade, exerting particular influence in terms of

¹ Gairdner's (1992) writing is one Canadian example where this line of rhetoric replaces reasoned argument. For instance, he (p. 10) writes that the “top-down concept” of Canadian welfarism “operates like a State magnet that hovers over the people, who are seduced, induced, and coerced to align themselves with it like iron filing on a table. All truth flows from one source, creating an enormous pressure for conformity, the homogenization of social attitudes, and a consequent fear of differences.” The B.C. branch of R.E.A.L. Women (1998) employs similar language to critique the B.C. Human Rights Commission. The article charges that the Commission’s concern to redress ‘historically disadvantaged’ groups is a “recipe for totalitarianism.” Similarly, Selick (1998), writing for the Fraser Institute, likens the concept of public child care with a “desire to achieve a state of Borg-like submissiveness” by institutionalizing “government control of the country’s children at ever younger ages.”
the delivery of income assistance for children, as well as to the evolution of fiscal federal relations. The federal government’s introduction of the Canada Child Tax Benefit and its heightened respect for ‘competitive federalism’ both track policy prescriptions advanced by Richards (1997, chapter 12, and 243-249) and Courchene (1994a, 154-155, 324; 1997).

The sophistication of Courchene’s and Richards’s analyses makes it challenging to identify their work with one political ideology over another. Thus, my characterization of Courchene and Richards as ‘neoconservatives’ is subject to debate, particularly in the latter case since Richards initially was a New Democratic Party member of the Saskatchewan legislature in the 1970s. Given that both men support the state’s role in fostering the social dimension of citizenship, some may prefer to align Courchene and Richards with the ‘third way’ articulated by Giddens (1999; 2000). However, I argue in section four that this classification would mischaracterize their work. The commonalities they share with Giddens reveal the growing consensus across the political spectrum on certain issues such as citizen duties and the welfare potential of the labour market and domestic sphere. Courchene and Richards nonetheless depart importantly from the third way because they give support for these increasingly accepted insights in the context of other commitments. These other commitments reflect strong neoconservative leanings, including (i) preference for a curtailed state role in social policy; (ii) hostility towards ‘special interests’; and (iii) a tendency to ignore the implications of the gender division of care.

\(^2\) However, the comment that opens Richards’s (1997, ix) important critique of the welfare state indicates that he has departed considerably from his earlier NDP political roots. In his words: “If you are not a socialist before age 40, the saying goes, you have no heart; if you are still a socialist after 40, you have no brains.”

\(^3\) For example, Richards (1997, 27, 29) strongly defends the position that “good social programs can dramatically enhance the quality of life in rich countries as much as in poor ones;” and that “[m]arkets by themselves [can]not ensure people a decent life.” Similarly, Courchene (1994a, 339) maintains that To be a Canadian in the next century must, among other things, mean that all citizens have access to a social infrastructure that allows them full opportunity to develop and enhance their skills and human capital in order that they be full participants in the Canadian and global societies. This is what the social policy blueprint is all about.

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1. Neoconservative State Restructuring

Neoconservative thinking has had a profound influence on the post-war paradigm of social citizenship by launching a new era of state and market restructuring in which citizens were asked to reduce their expectations of the welfare state. The resultant restructuring was an international phenomenon. During the 1980s, neoconservative policy practices were most visible in the United States, Britain and New Zealand (Brooks 1993, 146), but did not leave even Sweden's highly developed welfare state unaffected (Jenson 2000/1998, 12).

The efforts of senior Canadian governments to restructure state activity were somewhat more subtle in the 1980s than Reganomics and Thatcherism (Brooks 1993, 146). This subtlety was due in part to the nature of Canadian federalism, which permitted some economic conservative arguments to be presented in terms of respect for Constitutional jurisdiction and the conditions of national unity (Teghtsoonian 1993, 114), a theme I discuss in section four. By the mid-1990s, however, the pace of restructuring in Canada accelerated under the Chrétien Liberal government. The dramatic consequences resulting from two decades of neoconservative policy are now well documented. The discussion below is a brief thematic summary of welfare state restructuring, particularly since 1990. I append a footnote to each theme in order to provide references to more detailed discussions of specific policy trends.

Preoccupied with an impending deficit and debt 'crisis', the need to improve public finances became the main priority of all senior Canadian governments in the 1990s. One budget-balancing strategy saw federal and provincial governments privatize and deregulate crown corporations. The list of publicly run industries that were commercialized included Canadian National Railways, Teleglobe, Air Canada, Petro Canada, and the St. Lawrence Seaway.\(^4\)

\(^4\) For commentary on the privatization of crown corporations, see Cohen 1997; Shields and McBride 1997, 63; Stanford 1999, 391-392.
Almost all governments also cut spending on social programs. At the federal level, particularly dramatic spending cuts included the Mulroney Conservatives’ cap on the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) for Ontario, Alberta and BC; and the Chrétien Liberals’ 1995 budget, which replaced existing intergovernmental transfers for health care, post-secondary education and social assistance with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). While the cap on CAP reduced federal commitments to share 50/50 the cost of eligible social assistance programs with the three ‘have’ provinces, the CHST eliminated entirely intergovernmental transfers that required the federal government to match provincial and territorial expenditures. When first introduced, the CHST represented a $6 billion annual reduction in federal transfers to the provinces and territories, although some of this reduction has since been returned.

Spending reductions in turn powered a retreat from universality in favour of programs that provide benefits only to citizens with very low incomes. The decision to replace the federal universal family allowance and the child tax deduction with the targeted Child Tax Benefit in 1992-93 is an example of this trend (Banting, Beach and Betcherman 1994, 16). Further public expenditure reductions were achieved by extensive layoffs in the public sector. Ottawa reduced the size of the federal public service by more than 30,000 jobs between 1995 and 1998, while provincial governments targeted health care and social-service delivery for privatization, in part


7 For further analysis of the retreat from universality, see Brodie 1995, 61, 73-74; Brodie 1996; Brooks 1993, 147; McBride and Shields 1997, 25, 89; Boase 1996, 449; Workman 1996, 25.

due to their size in public budgets.\textsuperscript{9} Public sector downsizing had particularly harmful effects for women's employment since the post-war welfare state was an important source of good jobs for women and because women tend to occupy less senior positions with less job security.\textsuperscript{10} In addition, the privatization of caregiving-related social services positioned many women to function as 'shock absorbers' in response to state restructuring, shouldering much of the poorly paid and unpaid care labour devolved to the market, voluntary sector and private households.

The 1990s also witnessed Canadian governments make a concerted effort to mitigate social policy incentives that allegedly induce dependency on state social assistance. The Mulroney and Chrétien federal governments both revised unemployment insurance by lengthening qualifying periods, reducing the duration and value of benefits, and disqualifying persons who 'voluntarily' left jobs.\textsuperscript{11} The federal government also devolved administrative control over labour market training to the provinces (Haddow 1998), permitting provincial governments more latitude to institutionalize a shift from welfare to workfare strategies in which training and other related employment programs are compulsory upon claiming assistance.\textsuperscript{12} Simultaneously, a number of provincial governments sharply reduced social assistance


\textsuperscript{10} For discussion of the impact of public sector downsizing on women, see Armstrong 1997, 53; Armstrong 1996, 39; Brodie 1996, 126-127; Evans and Wekerle 1997, 4; Kline 1997, 333.

\textsuperscript{11} For information about the restructuring of unemployment insurance, see Armstrong 1997, 55; Evans 1997; McBride and Shields 1997, 91-96; Phillips 1995, 75.

\textsuperscript{12} For information about the transition from welfare to workfare, see Brodie 1995, 62; Brodie 1996, 138; Evans and Wekerle 1997, 12; McBride and Shields 1997, 90-91; O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 113; Price Boase 1996, 460-461.
benefits. The Klein government in Alberta was the first to slash welfare expenditures, but was soon emulated by the Mike Harris ‘Common Sense Revolution’ in Ontario, which imposed a 22 percent across-the-board cut in social assistance. The recently elected Liberal government in BC is about to engage in a comparable round of government cuts to welfare. Since women are more likely than men to receive income assistance and use social services, spending cuts to these policy envelopes disproportionately harm women and contribute to the increased feminization of poverty, especially among racialized, immigrant, single, elderly and disabled women.

In addition to launching an aggressive spending reduction agenda, neoconservative governments at the federal level sought to entrench a commitment to a smaller public sphere in the Constitution and in international trade agreements. While constitutional negotiations have been driven by an agenda expressed in the discourse of provincial jurisdiction and regional dissatisfaction, constitutional reform processes provided economic conservatives with an opportunity to introduce changes that reflect their political and economic agenda. For instance, in the Charlottetown round of negotiations, the Mulroney Conservatives announced 15 specific constitutional proposals to strengthen the free-market basis of the economic union, including the principle that no Canadian government can legitimately interfere with market relations.

Constitutional change ultimately proved beyond the reach of neoliberals. However, some commentators argue that the quid pro quo for dramatic transfer cuts to provinces under the

13 For analyses of social assistance reductions at the provincial level, see Kline 1997; Maslove and Moore 1996, 346; Philipps 1996b, 723; Boase 1996, 460-462; Richards 1997, 13.


15 For commentary about neoliberal constitutional proposals, see Brodie 1995, 18; Brodie and Smith 1998, 85-86; McBride and Shields 1997, chapter 5; Rocher and Nimijean 1995, 226.
CHST was a reduced federal role in the social policy envelope. The effect, it is alleged, is a quasi-constitutional change that will be difficult for the federal government to reverse if, and when, it is interested in re-exerting its influence over pan-Canadian social programming. There is some evidence that this evaluation is accurate. As the Chrétien Liberals' endeavoured to re-invest in social programming when Ottawa’s fiscal situation improved, the federal government increasingly relied on the tax system to deliver new expenditures. The fact that the tax system falls within federal jurisdiction may partly explain this trend, since it enables Ottawa to introduce new spending measures without having to engage in formal negotiations with the provinces.

Regardless of quasi-constitutional changes, the Mulroney Conservatives effectively institutionalized in supra-national trade agreements the very economic objectives they failed to constitutionalize. Both the FTA and NAFTA specifically require governments to ‘act solely in accordance with commercial considerations’, disregarding that one overarching point of public-sector activity is to provide goods and services in ways in which the private sector cannot or will not. This international requirement urges the privatization of public sector entities either wholly or in part, and includes the capacity to prohibit the introduction of public programs that did not exist before the trade agreements. Several commentators report that the empowerment of supra-national arbitration bodies by free trade agreements renders increasingly irrelevant the very state institutions that sometimes supported the ideas of equality for diverse groups of women and, in the case of minority ethnic women, their families during the 1970s and early 80s.

16 For further discussion of decentralization, see Banting 1998; Boismenu and Jenson 1998; Courchene 1994b; Dupré 1995, 395; Lazar 1998a, 8-10; Muszynski 1995, 309; Pal 1998, 6; Richards 1998; Vickers 1994, 144.

While the relevance of state institutions in the face of supra-national agreements remains a matter of debate, many of the earlier achievements of the women’s movement were rolled back and/or marginalized within the state as a result of domestic deficit reduction. As governments reduced program expenditures, they encountered state-subsidized groups opposed to their decisions. By the 1990s, many governments saw less value in funding their critics and therefore reduced funding for the public sector agencies that were at least nominally established to protect women’s interests within the state, including by dismantling the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Funding reductions for the intermediary institutions that provided women representation in the state were accompanied by spending cuts to the already minimally funded non-profit child care centres, women’s shelters and women’s job training programs.  

Neoconservative restructuring unfolded initially during a period of substantial public deficits. The fiscal climate provided the primary justification for restructuring: namely, that there was no other choice, we could no longer afford the post-war welfare regime. But the late-1990s brought a very different fiscal environment founded on solid economic growth, declining unemployment, and government surpluses in federal and some provincial coffers. The Ministry of Finance in 2000 projected a 5-year federal surplus of $106 billion (Hale 2000, 74).  

The size of the projected federal ‘fiscal dividend’ provided Canadians and their governments with a genuine choice about how best to proceed in terms of reorganizing the country’s commitment to social citizenship. The Liberals campaigned in 1997 on a 50/50 platform: half of any surplus would be re-invested as new spending; the other half allocated to

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19 The scope of the economic downturn in the U.S., particularly following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have forced finance representatives to re-evaluate the extent of the federal government’s ‘fiscal dividend’.
tax cuts and debt reduction. However, federal budgetary decisions in 2000 diverged sharply from this plan, allocating more than $100 billion to tax changes that will result in an average tax reduction of 21 percent by 2004-2005 (Government of Canada 2000b, chapter 5). The Ministry of Finance states proudly in its 2000 mini-budget that federal program expenditures as a percentage of GDP have fallen to 11.7 percent, the lowest level in more than 50 years and down from over 19 percent in the mid-1970s and 80s (Government of Canada 2000b, chapter 3). The Klein government in Alberta demonstrated a similar preference for tax cuts by introducing in 2001 the country's first single-rate or 'flat' tax. The Harris government in Ontario revealed still greater faith in the value of dramatic tax cuts by competing with Alberta to have the lowest personal income taxes in the country, incurring significant provincial deficits in the process. The Campbell government in BC is currently emulating the Harris tax plan by accepting very large deficits to power extensive personal and corporate income tax reductions in an effort to improve the province's competitiveness (Hale 2002, 331, Table 12.5). The BC Liberals have in turn used the resultant revenue shortfall to defend extensive expenditure cuts on the order of between 20 and 50 percent for all ministries other than Health and Education.

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20 This federal government figure overstates the extent of tax relief by roughly $9.5-billion since it includes revenue losses over the five year period associated with increasing the value of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures represent increased government spending rather than tax relief. The 2000 budget and mini-budget increased the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) by $7.845-billion, tax assistance for people with disabilities by $555-million, the Caregiver Credit by $100-million and the Education credit by $945-million (Government of Canada 2000b, chapter 5). In addition, the $100-billion figure also includes the revenue losses from restoration of full indexation of the personal income tax system (PIT). Full indexation prevents the real tax increases that would otherwise result from inflation, such as 'bracket creep' through which income is subject to higher tax rates even when real income or purchasing power does not increase; and the declining real value of tax credits, including the basic personal credit, spousal credit, CCTB and GST credit. Hale (2000, 75) lists the cost of restoring full indexation to the PIT at $4.5-billion between 2000 and 2005. While this technical change in 2000 may mean Canada's PIT now better approximates a normative tax system designed to subject only real income increases to higher rates of tax, the decision to fully index the PIT was just as much a policy option competing for funds from the 'fiscal dividend' as was the option to address problems with health care, education and other social services. Thus, the federal government's decision to restore full indexation to the PIT is a further indication of its primary concern to reduce the 'tax bite' rather than reinvest in social programs.
2. The Social Conservative Critique of Post-War Welfare

The restructuring described above has particularly strong economic conservative roots, which I document in sections three and four below. However, the restructuring is not fully appreciated without examining the support for institutional reorganization offered by social conservatism, particularly given the successful emergence in the 1990s of the Reform/Alliance Party that is home to a vocal social conservative constituency. Laycock (2002, 8) argues that the Reform party “did more than any other organized political force to push the Liberals, who took office in 1993 as a centralist and moderately free-spending government, into a decentralizing, fiscally conservative mould.” Therefore, this section examines the support for a fiscally conservative agenda that social conservatives provide by invoking their own versions of the charges that the post-war welfare regime (a) overemphasizes state welfare and (b) fails to adequately enforce citizenship duties. On one hand, the discussion reveals important points of convergence between some social conservative tenets and some feminist literature. On the other hand, it illuminates the significant role that social conservatism played in legitimizing government decisions to withdraw some social service provision in favour of transferring care labour back to private households, the volunteer sector and/or the market.

2a. The post-war emphasis on state welfare obscures domestic welfare contributions

The social conservative argument that the post-war paradigm overemphasizes state welfare invokes a number of themes that parallel closely various feminist insights by directing attention to the domestic sphere. For instance, many social conservatives underscore the value of unpaid caregiving work. Gairdner (1992, 9) describes raising one’s own children as “the most valuable of jobs.” Canadian Alliance MP, Gary Lunn (1999), claims that “parenting is one of our most important occupations that any Canadian can do.” R.E.A.L. Women of Canada (2001a)
argues that at-home parents “negate the need for outside day care services” and make “a long-term investment in the well-being of their children and in the future stability of the next generation.” Similarly, Smith (1997) charges that “the work of women in the home, as volunteers in the community, and as caregivers to the sick … elderly and… young, is ignored.”

Gairdner (1992, 67) and Berger and Berger (1983, 177) articulate another theme common among feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Collins (1994). They describe the family and household sphere as a sanctuary and place of protection. Although social conservatives do not typically acknowledge the racial discrimination that informs analyses of the household sphere by feminists of colour, the Bergers (1983, 177) nonetheless maintain that:

The tensions of modernization, even under relatively benign circumstances, are trying for the individual; the family is the most important institution in which the child is prepared to withstand these tensions and in which, later on, the adult is given the emotional support to continue withstanding them. While providing this stability, the bourgeois family at the same time cultivates individual independence and initiative—again, personality traits that are particularly important under conditions of rapid social change.

Gairdner (1992) and Smith (1997) allude to a third idea that also emerges from feminist analyses captured by Collins (1994): that participation in one’s sphere of personal relationships is a critical element of full membership in society. Gairdner (1992, 69), for example, describes the “home as our most intimate emotional space” and argues that public policy should enable individuals to spend more time among their nearest relations, especially when they are children. Smith (1997) in turn observes that some women “are very offended at social policy which denies them the option of being home with [their] children,” or denies their “dignity” and the “financial means” necessary for personal security when they work as full-time parents. By degrading the unpaid caregiver role, Smith (2001) remarks that post-war welfare state policy has pressured men and women to earn money without allowing time for the caregiving part of life. Stresses personally in terms of health and stresses nationally in terms of funding such care professionally have created what has become known as the ‘career-family dilemma’. It is evident economies in a healthy and democratic society must also give social status to and allow time for the non-waged obligations and commitments of adults.
Social conservatives further resemble some feminist positions by emphasizing the role of citizen duties in the context of the domestic sphere. According to Roche (1992, 115), social conservatives typically employ rights discourse only to claim “rights to assume profound responsibilities and duties” to familial relations. They understand citizens’ familial duties to include “those of husbands and wives, of parents and young children, and of mature children and old parents to respect and care for each other, ideally for life” (ibid.).

From a perspective attuned to family obligations, many social conservatives indict the post-war paradigm on the grounds that its preoccupation with state welfare actually obstructs citizens from fulfilling their private care-related responsibilities. However, the manner in which social conservatives typically articulate this charge demarcates a primary point of departure from feminists. As discussed in chapter three, one overarching feminist charge is that the post-war paradigm over-obligates women with family duties, ideologically constructing racially and economically privileged women as citizen-caregivers rather than citizen-workers. According to feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Pateman (1988), the problem is that the post-war paradigm is too permissive in regards to men, absolving men of the majority of care work in the domestic sphere. Similarly, for researchers who contribute to the literature linked to Collins (1994), the problem is not only that post-war welfarism obstructs some citizens from carrying out family duties, but also the patriarchal character of those duties.

By contrast, many social conservatives embrace, rather than question, the patriarchal division of labour. R.E.A.L. Women of Canada (2001a) argues that “women should have a genuine choice, financially and socially, to remain at home as full-time mothers, if they so choose, especially when their children are young.” The Bergers (1983, 205) “hope” that many
women “will come to understand that life is more than a career and that this ‘more’ is above all to be found in the family.” Novak (1987, 28) claims that “[i]n the best of all possible worlds... it is better for mothers to attend to their very young children wisely rather than work.” Gairdner (1992, 3, 55) identifies the “natural family” – “that immemorial unit of a married man and woman and their dependent children living together in the same home”21 – as “the basic social unit throughout human history.” He therefore describes as the “finest social accomplishment of the 19th century... its success in getting the women and children out of the factory, off the streets, and into the schools as well as the homes” (ibid., 8).

Social conservatives offer a number of reasons to support their preference for the patriarchal family structure. Gilder (1987, 22) implies that extensive labour force participation among wives contributes to marital and family breakdown. Following Gilder, Gairdner (1992, 8) alleges that a traditional marriage tames men, who otherwise might be “a confused and aimless, even dangerous, lot.” Seeking more defensible ground, Gairdner also argues that childrearing requires two parents performing distinct, but complementary, roles:

the total requirements of daily work to satisfy individual needs, earn income, and tend to our young cannot be handled by one. Teamwork is needed. Interdependence is needed. And the [patriarchal] family is, historically, the only social organization that has shown itself capable of fulfilling all these chores and duties (ibid., 90).

Gairdner (ibid., 305-310) and other social conservatives in turn invoke biology and anthropology to defend the claim that mothers are better suited to care. He (ibid., 333) contends “that nothing will ever replace even a poor mother, let alone a good one,” and rejects the claim that fathers are equally capable of nurturing children: “who are we kidding?” he asks. Paternal care is “not the same during infancy. It may not be the same at any time in a person’s life.” Similarly, the Bergers (1983, 152-153) concede that the “evidence... leaves open the theoretical

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21 The homophobic underpinnings of some social conservative positions are explicit in Gairdners’ work. He (1992, 59) argues that “[t]wo gays or lesbians claiming common law status or marriage can never be a natural family.”
possibility that a male could play the role of ‘mother figure’.” However, they argue that this possibility is “not too likely and for a simple reason: If such an arrangement were viable for the development of healthy infants, the vast variety of family arrangements in differing cultures would make one expect that it would have been successfully tried somewhere.” The Bergers (ibid., 156) therefore charge that the burden of proof in debates about the value of the patriarchal division of labour “rests on all proposals to deprive children of the intensive interaction with their mothers that for good reason, has been the norm throughout history.”

The B.C. branch of R.E.A.L. Women (1997) implies that critics of the patriarchal model who propose day care as an alternative cannot meet this burden. The organization claims “that non-parental care for more than 20 hours per week has a definite negative effect on children’s social and emotional development, behavioral adjustment and bonding.” Similarly, Gairdner (1992, 340) aligns child care services with crime, suggesting that children deprived of the opportunity to adequately bond with their mothers “are sociopaths in the making.”

Social conservative support for the ‘traditional’ family rests on a tendency to either deny, or downplay, the costs for women of the patriarchal division of labour. Gairdner (1992, 82) falls into the first category. He alleges that women exercise substantial power within heterosexual relationships, regardless of their financial resources. In his view, women know they can “bring men to heel by withholding what they wan[t] most: sex, the promise of marriage, children; in short, a culturally validated future for males.” He (ibid., 349) rejects the suggestion that women are oppressed “as intellectually vulgar,” claiming that Canadian women are “demonstrably the

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22 This conservative position is highly contested by evidence from neuroscience and longitudinal research. For instance, Norrie McCain and Mustard (1999, 7) report that “[t]he [neuroscience] evidence is clear that good early child development programs that involve parents or other primary caregivers of young children can influence how they relate to and care for children in the home, and can vastly improve outcomes for children’s behaviour, learning and health in later life. The earlier in a child’s life these programs begin, the better. These programs can benefit children and families from all socioeconomic groups in society.” Similarly, Lipps and Yiplong-Avila (1999) report evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth that indicates that children who participate in child care before age six more regularly enjoy greater success during the first years of elementary school.
best-fed, best-educated, most materially well-off group of women that has ever existed. And Canadian women live in one of the safest, most free nations.” The pervasiveness of male violence against women is exaggerated, Gairdner (ibid., 344), argues: “we have been successfully brainwashed by man-hating, politically motivated feminists to believe that men are the only violent members of society.” Finally, Gairdner (ibid., 327) contends that the women’s movement pursues “a false equality”: “there are no grounds whatever for the pivotal feminist claims that males and females are the same... [T]he immense amount of material on sex differences makes the continued respectability of feminism no less than a scandal” (ibid., 314).

More thoughtful social conservatives acknowledge the costs for women that flow from the patriarchal division of labour, but argue that the costs can be mitigated through policy changes that do not alter women’s positions as primary caregivers. For instance, Smith (1997) recommends tax policy changes to permit women who work in the home to be paid a salary by their husbands. She also advocates that ‘homemakers’ be added to the official list of professions so that mothers would become eligible for unemployment insurance as ‘working women’, as well as eligible to make contributions to the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. R.E.A.L. Women of Canada (2001b) propose similar policies. The organization maintains that if women are to have a genuine choice to “become full-time mothers, they must receive adequate income so as to enable them to exist without severe financial pressures and also with some personal financial security.” The adequacy and feasibility of these and other social conservative proposals to protect women from the costs of domestic specialization are examined in chapter six.

Convinced of the merit of the patriarchal division of labour, the social conservative charge that the post-war paradigm prioritizes state welfare assumes a second meaning: that welfare policy has come at the expense of traditional families and values. One version of this
argument depicts the taxation required to fund state welfare as an attack on traditional families. Gairdner (1992, 9) charges that “high taxes are driving both spouses, willing or not, into the work force, consigning countless children to paid third-party care.” Similarly, R.E.A.L. Women (1999) suggests that the “real cause” behind the pressure for mothers with young children to seek paid employment “is that Canada has a punitive income tax structure.” However, this line of critique ignores international evidence that shows Canada is below average among OECD countries in terms of the taxes that governments collect relative to GDP (Hale 2002, 20), as well as the roads, national security, public utilities, medical insurance, etc. that citizens would need to pay for privately if they were not paid for publicly through taxes (Brooks 1997).

A second version of the argument indicts the welfare state for imposing values upon individuals and families. The Bergers (1983, 207), for instance, reject the use of “government power to influence or control behaviour within the family.” At issue, the Bergers (1983, 212) insist is “the extent to which parents are to be trusted to make decisions on the affairs of their children,” regardless of their economic situation or educational status. “It is particularly odious, and empirically nonsensical,” they (ibid., 213) argue, “to think that poorer and less educated parents are to be trusted less in those matters.” The Bergers (ibid.) therefore recommend the following “general maxim”: “trust parents over against experts; the burden of proof against individual parents should be very strong indeed before the opposite choice is made” to privilege professionals claiming to represent the best interests of children.

The Bergers’ support for reinforcing parental authority relative to that of state regulatory and judicial bodies resembles another argument made by some feminists. Commenting on the impact of child welfare law on First Nations women, Kline (1995) questions the state’s tendency to impose on poorer families of colour values that reflect privileged social locations. She argues
that Canada’s child welfare systems prioritize white, middle-class expectations of motherhood, which discount the consequences of colonialist oppression and different cultural norms for the mothering practices of First Nations women. The result, she claims, is that child custody proceedings infused with a culturally and economically specific value-system inappropriately function “to construct many First Nations women as ‘bad mothers’, in the process of justifying the removal of their children and their subsequent placement in state care” (ibid., 119).

While sharing with some feminists a concern about the state’s encroachment on parental responsibilities and discretion, social conservatives typically identify feminism as one of the ‘perverse’ systems of value that state mechanisms are inappropriately imposing on families (Gairdner 1992, 296). Feminism has therefore emerged as a primary target of social conservative attacks. Failing to acknowledge the diversity of feminist views, some social conservatives caricature feminism by claiming that is not just a protest against select elements of “the contemporary role of women,” but “a reinterpretation of history” that is hostile to conventional morality, men, the traditional family and, worse still, children (Berger and Berger 1983, 25-28). The Bergers (ibid., 98-99, 120-122) perceive a commitment to “hyper-individualism” as the primary source of this hostility. On this view, the search for personal identity and self-fulfillment in isolation from communal definitions becomes the organizing theme of feminism. The Bergers (ibid., 25) in turn argue that feminism construes the family as a “major obstacle to… liberation,” repressing the individual’s quest for self-realization or failing to support it sufficiently. The alleged result is that feminism minimally undermines the spousal community and the mother-child bond. At its worst, feminism promotes fatherless families by maintaining that women can rear children in the absence of male assistance, while demonstrating disdain for children through enthusiasm for abortion and non-parental child care.
Allegedly informed by feminist thinking, some social conservatives charge that the expansion of state welfarism and the concomitant growth of ‘professionals’ who prioritize their expertise above the practices of ordinary individuals contributed to the demise of ‘traditional’ families and Christian values (Berger and Berger 1983, 176; Gilder 1987, 25). This disintegration is blamed for a number of social ills, including “juvenile delinquency and (increasingly) serious crime, drugs and alcoholism, suicide, a frenetic preoccupation with sexuality, mental disorders, and the appeal of fanatical cults” (Berger and Berger 1983, 160-161). Gilder (1987, 25, 23) adds that “a collapse of family discipline and sexual morality” is responsible for rising poverty, destructive males, and households headed by single mothers.

In response to perceived pressures on ‘traditional’ practices, many social conservatives lobby to “restore the autonomy of the family” (Berger and Berger 1983, 210). The Bergers (ibid.) maintain that “[t]his entails measures to empower families to take control of their own problems.” Renewed control, Gairdner (1992, 61-62) implies, would require the state to reverse the post-war trend which has witnessed the family lose “many of its functions” to paid teachers, social workers and health care professionals. The objective, social conservatives indicate, is to obligate citizens to fulfil private responsibilities of care that citizens owe not only their own family members, but the community more generally. From this perspective, the Bergers (ibid., 214) suggest that “[a] general direction of public policy should be to turn to other mediating structures (neighborhood, church, voluntary association, ethnic or racial subculture), if individual families are no longer able to cope, before there is recourse to professional or bureaucratic agencies of the ‘service delivery’.”
The social conservative lobby to permit citizens to care privately for their family and community provides a convenient justification for government decisions that reduce public expenditures by transferring care-related labour to the voluntary and domestic spheres. Kline (1997) finds that the Alberta government used this strategy to defend its decision to privatize the management and delivery of child welfare services to voluntary boards and local agencies with the intention of reducing the number of children and families dependent on public support. According to the Government of Alberta (1994), this “realignment of roles and responsibilities [would] let parents and communities do what they do best – care for children – and let government support change, define key results, and facilitate the process” (in Kline 1997, 331).

Similarly, Teghtsoonian (1993, 118-120) reveals that social conservative thinking exerted influence during federal parliamentary debates in which the Mulroney government abandoned its national child care commitment. She reports that Conservative MPs argued “strongly against a federal role in regulating child care services, insisting that ‘Canadians don’t want arbitrary standards to be forced upon them as if they did not know what is best for their children’” (ibid., 118). The influence of social conservative thinking also explains in part why provincial government support for child care has remained tepid outside of Quebec and dissipated in some provinces such as Ontario (Doherty, Friendly and Oloman 1998, 18-30). By prioritizing “parents’ right to make choices about how their children are raised” (Teghtsoonian 1993, 119), social conservatism constructs child care as an issue for which governments can leave responsibility primarily in the private sector without suffering a considerable loss of public support. Finally, the role of social conservatism in Canada provides insight into the Chrétien government’s changes to parental leave, its most significant reinvestment in family policy since
balancing the federal budget. The extension of the leave benefit period from six months to a year is consistent with social conservative values that favour mothers at home, especially since women represent 98 percent of maternity/parental leave claimants in Canada (Statistics Canada 2000, 109).

3. Economic Conservative Critiques of Post-War Welfare Dominated State Restructuring

While social conservative thinking factored importantly in justifying state restructuring over the past two decades, the institutional reordering described in section one was motivated predominantly by economic conservative critiques of the post-war regime. These critiques drew extensively from mainstream economic analysis on a variety of subjects, including the economic distortions and efficiency costs associated with high marginal tax rates, growing deficits and debts, and some income support programs, as well as the implications of the shift from resource-based to information- and service-based economies. The following discussion references some of the social science findings that underpin neoliberal interest in (a) retaining the scope of the public sphere, (b) citizen obligations, and (c) human capital. I conclude the section by drawing attention to connections between feminist and third way analyses and neoconservative research, revealing growing consensus about these three issues across partisan lines.

3a. Social science points to constraints on the size of the public sphere posed by high marginal tax rates, deficits and economic restructuring

In chapter two, I suggested that the predominantly class-based analysis implicit in the post-war approach to social citizenship is inclined to portray capitalism as "a system, not of equality, but of inequality" (Marshall 1964, 84). Richards (1997, 50) observes that this depiction of markets risks positioning defenders of the post-war regime so that they embrace a commitment to state welfare that expresses a "fundamental hostility to market behaviour." He

23 In chapter eight I discuss in detail the new universal child care program in Quebec as well as the federal government's extension of parental leave benefits.
identifies two problems with such hostility. First, proponents of post-war welfarism risk overlooking “that generous social programs require successful capitalist economies” (ibid., 25). Second, they risk obscuring the potential for redistribution to undermine the efficiency of economies, thereby limiting the welfare produced by labour and consumer markets, as well as the revenue available for public programming (ibid., 51; Roche 1992, 82). In particular, work popularized by Laffer reveals the possibility that reducing income tax rates that discourage the activity being taxed may lead individuals to work and earn more, with the result that government revenue actually rises (Auerbach and Feldstein, 1985). Consistent with this insight, Richards (1997, 5-8) links the “extent of redistributive taxation” in Sweden with the country’s falling GDP per capita compared to other industrialized countries to argue that “[a]gressive redistribution can... reduce economic productivity.”

Economic conservatives also argue that the adverse consequences for economic efficiency potentially yielded by aggressive government redistribution are exacerbated by political and bureaucratic failures. While not problems specific to the post-war paradigm, neoliberals often imply that the effects of government error are more pronounced as the size of the public sphere expands in response to the tendency to “attach so little moral legitimacy to private market activity” (Richards 1997, 51). First among political failures that concern most economic conservatives is “debt denial” (ibid.). Blinder (1987, 5) reports that “there was a broad consensus” among economists in the early 1980s “that massive government deficits would keep real interest rates very high, thereby creating an unfavourable climate for investment” that would limit economic growth. Richards (1997, 65) observes that politicians who disregarded this economic evidence suffered from what he terms “Opportunistic Keynesianism.” Such policy makers “sin by omission,” ignoring “the politically painful half of fiscal stabilization: that
governments must run fiscal surpluses to dampen the inflationary potential of economic booms and to maintain the financial capacity to run deficits during recessions.” The result is the repeated deficits and ballooning debt-service charges that “squeez[ed] the fiscal resources required for other programs” in federal and provincial governments between the 1970s and 1990s (Richards 1998, 74). Richards (ibid.) suggests that the time it took for politicians to overcome ‘debt denial’ exacerbated the challenges confronting Canada’s public sphere and forced more severe spending reductions than would otherwise have been necessary.

In addition to social science evidence suggesting the adverse effects of aggressive redistribution and ‘debt denial’, Courchene (1994a, 5, 152, 238) argues that the case for restructuring is stronger still because the post-war regime is inadequate for the contemporary economic context. He observes that policy makers in the 1950s and 60s presumed continuous economic growth would power welfare state expansion, while full employment would limit welfare and UI caseloads. Welfare recipients were envisioned to be unemployable and unemployment insurance was instituted to support citizens who temporarily lost jobs during the downturn in business cycles. Against this welfare policy backdrop, he argues that the country was able to become a high wage economy in large part because of Canada’s extensive resource endowment that governments buttressed with a system of tariffs that provided considerable protection for Canadian products and inter-provincial trade.

By the 1970s, however, Courchene (1994a, 4-5) observes that these structural features started to dissipate and now no longer describe the contemporary context confronting Canada. Sustained economic growth ceased to be the norm. Unemployment rose to double-digits and has since not dropped much below 7 percent after years of sustained economic growth. Tariff barriers have fallen, and globalization is fostering the transition to knowledge-based economies.
This contextual shift, Courchene (1994a, 318) argues, places far more stringent fiscal constraints on the state than existed in the first post-war decades since policy makers can no longer count on sustained and rapid economic growth to power expansion of the welfare state (see also Richards 1997, 12-13). The implication is that governments must acknowledge an “environment of fiscal restraint” (Courchene 1994a, 318). Given that “Canada’s fiscal predicament [was] nothing short of staggering,” Courchene concludes that “[a]ll policy areas, social policy included, [had to] make their contribution to restoring Canada’s fiscal integrity” (ibid.).

3b. Social science identifies ‘transfer dependency’ and highlights the value of re-emphasizing citizen duties

Whereas the first economic conservative critique argues that an extensive public sphere exerts a dampening influence on the economy and, thus, exacerbates poverty while limiting the state revenue available to redress this problem, Roche (1992, 83) observes that neoliberals advance a second charge that suggests post-war welfarism is “positively dysfunctional in welfare terms.” This second charges draws on social science evidence to claim that the structure of post-war programming entrenches poverty by inducing citizenry dependency on social transfers.

Mead (1986) is especially effective at articulating this second line of critique in the United States. He charges that American “programs that support the disadvantaged and unemployed have been permissive in character, not authoritative… [T]hey have given benefits to their recipients but have set few requirements for how [recipients] ought to function in return” (ibid., 1). Particularly harmful, Mead (ibid., 3) suggests, is that “government programs have given [the message] that hard work in available jobs is no longer required of Americans.” If employment conditions are disagreeable or remuneration too low, passive employment insurance and welfare programs relieve citizens of the responsibility to work. This failure to obligate benefit recipients does the disadvantaged a disservice, Mead (ibid., 12) maintains, by
“undercutting” incentives to acquire “the competencies [they] need to achieve status” and social belonging. The result, he concludes, is a population of social assistance recipients who are permitted to remain dependent on the largesse of the public sphere, rather than strive for self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

Canadian neoliberals articulate similar concerns. For instance, Richards (1997, 144-5) notes that between 1971 and 1992, “repeat users became an increasingly important share of UI beneficiaries. The probability that a repeat user... would initiate a claim in any year grew from approximately 50 percent in 1972 to a peak of 80 percent in the mid-1980s.” Similarly, Courchene (1994a, 36) reports that “in two New Brunswick counties, 100 percent of two-earner households accessed UI at some time during 1992 and the ratio was well above 90 percent for many other counties in Atlantic Canada.” The problem is not solely a regional problem. Across the country, he claims, the “tourist industry in all provinces is now geared to the existence of UI:” workers put in the sufficient hours during the tourist season to draw on unemployment insurance during off-peak periods. On the West coast, the concept of “Fishing for stamps” signals the same trend whereby some fishers work only the time required to qualify for social assistance and UI benefits. What these examples indicate, Courchene concludes, is the pervasiveness of “transfer dependency” in Canada. Canadians must therefore “be prepared to contemplate that government largesse, at least as embodied in the current nature of our transfer envelope, is part of the problem rather than part of the solution” (ibid., 43;).

Courchene (1994a 29-30) is careful not to blame individuals who fall subject to the ‘welfare trap’. “[O]ver time,” he allows that “transfer dependency has proved to be pervasive enough to alter values and lifestyles.” But the problem ultimately reflects a “system dysfunction” that does “not... relat[e] to the character of individuals that may get caught in these
transfer-dependency syndromes.” The essence of the welfare trap, Courchene argues, is that the post-war welfare regime institutionalized incentives that have for decades interrupted the adjustment processes of the national economy, including inter-regional migration among the un(der)employed. This interference “was bound to serve to entrench and, in many cases, exacerbate the pre-existing degree of disparity [between citizens]” since “[b]y and large, [benefit claimants] have acted entirely rationally in the face of a wholly inappropriate set of incentives.”

Neoliberals typically cite at least three system failures inherent in Canadian post-war welfare programming. Overly generous benefits often top the list. For instance, Richards (1997, 158) attributes much of the significant rise in welfare caseloads in Ontario during the 1980s and early 1990s to increasingly valuable welfare benefits in the province. Tax rates for people leaving welfare or UI in favour of employment is a second significant concern emphasized by both Courchene (1994a, 154) and Richards (1997, 269). Courchene reports that “average tax rates in the transition from welfare to work frequently tend to be confiscatory by exceeding 100 percent. This is especially true when one adds in the ‘non-cash’ components of welfare, such as free drugs, subsidized housing, and so on.” Finally, Courchene (1994a, 154) also singles out welfare benefits for children as a particularly problematic structural failure. Using 1992 data for Ontario, he observes that employable single adults received $7,804 annually, whereas a single parent with one child received $15,772, with two children $18,864, and with three children $22,365. Comparable after-tax incomes from employment in the same year demanded annual salaries of $7,350, $18,425, $22,800, and $29,625 respectively. The market-income equivalencies were higher still among welfare recipients benefiting from subsidized housing, amounting to more than $32,000 for a single parent with three children. Courchene’s point is that “[f]ew single parents on welfare can step into the workforce and command a $32,000
income. In effect, therefore, the so-called welfare trap is really due to the presence of children and how they are treated under welfare” (ibid.).

The system failures that allegedly induce transfer dependency mark the point of departure for many economic conservative visions of social citizenship. In particular, Mead, Richards, and Courchene ask that we reassess the nature and place of social duties in our conception of modern welfare states (Roche 1992, 73). According to Mead (1986, 6), attention to social obligations must extend beyond a commitment to “paying taxes, obeying the law, or serving in the military.” He argues that social order “also requires that people function well in areas of life that are not directly regulated,” including the fulfillment of expectations that others hold about our roles as workers on the job, as neighbours, or as strangers in the streets. This expectation “requires not only self-discipline but activity and competence.” Mead advocates a social order in which the population is encouraged to cultivate “those habits of mutual forbearance and reliability which we call civility,” habits that are premised on “the capacities to learn, work, support one’s family, and respect the rights of others.” The attainment and exercise of these capacities constitute what Mead terms “a set of social obligations” that citizens incur in addition to our political duties.

Mead’s vision of social order has specific consequences for welfare policy design. Foremost is the expectation that social programming “complement welfare rights with obligations, both of them legally codified” (Mead 1997, 222). The concepts of a social contract and reciprocity are at the core of this alternative vision of state welfarism, displacing entitlement as the leading maxim. “The idea,” Mead (ibid., 221) explains, “is that the needy should receive aid, but only in return for some contribution to the society and not as an entitlement.”

For many economic conservatives, the most important obligation that social policy must enforce is the duty to work. Marshall (1964, 118-119) recognized this duty in his initial research
on social citizenship, calling upon each citizen to “put one’s heart into one’s job and work hard.” But the commitment to a protestant work ethic implicit in Marshall’s position is elevated to a new status in the research of economic conservatives like Richards, Courchene and Mead who advocate the transition from welfare to ‘workfare’ or ‘training-fare’. According to Richards (1997, 257), “programs designed to aid the able-bodied unemployed should impose work and/or training conditions on the receipt of income transfers and should not accommodate long-term transfers to individuals if financial need is the only presenting problem.” Given “what is known about social pathologies arising from long-term transfer dependence and the skills lost from extended unemployment,” he (ibid., 275) argues that transfer programs which fail to institutionalize work requirements “pose serious disadvantages” (on this point, see also Courchene 1994a, 327). The underlying assumption of economic conservatives is that labour force participation signals a citizen’s commitment to the reciprocal obligations of social citizenship, thus entitling the person to social benefits. Mead (1986, 244) summarizes the assumption as follows. Once adults are “making an honest effort to support their families, that is enough to justify at least some assistance. Indeed, since work is the strongest social obligation, the mere fact of working establishes a strong presumptive claim to assistance.”

Mead (1986, 10) concedes that workfare may at first seem punitive, “nothing more than an elaborate way of ‘blaming the victim’. But he argues that proponents of social citizenship must recognize that transfer dependency has become pervasive partly because “social programs... expect too little of their recipients, not too much.” By obstructing the implementation of reciprocal expectations about how benefit recipients must function to earn public assistance, Mead maintains that “exaggerated fears of victim-blaming” do not help the poor, but become “a leading cause of dependency.” Richards (1997, 260) agrees, arguing that:
Untied aid for the poor – such as long-term welfare – is a poisoned chalice. It has encouraged the poor to accept and even pursue extended periods without work, contrary to their own long-term interests, and it has damaged the stability of communities that have come to depend on transfers as the dominant source of income.

Thus, from the economic conservative perspective, workfare is not so much a measure by which the state blames those who deviate from societal expectations as it is a means to “persuade them to blame themselves” (Mead 1986, 10; italics in original). Acceptance of personal responsibility emerges for neoliberals as a critical criterion for genuine social inclusion and equality. This is especially evident in the work of Mead. Commenting on the United States, he argues that “true acceptance in... society requires” that citizens face and fulfill social requirements, “such as work” (1986, 4). He adds that “American equality seems to entail common obligations, not only rights” (ibid., 239). Accordingly, post-war welfare “programs infringe equality in this sense as much as they serve it. They raise the income of the needy, but they also exempt them from work and other requirements that are just as necessary for belonging” (ibid., 12). The resulting social exclusion that accompanies passive social assistance means that work requirements for welfare recipients no longer seem so punitive. Instead, Mead (ibid., 240) suggests their underlying “moral” motivation becomes salient. Linking work requirements to social assistance is not simply an expression of the state’s “self-interest” in retaining expenditures, but a moral project designed to “to ensure, for their own benefit and others’, that recipients do in fact discharge the common obligations of citizenship.”

3c. The shift from a resource-based to a knowledge-based economy suggests the need to prioritize human capital

Implicit in some neoliberals’ position that unemployed citizens should perform work or training as a condition of social assistance is the insight that the diminution of resource-based

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24 While Mead’s analysis is about the United States, neoliberal thinkers in Canada are positioned to make similar arguments given that the electorate in many Canadian provinces, most notably Alberta and Ontario, have sanctioned through re-election provincial governments that have experimented with workfare.
industries and the expansion of the information sector elevates the importance of ‘human capital’ for personal security, including investments in education, training and work-experience. Courchene (1994a, 234) notes that a policy orientation organized around ‘human capital’ was “not viewed as essential to our prosperity in an era when high school dropouts could earn ‘middle-class’ incomes in the forests, mines or energy sector.” But he argues that the concept must now play a much more significant role given that burgeoning welfare caseloads increasingly include beneficiaries who are able to work and as the resource sector consistently produces fewer high-paying jobs for low-skilled labour. Therefore, Courchene (ibid.) recommends that Canada must move beyond a “resource-based mentality to a human-capital mentality.” He urges that the top priority for social policy reform process should be to design “a set of programs geared to ensure that individual Canadians have both access and opportunity to enhance their skills and human capital” (ibid., 240), since this form of capital will be the key that enables citizens to function as “full participants in the Canadian and global societies” (ibid., 339). Richards (1997, 264) articulates a similar position. He argues that “[a] crucial component [of future social policy] should be a political commitment to fund generous, lifetime training programs for all” and recommends that training “for nonprofessionals should be subsidized as generously as is university training for those pursuing professional careers.”

The call for governments to expand life-long learning programs signals that the economic conservative vision of restructuring articulated by Richards and Courchene does not just entail spending reductions. Although cost-cutting on the social policy front is necessary given fiscal constraints confronting the welfare state, state “restructuring” is necessary to prevent full “erosion” of the welfare system (Courchene 1994b, 111; see also Richards 1997, 38). Therefore, according to Courchene, extensive cuts must power some reinvestment in policy envelopes that
have become more pressing with the ‘knowledge-economy revolution’. Specifically, he thinks that “social policy re-emerges as an indispensable factor since, in an era where knowledge is at the cutting edge of competitiveness, social policy as it relates to human capital and skills formation becomes indistinguishable from economic policy” (1994a, 233).

While recent state restructuring successfully institutionalized the neoconservative concern with fiscal prudence that resulted in substantial cuts to passive social assistance and unemployment measures, senior Canadian governments have so far only appropriated rhetoric associated with human capital strategies without reinvesting in this policy envelope. For instance, former HRDC Minister, Jane Stewart, affirms that “[t]he quality and quantity of Canadians’ skills will primarily determine Canada’s future competitiveness and quality of life” (Scoffield and McCarthy 2001, A4). But substantial federal commitments of new funding for training and skills initiatives remain a matter of policy discussion in government white papers (ibid.).

Similarly, at the provincial level, government commitment to human capital acquisition dissipated considerably as public spending per student in postsecondary education fell by roughly 30 percent between 1980 and 1998 (Banting 2001).

The failure of senior Canadian governments to reinvest significantly in skills acquisition from revenue saved from cuts to other social policy envelopes reveals the importance of distinguishing between theoretical proponents of a particular political-ideological position and the governments whose policies are partially and imperfectly informed by them. In this case, the distinction raises questions about the sustainability of the newly restructured welfare regime. The present welfare system implies a diminished commitment to social citizenship in Canada even in respect of the economic conservative vision articulated by Courchene and Richards, a

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25 Banting (2001, 14) notes that “[r]ecent federal initiatives, such as the Millennium Scholarships, Canada Research Chairs and tax incentives for educational savings point to modest reinvestment in advanced education. But such initiatives are not strong enough to reverse the general evolution in the sector, and pressures are likely to grow.”
fact that Banting (2001, 14) projects will motivate recurring political challenges. In particular, Banting (ibid.) anticipates that there is likely to be an intense interest in education and other human capital policy in the future because cuts to education and training budgets have resulted in increasingly unequal access to opportunities to acquire relevant skills. He reports "initial evidence of a widening gap in participation [in postsecondary education] by young people from families with different socio-economic status" since the mid-1980s (ibid., 10). According to Banting (ibid., 14), if these "early indications of increasingly unequal participation in advanced education are confirmed over time, politicians are likely to reap a whirlwind created by aspirations they themselves helped to nurture" by invoking arguments about the importance of human capital for personal security in an increasingly knowledge-based economy.

3d. Select points of convergence between feminist, third way and neoliberal research

The paradigm shift advocated by economic conservatives such as Richards and Courchene asks Canadians to rethink sources of security that are available in the contemporary context. Their commitment to education, training and workfare implies that social security should no longer be viewed primarily as protection from market operations, but the capacity to participate in, and adapt to, markets that shift in response to global pressures. At a conceptual level, Banting (2001, 4-5) summarizes the shift in thinking as the transition from understanding "security as protection from change, to [viewing] security as the capacity to change."

This construction of social security parallels closely one position held by feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Pateman (1988, 179-209). This literature argues that women's autonomy and personal security is enhanced considerably by sustained participation in the paid labour force. While the primary neoliberal focus on transfer dependency diverges from the primary feminist concern about women's right to be appropriately commodified (Orloff
1993a), both schools of thought include researchers who share a concern to restructure Canada’s social citizenship framework to acknowledge the welfare potential of labour markets. Despite distinctly different political objectives, some economic conservatives and feminists acknowledge the need for the social policy envelope to integrate a new analytic dimension that monitors the degree to which state institutional arrangements entice or discourage employment. Some neoliberals even concede the feminist insight that child care poses a barrier to labour force participation for many women. For instance, Mead (1997, 224) argues that the successful “implementation of work enforcement means spending lavishly on child care and other support services for the recipients required to work, although the cost is more than recouped in effective programs due to caseload reductions.” Similarly, Courchene (1994a, 82) states:

I believe that day care is a policy whose time has finally arrived. It is much easier to rationalize day care in the emerging knowledge based society than in the former resource-based society, since one can make human capital formation arguments for parents and children alike. However, it is a big ticket item and the only way that we can probably afford even a limited system is in the context of a wholesale restructuring of the existing social envelope.

The economic conservative vision articulated by Courchene and Richards parallels even more closely some insights that characterize the third way advanced by Giddens (1999; 2000). For instance, Giddens (1999, 65; italics in original) suggests that the “prime motto” for the third way is the position “no rights without responsibilities.” This position entails a commitment that “[u]nemployment benefits... should carry the obligation to look actively for work” (ibid.). Governments must therefore ensure that “welfare systems do not discourage active search [for employment]” (ibid.) by retaining incentives that induce transfer dependency (ibid., 114-115). In keeping with this view, Giddens (ibid. 117; italics in original) concurs with Courchene and Richards that “investment in human capital” should replace “direct provision of economic maintenance” “wherever possible.” Again like Courchene and Richards, Giddens (2000, 57) concedes that “there is no doubt that in many countries the state, national and local, became too
large and cumbersome.” He therefore cites social science evidence (ibid., 97-100) to conclude that “[i]t is no longer feasible, or desirable, to have very steeply graduated income tax of the sort that existed in many countries up to thirty or so years ago” (ibid., 97)

4. The Divide Between Economic Conservatism and Third Way Politics

The similarities between Richards and Courchene, on one hand, and Giddens, on the other, may incline some to reject my classification of the former as economic conservatives in favour of aligning their respective views with the third way. This classification may seem all the more appropriate given that Richards and Courchene sanction substantial reinvestment in human capital measures with revenue saved from cutbacks on other policy fronts, a trajectory that Canadian neoconservative governments have resisted to date. While the divergence between actual policy and the prescriptions of Richards and Courchene reveals that they do not support the degree to which many governments have retracted the public sphere, this recognition alone is not sufficient reason to characterize their visions of social citizenship as an example of third way politics. I argue instead that Courchene and Richards articulate insights shared by the third way, but do so in a broader neoconservative theoretical context that gives voice to positions that depart significantly from third way thinking. I focus on three points of divergence to further define economic conservatism in this section. The first (a) is the extent of Courchene’s and Richards’s interest in confining the public sphere, especially at the federal level. This interest is in turn supported by (b) a willingness in Richards to pathologize ‘special interests’, and (c) a tendency for both thinkers to ignore the implications of the gender division of care labour.

4a. The scope of the state’s role in social policy

The themes of human capital acquisition and workfare that dominate the vision of restructuring advanced by Richards and Courchene are also important in work by Giddens. But
Giddens warns against limiting the state's role only, or even primarily, to these policy fronts. For instance, while he acknowledges that “[i]nvestment in education is an imperative of government today,” Giddens (1999, 109-110) argues that “the idea that education can reduce inequalities in a direct way should be regarded with some scepticism. A great deal of comparative research, in the US and Europe, demonstrates that education tends to reflect wider economic inequalities and these have to be tackled at the source.” Similarly, he critiques workfare on the grounds that “[r]educing benefits to force individuals into work pushes them into already crowded low-wage labour markets,” whereas “[i]nvolve[ment] in the labour force, and not just in dead-end jobs, is plainly vital to attacking involuntary exclusion” (ibid., 110).

In addition to these critiques, Giddens (2000, 33) argues against reducing state welfare to a ‘safety net’ of last resort that faithfully awaits the “trickle-down effects” of economic growth. He advocates instead in favour of “a welfare system that benefits most of the population” in order to “generate a common morality of citizenship.” As he warns, “[w]here ‘welfare assumes only a negative connotation, and is targeted largely at the poor, as has tended to happen in the US, the results are divisive” (Giddens 1999, 108). In addition, the third way vision of social citizenship is concerned to “foste[r] psychological as well as economic benefits” (Giddens 1999, 117). On this view, state provision of income support is rarely sufficient. Fighting poverty becomes part of a broader project of “community building” that “concentrate[s] upon the multiple problems individuals and families face, including job quality, health and child care, education and transport” (ibid., 110). Such a citizenship regime demands that “welfare expenditure remain at European rather than US levels,” switching when necessary from passive to active income support measures to mitigate transfer dependency (ibid., 122).

As of 1997, total tax revenue collected by Canadian governments is 36.8 percent of GDP, just slightly below the OECD average of 37.2 percent, and considerably lower than the European Union average of 41.5 percent. The
A comparable commitment to a strong welfare state is not obvious in the work of Richards (1997, 257-266) or Courchene (1994a, 233; 1994b, 114) who argue for reinvestment in social policy primarily because, and only where, it "holds the key to regaining [Canada's] competitive edge" in the global economy (ibid.). For Courchene and Richards, reinvestment in social programming appears largely conditionally valuable as a means to reinforce economic growth, rather than intrinsically important for fostering social inclusion or minimizing inequality. This perspective is consistent with organizing restructuring around measures that promote workfare, which supply low-skill labour for the growing service sector, and human capital acquisition, which cultivate skilled labour to service the knowledge-based sector.

Richards's analysis of the 1995 federal budget further implies a weaker role for the public sphere than Giddens envisions. Richards (1998, 80) suggests that the resultant 17 percent per capita reduction in federal program expenditures projected for 1998-99 was not "draconian" and did not "threaten the health of Canadian social programs." This position departs from Giddens's view that welfare expenditures should remain at European rather than American levels. Compared to maximum levels in 1990-94, Canadian program spending measured as a share of GDP fell by 9.6 percent by 1999. This reduction well surpassed roughly 6 percent reductions in Britain and Ireland; 4 percent reductions in Italy and the US; and reductions of less than two percent in France and Germany (Hale 2002, 234, Table 9.4). While Finland and Sweden reduced expenditures more significantly than Canada, their levels of program expenditure as a share of GDP remain 10 and 17 percent higher than in Canada (ibid.).

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Canadian figure, however, is significantly higher than the US figure of 29.7 percent (Hale 2002, 20, Table 1.2). By the end of the 1990s, program spending in Canada reached a low of 36.4 percent of GDP, comparable to Britain at 36.9 percent, but well below Sweden at 53.5 percent, France at 49.3 percent, Finland at 45.6 percent, Germany at 44.3 percent, and Italy at 41.0 percent. In contrast, the US figure is only 27.3 percent (ibid., 234, Table 9.4).
The commitment to a smaller state role in social policy that I attribute to Richards and Courchene compared to Giddens cannot be corroborated by finding “rhetorical flourishes” in their work that invoke the risks of ‘big government’ for individual liberty or the foundation of democracy that are sometimes heard in the United States. However, Teghtsoonian (1993, 114) observes that conservatives in Canada have not needed to pursue their agendas in such an “obviously ideological manner” because the pervasiveness of debates about federalism allows them to tap into alleged “structural constraints” to further limit the size of the public sphere. The primacy of jurisdictional issues and regional politics in Canadian social policy forums has been observed by Simeon (1994). He argues that the Constitution and related issues of national unity tend to overshadow or ‘trump’ debate about substantive policy issues; and that questions of distribution which in other advanced countries might be approached in terms of class or economic sectors are assessed in Canada primarily in terms of distribution across provinces or regions. This character of Canadian politics provides a forum for advocates of smaller government to appeal to “constitutional sensitivities” and jurisdictional constraints to urge a reduction in government, particularly at the federal level (Teghtsoonian 1993, 114).

Consistent with Teghtsoonian’s analysis, Courchene and Richards utilize fiscal federal issues to advocate that Ottawa’s spending and policy role should be reduced. For instance, Courchene (1997) developed for the Ontario government his now much discussed ACCESS (A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems) that proposes responsibility for social policy should be shifted entirely to the provinces, along with the federal tax points that currently co-finance health care, education, and social services. In his view:

In order to create and integrate our “national” social policy network in the 50s and 60s, Ottawa needed to play an overarching role. And central to this role were the development of the various shared-cost programs and the evolution of our comprehensive equalization program. As these social programs matured and became ‘established’, it was only natural to shift funding from a conditional (shared-cost) basis to unconditional grants. Now that social Canada is in need of
restructuring in the face of a variety of forces (economic, fiscal, demographic, etc.), the roles of the two orders of government in this renewed process are now radically altered. Specifically, apart from providing certain social services to First Nations, Ottawa is not really a player in the social policy design and delivery game (ibid., 81).

Richards (1997, 250) supports this analysis, conceding that "[h]istorically, conditional transfers to the provinces played a role in accelerating provincial adoption of certain social programs in the 1960s and 70s." But he argues that "[t]he relevant programs are now well established, and there are no sound policy arguments for major intergovernmental transfers beyond equalization."

Underlying the description of conditional transfers which evolved ‘naturally’ into block transfers that in turn must give way to ‘radically altered’ roles for the two orders of government is an inaccurate linear understanding of the evolution of Canadian social programming. The suggestion that the defining features of Canada’s social safety net are already in place rules out the possibility that the essentials of Canada’s social programming network are incomplete or in flux: that in addition to health care, education, and welfare, a further system of programming needs to be entirely developed, rather than simply ‘restructured’ to emphasize workfare and human capital acquisition. But, as Arneil (2000, 2-3) remarks, for diverse groups of Canadians, particularly disparate groups of women and children, independence and integration into the mainstream of social, economic and political life remains intimately tied to the presence or absence of social policy that effectively responds to racialized, classist, gendered and other systemic forces. In contrast to the view of Courchene and Richards, the fact remains that only Ottawa is positioned to address these systemic forces on a national scale as they interact with, and contribute to, the evolution of family structures, families’ financial requirements, and labour market trends. I return to this theme in Part III of the dissertation.
4b. Disqualifying alleged 'special interests'

The support that Giddens (1999, 47-48) offers for a strong public sphere reflects a long list of roles that he argues “[g]overnment exists to” perform. First on his list is the provision of “means for the representation of diverse interests” and “a forum for reconciling the competing claims of these interests.” The prominence that Giddens assigns the state’s role in representing diverse group viewpoints flows directly from his list of “third way values” that prioritize “equality” and “protection of the vulnerable” (ibid., 66). Equality, for Giddens (ibid. 102-103), is understood in terms of “inclusion,” which, among other things, “refers to opportunities and to involvement in public space.” This concern to ensure equal involvement in public space implies a state responsibility to provide marginalized social groups with the resources and opportunities necessary to voice their perspectives.

In contrast to this third way concern, Laycock (2002, 10) argues that neoconservatives “construc[t] a new story about the people’s enemies, a story based on a redefinition of ‘special interests’.” Whereas earlier movements on the left “portrayed as ‘special interests’, opposed to the interests of ‘the people’, various private-sector corporate groups and the political parties they funded,” contemporary neoconservatives “define as ‘special interests’ groups that support the welfare state, oppose major tax cuts, and propose that social resources should be allocated on the basis of non-market principles” (ibid.). This redefinition of ‘special interests’ underpins “a very effective campaign to redefine equality” in a way “that encourages ‘ordinary’ people to see themselves as victims of the machinations of special interests and state elites, neither of which can be effectively held accountable” (ibid., 10-11). ‘Ordinary’ citizens are threatened by the inclusion of ‘special interests’ in the policy arena because the former have “no such ‘special’ representation” (ibid. 38). ‘Special interests’ therefore ask to be “undeserving beneficiaries of...
state action" by deviating from an understanding of equality that would only see “all citizens... equally subject to the same laws, rules and benefits” (ibid., 10-11).

Richards’s work is consistent with this broader neoconservative tendency to pathologize so-called ‘special interests.’ He argues that one of the “three disastrous syndromes” from which defenders of the post-war welfare regime suffer is “[a]n unqualified identification with the claims of particular interest groups against society at large” (Richards 1997, 50-51). The expansion of the post-war welfare paradigm, he claims, was “accompanied by the growth of interest groups intent on defending specific programs. Their effect is to render extraordinarily difficult the exercise of Cabinet discretion – at either the federal or provincial level – in the field of social policy” (Richards 1994, 358). In his indictment of ‘interest groups,’ Richards focuses primarily on “public sector unions,” “associations of contracted workers,” “groups representing beneficiaries of major transfer programs,” including seniors and seasonal workers, and “regional alliances in ‘have-not’ provinces” (ibid., 359; 1997, 176-184).27 However, he also implicates “women’s groups” and groups concerned with the rights of “gays and aboriginals” (1997, 54).

By disqualifying the legitimacy of ‘special interests’ and their role in the policy-development process, Richards conveys a vision of citizenship that further limits the boundaries of the public sphere by discounting the need for the state to give voice to less powerful group perspectives. Jenson and Phillips (1996) reveal that this analytical approach has been institutionalized by the Mulroney and Chrétien federal governments, as well as advocated by the Reform/Alliance Official Opposition Party, in the form of a “full-scale assault on the legitimacy and credibility of advocacy groups” under the guise “that the only legitimate representational

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27Courchene (1994a, 195-197) raises the same issues in his work by citing Richards’s research. However, Courchene’s language is much more muted than Richard’s rhetoric, and Courchene does not extend his concern with “vested interests” to include women’s groups, or groups that prioritize the rights of gays and aboriginals.
form is a direct link between individuals and their MPs.” (ibid., 124). The results of this attack included the de-funding of state institutions that nominally represented women’s interests in the government as well as women’s non-governmental advocacy groups and women’s programs, a theme discussed in section one. The pejorative reconstruction of ‘special interests’ also resulted in changes to the format of public consultations organized by federal and provincial governments that severely limit opportunities for group representation other than from a narrow set of business community voices (ibid., 126-127; Laycock 2002, 36).

The growing state antagonism for ‘special interests’, together with dramatic cuts to social services and their reorientation around workfare, imply a significant change in Canadian citizenship. Brodie (1995, 57) reports that the new paradigm depicts the ‘good’ citizen as one who “does not make special impositional claims on the state based on difference or systemic discrimination because one should be able to take care of oneself.” Similarly, Workman (1996, 67) reports that emancipatory political organizations that continue to lobby for funding are more frequently discounted “as cavalier and irresponsible.” He explains that activists who challenge government cutbacks on the grounds that they are harmful to welfare recipients, single mothers, and other disadvantaged groups are “dismissed as advocates of ‘special interests’, a term calling attention to their refusal to accept the reasonableness of fiscal restraint on behalf of the entire social body” (ibid.). Little (1999, 60) and Jenson (2000/1998, 11) report that the hostility towards ‘special interests’ has resulted in a loss of moral authority from which the disadvantaged can demand a range of social entitlements and the redistribution of political and social power.

This loss of moral authority reveals a reversal in the post-war evolution of social citizenship. As Laycock (2002, 43) observes, “[c]itizens who stop thinking that their personal challenges and problems are related to public decisions about justice make fewer demands for
public support, and begin to believe that these private problems are essentially expressions of personal deficiencies, fate, or bad luck.” In so far as this shift in citizenry thinking has unfolded, the state restructuring of the past two decades has marginalized post-war ideals which “held that markets were subject to political control, that people should not be forced to engage in market activities that denied their safety or dignity, and that the national community was responsible for the well-being of its individual members” (Brodie 1997, 234). In place of this post-war norm, Brodie (1997, 234-239; 1996) observes a new vision of social citizenship that embraces self-reliance, self-sufficiency and the protestant work ethic. Canadians are told that they must scale down their expectations of governments and accept a significant curtailment in the scope and comprehensiveness of state-provided services (Evans and Wekerle 1997, 3). In place of universal state intervention, the citizenry is urged to accept the obligation to work longer and harder to take care of themselves and others to facilitate the reorganization of services to target only the ‘deserving’ poor – persons who are unemployable or demonstrate a sufficient commitment to the workforce (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 233).

A preoccupation with self-reliance inclines conservative proponents to hold individuals personally responsible for their own economic difficulties. This approach to social problems reflects a propensity for individualist, decontextualized understandings of the sources of inequality that risk submerging “the conditions of oppression, exploitation and inequality that determine when, how and which people can exercise ‘individual responsibility’” (Kline 1997, 338). In particular, the focus on personal responsibility obscures the role of the state and market in “creating” and “reproducing” relations of social and economic discrimination that contribute to poverty, ill-health, joblessness, and exclusion (ibid.). 28

28 I explore this theme in more detail in chapter five in terms of the neoliberal perspective on unemployment and the work duties increasingly assigned to receipt of social assistance. The persistence of unemployment at a rate of
Children are one notable exception to the pathology of special interests evident in some neoconservative thinking. While almost all adult dependency has become “suspect,” poor children remain able to claim a socially sanctioned dependence on the public sphere within the restructured welfare regime (Brodie 1995, 60). Jenson and Thompson (1999, 29) observe that children are being removed from the ‘formal’ social assistance system. In lieu of social assistance, children are entitled to a series of new, very positively named, non-stigmatized child benefits paid in their name. Thus social assistance programs are becoming a regime of last resort, intended only for adults with no children and no job, and sometimes for those who are disabled.

Approbation of child dependency among neoconservatives arises for a number of reasons. The economic conservative concern with human capital renders children an important focus of social policy. The more that education and training are considered primary sources of security in the modern knowledge-based economy, the more pressing it becomes to ensure that children are provided a rich learning environment from the earliest years (Banting 2001, 5). Reorganizing income-support programs for children also emerged as a critical policy problem for economic conservatives given the perception that post-war social assistance for children constituted a significant plank in the welfare wall that prevented citizens from finding employment. The inherent political appeal of focusing on ‘innocent’ children also explains why neoconservatives condone this dependency. However, O’Hara (1998, 9) remarks that the focus is all the more appealing because of its potential to reduce pressure on governments to address the unemployment and poverty endured by the parents of poor children.

roughly 7 percent following a sustained period of extensive economic growth since the mid-1990s raises questions about the value of reforming social policy to ‘increase incentives’ to accept jobs that are non-existent. In the absence of sufficient demand for labour, economic enforcement of work obligations risks penalizing individuals for systemic labour market conditions well beyond their control.

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4c. Discounting the implications of the gender division of care labour

The decontextualized approach to conceptualizing individual responsibility influences Richards’s and Courchene’s discussion of family policy, a factor that further differentiates their research from Giddens’s. Central to Giddens’s vision is “the democratic family” (1999, 89-98).

Democratic family relationships imply a shared responsibility for child care, especially greater sharing among women and men, and among parents and non-parents, since in the society at large mothers are bearing a disproportionate share of the costs (and enjoying a disproportionate share of the emotional rewards) of children (ibid., 94-95).

This third way vision of the family entails a reordering of both gender relations and institutional arrangements between private households, the market and the state to achieve “family-friendly workplace policies,” including child care, telecommuting and work sabbaticals (ibid., 125-126).

On one hand, Courchene’s (1994a, 82) claim that “day care is a policy whose time has... arrived” suggests that he is supportive of the institutional reordering recommended by Giddens. But he ultimately expresses only tepid support for this policy initiative, noting that “a move to universal day care, as in the Scandinavian countries, will not trigger a major increase in labour force participation of females: they are already in the labour force” (ibid., 80). The implication is that most Canadian women have managed to arrange adequate strategies for shouldering employment and caregiving in the absence of significant public assistance. But this element of Courchene’s analysis is too cursory, failing to acknowledge the patriarchal division of labour that pervades the social context. He ignores that many Canadian women access the labour force because they transfer their care responsibilities to others for no or little pay; they function as ‘super-moms’ incurring the stress and related health consequences of balancing extensive care and employment commitments; they limit their attachment to the marketplace through part-time work; or they lessen their caregiving work by having fewer, if any, children. Each alternative entails considerable costs, particularly for diverse groups of women, as I discuss in chapter six.
What is more, in light of his position that the state should reinvest in social policy primarily when it is a key to economic competitiveness, the observation that most women access the labour market without much public assistance implies that Courchene is only offering moderate support for child care services. This interpretation is corroborated by the caution he urges about a "monopoly" of "universal day care" modeled on the school system (ibid., 81).

Courchene’s moderate support for child care risks reinforcing work by Mead (1997, 224) who is much more explicit that child care assistance should be limited only to mothers who need to work to relieve the state of income assistance responsibilities. Beyond this category of mothers, Mead is wary about the increased labour force participation of women. In his view, joblessness today is due primarily to a growing labour force and job turnover. One overarching reason for the increasing pool of labour, Mead (1986, 71) claims

is that more women and teenagers have been seeking jobs. While some members of these groups are responsible for their own households, many more of them, compared to adult, men, are 'secondary' workers, from families where husbands, parents, or other members are already working... While these workers clearly could use work, their joblessness cannot be viewed with the same seriousness as that of family heads, because they have other means of support.

By sanctioning child care only when it supports workfare initiatives, Teghtsoonian (1996, 134-136) notes that neoconservatives like Mead convey “a subtle denigration of the inherent value of gender equality.” Women’s work outside the home is considered worthy of public support “because it contributes to economically valuable goals, rather than for its own sake.” Thus, Mead does not envision support for individual caregiving responsibilities as a citizenry entitlement. Instead, “implicit in the argument that ‘women have to work’ for economic reasons is the notion that, if they don’t have to, they shouldn’t.” From this view, women’s labour force participation, especially those with children, appears only “contingently acceptable.”

While it is not clear that Courchene’s commitment to child care extends only as far as his interest in workfare, he and Richards indicate a very limited interest in, and decontextualized
understanding of, the domestic sphere when they “support” “the ongoing degree of fiscal stringency embodied in [federal] deficit offloading” (Courchene 1994a, 224). Courchene links this offloading with the “pressure” necessary to motivate provincial restructuring since it severely limits fiscal capacity of provinces to deliver social services (ibid.). As mentioned in section one, the resultant erosion of provincial programming has “the effect of forcing health, child, and elderly care back onto the family and the unpaid work of women” (Brodie 1995, 53-54). Depicting this shift as a sustainable policy direction rests on one of two assumptions: either (i) the rapid rise in female labour force participation has not come at the expense of many families’ capacity to perform unpaid domestic work; or (ii) women will leave employment or take part-time work to meet the new private caregiving needs.

Courchene’s observation that significant public expenditures were not necessary to facilitate the increase in women’s labour force participation implies the former – that the temporal resources available to families are sufficiently elastic to provide whatever domestic care is necessary regardless of increased rates of female employment. But he offers no defence of this assumption and, as I argue in chapter six, it is not supported by evidence regarding the time-stress and related health-ailments confronting Canadians.

By contrast, Richards indicates more sympathy for the second assumption. He makes explicit that “family structure matters” (1997, 208) and recommends that the state “discriminate” fiscally in favour of two-parent families (ibid., 255). This recommendation implies support for the ‘traditional’, idealized family of the 1950s (ibid., 256). In his view:

Commentators during the past generation have developed an important body of economic analysis that views traditional marriage as an efficient contract for the lengthy investment required for successful child rearing... It is understood that each party will exploit his or her comparative advantage in order to maximize the joint interest in the success of the venture; the usual consequence (with many variants) is that mothers concentrate on child rearing, especially during the years of early childhood, and fathers on earning income (ibid., 210-211).
While Richards concedes that "[feminists are right to lobby for a different distribution of benefits within marriage" (ibid., 211), he qualifies this concession by claiming it "is hard" to "measur[e] just how inegalitarian marriages were in the past (and how egalitarian they are now)" (ibid.). With this qualification, Richards largely discounts the extensive feminist literatures reviewed in the previous chapter, which reveal that a welfare regime premised on the 'traditional' family has left women far more susceptible to poverty, violence, economic dependence, social exclusion, and, in the case of some poor, ethnic minority and immigrant women, marginalized from their own domestic sphere.

Conclusion

Feminists who build on the work of Pateman (1988), third way proponents and economic conservatives agree about the need to reprioritize citizenship duties as well as the welfare potential implicit in the labour market and human capital. These points of convergence across partisan lines reflect in part the influence of mainstream social science findings about the social and economic implications of aggressive redistribution, passive income assistance measures and strong ties to the labour force. However, neoliberals depart importantly from feminists and third way thinkers by promoting a considerably smaller role for the public sphere. For instance, economic conservatives support reinvestment primarily in state functions where social and economic policy merge to advance the country's economic competitiveness. This position diminishes the role of social policy in fostering greater inclusion and minimizing inequality when it does not necessarily have positive economic consequences. Some economic conservatives further contain the public sphere by limiting its role in facilitating adequate representation for disadvantaged groups, as well as by capitalizing on the welfare potential of the domestic sphere without examining sufficiently the consequences for diverse groups of women.
For neoliberals like Courchene who do not express an explicit commitment to the ‘traditional’ family, there is a tension in assigning human capital acquisition a primary role for ensuring individual security in the global economy while ignoring the consequences that this policy trajectory has for families’ domestic resources when capitalizing on unpaid care work to reduce public expenditures. I explore this theme in detail in chapter six when questioning the sustainability of the neoconservative paradigm. The tension is more significant still for conservatives like Richards and Mead who express far more sympathy for the idealized 1950s family. Not only does this sympathy indicate that the division between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ conservative is often more fluid in practice than the conceptual distinction implies, their attempt to marry the two camps advances a relationship premised on what Giddens (1994, 40) describes as “a damaging contradiction.” By promoting less fettered market practices, Richards and Mead wish to launch far-reaching social forces that are hostile to the patriarchal family and other community networks on which they and other economic conservatives wish to draw for added caregiving work in an effort to cut public spending.

While some may remain unconvinced by my characterization of Courchene and Richards as neoconservatives rather than proponents of the third way, this scepticism does not undermine the chapter’s broader analysis which reveals important points of convergence between neoconservatives such as Mead and some feminists who acknowledge the welfare potential of the labour market. Nor does it counter the finding that some social conservatives and feminists converge on a number of issues in regards to the welfare potential of the domestic sphere and the resultant civic duties that this potential generates. Finally, since Courchene and Richards have been influential intellectual contributors to the current citizen-state regime that “[m]ost political economists agree” is “neo-liberal” (Brodie 1997, 227), any alignment of their work with the third
way would at the very least underscore the importance for academics to defend against the ideological deployment of their work in the political arena.
PART II

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES CONFRONTING CANADIAN SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
We no longer need much vision and imagination to understand that the incessant development and application of science-based technology, among other factors, is transforming late twentieth-century advanced economies. The evidence of a new 'Industrial Revolution', this time a 'post-industrial revolution', is beginning to accumulate around us. One of the main aspects of this change relevant to social citizenship is that it is possible that post-industrial, high technology, high labour-productivity economies have fewer structural incentives and less structural ability to deliver 'full employment' in response to Keynesian economic policy than do traditional labour-intensive industrial economies.


Previous chapters developed the concept of social citizenship as a set of state commitments to social security, substantive equality and full community membership, describing how these commitments were institutionalized in the first decades following World War II. The analysis engaged with critiques of post-war welfarism developed by diverse feminist and neoconservative perspectives and documented the resultant restructuring since the 1970s to which these critiques contributed. The role of economic conservative challenges in shaping public policy over the past two decades received particular attention. In Part II of the dissertation, the analysis shifts to examine two structural changes that differentiate the contemporary social and economic context from the post-war era in which the concept of social citizenship was first implemented in Canada - what I term the post-industrial and post-traditional transitions respectively. Both transitions present challenges to which the post-war citizenship regime was ill-equipped to respond, a fact that explains in part the restructuring of the past two decades.

In this chapter I examine the first structural transition, paying particular attention to the evolution of the labour market since the mid-1970s. I argue that the post-industrial shift has two particularly notable consequences for social citizenship. First, it renders questions about the distribution of employment hours more pressing than in the early post-war years. Second, the shift transforms and exacerbates the challenges that Canadians encounter in their efforts to
balance daily care aspirations and obligations with other, particularly financial, responsibilities. Both consequences have significant implications for the country's social welfare system.

T.H. Marshall\(^1\) and Beveridge in England, Marsh in Canada, and their contemporaries in other countries took for granted a growing post-war economy that would rely on highly mechanized but nonetheless labour-intensive mass production systems capable of powering welfare state expansion, sustaining full employment and limiting welfare and unemployment caseloads (Courchene 1994a, 152; Esping-Anderson 1990, 148; Roche 1992, 41-42). Policy makers further presumed that women would leave paid work upon marriage to be full-time wives and mothers and recommended policy measures to support this household arrangement (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 57-58). This gendered assumption substantially reduced the population to which post-war commitments to full-employment obtained.

The early post-war economic and social context has changed dramatically in successive decades. The sustained economic boom that followed the Second World War came to a rather abrupt end in the early 1970s, signalled in part by the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the resultant increase in oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (McBride and Shields 1997, 47). One trend that coincided with the economic transition was the rapid decline in business profitability in Canada. Stanford (1999, 236) reports that the portion of the national economy's output represented by business profits fell from typical levels of 20 percent or more of GDP in the 1950s and 60s to an average of just 12.7 percent during the period 1990 to 1997.

McBride and Shields (1997, 47) observe that another signal of the changing economic context was the internationalization of production as many corporations rapidly shifted their

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\(^1\) Commenting on citizens' obligations to participate in the paid labour force, Marshall (1964, 118-119) explains that the "duty is not to have a job and hold it, since that is relatively simple in conditions of full employment, but to put one's heart in one's job and work hard."
manufacturing investments and resource production and processing to the industrializing centres of the Third World where cheaper labour could be employed. The ensuing ‘capital flight’ triggered a process of disinvestment in the productive capacity of Canada’s industrial core. Courchene (1994a, 234) reports that the globalization of economies resulted in the loss of substantial numbers of jobs in the forests, mines, or energy sector, many of which were unionized and paid relatively high wages relative to educational and training requirements. Similarly, McBride and Shields (1997, 47) explain that:

The traditional smokestack industries—steel-making and other heavy manufacturing—rapidly declined, causing unemployment in the industrial belts and a transformation of the structure of employment. In Canada, employment in goods-producing industries fell from 34.8 percent of the labour force in 1951 to 26.7 percent in 1981, a pattern replicated in most other OECD nations.

The globalization of investment and production was accompanied by numerous technological advances that permitted corporations to modernize their business practices with the intention of further reducing labour costs in order to rejuvenate profits. McBride and Shields (1997, 47-48) draw upon a 1984 report of the Economic Council of Canada (p. 75) to illuminate the impact of technological change on domestic employment opportunities:

Throughout the 1971-1979 period, advances in technology made it possible to produce the 1979 level of output with 8 percent fewer jobs in the commercial sector of the economy than would have been required under 1971 conditions. This represented a labour saving of approximately 630,000 jobs. As expected, the impact of technology varies from one industry to another. Only in seven of the thirty-nine industries did the introduction of new technology call for additional labour skills. In all others, labour saving ranged from 37 percent of total employment in knitting mills to 1 percent in the construction industry.

Declining profits, globalization of production and technological advances contributed to the sudden demise of ‘full employment’ that Canada and other OECD nations enjoyed from the 1950s until the early 1970s. During this ‘golden’ post-war era, Esping-Anderson (1990, 163) explains that unemployment levels in most OECD countries remained below three percent, a measure equated with full-employment by post-war policy makers. But very few nations (only Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) were able to sustain full employment consistently beyond the
early 1970s. In Canada, McBride and Shields (1997, 48) report that official unemployment figures rose from 3.6 percent in 1950 to 5.9 percent in 1970 and ballooned thereafter to a high of 11.9 percent in 1983.

While the unemployment rate climbed, the share of Canadians with employment also increased steadily from roughly 50 percent of people over age 15 in 1961 to almost 60 percent in the 1980s and 1990s (Beaujot 2000, 135-136). This increase in the employment-to-population ratio arose despite greater numbers of retirees and predominantly reflects the rapid rise in the rate of female labour force participation. In 1961, just 29 percent of women over fifteen were either employed or actively seeking paid work. By 1971, the figure rose to 40 percent; it climbed still further to 52 percent in 1981 and 59 percent in 1991 (Beaujot 2000, 136). The participation rate stands at 60 percent as of 2000 (Statistics Canada 2001c). 72 percent of women with employment work full-time, compared to 90 percent of men (Statistics Canada 2000, 123).

The dramatic shift in women’s employment practices reflected both a significant change in cultural attitudes about women, family and work, as well as new economic pressures that middle-class households confronted amidst the post-industrial transition. Rising unemployment in the 1970s was initially accompanied by upwardly spiraling prices that soared until 1982. The co-existence of high unemployment and inflation, or ‘stagflation’, contributed to record numbers of women entering the paid labour market to sustain family incomes (Armstrong 1997, 44). The pressure for women to assume paid work responsibilities grew more acute still as the real value of male wages declined, a theme that I examine below.

As discussed in chapter four, neoconservatives like Courchene and Richards recognize that the structural evolution of industrial economies poses significant challenges for contemporary social policy blueprints. Their primary concerns include the fiscal constraints
imposed on the welfare system by less consistent economic growth, as well as the value of human capital as a source of security in an insecure world.

In this chapter, I examine three other elements of the post-industrial transition that pose equally significant social problems for the modern welfare state. Section one explores structural unemployment. The increase in the share of working age Canadians in the labour market has coincided with the expansion of the service sector, technological advancements, global production strategies and international trade agreements that have changed employers' labour usage patterns. The concurrence of these two trends raises the concern that modern markets have fewer structural incentives, and less structural ability, to deliver 'full employment' at life-sustaining wages than did the post-war context of the 1950s (Roche 1992, 46). Although the 10 percent increase in the employment-to-population ratio since 1960 signals that citizens', and particularly women's, opportunities to work for pay have risen considerably, sustained levels of high un(der)employment have simultaneously eroded the political and cultural environment in which policy makers can depict employment as a social 'right'.

If persistent levels of high un(der)employment mean that paid work is better viewed as a privilege than an entitlement, the question arises: is the distribution of paid work hours – and not just income – an important matter of social justice for society? Feminist and neoconservative positions that identify an appropriate degree of labour market attachment as a necessary criterion of genuine social belonging answer this question affirmatively. On the basis of this shared insight, I argue that the now dominant, largely neoliberal, approach to social citizenship in Canada is inadequate on two fronts: the paradigm (a) relies too much on the concept of human capital acquisition to power employment growth; and (b) risks pathologizing the un(der)employed by overemphasizing the duty to work in a context of structural unemployment.
The other two elements of the post-industrial shift that I examine pose additional problems that any adequate contemporary framework of social citizenship must address. Both suggest the importance of better integrating caregiving and unpaid familial responsibilities into our system of social security. The first is the effect of two decades of wage conditioning. Data indicate that the real wages of males who entered the labour market since the 1970s have consistently dropped year after year. This trend has contributed to rising poverty rates among young adults, and particularly families with young children. I discuss this theme in section two.

In section three, I examine the polarization of paid work hours between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ labour market positions. Not only did this post-industrial trend increase income inequality in Canada during the 1980s, I argue that it has further entrenched a model of the ideal worker that is growing more incompatible with unpaid caregiving. One consequence is that the primary breadwinner/primary caregiver (and therefore secondary earner) model of household organization is being reinforced despite the increase in women’s paid labour force participation. Persons who wish to shoulder a significant commitment to unpaid familial obligations remain at greater risk of economic dependence on either a breadwinner or the state.

1. Structural Unemployment

1a. The ‘ratcheting-up’ of involuntary unemployment in post-industrial economies.

Some colloquial definitions of ‘structural unemployment’ interpret the term to mean ‘long-term and chronic’ unemployment. This has been the Canadian experience over the past two decades. In the early 1980s, unemployment in Canada and other OECD nations rose to levels unseen in the post-war era. The unemployment rate remained high in many advanced industrial countries until the latter of the half of the decade and then fell very slowly. In Canada,
the unemployment rate peaked at 11.9 percent in 1983, and dropped only as low as 7.5 percent in 1989 (Lipsey and Ragan 2001b, 723).

With the onset of another recession in the early 1990s, the unemployment rate rose again in Canada between 1990 and 1992, peaking at 11.3 percent. Over the next five years, the official unemployment rate fell only moderately as Canada endured another ‘jobless recovery’. By early 1994, the rate remained above 10 percent (Lipsey and Ragan 2001b, 723) and had fallen only to 9.5 percent by the beginning of 1997.

Picot and Heisz (2000, S9) report that the slow pace of employment creation in Canada during much of the 1990s was particularly pronounced in terms of full-time paid jobs. Over the business cycle, full-time job creation accounted for only 18 percent of net job creation before 1999 (ibid., S10). The weak employment recovery also witnessed a substantial shift in the types of jobs created in favour of more self-employment, although current research does not show conclusively that this trend represents an enduring change in the nature of work or the way in which firms engage labour.

Increased downsizing during the recovery of the 1990s factored significantly in the slow employment growth, but it was not a widespread phenomenon affecting the entire commercial sector. The large majority of the increase in job destruction was concentrated in the public services (health, education and government sectors) and consumer service industries: these sectors each accounted for nearly 40 percent of the increase in eliminated jobs (Picot and Heisz 2000, S19-S20). This concentration raises some doubts as to whether the effects of competitive pressures or technological change remained the primary causes of job destruction in Canada over the last decade. At the very least, the downsizing of the public sector reflects the influence of
public deficits that spurred governments across the country to lay off public sector workers as one plank in a balanced budget platform.

In spite of concerns regarding job loss, the likelihood of being permanently laid off did not rise during the 1990s, as compared to the 1980s (Picot and Heisz 2000, S17-S18). The more significant change during the decade was the likelihood of getting a job, not losing it. Since employees were confronted with poor job opportunities, the rate of job quitting was also lower in the 1990s than during the previous decade. This lower rate of job turnover extended the average duration of job tenure, despite popular concerns that job stability declined. Lengthened job tenure is not necessarily a positive sign, however, since it reflects at least partly the lower rates of quitting and hiring that are common in a poor labour market.

The weak job recovery of the 1990s contributed to a reversal of the post-war legacy of increased paid work activity among Canadians. From a high of 67.5 percent in 1989, the labour force participation rate dropped to roughly 65 percent in 1995 as rising numbers of discouraged workers, including many recently laid off, abandoned job searches in the face of the chronically poor employment climate of the early 1990s (Stanford 1999, 7).

The pace of the economic recovery increased at the very end of the decade. After 5 years of steady economic growth, the unemployment rate fell to 6.6 percent in June 2000, the lowest level in more than 20 years. Following the stagnating U.S. economy, and the shock of September 11th, the rate rose again to over 8.0 percent towards the end of 2001, but has since fallen to 7.6 percent as of April 2002. Despite the employment gain at the end of the decade, the rapid increase in unemployment during the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s, matched by only moderate employment growth during recovery periods, provide evidence of the 'ratcheting up' of involuntary unemployment in the present, post-industrial economic climate. The
unemployment rate has remained very high during business cycles in the last twenty years by the standards of the first post-war decades.

Some neoconservatives, especially those in the United States where official unemployment levels have been consistently lower than in Canada, express scepticism that unemployment figures provide evidence of involuntary joblessness. For instance, Mead (1986, 69) argues that

society's interest in work can be greater than the individual's, especially in the case of 'dirty', low-paid jobs. For both rich and poor alike, work has become increasingly elective, and unemployment voluntary, because workers commonly have other sources of income, among them government programs. Jobseekers are seldom kept out of work for long by a literal lack of jobs. More often, they decline the available jobs as unsatisfactory, because of unrewarding pay and conditions.2

According to Mead (1986, 73), a "pathological instability in holding jobs," largely explains why some individuals are often unemployed, not a lack of jobs. This turnover trend in unemployment is difficult to blame on the economic environment, he suggests, since it is not influenced significantly by the ups and downs of the business cycle. Instead, he identifies transfer dependency as a more significant factor: welfare programs have failed to obligate citizens to perform work activities in return for social assistance (ibid., 76-82).

Giddens (1994, 146-147) is sceptical of this neoconservative position on involuntary joblessness. He argues that "[i]f welfare incentives lead to underclass joblessness .... [this trend] should become reversed when welfare benefits decline, as they have done in many Western countries over the past twenty years. This has not happened." The Canadian data supports Giddens' view. Despite the dramatic cuts to social assistance and unemployment insurance that provincial and federal governments implemented in the early and mid-1990s, official unemployment rates hover around 8 percent as of 2002. Even if one grants that the more

2 On this point, see also Murray 1987.
dramatic decline in unemployment at the end of the decade indicates that citizens took several years to adjust to reorganized welfare incentives, persistent unemployment above 7 percent despite five years of strong economic growth, lower benefit levels and increased work and training obligations suggests that joblessness is due to more than transfer dependency alone.

In Canada, some economic conservatives credit minimum wage regulations with increasing the level of unemployment. For instance, Courchene (1994a, 327) suggests that it has been a mistake to design the minimum wage so that it delivers an above-poverty income. By assigning the wage system this redistributive role, the state interferes with the system’s allocative function in a mixed economy whereby it matches persons seeking and selling labour. The result, Courchene (ibid.) and Richards (1997, 275-276) imply, is lost jobs among the less skilled. The moderate training and work experience of most individuals with limited attachment to the labour force mean most are low-productivity workers whose opportunities to find employment are only worsened when the cost of hiring them is increased. Thus, rather than raise the minimum wage, Courchene (1994a, 243, 327) argues that the less advantaged in the labour market would be better served if the existing redistributive element implicit in minimum wages is reassigned to other policy mechanisms such as a negative income tax. The wage system would therefore be left to perform only its allocative role, and employers would be permitted to hire more low-productivity workers at a wage that is cost-efficient.

However, available data also render this economic conservative position far from conclusive. In an analysis of the effects of minimum wage changes in B.C., Alberta, Ontario and Québec, Goldberg and Green (1999, 8-21) provide evidence that is consistent with the existing "literature on impacts of minimum wages, namely that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage produces declines in the employment-to-population ratio in the range of 1 to 3 percent.
This is generally interpreted as a small disemployment effect” (ibid., 21). Given this finding, Goldberg and Green (ibid.) conclude that “claims that minimum wage cuts will lead to large jumps in employment” are “simply misguided,” since “it is reasonable to argue that other factors play a much larger role in determining levels and trends in employment.”

The inconclusive status of neoconservative claims that transfer dependency and minimum wage regulations function as significant sources of unemployment provide reason to look elsewhere for primary explanations of higher rates of joblessness in the modern, post-industrial economy. Many economists speak of contemporary unemployment as a ‘structural’ problem. The term ‘structural unemployment’ has two meanings in economics literature (Sharpe and Sargent 2000, S3), both of which I examine below. In each case, the relevant data provide reason to be cautious about the present, predominantly neoliberal, paradigm of social citizenship in Canada that currently prioritizes employment duties and human capital acquisition.

1b. Structural unemployment as ‘mismatch’

Following the Finance Canada definition, Osberg and Lin (2000, S142) understand structural unemployment to occur “when workers are unable to fill available jobs because they lack the skills, do not live where jobs are available, or are unwilling to work at the wage rate offered in the market.” This first definition illuminates a mismatch between the characteristics sought by employers wishing to fill vacant positions versus the characteristics that unemployed labour force participants actually possess. It is this understanding of structural unemployment that drives much of the neoliberal paradigm in Canada. The impetus behind the expectation that Canadians should view human capital acquisition as the primary source of security in the modern knowledge-based economy is largely due to concern about a growing disjuncture between employer needs and the capabilities of the labour force, particularly the un(der)employed.
The question remains, however, does the concept of a skills gap explain the persistently high levels of unemployment in Canada? Osberg and Lin (2000, S153) provide evidence suggesting that its explanatory value is limited given the relative dearth of job openings across the country compared to the share of the labour force that is without paid work. They conclude that as of October 1999 “the best evidence is that less than one-eighth of the national unemployment rate [of 7.5 percent] could be due to structural mismatch between the skills demanded in available jobs and the skills possessed by the unemployed.” Their conclusion rests on data about the period 1998-99 which indicates that the rate of job vacancies in Canada was approximately 0.4 to 0.75 percent of the labour force. Although their findings acknowledge that the vacancy rate was higher in the burgeoning ‘high technology’ sector (at 2.2 percent of the labour force), “this sector is very small as a proportion of total employment and its vacancy rate is certainly much higher than in the economy as a whole.”

The Osberg and Lin study provides reason to be cautious about overstating the value of reforming labour policy to provide additional educational opportunities and work incentives. Evidence indicating that high unemployment is not the result of a structural skills gap suggests that concerns about a shortage of skilled workers have been exaggerated. If so, additional training for the un(der)employed is likely to offer few payoffs in the absence of increased demand for trained labour. As Osberg (1994, 129) observes in an earlier study, any adequate reform of the post-war social policy paradigm designed to combat un(der)employment “must recognize the crucial importance of the demand side of labour markets, and the role of macroeconomic policy in influencing aggregate demand.”

3Given the importance of the demand side of labour markets, any focus on human capital acquisition should prioritize education in, and support for, entrepreneurship just as much as training in the skills increasingly sought by expanding industrial sectors. Prosperous economies depend on persons who start new businesses by finding new
Picot and Heisz (2000, S13-S16) provide further reason to be wary of the economic conservative faith in human capital acquisition as an effective anti-unemployment strategy. They find that the education and experience of the labour force increased considerably through the 1980s and 90s. As a greater share of Canadians pursued post-secondary education, and the labour force underwent a demographic shift that witnessed a significant increase in the number of mature workers with extensive work experience, there has been a notable improvement in the quality of available labour. While data indicate that persons with more human capital continue to enjoy better labour market outcomes than those with less, Picot and Heisz (ibid., S9-S10) conclude that there has been “a marked deterioration (in an ‘absolute’ sense) in unemployment and job-holding for workers with a given level of human capital, particularly among men” (ibid., S9-S10). This deterioration raises questions about the capacity of human capital acquisition to function as an effective source of social security for individuals in the coming decades.

Banting (2001, 9-13) suggests another reason to question the logic behind the new social security paradigm's focus on education and training. Despite the rhetoric, he observes that most governments in Canada have not actively strengthened their financial commitments to post-secondary education. The dominant pattern of the past decade has been a rapid withdrawal of funding for universities and colleges, and the resulting transfer of responsibility for investing in human capital onto individual citizens. While tuition fees were stable in real terms during the 1970s and 1980s, they rose dramatically in most provinces throughout the 1990s (BC and Québec are exceptions). Simultaneously, governments withdrew financial support delivered as bursaries in favour of reliance on student loans. The combination of rising tuition and loan levels, matched by fewer grants, has had far-reaching effects for student debt load in Canada.

product niches or export prospects, thereby generating employment for others either directly in their own businesses or indirectly as spin-off positions in supplier firms.

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More significant still, Banting (2001, 9-13) documents domestic and international evidence suggesting that socio-economic background has a major impact on individuals’ educational attainment, a factor that is being exacerbated in Canada as governments disinvest in post-secondary institutions and student bursaries. This evidence suggests that investment in human capital alone cannot serve as a functional equivalent to the postwar approach to economic security premised primarily on decommodifying measures, since access to training and education is mediated by the economic resources available to citizens. Thus, Banting urges that any meaningful commitment to human capital acquisition as a strategy for economic security must also be accompanied by a redistributive approach that mitigates the impact of social, and particularly family, background on access to, and success in, educational institutions (ibid., 17).

1c. Structural unemployment as the NAIRU

The second meaning assigned the term ‘structural unemployment’ is what economists refer to as the NAIRU – the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (For examples of studies in which the term is employed in this sense, see Fortin 2000, Nickell and van Ours 2000). The NAIRU refers to the level of unemployment below which upward pressure on wages and prices can be expected. The rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation changes over time and economists estimate that it began to rise sharply in the 1970s, peaking at roughly 7.5 percent by 1989 (Lipsey and Ragan 2001b, 723).

The logic behind the NAIRU is as follows. If the labour market is ‘too tight’, employees are positioned to demand wage increases. Wage increases are a primary source of inflation. The wage escalation that results when unemployment drops ‘too low’ for a sustained period causes inflation to rise continuously. Since inflation is harmful to financial investors, employers and consumers alike, the federal Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Canada have
reason to utilize monetary and fiscal policy to foster sufficient unemployment that will exert a dampening effect on prices and wages.

In response to inflation rates that surpassed 12 percent in the 1980s, the Bank of Canada, under the guidance of Governor John Crow, aggressively followed the NAIRU logic in 1988 by implementing very high interest rates and restrictive monetary policy that sought to reduce annual inflation to between one and three percent (Lipsey and Ragan 2001b, 713). Reports indicate that Canada pursued anti-inflation policies more fervently than its trading partners (ibid.). Many economists have since acknowledged the deleterious consequences for Canadian employment that resulted from the zeal with which the Bank of Canada imposed inflation-control, including a widening gap between Canada’s unemployment rate and that found south of the border (see for example, Richards 1997, 19; Stanford 1999, 194-198).  

State efforts to control inflation with very high real interest rates that dampen the demand for labour effectively impose the costs of other people’s progress on the shoulders of the un(der)employed. This fiscal strategy requires that some citizens are purposefully treated as conduits for social utility – their un(der)employment is induced on the grounds that it maximizes societal well-being. One effect is that NAIRU-informed policy tacitly accepts that a sizeable portion of the labour market will shoulder disproportionately the harmful effects of an economic regime intent on benefiting from low inflation.

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4Fortin (2000, S129) further suggests that fiscal and monetary policies that inflate unemployment have the potential to raise the NAIRU. He argues that lower unemployment is accompanied by a reduction in the duration of joblessness and therefore an increase in the share of the unemployed pool made up of the short-term out of work. Since their skills have not had time to deteriorate, their job-search activity remains intense and they continue to be perceived relatively positively by employers, the short-term unemployed constitute a greater threat to the positions of employed workers than persons who have been jobless for extended periods. As a result, Fortin contends that each percentage reduction in total unemployment “could exert a stronger negative pressure on wage growth and inflation when unemployment is low than when it is high.”
This line of thinking stands in stark contrast to the contract tradition implicit in the dominant post-war paradigm of social citizenship that regards society as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage" (Rawls 1971, 4). The contract tradition implies that individuals are only full members of a community when it can reasonably be expected that they would voluntarily collaborate with others, including persons who are more fortunate in their social circumstances (ibid., 103). However, voluntary collaboration is highly unlikely in an economic context guided by the NAIRU concept, since underemployment risks social marginalization and a more limited capacity to enjoy the full force of one's civil and political rights. Unless a robust redistributive program capable of effectively countering this risk balances NAIRU-informed fiscal and monetary policy, the policy will violate both Rawls's difference principle and Marshall's standard of civilization criterion. In so far as employment remains a critical avenue by which individuals achieve social belonging – as it does according to economic conservatives and feminists who work in the tradition of Pateman (1989) – NAIRU informed policy leaves a significant share of the population at risk of suffering social exclusion by virtue of their jobless status or due to a relative level of material deprivation that means individuals no longer "live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society" (Marshall 1964, 72). Similarly, in the absence of a social security system that facilitates the dignified social participation of the unemployed, a social order organized so that unemployment will not fall below the NAIRU sanctions inequalities in wealth and income that do not benefit the least advantaged in society, but instead capitalizes on their hardship to promote the prosperity of the broader community.

The public willingness to accept social exclusion that is implicit in policy guided by the NAIRU represents a substantial retreat from the social citizenship commitments advocated by
the founders of the concept in the first post-war decades. The retreat is accelerated when matched by a policy shift that emphasizes citizens' duty to work. Enhanced training and reorganized work incentives cannot be an adequate source of social security for the many Canadians who find themselves out of paid work as a result of state efforts to stabilize unemployment so that it does not fall below the NAIRU. The logic of the NAIRU is to justify permanent unemployment. But when permanent unemployment is sanctioned and fostered by the state, the concept of the citizen's duty to engage in paid work becomes punitive. The alleged duty risks individualizing a person's jobless status by attributing her joblessness to personal behaviour or failures. It therefore conveniently draws attention away from the broader social and economic climate in which some citizens encounter difficulties finding paid work, including the role that the state plays in perpetuating unemployment.

As the 1990s drew to a close, Stanford (1999, 197) reports that the NAIRU theory was discredited in the eyes of many economists. Considerable doubt about the reality of a NAIRU was generated by falling unemployment in Canada and especially in the U.S. where the rate dropped well below what had been perceived as the minimum NAIRU level without triggering inflation rates. This doubt restores the intellectual room required to re-prioritize unemployment reduction as a key component of any contemporary social policy blueprint. Canada's capacity to redistribute paid work hours is a question that I explore in chapter eight.

2. Wage Conditioning

In addition to higher rates of unemployment, many Canadian labour force participants have also endured deteriorating levels of remuneration in recent decades. The real wage gains achieved by workers in the 1950s and 1960s that powered a burgeoning middle class and an expanding welfare state contributed considerably to declining corporate profits by the 1970s.
Stanford (1999, 245) explains that Canadian workers won an increasing portion of the economic pie during the first decades of post-war expansion. "The share of total GDP paid out in wages and fringe benefits grew from just over 45 percent after World War II to a peak of 56 percent in 1977." This 11 percent increase in wage share meant for some companies the difference between rich profitability and marginal viability. Thus, "labour’s ability to expand its share of total output was... a key factor both in the dramatic rise in living standards which most workers enjoyed during the ‘golden age’ boom, but also in the correspondingly marked decline of profitability during the same period."

Eager to limit real wage gains of the sort achieved by workers in the 1950s and 60s, many employers introduced wage ‘disciplining’ or ‘conditioning’ tactics that imposed pay freezes or exacted wage concessions. Some businesses also challenged trade union initiatives and lobbied for weaker state labour supports (Workman 1996, 20; Ocran 1997, 149). Governments often proved willing to implement the kinds of regulatory changes proposed by the business community out of their own concern for rising unemployment, inflation, and stagnant economic growth (McBride and Shields 1997, 68-70). One notable example is that governments across the country permitted the real value of the minimum wage to fall in keeping with the economic conservative reasoning that minimum wages eliminate low-skill jobs. Whereas a Canadian parent with one child in 1976 had to work 41 hours a week at minimum wage to push the family above the low-income cut-off, the same parent in 1994 had to work over 73 hours in some provinces (Jenson and Thompson 1999, 20).

The success of wage discipline strategies was facilitated by the deteriorating economic context of the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to the direct effect of putting thousands of Canadians out of work, rising joblessness indirectly shaped the labour market environment for
those retaining employment (Maruani 2000/1998, 23). The larger pool of unemployed workers available to fill positions coupled with the perception that businesses were increasingly willing to close and/or relocate made many workers worry about the security of their jobs, a social trend reflected in the increased length of job tenure discussed above. At the same time, the cost of losing employment was heightened by both the decreased likelihood of finding a replacement job and less generous employment insurance policies. These market conditions combined to yield more pliant workers. Stanford (1999, 247) observes:

In the 1970s, Canadian workers showed up at the job and demanded fair treatment. In the 1990s, they are more likely to get down on their knees in thanks that they still have a job. The best efforts of union activists and other social justice campaigners have defended many of the gains made by workers earlier in the post-war era; but the harsh economic circumstances most workers have faced in this gloomy decade have had a chilling effect on their willingness to fight for their rights.

A weak labour market positioned many businesses to impose two decades of wage discipline. Data indicate that younger, more recent labour market entrants have been primary targets for wage conditioning strategies. Beaudry and Green (2000) examine the weekly earnings of workers age 25 or 26 starting in 1971 to document real wage changes over two year intervals among relatively new labour market participants. Their findings indicate that successive waves of labour market entrants since the 1970s, particularly men, have consistently fared poorly in comparison to earlier entrants (2000, 916-921). Data reveal a downward trend in the real starting wages of high-school educated males age 25 or 26 since 1978. That is, the real wages of men 25 to 26 in 1980 were lower than those earned by men of the same age with high-school education in 1978; real wages in 1982 were still lower than those earned in 1980; and so on until 1993, the latest year for which Beaudry and Green present data. Among university-educated men, the downward trend started at an even earlier point and is evident throughout the entire period 1971 to 1993. Beaudry and Green indicate that the real decline in starting wages is
significant: a 1992 university educated labour market entrant earns approximately 20 percent less than his counterpart did twenty years earlier.

In addition to starting at lower real wages, Beaudry and Green (2000, 919-920) observe a slower rate of wage growth for successive waves of male labour market entrants since 1978 as compared to previous entrants. This finding suggests that more recent male labour force participants are not eventually compensated for their lower initial wages by increasing returns for experience. Given this second finding, Beaudry and Green conclude that newer market participants are unlikely to catch up to the earnings of earlier entrants unless there is a major reversal in the underlying forces driving labour market trends.

Earnings patterns among successive waves of female labour market entrants differ considerably (Beaudry and Green 2000, 921-922). Starting real wages have declined only minimally for high-school educated women. By contrast, starting real wages for university-educated women follow a similar pattern to that of their male counterparts, although the scope of the decline is much less dramatic than among men. In addition, Beaudry and Green (ibid., 930) suggest there is some evidence that women with university degrees may enjoy increased compensation for work experience over the life course, though they warn that “such extrapolation should be interpreted with caution.”

There are several explanations for the growing generational wage disparity. Beaudry and Green (2000, 935) observe that earlier literature suggested the gap is due to an accelerating wage premium paid to older workers for their experience in a world of rapid technological change. But the supposition that there is an increase in returns to experience is not supported by the Beaudry and Green finding that successive waves of male labour market entrants are not benefiting from the same rate of wage growth over the life course that was enjoyed by earlier
labour market entrants. Other explanations suggest that the age-related earnings differential may reflect that it is easier for companies to reduce labour costs by lowering the wages of entry-level positions than the remuneration paid experienced workers (Picot 1998, 3.16). Still others point to the higher education levels of older workers relative to their younger counterparts. Whereas baby-boomers acquired substantially more education than previous workers, the same is not true for successive generations. By the 1990s, most of the educational advantage that young workers enjoyed in the market relative to older workers had largely disappeared. Kapsalis, Morissette and Picot (1998) estimate that the less significant cross-generational educational difference may account for 25 to 30 percent of the growing wage gap between younger and older workers.

Regardless of what specific factors contribute to lower earnings for younger workers, recent male market entrants have experienced a substantial remuneration gap compared to older colleagues. If Beaudry and Green are correct that younger workers are unlikely to enjoy accelerated returns for experience over their life course, this generational earnings differential signals the success that companies across the economy have achieved in terms of reversing the trend that saw rising real labour costs significantly reduce profits in the 1970s.

The declining fortune of recent market entrants further illuminates the importance for any social policy framework in Canada to better accommodate the caregiving obligations of citizens. Lower real starting wages limit the income of many labour market participants who are in their prime child-rearing years – a point in the lifecourse when personal caregiving expenses often rise dramatically in the form of forgone income and/or the high costs of child care. The combination of lower real wages and high expenses force some young workers to labour longer hours to

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5 The Government of British Columbia (2001b) has also recently capitalized on this strategy by introducing the ‘training wage’ of $6 per hour for new labour market entrants with less than 500 hours of paid work experience. The training wage is $2 an hour less than minimum wage.
maintain household financial security. As discussed above, the labour market activity of women has increased especially dramatically as many mothers of young children have re-entered the labour force to compensate for falling real male wages. One cost of increased paid labour force activity is less time to care for children and other dependents, rendering it more difficult for some individuals and entire households to balance earning and unpaid caregiving obligations. For other relatively young workers, the decline in real starting wages means an increased risk of poverty. This increased risk is manifest in higher rates of low-income status among young families with children. Conway (1997, 59) observes that over the past three decades

the greatest risk of poverty has shifted from the old to children and young families. In 1969 elderly families (head over 65) suffered a poverty rate of over 42 per cent. In 1990, that rate was under 9 per cent. On the other hand, in 1972 families headed by persons under 25 years suffered a 16 per cent poverty rate. In 1994, that had increased by two-and-one-half times to over 41 per cent.

3. Polarization in the Distribution of Paid Work Time

3a. Employers introduced revised labour usage strategies to reduce labour costs

In addition to wage conditioning tactics, businesses throughout the economy also sought to redress declining profits by revising labour usage strategies to minimize input costs and to create a 'just-in-time' workforce geared to production schedules or evolving consumer demands. Just as the increasingly precarious position occupied by workers throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s induced many to accept wage concessions, so it also motivated many to capitulate to employer demands for revised workday scheduling (Jenson 2000/1998, 6-7).

In the service sector, proportionately fewer employees have been retained to work a standard work-week of 35 to 40 hours. In the 1980s and 90s, it became increasingly likely for people to work either more than 40 hours or less than 35 hours per week. Professionals who already typically worked longer hours continued to do so (Hall 1999, 33), while managers were
increasingly expected to put in extended hours, often without additional compensation (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-22 – C-23).

Conversely, employment relations among non-managerial service sector employees became more 'casual' as employers reorganized workplaces to capitalize on the savings associated with part-time, temporary, contract, and seasonal work (Duffy 1997, 168; Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-23). On one hand, casual work arrangements permitted employers to adjust labour to peaks and lulls in production and demand. On the other hand, the lower wages, fewer benefits and lower levels of unionization that typically characterize casual work motivated some employers to convert formerly full-time positions into less costly informal arrangements (Jenson 1996, 94-5). This shift in the organization of service sector employment was particularly common in health and social services and accommodation and food services (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-18).

Employers in goods-producing industries were similarly concerned to ensure that employment relations conformed more to production and demand cycles. In these industries, however, employment shifts away from standard hours predominantly favoured longer work-weeks (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-16 – C-18). As in the service sector, managers were increasingly called upon to work longer hours, sometimes to compensate for employees lost through layoffs. But goods-producing employers also relied more on the overtime labour of hourly paid blue-collar workers instead of resorting to casual arrangements to fill production gaps. By relying on existing employees to work more hours, goods-producing industries could avoid costs associated with hiring, training, and providing fringe benefits to additional workers.

Extensive use of overtime labour between 1976 and 1995 may explain why the goods-producing sector did not experience the same escalation in part-time work as service industries.
Nevertheless, since 1975 the proportion of people working part-time hours in goods-producing industries did increase moderately (Duffy 1997, 171; Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-16 – C-17). Some recent statistics also suggest that arrangements of less than 35 hours per week have risen more dramatically in the goods-producing sector in the 1990s (Hall 1999, 32).

Like traditional goods-producing industries, the emerging high technology sector has also looked to use core workers for extended hours. Employers claim that the rapid evolution of new technologies demand a different set of workplace norms in order for their businesses to remain competitive. In an effort to facilitate labour usage strategies predicated on long work-weeks, high-tech industries across the country have lobbied for changes to employment regulatory standards. In February of 1999, the Government of British Columbia (1999) proudly announced that it was “the first province in the country to create employment standards that meet the specific needs of this booming industry.” BC’s regulatory changes exempt high-tech professionals from Parts 4 and 5 of the provincial Employment Standards Act regulating hours of work, overtime and statutory holidays. In companies where more than half of the employees are high-tech professionals, non-professional employees are only partially exempt from the above labour standards. Employers can require non-professionals to work up to 12 hours a day or 80 hours over two weeks before being paid overtime at time-and-a-half.6

Recent changes to Employment Standards legislation in Ontario further facilitate the use of employees for extensive hours throughout the entire provincial economy. New legislation

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6 In 2001, the BC government released a discussion paper that proposes to extend the rationale underpinning revised regulations for the high-tech sector to a much broader range of workers. Options presented in the paper include exempting workers with incomes above roughly $58,000 from the entire Employment Standards Act (ESA), as well as members of licensed or self-governing professions, and workers protected by union agreements (Government of British Columbia 2001, 1-3). The discussion paper further examines the possibility of broadening the definition of ‘manager’ to include workers “who do not have supervisory or executive capacity” and again excluding this category of workers entirely from protection under the ESA (ibid., 3). Exemption from the ESA implies a number of regulatory changes for workers, including the complete absence of state policy limiting maximum hours of work.
permits employers to design work hour arrangements that would have employees work as long as 180 hours in a three week period (averaging 60 hours/week). Ontario employees are permitted to refuse work only after labouring 48 hours in one week and are due overtime compensation only after 44 hours (Government of Ontario, 2000).

3b. The polarization of paid work time: a closer look at the data

The intersection of the growing supply of female labour with employers’ interests in achieving a more flexible workforce across industries generated significant changes in the distribution of paid work time among Canadians. This section explores labour statistics that document the extent to which revised labour usage strategies increased the frequency with which Canadians work both shorter and longer paid work-weeks. A careful examination is needed since aggregate data and data disaggregated by sex appear to support different conclusions. Statistics describing all workers indicate that the most significant shift in labour usage has favoured work-weeks of less than 35 hours. In contrast, data broken down by sex indicate that the most significant proportional shifts for both men and women have been towards longer paid work-weeks. The discussion below reconciles these two apparently contradictory findings, illuminating key labour force shifts that underscore an employment pattern that witnessed some ‘core’ workers labour longer hours, while the share of the labour force situated more tenuously at the periphery of the marketplace expanded. This trend poses a series of challenges for any contemporary commitment to social citizenship in terms of earnings inequality, work-family balance and gender equality.

As discussed above, shorter work-weeks became more common in the service-sector among all male and female non-managerial employees, while longer hours grew more common in goods-producing industries. For managers, the shift towards longer work-weeks
predominated across all industries. These transitions reflect a polarization in the distribution of paid work hours among Canadians: a decline in the proportion of people working standard hours matched by increases in the share of people working both short and long work-weeks. Three recent studies document the extent of this polarization. While their figures differ for methodological reasons, all three confirm that the proportion of people working a ‘standard’ 35 to 40 hour week has dropped by roughly 10 percent since 1975. One study indicates that the standard work-week ceased to be the norm for the majority of Canadians by 1980 and that only 41.2 percent of Canadians work 35 to 40 hours per week as of 1998 (Hall 1999, 30).

Data describing the labour patterns of all workers indicate that the shift towards short work-weeks has been more pronounced than the shift towards longer hours. Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty (1996, C-5) report that the drop in standard hours between 1976 and 1995 was the result of a 7.6 percentage point rise in the share of Canadians usually working less than 35 hours (from 16 percent to nearly 24 percent) and a 3 percentage point increase in the proportion usually working over 40 hours (from 19 percent to 22 percent). Hall (1999, 30) describes a similar trend between 1980 and 1998. Her data indicate a 4.8 percentage point increase in the proportion of Canadians working short hours (from 33.5 percent to 38.3 percent) and a 3.3 percentage point rise in the share working more than 40 hours a week (from 17.3 percent to 20.6 percent).

Morissette, Myles and Picot (1995) evaluate the proportion of paid workers labouring in jobs requiring a given number of hours per week. Their findings show that the percentage of men working in occupations defined as 35 to 40 hour positions dropped by 9.1 percentage points between 1981 and 1989, from 74.7 percent to 65.6 percent. They record a smaller drop of 3.5 points among working women during the same period, from 64.6 percent to 61.1 percent (ibid., 38). Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty (1996) analyze the hours that Canadians report they usually work. Their data reveals that the percentage of Canadians typically claiming to work 35 to 40 hours a week fell from 65 percent to roughly 54 percent between 1976 and 1995, a drop of more than ten percentage points (ibid., C-4). Hall (1999) in turn focuses on the hours that Canadians actually labour. Her data indicates that actual hours diverge substantially for persons who claim they usually work 35 to 40 hours a week, as roughly 39 percent put in shorter or longer hours. Hall’s study suggests that the percentage of Canadians working 35 to 40 hours a week dropped by about 8 points between 1980 and 1998, from 49.2 percent to 41.2 percent (ibid., 29-30).
The more significant shift towards shorter hours reflects the convergence of three key labour market developments since the 1970s. First, the labour force participation rate of women rose substantially, while it declined slightly for men (Statistics Canada 2000, 99). Second, the service sector grew extensively since the early 1970s, surpassing the relative size of goods-producing industries in the Canadian economy. As of 2002, 75 percent of Canadian employment is found in the service sector (Statistics Canada 2002b). Third, we have seen that employers sought to lower labour costs substantially after 1970 in response to declining profits. In the rapidly expanding service sector, labour cost reduction strategies favoured shifts from standard hours to shorter hours for non-managerial employees. Together, these three labour market developments contributed to the rapid expansion of part-time positions relative to full-time work: the former grew by more than 120 percent between 1976 and 1995, while the latter rose by roughly 45 percent (TABLE 1; see also Duffy 1997, 168). Women filled more than two-thirds of the new part-time positions (ibid.) and have represented roughly 70 percent of part-time workers since 1970 (Statistics Canada 2000, 103).

The convergence of the three labour market trends was no coincidence. In the absence of significant state support for child care services, many women were motivated by economic need and ideological changes to look for employment that they could manage in addition to their primary responsibility for unpaid care work. Many of the emerging service industry jobs were simultaneously looking for skills associated with ‘women’s’ domestic work, including caregiving, hospitality-provision, food preparation, and cleaning (Armstrong 1997, 45). Service industry efforts to ‘casualize’ labour force participation patterns were also consistent with the short work-weeks put in by a sizable proportion of women workers in the 1970s. While just over 60 percent of women in 1976 worked standard hours per week, 30 percent worked fewer than 35
hours. Thus, the labour usage strategies implemented after the mid-1970s suggest that service industry employers sought to acquire increased flexibility from its growing workforce by capitalizing on (and catering to?) the most significant non-standard labour force attachment pattern demonstrated by the pool of potential workers they intended to attract (Fagan, O’Reilly and Rubery 2000/1998, 177-8; Jenson 1996, 94).

Whereas aggregate data indicate that the shift from standard hours has flowed more towards shorter work-weeks, data broken down by gender indicate that the most significant proportional gain for both female and male employees was in positions in which they worked more than 40 hours per week (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 37). Between 1976 and 1995, the share of women working long work-weeks rose 4.2 percentage points (from 8.9 percent to 13.1 percent of all women labour force participants), whereas the percentage of women working short weeks rose only by 1.4 percentage points (from 29.7 percent to 31.1 percent). During the same period, the share of men putting in long hours increased by 5.2 percentage points (from 27.9 percent to 33.1 percent of all male labour force participants), versus a 4.1 percentage point increase in short weeks (from 4.3 percent to 8.5 percent).

The apparent inconsistency between the data broken down by sex and the data for all workers is reconciled when attention is given to the numbers of women and men to which the above percentage gains correspond. As TABLE 1 shows, relatively few men (only 4.6 percent) worked part-time in 1976. Between 1976 and 1995, an additional 4 million workers entered Canada’s labour market, two-thirds of whom were women. For every 100 new female labour entrants, roughly 50 more women worked in jobs with standard hours, 33 worked part-time and 17 accepted positions with long work-weeks. In contrast, for every 100 new male market
entrants, roughly 50 more men worked in positions characterized by long hours, 28 worked standard hours, and 22 laboured short work-weeks.

### TABLE 1: POLARIZATION IN DISTRIBUTION OF PAID WORK TIME

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 34 hrs</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>35 to 40</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>-8.3%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41+</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute #</td>
<td>944.37</td>
<td>2,090.91</td>
<td>1,146.53</td>
<td>207.57</td>
<td>526.03</td>
<td>318.46</td>
<td>736.80</td>
<td>1,564.88</td>
<td>828.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 34 hrs</td>
<td>4,762.02</td>
<td>6,442.28</td>
<td>1,680.26</td>
<td>3,328.85</td>
<td>3,633.65</td>
<td>394.79</td>
<td>1,523.16</td>
<td>2,808.63</td>
<td>1,285.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41+</td>
<td>2,716.15</td>
<td>1,161.03</td>
<td>1,355.12</td>
<td>1,355.12</td>
<td>2,056.07</td>
<td>720.92</td>
<td>219.97</td>
<td>660.08</td>
<td>440.11</td>
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The numbers of men and women finding jobs with short, standard and long hours indicates that significant proportional increases do not necessarily correspond to labour market trends affecting the greatest number of men and women. For male workers, there is a correspondence between the greatest proportional and numerical gains over the period 1976 to 1995. The 5.2 percentage point rise in long weeks is equivalent to 721,000 more male workers putting in over 40 hours, while the 4.1 percentage point rise in the proportion working less than 35 hours represents an added 318,000 male part-time workers. This correspondence between proportional and numerical gains reflects in large part men's predominance in the goods-producing sector where labour cost reduction strategies favoured fewer workers putting in longer hours. However, the historically low rates of part-time market participation among men mean that the number of additional male workers labouring less than 35 hours per week should not be overlooked. The increase of 318,000 male part-time workers represents a 116 percent rise in men working short work-weeks, compared to a 1.2 percent gain in men working standard hours, and a 54 percent increase in the number of men putting in long hours.

For women, the relationship between the largest proportional and greatest numerical gains in the distribution of paid work hours is very different. The 4.2 percentage point rise in the
proportion of women working more than 40 hours represents only 440,000 more women putting in long work-weeks; whereas the smallest proportional increase of 1.4 percentage points reflects an additional 828,000 women in part-time positions. Similarly, the largest gain numerically for women – 1.3 million additional women workers in jobs with standard hours – represents a proportional decline of 5.6 percent.

Numerically speaking, then, the data indicates that many more women sought and accepted full-time positions as their labour market opportunities increased in number and improved in quality and remuneration. In fact, for roughly every three additional female labour market entrants between 1976 and 1995, two women found positions of 35 or more hours. The rise in full-time work was particularly notable among women aged 35 to 54 who experienced a substantially lower rate of decline in standard hours and relatively little shift towards short work-weeks. The number of women in this age bracket that moved from marginal positions to career jobs after 1976 likely explains this trend (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-14).

Nonetheless, the 828,000 additional women working part-time in 1995 compared to 1976 greatly affected the balance between part-time, standard, and long hours for all workers. The historically low rates of part-time market participation among men, as well as men’s declining share of the workforce, meant that additional women working part-time contributed significantly to the shift away from standard hours among the entire labour force that manifest itself in a more pronounced increase in short work-weeks.
3c. ‘Core’ and ‘peripheral’ jobs

The trends underlying the polarization in working time since 1976 converged with job characteristics relating to earnings, education and age. As a result, the redistribution of paid work hours has contributed to a growing gap between a ‘core’ and a ‘contingent’ labour force.

Between 1985 and 1995, growth in long work-weeks was particularly acute among managers, up 8.2 percent for men and 3.2 percent among women. Long work-weeks also increased for professionals, as well as for blue collar workers in typically male industries, such as processing, machining, fabricating, primary occupations, construction and transport operations (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-19 – C-20).\(^8\) Consistent with this data, roughly half of all workers reporting overtime in the late 1990s are in professional, managerial and administrative occupations, while another 15 percent work in processing and machining or product fabrication positions (Duchesne 1997, 14). The overtime work of managers is typically unpaid: fewer than 5 percent report working paid overtime regularly each week, whereas 29 percent report working extra hours for no additional compensation. In addition to managers, weekly unpaid overtime is reported by 24 percent of professionals, 9 percent of technical workers, and 8 percent of administrators. In contrast, the overtime put in by trades and production workers is more often compensated: less than 3 percent claim they work unpaid overtime, whereas 16 percent report weekly overtime hours for which they receive extra remuneration (Hall 1999, 36).

\(^8\) Hall’s (1999, 33) data describing actual hours worked suggest that growth in short work-weeks predominated in managerial, professional and blue-collar occupations between 1989 and 1998. According to her figures, most of the shift from standard hours to short weeks occurred in the early 1990s (p. 30-31). This finding stands in stark contrast to the Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty (1996) data based on usual hours, which indicate a substantial shift from standard hours primarily to long work-weeks within these occupations. I rely on the latter data when examining the growing gap between ‘core’ and ‘contingent’ positions because I suspect that fringe benefits and non-overtime salaried earnings are more likely to be based on usual hours than actual hours. Whether this assumption holds for hourly-paid blue-collar workers is less clear. Therefore there is some need for further examination of how the numbers generated by the respective studies differ, particularly to determine more precisely the timing of the increases in long- and short-weeks. Still, although there is some inconsistency in terms of describing the timing of these shifts, the aggregate data of both studies confirm that standard hours fell roughly by 10 percent and shifted more towards short work-weeks.
Given the occupations in which overtime has become more common, growth in long-work weeks has occurred disproportionately among individuals with relatively high (before overtime) earnings, particularly during the 1980s (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 38). The concentration of longer hours among higher paid workers meant a steady increase in the proportion of university graduates labouring long work-weeks between 1976 and 1995. The share of women with degrees working long hours increased by five percentage points to 17.9 percent, while the share of men rose by six points to 31.8 percent (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-14 – C-16).

Women age 35 to 54 also moved increasingly from standard hours into long work-weeks since 1976. As of 1995, 8.1 percent of women age 35 to 44 and 9.2 percent of those age 45 to 54 worked long hours weekly, up 2.3 and 3.4 percentage points respectively. Among women aged 25 to 34 there was substantial polarization, as short and long work-weeks rose by 4 percent and 3 percentage points respectively. Like young women, men across age brackets have seen work time polarize, though shifts away from standard hours favoured long work-weeks at all ages. As with women, the growth in long weeks surpassed that of short hours most significantly for men between age 35 and 54 (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-12 – C-14).

While long work weeks have grown more common for high-wage earners, the university educated, and (to some extent) among workers aged 35 to 54, growth in short work-weeks has been more concentrated among low-wage workers, persons with no post-secondary certificate (up roughly 5 percent for women and men), women over 55 (up 9.7 percent), and workers age 15 to 24 who are no longer in school (up 18.8 percent) (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 38; Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-10, C-13, C-14). In addition, the share of short work-weeks increased for men in typically ‘female’ clerical, service and sales occupations, by 4.1, 2
and 5.1 percentage points respectively between 1976 and 1995. However, no clear trend emerged for women in these traditionally ‘female’ occupations. In clerical positions, women experienced only a 1.7 percentage point shift to short hours; those in sales witnessed a substantial 8.5 percentage point increase in standard hours; and women in service industries encountered a slight 1 percentage point rise in long hours (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-19 – C-21).

The convergence of worker characteristics and changes in the distribution of work time is consistent with the view that employers in many industries have come to rely increasingly on a ‘core’ of relatively well-paid, educated, and experienced workers for longer hours (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 38; Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-26). For both men and women, occupations in which long hours have risen either include a high level of responsibility (as with white collar managers, administrators and professionals), or regular opportunities for paid overtime (as with blue collar industrial workers) (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-16 – C-22). White collar workers, particularly managers, are likely working longer hours in part because of the added responsibilities that flow from layoffs, enhanced employer expectations in an employment environment that is increasingly competitive, and/or in hopes of securing future promotions. For blue-collar workers, increased paid overtime opportunities may reflect employers’ interests in avoiding the costs of hiring and training additional employees, as well as added payroll expenses.

As employers have relied increasingly on ‘core’ workers, a ‘periphery’ labour force has also expanded, particularly in the service sector (Duffy 1997, 182-3; Jenson 2000/1998, 8; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 100; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 146). Growth in short work-weeks for men and women is concentrated in relatively unskilled jobs for which little site-specific training is necessary and pay is low. Because many workers appear largely
interchangeable in such employment situations (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-26), they have few resources to resist the casualization of their paid work that effectively transfers from employers more of the economic risks linked with the business cycle. From the employer’s standpoint, added flexibility and reduced fringe benefit costs offset expenses associated with managing a part-time, and sometimes temporary, workforce. The result is the growth in forms of work “that are on the borderline between non-participation in the labour force and employment,” with an increase in short-term, highly unstable jobs that sometimes do not generate enough income to push workers above low-income cut-offs (Meulders 2000/1998, 251).

The expansion in employment at this ‘borderline’ is manifest in a number of ways. One important example is the much higher rate of involuntary part-time employment. By 1995, slightly more than one-third of part-time workers were unable to find full-time hours, compared to only 11 percent in 1975 (Duffy 1997, 175; see also Gabriel 1999, 149). In addition, Drolet and Morissette (1997, 34) report that 54 percent of women and 78 percent of men with paid work-weeks shorter than 30 hours would like to have more paid work time.\(^9\) Similarly, an expanded periphery has also led to an increase in the share of workers holding multiple jobs, from roughly 2 percent in 1977 to about 5 percent for both women and men in 1995 (Beaujot 2000, 138). Whereas 80 percent of multiple job-holders in 1976 worked more than 40 hours between their various positions, this figure dropped to only 64 percent by 1995. Multiple job-holders today are more likely to be young persons working part-time hours in two jobs, the sum of which may not add up to a standard work-week. (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-7).

The expansion of the periphery labour market is also apparent in the significant growth in self-employment since 1975, and particularly since 1990. Stanford (1999, 131-3) reports that

\(^9\)These figures are based on calculations using data presented in Table 2 of Drolet and Morissette (1997, 34).
self-employment increased by one-third between 1990 and 1997 (to 18 percent of all jobs in Canada), and accounted for over three-quarters of job growth during the period. While growth in self-employment is sometimes taken as a sign of enhanced access to 'good' quality market opportunities, recent data suggest this assumption is inaccurate. 90 percent of growth in self-employment between 1990 and 1997 was among 'own account' individuals who have no additional employees. On average, own account self-employed earnings are just two-thirds of the average earnings of paid employees ($22,000 in 1995); and self-employment provides no access to fringe benefits and insurance programs other than what one purchases for oneself, purchases that are often out of reach due to low earnings for many own account workers (Jenson and Stroik 1999, 12). In addition, own account workers tend to have either very long or quite short hours (Armstrong 1996, 47). 1995 data indicate that the self-employed are nearly three times as likely to work long hours compared to paid employees (44 percent versus 15 percent), and somewhat more likely to work short hours (29 percent versus 24 percent). Moreover, short work-weeks began to rise more rapidly for the self-employed during the recession of the 1990s and the slow growth recovery that ensued (Sheridan, Sunter and Diverty 1996, C-8).

While some women and men may be choosing to work for themselves, Armstrong (1996, 48) and Stanford (1999, 133) observe that the increase in self-employment also importantly reflects structural factors, particularly the transformation of permanent jobs into contract jobs and chronically poor employment opportunities in the 1990s. Their position is corroborated by the fact that, in the past two decades, the rate of self-employment has risen especially rapidly during recessions, suggesting that self-employment in many cases may be "appealing only by default" (ibid.). Among women, for instance, self-employment is growing particularly quickly in traditionally low-paying child care and home-cleaning occupations where it seems unlikely that
'becoming one’s own boss' is the major incentive behind the renewed growth in these traditional domestic services (ibid.). Instead, much of the growth in own account self-employment likely reflects various efforts to maintain self-reliance in low-wage jobs by workers displaced from other paid employment positions.

3d. Two ‘ideal’ worker norms: neither adequately facilitates earning and caring

Data documenting labour market trends suggest that the restructuring of the 1980s and 90s further entrenched the dominant norm of the ideal worker as someone unencumbered by responsibilities that limit one’s willingness to commit to the job to the degree demanded by an employer. As a result of revised labour usage strategies intended to garner more flexibility from employees, well-educated workers in positions that involve significant responsibility have been increasingly asked to work additional hours per week. This trend is particularly noticeable in the share of professionals and managers working long work-weeks and the shift from standard hours to overtime that was especially acute among managers. While many professionals and managers are not compensated for overtime hours, their non-overtime earnings are typically much higher than occupations with less responsibility, especially if they entered the labour force before 1978. Although blue-collar workers may shoulder less responsibility than their white-collar counterparts, many goods-producing companies have chosen to use fewer employees for longer hours and compensate their remaining blue-collar ‘core’ with enriched overtime pay. Thus, work time patterns that evolved in the 1980s and 90s mean that occupations that pay well and/or grant substantial responsibility provide employees less time to spend on non-paid work aspirations and needs than was the case in the mid-1970s, including less time for caregiving.

The especially long hours which characterize the high-tech sector, and BC’s revised regulatory standards, also speak volumes about what is expected of ‘ideal’ employees in today’s
market. More than any other sector, high-tech companies and their knowledge-based industry affiliates are touted as the future engine of Canadian economic growth. As local natural resource industries struggle and developing nations expand their goods-producing industrial output, knowledge industries are thought to be located at the cutting edge of a market niche in which developed countries with well-educated labour forces can retain their comparative advantage. Identified as an economic leader in the new millennium, it is telling that the high-tech sector’s average work-week is 48 hours and that one in five employees work over 60 hours per week (Duxbury, Dyke and Lam 2000). Such employment expectations signal that the sorts of workers that the country is particularly hoping to educate are expected to enter an occupational environment that leaves significantly less time for outside interests and obligations than was the norm in the 1960s and 70s.

Since the flexibility expected of an ‘ideal’ worker today often requires a greater time commitment to paid work than three decades earlier, there is good reason to believe it has grown increasingly difficult to balance unpaid caregiving with tenure in ‘good’ jobs that pay well. Not only has the dramatic rise in the share of women in the paid workforce meant there are fewer people in the domestic sphere to shoulder significant caregiving responsibilities on behalf of ‘ideal’ workers, ‘good’ jobs increasingly provide workers with fewer hours to tend to non-employment aspects of their life.

The continued, if not growing, incompatibility of unpaid caregiving obligations and ‘ideal’ worker status is manifest in various ways. In 1999, the Québec Council for the Status of Women reported that one Québécois woman a day loses her job because she is pregnant or recently had a child (Picard 2000), despite the fact that the province has the most family-friendly policies in the country. Similarly, 1998 research about careers in the federal government,
historically a key source of 'good' jobs for women, found that “motherhood and career advancement are perceived by many female Public Service knowledge workers to be mutually exclusive goals” (Duxbury, Dyke and Lam 1999, 123). Whereas 97 percent of male executives in the federal civil service had children, only 55 percent of female executives did (ibid., 17); and 30 percent of women in the federal bureaucracy cited the presence of children as barriers to career advancement, compared to just 10 percent of men (ibid., 310). Within high-tech industries, research by Duxbury, Dyke and Lam (2000) suggests that long hours accepted by employees under 30 who typically have fewer caregiving responsibilities pose significant work-family conflicts for employees 30 to 39 for whom child-rearing work increases significantly. Yet, many professionals who opt for fewer hours of paid work to balance family and career report feeling peripheralized in their work settings. ‘Mommy’ and ‘daddy track’ workers are often regarded as less serious about their careers, risk being passed over for promotion, and have a higher rate of layoff compared to their ‘more committed’ colleagues (Duffy 1997, 176; Coltrane 1996, 229; Baker 1995, 176).

While the norm of the ‘ideal’ worker has not evolved in response to fewer women providing less unpaid care in the domestic sphere, nor to accommodate the increased share of employees who shoulder extensive unpaid caregiving responsibilities, trends in work time indicate that the labour market has nonetheless reorganized in response to the changing labour force participation patterns of women (Jenson 1996, 92). The expansion of the periphery labour force marks the emergence of a new labour market norm of an ‘ideally casual’ worker. This new norm is modeled on the ‘secondary earner’ status ideologically ascribed to women in the 1950s and 60s employed in work settings that seemed to permit them more flexibility to shoulder primary responsibility for caregiving than did a standard, full-time job (Leach 1996, 208).
During the era of revised labour usage strategies, the lesser time commitment to the market that many women accepted and/or sought dovetailed well with companies’ concerns to generate more of a ‘just in time’ workforce. Employers could utilize part-time workers to supplement their ‘core’ labour force and thereby achieve the flexibility necessary to schedule labour for peaks and lulls in production and demand. Accordingly, an ‘ideally casual’ worker evolved as someone who would work only those hours an employer needed, often on a temporary contract or seasonal basis. She or he would usually be cheaper, earning lower wages and fewer, if any, fringe benefits, and be more pliable to changing employer expectations due to lower rates of unionization. Ultimately, the ‘ideally casual’ worker is disposable when deemed necessary by an employer and easy to replace because of the relative interchangeability of the skill-set associated with employment at the market’s periphery.

Companies’ efforts to capitalize on the advantages associated with ‘ideally casual’ workers, particularly in the service sector, have meant a rapid expansion of positions that appear to permit workers more flexibility to tend to unpaid caregiving aspirations in addition to paid work. Although they may permit more time to combine caring and earning, ‘non-core’ jobs are increasingly characterized by reduced earnings potentials that ignore the financial component of caregiving. Low wages, few benefits and occupational instability limit a caregiver’s capacity to provide economically for care-recipients, both children and dependent adults. In addition, investigations of working conditions draw attention to the fact that some part-time work does not afford employees the sort of flexibility that truly facilitates combining earning and caring roles. For instance, Meulders (2000/1998, 258) observes that part-time work does not rule out long work-days, schedules that diverge from the standard 9:00 to 5:00 business hours, nor, in some cases, long work-weeks. Part-time workers are also more regularly expected to work week-ends
than their full-time counterparts. And part-time work frequently entails greater variations in day-
to-day scheduling at the employer’s request, as well as less consistency in the number of hours or
days that one works from week to week.

By further entrenching the ideal worker norm, and operationalizing a new norm of an
‘ideally casual’ worker, the labour market restructuring of the 1980s and 90s was both inattentive
and ambivalent towards the caregiving ambitions and responsibilities of many Canadians. Jobs
that pay well have become increasingly incompatible with caregiving due to time-constraints,
whereas jobs that provide more time to care are now increasingly incompatible with caregiving
for financial reasons. Thus, revised labour usage strategies have enhanced a structural barrier
that obstructs the achievement of work-family balance. This structural barrier has been
exacerbated by intergenerational dynamics that not only reduced the initial earnings of recent
market entrants, but limited financial returns for their increased experience over time,
particularly among men. As a result, income is falling among a group of labour market
participants in their prime child-rearing years for whom the costs of caregiving are likely to be
especially high (Stroik and Jenson 1999, 11).

3e. The structural barrier that impedes work-family balance also underlies rising earnings
inequality and reinforces relations of dependency

The same structural barrier that impedes work-family balance has simultaneously
contributed to disturbing trends in earnings inequality. The polarization of paid work hours that
widened the core/periphery labour force divide also increased earnings inequality among all paid
labour force participants in the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1989, weekly earnings inequality grew
13 percent among Canadian male workers and 5 percent among women workers (Morissette,
Myles and Picot 1995, 37). The rise in inequality between men was driven by two factors: (i) the
growing inequality in the distribution of paid work hours; and (ii) the changing work patterns of
low- and high-wage labour force participants which saw the latter group assume longer hours more regularly than the former. Earnings inequality grew more slowly among women workers because there was less inequality in the distribution of work time. As more women moved from standard hours to long work-weeks, more part-time women employees also put in longer hours (though still often less than 35 per week). Thus, the more moderate growth in earnings inequality among women was due entirely to the second factor affecting men: relative to low-wage workers, a greater share of higher-paid women worked long work-weeks in 1989 than in 1981 (ibid., 38). Since the late 1980s, data indicates that earnings inequality has levelled off for both sexes (Picot 1998).

A 1998 study by Picot reveals that the growth in earnings inequality observed during the 1980s among paid workers disappears when the point of focus extends to consider the declining share of working age adults outside the labour force. In fact, Picot’s research (1998, 3.10) indicates that earnings inequality changed little over the entire period 1975 to 1995 when the population age 17 to 64 is the object of examination. As the share of working age Canadians with no earnings decreased because of the growth in women’s labour force participation, their increased earnings compensated for additional gains made by high-wage workers.

However, Picot notes that the overall stability in earnings inequality among the working age population highlighted by aggregate data obscures two off-setting trends that underlie it. On one hand, there has been a significant decline in earnings inequality among women as their labour force participation rate rose. One common measurement of inequality is the gini coefficient. Between 1977 and 1990, the gini fell 9.9 percent (with cyclical variation removed), signalling a reduction in earnings inequality between working age women. After 1990, the gini plateaued, likely reflecting that the employment to population ratio among women levelled off at
that time (Picot 1998, 3.10). On the other hand, inequality among working age men rose even more substantially than it declined for women. Picot (ibid., 3.11) reports that the gini for men rose steadily between 1977 and 1995, increasing by almost 19 percent over the period. Not only did men in lower paid positions work fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year relative to high-wage earners, the share of men with zero market earnings increased due to layoffs and (early) retirement, especially in the 1990s.

From one perspective it is welcome news that women’s changed labour force participation mediated growth in earnings inequality among working age Canadians. However, the counter-force provided by women consists primarily of an increase in the share of women earning less than $13,100 a year, and especially those earning less than $10,000 annually (Picot 1998, 3.12). In other words, aggregate earnings inequality is not rising among Canadians age 17 to 64 because many more women are earning income consistent with participation patterns at the margins of the market. While such participation may stabilize aggregate earnings inequality, it is not obviously a recipe for equality within heterosexual couples, or between women and men more generally, “whether considered in terms of the gender division of labour in the family or of the capacity of a woman to be self-supporting” (Jenson 1996, 96).

Even if we bracket for a moment questions of gender-based inequality, the ambivalence to caregiving implicit in the norm of the ‘ideal’ (as opposed to the ‘ideally casual’) worker would still reinforce relations of dependency. Rather than moving towards a labour market system that enables one person to earn sufficient income and care simultaneously, the norm of the ideal worker today makes it more difficult for anyone to combine these two roles.10 There is little

101996 Census data indicate that 48 percent of labour force participants have a child who resides at home and 17 percent perform elder care on a weekly basis. 20 percent have both a child living at home and perform weekly unpaid elder care. In many cases, unpaid care work will be particularly significant for labour market participants with younger children. 1996 data indicate that 26 percent of labour force participants have children under fourteen.
indication that the “functional division” of responsibilities between ideal worker and unpaid caregiver are blurring (Slaughter 1995, 75). Unless an ideal employee chooses to remain childless (as are more Canadians), someone else must assume responsibility for her/his children in order to free this employee to be a member of the ‘core’ staff. Whoever assumes this unpaid responsibility disqualifies her/himself from the category of ideal worker and is therefore far more likely to work at the margins of the market if s/he endeavours to maintain some attachment to the labour force. At the margins, we have seen that economic sustainability is increasingly difficult to achieve as hours, pay, and benefits decline. Even if primary caregivers initially intend to work fewer paid hours only while their children are pre-school age, the consequences of this decision are dynamic, not static. The term ‘dynamic’ acknowledges how such decisions have considerable influence on future work options and wages, a theme that I develop in the next chapter. The result is that persons who (wish to) take on a significant role providing unpaid care remain at risk of economic dependence on either an ideal worker or the state, despite the fact that they are also far more likely to be in the labour force today than they were thirty years ago.

Although expectations of the ‘ideal worker’ will reinforce relations of dependency regardless of whether the gendered nature of the earner and unpaid caregiver roles change, the next chapter explores the costs for diverse groups of women that result from the fact that the caregiver role remains primarily ‘women’s work’. Sex, race, class and citizenship all factor in determining the distribution of care labour. This distribution in turn mediates who is available for ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ positions and the costs and gains associated with these market locations (Jenson 2000/1998, 7, 10).

10 percent have children under six. 5 percent have children under two. (See Tables 93f0027xdb96006v2.ivt and 93f0027xdb96016v2.ivt from the 1996 Census, the Nation Series, Package 7 –Labour Market Activities, Industry and Occupation, Household Activities, Place of Work and Mode of Transportation. Available at: http://data.library.ubc.ca/datalib/survey/statscan/census/1996/b2020/nation/index.html#pack7).
Conclusion

Labour market transitions of the past two decades illuminate the intimate links between paid work opportunities and opportunities to fulfil and pursue care obligations and ambitions. Rising female labour force participation means that more single mothers and two-parent families have less time to perform unpaid care duties. The resultant increased labour force participation among the working age population renders it more challenging for society to ensure employment opportunities for all citizens seeking paid work, particularly as core workers labour longer hours. The longer hours expected of core workers position unpaid care commitments as sources of dependency and inequality. Together, these three trends raise questions about current cultural expectations regarding full-time work. In particular, we must ask whether existing social conceptions of the full-time work-week or full-time work over the life course are either sustainable or desirable given the escalating difficulties inherent in balancing the requirements of employment and family, the significant share of the population that is marginalized by un(der)employment, and the fact that care obligations and aspirations render citizens at increased risk of economic insecurity.

Questions about the distribution of paid work time and, thus, time available to perform unpaid care and other citizenry pursuits, become still more complex and pressing given the declining real value of wages earned by relatively recent labour market entrants, particularly men. Lower real starting wages in the absence of accelerating returns for experience pose substantial monetary challenges for young families with children, a fact to which rising poverty

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11 In 2002, the BC Liberal government made social assistance eligibility criteria more restrictive for single parents. Legislation now requires 'employable' lone-parents to seek work when their youngest child turns three, down from age seven (Government of British Columbia 2002, 4). This policy shift will increase the number of single mothers with less time to perform unpaid care duties. The resultant work-family balance challenge is further exacerbated by the provincial government's simultaneous decision to restrict eligibility for provincial child care subsidies by lowering the average income-level under which citizens qualify for public child care assistance (ibid.).
rates are testament. Income needs in turn pressure citizens to seek more paid work. This pressure only magnifies the temporal constraints that impede unpaid caregiving and poses further barriers to any initiative to redistribute paid work time among greater numbers of citizens in order to minimize un(der)employment. By recognizing the intersections between the distribution of paid work hours, earnings and opportunities to care, the possibility emerges that policy measures which better account for the domestic sphere may provide the foundation for a social policy blueprint that is more effectively positioned to counter un(der)employment and mitigate the effects of declining real wages and rising earnings inequality. I explore this possibility in chapter eight.
A post-traditional [social] order is not one in which tradition disappears – far from it. It is one in which tradition changes its status. Traditions have to explain themselves, to become open to interrogation or discourse... In a globalizing, culturally cosmopolitan society... traditions are forced into open view: reasons or justifications have to be offered.

-- Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (1994, 5).

Chapter six continues with the recognition that the post-war approach to social citizenship was a creature of its time and the times have changed. The structural transition at issue in this chapter is the rapid shift way from the ‘traditional’ 1950s patriarchal family. The dramatic increase in women’s labour force participation discussed in the previous chapter has coincided with an equally dramatic transformation in household organization in Canada. The marriage rate is down roughly 44 percent since the early 1970s (Statistics Canada 2000, 30) and just 50 percent of women over 15 are married (ibid., 29). By contrast, the share of women living in a common law-union has doubled since 1981 to reach 8 percent (ibid., 29); the percentage of adult women living alone has nearly doubled since 1971, from 7 to 13 percent (ibid.); and the proportion of female lone parents has also almost doubled in the same period, rising from 10 to 19 percent of all families with children (ibid., 32). Although the largest share (55 percent) of single mothers are divorced or separated from former husbands, a growing proportion are women who have never married: 24 percent\(^1\) in 1996 compared to 11 percent in 1981 (ibid., 33). The rise of lone-mother families has coincided with a more general increase in the share of single parent families, which now represents 22 percent of all families with children (ibid., 43). Women head roughly 83 percent of all one-parent families, as they have done since the mid-1970s (ibid.).

\(^1\) This number may include a significant share of women who were living in common-law relationships at the time of their child’s birth (Statistics Canada 2000, 33).
Among the declining share of two parent families, the proportion in which one parent remains out of the labour force to care for children has dropped substantially in the past three decades. As of 1997, 22 percent of two-parent families with at least one child under sixteen had one income earner and one non-earning at-home spouse, compared to 52 percent of families in 1976 (Statistics Canada 2000, 110). This proportional decline represented a shift from 3 million at-home mothers in 1976 to just 1.1 million by 1997 (ibid.).

The transition in family forms and household organizational practices fostered and reflected a gradual, but nonetheless, dramatic ideological shift in Canada: citizens and policy makers increasingly resisted the fragmented post-war model of differential citizenship for (racially privileged) men and women in favour of a new social citizenship paradigm premised on the activities of the wage-worker. One effect of this ideological shift was the extension of many male citizenry practices and expectations to women (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 15).

The weaker social protections for mothers in the early post-war era compared to those available for male breadwinners set the stage for some feminist arguments to contribute to the emergent hegemony of the citizen-worker paradigm. We saw in chapter three that many feminists advanced the position that social inclusion and security demand not only the post-war paradigm’s commitment to decommodifying policies, but also measures that guarantee entitlement to a sufficient degree of commodification for all citizens. From this perspective, female employment-promotion emerged as the crux of many feminist political platforms, particularly among white, middle-class women for whom social expectations of domesticity proved a significant barrier to the paid labour force.

Feminist lobbying successfully won pay and employment equity measures in the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter three). The public recognition of women as citizen-wage-workers
implicit in these policies intersected with recessions and declining male wages to power the rapid rise in female labour force participation, including among mothers of young children. As of 1999, 61 percent of mothers with children under three work for pay in the labour market, up from 28 percent in 1976. Similarly, 66 percent of mothers with children age three to five are employed, up from 37 percent. Roughly 70 percent of employed women with children under six now hold full-time positions (Statistics Canada 2000, 100-101, 116-119).

While feminism facilitated the ideological extension of historically male citizenry practices to many more women, my focus in this chapter is the contribution of economic conservative thinking. In section one, I discuss how assumptions about work and family that underpin the current model of social citizenship have a distinctly neoliberal individualist character. In particular, the economic conservative preoccupation with transfer dependency provided ideological support for extending to women the citizen-wage-worker model. However, new social measures to support women and men balance employment in the absence of someone at home full-time are not consistent with the economic conservative plan to reduce government and privatize social services. Accordingly, the neoliberal focus on self-reliance powered a second ideological shift that is implicit in its support for the citizen-wage-worker model. This shift further obscures the welfare contributions of the domestic sphere by presuming that single citizens are (or ought to be) capable of shouldering simultaneously the earning and caring roles that were formerly assigned to a married couple under the post-war regime (Eichler 1997, 13).

At an ideological level, the contemporary economic conservative model of social citizenship reflects a stronger commitment to gender equality than that of the post-war era, as I discuss in section two. But the logic of the new model is ultimately inadequate for including all citizens as full members of society due to its androcentrism. The neoliberal framework fails to
account for 'traditionally' female citizenry practices and thereby repeats the post-war failure to theorize domesticity adequately. In section three, I examine how the androcentrism of neoliberal policy neglects unpaid caregiving and the reality that women continue to perform the majority of this work. By discounting this reality, the new social citizenship framework poses a range of costs for diverse groups of women that undermine the model's sustainability and claims to fairness and equality. I discuss some of these costs in sections four and five. Section six rejects the suggestion that the remedy to the neoliberal model of social citizenship can be found by returning to the 'traditional' patriarchal breadwinner/caregiver division of labour.

1. The Individual Responsibility Model of the Family

The economic conservative depiction of social security as participation and adaptation in the labour market meant that many neoliberals shared with feminists a concern to restructure Canada's social citizenship framework to acknowledge the welfare potential of the labour force. We saw in chapter four that neoliberals advocate that Canada's social policy envelope should integrate a new analytic dimension that monitors the degree to which state arrangements entice or discourage employment. Concern with transfer dependency inclined many economic conservatives to encourage women (including mothers of young children) on social assistance to secure paid employment in order to reduce government spending on welfare, sometimes sanctioning moderate government support for child care spending in the process (Mead 1997, 224; Courchene 1994a, 82). More generally, some economic conservatives imply that women's participation in the paid labour force (typically for wages that are lower than men's) contributes to economic productivity and international competitiveness (Teghtsoonian 1997, 122).

Although consistent with the economic conservative preoccupation with human capital, the extension of the citizen-worker model of social citizenship poses significant tensions for
neoliberalism specifically. First, this extension is at odds with the social conservative preference for the ‘traditional’ one-earner heterosexual couple, particularly when young children are at issue. Second, universalization of the citizen-wage-worker model to women conflicts with the neoliberal concern to reduce spending on caregiving-related social services by re-privatizing considerable amounts of care work to the domestic sphere and voluntary sector. The retrenchment of public health care, elder care, child welfare, child care and other services throughout many Canadian provinces in the 1990s (and well into the first decade of the new millennium in BC under the Campbell Liberal government) presumed that families, meaning primarily women, would expand their caregiving labour to compensate. This presumption ignores that one opportunity cost of rising female labour force participation is that many women have far less time available to care privately, or to volunteer their care in a community context. This opportunity cost is particularly significant given that that rising female labour force participation has been accompanied by greater numbers of women living alone or as single parents. Thus, just as privatization implies re-expansion of women’s unpaid caring, the citizen-wage-worker model and the post-traditional familial shift imply a contraction of this role.

While neoliberalism largely ignores the practical implications of these tensions, as I discuss below in sections four and five, it resolves them intellectually by invoking a further ideological shift to accompany the extension of the citizen-wage-worker model to women. Eichler (1997, 13-14) captures this shift in her discussion of the “individual responsibility model of the family” in Canadian public policy. She observes that increasing recognition of women as citizen-wage-workers reflected the assumption that women are capable of fulfilling *either* the care or provider functions. But within a neoliberal policy context preoccupied with self-reliance, this assumption yielded a perverse effect. From the assumption that one person is capable of
either role, "the conclusion is drawn that one parent should be able to do both." This leap in logic 'assumes away' the extensive labour inherent in domestic and caregiving obligations that poses policy challenges for neoliberals who wish to prioritize citizenry labour force participation while simultaneously restraining state expenditures. The individual responsibility model of the contemporary era therefore sets the ideological stage for the containment, and subsequent erosion, of public supports for citizens' caregiving ambitions and obligations despite the rapid decline in time available for households to perform domestic responsibilities.

Courchene's discussion of child care policy exemplifies the influence of the individual responsibility model on economic conservatism. As discussed in chapter four, Courchene (1994, 80) limits his support for child care by observing that "a move to universal day care, as in the Scandinavian countries, will not trigger a major increase in labour force participation of females: they are already in the labour force." His assumption that most Canadian women arrange adequate strategies for shouldering both employment and caregiving in the absence of significant public assistance ignores that that many women (and men) access the labour force because they transfer their care responsibilities to others for no or minimal pay; they incur the time-stress and health consequences associated with the role of 'super-mom'; or they work fewer paid hours. Each of these strategies entails substantial costs for diverse groups of women, as I discuss below.

The individual responsibility model also underscores the recent decision by the Government of British Columbia (2002, 4) to make eligibility for social assistance more restrictive for single parents. Legislation now requires 'employable' lone-parents to seek work when their youngest child turns three, down from age seven. The aim of the new policy is to reduce social assistance caseloads by requiring lone-mothers to capitalize more on the welfare potential of labour markets in keeping with a broader reorientation of social services around the
concept of workfare. However, the B.C. government has simultaneously restricted eligibility for provincial child care subsidies by lowering the average income-level under which citizens qualify for public child care assistance (ibid.). Not only does this decision ignore the challenges that child care costs pose for single mothers trying to find and retain employment, it also reflects an inadequate understanding of the welfare contributions that lone-mothers on social assistance provide in the domestic sphere in part by saving the state the cost of child care subsidies.

The influence of the individual responsibility model of the family is also evident in the revised labour usage strategies of the past two decades. The relative time-deprivation confronted by dual-earner and single parent households illuminates a disjuncture between the ideal (as opposed to ideally casual) worker norm and the challenges posed to individuals by structural social changes. But instead of moderating temporal expectations in the wake of the post-traditional familial shift, employers increasingly call on core workers to perform additional hours. This further entrenchment of the ideal worker norm in an era characterized by far higher rates of female labour force participation and single parenthood reveals the cultural prominence of the individual responsibility model. Ideological assumptions premised on the view that one person should be capable of Shouldering caring and earning responsibilities excuse the inattention of policy makers and employers to the growing work-family balance challenges that confront roughly 55 percent of labour force participants who have either children residing at home and/or who provide weekly elder care.²

2. The Neoliberal Model of Social Citizenship is Androcentric

At the level of ideology, there is a greater commitment to gender equality implicit in the citizen-wage-worker model than was present in the post-war model of citizenship that assumed male dominance and female dependency. Eichler (1997, 13) observes that the new model implies a shift from a society premised on “gender differentiation” to “one that prides itself on being committed to equal treatment of individuals, regardless of gender distinctions.” This shift is evident in numerous policy domains, including in pay and employment equity measures, and especially in the equality provision (section 15.1) of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

The transition from a gender-differentiated model reflects further extension of the politics of dignity discussed in chapter two. The presumption that women are equally competent labourers who should be paid and employed accordingly prioritizes what is the ‘same’ about men and women and supports an analytical approach that is ‘blind’ to differences in many cases. Accordingly, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) link the economic conservative paradigm with the institutionalization of the “logic of gender sameness.”

But the logic implicit in the citizen-wage-worker model assumes a distinctively privileged male frame of reference (Fraser 1994, 605). Fraser (ibid.) observes that this model universalizes the male half of the breadwinner/homemaker couple to all citizens, while providing little additional public support for the caregiving and other domestic responsibilities that had formerly been the domain of economically advantaged women (with the assistance of low-paid female domestic help). The androcentrism of the citizen-worker model is obvious in the dearth of public support for individuals’ caregiving roles, as discussed in chapter three. While pay and employment equity measures welcome women as potential ideal workers on the grounds that they satisfy expectations that were established in an era where core employees were generally...
supported by a full-time wife and mother, the state has not institutionalized broad social supports such as child care or parental leave to assist citizens, particularly women, balance their domestic workloads with more extensive paid labour force commitments.

The androcentrism of the citizen-wage-worker model ignores entirely one line of analysis shared both by social conservatives and feminists who contribute to the literature represented by Collins (1990; 1994). Members of both schools of thought not only reference the welfare contributions of the domestic sphere, but also the importance of participating in one’s own domestic sphere in order to nurture relationships that tend to be fundamental to a person’s sense of belonging, security and fulfillment (see chapters three and four). The significance of providing this care is minimized further when traditionally male practices of citizenship are extended to women in the absence of any simultaneous effort to support men and women fulfill and enjoy traditionally female citizenry roles.

By minimizing the value of domestic participation, the citizen-worker model represents a contemporary instantiation of the classic liberal public/private dualism. Classical liberalism assumed a division between the public world of state and civil society and the private family household of male head and dependent family members, valuing the former over the latter. We saw that this division was carried over into the new liberalism of post-war welfarism by thinkers like T.H. Marshall and Rawls, where it shaped social policy regimes around a concept of the family wage that privileged the public breadwinner role (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 46). While this concept has become problematic for both ideological and fiscal reasons in the current era, the inattention to domesticity demonstrated by the citizen-wage-worker model retains many elements implicit in Rawls’s original position. In particular, by evading questions of the welfare contributed, and value derived, by citizens acting in their private spheres of intimate
relationships, the citizen-wage-worker model reflects assumptions implicit in Rawls's work which effectively disqualifies the domestic sphere as an appropriate point of focus for discussions about matters of citizenship by presuming that contractors in the original position should be mutually disinterested. In a similar fashion, the individual responsibility model of the family acknowledges only superficially that many citizen-workers are likely to have temporally 'encumbering' intimate and family relationships by largely discounting the work that such relationships can generate, as well as the barriers that this work can pose to successful participation in the paid work force. I return to this point in some detail in chapter seven where I argue that the citizen-worker model is impoverished because it neglects the centrality of caregiving for fostering individual autonomy and a sense of belonging.

In addition to distorting the importance of caregiving for social citizenship in our current period, the androcentrism of the citizen-worker model obscures how the cultural recognition of women and men as equals in the labour market has not been accompanied by an equally significant shift in the distribution of domestic and caregiving work along gender lines. The persistent hegemony of the female caregiver role is the subject of the next section. Sections four and five follow with a discussion of some of the various costs that this role continues to impose on diverse groups of women.

3. The Hegemony of the Female Caregiver Model

Regardless of their employment status and occupation, Canadian women typically retain primary responsibility for work in the home today, including caregiving. 94 percent of stay-at-home parents in single-earner couples are women (Statistics Canada 2000, 110). Part-time employed women age 25 to 44 are fifteen times more likely than men of the same age to report that child care responsibilities preclude them from pursuing full-time positions, at 32.5 percent
versus 2.2 percent (ibid., 125). Full-time employed women typically remain responsible for organizing replacement care arrangements while they and their partners are in the labour force (Glenn 1994, 15), as well as for coordinating the performance of domestic household work (Conway 1997, 207). Full-time employed women also consistently provide more unpaid caregiving than full-time employed men, and they enjoy less leisure on average than their male counterparts. According to data from the early 1990s, 52 percent of married mothers in households in which both parents work in the labour market retain all responsibility for housework (which includes child care and general health care for family members, as well as the added laundry, dishes, cleaning and so forth to which children and dependents contribute). 28 percent of mothers maintain most responsibility; 10 percent share domestic work equally with their male partners; and only in 10 percent of cases in which both parents work full-time are men reported to assume more responsibility than women (Beaujot 2000, 214; Boyd 1997b, 257; Conway 1997, 113, 207). Conway (1997, 207) reports that full-time working women in dual-earner heterosexual families are almost as likely to carry all responsibility for domestic labour as are women employed part-time and women who remain outside of the paid workforce.

The presence of preschool age children particularly influences women’s unpaid and paid workloads in a manner that diverges from the patterns of men. For instance, 1996 census data found that roughly one half (51.1 percent) of full-time employed fathers in heterosexual relationships with a child under six provided 14 or fewer hours of unpaid child care per week. In contrast, nearly one half (48.7 percent) of full-time employed mothers with a child under six performed 30 or more hours of care weekly (Statistics Canada 1998). Employed women with preschool children have twice the absenteeism rate due to personal/family-related responsibilities than employed men with children under six: women lost on average 3.4 work-days in 1999,
whereas men lost only 1.8 days (Statistics Canada 1999a). In families with preschool children, women tend to perform far fewer hours of paid work, including in heterosexual households where both parents work full-time. Silver (2000, 27) reports that in such households mothers work roughly 10 fewer paid hours a week than their partners. As the number of children increase in heterosexual two-parent households, the amount of paid work that mothers perform falls, while it increases for fathers (Drolet and Morissette 1997, 35). Mothers of young children also indicate a preference to reduce weekly paid employment more regularly than fathers (ibid., 37).

Although women have adopted most of the roles formerly identified with the ‘male domain’, the above data indicate that most men have yet to assume substantial responsibility for tasks historically identified as ‘women’s work’ in the domestic sphere. Research from the 1980s and early 1990s suggest that most men in heterosexual relationships have not significantly increased the amount of unpaid household work they do despite their partners’ higher rates and longer hours of paid labour force participation (Beaujot 2000, 183; Conway 1997, 206; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 42). As Eichler (1997, 60) remarks, “[t]here is a remarkable inelasticity in men’s contributions to household tasks.” Regardless of how much housework other women do on their behalf, men perform roughly the same amount.¹ She notes that:

Although there are some variations, the unequal division of [domestic] labour is not affected by social class, urban-rural differences, the number of children present in a household, whether or not the wife/mother is in the labour force... or how many resources women have as measured in employment, education, reproductive decision making and family structure.

While men’s hourly contribution to domestic work remains relatively static, there is some evidence that men are increasing their involvement in child rearing specifically. For instance,

³ While the number of hours that men contribute to domestic tasks is not changing significantly, their share of unpaid household work has risen. Women respond to the time constraints posed by their greater paid workloads by doing less at home, lowering their standards, and/or purchasing services. As wives/mothers cut back their domestic roles, one result is that men perform a larger proportionate share of household work (Beaujot 2000, 39; Coltrane 1996, 159-60).
Coltrane (1996, 55) notes that most studies show that parents are increasingly likely to work different shifts, and that “[w]hen the mother is on the job, the father often stays home to watch the children” (see also K. Marshall 1998, 12). Similarly, the number of stay-at-home fathers with children under 16 (those who are able to work but are not looking for employment or attending school) nearly doubled between 1976 and 1997, increasing from 41,000 to 77,000. Some additional 210,000 Canadian families have fathers at home for other reasons, including unemployment, school, and an inability to work (K. Marshall 1998, 11-14). While data suggest that unemployed men still do less than half of the domestic work in a household (Beaujot 2000, 200), a small, but growing, share of fathers are assuming the role of an at-home parent.

In addition, the 1998 General Social Survey on time use indicates that many fathers are making substantial time commitments to their children. Examining heterosexual couples in which both parents are employed full-time, the survey indicates that fathers of children under five are in the company of their children for an average of 4.3 hours/day, compared to mothers who spend 6.4 hours a day. Much of this sex-based difference in time spent with preschoolers can be attributed to the fact that fathers in dual-earner families in which both parents work full-time report an additional 1.5 hours/day of paid labour compared to their spouses. The gap between time that fathers and mothers spend with their children is most pronounced for preschoolers and decreases as children grow older (though primarily because the time that mothers are in the company of their children drops sharply as their hours of paid work rise). For example, children aged 5 to 8 spend 3.4 hours/day with their fathers and 5.0 hours/day with their mothers. Children 9 to 12 are with their fathers daily for 3.0 hours and with their mothers for 3.8

4 Statistics Canada (2000, 111) reports that 6 percent of the 77,000 stay-at-home fathers were actually discouraged workers who “wanted a job, but were not looking for employment in the belief that no work was available.”
hours. And young teens aged 13 to 14 spend slightly more time a day with their fathers than mothers: 2.7 hours versus 2.6 hours respectively (Silver 2000, 26-7).

These most recent Canadian statistics reveal that fathers in dual-earner families in which both parents work 30 or more hours/week are spending substantial amounts of time with their children, though still less than mothers. This relatively high level of paternal involvement in family life should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, studies also show that fathers’ involvement with their children remains “of a different quality and order than that expected of mothers and that fathers are significantly less accountable for it” (Swift 1998, 171). Most significantly, 1998 Canadian data indicate that women remain disproportionately responsible for coordinating and providing primary child care. Primary child care does not simply refer to time spent in the company of one’s children, but to a more narrow concept of time allocated specifically to child care related activities, particularly activities addressing the personal care needs of children (i.e. dressing, feeding, washing, and medical care), as well as reading to, helping, teaching or reprimanding children (C. Young 1994, 550).

For instance, full-time employed mothers report spending 2.65 hours/day with preschool children when child care is their primary activity, over an hour more than that reported by their full-time employed, heterosexual spouses. Similarly, mothers devote 91 minutes a day to personal care (feeding, washing, dressing and medical care) for children aged 0 to 4, whereas fathers spend only 47 minutes/day on these tasks. With children aged 5 to 8, mothers commit 48 minutes a day to personal care, compared to just 18 minutes by fathers. For children aged 9 to 12, mothers continue to provide nearly twice as much personal care as fathers and mothers devote more time to helping, teaching, and reading with children. For young teens, the most prevalent child care activity required is chauffeuring between various activities. Only when
children's needs shift in this direction do full-time employed fathers begin to provide slightly more child care than their full-time employed spouses: 48 minutes daily versus 40 minutes (Silver 2000, 27-9). However, a 1999 Health Canada study found that teenagers continue to prefer to approach their mothers over their fathers about matters that are of particular concern to them (Government of Canada 1999c, 30).

This most recent Canadian data-set shows that the increased time that some men are spending with their children has not translated into their assuming responsibility for primary child care tasks to a degree that approximates the workload borne by mothers, particularly when young children are at home. Thus, the fact that some men are dedicating more time to their children does not yet signal a broad-based gendered restructuring of responsibility for child care (Ferguson 1998, 198; Boyd 1997a, 7; Armstrong 1997, 50). To be sure, the increased amount of time that men dedicate to their children provides some reason to remain optimistic that a redistribution of responsibility for primary child care may someday be accepted (perhaps even welcomed) by men. At present, though, it remains the case that women shoulder the bulk of responsibility for unpaid caregiving.

4. Costs Imposed by the Patriarchal Division of Care Labour in Unpaid Contexts

The gender division of care labour within private households poses a number of challenges and costs for women in a social and economic policy context that prioritizes the citizen-worker and the core employee capable of labouring long hours. While costs materialize somewhat differently for women depending on their social locations amidst relations of race and class, this section explores briefly three sets of challenges that cut across distinctions between women: costs incurred from extended periods outside the labour market; the gender earnings gap; and stress and related health consequences associated with the 'second shift'. In section 5, I
examine more closely costs associated with the hegemony of the female caregiver model that illuminate how social forces indexed to class and race continue to inhere within, and reinforce, patriarchal household practices and norms.

4a. The costs of extended withdrawals from the paid labour force

Chapter three identified some of the costs incurred by women in the 1950s and 60s as a result of extended periods outside of the labour market. Costs included forgone income, ineligibility for ‘fringe’ social benefits in the absence of spousal relationships with a successful breadwinner, depreciating human capital and employment marketability, and relinquished opportunities for training, wage raises, career advancement and enriched pensions.

Far fewer Canadian women now sever their labour market links to the degree expected of middle-class women in the first post-war decades. There are only 1.1 million at home mothers today, down from 3 million in 1976 (Statistics Canada 2000, 110). This decline reflects how 63 percent of Canadian mothers with children under six are now employed, roughly 70 percent of whom work for pay full-time (ibid., 100-101). 86 percent of Canadian mothers return to paid work within one year of giving birth and 93 percent return within two years (ibid., 102).

Higher labour force participation rates among mothers render the dual-earner family the "seeming norm" (Beaujot 2000, 230). However, data from the 1994-95 National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth indicate that the majority of children under twelve in two-parent families reside in homes that remain what Beaujot (ibid.) terms “neo-traditional” for many years. The survey found that 36 percent of such children live with parents who both work full-time, compared to 33 percent who have at least one parent who is not employed, and 22 percent who have at least one parent employed part-time (Ross, Scott and Kelly 1996, 35-36). Given that stay-at-home parents are overwhelmingly mothers, and women constitute 70 percent of part-time
workers, these data suggest that many heterosexual two-adult homes are dividing paid and unpaid work along patriarchal lines when children are under twelve. This division of labour sustains the primary earner/secondary earner dynamic, generating costs that are just as significant for women today as they were several decades ago.

The long-term economic costs that accompany extended periods of labour market withdrawal presently fall disproportionately to single mothers. Ross, Scott and Kelly (1996, 36) report that the majority (55 percent) of children under twelve in single parent homes reside with a parent who is not employed, 11 percent live with a parent employed part-time, while just 34 percent have a parent who works for pay full-time. Statistics Canada (2000) finds that among mothers with a child under age 3, female lone parents were only about half as likely as women with a spouse to be employed in 1999: 38% versus 63%... Among those whose youngest child was age 3-5, 55% of female lone parents, compared with 68% of mothers in two-parent families, were part of the paid workforce.

Similarly, K. Marshall (1999, 23) notes that although 93 percent of employed women who gave birth in 1993-1994 returned to the labour market within two years, single mothers represented 30 percent of the non-returnees, compared to just 4 percent of the women who returned to work.

Lower rates of labour force participation among lone-mothers largely reflect the added difficulties of managing child care responsibilities or affording supplementary services in the absence of a partner and second income. However, social policy also contributes to lower labour force participation rates among this group of women. For instance, under the former NDP government in BC, lone-parent social assistance recipients were exempted from the requirement of seeking employment until their child(ren) turned seven rather than three. This policy reflected in part an appreciation for the welfare contributions of at-home mothers, as well as the potential inefficiency in issuing child care subsidies to enable single mothers with limited earnings potential to labour in jobs in which their wages may be less than the cost of the provincial child
care support. However, the policy also instituted structural incentives for lone-parents to weaken their labour market attachment for a seven year period in favour of dependence on state welfare, with the consequence that job experience and training would become less marketable in the dynamic economy and thereby position single mothers at greater risk of future dependence on either the state or a breadwinner. The new social assistance policies implemented by the Campbell government have the potential to mitigate the degree to which lone-parents permit their marketability to deteriorate outside of the labour force. However, this potential is being undermined because the government is also restricting eligibility for provincial child care subsidies in keeping with the individual responsibility model of the family (Government of British Columbia 2002, 4).

The potential income that some stay-at-home mothers forgo received considerable attention in recent years in federal politics, with the Reform/Alliance Party championing the contributions of at-home parents in single-earner couples during debates about taxation (McCarthy 1999a – 1999f). In recognition of the financial sacrifices made by at-home mothers, the Alliance proposes additional tax relief for single-earner, two-parent families. The Party’s literature in the 2000 federal election campaign identified its desire to minimize alleged inequalities in the tax treatment of single-earner and dual-earner couples as the primary motivation for the Party’s 17 percent ‘flat’ tax proposal (Kesselman 2000, 36). I examine Alliance positions on taxation of families and child care in detail in chapter nine.

The discourse initiated by the Alliance Party primarily focuses on the costs for household units that result from the income forgone by stay-at-home parents. Income data reveal that this household focus is important. One-earner couples generally have lower incomes and a
substantially higher risk of poverty than dual-earner households (Conway 1997, 130). This trend is exacerbated for lone-parent households (National Council of Welfare 2000, Figure 4.1).

Nonetheless, a focus on the costs for households obscures the specific costs for women that flow from extended labour market withdrawals. Although the risks inherent in forfeiting their economic independence may appear acceptable (and ‘rational’ from the standpoint of the couple) so long as at-home caregivers reside with their spouse, the risks frequently materialize for women in the form of significantly lower living standards or poverty when a couple divorces or a partner dies (Armstrong 1997, 43; Eichler 1997, 36). In 1998, 54 percent of single mother families with children under 18 had household incomes that fell below Statistics Canada’s LICOs, a rate many times higher than that of couples (National Council of Welfare 2000, Figure 4.1). Although some single mothers who leave married or common-law relationships escape poverty, almost all experience a significant drop in their standard of living, while their ex-spouse regularly enjoys a noticeable improvement. In addition, the traditionally high rate of poverty among unattached women over 65 reflects the economic legacy of extensive commitments to unpaid caregiving, as well as lesser pension entitlements that accompany this domestic labour (Evans 1998, 46; Armstrong 1997, 43). Despite policy changes that have significantly reduced the poverty rate among women seniors from 38 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1998 (National Council of Welfare 2000, Figure 7.14), many continue to live below or near the poverty line.5

5 In addition to the economic costs of financial dependence, some studies indicate that full-time devotion to unpaid caregiving has psychological costs for many women. Reports of depression are particularly common among new mothers who must cope with the isolation commonly entailed by full-time caregiving of a newborn (Conway 1997, 143). Armstrong and Armstrong (1994, 120) observe that “[s]uddenly out of the labour force, women often spend most of the day alone in the house with the full and constant responsibility for the child and with little adult company to stimulate them.” More generally, evidence suggests that ‘traditional marriage’ and ‘dependency’ are importantly implicated in women’s greater vulnerability to mental illness. According to Conway (1997, 146), a substantial body of literature suggests that, “[a]s women become less dependent economically and psychologically, their risk of psychopathology decreases dramatically. Married women who work outside the home are not only less [economically] vulnerable, but positively psychologically healthier than women who do not.”

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4b. The gender earnings gap

While only a small minority of women today sever completely their links to the labour force following childbirth, the gender division of unpaid caregiving continues to pose substantial costs and challenges even for women who participate in the paid labour market. The economic costs are most evident in the gender earnings gap. According to Statistics Canada (2000, 141), employed women have average annual earnings of just over $21,000, only 64 percent of male average earnings. Among workers employed full-time, full-year, average female earnings of just under $31,000 amount to 73 percent of male earnings. This difference represents a considerable gender earnings gap that renders women more likely to remain economically dependent on either a spouse or the state despite considerable commitment to the market.

6 The earnings gap has decreased noticeably among full-time, full-year workers since 1980. In the early 80s, women earned roughly 64 percent of male earnings. The narrowing gap reflects both increases in female earnings and decreases in male earnings (Statistics Canada 2000, 141; Armstrong 1996, 50-51).

7 The substantial gender earnings gap persists among full-time, full-year workers regardless of women’s education level and occupational category. Female university graduates earn only 74 percent as much as their male colleagues. The gender earnings ratio among professionals ranges from just over 80 percent in the natural sciences and teachers to nearly 65 percent in management and administration, social sciences and religious occupations. For non-professionals, the gendered earnings ratio ranges from over 80 percent in clerical positions to under 65 percent in service, manufacturing and handling jobs (Statistics Canada 2000, 143).

In terms of average employment earnings, women of colour, immigrant women and Aboriginal women fare worse than their white and Canadian-born counterparts. As of 1995, visible minority full-time, full-year female employees age 15-64 earn on average $27,500, roughly $3,000 less than their non-visible minority counterparts; $8,500 less than men of colour; and $15,000 less than Caucasian men (Statistics Canada 2000, 230). The comparable figure for immigrant women age 25 to 44 is $28,700, $2000 less than Canadian-born women in this age bracket; $9,500 less than immigrant men; and $12,500 less than non-immigrant men. The earnings of recent immigrant women (those who arrived to Canada since 1991) are especially low, averaging only $21,900 in 1995 (Statistics Canada 2000, 203-4). Among Aboriginal women, average income from all sources is just $13,300, more than $6,000 less than that enjoyed by non-Aboriginal women and $5,000 less than the average income of Aboriginal men (ibid., 258).

The lower earnings of women of colour and immigrant women persist despite relatively high levels of education. As of 1996, 17 percent of visible minority women aged 15 and over have a university degree, compared with 12 percent of other women; and women of colour are nearly twice as likely as other female gradates to study science, commerce, management and business administration. An additional 13 percent of women of colour have some university education (but no degree), compared to only 10 percent of other Canadian women (Statistics Canada 2000, 224). The data for immigrant women depicts a similar trend. As of 1996, 17 percent of recent immigrant women age 25 to 44 have a bachelor’s or first professional degree, compared to fewer than 15 percent of other immigrant women, and 13 percent of Canadian-born women. Moreover, 9 percent of recent immigrant women held master’s or doctoral degrees, versus 6 percent of earlier immigrant women and just 4 percent of Canadian-born women (ibid., 197).
Canadian data indicates that wage discrimination is responsible for less than 5 percent of the gender earnings gap, where ‘wage discrimination’ connotes the idea that women are paid less than men for the same work (Cleveland and Krashinsky 1998, 43; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 54). Two other related factors contribute far more significantly to women’s lower earnings: fewer hours of paid work and employment segregation in lower-paying occupations (Jacobsen 1994, chapters 6 to 9; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 53-8). The distribution of unpaid caregiving directly influences both of these issues.8

Primary responsibility for caregiving inclines many women to search for employment opportunities that permit them more flexibility to tend to unpaid care obligations. This preference regularly translates into their performing fewer hours of paid work, even when employed full-time. According to 1996 data, the average full-time work-week for women age 25 to 44 is 39.8 hours, 12.3 percent less than average male work-weeks of 44.7 hours (Beaujot 2000, 146). ‘Mommy track’ positions reduce weekly schedules on the job for some professional women. But such positions also typically mean lower earnings, lower rates of promotion, and less job security (Duffy 1997, 176; Coltrane 1996, 229; Baker 1995, 176). Women also have higher rates of work absenteeism for personal and family reasons, contributing to shorter actual work-weeks regardless of their usual hours (Hall 1999, 30). And women account for almost all (98 percent) recipients of maternity and parental leave benefits under the Canadian Employment Insurance system (Statistics Canada 2000, 109), benefits that reduce recipients’ earnings by at least 45 percent for the duration of the leave.

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8 The female-to-male earnings ratio is highest for groups of women who are less likely to have reduced their paid work hours due to the presence of children and/or marriage. For instance, the 1997 ratio for workers under 25 working full-time, full-year is 81 percent, whereas the figure is 76 percent for those aged 25 to 34, and lower still for older workers. Similarly, the earnings ratio for single, never married women is nearly 92 percent of men’s earnings, considerably higher than for married women for whom the ratio is 67.5 percent (Statistics Canada 2000, 143, 157).
A desire for paid work opportunities that are more compatible with unpaid caregiving responsibilities also inclines many women to opt for part-time employment in which wages, benefits and job security are noticeably lower. Since the mid-1970s, Statistics Canada (2000, 103-4) reports that women have consistently counted for roughly 7 in 10 part-time workers and, thus, the majority of 'ideally casual' labourers to whom employers have turned when revising their labour usage strategies. As of 1999, 28 percent of all employed women work part-time, compared to just 10 percent of male employees. The difference in part-time employment rates is particularly high for workers age 25 to 44: 22 percent of women work part-time compared to just 5 percent of men. Much of this difference can be attributed to the fact that women are far more likely than men to cite child care and other family or personal responsibilities to account for their part-time employment, at 32.5 versus 2.2 percent (ibid., 125).

A preference among some women for jobs that permit more flexibility to fulfill unpaid caregiving workloads contributes to employment segregation (Beaujot 2000, 162). The concentration of women in 'pink collar' positions is well documented in Canada. As of 1999, 70 percent of all employed women work in traditionally female occupations: teaching, nursing and related health positions, clerical or other administrative jobs, and sales and service employment.9 By contrast, just 29 percent of men with jobs work in these occupations (Statistics Canada 2000, 107). Women have increased their representation in various professional fields and managerial

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9 Immigrant women and women of colour are far more likely to find employment as manual labourers than Canadian-born and white females. Among women aged 25 to 44, 12 percent of all immigrant women, and 17 percent of recent immigrant women are manual workers, versus just 6 percent of Canadian-born females. Similarly, 13 percent of visible minority women work in semi-skilled or other manual positions, compared to 7 percent of other women. Southeast Asian (32 percent), South Asian (19 percent), and Latin American (16 percent) women are especially likely to find employment as manual workers.
positions in recent decades. But within these occupations women are more concentrated in less lucrative positions among lower level managers.

Traditionally 'female' occupations tend to pay relatively low wages. Armstrong (1997, 46) reports that dieticians and nutritionists, nurses, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, and radiological technologists and technicians were the only female-dominated occupations with annual incomes of at least $30,000 in the early 1990s. This finding reveals that most women in higher-paid occupations "are paid directly or indirectly by governments" (ibid.). In addition, Armstrong (ibid.) and Phillips and Phillips (1993, 58) observe that women make up just 20 percent of workers in the ten highest paid occupations, but account for over 70 percent of those in the ten lowest. Women are nearly twice as likely as men to work for minimum wage and disproportionately work in positions regulated by the minimal protections of employment standards legislation, rather than collective bargaining agreements (Armstrong 1997, 48').

In addition to some women's pursuit of 'flexible' work arrangements, occupational segregation also reflects a cultural context predisposed to socially construct women as caregivers. Research suggests that the socialization of girls and boys factors significantly in the employment decisions that they make. Phillips and Phillips (1993, 60) remark that:

Stereotypes about what are appropriate jobs for men and women are ingrained early in life, reinforced by role models, the education system, counseling and by the societal expectation that women's primary commitment is to the household and reproduction function. This is confirmed by attitudinal studies of what most women themselves consider as appropriate female work. The

10 1996 data indicates that women of colour (13 percent) and immigrant women (13 percent) are somewhat less likely to be professionals than Caucasian women (16 percent) and non-immigrant women (19 percent) (Statistics Canada 2000, 201-2, 228-9).

11 As of 1999, women represent 49 percent of business and financial professionals, up from 41 percent in 1987; 47 percent of doctors and dentists, up from 44 percent in 1987; 58 percent of professionals in social sciences or religion, compared with 48 percent in 1987; and 35 percent of managers, compared to 29 percent in 1987. In contrast, there has been very little change in the share of women among professionals in the natural sciences, engineering and mathematics: women account for just 20 percent of workers in these professions. Similarly, relatively few women find employment in most goods-producing occupations. Just 30 percent of manufacturing workers are women, as are 22 percent of employees in primary industries and only 6 percent in construction, trades and transportation (Statistics Canada 2000, 107).
effect of this social discrimination is to channel women into a narrow range of occupations, which not only keeps wages in these jobs low but also tends to undercut female wage levels in all other occupations even when they attempt to enter non-traditional jobs.

The hegemony of the female caregiver model also ensures that middle-class men occupy a structurally advantaged position in a labour market that demands an unencumbered commitment to paid work in ‘core’ positions. Whereas women are expected to care, heterosexual men possess the option (at least ideologically) of leaving the daily care involved in child rearing to their spouses (Evans 1997, 109; Leira 1992, 175; Neysmith 1998, 239). This option of non-participation in child care likely affects the attitudes and decisions of employers.

In 1989, Pateman (1989, 190) suggested that:

Women in the workplace are still perceived primarily as wives and mothers, not workers. The view is also widespread that women’s wages are a ‘supplement’ to those of the breadwinner. Women it is held do not need wages in the same way that men do – so they may legitimately be paid less than men.

Over a decade later, it is questionable that women are still viewed primarily as ‘secondary’ earners. Nonetheless, Pateman’s point about employer attitudes remains helpful for understanding occupational segregation. Some employers may regard men as having more potential to commit to the job as ideal workers given that women invariably shoulder primary responsibility for unpaid care labour. Conversely, women may be viewed by some employers as (potentially) encumbered with family responsibilities, regardless of their actual interest in having children (Fineman 1995, 207). As a result, even women intent on not permitting children to disrupt their careers may sometimes suffer from the presumption that child rearing will interfere in the future with their continuing commitment to the job (Conway 1997, 136-7).

Data describing the gender earnings gap, hours of work and employment segregation suggest that new structures of gender inequality indexed to the division of caregiving have coincided with the rapid rise in female labour force participation. Relations of dependency for women are re-entrenched by labour market trends that witness women disproportionately
employed in the service sector where jobs tend to have lower pay, fewer benefits, less security and more part-time hours. In the present market context that values casual labour just in virtue of its lower cost, Jenson (1996, 96) observes that a part-time job is not likely to "to lead to a level of income, with security and job-related benefits, that is a foundation for any economic equality" between the sexes. Instead, patriarchal dynamics inside the home and market are more likely to be maintained so long as many men continue to earn considerably more than women (Beaujot 2000, 352; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 66). If nothing else, the persistent gender earnings gap renders it 'rational' for heterosexual couples to maximize household income by asking the lower-earning woman to reduce, or terminate, her attachment to the labour market when unpaid care workloads are heavy. Such decisions perpetuate the cycle of dependency discussed in chapter three. A similar cycle confronts single mothers who must weigh the earnings and expenses associated with labour market participation against the value of social assistance and the long-term costs of dependence on the state.

4c. Stress and other health-related costs of the gender division of care labour

In addition to economic costs, data suggest that the gender division of labour imposes additional health costs on women in the paid workforce. Stress-related problems are a primary concern. Canada's 1998 General Social Survey found that 38 percent of full-time employed married women aged 25 to 44 report high levels of stress, significantly more than the one-quarter of married men (Statistics Canada 1999b). The rate of high-stress rises to 50 percent for women in this category who have a child under five. Only lone-mothers (regardless of their employment) report stress levels comparable to married mothers who work full-time.

Studies suggest that stress levels are particularly high for mothers because they continue to bear primary responsibility for unpaid child-rearing tasks. Although the demands of the
modern workplace often raise blood-pressure rates for both men and women, research consistently shows that these rates regularly drop to normal levels for men after work. In contrast, a study by University of Laval researchers indicates that blood pressure levels among many women remain elevated well after the paid work-day, a reality that significantly increases their risk of stroke and heart disease (Brisson et. al.). Moreover, the Laval study found a strong correlation between women’s high blood pressure during off-work hours and a lack of support from their partners with childrearing responsibilities. As Dr. Milot explains, “It’s not the superwoman who [who wants to balance work and family that is at risk of high-blood pressure]; it’s the superwoman in chains” (quoted in Picard 1999a), bound by ideological expectations about motherhood and inadequate contributions from male partners.

Although employed women consistently shoulder more domestic work, some evidence indicates that men increasingly suffer the stress-related consequences of the ‘second shift’. Citing a study of dual-earner families by Hochschild and Machung (1989), Conway (1997, 207) observes that

> While four in five men [fail] to engage in equal sharing, the other one [does]. Only one in 10 men [take] on less than one-third of the household burden. Thus one must conclude some degree of a double burden conflict for nine out of 10 working husbands of working wives. Of course, doing the actual work is only part of the double burden. The other part is organizing and orchestrating that domestic campaign.

In keeping with Conway’s supposition, recent Canadian research indicates that employment absenteeism for personal or family reasons among fathers of preschoolers doubled since 1997, from .9 to 1.8 days per year. In contrast, absenteeism for personal or family reasons fell by almost an equal amount for employed mothers of preschoolers, from 4.2 to 3.4 days (Statistics Canada 1999a). The frequency with which married, full-time employed fathers report high stress levels also rose more sharply over the past decade than it did among women (though women still report higher stress levels more regularly) (Statistics Canada 1999b). Data of this
kind may reflect that some Canadian fathers are assuming greater responsibility for unpaid caregiving responsibilities and struggling accordingly to balance these new obligations with their existing paid work commitments.

Rising stress levels among women and men raise questions about the sustainability of the economic conservative model of citizenship, particularly its neglect for the new challenges that Canadians now encounter in part because households have less unpaid time to fulfil domestic caregiving responsibilities. Although the dual-earner couple is now the most common and economically viable family form in Canada (Eichler 1997, 36), recent Canadian studies find that this family form suffers particularly high levels of stress when children are at home (Statistics Canada 1999b; Conway 1997, 24). Declining household incomes for most of the 1990s, coupled with state cutbacks to care-related public services, forced many Canadians, particularly women, to work longer hours in paid employment and in the domestic sphere (Conway 1997, 129-30, 183; Eichler 1997, 37; Phillips and Phillips 1993, 37). As balancing paid work and unpaid family responsibilities becomes more difficult, Canadians are taking off more unscheduled sick days from employment (Statistics Canada 1999a), and have higher risks of heart disease and stroke. MacBride-King and Bachmann (1999) indicate that the 20 percent of ‘sandwiched’ labour force participants who care both for children and elderly relatives are particularly vulnerable to stress-related health ailments.

5. Costs Imposed by the Patriarchal Division of Care Labour in Market Contexts

Labour market segregation reveals that the hegemony of female caregiving does not just pertain to unpaid domestic work, but also to care delivered in the marketplace. The concentration of women in care occupations is unmistakable. 98 percent of employees in child

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12 The poverty rate for dual-earner couples is 3.5 times lower for single-earner couples (Conway 1997, 130).
care centres are women, as are 99 percent of caregivers who run small child care operations from their homes, 97 percent of nannies, and 87 percent of nurses and health-related therapists (Beach, Bertrand and Cleveland 1998, 8; Doherty et. al., 2000, 23, 79; Statistics Canada 2000, 107).

This concentration means that women and men who purchase care arrangements to facilitate greater access to the market effectively transfer some of their caregiving workloads to other, often less privileged, women. The transfer frequently tracks class and ethnic differences between women, reinforcing social forces indexed to these differences, while leaving patriarchal norms and structures relatively unchallenged (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 12; Bakan and Stasiulis 1996, 237; Chang 1994, 261; McWatt and Neysmith 1998, 223; Roberts in 1995, 236; Razack 1998, 34). I examine in this section two implications of the class and racial trajectories that sustain patriarchy: low remuneration levels for caregivers and the estrangement that some caregivers endure from their own sphere of intimate relations.

5a. Poor remuneration, benefits and working conditions for paid caregivers

In May 1999, a Toronto Globe and Mail headline asked “How to tell daycare workers from zookeepers?” The article referred to frustrations expressed by Québec child care workers that “their average pay of $11 an hour was less than that of employees who clean the cages at [a community] Zoo” (Picard 1999b). The sub-cage-cleaner earnings of child care workers in Québec are not atypical. Poor wages, benefits and working conditions are the norm for care labourers in Canada where there work is viewed to replace or supplement domestic tasks and care historically performed for no pay by white, middle-class women in their own homes.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} The Québec government has since become atypical in Canada by increasing caregiver salaries by 40 percent (Tougas 2002, chapter 1).

\textsuperscript{14} Numerous factors contribute to poor remuneration in the child care sector. In addition to social dynamics that contribute generally to gender and racial earnings gaps throughout the labour market, a number of specific issues further explain why child caregiving work receives especially low pay. First, child care workers are thought to replace parents, especially mothers, who are paid nothing for their caregiving work (Ferguson 1998, 194;
Child care teachers in centre-based settings are typically the highest paid child care providers in the country. As of 1998, the national average annual salary for child care teachers is $22,717, just $1,700 more than the average national salary for parking lot attendants. The position of parking lot attendant requires no formal education, involves passively watching inanimate objects and includes virtually no decision-making (Doherty et al. 2000, 81). By contrast, child care teachers have primary responsibility for a group of children and often supervise assistant teachers. Most provinces require centre-based teachers to complete at least

Teghtsoonian 1997, 127). Since the work in one context receives no pay, many are motivated to think that substitute labour in another context is of little value. This conclusion ignores that at-home mothers do not care for their own children ‘for free’, but incur various opportunity costs discussed earlier.

Second, there is resistance in Canada to acknowledging the educational component of child care work (Ferguson 1998, 197-9). Studies increasingly show that children’s development is intimately related to the sorts of stimulation they receive in their earliest years (Norrie McCain and Mustard 1999). Early child care and education training equips caregivers with more knowledge to draft, plan and integrate play activities that socially, emotionally, and intellectually stimulate the children in their care. Broad societal convictions downplay the training and knowledge necessary to organize such activities by maintaining that parents, primarily mothers, ‘know best’ how to care for their own children regardless of their familiarity with early child development research. This social attitude reinforces the view that mothers rear children ‘naturally’ and that the biological capacity to reproduce is sufficient to fulfill the job of expert caretaker for one’s own child(ren) (Armstrong and Armstrong 1994, 112). This naturalization of child-rearing in the domestic sphere in turn contributes to its devaluation in the market (Ferguson 1998, 200; Teghtsoonian 1997, 123).

Third, the invisibility of work inherent in domestic child care perpetuates the perception that women mother ‘naturally’. DeVault (1991, 56-57) notes that much of the planning necessary for meal preparation, scheduling of activities and so on is unobservable “mental work, spread over time and mixed in with other activities.” The affective component of child rearing also “involves the performance of many simultaneous tasks and the investment of a great deal of (unobservable) mental energy in emotional support and caretaking” (cited in Teghtsoonian 1997, 126). Therefore, when the work required to rear children is done well, Teghtsoonian (ibid.) observes that it may seem to many (men) “to emerge spontaneously from instinct and/or innate knowledge that women possess by virtue of their sex.” The reality that so much of this work is the result of “learned skills and constant effort” only becomes noticeable when it is not completed (ibid.) – as DeVault (1991, 56-57) remarks “when the milk is all gone,” “when the meal is not ready on time,” or, in an extreme case, when a child is neglected. The relative invisibility of care labour in turn influences its valuation in contemporary markets. Arat-Koc (1999, 211) argues that “[o]ne of the dimensions of the way skill is defined in modern capitalist societies is that it tends to either exclude or undervalue skills and personal qualities women tend to develop during gender socialization and in learning to perform domestic work.”

Child care teacher’s average annual salaries vary significantly between provinces, ranging from $13,639 in Newfoundland to $26,496 in Ontario (Doherty et al., 2000, 78-99). The average salary in Newfoundland falls below Statistics Canada’s Low-Income Cut-Off (LICOs) for single people living without dependents in communities of less than 30,000 people. In New Brunswick, average annual salaries are below the LICO for communities of 30,000 to 99,000. Assistant teachers in Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia child care centres fair worse still, falling further below the poverty lines than their slightly better paid teacher colleagues (Doherty et al., 2000, 77).
one year of specialized training; and over three-quarters of child care teachers have educational
credentials reflecting two or more years of post-secondary schooling (ibid., 78-80).

Relatively poor working conditions and few benefits compound low remuneration. 63
percent of child care teachers have no paid lunch break. Nearly half have no paid preparation
time. More than half are not compensated for parent meetings after regular hours. And nearly
all (83 percent) receive no compensation for attending board meetings after hours (Doherty et.
al., 2000, 80). The average child care teacher performs 5.9 hours of unpaid work per week
(ibid., 70). In addition, over one quarter have no sick days; over a third receive no job protected
maternity/parental leave; 42 percent have no extended health care; more than half have no short-
or long-term disability insurance; and three-quarters have no retirement or pension plan.

Child care providers who operate from their own home (typically referred to as family
caregivers) have still lower salaries and benefits, though they also tend to have fewer educational
qualifications than centre-based teachers. The average net income for family child caregivers is
$8,400. Since family caregivers are self-employed, most do not receive fringe benefits, enjoy the
protection of employment standards, or benefit from Employment Insurance, including its
maternity/parental leave provisions. Although required to make C/QPP contributions, and
formally eligible for RRSPs, the projected retirement income from these sources is limited for
family day care workers since typically low incomes limit their contributions. While some child
care associations are working to address the lack of benefits, most family care providers continue
to go without. Available data indicate that only 2 percent have medical/dental insurance, pension
plans or sick leave; 4 percent have disability insurance; 7 percent have vacation leave; and 42
percent have group liability insurance (Beach, Bertrand and Cleveland 1998, 82-3).
Finally, Statistics Canada (1995) data rank in-home caregivers, or nannies, at the bottom of Canada’s 25 poorest paid full-time occupations. The average national annual income of $12,713 falls below that paid animal care workers, taxi drivers, housekeepers, hotel front desk clerks, bar tenders, and food and beverage servers. No reliable nationwide data document the share of nannies who receive benefits such as sick leave, long-term disability, or pensions.

The working conditions for in-home caregivers vary. One significant factor is whether they reside with their employer. Most jurisdictions exclude in-home caregivers from employment standards regulating hours and overtime pay (Beach, Bertrand and Cleveland 1998, 86). Evidence also suggests that enforcement is negligible in jurisdictions where the standards pertain (Fudge 1997, 119). Live-in caregivers are therefore particularly vulnerable to home/work dynamics that result in their labouring work-weeks that far exceed the standard 40 hour norm without receiving appropriate compensation.

Reports suggest that foreign domestic workers endure particularly poor working conditions. The Live-In Caregiver Program (LCP) follows in the path of former Canadian immigration policy by constructing women of colour as ‘workers – before mothers’. Foreign domestics, predominantly Filipino women, enter Canada today on temporary employment visas. They are eligible to apply for landed immigrant status only after performing 2 years of domestic

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16 The construction of immigrant women of colour as ‘workers – before mothers’ under the LCP is now tempered by other immigration legislation which allows most women immigrating to Canada to qualify as ‘sponsored’ family class members (Arat-Koc 1999, 210). Family class immigrants enter the country on the condition that a qualified Canadian citizen will provide accommodation, care and maintenance for a ten-year period. This condition systematically reinforces sexual inequality within families by relegating one spouse (typically the wife) legally dependent on the other. Often, family class immigrants are also rendered economically dependent on the sponsor because they are ineligible to apply for publicly funded language training programs, subsidized housing and social assistance (Gabriel 1999, 144). Underlying their ineligibility for language training is the implicit assumption that sponsored immigrants do not require proficiency in an official language since they will not participate in the paid workforce (Arat-Koc 1999, 212). The validity of this assumption is belied by labour force participation rates among immigrant women that exceed those of Canadian-born women (Arat-Koc 1999, 209-11). Regardless of its inaccuracy, this assumption reveals that where outwardly denigrating racialized constructions of women of colour have been minimized in Canadian immigration policy, they have been replaced by gendered expectations of privatized dependence previously reserved for the white middle-class.
work for a designated employer (Bakan and Stasiulis, 35). During this period, the foreign domestic must live with, and work exclusively for, her employer-family.

A perpetual threat of deportation inherent in workplace conflict exacerbates the vulnerability of foreign domestics to racial harassment and sexual, physical, and emotional abuse (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997b, 37; Arat-Koc 1999, 218). The live-in requirement further limits their choices about meals and other living conditions (Daenzer 1997, 101). Employer decisions even implicitly regulate their sexual practices in many cases since the work/home environment typically limits opportunities for privacy (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 15-6).

5b. Barriers to participating in one’s own sphere of personal relations

In addition to poor pay and working conditions, the LCP permits foreign domestics no standing to sponsor their own children or spouses to immigrate to Canada during the mandated two-year period of live-in employment (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 20; McWatt and Neysmith 1998, 221). This legislation institutionalizes for foreign domestics an extreme degree of estrangement from their own spheres of intimate relations. Ironically, foreign domestics are constrained to sacrifice participation in their own families to nurture the children and adult dependents of more affluent Canadians (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 17; Dua 1999, 247).17 This legislated dis(organization) of family relations among foreign domestics exacerbates the

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17 It should not be assumed that decisions to endure such lengthy separations are matters of genuine choice. Many foreign domestics report that poverty and unemployment make it impossible to sustain their families’ physical well-being in their home country (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 17). The substantial debt-loads of many developing nations further motivate governments to draft policies that encourage migration of potential foreign domestics. Migration lessens pressure on economies unable to produce sufficient jobs and reduces the cost of social assistance programs. Migration also provides important opportunities to procure foreign currency that is essential to debt-repayment schemes. For the Philippines, currently the largest source of foreign caregivers in Canada, “[r]emittances by Filipina domestic workers are that country’s largest single source of foreign revenue, estimated at $2 billion to $6 billion per year” (McWatt and Neysmith 1998, 227). More generally, Bakan and Stasiulis (1996, 217) report that “[t]he World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have insisted that in return for international service of debts, Third World governments [must] pursue policies that induce their citizens to seek jobs and money elsewhere.” This financial and policy climate contributes to an international economy where labour is currently the second most important ‘primary commodity’ traded globally, the first being oil” (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997b, 30).
financial barriers that impede poorly paid caregivers in the marketplace more generally from affording time to provide unpaid care to their own families while retaining a reasonable opportunity to secure their economic well-being.

The LCP received front-page news attention in 1999 and 2000 as foreign domestic worker, Leticia Cables, received a deportation order. The problem, as reported by the *Globe and Mail*, was that “she work[ed] at too many jobs” (Leblanc 1999). Ms. Cables contravened immigration law for foreign domestics by accepting extra caregiving and housecleaning work with families in addition to the family named on her employment authorization. “Immigration officials... said her breach of the rules might take away work from Canadians and was serious enough to scotch her chances of getting landed-immigrant status for her and her husband and two teenaged children, who still live in the Philippines” (Mitchell and Laghi 2000).

Ms. Cables’ circumstances reflect the ongoing commodification of some immigrant women of colour as ‘workers – before mothers’ by Canadian immigration policy. Foreign domestics are recruited to perform work that Canadians are unwilling to do. But when recruits endeavour to compete for jobs that Canadians may seek, the LCP implies that they are no longer welcome in Canada, nor are their families.

5c. The individual responsibility model capitalizes on class and racial hierarchies

Since the 1960s, the experiences of white, middle-class women increasingly grew to resemble that of many working-class, immigrant and non-white women for whom economic provision has historically been an expected part of mothering in Canada. Whether married or not, mothers or not, the norm today is that women are active in the labour force: full-time housewives are the exception (Eichler 1997, 33).
Despite reflecting more closely the experiences of women of colour, the substantial re-ordering of white, middle-class female roles has not obviously led to less class-, gender- and race-based inequality. Some middle-class women and men facilitate their increased participation in the paid workforce by transferring domestic responsibilities to other unpaid caregivers – their mothers, relatives and women friends. But since many of these women are also in the paid labour market today, employed middle-class women and men have turned increasingly to market-provided care, occupations in which women of colour, immigrant women and poor women disproportionately find employment (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997b, 40; Brand 1999, 90).

The limited remuneration of market-provided care is often integral to other women’s decisions to accept paid work. Teghtsoonian (1997, 131) remarks that there is a deeply ingrained tendency in our society to understand child care costs as being paid for by the mother’s income. This assumption is reflected in the frequently articulated view that it is ‘not worth it,’ and to some degree not legitimate, for mothers in two-parent families to take on paid employment if the costs of child care services absorb a significant portion of their take-home pay.

The pervasiveness of this cultural conviction in a policy context bereft of significant public financial support for caregiving means that some middle-class women are released to pursue careers or employment only because other women provide poorly paid care services. By resorting to care arrangements that reflect hierarchies indexed to sex, class and race, middle-class women (and men) capitalize on, and perpetuate, the oppression of less privileged women, but do not obviously challenge the gendered division of caring that constrains the options available to all women (Arneil 1999, 62, 66-8; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997a, 12; Chang 1994, 261; Gabriel 1999, 145; Roberts 1995, 236). Instead, Glenn (1994, 7) notes that existing care arrangements free middle-class, heterosexual men to retain “the illusion (or reality?) of the home as a private haven, while enjoying the services of their wives or their wives’ substitutes in maintaining that haven. Thus, the notion of mothering as women’s responsibility is left unchallenged.”
The poor wages, benefits and working conditions which characterize market-delivered child care also serve the interests of employers and financially strapped governments. Lower child care costs enable more Canadians to transfer some of their unpaid caregiving responsibilities. This transfer permits more women and men to function as unencumbered ideal workers without increasing corporate or personal taxes. The costs to governments are minimized when provinces target child care programs to assist low-income families and parents of children with extra support needs. Low remuneration in the child care sector further reduces the costs of leaving social assistance for single mothers and therefore mitigates government spending in this social envelope as well (Teghtsoonian 1997, 123). For these reasons, the state has historically tolerated (perhaps even welcomed) the low pay awarded child caregivers.¹⁸

In sum, the individual responsibility model of the family that characterizes the current social and economic policy context supports some positive steps towards minimizing gender inequality. But the model is strongly market reinforcing and capitalizes on existing patterns of disadvantage. O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999, 106-7) note that “[i]t facilitates labour market participation for men and women with caring responsibilities, provided their market return is sufficient to meet care costs.” This system exacerbates class and racial stratification by ignoring how occupational location may constrain one’s ability to purchase care from the market. One result is that the individual responsibility model leaves many women citizens for whom paid work is an economic necessity with few, and sometimes inadequate, care alternatives for their children and other dependent relatives, while other women limit their labour force attachment to provide care personally and incur the opportunity costs that accompany this strategy.

¹⁸ Governments in four provinces – Ontario, BC, Saskatchewan and Québec – have recently diverted from this tradition by implementing public wage enhancement programs to improve the pay of (select) child care workers (Doherty et. al., 2000, 74).
6. Returning to a Gender-Differentiated Model of Citizenship is Not a Remedy to the Failings of the Neoliberal Vision

In her charge to the United Nations that Canada discriminates against at-home mothers, Smith (1997) implies that the problem with the individual responsibility model of the family is its rejection of a gender-differentiated citizenship status for women. She lists a number of concerns in her brief, including that stay-at-home mothers are restricted by (i) the tax system from being paid a salary by their husbands, or making contributions to unemployment insurance and sick leave benefits; and (ii) by the Canada Pension Plan from contributing to, and participating in, the national pension system. Were governments to remedy these alleged problems, Smith intimates that a social citizenship framework could foster equality for women who choose to focus exclusively on the specialized domestic role assigned women in the first post-war decades. In contrast to the economic conservative vision, Smith’s position would not make women’s lives parallel men’s, but, instead, make their difference ‘costless’. On this view, the path to gender equality lies in policies that effectively mitigate the economic dependence and increased risk of poverty that accompany an extensive commitment to domesticity. Such measures could pave the way for reformulating Canada’s citizenship paradigm to recognize motherhood, and caregiving more generally, as the cornerstone of women’s identities, without relegating women to a lower tier of citizenship. The status of the exclusive caregiver role would be raised to that of the breadwinner, permitting women and men to enjoy equivalent levels of dignity and well-being (Fraser 1994, 606).

While the objective of re-valuing women’s unpaid caregiving contributions is laudable, returning to a gender-differentiated citizenship regime to achieve this end is a deficient strategy for a number of reasons. First, family models based on complementarity and specialized activities for women and men fall subject to an implausible essentialism that depicts all women
as naturally inclined and contented 'nurturers', ignoring the various ways in which women and men differ in this respect (Lister 1997, 18). Second, the proposal indicates nostalgia for the patriarchal division of labour that is both unrealistic and harmful on a number of fronts in the current context (Eichler 1997, 15). By calling for policies that would privilege an idealized notion of this family form, proponents typically ignore the problems of violence and domination with which it is associated. They also obscure the actual range of family organizational strategies in Canada, recommending little additional support for single parents and overlooking the racial and classist modes of oppression that historically impeded many groups of women from approximating post-war, middle-class ideals of femininity and motherhood. The proposal further disregards the declining real wages and other elements of the post-industrial structural shift that contributed importantly to the transition away from the 'traditional' one-earner couple. The majority of Canadian families need two sources of income to maintain their standard of living and many families need a second earner just to remain above the low-income cut-off. Reports indicate that the percentage of dual-earner families with low-income in 1997 would have been much higher in the absence of earnings contributed by wives, rising from 4.7 percent to 17.5 percent (Statistics Canada 2000, 146). This finding is consistent with the discussion above that single-earner couples endure a poverty rate that is 3.5 times greater than dual-earner couples.

Third, while one can imagine that wages or pensions for mothers might render women "independent, well provided for, well rested and respected" in their specialized citizenry domain, Fraser (1994, 599) points out that women would nonetheless remain "enclaved in a separate domestic sphere, removed from the life of the larger society." Although caregiving work is a critical source of welfare and satisfaction for individuals, families and communities, this work is not appropriately valued if its performance necessitates the marginalization of caregivers from
other important social spaces and sources of fulfilment, such as “in employment, in politics [and] the associational life of civil society” (ibid.). Full community membership implies participation across important areas of social life, including, but not exclusively, the domestic sphere.

Fourth, Fraser (1994, 609-610) also observes that a gender-differentiated model of citizenship risks demeaning caregiving work since it does not value it sufficiently to demand that men do it too. The model includes no expectation that men amend their behaviour and practices to recognize and contribute to the welfare potential associated with care work. Nor does the model acknowledge unpaid care ambitions among men. One result is that it risks further marginalizing men within the domestic domain where the opportunity to nurture children, spouses, relatives and other intimate relations makes available rich emotional and psychological rewards that can shape one’s sense of self, history, belonging and purpose. This risk is particularly worrisome in light of new research about fathers where men regularly identify (at least rhetorically) their becoming a father as the most important event in their lives, as well as a desire to diverge from the parenting practices of their ‘absent’ fathers (Coltrane 1996, 118, 121).

In addition to the above problems, efforts to compensate women for their care labour run aground on questions of implementation. One question regards valuation (Maloney 1989, 194-195). If the value of domestic care is determined by reference to what it would cost to replace in the market, any strategy to compensate unpaid caregiving would appropriate a market-based system of valuation that operates in a context in which women already provide a significant amount of care for no pay. Research on gender wage differentials suggest that some female dominated jobs earn less in part because they resemble, if not ‘compete’ with, the kind of work that women do ‘for free’ at home (Gaskell 1991; Teghtsoonian 1997). Therefore, appealing to the market to determine the rate of compensation for currently unpaid labour invokes a system of
valuation premised on the power dynamics that the proposed compensation is meant to counter. Beyond the question of valuation, proposals to provide a homemaker’s wage would be financially untenable. Phillips and Phillips (1993, 150) report that this proposal would cost governments at least $30 billion annually if the state is expected to shoulder the new wage. If it is assumed that spouses will pay for the domestic work from which they benefit, the proposal will be unfeasible for unemployed and low-income breadwinners.

Since a wage system is a non-starter fiscally, proponents of the view that a gender-differentiated citizenship model could be refurbished to minimize the costs of unpaid domestic labour are resigned to accept less expensive measures. Smith’s recommendation of pension reform is one option that receives attention in feminist literature (Phillips and Phillips 1993, 156-159). Pension reform may be a helpful short-term measure to mitigate the costs for women who specialized in domesticity in keeping with earlier social expectations. In particular, enriched pensions for mothers could alleviate some of the poverty that continues to plague senior, unattached women in Canada at higher rates than their male counterparts. Ultimately, however, pensions that are not indexed to earnings are highly unlikely to garner the long-term public support necessary to ensure their payments approximate earnings-based schemes. The result is that pensions for ‘mothers’ are likely to rank caregiving as a second-tiered citizen occupation by delivering benefits that are considerably less valuable than those attainable in the labour force.

Similarly, the tax system is often identified as a means to recognize women’s unpaid care labour. But proposals typically amount to little more than symbolic recognition. For instance, the Income Tax Act currently permits a $560 caregiver tax credit for persons who support an elderly dependent relative (s.118(1)(c.1)). Similarly, the Reform/Alliance Party advocated in 1999 for the conversion of the Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED) into a refundable tax
credit that would deliver roughly an additional $1,200 per child to stay-at-home parents.\textsuperscript{19}
Although the total bill for this Alliance proposal would amount to several billion dollars, the
effects would be modest for individual mothers since an extra thousand dollars or so does not
mitigate the economic dependence that accompanies specialization in domesticity.

For the above reasons, the appropriate remedy to the failings of the individual
responsibility model of the family will not be found in nostalgia for the patriarchal division of
labour balanced by enhanced concern to mitigate the costs of full-time motherhood. The
problem with the model is not its logic of gender sameness, but that its logic is premised entirely
on traditionally male norms. Our contemporary social citizenship framework invites women to
be full-members of society only on male terms that were institutionalized in a social and
economic environment that excluded women’s full participation. While extending an invitation
to women to participate as full members represents progress compared to the first decades of the
twentieth century, the current conception of citizenship is nonetheless impoverished both for
women and men because it neglects citizens’ ambitions and obligations in the domestic sphere.

In Part III of the dissertation, I argue that a primary social citizenship challenge
confronting Canadians today is the need to universalize the female half of the former
breadwinner/homemaker equation to all citizens, just as the traditionally male side of the
equation has been extended to women over the past decades. Redistributing responsibility for
care labour between the sexes is imperative to meet this challenge. The option open to men to
abdicate responsibility for caregiving remains “an essential element in women’s structurally
inferior position in modern welfare societies” (Neysmith 1998, 239) and perpetuates
discrimination that tracks class and racial differences. But redistribution between the sexes is

\textsuperscript{19} Before the 2000 election, the Alliance revamped its proposal for the CCED, which I examine in chapter nine.
unlikely to unfold in the absence of institutional reorganization between the state, marketplace and household spheres. Therefore, chapters seven through nine propose a blueprint to guide the necessary institutional reordering. The insights shared by neoconservatives and feminists already examined in the dissertation provide the starting points for my discussion.
PART III

CHARTING AN ALTERNATIVE BLUEPRINT FOR CANADIAN SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
[A] new world of economic production and social reproduction is emerging—a world of less stable employment and more diverse families. Although no one can be certain about its ultimate shape, this much seems clear: the emerging world, no less than the world of the family wage, will require a welfare state that effectively insures people against uncertainties. If anything, the need for such protection is increased. It is clear, too, that the old forms of welfare state, built on assumptions of male-headed families and relatively stable jobs, are no longer suited to providing this protection. We need something new, a postindustrial welfare state suited to radically new conditions of employment and reproduction.


Post-industrial and post-traditional structural shifts ushered many more women into the income-earner role that was formerly reserved ideologically for racially privileged men. However, previous chapters indicate that Canadian governments remain content to delegate much of the responsibility for care for the young, elderly, sick and helpless to groups of women operating within the domestic and voluntary sectors, minimizing the extent to which questions about care are considered the appropriate domain of ‘polities’. The resultant de-politicization of care issues has permitted dominant discourses about citizenship to remain silent about the persistent and pervasive role of the patriarchal division of caregiving in determining the distribution of social benefits. Previous chapters reveal that some institutional arrangements in Canada sustain patriarchy by reinforcing and capitalizing on relations of power that track sex, ethnicity, class and immigration status. The intersection of these social forces generates a range of economic and social costs for diverse groups of women. Costs include marginalization from one or more important areas of social life, such as the political arena, market or domestic sphere; earnings inequality that increases the risk of dependence on the state or a breadwinner; and higher rates of stress-related health ailments.

In this final part of the dissertation, I argue that the new post-industrial, post-traditional welfare paradigm called for by Fraser in the quote that opens this chapter can be achieved by
institutionalizing an alternative framework for social citizenship that re-politicizes questions of care. Drawing on Rawls's (1971, 7) understanding of "the primary subject of justice," the alternative framework presents caregiving as one of the "fundamental rights and duties" that "major social institutions distribute" to "determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." Social conservative literature and feminist research associated with Collins (1994) underscore the importance of institutionalizing policy that provides some opportunities for citizens to care in their sphere of personal relations as a right of modern citizenship. Both literatures provide reason to regard participation in one's family network as an essential element of genuine social belonging that has been inadequately acknowledged by many contemporary theorists of citizenship.

But given the current social and economic context, reconstructing certain activities of care as an entitlement of citizenship risks reinforcing patriarchy if other care practices are not simultaneously presented as an integral responsibility of modern citizenship that equally binds men and women. Patriarchy continues to disadvantage diverse groups of women largely because state, market and family practices grant many men the opportunity to benefit from what Tronto (1993b, 174) terms "privileged irresponsibility." The ideological construction of male citizenry roles, including fatherhood, privileges many men by permitting them to abdicate primary obligations for the welfare potential that inheres in child, elder and other dependent care. In response, I develop Kymlicka's (2002, 419) recognition that "certain activities or practices of care should be seen as an obligation of citizenship—as important as the obligation to pay taxes or serve in the military—and one which applies to men as much as women." Following Fraser (1994, 611), I argue that care is institutionalized as a universal duty of citizenship only when
policies “induce men to become more like most women are now—that is, people who do primary care work” in addition to their other pursuits, including paid work in the labour market.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to lay the theoretical groundwork for an alternative social citizenship framework, which will guide the policy discussions of the last two chapters. In section one, I argue that institutionally integrating care activities as a right and obligation of citizenship entails a significant theoretical shift when drafting policy. Policy makers must broaden their analytical scope to include a new appreciation for what Taylor (1994, 32) calls the “dialogical character” of agency that rejects the alignment of autonomy with individualism.

The discussion in section one draws on the ethic of care literature initiated by Gilligan (1982), which advances a theoretical perspective that demonstrates how care practices can simultaneously enhance and constrain autonomy. On one hand, the literature acknowledges that care relationships are fundamental for the development of self-understanding that is ultimately necessary for autonomous action. This reality is most obvious when we are young, although it persists throughout the life course (Baier 1985; Code 1987). On the other hand, the literature recognizes that any understanding of autonomous agency as the unencumbered pursuit of personal projects risks equating autonomy with the abandonment of care responsibilities. One can only approximate a relationally unencumbered status if one exploits subordinate groups by transferring the care obligations inherent in relationships to others who, as a consequence, compromise their own autonomy by disproportionately shouldering care labour. If we reject this exploitation to minimize inequalities across sex, race and class lines, the assumptions about autonomy that inform policy must be refined so that autonomous agency is not viewed to be achieved at the expense of performing unpaid care duties.
In section two, I argue that an enhanced public commitment to facilitate work-family balance for all citizens marks a strategy by which to institutionalize the dialogical thesis about agency in Canada’s social policy blueprint. The work-family balance concept includes resources to refine constitutive elements of the now dominant economic conservative discourse about citizenship, while simultaneously transforming this discourse by prioritizing additional issues about which economic conservatism is silent. Whereas the neoliberal vision of citizenship universalizes only the male half of the ‘traditional’ breadwinner/caregiver equation, a work-family balance framework would extend both roles to all citizens. The aim is to complement the attention presently paid human capital acquisition by integrating a new analytical dimension concerned with caregiving throughout all social citizenship commitments. This new dimension would transcend the economic conservative paradigm by valuing caregiving so much that it expects men will do it too and thereby displace masculinist norms that relieve many men of considerable responsibility for child, elder and other dependent care.

By universalizing both parts of the fragmented post-war model, the framework that I advance would institutionalize Fraser’s (1994, 599-600) “antiandrocentrism principle” discussed in chapter one. A commitment to work-family balance for all citizens would restructure patriarchal systems in order to welcome citizens who often care for relatives, friends and neighbours, “treating them not as exceptions, but as ideal-typical participants” (ibid.). This shift in policy would accommodate biological differences between women and men, particularly in terms of pregnancy and childbirth, but it would no longer exaggerate these differences by ideologically codifying ‘care’ as primarily ‘women’s work’ in virtue of their capacity to birth and breastfeed. The proposal would therefore reject the present assumption that traditionally privileged male “life patterns” represent the ‘unencumbered’ “human norm” to which “women
ought to assimilate” (ibid.). In place of this assumption, new policies would acknowledge institutionally a much larger common ground between women and men in terms of their capacities to nurture, support and provide economically for dependents. Such policies would redefine ideological expectations of men in the domestic sphere just as pay and employment equity legislation helped to redefine gendered assumptions about women in the marketplace.

1. The Dialogical Character of Agency

A concern with the social preconditions that are necessary for the expression of personal autonomy unites that social citizenship commitments to security, equality and full community membership that are evident in the work of Marshall (1964, 65-122) and Rawls (1971). Throughout the dissertation, it has been shown that state commitments to these social preconditions are coloured by a set of assumptions about the nature of personal agency. In particular, assumptions of the kind underlying Rawls’s thought experiment of the original position yielded especially significant influence over the design of post-war welfare institutions and policies. The liberal ideal of a self-defining, self-realizing and self-governing agent who is free of relational obligations and sentiments of affection that may limit either temporally or psychologically his opportunity to pursue self-selected ends importantly informs both the fragmented post-war model of citizenship (see chapter three), as well as the neoliberal citizen-wage-worker paradigm premised on the individual responsibility model of the family (see chapter six). Both social citizenship regimes align autonomy with individualism, separateness, or disconnection by largely ignoring the role and value of care relationships for individual well-being and agency, particularly within citizens’ spheres of private relations.

A work-family balance framework explicitly rejects this alignment. While it affirms the importance of autonomy for citizenship, it maintains that this commitment does not entail
subscribing to an atomistic liberal individualism. Instead, the framework’s implicit concern to incorporate care into the meaning of citizenship illuminates an alternative model of agency that better represents lived experience – the dialogical thesis. The frameworks richer appreciation for care work reveals that “[a]utonomy, and the agency that derives from it, is made possible only by the human relationships that nourish it, and the social infrastructure that supports it” (Lister 1997, 21). Recognition of the centrality of care relations in mediating autonomy marks the principal theoretical shift necessary to develop a policy blueprint that facilitates for all citizens the opportunity to balance the ambitions and obligations indexed to both caring and earning, and to permit the state to capitalize fully on the welfare potential of the market and domestic sphere.

1a. Autonomy evolves from interdependence

Taylor (1994, 32) captures the fundamental connection between care relationships and human agency with his recognition that the genesis of personal autonomy is not monological, something we each achieve on our own, but “dialogical.” He argues that “[w]e become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.” Taylor uses the term ‘language’ in a broad sense, referring not only to the words we speak, but also to “other modes of expression,” such as “the ‘languages’ of art, of gesture, of love, and the like.” Other formative languages include fluency in societal expectations, communal depictions of history, and the range of possible life-paths articulated by cultural contexts (Kymlicka 1989). Taylor (1994, 32) observes that

we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us—what George Herbert Mead called ‘significant others’.

Taylor’s position is consistent with the insights of some social conservatives who argue that the family is often a primary humanizing, socializing and morality-engendering institution in modern society; the social institution principally responsible for reproducing self-reliant and
well-socialized future citizens. For instance, like Taylor, social conservative sociologists Brigitte and Peter Berger (1983, 165) build on George Herbert Mead’s recognition of the contributions of ‘significant others’ to the genesis of the self. “[T]he family,” they (ibid., 172) claim, “is the necessary social context for the emergence of the autonomous individuals who are the empirical foundation of political democracy.” Infancy and early childhood serve “as the matrix... for everything the particular individual will be and think in later life. In these early years... both personality (or identity) and consciousness are formed” (ibid., 150). For the Bergers, parents contribute most significantly to the moral norms that individuals internalize as children, representing “the strongest possible models for the performance of adult roles. Even when the child, in the process of growing up, struggles with and against these models, they are indispensable in serving as points of orientation” (ibid., 162).

Feminists such as Baier (1985, 84) echo the analysis advanced by the Bergers. “A person,” she remarks is perhaps “best seen as one who was long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood.” Every autonomous individual experiences “a childhood in which a cultural heritage is transmitted, ready for adolescent rejection and adult discriminating selection and contribution” (ibid., 85). Thus, for Baier:

Persons are essentially successors, heirs to other persons who formed and cared for them, and their personality is revealed both in their relations to others and in their response to their own recognized genesis. Not only does each earlier phase causally influence each later phase, as in all enduring things, not only is there growth, maturation, and aging, as in all living things, but in persons each later phase is a response to earlier phases, caused not only by them but by some sort of partial representation of them and their historical causal relationships (ibid.).

The Bergers, Baier, and Taylor indicate that the constitutive role that others play in the formation and evolution of self-understanding, and the autonomous action this understanding permits, is most evident while we are infants, children and youths. This role is so obvious in the early years that most thinkers who are committed to the alignment of autonomy and individualism are likely to concede willingly that our identities and personal projects are shaped
significantly by the influence of persons who nurture us (or fail to do so) during childhood, as Rawls does in chapter eight of *A Theory of Justice*. Despite granting this point, though, persons with individualist inclinations about autonomy may nonetheless reject the dialogical character as a suitable starting point to develop an account of human agency.

For instance, Tronto (1993b, 163) observes that many political theorists who work in the tradition of Smith and Rousseau regard the life course transition from stronger dependence towards greater individuation to be a fact that merits particular attention in theories of agency. In this tradition, the important influence of others during early childhood development does not negate the fact that we should strive to define ourselves on our own terms as much as possible because dependent people risk losing “the ability to make judgements for themselves, and end up at the mercy of others on whom they are dependent” (ibid.). Accordingly, recognition of the dialogical character of childhood implies that we should strive to arrive at some understanding of, and therefore some control over, the influence that immediate family members and others hold over us while we are growing up. Furthermore, although we may wish to acknowledge the contributions that others make to the formation of self-understanding, one might contend that it is not obvious that we should seek similar relationships of dependence as adults that may mean we lose control over external influences. Rather, for persons inclined to align agency with individualism, it may appear that we only achieve autonomy when we are free to think, choose and act independently for ourselves unconstrained by the attitudes, opinions and actions of others. Therefore, the most appropriate starting point for analyses of human agency, the argument continues, is the recognition that autonomous agents are first and foremost sufficiently independent from the undue influence that others can yield.
While this line of critique raises legitimate worries about the proposal to revisit the link between autonomy and individualism, insights about agency advanced by some feminists, social conservatives and others show that the above reasoning goes wrong for two reasons. First, the dialogical character of the human condition is not simply a fact about the “genesis” of our identities (Taylor 1994, 32). Our sense of self, our understanding of ‘where we are coming from’, and perhaps more importantly ‘where we are going’, is never permanently fixed or stagnant. Rather, Code (1987, 363) explains that we have a propensity to be influenced by others throughout our lives, one that leaves us always “open to the effects of an interdependence.” For this reason, the Bergers (1983, 165) remark that “significant relationships are important throughout life for the maintenance of identity and meaning.” On one hand, persons continually reinterpret and respond to past experiences. We remain in dialogue with, and often struggle against, the views expressed by people who have been significant in our lives. Taylor (1994, 33) comments that “[e]ven after we outgrow some of these [significant] others—our parents, for instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live.” On the other hand, our patterns of interaction also change. Over time we establish new relationships that may illuminate a range of values and interests that were not salient during earlier periods. By broadening our horizons, new relationships encourage the reassessment of our histories, motivations and goals. Thus, as Baier (1985, 85) explains,

\footnote{Lister (1997, 21) warns that “uncritical use of the language of interdependence” risks ignoring that “[t]he unequal power relationship that underpins some women’s economic dependence on men means that the interdependence of which the dependence is an element is skewed in men’s favour. It is not surprising, therefore, that the other element of the equation - men’s dependence on women for care and servicing which facilitates their own independence as citizens and workers - is conveniently obscured.” Thus, while the dialogical thesis recommends a citizenship paradigm that acknowledges the constitutive role of relationships for personal agency, the paradigm must remain wary of assuming a conservative quality. When preservation of a web of relationships is a starting premise for policy making, one risks failing to question whether the “relationships are good, healthy or worthy of preservation” (Tronto 1993a, 250). A work-family balance framework must therefore foster new state commitments to care relations within a conceptual orientation that is attentive to the fact that patriarchal patterns of interdependence risk distorting the autonomy of many women by denying the inequalities of power, feminine “selflessness and self-sacrifice” that characterize many practices within the present social order (Gilligan 1995, 122).}
Second, implicit in concerns about treating the dialogical character as a starting point for theories of personal autonomy is the suggestion that this feature of the human condition entails a lack of control over the influence that other persons exact on our identities. This lack of control is then interpreted as evidence of a loss of genuine autonomy and individuality. But it is important to distinguish between claiming that our sense of self is shaped through interactions with others versus the claim that others construct our identities for us. In accounting for human experience, the dialogical thesis does not depict the self as formed only by the ideas, values and actions of others. The point is that the self is in dialogue with these things. Baier (1985, 85) and the Bergers (1983, 162) concur that the transmission during childhood of a cultural heritage infused with values and a range of sanctioned and proscribed life-paths is subject to adolescent scepticism or struggle and adult reformulation. Once equipped with some set of ‘languages of expression’ and ‘arts of personhood’, we enter into a life of exchanges with other persons. We bring to these engagements our unique personality, creativity and intellectual inclinations, characteristics that first develop largely in response to the way our natural talents were cultivated and our weaknesses emerged during early dependence. Sometimes exchanges result in our criticizing the values that others hold; on other occasions we may internalize them. Whatever the result, the dialogical thesis acknowledges that we normally contribute significantly to the exchange (Code 1987, 363).

Accepting as foundational the dialogical character of the human condition therefore does not impute a lack of control, loss of autonomy, or absence of individuality to the self, “so long as ‘individuality’ is not equated with ‘individualism’” (Code 1987, 361). The assumption implicit
in the ‘unencumbered self’ that we act autonomously only when our reasons for action originate from a self-defined sense of what matters in life is intuitively attractive. But the relational disconnection implicit in the original position discounts how we achieve this self-definition. By contrast, social conservatives, feminists and others illuminate how our sense of self is as much dependent on social and environmental relationships as it is upon what might be termed our ‘own nature’. The dialogical thesis therefore does not deny anything “of personal uniqueness, creativity, expressiveness and self-awareness” (Code 1987, 361). Rather, as Code (ibid.) observes, the thesis shows how “all of these grow out of interdependence, and continually turn back to it for affirmation and continuation.”

1b. The unpredictable needs of dependents constrain autonomy

In contrast with traditional liberal assumptions, the dialogical thesis does not pit self-determination against interconnectedness. Rather than mutually disinterested, relationally unencumbered actors, the thesis envisions individuals as “persons-in-relation” moving along a continuum of separation and connection that tracks life course changes (J. Nelson 1996, 68-69). This shift in thinking has significant policy implications. Most notably, it urges policy makers to reconcile autonomy with (inter)dependence across various spheres of social life, including in the economic domain. Reconciliation is necessary because the dialogical thesis illuminates obligations to respond to the needs of dependents and persons with whom we act in interdependent relationships. As Tronto (1993b, 164) explains, re-politicizing care motivates a “shift in our conceptions of human nature” by supplementing “our notion of ‘interests’ with the broader cultural concern with ‘needs’.”

Too often moral and political thinkers conceive of human activity in terms that are either logically or culturally individualistic, such as ‘interest’ or ‘project’. In contrast, to use ‘needs’ is necessarily intersubjective, cultural rather than individual, and almost surely disputed within the culture. For someone to say, ‘I have a need’... invokes a different response than the notion, ‘I have an interest’. How one arrives at a need is a matter of social concern, how one arrives at an interest is not.
Since the needs of others are a matter of social concern, they can generate obligations to respond that impose constraints on our time and flexibility to set personal goals or commit to personal projects. The Rawlsian tradition partly acknowledges this reality by examining in the original position the citizenship responsibilities to which mutually disinterested, competent, able-bodied adults would consent in order to secure the voluntary cooperation of others that makes possible a better life for all. Kymlicka (2002, 416) observes that the Rawlsian concern to codify moral principles in advance contributes significantly to preserving the “predictability” required for “meaningful autonomy” that is at risk when the needs of others can morally require that individuals divert from their pursuit of self-selected commitments to fulfill moral obligations. Moral principles provide guidelines by which citizens can distinguish in advance circumstances in which they owe responses to others from situations in which the subjective frustrations of others are a matter for which the persons in need are personally accountable as competent agents who are responsible for the consequences of their own actions. This advance knowledge is important, Kymlicka (ibid., 415) argues, because:

If our aim is to ensure that the free pursuit of one’s projects is not entirely submerged by the requirements of ethical caring, then we do not simply need limits on our moral responsibilities, we also need predictable limits. We need to know in advance what we can rely on, and what we are responsible for, if we are to make long-term plans. It is not much good being told at the last minute that no one needs your moral help today, and that you are free to take a moral holiday, as it were. We can only take advantage of holidays if we can plan them, and that requires that we can determine now which interests we will be held responsible for later (italics in original).

While the original position may help to identify principles of justice that retain the predictability necessary for meaningful autonomy in interactions between mentally competent, able-bodied adults, Rawls’s thought experiment sidesteps a more significant challenge posed by the unpredictable needs and demands of dependents. Children, for instance, cannot be expected to demonstrate the same level of personal responsibility for their own needs and preferences, or engage in relations of reciprocity whereby they show equal concern for preserving and fostering
the autonomy of persons from whom they receive care (Kymlicka 2002, 415, 418). Similarly, the needs of the sick, elderly or otherwise dependent are often not a matter over which they have control or can manage independently and, again, undermine their capacity to show reciprocal concern not to limit the autonomy of their care providers.

Consistent with the analysis in this dissertation, Kymlicka (2002) observes that the mutually disinterested status typically assigned agents in liberal theory largely discounts the constraints on predictability that care for dependents can impose. He observes that much liberal theory either ignores “[t]he nurturing of children and caring for dependents;” assumes this work will “be somehow ‘naturally’ dealt with in the family, which... fall[s] outside of the scope of a theory of justice” (ibid., 417); or presumes “that some people (women) will ‘naturally’ desire to care for others, as part of their plan of life, so that the work of caring for dependents is not something that imposes moral obligations on all persons” (ibid., 418).

Previous chapters provide reason to reject these theoretical oversights or assumptions in favour of moving issues of care to the forefront of political theorizing and public policy, in part by institutionalizing certain practices of care for dependents as a citizenship obligation. This theoretical and policy shift has significant ramifications for dominant presumptions about autonomy. As Kymlicka (ibid., 419) puts it: “Once people are responsible for attending to the (unpredictable) demands of dependents, they are no longer capable of guaranteeing their own predictability” to the degree presumed in the original position. If this predictability cannot be guaranteed, questions arise as to whether we can “meet our responsibilities for dependent others without giving up the more robust picture of autonomy” that underpins Rawlsian theory and the social institutions it informs (ibid., 420). According to Kymlicka (ibid.):

Justice theorists have constructed impressive edifices by refining traditional notions of fairness and responsibility. However, by continuing the centuries-old neglect of the basic issues of child-rearing and care for dependents, these intellectual achievements are resting on unexamined and
perilously shaky ground. Any adequate theory of sexual equality must confront these issues, and the traditional concepts of discrimination and privacy that have hidden them from view.

Kymlicka’s (2002, 420) conclusion that “it is too early to tell” whether we can retain “the more robust picture of autonomy” renders it all the more pressing to follow Collins’s (1994, 48-49) recommendation that the lived experiences of women of colour should be shifted to the centre of theorizing. The historical challenges and life patterns of many women of colour emerge as a rich resource for theory and public policy since paid work and domesticity rarely functioned as dichotomous spheres for some groups of minority ethnic women (see also Roberts 1995, 233; Segura 1994, 223-225). Collins’s (1994, 49-56) use of the themes of ‘resistance’ and ‘empowerment’ to describe both financial provision and unpaid care for family, friends and communities suggests that many minority ethnic women exercise considerable autonomy by balancing earning and nurturing roles to defy racial oppression and poverty. In addition, the depiction of the family sphere as a ‘refuge’ from discrimination where individuals can actively foster relationships that contribute to their personal identity, sense of worth and cultural belonging further suggests that care provision can be a site where some citizens exercise a degree of autonomy not permitted in other social areas. These lived realities provide evidence that some caregiving for dependents can be reconciled with autonomy and, therefore, suggest that the relationally ‘unencumbered status’ envisioned in the original position is a character trait that exaggerates the necessary conditions for autonomous agency.

Although the experiences of many minority ethnic women indicate that caring and the pursuit of other projects including earning can be interwoven, they are only balanced with considerable strain in the present institutional setting, strain that ultimately impedes the degree of flexibility one enjoys to commit to self-selected projects. This struggle is something that more white women are also experiencing now that most middle-class mothers also participate in the
paid labour force. Since previous chapters reveal that the struggle is the result in part of institutional arrangements content to capitalize on the care labour of diverse groups of women, reorganizing the institutional boundaries between state, market and private homes holds open the potential to mitigate some of the challenge of balancing care for dependents with other pursuits, including income-earning goals and needs. Specifically, policy can be designed to institutionalize incentives that favour increased contributions in the domestic sphere from the many men who have traditionally benefited from the irresponsibility made possible by their privilege. By expanding the male role in care activities, new opportunities can be opened for diverse groups of women to set and pursue non-care-related personal goals. But redistribution of care responsibilities between the sexes is not sufficient. Policy decisions that presently relegate so much care to private spaces ultimately impede the integration of public life with dependent care for all citizens who shoulder primary care responsibilities. Therefore, it is also necessary to expand the public role in supporting and accommodating care provision so that citizens can retain sufficient time and flexibility to strive for personally established objectives, whether they exist in or beyond the domestic sphere. In short, the extent to which “the more robust picture of autonomy” that prioritizes commitments to self-selected ends can be reconciled with obligations to care for dependents is largely a question of institutional design within, and across, important areas of social life. The last two chapters examine issues of institutional design in more detail.

2. Work-Family Balance Captures in Policy the Nuances of the Dialogical Thesis

Before turning to specific questions of institutional design, I defend in the rest of this chapter the position that the concept of work-family balance is sufficiently flexible to capture in policy the theoretical insight that care is both an enabler and constraint on autonomy. This
flexibility renders the concept a particularly helpful metaphor to guide the institutionalization of the dialogical thesis about agency into Canada’s social citizenship blueprint.

In contrast to the individualism inherent in the post-war and neoliberal frameworks, the ‘family’ half of the work-family balance concept directs policy attention to one of the key social domains for caregiving. An enhanced concern for work-family balance urges that one’s private sphere of personal relations be recognized as an important site of social membership where care provision is often a central ambition for citizens whose unpaid labour can foster their own self-understanding as well as the autonomy of others. But by juxtaposing ‘family’ with ‘work’, the concept also captures the ambivalence about care represented in the literature initiated by Gilligan (1982). The challenge of combining family and work responsibilities in the current institutional context reveals that care activities can impede personal autonomy by undermining citizens’ potential to achieve self-sufficiency, economic security and equal inclusion across important areas of social life. In response, the ‘work’ half of the concept identifies economic security and self-sufficiency as important emancipatory objectives of social citizenship, but does so in a broader framework designed to accommodate how these qualities define themselves against a backdrop of (inter)dependence in which care relationships and responsibilities are integral. A work-family balance framework therefore approaches the reality of human (inter)dependence illuminated by the dialogical thesis so as to enhance its enabling potential for personal autonomy during some life course stages, while mitigating the various constraints that it can pose during others.

This theoretical reorientation facilitates the recognition that the ‘social citizen’ is neither wholly a labour force participant nor only an unpaid caregiver but a citizen who interweaves both roles. On this view, social policy should acknowledge that all labour force participants are
also unpaid domestic actors with care obligations, and likely also care ambitions, whether to partners, children, parents, other relatives, friends, neighbours, even strangers. This approach guides the policy discussions in chapters eight and nine.

The claim that work-family balance should be employed as a governing theme for a post-industrial, post-traditional social citizenship framework moves the concept well beyond the domain of 'family policy' in which it is typically debated. In this last section of the chapter, I therefore develop the work-family balance concept further in terms of the three dominant social citizenship commitments evident in the work of Marshall (1964, 65-122) and Rawls (1971): social security, substantive equality of opportunity, and full community membership (see chapter two). The alternative framework that I propose retains these three social citizenship pillars while employing the concept of work-family balance to defend the introduction of new policy measures to respond effectively to the structural and ideological changes of the past three decades. Where relevant, I draw attention to parallels between the work-family balance framework that I propose and Giddens's third way.

Much of the discussion below draws on various points of convergence between neoconservative and feminist literature to defend the work-family balance concept. This strategy is consistent with the idea of 'counterhegemony' developed by Gramsci (1971) and A. Hunt (1993, 229-235). Their work acknowledges that dominant social paradigms sustain their influence largely because some tenets resonate even with persons they ultimately disadvantage. Thus, by identifying points of convergence between feminist and neoconservative research, I argue in favour of replacing the present welfare paradigm by identifying and refining elements which citizens across the ideological spectrum likely support, while simultaneously reconstructing the paradigm with ingredients that are currently missing.
2a. Work-family balance and social security

Previous chapters reveal that post-war welfarism is critiqued for downplaying the welfare potential of the labour market and domestic sphere. A work-family balance framework is designed to respond to these issues. First, a policy commitment to work-family balance signals a concern to commodify citizens’ labour potential sufficiently, including by providing time for citizens to foster strong ties to the labour market. This commitment to commodification is consistent with the neoliberal construction of social security as human capital acquisition that permits adaptation in the labour market (Courchene 1994a) and the feminist position that women’s autonomy and security is enhanced by sustained participation in the paid labour force (Orloff 1993a). This shared interest in commodification signals support across the ideological spectrum for the introduction of new measures that facilitate paid work for all citizens.

In keeping with the neoliberal concern with transfer dependency and some mismatch between employee skills and employer needs, a work-family balance framework prioritizes active income supplement measures that link receipt of social assistance with employment search requirements as well as participation in appropriately funded opportunities for (re)training, skills development and support for entrepreneurship. The framework must be careful to follow Courchene (1994a, 29-30) to publicize the fact that transfer dependency is a “system dysfunction” unrelated to the “character of the individuals that may get caught in these transfer-dependency syndromes.” The language of ‘moral hazard’ common in economics literature can be helpful to convey this message. The concept is frequently employed in discussions of insurance which reveal that “[i]ndividuals and firms who are insured against loss will often take

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2 As discussed in chapter five, governments influenced by economic conservatism have yet to implement adequately new funding for educational programming. In fact, Banting (2001) observes that the opposite trend has dominated as public-spending per student in postsecondary education fell by roughly 30 percent between 1980 and 1998 and the cost of post-secondary education rose dramatically in real terms over the 1990s.
less care to prevent that loss than they would in the absence of insurance” (Lipsey and Ragan 2001a, 385), particularly over the long-term. The insight implicit in this concept is that insurance programs can assume “their own autonomy, regardless of whether or not they meet the purposes for which they were originally designed” (Giddens 1999, 115). The presence of insurance means that individuals do not incur the full cost if the insured against action occurs, whereas they do shoulder the entire cost of taking action to reduce the likelihood that the event will materialize. The result is that insurance can create incentives or ‘hazards’ to engage in socially non-optimal behaviour to which people adapt over time to take rational advantage of opportunities and cost-savings made available by policy.

The concern to counter system dysfunctions and commodify citizens sufficiently that underscores active labour market programs is consistent with redefining single mothers as ‘employable’ sometime before their children reach school age in order to minimize structural incentives that induce lone-parents to weaken their labour market attachment. This policy approach must ultimately be balanced by an adequate appreciation for the welfare contributions of at-home mothers in the domestic sphere, as well as the potential inefficiency in issuing child care subsidies that may cost more than the wages earned by citizens who have low earnings potential. Nonetheless, policies that exempt single parents from active income assistance measures for too long risk positioning them to endure a longer cycle of dependence on state welfare because depreciating human capital and limited job experience undermine their marketability in the labour force.

A work-family balance framework would depart from policy changes recently introduced by the Government of British Columbia (2002, 4), however, by ensuring that active labour

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3Provincial legislation now defines lone-parents as ‘employable’ when their youngest child turns three, down from age seven (Government of British Columbia 2002, 4). This policy change has been accompanied by more restrictive
market measures are accompanied by the child care services that are necessary for parents to have the flexibility and time to achieve their potential in the labour force. In the absence of sufficient child care services that are affordable, active labour market measures do not obviously support single mothers to succeed in the workforce so much as they position mothers to receive increased government surveillance that is likely to be more punitive than empowering. In addition, in contrast to neoconservatives such as Mead (1997, 224) who support state child care subsidies only with respect to workfare recipients, I consider evidence in chapter eight that supports the implementation of a universally subsidized system of child care to reduce obstacles to paid employment for all parents, which women disproportionately bear in the current context.

In addition to supporting the appropriate commodification of citizens, a work-family balance paradigm would commit to providing individuals with a sufficient range of decommodifying measures that mitigate market forces and create added time for citizens to respond to dynamic needs in the domestic sphere. This policy trajectory is consistent with insights shared by social conservatives and feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Collins (1990; 1994). Both groups reference the substantial welfare contributions of citizens, primarily women, in private households, an insight that is supported by estimates which suggest that the value of unpaid household work is equivalent to between one-third and one-half of Canada's GDP (Status of Women Canada 1998, 92). The two literatures also agree that the domestic sphere can be a sanctuary for citizens from alienating social forces if properly constituted and supported. The family has the potential to provide almost all citizens, and particularly the very poor, with emotional and material resources that likely "no other institution can match" (Giddens 1994, 162). As Giddens (ibid.) observes, "family ties offer social eligibility criteria for child care subsidies that lower the average income-level under which citizens qualify for public child care assistance (ibid.)."
assistance to many individuals, protecting them when times are especially difficult,” and often in a manner that is relatively honourable as opposed to demeaning.

This convergence of some feminist and social conservative thinking about the domestic sphere suggests there may be broad support across the ideological spectrum for a social citizenship framework that actively sustains and fosters family linkages by supporting citizens to secure the opportunity – both temporal and financial – to cultivate a strong nexus of relationships in which they can nurture others and receive care personally. In contrast to some social conservative literature that downplays the extent to which domesticity has been a site of violence and exploitation for women and children, the importance of pursuing this end within a broader context that acknowledges that the family is also often a site of oppression has been defended in previous chapters. Any commitment to facilitating increased citizenry participation in the domestic sphere must therefore be complemented by a further commitment to combat patriarchy.

The concern to render unpaid family responsibilities more compatible with paid labour force participation acknowledges the need to broaden the scope of decommodifying measures beyond the post-war concern with class-relations to mitigate also the salience of gender and ethnicity for citizen outcomes. One implication of this broadened purview would be the redefinition of the terms used to measure successful market participation in order to permit more integration between employment and unpaid roles historically neglected by the public sphere. This redefinition would enable Canada to reorient its social security system so that it can respond more effectively to new pressures and challenges in fulfilling unpaid family obligations and ambitions in the wake of post-industrial and post-traditional social change. The importance of this reorientation is suggested by the hardships suffered by some women of colour, immigrant women and poor women who historically endured substantial temporal and spatial separation.
from their own families, hardships that include lost opportunities to care for the welfare-related needs of their children, partners and other relatives.

While a necessary condition for social security in the contemporary context, policy measures designed to promote work-family balance will not ultimately be sufficient as a post-industrial, post-traditional welfare strategy. The initial post-war concern with a 'guaranteed minimum' proposed by Marshall, Rawls and others remains an important element of any adequate social safety net. Fraser and Gordon (1992, 47) remark that "[f]ull employment simpliciter" is not the entire solution to modern welfare challenges, since it would not erase the income-related needs of many employed single parents, or the needs of the old and infirm. Therefore, the guiding post-war concern to diminish citizens' status as commodities by permitting them to make their living standards independent of pure market forces represents an integral element of any adequate social citizenship framework, a theme that Esping-Anderson (1990) has developed. Modern welfare policy is impoverished if it fails to include a vision of honourable entitlement for citizens for whom labour force participation is not an available source of security. This honourable entitlement grows more important still given persistent unemployment, structural unemployment understood as either a skills mismatch or the NAIRU, and the declining real value of the minimum wage.

2b. Work-family balance and substantive equality of opportunity

Marshall and Rawls both prioritize the need for the state to foster the social conditions necessary to preserve fair equality of opportunity for all citizens (see chapter two). Their mutual concern for equal opportunity directs attention to the practices of citizenship beyond the formal articulation of civil and political rights. For both thinkers, it is essential that social class should not affect the prospects of individuals with similar abilities and aspirations. Therefore, their
respective support for a guaranteed social minimum is not only intended to promote the general reduction of risk and insecurity by equalizing social conditions between the more and less fortunate, but also to prevent inequalities that ‘cut too deep’ by structuring opportunities that are unavailable to some becomes of their socio-economic starting points.

Concern with the patriarchal division of labour that pervades the literature initiated by Pateman (1989) illuminates that the allocation of citizenship responsibilities influences social opportunities in addition to questions of income distribution. Until recently, cultural norms prescribing a gender division of labour meant that most men could expect to be confined to the paid labour force for much of their lives, while the activities of many (especially class privileged) women were restricted to the domestic realm. This division of labour institutionalized a cultural barrier between many men and their potential domestic pursuits. The barrier may become increasingly alienating as structural unemployment and heightened awareness of the challenges in balancing work and family in the wake of higher rates of female employment raise questions about the status that paid work should enjoy in relation to other life values. Nonetheless, the freedom from primary care responsibilities implicit in men’s privileged relationship to citizenship also constitutes a systemic advantage in accessing various labour market opportunities when contrasted with the care obligations that impede many women’s efforts to approximate the norm of an unencumbered ideal worker. Despite the rapid rise in female participation in the market, men collectively continue to enjoy this structural advantage as evidenced by the intimate relationship between the gender earnings gap and women’s unpaid caregiving work (see chapter six).

In response, a work-family balance framework would institutionalize the tenet increasingly common across partisan lines that citizen rights imply citizen duties, while doing so
without dividing responsibility along gender lines. The proposed framework would complement the now universal economic conservative duty to work by extending to all citizens a duty to care in the domestic sphere. Obligating men to perform their citizenry responsibilities to care will require new policy measures that minimize the option of leaving caring to women on which many men capitalize. A social policy blueprint committed to this end must pay far closer attention to the structural elements of the present social and economic context than the neoliberal paradigm demonstrates. Just as structural unemployment undermines the conditions necessary for all citizens to actualize the neoliberal paid work ethic as a criterion for receipt of social assistance (see chapter five), previous chapters indicate that existing labour market and cultural practices constrain decisions regarding men’s employment and unpaid caregiving contributions, perpetuating men’s collective choice of non-participation in primary care. While the risks for men inherent in non-fulfilment of citizenry care obligations are less financially imposing than failure to perform the economic conservative work duty, we have seen that the consequences of limited male contributions to domesticity are deleterious for diverse groups of women. Chapters eight and nine therefore discuss policy measures that will be particularly important for restructuring institutional relationships between state, market, and private households so as to construct incentives that facilitate the assumption of increased care responsibilities by men.

2c. Work-family balance and full community membership

Rawls’s difference principle and Marshall’s standard of civilization criterion distinguish between merely treating individual poverty and fostering a climate of dignified inclusion for all citizens through institutional reorganization. This distinction alleges that our notion of citizenship is impoverished if it accepts unquestioningly that the state meets its obligations to the less fortunate by responding after the fact to their suffering. Bakan (1997, 141) observes that
individuals do not obviously achieve full membership status in a society because the state agrees to treat their poverty with social assistance and their ill-health with medical care. Absent from this depiction of citizenship is the collective willingness to reassess the fundamental relationships between social institutions to discern state contributions to individual hardship. A welfare system that is content only to react to individual ill-fortune obscures the extent to which some state decisions may systemically foster social exclusion for select citizens by reinforcing political, market and household structures that privilege some social locations over others.

The convergence of neoconservative and feminist critiques of post-war welfarism offer important insights about the scope of institutional reorganization that is needed to facilitate full community membership for all citizens in the present post-industrial, post-traditional context. First, the economic conservative assertion that genuine acceptance in society entails that citizens fulfil the social requirement of paid work is supported by the feminist position that weaker labour market ties historically served to marginalize women as citizens. This shared insight suggests that our society is one in which paid work is a central element of genuine social inclusion that contributes significantly to one's "standard of living" and "self-esteem" (Giddens 1999, 103) and "gives a sense of stability and direction in life" (ibid., 110).

The convergence of some feminists and economic conservatives on this issue is consistent with recent electoral results in Canada. Re-election of governments (particularly at the federal level, and in Ontario and Alberta) that have implemented predominantly neoliberal agendas, including dramatic cuts to social assistance and social services to minimize transfer dependency, suggests that much of the citizenry associates dignity with an ideal of self-sufficiency defined in opposition to receipt of state welfare. The pervasiveness of the cultural norm linking dignity with paid work is further corroborated by counselling psychologists who
observe that many unemployed individuals also identify personal integrity with employment, particularly men. For instance, Malek (1999, 99-100) observes a deteriorated sense of social status, self-esteem and personal autonomy among out-of-work persons in response to their newfound distance from the income-earner role. More generally, data from the 1995 General Social Survey found resounding support among Canadians for the view that ‘being able to take a paying job is important to happiness’. 86 percent of men agreed with the statement, as did 64 percent of women, with still higher support among younger women (Beaujot 2000, 327).

A work-family balance framework for social citizenship encompasses the insight that sufficient paid worktime is a key component of dignified social inclusion in Canada in addition to adequate income. The framework follows Giddens (2000, 88) in acknowledging that:

An individual who is unemployed might be living in a society that pays high levels of social security. Although economically in the same position as someone in work, or close to it, that person might be worse off in terms of well-being, because enforced unemployment is widely associated with lack of self esteem and with the ‘oppression of surplus time’.

In response, the work-family balance concept interprets structural unemployment and the polarization of paid work hours as factors that indicate the need to reorganize institutions around revised cultural conceptions of full-time employment. Redefinition of full-time work norms would transform the present policy orientation content only to transfer social assistance to the un(der)employed into an orientation also committed to transferring employment opportunities. Giddens’s (1994, 195) notes that this second transfer will require changed attitudes towards worktime among the more affluent generally and among policy makers specifically. Chapter eight investigates in more detail policies that may facilitate paid worktime redistribution as part of broader project concerned to challenge the gender division of caregiving.

The concern to redistribute employment opportunities has some potential to facilitate more citizens assuming an income-earner role in keeping with the ideological extension of this
role to all citizens by economic conservatism more than two decades ago. However, arguments from previous chapters indicate that the neoliberal vision of social citizenship premised on the ideally unencumbered worker norm is impoverished. The one-sided, 'workerist' model neglects the value for citizens inherent in domestic participation and also constrains the time that individuals have to participate in politics and civil society. By contrast, full community membership implies dignified access to and participation across all important social spaces. This position is consistent with Giddens (1999, 110) who remarks that:

> inclusion must stretch well beyond work, not only because there are many people at any one time not able to be in the labour force, but because a society too dominated by the work ethic would be a thoroughly unattractive place in which to live. An inclusive society must provide for the basic needs of those who can't work and must recognize the wider diversity of goals life has to offer.

By guiding social citizenship policy, the work-family balance concept would contribute to remedying the one-sidedness of the present paradigm by elevating participation in the private sphere of personal relations to the same status as participation in the market and political arena when measuring the extent to which citizens achieve full membership. One fundamental concern of the social element of citizenship is to provide entitlements to services and social safety nets in order to enable individuals to pursue a diverse range of visions of the good life. But a social citizenship framework is incomplete if it fails to acknowledge that this vision for almost everyone will "include the development of caring relationships" (Held 1995, 131), or if it fails to support citizens realize care ambitions and fulfil the concomitant responsibilities.

According to Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 362), the recognition that citizens attach considerable value to their care pursuits is implicit in much political theory:

> Most people find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in politics. Political participation is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, activity needed to ensure that government respects and supports their freedom to pursue these personal occupations and attachments. This assumption that politics is a means to private life is shared by most people on the left (Ignatieff 1989, 27-73) and right (Mead 1986, 254), as well as by liberals (Rawls 1971, 229-230), civil society theorists (Walzer 1989, 215), and feminists (Elshtain 1981, p. 327), and defines the modern view of citizenship.
While the assumption that politics is a means to private life may represent the modern view of citizenship, previous chapters indicate that some aspects of 'private life' associated with domesticity enjoy far less attention in citizenship theory outside of feminist work when compared to questions of market participation and freedom of conscience. In Rawls's (1971, 7) work, the "monogamous family" is listed as an example of the major social institutions that are the appropriate subject for political and moral analysis. But Okin (1989, 94) shows that the family is the one major social institution in his list that Rawls fails to critically examine by the conclusion of *A Theory of Justice*. Similarly, Marshall (1981, 123-136) employs the concept of the "hyphenated society" to describe the complex of social systems that make up the modern context for welfare. The concept references the welfare state, democracy and capitalism, but, as Roche (1992, 33) points out, overlooks the family. The post-war welfare regime that culturally reflected Marshall’s and Rawls’s inattention to the family in turn privileged social practices performed outside of the domestic sphere, linking social citizenship benefits primarily to formal paid labour force participation (Leira 1992, 171; O’Connor 1993, 504; Orloff 1993a, 315).

In addition, the account of responsible citizenship by Galston (1991, 220-227) which Kymlicka and Norman (2000, 7) suggest “captures a core set of concerns in the citizenship literature” examines four categories of civic virtues in which the theme of “family solidarity” receives only minimal attention and is not further developed in his analysis of how to institutionalize liberal theory in state practices. Again, Esping-Anderson’s (1990, 153-156) very influential examination of modern welfare regimes identifies maternal and parental leave benefits as important decommodification measures in social democratic states. But this insight is largely overshadowed by Esping-Anderson’s broader class analysis that directs his attention to other decommodification policies, primarily pensions that permit citizens with strong labour
force attachments to eventually exit the labour market. Finally, Eichler (1997) finds that the work of economic conservatives reflects “the individual responsibility model of the family” that assumes citizens should be able to integrate the earning and caring roles that were divided along gender lines by the post-war paradigm. But economic conservatives capitalize on this assumption to limit state spending without adequately examining the challenges inherent in balancing work and family in the existing arrangement of major social intuitions, a failing that was identified in Courchene’s (1994a, 78-82) discussion of day care policy.

By enhancing the status ascribed participation in the domestic sphere so that it is on par with involvement in the market and political arena in citizenship theory and practices, a work-family balance framework would institutionalize another insight suggested by some social conservatives and feminists such as Collins (1994). Both groups observe that our home and extended network of family and friends is typically the most intimate and emotional space available to us, where unpaid care often expresses commitment to a network of relationships that are intrinsically rewarding. The work of feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Collins is particularly insightful for revealing that care activities in the domestic sphere provide an important basis for any sense of community belonging. Participation in the private life of family and close friends protects citizens from isolation and often situates citizens amidst a web of relations that will validate their sense of self worth and, in some cases, provide a place of refuge from the forces of discrimination. This validation of personal worth in turn strengthens the collective identities of the various social groups to which individuals belong, ethnic or otherwise (see chapter three, sections 2 and 3).

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4 Esping-Anderson (1999) has recently adjusted his analytical framework in response to feminist criticism by writing of a triangle linking family, economy and state.
By elevating some domestic care activities to the same status as participation in public spaces when theorizing social inclusion, a work-family balance framework for social citizenship is tantamount to a “reconstructive ideal” of the so-called ‘private’ half of the liberal public/private. This reconstruction is recommended by Elshtain (1981, 322) who urges that the private should not be “taken-for-granted” or viewed only in “instrumentalist terms” as a domain responsible for raising and educating future citizens, or supporting the non-domestic participation of current community members. Nor should the private be viewed only as an obstacle to social justice that must be “overcome in order to attain unity” with more privileged citizens in the domain of politics and economics. Although these characterizations of domesticity capture real aspects of the private sphere that can contribute to the isolation and debasement of women, they nonetheless fail to attach sufficient importance to the private sphere as a vital “locus of human activity, moral reflection, social and historical relationships, the creation of meaning, and the construction of identity;” as a place of belonging, intimacy, security, and happiness; as a space with its “own integrity.”

Research suggests that this reconstructive ideal is consistent with attitudinal trends among the broader public. Storey (2000, 29) observes about the evolution of attitudes towards work and career that the “emerging dominance of market forces in the 1980s... has been somewhat tempered by an increased emphasis on quality of life in the 1990s. There appears to be a trend towards viewing work as just one component of life rather than the ‘be-all and end-all.’” Compared to their parents, Storey (ibid., 30) cites US data which suggest that Generation X-ers, born between 1965 and 1981, want more balance between work and private life and to be more available for their children. This finding is consistent with Beaujot’s (2000, 28) analysis of recent Canadian data, which reveals that most people “place a high priority on three goals: to live
in a rewarding and continuing relationship, to have and raise children, and to have secure and meaningful work. For most people, the issue is not to set aside one of these priorities but to somehow fit them together and to deal with the resulting conflicts.”

There remains ambiguity with respect to what ‘balance’ means to citizens. For some Generation X-ers, the desire for balance translates into renewed interest in ‘traditional’ families, although, as we have seen, market forces and revised labour usage strategies rule out this option for many couples. For others, balance means managing both work and family responsibilities personally, a sentiment that is becoming more common even among men. Lupton and Barclay (1997, 1) report that new fathers increasingly articulate the hope that they will not repeat the relatively absent role that many of their own fathers played during their childhood.

The reconstructive ideal of the domestic sphere would represent a dramatic societal revaluing of caregiving. Care would be so valued that women and men are expected and facilitated to perform it, without putting at risk their financial security or that of their dependents. As discussed above, the concern for citizens’ financial sustainability implicit in a work-family balance framework would entail a considerable transfer of care labour to state services so as to facilitate paid labour market participation. Access to such services would be an entitlement of citizenship, rather than a benefit contingent on employment or income level. But just as critically, the framework does not assume that all care work will be shifted to social services. The recognition that provision and receipt of unpaid care is an intrinsically valuable facet of family and community belonging motivates public support for citizens to act within their private domains to foster the care relationships that are almost always a central element of individual life plans. A restructured welfare system would therefore integrate policy measures that provide
citizens the time to care in this capacity. Included in this set of measures would be enriched, lengthened and more flexible family leave benefits, which I discuss in chapter eight.

Conclusion

A work-family balance framework builds on the now dominant economic conservative approach to social security that prioritizes further commodification of citizens through enhanced commitments to human capital acquisition and active labour market measures. The framework uses insights from the feminist literature identified with Pateman (1989) to renovate neoliberal discourse by integrating questions of gender equality into its analysis of the state’s role in facilitating or impeding citizen employment. The work-family balance concept then transforms the economic conservative paradigm by reprioritizing the post-war preoccupation with decommodification. However, the post-war focus is also refashioned by engaging it with feminist literature associated with Collins (1994). This second stream of feminism underscores the need to broaden the scope of decommodification policy beyond its role in protecting citizens from market exploitation and providing insurance during recessions to also include a concern to grant citizens more time to care in unpaid contexts and thereby capitalize on the domestic sphere’s welfare potential.

By reworking both post-war and economic conservative discourses in light of different strands of feminist research, the work-family balance concept remedies the inadequate attention given to the domestic sphere by the two welfare regimes that informed Canadian policy since the Second World War. This heightened awareness of domesticity results in an enhanced appreciation for the contributions and barriers that care relations pose for personal autonomy in keeping with some of the feminist work motivated by Gilligan (1982). The new appreciation for caregiving motivates two broad policy shifts. The first would institutionalize certain care
activities as an obligation of citizenship that equally binds men and women in order to counter the gender division of labour. Since the work-family balance concept specifically acknowledges the challenges that dependent care poses for one’s own predictability, it extends care as a citizenship responsibility only within a broader institutional commitment to provide new measures to assist citizens interweave their care duties with the pursuit of other self-selected projects, particularly in the labour market.

Second, the proposed framework evaluates full membership in society by giving due attention to the role of care relations in fostering personal identity and social belonging, working to ensure that citizens’ care ambitions are compatible with their continued participation in the public domain. This shift reprioritizes activity in one’s sphere of personal relations on par with involvement in the market and political arena in contrast to much western liberal theory that has historically privileged ‘public’ over ‘private’ practices (Arneil 1999, 28-42). The work-family balance concept underpins a political concern to ensure that citizens have time to pursue familial aspirations and discharge the associated responsibilities in addition to securing their (and their dependents’) economic welfare. This political concern publicly acknowledges both the nurturing and financial components of care in contrast to the neoliberal individual responsibility model of the family that largely discounts the daily work that nurturing entails. In effect, a work-family balance framework would provide an institutional blueprint to accompany the ideological expectation implicit in the individual responsibility model that single citizens should be able to combine the financial and nurturing elements of care into their daily lives, rather than partition these roles between members of a household unit as was advocated during the post-war era. The details of this institutional blueprint are the subject of the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 8:  
THE POLITICS OF TIME

Behind the question of power over time, it is power tout court that is at issue: the distribution of power throughout society, and the direction in which society is to move. Rights over time, over periods of time for diversified activity, are the stakes in a cultural conflict which inevitably spills over into a political conflict.


Interpretations of inequality and social security that rely only on measurements of money income ignore two insights about time made salient by neoconservative and feminist researchers. First, sufficient time in the labour market is an important element of genuine social membership in the contemporary context, one that income assistance alone cannot replace. Second, monetary measures ignore questions about how much time people work for their income and the utility that individuals derive from non-paid working time (Osberg 2001, 3), including the welfare contributions, sense of social belonging and intimacy that one can foster with time spent in one’s sphere of personal relations.

This chapter defends a work-family balance framework for social citizenship that advocates a new politics of time premised on these two insights. The term ‘politics’ acknowledges that public policy mediates citizenry access to paid and unpaid temporal opportunities. The level of demand for employment and its distribution between citizens is significantly influenced by state regulations governing employment standards and industrial relations, monetary and taxation policies, and social spending. Non-labour market time is also affected by state decommodification measures that moderate the degree to which citizens can maintain a livelihood independent of pure market forces.

The public role in fostering employment, regulating labour market practices and decommodifying citizens renders paid time in the market and unpaid time across other key social spaces a divisible social benefit. Individual time usage patterns are not simply a matter of
personal prerogative, but also a function of social decisions. As such, questions of distributive justice arise regarding citizens’ access to diverse time-related opportunities, including the potential disutility of time constraints and imbalances that impede individual participation in important areas of community life. Given the significance of time in the labour market and the domestic sphere for full community membership, the collective interest in distributive justice should extend beyond the allocation of material rewards to account also for the distribution of time for paid work, family and other citizenship practices.

The primary change implied by a new politics of time is a revamped ideal worker norm to reflect the view that the social citizen is neither wholly a labour force participant nor only an unpaid caregiver but a citizen who interweaves both roles in keeping with the dialogical thesis of agency discussed in the previous chapter. This conceptual shift would extend to all men the caregiver half of the post-war breadwinner/carer model, just as the breadwinner role has been extended (at least ideologically) to women through pay and employment equity legislation. While a new ideal worker norm would entail a number of policy changes, I focus on three particularly important reforms in this chapter. The first two redefine full-time employment expectations (i) over the life course through leave entitlements and (ii) over the week and year through employment standards that regulate hours of work. The third reform prioritizes child care as a critical employment-enabling service. I examine the income tax treatment of caregiving and dependency in chapter nine.

Although others have already proposed for the North American context the three policy reforms examined in this chapter,$^1$ my analysis departs from previous research by examining

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$^1$ For instance, Fraser (1994, 612) recommends shorter full-time work weeks; Baker (1997) and Beajot (2000, 353-354) advocate changes to parental leave; and Ferguson (1998) and Teghtsoonian (1997) critically evaluate the tenor of Canada’s public debate about child care.
more closely the impact of specific policy design features for gender equality in light of recent Canadian and European evidence — the subject of sections 1 and 2 below. In addition, since gender equality is not obviously a significant motivating force in the present policy arena, I also assess the policy recommendations in terms of their positive consequences for three other social issues that may be more politically compelling: the shift in poverty to families with young children powered in part by declining real male wages, earnings polarization, and persistent un(der)employment. The scope of social problems that would be partly addressed by the policy proposals is regarded as a strong justification for treating the work-family balance concept as a solid foundation on which to develop a more detailed social citizenship blueprint for Canada’s post-industrial and post-traditional context. The chapter concludes by examining briefly some of the obstacles to implementing this new framework in Canada’s federal and liberal democracy.

1. A Policy Blueprint for the New Work-Family Balance Welfare Regime

An ideal worker norm premised on the assumption that workers are also carers must minimize the functional division of responsibilities between primary breadwinner and primary unpaid caregiver. This division will be undone only if institutional arrangements are reorganized

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2 One issue that is not dealt with in the following analysis is the impact of the proposed policy changes for children. This issue is critical since the citizenship needs of children and adults are not obviously congruent. However, the issue lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. One would need to engage in some detail with the burgeoning neuroscience literature and longitudinal research which increasingly suggests “that the early years of development from conception to age six, particularly for the first three years, set the base for competence and coping skills that will affect learning, behaviour and health throughout life” (Norrie McCain and Mustard 1999, 5).

The focus on the social citizenship needs of adults in this chapters responds to the political reality that children, particularly in poor families, are one of few social groups for which demands for public provision of assistance and services are condoned under the neoconservative paradigm (Brodie 1996, 135). In a context where adult dependency is increasingly pathologized, neoconservative approbation of child dependency risks obscuring the intimate, though not necessarily parallel, connection between children’s well-being and their parents’ circumstances. The risk is exacerbated because the political appeal of a child-centred analysis has moved many critics of neoconservative restructuring to advocate that policy critiques focus on the consequences of state retrenchment for children (see for example Nakamura and Diewert1995, 177-178). As policy actors increasingly engage with questions of early childhood development and income security, it is critical to ensure that the distinct citizenship needs of parents are integrated into policy design. The analysis in this chapter contributes to this end by returning attention to questions of adult citizenship as they are impacted by policies concerned to facilitate greater work-family balance.
to reflect new cultural expectations about full-time employment. New employment practices are necessary to ensure that citizens’ legitimate family ambitions and care responsibilities become more compatible with paid work opportunities in which citizens contribute as core members of an organization and earn an economically viable income for themselves and their dependents. This institutional change would require that we challenge and redefine labour market norms that dictate the hours that ‘core’ workers devote to employment with the intention of providing such employees more time to care in their spheres of private relations. This change would reduce the total amount of time that ideal workers are expected to commit to their jobs, particularly during life course stages when citizens’ unpaid careloads are especially acute. I draw on two models for reducing paid working time increasingly common in Europe: the first revises employment expectations over the life course; the second revises worktime norms over the week and year.

Reform I: Paid Worktime Reductions Over The Life Course

Maternity and parental leave benefits represent an obvious place to redefine full-time employment expectations over the life course since they have the potential to subsidize and normalize extended periods of labour market withdrawal for citizens when unpaid caregiving responsibilities and aspirations increase. In 2001, the Canadian federal government introduced new provisions that extend the combined maternity/parental leave benefit period available through Employment Insurance (EI) from roughly six months to 50 weeks\(^3\) at a cost of roughly \$1-billion annually by 2003, raising the annual expenditure on leave to \$2.4-billion in that year (Chief Actuary 2001, 9-13). The leave must be used in the child’s first year. Fifteen weeks of the leave period are defined as ‘maternity’ leave for which only biological mothers are eligible. The remaining 35 weeks are characterized as ‘parental’ leave, and may be taken by the mother or

\(^3\) *Budget Implementation Act, 2000*, S.C. 2000, c. 14. Section 3(2) extended the duration of parental leave benefits from 10 to 35 weeks.
father (biological or adopted), or shared by both. The value of maternity/parental leave benefits is income contingent, calculated at a rate of 55 percent of the recipient’s earnings up to a maximum benefit $413 a week.4 There is a two-week period following a parent’s temporary departure from employment before benefit payments are issued.

The number of hours that a citizen must work in one year to receive leave benefits was reduced from 700 to 600 in 2001. Despite this change, many part-time workers (the majority of whom are women) will continue to pay EI premiums without the opportunity to cash in on leave benefits. In addition, self-employed citizens are not eligible for maternity and parental leave benefits because the system is administered through the Employment Insurance envelope to which the self-employed do not contribute. One result of present eligibility conditions is that less than half of all newborns (48.7 percent) in 1998 resided in homes in which parents received parental benefits either from contributions to EI by the mother or father (Statistics Canada 1999c). Thus, the majority of Canadian families have no income support to compensate lost earnings should parents choose to take a leave following the birth of a child.

In sections two and three below, I defend as the first plank of a new work-family balance framework that maternity/parental leave benefits should be amended in the following ways, some of which the Québec government captures in its plan to change parental leave in its province.5 The leave system should be removed from Employment Insurance administrative

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4 The Employment Insurance Act (S.C. 1996, c. 23) reduced the maternity/parental benefit rate from $448 in 1996.

5 The Québec government’s 1997 Family Policy agenda announced the province’s intention to increase parental leave benefits so that they replace 70 percent of a citizen’s previous earnings. The primary condition to access benefits is that recipients must earn more than $2,000 in the previous year, ensuring that most self-employed and part-time workers would become eligible. According to the proposal, benefits would reach a maximum value when a person’s earned income surpasses $51,000, well above the $39,000 limit that defines the current federal EI program (Beaujot 2000, 335). The Québec government has made implementation of the proposal conditional on receiving from Ottawa the share of funding currently spent in the province under the national EI leave system. To date, the federal Liberals have resisted transferring this revenue and the Québec plan is stalled. The 2000-2001 Annual Report of the Ministère de la Famille et de l’Enfance indicates that the province plans to continue lobbying Ottawa to free the necessary funds (Government of Québec 2001, 25).
mechanisms and financed through general tax revenue to which the self-employed contribute with the intention of making this growing part of the labour force in Canada eligible for maternity and parental benefits. The value of benefits should continue to be based on previous income but be increased on two fronts: the level of remuneration should be calculated as 80 percent of previous income, on par with Sweden and Norway;\(^6\) and the maximum monthly benefit should plateau at annual incomes of roughly $50,000, rather than the present $39,000 limit. While the value of benefits should remain income-contingent, eligibility conditions should be loosened to capture a greater share of the population employed part-time. As in Norway and Sweden,\(^7\) the parental benefit system would ideally encompass a minimum flat rate benefit even for parents who do not meet employment eligibility criteria in recognition of the social value of quality early childhood development experiences provided by parents during a child’s early years. A substantial portion of parental leave should also be reserved exclusively for fathers,\(^8\) with appropriate exceptions for single, gay and lesbian parents. When fathers do not make use of this reserved time, the leave system should not permit the benefits to be transferred to the mother and should be deducted from the total benefit period available to the family. Finally, the Canadian leave system should permit parents to ‘time-bank’ their benefits in order to take

\(^6\) Sweden subsidizes 15 months of subsidized parental leave per child to be shared by mothers and fathers. Since 1989, the value of parental benefits in Sweden fell from 90 to 80 percent of full pay up to a ceiling for the first 12 months. The value dropped further to 75 percent by 1997, but has since been raised again to 80 percent. The final three months are paid at a fixed rate per day that is not income contingent (European Industrial Relations Review (hereafter EIRR) 2001c, 14-15). In Norway, the value of parental leave depends on its duration. Parents can share up to 42 weeks at full pay (up to a ceiling), or 52 weeks at 80 percent pay (up to a ceiling). The level of pay that fathers receive while on leave is determined by the mother’s salary (EIRR 2001b, 18).

\(^7\) Both Sweden and Norway provide flat-rate leave benefits for parents with limited or no labour force attachment who do not qualify for parental leave subsidies based on their previous earnings (Baker 1995, 176; EIRR 2001b, 18).

\(^8\) In 1993 Norway became the first country to reserve four weeks of leave specifically for fathers. If a father does not make use of this time, it cannot be transferred to the mother and is deducted from the overall benefit (EIRR 2001b, 18). Starting in 1995, the Swedish government emulated its Norwegian neighbour by also reserving thirty days of leave for fathers. The Swedish government increased the non-transferable period for fathers to two months as of January 2002 (EIRR 2001c, 14-15).
advantage of them on a part-time basis over multiple years while participating in the labour market at half- or two-thirds time.\(^9\)

Although maternity/parental leave benefits offer an obvious starting point for further integrating earning and caring roles given recent federal changes and the intentions of the Québec parliament, Canadian governments should also pay careful attention to the system of subsidized leave employed in Denmark that supplements the country's regular parental leave benefit system. Starting in 1994, all Danish employees became eligible to take educational, caregiving and personal sabbatical leaves of up to one year, conditional on the agreement of their employers. While on leave, employees can claim unemployment insurance: 100 percent of regular benefits for educational leave and 60 percent for caregiving and personal leave. In 1996, 121,000 people took advantage of this leave opportunity (Hayden 1999, 155).

The personal sabbatical option of the Denmark program is especially unique and innovative. It permits citizens of Denmark to take a leave of absence for any purpose provided that the company hires an unemployed person as a replacement. In effect, the sabbatical functions as an exchange of wages and unemployment benefits between someone with and someone without a job (Hayden 1999, 155). The system provides Danish citizens with added flexibility not only to balance unpaid care with employment throughout the life course, but also other important citizenry pursuits. The possible savings to government make this option attractive, since the program effectively swaps full EI benefits paid to a jobless person in favour of 60 percent of benefits paid to a person on leave.

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\(^9\) The parental leave systems in Norway and Sweden subsidize either full- or part-time absences from paid work at any point before the child turns eight years old. For instance, parents may take four months of full-time leave, and use the remainder of the leave to reduce their work-day to half- or three-quarter time depending on their preferences (Beaujot 2000, 325-326; EIRR 2001b, 18).
Reform II: Paid Worktime Reductions over the Week and Year

The second paid working time transition that I defend would follow France and Germany to implement a shorter standard full-time employment week and year. The French government introduced the *loi Aubry* in 1998, which launched a process that will see statutory weekly working time reduced from 39 to 35 hours. The new legislation obliges employers to pay overtime premiums for weekly work following the 36th hour at a rate of 25 percent for the first seven hours and 50 percent for overtime hours thereafter. The premium can be taken as either added pay or time off, with a presumption in favour of time off in the absence of a collective agreement (Bilous 2000, 1). The new French legislation also limits maximum annual overtime hours for individuals to 130 hours. This provision applies to professional staff and production managers, but excludes senior management. Some intermediate level managers have added flexibility under the statute that permits up to 180 overtime hours per year (EIRR 2001e, 26-27).

The *loi Aubry* institutionalizes an annualized norm of working time that provides employers with new forms of flexibility in labour usage patterns to facilitate compliance with the 35-hour week (EIRR 1998, 22). Under this annual norm, the threshold after which overtime is calculated is 1,600 hours. The annualized norm permits employers to vary weekly working time according to demand and production cycles and facilitates the reduction of weekly working hours in the form of rest days. Rest days are specifically aimed to mitigate the problem of reducing the working time of executives, managers and other senior staff by enabling companies to offer directors time off in lieu of extra hours worked over given weeks. French legislation further allows rest days to be used in combination with a time-banking system that permits a certain share of rest days to be set aside for use at a future date over several years.
While France pursued paid worktime reduction through legislation, Germany provides an example of worksharing achieved exclusively through collective bargaining. Unions in Germany bargain at the industry level and the terms of the collective contract apply not only to members but also almost all other workers in the sector (Contensou and Vranceanu 2000, 36). In 1990, the union IG Metall and employers negotiated new initiatives to reduce hours of work to 35 per week (from 38.5) without loss of pay, but with a slower pace of wage increase. In return, employers received more flexibility in the organization of the manufacturing process that permits capital to be utilized for longer hours and on weekends in order to avoid overtime payments (J. Hunt 1998). By early 1995, ten industrial sectors in Germany covering 6.5 million workers signed similar worktime frameworks (Contensou and Vranceanu 2000, 37).

Extending the French and German commitment to reduce standard full-time work hours measured over the year in Canada would explicitly reverse many of the recent employment standard revisions in Ontario and BC that enable companies to rely on individual employees for longer hours (see chapter five). The policy would apply overtime premiums starting in the 36th hour of work per week (averaged over a year), in contrast to current provincial arrangements that stipulate overtime pay after 40 hours in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Québec, the territories, and BC; after 44 hours in Alberta, Ontario, and New Brunswick; and 48 hours in Nova Scotia and PEI (Hayden 1999, 116). The shift to shorter work hours could retain the 1.5 times regular pay overtime premium typical in most provinces, or implement a tiered overtime system as in France.

A reduction in statutory full-time hours would track the Canadian labour market shift across occupational categories in the 1990s that witnessed proportionately more citizens find positions with work-weeks shorter, rather than longer, than 35-hours (Hall 1999, 33; see chapter five). Since shorter employment hours in Canada presently imply significant social costs for
some workers in the form of few, if any, fringe benefits and social protections, policies designed to normalize reduced full-time hours should be accompanied by measures that mitigate this trend. The Government of Saskatchewan (2002) implemented legislation that contributes to this end. The province’s labour standards now entitle workers who labour at least 30 hours a week in businesses with at least ten full-time equivalents (also measured on the basis of 30 hour weeks) to participate fully in the dental, prescription, and insurance benefit programs offered to colleagues working longer hours. The legislation further entitles part-time workers who labour 15 to 30 hours a week to 50 percent of a company’s benefit program.

Reform III: Enriched Public Commitments to Child Care

The third policy trajectory of a work-family balance framework seeks to render paid labour market participation more compatible with unpaid caregiving ambitions and responsibilities by implementing far stronger public commitments to child care services. Sections two and three below defend the view that the federal, provincial and territorial governments in Canada should collaborate to inject substantially more public funding for regulated child care services so that the state subsidizes roughly 80 percent of the costs of care for all children under six. This level of state funding would be consistent with expenditures in Denmark and France\(^{10}\) and is also being institutionalized in the province of Québec.

The Québec child care system has two parts that are relevant to children under six (Tougas 2002, chapter 1). The first provides full school-day kindergarten programs for all five-year-olds with no parent fees. The second subsidizes child care organized by Centres de la petite

\(^{10}\) 1995 Danish statistics show that parents pay on average 21 percent of the costs of child care in the country’s universal child care system, while the state covers the remaining portion (ECNC 1995, 19; Moss and Penn 1996, 123). In France, most children (94 percent) between the ages of three and six attend écoles maternelles that are run by the Ministry of Education and which charge no parental fee (Friendly 1994, 109). These educational programs are supplemented by services offered through the welfare system that are also extensively subsidized for all families, charging parents approximately 28 percent of the costs of care provision (Hunter and Gaudet 1997, 19).
enfance (CPEs), which coordinate full-day programs in centres for children age zero to four, as well as programs in home-based family day care contexts for children under thirteen. The maximum cost of full-day care in both settings is $5 per day, regardless of a family's income or employment status. The $5 daily parent fee covers less than 20 percent of the actual cost of care, with the provincial government paying the remaining operating expenses.\footnote{Despite recent advances, the Québec child care system remains underdeveloped. Baril, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2000, 23) draw attention to this problem by reporting that the province had only 30,000 regulated child care spaces for 90,000 four-year-olds in 1998. One result is that roughly 60,000 children had no access to subsidized child care during the first phase-in year of the new policy agenda and potentially received less direct financial assistance from the provincial government because it replaced three universal demogrants in 1997 with one targeted subsidy for low-income families. The transition to one targeted subsidy contributed to the government's balanced budget objective and also freed funds for the new child care and parental leave proposals. This concern has been addressed partially by the development of 54,000 new regulated spaces since 1997, as well as the province's plan to create an additional 67,000 regulated spaces over the next five years – a goal that is well in reach given that annual growth in regulated spaces since 1998 surpassed 16 percent (Government of Québec 2001, 17). Nonetheless, the critique remains important insofar as the goal of 200,000 spaces by 2005-2006 will still only provide full-time care for roughly 42 percent of children under five years, leaving the Québec government with considerable work to remedy the potential dearth of spaces.}

While other provinces may prefer a different fee system than that implemented in Québec, all should adopt some version of a sliding fee scale to ensure that no family would be responsible for more than 30 percent of actual costs following the Danish model (ECNC 1995, 19; Moss and Penn 1996, 123). Before establishing new government funding levels, average caregiver wages should be reviewed and increased (outside of Québec where they were raised by roughly 40 percent in 1999) with the intention of ensuring that child care workers do not implicitly subsidize care arrangements for both parents and the state.

Extending Québec's child care goal across Canada would represent a dramatic departure from the existing funding scheme in many provinces. As of 1998, parent fees cover on average 82 percent of actual regulated care costs in Newfoundland; more than two-thirds of costs in the Maritimes; half of costs in BC, Alberta and Ontario; and 38 and 34 percent in Saskatchewan and Manitoba respectively (Childcare Resource and Research Unit (CRRU) 2000, 108).
The commitment to subsidize spaces for all children under six would require an even more dramatic increase in the number of regulated spaces. According to 1998 data, there are regulated spaces in Canada for just 10 percent of all children under 12. Outside of Québec, the rate ranges from as low as 3.9 percent in Saskatchewan to 15.4 percent in PEI (CRRU 2000, 96).

The net cost of the proposed system on a national scale would be substantial. Cleveland and Krashinsky (1998) estimate the cost to Canadian governments of a quality child care program available to children between the age of two and five inclusive residing with parents who wish to take advantage of either part-time or full-time care. The projected cost is $7.91 billion annually (less than .8 percent GDP), approximately $5.3 billion a year more than federal and provincial governments spent on child care as of 1997. The Cleveland/Krashinsky (1998, 72) study concludes that the added $5.3 billion will eventually generate more than $10.5 billion in annual benefits in terms of early childhood development outcomes and increased labour force participation among mothers, a favourable 2-to-1 benefit/cost ratio.

2. Restructuring the Patriarchal Gender Order

Enriched funding for regulated child care and maternity/parental leave accompanied by a broader societal commitment to redefine full-time employment have the potential to minimize many costs discussed in chapter six that are imposed by the patriarchal division of labour. By

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12 The Cleveland/Krashinsky (p. 56-58) projection assumes a system that is available to all families regardless of parents' employment status, open for hours that extend beyond the work day, and that pays caregivers an average salary of $30,000, as well as fringe benefits valued at an additional $6,000. The projection further assumes that parents would pay on average twenty percent of the full cost of high quality care and that existing public funds spent on the child care expense deduction, child care subsidies to low-income families and child care assistance provided to parents in training programs would be redirected into the proposed pan-Canadian system.

13 The initial injection of $5.3 billion in new public expenditures implies higher marginal tax rates (MTRs) over a transition period before the anticipated positive consequences of increased child care spending materialize. The Cleveland/Krashinsky analysis does not attempt to estimate adverse effects on economic efficiency associated with higher MTRs during this interim period. However, the projected 2-to-1 benefit/cost ratio suggests that increased investment in quality child care has the potential to lower MTRs over the medium and long term, generating efficiency gains beyond those projected by Cleveland and Krashinsky.
easing the burden of balancing earning and unpaid caring, the policy proposals are likely to mitigate some of the rising stress levels and associated health ailments that many Canadians report in recent years, particularly single and/or full-time employed working mothers. The wage increases proposed for regulated child caregivers would also address the current situation in which child care workers subsidize the costs of childrearing for both parents and the state. Since the new regulated child care commitment would mean a dramatic increase in demand for qualified caregivers, the federal government could also revisit immigration statutes governing the Live-In Caregiver program to rescind its ‘live-in’ requirement and recruit foreign caregivers for centre-based rather than live-in domestic positions. This shift would still maintain important opportunities for women in developing nations to immigrate to Canada, while eliminating the added vulnerability to abuse that some foreign domestics presently encounter because their employer is also responsible entirely for their place of residence.

The policy changes recommended in section one not only possess resources to address some of the harmful effects of the patriarchal division of labour, they also include resources to challenge the very sources of this division. Considerable research has examined men’s and women’s attitudes about fatherhood, the work that men do (not) perform in this role, and their willingness to share domestic and care labour equally in order to mitigate systemic barriers to gender equality (Coltrane 1996; Lupton and Barclay 1997). A number of studies suggest that practical necessity is constraining men to shoulder additional caregiving responsibilities (Coltrane 1996, 206; Conway 1997, 181). The increasing need for two incomes to maintain household security coupled with the relative isolation of many nuclear families from extended kin networks is pressing some men to contribute more in the domestic context, whether inclined to or not. For some fathers, personal motivations also contribute importantly to their willingness
to share domestic work (Coltrane 1996, 117-121). Some regard spending time with their children as an activity that fosters personal growth and development, while others wish not to repeat the relatively absent role that their own fathers played while they were children.

Beyond the influence of practical necessity and personal motivation, research identifies two other factors that are also closely associated with heterosexual men assuming added caregiving workloads: (i) the relative labour force attachment of their female partners; and (ii) timing, both in terms of when in the lifecycle men and women become parents, as well when men starting participating in primary parenting following the birth of a child. This evidence confirms the importance of enriching parental leave and child care benefits, as I discuss below.

2a. Relative labour force attachment

Research by Coltrane (1996, 111-113) identifies a strong connection between women’s labour force attachment and the share of care and domestic work that male spouses shoulder (see also Beaujot 2000, 198-204; Conway 1997, 207-208). Generally, the more women contribute to overall household income, the greater share of domestic work their husbands perform. Men’s share of housework and caregiving also tends to rise as women demonstrate a longer period of continuous paid workforce experience and as their occupational prestige increases relative to their husbands’. The correlation between women’s labour force attachment and men’s contributions to the domestic sphere suggest that wives are better positioned to demand that their spouses share care and domestic duties as their relative earnings potential rises; and that higher female earnings potential mean heterosexual couples have less reason to limit specifically the

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14 As women’s relative labour force attachment rises past a certain point, data also indicate that men perform considerably less domestic work. For instance, some studies show that husbands do very little housework when they are entirely dependent on wives for income, and even in some cases when wives contribute significantly more than half of household earnings. The impact of gender ideology seems particularly strong in such cases. The cultural identification of masculinity with breadwinning may mean that some men who struggle in the employment context compensate for this lost element of their manhood by further distancing themselves from what is ‘feminine’ – the performance of domestic and care work (Beaujot 2000, 202-3).

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market participation of wives for the purpose of supporting the employment success of husbands or for saving child care and other domestic expenses. The additional earnings that typically accompany women's stronger attachment to the paid labour force may also provide male partners with added financial security, which in turn could permit men to reduce their paid worktime and shoulder a greater share of the domestic workload.

This research supports significantly increasing funding for child care arrangements if minimizing gender inequality is a public policy priority. Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) and Powell (1997) argue that child care costs exert a significant negative influence on the labour supply of women with children, as well as decisions to purchase market-based care. On the basis of Canadian data, the studies find that a 10 percent increase in the expected price of child care yields a 3.9 percent decline in the mother's probability of engaging in paid employment and an 11 percent reduction in the probability of buying care arrangements from the child care sector. The shift from market-based to more informal care arrangements further weakens the labour market ties of people (almost always women) who agree to provide care at no, or very reduced, costs. Given this evidence, the average 80 percent subsidy for regulated child care proposed above can be expected to increase female labour force participation significantly (raising the probability that a woman will engage in paid employment by roughly 32 percent). Stronger labour force ties minimize lost wages, promotions, pay raises and human capital that women might otherwise forgo.

The correlation between female labour force attachment and male assumption of domestic duties also provides strong reason to limit new funding for child care exclusively to regulated arrangements, despite charges that such a policy is not sufficiently neutral with respect to parental preferences regarding earning and caring. Writing for the Institute for Research on
Public Policy (IRPP), Baril, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2000, 10) raise this concern in regards to the Québec child care system, arguing that it is "for the most part benefiting families where the parents [are] participating in the labour market." A "more efficient" system, they (ibid., 3) argue, "would not unduly influence [parental] choices."

In place of Québec’s new child care commitment and targeted child benefit, Baril, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2000, 26) recommend that the same funding should be used to introduce "a nontaxable universal family allowance." They offer two options: the first, a demogrant of $1,752 annually per child under 18; the second, a tiered universal allowance system of $2,754 for children under six, and $1,377 for children age seven to fifteen. A third option not discussed in the paper would enrich the existing federal and provincial child tax benefits, rather than introduce a new subsidy entirely. All three proposals would provide more cash for parents with children, raising their resources and therefore their ability to choose to remain home with their children or go to work and hire child care services.

The IRPP critique presupposes that the social, economic and policy context prior the introduction of the new child care program in Québec was neutral with regard to families’ caregiving decisions, an assumption that ignores the historical evolution of social institutions in response to the patriarchal division of labour discussed throughout this dissertation. The early post-war era assigned primary responsibility for caregiving to diverse groups of women both ideologically and practically, withdrawing funding for child care following World War II (Baker 1995, 199) and recruiting female foreign domestics (Arat-Koc 1997, 74). Labour market expectations regarding an ideal worker were constructed by men in respect of male experience and produced employment norms regarding hours of work that are largely incompatible with primary responsibility for unpaid caring 'encumbrances' (Slaughter 1995). Early post-war
attitudes depicted women in the labour market as 'secondary earners' and less productive due to pregnancy and their primary childrearing roles (Pateman 1989, 190). The socialization of young girls to assume domestic roles as wives and mothers also encouraged many women to invest less in human capital, while social expectations about 'appropriate' occupations for women contributed to employment segregation (Phillips and Phillips 1993, 60). Each of these factors contributed to a gender earnings differential that powers a self-reinforcing cycle in which it becomes 'economically rational' for heterosexual couples to maximize household income by investing more heavily in the man's career and woman's domesticity.

The IRPP proposal to replace Québec's child care system with a demogrant that is ostensibly more neutral ignores the systemic forces that underpin this cycle and, as a result, fails to challenge them.\(^\text{15}\) Added cash in hand for both familial and non-familial care does not provide additional incentives to reinforce women's labour force ties or men's attachment to unpaid care responsibilities. Since families will receive the subsidy regardless of labour force patterns, women's after-tax earnings must still surpass the cost of care arrangements and lost domestic productivity before some couples will think it financially worthwhile for mothers to pursue paid employment. The maximum $2,754 value of the proposed allowance also falls well short of the average cost of regulated care,\(^\text{16}\) increasing the risk that couples will decide that two-earners are 'not worth it'. As a result, the IRPP demogrant may actually further shift the balance of

\(^{15}\) Baril, Lefebvre and Merrigan's (2000, 5) limited attention to the systemic factors that influence the patriarchal division of labour is conspicuous in its absence from their discussion of reasons for governments to deliver public subsidies to "people who have made the private choice to have children." Their analysis references positions such as how "society needs children" since they "are the source of renewal of the human capital of an economy"; how "equal opportunity" for children requires the redistribution of material rewards from rich to poor families; as well as the difficulties that parents encounter balancing work and family. However, the discussion makes no reference to the gender division of labour or the barriers to gender, race and class equality that this division poses.

\(^{16}\) Across Canada the average cost of regulated care for a three-year-old ranges from roughly $4,500 to $5,500 and usually is substantially higher for children under three (Beach, Bertrand, Cleveland 1998, 27).
incentives in favour of supporting couples to decide that one parent (typically the mother) should withdraw from the labour force by adding an additional few thousand dollars to ease this transition. With such decisions, the patriarchal division of care labour is buttressed rather than challenged. By contrast, the Québec Family Policy institutionalizes new incentives that mitigate the systemic factors that underpin patriarchy because they explicitly reduce the relative cost of non-familial care, thereby encouraging stronger labour market ties among women.

The concern to strengthen female labour market attachment to elicit the redistribution of domestic duties between men and women also supports the position that Canada’s system of parental leave benefits should permit parents to bank their benefits over multiple years to subsidize a shift from full-time to part-time hours, rather than just a complete withdrawal from employment for a one-year period. The birth of a child in dual-earner heterosexual families is already a critical moment in the division of labour, a time at which significant emotional, cultural and economic pressures encourage mothers to remain at home beyond the expiration of maternity/parental leave (Iyer 1997, 179). Leave systems that deduct from the parental benefit any income that a recipient earns during the benefit period (as Canada’s did prior to January 2001) compounds these social pressures that impel women to withdraw from the labour force entirely. Such deductions effectively mean that benefit recipients (typically mothers) are being paid not to work, removing a mother completely from her workplace for the duration of the benefit period. The gendered division of labour within the family is thereby reinforced.

The 2001 changes to Canada’s parental leave system made only minor headway in mitigating this adverse policy outcome. Although leave benefit recipients are no longer required to withdraw entirely from their workplace for the duration of the 50-week period, the mandated reduction in paid worktime remains substantial. As was the case pre-reform, any employment-
income earned during the 15 weeks reserved exclusively for biological mothers as ‘maternity leave’ is deducted dollar for dollar from the benefit. New regulations, however, now permit a parent to earn up to $50 a week, or 25 percent of their benefit payment to a maximum of $103.25, whichever is higher, while taking the 35 weeks of parental leave. In effect, this change permits benefit recipients to work roughly one day (or less) a week in the paid labour market during the parental component of the leave period.

Since one day of paid work per week by no means constitutes a strong labour force connection, the Canadian parental leave system should be reorganized to model more closely that element of the Swedish and Norwegian systems which facilitate additional paid work throughout the duration of the benefit period (Beaujot 2000, 325-326; EIRR 2001b, 18). Moreover, the gendered implications of the dollar for dollar deduction of earnings from Canadian maternity benefits merits careful scrutiny, especially now that parental leave permits some additional income. Payments not to work during maternity leave may appropriately recognize that pregnancy and childbirth are a physical ordeal for women that require preparation and recuperation. Nonetheless, divergent expectations about attachment to the labour force for mothers and fathers may also underlie the differential treatment of the two leave categories and have the potential to further reinforce the patriarchal division of household work.

While strengthening female labour market ties is important for mitigating the gender division of labour, the work-family balance concept acknowledges how participation in one’s sphere of personal relations is a critical element of genuine social inclusion. Accordingly, the framework is also concerned to provide many citizens (women and men alike) with more time to care in unpaid contexts. The proposal to enrich Canada’s twelve months of parental leave benefits from the present remuneration rate of 55 percent of previous earnings to a rate of 80
percent is critical for this purpose. This policy shift has the potential to render more economically feasible for parents the choice to care personally for their young children for an extended period as advocated by the IRPP study. But as I discuss below in regards to questions of timing, parental leave offers a policy tool that can be designed so that the state achieves this end without buttressing the patriarchal division of labour.

Raising the value of parental leave benefits and instituting a minimum flat rate subsidy is particularly important for increasing the range of caregiving options available to low-income and single parents. A minimum flat rate subsidy as part of the universal parental leave system likely renders the choice to stay home to care less stigmatized than it would otherwise be if contingent on receipt of social assistance, while higher benefit levels mean the choice of providing child care personally becomes more feasible because it is more affordable.17 Iyer (1997, 173-174) calculates that the minimum 45 percent drop in income mandated by the present leave system means that a new mother’s previous earnings had to be roughly $665 (or $16.63/hour for 40 hours/week) to receive an income from maternity benefits comparable to the low-income cut-off in Canada (just over $400 a week) for a family of one adult and one dependent in a city of more than 500,000. By contrast, the average value of maternity benefits received by Canadian mothers in 1998 was only $277 a week (Statistics Canada 1999c). This level of income is clearly unaffordable for many new parents given that the costs associated with a newborn typically raise private expenditures substantially. Since immigrant women of colour, aboriginal women and women with disabilities are disproportionately likely to earn incomes that yield extremely low levels of maternity benefits, Iyer (ibid., 171) observes that the “typical recipient of the benefit

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17 Conversely, enriched child care subsidies are also critical for providing many single mothers a genuine option (because it is affordable) to maintain strong labour force ties. Chapter six revealed that lone female parents have considerably lower rates of labour force participation, which reflect in part the added challenges of managing child care responsibilities or affording supplementary services in the absence of a partner and second income.
emerges as a white, middle-class, female employee, over 25, with either a higher than average income, or more likely, partnered with someone else who is the primary income earner.” Thus, the structure of the present benefit system generates a group of women who pay employment insurance premiums despite being disqualified from taking advantage of maternity leave because they cannot afford the drop in earnings that the system entails. One result is that the premiums of less economically advantaged women “subsidize the reproductive activities of more economically privileged women” (ibid., 176).

The Danish system of career breaks that permit an exchange of wages and unemployment benefits between a jobholder and unemployed citizen offers another model by which Canadian governments could provide additional subsidized time for citizens to care not only for children but for any dependent. A policy alternative designed to cater to family’s elder care needs is likely to grow more pressing as the generation of baby boomers retire. Iyer’s analysis indicates that the subsidy rate (60 percent of EI benefits) would render this leave opportunity unaffordable to many low-income and single Canadians. Although class inequalities would therefore mediate the use of career breaks, this policy implication is justifiable given the broader class ramifications of the program that would see out-of-work citizens access earning opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable.

2b. The importance of timing

In addition to the relative earnings and occupational prestige of spouses, studies also indicate that the timing of a child’s birth contributes significantly to gender divisions of labour. Coltrane (1996, 126-133) reports that men and women who share household work most equally tend to delay childbearing until at least their late twenties or early thirties. Delaying the transition to parenthood increases substantially the likelihood of continued employment for
women following childbirth since a period of childlessness permits women the time to develop strong employment-related identities. Similarly, delaying the transition to parenthood appears to help men avoid some of the financial and time constraints that early-birth fathers face when they endeavour to forge an employment- and fatherhood-identity simultaneously.

While I advocate a minimum maternity/parental leave benefit for all parents regardless of their employment history in recognition of the social value of childrearing, parental leave benefits should continue to be calculated based on previous earnings so as to retain a structural incentive for parents to delay child rearing until they develop labour market ties. The value of this strategy is confirmed by Swedish experience. Since parental benefits in Sweden are also based on previous earnings, the logic of the system provides a significant incentive to any parent contemplating having a child that she or he secure a job before launching into parenthood. Baker (1995, 176) reports that this incentive has contributed to family planning decisions that result in only 6 percent of Swedish mothers not conforming with this pattern of delayed motherhood.

Beyond the life course timing of parenthood, the point at which a father involves himself in primary child care is also found to have long-term consequences for the man’s participation in childrearing and other household work. Coltrane (1996, 82-3) reports that heterosexual couples who generally share most responsibility for care and domestic labour tend to involve the father in routine child care from early infancy. Similarly, research from Canada and Sweden indicates that men who take advantage of parental leave tend to spend more time childrearing throughout their children’s lives (Baker 1997, 66).

The long-term consequences for the gender division of labour that follow from the timing of fathers’ involvement in primary childrearing provide further reason to revamp and enrich parental leave entitlements in Canada. The value of leave benefits presently constitutes a barrier
to male participation in the program. The leave system positions the lower-earner in a heterosexual couple to take the leave since a couple maximizes household income by deciding it can least afford a minimum 45 percent reduction of the higher earner’s salary. Given the persistent gender earnings gap, the lower earner is typically the mother. Together, the structural incentive implicit in the policy and the gender earnings differential explain in part why just two percent of parental leave benefit recipients in Canada are fathers as of 1998 (Statistics Canada 2000, 109). Only a more generous benefit system can mitigate this gendered consequence by minimizing the financial losses associated with the higher earner in a family withdrawing from the labour force. A leave system that remunerates 80, rather than 55, percent of previous earnings up to maximum annual salaries of $50,000, rather than $39,000, would represent a positive move in this direction. In Sweden, where remuneration rates are 80 percent of previous income, data indicate that a bare majority of fathers now participate in the leave program (O’Hara 1998, 16-17), a figure that far exceeds paternal participation in Canada.

To further acknowledge men’s unpaid care responsibilities in the domestic sphere, Canada should follow Norway and Sweden in reserving some of the parental benefits exclusively for fathers. This policy would ensure that initiatives designed to facilitate added time for parents to participate in their spheres of personal relations will oblige men to assume a greater share of the associated domestic work, in contrast to the IRPP proposed demogrant which includes no such incentive. The results of the Swedish experience suggest the importance of being aggressive on this front. The introduction of the one ‘daddy month’ in 1995 saw the share of male parental leave recipients in Sweden rise 2.6 percentage points (from 28.5 to 31.1 percent) by 1996, an increase that surpassed that of the previous four years combined. The accelerated

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18 The potential earnings-loss for some higher income parents surpasses 45 percent for because parental leave benefits are subject to clawback provisions at tax time for individuals with net taxable incomes that surpass $48,750.
pace of male participation continued throughout the rest of the decade so that 37.7 percent of benefit recipients are fathers as of 2000. Men now use 12.4 percent of the days for which a parental allowance is paid by the state, up from 9.2 percent in 1995 and 7.7 percent at the beginning of the decade. In response to the increased (albeit still small) share of days taken by men, the Swedish government has acknowledged that the one-month reserve policy remains too little an incentive to challenge the gendered expectations that pervade household and market spheres by extending to two months the period of leave that is reserved exclusively for fathers.

In keeping with Swedish policy, the Canadian federal government should require fathers in two-parent families (making appropriate exceptions for single, gay and lesbian parents) to use at least two, and ideally four, months of the 50 week leave period — the latter would represent half of the recently lengthened parental leave component. If the value of leave benefits is enriched to 80 percent of previous earnings, the four month requirement would constitute a significant incentive for men to involve themselves early in primary child care and signal to employers that men are increasingly likely to be encumbered by care responsibilities following child birth.

Reserving several months of the existing leave period for fathers risks penalizing women (in the form of lost access to weeks of currently available leave) who reside with male partners unwilling to take advantage of the ‘daddy months’. This risk is minimized because benefit levels will rise from 55 to 80 percent of previous income, representing a 45 percent increase in the value of maternity/parental leave benefits. Therefore, a woman could replace in eight months the value of forgone earnings as a result of the proposed changes that she receives in 11.6 months.

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I am indebted to professor Anita Nyberg for the parental leave data from Sweden who works at Svensk modell i förändring Arbetslivsinstitutet, 112 79 Stockholm. The data is available at www.rfv.se/stat/socfakt/famba for persons who are fluent in Swedish.
under the current system. The mother would be free to allocate the financial assistance over a 50-week period and enjoy the same length of leave at roughly the same benefit rate that is currently available under EI. The risk could be further minimized by following the Swedish government which extended the total duration of leave benefits by one month in 2002 so as to lengthen the portion reserved for fathers by an additional month, rather than set aside a second month for men from within the time available to households before 2002. Although it may seem unfair (particularly for mothers) that heterosexual households with fathers who do not reduce temporarily their labour force participation will benefit from fewer months of leave, social policy that does not alter the patriarchal division of care also imposes costs on women that are unjust. These costs manifest themselves in far broader social ills, including the gender earnings gap, feminization of poverty, and women’s under-representation in political spheres.

2c. The importance of shorter standard work weeks/years

The general reduction of full-time paid work hours over the week or year institutionalized in France and Germany constitute important strategies for remedying the functional division between breadwinner and unpaid caregiver, even though the policies do not specifically target the needs of parents of young children. This is so for three reasons. First, citizens are ‘persons-in-relations’ throughout their life course and careloads wax and wane during different life course stages (Nelson 1996, 69). 1996 census data found that 55 percent of labour force participants have children residing at home or provide weekly elder care and 20 percent of people in the labour market shoulder both roles.20 The distribution of caregiving is therefore an important citizenship issue throughout people’s lives, mitigating full participation across social spaces.

Second, shorter standard hours imply on average a more significant decline in income for men compared to women. In Canada, men work overtime more regularly than women, accounting for almost two in three overtime hours in 1997 (Duchesne 1997, 10-11). Similarly, 1998 data indicate that fathers of preschoolers in dual-earner heterosexual couples in which both parents are employed full-time work for pay 10.5 more hours a week than mothers (Silver 2000, 27). A reduction in standard working hours will therefore have a particularly significant effect on men’s paid work patterns, decreasing their average hours and earnings proportionately more than women. As a result, paid working time transitions would shift the balance of existing economic incentives within heterosexual couples. Reduced earnings among men may generate an income effect in response to which women who currently do not perform (full-time) standard paid work hours may increase the time they dedicate to employment. The extent of the income effect will be mediated by the degree to which spouses are substitutes in caregiving and household production, as well as the importance of complementarity in leisure that may incline some spouses to respond to a partner’s added leisure by retaining or reducing her own level of paid work so that the couple can enjoy unpaid time together (J. Hunt 1998).

Third, decisions regarding the division of care labour are ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘static’ choices. The term ‘dynamic’ acknowledges how such decisions have considerable influence on future work options, wages and pension entitlements, just as choices regarding levels of education, skills development and length of tenure at a particular workplace do. So long as the ideal worker norm requires hours of employment that are not compatible with significant unpaid

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21 The potential for reduced earnings among single individuals and couples in which both partners already work the maximum overtime hours raises the challenge that the shorter full-time employment norm would limit total income among some citizens without a partner who can increase her/his paid labour force participation. The consumption of such individuals and couples may be restricted as a result. This outcome cannot be defended by invoking positive consequences for gender equality, although it is supported somewhat by the modest employment gains that can be anticipated from redistributing paid worktime to the un(der)employed. I address this subject in section three.
care obligations and aspirations, systemic barriers to successful labour force participation among single parents persist. Similarly, the long hours expected of core employees increases the likelihood that heterosexual couples will approximate the primary breadwinner/primary caregiver model for at least twelve years while young children are present.\textsuperscript{22} Persons fulfilling the primary care role risk enduring harmful economic consequences that manifest themselves in, among other things, occupational segregation and shorter hours of paid work that account for 10 and 15 percent of the gender earnings gap in Canada respectively (Cleveland and Krashinsky 1998, 43).\textsuperscript{23} The earnings gap in turn contributes to less valuable pensions and higher rates of poverty among senior women as compared to senior men (National Council of Welfare 2000). Thus, while only one in five families has a child under six at any given time (Statistics Canada 2000, 37), the dynamic nature of decisions about the division of care mean that employment norms regulating hours of work have long-term consequences for the 80 percent of Canadians that have children at some point in their lives.

The risk of reinforcing gender inequality by promoting part-time employment to facilitate work-family balance among mothers must ultimately be weighed against the value of providing citizens greater opportunity to pursue care aspirations in their spheres of personal relations. The risks are minimized, however, the more that the functional division between earning and caring is bridged. The bridge is made increasingly secure as persons with considerable unpaid care work are better positioned to serve as core employees who closely approximate (at least when

\textsuperscript{22} Recall from chapter six that the majority of Canadian children under twelve live with at least one parent (regularly the mother) who remains home full-time or accepts only part-time employment (Ross, Scott and Kelly 1996, 35-36).

\textsuperscript{23} The recommendation that Canada reorganize its parental leave system to subsidize part-time employment by permitting citizens to bank their benefits over multiple years while working reduced hours would minimize the earnings differential that results from part-time work. However, the recommended policy change cannot ensure that parents who opt for subsidized part-time hours do not undermine future prospects for promotion or on-site training within their place of employment, especially in the absence of a legal context that proscribes discrimination on the basis of part-time status.
not taking advantage of statutory leave benefits) the hours on the job typical of childless staff, or staff who do not share primary responsibility for their children. A reduction in standard full-time hours to 1,600 per year raises the probability that this challenging balancing act will become a genuine opportunity for citizens. 24

3. Broadening the Analytical Boundaries Associated with Work-Family Balance

Integrating renewed and enhanced commitments to gender equality within a post-industrial welfare regime is the primary motivation for the alternative work-family balance citizenship paradigm outlined in section one. But since gender equality concerns do not represent the most influential motivating force in the present policy climate, it is helpful to illuminate how the policy proposals could mitigate three additional disturbing social trends characteristic of the post-industrial era, all of which were discussed in chapter five. This discussion aims to extend the boundaries of policy analysis typically associated with the concept of work-family balance.

Beaudry and Green (2000, 916-921) document the first trend by examining the weekly earnings of Canadian workers age 25 or 26 since 1971. Their findings indicate that successive waves of labour market entrants since the 1970s, particularly men, have consistently fared poorly in comparison to earlier entrants regardless of education levels. Their research also finds

24 Following the loi Aubry in France, a shift to shorter standard work weeks can accommodate some heterogeneity in employment/professional requirements and individual preferences regarding work and leisure. The proposed changes to employment regulations would not govern the self-employed. Therefore some individuals in legal, medical and other professions in which workers regularly run their own businesses would have the flexibility to perform whatever hours they think is necessary to ensure quality service provision. Similarly, the loi Aubry includes exemptions from maximum worktime regulations for some senior level staff and permits employers and employees to respond to peaks and lulls in production and demand cycles by adapting to the shorter full-time work norm over the year, rather than just the week. The concept of rest days also allows employees to work beyond the maximum number of annual overtime hours and bank the time as future holidays, some of which can be saved over a multiple year period. This flexibility to accommodate the shorter worktime norm over several years may be particularly appealing to the 45 percent of the labour force in Canada who are childless or do not provide regular elder care.
no evidence that more recent male entrants are eventually compensated for their lower initial wages by increasing returns for experience.

Declining real starting wages and slower wage growth further illuminate the importance for any welfare regime to acknowledge work-family balance as a pressing social problem. Lower real starting wages limit the income of many labour market participants in their prime child-rearing years, which is a point in the life course when private caregiving expenses are often very high. The combination of lower real wages and high expenses force some young workers to labour longer hours to maintain household financial security, a trend perhaps most obvious in the dramatic rise in labour force participation among mothers of young children in heterosexual couples. One cost of increased paid labour force activity is less time to care for children and dependents. For some relatively young workers, the decline in real starting wages also means an increased risk of poverty. This problem is manifest in rising rates of low-income status among young families with children (National Council of Welfare 1998, 10-15).

Parental leave and child care provisions have the potential to mediate the added challenges that younger workers encounter as a result of declining real starting wages and slower wage growth. Both policies could operate as keenly timed citizenship entitlements that preserve or supplement household income at periods when private expenses are particularly high and income is often relatively low. By publicly subsidizing child care and parental leave, some of the extra costs associated with childrearing (whether forgone income or expenditures on services) could be spread over the life cycle and repaid through income taxes on a sliding scale sensitive to income as one’s work-life proceeds.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{25}\) In addition, since the changes to child care and parental leave recommended in section one are expected to reinforce mothers’ labour force ties, these policy changes would also combat persistent child poverty rates indirectly. A father’s employment today is far from a certainty, especially as traditional resource and new
The finding of Morissette, Myles and Picot (1995, 36) that increased polarization of earnings in Canada over the 1980s was driven primarily by a polarization in paid work hours points to a second reason to prioritize work-family balance as a foundational policy goal for a new welfare regime. One implication of their finding is that policies which target wage levels alone will prove insufficient to remedy the earnings inequality that has been entrenched since 1989 because a shortage of paid hours accounts significantly for the falling income of persons in the bottom income deciles. To reverse this trend, policy makers must reduce the incentives that disincline companies from hiring additional workers or redistributing job tasks and responsibilities between a larger number of employees (Morissette, Myles and Picot 1995, 44). The proposed reduction of standard work hours to increase the cost of weekly labour over 35 hours (averaged over a year) is one important step towards changing this incentive structure. Legislators would further remedy incentive structures by converting some labour expenses that are currently fixed into costs that would vary according to hours of work.²⁶

The increasing inequalities in the distribution of paid worktime that drove rising earnings inequality in the 1980s in Canada is symptomatic of broader problems of persistent unemployment domestically and internationally – a third social trend that suggests linking work-family balance policies with broader social and economic goals. In response, J. Hunt (1998, 339) reports that the concept of worksharing has represented the hope (and sometimes knowledge-based industries layoff workers simultaneously. The presence of two incomes in a family therefore represents a form of insurance that protects the household and its children if the income of one parent is lost.

²⁶ For instance, Morissette, Myles and Picot (1995, 44) observe that payroll taxes for programs like the CPP/QPP, EI and employer contributions for fringe benefits typically reach a maximum when employee earnings rise above a specified level. As a result, it is advantageous for employers to retain higher paid workers for longer hours instead of hiring additional workers to increase output when “the skills required are firm specific and training costs are absorbed by the employer.” Rather than base employer contributions entirely on employee income, new policies could calculate payroll taxes partially in terms of an employee’s hours. Rates could increase linearly or progressively, with the outcome that employers incur added costs for overtime employment.
conviction) in some European countries that a reduction in hours per full-time worker will spread the available demand for labour more broadly and thereby increase aggregate employment. This hope represented the primary motivation behind worktime redistribution plans in France and Germany implemented over the past two decades.

The most recent economic research reveals that worksharing is not a primary solution to problems of persistent unemployment. In a review of job creation achieved by European government interventions designed to redistribute paid worktime, Freeman (1998, 196) concludes that “while worksharing can increase employment, most government-sponsored efforts to spread work have had limited efficacy.” The relative lack of success in Europe provides little reason to believe that other states can attain more successful results. This view is now the consensus held by those who initially expected worksharing to dramatically reduce unemployment as well as those who did not expect it to succeed (Freeman 1998, 219, note 14).

Although not a primary solution to persistent underemployment, the evidence surveyed by Freeman indicates that paid worktime redistribution of the sort proposed in section one minimally will not exacerbate unemployment levels, and is more likely to generate positive, albeit very moderate, employment gains. Given the importance of employment for dignified community membership suggested by both neoconservatives and feminists, the possibility of generating even modest increases in job openings as a result of measures designed to promote gender equality is regarded as further justification for the policy shifts recommended above.

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27 Freeman (1998, 210) suggests that there is reason to think that worksharing initiatives in Canada could generate moderately stronger positive employment effects. He points out that:

The countries that tried worksharing [to mitigate rising unemployment over the past two decades] had already made extensive use of short-time work and had low levels of normal worktime; thus, their margins on which to work were not very large. Worksharing might arguably be more successful in economies in which employees work many hours, such as in Spain, Japan, the United States, or Canada.
Economists measure the employment effects of worksharing in terms of the number of jobs generated or lost relative to the size of the reduction in paid working hours (the elasticity of jobs to hours). Freeman’s (1998, 207-210) review of the existing literature suggests that worktime reductions in Europe all had positive (although small) effects for employment, reporting elasticity coefficients that range from 0.08 to 0.4. This range indicates that a 10 percent reduction in paid hours can be expected to generate an increase in employment of somewhere between 0.8 percent and 4 percent. Huberman and Lanoie (2000, 144) support Freeman’s finding, reporting that international studies indicate elasticities of jobs to hours that range from 0.3 to 0.8. They also add to the existing body of research by examining worksharing initiatives implemented during the 1990s by four corporations and one provincial government ministry in Québec, identifying elasticities that range from 0.14 to 0.68 (ibid., 146). Similarly, Bosch (1993, 147) summarizes the findings of roughly a dozen German worksharing studies, reporting that all “conclude that working-time reductions had a positive employment effect,” including the studies launched by the employers’ association. The elasticity of jobs to employment reported in each study ranged from 0.4 to 0.75.

Research indicates that extended blocks of time off – such as paid leave arrangements, career breaks or early retirement – offer the most potential for job creation through worksharing (Advisory Group on Working Time 1994, 60; Contensou and Vranceanu 2000, 30-1; Freeman 1998, 209). Studies suggest that technological processes and cost structures are such that firms are more likely to replace an incumbent worker who leaves the firm temporarily (or permanently

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28 The 0.08 elasticity of jobs to hours is reported by the OECD regarding the efforts of the French government in the early 1980s to reduce standard hours by one hour per week and legislate an additional week of annual statutory paid vacation without permitting employers to reduce wages. The more promising elasticity measurement of 0.4 pertains to Belgium experiments in the mid-1980s, where the state implemented incentives designed to entice employees to participate in the paid worktime redistribution strategy (Freeman 1998, 207).
in the case of early retirement) with a new employee rather than respond to a statutory reduction in standard full-time hours by hiring additional labour. This finding provides added reason to reconsider public financial commitments to parental leave, calculating its cost in reference to the potential EI and social assistance savings that can be expected from extended leave periods. Canadian policy makers may also wish to follow one element of the Spanish leave system to further capitalize on the potential employment gains implicit in parental leave policy. Since 1998, employers in Spain have been exempt from paying social security contributions for the contracts of workers recruited to replace those on leave for maternity, adoption or foster parenting (EIRR 2001c, 14).

In a recent paper, J. Hunt (1999) expresses scepticism about earlier studies of the employment effects of worksharing, particularly in Germany. She points out that most of these evaluations consist either of surveys of firms before and after worksharing policies were introduced, or econometric studies that rely on aggregate time series data. In both approaches, the effect of falling standard hours could be confounded with the effects of other factors. To avoid this methodological problem, she takes advantage of the industry-level variation in standard hours reductions in West Germany to evaluate the impact of working time transitions on employment. Her results suggest that reductions in standard hours actually caused very small employment losses among German men. The reason for the decline in employment, she argues, is that actual hours reductions were not accompanied by an associated drop in income. The

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Evidence regarding the success of extended leave periods for sharing employment may provide reason to reject the recommendation above that Canada should permit citizens to bank parental leave benefits to facilitate part-time hours over multiple years of child-rearing. The more significant employment gains that can be expected from leave systems that mandate a complete withdrawal from the labour force do not appear entirely consistent with the objective of strengthening mothers' labour market ties by facilitating paid worktime reductions over the week and year through a more flexible parental leave system. Opting between the two approaches ultimately rests on a value-based decision, although further econometric studies estimating the employment effects associated with the two different systems of parental leave would be helpful for making a final judgment.
result was a *de facto* wage increase, which renders unlikely the possibility of an employment rise in response to reduced standard hours since labour is more expensive. However, her analysis also acknowledges the possibility of increased employment through other worksharing strategies that do not require firms to compensate employees fully for lost hours of work.

Given the risk of employment losses associated with worksharing strategies that require firms to compensate workers fully for lost hours, worktime redistribution designed to promote gender equality must countenance the reality that some workers stand to endure real wage declines. However, one result of the declining fortune of recent market entrants is a generation of male workers who are more likely to resist the redistribution of paid worktime on the grounds that they are less able to afford the loss of income associated with reduced working hours. Accordingly, Huberman and Lanoie (2000, 152) suggest that the success of worktime redistribution in Canada depends importantly on transitional government incentives designed to minimize the wage penalty associated with working less. This strategy is currently being employed in France under the *loi Aubry*.30

In addition to transitional incentives, enriched child care and parental leave benefits could also provide the basis for broader societal commitments to wage moderation. Such commitments

**30** Of the case studies that Huberman and Lanoie (2000) examine, the company Alcan enjoyed the most significant positive employment effect, largely because employees' earnings losses from worktime reductions were mitigated by federal and provincial wage subsidies. Citing an explanatory cost-benefit analysis by Lanoie and Raymond (1999), Huberman and Lanoie (2000, 149) report that "the federal subsidy was more than offset by the reduction in employment insurance payments that would have been paid out. However, with regard to the provincial government, which faced the choice between subsidies and welfare payments, the same study found no great change in welfare expenditures as a result of the increase in jobs."

**31** The French *loi Aubry* of 1998 provides financial incentives to encourage firms to reduce weekly working time and recruit new employees. To qualify for financial aid, firms must meet two conditions: reduce working hours by at least 10 percent to a maximum 35 hours per week; and increase their workforce by at least 6 percent. A 6 percent increase in employment earns a 10 percent reduction in social security contributions. The reduction rises to 15 percent if companies increase employment by 9 percent or more. The subsidies run for a five-year period (EIRR 1998, 21). Preliminary estimates indicate that *loi Aubry* incentives generated a net total of 265,000 new jobs by December 2000. One study projects that the *loi* will create roughly 500,000 jobs in total (Freyssinet 2001).
are important for the long-term success of worksharing initiatives since demand for employment will be more robust the more that the cost of labour is competitive relative to the cost of capital. By supplementing income substantially when private financial pressures grow especially acute, child care and parental leave benefits hold some potential to mitigate citizens’ concerns about trading wage increases against a reduction in paid working hours, at least among the 80-plus percent of Canadians who become parents. In return for added social benefits (and time for family and leisure), citizens would acknowledge an obligation to dampen wage demands. Underlying this social obligation is the expectation that citizens recognize the social value associated with societal-wide efforts for individuals to take future productivity gains in the form of reduced working time so that the benefits of future economic growth can be shared among more workers in a manner that challenges systemic barriers to gender equality.

4. Impediments to Implementing in Canada Policies Adopted by Unitary Governments in Social Democratic and Corporatist States

The previous three sections describe and defend an alternative social citizenship regime for Canada premised on the concept of work-family balance, drawing on European models to suggest specific policy design features. Since European policy reflects distinct intellectual and institutional histories, European strategies are not necessarily ‘translated’ easily in Canada where public values and government structures differ considerably. The chapter therefore concludes by examining some of the obstacles to institutionalizing a work-family balance framework in Canada’s liberal democracy and federalist system of government.

32 There is precedent in Canada for utilizing family benefits as wage restraint measures. In 1945, the federal government implemented universal family allowances in large part to promote economic stabilization goals. Ursel (1992, 190-198) argues that the Finance Department intended the family allowance plan to mitigate labour demands for higher wages following years of war-time restraint (see also Baker 1995, 128; Baker and Phipps 1997, 146).
Esping-Anderson (1990, 26-33) argues that liberal welfare states such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain differ importantly from their European counterparts in terms of the primacy they assign to the marketplace to mediate the distribution of welfare across society. On one hand, a preoccupation with market efficiency motivates a stronger cultural commitment in Anglo-speaking nations to a circumscribed state that regulates the relations of exchange and enforces property rights in social conditions of scarcity (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, 47). On the other hand, this preoccupation underpins a more cautious approach to social rights on the grounds that they may generate incentives that incline citizens to opt for state assistance over waged work (Esping-Anderson 1990, 26).

An enhanced commitment to market capitalism in Canada compared to much of Europe suggests that there is less ideological support domestically for worksharing initiatives such as the French loi Aubry through which the state imposes further restraints on market practices by enforcing more restrictive overtime premiums and maximum overtime regulations. Social and political barriers to worktime redistribution in Canada are most evident in Ontario and B.C.

Esping-Anderson (1990, 26-33) distinguishes liberal welfare regimes from two distinct clusters of countries in Europe to account for international variation in welfare policy and social rights. He identifies Austria, France, Germany and Italy as archetypal examples of what he terms the “corporatist” welfare-state regime-type; and categorizes the Scandinavian nations along with the Netherlands as “social democratic” welfare regimes. Using this typology, Esping-Anderson (ibid., 27) argues that in ‘corporatist’ welfare states, the liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification was never preeminent and, as such, the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status. This corporatism was subsumed under a state edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as a provider of welfare; hence, private insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role. On the other hand, the state’s emphasis on upholding status differences means that its redistributive impact is negligible.

By contrast, social democratic welfare regimes diverged from liberal and corporatist models by “rejecting a dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class” (ibid.). Instead, “social democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere” (ibid.). Accordingly, social democrats sought to implement welfare provisions that would appeal to the discriminating tastes of the new middle classes that emerged following the Second World War by entitling workers to benefit fully from the quality of rights enjoyed by the more privileged.
where provincial governments recently relaxed labour standards governing hours of employment to permit businesses to utilize employees for longer hours.

Insofar as the Ontario and BC labour standard changes imply a desire for added flexibility in the use of capital, worktime redistribution will likely be better received domestically if strategies are accompanied by measures that facilitate greater utilization of capital or "capital-sharing,"\(^{34}\) including less costly week-end work, additional night shifts, and the relaxation or elimination of regulations regarding store closing hours.\(^{35}\) German experiments with worksharing provide especially useful models in this case since unions and employers negotiated worksharing measures in the absence of state incentives for firms. The *quid pro quo* for shorter hours in Germany was that working time reductions would be accompanied by greater flexibility in setting work hours to increase plant utilization and reduce overtime costs (J. Hunt 1998). The recommendation that Canadian provinces adopt an annualized norm of full-time employment is one step towards providing this added flexibility in capital usage, which parallels somewhat the Ontario government's effort to redefine maximum statutory work hours over three-week periods.

Federal jurisdiction over employment insurance has enabled the federal government to experiment since 1982 with short-term worksharing benefits designed to decrease the number of cyclical layoffs in Canada. Program incentives are structured to induce businesses confronted

\(^{34}\) See Freeman (1998, 217) for further discussion of "capital-sharing."

\(^{35}\) Hayden (1999, 153) observes that increasing the flexibility of capital-usage is not without risks to a work-family balance agenda insofar as it disrupts collective time rhythms. A "twenty-four hour" economy can damage family life if it is no longer possible to bring members together at the same time because of evening and weekend work. Time outside of the market is important, but its qualitative value depends on when that time is available and who can share it. Consequently, the competing objectives of quality unpaid time versus gender equality and employment gains raise a policy trade-off that ultimately rests on value-based judgments. In search of the appropriate balance, Canadian policy-makers would be wise to monitor the experiences of Europeans as they move further along in their experiments with shorter paid working time schedules, paying particular attention to the role of longer paid vacation benefits that may permit relations who work opposing shifts more opportunities to spend unpaid time together with their families.
with redundancies to reduce worktime among all employees rather than let go individual workers.\textsuperscript{36} However, since employment standards are a provincial matter in Canada, jurisdictional constraints prevent the federal government from statutorily reducing full-time work norms on a national scale as occurred in France where regional authorities fall under the constitutional jurisdiction of the national government. Thus, the path towards reducing full-time work norms must start with one or more provinces, if it is to start at all. The view expressed by Richards (1998, 94) that decentralization of jurisdiction in Canada fosters increased policy experimentation holds open the possibility that entrepreneurial provincial politicians in one province may yet pursue paid worktime redistribution measures as they contemplate how to further capital utilization.\textsuperscript{37} If successful, worktime redistribution experiments in one province could be replicated in other provinces as ‘best-practices’, just as some jurisdictions eventually adopted public health care innovations implemented by the government of Saskatchewan in the first post-war decades.

In keeping with this possibility, Huberman and Lanoie (2000) suggest that the social context is particularly well-tuned in Canada today as compared to previous decades for a provincial population to sanction worksharing initiatives. They report that:

\textit{As the workforce ages, the average employee may view worksharing as a means of preserving an attachment to the firm. With levels of income higher than ever before, individuals may now be}

\textsuperscript{36} See Gray (1996, 802) for an evaluation of the employment effects of this federal worksharing policy.

\textsuperscript{37} To date, Québec has been the Canadian leader in promoting practices that redistribute paid work-time (Huberman and Lanoie 2000, 142). In the early 1990s, the province introduced a grant incentive program for medium-sized and large firms to encourage work-time reductions so as to prevent layoffs and permit new hiring. Maximum grants of $400,000 per firm were intended to offset personal income losses for employees resulting from work redistribution strategies (Advisory Group on Worktime 1994, 42). In 1996, the Quebec government proposed a number of additional measures at its economic summit intended to reduce the province’s unemployment rate by 2 percent by year 2000. The proposals included the reduction of the legal workweek and measures to increase vacation time and unpaid sabbaticals. The province also renewed its earlier commitment to worksharing incentive grants for firms. These Québec government measures facilitated a number of programs at the corporate/public sector level in which workers accepted reduced hours to avert layoffs, including at Bell Canada, Alcan, Scott Paper, Sico and the Ministère de l’environnement et de la faune. See Huberman and Lanoie (2000) for an evaluation of the employment effects of these worksharing experiments.
more prepared to substitute leisure for work. With higher levels of total market-work hours per family, individual family members may be more willing and able to substitute work hours among themselves. And finally, with greater numbers of female members, unions may be more willing to support worksharing initiatives. Worksharing practices and proposals in the late 1990s, therefore, are a break from previous [Canadian] experience (ibid., 142).

Just as the heightened attention in liberal democracies to the value of a circumscribed state constrains domestic support for European worksharing strategies, it also limits the potential to expand social programs that target preschool children in Canada. The cultural preference for a smaller public sphere positions Canadians to regard care for preschool children as "primarily a private responsibility of those who bear or raise those children" (Ferguson 1998, 201), whereas Scandinavian countries typically "view children as both a private and a public responsibility" (Stroik and Jenson 1999, 55). These divergent ideological perspectives reveal themselves in significantly different levels of public expenditure for pre-school children's services. For instance, public expenditures on child care programs for children under six in Denmark during the early 1990s amounted to roughly 1.2 percent of GDP, excluding capital costs and infrastructure costs such as staff training. The Swedish figure was 2 percent of GDP for both preschool and school-age child care (ECNC 1995). By contrast, 1997 estimates of pan-Canadian spending on child care for children under sixteen place the figure at just 0.3 percent of GDP.38

The social construction of preschool children as primarily private family responsibilities means that significant policy action on parental leave is more likely than policy innovation regarding non-parental child care arrangements. While both programs require the injection of considerable public funding (which would signal a de facto increase in public responsibility), social expenditures for parental leave are designed to facilitate parents performing their private family duties. Publicly subsidized child care, by contrast, implies a dramatic reduction of

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38 This figure is based on the work of Cleveland and Krashinsky (1998). The researchers estimate that cumulative federal and provincial spending in 1997 equaled $2.61 billion (p. 58). Real GDP in that year measured at market prices was $885 billion (Statistics Canada 2002).
familial obligation. The recent extension of maternity/parental leave from roughly six months to a year by the federal government at an annual cost of roughly $1-billion as of 2003 is consistent with this ideological context, particularly when compared to the far more tepid interest that the federal government demonstrates concerning a national child care program, as I discuss below.

Canada’s federal system is again a significant factor in the development of parental leave policy, both as an enabler and obstacle. The fact that Employment Insurance falls under federal jurisdiction allowed Ottawa to act unilaterally on this policy envelope regardless of provincial preferences. In addition, it is no coincident that the federal government extended parental leave benefits to earn political credit following the announcement in Québec that the National Assembly aims to reduce eligibility criteria and enrich parental leave benefits in its province. Conversely, federal spending authority is also impeding Quebec in its efforts to improve its parental leave system beyond the recent federal changes. The federal-provincial-territorial division of jurisdiction over labour market policy may also require considerable intergovernmental negotiation before Ottawa could reorganize the leave system outside of the EI mechanism so as to include the growing number of self-employed Canadians.

Finally, Canada’s federal system has been identified as a significant obstacle impeding the development of an enriched pan-Canadian child care subsidy system, particularly given the decentralizing forces implicit in key federal spending decisions in the 1990s, including the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) and the National Child Benefit (NCB). For

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39 In 1998, all senior governments in Canada (with the exception of Quebec) collaborated to develop the National Child Benefit (NCB). Under the NCB, the federal government combined the Child Tax Benefit and the Working Income Supplement into a new tax expenditure, the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB). Simultaneously, Ottawa enriched the CCTB by $1.7 billion over three years, enabling the federal government “to assume more financial responsibility for providing basic income support for children” (National Child Benefit 1997, 7). The increased federal benefits for low-income families permits provinces and territories to reduce social assistance payments for families with children by the value of the federal supplement so that “these families receive at least the same level of overall income support from governments” (ibid.). Provinces and territories agreed to reinvest “these newly-available funds in complementary programs targeted at improving work incentives, benefits and services for low-
example, Phillips (1995, 66) argues that the CHST’s initial $6 billion cut to annual federal transfers, matched by its retraction of the federal commitment to cost-share services, “marks the end of the postwar era of an activist federal stance towards intervention in social programs.”

Similarly, Bach and Phillips (1997, 236) assert that programs like the CHST and NCB represent the construction by the federal and provincial governments of a New Social Union, which has shifted the balance from primarily public to greater private provision of social services, from direct state funding of services to reliance upon the tax system for distributing income to individuals and families, and from a moderate degree of federal involvement in social services and welfare to emphasis upon the primacy of the provinces.

Bach and Phillips (1997, 236, 251) add that a national child care system should be considered the “first fatality” of this New Social Union: the NCB signals that “the federal government has retreated from a leadership role in helping the provinces expand their child care systems... [leaving the] development of a ‘national’ child care program... to the ‘consent’ of the provinces.” Echoing this position, Boismenu and Jenson remark that “long-standing hopes for a standard set of services for all children, such as a pan-Canadian child care system, are dashed by programs such as the NCB.” “That era is over,” they suggest, in part because the NCB reflects the emerging neoliberal preference in Ottawa to limit its participation in social policy development to programming that can be funded through the delivery of tax expenditures.

Although there is no denying that the Chrétien Liberals permitted further decentralization as part of their deficit reduction strategy in the mid-1990s, the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) of 1999 suggests the above analyses exaggerate the extent to which the Liberals oversaw the ‘end of an era’ of federal intervention in social policy. First, section 5 of SUFA includes language that clearly affirms Ottawa’s spending authority. Second, while it

income families with children. Provinces and territories are also exploring whether they can invest incrementally in children’s programs as resources permit” (ibid., 7-8).

40 Section five of SUFA, “The federal spending power – Improving social programs for Canadians,” claims that two types of federal transfers have been “essential to the development of Canada’s social union.” The first is social
formally imposes a new federal obligation, the SUFA commitment that obliges Ottawa not to use its spending power to create new shared cost programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction without the consent of a majority of the provinces is less restrictive than the measure proposed under the Charlottetown Accord that required the approval of seven provinces containing 50 percent of the population (McBride and Shields, 123). The SUFA provision therefore permits the initiation of new shared-cost programs without the approval of any of the ‘have’ provinces and does not effectively grant Ontario a veto over new conditional transfers given the size of the province’s population. Third, SUFA’s ‘opt-out’ measure provides the federal government with discretion in defining narrowly (or broadly) the conditions that provinces must meet to be eligible for federal funds if they do not participate in any new national social policy initiative agreed to by the majority of the provinces. And fourth, SUFA re-validates the federal government’s capacity to act unilaterally by using direct transfers to individuals and organizations in order to circumvent the obstacles for social policy development posed by federal-provincial-territorial negotiations.\textsuperscript{41}

Consistent with the policy latitude that SUFA permits the federal government in terms of direct transfers, Kent (2000, 14) identifies a policy route through which Ottawa could initiate a pan-Canadian child care subsidy system that would circumvent stalled federal-provincial-territorial discussions. Using federal jurisdiction over income taxation, he recommends that Ottawa phase out the existing child care expense tax deduction in favour of

\textsuperscript{41} Recent policy decisions show that the Chrétien federal government is ready to act unilaterally. In 1998 Ottawa announced the Millennium Scholarships, which further fueled premiers’ demands for the Social Union negotiations. Two months before the Framework was signed, Chrétien announced a “multi-million-dollar federal youth-unemployment initiative without... warning” provincial governments (Mitchell 1998). Since signing SUFA, the Liberals also re-allocated funding to social housing without first coordinating their efforts with the provinces (Séguin, Mackie, and Roberts 2000).
a refundable tax credit of up to $7,000 a year to the parents of a preschool child who attends a
child centre providing care of sufficiently high quality to justify that fee. On the firm basis of this
commitment, but without other prior conditions, Ottawa would then negotiate with the provinces
how financing on this scale could best be used for child development in the circumstances of each
province.

Section five of SUFA explicitly commits Ottawa to engage in the sort of consultation that
Kent proposes before launching a new direct transfer. As a result of such consultations, Kent
(2000, 14) hopes that provincial governments would actively coordinate new federal funds for
child care so that federal tax expenditures sent directly to families are not the actual delivery
mechanism. In his view, the refundable tax credit strategy “is certainly not the ideal way to
provide the public service of early childhood care and education.” The strength of the proposal,
however, is that it offers Ottawa a way to move forward regarding child care in the absence of
provincial agreement. Although provinces “could choose a passive role” with respect to
administering the federal funding, their governments “could not forbid residents to take
advantage of the refundable tax credit.” Federal funding would thereby “provide financial
empowerment for popular demand,” and leave further coordination of child care systems to
“parents” and “communities” through local non-governmental and municipal organizations.

Given that SUFA grants the federal government room to manoeuvre regarding child care,
the typically liberal democratic values that portray care for preschool children as a private matter
appear to represent a greater obstacle to the development of enriched child care programming
across the country. The intergovernmental Early Childhood Development (ECD) Agreement of
2000 reveals that the federal government is reticent to accept dramatically more responsibility
for child care by universally subsidizing the cost of non-parental measures. The Agreement’s

42 In September 2000, all senior Canadian governments (with the exception of Quebec) signed the ECD Agreement.
Under this initiative, the federal government will transfer to the provinces and territories $2.2-billion over five years.
The provinces and territories agree to allocate the funding to one or more of four policy areas: (i) promoting healthy
pregnancy, birth and infancy; (ii) improving parenting and family supports; (iii) strengthening early childhood
development, learning and care; and (iv) strengthening community supports. For more information, see the
September 11th 2000 First Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué on Early Childhood Development at
maximum annual federal expenditure of $500 million falls well short of the $5.3 billion additional cost of a universal child care program for children age two through five estimated by Cleveland and Krashinsky. In addition to inadequate funding, the ECD Agreement does not require that provincial governments allocate any of the federal expenditure to regulated child care services. This flexibility has resulted in the government of Ontario publicly announcing that none of its share of the federal transfer will be used to subsidize or expand its regulated child care sector (CRRU 2001).

Given Canada’s political and intellectual heritage that is cautious about accepting increased responsibility for the care of preschool children, the innovative potential of Canada’s decentralized federation marks the point from which genuine political pressure to act on the child care policy front is most likely to arise. The Québec experiment with child care has been incredibly popular to date in the province. Picard (1998) observes that the program is now viewed so favourably by the electorate that it is “almost untouchable” politically. He defends the statement with reference to Jean Charest’s speculation during the last Québec election that the provincial Liberals might eliminate the program if in power. Charest’s claim generated so much public opposition that he reversed his position during the campaign and “quickly unveiled his own pro-family policies.”

Despite Québec’s unique position within the Canadian federation, the popularity of its provincial child care program may still influence the expectations and attitudes of voters across the country. This possibility was signalled by the previous B.C. government’s intention to slowly implement a universal, albeit less generous, child care program modelled in part on the Quebec system (Government of British Columbia 2000). Although BC Liberals eliminated the program upon being elected in 2001, ongoing support in Quebec for the provincial child care
system may slowly change the opinions of Canadians in other provinces, particularly if research produces longitudinal data that demonstrates the provincial system contributes importantly to quality early childhood development outcomes. Just as it took two decades for a national Medicare system to emerge following the first introduction of hospital insurance in Saskatchewan, so it may be two decades before we can determine whether Lucien Bouchard proves to be child care’s Tommy Douglas.

Conclusion

The Canadian policy climate poses impediments to implementing a work-family balance framework that are not present in social democratic states run by unitary governments. However, implementation challenges do not mean that an alternative vision of Canadian social citizenship is any less necessary to address elements of the existing welfare regime that impede equality, security and dignified inclusion for diverse groups of citizens, particularly women.

While the ideological and institutional challenges are imposing, there remains some potential that Canada could yet adopt a work-family balance framework for social citizenship because, as Jenson (1997, 630) observes, “politics matters.”

Institutions... [are] the product of political action in a variety of settings. Neither the creation of institutions nor their modification are unmediated consequences of socio-economic structural tendencies. Limits and constraints obviously exist, but structuration is the result of action. These processes of structuration require detailed attention, precisely because they vary in space and in time. This means choices exist (ibid.).

In so far as the future of social citizenship in Canada depends on political choices, there is always room for political actors to recognize that Canadian governments, particularly outside of Quebec, are far from capitalizing on the full potential of work-family balance measures. Additional public funding for child care and parental leave in the context of broader worktime redistribution measures have resources to minimize sex, race and class inequalities, while also addressing declining real male wages, earnings inequality and un(der)employment.
CHAPTER 9
RETHINKING TAXATION OF DEPENDENCY AND CAREGIVING

The tax system is the government's most pervasive, visible, and contested policy instrument. As such, it is a particularly reliable barometer of shifts in the prevailing ideology.


An examination of the policy implications of a work-family balance framework for social citizenship is incomplete if the tax system is ignored. The analysis in this chapter focuses on personal income taxation and, in particular, the tax treatment of spousal dependency and caregiving. I propose federal income tax changes that would account more adequately for the value and opportunity costs of unpaid caregiving without reinforcing the present gender division of labour that structurally impedes full social membership for diverse groups of women.

The principal recommendation of the chapter is concerned with the Spousal, Equivalent-to-Spouse and Caregiver tax credits of the Income Tax Act. The Government of Canada (2001a, Table 1) identifies all three measures as tax expenditures\(^1\) that deliver grants to persons through the income tax system which subsidize costs incurred to support eligible financial dependents: the Spousal credit (s. 118(1)(a)) subsidizes taxpayers with an economically dependent spouse or common law partner; the Equivalent-to-Spouse credit (s. 118(1)(b)) financially assists single tax filers with dependent children or grandparents; and the Caregiver credit (s. 118(1)(c.1)) subsidizes taxpayers, regardless of their marital status, who reside with an elderly, or otherwise infirm, dependent relative.

\(^{1}\)Income tax systems generally consist of two parts according to tax expenditure theory. The first is a set of tax measures integral to the revenue raising capacity of the income tax (or what is often referred to as the 'benchmark' model of the income tax). The benchmark is considered to include mechanisms that measure income, the tax unit, the period over which income is to be calculated, and tax rates. The second is a set of measures that depart from this benchmark, including tax deductions, exemptions, credits, and deferrals that function as expenditures by delivering subsidies to persons or businesses through the income tax system. Departures from the benchmark decrease the amount of income on which parents pay tax, thereby lowering the amount of tax owed. The lower tax paid is a tax saving that is functionally equivalent to a direct government spending program that delivers to individuals an amount equal to the tax saving (McDaniel and Surrey 1985, 3-4; Surrey 1973, 6-18; C. Young 1997a, 270).
I argue that the Spousal credit should be eliminated and that the revenue savings should be used to enrich and revamp the existing Caregiver credit. Since rescinding the Spousal measure removes the point of comparison for the Equivalent-to-Spouse provision, the revised Caregiver credit (RCC) that I propose ensures that single tax filers retain the same flexibility to deduct expenses for a dependent child or elderly relative. The RCC has four values that vary according to family structure. The top values are reserved for eligible single-adults and full-time, at-home caregivers, while caregivers in dual-earner families are entitled to lower levels of tax relief. The RCC’s eligibility criteria exclude homemakers in single-earner households in which there are no children under eighteen, or disabled, infirm or elderly family members.

The maximum value of the RCC would be equivalent to the tax savings generated by the existing Caregiver credit plus the value of the Basic Personal tax credit. Therefore single-caregivers and families with eligible full-time, at-home caregivers stand to benefit under the RCC from additional tax savings equal in value to raising the existing Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits to match the value of the Basic Personal credit. This added tax relief amounts to $192. Lone-parents stand to gain even more in recognition of higher rates of poverty among this category of families. While the nominal value of the RCC would be considerably lower for caregivers in dual-earner couples, they would also gain tax relief amounting to $192. This minimum tax saving would reintegrate universal recognition of the costs associated with rearing children or caring for other dependents into the personal income tax system, although the acknowledgement would be largely symbolic for many families given the limited value of the minimum proposed tax relief.

The second recommendation of the chapter addresses s. 63 of the \textit{ITA}, the Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED). I argue that so long as a pan-Canadian child care system that
universally subsidizes regulated care arrangements on a sliding scale remains an ideal rather than reality, the CCED’s present eligibility criteria that restrict single-earner couples from claiming the deduction should be retained. I defend this position on the grounds that broadening eligibility would exacerbate barriers to paid labour force participation among mothers.

Re-examining personal income tax treatment of dependency and caregiving is germane in the present policy context. This issue was the subject of review by the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women in 1999, where Beverly Smith (1997) charged that various federal income tax provisions discriminate against Canadian women homemakers. Her brief to the UN included the following two allegations:

- discrimination in tax law so that a married man and woman are taxed more heavily if they have single income rather than dual income, despite having the same total income and number of dependents.

- discrimination in tax law so that a woman who puts her child into care by a stranger or care by a nanny, can deduct the expenses of this care, up to [$7,000] per child per year to age 14, while a mother who opts for any other arrangement of child-care cannot deduct expenses. The tax system therefore discriminates against the option of having a child cared for by a blood-relative including a grandmother, a friend, sibling or even one of the parents.

The same assumptions about taxation of dependency and caregiving that underpin Smith’s allegations also factored importantly in the Canadian policy debates that contributed to the federal personal income tax reforms of 2000. The Chrétien Liberals diverged sharply from their 50/50 plan for federal surpluses by dramatically reducing personal income taxes to preempt the Canadian Alliance ‘flat tax’ electoral commitment premised on a single rate of tax, an enriched Spousal credit and a new child deduction that effectively broadens the CCED’s eligibility criteria. Alliance Party literature reports that the primary objective of these personal

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2 Immediately prior to the 2000 federal election campaign, the Alliance Party modified its flat tax promise, announcing that it would implement an interim ‘dual’ tax for the first four years of any mandate that it wins. After the fourth year (in a second mandate), the Party commits to implement a single rate of 17 percent for all individual taxable income. The significant difference between the flat and dual tax platforms is that a second marginal tax rate of 25 percent would apply to individual taxable income above $100,000. Since the ‘dual’ tax is only an interim measure, I target my analysis of the Alliance platform to its ultimate goal – a single rate personal income tax system.
income tax proposals is to remedy differential tax treatment that allegedly penalizes families with at-home caregivers (Kesselman 2000, 36). Thus, tax rate flattening has been advocated at the federal level in the name of validating and facilitating ‘caring’ by family members. At the provincial level, the Alberta government has gone far beyond advocating change to implement its own flat tax and enriched Spousal credit, significantly shifting the provincial personal income tax burden from single-earner families to middle-class, dual-earner couples (McMillan 2000, 1037). The Government of Alberta (2001) website defends the new tax regime on the grounds that it “ease[s] the burden on two-parent, single-income families. Families will no longer be penalized when one parent chooses to stay home.”

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first argues that Alliance Party and Alberta government literature is disingenuous when it implies that facilitating caregiving by family members is the primary motivation underpinning their flat-tax proposals. The second section argues that the Spousal credit inappropriately characterizes unpaid domestic labour as a drain on a household’s ability to pay tax and exacerbates obstacles to paid employment among married and common law women. The third section describes and defends a Revised Caregiver Credit to replace the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse provisions. The fourth section engages with the critiques of the CCED advanced by Smith and the Alliance Party, rejecting the changes to the CCED proposed by the Official Opposition.

1. Flat Taxes and ‘Family’ Taxation

Kesselman (2000, 36) reports that the Alliance Party identified its intention to eliminate the differential tax liability to which some single-earner families are subject as “the primary justification for adopting a single tax rate... Simplicity and efficiency were... secondary considerations.” The Alliance argument runs as follows:
Simply, the principle of horizontal equity asserts that two individuals earning the same amount should pay the same amount of tax. Similarly, two families earning the same amount should pay the same amount of tax...[A] fundamental breach of horizontal equity in the Canadian personal income tax system...[arises from] the choice of the individual as the unit of taxation and the use of one rate structure with multiple marginal rates. The result is that two families with identical total family incomes will have significantly different tax liabilities if one family has a single-income earner and the other two income earners... (Canadian Alliance. “Tax Reduction and Tax Reform” in Kesselman 2000, 36).

The 2000 Alliance tax platform would remedy this alleged horizontal inequity with three changes to the federal personal income tax. First, the ‘flat’ tax would eliminate marginal tax rate progressivity, substituting a single rate of 17 percent for the recently lowered rates of 16 percent for income below roughly $31,000; 22 percent for income between $31,000 and $62,000; 26 percent for income between $62,000 and $100,000; and 29 percent for income above $100,000. The second Alliance change would amend the Spousal credit so that its value equals the Basic Personal credit. Changes announced in 2000 by the federal Liberals mean these credits are worth 16 percent of $6,800 and $8,000 respectively as of 2001. Under the Alliance tax platform, both credits would be increased to 17 percent of $10,000. The third Alliance change would re-introduce a universal deduction for dependent children of $3,000 and disallow the first $3,000 of child care expenses that presently can be claimed under the CCED. Taxpayers with eligible child care expenses that exceed $3,000 could deduct these costs up to the CCED’s current deductible limits of $7,000 for children under seven and $4,000 for children seven to sixteen.

According to the Alliance, these three changes would restore horizontal equity between a single-earner family with $50,000 in income and a dual-earner couple in which one partner contributes $30,000 and the other $20,000 (see Table 2). Most work towards this end would be achieved by the single tax rate. It would ensure that the single-earner family’s income over $31,000 is not taxed at a higher marginal rate than the income earned by the dual-earner partners. At present, the application of progressive marginal tax rates produces a tax disparity of more than $1,100 between the two families. By equalizing the value of the Spousal credit and the
Basic Personal credit, the Alliance would remove a tax distinction that presently produces an additional $192 saving for dual-earner couples. Finally, adding the universal child deduction would cancel another tax disparity of roughly $444 dollars, although the value varies depending on the amount that tax filers pay for child care and their marginal tax rate.

**TABLE 2: THE IMPACT OF THE ALLIANCE FLAT TAX FOR ONE- AND TWO-EARNER COUPLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current Personal Income Tax System</th>
<th>Alliance Flat Tax Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single-Earner</td>
<td>Dual-Earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 $50,000</td>
<td>P3 $30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P2 $0</td>
<td>P4 $20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTRs to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Earner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 = .16(30,754)</td>
<td>$9,155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ .22($19,246)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= $9,155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 = .16(0)</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= $0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-Earner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 = .16(30,000)</td>
<td>$8,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4 = .16(20,000)</td>
<td>$3,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= $3,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+ $1,155</td>
<td>$8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtract Basic/Spousal credits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 basic credit</td>
<td>.16(8,000) = $1,280</td>
<td>P3 basic credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.16(8,000) =</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17(10,000) = $1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 Spousal credit</td>
<td>.16(6,800) = $1,088</td>
<td>P4 basic credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.16(6,800) =</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17(10,000) = $1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,088</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Credit Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per Family</td>
<td>$2,368</td>
<td>$2,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+ $192</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Tax Liability After Credits Difference</td>
<td>+ $1,347</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child (Care)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deductions</td>
<td>No Child Deduction</td>
<td>No Child Deduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtract CCED</td>
<td>Subtract Child Deduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.16(2,772)* = $444</td>
<td>= $510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not eligible for CCED</td>
<td>Not eligible for CCED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Tax Liability After Child (Care) Deductions Difference</td>
<td>$6,787</td>
<td>$4,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ $1,791</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $2,772 is the average deduction per child claimed under the CCED in 1999 (Government of Canada 2001b, Basic Table 8).
The Alliance identification of horizontal inequities between single- and dual-earner families ‘earning the same amount’ may appear intuitively attractive at first glance. But the Party’s reasoning ignores a number of insights that pervade taxation texts that suggest that monetary income is an inadequate measure of ability to pay tax. In particular, when comparing one-earner and two-earner couples, market income neglects two key differences: the additional time that a non-employed partner has available for performing services in the home and the additional costs that dual-earner couples incur to compensate for the temporal constraints that impede their performance of some of this unpaid work.\(^3\) A non-employed parent who provides child care at home achieves a considerable savings for the family given that the average monthly cost of licensed centre-based care for children under six in BC ranges from $494 to $705 and is particularly high for infants and toddlers (Forer and Hunter 2001). In addition, she (or much less likely he) has considerably more time for cooking, housecleaning, shopping and other errands or repairs. In the marketplace, these services are costly to purchase and a dual-earner couple must purchase far more of them in order to be comparably situated with a one-earner couple, particularly in terms of leisure time. Thus, much tax literature acknowledges that single-earner and two-earner couples with equal market incomes do not share comparable abilities to pay tax. Since the latter have less unpaid time to be productive, they have higher household expenses and less disposable income. If ability to pay is the criterion for tax liability, these standard taxation insights suggest two-earner couples should shoulder a lower total tax burden than single-earner couples.

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\(^3\) Tax literature typically discounts market income as a measure of ability to pay tax in terms of its failure to capture the value of 'imputed income'. Imputed income refers to, among other things, the value people receive from services they perform for themselves, as well as the value of services that others perform for them at no monetary cost (Brooks 1997, 49). An example of the former is the value generated by a parent who looks after her own child at home instead of purchasing child care. The savings obtained by a parent from child care provided at no charge by a grandmother is an example of the latter. For discussions of imputed income and some of the ramifications of not taxing it, see Maloney 1989, 193-201; Maloney 1994, 130; Women and Taxation Working Group 1992, 23-27; and C. Young 1997a, 267-268.
couples with equal monetary incomes. The progressive tax rates of the present personal income tax facilitate this outcome in some cases, although the tax savings realized by two-earner couples will vary arbitrarily depending upon the income disparity between the two earning partners.

Brooks (1996, 37) also observes that the Alliance analysis of alleged horizontal inequities between single- and dual-earner couples overlooks numerous benefits that the former already receive under the current tax and transfer system. For instance, he remarks that although all workers earning the same income pay the same premium toward the Canada Pension Plan..., because the plan contains marital benefits, single-earner families receive a considerable benefit over two-earner families. Private pension plans that qualify for tax assistance normally contain spousal survivor benefits. Also, nontaxable fringe benefits, such as dental and private health insurance plans, frequently contain marital benefits; thus, one-earner families receive a larger implicit subsidy for these plans than two-earner families. Finally... the non-deductibility of many work-related expenses in two-earner families constitute a substantial unjustified tax bias in favour of one-earner families.

Since tax literature provides reason to remain cautious about the Alliance analysis of single- versus dual-earner taxation, there are grounds to question whether fair taxation of different family forms is in fact the primary motivation for the Party’s flat tax platform. This question is further urged by the Party’s preferred solution to the alleged horizontal inequities. Kesselman (2000, 38-39) observes that the Alliance tax literature acknowledges that another option would also address the Party’s concerns about horizontal equity—a tax system premised on joint filing as is used in the United States. This alternative would implement a new rate schedule for couples that permits income splitting between spouses. For instance, joint filing might make available tax brackets for spousal units that are twice as wide as the brackets allowed for single filers. Although this would significantly shift the tax burden from single-earner couples to other family forms, it would nonetheless preserve the progressivity of marginal tax rates that the Alliance proposal would eliminate.

Kesselman (2000, 38) reports that the Alliance literature discounts joint filing for three reasons, all of which he finds “to have little substance.” First, the Alliance analysis asserts that
joint filing would compromise privacy between spouses who may otherwise prefer not to share the extent of their income with one another. However, the Alliance flat tax platform includes provisions that permit the transfer of unused exemptions from a lower-earning spouse to the higher-earning partner, as well as the existing Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB). Both elements of the plan require that partners disclose their respective incomes. Second, the Alliance Party contends that joint filing would introduce a controversial question of defining ‘adult equivalents’. This definition would be necessary in recognition that economies of scale mean a couple can live less expensively than two single persons because spouses share housing expenses and the costs of a car, phone, etc. The Alliance rightly observes that joint filing would require a technical answer to the question ‘how much less expensively can a couple live?’ if ability to pay is accepted as the criterion for tax liability. However, the Party is reticent to provide an answer, despite the fact that the Government of Canada already offers a definition in various studies by Statistics Canada that rely on measurements of adult equivalents. Third, the Alliance literature claims that joint filing would further complicate the income tax system for administrators and tax filers. But Kesselman rejects this claim by arguing that

joint filing substantially reduces the complexity of financial planning and accounts for married couples, and it also reduces the complexity of their tax planning and filing. Under the current system, married partners must do complex calculations for many decisions to determine their jointly optimal investment strategies.

Kesselman’s examination of the Alliance defence of a flat tax over joint taxation suggests that far more is at work in the Party’s tax platform than is suggested by its alleged primary concern with pursuing equity between single-earner and dual-earner families. Regardless of Party rhetoric, the progressivity of the tax rates is a fundamental target of the proposed reforms. Kesselman (ibid., 23) captures this reality by documenting the tax savings that would be produced by the Alliance plan as a percentage of persons’ taxable income. While all taxpayers
would benefit somewhat under the single rate tax, his analysis reveals that individuals with $30,000 income achieve the least savings – just 1.6 percent of taxable income (or $471).\textsuperscript{4} The tax savings rise only very slowly among the middle-class, amounting to 3.2 percent for incomes of $40,000; and 4.1 percent for incomes of $50,000. For low-income individuals, the savings are also modest. Someone with $20,000 would save just 2.4 percent of taxable income, while someone with $10,000 would save 4.7 percent. Any tax saving delivered to individuals with incomes below $30,000 would be produced by the enriched basic personal credit. By contrast, higher-income individuals would benefit substantially from the elimination of progressive marginal tax rates, realizing significantly larger tax savings both in monetary terms and as a percentage of taxable income. Someone earning $100,000, for instance, would save 8 percent of taxable income (or $8,044), while a person earning $200,000 would save 10.7 percent (or $21,494). Thus, the overarching effect of the Alliance flat tax would be to redistribute the tax burden from high-income earners to the middle-class, especially single individuals and dual-earner middle-class families. As shown in TABLE 2 above, a single-earner family earning $50,000 stands to save $1,763 under the Alliance flat tax proposal, over $1,300 more than a dual-earner family with the same income.

McMillan (2000) reports that the Alberta tax reduction plan premised on a flat tax similar in structure to that advocated by the Alliance has had comparable effects to those projected by Kesselman. Until 1999, the Spousal and Basic Personal exemptions in the province were $6,055 and $7,131 respectively. The Klein government has since raised both to $12,900, while also eliminating marginal tax rate progressivity by introducing a single rate of 10 percent for all

\textsuperscript{4} The Kesselman figures are calculated on the basis of the federal income tax rate schedule that was in place prior to the 2000 federal mini-budget. As a result, his numbers overstate the extent of the savings that would be produced by the Alliance flat tax since they do not account for the rate reductions that the Liberals announced in the fall of 2000.
taxable income. The tax savings achieved by low-income families in Alberta due to the enriched Basic and Spousal credits merit considerable attention, particularly the gains provided low-income single parents who can claim an Equivalent-to-Spouse tax credit for their first child. A lone-parent in Alberta now pays no provincial income tax on earnings up to $25,800, and only modest provincial income tax thereafter. The result is that a single parent with earnings of $35,000 pays less than $1,000 in Alberta personal income tax, a remarkable achievement.

McMillan (2000, 1052) explains, however, that “the tax reductions to income earners under $30,000 will be paid for entirely by the $30,000 – $100,000 group, and taxpayers with incomes over $100,000 will not contribute.” In effect, the Alberta plan shifts the tax burden to the middle-income taxpayer generally. Within the middle-income class, the expanded spousal exemption narrows the burden “to focus it more on... single taxpayer and dual-earner family groups” (ibid., 1037). In fact, the tax savings promised many middle-income taxpayers by the initial Alberta single tax plan were so moderate that the Klein government was forced to revise its plan following the federal tax changes announced in 2000. These changes meant that many middle-income Albertans would have saved more tax had the province not moved ahead with its flat tax proposal, which divorced provincial rates from the federal rate schedule. In response, the Alberta Conservatives revised its single rate tax by reducing the planned rate of 11 percent to 10 percent and enriching the planned $11,620 personal and spousal exemptions to the current rate of $12,900 (ibid., 1020).

McMillan (2000, 1052) concludes his analysis of the Alberta flat tax by observing that there is no “evidence of offsetting gains to the majority of taxpayers from a single-rate tax that would not also be available from a more distribution-neutral tax reduction.”

Most, if not all, efficiency improvements come from tax reduction, not from the shift to a single-rate tax. Also, taxes are a minor determinant of the so-called brain drain, and payoffs there also come from overall tax reduction. Not surprisingly, with rare exceptions, reforms of the personal
income tax recommended by tax analysts do not include a single-rate tax structure. Thus, the only certain result of Alberta’s conversion to a single-rate tax is the large tax savings to the top 2 or 3 percent of taxpayers; beyond that, the advantages are dubious. Unfortunately, the shift of the Alberta personal income tax burden to the large middle income class has been obscured by the large and recently expanded tax reductions. Consequently, the question of redistribution of the tax burden has not been debated as thoroughly as it deserves.

The above analyses of the Alliance and Alberta flat taxes reveal that substantial redistribution of the tax burden in a manner that benefits the rich is being justified largely under the guise of recognizing and facilitating the care provided by at-home parents in single-earner couples. This section provided reason to remain wary about the alleged horizontal inequities endured by single-earner couples, suggesting that single-rate taxes are touted as a solution to a problem that is more fabrication than reality because proponents misalign market income with ability to pay tax. Regardless of one’s view on this issue, the distributional effects of flat taxes are entirely inconsistent with a new politics of time concerned to promote work-family balance for all citizens. Unsurprisingly, the tax changes that favour single-earner families create additional barriers to the redistribution of paid and unpaid work between diverse groups of men and women, an issue I consider in more detail in the next section. In addition, there is evidence that rate flattening further reinforces these barriers. Studies from Sweden indicate that the progressive income tax structure has been a major determinant of relatively short working hours among men and relatively long working hours among women (Pettersson 1993, 254-255).

Finally, a society’s commitment to social citizenship is intimately implicated (and expressed) by the kind and level of taxes it levies. According to Schumpeter (1991, 108), taxes shape the basic structure of society: “they become a handle, as it were, which social powers can grip in order to change this structure.” By transferring more of the tax burden away from the privileged, flat tax proposals further erode whatever class consensus remains about collective responsibility to facilitate genuine social integration for all citizens. Reducing the progressivity of the income tax system disables it as a policy instrument that can redistribute income and
wealth, while dramatic tax cuts effectively de-fund the welfare state’s capacity to provide measures that promote full membership and ensure an egalitarian social foundation (Brooks 1997, 109). Although T.H. Marshall (1964, 117) underemphasized the latter ‘half’ of the rights/duty equation, he nonetheless recognized explicitly that “[t]he duty whose discharge is most obviously and immediately necessary for fulfillment of the right [of social citizenship] is the duty to pay taxes and [public] insurance contributions.” The flat taxes advocated by the Alliance Party and the Alberta government radically redefine this responsibility for the most economically privileged members of society, absolving them of considerable contributions to the institutional structures that foster and nurture the economic, political and social context that enables and facilitates prosperity and well-being. This redefinition of responsibilities among the privileged is especially perverse given that it is advocated to promote ‘caring’. If anything, the dramatic restructuring of the personal income tax suggested by the Alliance and implemented by the Alberta government redefines and reduces the extent to which the most economically secure in society are expected to ‘care’.

2. The Tax Treatment of Spousal Dependency

2a. The tax unit

By shifting the tax burden from one-earner couples to single adults and especially two-earner couples, recent talk of flat taxes raises questions about the appropriate unit on which income taxes should be levied – the individual or family. As Brooks (1996, 37) remarks, such questions are not new: “Likely, more has been written on the question of whether the individual or the family should be the tax unit than any other tax policy issue.” He adds, however, that as a conceptual matter, the debate is not really over whether the family or the individual is the correct unit of account. Few people claim that the household is that natural unit to which utility – or anything else that matters for tax purposes – accrues. Instead, the individual is the proper focus of fairness in any social institution; therefore, the proper question is, in determining an
individual’s tax liability, should that individual’s marital status, or other personal relationships, be relevant? (ibid., 47).

This question has traditionally been answered from one of two perspectives: one favouring the view that individuals should be taxed on income from which they benefit; the other claiming that individuals should pay tax on the income they control (Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 260). The first maintains that if an individual participates in a sharing relationship with another, the economic resources she or he derives from that relationship should be included in her or his income and subtracted from the income of the benefactor. Assuming that married couples share all of their economic resources, proponents of family taxation such as McIntyre (1996) claim that the taxable income of both spouses should be totalled and then divided equally between them for the purpose of measuring their respective tax liabilities.

The second perspective takes issue with the assumption that spousal units share funds equally between partners. For instance, Millar’s (1996, 54-57) review of existing evidence concludes that complex processes of resource allocation mean that many economically dependent women in spousal relationships do not have complete access to, or equal control over, their partners’ income5 (see also, Brooks 1996, 62-3; Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 262; Maloney 1989, 191; J. Nelson 1996, 109; C. Young 1997a, 266). Given this evidence, advocates of the second viewpoint argue that if capacity to pay is the criterion for measuring tax liability,

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5Citing Vogler and Pahl (1993), Millar (1996, 56) explains that: couples with the man in full-time work and the woman either not employed or in part-time work (the most common pattern among families with children) are the most likely to use male-managed systems [of household financial planning], and the women, although perhaps responsible for day-to-day spending, have little real control and power. Millar (ibid., 55) adds that it is clear from existing studies on money management within families “that the source of income is important in determining how money is perceived and can be spent... The fact that the man earns the money gives him greater control over how it should be spent and makes it legitimate for him to retain some part of the total income as personal spending money or ‘pocket money’.”
only a person who is able to control income can be said with confidence to have this capacity. The decision to spend or share income is beside the point (Brooks 1996, 54).6

The benefit and control perspectives both provide insights that have some intuitive appeal. The former represents a worthy ideal for spousal relationships by assuming that partners share all material resources equally. The benefit theory is also consistent with the dialogical thesis that warns against aligning autonomy with individualism. This alignment risks obscuring the network of dynamic relationships within which individual autonomy evolves. The language of the ‘individual’ as the tax unit is predisposed to direct attention to adult earners at a life course stage when they are least dependent on others, downplaying the caregiving relationships that function critically not only to nurture their own agency, but also to foster the autonomy of others. Some of this care provision can and should be accounted for by an income tax system that is sensitive to the effects of life-cycle relationships that impact an individual’s ability to pay.

By contrast, the control theory appropriately acknowledges the power differential that permeates the patriarchal social order in which spousal relationships operate. The assumption underpinning this perspective is that the state has a responsibility not to organize the income tax system in a way that exacerbates systemic systems of discrimination. For this reason, advocates of the control theory maintain it would be better to enact policies that encourage intra-household equality, rather than presume this equality exists and implement policies that may reinforce unequal earning and unequal power between spouses.

6 It is interesting to recall that one reason the Alliance Party opts for a single rate of tax over a system of joint taxation is that the latter requires spouses to disclose information about their sources of income fully whereas “spouses may prefer some economic autonomy and to keep their financial matters private” (Canadian Alliance, “Tax Reduction and Tax Reform,” p. 23; in Kesselman 2000, 38). This reasoning is consistent with the control perspective that does not presume that spouses share all material resources equally. Yet the effect of the Alliance Reforms would be to institutionalize a personal income tax system that for all intents and purposes treats the family as the appropriate tax unit and, therefore, internalizes the benefit perspective and its primary assumption that spouses share equally in household income regardless of the employment status of each partner.
The fact that both perspectives have some merit may partly explain why Canada’s tax unit is formally the individual, yet the personal income tax system is replete with measures that recognize spousal and other relationships. Canada’s income tax unit is therefore better viewed as a ‘hybrid’ of the individual and family options, rather than a theoretically pure individual model (Lahey 1997, 130). C. Young (1997a, 264) identifies the following as some of the more important rules that recognize spousal relationships:

- rules that are based on dependency, including the ability to transfer unused tax credits to a spouse, the deductibility of contributions made on behalf of one’s spouse to a private pension plan, the [spousal] credit, and the non-taxation of imputed income arising from household labour
- provisions that aggregate the income of spouses for certain purposes;
- the ‘rollover’ provisions that allow the transfer of certain property, including capital property, by an individual to their spouse without tax consequences;
- tax avoidance measures, such as Canada’s attribution rules, which prevent the splitting of investment income by spouses.

In this section, I accept that the a ‘hybrid’ model is appropriate for Canada’s income tax system on the grounds that the tax system ought to accommodate the important role that care relationships play in nurturing personal agency. However, I argue that measures premised on spousal dependency are problematic because they wrongly portray unpaid domestic work as a drain on a household’s capacity to pay tax, as well as reinforce barriers that impede the redistribution of paid and unpaid time between women and men. While my analysis below focuses on the Spousal credit, similar arguments are also found in tax literature in regards to the transferability of unused tax credits to a higher-earning spouse (see Brooks 1996, 73; Maloney 1989, 185; The Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 316; C. Young 2000b, 54-56).

2b. The Spousal credit

The current design of the Spousal credit reflects the patriarchal model of fragmented citizenship discussed in previous chapters: it provides a government grant to taxpayers

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7 The personal income tax measures that recognize relationships have been the subject of considerable analysis and critique (see for example Lahey 1996; Maloney 1989; McIntyre 1996; J. Nelson 1996; C. Young 2000a).
(overwhelmingly men) to subsidize the costs of supporting a non-earning spouse or common law partner. As of 2001, the Spousal credit entitles a taxpayer residing with a non-employed partner to a credit of 16 percent of $6,800. The value of the credit is reduced by 16 percent of the dependent’s income above $538, ensuring the tax relief specifically targets families in which the at-home spouse has almost no attachment to the paid labour market.

Tax provisions based on spousal dependency are a disincentive to women’s employment. Before a non-earning partner in a couple is likely to accept a paid position, the financial benefits must outweigh the costs, such as child care, transportation, clothing, less household production and the cost of replacing household labour. The Spousal credit exacerbates these costs on two fronts. First, it treats many married and common-law women less favourably than men by effectively taxing them on income that surpasses $538, rather than on income that surpasses the Basic Personal credit of $8,000. Second, the Spousal credit adds another $1,088 to the expenses that the non-earning spouse must weigh in the decision to seek paid work. While a credit of $1,088 alone is unlikely to dissuade a non-earning spouse from seeking employment, the cumulative costs of paid labour force participation pose a considerable barrier. This is particularly true in light of the gender earnings gap and evidence suggesting that women’s paid work decisions are more sensitive to after-tax wages than are men’s (Maloney 1994, 124; Maloney 1994, 124; Maloney 1994, 124).

8 See C. Young (2000a, 26-34) for a brief review of the Spousal credit’s history.

9 Prior to 2000, the definition of ‘spouse’ excluded same sex couples. In response to an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General), the federal government amended the definition of ‘spouse’ to include same sex partners in section 252(4) of the ITA for the purposes of registration of occupational pension plans (C. Young 2000a, 32). The federal government has since implemented the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act (S.C. 2000, c. 12). The Act amends the ITA by inserting a distinction between ‘spouse’ and ‘common-law partner’. The former term now refers exclusively to married persons, while the latter refers to partners in both heterosexual and same-sex couples who have cohabitated for a continuous period of at least one year. These definitional changes are accompanied by a further provision that amends every reference in the ITA to “spouse” or “spouses” so that it now reads “spouse or common-law partner” and “spouses and common law partners.” The effect is that same-sex partners are now treated as ‘spouses’ were previously under the ITA without granting them this title (C. Young 2000a, 33).
Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 264, 270). Enrichment of the Spousal credit, as proposed by the Alliance and implemented by the Alberta government, (would) only further increase(s) the tax measure’s disincentive effect by more than $600 each.

In addition to its financial (dis)incentive, the Spousal credit performs an ideological function. As C. Young (2000b, 55) notes, it implies a government preference for women to remain in the domestic sphere by “affirming that a woman’s dependency on a man deserves tax relief.” Previous chapters documented problems with the post-war fragmented model of citizenship that treats women as appendages of a household unit that enables male partners to exercise considerable flexibility in the public domains of market and political arena. This is not to deny that women (or men) who wish to work in the home should have every right to do so. Rather, the point is that women (or men) who perform exclusively unpaid productive roles should not be given preferential treatment by the tax system, compounding elements of the current social climate that may already distort the choices of women who might otherwise pursue non-domestic interests (Maloney 1994, 121). This point is more pressing still given that unpaid domestic work reduces the non-discretionary costs of the breadwinning partner, thereby increasing his ability to pay tax.

The Spousal credit has been defended as a means of compensating women for their unpaid domestic labour (Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 268). But the merit of this argument is belied by the structure of the credit. The tax relief is delivered directly to the breadwinning partner (typically a man), rather than to the actual care provider who remains at home. In addition, domestic labour is not the sole domain of full-time homemakers. As discussed in chapter six (see section 3), many women who work long hours in the labour market shoulder a ‘second shift’ at home performing the bulk of the domestic work, yet cannot benefit
from the additional tax relief delivered by the Spousal credit. It has also been argued that the Spousal credit functions as an indirect public contribution to the cost of raising children. But the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993, 268) reports that the evidence does not support this latter argument, since only about half the claimants of the Spousal credit have dependent children.

Provisions that are structured to provide tax relief specifically for spousal dependency should therefore be eliminated from the personal income tax.\(^{10}\) In addition to compounding financial disincentives to women’s paid labour force participation, such tax measures mischaracterize the contributions to the economy provided by women working in the home as labour that limits, rather than augments, a family’s ability to pay tax. By no means is this conclusion meant to downplay the value of spousal relationships. They are a critical element of the network of interdependencies in which persons live, play, love and work, and merit attention from a revised framework of social citizenship premised on a new politics of time. Moreover, when revising the tax system to be consistent with a new politics of time, it is important not to ignore entirely insights about the effects for tax liability of sharing income with dependents, as well as the substantial financial sacrifices that at-home parents make, points to which I return below. Instead, the claim is that the tax system is not the public policy instrument best suited to recognize spousal relationships specifically. Given the current social and economic context, organizing the income tax system around spousal relationships risks perpetuating numerous inequalities for disparate groups of women. As argued in chapter 8, revised paid worktime expectations that permit more leisure, paid family leave days, and enriched and extended parental leave entitlements offer more effective tools to support the costs of unpaid caring and facilitate additional time to nurture intimate spousal relations without buttressing patriarchal divisions of labour that track sex, class and ethnic differences.

\(^{10}\) The Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993, 304) and Maloney (1994, 146) also defend this conclusion.
3. A Revised Caregiver Credit to Replace the Spousal credit

In place of the Spousal credit, I suggest an alternative tax measure that would provide tax relief in recognition of citizens' legitimate care aspirations, the fundamental role that some care relationships play in fostering personal autonomy, as well as the financial sacrifices that citizens incur to provide this care. Since eliminating the Spousal credit also means eliminating the Equivalent-to-Spouse credit, the substitute measure is designed specifically to ensure that the proposed changes do not reduce the tax savings that are currently available to single parents.

The proposal to replace the Spousal credit with an alternative tax measure is not intended to lend support for the view that policy makers should increasingly turn to the ITA to deliver subsidies for care provision. C. Young (1997b, 307) documents the "detrimental consequences" for women that result from "the privatizing effect of funding social and economic programs through the tax system."

This privatization is manifested primarily by use of tax incentives to encourage reliance on the family (rather than the state) for matters such as the support and care of children and the financial welfare of elderly women. Despite the fact that public funds are being directed by the tax system towards such matters as child care and the support of the elderly, the structure of the tax system results in an abdication by the state of much of the responsibility for these matters and places it on the family and, in some instances, the market (ibid., 307-308).

Given the gender division of labour, Young claims that state abdication of responsibility for caregiving exacerbates barriers to full participation across important areas of social life predominantly for diverse groups of women who provide care in contexts where they receive no, or relatively low, wages.

Although this dissertation argues in favour of a social citizenship regime that facilitates sufficient time for citizens to provide and receive care in their network of domestic relations, the privatizing effects that Young documents merit careful scrutiny given the present gender order. Therefore, the proposal to replace the Spousal credit with another tax measure should be read as part of a broader policy platform that encompasses the recommendations of the previous chapter.
In particular, the new Caregiver credit that I describe should be evaluated in the context of arguments supporting a universal child care system that would significantly expand the state's role in child care, as well as parental leave changes that would challenge the present gender regime by increasing men's participation in primary child rearing.

The alternative tax measure that I propose to replace the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits is designed to minimize the risk of reinforcing patriarchy that is implicit in organizing the income tax system to acknowledge familial relationships. A revised Caregiver credit would minimize this risk by incorporating a distinction advanced by Eichler (1997, 135) between unpaid care that is *socially useful* as opposed to care that is just *privately useful*. Eichler describes a "simple test" to distinguish one from the other: "would the public pick up the cost of care if it was not provided by a family member?" If the answer is yes, the care includes a socially useful component, typically rendered either to children or adults who need care because of chronic or temporary illness, disability, senility, etc. If the answer is no, as would be the case "when a wife renders services to a physically and mentally fit husband, adult child, for herself, or for some other adult," then it is a privately useful service (ibid.). Privately provided care that is socially useful should be publicly recognized and compensated to some degree because the state profits directly from it in the form of reduced expenditures for the social service and health care systems. But by disallowing tax relief for care that is only privately useful, the proposed alternative would ensure that the income tax system acknowledges the economic value of domestic labour and, therefore, does not wrongly depict work performed by a full-time homemaker as a drain on the household's ability to pay tax.
3a. The Caregiver credit model

The Caregiver credit is a measure that presently recognizes elder and adult dependent care relationships that include a socially useful element. As such, it offers a model for developing a revised Caregiver credit (RCC) to replace the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse provisions. The changes to the Caregiver credit that I propose below assume that the $1.78 billion expenditure projected by the Government of Canada (2001a, Table 1) for the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits in 2002 is redirected to the RCC.

The Government of Canada (1998b, "Taxation") introduced the Caregiver credit in 1998 specifically to recognize the "irreplaceable" work performed by "an unprecedented number of Canadians – mostly women – who are today providing care for family members at home – very often an elderly parent or a disabled child." The new credit initially provided up to $400 of tax relief for individuals residing with, and providing care in-home for, an elderly parent or grandparent aged 65 or older, or for an infirm dependent adult relative (Government of Canada 1999a, 57). In the 2000 federal mini-budget, the maximum value of the Caregiver credit was increased to $560 (16 percent of $3,500). The tax relief is reduced by 16 percent of the amount that the dependent's net income exceeds $11,500. The credit is not available if the caregiver claims the Equivalent-to-Spouse credit on behalf of the dependent. If more than one person supports the same dependent, the tax credit can be split between caregivers, although the total

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11 Since the existing Caregiver credit addresses issues of care for the aged and disabled, I include these forms of informal care in the following discussion of a replacement for the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits. An adequate analysis of Canadian elder and disabled care policy would require an examination of a large literature that is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Without minimizing the importance of this examination, the following discussion assumes that any replacement for the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse tax credits in the ITA is supplemented by other policy measures in the elder and dependent care policy envelopes. These other policies would need to counter the tax expenditure's potentially harmful 'privatizing' effects, just as commitments to universal child care would mitigate these effects for the child care policy domain. This issue is more pressing still given that the Women and Taxation Working Group (1992, 45) of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission observes that the amount of care required by frail elderly or disabled dependents varies with the degree of frailty and disability. The tax system is an inappropriate policy instrument for providing varied amounts of support based on needs that cannot be measured through easily quantifiable indicators such as income.
claim cannot exceed more than $560 in tax relief. The Government of Canada (2001a, Table 1) estimates that the credit will cost $30 million in 2002.12

Two structural elements of the Caregiver credit distance (although do not totally exempt) this tax measure from problems implicit in the proposal to further value unpaid domestic care by enriching the Spousal credit. First, in some cases, the new tax expenditure is delivered directly to care providers in recognition of their work. This stands in stark contrast to the Spousal credit that always directs tax relief to breadwinners of at-home caregivers. The distinction is important symbolically because the Caregiver credit acknowledges that women’s unpaid care labour merits compensation as a socially and economically important contribution. Second, the Caregiver credit targets tax relief only to socially useful care that relieves the health and welfare system of work it may otherwise perform and does not subsidize care rendered to an able-bodied spouse, child or other adult that has only private utility for recipients and providers. This distinction ensures the Caregiver credit reinforces the perception that unpaid care labour is a valuable household resource that increases, rather than diminishes, household economic security. The subsidy it delivers recognizes the social value that spills over from some unpaid care, as well as the financial sacrifices that individuals incur to perform this socially useful work.

While it is an important symbolic gesture on the path to appropriately valuing women’s unpaid care work, there are problems with the Caregiver credit. In particular, it remains far too oriented to the financial component of caregiving, the stereotypically male contribution. This orientation is manifest in two ways. First, persons without taxable income will not benefit

12 It is worth noting that the Government of Canada (1998a, Table 1, p. 12) anticipated that the Caregiver credit would cost $120 million when introduced in 1998. This projection well surpasses the $24 million figure that has since been estimated based on 1998 tax data (Government of Canada 2001a, Table 1, “Family”). The substantial disparity raises questions about the efficacy of the income tax system as a subsidy delivery mechanism in terms of its capacity to reach intended recipients. A similar question arises in regards to the CCED. Increases to the maximum deductible limits in 1998 did not produce the projected $85 million additional expenditure (Government of Canada 1998a, Table 1, p. 16). Estimates based on 1998 tax records indicate that the decline in federal revenue between 1997 and 1998 was only $30 million (Government of Canada 2001a, Table 1, “Memorandum Items”).
directly from the tax expenditure since it is not refundable. This outcome is very suspect for a tax measure ostensibly designed to value caregiving since nurturing others on a full-time basis often makes it impossible to earn sufficient income to claim a non-refundable tax credit. The consequences are especially perverse for full-time, at-home caregivers. In one-earner heterosexual couples, it is far more likely that the at-home spouse, almost always a woman, will shoulder the majority of care work for an in-home dependent relative. Yet the structure of the Caregiver credit only makes the tax subsidy available to the breadwinning spouse in this family form, repeating one critical problem of the Spousal credit. While there is indeed an important financial component to caregiving as reported by many ethnic minority, immigrant and poor women for whom earning and caring have historically been interwoven domains (Collins 1994), the structure of the Caregiver credit ignores entirely the care labour component in one-earner families. Women are disproportionately disadvantaged as a result because of the gendered division of labour.

The fact that the value of the Caregiver credit dissipates rapidly if the care recipient earns even a limited income further bespeaks how the tax measure subsidizes financial dependence more than care labour. Referencing eligibility to earnings of the care recipient obscures how the amount of care one provides to a disabled or frail relation may be entirely unrelated to that income. An elderly parent with a generous pension may nevertheless require regular home visits from a nurse or other health professional in the absence of care provided by an adult child. In addition, C. Young (2000b, 60) points out that this design feature of the Caregiver credit “discourages the person being cared for from attempting to earn income outside the home, where possible.” While the $560 tax subsidy alone may be a minimal disincentive, it nonetheless compounds barriers linked to, among other things, ageism, frailty, and disability that
compromise care recipients efforts to achieve greater self-reliance and autonomy. This consequence is unacceptable since one of the overarching purposes of nurturing dependents is to foster autonomy, not impede it.

The structure of the Caregiver credit can be revised to overcome the above problems by making the credit refundable and eliminating the income ceiling that limits eligible care recipients to persons who are financially dependent. These two changes would ensure that the tax credit compensates care work in addition to monetary expenditures made on behalf of care recipients. The first change would mean that persons with insufficient taxable income would nonetheless benefit directly from the tax delivered subsidy if they provide care to an eligible dependent, including full-time at-home caregivers. The second would ensure that persons who provide socially useful care to persons who are financially self-reliant are also eligible to receive the symbolic recognition and tax relief accorded by the Caregiver credit. Both changes would parallel Québec income tax policy, which provides an ascendant lodging tax credit to assist persons who have elderly relatives live with them. The Québec credit is refundable and is not limited to care recipients who are financially dependent on the taxpayer (C. Young 2000b, 59).

The revamped and enriched Caregiver credit that I propose to replace the Spousal credit assumes that its structure has been modified in keeping with the model offered by the Québec ascendant credit. I recommend additional changes below, which are not so much driven by theoretical commitments, as they are by careful consideration of the financial effects of income tax revisions for disparate family arrangements, the resultant incentive effects, and the political feasibility of proposed amendments.
3b. Proposed eligibility criteria for the RCC

The eligibility criteria of the Caregiver credit should be made more inclusive on two fronts. First, the purview of the credit should be extended to include care provided to children aged seventeen and under. This change would permit the tax provision to recognize a much broader range of socially useful care, and ensure that it directly contributes to the cost of raising children – a function sometimes attributed to the Spousal credit. Second, following Eichler’s (1997, 142) work, the eligibility criteria should be revised to include non-kin relations residing in the taxpayer’s home. A tax measure concerned to compensate caregiving should recognize the socially useful care that individuals provide regardless of a familial connection. The savings to the health and welfare systems are no less real because the care recipient is not related to the caregiver by blood or marriage license.13 Both changes to eligibility are important in terms of the political feasibility of replacing the Spousal credit. Only by recognizing a very broad range of relationships will the revised Caregiver credit still be available to many families with at-home spouses, the group for whom replacing the Spousal credit will be most controversial.

3c. Proposed values for the RCC

The amount of tax relief delivered by the Caregiver credit should also be enriched if it is to replace the Spousal credit. I propose four distinct levels of tax savings that would vary with the circumstances of the caregiver and the care recipient. The maximum value would be 16 percent of $11,500 (or $1,840); the second tier would equal 16 percent of $8,000 (or $1,280); while the third and fourth tiers would be 16 percent of $4,700 (or $752) and 16 percent of $1,200 (or $192) respectively. The assigned values are dictated largely by the value of existing tax

13The provision of a tax credit for care provided to non-kin must not legally oblige the taxpayer to continue to care and provide financial support in the future. The purpose of extending eligibility to non-kin is to reward voluntary care provision that is socially useful, not penalize people’s generosity (Eichler 1997, 140-142).
measures. They represent political decisions that would be necessary to ensure that providers of socially useful care are not penalized by the decision to exchange the Spousal credit with the RCC. In many cases, caregivers/families would gain at least $192 in tax relief. This moderate increase is meant to foster acceptance for the proposed tax changes among diverse stakeholders. Although including four disparate values would complicate the structure of the recommended tax provision, the difficulty in claiming the tax relief would be no more onerous than the challenge posed to taxpayers in 2000 who had to manage three distinct tax rates for their capital gains that varied with the date of sale.

The maximum $1,840 value of the revamped Caregiver Credit would be available to:

- single taxpayers who reside with at least one child under eighteen, or one mentally or physically infirm dependent, or one individual over 65; and
- a spouse or common law partner who resides with and provides full-time at-home care for at least one mentally or physically infirm dependent, or one individual over 65.

$1,280 in tax relief would be delivered to:

- a spouse or common law partner who resides with and provides full-time at-home care for at least one child under six.

Less valuable sums of tax delivered assistance would be provided on the following terms:

- $752 for a common law or married taxpayer who resides with, but does not provide full-time at-home care for, at least one mentally or physically infirm dependent, or one individual over 65.
- $192 for a common law or married taxpayer who resides with at least one child under six, but who does not provide full-time at-home care for the child; and
- $192 for common law or married taxpayer who resides with at least one child age six to seventeen.

For the purpose of the revised Caregiver credit, a tax filer would be determined to provide "full-time at-home" care if she or he satisfies the following criteria: neither the tax filer, nor his or her spouse or common law partner, (i) claimed the CCED or (ii) utilized publicly subsidized care more than once a week on average during the previous year; and (iii) the tax filer
is what Eichler (1997, 135) terms a “derived dependent” without taxable income. The term ‘derived dependent’ recognizes the incompatibility of providing full-time care with regular labour force participation and the resultant limited earnings of tax filers who specialize in unpaid care. The RCC would therefore include provisions to claw-back the maximum tax subsidy for spouses and common-law partners at a rate of 16 percent of taxable income exceeding $538, consistent with the reduction rate of the present Spousal credit. The RCC would reach its minimum values ($752 for care provided to the aged or disabled and $192 for child care) when income exceeds $7,338.

The differential treatment for single-caregivers versus common law or married caregivers is necessary to accommodate distinctions between the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits. The former does not discriminate between privately and socially useful unpaid care because it subsidizes some one-earner couples in which the homemaker does not nurture a young child or infirm/elderly dependent. The latter, by contrast, only subsidizes single taxpayers who provide care that has a socially valuable component to a child or elderly relative, while it also delivers financial assistance to a family form that endures disproportionately high rates of low-income status (National Council of Welfare 2000). The income deprivation more regularly encountered by lone-parents demands that any revision of the personal income tax should minimally not exacerbate the relative economic insecurity of this family form. The RCC that I propose would ensure that single-caregivers are eligible for at least an additional $192 in tax relief in all situations where they are currently permitted to claim both the Equivalent-to-Spouse credit on behalf of one dependent and the Caregiver Credit on behalf of a second dependent. Single-caregivers who currently claim only the Equivalent-to-Spouse credit stand to gain a further $560 in tax relief (for a total of $752). Since the RCC would also be refundable, some poor single-
caregiver families that currently do not benefit from the full value of the Equivalent-to-Spouse and Caregiver credits stand to gain considerably more tax-delivered assistance because receipt of the RCC would not be contingent upon earning taxable income.

The maximum $1,840 tax saving is equivalent in value to the cumulative tax relief generated by the current Basic Personal and Caregiver credits. This value would ensure that families in which an at-home spouse cares for an infirm or elderly dependent would gain at least $192 in tax relief, representing the difference in value between the existing Spousal credit (16 percent of $6,800) and the Basic Personal credit (16 percent of $8,000). Some low-income single-earner couples may benefit further because the proposed tax relief would be refundable. The $1,280 figure is equivalent to the tax saving produced by the Basic Personal credit and would again deliver a minimum additional $192 tax rebate to couples in which one spouse remains home to rear a preschool child(ren). The minimum added tax saving proposed for full-time unpaid caregivers would address the concern articulated by Smith (1997) and the Alliance Party that the income tax system presently undervalues the domestic work of homemakers by providing less tax relief under the Spousal credit than is available under the Basic Personal credit. In addition, by providing the most valuable tax expenditures directly to full-time at-home caregivers, the RCC would also follow social conservatives in acknowledging that this group of care providers incurs particularly high opportunity costs, including forgone income.

The proposed $752 third-tier is the current value of the Caregiver Credit supplemented by $192 that is commensurate with the tax relief that would be generated by calculating the RCC based on the Basic Personal credit rather than the Spousal provision.

Finally, the $192 difference between the Spousal and Basic Personal credits represents the minimum value that would be delivered by the RCC. It would constitute universal tax
recognition of the additional costs of rearing children. Only a token amount is recommended for this purpose for a number of reasons. First, the $192 tax saving ensures that dual-earner families will not gain more than single parents as a result of the decision to replace the Spousal credit with a revised caregiver provision (see TABLE 3). Second, the inter-connected Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) and National Child Benefit system already provide considerable refundable tax relief to low- and medium-income families in recognition of the extra costs of children. As of 2004, the maximum tax expenditure under the CCTB will be $2,500 for a family’s first child (Government of Canada 2000b, “Reducing Taxes for Canadians”).

Third, providing child tax benefits to families at above-average incomes foregoes state revenue that might otherwise enable further enrichment of child care services and parental and other leave entitlements. As discussed in the previous chapter, these benefits are important elements of a new social citizenship framework premised on work-family balance for all citizens that would institutionalize incentives that effectively challenge the present patriarchal order and deliver significant public subsidies to support the added costs of rearing children. Additional tax delivered support for children is unlikely the best use of scarce resources, particularly when dual-earner couples and single parents with children under six are likely to use publicly subsidized child care services extensively under a welfare regime organized around a new politics of time. In terms of the current regime, the CCED is available to both family forms and should remain so as I discuss below.

Fourth, and finally, only $192 in tax relief is provided to at-home parents with children over five since children of this age will be in school for all but the summer months. Therefore, any decision to remain home full-time reflects personal preferences that extend well beyond the desire to provide full-time, socially useful care. While a tax filer’s non-employed status may
also reflect difficulties finding paid work, the state has specifically instituted employment insurance, social assistance and other social services to assist tax filers who struggle in the paid labour force. The fact that some breadwinners financially support an unemployed partner who is seeking paid work but ineligible for EI benefits may point to problems with the employment insurance system. However, it is far from obvious that inclusion of a spousal dependency provision in the \textit{ITA} is the most appropriate remedy to problems with EI.\footnote{One might argue that Eichler's distinction between socially and privately useful care supports the inclusion of a spousal dependency provision in the \textit{ITA} in recognition of the financial support that income-earning married or common-law partners provide a dependent spouse who has little earnings potential. In the absence of this financial support (for example, if the partners divorced), the state may be called upon to provide social assistance to the economically dependent partner. This scenario is especially likely in the case of full-time women homemakers who remained in the domestic sphere for the entire period when dependent children resided at home.

However, it is precisely in response to the sort of economic vulnerability that typically tracks limited paid labour force ties that I recommend eliminating the existing Spousal credit since it exacerbates systemic social forces that encourage women to decrease their level of labour force participation in favour of increasing their unpaid care loads. In addition, the fact that some breadwinner's financially support spouses with limited earnings potential as a result of her earlier specialization in domesticity should be viewed as an associated cost of the breadwinner's previous preference for a full-time homemaker.}

Given that multiple values are proposed for the RCC, tax filers would be permitted to file a claim for the care relationship that generates the most tax relief. As is the case under the current Caregiver credit, more than one tax filer could claim tax relief in regards to care provided to the same dependent, so long as the total tax saving does not exceed the amount that the credit would generate for the person for whom it would be least valuable. I recommend against including a clause that would automatically deliver the tax saving to the 'primary caregiver' with a rebuttable presumption that this person is a woman. While previous chapters document that women continue to shoulder primary responsibility for care work, a caregiver tax provision that may be claimed by either partner in a married or common law relationship has some potential to challenge ideological assumptions. At tax time, couples would be required to decide how to allocate the available tax saving. This decision may in turn spur conversations between spouses and common-law partners about the division of labour within the home, rather than reinforce an
assumption that women should be primary caregivers. In addition, the proposed structure for the revised credit includes a financial incentive for an at-home spouse or common law partner to receive the tax expenditure. Since the maximum value is only available to full-time at-home and single-caregivers, a single-earner family would benefit more if the non-earning spouse takes the credit. This structural feature should allocate the tax-delivered subsidy directly to the person who is most likely performing the majority of care labour in one-earner families.

**TABLE 3: WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES FROM THE PROPOSAL TO REPLACE THE SPOUSAL CREDIT WITH A REVAMPED CAREGIVER TAX CREDIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caring for:</th>
<th>Single-Person</th>
<th>One-Earner Couples</th>
<th>Two-Earner Couples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child under 6</td>
<td>+ $192 - $752</td>
<td>+ $192</td>
<td>+ $192*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child 6 – 17</td>
<td>+ $192 - $752</td>
<td>- $896</td>
<td>+ $192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirm/elderly dependent</td>
<td>+ $192 - $752</td>
<td>+ $192</td>
<td>+ $192**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children under 18 or infirm/elderly dependent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>- $1,088</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure assumes that the lower-earner in the couple earns more than $7,338, the annual income threshold above which the RCC would reach its minimum value of $192 for care provided to children under six. The lower-earner stands to gain more if her/his income is below this threshold.

** This figure assumes that the lower-earner in the couple earns more than $7,338, the annual income threshold above which the RCC would reach its minimum value of $752 for care provided to the elderly and disabled. The lower-earner stands to gain more if her/his income is below this threshold.

Table 3 shows that two groups of one-earner couples stand to lose from the proposal to replace the Spousal credit with a revamped caregiver provision: those without preschool children and/or those without infirm or elderly dependents. This proposed reduction in tax relief is consistent with the argument that only care that has a socially useful component should receive tax recognition for the purpose of measuring tax liability. The RCC would symbolically acknowledge the social value of domestic labour and further divorce the income tax system from patriarchal norms that imply women’s unpaid care diminishes a household’s ability to pay tax. Although some social conservative groups may resist this strategy on the grounds that it undermines the ‘traditional family’, the tiered-value system proposed for the RCC would be entirely in keeping with social conservative positions. In recognition of the opportunity costs
incurred by stay-at-home caregivers, full-time homemakers who perform socially useful care receive significantly more tax savings than citizens striving to balance earning and caring: $1,840 and $1,280 versus $752 and $192. The more valuable tax expenditure is restricted to the at-home caregiver even though many women in the paid labour force perform considerable amounts of unpaid domestic labour on top of their paid work (see chapter six, section 3).

Although the nominal value of the RCC would appropriately acknowledge that full-time at-home caregivers accept particularly high opportunity costs, TABLE 3 indicates that the proposed credit is consistent with feminist concerns to value unpaid care work further without reinforcing patriarchal systemic forces. First, the RCC would restructure the system of incentives to deter exclusive female domesticity within households that do not care for preschool children, the aged, infirm or disabled by significantly limiting the tax relief available to such families. In terms of married and common-law partnerships that do provide such care, TABLE 3 reveals that the RCC would have little effect on existing incentive structures. Just as single-earner couples would typically gain $192 under the RCC, so would dual-earner couples.

4. Evaluating the CCED

The previous sections argued that (i) the Alliance Party and Alberta government are disingenuous when they claim their commitments to flat taxes are driven primarily by concerns to minimize barriers that impede full-time at-home caregiving; and (ii) further enriching the value of Spousal credits raises serious problems for gender equality. In response to the latter, I propose a revised and enriched Caregiver credit to replace existing Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse provisions. In this last section, I examine the third plank of the Alliance flat tax platform that pertains specifically to caregiving: the Party’s critique of the CCED and the remedy it proposes. The Canadian debate about the CCED is complex because participants enter the
dialogue with three competing visions of s. 63 that assign the tax measure distinct objectives that are worthy of public attention, but which one policy tool cannot pursue simultaneously.

4a. The Alliance perspective: the CCED should recognize the private costs and social value of child rearing.

Section 63 of the ITA enables taxpayers to deduct eligible child care expenses from their taxable income up to $7,000 per child with a disability and/or under age seven, and $4,000 per child aged seven to sixteen. Eligible costs are defined as those incurred to perform the duties of employment, carry on a business, conduct grant-funded research, and attend school or occupational training. In two-parent families, both parents must generally be engaged in one of the above activities if the family is to be eligible to claim the deduction. The lower income-earner in the couple is required to claim the CCED and the total deduction cannot surpass two-thirds of her/his earned income.

The Reform/Alliance Party critiques the CCED because it is not available to families in which one parent remains home to rear children (McCarthy 1999c; 1999d; McCarthy and Greenspon 1999). From this viewpoint, s. 63 compounds the devaluation of caregiving work done by at-home parents because its eligibility criteria ignore the costs that these parents incur. According to Reform/Alliance MP Jason Kenny, at-home parents “are forgoing thousands of dollars of income and lowering their standard of living in order to stay home with their children” (in McCarthy and Greenspon 1999). Since the CCED does not subsidize these costs, but delivers financial support for the costs incurred by families that purchase care arrangements, Kenny (ibid.) claims that s. 63 contributes to a gross and inexcusable inequity, one that undermines the basic unit of any healthy society, the family; an inequity which creates perverse unfairness for struggling, hard working, parents who are doing the most important work of the nation, raising children, raising the next generation.
To remedy this alleged discrimination, the Reform/Alliance Party tabled a 1999 motion to replace the CCED with a refundable tax credit valued up to $1,190 for each child under twelve that would be available to all families regardless of parents' employment circumstances. The proposal won the support of the other opposition parties, but was defeated by the governing Liberals (McCarthy 1999c; 1999d). In preparation for the 2000 election campaign, the Alliance Party proposed an alternative remedy. Adapting a model recommended by Boessenkool and Davies (1998, 26), the Alliance now recommends the introduction of a new $3,000 tax deduction per child. This plan would disallow the first $3,000 of child care expenses that can be claimed under s. 63, while leaving unchanged the CCED's upper deductible limits.15

The changes to the CCED recommended by Reform/Alliance reflect the assumption that s. 63's primary goal should be to provide public recognition of the non-discretionary private costs and social benefits associated with private child rearing work. Canada's tax and transfer system historically included the universal family allowance program and a universal child tax exemption that performed this function. As of 1993, these mechanisms were eliminated in favour of a Child Tax Benefit (now replaced by the CCTB) targeted towards low- and middle-income families. In the absence of universal provisions, the Reform/Alliance critique of s. 63 implies that the CCED should be amended to assume the function the universal provisions used to perform. Both remedies proposed by Reform/Alliance would have this effect, ‘universalizing’ the tax recognition of child care costs, including opportunity costs incurred by at-home parents.

The problem with the Reform/Alliance critique of the CCED is that it discounts the purpose for which the deduction was actually introduced. When first proposed by the federal government in 1969 (and eventually implemented in 1972), the Government of Canada (1969,

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15 Boessenkool and Davies (1998, 26) recommend a less generous universal child deduction of $2,000.
explained that the CCED was “intended primarily to benefit mothers who need to work to support their families” (in C. Young 2000b, 20). In keeping with this objective, the deduction was initially made sex-specific: while exceptions were made for single, working fathers, generally women in the labour force were the only taxpayers permitted to claim tax savings under s. 63 (Lahey 1997, 139). According to the federal government, this design-feature responded to the systemic discrimination confronting women, including the fact that “women’s decisions to enter the salaried workforce were influenced by the costs of child care services in a way that men’s were not” (Lahey 1997, 139; See also Maloney 1994, 133).

The CCED’s sex-specific eligibility criterion remained until 1983 when it was changed in response to a Human Rights Tribunal decision that ruled the criterion discriminated against men (Bailey v. The Queen [1980]). Although the language of the CCED is now gender-neutral, the requirement that the lower-earner in a two-parent family take the deduction approximates the effect achieved by the sex-specific language. Given the gender earnings gap, the lower-earner is more often a mother.

Since the Alliance critique discounts the initial reason for implementing the CCED, the Party’s remedy would run contrary to the incentive that s. 63 was initially designed to provide. Generally, the proposal to implement universal child tax deductions while reducing by an equivalent amount the value of the CCED would have a differential impact for one-earner couples as compared to employed single parents and dual-earner partners. The intended effect of the Alliance proposal would be to introduce additional tax relief for one-earner couples, while leaving the latter two family forms with the status quo.16 Tax savings that the latter gain from

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16 As I discuss below, the CCED is an ineffective child care subsidy mechanism. One result is that some taxpayers currently entitled to benefit from s. 63 also stand to gain from the Alliance tax deduction of $3,000 per child, regardless of its impact on the CCED. In particular, 40-plus percent of eligible taxpayers fail to claim the CCED. These taxpayers would therefore benefit from the Alliance proposal, as would persons who currently deduct less
the new deduction would be minimized, if not entirely lost, in the form of a less valuable CCED. Thus, rather than being neutral, the Alliance proposal for a ‘universal’ child tax deduction would change the balance of incentives delivered through public policy in favour of increased reliance on unpaid child care typically provided by women. The universal deduction would raise the relative cost for parents (generally mothers) re-entering the paid labour force because they would no longer receive an extra tax deduction for the first $3,000 of child care expenses that they incur. This effect is inconsistent with a new politics of time intent to redistribute paid and unpaid worktime between women and men by facilitating labour force participation among mothers. Therefore, in contrast to the Alliance proposal, I recommend against introducing measures that target tax relief disproportionately to single-earner couples: eligibility to claim the CCED should continue to be reserved for families that do not rely on an unpaid caregiver.

While I argue that the CCED is not an appropriate policy mechanism to account for the substantial income that some parents forgo to remain home, the RCC discussed above would acknowledge this financial sacrifice by providing substantially more tax relief to one-earner families than dual-earner couples with children. In addition, the RCC would respond somewhat to the Alliance concern that the tax system lacks universal recognition of the extra costs of rearing children by delivering a minimum $192 tax saving for every family with at least one child under eighteen. However, this level of universal recognition is less valuable than the $510 tax saving (17 percent of a $3,000) that the Alliance Party recommends for each dependent child.

4b. Two competing Liberal visions: the CCED as subsidy vs. the CCED as a tool to promote horizontal equity

There is good reason to discount the Alliance critique of the CCED on the grounds that it ignores entirely the primary policy objective initially assigned to s. 63 and, as a result, obscures

than $3,000 in child care expenses. The average 1999 deduction of $2,772 means that the tax relief produced by the Alliance deduction would surpass in value the tax savings that a number of Canadians currently claim under s. 63.
the adverse effects for gender equality that the Party’s proposed remedy risks institutionalizing. However, the purpose of the CCED remains open to debate because the governing Liberals ascribe competing policy goals to the tax measure. I conclude the chapter by reviewing these conflicting visions, acknowledging that further recommendations regarding s. 63 are difficult to develop so long as the primary intention for the tax measure remains unclear.

In response to the Reform/Alliance charge that the CCED disadvantages families with an at-home parent, the federal Liberals appropriately defend s. 63 by re-invoking the original reason for implementing the deduction – to minimize the barrier to female labour force participation posed by the high costs of child care. For instance, Liberal MP Sarmite Bulte explains that “What we’re talking about is the economic emancipation or independence of women... [W]e need to foster an environment for women to be... financially independent” (in McCarthy 1999e). Similarly, the Liberals’ response to Beverly Smith’s communication to the UN explains that “[w]ithout [the CCED], the tax system would... constitute a barrier to the employment of women who tend to be the primary providers of care to children” (Government of Canada 1999b, 20).

The view that the CCED is a child care subsidy is supported by a variety of commentators in the tax literature (see for instance Brooks 1996, 76; Maloney 1994, 134; Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993, 218; Surrey 1973, 201; Woodman 1990, 683; C. Young 1997b, 309; C. Young 1994). Proponents of this view argue that the deduction is not part of the benchmark income tax structure and therefore acts as a public subsidy by allowing parents to subtract eligible child care expenses from their taxable income. This deduction decreases the amount of income on which parents pay tax, thereby lowering the amount of tax owed. The lower tax paid is a tax saving and functionally equivalent to a direct government spending program. The same result – a specified amount of extra money in the pockets of individual
taxpayers – could be achieved if the government taxed parents on their income, including that spent on child care, and then gave taxpayers a direct grant for an amount equal to the tax saving.

However, just as the Reform/Alliance critique of the CCED is problematic, there are also two problems with defending the deduction on the grounds that it is a subsidy for paid work-related child care expenses. One problem is that s. 63 is ineffective in its capacity as child care subsidy for a variety of reasons. First, the maximum tax savings produced by the deduction falls thousands of dollars short of the average annual cost of licensed care for children under six, particularly in BC and Ontario, and particularly for infants and toddlers (Lahey 1996, 416-7; C. Young 1997a, 281; C. Young 1994, 546-7). Second, the CCED’s take-up rate is low, in part because subsidies delivered through the tax system are less visible to parents. Reports indicate that as few as 30 to 60 percent of eligible taxpayers take advantage of the tax relief that the CCED makes available (Cleveland and Hyatt 1997, 22; Sub-Committee on Tax Equity for Canadian Families with Dependent Children 1999, 9; Task Force on Child Care 1986, 170). Third, the CCED’s tax relief is generally delivered at tax time, three to fifteen months after care arrangements are purchased. As a result, the deduction typically provides little assistance to parents who cannot afford care without receiving public financial assistance in advance (Macklin 1992, 509). Fourth, s. 63 provides a tax saving regardless of the quality of care that is purchased and irrespective of whether arrangements are regulated, ignoring evidence about the connection between regulated care and healthy early childhood development (Bach and Phillips 1997, 253; Teghtsoonian 1997, 122; C. Young 1994, 563). Fifth, the deduction does not offer the state a vehicle through which to systematically address the low wages and few benefits that are paid care providers. Instead, it often facilitates the purchase of care at very low rates of remuneration and sometimes in contexts where providers are vulnerable to abuse, particularly immigrant
women who work as live-in caregivers (C. Young 1997b, 312; Teghtsoonian 1997, 122). Sixth, and the most frequently cited failing, s. 63 provides an ‘upside-down subsidy’ by delivering tax savings that are most valuable for high-income earners and least valuable to Canadians with no taxable income (Brooks 1996, 76; Maloney 1994, 134; C. Young 1997a, 273, 281). The CCED therefore produces the least tax relief for the very women for whom the costs of non-parental care arrangements pose the largest obstacle to labour market participation.

The second problem with defending the CCED as a tax-delivered subsidy is that the deduction’s status as a tax expenditure unrelated to the benchmark is a subject of debate in tax literature. Some commentators argue that the CCED is integral to the ITA’s capacity to measure accurately people’s ability to pay tax (see Boadway and Flatters 1988, 81; Bruce 1988a, 6; Bruce 1988b, 39-40; Cleveland and Hyatt 1997, 2; Cloutier and Fortin 1989, 55-59; Kesselman 1988, 303). According to this third view, the CCED is not a subsidy of any kind, but functions as a tax tool designed to help ensure that families with comparable abilities to pay are required to pay the same amount of tax. The underlying claim is that two couples with children who have equal monetary incomes, say $37,000, do not enjoy the same ability to pay tax if one relies exclusively on a single-earner, while the other requires two earners. The latter family may have considerably less disposable income because it incurs several thousands of dollars in non-parental child care expenses as parents work in the paid labour force, costs that the first family avoids because an at-home parent provides care. The CCED accounts for this potential disparity in discretionary income by permitting the latter family to deduct up to $7,000 in non-parental care expenses per child. In so doing, the deduction implies that the dual-income couple with $7,000 in child care expenses is better compared for tax purposes to a single-earner couple with one child that has 30,000 of income – not $37,000.
Although the CCED functions poorly as a subsidy for purchased child care arrangements, it operates relatively well in this latter capacity. The provision's only limitation is that it does not permit the deduction of eligible child care costs that surpass $7,000 per child with a disability or under age seven, $4,000 per child seven to sixteen, or two-thirds of the lower-earning parent's taxable income. The result is that a dual-earner couple with income of $37,000 and child care expenses of $8,000 (which is common for infants and toddlers living in urban areas) will only have $29,000 in disposable income, but be compared to a single-earner couple with earnings of $30,000 for the purpose of determining tax liability.

Perhaps because the CCED is vulnerable to various critiques qua child care subsidy, the Liberals further buttress their defence of the deduction by referencing this third characterization of s. 63 to argue that the Reform/Alliance charges tell the story backwards. For instance, Liberal MP Hedy Fry asserts that, in the absence of the CCED, it is parents who purchase paid work-related care who would endure a tax disadvantage relative to families with an at-home parent — not vice versa as Reform/Alliance contends. Fry points out that this “disparity” persists under the current tax regime for “the dual-income earning family which cannot fully deduct child care,” alluding to the example above in which a couple incurs care costs of $8,000 for a child under seven. Accordingly, Fry argues that extending the CCED to families that rely on an at-home parent would only exacerbate this inequality, “suddenly mak[ing] that dual-income family even worse off than they were before” (McCarthy and Greenspon 1999).

Both Liberal characterizations of the CCED provide parents the opportunity to not pay tax on the income they use to purchase eligible child care arrangements. The resultant reduction in tax owing lessens somewhat the high cost of non-familial care arrangements, consistent with the primary objective initially assigned to s. 63. But the two Liberal policy goals are ultimately
not reconcilable. The problem is that the features of the CCED that render it a poor subsidy mechanism make it a relatively effective tool to shelter non-discretionary child care expenditures from taxation in order to promote horizontal equity between families with and without paid care arrangements. In particular, if the CCED is converted into a refundable tax credit to eliminate the upside-down subsidy, s. 63 would not fully exclude the income that some taxpayers use for non-discretionary care arrangements from calculations of tax liability so long as the personal income tax system retains progressive marginal rates. For instance, a dual-earner family with child care expenses of $7,000 in which both parents earn $40,000 pays federal taxes at a marginal rate of 22 percent. If the CCED is converted into a credit that is calculated at 16 percent of eligible child care expenses, roughly $1,900 of the family’s $7,000 non-discretionary child care expenditure would not be sheltered from the calculation of its tax liability, increasing the family’s federal tax bill by $420.

The need to reconcile the two objectives assigned to s. 63 by the federal Liberals would be a moot issue were a pan-Canadian child care program implemented as recommended in chapter eight. Under a new social citizenship regime supported by a federally subsidized universal child care system, the CCED would become irrelevant as a tax delivered subsidy for child care and arguably unnecessary as a tool to promote horizontal equity between families. For instance, the tax relief delivered by the CCED to parents in Québec is considerably lower now that many benefit from the province’s $5 per day child care system. The new fee schedule means that the maximum CCED claim per Québec child will be roughly $1,200 when sufficient spaces are available for all families seeking care arrangements. At this level, concerns about horizontal equity between families with and without children, as well as one-earner and two-earner families, are much less significant than when the annual cost is more than $6,000, as is the
case in many metropolitan areas outside of Québec. Thus, should the rest of the country follow Québec down the path of universal child care, the status of the CCED as a necessary tax measure would merit further attention.

So long as a universal child care system remains a proposal rather than a reality, a commitment to work-family balance for all citizens would be supported by retaining a system of tax relief for child care services purchased for paid work-related reasons. Regardless of whether one views s. 63 as a child care subsidy or a tax measure to promote horizontal equity, the CCED delivers important financial assistance to some Canadian parents: in its absence, roughly 663,000 families with 1.1 million children would have less disposable income to purchase child care arrangements (Government of Canada 2001b, Basic Table 8). Relative to other federal expenditures, the CCED’s estimated $390 million federal price tag in 2002 represents the most significant financial relief that Ottawa provides specifically for child care.17

Choosing between the two Liberal objectives ultimately rests on a value judgment that has significant class consequences: higher-income earners benefit far more as a result of the present design of the CCED than they would if the deduction were converted into a refundable credit to render it a more equitable subsidy mechanism. But in its annual *Tax Expenditures and Evaluations* publication, the Government of Canada (2001a, Table 1) continues to defer judgment on this matter. The publication lists s. 63 as a ‘Memorandum Item’, indicating that the

17 Other than the CCED, Ottawa allocates approximately $201 million a year through the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) which provincial and territorial governments in turn spend on child care services (Bach and Phillips 1997, 246). Just $18.6 million of the $400 million allocated by the federal government to the Early Childhood Development Initiative Funding has so far been earmarked by the provinces specifically for regulated child care (CRRU 2001). The federal department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIANA) delivers an added $18 million annually for aboriginal child care, while Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) allocates another $40 million to First Nations and Inuit child care and $6 million annually to support research and development projects related to early childhood education (Bach and Phillips 1997, 246). Federal contributions to child care are relatively small compared to provincial expenditures. In 1998, the provinces and territories collectively spent $1.49 billion on regulated child care services through subsidies typically targeted to low-income families and/or children with extra support needs, as well as through direct grants to regulated services to enhance wages and/or subsidize operating costs (CRRU 2000, 104).
tax measure’s status as a public expenditure on child care remains inconclusive. The final report of the 1999 Sub-Committee on Tax Equity for Families with Dependent Children (p. 18) recognizes that this inconclusive status is undesirable and calls on the federal government to re-examine the CCED’s primary policy objective(s) “to ensure that it is meeting [them] in a way which is most efficient and effective for Canadian families with children.” The Chrétien Liberals remain silent on this issue to date.

Conclusion

The previous chapter concluded with the recognition that Canada’s future social citizenship regime will be the product of political choices that are not dictated entirely by institutional and ideological constraints. Schumpeter’s (1991, 108) insight that taxes are a “handle... which social powers can grip to change” the “social structure” suggests that choices about taxation yield a particularly significant influence in shaping citizen-state paradigms in part because of the pervasiveness and visibility of this policy tool. Given that intergovernmental negotiations do not pose a barrier to personal income tax changes at the federal level, federal tax treatment of caregiving and dependency is a policy domain where the national government enjoys added flexibility to make choices that could launch Canada towards a new politics of time by replacing the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits with a revised Caregiver provision. Similarly, although the single rate of tax and enriched Spousal credit recently introduced by the Alberta government are inconsistent with a work-family balance framework, they nonetheless reveal that provincial governments also have a great deal of latitude to make bold changes to provincial income taxes. Thus, just as neoconservatives have dramatically reduced taxes and/or shifted the tax burden away from single-earner couples to restructure Canada’s social citizenship regime, so the success of an alternative work-family balance framework rests with political
actors who must strategically employ the policy 'handle' that taxes make available to reprioritize Canada's collective concern for security, equality and dignified inclusion.
CONCLUSION

WORK-FAMILY BALANCE: A LEGITIMATE CITIZENRY EXPECTATION

Benefits in the form of a service have this further characteristic that the rights of the citizen cannot be precisely defined. The qualitative element is too great. A modicum of legally enforceable rights may be granted, but what matters to the citizen is the superstructure of legitimate expectations...

Expectations officially recognized as legitimate are not claims that must be met in each case when presented. They become, as it were, details in a design for community living.


The question of what entitlements citizens can legitimately expect of the state and what responsibilities the state can reasonably expect of the citizenry have been central to public sphere restructuring over the past two decades. The dramatic budgetary cutbacks to social spending entrenched by more recent commitments to tax reduction and tax rate flattening have powered a qualitative shift in Canada’s commitment to state welfarism. Restructuring has qualified the concept of social rights to services and income assistance by introducing the political and cultural metaphor of a contractual relationship whereby citizens owe the community in return for services and insurance provided as part of the social safety net. The contractual concept has increasingly reoriented public consciousness to link full membership status with the discharge of social obligations. In particular, renewed emphasis is placed on personal responsibility, as citizens are expected to acknowledge a duty to secure self-sufficiency through employment, as well as the duty to take greater care of one’s own.

Part I of the dissertation defended the claim that there was good reason to restructure Canada’s social citizenship regime in the 1980s by drawing on diverse neoconservative and feminist critiques of post-war welfarism. Bold restructuring was also in order given the contextual changes brought about by post-industrial and post-traditional economic and social transitions, as discussed in Part II. The emergent contractual metaphor arguably includes
resources to remedy one problem that results from the post-war tendency to prioritize rights at the expense of duties. A rights-dominated welfare discourse risks fostering a social climate of entitlement in which individuals are inattentive to what Rawls (1971, 4) terms the “identity of interests” that binds society since “social cooperation” makes available to individuals “a better life for all” than any one person could achieve independently. The construction of social citizens primarily as ‘rights-claimers’ positions individuals to demand the benefits of community living without acknowledging the civic practices and virtues required to sustain the collective institutions that make these benefits available. By redirecting attention to what citizens owe their communities, the social contract metaphor has potential counter this risk, heightening citizens’ awareness of the broad webs of interdependence that characterize society.

Rather than capitalize on this potential, however, I have argued that the economic conservative appropriation of the contractual metaphor undermines it. Citizens are asked to resume responsibilities formerly taken on by the welfare state not only to permit the public sphere to operate differently, but ultimately so that it can do considerably less. The ‘good’ citizen is expected to concede the value of a circumscribed state, absolving the community of obligations to its members. One risk inherent in this individualist trend is that citizens who regard themselves as self-sufficient are more inclined to overlook realities about the present structural context. For instance, preoccupation with self-reliance obscures how the neoliberal work-duty is punitive when the demand for labour remains insufficient to generate full-employment despite sustained levels of economic growth between 1995 and 2000. Similarly, the preoccupation overlooks how the expectation that ‘families’ will assume renewed responsibility for services formerly performed by the post-war welfare state discounts the significant rise in female employment and obscures the added costs for diverse groups of women that result from
the persistent patriarchal division of care. Ultimately, neoliberal use of the social contract metaphor misrepresents how self-reliance as a political ideal has very different consequences for citizens depending on their social locations amidst relations of race, class, and sex that distort the distribution of primary social goods necessary for the autonomous pursuit of self-defined goals.

Given concerns about neoconservative restructuring, this dissertation defends the position that an alternative framework for social citizenship premised on the concept of work-family balance can capture the value of re-emphasizing individual responsibility while resisting the economic conservative tendency to dismantle institutions of collective action. Although the proposed alternative is sympathetic to the neoliberal concern with reciprocal duties of citizenship, it is extremely cautious about supporting a policy framework that marginalizes and penalizes the un(der)employed in a post-industrial market that is proving incapable of generating sufficient employment opportunities. So long as this employment shortage remains, a work-family balance framework would instead prioritize assumption of citizenry responsibilities in the context of unpaid care provision. Since women have historically shouldered more than their fair share of this responsibility, the alternative paradigm would focus primary attention on shifting the gender division of care labour in order to redefine cultural expectations of male citizenry roles that would witness men assume a larger proportion of unpaid caregiving.

The proposed work-family balance framework would reorient public attention to male citizenry responsibilities in the domestic sphere within a broader context of renewed state restructuring that explicitly acknowledges the three pillars of social citizenship that are evident in the work of Marshall and Rawls: collective obligations to social security, substantive equality of opportunity and full community membership for all citizens. Building on these three themes, the alternative framework would advance four new policy trajectories. The first two would redefine
cultural understandings of full-time employment. One would institutionalize new employment leave opportunities, including the provision of benefits that specifically target new fathers. The other would reduce the number of hours that full-time workers labour over the year. The third trajectory would launch Canada down the path of universal child care already charted by many European nations. The fourth policy change would transform the tax treatment of dependency and caregiving, replacing the Spousal and Equivalent-to-Spouse credits with a measure that targets tax relief to citizens who provide unpaid socially useful care in the domestic sphere.

In keeping with T.H. Marshall’s (1964, 104) insight that “[e]xpectations officially recognized as legitimate” constitute the qualitative content of social rights and obligations, one argument implicit throughout the previous chapters is that work-family balance (as represented by the four proposed policy trajectories) is, and should be acknowledged as, a legitimate citizenry expectation. I have suggested that the expectation derives its legitimacy from normative, practical, strategic and ideological considerations.

A more robust public commitment to facilitate work-family balance is important for normative reasons because this commitment would contribute to increased social security for citizens, as well as promote substantive equality of opportunity and full inclusion throughout important areas of community life. First, personal security in the contemporary era demands that citizens acquire sufficient levels of human capital to succeed and adapt in the dynamic post-industrial labour force in which knowledge is an increasingly important commodity. Economic conservatives and feminists who work in the tradition of Pateman (1989) support this characterization of security by emphasizing the welfare potential of market participation, particularly for minimizing dependency. The first half of the work-family balance concept captures this shared insight, indicating concern to counter systemic barriers to employment for
some social groups, while also prioritizing education and re-training to offset structural unemployment understood as a mismatch between the skills demanded by employers and those possessed by the un(der)employed.

By contrast, the second half of the work-family balance concept acknowledges that one’s private sphere of intimate relations is also an important source of welfare that state social services cannot replace. Families that function well have the potential to provide their members with emotional and material resources often in a dignified manner that other institutions can rarely match. The early post-war paradigm explicitly capitalized on this reality by institutionalizing distinct citizenship roles for economically and racially privileged women to provide welfare in the domestic sphere. The social and economic costs for women associated with this fragmented and marginalized citizenry role are problematic, as has been discussed throughout the dissertation. But the costs do not mean the work is any less significant for individual security, or that citizens do not have a responsibility and in many cases a genuine desire to care and nurture in domestic contexts in order to foster the autonomy of intimate relations. Both feminists and social conservatives acknowledge citizenry responsibilities and aspirations to care privately, although the two schools of thought diverge over the question of men’s obligations.

This question of male citizenry duties, however, is fundamental to societal commitments to substantive equality of opportunity – the second overarching concern of social citizenship. Equality of opportunity implies not only that individuals will be evaluated strictly on the basis of their qualifications for positions, but also, and more fundamentally, that individuals should have the same chances to acquire the qualifications for desirable positions (Boxill 1991, 334). In this dissertation, I have argued that the latter requirement of equal opportunity is not simply a matter
of the distribution of material resources. The distribution of roles and responsibilities is just as important. Specifically, the persistent hegemony of the female caregiver model constrains the time and opportunities available to women to labour in the paid workforce and acquire the level of human capital with which financial security and occupational advancement is associated. In response, the work-family balance metaphor signals a strategy by which to remedy the present distribution of responsibility for caregiving. The metaphor illuminates the need to render paid work and unpaid care more compatible in order to provide some women new opportunities to pursue success in the labour market, while also facilitating (and demanding) that more men assume greater responsibility for care work so as to restructure the existing gender regime.

Although a work-family balance framework expresses concern to equalize employment-related opportunities between the sexes, it resists a one-dimensional 'workerist' understanding of social inclusion. The latter half of the metaphor heightens public awareness about the value of participation in one's sphere of personal relations and the legitimacy of individual desires to spend more time there. Therefore, under the concept of work-family balance, equality of opportunity implies minimizing social and economic factors that constrain the time that some citizens can afford to spend among intimate relations in addition to mitigating barriers that impede access to the public spaces of market and political arena. This equal opportunity commitment motivates renewed concern for decommodifying social programs that may be especially important to some lower-income and single women for whom financial necessity impedes the fulfilment of their desires to nurture and care at home. Decommodifying measures that render more domestic time affordable will also be important for providing some men the incentive to redefine their present roles as secondary carers.
The intention to equalize domestic opportunities implicit in the work-family balance concept signals a fundamental insight about community membership that has typically been neglected by traditional liberal understandings of citizenship that prioritize inclusion in public domains. The latter half of the work-family balance metaphor suggests that our understanding of full community membership is impoverished if it takes the private sphere for granted or views it only in instrumentalist terms. Following feminists who contribute to the literature associated with Collins (1990, 1994), the alternative framework urges the state to regard the private sphere of spousal, family and friendship relationships as a vital site of citizenry activity that can protect individuals from isolation, foster and redefine personal identity, validate one’s sense of self worth, provide a reprieve from discriminatory social forces, and empower individuals and the diverse communities in which they belong. In response to this recognition, the work-family balance metaphor points to the importance of building a social policy blueprint that integrates the need for private unpaid time into broader institutional planning.

Although it elevates participation in the domestic sphere to the same status as inclusion in the market and political arena, the work-family balance concept fully acknowledges insights that link paid work with dignified social inclusion advanced by economic conservatives and feminists who work in the tradition of Pateman (1989). Under neoliberalism, performance of paid work emerged as the primary social duty in return for which one earns entitlement to social security. But significantly higher rates of unemployment over the past twenty-five years compared to the first post-war decades indicate that the post-industrial transition has eroded the context in which individuals seeking paid work can claim sufficient time in the labour market as a ‘right’ of citizenship. In response, a work-family balance framework acknowledges that the distribution of paid and unpaid time is a matter of distributive justice that is importantly influenced by state
regulations governing employment standards and industrial relations, monetary and taxation policies, and social spending. The framework therefore prioritizes public policy changes to redefine cultural constructs of full-time employment. Restructuring the existing gender order is the primary goal of this policy trajectory because it would render paid work and unpaid caregiving more compatible. However, a further implication of the policy shift is a modest potential to redistribute paid work time between the employed and un(der)employed in order to foster increased opportunities for genuine social inclusion among the latter.

Since enhanced public commitments to work-family balance would contribute importantly to promoting security, substantive equality and full membership across important areas of social life, citizens have solid normative grounds on which to demand that the public sphere reorganize itself to better accommodate this balancing act. In addition to questions of distributive justice, there are also significant practical factors that motivate this state restructuring. The post-industrial transition has meant declining real male wages, as well as income and jobs polarization (see chapter five). These structural shifts intersected ideological changes that powered the post-traditional transition, one result of which is dramatically higher rates of female labour force participation. Together, the two broad socio-economic transitions mean that most families can no longer financially afford, nor necessarily desire, to have one partner remain home to specialize in unpaid domestic work. This option is even more remote for most of the rising number of single parent families. The resultant shift within households away from unpaid domestic time in favour of increased paid time means that families increasingly encounter a ‘time crunch’. As households adapt their planning strategies to resist the financial squeeze that became more common for many Canadians during most of the 1990s, one significant opportunity cost is lost leisure and less time with partners, children, friends and the
broader community. Lost unpaid time disrupts collective time rhythms and augments stress. Single mothers and married mothers who work full-time are particularly prone to higher levels of stress and the related health ailments.

A work-family balance framework for social citizenship would partially address the growing time crunch that many citizens endure on two fronts. First, the stress encountered by parents who struggle to find suitable care arrangements for children while on the job would be minimized by instituting quality child care programs that are affordable for all families. Second, the framework would institutionalize new opportunities for unpaid time that are affordable by implementing new and enriched subsidized employment leave benefits, as well as encourage citizens to share in future productivity grains in the form time away from paid work.

Work-family balance is also a legitimate expectation for strategic reasons in so far as the concept includes resources to address simultaneously multiple social problems. First, as already discussed, redefining cultural constructs of full-time employment is expected to generate modest employment gains. Second, the same policy measures have the capacity to mitigate earnings polarization. Research indicates that policies which target wage levels alone will prove insufficient to stabilize the earnings of those in the bottom income deciles since a shortage of paid hours accounts significantly for their falling income. The work-family balance framework would address this finding by reducing the existing incentives that disincline companies from hiring additional workers or redistributing job tasks between a larger number of employees, all as part of the broader goal to render unpaid work and paid employment more compatible. Third, enriched child care and parental leave entitlements have some potential to mitigate poverty among families with young children, which has grown more common over the past two decades in part because of declining real male wages. Both public benefits would respond to citizens’
financial pressures during life course periods when private expenses are particularly high and income is often relatively low. Child care facilitates continued labour force participation and reduces the cost of alternative care arrangements, while enriched parental leave would enable more parents (including fathers) to remain home with young children to avoid that substantial expense of non-parental care.

Existing ideological factors also render it legitimate for citizens to demand policies that facilitate more work-family balance in the present socio-economic context. Most importantly, the now dominant neoliberal discourse already integrates the individual responsibility model of the family that ideologically presumes that single citizens should be capable of shouldering both the earning and caregiving roles. This assumption underpins the economic conservative interest in extending work duties to mothers to minimize social assistance caseloads while simultaneously reducing government commitments to care-related social services. A work-family balance framework for social citizenship would retain the idea that the social citizen is one who can balance adequate participation in private and public spaces, but reverse the policy course that witnessed neoliberals privatize many welfare services to the domestic and voluntary sector.

In addition, the convergence of some feminist and neoconservative insights about social security, social inclusion and the dialogical character of agency lends further legitimacy to the demand for work-family balance. Since the two heterogeneous schools of thought represent dominant ideological forces of the past two decades, points of convergence suggest policy objectives for which there is potential to generate broad public approval. Broad approval is important because a level of social consensus adds pressure on political actors to officially recognize legitimate expectations and institutionalize them as ‘designs for community living’.
While select points of convergence indicate some potential to foster a considerable degree of social consensus in favour of the four policy trajectories defended in Part III, the existing intellectual divide between feminists and neoconservatives renders it difficult to capitalize on this potential. A lack of genuine dialogue between the two schools inclines researchers from both camps to caricature one another rather than develop charitable interpretations of their respective positions. In the absence of charitable interpretations, one risks overlooking the nuance and complexity of the analyses developed by the two distinct sets of perspectives, obfuscating where their diverse concerns and theoretical assumptions intersect. By focussing attention on insights shared by different groups of feminists and neoconservatives, this dissertation reveals new theoretical ground on which future research may build analytical bridges between the two schools of thought. Such bridges may ultimately enable political actors to illuminate areas of commonality between divergent social constituencies with the intention of brokering the political compromises necessary to develop an alternative framework for social citizenship that is capable of challenging the existing neoconservative regime.
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